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A “ ‘ - A LIBRADV .6 University This is to certify that the thesis entitled A PHENOMENOLOGICAL THEORY OF POPULAR AND ELITE LITERATURE presented by JANICE ANNE RADWAY has been accepted towards fulfillment of the requirements for Jinn.— degree in Marian Studies Wan}, Major professor Date August 5, 1977 0-7 639 mlllllllmm1”grillll(ll[Lilli1mm!Willll L 3 129 © Copyright by JANICE ANNE RADWAY 1977 A PHENOMENOLOGICAL THEORY OF POPULAR AND ELITE LITERATURE BY Janice Anne Radway A DISSERTATION Submitted to Michigan State University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY Program of American Studies Department of English .1977 ABSTRACT A PHENOMENOLOGICAL THEORY OF POPULAR AND ELITE LITERATURE BY Janice Anne Radway Although the study of popular art has recently emerged as a legitimate academic pursuit, very little theoretical speculation about the nature of popular forms of expression has been conducted. Some popular culture analysts have demon- strated a growing interest in new methodologies for the study of specific works but few have scrutinized the methodologies themselves or placed them within a larger framework consider- ing human creation in general. It is,therefore, the purpose of this study to situate popular forms of expression within a broad theory of human creation, to analyze the similarities and differences between "popular" and "elite" literary texts, and to suggest alternative procedures for aesthetic evalua- tion and judgment. A While I agree with the premise of French Structuralism that all forms of human behavior including literary expres- sion can be fruitfully compared to man's use of the linguis- tic system, I have definite reservations about the conception of language which Structuralism employs. In an attempt to compensate for the Structuralist preoccupation with the syn- chronic, institutional nature of language, I have, therefore, Janice Anne Radway turned to the linguistic theories of Maurice Merleau-Ponty. As a phenomenologist, Merleau-Ponty is primarily concerned with individual speech acts and the effects they have on the diachronically evolving nature of the language system. After defining the need for a theory of popular liter- ature in the first chapter, I provide, in the second, a short exigesis of Merleau-Ponty's ontological theories about the nature of man's insertion in the world, the general char- acter of all expressive acts, and the specific character of linguistic expression. The chapter then concludes with an examination of Merleau-Ponty's belief that speech may be Creative if man uses the prOperties of the language system in unfamiliar ways, thus creating new meaning, or Empirical, if he employs the same prOperties traditionally, thus rely- ing on the standard sedimented significance associated with them. The third chapter suggests that literature can be thought of as a language system complete with fundamental properties and rules for their combination. After explain- ing that individuals know how to create and read literary texts only because they have acquired a "literary" compe- tence in addition to the linguistic competence they possess as native speakers of a language, I extend the analogy be- tween literature and language even further, describing "popular" texts as Empirical or Conservative uses of the literary system and ”elite" texts as Creative uses. I do not, however, argue that every text must fit within one of Janice Anne Radway two rigidly defined categories, but maintain instead that all texts form a continuum extending between the theoretical poles of Empirical and Creative literary expression. Part Two of this dissertation is a case study designed to demonstrate through reference to a single genre, that texts actually use literary elements in creative and conservative ways. Accordingly, in the fourth chapter, I analyze classic examples of the gothic novel in order to establish the pro- perties and essential combinations which define the genre. My analysis is based on an examination of The Castle of Otranto, The Mysteries of Udolpho, The Monk, and Melmoth the Wanderer. Then, in the fifth chapter, I show how Phyllis Whitney's popular gothic romances employ the standard gothic "system" traditionally, while Carson McCullers' The Member of the Wedding and William Faulkner's Sanctuary deform that sys- tem, using essential properties in unfamiliar ways, thus causing the gothic form to carry new significance. The final chapter explores the possibility that popu- lar texts may be read without the benefit of a literary com- petence. In arguing that such non-literary reading may be related to play, I propose new ways for judging the relative merits and success of different empirical texts. "To S. O. R. with Love" ii ACKNOWLEDGMENTS Before I can thank all those teachers and friends who have offered assistance and encouragement during the writing of this dissertation, I would like to acknowledge the debt I owe to two very special men without whose advice, criti- cisms, and example this study would never have been completed. Professor Russel B. Nye has directed my interest in American Studies and popular culture from the beginning and it was he who provided the initial suggestion for this paper. His re- markable curiosity, generosity, and willingness to listen have been a constant inspiration to me. It is with consider- able regret that I now leave Michigan State and his immediate guidance. Professor E. Fred Carlisle has provided extraordinary and continuing assistance during the past year. I would have found it vastly more difficult to come to terms with the theo- ries of Merleau-Ponty had I not shared so many challenging conversations with him about phenomenology, language, and literature. I have benefited immensely from his attentive and critical reading of this study at every stage of its completion and his delightful sense of humor has helped me to laugh at the times when I needed to most. So many of my teachers at Michigan State have offered assistance and advice that it would be impossible to iii acknowledge every one individually. I would, however, like to thank Professor Roger Meiners for making my first encoun- ters with critical theory immensely interesting and for in- troducing me to the work of Owen Barfield. I also want to thank Professors David Mead, Douglas Miller, and Barry Gross for their continuing interest and concern. In addition, John G. Cawelti of the University of Chicago was kind enough to meet with me on a rainy Saturday morning to discuss popu- lar culture. That conversation proved particularly helpful as I first began to formulate my own ideas about new criti- cal perspectives. I also want to acknowledge the support of Karen, Marcia, Mary, and Ana upon whom I have come to depend for much needed perspective and lightness of the heart. Finally, I want to express deepgratitude to two es- pecially important people for their continuing care and con- stant attention. My friend, Nancy, helped me to see clearly when lack of confidence and fatigue clouded my vision and I truly appreciate her concern for my personal and professional growth. My husband, Scott, has cheerfully shared every mo- ment of this enterprise and provided gentle but searching criticisms when most needed. I cannot imagine having com- pleted this study without his unqualified support, friend- ship, and love. iv TABLE OF CONTENTS Part One Phenomenology, Language, and Literature Chapter Page I. THE PRESENT SITUATION IN POPULAR CULTURE ANALYSIS: THE NEED FOR A COMPREHENSIVE THEORY O O O O O O I O O O O O I I O O II. A PHENOMENOLOGICAL THEORY OF LANGUAGE . Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology. and Human Expression . . . . Speech and Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . The Phenomenological Conception of Language . . . . . . . . . . Authentic or Creative Speech . Empirical Speech . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The Radical Interdependence of Creative and Empirical Speech . . . . . . . . III. A PHENOMENOLOGY OF LITERARY EXPRESSION . Why Phenomenology? . . . . . . . . . . Literature Considered as a Language System . . . . . . Literary Competence . . A Literary Continuum . Who is Reading? . . . . . . . . . . . Part Two Practical Implications of the Idea of a Literary Continuum: 'A Case Studyi 14 14 23 28 34 52 54 69 69 78 90 98 122 IV. AN ACCOUNT OF A LITERARY COMPETENCE AND A THEORY OF THE GOTHIC NOVEL . . . Specific Strategies for Reading The "Codes” of Roland Barthes The Origins of the Gothic Novel The Castle of Otranto . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138 . . . . . . . . 138 143 156 160 Chapter The Mysteries of Udolpho . The Monk . . . . . . . Melmoth the Wanderer . The Conventional Gothic . . . . . . . . . Page 167 181 198 211 V. CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN GOTHIC: EMPIRICAL AND CREATIVE USE OF A LITERARY "SYSTEM" . . . . 224 The Gothic Novel in the Twentieth Century. . 224 Phyllis Whitney and the Popular Gothic Romance . . . . . . . . . . . Carson McCullers, The Member of the Wedding, and "New American Gothic“ . . . . . The Gothic World of William Faulkner's Sanctuary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The Question of the Literary Continuum and Borderline Cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VI. SOME FINAL THOUGHTS ABOUT NON-LITERARY READING PATTERNS, POPULAR LITERATURE, AND AESTHETIC ANALY S I S O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O I BIBLIOGRAPHY O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O 0 228 256 294 328 344 366 vi PART ONE PHENOMENOLOGY, LANGUAGE, AND LITERATURE CHAPTER I THE PRESENT SITUATION IN POPULAR CULTURE ANALYSIS: THE NEED FOR A COMPREHENSIVE THEORY Since man first developed his capacity for expression, all human societies have produced characteristic forms of folk or popular culture. However, because such forms were largely the creations of the poorest and least educated members of so- ciety, and because they differed greatly from the works of the most celebrated artists of the day, they were generally ig- nored in philosophical and critical treatises on the subject of the arts. But as industrialization changed the very nature of life in the early twentieth century, it had a tremendous impact on the standard critical neglect of popular culture forms. When the middle class appeared and grew to huge pro- portions as a result of industrialization, it began to demand and produce its own unique forms of expression. Then, with the help of the newly emergent business class and its increas- ingly successful methods of production and distribution, such cultural forms proliferated, became extremely visible, and seemed to challenge the hegemony of high or elite art. With the advent of the electronic media, the problem became even more worrisome, and many began to wonder if the exploding popular culture of the middle class did not pose a serious threat to the survival of high culture and elite art. As 1 concern mounted, critics previously preoccupied only with the state of high art began to devote time and energy to the analy- sis of popular forms of culture and, as a result, the first attempts to understand the nature of such work and to distin- guish it from the forms of high culture were made. During the 1930's and 1940's in the United States, and even well into the 1950's, much of the resulting analysis of popular literature, as only one form of this sort of cultural production, was highly critical. Such analysis was nearly always based on the assumption that popular forms of expres- sion were either unsuccessful attempts at the creation of art or deliberate attempts to ignore artistic standards in order to appeal to a broader group. Dwight MacDonald pointed out, for example, in Against the American Grain (1952), that popu- lar culture came not from the masses but from above. He ar- gued that it was "fabricated by technicians hired by business- men" and maintained that it did not satisfy but rather exploit- ed the desires of the masses.1 Early analysts such as MacDonald assumed that all artistic creation ought to pursue the same purpose and argued that the real distinction between elite and popular literature was merely the difference between aesthetic success and failure. Although such analysis paved the way for serious consideration of a subject previously 1a- beled insignificant, it managed to avoid the most difficult questions posed by the appearance of two apparently separate and distinct cultures. Neither MacDonald nor others of his persuasion ever questioned whether all forms of human crea- tion embodied in written texts were the same. They did not ask if all literary texts were meant to perform similar cul- tural functions, nor did they attempt to determine whether they ought to be judged on the basis of the same aesthetic standards. In short, they failed to question that basic premise which served as the foundation for all their critical judgments; they simply assumed that all forms of human expres- sion ought to be evaluated on the basis of a single set of absolute criteria. Highly critical analysis such as MacDonald's was gradu- ally replaced in the 1960's by a more favorable sort in which popular forms of culture were scrutinized and examined in their own right. This kind of analysis developed as a result of the growing interest in comprehensive intellectual history and be- cause of the new concern for the sociological study of all forms of cultural expression, whether high or low. Three dis- tinct but related approaches developed during this period, and all assumed that the study of popular literature could tell a great deal about the culture that produced it. The first approach, which I call "historical," made every effort to avoid critical judgments based on the notion of artistic merit. Its practitioners observed that popular forms of ex- pression were appealing to larger and larger audiences and they argued that because of this such forms ought to be ex- amined systematically and in depth. What resulted was a his- torical catalogue or a history of the development of genres. Perhaps the most important and best known study using this general historical approach was Russel B. Nye's The Un- embarrassed Muse: The Popular Arts in America, first publish- ed in 1970. Nye's work was a detailed history of the develop- ment of popular literature, music, and drama, and it was based on the assumption that "whatever its manner of expression, popular culture and the arts included in that culture can no longer be treated with contempt or dismissed as unworthy of study." 2 Nye rarely made comparative judgments about various works within a particular genre and preferred, instead, to describe in depth the development of the genre as a whole. His book was one of the first to treat popular art seriously and without condescension. As the historical approach developed in sophistication and popularity, it gave rise to a related form of analysis and study which I like to call "sociological." This approach, like its parent, avoided the whole problem of critical evalu- ation and instead thought of the popular arts as a cultural barometer. Sociological analysts argued that by examining the themes and ideas of popular forms of expression, one could learn a great deal about the general concerns and preoccupa- tions of the culture as a whole. Roderick Nash, for instance, maintained in The Nervous Generation: American Thought, 1917 1930, that "the intellectual life of a nation does not begin and end with intellectuals."3 As a result, his study of the American twenties paid due homage to Fitzgerald, Hemingway, and O'Neill, but also focused on Gene Stratton-Portor, Zane Grey, and Bruce Barton. Although Nash thus acknowledged the importance of popular literature, his analysis of it was still highly traditional in its preoccupation with theme and idea. Nash simply applied the common tools of literary analysis to popular literature in order to shed some light on those as- pects of American culture not represented or expressed in elite art. In a sense, he assumed as MacDonald had, that popular and elite literature functioned in the same way and could be explicated using the same method. The difference was that Nash saw some sociological value in the study of popular forms of expression, whereas MacDonald generally 1a- mented the fact of their existence. The third approach to the study of popular literary forms also developed in the late sixties and was closely re- lated to the sociological approach in its dependence on the tools and forms of traditional literary analysis. However, while sociological analysts used these tools to demonstrate the way in which pOpular works reflected the world of which they were a part, these other "literary" analysts simply used the tools to interpret works regardless of their connection with society. This "literary" approach became increasingly popular after the founding of the Popular Culture Association in 1968, and it is still the primary method employed by con- tributors to the Journal of Popular Culture. In this kind of analysis, a popular work of literature is considered in- trinsically valuable and it is dissected and explained with the same kind of attention to detail that would be paid to a work like Ulysses or The Sound and the Fury. In the Fall, 1974 issue of the Journal of Popular Culture, for instance, James B. Lane carefully analyzed the themes of violence and sex in Harold Robbin's A Stone for Danny Fisher and Hubert Selby, Jr.'s Last Exit to Brooklyn.4 While Lane did specu— late that the reason for the popularity of these works was their ability to create a "realistic journey into the recent past," he did not analyze the novels solely because they could be treated as a window open to that past.5 Instead, he argued that their very popularity attested to their sig- nificance and, as a result, he carefully scrutinized character development, plot construction, and thematic unity. Like the historical and sociological analyst of popular literature, the literary analyst like Lane seldom concerned himself with the differences between his subject and the forms of elite literature. Content to confine himself to an analy- sis of the structure and ideas found in works clearly identi- fiable as "popular," this sort of analyst produced almost no theoretical writing about the relationship between popular or low literature and high art. As a result, most of the ques- tions left unanswered by the early critics of popular culture continued to be ignored by the new historical, sociological, and literary apologists alike. It appears to me that if these very basic questions about the structure and function of popular literature are not first addressed, no serious at- tempt can be made to formulate comparative or evaluative judg- ments about popular forms of expression. If we do not make some attempt to describe the exact nature of popular literary forms, we can never hope to distinguish them from high art forms, nor can we hope to evaluate their relative success or failure on their own merits. To do so, certain fundamental problems must first be confronted and resolved. It is first absolutely necessary to recognize that the heretofore generally accepted distinction between elite and popular literature is not a distinction that has been care- fully and systematically established in theory. In most cases where the problem is even treated, the two different categories have been set up on two completely distinct and separate sets of criteria. The category, "art," or elite literature, for example, is usually composed of those works judged by the literary and academic community to embody cer- tain ideal standards and to perform some generally agreed- upon "aesthetic" function. Often, however, these ideal standards are not explicitly stated, nor are the aesthetic functions to be performed by a work of art set forth. Still, works continue to be dismissed and excluded from this vaguely defined category in an easy and off-handed manner that is truly astonishing. On the other hand, the category, "popular literature," is sometimes established on the basis of numbers alone, and sometimes on the notion that the ideas and themes exhibited in such works are “of the people." There seems to be a genu- ine disagreement over the meaning of the word, "popular," since some critics argue it refers simply to the phenomenon of mass readership, while others maintain it delineates a cer- tain kind of relationship between a work and the society that produced it. In both instances, however, the definition cre- ates more problems than it solves. In the first case, the definition forces us to label most of William Shakespeare's major plays "popular literature," and in the second case, we find ourselves hard pressed to exclude Benjamin Franklin's Autobiography from a list of those works whose themes are judged to be "of the people." While such categorization might not bother the most rabid champion of popular litera- ture, it would almost certainly be challenged by elite crit- ics and popular culture analysts alike who, for centuries, have thought of both Shakespeare's and Franklin's work as "art." The real problem with these glibly defined categories of "art" and "popular literature," is that they do not sepa— rate popular works from elite works on a consistent basis. Because the criteria used to identify a work of art are quite different from those used to isolate a popular work, the categories thus established are not mutually exclusive. They are not founded on a differentiation based on certain constant reference points such as language-use or character development and, as a result, it is entirely possible to find a work that performs the aesthetic functions thought of as the province of art, and which, at the same time, en- joys immense popularity in the sense of mass readership. By the same token, it is conceivable that we can point to a work which reflects the attitudes and ideas "of the people” and which fulfills, at the same time, the ideal standards conceived of as the definition of art. In each case, the shoddy and inconsistent delineation of criteria prevents us from identifying how a particular work differs from another, and we are then prevented from assigning any work to a truly descriptive category. Consequently, categorization such as this is generally useless and in effect serves only to muddy already unclear waters to an even greater extent. It seems evident to me that popular literature analysts are in desperate need of a comprehensive theory of literary expression which will include a system of categorization that is both consistent and useful. In such a theory, the exact range of the categories themselves will have to be founded on the similarities that exist among all forms of written ”literary" expression, and the resulting distinctions between kinds or types of expression will have to be formulated on the basis of a comparison over a fixed set of referenceepoints or ideas. Only by establishing such categories on a consist- ent basis, can we hope to differentiate one kind of literary expression from another with any sort of confidence. However, I must add here that I do not envision such a system of cate- gorization as a rigid or static one composed only of separate categories with absolutely determined and impenetrable bound- aries. Instead, I prefer to think of the whole realm of lit- erary expression as a kind of continuum, possessing two 10 theoretical poles composed of works different from one an- other, but joined by a middle range marked off by a multitude of variations. In such a system, the continuum would ideally include all texts that could be identified as "literary," and the two poles would be defined by the fact that certain groups of works could be shown to theoretically exhibit diametrically opposed structures and to perform opposite functions. It will be my purpose in this paper then, to define the nature of that continuum, to indicate how and in what way it is marked off in theory by two very different types of literary texts, and to explain how those types gradually fade into each other in practice. In approaching such a problem, it occurs to me that there is no small significance in the fact that all written literary texts, whether casually defined as popular or elite, are at one and the same time expressions of an individual human mind and creations wrought of language. While this kind of observation may amount to nothing more than a truism for some, it seems absolutely essential to me as that most basic of starting points. For if we can accurately determine what it is that "high art" and "popular literature" have in common as human creations in the medium of language, we might be better able to discern exactly how they use that language differently and in what way they vary their appeal to their readers. A two-sided observation such as this would then enable us to suggest flexible categories based on both struc- tural and functional differences. While it would be impossible 11 to specify the exact dividing line between the two categories, we could define them as pure theoretical types and then com- pare specific works to each. In this way, we could identify which structures and functions a particular work possessed or did not possess and, as a result, we could place that work on the continuum of literary texts by referring to how closely it approached one or the other theoretical type. From the preceding introductory remarks, I am sure it is easy to discern the direction I propose to take for the remainder of this study. After establishing a certain theory of human expression and providing a complementary theory of language-use, I intend to suggest ways in which written texts employ language differently for different expressive purposes. I propose to delineate both structural and functional differ- ences among kinds of literary texts and I hope thereby to ex— plain both how and why one kind of text can establish a cer— tain relationship with its readers, while another type can appear to create a very different one. After formulating such loose and flexible theoretical distinctions, I will ex- amine certain texts generally thought of as obviously differ— ent in kind with the intention of showing the structural and functional variations in operation. I then propose to con- sider the problems posed by borderline cases, that is, by texts which do not clearly fall within the ideal limits of one category or the other. Only then will I address the dif- ficult problem of comparative evaluation and aesthetic judg- ment and make some suggestions about the models and methods 12 which might be employed with such a normative interest in mind. NOTES 1Dwight MacDonald, Against the American Grain (New York: Random House, 1952), p. 14. 2Russel B. Nye, The Unembagrassed Muse: The Popular Arts in America (New York: The Dial Press, 1970), P. 420. 3Roderick Nash, The Nervous Generation: American Thought, 1917-1930 (Chicago: Rand McNally College Publish- ing Company, 1970), p. ix. 4James B. Lane, "Violence and Sex in the Post-War Popular Urban Novel: With a Consideration of Harold Robbins's a Brooklyn.“ Journal of Popular Culture, VIII (1974), 295-308. A Stone for Danny Fisher and Hubert Selby, Jr.'s Last Exit to 5 Lane, "Violence," p. 295. 13 CHAPTER II A PHENOMENOLOGICAL THEORY OF LANGUAGE Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology, and Human Expression It has always been my conviction that the most useful and convincing theories of literary form are those derived from a clear theoretical conception of the human mind and the process of artistic creation. While many have speculated over the years on the exact nature and function of literary form, comparatively few have grounded such speculations in an understanding of the complex relationship that obtains between thought, language-use, and expression. However, modern phenomenology and linguistic theory have evolved since the turn of the century into far-reaching inquiries into the general human capacity to create meaning and, as a result, a new comprehensive outlook has prompted the formulation of several inclusive theories which treat literary creation as a special case of human expression. Although Maurice Merleau- Ponty was only one among many phenomenological philosophers, and despite the fact that he died before he could systemati- cally examine the peculiarities of expression in the medium of language, it seems to me that Merleau-Ponty's theory of the body-subject possesses some of the most interesting and pregnant suggestions ever made about the intricate connec- tions between consciousness, perception, and literary l4 15 expression. Before he died in 1961, Merleau-Ponty was able to sketch out the framework for a complete phenomenology of language, which I believe can be filled inland extended to produce a phenomenology of literary expression which will specifically treat the differences and distinctions between those forms we traditionally call "elite" and "popular." This chapter, then, is an exploration and extension of Merleau- Ponty's phenomenology of language and, in it, I try to lay the groundwork for the phenomenology of literary expression which is the subject of the third chapter. Maurice Merleau-Ponty's theory of language is itself only one aspect of his more comprehensive exploration into the nature of human life in general and it is, therefore, de- rived from a complex conception of the relationship between the human subject and his environment. In fact, most of Merleau-Ponty's early works are designed as systematic refu- tations of the traditional notion of the human subject as a consciousness distinct and separate from an independent en- vironment or Nature.1 Merleau—Ponty generally disagrees with Cartesian philosophy and rejects the traditional subject- object ontology which even now still dominates much of twentieth-century philosophical thought. In The Structure of Behavior, for example, Merleau-Ponty explores generally- accepted theories about the relationship between the human subject and its world, and concludes, finally, that "a deeper reflection on the objects of science and on physical causality finds relations in them which cannot be posited in-themselves 16 (en soi) and which have meaning only before the inspection of mind."2 Merleau-Ponty argues, in effect, that subject and object, body and world, are inextricably intertwined and as a result cannot be accurately spoken of as separate and distinct entities. Consciousness, for Merleau-Ponty, is always consciousness g: something, just as the world is a world only by virtue of the fact that it exists f9; someone. Using terminology borrowed from the writings of Edmund Husserl, Merleau-Ponty expands upon this conclusion in his preface to Phenomenology of Perception, where he advocates that philosophy return to the Lebenswelt, or to a description of things themselves. "To return to the things themselves," he writes, "is to return to that world which precedes knowl- edge, of which knowledge always speaks and in relation to which every scientific schematization is an abstract and derivative sign-language, as is geography in relation to the countryside in which we have learnt beforehand what a forest, a prairie or a river is."3 Merleau-Ponty insists that phe- nomenology's goal is the description of the primordial con- tact between body and world which exists prior to any form of consciousness as suCh. He argues that the human body is not a separate physical entity which merely comes into con- tact with an already fully constituted world, but instead, a structure which is open to the world and correlative with it. He also maintains that the world is inseparable from the perceiving subject who is always inserted in the world by virtue of his incarnation as a body. Man's "being-in-the- 17 world” precedes any consciousness he may have of that world, and as a result, he is truly a body-subject who lives in direct contact with beings and things.4 This notion of the body-subject, then, is the founda- tion of all Merleau-Ponty's philOSOphical speculations in- cluding those he made about language-use and the creation of meaning. It is the primary concern of his two major treatises, Phenomenology of Perception and The Visible and the Invisible,5 and it must be recognized for the revolu- tionary concept that it is, if the full implications of his position are to be known. It is, therefore, necessary to summarize this conception before any discussion of his lin- guistic theories can begin. The following is in no way in- tended as a critical analysis of the notion of the body- subject, but is meant, rather, as a quick summary of Merleau- Ponty's most basic premise and starting point.6 In commenting on Merleau-Ponty's use of the phrase j'en suis in The Visible and the Invisible, Remy Kwant has pointed out that the choice could not have been a more per- fect one, since the very structure of the phrase itself em- phasizes the fact that man and the world are not separate entities for Merleau-Ponty.7 Because of the peculiar exi- gencies of French grammar, subject and object are locked to- gether here as the single morpheme or word, 1:32. Thus, by using this particular wording, Merleau-Ponty has not only said that I, as human consciousness, belong to it, or Being, but that consciousness and Being are intertwined or joined 18 as two syllables of a single word or as two sides of a single piece of paper. He also uses the word 1e chiasme or chiasm to describe this conjunction, and the metaphor seems peculiarly apt. 8 By referring to the connection between man and the world as a figure of crossed lines like the Greek letter chi, Merleau- Ponty indicates that the entity he seeks to describe is a unity composed of distinct elements and that any analytical procedure which attempts to isolate or separate those elements actually destroys that unity.9 Merleau-Ponty maintains that consciousness and the world only have real being as correla- tive aspects of a single entity and that to speak of them ac- curately, we must, in effect, learn to distinguish without dividing. Although Merleau-Ponty elaborates at some length 10 in the last section of The Visible and the Invisible on the exact nature of this connection between man and Being, it is not necessary to recount the entire argument here. Suffice it to say that Merleau-Ponty envisions human consciousness and the environment as reverse "sides" of a unified single Being and refuses to grant independent ontological status to either. They exist together for Merleau-Ponty as a unity of reciprocal implication. He argues that consciousness and the world are inextricably intertwined through the medium of the human body and that if we are to understand how man makes -meaning out of that environment, we must acknowledge the im- portance of the corporeal connection between the two. 19 It is absolutely clear that although the idea of incar- nation is central to Merleau-Ponty's theory, his conception of the body is not even remotely related to our common-sense notion of it as a mere collection of physical organs. In- stead, he views it as a kind of power or ability, an I-can, as he sometimes calls it. Merleau-Ponty thinks of the human body as the center of power or locus of a man's ability to be subject and object for himself at one and the same time. He points out again and again throughout his works that man can use his left hand to touch his right hand just as his right hand is touching his left, and thus simultaneously be both toucher and touched, perceiver and perceived, subject and object. From this he concludes that man has the unique ability to be both sensitive to himself and to the world as well. His body is a perceptible reality in that it is fully continguous with Being and can be seen, and yet it is likewise a perceiving reality since it can take note of the reality that surrounds it. The body, then, belongs to things or to the world and is in full communion with them, but it is also separate from those things in that it is capable of "looking" at them from a distance. As Merleau-Ponty writes in Themes from the Lectures, "we are not dealing here with two natures, one subordinate to the other, but with a double nature. . . . Thus the body proper is a sensible and it is the 'sensing'; it can be seen and it can see itself; it can be touched and it can touch itself, and, in this latter respect, it comprises an aspect inaccessible to others, open in principle only to 20 In other words, while man's body is visible to others, his power to see or to do is not; hence, his visible body is the reverse side of his invisible power to see or to do. The human body is, therefore, simultaneously a "thing" and an activity or power, and its two aspects are conditioned by the fact that they occupy a physical place by virtue of their connection and mutual interpenetration in a single, sensible portion of Nature. It can be seen therefore that for Merleau-Ponty the human subject is truly a body-subject, that is, an incarnate power-to-be occupying a specific, identifiable place in na- ture. What this means is that every human subject has a unique physical perspective on the things of his environment and is simultaneously affected by and expressive of that situation or perspective. To see the world is to see from a certain place, and the things that are seen are thus per- spectively altered by the position from which they are viewed. To speak is to speak about things from a particular point in space and time, and the things that are uttered are thus con- ditioned by the special circumstances of the point of utter- ance. It is impossible'for man to operate outside his own particular corporeal orientation and, as a result, every gesture, movement, thought, and act is in some way an expres- sion of that individual's way-of-being-in-the-world. In es- sence, then, both the act and the product of that act are embodiments of the actor's particular corporeal situation. Even in vision, as Merleau-Ponty says, "the meaning of a 21 perceived object when picked out from all others still does not stand isolated from the constellation in which it appears; it is articulated only as a certain distance in relation to the order of space, time, motion, and signification in general in which we are established." 