CHOICE AND PERCEIVED AUDIENCE
ATTITUDE AS DETERMINANTS OF
COGNITIVE DISSONANCE AND
SUBSEQUENT ATTITUDE CHANGE
FOLLOWING COUNTERATTITUDINAL ADVOCACY

Thesis for the Degree of Ph. D.
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EDWARD M. BODAKEN
1970





This is to certify that the

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CHOICE AND PERCEIVED AUDIENCE ATTITUDE AS DETERMINANTS
OF COGNITIVE DISSONANCE AND SUBSEQUENT ATTITUDE
CHANGE FOLLOWING COUNTERATTITUDINAL ADVOCACY

presented by

Edward M. Bodaken

has been accepted towards fulfillment of the requirements for

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















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by Edward M. Bodaken

This study sought to assess the effects of choice and audience commitment on attitude change following encoding of counterattitudinal communications.

Students enrolled in undergraduate communication courses at Michigan State University were administered a pretest attitude questionnaire containing several issues considered to be salient and ego-involving for university students. The issue producing the most skewed distribution called for compulsory on-campus residency for all college students; thus, it was chosen as the experimental issue.

Subjects were randomly assigned to experimental conditions. Approximately two weeks after the pretest, experimental subjects encoded counteratitudinal essays under varying conditions of choice and audience attitude toward the issue. Post-encoding measures were then taken of each subject's attitude toward the issue and the perceived difficulty in encoding the essay. The effectiveness of each manipulation was assessed by asking subjects to respond to items tapping subjects' perceptions of choice and audience attitude toward the topic. Subjects in a control condition completed pretest and posttest instruments.

The choice variable was dichotomized into Free Choice and No Choice levels. Subjects in the Free Choice conditions were informed of

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their freedom to comply at specified points in the experimental induction. Subjects in the No Choice conditions were not given such freedom.

Audience attitude toward the topic was dichotomized into Committed Audience and Uncommitted Audience levels. Subjects in the Uncommitted Audience conditions were told that their essays would be presented to an audience composed of high school students who held no opinion on the experimental issue. Subjects in the Committed Audience conditions were told that their essays would be presented to an audience composed of high school students who favored the proposition that all college students should be required to live on campus.

The major dependent variable, attitude change, was measured by use of subjects' pretest to posttest attitude change ratings of the topic on four, seven-interval semantic differential-type scales. In addition, the counterattitudinal messages were analyzed on measures of persuasiveness, organization, attitudinal direction, and essay length.

Three hypotheses were tested in this investigation: First, that attitude change would be significantly greater in Free Choice than in No Choice conditions; second, that subjects in the Free Choice: Uncommitted Audience condition would demonstrate significantly greater attitude change than individuals in all other conditions; and third, that attitude change demonstrated by individuals in the No Choice: Committed Audience condition would be significantly less than change demonstrated by subjects in all other conditions.

The results failed to confirm the research hypotheses. However, a significant audience effect was found, indicating that subjects who statione attitude triang the topic and distributed anto

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greater than those subjects who encoded such messages for a committed
audience. Analyses performed on message persuasiveness, organization,
and encoding difficulty failed to demonstrate differences among the
experimental groups. Judgments by independent raters indicated that
the essays were counterattitudinal for the subjects. Finally, analysis
of essay length revealed that subjects in the Uncommitted Audience
conditions wrote significantly longer messages than did those of the
Committed Audience conditions.

Analyses of subjects' ratings indicated that the levels of choice were successfully manipulated. The manipulation of audience attitude was successful in all experimental conditions except the No Choice: Committed cell.

The results were discussed in light of dissonance formulations and a number of suggestions were offered for future research in counterattitudinal advocacy. an Kuluma en enweett for energies had an half of profession. A systemonal final the profession research en energies of the control of the control of the wife two control of the control

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By e

Edward M. Bodaken

A THESIS

Submitted to Michigan State University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

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1970



Accepted by the faculty of the Department of Communication, College of Communication Arts, Michigan State University, in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Doctor of Philosophy degree.

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
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DEDICATION

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
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Statement of the Problem

Generally, investigators concerned with counterattitudinal advocacy have concentrated on the effects of varying amounts of incentives used to induce a subject to encode a belief-discrepant communication. The foundation for such research can be found in Festinger's (1957) original formulation of the relationship between the amount of incentives and the magnitude of dissonance.

the magnitude of the reward or punishment, that is, the attractiveness and desirability of the offered reward or the unpleasantness and the undesirability of the threatened punishment is an important determinant of the magnitude of dissonance which exists once compliance is exhibited. Too great a reward or punishment will result in only little dissonance. (p. 91)

Taken collectively, the results of the many studies investigating the relationship between justification and attitude change are far from conclusive. For example, the classic Festinger and Carlsmith (1959) investigation demonstrating an inverse relationship between the two variables was replicated by Cohen (1962), reversed by Janis and Gilmore (1965), and methodologically decimated by Rosenberg (1965).

Central to Festinger's (1957) theory of cognitive dissonance is the variable of choice. It is only when the individual makes a choice that he experiences dissonance. Festinger writes:



after having made the decision he is no longer in conflict; he has made his choice; he has, so to speak, resolved the conflict. He is no longer being pushed in two or more directions simultaneously. He is now committed to the chosen course of action. It is only here that dissonance exists, and the pressure to reduce this dissonance is not pushing the person in two directions simultaneously. (p. 39)

From this formulation, it follows that the amount of dissonance and the subsequent attitude change are functions of the extent of the individual's commitment to the chosen course of action. For if the individual feels no real commitment to or involvement in the choice, the decision will produce little dissonance. On the other hand, if the individual has freedom of choice, one would expect a positive relationship between commitment and dissonance. Brehm and Cohen (1962) suggest that an individual's perception of control over his own behavior is a mediating variable in generating greater dissonance. They term this perception, or feeling, volition, and they define it as the "conscious control of one's own behavior." (p. 201) Volition also fixes responsibility for the consequences of an act. Stated another way, if an individual feels that he freely engaged in behavior with harmful or unpleasant consequences for himself or others, the magnitude of dissonance should be positively related to the degree of volition and the perceived potential harm of the behavior.

Presumably, most dissonance experiments have offered subjects some choice as to whether or not they will perform belief-discrepant behaviors. Generally, however, the choice, or volition, operational procedures are not replicated from one study to another. For example, the method of cajoling subjects to perform in the Festinger and

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Carlsmith (1959) study (e.g. "It will only take a few minutes.") was quite different from the method employed by Janis and Gilmore (1965). In the latter study, subjects were visited in their dormitories by the experimenters. It seems reasonable to assume that subjects in such a situation would perceive less threat or force than the Festinger and Carlsmith psychology laboratory setting. At any rate, the role of choice in counterattitudinal advocacy is obscured by the paucity of reproducible manipulations.

Moreover, investigators have not systematically tapped the consequences dimension of the chosen alternative. Collins (1969) suggests that dissonance may exist if an individual feels personally responsible for potential harmful or aversive consequences. Aronson (1968) states that it is incorrect to say that the cognitions, "I believe the task was dull," and "I told someone the task was interesting," are dissonant. Rather, the following represent dissonant cognitions: "I am a decent truthful human being," and "I have misled a person; I have conned him into believing something which just isn't true; he thinks that I really believe it and I cannot set him straight because I probably won't see him again." (p. 24) If one adds the cognition, "I freely chose to engage in misleading behavior," dissonance should be greater.

The preceding discussion suggests a reformulation of the justification-attitude change question. The overriding concerns for an individual faced with a choice may be his perceived freedom of choice and the consequences of his act. Furthermore, the choice itself may serve as a reinforcing contingency for the act, so that justification may be subsumed by choice. Existing research on counterattitudinal advocacy

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has not focused on the relationship between freedom of choice and possible aversive outcomes for a source's audience. The present study is designed to test such a relationship.

Review of Relevant Research

<u>Choice</u> Nearly a decade ago, Cohen (1960) indicated that the perception of commitment to choice could serve as a necessary precondition for the creation of dissonance;

Where choice is varied, expectations from dissonance theory are fulfilled only under high-choice conditions; under low-choice conditions, straightforward motivational or resistance effects seem to account for the results. (p. 306)

More recently, Collins (1968) has termed the manipulation of choice the "classical dissonance manipulation." (p. 822) The following discussion will focus on research which has yielded results relevant to the role of choice in producing dissonance.

