

MANUFACTURING SAMENESS: CONTINUITIES AND EXPANSIONS OF
COMMUNITY IDENTITY IN AFRO-CHINESE RELATIONS

By

Tara Mock

A DISSERTATION

Submitted to
Michigan State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of

African American and African Studies — Doctor of Philosophy

2018

ABSTRACT

MANUFACTURING SAMENESS: CONTINUITIES AND EXPANSIONS OF COMMUNITY IDENTITY IN AFRO-CHINESE RELATIONS

By

Tara Mock

This study examined the nature and awareness of, and attitudes toward Chinese nation branding in Africa. Using critical discourse analysis and survey research, the project analyzed the impact of images and messages indicative of *brand-China* on attitudes toward China in the Gambia, Kenya, and South Africa. By debating the significance of these images to China's continued rise on the continent and demonstrating the agency embedded within diverse African responses, the author hopes to prompt a reconsideration of the discursive power mechanisms exercised in and through national image making. The argument established is that national imaginary constructions serve as part of the "strategy, substance, and symbolic action" of strategic self-presentation, and thus, African leaders and individuals should pay greater attention to performative practices states engage in as, first, national imaginary constructions and, second, as strategies of presentation in the world. This study is located within the general body of scholarship that constitutes Black or Africana Studies, with a specific focus on Afro-Chinese relations. The project also fits within the disciplinary scope of international relations and development studies.

This dissertation is dedicated to Greyson, for whom and with whose encouragement I began and completed this project. For five years you allowed me to share my love and time with an unseen sibling. As you grew, so too did the project, and I am equally proud of what you've both become.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This dissertation would not have been possible without the love and support of my family including my son and primary research assistant, Greyson, who traveled the world with me and supported me through the vicissitudes of graduate education. I would also like to thank my parents, Ethel and James; my step-parents, Jesse and Pat; and my siblings, Tiffany, Brian, and William, who performed regular wellness checks and consistently offered words of encouragement. I am also indebted to other family members, namely siblings, cousins, and close friends, whose patience, love and understanding sustained me throughout this journey.

I would like to thank my advisor, Dr. Rita Kiki Edozie, whose support and suggestions were a great help in producing the final product. Dr. Edozie, along with Dr. Jamie Monson, Dr. Forrest Carter, and Dr. Aminda Smith provided untold amounts of support, encouragement, and insight which enabled me to forge my own intellectual path. I am privileged to have met and worked with such talented and dedicated faculty members at Michigan State University and I am forever beholden to them. In addition, I would like to acknowledge two other colleagues whose advice was instrumental during the early stages of the project, Dr. Howard Bossen and Dr. Folu Ogundimu, as well as Dr. John Metzler, who read the dissertation and provided valuable suggestions. Most importantly, I am grateful to the administration, faculty, and students at the University of the Gambia, the United States International University, Pwani University, Kenyatta University, The University of Johannesburg, and Witwatersrand University; who trusted me with their stories.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES.....	ix
LIST OF FIGURES	xi
Chapter One.....	1
<i>The Visual Politics of Africa-China</i>	1
Introduction	1
Purpose and Goals of the Study.....	5
Brand-China	12
Research Questions	16
Methodology.....	18
Rationale, Relevance, and Significance of the Study	21
Implications to Future Research	24
Outline of Chapters.....	25
Chapter Two.....	29
<i>Imagining the Nation</i>	29
Introduction	29
Establishing the Brand	30
Brand identity	32
Brand meaning.....	32
Brand response.....	33
Brand relationship.....	34
Crafting the Image	35
Imagining the Nation	40
(Mis)imagined Communities.....	46
Language and Culture	52
Conclusion.....	53
Chapter Three.....	54
<i>Africana Constructivism</i>	54
Introduction	54
Research Philosophy	57
Ontology	58
Epistemology	59
Paradigm.....	61
Research Approach	63
Research Design	65
Critical Discourse Analysis	65
Research Methods	67
Textual Artifacts.....	68
Sampling.....	71
Data Analysis	73

First Cycle Coding.....	74
Second Cycle Coding	74
Post-Coding, Pre-Writing, Writing and ReWriting.....	76
Survey Research	77
Research Methods	80
Variable Operationalization.....	80
Survey Design.....	81
Pretest.....	82
Structure of the Questionnaire.....	83
Stimuli Countries.....	84
Population and Sampling.....	85
Data Analysis	86
Limitations	92
Conclusion.....	93
 Chapter Four.....	 95
<i>Good Partners, Good Friends, Good Brothers</i>	95
Introduction	95
Penetrating a Stone	96
Solidarity (1955-1976).....	100
Retreat (1976-1995).....	104
Reengagement (1995- Present).....	105
Africa-China Country Case Studies.....	109
The Gambia	110
Kenya	113
South Africa.....	117
African Perspectives	121
Conclusion.....	124
 Chapter Five.....	 125
<i>Turning Dragons into Pandas</i>	125
Introduction	125
The Rhetorical Construction of <i>brand-China</i> in Africa.....	131
Artifact Characteristics.....	131
Sameness	132
Culture	136
Marginalization.....	138
Inclusion	141
Development.....	142
Homegrown Development.....	145
Development Aid.....	147
China Dream	149
Friendship.....	152
Historical Friendship.....	153
Solidarity	157

Partnership.....	160
Cooperation.....	161
Common South Identity	165
Conclusion.....	167
 Chapter Six.....	 168
<i>We Look Forward</i>	168
Introduction	168
Study Demographics.....	171
Participant Profile	171
Gender	172
Age.....	173
Place of Origin.....	173
Religion	174
Exposure to <i>brand-China</i>	176
Sources of Information	178
Images of China	179
Perceptions of <i>brand-China</i>	181
Underlying Dimensions of <i>brand-China</i>	181
Culture.....	184
Development.....	184
Trustworthiness	185
Imperialism	185
Composite Perceptions	186
Drivers of Brand Image.....	187
Gender	188
Religion	189
Source of Arrival.....	190
Cultural Orientation	191
Economic Indicators.....	193
Social Indicators.....	194
Country Knowledge.....	195
Media Exposure	196
Encounters with Chinese.....	198
Attitudes toward <i>brand-China</i>	198
Composite Perceptions.....	205
Conclusion.....	205
 Chapter Seven.....	 207
<i>Because of War, We Come Together</i>	207
Introduction	207
(Re)Constructing Social Identity	210
The Right to Belong.....	212
Gambia	215
Kenya	217
South Africa.....	218

A Stroke of the Post.....	219
APPENDICES.....	222
APPENDIX A: IRB Initial Consent Form.....	223
APPENDIX B: Survey Instrument.....	225
APPENDIX C: IRB Exemption.....	235
BIBLIOGRAPHY.....	238

LIST OF TABLES

TABLE 1: D’ASTOUS AND BOUJBEL COUNTRY PERSONALITY SCALE.....	82
TABLE 2: PERCEPTIONS OF <i>BRAND-CHINA</i>	87
TABLE 3: PARTICIPANTS BY SITE COUNTRY AND GENDER.....	172
TABLE 4: TOTAL POPULATION BY GENDER	173
TABLE 5: SITE COUNTRY BY MEDIAN AGE.....	173
TABLE 6: SITE COUNTRY BY PLACE OF ORIGIN.....	174
TABLE 7: PARTICIPANTS BY COUNTRY AND RELIGION.....	175
TABLE 8: PARTICIPANT CHARACTERISTICS.....	176
TABLE 9: SITE COUNTRY BY INTERNATIONAL EXPERIENCE	178
TABLE 10: SITE COUNTRY BY PREVIOUS TRAVEL TO CHINA.....	178
TABLE 11: SOURCES OF INFORMATION.....	179
TABLE 12: IMAGE FREQUENCY	180
TABLE 13: IMAGE TYPE.....	180
TABLE 14: IMAGE CHARACTERIZATION.....	181
TABLE 15: ENCOUNTERS WITH CHINESE	181
TABLE 16: DIMENSIONS OF <i>BRAND-CHINA</i>	183
TABLE 17: SITE COUNTRY POSITIONS ON THE MULTI-ITEM SCALE (A).....	183
TABLE 18: SITE COUNTRY POSITIONS ON THE MULTI-ITEM SCALE (B).....	184
TABLE 19: SITE COUNTRY PERCEPTIONS (WEIGHTED).....	187
TABLE 20: GENDERED PERCEPTIONS ON MULTI-ITEM SCALE	188
TABLE 21: MULTI-ITEM SCALE SCORES BY RELIGION	189

TABLE 22: SOURCE OF ARRIVAL.....	191
TABLE 23: SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC DETERMINANTS OF CULTURE.....	192
TABLE 24: ECONOMIC CULTURAL INDICATORS.....	193
TABLE 25: SOCIAL CULTURAL INDICATORS	194
TABLE 26: ITEM-LIST	200
TABLE 27: REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS AND STANDARD ERRORS	201
TABLE 28: STRUCTURE OF THE DISCRIMINANT FUNCTION.....	203
TABLE 29: GROUP MEANS ON THE DISCRIMINANT FUNCTION	204
TABLE 30: PREDICTED GROUP MEMBERSHIP	204

LIST OF FIGURES

FIGURE 1: CHINA-AFRICA SOLIDARITY PROPAGANDA.....	14
FIGURE 2: KELLER’S BRAND EQUITY MODEL.....	31
FIGURE 3: “THE STRUGGLE OF ALL THE PEOPLE IN THE WORLD...”	101
FIGURE 4: “CHAIRMAN MAO IS THE GREAT LIBERATOR”	102
FIGURE 5: “LONG LIVE CHAIRMAN MAO...”	130
FIGURE 6: BANK OF CHINA BILLBOARD (LUSAKA, 2015).....	130
FIGURE 7: CHINA SOUTHERN AIRLINES BILLBOARD (NAIROBI, 2015)	134
FIGURE 8: NORMAL P-P PLOT OF REGRESSION STANDARDIZED	202
FIGURE 9: SCATTERPLOT OF REGRESSION	202

Chapter One

The Visual Politics of Africa-China

“Communities are to be distinguished, not by their falsity or genuineness, but in the style in which they are imagined.”—Benedict Anderson 1991, 5

Introduction

When the Hubei Provincial Museum in Wuhan, China (PRC, Beijing) opened its exhibit, *This is Africa*, on September 28, 2017, no one anticipated the protests it would incite leading to its removal roughly two weeks later¹. The exhibit featured a series of diptychs, each containing a photo of an African person juxtaposed alongside a wild animal, in what the photographer, Yu Huiping, maintained was designed to celebrate “harmony between man and nature.”² The exhibit featured photographs of African people expressing various states of emotion alongside a cautious cheetah, curious meerkats, contemplative baboon, proboscis, lemur, and colobus monkeys, sparking accusations of racism from observers outside and within China.³ Most striking, however, was the photo of a screaming African boy collocated with a similarly positioned howling chimpanzee. Neither Yu, nor the museum’s curator, Fan Qin, acknowledged the casual racism, yet the exhibit, which opened to fanfare surrounding China’s eight-day National Day holiday was unceremoniously shuttered less than two weeks later.

¹ Huang, Echo and Kuo, Lily. “A Museum in China put on an exhibit called ‘This is Africa’ that compares Africans to Animals” *Quartz Africa*. October 13, 2017. <https://qz.com/1101699/africans-in-china-are-infuriated-over-a-museum-exhibit-comparing-africans-to-animals/>

² Ibid.

³ Haas, Benjamin. “Chinese museum accused of racism over photos pairing Africans with animals”. *The Guardian*. October 14, 2017. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/oct/14/chinese-museum-accused-of-racism-over-photos-pairing-africans-with-animals>

Equating African people with animals would be problematic as an isolated event, but when considered alongside other recent occurrences of casual racism in China—CCTV’s Spring Festival Gala depicting Chinese actors in Blackface⁴, a Qiaobi Detergent ad featuring an African man denuded of his blackness to gain the affection of a Chinese female⁵ and Chinese social media platform, Wechat, translating the word for ‘black foreigner’ as ‘nigger’⁶—begs the question whether these are isolated incidents or more endemic of widely held societal views.⁷

Consistent with the manner in which European thinkers created a scientific, biologically- based racial binary between Africans and Europeans during the 19th century,⁸ *This is Africa* reinforces longstanding ideologies of racial hegemony. The dominant ideology during colonialism was that the African was a savage.⁹ Not only was Africa stripped of his burgeoning culture, but the “twin processes of balkanization and misrepresentation”¹⁰ twisted the image of Africa into the distorted portrait of our current understanding to justify colonization of the continent. Oyeronke Oyewumi (1997) posits that in the west, biological explanations appear to be especially privileged

⁴ Taylor, Adam. “China’s televised New Year’s Gala featured a blackface skit about Africans”. The Washington Post. February 16, 2018.

⁵ Horwitz, Josh. “The full apology from the Chinese company behind the racist laundry detergent ad”. *Quartz Africa* <https://qz.com/695240/the-full-apology-from-the-chinese-company-behind-the-racist-laundry-detergent-ad/>.

⁶ Linder, Alex. “WeChat apologizes after being caught translating 'black foreigner' into the N-word.” October 12, 2017. *Shanghaiist* <http://shanghaiist.com/2017/10/12/n-word-wechat.php>

⁷ Chiu, Joanna. “China has an irrational fear of a “black invasion” bringing drugs, crime, and interracial marriage.” *Quartz Africa*. <https://qz.com/945053/china-has-an-irrational-fear-of-a-black-invasion-bringing-drugs-crime-and-interracial-marriage/>; Sautman, Barry, “Anti-black Racism in Post-Mao China.” *The China Quarterly* 138, June 1994, pp 413–37.

⁸ Crais, Clifton C., and Pamela Scully. *Sara Baartman and the Hottentot Venus: a Ghost Story and a Biography*. Princeton University Press, 2011, p. 6.

⁹ Opoku, Agyeman, *Pan Africanism and Its Detractors: A Response to Harvard’s Race-Effacing Universalists*, Edwin Mellen Press, 1997, p.33.

¹⁰ Edozie, Rita Kiki and Peyi Soyinka, eds. *Reframing Contemporary Africa: Politics, Economics, and Culture in the Global Era*. Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 2010, p. 36.

over other ways of explaining difference. She contends that because “western preoccupation with biology creates new biologies,”¹¹ the notion that African people would be racialized in a manner which confines them to a role representative “of the larger whole from which they emanate,”¹² fits within historical western biological imperatives.

Early literary, cinematic, and photographic forms of entertainment during periods of capital accumulation in the late 19th and early 20th century depicted African and Asian people as savage and animalistic while presenting Europeans as more civilized and advanced.¹³ Joseph Conrad’s novella, *Heart of Darkness* (1899), demonstrates the practice in his description of a place where indigenous Congolese people go to die from the perspective of the colonizer. He writes,

“Black shapes crouched, lay, sat between the trees, leaning against the trunks, clinging to the earth in all attitudes of pain, abandonment, and despair. They were nothing earthly now, nothing but black shadows of disease and starvation. One of these *creatures* rose to his *hands and knees* and went off *on all fours* towards the river to drink.”¹⁴

In the narrator’s view, Africans were not humans but indistinguishable “black shadows” and animal-like “creatures” crawling on “all fours,” reinforcing the idea that the indigens were less than human. Conrad’s use of animals to create a moral binary wherein African people represented all that was bad, weak, undeveloped, and

¹¹ Oyewumi, Oyeronke. *Invention of Women: Making an African Sense of Western Gender Discourses*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997, p. 328.

¹² Said, Edward W. *Orientalism*. Vintage Books, 1979, 363.

¹³ Shohat, Ella, and Robert Stam. *Unthinking Eurocentrism: Multiculturalism and the Media*. Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 2014.

¹⁴ Conrad, J. (1995). *Heart of Darkness*. Ware: Wordsworth Editions, pp.14-20.

unintelligent, exemplifies its function as an important rationale for and underpinning to the colonial project. Siba N’Zatioula Grovogui (1996) describes colonial depictions of Africans thusly,

“in the aftermath of the ‘discovery’... Western conquerors began to use images of witches, wild men, and animals—all intolerable aspects of the European self—to characterize the peoples they subordinated, dominated, exploited, or simply marginalized”¹⁵.

This point is underscored by Olufemi Taiwo (2009), who writes

“To put it bluntly: They did not think that Africans were a part of the human family, and if they were, they were so far down the human ladder that they were adjudged to be more kin to the lower animals than to humans”¹⁶ (59-60).

Colonial discourse reinforced burgeoning ideologies of race, showcasing the modernity of the colonial project, through reducing African people and spaces to savages and animals. Such images served to cement an imagined community of British, Flemish, and French identity and, also, bolstered support for the colonial project amongst the working classes of Europe and the United States.¹⁷ The gradual formation of an object world, broadcasting imperial imagery of an uncivilized, inferior Africa to popular audiences across Europe, relegated African people to primitivism; informed the myth of

¹⁵ Grovogui, Siba N’Zatioula. *Sovereigns, Quasi Sovereigns, and Africans: Race and Self-Determination in International Law*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996, p. 8.

¹⁶ Taiwo, Olufemi. *How Colonialism Preempted Modernity in Africa*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2009, pp.59-60

¹⁷ Shohat, Ella, and Robert Stam. *Unthinking Eurocentrism: Multiculturalism and the Media*. Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 2014, p. 100.

the continent as an inherently different, wild and dangerous space, and reified the perceived distance between Africa and Europe.¹⁸

The perceptions that they are not like us...are sub-human...need our protection and guidance, were important rationales for colonialism. The need to create a moral binary wherein African people represented all that was bad, weak, undeveloped, and unintelligent, was an important aspect of the European narrative because it created a space wherein Europe and Europeans, as opposites both physically and socially, could become everything that Africa wasn't—in the European mind. The central goal was to locate support within the constructed confines of the national imaginary of community.

Purpose and Goals of the Study

Similarly to the cinematic projection of empire accompanying the imperial project, during neoliberal globalization, as leaders once again conceptualize their political mandates in terms of the competition for global capital, governments continue to search for ways to reconstitute images of self against that of a political 'other'.¹⁹ The polarization of global space functioning as national imaginary constructions within King Solomon's Mines (1885), King Kong (1933), Tarzan of the Apes (1912), and How the West was Won (1936) shifted over time. Contemporary constructions of self and other accompanying the global project of capital accumulation include filmic, journalistic, and literary manifestations of political rhetoric within the Indiana Jones movies (1981 – 2008), Coverage of The Gulf War, Stargate (1994) Avatar (2009), the

¹⁸ Bonsu, Samuel K. "Colonial images in global times: consumer interpretations of Africa and Africans in advertising", *Consumption Markets & Culture*, p. 5.

¹⁹ Schwak, Juliette. "Constructing political common sense: Nation branding professionals and discourses of truth in Korea". Presented at the International Studies Association Conference, Baltimore, MD. 2017, Shohat and Stam 1994)

Force Awakens (2015), Wolf Warrior 2 (2017), and even seemingly innocuous actions as the fetishization and objectification of black bodies, like Lupita Nyong'o, for white consumption.

Within the increasingly encompassing relations that mark globalization, identities and imaginaries are facilitated along new routes of circulation and expansion. Cultural identities, companion to other forms of identity, continue to be imbued with power relations and inequalities reminiscent of earlier eras of capital accumulation. Nowhere is the negotiation more profoundly observed than Africa, where the landscape has changed rapidly during the last twenty years, shifting from solidly Western-led to one in which new developmental partners from the global South are taking on more pivotal roles. These changing dynamics have led to increased competition between Beijing, Washington and London for favor with African nationals—a competition often played out in the court of public opinion.²⁰

Competing theories of contemporary global capital accumulation are united in their desire to define changes in how nations are incorporated into the global society, the outward rationale for those changes (economic exploitation, state building and alliances, broad restructuring, or self-reflexive cultural identification), and how such changes impact individual nation-states. Wallerstein (1987) and Sklair (2002) assert that globalization, as part of the modern capitalist world economy, operates on many levels, with capital accumulation being its primary driver. As states and transnational corporations become responsible for disseminating the 'culture ideology of

²⁰ In addition to smaller players like India and Brazil, and formal colonial States of France and Germany.

consumerism', these entities once again create images of themselves utilizing new and existing forms of expression to facilitate globalization's reach into new markets.²¹

The PRC significantly increased its presence on the African continent within the last two decades, emerging as its largest trading partner within recent years. As China becomes a progressively important trading partner to nations across the breadth and width of Africa, Beijing increasingly manufactures a narrative of itself and Africa-China predicated on cultural and historical proximity.²² This practice speaks to not only Africa's growing significance to China but, also, to the need for the PRC to distinguish itself within Africa.

Beijing successfully curates an image of self on the continent as a counterhegemonic force against Western tyranny, privileging themes of "oppression", "domination", and "subordination" symbolic of the global African experience.²³ Similarly to the mission of the colonial project, the overarching imperative to construct a national imaginary predicated upon a binary opposition between "we" and "them" remains constant.²⁴ In this instance, however, the 'we' are Africa and China through the indigenization of media,²⁵ and 'them', the west, as identity maps are redrawn such that something "patently foreign and distant acquires, for one reason or another, a status more rather than less familiar."²⁶ This process of cultural synchronization, whereby the

²¹ Tomlinson, John. "Cultural Imperialism." Found in Lechner, Frank J., and John Boli. *The Globalization Reader*. J. Wiley & Sons, 2012, p. 347.

²² Kopiński, Dominik, Andrzej Polus, and Ian Taylor. "Contextualising Chinese engagement in Africa." *Journal of Contemporary African Studies* 29.2 (2011): 131.

²³ Hamilton, Ruth Simms, ed. *Routes of passage: rethinking the African Diaspora*. Vol. 1. MSU Press, 2007, p. 24.

²⁴ Shohat, Ella, and Robert Stam. *Unthinking Eurocentrism: Multiculturalism and the media*. Routledge, 2014.

²⁵ Lechner, Frank J., and John Boli. *The Globalization Reader*. J. Wiley & Sons, 2012, p. 341.

²⁶ Said, Edward W. *Orientalism*. Vintage Books, 1979, p. 59.

tendency is toward convergence and homogeneity, rather than alterity, is unprecedented historically and attributable to the spread of global capital.²⁷

Beijing claims to present a different view of the African continent and its people, but conflicting messages embedded within popular depictions of Africa establish that the Chinese have internalized western views of the continent. Shanshan Lan (2016) suggests a disconnect between the pro-African political rhetoric of friendship “at the state level and anti-African sentiments and practices at the individual and local level.”²⁸ Incongruent representations of Africa, of China, and of Africa-China at the level of personal interaction, threaten the potency of official State messages of ‘brotherhood’, ‘trustworthiness’, and ‘solidarity’. Contemporary official rhetoric on Afro-Chinese as a relationship amongst ‘brothers and friends’ is complicated by the use of hegemonic colonial discourse and cultural stereotyping in individual and corporate Chinese depictions of Africa. The messages of goodwill generated by the 2017 inauguration of the ‘Madaraka Express’, a China Road and Bridge Corporation constructed standard gauge railway, as it embarked on its inaugural journey from Mombasa to Nairobi, are in conflict with the colonial racial constructions of Africans embedded in the 2015 ‘Chinese Restaurant’ row in Nairobi, exemplifying Lan’s concern.²⁹

The tension between Chinese popular discourse and official State accounts of Africa, its people, and its relationship to China is the subject of this inquiry. This

²⁷ Tomlinson, John. “Cultural Imperialism.” Found in Lechner, Frank J., and John Boli. *The Globalization Reader*. J. Wiley & Sons, 2012, p. 347.

²⁸ Lan, Shanshan. “The Shifting Meanings of Race in China: A Case Study of the African Diaspora Community in Guangzhou”. *City & Society*, Vol. 28, Issue 3, 2016, p. 305.

²⁹ Smith, SJ, *Bounding the borders*, 1993; Habil, Evans. “Nairobi county gov’t closes ‘racist’ Chinese restaurant”. *The Daily Nation*. March 24, 2015. <https://www.nation.co.ke/counties/nairobi/Chinese-Restaurant-Kilimani-Racism/1954174-2664382-r6f8s7/index.html>.

dissertation project builds upon emerging literature in the field, examining Afro-Chinese relations through contemporary depictions of the Chinese national imaginary depicted within its nation brand. Specifically, the dissertation focuses on how nation branding images and messages, produced by the Chinese State, affect attitudes and community identity amongst university students within the Gambia, Kenya, and South Africa. The dissertation is grounded in the tradition of Afrocentric social research in its inquiry into how people in three African nations (the Gambia, Kenya, and South Africa) receive and reconstitute images of self and other conveyed through China's nation brand.

The project's central goal is to explore the liminal space between official and personal accounts of China and Africa-China, critically challenging *brand-China* as yet another spatial fix designed to facilitate access to resources and markets in Africa. Consistent with E.H. Carr's categorization of international power as 'power over opinion' the project adopts a dissensus-constructivist approach, through its concern with how image-making is implicated in relations of social power, problematizing the tendency of nation branding to depoliticize and obscure the struggles and negotiations through which national identities are produced.³⁰ The project unveils the power mechanisms at play in the phenomena of national image politics by critically analyzing promotional discourses and nation branding practices with regard to international politics in the context of Afro-Chinese relations. More particularly, the dissertation analyzes how state manufacture of Africa-China as an identity construction influences

³⁰ Rancière, Jacques. *Dissensus: On politics and aesthetics*. Bloomsbury Publishing, 2015. Nye, Joseph (2015) China and Soft Power, South African Journal of International Affairs. citing E.H. Carr in describing the three components of international power. Kaneva, Nadia. "Nation branding: Toward an agenda for critical research." *International journal of communication* 5, 2011.

creation, co-creation, and recreation of not only the Chinese national imaginary but the constructed image of a fictive Afro-Chinese community. The project, thereby, also explores how the historical memory of community expansion within Africa is mapped onto *brand-China*.

The analysis focuses specifically on public awareness of, exposure to, and perceptions of these new external forms of national and supranational consciousness constructed through Chinese nation branding on the continent, in the Gambia, Kenya, and South Africa. The selected sites are each Anglophone countries, with varied regional economies, and longstanding diplomatic and economic relations with China. The PRC also functions as the largest single exporter of consumer products to each country, which supports an analysis of the correlation between market presence, brand image, and awareness. The Gambia, the third nation under consideration, has long been isolationist and only recently reestablished diplomatic relations with Beijing. The Gambia's unique circumstance should aid in isolating the effects of *brand-China* from general awareness of the PRC.

Nation branding offers an emerging 'corpus of analysis' through which the national imaginary can be examined using the tools of marketing to effectively alter public attitudes or perceptions about a nation without using hard power.³¹ The practice of repositioning one's national image against a political other has long been utilized to

³¹ Kaneva, Nadia. "Nation branding: Toward an agenda for critical research." *International journal of communication* 5, 2011; Leonard, M.. Diplomacy by other means. *Foreign Policy*, 132, 2002, 48. Osei, Collins and Gbadamosi, Ayantunji. "Rebranding Africa" *Marketing Intelligence and Planning* 29.3, 2011, 284-304; Szondi, György, 'The role and challenges of country branding in transition countries: The Central and Eastern European experience'. *Place Branding and Public Diplomacy* 3.1, 2007, 29. Jordan, Paul. "Nation Branding: A Tool for Nationalism?." *Journal of Baltic Studies* 45.3, 2014, p. 284; Anholt, S. 'Nation brands index: How the world sees the world', Second Quarter, Global Market Insight, 2005; Fan, Ying "Branding the Nation: What is being branded?" *Journal of Vacation Marketing* 12.1, 2006, pp. 5-14; Gudjonsson, Hlynur. "Nation branding." *Place branding* 1.3, 2005, 285.

garner public support domestically and abroad for the state's political agenda. Within globalization national interests are increasingly expanding beyond the political, however, in what Melissa Aronczyk (2013) deems the "interpenetration of commercial and public sector interests designed to help the nation-state successfully compete for international capital, convey an image of legitimacy,... and create positive foreign opinion."³² In this milieu, managing a nation's image amongst foreign nationals becomes an important component of economic and foreign policy,³³ as nation branding becomes a placeholder for how effectively countries compete with each other for favorable positioning.³⁴

Done correctly, brands should convey an image of attractiveness and trustworthiness abroad, and inculcate an ethos of shared community at home. Branding the nation is equivalent to the US as 'the land of the free and home of the brave' or 'Japan being the land of the sun'. The Nation as a brand is whatever and because we imagine it to be so. Communicating promotional images and messages that 'we are like you' yet 'different than they are' enables governments to exercise an element of control over the multitude of messages audiences associate with the state by projecting a carefully curated, positive overall image.³⁵

National image and reputation are of paramount importance to building brand equity. Where borders and boundaries appear increasingly obsolete, nations faces

³² Aronczyk, Melissa, *Branding the nation: Mediating space, value, and identity in the context of global culture*. New York University, ProQuest, UMI Dissertations Publishing, 2009, pp 16-32.

³³ Fan, Ying "Branding the Nation: What is being branded?" *Journal of Vacation Marketing* 12.1, 2006, pp. 5-14; Kotler, Philip, and David Gertner. "Country as Brand, Product, and Beyond: A place marketing and brand management perspective." *Journal of brand management* 9.4 (2002): 249-261.

³⁴ Anholt, Simon. "Competitive identity: The new brand management for nations, cities and regions." *Journal of Brand Management* 14.6 (2007): 474-475.

³⁵ Shapiro, Michael J. *Violent cartographies: Mapping cultures of war*. U of Minnesota Press, 1997.

conflicting tensions toward homogenization and differentiation, self and ‘other’, ‘we’ and ‘them’.³⁶ An effective strategy, balancing these competing tendencies toward sameness and difference has gradually become an important aspect of global competition.³⁷

One way to combat these conflicting tendencies is to intentionally create complementary visual and textual elements and artifacts that positively affect consumer reception to the brand. Contemporarily, states utilize a pastiche of unique identifiers within the arts, history, popular culture, sports, media, and architecture to assimilate with or dissimilate themselves from competitors.³⁸ The constitutive value of these artifacts stems from their seemingly innocuous ability to influence public opinion through soft power initiatives.³⁹ When audiences possess a cohesive, favorable nation brand image of the state, messages have a stronger influence on individual consumer attitudes toward the state vis-a-vis competing messages.⁴⁰

Brand-China

The Chinese state frames its brand in Africa as a partnership predicated on *South-South* cooperation, similarly antagonistic relations with the West, brotherhood amongst equals, and a longstanding, ‘traditional’ friendship. To cement these images Beijing draws heavily upon its history of engagement with the continent, frequently linking

³⁶ Loo, Theresa, and Gary Davies. "Branding China: The ultimate challenge in reputation management?." *Corporate reputation review* 9.3 (2006): 203; Rose, Gillian. *Visual methodologies: An introduction to researching with visual materials*. sage, 2016, 201; Szondi, G, 2007.

³⁷ Ahn, Michael J., and Hsin-Ching Wu. "The Art of Nation Branding." *Public Organization Review* 15.1 (2015): 159.

³⁸ Loo and Davies, 2006, 205.

³⁹ Ahn, Michael J., and Hsin-Ching Wu. "The Art of Nation Branding." *Public Organization Review* 15.1 (2015): 157-173.

⁴⁰ Hsieh, An-Tien, and Chung-Kai Li. "The moderating effect of brand image on public relations perception and customer loyalty." *Marketing Intelligence & Planning* 26.1 (2008): 26-42. Dinnie, Keith. *Nation branding: Concepts, issues, practice*. Routledge, 2015, p. 18.

modern Afro-Chinese relations with the 15th Century when Chinese traders visited the East African coast and, more recently, to the Bandung Conference (1955) when the foundation for modern day Sino-African relationships was laid. Although the Chinese state nurtures the image of a fictive community between the two regions to facilitate its neoliberal goals, Beijing's recent fortunes are in stark contrast with those experienced during the *First Five Year Plan* (1953-57) and the *Great Leap Forward* (1958-60) when the PRC initially established relations with African nations.

In 2009, perhaps in response to its nation building efforts, the PRC surpassed the United States to become Africa's largest trade partner. Yet, although Chinese economic growth has averaged 10-percent per year since 1978, the PRC continues to frame the relationship as a continuation of a *longue duree* between *global south* development partners and foil to western hegemony.⁴¹ In this milieu, the PRC's official brand reflects a carefully crafted, government controlled-narrative with *realpolitik* foreign policy goals no different than Western interests in Africa. Understanding this dual function of *brand-China* is important to comprehending Beijing's attempts to create and manage its brand in Africa.

The PRC long understood the import of image competitiveness to economic competitiveness and China's investment in its own image undergirds its strategic self-presentation in Africa. The Propaganda Department of the Chinese Communist Party was founded alongside the Party itself (1921), underscoring the importance of image building to nation building. Historical and contemporary leaders stressed the need to

⁴¹ Data derived from World Bank figures on nation development.
<https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG?locations=CN>, accessed on October 29, 2017

control China's impression abroad and Beijing worked to build soft power and influence in Africa since the 1960s. Propaganda images of the 'solidarity movement' (image 1), depicting China and Africa united against a common western foe, and recent nation branding films, such as "Made in China" (2007), "Perspectives" (2010),⁴² and "People" (2011),⁴³ highlight China's solidarity with African decolonization movements during the 1960s and 1970s and its contemporary overseas production capacity, culture, and inclusiveness in 2017. Images of China, reinforcing messages of global competitiveness, solidarity and traditional friendship with Africa, are ubiquitously present at every touch point: from a *ChinAfrica* magazine cover announcing the PRC's priority of achieving food security for China and Africa⁴⁴ to Chinese cartoons broadcast in Antananarivo⁴⁵ to speeches by the Chinese Ambassador to South Africa stressing the import of developmental cooperation between the two nations.




FIGURE 1: CHINA-AFRICA SOLIDARITY PROPAGANDA

⁴² "Perspectives", a Chinese nation branding film which ran 17 minutes, featured the changes and challenges of Chinese society since the country implemented Opening and Reform policies in the late 1970s. The film highlights how China has preserved its own special characteristics while embracing the world and connects inclusion of ethnic minorities with its international cosmopolitanism.

⁴³ "People", is a 60 second spot featuring prominent Chinese personalities from sports, science, business and entertainment. The film ends with smiling faces of ordinary Chinese people flashing quickly across the screen, with the tagline "Chinese Friendship" in the background.

⁴⁴ ChinAfrica Magazine food security cover. http://www.chinafrica.cn/Cover/txt/2014-03/01/content_599048.htm, accessed October 29, 2017.

⁴⁵ "Chinese TV Programs to be Broadcast in Madagascar" *AllAfrica.com* <http://allafrica.com/stories/201703130528.html>, accessed October 29, 2017.

One of the greatest challenges of nation branding is the question of how to conflate the nation's many intersectional identities into one neatly packaged, easily congested image resonating with its many different constituencies. A national imaginary that appeals to one culture or situation may not achieve the same effect in another, for it is almost impossible to develop a simple image or core message about a country that effectively resonates with and within all other nations⁴⁶. Trying to be one thing to all audiences or all things to all audiences renders the message meaningless, but states can be consistent in their messaging and prolific in the promulgation of those messages. Within Africa, Beijing does precisely that. Despite subtle nuances, the Chinese State creates a consistent image of itself and its relationship with Africa as 'friend', 'brother', and 'partner'. The PRC frames Africa-China as a partnership predicated on "brotherhood," *South-South* cooperation, and longstanding, traditional friendship, but also "oppression", "domination", and "subordination."⁴⁷ In so doing Beijing attempts to "denationalize racial inequality,"⁴⁸ by creating an imagined community with Africa through the shared intimacy of marginalization by the West and invoking the spirit of Ruth Simms Hamilton's (2007) supposition that the injustices visited upon the African continent are "a world phenomenon that spans historical and social space."⁴⁹

⁴⁶ Fan, 2006, p.10

⁴⁷ Mock, Tara D. *Good Friends, Good Brothers, Good Partners: Viewing Afro-Chinese Relations the lens of promotional culture*, found in *Communication Strategies: The Role of Culture, Identities and Ideologies in Africa-China*. Pretoria: the University of South Africa Press Pretoria, (forthcoming 2018)

⁴⁸ IBID

⁴⁹ Simms Hamilton, Ruth (2007). *Transnational Politics: A note on Black Americans and the Paris Peace Conference of 1919* found in *Routes of Passage: Rethinking the African Diaspora*. Michigan State University Press: East Lansing (227).

Research Questions

The project examines attitude and identity formation, questioning how people in Kenya, South Africa, and the Gambia receive and reconstitute images of the other and self constructed through China's nation brand image. Images of both Africa and China are represented in its brand and though each is discursively constructed through Western discourse, the rhetoric imbued within *brand-China* is at once both distant from and near to Western historical notions of Africa.

Specifically, the study seeks to answer the following research questions:

Q1. What is the nature of China's nation brand image in Africa?

Question one examines how the Chinese State and state owned and supported enterprises construct a national imaginary of China and Africa-China in their promotional discourse. How does the PRC inculcate images of difference from the west and similitude with African people through its brand? How does the Chinese state use nation branding to align its historical experiences as a community with Africa's distinct socio-historical marker(s)? Do Chinese officials utilize such messages more frequently than their African counterparts? How do African producers co-create Africa-China in their promotional discourse?

The Chinese State utilizes nation branding in the construction of its national imaginary, as the PRC, like other nations across the globe, seeks to distinguish itself in the contest for global capital. This rivalry is particularly important in Africa, a region where such competition not only played out previously but one many view as the 'final frontier' of capital accumulation in an increasingly multipolar world. The question also historicizes the use of nation branding within Afro-Chinese relations, with particular

emphasis on the PRC's relationship to the Gambia, Kenya, and South Africa. In so doing, it pays particular attention to the ways brand images of the relationship continue to reference and reimagine the narrative of the Bandung Conference, colonialism, neo-imperialism, and globalization by paying particular attention to the repetition of specific code-signs in brand messages.

Q2. How do African people in diverse environments receive, perceive, and interpret brand-China?

Question two investigates congruency between images and messages indicative of *brand-China* and external factors (message exposure and perspectives of China's nation brand image across Africa). Insight from perspectives of China and Africa-China in the Gambia, Kenya, and South Africa contribute to understanding how individuals in diverse environments understand and engage with the PRC as a brand. Particular attention is given to contextualizing how opinions differ across space and time by analyzing how social indicators, such as ethnicity, gender, class, and culture codes influence perspectives.

Q3. Does the use of cultural and experiential similarities between Africa-China within brand-China help to facilitate more positive attitudes toward the Chinese?

Brand-China regularly taps into the experiences of common ancestral heritage, coupled with shared historical conditions and situations during most of the last five hundred years, which helped form significant components of global African identity. Building on the historical experience of community formation across Africa and its diaspora, this question explores whether ideas of community are being expanded beyond consanguine and geographical boundaries to include the "Global South" nee

Chinese. Building on themes of brotherhood, solidarity, friendship, culture, and tradition, frequently employed within *brand-China* the question investigates whether and how attitudes toward *brand-China* are affected by concepts of self and other across diverse African contexts.

Methodology

To answer the research questions, the study adopts a three-pronged approach. The first interrogates how *brand-China* is constructed by the PRC through an ideological framing of history, culture, tradition, and identity. The second approach is grounded in the tradition of Afrocentric social research in its inquiry into how African people receive and reconstitute images of the other and self. Molefi K. Asante defines the Afrocentric paradigm by highlighting five minimum characteristics of African-centered research, including

- an intense interest in psychological location as determined by symbols, motifs, rituals, and signs;
- a commitment to finding the subject-place of Africans in any social, political, economic, or religious phenomenon with implications for questions of sex, gender, and class;
- a defense of African cultural elements as historically valid in the context of art, music, and literature;
- a celebration of “centeredness” and agency and a commitment to lexical refinement that eliminates pejoratives about Africans or other people; and

- a powerful imperative from historical sources to revise the collective text of African people.⁵⁰

The third approach interrogates the nation as “a repository of collective memory,”⁵¹ examining how the historical development of shared identity amongst African people as a coping and continuity mechanism during the experiences of enslavement, colonialism, and neo-imperialism, can be connected to the current system of neoliberal globalization. Within this aspect of the inquiry, the researcher questions whether and how *brand-China*’s insertion of Africa’s distinct socio-historical markers into its brand influences the expansion of local concepts of community beyond sanguine and geographic boundaries to include the ‘global south’ nee Chinese. In Melissa Aronczyk’s *Branding the nation: The global business of national identity* (2013), the author views the nation as “a site of identification and belonging.”⁵² A constitutive feature of nation branding and its success hinges on the state’s ability to cement a synchronic ideology of belonging and community with foreign publics—in this instance African people.

The project utilizes two principal modes of inquiry—critical discourse analysis and survey research. throughout African liberation movements, textual and visual media became the principal formats for promoting official discourse on Afro-Chinese solidarity to both popular and elite audiences.⁵³ Today, the discursive frameworks introduced within speeches, newspaper editorials, magazines, and advertisements

⁵⁰ Asante, Molefi Kete, Yoshitaka Miike, and Jing Yin, eds. *The global intercultural communication reader*. Routledge, 2013.

⁵¹ Aronczyk, Melissa. *Branding the nation: The global business of national identity*. Oxford University Press, 2013, 12.

⁵² Ibid.

⁵³ Fennell, Vera Leigh. "Race: China’s Question and Problem." *The Review of Black Political Economy* 40.3 (2013): 245-275.

continue to promote China's contemporary manufacture of Africa-China and proliferate its message for popular consumption. To illustrate this expanded process of image creation, co-creation, and recreation I revisited the modern history of image making in Africa between 2000-2017 to trace the unique ways the relationship has been depicted from both Chinese and diverse African perspectives. I investigated the complete archives of images and messages concerning Afro-Chinese relations, delivered by official African and Chinese representatives since the first Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (2000), marking the period of Chinese reengagement with Africa. I conducted a systematic textual and visual content analysis of speeches, magazines, newspaper editorials, and billboards developed for African consumption. The total corpus of texts and images consists of 337 items for analysis (260 textual and 77 visual artifacts).

The research adopted a dissensus constructivist approach to look for emerging patterns and meanings in how the Chinese State constructs an image of itself, Africa, and/or Africa-China. Similar studies focused on contemporary and emergent practices through the lens of the socio-historical conditions that created them, including power relations, colonialism and its legacies, the commodification of culture, and the geopolitics of space and place within globalization with a distinctive feature being the search to understand the relationships of cultural production, consumption, belief and meaning, to social processes and institutions.⁵⁴ In this vein, the images and messages are analyzed without separating them from the social processes creating them. In so

⁵⁴ Lister, Martin, and Liz Wells. "Seeing beyond belief: Cultural studies as an approach to analysing the visual." *Handbook of visual analysis* (2001): 62.

doing, I resist reifying or hypostatizing the artifacts, seeing them, instead, as dynamic and movable concepts changeable according to circumstance and situation.

The second method of inquiry employed survey research to glean insight into popular opinions, understandings, and attitudes toward the Africa-China relationship and brand-China in the Gambia, Kenya, and South Africa. The primary objective is to present a comprehensive framework for the systematic study of nation branding from an African point of view. This is achieved by gauging participant attitudes toward the nation brands of eight different countries, with an emphasis on China, utilizing an empirically derived methodology based on the nation brand personality construct and Fishbein's Multiattribute Theory Model.⁵⁵ Because college students tend to possess relatively high knowledge levels concerning international relations, the survey population focuses on university students in each of the nations under observation.⁵⁶

Rationale, Relevance, and Significance of the Study

Because Africana Studies is multidisciplinary by design, this study builds upon theories emanating from that field and others— international relations, communication, and marketing—to explain how nation branding influences the political and social spheres and alters perceptions of community within Afro-Chinese relations. A constitutive feature of the project is developing a facility for understanding nation branding and national imaginary construction in foreign contexts, a field noted by scholars as lacking in theoretical foundation.⁵⁷ The primary objective of the current

⁵⁵ Aker 1997; d'Astous, A. and Boujbel, L. 2007; Kim, Shim, and Dinnie 2013; Rojas-Mendez and Papadopoulos 2011

⁵⁶ Rojas-Mendez, Jose I. "The Nation Brand Molecule", *Journal of Product and Brand Management* 22/7. 2013, pp. 465.

⁵⁷ Balakrishnan, 2009; Insch and Florek, 2008; Medway and Warnaby, 2008

study, however, is to present a theoretical and comprehensive framework for the systematic study of nation branding from an African point of view. The project examines the dimensions of nation brand image using African perceptions and attitudes toward eight different countries, with an emphasis on China, utilizing an empirically derived methodology based on the nation brand personality construct. A small subset of studies in the field attend to the development of a theoretical framework for identifying how nation brands are positioned within the minds of foreign publics,⁵⁸ while far fewer attend to how the phenomenon operates within Africa countries or from the perspective of African citizens.⁵⁹

Paying particular attention to the manner in which African agency is exhibited through individual awareness of and responses to *brand-China*, the researcher seeks to understand how the brand functions within the context of the PRC's relationship to the Gambia, Kenya, and South Africa. The project specifically examines how promotional images and messages, produced by the Chinese State, affect awareness, perception, and attitudes toward Chinese involvement in these countries. Its purpose is not to present a normative assessment of how successful *brand-China* is in comparison to other nations. Instead, the project seeks to critically challenge the notion of African subjectivity in international politics by privileging African perspectives.⁶⁰ The potential theoretical contribution of the study lies not only within nation branding research but, more importantly, within Africana studies in its commitment to locating the 'subject-place'

⁵⁸ See Aaker, J.L. 1997; d'Astous, A. and Boujbel, L. 2007; d'Astous, A. and Li, D. 2009; Kim, Shim, Dinnie 2013; and Rojas-Mendez, J., Murphy, S. and Papadopoulos, N. 2011.

⁵⁹ See Anholt, 2007; Odia and Isibor, 2014; Osei and Gbadamosi, 2013.

⁶⁰ In *Empire, Global Coloniality and African Subjectivity* (2013), Sabelo Ndlovu-Gatsheni writes that colonial matrices of power and technologies of subjection produced African subjectivity as that of a being constituted by a catalogue of deficits and a series of 'lacks.'

of African people within Africa-China. Although there is a small body of existing literature on the project of image-making in Afro-Chinese relations⁶¹, and an emerging body of work canvassing public perceptions in Africa⁶², none consider the variegated nature of such perceptions across the African continent or how they may be influenced by the unique historical, geographic, and social factors inherent to each space.

African states have become increasingly prominent actors in international politics, a fact most clearly evinced in their ability to affect positive outcomes in international trade negotiations, renegotiate the terms of aid agreements, and take the lead in military and humanitarian intervention efforts on the continent. The dynamics of Afro-Chinese relations mark how African governments and non-state actors have responded to an increasingly multi-polar world to create new opportunities for independent action unbound by longstanding structures of power. As such, the study makes its most significant contribution to the field of Africana Studies in its attention to identifying the moments and characteristics of African agency within the Afro-Chinese relationship and the resultant paradigmatic shift in Africa's relations to the West and East, facing instead, in the words of Kwame Nkrumah, "forward."

African cultures have long been essentialized and othered to contribute to the narrative of European exceptionalism and create compelling reasons for the colonial and developmental projects. During the imperial project and again during the neoliberal global project, filmic, literary, and other representations of Africa serve as apparatuses of geopolitics and power upon which nations build and maintain reputational capital

⁶¹ Mawdsley, 2008; Johannson 1999; Bonsu 2009

⁶² Kalu 2012; Mohan and Lampert 2013; Afrobarometer 2014; Global Ethics Institute of South Africa 2014

and through which foreign nations and people can be reached.⁶³ The dissertation project explores Africa-China through the prism of these performative constructions of Afro-Chinese identity, examining Chinese state manufacture of self, of Africa, and of Africa-China. The dissertation connects identity constructions within neoliberal globalization to colonial constructions not only of African people but by them as well, speaking to the determination of these populations to create spaces for self-definition within the confines of subjugation. In so doing so the project expands the scope of diaspora, black identity constructions, and global black consciousness by developing a broader interdisciplinary approach to connect the transnational black experience. It also moves beyond existing scholarship on Africa, China, and Africa-China in its attention to how expansions of community identity within Africa-China fit within a long trajectory of African identity formations during earlier eras of capital accumulation.

Implications to Future Research

In general, Africanist and Diaspora scholars who explore African identity and community formations may be enlightened by the potential for these new forms of supranational identity construction supported by *brand-China*, and how they operate alongside earlier expansions and reconstructions of African identity. These reconstructions involve both the individual and whatever communities they subscribe to. Because this project looks specifically at how nation branding as a foundation to community building, impacts attitude formation, it could be advantageous to determine the precise nature of the relationship between culture and attitudes toward foreign nations in Africa. Further exploration of the relationship between local attitudes toward

⁶³ *van Ham, Peter 2001, 2002, 2008.*

foreign nation brand and their related effects on domestic policymaking is also warranted. Each consideration is central to deconstructing how brands are constructed and received within African communities.

Viewing Africa-China through this expanded lens creates new possibilities for future exploration of national imaginary construction, reconstruction and, ultimately, reception. The ways in which states create narratives of their identities, how international audiences consume these messages, and what, if any, effect audience reception has on national imaginary construction remain avenues for future research. While the dissertation focuses on Afro-Chinese relations, the project necessarily entails engaging the histories, cultural and social experiences, and political and economic realities of African and Asian people in transnational contexts. In my future research I will continue to explore the ways in which governments search for ways to reconstitute images of self against that of a political ‘other’ as they reconstruct their political mandates in terms of the competition for global capital, paying particular attention to the linkage between nation branding discourses, popular awareness, and the foreign policy decision-making process.

Outline of Chapters

The following is a breakdown of the chapters in this dissertation and a summary of their content:

The introductory chapter, “The Visual Politics of Africa China”, addressed the statement of the problem; purpose and goals of the study; research questions; rationale, relevance and significance of the study; and limitations. The chapter presented an

overview and critique of the literature on China- Africa relations, paying particular attention to the historical construction of brand-China.

Chapter Two, “Imagining the Nation”, provides an overview of selected background literature in the fields of branding and nation branding, insight into imagined communities, and African perspectives of Africa-China. The literature review was developed based on existing literature and the main finding in this study, which point to the fact that *brand-China* is comprised of images and messages surrounding themes of community, historical experience, cultural orientation, and cooperation between the two regions.

Chapter Three, the Methodology section, describes the research design and experience, providing the reader with specific details regarding the researcher’s assumptions and the ontological, epistemological and paradigmatic premises underpinning the project. A thorough discussion of the systematic coding system used during and after data collection is provided. The chapter then moves into the steps used for pre-coding, and first cycle coding, which include development of a codebook and thematic coding into NVIVO and second-cycle coding. The chapter explains the methods for subject recruitment, criteria for sample selection, survey setting, and instrumentation. The chapter also explains the pilot and main studies, detailing survey design, refinement, and testing, before providing a brief concluding summary.

Chapter Four, “Good Partners, Good Friends, Good Brothers”, contextualizes historical and contemporary Afro-Chinese relations. It provides insight into how migratory patterns and diplomatic and cultural orientations shaped contemporary forms of interaction. The chapter provides a historiography of Chinese soft power in Africa

from its nascence, as an extension of Confucian principles, to its use in support of contemporary Afro-Chinese relations. The chapter is divided into two sections: the historical construction of *brand-China* and an overview of Afro-Chinese relations with the Gambia, Kenya, and South Africa.

Image has long been an important component of China's identity. This fact influences the PRC's efforts to manage its domestic population as strongly as it does its ability to nurture relationships with foreign nations. Chapter Five, "Turning Dragons into Pandas", answers research question one, outlining how the PRC's nation brand manifests the significance of image within Chinese politics. The chapter pays particular attention to how the Chinese State constructs its image in Africa through the use of cultural artifacts representative of not only China, but Africa as well. In this way the chapter examines the dialectical contours of China's brand across the continent, revealing broad themes emerging from the analysis. The chapter begins by outlining the findings of the textual analysis, before examining each thematic finding and its implications in turn. The chapter concludes by summarizing the findings.

Equally important to the narrative of Africa-China are responses of the African people to these images and messages of self and other. Chapter Six, "We Look Forward", answers questions regarding how the PRC's image is realized in Africa by outlining attitudes toward *brand-China* amongst college students in the Gambia, Kenya, and South Africa. The chapter pays specific attention to how respondents perceive, receive and consume *brand-China* as an identity construction. The chapter employs quantitative methods of inquiry to glean insight into popular opinions, understandings, and awareness of the Afro-Chinese relationship and brand-China

amongst 4,213 university students drawn from each of the nations under observation.

The chapter begins with a brief introduction, before proceeding to answer research questions two and three, and finally, offering a chapter summary.

The seventh and final chapter, “Because of War, We Come Together”, summarizes Chinese state and state-owned and supported enterprise construction of *brand-China* in Africa and how respondents in the Gambia, Kenya, and South Africa interpret such images. The chapter revisits the three initial research questions and demonstrates how they are addressed within the study, drawing conclusions regarding the findings and their larger implications to the sites under observation and the field of Africana Studies in consequence of the realities of these increasingly global forms of interaction.

Chapter Two

Imagining the Nation

“Before the nation can exist... it must be imagined”

--Aronczyk, *Branding the Nation: Mediating space, value, and identity in the context of global culture*

Introduction

Nations have always branded themselves through symbols, currency, flags, anthems, and names.⁶⁴ As feudalism gave way to the nascent formation of the nation state, the nation was regularly constructed symbolically through folkloric dress or the lore of triumphant conquest or the obelisk of Axum, each sculpted symbols of wealth, power, and mystery. By virtue of such carefully constructed artifacts, the “magic of nationalism” not only “turned chance into destiny” but responded to the demands of the these newly formed states by establishing recognizable national traits supporting a strong sense of shared identity and member recognition within the nation.⁶⁵

The industrial revolution (1760 – 1840) ushered in a new era, wherein the mass production of goods necessitated the need to establish distinctions between products and vendors. Newly mechanized, repeatable processes, enabled consumer goods manufacturers to scale products and expand their customer base beyond the local community. The desire for one’s goods or services to be distinguished from competitors was an important inducement for developing unique brand personalities and print

⁶⁴ Dinnie, 2013

⁶⁵ Anderson, 1983

advertising become the most prevalent means of communicating those qualities to potential consumers.⁶⁶

Beginning with its development as an outgrowth of culturally symbolic practices, this chapter examines how conceptualizations and the institutionalization of nation branding emerged as a practice for imagining the nation. The chapter explores how culture is constructed, expanded, and contracts alongside the brand, and how it is implicated in the brand as a national imaginary construction. The literature review that follows divides the literature into three related theoretical clusters: branding/nation branding, culture, and imagined communities.

