——'-_-A-.‘ #1.“. - -‘ —-— 'v-w‘ ‘M F; LIBRAI" 1' i”; l\\\\\\\\\\l\\\\\\\\l\ll\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\lllll\\\ll\l 3 1293 00003 4649 #— This is to certify that the thesis entitled TOWARD A THEORY FOR VALUES DEVELOPMENT EDUCATION presented by John S. Stewart has been accepted towards fulfillment of the requirements for PhD . degree in SflmndamEducat ion and Curriculum Major professor Ted W. Ward Date .Ma.¥_L,_J_9_Z_4._—_ 0-7639 ABSTRACT TOWARD A THEORY FOR VALUES DEVELOPMENT EDUCATION This dissertation is an attempt to lay the initial ground- work for a theory for values development education. It is, therefore, preliminary and tentative, but it is based on well-established psycho- logical and phi1050phica1 works, especially the work of John Dewey, Jean Piaget, and Lawrence Kohlberg. Recognizing the need on the part of educators for curricular guidelines, programs, and instructional materials for values/moral education that are compatible with and usable within the orientation of a pluralistic and democratic society, the writer has attempted to bring together the contributions of the three principal scholars named above, along with the contributions of many other scholars, in such a way as to begin to provide the founda- tion for meeting these needs. Reviews of the values/moral education and deveIOpment literature are presented and critiqued. Four approaches to values/moral education are presented: (1) the traditional-authoritarian, (2) the cultural-relativiStiC: (3) the absolute relativistic, and (4) the organismic-structural—deve10pmenta1. The position is taken and defended that the first three of these approaches are inconsistent with democratic principles and/or are ineffective. The fourth position has been chosen as the basis for values development education, and the presentation, elaboration, support, and implications of this position constitute the subject and substance of this dissertation. The thesis is taken that each educator has a view of man that serves as the basis for his or her educational phi1050phy, methodology, and approach to teaching. The view may be implicit or explicit. The position is taken that the educator has a moral obligation to system- atically deve10p and make explicit the individual's view of man. Three major views of man that tend to dominate western behavioral science are presented and critiqued: behaviorism, psychoanalysis, and organismic psychology. Existential psychology is also presented-- as partly overlapping with organismic psychology, but as having some fundamental differences. Support is presented for organismic psycho- logv as the most defensible view of man as the basis for values deve10p- ment education. Chapter 4 is a presentation of the organismic view, along with the methodology of modern structuralism and the theories of deve10pmental psychology. Thus the organismic-structuralZ—deveZopmental cenceptual framework is an integration of these three orientations. Included are the cognitive-developmental stages of Piaget and the values/moral development stages of Kohlberg. A major implication of this conceptual framework is that democracy (as a sociOpSyChological system) is both structure and process for values/moral development and education. That is, democracy is the methodological process that enhances, encourages, and maximizes values/ moral development; and principled morality is essentially based on democratic moral principles democratically derived. From this Standpoint the school is examined as a values/moral agent and the themes of education, curriculum, and values deve10pment are elaborated from the organismic-structural-developmental perspective. One of the major theses of this dissertation is that the school is inherently a values/moral system, and that this role can be maximized for a pluralistic and democratic society if the school attempts to operate as a just moral commnitynthat is if the school can be a place where justice is transactionally experienced in community with faculty, students, parents, and community as partners in the democratic process. A tentative plan for initiation of such a concept is presented, along with other recommendations for implementa- tion of the conceptual framework of values deve10pment education. Recommendations are made for further theoretical, phi1050phical, and empirical exploration and extension of the attempt to build toward a theory for values deve10pment education, as well as for practical applications of what has been presented. TOWARD A THEORY FOR VALUES DEVELOPMENT EDUCATION BY John S. Stewart A DISSERTATION Submitted to Michigan State University in partial fUlfillment of the requirements for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY Department of Secondary Education and Curriculum 1974 (c) C0pyright by JOHN S. STEWART 1974 DEDICATION T0 CARLA My Wife, my Love, and my Life. It was her idea to get this degree, and her hard work that helped finance it and otherwise make it possible. And it is her Love that makes it all worthwhile. To her I can only say with all my Love: Grow old along with me! The best is yet to be, The last of life, for which the first was made...* 669 *The opening lines of ”Rabbi Ben Ezra," by Robert Browning. ii SPECIAL ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS This dissertation was prepared as part of our work in the Values DevelOpment Education Program, College of Education, Michigan State University. The Program is funded by The Lilly Endowment, Inc , Indianapolis, Indiana. Our deep gratitude to the Endowment deserves special mention. Their interest in and support for our total program is generally acknowledged here, along with particular acknowledgement for both financial support and encouragement for deve10pment of the theoretical foundation, for which this dissertation was created. The writer is especially grateful to the following officials of The Lilly Endowment, Inc. , for making this all possible: Dr. Landrum R. Bolling Executive Vice President Dr. James B. Holderman Vice President for Education Dr. Charles G. Williams Vice President for Religion iii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS A dissertation in one sense is the individual creation of one writer-~but only in a very limited sense is that true. This particular dissertation is an exemplification of the underlying principle that a dissertatixnn is the product of complex transactions among many people whose contributions become focused and integrated through the individual creation.. 9) describes the role of theory: Generally speaking, all theory may be viewed as having two major and complementary functions: it serves as a tool, to guide observation and so produce new and firmer facts, and it is a goal of science in that our ultimate objective is as complete an under- standing as possible of the natural world, including of course man and his artifacts. Chinoy's definition and discussion about the need to define concepts and describe the interrelationships of these concepts; Hall and Lindzey's characterization of theory in terms of empirical definitions (Operational definitions), systematic relationships of relevant assumptions, the systematic and heuristic generation of research, the means of providing a conceptual filter or lattice by which to observe phenomena, the building process of theory in both inductive and deductive terms, the true-false distinction involved, and the creative nature of theory; and Marx's definition in terms of provisional explanatory prOpositions, observed relationships, underlying struc- tures, inferred relationships, and the tool and goal functions of theory-- these three conceptualizations of theory and theory-building are all highly congruent, frequently isomorphic, and together as an integrated matrix describe the processes used in this dissertation, the goals sought, and the outcomes achieved. These metatheoretical assumptions were applied to a large body of data, composed of theories, systems, empirical findings, philoso- phical formulations and speculations, and conceptual models in order 11 to identify the most useful of the above factors, systematically relate them, and generally build an integrated base for a theory. From this base, implications were drawn for (1) further deve10pment of the theory, (2) application to education in general, and (3) application to specific areas of education, curriculum instructional development, and the nature and structure of the school. D. Specified Need for a Conceptual Framework in Values/Meral Education Any attempt to deal with values, values education, morality, or moral education, of necessity, involves the taking of positions on a number of highly controversial significant issues. These positions may be consciously