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"fl '. amp‘ y... . ”may, ... twp-:7 Unan‘rrurn up-" lfA-i‘ 1 a '1'qu srurrr 94-mequ H .i mayfiu'... . ,.,.,,., 9. ......MW .. nun.- vi.- r-mr. ,3 «rv an... )xm‘ln-w g rm _: ‘flmvflfr a”... n v w u a». n1 - ..a ¢- mu-n‘ ryovmuvwkudnu canned-mm: h I 9' .' ”'2" — v‘p-v' . >1. . . m ,Mfu-n-I-v‘vru'ulv a mum unu— ...”, w .. . .-.r':.r;.:.i:z;!5“’5{v 6W"; mustang '~ an “ \ . .AH 44 - U wry-”manna ~ .. , 1 ... . .~ "f" . . . 150.: n ' "" "'"'“"“ ‘f " . 7' "T""’ ’3'". . W, “3:53, ..,, . . ....“ ,1". ., N. _.._.;~..;»-'r,',» » w i ' mmvrir. mtg; , ."z “W" ”'"a‘I: . .._. . . .. .-,.'~mtfi.:.r.<.r:" - ‘ y, m. . , ' .. _...~..,- .x.. i->Av-u'-~ ..,...1f'.§'~.wg~v-., ”9‘ c. a?" firm . THES’S 0—169 This is to certify that the thesis entitled AN APPROACH TO CONFLIST RESOLUTION Date USING THE DIALOGUE AS AN INTERVENT ION MECHANI SM presented by David J. F. Beatty a has been accepted towards fulfillment of the requirements for _Ph-D§-degree inmcation ' M Major professor PLACE IN RETURN BOX to remove thb cpeckout from your record. To AVOID FINES return oriprbofm date - , . MSU Is An Affirmative Action/Equal Opportunity Institution ablrcmpma-pt . wr‘WhVIl-tnl‘ll ‘ I A _._-r-—‘ ABSTRACT AN APPROACH TO CONFLICT RESOLUTION USING THE DIALOGUE AS AN INTERVENTION MECHANISM BY David J. F. Beatty The purpose of the dissertation is to develop a framework for conflict resolution which will be useful for assisting third party interventions. Conflict is defined as interaction between two par— ties which becomes characterized by disagreement. The inter— action leads to damaging outcomes of varying intensity which are unacceptable either to the two parties or the system of which they are members. The incident that leads to the third party intervention is the conflict event. Whatever precedes that event is the conflict process. The goal of the intervention is to change that process to prevent the reoccurrence of undesirable outcomes. These events or processes may be the result of different pressures: structural or perceptual. Structural pressures refer to elements of the environ— ment which produce the interactions which lead to conflict ‘ David J. F. Beatty events. Overpopulation, laws, economic resources, and tech- nology are examples of structural variables that may promote conflict. Perceptual pressures arise from the definition of the situation which the participants hold. Such variables as values, goals, attitudes, and images of the world fall in this category. Within perceptual processes, two types of conflict dynamics can be distinguished. Issue dynamics involve win- lose perceptions where the relation between ends and means can be articulated by the protagonists. Behavior is goal— oriented and strategies can be translated by the participant into a series of ”if. . .then" statements which are intended to accomplish his stated goal. Illusory dynamics, loosely incorporating all that is not clearly issue oriented, em— phasize the "we. . .they“ phenomena of distortion, stereo— typing and self—fulfilling selectivity. In addition to construction of this conflict resolu- tion paradigm, two other interests are explored in this study: the testing of the Dialogue as a research and inter- vention mechanism, and the testing of Rapoport's principles in debate conflict resolution. David J. F. Beatty Pairs of ROTC members and individuals opposed to ROTC on campus met with a third person for one hour to discuss their differences. The control condition allowed undirected conversation. The experimental condition opera— tionalized Rapoport's three principles as communication guidelines. The principles were: 1. The ability and willingness of each participant to state the position of the opponent to the opponent's satisfaction. 2. The ability and willingness of each participant to state the conditions under which the opponent's position is valid or has merit. 3. The ability and willingness of each participant to assume that in many respects the opponent is like himself, that they share common values, and that each is aware of the common ground, and perhaps, of the circumstances which have led the opponent to his position. In both directed and undirected communication situa— tion, there was significant attitude change (p<.OOl) toward the other person. Both groups increased significantly (p<.Ol) on perceived similarity, but there was not an overall gain in accuracy. (p<.05 in directed pairs) Neither con— dition achieved significance of attitude change on one's own issue position. There was not a significant difference be— tween conditions on any of the dimensions. Internal data analysis suggest independence between attitude toward the other and attitude toward the issue. David J. F. Beatty An information gain hypothesis was more adequate than a Newcomb balance model in interpreting results. The success in using the Dialogue in an ongoing situation was reflected in positive participant reaction, and the speed and practicality of implementing the Dialogue. A distinction between continuous relationship conflicts and intermittent relationship conflicts is suggested as useful for deciding when the Dialogue would be most useful for third party interventions. lAnatol Rapoport, Fi hts, Games, and Debates, Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, I960. Accepted by the faculty of the Department of Communication, College of Communication Arts, Michigan State University, in partial fulfillment of the require- ments for the Doctor of Philosophy degree. MM Director of Thesis Guidance Committeeg¢£2244Z£L&ZZEu&&£;J Chairman [Cbhd« £31223¢a4wvu~ AN APPROACH TO CONFLICT RESOLUTION USING THE DIALOGUE AS AN INTERVENTION MECHANISM BY David J. F. Beatty A THESIS Submitted to Michigan State University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY Department of Communication 1970 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS I would like to thank Dr. Gerald Miller for granting me the freedom to explore independent interests while still providing his personal support and expertise. Thanks also to Dr. R. Harrison and Dr. L. Sarbaugh for their continuing availability as advisors. I would like to thank Dr. Iwao Ishino for his con— tinual stimulating conversations and help in examining the nature of my paradigm. Claudia Marshall is only one among many members of the Communication Department whose assistance is gratefully remembered. Two persons in particular deserve special tribute. Dr. Dan Wackman came late but added most. His clarifications in theory and method were only outdone by his personal patience with my struggles to finish the dissertation. Dr. Clyde Morris has been my favorite companion, both intellectually and personally, in my graduate years. This dissertation is dedicated to him as a first step in our mutual commitment to developing practical solutions for the many conflicts foreseen in the 1970's. ii TABLE OF CONTENTS INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Chapter I. DEFINING DYNAMICS IN CONFLICT PROCESSES II. AN IMAGE—BASED APPROACH TO CONFLICT RESOLUTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . III. OPERATIONALIZING DIALOGUE AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . IV. RESULTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . V. EXPANDING THE RESOLUTION APPROACH TO CONFLICT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . REFERENCES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . APPENDICES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii Page 29 45 71 124 146 151 it "’I,'I’|' ill 7A. 7B. LIST OF TABLES Factor Analysis of Semantic Differential Scales on a Pre-test: Varimax Rotation . . Factor Analysis of Semantic Differential Scales on Post—test: Varimax Rotation . . Factor Analysis on Issue Items Pre—test: Varimax Rotation . . . . . . . . . . . . . Attitude Towards Communication Experience . . Results of Tests on Hypothesis 2A: Attitude to Other . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Predicted Attitude of Other to Self . . . . . Increase in Perceived Similarity . . . . . . Absolute Condition Difference in Perceived Similarity: Before Dialogue . . . . . . . Absolute Condition Difference in Perceived Similarity: After Dialogue . . . . . . . . Increase in Accuracy of Estimate of Other's Position on Military Issues . . . . . . . . Perceived Benefit of Dialogue . . . . . . . . Perceptions of Pair Following Dialogue . . . Differences Between High Accurate and Low Accurate States on Attitude Toward Other and Conception of Other's Attitude Toward Self . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iv Page 60 61 64 72 76 77 82 83 84 88 94 96 105 LIST OF FIGURES Image Dimensions Related to Conflict Resolution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2. Schematic Illustration of the Minimal A-B-x system C O O I O O O O O I O I O O I Q 109 3. Expected Initial Balance State . . . . . . . . 109 4. Attitude Change with Balance Explanation . . . 112 5. Attitude Change with Accuracy Explanation . . 113 LIST OF APPENDICES Appendix page I. Volunteer Form . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151 IA. General Opening Instructions . . . . . . . . . 153 II. Observer's Sheet: Control Condition . . . . . 156 III. Instruction for Experimental Treatment . . . . 160 IV. ROTC: Dialogue Background and Completion Forms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163 vi INTRODUCTION This thesis is intended to be a beginning of an applied science of conflict resolution. It defines conflict in the manner most practical for third parties who are engaged in resolving conflicts. The theoretical discussion centers on the relation of participants and their perceptions rather than on structural features of the environment. It seeks to develop a research paradigm that will encourage the develop— ment of communication strategies for conflict resolution. There are two major aspects to the thesis. The first contribution involves a way of approaching conflict situa— tions by a third person when the intervention occurs in the middle of an ongoing process. This approach to conflict implies: (a) The third person does not impose the solution. His function is to help the participants come to an agree— ment as to what can be done. (b) Since he intervenes somewhere in the middle of an ongoing process, there is an unknown past history of interaction and perceived interaction (the conflict process) which has led to an undesirable outcome (the conflict event). (c) Situations are functions of perceptions. Per— ceptions of participants may be accurate or inaccurate, but the consequences of these perceptions are real. The task of resolution is to discover which perceptions are leading to conflict behaviors, to separate distortion of each other from these perceptions, and to provide an opportunity for the participants to deal with problems. (d) There are dynamics in the preceding perceptions and events which should be treated separately, not because they occur separately, but because separating the effects of issue dynamics and illusory dynamics is useful for getting the conflict defined by the participants to a point where the problem is clear and can be worked on. This last point implies that these dynamics operate independent of the situation—specific cause. Conflict, as defined in this thesis, is defined as it looks before it is understood, as it looks to a person approaching the problem from the outside. Issue dynamics and illusion dynamics are conceptions useful to the third person (the practitioner) as heuristic categories for unravelling past (therefore inac— cessible) interactions, regardless of what the ultimate "cause" is finally defined to be. The first chapter will explicate the definition of conflict process, conflict event, issue dynamic, and illusory dynamic in more detail. The second purpose of the thesis is to develop a practical intervention mechanism which is also suitable for research into intra-personal cognitive "images” and inter— personal communication patterns. The research reported in this dissertation is not intended to verify the utility of the theory for interaction, but to stipulate a framework within which useful tools can be developed. Testing the utility of the Dialoguel is a first step toward finding a way to facilitate participants' communi— cation in order that they will be able to separate the dis- torted images of the other and his position (which underlie the illusory dynamics) from the goal oriented behaviors (which underlie the issue dynamics). The purpose of the Dialogue is: (a) To see if individuals who are opposed in conflict situations will participate in an experience requiring them to communicate face—to—face with someone with whom they strongly disagree. (b) To provide a mechanism within which to examine the ”Image" approach to conflict resolution. The important assumption of the approach is that all conflict is perceived, and that attitudes toward salient issues and individuals form a coherent, inter—related whole° Analysis of the participants' perception of self and other, compared to their actual posi- tions with regard to the issue and each other, should clarify the dimensions of mental systems (Images)2 that are operative in conflict situations. (c) To test three principles for conflict resolution suggested by Anatol Rapoport. These principles are based on the assumption that belief systems are Images which are con- sistent, and that these Images filter out threatening inf” formation. Rapoport's principles are translated into communica— tion guidelines which should be useful in facilitating communication to reduce the illusory components in these Images. Chapter II discusses the basis of Rapoport's sugges- tions and the "Image” approach to attitude change in conflict situations. Chapter III reports the circumstances and operation— alization of this Dialogue. Chapter IV reports on the testing of Rapoport's three principles as compared to open communication for one hour, and analyzes the data in terms of (l) the mental configura— tions that the participants brought to the situation, and (2) Newcomb's A—B—X balance model that has been useful in situations where individuals are positively related. Chapter V concludes with suggestions for extension of this initial probe in two areas. In the first area are the research questions concerned with individual changes within the Dialogue as communication is varied. It is sug— gested that a more adequate model of mental states affecting and affected by conflict relations needs to be developed. The second area involves an examination of the effect of the Dialogue on the larger system which is in conflict and on later behaviors by participants. Finally, the thesis argues for attention to developing usable theories of conflict and methods of measurement of conflict dynamics. Social problems increasingly involve polarized groups, and a better understanding of communication between them is needed. Communication research seems partic— ularly applicable to both theoretical and practical problems current in the interdisciplinary field of conflict and its resolution. CHAPTER I DEFINING DYNAMICS IN CONFLICT PROCESSES Defining Conflict The framework for this thesis is different than earlier taxonomies of conflict. The author is interested in conflicts from the point where a third party intervenes. The practitioner's goal is to change the relations between two parties by enabling them to change their definitions of each other and the problem. The thesis posits a distinction within conflict dynamics——issue and illusory——as a useful dichotomy for investigating what has occurred before the intervention, and for clarifying participant objectives. In general, conflict involves interaction between two parties which becomes characterized by disagreement. The interaction leads to damaging outcomes of varying inten— sity which are unacceptable either to the two parties or to the system of which they are a part. In this thesis, conflict will be considered to be a process which occurs over time. Since the thesis is con— cerned with the practitioner who intervenes in the ongoing process, two distinctions are made. The conflict event re— fers to the incident that is unacceptable and leads to the third party intervention. The conflict process refers to the interaction preceding the conflict. For the practitioner, this process is inaccessible, and he has to reconstruct its history. The present framework suggests guidelines for that reconstruction. Three implications of a reconstruction orientation should be noted: (1) The object is to resolve the conflict, not under- stand all its history. (2) If the participants can jointly redefine the past interaction to eliminate the pressures for conflict, the conflict will be resolved. (3) A process of having the participants reconstruct the past may enable the practitioner to decide which dynamics in the conflict suggest the best approach for his intervention. Thus, a reconstruction of the conflict process may solve the problem or, at a minimum, provide the third party with infor— mation as to the type of conflict dynamics operating in the situation. There are other approaches to defining conflict. Many of them define conflict in terms of a situation in which some deviation from "normalcy“ occurs, and conflict resolution is a return to a pre-approved state. Each definition occurs within a situation of interest, and the indicators are situa— tion specific. For example, marital conflict is distin— guished from international conflict, and findings in one area are not meant to apply to other areas. The present attempt is to find an approach to conflicts in general which aids in resolution across many kinds of situations, where the common reference point is the intervention of a third party who attempts to clarify with the participants the cause of the problem. .flgA second approach to conflict is one that posits a "cause" of the conflict. The choice of this basic "cause" usually reflects a perspective of one discipline. For ex- ample, attempts to explain conflict on the basis of violated territorality, or frustration, concentrate on the definition of the basic cause rather than the explication of conflict and the steps occurring once a violent (or some similarly negative) event occurs. The present framework is not inter- ested in a theory of causes, but in a program for promoting resolution. Resolution requires that the participants define the situation so that they can solve their problem. The definition is strongly practitioner—biased, with the progress in theory construction evolving from the use of the approach in real—life situations. %KA third approach to conflict would be the operation— alization of variables that indicate the presence of conflict at different intensity levels. At the moment, theories attempting to do this are either quite macroscopic (such as computer simulations of international conflicts), or very situation bound. The ultimate form of a theory of conflict would be close to this approach, but the measurement and conceptual framework is still in a primitive stage. Inter— disciplinary discussions may lead to a common theory of conflict, but it is not yet in existence. The present approach assumes that resolving conflicts may be possible without understanding their causes and sys- tematic developments.3 The author is not discounting the contributions of other approaches. Empirical study of con— flict in real situations is just beginning and is very diffi— cult. Rather than starting from laboratory creations (e.g. game theory), the author prefers to become involved in on— going problems, and to find practical tools that increase the probability of the participants solving the conflict. This method pre—supposes trial and error probes, with an attempt to eventually create formal theory by looking back at trends working in each situation. The present conception of conflict implies several criteria for identifying conflict: (a) There are at least two parties, who can be identified by a third person and by each other. (b) There is a history of interaction between them (or, at least, previous communication between them). (c) There is some issue that is salient in this previous interaction, as perceived by them or by the inter— vening party. (d) The outcomes of their interaction are suffi— ciently damaging to be noticed by the third party or the participants. 