Cohen, Brehm, and Fleming (1958) hypothesized that the greater the justification the less the magnitude of dissonance and subsequent attitude change. Relevant to this discussion is their rationale for failure to confirm the study's hypothesis:

All Ss in both conditions complied. It may thus be inferred that the general force to comply was very compelling, and little attitude change is therefore to be expected. (p. 277)

In fact, the instructions given subjects by Cohen et al. were very persuasive and emphasized such factors as the positive qualities of considering the other side of the issue, the benefits to research, and the fairness of the task. This type of justification manipulation tends to reduce the individual's perceived choice. But, more importantly,



it provides the subject with an intellectual exercise which minimizes commitment and thus lessens dissonance.

Brehm and Cohen (1959) directly manipulated the variable of choice in an attempt to answer two questions: Can a chance event affect the magnitude of dissonance?; and Does the effect of such a chance event depend upon there having been a prior relevant choice. They hypothesized that under greater degrees of choice, increasing relative deprivation results in increasing satisfaction. Subjects were told that an experiment was being conducted and that the task involved was not very interesting (copying random numbers). Schedule sheets were then distributed so subjects could indicate their free hours. In the high choice condition, subjects were told that if necessary they could be excused; in the low choice condition, subjects were not told of the possibility of being excused. The schedule sheets were collected and subjects were given a questionnaire ostensibly to evaluate the general issue of participation in research. Relative deprivation conditions were induced through the questionnaire instructions. Subjects were told that while most persons would receive payment for the work, a few randomly chosen people would receive nothing. The instructions concluded by noting that the subject would or would not receive payment depending on whether a check-mark appeared on an appropriate line. All subjects were led to believe that they would receive no payment. In the low relative deprivation condition, subjects were told that those being paid would receive \$1.00; in the high relative deprivation condition, the amount was \$10.00.

Manipulation checks indicated a significant difference between deprivation conditions but no significant difference between choice to ending the ending of the lateral services of the national services of the installation of the translation of the endings of the translation of the endings of the control of the translation of the end of the control of the control of the end of the en

conditions. The researchers then analyzed the data according to perceived choice. Under conditions of low perceived choice, the more relative deprivation, the more negative were attitudes toward the <u>fait accompli</u>; while under conditions of high perceived choice, the more relative deprivation the more positive were attitudes toward the <u>fait accompli</u>.

This choice manipulation would seem to be entirely consistent with Cohen's (1960) thesis concerning the extent to which self-selection becomes a problem when subjects are able to refuse to participate. He argues for presenting the illusion of choice but cautions against letting the subject leave the experiment. The difficulties experienced by Brehm and Cohen (1959) in presenting such an illusion forced them to analyze the data on the basis of subjects' perceptions rather than experimental assignment. Therefore, their findings are, by admission, somewhat equivocal.

A different approach to the problem of choice was taken by Brock (1962). Incorporating Zajonc's (1954, 1960) cognitive structure measurements and Festinger's (1957) theory, Brock was interested in the effects of choice and confrontation on subsequent attitude change. Subjects were administered questionnaires on the issue of conversion to Catholicism. In addition to the questionnaire, each subject completed the following sentence on 16 slips of paper: "For me becoming a Catholic would mean:." After completing the sentences subjects were asked to group the slips of paper. Also, they were asked to specify relations (bonds) among the slips. One week later, subjects were contacted and asked to participate in a follow-up study on the issue. The task (an essay on "Why I would

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like to become a Catholic.") was presented to subjects and the choice inductions were administered. Subjects in the high choice condition were told that the task was voluntary and that they were under no obligation to write the essays. Each subject was asked individually to participate and each said "Yes" at least once. Subjects in the low choice condition were not given this option. High confrontation was established by asking the subjects, after they had written the essays, to rewrite them, ranking the sentences in terms of their originality and persuasiveness. Subjects in the low confrontation condition were told to rewrite their essays according to a syllables chart.

Manipulation checks indicated that high choice subjects reported significantly less obligation and more option than low choice subjects. Subjects in the high confrontation condition reported significantly more awareness of meaning and more deliberation than low confrontation subjects. Also, the results indicated that more attitude change was obtained under high than under low choice conditions. Finally, given high choice, more favorable revaluation occurred under high than under low confrontation; given low choice, the effect was reversed. These findings support a positive relationship between choice and attitude change. Moreover, the interaction finding suggests that when an individual is forced to perform a belief-discrepant act under conditions of confrontation, he will resist a revaluation of cognitions in the counterattitudinal direction.

Linder, Cooper, and Jones (1967) attempted to resolve the contradictory findings of the Cohen (1962) and Rosenberg (1965) studies, claiming that the latter study failed to offer the subject freedom not to comply. Rosenberg's investigation attempted to eliminate evaluation



apprehension on the part of the subject by separating the beliefdiscrepant task and the evaluation of the attitude object. When Rosenberg introduced this methodological change, he found an incentive effect: attitude change and justification were positively related.

Linder et al. (1967) argued that Rosenberg's findings could not be compared with Cohen's because different conditions existed. Furthermore, they claimed that the crucial difference between the Cohen and Rosenberg studies was the freedom not to comply. Therefore, they conducted two experiments to determine the effects of choice in interaction with justification.

In the first experiment, similar to Cohen's (1962), subjects were assigned to conditions of high or low incentive (\$2.50 or fifty cents), and no-choice or free-choice. In the free-choice condition subjects were told that the decision to perform the task was their own and they could leave if they desired. In the no-choice conditions, no mention was made of such freedom. Analysis revealed a positive relationship between attitude change and incentive in the no-choice conditions and a negative relationship in the free-decision conditions. Linder et al. demonstrated the possibility of testing both dissonance and incentive predictions within the same paradigm. They also demonstrated that the effectiveness of testing these theories rests on the importance of choice in compliance.

The second experiment attempted to illustrate that a more precise method existed for removing evaluation apprehension from an experiment. The variables remained the same, but the design was changed to a replication of Rosenberg's (1965) method. Linder et al. claimed that subjects

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in the Rosenberg study found it difficult not to comply because of various commitments they made. In Rosenberg's study the subject strengthened his commitment to participate in "another little experiment." Linder et al. eliminated this possibility in Experiment II by indicating to the subjects before they moved to the other experiment that they did not have to participate. Subjects were asked to write essays in favor of in loop parentis regulations. Analysis of the results revealed a significant inverse relationship within the free-decision conditions. Within prior commitment conditions a significant positive relationship was found.

Taken together, these two experiments strongly indicate that decision freedom is an important determinant of dissonance under conditions of counterattitudinal advocacy. Moreover, it seems plausible to conclude that, all other things equal, the greater the freedom to encode belief-discrepant communications, the greater the dissonance and subsequent attitude change.

Audience Attitude Toward the Topic The implication underlying dissonance arousal in such studies as Festinger and Carlsmith (1959) is that "Holding an opinion implies telling it to an interested party."

(Abelson, 1968, p. 130) The notion here is that the arousal of dissonance and the choice of an appropriate mode of reduction are not processes that can be limited to the circumstances explicitly defined in the experimental paradigm. Whether the subject is encoding belief-discrepant essays or delivering a counterattitudinal speech before a video tape camera, he will probably be aware of some consequences of his behavior.

If his communication is perceived to be anonymous, the aversive conse-



quences should be perceived as minimal. Carlsmith (1968) asserts:

anytime a person makes some statement counter to his attitudes, and a listener (whose opinion is important to the speaker) is unaware of both the speaker's attitudes and his motivation for speaking against these attitudes, dissonance will be aroused. (p. 806)

Thus, if a subject perceives his audience to be persuasible and unaware of his private opinions, dissonance should exist. The present study will not be concerned directly with the private-public aspects of a counterattitudinal act. Conflicting evidence from several studies suggest that this variable may confound more than anything else.


Collins (1969) concludes his review of research in the area of public-private encoding as follows:

The . . results lead me to abandon the notion that the public-private dimension is the crucial one for the production of a dissonance, negative relationship between financial inducement and attitude change. (b. 218)

While this conclusion refers to financial incentives, there is no reason to think that the absence of such incentives and the manipulation of choice and audience attitude will serve to clarify the publicprivate dimension.

Inextricably bound to a consideration of research relating to consequences of belief-discrepant behavior is the relevance of the selfconcept. Bramel (1968) suggests that the self is affected as a result of concern for what others may think. He writes:

The theoretical relevance of the self in this view of dissonance theory now becomes clearer. . . dissonance is a feeling of personal unworthiness (a type of anxiety) traceable to rejection of oneself by other people either in the present or in the past. Any information which implies that one is incompetent or immoral arouses dissonance. The reason dissonance is greatest when the person feels personally responsible for his behavior is



that rejection by other people is usually greatest when they believe the person voluntarily acted in an appropriate way. (p. 365)

Therefore, of interest in self-persuasion research are results suggesting the importance of self and its implications for the perception of possible harmful effects that may occur as a result of the counterattitudinal behavior.