12 Merleau-Ponty concludes that meaning or order cannot be said to exist solely within the natural world nor can it be seen as the creation of conscious- ness alone. Rather, it must be thought of as the pre-conscious orientation itself or way of occupying space born at that mo- ment when a body-subject is situated within Being. Merleau-Ponty argues that this pre-conscious orientation exists for the body-subject from the beginning, but not as con- scious awareness of "meaning" as such. It is only objectified and given presence in the world through expression which he defines as man's ability to absent one portion of his experi- ential field as "object" from the rest of himself as experi- encing subject. Merleau-Ponty argues that man is continuous with the world and open to its meaning before he is conscious of it as meaning. When he does gradually become aware of him- self as the tangible-toucher, the audible-hearer, and the sen- sible sensor, man can be said to be both absent from himself and present to himself at the same time. He is absent from himself in that he feels a portion of himself as an alien "object," as a tangible "thing," for instance. But he is, at the same time, present to himself because he continues to ”know" he is the toucher of that thing. Once man is able to absent himself in this way, he is able to make an object of 22 virtually any portion of that Being with which he is continu- ous. In doing so, he expresses his primordial situation and gives it objective existence as the object seen, thing felt, or act completed. In essence; Merleau-Ponty argues the ob- ject "created" is not separate from the act that gave it ex- istence or meaning, and hence, that both are always necessary expressions of a way-of-being-in-the-world. Even perception itself is expression according to Merleau-Ponty, and the thing perceived is as much a part of that expression as is the act itself. "Perception," he writes, "is precisely that kind of act in which there can be no question of setting the act it- self apart from the end to which it is directed. Perception and the perceived necessarily have the same existential mo- dality, since perception is inseparable from the conscious- ness it has, or rather is, of reaching the thing itself."13 Expression then is that most basic activity through which man gives objective, identifiable, and separate existence to some small portion of his manner of being-in-the-world. It is the process by which he makes meaning out of his corporeal situation and causes part of it to be born as sense or as some "thing" in the world. It is, in short, that "primary operation which first constitutes signs as signs, makes that which is expressed dwell in them through the eloquence of their arrangement and configuration alone, implants a meaning in that which did not have one, and thus-mfar from exhausting itself in the instant at which it occurs-—inaugurates an order and founds an institution or tradition."14 23 It is expression, therefore, which is the link between human consciousness as we know it in everyday life and the pre-conscious, pre-verbal level of existence in which that consciousness is grounded. At this primordial level of aware- ness all being is inarticulate or mute in that it has no identifiable "meaning" as such. What form or structure there is exists as inseparable and indistinguishable from the field as a whole. Individuals and things are merely im- perceptible variations woven into the single fabric of Being. However, through expression, these variations or mute struc- tures and forms are actualized by being isolated; they are marked off or framed by a body-subject as separate aspects of its own field and thus given objective, bodily presence. To express is to give existence to some part of that system which is made up of all the connections and lines of force created by a particular body-subject's insertion in the world. As Remy Kwant points out, expression transforms man's pri- mordial or pre-conscious awareness of the world into a reflec- tive consciousness which is simultaneously aware of itself as perceiver and of the world as perceived.15 Speech and Language Merleau-Ponty maintains that expression can take many forms including that of gestures, behavior, or work, but he concedes that expression through speech is a special case and occupies a privileged position.l6 Expressive speech is born between two silences according to Merleau-Ponty; it ‘24 expresses the pre-conscious silence that is inarticulate and unaware of its own meaning, but it does so only to bring that silence or "truth," as he sometimes calls it, to conscious existence--only to actualize it as part of the objective world. As Merleau-Ponty writes in The Prose of the World, "when one goes from the order of events to the order of ex- pression, one changes levels but does not change the world."17 It is through the objectification process inherent in lan- guage-use itself that distance is achieved between man and Being, and, as a result, man must speak of the world in order to know it. To say something about the world is actually to bring that world to existence. A word is not the sign or representation of a particular thought but that thought's very existence in the world. Expressive speech, then, or the use of language, is not merely a mental act but a produc- tion of the entire body-subject. Just as man's body is the incarnation of a dimension or style of being in physical space, so speech is the embodiment of that style in act. Merleau-Ponty argues that when someone speaks, inchoate Being is transmuted into objectified meaning. In speech there occurs a "migration of meaning scattered in experience that leaves the flesh in which it did not manage to collect itself, mobilizes already capitalized instruments for its (own profit, and employs them so that in the end they become the very body it had needed while in the process of acquir- ing the dignity of expressed meaning." Speech is not merely 18 one gesture among many for Merleau-Ponty but "the vehicle of 25 our movement toward truth, as the body is the vehicle of our being in the world."19 It is the incomprehensible virtue of language that it segm§_to efface itself before the meaning that it embodies, and it thus always propels us toward the world it signifies and to which it refers. For example, when we understand what someone is saying, we do not attend to each word as it is uttered but rather to the entire meaning or idea marked out by those words taken together. As Merleau-Ponty comments, "the perfection of language lies in its capacity to pass unnoticed."20 Because of its abilities and consequent complexities, language can always be considered from two distinct but en- tirely related perspectives. It is, on the one hand, an in- stitution or system made up of culturally agreed-upon signs, equivalent meanings, and rules for their combination. On the other hand, it can also be thought of as an act or event whereby we are ostensibly led beyond the signs themselves to some separate "meaning." Language is neither the stable in- stitution itself nor the speaking event alone. The two exist, rather, as reverse sides of a single entity. If a system of signs with generally agreed-upon meanings did not exist, men could not objectify their experiences in such a way that they could be understood by others. But, on the other hand, if it was not possible to add to that system through new speech acts, to augment the meanings already available within the institution, then no man could ever say anything that had not been said before and no new meaning could ever be embodied in 26 the carnal presence of words. For every potential speaker, therefore, language is first a system that must be learned, an institution to which entrance must be sought. If looked at in this manner, that is synchronically, it is a static, unchanging body of knowledge which every child must acquire. Merleau-Ponty refers to language looked at in this way as le langage parlé21 and thinks of it as a "fait accompli--as the residue of past acts of signification and the record of already acquired meaning."22 Language in this sense, however, is wholly dependent on speech events themselves which create the institution over the course of time. Speech, or 13 langage‘parlant, language looked at diachronically, is then made up of contingent, temporary, individual acts which go beyond the limits of the institution itself and which con- stantly add to or actualize the possibilities of expression contained within it. Speech events are therefore capable of and responsible for the modification of language as a system. The two taken together comprise the true being of language, which Merleau-Ponty refers to as logic in contingency. Lan- guage, he comments, is an "oriented system which neverthe- less always elaborates random factors, taking what was for- tuitous up into a meaningful whole - incarnate logic."23 In his essay, "On the Phenomenology of Language," Merleau-Ponty is careful to stress the fact that language can never be reduced to either one of its two aspects. He cautions, furthermore, that we must not conceive of them as two separate and distinct entities in sequential juxtaposition, 27 but must recognize that they interpenetrate one another and function simultaneously in a kind of dialogue. Merleau-Ponty adds that "far from our being able to juxtapose a psychology of language [focusing on the event] and a science of language [focusing on the institution] by reserving language in the present for the first and language in the past for the second, we must recognize that the present diffuses into the past to the extent that the past has been present. History is the history of successive synchronies, and the contingency of the linguistic past invades even the synchronic system."24 In other words, it can never be a question of arguing that speech events are the chronological antecedents of language considered as a system, since there can never be a speech event that does not use the elements of that system. Nor can we ever say that the institution as such precedes any use that can be made of it, since the institution itself is determined by the residue or sedimentation of all past speech acts. Still, theorists deliberately ignore the diachronic aspect of the being of language and insist on considering language wholly as a synchronic system. But this kind of limiting vision prevents us from understanding how new mean- ing is made and how it is communicated among men. To look, at language synchronically, that is as a stable, self-contained system, is to close off the possibility of diachronic or tem- poral change and hence to ignore the fact that speakers utter things that have never been said before and that, as a result, 28 still others are admitted to ideas they did not previously know. The Phenomenological Conception of Language If we are to account for the fact that people g9 learn, it seems absolutely necessary to consider language phenome- nologically, that is, from the point of view of a speaker who can manipulate the language system to express his unique way- of-being-in-the-world and to communicate that meaning to others.25 To look at language in this way is to recognize the intertwining that exists between language as event and language as a system and to acknowledge the fundamental na- ture of the interdependence that results. However, the phe- nomenological point of view also enables us to admit that despite this radical dependency, language as event is onto- logically prior to language considered as a system. What this means is that the temporal speech act itself is actual, that is, it can be said to exist in the real world, whereas the language system as a whole is only virtual in that no speech act can ever realize it in totality. As Merleau- Ponty says, "since synchrony is only a section of diachrony, the system realized in it never exists wholly in act but always involves latent or incubating changes."26 Thus, lan- guage considered phenomenologically can never be thought of as a group of absolutely determined univocal meanings which are explicitly defined as the equivalents of certain signs by some tranSparent consciousness. Rather, it must be thought 29 of as “a cohesive whole of convergent linguistic gestures, each of which [is]'defined less by a signification than a use-value."27 Language in this sense is truly a system-in- use and Merleau-Ponty refers to it as Speech. This phenome- nological conception of language as Speech, does not refer merely to the act of speaking itself nor to the system of sedimented.meaning, but rather to the convergence or inter- twining of the two that is effected when a human subject utters words to make himself understood. Speech, as Merleau- Ponty says, does not simply activate the possibilities con- tained within the language system. Far from being a simple effect of that system, "it modifies and sustains [it] just as much as it is conveyed through it."28 Merleau-Ponty is not always consistent in his use of the term Speech and sometimes employs it to refer to any speech event at all. However, he does use the term most often to designate that kind of speech act which manipulates the language system in order to formulate a new meaning, that kind of act which attempts to give carnal presence to an ”idea" that has only previously existed outside the system itself. When language is thus used "authentically," it forces the listener to go beyond the system of signs and their equivalent meanings to some indeterminate space where the new meaning is created for the first time. When language is used in this way, as Speech, "it is not a simple invita- tion to the listener or reader to discover in himself signifi- cations that were already there. It is rather the trick 30 whereby the writer or orator, touching on these significa- tions already present in us [as part of the language system], makes them yield strange sounds."29 As Merleau-Ponty usually defines it, then, Speech is "that operation through which a certain arrangement of already available signs and significa- tions alters and then transfigures each of them, so that in the end a new signification is secreted."30 Language used in this way is truly expressive, that is, it is used to give form to that primordial, pre-verbal level of experience which is thereby organized and made to exist in the carnal presence of words. However, it must be added here that language can also be used in such a way that both speaker and listener rely on familiar significations which have been previously deposited within the system as a result of creative speech acts. But before I can elaborate on this kind of language- use or discuss its relationship to truly expressive Speech, it is first necessary to point out a few crucial facts about the nature of the language system itself. As I have noted previously, a language system is com- posed of signs which seem to possess certain equivalent mean- ings and rules governing the combination of those signs. Every speech act, therefore, whether true Speech or not, must rely on and manipulate those signs according to the agreed-upon rules if anything at all is to be said. It is important to point out, however, that the signs themselves, taken singly, one by one, actually signify nothing. While this observation about language, first made by Ferdinand de 31 Saussure, is an extremely difficult one to grasp, it must be understood if we are to comprehend how a word, already known to possess a certain identifiable signification, can be modi- fied and forced to take on new meaning as a result of combina- tion with other words. Saussure maintained that although the sign was indeed the fundamental unit of language, it was not a thing or a substance but a functional relationship which itself contained two factors. The sign was actually the juncture between the word itself, the signifiant or signi- fier, and its arbitrarily determined meaning or signifié. 31 Saussure argued further that the essence of any sign was not simply its signifié, or some positively determined diction- ary definition, but rather the signification distance it marked off between itself and other signs. As Merleau-Ponty acknowledges, Saussure maintained that each sign "does not so much express a meaning as mark a divergence of meaning between itself and other signs" and that, as a result, "the terms of language are engendered only by the differences which appear among them."32 For example, the phoneme, "knife," taken entirely by itself, does not automatically signify that sharp-bladed instrument we commonly think of when we hear the phoneme pronounced. Rather, that sound refers to that instru- ment only by virtue of the fact that there are other, differ- ent sounds within the same language system which do not refer to it, but which indicate instead fork, spoon, spade, or shovel. Thus, the meaning of the word "knife" is not lodged in itself as it is explained in the dictionary correspondence table, but 32 [exists within the language system as a whole. The meaning of each sign is, therefore, dependent on the total movement of the language as it is spoken. Currently accepted theory about the acquisition of language in children seems to support Saussure's notion. Jean Piaget, for instance, points out that for very young children, words and even syllables function as complete sen- tences.33 He implies that what a child fi£§E_learns about language is not certain finite words and their dictionary meanings, but rather certain oppositive and relational prin- ciples about sign juxtaposition which are later applied and extended to a broader and broader range of signs. As Merleau- Ponty himself points out, "the important point is that the phonemes [or first words] are from the beginning variations of a unique speech apparatus, and that with them the child seems to have 'caught' the principle of a mutual differen- tiation of signs and at the same time to have acquired the meaning of the sign."34 What this means is that when a child has learned to speak and to master these functional opposi- tions, he has been initiated into a system where the ultimate relation of sign to meaning is dependent on the lateral re- lationship of sign to sign. Meaning, then, as it is created through language, arises only at the intersections and intervals between words. In order to Speak and to refer to the world we must make sen- tences out of signs which are themselves "empty." Like a charade, our speech can only be understood "through the 33 interaction of signs, each of which, taken separately, is equivocal or banal, and makes sense only by being combined with others." 35 Each time a sign is uttered, then, it is entirely dependent for its meaning on the speech act as a whole. Thus it is that the creation of guy meaning, whether familiar or new, is actually the product of the complete lan- guage system as it is mobilized and put to use in that par- ticular speech act. Meaning, therefore, cannot be said to exist behind or beneath separate words but is, rather, the creation of whole sentences engaged in discourse. To under- stand a speaker's meaning, we must let outselves be seduced by the motion of the sentences of his conversation, rather than consult a dictionary for the meaning of each word. Even though the sentence as the foundation of the speech act is composed of signs, it is not a sign itself. Created by the juxtaposition of a naming function and a predicative function, the sentence is a synthesis which goes beyond the simple sum of its parts. It is, in reality, a wholly separate entity, and it is through its existence as gygnp that meaning is made. Therefore, we are forced to analyze the exact nature of the speech event itself if we are to understand precisely how "empty" words can be put together to yield very different kinds of results. It has got to be the character of the tem- poral occurrence which determines whether words merely con- front a listener with familiar meanings or whether they point the way to radically new and not yet entirely formulated sig- nifications.36 34 Authentic or Creative Speech As has been mentioned before, language can be used in two distinct and different ways. Words can be combined ”authentically" so that they intersect with each other and thus create new meaning or they can be put together in such a way that both speaker and listener rely on the significa- tions generally associated with the words used. However, since those significations were once the original products of previously creative acts, the true importance of speech to the institution of language becomes increasingly clear. It would seem, therefore, absolutely necessary to explain the nature of a truly creative speech act before analyzing that secondary event which only refers to already expressed meanings. In the authentic use of language, that is, in true Speech, the speaking subject seeks to give objective, verbal presence to some portion of his pre-verbal, pre-conscious existence. What this means is that true Speech is not the verbal equivalent of some previously existing, conscious "thought," but that thought's actual existence or presence in the world. Thought simply cannot precede language if we accept Merleau-Ponty's premise that true meaning is only made to exist when some subject is able to separate a portion of his primordial existence from the total experiential field and cause it to exist apart from that field through the aus- pices of some other medium. A thought limited to existing for itself, outside the confines of language and speech, 35 would merely sink back into the pre-conscious state as soon as it had appeared. In essence, it would not even exist for itself, since without the separation and objectification of language there would be no consciousness. This idea can be demonstrated if we think about the process that occurs when we see an object whose exact essence we cannot discern. When I perceive some "thing" partially revealed in the shadows of twilight, that thing has no deter- minate existence for me until I can name it. While I do ad- mittedly see something, the object does not come into focus for me as an object until I can identify exactly what it is. To identify it is to give it its proper name, and therefore I only see a wheelbarrow-hidden-by-shadows at the very moment that I can say "that is a wheelbarrow hidden by shadows." The denomination of the object does not follow recognition but rather is that recognition itself.37 Thus, my statement itself bears the meaning, and by imposing it on the object, I am conscious of finally reaching and understanding that wheelbarrow. When a speech act is successful, therefore, and meaning is created, the sentence does not leave behind a simple reminder of some thought existing "out there" but brings the meaning into existence as the very essence of the words employed. As has been pointed out before, when I hear someone speak, I do not first attend to his words and then decipher the meaning hidden behind them. Instead, I listen to the thought or meaning directly as it is bodied forth at that moment in the presence of those words. 36 What is so misleading about the relationship between language and thought and causes us to believe in the exist- ence of thoughts apart from language, is thought already con- stituted and expressed--thought which we recall to ourselves in the privacy of our silent existence. However, this silence is, in actuality, teeming with words, and our inner life is really an internal speaking.38 Such thoughts were at one time the original products of radically creative speech acts, and it is only as a result of repetition and familiarity that they have become acquired significations and internal posses- sions. We must say, therefore, with Merleau-Ponty, that "true speech does not translate ready-made thought, but ac- complishes it."39 When man uses language to accomplish thought, to ex- press, whether for himself or others, something about his living relation with the world, that language is not an in- strument of translation, but a manifestation or revelation of his most personal existence. When he speaks "authenti- cally," he does not simply transpose into equivalent words some previously known "thing-to-say," existing before him, but rather gives verbal existence to an as yet indeterminate desire to say something. This "significative intention," as Merleau-Ponty terms it, is an experienced gap or a ”speechless want," and it is produced by the fact that each 40 man experiences a great deal more than he or anyone else has ever expressed. What any speaker has to say, then, is only "the excess of what [he] lives over what has already been 37 said." 41 Since this significative intention is merely the awareness of a lack, the speaking subject has no text to guide him, no concrete idea of what words to choose to tell him what he feels the lack or privation of. He has no ex- plicit or formulated idea of what he desires to say until he has actually said it. In true speech, therefore, the subject does not deliberately select each sign as the equivalent of some previously worked out signification "the way one searches for a hammer to drive in a nail or pincers to pull one out."42 Instead, he feels the need to say something, directs his in- tention toward the as yet indeterminate goal and simply be- gins to speak.‘ One might say that the speaker aims at the words he needs in the same way that I unconsciously reach across my desk to shut a window. I do not need to mentally represent space and my own body in order to effect the neces- sary movements involved in shutting the window because both space and my own body exist for me as part of a possible field of action. In the same way, the speaker does not need to visualize a word or represent it to himself in order to articulate it. He possesses certain words as part of his linguistic field of action, merely reaches back to the neces- sary locations in that field, and utters the words he finds. Since this is an extremely difficult concept to grasp, it . might be helpful here to let Merleau-Ponty himself speak at some length on the subject. In commenting on the way in which words are selected in a speech act, he writes: 38 The words and turns of phrase needed to bring my significative intention to expression recom- mend themselves to me, when I am speaking, only by what Humboldt called innere Sppachform . . . that is, only by a certain style of speaking from which they arise and according to which they are organized without my having to repre- sent them to myself. There is a "languagely" meaning of language which effects the mediation between my as yet unspeaking intention and words, and in such a way that my spoken words surprise me myself and teach me my thought. Organized signs have their immanent meaning, which does not arise from the "I think" but from the "I am able to." This action at a distance by lan- guage, which brings significations together without touching them, and this eloquence which designates them in a peremptory fashion without ever changing them into words or breaking the silence of consciousness are eminent cases of corporeal intentionality. . . . Signification arouses speech as the world arouses my body - by a mute presence which awakens my intentions without deploying itself before them.43 It is true to say, therefore, that a speaker never knows exactly what he wishes to say until he says it. While he does experience a desire to say something, the exact char- acter of that something remains concealed from him until he gives it the "bodily" presence of words. In a sense, his meaning precedes his speaking and simultaneously is its re- sult. It can be said that it comes into existence as the internal companion of the words he utters, and yet that it also guides the choice of those words. A speaker thus has only one way to represent a word or idea to himself and that is to utter it.‘ It is impossible to state, therefore, whether meaning precedes language or is its creation. There can be no question of primary or secondary phenomena here since sub- ordination of one to the other simply cannot exist.44 Speech- 39 or the act of expression-~"this joining through transcendence of the linguistic meaning of speech and the signification it intends - is not for us speaking subjects a second-order oper- ation we supposedly have recourse to only in order to communi- cate our thoughts to others, but our own taking possession or acquisition of significations which otherwise are present to us only in a muffled way."45 If we accept this fact that new significations come in- to existence as the result of authentic speech acts, we must inevitably wonder how it is that familiar words can be com- bined to reveal meanings they have never carried before. Furthermore, we are prompted by such an assertion to question the manner in which the traditional use-value of individual signs can be permanently altered by a single, contingent speech event. That this undoubtedly occurs is attested to by the publication history of any good dictionary since the meanings of many words are subtly altered between one edition and the next. But the exact manner in which such a change is effected is not clearly understood and the process itself is seldom treated systematically in linguistic theories. In attempting to account for the radical creation of meaning and its consequent effect on the character of the language system, Merleau-Ponty uses a phrase he attributes to André Malraux, who attempted to explain the operation of a similar process in painting.46 Merleau-Ponty speaks of "the coherent deforma- tion," as that operation which arranges available words and their significations in a new sense thereby taking "not only 40 the hearer but the speaking subject as well through a deci- sive step." What he describes here is that strange process 47 which occurs when one suddenly sees through the previously opaque words of a speaker or writer and instantly understands ideas which have been obscure until that particular moment. Such an éclarissement or enlightening can occur at all levels, whether one is confronted by the modest changes to a few words introduced by the operation of a local metaphor or by the radical reorientation of a whole language system created by the statement of a new philosophical theory. In either case, once-familiar words are combined in such a way that they are momentarily thrown out of focus for the reader or listener who is then forced to ignore their generally accept- ed significations and to await the modification or augmenta- tion of them which will be effected by their own internal co- herence and form. It is this action of language upon language which is the essence of Speech, and Merleau-Ponty argues we cannot conceptually place it within the speaker or the listener or even within the words themselves. This magical transforma- tion of signs occurs, instead, at the point of convergence created when a man speaks to another man using the standard units of a language system. Merleau-Ponty acknowledges the importance of this conjunction in The Prose of the World when he writes, "the other's words or mine in him, do not limit themselves to vibrating like chords the listener's machinery of acquired significations or to arousing some 41 reminiscence. Their flow must have thegpower of throwing me in turn toward a signification that neither he nor I possessed before." In actuality then, it is the flow of the words 48 themselves as they interact within both speaker and listener which creates the decentering and subsequent refocusing re- sponsible for the foundation of new meaning. This difficult concept can be explained fairly easily if we stop here for a moment and expand on Merleau-Ponty's notion of the body-subject, on its insertion in and perception of the world, and on its confrontation with others. At the moment when man is born into the world as a body-subject, he is primordially situated and immediately begins to organize his perceptual field. As a result of this normal situation and organization process, certain figures are set off from the ground, tOp is distinguished from bottom, and space is organized. As Merleau-Ponty puts it, "certain elements of the world assume the value of dimensions to which subsequently all the rest relate and through which we can point them out."49 Meaning is then created out of this situation when a subject focuses on and isolates an aspect of his pre-verbal existence as it is profiled against this primordial orientation or situa- tion. In a sense, this is a process of comparison, and in dis- cussing it in The Prose of the World, Merleau-Ponty refers to it both as the "coherent deformation" and as the perceiver's individual "style" of perception. He echoes Malraux's com- ment that "all style is giving form to the elements of the world which permits the orientation of the world to one of 42 its parts," and then adds that "signification occurs where we subject the given elements of the world to a 'coherent deformation.”50 His point here is that even at the most basic level of individual experience, meaning is the product of a comparative relationship established between the "object" being brought into existence and the perceiving subject's primordial organization of the perceptual field. By placing the new element into relationship with the already organized field, the perceiver subjects the field to a change or deforma- tion that is nonetheless coherent. The whole field is deform- ed in that it is organized around an entirely new focal point, but that deformation is still comprehensible to the perceiver because the reorganization is carried out with respect to the originary dimensions which mark his primordial situation. Merleau-Ponty argues that even when a man perceives his world, he "stylizes" it--that is, he affects all the elements of the thing, body, or behavior which he sees with a certain common deviation with respect to the familiar norm that he has be- hind or within him.51 Even perceptual meaning, therefore, is the product of this comparison process--this coherent de- formation through which man "focuses the signification still scattered in his perception and gives it an express exist- ence."52 As a result of this fundamental operation, each body- subject works out a system of relationships and equivalences which serves as the skeleton or framework for all future per- ceptions. EaCh time a subject confronts some new object, 43 person, or idea, those "things” are fit into that system, differentiated by the distance marked off between them and the elements of the system, and thus given meaningful, in- dependent, perceptual existence. Each individual, therefore, can be said to possess his own unique style or system of in- ternal relationships and'equivalences, and communication is, as a result, the confrontation and merging of one style with another. This confrontation and interpenetration is made possible by the fact that both subjects perceive the same world through similar bodies. Their perceptual systems, therefore, possess certain elements in common, and the mean- ings of one can be understood and accommodated by the mean- ings of the other. What this signifies is that when I per- ceive the gestures of another, I do not merely understand the meaning I have put into those gestures, but actually com- prehend the gestures themselves in terms of my own body and its system of equivalences. As Merleau-Ponty says, "in watching an organism orient gestures towards its environ- ment, I begin to perceive its perceiving because the internal organization of its gestures is the same as my own conduct and tells me of my own relation to the world. . ."53 Just as we are able to understand another's gestures because we share an anonymous corporeality, so we are able to understand another's Speech because we possess the same language. The solution to the problem of understanding how we can truly comprehend the "meaning" of another lies, Merleau- Ponty writes, "in recognizing that, in the experience of 44 dialogue, the other's speech manages to reach us in our sig- nifications, and that our words, as the replies attest, reach him in his significations. For we encroach upon one another inasmuch as we belong to the same cultural world, and above all to the same language, and my acts of expression and the other's derive from the same institution."54 Because I speak the same language as my listener, our internal perceptual sys- tems are articulated in the same terms and even though slight- ly different in focus and perspective, converge at certain crucial points. Because of this convergence, I can listen to another's words which are expressions of his primordial situa- tion, perceptual system, and style, fit those words into the spaces of my own system, and thereby activate for myself the meaning they already express. As Merleau-Ponty so eloquently puts it, "when I speak to another person and listen to him, what I understand begins to insert itself in the intervals between my saying things, my speech is intersected laterally by the other's speech, and I hear myself in him, while he speaks in me."55 All understanding of meaning, then, is a product of the relationship established between the alien project of an actor, whether in the form of gestures or speech, and the pri- mordial situation or perceptual system of the perceiver. The gestures or words possess significance themselves, but that significance cannot be meaningful for the perceiver until it inserts itself within his own system, subjects that system to deformation, and then reorients the entire system coherently 45 about itself. This process explains why a subject can listen to another's words, attend immediately to their traditional significance and then realize that, taken together, they seem to mean nothing. It is only after he allows the coherent de- formation to take place within himself that he is permitted to hear the other speak in him. It is in this remarkable way that a speaker can listen to familiar words and suddenly be led beyond the words themselves and the significations he already possesses in connection with them to some new meaning or comprehensible signification. Speech, Merleau-Ponty re- marks, "endlessly renews the mediation of the same and other" and "perpetually verifies for us that there is no significa- tion without a movement, at first violent, that surpasses all signification."56 Before explaining just how this new meaning created by the coherent deformation manages to anchor itself in the words responsible for its presence, I would like to quote at length once again from Merleau-Ponty. His description of the process whereby new significance is brought into existence is both eloquent and precise and it is, I feel, the best illustration that can be given of this amazing operation: My relation to a book begins with the easy familiarity of the words of our language, of ideas that are part of our makeup, in the same way that my perception of the other is at first sight perception of the gestures and behavior belonging to "the human species." But if the book really teaches me something, if the other person is really another, at a certain stage I must be surprised, disoriented. If we are to meet not just through what we have in common but in what is different between us--which 46 presupposes a transformation of myself and of the other as well - then our differences can no longer be opaque qualities. They must become meaning. In the perception of the other, this happens when the other organism, instead of "behaving" like me, engages with the things in my world in a style that is at first mysterious to me but which at least seems to me a coherent style because it re- sponds to certain possibilities which fringed , the things in my world. Similarly, when I am reading, there must be a certain moment when the author's intention escapes me, where he withdraws himself. Then I catch up from behind, fall into step, or else I turn over a few pages and, a bit later, a happy phrase brings me back and leads me to the core of the new significa- tion, and I find access to it through one of its "aspects" which was already part of my experience.5 In summary, we might say that it is the power inherent in Speech itself which rescues the utterances of the other from total non-sense and leads me beyond the significations I al- ready possess to those he had originally intended. The force of the words themselves, as they are repeated within me, per- forms the coherent deformation, remakes me in the other's image and admits me to the presence of new meaning. The other can communicate with me and I with him because we are alike capable of Speech in the same language and thereby open to being led by the flow of each other's talk toward a new state of knowledge. The direction of the coherent deformation is a centrifugal one in that it is a movement away from insti- tuted language that is, from.words and their sedimented mean- ings, toward an indefinite significatory space in which some new meaning is gradually materialized. The centrifugal 58 movement of the coherent deformation is then followed by a 47 centripetal movement which causes the newly created meaning to be deposited in the very words that gave it birth. In actuality, it is this secondary movement which is responsible for the sedimentation that is the foundation of the institu- tion of language and it is to it that we must now direct our attention. The centrifugal movement of the coherent deformation does not operate in isolation. If it did, the creation of new meaning would be a wholly transitory event and in effect nothing new could be brought into existence. If new meaning is to be made present in the language system, it must be made to exist within that system, as a property of familiar words. This centripetal movement, therefore, is the process spoken of earlier whereby a single, contingent speech event perma- nently alters the "meanings" of particular words and phrases. When I am led, for example, by the power of the other's words to realize some new meaning beyond my own significations, it suddenly appears to me that those words have always possessed or contained that meaning which I simply never saw before. I am deceived into believing that the meaning existed even before I became cognizant of it as the content of the words that only just gave it birth. In fact, the meaning did not exist prior to the immediate utterance, but once bodied forth as the production of that utterance, drifted back into those words and became merely one more addition to their polysemic nature. Although Merleau-Ponty admits this process occurs at all levels, he notes it is particularly visible when we 48 read an unfamiliar author for the first time. He claims, for example, that when we begin to read a philosopher, we first assign common and accepted meanings to the words he employs. However, over the course of time, "through what is at first an imperceptible reversal, his speech comes to dominate his language, and it is his use of words which ends up assigning them a new and characteristic signification."59 This signifi- cation, therefore, becomes a permanent alteration of the words used because the power of speech and the magic of the coherent deformation admits us to the meanings intended by the philoso- pher and forces us to alter our own language system in order to accommodate them. We come to understand the philosopher's theories because we slowly comprehend his meanings as the peculiar style of his way of speaking. The meanings, as such, become received knowledge for us when we can organize further discourse about them. But this occurs only when we have suc- ceeded in giving them separate and distinct existence by forc- ing them to live in that series of words which never before carried them as significance. 