10 The outcome which leads to the attention of the third person is called the conflict event. The most common con— flict event is violence, but it may be any other behavior that threatens the system of which the two (or more) parties are members. The extremity of this conflict event may vary with the type of system. For example, number of deaths, dam- age to property, or violation of territorial rights may suf- fice in large system considerations, whereas verbal intensity, threats, or refusal to communicate may be more typical of intimate small system conflicts. Whatever the specific nature of the conflict event, it is of sufficient importance to draw the attention of a third party. From his point of view what has occurred before must be considered, not merely as a social history, but as a conflict process. The salient event (the conflict event) indicates that some patterns of behavior have previously developed which led to undesirable outcomes, and those ele— ments of this earlier process constitute a systematic whole, the conflict process. Process implies: (a) that the previous interaction producing the con— flict is systematic; (b) that the system has developed over time; (c) that there are relations between components of the system; 11 (d) that the components that have contributed to the conflict event are interdependent. The goal of the intervention in a conflict process is to change that process to prevent the re-occurrence of undesirable events. These events or processes may be the result of different pressures. Two kinds of pressures can be distinguished: structural pressures and perceptual pres- sures . jHStructural pressures refer to elements of the environ— ment which produce the interactions resulting in conflict events. For example, perhaps a third party becomes involved in a conflict between white police patrolmen and ghetto resi- dents. Several incidents of physical violence have occurred on both sides. In considering the situation, the practi— tioner may notice that the police are understaffed, that the wage scale for the inner—city patrolmen is such that only poorly educated applicants are available, and that no back— ground on urban problems is given to the police. On the other hand, no black patrolmen from the area are on the force, the area of the city has the highest rate of crime in the city, and 22 per cent of the men in the district are unem— ployed. At this moment, he may decide that an intervention which tries to change the perceptions of protagonists is not a worthwhile investment, considering the number of environ— mental pressures contributing to the life situation of the participants. He should probably concentrate his energies 12 on changing structural conditions within which their inter- action occurs. Such variables as over—population, legal constraints, economic resources, and technological change are examples of structural variables that may promote con- flicts. Perceptual pressures are those that spring from the definitions of the situation chosen by the participants. Such perceptions as basic values, goals, and images of the other would fall in this category. In the example of conflict between white police patrolmen and ghetto residents, the practitioner may discover that the local community is concerned about the problem, that much of the violence occurs on Saturday nights when the police enforce laws at the closing hours of local bars, that cul— tural values regarding masculinity require a man to defend his honor when challenged, and that the police do not know any members of the community. He then may decide that much of the difficulty can be eliminated by having the participants become aware of the perceptions of the other, and change their own perceptions. The pressures leading to conflict are in the "eyes of the beholder", and change in these ways of looking at the world would reduce the conflict. The importance of the distinction between structural and perceptual pressures is that the third person must de— cide whether he should involve the participants in the solu— tion, or whether the solution to the conflict is in the environment beyond the participants' range of influence. 13 This thesis is concerned with conflicts that are perceptual. If the conflict is considered a perceptual con— flict, we make a further distinction between issue and illusory dynamics, and hypothesize that differences in these dynamics require different resolution strategies. The concept dynamic assumes that, within a conflict process are recognizable sequences of events and attitudes that are inter—related, and that have an escalation cycle of their own. These dynamics are distinct from the conflict event, from the content of the conflict, and from the context. They are hypothesized to be general dynamics, separate from the situation. For example, in the police-ghetto conflict, the conflict event may be the killing of a policeman, and the conflict topic may be police brutality. However, the dynamics of the interaction producing these events may be from a goal-oriented behavior (issue dynamics), or from hos— tile definitions of the other (illusopy dynamics). If the underlying dynamic is an issue dynamic, then the death may be an escalation in the struggle to obtain immunity for the booking racket by intimidating the police. If the under— lying dynamic is illusory, then the death might be the unfor— tunate result of stereotypes held by the police and the ghetto resident which become self—fulfilling prophesies when they meet under tense circumstances. The motivations and objectives differ for these kinds of events, and the composite description of this kind 14 of difference is called a dynamic. At the base of issue dynamics is a specifiable goal which can be dealt with. At the base of illusory dynamics is a view of the other which produces hostility, misunderstanding, and the increased probability of damaging encounters from these definitions. It would be much simpler if one could deal with either issue or illusory dynamics. However, most often, the outside person--consultant, researcher, or mediator—-appears when the scene is well begun. What confronts him is an emotion-laden problem, complete with stereotyped rhetoric and absolute positions. He must begin disentangling this confusion, and try to find those processes which would enable the participants to reach a solution. The positing of the issue—illusory dichotomy suggests the following course of action for the person faced with the conflict situation: Somewhere in the morass of past interaction, there may or may not be legitimate objectives about which the individuals are in conflict. If such issues can be mutually identified, if the participants can state their own goals and the goals of the other party, if they are able to stipu— late the relationship between their behaviors and their goals, and describe an acceptable solution; then, the con— flict can be considered an issue conflict. Given such clar— ity, the methods for resolution are much different than if theseneans—endstatements cannot be made. 15 If the parties in conflict are not able to state such objectives, two alternatives arise. First, there may be basic issues which eventually could be outlined in the above manner, but there may be so many other intervening misperceptions that the conflicting parties cannot specify the basis of their antagonism. These intervening elements are the illusory elements in the conflict process. They have a dynamics of their own which is usefully distinguished from the dynamics of an issue—based conflict. Second, it may be that there is no real issue at base. No issue settlement would eliminate future conflict events. Absence of a specifiable issue may occur because the conflict is basically structural where more and more issues continually arise and no particular grievance emerges. Or perhaps no issue can be specified because there is no basic issue. The original issue may have disappeared, been non—existent, or if solved, the legacy of past issues may lead to such strong feelings against each other that no action can change the hostility. Consequently, these emo— tive, or illusory, components have consistent dynamics of their own which generates reasons for conflict. Thus, although the term “illusory" reflects the ab- sence of specifiable events over which the parties differ strongly, it does not imply that the attitudes toward the other, or behaviors performed toward the other, are without reason. Rather, the definition suggests that one has to I- O - ’0)Joh'51.fl, 16 deal with the psycho-logic of the individual's system of looking at the world, and try to replace the dynamics spring- ing from misperception and distortion with more reality— oriented images. Issue Conflicts When a conflict involves essentially an issue dy— namic, the problem is specifiable by the participant. If a person can define his goal, this implies that his behavior in the situation can be considered a strategy designed to achieve his goal. The dynamics that occur between two par- ties struggling for a goal, with strategies designed to achieve that goal, can be analyzed in terms of win—lose estimates, estimates of risk, of power, and of utilities. The relation between strategies and goals is assumed to be psycho—rational. As stated by the participants, the goals appear sensible to the participants. ”Sensible" implies that his statements can be translated into a series of logi- cal "if...then" statements relating to future ”moves" and "counter—moves" designed to increase closeness to the goal. "Sensible" also implies estimates of profit—loss considera— tions in planning behavior. The issue—based dynamic involves the concept of power. Some examples of issue—based situations are manage- ment—union conflicts over strikes and wage—increases, struggle for land between nations, or conflict over promotion in a formal organization. 17 If the conflict is mobilized around specific goals and competition toward these goals, then a dynamic has started with calculable strategies that may escalate to violence. The task of resolution is to (1) reduce the me— chanics of escalation. (Escalation mechanics refer to be— haviors that are designed to increase power, for example, weapon increases, pickets, price cuts)and (2) have the par— ticipants communicate about the issues which have led to the escalation. If the goal towards which the escalation is oriented can be changed by methods such as redefining the zero-sum nature of the perceptions or of the environment, or by introducing other ”currencies" (such as satisfaction, prestige, public attention, etc.) then the conflict can be resolved. Not all conflicts are capable of being resolved. Attempts to resolve issue conflicts might have to face two eventualities. First, it may be, that after eliminating the illusory elements, the basic issue between opponents may be unresolvable given the environment. For example, competition between poor whites and poor blacks for work may be unre— solvable simply because there is not enough employment in the environment. Second, the definitions of the basic issues may be so ingrained in the different cultures or value systems of the two parties that, after all misunderstanding has been eliminated, both parties are accurately in disagreement as to what the goals are, or should be. No redefinition is , w. Fa . szsq 9:19 5'36“ (5 18 acceptable to them. Religious conflicts may produce such an impasse. Communication strategies for situations that have been reduced to issue conflicts will not be discussed in this thesis. However, these problems are worthy of atten— tion in further research. Illusory Conflicts Whatever is not part of an issue dynamic can be con— sidered part of an illusory dynamic. Processes of stereo— typing, of defining the other as enemy, of selectively perceiving the other's behaviors and attributing negative motives to him are internal processes. These components eventually form an image, which like other mental systems, is consistent. When this image is unrealistic and system— atically biased against the other, the possibility of favor— able outcomes leading to resolution is decreased. Reduction in inaccuracies and negative attitudes should help to resolve conflicts. If these components can be reduced, the conflict may disappear entirely, or reveal the fundamental disagree— ment between the conflicting parties. When the situation has been clarified so that both participants can clearly state their own position, state the other's position clearly, and examine the relation between their strategies, then con— flict resolution has reached the point where the problems are not caused by distortions and ambiguous emotional state— 19 ments. The situation can then be tackled as a problem which will end the conflict if it is solved. If conflict is perceptual, and some of these percep- tions are distorted, then it is important to find out the ways in which image systems organize themselves with regard to the perceived issue, and the opponent. Similarity of the Issue—Illusopy Conception to Past Theories of Conflict The discussion to this point has been from a prac— titioner's point of view. Much of the logic in the present framework is consistent with earlier descriptions of con— flict. Game theory is closer to an issue dynamic approach to conflict than is any other theory. It involves a rational player who takes into account the possible consequences of the courses of action open to him, one who has clearly de— fined his utility preferences, and who chooses in accordance with these preferences. Thomas Schelling distinguished two types of conflict: Among diverse theories of conflict—corresponding to the diverse meanings of the word 'conflict'——a main dividing line is between those that treat conflict as a patho— logical state and seek its causes and treatment, and those that take conflict for granted and study the be— havior associated with it. Among the latter. . .are those that examine the participants in a conflict in all their complexity—~with regard to both 'rational' and 'irrational' behavior, conscious and unconscious, and to 20 motivations as well as to calculations—-and those that focus on the more rational, conscious, artful kind of behavior.6 As indicated by this statement, issue dynamics treat conflict as if it were a rational set of moves designed to win specifiable goals. Little consideration is given to irrationality, or to emotion that interferes with the rela— tions between means and ends. , George Simmel distinguished social conflicts (unde— fined) on a different, yet related basis: Conflicts which arise from frustration of specific de— mands within the relationship and from estimates of gains of the participants, and which are directed at the presumed frustrating object, can be called realistic conflicts, . . .in so far as they are means toward a specific result. . .Non—realistic conflicts. . .although still involving interaction between two or more persons are not occasioned by rival ends of the antagonists, but by the need for tension release of at least one of them.7 Again, the distinction between the ”types" of con- flict involves relating the behavior of the participants to a specifiable goal. Irrational, tension-release functions of conflict seem likely to generate conflicts which are not goal—oriented, but which nevertheless generate violent inter— action between participants. The emotional interaction, characterized by a loss of clearly—stated objectives, cannot be solved by an issue—based