Carlsmith, Collins, and Helmreich (1966) manipulated role playing, experimenter bias, and monetary incentives to test dissonance and incentive theory predictions in the same paradigm. Subjects were asked to strike out certain digits in several booklets of random numbers. After an hour, subjects engaged in either essay writing or role-playing conditions. In the former, the subject was instructed to write essays detailing the interesting aspects of the experiment. He was told that no other subjects would read the essays, that the experimenter would use them as source material. In the role-playing condition, the subject was asked to describe the task as interesting to a waiting student (confederate). In both conditions, subjects were told that since the experimenter was "in a bind" and needed help, he could pay them (fifty cents, \$1.50, \$5.00). After completing the task, the subject was led to another room under the guise of participating in a different research project and posttest measures were obtained.

Carlsmith $\underline{\text{et}}$ $\underline{\text{al.}}$. hypothesized a dissonance effect in the roleplaying condition: the greatest attitude change should occur in the fifty cent condition. An incentive effect was predicted for the essay writing condition: the greatest attitude change should occur in the \$5 condition. Results confirmed both hypotheses. Relevant to this discussion was the affirm on dringing tolking opposite the fundation to

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the finding that increased pressure for compliance yielded less attitude change in the role-playing condition. These researchers suggest that the social consequences of the role-playing were much more dissonant-producing because the subject believed the audience (the confederate) perceived him as sincere when he described the dull task as exciting, interesting, and enjoyable. Major methodological differences preclude a great deal of reliance on the findings. For example, the subjects in the role-playing condition were given two minutes to describe the task as compared to the maximum 17 minutes allowed in the essay condition. According to the authors, subjects in the role-playing condition performed under more "hectic" or "crisis" circumstances than essay subjects. At any rate, there is some basis for concluding that implications of social consequences deriving from the belief-discrepant act are determinants of dissonance.

More relevant to the notion of harmful consequences as a determinant of dissonance is the Helmreich and Collins (1968) study in which financial inducement and commitment were manipulated. Subjects were given a card with several arguments supporting the proposition that family size should be limited by the government. Subjects were assigned to one of three commitment conditions: no-takeback video, takeback video, anonymous audio. In the no-takeback condition, subjects were instructed to deliver a speech on videotape. Furthermore, they were not instructed to tell anyone their reasons for recording the speech nor their private opinions. Subjects in the takeback condition were told the audience who would see the speech would be debriefed and were asked to make a second tape telling the audience why they made the tape and revealing their

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true private opinions. Subjects in the anonymous audio condition were asked to perform the counterattitudinal task, but they were told their names were not needed. Financial inducement was either fifty cents or \$2.50.

The findings supported Helmneich and Collins! first hypothesis: a disconance effect was obtained in the no-takehack video condition Their second prediction was not confirmed: there was no difference between the two video conditions. However, with inducement conditions collapsed the no-takeback video condition was significantly higher (more favorable rost-task rating) than the takeback video and the anonymous audio conditions. Thus, this study supports the assertion that subjects who are strongly (publicly) committed to a belief-discrepant act experience dissonance. Moreover, the manipulation used to induce the levels of commitment was handled in such a manner that subjects believed the tapes would actually be used to change the attitudes of others. Subjects in the no-takeback condition experienced dissonance because they were faced with cognitions relating not only to the performance of beliefdiscrepant behavior, but also the knowledge that their arguments would be used to persuade others. In addition, they may have perceived that they would not be able to tell the audience their real positions on the issue. Added together, these cognitions could create a magnitude of dissonance that would be reduced by subsequent attitude change.

Steiner and Darroch (1969) had subjects deliver short counterattitudinal speeches opposing draft deferments for college students. Public and private role assignment and agreeing and disagreeing audiences were the independent variables. Relationships between attitude change and subjective appraisal of performance were examined. No significant



differences were reported, but one finding that approached significance is of interest. As noted earlier, subjects who believe that their audience is unaware of their motives or real opinions should experience greater attitude change than those who are allowed to take back their acts.

Steiner and Darroch's findings reveal just the opposite trend (p < .10): subjects who were privately assigned (audience unaware of position) demonstrated less attitude change than those publicly assigned (audience aware of position). It should be noted that encoding time was not controlled: the speeches varied from one-half minute to seven minutes. Nevertheless, this trend is at odds with the Carlsmith et al. (1966) conclusion that subjects who deceive an audience concerning their true beliefs should experience more dissonance than subjects who do not engage in such deception.

A recent study by Nel, Helmreich, and Aronson (1969) offers dramatic support for an aversive consequences position. These researchers varied financial incentives (fifty cents, \$5), and audience attitude toward the topic (opposed, in favor, no opinion). Subjects were given a card with several arguments advocating the counterattitudinal issue (legalization of marijuna) and instructed to deliver the speech on video tape. Nel et al. hypothesized: (a) when addressing an audience of uncommitted individuals, subjects undergo more attitude change in a low inducement condition than in a high inducement condition; (b) the strongest negative effect (i.e., dissonance) will be in the uncommitted audience condition; and (c) the condition most likely to have a positive relationship between attitude change and financial inducement is the condition where the audience is already committed to the position advocated. While subsequent analysis failed to yield significance, some a

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<u>priori</u> comparisons indicated that a significant difference existed between the fifty cents and \$5.00 uncommitted audience conditions. The interactions were nonsignificant. The most relevant finding for this discussion concerns the inverse relationship in the uncommitted condition. Nel et al. conclude:

Our reasoning was that the anticipated evil results of the subject's counterattitudinal advocacy should be most damaging to the self-concept when the behavior is elicited under conditions of minimal justification and should lead to dissonance reduction through internalization of the advocated communication. (p. 124)

Some possible procedural difficulties may have militated against more consistent support of the hypotheses. First, subjects were given little indication of choice until after they had agreed to perform the task. That is, using a two-experiment guise, subjects complied with "Experimenter 2" and moved to another room. This commitment was then rewarded by the fifty cent or \$5.00 incentive. Secondly, the use of a prepared speech outline could have influenced the results, for subjects in the committed conditions might not think it worthwhile to incorporate any new arguments into the outline. By contrast, those in the uncommitted condition could well be persuaded more by the prepared arguments than by the encoding act itself. In other words, a direct persuasive effect could occur when subjects are given several important arguments.

Nevertheless, Nel $\underline{\mathbf{et}}$ $\underline{\mathbf{al}}$. have provided support, albeit equivocal, of the consequences position. Moreover, their operationalization of audience attitude is a worthwhile methodological addition to the self-persuasion research.

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Rationale and Hypotheses

Based on the research findings which demonstrate a positive relationship between choice and dissonance in a counterattitudinal encoding task, the following hypothesis will be tested:

H₁: Persons encoding counterattitudinal communications under conditions of free choice will demonstrate greater attitude change in the direction of the position taken in the communication than persons encoding counterattitudinal communications under conditions of no choice.

Moreover, the dissonance-producing effect that exists when a counterattitudinal communication is directed toward an uncommitted audience suggests the second research hypothesis:

> H₂: Attitude change in the direction of the position taken in the counterattitudinal communication will be greatest when the communication is encoded for an uncommitted audience under conditions of free choice.

Finally, since conditions of no choice and committed audience should yield the least dissonance, the following relationship is predicted:

> H₃: Attitude change in the direction of the position taken in the counterattitudinal communication will be least when the communication is encoded for a committed audience under conditions of no choice.

Support for Hypothesis 1 derives from the research of Brehm and Cohen (1959), and from the theoretical notions of dissonance theory.

Obvious difficulties arise in directly manipulating choice, which may account for the bulk of literature that indicates a more indirect testing of the variable. The major problem is one of self-selection; by directly manipulating the variable, the possibility exists that those who choose to stay are able to perform the behavior without experiencing dissonance.



Ashmore and Collins (1968) suggest that a subject may not change his attitude simply because the belief-discrepant act may fall within his range of acceptable behavior. However, given that the subject believes the decision to be his own, he should experience dissonance. For not only is he encoding a communication that is at odds with his private opinion, he has freely chosen to do so. Upon agreeing to perform this belief-discrepant act, he will choose a mode of dissonance reduction that will allow him to justify the behavior. A probable method of dissonance reduction, assuming the plausibility of the induction, is a change in his attitude toward the issue he is advocating.

