! MANUFACTURING SAMENESS: CONTINUITIES AND EXPANSIONS OF COMMUNITY IDENTITY IN AFRO -CHINESE RELATIONS By Tara Mock A DISSERTATION Submitted to Michigan State University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of African America n and African Studies Ñ Doctor of Philosophy 2018 !ABSTRACT MANUFACTURING SAMENESS: CONTINUITIES AND EXPANSIONS OF COMMUNITY IDENTITY IN AFRO -CHINESE RELATIONS By Tara Mock This study examined the nature and awareness of, and attitudes toward Chinese nati on branding in Africa. Using critical discourse analysis and survey research, the project analyzed the impact of images and messages indicative of brand -China on attitudes toward China in the Gambia, Kenya, and South Africa. By debating the significance of these images to ChinaÕs continued rise on the continent and demonstrating the agency embedded within diverse African responses , the author hopes to prompt a reconsideration of the discursive power mechanisms exercised in and through national image making. The argument established is that national imaginary constructions serve as part of the Òstrategy, substance, and symbolic actionÓ of strategic self -presentation, and thus, African leaders and individuals should pay greater attention to performative practi ces states engage in as, first, national imaginary constructions and, second, as strategies of presentation in the world. This study is located within the general body of scholarship that constitutes Black or Africana Studies, with a specific focus on Afro -Chinese relations. The project also fits within the disciplinary scope of international relations and development studies. """!! This dissertation is dedicated to Greyson, for whom and with whose encouragement I began and completed thi s project. For five years you allowed me to share my love and time with an unseen sibling. As you grew, so too did the project, and I am equally proud of what you Õve both beco me. "#!!ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS This dissertation would not have been possible without t he love and support of my family including my son and primary research assistant, Greyson, who traveled the world with me and supported me through the vicissitudes of graduate education. I would also like to thank my parents, Ethel and James; my step -paren ts, Jesse and Pat; and my siblings, Tiffany, Brian, and William, who performed regular wellness checks and consistently offered words of encouragement. I am also indebted to other family members, namely siblings, cousins, and close friends, whose patience, love and understanding sustained me throughout this journey. I would like to thank my advisor, Dr. Rita Kiki Edozie, whose support and suggestions were a great help in producing the final product. Dr. Edozie , along with Dr. Jamie Monson , Dr. Forrest Cart er, and Dr. Aminda Smith provided untold amounts of support, encouragement , and insight which enabled me to forge my own intellectual path. I am privileged to have met and worked with such talented and dedicated faculty members at Michigan State University and I am forever beholden to them . In addition, I would like to acknowledge two other colleague s whose advice was instrumental during the early stages of the project, Dr. Howard Bossen and Dr. Folu Ogundimu, as well as Dr. John Metzler, who read the disse rtation an d provided valuable suggestions . Most importantly, I am grateful to the administration, faculty, and students at the University of the Gambia, the United States International University, Pwani University, Kenyatta University, The University of Jo hannesburg, and Witwatersrand University ; who trusted me with their stories . #!!TABLE OF CONTENTS LIST OF TABLE S ......................................................................................................... ix LIST OF FIGURES ....................................................................................................... xi Chapter One .................................................................................................................... 1 The Visual Politics o f Africa -China ................................................................................. 1 Introduction .................................................................................................................... 1 Purpose and Goals of the Study ....................................................................................... 5 Brand -China ................................................................................................................. 12 Research Questions ....................................................................................................... 16 Methodology ................................................................................................................. 18 Rationale, Relevance, and Significance of the Study ..................................................... 21 Implications to Future Research .................................................................................... 24 Outline of Chapters ....................................................................................................... 25 Chapter Two ................................................................................................................. 29 Imagining t he Nation .................................................................................................... 29 Introduction .................................................................................................................. 29 Establishing the Brand .................................................................................................. 30 Brand identity .......................................................................................................... 32 Brand meaning ......................................................................................................... 32 Brand response ......................................................................................................... 33 Brand relationship .................................................................................................... 34 Crafting the Image ........................................................................................................ 35 Imagining the Nation .................................................................................................... 40 (Mis)imagined Communities ......................................................................................... 46 Language and Culture ................................................................................................... 52 Conclusion .................................................................................................................... 53 Chapter Three ............................................................................................................... 54 Africana Constructivism ................................................................................................ 54 Introduction .................................................................................................................. 54 Research P hilosophy ..................................................................................................... 57 Ont ology .................................................................................................................. 58 Epistemol ogy ........................................................................................................... 59 Paradigm .................................................................................................................. 61 Research Approach ....................................................................................................... 63 Research Design ........................................................................................................... 65 Critical Discours e Analysis ...................................................................................... 65 Research Methods ............................................................................................... 67 Textual Artifacts ............................................................................................. 68 Sampling ........................................................................................................ 71 Data Analysis ................................................................................................. 73 #"!! First Cycle Coding ..................................................................................... 74 Second Cycle Coding ................................................................................ 74 Post -Coding, Pre -Writing, Writing and ReWriting ..................................... 76 Survey Resea rch ...................................................................................................... 77 Research Methods ............................................................................................... 80 Variable Operation alization ............................................................................ 80 Survey Design ................................................................................................ 81 Pretest ........................................................................................................ 82 Structure of the Questionnaire .................................................................... 83 Stimuli Countries ....................................................................................... 84 Population and Sampling ................................................................................ 85 Data Analysis ................................................................................................. 86 Limitations ................................................................................................................... 92 Conclusion .................................................................................................................... 93 Chapter Four ................................................................................................................. 95 Good Partners, Good Friends, Good Brothers .............................................................. 95 Introduction .................................................................................................................. 95 Penetrating a Stone ....................................................................................................... 96 Solidarity ( 1955-1976) ............................................................................................100 Retreat (1976 -1995) ................................................................................................104 Reengagement ( 1995- Present) ................................................................................105 Africa -China Country Case Studies ..............................................................................109 The Gambia ............................................................................................................110 Kenya .....................................................................................................................113 South Africa ............................................................................................................117 African Perspectives ....................................................................................................121 Conclusion ...................................................................................................................124 Chapter Five ................................................................................................................125 Turning Dragons i nto Pandas ......................................................................................125 Introduction .................................................................................................................125 The Rhetorical Construction of brand -China in Africa .................................................131 Artifact Characteristics ............................................................................................131 Sameness ................................................................................................................132 Culture ...............................................................................................................136 Marginalization ..................................................................................................138 Inclusion ............................................................................................................141 Deve lopment ...........................................................................................................142 Homegrown Development ..................................................................................145 Development Aid ...............................................................................................147 China Dream ......................................................................................................149 Frie ndship ...............................................................................................................152 Historical Frie ndship ..........................................................................................153 Solidarity ...........................................................................................................157 #"" !! Partn ership ..............................................................................................................160 Cooperation ........................................................................................................161 Common South Identity .....................................................................................165 Conclusion ...................................................................................................................167 Chapter Six ..................................................................................................................168 We Look Forward ........................................................................................................168 Introduction .................................................................................................................168 Study Demographics ....................................................................................................171 Particip ant Profile ...................................................................................................171 Gender ....................................................................................................................172 Age .........................................................................................................................173 Place of Origin ........................................................................................................173 Religion ..................................................................................................................174 Exposure to brand -China .............................................................................................176 Sources of Information ...........................................................................................178 Images of China ......................................................................................................179 Perceptions of brand -China .........................................................................................181 Underlying Dimensions of brand -China ..................................................................181 Culture ...............................................................................................................184 Dev elopment ......................................................................................................184 Trustwothiness ...................................................................................................185 Imperialism ........................................................................................................185 Composite Perceptions .......................................................................................186 Drivers of Brand Image ................................................................................................187 Gender ....................................................................................................................188 Religion .................................................................................................................189 Source of Arrival .....................................................................................................190 Cultural Orientation ................................................................................................191 Economic Indicators ...........................................................................................193 Social Indicators .................................................................................................194 Country Knowledge ................................................................................................195 Media Exposure ......................................................................................................196 Encounters with Chinese .........................................................................................198 Attitudes toward brand -China ......................................................................................198 Composite Perceptions .................................................................................................205 Conclusion ...................................................................................................................205 Chapter Seven ..............................................................................................................207 Because o f War, We Come Together ............................................................................207 Intro duction .................................................................................................................207 (Re)Constructing Social Identity ..................................................................................210 The Right to Belong .....................................................................................................212 Gambia ...................................................................................................................215 Kenya .....................................................................................................................217 South Africa ............................................................................................................218 #""" !! A Stroke of the Post .....................................................................................................219 APPENDICES .............................................................................................................222 APPENDIX A: IRB Initial Consent F orm ....................................................................223 APPENDIX B: Survey Instrument ...............................................................................225 APPENDIX C: I RB Exemption ...................................................................................235 BIBLIOGRAPHY ........................................................................................................238 "$!!LIST OF TABLES TABLE 1:DÕASTOUS AND BOUJBEL COUNTRY PERSONALITY SCALE ........... 82 TABLE 2: PERCEPTIONS OF BRAND -CHINA .......................................................... 87 TABLE 3: PARTICIPANTS BY SITE COUNTRY AND GENDER ...........................172 TABLE 4: TOTAL POPULATION BY GENDER ......................................................173 TABLE 5: SITE COUNTRY BY MEDIAN AGE ........................................................173 TABLE 6: SITE COUNTRY BY PLACE OF ORIGIN ................................................174 TABLE 7: PARTICIPANTS BY COUNTRY AND RELIGON ...................................175 TABLE 8: PARTICIPANT CHARACTERISTICS ......................................................176 TABLE 9: SITE COUNTRY BY INTERNATIONAL EXPERIENCE ........................178 TABLE 10: SITE COUNTRY BY PREVIOUS TRAVE L TO CHINA ........................178 TABLE 11: SOURCES OF INFORMATION ..............................................................179 TABLE 12: IMAGE FREQUENCY ............................................................................180 TABLE 13: IMAGE TYPE ..........................................................................................180 TABLE 14: IMAGE CHARACTERIZATION .............................................................181 TABLE 15: ENCOUNTERS WITH CHINESE ...........................................................181 TABLE 16: DIMENSIONS OF BRAND -CHINA .........................................................183 TABLE 17: SITE COUNTRY POSITIONS O N THE MULTI -ITEM SCALE (A) .......183 TABLE 18: SITE COUNTRY POSITIONS ON THE MULTI -ITEM SCALE (B) .......184 TABLE 19: SITE COUNTRY PERCEPTIONS (WEIGHTED) ...................................187 TABLE 20: GENDERED PERCEPTIONS ON MULTI -ITEM SCALE ......................188 TABLE 21: MULTI -ITEM SCALE SCORES BY RELIGION ....................................189 $!!TABLE 22: SOURCE OF ARRIVAL ..........................................................................191 TABLE 23: SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC DETERMINANTS OF CULTURE .............192 TABLE 24: ECONOMIC CULTURAL INDICATORS ...............................................193 TABLE 25: SOCIAL CULTURAL INDICATORS .....................................................194 TABLE 26: ITEM -LIST ..............................................................................................200 TABLE 27: REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS AND STANDARD ERRORS ..............201 TABLE 28: STRUCTURE OF THE DISCRIMINANT FUNCTION ...........................203 TABLE 29: GROUP MEANS ON THE DISCRIMINANT FUNCTION .....................204 TABLE 30: PREDICTED GROUP MEMBERSHIP ....................................................204 $"!!LIST OF FIGURES FIGURE 1: CHINA -AFRICA SOLIDARITY PROPAGANDA .................................... 14 FIGURE 2 : KELLERÕS BRAND EQUITY MODEL .................................................... 31 FIGU RE 3 : ÒTHE STRUGGLE OF ALL THE PEOPLE IN THE WORLD ...Ó ...........101 FIGURE 4 : Ò CHAIRMAN MAO IS THE GREAT LIBERATORÓ .............................102 FIGURE 5 : ÒLONG LIVE CHAIRMAN MAO ÉÓ ......................................................130 FIGURE 6 : BANK OF CHINA BILLBOARD (LUSAKA , 2015 ) ................................130 FIGURE 7 : CHINA SOUTHERN AIRLINES BILLBOARD (NAIRO BI, 2015 ) .........134 FIGURE 8 : NORMAL P -P PLOT OF REGRESSION STANDARDIZED ..................202 FIGURE 9 : SCATTERPLOT OF REGRESSION ........................................................202 %!!Chapter One The Visual Politics of Africa -China ÒCommunities are to be distinguished, not by their falsity or genuineness, but in the style in which they are imagined. ÓÑBenedi ct Anderson 1991, 5 Introduction When the Hubei Provincial Museum in Wuhan, China (PRC, Beijing) opened its exhibit, This is Africa , on September 28, 2017 , no one anticipated the protests it would incite leading to its re moval roughly two weeks later 1. The exhibit featured a series of diptychs, each containing a photo of an African person juxtaposed alongside a wild animal , in what the photographer, Yu Huiping, maintained was designed to celebrate Òharmony between man and nature .Ó2 The exhibit featured photographs of African people expressing various states of emotion alongside a caut ious cheetah, curious meerkats, contemplative baboon, proboscis, lemur, and colobus monkeys, sparking accusations of racism from observers out side and within China .3 Most striking, however, was the photo of a screaming African boy collocated with a similarly positi oned howling chimpanzee . Neither Yu, nor the museumÕs curator, Fan Qin, acknowledged the casual racism, yet the exhibit, which op ened to fanfare surrounding ChinaÕs eight -day National Day holiday was unceremoniously shuttered less than two weeks later. 1 Huang, Echo and Kuo, Lily. ÒA Museum in China put on an exhibit called ÔThis is AfricaÕ that compares Africans to AnimalsÓ Quartz Africa. October 13, 2017. https://qz.com/1101699/africans -in-china -are -infuriated -over -a-museum -exhibit -comparing -africans -to-animals/ 2 Ibid. 3 Haas, Benjamin. ÒChinese museum accused of racism over photos pairing Africans with animalsÓ. The Guardian. October 14, 2017. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/oct/14/ chinese -museum -accused -of-racism -over -photos -pairing -africans -with -animals &!!Equating African people with animals would be problematic as an isolated event, but when considered alongside other recent occurr ences of casual racism in China ÑCCTVÕs Spring Festival Gala depicting Chinese actors in Blackface 4, a Qiaobi Detergent ad featuring an Afric an man denuded of his blackness to gain the affection of a Chinese female 5 and Chinese social media platform, Wechat , tran slating the word for Ôblack foreignerÕ as ÔniggerÕ 6Ñbegs the question whether these a re isolated incidents or more endemic of widely held societal views .7 Consistent with the manner in which European thinkers created a scientific, biologically - based raci al binary between Africans and Europeans during the 19 th century, 8 This is Africa reinforces longstanding ideologies of racial hegemony. The dominant ideology during colonialism was that the African was a savage .9 Not only was Africa stripped of his burgeo ning culture, but the Òtwin processes of balkanization and misrepresentationÓ 10 twisted the image of Africa into the distorted portrait of our current understanding to justify colonization of the continent. Oyeronke Oyewumi (1997) posits that in the west, b iological explanations appear to be especially privileged 4 Taylor, Adam. ÒChinaÕs televised New YearÕs Gala featured a blackface skit about AfricansÓ. The Washington Post. February 16, 2018. 5 Horwitz, Josh. ÒThe full apology from the Ch inese company behind the racist laundry detergent adÓ. Quartz Africa https://qz.com/695240/the -full -apology -from -the -chinese -company -behi nd-the -racist -laundry -detergent -ad/ . 6 Linder, Alex. ÒWeChat apologizes after being caught translating 'black foreigner' into the N -word.Ó October 12, 2017. Shanghaiist http://shanghaiist.com/2017/10/12/n -word -wechat.php 7 Chiu, Joanna. ÒChina has an irr ational fear of a Òblack invasionÓ bringing drugs, crime, and interracial marriage.Ó Quartz Africa. https://qz.com/945053/c hina -has -an-irrational -fear -of-a-black -invasion -bringing -drugs -crime -and -interracial -marriage/ ; Sautman, Barry,ÒAnti -black Racism in Post -Mao China.Ó The China Quarterly 138, June1994, pp 413 Ð37. 8 Crais, Clifton C., and Pamela Scully. Sara Baartman and t he Hottentot Venus: a Ghost Story and a Biography . Princeton University Press, 2011, p. 6. 9 Opoku, Agyeman, Pan Africanism and Its Detractors: A Response to HarvardÕs Race -Effacing Universalists , Edwin Mellen Press, 1997, p.33. 10 Edozie, Rita Kiki and Pe yi Soyinka, eds. Reframing Contemporary Africa: Politics, Economics, and Culture in the Global Era . Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 2010, p. 36. '!!over othe r ways of explaining difference . She contends that b ecause Òwestern preoccupation with biology creates new biologies, 11 the notion that African people would be racialized in a manner which c onfines them to a role representative Òof the larger whole from which they emanate ,Ó12 fits within historical western biological imperatives. Early literary, cinematic, and photographic forms of entertainment during periods of capital accumulation in the late 19 th and early 20 th century depicted African and Asian people as savage and animalistic while presenting European s as more civilized and advanced. 13 Joseph ConradÕs novella, Heart of Darkness (1899) , demonstrates the practice in his description of a pla ce where indigenous Congolese people go to die from the perspective of the colonizer. He writes, ÒBlack shapes crouched, lay, sat between the trees, leaning against the trunks, clinging to the earth in all attitudes of pain, abandonment, and despair. They were nothing earthly now, nothing but black shadows of disease and starvation. One of these creatures rose to his hands and knees and went off on all fours towards the river to drink.Ó 14 In the narratorÕs view, Africans were not humans but indist inguishable Òblack shadowsÓ and animal -like ÒcreaturesÓ crawling on Òall fours,Ó reinforcing the idea that the indigens were less than human. ConradÕs use of animals to create a moral binary wherein African people represented all that was bad, weak, undeve loped, and 11 Oyewumi, Oyeronke. Invention of Women: Making an African Sense of Western Gender Discourses. Minneapolis: Univers ity of Minnesota Press, 1997, p. 328. 12 Said, Edward W. Orientalism. Vintage Books, 1979, 363. 13 Shohat, Ella, and Robert Stam. Unthinking Eurocentrism: Multiculturalism and the Media . Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 2014. 14 Conrad, J. (1995). Heart of Darkness . Ware: Wordsworth Editions, pp. 14-20. (!!unintelligent, exemplifies its function as an important rationale for and underpinning to the colonial project . Siba NÕZatioula Grovogui (1996) describes colonial depictions of Africans thusly, Òin the aftermath of the ÔdiscoveryÕ ÉWestern conqu erors began to use images of witches, wild m en, and animals Ñall intolerable aspects of the European self Ñto characterize the peoples they subordinated, dominated, exploited, or simply marginalizedÓ 15. This point is underscored by Olufemi Taiwo (2009), wh o writes ÒTo put it bluntly: They did not think that Africans were a part of the human family, and if they were, they were so far down the human ladder that they were adjudged to be more kin to the lower animals than to humansÓ 16 (59 -60). Colonial discou rse reinforced burgeoning ideologies of race, showcasing the modernity of the colonial project, through reducing African people and spaces to savages and animals. Such images served to cement an imagined community of British, Flemish, and French identity a nd, also, bolster ed support for the colonial project amongst the working classes of Europe and the United States. 17 The gradual formation of an object world, broadcasting imperial imagery of an uncivilized, inferior Africa to popular audiences across Europe , relegated African people to primitivism; informed the myth of 15 Grovogui, Siba NÕZatioula. Sovereigns, Quasi Sovereigns, and Africans: Race and Self -Determination in International Law. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996, p. 8. 16 Taiwo, Olufemi. How Coloni alism Preempted Modernity in Africa . Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2009, pp.59 -60 17 Shohat, Ella, and Robert Stam. Unthinking Eurocentrism: Multiculturalism and the Media . Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 2014, p. 100. )!!the continent as an inherently different, wild and dangerous space, and reified the perceived distance between Africa and Europe. 18 The perception s that they are not like usÉare sub -humanÉneed our protection and guidance, were important rationale s for colonialism. The need to create a moral binary wherein African people represented all that was bad, weak, undeveloped, and unintelligent, was an important aspect of the European narrative because it created a space wherein Europe and Europeans, as opposites both physically and socially, could beco me everything that Africa wasnÕt Ñin the European mind. The central goal wa s to locate support within the constructed confines of the national imaginary o f community . Purpose and Goals of the Study Similarly to the cinematic projection of empire accompanying the imperial project, during neoliberal globalization, as leaders once again conceptualize their political mandates in terms of the competition for gl obal capital, governments continue to search for ways to reconstitute images of self agains t that of a political ÔotherÕ .19 The polarization of global space functioning as national imaginary constructions within King SolomonÕ s Mines (1885), King Kong (1933 ), Tarzan of the Apes (1912) , and How the West was Won (1936) shifted over time . Contemporary constructions of self and other accompanying the global project of capital accumulation include filmic, journalistic, and literary manifestations of political rhet oric within the Indiana Jones movies (1981 Ð 2008), Coverage of The Gulf W ar, Stargate (1994) Avatar (2009) , the 18 Bonsu, Samuel K. ÒColoni al images in global times: consumer interpretations of Africa and Africans in advertisingÓ, Consumption Markets & Culture, p. 5. 19 Schwak, Juliette. ÒConstructing political common sense: Nation branding professionals and discourses of truth in KoreaÓ. Pre sented at the International Studies Association Conference, Baltimore, MD. 2017, Shohat and Stam 1994) *!!Force Awakens (2015), Wolf Warrior 2 (2017), and even seeming ly innocuous actions as the fetishization and objectification of black bodies, lik e Lupita NyongÕo, for white consumption. Within the increasingly encompassing relations that mark globalization, identities and imaginaries are facilitated along new rout es of circulation and expansion . Cultural identities, companion to other forms of i dentity, continue to be imbued with power relations and inequalities reminiscent of earlier eras of capital accumulation. Nowhere is the negotiation more profoundly observed than Africa, where the landscape has changed rapidly during the last twenty years, s hifting from solidly Western -led to one in which new developmental partners from the global South are taking on more pivotal roles. These changing dynamics have led to increased competition between Beijing, Washington and London for favor with African nati onals Ña competition often played out in the court of public opinion. 20 Competing theories of contemporary global capital accumulation are united in their desire to define changes in how nations are incorporated into the global society, the outward rational e for those chang es ( economic exploitation, state building and alliances, broad restructuring, or self -reflexive cultur al identification), and how such changes impact individual nation -states. Wallerstein (1987) and Sklair (2002) assert that globalization , as part of the modern capitalist world economy, operates on many levels, with capital accumulation being its primary driver . As states and transnational corporations become responsible for disseminating the Ôculture ideology of 20 In addition to smaller players like India and Brazil, and formal colonial States of France and Germany. +!!consumerismÕ, these entiti es once again create images of them selves utilizing new and existing forms of expression to facilitate globalizationÕs reach into new markets .21 The PRC significantly increased its presence on the African continent within the last two decades , emerging as its largest trading partner within recent years. As China becomes a progressively important trading partner to nations across the brea dth and width of Africa, Beijing increasingly manufactures a narrative of itself and Africa -China predicated on cultura l and historical proximity. 22 This practice speaks to not only AfricaÕs growing significance to China but, also, to the need for the PRC to distinguish itself within Africa . Beijing successfully curates an image of self on the continent as a counterhegemo nic force against Western tyranny, privileging themes of ÒoppressionÓ, ÒdominationÓ, and ÒsubordinationÓ symbolic o f the global African experience. 23 Similarly to the mission of the colonial project, t he overarching imperative to construct a national imagin ary predicated upon a binary opposition between ÒweÓ and ÒthemÓ remains constant .24 In this instance, however, the ÔweÕ are Africa and China through the indigenization of media ,25 and ÔthemÕ , the west, as identity maps are redrawn such that something Òpaten tly foreign and distant acquires, for one reason or another, a status more rather than less familiar .Ó26 This process of cultural synchronization, whereby the 21 Tomlinson, John. ÒCultural Imperialism.Ó Fo und in Lechner, Frank J., and John Boli. The Globalization Reader . J. Wiley & Sons, 2012, p. 347. 22 Kopi !ski, Dominik, Andrzej Polus, and Ian Taylor. "Contextualising Chinese engagement in Africa." Journal of Contemporary African Studies 29.2 (2011): 131. 23 Hamilton, Ruth Simms, ed. Routes of passage: rethinking the African Diaspora . Vol. 1. MSU Press, 2007, p. 24. 24 Shohat, Ella, and Robert Stam. Unthinking Eurocentrism: Multiculturalism and the media . Routledge, 2014. 25 Lechner, Frank J., and John Boli. The Globalization Reader . J. Wiley & Sons, 2012, p. 341. 26 Said, Edward W. Orientalism . Vintage Books, 1979, p. 59. ,!!tendency is toward convergence and homogeneity, rather than alterity, is unprecede nted historicall y and attributable to the spread of global capital. 27 Beijing claims to present a different view of the African continent and its people , but conflicting messages embedded within popular depictions of Africa establish that the Chinese have internalized west ern views of the continent . Shanshan Lan (2016) suggest s a disconnect between the pro -African political rhetoric of friendship Òat the state level and anti -African sentiments and practices at the individual and local level.Ó 28 Incongruent representations of Africa, of China, and of Africa -China at the level of personal interaction, threaten the potency of official State messages of Ôbrotherhood Õ, Ôtrustworthiness Õ, and Ôsolidarity Õ. Contemporary o fficial rhetoric on Afro -Chinese as a relationship amongst Ôbrothers and friends Õ is complicated by the use of hegemonic colonial discourse and cultural stereotyping in individual and corporate Chinese depictions of Africa. The messages of goodwill generated by the 2017 inauguration of the ÔMadaraka Express Õ, a China Road and Bridge Corporation con structed standard gauge railway , as it embarked on its inaugural journey from Mombasa to Nairobi, are in conflict with the colonial racial constructions of Africans embedded in the 2015 ÔChinese Restaurant Õ row in Nairobi, exemplifying LanÕs concern. 29 The tension between Chinese popular discourse and official State accounts of Africa, its people, and its relationship to China is the subject of this inquiry. This 27 Tomlinson, John. ÒCultural Imperialism.Ó Found in Lechner, Frank J., and John Boli. The Globalization Reader . J. Wiley & Sons, 2012, p. 34 7. 28 Lan, Shanshan. ÒThe Shifting Meanings of Race in China: A Case Study of the African Diaspora Community in GuangzhouÓ. City & Society, Vol. 28, Issue 3, 2016, p. 305. 29 Smith, SJ, Bounding the borders , 1993; Habil, Evans. ÒNairobi county govÕt closes ' racist' Chinese restaurantÓ. The Daily Nation . March 24, 2015. https://www.nation.co.ke/counties/nairobi/Chinese -Restaurant -Kilima ni-Racism/1954174 -2664382 -r6f8s7/index.html . -!!dissertation project builds upon emerging literature in the fie ld, examining Afro -Chinese relations through contemporary depictions of the Chinese national imaginary depicted within its nation brand. Specifically, the dissertation focuses on how n ation branding images and messages, produced by the Chinese State, affec t attitudes and community identity amongst university students within the Gambia, Kenya, and South Africa. The dissertation is grounded in the tradition o f Afrocentric social research in its inquiry into how people in three African nations (the Gambia, Ken ya, and South Africa) receive and reconstitute images of self and other conveyed through ChinaÕs nation brand . The projectÕs central goal is to explore the liminal space between official and personal accounts of China and Africa -China , critically challengi ng brand -China as yet another spatial fix designed to facilitate access to resources and markets in Africa. Consistent with E.H. CarrÕs categorization of internationa l power as Ôpower over opinionÕ the project adopts a dissensus -constructivist approach, through its concern with how image -making is implicated in relations of social power, problematizing the tendency of nation branding to depoliticize and obscure the struggles and negotiations through which national identities are produced. 30 The project unveils the power mechanisms at play in the phenomena of national image politics by critically analyzing promotional discourses and nation branding practices with regard to international politics in the context of Afro -Chinese relations. More particularly , the dissertation analyzes how state manufacture of Africa -China as an identity construction influences 30 Ranci‘re, Jacques. Dissensus: On politics and aesthetics . Bloomsbury Publishing, 2015. Nye, Joseph (2015) China and Soft Power, South African Journal of International Affairs. citing E.H. Carr in describing the three components of international power. Kaneva, Nadia. "Nation branding: Toward an agenda for critical research." International journal of communication 5, 2011. %.!!creation, co -creation, and recreation of not only the Chinese national imaginary but the constructed image of a fictive Afro -Chinese community . The project, thereby, also explores how the historical memory of com munity expansion within Africa is mapped onto brand -China . The analysis focuses specifically on public awareness of, exposure to, and perceptions of these new external forms of national and supranati onal consciousness constructed through Chinese nation branding on the continent , in the Gambia, Kenya, and South Africa . The selected sites are each An glophone countries, with varied regional economies, and longstanding diplomatic and economic relations wi th China. The PRC also functions as the largest single exporter of consumer products to each country, which supports an analysis of the correlation between market presence, brand image, and awareness. The Gambia, the third nation under consideration, has l ong been isolationist and only recently reestablished diplomatic relations with Beijing. The GambiaÕs unique circumstance should a id in isolating the effects of brand -China from general awareness of the PRC. Nation branding offers an emerging Ôcorpu s of analysisÕ through which the national imaginary can be examined using the tools of marketing to effectively alter public attitudes or perceptions about a nation without using hard power .31 The practice of repositioning oneÕs national image against a pol itical other has long been utilized to 31 Kaneva, Nadia. "Nation branding: Toward an agenda for critical research." Internationa l journal of communication 5, 2011; Leonard, M.. Diplomacy by other means. Foreign Policy , 132 , 2002, 48. Osei, Collins and Gbadamosi, Ayantunji. ÒRebranding AfricaÓ Marketing Intelligence and Planning 29.3, 2011, 284 -304; Szondi, Gyırgy, ÔThe role and c hallenges of country branding in transition countries: The Central and Eastern European experienceÕ. Place Branding and Public Diplomacy 3.1, 2007, 29. Jordan, Paul. "Nation Branding: A Tool for Nationalism?." Journal of Baltic Studies 45.3, 2014, p. 284; Anholt, S. ÔNation brands index: How the world sees the worldÕ, Second Quarter, Global Market Insight, 2005; Fan, Ying ÒBranding the Nation: What is being branded?Ó Journal of Vacation Marketing 12.1, 2006, pp. 5-14; Gudjonsson, Hlynur. "Nation branding." Place branding 1.3, 2005, 285. %%!!garner public support domestically and abroad for the state Õs political agenda. Within globalization national interests are increasingly expand ing beyond the political , however, in what Melissa Aroncyzk (2013) deems t he Òinterpenetration of commercial and public sector interests designed to help the nation -state successfully compete for international capital, convey an image of legitimacy ,É and create positive fore ign opinion.Ó 32 In this milieu, m anaging a nationÕs imag e amongst foreign nationals becomes an important component of economic and foreign policy ,33 as nation branding becomes a placeholder for how effectively countries compete with each other for favorable positioning .34 Done correctly, brands should convey an image of attractiveness and trustworthiness abroad , and inculcate an ethos of shared community at home . Branding the nation is equivalent to the US as Ôthe land of the free and home of the braveÕ or ÔJapan being the land of the sunÕ. The Nation as a brand is whatever and because we imagine it to be so. Communicating promotional images and messages that Ôwe are like youÕ yet Ôdifferent than they areÕ enables governments to exercise an element of control over the multitude of messages audiences associate wit h the state by projecting a carefully curated, positive overall image. 35 Nation al image and reputation are of paramount importance to building brand equity . Where borders and boundaries appear increas ingly obsolete, nations faces 32 Aronczyk, Melissa, Branding the nation: Mediating space, value, and identity in the context of global culture . New York University, ProQuest, UMI Dissertations Publishing, 2009, pp 16 -32. 33 Fan, Ying ÒBranding the Nation: W hat is being branded?Ó Journal of Vacation Marketing 12.1, 2006, pp. 5 -14; Kotler, Philip, and David Gertner. "Country as Brand, Product, and Beyond: A place marketing and brand management perspective." Journal of brand management 9.4 (2002): 249 -261. 34 Anholt, Simon. "Competitive identity: The new brand management for nations, cities and regions." Journal of Brand Management 14.6 (2007): 474 -475. 35 Shapiro, Michael J. Violent cartographies: Mapping cultures of war . U of Minnesota Press, 1997. %&!!conflicting tensions towa rd homogenization and differentiation , self and ÔotherÕ, ÔweÕ and ÔthemÕ .36 An effective strategy, balan cing these competing tendencies toward sameness and difference has gradually become an important aspect of global competition. 37 One way to combat these conflicting tendencies is to inten tionally create complementary visual and textual elements nee artifacts that positively affect c onsumer reception to the bra nd. Contemporarily, state s utilize a pastiche of unique identifiers within the arts, history, popular culture, sport s, media, and architecture t o assimilate with or dissimilate themselves from competitors .38 The constitutive value of these artifacts stems from their seemingly innocuous ability to influence public opinion through soft power initiatives. 39 When audiences possess a cohesive, favorable nation brand image of the state , messages ha ve a stronger influence on individual consumer attitudes toward the state vi s-a-vis competing messages .40 Brand -China The Chinese s tate frames its brand in Africa as a partnership predicated on South -South cooperation, similarly antagonistic relations with the West , brotherhood amongst equals, and a longstanding, Ôtraditional Õ friendship . To cement these images Beijing draws heavily upon its history of engagement with the continent , frequently linking 36 Loo, Theres a, and Gary Davies. "Branding China: The ultimate challenge in reputation management?." Corporate reputation review 9.3 (2006): 203; Rose, Gillian. Visual methodologies: An introduction to researching with visual materials . sage, 2016, 201; Szondi, G, 2007 . 37 Ahn, Michael J., and Hsin -Ching Wu. "The Art of Nation Branding." Public Organization Review 15.1 (2015): 159. 38 Loo and Davies, 2006, 205. 39 Ahn, Michael J., and Hsin -Ching Wu. "The Art of Nation Branding." Public Organization Review 15.1 (2015): 157 -173. 40 Hsieh, An -Tien, and Chung -Kai Li. "The moderating effect of brand image on public relations perception and customer loyalty." Marketing Intelligence & Planning 26.1 (2008): 26 -42. Dinnie, Keith. Nation branding: Concepts, issues, practice . Routledg e, 2015, p. 18. %'!!modern Afro -Chinese relations with the 15th Century when Chinese traders visited the East Africa n coast and, more recently, to the Bandung Conference (1955) when the foundation for modern day Sino -African relationships was laid. Although the Chinese state nurtures the image of a fictive comm unity between the two regions to facilitate its neoliberal goals, BeijingÕs recent fortunes are in stark contrast with those experienced during the First Five Year Plan (1953 -57) and the Great Leap Forward (1958 -60) when the PRC initially established relations with African nations. In 2009, perhaps in response to its nation building efforts, the PRC surpassed the United States to become AfricaÕs largest trad e partner. Yet, although Chine se economic growth has averaged 10 -percent per year since 1978, the PRC continues to frame the relationship as a continuation of a longue duree between global south development partners and foil to western hegemony. 41 In this milieu, the PRCÕs official bran d reflects a carefully crafted, government controlled -narrative with realpolitik foreign policy goals no different than Western intere sts in Africa. Understanding this dual function of brand -China is important to comprehending BeijingÕs attempts to create and manage its brand in Africa . The PRC long understood the import of image competitiveness to economic competitiveness and ChinaÕs investment in its own image undergirds its strategic self -presentation in Africa. The Propaganda Department of the Chines e Communist Party was founded alongside the Party itself (1921), underscoring the importance of image building to nation building . Historical and contemporary leaders stressed the need to 41 Data derived from World Bank figures on nation development. https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG?locations=CN , accessed on October 29, 2017 %(!!control China Õs impression abroad and Beijing worked to build soft p ower and influence in Africa since the 1960s . Propaganda images of the Ôsolidarity movementÕ (image 1 ), depicting China and Africa united against a common western foe , and recent nation branding films, such as Ò Made in ChinaÓ (2007), ÒPerspectivesÓ (2010) ,42 and ÒPeopleÓ (2011) ,43 highlight ChinaÕs solidarity with African decolonization movemen ts during the 1960s and 1970s and its contemporary overseas production capacity, culture, and inclusiv eness in 2017. Images of China , reinforcing messages of global com petitiveness, solidarity and traditional friendship with Africa, are ubiquitously present at every touch point: from a Chin Africa magazine cover announcing the PRCÕs priority of achieving food security for China and Africa 44 to Chinese cartoons broadcast in Antanarivo 45 to speeches by the Chinese Amba ssador to South Africa stress ing the import of developmental cooperation between the two nations. FIGURE 1: CHINA -AFRICA SOLIDARITY PROPAGANDA 42 ÒPerspectivesÓ, a Chinese nation branding film which ran 17 minutes, featured the changes and challenges of Chinese society since the country implemented Opening and Reform policies in the late 1970s. The film highlights how China has preserved its o wn special characteristics while embracing the world and connects inclusion of ethnic minorities with its international cosmopolitanism. 43 ÒPeopleÓ, is a 60 second spot featuring prominent Chinese personalities from sports, science, business and entertain ment. The film ends with smiling faces of ordinary Chinese people flashing quickly across the screen, with the tagline ÒChinese FriendshipÓ in the background. 44 ChinAfrica Magazine food security cover. http://www.chinafrica.cn/Cover/txt/2014 -03/01/content_ 599048.htm, accessed October 29, 2017. 45 ÒChinese TV Programs to be Broadcast in MadagascarÓ AllAfrica.com http://allafrica.com/stories/201703130528.html, accessed October 29, 2017. %)!!One of the greatest challenges of nation branding is the questio n of how to conflate the nationÕs many intersectional identities into one neatly packaged, easily congested image resonating with its many different constituencies . A national imaginary that appe als to one culture or situation may not achiev e the same effe ct in another, for it is almost impossible to develop a simple image or core message about a country that effectively resonate s with and within all other nations 46. Trying to be one thing to all audiences or all things to all audiences renders the message m eaningless , but states can be consistent in their messaging and prolific in the promulgation of those messages . Within Africa, Beijing does precisely that. Despite subtle nuances, the Chinese State creates a consistent image of itself and its relationship with Africa as Ôfriend Õ, Ôbrother Õ, and Ôpartner Õ. The PRC frame s Africa -China as a partnership predicated on Òbrotherhood,Ó South -South cooperation , and longstanding, traditional friendship , but also ÒoppressionÓ, ÒdominationÓ, and Òsubordination .Ó47 In so doing Beijing a ttempts to Òdenationalize racial inequality ,Ó48 by creating an imagined community with Africa through the shared intimacy of marginalization by the West and invoking the spirit of Ruth Simms HamiltonÕs (2007) supposition that the injustices visited upon the African continent are Òa world phenomenon that spans historical and social space .