60 When we are able to do this, the meanings are truly acquired and henceforth always avail- able to us. We can be said to possess them as the transform- ed content or significance of the once familiar words that have now been forever altered by the speech of the philosopher. The centripetal movement of the coherent deformation, then, is the recentering process whereby the listener, having understood the style of the other's speaking, gives form to that style by locating it in the very words that first directed 49 his gaze or attention outward toward it. Such a process can also be thought of as a refocusing operation conducted largely by the listener himself. When someone hears familiar words uttered by another and does not quite understand how they are used or what is intended, he feels those words slip out of focus. However, if he lets the words continue to resonate within him, his capacity to understand is transformed or aug- mented by the centrifugal force of the coherent deformation. Then, when he refocuses on the words, because he himself has been altered, the words appear to contain the significance he now comprehends. It can be seen, therefore, that the process of under- standing another's speech is a complex and delicately balanced operation in which the listener is forced to step beyond the language system itself in order to comprehend the new or dif- ferent significations intended by the other. However, that same listener is forced to return to the system and to employ familiar signs to act as vehicles for the newly discovered significations if his comprehension of them as style is to be transformed into understanding of them as acquired mean- ing. As Merleau-Ponty himself puts it, to understand the unique meanings offered by another is to understand speech as it is distinguished from language, and speech, he says, "is that moment when the significative intention (still si- lent and wholly in act) proves itself capable of incorporat- ing itself into my culture and the culture of others - of 50 shaping me and others by transforming the meaning of cultural instruments. It becomes 'available' in turn because in retro- spect it gives us the illusion that it was contained in the already available significations, whereas by a sort of EEEE it espoused them only in order to infuse them with a new life."61 Therefore, it is through the centripetal movement of the coherent deformation that speech comes to dominate language as a system and the contingent event permanently alters the meanings of individual signs contained within that system. As can be seen from the preceding discussion, a speech act involves both a transitory action in which signs are com- bined and uttered, and a simultaneous creation of meaning in which significations are brought into existence which live on in the listener after the event has exhausted itself. This dual nature of the speech act is once again a unity which can- not be divided into primary and secondary elements. Meaning comes into existence at the very moment of utterance and is, therefore, essentially part of the event itself. It is simply impossible to conceive of it as something separate from the words through which it is first bodied forth. If we are careful, however, to distinguish without dividing, we can state that the event is that aspect of the act which disap- pears or ends. In effect, it is the temporal aspect of the speech act and in it the message exists as duration. On the other hand, the meaning is that portion of the act which, from the moment of utterance, seems to live a life of its own. 51 Because we think of it as that aspect of the speech act which is communicated from speaker to listener, we conceive of it as an abstraction translatable from one vehicle to another. In actuality, it never ceases to be the invisible side of the visible event, but because it can continue to exist as acquired meaning in our private world of silent speaking, it seems to function as a "thought" capable of generating in- numerable ways to clothe itself. As Merleau-Ponty points out, meaning is usually thought of as transcending the signs which indicate it, just as thought is usually conceived of as tran- scending the sounds and sights which mark it off.62 In truth, that is, if we are speaking phenomenologically, neither is an accurate description since the meaning of a sign exists only in so far as it is profiled against other signs and thought is always locked to words. Still, we often do put signs to- gether as if each word possessed its meaning once and for all, and we talk as if speaking merely involved matching one element of meaning with an equivalent element of discourse. Language used in this way is neither expression nor Speech, for it is no longer that primary operation which first con- stitutes signs as signs and implants the meaning which dwells in them "through the eloquence of their arrangement and con- figuration alone."63 Instead, when language is used in this manner, both speaker and listener rely on the sedimented meanings of the signs as they are traditionally used and, as a result, they remain within the boundaries of the language system itself. In Merleau-Ponty's terms, they speak 52 "empirically" or make use of language as a complete, fully created institution. Empirical Speech Merleau-Ponty cautions in "Indirect Language and the Voices of Silence," that "the empirical use of already es- tablished language should be distinguished fromits creative use" even though the latter necessarily involves the former.64 When language is used empirically, the speaker depends on sedimented meaning or that collection of relationships be- tween signs and significations which he gradually learned as a child while seeking to master the use of the system as a whole. This store of established relations was itself at one time the production of primary Speech acts which established sign and signification together as one unit. But because of the peculiar nature of the act of speaking itself, the two gradually appeared to separate and signs seemed to point to meanings which were separate and distinct "thoughts." Em- pirical use of language, then, is nothing more than the "op- portune recollection of a pre-established sign" which itself possesses a definitive sense. A speaker employs the sign 0 O I 65 and its traditional sense conservatively and cannot be said to change or augment its use-value in any way. He does not rattle the chain of language as an integrated whole to ring from it some new signification, but is, instead, content to strike each word separately, permitting it to vibrate the next only in the most traditional way. 53 In empirical speech, therefore, the speaker allows what he wishes to say to be controlled by the previously establish- ed significations of the signs he uses, since he does not sub- ject those signs to any kind of change or re-orientation. Because he allows his intentions to be contained within the language system itself, he does not truly express his unique way-of-being-in-the-world, but instead permits the culture, as it is contained within the language system, to speak through him. Furthermore, when using language empirically, the speaker does not subject the system to a coherent deforma- tion because that which he seeks to say is already embodied within it. As a result, there is no need for his significa- tive intention to alter previously existing cultural instru- ments in order to make itself present within the institution of which they are a part. Since the speaker simply utters familiar signs and refers to their traditionally agreed-upon meanings, it can be said that he speaks not as a unique and individual body-subject, but as a culturally determined mem- ber of a group. In essence, he merely seeks to replace his "thought," which was itself at one time the radical creation of Speech and the coherent deformation, with some verbal counter that can serve as its equivalent. 'His listener then comprehends that counter because it vibrates like a chord his own machinery of acquired significations and arouses in him the necessary reminiscence.66 Merleau-Ponty points out that "speech in the sense of empirical language. . .is not speech in respect to an authentic language. It is as 54 Mallarmé said, the worn coin placed silently in my hand."67 The Radical Interdependence of Creative and Empirical Speech This crucial distinction between the creative and em- pirical use of language will, perhaps, be greatly clarified if we can imagine two conversations, one of which is control- led by the creative use of language while the other is domi- nated by its empirical use. In the first, I listen to ap- parently familiar words uttered by some other and feel strangely separated from their total meaning by a kind of screen. Words that ought to be transparent and reveal their meaning to me because I have already learned them suddenly become opaque, and I hear nothing more than Egg-sense. How- ever, if I listen to the speaker long enough, his speech begins to take over and I am gradually led away from my own understanding of the separate words he uses to the general sense or signification they contain for him. I am, in ef- fect, changed or altered because his words repeated within me actually give me the capacity or ability to comprehend that which I did not know before. Through the medium of our shared language and by virtue of the power of his words, I suddenly confront him as Other, as an individual wholly distinct and different from me. At this moment, I do not meet him through what we have in common but instead am taken out of myself and confront him on his own ground. His style or way of intending the world through language gradually be- comes familiar to me and I begin to understand the way of 55 being in the world that is behind it. Slightly altered therefore in the direction of his vision, I now turn back to the elements of my own system and see those once-familiar words in a new way. It is at this point that the screen is removed, the words become transparent, and I suddenly possess as acquired meaning the significations intended by the other. It can be said, therefore, that when a speaker uses language creatively, he not only fabricates new meaning, but also ex- pands his listener's capacity to understand it and therefore restructures the vehicle in which that understanding is to be revealed. In a sense, he can be said to re-create his listener's entire language system. As Merleau-Ponty argues, "it is. . .necessary to conceive the operation of speech out- side any previously institutionalized signification, as a unique act whereby a man's speaking furnishes his listener and a culture that is common to them." 68 Such use of lan- guage is, therefore, a radically creative act and through it a speaker can express for another his own very special way of inhabiting the world. Empirical language, however, cannot be used in this way and, as a result, any conversation dominated by it is vastly different from the one just related. When I converse on an empirical level, for example, I listen to the words spoken by the other and simultaneously understand what they mean. I am not conscious of any disjunction between the sounds the speaker utters and the significations he intends for, in this instance, they appear to me to be one and the 56 same thing. The words themselves are transparent and to hear them stated is to immediately see through them to the sense they contain. This is possible because I possess those words and certain coordinate significations as part of my own per- sonal language storehouse and, when they are spoken by the other, it appears as if his language system is identical to my own. His words simply call up the thoughts or meanings I possess as the equivalent of those particular counters. Because of this rigid parallelism, we are not forced to con- front each other as wholly separate and distinct individuals, but instead acknowledge each other's presence within the same institution or culture. I am not pushed beyond myself in order to understand what the other says because I carry his meanings within me as the sedimentation of the signs I use every day. Thus, when we communicate in this way, on this particular level, we converse as culturally determined beings inserted within the same institution and, as a result, we acknowledge all that we possess in common as members of the same system. It is just because we are able to depend on this pre- viously worked out, stable institution of language that we begin to believe our thoughts lead an independent existence of their own. Because we possess an equivalent meaning or "idea" for every sign contained within the language we speak, and because we know how to transpose those meanings into still other signs, we begin to assume that the thoughts themselves precede their expression in language. The individual words 57 then seem to be simply the arbitrary English, French, or German equivalents of previously existing human ideas. The real difficulty however in looking at language in this way is that it prevents us from understanding how meaning can be created or how men can learn things they do not already know. For if, in speaking, a person merely codes his thought and replaces it "with a visible or sonorous pattern which is noth- ing but sounds in the air or ink spots on the paper," then an- other can understand those thoughts only if he already pos- sesses them as the equivalent of those particular sounds or ink spots. 69 But if this is the case, then no listener can ever discover in another's words anything more than what he has put there himself and true communication between differ- ent individuals is impossible. Indeed, if language only operates in this way, "how [can] communication possibly carry us beyond our own powers of reflection, since the signs com- munication employs [can] never tell us anything unless we al- ready grasp the signification?"70 If we are honest with ourselves, however, we must ack- nowledge that our own educational experience warns that this is not the entire picture. All, for example, who have ever discovered a new idea expressed through the medium of famil- iar words, must recognize that the meanings of words can be changed by the context in which they are used. Furthermore, any one who has ever encountered the curious magic of a meta- phor must certainly be aware that language is not entirely fixed, but malleable and flexible, and that words can be 58 combined to say things they have never said before. In fact, the creation of new meaning is a common occurrence in all lan- guage systems, and as a result of the contingent events re- sponsible for this, such systems evolve diachronically through time. It can be seen, therefore, that language is pggh a pre- established stable institution and a dynamically changing method for making meaning out of the world, and it can, con- sequently, be used in two entirely different ways. A speaker may situate himself within the system and depend completely on its signs and accepted significations to carry his meaning or he may choose instead to use that system the way a sculptor uses clay. Unable to change its basic structure or character, he will mold it into the shape he desires and force it to "say" that which he wishes to communicate. While this does not mean that every speech act falls clearly into one of these two categories or the other, it does suggest the existence of two poles between which all speech events are situated. Although it is, in reality, im- possible for an entire conversation to be conducted at the level of the creative use of language, any such conversation could conceivably be characterized by a preponderance of au- thentic or creative speech acts. At the same time, another conversation could be dominated by the empirical use of lan- guage and both speakers would then rely almost entirely on the sedimented meanings of the words employed. In any case, when discourse effects true communication between two separate individuals, it is highly probable that the conversation will 59 include both kinds of language use. In summary, then, I might reiterate that language con- sidered phenomenologically, that is, as it functions in real speech, is truly "logic in contingency." Although it is an oriented, equilibrated system, it is, nevertheless, capable of sudden change and can absorb the effects of such change as permanent alterations of itself. While it is also com- posed of discrete units or signs, each of which possesses its own sedimented meaning, it can be used in such a way that those signs are forced to secrete a significance they have never before possessed. In other words, depending on which aspect of its nature is stressed in the composition process, language may force the listener to go beyond himself and his immediate ability to comprehend in order to understand that which has been intended, or it may merely require him to de- pend on standard procedures and operations to decipher the meanings encoded within traditional forms. In the latter case, when language is used empirically, both speaker and listener rely on the sedimented meanings of the signs manipu- lated. By asking nothing more of the signs he uses than that they reveal their familiar and accepted meanings, the speaker fits his intention to speak within the limits of the language system. The listener, then, easily decodes the speaker's utterance because the speaker's word-usage conforms to his linguistic expectations. Because he is a member of the same language system as the speaker, he understands the same signs and their traditional meanings, knows the same implicit rules 60 governing their combination, and thus possesses a similar set of expectations or anticipations about the way in which those signs should mean for him. This linguistic "competence," or ability to understand all rule-governed speech acts, then en- ables him to immediately "hear" the meaning contained within the speaker's utterances if they conform to the implicit rules of the language he speaks.71 In the former case, however, when language is used cre- atively, the listener does not immediately comprehend the significance of the words uttered because they interact among themselves in an unexpected way. While the words, taken sepa- rately, may each sound familiar to the listener, the statement as a whole appears strange. His linguistic competence is un— able to aid him in decoding its significance because the words have been combined in a manner that breaks some rule or ex- pectation about context implicit within his language system. In order to understand the meaning contained within this kind of speech event, therefore, the listener must actually attend to the words themselves and permit them to direct him toward the as-yet silent space of signification intended by the speaker. When he lets the words resonate within him, he is gradually led beyond his own expectations and, through the power of the coherent deformation, begins to absorb the other's style of speaking and the unfamiliar rules governing the sort of expression that results. To use language creatively, therefore, is to alter the language system itself by changing the rules for the production 61 and comprehension of meaning. The standard rules are effec- tively changed or added to the moment a speaker produces an utterance defying them, simply because the utterance as such exists and cries out to be understood. If he wishes to make sense of such an utterance, a listener is forced to scrap his previous expectations and must attempt to determine the im- plicit principles underlying its peculiar organization and structure. If he can do so, his linguistic competence is forever altered by the action of the words themselves, for it is they who create in him the capacity to follow their style and the ability to understand the latticework of inter- nal relationships that is the necessary foundation of that style. When the listener finally does absorb the principles by which a certain signification is given verbal presence in the world, he then possesses as acquired knowledge the ability to discern and comprehend other speech events organized along the same lines. In essence, both his capacity to understand others and his ability to make meaning out of his own world are enlarged by the concerted action of the other's speech and the power inherent within language itself. As Merleau-Ponty himself concludes at the end of The Prose of the World, it is through Speech "that we realize the impossible agreement between two rival totalities not be- cause speech forces us back upon ourselves to discover some unique spirit in which we participate but because speech con- cerns us, catches us indirectly, seduces us, trails us along, 62 transforms us into the other and him into us, abolishes the limit between mine and not-mine, and ends the alternative between what has sense for me and what is non-sense for me, between me as subject and the other as object."72 Although it is ultimately authentic Speech which enriches language and forever increases its capacity to delineate the world, there can be no Speech or expression without the underlying stability of a familiar language system. In the end, both personal expression and interpersonal communication are en- tirely dependent on the fact that language can be made to function for both speaker and listener in two distinct but reciprocally dependent ways. NOTES 1Maurice Merleau-Ponty, The Structure of Behavior, trans. Alden Fisher (New York: Beacon Press, 1963), and Phenomenol- ogy of Perception, trans. Colin Smith (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1962). Because of the limited availability of the French editions, I have referred to and quoted from the stand- ard English translations of Merleau-Ponty's works wherever possible. 2Merleau-Ponty, Structure, p. 215. 3Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology, p. lx. 4Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology, p. xv. 5Maurice Merleau-Ponty, The Visible and the Invisible, ed. Claude Lefort, trans. Alphonso Lingis (Evanston: North- western University Press, 1968). 6Because Merleau-Ponty's philosophical thought was actually a system in evolution, there are contradictions, in- consistencies and disavowals of earlier positions throughout his work. As a result, commentators often rightly disagree over what Merleau-Ponty ”really" meant, and the writings them- selves are not always entirely clear or definitive. For pur— poses of this short summary, I have attempted to represent what seemed to be his position at the time of his death. This has been an extremely difficult task since Merleau-Ponty had already abandoned consideration of several of the topics ex- amined here by the time he turned to The Visible and the In- visible where he was clearly changing or altering some of his most fundamental premises. I have been aided in this inter- pretive task by Remy Kwant's invaluable study, From Phenome- nology_to Metaphysics: An Inquir into the Last Period of Merleau-Ponty's Philosophical Li e (Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania: Duquesne University Press, 1966). 7Remy C. Kwant, From Phenomenology to Metaphysics: An Inquiry into the Last Period ofiMerleau-Ponty s Philosophical Life (Pittsburgh: Duquesne Un1vers1ty Press, 1966), p. 44. 8 Merleau-Ponty, The Visible, p. 131. 9Merleau-Ponty, The Visible, pp. 145-146. 10In paraphrasing Merleau-Ponty's argument here, I have made use of a phrase of Coleridge's that was first introduced 63 64 to me by Dr. Roger Meiners. The concept of distinguishing without dividing and its philosophical consequences is ex- plored at length by Owen Barfield in What Coleridge Though; (Middletown, Connecticut: Wesleyan University Press, 1971), pp. 18-21, 36, 93, 148, 172, l49n, 251n. 11Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Themes from the Lectures at the College de France 1952-1960, trans. John O'Neill (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970), p. 129. 12Merleau-Ponty, Themes, pp. 3-4. 13Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology, p. 374. 14Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Si ns, trans. and with an in- troduction by Richard C. McCleary (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1964), p. 67. 15Kwant, From Phenomenology to Metaphysics, p. 77. 16This is the position set forth in the enigmatic and incomplete last chapter of The Visible and the Invisible, pp. 130-155. It is in some sense a direct contradiction of his earlier position, set forth in the Phenomenology, that perception and its structures determine the nature of all higher-level activities. Merleau-Ponty defended his early argument in his address to the Société francaise de philosophie, which he called "The Primacy of Perception and Its Philosophical Consequences." This address can be found in The Primacy of Perception and Other Essays on Phenome- nological Psychology, the Philosophy of Art, History, and Politics, ed. James M. Edie (Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 1964). Although he did grant primacy to language in The Visible and the Invisible, he never abandoned his notions about embodiment and incarnation and thus never moved away from his conviction that language is still a form of that most basic human activity of the body-subject, ex- pression. l7Maurice Merleau-Ponty, The Prose of the World, ed. Claude Lefort, trans. John O'Neill (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973), p. 75. 18 Merleau-Ponty, Prose, p. 48. 19Merleau-Ponty, Prose, p. 129. 20Merleau-Ponty, Prose, p. 10. 21Merleau-Ponty, Prose, p. 10. 22Merleau-Ponty, Signs, p. 85. 65 23Merleau-Ponty, Signs, p. 88. 24This is, of course, to ignore the fact that at one time there must have been an initial speech act which pre- ceded language as institution and which was actually respon- sible for the creation of that institution. This is an ex- tremely difficult problem and one that is really outside the realm of this study. Still, Merleau-Ponty does account for the possibility of a radically creative speech act and the reader may wish to consult his discussion in Chapter Five of The Prose of the World, pp. 42-45, 131-146. 25 Merleau-Ponty, Signs, p. 85. 26Merleau-Ponty, Signs, p. 87. 27Merleau-Ponty, Signs, p. 87. 28Merleau-Ponty, Themes, p. 19. 29Merleau-Ponty, Prose, p. 13. 3oMerleau-Ponty, Prose, p. 13. 31Eugene F. Kaelin, An Existentialist Aesthetic: The Theories of Sartre and Merleau-Ponty (Madison, Wisconsin: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1966), pp. 265-266. 32 Merleau-Ponty, Signs, p. 39. 33Jean Piaget, Play, Dreams and Imitation in Childhood, trans. C. Gattegno and F. M. Hodgson (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1962), pp. 215-245. 34 Merleau-Ponty, Signs, p. 40. 35Merleau-Ponty, Signs, p. 42. 36This notion of the speech event will become very im- portant in the third, fourth, and fifth chapters of this paper where I will be arguing that a literary text is in many ways like a speech act. If we can think of literature as a language system composed of basic units and rules for their combination, then the meaning of any text is not to be found solely in the units it uses but rather in the way it uses those units. For example, both The Golden Unicorn. a popular novel by Phyllis Whitney, and The Member of the Weddin , by Carson McCullers, are written about young girls who Have been called descendants of the gothic heroine in the novels of Ann Radcliffe. However, these two novels are extremely different from each other in theme and in signifi- cance and, as a result, it seems logical to conclude that m 6 the difference in meaning is "caused" by differing uses of this gothic heroine. 3.7Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology, p. 183. 38Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology, p. 177. 39Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology, p. 178. 4oMerleau-Ponty, Signs, p. 90. 41Merleau-Ponty, Prose, p. 112. 42Merleau-Ponty, Prose, p. 45. 43Merleau-Ponty, Prose, pp. 88-89. 44Merleau-Ponty, Signs, p. 83. 45Merleau-Ponty, Signs, p. 90. 46Merleau-Ponty, Prose, p. 61. 47Merleau-Ponty, S'gns, p. 91. 48Merleau-Ponty, Prose, p. 142. (emphasis added) 49Merleau-Ponty, Prose, p. 61. 50Merleau-Ponty, Prose, p. 60. 51Merleau-Ponty, Prose, p. 60. 52Merleau-Ponty, Prose, p. 61. 53Merleau-Ponty, Prose, p. 142. 54Merleau-Ponty, Prose, p. 139. 55Merleau-Ponty, Prose, p. 142. 56Merleau-Ponty, Prose, p. 142. 57Merleau-Ponty, Prose, pp. 142-143. 58Merleau-Ponty never specifically appends the terms centrifugal and centripetal to his discussions of language- use and the coherent deformation. He does, however, use the terms to describe the reciprocal relationship established between an individual and the culture within which he is situ- ated in an essay entitled "The Philosopher and Sociology" included in Signs, pp. 98-113. The relationships he des- cribes are strictly analogous to the operations of language- 67 use as he conceives it and, as a result, I have used his own terms in this different context. The passage from which I have adapted the terminology follows: For there are two truths which must be grasped simultaneously. The individual drama takes place among roles which are already inscribed in the total institutional structure, so that from the beginning of his life the child proceeds--simply by perceiving the attentions paid to him and the utensils surrounding him--to a deciphering of meanings which from the outset generalizes his own drama into a drama of his culture. And yet it is the whole symbolic consciousness which in the last analysis elaborates what the child lives or does not live, suffers or does not suffer, feels or does not feel. Consequently, there is not a single detail of his most individual history which does not contribute something to that per- sonal significance he will manifest when (having firstthought and lived as he thought best, and perceived according to his culture's imagery) he finally comes to the point of reversing the re- lationship and slipping into the meanings of his speech and his behavior, converting even the most secret aspects of his experience into culture. From the causal point of view it is unthinkable that this centripetal movement and this centri- fugal movement are compossible. 59 Merleau-Ponty, Si ns,F 60Merleau-Ponty, ' 3 F: ) U Merleau-Ponty, Merleau-Ponty, Merleau-Ponty, O C . H ) U . P D ( - P E m ) E U ) S U [ 91. 91. 92. 42. 67. 61 62 63 64 65 66 Merleau-Ponty, Si ns, 45.F Merleau-Ponty, " F 1 ns, 44. Merleau-Ponty, Prose, 1'42. 67Merleau-Ponty, ns,F 44. 68Merleau-Ponty, Prose, 69Merleau-Ponty, Prose, 141. 7. 7oMerleau-Ponty, Prose, 145. 68 71The term "competence" is actually Noam Chomsky's. He was the first to use it to refer to that body of implicit linguistic knowledge possessed by a native speaker of a lan- guage which enables him to decipher grammatical and non- grammatical utterances. I suspect many of Merleau-Ponty's followers would object to my application of this term to his phenomenological theories since Chomsky's own enterprise is strictly structural in its attempt to discover the principles of a universal human grammar. Although Merleau-Ponty criti- cized such an attempt in his early writings on language, he also recognized the importance of la langue and even argued for its logical priority with respect to la parole. I am in full agreement, furthermore, with James Edie who maintains in Speaking and Meaning; The Phenomenologytof Language (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1976), that Merleau-Ponty tried to reconcile the structuralist and phe— nomenological conceptions of language in his last published work, The Visible and the Invisible. It is on this basis that I feel justified in incorporating a structuralist term in my exigesis of Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology of language. Since that phenomenology does recognize the claims of lan- guage considered as a system, I see no harm in "naming" that phenomenon with Chomsky's term. For what Chomsky has to say about linguistic competence, see especially Aspects of the Theory Of Syntax (Cambridge, Mass.: The M. I. T. Press, 1965), pp. 3-15. 72Merleau-Ponty, Prose, p. 145. CHAPTER III A PHENOMENOLOGY OF LITERARY EXPRESSION Why Phenomenology? Before moving from the study of language to the study of literature, it is necessary to explain why I have turned to Merleau-Ponty and his particular phenomenology of language in my search for a conceptual framework which might encom- pass both popular and elite literary forms. This question is particularly significant in light of the fact that so much recent work has been done in the name of "structuralism" on the connections between modern linguistics and literary in- quiry. Although I agree with theorists such as Roland Barthes, Julia Kristeva, and Tzvetan Todorov that literature as an in- stitution can be fruitfully thought of as a language and that, as a result, the characteristic principles and processes of modern linguistics can be applied to written texts, I have definite reservations about the particular conception of lan- guage that they, as structuralists, employ. It seems to me that by looking at language phenomenologically, taking into account the point of view of a speaking subject, Merleau- Ponty corrects some of the significant omissions and unfor- tunate emphases of purely structuralist analysis. More spe- cifically, he avoids their tendency to concentrate the meaning 69 70 of an utterance in the listener and his knowledge of the lan- guage system alone. Such a tendency derives from the fact that structural linguistics directs its attention away from the individual speech act and the meaning it founds in order to focus on that unconscious knowledge of a language system which is necessary for both the production and comprehension of the act and its meaning. Indeed, Ferdinand de Saussure, acknowledged by the structuralists as one of their great pro- genitors, devotes a considerable amount of time and effort to the argument that while la parole or speech has significance in and of itself, it is outside the realm of a truly scien- tific linguistic study which ought to concern itself solely with la langue.1 Because Saussure maintains that la langue is the essential aspect of language and la parole only the accessory or accidental, contemporary structuralism derived from his theory "directs its 'scientific' attention toward the analysis of the macroscopic and intersubjectivestructures, the statistical regularities, the nontemporal and nonparticu- 1ar synchronic forms to which behavior can be found to con- form."2 Indeed, structuralism has often been accused of do- ing away with the human subject, since it attributes so much power to the determining capabilities of unconscious struc- tures. ~ Since most critics willing to call themselves struc- turalists focus their attention on la langue or on the syn- chronic system that is the possession of all speakers of a language, they transpose that preoccupation with linguistic 71 competence to the study of literary texts. They argue that an utterance has a particular form or structure and hence, a meaning, ggly_within a certain language system and that in order to understand how that meaning is produced, one must know the various rules and strategies used by a listener to construe that specific form as meaning. Structuralists are less concerned therefore with the meaning of a speech act or the significance of a text than with the peculiar manner in which such meaning or significance is produced by a listener or reader. The structural analysis of texts, argues Roland Barthes in Critique et vérité, is not a study of content, but rather "a science of the conditions of content, that is to say of forms. What interests it will be the variations of meaning generated and, as it were, capable of being generated by”works; it will not interpret symbols but describe their polyvalency. In short, its object will not be the full meanings of the work but on the contrary the empty meaning which supports them all."3 While most structuralists acknowledge the existence of la parole, and Barthes himself admits in §Z§ that the meanings found in a text are not established by one reader or a series of readers alone, but by specific "systematic marks," both 4 Barthes and his fellow structuralists continue to insist on the primary importance and determining power of the linguistic and literary systems as they are possessed by the readers of such texts. To study literature with the tools of linguistics does not mean, for a structuralist, to analyze those meanings produced by the language and comprehended by a reader, although 72 that is sometimes done. Instead, it means to examine the forms of specific texts in the hope of discovering what ex- pectations and reading strategies a reader employs to make those texts "signify." While Merleau-Ponty does not discount the importance of the listener and his knowledge of-a language system to the comprehension process, neither does he focus on these things to the exclusion of all other factors involved in the opera- tion. Although he acknowledges the logical primacy of 13 langue to la parole and admits that no human can ever speak unless he already possesses implicit knowledge of a language system, he maintains that ontological primacy must be granted to la parole or to the speech event itself.5 In fact, in all his various writings on language, Merleau-Ponty rarely con- cerns himself with the listener or receiver of an utterance because his interest rests primarily with the speaker and his ability to express his way-of-being-in-the-world by em- bodying his significative intention in the carnal presence of words. Furthermore, because he is most curious about man's ability to create new meaning and to say things that have never before been said in the language he speaks, Merleau- Ponty focuses his attention on the peculiar nature of the sign or the word itself and its capacity to carry wholly un- familiar significance. By arguing so vehemently for the ges- tural significance of words and by maintaining that the mean- ing of an authentic utterance cannot be separated from the physical form in which it is couched, as the meaning of a 73 dance cannot be separated from the actual movements of the dancers,6 Merleau-Ponty draws attention away from the fact that, ordinarily, listeners do "know" words and associate meanings with them. Indeed, he often seems to forget that even the creative use of language is entirely dependent on the fact that both speaker and listener must necessarily be- gin with empirical language, that is, with individual words which possess certain known sedimented meanings. If this were not the case, men could express themselves with unique but entirely random vocalizations and they thus would be in— comprehensible to each other. Still, his preoccupation with the ”languagely" meaning of language itself and the power of words to take a listener completely outside himself and the knowledge he already possesses, is characteristic of his phe- nomenological concern with the actual event or phenomenon as "the thing itself." [It is important to stress at this point that in sudden- ly speaking of the listener and linguistic competence at the end of chapter two, I believe I am reflecting a subtle shift in position that takes place in Merleau-Ponty's thought it- self.7 While he shows very little interest in language as a system or body of knowledge in his earliest works, particu- larly in Phenomenology of Perception, he encountered the writ- ings of Saussure shortly after the Phenomenology's publication in 1945 and his work published after 1949 reflects his very personal version of Saussurean structuralism.8 Although he continues to focus on the speaker after reading Saussure, he 74 pays new attention to the acquisition of language in children and concerns himself with the problem of what it is a child learns when he learns to speak.9 While this never leads Merleau-Ponty to a full-fledged examination of language as "possession," it does cause him to introduce the distinction between authentic and empirical language-use and forces him to acknowledge that speakers necessarily rely, at least ini- tially, on sedimented meanings and traditional syntactical or combinatory rules. At a deeper level, his encounter with Saussure prompts him to reconsider the nature of perceptual truth and rational or intellectual truth, and eventually to conclude in The Visible and the Invisible that perception is structured as language is, and not vice versa, as had been his argument in the Phenomenology. In this last work, published after his death, Merleau- Ponty argues that the structures of perception are analogous to the structures of language and he suggests that man's knowledge of anything is at once an opening onto the things themselves and an introduction to the "ideal" structure under- lying them. It is possible, in fact, to argue, as James Edie does, that Merleau-Ponty finally considers the world from pgph a phenomenological and structural point of view. He continues to stress the essential reality of phenomena or "the things themselves,” but he admits the equally real existence of the necessary structural conditions present within the body- subject which are responsible for the form those phenomena take for that subject. With respect to language, this leads 75 him to conclude that while the speech-event itself is of cru- cial and even primary importance, there are, indeed, morpho- logical, syntactical, and phonological rules governing both the production and comprehension of such acts. As Edie points out, at the time of his death, Merleau-Ponty was attempting to account for the interdependence of 1a parole and la langue and to demonstrate the fundamental reciprocity of structural rules or conditions and the actual events which are founded on them but which give them their "ontological validity."10 The implications of Merleau-Ponty's final position are considerable, especially for anyone contemplating the applica- tion of language theory to the phenomenon of literature. For if we argue that meaning is produced in speech by the coming- together of a speaker, speech-act, and listener, then any analysis of the meaning of an utterance must be based on an examination of all three factors and the nature of their con- nection in the act of comprehension. Furthermore, if we agree with Merleau-Ponty that the utterance itself ig meaning, then we must acknowledge the power of that utterance to de- termine the nature of its comprehension. However, if we also concede that both speaker and listener are determined by the structures of the language they speak, then it is also im- perative that we recognize the extent of the comprehension can be circumscribed by the listener's linguistic competence. If, therefore, we decide to consider literature as a language, we ought to admit that the meaning of a text is similarly the 76 result of a conjunction between author, text, and reader. While the text itself can certainly be said to possess or ex- hibit meaning, that meaning can only be brought into existence by the action of a reader whose ability to construct or con- strue meaning is directly affected by all his previous en- counters with literature. In dealing with literature, there- fore, throughout the remainder of this chapter, I will not argue that a single objective and complete meaning exists within a text and can be ferreted out by some ideal reader. Neither, however, will I argue that meaning is solely the creation of a reader and thus wholly dependent on that read- er's literary expectations and reading strategies. Instead, it is my contention that meaning does exist as the invisible side of the visible words of a text, but that it must also be construed by the actions of a reader if it is to be truly present ig the world as an existential "phenomenon." It is useful, I think, to point out that this notion about the ontological status of meaning can be directly de- rived from Merleau-Ponty's arguments about the essential wrong-headedness of both materialism and transcendental ideal- ism in philosophy. He is, in fact, always careful to point out that the order or meaning of the universe cannot be said to exist solely within the material world itself nor can it be thought of as the mental or "ideal" production of a trans- parent, constituting consciousness. His position is a care- ful and calculatedly-maintained dialectical stance which seeks to stress the essential but partial truth of each of 77 these two arguments. For Merleau-Ponty, meaning exists 13 Nature as an inarticulate or undifferentiated variation in the fabric of Being, but it must, nevertheless, be brought to the level of carnal and hence conscious existence by the activity of a body-subjectwif it is to exist as meaning. It is, therefore, because Merleau-Ponty's theory of language is derived from a complex position about the exis- tential status of meaning that I have chosen it as my start- ing point in an attempt to differentiate popular from elite literary texts. I do not claim, as the structuralists do and, as Jonathan Culler does, that linguistics merely pro- vides a useful model for the analysis of literature and lit- erary texts. I claim much more for the theory and philosophy of language for I look upon language as the quintessential semiotic system and think of speech as the primary instance of man's ability to distance himself from the Being within which he is situated and out of which he creates meaning. I am in full agreement with Merleau-Ponty, and I contend that meaning is always and everywhere, in all media, the produc- tion of the convergence between the act of an actor (13 parole) and the action or activity of some perceiver or lis- tener who is, in some sense, determined by prior knOwledge, experience, and structures (la langue). The meaning produced by such a convergence can be "new" in that what is apprehended has previously been only an undifferentiated part of Being and is now made to exist within the system or structures of the particular vehicle used to bring it to existence for the 78 first time. On the other hand, such meaning can also be fa- miliar and previously understood since what is apprehended in this instance is merely some act, idea, or object already embodied in the system employed. It is, therefore, absolutely essential to look at literature as a kind of language which is simultaneously an institution or system and a string of individual and unique speech-events or texts. When man en- gages in the creation and comprehension of literature, he is simply using his ability to make meaning of his world in a very special way and thus, in order to understand the pecul- iar nature of this activity, it makes sense to examine it using what we already know about language and speech. Literature Considered as a Language System I want to make it clear that I am not, for the moment, concerned with the current debate over the structural dif- ferences between literary and non-literary texts. While it is entirely possible that such differences may be discovered in the future when we have perfected methods for uncovering the complex structures of all sorts of texts, I don't think it is necessary to await Such a breakthrough in order to make some observations on groups of texts we traditionally agree are "literary." Because I see no problem in defining litera- ture functionally, I will use the term accordingly to refer to those texts we approach by convention as fictional accounts by an author designed to have some connection, however remote 79 or dubious to the world in which we live. Furthermore, I will include within this group not only those texts tradition- ally labelled "Literature," that is, elite works of high art, but also those works generally excluded as "popular culture," or the popularly acclaimed works of mass entertainment. In other words, for purposes of this study, the term "litera- ture" will be applied to all those texts we can and do read as literature. While I am fully aware that this seemingly arbitrary cultural agreement about what is to be designated "literary" is almost certainly founded on unconscious, in- articulate perceptions about real differences in structure and function, I don't think these differences have been iso- lated as yet. It seems to me it will be possible to do so only after we have acknowledged the existential reality of this operational category and attempted to describe its structural and functional properties in detail. This is ob- viously a huge undertaking and, as a result, this paper pro- poses only to provide some general theoretical hypotheses about differences within this group of "literary" texts and then seeks to make some procedural and methodological sugges- tions about how to conduct further analysis of individual texts in order to discover those prOperties that differentiate them from non-literary texts. Because I take literature to be all those texts we read as literature, I do not believe a reader can approach an un- familiar text anew without falling back on certain implicit notions about what literary texts in general ought to look 80 like or "do." We cannot understand a wholly unfamiliar land- scape without unconsciously referring to all other landscapes we have previously viewed, just as we cannot comprehend a new utterance without also relying on what we have already learn- ed about utterances in general from our previous experience. We are always already situated within an institution because of our primordial incarnation as body-subjects and, as a re- sult, we can never escape the unconscious knowledge that ac- companies such a situation. We are at once situated in a world, a language, and a culture and, as we are educated, we are also incorporated into a literary institution whose com- position preceded our individual appearance. To read a text as literature, therefore, is to come to it with certain pre- conceived ideas about the way sentences are put together and the way those sentences refer to the world. In other words, in order to make sense of a text we have never encountered before, we must rely on accepted notions about how written literary language "means." Similarly, we also approach new texts with previously established expectations about the ways in which specific textual elements are combined in the production of certain generic forms, just as we encounter the genre itself with certain ideas about that genre's rela- tion to the world and its consequent significance. In summary, we might say that we always approach an unfamiliar text with specific expectations in mind. As a result, our ability to understand that text is necessarily affected and often limited by the flexibility of those expectations. 