Establishing the Brand

According to the American Marketing Association (AMA), a brand is “a name, term, sign, symbol, or design, or a combination of them, intended to identify the goods and services of one seller or group of sellers and to differentiate their offerings from those of competitors.”⁶⁷ A successful brand experience necessitates exposing consumers to the various attributes associated with a particular brand and creating an environment surrounding the customer with positive elements attached to the brand.⁶⁸ Somewhat surprisingly, strong brands do not necessarily prompt consumer purchases, rather they simply alert consumers to what the product or corporation is, what it stands for, and what experience and/or benefit one can expect to derive through association with it.⁶⁹

⁶⁶ Dinnie, 2013

⁶⁷ Keller 2012, 30

⁶⁸ Aaker 1991, 109

⁶⁹ Keller 2012)

Much of the academic literature surrounding contemporary branding coalesces around the scholarship of Kevin Keller. Keller's Brand Equity Model (2012) [figure 1] posits that in order to build brand equity or effective positioning in the minds of consumers, corporations and organizations must shape buyer thoughts and feelings about them (attitudes) and/or their product or service. Brand equity is achieved when numerous components all working in concert effectively execute a positioning strategy and communicate the product or corporation or individual's or nation's essence to audiences.⁷⁰ The right types of experiences positively affect consumer thoughts, feelings, beliefs, opinions, and perceptions regarding that essence and help the brand to establish itself vis-à-vis competitors.

Keller illustrates four steps corporations should follow to build strong brand equity: brand salience, brand meaning, brand response, and brand resonance; each representing a fundamental question consumers ask about the brand when interacting with it.⁷¹




FIGURE 2: KELLER'S BRAND EQUITY MODEL

⁷⁰ Keller 2012, 70

⁷¹ Keller 2012 105-120

Brand identity: brand identity, the first step in the brand equity model reflects how corporations want to be seen by consumers. Brand identity exists at the intersection of perception and awareness, manifested through the functional and mental associations the brand aspires to create or maintain, consumer awareness of the brand, and the consumer's ability to recall specific brand elements.⁷² These associations represent what the brand stands for and imply a potential promise to consumers.⁷³ *Apple cautions consumers to "Think. Different"—a tribute to all the time-honored visionaries who challenged the status quo and changed the world.* The multitudinous images concomitant with each brand (name, logo, tone, tagline, typeface) are designed to reflect the associations the entity hopes to establish within the minds of consumers. Aker (1991) contends that one aspect of how brand awareness contributes to the value of the brand is through building an anchor to which other associations can be attached. In order to communicate certain values, the brand name first has to be established and recognized before one can form an attachment to it.⁷⁴

Brand meaning: Branding is all about creating difference,⁷⁵ and the second step of Keller's model enables corporations to do precisely that. Once consumers are aware that the brand exists, the next step is to differentiate it from competitors. Brand meaning is intended to identify and communicate associations to purchasers regarding what the brand means and what it stands for.⁷⁶

The two building blocks of this step are 'performance' and 'imagery.'⁷⁷

⁷² Keller 2012

⁷³ Aaker, 1996; Keller 1993

⁷⁴ Rose 266

⁷⁵ Keller 2012, 58

⁷⁶ Dinnie 2013, 13

⁷⁷ Dinnie 2013, 46

- ‘Performance’: Brand performance relates to how a product or service attempts to meet customers’ more functional needs. According to the model, performance consists of five categories: primary characteristics and features; product reliability, durability, and serviceability; service effectiveness, efficiency, and empathy; style and design; and price.

- ‘Imagery’ refers to how well the brand meets consumer needs on a social and psychological level. It speaks to how consumers think about a brand abstractly, rather than what they think the brand actually does. Thus, imagery refers to more intangible aspects of the brand. Imagery associations can be formed directly (from a consumer’s experiences and contact with the product, brand, target market or usage situation) or indirectly (through the depiction of these same considerations communicated in brand advertising or by some other source of information, such as word of mouth).

A strong brand mixes and blends product performance and imagery to create a rich, deep, and complementary set of consumer responses towards the product, which enables consumers to more effectively bond with it.⁷⁸ If successful, associations and images embed points of differentiation within the consumer mind, positively affecting its positioning relative to competitors in the marketplace.⁷⁹

Brand response: A strong brand mixes and blends product performance and imagery to create a rich, deep, and complementary set of consumer responses towards the brand.⁸⁰ *Consumers come to the realization that Apple isn't just any old computer; it is so powerful and so simple to use that it makes the average computer user feel*

⁷⁸ Keller 2012, 118-9; Zamardino and goodfellow, 2007

⁷⁹ Keller 2012, 58; Xie, Hu and Boggs 2006, 352; King, 1991; Aaker, 1996; Keller 1993

⁸⁰ Keller 2012, 118-9

innovative and tech-savvy. The third step, brand response, captures two categories of consumer reactions to the brand: “judgments” and “feelings.”

- ‘Judgments’ involve the process by which consumers make judgments about the brand in terms of quality, credibility, consideration, and superiority.⁸¹
- ‘Feelings’ refer to how patrons connect emotionally with the brand. This response may be to the brand itself or to how that brand makes the user feel about him or herself.

Brand relationship: Brand "resonance," the final step in Keller's model, sits at the top of the pyramid because, according to Keller (2012), it is the most difficult – and the most desirable – level to reach. An entity has achieved brand resonance *nee* equity, measured through behavioral loyalty (regular, repeat purchases), attitudinal attachment, sense of community (with others associated with the brand), and active engagement (with activities and organizations related to the brand), when consumers feel a deep, “psychological bond” with the brand (120). *Apple users purchase not only computers but also a suite of electronic devices— mobile phone, televisions, and watches based upon their loyalty to the brand*. Keller defines Brand relationship through four categories:

- Behavioral loyalty: Reflected in regular, repeated purchases of the good or service.
- Brand Attitude: Represents a strong likelihood of purchasing, liking, or viewing brand favorably; and is important to purchasing distinctions.

⁸¹ Dinnie 2013, 64

- Sense of community: Patrons experience a sense of community with those associated with the brand, including other consumers and company representatives.
- Active engagement: This is the strongest example of brand loyalty. Customers actively engage with the brand, even when they are not purchasing it or consuming it.

Successful brands resonate in consumer memories long after the mechanics of marketing are said and done. Therefore, it is not sufficient to simply provide a product or service and await customer recognition; one must actively work to cultivate and reinforce experiences whereby consumers develop specific and positive thoughts, feelings, beliefs, opinions, and perceptions of the brand.⁸²

Crafting the Image

Brand ‘Image’ is a symbolic association with the brand—real or imagined—long held in public memory.⁸³ The image consumers hold of a given brand relies not only on the ocular, but the sentient, auditory and abstract aspects of the product or services offered. In this manner, image is not something the consumer can grasp, but something he or she perceives. Consumer perception is what the mechanics of branding strive to influence through advertising, marketing and public relations.⁸⁴ The eponymous Tiffany blue box, the fact that M&Ms “melt in your mouth, not in your hands”, Macintosh’s Apple, Starbucks’ Siren, and McDonalds’ Golden Arches are all brand images that evoke specific consumer perceptions. In Naomi Klein’s excoriating account of brand culture, *No Logo* (1999), she notes that strong brands surpass the physical product; filling the space between with whatever image the consumer conjures. Be it

⁸² Aaker 1996

⁸³ Keller 1993, 2012; Aaker 1991, 1996; Roy and Banerjee, 2007)

⁸⁴ Olins, 2005

positive, negative, luxury, family-oriented, or dependability, the image evoked represents the overall mental picture consumers possess of the brand's qualities relative to other brands.⁸⁵

The scope of branding incrementally surpassed its initial application to products, services, and companies, to formally include cities, regions and nations.⁸⁶ Nations brand themselves using the tools of marketing to positively create, change or influence a nation's image,⁸⁷ by effectively altering public attitudes or perceptions about a nation without using hard power, for economic,⁸⁸ political,⁸⁹ or social gain.⁹⁰ Simon Anholt (2005), proposes that the branding of nations does not differ greatly from the branding of products or corporations.⁹¹ Corporate branding attends to the import of image within the private sphere; whilst nation branding is, likewise, concerned with image, though in this instance replacing the corporation with the city or nation-state as the unit of inquiry.⁹² Peter van Ham's (2001) scholarship on the rise of the 'brand state' is often cited to justify state practices of adapting branding approaches to foreign policy and public diplomacy.⁹³ With the emergence of *brand-states*, van Ham identified a paradigm shift, whereby the 'modern world of geopolitics and power is being replaced by the postmodern world of images and messages'.⁹⁴

⁸⁵ Faircloth, 2005; Hsieh and Li, 2008

⁸⁶ Anholt, 2007; Dinnie, 2008; Oda, Edith Onowe; Isibor, Felix Osaiga 2014, 205

⁸⁷ Gudjonsson, 2005; Fan, 2006, 2008b, Anholt 2005, Gudjonsson 2013

⁸⁸ Leonard 48; Dinnie 2013; Osei and gbadamosi 2013

⁸⁹ Rendon, 2003; Szondi, 2007; Jordan 284

⁹⁰ Anholt 2005; Fan 2006; Gudjonsson 285

⁹¹ Simon Anholt is widely touted as the 'father' of nation branding.

⁹² Fan, 2010

⁹³ van Ham 2001

⁹⁴ *ibid*

Newman and Perloff (2004) write that the principles utilized in corporate branding also “hold true in the political marketplace”.⁹⁵ Accordingly, political figures adopt ‘marketing orientations’ and nation branding techniques “when running for office...(and) when running the country.”⁹⁶ Despite clear distinctions between corporate and political/nation branding, Newman and Perloff insist that there are strong similarities between the two techniques: the use of marketing tools, like marketing research, market segmentation, targeting, and positioning, and strategy development and implementation; the presence of consumers, who can be analyzed “using the same models and theories” inherent to both approaches; and similar tactics to building brand equity.⁹⁷ It is the desire to win in terms of political competition, which prompts leaders to focus their resources on building the nation’s image to attract tourists, investors, consumers and students; or simply to build coalitions in support of their policies.⁹⁸

A nation’s brand can be ‘organic’ in that it exists without effort, as each country conveys a certain image to its publics, be it strong or weak, current or outdated, clear or vague. Ask anyone about Spain, for example, and the question might conjure up positive images of beach vacations in Ibiza, Gaudi architecture in Barcelona, Bosch paintings at the Prado, tapas, bullfighting, or flamenco. To others, however, the same question might elicit negative responses about beach vacations in Ibiza, slavery, bullfighting, and separatist movements. Fan writes (2005), whichever “image is retrieved depends on the audience and the context. To mention Germany may still bring

⁹⁵ Newman and Perloff, 2004

⁹⁶ Newman and Perloff 2004, 18

⁹⁷ Newman and perloff 2004, 19

⁹⁸ Rojas-mendez 2013, 463

painful memories to some European countries about the Nazi atrocities. To the Chinese, it is Japan that is associated with the war crimes committed 60 years ago.’’⁹⁹

Every nation has an image, varying across time and space, influencing both consumer perception of its products or services or partnership potential, and investor perception of its investment potential. A nation’s image can be informed by experience, education, media exposure, travel, product purchases, or word-of-mouth. Nation branding is concerned with a country’s whole image on the international stage, covering political, economic and cultural dimensions.¹⁰⁰ It is the total sum of all perceptions of a nation in the minds of international stakeholders and exists with or without conscious effort.¹⁰¹ The underlying goal is to make the nation matter in a world where borders and boundaries appear increasingly obsolete.¹⁰² Yet, because nations are economically, culturally, and politically diverse; projecting a positive overall image of each consistent with the State’s national imaginary is a difficult task.¹⁰³

Establishing the nation as a differentiated identity with targeted international audiences through the use of specific, constructed ‘image-signs’, namely the state’s name, logo and other branding elements, has gradually become an important aspect of global competition.¹⁰⁴ Diverse images of the United States-- the Statue of Liberty, the “Real Housewives” franchise , President Donald Trump’s escalating trade war with the Chinese, the United States’ occupation of Guantanamo Bay, Exxon, and Marvel’s the

⁹⁹ Fan, 2005, 8; Rose 2010

¹⁰⁰ Quelch and Jocz, 2004; Fan, 2006

¹⁰¹ Fan, 2006, 12

¹⁰² Aronczyk 2013, 3

¹⁰³ Loo and Davies 2006, 203

¹⁰⁴ Ahn and wu 2015, 159; Szondi 2007; Jordan 2014, 284).

“Black Panther”, resonate differently with the intersectional identities and experiences of those who consume them.

As a whole such images affect public thoughts and opinions (both domestically and internationally) of the United States. Based on what one already knows about America’s brand—its quality, product characteristics, and so forth—consumers can make assumptions and form reasonable expectations about what they may *not* know.¹⁰⁵ If consumers recognize, are knowledgeable of, and positively respond to a nation’s brand, it lowers resistance to people, products, and services originating from that nation. This is why negative perceptions and stereotypes can be so invidious.

The objective of nation branding, therefore, is to project a positive overall image that resonates with consumers, be they domestic or international.¹⁰⁶ Although some aspects of the brand footprint may be negative, when consumers possess a cohesive, favorable overall nation brand image, the brand’s messages have a stronger influence on their decision-making than competitors.¹⁰⁷ Stipulating that nations are more complex than products, Olins (2004) contends that when it comes to national image, people can be “motivated and inspired and manipulated” in much the same manner as they can with products (24). This suggests that effective branding can help erase misconceptions about a country and allow it to reposition itself more favorably.¹⁰⁸ Failure to do so will essentially leave target markets and competitors free to create whatever stereotypes they wish.¹⁰⁹

¹⁰⁵ Keller 2012; 34

¹⁰⁶ Loo and Davies 2006

¹⁰⁷ Hsieh and Li 2008

¹⁰⁸ Dinnie 2008

¹⁰⁹ Loo and Davies 2006, Dinnie 2008

Imagining the Nation

In *Imagined Communities* (1983), Benedict Anderson argues that the nation is a new, modern phenomenon. As feudal states gave way to new political forms of governance during the 17th and 18th centuries, political institutions formed through “a sacred language, sacred cosmology and dynastic power, and sense of historical temporality” also yielded to new forms of social and political connections.¹¹⁰ Emerging social conditions and rationalist perspectives, which gained momentum during this age, facilitated the development of spaces where individuals could conceptualize themselves as part of an ‘imagined community’. Most members of the community likely do not know one another, yet the shared sense of identity underpinning the nation enables them to envision ‘parallel and plural realities’ that connect them to other individuals.

Speaking to power of the imagined community to create possibilities for solidarity and groupness between strangers, while also creating new divisions and fissures both within and across borders, Anderson (1983) writes,

“All nations larger than primordial villages of face-to-face contact (and perhaps even these) are imagined. Communities are to be distinguished, not by their falsity/genuineness, but by the style in which they are imagined.... Finally, [the nation] is imagined as a community, because, regardless of the actual inequality and exploitation that may prevail in each, the nation is conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship. Ultimately, it is this fraternity that makes it possible, over

¹¹⁰ Nguyen 2016

the past two centuries for so many millions of people, not so much to kill, as willingly to die for such limited imaginings.”¹¹¹

Thus, the imagination is integral to all forms of agency. It is what enables individuals to reconstruct the nation, themselves, and their communities differently. It is what gave rise to the creation of a community identity amongst subjugated African people and it is what can create space for African and Chinese people to become ‘brothers.’

A conceptual nation, Anderson argues, “could arise historically only when substantial groups of people were in a position to think of themselves as living lives parallel to those of other substantial groups of people – if never meeting, yet certainly proceeding along the same trajectory”.¹¹² The idea of China and Africa as brothers, similarly maligned by the west, and working toward collective development for the mutual benefit of both regions, is one such example. The average Ugandan will never venture to Guangzhou, will never meet a Taishanese, yet, according to Anderson, a communion of sameness and collective identity can be established through the imagination of shared experience.

Arjun Appadurai (1996), likewise, speaks of the ethos among community members as a “collective” who imagine themselves as a unit, thus creating a sentiment uniting the group together and solidifying individual identities. Appadurai crystallizes our understanding of the imagined community as one constructed and reinforced through the proliferation of mediated messages. These messages reflect the conflicting

¹¹¹ Anderson 1983, 30-35

¹¹² Anderson 1983; 188

tendency toward both cultural distance and proximity upon which the new social order underpinning globalization relies.

Nation branding represents another form of imagining the community and the nation, creating communion between strangers. Part of the process of discursively constructing “the nation” is to establish its coordinates in time and space, situating it in relation to other nations, other people, ‘others’, and essentially “putting the country on the map”.¹¹³ The brand is increasingly significant as national interests increasingly expand beyond the political as the dictates of globalization necessitate that nation-states compete for international capital, convey an image of legitimacy, and create positive foreign opinion. Given global capital’s tendency toward geographic discontinuity and mobility, nations have become enmeshed in structures of economic and political power whereby repositioning the country’s image against others is imperative.¹¹⁴

In this context, assessing a state’s national imaginary or brand image amongst foreign nationals becomes an important placeholder for how effectively countries compete with each other for favorable perception.¹¹⁵ One of the many ways nation-states have accomplished this in recent years has been to engage in image-building initiatives.¹¹⁶ Aronczyk and Powers (2010) reason that shifts in how nations promote themselves globally is “both symptom and cause” of the manner in which political and economic relations between and within nations are articulated.¹¹⁷

¹¹³ Jordan 2014, 289

¹¹⁴ Shohat and Stam 1994

¹¹⁵ Kotler and Gertner 2002; Fan, 2006; Anholt, 2007

¹¹⁶ Gudjonsson 2005, 284

¹¹⁷ Aronczyk and powers 2010, 3.

Considering the explicitly political dimensions of branding, John Corner (2007) raises that concomitant with promotional culture's tendency toward capital accumulation is an equivalent tendency toward "institutionalized deception."¹¹⁸ Government strategies of self-promotion, Corner contends, are part of a larger trajectory of deceptive government practices in which global capital manipulates cultural forms, identities, and notions of community to communicate brand messages "virtually coextensive with our produced symbolic world."¹¹⁹

Andrew Wernick (1991) first introduced promotional identities in his book *Promotional Culture: Advertising, Ideology and Symbolic Expression*, which describes the recursive function of promotionalism as a tool of influence on cultural expression. In its initial application to advertising, Wernick argued that promotional culture is designed to convey a specific, precise message. These messages are not necessarily reflective of the culture of production but aim to valorize the discursive processes through which that culture is constructed for mass consumption. The cinematic projection of exteriority and alterity accompanying the colonial project is replicated within contemporary nation branding as governments search for ways to reconstitute images of self against that of a political 'other', reimagining their countries as a function of the competition for global capital.¹²⁰

In *ReOrient* (1998), Andre Gunder argues that many of the pejorative views on Asia (and Africa) did not come into being until the nineteenth century, with the advent of colonialism and industrialization. It was then that European thinkers (Marx, Dickens,

¹¹⁸ Corner, John 2007, 669–677

¹¹⁹ *ibid*

¹²⁰ Said 1979; Schwak 2017; Shohat and Stam 1994

Weber) began to reshape the image of themselves and Asian and African spaces into the civilized world versus the ‘dark continent’ or ‘Orient’ of our current understanding. The perception that “they are not like us”, “are sub-human” or “need our protection and guidance” were recurring storylines well into the twentieth century and an important rationale for colonialism.¹²¹ Edward Said (1979) contends

“to a certain extent modern and primitive societies seem thus to derive a sense of their identities negatively. A fifth-century Athenian was very likely to feel himself to be nonbarbarian as much as he positively felt himself to be Athenian. The geographic boundaries accompany the social, ethnic, and cultural ones in expected ways. Yet often the sense in which someone feels himself to be not-foreign is based on a very unrigorous idea of what is "out there," beyond one's own territory. All kinds of suppositions, associations, and fictions appear to crowd the unfamiliar space outside one's own”.¹²²

The ‘other’, Said writes, is imagined and in so doing ‘self’ and ‘community’ become imagined constructs as well. The need to create a moral binary wherein non-Europeans represented all that was bad, weak, undeveloped, and unintelligent, was an important aspect of the European narrative. Within transatlantic slavery and colonialism, the African was renamed savage.¹²³ The dispossession of African identities shaped the continent’s image into our current understanding. The colonizers, whatever their persuasion, inevitably developed a distorted portrait of the colonized as

¹²¹ Said 1979

¹²² Said 1979, 55

¹²³ Agyeman 2004; Opoku 2004, 33

justification of their role on the continent, for nothing “could better justify the colonizer’s privileged position than his industry, and nothing could better justify the colonized’s destitution than his indolence”.¹²⁴ Thus, the reification of oppositional images of the west to Africa helped maintain “a sense of logic regarding structures of global hierarchy and unspoken convictions of global difference and cultural superiority”.¹²⁵

As modern states reconstitute their political mandates in terms of competition for global capital, King Solomon’s Mines (1885), King Kong (1933), and the White Man’s Burden (1899) are increasingly replaced with images and messages aimed to create imagined communities celebrating cultural proximity rather than distance. Nonetheless, the overarching imperative to construct a national imaginary of moral or social superiority over an “other” remains consistent.¹²⁶

Conceptualizing ‘community’ as a social construct whereby members perceive commonality with others, even when they cannot know them, is an integral component of this project. A sense of connectedness, of identity, exists purely in the imagination of members and is the first step in the process of community building.¹²⁷ The imagined community *nee* national imaginary, as an alternative spatial rendering, creates room for parallel and plural realities in individual and communal understandings of self. Associations between nation branding, and community identity and cultural orientation have been explored by earlier scholars to explain consumer perceptions.¹²⁸

¹²⁴ Memmi, Albert 1991, 41; Taiwo, O. 2009, 79

¹²⁵ Edozie and Soyinka-Airewele 2010, 15

¹²⁶ Shohat and Stam 1994

¹²⁷ Appadurai 1996; Aronczyk 2013

¹²⁸ Lilli and Diehl 1999; Rojas-Mendez, Murphy, Papadopoulos 2013; d’Astous and Boujbel 2007; Boujbel and Li 2009

(Mis)imagined Communities

Existing studies suggest that consumers prefer nation brands with personalities or cultures that align most closely with their own self-concepts.¹²⁹ D'Astous and Boujbel (1999) concluded that individuals typically possess a preference for countries and people whom they believe to be culturally similar to themselves.¹³⁰ The *self-congruity hypothesis* is rooted in the assumption that individuals strive to maintain cognitive consistency in their beliefs and behaviors and it is here that the syncretic function of nation branding becomes most evident.¹³¹ Individuals and communities prefer nations that possess qualities similar to their own, therefore, constructing a national imaginary of self for foreign nations and publics, underpinned by similitude, increases the likelihood that one's nation will be viewed favorably. Companion to this is that early studies of nation branding conclude that the relationship between brand personality and brand self-congruity is moderated by cultural orientation.¹³²

Sojka and Tanusuhaj (1995) resolved that culture is operationalized through language, artifacts, and beliefs.¹³³ Matzler et al (2016), similarly proclaimed that culture is a set of learned traits and shared institutions, manifested through the artifacts and values inherent to a particular group.¹³⁴ A society's culture (or cultures) is comprised of symbolic ways of "thinking, feeling and reacting" shared within groups but which also

¹²⁹ Matzler et al, 2016

¹³⁰ d'Astous and Boujbel 2007, 232

¹³¹ Taken from Matzler et al (2016) brand-self congruity is defined as the match between a brand's image and an individual's self-concept; Sung & Choi 2012.

¹³² In fact, studies of culture, specifically, and its influence on perception and consumption accounted for nearly ten percent of articles published in marketing journals between 1996-2000; See Stokburger-sauer, et al. 2012; Sung & Choi, 2012

¹³³ Sojka, Jane, and Patriya S. Tansuhaj. "Cross-cultural consumer research: A twenty-year review." *ACR North American Advances* (1995).

¹³⁴ Matzler, Kurt, et al. 2016

allow latitude for distinct expressions of individuality.¹³⁵ Hall (1987) posited that within high-context, collectivist cultures (Africa and Asia), the ability to interpret nonverbal appeals to ego-focused emotions (Happiness, Pride) are highly valued, whereas such traits are often ignored in low- context cultures (the United States). Aker and Williams (1998) substantiate Hall's findings while contributing the insight that although members of high-context, collectivist cultures are dominated by their interdependent selves, there are still instances in which members of those cultures access their independent selves, enabling them to act simultaneously as part of a collective while also allowing for singular action.

Hofstede (2001) operationalized cultural variables into measurable dimensions, including:

- Individualism vs. collectivism: the degree to which individuals are supposed to focus on their own self-interest or remain integrated into groups,
- Power distance: the extent to which less powerful members of organizations and institutions accept and expect power to be evenly distributed,
- Uncertainty avoidance: the extent to which a culture inculcates feelings discomfort or comfort with unstructured, unknown, or unusual situations, and
- Masculinity vs. Femininity: the distribution of emotional roles between the genders in which aggressive societies are considered masculine, and gentle societies are considered feminine.

The tendency of Western societies to paint non-western values statically and with broad strokes of 'high-context', 'collectivism,' and 'familism' is problematized by Fan

¹³⁵ Hofstede 2001, 9

(2000) who argues that existing models are limited in their understandings of non-western cultures. In this sense, Hofstede's findings are not incorrect but, rather, too narrowly simplistic to capture the richness of cultural orientation. Still, several broad themes have been identified by scholars, which prove useful to an analysis of an imagined 'Afro-Chinese' community, particularly one reinforced within China's nation brand.

In *African Cultural Values: An introduction* (1996), Kwame Gyekye suggests that among moral values upheld in African societies, particularly among the Akan in Ghana, communal responsibility is deemed most important. The significance of this value, he writes, is instilled in all members of the community early in life, and regularly reinforced through folktales and proverbs such as, "*Abofra bo nnwa na ommo akyekyedee.*"¹³⁶ Companion to this, Geurts (2002) asserts that within an African cultural context, communal responsibility, which she specifically outlines as 'a sense of community life', 'a sense of respect for authority and the elders', 'a sense of hospitality', 'a sense of good human relations', and 'a sense of language and proverbs,' is key. Kamwangamalu (2014) likewise posits that 'community,' manifested through the expression of *Ubuntu*, is a constitutive feature of African societies. In his analysis of Ubuntu in South African society, Kamwangamalu (2014) found that the core characteristics of African ontologies: respect for human dignity and human life, group solidarity, hospitality, and collective consciousness underpin the way members of society treat one another.¹³⁷

¹³⁶ This is an Akan proverb, the literal translation of which is "A child breaks a snail, not a tortoise". The practical translation is that children should take care when engaging with adults lest their actions be misunderstood.

¹³⁷ Kamwangamalu, Nkonko M. 2013, 241

While agreeing that culture has “been the main source to construct identity and to reinvent the nation and ethnicities in the face of colonial imposition and the subsequent changes that followed,”¹³⁸ Falola (2003) balks at the notion of extant African cultural practices, values, dialects, philosophies, and worldviews. The colonial experience, he cautions, “transformed African cultures to an extent that some became strangers to the traditions of old, suffering alienation in the process”, relegating the notion of a homogenous African culture mythic.¹³⁹ Pwiti and Ndoro (1999), likewise, privilege the effects of colonialism on perceptions of the past and cultural alienation in (Southern) Africa. They point out that the colonizing powers forced African people to abandon their religious beliefs, governmental systems, and a host of other traditional ways of doing things and fostered the creation of new values which, in the long term, permanently distanced African communities from their past cultural values.¹⁴⁰

The concept of a collective African identity is derived from colonialism because the imperial project changed the construct of Africa from Afrocentric to Eurocentric.¹⁴¹ The restructuring of Africa involved the exploitation of the land, domination of the mind and body, and the infusion of western ideas into already existent civilizations. Selective Euro-centered philosophies and theories developed to support the colonial model contrived concepts of African communities and ways of being, which have had a lingering effect on the African sense of identity. Mudimbe deems this intermediate space between natural and imposed definitions of self dangerous because it prevents African people from moving forward as they cling to vestiges of the past.

¹³⁸ Falola, Toyin 2003, 3

¹³⁹ Falola, Toyin 2003, 5

¹⁴⁰ Pwiti and Ndoro, 1999

¹⁴¹ Mudimbe, V.Y. 1988

Contemporarily, Joseph Mensah's (2008) critique of globalization's tendency to obliterate local cultural values complicates nation branding within an African social context. Mensah problematizes globalization's similarities to earlier forms of capital accumulation in its effects on cultural inscription, dislocation and appropriation. He maintains that although African people willingly adopt western culture through these processes, cultural hegemony is still inscribed and reproduced through the act of doing so.¹⁴²

Simultaneously privileging and distancing the Catholicism of Ubuntu, many western philosophers also question its uniqueness to Africa.¹⁴³ Makhudu (1993) suggests that the qualities of Ubuntu, or humanity, exist in every person. In reality, the belief of actualizing one's humanity through relationships with others is also shared by Native Hawaiian culture, a constitutive feature of which is "the triangulation of meaning," through the integration of the mind, the body, and the heart as a holistic, spiritual, and experiential way of knowing.¹⁴⁴ Similar ways of being can be found within Islamic cultures who share the theory of *tawhid*, the doctrine of *tabligh*, the concept of *ummah*, and the principle of *taqwa* as the fundamental principles of ethical communication in Muslim societies.¹⁴⁵

Chinese cultures, wherein Confucian teaching is concerned with ethics and morality, are also thought to possess a shared sense of humanity.¹⁴⁶ Hui-Ching Chang (2014) dissuades the privileging of collectivist metaphors in explaining Confucianism,

¹⁴² Mensah, Joseph 2008

¹⁴³ Broodryk, 1996; Prinsloo, 1996; Shutte, 1994

¹⁴⁴ Aluli-meyer 2014

¹⁴⁵ Mowlana 2014; (1) *tawhid* (unity, coherence, and harmony of all in the universe), (2) *amr bi al-ma'ruf wa nahy'an al munkar* (commanding to the right and prohibiting from the wrong), (3) *ummah* (community), and (4) *taqwa* (piety).

¹⁴⁶ Weiming 2014; Chang, Hui-Ching 2014

however, because in her view they fail to adequately account for the subtleties of individual decision-making.¹⁴⁷ Instead, contemporary scholars suggest that Confucianism should be viewed as part of a ‘living tradition’, necessitating individual determinations of ‘what to shift’, ‘what to discard’, and ‘what to retain’ for continued survival.¹⁴⁸ This is similar to Falola’s (2003) reading of African cultures in that they have been and are invented and reinvented over time, proactively blending the old with the new.

Hongmei Li’s (2009) argument that there has been a shift from communal notions of egalitarianism (*chengfen*) to a modern China motivated by consumption (*shenjia*) is one example. Hongmei details how discourses of self-worth and reputation shifted from a class-status framework in the decades following the founding of the People’s Republic of China, to a commercially oriented, individualized framework since the period of Chinese reengagement with the west. The transition from *chengfen* to *shenjia*, Hongmei argues, highlights the particular ways in which discourses surrounding global capital accumulation have influenced identity construction in China.

The discursive privileging of palimpsestic syncretisms makes culture’s place in national imaginary construction and broader considerations of branding the nation particularly difficult to model.¹⁴⁹ Culture is relevant to conversations surrounding nation branding because the brand not only communicates a nation’s policies and culture to consumers, but also attempts to cultivate public opinion by tapping into the brand’s congruence with consumer orientation.¹⁵⁰

¹⁴⁷ Chang, Hui-Ching 1997, 107-131.

¹⁴⁸ Miike 2014

¹⁴⁹ Ibhawoh 2000; O’shaughnessy & O’shaughnessy, 2000; Skinner & Kubacki, 2007

¹⁵⁰ Jordan 2014, 284; Ahn and Woo 2015; Dinnie 2008

Language and Culture

Language is an artifact of culture, through which meaning making is performed and community members identify and interact with others in the group.¹⁵¹ Krippendorff (2005) describes language as a facility for co-constructing reality and, as such, language constitutes an important aspect of how cultural artifacts are “perceived, conceptualized, and talked about.”¹⁵² Communities identify with one another through language, but group identity is also enacted through the use of artifacts enabling members to conceptualize and bind their relationship to one another through discourses.¹⁵³

These discourses, Krippendorff explains, “reside in communities of people who collaborate in enacting what constitutes their community, performing it, so to speak, and thereby creating everything that matters to the members of a community as members.”¹⁵⁴ Thus, communities are not only constructed through the formation of a sense of belonging, a fomenting of national identity but, also, through language which assigns shared meaning to these discourses; discourses which reflect how communities organize themselves and construct their identities and that of the larger world.¹⁵⁵

Defined as a practice by which individuals imbue reality with meaning, discourses may reflect any number of social practices, including Roman Catholic mass, line dancing, or the rules of *Pokemon Sun and Moon*. Krippendorff (2005) argues that discourses are the domain of community of practitioners who habitually “(re)read,

¹⁵¹ Gee 2014, 7

¹⁵² Krippendorff 2005, 54 150

¹⁵³ Gee 2014, 9

¹⁵⁴ Krippendorff 2005, 10.

¹⁵⁵ Gee 2014, 11

(re)write, (re)produce, (re)work, (re)search, (re)articulate, (re)design, and (re)evaluate” textual matters as a trust of groupness and belonging and successful discourses justify their version of reality to those outside the community.¹⁵⁶ Language is conceived as a vehicle for action, whereby the action is the representation of reality.¹⁵⁷ It is this participatory mechanism driven by a desire to influence the ways African people perceive, conceptualize, and talk about Africa-China as a discourse community that sets the relationship apart and makes it a political object useful for a serious study of nation branding.

Conclusion

Nation branding offers an emerging corpus of analyses to examine the construction of nations and their promotional images with varying constituencies.¹⁵⁸ This chapter explored existing literature in the fields of corporate branding, alongside its relationship to nation branding to examine how the concepts are used in promotional discourses and practices in the context of Afro-Chinese relations. The chapter specifically examined how the development of corporate branding and nation branding were both influenced by the significance of image in building brand resonance with consumers. The chapter then explored the imagined community before considering how the imagination and nation branding are implicated within the construction of national identity and culture. The chapter concludes by engaging the existing debate regarding culture and community broadly and specifically within an African social context before briefly discussing the use of language and communication as artifacts of culture.

¹⁵⁶ Krippendorff 2005, 24-5

¹⁵⁷ Potter 1996

¹⁵⁸ Kaneva 2011

Chapter Three

Africana Constructivism

Introduction

The analysis of nation branding has largely remained confined to marketing and communication research, where scholars examine the practice through the lens of corporate interests or limit the analysis principally to inquiries involving the United States or other western nations. A more nuanced approach exposes observers to its potential applications to interactions between nations and people outside of the United States and Europe. The overall purpose of this project is to demonstrate how African people in diverse local contexts perceive, receive, and interpret brand-China. The dissertation is specifically concerned with how African and Chinese identities are constructed, comprehended and negotiated within China's narrative of Africa, China, and Africa-China; and the larger relationship of nation branding discourse to community, and national and supranational identity constructions.

The PRC's nation brand reflects a carefully crafted, government controlled-narrative with *realpolitik* foreign policy goals no different than Western interests in Africa. Understanding the duality of China's constructed brand image as simultaneously self-sacrificing and self-serving is important to comprehending its attempts to create and manage its brand in Africa and also underscores the difficulty of discerning Beijing's motives. Images of both Africa and China are represented in its brand and though each is discursively constructed through Western discourse, the rhetoric imbued within *brand-China* is at once both distant from and near to Western historical notions of Africa. By examining the manner in which China utilizes nation

branding to construct its image within Africa, the study prompts a reconsideration of the discursive power mechanisms exercised in and through national image making. More importantly, the project questions how university students in Kenya, South Africa, and the Gambia receive and reconstitute images of self and other, reinforced through China's constructed nation brand image in Africa.

The specific research questions formulated in Chapter One are restated here. The study asks:

Q1. What is the nature of China's nation brand image in Africa?

Question one examines how the Chinese State constructs a national imaginary of China and Africa-China in its promotional discourse. How does the PRC inculcate images of difference from the west and similitude with African people through its brand? How does the Chinese state use nation branding to align its historical experiences as a community with Africa's distinct socio-historical marker(s)? Do Chinese officials utilize such messages more frequently than their African counterparts? How do African producers co-create Africa-China in their promotional discourse? The Chinese State utilizes nation branding in the construction of its national imaginary across Africa, as the PRC, like other nations across the globe, seeks to distinguish itself in the contest for global capital. This rivalry is particularly important in Africa, a region where such competition not only played out previously but one many view as the 'final frontier' of capital accumulation in an increasingly multipolar world. The question also historicizes the use of nation branding within Afro-Chinese relations, with particular emphasis on the PRC's relationship to the Gambia, Kenya, and South Africa. In so doing, it pays particular attention to the ways brand images of

the relationship continue to reference and reimagine the narrative of the Bandung Conference, colonialism, neo-imperialism, and globalization by paying particular attention to the repetition of specific code-signs in brand communication. Question one will be answered within chapter five.

Q2. How do African people in diverse environments receive, perceive, and interpret brand-China?

Question two investigates congruency between images and messages indicative of *brand-China* and external factors (message exposure and perspectives of China's nation brand image across Africa). Insight from perspectives of China and Africa-China in the Gambia, Kenya, and South Africa contribute to understanding how individuals in diverse environments understand and engage with the PRC as a brand. Particular attention is given to contextualizing how opinions differ across space and time analyzing how social indicators, such as ethnicity, gender, class, and culture codes influence perspectives. Question two will be explored within chapter six.

Q3. Does the use of cultural and experiential similarities between Africa-China within brand-China help to facilitate more positive attitudes toward the Chinese?

Brand-China regularly taps into the experiences of a common ancestral heritage, coupled with shared historical conditions and situations during most of the last five hundred years, which helped form significant components of global African identity. Building on the historical experience of community formation across Africa and its diaspora, this question explores whether ideas of community are being expanded beyond consanguine and geographical boundaries to include the "Global South" new Chinese. Building on themes of brotherhood, solidarity, friendship, culture, and

tradition, frequently employed within *brand-China* the question investigates whether and how attitudes toward *brand-China* are affected by concepts of self and other across diverse African contexts. Question three will be examined within chapter six.

Chapter three presents the methodological processes the researcher employed to answer these research questions, outlining the theories and procedures guiding the project. The chapter provides contours of the research philosophy, research approach, research design, data collection and data analysis procedures determined most suitable for addressing the research questions. The chapter summarizes not only the practical procedures followed but also provides a detailed orientation to the theoretical fundament underpinning the research design and methodological approach.

Research Philosophy

The decision of which research philosophy to adopt for a study depends heavily on how the researcher relates to questions concerning the development of knowledge and the nature of that knowledge, and also reveals important insight into the researcher's view of the world.¹⁵⁹ These insights color how the researcher views the relationship between knowledge and the process by which it is developed. Thus, understanding a researcher's 'philosophy' is important to understanding not only the lens through which he or she views the world, but also how that lens affects the researcher's method of examining the questions undergirding the research project. There are three defined ways of thinking about research philosophy: ontology, epistemology, and methodology. Each philosophical concept aids in understanding how the researcher approaches knowledge.¹⁶⁰

¹⁵⁹ Saunders, M., P. Lewis, and A. Thornhill. 2009

¹⁶⁰ Patton 2002

Ontology

Ontology is broadly defined as the philosophical study of the nature of being, becoming, existence, or reality.¹⁶¹ Traditionally included within the major branch of philosophy known as metaphysics, ontologies are systems of belief reflective of an individual's interpretation of what constitutes a fact and how we understand existence. My belief structure is one which insists that reality is a construction based upon individual and communal beliefs and my ontological location is one of constructivism. Bryman (2001) considers Constructivism an alternative ontological position where social phenomena and their meanings are continually being changed and revised through social interaction.

Social construction and constructivist ontology recognize the world as a construction, be it a social, political, or psychological one¹⁶². According to Patton (2002), constructivism considers how individuals within the research construct reality. It asks for whom and for what reason a specific version of reality is being constructed. What are their perceptions and truths, explanations, beliefs, and worldviews? What are the consequences of these constructions for those with whom these individuals interact?¹⁶³ In international relations, constructivism is the claim that core aspects of relations between nations are historically and socially constructed through language and rhetoric, rather than as a natural consequence of human interaction.

This study examines different constructions of Africa-China through the lens of nation branding in Africa, giving voice to a diversity of perspectives of the

¹⁶¹ Blaikie 2010

¹⁶² Tuli 2010

¹⁶³ Patton 2002, 96

phenomenon. The question of which members of a community possesses the power to create and define reality is a key consideration of this study as it is important to not only discuss and present a single and dominant view, but also acknowledge dissensus. Constructivist research criteria therefore constitutes a suitable ontological framework for this study. More narrowly, the project adopts a dissensus-constructivist approach, which is concerned with how nation branding is implicated in relations of social power, problematizing the tendency of nation branding to depoliticize and obscure the struggles and negotiations through which national identities are produced.¹⁶⁴

Epistemology

Epistemology describes ways of knowing. It is the philosophical theory of knowledge, which distinguishes what we know from what we think about a phenomenon. Through the use of methods, validity, and scope, epistemological questions ask, "What is knowledge?", "How do we know what we know?", and "How is knowledge acquired?" Nobles (2006) provides five tenets of epistemology, defining it simultaneously as the study of (1) the nature of reality; (2) how truth is defined; (3) the relationship between the knower, knowing, and the known; (4) what can be known; and (5) what should/could be done with the known. Africana Studies approaches knowledge from a culturally informed perspective.¹⁶⁵ MacDougall (2014) states that within Africana Studies, knowledge "is rooted in the history, philosophy, and culture of Classical Africa while also embracing the new challenges and transformations that characterize Africa and its diaspora today".¹⁶⁶

¹⁶⁴ Kaneva 2011

¹⁶⁵ Kambon 1999, Macdougall 2014

¹⁶⁶ MacDougall 2014, 241

This study is grounded epistemologically within the Afrocentric tradition.

Afrocentricity, as an epistemological approach within Africana Studies, places African ideals at the center of analyses involving African culture and people.¹⁶⁷

Afrocentricity's aim is to shift the focus from a European centered analysis to an African centered one, viewing the world through the gaze of African people. Molefi K. Asante, one of the principal proponents of Afrocentricity, considers research of African cultural communication as being the single most important factor in defining the concept.¹⁶⁸ Asante (1987) writes that the universalities of African language, meaning the verbal, written, and symbolic messages unique to African forms of communication, are what give meaning to Afrocentrism. To this point MacDougall (2014) references Dixon (1976) in his description of African epistemology as one including "affect symbolic imagery cognition which refers to the use of phenomenon such as words, gestures, tones, rhythms, and objects to convey meaning...symbolic imagery is a part of the phenomenal world. Therefore, when people of African descent engage in symbolic imagery, image construction, and invention to convey meaning, it must be understood that they are engaging in intellectual acts".¹⁶⁹ This suggests that African people possess specific forms of language and communication that are both unique and central to how they construct the realities of their world and that the specificity of these forms are worthy of academic study.

¹⁶⁷ Asante 1998, 2

¹⁶⁸ Asante 1998

¹⁶⁹ MacDougall 2014, 239

Paradigm

Guba and Lincoln (1994), argue that questions of research methods are of secondary importance to questions of which paradigm is used. A paradigm is a general way of understanding and approaching knowledge about the world with broad application. Paradigms guide a researcher through the experience of acquiring knowledge. The primary objective of this dissertation is to present a theoretical and comprehensive framework for the systematic study of nation branding and national imaginary constructions from an African point of view. Consequently, the researcher locates the paradigm consistent with the assumptions regarding ontology (Constructivism) and epistemology (Afrocentricity) as Africana Constructivist. It is fitting that, methodologically, the project be couched within the Africana Studies paradigm, which is characterized, according to McDougall (2014), by its attention to the Necessity of Cultural Specificity, Prioritization of Africana Needs and Interests, Heterogeneous Collectivism, Collective Emancipation and Empowerment, Agency and Self Consciousness, Historical Location, Cultural Situating, Recognizing the Shaping Effects of Oppression and Liberation, and Intersectionality:¹⁷⁰ Of particular significance to this study is the:

Recognition of the Necessity of Cultural Specificity: One of the reoccurring features of Africana Studies theories is their recognition that: (1) African people's lives are worthy of ethnic specific theorization. This study narrowly focuses on the lives and experiences of African people in diverse local environments.

¹⁷⁰ See MacDougall 2014

- **Prioritization of Africana Needs and Interests:** The study privileges the needs and interests, experiences and expressions of people of African descent through its focus on African responses and attitudes toward brand-China.
- **Heterogeneous Collectivism:** African people are conceptualized as extensions of their common African heritage and active agents in carving out unique cultural spaces on the continent, in the diaspora, and in their unique multi ethnic local contexts. The study explores how African historical experiences are utilized within brand-China and, also, how those same experiences help shape local responses to the phenomenon.
- **Agency and Self Consciousness:** Agency is one of the key concepts in the Afrocentric Paradigm and recognizes the importance of focusing on how people of African descent engage in the self-conscious shaping of their reality and the world in their own image and interests in the past and present. The study pays particular attention to the manner in which African agency is exhibited through individual awareness of and responses to *brand-China*.
- **Historical Location:** Africana Studies rejects the idea of studying African people's lives at a single point in time without placing them in historical context. The study examines attitudes toward the phenomenon of Chinese nation branding in Africa mark a continuation or cessation of historical responses to earlier eras of capital accumulation.
- **Recognizing the Shaping Effects of Oppression and Liberation:** Africana Studies recognizes the effects that the experience of oppression and the struggle for freedom have had on the lives of people of African descent. The study examines how *brand-China* taps into African historical experiences to facilitate brand performance.

- Intersectionality: Africana Studies acknowledges the interactive effects of multiple histories, political contexts, social forces and social systems on African people's lives. The study examines how contemporary African people create intersectional social systems to shape their experiences.

Approaching the research project from within an *Africana Constructivist* perspective allows the researcher space to observe the phenomenon within a global framework while still centering African people, and how they make sense of their world.

Research Approach

Before selecting the appropriate research approach to accompany the Africana Constructivist paradigm, it was necessary to determine whether the purpose of the research was descriptive, explanatory, exploratory or predictive, as doing so assists with deciding on an appropriate research design method.¹⁷¹ The purpose of this project was three-fold; the first was to describe the precise nature of *brand-China* in Africa. The second objective was to proffer a predictive model of African perceptions of brand-China. Finally, the third goal was to explain the relationship between community identity, self-concept, and attitudes toward a nation's brand within Afro-Chinese relations. Two separate but related methodological approaches were required to adequately describe the phenomenological underpinnings to the project. Determining the precise nature of the construct *brand-China* requires descriptive research methods; while testing the predicted influence of nation branding and national imaginary constructions on African perceptions of self and other is predictive and explanatory in nature.¹⁷²

¹⁷¹ Yin 1998; Snow and Thomas 1994

¹⁷² Snow and Thomas 1994, 465

There are multiple methods commonly used within descriptive theory building, including observational methods, case-study methods and survey methods. Predictive and explanatory methods call for large sample surveys.¹⁷³ Before proceeding, the researcher had to determine which approach would best contribute to answering the research questions within descriptive, predictive, and explanatory frameworks. The first step was to figure out whether the most appropriate methods would be qualitative, quantitative, or a combination thereof.

In qualitative research, the goal is to discover meaning.¹⁷⁴ Qualitative methods of inquiry are concerned with opinions, feelings and experiences, and describe social phenomena as they occur naturally, with a desire to understand the phenomena holistically.¹⁷⁵ Thus, the data utilized in qualitative assessments can be difficult to measure and quantify, inasmuch as quantifying an observation of traditional homeopathic healing practices may be challenging. Quantitative research, conversely, is used to systematically investigate observable phenomena using statistical, mathematical or computational techniques. In contrast to the depth and detail inherent to qualitative research, quantitative methods are characterized by their use of mathematical models as the method of data analysis.¹⁷⁶

The two approaches can also work together. The Mixed Methods Approach, according to Johnson and Onwuegbuzie (2004) provides researchers with an alternative way of thinking about whether an amalgam, or mixing, of the two can be successfully

¹⁷³ Snow and Thomas 1994; Montgomery, Wernerfelt, and Balakrishnan 1989

¹⁷⁴ Patton 2002

¹⁷⁵ *ibid*

¹⁷⁶ Sayre 2001

accomplished.¹⁷⁷ The technique allows researchers to incorporate methods of collecting or analyzing data from the quantitative and qualitative research procedures in a single research study.¹⁷⁸ Sandelowski (2000) argues that mixed methods enable the researcher to expand the scope of a study in instances where the goal is to “capture method-linked dimensions of a target phenomenon (given that) different aspects of reality lend themselves to different methods of inquiry”.¹⁷⁹

Within the approach researchers are given the latitude to collect or analyze not only numerical data, which is customary for quantitative research, but also narrative data, which is the norm for qualitative studies. The goal is to draw from the strengths and minimize the weaknesses of each approach on its own. This research project utilizes a mixed method approach. Using mixed methods enabled the researcher to design a single research study that answers questions about both the complex nature of the phenomena studied from the participants’ point of view and the relationship between measurable variables.¹⁸⁰

Research Design

The project utilizes two principal modes of inquiry derived from the mixed methods approach—critical discourse analysis and survey research.

Critical Discourse Analysis

Discourse analysis, as a methodological approach, is utilized within a broad diversity of disciplines in the humanities and social science fields.¹⁸¹ The method offers

¹⁷⁷ Johnson and Onwuegbuzie 2004, 14

¹⁷⁸ Creswell, 2003

¹⁷⁹ Sandelowski 2000, 247

¹⁸⁰ Creswell 2003

¹⁸¹ Gee 2014

a conceptual framework for examining how social and cultural perspectives and identities are constructed semiotically through language.¹⁸² The approach examines the relationship of power to language, by interrogating the role artifacts play in the “(re)production of dominance and inequalities in society.”¹⁸³ As discourses, these constructions constitute selective “representations, ‘simplifications’, and ‘condensations’, of highly complex economic, political, social and cultural realities, which include certain aspects of these realities and exclude others.”¹⁸⁴

Critical Discourse Analysis is by its very nature political. This is because language, as a reflection of the collective memories of the cultural communities within which discourses circulate, is political.¹⁸⁵ Krippendorff (2004) writes that this approach addresses contemporary processes of social change by examining the semiotic and linguistic aspects of the texts, which aid in the construction and sustenance of subnational, national and supranational identities.¹⁸⁶ We can distinguish three forms of critique relevant to CDA: ideological, rhetorical, and strategic.¹⁸⁷ Whereas ideological critique focuses on the effects of semiosis on social relations of power, and rhetorical critique examines the role of persuasion in individual artifacts; strategic critique focuses on how semiosis figures into the strategies pursued by groups of social agents to change societies in particular directions.¹⁸⁸ This analysis focuses on the rhetorical critique, examining how the Chinese state and state-owned enterprises wield *brand-China* as an instrument of social power in Africa.

¹⁸² Fairclough 2001; 1995; Kress And Van Leeuwen 1996; Van Dijk Ed., 1997

¹⁸³ Krippendorff 2009, 65

¹⁸⁴ Fairclough 2013, 10

¹⁸⁵ *ibid*

¹⁸⁶ Krippendorff 2005, 54; Fairclough 1989, 2001

¹⁸⁷ Fairclough 2009

¹⁸⁸ Krippendorff 2005, 54; Fairclough 1989, 2001

Discourse analysis contributes to a conceptual framework for discussing a nation's brand and how it is constructed semiotically as part of a discursive process.¹⁸⁹ Existing studies utilize some form of discourse analysis to glean insight into how participants make sense of their world.¹⁹⁰ The project utilizes discourse analysis of an array of artifacts produced by the People's Republic of China for African consumption. The method draws upon content analysis, which has frequently been used in the context of research on nation branding¹⁹¹ and China-Africa¹⁹² to flesh out themes emerging from texts. The study concerns itself with the contemporary process of social transformation characterized as neoliberal globalization, and how it is discursively constructed and reconstructed through language.¹⁹³ In consequence, the project utilizes critical discourse analysis to analyze the use of artifacts of the Afro-Chinese relationship in the production and reproduction of dominance and inequality in society as a construction of reality.¹⁹⁴

Research Methods

After determining that critical discourse analysis was an appropriate methodological approach for this project, the researcher worked to define a population of communication. A population of communication, Krippendorff (2004) asserts, may be drawn from books, magazines, pamphlets, newspapers, transcripts of meetings or

¹⁸⁹ Semiotics focuses attention on textual signs and how readers might interpret those signs. Semioticians believe that reality is a socially constructed system of signs, its meaning contextual and subject to human interpretation. Deconstructing and contesting these signs can reveal whose realities are privileged and whose are 'repressed or suppressed in official discourse'.¹⁸⁹ In this respect the study of signs, therefore, can be equated to the study of the construction and maintenance of reality.

¹⁹⁰ Glasgow University Media Group 1980; Leiss et al. 1990; McQuarrie & Mick 1992

¹⁹¹ Kaneva 2011

¹⁹² Barr 2012; Manzenreiter 2010

¹⁹³ Fairclough 2005

¹⁹⁴ Krippendorff 2009, 65

proceedings, government documents, memoranda, diplomatic communiqués or messages, e-mail, letters or diaries, posters, cartoons, political advertising, speeches, films, CDs, audio tape, video tape, DVD recordings, photographs or web pages.¹⁹⁵ Within the current project, the population of communication drew from speeches, magazine covers, newspaper editorials, and advertisements developed by the Chinese State, or State Owned or supported firms or entities, for African consumption. During African liberation movements, textual and visual media became the principal formats for promoting official discourse on Africa-China to both popular and elite audiences.¹⁹⁶ Today, the discursive frameworks introduced in speeches, news editorials, magazines, and advertisements during that period continue to promote China's contemporary view of the relationship and spread its message for consumption across Africa.

Textual Artifacts

Chinafrica (magazine): *ChinAfrica* magazine, first launched in 1988, is an English and French language magazine designed to “further promote mutual understanding of China and African countries.”¹⁹⁷ The magazine targets an African audience in addition to “high-end international readers” and is designed to present “a real China to African readers.”¹⁹⁸ Based in Johannesburg, South Africa, the magazine was relaunched in 2012 and is distributed monthly. This study focuses its analysis on the magazine's covers only, which are most likely to be observed in a check-out line or through casual encounters. Malkin, Wornian, and Chrisler (1999) expressed that it is “the cover that initially attracts the reader to the magazine...titles, catch phrases, and pictures

¹⁹⁵ Manheim, Rich, Wilnat, and Brains, 2007, 181

¹⁹⁶ Fennel 2013

¹⁹⁷ <http://www.chinafrica.cn>

¹⁹⁸ *ibid*

displayed on magazine covers are usually all that the reader has time to look at in a store.”¹⁹⁹ Clucas, McHugh, and Caro (2008) determined magazine covers were appropriate artifacts to include within their study because they adequately reflect the feature articles within. Held (2005) described these covers as “omnipresent contact texts” which, though complex, represent “a form of advertisement whose visual-verbal rhetorics” facilitate consumer interest and enjoyment. This study focuses on covers of *ChinAfrica* issues distributed from 2010 through December 2017 (89 images).