Ó49 46 Fan, 2006, p.10 47 Mock, Tara D. Good Friends, Good Brothers, Good Part ners: Viewing Afro -Chinese Relations the lens of promotional culture , found in Communication Strategies: The Role of Culture, Identities and Ideologies in Africa -China. Pretoria: the University of South Africa Press Pretoria, (forthcoming 2018) 48 IBID 49 Simms Hamilton, Ruth (2007). Transnational Politics: A note on Black Americans and the Paris Peace Conference of 1919 found in Routes of Passage: Rethinking the African Diaspora. Michigan State University Press: East Lansing (227). %*!!Research Questions The project examines attitude and identity formation, questioning how people in Kenya, South Africa, and the Gambia receive and recon stitute images of the other and self constructed through ChinaÕs nation brand image . Images of both Africa and China are represented in its brand and though each is discursively cons tructed through Western discou rse, the rhetoric imbued within brand -China is at once both distant from and near to Wester n historical notions of Africa. Specifically, the study seeks to answer the following research questions: Q1. What is the nature of ChinaÕs nation brand image in Africa? Question one examines how the Chinese State and state owned and supported enterprises construct a national imaginary of China and Africa -China in their promotional discourse. How does the PRC inculcate images of difference from the west and similitude with African people through its brand? How does the Chinese state use nation branding to align its historical experience s as a community with AfricaÕs distinct socio -historical marker(s)? Do Chinese officials utilize such messages more frequently than their African counterparts? How do African pro ducers co -create Africa -China in their promotional discourse? The Chinese State utilizes nation branding in the construction of its national imaginary , as the PRC, like other nations across the globe, seeks to distinguish itself in the contest for global capital. This rivalry is particularly important in Africa, a r egion where such competition not only pl ayed out previously but one many view as the Ôfinal frontierÕ of capital accumulation in an incr easingly multipolar world . The question also historicizes the use of nation branding within Afro -Chinese relations, with particular %+!!emphasis on the PRCÕs relationship to the Gambia, Kenya, and South Africa. In so doing, it pays particular attention to the ways brand images of the relationship continue to referenc e and reimagine the narrative of the Bandung Conference, colonialism, neo -imperialism, and globalization by paying particular attention to the repetition of specific code -signs in brand messages . Q2. How do African people in diverse environments receive, p erceive, and interpret brand -China? Question two investigates congruency between images and messages indicative of brand -China and external factors (message exposure and perspectives of ChinaÕs nation brand image across Africa). Insight from perspectives o f China and Africa -China in the Gambia, Kenya, an d South Africa contribute to understanding how individuals in diverse environments understand and engage with the PRC as a brand. Particular attention is given to contextualizing how opinions differ across s pace and time by analyzing how social indicators, such as ethnicity, gender, class, and culture codes influence perspectives. Q3. Does the use of cultural and experiential similarities between Africa -China within brand -China help to facilitate more positiv e attitudes toward the Chinese? Brand -China regularly taps into the experiences of c ommon ancestral heritage, coupled with shared historical conditions and situations during most of the last five hundred years, which helped form significant components of g lobal African identity. Building on the historical experience of community formation across Africa and its diaspora, this question explores whether ideas of community are being expanded beyond consanguine and geographical boundaries to include the ÒGlobal SouthÓ nee %,!!Chinese. Building on themes of brotherhood, solidarity, friendship, culture, and tradition, frequently employed within brand -China the question investigates whether and how attitudes toward brand -China are affected by concepts of self and other across diverse African contexts. Methodology To answer the research questions , the study adopts a three -pronged approach. The first interrog ates how brand -China is constructed by the PRC through an ideological framing of history, culture, tradition , and i dentity . The second approach is grounded in the tradition of Afrocentric social research in its inquiry into how African people receive and reconstitute images of the other and self . Molefi K. Asante defines the Afrocentric paradigm by highlighting five mi nimum characteristics of African -centered research, including ¥!an intense interest in psychological location as determined by sym bols, motifs, rituals, and signs; ¥!a commitment to finding the subject -place of Africans in any social, political, economic, o r religious phenomenon with implications for questions of sex, gender, and class; ¥!a defense of African cultural elements as historically valid in the context of art, music, and literature; ¥!a celebration of ÒcenterednessÓ and agency and a commitment to le xical refine ment that eliminates pejoratives about Africans or other people; and %-!!¥!a powerful imperative from historical sources to revise the col lective text of African people. 50 The third approach interrogates the n ation as Òa reposit ory of collective mem ory ,Ó51 examining how the historical development of shared identity amongst African people as a coping and continuity mechanism during the experiences of enslavement, colonialism, and neo -imperialism, can be connected to the current system of neoliberal glo balization . Within this aspect of the i nquiry, the researcher questions whether and how brand -China Õs insertion of AfricaÕs distinct socio -historical markers into its brand influences the expansion of local concepts of community beyond sanguine and geograp hic boundaries to include the Ôglobal southÕ nee Chinese. In Melissa AronczykÕs Branding the nation: The global business of national identity (2013 ), the author view s the nation a s Òa site of iden tification and belonging.Ó 52 A constitutive feature of nation branding and its success hinges on the stateÕs ability to cement a synchronic ideology of belonging and community with foreign publics Ñin this instance African people . The project utilize s two principal mod es of inquiry Ñcritical discourse analysis and survey research. throughout African liberation movement s, textual and visual media became the principal formats for promoting official discou rse on Afro -Chinese solidarity to both popular and elite audiences. 53 Today, the discursive frameworks introduced with in speeches, newspaper editorials, magazines, and advertisements 50 Asante, Molefi Kete, Y oshitaka Miike, and Jing Yin, eds. The global intercultural communication reader . Routledge, 2013. 51 Aronczyk, Melissa. Branding the nation: The global business of national identity . Oxford University Press, 2013, 12. 52 Ibid. 53 Fennell, Vera Leigh. "Race: ChinaÕs Question and Problem." The Review of Black Political Economy 40.3 (2013): 245 -275. &.!!continue to promote ChinaÕs contemporary manufacture of Africa -China and proliferate its message for popular consumption . To illustrate this expanded process of image creation, co -creation, a nd recreation I revisit ed the modern history of image making in Africa between 2000 -2017 to trace the unique ways the relationship has been depicted from both Chinese and diverse African perspectives. I investigated the complete archives of images and mess ages concerning Afro -Chinese relations , delivered by official African and Chinese representatives since the first Forum on China -Africa Cooperation (2000), marking the period of Chinese reengagement with Africa. I conduct ed a systematic textual and visual content analysis of speeches, magazines, newspaper editorials, and billboards developed for African consumption. The total corpus of texts and images consists of 337 items for analysis (260 textual and 77 visual artifacts ). The research adopt ed a dissensu s constructivist approach to look for emerging patterns and meanings in how the Chinese State constructs an image of itself, Africa, and/or Africa -China . Similar studies focus ed on contemporary and emergent practices through the lens of the socio -historica l conditions that create d them, including power relations, colonialism and its legacies, the commodification of culture, and the geopolitics of space and place within globalization with a distinctive feature being the search to understand the relationships of cultural production, consumption, belief and meaning, to social processes and institutions. 54 In this vein, t he images and messages are analyzed without separating them from the social processes creati ng them. In so 54 Lister, Martin, and Liz Wells. "Seeing beyond belief: Cultural studies as an approach to analysing the visual." Handbook of visual analysis (2001): 62. &%!!doing, I resist reifying or hypostati zing the artifacts , seeing them, instead, as dynamic and movable concepts changeable according to circumstance and situation. The second method of inquiry employed survey research to glean insight into popular opinions, understandings, and attitudes toward the Africa -China relationship and brand -China in the Gambia, Kenya, and South Africa. The primary objective is to present a comprehensive framework for the systematic study of nation branding from an African point of view. This is achieved by gauging pa rticipant attitudes toward the nation brands of eight different countries, with an emphasis on China, utilizing an empirically derived methodology based on the nation brand personality construct and FishbeinÕs Multiattribute Theory Model. 55 Because college students tend to possess relatively high knowledge levels concernin g international relations , the survey population focuses on university students in each of the nation s under observation. 56 Rationale, Relevance, and Significance of the Study Because Afric ana Studies is multidisciplinary by design, this study builds upon theories emanating from that field and others Ñ international relations , communication , and marketing Ñto explain how nation branding influences the political and social sphere s and alters pe rceptions of community within Afro -Chinese relations . A constitutive feature of the project is developing a facility for understanding nation branding and national imaginary construction in foreign cont exts, a field noted by scholars as lacking in theoreti cal foundation. 57 The primary objective of the current 55 Aker 199 7; dÕAstous, A. and Boujbel, L. 2007; Kim, Shim, and Dinnie 2013; Rojas -Mendez and Papadopoulas 2011 56 Rojas -Mendez, Jose I. ÒThe Nation Brand MoleculeÓ, Journal of Product and Brand Management 22/7. 2013, pp. 465. 57 Balakrishnan, 2009; Insch and Florek, 2 008; Medway and Warnaby, 2008 &&!!study, however, is to present a theoretical and comprehensive framework for the systematic study of nation branding from an African point of view. The project examines the dimensions of nation brand ima ge using African perceptions and attitudes toward eight different countries, with an emphasis on China, utilizing an empirically derived methodology based on the nation brand personality construct. A small subset of studies in the field attend to the devel opment of a theoretical framework for identifying how nation brands are positioned within the minds of foreign publics, 58 while far fewer attend to how the phenomenon operates within Africa countries or from the perspective of African citizens. 59 Paying pa rticular attention to the manner in which African agency is exhibited through individual awareness of and responses to brand -China , the researcher seeks to understand how the brand functions within the context of the PRCÕs relationship to the Gam bia, Kenya , and South Africa. The project specifically examines how promotional images and messages , produced by the Chi nese State, affect awareness, perception , and attitudes toward Chinese involvement in these countries . Its purpose is not to present a normative a ssessment of how successful brand -China is in comparison to other nations. Instead, the project seeks to critically challenge the notion of African subjectivity in international politics by privileging African perspectives. 60 The potential theoretical cont ribution of the study lies not only within nation branding research but, more importantly, within African a studies in its commitment to locating the Ôsubject -placeÕ 58 See Aaker, J.L. 1997; dÕAstous, A. and Boujbel, L. 2007; dÕAstous, A. and Li, D. 2009; Kim, Shim, Dinnie 2013; and Rojas -Mendez, J., Murphy, S. and Papadoupoulos, N. 2011. 59 See Anholt, 2007; Odia and Isibor, 2014; Osei and Gbadamosi, 2013. 60 In Empire, Global Coloniality and African Subjectivity (2013), Sabelo Ndlovu -Gatsheni writes that colonial matrices of power and technologies of subjection produced African subjectivity as that of a being constituted by a catalogue of d eficits and a series of Ôlacks.Õ &'!!of African people within Africa -China . Although there is a small body of existing literatur e on the project of image -making in Afro -Chinese relations 61, and an emerging body of work canvassing public perceptions in Africa 62, none consider the variegated nature of such perceptions across the African continent or how they may be influenced by the un ique historical, geographic, and social factors inherent to each space . African states have become increasingly prominent actors in international politics , a fact most clearly evinced in their ability to affect positive outcomes in international trade ne gotiations, renegotiate the terms of aid agreements, and take the lead in military and humanitarian intervention efforts on the continent. The dynamics of Afro -Chinese relations mark how African governments and non -state actors have responded to an increas ingly multi -polar world to create new opportunities for independent action unbound by longstanding structures of power. As such, the study makes its most significant contr ibution to the field of Africana Studies in its attention to identifying the moments and characteristics of African agency within the Afro -Chinese relationship and the resultant paradigmatic shift in AfricaÕs relations to the West and East, facing instead , in the words of Kwame Nkrumah, Òforward.Ó African cultures have long been essentiali zed and othered to contribute to the narrative of European exceptionalism and create compelling reasons for the colonial and developmental projects. During the imperial project and again during the neoliberal global project, filmic, literary, and other rep resentations of Africa serve as apparatuses of geopolitics and power upon which nations build and maintain reputational capital 61 Mawdsley, 2008; Johannson 1999; Bonsu 2009 62 Kalu 2012; Mohan and Lampert 2013; Afrobarometer 2014; Global Ethics Institute of South Africa 2014 &(!!and through which foreign nations and people can be reached. 63 The dissertation project explores Africa -China through the prism o f these performative constructions of Afro -Chinese identity, examining Chinese state manufacture of self, of Africa, and of Africa -China. The dissertation connects identity constructions within neoliberal globalization to colonial constructions not only of African people but by them as well, speaking to the determination of these populations to create spaces for self -definition within the confines of subjugation. In so doing so the project expands the scope of diaspora, black identity constructions, and glo bal black consciousness by developing a broader interdisciplinary approach to connect the transnational black experience. It also moves beyond existing scholarship on Africa, China, and Africa -China in its attention to how expansions of community identity within Africa -China fit within a long trajectory of African identity formations during earlier eras of capital accumulation. Implications to Future R esearch In general, Africanist and Diaspora scholars who explore African identity and community formations may be enlightened by the potential for these new forms of supranational identity construction supported by brand -China , and how they operate alongside earlier expansions and reconstructions of African identity. These reconstructions involve both the indi vidual and whatever communities they subscribe to. Because this project looks specifically at how nation branding as a foundation to community building, impacts attitude formation, it could be advantageous to determine the precise nature of the relationshi p between culture and attitudes toward foreign nations in Africa. Further exploration of the relationship between local attitudes toward 63 van Ham, Peter 2001, 2002, 2008. &)!!foreign nation brand and their related effect s on domestic policymaking is also warranted. Each consideration is centra l to deconstructing how brands are constructed and received within African communities. Viewing Africa -China through this expanded lens creates new possibilities for future exploration of national imaginary construction, reconstruction and, ultimately, reception. The ways in which states create narratives of their identities, how international audiences consume these messages, and what, if any, effect audience reception has on national imaginary construction remain avenues for future research. While the di ssertation focuses on Afro -Chinese relations, the project necessarily entails engaging the histories, cultural and social experiences, and political and economic realities of African and Asian people in transnational contexts. In my future research I will continue to explore the ways in which governments search for ways to reconstitute images of self against that of a political ÔotherÕ as they reconstruct their political mandates in terms of the competition for global capital, paying particular attention to the linkage between nation branding discourses, popular awareness, and the foreign policy decision -making process. Outline of Chapters The following is a breakdown of the chapters in this dissertation and a summary of their content: The introductory chapter , ÒThe Visual Politics of Africa ChinaÓ, addressed the statement of the problem; purpose and goals of the study; research questions; rationale, relevance and significanc e of the study; and limitations. The chapter presented an &*!!overview and critique of the literature on China - Africa relations, paying particular attention to the historical construction of brand -China . Chapter Two , ÒImagining the NationÓ, provides an overview of selected background li terature in the fields of bra nding and nation brand ing , insight into imagined communities, and African perspectives of Africa -China . The literature review was developed based on existing literature and the main fi nding in this study , which point to the fact that brand -China is comprised of images and messa ges surrounding themes of community, historical experience, cultural orientation, and cooperation between the two regions . Chapter T hree, the Methodology section, describes the research design and experience, providing the reader with specific details reg arding the researcherÕs assumptions and the ontological, ep istemological and paradigmatic premises underpinning the project. A thorough discussion of the systematic coding system used during and after data collection is provided. The chapter then moves int o the steps used for pre -coding, and first cy cle coding, which include development of a codebook and thematic coding into NVIVO and second -cycle coding. The chapter explains the methods for subject recruitment, criteria for sample selection, survey setting , and instrumentation. The chapter also explains the pilot and main studies, detailing survey design, refinement, and testing, before providing a brief concluding summary. Chapter F our, ÒGood Partners, Good Friends, Good BrothersÓ, contextualizes historic al and contemporary Afro -Chinese relations. It provides insight into how migratory patterns and diplomatic and cultural orientations shaped contemporary forms of interaction. The chapter provides a historiography of Chinese soft power in Africa &+!!from its na scence, as an extension of Confucian principles, to its use in support of contemporary Afro -Chinese relations. The chapter is divided into two sections: the historical construction of brand -China and an overview of Afro -Chinese relations with the Gambia, K enya, and South Africa. Image has long been an important component of China Õs identity. This fact influences the PRCÕs efforts to manage its domestic population as strongly as it does its ability to nurture relationships with fo reign nations. Chapter F ive , ÒTurning Dragons into PandasÓ, answers research question one, outlining how the PRCÕs nation brand manifests the significance of image within Chinese politics. The chapter pays particular attention to how the Chinese State constructs its image in Africa through the use of cultural arti facts representative of not only China, but Africa as well . In this way the chapter examines the dialectical contours of ChinaÕs brand across the continent, revealing broad themes emerging from the analysis. The chapter begi ns by outlining the findings of the textual analysis, before examining each thematic finding and its implications in turn. The chapte r concludes by summarizing the findings. Equally important to the na rrative of Africa -China are responses of the Afric an people to these images and messages of self and other. Chapter Six, ÒWe Look ForwardÓ, answer s questions regarding how the PRCÕs imag e is realized in Africa by outlining attitudes toward brand -China amongst college students in the Gambia, Kenya, and Sou th Africa . The chapter pays specific attention to how respondents perceive, receive and consume brand -China as an identity construction. The chapter employs quantitative methods of inquiry to glean insight into popular opinions, understandings, and awarene ss of the Afro -Chinese relationship and brand -China &,!!amongst 4,213 university students drawn from each of the nations under observation. The chapter begins with a brief introduction, before proceeding to answer research questions two and three, and finally, offering a chapter summary. The seventh and final chapter , ÒBecause of War, We Come TogetherÓ, summarizes Chinese state and state -owned and supported enterprise construct ion of brand -China in Africa and how respondents in the Gambia, Kenya, and South Afri ca interpret such images . The chapter revisits the three initial research questions and demonstrates how they are addressed within the study , drawing conclusions regarding the findings and their larger implications to the sites under observation and the fi eld of Africana Studies in consequence of the realities of these increasingly global forms of interaction . &-!!Chapter Two Imagining the Nation ÒBefore the nation can existÉ it must be imaginedÓ --Aronczyk, Branding the Nation: Mediating space, value, and identity in the context of global culture Introduction Nations h ave always branded themselves through symbols, currency, flags, anthems, and names. 64 As feudalism gave way to the nascent formation of the nation state, the nation was regularly constructed symbolically through folkloric dress or the lore of triumphant conquest or the obelisk of Axum , each sculpted symbols of wealth, power, and mystery. By virtue of such carefully constructed artifacts , the Òmagic of nationalismÓ not only Òturned chance into d estinyÓ but responded to the demands of the these newly formed states by establishing re cognizable national traits supporting a strong sense of shared identity and member recognition within the nation. 65 The industrial revolution (1760 Ð 1840) ushered in a new era, wherein the mass production of goods necessitated the need to establish distinctions between products and vendors. Newly mechanized, repeatable processes, enabled consumer go ods manufacturers to scale products and expand their customer base beyon d the local community. The desire for oneÕs goods or services to be distinguished from competitors was an important inducement for developing unique brand personalities and print 64 Dinnie, 2013 65 Anderson, 1983 '.!!advertising become the most prevalent means of communicating those qualities to potential consumers. 66 Beginning with its development as an outgrowth of culturally symbolic practices, this chapter examines how conceptualizations and the institutionalization of nation branding emerged as a practice for imagining the nation. The chapt er explores how culture is constructed, expanded, and contracts alongside the brand, and how it is implicated in the brand as a national imaginary construction. The literature review that follows divides the literature into three related theoretical cluste rs: branding/ nation branding, culture , and imagined communities. Establishing the B rand According to the American Marketing Association (AMA), a brand is Òa name, term, sign, symbol, or design, or a combination of them, intended to identify the goods and services of one seller or group of sellers and to differentiate their offerings from those of competitors.Ó 67 A successful brand experience necessitates exposing consumers to the various attributes associated with a particular brand and creating an environm ent surrounding the customer with positive elements attached to the brand. 68 Somewhat surprisingly , strong brands do not necessarily prompt consumer purchases, rather they simply alert consumers to what the product or corporation is, what it stands for, and what experience and/or benefit one can expect to derive through association with it. 69 66 Dinnie , 2013 67 Keller 2012, 30 68 Aaker 1991, 109 69 Keller 2012) '%!!Much of the academic literature surrounding contemporary branding coalesces around the scholarship of Kevin Keller. KellerÕs Brand Equity Model (2012) [figure 1] posits that in order to build brand equity or effective positioning in the minds of consumers, corporations and organizations must shape buyer thoughts and feelings about them (attitude s) and/or their product or service. Brand equity is achieved when numerous co mponents all working in concert effectively execute a positioning strategy and communicate the product or corporation or individualÕs or nationÕs essence to audiences. 70 The right types of experiences positively affect consumer thoughts, feelings, beliefs, opinions, and perceptions regarding that essence and help the brand to establish itself vis -‹-vis competitors. Keller illustrates four steps corporations should follow to build strong brand equity: brand salience, brand meaning, brand response, and brand resonance; each representing a fundamental question consumers ask about the brand when interacting with it. 71 FIGURE 2: KELLERÕS BRAND EQUITY MODEL 70 Keller 2012, 70 71 Keller 2012 105 -120 '&!!Brand identity: brand identity, the first step in the brand equity model reflects how corporations want t o be seen by consumers. Brand identity exists at the intersection of perception and awareness, manifested through the functional and mental associations the brand aspires to create or maintain, consumer awareness of the brand, and the consumerÕs ability to recall specific brand elements. 72 These associations represent what the brand stands for and imply a potential promise to consumers. 73 Apple cautions consumers to ÒThink. DifferentÓ Ña tribute to all the time -honored visionaries who challenged the status qu o and changed the world. The multitudinous images concomitant with each brand (name, logo, tone, tagline, typeface) are designed to reflect the associations the entity hopes to establish within the minds of consumers. Aker (1991) contends that one aspect o f how brand awareness contributes to the value of the brand is through building an anchor to which other associations can be attached. In order to communicate certain values, the brand name first has to be established and recognized before one can form an attachment to it. 74 Brand meaning: Branding i s all about creating difference ,75 and the second step of KellerÕs model enables corporations to do precisely that. Once consumers are aware that the brand exists, the next step is to differentiate it from comp etitors. Brand meaning is intended to identify and communicate associations to purchasers regarding what the brand means and what it stands for. 76 The two building blocks of this step are ÔperformanceÕ and Ôimagery.Õ 77 72 Keller 2012 73 Aaker, 1996; Keller 1993 74 Rose 266 75 Keller 2012, 58 76 Dinnie 2013, 13 77 Dinnie 2013, 46 ''!!¥!ÔPerformanceÕ: Brand performance re lates to how a product or service attempts to meet customersÕ more functional needs. According to the model, performance consists of five categories: primary characteristics and features; product reliability, durability, and serviceability; service effecti veness, efficiency, and empathy; style and design; and price. ¥!ÔImageryÕ refers to how well the brand meets consumer needs on a social and psychological level. It speaks to how consumers think about a brand abstractly, rather than what they think the brand actually does. Thus, imagery refers to more intangible aspects of the brand. Imagery associations can be formed directly (from a consumerÕs experiences and contact with the product, brand, target market or usage situation) or indirectly (through the depic tion of these same considerations communicated in brand advertising or by some other source of information, such as word of mouth). A strong brand mixes and blends product performance and imagery to create a rich, deep, and complementary set of consumer re sponses towards the product , which enables consumers to more effectively bond with it. 78 If successful, associations and images embed points of differentiation within the consumer mind, positively affecting its positioning relative to competitors in the ma rketplace. 79 Brand response: A strong brand mixes and blends product performance and imagery to create a rich, deep, and complementary set of consumer responses towards the brand. 80 Consumers come to the realization that Apple isn't just any old comp uter; it is so powerful and so simple to use that it makes the average computer user feel 78 Keller 2012, 118 -9; Zamardino and goodfellow, 2007 79 Keller 2012, 58; Xie, Hu and Boggs 2006, 352; King, 1991; Aaker, 1996; Keller 1993 80 Keller 2012, 118 -9 '(!!innovative and tech -savvy. The third step, brand response, captures two categories of consumer reactions to the brand: ÒjudgmentsÓ and Òfeelings.Ó ¥!ÔJudgmentsÕ involv e the process by which consumers make judgments about the brand in terms of quality, credibility, consideration, and superiority. 81 ¥!ÔFeelingsÕ refer to how patrons connect emotionally with the brand. This response may be to the brand itself or to how that brand makes the user feel about him or herself. Brand relationship: Brand "resonance," the final step in KellerÕs model , sits at the top of the pyramid because, according to Keller (2012), it is the most difficult Ð and the most desirable Ð level to re ach. An entity has achieved brand resonance nee equity, measured through behavioral loyalty (regular, repeat purchases), attitudinal attachment, sense of community (with others associated with the brand), and active engagement (with activities and organiza tions related to the brand) , when consumers feel a deep, Òpsychological bondÓ with the brand (120). Apple users purchase not only computers but also a suite of electronic devices Ñ mobile phone, televisions, and watches based upon their loyalty to the brand . Keller defines Brand relationship through four categories: ¥!Behavioral loyalty: Reflected in regular, repeated purchases of the good or service. ¥!Brand Attitude: Represents a strong l ikelihood of purchasing, liking, or viewing brand favorably; and is impor tant to purchasing distinctions. 81 Dinnie 2013, 64 ')!!¥!Sense of community: Patrons experience a sense of community with those associated with the brand, including other consumers and company representatives. ¥!Active engagement: This is the strongest example of brand loyalty. Customers actively engage with the brand, even when they are not purchasing it or consuming it. Successful brands resonate in consumer memories long after the mechanics of marketing are said and done. Therefore, it is not sufficient to simply provide a prod uct or service and await customer recognition; one must actively work to cultivate and reinforce experiences whereby consumers develop specific and positive thoughts, feelings, beliefs, opinions, and perceptions of the brand. 82 Crafting the I mage Brand ÔIm ageÕ is a symbolic association with the brand Ñreal or imagined Ñlong held in public memory. 83 The image consumers hold of a given brand relies not only on the ocular, but the sentient, auditory and abstract aspects of the product or services offered. In this manner, image is not something the consumer can grasp, but something he or she perceives. C onsumer perception is what the mechanics of branding strive to influence through advertising, marketing and public relations .84 The eponymous Tiffan y blue box, the f act that M&Ms Ò melt in your mouth, not in your handsÓ, MacintoshÕs Apple, StarbucksÕ Siren, and McDonaldsÕ Golden Arches are all brand images that evoke specific consumer perceptions. In Naomi KleinÕs excoriating account of brand culture, No Logo (1999), s he notes that strong brands surpass the physical product; filling the space between with whatever image the consumer conjures. Be it 82 Aaker 1996 83 Keller 1993, 2012; Aaker 1991, 1996; Roy and Banerjee, 2007) 84 Olins, 2005 '*!!positive, negative, luxury, family -oriented, or dependability, the image evoked represents the overall mental picture consu mers possess of the brandÕs qualities relative to other brands. 85 The scope of branding incrementally surpassed its initial application to products, services, and compani es, to formally include cities, regions and nations. 86 Nati ons brand themselves using t he tools of marketing to positively create, change or influence a nationÕs image, 87 by effectively altering public attitudes or perceptions about a nation without using hard power, for economic, 88 political, 89 or social gain. 90 Simon Anholt (2005), proposes th at the branding of nations does not differ greatly from the branding of products or corporations. 91 Corporate branding attends to the import of image within the private sphere; whilst nation branding is, likewise, concerned with image, though in this instan ce replacing the corporation with the city or nation -state as the unit of inquiry. 92 Peter van HamÕs (2001) scholarship on the rise of the Ôbrand stateÕ is often cited to justify state practices of adapting branding approaches to foreign policy and public d iplomacy. 93 With the emergence of brand -states , van Ham identified a paradigm shift, whereby the Ômodern world of geopolitics and power is being replaced by the postmodern world of images and messagesÕ. 94 85 Faircloth, 2005; Hsieh and Li, 2008 86 Anholt, 2007; Dinnie, 2008; Odia, Edith Onowe; Isibor, Felix Osaiga 2014, 205 87 Gudjonsson, 2005; Fan, 2006, 2008b, Anholt 2005, Gudjonsson 2013 88 Leonard 48; Dinnie 2013; Osei and gbadamosi 2013 89 Rendon, 2003; Szondi, 2007; Jordan 284 90 Anholt 2005; Fan 2006; Gudjonsson 285 91 Simon Anholt is widely touted as the ÔfatherÕ of nation branding. 92 Fan, 2010 93 van Ham 2001 94 ibid '+!!Newman and Perloff (2004) write that the principles utilized in corporate branding also Òhold true in the political marketplaceÓ. 95 Accordingly, political figures adopt Ômarketing orientationsÕ nee nation branding techniques Òwhen running for officeÉ(and) when running the country.Ó 96 Despite clear distinction s between corporate and political/nation branding, Newman and Perloff insist that there are strong similarities between the two techniques: the use of marketing tools, like marketing research, market segmentation, targeting, and positioning, and strategy d evelopment and implementation; the presence of consumers, who can be analyzed Òusing the same models and theoriesÓ inherent to both approaches; and similar tactics to building brand equity. 97 It is the desire to win in terms of political competition, which prompts leaders to focus their resources on building the nationÕs image to attract tourists, investors, consumers and students; or simply to build coalitions in support of their policies. 98 A nationÕs brand can be ÔorganicÕ in that it exists without effort , as each country conveys a certain image to its publics, be it strong or weak, current or outdated, clear or vague. Ask anyone about Spain, for example, and the question might conjure up positive images of beach vacations in Ibiza, Gaudi architecture in B arcelona, Bosch painting s at the Prado, tapas, bullfighting, or flamenco. To others, however, the same question might elicit negative responses about beach vacations in Ibiza, slavery, bullfighting, and separatist movements. Fan writes (2005), whichever Òi mage is retrieved depends on the audience and the context. To mention Germany may still bring 95 Newman and Perloff, 2004 96 Newman and Perloff 2004, 18 97 Newman and perloff 2004, 19 98 Rojas -mendez 2013, 463 ',!!painful memories to some European countries about the Nazi atrocities. To the Chinese, it is Japan that is associated with the war crimes committed 60 years ago.Õ Õ99 Every nation has an image, varying across time and space, influencing both consumer perception of its products or services or partnership potential, and investor perception of its investment potential. A nationÕs image can be informed by experience, education, media exposure, travel, product purchases, or word -of-mouth. Nation branding is concerned with a countryÕs whole image on the international stage, covering political, economic and cultural dimensions. 100 It is the total sum of all perceptions of a n ation in the minds of international stakeholders and exists with or without conscious effort. 101 The underlying goal is to make the nation matter in a world where borders and boundaries appear increasingly obsolete .102 Yet, because nations are economically, cu lturally, and politically diverse; projecting a positive overall image of each consistent with the StateÕs national imaginary is a difficult task. 103 Establishing the nation as a differentiated identity with targeted international audiences through the use of specific, constructed Ôimage -signsÕ, namely the stateÕs name, logo and other branding elements, has gradually become an important aspect of global competition. 104 Diverse images of the United States -- the Statue of Liberty, the ÒReal HousewivesÓ franchise , President Donald TrumpÕs escalating trade war with the Chinese, the United StatesÕ occupation of Guantanamo Bay, Exxon , and MarvelÕs the 99 Fan, 2005, 8; Rose 2010 100 Quelch and Jocz, 2004; Fan, 2006 101 Fan, 2006, 12 102 Aronczyk 2013, 3 103 Loo and Davies 2006, 203 104 Ahn and wu 2015, 159; Szondi 2007; Jordan 2014, 284). '-!!ÒBlack PantherÓ, resonate differently with the intersectional identities and experiences of those who consume them. As a whole such images affect public thought s and opinions (both domestically and internationally) of the United States. Based on what one already knows about AmericaÕs brand Ñits quality, product characteristics, and so forth Ñconsumers can make assumption s and form reasonable expectations about what they may not know. 105 If consumers recognize, are knowledgeable of, and positively respond to a nationÕs brand, it lowers resistance to people, products, and services originating from that nation. This is why neg ative perceptions and stereotypes can be so invidious. The objective of nation branding, therefore, is to project a positive overall image that resonates with consumers, be they domestic or international. 106 Although some aspects of the brand footprint may be negative, when consumers possess a cohesive, favorable overall nation brand image, the brandÕs messages have a stronger influence on their decision -making than competitors. 107 Stipulating that nations are more complex than products, Olins (2004) contends that when it comes to national image, people can be Òmotivated and inspired and manipulatedÓ in much the same manner as they can with products (24). This suggests that effective branding can help erase misconceptions about a country and allow it to reposit ion itself more favorably. 108 Failure to do so will essentially leave target markets and competitors free to create whatever stereotypes they wish. 109 105 Keller 2012; 34 106 Loo and davies 2006 107 Hsieh and Li 2008 108 Dinnie 2008 109 Loo and Davies 2006, Dinnie 2008 (.!!Imagining the N ation In Imagined Communities (1983), Benedict Anderson argues that the nation is a new, mod ern phenomenon. As feudal states gave way to new political forms of governance during the 17th and 18th centuries, political institutions formed through Òa sacred language, sacred cosmology and dynastic power, and sense of historical temporalityÓ also yiel ded to new forms of social and political connections. 110 Emerging social conditions and rationalist perspectives, which gained momentum during this age, facilitated the development of spaces where individuals could conceptualize themselves as part of an Ôima gined communityÕ. Most members of the community likely do not know one another, yet the shared sense of identity underpinning the nation enables them to envision Ôparallel and plural realitiesÕ that connect them to other individuals. Speaking to power of the imagined community to create possibilities for solidarity and groupness between strangers, while also creating new divisions and fissures both within and across borders, Anderson (1983) writes, ÒAll nations larger than primordial villages of face -to-face contact (and perhaps even these) are imagined. Communities are to be distinguished, not by their falsity/genuineness, but by the style in which they are imagined.... Finally, [the nation] is imagined as a community, because, regardless of the actual i nequality and exploitation that may prevail in each, the nation is conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship. Ultimately, it is this fraternity that makes it possible, over 110 Nguyen 2016 (%!!the past two centuries for so many millions of people, not so much to kill, as wi llingly to die for such limited imaginings.Ó 111 Thus, the imagination is integral to all forms of agency. It is what enables individuals to reconstruct the nation, themselves, and their communities differently. It is what gave rise to the creation of a comm unity identity amongst subjugated African people and it is what can create space for African and Chinese people to become Ôbrothers.Õ A conceptual nation, Anderson argues, Òcould arise historically only when substantial groups of people were in a positio n to think of themselves as living lives parallel to those of other substantial groups of people Ð if never meeting, yet certainly proceeding along the same trajectoryÓ. 112 The idea of China and Africa as brothers, similarly maligned by the west, and working toward collective development for the mutual benefit of both regions, is one such example. The average Ugandan will never venture to Guangzhou, will never meet a Taishanese, yet , according to Anderson, a communion of sameness and collective identity can b e established through the imagination of shared experience. Arjun Appadurai (1996), likewise, speaks of the ethos among community members as a ÒcollectiveÓ who imagine themselves as a unit, thus creating a sentiment uniting the group together and solidify ing individual identities. Appadurai crystallizes our understanding of the imagined community as one constructed and reinforced through the proliferation of mediated messages. These messages reflect the conflicting 111 Anderson 1983, 30 -35 112 Anderson 1983; 188 (&!!tendency toward both cultural distance an d proximity upon which the new social order underpinning globalization relies. Nation branding represents another form of imagining the community and the nation , creating communion between strangers. Part of the process of discursively constructing Òthe na tionÓ is to establish its coordinates in time and space, situating it in relation to other nations, other people, ÔothersÕ, and essentially Òputting the country on the mapÓ. 113 The brand is increasingly significant as n ational interests increasingly expand b eyond the political as the dictates of globalization nece ssitate that nation -states compete for international capital, convey an image of legitimacy, and create positive foreign opinion. Given global capitalÕs tendency toward geographic discontinuity and mobility, nations have become enmeshed in structures of economic and political power whereby repositioning the countryÕs image against others is imperative. 114 In this context, assessing a stateÕs national imaginary or brand image amongst foreign nationals b ecomes an important placeholder for how effectively countries compete with each other for favorable perception. 115 One of the many ways nation -states have accomplished this in recent years has been to engage in image -building initiatives. 116 Aronczyk and Power s (2010) reason that shifts in how nations promote themselves globally is Òboth symptom and causeÓ of the manner in which political and economic relations between and within nations are articulated. 117 113 Jordan 2014, 289 114 Shohat and Stam 1994 115 Kotler and Gertner 2002; Fan, 2006; Anholt, 2007 116 Gudjonsson 2005, 284 117 Aronczyk and powers 2010, 3 . ('!!Considering the explicitly political dimensions of bran ding, John Corner (2007) raises that concomitant with promotional cultureÕs tendency toward capital accumulation is an equivalent tendency toward Òinstitutionalized deception.Ó 118 Government strategies of self -promotion, Corner contends, are part of a larger trajectory of deceptive government practices in which global capital manipulates cultural forms, identities, and notions of community to communicate brand messages Òvirtually coextensive with our produced symbolic world.Ó 119 Andrew Wernick (1991) first int roduced promotional identities in his book Promotional Culture: Advertising, Ideology and Symbolic Expression, which describes the recursive function of promotionalism as a tool of influence on cultural expression. In its initial application to advertising , Wernick argued that promotional culture is designed to convey a specific, precise message. These messages are not necessarily reflective of the culture of production but aim to valorize the discursive processes through which that culture is constructed f or mass consumption. The cinematic projection of exteriority and alterity accompanying the colonial project is replicated within contemporary nation branding as governments search for ways to reconstitute images of self against that of a political ÔotherÕ, reimaging their countries as a function of the competition for global capital. 120 In ReOrient (1998) , Andre Gunder argues that many of the pejorative views on Asia (and Africa) did not come into being until the nineteenth century, with the advent of coloni alism and industrialization. It was then that European thinkers (Marx, Dickens, 118 Corner, John 2007, 669 Ð677 119 ibid 120 Said 1979; Schwak 2017; Shohat and Stam 1994 ((!!Weber) began to reshape the image of themselves and Asian and African spaces into the civilized world versus the Ôdark continentÕ or ÔOrientÕ of our current understanding. The perception that Òthey are not like usÓ, Òare sub -humanÓ or Òneed our protection and guidanceÓ were recurring storylines well into the twentieth century and an important rationale for colonialism. 121 Edward Said (1979) contends Òto a certain extent modern a nd primitive societies seem thus to derive a sense of their identities negatively. A fifth -century Athenian was very likely to feel himself to be nonbarbarian as much as he positively felt himself to be Athenian. The geographic boundaries accompany the soc ial, ethnic, and cultural ones in expected ways. Yet often the sense in which someone feels himself to be not -foreign is based on a very unrigorous idea of what is "out there," beyond one's own territory. All kinds of suppositions, associations, and fictio ns appear to crowd the un -familiar space outside one's ownÓ. 122 The ÔotherÕ, Said writes, is imagined and in so doing ÔselfÕ and ÔcommunityÕ become imagined constructs as well. The need to create a moral binary wherein non -Europeans represented all that was bad, weak, undeveloped, and unintelligent, was an important aspect of the European narrative . Within transat lantic slavery and colonialism, the African was renamed savage. 123 The dispossession of African identities shaped the continentÕs image into our curr ent understanding. The colonizers, whatever their persuasion, inevitably developed a distorted portrait of the colonized as 121 Said 1979 122 Said 1979, 55 123 Agyeman 2004; Opoku 2004, 33 ()!!justification of their role on the continent , for n othing Òcould better justify the colonizerÕs privileged position than his industr y, and nothing could better justify the colonizedÕs destitution than his indolenceÓ. 124 Thus, the reification of oppositional images of the west to Africa helped maintain Òa sense of logic regarding structures of global hierarchy and unspoken convictions of global difference and cultural superiorityÓ. 125 As modern states reconstitute their political mandates in terms of competition for global capital, King SolomonÕs Mines (1885), King Kong (1933), and the White ManÕs Burden (1899) are increasingly replaced wit h images and messages aimed to create imagined communities celebrating cultural proximity rather than distance. Nonetheless, the overarching imperative to construct a national imaginary of moral or social superiority over an ÒotherÓ remains consistent. 126 Conceptualizing Ôcommunity Õ as a social construct whereby members perceive commonality with others, even when they cannot know them, is an integra l component of this project. A sense of connectedness, of identity, exists purely in the imagination of member s and is the first step in the process of community building. 127 The imagined community nee national imaginary, as an alternative spatial rendering, creates room for parallel and plural realities in individual and communal understandings of self. Association s between nation branding, and community identity and cultural orientation have been explored by earlier scholars to explain consumer perceptions. 128 124 Memmi, Albert 1991, 41; Taiwo, O. 2009, 79 125 Edozie and Soyinka -Airewele 2010, 15 126 Shohat and Stam 1994 127 Appadurai 1996; Aronczyk 2013 128 Lilli and Diehl 1999; Rojas -Mendez, Murphy, Papadopoulos 2013; dÕAstous and Boujbel 2007; Boujbel and Li 2009 (*!!(Mis)imagined Communities Existing studies suggest that consumers prefer nation brands with personalities or cultures that align most closely with their own self -concept s.129 DÕAstous and Boujbel (1999) concluded that individuals typically possess a preference for countries and people whom they believe to be culturally similar to themselves. 130 The self -congruity hypothesis is rooted in the assumption that individuals strive to maintain cognitive consistency in their beliefs and behaviors and it is here that the syncretic function of nation branding becomes most evident. 131 Individuals and communities prefer nations that possess qualities similar to their own, therefore, constructing a national imaginary of self for foreign nations and publics, underpinned by similitude, increases the likelihood that oneÕs nation will be viewed favorably. Companion to this is that ear ly studies of nation brandi ng conclude that the relationship between brand personality and brand self -congruity is moderated by cultural orientation. 132 Sojka and Tanusuhaj (1995) resolved that culture is operationalized through language, artifacts, and bel iefs. 133 Matzler et al (2016), similarly proclaimed that culture is a set of learned traits and shared institutions, manifested through the artifacts and values inherent to a particular group. 134 A societyÕs culture (or cultures) is comprised of symbolic ways of Òthinking, feeling and reactingÓ shared within groups but which also 129 Matzler et al, 2016 130 dÕAstous and Boujbel 2007, 232 131 Taken from Matzler et al (2016) brand -self congruity is defined as the match between a brand's imag e and an individual's self -concept; Sung & Choi 2012. 132 In fact, studies of culture, specifically, and its influence on perception and consumption accounted for nearly ten percent of articles published in marketing journals between 1996 -2000; See Stokburge r-sauer, et al. 2012; Sung & Choi, 2012 133 Sojka, Jane, and Patriya S. Tansuhaj. "Cross -cultural consumer research: A twenty -year review." ACR North American Advances (1995). 134 Matzler, Kurt, et al. 2016 (+!!allow latitude for distinct expressions of individuality. 135 Hall (1987) posited that within high -context , collectivist cultures (Africa and Asia ), the ability to interpret nonverbal app eals to ego -focused emotions (Happiness, Pride) are highly valued , whereas such traits are often ignored in low - context cultures (the United States). Aker and Williams (1998) substantiate HallÕs findings while contributing the insight that although member s of high -context, collectivist cultures are dominated by their interdependent selves, there are still instances in which members of those cultures access their independent selves , enabling them to a ct simultaneously as part of a collective while also allo wing for singular action . Hofstede (2001) operationalized cultural variables into measurable dimensions, including: ¥!Individualism vs. collectivism : the degree to which individuals are supp osed to focus on their own self -interest or remain integrated into groups, ¥!Power distance : the extent to which less powerful members of organizations and institutions accept and expect power to be evenly distributed, ¥!Uncertainty avoidance : the extent to which a culture inculcates feelings discomfort or comfort with uns tructured, unknown, or unusual situations, and ¥!Masculinity vs. Femininity : the distribution of emotional roles between the genders in which aggressive societies are considered masculine, and gentle societies are considered feminine. The tendency of Weste rn societies to paint non -western values statically and with broad strokes of Ôhigh -contextÕ, Ôcollectivism,Õ and ÔfamilismÕ is problematized by Fan 135 Hofstede 2001, 9 (,!!(2000) who argues that existing models are limited in their understandings of non -western cultures. In this sense, HofstedeÕs findings are not incorrect but, rather, too narrowly simplistic to capture the richness of cultural orientation. Still, several broad themes have been identified by scholars, which prove useful to an analysis of an imagined ÔAfro -Chinese Õ community , particularly one reinforced within ChinaÕs nation brand . In African Cultural Values: An introduction (1996), Kwame Gyekye suggests that among moral values upheld in African societies, particularly among the Akan in Ghana, communal responsibi lity is deemed most important. The significance of this value, he writes, is instilled in all members of the community early in life, and regularly reinforced thr ough folktales and proverbs such as , ÒAbofra bo nnwa na ommo akyekyedee .Ó136 Companion to this, Geurts (2002) asserts that within an African cultural context, communal responsibility, which she specifically outlines as Ôa sense of community lifeÕ, Ôa sense of respect for authority and the eldersÕ, Ôa sense of hospitalityÕ, Ôa sense of good human rela tionsÕ, and Ôa sense of language and proverbs,Õ is key. Kamwangamalu (2014) likewise posits that Ôcommunity,Õ manifested through the expression of Ubuntu , is a constitutive feature of African societies. In his analysis of Ubuntu in South African society, Kamwangamalu (2014) found that the core characteristics of African ontologies : respect for human dignity and human life, group solidarity, hospitality, and collective consciousness underpin the way members of society treat one another. 