Hypothesis 2 is based on the findings cited earlier which suggest that dissonance is heightened when probable harmful consequences are perceived by the subject. A subject encoding a belief-discrepant message for an uncommitted audience should experience more dissonance than a subject performing the same act for a committed audience. Festinger's (1957) original formulation of dissonance theory states that the magnitude of dissonance is a function of the importance of the opinions or behavior. It seems reasonable that encoding a message -- attitudinally-discrepant or consistent -- will be more significant to the encoder if the probability is high that the message may affect others. Given both a belief-discrepant act and a persuasible audience, the act should take on even more significance. For not only does the subject perceive the act as belief-discrepant, he also perceives that he may influence others to accept the counterattitudinal position. Add to this the fact that he cannot take back the act or inform the audience of his private opinions and one can predict a substantial magnitude of dissonance. to be his own, he should on, risks the subject believes to be his own, he should on, risks discount. The state of the heading a communication of the heading and t

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Hypothesis 3 predicts that under conditions of no choice and audience commitment, subjects engaged in counterattitudinal advocacy should experience little, if any dissonance and subsequent attitude change. For subjects will perceive the act to be without volition and the responsibility of another. Dissonance, if any, may be resolved by derogating the experimenter, accepting the task as an intellectual activity, simply tolerating inconsistency, or some combination of these modes. Moreover, these subjects may simply assimilate the behavior to their own opinions and recognize that such activity is part of some behavior peculiar to experiments. The subject should not experience dissonance as a result of potential harmful effects for two reasons: first, aversive consequences that may occur cannot be the subject's responsibility since he assumes no responsibility for the behavior leading to such consequences; second, the audience should not be perceived as persuasible, since it is already on record as supporting the belief-discrepant issue. Therefore, because the subject does not see the act as his own and because the probability of harmful consequences to his audience is low, he should not experience dissonance or subsequent attitude change.

While predictions are not made concerning attitude change in the Choice: Committed and No Choice: Uncommitted cells, it follows from Hypotheses 2 and 3 that subjects in those conditions will experience moderate dissonance and will demonstrate amounts of change ranging between the Choice: Uncommitted and No Choice: Committed conditions.

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CHAPTER II METHODS AND PROCEDURES

Overview

On the basis of pretest results, an issue was chosen which was counterattitudinal for <u>S</u>s. <u>S</u>s were randomly assigned to experimental and control groups. In the experimental conditions, <u>S</u>s encoded belief-discrepant essays under varying conditions of choice and audience attitude. <u>S</u>s then completed post-encoding questionnaires. In addition to containing attitude items dealing with the experimental issue, the posttest questionnaire included items designed to measure perceived choice, perceived audience attitude, and degree of difficulty in encoding the messages. <u>S</u>s in the control condition completed pretest and posttest instruments.

Pretest

Students in undergraduate communication courses at Michigan State University were administered a pretest questionnaire, ostensibly to solicit student opinion on possible issues to be used in a class project. (See Appendix A) The instrument contained several issues believed to be salient and somewhat ego-involving for undergraduate students. Each issue was followed by four, seven-interval, semantic differential-type scales bounded by the adjectives good-bad, valuable-worthless, pleasant-unpleasant, and fair-unfair (Osgood, Suci & Tannenbaum, 1957). Issues were scored by summing across the attitude scales on a one low, seven



high basis. Thus, with four scales per issue, the possible range was from four to 28. The issue producing the most skewed distribution called for compulsory on-campus residency for all college students; thus, it was chosen as the experimental issue for the investigation.

Independent Variables

Two independent variables were manipulated in this investigation:

- Perceived Choice: This variable was dichotomized as Free Choice and No Choice. So in the Free Choice conditions were informed of their freedom to comply at specified points in the experimental induction. So in the No Choice conditions were not given such freedom.
- 2. Audience Attitude: This variable was dichotomized as Committed Audience and Uncommitted Audience. So were told that the Committed Audience was composed of individuals who held attitudes consistent with the counterattitudinal position advocated by the Ss. So in the Uncommitted Audience conditions were told that the audience was composed of individuals who held no opinion on the issue.

Inductions and Posttest

Approximately two weeks after the pretest had been administered and the experimental issue had been chosen, $\underline{S}s$ were induced to perform the counterattitudinal task. $\underline{\underline{F}}$ gave the following instructions to $\underline{\underline{S}}s$ in the Free (hoice conditions:

The Department of Communication at Michigan State is currently conducting research aimed at finding out what it takes to strengthen or change people's attitudes. What we do is to get some indication of the attitudes people have on certain issues and then, at some later date, we present certain arguments in the form of speeches, essays, debates—various methods—which are desimed to get them to change or strengthen their the chosen as the experienced leave the till billiage studences

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attitudes. Sometime ago, we administered questionnaires to students enrolled in various high schools in the Lansing-Fast Lansing area asking them their attitudes toward a policy of required on-campus living for all college students. That is, we were interested in their opinions on the issue of whether or not college students should be required to live on campus during their attendance at college. Analysis of the questionnaires indicates that these high school students are generally undecided on (favorable toward) the issue. That is, they really have no opinion on (favor) the issue. We are interested in getting the most persuasive arguments we can supporting a policy that would require students to live on campus during their college attendance. Your arguments will be presented to these high school students who are undecided about (favorable toward) the issue and we will again measure their attitudes toward the issue. In other words, you are being asked to write essays that present the most persuasive arguments favoring compulsory on-campus residency for college students. Those choosing to write the essays will be given 15 minutes. We hope that all of you will write the essays. However, if you do not care to participate, you may leave now.

Ss in the No Choice conditions were given the following instructions:

The Department of Communication at Michigan State is currently conducting research aimed at finding out what it takes to strengthen or change people's attitudes. What we do is to get some indication of the attitudes people have on certain issues and then, at some later date, we present certain arguments in the form of speeches, essays, debates--various methods--which are designed to get them to change or strengthen their attitudes. Sometime ago we administered questionnaires to students enrolled in various high schools in the Lansing-East Lansing area asking them their attitudes toward a policy of required on-campus living for all college students. That is, we were interested in their opinions on the issue of whether or not college students should be required to live on campus during their attendance at college. Analysis of the questionnaires indicates that these high school students are generally undecided on (favorable toward) the issue. That is, they really have no opinion on (favor) the issue. We are interested in getting the most persuasive arguments we can supporting a policy that would require students to live on campus during their college attendance. Your arguments will be presented to these high school students who are undecided about (favorable toward) the issue and we will again measure their attitudes toward the issue.

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In other words, you are to write essays that present the most persuasive arguments favoring compulsory oncampus residency for college students. You will be given 15 minutes to write your essays.

So were then given paper on which to write the essays. After 15 minutes, the essays were collected and the post-encoding questionnaires were distributed. The instrument contained the same four semantic differential-type scales employed in the pretest to measure attitudes toward compulsory on-campus living. In addition, it contained items designed to tap So' perceptions of choice, audience attitude, and difficulty experienced in encoding the essays. (See Appendix B)

Control So completed a posttest questionnaire which contained several issues, among them the experimental issue with the same scales employed in the experimental conditions. (See Appendix C)

Dependent Variables

The major dependent variable in this investigation was attitude change: the difference between \underline{S} 's attitude score on the pretest and posttest measures.

In addition, a random sample of essays from all experimental groups was drawn and distributed to two varsity debaters who were asked to evaluate them and respond to items designed to measure the following dimensions: attitudinal direction, persuasive appeal, organizational quality, number of different arguments, and argument content. This essay analysis was similar to the method employed by Rosenberg (1965) and Linder et al. (1967). The essays were randomly ordered and the raters worked independently and without knowledge of the experimental conditions. Finally, word counts were made of all essays and these were

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examined for possible differences.

Manipulation Checks

The effectiveness of the Choice-No Choice manipulations was determined by having Ss respond to the following question: How much choice did you have in your decision to write the essay? Ss responded on a seven-interval, semantic differential-type scale that used Complete Choice, Neither, and No Choice as anchors.

Perceptions of the audience attitude manipulations were determined by having Ss respond to the following question: Before you wrote your essay, how did you think the high school students felt toward the issue of compulsory on-campus residency? Ss responded on a scale consisting of the response categories Favorable, Undecided, Opposed, and Don't Know.

The amount of perceived difficulty in encoding the essays was measured by having <u>S</u>s respond to the following question: How difficult was it for you to write the essay on this issue? <u>S</u>s responded on a seven-interval, semantic differential-type scale that used Difficult, Neither, and Easy as anchors.

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CHAPTER III

RESULTS

Pretest

After random assignment of subjects to experimental and control groups, two preliminary analyses were performed to ensure that there were no significant differences among the groups' pretest scores. First, Bartlett's test for homogeneity of variance (Winer, 1962) was performed. The results indicated no significant differences existed in the variances of the five groups ($X^2 = 3.57$; p > .05).