Advertisements: The project also utilized images from billboards, print, and online advertisements produced between 2000-2017. The images were either captured personally by the researcher within the sites of interest or locate through online sources.

Chinese National Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Consular Websites within Anglophone African Nations and Official Ministry Websites of Anglophone African Nations (websites); *Official Ministry of Foreign Affairs websites of Anglophone African nations; news editorials housed within these sites.*²⁰⁰ Visits by senior Chinese leaders are another way that China cements its relationships with African states. Since 2004, President Hu Jintao has made three trips to the African continent, visiting 14 countries. Premier Wen Jiabao has visited eight African countries since 2003; and former foreign

¹⁹⁹ Malkin, Wornian, and Chrisler Women and Weight: Gendered Messages on Magazine Covers (1999) 649

²⁰⁰ The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China-http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/; and Chinese Embassy in Botswana (<http://bw.china-embassy.org/eng/>); Chinese Embassy in Gambia (<http://gm.china-embassy.org/>); Chinese Embassy in Ghana (<http://gh.china-embassy.org/>); Chinese Embassy in Kenya (<http://ke.china-embassy.org/>); Chinese Embassy in Lesotho (<http://ls.china-embassy.org/>); Chinese Embassy in Liberia (<http://lr.china-embassy.org/>); Chinese Embassy in Malawi (<http://mw.china-embassy.org/>); Chinese Embassy in Namibia (<http://na.chineseembassy.org/>); Chinese Embassy in Nigeria (<http://ng.chineseembassy.org/>); Chinese Embassy in South Africa (<http://www.chinese-embassy.org.za/>); Chinese Embassy in Tanzania (<http://tz.china-embassy.org/>); Chinese Embassy in Uganda (<http://ug.china-embassy.org/eng/>); Chinese Embassy in Zambia (<http://zm.chineseembassy.org/>); Chinese Embassy in Zimbabwe (<http://www.chinaembassy.org.zw/>)

minister Li Zhaozhing, visited 13 countries in 2006 and 2007. Official visits by high ranking Chinese officials are not limited only to countries with large economies or those with significant natural resources, but also often include small nations “regularly overlooked by US leaders”.²⁰¹ These visits frequently correspond with speeches and editorials delivered by state officials and play an important role in “shaping perceptions and partnerships.”²⁰²

The Chinese State maintains diplomatic relations with 49 African nations, of which 14 are Anglophone nations.²⁰³ Speeches and editorials developed for Anglophone nations were selected for consistency with the populations included in the survey. Using English, the researcher’s native language, also meant that the artifacts could be analyzed in the language of delivery, rather than translated into English, avoiding potential ‘distortions’ of the artifacts.²⁰⁴ For inclusion in the study, speeches had to be delivered by high-ranking representatives of the Chinese State (President, Premier, Ambassador) or African nation (President, Ambassador, Minister, King), with Afro-Chinese relations being the principle topic as indicated by the title. Neuendorff (2001) writes that Textual Analysis is an appropriate method for analyzing speeches.²⁰⁵ In fact, the practice of using the technique to measure word usage and emergent themes

²⁰¹ Jennifer G. Cooke, “China’s Soft Power in Africa” Found in Chinese Soft Power and Its Implications for the United States: Competition and Cooperation in the Developing World. A Report of the CSIS Smart Power Initiative. Carola McGiffert, ed. 2009

²⁰² Cooke 2009

²⁰³ These include Botswana, the Gambia, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Malawi, Namibia, Nigeria, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.

²⁰⁴ Colby 1966

²⁰⁵ Neuendorff 2001, 1

within political speeches has been used since the 19th century.²⁰⁶ The total corpus of texts available for inclusion in the study was 1,037 artifacts.

Sampling

Whereas quantitative research works best with random probability, there are no specific rules for qualitative sampling procedures. Patton (2002) describes the different approaches to sampling within quantitative and qualitative research as a ‘trade-off between breadth and depth.’²⁰⁷ The practice should be motivated by the desire to provide detailed answers to a conceptual question rather than concerns about how representative or generalizable the data are.²⁰⁸ Since the object of qualitative research is not generalizability but transferability, sampling does not need to ensure that all objects being analyzed have an equal or predictable probability of being included in the sample. Instead, sampling should be theoretical and purposive.²⁰⁹

Sandelowski (1994) balks at the idea that numbers are unimportant in qualitative research. She explains that a problem arises when “sample sizes may be too small to support claims of having achieved either informational redundancy or theoretical saturation, or too large to permit the deep, case-oriented analysis that is the *raison-d’être* of qualitative inquiry.”²¹⁰ The selection of sample size depends, instead, on researcher considerations about the quality of information collected.²¹¹ McNamara (2005) weighs that qualitative sampling must consider the population of

²⁰⁶ Elo, S. and Kyngäs, H. 2008; Stewart 1986; Zullo and Seligman 1990; Hart 1997; Hogenraad and McKenzie 1999

²⁰⁷ Patton 2002, 228

²⁰⁸ Miles and Huberman 1994, 29

²⁰⁹ Transferability refers to a judgment about whether findings from one context are applicable to another

²¹⁰ Sandelowski 1995, 179

²¹¹ Sayre, 2001; Patton, 2002; Sandelowski 1995

communication, the selection of issues or dates, and content from within those media.²¹²

This project includes speeches, newspaper editorials, advertisements and magazine covers focused on Africa-China. This aspect of the project utilized purposeful sampling.²¹³ Maximum variation sampling, also known as heterogeneous sampling, is a purposive sampling technique used to capture a wide range of perspectives relating to the phenomena being observed.²¹⁴ The conceptual basis for the procedure is that by using different perspectives of a phenomenon, the aggregate should mirror the population's whole.

To analyze the artifacts indicative of *brand-China*, the researcher constructed a matrix of the 14 Anglophone African nations with whom China maintains a diplomatic relationship, listing the artifacts by date within the matrix. To ensure an equal likelihood of selection, the researcher then randomly selected every fourth artifact for inclusion in the analysis.²¹⁵ The process rendered 260 textual artifacts for analysis. The researcher followed a similar process for determining which issues of *ChinAfrica* and advertisements to include in the analysis, which yielded an additional 77 artifacts for inclusion, increasing the total corpus of artifacts examined during critical discourse analysis to 337.

The researcher next worked to define a unit of analysis by narrowing the focus of the study. A unit of analysis is the element of the population the researcher is going to

²¹² McNamara 2005, 23

²¹³ Patton 1990; Sandelowski 1995

²¹⁴ *ibid*

²¹⁵ No artifacts were available concerning Gambia-China, which resumed diplomatic relations with China after a 19 year separation in 2016.

study. Coding units may be words, phrases, sentences, images, paragraphs or whole documents.²¹⁶ The researcher used both sentence level and paragraph level unit analysis of the artifacts to determine the frequency of word usage, which allowed them to situate the individual concepts within their broader meanings.

Data Analysis

Once determinations were made regarding which textual sources to use, the next and most important step was to begin the process of interpreting and identifying meanings or themes by developing a coding scheme.²¹⁷ Qualitatively, this involved identifying patterns and common sequences within the corpus of artifacts. These patterns may involve the number of times a word appears in a document or focus on how combinations of words or sentences are used to convey an idea.²¹⁸

The researcher adopted a dissensus constructivist approach to look for emerging patterns and meanings in how the Chinese State constructs an image of self, Africa, and Africa-China by searching for words, phrases, semantic units, and themes which were then sorted into meaning units (such as brotherhood, friendship, partnership, altruism, etc.).²¹⁹ Similar studies adopting the approach focused on contemporary and emergent practices through the lens of the socio-historical conditions that create them, including power relations, colonialism and its legacies, the commodification of culture, and the geopolitics of space and place within globalization, with a distinctive feature being the search to understand the relationships of cultural production, consumption, belief and

²¹⁶ Krippendorff 2009

²¹⁷ van Manen 1990; Patton 2002

²¹⁸ Patton 2002

²¹⁹ Ranciere 2011; Bernard, 2006; Strauss, 1987

meaning, to social processes and institutions.²²⁰ The images and messages were analyzed within the context of the social processes that created them.

First Cycle Coding: Saldana's (2009) recommendations for qualitative research guided the researcher's decision regarding coding and categorization. The method was divided into first and second cycle coding. First cycle coding required artifacts be further divided into thematic subcategories and loosely hand coded using the codebook developed from the review of literature on Africa-China. Additional thematic insights derived from this coding cycle were then transferred to the codebook (appendix).

Second Cycle Coding: During the second coding cycle, the researcher reorganized and reanalyzed the pre-coded artifacts with a goal of developing "a sense of categorical, thematic, conceptual, and/or theoretical organization from (the) First Cycle codes".²²¹ The researcher utilized NVIVO 11.4 and SPSS 24 statistical software packages as both organizational and analytical tools to ascertain the semiotic meaning of the artifacts under study. Both software packages were applied because they were capable of working complementarily and possessed the ability to transfer data in both directions, "enabling single data sets to include both qualitative and quantitative items".²²² Notwithstanding the ability to utilize the software interchangeably as an "ecumenical blend of epistemologies,"²²³ quantitative data analysis was limited only to the results of magnitude coding, which supported statistical tests that identify the presence or absence

²²⁰ Lister and Wells 2001, 62

²²¹ Saldana, 2009, 149

²²² Andrew, Salamonson, and Halcomb, 2008

²²³ Miles and Huberman 1984

of a particular theme or category within each artifact. This was done to reduce potential challenges to content and external validity.²²⁴

The first step at this stage was to create parent nodes in NVIVO 11.4 for each of the themes in the codebook. These included ‘Partnership’, ‘Sameness’, ‘Friendship’, ‘Development’, ‘Culture’, ‘Benevolence’, ‘Solidarity’, ‘Trust’, ‘Sovereignty’, ‘History’, ‘Future Prospects’, ‘Center’, and ‘Imperialism (or Western aggression).’ Next, divisions within these categories were listed and coded under the parent nodes as child nodes in the NVIVO project file. When reviewing the texts for analysis the researcher examined each artifact line-by-line to determine what each sentence was about and how they fit into the larger paragraph and document as a whole.²²⁵

A closer look at the artifacts reveals insights into the researcher’s analytical process. The March 2014 cover of *ChinAfrica* magazine, as an example, speaks to a number of themes operating within China’s nation brand strategy in Africa: “Culture”, “Sameness”, “Security”, “Center”, and “Development”. The artifact’s header features the magazine’s title, “*ChinAfrica*”, in both English and Mandarin, set against a red background. Speaking to the power of language and naming, the magazine’s title, “*ChinAfrica*”, centers China, despite the magazine’s publication on the African continent. The web address, “chinafrica.cn”, by utilizing a Chinese domain name, likewise, situates the artifact as a solidly Chinese entity. The decision to feature English and Mandarin in the title, rather than Swahili, Wolof, isiZulu, or any other African lingua franca perpetuates cultural dominance or imperialism and the exclusion of

²²⁴ According to Saldana (2009), Magnitude Coding “consists of and adds a supplemental alphanumeric or symbolic code or subcode to an existing coded datum or category to indicate its intensity, frequency, direction, presence, or evaluative content.”

²²⁵ (Ryan & Bernard 2003, 91)

African people from the rights of membership within their own spaces. This aspect of the header, in featuring Mandarin as the only language other than English, also privileges Chinese cultures as equal to the English-speaking west, while demoting and silencing Africa. Finally, the use of the color red, symbolic of good fortune, happiness, celebration, and joy, holds particular significance within Chinese cultures and is indicative of the magazine's function within the Afro-Chinese relationship by focusing on and privileging China.

Another aspect of the artifact's header reveals themes of "culture", through a focus on both the Chinese film industry and "the year of the horse"; as well as "security", in the feature on the global crackdown on wildlife crime, demonstrating the PRC's strength and its commitment to law and order. Finally, the magazine's feature image highlighting food security, simultaneously reinforces and corrodes *brand-China's* resonance on the continent. The image, features a pair of chopsticks and bowl of rice beneath the words, "Enough to Eat: Safeguarding food security a top priority in China and Africa". The implied message is one of a shared need for food security, and that African states and China are at similar developmental and experiential stages. The image also centers China and Chinese needs through the use of chopsticks, a uniquely Asian utensil, as well as the decision to feature rice, the most popular grain in Asia and one of the principle and most costly food imports to Africa.

Post-Coding, Pre-Writing, Writing and Rewriting: Saldana (2009) describes the post-coding stage as one where, "if all has gone well, you should now have several major categories, themes, or concepts." The researcher developed several organizational strategies in preparation for disclosing findings of the discourse analysis.

In this stage they paid particular attention to quotes and insights from the artifacts and other sources deemed most relevant to answering research question one.

Survey Research

The second method of inquiry utilized within the study involved multination survey research.²²⁶ Groves et al (2004) describe surveys as systematic methods “for gathering information from (a sample of) entities for the purposes of constructing quantitative descriptors of the attributes of the larger population of which the entities are members.”²²⁷ Stated differently, surveys are utilized to collect large-scale data that will enable the researcher to make statistical inferences about the social, political, and/or economic behavior of the population under observation. The data may be used to gain insights into individual and group preferences (for one political party versus another), opinions (issues that mattered the most when deciding who to vote for in the last presidential election), or behavior (how frequently one engages in politically motivated discussions on social media).

Kraemer (1991) notes that there are three distinguishing characteristics of survey research.²²⁸ First, survey research is used to quantitatively define characteristics of a population. Second, the data are derived from human respondents and therefore subjective in nature. Finally, the data are derived from a sample drawn from a given population, which allows the findings to later be generalized back to that population. The target population can range from the general population of a given country to

²²⁶ Pinsonneault and Kraemer (1993) defined a survey as a “means for gathering information about the characteristics, actions, or opinions of a large group of people” (77).

²²⁷ Groves 2011, 2

²²⁸ Kraemer 1991, xiii

specific groups of people within that country or, as this project indicates, populations across multiple countries who share certain characteristics of interest.

The current project utilizes survey research to glean insight into popular opinions, understandings, and exposure to Afro-China relationship and brand-China in the Gambia, Kenya, and South Africa. It employs cross-national survey research based on Aker's (1997) Nation Brand Personality Construct²²⁹ and Fishbein's Multiattribute Theory Model.²³⁰ Existing studies of nation branding and national imaginary construction found within the annals of the *International Journal of Communication*, *Cultural Studies*, *Political Communication*, *Geopolitics*, *Journal of Politics*, and *Place Branding*, and *Communication, Culture, and Critique*; commonly utilize survey research as a methodological approach. In an analysis of studies focused on political communication, Graber (2004) found that surveys represented the most commonly used research methodology. The study determined that nearly half (48%) of the studies published utilized survey research as the primary data collection method; whereas, textual analysis accounted for one-fifth of studies.²³¹

Graber's findings are consistent with nation branding and national imaginary research, which frequently employ survey design to measure perceptions of national identity. This includes Jones and Ashmore's study (1973), which identified eight distinct country groups that could be positioned on four dimensions: "modern-backward" and "cooperative-competitive"; Anholt's Nation Brands Index (2007),

²²⁹ Aker 1997; d'Astous, A. and Boujbel, L. 2007; d'Astous, A. and Li, D. 2009; Kim, Shim, and Dinnie 2013; Rojas-Mendez and Papadopoulos 2011

²³⁰ The Fishbein model measures attitudes toward the brand, using three components of attitude—salient beliefs, object-attribute linkages, and evaluation. Each component is weighted and included in the determination of a measurable score representing a consumer's attitude.

²³¹ Doris Graber, "Methodological Developments in Political Communication Research" in Lynda Lee Kaid *Handbook of Political Communication Research* Routledge Communication Series 2004

which measures nation brands in terms of people, products, government, and culture; and Rojas-Mendez, Papadopoulos, and Murphy (2013), who explored the extent to which personality traits can be used to identify, differentiate, and position a nation.

Several scholars have used adapted versions of existing instruments to better understand the relationship between constructions of the nation and culture and identity. D'Astous and Li (2009) utilized an adapted version of a country personality scale developed for western countries to position 11 countries on a six-nation brand personality dimension, within a "Chinese social context".²³² Keillor and Hult (1999) limited their study to the cultural dimensions of nation branding, using a scale comprised of "belief structure," or the role of religion or supranatural beliefs in facilitating cultural participation and solidarity, "cultural homogeneity," referring to the uniqueness of a given society's sense of national identity, "national heritage", which refers to the importance of history to a nation's people, and "consumer ethnocentrism", which focuses on respondent beliefs about purchasing foreign goods.²³³ Winit et al (2004) extended Keillor's National Identity Scale to a Thai cultural context, introducing two new dimensions 'nativist ideas' and emotional attachment to the nation. Devos and Banaji (2005) attempted to measure American identity using a four dimensional scale, including the endorsement of civic values, emotional attachment to the nation, nativist ideas, and religious beliefs. Mohler and Johnson (2010) cite Scheuch (1989) in their criticism that researchers stop 're-inventing the wheel' when it comes to the methodological processes of comparative survey

²³² d'Astous, A. and Li, D. 2009

²³³ Keillor and Hult 1999, 68,

research and learn from previous research and knowledge gained.²³⁴ This study builds upon earlier research in its choice of approach to survey research, adapting existing models for application to an African social context.

Research Methods

The second method of inquiry involved survey research designed to glean insight into popular opinions and understandings of, and attitudes toward brand-China in the Gambia, Kenya, and South Africa. The primary objective was to present a comprehensive framework for the systematic study of nation branding from an African point of view. This was achieved by examining African attitudes toward the nation brands of eight different countries, with an emphasis on China, utilizing an empirically derived methodology based on the nation brand personality construct and Fishbein's Multiattribute Theory Model.²³⁵

This aspect of the project answers research questions two and three: How do African people in diverse environments receive, perceive, and interpret *brand-China*? How does exposure to nation branding affect attitudes toward *brand-China*? Does the use of cultural and experiential similarities between Africa-China within *brand-China* help to facilitate more positive attitudes toward the Chinese?

Variable Operationalization

A construct is a conceptual term that describes a phenomenon of theoretical interest, whereas its measure is an observed score.²³⁶ Based on the Fishbein Multiattribute Theory Model, the constructs of interest in this research study are

²³⁴ Mohler and Johnson 2010, 25

²³⁵ Aker 1997; d'Astous, A. and Boujbel, L. 2007; Kim, Shim, and Dinnie 2013; Rojas-Mendez and Papadopoulos 2011

²³⁶ Kerlinger 1999

‘Attitude’ toward *Brand-China*, ‘Beliefs’, ‘Importance’, and ‘Exposure’. In this design “Attitude” functions as the dependent variable, while ‘Beliefs’, ‘Importance’, and ‘Exposure’ each function as independent variables.

- *Attitude* is operationalized as the score assigned to each respondent based upon their individual response to the *brand-China* Attitude Measure.

- *Exposure* is operationalized as each respondent's response to measures of country-specific exposure to the types of artifacts indicative of *brand-China*.

- *Belief* is operationalized as each respondent’s characterization of China using the Country Perception Inventory.

- *Importance* is operationalized as each respondent’s scale response to an assessment of the most significant values and beliefs within their community as expressed on the Cultural Orientation Inventory.

The hypothesized relationships between these constructs and their measurements are explained as follows.

H1: Attitudes toward *brand-China* can be characterized as some function of the relationship between each respondent’s ‘exposure’, ‘beliefs’, and ‘importance’ scores.

H2: Attitudes toward *brand-China* are more positive when cultural importance is closely aligned with participant perceptions of the brand.

Survey Design

Given that the goal of this study is to establish a context for understanding African perspectives of foreign nation brand image, in order to fashion a generalizable model, the researcher utilized adapted versions of existing Nation Brand Personality scales.

Existing scales established a foundation for describing foreign nations, using adjectives

along discrete dimensions and questions designed to gauge strength of beliefs. The first step in the scale adaptation procedure involved conducting an extensive review of existing scales. The exercise identified several scales designed to measure nation brand image, including d'Astous, and Boujbel's (2007), which identified six country personality dimensions (Table 1): agreeableness, wickedness, snobbism, assiduousness, conformity, and unobtrusiveness; Keillor and Hult's (1999) which identifies four major components of national identity – cultural homogeneity, belief structure, national heritage and ethnocentrism; and Lilli and Diehl's (1999) which proposed five subscales of national identity – membership; private, public, identity, and comparison.

TABLE 1: D'ASTOUS AND BOUJBEL COUNTRY PERSONALITY SCALE

Agreeableness	Wickedness	Assiduousness	Snobbism	Conformity	Unobtrusiveness
Bon-vivant	Vulgar	Organized	Snobbish	Religious	Cowardly
Amusing	Decadent	Rigorous	Haughty	Spiritual	Wimpy
Reveler	Offender	Hard to Work	Mannered	Traditionalist	Dependent
Agreeable	Immoral	Flourishing	Chauvinist	Ceremonious	Discrete
Generous	Fighter	Serious	Egocentric	Mysterious	Neutral
Cooperative	Violent	Important			Self-contained
Accommodating					
Romantic					
Accepting					
$\alpha=0.87$	$\alpha=0.8$	$\alpha=0.79$	$\alpha=0.82$	$\alpha=0.78$	$\alpha=0.67$

Pretest

Earlier scales shared numerous points of commonality, including the use of adjective-based personality constructs centered on Aker's (1997) study of brand personality. The researcher compiled the list of national personality traits emerging from earlier studies and conducted a pretest of the resultant scales with 22 African undergraduate and graduate students studying in the United States. Participants were asked to identify items that could be used to describe a nation's image or identity. To reduce any bias effect, participants were only asked to free elicit for three countries,

with China included in each version. The exercise yielded 130 adjectives from the existing list, plus 62 additional adjectives. Those adjectives receiving fewer than three total mentions or synonymous with other words on the list were removed. The nascent list was compared against themes emerging from a meta- analysis of 172 artifacts (books, articles) analyzing Afro-Chinese relations. The final list was reduced to thirty-eight adjectives selected for inclusion in the present study.²³⁷

Structure of the Questionnaire

The main study was comprised of four sections. The first section captured information on participant exposure to and awareness of the stimuli nations by asking participants to answer questions regarding people, places, and things representative of each of the foreign nations under analysis. Section two measured attitudes, asking participants to rate three nations using the 38 personality adjectives emerging from pretesting, with the help of a five-point bipolar scale. Section three asked respondents to indicate their level of agreement with fifteen statements regarding their beliefs about each country. Using items adapted from d'Astous and Boujbel (2007), the section measured responses to questions concerning each country's people, "this country's people are kind," economy, "if I were a businessman, I would invest in this country," policies, "this country has good policies and leaders," and culture, "tradition is important to this country." Each stimulus country had to be rated along a five-point

²³⁷ The adjectives utilized for this analysis included Adventurous, Aggressive, Brotherly, Business-Oriented, Colonizing, Communalistic, Competitive, Consumerist, Corrupt, Cruel, Culturally-oriented, Developing, Diplomatic, Family-Oriented, Friendly, Hard Working, Helpful, Humane, Imperialistic, Individualistic, Industrialized, Innovative, Loyal, Nationalistic, Nice, Opportunistic, Partner, Peaceful, Powerful, Racist, Reliable, Respectful, Spiritual, Technology-Oriented, Tied-to-the-rules, Traditional, Trustworthy, and Welcoming.

scale “very untrue of what I believe” to “very true of what I believe”. The fourth section measured cultural values and orientation. Finally, section five collected demographic data.

Stimuli Countries

In an effort to reduce any bias effect, participants were asked questions regarding several stimulus countries. The choice of countries was determined based upon criteria that each was either an Anglophone African nation, one with significant economic interest on the continent, and/or a BRICS nation. The list of stimulus countries selected for inclusion in the study is as follows: Brazil, China, the Gambia, India, Kenya, South Africa, United Kingdom, and the United States. The eight countries represent five continents, each of which participants of the pre-test expressed some familiarity with. The list differs from d’Astous and Li (2009) Kim, Shim, and Dinnie (2013) and Rojas-Mendez, Papadopoulos, and Murphy (2013) in the addition of the Gambia, Kenya and India. Each version of the instrument contained questions regarding three countries. Subjects were not asked to complete surveys regarding their country of origin.

Five different groups of countries were thus formed, resulting in five different versions of the questionnaire, each including China coupled with:

- Brazil and the United Kingdom;
- Gambia and the United States;
- India and the United States;
- Kenya and the United Kingdom;
- South Africa and the United States.

Population and Sampling

The population for the study was comprised of subjects from three African nations— the Gambia, Kenya, and South Africa. The objective was to research the relationship between variables, rather than generalize results to the population at large, therefore, the matched samples technique was considered appropriate.²³⁸ With this approach representative samples are not important, the goal is to identify well-defined and homogeneous samples which, though from different nations still possess similar demographic attributes.²³⁹ Because college students have a comparatively high education level and generally possess strong interest in international relations, undergraduate and graduate students constituted the survey sample.²⁴⁰ Data were gathered from university student populations within the three site countries between June 2016-June 2017. Using a convenience sampling method, the researcher collected data at the University of the Gambia (G), Kenyatta University (K), the United States International University (K), Pwani University (K), the University of Witwatersrand (S), and the University of Johannesburg (S). The total population of university students in Kenya is 443,000,²⁴¹ in South Africa 983,698,²⁴² and the Gambia is 3,400.²⁴³ Based on the student populations in each nation, the minimum sample size necessary to yield results representative of, though not necessarily generalizable to, the total population of university students within the three countries was 1065 (Kenya), 1066 (South Africa),

²³⁸ Hofstede 1991; Verhage, Yavas, and Green 1991

²³⁹ Hofstede 1991

²⁴⁰ d'Astous and Boujbel 2007

²⁴¹ Kenya National Bureau of Statistics 2014

²⁴² South African Council of Higher Education 2016

²⁴³ Figure attained from Bobo Banteh, Registrar, University of the Gambia)

and 511 (the Gambia).²⁴⁴ Participants represented current students within each space -- both domestic and foreign. Blank questionnaires were hand delivered to each classroom within the selected universities and completed questionnaires were collected upon completion. A total of 4213 completed and useable questionnaires were returned from the 5062 that were originally distributed, an 83% response rate.

Data Analysis

The data were entered into SPSS 25, where they were screened and cleaned for missing data points, erroneous outliers, and incomplete or incorrect entries. The data were first checked to ensure that each score was within the range of possible scores. Once discovered, errors in the data file were corrected. After cleaning the data file, the researcher obtained descriptive statistics on the categorical and continuous variables used in the analysis to ensure that the data did not violate any of the assumptions made by individual tests. The researcher ran frequency distributions and descriptive statistical tests to obtain summaries. For categorical variables frequency counts were calculated. Group comparisons were also made using Pearson's chi-square (χ^2) tests. For continuous variables, means, medians, and standard deviations were processed, and group comparisons were made using t-tests. In addition, minimum, maximum, and range scores were determined for both types of variables. These tests revealed the characteristics of the data (age, ethnicity, religion, country) and yielded insight into how participant experiences and opinions differ across and within the countries under study. Descriptive data regarding how participants receive information generally, information about foreign countries, and information regarding China specifically, was

²⁴⁴ Using a 95-percent confidence level and a three percent margin of error in Kenya and South Africa, and four percent margin of error in the Gambia.

examined for differences across country, age groups, religious affiliation, and gender. Similar tests were conducted to examine variations in the source, degree of frequency, and tone of information received.

The data were next manipulated into a format that would enable the researcher to conduct analyses and test the hypotheses. Items worded negatively to prevent response bias, such as ‘this country is lazy,’ were reversed, before examining the data to determine whether a Principal Components Analysis (CPA) of the ‘Belief’ scale items was appropriate. Both the project’s sample size and the strength of the relationship among the variables confirmed that the data were sufficiently appropriate to conduct a Principal Components Analysis (CPA), as the sample for this study far exceeds the comfortable sampling minimum, ‘ratio of participants to items’ and correlations suggested by Tabachnick and Fidell (2013).²⁴⁵

TABLE 2: PERCEPTIONS OF *BRAND-CHINA*

<i>Tradition is important to this country.</i>
<i>This country is kind.</i>
<i>This country is a brother to Africa/n people.</i>
<i>Africa is growing stronger because of this country.</i>
<i>This country is able to retain its culture while developing.</i>
<i>This country is primarily interested in expanding its influence.</i>
<i>This country has abundant cultural heritage.</i>
<i>This country behaves responsibly as a global citizen.</i>
<i>This country has good policies and leaders.</i>
<i>This country produces good products for Africa.</i>
<i>This country is lazy.</i>
<i>This country has always been a good friend to Africa/n people.</i>
<i>This country is a good model for African development.</i>
<i>This country is trustworthy.</i>
<i>This country is Africa’s most important partner.</i>
<i>This country values family and community above all else.</i>
<i>This country is religious.</i>
<i>This country is rigid.</i>
<i>This country is fair.</i>
<i>This country is racist.</i>
<i>I would like to visit this country.</i>

²⁴⁵ Tabachnick and Fidell 2013, 613, suggest having at least 300 cases for factor analysis.

Consumer perceptions were measured using a Multi-item measure of perceptions of *brand-China* based on twenty-one statements found in the nation branding literature (table 2). Following the multi-step approach proposed by Rojas-Mendez, Papadopoulos, and Murphy (2013), the Multi-item measure of perceptions of *brand-China* was subjected to a Principal Components Analysis to determine dimensionality. The technique attempts to produce a smaller number of combinations of the original variables in a way that captures most of the variability in the pattern of correlations.²⁴⁶ Prior to performing PCA, the suitability of the data for analysis was assessed. Inspection of the correlation matrix revealed the presence of many coefficients of .4 and above. The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin value was .79, exceeding the recommended value of .6 and Bartlett's Test of Sphericity reached statistical significance, supporting the factorability of the correlation matrix.²⁴⁷ Components were extracted to discover the smallest number of "conceptually coherent" variables that could be used to represent a given set of relationships between and amongst the variables.²⁴⁸ There are multiple approaches that can be adopted to determine this relationship, including maximum likelihood factoring; alpha factoring; and generalized least squares; but principal components analysis was selected because of its use in developing predictive models.

249

To aid in the interpretation of the components, Varimax rotation was performed. Varimax orthogonal rotation tries to maximize variance of the squared loadings in each

²⁴⁶ Pallant, Julie "SPSS Survival Manual." 2016 iBooks.

²⁴⁷ Kaiser 1970, 1974; Bartlett 1954

²⁴⁸ Principal Components Analysis Duntzman; Julie Pallant *SPSS Survival Manual* 2016 260

107 "A Beginner's Guide to Factor Analysis: Focusing on Exploratory Factor Analysis" An Gie Yong and Sean Pearce *Tutorials in Quantitative Methods for Psychology* 2013, Vol. 9(2), p. 79-94.

factor.²⁵⁰ The rotated solution revealed the presence of a simple structure, with each component showing a number of strong loadings and all variables loading substantially on only one component.²⁵¹ Using Kaiser's criterion, only factors with an eigenvalue of 1.0 or more were retained for additional review.²⁵² The eigenvalue indicates the amount of total variance explained by a given factor.²⁵³ The twenty-one items were reduced to four components with eigenvalues greater than 1.0. The four-component solution explained a total of 64.9% of the variance, with Component 1 contributing 26.4%, Component 2 contributing 21.0%, Component 3 contributing 8.9%, and Component 4 contributing 8.6%. Catell's scree test was also examined to determine when the curve changed direction and began moving horizontally, as everything above that point is thought to contribute significantly to the total variance described by the analysis.²⁵⁴

Reliabilities were then calculated for each scale. The scale reliability for each component was tested for internal consistency by assessing the item-to-total correlation for each separate item and Cronbach's alpha for the consistency of the entire scale. All scale reliabilities, as measured by Cronbach's alpha, were between 0.68 and 0.91, with Item-to-total correlations ranged between .433 to .828, which meets or exceeds the thresholds established within earlier studies.²⁵⁵

Individual participant scores for the China Cognitive Associations Scale (CCAS), comprised of each respondents' individual scale score, were calculated from the

²⁵⁰ Pallant, Julie "SPSS Survival Manual." iBooks 2016

²⁵¹ Pallant, Julie "SPSS Survival Manual." iBooks 2016

²⁵² Duntelman, "Principal Components Analysis"

²⁵³ Pallant, Julie "SPSS Survival Manual." iBooks 2016, 260

²⁵⁴ Catell 1966

²⁵⁵ In several studies, total item correlation serves as a criterion for initial assessment and purification. Various cut-off points are adopted: 0.30 by Cristobal et al. (2007), 0.40 by Loiacono et al. (2002), 0.50 by Francis and White (2002) and Kim and Stoel (2004).

resultant findings. Building on the CCAS, a one-way between-groups analysis of variance (ANOVA) was conducted to determine site country positions on the scale. Participant responses were divided into three groups according to the country in which the instrument was completed (Group 1: the Gambia, Group 2: Kenya, Group 3: South Africa). The ANOVA procedure used for the China Cognitive Associations Scale (CCAS) was replicated to examine how perceptions of a country's nation brand are moderated by demographic and social indicators. Any relationships between the emergent CCAS components and various descriptive indicators (age, religion, gender, education) were examined to look for clear differences between groups using t-tests and ANOVA.

Fishbein's Multiattribute Theory model posits that beliefs are the only mediators of attitude formation and change.²⁵⁶ Attitudes, as defined by Mitchell and Olson (1983), refer to an "individual's internal evaluation of an object" and are considered relatively "stable and enduring" predictors of consumer behavior.²⁵⁷ The model proposes that attitudes toward an object are a function of the strength of the salient beliefs regarding that object and the evaluations of those beliefs.²⁵⁸ The basic multiattribute approach for modeling attitudes uses attributes, beliefs, and weights (importance) to determine a measurable score representing consumer attitude.²⁵⁹ Attitude is then formed through integrating individual evaluations of the salient beliefs about the extent to which the brand is believed to possess the attribute (R_i), weighted by the strength of each belief or

²⁵⁶ MacKenzie, Scott B., Richard J. Lutz, and George E. Belch 1986

²⁵⁷ Andrew A. Mitchell, Jerry C. Olson 1983

²⁵⁸ van der Pligt, Joop, et al 2000

²⁵⁹ van der Pligt, Joop, et al 2000

level of importance assigned by the individual consumer (b_i) (I_i) to create an overall evaluation or attitude toward the brand (A).

$$A_j = \sum_i \beta_i R_{i,j} I_i$$

Based on Fishbein's Model, linear multiple regression analysis was employed to test the relationship between beliefs about China and its relationship to Africa, exposure to information on brand-China, and cultural importance as predictors of overall attitudes toward the PRC. The following model was used to test the relationship.

$$A = \alpha + \beta_1 X \sum_i X_i R_{i,j} I_i$$

A = Attitude toward brand:

i = attribute

j = brand

I = Importance weighting (alignment with cultural orientation)

R = rating or belief

X = extent of exposure to the attribute

The analysis was conducted to test the mediating effects of exposure on the cognitive (cultural) importance – attitude linkage with respect to *brand-China*. Comprised of multiple respondent responses and covariates or predictor variables, multivariate linear regression allowed the researcher to fit a single model for respondents. The dependent variable 'attitude' (A) toward brand-China was regressed on three variables: 'perception' (P), 'importance' (I), and 'exposure' (X) according to the traditional Fishbein Multi-attribute Theory model.²⁶⁰ A reduced number of items

²⁶⁰ Mitchell, Andrew A., and Jerry C. Olson 2000

were included in the analysis to ensure one-to-one correspondence across all constructs, meaning that only those items with comparable variables across all three categories [‘perception’ (P), ‘importance’ (I), and ‘exposure’ (X)] were included in these calculations.

In order to determine how attitudes differed with respect to participant response to the three predictors, the researcher conducted a discriminant function analysis. Discriminant Function Analysis (DA) undertakes the same task as multiple linear regression by predicting an outcome, however, multiple linear regression is limited to cases where the dependent variable on the Y axis is an interval (rather than categorical) variable, so that the combination of predictors will produce estimated mean population numerical Y values for given values of weighted combinations of X values.²⁶¹ The items in the ‘attitude’ construct were subjected to a binning transformation prior to analysis to transform them into categorical variables, using categories of low, medium, and high attitude scores in response to brand- China.²⁶²

Limitations

Although the project was ultimately successful in achieving its aims, several limitations to the research must be disclosed. Limitations of this research project include the study sample of university students in the Gambia, Kenya, and South Africa. Research on the use of college students in social science research notes that the researcher must exercise caution when attempting to generalize findings to nonstudent populations because student responses may not be reflective of the larger population. Peterson (2001) argues that it is important in these instances to replicate any findings

²⁶¹ Tabchnick and Fidell 2013

²⁶² Pallant 2013

based on college student subjects before generalizations can be made.²⁶³ Demographic variables derived from the populations sampled may also prove limiting, as participants were recruited from universities in three African nations where university education is an exception. As a result, knowledge of the world, as well as social, economic, and cultural values contained within these populations could potentially differ significantly from those within the general population.

Additionally, results must be viewed within the context of other limitations, namely participant recruitment and selection. Participants were recruited using a non-random selection technique, given that students were asked to participate within existing self-contained classrooms, ranging in size from 5-200. Because the researcher used a convenience sample rather than a random sample, the findings can only be deemed suggestive or indicative of, rather than generalizable to, the general population under study.²⁶⁴ The survey protocol could be viewed as insufficient as there are factors that may have an impact on participant perception which were not addressed. Despite these limitations, the results yield significant findings for future research and policy implications.

Conclusion

Chapter three provided an in-depth overview of the methodological processes the researcher utilized within the study. The chapter provided insight into the theories and procedures guiding the project, outlining the researcher's research philosophy and

²⁶³ On the Use of College Students in Social Science Research: Insights from a Second-Order Meta-analysis

Robert A. Peterson *Journal of Consumer Research*, Volume 28, Issue 3, 1 December 2001, Pages 450–461

²⁶⁴ (Simon, 2011).

orientation to the project. The chapter continued by rationalizing the current project's use of a mixed methods research approach and the research methods necessitated by that approach within the context of the current project. The chapter continued with a detailed outline of the project's design, and the data collection and data analysis procedures determined most suitable for addressing the research questions.

Chapter Four

Good Partners, Good Friends, Good Brothers

“...though vast oceans keep China and Africa apart, the friendship between our two peoples has a long history, and having been tested by times, is strong and vigorous.”

Hu Jintao, 2006

Introduction

Zheng He was one of the great navigators of the Ming Dynasty (1368-1644). his exploits rivaled those of Marco Polo, Vasco da Gama, Ferdinand Magellan and Christopher Columbus, as he often traveled the western seas in search of new adventures.²⁶⁵ One such journey transported Zheng to the eastern shoreline of Kenya, bringing with him both “Chinese porcelain and friendship,” and upon his departure for China, he was gifted a giraffe by the people of Malindi.²⁶⁶ According to Chinese lore the long-standing, traditional friendship between African and Chinese people began with ‘giraffe diplomacy’.²⁶⁷ To this end, the PRC frequently frames Africa-China as part of a *longue duree* fomented pre-European conquest, nurtured by diplomatic relations during the Bandung Conference (1955), strengthened by Beijing’s solidarity with African decolonization movements and ultimately, reinforced by contemporary economic, social, and diplomatic interactions between the two regions.

This chapter provides a simplified analysis of historical and contemporary relations between the African continent and China. It narrates the history of modern Afro-Chinese relations (1955-) to explicate how migratory patterns, and diplomatic and

²⁶⁵ Lan 2016

²⁶⁶ Xianfa 2015

²⁶⁷ Okihiro 2014

cultural orientations between the two regions developed and continue to shape contemporary patterns of engagement. The chapter provides a historiography of Chinese soft power in Africa from its nascence, as an extension of Confucian philosophical principles, to its use in support of present-day Afro-Chinese relations. This streamlined analysis of interaction between the two regions explores the role of the various ecologies and corridors utilized by the Chinese to carve out its niche within Africa. In this manner, it underscores some of the broader themes exhibited in the relationship with regard to nation branding and national imaginary creation. A conscious decision was made to forego rich historical observations in favor of a more selective, thematic organizational structure.²⁶⁸ The background information that follows divides the literature into three sections: the historical construction of brand-China; an overview of the PRC's relationship with the Gambia, Kenya, and South Africa; and, finally, existing scholarship on African perspectives of Africa-China.

Penetrating a Stone

Fan (2008) writes that in Ancient China, the idea of soft power was advocated for and utilized by rulers in their interactions with foreign entities. Soft power was considered stronger than hard power, with influence considered a crucial tool to attaining world dominance. The Chinese proverbs 'to use soft and gentle means to overcome the hard and strong' (*yi rou ke gang*) and 'drips of water can penetrate a stone' (*di shui chuan shi*) underscore this point.²⁶⁹ Early Chinese scholars, like Mencius (372 – 289 BC), believed that the way to win the support of the oppressed was to

²⁶⁸ George and Bennett 2005

²⁶⁹ Fan 2008 149

comport oneself as a benevolent ruler.²⁷⁰ Sun Tse (544–496 BC), similarly, promoted “winning a battle without a fight;” Confucius (551–479 BC) argued that the ruler should win the allegiance of the people with virtue (soft power), not by force (hard power); and Lao Tze, (-531 BC) wrote that “the softest can win the hardest.”²⁷¹ These teaching are exemplified within Zheng He’s travels to Kenya, where he arrived with “Chinese porcelain and friendship” rather than bibles and gun barrels.²⁷² Such is the soft touch advocated historically and contemporarily by the Chinese in its interactions with foreign states.

Contemporary Chinese image building initiatives have “been associated with such essentially benign activities as the release of news, general shaping of ideology, or even advertisement”, consistent with what Yiwei Wang (2008) terms *dui wai xuan chuan* or *wai xuan*.²⁷³ Hongmei Li (2010) also privileges the significance of Chinese nation branding. Li avers that during the transition from communist China to neoliberal China, the state constructed a new national imaginary through the use of state media to deconstruct the old and construct the new brand through storytelling.²⁷⁴ Demonstrably the establishment of the Propaganda Department of the Chinese Communist Party during the same year as the founding of the Party itself (1921) underscores this point.

Contemporary Chinese relations with Africa date back to the Bandung (Bandung) Conference.²⁷⁵ Twenty-nine nations from Asia and Africa, including representatives

²⁷⁰ Advocated ruling a kingly way (*wang dao*) rather than the tyrant way (*dao*); See Sheng Ding 262

²⁷¹ Fan 2008 149

²⁷² Xianfa 2015

²⁷³ see Wang, Yiwei. "Public diplomacy and the rise of Chinese soft power." *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 616.1 (2008): 257-273.

²⁷⁴ Li Hongmei, From Chengfen to Shenjia: Branding and Promotional Culture in China in Aronczyk, Melissa, and Devon Powers, eds. *Blowing up the brand: Critical perspectives on promotional culture*. Vol. 21. Peter Lang, 2010.

²⁷⁵ Wright 1956

from six African nations, convened a conference in Bandung, Indonesia from April 18th–24th, 1955, to discuss peace, economic development, and decolonization, and to provide a counterbalance to the axis of power held by the United States and the USSR.

²⁷⁶ Specific topics for debate included participant displeasure with the exclusionary practices of Western powers when making decisions affecting Asia; concerns about tension between the People's Republic of China and the United States; a desire to increase peaceful cooperation between themselves and China; their opposition to colonialism, especially French influence in North Africa; and Indonesia's desire for resolution to its dispute with the Netherlands over western New Guinea.²⁷⁷

Contemporary imaginings of the conference that it marked the first time nations from the (then unnamed) *global south* came together to rebuke the forces of colonialism and neocolonialism and solidify the ideology of a common south identity. It was the first forum of its kind wherein solidarity and similarities between African and Asian peoples were recognized and revered.²⁷⁸ Zhou Enlai, the Chinese Premier, was a key figure at the conference.²⁷⁹ Zhou's "Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence in the Promotion of Peace and Development," including mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity; non-aggression; non-interference in the domestic affairs of another state; equality and mutual benefit; and peaceful coexistence; were incorporated into the

²⁷⁶ See Alden and Alves 2008; The African delegations in attendance included Egypt; Ethiopia; Ghana (then known as the Gold Coast); Liberia; Libya; and Sudan.

²⁷⁷ Lumumba-Kasongo, Tukumbi, 2015

²⁷⁸ The *global south* is a term used within transnational and postcolonial studies to refer to what may also be called the "third world" (i.e., Africa, Latin America, and the developing countries in Asia), "developing countries," "less developed countries," and "less developed regions." The term specifically refers to those countries' "interconnected histories of colonialism, neo-imperialism, and differential economic and social change through which large inequalities in living standards, life expectancy, and access to resources are maintained."; Shelton 2005

²⁷⁹ Shelton 2001

conference's 10-point declaration and later served as the underpinning to Beijing's policy of engagement with Africa.²⁸⁰ Alden and Alves (2008) write,

“The Bandung conference represented a unique opportunity for Beijing to meet the new countries of Asia and Africa, court them with its anti-colonial credentials, present itself as a model of self-reliance (revolutionary struggle) and appeal to Asian-African unity...China's aim in Bandung was clearly to create a sense of union based on common past experiences under western colonialism from which to build a new international force.”²⁸¹

Robert Vitalis' (2013) work represents a growing scholarly trend, complicating the validity of China-centered narratives of the conference's objectives and outcomes, China's role, and African participation. Vitalis asserts that “myths” imagining Bandung as a source of time-honored Afro-Chinese solidarity are ahistorical. The many misrepresentations attributed to the conference, according to Vitalis, range from statements that Kwame Nkrumah and Jomo Kenyatta were in attendance (they were not), to accounts that the conference's participants were “non-aligned” and dedicated to the cause of Afro-Asian solidarity. In fact, Vitalis contends, many participants were initially unaware of the conference's mission as laid out by its organizers. Instead, what united them in signing on to its declarations, was a shared aversion to colonialism and “white supremacy” and the desire for greater diversity of membership to the United Nations.

²⁸⁰ Wright 1956

²⁸¹ Chris Alden & Cristina Alves 2008, 47

Simultaneously privileging and distancing existing narratives surrounding the conference, Vera Fennell (2013) also questions the rhetoric of Afro-Chinese solidarity. Fennell calls attention to the fact that prior to the Bandung, mentions of Africa in the Chinese press were virtually nonexistent, as was interaction with African people.²⁸² Notwithstanding, the Conference increased Chairman Mao Zedong's awareness of what he came to perceive as experiential similarities between African and Asian people.²⁸³ Chinese news coverage of the conference post-Bandung analogized cultural similarities between the two regions—the shared experience of colonialism, alongside the common plight of peripheralism—exposing African people to many in China for the first time.²⁸⁴

Solidarity (1955-1976)

What little awareness the Chinese possessed of Africa and her people pre-Bandung stemmed from colonialist propaganda, yet after the conference, China claimed to be part of the third world alongside Africa.²⁸⁵ Still, despite increased diplomatic relations between the two regions, China's involvement on the continent was largely moderated through the Soviet Union. According to Alden and Alves (2008), direct involvement between African nations and China was still relatively minor at the time, with the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization (1957) being the primary conduit through which China exerted influence.²⁸⁶

²⁸² Fennell 2013, 256

²⁸³ Monson 2008

²⁸⁴ Fan 2014

²⁸⁵ *ibid*

²⁸⁶ Chris Alden & Cristina Alves, 47

As ideological differences between Beijing and Moscow emerged, prompting the Sino-Soviet split, Mao developed the ‘Three Worlds’ policy.²⁸⁷ The policy focused on ridding China of its “sick man of East Asia” image, replacing it instead with a new world order, with economically and socially marginalized nations from the developing countries of Africa, Asia, and Latin-America at the center and China at the head.²⁸⁸ Solidarity propaganda of the period (Images 2-3) reflected Mao’s strategy, depicting Chinese solidarity with Africa against European colonialism and the neo-imperialist and hegemonic tendencies of the USSR and the West.²⁸⁹



FIGURE 3: “THE STRUGGLE OF ALL THE PEOPLE IN THE WORLD...”

²⁸⁷ Zedong 1986

²⁸⁸ Zedong 1986

²⁸⁹ Kelley R and Esch B 1999



FIGURE 4: “CHAIRMAN MAO IS THE GREAT LIBERATOR”

Chinese support for African liberation struggles during the period took innumerable forms. Chairman Mao (1964) called that

“People of the world, unite and defeat the U.S. aggressors and all their running dogs! People of the world be courageous, dare to fight, defy difficulties and advance wave upon wave. Then the whole world will belong to the people. Monsters of all kinds shall be destroyed”²⁹⁰

Mao’s statements were indicative of the rhetorical, financial, and in-kind support offered to many African states as they struggled to attain liberation. The PRC directly backed military movements such as Julius Nyerere’s Tanzania and Angola’s UNITA, and made more symbolic gestures like the \$400 million, interest-free loan provided between 1970-1977 for the landmark 1,860 kilometer Tanzania- Zambia (TaZara)

²⁹⁰ Robin DG, and Betsy Esch 1999 11

Railway.²⁹¹ But the relationship was not one-sided. Of his negotiations for the construction project, Zambian President Kenneth Kaunda famously remarked, “Quite honestly, I do not know whether to be angry or to laugh at this... Four trips to the West... are not sufficient to make me a capitalist... Only one trip to Peking will make me a communist.”²⁹² Kuanda’s remarks demonstrate that Africa and China cultivated a growing affinity between the two regions, one poised to displace western influence.

Vera Fennell (2013) militates against thinking that the PRC’s policy of supporting African decolonization movements was “based in altruism or feelings of good will.”²⁹³ Instead, she argues, Chinese support for African liberation was part of a “theoretically-based, historically-rooted” international strategy underpinned by the strength of China’s soft power initiatives.²⁹⁴ According to Fennell, Afro-Chinese interaction during this phase of history was part of carefully curated, highly politicized image campaign designed to “deepen mutual understanding...in an effort to create an ideologically inspired solidarity of ‘brotherhood’”.²⁹⁵

Two conclusions can be drawn. The first is that China, over the years, has become increasingly adept at curating and nurturing soft power narratives of its relationship to African and its people. The second, more sinister implication, and the one implied within Fennell’s remarks is that the PRC’s motives for supporting African liberation struggles and economic development were not as entirely altruistic as solidarity

²⁹¹ Monson 2009

²⁹² Kuanda 1967

²⁹³ Fennell 2013, 253

²⁹⁴ *ibid*

²⁹⁵ Fennel 255

propaganda of the period would lead one to believe and, instead firmly rooted in a long game of Chinese self-interest.²⁹⁶

Domestically, though the Chinese Civil War had ended (1927-1950), the resolution establishing two Chinas (the PRC, the ROC) meant that its conclusion was still unresolved.²⁹⁷ The PRC sought to stake its claim for a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council, thus establishing itself as the one, true China. Displacing Taiwan (ROC), however, required the support of newly independent African States who tended to vote as a bloc.²⁹⁸ A triumphant Chairman Mao acknowledged the significance of African support in his remark that “It is our African brothers that have carried us to the UN.”²⁹⁹ The new power wielded by China, and African proximity to its source, promised a more powerful voice for Africa on the international stage.

Retreat (1976-1995)

The PRC’s Africa policy was upended following the death of Mao Zedong (1976). Under the new leadership of Deng Xiaoping, Beijing embarked upon a journey of domestically-driven transformation.³⁰⁰ Deng’s *Four Modernizations* shifted China’s philosophical focus away from political alliances, toward economic priorities and internal capacity building in fields like agriculture, industry, national defense and science and technology.³⁰¹ In light of these goals, Beijing began positioning itself for entry into the global economy.

²⁹⁶ Fennell 2013

²⁹⁷ Rotberg 2008

²⁹⁸ Shinn 2012

²⁹⁹ Mao, 1971

³⁰⁰ Osei, et al. 2010; Shinn 2012; Taylor 2009

³⁰¹ Baum 1996

Deng desired to cultivate an image of China as “a peaceful, united country and even a model country for peace and unity.”³⁰² Bearing these goals in mind, China embarked upon more stable relations with western nations, like the United States and the United Kingdom; joined the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF); and applied for entry to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the World Trade Organization (WTO).³⁰³ African economies, newly liberated and economically bereft of capital could in no way compete with the allure of mature western markets.

Deng’s successors, Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao were, likewise, concerned with the image China portrayed on the world stage. Hu expressed that the PRC should “...make China become more influential politically, more competitive economically, (and) in terms of national image, more friendly and morally more inspirational.”³⁰⁴ Modifying public perception of the PRC from ideological “sick man” of Asia to technologically advanced, new goods supplier required focus and finesse. This meant prioritizing economic imperatives over political ones, and deprioritizing African allegiances, which had little to offer economically at this point.³⁰⁵

Reengagement (1995-Present)

Several factors precipitated China’s renewed interest in Africa at the start of the 1990s. Politically, Beijing’s response to the Tiananmen Square protests of 1989 drew condemnation from the West, whilst African leaders were more tempered in their

³⁰² Feng 2013

³⁰³ Shelton 2001

³⁰⁴ Lian, 2009

³⁰⁵ Lian, 2009

criticisms, leaving room for renewed relations.³⁰⁶ Economically, China began realizing growth from its ‘Peaceful Development’ strategy of the 1980’s, allowing it to compete more successfully on the global stage.³⁰⁷ The nation’s rapid internal growth required natural resources and new goods markets to be sustainable in the long run. African nations possessed both, and the PRC began the process necessary to facilitate full-scale engagement with the continent.