approach. Lewis Coser defined conflict as a struggle over values and claims to scarce power, status, and resources, in which the aim of the opponents is to neutralize, injure, or elimi— 21 nate the rival.8 Within this definition, Coser distinguished between basic cleavage conflicts, which are about the very nature of the consensual framework within which the groups operate, and social conflicts, which concern conflicts over the means and subordinate needs within a consensual frame- work. When one begins to consider conflicts that stem from different value systems, it is important to clarify means and ends. One part of the task is to reduce the illusion compon— ents to a more accurate representation of the other's posi- tion. Rapoport has distinguished types of conflict in terms of differences in objectives. For Rapoport, a fight is an irrational encounter, lacking rational goals, with the simple objective of elimi— nating, subduing, or cutting down the opponent. Games are contests of power, where rational strategies to maximize profits and minimize losses lead to strategic decisions aimed at winning profit for self. Debate conflicts spring from incompatible or perceived incompatible frames of reference. The objective is to make the other see the world as you see it, to change his image. The fight category of conflict appears to be roughly equivalent to the definition of conflict event. Most likely the antecedents to the encounter depend heavily on an esca— lating dynamic of ”enemy” involving stereotyping, systemati- cally distortion of information, and a tendency to respond 22 to all members of the opposite group the same way.9 The debate conflict discussed by Rapoport is the concept upon which the image—based approach to conflict resolution is based. It will be discussed in Chapter II. The above definitions represent the theoretical background from which the present approach to conflict dy— namics has been developed. However, the purpose of the issue-illusory dichotomy is not to account for past theories, but to point out general trends in past considerations which would suggest that this division is a useful tool to give the practitioner who has to deal with conflict. Summary The purpose of the definition of conflict is to assist a person in resolving a conflict. As a third party, he probably enters in a process that has a history. Often it takes much energy to find out what has happened, and may even be impossible since participants' biases cloud attempts at getting reliable information. The best of all possible worlds would be a solution that does not involve the neces— sity of gathering "objective" data on the past. Conflict pressures can be divided into two categories: Structural and Perceptual. To find structural pressures, a practitioner would tend to look at the frameworks of the environment which produce pressures in people to engage in violence against others. Within this approach, the prac- 23 titioner would look at such structural constraints as the economic system, the legal system, or perhaps the ecological balance, e.g. territoriality, to show how these macro- structures produce environmental conditions that promote con- flict. He would concentrate on changing the conditions under which people live, without necessarily dealing with the per- ceptions of the people being affected. His concern would be with access to those who have the power to change the environ— ment (in some cases, the participants) rather than access to those who are in conflict with each other. To find perceptual pressures, a practitioner looks at people's definitions of the situation, based on the assumption that conflict is in the eyes of the beholder-— that the crucial variables for resolution are the ways in which the participants define the problem, and the images thay have of each other. The practitioner assumes that there is no "objective" solution which merely has to be presented to both to obtain agreement. Resolution involves restruc- turing of the participants' definitions of the world. This approach requires that the participants undergo a process where phgy confront their different perceptions, and phgy develop an outcome that both can accept. This theory does not assume that structural and perceptual perspectives are mutually exclusive. Rather, the two-fold division suggests a distinction for solving and for communication intervention when participants are being 24 :included in the solution. Perceptual conflict is the inter— east of the present research. Once interest has been narrowed to perceptions of 1participants in conflicts, a secondary major dichotomy is Jposited. Two perceptual dynamics are hypothesized. The dis- itinction is considered important because the dynamics lead ‘to different interactions. The first is an issue dynamic. Issue dynamics spring :from perceived zero—sum games.10 They spring from competition :for a desired goal, where if one of the participants achieves Tnis goal, the other is not able to achieve his. The second are called illusory dynamics. These stem from misunderstanding of the other, from negative feelings characterized by such processes as stereotyping, lack of communication between the conflicting parties, and from an inability to state one‘s goal in relation to the other. Past theories of social conflict can be categorized on the basis of the preceding distinction between issue and illusory dynamics. The distinction does not imply that in real life these dynamics occur separately. It implies that resolution is reached differently when a conflict is an issue conflict than when it is an illusory conflict, and that ener— gies can be better applied if a distinction is made as to which of these processes is salient. The distinction implies that the elements within the same dynamic operate highly interdependently, but that the 25 relation between issue and illusory dynamics is not neces— sarily consistent. For example, stereotyping the other per- son as the enemy is likely to be highly related to over— generalization of attributes to all members of the opposition, to lowering of estimates of other's good qualities, and to inaccuracy in stating the goals of the other party. Likewise, in the same conflict, competition for a scarce status, estim- ates of power, and strategies of bargaining are likely to be related. The relationship between these dynamics is not yet clear, though it should be clarified with more research. But because of the practitioner's needs at the present time, illusory dynamics will be investigated first. This is because in conflicts, distortion needs to be reduced before a clear definition of the issue is likely to emerge in any case, or before the parties will be willing to communicate about the issue. The experiment with the Dialogue is a preliminary attempt to examine conditions of change in conflict situa— tions when a third party has decided that: (l) The conflict is solvable within the social structure. (2) Participant perceptions can be redefined through communication. (3) The problem can be solved if it is redefined. (4) There are images held by the two parties which contain distortions preventing clear problem definition. FOOTNOTES Dialogue refers to the name of the situation which was publicized to the participants. It refers to a situa— tion where individuals meet to discuss the issue on which the conflict centers. In this specific situation, it includes two kinds of communication, one open and the other directed by a third person. The experience as it was ”advertised" to the partici— pant was as follows. An issue that is facing many campuses is the abolishment of the ROTC program. However, the debate has been carried on in the media and from the podium with little chance for students to share their opinions face—to—face. The Department of Communication is sponsoring a Dialogue for students who have different opinions on the issue. An assistant from the Department of Communication will participate in the discussion, and lend whatever exper— tise he has to making a fruitful discussion. I would be willing to spend an hour discussing the ques— tion of ROTC on campus with another student who disagrees with my position. 2The meaning of ”image” is clearly explicated in the following chapter. Image, when capitalized, refers to the total mental system of the individual. Resolution needs cannot wait until a theory of con— flict develops. Resolution techniques which involve having participants re—define their problems, while intriguing tools for resolution may also promote progress toward a general theory of conflict. A process definition of conflict implies that the system can be conceptualized so violence is the main outcome, and not merely the accidental correlate of other outputs. For the practitioner trying to reconstruct this system, the most fruitful conception is one which assumes that the con— flict event (usually violent) is the product of a coherent, interacting series of events. 26 27 A more extreme position would state that violence in society is one outlet for the continual struggle between interest groups underlying all social structure, and that a conflict paradigm is more useful than a framework which en— visions society as a consensual mechanism. A well—argued discussion of this more extreme conflict position is found in "Consensus, Conflict, and Cooperation: A sociological Inventory", by Louis Horowitz, in Social Forces, Vol. 41, 1962, PP. 177—188. 5Anatol Rapoport, Fights, Games, and Debates, Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 1960. See Part Two: "The Logic of Strategy". 6Thomas Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, New York, Oxford University Press, 1960, p. 1. 7Lewis Coser, The Functions of Social Conflict, New York, Free Press, 1956, P. 49. The first three chapters of Coser provide an extended discussion of the history of conflict theory in sociology. 81bid., p. 8. See Muzafer Sherif, In Common Predicament, Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1966, Chapter Two. A zero—sum game is a two (or more) player game where the sum of the payoffs is always zero. What one wins, the other loses. CHAPTER II AN IMAGE—BASED APPROACH TO CONFLICT RESOLUTION Introduction The theoretical framework presented in Chapter I is the background for future applied work in conflict resolu— tion. However, within the larger framework of conflict theory, there are constructs at different levels which re— main to be clarified. One construct at the intra—personal level that needs to be developed is the pattern of attitudes that are salient in conflict situations. While the hypothe— sis of issue—illusory dynamics represents the most useful tool for the problem—solving needs of the practitioner, it is also hoped that these dynamics will turn out to be measur— able relationships that are generalizable across many conflict situations. At this intra—personal level, the image—based approach to conflict described in this chapter is the closest approx— imation to the assumptions in the first chapter concerning the existence of issue—illusory dynamics. By exploring intra— personal change from a balance theory perspective, the re— search may begin the development of better theoretical under— 28 29 standing of how conflict dynamics interact, both as percep— tual configurations and as interpersonal interaction patterns. The first chapter indicated that the research would investigate methods of correcting distortion in images. It is assumed that these changes——reduction of distortion, of perceived distortion, of mistrust—-would constitute progress in eliminating conflict caused by illusory dynamics in con- flict situations. The present chapter will review an approach to mental systems that characterize them as seeking consistency, and as composed of inter—related attitudes, values, and beliefs which systematically affect the processing of data from the environment. The total system is called, in Boulding's ter— minology, the Image.1 (The use of the capital letter dis— tinguishes this total system from the use of the word "image" to describe a mental perception of an object or attribute.) Since people have different Images, they tend to label what is, or what should be, differently. This chapter will examine some aspects of that judgment process as they apply to problems of resolving conflicts. A brief explica— tion of the ”Image" model of human behavior will be presented, and this will be related to a theory of attitude change in conflict situations which has been outlined by Anatol Rapoport.2 A Dialogue mechanism will be presented as a research situation in which cognitive change can be examined in 3O conflict situations where two individuals are polarized on an issue salient to both of them. The Image Man perceives selectively. He emphasizes some as— pects of the sensory environment, drops out others, and dis— torts still others. He appears to do this systematically as a function of sets and expectations derived from past expe— rience and his private interpretations of this experience. What the individual "learns" in a situation is a combination of what is presented to him and what he himself brings to it. Image systems are assumed to be psycho—logically consistent. It is assumed that the psychic system has a capacity to look at itself, and, through a process of ab— sorbing and analyzing data about a multitude of internal and external events, develop a framework that is somewhat stable. The framework is sufficiently stable to make sense of itself and its environment, and is sufficiently accurate in predic— tion to meet the organism's needs. Dimensions of the Image are related, and recognized contradictions, or imbalances, are hypothesized to produce tensions for change. Much social science research has been done to demon— strate the conditions under which physical perceptions are changed by the ”gestalt" of the receiver.4 Higher order configurations——such as ethical beliefs, ideologies, and attitude complexes—-have also been hypothesized to operate 31 in a similar manner, and research in dissonance theory and cognitive consistency is exploring the conditions for change in these mental processes. An important facet of an Image theory is a suppOsition that important patterns of interpretation have a resistance to change. This stabilizing tendency affects inputs which ndght upset the balance of the Image or require changes. It is not merely a question of inconvenience due to effort needed to rearrange the Image. Rather, it is a disinclina— tion to face the risk of giving up an adequate coping mech— anism, thus, leading to rejection of some information. The ‘world view of the individual has satisfied his needs to some extent, and challenges to that adaptation are a threat. If the parts of the system that are operative in interpreting a situation are central to the Image, then it is assumed the emotional commitment to maintain the system is strong enough to detour the "threatening" messages in some fashion. There are many problems with such a view of the men— tal system. Since systems are psychologically consistent, it is difficult to say what can or cannot be incorporated into a system. Concepts such as centrality and valency (emotional investment in a component) are difficult to meas— ure. Nevertheless, the prevalance of private realities cannot be denied, and the realization that all human inter— action is perceived human interaction is important in studying conflict. 32 Debate Conflicts Anatol Rapoport uses the term debate conflict to characterize encounters which stem from arguments over "what “ought to be". Such conflicts have as their goal the estab- lishing of one's own View of the world as superior to the opponent's, presumably by convincing him of the rightness of one's own View. Since debate conflicts spring not from verifiable aspects of reality, but from differing value images, the dynamics of image maintenance and change are central to the problems of promoting conflict resolution when the conflict is judged to contain many illusory compo— nents. A debate conflict involves an awareness of the oppo- nent and a perception of his position as different from one's own. That is, as well as a judgment of some issue, there is the additional image of the other's position. Information supporting the other position, particularly when it comes from the other person, may be in some ways a threat to one's own position. The most threatening aspects of the other's position are the messages most likely to challenge the central components of one's own system. Thus, the most important parts of an opponent's belief system are the messages that are most likely to be distorted or censored by the other. Over time, the censoring process produces a stereotyped View of the other and of his position, a view which is consistent with the expectation of one's own position. The censoring 33 process is a self-fulfilling process, eventually selecting only the messages it wishes to hear. The nature of the dis- tortion of "opponent" and "opponent's position“ that occurs in conflict situations is not known, but it is assumed that the net effect of distortion on a perceived opponent's position will be inaccuracy in a direction unfavorable to the opponent. A debate conflict is often a perceived debate con— flict. Disagreement on the statement of a position may or may not reflect an entirely different categorizing system for estimating values of assertions. Some part of the perceived conflict between opponents may be illusory——that is, disagree— ment on a specific issue may be generated from different ways of looking at the world. This illusion of large differEnqes between self and other is increased by the need to:see the 8 other as an opponent, as the type of person who would hold a position opposite to one's own. The self-fulfilling dy— namics of such perceptions have been recorded in the litera— ture on stereotyping and out—group images.6 It is assumed that the greater the accuracy concern— ing the other's position and the greater the perceived similarity between self and other, the less is the likelihood of a spiral of negative perceptions and negative responses. It is assumed that the very nature of conflict involves a negative image of an opponent. This negative image decreases the likelihood of a resolution process occurring and lessens 34 the chance of accepting information from the other that might change the attitude on the issue at hand. Further, if the Image has a vested interest in not changing, then information contrary to the position—-particularly information from some- one known to hold an opposing view——has a high chance of being misperceived. Given these tendencies in the Image to resist change, how does one use communication in a conflict situation? Rapoport suggests three methods. The first he labels brainwashing. Brainwashing uses conditioning principles to reward or punish responses. The Image becomes too expensive to hold in terms of negative costs (e.g. pain, lesser rewards, etc.), and it is changed to cope with the reinforcement patterns in the new environment. However, this method re— quires control over the other and his environment and is not acceptable ethically to most people. 