81 Before moving on to a consideration of the implications of such a conception of the reading-process, it is necessary to digress for a moment in order to examine the whole question of "meaning" and "reference to a world." As has been pointed out before, the structuralists are not interested in the mean- ing of a text but concern themselves instead with the neces- sary conditions responsible for the presence of that meaning in the world. However, I do not see how we can go about iso- lating the elements and structures responsible for a certain meaning unless we already have a general sense of what that meaning is. Analysis or structuralist decomposition there- fore can only follow understanding or comprehensive synthesis and it is this process or ability we must account for before proceeding to an examination of the structures of certain texts. We must first make some observations about he! mean- ing is understood before we can speculate about exactly how that meaning is made. I have left this problem until now because Merleau— Ponty does not deal with it explicitly in his numerous writ- ings on language. Despite this fact, however, it is possible to derive the implicit notions he adhered to by acknowledging the fact that he accepted most Saussurean linguistic theory. This is exactly what James M. Edie has done in a volume en- titled Speaking and Meaning: The Phenomenology of Language, where he concerns himself with how Merleau-Ponty the phenome- nologist accounts for the process of comprehension. In re? sponse to such a concern, Edie writes, "the answer to this 82 question, of course, takes us away from la langue towards lg parole and to questions of referential meaning and semantic conditions. This question takes us away from the necessary, presupposed structural condition of all speaking to the speec - ESE itself, and Merleau-Ponty, like all phenomenologists . . . recognizes that meaning is actualized only in use and that the sentence . . .is, in an existential sense, intentionally prior to its component parts (the morphemes and words, which can be discovered only by a later, formal analysis.)" 11 Edie notes that although Merleau-Ponty once wrote that as human beings we are condemned to meaning, he never systematically concerned himself with problems of syntax or semantics. He simply did not describe in any detail how one speaker under- stands another. As a remedy, Edie proposes to distinguish four levels of meaning revealed by the BEE of language, and I think it particularly useful to summarize the levels here for his conception can provide a solid base for our attempt to understand how human beings make sense of complex literary texts. Edie argues that four levels of meaning can be isolated in linguistic experience; the first, the level of immanent meaning, is dependent on language as a phonological system; the second, the level of transcendent meaning, is produced by the move from semiotics to the semantic; the third, the level of syntax and semantics, concerns the use of sentences, and the fourth, designated as "the higher unit of 'texts,'” encompasses and goes beyond the preceding three.12 The level 83 of immanent meaning, which exists below the level of speech, is that "languagely" aspect of language which Merleau-Ponty charges with ultimate responsibility for the coherent deforma- tion. He bases such a conception on his belief that language is not composed of discrete, wholly positive and independent signs, but exists rather as a system of differences or dia- critical oppositions revealed ip_the presence of a system of phonemes. At this level, the language system exists apart from its ability to signify and it refers to nothing other than itself. As Edie points out, "each phoneme takes its place in the phonological system as an element sufficiently distinct to be distinguished from all others in the same sys- tem and capable of being related to others according to a system of phonological rules which apply within the system and refer to nothing outside the system itself." 13 What this means is that the phonemes or sounds of a particular language system possess certain affective, immediately understood "meanings" as immanent sense. When a child begins to babble, for example, Merleau-Ponty maintains that his utterances con- tain this level of meaning for it is not words the child is beginning to understand but the melody of the phonemic opposi- tions characteristic of his native language. "The meaning of words," Merleau-Ponty writes, "must be finally induced by the words themselves, or more exactly, their conceptual meaning must be formed by a kind of subtraction from a gestural mean- ing which is immanent in speech." His point is that, des- 14 pite its ability to point beyond itself to elements of another 84 world, language first possesses a kind of internal or emotion- al sense that is locked to the very sounds of which it is com- posed. That sense is unique to that particular system and it is this level of meaning that cannot be translated into other languages since they too are based on phonological systems which possess their own immanent sense. Once a speaker has learned the necessary system of diacritical oppositions and begun to speak, he has, in effect, internalized the "ideal" collection of phonological rules which describes the operation and possibilities of the system and he can immediately compre- hend the level of immanent meaning in any utterance based on the phonemes in question. However, because these sounds and phonemic oppositions are realized in the presence of words, it is necessary to move on to the second level of meaning which involves word-combination and usage. At this second level of language-use, signs or words are combined according to syntactical rules implicit within the language system itself in order to refer to something that transcends the system as a whole. It is these rules that have been the consistent concern of linguists for years, and Edie merely summarizes the general concept. As he points out, this notion of language as a semiotic system of signs which can be paired with ”meanings" is based on the assumption that "the primary, although incomplete, elements of syntax are Egggg which must be arranged according to strict syntactical rules in order to make sense." In other words, when any 15 speaker engages in discourse and seeks to make himself 85 understood, he must employ words contained within the language he speaks according to the logical grammatical rules which gov- ern such combination in his language. Most linguists agree that such grammatical rules are based on the primacy of the logical proposition and it is because all languages are or- ganized similarly at this second level that utterances Egg be translated from one language to another. As Edie points out, our experience of words in their "isolability" often leads us to question the possibilities of translation since a word in one language is rarely identical to its equivalent in another. But, he adds, "the purely syncategorematic or syntactical ele- ments in various languages, particularly when formalized into the rules of pure logical grammar, approach and even reach the perfect unity (and translatability) of mathematical and other purely formal systems."16 Once again, when a subject learns to speak, he does not only memorize lists of words and equivalent meanings but also internalizes these syntactical rules that are contained implicitly in the language he is learning. As a result, he is forever after capable of dis- covering the sense contained in word-combinations he has never encountered before if those combinations are organized according to the rules he has learned. He does not, however, have to be conscious of those syntactical rules in order to understand another's speech. It is enough that he possess them implicitly if he wishes to distinguish the grammatical from the non-grammatical and that which has sense from that which does not. 86 On the third level of meaning, that is, at the level of syntax and semantics, the words a speaker has learned in the process of acquiring use of the system as a whole are combined in sentences in an attempt to designate ideas, things, feelings, and persons which exist wholly outside the language system itself. This is the level of speech to which Merleau-Ponty often directed his attention because it is on this level that someone speaks about something to someone. It is the thing, idea, or person which transcends the semiotic system and which is intended by the speaker that takes on pri- mary importance here for it is this "meaning" which is reveal- ed through the use of the sentence. As Edie himself points out, "language, which can be considered as a closed system of signs or symbols governed by fixed rules on the semiotic level, on the semantic level necessarily refers to something other than itself."17 When a Speaker uses language in this way, therefore, he simultaneously becomes conscious of himself as the speaker and of his world as that which he intends through his speech. To focus on this level of meaning then is actually to be concerned with la parole and the remarkable ability of speakers to produce an infinite number of new word-combina- tions using the same few syntactical rules which are invariant and basic to nearly all natural languages. Edie calls this the "paradox of language" and stresses the fact that strict adherence to the syntactical rules alone will not produce a sentence with meaning. If a speaker does not also pay attention to the meanings of words and to the 87 fact that they must generally appear in context, he may pro- duce such utterances as "the book feared the grass" or "green isn't intelligent." While these sentences are structured according to the rules of pure syntactical grammar, they make no sense because ordinarily one cannot attribute fear to a book or a quality of mind to a color. Edie suggests that what such utterances tell us is "that there are semantic laws of 'context' which cannot be reduced to the purely for- mal structures of syntax." 18 At this level, then, the fact that words do refer to things which transcend the physical presence of the words themselves becomes a determining fac- tor in the sense that is produced, and, to converse meaning- fully, a speaker must not only combine words according to syntactical rules but according to meaning contexts as well. In attempting to comprehend a new utterance, therefore, a listener relies on both his implicit knowledge of grammatical rules and on his understanding of the meanings of words and the general regions in which they traditionally occur. What prompts Edie to distinguish a fourth level of meaning above that of sentences is largely an observation by Emile Benveniste "that the recognition of the meaning of the various constituent parts of linguistic strings is essential to distinguishing them."19 Edie argues that this implies we cannot determine the necessary constituent parts of a sen- tence unless we already know what Significance each of those parts contributes to the sentence as a meaningful whole. Linguistic units, therefore, cannot be isolated unless they 88 can be understood as parts of some more complex, comprehen- sible entity. He reasons from this that there must be some higher level of organization than the sentence itself which permits us to discriminate, for example, between sentences which contribute to plot structure and those which do not. As he comments, "there has to be an organizing principle of meaningfulness in language higher than the sentence simply because, to be meaningful, sentences cannot follow one an- other in random order."20 He agrees with such theorists of the text as Jacques Derrida, Paul Ricoeur, and Hans-Georg Gadamer who maintain that the larger structures of common plots, generic types, and myths determine the significance of single paragraphs and sentences. Edie specifically credits structuralism with the discovery of the text as a higher level linguistic unit and he argues that the true strength of struc- turalism lies in its ability to discover those structures in- digenous to the text which give sentences, paragraphs, charac- ters, and events the peculiar significance they possess as parts of a whole. "There is a meaning in the text," he agrees, "which not only transcends the rules and elements of linguis- tjx:usage. . .but also transcends the psychological and delib- erate intentions of the authors themselves."21 In other words, just as the phonemic, morphological and syntactical rules of la langue control what a speaker wishes to utter because they circumscribe what he can potentially say and still be compre- hensible to another speaker of the same language, so the structural rules governing the organization of linguistic 89 strings in texts also govern what an author can write and still be understood by readers operating within the same sys- tem. While an author can deliberately choose to ignore the structural semantic, and functional rules governing the compo- sition of texts and write entirely outside the literary in- stitution, it is doubtful he will be understood by more than a handful of readers. What Edie's fourth level of meaning tells us then is that in comprehending a literary text, a reader relies on an implicit body of knowledge which tells him how to construe lower levels of linguistic meaning into larger structures which are themselves meaningful and constitutive of the sig- nificance of the text as a whole. Like the linguistic compe- tence he possesses as a native speaker of a language, this knowledge is responsible for his extraordinary ability to read a text he has never seen before and to know immediately the structure of its plot and the import of its story. It is also synonymous with those expectations I was speaking of earlier before embarking on this digression about meaning- levels and strategies for comprehension. Because he possesses this knowledge, the reader of literature comes to a text with certain expectations and preconceived notions and it is these which enable him to understand that an occurrence in a text is meaningful despite the fact that he is yet ignorant of the outcome of that particular plot. Similarly, it is this body of knowledge which determines whether a text creates new mean- ing or whether it merely manipulates old and, as a result, it 90 is to it that I now wish to direct my attention. Literary Competence While the first three levels of meaning are also neces- sary components of literary texts and, despite the fact that readers must implicitly understand the rules governing their appearance in order to understand the significance presented at those levels, it is the larger, fourth level that has be- gun to preoccupy literary critics and theorists alike. The notion that there is an exclusive body of knowledge bearing on our ability to make sense of literary texts is a relatively new notion developed primarily by structuralists such as Barthes and Todorov. In his critical analysis of the struc- turalist methodology, Structuralist Poetics: Structuralism, Linguistics, and the Study of Literature, Jonathan Culler devotes an entire chapter to this body of knowledge which he calls "literary competence." 22 If we recall that what Noam Chomsky designates as linguistic competence is a native speaker's implicit understanding of the phonetic, morphologi- . cal and syntactic rules of the language he speaks, it becomes clear that what Culler refers to as literary competence is that collection of implicitly understood rules, procedures, and strategies used by a reader to make sense out of those long strings of sentences and paragraphs which constitute all texts. Because a reader knows these rules implicitly, he is able to come to an unfamiliar text as a comprehensible, sig- nificant whole rather than as a random and entirely'contingent 91 collection of independent sentences. As Culler himself points out, "anyone lacking this knowledge, anyone wholly un- acquainted with the conventions by which fictions are read, would, for example, be quite baffled if presented with a poem. His knowledge of language would enable him to understand phrases and sentences, but he would not know, quite literally, what to mgkg of this strange concatenation of phrases. He would be unable to read it fig literature . . . because he lacks the complex 'literary competence' which enables others to proceed."23 Although it is certainly true that knowledge of the language and tacit comprehension of the rules governing the first three levels of meaning will take any reader part of the way in understanding a novel or short story, neither will instruct him in how to assign particular significance to cer- tain descriptions and how to distinguish them from those which may be passed over quickly as mere contributions to superfluous detail. This kind of comprehension is actually a form of anticipation or an educated guessing about the way in which the plot is likely to develop or the manner in which the story will probably end. Such anticipatory knowledge can only have been built up in the reading of other similar types of texts. Because a reader already knows something about the probable ways in which a story will progress or conclude from his previous encounters with similar forms, he has a fairly good chance of distinguishing events which will prove to be meaningful with respect to the sense of the text as a whole 92 from those that are merely insignificant. This ability to discriminate between sense and non-sense in unfamiliar phe— nomena, then, is the product of the reader's literary compe- tence. To say, however, that a reader possesses literary com- petence or has acquired the principles of literary composi- tion just as he has acquired the principles and rules of his own language system is to say at the same time that the writer must possess that competence as well. In both, a portion of this knowledge may be brought to the level of consciousness, but a great deal of it often subsists at the pre-conscious, inarticulate level of general existential awareness. Even though such knowledge is then possessed implicitly or tacitly, it is just as powerful in directing a reader's attempts to apprehend the structure and thus to comprehend the meaning of an unfamiliar text. There is an obvious parallel to lin- guistic competence here, for while I may not know all the rules of English grammar as they are currently represented and articulated in my culture, as a native speaker of the language, I have an internal awareness of what makes sense and what does not. While I may be aware that "erasers smile curdled" is nonsense, at least according to traditional norms, I may not be able to explain what rules have been broken or to articulate why those particular words can't be combined in that way. Nevertheless, I do know this can't be done and I either avoid communicating such nonsense to another or tell the person to whom I am listening that this is precisely what 93 he is telling me. In other words, while neither writer nor reader may be aware of what constitutes his literary competence, nor even of the fact that his comprehension is based on such a body of knowledge, both possess that knowledge implicitly and, as a result, it tacitly governs the nature of their production and the quality of their understanding of literary texts. Each has certain expectations about how texts are structured and how they function. Consequently, the writer may choose to compose according to those conventions or he may deliber- ately decide to violate some and ignore others. The reader, on the other hand, may find it helpful to rely on the reading strategies developed from such expectations in order to make sense of a strange text, or he may discover those procedures are useless and the text remains obscure. But, in any case, to be composed or understood as a distinct entity, as a whole, a literary text must be placed in relationship to all those dimensions, perspectives, and expectations which are part of man's situation as an incarnated, primordially oriented being. This sounds remarkably similar to what Merleau-Ponty asserted about all perceived objects when he wrote, "the mean- ing of a perceived object does not stand isolated from the constellation in which it appears; it is articulated only as a certain distance in relation to the order of space, time, motion and signification in general in which we are estab- lished." I might add here that the meaning of a literary 24 text does not stand isolated from the constellation in which 94 it appears either. It is articulated only as a certain dis- tance in relation to the order of literary texts in general, the genre of which it is a member, and the author's corpus of work in which it is included, to name only a few. All of these things are aspects of the competence we possess as readers who have been introduced gradually and by education to an always already constituted literary system. It is important to emphasize, here, a point I made earlier in this chapter; that is, the meanings of a text are not simply imposed on that text by a reader and the competence he brings to his confrontation with it. While a text must un- doubtedly be read and construed with respect to a previous knowledge of how other texts function, it nevertheless pos- sesses in itself that structure or form which serves as the latticework, foundation, or vehicle for the meaning as it is realized in the act of reading. The text ii that inarticu- late structure or form in the same way the environment is a style or structure even before its various elements are marked off and actualized as objects in the consciousness of a par- ticular body-subject or perceiver. The meanings of the text, therefore, can be thought of as the tacit component of the words, sentences, paragraphs, and larger structures which make up the entity which is that specific text. We can argue that this meaning is "created" by the author because he is the manipulator of the words, the one responsible for bring- ing that text into existence. However, once the words are written down, the text frees itself from its author and the 95 meanings contained therein are no longer entirely dependent on him or on the original significative intention which sought to bring them into existence. They simply await a reader who, in the act of reading, confronts the visible form of which they are the invisible depth. If such a reader closely and carefully attends to that form, he can reactivate those meanings as they were formulated by the author so that they come to exist for him in his consciousness. It is impossible to say then whether the meaning of a text, as it is construed by a reader, is the result of the author's creative actions or simply an effect produced by the power of the language itself. Certainly, the author cannot compose without the benefit of an already fully constituted language and, as a result, what he wishes to say must, in some ways, be determined by the language that he Speaks. However, like any speaker, he can use that language creatively or "authentically" and when he does, he stamps that language with his own very personal imprint. If he is successful in this, the words he writes will cause his reader to be dis- oriented for a moment until they can carry him along and help him to detect, beneath familiar words, the new context, form, or structure created by the author which causes those words to mean in a different way. Merleau-Ponty has described this reading process at length and he makes it very clear where he believes the meaning lies: 96 But the book would not interest me so much if it only told me about things I already know. It makes use of everything I have contributed in order to carry me beyond it. With the aid of signs agreed upon by the author and myself because we speak the same language, the book makes me believe that we had already Shared a common stock of well- worn and readily available significations. The author has come to dwell in my world. Then, imperceptibly he varies the ordinary meaning of the signs, and like a whirlwind they sweep me along toward the other mean- ing with which I am going to connect. Before I read Stendhal, I know what a rogue is. Thus I can understand what he means when he says that Rossi the revenue man is a rogue: but when Rossi the rogue begins to live, it is no longer he who is the rogue: it is a rogue who is the revenue man Rossi. I have access to Stendhal's out- look through the commonplace words he uses. But in his hands, these words are given a new twist. The cross references multiply. More and more arrows point in the direction of a thought I have never encountered be- fore and perhaps never would have met with- out Stendhal . . . . I create Stendhal; I am Stendhal while reading him. But that is because he first knew how to bring me to dwell within him. The reader's sovereignty is only imaginary, since he draws all this force from that in- fernal machine called the book, the apparatus for making signification.2 It is not possible to say, therefore, that the reader is alone responsible for the meaning which is produced in the act of reading a text. While his activity certainly does cause that book to live for him and thus serves as the agent which brings the meaning into existence as meaning, such ac- tivity must be carried out with respect to a text which it- self possesses an unavoidable structure or form. Although no reader can ever make his knowledge of a book identical 97 with the psychological intentions of the author who produced it, he is obliged to attempt to discern beneath the actual presence of the words themselves, the peculiar style which informs that author's way-of-being-in-the-world and the ex- pression he has created out of it. As Merleau-Ponty points out, "although the final effect is not for me to dwell with- in Stendhal's lived experience, I am at least brought with- in the imaginary self and the internal dialogue Stendhal held with it for the fifty years he was coining it in his works."26 I want to make it clear, however, that in accepting such a notion of the reading process, I do not think of the meaning of a text as an objective "thing" present in or be- hind the words employed which merely needs to be perceived and described by an intelligent reader. If we recall that for Merleau-Ponty no object is conceivable except as an ob- ject g: consciousness, then it becomes clear that the mean- ing of a text cannot be conceived except as an object materi- alized 12 the consciousness of a reader. The meaning is not a thing or object in the world but rather that which is formu- lated in the mind of the reader about that thing which he brings into existence. Strictly speaking, the meaning is the result of a convergence that occurs between a reader and a text and it is thus always perspectively altered by the reader's perceptual orientation, linguistic knowledge, and literary competence. Despite the fact that a text does have a unique structure or form, that form can have no sense for 98 a reader unless he implicitly understands how to construe that form as meaning. While a poem such as T. S. Eliot's ”The Wasteland" has a complex structure which is often natu- ralized or made to mean in a specific way, that form and meaning do not exist for the reader who is ignorant of the procedures necessary to construe them as symbols of the mod- ern human predicament. Because he lacks the necessary liter- ary competence, the poem is meaningless for him. A Literary Continuum Before confronting this extremely complex question of literary competence and attempting to determine exactly what assumptions, rules, and strategies govern our comprehension of popular and elite literary texts, I want to examine liter- ature itself from a phenomenological point of view. Whereas phenomenology is, in general, a science of the various ob- jects which can be given to consciousness, the following discussion will be limited to concern with the object "litera- ture" and to a consideration of some of the ways in which that object is given to the consciousness of both author and reader. Specifically, I want to approach the act of writing as a process that is in some respects analogous to the act of speaking. I will look at the activity from the point of view of the writer who functions as a speaker when he pro- duces his utterance, the text. In order to present the world with this ”thing," the author manipulates the words of his language in concert with traditional literary forms and 99 procedures. As the words are part of his linguistic compe— tence as a native speaker of his language, so his knowledge about literary forms and procedures for interpretation is part of his literary competence as a member of a previously existing literary institution. In other words, I will be discussing literature here as a language put to use, as an institution that is made to "mean" by a writer in the act of writing and by a reader in the act of reading. Once I have examined literature from this point of view, I will then re- turn to it as a system or institution and discuss the prob- lems of attempting to discern the particular elements and rules of which it is composed. At this point, it is important to recall Merleau-Ponty's constant insistence on the fact that language possesses a dual aspect. It is, at one and the same time, a stable in- stitution filled with familiar words and traditional meanings and a tool for the creation of meaning which has never exist- ed before. It can be spoken of as la langue and yet, it is simultaneously capable of being transformed into la parole. Because of this peculiar property, a speaker may combine the familiar signs of the system in different ways: he may group them together according to standard rules and use them in con- ventional contexts or he may deliberately choose to ignore those conventions in a creative speech act and thus try to extend the signifying potential of the system as a whole. If he decides to remain within the system and compose accord- ing to traditional norms, that is according to syntactic rules 100 Egg traditional semantic contexts, he can rely only on the sedimented meanings of the Signs he uses. However, if he chooses to break those norms and to combine words in a dif— ferent way or to use them in a different context, he depends as much on the sedimented meanings of those words Egg on their immanent, phonemic meanings, as on the new structure or combination itself. It is, then, the conjunction of these three things which gives to words the power to create an abil- ity in the listener to discern the new sense brought into be- ing because familiar words have been used in a strange way. In this latter case, the Speaker uses language authen- tically while in the former he uses it empirically. A con- Itinuum exists between the two for a speaker may actually break or adhere to any number of rules he desires just as he may violate contexts as he wishes. He can, for example, choose to ignore nearly all traditional rules for formulating a verbal utterance, upset all his listener's expectations and strategies for comprehension, and thus risk communicating only nonsense. If I say "purple into malicious of" to a native speaker of English it is doubtful that even the most imagina- tive listener will be able to make any sense out of it at all. However, if I then say "purple boxes are desolate," it is con- ceivable that my listener will be able to discover some con- text or operation which will make that utterance meaningful. In a case such as this, the speaker adheres to most of the norms of the language he is speaking and simply violates one or two expectations by using signs in an unfamiliar context. 101 As a result, he depends on his reader to detect the structure or principle of composition underlying the new use. On the other hand, it is entirely possible for a speaker to remain within the language system, break no rules, conform to all norms and expectations, and thus to utter nothing more than a clichéd phrase. By continuing to extend the comparison between litera- ture and language, it is possible to come up with a very use- ful notion of a similar literary continuum in which specific texts are located with respect to the number of rules, norms, and expectations of the literary system which they violate. Of course, I am not talking here of definitive, logical classes based on some requisite number of broken or satisfied norms. Rather, I am speaking of operational distinctions between texts which use the elements of the linguistic and literary systems differently and thus are rendered more or less mean- ingful, more or less intelligible to the reader. I think texts can be grouped functionally according to the ways in which they work for readers with respect to literary compe- tence. Given, for example, some absolute, ideal notion of literary competence (it does not matter for the moment what that includes), some texts will break all the rules, some will violate only a few, and others will violate none. This is not, certainly, a new notion, and Roland Barthes and other structuralists have demonstrated how a wholly deviant and un- readable "modern" text differs from one which fulfills con- ventional norms of plot structure, character development, 102 and thematic unity. Barthes himself, for example, distin- guishes between the text of pleasure, "the text that contents, fills, grants euphoria; the text that comes from culture and does not break with it, [the text that] is linked to a 99m: fortable practice of reading," and the text of bliss, or that which "imposes a state of loss, the text that discomforts (perhaps to the point of a certain boredom), unsettles the reader's historical, cultural, psychological assumptions, the consistency of his tastes, values, memories, brings to a crisis his relation with language."27 To my knowledge, however, no one has yet systematically applied this particu- lar conception of the variations in texts to the subject of popular literature and its differences from elite art. I find the notion an extremely suggestive one and I think it can tell us a great deal about the very real differences ob- servable between popular texts and those we call "art." I suggest, therefore, that those texts we traditionally label elite literature are the texts that defy convention and vio- late norms, while the ones we often think of as popular are those which remain within the literary system and are com- posed according to readers' expectations. On the "revolutionary" side of the proposed continuum, we might include all those texts which upset conventions, pioneer in the formation of unusual structures, and create new meaning. Some of these works are so far outside the literary institution as it exists at the moment of their cre- ation, that they are virtually unreadable and incomprehensible. 