CHALLENGES TO THE EUROPEAN PROJECT: THE ROLE OF COLLECTIVE
NATIONAL IDENTITY AND THE “OTHER” IN SHAPING EUROPEAN SOLIDARITY
By
Colleen Wilson-Rood

A DISSERTATION

Submitted to
Michigan State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of
Sociology-Doctor of Philosophy
2013

ABSTRACT
CHALLENGES TO THE EUROPEAN PROJECT:
THE ROLE OF COLLECTIVE NATIONAL IDENTITY AND THE ‘OTHER’ IN SHAPING
EUROPEAN SOLIDARITY
By
Colleen Wilson-Rood

Since the end of WWII individual European nation-state elites have worked together on
the European Project, currently known as the European Union. The European Project was a
reaction to war’s aftermath and the rapidly changing global political post-war economy, the
beginning of the Cold War, and the trend toward decolonization. Although the European Project
began as a strictly economic partnership, by the 1990s the need for political- and social-based
programs to re-build European solidarity and identity was eventually recognized by the political
elite. A collective identity was deemed vital to invigorate and sustain the legitimacy and
usefulness of state institutions; EU institutional leaders recognized the criticality of creating
solidarity and a collective identity among European citizens and members in order to legitimate
and perpetuate EU institutions. Lack of solidarity on the “ground level” among citizens is now
among a variety of challenges facing the European Project.
Notwithstanding the continual growth of the EU through enlargement, the rising viability
of the euro, and the seeming ease with which social and political progress and cooperation has
been accomplished through the 1990s, challenges to the EU have emerged as threats to the
viability of institutions as well as to collective solidarity and identity among citizens. These
challenges revolve around member state identity and loyalty built centuries before through
colonization, imperialism and war experiences that solidified citizens’ loyalty and trust in
Member State institutions. The main challenge focused on here is “the gap” reflected in a

“democratic deficit” between Brussels and EU citizens characterized by low levels of trust and
participation in EU institutions. Additionally, European nationalism, the Eurozone crisis and the
increasingly questionable economic viability of the EU that has emerged in the past few years
has also fueled perceived threats to Member State identity that maintains “the gap” between
citizens and institutional agendas and goals.
This dissertation examines the “top-down” institutional need to construct solidarity and
loyalty among EU citizens as well as the “bottom-up” reaction from citizens in regard to their
trust in and support for the EU. Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) of European Commission
White Papers illustrate the role of institutional power in attempts to create and shape European
identity as a way of legitimizing the EU not only to its citizens but also in the international arena.
Eurobarometer data are analyzed to explain citizens’ perceptions of and attitudes toward the EU.
Patterns of response among younger cohorts, those experiencing financial difficulty and in
occupational categories of “housepersons” and the unemployed are most likely to reveal a
“populist” perspective that is less likely to feel European, less likely to support the EU and more
likely to be critical of presence of the Other. Also, trends among older Europeans and those
who tend to benefit from the European Project, such as managers and students, reflect a
“cosmopolitan” perspective in which there is more attachment to European identity, support for
the EU and less critical perspectives of the Other in European society.

Copyright by
COLLEEN WILSON-ROOD
2013

DEDICATION
To Grandma and Grandpa Wilson, Aunt Char and Abe.

v

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

There are many people I would like to acknowledge for their participation and enduring
support throughout this seemingly lifelong endeavor. I would like to not just acknowledge but
also thank whole heartedly my advisor, Dr. Brendan Mullan, for his constant guidance,
encouragement and patience. I would also like to acknowledge my committee members: Dr.
Leslie Moch, Dr. Stephanie Nawyn and Dr. Carl Taylor for their support, input and direction. I
would like to extend gratitude to Dr. Jan Bokemeier for her persistent encouragement and for
opening up so many opportunities to me during my time at Michigan State University. Most
importantly, I would like to thank my husband Matt as well as my parents, Dick and Sally
Wilson, for their unconditional love and support. Additionally, I would like to thank the rest of
my family: Amy, Kelly, Jeff, Kalie, Spencer, Sebastian, Nicholas, Ryan and Sandra for all of
their love, encouragement and patience during this process that seemed endless. Finally, I must
acknowledge my colleagues and friends who offered assistance, encouragement and the needed
boost to get me through to the end: Cedric Taylor, Donna Giuliani, Brigitte Bechtold, Angie
Cooper, Tim Gleason and Jo Jo Pisoni. This is a lifelong goal that I could not have achieved by
myself; it was truly a group effort so I thank you all from the bottom of my heart.

vi

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES……………………………………………………………………………….x
LIST OF FIGURES……………………………………………………………………………..xii
KEY TO ABBREVIATIONS…………………………………………………………………..xiii
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION………………………………………………………………...1
NATION-STATES IN THE ERA OF POST WWII GLOBALIZATION…….………....1
The “Development Project” and Economic Prescriptions for Integration…...….2
Normative Power and Neo-Liberal Ideology……………………………………..6
ADAPTING TO CHALLENGES FACING THE NATION-STATE:
EXAMINING THE EUROPEAN PROJECT……………………………………...……..9
Challenges Facing the European Project……………………………………......12
FOCI OF THE DISSERTATION.……………………………………………………….14
DISSERTATION STRUCTURE AND CHAPTER SUMMARIES.……………………19
CHAPTER 2: THEORY AND LITERATURE REVIEW………………………………………24
POWER………………………………………………………………………………….24
Lukes’ s Dimensional Theory of Power………………………………………….24
Hard Power and Soft Power……………………………………………………..25
Foucault’s “Power-Truth-Knowledge”: Discourse and Representation………..28
Hegemonic Power………………………………………………………………..31
STATES, NATIONS, AND THE NATION-STATE IN THE CURRENT ERA OF
GLOBALIZATION……………………………………………………..………………35
The State………………………………………………………………………...39
The Social Contract……………………………………………………………..42
The Nation………………………………………………………………………43
Citizenship………………………………………………………………………45
The Threat of Globalization and Challenges to the Nation-State..……………..48
THE EUROPEAN PROJECT..…………………………………….…………………...50
The History of the Post WWII “European Project:” A Brief Summary…...……53
CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY………………………………………………..59
A TWO-FOLD APPROACH TO EXAMINING THE EUROPEAN PROJECT………59
Connecting Theory to Research Methodology………………………………….61
The “Top Down” Perspective: Critical Discourse Analysis
and Grounded Theory Approaches……………………………………………..63
Grounded Theory and Methods for Coding EC White Papers…………………67
European Commission White Papers: Using NVivo for CDA………………….70
“Bottom-Up” Perspectives of the European Project and Identity:
Eurobarometer Survey Data…………………………………………………….72

vii

CHAPTER 4: CRITICAL DISCOURSE ANALYSIS OF EUROPEAN “TOP-DOWN
PERSPECTIVES AND INITAITIVES ………………………………………………………...76
EUROPEAN COMMISSION WHITE PAPER ANALYSIS.………………………….78
European Project Discourse: Using CDA to Examine EC White Papers………80
EC White Paper Analysis: NVivo and Coding Approaches…………………….81
EC White Paper Coding Summary……………………………………………..84
WHAT THE EC WHITE PAPERS REVEAL ABOUT THE EP…..………………….84
Official Titles of the EP………………………………………………………...84
Detailed Discussion of EC White Paper Analysis……………………………...85
1985 White Paper Discursive Themes ……………………..…………………..86
The 1990s White Papers:
Social policy and strengthening the labor market………..……………………..90
Advancing the European Social Model:
White Papers from 2000-2007………………………………………………….98
DISCUSSION OF CDA ANALYSIS…..……………………………………………..109
CHAPTER 5: BOTTOM-UP REACTIONS TO THE EP; FROM PERMISSIVE CONSENSUS
TO “THE GAP”……………………………………………………………………………….112
DESCRIBING “THE GAP”…………………………………………………………..113
EU Authority in Citizen’s Lives:
Centralization and Globalization Shaping “the Gap”…………………………117
Nationalism, Member State Identity
and the Other’s Roles in Shaping “the Gap”…………………………………..119
EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVES ILLUSTRATED BY EUROBAROMETER DATA..122
Summary of Demographic Variables………………………………………….124
Sex……………………………………………………………………..124
Age…………………………………………………………………….125
Respondent Occupation (Scale)……………………………………….126
Type of community…………………………………………………….126
Difficulty Paying Bills…………………………………………………127
Data Analysis According to Three Main Themes……………………………..127
Discussion of Results………………………………………………………….128
Examining “the Gap” and Aspects of Identity:
Sense of Belonging, Perceptions of the Other and Attitudes toward
Globalization……………………………………………….……………..….131
Examining “the Gap” and Views of State Institutions:
Public Authority’s Impact, Trust in Institutions and the EU’s Role in
Globalization………………………………………………………………….139
Examining “the Gap” and Support for the European Project:
Views of Membership, the Euro and EU Enlargement………………………..141
Final Notes about the Eurobarometer Data Analysis…………………………143
CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION………………………………………………………………..146
Summary of the EC White Paper Analysis and Findings……………………………………..147
Summary of the Main Eurobrometer Analysis and Findings…………………………………150
The Unfolding Eurozone Crisis: Implications for Future Research………………………….154
viii

APPENDICES.……………………………………………………………………………….157
APPENDIX A: List of EC White Papers ………………………………………………….…158
APPENDIX B: Summary of Discursive Themes in EC White Papers ...…………………….159
APPENDIX C: Eurobarometer Analysis Tables……………………………………………..162
REFERENCES...…………………………………………..……..…………………………..170

ix

LIST OF TABLES
Table 4.1.: “1985 Completing the Internal Market” White Paper Main Codes Summary…… 87
Table 4.2: “Harmonization” Main Code Free Nodes by % of Text Coverage………………...87
Table 4.3.: “1994 European Social Policy” White Paper Main Codes Summary…………….91
Table 4.4: “1994 Member State vs. Commission” White Paper Free Nodes by Percentage
of Text Coverage………………………………………………………………………………91
Table 4.5.: “1995 Preparation of C and E Countries” White Paper Main Codes Summary….93
Table 4.6.: “1995 Prep of C and E Countries” “Free Movement” Main Code Free Nodes
by % of Text Coverage………………………………………………………………..………94
Table 4.7.: “1995 Education and Training” White Paper Main Codes Summary…..……….95
Table 4.8.: “1995 Education and Training” White Paper “EU Level Policy_Systems”
Main Code Free Nodes by Percentage of Text Coverage…..…………………………………95
Table 4.9.: “2000 Reforming the Commission” White Paper Main Codes Summary………..98
Table 4.10.: “2000 Commission Reform” White Paper “Commission Reform”
Main Code Free Nodes by Percentage of Text Coverage…………………………………......99
Table 4.11.: “2001 European Governance” White Paper Main Codes Summary…………...100
Table 4.12.: “2001 European Governance” White Paper “EU Gov’t. Reform”
Main Code Free Nodes by Percentage of Text Coverage………..…………………………..101
Table 4.13.: “2001 New Impetus for a European Youth” White Paper
Main Codes Summary……………………………………………………………………….103
Table 4.14. “2001 New Impetus for a European Youth” White Paper “Youth Participation”
Main Code Free Nodes by Percentage of Text Coverage……………………………………103
Table 4.15.: “2004 Services of General Interest” White Paper Main Codes Summary……..105
Table 4.16. “2004 Services of General Interest” White Paper “Services of General Interest
Definition and Description” Main Code Free Nodes by Percentage of Text Coverage……..105
Table 4.17.: “2006 Communication Policy” White Paper Main Codes Summary………….106
Table 4.18. “2006 Communication Policy” White Paper “Partnerships for Communication”
Main Code Free Nodes by Percentage of Text Coverage……………………………………107
x

Table 4.19.: “2007 Together for Health” White Paper Main Codes Summary………………108
Table 4.20. “2007 Together for Health” White Paper “Partnerships in Health Strategies” Main
Code Free Nodes by Percentage of Text Coverage…………………………………………...108
Table A.1. Discursive Theme Summary Table by Year, Title and Main Theme Signifier and
Description…………………………………………………………………………………….159
Table 5.1. European Sense of Belonging…………………………………………………...162
Table 5.2. Perceptions of Immigrants and Minorities in European Society………………….163
Table 5.3. Globalization: Perceived Threat or Opportunity?....................................................164
Table 5.4. Perceptions of Which Public Authority
Has the Most Impact on Living Conditions…………………………………………………165
Table 5.5. Trust in EU and National Institutions……………………………………………166
Table 5.6. Perceptions of European Union Membership……………………………………167
Table 5.7. European Support for the Euro and Future Enlargement…………………………168
Table 5.8. European Union's Perceived Role in Globalization's Impact on Citizens………...169

xi

LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 2.1: Escobar’s Model of Development Discourse………………………………………..30
Figure 4.1: Discursive Theme Summary Table by EC White Paper
Year, Title and Main Theme Signifier with Description……………………………...…………84

xii

KEY TO ABBREVIATIONS

TNC Transnational Corporation
WB

World Bank

IMF

International Monetary Fund

WTO World Trade Organization
EEC

European Economic Community

EP

European Project

EU

European Union

SEA

Single European Act

CDA Critical Discourse Analysis
UN

United Nations

ECSC European Coal and Steel Community
ERDF European Regional Development Fund
EC

European Commission

DT

Discursive Themes

DS

Discursive Signifiers

xiii

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
NATION-STATES IN THE ERA OF POST WWII GLOBALIZATION
The modern state system, characterized by the nation-state as the predominant political
structure in a global capitalist economy, is a relatively recent phenomenon. Before World War II
the modern state system consisted of a comparatively few states and a multitude of colonies that
fell under their jurisdiction. After World War II newly liberated colonies and nations began the
task of nation-building, pressured to mirror political and economic structures of former colonial
powers under the guise of “development” (McMichael 2010; Rist 1997).
“States” constitute an organized infrastructure of power and authority in societies where
institutions such as governments, military, legal judicial systems and public safety reflect the
official roles of power, including legitimate violence, representation, and decision making
capabilities (Robbins 2008; McLaren 2006; VanHam 2001; Giebernau 1999; Holton 1998).
“Nations” are communities bound by shared culture, history and/or ethnic identity that comprise
a collective national identity as the basis for social solidarity (Robbins 2008; Giebernau 1999;
Holton 1998).
The political structure of nation-states reflects a social contract between citizens and the
state where reciprocal rights and obligations are recognized and upheld. For instance, the state
has the right to institutionalize mores as well as the obligation to protect citizens and ensure the
rights they are afforded by the social contract. Members of the nation-state, or citizens, enjoy
state protection of rights from outside threats but are also obligated to follow the mores of the
state such as paying taxes and obeying the law. Often, the cultural and/or ethnic identity of the
nation—the collective identity—provides solidarity among citizens while also ensuring loyalty to

1

state institutional power. The collective identity of the nation helps to provide states with
legitimate power in the eyes of the nation and political legitimacy in the global state system.
Relationships between nations, states, and nation-states are being challenged and
questioned as never before in the current age of “globalization” and global “connectedness”
(Graham 2006; Wallerstein 2005; Castles and Miller 2003; Ohmae 2000; Guibernau 1999;
Strange 1997, 2000; Sassen 1996; Huntington 1993). The form, function, and very existence of
nation-states is being challenged, if not threatened, by transnational flows and counter-flows of
people, capital, information, trade, and technology. Additional challenges and “threats” to
nation-states include the emergence of transnational institutions such as transnational
corporations (TNCs), financial institutions such as the World Bank (WB) and International
Monetary Fund (IMF) as well as regulatory institutions such as the World Trade Organization
(WTO). In short, the emergence, content, and institution-creating consequences of globalization
arguably threaten the sovereignty of nation-states while also muting national identity and
nationalism (Eitzen and Baca Zinn 2009; Strange 1997, 2000; Ohmae 2000; Guibernau 1999;
Holton 1998).
The “Development Project” and Economic Prescriptions for Integration
The new global stratification system of power, participation and representation has been
shaped by the post-1945, “development project” (McMichael 2008; McClosky 2003; McCann
2003; Rist 1997). This “development project,” initiated through the creation and implementation
of institutions and regulatory standards, focused on rebuilding war-torn nations and, latterly,
integrating newly liberated colonies into a global political economy. Post-WWII development
initially focused on national projects where nation-state governments played an important role of
middleman between citizens and international institutions participating in globalization

2

processes, in addition to their traditional role as the protector of member (citizen) rights (Robbins
2008; Feldman 2005). After 1945, theorists and policy makers focused on a particular path for
development, which included planned social and economic change with the predominant focus
of integrating national economies into a global political economy where the benefits of
modernization via application of science and technology coupled with expansion of free markets
would be key to ideals of peace, prosperity and progress for newly liberated and developing
nations.
In the beginning, the road to development and global integration was not supported by
consensus based ideology. Politicians, academics and economists did not provide a uniform
front for which direction would be best for developed and developing societies in the aftermath
of decolonization and the emerging Cold War. Modernization theory proposed a paternalistic
linear path of development in which backward, traditional, underdeveloped societies should
abandon cultural values and norms that prevented the adaptation of modern scientific,
technological, and industrialized methods of economic growth, which were viewed as greatly
successful in “advanced” industrialized, developed nations (Nederveen Pieterse 2001; Peet and
Hartwick 1999; Martinussen 1997).
Keynesian theory proposed interventionist tactics where states played a role in regulating
interest rates and planning strategies for maintaining minimum standards of living to boost
consumer confidence, economic growth and free market participation (Peet and Hartwick 1999;
Harvey 2005). Although policymakers initially looked to these theories to cope with the rapid
transformations occurring after the war, a new ideology referred to as “neo-liberalism” would
begin to take hold in the late 1960s, shaping the “development project” and globalization as we
know it today (McMichael, 2010).

3

“The development project” focused on structural development in former colonies and
“underdeveloped” nations via national development projects. The restructuring of states in the
post WWII era was intended to prevent a resurgence of conflict between states and the
conditions that threatened capitalism in the 1930s (Harvey 2005: p.9). However the ascendency
of neo-liberal ideology to eventually comprise the core of global economics demanded a shift in
the role of states where protection of transnational corporate class was paramount. “Neoliberalism” is an economic and social ideology formulated most notably by Friedrich von Hayek,
Ludwig von Mises, Milton Friedman and other founders of the Mont Pelerin Society (Peet and
Hartwick1999; Harvey 2005). They referred to themselves as “liberals” because of their
purported core focus on “personal freedoms” and individualism, mainly freedom to participation
in free markets without regulation (Harvey 2005). Describing the implementation of neo-liberal
policy by the Thatcher administration in 1979, replacing the social democratic state in Britain,
David Harvey states (2005: 23):
This entailed confronting trade union power, attacking all forms of social
solidarity that hindered competitive flexibility … , dismantling or rolling back the
commitments of the welfare state, the privatization of public enterprises, reducing
taxes, encouraging entrepreneurial initiative, and creating a favourable business
climate to induce a strong inflow of foreign investment. There was, she famously
declared, ‘no such thing as a society, only individual men and women’…
In short, the tenet of neoliberalism was “no holds barred” capitalism with little or no regulation
of markets, full privatization and the dismantling of state welfare programs (Eitzen and Baca
Zinn 2009; Harvey 2005). This ideology became the dominant prescription for developing
nations around the world under the command of developed nations and the institutions they set
up to maintain their place at the top of the global hierarchy.
Protecting the interests of neo-liberal ideology and its benefactors required manufactured
consent among those who did not benefit, or were likely harmed by the everyday effects of neo4

liberalism. Individuals aligned themselves with policy and political representatives who were
advocating economic policy in direct opposition to their class interests. The “Washington
Consensus”, or powerful proponents of neo-liberalism in the Reagan/Thatcher cohorts, was able
to correlate fundamentally coveted cultural values, such as individual freedoms and equity, with
access to the market, deregulation, lack of government intervention and competition to garner
support for economic strategies that benefited relatively few in society (Harvey 2005; Sklair
2002). Beginning in the late 1960s, a context of economic crisis, social movements and political
momentum regarding individual freedoms set the stage for a shift in political ideology. The
power over discourse employed by the “Washington Consensus” and neo-liberal advocates
marked a planned shift in economic ideology where neo-liberalism became normative and taken
for granted. This led to a shift in the direction of development, including the role of the state.
By the 1970s and 1980s nation-states’ sovereignty and their relative position of power in
the global economy was increasingly based on adherence to the neo-liberal ideology, also known
as the “Washington Consensus”, which became normative within the dominant culture of global
capitalism (McMichael 2010; Robbins 2008; Harvey 2005). During the 1950s and 1960s states,
specifically core developed nations, prescribed to Keynesian economic ideology and “embedded
liberalism” where states actively took part in regulation and intervention in industry as a way of
balancing class interests in state institutions and functions (Harvey 2005). By the 1960s,
however, embedded liberalism was faltering and calls for an alternative were growing stronger.
What emerged as the dominant normative political and economic ideology was the “Washington
Consensus” residual from Reagan and Thatcher’s “magic of the market place” years that created
a context where values of privatization, dismantling of welfare state programs and maximum deregulation became normative through the regulatory power of the WTO, IMF and WB, by such

5

means as structural adjustment programs, which ultimately compromised nation-state sovereign
power.
As neo-liberalism became normative, the role of the state was altered. The “neo-liberal
state” was one that ideally favored the interests of private property owners, business,
multinational corporations and financial capital (Harvey 2005: 7). Values of “freedom” and
“individualism” were attached to concepts of access to the marketplace, competition as a virtue
and the demonization of states as impediments to their individual freedoms. This approach to
creating common sense through the use of such widespread and coveted values made neoliberalism something deemed necessary or, more importantly, “normal” (Harvey 2005).
Normative Power and Neo-Liberal Ideology
The “development project” focused on structural development in former colonies and
“underdeveloped” nations via national development projects. The restructuring of states in the
post-WWII era was intended to prevent a resurgence of conflict between states and the
conditions that threatened capitalism in the 1930s (Harvey 2005: p.9). The ascendency of the
neo-liberal ideology eventually comprised the core of global economics, however, and demanded
a shift in the role of states to one where protection of the transnational corporate class was
paramount. Individuals aligned themselves to policy and political representatives who were
advocating economic policy in direct opposition to their class interests. The “Washington
Consensus” was able to correlate the coveted cultural values of individual freedom and equity,
with access to the market, deregulation, lack of government intervention and competition, thus
garnering support for economic strategies that benefited relatively few in society (Sklair 2002;
Harvey 2005). Beginning in the late 1960s, a context of economic crisis, social movements and
political momentum regarding individual freedoms set the stage for a shift in political ideology.

6

Although nation-states have remained the predominant political structure since WWII,
shifts in economic ideology as well as increased patterns of migration, technical compression of
time and space, and the emergence of supranational institutional power are forcing nation-states
to transform, react and/or adapt to the changes and challenges that accompany globalization.
Furthermore, international migration in the current context of globalization and the consequences
of nation-building became critical to comprehending global issues related to transnationalism.
Historical processes shaping the current global political economy including the
establishment of the Bretton Woods institutions, the emergence of the “age of development” via
“the development project” and the rise and predominance of neo-liberalism all help to explain
trends and flows of migrants across borders and the impacts of migrant departure and
transnational networks on the sending nation and/or community. Understanding the global
political economy helps identify the reasons why people migrate as well as the policies and
procedures that facilitate their migration. Historical processes are also important to identify and
examine current relationships between host and migrant populations. These relationships include
the degree to which migrant communities are incorporated, assimilated, and/or distinct from the
host population.
Equally important to the discussion of social transformation is the technological and
information communication innovation that accompanied globalization. Technology has
influenced economic processes and led to easing of trade, investment and flows of finance and
capital (Guillén 2001; Giddens 2000; IMF 2000; Martinez 1998). Martinez (1998) calls
technological innovations that facilitate the constant expansion of markets and flows of capital
“megatechnologies.” In this case, technology is a tool of capitalist exploitation and expansion.
As he puts it (1998: 3):

7

In the language of world systems theory, the scenario I see is one where core nations use
information technology to “manage” the extraction of raw resources from developing
nations, the manufacture of commodities in semi-core nations and, as much as possible,
the dynamics of currency markets on a global level.
Technology can also been viewed as the key to structural adjustment programs in that it
promotes key components of foreign direct investment and production (Streeten 1987).
Just as it facilitates economic processes of globalization, technology drives the
compression and “distanciation” of space and time where the world is becoming a smaller place,
making people, markets and states more closely connected than they have ever been (Guillén,
2001; Giddens, 2000). Innovations like the Internet, cell phones and instant messaging invade the
nuances of micro level interaction, behaviors and practices while also making travel and
communication less expensive, increasingly connecting people who were previously distant and
facilitating processes such as transnationalism.
Finally, challenges to the nation-state posed by the emergence of supranational
institutional power are at the core of debates surrounding the viability of state sovereignty.
Many of the criticisms of conceptualizing globalization in economic terms include the notion
that the social, cultural, and political consequences of economic policy are crucial to a holistic
understanding of globalization. The “globalization from above” perspective—in which decision
making is centralized in the hands of few and the benefits “trickle down” to the individuals most
in need—proposes economic globalization as a major factor in the convergence of national
economies. The Bretton Woods institutions, the World Bank and the International Monetary
Fund, were established to restructure and regulate the new global order emerging after World
War II. Subsequently additional components of the “globalization project” have provided a
framework from which international standards and regulatory powers, such as those found in the
World Trade Organization, can challenge or trump the sovereign power of nation-states
8

(McMichael 2010). Certainly the results of globalization as inherently positive have been
contested yet these ideologies remain justification for the continual implementation of neoliberal policy under the rubric of globalization via development policy and programs.
To further examine and understand how nation-states are transformed by current patterns
and processes of globalization, we must view the association between the state and the nation in
terms of a social contract where states and citizens have a recognized reciprocal relationship
involving mutual rights and obligations. Here, citizenship and collective national identity are
markers of membership to the state, engaging citizens in the social contract, which affords access
to rights and obligations while also justifying the civil hegemony based in the state. The
legitimacy of the state, including its institutions and ideologies, relies upon a solitary demos or
citizenry with a collective identity that ensures loyalty and adherence to state hegemony (Bruter
2005; Guibernau 1999). It is here that issues of nation building and the “creation of the nationstate” arise as a means of understanding the ideally reciprocal, overlapping, co-dependent
loyalties of the state, nation and their citizenry. National identity, as collective identity, is
directly connected to notions of political identity and to a sense of belonging that is based on
shared culture, history, and/or ethnicity (Adamson and Demetriou 2007; Dobson 2006).
Citizenship, as the link between the individual and the institutional, provides a shared identity
that provides a loyal basis from which the state draws power and legitimacy (Robbins 2008;
Dobson 2006; Dell’Olio 2005; Bruter 2005; Castles 2000).
ADAPTING TO CHALLENGES FACING THE NATION-STATE:
EXAMINING THE EUROPEAN PROJECT
Much attention has been paid to the adaptive strategies and reactions to the “development
project” and institutional framework of globalization on the part of peripheral or least-developed
nation-states (McMichael 2010; Rist 1997; Escobar 1995). However, the European Project (EP),
9

or the European Union (EU), allows us to observe and explore the transforming dynamic
relationship between nation-states and the international system couched in the framework of
current globalization (Hopper 2006; Guibernau 1999). With continued integration and
enlargements efforts, Europe has emerged as a supranational state-bloc with shifting roles,
responsibilities and rights of the member states and their citizens.
Europe’s attempts to build a singular democratic society, the “European Project”, began
at the end of World War II with the harmonization of economic institutions, specifically coal and
steel trade policy and standards, across the sovereign boundaries of the original six member
states—Italy, France, Germany, Belgium, Luxumburg and the Netherlands. Initiated with the
1951 European Coal and Steel Treaty and solidified in 1957 with the Treaty of Rome, the
European Economic Community (EEC) was established to promote the economic strategies and
cooperation of its initial six member states. The Merger Treaty of 1965 which established the
institutional framework of the EP—the European Commission and the Council of Europe—
stipulated the political mechanisms through which the ECC would operate.
The 1960s were characterized by the beginnings of free trade and European
standardization with policies such as the common agricultural policy that assisted with the initial
integration of member states into what would be the internal market. The early 1970s witnessed
the first of many enlargement efforts—Denmark, Britain and Ireland joined what would become
known as the European Union (EU). Further steps toward economic integration including
introductory ideas for an exchange rate mechanism and a common currency, were presented in
1972. In 1974 the European Economic Development Fund was established by EU leaders to
assist poorer countries with infrastructure needs.

10

The Single European Act (SEA) of 1987 accelerated economic integration by
establishing goals for a single market. The political component of the European Project
culminated in the 1992 Treaty on the European Union when the Maastricht Treaty formally
changed the ECC acronym to the “European Community” while beginning the institutionalizing
of European citizenship and a single currency. Goals for political integration were added to the
existing “conventional” economic agendas of the European Project. The Treaties of Amsterdam
(1999) and Nice (2003) accelerated enlargement of the EU to 27 member states by 2007. EU
institutions, such as the European Commission and the European Council, focused on advancing
the EP through the establishment of integration efforts such as education programs (Comenius,
Erasmus, Grundtvig and Leonardo Programmes1) most of which include language objectives and
information dispensing/knowledge creating civic programs (“Europe for Citizens”; “Culture
Program” and “Youth in Action”2) that targeted European youth. The Citizenship Initiative also
promotes “active citizenship” in EU processes, decision- and policy-making efforts petitionbased initiatives driven from grassroots interests (Europa). Through these programs steps toward
nation-building included creation of a sense of common heritage and culture as well as a
normative concept of Europe as a single nation from which collective identity can and should
exist. Increasingly the establishment of collective identity has taken a more prominent role in

1 These programs

are included in the overarching “Lifelong Learning” theme where each focuses
on specific areas of education. Comenius focuses on school education and Erasmus is aimed at
higher education programs while the Grundtvig and Leonardo da Vinci programs are focused on
adult education and vocational training respectively.
2 “Europe for Citizens” includes two actions aimed at building active citizenship and civil
society in Europe. The “Cultural Programme” includes cultural projects and dispensing
knowledge to build culture in Europe. The “Youth in Action” program acts to build knowledge
and participation among European Youth in political and civic activities.
(http://eacea.ec.europa.eu/about/programmes_delegated_to_eacea_en.php#citizenship)
11

building Europe and creating a sense of common culture and heritage is crucial to creating
national collective identity and solidarity as well as hegemonic power at the institutional level.