and reflectively taken, or they may be unconsciously assumed with reflection. In other words, you may systematically analyze the issues, investigate the problems, reflect on the data, and make an attempt to develop an integrated, consistent, and sound basis for holding, defending, and using a particular position. Or you may arrive at your position without systematic analysis or an attempt to integrate the components of your belief system into a justifiable or defensible position. Regardless of which route you take it is inevitable that you will, at least Operationally or behaviorally, have a position that reflects your judgments and influences your actions with regard to values and morality. This position we will identify and label as one's BIAS. Since all human beings, by their nature, have perceptual, cognitive, and affective limitations, no human being can presume to know absolute truth. Consequently, no matter how thoroughly, systema- tically, or scientifically one develops his belief system, it can 12 never be more than a bias. From a scholarly viewpoint, a rationally developed bias, better called a conceptual framework, is practically and morally superior to an irrationally conceived bias. The latter would be preperly called a set of prejudices. Furthermore, it is an assumption Of this thesis that anyone holding a Significant and influential role in the social system, and who is involved in the socialization process itself, has a moral obligation to develop a conceptual framework and not a set of prejudices. Parents, teachers, and clergy, directly, and behavioral scientists, indirectly, are so deeply involved in the sociali- zation process that the deve10pment of a conceptual framework with regard to values education should be one of their highest priorities. The claim for the practical superiority of a conceptual frame- \ work is based on a number of foundational assumptions. First, a scienti- fic investigation of the problem will make available to the investigator a wider array of data than would otherwise be considered. An objective search for information about values will bring into focus data from many disciplines and over the entire sweep of history. Second, the analy- sis of this data is more likely to generate a greater number and higher quality of researchable hypotheses than would a narrow search of a smaller segment of history or of a lesser number of disciplines. Third, the exercise of systematizing and integrating the findings is likely to produce more powerful and more usable strategies because of the oppor- tunity to observe relationships that would otherwise go unnoticed. Fourth, the opportunity to benefit from the mistakes, findings, insights, and data of others becomes available. And fifth, the development of 13 a conceptual framework makes it possible to establish a basis for evalu- ation. That 15, the decisions that enter into the selection of components for the framework can serve as the basis for the criteria by which one evaluates the effectiveness and the efficiency of his strategies. In general, the development of a conceptual framework makes it possible to see consistencies and inconsistencies, relationships, and applications that are not otherwise obvious and may not even be welcome, and it tends to provide the impetus for formative evaluation. All of these add up to the possibility of greater effectiveness, higher efficiency, and more enduring impact. On the other hand, the claim for the moral superiority of a conceptual framework over a set of prejudices goes directly to the heart of the values issue, viz., justice. To the extent that one operates with a set of prejudices, the danger of making judgments and engaging in actions on the basis of invalid beliefs, unwarranted assump- tions, and distorted and incomplete facts is always present. Judgments based on a set of prejudices make it difficult at best, and frequently impossible, to render justice to one's fellow human beings. If we think of justice as the process by which one resolves competing claims on the basis of equal human rights and the absolute value of each human life, then it becomes a moral imperative to deve10p the capacity to take the role and perSpective of the other person. (One cannot truly take the role and perspective of the other person if he is prejudging the situation and/or the person. Clearly, then, from the standpoint of morality, a conceptual framework is superior to a set of prejudices. 14 The practical and moral superiority of the conceptual framework approach becomes even more evident after an investigation of the his; torical deve10pment of approaches to values education. Because of its centrality in the affairs of life and the concomitant sensitivity in social, political, and economic arenas, values education has largely proceeded from positions of vested interest and emotional involvement. Consequently, in spite of occasional attempts to define rationally the parameters of values development, values education has more typically proceeded under a number of sets of prejudices. Not until recently have there been sustained attempts to develop a conceptual framework. The present state of world affairs, the immense and complex social problems of our culture, and the growing awareness of the need for a more universally accepted ethos that will enhance the potentiality of worldwide justice and peace make it imperative that there be developed a comprehensive, integrated, efficacious, and valid conceptual frame- work for values education. As behavioral scientists and educators intensely interested in this need and deeply involved in the problems, we have been aware of our own moral obligation to contribute to the deve10pment of such a conceptual framework. In the sections that follow we will attempt to identify some of the problems and some of the available theoretical formulations and paradigms that appear to be promising components of the conceptual framework. ‘ E. OrganizatiogL Plan, and Content ‘of the Dissertation The organization and sequence of the dissertation proceeds from a brief review of approaches to values/moral education, partly 15 based on reviews of the literature by Hoffman (1970) and Kohlberg (1964) and complemented and supplemented by a presentation and analysis of a classification scheme for these approaches deveIOped by Stewart (1973). In this way Chapter II deals with the background and overview of the subject . The major assumption is made that all approaches to values/ moral development and education are based on an implicit or explicit view of the human organism, its nature, its capacities and potentiali- ties, and the processes and procedures by which it grows and develOpS. In Chapter III these fundamental issues of the major prevailing views of man that tend to dominate the behavioral sciences and philosophy of education in western culture are presented and critiqued. Justifica- tion for the selection of organismic psychology as the most usable, most defensible, and most balanced presently available for the foundation of the theory for values deve10pment education is presented. Chapter IV constitutes the major synthesis of the components considered fbr selection into the organismic—structural-devel0pmental conceptual framework that serves as the foundation for values develop- ment education. Each of the three components, viz., organismic, struc- tural, and developmental is extensively developed, defined, and inte- grated into the overall structure. Major theorists, researchers, and scholars are identified and their contributions presented. A major portion of Chapter IV is devoted to extensive presentations of the stages of Piaget and Kohlberg. Two of the most important implications of the findings of the research and the integration of the theoretical frameworks of the l6 organismic-structural-developmental theory are presented in Chapter V. They are that democracy constitutes advanced sociomoral development, and democracy is also a major process by which such development is facili- tated and achieved. Support for these theses is presented in order to Show the isomorphism of democracy and principled morality (high-level moral deve10pment) and democracy as process for moral development. The final section of this chapter is devoted to an attempt to identify, define, and elaborate the characteristics or criteria for principled morality. Kohlberg's major claim that justice is the core of morality is shown to be consistent with and supported by other major philosophers. Chapter VI is an attempt to apply the organismic-structural- developmental conceptual framework to the school, curriculum, and education in general. The role of the school as a values/moral agent is analyzed, with the major conclusions