2¥—A second method of changing the Image, Rapoport calls the psycho—therapeutic approach——the Image is changed by having its origins explained. Such an approach would say, ”your position is a mistaken one that can be explained by the nature of the origins of your belief.” Once the presum— ably neurotic causes of the individual's belief have been explained to him, he will be free to choose a more adequate belief system. However, the need for an enlightened thera— pist in whom the subject has high trust renders this method unusable in most instances. 35 The third method, which Rapoport uses as the basis for his resolution attempts in debate conflicts, is rempyal/ of threat. It is "based on the assumption that the stability / of the persisting image is based on the (patient's) refusal even to look at other images, because they are threatening."7 Thus, the three principles to be outlined below are designed to help lessen the threat of possible change. Resolution: Rapoport's Suggestions There seem to be two aspects of the world view (Image) that contribute to conflict potential in a debate conflict. First, there are the differing views of the world. Second, there is the threat posed by the other's view of the world, presenting an imagined danger to one's own position. It is assumed that the topics under consideration in the conflict are salient areas for the individual and he is likely to be highly ego—involved in them. Rapoport suggests three principles for decreasing the impact of the perceived threat and the consequent distorting of the communication from an opponent. l. The ability and willingness of each participant to state the position of the opponent to the opponent's satisfaction. 2. The ability and willingness of each participant to state the conditions under which the opponent's position is valid or has merit. 36 3. The ability and willingness of each participant to assume that in many respects the opponent is like himself, that is, each recognizes that they share common values and each is aware of the common ground, and perhaps, of the circumstances which have led the opponent to his position. The first principle is designed to assure the opponent that he has been understood. Rapoport argues that "the futil— ity of most debates as means of modifying outlooks can be traced to the unwillingness or the inability of the opponents to listen to one another. If this failure to listen is the result of protective censorship, that is, an attempt to shut out the stimuli which threaten to disrupt one's own image, then clearly the way to circumvent this censorship is to present admissable stimuli to the opponent. The assumption is that the statement of his own outlook will be admissable to the opponent, and that he will therefore listen to it."8 The second principle tries to get beyond the ten— dency to attribute reality to word descriptions of the world. Since distinctions are man made, there are some rules or perceptions that give meaning to assertions. This principle assumes that under some circumstances every assertion can have validity. Each statement has a "region of validity". Stating this region of the opponent's position helps circum— vent the Image censor in two ways: 37 First, it serves to minimize threat by additional evi— dence of understanding. Being a co-operative act, the granting of a valid region for the opponent's stand postpones the posing of antagonistic positions. Some— thing is done to minimize the explosion of irrelevant opposition which makes so many debates futile from the start. Second, the delineation of the region of validity by implication points up the boundaries which separate the positions and thus provides the transition from the acknowledgment of the common area of agreement (without which the debate is futile) to the frank recognition of the area of disagreement relatgd to specifically stated different frames of reference. The third principle is designed to make each partic— ipant consider that the attributions he makes to himself-- rational, honest, etc.——may also be characteristic of his opponent. By focusing on values that they share in common, the fact of differences is not isolated and stressed to the exclusion of the values that they may share. There is some ambiguity in the rationale for the three principles. Rapoport describes them essentially as trust—inducing suggestions. The qualities he attributes to his principles are assumed to promote trust. Shared experi— ence effects, the presentation of one's own position as admissable stimuli, and evidence of good faith are elements for reducing threat and promoting trust. In addition to assuming that these characteristics are attributable to the principles and that these qualities promote trust formation, Rapoport also assumes that, given the development of trust, resolution is more likely. However, the effect of the principles may be described in other frameworks.. The emphasis on feedback and listening 38 carefully to the other person may improve communication regardless of changes in attitudes toward the other. An experimenter effect might be suspected, as well, since in the experimental condition the third party becomes more prominent than in the control condition. These principles are quite transparently aimed at producing cooperation, and participants may respond to this experimenter cue. From a practitioner's point of view, these internal alternative explanations are not immediately critical. Prob- ably some proportion of the effect can be attributed to all of the above. More important is the first examination of patterns of effects of the intervention technique and the practicality of the principles as communication strategies in non—laboratory situations. Rapoport's suggestions have advantages for research. First, they can be translated into message strategies. Second, they are non-directive. As well as the ethical advantages to this stance, they represent a non—threatening intervention technique to help participants to change past methods of communication that have proven ineffective. Rapoport's approach to conflict makes sense in terms of the illusory dynamics discussed in the first chapter. His three principles suggest a more precise strategy for resolving conflicts then mere exposure. Illusory conflict springs from different frames of reference that produce dis— tortion. This approach does not argue that stated differ— l i I 39 ences are merely verbal, but that the self—fulfilling dy— namics of perceived difference, inaccuracy of knowledge concerning the other's position, etc. can be decreased by these principles. Such changes promote resolution and de— crease the probability of violence springing from misunder— standing. Two important modifications in Rapoport's approach have been made in this research. When Rapoport discusses the principles, he does so as if he were recommending them as beliefs to be internalized by a participant. For example, when he discusses the utility of the third principle he writes: I suppose the most promising way to induce the assumption of similarity in the other is to make it oneself. . . . One seeks within oneself the clearly perceived short— comings of the opponent. . . .Our ultimate purpose in raising questions about ourselves is to induce the oppo- nent to raise similar questions about himself."10 As Rapoport suggests, the strategy may only be effective when it is seen by the opponent as evidence of good faith. By making the method a suggestion of a third party, it may lose its trust—inducing power. However, the three principles still appear as possible ways of reducing distortion. A second effect of having these methods of communi— cation suggested by a third person is that the terms ”ability and willingness" lose much of their power. The tasks involved in the three suggestions are not simple. When used honestly by a participant, the commitment to the difficult 4O process of seeing the world from the other's point of view is self—imposed. When suggested as a method of communica— tion by an outside consultant, much of the educational func— tion may be lost if the performance is merely a rote response to his suggestion. However, this too is still a matter of conjecture. The principles suggest a more rational, more pleasing method of interaction, and the shared experience of this approach to discussing differences between two partici— pants may be sufficient to overcome the handicap of removing the suggestions to a third party. Research Goals The word Dialogue in this research refers to a situa— tion description. It does not yet imply a successful, open, two—way process of communication. It is meant to be a setting within which methods of promoting understanding between individuals who disagree strongly on salient issues can be investigated. Its development rests on the assumption that people can resolve conflict through face-to—face communica— tion. The search for the method and circumstances for its success has just been begun. The present research is explora— tory. It hopes to begin progress in several areas. 1. The first goal is to develop a mechanism, the Dialogue, which is (a) usable without excessive expertise or cost, and (b) does not need unique conditions for use and can be used in those situations where misunderstanding and lack of communication may be contributing to conflict. 41 If the three principles are operationalized as communication suggestions, and have some payoff, they are the type of suggestions that can be used by anyone. No "communication expert" is required. Rapoport's principles are being tested as extensions of simple interaction. If they prove useful in resolving conflicts, then more precise examination of specific effects can be undertaken. 2. A second goal is to begin to stipulate behavioral changes which can be called indicators of "resolution". If the Image is multi—dimensional, then changes can occur on more levels than simply change on the issue itself. Given the short duration of the Dialogue (one hour), the magnitude of the changes is likely to be much less than com— plete conversion and agreement. By looking at related aspects of the Image, some beginning to understanding the inter— relation between these varied attitudes can be accomplished. 3. A third goal is to propose areas of research in Image change, (information gain, attitude change, centrality changes, etc.) where the conditions under which the messages occur involve perceived conflict between two opponents. Rapoport's approach has partial overlap with pre— vious communication research. For example, his first princi— ple involves stating a counter—attitudinal message, but obviously in different ways than researched by earlier disso— nance studies.ll There are many possibilities for variations internal to the Dialogue that could take advantage of the F 42 already generated conflict brought into the situation. It would appear that the Dialogue is a logical extension of work being done in communication in terms of a "co— orientational approach in communication research."12 Ques— tions concerning the relationship between congruence (per— ceived similarity), actual difference, accuracy of estimate, and the communication patterns used between individuals in conflict can be explored in the future with this paradigm. Summary Rapoport's discussion of debate conflicts, and his descriptions of how Image systems operate are valuable beginnings for developing a model of attitude change in con— flict situations. The three principles for change that he suggests spring from assumptions concerning the censorship function of messages that threaten high ego—involvement areas of the Image. These principles for overcoming inbuilt defenses in an opponent have been translated to communication strategies to be recommended by a third party to two partici— pants in a Dialogue situation. The exploratory nature of this first inquiry has been reported, and the goal of the Dialogue has been out— lined. FOOTNOTES lSee Kenneth Boulding, The Image, Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 1966. Discussions relevant to the dynamic equilibrium model implied in consistency theories are found in Chapter I and Chapter IV. "In summation, then, my theory might well be called an organic theory of knowledge. Its most fundamental proposition is that knowledge is what somebody or some— thing knows, and that without a knower, knowledge is an absurdity. Moreover, I argue that the growth of knowledge is the growth of 'organic structure'." (p. 16) 2Anatol Rapoport, Fights, Games, and Debates, Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 1960. 3Many variations of the ”balance” model of human perception have been developed. Rosenberg summarizes the propositions underlying such systems. ”Stated in terms of a simple propositional sequence the basic theoretical view as originally propounded was this. 1. When the affective and cognitive components of an attitude are mutually consistent, the attitude is in a stable state. 2. When these components are mutually inconsistent, to such a degree that exceeds the individual's Tolerance limit' for such inconsistency, the attitude is in an unstable state. 3. In such an unstable state the attitude will undergo reorganizing activity until one of three possible out— comes is achieved. These outcomes are: (a) rejection of the communications, or other forces, that engendered the original inconsistency between affect and cognition and thus rendered the attitude unstable, i.e. restoration of the original stable and consistent attitude; (b) 'frag— mentation' of the attitude through the isolation from 43 44 each other of the mutually inconsistent affective and cognitive components; (c) accommodation to the original inconsistency—producing change so that a new attitude, consistent with that change, is now stabilized, i.e. attitude change." Milton J. Rosenberg, "Hedonism, Inauthenticity, and Other Goads Toward Expansion of a Consistency Theory,", in Theories of Cognitive Consistency: A Sourcebook, ed. Abelson, Aronson, et a1, Chicago, Rand McNally and Co., 1968. 4Sherif, M. and Hovland, C. 1., Social Judgment, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1961. 5Methods of resolving inconsistency is again a widely discussed area, with consideration of methods, and situations, and research approaches sufficiently varied that at this stage in conflict research it is unclear which framework would be most useful for testing specific changes and resolutions in conflict situations. A complete discussion of such issues can be found in Theories of Cognitive Consistency: A Source- book, Section LV. C. Modes of Resolution, pp. 653—716. Muzafer Sherif, In Common Predicament, Boston, Houghton—Mifflin, 1966, Chapter Two. 7Anatol Rapoport, FightsI GamesI and Debates, p. 285. 8Ibid., p. 288. 9Ibid., p. lOIbid., p. 306. 11For two discussions of current research in this area, see Irving L. Janis, "Attitude Change via Role Playing," and Barry E. Collins, ”The Mediation of Change Due to Counter— attitudinal Behavior”, in Theories of Cognitive Consistency: A Sourcebook. 