The Chinese state created the PRC’s three policy banks in 1994, which helped facilitate aid negotiations and developmental partnerships between the two regions.³⁰⁸ Diplomatically, Afro-Chinese relations were given more formal status through the establishment of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), held in Beijing in October 2000, with foreign and economic ministers attending from forty-four African states.³⁰⁹ The conference was designed to work toward the establishment of a new international political and economic order in the 21st century and further strengthen Sino-African economic cooperation, outlined by the principles of mutual cooperation, non-interference, and diplomatic solidarity.³¹⁰ Wuthnow (2008) contends that unlike the 1950s, when the focus of Chinese foreign policy was to establish its position as a leader in the *global south*, the PRC’s contemporary policy toward Africa centers on increasing its “diplomatic capital.”³¹¹ This iteration of the relationship is nurtured by the

³⁰⁶ Taylor 2006

³⁰⁷ Alden 2008

³⁰⁸ Brautigam 2009

³⁰⁹ <http://focac.org>

³¹⁰ <http://www.focac.org/eng/ltada/dyjbzjhy/CI12009/t157578.htm>; Taylor 2006; Tselichtchev 2011

³¹¹ Wuthnow 2008, 14

construction of a new national imaginary of the PRC, one underpinned by the China that exists as an appendage of and cleaves to the manufacture of *Africa-China*.³¹²

In his speech before the 17th CCP Congress, President Hu Jintao called for enhancing the soft power of Chinese culture, signifying the strength of the PRC's societal foundation as an instrument of attraction.³¹³ China's contemporary soft power campaign is closely associated with the "active export of Chinese values,"³¹⁴ whereby the PRC contours its image in Africa by reviving "Maoist discourse of Sino-African solidarity"³¹⁵ linking "...the anti-hegemonic posture of the early 1970s to the fight against past colonialism both for China and the developing world."³¹⁶ Revisiting past experiences of Afro-Chinese camaraderie as an approximation of the PRC's present cultural values enables Beijing to promote its long-term foreign policy goals by distancing Africa from the west and moving the continent ever-closer to China.³¹⁷

The PRC prepensely manufactures a narrative of not only post-Bandung solidarity with Africa, but one consistently reinforcing historical and experiential ties between the two regions without regard to the veracity of such claims. Images of shared civilizations of ancient origins, histories of colonial subjugation and oppression, and fights for independence and sovereignty are reinforced through newscasts, official visits, and advertisements, weaving tales of "political solidarity and groupness

³¹² Scholars have become increasingly concerned with how image is implicated in Chinese modern soft power initiatives and, more specifically, how Beijing's image functions as a component of its soft power in Africa; See: Nye 2005; Gagliardone 2013, Hartig 2012, Wuthnow 2008, wang; See also, Ronning, H 2016

³¹³ Ding S 2008, 264

³¹⁴ Barr 2012

³¹⁵ Lan 2016, 306

³¹⁶ Taylor, 2006, 167

³¹⁷ Fennell 2013, 251

(transcending) geo-spatial and racial boundaries.”³¹⁸ The repeated telling of these stories exemplifies the contemporary construction of the Chinese image as a counterhegemonic force against western imperialism.³¹⁹ Alden and Alves (2008) suggest, however, that “beneath the platitudes of solidarity is a reading of Chinese historical relations with Africa emanating from Beijing that is... at times at odds with the historical record of Chinese involvement on the continent”.³²⁰ The disconnect between Beijing’s projected brand image and its national identity has increasingly become the subject of scholarly inquiry vis-a-vis its relationship to Africa and serves as an important rationale for nation branding within the context of Afro-Chinese relations.

The success of China’s soft power initiatives rests, however, “not only on whether China can sell its image to African states but also whether African states are willing to buy it.”³²¹ This is potentially problematic given that the image China presents to foreign publics is often “ambivalent and confusing.” Loo and Davies (2006) unpack the illogicalities embedded within *brand-China*,

“The image of modern day China is fraught with contradictions; an emergent industrial power but one based more upon enlightened communism than on capitalism; an enormous market but one where most consumers are still relatively poor; a source of goods made for established Western or Japanese brands rather than a source of goods valued because they are ‘made in China.’”³²²

³¹⁸ Lan 2016, 306; Fennell 2013, 246

³¹⁹ Fennell 2013, 247

³²⁰ Alden and Alves 2008, 44

³²¹ Fijalkoswi 2011

³²² Loo and Davies 2006

Even if some misperceptions about China could be eliminated, within western conceptualizations of identity, Chinese cultures, as inherently non-western, pose considerable obstacles to effectively communicating its brand.

Africa-China Country Case Studies

Comprehending how the Chinese state crafts its image in Africa necessitates an understanding of the unique histories of each of the states under consideration and their interaction Beijing. Viewpoints of exactly why China renewed relations Africa during the 1990s with increased intensity and precisely how the relationship bodes for the continent vary. Dominant discourse on Afro-Chinese relations, however, supports the assertion that Beijing's strategic interest in the continent is grounded primarily in some combination of politics and economics. Rising living standards and industrialization dramatically increased the consumption of energy and raw materials, increasing China's dependence on imports of oil and minerals.³²³ In response Chinese trade with African economies boomed. Between 2002-2012, China's total imports from Africa increased from US\$5 billion to US\$113 billion.³²⁴ Despite slumps in demand in recent years, China now accounts for more than 20 per cent of imports in Africa and approximately 15 percent of its exports, more than 80 percent of which are concentrated in the commodity and extractive industries.³²⁵

The PRC's pattern of economic involvement within Africa varies from country to country, as it negotiates investment and aid deals independently with each state.

Broadly comprehending Beijing's historical and contemporary patterns of engagement

³²³ Tselichtchev 2011; Taylor 2006

³²⁴ China-Africa Research Initiative, www.sais-cari.org, accessed 01/29/2018.

³²⁵ Financial Times, December 3, 2015, www.ft.com, accessed 1/11/2018.

with each of the sites under analysis is important to understanding how individuals within these countries comprehend *brand-China* and consume *Africa-China* in relation to their own nations. The selected sites are each Anglophone countries (the Gambia, Kenya, South Africa), two with leading regional economies, and each possessing longstanding diplomatic and economic relations with Beijing.

The Gambia

The Republic of The Gambia is a small, narrow West African nation bordered on three sides by Senegal, with the exception of its western coastline, which borders the Atlantic Ocean. The African nation holds the distinction of being mainland Africa's smallest nation by size (4,127 sq mi), boasting a larger area than only Cape Verde, Comoros, Mauritius, Sao Principe and Tome, and the Seychelles in square miles.³²⁶ Like many West African nations, the nation's strategic geographic positioning, at the mouth of the Gambia River, made it a significant factor during the transatlantic slave trade and colonization of Africa, first by the Portuguese and later, the British, when The Gambia was subsumed within the British Empire.

In 1965, The Gambia gained independence under the leadership of Dawda Jawara, who served as Prime Minister of the nation since 1962. Jawara became president in 1970, retaining the office until 1994, when Yahya Jammeh seized power in a bloodless coup.³²⁷ Jammeh's rule is notable for many reasons, not the least of which was his administration's suppression of the press, withdrawal from the British Commonwealth and the International Criminal Court, repression of homosexual rights, and human

³²⁶ CIA World Factbook; <http://www.cia.gov>, accessed 11/3/17

³²⁷ Omar Touray, *The Gambia and the World: A History of the Foreign Policy of the Africa's smallest State, 1965-1995*. Institute for African Affairs: Hamburg

rights abuses.³²⁸ Yet, Jammeh ruled the nation for 22 years until real estate developer Adama Barrow became the Gambia's third president in January 2017 after his surprising defeat of Jammeh during the December 2016 national elections.

As a former British colony, the Gambia's official language is English. Despite this local populations also speak one or more of the languages indigenous to its major ethno-linguistic groups, namely Mandinka, Fulani, Wolof, Jola, and Serahule. The nation boasts fewer than two million inhabitants, the vast majority of whom subscribe to the Islamic faith.

The nation's economy is dominated by farming and fishing, with agriculture employing 70 percent of the labor force and accounting for more than 30 percent of the nation's GDP.³²⁹ Tourism from the United Kingdom, Germany, Sweden, the United States, Canada and, increasingly, China; and the remainder of the services sector, account for more than 50 percent of the nation's GDP.³³⁰ The manufacturing sector contributes little to the national economy, accounting for only five percent of the national GDP.

Gambia-China relations have been marked by constant change. The Gambia established diplomatic relations with the Republic of China (Taiwan) shortly after gaining independence from the United Kingdom. In 1974, the Gambia switched its allegiance to the People's Republic of China (PRC), dissolving its relationship with Taiwan.³³¹ In 1996, The Gambia again recognized the Republic of China (Taiwan),

³²⁸ "Attacks on the Press 2000: The Gambia" *Committee to Protect Journalists* 2001. Retrieved September 12, 2017; "Gambian president says gays a threat to human existence", *Reuters*, 28 September 2013; "Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: The Gambia", U.S. Dept. of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, 23 February 2001.

³²⁹ CIA World Factbook; <http://www.cia.gov>, accessed 11/3/17

³³⁰ CIA World Factbook <http://www.cia.gov>, accessed 11/3/17; World Bank

³³¹ Drun, J. "China-Taiwan Diplomatic Truce Holds Despite Gambia" *The Diplomat* March 29, 2014

leading the PRC to sever ties with the small nation. The Gambian president again cut political ties with Taiwan soon thereafter (2013) for “reasons of national interest”.³³² Gambia remained one of a small cohort of African nations without a diplomatic relationship with either of the two China’s until 2016, when The People's Republic of China and the Gambia reestablished diplomatic relations. The new relationship was solidified through the erection of the China-funded, 10-story ‘Petroleum House,’ the tallest building in the tiny African nation.

Despite shifting allegiances, Gambian-Chinese economic relations have remained consistent. Chinese exports to the Gambia increased from US\$51.93 million in 1992 to US\$315.1 million in 2016.³³³ Gambian exports to China, likewise, grew over the same period from US\$111 thousand in 1992 to US\$90.1 million in 2016. The African nation’s top exports remain raw materials, with rough wood, coconuts, and brazil nuts being the most regularly exported items. This brief glimpse into Gambia-China economic relations demonstrates two things: the first is that although trade between the two nations is significantly imbalanced, Gambian exports to Beijing are increasing at a phenomenal rate;³³⁴ and secondly, that despite volatile diplomatic relations between China and the Gambia within the last 25 years, economic dealings between the two countries remained open.

³³² Butch, T. “China and Gambia Reestablish Diplomatic Ties”, The Huffington Post, 03/21/2016, accessed 12/1/17.

³³³ China-Africa Research Initiative, accessed 01/29/2018

³³⁴ *ibid*

Kenya

The Republic of Kenya is an African nation covering a diverse and expansive stretch of terrain (224,445 sq mi). The East African nation is bordered by South Sudan to the northwest, Ethiopia to the north, Somalia to the northeast, Uganda to the west, and Tanzania to the South. Modern Kenya boasts one of the largest populations within Africa (48 million) and is comprised of 44 recognized ethnic groups constituted principally of Bantu and Nilotic populations, which together comprise 97% of the nation's residents.³³⁵

East Africa has enjoyed steady inhabitation by humans since the Lower Paleolithic period. Around 2000 BC, Cushitic-speaking people from northern Africa settled in the part of East Africa currently referred to as Kenya.³³⁶ By the 1st Century AD, the Kenyan coast was frequented by Arab traders, who began establishing outposts in the area because of its proximity to the Arabian Peninsula.³³⁷ Early Kenya played host to ironworkers, farmers, hunters and fishers who supported the acephalous region's burgeoning economy through agriculture, fishing, metal production and trade with foreign countries.³³⁸ During the period Bantu people established trade links with communities as far afield as Persia, Arabia, India, and India.³³⁹ The Arab presence in the Republic holds particular significance to early Kenyan history because of the

³³⁵ "Indians In Kenya Are Now The '44th Tribe' Of The Country" *Huffington Post*, July 25, 2017 <http://huffingtonpost.in>. Accessed September 27, 2017; The major indigenous ethnic groups within Kenya include the kikuyu (6,622,576), luhya (5,338,666), kalenjin (4,967,328), luo (4,044,440), kamba (3,893,157), kisi (2,205,669), mijikenda (1,960,574), meru (1,658,108), turkana (988,592), and maasai (841,622)] source U Penn

³³⁶ Daniel Branch, *Kenya: Between Hope and Despair, 1963-2011*, TJ International, Ltd. Cornwall

³³⁷ Hallet R 1970; Ehret C 2002; Shillington K 2012

³³⁸ *ibid*

³³⁹ *ibid*

introduction of Islam and Arabic influences on the Bantu languages.³⁴⁰ European presence on the coast was initiated in 1498, with the arrival of Portuguese sailors, who soon challenged Arab influence over Mombasa.³⁴¹ The Portuguese later relinquished control of the port back to Islamists under the Imam of Oman in the 1600s.

It was not until 1885, when Germany established a protectorate over the Sultan of Zanzibar's coastal possessions that Europeans returned en masse to the Kenyan coast.³⁴² In 1888, the Imperial British East Africa Company also arrived in Kenya, leading Germany to surrender its coastal holdings to Britain in 1890. By 1895 the British government had set up the East Africa Protectorate, claiming the country's interior as far west as Lake Naivasha. The ability to transport people and goods from the coast inland was considered a high priority for the British stronghold in Kenya, thus plans were soon drawn for the construction of the Kenya–Uganda railway bisecting the country.³⁴³

Railway construction enabled British farmers to settle deeper within the interior regions of the country, an area already heavily populated by indigenous Kikuyu people. Unlike the European settlers, the indigenes were banned from owning land forcing them to subsist as itinerant farmers. Between 1942 and 1959 members of the Kikuyu, Embu, Meru and Kamba ethnic groups began challenging colonial rule.³⁴⁴ The *Mau Mau Rebellion*, as it was known, possessed both economic and political components, attacking political opponents and raiding white settler farms and destroying

³⁴⁰ Today, roughly 10 percent of Kenyans identify with Islam, whilst 45 percent identify as Protestant, 33 percent Roman Catholic, and 10 percent adhere to indigenous belief systems, CIA Factbook 2016.

³⁴¹ Hallet R 1970; Ehret C 2002; Shillington K 2012

³⁴² Hallet R 1970

³⁴³ Kanyinga, K 2009

³⁴⁴ Londale 1990

livestock.³⁴⁵ The Movement successfully disrupted British rule, leading to a state of emergency from October 1952 to December 1959.

The Colony of Kenya, occupied by the United Kingdom, and the Protectorate of Kenya, held by the Sultan of Zanzibar, became a single independent state in 1963.³⁴⁶ One year later, Kenya officially became the *Republic of Kenya*, with Jomo Kenyatta as its first president.³⁴⁷ Kenyatta remained in office until his death in 1978 and was succeeded by the former Deputy President Daniel arap Moi. Arap Moi retained held office until 2002, at which point he was constitutionally barred from running for an additional term.³⁴⁸ Mwai Kibaki, running for the opposition coalition "National Rainbow Coalition" (NARC), was elected President.³⁴⁹ Deputy Prime Minister Uhuru Kenyatta, Jomo's son, became the East African nation's fourth president in 2013. The summer following his election, Kenyatta visited China at the invitation of President Xi Jinping.³⁵⁰

Economically, The Kenyan economy is bolstered by its service sector, which contributes 61% of the nation's GDP and is dominated by tourism.³⁵¹ Tourists, the largest number being from Germany and the United Kingdom, are attracted mainly to the nation's coastal beaches and game reserves. Agriculture is the second largest contributor to Kenya's gross domestic product (GDP).

³⁴⁵ Londale 1990

³⁴⁶ Daniel Branch, Kenya: Between Hope and Despair, 1963-2011, TJ International, Ltd. Cornwall

³⁴⁷ Daniel Branch, Kenya: Between Hope and Despair, 1963-2011, TJ International, Ltd. Cornwall

³⁴⁸ Ibid.

³⁴⁹ Ibid.

³⁵⁰ Raghavan, Sudarson "In snub to Washington, Kenyan president visits China, Russia in first official visit outside Africa" *The Washington Post* August 17, 2013

³⁵¹ CIA Factbook 2016

Kenya also derives support from regional alliances. The presidents of Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda re-established the East African Community (EAC) in March 1996. The EAC's objectives include harmonizing tariffs and customs regimes, free movement of people, and improving regional infrastructures. In March 2004, the three East African countries added a customs agreement to their cooperative agreements. Most recently, in 2007, the Kenyan government unveiled Vision 2030, an economic development program it envisions as a competitor to the Asian Economic Tigers by the year 2030.

Bilateral relations between Kenya and China date back to 1963 when, soon after Kenya's first elections, China became one of the first nations to open an embassy in the east African nation recognizing its sovereign legitimacy. Affairs between the two countries has since been marked by diplomatic, economic, and military cooperation. President Uhuru Kenyatta's diplomatic visit to China in 2013, yielded more than US\$5 billion in infrastructure and economic investment deals between the two countries.³⁵² The Chinese Premier, Li Keqiang visited Nairobi during his 2014 Africa tour, signing the deal leading to the construction of another Kenyan railway, the *Madaraka Express*. Li's visit also promised funding to establish a China-Africa Development Bank, Humanitarian Assistance in the Sudan and wildlife Conservation.³⁵³

Vision 2030 demonstrates the Kenyan government's prioritization of infrastructure, financial services, agriculture, manufacturing, and tourism as prerequisites to sustainable development. In response, Kenyatta actively pursued relations with the

³⁵² <https://www.capitalfm.co.ke/news/2017/09/bilateral-relations-kenya-china-yield-economic-benefits/>

³⁵³ https://www.the-star.co.ke/news/2017/05/20/enter-the-dragon-kenya-china-relations_c1564316

Chinese to achieve these aims.³⁵⁴ Notwithstanding, bilateral trade between the two nations amounted to US\$ 5.59 billion Chinese exports to Kenya and US\$97.1 million in imports to China in 2016, reflecting a significant trade imbalance between the two nations.³⁵⁵ The vast majority of Kenyan exports to China involve raw materials, namely titanium ore, scrap copper, and other metals.³⁵⁶

At its core Kenya-China relations has not yet generated sustained economic benefits to the East African nation. The PRC, in contrast, benefits from Kenya's strategic positioning, where Chinese developers are building infrastructure projects designed to facilitate transport of goods along Indian Ocean Shipping routes.³⁵⁷ Kenyan-Chinese relations have recently experienced backlash as a result of negative publicity stemming from Chinese entrepreneurs' treatment of local Kenyans and the perceived effect of infrastructure projects on the local environment.

South Africa

South Africa, is the southernmost country in Africa. Bounded on the north by Namibia, Botswana, and Zimbabwe; and on the east and northeast by Mozambique and Swaziland; it surrounds the kingdom of Lesotho.³⁵⁸ The country boasts a population of more than 56 million inhabitants.³⁵⁹ The land now known as South Africa was originally inhabited by Bantu-speaking people, who, as herdsman and agricultural farmers, roamed the area for millennia. Indigenous populations are comprised of descendants of these Bantu people, along with Khoisan, Khokhoi, Xhosa, and Zulu

³⁵⁴ Nyaga et al 2017

³⁵⁵ China-Africa Research Initiative, accessed 01/29/2018

³⁵⁶ The Observatory of Economic Complexity, MIT accessed: 10/07/17 <https://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/>

³⁵⁷ Chege 2008

³⁵⁸ CIA World Factbook

³⁵⁹ Statistics South Africa Mid-Year Report

<http://www.statssa.gov.za/publications/P0302/P03022017.pdf>

people, and other groups who account for roughly 81-percent of the total South African population.³⁶⁰ Newer arrivals to the multiracial nation, namely European descendants, coloured biracial or multiracial groups, and the Indian/Asian population, account for 8.0-percent, 8.8-percent, and 2.5-percent of the total population respectively.³⁶¹

The first European settlement in southern Africa was established by the Dutch East India Company in Table Bay (Cape Town) in 1652.³⁶² It was created as a supply port for ships traversing the cape, and a colony was soon established there to provide needed supplies for migrating European settlers without regard to local populations already inhabiting the land.³⁶³ During the late 18th century, colonists and indigenous populations embarked on a century of intermittent warfare over the dispossession of Khoe and San indigenous people from their lands. during which the colonists emerged victorious over the local populations.³⁶⁴

The first British Settlers arrived in 1820. South Africa's mineral wealth was discovered by Europeans in 1867, with the discovery of diamonds and, later, gold mines in the Northern Cape.³⁶⁵ At the conclusion of the South African War (1899-1902), the Union of South Africa was created with the intent of becoming a white nation despite being comprised of a majority black population.³⁶⁶ Already divested of the land essential to their pastoral way of existence, indigenous people were further

³⁶⁰ Statistics South Africa Mid-Year Report
<http://www.statssa.gov.za/publications/P0302/P03022017.pdf>

³⁶¹ Statistics South Africa Mid-Year Report
<http://www.statssa.gov.za/publications/P0302/P03022017.pdf>

³⁶² See: A Concise History of South Africa, Robert Ross Cambridge University Press 2008.

³⁶³ See: A Concise History of South Africa, Robert Ross Cambridge University Press 2008.

³⁶⁴ See: A Concise History of South Africa, Robert Ross Cambridge University Press 2008.

³⁶⁵ <https://www.gov.za/about-sa/history>

³⁶⁶ <https://www.gov.za/about-sa/history>

dispossessed by the institution of racially-divisive laws and policies designed to force them to work their land to the benefit of others.

During the same period Chinese indentured laborers were imported to the Transvaal to work South African mines to meet the accumulative needs of mining community and the local shortage of mining labor.³⁶⁷ The scheme was also designed to help cement white Britishness and colonial rule in the new colony. More than 60,000 indentured workers were brought to South Africa between 1904 and 1907 but the plot did not proceed as planned.³⁶⁸ The newly arrived Chinese laborers were soon at the center of widespread conflict and violence, causing public perception of the program to sour.³⁶⁹ The decision was made to end future importation of Chinese workers and repatriate existing workers back to China.³⁷⁰

The African National Congress (ANC) was founded in 1912 as a new form of rebellion against European occupation and the racist policies underpinning the occupation.³⁷¹ Despite continued remonstrations by indigenous populations, the ideological move toward an all-white segregationist state was cemented when the pro-Afrikaner National Party (NP) came to power in 1948.³⁷² The party's platform, founded upon the ideology of apartheid, was socially and economically repressive. Indigenous South Africans and their allies globally, continued their protest and

³⁶⁷ Bright, Rachel. *Chinese Labour in South Africa, 1902-1910: Race, Violence, and Global Spectacle*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013.

³⁶⁸ IBID

³⁶⁹ IBID

³⁷⁰ Although the program was short-lived it aided the development of a white settler identity in South Africa distinctly and influenced restrictions on Asian migration until the 1990s.

³⁷¹ www.anc.org.za, accessed May 17, 2018

³⁷² See: *A Concise History of South Africa*, Robert Ross Cambridge University Press 2008.

opposition to Apartheid rule for more than forty years and the country finally emerged as an independent nation in 1990.³⁷³

Post-apartheid South Africa had to contend with the social, economic, and political fallout of European oppression and the nation experienced an economic recession until 1993. In the interim the economy has experienced both highs and lows marked by high growth but also high inflation. South Africa has overcome many of its economic concerns and currently possesses the third largest GDP and highest GDP per capita within Africa.³⁷⁴ Similarly to other African nations, South Africa's economy has been traditionally supported by the primary sector but this is shifting. Since the early 1990s, economic growth has been driven primarily by the tertiary sector and the development of finished goods and services. Yet, poverty and unemployment remain high, especially amongst the indigenous populations.³⁷⁵

Prior to the fall of apartheid, relations between South Africa and China were marked by conflict resulting from competing political ideologies and allegiances.³⁷⁶ South Africa previously maintained a close official relationship with the Republic of China.³⁷⁷ The dismantling of the apartheid regime presented an opportunity for official relations to be established between the two nations under the direction of the newly elected South African head of state: Nelson Mandela.³⁷⁸ The South African government

³⁷³ See: A Concise History of South Africa, Robert Ross Cambridge University Press 2008.

³⁷⁴ IMF World Economic Outlook (WEO), October 2016

³⁷⁵ CIA World Factbook

³⁷⁶ In the Korean War, the South African Air Force fought on the side of the United Nations against the Chinese Peoples Liberation Army, while Pretoria later enjoyed a strong relationship with the Republic of China (ROC) in Taiwan. The PRC supported and was closely allied with the anti-apartheid group the Pan African Congress (PAC) while the African National Congress (ANC) was supported by the PRC's communist rival, the Soviet Union.

³⁷⁷ Alden and Wu 2014

³⁷⁸ R.W. Johnson, "South Africa's Brave New World: The beloved country since the end of apartheid" Overlook Publishing, New York: 2009.

announced that it would switch recognition from Taiwan to the PRC in January 1998, soon after the handover of Hong Kong to the PRC in 1997, given that South Africa, as another former British colony, possessed existing ties with Hong Kong.³⁷⁹

The PRC's economic relationship to Africa varies from country to country, as it negotiates investment and aid deals independently with each state, but South Africa remains the largest buyer of Chinese goods on the continent. In 1992, Chinese exports to South Africa were virtually nonexistent but by 2014 they increased to US\$13.54 billion.³⁸⁰ South African exports to China, likewise, grew from negligible amounts to reach US\$44.57 billion in 2014, before falling to US\$ 6.8 billion in 2016.³⁸¹ These figures reflect a certain reciprocity in South African-Chinese relations, though South African exports to China mirror other nations on the continent, by being heavily weighed by the export of primary goods. Diplomatic and economic ties between the countries are intertwined through shared participation in the BRICS group of emerging economies and cemented during the Forum on China African Cooperation hosted by South Africa in 2015, where the two countries signed twenty-five agreements worth a combined value of US\$16.5 billion.³⁸²

African Perspectives

The ultimate test for China's global positioning and its engagement with Africa is not what the West thinks, but what Africans think.³⁸³ Yet absent, most strikingly, from

³⁷⁹ China / South Africa -- a Chopsticks Relationship, P J Botha, Embassy of the People's Republic of China in the Republic of South Africa, 4 July 20

³⁸⁰ China-Africa Research Initiative, www.sais-cari.org, accessed 01/29/2018.

³⁸¹ "Africa, China Business Leaders Sign Billions in Investments". SABC News. 5 December 2015. Retrieved 17 January 2016; Johns Hopkins University, China-Africa Research Initiative, accessed 01/29/2018

³⁸² <http://www.focac.org>

³⁸³ Cao 2013, 68

the vast majority of the literature on Africa-China are empirical studies interrogating the benefits to African states and people.³⁸⁴ Kalu (2012) asseverates that much of the existing scholarship on Afro Chinese relations analyzes the relationship from a Western or Eastern perspective, concentrating extensively on the benefits and burden to China. Mazimhaka (2013) similarly remarked that in most perception surveys on the Chinese presence in Africa, the perceptions of Africans are not canvassed.

Mohan and Lampert (2013) and Corkin (2013) shifted the focus specifically to African agency, writing that most “analyses of China’s renewed engagement with Africa treat Beijing as the driving force, and little recognition is given to the role of African agency, especially beyond the level of state elites.”³⁸⁵

Global discourses of Africa-China, similarly, to colonial discourses of Africa-Europe, position African people as subject to rather than subject of their own stories. The scholarly trend has been to analyze China’s renewed engagement through the lens of Chinese actors, with little recognition given to the ways in which people on the continent individually and collectively act as agents of their own destinies.³⁸⁶ Cornelia Tremann (2013) writes, one of the ways in which colonial discourses have been sustained is through ignoring African agency in the Afro-Chinese relationship.³⁸⁷ Mazimhaka (2013) similarly remarked that in most perception surveys on the Chinese presence in Africa, the perceptions of Africans are completely overlooked.³⁸⁸

³⁸⁴ Kalu 2012

³⁸⁵ Mohan and Lampert 2013, 92

³⁸⁶ Mohan and Lampert 2013, 92

³⁸⁷ Tremann 2013, 11

³⁸⁸ Mazimhaka P, “China in Africa: an African view” in Liu, Jerry, and Patrick Mazimhaka. *The Morality of China in Africa: The Middle Kingdom and the Dark Continent*. Zed Books Ltd., 2013.

Studies interrogating Africa-China through the lens of its effects on or from the perspectives of local populations, often focus principally on gauging perspectives of economic and democratic indicators.³⁸⁹ Harneit-Sievers, Marks, and Naidu (2010), Gadzala and Hanusch (2010), and Firenze and Marks (2007); while giving voice to both African and Chinese perspectives of the relationship, present essays examining Africa's engagement with China in the economic and political arenas, without due consideration of how social indicators may influence or be influenced by the relationship.³⁹⁰

Other opinion studies of China, surveying at least one African nation captured opinions of the PRC from participants globally and did not focus on Africa.³⁹¹ Related findings suggest that people across Africa are content with China's contributions but wary of the economic, environmental, and social impact of their presence. The 2013 Pew Global Attitudes Study, as an example, found that positive perceptions of China in Africa stood at 65 percent.³⁹² The 2009 BBC World Service study, including three Africa nations (Nigeria, Egypt and Ghana), found perceptions of China most positive within Africa.³⁹³ In perhaps the largest study of African perceptions of China to date, Afrobarometer's 2016 opinion survey of 36 nations indicates that China falls second

³⁸⁹ See: Afrobarometer 2016, Afrobarometer 2014, Global Ethics Institute of South Africa 2014, Hanusch 2012, Sautman and Hairong 2009, Manji and Marks 2007

³⁹⁰ See: Harneit-Sievers, Axel, Stephen Marks, and Sanusha Naidu, eds. *Chinese and African perspectives on China in Africa*. Fahamu/Pambazuka, 2010; See: Gadzala, Aleksandra, and Marek Hanusch. "African perspectives on China-Africa: Gauging popular perceptions and their economic and political determinants." *Afrobarometer Working Papers 17*. 2010.

³⁹¹ *Pew Global Attitudes Study 2013*; BBC World Service Study 2009

³⁹² "Pew Global Attitudes Study," *Pew Research Center* 2013

³⁹³ Rebol 2010

only to the United States in its perception as a development model.³⁹⁴ One of the more compelling findings of earlier studies comes from Sautman and Hairong's (2009) discovery that Western media is one of the principle influencers of opinion formation regarding China amongst the populations studied. Their study also highlights the importance of different perspectives between countries in their findings that Kenyan perspectives of the Afro-Chinese relationship were "consistently positive" whilst more variation exists within South Africa.

Conclusion

This chapter provided an historiography of Chinese soft power in Africa, primarily describing Chinese views regarding soft power and culture and the significance of those views to understanding Afro-Chinese relations. The chapter also delivered a simplified analysis of historical and contemporary relations between the Gambia, Kenya and South Africa, and China. It narrated the history of modern Afro-Chinese relations (1955), considering historical and recent trends in Afro-Chinese relations to explicate how migratory patterns, and diplomatic and cultural orientations between the two regions historically evolved and shaped contemporary patterns of interaction.

³⁹⁴ See: Mogopodi Lekorwe, Anyway Chingwete, Mina Okuru, and Romaric Samson, "China's growing presence in Africa wins largely positive popular reviews" *Afrobarometer* Dispatch No. 122, October 2016

Chapter Five

Turning Dragons into Pandas

“The Western approach sees individual people as the units through which the world is understood and tends to think in absolutes, that is, good versus evil. The self is identified with God; the other is the heathen and an irreconcilable enemy. In contrast, Chinese thought supposes many kinds of other and suggests methods to reconcile that other into a harmonious existence. Here, the other can become the self.”- Yiwei Wang, *Public Diplomacy and the Rise of Chinese Soft Power*, 262.

Introduction

On Wednesday, May 31st 2017, the Madaraka Express (*Madaraka*), a China Road and Bridge Corporation constructed standard gauge railway, embarked on its maiden journey from Mombasa’s Miritiri Station to Nairobi. One of several planned China constructed railway lines in Africa, the railway replaced the infamous Kenya-Uganda “Lunatic Express” (1903-2017), a holdover from British colonial occupation.³⁹⁵ Madaraka connects the Kenyan capital with its eastern coastline, bisecting Tsavo National Park to cut passenger journeys by matatu or car in half. Completing the railway, on time, was a key priority and campaign promise for Kenya’s President Uhuru Kenyatta, for whom Madaraka represented a “new era of autonomous rule on the continent.”³⁹⁶ Kenyatta, like many leaders across Africa, has long heralded the benefits

³⁹⁵ <http://krc.co.ke/history/> accessed 10/17/17 Kenyan Railways Website

³⁹⁶ Full 2017 Madaraka Day speech By Uhuru Kenyatta on Posted on June 1, 2017

of Chinese-led projects, yet, despite Presidential support, the line opened to mixed reviews.³⁹⁷

The pageantry surrounding Madaraka's inauguration brought inevitable remarks from critics who questioned China's motives on the continent but also waves of nostalgia about the first continental Chinese-backed railway in Africa, the Tazara "freedom railway" (1976). The Tazara linked Tanzania and Zambia and was widely viewed as a solution to the stronghold southern African states held over transportation between Tanzania and Zambia post-independence.³⁹⁸ Some detractors argue that Madaraka is overpriced, as it accounts for more than five percent of Kenya's gross domestic product; for others, the railway project was emblematic of creeping Chinese cultural intrusion on the continent.

Subtle messages observed during the line's inauguration--pamphlets written in Mandarin, visitors greeted by staff donning red and gold uniforms, and a stone image of admiral Zheng He overseeing pedestrian traffic on the platform—underscored thinking that although Madaraka was a Kenyan possession, it was still very much Chinese owned.³⁹⁹ The image Madaraka helps curate of Africa-China is also undermined by negative press and competing images in the manner that CCTV's Annual Spring Festival Gala "Celebrating Together", which recounted the opening of the Railway from a decided Chinese point of view, depicting Chinese actors in blackface.

³⁹⁷ Kenya's Madaraka Express Launches Amid Fanfare - And Criticism. AllAfrica.com. Accessed online September 7, 2017.

³⁹⁸ Monson, J. (2009) Africa's Freedom Railway: How a Chinese Development Project Changed Lives and Livelihood in Tanzania.

³⁹⁹ Zheng He was one of the great navigators of the Ming Dynasty who visited Kenya during one of his wester voyages (1368-1644); Kenya's Madaraka Express Launches Amid Fanfare - And Criticism. AllAfrica.com. Accessed online September 7, 2017. .

The performative practice of these artifacts in the theatre of Africa-China is far more complex than simply signifying the inauguration of the PRC's latest infrastructure project. Madaraka, alongside the pomp and circumstance of its opening ceremony, plays an important role in the everyday politics of Africa-China. It is a role symbolic of the strength of the Chinese state and its global ambitions but, also one that serves as a visual reinforcement of China's image as a development model, friend, and brother to Africa.

'Madaraka' becomes concomitant with the *longue duree* of Africa-Chinese relations fomented pre-European conquest through 'giraffe diplomacy,' nurtured by diplomatic relations during the Bandung Conference (1955), strengthened by Beijing's solidarity with African liberation movements and, ultimately, reinforced by contemporary economic, social, and diplomatic interactions between the two regions. Curating an image of Afro-China established through the mutually beneficial exchange of gifts, historical friendship, and cultural propinquity reinforces the notion that if not for the "twin evils" of the transatlantic slave trade and colonialism, Africa and China would have remained consistently close 'friends, brothers, and partners' for more than 600 years⁴⁰⁰. More importantly, the narrative also mirrors attempts to transform domestic and international viewpoints of China and its interactions with African nations and how those attempts are inhibited by tension between official and personal accounts of China and Africa-China.

Artifacts reinforcing the image of China in Africa at once as loyal friend, cultural traditionalist, and once- impoverished nation victimized by Western imperialism,

⁴⁰⁰ Statement made by Chinese President Xi Jinping in an Egyptian editorial "Let China-Arab Friendship Surge Forward like the Nile" 01/20/16.

resonate with African decision-makers seeking developmental alternatives to the West's neoliberal agenda.⁴⁰¹ This imagining of China serves to distinguish the PRC as an antithetical construction of the West but, also, obscures the neoliberal relational dynamics of Africa-China, utilizing soft power images to “denationalize racial inequality.”⁴⁰² Nations select which image of self to disseminate to international audiences. Subovic (2017) explains, that this is how “forces like nostalgia, origin stories, enemy construction, and others, are mobilized – through a fantastical structure of the nation that enrolls people into a particular national narrative of the imaginary.”⁴⁰³ Strategically constructing this narrative of China and Africa-China requires synchronizing the symbols states use to communicate their imaginings of self, other, power, and powerlessness.

The Chinese State consistently utilizes a diversity of performative symbols in the construction of its brand across Africa. Official images of China and Africa reinforce a particular narrative of the Chinese national imaginary through billboards depicting China Southern Airlines' new service from Nairobi to Guangzhou; films like “Let's Get Married;” diplomatic speeches during the opening of China Europe International Business School (CEIBS) in Accra, and articles in *ChinAfrica* magazine, signifying to observers on both sides of Africa and within that Afro-Chinese relations are strong, mutually beneficial and growing.

Nation branding is a project of political imagination, designed to either reinforce or replace existing concepts of the national imaginary and this chapter views Africa-China

⁴⁰¹ Kopinski 2012

⁴⁰² Simms Hamilton 1970, 24

⁴⁰³ Subovic 2017, 3

through the lens of China's constructed national imaginary as an expression of its nation brand within Africa.⁴⁰⁴ These narratives influence and speak to relations between nations at the elite economic and diplomatic level, and also of the desire to direct conversations regarding these relationships and how the states within them are consumed, at the popular social and cultural levels.

This chapter builds on the understanding that nation branding serves as “an ideological framing of history, nature and tradition, a framing that has the power to reshape culture and nature to its own needs”.⁴⁰⁵ As the Chinese economy began to expand in the 1980s, and new policies driving outward expansion and engagement with the west emerged, the PRC increasingly utilized specific soft power images and messages building on Maoist propaganda of the past, as a vehicle of national imaginary construction.

Throughout African liberation movements, textual and visual media became the principal formats for promoting official discourse on China and Africa-China to both popular and elite audiences (image 4).⁴⁰⁶ Today, the discursive frameworks introduced in speeches, newspaper editorials, magazines, and advertisements continue to promote China's contemporary view of Africa-China and spread its message for consumption across the continent (image 5). The chapter seeks to discern the specific nature of *brand-China* in Africa, viewing contemporary depictions of China's brand within the historical frameworks of previous Afro-Chinese encounters. The principal concern is

⁴⁰⁴ Nation branding attempts to positively create, change or influence a nation's image (Gudjonsson, 2005; Fan, 2006, 2008b, Anholt 2005, Gudjonsson 2005), effectively altering public attitudes or perceptions about a nation without using hard power, for economic (Leonard 2002:48, Dinnie (Osei and Gbadamosi 2013), political (Rendon, 2003; Szondi, 2007; Jordan 2014:284), or social gain (Anholt 2005; Fan 2006; Gudjonsson 2005: 285).

⁴⁰⁵ Maccannell 1992, 1

⁴⁰⁶ Fennell 2013

with how the Chinese state and state-owned or supported enterprises (SOEs) utilize nation branding to construct the Chinese image on the continent and how those images align with or deviate from official brand messages of Africa-China. The chapter is organized along the following lines: It began with a brief outline of China's national imaginary construction in Africa, exploring Afro-Chinese relations from a nation branding perspective. The chapter continues by detailing the empirical core of the research in which research question one is answered. Finally, the article provides a summary of findings.



FIGURE 5: “LONG LIVE CHAIRMAN MAO



FIGURE 6: BANK OF CHINA BILLBOARD (LUSAKA, 2015)

The Rhetorical Construction of *brand-China* in Africa

Artifact Characteristics

Three hundred and thirty-seven (337) items were used in the analysis. Within the project, the population of communication principally drew from speeches, magazine covers, advertisements, and newspaper editorials developed by the Chinese State or State Owned or supported firms, or delivered by high-ranking Chinese officials (President, Premier, Ambassador, etc.) for African consumption. This includes 260 textual (speeches and editorials) and 77 visual (magazine covers) artifacts. The vast majority of artifacts were produced by the Chinese producers (89%). More than two-thirds of the textual artifacts (77%) were attributed to high-ranking diplomats (Ambassadors) from each nation, with an additional fourteen percent (14%) delivered by senior leadership (President, Premier, King). Ambassadors represent the highest diplomatic post to a nation, yet the artifacts they presented were often delivered before popular audiences at public events, including hospital launches, student award ceremonies, or the distribution of school supplies. The artifacts used within the analysis were produced within fourteen African nations and China, namely Botswana, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Malawi, Namibia, Nigeria, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, Zimbabwe, Morocco, and Ethiopia.⁴⁰⁷ The number of textual artifacts delivered increased over time between 2000-2015, reaching its apex in 2015 prior to and during the Sixth Ministerial Conference of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), held in Johannesburg, South December 4-5, 2015.

⁴⁰⁷ Chinese artifacts represent those delivered before majorly or abundantly African audiences, such as The Fifth Ministerial Conference of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), held in Beijing, China, from 19 to 20 July 2012

Critical discourse analysis of the artifacts yielded 88 unique nodes; including “Benevolence,” “History,” “Poverty,” “Solidarity,” “China Dream,” “Marginalization,” “Science and Technology,” “Security” and “Mutual Benefit”. These nodes were grouped into seven distinct thematic categories encompassing issues of “Development,” “Sovereignty,” “Marginalization,” “Friendship,” “Eurocentrism,” “Sameness,” “Partnership,” and a miscellany of other references such as the narrative of “Peacefulness”. An initial review of coding categories revealed most frequent references to nodes surrounding themes of “Sameness,” “Development,” “Friendship,” and “Partnership.” Collectively, these themes account for 73.8 percent of the variation in how *brand-China* is constructed in Africa. The most frequently referenced themes are each discussed in turn and collectively serve as the foci of the remainder of this chapter.

Sameness

The most frequently constructed narrative of brand-China in Africa is one of “sameness.” *Sameness* speaks to a level of affinity beyond that shared by partners or friends, creating a discursive framework for establishing points of commonality between Chinese and African people, the historical and contemporary experiences of Chinese and African people, cultural propinquity, being part of a shared (or the same) community, Chinese kinship, brotherhood, sisterhood, or familyhood with Africa. Chinese Ambassador Tian Xuejun expressed the feeling of ‘sameness’ during his

farewell luncheon when he remarked, “My wife and I regard South Africa as our second home, and the people of South Africa as our brothers and sisters.”⁴⁰⁸

The ideology of brotherhood, in particular, is reinforced through promotional homily utilized in 251 of 337 artifacts, more frequently than any other theme. Throughout Chinese promotional artifacts African people are regarded “as our brothers and sisters.”⁴⁰⁹ When China’s seat was restored in the UN, “our African brothers burst into tears of happiness,”⁴¹⁰ therefore, Beijing feels “the responsibility that we can by no means fail our African brothers.”⁴¹¹ For, as “a Chinese saying goes, ‘unity of two brothers gives them the strength to cut through metal.’”⁴¹² Statements such as these reinforce thinking that Chinese and African people are united by a fictive kinship, which underpins the Afro-Chinese relationship as well as an image of Chinese proximity to the continent and its people. Yiwei Wang explains,

“Western political discourse asks first, ‘Who are you?’ It is concerned with the problem of identity, with distinguishing and making friends and enemies, exploring ‘us’ and ‘others.’ It is a worldview based on splitting. In contrast, Chinese political thinking first asks, ‘Who are we?’ creating the concept of ‘the whole world as one family.’”⁴¹³

⁴⁰⁸ Ambassador Tian Xuejun at His Farewell Luncheon Hosted by the South African Department of International Relations and Cooperation (3/23/17)

⁴⁰⁹ Remarks by H.E. Wang Yi Minister of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, At the Launch of the Book A Monument to China-Africa Friendship: First-hand Account of the Building of Tazara 23 July 2015

⁴¹⁰ Speech by H.E. Li Keqiang, Premier of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, At the AU Conference Center, Addis Ababa, 5 May 2014

⁴¹¹ Building a Better China-Africa Partnership-Speech by H.E. Ambassador Liu Guangyuan at the Conference “Towards a New Africa-China Partnership” 2011/03/28

⁴¹² President Xi Jinping's Congratulatory Message and State Councilor Yang Jiechi's Keynote Speech to The Opening Ceremony of the Coordinators' Meeting on the Implementation of The Follow-up Actions of the Johannesburg Summit of The Forum on China-Africa Cooperation 2016/08/02

⁴¹³ yiwei wang (2008) the annals of the american academy, public diplomacy and the rise of chinese soft power (262).

Yiwei Wang's reflections support the ingenuousness of Chinese moves toward an Afro-Chinese community by suggesting that China's views of Africa are but an extension of the Confucian worldview.



FIGURE 7: CHINA SOUTHERN AIRLINES BILLBOARD (NAIROBI, 2015)

The narrative of Brotherhood is also discursively constructed within advertisements depicting Africa-China. An image of a China Southern Airlines (image 6) advertisement discovered in 2015, along the airport road in Nairobi, demonstrates this point. The billboard, designed to capture the attention of a domestic Kenyan audience interested in traveling to China, publicized China Southern Airline's new service from Nairobi to Guangzhou. The billboard features two central figures, a Panda and Giraffe. The panda, leaning forward, embraces the giraffe lovingly, speaking to a level of affinity beyond friendship between the two creatures.

Although the use of animals is a common practice in advertising, reimagining African people as savage or animalistic is problematic in any context. While the panda,

nee Chinese, are also depicted as animals on the billboard, the particularities of the African historical circumstance complicate the rhetorical intent of the advertisement within a market predominated by indigenous African people and diffuses the message of sameness. In the image, the panda is embracing, nee acting upon the giraffe. The giraffe, a generally docile creature, doesn't respond. In this way, the focal point of the ad, the portrayal of a panda embracing a giraffe, replicates not simply the rhetoric of "brotherhood" as a component of "sameness," but also that of benevolence found throughout colonial depictions of Africa in its representation of African inertia or immobility.

The narrative of "sameness" extends beyond familial connections to include the use of historical reference points illustrating experiential similarities between the two regions. Statements expressing that though Africa "is considered the cradle for mankind, China is one of the four great ancient civilizations" exemplify this point.⁴¹⁴ Premier Wen Jiabao's remarks during the Opening Ceremony of the 4th Ministerial Conference of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (2009) also illustrate a unity between the two regions underpinned by shared victimization by "external aggression or colonization... (prompting Africa and China to) support each other in the fight for independence."⁴¹⁵ In a separate speech, Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi noted during the 15th Lanting Forum (2015) that

"There is a popular Chinese song named 'Hold Your Hands'. The lyrics go like this, 'Because I traveled the path you have traveled and

⁴¹⁴ Address by H.E. Li Keqiang, Premier of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, the 24th World Economic Forum on Africa, Abuja, 8 May 2014

⁴¹⁵ Speech by Premier Wen Jiabao at the Opening Ceremony of the 4th Ministerial Conference of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (2009)

suffered the pain you have suffered, I share your joy and pursuit.’ I think it can also be borrowed to describe the relations between China and Africa. Chinese and African people have suffered from similar scourge, and both have traveled a path fraught with hardship. That is why we are able to understand each other, share weal and woe and join hands in pursuing the same goal and same dream.”

Wang Yi’s remarks align with Wen Jiabao’s statements and are indicative of the desire to connect specific historical experiences of African people with those of China as a component of “sameness.”

Culture

Cultural proximity creates an additional layer of support for Afro-Chinese similitude. China’s president XI Jinping, proclaimed in a speech before the China Central Committee in 1994 that “The stories of China should be well told, voices of China well spread, and the characteristics of China well explained,”⁴¹⁶ stressing the import of promoting Chinese soft power and culture abroad. Correspondingly, key elements of *brand-China* are fashioned from an admixture of Chinese cultural components, including Confucian philosophies, historical experiences, linguistic patterns, and artistic customs. Remarks that “Chinese people cherish our own culture and tradition... (and) African people also preserve their culture very well. Some values we believe can also be found in African culture”⁴¹⁷ exemplify this point. Although culture alone isn’t a determinant of individual and state perception, it “lays a foundation

⁴¹⁶ China and Nation Branding” <http://thediplomat.com> January 11, 2014. Accessed may 24, 2016.

⁴¹⁷ Speech by Ambassador Zhao Yali at the Launch of the Confucius Institute at Makerere University (19 December, 2014).

of respect and tolerance by foreign actors, who, over time, may help to shape an international environment conducive to China's growth.”⁴¹⁸

Narratives of Afro-Chinese cultural value alignment and traditionalism are interwoven through the use of proverbs, such as

“...an African proverb which states that ‘The one who asks questions doesn't lose his way’, while Chinese people believe that one has to be not ashamed of to ask and learn of his inferiors to become a real master. Many similar values exist in both Chinese and African cultures.”⁴¹⁹

A Chinese saying pronounces “‘When everyone paddles together, even a big ship can sail at a fast speed.’ There is an African proverb, ‘A single person is not strong enough to pull a boat.’ I believe, as long as we join hands and redouble our efforts, China-Kenya comprehensive cooperative partnership certainly will have a (sic) even better future.”⁴²⁰

“In African legend, the Phoenix, a long-lived bird, dies by fire every 500 years, only to rise from the ashes to be reborn again. In Chinese culture, you can find a similar story of a mythical bird named Fenghuang that, too, cyclically regenerates itself. These two legends seem to be telling us

⁴¹⁸ Wuthnow 2008, 9-10

⁴¹⁹ Speech by Ambassador Zhao Yali at the Launch of the Confucius Institute at Makerere University (19 December, 2014).

⁴²⁰ Speech By H.E. Ambassador Liu Xianfa At the Reception Marking the 66th Anniversary of the Founding of the People's Republic of China 2015/10/01

that the great renewal of the Chinese nation and the African continent represents an unstoppable historical trend.”

“As one Zimbabwe idiom goes, ‘chikuni chimwe hachikodzi sadza’, Chinese people also believe that ‘when everybody adds firewood, the flames will rise high.’”⁴²¹

The recurrent usage of such imagery signals attempts to establish a cultural connection between African and Chinese people, bespeaking the intentionality of a socially constructed Chinese imaginary. The repeated telling of these stories communicates, ‘you should trust us’ ‘you should partner with us’ and, more importantly, ‘you should do so because we value the same things you value.’

Fennell (2013), refers to such platitudes as “false statements.” Considering the differences between the two regions, she writes, “there...could (n)ever be a relationship based in...a sense of unity comparable to the relationship between the United States and England between the peoples and governments of the various African states and the people and government of the People’s Republic of China.”⁴²² In Fennell’s view, the assertion that African and Asian people are the same is unsound given obvious differences between the two regions.

Marginalization

The concept of shared marginalization by the west is also discursively constructed within *brand-China* as a component of “sameness.” Dr. Liu Xianfa, Chinese

⁴²¹ “Let the Flower of China-Zimbabwe Friendship Bloom with New Splendor” 2015/11/30 H.E. Xi Jinping President of the People's Republic of China

⁴²² Fennell 2013, 246

Ambassador to Kenya, remarked during the launching ceremony of the China-Kenya Comprehensive Cooperative Partnership, that China and Africa are united through mutual experiences by “both as victims of western colonialism and aggression.”⁴²³ In a separate speech, Liu Xianfa rearticulates this sentiment in his statement that in “modern times, both as victims of western colonialism and aggression, Chinese and Kenyan people have encouraged and supported each other to achieve national liberation and independence.”⁴²⁴ Liu Xianfa’s sentiments reinforce criticisms that despite changes to its developmental trajectory, the PRC continue to inculcate a consistent image of self, mirroring the socio-historical experiences of African people.

In 2008, in response to criticism of Chinese engagement with Botswana, Ding Xiaowen, Chinese Ambassador to Botswana shared his contribution to the Africa-China marginalization narrative thusly,

“Chinese, like the African, like Batswana (sic), suffered a lot under colonialism. China was bullied by Western colonies for almost 100 years. China was a semi-colonial, semi-feudal country from 1840 until the new China was founded in 1949. So China as a country was bullied by Western colonies. As a people, they suffered a lot in the past. How could such a nation, such a people, become racist to bully other people?”

425

⁴²³ Remarks by H.E. Dr. Liu Xianfa, Chinese Ambassador to Kenya, at the Launching Ceremony of photo exhibition commemorating the Second Anniversary of the Establishment of China-Kenya Comprehensive Cooperative Partnership (June 26th, 2015)

⁴²⁴ New Start, New Achievements, and a New Future

⁴²⁵ 31st March 2008, H.E. Ding Xiaowen, Chinese Ambassador to Botswana, “Ambassador Ding tells Botswana a Real China”

This imagining of the historical Chinese experience serves as an antithetical construction of the West. It also obscures the neoliberal relational dynamics of Africa-China by asserting equivalent claims to pain by “denationalize(ing) racial inequality.”⁴²⁶

African leaders also carry the mantle of Afro-Chinese similitude through the experience of subjugation at the hands of the west. Kenyan president Uhuru Kenyatta remarked in his Goodwill Message on the Occasion of the Chinese New Year (2017), that “We fought colonialism together in the past; today, we fight for development that serves our people and protects our planet; and for an international order that respects the equal dignity of all peoples.”⁴²⁷ Namibian President, Hage Geingob, similarly references colonialism in his reflection that “It is ironic that those who warn us are the same nations who sat around the table at the Berlin Conference in 1884 and carved out colonies in Africa with the sole intent to develop their countries with our mineral resources and the blood and sweat of our forced labour.”⁴²⁸ Finally, Jacob Zuma former leader of South Africa co-constructs the narrative of Afro-Chinese shared marginalization through remarks that,

“Historians record that these ancient relations were based on mutual respect and understanding, territorial integrity, similar values, solidarity and friendship. However, colonialism interrupted these mutually beneficial relations. The rise of China indicates that the world is now returning to its historical economic powers and trade patterns! Our visit

⁴²⁶ Simms Hamilton 2007, 24

⁴²⁷ President Uhuru Kenyatta’s Goodwill Message on the Occasion of the Chinese New Year 1/30/2017

⁴²⁸ Hage Geingob, President of Namibia’s Remarks at the opening of the FOCAC Summit (12/7/15)

is therefore a natural progression, building on relations that date back so many thousands of years ago between China and Africa.”⁴²⁹

Such examples lend credence to China’s positioning as a counterhegemonic force against Western tyranny. They also underpin justifications for Afro-Chinese relations by insisting that the relationship’s utility is rooted not only in its longstanding affiliation with Africa but, also, but more importantly a ‘common south’ identity of victimization by “western imperialism”.⁴³⁰

Inclusion

The final component of “Sameness” reflects new forms of social and political connection wherein African and Chinese people can conceptualize themselves as part of the same community, sharing the same destiny. In 2005, then Chinese President Hu Jintao introduced the idea of building a ‘harmonious world with lasting peace and common prosperity’.⁴³¹ This world, while centering China, was characterized by what Hu Jintao defined as ‘harmonious coexistence’ and mutually beneficial cooperation, would be equal and inclusive of others.⁴³² Illustrating the concept of inclusion, Hu Jintao affirmed that “building strong ties between China and Africa will not only promote development of each side, but also help cement unity and cooperation among developing countries and contribute to establishing a just and equitable new international political and economic order.”⁴³³ This account is typical of the counterhegemonic ‘new world order’ rhetorically promoted by China. Lu Shaye

⁴²⁹ Address by President JG Zuma to the South Africa-China Business Forum on the occasion of the state visit to the People's Republic of China, Beijing (8/24/10)

⁴³⁰ Kopinski et al 2011

⁴³¹ Hu 2005

⁴³² Hu 2005

⁴³³ President Hu Jintao’s speech at the opening ceremony of the Beijing Summit of FOCAC (2012)

activates the narrative of “inclusion” in a 2013 speech designed to encourage mutual cooperation between African and China. Lu Shaye observed,

“The dream is ahead of us. The path is under our feet. We must make earnest and hard efforts to realize the Chinese Dream and the African Dream. China is ready to work with Africa to consolidate strategic mutual trust, safeguard and develop our relations as a community of common destinies, actively expand and deepen pragmatic cooperation for common development, and strengthen coordination and cooperation in global governance to forge a more fair, just and balanced global order that benefits all.”⁴³⁴

While this aspect of ‘sameness’ stresses the importance of an international system predicated on equality amongst all members, China remains the central focus and principal author of its vision.