being that, in general, our schools tend to be both unwise and ineffective values/moral agents. Both the planned curriculum and the unplanned curriculum are evaluated. Definitions of curriculum and curriculum theory are presented, and an outline of a plan for curriculum theory is presented that is believed to be consistent with the principles of the organismic-structural- deve10pmental View of man and education. What is considered the single most important implication and conceptual derivation of the entire theory, namely, the conceptualiza- tion of the school as a just moral community, is presented, deveIOped, and supported in Chapter VII. The characteristics of the just moral community are identified, the role of the teacher is elaborated, the 17 need for an ombudsman in schools as a means of implementing justice, and the significance of responsibility are presented within the context of the school as a just moral community. Chapter VIII briefly summarizes the dissertation, and then presents a number of recommendations with respect to the following categories: 1. General application of the theory, 2. Psychological, philosophical, and methodological applications, and 3. Recommendations for the exploration of or extension of theories, theorists, systems, and conceptual frame- works to augment the development of the theory. F. Conclusion Two final thoughts are offered before asking the reader to make the long, but hopefully fruitful, journey through the following chapter. First, the theory that is the goal of the thesis is to respond to the need for education as seen by one of the contemporary world's greatest educational theorists, Jean Piaget. He says (in Ripple and Rockastle, 1964, p. 5): The principal goal of education is to create men who are capable of doing new things, not simply repeating what other generations have done--men who are creative, inventive, and discoverers. The second goal of education is to form minds which can be critical, can verify, and not accept every- thing they are offered. The great danger today is of slogans, collective opinions, ready-made trends 0f thought. We have to be able to resist individually, to criticize, to distinguish between what is proven and what is not. So we need 18 pupils who are active, who learn early to find out by themselves, partly by their own spontaneous activity and partly through material we set up for them; who learn early to tell what is veri- fiable and what is simply the first idea to come to them. The second thought comes from William James. To a graduate student who had done a critical thesis on his work, James wrote: Building up an author's meaning out of separate texts means nothing, unless you have first grasped the centre of his vision by an act of imagination. This concern for the center of great men's vision has been the major guiding principle throughout the deve10pment of this work. For that reason many of the quotations included are longer than they otherwise might be in order to present the heart of the message within the context from which it comes, without misapplying the literal nature of the words. There is some planned redundancy, in the dissertation, especially where identical or related themes are presented in various ways and in several relationships. Wherever possible, the precise location of the quotations is included, citing including alternate locations when relevant. The richer meaning of the statement can thus be obtained by the reader who has the time, patience, and inclination to refer back into the sources used here. The statement by William.lames is also offered in the hOpe that the reader will grasp the center of the writer's vision from the entire work, rather than the distorted vision that could come from reading only part or sections! A kiva in the Pueblo Indian culture is a very special kind of building. It is usually a circular meeting place that serves a 19 multipurpose focal point for the most important community activities of the tribe. Ritual, ceremony, decision, discussion, and many other vital functions of the life of the tribe took place in the kiva. It served as a place to perpetuate the viability of the culture. The author would like to metaphorically think of this dissertation as a philosophical and psychological kiva where many people and many ideas have come together to enrich the culture of education. It is hoped that the reader will enjoy and be enriched by having come here and taken the patience to read and reflect. Hopefully, some readers will respond and offer critical guidance toward the larger task of continuing to build a needed theory for values development education. CHAPTER TWO BACKGROUND AND OVERVIEW The literature on values/moral development1 and education is so massive that it precludes a truly meaningful review within the scope and framework of this chapter. Hoffman (1970) and Kohlberg (1964) have attempted extensive and systematic surveys which provide a fairly broad picture of what is known about moral development. These reviews Should be read with the authors' perspectives in mind. Hoffman's extensive treatment is apparently biased by his orientation in behavioristic social learning theory. Also, his review of the cognitive-developmental approach is predom- inantly based on Piaget's (1932) preliminary, tentative, and explor- atory work in the field of moral judgment. He devotes twelve pages to an extensive critical analysis of Piaget's brief foray into this field, and little more than four pages to Kohlberg's later, deeper, more extensive, and empirically substantiated work. He erroneously presents Kohlberg's work as a mere extension of Piaget's 1932 work. It is true that Piaget was one of the major inspirations for Kohlberg's beginning work in the late 1950's, and that Kohlberg's doctoral dissertation (1958) reported his efforts to test Piaget's hypotheses and Stages. In the intervening years, however, Kohlberg has elabor- 1The term used in this dissertation indicates the concern for a person's development in reference to his moral code and system of values. 20 21 ated his theory more on the basis of Piaget's extensive work on intellectual development, and the early 1932 work has become rela- tively less Significant. Hoffman bases his review on Kohlberg's early work, from 1958 to 1964. Considering that Hoffman wrote this review in 1970 it is strange that he failed to consider Kohlberg's later work, including reformulations of his stages based on empirical investigation beyond the 1958 paper. Hoffman's review is important fOr its extensive review and analysis of the work done on moral deve10pment from the perspective of social learning theory; this approach combines behaviorism and psychoanalysis. Social learning theory represents an attempt on the part of some moderate behaviorists to formulate Freud's findings and hypotheses in behavioristic terms and assumptions. Hoffman devotes Sixty-eight pages to social learning theory, the position from which he works in the field of moral development. Kohlberg's review is more balanced than Hoffman's but is substantially biased in the cognitive-developmental direction. Kohlberg's view of the other major approaches and the relation of Kohlberg's findings and position to Piaget's 1932 work are provided. Since the review was written in the early 1960's it has historical importance with reference to Kohlberg's theory. The foundation for a theory of values/moral development and education lies in the historical approaches to values/moral education. A brief description of some of the major forces that have operated in this field follows. By examining the history of the issue broadly and especially considering the philosophical issues 22 rather than being limited to the almost exclusively psychological orientation taken by both Kohlberg and Hoffman, we gain perspective. The broad approach deve10ped in this chapter serves as a conceptual base for the dissertation. .A. Approaches to values Education Approaches to values education can be classified in many ways. Any scheme will be somewhat arbitrary because the issues involved are complex. The dimensions of analysis and comparison are numerous: many factors cut across disciplinary and philosophical categories, and objectivity is difficult to achieve in such a highly controversial area. Any typology, of necessity, will be both arbi- trary and artifactual. Hoffman (1970) organized his analysis on the basis of three philosophical doctrines that he believes are central in the historical development of approaches to moral development. The three doctrines are: (1) original sin (possibly more appropriately labeled the doctrine of innate depravity), (2) innate purity, and (3) tabula rose. The original sin doctrine demands early and continual