137 136 This is an Akan proverb, the lit eral translation of which is ÒA child breaks a snail, not a tortoiseÓ. The practical translation is that children should take care when engaging with adults lest their actions be misunderstood. 137 Kamwangamalu, Nkonko M. 2013, 241 (-!!While agreeing that culture has Òbeen the main source to construct identity and to reinvent the nation and ethnicities in the face of colonial imposition and the subsequent changes that followed,Ó 138 Falola (2003) balks at the notion of extant Africa n cultural practices, value s, dialects, philosophies, and worldviews. The colonial experience, he cautions, Òtransformed African cultures to an extent that some became strangers to the traditions of old, suffering alie nation in the process Ó, relegating the notion of a homogenous Afr ican culture mythic. 139 Pwiti and Ndoro (1999), likewise, privilege the effects of colonialism on perceptions of the past and cultural alienation in (Southern) Africa. They point out that the c olonizing powers forced African people to abandon their religious beliefs, governmental systems, and a host of other traditional ways of doing things and fostered the creation of new values which , in the long term, permanently distanced African communities from their past cultural values. 140 The concept of a collective African identity is der ived from colonialism because the imperial project changed the construct of Africa from Afrocentric to Eurocentric. 141 The restructuring of Africa involved the exploitation of the land, domination of the mind and body, and the infusion of western ideas into already existent civilizations. Selective Euro -centered philosophies and theories developed to support the colonial model contrived concepts of African communities and ways of being, which have had a lingering effect on the African s ense of identity. Mudimbe deems this intermediate space between natural and imposed definitions of self dangerous because it prevents African people from moving forward as they cling to vestiges of the past. 138 Falola, Toyin 2003, 3 139 Falola, Toyin 2003, 5 140 Pwiti and Ndoro, 1999 141 Mudimbe, V.Y. 1988 ).!!Contemporarily, Joseph MensahÕs (2008) critique of globalizationÕs tendency to obliterate local cultural values complicates nation branding within an African social context. Mensah problematizes globalizationÕs similarities to earlier forms of capital accumulation in its effects on cultural inscription , dislocation and appropriation. He maintains that although African people willingly adopt western culture through these processes, cultural hegemony is still inscribed and reproduced through the act of doing so. 142 Simultaneously privileging and distanc ing the Catholicism of Ubuntu, many western philosophers also question its uniqueness to Africa. 143 Makhudu (1993) suggests that the qualities of Ubuntu, or humanity, exist in every person. In reality, the belief of actualizing oneÕs humanity through relatio nships with others is also shared by Native Hawaiian culture, a constitutive feature of which is Òthe triangulation of meaning,Ó through the integration of the mind, the body, and the heart as a holistic, spiritual, and experiential way of knowing. 144 Simil ar ways of being can be found within Islamic cultures who share the theory of tawhid , the doctrine of tabligh , the concept of ummah , and the principle of taqwa as the fundamental principles of ethical communication in Muslim societies. 145 Chinese cultures, wherein Confucian teaching is concerned with ethics and morality, are also thought to possess a shared sense of humanity. 146 Hui -Ching Chang (2014) dissuades the privileging of collectivist metaphors in explaining Confucianism, 142 Mensah, Joseph 2008 143 Broodryk, 1996; Prinsloo, 1996; Shutte, 1994 144 Aluli -meyer 2014 145 Mowlana 2014; (1) tawhid (unity, coherence, and harmony of all in the universe), (2) amr bi al -maÕ ruf wa nahyÕan al munkar (commanding to the right and prohibiting from the wrong), (3) ummah (community), and (4) taqwa (piety). 146 Weiming 2014; Chang, Hui -Ching 2014 )%!!however, because in her view they fail to adequately account for the subtleties of individual decision -making. 147 Instead, contemporary scholars suggest that Confucianism should be viewed as part of a Ôliving traditionÕ, necessitating individual determinations of Ôwhat to shiftÕ, Ôwhat to discardÕ, and Ôwhat to retainÕ for continued survival. 148 This is similar to FalolaÕs (2003) reading of African cultures in that they have been and are invented and reinvented over time, proactively blending the old with the new. Hongmei LiÕs (2009) argum ent that there has been a shift from communal notions of egalitarianism (chengfen) to a modern China motivated by consumption ( shenjia) is one example . Hongmei details how discourses of self -worth and reputation shifted from a class -status framework in the decades following the founding of the PeopleÕs Republic of China, to a commercially oriented, individualized framework since the period of Chinese reengagement with the west. The transition from chengfen to shenjia, Hongmei argues , highlights the particul ar ways in which discourses surrounding global capital accumulation have influenced identity construction in China. The discursive privileging of palimpsestic syncretisms makes cultureÕs place in national imaginary construction and broader considerations of branding the nation particularly difficult to model. 149 Culture is relevant to conversations surrounding nation branding because the brand not only communicates a nationÕs policies and culture to consumers, but also attempts to cultivate public opinion b y tapping into the brandÕs congruence with consumer orientation. 150 147 Chang, Hui -Ching 1997, 107 -131. 148 Miike 2014 149 Ibhawoh 2000; OÕshaughnessy & OÕshaughne ssy, 2000; Skinner & Kubacki, 2007 150 Jordan 2014, 284; Ahn and Woo 2015; Dinnie 2008 )&!!Language and C ulture Language is an artifact of culture, through which meaning making is performed and community members identify and interact with others in the group. 151 Krippendorff (2005 ) describes language as a facility for co-constructing reality and, as such, language constitutes an important aspect of how cultural artifacts are Òperceived, conceptualized, and talked about.Ó 152 Communities identify with one another through language, but group identity is also enacted through the use of artifacts enabling members to conceptualize and bind their relationship to one another through discourses. 153 These discourses, Krippendorff explains, Òreside in communities of people who collaborate in enac ting what constitutes their community, performing it, so to speak, and thereby creating everything that matters to the members of a community as members.Ó 154 Thus, communities are not only constructed through the formation of a sense of belonging, a fomentin g of national identity but, also, through language which assigns shared meaning to these discourses; discourses which reflect how communities organize themselves and construct their identities and that of the larger world. 155 Defined as a practice by which individuals imbue reality with meaning, discourses may reflect any number of social practices, including Roman Catholic mass, line dancing, or the rules of Pokemon Sun and Moon . Krippendorff (2005) argues that discourses are the domain of community of prac titioners who habitually Ò(re)read, 151 Gee 2014, 7 152 Krippendorff 2005, 54 150 153 Gee 2014, 9 154 Krippendorff 2005, 10. 155 Gee 2014, 11 )'!!(re)write, (re)produce, (re)work, (re)search, (re)articulate, (re)design, and (re)evaluateÓ textual matters as a trust of groupness and belonging and successful discourses justify their version of reality to those outsid e the community. 156 Language is conceived as a vehicle for action, whereby the action is the representation of reality. 157 It is this participatory mechanism driven by a desire to influence the ways African people perceive, conceptualize, and talk about Africa -China as a discourse community that sets the relationship apart and makes it a political object useful for a serious study of nation branding. Conclusion Nation branding offers an emerging corpus of analyses to examine the construction of nations and th eir promotional images with varying constituencies. 158 This chapter explored existing literature in the fields of corporate brand ing, alongside its relationship to nation branding to examine how the concepts are used in promotional discourses and practices i n the context of Afro -Chinese relations. The chapter specifically examined how the development of corporate branding and nation branding were both influenced by the significance of image in building brand resonance with consumers. The chapter then explored the imagined community before considering how the imagination and nation branding are implicated within the construction of national identity and culture. The chapter concludes by engaging the existing debate regarding culture and community broadly and sp ecifically within an African social context before briefly discussing the use of language and communication as artifacts of culture. ! 156 Krippendorff 2005, 24 -5 157 Potter 1996 158 Kaneva 2011 )(!!Chapter Three Africana Constructivism Introduction The analysis of nation branding has largely remained confined to marke ting and communication research, where scholars examine the practice through the lens of corporate interests or limit the analysis principally to inquiries involving the United States or other western nations. A more nuanced approach exposes observers to i ts potential applications to interactions between nations and people outside of the United States and Europe. The overall purpose of this project is to demonstrate how African people in diverse local contexts perceive, receive, and interpret brand -China. T he dissertation is specifically concerned with how African and Chinese identities are constructed, comprehended and negotiated within ChinaÕs narrative of Africa, China, and Africa -China; and the larger relationship of nation branding discourse to communit y, and national and supranational identity constructions. The PRCÕs nation brand reflects a carefully crafted, government controlled -narrative with realpolitik foreign policy goals no different than Western interests in Africa. Understanding the duality of ChinaÕs constructed brand image as simultaneously self -sacrificing and self -serving is important to comprehending its attempts to create and manage its brand in Africa and also underscores the difficulty of discerning BeijingÕs motives. Images of both Africa and China are represented in its brand and though each is discursively constructed through Western discourse, the rhetoric imbued within brand -China is at once both distant from and near to Western historical notions of Africa. By examining the mann er in which China utilizes nation ))!!branding to construct its image within Africa, the study prompts a reconsideration of the discursive power mechanisms exercised in and through national image making. More importantly, the project questions how university s tudents in Kenya, South Africa, and the Gambia receive and reconstitute images of self and other, reinforced through ChinaÕs constructed nation brand image in Africa. The specific research questions formulated in Chapter One are restated here. The study as ks: Q1. What is the nature of ChinaÕs nation brand image in Africa? Question one examines how the Chinese State constructs a national imaginary of China and Africa -China in its promotional discourse. How does the PRC inculcate images of difference from the west and similitude with African people through its brand? How does the Chinese state use nation branding to align its historical experiences as a community with AfricaÕs distinct socio -historical marker(s)? Do Chinese officials utilize such messages more frequently than their African counterparts? How do African producers co -create Africa -China in their promotional discourse? The Chinese State utilizes nation branding in the construction of its national imaginary across Africa, as the PRC, like other nati ons across the globe, seeks to distinguish itself in the contest for global capital. This rivalry is particularly important in Africa, a r egion where such competition not only played out previously but one many view as the Ôfinal frontierÕ of capital accum ulation in an increasingly multipolar world. The question also historicizes the use of nation branding within Afro -Chinese relations, with particular emphasis on the PRCÕs relationship to the Gambia, Kenya, and South Africa. In so doing, it pays particular attention to the ways brand images of )*!!the relationship continue to reference and reimagine the narrative of the Bandung Conference, colonialism, neo -imperialism, and globalization by paying particular attention to the repetition of specific code -signs in brand communication. Question one will be answered within chapter five. Q2. How do African people in diverse environments receive, perceive, and interpret brand -China? Question two investigates congruency between images and messages indicative of brand -China and external factors (message exposure and perspectives of ChinaÕs nation brand image across Africa). Insight from perspectives of China and Africa -China in the Gambia, Kenya, and South Africa contribute to understanding how individuals in diverse envi ronments understand and engage with the PRC as a brand. Particular attention is given to contextualizing how opinions differ across space and time analyzing how social indicators, such as ethnicity, gender, class, and culture codes influence perspectives. Question two will be explored within chapter six. Q3. Does the use of cultural and experiential similarities between Africa -China within brand -China help to facilitate more positive attitudes toward the Chinese? Brand -China regularly taps into the experien ces of a common ancestral heritage, coupled with shared historical conditions and situations during most of the last five hundred years, which helped form significant components of global African identity. Building on the historical experience of community formation across Africa and its diaspora, this question explores whether ideas of community are being expanded beyond consanguine and geographical boundaries to include the ÒGlobal SouthÓ nee Chinese. Building on themes of brotherhood, solidarity, friends hip, culture, and )+!!tradition, frequently employed within brand -China the question investigates whether and how attitudes toward brand -China are affected by concepts of self and other across diverse African contexts. Question three will be examined within ch apter six. Chapter three presents the methodological processes the researcher employed to answer these research questions, outlining the theories and procedures guiding the project. The chapter provides contours of the research philosophy, research approac h, research design, data collection and data analysis procedures determined most suitable for addressing the research questions. The chapter summarizes not only the practical procedures followed but also provides a detailed orientation to the theoretical fundament underpinning the research design and methodological approach. Research Philosophy The decision of which research philosophy to adopt for a study depends heavily on how the researcher relates to questions concerning the development of knowledge an d the nature of that knowledge, and also reveals important insight into the researcherÕs view of the world. 159 These insights color how the researcher views the relationship between knowledge and the process by which it is developed. Thus, understanding a researcherÕs ÔphilosophyÕ is important to understanding not only the lens through which he or she views the world, but also how that lens affects the researcherÕs method of examining the questions undergirding the research project. There are three defined ways of thinking about research philosophy: ontology, epistemology, and methodology. Each philosophical concept aids in understanding how the researcher approaches knowledge. 160 159 Saunders, M., P. Le wis, and A. Thornhill. 2009 160 Patton 2002 ),!!Ontology Ontology is broadly defined as the philosophical study of the nature of being, becoming, existence, or reality. 161 Traditionally included within the major branch of philosophy known as metaphysics, ontol ogies are systems of belief reflective of an individualÕs interpretation of what constitutes a fact and how we understand exis tence. My belief structure is one which insists that reality is a construction based upon individual and communal beliefs and my ontological location is one of constructivism. Bryman (2001) considers Constructivism an alternative ontological position where social phenomena and their meanings are continually being changed and revised through social interaction. Social construction and constructivist ontology recogniz e the world as a construction, be it a social, political, or psychological one 162. According to Patton (2002), constructivism considers how individuals within the research construct reality. It asks for whom and for what reason a specific version of reality is being constructed. What are their perceptions and truths, explanations, beliefs, and world views? What are the consequences of these constructions for those with whom these individuals interact? 163 In international relations, constructivism is the claim that core aspects of relations between nations are historically and socially constructed throug h language and rhetoric, rather than as a natural consequence of human interaction. This study examines different constructions of Africa -China through the lens of nation branding in Africa, giving voice to a diversity of perspectives of the 161 Blaikie 2010 162 Tuli 2010 163 Patton 2002, 96 )-!!phenomenon. The question of which members of a community possesses the power to create and define reality is a key consideration of this study as it is important to not only discuss and present a single and dominant view, but also acknowledge dissensus. Constructivist research criteria therefore constitutes a suitable ontologi cal framework for this study. M ore narrowly , the project adopts a dissensus -constructivist approach, which is concerned with how nation branding is implicated in relations of social power, problem atizing the tendency of nation branding to depoliticize and obscure the struggles and negotiations through which national identities are produced. 164 Epistemology Epistemology describes ways of knowing. It is the philosophical theory of knowledge, which di stinguishes what we know from what we think about a phenomenon. Through the use of methods, validity, and scope, epistemological questions ask, "What is knowledge?", ÒHow do we know what we know?Ó, and "How is knowledge acquired?" Nobles (2006) provides fi ve tenets of epistemology, defining it simultaneously as the study of (1) the nature of reality; (2) how truth is defined; (3) the relationship between the knower, knowing, and the known; (4) what can be known; and (5) what should/could be done with the kn own. Africana Studies approaches knowledge from a culturally informed perspective. 165 MacDougal (2014) states that within Africana Studies, knowledge Òis rooted in the history, philosophy, and culture of Classical Africa while also embracing the new challeng es and transformations that characterize Africa and its diaspora todayÓ. 166 164 Kaneva 2011 165 Kambon 1999, Macdougall 2014 166 MacDougall 2014, 241 *.!!This study is grounded epistemologically within the Afrocentric tradition. Afrocentricity, as an epistemological approach within Africana Studies, places African ideals at the center of analyses involving African culture and people. 167 AfrocentricityÕs aim is to shift the focus from a European centered analysis to an African centered one, viewing the world through the gaze of African people. Molefi K . Asante, one of the principal propo nents of Afrocentricity, considers research of African cultural communication as being the single most important factor in defining the concept. 168 Asante (1987) writes that the universalities of African language, meaning the verbal, written, and symbolic m essages unique to African forms of communication, are what give meaning to Afrocentrism. To this point MacDougall (2014) references Dixon (1976) in his description of African epistemology as one including Òaffect symbolic imagery cognition which refers to the use of phenomenon such as words, gestures, tones, rhythms, and objects to convey meaningÉsymbolic imagery is a part of the phenomenal world. Therefore, when people of African descent engage in symbolic imagery, image construction, and invention to conv ey meaning, it must be understood that they are engaging in intellectual actsÓ. 169 This suggests that African people possess specific forms of language and communication that are both unique and central to how they construct the realities of their world and that the specificity of these forms are worthy of academic study. 167 Asante 1998, 2 168 Asante 1998 169 MacDougall 2014, 239 *%!!Paradigm Guba and Lincoln (1994), argue that questions of research methods are of secondary importance to questions of which paradigm is used. A paradigm is a general way of understandin g and approaching knowledge about the world with broad application. Paradigms guide a researcher through the experience of acquiring knowledge. The primary object ive of this dissertation is to present a theoretical and comprehensive framework for the syste matic study of nation branding and national imaginary constructions from an Africa n point of view. Consequently, the researcher locate s the paradigm consistent with the assumptions regarding ontology (Constructivism) and epistemology (Afrocentricity) as Af ricana Constructivist. It is fitting that, methodologically, the project be couched within the Africana Studies paradigm, which is characterized, according to McDougall (2014), by its attention to the Necessity of Cultural Specificity, Prioritization of A fricana Needs and Interests, Heterogeneous Collectivism, Collective Emancipation and Empowerment, Agency and Self Consciousness, Historical Location, Cultural Situating, Recognizing the Shaping Effects of Oppression and Liberation, and Intersectionality: 170 Of particular significa nce to this study is the: Recognition of the Necessity of Cultural Specificity: One of the reoccurring features of Africana Studies theories is their recognition that: (1) African peopleÕs lives are worthy of ethnic specific theoriza tion. This study narrowly focuses on the lives and experiences of African people in diverse local environments. 170 See MacDougall 2014 *&!!¥!Prioritization of Africana Needs and Interests: The study privilege s the needs and interests, experiences and expression s of people of African descent through its focus on African responses and attitudes toward brand -China . ¥!Heterogeneous Collectivism : African people are conceptualized as extensions of their common African heritage and active agents in carving out unique cultural spac es on the continent, in the diaspora, and in their unique multi ethnic local contexts. The study explores how African historical experiences are utilized within brand -China and , also, how those same experiences help shape local responses to the phenomenon. ¥!Agency and Self Consciousness: Agency is one of the key concepts in the Afrocentric Paradigm and recognizes the importance of focusing on how people of African descent engage in the self -conscious shaping of their reality and the world in their own image and interests in the past and present. The study pays particular attention to the manner in which African agency is exhibited through individual awareness of and responses to brand -China. ¥!Historical Location: Africana Studies rejects the idea of studying A frican peopleÕs lives at a single point in time without placing them in historical context. The study examines attitudes toward the phenomenon of Chinese nation branding in Africa mark a continuation or cessation o f historical responses to earlier eras of capital accumulation. ¥!Recognizing the Shaping Effects of Oppression and Liberation : Africana Studies recognizes the effects that the experience of oppression and the struggle for freedom have had on the lives of people of African descent. The study examin es how brand -China taps into African historical experiences to facilitate brand performance. *'!!¥!Intersectionality: Africana Studies acknowledges the interactive effects of multiple histories, political contexts, social forces and social systems on African peopleÕs lives. The study examines how contemporary African people create intersectional social systems to shape their experiences . Approaching the research project from within an Africana Constructivist perspective allows the researcher space t o observe t he phenomenon within a global framework while still centering African people, and how they make sense of their world . Research Approach Before selecting the appropriate research approach to accompany the Africana Constructivist paradigm, it was necessary t o determine whether the purpose of the research was descriptive, explanatory, exploratory or predictive, as doing so assists with deciding on an appropriate research design method. 171 The purpose of this project was three -fold; the first was to describe the precise nature of brand -China in Africa. The second objective was to proffer a predictive model of African perceptions of brand -China. Finally, the third goal was to explain the relationship between community identity, self -concept, and attitudes toward a nation Õs brand within Afro -Chinese relations. Two separate but related methodological approaches were required to adequately describe the phenomenological underpinnings to th e project. Determining the precise nature of the construct brand -China requires d escriptive research methods; while testing the predicted influence of nation branding and national imaginary constructions on African perceptions of self and other is predictive and explanatory in nature. 172 171 Yin 1998; Snow and Thom as 1994 172 Snow and Thomas 1994, 465 *(!!There are multiple methods commonly used within d escriptive theory building, including observational methods, case -study methods and survey methods. Predictive and explanatory methods call for large sample surveys. 173 Before proceeding, the researcher had to determine which approach would best contribute t o answering the research questions within descriptive, predictive, and explanatory frameworks. The first step was to figure out whether the most appropriate methods would be qualitative, quantitative, or a combination thereof. In qualitative research, th e goal is to discover meaning. 174 Qualitative methods of inquiry are concerned with opinions, feelings and experiences , and describe social phenomena as they occur naturally, with a desire to understand the phenomena holistically. 175 Thus, the data utilized in qualitative assessments can be difficult to measure and quantify, inasmuch as quantifying an observation of traditional homeopathic healing practices may be challenging. Quantitative research , conversely, is used to systematically investigate observable p henomena using statistical, mathematical or computational techniques. In contrast to the depth and detail inherent to qualitative research, quantitative methods are characterized by their use of mathematical models as the method of data analysis. 176 The two approaches can also work together . The Mixed Methods Approach , according to Johnson and Onwuegbuzie (2004) provide s researchers with an alternative way of thinking about whether an amalgam, or mixing, of the two can be successfully 173 Snow and Thomas 1994; Montgomery, Wernerfelt, and Balakrishnan 1989 174 Patton 2002 175 ibid 176 Sayre 2001 *)!!accomplished .177 The tech nique allows researchers to incorporate methods of collecting or analyzing data from the quantitative and qualitative research procedures in a single research study. 178 Sandelowski (2000) argues that mixed methods enable the researcher to expand the scope of a study in instances where the goal is to Òcapture method -linked dimensions of a target phenomenon (given that) different aspects of reality lend themselves to different methods of inquiryÓ. 179 Within the approach researchers are given the latitude to colle ct or analyze not only numerical data, which is customary for quantitative research, but also narrative data, which is the norm for qualitative studies . The goal is to draw from the strengths and minimize the weaknesses of each approach on its own. This re search project utilizes a mixed method approach . Using mixed methods enabled the researcher to design a single research study that answers questions about both the complex nature of the phenomena studied from the participantsÕ point of view and the relatio nship between measurable variables. 180 Research Design The project utilizes two principal modes of inquiry derived from the mixed methods approach Ñcritical discourse analysis and survey research. Critical Discourse Analysis Discourse analysis, as a methodol ogical approach, is utilized within a broad diversity of disciplines in the humanities and social science fields. 181 The method offers 177 Johnson and Onwuegbuzie 2004, 14 178 Creswell, 2003 179 Sandelowski 2000, 247 180 Creswell 2003 181 Gee 2014 **!!a conceptual framework for examining how social and cultural perspectives and identities are constructed semiotically throu gh language. 182 The approach examines the relationship of power to language, by interrogating the role artifacts play in the Ò(re)production of dominance and inequalities in society.Ó 183 As discourses, these constructions constitute selective Òrepresentations, ÔsimplificationsÕ, and ÔcondensationsÕ, of highly complex economic, political, social and cultural realities, which include certain aspects of these realities and exclude others.Ó 184 Critical Discourse Analysis is by its very nature political. This is be cause language, as a reflection of the collective memories of the cultural communities with in which discourses circulate, is political. 185 Krippendorff (2004) writes that this approach addresses contemporary processes of social change by examining the semiot ic and linguistic aspects of the texts, which aid in the construction and sustenance of subnational, national and supra national identities. 186 We can distinguish three forms of critique relevant to CDA: ideological, rhetorical, and strategic. 187 Whereas ideol ogical critique focuses on the effects of semiosis on social relations of power, and rhetorical critique examines the role of persuasion in individual artifacts; strategic critique focuse s on how semiosis figures into the strategies pursued by groups of so cial agents to change societies in particular directions. 188 This analysis focuses on the rhetorical critique, examining how the Chinese state and state -owned enterprises wield brand -China as an instrument of social power in Africa. 182 Fairclough 2001; 1995; Kress And Van Leeuwen 1996; Van Dijk Ed., 1997 183 Krippendorff 2009, 65 184 Fairclough 2013, 10 185 ibid 186 Krippendorff 2005, 54 ; Fairclough 1989, 2001 187 Fairclough 2009 188 Krippendorff 2005, 54 ; Fairclough 1989, 2001 *+!!Discourse analysis contr ibutes to a conceptual framework for discussing a nationÕs brand and how it is constructed semiotically as part of a discursive process. 189 Existing studies utilize some form of discourse analysis to glean insight into how participants make sense of their wo rld. 190 The project utilizes discourse analysis of an array of artifacts produced by the PeopleÕs Republic of China for African consumption. The method draws upon content analysis, which has frequently been used in the context of research on nation branding 191 and China -Africa 192 to flesh out themes emerging from text s. The study concerns itself with the contemporary process of social transformation characterized as neoliberal globalization, and how it is discursively constructed and reconstructed through langua ge. 193 In consequence, the project utilizes critical discourse analysis to analyze the use of artifacts of the Afro -Chinese relationship in the production and reproduction of dominance and inequality in society as a construction of reality. 194 Research Method s After determining that critical discourse analysis was an appropriate methodological approach for this project, the researcher worked to define a population of communication. A population of communication, Krippendorf (2004) asserts, may be drawn from bo oks, magazines, pamphlets, newspapers, transcripts of meetings or 189 Semiotics focuses attention on textual signs and how readers might interpret those signs. Semioticians believe that reality is a socially constructed system of signs, its meaning contextual and subject to human interpretation. Deconstructing and contesting these signs can reveal whos e realities are privileged and whose are Ôrepressed or suppressed in official discourseÕ. 189 In this respect the study of signs, therefore, can be equated to the study of the construction and maintenance of reality. 190 Glasgow University Media Group 1980; L eiss et al. 1990; McQuarrie & Mick 1992 191 Kaneva 2011 192 Barr 2012; Manzenreiter 2010 193 Fairclough 2005 194 Krippendorff 2009, 65 *,!!proceedings, government documents, memoranda, diplomatic communiqu”s or messages, e -mail, letters or diaries, posters, cartoons, political advertising, speeches, films, CDs, audio tape, vide o tape, DVD recordings, photographs or web pages. 195 Within the current project, the population of communication drew from speeches, magazine covers, newspaper editorials, and advertisements developed by the Chinese State , or State Owned or supported firms o r entities , for African consumption. During African liberation movements, textual and visual media became the principal formats for promoting official discourse on Africa -China to both popular and elite audiences. 196 Today, the discursive frameworks i ntroduc ed in speeches, news editorials, magazines, and advertisements during that period continue to promote ChinaÕs contemporary view of the relationship and spread its message for consumption across Africa. Textual Artifacts Chinafrica (magazine) : ChinAfrica magazine, first launched in 1988, is an English and French languag e magazine designed to Òfurther promote mutual understanding of China and African countries.Ó 197 The magazine targets an African audience in addition to Òhigh -end international readersÓ and is designed to present Òa real China to African readers.Ó 198 Based in Johannesburg, South Africa, the magazine was relaunched in 2012 and is distributed monthly. This study focuse s its analysis on the magazineÕs covers only, which are most likely to be observed in a check -out line or through casual encounters. Malkin, Wornian, and Chrisler (1999) expressed that it is Òthe cover that initially attra cts the reader to the magazineÉt itles, catch phrases, and pictures 195 Manheim, Rich, Wilnat, and Brains, 2007, 181 196 Fennel 2013 197 http://www.chinafrica.cn 198 ibid *-!!displayed on magazine covers are usually all that the reader has time to look at in a store.Ó 199 Clucas, McHugh, and Caro (2008) determined magazine covers were appropriate artifacts to include within their study because they adequately reflect the feature articles within. Held (2005) described these cover s as Ò omnipresent contact textsÓ which, though complex, represent Òa form of advertisement whose visual -verbal rhetoricsÓ facilitate consumer interest and enjoyment. This study focuses on covers of ChinAfrica issues distributed from 2010 through December 2 017 (89 images). Advertisements : The project also utilized images from billboards, print, and online advertisements produced between 2000 -2017. The images were either captured personally by the researcher within the sites of interest or locate through o nline sources. Chinese National Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Consular Websites within Anglophone African Nations and Official Ministry Websites of Anglophone African Nations (websites) ; Official Ministry of Foreign Affairs websites of Anglophone Africa n nations ; news editorials housed within these sites :200 Visits by senior Chinese leaders are another way that China cements its relationships with African states. Since 2004, President Hu Jintao has made three trips to the African continent, visiting 14 cou ntries. Premier Wen Jiabao has visited eight African countries since 2003; and former foreign 199 Malkin, Wornian, and Chrisler Wo men and Weight: Gendered Messages on Magazine Covers (1999) 649 200 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PeopleÕs Republic of China - http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/ ; and Chinese Embassy in Botswana ( http://bw.china -embassy.org/eng/ ); Chinese Embassy in Gambia ( http://gm.china -embassy.org ); Chinese Embassy in Ghana ( http:// gh.china -embassy.org ); Chinese Embassy in Kenya ( http://ke.china -embassy.org ); Chinese Embassy in Lesotho ( http://ls.china -embassy.org ); Chinese Embassy in Liberia (http://lr.china -embassy.org ); Chinese Embassy in Malawi ( http://mw.china -embassy.org ); Chinese Embassy in Namibia (http: //na.chineseembassy.org ); Chinese Embassy in Nigeria ( http://ng.chineseembassy.org ); Chinese Embassy in South Africa ( http://www.chinese -embassy.or g.za ); Chinese Embassy in Tanzania (http://tz.china -embassy.org ); Chinese Embassy in Uganda ( http://ug.china -embassy.org/eng/ ); Chinese Embassy in Zambia ( http://zm.chineseembassy.org ); Chinese Embassy in Zimbabwe (http://www.chinaembassy.org.zw ) +.!!minister Li Zhaozhing, visited 13 countries in 2006 and 2007. Official visits by high ranking Chinese officials are not limited only to countries with large econo mies or those with significant natural resourc es, but also often include small nations Òregularly overlooked by US leaders Ó.201 These visits frequently correspond with speeches and editorials delivered by state officials and play an important role in Òshapin g perceptions and partnerships.Ó 202 The Chinese State maintains diplomatic relations with 49 African nations, of which 14 are Anglophone nations. 203 Speeches and editorials developed for Anglophone nations were selected for consistency with the populat ions in cluded in the survey. U sing English, the researcherÕs native language, also meant that the artifacts could be analyzed in the language of delivery, rather than translated into English, avoiding potential ÔdistortionsÕ of the artifacts. 204 For inclusion in th e study, speeches had to be delivered by high -ranking representatives of the Chinese State (President, Premier, Ambassador) or African nation (President, Ambassador, Minister, King), with Afro -Chinese relations being the principle topic as indicated by the title. Neuendorff (2001) writes that Textual Analysis is an appropriate method for analyzing speeches. 205 In fact, the practice of using the technique to measure word usage and emergent themes 201 Jennifer G. Cooke, ÒChinaÕs Soft Power in AfricaÓ Found in Chinese Soft Po wer and Its Implications for the United States: Competition and Cooperation in the Developming World. A Report of the CSIS Smart Power Initiative. Carola McGiffert, ed. 2009 202 Cooke 2009 203 These include Botswana, the Gambia, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Malawi, Namibia, Nigeria, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. 204 Colby 1966 205 Neuendorff 2001, 1 +%!!within political speeches has been used since the 19 th century. 206 The total corpus of texts available for inclusion in the study was 1,037 artifacts. Sampling Whereas quantitative research works best with random probability, there are no specific rules for qualitative sampling procedures. Patton (2002) describes the di fferent approaches to sampling within quantitative and qualitative research as a Ôtrade -off between breadth and depth.Õ 207 The practice should be motivated by the desire to provide detailed answers to a conceptual question rather than concerns about how repr esentative or generalizable the data are. 208 Since the object of qualitative research is not generalizability but transferability, sampling does not need to ensure that all objects being analyzed have an equal or predictable probability of being included in the sample. Instead, sampling should be theoretical and purposive. 209 Sandelowski (1994) balks at the idea that numbers are unimportant in qualitative research. She explains that a problem arises when Òsample sizes may be too small to support claims of havi ng achieved either informational redundancy or theoretical saturation, or too large to permit the deep, case -oriented analysis that is the raison -dÕetre of qualitative inquiry.Ó 210 The selection of sample size depends, instead, on researcher considerations a bout the quality of information collected. 211 McNamara (2005) weighs that qualitative sampling must consider the population of 206 Elo, S. and Kyng−s, H. 2008; Stewart 1986; Zullow and Seligman 1990; Hart 1997; Hogenraad and McKenzie 1999 207 Patton 2002, 228 208 Miles and Huberman 1994, 29 209 Transferability refers to a judgment about whether findings from one context are applicable to another 210 Sandelowski 1995, 179 211 Sayre, 2001; Patton, 2002; Sandelowski 1995 +&!!communication, the selection of issues or dates, and content from within those media. 212 This project includes speeches, newspaper e ditorials, advertisements and magazine covers focused on Africa -China. This aspect of the project utilized purposeful sampling. 213 Maximum variation sampling, also known as heterogeneous sampling, is a purposive sampling technique used to capture a wide ran ge of perspectives relating to the phenomena being observed. 214 The conceptual basis for the procedure is that by using different perspectives of a phenomenon, the aggregate should mirror the populationÕs whole. To analyze the artifacts indicative of brand -China , the researcher constructed a matrix of the 14 Anglophone African nations with whom China maintains a diplomatic relationship, listing the artifacts by date within the matrix. To ensure an equal likelihood of selection, the researcher then randomly s elected every fourth artifact for inclusion in the analysis. 215 The process rendered 260 textual artifacts for analysis. The researcher followed a similar process for determining which issues of ChinAfrica and advertisements to include in the analysis, which yielded an additional 77 artifacts for inclusion, increasing the total corpus of artifacts examined during criti cal discourse analysis to 337 . The researcher next worked to define a unit of analysis by narrowing the focus of the study. A unit of analysis is the element of the population the researcher is going to 212 McNamara 2005, 23 213 Patton 1990; Sandelowski 1995 214 ibid 215 No artifacts were available concerning Gambia -China, which resumed diplomatic relations with China after a 19 year separation in 2016. +'!!study. Coding units may be words, phrases, sentences, images, paragraphs or whole documents. 216 The researcher use d both sentence level and paragraph level unit analysis of the artifacts to determin e the frequency of word usage, which allowed them to situate the individual concepts within their broader meanings. Data Analysis Once determinations were made regarding which textual sources to use, the next and most important step was to begin the proce ss of interpreting and identifying meanings or themes by developing a coding scheme. 217 Qualitatively, this involved identifying patterns and common sequences within the corpus of artifacts. These patterns may involve the number of times a word appears in a document or focus on how combinations of words or sentences are used to convey an idea. 218 The researcher adopted a dissensus constructivist approach to look for emerging patterns and meanings in how the Chinese State constructs an image of self, Africa, an d Africa -China by searching for words, phrases, semantic units, and themes which were then sorted into meaning units (such as brotherhood, friendship, partnership, altruism, etc.). 219 Similar studies adopting the approach focused on contemporary and emergent practices through the lens of the socio -historical conditions that create them, including power relations, colonialism and its legacies, the commodification of culture, and the geopolitics of space and place within globalization, with a distinctive featur e being the search to understand the relationships of cultural production, consumption, belief and 216 Krippendorff 2009 217 van Manen 1990; Patton 2002 218 Patton 2002 219 Ranciere 2011; Bernard, 2006; Strauss, 1987 +(!!meaning, to social processes and institutions. 220 The images and messages were analyzed within the context of the social processes that created them. First C ycle Coding : SaldanaÕs (2009) recommendations for qualitative research guided the researcherÕs decision regarding coding and categorization. The method was divided into first and second cycle coding. First cycle coding required artifacts be further divided into thematic subcategories and loosely hand coded using the codebook developed from the review of literature on Africa -China. Additional thematic insights derived from this coding cycle were then transferred to the codebook (appendix). Second Cycle Cod ing : During the second coding cycle, the researcher reorganized and reanalyzed the pre -coded artifacts with a goal of developing Òa sense of categorical, thematic, conceptual, and/or theoretical organization from (the) First Cycle codesÓ. 221 The researcher u tilized NVIVO 11.4 and SPSS 24 statistical software packages as both organizational and analytical tools to ascertain the semiotic meaning of the artifacts under study. Both software packages were applied because they were capable of working complementaril y and possessed the ability to transfer data in both directions, Òenabling single data sets to include both qualitative and quantitative itemsÓ. 222 Notwithstanding the ability to utilize the software interchangeably as an Òecumenical blend of epistemologies, Ó223 quantitative data analysis was limited only to the results of magnitude coding, which supported statistical tests that identify the presence or absence 220 Lister and Wells 2001, 62 221 Saldana, 2009,149 222 Andrew, Salamonson, and Halcomb, 2008 223 Miles and Huberman 1984 +)!!of a particular theme or category within each artifact. This was done to reduce potential challenges to content and external validity. 224 The first step at this stage was to create parent nodes in NVIVO 11.4 for each of the themes in the codebook. These included ÔPartnershipÕ, ÔSamenessÕ, ÔFriendshipÕ, ÔDevelopmentÕ, ÔCultureÕ, ÔBenevolenceÕ, ÔSolidarityÕ, ÔTrustÕ, ÔSovereigntyÕ, ÔHistoryÕ, ÔFuture ProspectsÕ, ÔCenterÕ, and ÔImperialism (or Western aggression).Õ Next, divisions w ithin these categories were listed and coded under the parent nodes as child nodes in the NVIVO project file. When reviewing the t exts for analysis the researcher examined each artifact line -by-line to determine what each sentence was about and how they fit into the larger paragraph and document as a whole. 225 A closer look at the artifacts reveals insights into the researcherÕs analy tical process. The March 2014 cover of ChinAfrica magazine, as an example, speaks to a number of themes operating within ChinaÕs nation brand strategy in Africa: ÒCultureÓ, ÒSamenessÓ, ÒSecurityÓ, ÒCenterÓ, and ÒDevelopmentÓ. The artifactÕs header features the magazineÕs title, Ò ChinAfrica Ó, in both English and Mandarin, set against a red background. Speaking to the power of language and naming, the magazineÕs title, ÒChinAfrica Ó, centers China, despite the magazineÕs publication on the African continent. T he web address, Òchinafrica.cnÓ, by utilizing a Chinese domain name, likewise, si tuates the artifact as a solidl y Chinese entity. The decision to feature English and Mandarin in the title, rather than Swahili, Wolof, isiZulu, or any other African lingua fr anca perpetuates cultural dominance or imperialism and the exclusion of 224 According to Saldana (2009), Magnitude Coding Òconsists of and adds a supplemental alphanumeric or symbolic code or subcode to an existing coded datum o r category to indicate its intensity, frequency, direction, presence, or evaluative content.Ó 225 (Ryan & Bernard 2003, 91) +*!!African people from the rights of membership within their own spaces. This aspect of the header, in featuring Mandarin as the only language other t han English, also privileges Chinese culture s as equal to the English -speaking west, while demoting nee silencing Africa. Finally, the use of the color red, symbolic of good fortune, happiness, celebration, and joy, holds particular significance within Chinese culture s and is indicative of th e magazineÕs function within the Afro -Chinese relationship by focusing on and privileging China . Another aspect of the artifactÕs header reveals themes of ÒcultureÓ, through a focus on both the Chinese film industry and Òthe year of the horseÕ; as well as ÒsecurityÓ, in the feature on the global crackdown on wildlife crime, demonstrating the PRCÕs strength and its commitment to law and order. Finally, the m agazineÕs feature image highlighting food security, simultaneously reinforces and corrodes brand -Chin aÕs resonance on the continent . The image, features a pair of chopsticks and bowl of rice beneath the words, ÒEnough to Eat: Safeguarding food security a top priority in China and AfricaÓ. The implied message is one of a shared need for food security, and that African states and China are at similar development al and experiential stages . The image also centers China and Chinese needs through the use of chopsticks, a uniquely Asian utensil, as well as the decision to feature rice, the most popular grain in A sia and one of the principle and most costly food imports to Africa. Post -Codi ng, Pre -Writing, Writing and Re writing : Saldana (2 009) describes the post -coding stage as one where, Òif all has gone well, you should now have several major categories, themes, or concepts.Ó The researcher developed several organizational strategies in preparation for disclosing findings of the discourse analysis. ++!!In this stage t hey paid particular attention to quotes and insights from the artifacts and other sources deemed most relevant to answering research question one. Survey Research The second method of inquiry ut ilized within the study involved multination survey research. 226 Groves et al (2004) describe surveys as systematic methods Òfor gathering information from (a sampl e of) entities for the purposes of constructing quantitative descriptors of the attributes of the larger population of which the entities are members.Ó 227 Stated differently , surveys are utilized to collect large -scale data that will enable the researcher to make statistical inferences about the social, political, and/or economic behavior of the population under observation. The data may be used to gain insights into individual and group preferences (for one political party versus another), opinions (issues t hat mat tered the most when deciding who to vote for in the last president ial election ), or behavior (how frequently one engages in politically motivated discussions on social media). Kraemer (1991) notes that there are three distinguishing characteristics of survey research. 228 First, survey research is used to quantitatively define characteristics of a population. Second, the data are derived from human respondents and therefore subjective in nature. Finally, the data are derived from a sample drawn from a given population, which allows the findings to later be generaliz ed back to that population. The target population can range from the general population of a given country to 226 Pinsonneault and Kraemer (1993) defined a survey as a Òmeans for gathering information about the characteristics, actions, or opin ions of a large group of peopleÓ (77). 227 Groves 2011, 2 228 Kraemer 1991, xiii +,!!specific groups of people within that country or, as this project indicates, popu lations across multiple countries who share certain characteristics of interest. The current project utilizes survey research to glean insight into popular opinions, understandings, and exposure to Afro -China relationship and brand -China in the Gambia, K enya, and South Africa. It employs cross -national survey research base d on AkerÕs (1997) Nation Brand Personality Construct 229 and FishbeinÕs Multiattribute Theory Model. 230 Existing studies of nation branding and national imaginary construction found within t he annals of the International Journal of Communication, Cultural Studies, Political Communication, Geopolitics, Journal of Politics, and Place Branding , and Communication, Culture, and Critique; commonly utilize survey research as a methodological approac h. In an analysis of studies focused on political communication, Graber (2004) found that surveys represented the most commonly used research methodology. The study determined that nearly half (48%) of the studies published utilized survey research as the primary data collection method; whereas, textual analysis accounted for one -fifth of studies. 231 GraberÕs findings are consistent with nation branding and national imaginary research, which frequently employ survey design to measure perceptions of national identity. This includes Jones and AshmoreÕs study (1973), which identified eight distinct country groups that could be positioned on four dimensions: Òmodern -backward Ó and Òcooperative -competitive Ó; AnholtÕs Nation Brands Index (2007), 229 Aker 1997; dÕAstous, A. and Boujbel, L. 2007; dÕAstous, A. and Li, D. 2009; Kim, Shim, and Dinnie 2013; Rojas -Mendez and Papadopoulas 2011 230The Fishbein model measures attitude s toward the brand, using three components of attitude Ñsalient beliefs, object -attribute linkages, and evaluation. Each component is weighted and included in the determination of a measurable score representing a consumerÕs attitude. 