Challenges Facing the European Project
Currently, solidarity and collective identity in Europe is challenged by the ongoing
“democratic deficit”, i.e. the gap between institutional efforts to create and gain citizenship
support and loyalty, and knowledge and participation on part of the citizenry. These challenges
to collective identity have stalled the progress of the European Project as well as compounded
the tensions between Member State nations as a whole in light of the post-2008 Eurozone crisis.
Further, collective identity is challenged by issues of immigration and notions of the Other in
reference to ethnic minorities that continue to provide a basis for member state nationalism and
the perceived need for protection from outsiders (“outsiders” having been defined through
member state nation-building during colonization and post WWII decades). European collective
identity is also challenged by the fiscal economic crises that emerged in 2008 and continue to
unfold threatening the viability of the European Project.
The current economic crisis has contributed significantly to recent concerns that
European Member States will be divided rather than united. Not only are the socio-cultural
aspects of European integration being tested but the fundamental economic and political unity is
being challenged (Krugman 2011a; Krugman 2011b; Erlanger 2009; Erlanger and Castle 2009;
Bilefsky 2008). The current economic crisis has brought to the surface underlying issues of the
viability of the euro and the Eurozone (Alderman 2011; Cohen 2010); uneven development
among the member states (Dempsy 2010; Erlanger and Saltmarsh 2010); the tendency of
national governments, especially the more powerful states, to protect their own interests in

12

reaction to the groundswell of resentment from taxpayers (in Germany for instance) that their tax
euros are going to bail out “fiscally irresponsible” member states (such as Ireland, Cyprus, and
Greece) (Erlanger and Saltmarsh 2010; Cohen 2010; Ewing and Castle 2010); and the EU
decision to pursue certain approaches to deal with the crisis all have been criticized for being too
slow and painful a process as each nation’s agendas and concerns related to the crisis are being
heard.
Questions and debates arising from the economic crisis surround the viability of the
Eurozone including the possible scenario that if the euro fails, the European Project will also fail.
At the center of this debate are questions that ask “is the European Project failing because there
is no solitary political authority supporting the euro and the Eurozone?” Also, “if stronger
Member States are not willing to assist those in the Eurozone what is the point of the EU?”
Many speculate that if the euro fails, Europe will fail (Krugman 2011a).
Further, uneven development of Member States has been a long term issue that, in light
of the current economic crisis, raises concerns about differential economic strength including the
possibility that market competition from weaker states may undercut the power of stronger
national markets (Dempsey 2010). Some entrepreneurs feel they are not competing with markets
abroad but rather with markets of Member States also belonging to the EU (Erlanger 2009).
Labor migration from weaker to stronger states is also a major concern for destination states that
already deal with xenophobia and perceived threats of migration populations to the “native”
Member State citizenry (Castle 2010; Erlanger 2009; Bilefsky 2007). The Other in migrant/host
relations has been a long-term issue and seen as contributing to resurgent nationalist movements
in stronger member states such as Germany, France and Austria (Peter 2010; Cerkovnik 2010).

13

Finally, although the Lisbon Treaty of 2009 was passed to make EU decision-making
processes more efficient, questions of its effectiveness have surfaced in light of the economic
crisis. The decision-making process associated with the Irish and Greek bailouts revealed the
tendency of national representatives to take protectionist measures to ensure the interests of their
own populations. Germany and France, in particular, have been criticized by Ireland and Greece
for not being supportive enough in the bailout efforts. Simultaneously, German and French
officials are under tremendous pressure from their citizens, who resent the shift of their tax euros
to perceived “fiscally irresponsible” Member State economies (Krugman 2011a).
FOCI OF THE DISSERTATION
The trajectory of the European Project, including the current economic crisis, reveals the
shifting responsibilities and roles of nations, states, citizens and identities in Europe and in the
global context. The European Project as an adaptive measure in the current era of globalization
is being challenged in ways that are unique yet also reflect challenges to the nation-state as a
political structure. For this dissertation, three main challenges to the European Project will be
explored.
First, feelings of attachment and loyalty to a particular Member State on the part of
political officials and citizens provide a stumbling block to building European integration.
Member State loyalty also breeds apathy toward the role of the EU, muting the hegemonic power
of EU institutions based on participation, consensus and consent of citizens; solidarity based on
collective identity; and, ultimately, loyalty to the EU that provides legitimacy to its institutions
and endeavors. While EU institutions like the European Commission, the Council of Europe and
the European Central Bank play an increasingly dominant role in regard to member state affairs,
nation building at a larger, aggregate European level has been perceived as a threat to individual

14

European Member State identity and sovereignty. This threat has been met, at least in part, with
resistance (Hopper 2006; White 1997; Iivonen 1993;). Additionally, the social contract between
individual member states and citizens has been called into question due to the overriding power
of EU policy—especially in regard to EU legislation at the member state level and the
establishment of an EU citizenship.
Second, perceived institutional attempts to establish or create a European identity to
justify EU institutional power have strengthened loyalties of citizens to their member states
while fueling a resurgence of nationalistic movements, sometimes associated with racist violence
toward those deemed “outsiders” or “Others” to the state (Hopper 2006; White 1997; Iivonen
1993). The Other (outsiders to the nation-state) residual from 19th century nation-building, in
addition to current relations between migrant and host communities based in a history of guest
worker programs (Munz 1995; Munz and Ulrich 1995), show the importance of conceptualizing
collective identity, the changing role of the nation-state due to the challenges of globalization
and how challenges to collective identity at the European level pose challenges to the goal of the
European Project—Europe as a single, integrated, democratic society.
Third, and finally, the economic crisis in Europe that emerged in 2008 has presented
challenges to the social and cultural components of the European Project, specifically collective
identity, while also fueling Member State nationalism and schisms between “core” and
“peripheral” Member States within the EU. For instance, the ways in which Member States are
reacting to the causes of and responses to this crisis show increased tension between stronger and
weaker member states who claim different roles and responsibilities in the crisis. Resentment
between stronger and weaker member states may call into question the approval and trust of EU
institutions, as well as support for integration, by member state governments and European

15

citizens. Where the EU was once praised for promoting the economic growth of Member States,
the economic crisis has allowed old hierarchies and divisions between Member States to reemerge to some extent
Until recently, regardless of the perceived threat the EU poses to its Member States, it has
been agreed that the EU strengthens their members’ role and position by providing protection
from the challenges of globalization (Hopper 2006; VanHam 2001). EU membership is
anchored in member state citizenship, which enhances the role of member states vis-à-vis nonmembers, especially in regard to financial policy, immigration policy and identification of the
Other. Since the economic crisis has called the integration, including fiscal and monetary
responsibilities of Member States, in the EU into question, the issue then becomes to what extent
does a gap between institutional nation building and feelings of “Europeanness” exist and in
what ways does this gap challenge the European Project in terms of support for integration,
enlargement and EU institutional power?
The European Project demonstrates not only how the nation-state is being transformed
due to globalization but how changes in national identity influence EU integration processes
including the relationship between Member States and the EU as a supranational state. The
historical context of Member State identity, stemming from nation building and based on
constructions of the Other, must be explored in order to understand perceived threats of
globalization that challenge member state sovereignty and identity. Threats of fluid borders,
transnational institutions and economic power, in addition to issues of migration and
enlargement, must be understood in order to investigate support for integration and attachment to
European identity as a legitimizing force for the European Project (Dobson 2006; McNeill 2004;
Fuchs and Klingemann 2002; VanHam 2001).

16

The globalizing forces of the last three decades have reshaped concepts of sovereignty
and collective identity. They have also recast the associations and relationships between
citizenship, identity, nationalism and the changing role of the nation-state. This dissertation
poses six hypotheses through which the European Project will be explored and explained as an
adaptive development strategy illustrative of the transforming roles of states, nations and nationstates in the current era of globalization:
o The European Project has morphed from a largely economic project to a
socio-cultural project illustrating the shifting roles and relationships of
nations, states, nation-states, citizens and identities in the current era of
globalization
o Institutional efforts to construct a European collective identity among
citizens illustrates efforts to establish hegemonic power at the institutional
level (including knowledge construction, manufacturing consensus
[“common sense”], encouraging participation, and consent)
o Member State collective identity and nationalism challenges EU
solidarity, integration, hegemony and the overall European Project
o Immigration from weaker member states, immigration from developing
nations (Other nations) and prospects of future enlargement pose a threat
to EU solidarity, integration, hegemony and the overall European Project
o The current economic crisis, particularly concerning the euro, challenges
EU solidarity, integration, hegemony and the overall European Project
o Weak European collective identity, including a sense of attachment, trust
and loyalty, will stall, if not end, progress of the European Project

17

This dissertation uses critical discourse analysis (CDA) and grounded theory approaches to
coding in order to examine the trajectory of the European Project, including attempts to build
hegemonic power at the EU level, through the lens of European Commission White Papers that
reflect official discourse and EU institutional agendas. By examining EU institutional discourse
via European Commission White Papers from 1985-2006, this dissertation will trace the
increasing focus of institutional efforts on establishing building hegemonic power, including a
European collective identity among Member State elites and citizens vital to the European
Project. White papers are useful in illustrating political power within discourse, and the way
agendas are framed through discourse, as they are the instruments from which policy, and in this
case EU treaties, are established. White papers inform policy and, therefore, are useful in
understanding political power and objectives. Using NVivo software I analyze discourse in the
white papers as a way of identifying discourse patterns and coding “frames” that illustrate the
progression of the EU from an economic project to a political project and then increasingly a
socio-cultural project in addition to “top down” institutional efforts to build collective identity as
a way of legitimizing and constructing loyalty to EU institutional power. By examining
institutional discourse pertaining to nation-building and constructing a European culture and
identity, the “civil hegemony” platform of the EU as an elite driven project will appear more
visible. The analysis of the discourse will reveal tactics that will help to assess top-down
institutional efforts and agendas to construct a European identity among EU citizens.
The second part of the dissertation research utilizes Eurobarometer data on attitudes and
opinions of EU citizens. Challenges to institutional efforts to construct European collective
identity can be investigated through “bottom-up” reactions to these endeavors. “Bottom-up
reactions” to nation-building at the EU level are gauged by exploring three themes including

18

identity and sense of belonging; attitudes toward public authority and state institutions; and
perceptions of the Other—ethnic minorities and immigrants—in European society. The
Eurobarometer analysis provides a comparative, ground level perspective of identity and the
challenges facing institutional nation-building on the part of EU institutions and policy makers.
This dissertation addresses four deficits in the literature concerning the nation-state and
its transforming role in the face of globalization processes. First, it re-conceptualizes the shifting
role of nation-states in the global arena including new adaptations to the challenges presented by
globalization. Second, it addresses processes associated with the emergence of the EU as a
supranational state including attempts to establish a supranational European identity and the
ways this is shaping the future role of the nation-state. Third, it confronts and addresses the
limited investigation of non-economic indicators relating to support for integration and EU
enlargement as well as addressing timely issues faced by citizens of the EU on a daily basis.
Finally, assessment of the gap between attempts to construct a European identity and an actual
existing attachment to such identity by citizens allows for inferences regarding the importance of
identity in EU legitimization, and whether this is something that is necessary for the future of EU
development and the project of Europe.
DISSERTATION STRUCTURE AND CHAPTER SUMMARIES
This dissertation includes six chapters, including two chapters presenting data analysis,
results and discussion. Chapter 1 is an introductory chapter justifying the saliency of the topic
and summarizing the content and structure of the dissertation. Chapter 2 sets up the theoretical
and conceptual framework according to which the research is designed and the data analyzed.
Chapter 3 explains the methodological approaches used to address the research questions
presented as a means of understanding the EP, specifically current challenges stemming from a

19

lack of social solidarity and collective identity. The first of two research chapters, Chapter 4
utilizes CDA and grounded theory approaches to coding of European Commission White Papers
as a way of illustrating “top-down” approaches to building the social and political aspects of the
European Project. Chapter 5 is the second chapter to utilize research and data analysis as a way
to explore, describe, and assist in explaining challenges to the EU through a Eurobarometer datadriven examination of attitudes among of EU citizen. Finally, Chapter 6 assesses the
implications of the research as well as the currently unfolding economic issues facing the
European Project and a discussion of topics that require further research.
Chapter 1 is the introductory chapter summarizing the dissertation. This chapter lays out
the context and arguments of the dissertation. It also includes a brief summary of each chapter.
Chapter 2 introduces key concepts, theoretical perspectives pertaining to the overarching
concepts and themes. Key concepts of hegemonic power, the role of the nation-state,
globalization and the Other are deconstructed to explicate their role in understanding and
examining current issues and challenges facing the EU. Chapter 2 also develops the theoretical
framework from which further discussion of critical discourse analysis and its usefulness for
assessing power relations within the EU are related. Central to the theoretical framework is the
concept of power, specifically hegemonic power as a “normative” form of power built into taken
for granted aspects of everyday life. Other fundamental concepts are deconstructed to
contextualize the analysis of historic and current events as they relate to what has become the
European Union. Concepts of “the state”, “the nation”, the nation-state and the social contract
that exist between the two are examined, most specifically in relation to the role these political
structures play in the current era of “globalization” and global interconnectedness.

20

Chapter 3 discusses the research methodology, including Critical Discourse Analysis
(CDA) theory and grounded theory based coding in addition to factor analysis using the
Eurobarometer Survey data. CDA and grounded theory coding of European Commission White
Papers explicates an understanding of the historical emergence of the EU and attempts to
establish hegemonic power through a “European” collective identity. Further, challenges to
collective identity, and the European Project as a whole, are examined in relation to
Eurobarometer Survey data that assists in shedding light on attitudes and beliefs of EU citizens
related to issues such as immigration, enlargement, the Eurozone and being “European”.
Chapter 4 develops a brief history of the EU in regard to its formation and enlargement
processes. Critical Discourse Analysis is deployed to explore the construction of the European
Project, specifically the White Papers discourse that shaped, and continues to shape, policy in the
EU. This chapter sets the historical context for understanding EU relations that are in constant
flux. I also discuss the possibility of a nation-state identity in light of current economic, social
and political issues threatening the solidarity and cohesiveness of the EU.
Utilizing Eurobarometer data as a tool to illustrate “bottom-up” perspectives of the
European Project and European identity, Chapter 5 explores issues associated with the gap
between citizens and the European Project. “The gap” generally refers to the “democratic
deficit” between EU institutions and their citizens, or between “Brussels” and the people;
including the lack of participation in EU institutions reflected via low voter turnout, especially in
comparison to member state elections; wavering trust in EU institutions; and the general public’s
lack of knowledge about the EU. The lack of participation, interest, trust and/or loyalty in EU
institutions amongst its members is viewed as a vital threat to social solidarity, collective identity
and consequently the economic and political future of the EU. However, aspects of identity are

21

also essential to understanding the existence of the gap including attachment to Member State
and regional/local identity couples with perceived threats to Member State sovereignty and “way
of life” stemming from globalization and the presence of the Other in European society.
Chapter5 also examines issues pertaining to immigration and enlargement, especially as
they relate to xenophobia and racism in European member states as a result of nation-building
based on Member State collective identity and threatening concepts of the Other. Immigration
via decolonization and guest worker programs in the post-WWII context provides the historical
backdrop for current issues related to EU integration, the post-9/11 context that fuels antiimmigrant, anti-Islamic and anti-foreigner sentiments in EU member states, and the economic
discrepancies between EU Member States. Further, historical characterizations of the Other that
helped to build collective identity in individual member states provide a stumbling block to
member’s ability or willingness to transcend Member State identity in order to adhere to a
“European” identity while also fueling nationalistic sentiment in light of the tensions caused by
the Eurozone crisis.
Chapter 6 concludes the dissertation by summarizing the arguments, discussing the
implications of the research and outlining topics for future research. As part of the implications
for future research, this chapter explores the unfolding current economic crisis within the
Eurozone and how it is exacerbating and contributing to tensions between member states and
threatens the one element of solidarity that was consistently strong in the EU—economic
solidarity. Issues surrounding the viability of the Eurozone, the “blame game” between and
among member state governments, and the “fall-out” effects that will shape the economic,
political and social future of the European Union.

22

In sum, this dissertation shows that elite-driven attempts to build solidarity and collective
identity among Europeans through top-down efforts are threatened by past nation-building at the
individual Member State level and concepts of the Other on which member state nationalism
relied. Concepts of the Other in relation to member state nationalism are residual from the eras of
colonization, decolonization and the post-WWII context of immigration and enlargement. These
threats to European solidarity are paramount not only in regard to the success of the social and
political aspects of the European Project but also to the economic systems that formerly bound
the Member States successfully and are now in crisis. The ultimate question remains, are these
just challenges that will eventually strengthen the European Union or will we see the demise of
the European Project?

23

CHAPTER 2: THEORY AND LITERATURE REVIEW
Before discussing the changing role of the nation-state and European adaptive strategies
to maintaining power in the current global political economy, a theoretical framework within
which events and trends shaping these phenomena is established. The concept of power,
including the role it plays in the function and importance of the modern state and in the global
political economy is at the core of the discussion. In addition to a brief overview of definitions
and theories prevalent in power discourse, special attention will be paid to hegemonic power
characterized by Antonio Gramsci, especially as it relates to discourse, representation and
consent. After defining and explaining power in general, specific concepts associated with
power are explored further. These include a more complete understanding of nation-building,
i.e. the role of the state and nation in maintaining power structures and the role power, especially
hegemonic power, in maintaining the legitimacy of states in the global political economy in the
current era of globalization. The discussion of power begins with building a general
conceptualization of power.
POWER
The concept of “power” is central to political and international relations literature (Lenter
2006; Cerny 2006) and is core to understanding social relationships and structure (Foucault
1972; Mills 2004). There is, however, relatively little consensus regarding what constitutes
power (Lukes 1974: Haugaard 2006a). Generally speaking, power is the “ability to achieve
one’s purposes or goals (Nye 2004: 53)” or the influence and control groups and individuals
have over one another (Nafstad et al 2007: 313; van Dijk 1993: 254). More complex questions
relate to the ways in which power is obtained and secured as well as to the types of power that
are exercised to establish and maintain control in a given social context. Debates concerning
24

what constitutes power offer a broad range of perspectives from power as “consensual” to
perspectives of power as “dominance” and “coercion” (Laïtd 2008; Haugaard 2006a and 2006b;
Nye 2004; Escobar 1995; van Dijk 1993; Foucault 1972; Gramsci 1971). Several critical
perspectives have been put forward to enhance our understanding of power, including types and
extent of power, as well as its role in providing and/or constructing nation-state power. First, I
discuss Lukes’ three dimensional typology of power, Nye’s concepts of “hard” and “soft” power
followed by Foucault’s “Power-Truth-Knowledge” and Escobar’s “Developmental Discourse”
theory relating to discourse and representation. These theories will segue into the discussion of
hegemonic power as it exists in the interstate system specifically, between the nation and the
state.
Lukes’ s Dimensional Theory of Power
In his critical writing Power: A Radical View (1974) Steven Lukes proposes a threedimensional typology of power. Lukes identifies three interconnected and overarching types of
power he labels “relational power” (the “one-dimensional view”), “structural power” (“twodimensional view”) and “infrastructural power” (“three-dimensional view” or “third face of
power”) (Cerny 2006; Lukes 1974). “Relational power” is the traditional perspective where A
has power over B to the extent that A can get B to do what B would not otherwise do (Cerney
2006; Dahl 2005; Lukes 1974). Robert Dahl’s (2005) respected discussion of this type of power
in a broad political context argues that power lies in defeating opponents’ preferences and
creating conflict by pushing political bias. Here power is active and can be measured in regard
to political policy where one group’s agenda or choices are limited or promoted. The twodimensional view or “structural power”, according to Lukes, is embedded in a wider system that
provides its meaning and effectiveness. From this perspective, power is revealed through the

25

ability to influence or shape preferences by setting up “the rules of the game” or the normative
bureaucratic order. Finally, “infrastructural power”—otherwise known as the “third face of
power”—is power in the ability to maintain the status quo by shaping views of the world and
preferences in a way that ensures the acceptance of the status quo. With the third dimension or
“third face of power”, power is constructed as “natural” and normative establishing consent and
“common sense”. Hegemonic power correlates with Lukes’ conception of the “third face of
power” (Cerney 2006).
Hard Power and Soft Power
Expanding on diverse typologies of power, it is important to understand the distinction
and connection between concepts of coercion and consent in regard to power. In Lukes’ theory
of power, the one and two dimensional approaches focused more on the former where the third
dimensional view focused more on the latter. Understanding both in association as a
dichotomous and interconnected relationship is imperative.
Joseph Nye’s perspective of this dichotomy involves two types of power, relied upon by
states in establishing and maintaining power over the nation. According to Nye (2004: 5), “hard
power” refers to coercive power or “command power” that can be used to get others to change
their position—such as military or economic power—where as “soft power” refers to power that
allows “getting others to want the outcomes that you want”—that “co-opts people rather than
coerces them.” Soft power in this case is associated with “intangible power resources such as an
attractive culture, political values and institutions, and policies that are seen as legitimate or
having moral authority.” Also according to Nye, soft power is effective in that “if I can get you
to want to do what I want, then I do not have to force you to do what you do not want (bold in
original text)”.

26

In this case “hard power” provides a partial justification for legitimacy but does not
adequately capture the totality of the concept of power. “Soft power” not only justifies and
legitimates hard power but also provides a justification for social stratification systems and the
status quo. When we discuss the legitimacy of states and national identity it is important to
recognize the two sides of the nation-state coin in having hard power to wield but understanding
soft power is the most vital way of perpetuating and normalizing power through perceived shared
interests such as the social contract explored later in this section (Laïtd 2008; Cerney 2006).
Recently, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Rhodam Clinton discussed the critical need for
“smart power” in the form of expanding the role of citizen power in international development,
particularly USAID. In her Foreign Affairs article Leading through Civilian Power: Redefining
American Diplomacy and Development (2010: 1) she states:
Congress has already appropriated funds for 1,108 new Foreign Service and Civil Service
officers to strengthen the State Department's capacity to pursue American interests and
advance American values. USAID is in the process of doubling its development staff,
hiring 1,200 new Foreign Service officers with the specific skills and experience required
for evolving development challenges, and is making better use of local hires at our
overseas missions, who have deep knowledge of their countries. The Obama
administration has begun rebuilding USAID to make it the world's premier development
organization, one that fosters long-term growth and democratic governance, includes its
own research arm, shapes policy and innovation, and uses metrics to ensure that our
investments are cost-effective and sound.
Here Secretary of State Rodham Clinton emphasizes the need for power based in “soft power”
including specialized skills, training and knowledge as a gateway to developing societies and the
advancement of “American interests” and the advancement of “American values”. The
advancement of dominant interests including cultural norms and values helps to establish
normative and taken for granted power structures that go unquestioned and unchallenged as they
are intertwined with what is considered “normal” or “accepted.”

27

Critically, Nye’s concepts of “soft power” and Rodham Clinton’s promotion of “civilian
power” allude to the attractive nature of culture, including norms that set the precedent for
standards, rules and measures of value in society (Rodham Clinton 2010; Laïtd 2008; Nye 2004).
Normative power is seen as vital to the perpetuation of power hierarchies and the justification of
status quo in that it presents no alternative to the current power structure—where this structure is
viewed not only as “correct” and agreed upon but “natural” or normal. In this case normative
theories of power are useful in understanding how power hierarchies are perpetuated and
legitimated. Normative power stems from the Constructivist school of thought and is based on
the Weberian idea that human beings are social and cultural beings who construct meanings that
help us communicate and understand the world (Laïtd 2008). Here, normative theories of power
understand power as socially constructed, and therefore not natural. From this perspective social
reality is manufactured and social institutions are used to present certain social norms as correct
and normal over others giving an inherent ethnocentric perspective of the value of power
including who should have access to it and why.
Foucault’s “Power-Truth-Knowledge”: Discourse and Representation
Foucault’s conceptualization of the “Power-Truth-Knowledge” schema refers to the
connection between power, truth and knowledge especially, those entities of power, such as
science (and by this I mean the natural science model or positivist science) which was viewed as
a rational source of truth and knowledge. He was especially interested in “the careful,
rationalized, organized statements made by experts—what he called ‘discourses’ (Peet and
Hartwick 1999: 129-130).” Foucault viewed science as discourse, with access and control over
“discursive formation” and the construction of what we perceive to be “knowledge.” Science,
through discourse, is also responsible for creating organized systems of knowledge that become

28

taken for granted due to its credible, taken for granted authoritative status in Western societies.
According to Foucault, “truth is not outside of power” and modern systems of power draw on
notions of truth—regardless of its relativity or subjectivity.
From Foucault’s point of view, power is embedded in social relations where it provides
the ability to shape preferences, as Lukes referred to it, but also in the construction of knowledge
and “truth” in society via the control over discourse (Mills 2004; Wilson 2001; Peet and
Hartwick 1999; Escobar 1995; Foucault 1972). According to Foucault, power operates through
discourse, the spoken word and texts that represent and shape ideology helping to construct what
we “know” or what is taken for granted knowledge (Denzin and Lincoln 2000; Peet and
Hartwick 1999). Closely linked this theory is Arturo Escobar’s (1995: 10) crucial discussion of
consent vs. coercion through his theory of “Developmental Discourse”. Escobar describes the
processes of development, including discursive formation, through “languages of power” and
“regimes of representation,” which he described as “places of encounter where identities are
constructed and also where violence is originated, symbolized and managed.” Here,
representative power lies in the ability to control discourse and the frames from which views of
the world are shaped in society. Discourse shapes what we know to be “truth,” and truth often
translates to knowledge constructions. Escobar’s model of developmental discourse (Peet and
Hartwick 1999: 146) assists in illustrating the connections and dynamics between institutional
power and the social construction of reality:

29

Figure 2.1: Escobar’s Model of Development Discourse
Power Relations
(Institutions)
↓
Representation
(Discourses)
↓
Enframing
Imaginaries Identities
↓
↓
Deployment
Incorporation Professionalization Institutionalization
↓
↓
Social Construction of Reality

Exemplified in this model of developmental discourse is the connection between macro-level and
micro-level social structures including the institutional power in determining everyday
perspectives of reality including definitions and meaning associated with what is good/bad;
right/wrong; civilized/uncivilized; acceptable/unacceptable, etc. Here the institutional power
related to the ability to represent and make decisions on behalf of an entire group while also
being in a position to define this groups reality results in the social construction of reality which
manifests in behaviors, beliefs, identities including perspectives based on “us” and “them”
dichotomies.
These perspectives of discourse, the construction of truth and knowledge from the
institutional top-down perspective are crucial to examining the construction of national collective
identity. National identity as a form of collective will and identity is crucial for providing
legitimacy to the state. Escobar’s Model of Developmental Discourse shows the deployment of
“top-down” constructions through discourse. I contend that top-down constructions of identity
by EU institutions are an effort to create consensus and solidify hegemonic power within the EU.

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Hegemonic Power
I also rely heavily on Antonio Gramsci’s concept of hegemony to understand the origins
of this term and its main conceptualizations in the literature. The term “hegemony” stems from
the Greek word meaning leadership of a military alliance that was voluntary, possibly a rise up in
response to a military threat. Hegemony was perceived as a legitimate form of power that served
common interests among equals in contrast to those of empire (Haugaard 2006a and 2006b;
Fontana 2006; Cerny 2006; Lentner 2006; Nye 2004). In this case hegemony was presented as
serving the interests of everyone, not just those in power who typically exerted such power in
their own interests that did not coincide with those of the majority. The perception of equal and
common interests protected under the “hegemon” was embraced as an alternative to the power
held by empires. The meaning and usage of this word has changed along with power structures
in the global arena. Today, concepts of hegemony are crucial to understanding power relations
on a global scale, in politics and in social relations generally.
According to William Robinson (2005: 560) there are four major conceptualizations of
hegemony and its role in the international order. The first is hegemony as international
domination including dominance backed by active dominance—what Nye would refer to as
“hard power”. The second is hegemony as “state hegemony” or the dominance of a nation-state
that serves as an anchor to the world capitalist system. Here the focus is on economic
domination and leadership. The third is hegemony as the exercise of leadership of “historic
blocs’ within a particular world order, defined as hegemonic projects representing “… the basis
of consent for a certain social order, in which the hegemony of a dominant class is created and
re-created in a web of institutions, social relations and ideas (Robinson 2005: 564)”—again,
focusing on the power of dominant nation-states in the global order. Finally, and fourth,

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hegemony can be conceptualized as “consensual domination” or “ideological hegemony” where
the ruling group maintains rule via the consent of those who are ruled (Robinson 2005: 560).
Robinson’s first three conceptualizations offer ideas of state dominance in the interstate
system. This conceptualization is popular in the International Relations, International Politics
and World Systems literature that focuses on the dominance of a nation-state in the modern state
system that has the ability to set the agenda for the world order (Fontana 2006; Cerny 2006;
Lentner 2006; Reifer 2004; Wallerstein 2004; Rennstich 2004; Kentor 2004; Boswell and ChaseDunn 1996). Global cycles of power, from the Dutch to the British and more recently U.S.
power, are often examined using this perspective (Wallerstein 2005; Boswell and Chase-Dunn
1996). In this case, hegemonic power is measured in terms of the first three
conceptualizations—military and economic power as well as taking the lead in anchoring the
global capitalist system (Kentor 2004). More recently, Robinson hypothesized the possibility of
a transnational hegemonic power that lies outside of the state but not outside of the global order.
This dissertation does not seek to prove the EU to be a hegemonic power in the modern state
system, or a superpower; however it will rely on this conception to understand the need for the
EU to build legitimacy and power among its “nation” or citizens in order to be taken seriously
within the modern state system—especially in order to compete with the U.S. which has long
been considered a hegemonic power along these dimensions, albeit one that is perceivably on the
decline.
Given this dissertation’s interest in the preponderance of power among core nations in
regard to development and strategies for adapting to globalization processes, the fourth
conceptualization offered by Robinson, expanding on Gramsci’s idea of hegemony, is central to

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the notion of collective identity and the legitimacy of nation-state power in the global order, and,
more importantly, among its citizens or “demos”.
Antonio Gramsci’s perspective of hegemony was one of power embedded in social
relations. He saw hegemony represented in two superstructural levels of society: “civil (private)
society” and “political society” or “the state” (Gramsci 1971: 12). As he states, “These two
‘levels’ correspond to the function of ‘hegemony’ which the dominant group exercised
throughout society and ‘direct domination’ or command exercised through the State and
‘juridical’ government (Gramsci 1971: 12).” In this case he focused not only on the direct power
of states but also the ethical, moral, cultural and social power of ruling groups, or dominant
groups, in establishing and maintaining rule via the state as well as the consent, and often
participation, of the subjugated groups. At the base of this concept is not just power via
domination and rule but supplementing and perpetuating these power structures through the
consent of those with less power. This is done through the creation of ideology.
Ideologies are beliefs of the ruling class presented as shared interests. Ideology was
disseminated by the hands of “legislatures” and “intellectuals” of society that were able to create
and control ideological discourse which set the normative standard or “systematic
representation” by the ‘represented’ (Haugaard 2006b ; Gramsci 1971: 265-266). Inherent in this
is the ability to promote the ideologies of the ruling class through the guise of “shared interests”,
which of course is in stark contrast to reality. Overall, Gramsci argued the concept of
“statolatry”—meaning that political society and civil society were one in the same—two sides of
the same coin, interrelated and co-dependent working on behalf of the ruling group but presented
as “the normal state of life” (268).