inter- vention by the adult representatives of the established secular and sacred values in order to salvage what otherwise might become a "lost soul." The historical roots of this doctrine are deep and complex, but the contemporary representative, according to Hoffman, is psychoanalysis. The second category, innate purity, is traced to Rousseau and to the belief that the newborn infant is basically good and pure, 23 but is being corrupted by society. This doctrine calls for protection from the corrupting influence of the adult society for as long as that is possible, but especially in the early years. Hoffman identifies Piaget as the contemporary representative of this view.2 Hoffman's third approach, tabula rasa, is linked to behaviorism. Hoffman suggests that behavioristic learning theory is a direct descendant of the tabula rasa doctrine. Hoffman also indicates that this approach has much in common with the doctrine of "original sin" or innate depravity, especially in its demand for early adult intervention in order to prevent the infant from proceeding on a course of biological drive gratification. The interface between behaviorism and psychoanalysis is largely responsible for the social 2Hoffman's analysis of Piaget's position is decidedly in error. There is no basis to claim that Piaget views the child as innately pure. In fact, Piaget (1932, p. 99) states: "From the moral as from the intellectual point of View, the child is born neither good nor bad, but master of his destiny." Piaget's work is pri- marily concerned with epistemological development, and he generally eschews metaphysical arguments of this nature. Hoffman's judgment may be based on his categorizing Piaget with humanistic psychology and the existential movement, which judgment is in itself somewhat incorrect. Certainly Piaget's orientation is in many ways humanistic, and his personal philosophy, in those rare moments when it shows in his writings, is broadly humanistic, but not existential. He is more accurately classified as an organismic theorist whose primary interest is in genetic epistemology. Another possible explanation for Hoffman's judgment is that Piaget was for years Co-Director of the Institut J. J. Rousseau in Geneva. This, in combination with the fact that Piaget is in agreement with some of Rousseau‘s ideas (but strongly opposed to many others) could lead to an over-gener- alization on Hoffman's part. It would be more accurate to identify humanistic psychology and existential psychology, or the so-called "third force" movement, with the doctrine of innate purity. 24 learning theory movement, and which has invested deeply in the study of the socialization process and moral development. Whereas Hoffman classifies approaches to moral education by using philosophical labels for his categories, he actually develops them in psych010gical terms. Kohlberg (1964) describes his classifi— cation procedure as a concern for degrees of internalization. His three categories are: (1) behavioral, (2) emotional, and (3) judgmental. The first of these he identifies with the concern for the development of the common sense notion of "moral character" which is based on conformity or resistance to temptation. Kohlberg calls this the ”bag of virtues" approach. In this traditional approach, "character" is something one has or lacks. (Character, in this sense, is defined in terms of a precise and Specific list of virtues to be acquired and possessed and vices to be avoided.) This view of moral education can be appropriately labeled, according to Kohlberg, as either the moral character approach or the moral conduct approach. This approach is closely related to the behavior- istic tradition. Kohlberg's second category (emotional) he calls the moral ;% emotion approach. The fundamental premise of this view is that the child behaves morally in order to avoid feelings of guilt. Moral education must focus on training procedures that will ensure interna- lization of cultural and social standards, and conformity to those standards. It is obvious that Kohlberg's "bag of virtues" descriptor also applies to this approach. Cultural and social standards are merely different lists of virtues. Both the behavior- 25 istic and the psychoanalytic schools have seen guilt and anxiety as major socialization factors. The moral judgment approach, Kohlberg's third category, denotes the cagnitive-developmental approach to moral judgment as developed by Kohlberg himself from the inspiration derived from the work of Piaget and the writings of Dewey. It focuses on the under- lying judgment that fOrms the base of moral behavior. The Hoffman and Kohlberg classifications are very useful for looking at approaches to values/moral education. Neither system, however, is sufficiently inclusive and both fail to account adequately fer approaches based on different concepts of relativity in values/ moral issues. To accommodate these problems, an extended classifi- cation scheme was proposed (Stewart, 1973) in which four types of approaches to values/moral education are identified: 1. Traditional-Authoritarian Approach (Absolute Nomothetic) 2. Cultural Relativistic Approach (Relative Nomothetic) 3. Absolute Relativistic Approach (Idiographic) 4. Organismic—Structural-Deve10pmental Approach (Universal Transactional) Each of these approaches is examined following in some detail and the whole is summarized in Table 2.1. The descriptions are an attempt to simplify some of the more peripheral issues and to focus on the more dominant and central tendencies of the major thrusts in values education that have emerged in western culture over the last several centuries. Underlying these four broad 26 general views are different conceptualizations of the human organism, the nature of the environment and society, and the nature of the interrelationships between man and his environment. It is impossible to explore these issues or conceptualizations without getting involved in philosophy, theology, psychology, soci010gy, social psychology, and anthropology. No attempt to clarify all these facets of this complex subject will be made. Rather an attempt will be made to present the essential elements of these four approaches. To conceive of these four types of approaches as mutually exclusive and readily identifiable would be to extend the scheme too far. There are many similarities and points of overlap in the approaches, and a particular prOgram of values education, moral education, or character education may have characteristics common to more than one approach. However, in any prOgram some overriding or dominant thrust would identify it as predominantly reflecting one type, the views of man and society held by the builders of the program, would most likely belie underlying(inconsistencies and conflicts in the social psychological and philOSOphical views of the designers. 1. The Traditional-Authoritarian Approach (Absolute Nomothetic) The belief in absolute values that have meaning apart from and external to man is basic to the absolute nomothetic approach. It is man's responsibility to learn these values and live according to them, according to this view. Values are assumed to be embodied in the traditions of the society, and some- 27 times are believed to have been rendered either by a deity, a quasi- deity, or a charismatic figure from the past. Values are believed to be externally objective, i.e., they actually exist independent of human perception, cognition, or valuation. In this approach, following the established tradition is considered mandatory for legi- timate membership in the society. Compliance and unquestioning obedience to authority is demanded. Among the sanctions employed by the social system are punishment, limitations on rewards, strict control of role, incarceration, and other forms of coercion. The methods employed to enforce these sanctions include indoctrination, shaping, modeling, fear-induction, guilt-induction, and various kinds of force, both physical and psychological. The underlying view of man may be either the tabula rasa view or the inner depravity view. In either case, the environment is seen as transmitting the values, knowledge, and structure of external reality to the empty or irrational organism. An important characteristic of this approach is an identi- fiable cluster of character traits or virtues, and its concomitant list of vices to be eschewed. Different cultures or subcultures may have different lists, beliefs, and laws, but each one believes that its values are the right ones. The approach is absolutistic, not relativistic. While there may be recognition that other values pertain in other cultures, and to some degree a tolerance of different values, they are not accorded the status of truth. Abso- lutism is the central and fundamental element in this approach, and the point that most clearly differentiates it from other approaches. 