231 Doris Graber, ÒMetho dological Developments in Political Communication ResearchÓ in Lynda Lee Kaid Handbook of Political Communication Research Routledge Communication Series 2004 +-!!which measures natio n brands in terms of people, products, government, and culture; and Rojas -Mendez, Papadopoulos, and Murphy (2013), who explored the extent to which personality traits can be used to identify, differentiate, and position a nation . Several scholars have used adapted versions of existing instruments to better understand the relationship between constructions of the nation and culture and identity. DÕAstous and Li (2009) utilized an adapted version of a country personality scale developed for western countries to position 11 countries on a six -nation brand personality dimension, within a Ò Chin ese social contextÓ .232 Keillor and Hult (1999) limited their study to the cultural dimensions of nation branding, using a scale comprised of Òbelief structure,Ó or the role of religion or supranatural beliefs in facilitating cultural participation and solidarity, Òcultural homogeneity,Ó referring to the uniqueness of a given societyÕs sense of national identity, Ònational heritageÓ, which refers to the importance of history t o a nationÕs people, and Òconsumer ethnocentricismÓ, which focuses on respondent beliefs about purchasing foreign goods. 233 Winit et al (2004) extended KeillorÕs National Identity Scale to a Thai cultural context, introducing two new dimensions Ônativist ide asÕ and emotional attachment to the nation. Devos and Banaji (2005) attempted to measure American identity using a four dimensional scale, including the endorsement of civic values, emotional attachment to the nation, nativist ideas, and religious beliefs. Mohler and Johnson (2010) cite Scheuch (1989) in their criticism that researchers stop Ôre -inventing the wheelÕ when it comes to the methodological processes of comparative survey 232 dÕAstous, A. and Li, D. 2009 233 Keillor and Hult 1999, 68, ,.!!research and learn from previous research and knowledge gained. 234 This study builds upon earlier research in its choice of approach to survey research, adapting existing models for application to an African social context. Research Methods The s econd method of inquiry involved survey research designed to glean insight into popula r opinions and understandings of, and attitudes toward brand -China in the Gambia, Kenya, and South Africa. The primary objective wa s to present a comprehensive framework for the systematic study of nation branding from an African point of view. This was ac hieved by examining African attitudes toward the nation brands of eight different countries, with an emphasis on China, utilizing an empirically derived methodology based on the nation brand personality construct and FishbeinÕs Multiattribute Theory Model. 235 This aspect of the project answers research questions two and three: How do African people in diverse environments receive, perceive, and interpret brand -China ? How does exposure to nation branding affect attitudes toward brand -China ? Does the use of c ultural and experiential similarities between Africa -China within brand -China help to facilitate more positive attitudes toward the Chinese? Variable Operationalization A construct is a conceptual term that describes a phenomenon of theoretical interest, whereas its measure is an observed score. 236 Based on the Fishbein Multiattribute Theory Model, the constructs of interest in this research study are 234 Mohler and Johnson 2010, 25 235 Aker 1997; dÕAstous, A. and Boujbel, L. 2007; Kim, Shim, and Dinnie 2013; Rojas -Mendez and Papadopoulas 2011 236 Kerlinger 1999 ,%!!ÔAttitudeÕ toward Brand -China, ÔBeliefsÕ, ÔImportanceÕ, and ÔExposureÕ . In this design ÒAttitudeÕ functions as the dependent variable, while ÔBeliefsÕ, ÔImportanceÕ, and ÔExposureÕ each function as independent variables. ¥!Attitude is operationalized as the score assigned to each respondent based upon their individual response to the brand -China Attitude Measure. ¥!Exposure is operationalized as each respondent's response to measures of country -specific exposure to the types of artifacts indicative of brand -China . ¥!Belief is operationalized as each respondentÕs characterization of China using the Country Perception I nventory. ¥!Importance is operationalized as each respondentÕs scale response to an assessment of the most significant values and beliefs within their community as expressed on the Cultural Orientation Inventory. The hypothesized relationships between thes e constructs and their measurements are explained as follows. H1: Attitudes toward brand -China can be characterized as some function of the relationship between each respondentÕs ÔexposureÕ, ÔbeliefsÕ, and ÔimportanceÕ scores. H2: Attit udes toward brand -China are more positive when cultural importance is closely aligned with participant perceptions of the brand. Survey Design Given that the goal of this study is to establish a context for understanding African perspectives of foreign nation brand image, in order to fashion a generalizable model, the researcher utilized adapted versions of existing Nation Brand Personality scales. Existing scales established a foundation for describing foreign nations, using adjectives ,&!!along discrete dimensions and questions designed to gauge strength of beliefs. The first step in the scale adaptation procedure involved conducting an extensive review of existing scales. The exercise identified several scales designed to measure nation brand image, including d'Astous, and Bouj belÕs (2007), which identified six country personality dimensions (Table 1): agreeableness, wickedness, snobbism, assiduousness, conformity, and unobtrusiveness; Keillor and HultÕs (1999) which identifies four major components of national identity Ð cultur al homogeneity, belief structure, national heritage and ethnocentrism; and Lilli and DiehlÕs (1999) which proposed five subscales of national identity Ð membership; private, public, identity, and comparison. TABLE 1: DÕASTOUS AND BOUJBEL COUNTRY PERSONALITY SCALE Pre test Earlier scales shared numerous points of commonality, including the use of adjective -based personality constructs centered on AkerÕs (1997) study of brand personality. The researcher compiled the list of national personality traits emerging from earlier studies and conducted a pretest of the resultant scales with 22 African undergraduate and graduate students studying in the United States. Participants were asked to identify items that could be used to describe a nationÕs image or identity. To reduce any bias effect, participants were only asked to free elicit for three countries, ,'!!with China included in each version. The exercise yielded 130 adjectives from the existing list, plus 62 additional adjectives. Those ad jectives receiving fewer than three total mentions or synonymous with other words on the list were removed. The nascent list was compared against themes emerging from a meta - analysis of 172 artifacts (books, articles) analyzing Afro -Chinese relations. The final list was reduced to thirty -eight adjectives selected for inclusion in the present study. 237 Structure of the Q uestionnaire The main study was comprised of four sections. The first section captured information on participant exposure to and awareness of the stimuli nations by asking participants to answer questions regarding people, places, and things representative of each of the foreign nations under analysis. Section two measured attitudes, asking participants to rate three nations using the 38 per sonality adjectives emerging from pretesting, with the help of a five -point bipolar scale. Section three asked respondents to indicate their level of agreement with fifteen statements regarding their beliefs about each country. Using items adapted from dÕA stous and Boujbel (2007), the section measured responses to questions concerning each countryÕs people, Òthis countryÕs people are kind,Ó economy, Òif I were a businessman, I would invest in this country,Ó policies, Òthis country has good policies and lead ers,Ó and culture, Òtradition is important to this country.Ó Each stimulus country had to be rated along a five -point 237 The adjectives utilized for this analysis included Adventurous, Aggressive, Brotherly, Business -Oriented, Colonizing, Communalistic, Competitive, Consumerist, Corrupt, Cruel, Culturally -oriented, Developing, Diplomatic, Family -Oriented, Friendly, Hard Working, Helpful, Humane, Imperialistic, Individualistic, Industrialized, Innovative, Loyal, Nationalistic, Nice, Opportunistic, Partner, Peaceful, Powerful, Racist, Reliab le, Respectful, Spiritual, Technology -Oriented, Tied -to-the -rules, Traditional, Trustworthy, and Welcoming. ,(!!scale Òvery untrue of what I believeÓ to Òvery true of what I believeÓ. The fourth section measured cultural values and orientation. Final ly, section five collected demographic data. Stimuli Countries In an effort to reduce any bias effect, participants were asked questions regarding several stimulus countries. The choice of countries was determined based upon criteria that each was either an Anglophone African nation, one with significant economic interest on the continent, and/or a BRICS nation. The list of stimulus countries selected for inclusion in the study is as follows: Brazil, China, the Gambia, India, Kenya, South Africa, United Ki ngdom, and the United States. The eight countries represent five continents, each of which participants of the pre -test expressed some familiarity with. The list differs from dÕAstous and Li (2009) Kim, Shim, and Dinnie (2013) and Rojas -Mendez, Papadopoula s, and Murphy (2013) in the addition of the Gambia, Kenya and India. Each version of the instrument contained questions regarding three countries. Subjects were not asked to complete surveys regarding their country of origin. Five different groups of coun tries were thus formed, resulting in five different versions of the questionnaire, each including China coupled with: ¥!Brazil and the United Kingdom; ¥!Gambia and the United States; ¥!India and the United States; ¥!Kenya and the United Kingdom; ¥!South Africa a nd the United States. ,)!!Population and Sampling The population for the study was comprised of subjects from three African nations Ñ the Gambia, Kenya, and South Africa. The objective was to research the relationship between variables, rather than generalize results to the population at large, therefore, the matched samples technique was considered appropriate. 238 With this approach representative samples are not important, the goal is to identify well -defined and homogeneous samples which, tho ugh from differen t nations still possess similar demographic attributes. 239 Because college students have a comparatively high education level and generally possess strong interest in international relations, undergraduate and graduate students constituted the survey sample. 240 Data were gathered from university student populations within the three site countries between June 2016-June 2017. Using a convenience sampling method, the researcher collected data at the University of the Gambia (G), Kenyatta University (K), the Unite d States International University (K), Pwani University (K), the University of Witwatersrand (S), and the University of Johannesburg (S). The total population of university students in Kenya is 443,000, 241 in South Africa 983,698, 242 and the Gambia is 3,400. 243 Based on the student populations in each nation, the minimum sample size necessary to yield results representative of, though not necessarily generalizable to, the total population of university students within the three countries was 1065 (Kenya), 1066 (S outh Africa), 238 Hofstede 1991; Verhage, Yavas, and Green 1991 239 Hofstede 1991 240 dÕAstous and Boujbel 2007 241 Kenya National Bureau of Statistics 2014 242 South Afr ican Council of Higher Education 2016 243 Figure attained from Bobo Banteh, Registrar, University of the Gambia) ,*!!and 511 (the Gambia). 244 Participants represented current students within each space -- both domestic and foreign. Blank questionnaires were hand delivered to each classroom within the selected universities and completed questionnaires were col lected upon completion. A total of 4213 completed and useable questionnaires were returned from the 5062 that were originally distributed, an 83% response rate. Data Analysis The data were entered into SPSS 25, where they were screened and cleaned for missing data points, erroneous outliers, and incomplete or incorrect entries. The data were first checked to ensure that each score was within the range of possible scores. Once discovered, errors in the data file were corrected. After cleaning the data file, the researcher obtained descriptive statistics on the categorical and continuous variables used in the analysis to ensure that the data did not violate any of the assumptions made by individual tests. The researcher ran frequency distributions and descrip tive statistical tests to obtain summaries. For categorical variables frequency counts were calculated. Group comparisons were also made using PearsonÕs chi -square ( " 2) tests. For continuous variables, means, medians, and standard deviations were processed , and group comparisons were made using t -tests. In addition, minimum, maximum, and range scores were determined for both types of variables. These tests revealed the characteristics of the data (age, ethnicity, religion, country) and yielded insight into how participant experiences and opinions differ across and within the countries under study. Descriptive data regarding how participants receive information generally, information about foreign countries, and information regarding China specifically, was 244 Using a 95 -percent confidence level and a three percent margin of error in Kenya and South Africa, and four percent margin of error in the Gam bia. ,+!!examined for differences across country, age groups, religious affiliation, and gender. Similar tests were conducted to examine variations in the source, degree of frequency, and tone of information received. The data were next manipulated into a format th at would enable the researcher to conduct analyses and test the hypotheses. Items worded negatively to prevent response bias, such as Ôthis country is lazy,Õ were reversed, before examining the data to determine whether a Principal Components Analysis (CPA ) of the ÔBeliefÕ scale items was appropriate. Both the projectÕs sample size and the strength of the relationship among the variables confirmed that the data were sufficien tly appropriate to conduct a Principal C omponent s A nalysis (CPA) , as the sample for this study far exceeds the comfortable sampling minimum, Ôratio of participants to itemsÕ and correlations suggested by Tabachnick and Fidell (2013). 245 TABLE 2: PERCEPTIONS OF BRAND -CHINA 245 Tabachnick and Fidell 2013, 613, suggest having at least 300 cases for factor analysis. ,,!!Consumer perceptions were measured using a Multi -item measure o f perceptions of brand -China based on twenty -one statements found in the nation branding literature (table 2 ). Following the multi -step approach proposed by Rojas -Mendez, Papadopoulos, and Murphy (2013), the Multi -item measure of perceptions of brand -China was subjected to a Principal Components Analysis to determine dimensionality. The technique attempts to pr oduce a smaller number of combinations of the original variables in a way that captures most of the variability in the pattern of correlations. 246 Prio r to performing PCA, the suitability of the data for analysis was assessed. Inspection of the correlation matrix revealed the presence of many coefficients of .4 and above. The Kaiser -Meyer -Olkin value was .79, exceeding the recommended value of .6 and Bar tlettÕs Test of Sphericity reached statistical significance, supporting the factorability of the correlation matrix. 247 Components were extracted to discover the smallest number of Òconceptually coherentÓ variables that could be used to represent a given set of relationships between and amongst the variables. 248 There are multiple approaches that can be adopted to determine this relationship, including maximum likelihood factoring; alpha factoring; and generalized least squares; but principal components analysi s was selected because of its use in developing predictive models. 249 To aid in the interpretation of the components, Varimax rotation was performed. Varimax orthogonal rotation tries to maximize variance of the squared loadings in each 246 Pallant, Julie ÒSPSS Survival Manual.Ó 2016 iBooks. 247 Kaiser 1970, 1974; Bartlett 1954 248 Principal Components Analysis Dunteman; Julie Pallant SPSS Survival Ma nual 2016 260 107 ÒA BeginnerÕs Guide to Factor Analysis: Focusing on Exploratory Factor AnalysisÓ An Gie Yong and Sean Pearce Tutorials in Quantitative Methods for Psychology 2013, Vol. 9(2), p. 79 -94. ,-!!factor. 250 The rotate d solution revealed the presence of a simple structure, with each component showing a number of strong loadings and all variables loading substantially on only one component. 251 Using KaiserÕs criterion, only factors with an eigenvalue of 1.0 or more were re tained for additional review. 252 The eigenvalue indicates the amount of total variance explained by a given factor. 253 The twenty -one items were reduced to four components with eigenvalues greater than 1.0. The four -component solution explained a total of 64.9 % of the variance, with Component 1 contributing 26.4%, Component 2 contributing 21.0%, Component 3 contributing 8.9%, and Component 4 contributing 8.6%. CatellÕs scree test was also examined to determine when the curve changed direction and began moving h orizontally, as everything above that point is thought to contribute significantly to the total variance described by the analysis. 254 Reliabilities were then calculated for each scale. The scale reliability for each component was tested for internal consis tency by assessing the item -to-total correlation for each separate item and CronbachÕs alpha for the consistency of the entire scale. All scale reliabilities, as measured by CronbachÕs alpha, were between 0.68 and 0.91, with Item -to-total correlations rang ed between .433 to .828, which meets or exceeds the thresholds established within earlier studies. 255 Individual participant scores for the China Cogni tive Associations Scale (CCAS), comprised of each respondentsÕ individual scale score, were calculated fr om the 250 Pallant, Julie ÒSPSS Survival Manual.Ó iBooks 2016 251 Pallant, Julie ÒSPSS Survival Manual.Ó iBooks 2016 252 Dunteman, ÒPrincipal Components AnalysisÓ 253 Pallant, Julie ÒSPSS Survival Manual.Ó iBooks 2016, 260 254 Catell 1966 255 In several studies, total item correlation serves as a criterion for initial assessm ent and purification. Various cut -off points are adopted: 0.30 by Cristobal et al. (2007), 0.40 by Loiacono et al. (2002), 0.50 by Francis and White (2002) and Kim and Stoel (2004). -.!!resultant findings. Building on the CCAS, a one -way between -groups analysis of variance (ANOVA) was conducted to determine site country positions on the scale. Participant responses were divided into three groups according to the country in which the instrument was completed (Group 1: the Gambia, Group 2: Kenya, Group 3: South Africa). The ANOVA procedure used for the China Cognitive Associations Scale (CCAS) was replicated to examine how perceptions of a countryÕs nation brand are moderated by demog raphic and social indicators. Any relationships between the emergent CCAS components and various descriptive indicators (age, religion, gender, education) were examined to look for clear differences between groups using t -tests and ANOVA. FishbeinÕs Mult iattribute Theory model posits that beliefs are the only mediators of attitude formation and change. 256 Attitudes, as defined by Mitchell and Olson (1983), refer to an ÒindividualÕs internal evaluation of an objectÓ and are considered relatively Òstable an d enduringÓ predictors of consumer behavior. 257 The model proposes that attitudes toward an object are a function of the strength of the salient beliefs regarding that object and the evaluations of those beliefs. 258 The basic multiattribute approach for modeli ng attitudes uses attributes, beliefs, and weights (importance) to determine a measurable score representing consumer attitude. 259 Attitude is then formed through integrating individual evaluations of the salient beliefs about the extent to which the brand i s believed to possess the attribute (R i), weighted by the strength of each belief or 256 MacKenzie, Scott B., Richard J. Lutz, and George E. Belch 1986 257 Andrew A. Mitchell , Jerry C. Olson 1983 258 van der Pligt, Joop, et al 2000 259 van der Pligt, Joop, et al 2000 -%!!level of importance assigned by the individual consumer (b i) (I i) to create an overall evaluation or attitude toward the brand (A). !"#$%&%'(%)"*% Based on FishbeinÕs Model, linear multiple regression analysis was employed to test the relationship between beliefs about China and its relationship to Africa, exposure to information on brand -China, and c ultural imp ortance as predictors of overall attitudes toward the PRC. The following model was used to test the relationship. !#'+,&-.'$%'.%''(%)"'*% A = Attitude toward brand: i = attribute j = brand I = Importance weighting (alignment with cultural orientation) R= rating or belief X= extent of exposure to the attribute The analysis was conducted to test the mediating effects of exposure on the cognitive (cultural) importance Ð attitude linkage with respect to brand -China . Comprised of multiple respondent sresponses and covariates or predictor variables, multivariate linear regression allowed the researcher to fit a single model for respondents. The dependent variable ÔattitudeÕ (A) toward brand -China was regressed on three variables: Ôp erceptionÕ (P), ÔimportanceÕ (I), and ÔexposureÕ (X) according to the traditional Fishbein Multi -attribute Theory model. 260 A reduced number of items 260 Mitchell, Andrew A., and Jerry C. Olson 2000 -&!!were included in the analysis to ensure one -to-one correspondence across all constructs, meaning that only t hose items with comparable variabl es across all three categories [ÔperceptionÕ (P), Ôimpor tanceÕ (I), and ÔexposureÕ (X)] were included in these calculations. In order to determine how attitudes differed with respect to participant response to the three p redictors, the researcher conducted a discriminant function analysis. Discriminant Function Analysis (DA) undertakes the same task as multiple linear regression by predicting an outcome, however, multiple linear regression is limited to cases where the de pendent variable on the Y axis is an interval (rather than categorical) variable, so that the combination of predictors will produce estimated mean population numerical Y values for given values of weighted combinations of X values. 261 The items in the Ôatt itudeÕ construct were subjected to a binning transformation prior to analysis to transform them into categorical variables, using categories of low, medium, and high attitude scores in response to brand - China. 262 Limitations Although the project was ultima tely successful in achieving its aims, several limitations to the research must be disclosed. Limitations of this research project include the study sample of university students in the Gambia, Kenya, and South Africa. Research on the use of college studen ts in social science research notes that the researcher must exercise caution when attempting to generalize findings to nonstudent populations because student responses may not be reflective of the larger population. Peterson (2001) argues that it is impor tant in these instances to replicate any findings 261 Tabchnick and Fidell 2013 262 Pallant 2013 -'!!based on college student subjects before generalizations can be made. 263 Demographic variables derived from the populations sampled may also prove limiting, as participants were recruited from universities in three African nations where university education in an exception. As a result, knowledge of the world, as well as social, economic, and cultural values contained within these populations could potentially differ significantly from those within the general population. Additionally, results must be viewed within the context of other limitations, namely participant recruitment and selection. Participants were recruited using a non -random selection technique, given that students were asked to participate wit hin existing self -contained classrooms, ranging in size from 5 -200. Because the researcher used a convenience sample rather than a random sample, the findings can only be deemed suggestive or indicative of, rather than generalizable to, the general populat ion under study. 264 The survey protocol could be viewed as insufficient as there are factors that may have an impact on participant perception which were not addressed. Despite these limitations, the results yield significant findings for future research an d policy implications. Conclusion Chapter three provided an in -depth overview of the methodological processes the researcher utilized within the study. The chapter provided insight into the theories and procedures guiding the project, outlining the resear cherÕs research philosophy and 263 On the Use of College Students in S ocial Science Research: Insights from a Second -Order Meta -analysis Robert A. Peterson Journal of Consumer Research , Volume 28, Issue 3, 1 December 2001, Pages 450 Ð461 264 (Simon, 2011). -(!!orientation to the project. The chapter continued by rationalizing the current projectÕs use of a mixed methods research approach and the rese arch methods necessitated by that approach within the context of the curren t projec t. The chapter continued with a detailed outline of the projectÕs design, and the data collection and data analysis procedures determined most suitable for addressing the research questions. -)!!Chapter Four Good Partners, Good Friends, Good Brothers ÒÉthough vast oceans keep China and Africa apart, the friendship between our two peoples has a long history, and having been tested by times, is strong and vigorous.Ó Hu Jintao, 2006 Introduction Zheng He was one of the great navigators of the Ming Dynasty (13 68-1644). his exploits rivaled those of Marco Polo, Vasco da Gama, Ferdinand Magellan and Christopher Columbus , as he often traveled the western seas in search of new adventures .265 One such journey transported Zheng to the eastern shoreline of Kenya, bringi ng with him both ÒChinese porcelain and friendship,Ó and upon his departure for China, he was gifted a giraffe by the people of Malindi. 266 According to Chinese lore the long -standing, traditional friendship between African and Chinese people began with Ôgir affe diplomacyÕ. 267 To this end, the PRC frequently frames Africa -China as part of a longue duree fomented pre -European conquest, nurtured by diplomatic relations during the Bandung Conference (1955), strengthened by BeijingÕs solidarity with African decolon ization movements and ultimately, reinforced by contemporary economic, social, and diplomatic interactions between the two regions. This chapter provides a simplified analysis of historical and contemporary relations between the African continent and Chin a. It narrates the history of modern Afro -Chinese relations (1955 -) to explicate how migratory patterns, and diplomatic and 265 Lan 2016 266 Xianfa 2015 267 Okihiro 2014 -*!!cultural orientations between the two regions developed and continue to shape contemporary patterns of engagement. The chapter provi des a historiography of Chinese soft power in Africa from its nascence, as an extension of Confucian philosophical principles, to its use in support of present -day Afro -Chinese relations. This streamlined analysis of interaction between the two regions exp lores the role of the various ecologies and corridors utilized by the Chinese to carve out its niche within Africa. In this manner, it underscores some of the broader themes exhibited in the relationship with regard to nation branding and national imaginar y creation. A conscious decision was made to forego rich historical observations in favor of a more selective, thematic organizational structure. 268 The background information that follows divides the literature into three sections: the historical constructi on of brand -China ; an overview of the PRCÕs relationship with the Gambia, Kenya, and South Africa; and, finally, existing scholarship on African perspectives of Africa -China. Penetrating a Stone Fan (2008) writes that in Ancient China, the idea of soft po wer was advocated for and utilized by rulers in their interactions with foreign entities. Soft power was considered stronger than hard power, with influence considered a crucial tool to attaining world dominance. The Chinese proverbs Ôto use soft and gentl e means to overcome the hard and strongÕ ( yi rou ke gang ) and Ôdrips of water can penetrate a stoneÕ ( di shui chuan shi ) underscore this point. 269 Early Chinese scholars, like Mencius (372 Ð 289 BC), believed that the way to win the support of the oppressed was to 268 George and Bennett 2005 269 Fan 2008 149 -+!!comport oneself as a benevolent ruler. 270 Sun Tse (544 Ð496 BC), similarly, promoted Òwinning a battle without a fight; Ó Confucius (551 Ð479 BC) argued that the ruler should win the allegiance of the people with virtue (soft po wer), not by force (hard power); and Lao Tze, ( -531 BC) wrote that Òthe softest can win the hardest.Ó 271 These teaching are exemplified within Zheng HeÕs travels to Kenya, where he arrived with ÒChinese porcelain and friendshipÓ rather than bibles and gun barrels. 272 Such is the soft touch advocated historically and contemporarily by the Chinese in its interactions with foreign states. Contemporary Chinese image building initiatives have Òbeen associated with such essentially benign activities as the release of news, general shaping o f ideology, or even advertisement Ó, consistent with what Yiwei Wang (2008) terms dui wai xuan chuan or wai xuan . 273 Hongmei Li (2010) also privileges the significance of Chinese nation branding. Li avers that during the transition from communist China to ne oliberal China, the state constructed a new national imaginary through the use of state media to deconstruct the old and construct the new brand through storytelling. 274 Demonstrably the establishment of the Propaganda Department of the Chinese Communist Par ty during the same year as the founding of the Party itself (1921) underscores this point. Contemporary Chinese relations with Africa date back to the Bandung (Bandung) Conference. 275 Twenty -nine nations from Asia and Africa, including representatives 270 Advocated ruling a kingly way ( wang dao ) rather than the tyrant way ( dao ); See Sheng Ding 262 271 Fan 2008 149 272 Xianfa 2015 273 see Wang, Yiwei. "Public diplomacy and the rise of Chinese soft power." The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 616.1 (2008): 257 -273. 274 Li Hongmei, From Chengfen to Shenjia: Branding and Promotional Culture in China in Aronczyk, Melissa, and Devon Powers, eds. Blowing up the brand: Critical perspectives on promotio nal culture . Vol. 21. Peter Lang, 2010. 275 Wright 1956 -,!!from six African nations, convened a conference in Bandung, Indonesia from April 18th Ð24th, 1955, to discuss peace, economic development, and decolonization, and to provide a counterbalance to the axis of power held by the United States and the USSR. 276 Specif ic topics for debate included participant displeasure with the exclusionary practices of Western powers when making decisions affecting Asia; concerns about tension between the PeopleÕs Republic of China and the United States; a desire to increase peaceful cooperation between themselves and China; their opposition to colonialism, especially French influence in North Africa; and IndonesiaÕs desire for resolution to its dispute with the Netherlands over western New Guinea. 277 Contemporary imaginings of the con ference that it marked the first time nations from the (then unnamed) global south came together to rebuke the forces of colonialism and neocolonialism and solidify the ideo logy of a common south identity. It was the first forum of its kind wherein solidar ity and similarities between African and Asian peoples were recognized and revered. 278 Zhou Enlai, the Chinese Premier, was a key figure at the conference. 279 ZhouÕs ÒFive Principles of Peaceful Coexistence in the Promotion of Peace and Development,Ó including mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity; non -aggression; non -interference in the domestic affairs of another state; equality and mutual benefit; and peaceful coexistence; were incorporated into the 276 See Alden and Alves 2008; The African delegations in attendance included Egypt; Ethiopia; Ghana (then known as the Gold Coast); Liberia; Libya; and Sudan. 277 Lumumba -Kasongo, Tukumbi, 2015 278 The global south is a term used within transnational and postcolonial studies to refer to what may also be called the " third world " (i.e., Af rica, Latin America, and the developing countries in Asia), "developing countries ," "less developed countries," and "less developed regions." The term specifically refers to those countries ' "interconnected histories of colonialism , neo -imperialism , and differential economic and social change through which large inequalitie s in living standards, life expectancy, and access to resources are maintained."; Shelton 2005 279 Shelton 2001 --!!conferenceÕs 10 -point declaration and la ter served as the underpinning to BeijingÕs policy of engagement with Africa. 280 Alden and Alves (2008) write, ÒThe Bandung conference represented a unique opportunity for Beijing to meet the new countries of Asia and Africa, court them with its anti -colonia l credentials, present itself as a model of self -reliance (revolutionary struggle) and appeal to Asian -African unityÉChinaÕs aim in Bandung was clearly to create a sense of union based on common past experiences under western colonialism from which to buil d a new international force.Ó 281 Robert Vitalis Õ (2013 ) work represents a growing sch olarly trend, complicating the validity of China -centered narratives of the conferenceÕs objectives and outcomes , ChinaÕ s role, and African participation. Vitalis asserts th at ÒmythsÓ imagining Bandung as a source of time -honored Afro -Chinese solidarity are ahistorical . The many misrepresentations attributed to the conference, according to Vitalis, range from statements that Kwame Nkrumah and Jomo Kenyatta were in attendance (they were not), to accounts that the conferenceÕs participants were Ònon-aligned Ó and dedicated to the cause of Afro -Asian solidarity . In fact, Vitalis contends , many participants were initially unaware of the conferenceÕs mission as laid out by its organ izers . Instead, w hat united them in signing on to its declarations, was a shared aversion to colonialism and Òwhite supremacyÓ and the desire for greater diversity of membership to the United Nations. 280 Wright 1956 281 Chris Alden & Cristina Alves 2008, 47 %..!!Simultaneously privileging and distancing existing n arratives surrounding the conference, Vera Fennel l (2013) also questions the rhetoric of Afro -Chinese solidarity. Fennel l calls attention to the fact that prior to the Bandung, mentions of Africa in the Chinese press were virtually nonexistent, as was inte raction with African people. 282 Notwithstanding, t he Conference increased Chairman Mao ZedongÕs awareness of what he came to perceive as experiential similarities between African and Asian people. 283 Chinese news coverage of the conference post -Bandung analogi zed cultural similarities between the two regions Ñ the shared experience of colonialism, alongside the common plight of peripheralism Ñexposing African people to many in China for the first time. 284 Solidarity (1955 -1976) What little awareness the Chinese po ssessed of Africa and her people pre -Bandung stemmed from colonialist propaganda, yet after the conference, China claimed to be part of the third world alongside Africa. 285 Still, despite increased diplomatic relations between the two regions, ChinaÕs involv ement on the continent was largely moderated through the Soviet Union. According to Alden and Alves (2008), direct involvement between African nations and China was still relatively minor at the time, with the Afro -Asian PeopleÕs Solidarity Organization (1 957) being the primary conduit through which China exerted influence. 286 282 Fennell 2013, 256 283 Monson 2008 284 Fan 2014 285 ibid 286 Chris Alden & Cristina Alves, 47 %.%!!As ideological differences between Beijing and Moscow emerged, prompting the Sino -Soviet split, Mao developed the ÔThree WorldsÕ policy. 287 The policy focused on ridding China of its Òsick man of East AsiaÓ image, replacing it instead with a new world order, with economically and socially marginalized nations from the developing countries of Africa, Asia, and Latin -America at the center and China at the head .288 Solidarity propaganda of th e period (Image s 2-3) reflected MaoÕs strategy, depicting Chinese solidarity with Africa against European colonialism and the neo -imperialist and hegemonic tendencies of the USSR and the West. 289 FIGURE 3: ÒTHE STRUGGLE OF ALL THE PEOPLE IN THE WORLD...Ó 287 Zed ong 1986 288 Zedong 1986 289 Kelley R and Esch B 1999 %.&!! FIGURE 4: ÒCHAIRMAN MAO IS THE GREAT LIBERATORÓ Chinese support for African liberation struggles during the period took i nnumerable forms. Chairman Mao (1964) call ed that ÒPeople of the world, unite and defeat the U.S. aggressors and all their running d ogs! People of the world be courageous, dare to fight, defy difficulties and advance wave upon wave. Then the whole world will belong to the people. Monsters of all kinds shall be destroyedÓ 290 MaoÕs statements were indicative of the rhetorical, financial, and in -kind support offered to many Africa n states as they struggled to attain liberation. The PRC directly backed military movements such as Julius NyerereÕs Tanzania and AngolaÕs UNITA, and made more symbolic gestures like the $400 million, interest -free loan provided between 1970 -1977 for the landmark 1,860 kilometer Tanzania - Zambia (TaZara) 290 Robin DG, and Betsy Esch 1999 11 %.'!!Railway. 291 But the relationship was not one -sided. Of his negotiations for the construction project, Zambian President Kenneth Kaunda famously remarked, ÒQuite hones tly, I do not know whether to be angry or to laugh at this... Four trips to the West... are not sufficient to make me a capitalist... Only one trip to Peking will make me a communist.Ó 292 KuandaÕs remarks demonst rate that Africa and China cultivated a growin g affinity between the two regions, one poised to displace western influence. Vera Fennell (2013) militates against thinking that the PRCÕs policy of supporting African decolonization movements was Òbased in altruism or feelings of good will.Ó 293 Instead, s he argues, Chinese support for African liberation was part of a Òtheoretically -based, historically -rooted Ó international strategy underpinned by the strength of ChinaÕs soft power initiatives. 294 According to Fennell, Afro -Chinese interaction during this phase of history was part of carefully curated, highly politicized image campaign designed to Òdeepen mutual understandingÉin an effort to create an ideologically inspired solidarity of ÔbrotherhoodÕ Ó.295 Two conclusions can be drawn. The first is that China, over the years, has become increasingly adept at curating and nurturing soft power narratives of its relationship to African and its people. The second , more sinister implication, and the one implied within FennellÕs remarks is that the PRCÕs motives for s upporting African liberation struggles and economic development were not as entirely altruistic as solidarity 291 Monson 2009 292 Kuanda 1967 293 Fennell 2013, 253 294 ibid 295 Fennel 255 %.(!!propaganda of the period would lead one to believe and, instead firmly rooted in a long game of Chinese self -interest .296 Domestically, though the Chinese Civil War had ended (1927 -1950), the resolution establishing two Chinas (the PRC, the ROC) meant that its conclusion was still unresolved. 297 The PRC sought to stake its claim for a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council, thus establis hing itself as the one, true China. Displacing Taiwan (ROC), however, required the support of newly independent African States who tended to vote as a bloc. 298 A triumphant Chairman Mao acknowledged the significance of African support in his remark that ÒIt is our African brothers that have carried us to the UN.Ó 299 The new power wielded by China, and African proximity to its source, promised a more powerful voice for Africa on the international stage. Retreat (1976 -1995) The PRCÕs Africa policy was upended fo llowing the death of Mao Zedong (1976). Under the new leadership of Deng Xiaoping, Beijing embarked upon a journey of domestically -driven transformation. 300 DengÕs Four Modernizations shifted ChinaÕs philosophical focus away from political alliances, toward economic priorities and internal capacity building in fields like agriculture, industry, national defense and science and technology. 301 In light of these goals, Beijing began positioning itself for entry into the global economy. 296 Fennell 2013 297 Rotberg 2008 298 Shinn 2012 299 Mao, 1971 300 Osei, et al. 2010; Shinn 2012; Taylor 2009 301 Baum 1996 %.)!!Deng desired to cultivate a n image of China as Òa peaceful, united country and even a model country for peace and unity. Ó302 Bearing these goals in mind, China embarked upon more stable relations with western nations, like the United States and the United Kingdom; joined the World Ban k and the International Monetary Fund (IMF); and applied for entry to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the World Trade Organization (WTO). 303 African economies, newly liberated and economically bereft of capital could in no way compete w ith the allure of mature western markets. DengÕs successors, Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao were, likewise, concerned with the image China portrayed on the world stage . Hu expressed that the PRC should ÒÉmake China become more influential politically, more com petitive economically, (and) in terms of national image , more friendly and morally more inspirational.Ó 304 Modifying public perception of the PRC from ideological Òsick manÓ of Asia to technologically advanced, new goods supplier required focus and finesse. This meant prioritizing economic imperatives over political ones, and deprioritizing African allegiances, which had little to offer economically at this point. 305 Reengagement (1995 -Present) Several factors precipitated ChinaÕs renewed interest in Africa at the start of the 1990s. Politically, BeijingÕs response to the Tiananmen Square protests of 1989 drew condemnation from the West, whilst African leaders were more tempered in their 302 Feng 2013 303 Shelton 2001 304 Lian,2009 305 Lian, 2009 %.*!!criticisms, leaving room for renewed relations. 306 Economically, China began realizing growth from its ÔPeaceful DevelopmentÕ strategy of the 1980Õs, allowing it to compete more successfully on the global stage. 307 The nationÕs rapid internal growth required natural resources and new goods markets to be sustainable in the long run. African nations possessed both, and the PRC began the process necessary to facilitate full -scale engagement with the continent. The Chinese state created the PRCÕs three policy banks in 1994, which helped facilitate aid negotiations and developmental part nerships between the two regions. 308 Diplomatically, Afro -Chinese relations were given more formal status through the establishment of the Forum on China -Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), held in Beijing in October 2000, with foreign and economic ministers attendi ng from forty -four African states. 309 The conference was designed to work toward the establishment of a new international political and economic order in the 21st century and further strengthen Sino -African economic cooperation, outlined by the principles of mutual cooperation, non-interference, and diplomatic solidarity. 310 Wuthnow (2008) contends that unlike the 1950s, when the focus of Chinese foreign policy was to establish its position as a leader in the global south , the PRCÕs contemporary policy toward A frica centers on increasing its Òdiplomatic capital. Ó311 This iteration of the relationship is nurtured by the 306 Taylor 2006 307 Alden 2008 308 Brautigam 2009 309 http://focac.org 310 http://www.focac.org/eng/ltda/dyjbzjhy/CI12009/t157578.htm; Taylor 2006; Tselichtchev 2011 311 Wuthnow 2008, 14 %.+!!construction of a new national imaginary of the PRC, one underpinned by the China that exists as an appendage of an d cleaves to the manufacture of Africa -China .312 In his speech before the 17th CCP Congress, President Hu Jintao called for enhancing the soft power of Chinese culture, signifying the strength of the PRCÕs societal foundation as an instrument of attraction. 313 ChinaÕs c ontemporary soft pow er campaign is closely associated with the Òactive export of Chinese values,Ó 314 whereby the PRC contours its image in Africa by reviving ÒMaoist discourse of Sino -African solidarityÓ 315 linking Ò...the anti -hegemonic posture of the early 1970s to the fight against past colonialism both for China and the developing world.Ó 316 Revisiting past experiences of Afro -Chinese camaraderie as an approximation of the PRCÕs present cultural values enables Beijing to promote its long -term foreign policy goals by distancing A frica from the west and moving the continent ever -closer to China. 317 The PRC prepensely manufactures a narrative of not only post -Bandung solidarity with Africa, but one consistently reinforcing historical and experiential ties between the two regions with out regard to the veracity of such claims . Images of shared civilizations of ancient origins, histories of colonial subjugation and oppression, and fights for independence and sovereignty are reinforced through newscasts, official visits, and advertisement s, weaving tales of Òpolitical solidarity and groupness 312 Scholars have become increasingly concerned with how image is implicated in Chinese modern soft power initiatives and, more specifically, how BeijingÕs image functions as a component of its soft power in Africa; See: Nye 2005; Gagliardone 2013, Hartig 2012, Wuthnow 2008 , wang; See also, Ronning, H 2016 313 Ding S 2008, 264 314 Barr 2012 315 Lan 2016, 306 316 Taylor, 2006, 167 317 Fennell 2013, 251 %.,!!(transcending) geo -spatial and racial boundaries.Ó 318 The repeated telling of these stories exemplifies the contemporary construction of the Chinese image as a counterhegemonic force against western imp erialism. 319 Alden and Alves (2008) suggest, however, that Òbeneath the platitudes of solidarity is a reading of Chinese historical relations with Africa emanating from Beijing that is... at times at odds with the historical record of Chinese involvement on the continentÓ. 320 The disconnect between BeijingÕs projected brand imag e and its national identity has increasingly become the subject of scholarly inquiry vis -a-vis its relationship to Africa and serves as an important rationale for nation branding within the context of Afro -Chinese relations. The success of ChinaÕs soft power initiatives rests, however, Ònot only on whether China can sell its image to African states but also whether African states are willing to buy it.Ó 321 This is potentially problematic gi ven that the image China presents to foreign publics is often Òambivalent and confusing.Ó Loo and Davies (2006) unpack the illogicalities embedded within brand -China , ÒThe image of modern day China is fraught with contradictions; an emergent industrial pow er but one based more upon enlightened communism than on capitalism; an enormous market but one where most consumers are still relatively poor; a source of goods made for established Western or Japanese brands rather than a source of goods valued because t hey are Ômade in China.Ó 322 318 Lan 2016, 306; Fennell 2013, 246 319 Fennell 2013, 247 320 Alden and Alves 2008, 44 321 Fijalkoswi 2011 322 Loo and Davies 2006 %.-!!Even if some misperceptions about China could be eliminated, within western conceptualizations of identity, Chinese culture s, as inherently non-western , pose considerable obstacle s to effective ly communicating its brand. Africa -China Country Case Studies Comprehending how the Ch inese state crafts it image in Africa necessitates an understanding of the unique histories of each of the states under consideration and their interaction Beijing. Viewpoints of exactly why China renewed r elations Africa during the 1990s with increased intensity and precisely how the relationship bodes for the continent vary. Dominant discourse on Afro -Chinese relations, however, supports the assertion that BeijingÕs strategic interest in the continent is grounded primarily in some combination of politics and economics . Rising living standards and industrialization dramatically increased the consumption of energy and raw materials, increasing ChinaÕs dependence on imports of oil and minerals. 323 In response Chinese trade with African economies boomed. Between 2002 -2012, ChinaÕs total imports from Africa increased from US$5 billion to US$113 billion. 324 Despite slumps in demand in recent years, China now accounts for more than 20 per cent of imports in Africa and approximately 15 percent of its exports, more than 80 percent of which are concentrated in the commodity and extractive industries. 325 The PRCÕs pattern of economic involvement within Africa varies from country to country, as it negotiates investment and ai d deals independently with each state. Broadly comprehending B eijingÕs historical and contemporary patterns of engagement 323 Tselichtch ev 2011; Taylor 2006 324 China -Africa Research Initiative, www.sais -cari.org, accessed 01/29/2018. 325 Financial Times, December 3, 2015, www.ft.com, accessed 1/11/2018. %%.!!with each of the sites under analysis is important to understanding how individuals within these countries comprehend brand -China and consume Africa -China in relation to their own nations. The selected sites are each Anglophone countries (the Gambia, Kenya, South Africa), two with leading regional economies, and each possessing longstanding diplomatic and economic relations with Beijing. The Gambia The Republic of The Gambia is a small, narrow West African nation bordered on three sides by Senegal, with the exception of its western coastline , which borders the Atlantic Ocean. The African nation holds the distinction of being mainland Af ricaÕs smallest nation by size (4,127 sq mi), boasting a larger area than only Cape Verde, Comoros, Mauritius, Sao Principe and Tome, an d the Seychelles in square miles .326 Like many West African nations, the nationÕs strategic geographic positioning, at the mouth of the Gambia River, made it a significant factor during the transatlantic slave trade and colonization of Africa, first by the Portugue se and later, the British , when The Gambia was subsumed within the British Empire. In 1965, The Gambia gained in dependence under the lea dership of Dawda Jawara, who served as Prime Minister of the nation since 1962. Jawara became president in 1970, retaining the office until 1994, when Yahya Jammeh seized power in a bloodless coup .327 JammehÕs rule is notable for many reasons, not the least of which was his administrationÕs suppression of the press, withdrawal from the British Commonwealth and the International Criminal Court, repression of homosexual rights, and human 326 CIA World Factbook; http:www.cia.gov, accessed 11/3/17 327 Omar Touray, The Gambia and the World: A History of the Foreign Policy of the AfricaÕs smallest State, 1965 -1995. Institute for African Affairs: Hamburg %%%!!rights abuses. 328 Yet, Jammeh ruled the nation for 2 2 years until r eal estate developer Adama Barrow became the Gambia's third president in January 2017 after his surprising defeat of Jammeh during the December 2016 national elections. As a former British colony, the GambiaÕs official language is English. Despite this local populations also speak one or more of the languages indigenous to its major ethno -linguistic groups, namely Mandinka, Fulani, Wolof, Jola, and Serahule. The nation boasts fewer than two million inhabitants, the vast majority of whom sub scribe to the Islamic faith. The nationÕs economy is dominated by farming and fishing, with agriculture employing 70 percent of the labor force and accounting for more than 30 percent of the nationÕs GDP. 329 Tourism from the United Kingdom, Germany, Sweden , the United States, Canada and, increasingly, China; and the remainder of the services sector, account for more than 50 percent of the nationÕs GDP. 330 The manufacturing sector contributes little to the national economy, accounting for only five percent of the national GDP. Gambia -China relations have been marked by constant change. The Gambia established diplomatic relations with the Republi c of China (Taiwan) shortly after gaining independence from the United Kingdom. In 1974, the Gambia switched its alle giance to the PeopleÕs Republic of China (PRC) , dissolving its relationship with Taiwan. 331 In 1996, The Gambia again recognized the Republic of China (Taiwan), 328 ÒAttacks on the Press 2000: The Gambia" Committee to Protect Journalists 2001. Retrieved September 12, 2017; ÒGambian president says gays a threat to human existenceÓ, Reuters , 28 September 2013; ÒCountry Reports on Human Rights Practices: The GambiaÓ, U.S. Dept. of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, 23 February 2001. 329 CIA World Factbook; http:www.cia.gov, accessed 1 1/3/17 330 CIA World Factbook http:www.cia.gov, accessed 11/3/17; World Bank 331 Drun, J. Ò China -Taiwan Diplomatic Truce Holds Despite GambiaÓ The Diplomat March 29, 2014 %%&!!leading the PRC to sever ties with the small nation. The Gambia n president again cut political ti es with Taiwan soon thereafter ( 2013) for Òreasons of national interestÓ .332 Gambia remained one of a small cohort of African nations without a diplo matic relationship with either of the two C hina Õs until 2016, when The People's Republic of China and the Gam bia reestablished diplomatic relations . The new relationship was solidified through the erection of the China -funded, 10 -story ÔPetroleum House,Õ the tallest building in the tiny African nation . Despite shifting allegiances, Gambian -Chinese economic relat ions have remained consistent. Chinese exports to the Gambia increased from US$51.93 million in 1992 to US$315.1 million in 2016. 