In addition, a simple analysis of variance was performed on the pretest attitude scores of the experimental and control groups to ensure that the pretest scores were not significantly different. The results of this analysis indicated that the group means did not differ significantly (Table 1).

Table 1. Means, standard deviations, and analysis of variance of pretest attitude scores for experimental and control groups.

Condition	Mean	Standard Deviation
Choice: Uncommitted Audience	5.86	2.33
Choice: Committed Audience	6.38	2.92
No Choice: Uncommitted Audience	6.05	3.21
No Choice: Committed Audience	6.87	3.39
Control	7.47	3.46



Source	SS	df	 MS	F
Between Within Total	30.59 916.82 947.41	4 97 101	7.65 9.45	< 1 n.s.

Experimental and Control Differences

Attitude change scores of the experimental and control groups were submitted to a simple analysis of variance. The overall amount of change and analysis of variance results are found in Table 2. These results demonstrated that the five groups differed significantly on amount of attitude change. The specific differences between each experimental group and the control group were computed by means of Scheffe's test (McNemar, 1969). Table 3 reports the results of these comparisons.

Table 2. Attitude scores, amount of change, and analysis of variance of attitude change scores of experimental and control groups.

Condition	Pretest	Posttest	Change
Choice: Uncommitted Audience	5.86	10.71	4.85
Choice: Committed Audience	6.38	8.81	2.43
No Choice: Uncommitted Audience	6.05	10.77	4.72
No Choice: Committed Audience	6.87	9.78	2.91
Control	7.47	7.80	.33
Source SS		df	MS F
Between 246.58 Within 1,541.24 Total 1,787.82			61.64 3.88* 15.89

^{*}p < .05



Table 3. Analysis of differences of attitude change scores between each experimental group and control.

Condition*		Contro
	Means	.33
C:U	4.85	12.82**
C:C	2.43	5.95**
NC:U	4.72	12.57**
NC:C	2.91	7.45**

* C:U = Choice: Uncommitted Audience

C:C = Choice: Committed Audience NC:U = Choice: Uncommitted Audience

'NC:C = No Choice: Committed Audience

p < .05

Thus, the results of these analyses indicated that the amount of attitude change reported by each experimental group was significantly greater than that of the control group.

Manipulation Checks

Choice In order to determine if subjects in each of the choice conditions accurately perceived the level of the variable to which they were assigned (Choice or No Choice) and to discover whether or not these perceptions were significantly different, a two-factor analysis of variance was performed on the choice perception ratings. This analysis (Table 4) yielded a significant choice main effect. Subsequent tests demonstrated that the two levels of the choice variable were perceived as significantly different (Table 5); thus, the manipulation of the choice variable was successful.



Table 4. Means, standard deviations, and analysis of variance of choice ratings.*

Condition		Mean	Stan	dard Dev	iation
Choice: Uncom	mitted Audience	5.67		1.56	
Choice: Commi	tted Audience	5.71		1.85	
No Choice: Un	committed Audience	1.45		1.14	
No Choice: Co	mmitted Audience	2.00		1.65	
Source	SS	df	MS	F	
Audience Choice	.09 15.71	1	.09 15.71	< 1 157.22	n.s.
Interaction Error Total	.06 8.30 24.16	1 83 86	.06	< 1	n.s.

^{*}Choice perception scores ranged from 1 (No Choice) to 7 (Complete Choice). The higher the mean, the greater the perception of choice. * $^{h\phi}$ p < .05

Table 5. Comparisons of mean choice ratings of experimental groups.

Conditi	on*	C:U	C:C	NC:U_	NC:C
	Means	5.67	5.71	1.45	2.00
C:U	5.67		< 1	10.14**	8.56**
C:C	5.71			9.14**	7.81**
NC:U	1.45				1.51
NC:C	2.00				

^{*} C:U = Choice: Uncommitted Audience

C:U = Choice: Committed Audience

NC:U = No Choice: Uncommitted Audience

NC:C = No Choice: Committed Audience

p < .05

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manipulation was assessed by computing the percentages of individuals within each experimental group who accurately perceived the experimental induction. These percentages are reported in Table 6. The figures in this table indicate that 90 per cent of the subjects in the Choice:

Uncommitted Audience condition perceived the target audience as intended; 61 per cent of those in the Choice: Committed Audience condition accurately perceived the target audience; 69 per cent of the subjects in the No Choice: Uncommitted Audience condition perceived the audience as intended; and 26 per cent of those individuals in the No Choice:

Committed Audience perceived the induction correctly. With the exception of the latter experimental condition, the manipulation can be regarded as successful.

Table 6. Percentage and frequency of subjects accurately perceiving the audience condition. Italics indicate intended inductions.

Condi	tion	Audience Favorable	Audience Undecided	Audience Opposed	Audience Unknown
Choice:	Uncommitted Audience		90% (19)	10% (2)	
Choice:	Committed Audience	61% (13)	10% (2)	10% (2)	19% (4)
No Choic	e: Uncommitted Audience	4% (1)	69% (15)	9% (2)	18% (4)
No Choic	e: Committed Audience	26% (6)	22% (5)	35% (8)	17% (4)



Test of the Hypotheses

The three major hypotheses of this study were tested by use of two analyses. Hypothesis 1, which predicted a significant choice main effect, was tested by a two-factor analysis of variance. For Hypotheses 2 and 3, which predicted differential effects of the choice and audience attitude variables, multiple comparison \underline{t} tests were employed. Data used for analyses testing the hypotheses were the mean pretest to postenooding attitude change scores of the experimental subjects. The significance level employed for all analyses in this investigation was .05.

<u>Hypothesis 1</u> The first hypothesis predicted a positive relationship between degree of perceived choice and subsequent attitude change. Specifically, this hypothesis stated:

Persons encoding counterattitudinal communications under conditions of free choice will demonstrate greater attitude change in the direction of the position taken in the communication than persons encoding counterattitudinal communications under conditions of no choice.

Table 7 indicates the amount of pretest though post-encoding attitude change and presents a summary of the analysis of variance for the experimental groups. The results of this analysis indicated that freedom of choice had no significant effect on the attitude of the individuals performing the counterattitudinal task. However, the analysis indicated that subjects in the Uncommitted Audience conditions changed their attitudes significantly more than those in the Committed Audience conditions.



Table 7. Attitude scores, amount of change, and analysis of variance of attitude change scores of experimental groups.

Condition	Prete	st P	ost-Encod	ing (Change
Choice: Uncommitted Audie	ence 5.8	6	10.71		4.85
Choice: Committed Audience	e 6.3	8	8.81		2.43
No Choice: Uncommitted A	udience 6.0	5	10.77		4.72
No Choice: Committed Audi	ience 6.8	7	9.78		2.91
Source S	SS	df	MS	F	
	.50	1	4.50	4.14*	
	.03	1	.03	1	n.s.
	.09	1	.09	1	n.s.
Error 90. Total 95.	.47	83	1.09		

[&]quot;p < .05

<u>Hypotheses 2 and 3</u> These hypotheses specified those cells when the greatest and least amounts of attitude change would occur. Hypothesis 2 predicted:

Attitude change in the direction of the position taken in the counterattitudinal communication will be greatest when the communication is encoded for an uncommitted audience under conditions of free choice.

Hypothesis 3 stated:

Attitude change in the direction of the position taken in the counterattitudinal communication will be least when the communication is encoded for a committed audience under conditions of no choice.

Multiple comparison \underline{t} tests were performed for all possible two treatment combinations of the experimental groups. The results of these comparisons indicated no significant differences existed among the

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Table 8. Comparisons of mean change scores of experimental groups.

Condit:	ion*	C:U	C:C	NC:U	NC:C
	Means	4.85	2.42	4.73	2.91
C:U	4.85		1.72**	< 1	1.29
C:C	2.42			1.60	< 1
NC:U	4.73				1.19
NC:C	2.91				

^{*} C:U = Choice: Uncommitted Audience

Thus, the three major hypotheses of this investigation were not supported. $% \begin{center} \end{center}$

Supplementary Analyses

In addition to the analyses of the attitude change data, analyses were performed on measures related to the encoding behavior of the subjects and to some of the characteristics of their essays.

Table 9 reports the means, standard deviations, and analysis of variance of subjects' perceptions of difficulty in encoding the counter-attitudinal essays. These data were subjected to a two-factor analysis of variance. Results of this analysis indicated no significant differences among the experimental groups on the perception of difficulty measure.