103 In cases such as these, the deformation effected in the read- er's competence is so great that what he reads is no longer coherent for him. Often, a certain amount of time must elapse during which readers are pushed by the style of the work it- self to the point where they can comprehend that style im- plicitly, intuitively grasp the peculiar semantic richness of the words and forms used, and then begin to articulate that understanding by translating it into other words which are roughly equivalent. Works such as these which readily come to mind are the "Cantos" of Ezra Pound, T. S. Eliot's "The Wasteland," James Joyce's Finnegan's Wake, and even William Faulkner's The Sound and the Fury. With each of these texts, there was something of a time lag between the composition of the work and adequate explication of its sig- nificance. As Barthes has so astutely pointed out in a slightly different context, "to read is to struggle to name . . . to understand, to thematize . . . [it] is therefore to retreat from name to name, driven by the signifying thrust."28 His remark accurately diagnoses the peculiar prob- lem posed by works such as the preceding, since, in violating conventional norms and expectations, they create forms and significance which are outside the literary institution and thus have no label or name. If we recall that to name some- thing is to bring it to consciousness 3g an object of con- sciousness, as meaning, it becomes clear that literary works cannot be fully understood until their readers can express in familiar form the new sense which they intuitively grasp 104 in their reading. To say, therefore, what the meaning of The Sound and the Fury is, is ultimately to understand the style or structure which is the vehicle for that significance. There are cases, however, where only a few conventions and expectations are overturned and the consequent deforma- tion effected in the reader's competence is less severe. In instances such as these, the text often adheres to the tradi- tional norms governing generic form and plot construction, but ignores a few covering character development or reference to a world. When this occurs, a reader often finds that the meaning of the text has become momentarily Opaque only to clear up a few moments later when the coherent deformation extends his capacity to understand. In a case such as this one, the originary dimensions which mark off the limits of the reader's competence are generally respected and the minor deformation or disorientation produced by a strange configu- ration is consequently a coherent one. Merleau-Ponty has pointed out that we can approach Stendhal precisely because he makes use of commonplace words that are familiar parts of our own linguistic competence. But because he gives these same words a new twist, we can no longer rely on our own understanding of them and, in order to discover exactly how they signify for Stendhal, we must listen to the author's voice as it speaks through the entire context. As Merleau- Ponty observes, "common words and familiar events, like jeal- ousy or a duel, which at first immerse us in everyone's world, suddenly function as emissaries from Stendhal's world."29 105 A similar, though perhaps more extreme example, might be the work of Henry James. While his novels generally ad- here to conventions of generic form and plot construction, his characters are developed in a way that was alien to readers of his day. Since very little action of external consequence ever occurs in his works, it is nearly impossible to give meaning to his characters by observing how they be- have and what they do. It is necessary instead to pay very close attention to what they think, what they see, and what they choose 22E to do or say in order to make sense of their extremely limited activity. Though James' characters are re- vealed in greater depth than those of many of his contempo- raries, that depth can be missed if the reader does not con- strue the characters in the proper manner, a procedure which is dictated by the overall structure of the text itself. James' works, therefore, force us to read in a way that was unnecessary before he began writing. In effect, his novels have endowed his readers with new ideas and expectations about character development and, as a result, he can be said to have altered the general literary competence of the cul- ture and extended its ability both to signify and to compre- hend. To say that some literary texts violate norms of com- prehension and create new meaning may be a very useful ob- servation, but it is not an easy thing to demonstrate. While we may intuitively feel that the statement is an accurate one and that it correctly identifies an important characteristic 106 of literary works of art, we must still show hp! art effects these changes and in what way it causes us to understand things we have never encountered before. While it is perfect- ly admissable to agree with Merleau-Ponty that the meaning of a novel is perceptible at first only as a coherent deformation imposed on the visible and that "it is essential to what is true to be presented, first, last, and always in a movement which throws our image of the world out of focus, distends it, and draws it toward fuller meaning,"30 it is quite an- other thing to explain what that fuller meaning is and how it is made to exist in the world as a property of once famil- iar forms. In attempting to deal with both aspects of this prob- lem, I have found two comments made by Merleau-Ponty in The Prose of the World particularly enlightening. In the first, he attributes much of the power of literature to the fact that the words or signs of our language are Egg distinct en- tities which cause us to conjure up equally distinct and iso- lable significations. He points out instead that "in the art of prose, words carry the speaker and the listener into a com- mon universe by drawing both toward a new signification through their power to designate in excess of their accepted definition or the usual signification that is deposited in them from the life they have had together in us." This power to refer to 31 more than accepted definitions is a direct result of the fact that language is not composed of positive terms but of differ- ences among terms which are realized in the process of 107 combination. Merleau-Ponty firmly believes that the meaning of signs cannot be set forth independently of them because those meanings are really "nothing other than the way in which the signs behave toward one another and are distin- guished from one another." 32 Therefore, it is essentially the process of combination itself which gives meaning to signs, and the particular significance they carry is always determined by the nature of the combinations in which they occur. Because signs can be made to secrete a new signifi- cance simply by changing the context in which they are used, one can argue, as Merleau-Ponty does, that the meaning of any word is bound up with the drift of the entire language and that only a minor portion of its semantic richness is ever activated for us in any one combination. He refers to this capacity to signify beyond sedimented meaning as a word's "semantic thickness" or its "signifying soil" and he links it directly to the ambiguity of great literature which he argues is not a weakness but "the price we must pay to have a conquering language which, instead of limiting itself to pronouncing what we already know, introduces us to new experiences and perspectives that can never be ours, so that in the end, language destroys our prejudices."33 This notion that great works of literature do not pro- nounce what we as readers already know leads me to that sec- ond very important point which Merleau-Ponty makes about art in The Prose of the World. He writes that "what is irreplace- able in the work of art - what makes it not just a pleasant 108 occasion but a voice of the spirit whose analogue is found in all productive philosophical or political thought - is that it contains, better than ideas,matrices of ideas. A work of art provides us with symbols whose meaning we never stop developing. Precisely because it comes to dwell in the world in which it makes us at home though we do not have the key to it, the work of art teaches us to see and makes us think as no analytic work can, because in the analysis of an object we cannot find anything other than what we have put into it."34 The point here is by no means a simple one, but it seems to me Merleau-Ponty is arguing that a text which functions outside the system, whether that system be linguis- tic or literary, cannot present its reader either with a name, label, or "idea," which already exists within that system as the property of familiar words. As a result, because the reader is not confronted with a familiar abstraction, he is forced to discover, beneath the surface level of word-combina- tions, the new structuring principles which govern those com- -binations and which are responsible for the new sense brought into being in the process of reading. As a matrix can be the womb or any place of origin and growth, 35 so the structures of a text are the seeds from which significations bloom and develop. Once a reader has intui- tively comprehended the nature of this dynamic structure and is able to objectify it by giving it a name from within the system, then the effects it has had on the very words through which it is revealed become permanent aspects of the words' 109 Signifying soil. However, the structure itself continues to exist as a tacit component of the text itself, and whenever it is actualized in the process of reading, it persists in functioning as a matrix or womb of signification. Merleau- Ponty is careful to distinguish between the limited objecti— fication produced by the naming process of analysis and criti- cism and the eternal fertility of the structures themselves, and he stresses the fact that confrontation with a true matrix produces change in the reader before the meaning created 13 the matrix is brought to consciousness. "Critical thought," he concludes, "takes the system of ideas and technical means which it finds in the work of art and abstracts them from the inexhaustible signification with which the novel is invested when it manages to throw our imggg of the world out of focus, to distend the dimensions of our experience and pull them to— ward a new meaning. Prior to any signification our experi- ence is transformed when gripped by a novel, the way a figure acquires a new Shape with the addition of an extra line."36 In response, then, to the questions articulated earlier about what is created in a work of art and how that "thing" is brought into being, Merleau-Ponty would argue that while the significance itself is new, that significance is merely the reverse side of a structure produced through the unfamil- iar combination and use of familiar signs. It is the struc- ture or principle underlying the combination which is truly generative and constitutive of the significance, for it must be recalled that "meaning appears only at the intersection of 110 and as it were in the interval between words."37 I want to make it clear that while I have been applying Merleau-Ponty's observations primarily to language and thus to James Edie's first three levels of meaning, I am convinced that they also hold true with respect to the literary system and the fourth level of meaning discovered in the text. If one thinks of the various units and functions combined in the creation of a particular genre, for example, as signs and syntactic rules governing sign combination, it is possible to see how the lit- erary structure itself, taken as a whole, can also be thought of as a matrix. In this case, those particular elements such as characters, objects, and events, which comprise the text are juxtaposed to each other in new ways and the structures underlying those strange juxtapositions generate unfamiliar meanings and thus new poSsibilities in the genre itself. However, if we were to engage in practical criticism and attempt to discover the new structures presumably created by Faulkner's Absalom, Absalom! or by Hemingway's The Sun Also Riggg, it would first be necessary to determine the rules and conventions of the literary system or institution which they as individual texts violate. In other words, we must have a fairly detailed picture of our own perceptual, linguistic, and literary conventions for making sense of phenomena before we can describe exactly how these works render those conven- tions or strategies ineffectual, how they throw our under- standing of the world out of focus, and how they lead us to some new opening on it. To draw such a picture, however, 111 would entail discussing the entire range of our linguistic and literary competence, and I want to defer consideration of the obvious problems posed by such an undertaking until I have placed popular texts on the same continuum with those that create new structures and significations for the first time. Before moving to this opposite end of the continuum, however, I want to make it clear that I have purposely tried to avoid imposing value judgments on the ability of certain texts to draw a reader out of or away from himself and to enable him to forge new tools and strategies for making mean- ing of the world. As a result, I would like to refrain from stating categorically, at least for the moment, that it is Art which creates new meaning and reorients the conventions we have for making sense of literary texts. Suffice it to say at this stage in the argument, that some texts do create new structures and new significations because they function outside literary norms and conventions and that, for the most part, these are the texts we have traditionally called "elite literature." To argue, however, that the creation of new meaning is the sole criterion upon which we should base the category "Art" is not my intent or purpose here. I am simply interested in the fact that such an operation can and often does occur in literary texts and I think it useful to group all such texts accordingly. However, if we argue that our comprehension of a liter- ary work is governed by expectations and norms which are part 112 of a literary system, and that any number of these norms can be ignored or violated in the creation of texts, it is neces- sary to argue at the same time that it is equally possible for a text to remain within the system and to conform to all or nearly all of those same conventions. It is my belief that the texts we traditionally label ”popular literature" or disparage as ”mass entertainment" are actually those which chose not to violate conventions, upset expectations or pio- neer in the creation of new forms. Such works prefer instead to manipulate familiar forms and structures and to rely on the standard or sedimented significance generally associated with them. These texts are formulaic in that they rarely function outside a reader's competence and thus assiduously avoid disappointing his expectations. This notion of iden- tifying popular works as those which are formulaic is not new, however, and in exploring the idea at length, John G. Cawelti has defined a formula as "a combination or synthesis of a number of specific cultural conventions with a more uni- versal story form or archetype."38 Cawelti maintains, fur- thermore, that such texts serve the psychological functions of escape and entertainment because ”the formulaic element reflects the construction of an ideal world without the dis- order, the ambiguity, the uncertainty, and the limitations of the world of experience."39 This assertion is very simi- lar to Barthes' claim, noted earlier, that because the text of pleasure comes from culture and refuses to break with its norms, it is linked to a comfortable practice of reading. 113 It seems to me that both observations are astute, and Cawelti and Barthes are perfectly justified in focusing on the spe- cific character of the reading process, for it is that pro- cess and the strategies which control it that determines whether a text functions in a revolutionary way and creates new meaning or whether it functions as a conservative force and merely confirms or restates the familiar. As might be expected, I see a direct parallel between the empirical use of language described by Merleau-Ponty and the formulaic manipulation of literary elements such as nar- rative patterns, plot structures, and character types in popu- lar literature. If we recall that when a subject speaks em- pirically, he combines the words of the language system ac- cording to standard rules of syntax and thus reveals only the generally accepted sedimented meanings of those words, it is possible to think of the “popular'author "analogically" as one who arranges the common elements or signs of a literary text into familiar sequences which exhibit well-known mean- ings and thus provide the reader with the experience he an- ticipates. While I am here thinking of literature as a lan- guage system with basic units and rules of combination and thus am considering only the fourth level of meaning des- cribed by James Edie, I suspect that popular literature also reaffirms familiar meanings on the first three levels as well. In fact, it is my contention that those texts we have tradi- tionally labelled ”popular” are properly named and truly "of the people" in the sense that they remain entirely within 114 bgph the linguistic and literary expectations of the mass of readers. Indeed, the word-usage of a popular novel is seldom strange or out of the ordinary and any native speaker can at- tend to it as if it is transparent and provides a clear window to the natural, normal significance of each familiar word. By the same token, these texts also follow rigid patterns in plot structure and often make use of stock character types which rarely vary from one work to the next. As a result, any reader already familiar with the genre or particular type of popular text he is reading, can immediately assign to an event or character the proper significance it is to have in the narrative as a whole when that narrative is concluded. He does not need to suffer disorientation or to live with ambiguity until the coherent deformation teaches him hgg to comprehend that which he cannot see simply because there is nothing in the text he has not encountered before, did not expect, or does not know how to interpret. Such texts are entirely commensurate with the linguistic 32g literary com- petence possessed by most readers and, as a result, they function primarily to reaffirm their faith in the efficacy of the strategies and procedures they use to make sense of the world. Because the creator of a popular text does not defy convention and therefore relies on his own linguistic and literary competence, it can be argued that what he says in that text is actually molded by the language he speaks and the literary system within which he operates. He does not 115 express himself, at least in the way Merleau-Ponty thinks of expression, that is, as the creation of something wholly per- sonal and fundamentally new, because he does not stamp the culturally-owned materials he uses with a new and unique im- print. Instead, he combines words into accepted patterns, uses them in the proper contexts and manipulates literary characters, events, and "ideas" in familiar ways. Because he does not subject either the words he uses or the literary elements he employs to any kind of deformation, he does not disorient his reader or ask him to step out of himself in order to confront something alien to his entire range of pre- vious experience. Because he permits his culture to speak through him, by using its language and literary forms and generally accepted meanings, he enables his reader to decode the text quickly because that reader is a member of the same culture and possesses those same meanings as part of his own competence. For example, when a reader sees familiar words used in the context he expects, he is able to discount the visual presence of the words themselves and to penetrate to the meanings he "knows” they contain. As Merleau-Ponty himself points out, when we become engrossed in a book, we no longer see the letters on the page or even recall turning thepages.4o Instead, we ignore those physical characters and attend to the meaning itself. Although this certainly occurs in the case of successful authentic expression as well, it cannot happen im- mediately if the expression we encounter is too strange or too 116 far outside the range of our normal expectations and compe- tence. In that case, we are forced to note the presence of the character themselves Simply because those characters are not transparent and do not give way to a readily available "meaning." We are, therefore, able to ignore the signs them- selves in the reading process only because we already possess those signs in conjunction with certain culturally agreed- upon meanings. In essence, then, to read a text which uses familiar words in accepted ways is actually to affirm what we already know as members of a previously instituted cultural system. Because what is "meant" in formulaic texts is already an accepted part of the cultural and linguistic system, that meaning or signification is not dependent for its existence on those particular words of that particular text. Such a meaning already exists as an abstraction or "idea" within the culture and it can be transposed from phrase to phrase and from vehicle to vehicle. For example, in the contemporary gothic romance, The Golden Unicorn, Phyllis Whitney portrays characters and arranges events in such a way that her story seems to say the proper role of woman in modern society is that of the beloved wife of a devoted husband.41 Since such a notion is a cultural commonplace in twentieth-century America, one might expect this same idea to be revealed in numerous other forms and, indeed, this is the case. Not only do all of Whitney's novels evidence this same theme or preoccupation, but so do numerous other romantic novels, 117 daytime television serials, and magazine short stories. As a result, the texts through which these cultural abstractions are revealed are peculiarly ephemeral, and I suspect they disappear precisely because the culture does not 232g them to give expression to its concerns. Since those concerns are already well-known and previously embodied in other nearly equivalent vehicles, new texts which express them are largely interchangeable with the old and, as a re- sult, they are not preserved and reread for the unique light or perspective they shed on the modern world. Therefore, the function of such texts, with respect to both the linguistic and literary system, is to shore up, to reinforce, and to conserve traditional meanings and structures of combination. They are, by their very nature, conservative since they choose not to play with structure in the interest of creating new meaning. In addition, these texts also serve to confirm the efficacy of their readers' literary and linguistic competence. In fact, because they give way so quickly in the face of the procedures the readers bring to bear on them and yield their meaning so easily, they assure those readers that such pro- cedures and strategies are effective in making meaning of the world. Whereas texts which function "authentically" for the reader (by expanding his ability to make sense of other texts) create matrices of ideas rather than ideas themselves, formu- laic or empirical texts can be said to present the reader with abstract ideas or "thoughts." I do, however, want to 118 caution the reader here that I am not arguing for the estab- lishment of two separate categories into which all literary texts must be forced. I propose, instead, to think of all such texts as forming a continuum which extends between two purely theoretical extremes or poles where the structures employed are either radically creative or radically conserva- tive. In actuality, it seems to me, all texts fit somewhere in between the two poles and they thus combine both authentic and empirical use of the elements of which they are composed. To return, however, to the abstract notion of a strictly "empirical" text, I want to point out that such a text can be said to contain abstract ideas because it makes use of lin- guistic and literary structures that are already familiar to the reader as structures which possess a certain definitive sense or signification. Because an empirical text, like em- pirical speech, vibrates like chords the reader's "machinery of acquired significations" and arouses in him specific remi- niscences,42 the meaning of that text cannot be continually developed through time. Such a text does not provide the reader with symbols whose significance can be constantly elaborated and extended-but rather confronts him with counters or indices which are directly linked by tradition to previous- ly-known, immediately-available "ideas." Because they are members of the same culture and possessors of the same liter- ary and linguistic systems employed in the creation of the empirical text, readers of such texts know tacitly how to de- cipher the codes and indices which they encounter. They 119 possess the key to the puzzle because they already understand the nature of the link between sign and signification. A reader of westerns, for example, does not need to await the outcome of the adventure in order to know that the cowboy in black is an index or sign of evil. This is a common charac- ter in all westerns and any reader familiar with the genre knows implicitly that the black figure and evil are locked together "naturally." In essence, then, to read an empirical text is to re- affirm what we already know as members of a culture and to emphasize the accuracy and power of those strategies for com- prehension and models of intelligibility that we use every day in our ordinary encounters and intercourse with the world. Because empirical texts remain within the linguistic and lit- erary systems from which they are composed, it can be argued that their function is to stabilize or strengthen both those institutions. These texts function as a kind of anchor or weight in that they insure the continued survival of the sys- tems as shared cultural resources and, at the same time, as- sure their continued success in giving verbal conscious ex- istence to the culture's most basic and universal concerns. Continued use of the two institutions as they are familiarly known and understood tends to perpetuate the life and vitality of both. However, if we recall that language itself possesses a dual nature in that it is a stable system capable of radi- cally creative expression, we must acknowledge that wholly 120 empirical use of the literary system is both impossible and undesirable as well. If that system is to continue to be successful in making sense of a perpetually changing world, then it is imperative for the system itself to evolve and keep pace with environmental change. A necessary function is, therefore, performed by "authentic" or truly creative texts with respect to the literary and linguistic systems, because they constantly extend the boundaries or limits of both institutions. These texts are, by nature, subversive or revolutionary in that in breaking rules and defying con- ventions, they inevitably found new ones. Furthermore, these texts also undermine their readers' sense of stability and tradition because they constantly demonstrate the ineffective- ness and impotence of the reading strategies and procedures that they, as readers, bring to bear on such texts. Because. a truly creative text will not yield and fit in with a read- er's traditional models of intelligibility, that reader is forced to alter those models and to fashion new ones which will enable him to make sense of what he has previously been unable to decipher. A creative text that uses the linguistic or literary system "authentically" thus forces the reader to question his tacit knowledge and serves to push him out of or beyond his own personal and cultural frame of reference. In a sense, we might argue that texts such as these are a force for true communication in the world and the power be- hind the extension and growth of the institutions used for that communication. Creative texts renew literature 121 considered as a system, just as they tend to renew and extend the capacity for expression contained within language itself. In reality, they tug away at that anchor which holds the sys- tem back and they therefore constantly drag the system to un- charted areas and force it to function or Operate there as well. Once again, I want to make it clear that I do hgt_wish to place greater value on the creation of new structures and meanings than on conservation of the old. While the former activity is important and inevitable with respect to the in- stitutions of language and literature, I don't believe we can say that it is more important or desirable than the lat- ter. It seems essential that we remember, in language use or discourse, the creative character of certain speech acts is only discernible against the background of other more con- servative acts which underscore the traditional structures and meanings contained within the system. Therefore, if we are to argue that literature is also a system complete with basic units, rules of combination, and strategies for read- ing, and that it too is capable of being used to formulate revolutionary creative texts, we must never lose sight of the fact that those texts are creative only with respect to the traditional norms and familiar conventions of more con- servative works. Just as language as a dynamic totality must persist in functioning as a stable institution if the cre- ation of new meaning is to be possible at all, so literature must continue to exist as a balanced system of expression in 122 order for creative texts to be drawn from it. In short, if we are going to consider literature as a language, we are forced to acknowledge the reciprocal importance of its sub— versive and conservative texts. The literary system itself does not tell us which of its aspects has more value nor does it provide us with intrinsic criteria for judgment. All we know is that both uses of the system are possible and neces- sary and that it is inconceivable that one could exist with- out the other. Who is Reading? In discussing the proposed literary continuum and the violation or fulfillment of norms, expectations, and reading strategies, I have been thinking primarily of those rules which govern the structures of the text as a separate entity beyond the level of connected sentences alone. However, be- cause such textual units are necessarily composed of written language, they unavoidably make use of Edie's first three levels of meaning as well and, as a result, they require the reader to rely on his ordinary linguistic competence in read- ing any literary text. Because the writer may thus choose to violate either linguistic or literary conventions, it be- comes extremely difficult to situate texts on the suggested continuum. A given work, for example, can conceivably re- main within the linguistic competence of a certain reader while at the same time upsetting the traditional expectations he possesses concerning a familiar literary genre. On the 123 other hand, it is equally possible for a text to use language itself in new ways while making use of traditional narrative patterns, plot structures, and generic forms. In describing texts, therefore, and in attempting to decide whether they use the linguistic and literary systems empirically or cre- atively, it is first necessary to have some idea of who is reading those texts and what is included in the competence they bring to them. However, while it might be possible to identify the readers of various kinds of texts, I suspect that it would be almost entirely fruitless to question such readers about the procedures they use to derive sense from the astonish- 'ingly complex conglomeration of ideas, characters, and events which make up a literary work. AS fluent or accomplished users of both the linguistic and literary systems, such read- ers are no doubt tacitly aware of the rules and conventions which govern "grammatical" use of both institutions, but it is doubtful that even the most articulate reader could ever bring to the level of consciousness all the assumptions and tactics he uses to make sense of a text. The question of text identification and Classification thus becomes even more problematic and it is difficult to see how we will ever be able to suggest a procedure for categorization that will be anything more than an idiosyncratic method for assignment based on the most personal of expectations and assumptions. Still, I do think the problem can be solved and I sus- pect the key to it rests with the quality of our definition 124 of competence and our ability to keep in mind the fact that competence is an extra-personal, intersubjective body of knowledge that is directly connected with or related to a literary system which, though only a system in potentia, nevertheless exists as a phenomenological reality because it can always be partially embodied in actual texts which exist in the "real" world. It is, therefore, absolutely necessary to clarify the nature of the relationship between literary competence and the literary system if we are to offer sug- gestions about what it is we ought to look at in the attempt to judge whether a particular literary text is truly "cre- ative" or basically empirical. A reader's literary competence is directly related to the literary system since he can be said to possess compe- tence only when he has mastered the use of that system. How- ever, mastery cannot be defined as the reader's express knowl- edge of all the elements, functions, and relationships that comprise that system, since he can never have read all the texts which make use of the system, nor can he anticipate all that will be done with it in the future. To master the use of a system, therefore, whether linguistic or literary, is to have acquired an implicit knowledge of the basic opera- tions that can be brought to bear on the elements contained within it. That is to say, then, competence is actually a tacit knowledge of the principles governing the combination of elements and the formulation of structures in that system. Once he has acquired an understanding of these abstract 125 principles, the reader is able to approach a text he has never seen before, pick out the peculiar juxtapositions of elements which are the truly meaningful structures of that text, and then construe for himself the meaning that exists as the invisible component of those visible juxtapositions. A reader's competence, then, is really the set of rules governing his ability to read and to make sense of any le- gitimate use of the system from which those rules have been derived. I think it essential to keep in mind the fact that the literary system is at least logically prior to any individual reader's competence or ability to make use of it, since such competence or mastery must grow or develop out of an acquain- tance with actual uses of the system. The system then must exist prior to any reader's introduction to it and it certain- ly is present in the individual manifestations of it which he confronts. However, the idea of literature as a complete synchronic system is really a theoretical one since the sys- tem can never be made to exist in totality. The literary system is therefore the potential collection of all the signs or basic units of combination and the possibilities of com- bination that could be understood by a reader initiated into the system. It is easy to see here that while competence and liter- ature considered as a system are inextricably bound up with each other, they are still not the same thing. It seems to me that Jonathan Culler's foremost contribution to the 126 clarification of the structuralist enterprise is his ability to distinguish between these two notions. It is also signifi- cant that he provides this subtle differentiation in the proc- ess of pointing out that Northrop Frye's ingenious taxonomy or scheme for literary classification is not founded on a clear understanding of what literary categories ought to des- cribe. Culler points out that the status of Frye's taxonomic categories is "curiously indeterminate" and he asks "what is their relation to literary discourse and to the activity of reading?" It is at this point that he specifies the exact 43 nature of the difference between competence and the system itself and he identifies which of the two he feels ought to be studied: The linguistic model provides a slight re- orientation which makes apparent what is needed. Study of the linguistic system be- comes theoretically cOherent when we cease thinking that our goal is to specify the properties of objects in a corpus and con- centrate instead on the task of formulating the internalized competence which enables objects to have the properties they do for those who have mastered the system. To discover and characterize structures one must analyse the system which assigns struc- tural descriptions to the objects in ques- tion, and thus a literary taxonomy should be grounded on a theory of reading.4 Culler bases this conclusion, in large part, on his argument that linguistics itself did not meet with much suc- cess when it insisted on trying to describe the actual prop- erties or content of the synchronic language system. He main- tains that it made greater headway when it learned to focus on the rules a speaker employs when trying to make sense of 127 utterances he has never heard before and he argues that those concerned with the analysis of the literary system might learn a great deal from the linguists' eventual success in this area. He goes on to say that what is needed now is not a description of the literary system and the various cate- gories contained within it but rather the explicit formula- tion of a "poetics" whose object of study ought to be literary competence. Culler points out that "both author and reader bring to the text more than a knowledge of language," and he maintains that this additional knowledge which includes "expectations about the forms of literary organization, im- plicit models of literary structures, [and] practice in form- ing and testing hypotheses about literary works - is what guides one in the perception and construction of relevant patterns. To discover the nature and forms of this supple- mentary knowledge is the task of poetics. . . ."45 In actuality, Culler is not concerned with the lin- guistic character of texts, nor is he interested in the actual literary structure of specific works. Instead, what he wishes to discover is exactly how a reader goes about detecting plot structures, identifying the important details which aid in the development of a character, and assigning meanings to particular occurrences. He maintains that this sort of meaning-giving operation must precede any analysis of the text and he argues, therefore, that it should be the object of study and the basis of literary categorization. He agrees, finally, with Roland Barthes that the "task of 128 a structuralist poetics . . . would be to make explicit the underlying system which makes literary effects possible” and he cites Barthes' own statement that such a poetics "will not interpret symbols but describe their polyvalency. In short, its object will not be the full meanings of the work but on the contrary the empty meaning which supports them all."46 While I certainly agree with Culler that all readers possess a certain literary competence and am, therefore, sym- pathetic to his call for a poetics which would explicitly ar- ticulate this in the form of a grammar, such a goal is not my primary concern or preoccupation here. I do not propose, in short, to append to my theory of the differences between creative and empirical texts an even more comprehensive theory of literary discourse complete with a formal grammar account- ing for all those rules, strategies, and conventions which we possess as tacit knowledge and use to make meaning out of literary works. Rather, I am ultimately concerned with my hypothesis that "popular" or empirical literary texts remain within that competence hy using the elements of the synchronic literary system in accepted and familiar ways. I would, therefore, like to demonstrate through the use of a case study that such texts are, by nature, conservative in that they are put together in traditional ways according to tra- ditional conventions and that they can thus be construed or understood using traditional strategies based on those rules. In essence, what I am really interested in is the way in 129 which the various elements and structures, identified and objectified through the application of a competence, combine. I am interested in the properties of objects within a corpus, as Culler might say, since I would like to identify in some paradigmatic case those elements which constitute a particu- lar literary genre and also would like to discover which com- binations of those units are empirical or accounted for by the system itself and which are authentic deformations or ex- tensions of it. In short, I propose to concern myself in the next chapter with the actual content or composition of a single generic manifestation of the synchronic literary sys- tem. I believe, furthermore, that it is possible to accom- plish this precisely because I do possess both a certain linguistic and literary competence and can thus construe a text and "discover" the meaning that exists in it as the tacit component of its structure. Indeed, this sort of literary analysis has been conducted for centuries even though critics have, for the most part, been unaware of the implicit knowl- edge or models of intelligibility they have brought to bear on texts in the proceSS"of making them signify. Despite this lack of awareness, such critics have formulated adequate and accurate analyses of numerous works and, in accordance with that, I have every hope that the explications I shall offer will correctly identify those elements crucial to a genre and also accurately isolate the empirical and creative combinations of them. Jonathan Culler admits the worth of 130 such "unconscious" literary analysis in a roundabout way when he admits that if a critic "began by noting his own in- terpretations and reactions to literary works and succeeded in formulating a set of explicit rules which accounted for the fact that he produced these interpretations and not others, one would then possess the basis of an account of literary competence."47 He adds that "adjustments could be made to include other readings which seemed acceptable and to exclude any readings which seemed wholly personal and idiosyncratic, but there is every reason to expect that other readers would be able to recognize substantial portions of their own tacit knowledge in this account. To be an experi- enced reader of literature is, after all, to have gained a sense of what can be done with literary works and thus to have assimilated a system which is largely interpersonal."48 What is implicit in Culler's statement is the notion that any good reader who has a true mastery of the system will be able to produce a substantially "accurate" reading of the text even if he does not possess conscious awareness of what con- stitutes that mastery and thus is unaware of how he produces the literary effects he does. Working under the assumption, therefore, that what I isolate and describe in literary texts is not necessarily selected on personal and idiosyncratic principles, I propose to rely on my own competence or implicit understanding of the interpersonal literary system in order to demonstrate how certain elements of that system are used differently in 131 empirical and creative texts. I have arbitrarily selected a single type of genre within the broad class of texts identi- fied as novels in order to circumscribe the scope of my analy- sis. This genre has already been identified by other literary commentators who have themselves relied on their own mastery of the system in question in order to isolate this one form or manifestation of it and to include specific texts within it. I intend to examine the "contemporary gothic novel" or those texts whose lineage can be traced either to eighteenth- century gothics like Horace Walpole's The Castle of Otranto and Ann Radcliffe's The Mysteries of Udolpho, or to Charlotte Bronté's Jane Eyre which is itself an alteration or mutation of Walpole's and Radcliffe's earlier work. In the course of my analysis and explication, I will attempt to delineate those elements and their combinations, the structures of the novel, which are constitutive of the contemporary gothic form. I agree with Culler that a genre is actually "a conventional function of language, a particular relation to the world which serves as norm or expectation to guide the reader in his encounter with the text,"49 and by examining works that are almost exclusively formulaic, and thus the most reductive versions of the genre, I hope to detect the exact nature of the fundamental relation to the world which is the charac- teristic mark of this particular form. Culler later points out in his discussion of the idea of genre that the function of genre conventions "is essen- tially to establish a contract between writer and reader so 132 as to make certain relevant expectations operative and thus to permit compliance with and deviance from accepted modes of intelligibility . . . ."50 It is my contention that by following the generally familiar procedures of traditional thematic analysis and by continuing to take the analogy be- tween language and literature seriously, thereby using cer— tain linguistic terms and methods to modify this procedure, I will be able to discover the terms of the contract estab- lished between the contemporary gothic and its reader. By closely attending to the patterns of the texts themselves, I hope to isolate those elements and functions central to the genre which require reader construction or interpreta- tion. Then, having identified the functional units and juxtapositions or oppositions between them which define the genre, it will be posSible to deal with works which play with those essential units and relations of opposition in order to make that genre function or "mean" in a new way. In other words, it will be possible to identify deformations of the fundamental form and creative use of the system as a whole. In summary, then, what I propose to do in the fol- lowing two chapters is to analyze certain selected texts ag literature using the implicit literary competence I possess as a member of the cultural literary system. In the process of interpretation, I will produce "literary effects" as Jonathan Culler terms the meanings we derive from texts, but where his concern would be with the procedures I use to pro- duce those effects, my focus will be on the structures or 133 forms from which I create or construe those meanings. NOTES 1James M. Edie, Speaking and Meaning: The Phenomenol- ogy of Language (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1976), p. 108. 