333 Gambian exports to China, likewise, grew over the same period from US$111 thousand in 1992 to US$90 .1 million in 2016. The Af rican nationÕs top exports remain raw materials, with rough wood, coconuts, and brazil nuts being the most regularly exported items. This brief glimpse into Gambia -China economic relations demonstrates two things: the first is that although trade between t he two nations is significantly imbalanced, Gambian exports to Beijing are increasing at a phenomenal rate ;334 and secondly, that despite volatile diplomatic relations between China and the Gambia within the last 25 years, economic dealings between the two countries remained open. 332 Butch, T. ÒChina and Gambia Reestablish Diplomatic TiesÓ, The Huffington Post, 03/21/20 16, accessed 12/1/17. 333 China -Africa Research Initiative, accessed 01/29/2018 334 ibid %%'!!Kenya /01!213456"7!89!:1;<=!">!=; !?9@"7=;!;=A"8;!78#1@";B!=!C"#1@>1!=;C!1$3=;>"#1! >A@ 1A70!89!A1@@=";!D&&(E(()!>F!G"HI!/01!J=>A!?9@"7=;!;=A"8;!"> !58@C1@1C!5AE!JA0"83"=!A8!A01!;8@A0E!K8G=6"=!A8!A01!;8@A 01=>AE! MB=;C=!A8! A01 !L1>AE!=;C!/=;N=;"=!A8!A01!K84A0 I!O8C1@;!:1;<=!58=>A>!8;1!89!A01!6=@B1>A! 38346=A"8;>!L"A0";!?9@"7=!D(,!G"66"8;H!=;C!">!78G3@">1C!89!((!@178B;"N1C!1A0;"7! B@843>!78;>A"A4A1C!3@";7"3=66E!L0"70!A8B1A01@! 78G 3@">1!-+R!89!A01!;=A"8;S>!@1>"C1;A>I '')!!!!! East Africa has enjoyed steady inhabitation by humans since the Lower Paleolithic period. Around 2000 BC, Cushitic -speaking people from northern Africa settled in the part of East Africa currently referred to as K enya. 336 By the 1st Century AD, the Kenyan coast was frequented by Arab traders, who began establishing outposts in the area because of its proximity to the Arabian Peninsula. 337 Early Kenya played host to ironworkers, farmers, hunters and fishers who supporte d the acephalous regionÕs burgeoning economy through agriculture, fishing, metal production and trade with foreign countries. 338 During the period Bantu people established trade links with communities as far afield as Persia, Arabia, India, and India. 339 The A rab presence in the Republic holds particular significance to early Kenyan history because of the 335 ÒIndians In Kenya Are Now The '44th Tribe' Of The CountryÓ Huffington Post , July 25, 2017 http//:huffingtonpost.in. Accessed September 27, 2017; The major indigenous ethnic groups within Kenya include the kikuyu (6,622,576), luhya (5,338,666), kalenjin (4,967,328), luo (4,044,440), kamba (3,893,157), kisi (2,205,669), mijikenda (1,960,574), meru (1,658,108), turkana (988,592), and maasai (841,622)] source U Penn 336 Dani el Branch, Kenya: Between Hope and Despair, 1963 -2011, TJ International, Ltd. Cornwall 337 Hallet R 1970; Ehret C 2002; Shillington K 2012 338 ibid 339 ibid %%(!!introduction of Islam and Arabic influences on the Bantu languages. 340 European presence on the coast was initiated in 1498, with the arrival of Portuguese sail ors, who soon challenged Arab influence over Mombasa. 341 The Portuguese later relinquished control of the port back to Islamists under the Imam of Oman in the 1600s. It was not until 1885, when Germany established a protectorate over the Sultan of Zanzibar' s coastal possessions that Europeans returned en masse to the Kenyan coast. 342 In 1888, the Imperial British East Africa Company also arrived in Kenya, leading Germany to surrender its coastal holdings to Britain in 1890. By 1895 the British government had s et up the East Africa Protectorate , claiming the countryÕs interior as far west as Lake Naivasha. The ability to transport people and goods from the coast inland was considered a high priority for the British stronghold in Kenya, thus plans were soon drawn for the construction of the Kenya ÐUganda railway bisecting the country. 343 Railway construction enabled British farmers to settle deeper within the interior regions of the country, an area already heavily populated by indigenous Kikuyu people. Unlike the E uropean settlers, the indigenes were banned from owning land forcing them to subsist as itinerant farmers. Between 1942 and 1959 members of the Kikuyu, Embu, Meru and Kamba ethnic groups began challenging colonial rule. 344 The Mau Mau Rebellion , as it was kn own, possessed both economic and political components , attacking political opponents and raiding white settler farms and destroying 340 Today, roughly 10 percent of Kenyans identity with islam, whilst 45 percent identify as protestant, 33 percent roman catholic, and 10 percent adhere to indigenous belief systems, CIA Factbook 2016. 341 Hallet R 1970; Ehret C 2002; Shillington K 2012 342 Hallet R 1970 343 Kanyinga, K 2009 344 Londale 1990 %%)!!livestock. 345 The Movement successfully disrupted British rule, leading to a state of emergency from October 1952 to December 1959. The Colony of Kenya, occupied by the United Kingdom, and the Protectorate of Kenya, held by the Sultan of Zanzibar, became a single independent state in 1963. 346 One year later, Kenya officially became the Republic of Kenya , with Jomo Kenyatta as its first president. 347 Kenyatta remained in office until his death in 1978 and was succeeded by the former Deputy President Daniel arap Moi. Arap Moi retained held office until 2002, at which point he was constitutionally barred from running for an additional t erm. 348 Mwai Kibaki, running for the opposition coalition "National Rainbow Coalition" (NARC), was elected President. 349 Deputy Prime Minister Uhuru Kenyatta, JomoÕs son, became the East African nationÕs fourth president in 2013. The summer following his elect ion, Kenyatta visited China at the invitation of President Xi Jinping. 350 Economically, The Ke nyan economy is bolstered by its service sector, which contributes 61% of the nationÕs GDP and is dominated by tourism. 351 Tourists, the largest number being from Ge rmany and the United Kingdom, are attracted mainly to the nationÕs coastal beaches and game reserves. Agriculture is the second largest contributor to Kenya's gross domestic product (GDP). 345 Londale 1990 346 Daniel Branch, Kenya: Between Hope and Desp air, 1963 -2011, TJ International, Ltd. Cornwall 347 Daniel Branch, Kenya: Between Hope and Despair, 1963 -2011, TJ International, Ltd. Cornwall 348 Ibid. 349 Ibid. 350 Raghavan, Sudarson ÒIn snub to Washington, Kenyan president visits China, Russia in first officia l visit outside AfricaÓ The Washington Post August 17, 2013 351 CIA Factobook 2016 %%*!!Kenya also derives support from regional alliances . The presidents of Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda re -established the East Africa n Community (EAC) in March 1996. The EAC's objectives include harmonizing tariffs and customs regimes, free movement of people, and improving regional infrastructures. In March 2004, the three East African countries added a customs agreement to their cooperative agreements . Most recently, in 2007, the Kenyan government unveiled Vision 2030, an economic development program it envisions as a competitor to the Asian Economic Tigers by the year 2030. Bilateral relations between Kenya and China date back to 1963 when, soon after KenyaÕs first elections, China became one of the first nations to open an embassy in the east African nation recognizing its sovereign legitimacy. Affairs between the two coun tries has since been marked by diplomatic, economic, and military cooperation. President Uhuru KenyattaÕs diplomatic visit to China in 2013, yielded more than US$5 billion in infrastructure and economic investment deals between the two countries. 352 The Chin ese Premier, Li Keqiang visited Nairobi during his 2014 Africa tour, signing the deal leading to the construction of another Kenyan railway, the Madaraka Express . LiÕs visit also promised funding to establish a China -Africa Development Bank, Humanitarian A ssistance in the Sudan and wildlife Conservation. 353 Vision 2030 demonstrates the Kenyan government Õs prioritization of infrastructure , financial services, a griculture , manufacturing , and tourism as prerequisites to sustainable development. In response, Ken yatta actively pursued relations with the 352 https://www.capitalfm.co.ke/news/2017/09/bilateral -relations -kenya -china -yield -economic -benefits/ 353 https://www.the -star.co.ke/news/2017/05/20/enter -the -dragon -kenya -china -relations_c1564316 %%+!!Chinese to achieve these aims. 354 Notwithstanding, b ilateral trade between the two nations amounted to US$ 5.59 billion Chinese exports to Kenya and US$97.1 million in imports to China in 2016, reflecting a significa nt trade imbalance between the two nations. 355 The vast majority of Kenyan exports to China involve raw materials, namely titanium ore, scrap copper, and other metals. 356 At its core Kenya -China relations has not yet generated sustained economic benefits to t he East African nation. The PRC, in contrast, benefits from KenyaÕs strategic positioning, where Chinese developers are building infrastructure projects designed to facilitate transport of goods along Indian Ocean Shipping routes. 357 Kenyan -Chinese relations have recent experienced backlash as a result of negative publicity stemming from Chinese entrepreneursÕ treatment of local Kenyans and the perceived effect of infrastructure projects on the local environment. South Africa South Africa, is the southernmos t country in Africa. Bounded on the north by Namibia, Botswana, and Zimbabwe; and on the east and northeast by Mozambique and Swaziland; it surrounds the kingdom of Lesotho. 358 The country boasts a population of more than 56 million inhabitants. 359 The land no w known as South Africa was originally inhabited by Bantu -speaking people, who, as herdsman and agricultural farmers, roamed the area for millennia. Indigenous populations are comprised of descendants of these Bantu people, along with Khoisan, Khokhoi, Xho sa, and Zulu 354 Nyaga et al 2017 355 China -Africa Research Initiative, accessed 01/29/2018 356 The Observatory of Economic Complexity, MIT accessed: 10/07/17 https://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/ 357 Chege 2008 358 CIA World Factbook 359 Statistics South Africa Mid -Year Report http://www.statssa.gov.za/publications/P0302/P03022017.pdf %%,!!people, and other groups who account for roughly 81 -percent of the total South African population. 360 Newer arrivals to the multiracial nation, namely European descendants, coloured biracial or multiracial groups, and the Indian/Asian populati on, account for 8.0 -percent, 8.8 -percent, and 2.5 -percent of the total population respectively . 361 The first European settlement in southern Africa was established by the Dutch East India Company in Table Bay (Cape Town) in 1652. 362 It was created as a suppl y port for ships traversing the cape, and a colony was soon established there to provide needed supplies for migrating European settlers without regard to local populations already inhabiting the land .363 During the late 18 th century, colonists and indigeno us populations embarked on a century of intermittent warfare over the dispossession of Khoe and San indigenous people from their lands. during which the colonists emerged victorious over the local populations. 364 The first British Settlers arrived in 1820. South AfricaÕs mineral wealth was discovered by Europeans in 1867, with the discovery of diamond s and , later , gold mines in the Northern C ape. 365 At the conclusion of the South African War ( 1899-1902), the Union of South Africa was created with t he intent of becoming a white nation despite being comprised of a majority black population. 366 Already divested of the land essential to the ir pastoral way of existence, indigenous people were further 360 Statistics South Africa Mid -Year Report http://www.statssa.gov.za/publications/P0302/P03022017.pdf 361 Statistics South Africa Mid -Year Report http://www.statssa.gov.za/publications/P030 2/P03022017.pdf 362 See: A Concise History of South Africa, Robert Ross Cambridge University Press 2008. 363 See: A Concise History of South Africa, Robert Ross Cambridge University Press 2008. 364 See: A Concise History of South Africa, Robert Ross Cambridge U niversity Press 2008. 365 https://www.gov.za/about -sa/history 366 https://www.gov.za/about -sa/history %%-!!dispossessed by the institution of racially -divisive laws and polici es designed to force them to work the ir land to the benefit of others . During the same period Chinese indentured laborers were imported to the Transvaal to work South African mines to meet the accumulative needs of mining community and the local shortage of mining labor. 367 The scheme was also designed to help cement white British ness and colonial rule in the new colony . More than 60,000 indentured workers were brought to South Africa between 1904 and 1907 but t he plot did not proceed as planned .368 The newly arrived Chinese laborers were soon at the center of widespread conflict and violence , causing public perception of the program to sour .369 The decision was made to end future impo rtation of Chinese workers and repatriate existing workers back to China. 370 The African National Congress (ANC ) was founded in 1912 as a new form of rebellion against European occupation and the racist policies underpinning the occupation .371 Despite continued remonstrations by indigenous populations , the ideological move toward an a ll-white segregationist state was cemented when the pro -Afrikaner National Party (NP) came to power in 1948. 372 The partyÕs platform, founded upon the ideology of apartheid, was socially and economically repressive. Indigenous South Africans and their allie s globally, continued their protest and 367 Bright, Rachel. Chinese Labour in South Africa, 1902 -1910: Race, Violence, and Global Spectacle, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013. 368 IBID 369 IBID 370 Althou gh the program was short -lived it aided the development of a white settler identity in South Africa distinctly and influenced restrictions on Asian migration until the 1990s. 371 www.anc.org.za , accessed May 17, 2018 372 See: A Concise History of South Africa, Robert Ross Cambridge University Press 2008. %&.!!opposition to Apartheid rule for more than forty years and the country finally emerged as an independent nation in 1990. 373 Post -apartheid South Africa had to contend with the social, economic, and political fallout of European oppression and the nation experienced an economic recession until 1993. In the interim the economy has experienced both highs and lows marked by high growth but also high inflation. South Africa has overcome many of its economic concerns and cur rently possesses the third largest GDP and highest GDP per capita within Africa. 374 Similarly to other African nations, South AfricaÕs economy has been traditionally supported by the primary sector but this is shifting. Since the early 1990s, economic growth has been driven primarily by the tertiary sector and the development of finished goods and services. Yet, poverty and unemployment remain high, especially amongst the indigenous population s.375 Prior to the fall of apartheid, relations between South Africa and China were marked by conflict resulting from competing political ideologies and allegiances. 376 South Africa previously maintained a close official relationship with the Republic of China. 377 The dismantling of the apartheid regime presented an opportunity for official relations to be established between the two nations under the direction of the newly elected South African head of state: Nelson Mandela. 378 The South African government 373 See: A Concise History of South Africa, Robert Ross Cambridge University Press 2008. 374 IMF World Economic Outlook (WEO), October 2016 375 CIA World Factbook 376 In the Kor ean War, the South African Air Force fought on the side of the United Nations against the Chinese Peoples Liberation Army, while Pretoria later enjoyed a strong relationship with the Republic of China (ROC) in Taiwan. The PRC supported and was closely alli ed with the anti -apartheid group the Pan African Congress (PAC) while the African National Congress (ANC) was supported by the PRC's communist rival, the Soviet Union. 377 Alden and Wu 2014 378 R.W. Johnson, ÒSouth AfricaÕs Brave New World: The beloved country since the end of apartheidÓ Overlook Publishing, New York: 2009. %&%!!announced that it would switch recognition from Taiwan to the PRC in Janua ry 1998, soon after the handover of Hong Kong to the PRC in 1997, given that South Africa, as another former British colony, possessed existing ties with Hong Kong. 379 The PRCÕs economic relationship to Africa varies from country to country, as it negotiate s investment and aid deals independently with each state, but South Africa remains the largest buyer of Chinese goods on the continent. In 1992, Chinese exports to South Africa were virtu ally nonexistent but by 2014 they increased to US$13.54 billion. 380 Sou th African exports to China, likewise, grew from negligible amounts to reach US$44.57 billion in 2014 , before falling to US$ 6.8 billion in 2016 .381 These figures reflect a certain reciprocity in South African -Chinese relations, though South African exports to China mirror other nations on the continent, by being heavily weighed by the export of primary goods. Diplomatic and economic ties between the countries are intertwined through shared participation in the BRICS group of emerging economies and cemented d uring the Forum on China African Cooperation hosted by South Africa in 2015, where the two countries signed twenty -five agreements worth a combined value of US$16.5 billion. 382 African Perspectives The ultimate test for ChinaÕs global positioning and it s engagement with Africa is not what the West thinks, but what Africans think. 383 Yet absent , most strikingly, from 379 China / South Africa -- a Chopsticks Relationship , P J Botha, Embassy of the People's Republic of China in the Repub lic of South Africa, 4 July 20 380 China -Africa Research Initiative, www.sais -cari.org, accessed 01/29/2018. 381 "Africa, China Business Leaders Sign Billions in Investments". SABC News. 5 December 2015. Retrieved 17 January 2016; Johns Hopkins University, Chi na-Africa Research Initiative, accessed 01/29/2018 382 http://www.focac.org 383 Cao 2013, 68 %&&!!the vast majority of the literature on Africa -China are empirical studies interrogating the benefits to African states nee people. 384 Kalu (2012 ) asseverates that much of the existing scholarship on Afro Chinese relations analyzes the relationship from a Western or Eastern perspective, concentrating extensively on the benefits and burden to China. Mazimhaka (2013) similarly remarked that in most p erception surveys on the Chinese presence in Africa, the perceptions of Africans are not canvassed. Mohan and Lampert (2013) and Corkin (2013) shifted the focus specifically to African agency, writing that m ost Òanalyses of ChinaÕs renewed engagement with Africa treat Beijing as the driving force, and little recognition is given to the role of African agency, especially beyond the level of state elites.Ó 385 Global discourses of Africa -China, similarly, to colonial discourses of Africa -Europe, position Afric an people as subject to rather than subject of their own stories. The scholarly trend has been to analyze ChinaÕs renewed engagement through the lens of Chinese ac tors, with little recognition given to the ways in which people on the continent individually and collectively act as agents of their own destinies. 386 Cornelia Tremann (2013) writes, one of the ways in which colonial discourses have been sustained is through ignoring African agency in the Afro -Chinese relationship. 387 Mazimhaka (2013) similarly remar ked that in most perception surveys on the Chinese presence in Africa, the perceptions of Africans are completely overlooked. 388 384 Kalu 2012 385 Mohan and Lampert 2013, 92 386 Mohan and lampert 2013 , 92 387 Tremann 2013, 11 388 Mazimhaka P, ÒChina in Africa: an African viewÓ in Liu, Jerry, and Patrick M azimhaka. The Morality of China in Africa: The Middle Kingdom and the Dark Continent . Zed Books Ltd., 2013. %&'!!Studies interrogating Africa -China through the lens of its effects on or from the perspectives of local populations, often focu s principally on gauging perspectives of economic and democratic indicators. 389 Harneit -Sievers, Marks, and Naidu (2010) , Gadzala and Hanusch (2010), and Firenze and Marks (2007); while giving voice to both African and Chinese perspectives of the relationshi p, present essays examining AfricaÕs engagement with China in the economic and political arenas, without due consideration of how social indicators may influence or be influenced by the relationship. 390 Other opinion studies of China, surveying at least on e African nation captured opinions of the PRC from participants globally and did not focus on Africa. 391 Related findings suggest that people across Africa are content with ChinaÕs contributions but wary of the economic, environmental, and social impact of t heir presence. The 2013 Pew Global Attitudes Study, as an example, found that positive perceptions of China in Africa stood at 65 percent .392 The 2009 BBC World Service study, including three Africa nations (Niger ia, Egypt and Ghana), found perceptions of Ch ina most positive within Africa. 393 In perhaps the largest study of African perceptions of China to date, AfrobarometerÕs 2016 opinion survey of 36 nations indi cates that China falls second 389 See: Afrobarometer 2016, Afrobarometer 2014, Global Ethics Institute of South Africa 2014, Hanusch 2012, Sautman and Hairong 2009, Manji and Marks 2007 390 See: Harneit -Sievers, Axel, Stephen Marks, and Sanusha Naidu, eds. Chinese and African perspectives on China in Africa . Fahamu/Pambazuka, 2010; See: Gadzala, Aleksandra, and Marek Hanusch. "African perspectives on China -Africa: Gauging popular perc eptions and their economic and political determinants." Afrobarometer Working Papers 17 . 2010. 391 Pew Global Attitudes Study 2013 ; BBC World Service Study 2009 392 ÒPew Global Attitudes Study,Ó Pew Research Center 2013 393 Rebol 2010 %&(!!only to the United States in its perception as a development model. 394 One of the more compelling findings of earlier studies comes from Sautman and Hairong Õs (2009) discovery that Western media is one of the principle influencers of opinion formation regarding China amongst the populations studied. Their study also highligh ts the importance of different perspectives between countries in their findings that Kenyan perspectives of the Afro -Chinese relationship were Òconsistently positiveÓ whilst more variation exists within South Africa. Conclusion This chapter provided an hi storiography of Chinese soft power in Africa, primarily describing Chinese views regarding soft power and culture and the significance of those views to understanding Afro -Chinese relations. The chapter also delivered a simplified analysis of historical an d contemporary relations between the Gambia, Kenya and South Africa, and China. It narrated the history of modern Afro -Chinese relations (1955), considering historical and recent trends in Afro -Chinese relations to explicate how migratory patterns, and dip lomatic and cultural orientations between the two regions historically evolved and shaped contemporary patterns of interaction. 394 See: Mogopodi Lekorwe, An yway Chingwete, Mina Okuru, and Romaric Samson, ÒChinaÕs growing presence in Africa wins largely positive popular reviewsÓ Afrobarometer Dispatch No. 122, October 2016 %&)!!Chapter Five Turning Dragons into Pandas ÒThe Western approach sees individual people as the units through which the world is understood and tends to think in absolutes, that is, good versus evil. The self is identified with God; the other is the heathen and an irreconcilable enemy. In contrast, Chinese thought supposes many kinds of other and suggests methods to reconcile tha t other into a harmonious existence. Here, the other can become the self.Ó - Yiwei Wang, Public Diplomacy and the Rise of Chinese Soft Power , 262. Introduction On Wednesday, May 31 st 2017, the Madaraka Express ( Madaraka ), a China Road and Bridge Corporat ion constructed standard gauge railway, embarked on its maiden journey from MombasaÕs Miritiri Stattion to Nairobi. One of several planned China constructed railway lines in Africa, the railway replaced the infamous Kenya -Uganda ÒLunatic ExpressÓ (1903 -2017), a holdover from British colonial occupation. 395 Madaraka connects the Kenyan capital with its eastern coastline, bisecting Tsavo National Park to cut passenger journeys by matatu or car in half. Completing the railway, on time, was a key priority and cam paign promise for KenyaÕs President Uhuru Kenyatta, for whom Madaraka represented a Ònew era of autonomous rule on the continent.Ó 396 Kenyatta, like many leaders across Africa, has long heralded the benefits 395 http://krc.co.ke/history/ accessed 10/17/17 Kenyan Railways Website 396 Full 2017 Madaraka Day speech By Uhuru Kenyatta on Posted on June 1, 2017 %&*!!of Chinese -led projects, yet, despite Presidential support, the line opened to mixed reviews. 397 The pageantry surrounding MadarakaÕs inauguration brought inevitable remarks from critic s who question ed ChinaÕs motives on the continent but also waves of nostalgia about the first continental Chinese -backed ra ilway in Africa , the Tazara Òfreedom railwayÓ (1976). The Tazara linked Tanzania and Zambia and was widely viewed as a solution to the stronghold southern African states held over transportation between Tanzania and Zambia post -independence. 398 Some d etracto rs argue that Madaraka is overpriced, as it accounts for more than five percent of KenyaÕs gross domes tic product; for others, the railway project was emblematic of creeping Chinese cultural intrusion on the continent. Subtle messages observed during the lineÕs inauguration --pamphlets written in Mandarin, visitors greeted by staff donning red and gold uniforms, and a stone image of admiral Zheng He overseeing pedestrian traffic on the platform Ñunderscored thinking that although Madaraka was a Kenyan posse ssion, it was still very much Chinese owned. 399 The image Madaraka helps curate of Africa -China is also undermined by negative press and competing images in the manner that CCTVÕs Annual Spring Festival Gala ÒCelebrating TogetherÓ, which recounted the openin g of the Railway from a decided Chinese point of view, depicting Chinese actors in blackface. 397 Kenya's Madaraka Express Launches Amid Fanfare - And Criticism. Allafrica.com. Accessed online September 7, 2017. 398 Monson, J. (2009) AfricaÕs Freedom Railway: How a Chines e Development Project Changed Lives and Livlihood in Tanzania. 399Zheng He was one of the great navigators of the Ming Dynasty who visited Kenya during one of his wester voyages (1368 -1644); Kenya's Madaraka Express Launches Amid Fanfare - And Criticism. All africa.com. Accessed online September 7, 2017. . %&+!!The performative practice of these artifacts in the theatre of Africa -China is far more complex than simply signifying the inauguration of the PRCÕs latest infra structure project. Madaraka, alongside the pomp and circumstance of its opening ceremony, plays an important role in the everyday politics of Africa -China. It is a role symbolic of the strength of the Chinese state and its global ambitions but, also one th at serves as a visual reinforcement of ChinaÕs image as a development model , friend, and brother to Africa. ÔMadarakaÕ becomes concomitant with the longue duree of Africa -Chinese relations fomented pre -European conquest through Ôgiraffe diplomacy,Õ n urtured by diplomatic relations during the Bandung Conference (1955), strengthened by BeijingÕs solidarity with African liberation movements and , ultimately, reinforced by contemporary economic, social, and diplomatic interactions between the two regions. Curating an image of Afro -China established through the mutually beneficial exchange of gifts, historical friendship, and cultural propinquity reinforces the notion that if not for the Òtwin evils Ó of the transatlantic slave trade and colonialism, Africa a nd China would have remained consistently close Ôfriends, brothers, and partnersÕ for more than 600 years 400. More importantly, the narrative also mirrors attempts to transform domestic and international viewpoints of China and its interactions with African nations and how those attempts are inhibited by tension between official and personal accounts of China and Africa -China. Artifacts reinforcing the image of China in Africa at once as loyal friend, cultural traditionalist, and once - impoverished nation v ictimized by Western imperialism, 400 Statement made by Chinese President Xi Jinping in an Egyptian editorial ÒLet China -Arab Friendship Surge Forward like the NileÓ 01/20/16. %&,!!resonate with African decision -makers seeking developmental alternatives to the WestÕs neoliberal agenda. 401 This imagining of China serves to distinguish the PRC as an antitheti cal construction of the West but, also , obscur es the neoliberal relational dynamics of Africa -China, utilizing soft power images to Òdenationalize racial inequality.Ó 402 Nations select which image of self to disseminate to international audiences. Subovic (2017) explains, that this is how Òforces like n ostalgia, origin stories, enemy construction, and others, are mobilized Ð through a fantastical structure of the nation that enrolls people into a particular national narrative of the imaginary.Ó 403 Strategically constructing this narrative of China and Afri ca-China requires synchronizing the symbols states use to communicate their imaginings of self, other, power, and powerlessness. The Chinese State consistently utilizes a diversity of performative symbols in the construction of its brand across Africa. Off icial images of China and Africa reinforce a particular narrative of the Chinese national imaginary through billboards depicting China Southern AirlinesÕ new service from Nairobi to Guangzhou; films like ÒLetÕs Get Married;Ó diplomatic speeches during the opening of China Europe International Business School (CEIBS) in Accra, and articles in ChinAfrica magazine , signifying to observers on both sides of Africa and within that Afro -Chinese relations are strong, mutually beneficial and growing. Nation brandin g is a project of political imagination, designed to either reinforce or replace existing concepts of the national imaginary and this chapter views Africa -China 401 Kopinski 2012 402 Simms Hamilton 1970, 24 403 Subovic 2017, 3 %&-!!through the lens of ChinaÕs constructed national imaginary as an expression of its nation brand within Africa. 404 These narratives influence and speak to relations between nations at the elite economic and diplomatic level, and also of the desire to direct conversations regarding these relationships and how the states within them are consumed, at the popular social and cultural levels. This chapter builds on the understanding that nation branding serves as Òan ideological framing of history, nature and tradition, a framing that has the power to reshape culture and nature to its own needsÓ. 405 As the Chi nese economy began to expand in the 1980s, and new policies driving outward expansion and engagement with the west emerged, the PRC increasing utilized specific soft power images and messages building on Maoist propaganda of the past, as a vehicle of natio nal imaginary construction. Throughout African liberation movements, textual and visual media became the principal formats for promoting official discourse on China and Africa -China to both popular and elite audiences (image 4 ).406 Today, the discursive fr ameworks introduced in speeches, newspaper editorials, magazines, and advertisements continue to promote ChinaÕs contemporary view of Africa -China and spread its message for consumpti on across the continent (image 5 ). The chapter seeks to discern the speci fic nature of brand -China in Africa, viewing contemporary depictions of ChinaÕs brand within the historical framework s of previous Afro -Chinese encounters . The principal concern is 404 Nation branding attempts to positively create, cha nge or influence a nationÕs image (Gudjonsson, 2005; Fan, 2006, 2008b, Anholt 2005, Gudjonsson 2005), effectively altering public attitudes or perceptions about a nation without using hard power, for economic (Leonard 2002:48, Dinnie (Osei and Gbadamosi 20 13), political (Rendon, 2003; Szondi, 2007; Jordan 2014:284), or social gain (Anholt 2005; Fan 2006; Gudjonsson 2005: 285). 405 Maccannell 1992 , 1 406 Fennell 2013 %'.!!with how the Chinese state and state -owned or supported enterprises (SOEs) utilize nation branding to construct the Chinese image on the continent and how those images align with or deviate from official brand messages of Africa -China. The chapter is organized along the following lines: It began with a brief outline of ChinaÕs na tional imaginary construction in Africa, exploring Afro -Chinese relations from a nation branding perspective. The chapter continues by detailing the empirical c ore of the research in which research question one is answered. Finally, the article provides a summary of findings. FIGURE 5: ÒLONG LIVE CHAIRMAN MAO FIGURE 6: BANK OF CHINA BILLBOARD (LUSAKA, 2015) %'%!!The Rhetorical Construction of brand -China in Africa Artifact Characteristics Three hundred and thirty -seven (337) items were used in the analysi s. Within the project, the population of communication principally drew from speeches, magazine covers, advertisements, and newspaper editorials developed by the Chinese State or State Owned or supported firms, or delivered by high -ranking Chinese official s (President, Premier, Ambassador, etc.) for African consumption. This includes 260 textual (speeches and editorials) and 77 visual (magazine covers) artifacts. The vast majority of artifacts were produced by the Chinese producers (89%). More than two -thir ds of the textual artifacts (77%) were attributed to high -ranking diplomats (Ambassadors) from each nation, with an additional fourteen percent (14%) delivered by senior leadership (President, Premier, King). Ambassadors represent the highest diplomatic po st to a nation, yet the artifacts they presented were often delivered before popular audiences at public events, including hospital launches, student award ceremonies, or the distribution of school supplies. The artifacts used within the analysis were prod uced within fourteen African nations and China, namely Botswana, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Malawi, Namibia, Nigeria, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, Zimbabwe, Morocco, and Ethiopia. 407 The number of textual artifacts delivered increased over time betwe en 2000 -2015, reaching its apex in 2015 prior to and during the Sixth Ministerial Conference of the Forum on China -Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), held in Johannesburg, South December 4 -5, 2015. 407 Chinese artifacts represent those deli vered before majorly or abundantly African audiences, such as The Fifth Ministerial Conference of the Forum on China -Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), held in Beijing, China, from 19 to 20 July 2012 %'&!! Critical discourse analysis of the artifacts yielded 88 uniqu e nodes; including ÒBenevolence,Ó ÒHistory,Ó ÒPoverty,Ó ÒSolidarity,Ó ÒChina Dream,Ó ÒMarginalizatio n,Ó ÒScience and Technology,Ó ÒS ecurityÓ and Ò Mutual Benefit Ó. These nodes were grouped into seven distinct thematic categories encompassing issues of ÒDeve lopment,Ó ÒSovereignty,Ó ÒMarginalization,Ó ÒFriendship,Ó ÒEurocentrism,Ó ÒSameness,Ó ÒPartnership,Ó and a miscellany of other refere nces such as the narrative of ÒPeacefulnessÓ. An initial rev iew of coding categories revealed most frequent references to n odes surrounding themes of ÒSameness,Ó ÒDevelopment,Ó ÒFriendship,Ó and ÒPartnership.Ó Collectively, these themes account for 73.8 percent of the variation in how brand -China is constructed in Africa. The most frequently referenced themes are each discusse d in turn and collectively serve as the foci of the remainder of this chapter. Sameness The most frequently constructed narrative of brand -China in Africa is one of Òsameness.Ó Sameness speaks to a level of affinity beyond that shared by partners or frie nds, creating a discursive framework for establishing points of commonality between Chinese and African people, the historical and contemporary experiences of Chinese and African people, cultural propinquity, being part of a shared (or the same) community, Chinese kinship, brotherhood, sisterhood, or familyhood with Africa. Chinese Ambassador Tian Xuejun expressed the feeling of ÔsamenessÕ during his %''!!farewell luncheo n when he remarked, ÒMy wife and I regard South Africa as our second home, and the people of South Africa as our brothers and sisters.Ó 408 The ideology of brotherhood, in particular, is reinforced through promotional homily utilized in 251 of 337 artifacts, more frequently than any other theme. Throughout Chinese promotional artifacts African peop le are regarded Òas our brothers and sisters.Ó 409 When ChinaÕs seat was restored in the UN, Òour African brothers burst into tears of happiness,Ó 410 therefore, Beijing feels Òthe responsibility that we can by no means fail our African brothers.Ó 411 For, as Òa Ch inese saying goes, Ôunity of two brothers gives them the strength to cut through metal.Ó 412 Statements such as these reinforce thinking that Chinese and African people are united by a fictive kinship, which underpins the Afro -Chinese relationship as well as an image of Chinese proximity to the continent and its people. Yiwei Wang explains, ÒWestern p olitical discourse asks first, ÔWho are you?Õ It is concerned with the problem of identity, with distinguishing and making friends and enemies, exploring ÔusÕ an d Ôothers.Õ It is a worldview based on splitting. In contrast, Chinese political thinking first asks, ÔWho are we?Õ creating the concept of "the whole world as one family." 413 408 Ambassador Tian Xuejun at His Farewell Luncheon Hosted by the South African Department of International Relations and Cooperation (3/23/17) 409 Remarks by H.E. Wang Yi Minister of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, At the Launch of the Book A Monument to China -Africa Friendship: First -hand Account of t he Building of Tazara 23 July 2015 410 Speech by H.E. Li Keqiang, Premier of the State Council of the PeopleÕs Republic of China, At the AU Conference Center, Addis Ababa, 5 May 2014 411 Building a Better China -Africa Partnership -Speech by H.E. Ambassador Li u Guangyuan at the Conference "Towards a New Africa -China Partnership" 2011/03/28 412 President Xi Jinping's Congratulatory Message and State Councilor Yang Jiechi's Keynote Speech to The Opening Ceremony of the Coordinators' Meeting on the Implementation o f The Follow -up Actions of the Johannesburg Summit of The Forum on China -Africa Cooperation 2016/08/02 413 yiwei wang (2008) the annals of the american academy, public diplomacy and the rise of chinese soft power (262). %'(!!Yiwei WangÕs reflections support the ingenuousness of Chinese moves toward an Afr o-Chinese community by suggesting that ChinaÕs views of Africa are but an extension of the Confucian worldview. FIGURE 7: CHINA SOUTHERN AIRLINES BILLBOARD (NAIROBI, 2015) The narrative of Brotherhood is also discursively constructed within advertisemen ts depicting Africa -China. An image of a China Southern Airlines (image 6) advertisement discovered in 2015, along the airport road in Nairobi, demonstrates this point. The billboard , designed to capture the attention of a domestic Kenyan audience interest ed in traveling to China, publicize d China Southern Airline Õs new service from Nairobi to Guangzhou. The billboard features two central figures, a Panda and Giraffe. The panda, leaning forward, embraces the giraffe lovingly, speaking to a level of affinity beyond friendship between the two creatures. Although the use of animals is a common practice in advertising, reimagining African people as savage or animalistic is problematic in any context. While the panda, %')!!nee Chinese, are also depicted as animals on the billboard, the particularities of the African historical circumstance complicate the rhetorical intent of the ad vertisement within a market predominated by indi genous African people and diffuses the message of sameness. In the image, the panda is embr acing, nee acting upon the giraffe. The giraffe, a generally docile creature, doesnÕt respond. In this way, the focal point of the ad, the portrayal of a panda embracing a giraffe, replicates not simply the rhetoric of ÒbrotherhoodÓ as a component of Òsame ness,Ó but also that of benevolence found throughout colonial depictions of Africa in its representation of African inertia or immobility . The narrative of ÒsamenessÓ extends beyond familial connections to include the use of historical reference points il lustrating experiential similarities between the two regions. Statements expressing that though Africa Òis considered the cradle for mankind, China is one of the four great ancient civilizationsÓ exemplify this point. 414 Premier Wen JiabaoÕs remarks during t he Opening Ceremony of the 4th Ministerial Conference of the Forum on China -Africa Cooperation (2009) also illustrate a unity between the two regions underpinned by shared victimization by Òexternal aggression or colonizationÉ (prompting Africa and China t o) support each other in the fight for independence.Ó 415 In a separate speech, Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi noted during the 15th Lanting Forum (2015) that ÒThere is a popular Chinese song named ÔHold Your HandsÕ. The lyrics go like this, ÔBecause I tra veled the path you have traveled and 414 Address by H.E. Li Keqiang, Premie r of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, the 24th World Economic Forum on Africa, Abuja, 8 May 2014 415 Speech by Premier Wen Jiabao at the Opening Ceremony of the 4th Ministerial Conference of the Forum on China -Africa Cooperation (2009) %'*!!suffered the pain you have suffered, I share your joy and pursuit.Õ I think it can also be borrowed to describe the relations between China and Africa. Chinese and African people have suffered from similar scourge, and both have traveled a path fraught with hardship. That is why we are able to understand each other, share weal and woe and join hands in pursuing the same goal and same dream.Ó Wang YiÕs re marks align with Wen JiabaoÕs statements and are indicative of the d esire to connect specific historical experiences of African people with those of China as a component of Òsameness.Ó Culture Cultural proximity creates an additional layer of support for Afro -Chinese similitude. ChinaÕs president XI Jinping, proclaimed in a speech before the China Central Committee in 1994 that ÒThe stories of China should be well told, voices of China well spread, and the characteristics of China well explained,Ó 416 stressing the import of promoting Chinese soft power and culture abroad. Co rrespondingly , key elements of brand -China are fashioned from an admixture of Chinese cultural components, including Confucian philosophies, historical experiences, linguistic patterns, and artistic customs. Remarks that ÒChinese people cherish our own cul ture and tradition É (and) African people also preserve their culture very well. Some values we believe can also be found in African cultureÓ 417 exemplify this point. Although culture alone isnÕt a determinant of indiv idual and state perception, it Òlays a fo undation 416 China and Nation BrandingÓ http://thediplomat.com January 11, 2014. Accessed may 24, 2016. 417 Speech by Ambassador Zhao Yali at the Launch of the Confucius Institute at Makerere University (19 December, 2014). %'+!!of respect and tolerance by foreign actors, who, over time, may help to shape an international environment conducive to China's growth.Ó 418 Narratives of Afro -Chinese cultural value alignment and traditionalism are interwoven through the use of pro verbs, such as ÒÉan African proverb which states that ÔThe one who asks questions doesn't lose his wayÕ, while Chinese people believe that one has to be not ashamed of to ask and learn of his inferiors to become a real master. Many similar values exist in both Chinese and African cultures.Ó 419 A Chinese saying pronounces ÒÔWhen everyone paddles together, even a big ship can sail at a fast speed.Õ There is an African proverb, ÔA single person is not strong enough to pull a boat.Õ I believe, as long as we j oin hands and redouble our efforts, China -Kenya comprehensive cooperative partnership certainly will have a (sic) even better future.Ó 420 ÒIn African legend, the Phoenix, a long -lived bird, dies by fire every 500 years, only to rise from the ashes to be re born again. In Chinese culture, you can find a similar story of a mythical bird named Fenghuang that, too, cyclically regenerates itself. These two legends seem to be telling us 418 Wut hnow 2008, 9 -10 419 Speech by Ambassador Zhao Yali at the Launch of the Confucius Institute at Makerere University (19 December, 2014). 420 Speech By H.E. Ambassador Liu Xianfa At the Reception Marking the 66th Anniversary of the Founding of the People's Repu blic of China 2015/10/01 %',!!that the great renewal of the Chinese nation and the African continent represe nts an unstoppable historical trend.Ó ÒAs one Zimbabwe idiom goes, Ôchikuni chimwe hachikodzi sadzaÕ, Chinese people also believe that Ôwhen everybody adds firewood, the flames will rise high.ÕÓ 421 The recurrent usage of such imagery signals attempts to est ablish a cultural connection between African and Chinese people, bespeaking the intentionality of a socially constructed Chinese imaginary. The repeated telling of these stories communicates, Ôyou should trust usÕ Ôyou should partner with usÕ and, more imp ortantly, Ôyou should do so because we value the same things you value.Õ Fennell (2013), refers to such platitudes as Òfalse statements.Ó Considering the differences between the two regions, she writes, Ò thereÉ could (n) ever be a relationship based inÉa se nse of unity comparable to the relationship between the United States and England between the peoples and governments of the various African states and the people and government of the PeopleÕs Republic of China.Ó 422 In FennellÕs view, the assertion that Afr ican and Asian people are the same is unsound given obvious differences between the two regions. Marginalization The concept of shared marginalization by the west is also discursively constructed within brand -China as a component of Òsameness.Ó Dr. Liu Xianfa, Chinese 421 ÒLet the Flower of China -Zimbabwe Friendship Bloom with New SplendorÓ 2015/11/30 H.E. Xi Jinping President of the People's Republic of China 422 Fennell 2013, 246 %'-!!Ambassador to Kenya, remarked during the launching ceremony of the China -Kenya Comprehensive Cooperative Partnership, that China and Africa are united through mutual experiences by Òboth as victims of western colonialism and aggression.Ó 423 In a separate speech, Liu Xianfa rearticulates this sentiment in his statement that in Òmodern times, both as victims of western colonialism and aggression, Chinese and Kenyan people have encouraged and supported each other to achieve national liberation an d independence.Ó 424 Liu XianfaÕs sentiments reinforce criticisms that despite changes to its developmental trajectory, the PRC continue to inculcate a consistent image of self, mirroring the socio -historical experience s of African people . In 2008, in respon se to criticism of Chinese engagement with Bot swana , Ding Xiaowen, Chinese Ambassador to Botswana shared his contribution to the Africa -China marginalization narrative thusly, ÒChinese, like the African, like Batswana (sic), suffered a lot under colonial ism. China was bullied by Western colonies for almost 100 years. China was a semi -colonial, semi -feudal country from 1840 until the new China was founded in 1949. So China as a country was bullied by Western colonies. As a people, they suffered a lot in th e past. How could such a nation, such a people, become racist to bully other people?Ó 425 423 Remarks by H.E. Dr. Liu Xianfa, Chinese Ambassador to Kenya, at the Launching Ceremony of photo exhibition commemorating the Second Anniversary of the Establishment of China -Kenya Comprehensive Cooperative Partnership (June 26th, 2015) 424 New Start, New Achievements, and a New Future 425 31st March 2008, H.E.Ding Xiaowen , Chinese Ambassador to Botswana, ÒAmbassador Ding tells Botswana a Real ChinaÓ %(.!!This imagining of the historical Chinese experience serves as an antithetical construction of the West. It also obscures the neoliberal relational dynamics of Africa -China by asserting equivalent claims to pain by Òdenationalize(ing) racial inequality.Ó 426 African leaders also carry the mantle of Afro -Chinese similitude through the experience of subjugation at the hands of the west. Kenyan president Uhuru Kenyatta remark ed in his Goodwill Message on the Occasion of the Chinese New Year (2017), that ÒWe fought colonialism together in the past; today, we fight for development that serves our people and protects our planet; and for an international order that respects the eq ual dignity of all peoples.Ó 427 Namibian President, Hage Geingob, similarly references colonialism in his reflection that ÒIt is ironic that those who warn us are the same nations who sat around the table at the Berlin Conference in 1884 and carved out colon ies in Africa with the sole intent to develop their countries with our mineral resources and the blood and sweat of our forced labour.Ó 428 Finally, Jacob Zuma former leader of South Africa co -constructs the narrative of Afro -Chinese shared marginalization through remarks that , ÒHistorians record that these ancient relations were based on mutual respect and understanding, territorial integrity, similar values, solidarity and friendship. However, colonialism interrupted these mutually bene # cial relations. The r ise of China indicates that the world is now returning to its historical economic powers and trade patterns! Our visit 426 Simms Hamilton 2007, 24 427 President Uhuru KenyattaÕs Goodwill Message on the Occasion of the Chinese New Year 1/30/2017 428 Hage Geingob, President of NamibiaÕs Remarks at the opening of the FOCAC Summit (12/7/15) %(%!!is therefore a natural progression, building on relations that date back so many thousands of years ago between China and Africa.Ó 429 Such examples lend credence to ChinaÕs positioning as a counterhegemonic force against Western tyranny. They also underpin justificat ions for Afro -Chinese relations by insisting that the relationshipÕs utility is rooted not only in its longstanding affiliation with Africa but, also, but more importantly a Ôcommon southÕ identity of victimization by Òwestern imperialismÓ. 430 Inclusion The final component of ÒSamenessÓ reflects new forms of social and political connection wherein African and Chinese people can co ncept ualize themselves as part of the same community , sharing the same destiny. In 2005, then Chinese President Hu Jintao introduced the idea of building a Ôharmonious world with lasting peace and common prosperity.Õ 431 This world, while centering China, was characterized by what Hu Jintao defined as Ôharmonious coexistenceÕ and mutually beneficial cooperation, would be equal and inclusive of others. 432 Illustrating the concept of inclusion, Hu Jintao affirmed that Òbuilding strong ties between China and Afric a will not only promote development of each side, but also help cement unity and cooperation among developing countries and contribute to establishing a just and equitable new international political and economic order.Ó 433 This account is typical of the cou nterhegemonic Ônew world orderÕ rhetorically promoted by China. Lu Shaye 429 Address by President JG Zuma to the South Africa -China Business Forum on the occasion of the state visit to the People's Republic of China, Beijing (8/24/10) 430 Kopinski et al 2011 431 Hu 2005 432 Hu 2005 433 President Hu J intaoÕs speech at the opening ceremony of the Beijing Sumit of FOCAC (2012) %(&!!activates the narrative of ÒinclusionÓ in a 2013 speech designed to encourage mutual cooperation between African and China. Lu Shaye observed, ÒThe dream is ahead of us. The path is under our feet. We must make earnest and hard efforts to realize the Chinese Dream and the African Dream. China is ready to work with Africa to consolidate strategic mutual trust, safeguard and develop our relations as a community of common destinies, acti vely expand and deepen pragmatic cooperation for common development, and strengthen coordination and cooperation in global governance to forge a more fair, just and balanced global order that benefits all.Ó 434 While this aspect of ÔsamenessÕ stresses the im portance of an international system predicated on equality amongst all members, China r emains the central focus and principal author of its vision. Development The ÒChinese Dream and the African Dream are both for development.Ó 435 The focus on China -led development, industry, progress, growth, capacity building, or development aid is the second most oft -cited narrative of Africa -China. The desire to link regional destinies through shared aspiration to the Chinese and African ÔdreamsÕ by means of ÒTechnolog ical knowledge transferÓ 436, Òshared opportunitiesÓ, 434 Speech by Mr.Lu Shaye, Director -General of African Department of China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, on the seminar of Chinese Dream, African Dream --Achieving Common Development through Joint Efforts (7/17/13) 435 Speech by Mr.Lu Shaye, Director -General of African Department of China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, on the seminar of Chinese Dream, African Dream --Achieving Common Development through Joint Efforts (/07/17/13) 436 ChinAf rica Magazine, April 2014 %('!!infrastructure improvement 437, ÒinclusivenessÓ 438, and China -driven economic growth mark the foundation of Chinese strategies for AfricaÕs development. ÒDevelopmentÓ is distinct in its construction of an Afric a-China sustained by Chinese funding, Chinese initiatives, and Chinese competencies, relegating Africa to the role of recipient. In this scenario China is the big brother and African states the little brothers. Li Keqiang, Premier of the State Council, ou tlined ChinaÕs developmental approach to Africa in a speech before the African Union, ÒChina stands ready to exchange development experience and share development opportunities with African countries to promote inclusive development. We are willing to sha re with Africa those readily applicable technologies that China has developed without any reservation. We are also ready to transfer, on a priority basis, suitable labor -intensive industries to Africa to promote employment in Africa, as this is good for bo th sides and benefits the two peoples.Ó 439 The principal source of ChinaÕs developmental prowess rests on the fact that ÒChina has gone through the development stage Africa is currently in (and) the experience and technologies it has gained over the years wi ll dovetail with Africa's development needsÓ. 