28 Absolutism is thus the rock on which is built the philosophy and methodology of the values/moral education and other aSpects of the socialization process within this approach. What has been described here is present in various societies. The approach is readily usable as a socializing technique in widely (fivergent cultures and subcultures. Political, social, economic, and religious groups who see themselves as diametrically opposed to each other on matters of doctrine, belief, faith, and goals have used and cmufinue to use this approach to values education. Greater or lesser versions of it may be observed in practice or in history by analyzing thesocialization processes of such otherwise different entities as the communist party apparatus in Russia, the Zuni Indians, the Catholic Church, the Boy Scouts, many Protestant and fundamentalist Panestant sects in North America, the Ku Klux Klan, the John Birch Smjety, many schools and many large corporations in the United Snues, the Orthodox wing of Judaism, traditional Sunday schools, prmutive tribal societies, the Peeples Republic of China, the Black Sqnember Movement, the Black Power Movement, virtually all military Orgnnzations, and many athletic organizations. The above list serves to remind that this method of Sockflization is widely adaptable and has been extensively used for manycenturies. It has been severly criticized in the western world, especially in the United States, in recent years, and there may be a genenu.trend away from it. But old approaches don't die easily; thi~Sapproac'h is still very much alive, even in a pluralistic and democratic society. 29 The absolutist approach lends itself well to the techniques and theories of behaviorism, especially the operant conditioning model of B. F. Skinner's radical behaviorism. This approach, however, and behaviorism should not be identified as one, for the techniques of behaviorism are also applicable in other types of systems. But the Lmderlying View of man as a passive product or victim of the environ- ment is highly compatible with both behaviorism and the traditional- mnhoritarian approach. Proponents of this view generally stress the Ingency of early indoctrination, exposure, and training lest competing vhws get a foothold in the impressionable, malleable, and fickle mind ofthe child. Attempts are usually made to restrict Opportunities for eqmsure to other systems before the indoctrination process is cmmflete and the innoculation against infection from rival belief amivalues systems is secure. The "untruths" of other systems are vkmed as ridiculous, infectious, evil, and dangerous. Two basic ideas characterize the traditional—authoritarian amnoaCh to values/moral education: 1. Values are absolute, and apply to all peeple, at all times, under all circumstances, in all places. Truth objectively exists, is known, and can be transmitted. 2. The source of values is the culture or society. Values are nomothetic. Thematwo primary characteristics are the basis for the proposal thatthe traditional-authoritarian approach be given the technical designation absolute nomothetic . 30 2. The Cultural-Relativistic Approach (Relative Nomothetic) The cultural-relativistic approach has some points in common with the first approach, but also some major differences. The primary difference is its relativistic approach to values, even though this is not a complete relativism, since values are seen as being rather constant and general within a given society. Thus, the term is cultural relativism-~differences across cultures, but authoritarian ruthin a given culture. Other cultures are not only rec0gnized as hmdng different values, but their value systems are accorded equal tmnh status for the members of that society. Within any given axiety the values are considered "absolute" in a normative sense. meequently, the members of the social system are socialized for amformity, acceptance, and adjustment. Normalcy, mental health, smfity, and related concepts form the virtue list of this approach. Since this approach has largely grown out of the psycho- mmlytic tradition and the cultural anthrOpOIOgy that was heavily hufluenced by Freudian psychology, there is an underlying view of mamas an organism in conflict. Man must learn to control his paafions and subvert his desires. The cultural relativistic mnmoach relies heavily on guilt as a primary socialization instru- mau:and tool of values education. The induction of anxiety and the anneal of guilt are primary methods of inducing conformity to the nmmm of the group. Whereas the traditional-authoritarian approach ismore likely to emphasize the collective conscience of the society, thecultural relativistic approach is more likely to emphasize getting alongvfith one's peers and having satisfactory interpersonal relations. 31 Emotional sanctions and emotional rewards are heavily relied upon. Whereas the traditional-authoritarian approach is characterized by compliance and unquestioning obedience, the cultural-relativistic approach is characterized by identification with authority, conformity, and adjustment. This approach also lends itself well to the techniques of Inmaviorism. The combined influence of psychoanalysis and behavior- imnhave led to a concept of values education that reflects the smnal learning theory branch of behaviorism. Dominated by the views 5*? ofnmn from psychoanalysis and behaviorism, this approach to values emxmtion sees guilt as the basic factor and motive of morality. lbmfl.behavior thus rests on the necessity for the individual to hnernalize the standards of society and control his impulses and dmnres by focusing on the feelings of remorse, pain, and anxiety thn.accompany his tranSgressions. One of the major mechanisms by whnm this approach to socialization succeeds, according to the pmmhoanalysts, is through the Specialized and complex type of idmnification known as anaclitic identification. This process remflts in the child acquiring through introjection the values of thepmrents. Whereas the traditional approach focuses on the exunnal consequences of acts and is less likely to consider inten- tionisand motivation, this approach focuses on internal feelings, Selfquitical and self-punitive kinds of behavior, and guilt-inducing anxiety, The applications of this approach are most easily seen in themental health movement that was especially influential in the 32 late 1940's through the early 1960's. The values generally identified with the American middle class that emerged after World War II were very muCh reflections of this cultural-relativistic approach. thrality based on nationalism, patriotism, loyalty, getting along vdth the neighbors and peers, being a ”nice guy," expressing one's personality but within the boundaries prescribed by the group, and :xmking the rewards of recognition and approval are all related to this approach . Two basic ideas characterize the cultural-relativistic C/KA~ qnmoach to values/moral education: 1. Values are absolute within any given culture, but they are relative from culture to culture, society to society, or group to group. 2. The source of values is the local culture, society or group. Values are nomothetic. Tmacultural-relativistic approach to values/moral education can thus becategorized as relative nomothetic. Although these two approaches, described above, differ in mmnrways, in actual practice they have been combined. And in mmnrof the social systems presented in the long list exemplifying thetraditional—authoritarian approach this second approach can also berecognized. For example, the virtues and prescribed vices of the BOYEkouts, many religious groups and Sunday Schools, and many bUShums and industrial organizations are products of both approaches. innacombined influence of behaviorism and psychoanalysis, the two dominant forces in the mainstream of American behavioral science 33 and education for more than half a century, can be seen freely mixed tOgether in many of the common approaches to values education. 3. The Absolute Relativistic Approach (Idiographic) Modern emphasis on individual freedom has led many people into the position that all values are relative, that there are no absolute ethical principles or moral rules. There are no standards orcriteria by which one person can ultimately judge another, no pmtification in fact for one society or culture passing judgment mlanother. Thus the name of this approach clearly states its pmfition: it is absolutely true that all values are relative. Uhesumably, the only exception is the basic statement itself!) 