2Edie, Speaking, p. 108. 3Roland Barthes, Critique et vérité quoted in Jonathan Culler, Structuralist Poetics: Structuralism, Linguistics, and the Study of Literature (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1975), p. 118. My understanding of the structuralist enterprise has been greatly enhanced by Culler's critical evaluation of its attempt to apply linguistic methods to the analysis of literary texts. While I do not agree com- pletely with Culler.on the usefulness of the structuralist methodology, I have found this notion of "literary competence" extremely helpful and my own later use of the term in connec- tion with Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology and its applicability to the study of popular literature is directly derived from Culler's work. Since the question of literary competence and its relation to both the production and comprehension of literary texts is a major concern later in this chapter, I will leave an extended discussion of Culler's work and my own adaptation of it until then. 4Roland Barthes, gig, trans. Richard Miller (New York: Hill and Wang, 1974), p. 11. 5It is necessary to point out here that Merleau-Ponty's position on the exact nature of the relationship between 13 parole and la lapgue must be implied, for much of what he wrote about these two aspects of language is really oblique to the issue, at least as that issue has been formulated by structuralism. Unfortunately, he died just as the structur- alist point of view was beginning to clarify itself and I'm sure his statements on the problems involved here would have been more to the point had he been writing in response to explicitly formulated structuralist premises. However, this was not the case and, as a result, his comments on 13 parole and la langue must be carefully culled from other contexts. 61 am indebted to Professor E. Fred Carlisle who sug- gested this very useful comparison between a speaker and his speech and a dancer and his dance. 134 135 7There are several critical works easily available to the reader of Merleau-Ponty interested in the evolutionary nature of his philosophical thought. Perhaps the most gen- eral and in some ways the most useful is the work cited earlier by Remy Kwant, From Phenomenology to Metaphysics: An Inquiry into the Last Period of Merleau-Ponty's Philo- sophical Life. James Edie's Speaking and Meaning: The Phe- nomenology of Language, however, considers the changes in Merleau-Ponty's theory of language and J. F. Bannan's "The 'Later' Thought of Merleau-Ponty," Dialogue V no. 3 (December, 1966) focuses on the changes in his not1ons about perception. All are extremely helpful in the attempt to understand the exact nature of the changes in his approach embodied in the incomplete last volume, The Visible and the Invisible. 8 Edie, Speaking, p. 75. 9Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Consciousness and the Acquisi- sition of Language in Children, trans. Hugh J. Silverman (Evanston, Iliihois: Northwestern University Press, 1973). 10 Edie, Speaking, p. 123. llEdie, Speaking, p. 112. 12Edie, Speaking, pp. 124-150. l3Edie, Speaking, p. 126. 14Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology, p. 179. 15 Edie, Speaking, p. 132. l6Edie, Speaking, p. 134. 17Edie, Speaking, p. 137. 18Edie, Speaking, p. 139. 19Edie, Speaking, p. 142. 20Edie, Speaking, p. 143. 21Edie, Speaking, p. 149. 22Culler, Structuralist Poetics, pp. 113-130. I en- countered Culler's work immediately after I drew up the schematic outline for this chapter and his writing has helped me immensely in clarifying my own ideas on the sub- ject. I have decided to use his term to designate that system of rules and expectations which guides our compre- hension of literary texts in acknowledgment of his influ- ence and because I think the designation itself is descrip- tively precise and methodologically useful. 136 23Culler, Structuralist Poetics, p. 114. 24Merleau-Ponty, Themes, pp. 3-4. 25Merleau-Ponty, Prose, pp. 11-12. 26Merleau-Ponty, Prose, p. 12. (emphasis added). 27Roland Barthes, The Pleasure of the Text, trans. Richard Miller (New York: Hill and Wang, 1975), p. 14. 28 Barthes, S/Z, pp. 92-93. 29Merleau-Ponty, Prose, p. 12. 30Merleau-Ponty, Signs, p. 78. 31Merleau-Ponty, Prose, p. 87. 32Merleau-Ponty, Signs, p. 42. 33Merleau-Ponty, Prose, p. 90. 34Merleau-Ponty, Prose, p. 90. 35The Compact Edition of the Oxford English Dictionary (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971), p. 1744. 36Merleau-Ponty, Prose, p. 91. 37Merleau-Ponty, Signs, p. 42. 38John G. Cawelti, Adventure, Mystery! and Romance: Formula Stories as Art and ngular Culture (Chicago: The University of ChiCago Press, 1976), p. 6. 39 Cawelti, Adventure, p. 13. 40Merleau-Ponty, Prose, p. 9. 41Phyllis Whitney, The Golden Unicorn (Greenwich, Connecticut: Fawcett Publications, Inc., 1976). 42Merleau-Ponty, Prose, p. 142. 43Culler, Structuralist Poetics, p. 120. 44Culler, Structuralist Poetics, p. 120. 45Culler, Structuralist Poetics, p. 95. 46Culler, Structuralist Poetics, p. 118. 137 47Culler, Structuralist Poetics, p. 128. 48Cu11er, Structuralist Poetics, p. 128. 49Culler, Structuralist Poetics, p. 136. soCuller, Structuralist Poetics, p. 147. I H I I I I I I " a} ) izawm ’i A. PART TWO PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE IDEA OF A LITERARY CONTINUUM: A CASE STUDY CHAPTER IV AN ACCOUNT OF A LITERARY COMPETENCE AND A THEORY OF THE GOTHIC NOVEL Specific Strategies for Reading Having made several broad generalizations about liter- ature and the nature of its relationship to language and linguistics, it is now my task to show-that these general- izations are descriptive and that they identify real dif- ferences in the way literary texts function. This case study is in no way deSigned to "prove" my theory scientif- ically but is presented rather as a demonstration of its applicability and usefulness in isolating both structural and functional variations within a particular type or genre. In short, I hope to show that an understanding of the notions of literary competence and the literary continuum can help us to comprehend what a text is attempting to do, how well it succeeds in its purpose, and how that text can be class- ified with respect to others of its type. In this attempt to demonstrate how certain texts do function as I have said they can, I intend to make use of a method derived from the analogy between literature and language. In essence, this approach will be a "linguistic" one despite the fact that I will make no attempt to analyze the language of specific 138 139 literary texts. Because I have argued that literature is, in actual- ity, a language system, I have maintained that an analogical relationship exists between the elementary signs or words of a language and the fundamental combinatory units of the literary text. Just as a sign has little practical meaning when isolated or taken-entirely alone, so the elements of a text, whether they be sentence fragments, descriptive para- graphs, or whole character presentations, do not signify by themselves. Like signs, which only begin to signify when they are profiled against other signs, the basic units of literary texts make sense for a reader only because they are integrated within some larger literary context. In essence, they possess a meaning which can be comprehended by a reader only because they are parts of a larger signif- icant structure. Therefore, in order to determine the sense or import of any element contained within a text, it is first necessary to discover the place it occupies in some greater unit or structure and then to understand how that structure is itself integrated into the largest unit of all, the text as a whole.1 A simple example included at this point might help to clarify this somewhat troublesome concept. It is common knowledge that in everyday language-use it is possible to use the same word in different ways and, as a result, to force it to carry two very different meanings. If I say, for example, "Give me another cup of coffee," the word 140 "cup" has a very different meaning from the same word used in another sentence. When I say, "If you want to light the match in this wind, cup it between your two hands," I am using the word in question in a different manner, that is, metaphorically, and thus causing it to mean something other than a "small, open container for beverages." The meaning of this simple word "cup" is in each case determined by the exact nature of its relationship to the other words in the sentence. In this example, the significance is al- tered by the fact that the word performs a different gram- matical function in each of the two sentences. This same variation in meaning caused by a change in function also occurs in literary texts where similar events or characters can have different meanings depending on how they are used in the text as a whole. For example, the appearance of a large medieval castle in a narrative could indicate that the text is a gothic novel and that the hero or heroine is about to be threatened by the dark forces of the world. On the other hand, its appearance could conceiveably carry no special significance at all. The point here is that the meaning or sense of any element in a literary text is deter- mined by the relationship established by the author between that element and others of the text as well as by the func- tion it performs in the narrative as a coherent whole. It can be seen, therefore, that in my analysis of literary texts, I will have to concern myself with struc- tures in much the same way "pure" structuralist critics do. 141 This is understandable since their structuralism derives from their own use of the same linguistic model or analogy upon which I have relied to develop the idea of the liter- ary continuum. However, the emphasis of my argument will be different, since I plan to concern myself with the actual variations in meaning and significance created by an author and disclosed by the reader in his encounter with the struc- tures in question. It is unfortunate that many structural- ists tend to ignore the fact that linguistic and literary structures are meaning-ful entities and can only be ade- quately understood as such. This tendency to forget that structures are employed by speakers and writers to commun- icate meanings to other speakers and readers is dangerous, since it permits one to believe that meaning exists wholly within the structures themselves or within the mind of the reader. In actuality, meaning is a construction produced by the conjunction or coming-together of an author, his text, and a reader, and it is consequently the duty of any analyst to recognize the role played by each in the reading process. I want to describe, therefore, the specific procedures I will be followingin-attempting to isolate the elements and combinations of elements essential to the gothic novel in general and to the contemporary gothic novel in particu- lar. As I have pointed out before, comprehensive synthesis must necessarily precede any explicit analysis or decomposi- tion of a text into its component parts. That is to say, 142 in order to identify those elements essential to a specific text, a reader must first construe the unfamiliar words, sentences, events, and sequences into an organic, coherent whole. The necessary units of a text are, therefore, only identifiable against the background or outcome of the text as a complete unit. Because of this peculiarity, I have found it necessary to read, construct, and interpret certain texts identified as gothic novels as I would normally approach any work of literature. Therefore I have read The Castle of Otranto, The Mysteries of Udolpho, The Monk, and Melmoth the Wanderer in the same way I might read Romeo and Juliet, Bleak House, Moby-Dick,or The Sound and the Fury. I have also read popular gothics such as The Golden Unicorn, Spindrift, and The White Jade Fox in the same manner, that is, as literature, and my analysis of them is founded on the same set of analytic procedures and stra- tegies. However, I want to make it clear that I have done this knowing full well that the reading conventions I have followed, while standard, are not necessarily the only ones available. I engage, therefore, in such interpretation fully cognizant of the fact that in accepting Merleau— Ponty's phenomenological theory about how we transform experience into meaning, I must also admit the possibility that there are different ways of reading, as there are dif- ferent ways of seeing, because individuals can come to a new event with different histories and thus with different 143 expectations. Since I intend to concern myself with the possibility of reading popular texts as something other than literature in the final chapter of this study, I will leave that entirely separate problem until then and proceed with a discussion of Roland Barthes' description of liter- ary analysis--a description which I feel accurately, though perhaps not exhaustively, describes my own literary compe- tence. This description will later figure prominently in chapter six where I intend to propose a hypothesis about the difference between literary competence and that competence employed by those who read popular novels as something other than literary texts. The "Codes" of Roland Barthes I In §L§v Barthes' primary concern is with the manner in which a reader makes sense of the apparently random con— glomeration of characters, actions, and events he confronts when he begins reading any literary text. Barthes identi- fies the most basic or fundamental units of a text not as its words or even as its sentences, but rather as its meaning-units which can theoretically be groups of words, sentences, or even paragraphs. He calls these significant units "lexias" and maintains that each lexia in a text de- rives its meaning from the fact that it is organized hier- archically into ever-larger units. He also argues that the overall meaning of the narrative is therefore the product of this composite, hierarchical structure. 6 . . . . a . » 2 n . 6 L . 8 . 5 A . » a c . A U . 144 In an early essay entitled "An Introduction to the Structural Analysis of Narrative,"2 Barthes discusses this sort of structure but refers to the lexia as a "function." To avoid confusion with my own use of the term in chapter three, I will quote Barthes substituting the later word ”lexia" which he himself chose to use in SLE. In this essay, Barthes identifies three separate levels of organ- ization including the level of lexias, the level of actions, and the level of narrative, and he points out that "atten- tion is . . . called to the fact that those levels are bonded together according to a mode of progressive integra— tion: a lexia has meaning only insofar as it takes its place in the general line of action of an actant; and this action in turn receives its ultimate meaning from the fact that it is being told, that is, entrusted to a dis- course which possesses its own code."3 In commenting on Barthes' notion of the lexia, Jon- athan Culler has stated that "a lexie is a minimal unit of reading, a stretch of text which is isolated as having a specific effect or function different from that of neigh- boring stretches of text.. It could thus be anything from a single word to a brief series of sentences. The level of lexies would, then, be the level of one's primary contact with the text at which items are separated and sorted out so as to be given various functions at higher levels of organization."4 Barthes himself maintains that the "soul" of a particular lexia ”is, as it were, its seedlike quality, 145 which enables [it] to inseminate the narratiVe with an element that will later come to maturity, on the same level, or elsewhere on another level." For Barthes, then, a 5 lexia is any identifiable portion of the linguistic pattern of a literary text which possesses significance when viewed as a step in the development of some larger action, event, or idea contained within that text. This lexia can be thought of, furthermore, as a content-unit since it is "'what an utterance means,‘ not the way it is made, which constitutes it as a functional unit." 6 When, for example, I read Carson McCullers' The Member of the Wedding and note that at the beginning of the second chapter Frankie is suddenly referred to as F. Jasmine Addams, the significance of this lexia as a meaningful element in the text is not realized until I am able to subsume it under some category related specifically to the personality growth of Frankie Addams. The fact that her name is changed carries no special significance for me until I can correlate it with other lexias which indicate together that Frankie sees herself in an entirely new way. It is the hierarchical organization or structure therefore which gives a lexia its meaning and thus determines its function in the text. Because I am an educated reader and have already encountered numerous other texts, when I read an entirely new work as literature, I,am able to identify and isolate lexias and to group them according to type or kind. I 146 know what hierarchical structures they belong to precisely because I am already familiar with the literary system and know how certain textual units “mean." I am generally aware that certain kinds of lexias or stretches of a text move different aspects of that text forward and I am able to make immediate decisions about which descriptions con- tribute to plot construction, character development, or symbolic exposition. In the course of his discussion of the lexia, Barthes identifies several categories or groups of lexias which he believes are descriptive of the various levels of organ— ization present in a literary text. He maintains that these groups are organized and put together during any reading of a literary work and insists that they are the foundation of virtually all forms of traditional literary analysis. He argues, furthermore, that the organization of each such group is governed by a code which he defines as "one of the forces that can take over the text (of which the text is the network), one of the voices out of which the text is woven."7 Since Barthes is at his most cryptic in this book, it might be helpful here to quote Jonathan Culler who explains the code as a "general semantic model which enables one to pick out items as belonging to the functional space which the code designates. That is to say, the codes enable one to identify elements and to class them together under particular functions."8 In sum, what Barthes' codes account for is that remarkable process which 147 occurs when a reader encounters a wholly unfamiliar text and knows not only how to ferret out the essential textual units but also how to assign them to meaningful categories and classes which themselves are descriptive of significant "perspectives" of literary texts in general. Although Barthes himself does not list these codes in order of importance, it seems logical to begin with the proairetic code since it is the one which governs the reader's ability to identify and to name the actions con- stituting the text's plot structure. This code is the model which enables the reader to discover and group lexias to- gether that have to do with the story of the text and its continuing advancement. Because I already possess famil- iarity with certain basic plot structures, I can read a text I have never seen before and decide almost at the moment of first reading that a certain element is identi- fiable as a detail of the plot or one which primarily contributes to related character development, symbolic pre- sentation, or thematic exposition. As Barthes points out, the actions which are the terms of the proairetic code, can be grouped into different sequences. He argues that "whoever reads the text amasses certain data under some generic titles for actions (stroll, murder, rendezvous), and this title embodies the sequence; the sequence exists when and because it can be given a name, it unfolds as this process of naming takes place, as a title is sought or confirmed. . . ."9 To read a text and to organize it 148 according to the proairetic code is, then, to order certain of the available actions into sequences whose very names indentify the meaning or function of the lexias so organ- ized. A second code closely related to the proairetic is the hermeneutic code, defined by Barthes as "all the units whose function is to articulate in various ways a question, its response, and the variety of chance events which can either formulate the question or delay its answer. . ."10 This code, therefore, actually enables the reader to iden- tify those lexias which pose problems, ask questions and present enigmas. To fully comprehend this portion of the text, the reader must be able to hold these units in abey- ance, in waiting, so to speak, until the eventual solution or answer is provided by later developments within the text itself. Culler has pointed out that the hermeneutic code involves a logic of question and answer and, I might add here, that because of this, it is primarily responsible for the reader's ability to detect a mystery, to participate in suspense, and to be overwhelmed by dread. As one might expect, knowledge of the hermeneutic code is essential to an appreciation of the detective story and the mystery tale as well as to an understanding of the gothic novel. Like the elements of the proairetic code, the lexias of the her— meneutic code must be ordered horizontally or sequentially and it is the name given to the sequence as a whole which identifies the function or meaning of the elements contained 149 within it.. Whereas the organization of lexias in these first two codes proceeds in a linear fashion, that is sequentially, the organization in the remaining three must be carried out hierarchically or categorically. In other words, in the last three codes described by Barthes, sequential order- ing is not as important as is accurate grouping or assign- ment. For example, in the semic code, which enables the reader_to identify and collect units which develop charac- ters in the text, it is not immediately as important to order details properly as to include all those that are relevant and significant. It is somewhat more difficult to identify on first reading all those lexias of the semic code than to isolate those of the proairetic, since appar- ently trivial details often take on major importance in light of subsequent actions performed by the character in question. Barthes equates this process, whereby the reader comes to "know" a character, with the activity of naming. "To state that Sarrasine is 'active or passive by turns,'" he writes, "is to attempt to locate something in his char- acter 'which doesn't take,‘ to attempt to name something."ll Barthes adds that in this grouping and naming process, "the connotator refers not so much to a name as to a synonymic complex whose common nucleus we sense even while the dis- course is leading us toward other possibilities, toward other related signifieds: thus, reading is absorbed in a kind of metonymic skid, each synonym adding to its neighbor SC is H *5 or an; is the tic 150 some new trait, some new departure." . 12 Barthes identifies the fourth model which enables the reader to construct thematic and symbolic readings of a text as the symbolic code and maintains that the antithesis or juxtaposition of opposites is always at its base. His discussion of antithesis and its grounding in the human body is extremely complex, highly controversial, and irrel- evant to my concerns here. However, I do feel Barthes is correct in maintaining that some kind of model guides the reader's extrapolation of symbols from a text and I suspect the code enables us to detect some underlying pattern or theme which unites all the lexias organized through the other codes into a single, coherent, meaningful whole. As Jonathan Culler points out, it is in the symbolic portion or aspect of the text that "the process of interpretation is made to seem natural."l3 This is so precisely because it is the essence of this code to require us to generalize or extrapolate some meaning from events, actions, characters, and objects in the attempt to make those things signify beyond themselves. To read a text for symbols, in short, is to recuperate lexias of other codes in such a manner that they point to some acceptable, all-encompassing abstrac- tion beyond or outside the text itself. The final code is actually a group of models, iden- tified by Barthes in S4; as the referential codes, which permit the reader to focus on certain elements and to use them in his construction of the meaning of the text because 1 W 1*: 5‘ "L ”‘4: 151 they derive from his own cultural background. Barthes argues that lexias in the text which can be organized referentially are statements actually "made in a collective and anonymous voice orginating in traditional human exper- ience," and he maintains that through these lexias, the text in question refers to general patterns of knowledge and wisdom possessed by both author and reader alike.14 In discussing Barthes' notion of referential codes, Culler points out that the role of referential lexias is primarily "to substantiate the fictional contract," 15 that is, to convince the reader that the world he is constructing within the text is identical to and contiguous with the world that he himself inhabits. Because the referential statements of a text seem to appeal to moral and scientific authority, Barthes argues that they function as implicit proverbs. This might be clearer if I cite one of the lexias from "Sarrasine" which Barthes himself identifies as part of a referential code. He labels the phrase "this golden age of love, during which we take pleasure in our own feeling and in which we are happy almost by ourselves," as referential and then notes that the statement makes sense as part of the cultural code about the ages of love. What he implies here is that any reader familiar with the culture and hence with the code itself will be able to read this and immediately understand what age is intended and exactly what is being asserted about it. If we convert the phrase itself into a proverb ? — 4 - ' — - — _ — . — . w — F tC : I ( y " ) N ( 11 \- 40; 9.7.: In lit 'I'Or 152 "the golden age of love is that time when we take pleasure in our own feeling and in which we are happy almost by our- selves," we will see that this statement is indeed a cul- tural commonplace and we will know how to recuperate it or to group it properly. As Barthes points out, the utter— ances of the cultural code "are written in the obligative mode by which the discourse states a general will, the law of society, making the proposition concerned ineluctable or indelible. Further still: it is because an utterance can be transformed into a proverb, a maxim, a postulate that the supporting cultural code is discoverable: styl- istic transformation 'proves' the code, bares its structure, reveals its ideological perspective." 16 The referential codes, then, enable an author to construct within the con- fines of the text a world whose limits appear to be contin- uous with those of the world that exists outside that text and which is inhabited by both author and reader together. In large part, it is because we possess referential codes and write and read according to them that we assume all literary texts are "about" the human condition and the world as we know it.‘ In discussing Barthes' codes, Jonathan Culler crit- icizes him for failing to include a code which enables the reader to gather those lexias together which develop the narrator of a specific text. Culler acknowledges the crucial role of this fictional personage when he points out that the lexias or stretches of the text which ch ia' ‘kf LA. lis hC’n to a,“ 2"“! Sta 1'1: Hm bu: 153 characterize him also establish "a kind of communicative circuit" between the text and its reader through the med— iating role of the storyteller himself. 17 Although I am sure Barthes would maintain that the semic code governing the construction of characters in general would also cover the reader's ability to "name" the distinguishing traits of the narrator, I think Culler's emphasis on the special nature of this character is well placed. By separating these lexias and hence the narrator himself away from those units dealing with other characters in the text, we acknow- ledge that, in large part, it is the relationship estab- lished between the reader and the narrator which determines how other lexias are to be recuperated and how the text is to be read. I have included Barthes' complex description of the procedures of traditional literary analysis here because it seems to me his description accurately and adequately ' explains the strategies I have used in reading and inter- preting gothic novels. I have relied on my acquaintance with other literary texts as well as on my implicit under- standing of the methods my culture uses to detect the mean- ing in unfamiliar texts in order to establish the plots of these novels, to perceive their initial problem and its solution, to identify and develop their important charac- ters, to work out themes and a symbolic reading, and to relate all that has been presented in them to the world that I, as the reader, inhabit. Throughout the remainder 154 of this chapter, therefore, I will be presenting various interpretations or, in Culler's words, describing certain literary effects which I see in gothic novels precisely because I have acquired the use of these codes and know how to classify and to arrange what would otherwise be an orderless jumble of words, sentences, and paragraphs. After presenting further interpretations of gothic novels in chapter five, arrived at with the help of these codes, I will then return to them explicitly in chapter six in order to compare my literary mode of reading with that method employed by those who refuse to analyze popular novels and who claim that such works contain no signif- icance beyond that of the story itself. After describing the special literary effects pecu- liar to certain specific gothic novels, I will attempt to identify the various lexic groups or actants and actions constitutive of the gothic as a genre. Obviously, some of these will have been put together at the direction of the proairetic code, some according to the specifications of the hermeneutic, while still others will have been organized by the powers of the semic, symbolic, referential, and nar- rative codes. Furthermore, because I will continue to argue that these textual elements or lexic groups only possess meaning when they are profiled against other groups con- tained within the same text, I will also strive to clarify the nature of the relationships and oppositions that exist between them. For example, it will not be enough to state 155 that a gothic novel must have lexias devoted to a descrip- tion of an isolated medieval castle since it is really the relationship established between this castle and certain identifiable inhabitants which makes the novel in question a gothic. In reality, then, it is actually the nature of the relationship established between certain crucial lexic groups which defines a genre and not the content or compo- sition of the individual groups themselves. I want to make one final point before proceeding with my interpretations of specific gothic texts and the conse- quent analysis derived from them. If we recall the fact that every literary text is first composed of language and only then of certain fundamental textual units, I think the extraordinary complexity of any and all such texts is suddenly made clear. Not only must a reader make sense of the language he sees before him, but he must also dis— cover the significance of those textual combinations which produce a meaning above and beyond that secreted by the simple words themselves. In short, he must coordinate both his linguistic and his literary competence in order to read and understand any text, no matter how simple or how complex its levels of integration. What this remarkable complexity and intricacy means for the analyst is that the task of classifying texts as empirical or creative is made even more problematic since all levels of meaning must be taken into account in order to determine whether the system has been deformed and new significations created, or whether < fl u . C . 4 / \ n u . at r c 1 1‘ d r. 1 & s h. t i » o . 1 n O : l s T fi I L L e « W W , t P u . 156 it has been used conservatively to say that which it has always traditionally said. Indeed, we have to wonder whether any blanket generalization can ever be made at all since it is possible for a text to fulfill some expectations, to rearrange and reorganize others, and to defy still others completely. The problem of categorizing texts is obviously going to pose questions of degree since some works will create new meaning on several levels and in several cate- gories at once while others will pioneer in only one area at a time. In truth, we cannot avoid thinking of the entire range of literary texts as a vast continuum which has two clearly defined theoretical poles but which, in practice, is composed of texts whose relative positions are somewhat imprecise and strangely flexible. Still, I do think certain distinctions can be made and my ultimate task will be to demonstrate how several identifiably "gothic" contemporary novels use the conventions of the genre to underscore fam- iliar truths or to forge ones that are entirely new. The Origins of the Gothic Novel While there is ever-continuing debate over what it is that makes a novel "gothic," few literary critics or his- torians would dispute the fact that the form first appeared in 1764 with the publication of Horace Walpole's The Castle of Otranto: A Gothic Story. Although Walpole's novel is clearly derivative in that its close relationship to the sentimental romance is easily demonstrable, it does violate 157 some of the conventions of its day, particularly those which prescribed the kind of subject matter that ought to be treated in a novel. I do not propose to get involved here in a detailed analysis of the relationships between English gothic novels of the eighteenth century since my primary concern is with contemporary American manifesta— tions of the genre, but in passing, I would like to point out that Walpole's novel is almost certainly one of those problem texts which clearly violates certain specific lit- erary conventions while it fulfills the vast majority of others. The Castle of Otranto is assuredly not a creative or authentic text in the purest sense of those terms, but neither is it entirely formulaic or empirical since it is obviously distinguishable from the other literary works of its time. In fact, I suspect the borderline status of Walpole's novel is reflected in the very way the novel has survived in literary history. Although few have argued over the years that this first gothic romance is a great work of art, it has still managed to survive and is studied even now as the earliest serious manifestation of the de- veloping genre. The fact that it has not disappeared into oblivion with the hundreds of other imitations it spawned attests to its seminal place in the history of the form. Had Walpole defied all the literary conventions of the per- iod, his novel would have been incomprehensible to the vast majority of readers and, as a result, unpopular, and I question whether it could have had as great an impact as 158 it did on both the popular and "serious" fiction of the day. But, to return to the origins of the gothic genre, I think it useful to point out that Walpole himself was an intellectual dilettante convinced of the greatness of "the past" and intrigued by all things medieval. 18 In fact, having once purchased a small farm near Twickenham, Walpole set about gothicizing the main building until it evolved into a sort of castle complete with a gallery, round tower, greater cloister, and cabinet. 19 Although Walpole is often dismissed as a wealthy fop and dandy, his interests did reflect thOSe of his class and his age, and his preoccupa- tion with England's medieval past was really a reflection of his culture's growing rejection of Enlightenment thought and the Age of Dr. Johnson. Because Walpole was in touch with the unconscious trends of the day, his gothic story struck a chord in that society and although the novel was not a "best-seller," it did build up a solid following in the literary community. It took some time for imitation to begin, but when it did, a flood of gothic novels overwhelmed the English reading- public. Most of those gothic imitations were written by women and, though extremely popular, few have survived. Nevertheless, foremost among Walpole's imitators was a woman named Ann Radcliffe, whose novels were, and still are, recognized as a further development in the form initially created in The Castle of Otranto. Radcliffe's 159 The Mysteries of Udolpho (1794) and The Italian (1797) were followed by other novels which, though slightly dif- ferent from hers, were still clearly derived from Walpole's first formulation of the type. Included among these were Matthew G. Lewis's The Monk (1796), Mary Shelley's Frank: enstein (1816), Charles Robert Maturin's Melmoth the Wanderer (1820), and Emily Bronté's Wuthering Heights (1847). Al- though all the novels mentioned here were quite different from the immensely popular and clearly gothic "shilling- shockers" and "penny-dreadfuls" sold throughout the period in question, they originated in the same gothic impulse that had motivated Walpole and Radcliffe as well as those whose works were extraordinarily popular. The fact that all these novels are included together in a single genre raises serious questions about the definition of the genre itself and this situation poses subsequent problems for any analyst who seeks to describe the ways in which that genre has been varied and extended over the course of time. Therefore, before I can make assertions about contemporary use of gothic conventions, it is first necessary to identify those conventions which are shared by the paradigm works of Walpole, Radcliffe, Lewis, and Maturin and which, as a result, constitute the genre of the gothic novel. I believe that if we read these works closely enough, it is possible to discover a certain common skeleton of form and meaning underlying each unique set of characters, events, and themes which is the immediate preoccupation of 160 each individual work. In addition, it is my conviction that "the gothic" is something more than castles, dungeons, monks, and storms, and I am convinced that this peculiar something is tangible and thus identifiable. Therefore, in order to isolate this skeleton, I will focus on four of the works which I consider particularly representative with the express goal of describing those conventional meaning- structures which are at the foundation of all gothic novels. By looking at The Castle of Otranto, The Mysteries of Udolpho, The Monk, and Melmoth, the Wanderer, I hope to formulate that literary pattern or set of conventions which is the starting point for such contemporary "gothics" as The Golden Unicorn, Thunder Heights, Sanctuary, The Mem- ber of the Wedding, and Reflections in a Golden Eye. The Castle of Otranto As I have mentioned before, it seems to me that al- though Horace Walpole's The Castle of Otranto has a great deal in common with the sentimental romance, it is at the same time the precursor of those novels often identified with the high gothic mode. Regardless of the changes the (novel portends, Walpole's work is itself a peculiar con— glomeration of old styles, stock narrative devices, and familiar characters, and there are even long passages in the novel which seem to have been directly transposed from the plays of William Shakespeare. The cut and paste char- acter of the work has prompted Richard Kiely to remark 161 that because it is "littered with lifeless images and archaic conventions, Walpole's novel may still strike some as an act of irresponsible vandalism rather than a creative literary experiment." 