440 Therefore, it is thought to possess technological and economic acuity, and the ability to transfer that knowledge to African states. 441 437 Remarks by H.E. Wang Yi Minister of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China at the Launch of the Book A Monument to China -Africa Friendship: First -hand Account of the Building of Tazara (7/23/15) 438 Remarks by Vice Fore ign Minister Zhai Jun at the Seventh Lanting Forum (7/19/12) 439 Bring About a Better Future for China -Africa Cooperation Speech by H.E. Li Keqiang Premier of the State Council of the PeopleÕs Republic of China At the AU Conference Center Addis Ababa, 5 May 2014 440 Broad Prospects for the New Type of China -Africa Strategic Partnership, Remarks by Vice Foreign Minister Zhai Jun at the Seventh Lanting Forum 2012 -07-19 441 Jennifer G. Cooke Chapter 3, ChinaÕs Soft Power in Africa. %((!!A successful economy is an important source of attraction and ChinaÕs devel opmental success and willingness to work with African leaders is a compelling inducement for African heads of state, who have yet to fully enjoy the wholesale benefits of economic development. African leaders, such as MoroccoÕs head of the government Abdel ilah Benkirane and Namibian President Hage Geingob, have understandably praised ChinaÕs developmental assistance. 442 ÒAbove all, I should like to underscore the important role played by the PeopleÕs Republic of China as well as its continued contributions to the development of our continent and its exemplary solidarity with African countries. I wish to pay tribute to this great nation, which is steeped in history, for all it has been doing for the emergence of a peaceful, multipolar world, and for its unti ring action to serve the best interests of the countries of the South and support their legitimate ambitions. 443 ÒChinaÕs investment in Africa over the past several decades has been invaluable. These include investments in transport infrastructure developme nt and capacity building. This has enhanced AfricaÕs capability in moving goods and services. This level of support has existed for decades and is not a new trend as some may have us believe. 442 It is worth noting than many such speeches are delivered at or at events celebrating the FOCAC Summits. 443 MoroccoÕs head of the government Abdelilah Benkirane represented MoroccoÕs head of state King Mohammed VI in the Second Forum on China -Africa Cooperation, an event which took pla ce in Johannesburg on December 4 -5. %()!!In Namibia, we can attest to a number of key investments by Chin a which have made a significant impact on our economy.Ó 444 Homegrown Development The absence of wholesale development across the African continent has been attributed to everything from the behavior of corrupt governments and the failure of democracy to take hold, 445 small markets and a lack of market integration, 446 continued marginalization, 447 lack of infrastructure, 448 the tendency to externalize problems, 449 a lack of productive capital, 450 and a preference for leisure time. 451 A small contingent of Africanist schola rs, however, pinpoint the exact nature of underdevelopment across several African nations on the inheritance of economies with external cultural orientations. 452 This factor is particularly important during the current era of globalization, which like Slave ry, colonialism, and neocolonialism before it, attempts to expand the boundaries of capital using principally Western models. 453 Again, the orientation is external, leaving the task to African leaders to replace existing systems in an effort to integrate int o the global economy. For its part, the Chinese narrative, while also focused on ChinaÕs role as a development model , strikes a fine balance between external, PRC -driven solutions and internally drive, homegrown development in Africa. The Chinese discursi vely construct 444 President Geingob's speech at the opening of the FOCAC Summit, Mon, 7 December 2015 03:57 445 Van de Walle 52; Falola 197; Mills 446 Rodney 1981, 167 447 Van de Walle 2001 448 Chabal 2009, 118 449 Mills 2011 450 Sachs 2005 451 Gilbe rt and Reynolds 2012, 63 452 Okereke and Agupusi 2014; Bhengu 2011 453 Shivji 2009, 53 %(*!!the narrative of Ôhomegrown developmentÕ for Africa through an insistence that African states Òexplore a development path suited to the countryÕs conditionsÓ 454 and that Beijing can only provide developmental guidance to Africa within the limi ts of its capacity to do so. Fijalkowski (2011) suggests that ChinaÕs reluctance to be more prescriptive in its approach is attributable to thinking that actively promoting the Chinese experience would infringe upon the rights of African nations to self -determination and domestic sovereignty, a central component of the PRCÕs foreign policy. 455 President Xi JinpingÕs speech during the Sixth Ministerial Conference of the Forum on China -Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) in 2015 underscored ChinaÕs approach to ensuring African ownership in its developmental future, ÒTodayÕs Africa is a continent of encouraging and dynamic development. Africa has actively explored a path of development suited to its conditions and adhered to the principle of solving African issues in the African way. Such a momentum of independent development is unstoppable. Africa has actively advanced industrialization and pursued sustainable self -development. Such a momentum of rapid growth is unstoppable. Africa has accelerated its integration process and speaks in one voice on the international stage. Such a momentum of pursuing strength through unity is unstoppable.Ó 456 454 ÒBring About a Better Future for China -Africa CooperationÓ Speech by H.E. Li Keqiang, Premier of the State Council of the PeopleÕs Republic of China, At the AU Conference Center, Addis Ababa, 5 May 2014 455 Fijalkowski 2011 456 President Xi Jinping Speech at FOCAC 2015 %(+!!Chinese Ambassador to South Africa, Tian Xuejun, also reinforced BeijingÕs commitment to Homegrown Development in Africa. Tian Xuejun shared his thoughts thusly , ÒPresident Xi once said ÔOnly the wearer of the shoes knows if they fit or not.Õ There is no universal development model in the world and China never exports our ideology, let alone imposes our development model on others. We b elieve that African people have the wisdom and capability to find paths that suited to their national conditions. We are ready to offer help within our capacity in their endeavor.Ó 457 Development Aid Western aid policies and economic conditionalities levied on the African continent have compelled its leaders to adopt neoliberal development models designed without adequate consideration for local imperatives. 458 Consequently, western developmental mandates have been likened Òre -colonizationÓ 459 or a Ònew anti -colo nial imperialism,Ó 460 rather than development in Africa. The PRC adopts a vastly different strategy of dispensing developmental aid on the continent, one regularly reinforced within brand -China , as a longstanding pattern of altruistic acts toward African peo ple. Foreign Minister Wang Yi stressed ChinaÕs benevolence toward Africa during a speech before the 15 th Lanting Forum, 457 Promote Exchanges and Mutual Learning for Common Development 2015/09/17 Address by H.E. Ambassador Tian Xuejun At the Governance of China and Africa Relations Symposium 458 Okereke and Agupusi 2014 459 Edozie and Soyinka 2010, 201 460 Rist 2014, 75 %(,!!ÒWe will never forget that, last year, when the Ebola epidemic wreaked havoc in west Africa and many international airlines stopped fly ing there. China rented chartered planes flying half of the globe across three continents to deliver materials urgently needed by people in the epidemic -stricken areas. When some countries were evacuating their people, China was sending in top -level expert s and medical workers to join the local communities in fighting against Ebola.Ó 461 With an emphasis on Ômutual benefitÕ and Ôdiversity of form,Õ very little Chinese aid to Africa follows the formula of traditional development assistance. Rather, aid takes th e form of agreements in various fields, including education, health, agriculture, infrastructure development, and humanitarian assistance and peacekeeping; and the establishment of profit -generating joint ventures involving Chinese state -owned enterprises (SOEs). 462 Chinese aid differs from the west not only in terms of its motivation and content, but also because Beijing does not attach particular economic or political conditionalities (save for the adherence to the ÔOne China PolicyÕ) to its aid packages. This narrative of China as an antithetical development partner to the west runs throughout brand -China . Declarations that Òour aid and investment are provided sincerely without any political conditions attachedÓ 463 are repeated in some iteration within 71 art ifacts. 461 Build on Past Achievements and Open up the Future of All -round Development of China -Africa Friendship and Cooperation, Speech by Foreign Minister Wang Yi at the 15th Lan ting Forum 2015/11/26 462 Shelton, 2001, 114 463 H.E. Xi Jinping, President of the People's Republic of China at the Asian -African Summit, Jakarta, 22 April 2015 %(-!!Howard French (2014) balks at Chinese claims of altruism in Africa. Likening Chinese infrastructure projects to a millennial version of the colonial project, French notes, Òtoday one easily forgets that ports, railways, roads, and the administrat ive districts that became the downtowns of capitals around the world were built on an extraordinary scale all over the world by Westerners in the driven pursuit of their own interests. As manufacturing powers, they needed their goods to circulate, and they needed the raw materials from far -flung places in order to make them. Seen in this light, it scarcely seems coincidental that China, a country that has surged from near autarky to becoming the so -called factory of the world in the space of a mere generati on, has quickly become the most ambitious builder of infrastructure in Africa, the worldÕs fastest -growing region, both demographically and economically, and the source of a disproportionate share of the globeÕs natural resources.Ó China Dream Upon rising to the head of the Chinese Communist Party in November 2012, President Xi Jinping outlined a vision for the nationÕs future, which he referred to as the ÒChinese DreamÓ. In his proclamation that "the great revival of the Chinese nation is the greatest Chi nese Dream,Ó 464 Xi Jinping articulated Beijing Õs strategies for becoming a middle -income country by 2021, the 100th anniversary of the Chinese Communist Party; and for becoming a fully developed nation by about 2049, the 100th 464 H.E. Ambassador Liu Guangyuan ÒThe Chinese Dream: How Africa can Benefit from Beijing's Vast ExperienceÓ Daily Nation , July 30, 2013 %).!!anniversary of the founding of the People's Republic. The vision of the ÒChinese DreamÓ is an oft -cited component of the brand -China development narrative, exemplified by statements such that the ÒChinese people are working hard to realize the ÔChina DreamÕ of achieving national prosp erity and rejuvenation, as well as the people's happiness. At the same time, 2.1 million Namibian people are pursuing a "Namibia Dream" of achieving stable economic growth and national industrialization.Ó 465 Ambassador Xin ShunkangÕs statement also reinforc es the practice of connecting the Chinese and African ÔDreamsÕ nee experiences through statements that ÒWith common ideals, similar historical experiences and a shared need for development, China and Africa both pursue stability and peace in their dreams. We are both committed to safeguarding and promoting world peace. Our joint efforts to realize our dreams as peace -loving and peace -pursuing nations will greatly strengthen the force for peace and stability and add to the efforts of building a harmonious wo rld of enduring peace and common prosperity.Ó 466 The ÔChinese DreamÕ for development is clearly articulated as a manifestation of the hard work and ingenuity of the Chinese people yet, rhetorically; the ÔAfrican dreamÕ is achievable through African unity wit h China or other nations. For ÒAfrica, 465 Remarks by H.E. Ambassador Xin Shunkang At the Reception Marking the 25th Anniversary of China Namibia Diplomatic Relations March 25, 2015 466 Speech by Lu Shaye, Director -General of African Department of China's Min istry of Foreign Affairs, on the seminar of Chinese Dream, African Dream --Achieving Common Development through Joint Efforts July 17, 2013 %)%!!once poor and backward in development, is emerging as a continent of hope and growthÓ thanks to Chinese support. 467 This is born out by Òhistory and reality (which) tell us that when China develops well, Africa will get opportunities; (and) when Africa develops well, China will stand to benefit.Ó 468 China is Òwilling to link the Chinese dream with the African dream and China's two centenary goals with Africa's development strategiesÓ 469. The PRC brings Òrelative advantages i n development experience and production factorsÓ to the relationship, whilst African countries , similarly to earlier eras of capital accumulation, contribute Ònatural and human resources and its huge marketÓ 470. Industrial growth, like all modes of producti on, requires human resources, capital resources, and natural resources. Africa has never been short of natural or human factors, while population growth in China contributes to the declination of domestic resource stores. Another impact of industrializatio n in China is surplus production, making fulfillment of the ÔChinese DreamÕ dependent in many ways on securing new markets outside Asia for domestically produced goods. Africa as Ôresource hubÕ and Ônew goods marketÕ is a storyline played out throughout tr ansatlantic slavery and colonialism. The paradox within neoliberal globalization is that rather than resou rces and goods flowing westward , in this iteration the contraflow sends them eastward under the guise of development. 467 Remarks by H.E. Wang Yi Minister of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China At the Launch of the Book A M onument to China -Africa Friendship: First -hand Account of the Building of Tazara July 23, 2015 468 Speech by H.E. Li Keqiang, Premier of the State Council of the PeopleÕs Republic of China (2014) 469 Seize Development Opportunities and Achieve Win -Win Results Remarks by Ambassador Tian Xuejun at the opening ceremony of China -Africa Entrepreneurs Forum 2015/07/20 470 Speech by Foreign Minister Wang Yi at the 15th Lanting Forum 2015/11/26 %)&!!Friendship The third most comm only mentioned theme is Òfriendship.Ó As a strategic narrative, items in this category referred to Africa or African people (or the inverse, China or the Chinese) as friend, friends, friendly, referenced an extant friendship between the two regions, or mad e statements indicative of a friendship or alliance. Speakers from both regions categorized interaction between Africa and China as friendly, alternately alluding to the relationship as Òlong termÓ, an Òunbreakable bondÓ471, Òtrue friendsÓ Òdeeply rooted,Ó 472 Òbosom friends,Ó 473 and an Òunwavering friend(ship).Ó 474 A 2013 speech by the Chinese Ambassador to South Africa, Tian Xuejun, celebrating the 15th anniversary of diplomatic relations between China and South Africa, epitomizes the Afro -Chinese friendship narr ative : ÒThe first letter "F" stands for friendship, as it is the bonding tie linking China and South Africa together. Chinese has an old saying, ÔDistance cannot separate true friends, even when they are thousands of miles apartÕ. Despite of the long geog raphical distance, the people of our two countries enjoy a profound traditional friendship, and such a relationship is the inexhaustible driving force behind the comprehensive, rapid and 471 Speech by H.E. Li Keqiang, Premier of the State Council of the PeopleÕs R epublic of China, At the AU Conference Center, Addis Ababa, (2014) 472 Address by Amb. Tian Xuejun at The Reception Celebrating The 15 th Anniversary of Diplomatic Relations Between South African And China. 473 Remarks by H.E. Mr. Xin Shunkang, Chinese Ambassa dor to Namibia (2014). 474 Speech by Sun Xianghua on the Donation Ceremony from the China -Lesotho People -to-People Friendship Action Fund to Maseru Poverty -stricken Students 2017/02/21 %)'!!sound development of China -SA relationship. This is something that we must cherish.Ó 475 Tian Xuejun engages several key concepts within the narrative of brand -China as Òfriend Ó. The first is indubitably friendship. The second is affinity or similitude despite difference. Reinforcing the thinking that African and Chinese peop le choose to unify as a community by choice despite the geographical and social distance between them. Thirdly, Tian Xuejun Õs statements situate BeijingÕs interest in Africa as fundamentally rooted in tradition or historical patterns of engagement. Finally , Tian Xuejun Õs remarks speak to the need to protect or ÔcherishÕ the relationship for the future. The message is that Africa and China are friends. It is a friendship built upon longstanding, historical, or ÔtraditionalÕ relations between the two regions, and it is this same friendship that serves as a catalyst to contemporary and future interactions between Africa and China. Historical Friendship References to ChinaÕs longstanding, historical or traditional friendship with Africa are often tethered to men tions of pre -enslavement trade relations between the regions dating back millennia. Artifacts frequently memorialize a Òtraditional friendshipÓ or Òhistorical friendshipÓ between Chinese and African people predicated on Ò600 yearsÓ of camaraderie. 476 Then Ch inese President, Hu Jintao, remarked in 2006 that Òthough vast oceans keep China and Africa apart, the friendship between our two peoples has a long history, and having been tested by times, is strong and vigorous.Ó 477 Remarks by 475 Speech delivered January 31, 2013 in Pretoria, South Africa to celebr ate the 15th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relationship between the People's Republic of China and the Republic of South Africa. 476 Speech byh.E. Mr. Liu Guangyuan, the Chinese Ambassador to Kenya 2010/10/11 477 Address by Hu Jintao, Presid ent of the PeoplesÕs Republic of China at the Opening Ceremony of the Beijing Summit of the Forum of China -Africa Cooperation Beijing, November 4, 2006, accessed at http://www.focac.org on 07/07/2017. %)(!!the Chinese Ambassador to Na mibia during the Evening of Nanjing Cultural Performance (2015) are typical of the usage of historical connections between African and Chinese people, ÒAs we all know, the traditional friendship between China and Namibia came into being in the struggle o f the Namibian people for national liberation and independence. Since 1960s our two peoples support each other, help each other and strive side by side. On 22 March 1990, the day after Namibia got independent, China established formal diplomatic relations with Namibia. Hence, no matter how the international situation changes, China and Namibia are always good friends, good brothers and good partners.Ó 478 Historical friendship is also discursively co -constructed by African leaders by means of similar framewor ks. During an address before the South Africa -China Business Forum in Beijing, Jacob Zuma, then President of the Republic of South Africa, expressed his appreciation for Chinese friendship thusly, ÒThe rise of China indicates that the world is now returni ng to its historical economic powers and trade patterns! Our visit is therefore a natural progression, building on relations that date back so many thousands of years ago between China and Africa.Ó 479 478 Ambassador's Remarks at the Evening of Nanjing Cultu ral Performance 2015/04/17 479 Address by President JG Zuma to the South Africa -China Business Forum on the occasion of the state visit to the People's Republic of China, Beijing 24 Aug 2010 %))!!Such s tatemen ts refute claims undermining ChinaÕs intere st in the continent by establishing a timeline of historical interaction points between the two regions. These claims support assertions that Afro -Chinese relations predate the presence of the European in Africa. Zuma continues, recapitulating tales of Afr icaÕs longstanding, traditional, and historical friendship with China thusly, ÒSome of you may be surprised to hear that trade relations between China and Africa in general and South Africa in particular, dates back more than a thousand years. We know fr om historical records that the kingdom of Mapungubwe in Limpopo province, in the northern part of South Africa already had commercial links with China that far back. We should also recall that the famous Chinese mariner, explore r, diplomat and $ eet admiral, Zheng was sent by the Ming Emperor Yong Le, on expeditions to explore the "western oceans" in the early # fteenth century. He opened up trade routes as far south as Mozambique.Ó 480 ZumaÕs reference to Zheng historicizes Afro -Chin ese relations in a manner consistent with Chinese constructions of the relationship .481 On the 600th anniversary of his voyage, Beijing launched a campaign in ZhengÕs honor, privileging the navigator Õs contribution to China Õs Ôlongstanding Õ, Ôanti -colonial Õ friend ship and partner ship with Africa. Zheng serves as a placeholder illustrating the longevity and consistency of Afro -Chinese relations within 14 artifacts. A speech by Chinese Foreign 480 Address by President JG Zuma to the South Africa -China Busine ss Forum on the occasion of the state visit to the People's Republic of China, Beijing 24 Aug 2010 481 Zheng He was a Chinese navigator during the Ming Dynasty (1368 -1644). One journey transported Zheng to the eastern shoreline of Kenya, bringing with him bo th ÒChinese porcelain and friendship,Ó and upon his departure for China, he was gifted a giraffe by the people of Malindi. Thus, according to Chinese lore, began the long -standing, traditional friendship between Po -pa-li and Zhongguo. %)*!!Minister Wang Yi at the 15th Lanting Forum in 2015 provides but one example of how ZhengÕs memory is reactivated in contemporary Afro -Chinese relations, 482 ÒThis spirit is rooted in the long -standing traditional friendship and mutual support between China and Africa. Early in the 15th century, China's navigator Zheng He hea ded his fleet and arrived at the east coast of Africa for four times. That was a time when China was the strongest in the world. What they brought to Africa were silk and porcelain, and friendship and goodwill. They did not grab an inch of land. Nor did th ey ever take back one single slave.Ó 483 By activating ZhengÕs memory, the PRC creates an historical reference point establishing ChinaÕs harmonious presence on the continent pre -European conquest. Curating an image of Afro -China established through the mutua lly beneficial exchange of gifts, historical friendship, and cultural propinquity reinforces the notion that if not for the transatlantic slave trade and colonialism, the Afro -Chinese relationship as Ôfriends, brothers, and partnersÕ would have continued u ninterrupted for more than 600 years. Liu Guangyuan, the Chinese Ambassador to Kenya referenced this point in an editorial to The Nation , when he wrote, ÒIt would be appropriate, therefore, to claim that friendship between China and Kenya started almost 60 0 years ago with a beautiful and elegant giraffe.Ó 484 Perhaps more importantly, the narrative also potentially transforms how domestic and international publics view China and its interactions with 482 ÒBuild on Past Achi evements and Open up the Future of All -round Development of China -Africa Friendship and CooperationÓ --Speech by Foreign Minister Wang Yi at the 15th Lanting Forum 2015/11/26 483 ibid 484 H.E. Mr. Liu Guangyuan, the Chinese Ambassador to Kenya ÒFrom Giraffe t he diplomat to 'Peace Ark'Ó The Nation October 11, 2010 %)+!!African nations and refutes claims that BeijingÕs interest i n Africa is rooted in political realism. Solidarity The traditional friendship between Africa and China is also reinforced through the narrative of Afro -Chinese solidarity or south -south relations. Dating from the Bandung Conference (1955) and African liberation movements (1957 -), the narrative of Afro -Chinese ÒsolidarityÓ establishes a timeline of mutual support rooted in similar positioning between the two regions rather than capital accumulation. President Xi Jinping asserted during the opening to th e Forum on China -Africa Cooperation in 2015 that Òwe have always supported each other in trying times. The Tazara Railway and the Convention Center of the African Union built with Chinese assistance are landmarks of China -Africa friendship. The Chinese go vernment and people took the lead in helping Africa fight Ebola and led the international community in its efforts to assist Africa to combat the epidemic, demonstrating the bond of brotherhood between China and Africa in time of difficulty.Ó 485 Memories of the Bandung Conference are activated as a metaphor for the might of subjugated nations united against a common adversary. Xi Jinping remarked at the Asian -African Summit that, ÒSixty years ago, leaders from 29 Asian and African countries attended the Band ung Conference, giving birth to the Bandung Spirit of 485 Chinese resident Xi Jinping at the Opening to FOCAC 2015 %),!!solidarity, friendship and cooperation, galvanizing the national liberation movement that swept across Asia, Africa and Latin America, and accelerating the global process of decolonizationÓ 486 Fennell (20 13) argues that prior to the Bandung Conference, however, Òmentions of Africa in the Chinese press were virtually nonexistent, as was interaction with African people,Ó 487 yet, Post -Bandung Conference China claimed Òto belong with Africans to the Third World. Ó488 Contemporary rhetoric of the Bandung ConferenceÕs outcomes and Chinese and African participation within it fall short of reality. Post -Bandung and during the African liberation struggles of the 1960s and 1970s, the Afro -Chinese relationship continued based upon a shared aversion to the Western capitalist model that governed colonialism. At the time Chinese investment was more ideologically than economically motivated and focused on supporting the regionÕs guerilla fighters and Socialist regimes, such as Julius NyerereÕs Tanzania and AngolaÕs UNITA. 489 Contemporary narratives of Afro -Chinese solidarity make repeated reference to this period. Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi expressed during the 15 th Lanting Forum in 2015 that, ÒWe will never forget that in the middle of the last century, the Chinese people, after winning national liberation, gave full support to African countries in their just struggle to oppose hegemonism, colonialism and to gain national independence and liberation.Ó 490 486 ÒCarry Forward the Bandung Spirit for Win -win CooperationÓ Remarks by H.E. Xi Jinping President of the People's Republic of China at the Asian -African Summit, Jakarta, 22 April 2015 487 Fennel 2013, 256 488 Monson 2008 489 Jauch 2011 490 Build on Past Achievements and Open up all -around Development of China -Africa Friendship %)-!!African thoughts are expressed most resoundingly within the narrativ e of Afro -Chinese solidarity and leaders reference solidarity between the two regions as the underpinning to contemporary relations between African nations and China. MoroccoÕs head of the government, Abdelila h Benkirane, expressed that Ò Above all, I should like to underscore the important role played by the PeopleÕs Republic of China as well as its continued contributions to the development of our continent and its exemplary solidarity with African countries.Ó South African Minister of Science and Technology, Naledi Pandor, similarly remarked ÒAs we look back at our struggle for liberation and our progress since 1994, we do so fully aware that the support and solidarity from China played a critical role in our success.Ó Within South Africa, particularly, President Jacob Zuma and his cabinet frequently cited the ÒBandung SpiritÓ or alluded to Chinese solidarity during decolonization as symbolic of the Afro -Chinese relationshipÕs firm foundations and BeijingÕs con sistent loyalty to the African continent. During an Address by Zuma to the South Africa -China Business Forum, he stated ÒWhen friends were fewer, during the struggle against apartheid, China was available to assist, and we are grateful for that solidarity. Ó491 South African Minister of Education, Blade Nzimande, similarly paid homage to Afro -Chinese solidarity in his speech during the launch of the Africa -China network, Gordon Institute of Business Science in 2010, when he remarked Ò As early as the 1950s and 1960s, China and Africa had fought side by side in the struggle against imperialism and colonialism.Ó 492 491 Address by President JG Zuma to the South Africa -China Business Forum o n the occasion of the state visit to the People's Republic of China, Beijing 492 Address by the Minister of Higher Education and Training, Dr Blade Nzimande, at the launch of the Africa -China network, Gordon Institute of Business Science, 18 Jan 2010 %*.!!The narrative of historical and contemporary solidarity with Africa is frequently employed to portray the PRC as a still developing yet selfless, formerl y colonized subject. 493 Yet, this construction of Africa -China is inconsistent with reality. Fennel l (2013) portrays Chinese intervention as Òpart of a theoretically based international strategyÓ rather than based in Òaltruism or feelings of good willÓ (253) . The disconnect between the PRCÕs projected image and its identity has increasingly become the subject of scholarly inquiry regarding its relationship to Africa and an important rationale for nation branding within the context of Afro -Chinese relations. Partnership In January 2006, the Chinese government released a document outlining its newly articulated ÔAfrica PolicyÕ. The plan outlined a blueprint for enhancing Afro -Chinese relations beyond diplomatic and economic cooperation, into previously untapped areas such as science and technology, education, culture, and peace and security. 494 Most distinctively, the policy detailed a blueprint for better incorporating and involving African nations in determining the direction and tenor of Chinese participation on the continent. BeijingÕs focus on nurturing and establishing new cooperative partnerships is the fourth most frequently referenced theme within brand -China . Through the narrative of ÒpartnershipÓ, the PRC stresses the equitable role of Afro -Chinese relati ons, unlike that of ÒdevelopmentÓ, which is China -led. Repeatedly expressed through messages of ÔcooperationÕ, including references to the Afro -Chinese relationship as Ôwin -winÕ, Ômutually beneficial,Õ Ôsouth -southÕ, working together to achieve a common go al, the Forum on China Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), partnership, and teamwork; 493 Koi nski 2011; Michel and Beuret 2009; Kurlantzick 58 494 %*%!!construction of the Afro -Chinese relationship as one underpinned by African regard for ÒChina as their most important and reliable partnerÓ 495 or as a relationship amongst Òfriends who have long supported and worked to promote China -Africa cooperation 496Ó is commonplace. Cooperation Similarly to the rhetoric of solidarity undergirding the narrative of Afro -Chinese friendship, ÒcooperationÓ is regarded as the cornerstone of successful and ongoing partnerships between the two regions . A Speech by H.E. Li Keqiang Premier of the State Council of the PeopleÕs Republic of China speask to the potential for cooperative relations between Africa and China: ÒWith splendid chapters already writt en, China -Africa cooperation is poised to turn a brand new page. Characterized by their unprecedented scope of common interests and a much more solid foundation, China -Africa cooperation should seize the good opportunity and focus on the future. China woul d like to make joint efforts with African countries to actively promote major projects in six areas to upgrade our cooperation.Ó 497 Within Òpartnership,Ó great care is taken to distinguish between the need for African nations to align their interests and pra ctices with other states in an increasingly interdependent world order against the desire to retain their national sovereignty. 495 Speech delivered by Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi at the 15th Lanting Forum (2015). 496 Speech by H.E. Li Keqiang, Premier of the State Council of the PeopleÕs Republic of China, At the AU Conference Center, Addis Ababa, 5 May 2014 497 Bring About a Better Future for China -Africa Cooperation Speech by H.E. Li Keqiang Premier of the State Council of the PeopleÕs Republic of China At the AU Conference Center Addis Ababa, 5 May 2014 %*&!!Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Zhai Jun at the Seventh Lanting Forum (2012) points out, Òthat Africa belongs to the Africans; it is not anyone's "cheese". Any country that wishes to develop cooperation with Africa must respect the ownership of African countries. In a globalized world, countries' destinies are closely linked. China's relations with Africa are open and inclusive. It is all about cooperation rather than confrontation with any third party.Ó 498 African leaders were also keen to point out the significance of Afro -Chinese cooperation as an integral component of the African development potential. South African Cabinet Minist er Jeff Radebe remarked on the occasion of the inaugural China -Africa Media Summit that, ÒWe also invite our Chinese friends to partner with us in championing development in the continent through new business ventures, infrastructure development, media ca pacity development and many other areas of mutual interest. Together we can take Africa and China forward in positive ways that have never been imagined before.Ó 499 Much of the cooperation narrative also references ChinaÕs benevolent desire to help Africa an d African people, such as ÒIn light of the pressing need of Africa, China will strengthen its cooperation with Africa in areas such as infrastructure and 498 ÒBroad Prospects for the New Type of China -Africa Strategic PartnershipÓ Remarks by Vice Foreign Minister Zhai Jun at the Seventh Lanting Forum 2012 -07-19 499 1 Dec 2015 Opening Key Note Address by Minister Radebe during the inaugural China -Africa Media Summit held in Cape Town %*'!!industrialization, agricultural modernization, public health, people -to-people and cultural exchanges as well as peace and securityÓ 500 or ÒChina will share her experiences with (Africa) where and when necessary, so as to make our shared dreams come true.Ó 501 Similarly to the rhetoric of benevolence found throughout colonial constructions of Africa ,502 in this account, Afro -Chinese cooperation becomes rooted in AfricaÕs fundamentally pressing need for Chinese assistance. This narrative suggests that China is working with Africa because Africa needs the PRCÕs help. Yet, despite such needs, assistance can only pa ternalistically be meted out once African nations are deemed ready to receive it. African leaders, alternatively, while also stressing the significance of collaborative partnerships to the continentÕs continued growth and development, view Afro -Chinese rel ations as a vehicle through which African states can increase their international profiles by becoming global player s Òand not entirely depend on the generosities of others for the welfare of its people.Ó 503 The ÒcooperationÓ discourse, nonetheless, goes han d in hand with the concept of Afro -Chinese relations being equal, win -win, and/or mutually beneficial to all parties. These concepts are typified within statements by Hage Geingob, President of the Republic of Namibia, during the opening of the FOCAC Summi t in 2015, 500 Address by Chinese Ambassador to South Africa Tian Xuejun at the National Day Reception 2015/09/30 501 Speech by H.E. Ambassador Liu Guangyuan, Chinese Ambassador to Kenya, at the Reception to Mark the 50th Anniversary of the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations between China and Kenya (2015) 502 (Bonsu, 2009) 503 Remarks by Dr. Blade Nzimande, South African Minister of Higher Education and Training, at the launch of the Africa -China Network (2010). %*(!!ÒThe theme of China and Africa Progressing Together in a Win -Win Cooperation for Common Development is highly appropriate and speaks respectfully towards AfricaÕs demand for equal partnership and mutually beneficial developmentÉ In Namibia and i n Africa, we value the special relations we share with China. FOCAC is the ideal platform for us to build upon those relations for the purpose of mutual benefit.Ó 504 Nigerian President, Mohammed Buhari, likewise spoke to the mutual benefits of Afro -Chinese c ooperation during the commissioning ceremony for three naval ships in 2016, when he commented "I take this opportunity to pay tribute to this friendship, especially in acknowledgment of the mutually helpful military cooperation, of which the Nigerian Navy has been a major beneficiary.Ó 505 MoroccoÕs head of the government, Abdelilah Benkirane, engaged the narrative of cooperation during the Second Forum on China -Africa Cooperation, in his remarks that ÒOur determination to carry out concerted action and engag e in pragmatic cooperation is based on the principles of mutual benefits and shared development.Ó 506 Collectively these statements speak to what Lukasz Fijalkowski (2011) categorizes as ChinaÕs political and economic attractiveness in Africa. The PRC has ded icated tremendous resources toward Òbuilding a positive image in African states, particularly through promoting the vision of a Ôwin - winÕ strategy of mutual economic benefitsÓ, which 504 Statement By His Excellency Hage G. Geingob, Preside nt Of The Republic Of Namibia At The Opening Of The Forum On China -Africa Cooperation (Focac) Summit Johannesburg, South Africa, 5 December 2015 505 Nigerian President Mohammed Buhari s peech on the occasion of the commissioning ceremony for three naval ships in 2016 506 Abdelilah Benkirane, the Second Forum on China -Africa Cooperation, delivering a speech on behalf of MoroccoÕs King Mohammed %*)!!appeals the African states who have historically been divorced of the ability to direct their nation sÕ developmental paths. 507 Common South Identity Brand -China also makes use of the PRCÕs commonly shared roots with Africa as a similarly developing country and member of the Ôglobal southÕ rather than a Western state. This aspec t of the partnership narrative is demonstrably most visible in artifacts produced by African leaders. Dr. Blade Nzimande, South African Minister of Higher Education and Training, as an example, remarked during the launch of the Africa -China Network (2010): ÒThe burgeoning relationship between South Africa and China is based on a foundation of both our countries commitment to strengthening and deepening South -South collaboration. The new dynamic of the global political economy, especially the current globa l economic crisis and the threats posed by climate change, is the growing assertion of emerging powers such as Sout h Africa and China to forge a new dispensation that seeks to challenge traditional institutions and entrenched systems and in $ uence positive change in favour of ourselves in the developing world.Ó 508 During the same year (2015), Chinese President Xi Jinping also spoke of the importance of cooperation between Ôglobal southÕ partners in his declaration that, 507 Lukasz Fijalkowski (2011) 508 Remarks by Dr. Bla de Nzimande, South African Minister of Higher Education and Training, at the launch of the Africa -China Network (2010). %**!!ÒSecond, we should expand South -South cooperation. Mr. Deng Xiaoping, the chief architect of China's reform and opening -up, once said that South -South co operation was such a well -put term that we must give whoever invented it a big medal. Indeed, developing countries in their large numbers are all faced with the common mission of accelerating development and improving people's lives. They ought to look to one another for comfort and come to each other's aid in times of difficulty. And they should actively carry out cooperation across the board to realize their respective development blueprints. A successful Asian -African cooperation will set a good and impo rtant example for South -South cooperation in other parts of the world.Ó 509 Xi JinpingÕs remarks, though not delivered before an exclusively African audience, are emblematic of messages embedded within the Chinese narrative of cooperation. Such examples lend credence to ChinaÕs positioning as a counterhegemonic force against Western tyranny insisting, instead, that the partnershipÕs utility is rooted in its longstanding affiliation and predicated upon a Ôcommon southÕ identity of victimization by Òwestern imp erialism.Ó 510 Those favoring the association also mention that relations were initiated at a time in which ÒChina did not wield the economic or military power it now does and at the time, the nations were on fairly equal footing,Ó speaking to an extant equit y in the relationship. 511 509 Remarks by H.E. Xi Jinping, President of the People's Republic of China At the Asian -African Summit, Jakarta, 22 April 2015 510 Kopin ski et al, 2011 511 (-Ritchie 2008 %*+!!Conclusion This chapter investigated the specific nature of brand -China in Africa. ChinaÕs nation brand is a powerful geopolitical tool in Africa. It exhibits how Beijing hopes to be viewed by international publics; semiotically c onstructing and then transforms the Afro -Chinese relationship for multiple audiences through repetitively reiterating key aspects of the narrative at every touchpoint. The chapterÕs principal concern was with how the Chinese state and state -owned or suppo rted enterprises (SOEs) utilize nation branding to construct BeijingÕs image on the continent and how those images align with or deviate from official brand messages of Africa -China. Using speeches, magazine covers, editorials, and newspaper editorials as the population of communication, the chapter critically unpacked the semiotic messaging and rhetorical intent of artifacts developed by the PRC and multiple African states. Each artifact offered insight into one or more of the critical components of brand -China : ÒsamenessÓ, ÒdevelopmentÓ, ÒfriendshipÓ, and Òpartnership.Ó Images of both Africa and China are reflected in ChinaÕs national imaginary through images of ÒbrotherhoodÓ, shared subjugation, and ÒsolidarityÓ with Africa. Frequent stories of the Tazara Railway or Bandung Conference are told to underscore the continuity of Afro -Chinese relations and Chinese loyalty to and solidarity with African people. %*,!!Chapter Six We Look Forward "How do you know I'm real? I'm not real. I'm just like you. You don' t exist in this society. If you did people wouldn't be seeking equal rights. You're not real. If you were you'd have some status among the nations of the world. So we're both myths." --Sun Ra (1974) Introduction The Chinese State strategically manufactures a narrative of its national imaginary in Africa as an antithetical construction of the West Ñsymbolically establishing an imagined community predicated upon feelings of ÔsamenessÕ, ÔfriendshipÕ, ÔpartnershipÕ, and development. Images of both Africa and Chi na are represented within brand -China, underpinned by the concepts of brotherhood, a common south identity, shared subjugation, and solidarity with Africa. ChinaÕs nation brand acts as a powerful geopolitical tool in Africa, exhibiting how the Beijing hope s to be viewed by domestic and international publics. Brand -China semiotically constructs and then malleably transforms the Afro -Chinese relationship for various constituencies through the reiteration of key aspects of the narrative at every touchpoint. Unintentionally entangled within these narratives are images often at variance with brand -China; western rhetoric warning of a Ònew colonialismÓ 512 and competing messages from within China 513 offer conflicting messages of the Chinese and their opinions of Afric a and her people. Such messages 512 Zhao, Suisheng. "A neo -colonialist predator or development partner? China's engagement and rebalance in Africa." Journal of Contemporary China 23.90 (2014): 1033 -1052. 513 ÒLunar New Year: Chinese TV gala includes 'racist b lackface' sketchÓ http://www.bbc.com/news/world -asia -china -43081218 %*-!!also frequently employ tropes of African history, African traditionalism, and African passivity reminiscent of European portrayals of African racial alterity rather than Afro -Chinese proximity. Notwithstanding, the PRC conti nues to construct an imagined community of cultural proximity between Chinese and African people, often belying the reality of the fundamental changes China experienced , its own particular history, and internalized racism in China. Equal ly important to th e narrative of Africa -China, are African responses to these images and messages of se lf and other. The projectÕs goal is to critically challenge the notion of African subjectivity in international politics by privileging African perspectives. As the recent presidential elections in Kenya ,514 Sierra Leone ,515 and most recently, Zimbabwe demonstrate, local perceptions of Chinese influence bear important implications to more than simply the decision of whether to buy Lenovo products in the marketplace or use Wecha t rather than MPesa to send money. The current chapter is grounded in the tradition of Afrocentric social research, as it allows African people within diverse local environments to speak from their own existential conditions. The chapter specifically inqu iries into how university students in three nations Ñthe Gambia, Kenya, and South Africa Ñreceive and reconcile oftentimes conflicting messages of brand -China .516 The analysis focuses specifically on public 514 ÒKenyaÕs Botched Elections: What Role Could China Have Played?Ó http://sierraexpressmedia.com/?p=82914 515 ÒChinaÕs influence looms as Sierra Leone goes to the pollsÓ https://www.theguardi an.com/world/2018/mar/07/chinas -influence -looms -as-sierra -leone -goes -to-the -polls 516 The selected sites are each Anglophone countries, with leading regional economies, and longstanding diplomatic and economic relations with China. The PRC also functions as the largest single exporter of consumer products to each country, which supports an analysis of the correlation between market presence, brand image, and awareness. The Gambia, the third nation under consideration, has long been isolationist and only recen tly established diplomatic relations with Beijing. GambiaÕs unique circumstance should aid in isolating the effects of Brand China from general awareness of the PRC. %+.!!awareness and attitudes toward these new external for ms of national and supranational consciousness. Paying particular attention to the manner in which African agency is reified through individual awareness and attitudes toward brand -China, the researcher seeks to understand how ChinaÕs nation branding works within the context of the PRCÕs relationship to the Gambia, Kenya, and South Africa. The chapter focuses on answering the following organizing questions: 517 Q2. How do African people in diverse environments receive, perceive, and interpret brand -China? Question two investigates congruency between images and messages indicative of brand -China and external factors (message exposure and perspectives of ChinaÕs nation brand image across Africa). Insight from perspectives of China and Africa -China in the Gambia , Kenya, and South Africa contribute to understanding how individuals in diverse environments understand and engage with the PRC as a brand. Particular attention is given to contextualizing how opinions differ across space and time analyzing how social ind icators, such as ethnicity, gender, class, and culture codes influence perspectives. Q3. Does the use of cultural and experiential similarities between Africa -China within brand -China help to facilitate more positive attitudes toward the Chinese ? Common an cestral heritage, coupled with shared historical conditions and situations during most of the last five hundred years, have helped form significant components of global African identity. Building on the historical experience of community formation across A frica and its diaspora, this question explores whether ideas of community are 517 Question 1: Ò What is the nature of ChinaÕs nation brand image in Africa?Ó was addr essed in the preceding chapter. %+%!!being expanded beyond consanguine and geographical boundaries to include the ÒGlobal SouthÓ nee Chinese. Building on themes of brotherhood, solidarity, friendship, culture, and t radition, the question investigates whether and how attitudes toward brand -China are affected by concepts of self and other across diverse African contexts. The chapter employs quantitative methods of inquiry , namely multination survey research, to glean insight into popular opinions, understandings, and awareness of the Afro -Chinese relationship and brand -China in the Gambia, Kenya, and South Africa. Because college students tend to possess comparatively high interest in and knowledge of international rel ations, the survey population consists of 4,213 university students drawn from each of the nations under observation. 518 The chapter begins with a brief introduction, before proceeding to answer r esearch questions two and three and , finally, offers a chapter summary. Study Demographics Participant Profile The study population was drawn from students of six African universities within the Gambia (the University of the Gambia), Kenya (Kenyatta University, the United States International University, Pwani Univer sity), and South Africa (University of Witwatersrand, the University of Johannesburg). A total of 4,213 students were selected for participation, with 554 participants in the Gambia, 2066 participants in Kenya, and 1593 participants in South Africa (table 1). 518 Rojas -M”ndez, Jos” I., Nicolas Papadopoulos, and Mohammed Alwan 2015 %+&!!Gender Respondents identifying as female comprised more than 60 percent o f the survey population (table 3 ), followed by males, who comprised slightly more than one -third (37%) of participants. When examined at the site country level, the Gambian fem ale -to-male participant ratio was evenly split at 50%. These numbers closely align with the general population (50.6 percent female, 49.4 percent male) but were less reflective of composite educational attainment levels within the t iny west African nation (table 4 ).519 Gender disparities were more visible amongst the Kenyan and South African survey populations, where two -thirds of respondents were reportedly female. Though these figures are not representative of those found in the general population for eith er country, they are on par with higher education attainments rates for women nationwide in each country. 520 TABLE 3: PARTICIPANTS BY SITE COUNTRY AND GENDER 519 Gambia Bureau of Statistics 2016 520 In 2016, Females comprised more than 23 million of KenyaÕs nearly 46 million population but 62% percent of those p ursuing higher education (Kenya Bureau of National Statistics). In South Africa, females accounted for 58.3% of the nationÕs total full -time enrollment equivalents (678,842), whereas, total population exceeded 55 million. (South African Centre for Higher E ducation Trust South African Higher Education Performance Indicators 2009 -2015). %+'!!TABLE 4: TOTAL POPULATION BY GENDER 521 Age Participants were drawn from a broad diversity of d egrees, disciplines, and classifications. Given that the population of study focused on university students, participant age was heavily skewed toward younger respondents. Nearly six in ten participants were under the age of 21, with an additional one -thir d of participants ranging in age between 21 and 25 years (table 5 ). Respondent ages align with national median within the Gambia and Kenya but differ significantly from those in South Africa. Despite their youth, participants reportedly possessed greater a ccess to and interacted more frequently with mediated sources of information than the general population , consistent with earlier studies .522 TABLE 5: SITE COUNTRY BY MEDIAN AGE Place of Origin The vast majority of participants identified racially as desce nding from one of the original populations of Africa (82.5 -percent), with the remaining 17 -percent tracing their ancestral heritage to either Europe or Asia. These figures demonstrate a racially homogenous group largely comprised of in digenous African populations. As table 6 521 World Bank Group https://data.worldbank.org/ 522 Lenhart, Amanda, et al. 2010 %+(!!demonstrates, both Kenya and the Gambia possess more racially homogenous general populations. As a result, non-indigenous populations within these countries comprise fewer than one percent of their total populations .523 South African part icipants were understandably most diverse , with roughly two -thirds identifying as African or Black, 17-percent classifying themselves as having origins in Europe, seven percent in Asia, and five percent indicating that they were either biracial or multirac ial. These figures differ significantly from the general population but are likely attributable to economic disparities and differences in higher education attainment levels between indigenous and non -indigenous populations within the nation. 524 TABLE 6: SITE COUNTRY BY PLACE OF ORIGIN Religion The most widely practiced religion across all site countries was Christianity, with more than seventy percent of respondents indicating that they adhered to the Christian faith (table 7 ). When parsed to examine coun try -level practices, however, the data demonstrate that while Christianity was the most widely practiced religion amongst 523 Kenya: Kikuyu 22%, Luhya 14%, Luo 13%, Kalenjin 12%, Kamba 11%, Kisii 6%, Meru 6%, other Afric an 15%, non -African (Asian, European, and Arab) 1%. 523 The Gambia: Mandinka/Jahanka 34%, Fulani/Tukulur/Lorobo 22.4%, Wolof 12.6%, Jola/Karoninka 10.7%, Serahuleh 6.6%, Serer 3.2%, Manjago 2.1%, Bambara 1%, Creole/Aku Marabout 0.7%, other 0.9%, non -Gambian 5 .2%, no answer 0.6% (2013 est.) 523 524 Statistics South Africa Mid -Year Report http://www.statssa.gov.za/publications/P0302/P03022017.pdf %+)!!respondents in Kenya (91%) and South Africa (69%), within the Gambia only one quarter (23.8%) of those surveyed followed the Christian faith. Although the figures seemingly confirm that the vast majority of respondents in the Gambia practice Islam, the number falls far short of the proportion observed within the general population where more than 90 -percent of Gambians practice Islam. 