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From Gramsci’s point of view ideology excelled through its ability to tie together
divergent interests to associate itself with leadership, and to harness the ability of intellectuals to
universalize the interests of the ruling class through ideas, perceptions and shared morality
(Haugaard 2006b: 47). Ideology assists in creating and shaping “common will” through the
perception of shared, represented interests (Nafstad et al. 2007; Haugaard 2006b; Mills 2004;
Lessnoff 1986). Adherence to ideology reinforces the common bonds that maintain common
will but common will also facilitates consensus. As power hierarchies are re-created and
perpetuated by “intellectuals” and “historic blocs” they become increasingly taken for granted,
normative (seen as “normal” or “natural”) and apart of “common sense” knowledge. In this case
there is no (or little) perceived need for an alternative perspective or agenda and, certainly,
criticism—this is the essential nature of “consensual power” (Haugaard 2006b: 50).
Also taking from Gramsci’s work, Rennstich (2004: 38) points out that hegemony is the
“additional power that accrues to a dominant group by virtue of its capacity to lead society in a
direction that not only serves the dominant group’s interests, but is also perceived by the
subordinate groups as serving a more general interest.” In this case, hegemony necessitates
consent so that the power dominant groups hold is not seen as coercive, rather one that serves the
interests of subordinate groups. Consensual alliances contribute to the perceived legitimacy of
power hierarchies and structures (Haugaard 2006a). According to Mark Haugaard (2006a: 6):
The key to the creation of bourgeois domination and consent is the use of state power to
get other classes to make sense of the world in a bourgeois way. Subaltern groups
become socialized into the bourgeois order of things through an educational process
whereby this way of perceiving reality becomes naturalized—as inherent in the ‘natural
order’ of things.
In many ways the elements of dominant culture, or the given way of life for the most powerful
group in society—such as language, norms, values and belief systems—become institutionalized

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through hegemonic power, co-opting the values and viability of “Other” cultures along the way.
Dominant culture is institutionalized through schools (national education programs and policy),
the media and government discourse as well as the presentation of values and norms through
other aspects of civil society such as religious, non-profit and voluntary organizations (Fontana
2006; Haugaard 2006b). The aggregate effect of culture is the creation of a sense that those
norms presented as the standard through social institutions are those that are “natural” and
“normal.”
Scholars have adopted and adapted Gramsci’s view of hegemony in the role of political
and social life to explain the role of nation-state power in the global arena and in a social contract
between citizens and state institutions based on national identity, or the “nation.” I apply
Gramsci’s view of the state and hegemony by discussing the concepts of “nation”, “state” and
“nation-state”, leading up to the discussion of their changing roles and challenges to their
legitimacy experienced in the current era of globalization. According to Gramsci, “The nation”
or “civil society” plays the role of perpetuating “common will” in supporting the state, and it is
needed for legitimacy. State representatives work hard to create discourse that promotes
ideology and the construction of a common will, collective identity and perception of shared
interests.
STATES, NATIONS AND THE NATION-STATE IN THE CURRENT ERA OF
GLOBALIZATION
World Systems Analysis is commonly referred to in regard to explaining the nation-state
as a political unit exists within a world system characterized by capitalism which began to
emerge in Europe in the 16th century alongside political and sovereign boundaries and the
bureaucratization of power in society (Wallerstein 2005, 2004). Wallerstein (2004) characterizes
the modern state system by the sovereignty of states, or their ability to organize and maintain
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power and authority within a given geographical territory as well as the members, or citizens that
belong to the state. In this case, sovereignty is limited “only by the fact that states are located
within the interstate system (Wallerstein 2004: 20)”—a system that has international law but has
difficulty enforcing it in the absence of a world government. Further, states have clear
boundaries and are expected to enter into reciprocal recognition of the sovereignty of other states
in the system. There are no habitable territories and areas considered outside the jurisdiction of a
state—any given location is under the sovereignty of a state. Finally, war is illegitimate except
in self defense. Sovereign states recognize these requisites and rules that provide legitimacy to
the system, and to each other, via reciprocal recognition.
States do not stand alone. Nations provide legitimacy to states through the social
contract, which contributes to the legitimacy of states on the international stage. Their
relationship, referred to as “the nation-state” remains the focus of debate, examination and a
predominant unit of analysis for academics, economists and politicians, while other political
structures and identities such as those related to third level or identity politics including race,
class and gender (Holmes 1999), diasporas and sub-national (regional) identities (Adamson and
Dimetriou 2007; Guibernau 1999; Laitin 2002) have remained secondary in the understanding of
the modern state system. The notion that the global economy has, until recently, been based
largely on a modern nation-state system characterizes the current international system as a
normative taken for granted concept (Eriksen 2007; Dobson 2006).
Guibernau (1999: 14) defines the nation-state as “a modern institution, characterized by
the formation of a kind of state that has the monopoly of what it claims to be legitimate use of
force within a demarcated territory and seeks to unite the people subject to its rule by means of
cultural homogenization.” The emergence of the nation-state is well documented (Robbins

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2008; Hobsbawm 1990; Anderson 1983) and often debated in relation to the ways it has assisted
in shaping the current global order and international relations in addition to political and cultural
identities (Adamson and Dimetriou 2007; Laitin 2002; Guibernau 1999). Although this
dissertation does not focus in detail on the emergence of the modern state system, I briefly
describe and explain the ways in which it relates to the current role of nations, states, and nationstates in the current global order.
Immanuel Wallerstein (2005, 1999, 1998, 1974) describes the emergence of the world
system as embedded in the history of the modern nation-state system. He discusses the
influences of industrial capitalism, dominant Enlightenment ideology, including challenges to
traditional authority, and assertions of national self determination as crucial to nation-state
formation in the late 17th century. Wallerstein points to events like the Peace of Westphalia in
1648 and the French Revolution in the late 18th century both of which brought to light the notion
of sovereignty as the characterization of emerging nation-states. The dominance of the nationstate economy and the expansion of industrialization have given rise to the emergence of
commodity chains that have linked the world system as well as international institutional
structures and imagined communities that link loyalties and legitimacy to nation-states
(Anderson 1983; Wallerstein 1974).
The concept of the nation-state is closely connected to Europe in terms of its
materialization, colonialism and decolonization and its role in shaping the international
community (Holton 1998). Nation-state structures and institutions were implemented during
colonization and then remained during and after liberation, held in place by “the development
project.” With the end of World War II and the eventual fall of Cold War communist regimes,
the number of nation-states increased dramatically. The number of nation-states recognized by

37

the UN from 51 in 1945 to 192 in 2006 (United Nations 2006) and this was in part due to the
construction of small states formerly part of Cold War communist regimes (Dowley 2006;
Iivonen 1993). Recognition from international institutions such as the United Nations has
assisted in ensconcing the nation-state into the modern global system (Annan 2000; Meyer et al
1997). With this, the nation-state emerged as the predominant political representative unit and
system of political power within the modern state system.
Wallerstein (2004: 19-20) characterizes the modern state system by focusing on the
sovereignty of states, or their ability to organize and maintain power and authority with a given
geographical territory as well as the members, or citizens that belong to the state. In this case,
sovereignty is limited “only by the fact that states are located within the interstate system”—a
system that has international law but has difficulty enforcing it without a world government.
Further, states have clear boundaries and are expected to enter into reciprocal recognition of the
sovereignty of other states in the system. There are no habitable territories and areas considered
outside the jurisdiction of a state—any given location is under the sovereignty of a state. Finally,
war is illegitimate except in self defense. Sovereign states recognize these requisites and rules
providing legitimacy to the system, and each other, via reciprocal recognition.
Regardless of its seemingly long history and tradition as the dominant political unit
within the global political economy, the nation state has been challenged by what has been
referred to as the new era, or “second wave”, of globalization (Ohmae 2000; Strange 1997). The
“second wave” or “current” era of globalization refers to the decades after WWII in which the
context of the Cold War, decolonization, the emergence of the U.S. as a sole superpower in
conjunction with the establishment of the Bretton Woods institutions brought to fruition the
“development project”. This controversially proscribed macro-economic structural adjustment

38

that coincided with the ideology of modernization to reconfigure the global order and the
everyday lives of individuals (McMichael 2010; McClosky 2003; McCann 2003; Hoogvelt 2001;
Rist 1997). The hegemonic ideology underlying the development project was the pursuit of
democracy, peace, and freedom via expansion and liberalization of financial markets and
international trade (McMichael 2010). This “development project” coincided with marked
innovations in technology and communications that have made the world a small, more
interconnected place (Giddens 2000)
The emergence of a supranational system and framework comprised of the United
Nations (UN), the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB), standards and
policy implemented by transnational institutions such as the World Trade Organization (WTO)
and the extensive integration of these with nation-states solidified the nation-state’s role
representative of geo-political territories and populations that provided states with legitimacy.
“Reciprocal recognition” remains essential to the modern nation-state system, meaning that both
the external recognition of institutions and the internal recognition from citizens are essential to
the functioning of the state and the structures in which it is embedded (Wallerstein 2005, 1999).
The transnational trends characterizing this current era of globalization have led to the
argument that the nation-state is weakening in its ability to regulate its territorial institutions,
specifically economies and borders, and maintain national identity ties (Castels 2000; Ohmae
2000; Strange 1997). The arguments related to the challenges of the nation-state will be
explored in more detail later.
The State
To understand the nation-state as a representative political unit of the power and authority
of sovereign states, the definitions and distinctions between “state” and “nation” must be made

39

clear to understand the relationship between individuals and institutional structures. This
relationship is complex and entwined with notions of identity and constructions of the “Other”
where the state posits itself as the “protector against threats” to the citizenship, or the nation,
including threats of “outsiders” that are often related to threats of immigration (Fekete 2009;
Feldman 2005; Sassen 1999). Discussions of the nation-state, explored in more detailed in the
next section, relate power and authority of the state to sovereign territory that encompasses a
homogenized sense of cultural belonging. Also, the construction of the state and nation occur
simultaneously within a framework of interdependent legitimacy (Adamson and Demetriou
2007; Bruter 2005; Guibernau 1999; Laitin 1997). In this case the “state” is comprised of
institutions containing legitimate power and authority within sovereign geo-political boundaries,
while the nation provides the nationalist identity, loyalty and civic participation needed to justify
the state internally to its members and externally to international structures (Wallerstein 2005;
Robbins 2008; Meyer 2000; Castels 2000; Guibernau 1999).
Theorists have struggled to define and characterize the state for decades. In Politics as a
Vocation, Max Weber (1948: 77) defined the “state” as “… a human community that
successfully claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory”
emphasizing direct power over individual members of the state in ensuring compliance with state
institutions and processes. Holten (1998: 85) describes the state as “a set of institutions through
which public authority is exercised within a particular territory”. Clapham (1996) claims states
are often viewed as synonymous with governments, which exercise power and authority over a
specific territory. VanHam (2001) emphasizes the infrastructure of states, based on their
constitution and legal/judicial systems. Oommen (1997: 33) describes the state as “a legally
constituted entity which provides its residents protection from internal insecurity and external

40

aggression.” These foci remain valid in relation to the notion that, in order for states to exist,
they need an institutionalized, bureaucratic structure with representation to carry out power.
In addition, members of the state are necessary to control the territory and maintain a tax
system from which it can manage expenses. This perspective views the state as an association of
people who share the ideology of equal rights and access to the institutions of law and diplomacy
that provide members with feelings of equal representation. Sir Earnest Barker (1958: xv)
defined the state as “a legal association, constituted by the action of its members in making a
constitution … and therein and thereby contracting themselves into a body politic.” Rousseau
(Barker 1958: 257) famously discusses this “body politic” when he states that this “is known by
its members as the State, when an active one, as the sovereign people, and, in contrast to other
similar bodies, as a power. …it enjoys the collective name the People, the individuals who
comprise it being known as citizens in so far as they owe obedience to the law of the State.”
From this standpoint, the state is representative of a “social contract” by which citizens
presumably have consented to afford the state a monopoly on force in exchange for social rights
and responsibilities (Nafstad et al. 2007; Robbins 2008; Bruter 2005; Lessnoff 1986; Barker
1958). In order for the state’s institutions to function they must have agreement on the part of
“the people” that they will consent to and participate in the activities of the state, including
paying taxes, protecting borders from outside threats and providing internal security. The state
needs loyalty to ensure the people will uphold their rights and responsibilities while also
providing legitimacy to state institutions and representatives. In many ways the state is in a
position to construct the loyalty that is necessary for citizens to invest and adhere to the social
contract through institutions such as the legal judicial system but more importantly through
education systems that enable it to socialize its members from a young age into a national

41

identity. Socialization into national identity, or what Gramsci might have referred to as
“common will”, is the basis from which consensual, hegemonic power can be constructed and
maintained (Fontana 2006; Gramsci 1971).
The consensual agreement reflected in the social contract between the nation and the state
results in the political unit—the nation-state—that works within a framework of reciprocal
legitimacy. In the next section I explore the social contract in terms of constructing a “common
will”—largely referred to as the “nation” and representing the other face of the state.
The Social Contract
Rousseau’s famous Du Contract Social, first published in 1762, describes the social
contract as one involving the state and its citizens who are subject to its law of the state. Sir
Earnest Baker (1958: xii) follows up on Rousseau’s perspective by stressing two main aspects of
the social contract: the contract of the government—one between rulers and subjects, and the
contract of society—or one with an organized community “ready to assume the burden of
government in agreement with that will”.
Somewhat more recently, Michael Lessnoff (1986: 2) operationalizes the concept by
claiming it as a theory. He states, “a social contract theory is a theory in which a contract was
used to justify and/or to set limits to political authority, or in other words, in which political
obligation is analyzed as a contractual obligation.” He goes on to define a contract as
“constituted by a promise and agreement between the parties that the promise be legally
enforceable.” Here the characteristic of reciprocal agreement and recognition is applied to the
relationship between the state and its citizens, but what makes citizens abide to the
responsibilities they hold to the state and vice versa? If the social contract exists between the
state and “the nation” or the members of the state, it is essential to discuss it in detail.

42

The social contract alludes to a sense of agreement and mutual obligation between
citizens (individuals) and the state (institutional structure). If the citizens within the state do not
legitimize the power and authority of the state how would it continue to exist within the global
community? The “idea of the state” must be constructed in the minds of at least a majority of the
people who form the state. This construction is a legitimating factor that justifies the power
structure and decision making processes the state engages in (Adamson and Demetriou 2007;
Bruter 2005; Resse 2001; Laiten 1997;). In the next section nation-building and the creation of
“the nation” as the “soul” of the state will be discussed (Renan 1996: 52)
The Nation
As bureaucratic members of the state, citizens do not inherently hold loyalty to the state
or the perception of shared interests with the state, including its institutions and policies—this is
something that is actively taught and learned early in life, along with other forms of group
membership socialization and solidarity. In this case, a social contract will not succeed unless
the relationship between those entering the contract is predicated on common interests and
understanding. “The nation” is the “common will”, the sense of shared belonging, history and
identity of members that provides loyalty and legitimacy to the state (Delanty 2003; Waller and
Linklater 2003; Canovan 2003). Ommen (1997: 33) offers a definition of the nation as “a
territorial entity to which the people have an emotional attachment and in which they invest a
moral meaning: it is a homeland—ancestral or adopted.” Boswell and Chase-Dunn (1996: 148)
describes the nation as “the main collective solidarity that has flourished in the modern world,”
defined as “a multiclass group of people that identify with one another based on a common
culture and language, and who claim sovereignty over a contiguous piece of territory.”

43

The collective solidarity that comes about through shared language, history, a sense of
belonging and perceived shared interests in turn creates the national identity of the members of
the state. National identity provides loyalty to the state and facilitates participation in state
institutions and functions, while also providing legitimacy, in recognition of shared interests. As
the basis of collective identity, collective solidarity is embedded in shared history, or at least
notions of the past, that justifies the common bonds and future loyalty (Smith 1996; Balibar
1996).

Similarly, Ernest Renan (1996: 52-53) states:
The nation, like the individual, is the culmination of a long past of endeavors, sacrifice
and devotion … To have common glories in the past and to have a common will in the
present; to have performed deeds together, to wish to still perform more—these are the
essential conditions for being a people. … A nation is therefore a large scale solidarity,
constituted by the feeling of sacrifices one has made in the past and of those that one is
prepared to make in the future.”

This shared sense of the past that fuels future loyalties is essential to nation-building, especially
through education where ideological discourse that justifies the ruling class is presented as
knowledge, creating a sense of loyalty and shared interests in members of the state starting from
a young age. According to Gramsci, this is an example where the “political state” and “civil
society” (or “the cultural state”) collides.
Gramsci (1971: 258) discussed the nation as an “ethical and cultural state,” whose most
important function is to “raise the great mass of the population to a particular cultural and moral
level, a level (or type) which corresponds to the needs of the productive forces for development,
and hence the interests of the ruling classes.” Here the nation in Gramscian terms cannot be
separated from the activities of the state, or the ruling class, as they are contributing greatly to
normative ideas of culture and morals. The imposition of dominant culture as normative on
subordinate groups shapes the ruling class’s characterization of reality for the subjugated groups,
perpetuating the common will that justifies the ruling class’ position in society. State institutions
44

work hard to ensure loyalty of their citizens, resorting to force if needed, but usually relying on
symbols such as flags, anthems and on socialization and education (Waller and Linklater 2003).
Guibernau (1999: 13-14) emphasizes five dimensions of the nation that reoccur in the
literature: psychological (consciousness), cultural, territorial, political and historical. According
to Robbins (2008: 114), “if members of a state would see themselves as sharing a culture—a
common heritage, language, and destiny—not only could state leaders claim to represent the
‘people’, whoever they might be, but the people could be more easily integrated into the national
economy.” Identifying group membership based on a notion of collective origin, culture, shared
history, experiences and destiny, in addition to identifying those who do not belong, is
imperative in shaping the loyalty and obedience toward the state that is necessary for it to exist
(Holten 1998; Castels 2000; Valentine 2004). Of course, collective and national identities are
complex processes and concepts, especially when considering the rules of who belongs and who
is excluded from the group. When discussing state membership, or citizenship, it is imperative
to understand group dynamics based on notions of the “other”, “us” versus “them, and criteria
for who does belong and who does not belong to the group. In order to understand criteria for
inclusion and exclusion one must understand the bureaucratic side of citizenship as the
institutionalization of group membership as well as the “Other”.
Citizenship
Political identity stems from membership, which is signified by citizenship in the nationstate (Dobson 2006; Bruter 2005; Dell’Olio 2005; Alfonsi 1997) that provides a sense of
belonging for members of the state (Bruter 2005; Goosewinkle 2001; Vranken 1999; Guibernau
1999; Alfonsi 1997). Alfonso Alfonsi (1997: 54-55) discusses the dual model that has long
shaped debates regarding citizenship: the Lockean-Liberal model and the Artistotelian-

45

Republican model. In the former, citizens are considered external to the organization (the state),
participating in an institutional relationship based on reciprocal rights and responsibilities.
According to Alfonsi (1997) from the Lockean perspective, the citizen’s power lies in knowledge
of rights and the ability to exercise influence over those in decision making power positions. In
the latter Aristotlelian model, citizens should be integrated into the “polis” or political
collectivity to such an extent that their identity is shaped within a framework of common culture
and recognized political institutions. The first model emphasizes “active citizenship,” where
citizens are educated, active participants in the state. Marshall’s theory of citizenship closely
reflects Locke’s model, in that citizens trust state institutions because they feel their interests are
best served by them. Here, trust and pursuit of common interests are closely tied. In the second
model, citizenship is tied to the identity of the citizen, who feel a sense of shared history, culture
and investment in state institutions. In this case, “the nation” plays a crucial role in maintaining
solidarity, loyalty and trust amongst the “polis” or the citizenship.
Fiorella Dell’Olio (2005: 1) explains that “citizenship at the nation-state level
undoubtedly represents not only a legal means for the access to civil, political, and social rights,
but it also usually conflates with the idea of the nation-state in terms of belonging and cultural
identity”. She goes on to say “citizenship is an ‘idea’ that finds its way into law. As a legal
concept it creates “community” … which includes and protects those who belong to the same
system of rules. Citizenship therefore may be considered to be a set of rules that define citizens
as components of a polity. (Dell’Olio 2005: 7)” For Dell’Olio, citizenship is both a legal and a
sociological concept that must be understood as institutional infrastructure in addition to self
identification.

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Dobson (2006: 4) defines citizenship as a vehicle for the political justification of the
state: “Where citizenship is absent or ineffectual, persons are subjects, not citizens: the objects
of political power, not the sources of political authority”. The emphasis is on the participatory
role that citizens play in legitimizing the state. Adherents to Gramscian theory may also interpret
this participatory legitimization as a component of “civil hegemony” that provides indirect,
hegemonic power to the state based on constructed knowledge, consensus, and participation
(Goldman 2005). Here, having a sense of belonging is enhanced when one is a participant in and
assists in justifying state procedures and practices.
Citizenship is also based on constructions of the “Other”, socially and culturally defined
notions of “us” and “them”, in addition to relationships of group difference (Nichols 2010;
Feldman 2005; Mills 2004; Peet and Hartwick 1999; Newmann 1999; Said 1979). According to
Edward Said (1979: 331) “…the development and maintenance of every culture require the
existence of another, different and competing alter ego.” Constructions of knowledge and the
Other play a role in legitimizing and supporting hegemonic consensus and “common sense”
regarding globalization and development processes. Given the close link to culture in nation state
identity, notions of the Other are often based on citizenship as a marker of cultural or ethnic
belonging (Castels 2000; Smith 1996).
Without nationalism and nation building the state cannot be perceived as legitimate
internally to its demos or externally to the international structure into which globalization
dictates it must integrate. (Wallerstein 2005; Bruter 2005).

The strength of nation-state identity

and control over sovereign territories is being both challenged and questioned in globalization.
The next section investigates challenges and transformations facing the nation-state setting the
stage for exploration of the European Union as a case study to explicate the ways in which the

47

nation-state is changing, how the balance of power between the nation-state and the international
system is being transformed and, consequently, how identities are being affected by emergence
of the European Project.
The Threat of Globalization and Challenges to the Nation-State
The nation-state is being transformed by globalization and consequently the role of the
nation state is shifting in the global political economy. Although researchers may disagree about
the manner or depth to which this change is taking place, they tend to agree that the nation-state
and identities associated with it are being challenged by the processes accompanying
globalization (Graham 2006; Wallerstein 2005; Castles and Miller 2003; Ohmae 2000; Strange
2000, 1997; Sassen 1996; Guibernau 1999; Huntington 1993). The processes of globalization—
such as the integration of economies, the cross-border flows of information flows, ideas, cultures
and people, and the increasing influence of transgovernmental actors in the global political
economy—have led many to question the role of the state and whether it is becoming obsolete or
inconsequential.

Guibernau (1999: 150) argues four dimensions of the nation-state are being

modified by globalization including its existence within the nation-state system, its capacity to
exert administrative control, its power to claim legitimate monopoly of the means of violence,
and its territoriality.
There remains little doubt that the emergence of transnational economic power and
regulatory institutions has altered the role of the nation-state in the global economy (Holton
1998). Certain scholars have focused on the inability of states to maintain sovereignty due to
transnational economic power and institutions. Ohmae (2000) claims the end of the nation-state
in terms of real flows of economic activity and of regulation powers while Strange (2000, 1997)
declares that the state is retreating while markets master over governments. From her

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perspective the erosion of the state resides in its inability to control defense, finance, and welfare
provisions to members.
Scholars argue that we are moving toward a borderless world in which various proposed
entities control social structures and processes. Hardt and Negri (2000), for instance, propose a
project that speculates a borderless world where working masses dictate decision making
processes and essential structures of the global community. Laxer (2003) proposes a borderless
world where stateless corporations dominate the global political economy and obligate other
states to dismantle their borders for the sake of neo-liberal expansion of free markets.
Additionally, issues relating to identity are discussed in relation to the changing role of
the nation-state. Transnationalism, including migration, has increased the fluidity of borders in
conjunction to the technological and communication advances that have made the world a
smaller place (Robbins 2008; Eriksen 2007; Castels 2000; Sassen 1999). In this case,
transnational processes have led discussions surrounding the legitimacy of the state without a
solidified nation due to the increasing number of people considered “outsiders” to the state. On
the other hand, many argue that threats to national identity have also led to a resurgence of
nationalist movements, as we will discuss in examining the changing role of European Member
States in the EU. In addition, the rise of supra-national as well as sub-national, regional, local
and “third level” identities have also been discussed as a reaction to threats of national identity in
the face of globalization (Adamson and Demetrion 2007; Dobson 2006; Holmes 1999;
Guibernau 1999; Laitin 1997).
Conversely, calls for the end of the nation-state are considered by some to be premature
(Graham 2006). Many acknowledge the challenge to state functions and power caused by
globalization but claim that this is not the end of the state, because states are adaptable and can

49

reorganize to rise to such confrontations (Hoogvelt 2001; Annan 2000; O’Riain 2000; Cox
2000). Scholars such as Wallerstein (1999) and Robbins (2008) acknowledge the importance of
the state in the processes of globalization by emphasizing the important role of the state in
capitalism. According to these arguments, the activity of the state and globalization processes
go hand in hand as state elites play a vital function in providing capitalists with access to nations
as well as being the entity held accountable in the global political economy.
Gilpin (1987) declares reactions to and the processes of globalization themselves result in
the affirmation of domestic policies in which structural adjustment programs are targeted.
Sassen (1996) does not perceive the state to be disappearing in function but does see
globalization as transforming, and sometimes strengthening, the role of the state, such as in the
case of immigration control. Sassen also points to the emerging importance of global cities in
globalization processes, and adds that these must be understood in relation to the shifting and
adapting roles of the nation-state.
This dissertation seeks to investigate the changing role of the nation-state through a case
study of the European Project and the European Union. In response to the political and
economic transformations occurring in the post-WWII era, the European Project emerged as an
economic project build on political alliances. Current debates regarding the role of the European
Project in maintaining peace among European nations and sheltering member states from the
threats and challenges of globalization ask whether these justifications for the European Project
are enough to sustain loyalty and participation from EU citizens.
THE EUROPEAN PROJECT
The “European Union (EU)” is merely one part of a larger project that began after WWII
that this dissertation refers to as the “European Project (EP).” The EU is the current

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manifestation of the EP, which has been described as a “top-down”, elite driven, project
(McNeill 2004) as well as a “normative” project “intrinsically asserting moral content” (Dobson
2006: 6) with the aim of establishing hegemony via economic and civic participation as well as
consensus—what some refer to as “civic hegemony” (Dell’Olio, 2005; Goldman, 2005; Keyman,
1997). It is important to focus on the European Union as a “project” in that its goals and agendas
are still being established, changing especially in the face of challenges from the “ground-level”
of membership. Therefore, the “European Union” is just in the most current phase of a project
that is many decades in the making.
To better understand the “etymology” of the “European Project”, I draw upon Berezin’s
(2003: 13) description of a “project” as one that “denotes any set of ongoing actions in which
collective actors attempt to institutionalize new sets of norms, values, or procedures.” Further,
she states “Project is a felicitous term because it links culture to organization.” Here, Berezin
points out that institutionalized norms and values are “embodied in citizenship and nationality
law that juridicially tie individuals to the nation-state.” Therefore, examining discourse to
illustrate the norms and values at the institutional level is crucial to understand institutional
efforts that attempt to build solidarity among members, or in this case European citizenry, based
in a shared sense of belonging.
Further, top-down institutional agendas, policies and discourse must be understood as
part of a larger role related to the socialization process that connects institutions to the social and
cultural core of the political community (Bruter 2005). Institutions such as the European
Commission are agents of socialization for members of the EP in that they help to shape what it
means to be an active participant in the EP—what it means to “belong” (Checkel 2007).
Building a sense of “we” and a sense of belonging have been approached in a multitude of ways

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from the European level—namely language and education programs such as the
student/educational exchange SOCRATES and ERASMUS programs (Jacobs and Maier 1998)
but also the creation of “national symbols” such as the European Union flag and anthem, that
indicate not only a shared sense of belonging but also a shared history (one not based on conflict
but rather a cooperative, nostalgic shared history) both of which as critical to the establishment
of collective memory and identity (McNeill 2004).
During the Post-WWII era, specifically starting in the 1970s and taking hold in the
1980s, the EP infrastructure followed a normative prescription of economic, political and social
policy built upon neo-liberal ideology and consensus among the political elite and the actions
that result from such ideology. In many ways, the EP followed trends in neoliberal development
and membership through enlargement was based on structural adjustment programs meant to
develop Europe into a supra-national institution that could insulate itself from the affects of
globalization and conflict. The economic reductionist perspective in building the infrastructure
for the EP eventually resulted in a lack of interest and participation at the ground level, which
has proven in the past few years to be a massive challenge in light of the European economic
crisis. It also challenged the power of Member States who contend with pro-nationalist
movements calling for their protection from Europe and outsiders, or the Other, especially
toward the latter part of the 1990s when immigration policy at the EU level began to set the stage
for the resurgence of nationalism and the backlash of top-down assimilation agendas.
It wasn’t until the mid 1990s that discussion of the social contract, including social
cohesion, participation and active citizenship, took on importance with the recognized “gap”
between “Brussels” and European citizens. In the early years institutional agendas focused on
the consequences of social exclusion of individuals from the labor market and/or educational

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system. One goal was to build the EP as a technology and knowledge based society to remain
competitive in the global arena. Education became a vehicle for integration and active
citizenship and youth consultation turned the focus of socializing new generations of Europeans
into the EP.
Overall, the EP has maintained a neo-liberal project in the economic sense but it also
quickly became a pursuit for hegemonic power at the EU level. This pursuit, through top-down
programs and policy emphasize participation, consultation and incorporation of citizens at the
EU decision-making level however alienation among citizens has taken hold and contributes to
the lack of cohesion that is felt currently. Other challenges including the resurgence of
nationalism based on anti-Europe, anti-immigrant and anti-Islamic sentiment (these would all be
the Other in this case), pose not only a challenge to social and cultural solidarity but also
cooperation and participation at the political and economic levels.
The history of the Post WWII “European Project:” A brief summary
In Citizens of Europe? The Emergence of a Mass European Identity, Michael Bruter
(2005: 59) discusses four distinct phases of development related to EU integration. The first
phase, after WWII, was “a phase of Europeanisation based on international co-operation and
designed to favour peace in Europe and avoid the resurgence of the old and bloody nationalisms
that had been so omnipresent.” The EP thus emerged as a security measure to prevent new war
and to foster cooperation between the original member states (McClaren 2006). However, the EP
quickly moved into a second phase fostering economic integration based on neoliberal policy
(Fuchs and Klingemann 2002). In 1951 the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) was
established by the six founding members—Belgium, Germany, France, the Netherlands,
Luxembourg and Italy—and by 1957 the Treaty of Rome established the European Economic

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Community (EEC) solidifying the partnership between these member states. It was the Treaty
of Rome that Bruter (2005: 59) argues propelled the second phase of development of European
integration based on “technical” components of policy “that have been progressively devolved to
a new ‘European’ level of government in more and more territorially complex political systems.”
The third phase of development was underway by the 1970s when the Community began
enlarging and new social and environmental programs were taking root via the establishment of
the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF). As the number of member states grew and
became more integrated as economic partners, the economic agenda of the European Community
began to resemble more of a political project. In 1979 the first Parliamentary elections were held
while enlargement continued through the early 1980s by the induction of Greece, Spain and
Portugal.
The Maastricht Treaty in 1992 established a European “citizenship” that was symbolic of
the newly formed “social contract” based on membership to the Union (Bruter 2005; Dobson
2006). By 1993, the fourth phase of development toward integration began with an official
timeline for constructing the European Union as a single market. The objectives of the social
platform were based on both economic and political aspects of integration (Dell’Olio 2005;
VanHam 2001). A new “People’s Europe” was being constructed from the top-down and the
first step was to solidify its membership (Bruter 2005).

In 1997, the Amsterdam Treaty

reinforced the connection between Member-State citizenship and EU citizenship however
debates over sovereignty and immigration policy were already posing challenges to the social
platform of the EP.
Coinciding with earlier arguments regarding citizenship and national identity providing
legitimacy for the state, Dobson (2006) argues that European Union legitimacy is a precondition

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for development and integration. In this case, the fourth phase of European integration is based
on forming legitimacy for the EU via identity based on membership.
This phase did not come without hesitation and/or resistance. Issues associated with
globalization, including who benefits from the EP and other neoliberal based development and at
what cost? Further, debates regarding immigration, enlargement and “who belongs to Europe”
accompanied discourse on citizenship, membership to the EU and “the Other”. General
arguments relating to the lack of a “European people” (Dobson 2006: 55) and Europe as a
“community in need of an imagination” were common and often discussed (McNeill 2004.) The
notion of Europe’s “democratic deficits” was also widely popular (VanHam 2001; Jasson 2001;
Fuchs and Klingemann 2002; McNeill 2004). These arguments and discussions relate to EU
attempts at community building, and focus on whether an EU identity is feasible given the
strength of citizen association with member states.
The European Project (EP) began with the goals of ensuring peace, work cooperatively to
maintain competitiveness and to avoid U.S. hegemony within the post-WWII global economy
(Verdun 2009; McLaren 2006; Calhoun 2003; Fuchs and Klingman 2002). In 1952 the
institutional infrastructure of the EP was being put into place with the establishment of the
European Commission on Coal and Steel. In 1957 the Treaty of Rome further elaborated this
institutional framework with the creation of the European Economic Community, aimed at
establishing a European single market. Simultaneously the European Atomic Energy
Community was established as a means of addressing the Post WWII Cold War era (Ette and
Faist 2007).
Although the 1970s saw a small push to strengthen social citizenship and programs these
agendas were largely dismissed with the emergence of neo-liberalism as the normative

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development paradigm in the 1980s (Jacobs and Maier 1998). This paradigm became core to
European enlargement and structural assimilation in the EP beginning in the late 1970s and
taking strength in the 1980s. Social programs to build solidarity among Europeans were
relegated behind neo-liberal globalization processes, however this added to increasing
apprehension of the EP as a top-down, elite process increasingly affecting the “ground level”
citizens, including their perceptions of mistrust due to the perceived threat to Member State
sovereignty. Signs of building a European collective identity began to emerge through
“Eurosymbolism” or material and non-material symbols that defines who belongs to the EP such
as the European flag, “national” anthem, and common passport to indicate official membership
(Jacobs and Maier 1998).
By 1986 when the Single European Act was established, European institutional elites
focus was on “harmonization” of policy across Member States, which entailed cooperation in
decision-making processes and implementing the bureaucratic standardization of policy,
procedure and other institutional foundations of what we know as the European Union today. In
sum, the first three decades of the EP, including economic and political institutional
harmonization, was typically welcomed with permissive consensus by the public—or the Nation
(Checkle 2009; McLaren 2006; Deutsch 2006; Fuss and Grosser 2006; Schierup, Hansen and
Castles 2006). Some citizens followed the processes of the EP and approved but most were
largely apathetic and/or did not have the time to learn about or fully understand what was
happening at within this elite-driven project (Fuss and Grosser 2006; Schierup, Hansen and
Castles 2006). European progress moved along largely without widespread criticism or protest
from the “ground level”—or “bottom-up”—until the 1990s, when a populist shift began to occur.

