My dissertation studies the effect of recent pension reforms on teacher labor market behavior. I begin with “How Large is the Cut? Comparing Net Pension Wealth of State Defined Benefit Pension Plans for Teachers Across States and Over Time.” In this essay, I describe the across state and over time variation in the generosity of 41 defined benefit pension plans. To do so, I simulate the present value of the total pension compensation, net of contribution costs, for a representative teacher in each of the 41 defined benefit pension plans. I find large cross-state differences in the present value of net pension wealth as well as net pension wealth cuts. When examining the effect of pension-reducing legislation on hypothetical teachers’ net pension wealth, I find that states with more generous benefits pre-reform undertook larger cuts. However, a few states including Illinois, New Jersey, and New Hampshire, which were among the least generous pre-reform also experienced large benefit cuts, decreasing their net pension wealth by more than 50 percentage points. Last, I find that states that do not enroll teachers in Social Security faced worse pension funding crises and harsher cuts compared to those with Social Security coverage.In my next essay, “The Effect of Recent Teacher Pension Reforms on New Teacher Quality,” I estimate the effect of pension generosity on new teacher quality. Between 2007 and 2011, 19 states and four cities enacted salient pension reforms affecting all newly hired teachers. Using pooled cross-sectional teacher-level data from the 2003-2004, 2007-2008 and 2011-2012 Schools and Staffing Survey, I examine how new teacher quality changed differentially between the pre-benefit cuts and post-benefit cuts periods among states and cities that enacted pension reforms relative to those that did not have pension reforms. The hypothesis is that lower pension benefits, all else equal, decrease the attractiveness of teaching and discourage prospective teachers, particularly those with better alternatives, from entering the profession. Controlling for a complete set of time-varying factors that might affect teacher entry, I find that teachers entering the profession under pension reforms are from undergraduate institutions with 25.63 points lower 25th percentile SAT scores. I also find that a one percent increase in the present value of net pension wealth results in schools hiring new teachers from undergraduate institutions with 32.15 points higher 25th percentile SAT scores. In my last essay, “Who Chooses to Stay? The Effect of Teacher Pension Incentives on New Teacher Turnover,” I use recent pension reforms to identify the effect of pension incentives on the job change decisions of early career teachers. I test the hypotheses that lower expected compensation levels and higher vesting requirements decrease the cost of changing jobs and increase teacher turnover, all else equal. Using pooled cross-sectional teacher level data from the 2003-2005, 2007-2009 and 2011-2013 school years, I examine how new teacher turnover changed differentially between the pre-wealth cut and post-wealth cut periods among states that enacted pension reforms, relative to those that did not. Controlling for teacher and school characteristics, I find no significant effect of benefit-reducing legislation or more stringent vesting requirements on teacher turnover among newly hired teachers. These estimates may suggest that new teachers only value short-term pension wealth accruals or that teachers lack full knowledge of pension structure. Alternatively, the composition of the new teacher pool may have changed during recent pension reforms, with less mobile teachers entering the profession.
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