20 In fact, his own opinion is that Walpole's novel "proves him more adept at dismantling the old and presenting it in shambles than in building something truly new."21 While I certainly agree with the general import of Kiely's assessment, I feel Walpole's novel creates something new in the atmosphere of suspense and dread which permeates the entire narrative. It is this atmosphere combined with the change in subject matter which differentiates his work from that of Fielding and Richardson and, although Walpole's quarrel with his predecessors is primarily over issues of content rather than over issues of form, it is a quarrel nonetheless and it does result in a substantive break with tradition. Kiely himself has acknowledged this in distin- ~ guishing the earliest gothics written by Walpole and Rad- cliffe from those later ones produced by Lewis, Shelley, and Maturin, and, in fact, he has pointed out that "those writers who first turned to Gothic castles and oriental palaces did so because they were tired of the drawing room and the country inn."22 While obviously still thinking of Walpole and Radcliffe, Kiely adds that "certain of the earliest romantic experimenters changed the setting and cast of the novel without substantially altering the narrative procedures established by their predecessors."23 I do not 162 agree completely with Kiely on this last point since it seems impossible to me to ignore the fact that the inciden- tal properties introduced into fiction-writing by The Castle of Otranto later became the principal defining elements of a new form, and I cannot help but wonder if such apparently minor variations in scene and character were not also accompanied by certain more significant changes in narrative convention. When this first gothic novel is analyzed with respect to later works which developed from it, it becomes clear that Walpole did something more than legitimize the use of exotic settings and medieval architecture when he published The Castle of Otranto. Although the castle itself and the supernatural events which take place within its walls, because sensational, seem to be the most distinguishing marks of the novel, it is, in reality, the slight change in the narrative contract between text and reader which sets Walpole's work apart from that of Richardson and Fielding. Where Walpole's predecessors present their readers with numerous opinions about a sequence of events which every one agrees has taken place,24 Walpole includes fantastic events and then leaves his reader in doubt as to whether they occur at all. He does this by explaining to his reader in the preface that while the characters are represented as believing in "miracles, visions, necromancy, dreams, and other preternatural events," such occurrences "are exploded even from romances" and he implies that he 163 himself doesn't believe in such goings-on. Walpole rea- 25 sons that an author “is not bound to believe them himself, but he must represent his actors as believing them."26 This carefully calculated disclaimer suspends the reader between the world of the text, in which life is strange and threatened by the inexplicable, and the world of his own everyday life where events are familiar, rational and comprehensible. Because he is not sure whether he is to believe all he is told, the reader is left in a state of suspense not unlike that experienced by the characters themselves when they are confronted by the apparitions in question. Where sentimental fiction invites its readers to contemplate and admire fine feelings, the gothic vision of Horace Walpole requires participation by the reader in the action of the novel and seems to conceal a deliberate attempt to puzzle, shock and frighten. In fact, an essen— tial aspect of the gothic novel is its ability to include the reader as an active participant in the action of the narrative by carefully controlling the amount of information released to him. Reading The Castle of Otranto is like walking hand in hand with Manfred himself as he blunders his way from revelation to revelation and from mystery to solu- tion. Walpole knows very well what he is doing with the tale as indicated by his comment in the preface to the first edition that "everything tends directly to the catastrophe."27 As he points out, terror is the author's principal engine and "it prevents the story from ever languishing."28 He 164 adds that because the terror "is so often contrasted by pity . . . the mind is kept up in a constant vicissitude of interesting passions."29 If we grant the fact that this attempt to engage the reader by arousing his feelings is both a new and sig- nificant departure from previous fictional patterns, then it becomes clear why Walpole's gothic furniture had such an effect on his contemporaries. The isolated setting in both place and time is not merely a curioSity produced by Walpole's vivid imagination but rather a functional detail which serves to distance the world of the novel from that of the reader, thereby endowing the former with mystery and magic. The crumbling medieval castle, complete with its dungeons and secret passages, is the perfect embodiment of a world the reader is never intended to understand come pletely. Consequently it becomes the symbol of a kind of fiction whose avowed purpose is to frighten the reader by confronting him with the strange and the unfamiliar. There- fore, it seems to me Walpole's claim to be the "founder" of the gothic novel does not depend on the fact that he first wrote about a gothic castle or introduced the super- natural into the novel form, but rather on the fact that he created a narrative pattern or plot structure which engages the reader in an entirely different manner. In- deed, it is the general movement of Walpole's plot that is imitated by Radcliffe, Lewis, and Maturin despite the fact that each modifies the focus of the action in a unique and 165 individual way. It is possible to reconstruct the linear development of Walpole's plot even though the reader is prevented from following the action in this manner since certain of the events are not disclosed until the final dénouement. Al— though we do not learn this fact until the end of the nar- rative, the event which sets the story in motion and pro— vides the necessary motivation is the murder of Alfonso, Prince of Otranto, by Ricardo, the current Prince's grand- father. This crime has been compounded, we learn, by the fact that Ricardo fabricated a will, thus depriving the rightful heirs of their patrimony. At the time the story occurs, the true heir to the principality of Otranto, the peasant, Theodore, is concealed in another identity and even he is not aware of his "true self." However, by a chance occurrence, Theodore is introduced into the castle, is persecuted by Manfred who is trying to solidify his claim to the falsely—gotten inheritance, and is eventually re- vealed as a man of noble birth and the rightful heir to Manfred's estate. As E. F. Bleiler says of the typical gothic plot inspired by The Castle of Otranto, "through a chain of circumstances, which usually involve the super- natural, the ancient crime is detected, the villain is pun— ished, and the heir receives his birthright."30 Interestingly enough, Bleiler also adds that "it might be said the Gothic novel is a primitive detective story in which God or Fate is the detective." In truth, the 31 166 connection he draws between the gothic novel and the de- tective story is entirely justifiable since both are struc- tured around the fact that a crime has been committed and cries out for detection. In each, the reader is forced to participate in the process of discovery since he is only gradually accorded the knowledge he needs to solve the mys- tery. In Barthes' terms, the reader of the gothic novel is forced to rely on the hermeneutic code to make meaning of the numerous lexias he encounters which suggest problems, prOpose questions, and hint at enigmas. He learns to keep all the suggestions and clues revealed to him present in his mind because, as he winds his way through the sub- terranean passages of the novel, he gradually begins to discover the answers to the problems that trouble him. Al- though this process of revelation begins slowly, it accel- erates as the novel progresses until, in the last few pages, masks are thrown away, the crime is explained, the criminal himself is caught and punished, the hero gains what he deserves, and a semblance of order is restored to this fictionally disordered world. However, because the great- est portion of the gothic novel is devoted to the pieces of the puzzle, to disorder and to mystery, this final resolution often seems artificial and contrived. Indeed, in The Castle of Otranto, the reader is certainly less impressed by Walpole's final assertion of order in a "season of explanations" than by the chaos and illusion which precede it. Ultimately, it is the breakdown of 167 rationality, the descent into disorder, and the terror produced by both which-are the hallmarks of Walpole's novel and the genre created out of it. The Mysteries of Udolpho As Walpole's novel was absorbed by the literary con- sciousness of the day, it was gradually and then widely imitated. Several of the earliest such adaptations were produced by Clara Reeve and Charlotte Smith although none of their works ever achieved the popularity and significance of those created by Ann Radcliffe. Her most popular novel, The Mysteries of Udolpho, published in 1794, was an instant and enormous success. It went through ten editions alone between 1794 and 1860, after which it appeared in 1870, 1877, 1882, 1891, and sporadically thereafter.32 The novel, in short, became a general cultural possession, alluded to again and again in numerous novels, essays, and critical pieces as the epitome of the gothic form. Richard Kiely has pointed out that "her gently euphemistic prose, her fainting heroines, and explainable ghosts were reproduced by other writers so quickly and on such a large scale that they were clichés before they had time to become conven- tions. Not only the plots but the titles of her books were borrowed and used with slight variations. "33 It seems only natural to observe that where Walpole had struck a chord in the literary community two decades before, Mrs. Radcliffe touched a sensitive nerve now exposed throughout 168 the culture as a whole. Although it might be interesting to speculate why eighteenth century English society was so ready to be emotionally stimulated by the gothic novel, that cannot be my concern at this point. Rather, I would like to focus on the naturethe wierd happenings at Otranto, Mrs. Radcliffe centers her attention on Emily, the one character directly threatened by the unfamiliar and the strange. In devoting an enormous amount of time to Emily's hysterical frame of mind, and by linking her study of this aberrant psychology to an exploration of the gothic castle, Mrs. Radcliffe endows the most famous of Walpole's medieval properties with new meaning. Not only does the gothic castle and medieval setting serve to distance the action and thus create separation between the world Of the novel and that of the reader, but it also functions on a symbolic level as the objective correlative of Emily's mental state which grows ever more irrational as she re- mains within the castle walls, isolated from the calming influence of the natural world. Robert Kiely is entirely correct when he argues that "the achievement of The 180 Mysteries of Udolpho is not, then, the mere introduction of Gothic effects into an otherwise conventional senti- mental narrative, but the projection of a nonrational mentality into a total environment."48 By relating this story from her heroine's point of view, Mrs. Radcliffe forces the reader to seek the solu- tion to the mysteries with Emily herself; she is thus able to prompt that reader to succumb to the power of his own imagination and to experience with Emily the terror pro- duced by total irrationality. This careful narrative decision enables Mrs. Radcliffe to emphasize her ultimate thematic assertion, for it permits her to implicate the reader in this situation where reason has lost its sway. Because the reader believes in the reality of Emily's fantasies, when those fantasies are exposed for the wild imaginings they are, he cannot help but be impressed by Mrs. Radcliffe's belief that the health of the human mind is dependent on reason's ability to hold the imagination in check. Where Horace Walpole seeks only to arouse the feelings of his reader and to confuse him about the ul- timate reality of the world of Otranto, Mrs. Radcliffe deliberately pulls her reader into the very action of the narrative, forces him to participate in the dread and fear experienced by her heroine, and thus prompts him to cry out for the moral solution she proposes as the justifica- tion behind The Mysteries of Udolpho. In sum, her novel is both a derivation from and an extension of the fictional 181 form first created by Horace Walpole in The Castle of Otranto. The Monk If Ann Radcliffe's novel can be thought of as a particularly important step in the development of the gothic genre because of the modifications it produces in the form initially worked out by Walpole, then Matthew Gregory Lewis's The Monk must be considered equally significant since it too begins with Walpole's plot and gothic encum- brances, subjects them to a series of changes, and endows the genre itself with entirely new possibilities. Lewis's novel initiates the subsequent variations it does primarily because he adds a characteristically Radcliffean interest in interior mental states to Walpole's preoccupation with the villain. As a result, he creates an infinitely more intriguing character in the Capuchin monk, Ambrosio, than either Walpole or Radcliffe are able to present in Manfred or Montoni. However, in addition to this major variation, Lewis also reverses so many of the newly formed conven- tions of the genre, that The Monk almost appears to be a burlesque or parody of the early gothic novel. Even though Lewis does intend to poke fun at some of the most typical gothic excesses, he also uses the form seriously to explore the effects of passion, the dangers of superstition, and the nature of power and the subjugation it exacts from others. 182 Precisely because Lewis does intend to play with the gothic conventions he uses, the sequential plot development of The Monk is somewhat different from the familiar story line related by Walpole, Radcliffe, and the other gothic novelists of the period. However, despite this change, Lewis manages to include most of the expected gothic inci- dents in the novel and The Monk is filled with crimes and their concealment, descents into dungeons and catacombs, and ghostly appearances. Although an ancient crime com- mitted by some relative of a major character does not func- tion as the motivating force behind the main plot of The Monk, such a device.does figure prominently in the primary subplot concerning Raymond and Agnes. Thus, we are treated to the rather gruesome history of the Bleeding Nun and are even permitted a glimpse into the sordid past of the Wandering Jew. However, it is essential to point out that Lewis does not involve his reader in the detection of the crime as Walpole and Radcliffe do. In fact, the detection of the double murder at Lindenberg occurs almost by acci- dent as Raymond pursues the main business of his tale, union with Agnes. Nevertheless, Lewis does involve the reader in his story and much of what he writes is deliber- ately calculated to arouse emotions and to produce the suspense and dread so characteristic of the gothic form. He manages to accomplish this by advancing and then stall- ing the forward progress of the primary plot; even though the reader knows what crimes are meditated by Ambrosio he 183 is held in suspense as to whether they will be success- fully brought to conclusion. Lewis is able to provoke his reader's concern in this by forcing him to sympathize with both the heroine of the tale and with her potential ravisher, who is presented as a superior being capable at once of enormous excellence and abysmal crimes. I might add here that this extremely difficult task is one at which Walpole does not succeed and one which Ann Radcliffe never attempts. The Monk opens conventionally enough as Lewis brings together the three major characters of the now familiar gothic plot--the heroine, her hero, and the villain. Antonia, as she is described to us, is typically beautiful, demure and-innocent,49 and, as might be expected, the young, earnest hero, Lorenzo, falls in love with her at first sight. 50 However, most of the first chapter is devoted to a detailed description of the Capuchin monk, Ambrosio, who is, strangely enough, presented to us at the height of his powers. Technically, it does not become clear to the reader that it is Ambrosio who poses a threat to Antonia until chapter three of volume two which occurs more than halfway through the novel. But the comments Lewis includes in his first presentation of the monk hint at a dark nature hidden deep beneath the surface nobility and exemplary holiness he presents to the world. As Lewis points out about Ambrosio, ”still there was a certain severity in his look and manner that inspired universal awe, and few could 184 sustain the glance of his eye at once fiery and penetra- ting."' When he compounds this hint by disclosing in 51 the second chapter that Ambrosio suffers from inordinate pride, 52 it becomes obvious to a reader familiar with gothic conventions that the haughty villain necessary to the form will, in fact, prove to be Ambrosio himself. However, as I have said, Lewis does not make this clear until well into the novel, and, as a result, the beginning of The Monk tends to disappoint any expectations the reader might entertain about the way the story should progress. Although Lewis does detail Lorenzo's desire to marry Antonia, he spends little time describing either the relationship itself or the obstacles presented to it. Instead, he switches his interest to Ambrosio and his rela- tionship with the monk Rosario. In fact, all of chapter two is devoted to the story of Ambrosio's slip from grace as he gradually submits to the seductions of Matilda who has concealed her true identity and pretended to be Rosario only in order to be near Ambrosio. Again, Lewis interrupts even this tale and turns in chapter three to Raymond's recitation of his unsuccessful attempt to elope with his beloved Agnes. His narrative occupies two chapters and more than one hundred pages and upon its conclusion, Lewis does not return to the story of Ambrosio and Matilda, but rather doubles back even further and proceeds with the tale of Lorenzo and Antonia. The reader is not permitted to learn the consequences of 185 Ambrosio's temptation until the third chapter of the second volume. At this point Lewis finally dovetails the three stories heretofore kept separate and involves the participants of each with those of the other two. In this chapter Ambrosio conceives his plot to rape Antonia and, in a development unlike that in any other gothic novel preceding The Monk, he succeeds in his designs. In the process, Ambrosio kills Antonia's mother and mur- ders Antonia herself. Although Lewis does fulfill one of the gothic conventions by uniting his hero with a beauti- ful virgin at the end of the tale, he still manages to disappoint expectations since Lorenzo does not win Antonia and is forced to console himself with the affections of the hastily produced Virginia. Lewis does permit Raymond to win Agnes, but again, he provides a significant twist to the conventional gothic union since Agnes has already been seduced and the child she conceived has been allowed to perish. I think it probably clear from this brief recital of the plot structure of The Monk that although Matthew Lewis includes most of the conventional narrative devices of the gothic novel worked out by Walpole and Radcliffe, he introduces them at unexpected moments, delays the an- ticipated conclusions usually derived from them, and thus subjects the resolution of the story itself to a subtle shift in meaning. By tampering with gothic cliches, Lewis is able to fulfill a dual purpose in his novel. Since his 186 story does not hinge on the detection and revelation of a long-hidden crime, he must find some other way to in- volve his reader in the action of the story if his work is to remain within the gothic genre. Furthermore, be- cause he does not focus on his heroine or ask his reader to identify solely with her, he must use other means to create the sense of dread and fear of further exploration which are behind the plot development and reader response in The Castle of Otranto and The Mysteries of Udolpho. By conjuring up the necessary characters or properties in- volved in a certain typical gothic incident, he sets cer- tain expectations in motion and then turns around abruptly, disappoints them, and "proves" to his reader that things are not always as they seem. Thus, in bringing his reader face to face with the fact that most of what he thinks he "sees" is a deception, Lewis is able to create both the feeling of suspense and the dread of what lies hidden be- neath the surface which Walpole and Radcliffe produce by withholding information from their readers. In short, Lewis actually distorts certain gothic conventions pre- cisely because he wants to disorient his reader and to intensify that relationship between reader and text which is so characteristic of the gothic form itself. His deliberate attempt to involve his reader in the tension between deception and truth, and between illusion and reality serves an additional purpose in that Lewis causes the reader to experience that which is felt by 187 Ambrosio himself, who discovers again and again that appearances are false and conditions in this world are almost never what they seem. It appears to me that this is Lewis's ultimate goal, since his primary concern is certainly the fate of the Capuchin monk and it is through his demise that Lewis demonstrates the larger theme of this gothic romance. Although the subplots of the novel involve the conventional gothic lovers and the difficul- ties they encounter in consummating their love in an evil world, The Monk, as its title implies, is really the story of Ambrosio, the Capuchin abbot. More fully realized than either Manfred ar Montoni, Ambrosio is an extraordinarily talented man who is neither wholly good nor totally evil. In fact, Lewis is careful to point out that had Ambrosio been allowed to develop naturally, he may well have become a generous and kind human being. As he says, "he would have shown himself possessed of many brilliant and manly qualities. He was naturally enterprizing, firm, and fearless: He had a warrior's heart, and He might have shone with splendour at the head of an Army.‘ There was no want of generosity in his nature: The Wretched never failed to find in him a compassionate Auditor: His abilities were quick and shin- ing, and his judgment vast, solid, and decisive."53 How- ever, Lewis makes it clear, first through Ambrosio's actions and then in an explicit aside, that most of these qualities have been distorted or destroyed by the repressive 188 training of monastic life. That Lewis blames the church for what Ambrosio has become is clear for he comments, ”while the Mbnks were busied in rooting out his virtues, and narrowing his sentiments, they allowed every vice which had fallen to his share, to arrive at full perfec- tion. He was suffered to be proud, vain, ambitious, and disdainful: He was jealous of his Equals, and despised all merit but his own: He was implacable when offended, and cruel in his revenge."54 However, not only is the Church responsible in Lewis's eyes for Ambrosio's harsh and unyielding temperament, but he suggests it is also responsible for the crimes he commits, because it is the -excessive natureof his passion, previously repressed and now released with a vengeance, which causes him to murder and rape. Indeed, Lewis is ambivalent about all forms of social convention, and though he seems to be aware of the fact that they are necessary, he is also cognizant of the dangers inherent in them. In the end, his portrait of Ambrosio is the picture of an individual in almost total rebellion against the constraints produced by such forms. It is important to point out that although Ambrosio is clearly a descendent of Manfred and Montoni and thus a gothic villain, he also has a great deal in common with Emily St. Aubert, since his situation echoes, in some respects, that of the typical gothic heroine. Both Emily and Ambrosio gradually lose all ties to human society; the 189 story of each is the story of increasing isolation and the dangers it poses to the life of the individual. By first introducing Emily in the shelter of the family unit, Mrs. Radcliffe is able to contrast her idyllic life in the society of others with the hysterical and narcissistic existence she leads imprisoned within Udolpho and_the re- cesses of her own imagination. Lewis establishes a similar contrast between Ambrosio's early life as a participating member of the monastic community and his later existence, characterized by a rejection of all ordinary human rela- tionships and a refusal to conform to certain of his order's social conventions. Ambrosio's rejection of society is particularly ironic since early in the novel he discour— ses at length on the importance of human connection. How- ever, we cannot ignore the fact that even at this early stage, Ambrosio is fascinated by the possibility of an absolutely free and individual life, for he admits to lRosario that "were it possible . . . for Man to be so totally wrapped up in himself as to live in absolute se- clusion from human nature, and could yet feel the contented tranquility which these lines [of poetry] express, I allow that the situation would be more desirable, than to live in a world so pregnant with every vice and every folly."55 Although he feels the pull of the individual life, Ambrosio is still mindful of the dangers it poses. Thus, he lectures Rosario on the effects of an existence lived outside the bounds of human society and the 190 conventions it necessarily imposes, arguing: However little [man] may be attached to the World, He can never wholly forget it, or bear to be wholly forgotten by it. Dis- gusted at the guilt or absurdity of Mankind, the Misanthrope flies from it: He resolves to become an Hermit, and buries himself in the Cavern of some gloomy Rock. While Hate inflames his bosom, possibly He may feel con- tented with his situation: But when his passions begin to cool; when Time has mel- lowed his sorrows, and healed those wounds which He bore with him to his solitude, think you that Content becomes his Companion? Ah! no, Rosario. No longer sustained by the violence of his passions, He feels all the monotony of his way of living, and his heart becomes the prey of Ennui and weariness. He looks round and finds himself alone in the universe: The love of society revives in his bosom, and He pants to return to that world which He has abandoned.56 Ambrosio explains further to Rosario that he values his life in the monastery because it permits him to combine the best of two possible worlds. He can isolate himself from the evil and horror which plague human society in general and can yet partake of the pleasures of a social existence lived among a few valued friends. He argues that this bal— ance between isolation and conviviality' is "the principal merit of a Monastic Institution" since it "secludes Man from the temptations of Vice,” procures that leisure nec- essary for the proper service of the Supreme," "spares him the mortification of witnessing the crimes of the worldly, and yet permits him to enjoy the blessings of society." 57 I have quoted Ambrosio's sentiments at length because they are essential to the theme of the novel and because they occur at a crucial point in the narrative. No sooner 191 has Ambrosio delivered his speech about the necessity for communal life than he is presented with an opportunity to escape the restrictions it imposes. Rosario discards his disguise, reveals that he is a woman and, as Matilda, con- fesses her love for the Capuchin abbot. Although Ambrosio is able to resist Matilda's charms and to suppress his awakened passions for a short while, he is intrigued with the idea that he may be able to indulge his individual de- sires, disobey his religious vow of chastity, and yet remain within the protecting walls of the monastery itself. Once he has entertained such thoughts, his desire is released from the fetters which bound it, and he begins to dwell on Matilda's beauty and the possibility of possessing her. He does succumb, and in so doing, defies one of the most im- portant restrictions of the individual will established by the monastic community. Thus having denied the social taboo against expression of certain sexual desires, Ambrosio is completely unable to hold his passions in check. He grows bored with Matilda and when Antonia appears, imploring his help for her mother, he lusts after her. As a result, he breaks another of his mohastic vows by venturing outside the cloister. At this point, Lewis begins to link Ambrosio's sexual passion and his desire to express it with the will to power. What Ambrosio actually wants to do is to set himself outside or above all social conventions so he might satisfy those wants which society has decreed must go unfulfilled except 192 in certain situations. Matilda recognizes this, and in her attempt to bring Ambrosio into league with the devil, plays on his pride in his own individual strength and power. When he expresses horror at her pact with Satan, she con- tradicts his argument that she has enslaved herself for momentary happiness. She assures him that "the Enemy of Mankind is my Slave, not my Sovereign," and asks, "is there no difference between giving and receiving laws, between serving and commanding?" When he still refuses to accept 58 her reasoning, she scorns his timidity: You dare not? How have you deceived me! That mind which I esteemed so great and valiant proves to be feeble, puerile, and grovelling, a slave to vulgar errors, and weaker than a Woman's....It is not virtue which makes you reject my offer; you would accept it, but you dare not. 'Tis not the crime which holds your hand, but the punishment; 'tis not respect for God which restrains you, but the terror of his vengeance! Fain would you offend him in secret, but you tremble to profess your- self his Foe. Now shame on the coward soul, which wants the courage either to be a firm Friend, or an open Enemy! When Ambrosio continues to resist, she excites the one de- sire she knows he can no longer control and permits him to observe Antonia, the object of his lust, as she disrobes to bathe. Matilda succeeds in persuading Ambrosio and from this point on he seeks to impose his individual desires on those about him despite their wishes to the contrary. In his push to exert his will against any and all opposition, he murders Elvira, rapes Antonia, and then kills her as well. His attempt to set himself above society and the restrictions 193 it imposes on its members only serves to assure his par- ticipation in the violence and evil of the world, and as a reward for his hubris, Ambrosio achieves the isolation he had coveted. As the story draws to a close, he is rejected by his former monastic brethren and by society as a whole, and discovers that total isolation is even more terrible than he had suspected. Ambrosio, however, retains his sense of superiority to the end. He will neither pray to God nor beg for absolution because he reasons his crimes are so great that they could never be forgiven by anyone. That extraordinary pride in his own individuality and uniqueness which continues to separate him from the rest of humanity, eventually brings about his total destruction. The last few pages of Lewis's novel are particularly interesting for he integrates his belief in the dangers of extreme individualism with his interest in the problem of distinguishing between illusion and reality. When it be- comes clear to Ambrosio that his death is imminent, he decides to accept Matilda's solution and conjure up the devil. However, because he is not ready to renounce all ties to humanity or to give up hope of eventual salvation, he attempts to bargain with Satan himself. Indeed, in his final hours, Ambrosio is still so driven by pride that he suggests a lesser bargain and proposes to Satan, "be my Servant for one hour, and I will be yours for a thousand years." The devil, of course, refuses, for his condi- 60 tion is nothing less than the possession of Ambrosio's 194 soul for eternity. However, when his jailers are about to open his door to escort him to almost certain death, Ambrosio signs the pact and is spirited away, only to be told by his "savior" moments later, "the guards whom you heard at the prison-door came to signify your pardon."61 In fact, those very men who seem to be escorts to destruc- tion are actually agents of his salvation. Furthermore, his apparent escape from death by fire turns out to be a wholly unnecessary flight into the flames of eternal damna- tion. In addition, Ambrosio learns that in raping Antonia and in killing Elvira, he has ravished his own sister and murdered his mother. He discovers, to his horror, that what he thought was a simple crime against the laws of society was actually the most terrible crime against Nature itself. Ambrosio finally realizes that in denying the necessity of abiding by social convention, he has destroyed his most fundamental tie to human society, his connection with the members of his own family. However, even this revelation is not the last Ambrosio must endure, for Satan now withdraws from the bargain, admitting that Ambrosio will never leave the mountain upon which he has been depos- ited. In truth, what Ambrosio thought was a sure contract guaranteeing his continued existence is actually his death warrant. His story concludes as he is impaled on a moun- tain peak, rejected even by Satan himself. Unlike Emily, Ambrosio is never permitted to return to society and the solitude he once desired becomes his final curse. 195 Of course, it is essential to point out that Lewis contrasts Ambrosio's fate with that of the four lovers who do, in fact, achieve union and begin the formation of two new families. As Emily rejoins society and is united with Valancourt in The Mysteries of Udolpho, so Agnes is re- stored to Raymond and Lorenzo is joined with Virginia in The Monk. Even though Mrs. Radcliffe appears to be more interested in the chaos and confusion created when an in- dividual imagination is permitted to run wild, she even- tually reestablishes order in her novel by restoring the family unit to its position of dominance, leaving us with the distinct impression that Emily will never again allow her fantasies to control her reason. However, while Matthew Lewis also restores order and creates two new family units, we cannot forget that 2M3 M925 ends not on this note of relative stability and hope for the future, but rather concludes with the horrible torture and death in isolation of Ambrosio himself. Lewis's last words to his reader concern the monk's final days and his description is a gruesome reversal of the opening of the Book of Genesis. Ambrosio finally dies on the seventh day after he has been abandoned by Satan and Lewis makes it clear that he is aware of his state until the very last moment. Lewis's final description of his death in total isolation can only be an indication that Lewis himself enter- tains very little hope for the future. The ending of his gothic novel is bleak indeed--his vision is far removed 196 from that of Walpole or Radcliffe even though he makes use of similar properties and conventions to realize it. Blind, maimed, helpless, and despairing, venting his rage in blasphemy and curses, execrating his existence, yet dreading the arrival of death destined to yield him up to greater torments, six miserable days did the villain languish. 0n the Seventh a violent storm arose: The winds in fury rent up rocks and forests: The rain fell in torrents: It swelled the stream; The waves overflowed their banks; They reached the spot where Ambrosio lay, and when they abated carried with them into the river the Corse of the despairing Monk.62 Before leaving Lewis's gothic romance for Charles Robert Maturin's Melmoth the Wanderer, I want to comment on Lewis's use of standard gothic architecture as well as on his explicit descriptions of sexual passion, violence, and death. Although a gothic castle does not figure in the main plot of The Monk, Lewis does dwell on the castle of Lindenberg at length, using it to intensify the mystery surrounding the Bleeding Nun and to create a sense of dread about the outcome of the midnight tryst between Raymond and Agnes. Furthermore, it seems to me Lewis uses the Capuchin monastery of the primary plot in much the same way Radcliffe uses the castle of Udolpho. It is also particularly signi- ficant that when Ambrosio accepts Matilda's help in his attempt to rape Antonia, he does so in the dungeons and catacombs of the monastery. Furthermore, at the moment when he cuts all ties with society by raping and murdering his sister, he is hidden deep within the bowels of the struc- ture, surrounded by the bodies of dead monks and nuns. In 197 a sense, the more Ambrosio turns away from society and looks within himself for the power to satisfy his desires, the further he descends into the depths of the monastery, away from the life of society and into the embrace of the dead. It is also important that Ambrosio is never again released from these dungeons until he has signed away his right to be a member of the human community. Unlike Emily St. Aubert who is able to leave the haunted gothic castle behind and to rejoin society, Ambrosio continues to be imprisoned in it almost until the moment of his death. In the end, be- cause he continues to assert his individual will, he cuts himself off from intercourse with other men, and locks himself away in the prison of his own egotism. Although Lewis varies and plays with several gothic conventions in The Monk, the novel is most notably differ- ent from those preceding it because of the kinds of descrip- tions he chooses to include. While it is true that both Walpole and Radcliffe set out to shock their readers, they tend to do this by surprising them with an unexpected ex- planation or by suggesting that something terrible is about to happen. In fact, very little ever does, though we are continually told that the horrible sight is "beyond descrip- tion" or "too awful to express in words." Lewis, however, feels no such squeamishness. His novel is filled with graphic portrayals of torture, passion, and death; indeed, he is at his most detailed when writing of the dark side of human existence. His most original contribution to the 198 genre is his refusal to stop at "unspeakable horrors" and his willingness to present the physical aspects of pain and death in a realistic manner. Where The Castle of Otranto and The Mysteries of Udolpho are tales of terror in that their primary aim is to strike fear into the hearts of those who read them, The Monk is closer to a horror story in its desire to bring the reader face to face with everything decayed and disgusting in this world.62 Melmoth the Wanderer If Mattew Lewis's novel is important because of the complexity it brings to the traditional presentation of the gothic villain as well as because it darkens the gothic vision through its preoccupation with death and decay, then Charles Robert Maturin's Melmoth the Wanderer should also be considered equally significant for its villain is even more interesting than Ambrosio and its view of the world is less hopeful than that of The Monk. Although the derivation of the novel is clear because it makes use of the standard gothic props and conventions, it is, never- theless, decidedly different from either The Castle of Otranto or The Mysteries of Udolpho. Melmoth's story bears little outward resemblance to that of Manfred or Emily but it is still my conviction that Maturin's novel is a par- ticularly creative variation of the gothic form established in the two earlier romances. I am inclined to agree with Richard Kiely who sees it as a derivative work which is, 199 at the same time, "wilder, more complicated, and, in many ways,...more daring...than most of its predecessors."63 One of the things setting this novel appart from those which precede it is the fact that many of the traditional gothic properties dealing with the Roman Catholic Church, such as convents, monasteries, monks, and priestly rituals, are no longer employed simply to distance the action or to create an air of miraculous mystery. In Melmoth the Wanderer these things are important at the level of plot construction, but they are also integral to a larger thematic level of meaning as well. Maturin's work functions in some respects as an explicit denunciation of Catholicism and Kiely has called it "a belated work of the Reformation, a roar of outrage against the bigotry, superstition, sadism and hypocrisy which had infested the Roman Church."64 Part of the impact of this novel is attributable to its complex use of properties whose meanings in other gothic novels are simply the result of the functions they perform while moving the narrative forward. Because Maturin uses them within a larger conceptual framework, the properties themselves derive their significance from the thematic argument to which they contribute as well as from the role they perform within the plot. As a result, the monks, nuns, and monasteries of Melmoth the Wanderer are all more fully realized than those appearing in the earlier works. Although the thematic character of Maturin's work is relatively simple, his interest in the evil that pervades 200 all human existence is revealed through a complex narra- tive structure which is directly related to the halting forward movement of Lewis's The Monk. Melmoth is composed of five separate tales nested within each other as a "set of chinese boxes."65 These tales are, in turn, suspended within an even larger frame story whose principal charac- ter is John Melmoth, a descendent of the Wanderer. The six different stories are linked together by the fact that this wanderer, the original Melmoth, figures in all of them. Although the details of his story are not revealed until we encounter "The Lover's Tale," the last tale in the nar- rative, they do explain how he can continue to appear over the course of 150 years in places as far removed as Spain and the Orient. Like any good gothic novelist, Maturin releases this information about his villain-protagonist only gradually and he is thus able to shroud him in a cloud of mystery. Each new detail about Melmoth's history and temperament, supplied by some new character in a new tale, serves to compound this mystery. As a result, Melmoth be— comes an almost mythic figure even before he appears as principal protagonist. We eventually learn that Melmoth had become interested in astrology and the occult sciences and had been promised knowledge of the future world on the condition that he would yield his soul to the devil. However, this contract was made to appear less horrible by the fact that Melmoth was told he could be released from his bargain if, in the 201 course of 150 years, he presented a single soul as his substitute. Thus armed with the power to appear to the suffering at that moment when their pain was the greatest and resistance lowest, Melmoth wandered the world in search of a stand-in. Each of the tales recounts in ever- increasing clarity the power of his attempts and the ul- timate failure of them all. However, each time we reach the moment of temptation in a particular tale, Maturin lowers the veil once again, telling us only that the mys- terious visitor made a proposition which cannot be repeated. For example, in the second tale contained within the frame, Moncada tells Melmoth that a curious apparition "took advantage of my agony, half visionary, half real as it was, and, while proving to me that he had the power of effecting my escape from the Inquisition, proposed to me that incommunicable condition which I am forbid to reveal, except in the act of confession." 