C:C = Choice: Committed Audience

NC:U = No Choice: Uncommitted Audience

NC:C = No Choice: Committed Audience

P < .05 (t = 1.68; df = 40; one-tailed)

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Table 9. Means, standard deviations, and analysis of variance of difficulty ratings.*

Condition	A STATE OF THE PARTY OF THE PAR	Mean	Standard Dev	iation
Choice: Unc	ommitted Audience	3.76	2.07	
Choice: Com	mitted Audience	3.86	1.98	
No Choice:	Uncommitted Audience	4.14	2.00	
No Choice:	Committed Audience	3.22	1.76	
Source	SS	df	MS F	
Audience	.17	1	.17 < 1	n.s.
Choice Interaction Error	.02 .26 14.94	1 1 83	.02 < 1 .26 1.44 .18	n.s.
Total	15.39	86	.10	

Difficulty ratings ranged from 1 (Difficult) to 7 (Easy). The greater the mean, the easier the task was perceived to be.

A random sample of five messages from each experimental group was drawn and these messages were given to two independent raters for judgments on the following criteria: persuasiveness, organization, number of different arguments, and attitudinal direction of the essay. The two judges rated each essay by responding to a seven-interval, semantic differential-type scale for each criterion (persuasiveness or organization) bounded by the adjectives good and bad. The judges agreed or were only one point discrepant on 55 per cent of the persuasiveness ratings and 65 per cent of the organization ratings.

Each rater was asked to count the number of different arguments for each essay and these judgments yielded a correlation of .60. The judges agreed or were only one argument discrepant in 85 per cent of the essays.

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The judges were also asked to evaluate the essays as favorable, neutral, or opposed to the experimental issue. They agreed that 19 of the 20 essays (95%) were in favor of required on-campus living for all college students.

Finally, the essays of all conditions were submitted to a word count analysis. Table 10 indicates that individuals who encoded counterattitudinal messages in the Uncommitted Audience conditions wrote significantly longer essays than those who wrote in the Committed Audience conditions.

Table 10. Means, standard deviations, and analysis of variance of essay length.

Condition	Mean	Stand	ard Devi	ation	
Choice: Uncomm	itted Audience	172.33		56.60	
Choice: Committed Audience		156.76		47.83	
No Choice: Uncommitted Audience		174.68 52.46			
No Choice: Com	mitted Audience	144.57		56.43	
Source	SS	df	MS	F	
Audience Choice Interaction Error	521.85 24.25 52.89 10,932.76	1 1 1 83	521.85 24.25 52.89 131.72	3.96* < 1 < 1	n.s. n.s.

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CHAPTER IV

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DISCUSSION

In light of the strong theoretic support for the prediction, failure to confirm Hypothesis 1 is disappointing. Prior findings concerning the effects of varied choice conditions indicated that perceived freedom of choice in performance of a counterattitudinal task is a significant determinant of attitude change. The non-significant results are even more perplexing in light of the highly successful inductions of the choice variable. Nevertheless, there are several plausible explanations for the failure to confirm Hypothesis 1.

The classroom experimental setting is one factor which could account for individuals correctly responding to the manipulation check items but failing to demonstrate the predicted amounts of attitude change. Comments by the Choice experimental subjects during debriefing indicated that even though they had been given an opportunity to leave, they felt that the instructor would expect them to remain. Moreover, most of the subjects had participated in prior classroom experimental sessions and conformity with experimenter requests was perceived to be prometive behavior.

Debriefing information given by the Choice subjects is at odds with the position held by Holmes and Strickland (1970) concerning the desired situation for an optimum test of the choice variable. They argue that confronting subjects in a classroom situation allows them



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more freedom to leave the experiment than if they are involved in a one-on-one confrontation with the experimenter. In addition, they note that a group situation eliminates the problem of a sequence of decisions; that is, the subject does not have to first decide whether to attend an experimental session and then later decide whether to stay and complete the task. In the present study, the subjects indicated that they perceived the choice to be a very limited one, even though their choice ratings were high.

In an earlier study (Bodaken, 1969), subjects were invited to a special night session to participate in a research project. Individuals in the Choice conditions indicated that they remained to perform the task because they had taken the trouble to attend and that as long as they were there they could afford the time necessary to complete the task. Thus, it is clear that regardless of the method used to confront subjects, there is going to be some tempering of the choice perception. It may well be that the optimum test of the choice factor resides in a methodology which calls for confronting subjects in their residence halls or some similar extra-classroom environment. For the present study, it seems plausible that individuals perceived that they were given decision freedom. At the same time, they seemed to be aware of the situational requirements that they generally do not leave the classroom without the instructor's permission.

Another possible explanation for failure to confirm Hypothesis 1 involves the perceived importance of the subject's decision to perform the task. According to Festinger (1957), the variable of importance is

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a crucial determinant of the magnitude of dissonance. He writes:

The importance of the decision will affect the magnitude of the dissonance that exists after the decision has been made. Other things being equal, the more important the decision, the stronger will be the dissonance. (p. 37)

The importance of the choice as a relevant variable was determined in pretesting of the manipulation prior to the experimental induction. Students in several undergraduate communication courses were asked to react to a request to perform the counterattitudinal task. Generally, these students indicated that the choice would be relatively easy to make: they would refuse to comply. On the basis of further reactions, the choice inductions were rewritten to include a sponsor (the Department of Communication) and some clarification of the bogus research project. It was reasoned that the addition of these elements would make it more difficult for experimental subjects to refuse. Furthermore, it was felt that the experimenter's explicit statements reminding the subjects of their freedom not to comply would provide a perception of real decision freedom. Finally, the absence of the regular instructor during the entire experimental session was a factor that should have presented the subjects with an illusion of complete freedom. Thus, the choice to perform or not perform the task should have been perceived as an important one and, additionally, a decision free of external pressure.

Nevertheless, the subjects' comments indicated that the decision to write or not write the essays was perceived as relatively unimportant. After all, students perform many routine encoding tasks

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in the course of completing class requirements and, as noted earlier, conforming to an experimenter's request was perceived to be just another classroom exercise. In sum, while the task may have assumed importance during the actual encoding process, the choice <u>per se</u> was perceived as relatively unimportant.

Another possible reason for failure to confirm Hypothesis 1 one related directly to the perceived importance of the task—is concerned with the relative attractiveness of the unchosen alternative. Festinger (1957) specifies the importance of such relative attractiveness when he says:

. . . dissonance exists because, following the decision, the person continues to have in his cognition elements that, if considered alone, would lead to an action other than the one he has taken or is engaged in. . . Consequently, the greater the relative attractiveness of the unchosen alternatives to the chosen alternative, the greater will be the proportion of relevant elements that are dissonant with the cognition corresponding to the action. (pp. 37-38)

Subjects in this study were not presented with mutually positive or negative aspects of the alternatives. Generally, subjects seemed to be more concerned with the potential effects on the target audience than with the relative merits of whether or not they made the right decision. Brehm and Cohen (1962) suggest the importance of presenting attractive alternatives in a choice paradiem:

The subject in these experiments presumably wants to make a choice because of the benefits or potential benefits accruing to the choice, and little or no external pressure is needed to produce the choice. Dissonance in these studies is usually conceived of as a function of the relative number of cognitions favoring the unchosen alternative. (p. 21) (Underlining Added)

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They later note that:

. . . the more equal the distribution of relevant attributes (the higher the choice), the greater the dissonance and consequent attitude change in line with one's discrepant commitment. (p. 91)

Thus, assuming that the subjects perceived some pressure to perform the task, and further assuming that the manipulation of the Choice conditions did not present the alternatives as mutually attractive, it is reasonable to conclude that decision freedom was not a mediating variable in this study.

Perhaps the most relevant factor in the failure to confirm Hypothesis 1 was the subjects' concern for the potential effects of the counterattitudinal task. Invariably, subjects in the Uncommitted Audience conditions expressed concern for the possible effects that their essays might have had on the high school students' attitudes. This concern is supported by the significant results indicating that subjects in the Uncommitted Audience conditions demonstrated greater attitude change in the direction of the counterattitudinal position than those in the Committed Audience conditions. While this effect may have militated against confirmation of Hypothesis 1, it certainly supports earlier theoretic formulations and research. As noted earlier, Collins (1969) has suggested that an individual's concern about his responsibility for potentially harmful consequences growing out of his act may be dissonance producing. By contrast, as might be expected. subjects in the Committed Audience conditions were more concerned with the fact that their task was seemingly meaningless; they perceived themselves to be trying to persuade others (high school students) to adopt a position already held. Taken as a whole, these effects of the

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audience variable may have over-ridden any effects resulting from the

The significant audience effect not only supports Collins' theorizing, it is consistent with research by Nel, Helmreich, and Aronson (1969). Two major implications of this successful replication are apparent. First, it appears that manipulating audience attitude is a useful means of tapping the aversive consequences dimension. Unlike Nel et al., the present study did not manipulate a "neutral" audience attitude; however, the findings suggest that such a manipulation is unnecessary. Moreover, the procedures used by Nel et al. involved presenting the subjects with several major arguments on the experimental issue. By contrast, subjects in this study were not given any arguments on the issue; all arguments used in the essays were the subjects' own ideas. Thus, subjects were not allowed the option of cognitively shifting the responsibility of their task to the experimenter.