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After “three glorious decades” of steady growth, development and enlargement through
to the 1980s there began a remarkable shift from the “permissive consensus” to an era of rising
criticism of the EP due to the strengthening of citizenship and the perceived weakening of
Member State sovereignty (Schierup, Hansen and Castles 2006: 1). Increasing in the 1990s was
the criticism of institutional elites by a multitude groups related to growing nationalism, and
reacting to the perception of threats to Member State sovereignty such as neo-liberal
globalization that had hurt the working-class and unions as well as the increasing centralization
of power in Brussels. This originally culminated in early 1990s with debates over immigration
as a reflection of concerns over “the Other” in European society and the way this concept is
related to surges in racism, xenophobia and nationalism based in notions of “pure” Member State
identity that excludes the Other.
The need for a social and cultural project as it relates to Europe is increasingly
emphasized but is entangled in complex dynamics regarding nation-state loyalties and identities
residual from Europe’s conflicted past, coupled with the current threats of immigration,
enlargement of the Other—such as Turkey—as well as the current economic crisis that has
member state leaders questioning the viability of the European Project altogether. Amidst these
challenges is the question whether a European demos is needed and, if so, how it might be
constructed and sustained. The dissertation investigates “top-down” institutional constructions
of the European Project aimed to establish loyalty, identity and common will consensus,
characteristic of hegemonic power relations. It focuses on institutional discourse as a component
of development processes aimed at building legitimacy for EU institutional power, by examining
the European Commission White Papers as a reflection of access to and control over official
discourse that directly shapes policy making and treaty construction. In addition to examining

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“top-down” institutional-level constructions of the EU, I also examine the “bottom-up” reactions
to top-down constructions of loyalty and identity by utilizing Eurobarometer data. In the next
chapter, Chapter 3, a discussion of the methodological approaches to the research presented in
this dissertation will be presented. This includes an explanation of Critical Discourse Analysis
(CDA) theory coupled with grounded theory approaches to coding analysis and factor analysis of
Eurobarometer data used as a means of obtaining a holistic picture of the European Project,
specifically the current challenges to collective identity and solidarity that exist within the EU.

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CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
Chapter 2 developed a theoretical framework to describe and explain the changing role of
the nation-state in the current era of globalization, using the European Project, or what has
become known as the European Union (EU), as a case study. This general examination is made
specific through an investigation of the transformations the European Project has undergone
from its post-1945 emergence as an economic and political project to its more recent
manifestation as a social and cultural project designed to address the “demographic deficit” and
challenges to solidarity in the EU arising from immigration, enlargement and the Eurozone
crisis. In this chapter a description of Critical Discourse Analysis theory and grounded theory is
offered in relation to the coding schemas used to illustrate the dynamics of power and discourse
among European elites and institutions as they proceeded with the European Project. Ultimately
institutional discourse at the European level reflects a top-down institutional-elite approach to
constructing the loyalty and solidarity of Member State citizens, deemed necessary for the lasting
viability of the European Project.
A TWO-FOLD APPROACH TO EXAMINING THE EUROPEAN PROJECT
This chapter also describes a complementary methodological approach to incorporate the
use of Eurobarometer survey data into the research. The Eurobarometer Survey data facilitates
gauging bottom-up reactions and attitudes of European citizens toward institutional efforts to
create solidarity and collective identity in light of the challenges the EU has faced over time and
currently face.
The twofold approach pursued in this dissertation provides the methodological apparatus
to examine the overarching hypothesis of the dissertation, that the challenges facing the EU

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result in part from previous efforts at the Member State level to build solidarity and from
attempts to construct EU identity among Member State citizens based on concepts of the “Other”
that are associated with perceived threats associated with immigration, enlargement and the
present day Eurozone crisis. The dissertation acknowledges the lack of uniformity in attitudes of
Europeans toward the EU and feelings of attachment to Europe or European identity. Previous
studies regarding European identity show varying levels of “feeling European” based on factors
of age, income level, occupation, education and amount of experience with other Member States
through such things as language, study abroad and traveling (Checkel and Katzensteid 2009;
Fligstein 2009; Deutsch 2006; Fuss and Grosser 2006; McClaren 2006). For these reasons
demographic factors and feelings of identity at varying levels (European, national, regional, and
global) are explored later in Chapter 5 where Eurobarometer data analysis is used to understand
trends among Europeans.
Eurobarometer data is also used to illustrate significant relationships between adherence
among EU citizens to identity and feelings toward the EU, enlargement and minorities.
Although the current Eurozone crisis is another vital point of interest data is not accessible at the
time of writing this dissertation to add to these examinations; however a summary of current
discourse surrounding the crisis will be presented. Overall, the Eurobarometer analysis along
with the White Paper investigation will address the overall question of whether a European
identity is possible or even necessary for the success of the EU.
In addition to reviewing the methodological theory and approaches to coding alongside
the use of Eurobarometer survey data analysis as developed and deployed in this dissertation, an
elaborate on the history of the “European Project” is provided including the elite-driven
processes and events that culminated with the creation of the European Union (EU). The

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discussion will couple this elaboration of historical context with coding analysis of institutional
discourse expressed in the European Commission White Papers. EC White Papers are utilized as
social artifacts to reveal patterns of institutional norms, values, goals and agendas that inform
policy and treaties as well as agendas that aim to influence the attitudes and behaviors of
citizens.
In sum, the main focus of upcoming discussion in Chapter 3 is to connect the theoretical
perspectives of power and the nation-state with the theoretical approaches of CDA and
methodological approaches of grounded theoretical coding. Additionally, Eurobarometer survey
data analysis is conducted to understand the EU as a multi-dimensional supranational project
currently struggling with lack of social solidarity driven by member nations’ and citizens’
attachment to and solidarity to their own Member State rather than the EU. I connect the
previous discussions of power and the nation-state to state institutional discursive power and the
attempt to construct a “common will” and identity among EU citizens through hegemonic
consensus. This solidarity and consensus is critical if the EU is to achieve and maintain
legitimacy, and requires overcoming member-state and regional nationalism as well as perceived
threats related to enlargement and inclusion of previously known “outsiders” or the Other, and
the current economic crisis that has many member state leaders opening questioning the direction
of the EU and the viability of the European Project.
Connecting Theory to Research Methodology:
Literature concerning the role of the nation-state in the current era of globalization
reveals the complex relationships that make up the nation-state and how these are being
challenged by globalization. Relationships between the state and the nation, citizenship, national
identity, and constructions of the Other in the context of the European Project provide a unique

61

framework to understand the shifting dynamics and effects of their interdependence. There is
agreement that the EU provides a unique opportunity to understand newly emerging processes,
trends and relationships as they relate to globalization and more importantly, new responses to
the challenges of globalization (Hopper 2006; VanHam 2001; Sassen 2006)
The European Union, through its enlargement, is transforming how the nation-state is
affected by and responds to the processes of globalization. I examine four components of this
transformation:
o Is a solitary demos and collective identity necessary for the EU to succeed as a
supranational entity in the current era of globalization?
o What roles do EU institutions and policy makers, specifically the European
Commission, play in attempts to build solidarity including constructing a
collective European identity? How do these attempts help to construct, rely on
and/or solidify notions of “us” and “them” based on the Other (“European” vs. the
“Other”)?
o To what extent is there a gap between these efforts (institutional and policy based
community building) and individual attitudes or feelings of being/becoming
European, trust in and support for European institutions? To what extent is there a
gap between institutional efforts to construct solidarity and collective identity and
citizens’ support for integration? Support for immigration and free movement?
Support for enlargement?
o In what ways does the current economic crisis in the Eurozone contribute to “the
gap” by evoking historical definitions of the Other and differential status based on
stratification among core and peripheral nations within the EU?

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The multifaceted nature of these research questions necessitates complementary methodological
approaches: first, a top-down CDA and grounded theoretical approach as a means of
understanding solidarity and collective identity building at the institutional level and second, a
bottom-up data-driven approach incorporating Eurobarometer data to understand solidarity and
consensus for the European Project among member citizens.
CDA and grounded theory approaches to coding helps to debunk EU supranational
identity-building efforts to reveal an elite-driven project based on a “civil hegemony” platform
based in EU agendas of supranational power and legitimacy. CDA examines institutional power
reflected in discourse. In this case, it is used to examine the power of the European Commission
in shaping discourse and agendas as they relate to the European Project.
To gauge bottom up reactions to top-down efforts, Eurobarometer survey data will reveal
attitudes of citizens toward the EU and the future of the European Project. Chapter 5 examines
the bottom-up reaction to elite-driven actions will ask how likely it is for citizens to feel a certain
way, based on their age, occupation, sex and other demographic factors related to residence and
socio-economic level. The analysis of EC White Papers in Chapter 4 however reveal more
blatant tactics that will help to assess top-down institutional efforts and agendas to construct a
European identity among EU citizens. The analysis of Eurobarometer survey data will allow for
a detailed understanding of the feelings of belonging and attachment to a European identity
expressed by the citizens of the Union, as well as attitudes toward enlargement and integration.
The “Top Down” Perspective: Critical Discourse Analysis and Grounded Theory Approaches
Discourse Analysis theory and method emerged during the mid 1960s in France when
Todorov applied modern linguistics and semantics to literature (Van Dijk 1985). By the early
1970s, discourse analysis had emerged as a multidisciplinary approach to understanding the role
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of discourse and power as they related to a multitude of social relations and contexts (Nederveen
Pieterse 2001; Van Dijk 1985; Foucault 1972). Greater attention was paid to the social relations
and power embedded in language, meaning and the construction of meaning in texts, everyday
conversations, political discourse, and the like.
Foucault (1972: 49) examined the concept of discourse in The Archaeology of Knowledge
as a way of understanding discursive structures, which he defined as “practices that
systematically form the objects of which they speak.” Mills (2004: 6) summarizes Foucault’s
overarching characterization and highlights the importance of understanding discourse as the
“general domain of all statements, that is, all utterances or texts which have meaning and which
have some effects in the real world… .” Further, Foucault (1972: 24) claimed discourse analysis
is “a task that consists … of no longer treating discourses as groups of signs but as practices that
systematically for the objects of which they speak.”
Fairclough (2010: 3) defines discourse as a complex set of social relations that “… is not
simply an entity we can define independently, we can only arrive at an understanding of it by
analysing sets of relations.” He continues “… discourse brings into the complex set of relations
which constitute social life: meaning, and making meaning.” Similar to Foucault, who was
interested in the way knowledge is constructed, Fairclough argues for examining the relations
that define shared meaning that leads to notions of “common sense”, “normalcy” and morality.
Theo Van Leeuwen (2008: 6) defined discourses as “social cognitions, socially specific
ways of knowing social practices” or “socially regulated ways of doing things.” Van Dijk (1993:
249) adds to our understanding of discourse by focusing on “its role in the (re)production and
challenge of dominance.” Here Van Dijk emphasizes the need to understand access to and
control over discursive structures which he defines as structures involved in the reproduction of

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dominance. Van Dijk also examines the reflection of dominance in text and talk within specific
contexts that influence others (1993: 259).
Jan Nederveen Pieterse (2001) agrees that “… the very point of discourse analysis is that
discourse matters, talk and representation matter, representation is a form of power and it
constructs social realities.” Much attention has been given by Nederveen Pieterse, Edward Said,
Arturo Escobar, and others, to the role of discourse in development policy and process,
especially as it relates to power and representation of developing nations in the current context of
global neo-liberal development paradigms---or what I referred to in Chapter 2 as the
“development project.” Post-colonial and Subaltern studies have focused on the role of
discourse in shaping development for de-colonizing, Other societies deemed malleable and in
need of development by powerful core nations.
Further, as Fairclough (2010) points out, the emergence of critical discourse analysis
coincided with the emergence of the Washington Consensus and the global spread of neo-liberal
ideology. For Fairclough (2010: 1) CDA assists to “… develop ways of analyzing language
which addresses its involvement in the workings of contemporary capitalist societies.” He goes
on, “the ‘neo-liberal’ version of capitalism which has been dominant for the past thirty years is
widely recognized to have entailed major changes to politics, in the nature of work, education
and healthcare, in social and moral values, in lifestyles and so forth.” Here Fairclough
emphasizes the essential nature of understanding discourse in light of the transformations and
changing social relations that have accompanied neo-liberalism around the globe.
To understand CDA as a method from which to identify and explore discursive structures
as they relate to concepts such as power and ideology, Fairclough (2010: 3-4) argues that CDA
can be characterized in three main ways: relational, dialectical, and trans-disciplinary. CDA is

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relational because of its focus on complex social relations instead of individuals and entities. It
is dialectical in that it examines the “dialectical relations between discourse and other objects,
elements or moments, as well as an analysis of ‘internal relations’ of discourse.” Given the
essential nature of analyzing and understanding discursive relations in addition to the context
from which they are created and sustained, this calls for an inherently multi-dimensional and
multi-disciplinary approach—which Fairclough refers to as “transdisciplinary”. The
encompassing idea presented by this three-fold rubric of CDA is that discourse and social
relations cannot be understood without understanding the layers of relations, their dialectical
nature and the context in which they exist.
Fairclough (2010: 8) argues the main foci of CDA are the “effect of power relations and
inequalities in producing social wrongs, and in particular the effect of discursive aspects of
power relations and inequalities on dialectical relations between discourse and power, and their
efforts on other relations within the social processes and their elements.” In his CDA manifesto,
Fairclough calls for a shift of focus from a critique of structures to a critic of strategies, or “of
attempts, in the context of the failure of existing structures, to transform them in particular
directions”. This dissertation examines not only crises facing the EU in regard to solidarity and
identity, but also the economic crisis that has developed over the duration of this project.
Van Dijk (1993: 249) agrees with Fairclough’s approach to examine strategies, which
they refer to as “discursive strategies”. They claim the usefulness of CDA is to study “relations
between discourse, power, dominance, social inequality and the position of the discourse analyst
in such social relationships.” Further, the core of CDA is “a detailed description explanation and
critique of the ways dominant discourse (indirectly) influences such socially shared knowledge,

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attitudes and ideologies, namely through their role in the manufacture of concrete models (van
Dijk 258-259).”
Overall CDA enables drawing a connection between the macro and the micro; the local
and the global; the “top-down” and the “bottom up”, in a way that makes visible “the structures”
among “the stated.”
Grounded Theory and Methods for Coding EC White Papers
It is difficult not to become mystified at the broad range of approaches to CDA that have
been used within a variety of disciplines. CDA approaches such as the “Sociocognitive
Approach,” “Dispositive Analysis,” “Corpus-Linguistics Approach,” and “Dialectical-Relational
Approach” reveal the many directions from which to base an analysis of discourse. The main
goal of this research is not to conduct a word-by-word analysis from a semiotics or linguistics
perspective, nor was it to simply count the occurrences of certain words. The intention of the use
of CDA in this project is to understand power within discourse by looking at sentences and/or
segments of text that illustrate the power relations that are implemented and defined at the
institutional level.
In order to pursue this endeavor coding as a form of content analysis was utilized. More
specifically, a grounded theory based coding scheme that advocates remaining close to the data
(the text discourse) and allowing patterns to emerge during the coding process. Grounded theory
based methods for coding allows trends and patterns from which theory is built to emerge from
the “raw” discourse which is one way of establishing and making visible the contexts from
which challenges to the EP are rooted and might be understood more clearly.
Grounded theory as developed by Glaser and Strauss (1967: 2) is a way of building
theory from “data systematically obtained through social research.” Falling back on CDA

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principles this dissertation uses institutional discourse presented in text form as a tool to illustrate
institutional agendas, perspectives and power within the European Project. From a grounded
theory perspective the texts become data from which theory emerges.
Grounded theory methods “consist of systematic, yet flexible guidelines for collecting and
analyzing qualitative data to construct theories grounded in the data themselves (Charmaz 2006:
2).” Included in these methods are approaches to coding, “the analytic process through which
data are fractured, conceptualized, and integrated to form theory (Strauss and Corbin 1998: 3).
Coding becomes a way to attach categories to segments of data that describe or characterize what
the category is about (Charmaz 2006). According to Strauss and Corbin (1998: 6-7) the purposes
of coding include the following:
1. To build rather than test theory.
2. To provide researchers with analytic tools for handling masses of raw data.
3. To help analysts to consider alternative meanings of phenomena.
4. To be systematic and creative simultaneously.
5. To identify, develop, and relate the concepts that are the building blocks of theory
Coding is integral to understanding patterns within discourse that reflect institutional
perspectives and within a CDA and grounded theory approach to understanding discourse
becomes the link between data and theory development.
It must be noted that I had never previously sat down to read an EC White Paper before
pursuing this research and it was purposeful that I chose not to do so at any point in the research.
One approach to grounded theory coding, and method for “sticking close to the data”, is to not be
overly familiar with the data or text before coding. It was decided that coding without having
read the documents first would be an approach that would minimize bias and maximize the
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ability to keep coding categories closely reflective of the text. The goal of this approach was to
minimize pre-conceived ideas of what to code, how to code or which text to use for coding.
Therefore the coding was based on line-by-line and section-by-section coding that closely
reflected the text. If there had been significant prior knowledge or expertise of the White Papers,
treaties and other official institutional discursive documents there may have been a increased risk
in selective perception related to text selection and coding creation. In this case, lack of prior
knowledge of the documents assisted in creating codes that were more closely reflective of what
the authors of the discourse intended to convey.
The CDA conducted for this dissertation is intended to reveal an institutional perspective,
it is not intended to reflect the perspectives and attitudes of EU citizens, as many of them have
probably not read them to any great extent either. Regardless, it does reflect the perspective of
institutional elites who have shaped the European Project and continue to aim their efforts and
building “Europe” as a whole, with identity and solidarity from which legitimacy is sustained.
With that being said, two methods of coding were used in the analysis of institutional
discourse for Chapter 4. The first stage of coding included microanalysis coding (Strauss and
Corbin (1998: 13), or initial coding (Charmaz 2006: 46), that describes the detailed process of
coding line-by-line or in small segments, where code labels reflect the text closely and remain
close to the raw data.
The second stage of coding involved selective coding (Strauss and Corbin 1998: 143), or
focused coding (Charmaz 2006: 46) where codes from the first stage are refined or focused into
larger broader categories that help to identify emergent patterns in the discourse. The focused
codes are then used, in addition to specific segments of text from initial coding, to show the
trajectory of perspectives and agendas at the institutional level, important in shaping the

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European Project. Of course, EC White Papers are the focus of CDA and in the next section the
justification for their selection is explored.
European Commission White Papers: Using NVivo for CDA
A Critical Discourse Analysis of the discourse found in European Commission White
Papers was used as a way of understanding the top-down institutional efforts to shape discourse,
and build solidarity and collective identity among citizens, especially in light of the recent
“constitutional crisis” and “demographic deficit.”
Seven EU White Papers published between 1985 and 2007 were examined to understand
the overarching goals and agendas of the European Project as they changed over time to
increasingly incorporate socio-cultural agendas. These White Papers were also examined as a
way of showing the increased importance of building solidarity among Europeans and efforts to
construct a collective identity that would support EU solidarity. Conventionally, white papers are
understood to be “government report[s] giving information or proposals on an issue, (OED
2008).” More specifically, the EU (http://europa.eu/scadplus/glossary/white_paper_en.htm)
defines a white paper as follows:
Commission White Papers are documents containing proposals for Community
action in a specific area. In some cases they follow a Green Paper3 published to
launch a consultation process at the European Level. When a White Paper is
favourably received by Council, it can lead to an action programme for the Union
in the area concerned.
This definition emphasizes that the European Commission is in a position of access to, and
control over discourse by its ability to compose and present White Paper documents. White

3A

“Green Paper” is defined as “documents published by the European Commission to stimulate
discussion on given topics at the European level. They invite the relevant parties (bodies or
individuals) to participate in a consultation process and debate on the basis of the proposals they
put forward. Green Papers may give rise to legislative developments that are outlined in White
Papers (http://europa.eu/scadplus/glossary/green_paper_ed.htm)”
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Papers are powerful agents of discourse in shaping agendas and policy creation within the EU.
Regardless of their power to create and control discourse, although the White Papers are readily
available in print and on the Internet, this does not imply that the public read them and are
directly influenced by the discourse that is embedded. Rather, the indirect power of the
documents lies in their influence in shaping institutional perspectives on issues of major concern
to the EU, including its citizenry, and prescription policy addressing them.
The EU White Papers presented periodically since 1985 have been used as a platform for
institutional projects, goals and agendas as deemed important by the European Commission.
According to the Europa glossary
(http://europa.en/scadplus/glossary/european_commission_en.htm), the European Commission is
a:
politically independent collegial institution which embodies and defends the
general interests of the European Union. Its virtually exclusive right of initiative4
in the field of legislation makes it the driving force of European Integration. It
prepares and then implements the legislative instruments adopted by the Council
and the European Parliament in connection with community policies.
The Commission is made of up two representatives from member states with large populations
and one representative from smaller member states. Understanding the structure, power and
basis of the European Commission and its representation of EU institutional agendas and
platforms is directly related to this dissertation’s central research questions.
The aggregate patterns, trends and discourse found in these documents and statements
will reveal the institutional agendas of nation building and civil hegemony that survey data could

“Right of initiative” is defined in connection to the role of the Commission as “guardian of
Treaties” and “defender of the general interest” and as something which “empowers and requires
it [the Commission] to make proposals on the matters contained in the Treaty, either because the
Treaty expressly so provides or because the Commission considers it necessary
(http://europa.en/scadplus/glossary/right_of_initiative_en.htm)”
4

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not capture. Previous research has argued that those who benefit the most from the EU via such
things as experiences with travel associated with education or business opportunities are more
likely to support the EU including further enlargement and integration.
By examining the text of the White Papers I show the shifting perspectives on
participation in the European Project, what is expected of member states, and, ultimately, the
increasing emphasis on European solidarity and the need for a European collective identity. I
argue that these attempts have been rebuffed by populist movements and ethnic-based identity
movements that shed light on continual adherence to member state identity by Europeans that
becomes stronger in light of challenges such as perceived threats to dominant culture
accompanying immigration, enlargement of the “Other” and the economic crisis currently
refueling class biases between core and peripheral Member States and their members.
“Bottom-Up” Perspectives of the European Project and Identity: Eurobarometer Survey Data
The Eurobarometer was established in 1973 and consists of approximately 1000 face-toface interviews per Member State. Reports are published twice yearly and additional “flash,”
special topic, and qualitative Euro-barometer studies have been conducted. The Eurobarometer
allows for macro-level perspectives of attitudes concerning a range of topics and issues related to
the EU. Public opinion analysis is valuable in this case given the impact it has on public official
need to garner public support, but more importantly because of the public’s role in approving EU
policy and procedure, specifically as it relates to referendums (Dell’Olio 2005; McLaren 2006).
Eurobarometer data from “Eurobarometer 71.3: Globalization, Personal Values and
Priorities, European Identity, Future of the European Union, Social Problems and Welfare, and
European Elections, June-July 2009”

72

o Perceptions of EU Membership (QA6a, QA7a)
o Trust in EU institutions (QA9: 3, 5)
o Support for euro and enlargement (QA15: 1-2)
o Views of Globalization as a threat or opportunity (QB4a)
o Views on the EU’s Role in globalizations impact on citizens (QB5a, QB5b)
o Sense of belonging to EU, Nationality, Regional/Local, Global Citizen (QE4)
o Perceptions toward the impact of Public Authority on Living conditions (QG1)
o Feelings toward “Others” in society—other ethnic minority groups and
immigrants (QH1: 1, 3-4, 6)
These variables will be examined according to the following demographic data:
o Sex
o Age (recoded into 6 categories)
o Occupation
o Respondent difficulty in paying bills over the past 12 months
o Type of Community
The survey data will be used as a means of generally gauging the following three themes. The
first is “Identity” based on variables measuring “sense of belonging”, “Perspectives of the Other”
and “Perspectives of globalization as a threat or an opportunity. The second theme is “Views of
State Institutions and Public Authority” based on variables measuring perceptions concerning the
impact of public authority on living conditions, and the role of the EU in harnessing
globalizations impact, protecting and enabling citizens. The third and final theme is “Support for
the EP” including variables measuring perspectives toward EU membership as well as support
for the euro and future enlargement. Comparing trends of support for the EP and perspectives of
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EU authority to identity attachment and perspectives of globalization and the Other allows us to
gauge the gap that may exist between institutional policy efforts and the result they intend.
A multidimensional investigation of issues related to European identity as they relate to
integration and enlargement will allow for a “top-down” and “bottom up” approach to
understanding identity in the context of the transforming nation state and the effects this may
have on the emergence of the European Union as a supranational power within the global
political economy. The next chapter identifies discourse trends over time that reveal the
increasing focus of institutional goals and agendas on pursuing a “European Social Model.” The
core of this model is collective identity among Europeans based on shared history, sense of
belonging and shared sense of investment. From the State point of view a “demos” based on
collective identity is key to building solidarity, and subsequently legitimacy for the European
social contract between “Brussels” (EU political and economic institutional elites) and the
membership from which participation and loyalty is essential.
The following chapter, Chapter 5, then assesses the impact of institutional agendas
reflected in discourse by utilizing Eurobarometer data. The pursuit of this analysis is to follow
up the investigation of “top-down” initiatives to socialize citizens into “Europeans” revealed in
Chapter 4 and to conceptualize “the gap” between the EP and citizens. Perspectives and attitudes
according to demographic indicators will help to gauge the effects, and possible success, of
attempts at the “top-down” construction of a “European people” through proposed agendas
discussed in Chapter 4. Both perspectives contribute to the overall investigation of the European
Project and the challenges it faces moving forward in the Twenty-first century.

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CHAPTER 4: CRITICAL DISCOURSE ANALYSIS OF EUROPEAN
“TOP-DOWN PERSPECTIVES AND INITAITIVES
Chapter 4 explores the trajectory of the “European Project (EP)” through the lens of
European Commission White Paper documents. Utilizing critical discourse analysis and a
grounded theoretical approach to coding, this chapter addresses the role of European institutional
elites, specifically those from the European Commission, in setting the development agenda of
the EP. It also focuses on the role of institutions as agents of socialization shaping the shifting
relationships between institutions, states and the nation in the current era of globalization.
From the start of the EP in the 1950s, the following three decades seemed to be marked
with continual success in development and integration, as well as enlargement of the EP.
However, a series of institutional milestones coupled with the increasing role and impact on
members of the EP at the “ground level” (Member State citizens who ultimately became
European citizens) instigated a shift in goals and agendas of EP institutional elite.
By the early 1990s the EP was based largely on a taken for granted culture of
paternalistic, top-down, institutional development and socialization of EP membership that was
widely accepted without question, otherwise coined as the era of “permissive consensus”
(Checkle 2009; Athanassopoulou 2008; McLaren 2006). European level activities were viewed
as having little consequence on the “ground level” of citizens lives and the EP progressed with
little opposition, or knowledge and participation for that matter, on behalf of “everyday” citizens.
A shift occurred during the 1990s that questioned the EP, the role of institutional elites and the
challenge of the EU to Member-State sovereignty related to issues such as enlargement and
immigration that tapped into fear and threats of the Other in addition to the processes of
globalization viewed as largely benefiting the transnational corporate class and not “everyday
citizens” of the laboring classes.
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Increasingly the institutional elite began to recognize the need for social solidarity and
feelings of investment, loyalty and ultimately collective identity at the European level. Europe’s
“social project” began to take the center stage of European level agendas and goals, including the
promotion of solidarity and active civic participation. At this point, top-down efforts to build
solidarity and promote participation, especially among the youth were also utilized as new
platforms from which to build civil hegemony at the European level. Regardless of the
increasing focus on building social, cultural and political solidarity in addition (and association)
to European hegemony in recent years, challenges to sovereignty and questions regarding
globalization and the EP have become serious issues from the “bottom-up” lives of the nation
that faced the future of the EP.
In addition to the exploring various events (mainly the implementation of Treaties) that
reveal an institutional reaction to the “shift” in “bottom-up” ground level support of top-down
approaches to development within the EP there are other key components to understanding the
trajectory of the EP and the challenges it faces today. First, neoliberal development has been
core to EP integration, enlargement (including membership) and agenda setting. This has been
important to establishing, as well as perpetuating, discrepancies and hierarchies between
Member-States that have contributed to overall challenges, especially the Eurozone crisis. As
mentioned in Chapter 3, Fairclough (2010) strongly argues that neo-liberal economic
development on a global level has had a massive impact on discourse, especially political.
Further, attempts to build hegemonic power at the institutional level and consensus
among political elites, via participation and collective identity at the European level, has become
an essential element of the European Project but has not necessarily been successful at the
“ground level.” Decades of conflict and nation-building amongst Member-States stand in the

76

way of coming together as “Europeans” who willingly support and participate in European
institutions (providing these institutions with legitimacy). These divisions are only solidified
with conflict arising bottom-up perspectives of immigration, enlargement, globalization and the
global economic recession that influence, and sometimes stand in the way of collective identity
and solidarity at the European level.
Finally, top-down approaches to building the “European social contract” that emphasize
the increasing importance of integration, collective identity and social cohesion among citizens
as conditions for further progress of the European Project have not been received as intended by
institutional elites at the “ground level”. Bottom-up trends concerning the identities and attitudes
of European citizens will be examined in more detail in Chapter 5 through the analysis of
Eurobarometer data. Here, core issues previously discussed at the start of this chapter are
examined through coding of EC White Papers as a way to gauge top-down efforts toward neoliberal development, building solidarity alongside European level hegemony.
EUROPEAN COMMISSION WHITE PAPER ANALYSIS
Analysis of the institutional discourse within seven EC White Papers starting shortly
before the completion of the internal market in 1993 up to 2007 was conducted for the purposes
of this discussion. Table 4.1 summarizes the main coding themes from the paper, referred to as
“discursive themes,” which help to illustrate the shift from permissive consensus to increasing
bottom-up challenges to the role of European institutional elites and the EP itself. The coding
summary reveals major shifts in EP goals and agendas that reflected the European “social
program” and top-down attempts to build solidarity and civil hegemony. These inquiries into the
European Project assist in exploring the first two of the six proposed hypotheses of this
dissertation:

77

o The “European Project” has been transformed from a largely economic
project to a socio-cultural project illustrating the shifting roles and
relationships of nations, states, nation-states, citizens and identities in the
current era of globalization; and
o Institutional efforts to construct a European collective identity among
citizens illustrates efforts to construct hegemonic power at the institutional
level (including knowledge construction, manufacturing consensus
[“common sense”], encouraging participation, and consent);
Overall, examination of EC White Papers assist in conceptualizing and understanding
top-down institutional recognition of the need for a socially and culturally solidified and
participatory Europe as a means of legitimizing the EP. EC White Papers also reveal the role of
European institutions as agents of socialization to members of the EU, with the goal of building a
European demos as a critical part of perpetuating the EP, especially its institutions. Up through
the 1980s the top-down paternalistic development and role of the EP was based on “permissive
consensus” until bottom-up challenges to sovereignty based on globalization, enlargement and
immigration became increasingly important after 1990. The discourse analysis offered in this
chapter identifies efforts to construct solidarity among Europeans at the institutional level. It
also examines the challenges facing the EP such as the citizenship deficit, lack of European
identity, perceptions of the “Other” as well as the current unfolding economic crisis facing the
Eurozone.
The following section provide detailed analysis of discursive themes, including the main
codes that describe the discursive themes reveal and gradual push from economic integration to
political, social and cultural integration within the EP. The analysis reveals an increasing focus

78

of EU political elites attention on the role of public opinion but also the importance of European
identity and solidarity in making the EP successful and sustainable. The next section offers an
examination of top-down discourse that illustrates goals pertaining to building a European nation
at the ground-level.
European Project Discourse: Using CDA to Examine EC White Papers
The analysis of EC White Papers employs elements of traditional content analysis, where
the frequency of words, codes, and/or categories are counted and analyzed in a systematic,
replicable way (Stemler 2008). This analysis employs a mix of CDA approaches to address the
critique and to accommodate the research goals of this dissertation. The first goal of the EC
White Paper analysis is to examine the institutional role in creating and controlling discourse.
Norman Fairclough (2010: 122) advocates examining text production, which focuses on
“…connections between text production, and the social determination and creativity of the
subject” or the “motivation” of the individual(s) producing the text.” It will be sufficient for the
purposes of this project to generally discuss the role of the European Commission as an
institution. Focus on the individual members of the EC for each White Paper is beyond the
scope of this investigation. Examining the role of the EC helps us to understand access and
control over discourse, which will be useful in understanding the power of these texts in shaping
discourse that ultimately informs and influences policy and procedures within the EU.
The combination of elaborated content analysis with elements of CDA and analysis of
“text production” will allow for the examination of top-down institutional efforts within the EP,
including more recent agendas to solidify collective identity among Europeans as a means of
garnering legitimacy. These two complimentary approaches to understanding the role of power
and discourse in the EU, as well as the ways in which they shape European solidarity and

79

identity, will set the stage for “bottom-up” perspectives based in analysis of survey responses
reflecting attitudes of citizens toward the EU. Following the discussion of the European
Commission and its role as “text producer”, each of the following sections uses elaborated
content analysis to describe the main themes of each White Paper that reflects the goals and
agendas of the European Project officials. To support the analysis of themes, NVivo coding is
utilized to gauge the frequency of key terms, or discursive signifiers, within each paper. I
conclude with an overall summary of the shift in themes as they relate to key events and changes
in the direction of the EU.
EC White Paper Analysis: NVivo and Coding Approaches
With the help of NVivo software, seven European Commission White Papers from the
years 1985-2007 were coded to reveal overarching themes and foci related to institutional
discourse, including discursive signifiers, which shaped(s) top-down policy and action. Using a
grounded theory approach to coding, I completed “initial coding” line by line for each paper and
then proceeded to conduct “focused coding” to explore emergent themes and discursive
signifiers. The purpose of grounded theory in the initial phase of coding is to allow themes to
present themselves through the details of text and then to focus these details into broader
categories. I did not read the White Papers before beginning coding to minimize bias that may
have influenced the coding process due to prior knowledge. I chose one or more White Papers
from each year available that were offered in PDF and word document format and were
compatible with the NVivo software. This yielded seven EC White Papers ranging from 1985 to
2007. Papers available after 2007 on the website were not included because of document
formatting incompatibility in NVivo.