12See Steven H. Chaffee, Jack M. McLeod, and J. L. Guerrero, ”Origins and Implications of the Coorientational Approach in Communication Research," paper presented to the Theory and Methodology Division of the Association for Education in Journalism, Berkeley, California, August 1969. CHAPTER III OPERATIONALIZING DIALOGUE AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION This chapter will describe the conditions on campus when the Dialogue was used, and the way in which it was used in this particular circumstance. Five dimensions of atti- tudes are discussed, and the hypotheses, predicting greater change using Rapoport's suggesions, are stated. The Campus Situation Conditions under which the Dialogue will be opera- tionalized will vary with the circumstances of the conflict. The operationalization discussed in this chapter is partly a function of the research opportunity afforded by a conflict on Michigan State University campus last spring. Often the occurrence of conflict does not allow a long stage of prepa— ration, and the present research was developed in a short period to take advantage of the opportunity. A series of rallies were held on the MSU campus to discuss the issue of whether ROTC should be moved off the campus. One confrontation between ROTC members and opposed individuals resulted in some fighting, and there was much 45 .29"? '911' 32 46 newspaper space devoted to the issue, both on campus and on other college campuses. However, there is no way of estimat- ing how serious a conflict it represented. The ROTC conflict qualifies as the kind of conflict Rapoport would label debate conflict. It involved a differing estimate on the goodness or badness of an act, and the atti- tudes to the ROTC issue is assumed to be part of a larger View of the world dealing with attitudes towards militarism. This situation has the advantage of being a real con- flict which has not been generated by the researcher. Campus confrontations over ROTC were rampant on college campuses during the spring of 1969, and MSU itself had two encounters with some physical violence. The spring cadet march was can— celled, and the University appointed a committee to examine the question of ROTC. It seems then to be a legitimate con— flict, and one that is perhaps typical of many protests of the past two years—-polarizing into groups, sometimes using violence as a method of change, and having consequence for the society. One advantage of using a real life situation is that the problem in conducting the Dialogue itself should be useful for the practitioner primarily interested in finding intervention mechanisms that are practiced. Chairmen of the Department of Aeronautics and of the Department of Military Science were approached and per— mission to distribute volunteer forms was obtained. The author then made presentations in the junior and senior 47 classes of the Department asking for individuals who would be willing to participate in a dialogue encounter with indi- viduals who disagreed with the presence of ROTC on campus. The volunteer forms were left with the instructor and later returned to the author. In a few cases, the class instructor presented the forms when the researcher was not present. Through contacts with student government the same request for volunteers was made to other independent groups. These groups were pgp formed to deal specifically with the ROTC issue, and it was decided not to approach such groups directly since the possibility of the Dialogue itself be— coming an issue might invalidate the initial research. The first test of the Dialogue was to be with individuals who did not have a formal necessity to report to an intact group. It was more difficult to enlist volunteers opposed to ROTC who qualified on the extreme end of the scale. To be acceptable the individuals had to score 6 or 7 on the qualifying questionnaire (See Appendix I) and be willing to volunteer. To try to increase the number of anti—ROTC volun— teers, two additional presentations were made to undergrad— uate sociology classes. The number of available participants was approximate— ly 85 pro—ROTC volunteers (with scores of either 1 or 2 on the scale) and about 47 subjects marking 6 or 7 on the question: “ROTC should be banned from MSU campus." Method of selection and matching was simply to phone the persons 48 until an acceptable time could be found when they could both meet. No financial or academic reward was offered. Since the research was part of the campus conflict, the conflict was not generated in the research setting. The Dialogue itself was isolated from the group conflict occurring on campus, and any outcomes from the Dialogue did not have to be translated into action by the participants. The possible importance of these variations will be discussed in Chapter V. The Dialogue Situation In the Dialogue, we have two persons with opposite points of View on ROTC's presence on campus communicating for one hour in the presence of a third party. Each participant knew that the other person disagreed with his position, and that he had volunteered to spend an hour ”discussing the question of ROTC on campus". No statement of what partici— pants were expected to do had been given to them prior to their meeting. Three seminar rooms were obtained on campus. Phone appointments had been made the previous week following re— ceipt of the volunteer forms. The pairs were assigned to time availabilities of the research assistants, and to the times indicated on the participants' volunteer forms. In— dividuals were assigned to times solely on the basis of availability. No other matching was possible. No individual reported knowing the person that he met. 49 Assistants who acted as third parties were fellow graduate students in the Communication Department. They were assigned to an equal number of control and experimental conditions, and the sequence of these was arbitrarily assigned. When the participant came to the Dialogue, he was shown into a nearby room and asked to fill out a pre—test questionnaire. After filling out the pre—test form in sep— arate rooms, the subjects were introduced to each other by the assistant, and shown into a small classroom, where there were two chairs across from each other at a seminar table. The assistant withdrew to another small table in the corner of the room where he could observe the communication. The nature of the introduction and observation was different in experimental and control conditions. Control Condition In this condition, the participants, who knew only that the other was opposed to the position they had indicated on the volunteer form, were to have one hour (approximately) of non—directed conversation on the topic of whether ROTC should be abolished from MSU campus. The role of the third person was to be as informal as possible, and to stay out of the conversation. An instruction format was given to the assistants, but the instructions were not to be read exactly. The cost of such rigid control over the nature of the 50 instructions would have been to introduce the overtones of "experiment" into what was hoped would be a natural conversa- tion. Appendix II contains the Opening Instructions for the Control group, and guidelines for the observers' behavior during the hour. During the Dialogue, the observer was coding the interaction in a preliminary attempt to outline the nature of the communication in such a setting. The recording form is presented in Appendix III, but analyses of these forms were not integral to the hypotheses in the research, and will not be reported in the dissertation. Following approximately one hour of interaction, the Dialogue ended naturally or was interrupted by the assistant. A post-test questionnaire was filled out, and participants were asked not to discuss the Dialogue with friends until after the term was finished. Experimental Condition The same setting and same format for filling out pre—test and post—test questionnaires were used. This con— dition was distinguished from the control condition by the addition of three interventions by the observer that mirrored Rapoport's principles. Again the observer was instructed to introduce the suggestions in as informal a method as possible; thus, the research assistants did not read the instructions, but followed the wording by memory. A11 assistants met with 51 the researcher and outline sheets for the experimental condi- tion were presented and discussed. The same assistants were used for both control and experimental conditions, and as far as possible conducted an equal number of control and experi- mental conditions. Appendix II contains the instruction sheet for the experimental group. The actual suggested word— ing for the three communication strategies is presented below. Rapoport's first principle discusses the ability and willingness of each participant to state the position of the opponent to the opponent's satisfaction. This principle was outlined in the following manner, as a model that the assistants could adapt to their own comfort: ”Excuse me, Sl's name, and 82's name, but I've been listening for the last while, and I'd like to make a few suggestions from a communication point of view. Although you are both stating your position somewhat, I'm not sure from your conversation that you are getting the other per— son's position. If I can take part in the conversation for a while, I'd like to act as a monitor, and get you to try a communication practice which I've found often helps out. Sl's name, if you would state 82's name's position on ROTC as you understand it, that would be a good start. I want you to state his position so that you S2 agree that he under— stands it, then we can reverse the procedure, that is, you S2 could state Sl's position.” Because of the possible time problem, Rapoport's third principle was presented as the second communication suggestion. The principle is indicated as "the ability and willingness of each participant to assume that in many respects the opponent is like himself, that is to say, the opponents share common values and each is aware of this Common ground, and perhaps, of the circumstances which have '52 led the opponent to his position.1 This principle was trans- lated into the following instructions: _ "Ok, I think that was good. Another thing I often notice in Communication Seminars is the emphasis on differ- ences. In a way, you both have emphasized your own position in terms of differences. It might be more fruitful if we looked at the points that you share in common. What kinds of values and beliefs on this topic do you both agree on? Maybe once we have discussed that, we might be able to dis— cuss our differences in terms of the circumstances that have led the opponent to the position he takes. S1, what values or beliefs do you feel that you have in common with 82?“ The final principle that was included in the experi- mental format was the ability and willingness of each partici- pant to state the conditions under which the opponent's position is valid or has merit. This was the most difficult of the three to operationalize, and probably the most diffi— cult one for a person to do at someone else's request. It was described to the assistants in the following manner: “Let me make one last suggestion. You both appear to see the world from (slightly) different points of View. If the world were certain ways, each of your positions would be correct. If you could think of the world as being a certain way, how would it have to be before the other's position would be the right one? For example, Si, how would the world have to be before you would agree that ROTC should be on campus?” (Then, get S3 to go through the same process.) These principles—instructions were designed to guide the discussion along the lines that Rapoport felt represents the optimum way of changing an Image. However, a concern was also that they be sufficiently adaptable to natural Circumstances so they could be used in an informal manner. 53 The participants were given fifteen minutes of free conversa— tion, at which point the research assistant moved from his table in the corner to a chair at the seminar table, and joined with the first instruction. The estimated time sequence was fifteen minutes for each manipulation, but if the exercise was not being undertaken at all, the next one could be introduced. Likewise, if the manipulation was involving the participants, the time sequence could be ex- tended beyond the fifteen minute time limit. Statement of Hypotheses Resolution is operationalized in terms of change of attitude concerning the other, and change in attitude toward the issue. These changes are hypothesized to occur along five dimensions which were measured before and after the Dialogue: (1) attitude toward the other; (2) estimation of other's attitude to oneself; (3) perceived similarity between self and other's position; (4) accuracy of perception of other's position; (5) attitude toward the issue and related issues. Hypotheses Hypothesis One: When individuals who disagree on a salient topic communicate together in a Dialogue situation, those who perceived the interaction as beneficial will have 54 a positive change in attitude toward the other person significantly greater than those who did not perceive the experience I as beneficial. Hypothesis Two—a): There will be a significant positive change of attitude toward the other par- ticipant following the experimental treatment. The change in attitude toward the other will be significantly greater following the experimental treatment than following the control condition. (Corollary) b): There will be a significant change in rating of self attributed to the other in a positive direction following the experimental condition. This change in rating of self attributed to the other will be significantly greater in the experimental treatment than in the control condition. Hypothesis Three: The estimate of perceived similarity will be significantly greater in the post— test measure than in the pre—test measure in the experimental treatment. The experimental treatment will produce a significantly greater change in per— ceived similarity than will the control condition. Hypothesis Four: The accuracy of the estimate of the other's position on related issues will be signifi- cantly greater in the post—test than in the pre-test following the experimental treatment. The experimental treatment will produce significantly more accuracy than the control condition. Hypothesis Five: In the experimental treatment, there will be a significant difference in attitude toward the issue and related issues between post—dialogue and pre—dialogue measures. This difference will be in the direction of the moderate end of the scale. 55 The amount of attitude change in the experimental treatment will be greater than in the control condition. . f Rationale The last four hypotheses represent a unit that derives its support from the image—based approach to human information processing outlined in Chapter II. The first hypothesis was added to take account of the possibility that in using the manipulation (or in the control condition) the experience might not be favorable. Attitude toward the experience would over—ride any benefits of the manipulation in attitudes to other and to the issue. In that case, satis— faction with the experience would be sufficient to explain differences rather than any effect of the communication strategy in reducing the defenses of the image. Figure 1. represents a model of the attitude con- figuration tested by the four hypotheses. The present hy- potheses are designed to test the relationships of the image dimensions affected by communication in conflict situations. It is hypothesized that the dimensions are inter-dependent and that change along one dimension will influence and be influenced by changes in the other.2 The experiment with the Dialogue, however, is not sufficiently precise, nor is the sample large enough to allow controlled investigation of these relationships. Trends from the data should suggest more detailed hypotheses for further research. 56 am WIIIJII II 1 . _ _I.I . cnmzou ocsufluum o .0 m.oum mo mmmEH .% a».A _ m_Hpc< mo wmmEH I‘ll IL \\, r I I III .\ «v \\ mmsmmfl couwaou mwSmmH coumaos w mummfl cuwBow :oflmeHHmaom a mSmmH cumzou cOHpSHommm “oaamcoo Op cmumamm mcoflmcmafla ommEH .H musmflm mmSmma concawu w msmm. _ mosmmfl cwumawu w wsmmfl _ _ chosen wcsaauum _ v T&_ wMQDBHBBfi m m Eosm m coco m m. mQDBHBB< UBOMIHDC< . manmno>mw .14m comwwnozfl My oeomloHm _ _ oaomuanam mo mmmEH .\ \ mo mamas 2.x mfinmuo>mm .o m de. o OmmEH memeOQfl QN . OH& HO OmmEH m.oum mo mmmfifl w.Huc< mo moose 57 The hypotheses of significant difference between experimental and control condition rests on the argument presented by Rapoport that change in the Image is threaten-A ing, and that the three principles reduce the threat of change. Hypothesis Two has two parts. Individuals make evaluations of the other, and they are aware that the other is liable to make evaluations of them. These orientations toward the other should change with communication and, if Images are inter-related, should effect attitudes toward the issue. Both conditions represent a shared experience. The increased effectiveness of the experimental condition could be due to either increased satisfaction with the experience or to the effect of better communication through the third person's communication suggestions. Results from Hypothesis One will allow distinction between these two possibilities. The corollary of Hypothesis Two suggests that the expectations concerning the other's feeling toward oneself are important. The dynamics of the self-fulfilling prophecy suggest that if A perceives B as having a negative estimate of A, then A is likely to act in such a way as to encourage that very outcome. Development of an "opponent" or "enemy" image encourages a self—perpetuating illusion. Reduction of such an estimation should lessen distortion and perhaps increase chances for accurate estimates of B's position and re—evaluation of A's own position. 58 Hypothesis Three deals with the perception of the relation between self and other's position on the issue in question. Presumably the closer one perceives onself to another on important issues, the less tendency there is to see him as "other".