Development

The “Chinese Dream and the African Dream are both for development.”⁴³⁵ The focus on China-led development, industry, progress, growth, capacity building, or development aid is the second most oft-cited narrative of Africa-China. The desire to link regional destinies through shared aspiration to the Chinese and African ‘dreams’ by means of “Technological knowledge transfer”⁴³⁶, “shared opportunities”,

⁴³⁴ Speech by Mr. Lu Shaye, Director-General of African Department of China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, on the seminar of Chinese Dream, African Dream--Achieving Common Development through Joint Efforts (7/17/13)

⁴³⁵ Speech by Mr. Lu Shaye, Director-General of African Department of China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, on the seminar of Chinese Dream, African Dream--Achieving Common Development through Joint Efforts (7/17/13)

⁴³⁶ ChinAfrica Magazine, April 2014

infrastructure improvement⁴³⁷, “inclusiveness”⁴³⁸, and China-driven economic growth mark the foundation of Chinese strategies for Africa’s development. “Development” is distinct in its construction of an Africa-China sustained by Chinese funding, Chinese initiatives, and Chinese competencies, relegating Africa to the role of recipient. In this scenario China is the big brother and African states the little brothers. Li Keqiang, Premier of the State Council, outlined China’s developmental approach to Africa in a speech before the African Union,

“China stands ready to exchange development experience and share development opportunities with African countries to promote inclusive development. We are willing to share with Africa those readily applicable technologies that China has developed without any reservation. We are also ready to transfer, on a priority basis, suitable labor-intensive industries to Africa to promote employment in Africa, as this is good for both sides and benefits the two peoples.”⁴³⁹

The principal source of China’s developmental prowess rests on the fact that “China has gone through the development stage Africa is currently in (and) the experience and technologies it has gained over the years will dovetail with Africa’s development needs”.⁴⁴⁰ Therefore, it is thought to possess technological and economic acuity, and the ability to transfer that knowledge to African states.⁴⁴¹

⁴³⁷ Remarks by H.E. Wang Yi Minister of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China at the Launch of the Book A Monument to China-Africa Friendship: First-hand Account of the Building of Tazara (7/23/15)

⁴³⁸ Remarks by Vice Foreign Minister Zhai Jun at the Seventh Lanting Forum (7/19/12)

⁴³⁹ Bring About a Better Future for China-Africa Cooperation Speech by H.E. Li Keqiang Premier of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China At the AU Conference Center Addis Ababa, 5 May 2014

⁴⁴⁰ Broad Prospects for the New Type of China-Africa Strategic Partnership, Remarks by Vice Foreign Minister Zhai Jun at the Seventh Lanting Forum 2012-07-19

⁴⁴¹ Jennifer G. Cooke Chapter 3, China’s Soft Power in Africa.

A successful economy is an important source of attraction and China's developmental success and willingness to work with African leaders is a compelling inducement for African heads of state, who have yet to fully enjoy the wholesale benefits of economic development. African leaders, such as Morocco's head of the government Abdelilah Benkirane and Namibian President Hage Geingob, have understandably praised China's developmental assistance.⁴⁴²

“Above all, I should like to underscore the important role played by the People's Republic of China as well as its continued contributions to the development of our continent and its exemplary solidarity with African countries. I wish to pay tribute to this great nation, which is steeped in history, for all it has been doing for the emergence of a peaceful, multipolar world, and for its untiring action to serve the best interests of the countries of the South and support their legitimate ambitions.”⁴⁴³

“China's investment in Africa over the past several decades has been invaluable. These include investments in transport infrastructure development and capacity building. This has enhanced Africa's capability in moving goods and services. This level of support has existed for decades and is not a new trend as some may have us believe.

⁴⁴² It is worth noting that many such speeches are delivered at or at events celebrating the FOCAC Summits.

⁴⁴³ Morocco's head of the government Abdelilah Benkirane represented Morocco's head of state King Mohammed VI in the Second Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, an event which took place in Johannesburg on December 4-5.

In Namibia, we can attest to a number of key investments by China which have made a significant impact on our economy.”⁴⁴⁴

Homegrown Development

The absence of wholesale development across the African continent has been attributed to everything from the behavior of corrupt governments and the failure of democracy to take hold,⁴⁴⁵ small markets and a lack of market integration,⁴⁴⁶ continued marginalization,⁴⁴⁷ lack of infrastructure,⁴⁴⁸ the tendency to externalize problems,⁴⁴⁹ a lack of productive capital,⁴⁵⁰ and a preference for leisure time.⁴⁵¹ A small contingent of Africanist scholars, however, pinpoint the exact nature of underdevelopment across several African nations on the inheritance of economies with external cultural orientations.⁴⁵² This factor is particularly important during the current era of globalization, which like Slavery, colonialism, and neocolonialism before it, attempts to expand the boundaries of capital using principally Western models.⁴⁵³ Again, the orientation is external, leaving the task to African leaders to replace existing systems in an effort to integrate into the global economy.

For its part, the Chinese narrative, while also focused on China’s role as a development model, strikes a fine balance between external, PRC-driven solutions and internally drive, homegrown development in Africa. The Chinese discursively construct

⁴⁴⁴ President Geingob's speech at the opening of the FOCAC Summit, Mon, 7 December 2015 03:57

⁴⁴⁵ Van de Walle 52; Falola 197; Mills

⁴⁴⁶ Rodney 1981, 167

⁴⁴⁷ Van de Walle 2001

⁴⁴⁸ Chabal 2009, 118

⁴⁴⁹ Mills 2011

⁴⁵⁰ Sachs 2005

⁴⁵¹ Gilbert and Reynolds 2012, 63

⁴⁵² Okereke and Agupusi 2014; Bhengu 2011

⁴⁵³ Shivji 2009, 53

the narrative of ‘homegrown development’ for Africa through an insistence that African states “explore a development path suited to the country’s conditions”⁴⁵⁴ and that Beijing can only provide developmental guidance to Africa within the limits of its capacity to do so. Fijalkowski (2011) suggests that China’s reluctance to be more prescriptive in its approach is attributable to thinking that actively promoting the Chinese experience would infringe upon the rights of African nations to self-determination and domestic sovereignty, a central component of the PRC’s foreign policy.⁴⁵⁵ President Xi Jinping’s speech during the Sixth Ministerial Conference of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) in 2015 underscored China’s approach to ensuring African ownership in its developmental future,

“Today’s Africa is a continent of encouraging and dynamic development. Africa has actively explored a path of development suited to its conditions and adhered to the principle of solving African issues in the African way. Such a momentum of independent development is unstoppable. Africa has actively advanced industrialization and pursued sustainable self-development. Such a momentum of rapid growth is unstoppable. Africa has accelerated its integration process and speaks in one voice on the international stage. Such a momentum of pursuing strength through unity is unstoppable.”⁴⁵⁶

⁴⁵⁴ “Bring About a Better Future for China-Africa Cooperation” Speech by H.E. Li Keqiang, Premier of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, At the AU Conference Center, Addis Ababa, 5 May 2014

⁴⁵⁵ Fijalkowski 2011

⁴⁵⁶ President Xi Jinping Speech at FOCAC 2015

Chinese Ambassador to South Africa, Tian Xuejun, also reinforced Beijing's commitment to Homegrown Development in Africa. Tian Xuejun shared his thoughts thusly,

“President Xi once said ‘Only the wearer of the shoes knows if they fit or not.’ There is no universal development model in the world and China never exports our ideology, let alone imposes our development model on others. We believe that African people have the wisdom and capability to find paths that suited to their national conditions. We are ready to offer help within our capacity in their endeavor.”⁴⁵⁷

Development Aid

Western aid policies and economic conditionalities levied on the African continent have compelled its leaders to adopt neoliberal development models designed without adequate consideration for local imperatives.⁴⁵⁸ Consequently, western developmental mandates have been likened “re-colonization”⁴⁵⁹ or a “new anti-colonial imperialism,”⁴⁶⁰ rather than development in Africa. The PRC adopts a vastly different strategy of dispensing developmental aid on the continent, one regularly reinforced within *brand-China*, as a longstanding pattern of altruistic acts toward African people. Foreign Minister Wang Yi stressed China's benevolence toward Africa during a speech before the 15th Lanting Forum,

⁴⁵⁷ Promote Exchanges and Mutual Learning for Common Development 2015/09/17 Address by H.E. Ambassador Tian Xuejun At the Governance of China and Africa Relations Symposium

⁴⁵⁸ Okereke and Agupusi 2014

⁴⁵⁹ Edozie and Soyinka 2010, 201

⁴⁶⁰ Rist 2014, 75

“We will never forget that, last year, when the Ebola epidemic wreaked havoc in west Africa and many international airlines stopped flying there. China rented chartered planes flying half of the globe across three continents to deliver materials urgently needed by people in the epidemic-stricken areas. When some countries were evacuating their people, China was sending in top-level experts and medical workers to join the local communities in fighting against Ebola.”⁴⁶¹

With an emphasis on ‘mutual benefit’ and ‘diversity of form,’ very little Chinese aid to Africa follows the formula of traditional development assistance. Rather, aid takes the form of agreements in various fields, including education, health, agriculture, infrastructure development, and humanitarian assistance and peacekeeping; and the establishment of profit-generating joint ventures involving Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs).⁴⁶² Chinese aid differs from the west not only in terms of its motivation and content, but also because Beijing does not attach particular economic or political conditionalities (save for the adherence to the ‘One China Policy’) to its aid packages. This narrative of China as an antithetical development partner to the west runs throughout *brand-China*. Declarations that “our aid and investment are provided sincerely without any political conditions attached”⁴⁶³ are repeated in some iteration within 71 artifacts.

⁴⁶¹ Build on Past Achievements and Open up the Future of All-round Development of China-Africa Friendship and Cooperation, Speech by Foreign Minister Wang Yi at the 15th Lanting Forum 2015/11/26

⁴⁶² Shelton, 2001, 114

⁴⁶³ H.E. Xi Jinping, President of the People's Republic of China at the Asian-African Summit, Jakarta, 22 April 2015

Howard French (2014) balks at Chinese claims of altruism in Africa. Likening Chinese infrastructure projects to a millennial version of the colonial project, French notes,

“today one easily forgets that ports, railways, roads, and the administrative districts that became the downtowns of capitals around the world were built on an extraordinary scale all over the world by Westerners in the driven pursuit of their own interests. As manufacturing powers, they needed their goods to circulate, and they needed the raw materials from far-flung places in order to make them. Seen in this light, it scarcely seems coincidental that China, a country that has surged from near autarky to becoming the so-called factory of the world in the space of a mere generation, has quickly become the most ambitious builder of infrastructure in Africa, the world’s fastest-growing region, both demographically and economically, and the source of a disproportionate share of the globe’s natural resources.”

China Dream

Upon rising to the head of the Chinese Communist Party in November 2012, President Xi Jinping outlined a vision for the nation’s future, which he referred to as the “Chinese Dream”. In his proclamation that “the great revival of the Chinese nation is the greatest Chinese Dream,”⁴⁶⁴ Xi Jinping articulated Beijing’s strategies for becoming a middle-income country by 2021, the 100th anniversary of the Chinese Communist Party; and for becoming a fully developed nation by about 2049, the 100th

⁴⁶⁴ H.E. Ambassador Liu Guangyuan “The Chinese Dream: How Africa can Benefit from Beijing's Vast Experience” *Daily Nation*, July 30, 2013

anniversary of the founding of the People's Republic. The vision of the “Chinese Dream” is an oft-cited component of the *brand-China* development narrative, exemplified by statements such that the

“Chinese people are working hard to realize the ‘China Dream’ of achieving national prosperity and rejuvenation, as well as the people's happiness. At the same time, 2.1 million Namibian people are pursuing a “Namibia Dream” of achieving stable economic growth and national industrialization.”⁴⁶⁵

Ambassador Xin Shunkang’s statement also reinforces the practice of connecting the Chinese and African ‘Dreams’ nee experiences through statements that

“With common ideals, similar historical experiences and a shared need for development, China and Africa both pursue stability and peace in their dreams. We are both committed to safeguarding and promoting world peace. Our joint efforts to realize our dreams as peace-loving and peace-pursuing nations will greatly strengthen the force for peace and stability and add to the efforts of building a harmonious world of enduring peace and common prosperity.”⁴⁶⁶

The ‘Chinese Dream’ for development is clearly articulated as a manifestation of the hard work and ingenuity of the Chinese people yet, rhetorically; the ‘African dream’ is achievable through African unity with China or other nations. For “Africa,

⁴⁶⁵ Remarks by H.E. Ambassador Xin Shunkang At the Reception Marking the 25th Anniversary of China Namibia Diplomatic Relations March 25, 2015

⁴⁶⁶ Speech by Lu Shaye, Director-General of African Department of China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, on the seminar of Chinese Dream, African Dream--Achieving Common Development through Joint Efforts July 17, 2013

once poor and backward in development, is emerging as a continent of hope and growth” thanks to Chinese support.⁴⁶⁷ This is born out by “history and reality (which) tell us that when China develops well, Africa will get opportunities; (and) when Africa develops well, China will stand to benefit.”⁴⁶⁸ China is “willing to link the Chinese dream with the African dream and China's two centenary goals with Africa's development strategies”⁴⁶⁹. The PRC brings “relative advantages in development experience and production factors” to the relationship, whilst African countries, similarly to earlier eras of capital accumulation, contribute “natural and human resources and its huge market”⁴⁷⁰.

Industrial growth, like all modes of production, requires human resources, capital resources, and natural resources. Africa has never been short of natural or human factors, while population growth in China contributes to the declination of domestic resource stores. Another impact of industrialization in China is surplus production, making fulfillment of the ‘Chinese Dream’ dependent in many ways on securing new markets outside Asia for domestically produced goods. Africa as ‘resource hub’ and ‘new goods market’ is a storyline played out throughout transatlantic slavery and colonialism. The paradox within neoliberal globalization is that rather than resources and goods flowing westward, in this iteration the contraflow sends them eastward under the guise of development.

⁴⁶⁷ Remarks by H.E. Wang Yi Minister of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China At the Launch of the Book *A Monument to China-Africa Friendship: First-hand Account of the Building of Tazara* July 23, 2015

⁴⁶⁸ Speech by H.E. Li Keqiang, Premier of the State Council of the People's Republic of China (2014)

⁴⁶⁹ *Seize Development Opportunities and Achieve Win-Win Results* Remarks by Ambassador Tian Xuejun at the opening ceremony of China-Africa Entrepreneurs Forum 2015/07/20

⁴⁷⁰ Speech by Foreign Minister Wang Yi at the 15th Lanting Forum 2015/11/26

Friendship

The third most commonly mentioned theme is “friendship.” As a strategic narrative, items in this category referred to Africa or African people (or the inverse, China or the Chinese) as friend, friends, friendly, referenced an extant friendship between the two regions, or made statements indicative of a friendship or alliance. Speakers from both regions categorized interaction between Africa and China as friendly, alternately alluding to the relationship as “long term”, an “unbreakable bond”⁴⁷¹, “true friends” “deeply rooted,”⁴⁷² “bosom friends,”⁴⁷³ and an “unwavering friend(ship).”⁴⁷⁴ A 2013 speech by the Chinese Ambassador to South Africa, Tian Xuejun, celebrating the 15th anniversary of diplomatic relations between China and South Africa, epitomizes the Afro-Chinese friendship narrative:

“The first letter “F” stands for friendship, as it is the bonding tie linking China and South Africa together. Chinese has an old saying, ‘Distance cannot separate true friends, even when they are thousands of miles apart’. Despite of the long geographical distance, the people of our two countries enjoy a profound traditional friendship, and such a relationship is the inexhaustible driving force behind the comprehensive, rapid and

⁴⁷¹ Speech by H.E. Li Keqiang, Premier of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, At the AU Conference Center, Addis Ababa, (2014)

⁴⁷² Address by Amb. Tian Xuejun at The Reception Celebrating The 15th Anniversary of Diplomatic Relations Between South African And China.

⁴⁷³ Remarks by H.E. Mr. Xin Shunkang, Chinese Ambassador to Namibia (2014).

⁴⁷⁴ Speech by Sun Xianghua on the Donation Ceremony from the China-Lesotho People-to-People Friendship Action Fund to Maseru Poverty-stricken Students 2017/02/21

sound development of China-SA relationship. This is something that we must cherish.”⁴⁷⁵

Tian Xuejun engages several key concepts within the narrative of *brand-China* as “friend”. The first is indubitably friendship. The second is affinity or similitude despite difference. Reinforcing the thinking that African and Chinese people choose to unify as a community by choice despite the geographical and social distance between them. Thirdly, Tian Xuejun’s statements situate Beijing’s interest in Africa as fundamentally rooted in tradition or historical patterns of engagement. Finally, Tian Xuejun’s remarks speak to the need to protect or ‘cherish’ the relationship for the future. The message is that Africa and China are friends. It is a friendship built upon longstanding, historical, or ‘traditional’ relations between the two regions, and it is this same friendship that serves as a catalyst to contemporary and future interactions between Africa and China.

Historical Friendship

References to China’s longstanding, historical or traditional friendship with Africa are often tethered to mentions of pre-enslavement trade relations between the regions dating back millennia. Artifacts frequently memorialize a “traditional friendship” or “historical friendship” between Chinese and African people predicated on “600 years” of camaraderie.⁴⁷⁶ Then Chinese President, Hu Jintao, remarked in 2006 that “though vast oceans keep China and Africa apart, the friendship between our two peoples has a long history, and having been tested by times, is strong and vigorous.”⁴⁷⁷ Remarks by

⁴⁷⁵ Speech delivered January 31, 2013 in Pretoria, South Africa to celebrate the 15th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relationship between the People's Republic of China and the Republic of South Africa.

⁴⁷⁶ Speech by H.E. Mr. Liu Guangyuan, the Chinese Ambassador to Kenya 2010/10/11

⁴⁷⁷ Address by Hu Jintao, President of the Peoples’s Republic of China at the Opening Ceremony of the Beijing Summit of the Forum of China-Africa Cooperation Beijing, November 4, 2006, accessed at <http://www.focac.org> on 07/07/2017.

the Chinese Ambassador to Namibia during the Evening of Nanjing Cultural Performance (2015) are typical of the usage of historical connections between African and Chinese people,

“As we all know, the traditional friendship between China and Namibia came into being in the struggle of the Namibian people for national liberation and independence. Since 1960s our two peoples support each other, help each other and strive side by side. On 22 March 1990, the day after Namibia got independent, China established formal diplomatic relations with Namibia. Hence, no matter how the international situation changes, China and Namibia are always good friends, good brothers and good partners.”⁴⁷⁸

Historical friendship is also discursively co-constructed by African leaders by means of similar frameworks. During an address before the South Africa-China Business Forum in Beijing, Jacob Zuma, then President of the Republic of South Africa, expressed his appreciation for Chinese friendship thusly,

“The rise of China indicates that the world is now returning to its historical economic powers and trade patterns! Our visit is therefore a natural progression, building on relations that date back so many thousands of years ago between China and Africa.”⁴⁷⁹

⁴⁷⁸ Ambassador's Remarks at the Evening of Nanjing Cultural Performance 2015/04/17

⁴⁷⁹ Address by President JG Zuma to the South Africa-China Business Forum on the occasion of the state visit to the People's Republic of China, Beijing 24 Aug 2010

Such statements refute claims undermining China's interest in the continent by establishing a timeline of historical interaction points between the two regions. These claims support assertions that Afro-Chinese relations predate the presence of the European in Africa. Zuma continues, recapitulating tales of Africa's longstanding, traditional, and historical friendship with China thusly,

“Some of you may be surprised to hear that trade relations between China and Africa in general and South Africa in particular, dates back more than a thousand years. We know from historical records that the kingdom of Mapungubwe in Limpopo province, in the northern part of South Africa already had commercial links with China that far back. We should also recall that the famous Chinese mariner, explorer, diplomat and fleet admiral, Zheng was sent by the Ming Emperor Yong Le, on expeditions to explore the "western oceans" in the early fifteenth century. He opened up trade routes as far south as Mozambique.”⁴⁸⁰

Zuma's reference to Zheng historicizes Afro-Chinese relations in a manner consistent with Chinese constructions of the relationship.⁴⁸¹ On the 600th anniversary of his voyage, Beijing launched a campaign in Zheng's honor, privileging the navigator's contribution to China's 'longstanding', 'anti-colonial' friendship and partnership with Africa. Zheng serves as a placeholder illustrating the longevity and consistency of Afro-Chinese relations within 14 artifacts. A speech by Chinese Foreign

⁴⁸⁰ Address by President JG Zuma to the South Africa-China Business Forum on the occasion of the state visit to the People's Republic of China, Beijing 24 Aug 2010

⁴⁸¹ Zheng He was a Chinese navigator during the Ming Dynasty (1368-1644). One journey transported Zheng to the eastern shoreline of Kenya, bringing with him both “Chinese porcelain and friendship,” and upon his departure for China, he was gifted a giraffe by the people of Malindi. Thus, according to Chinese lore, began the long-standing, traditional friendship between Po-pa-li and Zhongguo.

Minister Wang Yi at the 15th Lanting Forum in 2015 provides but one example of how Zheng's memory is reactivated in contemporary Afro-Chinese relations,⁴⁸²

“This spirit is rooted in the long-standing traditional friendship and mutual support between China and Africa. Early in the 15th century, China's navigator Zheng He headed his fleet and arrived at the east coast of Africa for four times. That was a time when China was the strongest in the world. What they brought to Africa were silk and porcelain, and friendship and goodwill. They did not grab an inch of land. Nor did they ever take back one single slave.”⁴⁸³

By activating Zheng's memory, the PRC creates an historical reference point establishing China's harmonious presence on the continent pre-European conquest. Curating an image of Afro-China established through the mutually beneficial exchange of gifts, historical friendship, and cultural propinquity reinforces the notion that if not for the transatlantic slave trade and colonialism, the Afro-Chinese relationship as ‘friends, brothers, and partners’ would have continued uninterrupted for more than 600 years. Liu Guangyuan, the Chinese Ambassador to Kenya referenced this point in an editorial to *The Nation*, when he wrote, “It would be appropriate, therefore, to claim that friendship between China and Kenya started almost 600 years ago with a beautiful and elegant giraffe.”⁴⁸⁴ Perhaps more importantly, the narrative also potentially transforms how domestic and international publics view China and its interactions with

⁴⁸² “Build on Past Achievements and Open up the Future of All-round Development of China-Africa Friendship and Cooperation” --Speech by Foreign Minister Wang Yi at the 15th Lanting Forum 2015/11/26

⁴⁸³ *ibid*

⁴⁸⁴ H.E. Mr. Liu Guangyuan, the Chinese Ambassador to Kenya “From Giraffe the diplomat to 'Peace Ark'” *The Nation* October 11, 2010

African nations and refutes claims that Beijing's interest in Africa is rooted in political realism.

Solidarity

The traditional friendship between Africa and China is also reinforced through the narrative of Afro-Chinese solidarity or south-south relations. Dating from the Bandung Conference (1955) and African liberation movements (1957-), the narrative of Afro-Chinese “solidarity” establishes a timeline of mutual support rooted in similar positioning between the two regions rather than capital accumulation. President Xi Jinping asserted during the opening to the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation in 2015 that

“we have always supported each other in trying times. The Tazara Railway and the Convention Center of the African Union built with Chinese assistance are landmarks of China-Africa friendship. The Chinese government and people took the lead in helping Africa fight Ebola and led the international community in its efforts to assist Africa to combat the epidemic, demonstrating the bond of brotherhood between China and Africa in time of difficulty.”⁴⁸⁵

Memories of the Bandung Conference are activated as a metaphor for the might of subjugated nations united against a common adversary. Xi Jinping remarked at the Asian-African Summit that,

“Sixty years ago, leaders from 29 Asian and African countries attended the Bandung Conference, giving birth to the Bandung Spirit of

⁴⁸⁵ Chinese resident Xi Jinping at the Opening to FOCAC 2015

solidarity, friendship and cooperation, galvanizing the national liberation movement that swept across Asia, Africa and Latin America, and accelerating the global process of decolonization”⁴⁸⁶

Fennell (2013) argues that prior to the Bandung Conference, however, “mentions of Africa in the Chinese press were virtually nonexistent, as was interaction with African people,”⁴⁸⁷ yet, Post-Bandung Conference China claimed “to belong with Africans to the Third World.”⁴⁸⁸

Contemporary rhetoric of the Bandung Conference’s outcomes and Chinese and African participation within it fall short of reality. Post-Bandung and during the African liberation struggles of the 1960s and 1970s, the Afro-Chinese relationship continued based upon a shared aversion to the Western capitalist model that governed colonialism. At the time Chinese investment was more ideologically than economically motivated and focused on supporting the region’s guerilla fighters and Socialist regimes, such as Julius Nyerere’s Tanzania and Angola’s UNITA.⁴⁸⁹ Contemporary narratives of Afro-Chinese solidarity make repeated reference to this period. Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi expressed during the 15th Lanting Forum in 2015 that,

“We will never forget that in the middle of the last century, the Chinese people, after winning national liberation, gave full support to African countries in their just struggle to oppose hegemonism, colonialism and to gain national independence and liberation.”⁴⁹⁰

⁴⁸⁶ “Carry Forward the Bandung Spirit for Win-win Cooperation” Remarks by H.E. Xi Jinping President of the People's Republic of China at the Asian-African Summit, Jakarta, 22 April 2015

⁴⁸⁷ Fennell 2013, 256

⁴⁸⁸ Monson 2008

⁴⁸⁹ Jauch 2011

⁴⁹⁰ Build on Past Achievements and Open up all-around Development of China-Africa Friendship

African thoughts are expressed most resoundingly within the narrative of Afro-Chinese solidarity and leaders reference solidarity between the two regions as the underpinning to contemporary relations between African nations and China. Morocco's head of the government, Abdelilah Benkirane, expressed that "Above all, I should like to underscore the important role played by the People's Republic of China as well as its continued contributions to the development of our continent and its exemplary solidarity with African countries." South African Minister of Science and Technology, Naledi Pandor, similarly remarked "As we look back at our struggle for liberation and our progress since 1994, we do so fully aware that the support and solidarity from China played a critical role in our success."

Within South Africa, particularly, President Jacob Zuma and his cabinet frequently cited the "Bandung Spirit" or alluded to Chinese solidarity during decolonization as symbolic of the Afro-Chinese relationship's firm foundations and Beijing's consistent loyalty to the African continent. During an Address by Zuma to the South Africa-China Business Forum, he stated "When friends were fewer, during the struggle against apartheid, China was available to assist, and we are grateful for that solidarity."⁴⁹¹ South African Minister of Education, Blade Nzimande, similarly paid homage to Afro-Chinese solidarity in his speech during the launch of the Africa-China network, Gordon Institute of Business Science in 2010, when he remarked "As early as the 1950s and 1960s, China and Africa had fought side by side in the struggle against imperialism and colonialism."⁴⁹²

⁴⁹¹ Address by President JG Zuma to the South Africa-China Business Forum on the occasion of the state visit to the People's Republic of China, Beijing

⁴⁹² Address by the Minister of Higher Education and Training, Dr Blade Nzimande, at the launch of the Africa-China network, Gordon Institute of Business Science, 18 Jan 2010

The narrative of historical and contemporary solidarity with Africa is frequently employed to portray the PRC as a still developing yet selfless, formerly colonized subject.⁴⁹³ Yet, this construction of Africa-China is inconsistent with reality. Fennell (2013) portrays Chinese intervention as “part of a theoretically based international strategy” rather than based in “altruism or feelings of good will” (253). The disconnect between the PRC’s projected image and its identity has increasingly become the subject of scholarly inquiry regarding its relationship to Africa and an important rationale for nation branding within the context of Afro-Chinese relations.

Partnership

In January 2006, the Chinese government released a document outlining its newly articulated ‘Africa Policy’. The plan outlined a blueprint for enhancing Afro-Chinese relations beyond diplomatic and economic cooperation, into previously untapped areas such as science and technology, education, culture, and peace and security.⁴⁹⁴ Most distinctively, the policy detailed a blueprint for better incorporating and involving African nations in determining the direction and tenor of Chinese participation on the continent. Beijing’s focus on nurturing and establishing new cooperative partnerships is the fourth most frequently referenced theme within *brand-China*. Through the narrative of “partnership”, the PRC stresses the equitable role of Afro-Chinese relations, unlike that of “development”, which is China-led. Repeatedly expressed through messages of ‘cooperation’, including references to the Afro-Chinese relationship as ‘win-win’, ‘mutually beneficial,’ ‘south-south’, working together to achieve a common goal, the Forum on China Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), partnership, and teamwork;

⁴⁹³ Koinski 2011; Michel and Beuret 2009; Kurlantzick 58

⁴⁹⁴

construction of the Afro-Chinese relationship as one underpinned by African regard for “China as their most important and reliable partner”⁴⁹⁵ or as a relationship amongst “friends who have long supported and worked to promote China-Africa cooperation”⁴⁹⁶ is commonplace.

Cooperation

Similarly to the rhetoric of solidarity undergirding the narrative of Afro-Chinese friendship, “cooperation” is regarded as the cornerstone of successful and ongoing partnerships between the two regions. A Speech by H.E. Li Keqiang Premier of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China speak to the potential for cooperative relations between Africa and China:

“With splendid chapters already written, China-Africa cooperation is poised to turn a brand new page. Characterized by their unprecedented scope of common interests and a much more solid foundation, China-Africa cooperation should seize the good opportunity and focus on the future. China would like to make joint efforts with African countries to actively promote major projects in six areas to upgrade our cooperation.”⁴⁹⁷

Within “partnership,” great care is taken to distinguish between the need for African nations to align their interests and practices with other states in an increasingly interdependent world order against the desire to retain their national sovereignty.

⁴⁹⁵ Speech delivered by Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi at the 15th Lanting Forum (2015).

⁴⁹⁶ Speech by H.E. Li Keqiang, Premier of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, At the AU Conference Center, Addis Ababa, 5 May 2014

⁴⁹⁷ Bring About a Better Future for China-Africa Cooperation Speech by H.E. Li Keqiang Premier of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China At the AU Conference Center Addis Ababa, 5 May 2014

Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Zhai Jun at the Seventh Lanting Forum (2012) points out,

“that Africa belongs to the Africans; it is not anyone's "cheese". Any country that wishes to develop cooperation with Africa must respect the ownership of African countries. In a globalized world, countries' destinies are closely linked. China's relations with Africa are open and inclusive. It is all about cooperation rather than confrontation with any third party.”⁴⁹⁸

African leaders were also keen to point out the significance of Afro-Chinese cooperation as an integral component of the African development potential. South African Cabinet Minister Jeff Radebe remarked on the occasion of the inaugural China-Africa Media Summit that,

“We also invite our Chinese friends to partner with us in championing development in the continent through new business ventures, infrastructure development, media capacity development and many other areas of mutual interest. Together we can take Africa and China forward in positive ways that have never been imagined before.”⁴⁹⁹

Much of the cooperation narrative also references China's benevolent desire to help Africa and African people, such as

“In light of the pressing need of Africa, China will strengthen its cooperation with Africa in areas such as infrastructure and

⁴⁹⁸ “Broad Prospects for the New Type of China-Africa Strategic Partnership” Remarks by Vice Foreign Minister Zhai Jun at the Seventh Lanting Forum 2012-07-19

⁴⁹⁹ 1 Dec 2015 Opening Key Note Address by Minister Radebe during the inaugural China-Africa Media Summit held in Cape Town

industrialization, agricultural modernization, public health, people-to-people and cultural exchanges as well as peace and security”⁵⁰⁰ or “China will share her experiences with (Africa) where and when necessary, so as to make our shared dreams come true.”⁵⁰¹

Similarly to the rhetoric of benevolence found throughout colonial constructions of Africa,⁵⁰² in this account, Afro-Chinese cooperation becomes rooted in Africa’s fundamentally pressing need for Chinese assistance. This narrative suggests that China is working with Africa because Africa needs the PRC’s help. Yet, despite such needs, assistance can only paternalistically be meted out once African nations are deemed ready to receive it. African leaders, alternatively, while also stressing the significance of collaborative partnerships to the continent’s continued growth and development, view Afro-Chinese relations as a vehicle through which African states can increase their international profiles by becoming global players “and not entirely depend on the generosities of others for the welfare of its people.”⁵⁰³

The “cooperation” discourse, nonetheless, goes hand in hand with the concept of Afro-Chinese relations being equal, win-win, and/or mutually beneficial to all parties. These concepts are typified within statements by Hage Geingob, President of the Republic of Namibia, during the opening of the FOCAC Summit in 2015,

⁵⁰⁰ Address by Chinese Ambassador to South Africa Tian Xuejun at the National Day Reception 2015/09/30

⁵⁰¹ Speech by H.E. Ambassador Liu Guangyuan, Chinese Ambassador to Kenya, at the Reception to Mark the 50th Anniversary of the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations between China and Kenya (2015)

⁵⁰² (Bonsu, 2009)

⁵⁰³ Remarks by Dr. Blade Nzimande, South African Minister of Higher Education and Training, at the launch of the Africa-China Network (2010).

“The theme of China and Africa Progressing Together in a Win-Win Cooperation for Common Development is highly appropriate and speaks respectfully towards Africa’s demand for equal partnership and mutually beneficial development... In Namibia and in Africa, we value the special relations we share with China. FOCAC is the ideal platform for us to build upon those relations for the purpose of mutual benefit.”⁵⁰⁴

Nigerian President, Mohammed Buhari, likewise spoke to the mutual benefits of Afro-Chinese cooperation during the commissioning ceremony for three naval ships in 2016, when he commented "I take this opportunity to pay tribute to this friendship, especially in acknowledgment of the mutually helpful military cooperation, of which the Nigerian Navy has been a major beneficiary.”⁵⁰⁵ Morocco’s head of the government, Abdelilah Benkirane, engaged the narrative of cooperation during the Second Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, in his remarks that “Our determination to carry out concerted action and engage in pragmatic cooperation is based on the principles of mutual benefits and shared development.”⁵⁰⁶ Collectively these statements speak to what Lukasz Fijalkowski (2011) categorizes as China’s political and economic attractiveness in Africa. The PRC has dedicated tremendous resources toward “building a positive image in African states, particularly through promoting the vision of a ‘win- win’ strategy of mutual economic benefits”, which

⁵⁰⁴ Statement By His Excellency Hage G. Geingob, President Of The Republic Of Namibia At The Opening Of The Forum On China-Africa Cooperation (Focac) Summit Johannesburg, South Africa, 5 December 2015

⁵⁰⁵ Nigerian President Mohammed Buhari speech on the occasion of the commissioning ceremony for three naval ships in 2016

⁵⁰⁶ Abdelilah Benkirane, the Second Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, delivering a speech on behalf of Morocco’s King Mohammed

appeals the African states who have historically been divorced of the ability to direct their nations' developmental paths.⁵⁰⁷

Common South Identity

Brand-China also makes use of the PRC's commonly shared roots with Africa as a similarly developing country and member of the 'global south' rather than a Western state. This aspect of the partnership narrative is demonstrably most visible in artifacts produced by African leaders. Dr. Blade Nzimande, South African Minister of Higher Education and Training, as an example, remarked during the launch of the Africa-China Network (2010):

“The burgeoning relationship between South Africa and China is based on a foundation of both our countries commitment to strengthening and deepening South-South collaboration. The new dynamic of the global political economy, especially the current global economic crisis and the threats posed by climate change, is the growing assertion of emerging powers such as South Africa and China to forge a new dispensation that seeks to challenge traditional institutions and entrenched systems and influence positive change in favour of ourselves in the developing world.”⁵⁰⁸

During the same year (2015), Chinese President Xi Jinping also spoke of the importance of cooperation between 'global south' partners in his declaration that,

⁵⁰⁷ Lukasz Fijalkowski (2011)

⁵⁰⁸ Remarks by Dr. Blade Nzimande, South African Minister of Higher Education and Training, at the launch of the Africa-China Network (2010).

“Second, we should expand South-South cooperation. Mr. Deng Xiaoping, the chief architect of China's reform and opening-up, once said that South-South cooperation was such a well-put term that we must give whoever invented it a big medal. Indeed, developing countries in their large numbers are all faced with the common mission of accelerating development and improving people's lives. They ought to look to one another for comfort and come to each other's aid in times of difficulty. And they should actively carry out cooperation across the board to realize their respective development blueprints. A successful Asian-African cooperation will set a good and important example for South-South cooperation in other parts of the world.”⁵⁰⁹

Xi Jinping's remarks, though not delivered before an exclusively African audience, are emblematic of messages embedded within the Chinese narrative of cooperation. Such examples lend credence to China's positioning as a counterhegemonic force against Western tyranny insisting, instead, that the partnership's utility is rooted in its longstanding affiliation and predicated upon a 'common south' identity of victimization by “western imperialism.”⁵¹⁰ Those favoring the association also mention that relations were initiated at a time in which “China did not wield the economic or military power it now does and at the time, the nations were on fairly equal footing,” speaking to an extant equity in the relationship.⁵¹¹

⁵⁰⁹ Remarks by H.E. Xi Jinping, President of the People's Republic of China At the Asian-African Summit, Jakarta, 22 April 2015

⁵¹⁰ Kopinski et al, 2011

⁵¹¹ (-Ritchie 2008

Conclusion

This chapter investigated the specific nature of *brand-China* in Africa. China's nation brand is a powerful geopolitical tool in Africa. It exhibits how Beijing hopes to be viewed by international publics; semiotically constructing and then transforms the Afro-Chinese relationship for multiple audiences through repetitively reiterating key aspects of the narrative at every touchpoint. The chapter's principal concern was with how the Chinese state and state-owned or supported enterprises (SOEs) utilize nation branding to construct Beijing's image on the continent and how those images align with or deviate from official brand messages of Africa-China. Using speeches, magazine covers, editorials, and newspaper editorials as the population of communication, the chapter critically unpacked the semiotic messaging and rhetorical intent of artifacts developed by the PRC and multiple African states. Each artifact offered insight into one or more of the critical components of *brand-China*: "sameness", "development", "friendship", and "partnership." Images of both Africa and China are reflected in China's national imaginary through images of "brotherhood", shared subjugation, and "solidarity" with Africa. Frequent stories of the Tazara Railway or Bandung Conference are told to underscore the continuity of Afro-Chinese relations and Chinese loyalty to and solidarity with African people.

Chapter Six

We Look Forward

"How do you know I'm real? I'm not real. I'm just like you. You don't exist in this society. If you did people wouldn't be seeking equal rights. You're not real. If you were you'd have some status among the nations of the world. So we're both myths." --

Sun Ra (1974)

Introduction

The Chinese State strategically manufactures a narrative of its national imaginary in Africa as an antithetical construction of the West—symbolically establishing an imagined community predicated upon feelings of ‘sameness’, ‘friendship’, ‘partnership’, and development. Images of both Africa and China are represented within *brand-China*, underpinned by the concepts of brotherhood, a common south identity, shared subjugation, and solidarity with Africa. China’s nation brand acts as a powerful geopolitical tool in Africa, exhibiting how the Beijing hopes to be viewed by domestic and international publics.

Brand-China semiotically constructs and then malleably transforms the Afro-Chinese relationship for various constituencies through the reiteration of key aspects of the narrative at every touchpoint. Unintentionally entangled within these narratives are images often at variance with *brand-China*; western rhetoric warning of a “new colonialism”⁵¹² and competing messages from within China⁵¹³ offer conflicting messages of the Chinese and their opinions of Africa and her people. Such messages

⁵¹² Zhao, Suisheng. "A neo-colonialist predator or development partner? China's engagement and rebalance in Africa." *Journal of Contemporary China* 23.90 (2014): 1033-1052.

⁵¹³ “Lunar New Year: Chinese TV gala includes 'racist blackface' sketch”
<http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-43081218>

also frequently employ tropes of African history, African traditionalism, and African passivity reminiscent of European portrayals of African racial alterity rather than Afro-Chinese proximity. Notwithstanding, the PRC continues to construct an imagined community of cultural proximity between Chinese and African people, often belying the reality of the fundamental changes China experienced, its own particular history, and internalized racism in China.

Equally important to the narrative of Africa-China, are African responses to these images and messages of self and other. The project's goal is to critically challenge the notion of African subjectivity in international politics by privileging African perspectives. As the recent presidential elections in Kenya,⁵¹⁴ Sierra Leone,⁵¹⁵ and most recently, Zimbabwe demonstrate, local perceptions of Chinese influence bear important implications to more than simply the decision of whether to buy Lenovo products in the marketplace or use Wechat rather than MPesa to send money.

The current chapter is grounded in the tradition of Afrocentric social research, as it allows African people within diverse local environments to speak from their own existential conditions. The chapter specifically inquiries into how university students in three nations—the Gambia, Kenya, and South Africa—receive and reconcile oftentimes conflicting messages of *brand-China*.⁵¹⁶ The analysis focuses specifically on public

⁵¹⁴ “Kenya’s Botched Elections: What Role Could China Have Played?”

<http://sierraexpressmedia.com/?p=82914>

⁵¹⁵ “China’s influence looms as Sierra Leone goes to the polls”

<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/mar/07/chinas-influence-looms-as-sierra-leone-goes-to-the-polls>

⁵¹⁶ The selected sites are each Anglophone countries, with leading regional economies, and longstanding diplomatic and economic relations with China. The PRC also functions as the largest single exporter of consumer products to each country, which supports an analysis of the correlation between market presence, brand image, and awareness. The Gambia, the third nation under consideration, has long been isolationist and only recently established diplomatic relations with Beijing. Gambia’s unique circumstance should aid in isolating the effects of Brand China from general awareness of the PRC.

awareness and attitudes toward these new external forms of national and supranational consciousness. Paying particular attention to the manner in which African agency is reified through individual awareness and attitudes toward brand-China, the researcher seeks to understand how China's nation branding works within the context of the PRC's relationship to the Gambia, Kenya, and South Africa.

The chapter focuses on answering the following organizing questions:⁵¹⁷

Q2. How do African people in diverse environments receive, perceive, and interpret brand-China?

Question two investigates congruency between images and messages indicative of *brand-China* and external factors (message exposure and perspectives of China's nation brand image across Africa). Insight from perspectives of China and Africa-China in the Gambia, Kenya, and South Africa contribute to understanding how individuals in diverse environments understand and engage with the PRC as a brand. Particular attention is given to contextualizing how opinions differ across space and time analyzing how social indicators, such as ethnicity, gender, class, and culture codes influence perspectives.

Q3. Does the use of cultural and experiential similarities between Africa-China within brand-China help to facilitate more positive attitudes toward the Chinese?

Common ancestral heritage, coupled with shared historical conditions and situations during most of the last five hundred years, have helped form significant components of global African identity. Building on the historical experience of community formation across Africa and its diaspora, this question explores whether ideas of community are

⁵¹⁷ Question 1: "What is the nature of China's nation brand image in Africa?" was addressed in the preceding chapter.

being expanded beyond consanguine and geographical boundaries to include the “Global South” *nee* Chinese. Building on themes of brotherhood, solidarity, friendship, culture, and tradition, the question investigates whether and how attitudes toward *brand-China* are affected by concepts of self and other across diverse African contexts.

The chapter employs quantitative methods of inquiry, namely multination survey research, to glean insight into popular opinions, understandings, and awareness of the Afro-Chinese relationship and brand-China in the Gambia, Kenya, and South Africa. Because college students tend to possess comparatively high interest in and knowledge of international relations, the survey population consists of 4,213 university students drawn from each of the nations under observation.⁵¹⁸ The chapter begins with a brief introduction, before proceeding to answer research questions two and three and, finally, offers a chapter summary.

Study Demographics

Participant Profile

The study population was drawn from students of six African universities within the Gambia (the University of the Gambia), Kenya (Kenyatta University, the United States International University, Pwani University), and South Africa (University of Witwatersrand, the University of Johannesburg). A total of 4,213 students were selected for participation, with 554 participants in the Gambia, 2066 participants in Kenya, and 1593 participants in South Africa (table 1).

⁵¹⁸ Rojas-Méndez, José I., Nicolas Papadopoulos, and Mohammed Alwan 2015

Gender

Respondents identifying as female comprised more than 60 percent of the survey population (table 3), followed by males, who comprised slightly more than one-third (37%) of participants. When examined at the site country level, the Gambian female-to-male participant ratio was evenly split at 50%. These numbers closely align with the general population (50.6 percent female, 49.4 percent male) but were less reflective of composite educational attainment levels within the tiny west African nation (table 4).⁵¹⁹ Gender disparities were more visible amongst the Kenyan and South African survey populations, where two-thirds of respondents were reportedly female. Though these figures are not representative of those found in the general population for either country, they are on par with higher education attainments rates for women nationwide in each country.⁵²⁰

TABLE 3: PARTICIPANTS BY SITE COUNTRY AND GENDER

		Gender Designation			
		Male	Female	Nonbinary	Total*
Gambia	Count	246	246	0	492
	% within site country	50.00%	50.00%	0.00%	100.00%
Kenya	Count	701	1279	0	1980
	% within site country	35.40%	64.60%	0.00%	100.00%
South Africa	Count	512	996	6	1514
	% within site country	33.80%	65.80%	0.40%	100.00%
Count		1459	2521	6	3986
% within site country		36.60%	63.20%	0.20%	100.00%
Note: *Of those reporting gender					

Note: *Of those reporting gender

⁵¹⁹ Gambia Bureau of Statistics 2016

⁵²⁰ In 2016, Females comprised more than 23 million of Kenya's nearly 46 million population but 62% percent of those pursuing higher education (Kenya Bureau of National Statistics). In South Africa, females accounted for 58.3% of the nation's total full-time enrollment equivalents (678,842), whereas, total population exceeded 55 million. (South African Centre for Higher Education Trust South African Higher Education Performance Indicators 2009-2015).

TABLE 4: TOTAL POPULATION BY GENDER ⁵²¹

	<i>Male</i>	<i>Female</i>	<i>total</i>
Gambia, The	1,009,063	1,029,438	2,038,501
Kenya	24,085,548	24,376,019	48,461,567
South Africa	27,446,835	28,462,030	55,908,865

Age

Participants were drawn from a broad diversity of degrees, disciplines, and classifications. Given that the population of study focused on university students, participant age was heavily skewed toward younger respondents. Nearly six in ten participants were under the age of 21, with an additional one-third of participants ranging in age between 21 and 25 years (table 5). Respondent ages align with national median within the Gambia and Kenya but differ significantly from those in South Africa. Despite their youth, participants reportedly possessed greater access to and interacted more frequently with mediated sources of information than the general population, consistent with earlier studies.⁵²²

TABLE 5: SITE COUNTRY BY MEDIAN AGE

Site Country	Median Age
Gambia, The	21 years
Kenya	19.7 years
South Africa	27.1 years

Source: CIA World Factbook (2017)

Place of Origin

The vast majority of participants identified racially as descending from one of the original populations of Africa (82.5-percent), with the remaining 17-percent tracing their ancestral heritage to either Europe or Asia. These figures demonstrate a racially homogenous group largely comprised of indigenous African populations. As table 6

⁵²¹ World Bank Group <https://data.worldbank.org/>

⁵²² Lenhart, Amanda, et al. 2010

demonstrates, both Kenya and the Gambia possess more racially homogenous general populations. As a result, non-indigenous populations within these countries comprise fewer than one percent of their total populations.⁵²³ South African participants were understandably most diverse, with roughly two-thirds identifying as African or Black, 17-percent classifying themselves as having origins in Europe, seven percent in Asia, and five percent indicating that they were either biracial or multiracial. These figures differ significantly from the general population but are likely attributable to economic disparities and differences in higher education attainment levels between indigenous and non-indigenous populations within the nation.⁵²⁴

TABLE 6: SITE COUNTRY BY PLACE OF ORIGIN

Site Country by Place of Origin		Place of Origin*						Total
		African	European	Arab	Asian	Colored or biracial	Unknown	
Gambia	Count	231	0	0	0	0	0	231
	% within site country	100.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	100.00%
Kenya	Count	1162	36	0	39	3	18	1258
	% within site country	92.40%	2.90%	0.00%	3.10%	0.20%	1.40%	100.00%
South Africa	Count	782	199	8	80	62	15	1146
	% within site country	68.20%	17.40%	0.70%	7.00%	5.40%	1.30%	100.00%
	Count	2175	235	8	119	65	33	2635
	% within site country	82.50%	8.90%	0.30%	4.50%	2.50%	1.30%	100.00%

Note: Of those indicating place of origin

Religion

The most widely practiced religion across all site countries was Christianity, with more than seventy percent of respondents indicating that they adhered to the Christian faith (table 7). When parsed to examine country-level practices, however, the data demonstrate that while Christianity was the most widely practiced religion amongst

⁵²³ Kenya: Kikuyu 22%, Luhya 14%, Luo 13%, Kalenjin 12%, Kamba 11%, Kisii 6%, Meru 6%, other African 15%, non-African (Asian, European, and Arab) 1%.⁵²³ The Gambia: Mandinka/Jahanka 34%, Fulani/Tukulur/Lorobo 22.4%, Wolof 12.6%, Jola/Karoninka 10.7%, Serahuleh 6.6%, Serer 3.2%, Manjago 2.1%, Bambara 1%, Creole/Aku Marabout 0.7%, other 0.9%, non-Gambian 5.2%, no answer 0.6% (2013 est.)⁵²³

⁵²⁴ Statistics South Africa Mid-Year Report
<http://www.statssa.gov.za/publications/P0302/P03022017.pdf>

respondents in Kenya (91%) and South Africa (69%), within the Gambia only one quarter (23.8%) of those surveyed followed the Christian faith. Although the figures seemingly confirm that the vast majority of respondents in the Gambia practice Islam, the number falls far short of the proportion observed within the general population where more than 90-percent of Gambians practice Islam.⁵²⁵ The difference between general population figures and survey demographics is potentially attributable to a significant Nigerian student population within the university, many of whom identified as Christians. South African respondents practiced Christianity in far fewer numbers than the general population, where the majority of South Africans or 79.8%, are Christian.⁵²⁶ General population figures for Kenya, likewise, differ where more than four-fifths (83%) follow Christianity making it difficult to generalize participant responses based on faith.⁵²⁷

TABLE 7: PARTICIPANTS BY COUNTRY AND RELIGION

Site Country		RELIGION				Total
		Christianity	Judaism	Islam	Other*	
Gambia	Count	78	0	476	0	554
	% within site country	14%	0%	86%	0%	100%
Kenya	Count	1780	18	94	72	1964
	% within site country	91%	1%	5%	4%	100%
South Africa	Count	1040	56	117	295	1508
	% within site country	69%	4%	8%	20%	100%
Total	Count	2898	74	687	367	4026
	% within site country	72%	2%	17%	9%	100%

Note: *includes hinduism, traditional African beliefs, and other faiths

⁵²⁵ CIA Fact Book 2016

⁵²⁶ The independent African Zion Christian churches predominate, being the faith of 15,3% of the total population, and 19,2% of all Christians. Roughly 15% of the population have no religion, and 1,4% are undetermined about their faith. Islam is the religion of 1,5% of South Africans, Hinduism that of 1,2%, African traditional belief 0,3%, Judaism 0,2% and other beliefs 0,6%. Statistics South Africa Mid-Year Report <http://www.statssa.gov.za/publications/P0302/P03022017.pdf>

⁵²⁷ (Protestant 47.7%, Catholic 23.4%, other Christian 11.9%), Muslim 11.2%, Traditionalists 1.7%, other 1.6%, none 2.4%, unspecified 0.2% (2009 est.).

TABLE 8: PARTICIPANT CHARACTERISTICS

Description of respondents*			
Item	Description	Frequency	Valid Percentage
Gender	Male	1459	36.6
	Female	2521	63.2
	nonbinary	6	0.2
	Total	3986	100.0
Ethnic Origin	African	2175	83.6
	European	235	9.0
	Asian	127	4.9
	biracial	65	2.5
	Total	2602	100.0
Age	<21	2330	59.0
	21-25	1308	33.1
	26-30	107	2.7
	31-35	131	3.3
	36-40	33	0.8
	41-45	16	0.4
	46-50	23	0.5
	Total	3948	99.8
Major	Business	329	7.8
	Linguistics	24	0.0
	English	127	3.0
	Sciences	357	8.5
	Anthropology	79	1.9
	Visual/performing arts	27	0.6
	Education	155	3.7
	Political science	716	17.0
	Computer science	16	0.4
	Gender studies	64	1.5
	General studies	113	2.7
	Geography	21	0.5
	History	362	8.6
	Sociology	221	5.2
	Journalism	193	4.6
	Law	565	13.4
	Media studies	217	5.2
	Philosophy	21	0.5
	Psychology	185	4.4
	Religion	46	1.1
	Unknown or other	375	8.9
	Total	4213	100.0
Religion	Christianity	2898	72.0
	Judaism	74	1.8
	Islam	687	17.0
	Other	367	9.1
	Total	4026	100.0

Exposure to *brand-China*

Building on Papadopoulos and Heslop's (1986) study of the effects of familiarity and travel experience on attitude formation, respondents were also asked a series of

questions regarding their level of prior exposure to China.⁵²⁸ More than two-thirds of respondents reported that either they or a close friend or relative (parent, sibling) had previously traveled abroad, with most frequent voyages to the United States (1,653) and/or United Kingdom (1,195). One-fifth (22%) of participants noted that they had traveled internationally, with the highest incidence occurring in South Africa, where more than 44 percent of participants were international travelers (Table 9).

These numbers demonstrate that while survey participants were not well traveled in comparison with other students of similar age, participants still possess access to information about other countries from close friends and family members.⁵²⁹ Nearly every Gambian respondent indicating that a close friend or relative had traveled internationally, named China as one of their preferred destinations (16 of 17). These findings mirror those of Heidi Østbø Haugen and Manon Diederich (2016), whose study of Gambian migrants repatriating from China illustrates that China is increasingly a destination of choice for Gambians seeking non-western options for educational and economic opportunities abroad.⁵³⁰

⁵²⁸ Baughn, C. Christopher, and Attila Yaprak. "Mapping country-of-origin research: Recent developments and emerging avenues." *Product-country images: Impact and role in international marketing* (1993): 89-116.