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One main reason for choosing European Commission (EC) White Papers as a source for
institutional discourse analysis is because they illustrate the powerful institutional role of the EC
to set agendas that range from completing the internal market in the mid 1980s to reactions to the
“constitutional crisis” and “democratic deficit” of the early 2000s. The analysis of the White
Papers included in this dissertation illustrates EP goals and foci shifting from a largely elite
drive, top-down economic project to an increasingly social and cultural project that aims to build
solidarity and hegemonic power through consensus and “active citizenship”. It is important to
understand power dynamics and the role institutional actors play in shaping discourse, agendas
and the trajectory of the European Project, including the ways they shape the lives of EU
citizens.
Examination of European Commission White Papers also reveals top-down efforts to
shape European goals and agendas. Initially, the goals and agendas focused on providing
economic programs and garnering institutional support for the EP among Member State officials
and by the international community. More recent papers reveal a shift toward acknowledging
the need to establish a European demos where citizens’ loyalty, participation and feelings of
investment in the European Project provide its leaders with the legitimacy and support they need
to maintain their domestic and international activities The White Papers show a shift as leaders
move from garnering support at the institutional level to seeking support at the “ground level”
among citizens, albeit with top-down guidelines. Goals to construct identity and solidarity
acknowledge citizen reactions and attitudes toward the EP, especially in light of major
challenges facing the EP.
EC White Papers reveal the discourse and language reflective of shifts in goals and
agendas at the institutional level. These examinations also indicate discursive definitions of “us”

81

and “them,” a polarization that is often a foundation for solidarity building and identity
construction. The goal of this dissertation is to understand the EP as a historical project that
emerged in the post WWII era as a reaction to the shifting roles and relationships of nations,
states, nation-states, citizens and identities in the current era of globalization. The European
Union (EU) is just one phase or segment of a project that has been under construction since the
end of WWII, largely driven by elite, institutional interests. The newest phase of the European
Project is solidifying collective identity as a part of building and securing a European demos that
provides legitimacy, participation and support for the normative institutional power of the elites
who are attempting to maintain their position in the EU and globally. However, in light of “topdown” efforts to maintain the project there are significant challenges shaping the European
Project and the direction it may take.
Many elements of discourse can be examined as a way of understanding institutional
power within the European Project and the ways in which powerful actors have a hand in
shaping discourse that in turn shape policy and the everyday lives of citizens of the EU.
Treaties may be the most “official” texts that illustrate the institutionalized norms and values of
EP elites and institutional actors that have shaped the project since its entrance into the global
arena. Alternatively, EC White Papers are meant to identify problems, goals or projects that
represent and protect the interests of the EU. The EC White Papers are written to inform and
persuade policy makers that ultimately create the discourse comprising treaties. Therefore EC
White Papers are a valuable source to illustrate the political ideological power that underscores
the official power manifest in treaties, policy and law.
Overall, the institutional agendas of solidarity building within the EU have not
necessarily translated into a shared European culture and identity due to the relationship of

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citizens with member states. Later, the dissertation uses the responses of citizens from
Eurobarometer data to measure attitudes toward the EU resulting from the effects of the
European Project relationships explored earlier between the nation-state, citizenship and notions
of the “Other.” Eurobarometer data provides a “bottom-up” framework for an investigation into
arguments relating to integration based on collective identity.
EC White Paper Coding Summary
The year, title, main discursive themes and descriptions of seven coded EC White Papers
are included in Table A.1 of Appendix A to offer a perspective of top-down, institutional
perspectives and agendas for the European Project. “Discursive themes” refers to dominant
categories and themes that emerged from the coding of discourse within the European
Commission White Papers. The concept “discursive themes” is used in this dissertation as a way
of incorporating the concept of “discursive signifiers” which are describes as key words or
phrases that represent and/or signal discourse paradigms. Discursive signifiers are utilized as an
approach to coding the text and relating concepts within the text. Eventually discursive
signifiers (coded into “free nodes”) are connected to main coding categories, or “Discursive
Themes”. Both of these terms are used to describe data in the tables and figures throughout
Chapter 4.
WHAT THE EC WHITE PAPERS REVEAL ABOUT THE EP
Official Titles of the EP
References to the European Project have manifest in the official names assigned by its
institutional leaders and revealed in documents beginning with the Treaty of Rome where the EP
became known as the “European Economic Community (EEC)”. This was reflected in the 1985
EC White Paper on Completing the Internal Market where references to the “EEC” and more

83

commonly “the Community” are found. Later with the 1994 papers and beyond, the normative
term of “European” is more paramount that the term “Community,” indicating discursive shifts
in normative terminology and references to the EP. The shift in names reflects a shift of focus
from economics to “Community” indicating political, social and cultural community.
Regardless of name, what these terms are largely referring to is the infrastructure of the
European Project—the institutions. This includes the European Commission, whose role I focus
on greatly for this dissertation, as well as the Council of the European Union and European
Parliament among many other intergovernmental institutional bodies that make up the official
decision-making and power structures for the European Project. This dissertation focuses
specifically on the European Commission and the role of the EC White Papers in shaping
decision making and agenda setting policy and programs. In this case, examining the discourse
of the EC White Papers will allow us to understand the overarching ideology and agendas that
have emerged since just before the completion of the internal market.
Detailed Discussion of EC White Paper Analysis
The following section discusses the CDA and grounded theory analysis of EC White
Papers as a reflection of institutional discourse. Each paper’s discursive themes based on initial
codes that produced what NVivo refers to as “free nodes” but what I am calling “discursive
signifiers (DS)” due to their connection to “discursive themes (DT)”. Each table presenting DTs
and each figure presenting DSs that comprise each theme are a way of illustrating the power of
discourse in revealing and influencing ideas and agendas from an institutional point of view.
Table 4.1 indicates the major DTs that emerged during the EP trajectory beginning with
the 1985 White Paper include “harmonization” and “free movement” in relation to the
completion of the internal market and ending with agendas related to European “health policy

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and services” in 2007 as a benefit and concern of membership.
1985 White Paper discursive themes
The 1985 White Paper (WP) Completing the Internal Market emphasized timelines for
completion of the European Community Internal Market as well as eradication of barriers, such
as fiscal and technical that may stand in the way of integration. At this time, and in this case,
“integration” meant the bureaucratization of Member States as a part of assimilating into the
European Project at the institutional level. The 1985 WP is also focused on institutional and
economic aspects of policy and “harmonization”, or the standardization of European institutional
processes and policy to that of Member States. Reminiscent of the “par for the course” neoliberal globalization discussed in Chapter 2, the 1985 WP illustrates the agendas and processes
associated with Europe’s reaction to globalization and the push for neo-liberal development
during the 1970s and 1980s. For Europe, neo-liberal globalization manifest in the economic
integration of European member states parallels much of the development occurring in former
European colonies at the same time. It is not until later that the “peripheral” European nations
would enter the picture and take another step toward completing the structures of hegemonic
power among political and economic elite within the European Project.
Table 4.2 illustrates trends revealed in the coding of EC White Papers. First, it shows the
main codes according to the amount of “coverage” or text in that particular white paper that was
included in the codes. Almost one-third of the 1985 WP on “Completing the Internal Market”
was associated with “harmonization”—a key term, or discursive signifier, used to describe
standardization of policy across member-states as part of integration into the European internal
market. Further, the codes are ranked according to the amount of text it covered in total across
the paper as well as the number of “free nodes” or independent codes made up the main code.

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The same details are reported for each paper as a way of indicating overarching trends across
over 20 years of discourse.
Table 4.1.: “1985 Completing the Internal Market” White Paper Main Codes Summary
For interpretation of the references to color in this and all other figures or tables, the reader is
referred to the electronic version of this dissertation

Rank based
on % of
% Text
Text
Main Code Name
Coverage Coverage
Harmonization
32.79
1
Free Movement
21.42
2
Article or Treaty Reference
11.97
3
Community vs. Member State
11.60
4
Completing the Internal Market
9.08
5

Number
of Free
Nodes in
the Main
Code
15
7
5
6
7

Rank
based on
Number
of Free
Nodes
1
2
4
3
2

—

The “Harmonization” main code is comprised of 15 initial codes, or “Free Nodes”. Figure 4.1
itemizes the “free nodes” or independent codes that made up the “main code” of Harmonization
that emerged as the most important, and prevalent theme, in the first white paper coded:
Table 4.2: “Harmonization” Main Code Free Nodes by Percent of White Paper Text
Coverage
% Text
“Harmonization” Free Node Titles
Coverage
Developing cooperation between Member States
1.00%
European standards
1.02%
Commissions harmonisation approach principles
1.24%
Harmonization of national legislation objectives
1.35%
The Chosen Plan
1.43%
APPROXIMATION
1.52%
Intellectual and industrial property
1.62%
CREATION OF SUITABLE CONDITIONS FOR INDUSTRIAL
1.86%
COOPERATION
Member State Harmonization and abolition of barriers as a goal
1.90%
Actions to facilitate integration
2.28%
Mutual recognition
2.66%
Harmonization of financial service rules
2.88%
The New Strategy
2.95%
Clearing House System
3.84%
86

Harmonisation of VAT directives

5.25%

Two themes emerged from analysis of the 1985 White Paper: First, the concerns of the
“Community” officials over the adherence of Member State officials (both described as
“administrators” sporadically throughout the paper) to “Community policy”. It was clear that
Member States sovereignty would be challenged so creating a sense of egalitarian investment
and benefit among Member State political elite with concepts such as “harmonization” and
“mutual recognition” alluded to equal participation and success.
Second, it is clear the burden of "harmonization" and "mutual recognition" as aspects of
European Structural Adjustment that were emphasized fall on the Member State in carrying out
the will of European institutional elite. The 1985 WP shows European Project elites
participation in enforcing Community policy at the top levels of government, however from the
beginning there were also indications of goals to transform the Community into a "European
society", albeit an economic society. Most citizens did not see this agenda as political, social and
cultural until much later.
With the pending completion of the market, the concerns of Community officials, or at
least the authors of the White Paper, seem to revolve around breaking down barriers to economic
integration including hesitancy of Member State officials to take into consideration policy and
the future of the Community over their own Member State agendas. This was made clear that
the loyalty of Member State governments to their own agendas over Community agendas would
be a barrier to the success of the European Project.
For instance, when discussing the removal of internal barriers to movement the paper
states, “The formalities affecting individual travellers are a constant and concrete reminder to the
ordinary citizen that the construction of a real European Community is far from complete.” It
87

then goes on to state “Even though these controls are often no more than spot checks, they are
seen as the outward sign of an arbitrary administrative power over individuals and as an affront
to the principle of freedom of movement within a single Community. (1985: 16)” The first quote
indicates that not only are removal of border checks and other barriers to travel necessary for
economic and bureaucratic integration but that it is also a symbolic reminder to citizens of the
divisions among Member States and the lack of progress in completing the EP. The second
segment reminds European and Member State institutional elites that these are not just
bureaucratic measures; it is a part of creating a taken for granted community bound together by
reciprocal rights and responsibilities, without barriers such as overriding Member State loyalty.
Other statements show the clear struggle over control within the EP, where the
Commission as a representative of Community power shows its increasing strength over Member
State power. While clarifying the “harmonization approach” the 1985 White Paper states,
a clear distinction needs to be drawn in future internal market initiatives between
what it is essential to harmonize, and what may be left to mutual recognition of
national regulations and standards … this implies that, on the occasion of each
harmonisation initiative, the Commission will determine whether national
regulations are excessive in relation to the mandatory requirements pursued and,
thus, constitute unjustified barriers to trade according to Article 30 to 36 of the
EEC Treaty; legislative harmonisation (Council Directives based on Article 100)
will in future be restricted to laying down essential health and safety requirements
which will be obligatory in all Member States. Conformity with this will entitle a
product to free movement; harmonisation of industrial standards by the
elaboration of European standards will be promoted to the maximum extent, but
the absence of European Standards should not be allowed to be used as a barrier
to free movement. During the waiting period while European Standards are being
developed, the mutual acceptance of national standards, with agreed procedures,
should be the guiding principle. … The creation of the internal market relies in
the first place on the willingness of Member States to respect the principle of free
movement of goods as laid down in the Treaty. This principle allows the
Commission to require the removal of all unjustified barriers to trade (1985: 2122).
Here, the focus of solidarity in building a European Community is clearly aimed at Member

88

State officials who are seemingly poised, from the point of view of the European Commission, as
the main barrier to completing the internal market and successful harmonization. Later, this
focus shifts to the role of citizens and the gap between them and the institutions attempting to
create solidarity.
Additionally, although mainly policy and economic focused, the 1985 White Paper did
offer many discursive signifiers were used to establish the boundaries of who belong to the
Community and who did not. Most interesting was the term "continental uniform market,"
which appeared as an early term for what may now commonly be referred to as "state-bloc"
indicating an unclear idea of what “supranational” means in the European context. Also citizens
were referred to as "Community citizens" and compared to "non-Community citizens." Other
terms such as "frontier workers" and "internal migrants" emerged to describe the status of those
who would belong to the Community in association with their Member State status. In relation
to these terms was discussion of the breakdown of barriers for individuals and early discussion of
EU passports (ID cards), abolishment of border checks for citizens, and "harmonization" of
qualifications for "internal migrant" workers wishing to work in another Member State of their
own. All of these spell the initial context of EU immigration policy and terms for membership
which is clearly a part of the social policy that gains attention in the early 1990s with the
completion of the internal market and newer goals of building a “European Social Model.”
The 1990s White Papers: Social policy and strengthening the labor market
After ratification of the Maastrict Treaty on May 18, 1993 the single European market
was complete and attention turned to social aspects of the project, largely as they related to the
labor market. Terms such as “the European Model” and “the European Social Model” emerged
from the 1994 European Social Policy: A Way Forward White Paper to describe the abstract

89

nature of the EP as an ongoing set of actions meant to institutionalize norms, values and ideals. It
was also a way of describing the new phase for building Europe after the completion of the
internal market and integration of economies. The phrase “European Social Model” coded in
this paper was referenced in relation to creating social policy to invest in “a world class labour
market” where jobs are “the top priority” focusing on the laborers and citizens who participate
in the internal market. Also, “European Social Model” is referenced in the 1994 White Paper as
important to “the role of European Social Policy” in the international community.
Table 4.3.: “1994 European Social Policy” White Paper Main Codes Summary

% Text
Main Code Name
Coverage
Member State vs. Commission
33.27
Social Equity-Gender
28.93
Edu., Jobs and Labor Force
24.87
European Social Policy and Model
20.54
Citizenship and Immigration
18.74

Rank
Based on
% of Text
Coverage
1
2
3
4
5

Number
of Free
Nodes in
Main
Code
4
6
8
8
9

Rank
Based on
Number of
Free Nodes
5
3
2
2
1

—

The “Member State vs. Commission main code is made up of 4 initial codes or “free nodes”:
Table 4.4: “1994 European Social Policy” White Paper “Member State vs. Commission”
Main Code Free Nodes by Percentage of Text Coverage
“Member State vs. Commission” Free Node Names
Commission plan to strengthen cooperation with Member States in regard to
employment
Collaboration between Member States and the Commission with regard to
employment
Cooperation between Commission and Member States in regard to employment
and training
Member State vs EU power roles

90

%
Coverage
2.05%
3.24%
3.66%
24.32%

The 1994 paper reveals that the social aspects of the European Project were becoming
paramount not only in the White Paper agendas but also other aspects of institutional discourse
such as the Community Charter of the Fundamental Social Rights of Workers, which is
referenced in the 1994 White Paper in relation to the “European Social Model”. Here “shared
values” as a part of the European social model are discussed:
…there are a number of shared values which form the basis of the European
social model. These include democracy and individual rights, free collective
bargaining, the market economy, equality of opportunity for all and social welfare
and solidarity. These values - -which were encapsulated by the Community
Charter of the Fundamental Social Rights of Workers - are held together by the
conviction that economic and social progress must go hand in hand.
Competitiveness and solidarity have both to be taken into account in building a
successful Europe for the future (1994: 31).
The European Commission acknowledges that social and economic change go hand in hand,
however in 1994 solidarity and social progress was referenced in regard to the labor market and
economy, not necessarily based on a particular culture or sense of belonging as we see in later
papers. In other aspects of the paper, individual rights and responsibilities relate largely in terms
of the role of workers in European society. Social aspects of the EP relate to the protection of
workers free movement and ability to participate in the internal market. As stated in the 1994
White Paper, “European Social Policy—A Way Forward for the Union”:
One of the great successes of European integration has been to transmute
economic migratory movements between Member States into free movement
based on free movement of persons who draw their rights from the Treaty, which
contributes to a concrete and practical expression of European citizenship. This is
a real testimony to the values inherent in the European social model, and in
particular the rights and responsibilities of individuals (1994: 37)
Aspects of social exclusion were also acknowledged as a barrier to the success of workers.
Some attention was paid to the concept of “social cohesiveness” in addition to “social exclusion”
where issues of racism, gender inequality, xenophobia and ableism were briefly introduced and

91

discussed in relation to more economic aspects of the "social policy" such as strengthening the
role of laborers. For instance, when discussing equal opportunity for women the paper states:
The contribution which women can make to the revitalizing of the economy is
one of the reasons why the issue of equality should be seen as a key element to be
taken into account in all relevant mainstream policies. European efforts should be
redoubled to develop actions and policies which reinforce women's rights and
maximise their potential contributions. They should be underpinned by an
evaluation of the economics of equal opportunity, especially the costs of not
applying equal opportunity policy (1994: 33).
Although it must be recognized that social exclusion is important to ensuring the rights of
citizens and seeking solidarity it is also important to see the economic focus in ensuring equal
opportunity in this case, as the omission of equal rights and opportunity in other aspects of
social life become a serious challenge to social solidarity in later years.
Two papers from 1995 also examine policy as it relates to the social aspects of economic
integration as a major agenda for the European Project. The 1995 White Paper Preparation of
Central and Eastern Europe for Integration discussed the preparation Central and Eastern
European Countries (CEECs) for integration into the internal market.
Table 4.5.: “1995 Preparation of C and E Countries” White Paper Main Codes Summary

% Text
Main Code Name
Coverage
Free Movement
32.05
Pre-accession
18.53
EU Level Policy and Programs
12.73
Cooperative Networks
10.90
Integration and Harmonization
9.83

Rank
Based on
% Text
Coverage
1
2
3
4
5

Number
of Free
Nodes in
Main
Code
11
7
7
5
4

Rank
Based on
Number
of Free
Nodes
1
2
2
3
4

The “Free Movement” main code is comprised of 11 initial codes or free nodes:

92

—

Table 4.6.: “1995 Prep of C and E Countries” “Free Movement” Main Code Free Nodes by
Percentage of Text Coverage
%
“Free Movement” Main Code Free Node Name
Coverage
Free movement of goods
5.23%
Free Movement of Individuals
1.78%
Free movement of people, services and capital goal
5.16%
Free Movement of Services
4.95%
Free movement of workers
1.55%
Freedom of movement
1.96%
Freedom of services across frontiers
1.55%
Legislation ensuring the free movement of goods
2.66%
Legislation ensuring the free movement of persons
2.56%
Treaties ensuring free movement and integration
2.10%
Free movement of persons in the EU exclusions
2.56%

Detailing the "transition of legislation" or, the processes of preparing to implement
legislation as dictated at the Community level. The Preparation of Central and Eastern Europe
for Integration (1995: 10) paper states
National rules generally pursue legitimate public policy goals shared by all
Member States, for example public security (which includes combating crime,
fraud and illicit trade), the protection of public health and safety, the protection of
the environment, consumer protection, the preservation of public confidence in
the financial services sector and the guarantee of suitable qualifications for the
performance of certain specialised professions. These policy goals must continue
to be served and in most cases, national rules can be harmonised to create a single
set of Community rules, or approximated to a level where Member States are
prepared to apply the principle of mutual recognition. Achieving this through
legislation at the Community level has meant challenging many national rules and
practices
Again, the aim is to ensure Member States compliance with Community rules and standards –
citizens at this point are not a part of the big picture outside of being workers and recipients of
legislation (actors within institutions being established). Legislators are presented as the barriers
or challenges to integration and social cohesion at the "nation" level, similar to the 1985 paper.
93

A crucial aspect of this White Paper relates to discussion of preparing CEECs for
membership and integration. This theme reflects discourse regarding uneven development as
enlargement increases and newer, less "developed" nations are being annexed into the
Community. The idea of the “Other” as a threat or barrier to the European Project within the
White Paper is illustrated with the discussion of peripheral nations as a part of enlargement.
Nations traditionally considered the “Other" as outsiders to Europe brings up concern over their
ability to conform and integrate within European society. This theme has re-emerged with the
current economic crisis discussed in the last chapter of the dissertation.
Finally, of the White Papers from the 1990s that focus on integration and social policy,
the 1995 White Paper Education and Training emphasizes the investment in knowledge as
essential to social cohesion and combating social exclusion.
Table 4.7.: “1995 Education and Training” White Paper Main Codes Summary

% Text
Main Code Name
Coverage
EU Level Policy_Systems
24.82
Technology and Info Society
17.38
Social Cohesion
14.45
Cooperative Networks
10.25
Social Integration
10.00

Rank
Based on
% Text
Coverage
1
2
3
4
5

Number of
Free
Nodes in
Main
Code
7
7
7
2
4

Rank
Based on
Number of
Free
Nodes
1
1
1
4
2

—

The “EU Level Policy Systems” main code is comprised of 7 initial codes or free nodes:
Table 4.8.: “1995 Education and Training” White Paper “EU Level Policy Systems” Main
Code Free Nodes by Percentage of Text Coverage
%
“EU Level Policy Systems” Free Node Name
Coverage
European Level action
2.16%
New developments in light of changes to education
2.41%
systems
SOCRATES
3.29%
94

Table 4.8 (cont’d)
European level accreditation system
ERASMUS
LEONARDO Program
Education and training support at the European level

3.51%
3.93%
4.12%
5.39%

There were many passages in this paper where education is presented as a solidifying and
equalizing force, not only as a way to discipline the labor force and make them competitive but
also to bring people together as Europeans. As discussed in Chapter 2, education is essential to
socialization, solidarity, nation-building and the consensus related to hegemonic power. By
stating “… investment in knowledge plays an essential role in employment, competitiveness and
social cohesion” it is recognized that education is a great force of socialization. Unsurprisingly,
education is quickly recognized as a vehicle for building feelings of cohesiveness and a shared
sense of belonging so crucial to collective identity.
Powers of judgment and the ability to choose are the two essential skills for
understanding the world around us. They involve: criteria for making choices;
remembering the lessons of the past; and an ability to assess the future. The
ability to choose is based on personal and social values, as well as being able to
rationalize the world in which we live. Recalling and understanding the past is
essential in order to judge the present. Knowledge of history (including scientific
and technological history) and geography has a dual function as a guide in time
and space which is essential to everyone if they are to come to terms with their
roots, develop a sense of belonging and to understand others. It is small wonder
that the hallmark of authoritarian regimes and dictatorships has been the
undermining and falsifying of the teaching of history. The penalty society pays
for forgetting the past is to lose a common heritage of bearings and reference
points (1995: 12)
Education is viewed as a way of constructing a common history, a sense of belonging and a
shared interest in the future of the European Project. Education also becomes a means for social
integration with programs such as ERASMUS that allows students to experience the benefits of
European membership including free movement and increased opportunity within the boundaries
of the Community. This is meant to encourage individuals, especially young people, to become
95

invested in Europe, outside the borders of their home Member State. The earlier this
socialization begins in the lives of citizens, the more likely they are to become and remain loyal
to the EP as well as accept the power structures embedded in the EP as normative.
The 1995 White Paper on education also begins to address European youth as the first
generation to which "Europe is real". Here the idea of a disciplined, mobile workforce is
presented as the core of educational endeavors however the idea of socializing Europeans into
the Europe envisioned by the Commission is also clearly important. Up to this point
employment and labor issues have been a running theme throughout the White Papers making
the economic and labor agendas obvious but until now there has not been direct reference to the
essential need for education and a "broad knowledge base" to assist in establishing not only
social cohesion but also a collective memory. There are many mentions of a collective memory
and the vitality of this in building Europe as well as combating social exclusion that is viewed as
a threat to Europe’s solidarity. As stated in the paper:
The main challenge in this kind of society is to reduce the gap between these
groups whilst enabling the progress and development of all human resources. It is
possible to understand the world if the way it interacts and functions can be
grasped and a sense of personal direction found. This is the main function of
school. This is particularly appropriate to the building of Europe. By imparting a
broad knowledge base to young people enabling them both to pick their way
through its complexity and to discuss its purpose, education lays the foundations
of awareness and of European citizenship (1995: 9-10).
Finally, in regard to concepts of the “Other” this paper presents a "European Other"—one
that references the "Europe of yesterday" in comparison to the Europe that is being built and is
the future Europe. In many ways this comes across as an intentional effort to distance what
Europe “is to be” from the "old Europe" who was constantly in conflict, fighting over resources
and power. In order to move toward new identities of a cooperative, solidified Europe must be
established. With this in mind, the idea of Europe is not only based on comparisons to "Other"
96

nations such as the U.S. or issues of “outsiders” via immigration and de-colonization but also to
their “former selves” who were divided violently for decades. It is clear Europe is “moving on”
from its former self but in what direction, and who determines the direction?
Advancing the European Social Model: White Papers from 2000-2007
The series of papers introduced after the millennium revealed the crisis of the
“demographic deficit” and the apathy toward and that lack of knowledge about EU institutions
among citizens was becoming a glaring threat to the progression of the EP. The 2000 White
Papers Reforming the Commission Parts I and II touted the role of the European Commission as
"the motor of European integration”.
Table 4.9.: “2000 Reforming the Commission” White Paper Main Codes Summary

% Text
Main Code Name
Coverage
Commission Reform
143.30
Role of the Commission
31.37
Commission Efficiency
9.54
European Solidarity
5.17
European Citizens_Members
4.93

Rank for
%
Coverage
1
2
3
4
5

Number of
Free
Nodes in
Main
Code
20
12
3
3
3

Rank
Based on
Number of
Free
Nodes
1
2
3
3
3

The main code “Commission Reform” is made up of 20 initial codes or free nodes:

97

—

Table 4.10.: “2000 Commission Reform” White Paper “Commission Reform” Main Code
Free Nodes by Percentage of Text Coverage
%
“Commission Reform” Free Node Name
Coverage
Commission central to functioning of EU
0.71%
Need for administrative reform for Commission
0.71%
Commission objectives 2000 thru 2005
2.40%
Commission Management Reform
3.77%
Commission Human Resources and Management development
3.85%
Commission assessment of resources and activities
4.36%
Commission Investments in Reform
4.59%
Commission Reform Principles
4.73%
Commission reform of policies
5.13%
Commission Reform Themes
5.13%
Making Commission Reform a Reality
5.13%
Timeline for Commission Reform objectives
5.13%
Commission reform Summary
5.83%
Delivering and sustaining Commission Reform
5.83%
Timelines and objectives for delivering and sustaining reform
5.83%
Commission Activity Based Management as a tool for delivering 6.27%
policies
Commission Financial Management Reform
15.64%
Commission Career Development and Staff Regulations
28.92%
Commission Labor Development and Issues
28.92%

The paper attempts to inform readers of the role of the EC by offering a brief history of
the EU and EC. It also goes into detail regarding the responsibilities of the EC in respect to other
EU institutions. In this case, the EC is presented as the institution obliged with leadership in
solidifying the EU as a supranational state-bloc.
The paper not only informs readers of EC objectives but, more subtly, reinforces the
power of the Commission (and EU institutions in general) over that of Member State, regional
and local governments—although "cooperation" is the chosen term to describe these
relationships and power struggles. By discussing the role of the EC in determining where and
how tax funds are spent, once again, the power the EC holds in regard to the EU and how
citizens are affected by policy, decisions, etc is not only reinforced but presented by institutional
98

elites as normative. Although the role of the EC is clearly being questioned at the start of the
century this paper reasserts and reinforces the necessary role (and power) of the EC within the
European Project. Since White Papers are rarely read among citizens this paper might be
perceived as a plea for legitimacy among EU elite and/or Member State, local and regional
administrators.
The 2001 White Paper European Governance follows the lead of the 2000 White Paper
in acknowledging the gap that existed (and still exists) between EU institutions and citizens.
Table 4.11.: “2001 European Governance” White Paper Main Codes Summary
Number
Rank
of Free
Based on Nodes
% Text Text %
in Main
Main Code Name
Coverage Coverage Code
EU Gov’t Reform
132.45
1
14
EU vs. National, Regional and Local gov’ts.
60.17
2
8
Role of EU Institutions
34.34
3
5
Role of the Commission
32.34
4
5
EU Civil Society
23.75
5
6

Rank
Based on
Number
of Free
Nodes
1
2
4
4
3

—

Predictably, the main focus of this particular WP was EU government reform, as
reflected in the main code stemming from the 2001 paper. Table 4.13 lists the various free nodes
that comprised the “EU Gov’t Reform” main code:

99

Table 4.12.: “2001 European Governance” White Paper “EU Gov’t. Reform” Main Code
Free Nodes by Percentage of Text Coverage
“EU Gov’t. Reform” Free Node Name
Commission reform of policies
Commission Reform Themes
European Governance Executive Summary
EU Governance Reform_Better policies regulation and delivery proposal
Proposals for Governance Reform_Better Involvement
Proposals for Governance Reform_Better openness
European Governance Reform Refocusing EU Institutions
Increasing effective and transparent consultation at the heart of EU policy
shaping as part of Better Involvement Proposal
European Governance Reform
Community policy should be simplified_EU governance reform proposals
European Governance
Why Reform European Governance
Economic and Social Committee Role
The EUs Contribution to Global Governance_EU Governance Reform
Proposal

% Coverage
4.49%
4.49%
4.40%
27.11%
23.39%
23.39%
8.92%
6.63%
5.89%
5.83%
5.46%
4.55%
3.96%
3.94%

As a cornerstone of reform the 2001 European Governance White Paper offers principles
of “good governance” such as “participation” and “accountability”, which coincides with
ideology essential to building hegemonic power through consensus and participation. It also
offers idea of "refocusing" EU institutions so that the "top-down" approaches to implementing
EU policy is replaced with a "virtuous circle" of politicians, “networks” (NGOs and other
organizations), and citizens all contributing to the policy creation process.
This paper also introduces the idea of European alienation in light of low voter turnout as
well as the "Irish No Vote". There was heated debate over immigration and the role of Member
State governments in controlling issues accompanying enlargement, immigration and the
continual struggle to implement EU policy alongside Member State policy. Also, a year later the
euro was introduced so, seemingly, citizens are being bombarded at this time by information
preparing them for the everyday life changes that would be accompanying their membership to

100

the EU. The everyday affects of being a part of the EU has increased and may be a direct
contribution to the growing gap between citizens and “Brussels”.
In light of the concerns accompanying social change, the 2001 paper discusses revamping
EU institutions and policy in order to address these issues by presenting "principles of good
governance". These principles include “openness”, “participation”, “accountability”,
“effectiveness” and “coherence”. “Coherence” in this case refers to the process making
processes and information simple enough for the citizen to understand. They couple this with
“openness” where all aspects of bureaucracy must be made to improve “coherence”. Of course,
just because information is available does not mean that citizens will seek it out. By focusing
and restructuring goals around these principles they are addressing the "linear model of
dispensing policies from above" that must be replaced by a "virtuous circle based on feedback,
networks and involvement from policy creation to implementation (2001: 11)."
Further in regard to providing information to the public as a part of coherence the paper
states, "Providing more information and more effective communication are a pre-condition for
generating a sense of belonging to Europe (2001: 11-12)." The main focus presented here is on
creating a sense of “being European,” however, member state identity is still emphasized as
important, which seems contradictory. For instance, toward the end of the 2001 White Paper
there is an emphasis on previous goals to "integrate the people of Europe while fully respecting
individual national identities". This is an optimistic yet ironic ideology because although this is
how institutional elites idealize citizen feelings of belonging and solidarity, it is citizen national
identity and loyalty (and feelings of security and protection) that are being challenged and
widening the gap between EU institutions and citizens.