In addition to the methodological implications, the significant audience effect provides further support for theoretic expectations about the aversive consequences of counterattitudinal advocacy. The finding suggests that an individual's overriding concern in the performance of counterattitudinal tasks is the effect, or potential effect, that such messages have on others. Aronson (1968) and Collins (1969) have both indicated that individuals do not perform counterattitudinal tasks in a cognitive vacuum, that subjects are concerned with the perception that they have "conned" someone into believing some thing which is not true. Furthermore, the absence of an option to explain the behavior to the target audience is even more dissonance-producing.

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Subjects in the present study were told that they would <u>not</u> be able to explain their private opinions to the high school students, thus precluding a take-back mode of dissonance-reduction.

The significant audience effect also suggests the importance of self-concept and the part it plays in the arousal of dissonance. As noted earlier, Bramel (1968) posits that the cognition one has that he is immoral or has performed an immoral act can be instrumental in dissonance-arousal. Subjects in this experiment repeatedly commented on the unethical nature of performing the task because of the subsequent harmful effects such behavior could have in persuading high school students who held no opinion on the issue. However, since Bramel's formulation places emphasis on the voluntary nature of the task and since the results of this study fail to demonstrate a significant choice effect, the self-concept interpretation is equivocal.

While the results of this study failed to confirm Hypotheses 2 and 3, the pattern of change scores is encouraging. Taken together, these hypotheses predicted that the greatest and least amounts of attitude change would take place in the Choice: Uncommitted and the No Choice: Committed conditions, respectively. While no predictions were made for the Choice: Committed and No Choice: Uncommitted conditions, it was assumed that subjects in those conditions would experience moderate dissonance and would demonstrate amounts of change ranging between the Choice: Uncommitted and No Choice: Committed conditions.

The findings do indicate that persons in the Choice: Uncommitted conditions demonstrated a relatively greater amount of attitude change than subjects in the other conditions. However, the condition yielding the least amount of change was not the No Choice: Committed condition; with the light addition and at the party of the

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rather, it was the Choice: Committed condition. As indicated in Chapter III, the only significant difference among the experimental groups was between the Choice: Uncommitted and the Choice: Committed conditions.

Theoretically, the No Choice: Committed condition should yield minimal attitude change. For not only are subjects being forced to encode counterattitudinal messages, they are doing so for an audience that already holds the counterattitudinal position. The No Choice: Committed condition was not expected to be significantly different than the control group. In fact, all conditions differed significantly from the control group, with the Choice: Committed subjects demonstrating less attitude change, although not significantly different, than all other experimental groups. It is interesting to note that this pattern of changes replicates an earlier study (Bodaken, 1969). However, in the present study, the difference between the Choice: Committed and No Choice: Committed conditions was less than one-half a scale unit, thus preventing clear interpretation of the findings.

A possible contributing factor in the failure to confirm Mypotheses 2 and 3 was the partial failure of the audience attitude manipulation. Only 26 per cent of the subjects in the No Choice: Committed
condition perceived the audience attitude as intended, while by contrast,
90 per cent of the subjects in the Choice: Uncommitted condition perceived the audience attitude consistent with the induction. Also, the
induction was successful for over 60 per cent in each of the other two
experimental conditions. These figures indicate that while the induction
was generally successful, it did not work as intended in the No Choice:

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er gester sam Committed condition. The attitude change demonstrated by these individuals cannot be attributed to the audience induction. Considering this fact in conjunction with the failure to find a significant choice effect, it appears that the attitude change may be attributed to extraneous factors. For example, unlike the other conditions, subgroups of subjects in this condition were given instructions by different instructors. More investigation must be undertaken to explain the change demonstrated by No Choice: Committed subjects.

In presenting the rationale for Hypothesis 2, it was suggested that for subjects in the Choice: Uncommitted Audience condition, the voluntary nature of the task and its potential harmful effects would yield an amount of attitude change significantly greater than that observed in other conditions. While a significant audience effect was observed in this study, the lack of confirmation for the choice prediction prevented a powerful test of Hypothesis 2.

Hypothesis 3 was based on the assumption that lack of choice in performing a counterattitudinal task plus the seeming absence of harmful effects would combine to yield an insignificant amount of change in the No Choice: Committed Audience condition. Failure to find a significant choice effect, the apparent weakness of the experimental induction, and possible experimenter errors prevented confirmation of this hypothesis.

It is, however, interesting to note that in conditions where the most attitude change was reported, the subjects wrote significantly longer essays. That is, subjects encoding counterattitudinal messages directed toward an uncommitted audience wrote significantly longer essays than those subjects who wrote counterattitudinal messages

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directed toward a committed audience. This finding contradicts

Rosenberg's (1965) conclusion that verbal productivity does not correlate with attitude change. Also worth noting is Freedman's (1963) failure to find any differences in essay length and his conclusion that subjects did not exert any more effort in encoding essays across conditions. Confidence in the finding of the present study is tempered by the failure to find that subjects who showed greater attitude change wrote a significantly greater number of different arguments. Moreover, with the lack of a suitable control for individual differences in writing speed and verbal skills, the importance of this finding should not be overemphasized.

Implications For Future Research

While the major hypotheses of this study were not confirmed, several implications for future research in the area of self-persuasion can be suggested. First, present operational procedures for manipulating the choice variable need to be re-examined. Researchers investigating this variable have strayed considerably from Festinger's (1957) formulation of pre- and post-decisional conditions. Future researchers should concentrate on presenting the subject with attractive alternatives, rather than a sterile forced-choice paradigm. Not only should the subject feel that there are obvious benefits or harms in either alternative, regardless of his choice, he should also perceive the choice as important and one that is difficult to make.

The potential aversive consequences dimension of counterattitudinal advocacy is a worthwhile area for future research. The methodology employed in this study seems to be an adequate means of -tho this wish to With all only Taylory tasts

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 tapping this variable, but as indicated by the failure of the induction in the No Choice: Committed Audience condition, more can be done to successfully manipulate perceptions of audience attitudes. One option might be to present the experimental subjects with bogus results of a questionnaire presumably administered to a target audience. Another approach would be to make the encoding session an oral one in which subjects give speeches to an uncommitted audience composed of confederates. At predetermined intervals the confederates would signal agreement with the speaker, thus presenting him with immediate feedback. Measures of source attitude could then be taken at various times during the encoding process. Berger (1970) is currently conducting research employing this methodology.

Finally, efforts should be concentrated on analyzing the content of the counterattitudinal messages. While subjects in the present study supposedly did write counterattitudinal essays, nothing is known of the intensity or complexity of the language used. Burgoon (1970) has devised a methodology that, if successful, will provide information relevant to the correlation between language intensity and attitude change following counterattitudinal advocacy. Content analytic procedures also offer potentially useful measures for the comparison of counterattitudinal messages written by subjects in different experimental conditions.

The area of counterattitudinal advocacy offers the communication researcher the opportunity to perform insightful research into variables influencing attitude formation and change. This study has attempted to specify the relationship between two variables considered to be relevant to the persuasive process. Hopefully, the results will contribute to

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existing knowledge about self-persuasion phenomena and will lead to further investigation of the process of counterattitudinal advocacy.

Summary

This study examined the effects of choice and audience commitment on attitude change following encoding of counterattitudinal messages. Hypotheses were based on prior self-persuasion research which has established that decision freedom is a determinant of cognitive dissonance and subsequent attitude change, as well as research relevant to the self-concept and dissonance aroused when an act is perceived to have potentially aversive consequences. It was predicted that persons encoding counterattitudinal communications under choice conditions would demonstrate greater attitude change than persons encoding such messages under conditions of no choice. Furthermore, it was predicted that the amount of attitude change demonstrated by individuals freely choosing to encode counterattitudinal essays for an audience holding no opinion on the issue would be significantly greater than the change demonstrated in all other treatment conditions. Finally, it was hypothesized that the amount of attitude change demonstrated by subjects who were forced to encode counterattitudinal essays directed toward a committed audience would be significantly less than the change in all other treatment conditions.