'Dm roots of this belief are many and varied, but certainly the poM>World War II reaction against tyranny, Oppression, nationalism, rmfism, and other processes and systems that tend to enslave, dis- enfimnchise, or arbitrarily restrict the rights and freedoms of some peqfle by others in power is one of the major factors. Part of this bmmd movement is represented by existentialism, another by humanism, ahmg with other philosophical and political movements that have atUmmted to raise the status of the individual up to where it is eiflmr equal to or superior to the group. From its cultural hethmge as "the land of the free and the home of the brave," the Ihfited States draws a particularly strong bias toward individualism and anti-collectivism. In part, the absolute relativistic approach is a general reaCtion against the first two approaches. Many people have seen 34 the consequences of traditional-authoritarian and adjustment approaches to values--they have seen the atrocities of Hitler, Mussolini, and Stalin; they have seen the excesses of power manifested by dictator- ships; they have seen the pathology of racism; they have seen the stifling, deadening, and crippling effects of conformity and adjust- ment; they have seen inhumane acts committed by supposedly religious people and by religious organizations in the name of absolute truth. And in their reactions to the weaknesses, defects, and excesses of authority, tradition, and adjustment they have swung to the other extreme and declared all values to be arbitrary, relative, and personal. The absolute relativistic approach is more general and pervasive than the other two--more a sort of attitude in one of the major prevailing zeitgeists than a consciously programmed method of socialization. However, it manifests itself in many of the movements that have deve10ped into major educational and sociali- zation forces, e.g., sensitivity training, gestalt therapy, some forms of "Open" education, A. S. Neill's Summerhill approach, Situation ethics, the ethics of the drug culture, the "do-your-own- thing" spirit, and many liberal and radical anti-authoritarian PrOgrams and movements. The issue being raised here in connection with these programs and movements is not their general philosophical, educational, or social orientations, or the substantive aSpects of their goals, but only their position on the relativity of values. The best way to illustrate the approach and to indicate 1'55 consequences is to briefly describe what are probably its two 35 most striking exemplars in the field of education, viz., the value- free curriculum and the values clarification approach. The value—free curriculum is based on the premise that since all values are relative, teachers and school administrators have no right imposing their own, the community's or anyone else's value system on the students. The goal, then is to make a conscious attempt to avoid all forms of moralizing and, insofar as possible, to eliminate expressions of the teacher's bias. Even comparative religion programs are to be avoided in order to preclude the possi- bility of religious indoctrination. Students are encouraged to believe that not only should they solve moral problems for themselves, but that their solutions are of equal value in the sense that no one can legitimately pass judgment on them, i.e., declare them objec- tively right or wrong. The emphasis is on individual freedom, Spontaneous growth, and respect for rights of others to hold values that are different. (This last is often more claimed than realized.) Whereas the traditional~authoritarian approach makes the content of the values orientation of the school as explicit as possible, the absolute relativistic approach, in the form of the value—free Curriculum, attempts to make it non-existent. The values clarification approach accepts the premise of the value-free curriculum stated above, but provides a different ansWer to the problem. Rather than to attempt to eliminate any reference to values, this approach tries to focus the curriculum on Values by consciously and systematically encouraging, even demanding, that students actively engage in activities that will 36 aid them in formulating and clarifying their own values. The teacher is permitted to express his own views, but only as an example of one way to look at things, and not as the right answer. The exponents of this approach maintain that the role of the school with respect to values/moral education is to avoid indoctrinating for Specific values (content), concentrate on the process by which values zue determined, and provide maximum opportunity for Students to arrive at and act on their own values. The value-free curriculum is mostly a generalized Inevailing idea rather than a formal movement with specific leaders. 'Nm values clarification approach, on the contrary, is an organized mwement with identifiable leaders, a self—acknowledged theory, tans and handbooks, dissemination methods and recommended exper- immes. The founder of the movement and its chief theoretician islouis E. Raths. One of Raths' former students, Sidney B. Simon, hmsbecome the guiding Spirit and nationally recOgnized leader of thavalues clarification movement. The other nationally known kmders, all of whom have worked with Simon, are Merrill Harmin, Unand W. Howe, and Howard Kirschenbaum. They have several centers 0ftheir own and some of their Students have independently started Saufllite centers where teachers can receive training in the theory multechniques. Many workshops are held every year all over the lhdted States, and numerous school districts have contracted for Spmjfic training programs led by the leaders of this mpvement. In recent years the values clarification approach has beUmm~one of the most dominant, viable, and accepted methods of 37 values education in the United States. More than any other values education approach we have mentioned it has an organized, clearly identifiable and concrete program. The two most widely disseminated publications of this movement are the following: Louis E. Raths, Merrill Harmin, and Sidney B. Simon. Values and Teaching: Working with Values in the Classroom. (1966), and Sidney B. Simon, Leland W. Howe, and Howard Kirschenbaum. Values Clarification: A Handbook of Practical Strategies for Teachers and Students. (1972). The first of these books is the foundational statement afvalues clarification. The following quotations from Raths, Harmin, amiSimon (1966) illustrate their view of values education as an enmmlar of the absolute relativity approach: We believe that each person has to wrest his own values from the available array. AS is elaborated later, values that actually penetrate living in intelligent and consistent ways are not likely to come any other way. (p. 10) We therefore see values as constantly being related to the experiences that shape them and test them. They are not, for any one person, so much hard and fast verities as they are the results of hammering out a style of life in a certain set of surroundings. After a sufficient amount of hammering, certain patterns of evaluating and behaving tend to develop. Certain things are treated as right, or desirable, or worthy. These tend to become our values. In this book we Shall be less concerned with the particular value outcomes of any one person's experiences than we will with the process that he 38 uses to obtain his values. Because life is differ- ent through time and space, we cannot be certain what experiences any one person will have. We therefore cannot be certain what values, what style of life, would be most suitable for any person. We do, however, have some ideas about what processes might be most effective for obtaining values. These ideas grow from the assumption that whatever values one obtains should work as effectively as possible to relate one to his world in a satisfying and intelligent way. (p. 28) The point has been made that our values tend to be a product of our experiences. They are not just a matter of true or false. One can not go to an encyclopedia or to a textbook for values. The definition that has been given makes this clear. One has to prize for himself, choose for himself, integrate choices into the pattern of his own life. Infermation as such doesn't convey this quality of values. Values come out of the flux of life itself. (p. 36) For now, it is important to note that our definition of values and valuing leads to a conception of these words that is highly personal. It follows that if we are to respect a person's life, we must reSpect his experience and his right to help in examining it for values. (p. 36) These statements demonstrate the personal relativity of ‘wnues and their relationship to the idiosyncratic circumstances amicontexts of the