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The 2001 Impetus for EU Youth White Paper follows through with plans to educate and
socialize the "first real Europeans".
Table 4.13.: “2001 New Impetus for a European Youth” White Paper Main Codes
Summary
Rank
Number Based
Rank
of Free on
Based on
Nodes Number
% Text
% Text
in Main of Free
Main Code Name
Coverage Coverage
Code
Nodes
Youth Participation
26.71
1
7
2
Youth Field Description
16.57
2
7
2
Good Gov, Democracy and Participation
15.21
3
3
5
Youth Consultation
14.47
4
9
1
Issues Concerning Youth
12.23
5
5
3
—

With building solidarity and participation among European youth as the main theme for the 2001
paper the “Youth Participation” main code reveals details of the foci concerning the pursuit of
youth participation in the EP:
Table 4.14. “2001 New Impetus for a European Youth” White Paper “Youth Participation”
Main Code Free Nodes by Percentage of Text Coverage
“Youth Participation” Free Node Name
Participation encouraged among the youth
Youth participation in political and decision making
processes
Youth role in civil society
Youth activities in civil society
From local to European
Background for New Impetus for EU Youth
New Impetus for EU Youth Forword

%
Coverage
7.74%
6.45%
3.50%
0.93%
1.22%
3.84%
3.03%

At the beginning of the millennium EU officials and institutional representatives were
realizing that in order to strengthen the EU they needed to address the young people. Key
concepts such as “participation”, “youth concerns” and “European values” all come together to
102

describe the "new" or renewed focus on the role of youth in society and the untapped potential
that may be fostered and "guided" by top-down approaches to identity at the European level.
First addressed is the concept of participation. In this case young people's points of view
are being sought out (via conferences and meetings, begging the questions of who is
participating at this level and involved in these pursuits?) as a way of addressing their concerns
but at the same time it is obvious that a part of the agenda is to get young people thinking about
themselves, their lives, their futures etc in European terms--as European citizens, the future of
Europe etc. The phrase "no democracy without participation" is used as a header making the
point that participation is important to government, democracy and indeed the social contract that
exists between the state and the nation. In order to have strong state institutions you must have
people who are invested, willing to participate within and protect them. With this paper it
becomes clear that participation of EU youth being encouraged and fostered is a part of solidarity
and identity building among the portion of the population perceived to be most open to ideas of
“Europeaness” and “being European”.
Another focal point of the paper was the notion of young people as human capital.
European youth are viewed as a population that is vital to the future of the EU not just in terms
of participation but how are they prepared to participate. In other words, what makes them good
citizens and laborers willing to participate? The creation of a democratic society but also a
knowledge based post-industrial society is clear here. The focus is on educational training, labor
skills and competitiveness as a way of strengthening human capital and, overall, the labor force.
Further, information is viewed as key to building loyalty to the EU, integration as well as
participation, therefore information creation, access and utilization is also key to building
Europe.

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The 2004 Services of General Interest White Paper included two themes: the "European
Model of Society" described as the model "to become the most competitive and dynamic
knowledge based economy in the world capable of sustainable economic growth with more and
better jobs and greater social cohesion".
Table 4.15.: “2004 Services of General Interest” White Paper Main Codes Summary

Main Code Name
Services of General Interest Def. and
Description
Role of EU Institutions
Green or White Paper Reference
Member State vs. EU Power
Citizen Reference

% Text
Coverage
43.17
32.20
26.65
20.39
13.05

Rank
Based on
% Text
Coverage
1
2
3
4
5

Number
of Free
Nodes in
Main
Code
9
9
6
7
6

Rank
Based
on
Number
Free
Nodes
1
1
3
2
3

—

Table 4.16. “2004 Services of General Interest” White Paper “Services of General Interest
Definition and Description” Main Code Free Nodes by Percentage of Text Coverage
“Services of General Interest Definition and Description”
Free Node Name
Legal framework for services of general interest
Public consultation to promote services of general interest
Social and health services
Services of general interest debate
Differences between Member State services of general interest
Respecting diversity of services and situations related to services
of general interest
services in poor countries
Transparent framework for services of general interest
Definition of terms in services of general interest white paper

% Text
Coverage
9.08%
6.62%
6.31%
3.84%
2.62%
2.62%
2.36%
4.65%
5.08%

Additionally the concept of services of general interest and its linkage to citizenship
fundamental rights and quality of life for EU citizens was introduced. Services of general
interest include benefits of citizenship such as access to social and health services. Because they
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are working within a bureaucratic structure many of the details and recommendations revolved
around the shared public authority and responsibility of the EU as well as national, regional and
local officials. Within the details and the emphasis on fundamental rights for citizens there were
many illustrative examples reflecting the social contract being established and implemented
through the solidification of EU institutions. This paper clarifies the roles of various “key
players” and “stakeholders” by establishing the obligations of Member States in comparison to
EU institutions in carrying out the services of general interest. General interest is an “essential
component of citizenship and the fundamental rights that accompany it” according to the 2004
White Paper . Within this paper are various instances of evidence of a social contract and
initiatives to ensure and promote social cohesion among citizens while also providing the
concept of the European Model of Society.
Table 4.17.: “2006 Communication Policy” White Paper Main Codes Summary

Rank Based
on Text %
Coverage
1
2
3
4
5

% Text
Main Code Name
Coverage
Partnerships for Communication
56.70
Citizen Centered Policy
51.49
Gap Between EU and Citizens
43.54
EU Programs
14.78
Civic Education and Rights
20.09

Number of
Free Nodes
in Main
Code
5
9
8
4
5

Rank Based
on Number
of Free
Nodes
3
1
2
4
3

The “Partnerships for Communication” main code is made up of a total of five free nodes
described according to percentage of coverage in the text in Table 4.18:

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Table 4.18. “2006 Communication Policy” White Paper “Partnerships for
Communication” Main Code Free Nodes by Percentage of Text Coverage
“Partnerships for Communication” Free Node
Name
Key players
Partnerships for Communication policy
Role of Member States in communication
Working together
Commission approach to communication

%
Coverage
14.84%
13.05%
13.05%
13.05%
2.70%

Continuing with familiar themes the 2006 European Communication Policy White Paper
also addresses the gap between "Brussels" (EU institutions) and EU citizens. The paper states
Institutional communication, though essential and steadily improving, has clearly
not been sufficient to close the gap. The European Commission is therefore
proposing a fundamentally new approach - a decisive move away from one-way
communication to reinforced dialogue, from an institution-centred to a citizencentred communication, from a Brussels-based to a more decentralised approach.
Communication should become an EU policy in its own right, at the service of the
citizens. It should be based on genuine dialogue between the people and the
policymakers and lively political discussion among citizens themselves. People
from all walks of life should have the right to fair and full information about the
European Union, and be confident that the views and concerns they express are
heard by the EU institutions. The European Parliament, Member States and the
representation of European citizens have a special role to play, as peoples’
support for the European project is a matter of common interest (2006: 4).

Of course, communication is closely linked to democratic ideals and thus is viewed as an
important issue in related to "building a European public sphere". A European public sphere is
described as an open debate, dialogue and discussion about EU political life, issues and decision
making processes. The paper discusses the dominance of national and local public spheres and
the need to build a EU public sphere to help build communication and knowledge of EU
processes among citizens. Many programs are mentioned in relation to building the EU public
sphere-mainly the Commissions Plan D (for democracy, debate and dialogue) in addition to the
Commissions Action Plan for Communication. One important aspect of this paper is the
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mention of Eurobarometer surveys as a major measure of public opinion in Europe--it gives
some of the history and scope of the surveys while also mentioning smaller studies that have
opened a window into public opinion. Otherwise the main objective of the paper was to provide
guidelines, proposals and ideas for creating and defining common principles for Codes of
conduct related to communication policy--all aimed at closing the gap between EU institutions
and citizens--these will remain a major factors in challenges facing the EU such as fostering
democracy, nation-state institutions and relationships in addition to building democratic
institutions.
Table 4.19.: “2007 Together for Health” White Paper Main Codes Summary

Main Code Name
Partnerships in Health
Strategies
Health Strategies and Policy
Health Issues
Citizen Rights
Community Framework

% Text
Coverage
24.43

Rank Based
on % Text
Coverage
1

16.11
14.44
11.82
10.30

2
3
4
5

Number of
Rank Based
Free Nodes
on Number of
in Main Code Free Nodes
12
1
8
7
6
3

2
3
4
6

Table 4.20. “2007 Together for Health” White Paper “Partnerships in Health Strategies”
Main Code Free Nodes by Percentage of Text Coverage
“Partnerships in Health Strategies” Main Code Free Node % Text
Name
Coverage
Member States role in healthcare
5.09%
EUs role in global health
2.89%
Coordination between Member States and international
2.84%
community toward health
TOGETHER FOR HEALTH~
2.81%
Cooperation among Member States on health services
1.56%
EC role in health policy
1.56%
Community vs Member State measures and policy
1.37%
Public consultations
0.91%
Stakeholders
0.91%
Commission and Member State Partnerships
0.74%

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DISCUSSION OF CDA ANALYSIS
Although there have always been undercurrents of maintaining peaceful relations as a way of
encouraging integration into the EP, the importance of the civil and social aspects of the EP have
largely been underestimated until recently. The White Paper analysis reveals a core focus on
neo-liberal development included building hegemony among political elite but not necessarily
among citizens until the mid-1990s. Permissive consensus concluded that social integration and
solidarity building would be swift, possibly easy, but it has become one of the major stumbling
blocks to progression in the EU. From the “top-down” institutional perspective, the EP was
moving at an unprecedented pace in regard to economic and political (at least at the institutional
level) so there was no reason that endeavors related to a social platform would be different.
From the start, building solidarity at the European level was not necessarily a serious priority,
unless in the context of neo-liberal economic development. Essentially, similar to other neoliberal development occurring globally, the social and political effects (and responses) at the
ground level were not considered until decades into development because it was not deemed
necessary to economic development.
Later, as reflections of a democratic deficit begin to appear White Papers indicate a slow
response and similar underestimation of “the Gap” between citizens and the EP. This is only
fueled by nationalism at the Member State level that is seemingly being threatened by the
increased power of EU institutions, specifically immigration policy. Nationalism is also fueled
by populist movements that target both the EU as well as “Others” within society as a threat to
culture and way of life.
Finally, the idea of adding to or replacing loyalty to national identity was not convincing
when presented with the alternative. Nationalism and the idea of who was included in the

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category of “European” was enough to fuel skepticism but this seems as it came by surprise to
EU elites when reading the White Papers.
Although there is little hesitation today for claims that the European Project needs civic,
and possibly cultural, solidarity in order for it to fully develop as a legitimate, fully functioning
institution, there is also little consensus regarding how, to what extent and in what ways a
“demos” or nation might be constructed—or if it is even possible (Jacobs and Maier, 1998;
Dobson, 2006). Issues of “democratic deficits” and gaps between the popular expectations of
citizens and the EU’s willingness and capacity to meet these may also cause conflict or
challenges to becoming a solidified institutional and superpower within the global arena
(Holmes, 1999).
The lack of European identity and solidarity has been discussed but it must also be noted
that at this point identity attachment remains at the member state level (Dobson, 2006; McLaren,
2006). The questionable nature of dual national identity exists (Dobson, 2006) in conjunction
with the popular notion that the threat of European identity and its construction will have various
consequences at the Member State level, which has led to many levels of resistance to integration
and the notion of shared social values (Iivonen 1993; White 1997; Feldman 2005; Hopper 2006).
Some proponents of the EU argue a cohesive national identity must supersede previous
nationalisms in order for the EU to become completely integrated, and such notions have assisted
in the surge of reactions against integration and notions of EU identity.
Finally, attempts to defend and strengthen individual nation-states have been at the core
of both EU skepticism and related to the presence of the Other in European society. There has
been a resurgence of nationalist movements, some connected to the rapid increase in antiimmigration movements and political parties including France’s Front National party, Italy’s

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Lega Nord (Northern League) and Denmark’s Danish People’s Party (Hopper 2006: 36). Racist
movements have also received a boost especially in areas where there are levels of high
unemployment and poverty (White 1997) The increase of attacks toward those considered
“outsiders”, largely immigration groups (White 1997; Sassen 1999; Hopper 2006), and political
unrest in isolated immigrant communities give rise to the notion that there is a tradition of
resistance to outsiders of the nation-state and this may include a rejection of supranational forms
of identity and values which challenge it.
With these challenges in mind, the next chapter uses Eurobarometer survey data of
European attitudes and perspectives related to aspects of identity such as sense of belonging,
perspectives of the Other in European society and views of globalization as a threat or an
opportunity. Also, views of institutions and public authority will be examined to illustrate trends
that may relate to patterns found with themes of identity. Finally, support for the EP will be
assessed through perspectives of EU membership, levels of support for the euro and future
enlargement as a third way of understanding “the gap” within the EP as well as patterns related
to the two other themes examined.
Overall this assessment will help to address the question of whether the EP has been
successful in creating a “European people” or if national and regional identity attachment
coupled with perceived threats of weakening nation-states, globalization and the presence of the
Other in European society is enough to challenge the potential for solidarity at the EU level, and
consequently, the progress of the EP itself.

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CHAPTER 5: BOTTOM-UP REACTIONS TO THE EP;
FROM PERMISSIVE CONSENSUS TO “THE GAP”
A permissive consensus reigned at the ground level during the first few decades of the
European Project (EP) while it was pursued by Europe’s political and economic elite (Fuss and
Grosser 2006; McNeill 2004). Initially the EP was not perceived as a threat by citizens largely
because, for the most part, it was not thought to have a significant impact on their everyday lives
(McLaren 2006; Calhoun 2003). Increasingly citizens became more aware of the affect the EP
had in their lives through the common agricultural policy, the Customs Union and, later, the euro
in addition to public relations (both negative and positive coverage) surrounding the EU in the
news (McLaren 2006). As these effects took aim, citizens at the ground level became
increasingly leery of power building at the European level—some more than others.
This chapter utilizes Eurobarometer survey data to explore the “bottom-up” reactions of
Europeans to the European Project including attempts to build identity and solidarity from the
“top-down”. Chapter 4 presented a trajectory of institutional discourse that, overtime,
acknowledged “the gap” between the EP and citizens in addition to the importance of building a
sense of belonging, promoting feelings of loyalty, investment and willingness to participate at
the EU level—all of which contribute to the legitimacy of the EU among its membership, but
also in the global arena. The White Paper analysis also revealed many proposed goals and
outcomes for programs aimed at repairing disconnect between European institutional elites and
citizens and strengthening the “European social contract”. However, it is not clear that their
intended goals of establishing sense of belonging, trust, loyalty and sense of investment as a
means of promoting further integration, participation and legitimacy within the EP among its
membership have come to fruition. If anything, the current economic crisis has tested even the
strongest sources of European solidarity, including the success of the Eurozone.
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Given the observed trends in discourse and agenda-setting presented in Chapter 4, this
chapter seeks to assess the possible outcomes of “top-down” agenda-setting and decision-making
on “the gap” and overall European perspectives and identities. Three main groups of variables
were analyzed according to sex, age, occupation, experiences with difficulty paying bills, and the
type of community in which residents reside. The first theme explored is “European Identity and
the Other” in which questions concerning sense of belonging, perspectives of “other ethnic
minority groups” and immigrants in addition to views related to globalization as a threat or
opportunity. The second theme “Perspectives of States and Their Institutions” includes inquiries
related to citizen’s views concerning which public authority has the most impact on their living
conditions in addition to assessments of the EU’s role in harnessing globalization’s impact on
citizens. Further, this theme explores European trust in various state (national and EU)
institutions. The final and third theme explored along demographic lines is “Levels of Support
for the European Project” where attitudes concerning membership to the EU are considered
alongside support for EU projects. Specifically, the euro and future enlargement are investigated
to add to the larger picture of overall support for the EP. Before these trends are detailed I would
like to describe “the gap” that we are examining with Eurobarometer data further, to set the
context for the analysis and subsequent discussion.
DESCRIBING “THE GAP”
The 1990s brought increased attention to the social and cultural aspects of the EP due to
overwhelming evidence of “the gap” that existed between EU citizens and “Brussels”. Zweifel
(2002: 2) describes it as “a gap in the EU between democratic practice in theory and reality.”
“The gap” was characterized as a disconnect between what was happening at the top levels of the
EP in Brussels and the reality for people on the “ground-level” affected by, and expected to

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participate in, the EP (Berezin 2003). This was evidenced via lack of knowledge about the EU
and lack of participation in terms of voting and participation in public discourse on the part of
citizens. Further, these trends were coupled with outright mistrust and disapproval of the EP
among many who remain loyal to Member State institutions as see growing EU influence as a
threat to the social contract of European nation-states.
Additionally, trends associated with centralization of power at the EU level and the
impact of neo-liberal, globalization-driven integration shaped “the gap” in regard to the
revitalization of nationalism and populist movements where the working classes were described
as being negatively impacted by globalization and the EU’s growing influence. These
movements were fueled by perceptions that Member State sovereignty, including the ethnic or
cultural identity and “way of life” linked to national sovereignty, were under attack (Zweifel
2002). No longer was “the gap” a matter of addressing gaps in knowledge about the EP but
increasingly a lack of trust, feelings of investment, and overall lack of attachment or sense of
belonging that is necessary for collective identity and social solidarity. The goals of establishing
European collective identity and solidarity have been clearly stated within institutional discourse,
as reflected in analysis presented in Chapter 4. However, perceived threats to “ways of life”
based in a sense of pure, homogeneous ethnic identity based in European nation-state identity
remain a challenge to legitimacy at the EU level, both within its 27 nation-states and globally.
(Deutsch 2006; Zweifel 2002; Cederman 2001). More importantly, these divisions based on
identity are crucial to both enabling and preventing cooperation on all levels within the EP, not
just participation on behalf of the citizens but also cooperation among the political elite which
has also revealed itself to be a growing issue in light of the current economic crisis. This may be
the most serious challenge currently facing the establishment of European identity in support of

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the EP today. For these reasons, identity is explored via sense of belonging, perspectives of the
Other and globalization.
Also discussed among the White Paper analysis was the notion that citizens were initially
considered economic and political actors from the institutional viewpoint. It was not until the
1990s that institutional elites began to recognize “the gap” between the elite-driven project,
including it’s main actors, particularly those who were expected to legitimize and maintain it
through ground-level participation, consensus and loyalty. The White Paper discourse showed
institutional attempts to become more transparent, reflexive in their endeavors to that point and,
eventually, began to recognize the need for a socio-cultural program that would create taken-forgranted loyalty, participation and consensus at the citizen level—just as nation-state’s had done
decades before. The identity created with the nation-state and taken for granted by most in
European nations may become one of the main obstacles to the European Project, and as the
White Paper analysis reveals, this remains a paramount issue that has only recently been
recognized as a formidable opponent to European progress.
During the first decade of the 2000s, the gap became undeniably public with the
infamous French and Dutch “No” votes, turning down constitutional ratification measures in
2005. Although the 2007 Lisbon Treaty eventually addressed the constitutional issues, at the
time the “No” votes spelled out what many institutional elites did not expect—that “Unity in
Diversity” would not be as easy as it seemed (Athanassopoulou 2008; Calhoun 2003). The
recent fiscal/economic crisis in Europe has only fueled divisions along Member State lines, while
also invigorating national populist movements as a reaction to power at the European level and
globalization as a threat to working-classes and vulnerable minority groups.

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Three main aspects of “the gap” are examined with Eurobarometer data for the purposes
of this dissertation. First, European identity is explored from three angles. Sense of belonging
and attachment to various political identities including national, regional/local, European, and
“Citizen of the World”, or what I refer to as “global citizen” is assessed. Also, trends related to
perspectives of “the Other” in European society are examined as a way of illustrating patterns
related to identity. In this case, the Eurobarometer questions used specify “Others” as “other
ethnic minority groups” and “immigrants”. The way the concept is presented by the survey
indicates “the Other” in Europe can be both citizen or non-citizen, meaning even those officially
considered European may not be included in the definition of “European” for identity purposes.
As discussed earlier, the presence of “the Other” assists in defining and solidifying the dominant
group’s identity in return. Considering this, I sought patterns in the responses to questions
concerning the Other, sense of belonging and/or perspectives of globalization and the EP to seek
emergent patterns across and within demographic groups. Finally, attitudes concerning whether
globalization has had positive effects in addition to the perceived role the EU has played in
shaping globalization’s impact on citizen’s lives is also investigated as a way of explicating
patterns among demographic groups that might assist in describing in more detail “the gap” that
challenges the progress of the EP.
The second aspect of “the gap” explored with Eurobarometer analysis are views
associated with public authority and state institutions including the tendency of respondents to
trust in European institutions central to the EP in comparison to trust in national institutions and
government. In this case, patterns of response related to perceptions of public authority’s impact
on living conditions are compared in addition to assessments of trust in institutions to provide

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insight into which institutions and levels of authority citizens feel most invested in, connected to
and effected by.
Finally, support for the EP is explored via perceptions of EU membership and programs,
specifically the euro and future enlargement. Within this theme, variables focus on feelings
toward EU membership including whether it is a good thing or if it has been beneficial. Also,
gauging support for European programs such as the euro, but especially enlargement helps to
assess levels of support for the EP overall but also the direction it might possibly take in the
future based on gauged citizen responses.
As a general assessment of “the gap” it should be acknowledged that Euro-skepticism
and distrust of EU institutional power are built into reinvigorated nationalism and loyalty to
Member States. This is largely due to perceived threats to working classes, national sovereignty
and Member State power from “outsider” authorities at the EU level and within the processes of
neo-liberal globalization, such as the IMF. Issues related to identity and sense of belonging,
including the role of the Other in reinforcing national identity, are essential to establishing a
holistic perspective of “the gap” that exists and the possible challenges stemming from “the gap”
that may prevent the EP from moving ahead. Next I discuss elements fueling “the gap.”
EU Authority in Citizen’s Lives: Centralization and Globalization Shaping “the Gap”
The impact of globalization and neo-liberal policy, along with the end of the Cold War
and Communist Bloc, brought wide-sweeping economic changes that benefited some and the
expense of many (Castles 1999). Neo-liberal policy attacked labor unions, the working class and
social programs in European nation-states while fueling competition between the core and
periphery. Internal competition within the EEC between more and less developed European
nation-states brought critiques of the EP as well. While bureaucrats completed the single

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market, the Schengen Passport Zone and a successful policy for enlargement, nationalist
movements, the number of Euroskeptics, and anti-globalization critics began to grow (Calhoun
2003). Soon ideologies and agendas between the institutional elite “top” and the “bottom” at the
level of the Nation would begin to clash over the progression of the EP.
Globalization and centralization in Brussels related to concerns over the loss of Member
State sovereignty. The 1992 Maastrict Treaty solidified the political aspects of the EP by making
European citizenship official (Fuchs and Klingmann 2002; Holmes and Murray 1998). With the
increasing impact of European integration and globalization being felt on the ground level,
skepticism over who benefits from globalization adds to distrust of the growing power at the EU
level. Recent Eurobarometer studies reveal that class distinctions are found in regard not only to
European identity attachment but also to trust and support for European integration.
Fligstein (2009) utilized Eurobarometer data to reveal trends associated with
globalization, such as cross-border experiences, multi-lingualism and support for EU integration.
Similar to other studies (Checkel and Katzenstein 2009; McClaren 2006; Deutsch 2006), he
found differences in attitudes toward European identity and support for the EP based on socioeconomic status including income, occupation and educational attainment. Those who come
from working class and blue collar occupations, as well as those with lower socio-economic
backgrounds are found to be more attached to Member State identity as well as more skeptical of
and less trusting in the European Project—specifically European institutions and integration
(Fligstein 2009). The Eurobarometer data analysis offered in this chapter also focuses on low
SES status through the experience of difficulty in paying bills within the past year and
occupation as a way of exploring these arguments.

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As a way of describing the polarized experiences and attitudes toward the EP and
globalization based on socio-economic status (SES), Checkel and Katzenstein (2009) usefully
distinguish between the “Cosmopolitans” and the “Populists”. They describe one group as those
who benefit from European integration and the processes of globalization such as students and
business persons (the Cosmopolitans) compared to those who do not benefit from these aspects
of integration and globalization (the Populists) such as blue collar and service workers (mostly
likely to be vulnerable in the global economy) older individuals and those with lower socioeconomic status—if anything, these groups may have become more vulnerable and viewed as a
casualty of the “race to the bottom” and neo-liberal development. I too investigate trends
associated with these categories to find evidence that supports the idea that those who benefit
from the EU and globalization see themselves as more advantaged by these processes and
therefore are more supportive of them, where the opposite may be true of those who fall into the
“Populist” category.
Nationalism, Member State Identity and the Other’s Roles in Shaping “the Gap”
Nationalism and populist movements based in Member State identity emerged on a grand
scale during the 1990s as debates on immigration policy became increasingly common among
the growing number of EU Member States. Perceived threats to national sovereignty but also to
individual identity and “way of life” escalated in the debates surrounding the EP. Since
European member state identity tends to be entrenched in mythical notions of “pure” identity
based in a common sense of culture and shared history, immigration became a “hot button” issue
because of perceived threats to “way of life” for Europeans as a result of the growing presence of
“outsiders”. According to Favell and Hansen (2002: 583-84),

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“For centuries, a central feature of Europe’s political space has been the shifting
of borders … In the latter part of the nineteenth century and early years of the
twentieth century, the modern political order of European states and European
populations crystallized out of the territorial fixing of previously mobile
Europeans, either nationalizing then as territorially defined citizens of a particular
state or expelling minorities who fell within the state’s constructed borders.”