525 The difference between general population figures and survey demographics is potentially attributable to a significant Nigerian student population within the university , many of whom identified as Christians . South African respondents practiced Christianity in far fewer numbers than the general population, where the majority of South Africans or 79.8%, are Christian. 526 General population figures for Kenya, likewise, differ where more than four -fifths (83%) follow Christianity making it difficult to generalize participant responses based on faith. 527 TABLE 7: PARTICIPANTS BY COUNTRY AND RELIGON 525 CIA Fact Book 2016 526 The independent African Zion Christian churches predominate, being the faith of 15,3% of the total population, and 19,2% of all Christians. Roughly 15% of the population have no religion, and 1,4% are undetermined about their faith. Islam is the religion of 1,5% of South Africans, Hinduism that of 1,2%, African traditional belief 0,3%, Judaism 0,2% and other beliefs 0,6%. Statistics South Africa Mid -Year Report http://www.statssa.gov.za/publications/P0302/P03022017.pdf 527 (Protestant 47.7%, Catholic 23.4%, other Christian 11.9%), Muslim 11.2%, Traditionalists 1.7%, other 1.6%, none 2.4%, unspecified 0. 2% (2009 est.). %+*!!TABLE 8: PARTICIPANT CHARACTERISTICS Exposure to brand -China Building on Papadopoulos and HeslopÕs (1986) study of the effects of familiarity and travel experience o n attitude formation, respondents were also asked a series of %++!!questions regarding their level of prior exposure to China. 528 More than two -thirds of respondents reported that either they or a close friend or relative (parent, sibling) had previously traveled abroad, with most frequent voyages to the United States (1,653) and/or United Kingdom (1,195). One -fifth (22%) of participants noted t hat they had travel ed internationally, with the highest incidence occurring in South Africa, where more than 44 percent o f participants were international travelers (Table 9 ). These numbers demonstrate that while survey participants were not well traveled in comparison with other students of similar age, participants still possess access to information about other countrie s from close friends and family members. 529 Nearly every Gambian respondent indicating that a close friend or relative had traveled internationally, named China as one of their preferred destinations (16 of 17) . These findings mirror those of Heidi ¯stb¿ Hau gen and Manon Diederich (2016), whose study of Gambian migrants repatriating from China illustrates that China is increasingly a destination of choice for Gambians seeking non -western options for educational and economic opportunities abroad. 530 528 Baughn, C. Christopher, and Attila Yaprak. "Mapping country -of-origin research: Recent developments and emerging avenues." Product -country images: Impact and role in international marketing (1993): 89 -116. 529 ÒAre Millennial Travel Trends Shifting in 2016?Ó Jan 15, 2016 https://www.forbes.com/sites/lealane/2016/01/15/are -millennial -travel -trends -shifting -in-2016-youll -be-surprised/#5cc3bf6736a8 530 https://uturnasia.com %+,!!TABLE 9: SITE COUNTRY BY INTERNATIONAL EXPERIENCE TABLE 10: SITE COUNTRY BY PREVIOUS TRAVEL TO CHINA Sources of Information Participants were additionally asked to indicate how and where they receive information about other countries generally and, more speci fically, about China. While students indicated a tendency to in teract with varied media , more mature forms of communication, like watching television, listening to the radio, and reading newspapers or other periodicals were utilized less frequently . New di gital medias, involving text messaging and internet were the preferred mechanisms fo r acquiring information (Table 11 ). Respondents indicated that they engaged in these forms of communication %+-!!as frequently as several times a week to daily, which was unders tandable given their ubiquity within each site , where one often carries multiple mobile phones because of uneven carrier connectivity. 531 Distinct differences were discovered across site countries in terms of the frequency of internet use and television vi ewership. South African respondents reported a greater propensity to access the internet daily (95%), with roughly three -quarters of Kenyan and South African participants reportedly doing likewise. Television watching was another area in which there were d istinct differences across countries, with nearly two -thirds (62.5%) of Gambian respondents indicating that they watch television daily, in comparison with 40 -percent of South Africans and one -third of Kenyans (32.8%) who expressed similar viewing patterns . TABLE 11: SOURCES OF INFORMATION Images of China When asked questions specifically concerning China, participants reportedly encountered images or messages of China (people, places, or things) a couple of ti mes a month on average (Table 12 ). Responde nts indicated that they were exposed most 531 Jenny C. Aker and Isaac M. Mbiti ÒMobile Phones and Economic Developmen t in AfricaÓ Journal of Economic Perspectives, Volume 24, Number 3, Summer 2010, pp. 207 Ð232 %,.!!regularly to images and messages of Chinese politicians or Chinese products from telev ised or online sources (Table 13 ). When asked about personal interaction with Chinese people, participants rarely encountered in dividuals whom they identified as Chinese more frequen tly than once per week (Table 15 ). Within the Gambia, specifically, nearly two -thirds of participants reported having little to no direct exposure to Chinese people (62.5 percent), supporting the charac terization of per sonal interaction between participants and the Chinese as ÔinfrequentÕ. Though infrequent, participants were also asked to characterize the images or messages they rece ived of China (Table 14 ). More than half of respondents (50.2%) chara cterized the images they viewed of China as sometimes or mostly positive. Again, opinions varied across site countries , with just one -third of South African participants classifying their observations as positive, while six in ten Kenyans (59.4%) and Gambi ans (62.4%) did so. TABLE 12: IMAGE FREQUENCY TABLE 13: IMAGE TYPE %,%!! TABLE 14: IMAGE CHARACTERIZATION TABLE 15: ENCOUNTERS WITH CHINESE Perceptions of brand -China Building a successful nation brand requires developing a carefully curated image emphasizing the most optimistic and complementary characteristics of the national imaginary. Chapter five explored the rhetorical intent of Chinese nation branding in Africa. Four themes emerged from the analysis as the principle constructs of brand -China in Africa , namely ÒsamenessÓ, ÒdevelopmentÓ, ÒfriendshipÓ, and ÒpartnershipÓ. Each element drew upon historical, cultural, and economic factors, making the case that China is AfricaÕs best hope for continued progress. Underlying Dimensions of brand -China Thematically, African public perceptions of brand -China were organized based on their loadings and common characteristics on the multi -item country perception %,&!!inventory. The resultant dimensions labelled, ÒCultural Proximity (Culture)Ó (Dimension 1), ÒTrustw orthinessÓ (Dimension 2), ÒDevelopmentÓ (Dimension 3), and ÒImperialismÓ (Dimension 4) collectively embody the China Cognitive Associations Scale (CCAS) (table 16 ). Whereas the most frequently constructed narrative of brand -China in Africa is one of Ôsamen ess; Õ532 Òcultural proximityÓ, a component of sameness, emerged as the strongest dimension of participant perceptions of the PRC. A focus on Chinese -led development represented another oft repeated aspect of the Chinese state construction of its brand in Afr ica, and ÔdevelopmentÕ also emerged as component of participant perceptions. 533 ÔImperialismÕ and ÔtrustworthinessÕ, though not significant aspects of the brand -China message, also emerged as important components of participant perceptions of China. 532 Sameness creates a discursive framework for establishing points of commonality between Chinese and African people, the historical and contemporary experiences of Chinese and African people, cultural propinquity, being a part of a shared (or the same) community, Chinese kinship, brotherhood, sisterhood, or familyhood with Africa. 533 The desire to link regional destinies through shared aspiration to the Chinese and A frican ÔdreamsÕ by means of ÒTechnological knowledge transferÓ 533, Òshared opportunitiesÓ, infrastructure improvement, ÒinclusivenessÓ, and economic growth mark the foundation of Chinese strategies for AfricaÕs development. %,'!!TABLE 16: DIMENSIONS OF BRAND -CHINA Building on the China Cognitive Associations Scale (CCAS), a one -way between -groups analysis of variance (ANOVA) was conducted to determine site country positions. Participant responses were divided into three groups alignin g with the country in which the instrument was completed (Group 1: the Gambia, Group 2: Kenya, Group 3: South Africa). The findings reveal significant differences in the components of brand -China across all measures (Table 15). TABLE 17: SITE COUNTRY POSI TIONS ON THE MULTI -ITEM SCALE (A) %,(!!TABLE 18: SITE COUNTRY POSI TIONS ON THE MULTI -ITEM SCALE (B ) Culture There was a statistically significant difference at the p < .05 level in ÔcultureÕ for the three site s: F (2, 4197) = 47.5, p = .00. The effect size, calculated using eta squared, was .02, indicating a small effect size .534 Post -hoc comparisons using the Tukey HSD test indicated that the mean score for the Gambia (M = 25.06, SD = 7.03) was significantly different from South Africa (M = 21.94, SD = 6.38) and Kenya (M = 22.76, SD = 8.10). Development There was a statistically significant difference at the p < .05 level in ÒdevelopmentÓ levels for the three sites: F (2, 3972) = 46.0, p = .00. The effect size, calculated using eta squared, was .02, indicatin g a small effect size 535. Post -hoc comparisons using the Tukey HSD test indicated that the mean score for South Africa (M = 10.50, SD = 3.39) was significantly different from the Gambia (M = 11.43, SD = 3.21) and Kenya (M = 11.58, SD = 3.34). 534 ÒCohen 1988, pp. 284 Ð7 535 ibid %,)!!Trustworthine ss There was a statistically significant difference at the p < .05 level in ÒtrustworthinessÓ levels for the three sites: F (2, 3479) = 213.2, p = .00. Reaching a statistically significant result was expected given that there was also a significant differe nce in mean scores between the groups. The effect size, calculated using eta squared, was .10, indicating a large effect size 536. Thu s, it can be inferred ChinaÕs trustworthiness is of high practical signif icance to participants . Post -hoc comparisons using t he Tukey HSD test indicate that the m ean score for the Gambia (M = 2 4.62, SD = 4.08) was significantly different from South Africa (M = 22.27, SD = 4.971), which is also significantly different than Kenya (M = 26.3, SD = 5.95). The findings suggest that re spondents in the three site countries are deeply divided regarding whether China is a trustworthy brand. Imperialism A final one -way between -groups analysis of variance was conducted to explore different perspectives of brand -China by site country. There was a statistically significant difference at the p < .05 level in ÒimperialismÓ across the three sites: F (2, 3568) = 51.4, p = .00. The effect size, calculated using eta squared, was .03, indicating a small effect size 537. Post -hoc comparisons using the Tu key HSD test indicated that the mean score for Kenya (M = 9.42, SD = 3.67) was significantly different from South Africa (M = 10.62, SD = 2.86) and the Gambia (M = 10.38, SD = 3.55). Significant main effects were established between the sites countries and each of the multi -scale items (p < .01). 536 ibid 537 ibid %,*!!Composite Perceptions The country effects were most pronounced for beliefs about Ôtrustworthiness,Õ with Kenya (M= 26.30, SD=5.95) deeming the Chinese most trustworthy and South Africa finding the PRC least trustw orthy (M=22.27, SD=4.97), indicating vastly different perceptions across the continent of BeijingÕs stewardship as a n upright and honorable partner. These findings are consistent with South African (M=10.50, SD= 3.39) views of China as a less significant d evelopment partner on the continent than either the Gambia (M=11.43, SD=3.21) or Kenya (M=11.58, SD=3.34), perhaps because of the strength of South AfricaÕs economy and its inclusion alongside China as a BRICS nation. Analysis of variance in opinions of Ch ina as an ÔimperialisticÕ force in Africa also indicated strong beliefs in Kenya (M=9.42, SD= 3.67) that BeijingÕs motives are not rooted in expanding its global influence, which is consistent with thinking that the PRC is a trustworthy development partner . South African (M=22.76, SD=8.09) respondents answered less favorably to questions surrounding the PRC Õs affinity with Africa, than either Gambian (M=25.06, SD=7.03) or Kenyan (24.94, SD 6.38) participants. These findings support the conclusion that Sou th African respondents possess lower levels of agreement with statements suggestive of the PRC as culturally or experientially similar to Africa or independently possessing strong culture of its own. Moreover, the findings also suggest that South Africans possess lower levels of cognitive agreement with statements indicative of ChinaÕs import to African development and growth. These findings reveal that there are considerable differences across site countries in terms of their perceptions of China. In the Gambia, the composite view of China is %,+!!that of a state with strong cultural proximity to Africa and equally strong implications to AfricaÕs continued developmental growth and prosperity; participants in Kenya possess a significantly greater perception of C hina vis -‹-vis its intentions as a developmental partner, and also high regard for the PRC concerning its cultur al proximity to Africa; whereas. South Africa ns, though not considering ChinaÕs motives imperialistic, consistently evinced lower overall percep tions of the PRC as a trustworthy or culturally similar development partner. TABLE 19: SITE COUNTRY PERCEPTIONS (WEIGHTED) !Drivers of Brand I mage The statistical tests used for the China Cognitive Associations Scale ( CCAS) were repeated to examine how pe rceptions of a countryÕs nation brand are moderated by demographic and social indicators. Composite perceptions of brand -china , including ÒcultureÓ, ÒdevelopmentÓ, ÒtrustworthinessÓ, and ÒimperialismÓ, were tested against a diversity of demographic (gender , religion, place of origin) and social (cultural %,,!!orientation, awareness, international experiences, exposure) factors to determine whether statistically significant differences exist between countries. Gender 538 An independent -samples t -test was conducted to compare differences in the China Cognitive Associations Scale (CCAS) scores for males and females (Table 20 ). The results demonstrated that there was no significant difference in scores for males and females in terms of ÔcultureÕ (M=23.97, SD=7.45; M=2 3.70, SD=7.36), ÔdevelopmentÕ (M=11.36, SD=3.36, M=11.20, SD=3.35), or ÔimperialismÕ(M=10.02, SD=3.56, M=9.94, SD=3.24). A statistically significant difference was discovered in perceptions of ÔtrustworthinessÕ between males (M = 24.83, SD = 5.91) and fema les (M = 24.26, SD = 5.52; t (2481) = 2.72, p = .01, two -tailed). The magnitude of the differences in the means (mean difference = .56, 95% CI: .16 to .97) was very small (eta squared = .008). It can be inferred from the results that no statistically signi ficant difference exists in participant perceptions across genders. TABLE 20: GENDERED PERCEPTIONS ON MULTI -ITEM SCALE ! 538 Nonbinary gender participants were excluded from this aspect of the analysis because of the small sample size. %,-!!Religion A one -way between -groups analysis of variance was conducted to explore the impact of religious faith on perceptions of brand -China, as measured by the China Cognitive Ass ociations Scale (CCAS) (Table 21 ). Participants were divided into three groups according to their reported faith system (Group 1: Christianity; Group 2: Islam; Group 3: Other faiths). There was a statistically s ignificant difference at the p < .001 level in the China Cognitive Associations Scale (CCAS) scores for the three groups on each scaled item. ÔOtherÕ faiths, an amalgam of Judaism, Hinduism, traditional African religions and other faith systems, was demons trably the largest driver of difference across ÔcultureÕ (M=26.4, SD=6.24), ÔtrustworthinessÕ (M=22.4, SD=4.82), and ÔdevelopmentÕ (M=10.2, SD=3.43). Differences in ÔImperialismÕ (M=9.9, SD=3.49) scores were largely driven by adherents to Islam, with those identifying as Muslim rating the Chinese considerably less ÔimperialisticÕ than either Christians or those subscribing to other faiths. Muslim respondents, principally located with the Gambia, were on the whole less likely to cast aspersions against the C hinese, warranting additional investigation into why and how these responses differ so appreciably from other religious groups. TABLE 21: MULTI -ITEM SCALE SCORES BY RELIGION %-.!!Source of Arrival An independent -samples t -test was conducted to compare the China Cognitive Associations Scale (CCAS) scores for respondents accordin g to their source of arrival on the continent (Table 22 ). I ndividual group samples of non -indigenous participants (European, Asian) were small, which warranted that participants be divided into two groups according to their self -reported ethnic or racial grouping (Group 1: Indigenous African; Group 2: Non -indigenous African). Statistically significant differences were discovered in scores for indigenous and non -indigenous populations i n terms of ÔcultureÕ (M = 23.8, SD= 7.29; M=24.9, 7.26; t (2624)= -3.01, p = .003, two -tailed), ÔdevelopmentÕ (M= 11.4, SD = 3.28; M=9.9, SD=3.53; t (613) =8.31, % = .001, two -tailed), ÔimperialismÕ (M=9.7, SD=3.3; 10.9, SD=2.49; t (713)= -8.26, p = .001, t wo-tailed) and ÔtrustworthinessÕ (M =24.6, SD = 5.65; M= 21.9, SD=5.24; t (621) = 9.15, p = .001, two -tailed). Nonetheless, the magnitude of the differences in the means for each dimension was very small eta squared = <.04, indicating that less than four p ercent of the variance in perceptions of China is explained by ethnicity. These findings indicate that non -indigenous participants rated the Chinese more highly culturally but are, nonetheless, less likely to consider the PRC as a development model, posses sed more negative opinions of the Chinese as a collective, and are less likely to trust the Chinese state and its various sundry depictions on the continent. %-%!!TABLE 22: SOURCE OF ARRIVAL Cultural Orientation Cultural proximity creates an additional laye r of support for brand -China, reinforcing attempts to establish a cultural connection between African and Chinese people. Determinants of cultural orientation were selected using measures from an adapted version of the Cultural Orientation Scale deve loped by Sharma (2010) (table 23). Participant responses were recoded from categorical to continuous scaled variables using a Cochran Q analysis and a one -way between -groups analysis of variance (ANOVA) was conducted to explore differences in cultural orientatio ns by site country. 539 Respondents were divided into three groups according to the country of participation (Group 1: the Gambia, Group 2: Kenya, or Group 3: South Africa). A statistically significant difference was discovered at the p < .05 level in cultur al orientation scores for the three sites: F (2, 4207) = 206.8, p = .00. Reach ing a statistically significant result was expected given that there was also a significant difference in mean scores between the groups. The effect size, calculated using eta sq uared, was .08, indicating a 539 - Cochran's Q test is used to determine if there are differences on a dichotomous dependent variable between three or more relat ed groups. It can be considered to be similar to the one -way repeated measures ANOVA, but for a dichotomous rather than a continuous dependent variable, or as an extension of McNemar's test. Cochran's Q test is commonly used to analyze longitudinal study d esigns, as well as being used when analyzing participants that have undergone multiple different trials (a.k.a. treatments/conditions %-&!!moderate effect size .540 Post -hoc comparisons using the Tukey HSD test indicated that the mean score for the Gambia (M = 9.68, SD = 3.81) was significantly different from Kenya (M = 5.48, SD = 4.92) and South Africa (M = 7.45, SD = 4.48). These findings suggest that the indicators of community deemed most important to participants in South Africa are significantly different than those cherished with in either Kenya or the Gambia, which are in turn, different from one another. Whil e common characteristics do exist, the results demonstrate that there is no one cultural orientation within Africa but, rather, cultural orientations within each nation . Nonetheless, certain cultural traits did emerge consistently across all three sites as being most important: Òbeing respectfulÓ, Òbeing hardworkingÓ, and Òbeing hospitable.Ó TABLE 23: SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC DETERMINANTS OF CULTURE 540 Cohen 1988, pp. 284 Ð7 %-'!!Economic Indicators TABLE 24: ECONOMIC CULTURAL INDICATORS An independent -samples t -test was conducted to compare the brand -China China Cognitive Associations Scale (CCAS) scores for respondents according to the indicated importance of specific economic indicators (aggressive, entrepreneurship, pioneering, competitiveness, power -seeking) (table 24) .541 Participa nts were divided into two groups (Group 1: higher than average, Group 2: lower than average) to determine their orientation toward those indicators. Respondents with higher than average economic orientations were significantly statistically different than those with below average economic orientations in terms of ÔimperialismÕ (M= 10.21 , SD=3.56; M= 9.94 , SD=3.29; t(2673) = -2.28, p=.03, two -sided) and ÔtrustworthinessÕ (M= 24.07 , SD= 5.70; M= 24.61 , SD=5.50; t(2857) = 2.78; p=.01, two -sided). No statistically significant difference was discovered between those indicating a higher than average score on the multi -item scale on the ÔcultureÕ (M=23.14, SD=7.85; M=24.53, SD=6.98) or ÔdevelopmentÕ (M=11.17, 3.39; M=11.13, 3.36) components. 541 Threshold for economic indicator scores above or below 13.35. %-(!!A statistically significan t difference was found between groups in their responses to ÔimperialismÕ and Ôtrustworthiness, indicating that respondents with higher than average orientation toward capital accumulation possessed a lower than average rating of China Õs trustworthiness an d higher than average consideration of the PRC as an imperial power. More explicitly, the findings suggest that individuals who place greater value on capital accumulation and enterprise are more suspicious of ChinaÕs motives. Social Indicators TABLE 25: SOCIAL CULTURAL INDICATORS An independent -samples t -test was conducted to compare the China Cognitive Associations Scale (CCAS) scores for respondents according to the indicated importance of specific social indicators (hospitality, spirituality, helpfuln ess, humaneness, family -centeredness, kindness, respectfulness) (table 25) . Participants were divided into two groups (Group 1: higher than average, Group 2: lower than average) to determine their orientation toward those indicators. A statistically signif icant difference was found between groups in their responses to ÔcultureÕ, ÔimperialismÕ, and trustworthinessÕ. Distinct differences were discovered between responses (high; low) in terms of Ôcultural proximityÕ (M=24.2, SD=7.12; M=23.1, 8.00; t(2197) = -1.12, p=.001, two -sided), ÔimperialismÕ (M=10.2, SD=3.28; M=9.69, %-)!!SD=3.66; t(1604) = -3.63, p=.001, two -sided), and ÔtrustworthinessÕ (M=24.1, SD=5.34; M=25.2, SD=6.26; t(1492) = 5.01; p=.001, two -sided). No statistically significant difference was discove red between those indicating a higher than average orientation toward social indicators on the ÔdevelopmentÕ component (M=11.2, 3.33; M=11.2, 3.01). The magnitude of the difference in the means was small to moderate (eta squared ÔcultureÕ=.044, Ôimperialis mÕ=.031, ÔtrustworthinessÕ= .059), indicating that although less than six percent of the variance in perceptions of China is explained by social orientation, whether or not the country is considered trustworthy can be deemed to have a moderate effect on co mposite perception. 542 The findings suggest that although respondents with s tronger social orientations viewed the PRC more highly in terms of its cultural significance or proximity, those feelings of sameness do not translate to unqualified trust. Country Knowledge An independent samples t -test revealed additional differences between participants based on how much they know about China. 543 Participant responses were divided into two groups according to whether they possessed a higher or lower than average de gree of knowledge of China (Group 1: higher than average; Group 2: lower than average). There was a statistically significant difference at the p < .05 level in participant knowledge levels for the three sites : F (2, 4210) = 172.6, p = .00. The effect size , calculated using eta squared, was .04, indicating a small effect size 544. Post -hoc comparisons using the Tukey HSD test indicate that the mean score for South Africa 542 Less than four percent of the variance in perceptions of China is explained by ethnicity. 543 Knowledge was tested according to the ability to identify well -known figures and landmarks associated with each country. 544 Cohen 1988, pp. 284 Ð7 %-*!!(M = 2.65, SD = 1.29) was significantly different from Kenya (M = 1.99, SD = 1.37) and the Gambia (M = 1.64, SD = 1.09). These findings imply that although participants in South Africa possessed g reater China -specific knowledges the effects of that knowledge generated little overall effect. Media Exposure An independent -samples t -test was cond ucted to compare the China Cognitive Associations Scale (CCAS) scores for those with higher than average levels of media exposure against those with lower than average levels of exposure. 545 Participants were divided into two groups (Group 1: higher than ave rage, Group 2: lower than average). A statistically significant difference between groups was discovered in terms of ÔimperialismÕ [M=9.54, 3.30; M=10.49, 3.41; t (3429) = -8.192, p=.01, two - tailed], and ÔtrustworthinessÕ [M=24.63, 5.61; M=24.16, 5.69; t (3355) =2.38, p=.02, two -tailed]. More frequent media exposure implies that participants with greater access to media are less likely to characterize the PRCÕs motivations in Africa negatively and are generally more trusting of the Chinese. This finding implies that increased exposure to brand -China may positively influenc e characterizations of Beijing . There was no significant difference in scores for those with either below average or above average exposure to media their responses to ÔsamenessÕ [M=23.91 , 7.39; M=23.97, 7.40; t (3783) = -.268) or ÔdevelopmentÕ [M=11.09, 3.41; M=11.20; 3.36, t(380 7)= -1.038. The magnitude of differences in the means was very small (eta squared = .03, <.001), indicating that media exposure only accounts for a small amount of the variance in perceptions of brand -China. 545 Average reported total exposure was 34.55, us ed mean score as proxy for ÔaverageÕ amount of exposure Ñmore than 34 (2), less than 34 (1). Total exposure (higher than average or not) 1,2 %-+!!Similar testing was conducted to determine whether difference s between groups exist based on the characterization of the images one is exposed to. 546 An indepen dent -samples t -test compared brand -China attribute sc ores for respondents according to the tone of images and messages of China they experienced. Participants were divided into two groups (Group 1: positive, Group 2: negative) in accordance with their responses to questions corresponding with those indicator s. A statistically significant difference was discovered between respondents indicating that the images and messages they received of China were ÔsometimesÕ or ÔmostlyÕ positive versus those who characterized the images as ÔsometimesÕ or ÔmostlyÕ negative in their responses to all measures: ÔcultureÕ, ÔdevelopmentÕ, ÔimperialismÕ, and ÔtrustworthinessÕ. Respondents who categorized images of China as positive were statistically different than those whose characterization was negative at the p= <.001 level i n terms of ÔcultureÕ (M=23.6, MD=7.24; 24.4, 7.47; t(3896)=3.44), ÔdevelopmentÕ (M=11.9, SD=3.05; M=10.43, SD=3.51; t(3658)= -13.9), ÔimperialismÕ (M=9.46, SD=3.52; M=10.66, 3.10; t(3292)=10.48), and ÔtrustworthinessÕ (M=26.1, SD=5.54; M=22.7, 5.21; t(3261) =-18.1). The findings suggest that exposure to positive images and messages of the PRC does not increase perceptions of cultural proximity between the two regions. Nonetheless, respondents exposed to more positive constructions of brand -China were more l ikely to endorse ChinaÕs trustworthiness, less likely to deem the PRC imperialistic, and more likely to consider Beijing a positive model for development on the continent. 546 1-3 negative or neutral, 4 -5 positive tone %-,!!Encounters with Chinese An independent -samples t -test also compared China Cognitiv e Associations Scale (CCAS) scores for respondents based on how frequently they interact with the Chinese. Those i ndicating interaction with the Chinese or representations of China at least once a week, were statistically different in terms of Ôtrustworthi nessÕ (M=23.96, 5.73; M=24.94, 5.45; t (3248) = 4.96, p=.01, two -tailed) than those who reported doing so less infrequently. The magnitude of the differences in the means (mean difference = .97, 95% CI: .59 to 1.35) was very small (eta squared = .001). Pe rsonal interaction between participants and the Chinese suggests that familiarity does, indeed, breed contempt. Respondents who encountered the Chinese more frequently, considered them less trustworthy as a group, speaking to the disconnect between officia l and personal accounts of the Afro -Chinese relationship. Attitudes toward brand -China FishbeinÕs Multiattribute Theory M odel posits that beliefs are the only mediators of attitude formation and change. 547 Attitudes refer to an ÒindividualÕs internal eval uation of an objectÓ and are considered relatively Òstable and enduringÓ predictors of consumer behavior. 548 The model proposes that attitudes toward an object are a function of the strength of the salient beliefs regarding that object and the evaluations of those beliefs. 549 Thus, the basic multi -attribute approach to modeling attitudes uses attributes, beliefs, and weights of importance to determine a measurable score reflective of consumer attitudes. 550 Attitude is then determined using a specific calculus , assessing 547 MacKenzie, Scott B., Richard J. Lutz, and George E. Belch 1986 548 Mitc hell, Andrew and Jerry C. Olson 1983 549 source 550 source %--!!individual evaluations of the salient beliefs about the extent to which the brand is believed to possess the attribute (R i), weighted by the strength of each belief or level of importance assigned by the individual consumer (b i) (I i) to create an o verall evaluation or attitude toward the brand (A). !"#$%&%'(%)"*% A Linear multiple regression analysis was conducted to test the relationship between beliefs about China and its relationship to Africa, exposure to information on brand -China, and the importance of cultural proximity as predictors of overall attitudes toward the PRC. The following model was used to test the relationship. !#'+,&-.'$%'.%''(%)"'*% A = Attitude toward brand: i = attribut e j = brand I = Importance weighting (alignment with cultural orientation) R= rating or belief X= extent of exposure to the attribute The dependent variable ÔattitudeÕ (A) toward brand -China was regressed on three variables: ÔperceptionÕ (P), ÔimportanceÕ (I), and ÔexposureÕ (X). 551 A reduced number of items were included in the analysis to ensure one -to-one correspondence across all constructs, meaning that only those items with comparable variables across all three 551 Sources Fishbein and other -list &..!!categories (ÔperceptionÕ (P), ÔimportanceÕ (I), and ÔexposureÕ (X)) were included in these calc ulations (table 26 ). TABLE 26: ITEM -LIST The initial model consists of four constructs ÔattitudeÕ (A), ÔperceptionÕ (P), ÔimportanceÕ (I), and ÔexposureÕ (X), and 36 indicators (observable variable s). Attitude (A) was measured using 13 indicators, Perception (P) was measured using 11 indicators, Exposure (E) by 1 indicators, and cultural importance (I) through 11 indicators. A linear regression was used to assess the ability of ÔperceptionÕ (P), Ôim portanceÕ (I), and ÔexposureÕ ( X) measures to predict Attitude (A) toward brand -China. Model 1: !#'+,/%'&-0(%)"'*% The relationship between ÔattitudeÕ and the dimensions of ÔperceptionÕ, ÔimportanceÕ, and ÔexposureÕ tested revealed t hat the total variance explained by the model as a whole was 42%, F (2, 3094) = 1120, p < .001, indicating that it explained more than 40 percent of the variation in participant responses. Table 27 displays the regression coefficients and standard errors f or the final model. The indicators of goodness -of-fit obtained through the analysis of the model indicate a good fit. &.%!!Nonetheless, while the composite reliability suggested by the total coefficient of determination (r 2 ) was strong (0.42), inter -item corre lations indicated that many of the items possessed squared multiple correlations below 0.5, representative of low individual item reliabilities. TABLE 27: REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS AND STANDARD ERRORS The regression fit line and scatterplot imply a linea r, positive slope with a mode rately strong relationship. The outcome confirms the assumption of homoscedasticity between the predicted dependent variable scores and the errors of prediction, reducing the chances for making Ty pe I and Type II errors (figure s 2 and 3).552 Differences between the regression fit line and scatterplot suggest that while these data have a linear component that can be adequately described by the model, they also possess a random component that causes them to be scattered in ways not predicted by the model. 552 Pallant 2016 &.&!! FIGURE 8: NORMAL P -P PLOT OF REGRESSION STANDARDIZED RESIDUAL FIGURE 9: SCATTERPLOT OF REGRESSION The researcher also conducted a Discriminant Function Analysis (DA) to determine how attitudes differed in response to the thre e predictors . Discriminant Function Analysis undertakes the same task as multiple linear regression by predicting an outcome, however, multiple linear regression is limited to cases where the dependent variable on the Y axis is an interval (rather than ca tegorical) variable, so that the combination of predictors will produce estimated mean population numerical Y values &.'!!for given values of weighted combinations of X values. 553 The items in the ÔattitudeÕ construct were subjected to a binning transformation p rior to analysis to transform them into categorical variables, using categories of low, medium, and high attitude scores in response to brand - China .554 The first discriminant function (perception*importance) was statistically significant, ! = .640, "2(8, N = 36) = 33.92, p < .001, but the second (exposure) was not, ! = .900, "2(3, N = 36) = 3.32, p = .34. These findings underscore those born out by the linear regression model, that according to the Wilks's lambda, Ôperceived importÕ is the most important in dependent variable to the discriminant function. 555 Table 29 reveals that high scores on the discriminant function were associated with more positive perceptions of China and aligned with the level of cultural importance assigned to individual measures. TABL E 28: STRUCTURE OF THE DISCRIMINANT FUNCTION Variable Loading Perceived import .60 Exposure .04 Univariate analysis indicates that participant attitude groups differed significantly on perceived import, F(2, 3167) = 881.7, MSE = .104, p < .001, and e xposure, F(2, 3094) = 61.8, MSE = .036, p = .018. Table 29 contains the classification means for the groups on the discriminant function as well as the group means on each of the original 553 Tabchnick and Fidell 2013 554 Pallant 2013 555 ibid &.(!!variables, with FisherÕs procedure engaged to make pairwise comparis ons. 556 Participants with high positive attitudes toward China scored significantly higher on Ôperceived importÕ and ÔexposureÕ on the discriminant function than did those i n the other two groups (Table 29 ). Likewise, those with low positive attitudes toward China scored significantly lower on Ôperceived importÕ and ÔexposureÕ on the discriminant function than did those i n the other two groups (Table 29 ). Thus, the model excels at identifying attitudes in general and correctly predicted 57.7 percent of the or iginal cases. Though successful at the high and low end of the scale, the model does a poorer job of correctly classifying respondents with less polarized opinions. This finding suggests that another predictor may be needed in order to se parate these attit udes (Table 30). TABLE 29: GROUP MEA NS ON THE DISCRIMINANT FUNCTION TABLE 30: PREDICTED GROUP MEMBERSHIP 556 Fisher &.)!!Composite Perceptions Sixty -seven percent of respondents assigned the Chinese above average scores of cultural proximity and two -thirds (65 p ercent) deemed the PRC a strong development model. Participants were fairly evenly split regarding whether Beijing is trustworthy, with four of ten participants also ascribed negative characteristics to the Chinese. Feelings of cultural importance or proxi mity and the tone and level of exposure images and messages indicative of brand -China , seemingly dilute ill feelings toward the PRC and increase incentives for participants to view Beijing positively. The model explained more than 40 percent of the variati on in participant responses when testing the relationship between ÔattitudeÕ and the dimensions of ÔperceptionÕ, ÔimportanceÕ, and ÔexposureÕ. Thus, the general model, including aspects of participant perception, cultural importance, and exposure to brand -China, does a good job of predicting respondent attitudes toward China. The findings suggest that African perspectives of brand -China are, understandably, diverse and complex. Notwithstanding, consistent with the projectÕs guiding hypotheses, participant attitudes toward Brand -China are driven by exposure, perception, and cultural proximity. Moreover, attitudes toward brand -China are more positive when the respondentÕs own cultural orientation is closely aligned with participant perceptions of the brand. Hypotheses 2 and 3 are supported. Conclusion ChinaÕs nation brand acts as a powerful geopolitical tool in Africa, exhibiting how Beijing hopes to be viewed by international publics. Brand -China semiotically constructs and then malleably transforms the Afr o-Chinese relationship for various &.*!!constituencies through the reiteration of key aspects of the narrative at every touchpoint. This chapter explored local awareness and attitudes toward ChinaÕs often inconsistent nation brand in Africa. It evaluate d sever al factors vis -‹-vis local attitudes toward brand -China including respo ndent exposure, participants perception , and cognitive importance assigned to the brand as it relates to their everyday lives. From construction firms to market traders, Chinese compan ies and people have quickly become a ubiquitous presence on the African continent. In the wake of BeijingÕs expansion into Africa, however, many locals have seemingly formed a love -hate relationship with the PRC. There are mixed attitudes toward the percei ved advantages of Chinese partnership as opposed to the perils of Chinese control. Many view Beijing as the continentÕs best hope for sustained development; yet, high levels of distrust, underpinned by questions regarding ChinaÕs motives and competing bran d messages within the marketplace of Africa -China is problematic. Competing messages create cognitive dissonance, whereby a healthy percentage of respondents feel that China is bad for their countryÕs future, but still view it as the continentÕs best optio n.557 557 Basker, 2007 &.+!!Chapter Seven Because of War, We Come Together ÒThe wretched of the earth areÉnot necessarily allies to one anotherÓ Shohat and Stam (1994), Notes on the Postcolonial Introduction Similarly to the cinematic and literary projection of empire acc ompanying the colonial project, the current political mandate for nations seeking increased access to global resources and markets is to reconstitute images of self against that of a political ÔotherÕ. National imaginary constructions accompanying the cont emporary project of global capital accumulation continue to include filmic, journalistic, and literary manifestations of the political and social rhetoric of racial alterity developed during colonialism. Within the US and Europe and, more importantly for this analysis, throughout Asia, colonial definitions of African people and spaces are reified through Òyellow saviorÓ narratives as well as washing powder commercials wherein blackness is equated with dirtiness. This practice demonstrates that within the current era of neoliberal globalization, cultural identities, now as then, reflect power dynamics and internalized notions of difference between nations. Identities reflect not only what is but what could or should be reality; and discourses, as imaginarie s participate in the creation of new , and cultivate and nurture identities. Feelings of attachment, membership, belonging, and value formation sustain these new identity formations. Fictive and fantasmogoric new dimensions of self and community undergo mul tiple iterations and interactions, &.,!!sometimes calling for identities to overlap, sometimes include, sometimes exclude, and other times cooperate. These identarian constructions may create or reduce the boundaries between people but also govern and legitimat e circumstances for social and political action between groups. 558 With the advent of global ization, the African continent , has again captured the attention and imagination of new entrants to the global quest for wealth and political positioning . This late st march into the Ôlast frontierÕ , however, finds African spaces and people being redefined as points of inclusion rather than difference. China, most notably, emerged from its prolonged slumber with renewed interest in the African continent. Afro -Chinese relations have been reinvigorated within the last two decades as the PRC adopted more open policies in response to its escalating energy needs and global political aspirations. ChinaÕs uninvited entr ”e to what has, heretofore, been a western -led undertaki ng challenges the delegitimization of sovereignty outside the west, inspiring conjecture regarding how this new relationship fits within existing patterns of engagement with Africa. 559 Is it ultimately beneficial to the continent? Neocolonial? ÔFlexigemonic? 560 Or, is it perhaps a manifestation of Òglobal apartheidÓ auguring further Òmarginality and crisisÓ? 561 Inscribed within these questions are hegemonic discourses and practices presenting an unbalanced picture in which an all -powerful China subjugates weak African states. 562 The relentless focus on what China is doing ÒtoÓ or in Africa 558 Chrysochou, Panayiota, ed. 2017 559 Strang 1996 560 Flexigemony speaks to an orientation toward raw material supply through a combination of political, economic, and military levers; See Padraig Carmody 2010, 82 561 See: Muhammad Asadi 2003; Patrick Bond 2004; Akanmu Adebayo and Olutayo Adesina; 2010 562 Carmod y and Kragelund 2016 &.-!!perpetuates the notion of African subjectivity, disregarding the ability of African people to be aware of and make decisions in their own best interest. This project examined the tension between national imaginary constructions necessitated by the proliferation of global capital, extant colonial discourse, and the repackaging of cultural identities to increase state attractiveness Ñthrough the lens of Chinese nation branding in Africa. Whether fictive or real, (de)politicized or aesthetic, nation branding constructs and reimagines the nation and its people for domestic and foreign consumers. These national imaginaries generate legitimating circumstances for social and political a ction and renegotiate concepts of self and other. The research project explored not only how and why the Chinese state and state -owned or supported enterprises construct brand -China but, more importantly within Africana Studies, how the ÔbrandÕ is co -cons tructed and deconstructed by local populations. Building on the Afrocentric Paradigm, the project was largely driven by an intense interest in pinpointing the exact nature of African responses to the Òcultural symbols, motifs, r ituals, and signsÓ of Africa embedded within brand -China . The researcherÕs commitment to revising the narrative of African subjectivity is underscored by l ocating the Òsubject -plac eÓ of participating populations and celebrating the agency of African people in diverse environments. 563 The dissertation unveiled the drivers of participant attitudes toward brand -China by f ocusing on university students within six universities in the Gambia, Kenya, and South Africa. Understanding consumer attitudes toward the nation is important to buildin g and maintaining brand equity over time and to understanding how brand -China, as a social 563 Asante, Molefi Kete, Yoshitaka Miike, and Jing Yin, eds. The global intercultural communication reader . Routledge, 2013. &%.!!and political construct, functions as a component of and projects new state identities. Phrased differently, brands approximate national desires to maintain a specif ic position in the minds of those who ingest the brand. The rationale is that that positioning may over time help to distinguish the brand from competitors. Such positioning, within the conduct of nations and corpor ations, speaks to how various public s val ue the brand nee nation; the customerÕs feelings and emotional connection to the nation, its people, and its products. In a world where the proliferation of global communication reduces distance between nations, the ability to distinguish one from the othe r is increasingly important and leaves the state less vulnerability to competitive nation branding strategies. Chinese moves to ÔsamenessÕ, cultural proximity, or fictive kinship is the most significant aspect of its nation brand in Africa. 564 The rhetorica l move toward cultural hybridity, proximity, ÔsamenessÕ or, simply an imagined community rooted in fictive kinship , is reflective of BeijingÕs desire to map the histor ical experiences and cultures of China onto Africa . These attempts, though invidious , are not without merit. Similar experiences of subjugation served as the foundation to new community formations amongst African people throughout periods of enslavement and colonization. (Re)C onstructing Social Identity If current global transformations affe ct African people in much the same way as earlier forms of capital accumulation, understanding how diverse African populations, 564 Findings from textual analysis revealed one overarching key theme, namely, Sameness, as the most integral comp onent of the Chinese nation brand in Africa. Three other themes also emerged as components of brand -China and include: 1) China as development model; 2) China as cooperative partner; and lastly, 3) China as longstanding, traditional friend. Participant att itudes toward China, similarly, revealed additional components of the brand predominated by ÒCultural ProximityÓ, ÒTrustworthinessÓ, ÒDevelopmentÓ, and ÒImperialismÓ . &%%!!on the continent and across the diaspora, navigated the experiences of enslavement and colonialization might serve as an importa nt predictor of fu ture expansions . Comprised of vastly different linguistic and cultural groupings, e arly African states and people were as different as states and people anywhere else acros s the globe. Nonetheless, they were still thought to pos sess an ÔA fricanityÕ, which made it possible to distinguish the uniquely ÔAfricanÕ from the catholic. Pre -European conquest, the constitutive unit of formation across the continent was the family and the social net arising from such groupings played a pivotal role i n surviving the fetters of subjugation. The network of community allowed those subjected to successive forms marginalization outside and within Africa to establish agency over definitions of self, by defining thems elves on their own terms, tapping into and deriving sustenance from the comfort of fraternity . Malleable concepts of self have historically enabled African people to recreate and control their cultural identities in tension with, rather than conforming to the limiting definitions projected by Euro peans. Stimulated by the shared trauma of transatlantic slavery, colonialism, and neo -imperialism, African people expanded their notions of collective identity Ñwhether imposed or invented Ñas a coping and continuity mechanism to become ÔBlackÕ 565, ÔAfricanÕ, 566, ÔJewishÕ 567, and ÔHutusÕ 568. Thus, African identities have historically been fluid, often marked by the mixing and blending of traditional with contemporary, known with foreign, and innate with acquired to formulate new ways of being. 565 Smallwood 2007; Sweet 2003 566 Taiwo 2009; Mudimbe, 1988 567 Simms Hamilton 2006 568 Mamdani 2002 &%&!!So why wouldnÕt there be space for imagining and expanding new identity formations once again within this latest period of capital ac cumulation: globalization? The question may appear groundless, yet it strikes at the heart of Chinese moves toward Òsameness Ó in Africa. Both Afr ican nations and China had similar experiences in recent history; both were colonized, both fought vicious battles for liberation, and both struggled to align themselves with the west on their path s toward development. Within this broad narrative, the expe riences of both regions appear similar. Unlike China, however, many Africa nations remain constrained by the push and pull of the forces of Western hegemony, Chinese "flexigemony" and Pan African nationalism and regionalism. This triad of influences is inc reasingly important within an African context, where many countries are still grappling with the aftermath of slavery and colonialism, and the current realities of globalization. Nation branding works in concert with globalization by transmitting cultural ideals and establishing elements of symbolic and psychological influence. These elements force individuals and communities to constantly imagine and reimagine concepts of sel f and other. Brand -China inserts elements of the foreign into the local, using the m to transform existing norms and perceptions of identity across the African continent. 569 The Right to Belong Perhaps as a functi on of these globalist project and the cultural mapping implicit within them, the Chinese state constructs an imagined communit y of ÒsamenessÓ, realigning its cultural symbols, motifs, and rituals with those of the African . The practice leads one to wonder whether Chinese moves toward ÒsamenessÓ potentially 569 Fairclough 2013, 17 -18 &%'!!represent a natural expansion of African communities to again include othe r marginalized people as part of a cosmopolitan, utopian ideal ; or, is ÒsamenessÓ more akin to the commodification of African cultures found within colonial depictions of Africa? Brand -China discursively constructs Africa and its people within a static, Òculturally determinedÓ frame, insouciantly conflating differences between and within states, and differences between the continent and China to increase brand resonance. 570 BeijingÕs brand image functions by aligning itself with the continentÕs sometimes ess entialized and stereotypical markers, storifying its historical experiences of community formation for personal gain and reducing African cultures and traditions to sound bites . The brand reinforces images of China at once as Ôunderstanding brotherÕ, Ôloya l friendÕ, Ôcultural traditionalistÕ, and once - impoverished nation victimized by Western imperialism. These constructions of China and Africa -China, are replete with Bandung -era propaganda and reflect internalized colonial concepts of an immobile Africa, frozen in time. Thus, begging the question of how an image produced during the colonial period travels around the world and reproduces itself across different spaces and circuits of time. Beijing promotes its own long -term foreign policy goals in Africa, interrupting western influence on the co ntinent by reviving metaphors of the solidarity movement and linking the developmentalism of the present day with Maoist discourse. The PRC insinuates itself into AfricaÕs origin, evolution, and eventual fate through the repeated telling of these stories. These moves toward cultural hybridity and the seeming 570 Ndlovu -Garsheni 2013, 25; Edozie and Soyinka -Airewele 2010, 378 &%(!!interpenetration and homogenization of indigenous African cultures is problematic because cultural hegemony is inscribed and reproduced in the act of so. 571 The PRC adopts what Tuck and Yang (2012) classify as Ôsettler moves to innocenceÕ, deflecting the settler/colonial identity embedded in critiques of Africa -China, by depicting itself as Òsimultaneously oppressed and never an oppressorÓ. 572 This is problematic consi dering that , within brand -China and through the construction of ÒsamenessÓ, Beijing also claims the right to enjoy the benefits of certain settler privileges, including the right to determine who gains admission to the Ôtribe.Õ 573 As sovereign nations, Afric an states and people possess the discretion to determine who can hold the rights of membership. In 2017, President Uhuru Kenyatta named the descendants of early Indian migrants to the east African nation as the 44 th ÔtribeÕ of Kenya. KenyattaÕs act, seemin gly imperceptible to some given obvious differences between the two groups, laid the foundation for the rights of inclusion nee the rights of admission to the Ôtribe,Õ to also be extended to other groups in the future, such as the Chinese whose blood still courses through Lamu. 574 In similar fashion, descendants of European colonialists, comprising significant proportions of the populations within South Africa, Angola, Namibia, and Madagascar; now identify as African. These expansions of African identity spe ak to the power of the imagination to form and reform the nation, the state, and the community to meet its needs. The question is not whether such reconstructions are rational or appropriate but whether the fantasy of 571 Mensah 2008, 38 572 Tuck and Yang 2012, 9 573 Tuck and Yang 574 Chinese ancestry has been documented amongst the Malindi people in the Kenyan coastal community of L amu. Their ancestors were said to be from Kenyan women who married shipwrecked Chinese Ming sailors. See: http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2005 -07/11/content_459090.htm &%)!!