- Closely related to an estimation of difference be- tween one's own opinion and the other's position is the notion of the accuracy of the estimate of the other's posi- tion. Note that accuracy only makes sense from the point of View of a third party. As a participant, an individual can only deal with his own perceptions. If the Image is a perceptual configuration, then changes in the Image which represent an increase in perceived similarity are considered an advantage for conflict resolution apart from any indepen— dent corroboration of that estimate. The accuracy component is not as important for illusory dynamics as for issue dynamics except that implied in the notion of inaccuracy in a conflict situation is the assumption that the inaccuracy is usually on the negative side. Finally, Hypothesis Five deals with the question of attitude change on the issue and related issues. This is a common goal of conflict resolution: to move members of the conflict toward a more similar position on the issue about which they were previously polarized. Since the abolishment of ROTC represents the central issue on which the conflict centered, it is unlikely that attitudes toward the issue 59 will be influenced as much as the more peripheral components of the Image,3 since the discussion is relatively short. However, issue change is still a goal of the intervention. Operationalization of Variables Attitude toward the other and estimation of other's attitude toward oneself were measured with scales from the semantic differential tested by Osgood and by Berlo, Lemmert, and Mertz.4 The ten pairs of polar adjectives used were: friendly—unfriendly; openminded—closeminded; irrational- rational; trustworthy—untrustworthy; good-bad; weak—strong; competent—incompetent; informed—uninformed; meek—aggressive; frank-reserved. To permit addition across pairs in computing change scores for Hypothesis Two and its Corollary, the results of the scales were factor-analyzed. Table 1. shows the rotated factor loadings for the scales on the pre—test. Item No. 7 (informed—uninformed) was dropped from the testing of the hypothesis and the other nine polar adjectives considered as one dimension. On the post—test loading on the scales, the break— down was more complex. (See Table 2.). The emergence of three clusters as a result of the manipulation is to be expected since the pre—test questionnaire measured attitudes towards "a person holding the opposite position”, whereas Table 1. omqmmpwmI—I I" O Factor Analysis of Semantic Differential Scales on a Pre—test: Varimax Rotation LomqmmwaI—I H O 60 Rotated Factor Loadings 1 0.8280* 0.6548* 0.9069* 0.6974* 0.7553* 0.8054* 0.1926* 0.5051* 0.6429* 0.7504* Adjective Pairs Friendly Unfriendly Openminded Closeminded Rational Irrational Good Bad Competent Incompetent Strong Weak Informed Uninformed Aggressive Meek Frank Reserved 2 0.3670 0.3089 0.1365 0.3728 0.4693 0.1830 0.9453* 0.4431 0.5614 0.4953 Trustworthy Untrustworthy 61 Table 2. Factor AnaIysis of Semantic Differential Scales on Post—test: Varimax Rotation Rotated Factor Loadings l 2 3 4 1 0.7392* 0.0450 0.2207 0.1174 2 0.6752* —0.l477 —0.1966 0.4307 3 0.5618* 0.0203 0.0596 0.5347 4 0.6543* 0.2666 —0.0275 —0.0342 5 0.3079 0.1793 0.2395 0.7439* 6 0.2388 -0.3032 0.5291 0.5721* 7 —0.0286 0.1827 -0.0906 0.8619* 8 0.0059 0.1520 0.9305* 0.0136 9 —0.0431 0.8361* 0.1812 0.2425 10 0.2296 0.8731* -0.0431 —0.0058 Adjective Pairs Friendly Unfriendly Openminded Closeminded Rational Irrational Good Bad Competent Incompetent Strong Weak Informed Uninformed Aggressive Meek kooocmmwat-l Frank Reserved [—1 O Trustworthy Untrustworthy 62 in the post—test, responses were in relation to the specific person with whom the respondent had just completed one hour's interaction. More differentiation was to be expected. In using the paired—adjectives in the questionnaires, the order of the scales was varied, and the directionality of the positive-negative ends of the scale varied to avoid effects of a response bias. (See Appendix IV.) Changes on each of the nine scales were summed to produce the scores used in testing Hypothesis Two. Perceived similarity, accuracy, and attitude change were all measured upon a series of issue questions. The relevant dimension was the role of the military in American life, while irrelevant issues dealing with other facets of the culture Were included. Each participant in the Dialogue knew that the other person disagreed with his position concerning the abolish— ment of ROTC from campus. A scale was constructed to measure attitude change by summing across items that were felt to be closely related to the ROTC issue. Six questions were developed for this purpose. Four questions thought to be irrelevant to the ROTC issue were included in the question— naire. The ten items are reproduced in Table 3. Again the order was varied to eliminate the response bias. In addition, at a different point in the post-test questionnaire, (See Appendix IV), the original screening question ("ROTC should be abolished on MSU campus.") was 63 asked. However, it was not included in such a way as to allow it to be used in Hypotheses Three or Four (since the information had been given to the participants), and is included as a separate item in Hypothesis Five. A factor analysis (varimax rotation) was performed to test the validity of the relevant—irrelevant dimensions. Figure 3. reports the Rotated Factor Loadings for items used on the pre-test. Item 1 appeared to be a bad item, and has been dropped from the analysis. Items 2—6 were considered to represent one factor relevant to a military View of the world, and were used as components in the change scores for Hypotheses Three, Four and Five. The factor analysis performed on the post—test use of the scales did not invalidate any of the loadings from the pre—test. The exposures to another person would not be expected to influence the issue factor, since the referent for the issue did not change, as it did in the attitude factor toward the other person. Statistical Tests of Hypotheses Each hypothesis has been tested in the same fashion. First, the difference between pre—test and post—test meas— ures for the control group has been tested with a t-test for correlated measures. Then, the experimental group change has been compared with the amount of control group change by a t-test for independent samples. 64 Table 3. Factor Analysis on Issue Items Pre—test: Varimax Rotation l 2 1 0.1428* -0.0263 2 0.8522* -0.0529 3 0.7202* 0.1876 4 0.7926* -0.0511 5 —0.7806* -0.0352 6 —0.7412* 0.0431 7 —O.6114* 0.4732 8 0.4386* 0.4176 9 —0.0667 0.8201* 10 —0.0521 0.7972* 11 0.8582 ~0.0842 Issues: 1 The main reasons for abolishing ROTC are moral rather than academic. The United States is an imperialistic nation. Most people in ROTC are in favor of military solutions to world problems. The purpose of overseas military commitments is primarily to protect U. 8. business investment. To be realistic, one has to consider the menace of Communism in Asia and Africa. Draft laws should be tightened to puniSh those who try to avoid being drafted. The demand for admission of all Third World Students to the University regardless of academic qualifications is militant and racist. Abortion laws should be liberalized to allow those women who want them to have them. 65 Table 3. Continued. 9 Britain should be allowed into the European Common Market. 10 The vote against daylight savings time for Michigan was ridiculous. 11 The ROTC program should be abolished on Michigan State campus. Across hypotheses the formula is the same, although the entries in the formula may differ. Thus, for example, Hypothesis Three which estimates change in perceived similari- ty would have as its raw scores in the t—test (independent samples) the amount of change in perceived difference between pre and post measures, where the perceived difference score is itself a "D" score.5 However, in Hypothesis Five, the difference score is simply between raw scores before and after. The statistical formulas for each hypothesis are: a) Correlated t—test. t = Y (control—post) — E (control-pre) \/82 (post) / 82 (pre) — 2 r12(S post)(S pre) where X is the average amount of difference (Hypotheses Three and Four) across individuals. It should be remembered that the raw scores of these tests are themselves a summed average across the items of the scales. 66 b) t-test for independent measures. t = D (exp) = D (control) S22 (exp) % S22 (control) N1 N2 It was decided to test the control separately in this exploratory research because it represents a condition against which the Rapoport principles are being compared and the exact meaning of the term "control" as it applies to the study is not clear. With the number of individuals who qualified as "in conflict” for the study, it was not possible to consider all the permutations of control. In the present study, control group means a pair of individuals who talked about the issue over which they were in conflict for one hour with no directives governing their behavior. The experimental condition had three communication instruc— tions added to the interaction. Thus, it is likely that the control group's exposure will have some effect. There is reason to expect that the effect will be positive, although it is possible that it might be detrimental (For example, one person may do all the talking and aggravate the other). The small number of subjects who qualified as being polarized on the issue re— quired that the control condition be as useful as possible. It is predicted that the experimental pairs will produce differences significantly greater than the control 67 group. Significant differences may occur for two reasons. First, above and beyond the effect of open interaction, the experimental inputs may be significantly more effective in producing hypothesized changes. Second, the control condi— tion may have a negative effect. Then, even if the experi— mental group is not significantly different from zero change, it could be significantly different from the control group. If the differences are pg; significant, it could be for two reasons. First, the control condition may be suffi- ciently effective to change attitudes so that the experimental group could not increase effectiveness beyond the control condition. With a 7 point scale, if the control condition was effective, it might not be possible for the experimental treatment to be significantly more effective. Second, it may be that Rapoport's operationalized suggestions simply are not effective as communication guidelines. Testing the control group first obviates the need to test the experimental group separately. All research ques— tions can be answered by estimating control change, and comparing experimental to it. The format for stating hypo— theses predicts a significant change in the experimental treatment between pre— and post—test, but this significance can be assumed for the experimental treatment if it is more effective that the control condition. 68 Research Problems A disadvantage of pair research is that the absence of one member invalidates the experience for both. This is in addition to the problem of finding subjects polarized on a currently salient social issue, of obtaining their interest through mere presentation of the Dialogue opportunity, and finding times when both members are able to be present. Goals for the conditions were twenty pairs in each treatment, but absenteeism cost 40 per cent of the projected total. In the present research, hypotheses are formulated on the basis of individual change, and sample size for the exper— imental condition was twenty—six and for the control group twenty—two. In a few instances, some questions were not answered, reducing the sample size on a particular hypothesis. Summapy Five hypotheses representing an Image, or co—orien— tational, unit have been presented. The testing of these hypotheses is a first step in specifying what dimensions of cognitive change are most promising under conditions of con— flict. More controlled research can then be developed by exclusive focus on internal vairations on the Dialogue mechanism. FOOTNOTES 1 Anatol Rapoport, Fights, Games, and Debates, Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 1960, p. 291. 2The difficulties in specifying the particular cog- nitive rules for relationships between dimensions of thought structures are discussed by William J. McGuire in "Theory of the Structure of Human Thought", in Theories of Cognitive Consistency: A Sourcebook, ed. Abelson, Aronson, et al., Chicago, Rand McNally, 1968. Given the untested effect of a face—to—face en— counter with a person with whom one disagrees on a salient issue, the best guess is that the negative link between A and B will lessen the effect of any imbalance caused by a lessening of this negative link. A discussion of research relating to this negative AB link in the A—B—X model can be found in Theodore Newcomb's ”Interpersonal Balance", in Theories of Cognitive Consistency: A Sourcebook. 4Charles Osgood, The Measurement of Meaning, Urbana, Illinois, University of Illinois Press, 1957. David K. Berlo, James Lemert, and Robert Mertz, "Dimensions for Evaluating the Acceptability of Message Sources”, Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol. 33, Winter, 1969, pp. 563—576. 5The use of the D statistic is perhaps not the best choice. Daniel Wackman in “A Proposal For a New Measure of Coorientational Accuracy or Empathy“, an unpublished paper presented to the Theory and Methodology Division of the Asso— ciation for Education in Journalism, Berkeley, August, 1969, makes a good case for not using the D statistic. He argues that there are response set tendencies with the measure, and that there is a possible confounding effect on projection and anti—projection biases in the subject. However, the alternative, a partial correlation measure, requires a larger number of items than was constructed for this research project. One must thus assume that the projection/anti— projection biases are randomly distributed through the two samples. Since the "other” is in fact unknown (as compared 69 70 with the image—approach used with families in Wackman's discussion) all guesses in the pre-test are projections of some type. Accuracy, then, becomes the effect of the experi- ence in overcoming "stereo-typing" tendencies. In the first part of the hypothesis, the tendency to project or anti— project should be constant since each subject acts as his own control. CHAPTER IV RESULTS The Dialogue can be important in two ways. The practitioner wants to know whether it is usable and if it is effective as a tool in ongoing situations. The researcher wishes to understand the processes by which attitudes change interpersonally and intra—personally. This chapter will discuss these dual aspects of the Dialogue——the general effect on participants, and an internal analysis of pro— cesses and patterns of these effects. The hypotheses test the increased effectiveness in conflict resolution by using Rapoport's principles as communication guidelines as compared with open communication. Supplementary data on information gain, perceived satisfac— tion, and continued commitment will also be presented. Where the first analysis concentrates on overall effects, regardless of initial individual differences and different change patterns, the second looks more closely at the initial configurations of the participants, and examines the appropriateness of the balance model for explaining attitude change in conflict situations. Problems and intri— cacies of the coorientation model will be discussed, and 71 72 conflict resolution will be discussed in terms of the balance model suggested by Newcomb. Results of Hypotheses Hypothesis One: When individuals who disagree on a salient topic communicate together in a Dialogue situation, those who perceived the inter— action as beneficial will have a positive change in attitude toward the other person significantly greater than those who did not perceive the experience as beneficial. No participants recorded negative opinions of the experience, whether in the control or experimental situations. Table 4. reveals no significant difference between control condition and experimental condition, and a Kolmorgornov— Smirnof test confirms this lack of difference. Thus, as stated, the hypothesis cannot be tested. Table 4. Attitude Towards Communication Experience Where Would You Rate the Hour's Encounter On the Following Scale? Very Very Detrimental Beneficial —5 —4 -3 —2 —l 0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 Control Experimental 73 It is possible that results between experimental and control conditions could have been explained simply in terms of the positive or negative experiences of the participants. It was possible that open communication might have led to frustration from such breakdowns as one person monopolizing the conversation, an inability to reach any ground for dis— cussion, or concentration on one controversial issue. Commu- nication breakdown between two people who disagree strongly on a salient topic seemed quite possible. Likewise, Rapoport's suggestions could have been perceived as annoying interrup— tions, for example, or as rigid structures, or their perfor— mance could have been negatively reinforcing by inability to state the other's position to his satisfaction. Thus, it was possible that a more parsimonious explanation of resolution changes could have been that one treatment was a more enjoyable experience, or that there was an erratic distribution of positive and negative reactions through the two conditions. Reports on satisfaction suggest that this did not happen. Disconfirmation of this hypothesis is thus a safeguard against attributing results to Rapoport's principles when they might simply represent the ”halo" effect of having shared a good experience. Testing of the following four hypotheses was done at the group level. That is, the dimensions were hypothe— sized to be affected by the two treatments, regardless of internal pair differences. Since the effects of the treat— 74 ments could not be expected to occur uniformly, later inter- nal analysis of individual differences and inter—relations between dimensions should suggest the appropriateness of the "Image" model of attitudes and attitude change in conflict situations. This analysis will follow the discussion of the formal hypothesis testing. Hypothesis Two a) There will be a significant positive change of attitude toward the other parti- cipant following the experimental treat— ment. The change in attitude toward the other will be significantly greater following the experimental treatment than following the control condition. Hypothesis Two b) There will be a significant change in rating of self attributed to the other in a positive direction following the experi— mental condition. This change in rating of self attributed to the other will be significantly greater in the experimental treatment than in the control condition. Eefore communication with the other person, judg— ments concerning subject's liking of the ”other person”, and how an "other" would like the subject are stereotyped responses. The "other” is an unknown and what is being judged is an image of the ”typical” opponent. After communication, the response is the partici— pant's attitude toward the specific other that he encountered. Change in response from pre—test to post—test represents movement from a stereotype to an orientation toward a particular person. 