⁵²⁹ "Are Millennial Travel Trends Shifting in 2016?" Jan 15, 2016
<https://www.forbes.com/sites/lealane/2016/01/15/are-millennial-travel-trends-shifting-in-2016-youll-be-surprised/#5cc3bf6736a8>

⁵³⁰ <https://uturnasia.com>

TABLE 9: SITE COUNTRY BY INTERNATIONAL EXPERIENCE

Site Country by Travel Experience		Previous International Travel?		
		No	Yes	Total
Gambia	Count	259	18	277
	% within site country	94%	7%	100%
Kenya	Count	1888	178	2066
	% within site country	91%	9%	100%
South Africa	Count	785	608	1393
	% within site country	56%	44%	100%
Total	Count	2932	804	3736
	% within site country	79%	22%	100%

TABLE 10: SITE COUNTRY BY PREVIOUS TRAVEL TO CHINA

Site Country by Direct China Experience*		Previous China Travel?		
		No	Yes	Total
Gambia	Count	260	17	277
	% within site country	94%	6%	100%
Kenya	Count	1944	122	2066
	% within site country	94%	6%	100%
South Africa	Count	1280	113	1393
	% within site country	92%	8%	100%
Total	Count	3484	252	3736
	% within site country	93%	7%	100%

note:* reflects travel by respondent, parent, siblings, or close friend

Sources of Information

Participants were additionally asked to indicate how and where they receive information about other countries generally and, more specifically, about China. While students indicated a tendency to interact with varied media, more mature forms of communication, like watching television, listening to the radio, and reading newspapers or other periodicals were utilized less frequently. New digital medias, involving text messaging and internet were the preferred mechanisms for acquiring information (Table 11). Respondents indicated that they engaged in these forms of communication

as frequently as several times a week to daily, which was understandable given their ubiquity within each site, where one often carries multiple mobile phones because of uneven carrier connectivity.⁵³¹

Distinct differences were discovered across site countries in terms of the frequency of internet use and television viewership. South African respondents reported a greater propensity to access the internet daily (95%), with roughly three-quarters of Kenyan and South African participants reportedly doing likewise. Television watching was another area in which there were distinct differences across countries, with nearly two-thirds (62.5%) of Gambian respondents indicating that they watch television daily, in comparison with 40-percent of South Africans and one-third of Kenyans (32.8%) who expressed similar viewing patterns.

TABLE 11: SOURCES OF INFORMATION

Sources of Information		
	Mean	Std. Deviation
receive_text	5.77	0.791
send_text	5.69	0.908
use_internet	5.69	0.813
hear_info	5.01	1.365
watch_tele	4.54	1.655
Listen_radio	4.15	1.872
read_paper	3.70	1.638

Images of China

When asked questions specifically concerning China, participants reportedly encountered images or messages of China (people, places, or things) a couple of times a month on average (Table 12). Respondents indicated that they were exposed most

⁵³¹ Jenny C. Aker and Isaac M. Mbiti “Mobile Phones and Economic Development in Africa” *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, Volume 24, Number 3, Summer 2010, pp. 207–232

regularly to images and messages of Chinese politicians or Chinese products from televised or online sources (Table 13). When asked about personal interaction with Chinese people, participants rarely encountered individuals whom they identified as Chinese more frequently than once per week (Table 15). Within the Gambia, specifically, nearly two-thirds of participants reported having little to no direct exposure to Chinese people (62.5 percent), supporting the characterization of personal interaction between participants and the Chinese as ‘infrequent’.

Though infrequent, participants were also asked to characterize the images or messages they received of China (Table 14). More than half of respondents (50.2%) characterized the images they viewed of China as sometimes or mostly positive. Again, opinions varied across site countries, with just one-third of South African participants classifying their observations as positive, while six in ten Kenyans (59.4%) and Gambians (62.4%) did so.

TABLE 12: IMAGE FREQUENCY

	Never or rarely	Monthly	Couple times a month	Weekly	Couple times a week	Daily	Total
<i>Gambia</i>	134	56	112	56	70	110	538
	24.90%	10.40%	20.80%	10.40%	13.00%	20.40%	100.00%
<i>Kenya</i>	615	278	400	247	270	196	2006
	30.70%	13.90%	19.90%	12.30%	13.50%	9.80%	100.00%
<i>South Africa</i>	282	163	425	304	304	92	1570
	18.00%	10.40%	27.10%	19.40%	19.40%	5.90%	100.00%
Total	1031	497	937	607	644	398	4114
	25.10%	12.10%	22.80%	14.80%	15.70%	9.70%	100.00%

TABLE 13: IMAGE TYPE

	Politicians	Businessmen	Celebrities	Places	Products	Other	Total
<i>Gambia</i>	122	112	46	42	180	32	534
	22.8%	21.0%	8.6%	7.9%	33.7%	6.0%	100.0%
<i>Kenya</i>	189	233	435	164	836	69	1926
	9.8%	12.1%	22.6%	8.5%	43.4%	3.6%	100.0%
<i>South Africa</i>	481	145	89	174	538	71	1498
	32.1%	9.7%	5.9%	11.6%	35.9%	4.7%	100.0%
Total	792	490	570	380	1554	172	3958
	20.0%	12.4%	14.4%	9.6%	39.3%	4.3%	100.0%

TABLE 14: IMAGE CHARACTERIZATION

	Mostly negative	Sometimes negative	Neutral	Sometimes positive	Mostly positive	Total
<i>Gambia</i>	20	62	114	152	176	524
	3.8%	11.8%	21.8%	29.0%	33.6%	100.0%
<i>Kenya</i>	77	252	440	474	652	1895
	4.1%	13.3%	23.2%	25.0%	34.4%	100.0%
<i>South Africa</i>	100	323	561	326	184	1494
	6.7%	21.6%	37.6%	21.8%	12.3%	100.0%
Total	197	637	1115	952	1012	3913
	5.0%	16.3%	28.5%	24.3%	25.9%	100.0%

TABLE 15: ENCOUNTERS WITH CHINESE

	Never or rarely	Monthly	Couple times a month	Weekly	Couple times a week	Daily	Total
<i>Gambia</i>	334	2	18	144	14	22	534
	62.50%	0.40%	3.40%	27.00%	2.60%	4.10%	100.00%
<i>Kenya</i>	676	33	233	826	113	29	1910
	35.40%	1.70%	12.20%	43.20%	5.90%	1.50%	100.00%
<i>South Africa</i>	382	19	153	791	90	35	1470
	26.00%	1.30%	10.40%	53.80%	6.10%	2.40%	100.00%
Total	1392	54	404	1761	217	86	3914
	35.60%	1.40%	10.30%	45.00%	5.50%	2.20%	100.00%

Perceptions of *brand-China*

Building a successful nation brand requires developing a carefully curated image emphasizing the most optimistic and complementary characteristics of the national imaginary. Chapter five explored the rhetorical intent of Chinese nation branding in Africa. Four themes emerged from the analysis as the principle constructs of *brand-China* in Africa, namely “sameness”, “development”, “friendship”, and “partnership”. Each element drew upon historical, cultural, and economic factors, making the case that China is Africa’s best hope for continued progress.

Underlying Dimensions of brand-China

Thematically, African public perceptions of *brand-China* were organized based on their loadings and common characteristics on the multi-item country perception

inventory. The resultant dimensions labelled, “Cultural Proximity (Culture)” (Dimension 1), “Trustworthiness” (Dimension 2), “Development” (Dimension 3), and “Imperialism” (Dimension 4) collectively embody the *China Cognitive Associations Scale* (CCAS) (table 16). Whereas the most frequently constructed narrative of *brand-China* in Africa is one of ‘sameness,’⁵³² “cultural proximity”, a component of sameness, emerged as the strongest dimension of participant perceptions of the PRC. A focus on Chinese-led development represented another oft repeated aspect of the Chinese state construction of its brand in Africa, and ‘development’ also emerged as component of participant perceptions.⁵³³ ‘Imperialism’ and ‘trustworthiness’, though not significant aspects of the brand-China message, also emerged as important components of participant perceptions of China.

⁵³² Sameness creates a discursive framework for establishing points of commonality between Chinese and African people, the historical and contemporary experiences of Chinese and African people, cultural propinquity, being a part of a shared (or the same) community, Chinese kinship, brotherhood, sisterhood, or familyhood with Africa.

⁵³³ The desire to link regional destinies through shared aspiration to the Chinese and African ‘dreams’ by means of “Technological knowledge transfer”⁵³³, “shared opportunities”, infrastructure improvement, “inclusiveness”, and economic growth mark the foundation of Chinese strategies for Africa’s development.

TABLE 16: DIMENSIONS OF *BRAND-CHINA*

Dimensions of <i>Brand-China</i>				
Attributes	Factor Loadings			Communality
Component 1: Culture	F1			
Traditional	.93			.87
Brotherly	.66			.46
Abundant culture	.96			.92
Heritage	.93			.86
Friendly	.89			.80
Family (important)	.93			
Religious	.86			
Component 2: Trustworthiness	F2			
Kind	.69			.51
Visit	.53			.32
Global Citizen	.71			.52
Good Leaders	.72			.53
Good Products	.61			.39
Fair	.77			.60
Trustworthy	.77			.61
Component 3: Development	F3			
Strong	.86			.75
Partner	.90			.88
Model	.85			.78
Component 4: Imperialism	F4			
Expanding Influence			.86	.82
Rigid			.49	.26
Lazy			.48	.25
Racist			.90	.87
Eigenvalue	5.5	4.4	1.9	1.8
Variance (%)	26.3	21	8.9	8.6
Cumulative variance (%)	26.3	47.4	56.3	64.9
Cronbach's Alpha	0.91	0.828	0.858	0.684

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.
Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization.
a. Rotation converged in 5 iterations.

Building on the China Cognitive Associations Scale (CCAS), a one-way between-groups analysis of variance (ANOVA) was conducted to determine site country positions. Participant responses were divided into three groups aligning with the country in which the instrument was completed (Group 1: the Gambia, Group 2: Kenya, Group 3: South Africa). The findings reveal significant differences in the components of *brand-China* across all measures (Table 15).

TABLE 17: SITE COUNTRY POSITIONS ON THE MULTI-ITEM SCALE (A)

Country positions on the multi-item brand-China scale				
	Development	Imperialism	Culture	Trustworthiness
Kenya	11.58	9.42	22.76	26.30
South Africa	10.50	10.62	21.94	22.27
the Gambia	11.43	10.38	25.06	24.62

Entries reflect the mean position of each country on the items composing the *brand-China* attributes.

TABLE 18: SITE COUNTRY POSITIONS ON THE MULTI-ITEM SCALE (B)

Descriptive Statistics and One-Way ANOVAs for Composite Perceptions								
	Country Gambia (g) n=554		Kenya (k) n=2082		South Africa (s) n=1593			
Variable	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	F	η^2
Culture	25.06	7.03	24.94	6.38	22.76***	8.09	155.55	0.02*
Trustworthiness	24.62***	4.08	26.30***	5.95	22.27***	4.97	58.97	0.11**
Development	11.43	3.21	11.58	3.34	10.50***	3.39	33.14	0.02*
Imperialism	10.38	3.55	9.42***	3.67	10.62	2.86	52.20	0.03*

Note: degrees of freedom for all ANOVA numerators were 2 and for denominators ranged between 3405-4197, depending missing data.
* small effect size, ** large effect size, *** statistically significant result at $p = .01$ level.

Culture

There was a statistically significant difference at the $p < .05$ level in ‘culture’ for the three sites: $F(2, 4197) = 47.5$, $p = .00$. The effect size, calculated using eta squared, was .02, indicating a small effect size.⁵³⁴ Post-hoc comparisons using the Tukey HSD test indicated that the mean score for the Gambia ($M = 25.06$, $SD = 7.03$) was significantly different from South Africa ($M = 21.94$, $SD = 6.38$) and Kenya ($M = 22.76$, $SD = 8.10$).

Development

There was a statistically significant difference at the $p < .05$ level in “development” levels for the three sites: $F(2, 3972) = 46.0$, $p = .00$. The effect size, calculated using eta squared, was .02, indicating a small effect size⁵³⁵. Post-hoc comparisons using the Tukey HSD test indicated that the mean score for South Africa ($M = 10.50$, $SD = 3.39$) was significantly different from the Gambia ($M = 11.43$, $SD = 3.21$) and Kenya ($M = 11.58$, $SD = 3.34$).

⁵³⁴ “Cohen 1988, pp. 284–7

⁵³⁵ *ibid*

Trustworthiness

There was a statistically significant difference at the $p < .05$ level in “trustworthiness” levels for the three sites: $F(2, 3479) = 213.2, p = .00$. Reaching a statistically significant result was expected given that there was also a significant difference in mean scores between the groups. The effect size, calculated using eta squared, was .10, indicating a large effect size⁵³⁶. Thus, it can be inferred China’s trustworthiness is of high practical significance to participants. Post-hoc comparisons using the Tukey HSD test indicate that the mean score for the Gambia ($M = 24.62, SD = 4.08$) was significantly different from South Africa ($M = 22.27, SD = 4.971$), which is also significantly different than Kenya ($M = 26.3, SD = 5.95$). The findings suggest that respondents in the three site countries are deeply divided regarding whether China is a trustworthy brand.

Imperialism

A final one-way between-groups analysis of variance was conducted to explore different perspectives of *brand-China* by site country. There was a statistically significant difference at the $p < .05$ level in “imperialism” across the three sites: $F(2, 3568) = 51.4, p = .00$. The effect size, calculated using eta squared, was .03, indicating a small effect size⁵³⁷. Post-hoc comparisons using the Tukey HSD test indicated that the mean score for Kenya ($M = 9.42, SD = 3.67$) was significantly different from South Africa ($M = 10.62, SD = 2.86$) and the Gambia ($M = 10.38, SD = 3.55$). Significant main effects were established between the sites countries and each of the multi-scale items ($p < .01$).

⁵³⁶ *ibid*

⁵³⁷ *ibid*

Composite Perceptions

The country effects were most pronounced for beliefs about ‘trustworthiness,’ with Kenya ($M=26.30$, $SD=5.95$) deeming the Chinese most trustworthy and South Africa finding the PRC least trustworthy ($M=22.27$, $SD=4.97$), indicating vastly different perceptions across the continent of Beijing’s stewardship as an upright and honorable partner. These findings are consistent with South African ($M=10.50$, $SD=3.39$) views of China as a less significant development partner on the continent than either the Gambia ($M=11.43$, $SD=3.21$) or Kenya ($M=11.58$, $SD=3.34$), perhaps because of the strength of South Africa’s economy and its inclusion alongside China as a BRICS nation. Analysis of variance in opinions of China as an ‘imperialistic’ force in Africa also indicated strong beliefs in Kenya ($M=9.42$, $SD=3.67$) that Beijing’s motives are not rooted in expanding its global influence, which is consistent with thinking that the PRC is a trustworthy development partner.

South African ($M=22.76$, $SD=8.09$) respondents answered less favorably to questions surrounding the PRC’s affinity with Africa, than either Gambian ($M=25.06$, $SD=7.03$) or Kenyan ($M=24.94$, $SD=6.38$) participants. These findings support the conclusion that South African respondents possess lower levels of agreement with statements suggestive of the PRC as culturally or experientially similar to Africa or independently possessing strong culture of its own. Moreover, the findings also suggest that South Africans possess lower levels of cognitive agreement with statements indicative of China’s import to African development and growth.

These findings reveal that there are considerable differences across site countries in terms of their perceptions of China. In the Gambia, the composite view of China is

that of a state with strong cultural proximity to Africa and equally strong implications to Africa's continued developmental growth and prosperity; participants in Kenya possess a significantly greater perception of China vis-à-vis its intentions as a developmental partner, and also high regard for the PRC concerning its cultural proximity to Africa; whereas. South Africans, though not considering China's motives imperialistic, consistently evinced lower overall perceptions of the PRC as a trustworthy or culturally similar development partner.

TABLE 19: SITE COUNTRY PERCEPTIONS (WEIGHTED)

<i>Site country perceptions (weighted mean ratings, standard deviations)</i>						
	N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error	95% Confidence Interval for Mean	
<u>Culture</u>					Lower Bound	Upper Bound
<i>Gambia</i>	554	3.58	1.00	0.04	3.50	3.66
<i>Kenya</i>	2053	3.56	0.91	0.03	3.20	3.30
<i>South Africa</i>	1593	3.25*	1.16	0.02	3.52	3.61
<i>Total</i>	4200	3.41	1.06	0.02	3.38	3.44
<u>Development</u>						
<i>Gambia</i>	554	3.81	1.07	0.05	3.72	3.90
<i>Kenya</i>	1950	3.86	1.11	0.03	3.81	3.91
<i>South Africa</i>	1471	3.50*	1.13	0.03	3.44	3.56
<i>Total</i>	3975	3.72	1.13	0.02	3.69	3.76
<u>Trustworthiness</u>						
<i>Gambia</i>	524	3.52*	0.58	0.03	3.47	3.57
<i>Kenya</i>	1545	3.76*	0.85	0.02	3.71	3.80
<i>South Africa</i>	1413	3.18*	0.71	0.02	3.14	3.22
<i>Total</i>	3482	3.49	0.80	0.01	3.46	3.51
<u>Imperialism</u>						
<i>Gambia</i>	540	1.48	0.51	0.02	1.44	1.53
<i>Kenya</i>	1609	1.35*	0.52	0.01	1.32	1.37
<i>South Africa</i>	1422	1.52	0.41	0.01	1.50	1.54
<i>Total</i>	3571	1.43	0.49	0.01	1.42	1.45

Note: * Significant at the <.001 level.

Drivers of Brand Image

The statistical tests used for the China Cognitive Associations Scale (CCAS) were repeated to examine how perceptions of a country's nation brand are moderated by demographic and social indicators. Composite perceptions of *brand-china*, including "culture", "development", "trustworthiness", and "imperialism", were tested against a diversity of demographic (gender, religion, place of origin) and social (cultural

orientation, awareness, international experiences, exposure) factors to determine whether statistically significant differences exist between countries.

*Gender*⁵³⁸

An independent-samples t-test was conducted to compare differences in the China Cognitive Associations Scale (CCAS) scores for males and females (Table 20). The results demonstrated that there was no significant difference in scores for males and females in terms of ‘culture’ (M=23.97, SD=7.45; M=23.70, SD=7.36), ‘development’ (M=11.36, SD=3.36, M=11.20, SD=3.35), or ‘imperialism’ (M=10.02, SD=3.56, M=9.94, SD=3.24). A statistically significant difference was discovered in perceptions of ‘trustworthiness’ between males (M = 24.83, SD = 5.91) and females (M = 24.26, SD = 5.52; $t(2481) = 2.72, p = .01$, two-tailed). The magnitude of the differences in the means (mean difference = .56, 95% CI: .16 to .97) was very small (eta squared = .008). It can be inferred from the results that no statistically significant difference exists in participant perceptions across genders.

TABLE 20: GENDERED PERCEPTIONS ON MULTI-ITEM SCALE

Descriptive Statistics and Independent Samples T-test by Reported Gender*							
Variable	Gender Male (m) n=1453		Female (f) n=2514		t	95% Interval of Means	
	Mean	SD	Mean	SD		Lower	Upper
Culture	23.97	7.45	23.70	7.36	1.10	-0.21	0.745
Trustworthiness	24.83***	5.91	24.26***	5.52	2.72**	0.157	0.968
Development	11.36	3.36	11.20	3.35	1.35	-0.07	0.376
Imperialism	10.02	3.56	9.94	3.24	0.62	-0.161	0.308

Note: degrees of freedom for all ANOVA numerators were 2 and for denominators ranged between 3138-3970, depending upon missing data. *nonbinary gender responses (6) were excluded because of small sample size, **Welch statistic used to compensate for violation of homogeneity of variance, *** statistically significant result at $p = .01$ level.

⁵³⁸ Nonbinary gender participants were excluded from this aspect of the analysis because of the small sample size.

Religion

A one-way between-groups analysis of variance was conducted to explore the impact of religious faith on perceptions of brand-China, as measured by the China Cognitive Associations Scale (CCAS) (Table 21). Participants were divided into three groups according to their reported faith system (Group 1: Christianity; Group 2: Islam; Group 3: Other faiths). There was a statistically significant difference at the $p < .001$ level in the China Cognitive Associations Scale (CCAS) scores for the three groups on each scaled item. ‘Other’ faiths, an amalgam of Judaism, Hinduism, traditional African religions and other faith systems, was demonstrably the largest driver of difference across ‘culture’ ($M=26.4$, $SD=6.24$), ‘trustworthiness’ ($M=22.4$, $SD=4.82$), and ‘development’ ($M=10.2$, $SD=3.43$). Differences in ‘Imperialism’ ($M=9.9$, $SD=3.49$) scores were largely driven by adherents to Islam, with those identifying as Muslim rating the Chinese considerably less ‘imperialistic’ than either Christians or those subscribing to other faiths. Muslim respondents, principally located with the Gambia, were on the whole less likely to cast aspersions against the Chinese, warranting additional investigation into why and how these responses differ so appreciably from other religious groups.

TABLE 21: MULTI-ITEM SCALE SCORES BY RELIGION

Descriptive Statistics and One-Way ANOVAs for Composite Perceptions								
Variable	Religious Affiliation Christianity n=2942		Islam n=630		Other* n=441		F**	η^2
	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD		
Culture	23.8	7.48	23.4	7.45	26.4***	6.24	35.46	.01
Trustworthiness	24.8	5.80	24.4	4.79	22.4***	4.82	38.49	.02
Development	11.2	3.38	11.4	3.28	10.2***	3.43	18.33	.01
Imperialism	11.2	3.38	9.9***	3.49	11.1	2.41	38.84	.01

Note: degrees of freedom for all ANOVA numerators were 2 and for denominators ranged between 3371-4010, depending on missing data.
 * predominated by those indicating Judaism and hinduism, **Welch statistic, *** statistically significant result at $p < .001$ level.

Source of Arrival

An independent-samples t-test was conducted to compare the China Cognitive Associations Scale (CCAS) scores for respondents according to their source of arrival on the continent (Table 22). Individual group samples of non-indigenous participants (European, Asian) were small, which warranted that participants be divided into two groups according to their self-reported ethnic or racial grouping (Group 1: Indigenous African; Group 2: Non-indigenous African). Statistically significant differences were discovered in scores for indigenous and non-indigenous populations in terms of ‘culture’ ($M = 23.8$, $SD = 7.29$; $M = 24.9$, $SD = 7.26$; $t(2624) = -3.01$, $p = .003$, two-tailed), ‘development’ ($M = 11.4$, $SD = 3.28$; $M = 9.9$, $SD = 3.53$; $t(613) = 8.31$, $p = .001$, two-tailed), ‘imperialism’ ($M = 9.7$, $SD = 3.3$; $M = 10.9$, $SD = 2.49$; $t(713) = -8.26$, $p = .001$, two-tailed) and ‘trustworthiness’ ($M = 24.6$, $SD = 5.65$; $M = 21.9$, $SD = 5.24$; $t(621) = 9.15$, $p = .001$, two-tailed). Nonetheless, the magnitude of the differences in the means for each dimension was very small $\eta^2 = .04$, indicating that less than four percent of the variance in perceptions of China is explained by ethnicity. These findings indicate that non-indigenous participants rated the Chinese more highly culturally but are, nonetheless, less likely to consider the PRC as a development model, possessed more negative opinions of the Chinese as a collective, and are less likely to trust the Chinese state and its various sundry depictions on the continent.

TABLE 22: SOURCE OF ARRIVAL

Independent sample t-test results of brand perception by source of arrival*								
	Indigenous n=2166			Other n=460				
	Mean	SD	SE	Mean	SD	SE	t	p
Culture	23.8	7.29	0.16	24.9	7.26	0.34	-3.01	.003**
Development	11.4	3.28	0.07	9.9	3.53	0.17	8.315	.001**
Imperialism	9.7	3.30	0.08	10.9	2.49	0.13	-8.26	.001**
Trustworthiness	24.6	5.65	0.13	21.9	5.24	0.26	9.15	.001**
Note:								
*Test reflects results for those voluntarily reporting place of ethnic origin only.								
** significant at the <.003 level.								

Cultural Orientation

Cultural proximity creates an additional layer of support for brand-China, reinforcing attempts to establish a cultural connection between African and Chinese people. Determinants of cultural orientation were selected using measures from an adapted version of the Cultural Orientation Scale developed by Sharma (2010) (table 23). Participant responses were recoded from categorical to continuous scaled variables using a Cochran Q analysis and a one-way between-groups analysis of variance (ANOVA) was conducted to explore differences in cultural orientations by site country.

⁵³⁹ Respondents were divided into three groups according to the country of participation (Group 1: the Gambia, Group 2: Kenya, or Group 3: South Africa). A statistically significant difference was discovered at the $p < .05$ level in cultural orientation scores for the three sites: $F(2, 4207) = 206.8, p = .00$. Reaching a statistically significant result was expected given that there was also a significant difference in mean scores between the groups. The effect size, calculated using eta squared, was .08, indicating a

⁵³⁹ - Cochran's Q test is used to determine if there are differences on a dichotomous dependent variable between three or more related groups. It can be considered to be similar to the one-way repeated measures ANOVA, but for a dichotomous rather than a continuous dependent variable, or as an extension of McNemar's test. Cochran's Q test is commonly used to analyze longitudinal study designs, as well as being used when analyzing participants that have undergone multiple different trials (a.k.a. treatments/conditions)

moderate effect size.⁵⁴⁰ Post-hoc comparisons using the Tukey HSD test indicated that the mean score for the Gambia (M = 9.68, SD = 3.81) was significantly different from Kenya (M = 5.48, SD = 4.92) and South Africa (M = 7.45, SD = 4.48).

These findings suggest that the indicators of community deemed most important to participants in South Africa are significantly different than those cherished within either Kenya or the Gambia, which are in turn, different from one another. While common characteristics do exist, the results demonstrate that there is no one cultural orientation within Africa but, rather, cultural orientations within each nation. Nonetheless, certain cultural traits did emerge consistently across all three sites as being most important: “being respectful”, “being hardworking”, and “being hospitable.”

TABLE 23: SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC DETERMINANTS OF CULTURE

<i>Being Hospitable</i>
<i>Being Individualistic</i>
<i>Being Aggressive</i>
<i>Being Spiritual</i>
<i>Being Helpful</i>
<i>Being Humane</i>
<i>Being Entrepreneurial</i>
<i>Being Loyal</i>
<i>Being Pioneering</i>
<i>Being Patriotic</i>
<i>Being Community-oriented</i>
<i>Being Kind</i>
<i>Being Competitive</i>
<i>Being Respectful</i>
<i>Being Cautious</i>
<i>Being Powerful</i>
<i>Being Hard-working</i>
<i>Being Peaceful</i>

⁵⁴⁰ Cohen 1988, pp. 284–7

Economic Indicators

TABLE 24: ECONOMIC CULTURAL INDICATORS

Independent sample t-test results of brand perception by cultural orientation score (economic)								
	Below Average n=1939			Above Average* n=460				
	Mean	SD	SE	Mean	SD	SE	t	p
Culture	23.8	7.51	0.15	24.1	7.25	0.19	-1.27	
Development	11.2	3.39	0.07	11.1	3.36	0.09	0.34	
Imperialism	9.9	3.29	0.07	10.2	3.56	0.10	-2.33	.03**
Trustworthiness	24.6	5.70	0.12	24.1	5.50	0.15	2.78	.01**
Note:								
*Average score on economic indicator scale was 13.35								
** significant at the <.05 level.								

An independent-samples t-test was conducted to compare the brand-China China Cognitive Associations Scale (CCAS) scores for respondents according to the indicated importance of specific economic indicators (aggressive, entrepreneurship, pioneering, competitiveness, power-seeking) (table 24).⁵⁴¹ Participants were divided into two groups (Group 1: higher than average, Group 2: lower than average) to determine their orientation toward those indicators. Respondents with higher than average economic orientations were significantly statistically different than those with below average economic orientations in terms of ‘imperialism’ (M=10.21, SD=3.56; M=9.94, SD=3.29; $t(2673) = -2.28$, $p=.03$, two-sided) and ‘trustworthiness’ (M=24.07, SD=5.70; M=24.61, SD=5.50; $t(2857) = 2.78$; $p=.01$, two-sided). No statistically significant difference was discovered between those indicating a higher than average score on the multi-item scale on the ‘culture’ (M=23.14, SD=7.85; M=24.53, SD=6.98) or ‘development’ (M=11.17, 3.39; M=11.13, 3.36) components.

⁵⁴¹ Threshold for economic indicator scores above or below 13.35.

A statistically significant difference was found between groups in their responses to ‘imperialism’ and ‘trustworthiness, indicating that respondents with higher than average orientation toward capital accumulation possessed a lower than average rating of China’s trustworthiness and higher than average consideration of the PRC as an imperial power. More explicitly, the findings suggest that individuals who place greater value on capital accumulation and enterprise are more suspicious of China’s motives.

Social Indicators

TABLE 25: SOCIAL CULTURAL INDICATORS

Independent sample t-test results of brand perception by cultural orientation score (social)								
	Below Average n=2924			Above Average* n=1276				
	Mean	SD	SE	Mean	SD	SE	t	p
Culture	23.1	8.00	0.22	24.2	7.14	0.13	-4.33	.001**
Development	11.2	3.01	0.10	11.2	3.33	0.06	-0.01	
Imperialism	9.7	3.66	0.12	10.2	3.29	0.20	-3.64	.001**
Trustworthiness	25.3	6.26	0.20	24.1	5.34	0.11	5.01	.001**
Note:								
*Average score on economic indicator scale was 8.29								
** significant at the <.001 level.								

An independent-samples t-test was conducted to compare the China Cognitive Associations Scale (CCAS) scores for respondents according to the indicated importance of specific social indicators (hospitality, spirituality, helpfulness, humaneness, family-centeredness, kindness, respectfulness) (table 25). Participants were divided into two groups (Group 1: higher than average, Group 2: lower than average) to determine their orientation toward those indicators. A statistically significant difference was found between groups in their responses to ‘culture’, ‘imperialism’, and trustworthiness’. Distinct differences were discovered between responses (high; low) in terms of ‘cultural proximity’ (M=24.2, SD=7.12; M=23.1, 8.00; $t(2197) = -1.12$, $p=.001$, two-sided), ‘imperialism’ (M=10.2, SD=3.28; M=9.69,

SD=3.66; $t(1604) = -3.63$, $p=.001$, two-sided), and ‘trustworthiness’ ($M=24.1$, $SD=5.34$; $M=25.2$, $SD=6.26$; $t(1492) = 5.01$; $p=.001$, two-sided). No statistically significant difference was discovered between those indicating a higher than average orientation toward social indicators on the ‘development’ component ($M=11.2$, $SD=3.33$; $M=11.2$, $SD=3.01$). The magnitude of the difference in the means was small to moderate (eta squared ‘culture’=.044, ‘imperialism’=.031, ‘trustworthiness’=.059), indicating that although less than six percent of the variance in perceptions of China is explained by social orientation, whether or not the country is considered trustworthy can be deemed to have a moderate effect on composite perception.⁵⁴² The findings suggest that although respondents with stronger social orientations viewed the PRC more highly in terms of its cultural significance or proximity, those feelings of sameness do not translate to unqualified trust.

Country Knowledge

An independent samples t-test revealed additional differences between participants based on how much they know about China.⁵⁴³ Participant responses were divided into two groups according to whether they possessed a higher or lower than average degree of knowledge of China (Group 1: higher than average; Group 2: lower than average). There was a statistically significant difference at the $p < .05$ level in participant knowledge levels for the three sites: $F(2, 4210) = 172.6$, $p = .00$. The effect size, calculated using eta squared, was .04, indicating a small effect size⁵⁴⁴. Post-hoc comparisons using the Tukey HSD test indicate that the mean score for South Africa

⁵⁴² Less than four percent of the variance in perceptions of China is explained by ethnicity.

⁵⁴³ Knowledge was tested according to the ability to identify well-known figures and landmarks associated with each country.

⁵⁴⁴ Cohen 1988, pp. 284–7

($M = 2.65$, $SD = 1.29$) was significantly different from Kenya ($M = 1.99$, $SD = 1.37$) and the Gambia ($M = 1.64$, $SD = 1.09$). These findings imply that although participants in South Africa possessed greater China-specific knowledges the effects of that knowledge generated little overall effect.

Media Exposure

An independent-samples t-test was conducted to compare the China Cognitive Associations Scale (CCAS) scores for those with higher than average levels of media exposure against those with lower than average levels of exposure.⁵⁴⁵ Participants were divided into two groups (Group 1: higher than average, Group 2: lower than average). A statistically significant difference between groups was discovered in terms of ‘imperialism’ [$M=9.54$, 3.30; $M=10.49$, 3.41; $t(3429) = -8.192$, $p=.01$, two- tailed], and ‘trustworthiness’ [$M=24.63$, 5.61; $M=24.16$, 5.69; $t(3355) = 2.38$, $p=.02$, two-tailed].

More frequent media exposure implies that participants with greater access to media are less likely to characterize the PRC’s motivations in Africa negatively and are generally more trusting of the Chinese. This finding implies that increased exposure to *brand-China* may positively influence characterizations of Beijing. There was no significant difference in scores for those with either below average or above average exposure to media their responses to ‘sameness’ [$M=23.91$, 7.39; $M=23.97$, 7.40; $t(3783) = -.268$] or ‘development’ [$M=11.09$, 3.41; $M=11.20$, 3.36, $t(3807) = -1.038$]. The magnitude of differences in the means was very small ($\eta^2 = .03$, $<.001$), indicating that media exposure only accounts for a small amount of the variance in perceptions of brand-China.

⁵⁴⁵ Average reported total exposure was 34.55, used mean score as proxy for ‘average’ amount of exposure—more than 34 (2), less than 34 (1). Total exposure (higher than average or not) 1,2

Similar testing was conducted to determine whether differences between groups exist based on the characterization of the images one is exposed to.⁵⁴⁶ An independent-samples t-test compared *brand-China* attribute scores for respondents according to the tone of images and messages of China they experienced. Participants were divided into two groups (Group 1: positive, Group 2: negative) in accordance with their responses to questions corresponding with those indicators. A statistically significant difference was discovered between respondents indicating that the images and messages they received of China were ‘sometimes’ or ‘mostly’ positive versus those who characterized the images as ‘sometimes’ or ‘mostly’ negative in their responses to all measures: ‘culture’, ‘development’, ‘imperialism’, and ‘trustworthiness’. Respondents who categorized images of China as positive were statistically different than those whose characterization was negative at the $p < .001$ level in terms of ‘culture’ ($M=23.6$, $MD=7.24$; 24.4 , 7.47 ; $t(3896)=3.44$), ‘development’ ($M=11.9$, $SD=3.05$; $M=10.43$, $SD=3.51$; $t(3658)=-13.9$), ‘imperialism’ ($M=9.46$, $SD=3.52$; $M=10.66$, 3.10 ; $t(3292)=10.48$), and ‘trustworthiness’ ($M=26.1$, $SD=5.54$; $M=22.7$, 5.21 ; $t(3261)=-18.1$).

The findings suggest that exposure to positive images and messages of the PRC does not increase perceptions of cultural proximity between the two regions. Nonetheless, respondents exposed to more positive constructions of *brand-China* were more likely to endorse China’s trustworthiness, less likely to deem the PRC imperialistic, and more likely to consider Beijing a positive model for development on the continent.

⁵⁴⁶ 1-3 negative or neutral, 4-5 positive tone

Encounters with Chinese

An independent-samples t-test also compared China Cognitive Associations Scale (CCAS) scores for respondents based on how frequently they interact with the Chinese. Those indicating interaction with the Chinese or representations of China at least once a week, were statistically different in terms of ‘trustworthiness’ ($M=23.96$, 5.73 ; $M=24.94$, 5.45 ; $t(3248) = 4.96$, $p=.01$, two-tailed) than those who reported doing so less infrequently. The magnitude of the differences in the means (mean difference = $.97$, 95% CI: $.59$ to 1.35) was very small (eta squared = $.001$). Personal interaction between participants and the Chinese suggests that familiarity does, indeed, breed contempt. Respondents who encountered the Chinese more frequently, considered them less trustworthy as a group, speaking to the disconnect between official and personal accounts of the Afro-Chinese relationship.

Attitudes toward *brand-China*

Fishbein’s Multiattribute Theory Model posits that beliefs are the only mediators of attitude formation and change.⁵⁴⁷ Attitudes refer to an “individual’s internal evaluation of an object” and are considered relatively “stable and enduring” predictors of consumer behavior.⁵⁴⁸ The model proposes that attitudes toward an object are a function of the strength of the salient beliefs regarding that object and the evaluations of those beliefs.⁵⁴⁹ Thus, the basic multi-attribute approach to modeling attitudes uses attributes, beliefs, and weights of importance to determine a measurable score reflective of consumer attitudes.⁵⁵⁰ Attitude is then determined using a specific calculus, assessing

⁵⁴⁷ MacKenzie, Scott B., Richard J. Lutz, and George E. Belch 1986

⁵⁴⁸ Mitchell, Andrew and Jerry C. Olson 1983

⁵⁴⁹ source

⁵⁵⁰ source

individual evaluations of the salient beliefs about the extent to which the brand is believed to possess the attribute (R_i), weighted by the strength of each belief or level of importance assigned by the individual consumer (b_i) (I_i) to create an overall evaluation or attitude toward the brand (A).

$$A_j = \sum_i \beta_i R_{i,j} I_i$$

A Linear multiple regression analysis was conducted to test the relationship between beliefs about China and its relationship to Africa, exposure to information on brand-China, and the importance of cultural proximity as predictors of overall attitudes toward the PRC. The following model was used to test the relationship.

$$A = \alpha + \beta_1 X \sum_i X_i R_{i,j} I_i$$

A = Attitude toward brand:

i = attribute

j = brand

I = Importance weighting (alignment with cultural orientation)

R= rating or belief

X= extent of exposure to the attribute

The dependent variable ‘attitude’ (A) toward *brand-China* was regressed on three variables: ‘perception’ (P), ‘importance’ (I), and ‘exposure’ (X).⁵⁵¹ A reduced number of items were included in the analysis to ensure one-to-one correspondence across all constructs, meaning that only those items with comparable variables across all three

⁵⁵¹ Sources Fishbein and other-list

categories ('perception' (P), 'importance' (I), and 'exposure' (X)) were included in these calculations (table 26).

TABLE 26: ITEM-LIST

<i>Attitude</i>	<i>Importance</i>	<i>Perception</i>
Welcoming	Being hospitable	a place I'd like to visit
Helpful/partner	Being helpful	development partner
Business oriented	Being entrepreneurial	good products
Industrialized	Being pioneering	development model
Family/community oriented	Being communal	values family and community
Hardworking	Being hardworking	lazy (inverse)
Spiritual	Being spiritual	religious citizens
Humane	Being humane	global citizen
Trustworthy	Being loyal	trustworthy
Nice	Being kind	kind to Africa
Powerful	Being powerful	expanding influence

The initial model consists of four constructs 'attitude' (A), 'perception' (P), 'importance' (I), and 'exposure' (X), and 36 indicators (observable variables). Attitude (A) was measured using 13 indicators, Perception (P) was measured using 11 indicators, Exposure (E) by 1 indicators, and cultural importance (I) through 11 indicators. A linear regression was used to assess the ability of 'perception' (P), 'importance' (I), and 'exposure' (X) measures to predict Attitude (A) toward brand-China.

$$\text{Model 1: } A = \alpha + \sum_i \beta_1 x R_{i,j} I_i$$

The relationship between 'attitude' and the dimensions of 'perception', 'importance', and 'exposure' tested revealed that the total variance explained by the model as a whole was 42%, $F(2, 3094) = 1120$, $p < .001$, indicating that it explained more than 40 percent of the variation in participant responses. Table 27 displays the regression coefficients and standard errors for the final model. The indicators of goodness-of-fit obtained through the analysis of the model indicate a good fit.

Nonetheless, while the composite reliability suggested by the total coefficient of determination (r^2) was strong (0.42), inter-item correlations indicated that many of the items possessed squared multiple correlations below 0.5, representative of low individual item reliabilities.

TABLE 27: REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS AND STANDARD ERRORS

Variable	M	SD	1	2	Variable	B	SEB	β
Attitude Measure	40.4	5.20	.64**	.21**	Perceived Import (PI)	.55	.01	.63*
Predictor Variable					Exposure (EX)	.70	.15	.07*
1. Perceived Import	35.1	5.97	--	.22**	Note: R2 = .42 (N = 3013, $p < .01$)			
2. Exposure (EX)	1.5	1.18	.22**	--				

** $p < .01$

The regression fit line and scatterplot imply a linear, positive slope with a moderately strong relationship. The outcome confirms the assumption of homoscedasticity between the predicted dependent variable scores and the errors of prediction, reducing the chances for making Type I and Type II errors (figures 2 and 3).⁵⁵² Differences between the regression fit line and scatterplot suggest that while these data have a linear component that can be adequately described by the model, they also possess a random component that causes them to be scattered in ways not predicted by the model.

⁵⁵² Pallant 2016




FIGURE 8: NORMAL P-P PLOT OF REGRESSION STANDARDIZED RESIDUAL




FIGURE 9: SCATTERPLOT OF REGRESSION

The researcher also conducted a Discriminant Function Analysis (DA) to determine how attitudes differed in response to the three predictors. Discriminant Function Analysis undertakes the same task as multiple linear regression by predicting an outcome, however, multiple linear regression is limited to cases where the dependent variable on the Y axis is an interval (rather than categorical) variable, so that the combination of predictors will produce estimated mean population numerical Y values

for given values of weighted combinations of X values.⁵⁵³ The items in the ‘attitude’ construct were subjected to a binning transformation prior to analysis to transform them into categorical variables, using categories of low, medium, and high attitude scores in response to *brand- China*.⁵⁵⁴

The first discriminant function (perception*importance) was statistically significant, $\Lambda = .640$, $\chi^2(8, N = 36) = 33.92$, $p < .001$, but the second (exposure) was not, $\Lambda = .900$, $\chi^2(3, N = 36) = 3.32$, $p = .34$. These findings underscore those born out by the linear regression model, that according to the Wilks's lambda, ‘perceived import’ is the most important independent variable to the discriminant function.⁵⁵⁵ Table 29 reveals that high scores on the discriminant function were associated with more positive perceptions of China and aligned with the level of cultural importance assigned to individual measures.

TABLE 28: STRUCTURE OF THE DISCRIMINANT FUNCTION

Variable	Loading
Perceived import	.60
Exposure	.04

Univariate analysis indicates that participant attitude groups differed significantly on perceived import, $F(2, 3167) = 881.7$, $MSE = .104$, $p < .001$, and exposure, $F(2, 3094) = 61.8$, $MSE = .036$, $p = .018$. Table 29 contains the classification means for the groups on the discriminant function as well as the group means on each of the original

⁵⁵³ Tabchnick and Fidell 2013

⁵⁵⁴ Pallant 2013

⁵⁵⁵ *ibid*

variables, with Fisher's procedure engaged to make pairwise comparisons.⁵⁵⁶

Participants with high positive attitudes toward China scored significantly higher on 'perceived import' and 'exposure' on the discriminant function than did those in the other two groups (Table 29). Likewise, those with low positive attitudes toward China scored significantly lower on 'perceived import' and 'exposure' on the discriminant function than did those in the other two groups (Table 29). Thus, the model excels at identifying attitudes in general and correctly predicted 57.7 percent of the original cases. Though successful at the high and low end of the scale, the model does a poorer job of correctly classifying respondents with less polarized opinions. This finding suggests that another predictor may be needed in order to separate these attitudes (Table 30).

TABLE 29: GROUP MEANS ON THE DISCRIMINANT FUNCTION

Variable	Attitude Group		
	Low	Medium	High
Perceived Import	30.9	35.7	39.3
Exposure	3.3	3.5	3.8

TABLE 30: PREDICTED GROUP MEMBERSHIP

Cases	Predicted Group Membership*			Total
	Low	Medium	High	
Low	65.7	22.3	12	100
Medium	27.7	40.3	32	100
High	7.3	27.9	64.7	100

*percentages
57.7% of original grouped cases correctly classified.

⁵⁵⁶ Fisher

Composite Perceptions

Sixty-seven percent of respondents assigned the Chinese above average scores of cultural proximity and two-thirds (65 percent) deemed the PRC a strong development model. Participants were fairly evenly split regarding whether Beijing is trustworthy, with four of ten participants also ascribed negative characteristics to the Chinese. Feelings of cultural importance or proximity and the tone and level of exposure images and messages indicative of *brand-China*, seemingly dilute ill feelings toward the PRC and increase incentives for participants to view Beijing positively. The model explained more than 40 percent of the variation in participant responses when testing the relationship between ‘attitude’ and the dimensions of ‘perception’, ‘importance’, and ‘exposure’. Thus, the general model, including aspects of participant perception, cultural importance, and exposure to *brand-China*, does a good job of predicting respondent attitudes toward China.

The findings suggest that African perspectives of *brand-China* are, understandably, diverse and complex. Notwithstanding, consistent with the project’s guiding hypotheses, participant attitudes toward *Brand-China* are driven by exposure, perception, and cultural proximity. Moreover, attitudes toward brand-China are more positive when the respondent’s own cultural orientation is closely aligned with participant perceptions of the brand. Hypotheses 2 and 3 are supported.

Conclusion

China’s nation brand acts as a powerful geopolitical tool in Africa, exhibiting how Beijing hopes to be viewed by international publics. *Brand-China* semiotically constructs and then malleably transforms the Afro-Chinese relationship for various

constituencies through the reiteration of key aspects of the narrative at every touchpoint. This chapter explored local awareness and attitudes toward China's often inconsistent nation brand in Africa. It evaluated several factors vis-à-vis local attitudes toward *brand-China* including respondent exposure, participants perception, and cognitive importance assigned to the brand as it relates to their everyday lives.

From construction firms to market traders, Chinese companies and people have quickly become a ubiquitous presence on the African continent. In the wake of Beijing's expansion into Africa, however, many locals have seemingly formed a love-hate relationship with the PRC. There are mixed attitudes toward the perceived advantages of Chinese partnership as opposed to the perils of Chinese control. Many view Beijing as the continent's best hope for sustained development; yet, high levels of distrust, underpinned by questions regarding China's motives and competing brand messages within the marketplace of Africa-China is problematic. Competing messages create cognitive dissonance, whereby a healthy percentage of respondents feel that China is bad for their country's future, but still view it as the continent's best option.⁵⁵⁷

⁵⁵⁷ Basker, 2007

Chapter Seven

Because of War, We Come Together

“The wretched of the earth are...not necessarily allies to one another” Shohat and Stam (1994), Notes on the Postcolonial

Introduction

Similarly to the cinematic and literary projection of empire accompanying the colonial project, the current political mandate for nations seeking increased access to global resources and markets is to reconstitute images of self against that of a political ‘other’. National imaginary constructions accompanying the contemporary project of global capital accumulation continue to include filmic, journalistic, and literary manifestations of the political and social rhetoric of racial alterity developed during colonialism. Within the US and Europe and, more importantly for this analysis, throughout Asia, colonial definitions of African people and spaces are reified through “yellow savior” narratives as well as washing powder commercials wherein blackness is equated with dirtiness.

This practice demonstrates that within the current era of neoliberal globalization, cultural identities, now as then, reflect power dynamics and internalized notions of difference between nations. Identities reflect not only what is but what could or should be reality; and discourses, as imaginaries participate in the creation of new, and cultivate and nurture identities. Feelings of attachment, membership, belonging, and value formation sustain these new identity formations. Fictive and fantasmogoric new dimensions of self and community undergo multiple iterations and interactions,

sometimes calling for identities to overlap, sometimes include, sometimes exclude, and other times cooperate. These identarian constructions may create or reduce the boundaries between people but also govern and legitimate circumstances for social and political action between groups.⁵⁵⁸

With the advent of globalization, the African continent, has again captured the attention and imagination of new entrants to the global quest for wealth and political positioning. This latest march into the ‘last frontier’, however, finds African spaces and people being redefined as points of inclusion rather than difference. China, most notably, emerged from its prolonged slumber with renewed interest in the African continent. Afro-Chinese relations have been reinvigorated within the last two decades as the PRC adopted more open policies in response to its escalating energy needs and global political aspirations.

China’s uninvited entrée to what has, heretofore, been a western-led undertaking challenges the delegitimization of sovereignty outside the west, inspiring conjecture regarding how this new relationship fits within existing patterns of engagement with Africa.⁵⁵⁹ Is it ultimately beneficial to the continent? Neocolonial? ‘Flexigemonic’?⁵⁶⁰ Or, is it perhaps a manifestation of “global apartheid” auguring further “marginality and crisis”?⁵⁶¹ Inscribed within these questions are hegemonic discourses and practices presenting an unbalanced picture in which an all-powerful China subjugates weak African states.⁵⁶² The relentless focus on what China is doing “to” or in Africa

⁵⁵⁸ Chrysochou, Panayiota, ed. 2017

⁵⁵⁹ Strang 1996

⁵⁶⁰ Flexigemony speaks to an orientation toward raw material supply through a combination of political, economic, and military levers; See Pdraig Carmody 2010, 82

⁵⁶¹ See: Muhammad Asadi 2003; Patrick Bond 2004; Akanmu Adebayo and Olutayo Adesina; 2010

⁵⁶² Carmody and Kragelund 2016

perpetuates the notion of African subjectivity, disregarding the ability of African people to be aware of and make decisions in their own best interest.

This project examined the tension between national imaginary constructions necessitated by the proliferation of global capital, extant colonial discourse, and the repackaging of cultural identities to increase state attractiveness—through the lens of Chinese nation branding in Africa. Whether fictive or real, (de)politicized or aesthetic, nation branding constructs and reimagines the nation and its people for domestic and foreign consumers. These national imaginaries generate legitimating circumstances for social and political action and renegotiate concepts of self and other.

The research project explored not only how and why the Chinese state and state-owned or supported enterprises construct *brand-China* but, more importantly within Africana Studies, how the ‘brand’ is co-constructed and deconstructed by local populations. Building on the Afrocentric Paradigm, the project was largely driven by an intense interest in pinpointing the exact nature of African responses to the “cultural symbols, motifs, rituals, and signs” of Africa embedded within *brand-China*.

The researcher’s commitment to revising the narrative of African subjectivity is underscored by locating the “subject-place” of participating populations and celebrating the agency of African people in diverse environments.⁵⁶³ The dissertation unveiled the drivers of participant attitudes toward *brand-China* by focusing on university students within six universities in the Gambia, Kenya, and South Africa.

Understanding consumer attitudes toward the nation is important to building and maintaining brand equity over time and to understanding how *brand-China*, as a social

⁵⁶³ Asante, Molefi Kete, Yoshitaka Miike, and Jing Yin, eds. *The global intercultural communication reader*. Routledge, 2013.

and political construct, functions as a component of and projects new state identities. Phrased differently, brands approximate national desires to maintain a specific position in the minds of those who ingest the brand. The rationale is that that positioning may over time help to distinguish the brand from competitors. Such positioning, within the conduct of nations and corporations, speaks to how various publics value the brand nation; the customer's feelings and emotional connection to the nation, its people, and its products. In a world where the proliferation of global communication reduces distance between nations, the ability to distinguish one from the other is increasingly important and leaves the state less vulnerability to competitive nation branding strategies.

Chinese moves to 'sameness', cultural proximity, or fictive kinship is the most significant aspect of its nation brand in Africa.⁵⁶⁴ The rhetorical move toward cultural hybridity, proximity, 'sameness' or, simply an imagined community rooted in fictive kinship, is reflective of Beijing's desire to map the historical experiences and cultures of China onto Africa. These attempts, though invidious, are not without merit. Similar experiences of subjugation served as the foundation to new community formations amongst African people throughout periods of enslavement and colonization.

(Re)Constructing Social Identity

If current global transformations affect African people in much the same way as earlier forms of capital accumulation, understanding how diverse African populations,

⁵⁶⁴ Findings from textual analysis revealed one overarching key theme, namely, Sameness, as the most integral component of the Chinese nation brand in Africa. Three other themes also emerged as components of *brand-China* and include: 1) China as development model; 2) China as cooperative partner; and lastly, 3) China as longstanding, traditional friend. Participant attitudes toward China, similarly, revealed additional components of the brand predominated by "Cultural Proximity", "Trustworthiness", "Development", and "Imperialism".

on the continent and across the diaspora, navigated the experiences of enslavement and colonialization might serve as an important predictor of future expansions. Comprised of vastly different linguistic and cultural groupings, early African states and people were as different as states and people anywhere else across the globe. Nonetheless, they were still thought to possess an ‘Africanity’, which made it possible to distinguish the uniquely ‘African’ from the catholic. Pre-European conquest, the constitutive unit of formation across the continent was the family and the social net arising from such groupings played a pivotal role in surviving the fetters of subjugation.

The network of community allowed those subjected to successive forms marginalization outside and within Africa to establish agency over definitions of self, by defining themselves on their own terms, tapping into and deriving sustenance from the comfort of fraternity. Malleable concepts of self have historically enabled African people to recreate and control their cultural identities in tension with, rather than conforming to the limiting definitions projected by Europeans. Stimulated by the shared trauma of transatlantic slavery, colonialism, and neo-imperialism, African people expanded their notions of collective identity—whether imposed or invented—as a coping and continuity mechanism to become ‘Black’⁵⁶⁵, ‘African’⁵⁶⁶, ‘Jewish’⁵⁶⁷, and ‘Hutus’⁵⁶⁸. Thus, African identities have historically been fluid, often marked by the mixing and blending of traditional with contemporary, known with foreign, and innate with acquired to formulate new ways of being.

⁵⁶⁵ Smallwood 2007; Sweet 2003

⁵⁶⁶ Taiwo 2009; Mudimbe, 1988

⁵⁶⁷ Simms Hamilton 2006

⁵⁶⁸ Mamdani 2002

So why wouldn't there be space for imagining and expanding new identity formations once again within this latest period of capital accumulation: globalization? The question may appear groundless, yet it strikes at the heart of Chinese moves toward "sameness" in Africa. Both African nations and China had similar experiences in recent history; both were colonized, both fought vicious battles for liberation, and both struggled to align themselves with the west on their paths toward development. Within this broad narrative, the experiences of both regions appear similar. Unlike China, however, many Africa nations remain constrained by the push and pull of the forces of Western hegemony, Chinese "flexigemony" and Pan African nationalism and regionalism. This triad of influences is increasingly important within an African context, where many countries are still grappling with the aftermath of slavery and colonialism, and the current realities of globalization. Nation branding works in concert with globalization by transmitting cultural ideals and establishing elements of symbolic and psychological influence. These elements force individuals and communities to constantly imagine and reimagine concepts of self and other. *Brand-China* inserts elements of the foreign into the local, using them to transform existing norms and perceptions of identity across the African continent.⁵⁶⁹

The Right to Belong

Perhaps as a function of these globalist project and the cultural mapping implicit within them, the Chinese state constructs an imagined community of "sameness", realigning its cultural symbols, motifs, and rituals with those of the African. The practice leads one to wonder whether Chinese moves toward "sameness" potentially

⁵⁶⁹ Fairclough 2013, 17-18

represent a natural expansion of African communities to again include other marginalized people as part of a cosmopolitan, utopian ideal; or, is “sameness” more akin to the commodification of African cultures found within colonial depictions of Africa?