individual. Unfortunately, however, this amnoach creates as many problems as it resolves. The problems are hfimrent in the conflict that always comes with relativity in this annm.of life. The implication of the above Statements and, indeed, themderlying assumption throughout the entire book, is that these Prhmiples apply to those within the band of normalcy, moderation, andgmneral acceptance. The values clarification theory is based mlconstitutional and democratic principles. Yet democracy itself Gamma Survive, nor can the freedom and rights of individuals survive, 39 if each individual is permitted altogether free rein ”to do his own thing." Would, for example, Raths, Simon, et al hold for the appli- cation of their theory to individuals such as Hitler, Stalin, the local Mafia godfather? Or would this right to individualism be extended to the youngster who wants to burn the building down, shoot heroin, or simply drOp out? The implicit tenet in the values clari- fication doctrine is, of course, that within a certain band of acceptable behavior (a rather wide band, most likely) the individual has the right to his own values. As a matter of fact, early in the book the authors point out that certain behavior patterns are not good and need to be remedied. The theory was deve10ped partly to provide some answers for the problems of the unacceptable behaviors of apathy, flightiness, uncertainty, inconsistency, drifting, overconforming, overdissenting, and role playing (pp. 5-6). The underlying principle that seriously negates or weakens the position of relativity is explicitly revealed in a long section on the relative, personal nature of values. Raths, Harmin, and Simon say: As teachers, then, we need to be clear that we cannot dictate to children what their values Should be and what experiences they will have. We may be authoritative in those areas that deal with truth and falsity. In areas involving a5pirations, purposes, attitudes, interests, beliefs, etc., we may raise questions, but we cannot "lay down the law" about what a child's values should be. By definition and by social right, then, values are personal things. (p. 37) Their contention that "we may be authoritative in those areas that deal with truth and falsity" demonstrates either a simplistic 4O concept of truth or a basic flaw in their position. The statement is in conflict with the fundamental principles of values clarification presented throughout the remainder of the book. Herein lies the problem of a relativity approach to values. Recently Kirschenbaum (1973), one of the leaders in the movement, wrote a brilliant critique of the values clarification theory and raised numerous questions about the validity, logic, and consistency of the theory. Strangely, however, he did not recognize the relativity problem. In fact, he reaffirmed the basic relativity of values. The underlying conceptualization of the human organism in the absolute relativistic approach is quite different from that of either of the preceding approaches. The organism is viewed as active, rational, and good. The role of the environment is recognized, but the individual is central and dominant. The methods of this approach are vastly different from the methods of the other two previously described. Those accepting the absolute relativistic position utilize the methods of group dynamics, values clarification,3 sensitivity training, and other dynamic interpersonal and social techniques. Implicitly, they depend heavily on social and peer pressure, a fact that becomes apparent through study of their methodology. The absolute relativistic approach deemphasizes the structure and organization of the external world, and asserts that 3Their term for experiences in which a person is encouraged or forced to observe and, usually, to verbalize his moral judgments in the presence of peers or role models. 41 it is right and necessary that the individual assert himself, find his own way, and recognize that there are no absolute values. This approach to values/moral education and to life is an exemplar of the existential branch of the so-called "third force" in psychology. When the term "absolute relativistic" was first considered as the label for this approach it was with a somewhat humorous attitude. The juxtaposition of the two ostensibly contradictory terms, however, truly communicates the central theme and problem of this approach. Interestingly, the following statement was recently found in the literature. David Rapaport (1951, p. 274) says: ...This is prerequisite to that process by which thinking and knowledge of the world is freed of artless subjective realism, and even of'that brand of relativism which is itself’conceived as something absolute. (Italics added) Two basic ideas characterize the absolute relativistic approach to values/moral education: //// 1. Values are absolutely relative to the individual. A 2. Consequently, in spite of the influence of the environment, the ultimate source of values is within the individual. The absolute relativistic approach to values/moral education can thus be categorized as idiographic. 42 4. The Organismic-Structural-Deve10pmental Approach (Universal Transactional) The organismic-Structural-developmenta1 approach differs from the others in a number of highly significant ways and on a number of crucial issues. It is the approach believed by the author and his colleagues to be the most promising and fruitful approach to values/moral education. Consequently, it is the one to which this dissertation is devoted. A full elaboration of this approach will be given in Chapter IV. Only a brief introduction will be offered here. Organismic-structural-deve10pmentalism is based on a different view of man, the environment, and the relationship between them, and differs significantly from the other views discussed so far. AS an organized approach to values education it is relatively new, as are some of its theories and assumptions, but some of its histori- cal roots can be traced back for many years. So in some ways it can be called a new or modern approach, but it has not developed ex nihilo. An understanding of its basic premises and its different view of man will become somewhat clearer if we begin by defining and explaining the terms we have used to label it: organismic, structural, and developmental. By organismic we mean the view of man that sees man as an holistic, integrated, functional organism. Man is seen not as the passive victim of the environment as with the behavioristic view, nor as the instinctual, irrational being that needs to be subdued by the environment as with the psychoanalytic view. The extreme separation of organism and environment that characterizes those 43 two views of man is rejected by the organismic theorists. The relationship between the organism and the environment is seen as transactional.4 Values do not exist in some objective form in the p// environment; they are constructed by the organism both on its own terms and on the terms of the culture, society, group, and family. Organism and environment mutually influence each other in an ongoing and cybernetic way. The use of the term transactional is very significant here. A more common word is interactional. However, the latter term is ambiguous, misleading, and has several meanings. Many people use the term interaction synonymously with our usuage of transaction. But for a behavioristic view of man the term interaction has a mechanistic connotation that would be anathema to the organismic user. The distinctions involved in the two terms are clearly drawn by John Dewey and Arthur F. Bentley in their book, Knowing and the Known. Interaction is a term that reflects the relationship that exists between two things acting on each other, against each other, in the sense that they are balanced in some kind of causal interconnection. Thus a gear interacts with another gear. In the behavioristic view of man one organism is seen as interacting with another or with the environment in the stimulus-response sense. Transaction, on the other hand, was conceived by Dewey as depicting a different state of events more total, organismic, and systematic. Consequently, for Dewey, two machines interact, but two people transact. It is in the full, rich sense outlined by Dewey that we offer the word transaction as a much better descriptor of the relationships between or among people and between a person and his environment. This significant distinction has been effectively taken and applied by those social scientists who operate in the domain identified as transactional psychology, and is developed and elaborated in the book, Explorations in Transactional Psychology, edited by Franklin P. Kilpatrick. In order not to make the text cumbersome, we