75 Factor analysis of the polar adjectives used (see Chapter Three) resulted in a one—factor solution, and the data reported in Table 2. represent changes in the summed items of the factor. Pre—test means of the control and experimental groups indicate that these participants were not hostile toward an "other" initially. The mean position is 32.8 in the control condition and 33.2 in the experimental condition. Thus, on the whole, the attitude toward a person holding the "other" position is slightly favorable (36.0 is the neutral point). Whether this represents a bias toward not expressing nega— tive estimates on questionnaires, or an indication of a peculiarity in student conflicts, or simply that volunteers separated from groups in conflict are not hostile is unknown. Regardless of the label attached to 32.8 or 33.2, change in attitude toward the specific other person was significant beyond the p<.001 level. This was true in both conditions. When the two conditions were compared, no sig- nificant differences were found (see Table 5A). In changing attitudes toward the other, open communication was as effec— tive as communication in the experimental condition, where a third party imposed communication guidelines. In Hypothesis 2b, which asks the participants to estimate what an "other" would feel towards them, the same general pattern was found. It is interesting to note the differences between Hypothesis 2a and 2b in the pre—test 76 Table 5a. Results of Tests on Hypothesis 2a: Attitude to Other Experimental Condition Control Condition Pre—test i = 33.20 Pre-test E = 32.84 Post—test E = 24.58 Post—test i = 24.68 S_ = 1.22 S_ = 1.60 D D B = 8.62 B = 8.15 t = 7.05*** t = 5.10*** df = 24 df = 19 Experimental Condition vs. Control Condition on Attitude to Other Experimental Condition Control Condition i amount of change = 8.62 Y amount of change = 8.15 N = 24 N = 19 SE = 1.98 Experimental Control = .47 t= 0.24 (n, s.) Df = 41 *** Significance beyond .001 Level 77 Table 5b. Predicted Attitude of Other to Self Experimental Condition Control Condition Pre—test R = 37.38 Pre-test i = 37.37 Post—test i = 26.45 Post—test i = 29.26 S_ = 1.90 S_ = 1.57 D D B: 10.92 B: 8.11 t = 5.75*** t = 5.15*** Experimental Condition vs. Control Condition Experimental Condition Control Condition i amount of change = 10.92 E amount of change = 8.11 N: 24 N: 19437 SE = 2.55 Experimental Control = 2.81 t = 1.10 (n. s.) Df = 41 *** Significance beyond p<.001 78 measure. Estimates of the other's attitude toward oneself were slightly more pessimistic. (In control conditions average estimate was 37.37; in experimental conditions average estimate was 37.38.) While tending to like the other slightly, the respondents tend to attribute slightly nega— tive feelings about self to the other (neutral point on the scale is 36.0). Since their own positions represent the ob— verse position, participants in conflict situations tend to underestimate attitude of other to self. Both groups again changed in a positive direction beyond the p< .001 level. (See Table 5b.) The experimental condition was not significantly more effective in producing such a change. One purpose of Rapoport's principles is to decrease the censorship of messages by reducing threat. The effect of communication, whether free or following guidelines, produced a change in attitude toward the other. It is interesting also that changes in judgment seem to have been mutual. Since both attitudes changed significantly, this could be interpreted in different ways. It may be that while dealing with content communication (ROTC issue and related topics), both were successful in communicating some aspects of their perception of the other, which was reflected in the changed estimate of the other's attitude toward self. Also a change in positive attitudes toward the other may partially be a result of a ”pleasant ..- mml no alto}: O m“ 5.1.1391?" lr 79 surprise" in finding the other more favorable toward oneself and toward one's own position than expected. These changes in attitudes toward the other across both conditions will be examined in the later analysis, when a balance model is evaluated. The "shared experience" effect was successful on the relationship level, but again Rapoport's principles were not particularly more successful. There was a trend in the corollary toward significance, approaching p< .20. Hypothesis Three: The estimate of perceived similarity will be significantly greater in the post— test measure than in the pre-test measure in the experimental condition. The experimental treatment will produce a significantly greater change in per— ceived similarity than will the control condition. The following three hypotheses deal with "content" issues. There is a distinction between the primary issue: "abolishment of ROTC from MSU campus" and the complex of items that is considered to represent a "military" view of the world. The factor analysis (See Table 3.) outlines the items in this scale, and indicates a high clustering with the issue itself. However, in the analyses of perceived similarity and accuracy estimates, the primary issue is not included. The separation is for two reasons. First of all, the participants knew that the other opposed their position (be it pro—ROTC or anti—ROTC) and they were not asked to 80 estimate this position. Secondly, the notion of illusory components in a conflict setting suggests that part of the problem comes from distortions of the position (or belief structures) attributed to members of the other group. Al— though the salient issue position is well defined, inferences about the world view of the other are possible, and inaccura- cies in these inferences concerning the other's belief struc- ture may contribute to resolution difficulties. The belief that individuals in conflict will exag- gerate the differences between them underlies the perceived similarity hypothesis. Although participants were informed that they were opposed on the ROTC issue, no information was given them about other attitudes on related issues. Esti— mates of the opponent's issue positions, then, represent a stereotyping inference of the kind of belief structure that supports the opposing position. It is expected that parties in conflict will estimate the other as more different from oneself than they, in fact, are. Table 7a. indicates that this expectation is valid, particularly in reference to the perceived difference that the anti—ROTC subjects begin with. What represents accuracy is an arbitrary measure, but the pro—ROTC members do seem to be more accurate. No differences in perceived similarity exist (by t—test for independent measures) between control and experimental pre—conditions, although the absolute position of the pro—ROTC members seems somewhat more moderate in the experimental condition. 81 The figures in Table 7a. represent the absolute pre— test positions of the participants. The hypothesis comparing treatment effects refers to changes from pre— to post— experiment. (See Table 6.) It takes the beginning position as given. No distinctions between intensity of own position and hypothesized extremity of other's position is included. This is in keeping with the testing of the Dialogue as an intervention tool where no control over these factors is likely. As discussed in Chapter III, the perceived similarity score represents the difference between one's own position and the position attributed to the other. Differences on the relevant dimensions were summed to give a perceived similarity (or a perceived difference) score. In the control condition, the participants saw them— selves 16.19 units apart. Following open communication, this perceived difference was reduced to 13.57 positions apart. (See Table 6.) In the experimental conditions, the initial perceived difference was 13.92. Following the use of the communication instructions, the difference was 11.46. Both groups show a significant difference from pre— test to post—test measurements (p< .05), but there is no significant difference between the two treatment groups concerning changes in perceived similarity. (See Table 6.) The perceived similarity dimension is a hybrid dimension, i.e., a combination of perceived position of the 82 Table 6. Increase in Perceived Similarity Experimental Condition Control Condition Pre—test i = 13.92 ‘ Pre—test i = 16.19 Post-test R = 11.46 Post-test E = 13.57 S_ = 1.14 S__= 1.10 D D B: 2.46 B: 2.62 t = 2.16 * t = 2.39* N = 26 N = 19 Experimental Condition vs. Control Condition Experimental Condition Control Condition i amount of change = 2.46 i amount of change = 2.62 N = 26 N = 19 SDm = 1.59 t = —0.12 (n.s.) df = 45 * Significance at greater than p <.05 level 83 other and one's own position. In talking about changes in perceived similarity one is actually talking about the amount of change in estimating the other's position and change in one's own position. When the discussion is phrased in amount of change as it was in the hypothesis testing, then one is talking about a span between two positions, regardless of the initial position. However, if one turns to the absolute positions, the intricacy of the perceived similarity scale becomes more evident. (See Table 7a and 7b.) Table 7a. Absolute Condition Differences in Perceived Similarity: Before Own Position Control Ex-erimental Estimate of Other's PCsition Control E oerimental Perceived Differences Control EXoerimental Actual Differences Control E oerimental 84 Table 7b. Absolute Condition Differences in Perceived Similarity: After Own Position Control E oerimental Estimate of Other's Position Control Exaerimental Perceived Differences Control Ex-erimental Actual Differences Control E oerimental The initial position represents, as far as estimates of the other is concerned, a stereotyped image, since all that the participants know is that the other is opposed to them on the specific topic of ROTC's abolishment from MSU campus. In the pre—test all except pro—ROTC members in the experimental treatment tended to overestimate their opponent's position. (See Table 7a.) By the post—test scores, this error had been substantially corrected. (See Table 7b.) 85 The perceived similarity dimension was included because of the following possibility: If participants tend to exaggerate differences in their stereotypes of the other, it is possible that a shared experience, and change in liking of the other, could lead to a minimizing of their differences. Subjects could exaggerate their agreement because they changed their attitude to the other person. An increase in positive attitude on the relationship level might overshadow the actual state of their differences on issue (content) posi— tions. This did not happen in the present study. Correc— tion in exaggeration occurred regardless of condition treat— ment, but did not over—compensate in the opposite direction. Perceived similarity is a complex dimension. In future research, the same information could more simply be described by the estimate of the other's position. HOWever, there still is a confounding factor in discussion of esti- mates of other. The participant is limited to his own perceptions. For him, there is no difference between his estimate of the other's position and the other's position, or at least, he can never establish this difference. But the third party is able to determine whether the estimates of the participants are actually in error. If the communication strategy is successful, one would not expect high inaccuracy, whether perceived as too extreme, or as too similar. 86 To the extent that Rapoport's principles worked in terms of clarifying messages and positions one would expect change toward accuracy. Given an initial extreme position, change in perceived similarity would correspond with increase in accuracy. Examination of Table 7a and 7b shows that all changes are towards increased accuracy. Whether this is re- lated to information gain or change in attitude to the other participant cannot be separated. Another problem with the perceived similarity dimen— sion is the fact that neither end of the scale is stable. If communication is affecting A's estimate of B's position, it may also be changing A's 9E2 position. In the control condition, for example, while the average estimate by the pro—ROTC participants of the anti—ROTC's position is shift— ing toward a more moderate estimate (from 10.10 to 11.60) the actual anti—ROTC position is shifting toward the more extreme position (from 12.4 to 11.18). To suggest that this represents insight into the other's position as it is changing implies very successful communication. To be a deliberate occurrence, it implies that one participant is able to observe the changes that are occurring in the other as they converse. Assuming that the participant states the position he brought to the situation, and that change would occur only after exposure to the other person and his opinion, then it is unlikely that the change would be verbalized. It is possible, but unlikely. 87 In general, then, communication with a member of an opposing group increased similarity of perceived position. Again, Rapoport's guidelines were not more effective than open communication. Hypothesis Four: The accuracy of the estimate of the other's position on related issues will be signifi— cantly greater in the post—test than in the pre—test following the experimental treatment. The experimental treatment will produce significantly more accuracy than the con— trol condition. Data in Table 8. report results from this hypothesis. Many of the arguments from discussion of Hypothesis Three are relevant here. Accuracy estimates are a product of the changes in perception of the participant, and of actual change of the other. There is a problem that occurs in the accuracy meas— urement that is not present in other dimensions being tested by the hypothesis. Issues relevant to a ”military” factor have been clustered together, and in absolute scores indi—- vidual items have been totaled to give an "issue” position. However estimates of accuracy are made item by item and inaccuracies may cancel out. In talking about accuracy, a distinction must be made between accuracy on the entire scale, and accuracy on individual items. Variance produced by specific discussion of some items and not others, and inaccuracies caused by change 88 Table 8. Increase in Accuracy of Estimate of Other's Position on "Military" Issue Experimental Condition Control Condition Pre—test I = 8.50 Pre-test x = 7.85 Post—test i = 6.65 Post-test i = 7.05 s_ = 0.60 s_= 1.0 D D B = 1.85 B = 0.80 t = 3.05** t = 0.73 df = 24 df = 19 Experimental Condition vs. Control Condition on Amount of Increase in Accuracy Experimental Condition Control Condition i amount of change = 1.85 i amount of change = .80 N = 24 N = 19 SDm = 1.16 t = 0.90 (n. 5.) df = 41 ** Significance at greater than p< .01 level 89 matching, will produce differences in accuracy on individual items. These differences in item accuracy will be hidden if the total scale is used for estimating accuracy.l Since the researcher is more interested in the pro- cesses contributing to accuracy, the more adequate measure (summed item accuracy) is used in the hypothesis testing. Depending on the practitioner's orientation, the scale accura- cy may or may not be considered sufficient. The pre-test means of the two groups (7.85 average error in control estimate and 8.50 in experimental) suggest that the two groups were not extremely inaccurate to begin with. (Table 8.) Breakdowns into pro—ROTC and anti—ROTC subsamples indicate that much of the inaccuracy occurred because anti—ROTC estimates of the pro—ROTC configuration were too extreme. In the control condition, there was not a significant improvement on this initial estimate. In the experimental condition, the increase in accuracy was significant at the p< .01 level. However, again, Table 8. indicates non— significance of the differences between the two conditions. It is on the accuracy dimension that Rapoport's principles should show most effect. Two of the three prin— ciples stress clear statements of the other's and one's own position. That this treatment effect was not larger is dis- couraging. 90 There seem to be several possibilities for the ex— planation. The first consideration is the extreme complexity of the "accuracy" measure. There are the following problems with the accuracy measure : 1. There is confusion between individual item accuracy and summed cluster accuracy. 2. The other's position is not stable. Thus, accuracy can occur by change in the other's position with no change in estimate by the participant. 3. Estimates of accuracy may or may not be infer- ences, depending upon whether the topic was talked about or simply inferred from the communi- cation. 4. Accuracy can be talked about as a group accuracy or as accuracy in respect to the actual person encountered. That is, the other individual may or may not be typical of his group position, and depending upon the chance assignment, some estimates may be accurate with regard to the "typical" other, but inaccurate with regard to the individual. 5. Chance matching can produce high accuracy to begin with. Thus, there is no way that improved accuracy could be measured. The ceiling effect from initial high accuracy prevents increase in accuracy except in low accurate cases. 