ÒsamenessÓ spun through films, magazin es, television, editorials, and billboards as components of brand -China is accepted and internalized in a way that lays a foundation for establishing newly imagined communities between African and Chinese people. The construction of a brand -China rooted i n equivalent claims to pain and oppression, rather than acts of oppression, and designed to create a fictive Afro -Chinese community, is the most significant aspect of ChinaÕs nation brand in Africa. It is also a disingenuous, propagandized, and ahistorical representation of past and present African and Chinese experiences. Despite this, whereas the most frequently constructed narrative of brand -China in Africa is one of Òsameness,Ó 575 cultural proximity, a component of sameness, emerged as the strongest compo nent of participant perceptions of brand -China. Thus, the message of cultural affinity or similitude between Chinese and Africa people, whether accepted or not, clearly resonates across the continent. Gambian, Kenyan, and South African responses to brand -China differ in important ways . What these communities do share, however is a view of the Chinese and attitudes toward brand -China as, if not culturally similar, nonetheless, still worthy of at least some degree of cultural deference. The latter perhaps rei nforces to the cultural imperative toward respect and hospitality engendered within African cultures and extended to all people . Gambia This is born out in the Gambia, a small west African nation marked by self -imposed isolation, and political and economi c uncertainty for more than two decades. The 575 Sameness creates a discursive framework for establishing points of commonalit y between Chinese and African people, the historical and contemporary experiences of Chinese and African people, cultural propinquity, being a part of a shared (or the same) community, Chinese kinship, brotherhood, sisterhood, or familyhood with Africa. &%*!!composite Gambian view of China is of a state with strong cultural proximity to the continent and equally strong implications to AfricaÕs continued developmental growth and prosperity. Sentiments of cultural con nection were most evident amongst participants who possessed strong orientations toward social as opposed to economic indicators of culture. This can be interpreted to mean that participants for whom considerations of family and community were most importa nt, affinity with the PRC was greatest , demonstrating a relationship between attitude formation and cultural importance. Gambian participants reported low levels of exposure to the Chinese beyond ÔproductsÕ and ÔpoliticiansÕ, suggesting that though infrequ ent, political messages (alongside product placement) contribute to feelings of cultural proximity. Data were collected shortly after the nation transitioned from the leadership of President Yahya Jammeh to the recently elected Adama Barrow (2017 -), only t he countryÕs third leader post -independence and its second democratically elected. Despite this change, perceptions of closeness between Gambian people may also be attributable to the shared experience of authoritarian rule. Nonetheless, participant respo nses reflect hope for a future marked by greater internal stability and sustained growth. As a nation predominated by farming and fishing, wherein the agricultural sector employs 70 -percent of the labor force and accounts for more than 30 percent of the na tionÕs GDP, Gambians view the Chinese presence as an opportunity to diversify and increase manufacturing interests, which currently contribute little to the national economy. 576 576 CIA World Factbook; World Bank &%+!!Yahya Jammeh pursued a policy of isolation, which left country bereft of Wester n allies. Given the cessation of ties between Banjul and London and Banjul and Washington, it makes sense that the Gambian people should look favorably upon the new partnership with the Chinese. Participants trust the Chinese brand but a lack of general aw areness of the PRC as distinctly different than the ROC and the inconstant nature of Gambian -Chinese relations begs the question of which China Gambian students place their faith in. Kenya Pomp and circumstance surrounding the inauguration of the Madarak a Express, in conflict with negative press surrounding the 2015 ÔChinese RestaurantÕ row and other racially motivated unrest between the local population and Chinese migrants, exemplifies the diffuse nature of images and messages of brand -China experienced in Kenya. Participants hold regard for the PRC in terms of its cultural proximity to Africa, closely aligning with respondent beliefs that BeijingÕs motives are benevolent and rooted in something other than expanding its global influence. The fact that Ke nyan respondents expressed significantly lower feelings of similitude in their perceptions of China, than their Gambian counterparts, may be reflective of the strength and prevalence of these competing narratives of China within Kenya. Despite counternar ratives of the PRCÕs racialist perspectives of Africa and the reported effects of Chinese construction on indigenous plant life, Kenyan participants still consider Beijing the continentÕs best hope for sustained development al progress . Respondents possess significantly positive perceptions of China as a trustworthy, benevolently -intentioned development model and partner. Positive attitudes toward the &%,!!Chinese may also be attributable to Chinese investments in the Kenyan economy. Chinese leaders made a number of well -publicized financial commitments to the East African nation, which strengthens brand -China by insinuating that the PRC is a strong and trustworthy development model and partner. Nonetheless, the reality is that bilateral trade between the two nati ons is heavily skewed in BeijingÕs favor, demonstrating the power of rhetoric to shape perception despite reality. South Africa Perhaps because of the strength of its economy in its own right and its inclusion alongside China as a BRICS nation, South Afr ican participants viewed the PRC as a less significant development partner than those in either the Gambia or Kenya. Numerous factors could potentially underpin South African attitudes toward brand -China . Beijing Õs surging trade and investment in South Afr ica has grown significantly since the PRC implemented its policy of Ôgoing outÕ. Afro -Chinese trade relations across the continent are still dominated by Chinese exports of finished products and imports of African raw materials. Yet, the PRCÕs relationship with South Africa, as a fellow BRICS nation, more closely approximates a relationship of equals. South Africans were most discriminating in their opinions of brand -China and awareness may play a factor. South African respondents were significantly more knowledgeable of current events relative to the PRC than their counterparts in either the Gambia or Kenya. South African participants also found the Chinese least trustworthy and least culturally proxemic. These participants also questioned the PRCÕs moti ves on the continent significantly more than their counterparts and South African attitudes toward brand -China are potentially symbolic of an historical distrust of Asian migrants &%-!!in combination with growing xenophobia within the nation. Despite wholesale developmental gains , unemployment rates for indigenous South Africans remain high and unrest against those perceived as foreign competitors for jobs and resources simmers just below the surface. Lines between in -groups and out -groups have become more defin itive, making it difficult to imagine the communion of sameness with the ÔHausaÕ as much as the ÔHan Õ. A Stroke of the Post In ÒViolence, Mourning, Politics,Ó Judith Butler meditates on how experiences of vulnerability and loss can serve as the basis for establishing human connection. 577 Stimulated by the shared trauma of transatlantic slavery, colonialism, and neo -imperialism, African people have inexorably utilized their experienc es of loss to reconstitute individual and communal identities. For those comm unities experiencing brutal ruptures undermining their sense of identity, inscribing a collective character, one that reclaims the h istorical memory of the past, was essential to fashioning a Òresistant collective identity.Ó 578 Collective identity was predic ated not only on distance from their homeland s and their known communities but, also, a shared assimilation into a congregation Òwhose most distinguishing feature was its unnatural constitution: it brought strangers together in anomalous intimacy.Ó 579 Brand -China builds on this constant negotiation and renegotiation of self and other, aligning its nation brand with AfricaÕs Òdistinct socio -historical marker(s).Ó 580 Drawing heavily upon the concept of community identity and shared ethos to inculcate 577 Butler 2003, 20 578 Shohat and Stam 2014 579 Smallwood 2007, 101 580 Dodson 2014, 49 &&.!!a communal consciousness heightened by political and economic marginalization by the West, the Chinese State uses its brand to inculcate feelings of historical and experiential similitude with Africa. By examining official images and messages as sites of the nationÕs brand through which national imaginaries of self and other are produced and disseminated in societies, we see how subtle, consistent messages of Òfriendship,Ó Òbrotherhood,Ó Òdevelopment,Ó or Òcooperation,Ó reinforced through speeches celebrating the open ing of a Confucius Center or ads depicting African women dressed as Chinese ethnic minorities, project carefully curated images of the PRC for African consumption, creating an environment of experiential similitude with Africa. These practices are importa nt because Òthey are so routine, so prevalent, so popular, and so ubiquitous.Ó 581 Nation branding , whether depicting r eality, history, or fantasy has an important p lace within cultural politics as it help s shape the national imaginary of African communities. Brand -China is complicated by competing messages within state, corporate, and individual depictions of Africa. The unresolved tension between Chinese popular discourse and official State accounts of Africa, its people, and its relationship to China creat es brand confusion, thereby diminishing the strength and success of China's nation brand across the continent. More importantly, the very formulation of brand -ChinaÕs claims to ÒsamenessÓ, conflating vastly different African and Chinese experiences as Òequ ally Ôpost -colonial,Õ" is also problematic. 582 Disingenuously adjudging the two regionsÕ colonial and post -colonial experiences as equivalent, elides difference and overlooks the complexities of power relations between and within developing countries, 581 Subotic 2017, 9 582 Shohat and Stam 2014, 103 &&%!!betwee n dominant and subaltern, and settler and indigenous groups. The practice also overlooks internalized, racialized colonial notions of Africa and Africans embedded within the brand. Sameness , or the semblance of cultural affinity, as a social construction, nonetheless, appears an acceptable proposition from the vantage point of university students in the Gambia and Kenya. Metaphorically conceiving of themselves as part of a broadly defined Afro -Chinese community allows these peoples to expand and reimagine their social, cultural and political identities as well as enact their own visions for the future. 583 The fact that students in these spaces collectively envision a future inclusive of the Chinese as Òlongstanding friendsÓ and Òtrustworthy partnersÓ is perhap s the most telling symbol of brand -ChinaÕs success on the continent. Nonetheless, within their responses, these actors demonstrate the ability to distinguish what is uniquely Gambia n, Kenyan, and South African from Chinese invention ; creating new opportuni ties for independent action unbound by l ongstanding structures of power; and thereby proving themselves real subjects in their own right rather than simply recipients of Chinese whims or cogs in the machine of the domi nant global structure. 583 Keto 2001 &&&!! APPENDICES &&'!!APPENDIX A IRB INITIAL CONSENT FORM Michigan State University, East Lansing, Michigan, U.S. Project Title: Investigating Mediated Approaches to Enhancing National Image in International Environments Investigators: Tara Mock CONSENT STATEMENT My name is Tara Mock. I am in the Gambia undertaking research as part of a project geared toward identifying local perspectives of other countries. The name of the study is Investigating Mediated Approaches to Enhancing National Image in I nternational Environments . Taking part in this study may help us better understand how messages are received, interpreted, and acted upon in diverse settings. The people in charge of the study are myself and Rita Kiki Edozie. If you agree to participate, you will be asked to complete a forty -minute survey of your opinions concerning foreign nations and publics. Your participation in this research study is completely voluntary . If you decide not to participate, there will be no penalty or loss of benefits to which you are otherwise entitled. You can, of course, decline to discuss any issue, as well as stop participating at any time, without any penalty or loss of benefits to which you are otherwise entitled. Participation in this study will involve no cost to you and you will be compensated with 50 dalasis as a token of appreciation for your time. You will receive it at the beginning of the survey and keep it whether or not you choose to complete the process. Your participation in this study does not invol ve any physical or emotional risk to you beyond that of everyday life and all personal information will be kept confidential using the following safeguards: ¥!I will keep collected data private to the extent allowed by law. ¥!I will keep your records under a code number rather than by name. In other words your real name will not appear on the files associated with this project. ¥!I will keep your records (e.g., recorded interviews) on a password -protected computer in a locked office. Study staff will only b e allowed to look at the interviews. I will destroy the information at the end of the study. When results of this study are published your name and other facts that might point to you will not appear. &&(!!Whom to contact with questions: If you have any que stions or problems during your time on this study, you should call Rita Kiki Edozie as the person in charge of this research project, who can be reached at 1-517-432-5291 or rkedozie@msu.edu. Neither the Principal Investigator nor Michigan State Universit y have made provisions for payment of costs associated with any injury resulting from participation in this study. To ensure that this research is being conducted properly, the Michigan State University IRB may review study records. Rita Kiki Edozie Pro fessor, International Relations 364 North Case Hall Michigan State University East Lansing, MI 48824 -1212 Telephone: 517 -432-5291 Email: rkedozie@msu.edu Are you okay with participating in this study by answering questions about foreign countries? If yes, please sign your name on the signature line below. If not, please return this form to the study administrator. Name: ____________________________ Signature: _______________________________________ &&)!!APPENDIX B SURVEY INSTRUMENT !"#$%#&'(!)*'*+!,(#-+./#*01!2'/*!3'(/#(&1!"#$%#&'(1!,4)4 !5.67+$*!8#*9+:! !"#$%&'(%)#* +,-%)"#+.&-#/+%0&"'*0+12&)(-#+3'45)(+67)#)"# +89:;< !;(-+/*#&'*6. :!:-&-+="(> + Section A . Information A ccess The first set of questions concerns how you typically receive in formation about people, places, and events. Never or Rarely (less than once a month), Monthly (once a month), A couple of times a month (more than one but fewer than fou r times), Weekly (once a week), A couple of times a week (more than one but fewer th an seven times), Daily (every day) How often do you do the following (please circle only one answer for each question) : A1. Send text messages ? Never, or rarely Monthly A couple of times a month Weekly A couple of times a week Daily 1 2 3 4 5 6 A2. Receive text messages? Never, or rarely Monthly A couple of times a month Weekly A couple of times a week Daily 1 2 3 4 5 6 A3. Use the internet? Never, or rarely Monthly A couple of times a month Weekly A couple of times a week Daily 1 2 3 4 5 6 A4. Watch television? Never, or rarely Monthly A couple of times a month Weekly A couple of times a week Daily 1 2 3 4 5 6 A5. Read the newspaper, magazines, or other periodicals? Never, or rarely Monthly A couple of times a month Weekly A couple of times a week Daily 1 2 3 4 5 6 A6. Listen to the radio? Never, or rarely Monthly A couple of times a month Weekly A couple of times a week Daily 1 2 3 4 5 6 A7. Hear information about other countries from friends, relatives, television, radio, news, or other sources? Never, or rarely Monthly A couple of times a month Weekly A couple of times a week Daily 1 2 3 4 5 6 Section B . Country Exposure The next set of questions is about how often you receive information a bout people, places, and events f rom other countries. B1. Have you or any of your close relatives or friends been abroad? Yes 1 No 2 (skip to B 2) B1.1 If yes, who? (circle all that apply) Me Parent Brother/Sister Spouse/fianc”/ boyfriend/girlfriend Child Aunt/Uncle/Cousin Friend Other 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 B1.2 Which countries did you/they visit ? 1. _________________ _____ 2 . _________ _____________ 3. ____________________________ 4. _____________________________ B2.21 How often do you read about, hear about or see images of Ch ina? Never, or rarely Monthly A couple of times a month Weekly A couple of times a week Daily 1 2 3 4 5 6 B2.22. Who or what is featured most often in such images ? (please select only one answer) Politicians Businessmen Celebrities (actors, musi cians, athletes) Places Things/Products Other 1 2 3 4 5 6 B2.23. Where are you most likely to encounter such images? Television/ Film Books Newspaper/magazines online Personal interaction Other 1 2 3 4 5 6 B2.24. How would you characterize the im ages you see of China? Mostly negative Sometimes negative Neither negative nor positive Sometimes positive Mostly positive 1 2 3 4 5 B3.11 How often do you read about, he ar about or see images of India ? Never, or rarely Monthly A couple of times a month Weekly A couple of times a week Daily 1 2 3 4 5 6 B3. . Who or what is featured most often in such images ? (please select only one answer) Politicians Businessmen Celebrities (actors, musicians, athletes) Places Things/Products Other 1 2 3 4 5 6 B2.73. Where are you most likely to encounter such images? &&*!! Television/ Film Books Newspaper/magazines online Personal interaction Other 1 2 3 4 5 6 B2.74. How would you character ize the images you see of India ? Mostly negative Sometimes negat ive Neither negative nor positive Sometimes positive Mostly positive 1 2 3 4 5 B2.11 How often do you read about, he ar about or see images of the United States ? Never, or rarely Monthly A couple of times a month Weekly A couple of times a week Dai ly 1 2 3 4 5 6 B2.12. Who or what is featured most often in such images ? (please select only one answer) Politicians Businessmen Celebrities (actors, musicians, athletes) Places Things/Products Other 1 2 3 4 5 6 B2.13. Where are you most likely t o encounter such images? Television/ Film Books Newspaper/magazines online Personal interaction Other 1 2 3 4 5 6 B2.14. How would you character ize the images you see of United States ? Mostly negative Sometimes negative Neither negative nor positive Sometimes positive Mostly positive 1 2 3 4 5 Section C: Country Perceptions (descriptive terms ) C2. China Ñ How likely would you be to use the following words to describe China in a conversation ? Highly unlikely (fewer than times out of 10), Somewhat unlikely (3 -4 times out of 10), Neither unlikely nor likely (5 times out of 10), Somewhat likely (6-7 times out of 10), Highly likely ( 8 or more times out of 10). Adventurous Highly unlikely Somewhat unlikely Neither unlikely nor likely Somewhat likel y Highly likely 1 2 3 4 5 Aggressive Highly unlikely Somewhat unlikely Neither unlikely nor likely Somewhat likely Highly likely 1 2 3 4 5 Brotherly Highly unlikely Somewhat unlikely Neither unlikely nor likely Somewhat likely Highly likely 1 2 3 4 5 Business -Oriented Highly unlikely Somewhat unlikely Neither unlikely nor likely Somewhat likely Highly likely 1 2 3 4 5 Colonizing Highly unlikely Somewhat unlikely Neither unlikely nor likely Somewhat likely Highly likely 1 2 3 4 5 Commun ity -oriented Highly unlikely Somewhat unlikely Neither unlikely nor likely Somewhat likely Highly likely 1 2 3 4 5 Competitive Highly unlikely Somewhat unlikely Neither unlikely nor likely Somewhat likely Highly likely 1 2 3 4 5 Consumerist Highl y unlikely Somewhat unlikely Neither unlikely nor likely Somewhat likely Highly likely 1 2 3 4 5 Corrupt Highly unlikely Somewhat unlikely Neither unlikely nor likely Somewhat likely Highly likely 1 2 3 4 5 Cruel Highly unlikely Somewhat unlikely Neither unlikely nor likely Somewhat likely Highly likely 1 2 3 4 5 Cultural Highly unlikely Somewhat unlikely Neither unlikely nor likely Somewhat likely Highly likely 1 2 3 4 5 Developing Highly unlikely Somewhat unlikely Neither unlikely nor likely Somewhat likely Highly likely 1 2 3 4 5 Diplomatic Highly unlikely Somewhat unlikely Neither unlikely nor likely Somewhat likely Highly likely 1 2 3 4 5 Family -Oriented Highly unlikely Somewhat unlikely Neither unlikely nor likely Somewhat likely Highly likely 1 2 3 4 5 Friend Highly unlikely Somewhat unlikely Neither unlikely nor likely Somewhat likely Highly likely 1 2 3 4 5 Hard Working Highly unlikely Somewhat unlikely Neither unlikely nor likely Somewhat likely Highly likel y 1 2 3 4 5 Helpful Highly unlikely Somewhat unlikely Neither unlikely nor likely Somewhat likely Highly likely 1 2 3 4 5 Humane Highly unlikely Somewhat unlikely Neither unlikely nor likely Somewhat likely Highly likely 1 2 3 4 5 Imperialist Highly unlikely Somewhat unlikely Neither unlikely nor likely Somewhat likely Highly likely &&+!! Innovative Highly unlikely Somewhat unlikely Neither unlikely nor likely Somewhat likely Highly likely 1 2 3 4 5 Loyal Highly unlikely Somewhat unlikely Neither unlikely nor likely Somewhat likely Highly likely 1 2 3 4 5 Nationalistic Highly unlikely Somewhat unlikely Neither unlikely nor likely Somewhat likely Highly likely 1 2 3 4 5 Nice Highly unlikely Somewhat unlikely Neither unlikely nor likely Somewh at likely Highly likely 1 2 3 4 5 Opportunistic Highly unlikely Somewhat unlikely Neither unlikely nor likely Somewhat likely Highly likely 1 2 3 4 5 Partner Highly unlikely Somewhat unlikely Neither unlikely nor likely Somewhat likely Highly likely 1 2 3 4 5 Peaceful Highly unlikely Somewhat unlikely Neither unlikely nor likely Somewhat likely Highly likely 1 2 3 4 5 Powerful Highly unlikely Somewhat unlikely Neither unlikely nor likely Somewhat likely Highly likely 1 2 3 4 5 Racist Highly u nlikely Somewhat unlikely Neither unlikely nor likely Somewhat likely Highly likely 1 2 3 4 5 Reliable Highly unlikely Somewhat unlikely Neither unlikely nor likely Somewhat likely Highly likely 1 2 3 4 5 Respectful Highly unlikely Somewhat unlikely Neither unlikely nor likely Somewhat likely Highly likely 1 2 3 4 5 Spiritual Highly unlikely Somewhat unlikely Neither unlikely nor likely Somewhat likely Highly likely 1 2 3 4 5 Technology -Oriented Highly unlikely Somewhat unlikely Neither unlikely nor likely Somewhat likely Highly likely 1 2 3 4 5 Tied -to-the -rules Highly unlikely Somewhat unlikely Neither unlikely nor likely Somewhat likely Highly likely 1 2 3 4 5 Traditional Highly unlikely Somewhat unlikely Neither unlikely nor likely Some what likely Highly likely 1 2 3 4 5 Trustworthy Highly unlikely Somewhat unlikely Neither unlikely nor likely Somewhat likely Highly likely 1 2 3 4 5 Welcoming Highly unlikely Somewhat unlikely Neither unlikely nor likely Somewhat likely Highly likel y 1 2 3 4 5 Section C: Country Perceptions (descriptive terms) C4. India Ñ How likely would you be to use the following words to describe India in a conversation? Highly unlikely (fewer than times out of 10), Somewhat unlikely (3 -4 times out of 10), Neither unlikely nor likely (5 times out of 10), Somewhat likely (6 -7 times out of 10), Highly likely ( 8 or more times out of 10). Adventurous Highly unlikely Somewhat unlikely Neither unlikely nor likely Somewhat likely Highly likely 1 2 3 4 5 Aggressive Highly unlikely Somewhat unlikely Neither unlikely nor likely Somewhat likely Highly likely 1 2 3 4 5 Brotherly Highly unlikely Somewhat unlikely Neither unlikely nor likely Somewhat likely Highly likely 1 2 3 4 5 Business -Oriented Highly unlikely Somewhat unlikely Neither unlikely nor likely Somewhat likely Highly likely 1 2 3 4 5 Colonizing Highly unlikely Somewhat unlikely Neither unlikely nor likely Somewhat likely Highly likely 1 2 3 4 5 Community -oriented Highly unlike ly Somewhat unlikely Neither unlikely nor likely Somewhat likely Highly likely 1 2 3 4 5 Competitive Highly unlikely Somewhat unlikely Neither unlikely nor likely Somewhat likely Highly likely 1 2 3 4 5 Consumerist Highly unlikely Somewhat unlikel y Neither unlikely nor likely Somewhat likely Highly likely 1 2 3 4 5 Corrupt Highly unlikely Somewhat unlikely Neither unlikely nor likely Somewhat likely Highly likely 1 2 3 4 5 Cruel Highly unlikely Somewhat unlikely Neither unlikely nor likel y Somewhat likely Highly likely 1 2 3 4 5 Cultural Highly unlikely Somewhat unlikely Neither unlikely nor likely Somewhat likely Highly likely 1 2 3 4 5 Developing Highly unlikely Somewhat unlikely Neither unlikely nor likely Somewhat likely High ly likely 1 2 3 4 5 Diplomatic Highly unlikely Somewhat unlikely Neither unlikely nor likely Somewhat likely Highly likely 1 2 3 4 5 Family -Oriented Highly unlikely Somewhat unlikely Neither unlikely nor likely Somewhat likely Highly likely 1 2 3 4 5 Friend Highly unlikely Somewhat unlikely Neither unlikely nor likely Somewhat likely Highly likely 1 2 3 4 5 Hard Working Highly unlikely Somewhat unlikely Neither unlikely nor likely Somewhat likely Highly likely 1 2 3 4 5 Highly unlikely Somewhat unlikely Neither unlikely nor likely Somewhat likely Highly likely &&,!! Imperialist Highly unlikely Somewhat u nlikely Neither unlikely nor likely Somewhat likely Highly likely 1 2 3 4 5 Individualistic Highly unlikely Somewhat unlikely Neither unlikely nor likely Somewhat likely Highly likely 1 2 3 4 5 Industrialized Highly unlikely Somewhat unlikely Neithe r unlikely nor likely Somewhat likely Highly likely 1 2 3 4 5 Innovative Highly unlikely Somewhat unlikely Neither unlikely nor likely Somewhat likely Highly likely 1 2 3 4 5 Loyal Highly unlikely Somewhat unlikely Neither unlikely nor likely Somewh at likely Highly likely 1 2 3 4 5 Nationalistic Highly unlikely Somewhat unlikely Neither unlikely nor likely Somewhat likely Highly likely 1 2 3 4 5 Nice Highly unlikely Somewhat unlikely Neither unlikely nor likely Somewhat likely Highly likely 1 2 3 4 5 Opportunistic Highly unlikely Somewhat unlikely Neither unlikely nor likely Somewhat likely Highly likely 1 2 3 4 5 Partner Highly unlikely Somewhat unlikely Neither unlikely nor likely Somewhat likely Highly likely 1 2 3 4 5 Peaceful Highl y unlikely Somewhat unlikely Neither unlikely nor likely Somewhat likely Highly likely 1 2 3 4 5 Powerful Highly unlikely Somewhat unlikely Neither unlikely nor likely Somewhat likely Highly likely 1 2 3 4 5 Racist Highly unlikely Somewhat unlikely Neither unlikely nor likely Somewhat likely Highly likely 1 2 3 4 5 Reliable Highly unlikely Somewhat unlikely Neither unlikely nor likely Somewhat likely Highly likely 1 2 3 4 5 Respectful Highly unlikely Somewhat unlikely Neither unlikely nor likely Somewhat likely Highly likely 1 2 3 4 5 Spiritual Highly unlikely Somewhat unlikely Neither unlikely nor likely Somewhat likely Highly likely 1 2 3 4 5 Technology -Oriented Highly unlikely Somewhat unlikely Neither unlikely nor likely Somewhat likely Highly likely 1 2 3 4 5 Tied -to-the -rules Highly unlikely Somewhat unlikely Neither unlikely nor likely Somewhat likely Highly likely 1 2 3 4 5 Traditional Highly unlikely Somewhat unlikely Neither unlikely nor likely Somewhat likely Highly likely 1 2 3 4 5 Trustworthy Highly unlikely Somewhat unlikely Neither unlikely nor likely Somewhat likely Highly likely 1 2 3 4 5 Welcoming Highly unlikely Somewhat unlikely Neither unlikely nor likely Somewhat likely Highly likely 1 2 3 4 5 Section C: C ountry Perceptions (descriptive terms) C8. United States Ñ How likely would you be to use the following words to describe the United States in a conversation? Highly unlikely (fewer than times out of 10), Somewhat unlikely (3 -4 times out of 10), Neither unlikely nor likely (5 times out of 10), Somewhat likely (6 -7 times out of 10), Highly likely ( 8 or more times out of 10). Adventurous Highly unlikely Somewhat unlikely Neither unlikely nor likely Somewhat likely Highly likely 1 2 3 4 5 Aggressive Highly unlikely Somewhat unlikely Neither unlikely nor likely Somewhat likely Highly likely 1 2 3 4 5 Brotherly Highly unlikely Somewhat unlikely Neither unlikely nor likely Somewhat likely Highly likely 1 2 3 4 5 Business -Oriented Highly unlikely Somewhat unlikely Neither unlikely nor likely Somewhat likely Highly likely 1 2 3 4 5 Colonizing Highly unlikely Somewhat unlikely Neither unlikely nor likely Somewhat likely Highly likely 1 2 3 4 5 Community -oriented Highly unlikely Somewhat un likely Neither unlikely nor likely Somewhat likely Highly likely 1 2 3 4 5 Competitive Highly unlikely Somewhat unlikely Neither unlikely nor likely Somewhat likely Highly likely 1 2 3 4 5 Consumerist Highly unlikely Somewhat unlikely Neither unli kely nor likely Somewhat likely Highly likely 1 2 3 4 5 Corrupt Highly unlikely Somewhat unlikely Neither unlikely nor likely Somewhat likely Highly likely 1 2 3 4 5 Cruel Highly unlikely Somewhat unlikely Neither unlikely nor likely Somewhat lik ely Highly likely 1 2 3 4 5 Cultural Highly unlikely Somewhat unlikely Neither unlikely nor likely Somewhat likely Highly likely 1 2 3 4 5 Developing Highly unlikely Somewhat unlikely Neither unlikely nor likely Somewhat likely Highly likely 1 2 3 4 5 Diplomatic Highly unlikely Somewhat unlikely Neither unlikely nor likely Somewhat likely Highly likely 1 2 3 4 5 Family -Oriented Highly unlikely Somewhat unlikely Neither unlikely nor likely Somewhat likely Highly likely 1 2 3 4 5 Highly unlikely Somewhat unlikely Neither unlikely nor likely Somewhat likely Highly likely &&-!!Humane Highly unlikely Somewhat unlikely Neither unlikely nor likely Somewhat likely Highly likely 1 2 3 4 5 Imperialist Highly unlikely Somewhat unlikely Neithe r unlikely nor likely Somewhat likely Highly likely 1 2 3 4 5 Individualistic Highly unlikely Somewhat unlikely Neither unlikely nor likely Somewhat likely Highly likely 1 2 3 4 5 Industrialized Highly unlikely Somewhat unlikely Neither unlikely nor likely Somewhat likely Highly likely 1 2 3 4 5 Innovative Highly unlikely Somewhat unlikely Neither unlikely nor likely Somewhat likely Highly likely 1 2 3 4 5 Loyal Highly unlikely Somewhat unlikely Neither unlikely nor likely Somewhat likely High ly likely 1 2 3 4 5 Nationalistic Highly unlikely Somewhat unlikely Neither unlikely nor likely Somewhat likely Highly likely 1 2 3 4 5 Nice Highly unlikely Somewhat unlikely Neither unlikely nor likely Somewhat likely Highly likely 1 2 3 4 5 Oppo rtunistic Highly unlikely Somewhat unlikely Neither unlikely nor likely Somewhat likely Highly likely 1 2 3 4 5 Partner Highly unlikely Somewhat unlikely Neither unlikely nor likely Somewhat likely Highly likely 1 2 3 4 5 Peaceful Highly unlikely Som ewhat unlikely Neither unlikely nor likely Somewhat likely Highly likely 1 2 3 4 5 Powerful Highly unlikely Somewhat unlikely Neither unlikely nor likely Somewhat likely Highly likely 1 2 3 4 5 Racist Highly unlikely Somewhat unlikely Neither unlikel y nor likely Somewhat likely Highly likely 1 2 3 4 5 Reliable Highly unlikely Somewhat unlikely Neither unlikely nor likely Somewhat likely Highly likely 1 2 3 4 5 Respectful Highly unlikely Somewhat unlikely Neither unlikely nor likely Somewhat like ly Highly likely 1 2 3 4 5 Spiritual Highly unlikely Somewhat unlikely Neither unlikely nor likely Somewhat likely Highly likely 1 2 3 4 5 Technology -Oriented Highly unlikely Somewhat unlikely Neither unlikely nor likely Somewhat likely Highly likely 1 2 3 4 5 Tied -to-the -rules Highly unlikely Somewhat unlikely Neither unlikely nor likely Somewhat likely Highly likely 1 2 3 4 5 Traditional Highly unlikely Somewhat unlikely Neither unlikely nor likely Somewhat likely Highly likely 1 2 3 4 5 Trustworthy Highly unlikely Somewhat unlikely Neither unlikely nor likely Somewhat likely Highly likely 1 2 3 4 5 Welcoming Highly unlikely Somewhat unlikely Neither unlikely nor likely Somewhat likely Highly likely 1 2 3 4 5 Section D . Cultural Orientation Which of the following characteristics are deemed most significant within your culture? (Please select three traits from the list below ) Being Hospitable Being Individualistic Being Aggressive Being Spiritual Being Helpf ul Being Humane Being Entrepreneurial Being Loyal Being Pioneering Being Patriotic Being Community -oriented Being Kind Being Competitive Being Respectful Being Cautious Being Powerful Being Hard -working Being Peaceful Secti on E . Country Awareness Which of the foll owing people, places, and languages are most commonly connected with each country? I=Ind ia C=China US=United States (Please circle the letter associated with each nation in the space provided) Leaders Celebritie s/Hist. Fig. Place Language Landmark Tsai Ing -wen I C US Yao Ming I C US Beijing I C US Wolof I C US Taj Mahal I C US Yahya Jammeh I C US Kanye West I C US London I C US Mandarin I C US Kruger Natio nal Park I C US &'.!! Helpful Highly unlikely Somewhat unlikely Neither unlikely nor likely Somewhat likely Highly likely 1 2 3 4 5 Humane Highly unlikely Somewhat unlikely Neither unlikely nor likely Somewhat likely Highly likely 1 2 3 4 5 Imperialist Highly unlikely Somewhat unlikely Neithe r unlikely nor likely Somewhat likely Highly likely 1 2 3 4 5 Individualistic Highly unlikely Somewhat unlikely Neither unlikely nor likely Somewhat likely Highly likely 1 2 3 4 5 Industrialized Highly unlikely Somewhat unlikely Neither unlikely nor likely Somewhat likely Highly likely 1 2 3 4 5 Innovative Highly unlikely Somewhat unlikely Neither unlikely nor likely Somewhat likely Highly likely 1 2 3 4 5 Loyal Highly unlikely Somewhat unlikely Neither unlikely nor likely Somewhat likely High ly likely 1 2 3 4 5 Nationalistic Highly unlikely Somewhat unlikely Neither unlikely nor likely Somewhat likely Highly likely 1 2 3 4 5 Nice Highly unlikely Somewhat unlikely Neither unlikely nor likely Somewhat likely Highly likely 1 2 3 4 5 Oppo rtunistic Highly unlikely Somewhat unlikely Neither unlikely nor likely Somewhat likely Highly likely 1 2 3 4 5 Partner Highly unlikely Somewhat unlikely Neither unlikely nor likely Somewhat likely Highly likely 1 2 3 4 5 Peaceful Highly unlikely Som ewhat unlikely Neither unlikely nor likely Somewhat likely Highly likely 1 2 3 4 5 Powerful Highly unlikely Somewhat unlikely Neither unlikely nor likely Somewhat likely Highly likely 1 2 3 4 5 Racist Highly unlikely Somewhat unlikely Neither unlikel y nor likely Somewhat likely Highly likely 1 2 3 4 5 Reliable Highly unlikely Somewhat unlikely Neither unlikely nor likely Somewhat likely Highly likely 1 2 3 4 5 Respectful Highly unlikely Somewhat unlikely Neither unlikely nor likely Somewhat like ly Highly likely 1 2 3 4 5 Spiritual Highly unlikely Somewhat unlikely Neither unlikely nor likely Somewhat likely Highly likely 1 2 3 4 5 Technology -Oriented Highly unlikely Somewhat unlikely Neither unlikely nor likely Somewhat likely Highly likely 1 2 3 4 5 Tied -to-the -rules Highly unlikely Somewhat unlikely Neither unlikely nor likely Somewhat likely Highly likely 1 2 3 4 5 Traditional Highly unlikely Somewhat unlikely Neither unlikely nor likely Somewhat likely Highly likely 1 2 3 4 5 Trustworthy Highly unlikely Somewhat unlikely Neither unlikely nor likely Somewhat likely Highly likely 1 2 3 4 5 Welcoming Highly unlikely Somewhat unlikely Neither unlikely nor likely Somewhat likely Highly likely 1 2 3 4 5 Section D . Cultural Orientation Which of the following characteristics are deemed most significant within your culture? (Please select three traits from the list below ) Being Hospitable Being Individualistic Being Aggressive Being Spiritual Being Helpf ul Being Humane Being Entrepreneurial Being Loyal Being Pioneering Being Patriotic Being Community -oriented Being Kind Being Competitive Being Respectful Being Cautious Being Powerful Being Hard -working Being Peaceful Secti on E . Country Awareness Which of the foll owing people, places, and languages are most commonly connected with each country? I=Ind ia C=China US=United States (Please circle the letter associated with each nation in the space provided) Leaders Celebritie s/Hist. Fig. Place Language Landmark Tsai Ing -wen I C US Yao Ming I C US Beijing I C US Wolof I C US Taj Mahal I C US &'%!! Secti on E . Country Awareness Which of the foll owing people, places, and languages are most commonly connected with each country? I=Ind ia C=China US=United States (Please circle the letter associated with each nation in the space provided) Leaders Celebritie s/Hist. Fig. Place Language Landmark Tsai Ing -wen I C US Yao Ming I C US Beijing I C US Wolof I C US Taj Mahal I C US Yahya Jammeh I C US Kanye West I C US London I C US Mandarin I C US Kruger Natio nal Park I C US Xi Jinping I C US Mahatma Ghandi I C US New York I C US English I C US Cristo Redentor I C US Hillary Clinton I C US William Shakespeare I C US Taipei I C US Cantonese I C US Big Ben I C US Narendra Modi I C US Ang Lee I C US Delhi I C US Hindi I C US The Great Wall I C US Section F . Household Information The final set of questions is designed to provide more information about you. (please tick the correct response) F1. What country are you a citizen of? F2. How old are you ? F3. What is your gender? Male 1 Female 2 F4. What is your major? B5. What Ethnic Group do you belong to? F7. What is your religious aff iliation ? Christianty Judaism Islam No religion or other, please specifiy 1 2 3 4 F8. What is the highest level of education you have attained? None Some or completed primary school Some or completed secondary school Some or completed college (bachelo rÕs degree) Some or completed graduate school (masterÕs, PhD, or professional degree) 1 2 3 4 5 F9. Which of the following d o you p ossess inside your (family) home ? (Please tick all that apply) Television Computer Running Water Car Generator &'&!! Section G : Country Perceptions (descriptive terms) - How true are the following statements regarding your feelings about China ? Tradition is important to this country. Very untrue of what I believe Somewhat untrue of what I believe Neutral Somewhat tr ue Very true of what I believe 1 2 3 4 5 This country is kind. Very untrue of what I believe Somewhat untrue of what I believe Neutral Somewhat true Very true of what I believe 1 2 3 4 5 This country is a brother to Africa/n people. Very untrue of what I believe Somewhat untrue of what I believe Neutral Somewhat true Very true of what I believe 1 2 3 4 5 Africa is growing stronger because of this country. Very untrue of what I believe Somewhat untrue of what I believe Neutral Somewhat true Ver y true of what I believe 1 2 3 4 5 This country is able to retain its culture while developing. Very untrue of what I believe Somewhat untrue of what I believe Neutral Somewhat true Very true of what I believe 1 2 3 4 5 This country is primarily interested in expanding its influence. Very untrue of what I believe Somewhat untrue of what I believe Neutral Somewhat true Very true of what I believe 1 2 3 4 5 This country has abundant cultural heritage. Very untrue of what I believe Somewhat untrue of what I believe Neutral Somewhat true Very true of what I believe 1 2 3 4 5 This country behaves responsibly as a global citizen. Very untrue of what I believe Somewhat untrue of what I believe Neutral Somewhat true Very true of what I believe 1 2 3 4 5 This country has good policies and leaders. Very untrue of what I believe Somewhat untrue of what I believe Neutral Somewhat true Very true of what I believe 1 2 3 4 5 This country produces good products for Africa. Very untrue of what I believe Somewhat untrue of what I believe Neutral Somewhat true Very true of what I believe 1 2 3 4 5 This country is fair. Very untrue of what I believe Somewhat untrue of what I believe Neutral Somewhat true Very true of what I believe 1 2 3 4 5 This country has always been a good friend to Africa/n people. Very untrue of what I believe Somewhat untrue of what I believe Neutral Somewhat true Very true of what I believe 1 2 3 4 5 This country is a good model for African development. Very untrue of what I believe Somewhat untrue of what I believe Neutral Somewhat true Very true of what I believe 1 2 3 4 5 This country is trustworthy. Very untrue of what I believe Somewhat untrue of what I believe Neutral Somewhat true Very true of what I believe 1 2 3 4 5 This country is AfricaÕs most important partner. Very untrue of what I believe Somewhat untrue of what I believe Neutral Somewhat true Very true of what I believe 1 2 3 4 5 This country is a developing nation. Very untrue of what I believe Somewhat untrue of what I believe Neutral Somewhat true Very true of what I believe 1 2 3 4 5 This country values family and community above all else. Very untrue of what I believe Somewhat untrue of what I believe Neutral Somewhat true Very tru e of what I believe 1 2 3 4 5 This country is religious. Very untrue of what I believe Somewhat untrue of what I believe Neutral Somewhat true Very true of what I believe 1 2 3 4 5 This country is rigid. Very untrue of what I believe Somewhat untr ue of what I believe Neutral Somewhat true Very true of what I believe 1 2 3 4 5 This country is lazy. Very untrue of what I believe Somewhat untrue of what I believe Neutral Somewhat true Very true of what I believe 1 2 3 4 5 This country is raci st. Very untrue of what I believe Somewhat untrue of what I believe Neutral Somewhat true Very true of what I believe 1 2 3 4 5 &''!! Section G : Country Perceptions (descriptive terms) - How true are the following statements regarding your feelings about India ? Tradition is important to this country. Very untrue of what I believe Somewhat untrue of what I believe Neutral Somewhat true Very true of what I believe 1 2 3 4 5 This country is kind. Very untrue of what I believe Somewhat untrue of what I bel ieve Neutral Somewhat true Very true of what I believe 1 2 3 4 5 This country is a brother to Africa/n people. Very untrue of what I believe Somewhat untrue of what I believe Neutral Somewhat true Very true of what I believe 1 2 3 4 5 Africa is gro wing stronger because of this country. Very untrue of what I believe Somewhat untrue of what I believe Neutral Somewhat true Very true of what I believe 1 2 3 4 5 This country is able to retain its culture while developing. Very untrue of what I beli eve Somewhat untrue of what I believe Neutral Somewhat true Very true of what I believe 1 2 3 4 5 This country is primarily interested in expanding its influence. Very untrue of what I believe Somewhat untrue of what I believe Neutral Somewhat true Very true of what I believe 1 2 3 4 5 This country has abundant cultural heritage. Very untrue of what I believe Somewhat untrue of what I believe Neutral Somewhat true Very true of what I believe 1 2 3 4 5 This country behaves responsibly as a glob al citizen. Very untrue of what I believe Somewhat untrue of what I believe Neutral Somewhat true Very true of what I believe 1 2 3 4 5 This country has good policies and leaders. Very untrue of what I believe Somewhat untrue of what I believe Neutral Somewhat true Very true of what I believe 1 2 3 4 5 This country produces good products for Africa. Very untrue of what I believe Somewhat untrue of what I believe Neutral Somewhat true Very true of what I believe 1 2 3 4 5 This country is fair. Very untrue of what I believe Somewhat untrue of what I believe Neutral Somewhat true Very true of what I believe 1 2 3 4 5 This country has always been a good friend to Africa/n people. Very untrue of what I believe Somewhat untrue of what I believe Neutral Somewhat true Very true of what I believe 1 2 3 4 5 This country is a good model for African development. Very untrue of what I believe Somewhat untrue of what I believe Neutral Somewhat true Very true of what I believe 1 2 3 4 5 This count ry is trustworthy. Very untrue of what I believe Somewhat untrue of what I believe Neutral Somewhat true Very true of what I believe 1 2 3 4 5 This country is AfricaÕs most important partner. Very untrue of what I believe Somewhat untrue of what I bel ieve Neutral Somewhat true Very true of what I believe 1 2 3 4 5 This country is a developing nation. Very untrue of what I believe Somewhat untrue of what I believe Neutral Somewhat true Very true of what I believe 1 2 3 4 5 This country values fa mily and community above all else. Very untrue of what I believe Somewhat untrue of what I believe Neutral Somewhat true Very true of what I believe 1 2 3 4 5 This country is religious. Very untrue of what I believe Somewhat untrue of what I believe Neutral Somewhat true Very true of what I believe 1 2 3 4 5 This country is rigid. Very untrue of what I believe Somewhat untrue of what I believe Neutral Somewhat true Very true of what I believe 1 2 3 4 5 This country is lazy. Very untrue of wha t I believe Somewhat untrue of what I believe Neutral Somewhat true Very true of what I believe 1 2 3 4 5 This country is racist. Very untrue of what I believe Somewhat untrue of what I believe Neutral Somewhat true Very true of what I believe 1 2 3 4 5 &'(!! Section G : Country Perceptions (descriptive terms) - How true are the following statements regarding your feelings about United States ? Tradition is important to this country. Very untrue of what I believe Somewhat untrue of what I believe Neutral Somewhat true Very true of what I believe 1 2 3 4 5 This country is kind. Very untrue of what I believe Somewhat untrue of what I believe Neutral Somewhat true Very true of what I believe 1 2 3 4 5 This country is a brother to Africa/n people. Ver y untrue of what I believe Somewhat untrue of what I believe Neutral Somewhat true Very true of what I believe 1 2 3 4 5 Africa is growing stronger because of this country. Very untrue of what I believe Somewhat untrue of what I believe Neutral Somewh at true Very true of what I believe 1 2 3 4 5 This country is able to retain its culture while developing. Very untrue of what I believe Somewhat untrue of what I believe Neutral Somewhat true Very true of what I believe 1 2 3 4 5 This country is primarily interested in expanding its influence. Very untrue of what I believe Somewhat untrue of what I believe Neutral Somewhat true Very true of what I believe 1 2 3 4 5 This country has abundant cultural heritage. Very untrue of what I believe Som ewhat untrue of what I believe Neutral Somewhat true Very true of what I believe 1 2 3 4 5 This country behaves responsibly as a global citizen. Very untrue of what I believe Somewhat untrue of what I believe Neutral Somewhat true Very true of what I believe 1 2 3 4 5 This country has good policies and leaders. Very untrue of what I believe Somewhat untrue of what I believe Neutral Somewhat true Very true of what I believe 1 2 3 4 5 This country produces good products for Africa. Very untrue o f what I believe Somewhat untrue of what I believe Neutral Somewhat true Very true of what I believe 1 2 3 4 5 This country is lazy . Very untrue of what I believe Somewhat untrue of what I believe Neutral Somewhat true Very true of what I believe 1 2 3 4 5 This country has always been a good friend to Africa/n people. Very untrue of what I believe Somewhat untrue of what I believe Neutral Somewhat true Very true of what I believe 1 2 3 4 5 This country is a good model for African development. Very untrue of what I believe Somewhat untrue of what I believe Neutral Somewhat true Very true of what I believe 1 2 3 4 5 This country is trustworthy. Very untrue of what I believe Somewhat untrue of what I believe Neutral Somewhat true Very true o f what I believe 1 2 3 4 5 This country is AfricaÕs most important partner. Very untrue of what I believe Somewhat untrue of what I believe Neutral Somewhat true Very true of what I believe 1 2 3 4 5 This country is a place I would like to visit. Very untrue of what I believe Somewhat untrue of what I believe Neutral Somewhat true Very true of what I believe 1 2 3 4 5 This country values family and community above all else. Very untrue of what I believe Somewhat untrue of what I believe Neutral Somewhat true Very true of what I believe 1 2 3 4 5 This country is religious. Very untrue of what I believe Somewhat untrue of what I believe Neutral Somewhat true Very true of what I believe 1 2 3 4 5 This country is rigid. Very untrue of what I believe Somewhat untrue of what I believe Neutral Somewhat true Very true of what I believe 1 2 3 4 5 This country is fair . Very untrue of what I believe Somewhat untrue of what I believe Neutral Somewhat true Very true of what I believe 1 2 3 4 5 This country is racist. Very untrue of what I believe Somewhat untrue of what I believe Neutral Somewhat true Very true of what I believe 1 2 3 4 5 &')!! APPENDIX C IRB EXEMPTION October 14 , 2016 To: Rita Kiki Edozie rkedozie@msu.edu Re: IRB# x16 - 1203e D Category: Exempt 8 Exempt Determination Date: October 13, 2016 Title: C onstructing China's Nation Brand through African Public Opinion Your project has been determined to be exempt under the Flexibility Initiative Exemption Category 8. Exemption Category: This project has qualified for the Flexibility Initiative Exemption Category 8: Research involving benign interventions in conjunction with the collection of data from an adult subject through verbal or written responses (including data entry) or video recording if the subject prospectively agrees to the intervention and data collection and at least one of the following criter ia is met: (A) The information obtained is recorded in such a manner that human subjects cannot be identified directly or through identifiers linked to the subjects; or (B) Any disclosure of the hu man subjectsÕ responses outside the research would not re asonably place the subjects at risk of criminal or civil liability or be damaging to the subjectsÕ financial standing, employability, educational advancement, or reputation. See HRPP Manual 8 - 8 - B, Exemption Category 8, for the full text of Exemption Categ ory 8 (http://hrpp.msu.edu/msu - hrpp - manual - section - 8 - 8 - b). Exclusions: To continue to qualify for Exemption Category 8, the project must not include: o Federal funding or federa l training grants o FDA regulated o Sponsor or other contractual restrictions o Clinical interventions (including clinical behavioral interventions) o Prisoners as subjects o Receipt of an NIH issued certificate of confidentiality to protect identifia ble research data o Be a project for which MSU serves as the IRB of record o Children as rese arch subjects &'*!!If any of the above criteria become applicable to a project determined exempt under this flexibility initiative, the IRB office must be promptly notified prior to implementation of the criteria and the project must be reviewed and approved i n accordance with the appropriate review level (e.g. expedited, full board). Principal Investigator Responsibilities: The Principal Investigator assumes the responsibilities for the protection of human subjects in this project as outlined in HRPP Manual S ection 8 - 1, Exemptions (http://hrpp.msu.edu/msu - hrpp - manual - section - 8 - 1). SEE SPECIAL EXCLUSIONS BELOW (e.g. no federal funding) Renewals: Exempt projects do not need to be renewed. Revisions : In general, investigators are not required to submit changes to the IRB once a research study is designated as exempt as long as those changes do not affect the exempt category or criteria for exempt determination (changing from exempt status to expedited or full review, changing exempt category) or that may substantially change the focus of the research study suc h as a change in hypothesis or study design. See HRPP Manual Section 8 - 1, Exemptions, f or examples. Change in Funding: If new external funding is obtained for an active human research project that had been determined exempt, a new exempt application will be required, with limited exceptions. Problems: If issues should arise during the co nduct of the research, such as unanticipated problems that may involve risks to subjects or others, or any problem that may increase the risk to the human subjects and ch ange the category of review, notify the IRB office promptly. Any complaints from part icipants that may change the level of review from exempt to expedited or full review must be reported to the IRB. Personnel Changes: After determination of the exempt sta tus, the PI is responsible for maintaining records of personnel changes and appropr iate training. The PI is not required to notify the IRB of personnel changes on exempt research. However, he or she may wish to submit personnel changes to the IRB for recor dkeeping purposes (e.g. communication with the Graduate School) and may submit suc h requests by email. If there is a change in PI, the new PI must sign a PI Assurance form and the previous PI must submit the Supplemental Form to Change the Principal Invest igator (http://hrpp.msu.edu/forms). Closure: Investigators are not required to notify the IRB when the research study is complete. However, the PI can choose to notify the IRB when the project is complete and is especially recommended when the PI leaves the university. &'+!!For More Information: See HRPP Manual Section 8 - 1, Exemptions and Section 8 - 8 - B, Exemption Category 8 - 8 - B (http://hrpp.msu.edu/msu - hrpp - manual - table - contents - expanded). Contact Information: If we can be of further assistance or if you have questions, please contact us at 517 - 355 - 2180 or via e mail at IRB@ora.msu.edu. 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