Brand-China discursively constructs Africa and its people within a static, “culturally determined” frame, insouciantly conflating differences between and within states, and differences between the continent and China to increase brand resonance.⁵⁷⁰ Beijing’s brand image functions by aligning itself with the continent’s sometimes essentialized and stereotypical markers, storifying its historical experiences of community formation for personal gain and reducing African cultures and traditions to sound bites. The brand reinforces images of China at once as ‘understanding brother’, ‘loyal friend’, ‘cultural traditionalist’, and once- impoverished nation victimized by Western imperialism. These constructions of China and Africa-China, are replete with Bandung-era propaganda and reflect internalized colonial concepts of an immobile Africa, frozen in time. Thus, begging the question of how an image produced during the colonial period travels around the world and reproduces itself across different spaces and circuits of time.

Beijing promotes its own long-term foreign policy goals in Africa, interrupting western influence on the continent by reviving metaphors of the solidarity movement and linking the developmentalism of the present day with Maoist discourse. The PRC insinuates itself into Africa’s origin, evolution, and eventual fate through the repeated telling of these stories. These moves toward cultural hybridity and the seeming

⁵⁷⁰ Ndlovu-Garsheni 2013, 25; Edozie and Soyinka-Airewele 2010, 378

interpenetration and homogenization of indigenous African cultures is problematic because cultural hegemony is inscribed and reproduced in the act of so.⁵⁷¹ The PRC adopts what Tuck and Yang (2012) classify as ‘settler moves to innocence’, deflecting the settler/colonial identity embedded in critiques of Africa-China, by depicting itself as “simultaneously oppressed and never an oppressor”.⁵⁷² This is problematic considering that, within *brand-China* and through the construction of “sameness”, Beijing also claims the right to enjoy the benefits of certain settler privileges, including the right to determine who gains admission to the ‘tribe.’⁵⁷³

As sovereign nations, African states and people possess the discretion to determine who can hold the rights of membership. In 2017, President Uhuru Kenyatta named the descendants of early Indian migrants to the east African nation as the 44th ‘tribe’ of Kenya. Kenyatta’s act, seemingly imperceptible to some given obvious differences between the two groups, laid the foundation for the rights of inclusion nee the rights of admission to the ‘tribe,’ to also be extended to other groups in the future, such as the Chinese whose blood still courses through Lamu.⁵⁷⁴ In similar fashion, descendants of European colonialists, comprising significant proportions of the populations within South Africa, Angola, Namibia, and Madagascar; now identify as African.

These expansions of African identity speak to the power of the imagination to form and reform the nation, the state, and the community to meet its needs. The question is not whether such reconstructions are rational or appropriate but whether the fantasy of

⁵⁷¹ Mensah 2008, 38

⁵⁷² Tuck and Yang 2012, 9

⁵⁷³ Tuck and Yang

⁵⁷⁴ Chinese ancestry has been documented amongst the Malindi people in the Kenyan coastal community of Lamu. Their ancestors were said to be from Kenyan women who married shipwrecked Chinese Ming sailors. See: http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2005-07/11/content_459090.htm

“sameness” spun through films, magazines, television, editorials, and billboards as components of *brand-China* is accepted and internalized in a way that lays a foundation for establishing newly imagined communities between African and Chinese people.

The construction of a *brand-China* rooted in equivalent claims to pain and oppression, rather than acts of oppression, and designed to create a fictive Afro-Chinese community, is the most significant aspect of China’s nation brand in Africa. It is also a disingenuous, propagandized, and ahistorical representation of past and present African and Chinese experiences. Despite this, whereas the most frequently constructed narrative of *brand-China* in Africa is one of “sameness,”⁵⁷⁵ cultural proximity, a component of sameness, emerged as the strongest component of participant perceptions of brand-China. Thus, the message of cultural affinity or similitude between Chinese and Africa people, whether accepted or not, clearly resonates across the continent. Gambian, Kenyan, and South African responses to *brand-China* differ in important ways. What these communities do share, however is a view of the Chinese and attitudes toward *brand-China* as, if not culturally similar, nonetheless, still worthy of at least some degree of cultural deference. The latter perhaps reinforces to the cultural imperative toward respect and hospitality engendered within African cultures and extended to all people.

Gambia

This is born out in the Gambia, a small west African nation marked by self-imposed isolation, and political and economic uncertainty for more than two decades. The

⁵⁷⁵ Sameness creates a discursive framework for establishing points of commonality between Chinese and African people, the historical and contemporary experiences of Chinese and African people, cultural propinquity, being a part of a shared (or the same) community, Chinese kinship, brotherhood, sisterhood, or familyhood with Africa.

composite Gambian view of China is of a state with strong cultural proximity to the continent and equally strong implications to Africa's continued developmental growth and prosperity. Sentiments of cultural connection were most evident amongst participants who possessed strong orientations toward social as opposed to economic indicators of culture. This can be interpreted to mean that participants for whom considerations of family and community were most important, affinity with the PRC was greatest, demonstrating a relationship between attitude formation and cultural importance.

Gambian participants reported low levels of exposure to the Chinese beyond 'products' and 'politicians', suggesting that though infrequent, political messages (alongside product placement) contribute to feelings of cultural proximity. Data were collected shortly after the nation transitioned from the leadership of President Yahya Jammeh to the recently elected Adama Barrow (2017-), only the country's third leader post-independence and its second democratically elected. Despite this change, perceptions of closeness between Gambian people may also be attributable to the shared experience of authoritarian rule.

Nonetheless, participant responses reflect hope for a future marked by greater internal stability and sustained growth. As a nation predominated by farming and fishing, wherein the agricultural sector employs 70-percent of the labor force and accounts for more than 30 percent of the nation's GDP, Gambians view the Chinese presence as an opportunity to diversify and increase manufacturing interests, which currently contribute little to the national economy.⁵⁷⁶

⁵⁷⁶ CIA World Factbook; World Bank

Yahya Jammeh pursued a policy of isolation, which left country bereft of Western allies. Given the cessation of ties between Banjul and London and Banjul and Washington, it makes sense that the Gambian people should look favorably upon the new partnership with the Chinese. Participants trust the Chinese brand but a lack of general awareness of the PRC as distinctly different than the ROC and the inconstant nature of Gambian-Chinese relations begs the question of *which* China Gambian students place their faith in.

Kenya

Pomp and circumstance surrounding the inauguration of the Madaraka Express, in conflict with negative press surrounding the 2015 ‘Chinese Restaurant’ row and other racially motivated unrest between the local population and Chinese migrants, exemplifies the diffuse nature of images and messages of *brand-China* experienced in Kenya. Participants hold regard for the PRC in terms of its cultural proximity to Africa, closely aligning with respondent beliefs that Beijing’s motives are benevolent and rooted in something other than expanding its global influence. The fact that Kenyan respondents expressed significantly lower feelings of similitude in their perceptions of China, than their Gambian counterparts, may be reflective of the strength and prevalence of these competing narratives of China within Kenya.

Despite counternarratives of the PRC’s racist perspectives of Africa and the reported effects of Chinese construction on indigenous plant life, Kenyan participants still consider Beijing the continent’s best hope for sustained developmental progress. Respondents possess significantly positive perceptions of China as a trustworthy, benevolently-intentioned development model and partner. Positive attitudes toward the

Chinese may also be attributable to Chinese investments in the Kenyan economy.

Chinese leaders made a number of well-publicized financial commitments to the East African nation, which strengthens *brand-China* by insinuating that the PRC is a strong and trustworthy development model and partner. Nonetheless, the reality is that bilateral trade between the two nations is heavily skewed in Beijing's favor, demonstrating the power of rhetoric to shape perception despite reality.

South Africa

Perhaps because of the strength of its economy in its own right and its inclusion alongside China as a BRICS nation, South African participants viewed the PRC as a less significant development partner than those in either the Gambia or Kenya.

Numerous factors could potentially underpin South African attitudes toward *brand-China*. Beijing's surging trade and investment in South Africa has grown significantly since the PRC implemented its policy of 'going out'. Afro-Chinese trade relations across the continent are still dominated by Chinese exports of finished products and imports of African raw materials. Yet, the PRC's relationship with South Africa, as a fellow BRICS nation, more closely approximates a relationship of equals.

South Africans were most discriminating in their opinions of brand-China and *awareness* may play a factor. South African respondents were significantly more knowledgeable of current events relative to the PRC than their counterparts in either the Gambia or Kenya. South African participants also found the Chinese least trustworthy and least culturally proxemic. These participants also questioned the PRC's motives on the continent significantly more than their counterparts and South African attitudes toward *brand-China* are potentially symbolic of an historical distrust of Asian migrants

in combination with growing xenophobia within the nation. Despite wholesale developmental gains, unemployment rates for indigenous South Africans remain high and unrest against those perceived as foreign competitors for jobs and resources simmers just below the surface. Lines between in-groups and out-groups have become more definitive, making it difficult to imagine the communion of sameness with the 'Hausa' as much as the 'Han'.

A Stroke of the Post

In "Violence, Mourning, Politics," Judith Butler meditates on how experiences of vulnerability and loss can serve as the basis for establishing human connection.⁵⁷⁷ Stimulated by the shared trauma of transatlantic slavery, colonialism, and neo-imperialism, African people have inexorably utilized their experiences of loss to reconstitute individual and communal identities. For those communities experiencing brutal ruptures undermining their sense of identity, inscribing a collective character, one that reclaims the historical memory of the past, was essential to fashioning a "resistant collective identity."⁵⁷⁸ Collective identity was predicated not only on distance from their homelands and their known communities but, also, a shared assimilation into a congregation "whose most distinguishing feature was its unnatural constitution: it brought strangers together in anomalous intimacy."⁵⁷⁹

Brand-China builds on this constant negotiation and renegotiation of self and other, aligning its nation brand with Africa's "distinct socio-historical marker(s)."⁵⁸⁰ Drawing heavily upon the concept of community identity and shared ethos to inculcate

⁵⁷⁷ Butler 2003, 20

⁵⁷⁸ Shohat and Stam 2014

⁵⁷⁹ Smallwood 2007, 101

⁵⁸⁰ Dodson 2014, 49

a communal consciousness heightened by political and economic marginalization by the West, the Chinese State uses its brand to inculcate feelings of historical and experiential similitude with Africa. By examining official images and messages as sites of the nation's brand through which national imaginaries of self and other are produced and disseminated in societies, we see how subtle, consistent messages of "friendship," "brotherhood," "development," or "cooperation," reinforced through speeches celebrating the opening of a Confucius Center or ads depicting African women dressed as Chinese ethnic minorities, project carefully curated images of the PRC for African consumption, creating an environment of experiential similitude with Africa. These practices are important because "they are so routine, so prevalent, so popular, and so ubiquitous."⁵⁸¹ Nation branding, whether depicting reality, history, or fantasy has an important place within cultural politics as it helps shape the national imaginary of African communities.

Brand-China is complicated by competing messages within state, corporate, and individual depictions of Africa. The unresolved tension between Chinese popular discourse and official State accounts of Africa, its people, and its relationship to China creates brand confusion, thereby diminishing the strength and success of China's nation brand across the continent. More importantly, the very formulation of *brand-China's* claims to "sameness", conflating vastly different African and Chinese experiences as "equally 'post-colonial,'" is also problematic.⁵⁸² Disingenuously adjudging the two regions' colonial and post-colonial experiences as equivalent, elides difference and overlooks the complexities of power relations between and within developing countries,

⁵⁸¹ Subotic 2017, 9

⁵⁸² Shohat and Stam 2014, 103

between dominant and subaltern, and settler and indigenous groups. The practice also overlooks internalized, racialized colonial notions of Africa and Africans embedded within the brand.

Sameness, or the semblance of cultural affinity, as a social construction, nonetheless, appears an acceptable proposition from the vantage point of university students in the Gambia and Kenya. Metaphorically conceiving of themselves as part of a broadly defined Afro-Chinese community allows these peoples to expand and reimagine their social, cultural and political identities as well as enact their own visions for the future.⁵⁸³ The fact that students in these spaces collectively envision a future inclusive of the Chinese as “longstanding friends” and “trustworthy partners” is perhaps the most telling symbol of *brand-China’s* success on the continent. Nonetheless, within their responses, these actors demonstrate the ability to distinguish what is uniquely Gambian, Kenyan, and South African from Chinese invention; creating new opportunities for independent action unbound by longstanding structures of power; and thereby proving themselves real subjects in their own right rather than simply recipients of Chinese whims or cogs in the machine of the dominant global structure.

⁵⁸³ Keto 2001

APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

IRB INITIAL CONSENT FORM

Michigan State University, East Lansing, Michigan, U.S.

Project Title: Investigating Mediated Approaches to Enhancing National Image in International Environments

Investigators: Tara Mock

CONSENT STATEMENT

My name is Tara Mock. I am in the Gambia undertaking research as part of a project geared toward identifying local perspectives of other countries. The name of the study is *Investigating Mediated Approaches to Enhancing National Image in International Environments*. Taking part in this study may help us better understand how messages are received, interpreted, and acted upon in diverse settings. The people in charge of the study are myself and Rita Kiki Edozie. If you agree to participate, you will be asked to complete a forty-minute survey of your opinions concerning foreign nations and publics. Your participation in this research study is completely voluntary. If you decide not to participate, there will be no penalty or loss of benefits to which you are otherwise entitled. You can, of course, decline to discuss any issue, as well as stop participating at any time, without any penalty or loss of benefits to which you are otherwise entitled. Participation in this study will involve no cost to you and you will be compensated with 50 dalasis as a token of appreciation for your time. You will receive it at the beginning of the survey and keep it whether or not you choose to complete the process.

Your participation in this study does not involve any physical or emotional risk to you beyond that of everyday life and all personal information will be kept confidential using the following safeguards:

- I will keep collected data private to the extent allowed by law.
- I will keep your records under a code number rather than by name. In other words your real name will not appear on the files associated with this project.
- I will keep your records (e.g., recorded interviews) on a password-protected computer in a locked office. Study staff will only be allowed to look at the interviews. I will destroy the information at the end of the study.

When results of this study are published your name and other facts that might point to you will not appear.

Whom to contact with questions:

If you have any questions or problems during your time on this study, you should call *Rita Kiki Edozie* as the person in charge of this research project, who can be reached at 1-517-432-5291 or rkedomzie@msu.edu. Neither the Principal Investigator nor Michigan State University have made provisions for payment of costs associated with any injury resulting from participation in this study.

To ensure that this research is being conducted properly, the Michigan State University IRB may review study records.

Rita Kiki Edozie

Professor, International Relations
364 North Case Hall
Michigan State University
East Lansing, MI 48824-1212
Telephone: 517-432-5291
Email: rkedomzie@msu.edu

Are you okay with participating in this study by answering questions about foreign countries? If yes, please sign your name on the signature line below. If not, please return this form to the study administrator.

Name: _____ Signature: _____

APPENDIX B

SURVEY INSTRUMENT

Michigan State University, East Lansing, Michigan, U.S.
 Project Title: Constructing Nation Brand through African Public Opinion (RT1)
 Investigator: Tara Mock

Section A. Information Access <i>The first set of questions concerns how you typically receive information about people, places, and events.</i> <i>Never or Rarely (less than once a month), Monthly (once a month), A couple of times a month (more than one but fewer than four times), Weekly (once a week), A couple of times a week (more than one but fewer than seven times), Daily (every day)</i>						
How often do you do the following (please circle only one answer for each question):						
A1. Send text messages?						
Never, or rarely 1	Monthly 2	A couple of times a month 3	Weekly 4	A couple of times a week 5	Daily 6	
A2. Receive text messages?						
Never, or rarely 1	Monthly 2	A couple of times a month 3	Weekly 4	A couple of times a week 5	Daily 6	
A3. Use the internet?						
Never, or rarely 1	Monthly 2	A couple of times a month 3	Weekly 4	A couple of times a week 5	Daily 6	
A4. Watch television?						
Never, or rarely 1	Monthly 2	A couple of times a month 3	Weekly 4	A couple of times a week 5	Daily 6	
A5. Read the newspaper, magazines, or other periodicals?						
Never, or rarely 1	Monthly 2	A couple of times a month 3	Weekly 4	A couple of times a week 5	Daily 6	
A6. Listen to the radio?						
Never, or rarely 1	Monthly 2	A couple of times a month 3	Weekly 4	A couple of times a week 5	Daily 6	
A7. Hear information about other countries from friends, relatives, television, radio, news, or other sources?						
Never, or rarely 1	Monthly 2	A couple of times a month 3	Weekly 4	A couple of times a week 5	Daily 6	
Section B. Country Exposure <i>The next set of questions is about how often you receive information about people, places, and events from other countries.</i>						
B1. Have you or any of your close relatives or friends been abroad?			Yes 1		No 2 (skip to B2)	
B1.1 If yes, who? (circle all that apply)						
Me	Parent	Brother/Sister	Spouse/fiance/ boyfriend/girlfriend	Child	Aunt/Uncle/Cousin	Friend
2	3	4	5	6	7	8
B1.2 Which countries did you/they visit?						
1. _____ 2. _____ 3. _____ 4. _____						
B2.21 How often do you read about, hear about or see images of China?						
Never, or rarely 1	Monthly 2	A couple of times a month 3	Weekly 4	A couple of times a week 5	Daily 6	
B2.22. Who or what is featured most often in such images? (please select only one answer)						
Politicians	Businessmen	Celebrities (actors, musicians, athletes)	Places	Things/Products	Other	
1	2	3	4	5	6	
B2.23. Where are you most likely to encounter such images?						
Television/ Film	Books	Newspaper/magazines	online	Personal interaction	Other	
1	2	3	4	5	6	
B2.24. How would you characterize the images you see of China?						
Mostly negative 1	Sometimes negative 2	Neither negative nor positive 3	Sometimes positive 4	Mostly positive 5		
B3.11 How often do you read about, hear about or see images of India?						
Never, or rarely 1	Monthly 2	A couple of times a month 3	Weekly 4	A couple of times a week 5	Daily 6	
B3.. Who or what is featured most often in such images? (please select only one answer)						
Politicians	Businessmen	Celebrities (actors, musicians, athletes)	Places	Things/Products	Other	
1	2	3	4	5	6	
B2.73. Where are you most likely to encounter such images?						

Television/ Film	Books	Newspaper/magazines	online	Personal interaction	
1	2	3	4	5	

B2.74. How would you characterize the images you see of India?

Mostly negative	Sometimes negative	Neither negative nor positive	Sometimes positive	M
1	2	3	4	

B2.11 How often do you read about, hear about or see images of the United States?

Never, or rarely	Monthly	A couple of times a month	Weekly	A couple of times a week
1	2	3	4	5

B2.12. Who or what is featured most often in such images? (please select only one answer)

Politicians	Businessmen	Celebrities (actors, musicians, athletes)	Places	Things/Products
1	2	3	4	5

B2.13. Where are you most likely to encounter such images?

Television/ Film	Books	Newspaper/magazines	online	Personal interaction
1	2	3	4	5

B2.14. How would you characterize the images you see of United States?

Mostly negative	Sometimes negative	Neither negative nor positive	Sometimes positive	M
1	2	3	4	

Section C: Country Perceptions (descriptive terms)

C2. China— How likely would you be to use the following words to describe China in a conversation?
Highly unlikely (fewer than 1 times out of 10), Somewhat unlikely (3-4 times out of 10), Neither unlikely nor likely (5 times out of 10), Somewhat likely (6-7 times out of 10), Highly likely (8 or more times out of 10)

Adventurous	Highly unlikely	Somewhat unlikely	Neither unlikely nor likely	Somewhat likely
	1	2	3	4
Aggressive	Highly unlikely	Somewhat unlikely	Neither unlikely nor likely	Somewhat likely
	1	2	3	4
Brotherly	Highly unlikely	Somewhat unlikely	Neither unlikely nor likely	Somewhat likely
	1	2	3	4
Business-Oriented	Highly unlikely	Somewhat unlikely	Neither unlikely nor likely	Somewhat likely
	1	2	3	4
Colonizing	Highly unlikely	Somewhat unlikely	Neither unlikely nor likely	Somewhat likely
	1	2	3	4
Community-oriented	Highly unlikely	Somewhat unlikely	Neither unlikely nor likely	Somewhat likely
	1	2	3	4
Competitive	Highly unlikely	Somewhat unlikely	Neither unlikely nor likely	Somewhat likely
	1	2	3	4
Consumerist	Highly unlikely	Somewhat unlikely	Neither unlikely nor likely	Somewhat likely
	1	2	3	4
Corrupt	Highly unlikely	Somewhat unlikely	Neither unlikely nor likely	Somewhat likely
	1	2	3	4
Cruel	Highly unlikely	Somewhat unlikely	Neither unlikely nor likely	Somewhat likely
	1	2	3	4
Cultural	Highly unlikely	Somewhat unlikely	Neither unlikely nor likely	Somewhat likely
	1	2	3	4
Developing	Highly unlikely	Somewhat unlikely	Neither unlikely nor likely	Somewhat likely
	1	2	3	4
Diplomatic	Highly unlikely	Somewhat unlikely	Neither unlikely nor likely	Somewhat likely
	1	2	3	4
Family-Oriented	Highly unlikely	Somewhat unlikely	Neither unlikely nor likely	Somewhat likely
	1	2	3	4
Friend	Highly unlikely	Somewhat unlikely	Neither unlikely nor likely	Somewhat likely
	1	2	3	4
Hard Working	Highly unlikely	Somewhat unlikely	Neither unlikely nor likely	Somewhat likely
	1	2	3	4
Helpful	Highly unlikely	Somewhat unlikely	Neither unlikely nor likely	Somewhat likely
	1	2	3	4
Humane	Highly unlikely	Somewhat unlikely	Neither unlikely nor likely	Somewhat likely
	1	2	3	4
Imperialist	Highly unlikely	Somewhat unlikely	Neither unlikely nor likely	Somewhat likely

Innovative	Highly unlikely 1	Somewhat unlikely 2	Neither unlikely nor likely 3	Somewhat likely 4	
Loyal	Highly unlikely 1	Somewhat unlikely 2	Neither unlikely nor likely 3	Somewhat likely 4	
Nationalistic	Highly unlikely 1	Somewhat unlikely 2	Neither unlikely nor likely 3	Somewhat likely 4	
Nice	Highly unlikely 1	Somewhat unlikely 2	Neither unlikely nor likely 3	Somewhat likely 4	
Opportunistic	Highly unlikely 1	Somewhat unlikely 2	Neither unlikely nor likely 3	Somewhat likely 4	
Partner	Highly unlikely 1	Somewhat unlikely 2	Neither unlikely nor likely 3	Somewhat likely 4	
Peaceful	Highly unlikely 1	Somewhat unlikely 2	Neither unlikely nor likely 3	Somewhat likely 4	
Powerful	Highly unlikely 1	Somewhat unlikely 2	Neither unlikely nor likely 3	Somewhat likely 4	
Racist	Highly unlikely 1	Somewhat unlikely 2	Neither unlikely nor likely 3	Somewhat likely 4	
Reliable	Highly unlikely 1	Somewhat unlikely 2	Neither unlikely nor likely 3	Somewhat likely 4	
Respectful	Highly unlikely 1	Somewhat unlikely 2	Neither unlikely nor likely 3	Somewhat likely 4	
Spiritual	Highly unlikely 1	Somewhat unlikely 2	Neither unlikely nor likely 3	Somewhat likely 4	
Technology-Oriented	Highly unlikely 1	Somewhat unlikely 2	Neither unlikely nor likely 3	Somewhat likely 4	
Tied-to-the-rules	Highly unlikely 1	Somewhat unlikely 2	Neither unlikely nor likely 3	Somewhat likely 4	
Traditional	Highly unlikely 1	Somewhat unlikely 2	Neither unlikely nor likely 3	Somewhat likely 4	
Trustworthy	Highly unlikely 1	Somewhat unlikely 2	Neither unlikely nor likely 3	Somewhat likely 4	
Welcoming	Highly unlikely 1	Somewhat unlikely 2	Neither unlikely nor likely 3	Somewhat likely 4	

Section C: Country Perceptions (descriptive terms)

C4. India — How likely would you be to use the following words to describe India in a conversation?

Highly unlikely (fewer than times out of 10), Somewhat unlikely (3-4 times out of 10), Neither unlikely nor likely (5 times out of 10), Somewhat likely (6-7 times out of 10), Highly likely (8 or more times out of 10)

Adventurous	Highly unlikely 1	Somewhat unlikely 2	Neither unlikely nor likely 3	Somewhat likely 4	
Aggressive	Highly unlikely 1	Somewhat unlikely 2	Neither unlikely nor likely 3	Somewhat likely 4	
Brotherly	Highly unlikely 1	Somewhat unlikely 2	Neither unlikely nor likely 3	Somewhat likely 4	
Business-Oriented	Highly unlikely 1	Somewhat unlikely 2	Neither unlikely nor likely 3	Somewhat likely 4	
Colonizing	Highly unlikely 1	Somewhat unlikely 2	Neither unlikely nor likely 3	Somewhat likely 4	
Community-oriented	Highly unlikely 1	Somewhat unlikely 2	Neither unlikely nor likely 3	Somewhat likely 4	
Competitive	Highly unlikely 1	Somewhat unlikely 2	Neither unlikely nor likely 3	Somewhat likely 4	
Consumerist	Highly unlikely 1	Somewhat unlikely 2	Neither unlikely nor likely 3	Somewhat likely 4	

Corrupt	Highly unlikely 1	Somewhat unlikely 2	Neither unlikely nor likely 3	Somewhat likely 4	
Cruel	Highly unlikely 1	Somewhat unlikely 2	Neither unlikely nor likely 3	Somewhat likely 4	
Cultural	Highly unlikely 1	Somewhat unlikely 2	Neither unlikely nor likely 3	Somewhat likely 4	
Developing	Highly unlikely 1	Somewhat unlikely 2	Neither unlikely nor likely 3	Somewhat likely 4	
Diplomatic	Highly unlikely 1	Somewhat unlikely 2	Neither unlikely nor likely 3	Somewhat likely 4	
Family-Oriented	Highly unlikely 1	Somewhat unlikely 2	Neither unlikely nor likely 3	Somewhat likely 4	

Friend	Highly unlikely 1	Somewhat unlikely 2	Neither unlikely nor likely 3	Somewhat likely 4	
Hard Working	Highly unlikely 1	Somewhat unlikely 2	Neither unlikely nor likely 3	Somewhat likely 4	
	Highly unlikely 1	Somewhat unlikely 2	Neither unlikely nor likely 3	Somewhat likely 4	

Imperialist	Highly unlikely 1	Somewhat unlikely 2	Neither unlikely nor likely 3	Somewhat likely 4	
Individualistic	Highly unlikely 1	Somewhat unlikely 2	Neither unlikely nor likely 3	Somewhat likely 4	
Industrialized	Highly unlikely 1	Somewhat unlikely 2	Neither unlikely nor likely 3	Somewhat likely 4	
Innovative	Highly unlikely 1	Somewhat unlikely 2	Neither unlikely nor likely 3	Somewhat likely 4	
Loyal	Highly unlikely 1	Somewhat unlikely 2	Neither unlikely nor likely 3	Somewhat likely 4	
Nationalistic	Highly unlikely 1	Somewhat unlikely 2	Neither unlikely nor likely 3	Somewhat likely 4	
Nice	Highly unlikely 1	Somewhat unlikely 2	Neither unlikely nor likely 3	Somewhat likely 4	
Opportunistic	Highly unlikely 1	Somewhat unlikely 2	Neither unlikely nor likely 3	Somewhat likely 4	
Partner	Highly unlikely 1	Somewhat unlikely 2	Neither unlikely nor likely 3	Somewhat likely 4	
Peaceful	Highly unlikely 1	Somewhat unlikely 2	Neither unlikely nor likely 3	Somewhat likely 4	
Powerful	Highly unlikely 1	Somewhat unlikely 2	Neither unlikely nor likely 3	Somewhat likely 4	
Racist	Highly unlikely 1	Somewhat unlikely 2	Neither unlikely nor likely 3	Somewhat likely 4	
Reliable	Highly unlikely 1	Somewhat unlikely 2	Neither unlikely nor likely 3	Somewhat likely 4	
Respectful	Highly unlikely 1	Somewhat unlikely 2	Neither unlikely nor likely 3	Somewhat likely 4	
Spiritual	Highly unlikely 1	Somewhat unlikely 2	Neither unlikely nor likely 3	Somewhat likely 4	
Technology-Oriented	Highly unlikely 1	Somewhat unlikely 2	Neither unlikely nor likely 3	Somewhat likely 4	
Tied-to-the-rules	Highly unlikely 1	Somewhat unlikely 2	Neither unlikely nor likely 3	Somewhat likely 4	
Traditional	Highly unlikely 1	Somewhat unlikely 2	Neither unlikely nor likely 3	Somewhat likely 4	
Trustworthy	Highly unlikely 1	Somewhat unlikely 2	Neither unlikely nor likely 3	Somewhat likely 4	
Welcoming	Highly unlikely 1	Somewhat unlikely 2	Neither unlikely nor likely 3	Somewhat likely 4	
Section C: Country Perceptions (descriptive terms)					
C8. United States—How likely would you be to use the following words to describe the United States in a conversation?					
Highly unlikely (fewer than 1 times out of 10), Somewhat unlikely (3-4 times out of 10), Neither unlikely nor likely (5 times out of 10), Somewhat likely (6-7 times out of 10), Highly likely (8 or more times out of 10)					
Adventurous	Highly unlikely 1	Somewhat unlikely 2	Neither unlikely nor likely 3	Somewhat likely 4	
Aggressive	Highly unlikely 1	Somewhat unlikely 2	Neither unlikely nor likely 3	Somewhat likely 4	
Brotherly	Highly unlikely 1	Somewhat unlikely 2	Neither unlikely nor likely 3	Somewhat likely 4	
Business-Oriented	Highly unlikely 1	Somewhat unlikely 2	Neither unlikely nor likely 3	Somewhat likely 4	
Colonizing	Highly unlikely 1	Somewhat unlikely 2	Neither unlikely nor likely 3	Somewhat likely 4	
Community-oriented	Highly unlikely 1	Somewhat unlikely 2	Neither unlikely nor likely 3	Somewhat likely 4	
Competitive	Highly unlikely 1	Somewhat unlikely 2	Neither unlikely nor likely 3	Somewhat likely 4	
Consumerist	Highly unlikely 1	Somewhat unlikely 2	Neither unlikely nor likely 3	Somewhat likely 4	
Corrupt	Highly unlikely 1	Somewhat unlikely 2	Neither unlikely nor likely 3	Somewhat likely 4	
Cruel	Highly unlikely 1	Somewhat unlikely 2	Neither unlikely nor likely 3	Somewhat likely 4	
Cultural	Highly unlikely 1	Somewhat unlikely 2	Neither unlikely nor likely 3	Somewhat likely 4	
Developing	Highly unlikely 1	Somewhat unlikely 2	Neither unlikely nor likely 3	Somewhat likely 4	
Diplomatic	Highly unlikely 1	Somewhat unlikely 2	Neither unlikely nor likely 3	Somewhat likely 4	
Family-Oriented	Highly unlikely 1	Somewhat unlikely 2	Neither unlikely nor likely 3	Somewhat likely 4	
	Highly unlikely 1	Somewhat unlikely 2	Neither unlikely nor likely 3	Somewhat likely 4	

Humane	Highly unlikely	Somewhat unlikely	Neither unlikely nor likely	Somewhat likely	
	1	2	3	4	
Imperialist	Highly unlikely	Somewhat unlikely	Neither unlikely nor likely	Somewhat likely	
	1	2	3	4	
Individualistic	Highly unlikely	Somewhat unlikely	Neither unlikely nor likely	Somewhat likely	
	1	2	3	4	
Industrialized	Highly unlikely	Somewhat unlikely	Neither unlikely nor likely	Somewhat likely	
	1	2	3	4	
Innovative	Highly unlikely	Somewhat unlikely	Neither unlikely nor likely	Somewhat likely	
	1	2	3	4	
Loyal	Highly unlikely	Somewhat unlikely	Neither unlikely nor likely	Somewhat likely	
	1	2	3	4	
Nationalistic	Highly unlikely	Somewhat unlikely	Neither unlikely nor likely	Somewhat likely	
	1	2	3	4	
Nice	Highly unlikely	Somewhat unlikely	Neither unlikely nor likely	Somewhat likely	
	1	2	3	4	
Opportunistic	Highly unlikely	Somewhat unlikely	Neither unlikely nor likely	Somewhat likely	
	1	2	3	4	
Partner	Highly unlikely	Somewhat unlikely	Neither unlikely nor likely	Somewhat likely	
	1	2	3	4	
Peaceful	Highly unlikely	Somewhat unlikely	Neither unlikely nor likely	Somewhat likely	
	1	2	3	4	
Powerful	Highly unlikely	Somewhat unlikely	Neither unlikely nor likely	Somewhat likely	
	1	2	3	4	
Racist	Highly unlikely	Somewhat unlikely	Neither unlikely nor likely	Somewhat likely	
	1	2	3	4	
Reliable	Highly unlikely	Somewhat unlikely	Neither unlikely nor likely	Somewhat likely	
	1	2	3	4	
Respectful	Highly unlikely	Somewhat unlikely	Neither unlikely nor likely	Somewhat likely	
	1	2	3	4	
Spiritual	Highly unlikely	Somewhat unlikely	Neither unlikely nor likely	Somewhat likely	
	1	2	3	4	
Technology-Oriented	Highly unlikely	Somewhat unlikely	Neither unlikely nor likely	Somewhat likely	
	1	2	3	4	
Tied-to-the-rules	Highly unlikely	Somewhat unlikely	Neither unlikely nor likely	Somewhat likely	
	1	2	3	4	
Traditional	Highly unlikely	Somewhat unlikely	Neither unlikely nor likely	Somewhat likely	
	1	2	3	4	
Trustworthy	Highly unlikely	Somewhat unlikely	Neither unlikely nor likely	Somewhat likely	
	1	2	3	4	
Welcoming	Highly unlikely	Somewhat unlikely	Neither unlikely nor likely	Somewhat likely	
	1	2	3	4	

Section D. Cultural Orientation			
Which of the following characteristics are deemed most significant within your culture?			
(Please select three traits from the list below)			
Being Hospitable	<input type="radio"/>	Being Individualistic	<input type="radio"/>
Being Aggressive	<input type="radio"/>	Being Spiritual	<input type="radio"/>
Being Helpful	<input type="radio"/>	Being Humane	<input type="radio"/>
Being Entrepreneurial	<input type="radio"/>	Being Loyal	<input type="radio"/>
Being Pioneering	<input type="radio"/>	Being Patriotic	<input type="radio"/>
Being Community-oriented	<input type="radio"/>	Being Kind	<input type="radio"/>
Being Competitive	<input type="radio"/>	Being Respectful	<input type="radio"/>
Being Cautious	<input type="radio"/>	Being Powerful	<input type="radio"/>
Being Hard-working	<input type="radio"/>	Being Peaceful	<input type="radio"/>

Section E. Country Awareness				
Which of the following people, places, and languages are most commonly connected with each country?				
F=India C=China US=United States (Please circle the letter associated with each nation in the space provided)				
Leaders	Celebrities/Hist. Fig.	Place	Language	
Tsai Ing-wen I C US	Yao Ming I C US	Beijing I C US	Wolof I C US	
Yahya Jammeh I C US	Kanye West I C US	London I C US	Mandarin I C US	Kru

Helpful	Highly unlikely	Somewhat unlikely	Neither unlikely nor likely	Somewhat likely	
	1	2	3	4	
Humane	Highly unlikely	Somewhat unlikely	Neither unlikely nor likely	Somewhat likely	
	1	2	3	4	
Imperialist	Highly unlikely	Somewhat unlikely	Neither unlikely nor likely	Somewhat likely	
	1	2	3	4	
Individualistic	Highly unlikely	Somewhat unlikely	Neither unlikely nor likely	Somewhat likely	
	1	2	3	4	
Industrialized	Highly unlikely	Somewhat unlikely	Neither unlikely nor likely	Somewhat likely	
	1	2	3	4	
Innovative	Highly unlikely	Somewhat unlikely	Neither unlikely nor likely	Somewhat likely	
	1	2	3	4	
Loyal	Highly unlikely	Somewhat unlikely	Neither unlikely nor likely	Somewhat likely	
	1	2	3	4	
Nationalistic	Highly unlikely	Somewhat unlikely	Neither unlikely nor likely	Somewhat likely	
	1	2	3	4	
Nice	Highly unlikely	Somewhat unlikely	Neither unlikely nor likely	Somewhat likely	
	1	2	3	4	
Opportunistic	Highly unlikely	Somewhat unlikely	Neither unlikely nor likely	Somewhat likely	
	1	2	3	4	
Partner	Highly unlikely	Somewhat unlikely	Neither unlikely nor likely	Somewhat likely	
	1	2	3	4	
Peaceful	Highly unlikely	Somewhat unlikely	Neither unlikely nor likely	Somewhat likely	
	1	2	3	4	
Powerful	Highly unlikely	Somewhat unlikely	Neither unlikely nor likely	Somewhat likely	
	1	2	3	4	
Racist	Highly unlikely	Somewhat unlikely	Neither unlikely nor likely	Somewhat likely	
	1	2	3	4	
Reliable	Highly unlikely	Somewhat unlikely	Neither unlikely nor likely	Somewhat likely	
	1	2	3	4	
Respectful	Highly unlikely	Somewhat unlikely	Neither unlikely nor likely	Somewhat likely	
	1	2	3	4	
Spiritual	Highly unlikely	Somewhat unlikely	Neither unlikely nor likely	Somewhat likely	
	1	2	3	4	
Technology-Oriented	Highly unlikely	Somewhat unlikely	Neither unlikely nor likely	Somewhat likely	
	1	2	3	4	
Tied-to-the-rules	Highly unlikely	Somewhat unlikely	Neither unlikely nor likely	Somewhat likely	
	1	2	3	4	
Traditional	Highly unlikely	Somewhat unlikely	Neither unlikely nor likely	Somewhat likely	
	1	2	3	4	
Trustworthy	Highly unlikely	Somewhat unlikely	Neither unlikely nor likely	Somewhat likely	
	1	2	3	4	
Welcoming	Highly unlikely	Somewhat unlikely	Neither unlikely nor likely	Somewhat likely	
	1	2	3	4	

Section D. Cultural Orientation			
Which of the following characteristics are deemed most significant within your culture?			
(Please select three traits from the list below)			
Being Hospitable	<input type="radio"/>	Being Individualistic	<input type="radio"/>
Being Aggressive	<input type="radio"/>	Being Spiritual	<input type="radio"/>
Being Helpful	<input type="radio"/>	Being Humane	<input type="radio"/>
Being Entrepreneurial	<input type="radio"/>	Being Loyal	<input type="radio"/>
Being Pioneering	<input type="radio"/>	Being Patriotic	<input type="radio"/>
Being Community-oriented	<input type="radio"/>	Being Kind	<input type="radio"/>
Being Competitive	<input type="radio"/>	Being Respectful	<input type="radio"/>
Being Cautious	<input type="radio"/>	Being Powerful	<input type="radio"/>
Being Hard-working	<input type="radio"/>	Being Peaceful	<input type="radio"/>

Section E. Country Awareness			
Which of the following people, places, and languages are most commonly connected with each country?			
I=India C=China US=United States (Please circle the letter associated with each nation in the space provided)			
Leaders	Celebrities/Hist. Fig.	Place	Language
Tsai Ing-wen I C US	Yao Ming I C US	Beijing I C US	Wolof I C US
Yahya Jammeh I C US	Kanye West I C US	London I C US	Mandarin I C US
Xi Jinping I C US	Mahatma Gandhi I C US	New York I C US	English I C US
Hillary Clinton I C US	William Shakespeare I C US	Taipei I C US	Cantonese I C US
Narendra Modi I C US	Ang Lee I C US	Delhi I C US	Hindi I C US

Section F. Household Information				
The final set of questions is designed to provide more information about you. (Please tick the correct response)				
F1. What country are you a citizen of?				
F2. How old are you?				
F3. What is your gender?		Male 1	Female 2	
F4. What is your major?		B5. What Ethnic Group do you belong to?		
F7. What is your religious affiliation?				
Christianity 1	Judaism 2	Islam 3	No religion or other, please specify 4	
F8. What is the highest level of education you have attained?				
a n s w e r	Some or completed primary school 2	Some or completed secondary school 3	Some or completed college (bachelor's degree) 4	Some or completed graduate school (master's, PhD, or professional degree) 5
F9. Which of the following do you possess inside your (family) home? (Please tick all that apply)				
Television <input type="radio"/>	Computer <input type="radio"/>	Running Water <input type="radio"/>	Car <input type="radio"/>	Generator <input type="radio"/>

Section G: Country Perceptions (descriptive terms)-How true are the following statements regarding your feelings about China?					
Tradition is important to this country.	Very untrue of what I believe	Somewhat untrue of what I believe	Neutral	Somewhat true	
	1	2	3	4	
This country is kind.	Very untrue of what I believe	Somewhat untrue of what I believe	Neutral	Somewhat true	
	1	2	3	4	
This country is a brother to African people.	Very untrue of what I believe	Somewhat untrue of what I believe	Neutral	Somewhat true	
	1	2	3	4	
Africa is growing stronger because of this country.	Very untrue of what I believe	Somewhat untrue of what I believe	Neutral	Somewhat true	
	1	2	3	4	
This country is able to retain its culture while developing.	Very untrue of what I believe	Somewhat untrue of what I believe	Neutral	Somewhat true	
	1	2	3	4	
This country is primarily interested in expanding its influence.	Very untrue of what I believe	Somewhat untrue of what I believe	Neutral	Somewhat true	
	1	2	3	4	
This country has abundant cultural heritage.	Very untrue of what I believe	Somewhat untrue of what I believe	Neutral	Somewhat true	
	1	2	3	4	
This country behaves responsibly as a global citizen.	Very untrue of what I believe	Somewhat untrue of what I believe	Neutral	Somewhat true	
	1	2	3	4	
This country has good policies and leaders.	Very untrue of what I believe	Somewhat untrue of what I believe	Neutral	Somewhat true	
	1	2	3	4	
This country produces good products for Africa.	Very untrue of what I believe	Somewhat untrue of what I believe	Neutral	Somewhat true	
	1	2	3	4	
This country is fair.	Very untrue of what I believe	Somewhat untrue of what I believe	Neutral	Somewhat true	
	1	2	3	4	
This country has always been a good friend to African people.	Very untrue of what I believe	Somewhat untrue of what I believe	Neutral	Somewhat true	
	1	2	3	4	
This country is a good model for African development.	Very untrue of what I believe	Somewhat untrue of what I believe	Neutral	Somewhat true	
	1	2	3	4	
This country is trustworthy.	Very untrue of what I believe	Somewhat untrue of what I believe	Neutral	Somewhat true	
	1	2	3	4	
This country is Africa's most important partner.	Very untrue of what I believe	Somewhat untrue of what I believe	Neutral	Somewhat true	
	1	2	3	4	
This country is a developing nation.	Very untrue of what I believe	Somewhat untrue of what I believe	Neutral	Somewhat true	
	1	2	3	4	
This country values family and community above all else.	Very untrue of what I believe	Somewhat untrue of what I believe	Neutral	Somewhat true	
	1	2	3	4	
This country is religious.	Very untrue of what I believe	Somewhat untrue of what I believe	Neutral	Somewhat true	
	1	2	3	4	
This country is rigid.	Very untrue of what I believe	Somewhat untrue of what I believe	Neutral	Somewhat true	
	1	2	3	4	
This country is lazy.	Very untrue of what I believe	Somewhat untrue of what I believe	Neutral	Somewhat true	
	1	2	3	4	
This country is racist.	Very untrue of what I believe	Somewhat untrue of what I believe	Neutral	Somewhat true	
	1	2	3	4	

Section G: Country Perceptions (descriptive terms)-How true are the following statements regarding your feelings about India?					
Tradition is important to this country.	Very untrue of what I believe	Somewhat untrue of what I believe	Neutral	Somewhat true	
	1	2	3	4	
This country is kind.	Very untrue of what I believe	Somewhat untrue of what I believe	Neutral	Somewhat true	
	1	2	3	4	
This country is a brother to African people.	Very untrue of what I believe	Somewhat untrue of what I believe	Neutral	Somewhat true	
	1	2	3	4	
Africa is growing stronger because of this country.	Very untrue of what I believe	Somewhat untrue of what I believe	Neutral	Somewhat true	
	1	2	3	4	
This country is able to retain its culture while developing.	Very untrue of what I believe	Somewhat untrue of what I believe	Neutral	Somewhat true	
	1	2	3	4	
This country is primarily interested in expanding its influence.	Very untrue of what I believe	Somewhat untrue of what I believe	Neutral	Somewhat true	
	1	2	3	4	
This country has abundant cultural heritage.	Very untrue of what I believe	Somewhat untrue of what I believe	Neutral	Somewhat true	
	1	2	3	4	
This country behaves responsibly as a global citizen.	Very untrue of what I believe	Somewhat untrue of what I believe	Neutral	Somewhat true	
	1	2	3	4	
This country has good policies and leaders.	Very untrue of what I believe	Somewhat untrue of what I believe	Neutral	Somewhat true	
	1	2	3	4	
This country produces good products for Africa.	Very untrue of what I believe	Somewhat untrue of what I believe	Neutral	Somewhat true	
	1	2	3	4	
This country is fair.	Very untrue of what I believe	Somewhat untrue of what I believe	Neutral	Somewhat true	
	1	2	3	4	
This country has always been a good friend to African people.	Very untrue of what I believe	Somewhat untrue of what I believe	Neutral	Somewhat true	
	1	2	3	4	
This country is a good model for African development.	Very untrue of what I believe	Somewhat untrue of what I believe	Neutral	Somewhat true	
	1	2	3	4	
This country is trustworthy.	Very untrue of what I believe	Somewhat untrue of what I believe	Neutral	Somewhat true	
	1	2	3	4	
This country is Africa's most important partner.	Very untrue of what I believe	Somewhat untrue of what I believe	Neutral	Somewhat true	
	1	2	3	4	
This country is a developing nation.	Very untrue of what I believe	Somewhat untrue of what I believe	Neutral	Somewhat true	
	1	2	3	4	
This country values family and community above all else.	Very untrue of what I believe	Somewhat untrue of what I believe	Neutral	Somewhat true	
	1	2	3	4	
This country is religious.	Very untrue of what I believe	Somewhat untrue of what I believe	Neutral	Somewhat true	
	1	2	3	4	
This country is rigid.	Very untrue of what I believe	Somewhat untrue of what I believe	Neutral	Somewhat true	
	1	2	3	4	
This country is lazy.	Very untrue of what I believe	Somewhat untrue of what I believe	Neutral	Somewhat true	
	1	2	3	4	
This country is racist.	Very untrue of what I believe	Somewhat untrue of what I believe	Neutral	Somewhat true	
	1	2	3	4	

Section G: Country Perceptions (descriptive terms)-How true are the following statements regarding your feelings about United States?					
Tradition is important to this country.	Very untrue of what I believe	Somewhat untrue of what I believe	Neutral	Somewhat true	
	1	2	3	4	
This country is kind.	Very untrue of what I believe	Somewhat untrue of what I believe	Neutral	Somewhat true	
	1	2	3	4	
This country is a brother to African people.	Very untrue of what I believe	Somewhat untrue of what I believe	Neutral	Somewhat true	
	1	2	3	4	
Africa is growing stronger because of this country.	Very untrue of what I believe	Somewhat untrue of what I believe	Neutral	Somewhat true	
	1	2	3	4	
This country is able to retain its culture while developing.	Very untrue of what I believe	Somewhat untrue of what I believe	Neutral	Somewhat true	
	1	2	3	4	
This country is primarily interested in expanding its influence.	Very untrue of what I believe	Somewhat untrue of what I believe	Neutral	Somewhat true	
	1	2	3	4	
This country has abundant cultural heritage.	Very untrue of what I believe	Somewhat untrue of what I believe	Neutral	Somewhat true	
	1	2	3	4	
This country behaves responsibly as a global citizen.	Very untrue of what I believe	Somewhat untrue of what I believe	Neutral	Somewhat true	
	1	2	3	4	
This country has good policies and leaders.	Very untrue of what I believe	Somewhat untrue of what I believe	Neutral	Somewhat true	
	1	2	3	4	
This country produces good products for Africa.	Very untrue of what I believe	Somewhat untrue of what I believe	Neutral	Somewhat true	
	1	2	3	4	
This country is lazy.	Very untrue of what I believe	Somewhat untrue of what I believe	Neutral	Somewhat true	
	1	2	3	4	
This country has always been a good friend to African people.	Very untrue of what I believe	Somewhat untrue of what I believe	Neutral	Somewhat true	
	1	2	3	4	
This country is a good model for African development.	Very untrue of what I believe	Somewhat untrue of what I believe	Neutral	Somewhat true	
	1	2	3	4	
This country is trustworthy.	Very untrue of what I believe	Somewhat untrue of what I believe	Neutral	Somewhat true	
	1	2	3	4	
This country is Africa's most important partner.	Very untrue of what I believe	Somewhat untrue of what I believe	Neutral	Somewhat true	
	1	2	3	4	
This country is a place I would like to visit.	Very untrue of what I believe	Somewhat untrue of what I believe	Neutral	Somewhat true	
	1	2	3	4	
This country values family and community above all else.	Very untrue of what I believe	Somewhat untrue of what I believe	Neutral	Somewhat true	
	1	2	3	4	
This country is religious.	Very untrue of what I believe	Somewhat untrue of what I believe	Neutral	Somewhat true	
	1	2	3	4	
This country is rigid.	Very untrue of what I believe	Somewhat untrue of what I believe	Neutral	Somewhat true	
	1	2	3	4	
This country is fair.	Very untrue of what I believe	Somewhat untrue of what I believe	Neutral	Somewhat true	
	1	2	3	4	
This country is racist.	Very untrue of what I believe	Somewhat untrue of what I believe	Neutral	Somewhat true	
	1	2	3	4	

APPENDIX C
IRB EXEMPTION

October 14 , 2016

To: Rita Kiki Edozie
rkedozie@msu.edu

Re: IRB# x16 - 1203e D
Category: Exempt 8
Exempt Determination Date: October 13, 2016

Title: Constructing China's Nation Brand through African Public Opinion

Your project has been determined to be exempt under the Flexibility Initiative Exemption Category 8.

Exemption Category: This project has qualified for the Flexibility Initiative Exemption Category 8: Research involving benign interventions in conjunction with the collection of data from an adult subject through verbal or written responses (including data entry) or video recording if the subject prospectively agrees to the intervention and data collection and at least one of the following criteria is met:
(A) The information obtained is recorded in such a manner that human subjects cannot be identified directly or through identifiers linked to the subjects; or
(B) Any disclosure of the human subjects' responses outside the research would not reasonably place the subjects at risk of criminal or civil liability or be damaging to the subjects' financial standing, employability, educational advancement, or reputation.

See HRPP Manual 8 - 8 - B, Exemption Category 8, for the full text of Exemption Category 8 (<http://hrpp.msu.edu/msu-hrpp-manual-section-8-8-b>).

Exclusions: To continue to qualify for Exemption Category 8, the project must not include:

- o Federal funding or federal training grants
- o FDA regulated
- o Sponsor or other contractual restrictions
- o Clinical interventions (including clinical behavioral interventions)
- o Prisoners as subjects
- o Receipt of an NIH issued certificate of confidentiality to protect identifiable research data
- o Be a project for which MSU serves as the IRB of record
- o Children as research subjects

If any of the above criteria become applicable to a project determined exempt under this flexibility initiative, the IRB office must be promptly notified prior to implementation of the criteria and the project must be reviewed and approved in accordance with the appropriate review level (e.g. expedited, full board).

Principal Investigator Responsibilities: The Principal Investigator assumes the responsibilities for the protection of human subjects in this project as outlined in HRPP Manual Section 8 - 1, Exemptions ([http://hrpp.msu.edu/msu - hrpp - manual - section - 8 - 1](http://hrpp.msu.edu/msu-hrpp-manual-section-8-1)).

SEE SPECIAL EXCLUSIONS BELOW
(e.g. no federal funding)

Renewals: Exempt projects do not need to be renewed.

Revisions : In general, investigators are not required to submit changes to the IRB once a research study is designated as exempt as long as those changes do not affect the exempt category or criteria for exempt determination (changing from exempt status to expedited or full review, changing exempt category) or that may substantially change the focus of the research study such as a change in hypothesis or study design. See HRPP Manual Section 8 - 1, Exemptions, for examples.

Change in Funding: If new external funding is obtained for an active human research project that had been determined exempt, a new exempt application will be required, with limited exceptions.

Problems: If issues should arise during the conduct of the research, such as unanticipated problems that may involve risks to subjects or others, or any problem that may increase the risk to the human subjects and change the category of review, notify the IRB office promptly. Any complaints from participants that may change the level of review from exempt to expedited or full review must be reported to the IRB.

Personnel Changes: After determination of the exempt status, the PI is responsible for maintaining records of personnel changes and appropriate training. The PI is not required to notify the IRB of personnel changes on exempt research. However, he or she may wish to submit personnel changes to the IRB for recordkeeping purposes (e.g. communication with the Graduate School) and may submit such requests by email. If there is a change in PI, the new PI must sign a PI Assurance form and the previous PI must submit the Supplemental Form to Change the Principal Investigator (<http://hrpp.msu.edu/forms>).

Closure: Investigators are not required to notify the IRB when the research study is complete. However, the PI can choose to notify the IRB when the project is complete and is especially recommended when the PI leaves the university.

For More Information: See HRPP Manual Section 8 - 1, Exemptions and Section 8 - 8 - B, Exemption Category 8 - 8 - B ([http://hrpp.msu.edu/msu - hrpp - manual - table - contents - expanded](http://hrpp.msu.edu/msu-hrpp-manual-table-contents-expanded)).

Contact Information: If we can be of further assistance or if you have questions, please contact us at 517 - 355 - 2180 or via email at IRB@ora.msu.edu. Please use the IRB number listed above on any correspondence or forms submitted which relate to this project. Please visit [hrpp .msu.edu](http://hrpp.msu.edu) to access the HRPP Manual, forms, etc.