6. Increase in accuracy can be confused with changes in estimates of the other's issue position due to increased liking on the rela— tionship dimensions. Second, it is possible that participants in open communication may have used some of the same communication techniques as those suggested by Rapoport. It is also 91 possible that the suggestions did not "take“, and the parti- cipants were not able to follow the directions of the third party. It may be that the operationalization of the prin- ciples as communication guidelines was in error. Or it may be that Rapoport's theory of increasing information gain by using these approaches springs from a misconception of mental systems, and how they operate in conflict situations. Rapoport's principles did have some effect. However, although there was significant difference between pre- and post—test measures in the experimental treatment, this increase was not very large and was not significantly greater than the control condition. Hypothesis Five: In the experimental treatment, there will be a significant difference in attitude toward the issue and related issues between post—test and pre-test measures. This difference will be in the direction of the moderate end of the scale. The amount of attitude change in the ex- perimental treatment will be greater than in the control condition. Whether tested with the particular issue, (abolish— ment of ROTC), or whether tested in terms of the military configuration, neither group showed significant attitude change from pre—test to post-test situations, nor was there any significant difference between experimental and control conditions. Change on the issue was virtually non—existent. 92 On the initial polarized opinions, it is not expected that a central attitude on a salient issue would change with one hour's encounter. As a resolution mechanism, the Dialogue did not, in this study, attempt to change issues, as much as to reduce components that hindered identifying the issues. The cluster of attitudes related to the main issue was more likely to change, if for no other reason than that they did not turn out to be as extreme as the actual abolish— ment position marked on the volunteer form. However, if the ROTC issue represents a basic value difference between groups, then the position would not be expected to change for two reasons. As set up, without commitment and removed from the group context, the Dialogue was meant to reduce illusory com— ponents rather than to resolve legitimate issue differences. Second, the values that were being discussed would likely be anchored in relationships with significant others. Thus, change in attitude toward a relative stranger and increased awareness might not be expected to shift a central belief or value. A discussion of predictions from balance models concerning changes on dimensions of the attitude cluster will be discussed briefly in a later section of this chapter. Summary of Hypothesis Testing Two conditions were tested. In the control condi- tion there was open communication between two participants who were opposed on the issue of ROTC's abolishment from 93 campus. In the experimental treatment, participants' communi— cation was guided by three suggestions derived from Rapoport's analysis of debate conflicts. No significant difference be- tween the two conditions occurred on any of the five dimen- sions. Significant differences between pre—test and post- test measures were found on attitudes toward the other (Hypothesis 2a and 2b), and to a lesser extent on the per- ceived similarity dimension. The testing of the hypothesis at the condition level means that for the practitioner, on the whole, he will get equal success either way. Face to face communication made a difference on three of the five dimensions, and communica— tion using Rapoport's guidelines on four of the five dimen— sions. The practitioner can expect a reduction in illusion, but not any direct shift in issue position. Using Rapoport's suggestions may represent a refinement, but not a signifi— cant improvement over open communication. As perceived by the participants, the experience is a beneficial one. (See Table 4.) In addition, virtually all participants reported that they felt they understood the other's position better than before and that the other understood their position better than before. (See Table 9.) This effect was stronger in the experimental condition respondents than in the control pairs, although not statis— tically stronger. 94 ouommm sane mmmq £052 mnemom QMSB mmmq wnowmm cage mmmq mapflwfiam muowmm GMSB Hwepwm oz wuowmm Gag? wHOmmm QMSB umuumm mausmflam Hmuumm mausmaam whomwm whomwm CMfiB MO##mm QMSB HODDOm whomwm QMQB wuowom cage Monumm £052 >Hm Hmnwmm £052 mnw Hmucwfiflsmoxm Houpcoo Hmucmfiflnooxm Hospsoo cosuawom ME mtqmumnwcss on nmgu Homm H Goapamom mfl£ ccmumnmccs H panu Hwom H .Dsmmfloflvumg “0:00 0:9 SpMS msfixamw “mums .psmgfloflpumm soapo mgg £“H3 msaxamu nonm< meOHMHQ mo #Hmmsom ©®>flmouwm .m mance 95 Some commitment to further communication was achieved. Forty of the forty-four who responded to the question: "would you be willing to meet with the other participant for another hour sometime in the future if a convenient time can be found?", indicated that they would be willing to meet again. Thirty—nine of forty-four indicated a willingness to be interviewed together at a later date. This was in re— sponse to the question: "It may happen that WMSB would like to interview people who have taken part in this project. Would you mind being interviewed to ether?". Finally, Table 10. indicates that about half of the participants per— ceived some progress in reducing their disagreement. Data from the accuracy hypothesis suggest that this perceived progress is a correction in initial estimates rather than representing actual attitude change. The Dialogue is worthwhile to the practitioner as a setting in which individuals can communicate apart from the group conflict in which they are involved. The present study offered no monetary incentive and was conducted late in spring term as examination time approached. Yet indi- viduals were willing to volunteer. The presence of a third party sponsoring the Dialogue suggests that the label "Dialogue" may serve a legitimizing function for people to get together where previously there was no acceptable chan— nel. A more detailed discussion of these advantages can be found in Chapter V. 96 Table 10. Perceptions of Pair Positions Following Dialogue WMSB would like to interview students with different experiences in the encounter. Fill out which category you think best describes your position as a pair. Control E oerimental pair that disagrees with each other more strongly than when they began. pair that disagrees with each other just as strongly as before. A pair that disagrees with each other less strongly than before. pair who feels that they now both have changed to the same position. pair who feels that only one person has changed to the other's position. 97 Advantages (ease and feasibility) for the practi— tioner are drawbacks for the researcher. The amount of variation within treatments contributed to the lack of sig— nificance between treatments. Since the participants were admitted on the basis only of their attitude toward the ROTC conflict, they were not matched on any characteristic. It is clear that the effects were not uniformly successful. In attempting to explain why certain outcomes occurred, the data can be analyzed at different levels, and, if the initial positions differed, in terms of different "Images" brought to the situation. Accuracy States of Participants The Dialogue simply brought participants together for an hour. The goal was to begin developing a practical intervention mechanism that could be used "in the field", and to discover which internal communication variations had most success in promoting desirable outcomes. Using Rapoport's principles as communication guidelines did not significantly increase the effects of open communication. However, due to the uncontrolled matching of the subjects, and the range of communication events possible, other patterns may be present which point to a systematic effect on the outcomes. Participants were volunteers whose only known characteristic was their opposition to each other on the 98 ROTC issue. They may not have been similar on other dimen— sions. Many variables may be important. Personality charac— teristics may have significantly influenced communication and attitude change. Communication skills may have changed outcomes. In this study, it was not possible to deal with these combinations, and at the time of data collection, many of the conceptual problems had not been clearly foreseen. In any case, in most conflict situations, the practitioner would not likely have control over these variables, but would have to deal with the participant characteristics as they happened to exist in the particular problem he is called upon to resolve. As well, a method of study that tries to use "live" conflicts while they are still salient in the larger community may be limited in variation by the number of subjects available. It is still possible, by examining the pre—test ques— tionnaires, to see if different mental configurations were initially present. If communication is taken as a constant (since no difference was revealed between conditions), then different outcomes may be explained as a function of different reactions to the situation as a result of these differing initial orientations. It was assumed that perceptual conflicts involved some way of looking at the world which, if changed, would help resolve the conflict. Within perceptual conflicts, 99 two dynamics, issue and illusory, were suggested as heuris— tic frameworks for separating different types of pressures that prevented resolution. This study was intended as a beginning investigation of methods of reducing illusory com— ponents of conflict. As far as most participants are concerned, they know what the conflict is about, and what the other's posi— tion is. But, for the third party, if each participant de- fines the conflict differently and cannot articulate a rela— tion between means and ends for his own strategy, then there is a reasonable chance that there are areas of distortion which could be reduced to clarify the ”real" issues between the participants. In this case, three major distortions may have been present initially: (1) The prediction of the other's atti— tude toward oneself may have been in error; (2) One's attitude toward the other may have been sufficiently nega- tive to interfere with a rational dealing with the issue; (2) Prediction of the other's "view of the world” may have been in error. It is possible to estimate these three dimensions. There was a consistent distortion on the first dimension in this study. Most participants underestimated the positive attitude of the other to oneself. The mean ”liking” for the other was 33.05 (See Table 5a.), but the mean estimate of the other's liking for oneself was 37.42. (See Table 5b.) 100 Since these are the obverse of each other (A's estimate is of B's position, and vice versa), they tended in general to be inaccurate. This inaccuracy did not change much in post— test estimates. Although the estimates of the other's atti— tude toward self increased significantly, it still remained as different from one's attitude toward the other as it was in the pre—test. While making a significant gain relative to one's attitude to the other, the estimate of the other's feelings about oneself did not gain. The attitude to the other was not negative in this study. The.average position on attitude toward the other was slightly favorable-neutral. (See Table 5a). Across almost all subjects there was an increase in favorable attitude to the other. However, the initial attitude toward the other was not hostile. Both relationship dimensions (dimensions that deal with attitude toward the other) changed significantly (p‘<.001), but the accuracy dimension was not so successful. The range(3feffectiveness in the accuracy dimension permits an examination of the effect of accuracy, both as an initial position, and as a change that occurred for some subjects and not others. By dividing subjects into high and low accurates on the pre—test, we can examine whether: a) Accuracy levels make a difference in effect of communication. b) Changes in accuracy have accompanying effects on other dimensions. 101 An image—based approach implies a relation between dimensions. For example, Rapoport's principles imply that if trust can be increased (relationship change), then change in attitude on the issue (content level) is more likely be— cause of a reduction in threat through evidence of good will by the other person.2 By looking at the accuracy estimates, and their relative error and change, some data bearing on the relation between content and relationship dimensions may develop.3 Although increasing accuracy of estimate of other's position is not equivalent to "understanding” the other's position, it is a first step. Differing accuracy levels could be important for three reasons. First, differing initial accuracies mean that for some cases there will be no way of measuring in— crease in accuracy. There is a ceiling effect on what communi— cation could accomplish. Second, differing accuracy estimates may reflect different configurations of attitudes. For example, an individual who is highly accurate may also be more favorable toward the other and less suspicious of the other's attitude to himself than those who inaccurately estimate the other's position. Third, the experience of discovering one's error is open only to the inaccurate, and when this error is dis- covered, the increase in accuracy may be accompanied by other effects. 102 In this analysis, high—accurate refers to those participants who are in the top half of the distribution, both in total scale accuracy, and individual item accuracy. Presumably,high—accuratesshould not change if communication is successful. Any major shift can only be away from accuracy. One might want to assume some reaction confirming one's expectations, but this is beyond measure— ment. For low—accurates there is possibility of a signifi- cant increase in accuracy. If the other's position (X) is part of an ”image”, as Rapoport's discussion implies, then changes on this dimension may have effects on other dimen— sions. Successful communication with low-accurate partici— pants would be indicated by increase in accuracy. Thus, in the present study, successful communication could only be measured on low—accurates. Examination of those who increase in accuracy should give more precision to the data reported in Hypothesis Four. (See Table 10.) Note that ”accuracy” is an observer's construct, since it requires an ability to compare the "actual" posi— tion of B with A's estimate. In this study, accuracy is partly a matter of chance, depending on whether the other individual is a "typical" representative of the other group's position, or whether B's deviancy from that position happens to parallel the inaccuracy of A's estimate. Subjects were not matched on accuracy and it is possible that an individual may be quite accurate concerning 103 the other group position, but turn out to be inaccurate in respect to the individual he is matched with. A discrepancy between individual and group accuracy is not important when trying to ascertain effects of inaccuracy, and of the effects of increases in accuracy, but would be important for the practical goal of reducing conflict. One further distinction in accuracy needs to be made. A person may be inaccurate by projecting too great a difference between himself and the other, or he may be inac— curate by over-estimating the similarity of the other's position with his own. Similarly, a person may be accurate in instances where they are, in fact, quite similar, or in instances where they are, in fact, quite dissimilar on their attitudes toward the issue. Thus, two kinds of accuracy and two kinds of inaccuracy will be coded in Table 11. High-accurate (extreme) will refer to the subset of accuracy instances where the participant correctly predicts the other's position on the issue complex, and the correctly perceived difference between them is greater than the average difference between the pro—ROTC and anti—ROTC groups as a whole. An example of high—accurate (extreme) would be a pair where a particularly doctrinaire ROTC member predicts that the anti—ROTC participant will be opposite to him on all dimensions of a military view of the world, and in fact, the individual whom he meets in the Dialogue does turn out to be extremely opposed to ROTC on campus; and with a different View of the world leading to that judgment. 104 High-accurate (moderate) refers to those cases where both are less committed to the average group position on military outlooks to the world. That is, they are closer to each other on their world view than the typical pair, al- though they disagree strongly on the specific item of ROTC's position on campus. Low—accuracy (extreme) refers to those instances where the participant (A) predicts the other (B) is very different from himself, when in fact, the other is much closer to A's viewpoint than he predicted. Low—accuracy (moderate) refers to those instances where A predicts B is quite similar to himself when, in fact, B's orientation is quite different than A's. Data is reported in Table 11. Pre—test and Post— test Categories contain different individuals. Individuals who became inaccurate (3) were moved to the Low—Accurate category, while individuals who became accurate (8) were moved to a ”Changer” category. If the effect of correcting accuracy had any effect on other dimensions, then ”changers" sflnould differ from those who remained the same on the aaccuracy dimension. The low number of post—test inaccurates prevented a division into extreme and moderate categories. In the pre-test state, different levels of accuracy do not distinguish participants on any dimension except accuracy. Table 11. indicates little difference in any of the four sub-groups on their attitude to the other and 105 Hm.mm mo.mm NN.>N HH.mN AOH H09 4 Hmpwfi fiv.WM HO mm Hh.om oo.wm h.mN HH.©m muo on h.mm mm