This project addresses the problem of collective design in cyberspace using computerized governance rules. Despite many applications of computerized rules, there is no systematic method or model to design them. I conceptualized an e-constitution as a set of rules in computer code that allocate decision rights and incentives to govern decision making process. This dissertation develops a design model consisting of a structured representation that breaks down a constitution into 14 components including a state transition function and a weighting function. As a meta-artifact, this model provides a unified architecture for governance structures in a wide range of situations including crowdsourcing, blockchains and corporate governance. This model enables use of quantifiable performance measures to evaluate constitutions objectively, liberated from the fairness criteria used in impossibility theorems. A systematic methodology is also presented to improve the performance of constitutions efficiently. As a proof of concept, I implemented a generic e-constitution in a web application and measured the effects of different factors on the constitutional performance metrics through online experiments. One finding is that approval voting is significantly superior to the plurality voting, even under a prediction voting incentive scheme. -- Abstract.
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