C: Tara Mock

BIBLIOGRAPHY

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Aaker, David A. *Building strong brands*. Simon and Schuster, 2012.
- Aaker, J.L. "Dimensions of brand personality", *Journal of Marketing Research*, 34(3), 347–357, 1997.
- Adams, R. L. "Epistemological considerations in Afro-American studies". In D. P. Aldridge & C. Young (Eds.), *Out of the revolution: the development of Africana studies*(pp. 39–57). Lanham: Lexington, 2000.
- Addison, Richard B. "Grounded hermeneutic research." *Doing qualitative research*. (1992).
- Addul-Raheem, Tajudeen. *Pan Africanism: Politics, Economy, and Social Change in the Twenty-First Century*. New York University Press, 1996.
- Adebayo, Akanmu, Adesina, Olutayo and Olaniyi, Rasheed, eds. *Marginality and Crisis: Globalization and Identity in Contemporary Africa*. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, May 25, 2010.
- Adu-Febiri, Francis. "Globalization, Indigenization, and Tourism in Sub-Saharan Africa." In *Neoliberalism and Globalization in Africa: Contestations from the embattled continent*, 93-112. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008.
- Ahn, Michael J., and Hsin-Ching Wu. "The Art of Nation Branding." *Public Organization Review* 15.1 (2015): 157-173.
- Akbar, Na'im. "The evolution of human psychology for African Americans". In R. L. Jones (Ed.), *Black psychology* (pp. 99–123). Berkeley: Cobb & Henry, (1991).
- Alden, Chris, and Cristina Alves. "History & Identity in the Construction of China's Africa Policy." *Review of African Political Economy* 35, no. 115 (2008): 43-58.
- Alden, Chris. "Through African Eyes: Representations of China on the African Continent." In *SciPo/Fudan/LSE conference*, 2006.
- Alden, Chris. *China Returns to Africa: A Rising Power and a Continent Embrace*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2008.
- Allen, D. "New Directions in the Study of Nation Building: Views Through the Lens of Path Dependence", *International Studies Review* 12: 413–429, 2010.

Andersen, Rune S, Juha A Vuori, and Xavier Guillaume. "Chromatology of security: Introducing colours to visual security studies." *Security Dialogue* 46 (5):440-457, 2005.

Anderson, Benedict R. O'G. *Imagined Communities Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*. Rev. ed. London; New York: Verso, 2006.

Anderson, James C. and David W. Gerbing, "Structural Equation Modeling in Practice: A Review and Recommended Two-Step Approach," *Psychological Bulletin*, 103 (May), 1988, 411-423.

Anderson, James C., David W. Gerbing, and John E. Hunter, "On the Assessment of Unidimensional Measurement: Internal and External Consistency, and Overall Consistency Criteria," *Journal of Marketing Research*, 24 (November), 1987, 432-437.

Anholt, S. "Definitions of Place Branding—Working Towards a Resolution", *Place Branding and Public Diplomacy* 6 2010 pp.: 1–10.

Anholt, S. "Nation brands index: How the world sees the world", *Second Quarter, Global Market Insight*, 2005.

Ankie M. M. Hoogvelt *Globalization and the Postcolonial World: the new political economy of development* (Johns Hopkins University Press, 2013).

Appadurai, Arjun. "Illusion of Permanence," in *Perspecta*, Volume 34, pp. 44-52.

Aronczyk, Melissa, and Devon Powers, eds. *Blowing up the brand: Critical perspectives on promotional culture*. Vol. 21. Peter Lang, 2010.

Aronczyk, Melissa. *Branding the nation: Mediating space, value, and identity in the context of global culture*. New York University, 2009.

Aronczyk, Melissa. *Branding the nation: The global business of national identity*. Oxford University Press, 2013.

Asadi, Muhammed A. *Global Apartheid and the World Economic Order: Racism, the West and the Third*. Lincoln: Writer's Club Press, 2003.

Asante, M. K. "Africology and the puzzle of nomenclature". *Journal of Black Studies*, 40(1), 12–23, (2010).

Asante, M. K. "Locating a text: implication of Afrocentric theory". In A. Mazama (Ed.), *The Afrocentric paradigm*. Trenton: Africa World Press, 2003.

Ayers, Allison. "Beyond Myths, Lies and Stereotypes: The Political Economy of a 'New Scramble for Africa'", *New Political Economy* 18, no. 2 (2013): 227–57.

- Bagozzi, Richard P. and Youjae Yi, "On the Evaluation of Structural Equation Models," *Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science*, 16, 1 (Spring) 1988, 74-94.
- Balakrishnan, M.S. "Strategic branding of destinations: A framework", *European Journal of Marketing*, 43(5/6), 611–629, 2009.
- Banks, Marcus, and David Zeitlyn. *Visual methods in social research*. Sage, 2015.
- Barboza, D. "An Export Boom Suddenly Facing a Quality Crisis". *New York Times*. 5/18/2007.
- Barboza, D. "Shanghai Expo Sets Record With 73 Million Visitors" *New York Times*. 11/03/10.
- Barr, Michael. *Who's Afraid of China? The Challenge of Chinese Soft Power*, London: Zed Books, 2011.
- Barr, Michael. "Nation branding as nation building: China's image campaign." *East Asia* 29.1 (2012): 81-94.
- Barr, Michael. "The New Cultural Revolution" in *Who's afraid of China?: the challenge of Chinese soft power*. Zed Books Ltd., 2012.
- Barry, Boubacar. *Senegambia and the Atlantic Slave Trade*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998.
- Bauer, Martin W. and George Gaskell. *Qualitative Researching with Text, Image and Sound*. London, Sage, 2000.
- Baum, Richard. *Burying Mao: Chinese politics in the age of Deng Xiaoping*. Princeton University Press, 1996.
- Bauman, Z. "Sociological Responses to Postmodernity", in C. Mongardini and M.L. Maniscalco (eds), *Modernismo e Postmodernismo*. Roma: Bulzoni Editore, 1989.
- Beijing: Remin Chubanshe (People's Press), 2009, pp. 127–135
- Belk, R.W. "Possessions and the extended self", *Journal of Consumer Research*, 15(2), 139–168, 1988.
- Bell, Philip, "Content analysis of visual images" in *the Handbook of Visual Analysis*, edited by T Van Leeuwen and C Jewitt, SAGE Publications: London, 2001.
- Benjamin, W. *Illuminations*. New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1968.

Bentler, Paul M. and Douglas G. Bonett, "Significance Tests and Goodness-of-Fit in the Analysis of Covariance Structures," *Psychological Bulletin*, 88, 1980, 588-606.

Bergad, Laird W. *The Comparative History of Slavery in Brazil, Cuba, and the United States*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007.

Bilkey, W. J. and E. Nes, "Country of Origin Effects on Product Evaluations," *Journal of International Business Studies*, 8, 1982, 89-99.

Billig, M. *Banal Nationalism*. London: Sage, 1995.

Blaikie, N. *Designing Social Research*, Polity Press, 2010.

Blassingame, John W. *The Slave Community: Plantation Life in the Antebellum South*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1979.

Bleiker, Roland, and Amy Kay. "Representing HIV/AIDS in Africa: Pluralist photography and local empowerment." *International Studies Quarterly* 51 (1):139-163, 2007.

Bleiker, Roland, David Campbell, Emma Hutchison, and Xzarina Nicholson. "The visual dehumanisation of refugees." *Australian Journal of Political Science* 48 (4):398-416, 2013.

Bleiker, Roland. "Pluralist Methods for Visual Global Politics." *Millennium-Journal of International Studies* 43 (3):872-890, 2015.

Bleiker, Roland. *Aesthetics and world politics*. Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009.

Blommaert, Jan, and Chris Bulcaen. "Critical discourse analysis." *Annual review of Anthropology* 29.1 (2000): 447-466.

Boahen, A Adu. *African Perspectives on Colonialism* (The Johns Hopkins Symposia in Comparative History) Johns Hopkins University Press (1989).

Bond, Patrick. "Accumulation by Dispossession in Africa: False Diagnoses and Dangerous Prescriptions." In *Neoliberalism and Globalization in Africa: contestations from the embattled continent*, 17-32. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008.

Bonsu, Samuel. "Colonial images in global times: consumer interpretations of Africa and Africans in advertising", *Consumption Markets & Culture*, 12:1, 1-25, 2009.

Brautigam, Deborah. *The Dragon's Gift: the real story of China in Africa*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009.

Bristow, M. China's Internet Spin Doctors. BBC News Online. 12/16/08
<http://news.bbc>.

Burke, P. "New Reflections on World History", *Culture and History* 5, 1989.

Butler, Judith. "Violence, mourning, politics." *Studies in Gender and Sexuality* 4.1
2003: 9-37.

Butler, Kim. "Multilayered Politics in the African Diaspora: The Metadiaspora Concept and Minidiapora Realities." *Opportunity Structures in Diaspora Relations: Comparisons in Contemporary Multilevel Politics of Diaspora and Transnational Identity*. Ed. Gloria Totoricaguena. Reno: Center for Basque Studies, 2007.

Campbell, David. "Cultural governance and pictorial resistance: reflections on the imaging of war." *Review of International Studies* 29 (SupplementS1):57-73, 2003

Carmody, Padraig R., and Francis Y. Owusu. "Competing hegemons? Chinese versus American geo-economic strategies in Africa." *Political Geography* 26, no. 5 (2007): 504-524.

Carmody, Pádraig, *The Rise of the BRICS in Africa The Geopolitics of South-South*

Carmody, Padraig. *Globalization in Africa: Recolonization or Renaissance?* Lynne Reinner Publishers 2010.

Cavusgil, Tamer and John R. Nevin, "State-of-the-Art in International Marketing: An Assessment," in *Review of Marketing*, Enis B. and K. Roering eds. Chicago, IL: AMA, 1981, 195-216.

Cesaire, Aimé. *Discourses on Colonialism: A Poetics of Anti-Colonialism*. New York: Monthly Review Press, 2000.

Cesaire, Aimé. *Discourses on Colonialism: A Poetics of Anti-Colonialism*. New York: Monthly Review Press, (1955, 1972) 2000.

Chao, L "Pro-China Ad Makes Broadway Debut". Wall Street Journal China Real Time Report. 18th January, 2011.

Chen, J. "Zhuoli dazao Konzi xueyuan de pinpai (Efforts to Build the Confucius Institute Brand)" in: Hanban (ed) *Di er jie Kongzi xueyuan dahui mulu (Programme of the Second Confucius Institute Conference)*, 2008 pp. 70-75.

China Daily "Beef 'Made in China' Up With 'Created in China'" 12/25/09.

China Daily "Shanghai World Expo Builds Confidence for World Economy". 4/30/10.

Chrysochou, Panayiota (ed.). *Performing Identity and Gender in Literature, Theatre and the Visual Arts*. Cambridge Scholars, 2017.

Chukwumerije Okereke and Patricia Agupusi *Home-grown Development in Africa: Successes, Issues and Trends in African Socio-Economic Policies*, Routledge, 2014.

Cisse, Daouda, Cisse. "South-South Migration and Trade: Chinese Traders in Senegal," Centre for Chinese Studies, Stellenbosch University, June 2013.

Clucas, Barbara, Katherine McHugh, and Tim Caro. "Flagship species on covers of US conservation and nature magazines." *Biodiversity and Conservation* 17.6 (2008): 1517. co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/7783640.stm

Colby, Benjamin N. "The analysis of culture content and the patterning of narrative concern in texts." *American Anthropologist* 68.2 (1966): 374-388.

Collier, Malcolm. "Approaches to analysis in visual anthropology", in *the Handbook of Visual Analysis*, edited by T Van Leeuwen and C Jewitt, SAGE Publications: London, 2001.

Corner, John. "Mediated politics, promotional culture and the idea of propaganda'." *Media, Culture & Society* 29.4, 2007 pp: 669-677.

Creary, Nicholas, ed. *African Intellectuals and Decolonization*. Athens, OH: Ohio University Press – Swallow Press, 2012.

Creswell, John W., et al. "Advanced mixed methods research designs." *Handbook of mixed methods in social and behavioral research* 209 (2003): 240.

Curtin, Philip D. *Cross-cultural trade in world history*. Cambridge University Press, 1984.

d'Astous, A. and Boujbel, L. "Positioning countries on personality dimensions: Scale development and implications for country marketing", *Journal of Business Research*, 60(3), 231–239, 2007.

d'Astous, A. and Li, D. "Perceptions of countries based on personality traits: A study in China", *Asia Pacific Journal of Marketing and Logistics*, 21(4), 475–488, 2009.

d'Hauteserre, Anne-Marie. "Politics of imaging New Caledonia." *Annals of Tourism Research* 38 (2):380-402, 2011

Deighton, John. "Rhetorical strategies in advertising." *Advances in Consumer Research* 12.1 1985: 432-436.

Der Derian, James. *Virtuous war: mapping the military-industrial-media-entertainment network*. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 2001.

Ding, Sheng. *The Dragon's Hidden Wings: How China Rises with Its Soft Power*. Lanham MD: Lexington Books, 2009.

Ding, Sheng. "To build a "harmonious world": China's soft power wielding in the global south." *Journal of Chinese Political Science* 13.2 2008: 193-213.

Dinnie, Keith. *Nation branding: Concepts, issues, practice*. Routledge, 2015.

Dittmer, Jason. *Popular Culture, Geopolitics, and Identity*. Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2010

Dixon, V. J. "Worldviews and research methodology." In L. M. King (Ed.), *African philosophy: assumptions and paradigms for research on Black Persons* (pp. 51–77). Los Angeles: Fanon Center, 1976.

Dobbins, J. "A Guide to Nation Building". A report for the RAND Corporation, 2007.

Dodds, Klaus. "Licensed to stereotype: geopolitics, James Bond and the spectre of Balkanism." *Geopolitics* 8 (2):125-156, 2003.

Dodson, Jualynne E. "Sociological Study of the African Diaspora." *Athens Journal of Social Sciences*. January 2014: 47-57

Douglas Stiffler, "Three Blows of a Shoulder Pole: Soviet Experts at China's People's University, 1950-1957," in Bernstein and Li, eds., *China Learns from the Soviet Union*, 2011.

Dunn, Kevin C. "Fear of a black planet: Anarchy and anxieties in postcolonial travel to Africa." *Third World Quarterly* 25, no. 3, 2004: 483–99.

Edozie, Rita Kiki and Peyi Soyinka, eds. *Reframing Contemporary Africa: Politics, Economics, and Culture in the Global Era*. Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 2010.

Edwards, Brent Hayes. *The Practice of Diaspora: Literature, Translation, and the Rise of Black Internationalism*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003.

Elias, N. "On the Sociogenesis of Sociology", *Sociologisch Tijdschrift* 11(1), 1985.

Elias, N. "Sociology and Psychiatry", in S.H. Foulkes and G.S. Prince (eds), *Psychiatry in a Changing Society*. London: Tavistock. 1969.

Elias, N. *The Civilizing Process*, Volume I. Oxford: Blackwell, 1978.

- Elias, N. *The Civilizing Process*, Volume II. Oxford: Blackwell, 1982.
- Elo, Satu, and Helvi Kyngäs. "The qualitative content analysis process." *Journal of advanced nursing* 62.1 (2008): 107-115.
- Fairclough, Norman. "Discourse and text: Linguistic and intertextual analysis within discourse analysis." *Discourse & Society* 3.2 (1992): 193-217.
- Fairclough, Norman. *Analysing Discourse: Textual Analysis for Social Research*. New York: Routledge, 2003
- Fairclough, Norman. *Critical discourse analysis*. Ed. Ruth Wodak. London: Sage, 2013.
- Falola, T. and C. Jennings, eds. *Africanizing Knowledge: African Studies Across the Disciplines*. New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2002.
- Fan, Ying. "Branding the Nation: Towards a better understanding." *Place Branding and Public Diplomacy* 6, no. 2 (2010): 97-103.
- Fan, Ying. "Branding the nation: What is being branded?." *Journal of vacation marketing* 12.1 (2006): 5-14.
- Fan, Ying. "Soft power: Power of attraction or confusion?." *Place Branding and Public Diplomacy* 4, no. 2 (2008): 147-158.
- Faust, John and Judith Kornberg, *China in World Politics*, Boulder, Col.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1995.
- Featherstone, M. "Consumer Culture, Symbolic Power and Universalism", in G. Stauth and S. Zubaida (eds), *Mass Culture, Popular Culture and Social Life in the Middle East*. Boulder: Westport Press, 1987.
- Featherstone, M. (forthcoming) "Postmodernism, Consumer Culture and Global Disorder" in *Postmodernism and Consumer Culture*. London: Sage.
- Fijałkowski, Łukasz. "China's 'soft power' in Africa?" *Journal of Contemporary African Studies*, vol. 29, no. 2., 2011, pp. 223-232.
- Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence In: PRC China, *Independent Foreign Policy of Peace*, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, Beijing: MFAPRC, 2003. 347-383
- Fournier, S. "Consumers and their brands: Developing relationship theory in consumer research", *Journal of Consumer Research*, 24(4), 234-249, 1998.

- Fox, John. *Applied regression analysis, linear models, and related methods*. Sage Publications, Inc, 1997.
- Frank, Andre Gunder. *ReOrient: Global economy in the Asian age*. Univ of California Press, 1998.
- French, Howard W. *China's Second continent: How a million migrants are building a new empire in Africa*. Vintage, 2014.
- Fukuyama, F. "Liberal Versus State-Building", *Journal of Democracy* 18: 10–13, 2007.
- Gadzala, Aleksandra, and Marek Hanusch. "African perspectives on China-Africa: Gauging popular perceptions and their economic and political determinants." *Afrobarometer Working Papers* 17. 2010.
- Gagliardone, Iginio. "China as a persuader: CCTV Africa's first steps in the African mediasphere." *Ecquid Novi: African Journalism Studies* 34.3 (2013): 25-40.
- Gebauer, J., Tang, Y. and Baimai, C. "User requirements of mobile technology: Results from a content analysis of user reviews", *Information Systems & e-Business Management*, 6(4), 361–384, 2008.
- Gee, James Paul. *An introduction to discourse analysis: Theory and method*. Routledge, 2014.
- Genovese, Eugene D. *The Political Economy of Slavery: Studies in the Economy & Society of the Slave South*. Middletown: Wesleyan University Press, 1989.
- George, Alexander and Bennet, Andrew, *Case Studies and Development in the Social Sciences*, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2005.
- Gerbing, David W. and James C. Anderson, "On the Meaning of Within-Factor Correlated Errors," *Journal of Consumer Research*, 11 (June), 1984, 572-580.
- Gerbing, David W. and James C. Anderson. "An Updated Paradigm for Scale Development Incorporating Unidimensionality and Its Assessment," *Journal of Marketing Research*, 25 (May), 1988, 186-192.
- Gerbing, David W. and John E. Hunter. *ITAN: A Statistical Package for Item Analysis with Correlational Data including Multiple Groups Confirmatory Factor Analysis*, Portland State University, Portland, OR, 1988.
- Geurts, Kathryn. *Culture and the senses: Bodily ways of knowing in an African community*. Vol. 3. Univ of California Press, 2003.

Gilboa, E. "Media Diplomacy." *Harvard International Journal of Press/Politics* 3, no. 3 (1998): 56–76.

Gill, Bates, and James Reilly. "The tenuous hold of China Inc. in Africa." *Washington Quarterly* 30.3 (2007): 37-52.

Gilmore, Fiona. "A country-can it be repositioned? Spain-the success story of country branding." *The Journal of Brand Management* 9 (4-5):4-5, 2002.

Gomez, Michael. *Exchanging Our Country Marks: The Transformation of African Identities in the Colonial and Antebellum South*. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1998.

Gomez, Michael. *Reversing Sail: A History of the African Diaspora*. Cambridge: Cambridge University, 2004.

Gordon, April A., and Donald L. Gordon. *Understanding Contemporary Africa*. Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1992.

Graneheim, U. H. and Lundman, B. "Qualitative content analysis in nursing research: Concepts, procedures and measures to achieve trustworthiness", *Nurse education today*, 24(2), 105–112, 2004.

Greg Mills, *Why Africa is Poor: And What Africans Can Do About It* (Penguin Global; Reprint edition, 2011.

Grills, C., & Adjei, M. "African-centered conceptualizations of self and consciousness." In T. A. Parham (Ed.), *Counseling persons of African descent* (pp. 75–99). Thousand Oaks: Sage, (2002).

Groves, Robert M., et al. *Survey methodology*. Vol. 561. John Wiley & Sons, 2011.

Grovogui, Siba N’Zatioula. *Sovereigns, Quasi Sovereigns, and Africans: Race and Self-Determination in International Law*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996.

Gudjonsson, Hlynur. "Nation branding." *Place branding* 1.3 (2005): 283-298.

Hadland, Adrian, et al. "Power, politics and identity in South African media: Selected seminar papers.", 2008.

Haferkamp, H. "Beyond the "Iron Cage" of Modernity?", *Theory, Culture & Society* 4(1), 1987.

Hallen, B. "Yoruba moral epistemology". In K. Wiredu (Ed.), *A companion to African philosophy* (pp. 296–303). Oxford: Blackwell, 2006.

Hamilton, Ruth S., ed. *Routes of Passage Rethinking the African Diaspora*. Vol. 1. East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 2006.

Han, B. and Jiang, Q. *Ruanshili: Zhongguo shijiao (Soft Power: A Chinese Perspective)*.

Hannerz, U. "Notes on the Global Ecumene", *Public Culture* 1(2), 1989.

Harootunian, H. "Visible Discourses Invisible Ideologies" in M. Miyoshi and H.

Harris, H. "Content analysis of secondary data: A study of courage in managerial decision making", *Journal of Business Ethics*, 34(3/4), 191–208, 2001.

Hartig, Falk. "Confucius Institutes and the rise of China." *Journal of Chinese Political Science* 17.1, 2012: 53-76.

Harvey, David *A Brief History of Neoliberalism*, Oxford University Press, 2007

Hass, Benjamin. "Chinese museum accused of racism over photos pairing Africans with animals". *The Guardian*, 10/14/17

Held, G. "Magazine Covers – A Multimodal Pretext-Genre". *Folia Linguistica*, 39(1-2), pp. 173-196, 2005.

Hellstrom, Jerker. *China's Emerging Role in Africa*, Stockholm: Swedish Defence Research Agency, 2009.

Heselton, C. "The PRC and PR: Baffling Messages in Times Square?" *The China Beat*. 1/24/11. <http://www.thechinabeat.org/>

Heslop, L. A., J. Liefeld and M. Wall. "An Experimental Study of the Impact of Country-Of-Origin Information," Paper presented at the Annual Conference of the Administrative Sciences Association of Canada, Toronto, Ontario, 1987.

Holt, Thomas. "Slavery and Freedom in the Atlantic World: Reflections on the Diasporan Framework." In *Crossing Boundaries: Comparative Histories of Black People in Diaspora*, ed. Darlene Clark Hine and Jacqueline McLeod. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1999, pp. 33-44.

Hong, Sung-Tai and Robert S. Wyer, Jr., "Effects of Country-of-Origin and Product Attribute Information on Product Evaluation: An Information Processing Perspective," *Journal of Consumer Research*, 16 (Sept), 1987, 175-187.

Hoogvelt, Ankie M. *Globalization and the Postcolonial World: the new political economy of development*, Johns Hopkins University Press, 2013.

Hsieh, A.T. and C. Kai Li. "The moderating effect of brand Image on public relations perception and customer loyalty". *Marketing Intelligence and Planning*, 26(1): 26-42, 2008.

Hu, J. Report to the Seventeenth National Congress of the Communist Party of China, 15th October. www.china.org.cn/english/congress/229611.htm, (2007).

Huang, S. "Nation Branding and Transnational Consumption: Japan-mania and the Korean Wave in Taiwan", *Media Culture Society* 33: 3–18, 2011.

Hughes, Rachel. "Through the looking blast: geopolitics and visual culture." *Geography Compass* 1 (5):976-994, 2007.

Hulberg, Jon. "Integrating corporate branding and sociological paradigms: A literature study." *Journal of Brand Management* 14.1-2 (2006): 60-73.

Hunter, John E. and David W. Gerbing, "Unidimensional Measurement, Second Order Factor Analysis, and Causal Models," *Research in Organization Behavior*, 4, 1982, 267-320.

Hutchison, Emma. "A global politics of pity? Disaster imagery and the emotional construction of solidarity after the 2004 asian tsunami." *International Political Sociology* 8 (1):1-19, 2014.

Ian Taylor (2014) "Chinese interest in Nigeria's oil and the American context", *Canadian Journal of African Studies/La Revue canadienne des études africaines*, 48:3, 391-404

Inikori, Joseph. *The Atlantic Slave Trade: Effects on Economies, Societies and Peoples in Africa, the Americas, and Europe*. Durham: Duke University Press Books, 1992.

Insch, A. and Florek, M. "A great place to live, work and play: Conceptualising place satisfaction in the case of a city's residents", *Journal of Place Management and Development*, 1(2), 138–149, 2008.

Insch, G. S., Moore, J. E. and Murphy, L. D. "Content analysis in leadership research: Examples, procedures, and suggestions for future use", *The Leadership Quarterly*, 8(1), 1–25, 1997.

Jain, V., Roy, S., Daswani, A. and Sudha, M. "How celebrities are used in Indian television commercials", *Vikalpa: The Journal for Decision Makers*, 35(4), 45–52, 2010.

Jakobson, Roman. "On linguistic aspects of translation." *On translation* 3 1959: 30-39.

Jansen, Sue Curry. "Designer nations: Neo-liberal nation branding - Brand Estonia." *Social identities* 14 (1):121-142, 2008.

Joel Wuthnow, The Concept of Soft Power in China's Strategic Discourse, Issues and Studies June 2008 44 no. 2 1-28

Johansson, Johny K., Susan Douglas, and Ikujiro Nonaka. "Assessing the Impact of Country of Origin on Product Evaluations: A New Methodological Perspective," *Journal of Marketing Research*, 22 (Nov), 1985, 388-396.

Jones, Matthew. "A 'Segregated' Asia?: Race, the Bandung Conference, and Pan-Asianist Fears in American Thought and Policy, 1954-1955," *Diplomatic History*, vol. 29, no. 5 2005, 841-868.

Jordan, Paul. "Nation Branding: A Tool for Nationalism?." *Journal of Baltic Studies* 45.3 2014: 283-303.

Jose, A. and Shang-Mei, L. "Environmental reporting of global corporations: A content analysis based on website disclosures", *Journal of Business Ethics*, 72(4), 307-321, 2007.

Kahin, George McTurnan. *The Asian-African Conference, Bandung, Indonesia, April 1955*. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1956.

Kaid, Lynda Lee, ed. *Handbook of political communication research*. Routledge, 2004.

Kalu, Nkemjika E. "Understanding Africa's China Policy: A Test of Dependency Theory and a Study of African Motivations in Increasing Engagement with China." (2012).

Kambon, K. K. *The worldviews paradigm: foundation for African Black psychology*. Tallahassee: Nubian Nation, 1999.

Kanyinga, Karuti. "The legacy of the white highlands: Land rights, ethnicity and the post-2007 election violence in Kenya." *Journal of Contemporary African Studies* 27.3 (2009): 325-344.

Keillor, B.D. and Hult, G.T.M. "A five-country study of national identity: Implications for international marketing research and practice". *International Marketing Review*, 16, 65-82. 1999

Keller, Kevin Lane. *Strategic Brand Management*, Prentice Hall, New Jersey, 1998.

Keller, Kevin Lane, M. G. Parameswaran, and Isaac Jacob. *Strategic brand management: Building, measuring, and managing brand equity*. Pearson Education India, 2011.

Kelley, Robin DG, and Betsy Esch. "Black like Mao: Red China and black revolution." *Souls: Critical Journal of Black Politics & Culture* 1.4 1999: 6-41.

Keto, C. Tsehloane. *Vision and time: Historical perspective of an Africa-centered paradigm*. University Press of Amer, 2001.

Kiiza, Julius. "Mercantilism and the Struggle for Late Industrialization in an Afe of Globalization: A Comparative Analysis of Uganda and Taiwan." In *Neoliberalism and Globalization in Africa: Contestations from the embattled continent*, 177-202. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008.

Kim, You Kyung, Sung Wook Shim, and Keith Dinnie. "The dimensions of nation brand personality: a study of nine countries." *Corporate Reputation Review* 16.1 (2013): 34-47.

King, A. *Global Cities*. London: Routledge, 1990.

King, Kenneth. "China's Soft Power in Africa: Past, Present, and Future," in China's Aid and Soft Power in Africa: The Case of Education and Training. Suffolk: James Currey (2013). Pp. 172-207.

Kobena Hanson, George Kararach , and Timothy M. Shaw *Rethinking Development Challenges for Public Policy: Insights from Contemporary Africa*, Palgrave Macmillan , 2012.

Kopinski, Dominik, Andrzej Polus, & Ian Taylor, (Eds.) *China's Rise in Africa. Perspectives on a Developing Connection*. London & New York: Routledge, 2012.

Kopytoff, I. "The International African Frontier: The Making of African Political Culture", in *The African Frontier*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1987.

Krippendorff, Klaus, and Mary Angela Bock. *The content analysis reader*. Sage, 2009.

Krippendorff, Klaus. *On communicating: Otherness, meaning, and information*. Routledge, 2010.

Krippendorff, Klaus. *The semantic turn: A new foundation for design*. crc Press, 2005.

Kurlantzick, Joshua. *Charm Offensive How China's Soft Power Is Transforming the World*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007

Kwame Nkrumah, *Neo-colonialism: the Last Stage of Imperialism*. Thomas Nelson & Sons, Ltd., London.1965.

LaFraniere, S. "China Curtails Run of 'Avatar' as It Fills Theaters". *New York Times*. 1/19/10.

Landis, Richard J. and Gary G. Koch, "The Measurement of Observer Agreements for Categorical Data", *Biometrics* 33:159-174, 1977.

Lash, S. and Urry, J. *The End of Organized Capitalism*. Oxford: Polity Press, 1987.

Lefkowitz, Melissa. "Riding the Madaraka Express Can a brand new, Chinese-built railway lay the tracks to Kenya's future?" *Slate*, 10/17/17.

Lenhart, Amanda, et al. "Social Media & Mobile Internet Use among Teens and Young Adults. Millennials." *Pew internet & American life project*, 2010.

Leonard, M. "Diplomacy by Other Means." *Foreign Policy* 132 (2007): 48–56.

Li, Anshan; Liu Haifang; Pan, Huaqiong; Zeng, Aiping; and He, Wenping; "FOCAC Twelve Years Later: Achievements, Challenges and the Way Forward." Peking University Discussion Paper 74, 2012.

Li, M. *Soft Power: China's Emerging Strategy in International Politics*. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2009.

Lilli, W. and Diehl, M. "Measuring national identity", Working Paper, Nr 10, Mannheimer Zentrum für Europäische Sozialforschung, 1999.

Lipietz, A. *Miracles and Mirages: the Crisis of Global Fordism*. London: Verso, 1987.

Lister, Martin and Liz Wells. "Seeing beyond belief: Cultural Studies as an approach to analysing the visual", in the *Handbook of Visual Analysis*, edited by T Van Leeuwen and C Jewitt, SAGE Publications: London, 2001.

Liu, M. "Can the Sage Save China?" *Newsweek*, 3/20/2006.
<http://www.newsweek.com/2006/03/19/can-the-sage-save-china.html>

Lonsdale, John. "Mau Maus of the mind: making Mau Mau and remaking Kenya." *The Journal of African History* 31.3 (1990): 393-421.

Loo, Theresa, and Gary Davies. "Branding China: The ultimate challenge in reputation management?." *Corporate reputation review* 9.3 (2006): 198-210.

Lukes, S. *Emile Durkheim: His Life and Work*. Harmondsworth: Allen Lane, 1973.

Lumumba-Kasongo, Tukumbi. "Rethinking the Bandung conference in an Era of 'unipolar liberal globalization' and movements toward a 'multipolar politics'." *Bandung: Journal of the Global South* 2.1 (2015): 9.

Lumumba-Kasongo, Tukumbi. *Political Re-mapping of Africa: Transnational Ideology and the Redefinition of Africa in World Politics*. University Press of America, 1994.

- MacKenzie, Scott B., Richard J. Lutz, and George E. Belch. "The role of attitude toward the ad as a mediator of advertising effectiveness: A test of competing explanations." *Journal of marketing research* 1986: 130-143.
- Macnamara, J.. Media content analysis: Its uses, benefits and Best Practice Methodology. *Asia Pacific Public Relations Journal*, 6(1), 1– 34, 2005.
- Maffesoli, M. *Le Temps des Tribus*. Paris: Klincksieck, 1988.
- Mamdani, Mahmood. *Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996.
- Mamdani, Mahmood. *When Victims Become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism, and the Genocide in Rwanda*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002.
- Manzaria, Johnnie, and Jonathon Bruck. "Media's Use of Propaganda to Persuade People's Attitude, Beliefs and Behaviors." 1999.
- Marsh, David, and Paul Fawcett. "Branding and franchising a public policy: The case of the Gateway review process 2001–2010." *Australian journal of public administration* 70.3 (2011): 246-258.
- Mawdsley, Emma. "Fu Manchu versus Dr Livingstone in the dark continent? Representing China, Africa and the West in British broadsheet newspapers." *Political Geography* 27.5 (2008): 509-529.
- Mazama, A. *The Afrocentric paradigm*. Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, 2003.
- Mazimhaka P, "China in Africa: an African view" in Liu, Jerry, and Patrick
- Mazimhaka. *The Morality of China in Africa: The Middle Kingdom and the Dark Continent*. Zed Books Ltd., 2013.
- McDougall III, Serie. *Research Methods in Africana Studies* (Black Studies and Critical Thinking). New York" Peter Lang Publishing, 2014.
- McEnally, Martha R., and Leslie De Chernatony. "The evolving nature of branding: Consumer and managerial considerations." *Academy of Marketing Science Review* 1999 (1999): 1.
- McQuarrie, Edward F., and David Glen Mick. "Figures of rhetoric in advertising language." *Journal of consumer research* 1996: 424-438.
- McQuarrie, Edward F., and David Glen Mick. "Visual rhetoric in advertising: Text-interpretive, experimental, and reader-response analyses." *Journal of consumer research* 26.1 1999: 37-54.

Medway, D. and Warnaby, G. "Alternative perspectives on marketing and the place brand", *European Journal of Marketing*, 42(5/6), 641–665, 2008.

Memmi, Albert. *The Colonizer and the Colonized*. Boston: Beacon Press, 1991.

Menard, Scott. *Applied logistic regression analysis*. Vol. 106. SAGE publications, 2018.

Mendonsa, Eugene L. *Continuity and Change in a West African Society: Globalization's Impact on the Sisala of Ghana*. Carolina Academic Press, 2001.

Mensah, Joseph. "Africa and the Political Economy of Time-Space Compression and Space of Flows." *Neoliberalism and Globalization in Africa*. Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2008. 113-134.

Mensah, Joseph. "Cultural Dimensions of Globalization in Africa: A Dialectical Interpenetration of the Local and the Global." In *Neoliberalism and globalization in Africa: contestations from the embattled continent*, 33-54. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008.

Mensah, Joseph. *Neoliberalism and Globalization in Africa: Contestations from the Embattled Continent*. New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2008.

Metzler, N. "Mattel recalling more Chinese-made toys". USA Today. 8/14/2007. http://www.usatoday.com/money/economy/2007-08-13_1285292096_x.htm

Meyer, John W. "The Changing Cultural Content of the Nation-State: A World Society Perspective." In *New Approaches to the State in the Social Sciences*, edited by George Steinmetz. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997.

Mfuniselwa, John Bhengu. *African Economic Humanism: The Rise of an African Economic Philosophy*, Ashgate, 2011.

Michel, Serge, and Michel Beuret. *China Safari: On the Trail of China's Expansion in Africa*. New York: Nation Books, 2009.

Miles, Matthew B., and A. Michael Huberman. "Drawing valid meaning from qualitative data: Toward a shared craft." *Educational researcher* 13.5 1984: 20-30.

Mills, Greg and Shelton, Garth. "Emerging Powers and Africa", Johannesburg: SAIIA Policy Briefing, 2003.

Mitchell, Andrew A., and Jerry C. Olson. "Are product attribute beliefs the only mediator of advertising effects on brand attitude?." *Advertising & Society Review* 1.1 2000.

Mitchell, W. J. T. *Picture Theory : essays on verbal and visual representation*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994.

Mkandawire, Thandika. "Thinking about developmental states in Africa." *Cambridge journal of economics* 25.3 (2001): 289-314.

Mkandawire, Thandika. "Thinking about developmental states in Africa" *Camb. Journal*

Mogopodi Lekorwe, Anyway Chingwete, Mina Okuru, and Romaric Samson, "China's growing presence in Africa wins largely positive popular reviews" *Afrobarometer* Dispatch No. 122, October 2016.

Mohan, Giles and Ben Lampert. "Negotiating China: Reinserting African Agency into China–Africa Relations." *African Affairs* 112, no. 446 (2013): 92–110.

Monson, J. "Liberating Labour? Constructing Anti-Hegemony on the Tazara railway in Tanzania, 1965-76". In C. Alden, D. Large, & R. Soares de Oliveira, *China Returns to Africa: A Rising Power and a Continent Embrace*. London: Hurst & Company, 2008: pp. 197-220.

Monson, Jamie. "Three-Way Race: Whiteness and the Construction of Race Identity in China–Africa Relations." Paper presented at the Center for African Studies Fiftieth Anniversary Conference, "Retrospectives and Cutting Edges," University of Edinburgh, June 6–8, 2012.

Monson, Jamie. *Africa's Freedom Railway: How a Chinese Development Project Changed Lives and Livelihoods in Tanzania*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2009.

Montgomery, Douglas C., Elizabeth A. Peck, and G. Geoffrey Vining. *Introduction to linear regression analysis*. Vol. 821. John Wiley & Sons, 2012.

Moore, W.E. "Global Sociology: the World as a Singular System", *American Journal of Sociology* 71(5), 1966.

Moreira, Marcio, and William M. O'Barr. "The airbrushing of culture: An insider looks at global advertising." *Advertising & Society Review* 1.1, 2000.

Morgan, Nigel, Annette Pritchard, and Rachel Piggott. "New Zealand, 100% Pure. The creation of a powerful niche destination brand." *The Journal of Brand Management* 9 (4):335-354, 2002

Moyo, Dambisa. *Dead Aid: Why Aid is Not Working and How There is a Better Way for Africa*. New York: Farrar, Strauss and Giroux, 2009.

- Naccarato, J. L. and Neuendorf, K. A. "Content analysis as a predictive methodology: Recall, readership, and evaluations of business-to-business print advertising", *Journal of Advertising Research*, 38(3), 19–33, 1998.
- Ndlovu-Garsheni, Sabelo J. *Empire, Global Coloniality and African Subjectivity*. New York: Berghan Books, 2013.
- Nelson, Michelle R. "Recall of brand placements in computer/video games." *Journal of advertising research* 42.2 (2002): 80-92.
- Netemeyer, Richard G., Srinivas Durvasula, and Donald R. Lichtenstein. "A Cross-National Assessment of the Reliability and Validity of the CETSCALE," *Journal of Marketing Research*, 28, 3 (August), 320-327, 1991.
- Neuendorf, K. A. *The content analysis guidebook*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2016.
- Neuendorf, K. A., et al. "Shaken and stirred: A content analysis of women's portrayals in James Bond films", *Sex Roles*, 62(11–12), 747–761, 2010.
- Nicolas Van de Walle *African Economies and the Politics of Permanent Crisis, 1979-1999*, Cambridge University Press 2001.
- Nobles, W. W. "Ancient Egyptian thought and the development of African (Black) psychology". In M. Karenga & J. H. Carruthers (Eds.), *Kemet and the African Worldview*(pp. 100–118). Los Angeles: University of Sankore Press, 1986.
- Nobles, W. W. *Seeking the Sakhu*. Chicago: Third World Press, 2006.
- Nyaga et al, "Kenya-China Relations: Portrait of Economic Cooperation in the New Millennium", *International Journal of Social Science and Humanities Research*. Vol. 5, Issue 3, pp 254-268, July- September 2017
- Nye, Joseph S. "The rise of China's soft power." *Wall Street Journal Asia* 29 (2005): 6-8.
- Nye, Joseph. *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics*. NY: Public Affairs, 2004.
- Nyerere, Julius. *Ujaama*. Dar es Salaam: Oxford University Press, 1968.
- O'Loughlin, Ben. "Images as weapons of war: representation, mediation and interpretation." *Review of International Studies* 37 (01):71-91, 2011.
- Odia, Edith Onowe, and Felix Osaiga Isibor. "Strategic approach to nation branding: a Case of the Nigeria brand." *International Journal of Business and Management* 9.3 (2014): 204.

Offe, K. *Disorganized Capitalism*. Oxford: Polity Press, 1985.

Ohiorhenuan, John and Zoe Keler “International Political Economy and African Economic Development: A Survey of Issues and Research Agenda” *Journal of African Economies*, Volume 17, AERC Supplement 1 pp i140-i239.

Okiihiro, Gary Y. *Margins and mainstreams: Asians in American history and culture*. University of Washington Press, 2014.

Okpewho, Isidore, and Nkiru Nzegwu, eds. *The new African diaspora*. Indiana University Press, 2009.

Osei, Collins; Gbadamosi, Ayantunji. “Rebranding Africa.” *Marketing Intelligence & Planning* 29.3 2011: 284-304.

Ostbo Hagen, Heidi. “Chinese Exports to Africa: Competition, Complementarity and Cooperation between Micro-Level Actors,” *Forum for Development Studies*, v. 38, no. 2 June 2011, pp. 157-76.

Paek, H.-J., Reid, L. N., Jeong, H. J., Choi, H. and Krugman, D. “Five decades of promotion techniques in cigarette advertising: A longitudinal content analysis”, *Health Marketing Quarterly*, 29(1), 1–17, 2012.

Papadopoulos, N., L. A. Heslop and G. Bamossy. "International Competitiveness of American and Japanese Products," in *Dimensions of International Business* (no. 2),

Paradise, J. *China and International Harmony: The Role of Confucius Institutes in Bolstering Beijing’s Soft Power*. *Asian Survey* 49, 2009: 647–669

Parameswaran, Ravi and Attila Yaprak. "A Cross-National Comparison of Consumer Research Measures," *Journal of International Business Studies*, 18 (Spring), 1987, 35-49.

Patrick Chabal *Africa: The Politics of Suffering and Smiling*, Zed Books, 2009.

Patton, Michael Quinn. *Qualitative research*. John Wiley & Sons, Ltd, 2005.

Polier, N. and Roseberry, W. “Triste Tropes: Postmodern Anthropologists Encounter the Other and Discover Themselves”, *Economy and Society* 18(2), 1989.

Prah, K. K. *Afro-Chinese Relations: Past, Present and Future*. Cape Town, South Africa: CASAS, 2007.

Prempeh, Edward Osei Kwadwo. "The Anticapitalism Movement and African Resistance to Neoliberal Globalization." In *Neoliberalism and globalization in Africa:*

contestations from the embattled continent, 55-70. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008.

Raghavan, Sudarson "In snub to Washington, Kenyan president visits China, Russia in first official visit outside Africa" *The Washington Post* August 17, 2013

Ramo, J. *Brand China*. London: Foreign Policy Centre, 2007.

Ramose, M. B. "Philosophy of ubuntu and ubuntu as philosophy". In P. H. Coetzee, P. Abraham, & J. Roux (Eds.), *Philosophy from Africa* (pp. 230–238). Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002.

Robin D.G. Kelley and Betsey Esch, "Black Like Mao: Red China and Black Revolution," in Ho and Mullen, eds., *Afro-Asia*.

Robin Hallett, *Africa to 1875: A Modern History*, University of Michigan: Ann Arbor, 1970 p. 35.

Rodney, Walter. *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa*. Washington, D.C.: Howard University Press, 1981.

Rodney, Walter. *Pan Africanism and the African Diaspora: An analysis of Modern Afro-centric Political Movements*. Wayne State University Press (1993).

Rojas-Mendez, Jose I., Murphy, S. and Papadopoulos, N. (2011) 'The US Brand Personality: A Sino perspective'. *Journal of Business Research*, Vol. 66, pp. 1028-1034.

Rojas-Méndez, José I., Nicolas Papadopoulos, and Mohammed Alwan. "Testing self-congruity theory in the context of nation brand personality." *Journal of Product & Brand Management* 24.1 (2015): 18-27.

Rojas-Méndez, José I., Nicolas Papadopoulos, and Steven A. Murphy. "Measuring and positioning nation brands: A comparative brand personality approach." *Corporate Reputation Review* 16.1 (2013): 48-65.

Rose, Gillian. *Visual methodologies : an introduction to the interpretation of visual materials*. London: SAGE Publications, 2007.

Rose, Jonathan. "The branding of states: The uneasy marriage of marketing to politics." *Journal of Political Marketing* 9.4 (2010): 254-275.

Rutherford, Blair. "Zimbabwean Land Redistribution!: Globalization and Neoliberal Narratives and Transnational Connections." In *Neoliberalism and Globalization in Africa: Contestations from the embattled continent*, 203-220. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008.

Sahle, Eunice N. "Gender, States, and Markets in Africa." In *Neoliberalism and Globalization in Africa: Contestations from the embattled continent*, 71-92. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008.

Sakai, N. "Modernity and its Critique. The Problem of Universalism and Particularism", *South Atlantic Quarterly* 87(3), 1988.

Sandelowski, Margarete. "Sample size in qualitative research". *Res. Nurs. Health*, 18 (1995): 179–183.

Sandelowski, Margarete. "Combining qualitative and quantitative sampling, data collection, and analysis techniques in mixed-method studies." *Research in nursing & health* 23.3 (2000): 246-255.

Saunders, M., P. Lewis, and A. Thornhill. "Understanding research philosophies and approaches." *Research methods for business students* 4 (2009): 106-135.

Sautman, Barry. "Anti-Black Racism in Post-Mao China". *The China Quarterly*, Volume 138 June 1994 , pp. 413-437.

Schiller, H.I. "Electronic Information Flows: New Basis for Global Domination?", in P. Drummond and R. Patterson (eds), *Television in Transition*. London: British Film Institute, 1985.

Schlesinger, P. "On National Identity: Some Conceptions and Misconceptions Criticised", *Social Science Information* 26(2), 1987.

Schreier, M. *Qualitative content analysis in practice*. London: Sage.

Seligson, Mitchell A., John T. Passé-Smith, and Mitchell Allan Seligson, eds. *Development and underdevelopment: the political economy of global inequality*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998.

Shapiro, Michael J. *Studies in transdisciplinary method : after the aesthetic turn*. London: Routledge, 2013.

Shapiro, Michael J. *Violent cartographies: mapping cultures of war*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2007.

Sharma, Piyush. "Measuring personal cultural orientations: Scale development and validation." *Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science* 38.6 , 2010: 787-806.

Shelton, Garth, *China, Africa and Asia Advancing South-South Co-operation*. Buenos Aires, Argentina: Clasco, 2005.

Shelton, Garth. "China and Africa: Building an economic partnership." *South African Journal of International Affairs* 8.2, 2001: 111-119.

Shillington, Kevin. *History of Africa*. Palgrave Macmillan, 2012.

Shimp, Terence A. Shimp and Subhash Sharma (1987), "Consumer Ethnocentrism: Construction and Validation of the CETSCALE," *Journal of Marketing Research*, 24 August, 280-289.

Shivji, Issa C . *Accumulation in an African Periphery: A Theoretical Framework*, Mbuki na Nyota Publishers, Dar es Salaam, 2009.

Shohat, Ella, and Robert Stam. "The imperial imaginary." *The anthropology of media: A reader*, 2002, pp: 117-147.

Slaughter, A.M. (2004). *A New World Order*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, p. 267–268.

Smallwood, Stephanie. *Saltwater Slavery: A Middle Passage from Africa to American Diaspora*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007.

Sneyd, Adam. *Governing Cotton: Globalization and Poverty in Africa*, Palgrave

Soares, Ana Maria, Mino Farhangmehr, and Aviv Shoham. "Hofstede's dimensions of culture in international marketing studies." *Journal of business research* 60.3 (2007): 277-284.

Starr, D. (2009). "Chinese Language Education in Europe: The Confucius Institutes". *European Journal of Education* 44: 65–82.

Stiglitz, Joseph, *Globalization and Its Discontents* W. W. Norton & Company; 1 edition, April 17, 2003.

Strang, David. "Contested sovereignty: the social construction of colonial imperialism." *Cambridge Studies in International Relations* 46, 1996: 22-49.

Suzuki, S. (2009). "Chinese Soft Power: Insecurity Studies, Myopia, and Fantasy". *Third World Quarterly* 30: 779–793

Sweet, James H. *Recreating Africa: Culture, Kinship and Religion in the African-Portuguese World, 1441-1770*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2003.

Szondi, György "The role and challenges of country branding in transition countries: The Central and Eastern European experience". *Place Branding and Public Diplomacy* 3.1: 8-2, 2007.

Szondi, Gyorgy. *Public diplomacy and nation branding: Conceptual similarities and differences*. Netherlands Institute of International Relations 'Clingendael', 2008.

Szwed, John F. *Space is the place: The lives and times of Sun Ra*. Pantheon, 2012.

Taiwo, Olufemi. Ifa: “An account of a divination system and some concluding epistemological questions”. In K. Wiredu (Ed.), *A companion to African philosophy* (pp. 304–312). Oxford: Blackwell, 2006.

Taiwo, Olufemi. *How Colonialism Preempted Modernity in Africa*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2009.

Talentino, A.K. (2004). “The Two Faces of Nation Building: Developing Function and Identity”, *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 17: 557–575.

Tan-Mullins, May, Giles Mohan, and Marcus Power. "Redefining 'aid' in the China–Africa context." *Development and Change* 41.5 2010: 857-881.

Taylor, Ian. "China's relations with Nigeria." *The Round Table* 96, no. 392 (2007): 631-645.

Taylor, Ian. *China and Africa: Engagement and Compromise*. Routledge: London, 2006: 167.

Taylor, Ian. *The All-Weather Friend?* London: Routledge, 2004.

Thorelli, H.B., J. Lim, and J. Ye (1989), "Relative Importance of Country-of-Origin, Warranty, and Retail Store Image on Product Evaluations," *International Marketing Review*, 6(1), 35-46.

Tiryakian, E.A. “Sociology's Great Leap Forward: the Challenge of Internationalization”, *International Sociology* 1(2), 1986.

Tremann, Cornelia. "Temporary Chinese Migration to Madagascar: Local Perceptions, Economic Impacts, and Human Capital Flows" *African Review of Economics and Finance*, December 2013.

Tuakli-Wosornu, Taiye. "Bye-Bye, Babar (Or: What is an Afropolitan?)." 2008: 36-38.

Tuck, Eve, and K. Wayne Yang. "Decolonization is not a metaphor." *Decolonization: Indigeneity, education & society* 1.1 2012.

Tuli, Fekede. "The basis of distinction between qualitative and quantitative research in social science: Reflection on ontological, epistemological and methodological perspectives." *Ethiopian Journal of Education and Sciences* 6.1 (2011).

Tull, Denis M. "China's Engagement in Africa: scope, significance and consequences." *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 44, no. 03 (2006): 459-479.

Van de Walle, Nicolas. *African economies and the politics of permanent crisis, 1979-1999*. Cambridge University Press, 2001.

Van Ham, Peter. The Rise of the Brand State: "The postmodern politics of image and reputation". *Foreign Affairs* 8, no. 5: 2001, 2–6.

Van Ham, Peter. "Place branding: The state of the art." *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 616, no. 1 2008, 126–149.

Van Leeuwen, Theo and Carey Jewitt (eds.)-*Handbook of Visual Analysis*-SAGE Publications, 2001.

Vaughan, Megan. *Creating the Creole Island: Slavery in Eighteenth Century Mauritius*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2005.

Volcic, Zala, and Mark Andrejevic.. "Nation branding in the era of commercial nationalism." *International Journal of Communication* 5 (1):598-618, 2011.

Wallerstein, I. "World-Systems Analysis", in A. Giddens and J. Turner (eds), *Social Theory Today*. Oxford: Polity Press, 1987.

Walter Rodney, *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa*, Howard University Press, 1981.

Wang, J. "Nation Branding at the 2010 World Expo: A Matter of Balance", 2010. http://www.brandchannel.com/brand_speak.asp?bs_id=249.

Wang, Yiwei." Film to boost Chinese image". *China Daily*. 30th July, 2010.

Wang, Yiwei. "Public diplomacy and the rise of Chinese soft power." *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 616.1, 2008: 257-273.

Wernick, Andrew. "Promotional culture." *C Theory* 15.1-3, 1991 pp: 260-281.

White, Marilyn Domas, and Emily E. Marsh. "Content analysis: A flexible methodology." *Library trends* 55.1 (2006): 22-45.

Whitehead, Eleanor. "Going East: African Migrants Head for China," in *This is Africa*, 4 February 2014.

Whitelock, Jeryl, and Fernando Fastoso. "Understanding international branding: defining the domain and reviewing the literature." *International Marketing Review* 24.3 (2007): 252-270.

Williams, Eric. *Capitalism and Slavery*. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1994.

Winit, Warat, et al. "Global vs local brands: how home country bias and price differences impact brand evaluations." *International Marketing Review* 31.2 (2014): 102-128.

Wolf, D. (2011). "China's Ad Campaign: To Whom Are We Selling?" Silicon Hutong. <http://siliconhutong.com/2011/01/19/chinas-ad-campaign-to-whom-are-we-selling/>

Worger, William et al. *Africa and the West: A Documentary History*, 2010.

Wouters, C. "Formalization and Informalization: Changing Tension Balances in Civilizing Processes", *Theory, Culture & Society* 3(2), 1986.

Xin Xin. "Xinhua News Agency in Africa," *Journal of African Media Studies*, v. 1, no. 3 (2009), pp 363-77.

Yan X. "Ruan Shili de Hexin Shi Zhengzhi Shili (The Core of Soft Power is Political Power)". *Huanqiu Shibao (Global Times)*, 22nd May, 2007.

Yaprak, Attila and Ravi Parameswaran, "Strategy Formulation in Multinational Marketing: A Deductive, Paradigm-Integrating Approach," *Advances in International Marketing*, 1, 1986, 21-45,.

Yi, H. "Wenhua yu guojia wenhua ruanshili (Cultural Sovereignty and Cultural Soft Power of Nation)". *Shehui Kexue Wenxian Chubanshe (Beijing: Social Sciences Academy Press)*, 2009.

Young, N.C., and Jeong, J.H. China's Soft Power: Discussions, Resources, and Prospects. *Asian Survey* 48, 2008: 453–472.

Yu Xie, Henry, and David J. Boggs. "Corporate branding versus product branding in emerging markets: A conceptual framework." *Marketing Intelligence & Planning* 24.4, 2006: 347-364.

Zedong, Mao, 1986. *Selected Writings of MaoZadong*. Beijing: Renmin Press.

Zedong, Mao. "From Brothers to Partners: China and Africa Building Strategic Ties", quoted in Chang Ailing, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China Beijing: MFAPRC, 2006.

Zhang Wenzhong (2010). "National propaganda film lets the world misconceive China (Guojia xuanchuanpian' rang shijie wujie zhongguo)". 2 September, *Radio French Internationale*.

Zhang, L., Srisupandit, P. T. and Cartwright, D. "A comparison of gender role portrayals in magazine advertising: The United States, China and Thailand", *Management Research News*, 32(7), 683–700.

Zhu, Z. and Quan, Z. (2009). *Zhongguo gongchandang yu zhonghua minzu fuxing ruanshili* (Chinese Communist Party and the Soft Power of the Chinese National's Renaissance) Wuhan: Hubei Renmin Chubanshe (People's Press), pp. 94–95.