66 Maturin then deliber- ately suggests that this creature may be the one who tempted Stanton in his moment of despair in a madhouse. He appends to Moncada's recitation the observation that "here Melmoth could not forbear remembering the incommun- icable condition proposed to Stanton in the madhouse, - he shuddered and was silent. 67 ll By thus exciting our curiosity and delaying our discovery about the true nature of the Wanderer's plight, Maturin creates that air of suspense and dread which is at the heart of every gothic novel and which is the basis of the cOntract between the 202 gothic text and its reader. In Melmoth, as in Otranto and Udolpho, we are kept ignorant, given a few hints and suggestions about the reality that exists beneath the sur- face of events, and charged with the task of discovering the solution which will explain all that we have seen. Although the primary motive behind Maturin's delaying tactic seems to be his desire to provoke the reader's in- volvement in the mystery which enshrouds Melmoth, this in- tricate narrative structure serves a thematic function as well. Each of the five tales is told by or about a par- ticularly engaging character with whom we, as readers, are asked to identify. Four of these stories center around attractive young men who are subjected to all sorts of outrageous tortures and cruel punishments. In fact, it is easy to see that the younger Melmoth, Stanton, Moncada, and Guzman are all modeled after such innocent young heroes of earlier gothics as Theodore, Valancourt, and Lorenzo. The fifth tale is the story of the beautiful, Eve-like Immalee, and her derivation from Emily and Antonia is equally obvious. Thus, Maturin engages our sentiments in such a way that when Melmoth does intrude into the early tales, he is taken to be strangely alien, wholly evil, and the ultimate gothic villain.68 Maturin effectively controls our perception and leads us to a certain interpretation of this enigmatic figure whose situation we are sure we under- stand by the time the "Tale of the Indians" is presented. However, as in The Monk, appearances in the world of 203 Melmoth are deceiving, and in this crucial tale Maturin dashes our expectations, contradicts our interpretation, and presents Melmoth himself as a complex character who is both hero and villain to Immalee. By demonstrating to us that things are not always as they seem, Maturin pre- pares us for the moral argument he wishes to make in the novel as a cohesive whole. In essence, his narrative is really the story of Melmoth, and each of the tales must be reconstructed or reinterpreted in that light. The first encounter between Melmoth and Immalee occurs in the "Tale of the Indians," the third narrative related within the original frame story. The tale itself centers around Immalee who is, at this time, the sole inhabitant of an Edenic island in the Pacific. She is completely innocent and unfamiliar with the corrupt ways of the out- side world and Melmoth thinks of her as a means to escape his destiny. He destroys her innocence by acquainting her with the suffering and evil of the world beyond her island, but at the same time he is touched by her trust and grad- ually falls in love with her. Robert Lougy has argued that Maturin is at his best when describing Melmoth's re- awakening and rediscovery of dead emotion,69 and I certainly agree. His description of the pain Melmoth experiences as a result of the tension between the cynicism and despair he has lived with for over a century, and the fragile hope nourished by his feeling for Immalee, is a moving testament to Melmoth's deeply human nature in which evil is inextricably 204 bound up with good. Maturin writes: When absent from her, his purpose was what I have described; but while present, that purpose seemed suspended; he gazed often on her with eyes whose wild and fierce lustre was quenched in a dew that he has- tily wiped away, and gazed on her again. While he sat near her on the flowers she had collected for him, while he looked on those timid and rosy lips that waited his signal to speak, like buds that did not dare to blow till the sun shone on them, - while he heard accents issue from those lips which he felt it would be impossible to pervert as it would be to teach the nightengale blasphemy, - he sunk down he— side passed his hand over his livid brow, and, wiping off some cold drops, thought for a moment he was not the Cain of the moral world, and that the brand was effaced, - at least for a moment. He felt again the gnawings of the worm that never dies, and the scorching of the fire that is never to be quenched....He looked intensely at her, while rage, despair, and pity, convulsed his heart. . . .70 However, despite the redeeming nature of Immalee's love, Melmoth, whose extraordinary intellect still controls his emotions, reasons that a shield of cynicism and de- spair is the only armor man can use to combat the pain and suffering of human existence. As a result, he does not beg for the forgiveness still available to him and finally persuades Immalee to leave her island. He becomes, in effect, the agent of her corruption, and despite the short revival of his feelings, he appears to the reader even more depraved than before. After Immalee is returned to her family in Spain, Melmoth continues to visit with her. Once again, his dor- mant feelings are awakened and he begins to entertain the 205 faintest hope that his misery might be alleviated if he can share it with another. Immalee delays when he proposes marriage but eventually consents to follow him wherever he wishes. Melmoth, however, restrained by his conscience, cannot subject Immalee to a marriage with a doomed soul and abruptly disappears. He returns just as abruptly, how- ever, to marry her in a bizarre and diabolical ceremony which reverses the marriage ritual concluding every other gothic novel. Melmoth finally appears to be totally evil after all. But Maturin surprises us yet again. We learn some 200 pages later that in the interval between Immalee's acceptance and the actual marriage, Melmoth, in an unself- ish attempt to protect her warns her father of the danger which threatens her. In fact, he tells Aliaga, "there is an eye fixed on her, and its fascination is more deadly than that fabled of the snake! - There is an arm extended to seize her, in whose grasp humanity withers! - that arm even now relaxes for a moment, - its fibres thrill with pity and horror, - it releases the victim for a moment."71 He beseeches Aliaga to hear him, but because business matters prove too pressing, Aliaga does not hurry home, and the marriage takes place. Maturin's point in present- ing these reversals can only be that the will to do good still exists within Melmoth's soul and is at constant war with its darker, more pessimistic side despite his pact with the devil. With Melmoth's story, Maturin argues that no matter 206 how evil a man seems to be, no matter how depraved his life appears to others, he is always just outside the range of God's infinite mercy which can be extended to him if he will only deny his power-seeking ego and aCk- nowledge his need for something beyond himself. Melmoth, however, controlled by his own pride, cynicism, and de- spair, refuses to avail himself of the opportunity ex- tended to all men. As Robery Lougy points out, "his damnation results not from the diabolic powers without, but from within, and in this lies the tragedy of his fate."72 Like Ambrosio, Melmoth considers himself super- ior to all he sees about him, and it is finally this pride which isolates him from human society and dooms him to perdition. Both novels function on a thematic level as an exploration of the dangers of extreme individualism, and although both assert that human connection, achieved through the social institution of marriage, is both necessary 329 possible, they present that argument in subplots which are subordinate to the bleaker, less hope- ful stories of the title characters. Even though Ambrosio and Melmoth are finally punished and order restored at the end of both novels, it is still with the sense of hopelessness and despair which seems to be the character- izing theme of these two gothic "romances." By exposing the hypocrisy and corruption of the Church, both Lewis and Maturin seem to imply that man's salvation is entirely dependent on his personal, individual relationship with 207 God. However, since they also dwell on the horrible con- sequences of total reliance on the self, the reader cannot help but be more impressed with the inevitability of the paradox of individualism than with the possibility of its resolution. In his lengthy analysis of Melmoth the Wanderer, Richard Kiely includes an excellent statement of the prin- cipal concern of the literary form known as the gothic romance. Although he tends to speak of it in terms slightly different from mine, Kiely, too, focuses on the paradoxical situation confronted by Melmoth in the novel, exploring the consequences of the tension produced by the conflict between the two sides of Melmoth's nature. Kiely calls these two aspects "the compassionate" and "the cynical," referring specifically to Melmoth's desire for union with some other fellow human, and his inability to lower himself to the level of others. In this context, Kiely writes, "the difference between them, then, cannot be described in terms of action, but only in terms of attitude. One feels and hopes and therefore suffers mentally from the physical suffering he witnesses; the other feels and expects nothing, rejoices in his isola- tion from other men, and even asserts an indifference to nature, which gives him a kind of superiority over it. The struggle thus depicted is an internal one between two aspects of the self which can never be reconciled, yet which define one another as surely as night and day, 208 death and life."73 Like Ambrosio, Melmoth is an extra- ordinarily intelligent and perceptive human being, appalled and disgusted by the depravity and corruption he sees about him. But because he possesses such an acutely sensitive nature, he suffers from his own awareness, and isolates himself from others and thus from his own "human" nature. Whereas Ambrosio shuts himself up in a monastery, Melmoth tries to learn more than anyone else in order to alleviate his suffering. By setting themselves above the rest of men, both Ambrosio and Melmoth reject human society and are forced to turn inward in search of the power and abil- ity necessary to insure survival in a difficult world. This journey into the self, however, proves disastrous, for once an individual's connection to the social world is severed, the triumph of narcissism is complete and abso- lute isolation is the result. Neither Melmoth nor Ambro- sio ever discovers the passageway out of the haunted castle of the individual self. In the end, both succumb to the darker, more pessimistic side of their nature and die par- ticularly horrible, gruesome deaths. The damnation of each is made even more poignant by the fact that in both novels, some character does establish a connection with another which, however tenuous serves to justify the suf- fering and pain they must endure as part of the paradox of the human condition. It is ultimately this conflict between the power of the individual will, and the undeniable need for 209 communication and connection with others, which is at the heart of the gothic novel. While early manifestations of the form do not locate the conflict within the limits of the individual human psyche, they represent it as a struggle between the forces of good and evil. Neither Manfred nor Montoni is a fully realized human being precisely because each functions as a personification of the absolute evil inherent in the desire to control one's own destiny and that of others. They are opposed in Otranto and Udolpho by characters who similarly personify absolute good or the longing for connection and, as a result, Theodore and Valancourt, Isabella and Emily are easily and accurately described by the terms "hero" and "heroine." However, Radcliffe avoids Walpole's absolute dichotomy by placing her heroine in the middle of these opposing impulses, forcing her to choose between them. When Emily loses her ability to distinguish illusion from reality and good from evil, it is because she has been isolated from society by the power of her own will and imagination. As she grad- ually leaves objective reality behind her, she sinks into the same isolation and narcissistic individualism which imprisons Montoni, the "villain" of the story. Radcliffe, however, permits Emily to escape. Her marriage to Val- ancourt symbolizes both the necessity for and the possibil- ity of achieving connection with another, and hence, with the rest of human society. As I am sure it is clear by now, both The Monk and 210 Melmoth the Wanderer are structured around this seminal "gothic" conflict. However, in these two more complex variations of the genre, the struggle is located within the individual self and good and evil are not so easily distinguishable from one another. Although both novels include pairs of lovers who seem to be "heroes" and "heroines" this designation is not entirely satisfactory, for while Ambrosio and Melmoth are clearly the villains of the narratives, they also seem to be their heroes as well. Both are complex characters and, while it is not possible to say they are wholly good, neither can it be said that they are wholly evil. The will to exert power over others by virtue of one's own superiority is equally balanced in these hero-villains with the desire to rely on others through connection and communication. Although the desire for power wins the battle, these two men who have tried to live at the expense of others are harshly and brutally punished. Society is restored in The Monk and in Melmoth just as it is in Otranto and Udolpho, but the happiness of the restoration is tempered by the fact that the marriages upon Which it is based are not the ideal unions we might wish. Lorenzo does not marry his true love, but must content himself with a devoted substitute. Raymond marries Agnes only after he'has raped her and nearly caused her death. Similarly, Immalee is finally joined with Melmoth, but dies soon thereafter giving birth to their doomed child. 211 In the world of the late gothic novel, happiness is inextricably bound up with terrible suffering, good is unavoidably mixed with evil, and moral ambiguity charac- terizes all of human existence. These novels are directly linked to those by Walpole and Radcliffe by the fact that, in the end, they too counsel against hopelessness, assert- ing the importance of human connection even in the face of the constraints it produces on the individual will and the horrible pain it must endure in order to survive. Adapting a comment Kiely makes about Melmoth alone, one might say that the lesson these novels try to teach--which is not to despair--is all the more moving because their vision of man and nature gives so much to despair about.74 The Conventional Gothic Having presented this general interpretation of the genre, it is now possible, I think, to describe with accur- acy which elements or combinations of elements are constitu- tive (If the particular literary "system" we call the gothic novel. This form, as I have characterized it here, first appeared in reaction to the realistic novel of manners and morals which focused on society, its customs and conven- tions, and the individual's adaptation to each. Whereas the gothic is also concerned with the relationship between the individual and society, its focus, unlike its prede- cessor's, is on the individual and the state of his mind when he is cut off from harmonious communion with others. 212 The form is characterized, therefore, by its concern with an isolated, often orphaned seeker who is forced to pursue some goal in order to insure his own survival. Strangely enough, this seeker may either be a beautiful young woman or an extraordinarily talented, diabolical figure. The content of the unit does not matter as much as its rela- tionship to other central or defining units in the genre. What is crucial then is that this figure must somehow be cut off from all normal intercourse with human society and thus from the aid or sustenance which might be provided by others. As a result, this gothic seeker is forced to look inward to find the strength necessary to help him withstand the pain of life in a universe which is anything but wholly benevolent. The gothic is marked, furthermore, by the antipathy which develops between the isolated questor and the natural world. Because most of his normal ties to society have been severed, the questor's perception begins to be colored by the fact that it cannot be checked against the percep- tions of significant others. As a result, he gradually loses his ability to see objectively; he feels himself confronted at every turn by a completely alien and hostile environment bent only on his personal destruction. It is, in fact, the gothic novelist's preoccupation with the ques- tor's psychic state during this confrontation with the out- side world which produces that curious sense of dread and fear so characteristic of every novel in the genre. This 213 atmosphere of mystery and suspense is not simply a pecu- liar feature of certain novels but rather a defining unit of the genre itself. Indeed, it is through this presen- tation of an ominous and oppressive air that the gothic novelist is able to describe the questor's loosening grip upon reality and at the same time engage the reader's sympathies in the protagonist's struggle to control his own destiny in an alien world. Most gothic novels guarantee their reader's parti- cipation in this experience of dread by controlling the amount of information released to them, thereby forcing them to identify with the questor of the tale. Again, this technique is not a mere curiosity employed randomly by a few authors, but rather a condition of the contract established between reader and gothic text. By telling the tale from the questor's point of view and by granting to the reader only that information possesed by the ques- tor himself, the author places the reader in a position equivalent to that of the protagonist; he is thus forced to see the universe through the protagonist's strangely colored glasses. The obvious assumption behind such a strategy is that if a reader participates in the terror and fear produced by complete isolation, he will be all the more willing to accept the author's moral argument that order and stability are dependent on healthy social relationships. This sense of fear and dread is thus both thematically and stylistically important to the genre and 214 it is for this reason that the single defining element of the gothic novel is often thought to be its peculiarly oppressive atmosphere. Of course, it is my conviction that it is not suspense and dread alone which make a gothic novel, but rather the appearance of both within a tale told about an isolated seeker who at some time perceives the universe surrounding him as unutterably "other." However, there are still other elements I have not yet mentioned also central to the genre of the gothic novel. In addition to the relationships between questor and universe and between reader and text already mentioned, there must also be established certain relationships be- tween the questor and other characters if the novel is to be considered a gothic. The characteristic action of the genre is set in motion by a conflict between the desire for a life of isolation lived outside the cares and wor- ries of the world, and the recognition that connection with others is the only thing that can provide a shield against the suffering inherent in the human condition. These tend- encies may be embodied in two entirely separate characters or they may be portrayed as opposite sides of a single figure. In any case, not only must both forces exist within the novel, but they must be played off against each other in such a way that both protagonist and reader con- front the possibility of choosing between them. Thus, we have Emily St. Aubert, who wishes to marry Valancourt, suddenly locked within Udolpho and the fantasies of her 215 own imagination and then threatened with the isolation Montoni deliberately chooses. In another instance, we see Ambrosio the monk simultaneously attracted and re- pelled by the life of isolation and in the end cruelly punished because he chooses an existence ruled by the in- dividual will. In both cases, these opposing tendencies confront each other and the conflict is ultimately re- solved in favor of a life lived within the limits of social existence. It is necessary to add at this point that as a re- sult of this "gothic" conflict, the seeker-protagonist of the novel is always brought face to face with the vio- lence, evil and unspeakable cruelty which characterize human existence. He is most often initiated into an aware- ness of this evil, but occasionally he is implicated in it as well because he finds it necessary to use the same vio- lence and cruelty to assert his individual will. However, such a movement is not absolutely necessary, since what is truly important to the genre is the fact that knowledge of the suffering at the foundation of all human existence makes the choice between isolation and community even more difficult. The questor is seduced by the apparent ease of a life lived outside the inevitable problems of human society and he often believes he is opting for a virtuous existence by denying his participation in the human commun- ity. No such questor in the traditional gothic novel ever survives his choice of isolation; social connection is 216 always presented as the painful but necessary solution to a life that must be lived amidst such horror. Manfred, Montoni, Ambrosio, and Melmoth all try to impose their wills on others, attempt to deny their need for human con- nection and, as a result, are ultimately destroyed. The fate of the character who chooses the individual life is always contrasted in the gothic novel with that of one who is willing to commit himself to an existence lived in the presence of others despite the inevitable suffering' V such a connection portends. Marriage is essential to the resolution of the standard gothic romance for it stands in opposition to the life of isolation, symbolizing man's need for the comfort provided by others within the limits of social convention. While I have characterized the traditional gothic romance as a kind of quest novel, it is, in some respects, an escape narrative as well. At the same time the pro- tagonist of the novel searches for a way to live in a world filled with violence and pain, he desperately tries to avoid being sullied by the evil he perceives about him. Consequently, much of the gothic plot concerns this char- acter's attempts to escape a realization of or consummation with evil and the novel itself is dominated by his dread of this final, inevitable outcome. While evil is thus often the prime motivating force in the standard gothic romance, it seldom affects the ultimate resolution. As I have pointed out before, order is restored at the end 217 of these novels because all those who have attempted to set themselves outside society are punished, while all those who have consented to remain within it are rewarded with marriage. Nevertheless, because so much of the novel is devoted to descriptions of violence, torture, sexual passion, and death, the reader cannot help but be impressed by the extreme fragility of the gothic resolution. In short, the gothic form is characterized by this strange tension between the cynicism and despair of its thematic concerns, and the optimism and hope of its narrative action. Before leaving this discussion of the gothic genre in order to explore the ways in which it has been varied since the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, I want to make some comments about those standard properties often isolated as exclusively "gothic" and generally thought of as the defining elements of the form. I am referring specifically here to medieval castles, labyrinthine pass~. ages, subterranean caverns, ghosts, and all manner of super- natural happenings. It seems to me that simply because some of these things are present within a certain novel does not necessarily guarantee that such a work is in reality a true gothic romance. Indeed, it is my convic- tion that these "gothic" encumbrances are so closely iden- tified with the genre because they are the outstanding features of the earliest presentations of that strange, mysterious, and largely alien world so central to the fictional form just discussed. Including such properties 218 in a novel does not automatically make that novel a gothic because those properties must be integrated within the more fundamental structural patterns which function as the true foundation of the gothic form. Thus, a medieval castle is "gothic" if it is used to symbolize the charac- teristic questor's descent into the self. Similarly, ghosts and apparitions are "gothic" if they function within a nar- rative which concerns a character's loss of rational contact with objective reality. In other words, the tra- ditional gothic furniture is important to the genre because it plays an integral part in the creation of that menac- ing world which threatens both the protagonist of the novel and the reader who sympathizes with him. However, it is entirely conceivable that a gothic novel can be created without these properties since the necessary relationships between seeker and universe, between seeker and other char- acters, and between reader and text are not dependent on the presence of medieval castles or subterranean passages, or even on the appearances of ghosts. The gothic novel, then, can be defined as any prose narrative of considerable length which uses the structure of interlocking relationships heretofore discussed as its point of departure. An author may choose to use these relationships or oppositions in a conventional way, that is, according to the form defined by Walpole, Radcliffe, Lewis, and Maturin, or he may choose to subject them to slightly new combinations thus giving to the elements he 219 uses a somewhat different meaning. However, no matter how deformed he may wish to make the relationships among these elements the author must use them if his novel is to be in the gothic mode. In other words, he must concern himself with the conflict between the individual will and social commitment by focusing on a seeker who is isolated from the world and thus threatened by all he perceives about him. Furthermore, this author must include the read- er in the terror and fear experienced by the seeker as a result of his isolation, in order to involve that reader in the seeker's choice between a life lived with others amidst violence and pain, and a life lived alone within the confines of the solitary ego. While an author does not have to resolve this conflict in any specific way, his novel must dwell on the evil that pervades life in this world if it is to be judged a true gothic. The gothic vision, in short, is characterized by an awareness of the pain, suffering, and death inextricably bound up with life, and the narrative action of the genre is dominated by the discovery that any attempt to escape this human condition is doomed to failure. Connection with another human being is held out in the traditional gothic novel as the only viable solution for man in his attempt to withstand the tortures of human existence. Although these tortures can- not be avoided, they can at least be minimized by the com- fort derived from a life shared with others. NOTES 1Although I would also argue that the text itself has meaning only because it too is integrated into the larger context of an individual life, that issue need not concern us here if we can accept the premise as given. For a discussion of the connection between extra-literary contexts and the construction of meaning within a liter- ary text I would direct the reader to Si; by Roland Barthes and to Jonathan Culler's chapter on "Convention and Naturalization" in Structuralist Poetics, pp. 131-160. 2Roland Barthes, "An Introduction to the Structural Analysis of Narrative," trans., Lionel Duisit, New Liter- ary Histopy (Fall, 1975), 238-272. 3Barthes, "An Introduction," p. 243. 4Culler, Structuralist Poetics, p. 202. m m q m Barthes, "An Introduction," p. 244. Barthes, "An Introduction," p. 245. Barthes, S/Z, p. 21. Culler, Structuralist Poetics, p. 202. 9Barthes, 8/2, p. 19. 10Barthes, S/z, p. 17. 11Barthes, 8/2, p. 92. 12Barthes, S/Z, p. 92. 13Culler, Structuralist Poetics, p. 229. 14Barthes, 8/2, p. 18. 15Culler, Structuralist Poetics, p. 203. l6Barthes, 8/2, p. 100. l7Culler, Structuralist Poetics, p. 203. 220 221 18Eino Railo, The Haunted Castle: A Study of the Elements of English Romanticism (New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., 1927). p. 2. See also Martin Kallich, Horace Walpole (New York: Twayne Publishers, Inc., 1971), pp. 1-33. 19E. F. Bleiler, "Horace Walpole and The Castle of Otranto" in Three Gothic Novels, ed E. F. Bleiler (New York: Dover Publications, 1966), p. ix. 20Robert Kiely, The Romantic Novel in England (Cam- bridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1972), p. 41. 21 22 Kiely, The Romantic Novel, p. 41. Kiely, The Romantic Novel, p. 10. 23Kiely, The Romantic Novel, p. 10. 24Kiely, The Romantic Novel, pp. 20-21. 25Horace Walpole, The Castle of Otranto: A Gothic Stogy in Three Gothic Novels, ed. E. F. BIeiIer (New York: Dover PubliEatiOns, 1966), p. 18. 26 Walpole, Otranto, p. 18. 27Walpole, Otranto, p. 18. 28Walpole, Otranto, p. 18. 29Walpole, Otranto, p. 18. 30Bleiler, "Horace Walpole," p. xv. 31Bleiler, "Horace Walpole," p. xv. 32Bonamy Dobrée, "Introduction," to Ann Radcliffe, The Mysteries of Udolpho (London: Oxford University Press, 1966), p. Vii. 33Kiely, The Romantic Novel, p. 65. 34Ann Radcliffe, The Mysteries of Udolpho, ed. Bonamy Dobrée (London: Oxford University Press, 1966), P. 1. 35Not only does this passage enable the reader to add to his understanding of M. St. Aubert, but it also helps him to characterize Emily and to deepen his understanding of her. Furthermore, as the action of the novel progresses, it becomes clear to the careful reader that this passage must also be interpreted thematically as one of the key statements of the novel's moral point. In actuality, it functions simultaneously on several different meaning levels. 222 36Radcliff, Udolpho, p. 80. 37E. B. Murray, Ann Radcliffe (New York: Twayne Publishers, Inc., 1972), p.117. 38 Radcliffe, Udolpho, p. l. 39Radcliffe, Udolpho, pp. 225-226. 40Radcliffe, Udolpho, p. 226. 41Radcliffe, Udolpho, p. 80. 42Murray, Radcliffe, p. 124. 43Murray, Radcliffe, p. 127. 44Kiely, The Romantic Novel, p. 78. 45Kiely, The Romantic Novel, p. 78. 46Kiely, The Romantic Novel, p. 78. 47Kiely, The Romantic Novel, p. 78. 48Kiely, The Romantic Novel, p. 77. 49Matthew Lewis, The Monk: A Romance, ed. Howard Anderson (London: Oxford University Press, 1973), p. 9. 50 Lewis, The Monk, p. 24. 51Lewis, The Monk, p. 18. 52Lewis, The Monk, p. 39. 53Lewis, The Monk, p. 236. 54Lewis, The Monk, p. 237. 55Lewis, The Monk, p. 53. 56Lewis, The Monk, p. 53. 57Lewis, The Monk, p. 54. 58Lewis, The Monk, p. 268. 59Lewis, The Monk, pp. 268-269. 60Lewis, The Monk, p. 434.. 223 61Lewis, The Monk, p. 440. 62Although this is a distinction frequently made by critics of the gothic, I think it has been most cogently set forth by Robert D. Hume in an article entitled "Gothic versus Romantic: A Revaluation of the Gothic Novel," PMLA, 84 (1969). PP. 212-229. 63Kiely, The Romantic Novel, p. 189. 64Kiely, The Romantic Novel, p. 189. 65This comment on the novel's structure is included in nearly every study of the work but it is usually cited without an indication of its source. In Charles Robert Maturin: The Terror Novelist (Amsterdam, H.J. Paris, 1933), p. 90. Wiilem Scholten attributes the observation to an anonymous reviewer in The Quarterly Review, 1821, vol xxiv, p. 303. 66Charles Robert Maturin,Melmoth the Wanderer: A Tale, ed. Douglas Grant (London: Oxford University Press, 1968), p. 237. 67 Maturin,Melmoth, p. 237. 68Melmoth actually figures in three stories before he is presented to us in depth in the "Tale of the Indi- ans." We first hear of him in the frame story concerning his descendent. Then, he appears in Stanton's narrative and in the "Tale of the Spaniard" both of which are con- tained within the frame. The "Tale of Guzman's Family" in- tervenes between the "Tale of the Indians" and the "Tale of the Lovers," the two stories which actually concern Melmoth himself. Thus, Maturnuuses Guzman's story to tem- porarily halt the revelation of Melmoth's character begun but not completed in the "Indian" narrative. 69Robert E. Lougy, Charles Robert Maturh1(Lewisburg, Pa.: Bucknell University Press, 1975), p. 72. 70 Maturin, Melmoth, p. 299. 71Maturin, Melmoth, p. 503. 72Lougy,'Maturin, p. 72. 73Kiely, The Romantic Novel, p. 199. 74Kiely, The Romantic Novel, pp. 204-205. CHAPTER V CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN GOTHIC: EMPIRICAL AND CREATIVE USE OF A LITERARY "SYSTEM" The Gothic Novel in the Twentieth Century Although Charles Robert Maturin's Melmoth the Wanderer is generally thought of as the last real manifes- tation of the genre created by Horace Walpole and Ann Rad- cliffe at the end of the eighteenth century, many works written after 1820 have continued to be identified as "gothic" novels. In fact, this appellation has been ex- tended to such an extraordinarily diverse group of fic- tional products--including Wuthering Heights, Dracula, "The Fall of the House of Usher," Moby-Dick, The House of the Seven Gables, As I Lay Dying, and The Hawkline Monster-- that one must wonder exactly what these very different works could have in common in order to warrant the same description. While I dO'nOt propose here to engage in a defense of all those critics who have argued the gothic is something more than ghosts,castles, and monks, I would like to examine several contemporary works called "gothic," either by literary critics or book publishers themselves, in order to ascertain whether these works actually make use of that structure of interlocking relationships I have 224 225 identified as the skeleton of the form. In describing a particular novel's dependence on this peculiarly "gothic" constellation of textual units, I will attempt to establish whether the constellation has been used conventionally, that is, in the manner estab- lished by Walpole and Radcliffe and modified by Lewis and Maturin: or whether it has been subjected to a structural deformation severe enough to change the basic significance of the form itself. In short, I will attempt to demon- strate that two novels as different as Phyllis Whitney's The Golden Unicorn (1976) and William Faulkner's Sancturay (1931) can justifiably be called gothic novels, even though they appear to have nothing in common, because they both use the same skeleton as their point of departure. Ulti- mately, I hope to show that the distinction I have drawn between the empirical and creative use of a literary system is, in fact, a useful way of describing how certain texts employ the same elements or structures and yet appear to belong to two absolutely different categories of literary works. Since I have theorized that the texts we tradition- ally dismiss as "popular literature" or "mass entertain- ment" are, in reality, conventional or formulaic uses of a specific literary system, it seems logical to begin here with the popular gothics for, if my hypothesis is correct, they ought to prove very similar to those works by Walpole, Radcliffe, Lewis, and Maturin examined in the last chapter. 226 Although I will focus on only two popular gothic romances written within the last five years, these two novels are so similar to the hundreds of others which have flooded the paperback market in the last two or three decades that my analysis of them will be representative of the entire "class" or group as a whole. Before getting involved in a lengthy interpretation of Phyllis Whitney's Spindrift (1975) and The Golden Unicorn, I want to make a few com- ments about the enormous popularity of these and other works like them. According to a circular distributed to retail book outlets by a large midwest book distribution firm, "gothic" novels such as those by Whitney account for ten per cent of all mass market releases and sixteen per cent of all fiction published in any given year.1 Nearly thirty-five gothic titles are released in a typical month while more than 400 appear each year. The initial print- ing of a Phyllis Whitney paperback usually runs to about 800,000 copies. When Spindrift was first published in 1975, it sold more than 57,000 hard cover copies in less than eight months and remained on the New York Times best- seller list for more than three. Although very little research has been done on the nature of the audience reached by these books, most agree the majority of the readers are women. While these facts and figures certainly tell us nothing substantial about the relationship between these contemporary gothics and those English novels pub- lished more than 200 years before, they suggest that the 227 form still touches a nerve in the populace at large, and. that there continues to be something peculiarly appealing to women about these narratives--since the vast majority of Radcliffe's readers were also female. For purposes of organizational symmetry, I shall cen- ter my analysis of the contemporary gothic romance on two novels by Phyllis Whitney. Although most of the novels included within this popular genre are written by British writers (such as Victoria Holt, Norah Lofts, and Mary Stewart), Whitney's novels are structurally and thematic- ally so similar that any statements about them can be applied to the works of English authors as well. I have decided to focus on an American novelist primarily because I want to use American novels when I discuss the creative use of the gothic system later in this chapter. I want to do so in order to demonstrate that two works obviously de- rived from the singular world of the American South--TM§ Member of the Wedding (1946), and Sanctuary (l931)--are directly descended from The Castle of Otranto and The Mys- teries of Udolpho, though neither contains any of the medi- eval architecture or props so prominent in the earlier works. My purpose is two-fold. I want to establish, first of all, that the gothic form is something more than a ran- dom collection of drafty castles and moaning ghosts, by showing that the genre can continue to exist even though these properties have been long discarded as instruments 228 of terror and dread. Furthermore, I wish to show that the gothic novel is, in fact, the product of a literary system which exists outside cultural boundaries, one which can be adapted and modified to suit various kinds of thematic purposes. By selecting American novels which are neces- sarily derived from different cultural backgrounds and settings, I hope to show that in creating the gothic form, Horace Walpole and Ann Radcliffe did more than give expres- sion to popular British preoccupations of the late eigh- teenth and early nineteenth centuries. Phyllis Whitney and the Popplar Gothic Romance Phyllis Whitney first began writing during the De- pression when she composed hundreds