During this time, state policy toward citizenship also became bureaucratized and the nation-state
was increasingly solidified via the identification of “outsiders” (non-citizens) and ethnic
minorities to justify state policy and procedures. The notion of cultural homogeneity became
entrenched and the fear of settling immigrant communities increased. Implementation of guest
worker programs in the decades after WWII along with decolonization led to the eventual
settlement of guest workers and their families which, in turn, created tension-filled relations
between dominant and minority groups while simultaneously shaping identities of those apart of
host societies and migrant communities respectively (Münz 1995).
One unintended consequence of guest worker programs and decolonization-based
migration during the post-WWII transitory phase was the trend of immigrant groups being
characterized and perceived as a threat to dominant culture, therefore immigrants and associated
ethnic minorities were identified as the Other within European societies that helped to identify
who was “European” or a member of the Nation. Immigration usually occurs during times of
economic, political and social change (Castles and Miller 2003). In this case the threat of guest
workers and, later, the families that followed, in many ways strengthened the position of the state
and nation state. Perceived threats of immigration helped to solidify nation-state identity and the
state’s role as protector of citizens-especially during a post-WWII era when European citizens
may have been unsure of the state’s ability to protect and serve (Feldman 2005). On the other

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hand, many question whether the state was capable of protecting citizens from the “invasion of
immigrants” perceived as a challenge to the supposed homogeneous culture of European states.
As guest workers unexpectedly settled into their host communities in Germany, France,
the Netherlands and the U.K., they were increasingly portrayed and viewed as a challenge to the
dominant culture. Moch (2003) confirms that racism during guest worker programs was a
reaction to the settlement of workers viewed by member state natives as culturally and socially
distinct from Europeans. Among the characteristics that were considered distinguishable from
European cultural identity, and thus undesirable, were language, customs, shared history and
often appearance, such as clothing or physical differences like skin color.
In addition, Europeans remained focused on the perceived threat of Islam. Said (1979)
posits that this perceived threat emerged with the construction of the Oriental East as the Other in
European identity however the argument of a cultural divide between the East and the West has
reemerged especially in light of Samuel Huntington’s “clash of civilizations” theory. Many
believed migrant Muslim populations will pose a challenge to and attempt to debase JudeoChristian dominant European culture. Negative views of Islam were often built into nation
identity as children learned in schools of the defeat of European populations against Muslims in
history. Also, Islamic values were perceived as strikingly varied in comparison to European
values particularly in terms of gender relations and democratic processes. Currently, as countries
such as Turkey are considered for EU membership, these issues still garner enormous public
attention.
Arguments relating to threats toward member states due to enlargement illustrate
traditional constructions of the Other and hesitation to incorporate those groups into a larger
European identity and community. This was first witnessed with the recent accession of Eastern

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and Central European nations and the candidacy of nations such as Turkey whose citizens have
long been viewed as the Other within the original member states. Issues surrounding EU
enlargement by inclusion of additional Eastern and Central states revolved around unstable
governments and economic structures in light of post-Communist regimes (Jacobs and Maier
1998; Fuchs and Klingemann 2002).
Eurobarometer data analysis and research verifies that approximately 12% of Europeans
consider themselves European first (compared to a Member State nationality or regional
identity). This trend has not changed significantly since the 1990s but was not taken as a serious
threat until the early 2000s. However, Fligstein (2009) also notes that in 2004 the Standard
Eurobarometer showed 43.3% of the European population are what he refers to as “Situational
Europeans” who will claim European identity over national identity depending on the situation
and if it will benefit them according to the context. European Project elites have recognized the
importance of Public Opinion (McClaren 2006), however, the lack of European identity and
solidarity is only worsening with the current economic crisis, coupled with the “gap” that already
exists between EP institutional elites and the “ground-level” of the EP—the Nation.
EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVES ILLUSTRATED WITH EUROBAROMETER DATA
The Eurobarometer survey initiative was established in 1973 and consisted of
approximately 1000 face-to-face interviews per Member State every autumn and spring. Reports
are published for each of the annual Standard Eurobarometer surveys in additional “flash”
special topic and qualitative Eurobarometer studies that are conducted periodically along with
the Standard survey. This survey has been paramount in tracking the perspectives and attitudes
of Europeans and individuals in candidate countries for over three decades on a wide range of
issues, particularly those related to evaluating the EP, making a well known and widely used

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resource among social scientists, politicians and policy-makers alike. The Eurobarometer allows
for macro level perspectives of attitudes concerning a range of topics and issues related to the
EU. Public opinion analysis is valuable in this case given the impact it has on public officials
need to garner public support but more importantly the public’s role in approving EU policy and
procedure, specifically as it relates to referendums including the recent constitutional
referendums (Dell’Olio 2005; McLaren 2006).
The analysis presented in this chapter is based from the Eurobarometer data set
“Eurobarometer 71.3: Globalization, Personal Values and Priorities, European Identity, Future of
the European Union, Social Problems and Welfare, and European Elections, June-July 2009.” I
explore “bottom-up” or “ground-level” perspectives that would assist in understanding identity
in response to attempts at building identity and solidarity from the “top-down”. Critical
Discourse Analysis in Chapter 4 revealed that solidarity and “feeling European” was an
important institutional goal, so as a means of gaining a more holistic perspective of identity
within the European Project, and it role in “the gap”, it is important to explore levels of support
for the EU as well as sense of belonging to the EU is among citizens. Further, it is important to
gauge patterns related to perspectives of Others in European society as an additional challenge to
not only defining and establishing European identity but also making it a priority relative to
national identity that is fueled by the existence of the Other.
While not exhaustive, this discussion provides a basic look into these themes and the
challenges facing identity at the European level, and possibly the future progress of the European
Project. I began with simple frequency analysis of variables that relate to the main challenges
identified in the literature: the democratic deficit, or the “Gap”; Identity and Sense of Belonging;
perspectives of Others in European society that help to strengthen national identity. Following a

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brief summary of individual variables, including frequencies, a detailed account of trends based
on sex, age, socio-economic status (difficulty paying bills and occupation), and residential
location is presented along-side categorically themed variables.
Summary of Demographic Variables
Frequencies were ran for thirty-nine variables considered for the dissertation from the
“Eurobarometer 71.3: Globalization, Personal Values and Priorities, European Identity, Future of
the European Union, Social Problems and Welfare, and European Elections, June-July 2009”
data set obtained through the Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research.
Based on previous research based on Eurobarometer data and related to identity I chose five core
demographic variables:
Sex
The variable “sex” is included as a contribution to the basic demographic profile related
to the main themes of analysis. In this data set 55.1% of the respondents were female compared
to 44.9 of male respondents. Gender is generally an important demographic indicator to include
as a means of identifying overarching themes related to perspectives and attitudes across
demographic categories. There is little indication within the literature that there exist strong
gendered divisions pertaining to perspectives of European identity and levels of support for the
EU. Being that one of the goals of the dissertation is to explore and incorporate non-economic
factors in assessing perspectives toward the EP and European identity I felt it was important to
include gender as a way of understanding differences separate from SES indicators alone—
although gender is always connected to patterns in the labor force and in terms of inequalities
related to SES. It is unclear as to whether there are clear differences between men and women in
relation to their perspectives of the EP, which is a main reason for including it here.

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Age
Respondents were 15 and older. Age was re-coded into six categories because the
categories were more evenly distributed than the variable recoded for 4 categories—in the latter
variable the 55+ cohort dominated the distribution. In the six category age variable the 65 and
older cohort remain the modal group with 20.8%.
There is evidence that age may be a factor in shaping attitudes toward the EU, the
European Project, sense of belonging and perceptions of ethnic minorities and immigrants in
society. Younger cohorts tend to be more supportive of the European Union and youth oriented
programs have been a recent approach to building support for the European Project as indicated
by the White Paper analysis offered in Chapter 4. I classify age across the three main themes in
order to find support for the notion that younger people are more likely to support the EU, feel
European and have more positive perspectives pertaining to Others within European society.
Youth are often targeted by active citizenship and nation-building programs within the EU in
recognition that to build hegemonic power through consent, loyalty and/or identity, socialization
must begin as early in the life course as possible. It is also hypothesized that older cohorts,
specifically those 50 and older, may be more affected by conflicts of previous generations
between Member States. Older cohorts may be more resistant to change in regard to government
authority, policy but also demographics and the presence of Others in society. Generations who
not only remember, but possibly participated in or were affected by conflict between European
nations may still be influenced by those transformative and life-shaping eras and events.
Experiences of older generations based on belonging to particular Member States, in turn, may
increase their sense of nationality compared to their sense of being “European”. Also, the
definition of who is “European” is very different today than it was 50, 25, 15 or even just 10
years ago. The idea of “European” involving citizens of Eastern and Central Europe, let alone
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Turkey, may be completely new or unknown to those older generations may have known or been
socialized into a different perspective of who the label “European” refers to, let alone if it is a
label by which you self-identify.
Respondent Occupation (Scale)
Research also indicates a relationship between occupation (as a component of socioeconomic status) and support for the European Project as well as sense of belonging and
perspectives of Others in society. Those who tend to benefit less from processes of globalization
and European centralization—especially working class and manual laborers—are more likely to
support populist movements, be more skeptical and less supportive of EU programs and
institutions. Further, they are more likely to adhere to a national identity as compared to a
European identity. These trends are in contrast to the “Cosopolitains” who are more likely to
support the EU as well as benefit from its processes of integration such as education (students)
and/or business.
In regard to occupation, 19.7 reported jobs as managers or other white collar labor
whereas 19.6 reported being employed as a “manual worker.” 27.6 of respondents reported they
are “retired” where 7.7% were self-employed, 8% were “housepersons” and 8.1% “students.”
Type of community
I chose to examine the residential location of respondents in terms of rural areas, small or
midsized towns and large towns. Regional identity is also an important aspect of identity and
social location. I seek to address the question “if residents of larger towns support the EU and
adhere more to a European sense of belonging in contrast to their rural counterparts. I am also
curious if there is a difference in regard to perceptions of public authority, “the gap” and Others

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in society. Finally, “type of community” provides further dimensions for examining
demographic trends related to the themes of analysis.
Difficulty Paying Bills
Income level was not included in the survey data set. Instead, as an indication of
standard of living, I examine the variable “During the last twelve months, would you say you had
difficulties to pay your bills at the end of the month…?” as a proxy for socio-economic status,
but more importantly as a gauge for Europeans standard of living. The original variable indicates
that 14.9% of respondents had difficulty paying their bills “most of the time.” 30.2% had
difficulty “from time to time” whereas 52.9% had difficulty “Almost never/never.” This variable
was re-coded to indicate whether respondents had experienced difficulty (combining “most of
the time” and “from time to time”). Frequency analysis of the re-coded variable reports 45.1%
of respondents had experienced difficulty paying bills within the past year. This provides a
qualitative response as a way of reflecting struggles with monetary resources regardless of
income level.
Data Analysis According to Three Main Themes
As mentioned earlier, as a means of addressing “the gap,” the 2009 Eurobarometer data
permits examination of the three overarching themes: 1) Identity, 2) Perceptions of State
Institutions and Public Authority, and 3) Views of the European Project. First, the theme of
identity is assessed by looking at European sense of belonging, perceptions of the Other in
European society and views regarding the impact of globalization on communities. Second,
perceptions of state institutions and public authority are examined to understand Europeans
views on which public authority impacts their living conditions the most, to what extent they
trust various institutions in addition to perceptions of the EU’s role in harnessing globalization’s

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impact on the lives of citizens. Finally, levels of support for the EP are investigated through
views toward EU membership in addition to support for the euro and future enlargement of the
EU. These three themes are examined across demographic categories to determine if agendas
illustrated in the White Paper analysis, including those aimed at the youth, has had the impact on
identity, feelings of investment and belonging that are sought by institutional elites. Further, this
analysis is conducted to seek support for previous research indicating the importance of age,
education and socio-economic status in determining sense of belonging, support for the EP, as
well as globalization processes as a whole.
Discussion of Results
Using 2009 Eurobarometer data5 to explore perspectives and attitudes of Europeans, two
major sets of findings stand out in relation to differences both across and within demographic
groups (See Appendix C for tables and results of analysis). First, there was a split between
National/Regional and European/Global Citizen identity and/or attachment. Considering the
theme of identity described previously, it is not surprising that Europeans are most likely to feel
a sense of belonging to National identity, with adherence to regional identity following closely
behind. In contrast, there are significantly fewer respondents who reported feeling “European”
or having attachment to a “global citizen” identity. Also, Europeans indicate further attachment
to Member States and regional identities as trends reveal the majority of Europeans view
National public authority as having the most impact on living conditions. Similar to sense of
belonging, a strong majority of Europeans acknowledge the significance of regional/local public

Papacosta, Antonis. “Eurobarometer 71.3: Globalization, Personal Values and Priorities,
European Identity, Future of the European Union, Social Problems and Welfare, and European
Elections, June-July 2009”. This data set was obtained through ICPSR under the InterUniversity Consortium Agreement and was utilized based on all agreements according to ICPSR
policy.
5

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authority, which has only slightly less response in comparison to national authority but remains
paramount in relation to the perceive impact of EU authority.
Overall, the significant discrepancy between citizen’s perceptions regarding the impact of
National and Regional/Local authority in comparison to the EU’s impact on living conditions
provides insight into which public authority citizens feel has the most influence on their
everyday lives and standard of living. The perceived influence, and importance, of National and
Regional/Local public authority coupled with the tendency to identify with the same levels of
political identity is a reflection of the sense of attachment and investment citizens feel toward
institutions and the significant power they have over their lives.
Another example of the split between perceptions of National and European institutions
and an assessment of “the gap” is in relation to trust in institutions. Again, there emerged
differences in tendencies to trust national institutions in comparison to EU institutions; however
the data did not reflect what I initially understood. Initially, I assumed there would be less trust
in European institutions in comparison to National institutions however the data shows the
opposite is true, especially when referring to National Political Parties who garner extremely low
levels of trust in comparison to other institutions. This may indicate increased support for the EP
on the ground-level. It might seem to indicate that Member State authority is being challenged
by its membership and this is reflected in lack of trust at the National level, especially in
comparison to the EU. However, I do not think either is the case. I contend that Europeans feel
more invested and personally impacted by National and Regional/Local institutions, in regard to
their living conditions but also in their tendency to identify at the National and Regional/local
level and the impact that has on individual self-concept. Intense levels of attachment and
identity at the National level may spark more fervent criticism of National institutions as a result

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of apparent “higher stakes” citizens have invested—not only economic and political stakes, but
also “identity stakes” that shape our self-concept and perceptions of culture or “way of life” that
is considered sacred and in need of protection from “outsiders”. Further the EU, in possible
combination with the Other, provides a strong comparative to strengthen the already established,
solidified national and regional identities.
The second major set of findings that emerged consistently across the analysis by themes
are trends associated with age, occupation and socio-economic status, which in this case is
measured by whether respondents have experienced difficulty paying bills within the past 12
months as a indicator of recent standard of living. I did not assume that European perspectives
would be uniform and although I did find significant patterns in relation to support and
identification at the National/Regional level it was obviously necessary to look into demographic
differences identified in previous research as significant. Three demographic indicators revealed
more variation in comparison to two others included in the study. Indicators of age and socioeconomic status, specifically occupation and “experience difficulty paying bills” revealed the
most variation in response to the three main themes of inquiry. Although variables of “sex” and
respondents “type of community” in relation to residence were included and contributed to
creating a holistic view of overarching trends, such as those described in the previous section,
however they did not indicate noteworthy trends based on the simple cross-tabulations
conducted.
Overall, younger Europeans (especially the 15-24 cohort) along with managers and
students were most likely to feel European, support the EP and view globalization as an
opportunity. This group also tends to be less critical of the Other in European society. The
trends associated with these demographic groups appear to represent a category of Europeans

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who have accumulated experiences and benefits from globalization as well as belonging to the
EU—referred to in the literature as “cosmopolitans” due to their position and ability to take
advantage of the opportunities globalization processes and EU membership offers them.
In comparison, older cohorts (especially 65 and older) and the occupational categories of
“housepersons”, the unemployed and retirees tended to have the lowest rates for those who “feel
European”. They were also more likely to be skeptical of globalization as well as the EP and
they tend to be more critical of the Other in European society. This group is characterized in the
literature as “populists” due to their adherence to national identity but also their skepticism of
globalization and centralization of EU power, but “outsiders”, increasing cultural diversity and
the multitude of changes to “way of life” that accompanies globalization processes while
perceived as posing a direct threat to populist values and identities.
Finally, although the literature indicates that manual laborers are crucial to the “populist”
characterization, my analysis indicates that manual laborers are not as dominant in adhering to
“populist perspectives” as first assumed, especially in comparison to other occupational
categories such as house-persons, retirees and the unemployed. Further, those 65 years and older
alongside respondents who have experienced difficulty paying bills, add some of the most
skeptical responses in regard to the EP as well as the presence of Others in European society.
Examining “the Gap” and Aspects of Identity:
Sense of Belonging, Perceptions of the Other and Attitudes Toward Globalization
It is clear from the analysis presented in Chapter 4 that the aims of EU institutional elites
driving the European Project have increasingly incorporated goals for establishing European
identity, solidarity and feelings of investment at the European level among its citizens. As a way

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of gauging “bottom-up” reactions of citizens to institutional efforts to establish European identity
and solidarity I chose to begin with assessing sense of belonging as a reflection of identity.
Participants were asked their tendency to feel a sense of belonging associated with being
European, Nationality, an inhabitant of region/local communities and a global citizen of the
world. Quickly apparent, yet not incredibly surprising, is that overall responses indicated strong
attachment to national identity; however what is noteworthy is that Europeans also feel more of a
sense of belonging as an inhabitant of their region, much more so than compared to European
identity. When looking at the four categories together, tendencies to feel a sense of belonging to
national and regional identity are much stronger than those of a European and global citizen
identity. Looking closely at the national and regional identity there is very little variation within
and among the demographic categories. However, closer examination of the responses to the
European and global citizen categories show the most difference among the attributes within
each demographic category, specifically age and occupation. For instance, when considering the
range of responses the largest range of 4% was found among the occupation category where 97%
of retirees feel a sense of attachment to their nationality whereas 93.5% of students felt this sense
of belonging. There was even less variation within categories in relation to regional identity, the
highest range being only 2.8% within the age category.
However, the largest range of responses can be found within the occupation category in
relation to “feeling European” where the difference between the highest percentages reporting
attachment to European identity is 25.4% more than the lowest percentage reported. Here 86.3%
of managers reported a tendency to feel European whereas just fewer than 61% of house-persons
report feeling European. As a matter of fact, the groups most likely to feel European within the
occupation category are managers and students compared to house-persons and unemployed

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individuals who were least likely to feel European. The split between managers and students,
and house-persons, unemployed and retirees remain fairly consistent throughout the remainder of
the analysis.
Additionally, age as a demographic variable also consistently shows a split between old
and young. Both of these overarching trends relate to the idea of a split between those who “feel
European” and support the EP—the cosmopolitans; and those who feel less European and are
more skeptical of the EP, or the “populists”. Finally, only 66.3% of those who have experienced
difficulty paying bills “feel European” compared to 94% who feel attachment to nationality and
93.7% who feel attached to regional/local identity. Data related to those struggling financially
show they trend less toward European/Global Citizen identity, even in comparison to other
demographic indicators and lending evidence to their associated with the “populist” perspective.
In addition to “sense of belonging”, five questions concerning attitudes toward “the
Other” in European society are also included in analysis. Earlier I discussed the impact of the
Other in assisting the dominant group to identify themselves as they define who are “outsiders”
or those who do not belong. The Eurobarometer survey questions describe “the Other” in two
ways. First, they ask respondents about their perceptions of “other ethnic minority groups”. In
this case, the term “other” is used to indicate those who stand outside of the dominant group or
the “norm” for European society. The question also implies that the respondent is somehow
apart of the in-group by evaluating their perception of “them” (other ethnic minority groups)—
essentially asking the perspective of those who belong about those who do not. The question is
not stated in a way that might include ethnic minorities as apart of the in-group, or in this case as
“European”, rather it automatically defines “other ethnic minorities/minority groups” as the
Other (it is right in the question!!).

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The second group defined as the Other in the Eurobarometer questions are immigrants,
who are typically defined as the Other in the context of European immigration related to post war
guest worker programs and decolonization. It was actually issues related to immigration that
first illustrated the deep divide between those who are skeptical of the EP and those who support
it “full steam ahead”. What remains questionable about the questions presented to respondents is
do they (or the people who create Eurobarometer questions) understand the difference, or
distinguish in any way immigrants from “other ethnic minority groups”? Of course, ethnic
minorities can hold peer status to dominant group members in regard to citizenship; however it is
clear they are still a part of society not fully integrated regardless of citizenship status. Overall,
these questions and criticisms regarding who is portrayed as the Other in the Eurobarometer not
only gauges perspectives toward these groups but also provides insight into who is considered
European on a cultural and social level, not just in terms of official citizenship as a marker of
“belonging”.
The largest range of responses is found to support the “cosmopolitan” and “populist” split
discussed in the overarching findings. Across all five questions, the largest range of group
responses are among occupational categories, with the age categories showing the second most
differentiation. For examples, when asked if “other ethnic minority groups help to enrich
culture” the largest difference in responses were found within the occupation category where
those least likely to view other ethnic minority groups as enriching culture were house-persons at
39.8% compared to 63.9% of managers. For this question, the youngest age cohort of 15-24
were most likely to view the Other as enriching culture whereas the oldest, 65 and older, were
least likely to share this view with 44.2% agreeing with the statement.

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When asked if other ethnic minority groups cause insecurity, retirees (49.7%) and housepersons (48.7%) were most likely to agree however, and somewhat surprisingly, those who are
self-employed (48.7) also revealed the highest levels of agreement that these groups cause
insecurity. Again, students (39.6%) and managers (40.9%) are similar in their responses being
the least likely to agree that other ethnic minority groups cause insecurity. For differences
among age groups, the same patterns are as the previous question revealed, however the levels of
support are inversed where the youngest cohort are least likely to agree, in this case with the idea
that other ethnic minority groups cause insecurity and the oldest cohorts are most likely to agree.
The divide between the managers and students representing the “cosmopolitan”
perspective compared to house-persons and the unemployed who illustrate the “populist”
perspective were largely consistent throughout the remaining questions. Managers (38.5%) and
students (46.6%) show less support for the idea that “other ethnic minority groups increase
unemployment” compared to house-persons (56.8%) and the unemployed (53.1%) who are most
likely to agree with this notion. Unlike the previous two question response trends, age is not as
clearly correlated to support for the statement about ethnic minorities increasing unemployment.
In this case the youngest and oldest cohorts actually show more similarity in their responses that
previously. Younger respondents are still less likely to be critical of the presence of ethnic
minorities but the lowest levels of support are found in the 25-34 (category in comparison to 1524. As a matter of fact, those 15-24 (50.3%), 55-64 (50.4%) and those 65 and older (54.2%)
were most likely to agree that the presence of other ethnic minority groups increase
unemployment. Finally, those who experience difficulty paying bills (54.5%) also show high
levels of agreement with the idea that other ethnic minority groups increase unemployment.

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The final two questions utilized to understand perspectives of the Other in European
society were related to the role of immigrants both in the economy and their impact on tolerance
and cultural understanding in society. Not surprisingly, patterns of response associated with
occupation and age come close to mirroring previous responses to questions concerning “other
ethnic minority groups”. The groups most likely to agree with the statement that “immigrants
are needed in certain sectors of the economy” are managers (52.7%) and self-employed persons
(46.2%) compared to those least likely to agree—unemployed persons (30.7%) and of housepersons (36.2%). The response levels of these groups appear to indicate support for the notion
that those who benefit more from the EP, in this case economic integration, and from neo-liberal
globalization are more likely to support these processes. It would appear that managers and selfemployed persons would be more likely to benefit from the presence of migrants in comparison
to house-persons and the unemployed who may not only benefit from these trends but are more
likely to be threatened by them. Similarly, those experiencing difficulty paying bills are much
less likely to agree that immigrants are needed in sectors of the economy (33.4%) or that they
play a role in developing tolerance and understanding (39.1%).
In regard to age, once again patterns of response reveal decreasing support for the
statement as age increases. Similarly, the same patters emerge while examining responses to the
statement “Immigrants play a role in developing understanding and tolerance” providing support
for earlier claims that younger Europeans are more likely to be supportive of the EP but also less
critical of the Other in European society than older Europeans.
One last trend regarding perspectives of the Other that is noteworthy is that the largest
differences in responses from Europeans in various types of communities were found among
questions concerning the Other. Although they are not large differences, the most variation
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among “types of communities”, especially between residents of rural villages and small towns
compared to residents from large towns. Europeans in rural areas and smaller towns tend to be
more skeptical of the Other than those in larger towns. The largest range of responses came
with the statement “other ethnic minority groups increase unemployment” where 53.3% rural
residents and 50.6% of small town residents agree compared to 47% of those in large towns.
Further, when asked if ethnic minorities cause insecurity 48.5% of rural residents and 47% of
small town residents agreed compared to 43.2% of residents in large towns. Again, although
the variation in response levels is not extreme it is noteworthy that they largest differences
among Europeans based on the type of community they reside emerge when discussing the
role of the Other in Europe indicating an impact of the size of community on perspectives of
“outsiders”. Additionally, other trends indicate that strong regional/local identity coupled with
likelihood of Europeans to perceived regional/local authority as having a significant impact on
living conditions show support for regional communities having an impact on sense of
belonging but also perspectives of who belong and benefit from the EP and those who do not.
The final approach for this analysis in understanding identity is investigating European
perceptions of globalization as a threat or opportunity for citizens. Two points are argued
earlier—first, that those who relate to the “populist” perspective are less likely to benefit from
neo-liberal globalization processes in comparison to “cosmopolitan” Europeans who are more
likely to benefit, and participate in globalization processes. Second, it is argued that
globalization is viewed as a threat to nation-states in addition to strengthening the role of the
EU in Europeans lives which again, is viewed more positively by “cosmopolitans” than
“populists. Table 5.3 presents responses in regard to whether globalization is views as a
threat or opportunity, and again similar trends related to occupation and age are illustrated.

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Similar to previous aspects of identity investigated occupational status reveal consistent
patterns where managers (54.6%) and students (51.7%) are most likely view globalization as
an opportunity. In comparison, only 37.7% of housepersons and 38.4% of unemployed
individuals viewed globalization as a good opportunity. Overall, younger Europeans are more
likely than older Europeans to view globalization as an opportunity. 48.1% of those 15-24
agreed with this perspective whereas 39.5% of 65 and older agreed.
Of those who view globalization as a threat there are less discrepancies between young
and old—in this case, 36.5% of 15-24 year olds and 37.6% of those 65 and older view
globalization as a threat compared to 44.2% of those 45-54 who are most likely to share this
view. Once again, the least likely to view globalization as a threat are managers (36.7%) and
students (34.6%) compared to 44.4% of unemployed who are more likely to view
globalization as a threat.
Interestingly, this question revealed assumed trends related to manual workers, where
they emerge as the second most likely group (next to the unemployed) who view
globalization as a threat. Also, type of community shows a difference between perspectives of
those in rural areas, where 40.9% view globalization as a good opportunity compared to
46.6% of those in large towns.
Taking into consideration these patterns relating to identity, the second theme from
which “the gap” assessed pertains to views concerning the impact of pubic authority on
Europeans. Also, trust in State institutions at both the national and EU level and perspectives
concerning the role of the EU in protecting and enabling citizens in the processes of
globalization will be considered. Overall, the data concerning institutions and power structures
embedded in State (in this case both National and EU) reveal similar demographic patterns that
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were discovered while investigating aspects of identity. Mainly, overarching patterns related to
views of to national/regional authority comparative to EU authority, but also patterns related to
trust and SES (especially occupation and difficulty paying bills) that help to provide further
evidence of a split between “populist” and “cosmopolitan” viewpoint’s in relation to identity,
views of institutions and overall support for the EP.
Examining “the Gap” and Views of State Institutions:
Public Authority’s Impact, Trust in Institutions and the Role of the EU Globalization
In addition to exploring identity as an approach to understanding “the gap” that exists
between citizens and the EP it is also essential to assess citizen’s views toward various levels of
public authority and institutions that influence their everyday lives. I utilize variables that
represent European views concerning which public authority has the most impact on their lives
and their level of trust in European versus National institutions. EU elites have often touted the
EP as a vehicle for protecting Member States and citizens from the negative impacts of
globalization while harnessing the positive impacts for their benefit. To investigate whether
citizens hold these views I also included two variables addressing the role of the EU in enabling
and protecting citizens within the processes of globalization.
Overall, Europeans are more likely to view National public authority as having the most
impact on their living conditions with regional/local public authority coming in second in
relation to which authority Europeans has the most influence on their lives. In comparison,
European level public authority is perceived as having little impact on living conditions, much
less perceived impact in comparison to national and regional/local authority. The data indicates
little variation among responses within demographic groups, although the biggest range is found
among occupational categories. Interestingly, managers and students are the least likely to view
regional/local authority as having the most impact whereas retirees and the unemployed are the
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groups who are the most likely to feel this way. As mentioned earlier, it is the perception that
nation-states and regional/local authority have significantly more impact on everyday living
conditions compared to European authority may be a cause for the relatively lesser trust garnered
by national institutions in comparison to European institutions.
According to the data analysis, Europeans are overall more likely to trust European
institutions in comparison to National institutions, especially National political parties.
Again, in regard to age, younger Europeans trust more in European institutions alongside
managers and students. Also consistent with previous reported trends, house-persons and
the unemployed are least likely to trust European institutions. Overall, although European
institutions garner higher percentages of trust, I contend this is not necessarily due to
increased support for the EP, or European institutions are superseding National institut ions
in importance. Rather, I argue almost the opposite—that Europeans are so invested in
National institutions due to the perceived impact national authority has over living
conditions and the strong sense of belonging and investment citizens feel in these
institutions that they have become more critical of them in comparison to EU institutions.
In this case it is useful to note that there seems to be a significant “gap” between citizens
and their Member-State institutions that should be acknowledged in relation to “the gap”
associated with the EP and European citizens. The next section explores “the gap” between
the latter by exploring European viewpoints concerning EU membership and support for
programs including the euro and further enlargement to seek further evidence of these
trends identified thus far.

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Examining “the Gap” and Support for the European Project:
Views of Membership, the Euro and EU Enlargement
The last theme explored in relation to “the gap” European perspectives of EU
membership, including whether it is “good” or “beneficial”, in addition to levels of support
for the Single European Monetary Union (the euro) and future enlargement of the European
Union. Eurobarometer data shows that although a large portion of those surveyed view EU
membership as a “good thing” a significant portion views membership as “Neither Good Nor
Bad”. The large representation of those who consider membership “neither good nor bad”
indicates possible ambivalence or apathy among Europeans toward membership. In regard to
those who see EU membership as a “good thing”, younger Europeans are more likely to hold
this positive perspective, along with students, managers and self-employed individuals further
providing support for the idea that those who benefit more from the EP, including benefits
from business, education and travel are more likely to support the EU, in this case by viewing
membership positively. These groups are also most likely to report that they “benefited” from
membership. Conversely, older Europeans (specifically 65 and older) along with the
unemployed, retired and those experiencing difficulty paying bills are most likely to view
membership as a “bad thing” in addition to being the most likely to report they “did not
benefit” from membership.
To further examine “the gap” within the EP I investigated support for European programs,
specifically the euro and future enlargement as a reflection of support for the project as a whole.
More support is reported for the Euro in comparison to future enlargement overall. For
example, 58.8% of Europeans 65 and older support the euro in comparison to only 39.9% who
support enlargement. Further, this analysis indicates similar support for the “cosmopolitan” and
“populist” divide where managers and students are not only most likely to support the euro but
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also future enlargement. These trends are not surprising given trends related to perspectives of
the Other in addition to debates surrounding more recent enlargement efforts, specifically when
Turkey became a candidate in 2004. Regardless of levels of support presented here, it would be
useful to look into more recent data to find if support for the euro has decreased significantly
since the economic crisis starting in 2008.
Lastly, perceptions of the EU’s role in harnessing the impact of globalization are
investigated as a way of assessing whether ideologies concerning the role of the EU in
protecting European’s from globalization exist on the ground level and not just in institutional
discourse and theory. Overall there is support for the notion that the EU protects citizens from
the negative effects of globalization and enables citizens to benefit from globalization. Once
again, the most prevalent trends are associated with the “cosmopolitan” and “populist” divide
in perspectives toward the EU and the impact of authority in the lives of citizens. For
example, younger Europeans are more likely to view the EU’s role in harnessing globalization
more positively—the older the cohort the less likely you are to find support for these
perspectives—although, 65 and older respondents did agree that the EU protects just slightly
more than those 35-64. Further, those who experience difficulty in paying bills (55.9%) and
the unemployed (54%) were the least likely to agree with both perspectives. Somewhat
surprisingly, retirees were the most likely to agree that the EU protects citizens from the
negative effects of globalization with 68.9% (the highest level of support across all groups and
demographic indicators) in agreement. Further, students (75.9%) and managers (73.2%) were
most likely to agree that the EU’s enables citizens to benefit from globalization.