The results of this study failed to confirm the major hypotheses; however, a significant audience effect was observed, indicating that persons who encoded counterattitudinal communications directed toward an uncommitted audience demonstrated significantly greater attitude change than individuals who encoded such messages for a committed audience.

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APPENDIX A


PRETEST ATTITUDE QUESTIONNAIRE



COMMUNICATION 101 OPINION PROFILE

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ALL SCAL	ES SHOULD BE	CHECKED	DO NOT OM	IT ANY.		

WORK RAPIDLY -- RECORD FIRST IMPRESSIONS -- DO NOT CHANGE MARKS



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Unfair	:_	:_	;	_:_	:_	:	Fair
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APPENDIX B POSTTEST ATTITUDE QUESTIONNAIRE



L. at. 2011	Student	Number	
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Now that you have written your essay, we would like to know how you feel toward the issue of requiring all students to live on campus during their college attendance.

ALL STUDENTS SHOULD BE REQUIRED TO LIVE ON CAMPUS DURING THEIR COLLEGE ATTENDANCE Verv Pleasant Quite Pleasant Slightly Pleasant Neutral Slightly Unpleasant Quite Unpleasant Very Unpleasant ALL STUDENTS SHOULD BE REQUIRED TO LIVE ON CAMPUS DURING THEIR COLLEGE ATTENDANCE Very Good Quite Good Slightly Good Neutral Slightly Bad Quite Bad Very Bad



ALL STUDENTS SHOULD BE REQUIRED TO LIVE ON CAMPUS DURING THEIR COLLEGE ATTENDANCE

Very Valuable
Quite Valuable
Slightly Valuable
Neutral
Slightly Worthless
Quite Worthless
Very Worthless
STUDENTS SHOULD BE REQUIRED TO LIVE ON CAMPUS DURING THEIR COLLEGE ATTENDANCE
Very Unfair
Quite Unfair
Slightly Unfair
Neutral
Slightly Fair
Quite Fair
Very Fair
ice did you have in your decision to write the essay?
Neither No Choice



Before you v	wrote	your	essay,	how did	l you	think	the	high	school	students
felt toward	the	issue	of com	pulsory	on-ca	ampus 1	resid	dency'	?	

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	_They were	opposed to com	pulsory on-ca	mpus resid	ency.	
		now what their residency.	attitude was	toward com	pulsory	
How diffic	ult was it	for you to writ	e the essay c	on this iss	ue?	
Difficult	::	: Neit	:: her	_:	:Easy	_



APPENDIX C CONTROL POSTTEST ATTITUDE QUESTIONNAIRE



Vame	Student	Number

101 Section

Recently, the activities of university students across the country have provided a multitude of news stories for the mass media. Yet with all the publicity surrounding student revolt and unrest, little is really known about student attitudes toward a number of issues related to student life in the university community. On the following pages are several issues that are of concern to university students. Each issue is followed by a set of descriptive scales. We would like to have you place a check (/) on the line that you think best indicates your opinion toward the issue. Each scale should be checked—do not omit any.



The voting age should be lowered to 18 years.

Very Bad	Quite Bad	Slightly Bad	Neutral	Slightly Good	Quite Good	l Very Good
Very Pleasant	Quite Pleasant	Slightly Pleasant	Neutral	Slightly Pleasant	Quite Pleasant	Very Pleasant
Very Fair	Quite Fair	Slightly Fair	Neutral	Slightly Unfair	Quite Unfair	Very Unfair
Very Worthless	Quite Worthless	Slightly Worthless	Neutral	Slightly Valuable		Very Valuable
	The sale o	of cigarett	es should	be banned	on campus	
Very Unpleasan	Quite t Unpleasar	Slightly nt Unpleasa		Slightly Pleasant		:Very Pleasant
Very Bad	Quite Bad	Slightly Bad	Neutral	Slightly Good	Quite Good	: d Very Good
Very Valuable	Quite Valuable	Slightly Valuable		: Slightly Worthless	Quite Worthless	:Very Worthless
Very Unfair	Quite Unfair	Slightly Unfair	Neutral	Slightly Fair	Quite Fair	Very Fair



Draft deferments should be eliminated for college students.

Very Fair	Quite Fair	Slightly Fair	Neutral	Slightly Unfair	Quite Unfair	Very Unfair
Very Worthless	Quite Worthless	Slightly Worthless	Neutral	: : Slightly Valuable	Quite Valuable	Very Valuable
Very Good	Quite Good	Slightly Good	Neutral	Slightly Bad	Quite Bad	Very Bad
Very Pleasant	Quite Pleasant	Slightly Pleasant	Neutral	Slightly Unpleasant	Quite Unpleasa	: Very nt Unpleasant

All students should be required to live on campus during their college attendance.

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Very Valuable	Quite Valuable	Slightly Valuable	Neutral	Slightly Worthless	Quite Worthless	Very Worthless
Very Good	Quite Good	Slightly Good	Neutral	: Slightly Bad	Quite Bad	: Very Bad
Very Unfair	Quite Unfair	Slightly Unfair	Neutral	Slightly Fair	Quite Fair	: Very Fair
Very Pleasant	Quite Pleasant	Slightly Pleasant	Neutral	Slightly Unpleasan	Quite t Unpleasa	: Very nt Unpleasa



Military activity in South Viet Nam should be significantly increased.

Very Worthless	Quite Worthless	Slightly Worthless	Neutral	Slightly Valuable	Quite Valuable	Very Valuable
Very Fair	Quite Fair	Slightly Fair	Neutral	Slightly Unfair	Quite Unfair	Very Unfair
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Very Good	Quite Good	Slightly Good	Neutral	Slightly Bad	Quite Bad	Very Bad
Verv	:	: Slightly		: Slightly	:Ouite	· Verv



The letter grading system should be abolished

Very Bad	Quite Bad	: Slightly Bad	Neutral	Slightly Good	Quite Good	Very Good
Very	Quite	: Slightly	Neutral	: Slightly	Quite	Very
Pleasant	Pleasan	t Pleasant		Unpleasant	Unpleasant	Unpleasant
Very	Quite	Slightly	Neutral	Slightly	Quite	Very
Fair	Fair	Fair		Unfair	Unfair	Unfair
Very Worthless	Quite Worthless		Neutral	Slightly Valuable	Quite Valuable	Very Valuable

The United States should withdraw from the United Nations.

Very Unpleasant	Quite Unpleasan	: Slightly t Unpleasan		Slightly Pleasant	Quite Pleasan	: Very t Pleasant
Very Bad	Quite Bad	Slightly Bad	Neutral	: Slightly Good	Quite Good	: Very Good
Very Valuable	Quite Valuable	Slightly Valuable	Neutral	: Slightly Worthless	Quite Worthless	Very Worthless
Very Unfair	Quite Unfair	: Slightly Unfair	Neutral	: Slightly Fair	Quite Fair	: Very Fair



Presidential nominations should be based on a direct vote of the people.

Very Fair	Quite Fair	Slightly Fair	Neutral	Slightly Unfiar	Quite Unfair	Very Unfair
Very Worthless	Quite Worthless	Slightly Worthless		Slightly Valuable	Quite Valuable	Very Valuable
Very Good	Quite Good	Slightly Good	Neutral	Slightly Bad	Quite Bad	Very Bad
Very Pleasant	Quite Pleasant	Slightly Pleasant	Neutral	: Slightly Unpleasant	Quite Unpleasant	:Very t Unpleasant
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Very Valuable	Quite Valuable	Slightly Valuable	Neutral	Slightly Worthless	Quite Worthless	Very Worthless
Very Good	Quite Good	Slightly Good	Neutral	Slightly Bad	Quite Bad	: Very Bad
Very Unfair	Quite Unfair	Slightly Unfair	Neutral	: Slightly Fair	Quite Fair	Very Fair
Very Pleasant	Quite	Slightly Pleasant	Neutral	: Slightly Unpleasant	Quite Unpleasan	: Very t Unpleasant



All firearms should be licensed and registered

Very Worthless	Quite Worthless	Slightly Worthless	Neutral	Slightly Valuable	Quite Valuable	Very Valuable
Very Fair	Quite Fair	Slightly Fair	Neutral	: Slightly Unfair	Quite Unfair	Very Unfair
Very Unpleasant	Very Quite Slightly Neutral Slightly Quite Fair Fair Fair Unfair Very Quite Slightly Neutral Slightly Quite Unpleasant Unpleasant Unpleasant Pleasant Pleasant			Very Pleasant		
Very Bad	Quite	Slightly	Neutral	: ::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::	Quite	Very Good