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Final Notes about the Eurobarometer Data Analysis
The goal of utilizing Eurobarometer data was to identify trends that would indicate
whether EP agenda-setting and discourse has made an impact on European identity and
addressing “the gap” between EU elites and citizens. Further, I wanted to explore “the gap” in
more detail to identity patterns that may indicate which Europeans are more likely to support the
EP and “feel European” as a way of understanding which indicators are important in determining
these trends.
Overall, two overarching trends are discovered among the data. The first is an
overwhelming sense of attachment at the national and regional/local level, that latter of which is
as formidable an opponent to European identity as that rooted in Member State nationalism. The
second overarching trend related to the split between the “populist” viewpoint, which is less
likely to feel European, show less support of the EP overall and is more critical of perceived
threats to the nation-state such as the processes of neo-liberal globalization and international
power as well as the presence of the Other in European society, especially in consideration of
future enlargement and immigration trends.
The first trend indicates a strong sense of attachment to national and regional/local
identities but trends concerning views of public authority and trust in national versus European
institutions provide evidence of more intense feelings among Europeans for their investment at
the national and regional/local levels in comparison to the EU. Considering these patterns of
identity and solidarity, it remains apparent that adherence to the nation-state and Member State
collective identity remains a challenge to building European identity and solidarity, necessary for
the progression of the EP.

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The second overarching trend based on a cleavage between “populists” and
“cosmopolitains” revealed that socioeconomic status, especially in regard to occupation and
standard of living, has a major impact on “the gap” and those who still feel alien and least
benefited from the EP. On the other hand, it shows that programs aimed at European youth,
specifically those aimed at building identity and active citizenship, may be showing signs of
having an impact given trends associated with age and the likelihood that younger cohorts adhere
more to the “cosmopolitan” perspective. Further, occupation proves to be a strong indicator of
who is more likely to incorporated into the European Social model, or social contract, envisioned
by institutional leaders.
Finally, standard of living has an enormous impact on European’s identity and
perspectives related to the EP overall. Generally, the analysis finds support not only for “the
gap” that exists between citizens and the EP but also trends within the gap that indicate those
who feel they have benefited are more likely to feel European and support the EP than those who
feel less of a positive, and possibly more of a negative, impact.
Identities at the national, as well as the regional level, remain challenges to EP. The
current economic crisis has only fueled divisions of support for the EP, where Member State
membership has become increasingly paramount. Also, the impact of regional identity and
nationalism has exacerbated the split between those who support the EP and those who do not,
where “old”, pre-war divisions between European nation-states that intended to be eliminated
with the creation of the EU seem to be as strong as ever, especially in relation to “old” concepts
of the Other between the core and periphery, but also those who make up “Fortress Europe”
compared to the “newcomers” from the South, Central and Eastern regions of Europe. This

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along with other implications for future research will be explored in the context of the conclusion
of the dissertation.

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CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION

Within the past decade alone the European Project (EP), what has become known as the
European Union (EU), has undergone massive transformations that have impacted the
development of the EP as well as the social contracts between European “state” institutions and
the citizens, or members of the state. These social contracts are based ideally on reciprocal rights
and responsibilities that are the foundation of the sense of loyalty, attachment and investment
that ensure citizens will participate, support and legitimize state power including institutional
endeavors with little to no question or criticism, as explained earlier in Chapter 2 with the
discussion of hegemonic power.
In the case of hegemonic power, power comes from the governed through their
willingness to participate and support institutions (by voting, paying taxes and or fighting wars
on behalf of representatives of the state). This power becomes a part of the social context, or the
social construction of reality, where it is taken for granted, accepted without question and
considered “normal” by most in society. By utilizing critical discourse analysis it became
possible to make connections between EP institutional discourse as a way to illustrate power
structures including agendas and the elite who directly shape all of these components of building
hegemonic power. Conversely, by examining Eurobarometer data it was possible to gauge
whether efforts by European elites to establish, define and sustain collective identity based on a
sense of “being European” have taken root or manifest at any level. In this case, “bottom-up”
perspectives of Europeans related to identity, the impact of authority on living conditions,
support for the EP, trust in institutions and attitudes toward the Other, or those who are
seemingly identified as not belonging (even by the survey tool itself in a not so subtle way!)

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assist in assessing whether institutional efforts, as described in the discourse, are having the
intended impact, or if “the gap” remains as wide and deep as ever.
Summary of the White Paper Analysis and Findings
Although “permissive consensus” dominated until the 1990s in regard to citizen
perspectives, knowledge and/or participation with the EP, by the mid 1990s challenges from the
“ground-level” began to reveal the enormity of “the gap” between “Brussels” and EP citizens.
This was especially true concerning the issue of the growing influence of European power and its
ability to trump Member State power. As with the case of immigration policy, “bottom-up”
perceptions were that policies are sent down from “Brussels” to compromise Member State
sovereignty, identity, demographics, and, ultimately, “ways of life” reflected in nationalist
movements throughout Europe.
The White Papers provided a window into the historical trajectory of institutional efforts
concerning the gap as they identifies and defined the gap as a detriment to current and future
integration as well as other crucial goals for the progression of the EP. White Paper discourse
throughout the 1990s spelled out goals, agendas and trajectories of the EP aimed to close the gap
and build power and legitimacy through the construction of consensus and collective identity at
the European level. During the 1990s and into the 2000s White Paper discourse made clear the
notion that collective identity and solidarity are core to building hegemonic power at the
European level, as a way of combating challenges rooted in populist movements, and to establish
a “normal”, taken for granted role of European power and authority in the lives of its citizens.
Building a “European people” became important to the concept of legitimacy within the
EP as key to progressing into the 21st century. More importantly, according to White Paper
discourse, European identity and solidarity is central to the continual successful progression of

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the EP, especially as it concerns expansion and integration. Garnering not just the approval, but
the sense of loyalty, belonging and investment of European citizens would help to ensure not
only participation and consensus within the EP of a strong majority of Europeans, not just the
European elite. It is up to institutional elite, who have the power to shape the social construction
of reality for its members, to create a shared sense of investment so that Europeans do not
question the power that the EP has over their lives, especially when it circumvents the social
contract between them and their Member State governments and identities.
Until the 1980’s, importance of the EP among European elite was overt given they were
the most invested, had the most power and ability to participate, including representing
themselves and making decisions on behalf of their own interests at the “top” institutional levels
of the EP. However, the gap revealed that this experience within the EP is not necessarily that of
those at the “ground level”. All members of the EP are relied on to participate in the EP by
voting, paying taxes and/or abiding by rules and regulations that are implemented at the
European level, however these changes in civic duties and responsibilities were not viewed by
everyone, or even the majority, as positive. If anything, many Europeans did not have a feeling
of investment and a sense of attachment at the European level, let alone a strong basis of
knowledge of the EP from which to understand the effects that the EP has had on their political,
economic and social lives.
Needless to say, although elites felt attached, involved and loyal to the EP, “regular”
citizens did not, especially given the paramount investments, attachments and loyalties held at
the National level. In order to build a Europe based on solidarity and loyalty among its
members, WP discourse shows “old-fashioned” nation-building tactics presented as the best
method for creating a sense of belonging, shared history and sense of investment across Member

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State boundaries but within the new (and seemingly ever-expanding) scope of what was
considered Europe. Through language and education programs, the creation of information and
promotion of European civil society through active citizenship, especially among the youth EP
elites used institutional power to establish and shape identity among individuals. This was
attempted through creating a sense of shared history (as opposed to the “Old Europe” divided by
national boundaries), shared belonging to a common market and European community as well as
a sense of investment in the economic and political endeavors of the EP that promised to insulate
Europeans from the power of the U.S. and the transformations associated with the current era of
globalization.
Ultimately the goal was to erase conflict between European Member States that stemmed
from decades of nation-building and fueled by over three decades of war, to be replaced with a
cooperative, unified European identity based in shared economic and political investments at the
European level. However, perceived attempts to compromise nation-state power, sovereignty
and cultural “ways of living” based in national identity were not passively accepted. EP elites
greatly underestimated the threat they posed to national sovereignty and identity, which
ultimately backfired making the EP “the Other” to those who did not feel a part of the EP, let
alone a beneficiary of the EP. EP elites quickly realized they needed to aim efforts at the youth
in order to socialize them into a sense of European identity as a way of trumping nationalism
based in Member States.
For this dissertation relationships between state institutional power, as reflected in
discourse, and citizens including the ways in which the “social contract” and reciprocal rights
and responsibilities between the nation and the state are examined to assess the ways in which
they are being transformed as a result of the EP. This includes taking into account the changing

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role of nations and states in the current era of globalization, particularly the role of collective
identity and solidarity in providing a basis for sense of belonging and loyalty to state institutions
but also legitimacy, in this case both within Europe. As a means of exploring collective identity
and solidarity based on notions of nationalism or “being European” perspectives toward the
Other are included as a way of understanding what is shaping notions of nation-state identity, as
well as European identity, by identifying those who do not belong, or are not considered
European, or included in dominant European society.
Ultimately, the question asking “is European identity and solidarity necessary for the
European Project to proceed with success?” remains. EP elites must consider legitimacy derived
from the “ground-level” among citizens not only as a matter of necessity to keep the institutional
framework running but also to show the global community that Europeans are “on board” and
backing those that make decisions on their behalf and represent them at the European level to the
global community. If the global community perceives European citizens as rejecting or not
supporting the EP, they may not find it to be legitimate in its role in the global community as a
result.
Summary of Main Eurobarometer Analysis Themes and Findings
This dissertation argues that for approximately three decades the main challenge to
establishing European collective identity and solidarity has been the international elites’
underestimation of the impact of national, as well as regional/local identity in shaping citizen’s
role in the EP. Although permissive consensus via apathy and lack of knowledge are important
to understanding levels of citizen participation, trust and sense of belonging to the EU, they are
not the only aspects of “the gap” impacting their roles and perceptions in maintaining legitimacy
and assisting in the progression of the EP. Institutional acknowledgement and attempts to

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establish identity from the “top-down” became increasingly influential in the lives of citizens,
and in some cases, appeared more as a challenge to identity, rather than something that
complimented national identity and citizenship.
There are main themes that emerged in both the CDA analysis of “top-down” discourse
and agendas pursuing collective identity and solidarity building among citizens through
institutional information, policy and programs. Further there were main themes that emerged
from the analysis of “bottom-up” responses of Europeans in regard to the EP and sense of
identity as reported in the Eurobarometer Survey data from 2009. The two-fold approach to the
research provided a more holistic approach of the challenges facing the EP as well as factors
associated with the changing roles of citizens, nations, states and identities in the current era of
globalization.
According to discourse analysis presented in Chapter 4, from the completion of the
internal market in the mid 1980s to its completion in 1992, institutions viewed citizens largely as
economic actors, specifically laborers, and as those who would embody and carry out policies
regarding “harmonization” and integration. Solidarity and collective identity building were
aimed mainly at economic and political elite who were the “middlemen” between citizens and
institutions. In the early decades of integration, it was more a concern for EP elites that there
was solidarity at the upper levels of political and economic institutions rather than among
citizens. At that point citizens were seen as secondary actors who would simply benefit from
peace and economic prosperity, as well as increasingly fluid borders that would bring
opportunity and social mobility.
It is not until the mid-1990s that discourse reflects institutional acknowledgement of a
gap between citizens and “Brussels” in regard to trust and transparency as well as apathy based

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on lack of knowledge and participation. By the turn of the Twenty-first century the concerns
surrounding the gap were full blown among EP practitioners, especially with regard to how it
would impact economic integration.
Therefore, it is only relatively recently that EP elites have seriously considered a
“European Social Model” based on identity and a “European Demos” that implies a sense of
belonging based on solidarity, shared history and a common sense of loyalty and investment.
Tactics of building hegemonic power at the EU level through information distribution, education
and particularity programs aimed at promoting European identity and active citizenship,
particularly among the youth became the main foci of institutional efforts, and may have been
having some impact until the economic crisis took priority.
Intense sense of belonging at the national and regional levels coupled with threats to the
nation-state in the form of neo-liberal globalization, centralization and the growing impact of the
EP, as well as increasing diversity resulting from migration of the Other into seemingly
“culturally homogeneous” European societies, has exacerbated nationalist loyalty among many.
Nationalist movements took on a “populist” perspective and these patterns were found,
especially, in particular socio-economic categories as demonstrated in the Eurobarometer
analysis presented in Chapter 5. Ultimately, national identity is not only reinforced by Others
related to migration, but also those related to threats to the nation-state including neo-liberal
globalization and the impact of the EP on the lives of citizens—both of these “threats” also help
to define and reinforce national identity at the Member State and regional/local levels.
At the same time, there have been Europeans who have been more receptive and
supportive of the EP that those who take on the “populist” perspective; those who were more
likely to benefit from globalization, and/or the EP in regard to economic benefits (business and

151

finance especially) but also those who benefit from education and travel. Students and upperlevel business occupations (managers and other white collar workers) are more likely to
subscribe to a European, as well as a global citizen, identity. They also tend to be more
supportive of EU institutions and the role the EU plays in everyday living conditions. They also
tend to be less critical in their perceptions of the Other as well.
Similar to those who have benefited, an important population identified as a target of
socialization in European identity and promoting active citizenship at the EU level as a way of
building hegemonic power, are European youth. As shown in Chapter 4, European youth
became a focus of institutional efforts to promote the EU including participation, feelings of
loyalty and sense of belonging. Institutional agendas may be having an overall effect as younger
cohorts, especially those 15-24 are more likely to take on the above-mentioned “cosmopolitan”
perspective juxtaposed to the alternative populist perspective.
Overall, the EP has changed tremendously over the past three decades, however even
over the scope of the past five years the EP has taken an enormous shift in focus and priority as
nation-states adapted and reacted to the economic crisis of the Eurozone. The emerging crisis
contributed to the overall direction of this dissertation that seeks to understand the impact of the
EP social agenda and in what ways identity has and will influence the progress of the European
Project as an adaptive strategy to globalization and post-war international development, and
power, structures.
By the time institutional discourse indicated a serious acknowledgement by institutional
elite of the role of citizens, particularly of a “European society” or a “European identity” that
would provide legitimacy and resources for the EP to come to fruition, it was long-overdue. The

152

European social model and resulting social contract based on European solidarity and identity
has gotten a slow start, but it is not hopeless…until recently.
The crisis of the Eurozone has helped to re-surface “old” pre-EP divisions, as well as
possibly intensifying divisions related to support for the EP that are not distributed evenly across
demographic categories. The research presented here indicate trends of a “gap” between citizens
and EU institutions in general, but also between portions of the population who have benefited
from the EP compared to those who have not only benefited less, but may have been negatively
impacted, such as the working class and those in lower SES categories. There will be further
skepticism and division in relation to moving forward among “populists” but has the EP lost
support among “cosmopolitans” also? The unfolding Eurozone crisis has added tension between
Member States and threaten to further break down economic and political solidarity that may
have existed until this point. Until recently the EP had economic success and solidarity (to an
extent) on its side but this has been severely compromised since the unfolding of the economic
crisis, making the questionable future of the EP less about social solidarity and more of general
survival. As the EP attempts to adjust and adapt to the challenges it is facing there is no doubt
that identity and social solidarity will play a role, the extent to which is still unknown.
The Unfolding Eurozone Crisis: Implications for Future Research
Initially, I was interested in collective identity and solidarity in Europe in connection with
Turkey’s candidacy as a Member State nation and the conflict that was brewing with their
possible transformation from “the Other” to peer status within the EU. However, since the
current economic crisis has unfolded the paramount issues surrounding Member State identity
and the Other have shifted and become closely connected with “old” division between “Fortress
Europe”—France, Germany, the U.K and other powerful core nations that are dominant within

153

the EP and have benefited from their position compared to peripheral nations who are perceived
by the dominant group as causing the crisis. Peripheral nations within the EU are showing signs
of defiance to EU membership and policy as not being beneficial and having a negative impact
on the social contracts that exist between citizens and Member States.
In brief, there are three main areas of division among nation-states in regard to the
economic crisis. First, there is a division between nation-states who have been a part of the EP
for the longest, compared to newcomers of the group. Second, there is a division between those
who are perceived to have more power, stake and beneficial investment in the EU compared to
others. Third, there is the view from those at the top of the EU hierarchy, the core nations, that
those at the bottom, the periphery, are to blame for the economic crisis. Conversely, peripheral
nations feeling the most impact from the economic crisis blame those in control of the EU for not
providing more support to avoid and deal with the economic issue and using their power to
exploit the disadvantaged position of nations such as Greece, Portugal, and Ireland. The
example of Greece also reveals “old” divisions where nations in Southern, Eastern and Central
Europe helped to define Western Europeans, such as France and Germany, as “European” in
comparison to the Other located to the South and East.
In Greece there are aspects of identity, specifically related to culture, that are important to
recognize in regard to the reaction to austerity that has become a widely acknowledged example
of dissention within the EP on behalf of peripheral nations. Cultural norms and value systems
related to labor and community were revealed through protests against economic and social
austerity measures that cut programs for the poor, elderly and other groups that are socially
disadvantaged. Further, regional and national support was widespread and dominant intensifying
skepticism for Greece’s membership and role within the EP and the European hierarchy.

154

Greece has experienced the most significant issues surrounding debt and belonging to the
Eurozone (although at the time of writing, debt problems in Cyprus seem to be overshadowing
even those in Greece). The first Greek bailout was accepted in 2010 and then a second bailout
was accepted in 2012 accompanied by strict austerity measures that have impacted citizens in
relation to high levels of unemployment as well as a 50% drop in household income since the
first bailout (Smith 2013.) Reactions to austerity have come to fruition in riots, protests and via
the ballot as Greece’s elected officials feel pressure from both outside lenders (EU and
international organizations such as the IMF) and their membership who are looking to them to
represent the nation to the EU and others as well as to protect their “way of life”, particularly
standard of living and aspects of the economy that represent cultural values and ways of life,
such as community and taking care of those in need—particularly the elderly—as a part of the
nation-state social contract.
Greece exemplifies two trends that are notable in examining the economic crisis. First,
nation’s such as Greece that are a part of the EU and eurozone are treated as the “peripheral”
Other in regard to their level of debt and dominant perspectives that “blame the victim.” This
reinforces notions of “the Other” in regard to who should belong to “Europe” or who is really
“European”. Further, the loan packages accepted by Greece compromised the power of nationstate institutions to maintain the social contract with citizens—similar to developing nations in
the world-system. Greece is now dependent upon outside power structures while the living
conditions of Greek citizens are being compromised, especially relative to citizen’s of other
European nation-states who have not has to experience such a negative impact related to the
economic crisis.

155

In this case, the Eurozone crisis has further compromised the position of those who
already felt less benefited, negatively impacted and alienated by the European system. In the
case of Greece, not only national identity, but regional identity came to the surface in response to
the impact EU and international powers were having on their perceived way of life, traditions
and most importantly, standard of living. This mirrors what was found among the
Eurobarometer analysis where SES had an impact on perceptions of the EU and European
identity—the same can be found amongst nation-states as a whole, especially in the context of a
“European” world-system.

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APPENDICES

157

APPENDIX A: List of White Papers
2007 White Paper: Together for Health: A Strategic Approach for the EU 2008-2013
2006 White Paper on European Communication Policy
2004 White Paper on Services of General Interest
2001 White Paper: A New Impetus for European Youth
2001 White Paper: European Governance
2000 White Paper; Reforming the Commission (Parts I and II)
1995 White Paper on Education and Training-Teaching and Learning-Towards a Learning
Society
1985 Completing the Internal Market: White Paper from the Commission to the European
Council

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APPENDIX B: TABLE A.1: Summary of Discursive Themes
Table A.1: Discursive Theme Summary Table by Year, Title and Main Theme Signifier
and Description
Year
Title
Discursive Theme
Description of DT
(DT)
1985
“Completing
Harmonization;
 “Developing cooperation
the Internal
Free Movement
between Member States”
Market”
translated to the
institutionalization of EU
policy and power with
Member States cooperating
and acknowledging the
superincumbent status of
EU institutional and
political elite;
Establishment of
“European Standards”
 Integration and “Mutual
Recognition” in regard to
economic policy; par for
the course in regard to neoliberal economic
globalization

Year

Title

Discursive Theme

2000

“Reforming
the
Commission
Parts I and II”

“Reforming the
Commission,” “the
European Ideal,”
“Role of the
Commission”

DT Description






159

Reform from within
including timelines,
objectives and principles
for reforming the
Commission as suggested
by the Commission
The role of the
Commission described in
this paper as “the motor for
European integration”
The beginning of
acknowledging the end of
passive consensus from
citizens in regard to the EP
as well as lack of
participation, trust and
support of membership

Table A.1. (cont’d)
Year

Title

Discursive Theme

2001

“European
Commission
White Paper on
New Impetus
for European
Youth”

“Youth
Consultation”,
“Youth Field,”
“Good Governance
and Democracy,”
participation and
education among
European youth;
“Active Citizenship,”
EU vs Member State
power

160

DT Description




As a way of building
hegemony youth become
the focus of building good
governance, active
citizenship and
participation in the EP
starting at a young age.
It is acknowledged that for
Europe to be successful
citizens need to be
socialized early (via
education), continually
(education, language and
civic programs) and
understand their investment
in the EP and their
responsibility to
participate, become
knowledgeable etc as EU
citizens

Table A.1. (cont’d)
2004

2006

“White Paper
on Services of
General
Interest”

“White Paper
on European
Communicatio
n Policy”

2007 “Together for Health:
A Strategic Approach
for the EU 2008-2013”

“Services of General
Interest” description,
evaluation and
proposals for future
of, further discussion
of the role of EU
institutions vs.
Member States,
“Social Cohesion,”
“the European
Model”



Partnerships for
communication
policy” detailing the
role of EU, Member
State, Regional and
Local institutions;
“addressing the
‘Gap’”; “CitizenCentered Policy,”
“Civic Education and
Rights,” Citizens,
“Stakeholders” and
public opinion;
“Social Exclusion”







Services of general interest
linked to citizen rights and
building the social contract
between the EU and its
membership;
building a sense of
investment and interest in
services of general interest
as a benefit of
membership—this is
important to social
cohesion, legitimacy and
collective identity
“Communication Policy”
refers to communication
between the EU
(“Brussels”) and citizens;
includes transparency,
making information more
available and building
active citizenship through
citizen-centered policy
The “European Project”
mentioned in discourse

“Health Strategies,”

Healthcare policy as part of

Partnerships. Strategies
and issues;
“Citizen’s Rights,”

the social contract and
citizen rights; building a
strong society

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APPENDIX C: EUROBAROMETER ANALYSIS TABLES

Table 5.1. European Sense of Belonging
European Nationality
Sex
Female
Male

72.1
75

95.3
95.1

Age
15-24
25-34
35-44
45-54
55-64
65+
Difficulty Paying

74.6
74.6
75.5
73.7
74
69.2

93
93.7
94.9
94.7
96.6
97.3

Bills

66.3

94

72.7
86.3

94.1
95.6

73.5
74.5
60.9
66.4
70.3
78.8

96.3
94.9
93.4
93.1
97
93.5

Occupation
Self-employed
Managers
Other White
Collar
Manual Workers
House Person
Unemployed
Retired
Student

162

Citizen of
TOTAL
Ithe World
%
n
9
65.9
55
h
4
9
69
45
a
.
3
b
5
.
i
9
74.9
12.9
7
t
2
9
71.5
15.3
a
.
2
9
68.5
17.2
n
4
.
4
9
67.2
17.3
t
6
.
4
9
65.2
16.5
2
.
5
9
60.1
20.6
o
1
.
5
f
6
.
9
65.3
45.8
2
R
3
e
.
9
72
7.7
g
7
2
9
73
9.4
i
.
2
o
7
.
n
9
67.7
10.3
7
4
9
67.6
19.7
4
9
69.1
7.9
.
4
9
66.1
9.3
9
.
3
9
60.7
27.5
4
.
5
9
77.1
8.1
9
.
2
2
.
2

N
16340
13372
3834
4554
5124
5154
4912
6134
13357
2284
2803
3071
5850
2346
2749
8173
2412

Table 5.2. Perceptions of Immigrants and Minorities in European Society

Sex
Female
Male
Age
15-24
25-34
35-44
45-54
55-64
65+
Difficulty in
Paying Bills
Occupation
Self-employed
Managers
Other White
Collar
Manual Workers
House Person
Unemployed
Retired
Student

Ethnic
Immigrants
Groups Ethnic Groups Ethnic Groups Immigrants
Develop
Enrich
Cause
Increase
Needed in Understanding
Culture
Insecurity Unemployment
Economy and Tolerance
49.7
50.6

45.5
47.5

50.8
50.2

40
43.2

45.3
47.1

54
52.7
51.7
52.3
48.5
44.2

41.5
42.4
45.8
45.5
49.6
51.3

50.3
47.6
49.8
49.6
50.4
54.2

39.4
40.2
41.1
41.3
42.9
42.9

50
48.4
47.3
46.9
45.6
40.5

45

46.8

54.5

33.4

39.1

49.8
63.9

48.7
40.9

49.9
38.5

46.2
52.7

48.7
59.2

51

45.9

48.5

42.8

49.6

50
39.8
50.9
45.7
58.1

47.5
48.7
42.9
49.7
39.6

52.9
56.8
53.1
52.4
46.6

38.4
36.2
30.7
42.2
44.3

46.2
36.7
40.2
41.7
54

163

Table 5.3. Globalization: Perceived Threat or Opportunity?

Viewed as a
Good
Opportunity

Viewed as a
Threat
Total

N

Sex
Female
Male

41.2
46.2

39.9
41.2

55.2
44.8

16473
13370

Age
15-24
25-34
35-44
45-54
55-64
65+

48.1
45.6
44
42.8
43
39.5

36.5
39.8
42.1
44.2
42.3
37.6

12.8
15.1
17.2
17.3
16.6
21

3806
4521
5141
5155
4950
6270

37.1

43.5

45.6

13350

47.5
54.6
45.6
41.9
37.7
38.4
39.7
51.7

41.1
36.7
42.9
43.4
37.6
44.4
39.9
34.6

7.3
9.4
10.4
19.8
7.8
9.4
27.9
7.9

2183
2814
3093
5903
2338
2799
8329
2359

Difficulty in Paying
Bills
Occupation
Selfemployed
Managers
Other White Collar
Manual Workers
House Person
Unemployed
Retired
Student

164

Table 5.4. Perceptions of Which Public Authority Has the Most Impact on Living
Conditions

European

National Regional/
Local

Total
%

N

Sex
Female
Male

10.6
13.5

48.8
51.4

33.9
30.5

55.4 14870
44.6 11960

Age
15-24
25-34
35-44
45-54
55-64
65+

14.5
13.2
12.8
11.9
10.3
10.1

48.9
51.1
50.9
51.4
52
46.4

30
30.2
30.9
32.6
32.9
35.6

12.1
14.4
17.4
17.5
16.9
21.7

Difficulty Paying
Bills

12.9

47.8

32.4

43.3 11392

Occupation
Self-employed
Managers
Other White
Manual
Collar Workers
House Person
Unemployed
Retired
Student

14.2
11.4
13.1
12.9
10.9
11.9
9.9
14.2

50
59.7
52.4
48.6
47.4
47.5
47.6
51.5

31.3
26.3
30
33.1
31.7
34.2
35.8
28.3

7.3
9.9
10.9
20.2
7
8.5
28.6
7.6

165

3239
3876
4665
4695
4526
5829

1957
2646
2913
5410
1876
2289
7670
2044

Table 5.5. Trust in EU and National Institutions

Sex
Female
Male
Age
15-24
25-34
35-44
45-54
55-64
65+
Difficulty
Pay Bills
Paying
Occupatio
n SelfManag
employ
Other
ers
ed
Manual
White
House
Worker
Collar
Unempl
Person
s
Retired
oyed
Student

Nat.
Nat. EU
EU
Nat.
Nat.
Govt Parliament
Parliament
Justi
Pol.
ce Parties
Insts.
44.6
19.6 33.2
32.2 48.1
48.9
44.2
22.3 36.3
36.6 52.5
54
46.8
45.2
45.7
43.8
44.4
46.2

20.3
19.6
18.8
18.9
20.9
25.1

33.9
31.6
31.7
32.2
36.1
40.3

36.4

15.6

26.6

47.8
58.2
45.4
42.3
48
34.2
43.5
51.6

22.2
24.4
20.4
18.3
23.6
12.8
22.4
22.9

36.5
41.6
34.8
30.6
37.3
23.3
36.6
37.4

33.8
32.5
32.1
32
34.4
38.9

EU
EU
Commiss. Bank

44
50.6

42.9
53

57.8
51
49.1
48.8
48.2
47.9

54.7
51.6
51
51.6
50.6
49

47.7
48.5 46
47.1
48.4
47.5
43.5

48.6
49
49.6
48.2
43.7

26 45.3

45.4

40.7

39.7

53.4
63.3
56.1
50.4
41.9
42.1
48.1
60.6

50.3
61.4
52.7
45.8
36.9
38.6
43.7
53.3

53.2
65.8
54.3
46.2
36.5
38.1
43.1
50.8

36.3
43.5
34.7
30.7
36.3
21.9
34.9
38.8

166

53.1
59.9
51.6
48.4
45.4
43.1
46.4
63.1

Table 5.6. Perceptions of European Union Membership

Good
Thing

Bad
Thing

Neither
Total %
Good or Bad

N

Sex
Female
Male

48.8
57.8

13.9
14.2

32.8
25.8

55.4
44.6

14870
11960

Age
15-24
25-34
35-44
45-54
55-64
65+

61.3
56.2
54
50.8
51
47.9

9.3
12.6
12.9
15.5
14.9
16.6

26.1
27.8
30.2
30.9
30.9
30.3

12.1
14.4
17.4
17.5
16.9
21.7

3239
3876
4665
4695
4526
5829

43.8

17.1

14.9

43.3

11392

61.8
68.6
55.4
49.5
46.4
42.9
47
67.4

12.8
8.9
12
14.9
15
18.6
16.8
5.8

23.8
21
30.8
32.4
31.6
33.9
31.5
24.3

7.3
9.9
10.9
20.2
7
8.5
28.6
7.6

1957
2646
2913
5410
1876
2289
7670
2044

Difficult Paying
Bills

Occupation
Self-employed
Managers
Other White
Collar Workers
Manual
House Person
Unemployed
Retired
Student

167

Table 5.7. European Support for the Euro and Future Enlargement
For Euro

For
Enlargement

Total %

Sex
Female
Male

60.3
67.8

47.6
49.4

55.1
44.9

Age
15-24
25-34
35-44
45-54
55-64
65+

66.2
65.1
65.6
64.1
64.3
58.5

60.2
53.9
48.6
48.2
45
39.9

12.9
15.3
17.2
17.3
16.5
20.8

Difficulty in Paying Bills

57.2

48.4

46.1

67.8
76.2
68.2
62.9
56.5
58.1
59
70.7

50.6
53.7
50.6
48.4
41.6
50.6
42.1
63.6

7.7
9.4
10.3
19.6

Occupation
Self-employed
Managers
Other White Collar
Manual Workers
House Person
Unemployed
Retired
Student

168

9.3
27.6
8.1

N
1
6
1
7
3
0
6
8
3
3
5
9
4
2
6
5
5
5
2
5
1
2
2
5
5
3
0
6
5
0
3
1
2
0
3
5
6
9
0
2
3
2
2
8
3
9
3
1
5
6
9
2
82
7
5
4
2
4
1
8
8
4
2
3
2
1
8
4
0
5
7

Table 5.8. European Union's Perceived Role in Globalization's Impact on Citizens

EU Enables
Sex
Female
Male
Age
15-24
25-34
35-44
45-54
55-64
65+
Difficulty in
Paying Bills

EU Protects

Total %

57.1

65.3

52.4
47.6

59.8

67.1

64.9
60.1
57.3
55.5
54.3

72
68.6
65
64.1
65

59.4

64.3

12.7
15.6
18.3
17.8
16.5
19

55.9

62.2

44.1

58.1
59.1
57.1
58.1
57.8
54
57.2
68.9

66.2
73.2
66.6
64.9
63.8
61.2
63.4
75.9

8.2
10.2
10.8
19.9
7.1
9.2
26.2
8.4

Occupation
Selfemployed
Managers
Other White
Collar
Manual
Workers
House
Person
Unemployed
Retired
Student

169

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