will use the words transaction and interaction synonymously, but the reader should be aware that, to us, a human interaction is not reducible to the simplistic, two-part, cause-effect, action-reaction mechanism suggested by some of the popular uses of the word "interaction". For a full development of the concept and its implications see Chapter IV. 44 In the organismic view, man is not seen as a machine that can be manipulated, as do the behaviorists; nor is he seen as a conflict-ridden pathological organism as in the psychoanalytic view. Man is seen rather as a dynamic healthy organism. Motivation comes primarily from within the organism, not from external sources. The organism is active, not passive. Structural refers to the underlying, organized, dynamic, and universal patterns that characterize human behavior, eSpecially thought. Structuralism is a method of investigation used by some social scientists, anthropologists, linguists, genetic epistemolo- gists, and others to search for the fundamental determining organ— ization which lies beneath the ostensibly disparate phenomena of human behavior. The overt, superficial, readily observable aspects of behavior are called content. The underlying organization beneath the content is called structure. This is not the old structuralism of psychology that prevailed as one of the major schools of thought in the early 1900's. At that time one of the leading psychologists of the day, Edward Tichener, taking off from the work of Wilhelm Wundt and his introspectionist methods, extended and elaborated introspection in order to ascertain the structural properties of the mind. He was not, however, using the contemporary concept of structure. The content-Structure distinction was not part of that framework. Titchener's structuralism has long Since died. Modern structuralism is a methodology used by Piaget in psychology and epistemology, Claude Levi-Strauss and Edmund Leach in anthropology, Roman Jakobson and Noam Chomsky in linguistics, 4S Kohlberg in psychology, and others. The content-Structure distinction is one of the key features of the organismic-structural—deve10pmental approach (which will frequently be referred to in this work as the 0-S-D approach). Its importance rests in the potential resolution of the absolute-relative dilemma, and its enormous utility in the attempt to understand intellectual and moral behavior. A deeper understanding of human behavior is possible this way that is not obtainable by looking at only the content of behavior. Piaget's Stages of intellectual deve10pment and Kohlberg's stages of moral development are structural stages. The concept developmental is congruent with organismic and structural. To clarify the term some important distinctions must be made. First, development here does not mean maturation. Maturational or nativistic theories of development are based on the belief that development is an orderly and timely unfolding of the built-in, or "wired-in" characteristics and timetable of the nervous system and other systems of the body. A good example of this type of development is Arnold Gessell's (1954) theory. The major premise of this approach is that development is an automatic occurrence, provided of course that the organism receives the proper nourishment and some stimulation from the environment. For Gessell maturation was both a necessary and a sufficient condition for deve10pment. Behaviorists view development in a different way, as the quantitative accumulation of more and more Stimulus—response 46 connections, and the chaining together of these connections into more complex behavior patterns which is frequently referred to as the associationistic or behavioristic theory of development. Mentalistic concepts and Stages are rejected from this point of view. The two approaches described above explain development in terms of built-in and automatically unfolding programming for change or in terms of acquisition of the environmental structure by means of stimulus-reSponse mechanisms. Explanations of development in these terms are seen by organismic psychologists as both incomplete and partly false. They fail to account for development as the result of the organism's continuous need to change, adjust, and adapt to new conditions (both internal and external), changed relationships, unfamiliar perceptions, and a myriad of other imbalances that take place in and because of the dynamic trans- mnjonal exchanges between organism and environment. Development fmmlthe organismic—Structural-deve10pmenta1 perspective is seen as L//V flueresult of four general factors: biological maturation, experience, Smfial transmission, and internal equilibration (Piaget, 1970b, pp. 3641; Piaget and Inhelder, 1969, pp. 152-159; Baldwin, 1967, Ch.9). flame and other a5pects of development will be treated more fully hiChapter IV. In contrast to the other two views, this approach can be flumght of as interactionistic or transactionistic as well as cxmstructivistic. The organism participates in the developmental pmxess by constructing cognitive, moral, and other Structures 47 through transaction with the environment. Another major feature of this view is the recognition of a sequencing of developmental patterns. Intelligence and moral judgment, for example, both appear to proceed through qualitatively different, structurally whole, and hierarchically integrated stages that follow an invariant sequence. In summary, development is seen as a complex transactional process actively involving the organism and the environment, and including a universal structural base that develops in an invariant sequence of qualitatively different stages that become hierarchically integrated. The organismic-structural-developmental conceptualization of the human organism offers a different basis for approaching values/moral education. First, such education is not seen as the transmission of existing values to an empty or conflicted organism, but as the means for stimulating the natural deve10pmental processes of a dynamic organism, Second, universal patterns of values structures prove more fruitful than conceiving values as absolute mrrelative. The absolute-relative dichotomy grows out of the focus micontent, which of course is relative to culture, society, and individual. Third, it becomes unnecessary to mold and Shape young duldren into predetermined patterns of values/moral behavior. hxfact indoctrination practices seem harmful and have a retarding effect on the development of mature intelligence and behavior. The purpose of values/moral education now becomes the snimulation of universal structural development to encourage mature adult intelligence and principled moral judgment (the highest level 48 of moral judgment). The methodology of the O-S-D approach is based primarily on democratic involvement, developmental parenting, and developmental education. The methodology relies primarily on the induction of disequilibrium by creating Optimal disparity between existing cognitive-values structures and new data. Values clarifi- cation and values confrontation techniques, instructional simulation techniques, active involvement in the daily life of the home, school, and community, and various forms of educational intervention may be productively and constructively employed in this process. The most important aspect of this approach as a form of education is the fecus on the development of democratic community as the foundation fin-valueS/moral development. Two basic ideas characterize the organismic—structural- mwelopmental approach to values/moral education: 1. There are natural patterns of values/moral structures and behaviors that are universal to all human organisms. 2. 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Hoffman's innate purity approach, Kohlberg's moral judgment approach, and the organismic- structural-developmental approach have even more in common. Both Kohlberg and Hoffman omitted any mention of a relativity approach. In View of the fact that values/moral relativity has become such a prominent one in our culture this is a serious omission. It would not fit comfortably in any of Kohlberg's categories, although it could be subsumed somewhat comfortably under Hoffman's innate purity category. Another interesting point that needs to be brought out is that the behavioristically oriented and psychoanalytically oriented approaches in all three categorizations place virtually no emphasis mlthe higher mental processes and their role in moral development. This fact is probably one of the reasons these approaches have failed so much and have been of so little use to the educator interested in Inomoting values/moral deve10pment. The only approach that looks at atubad spectrum of human characteristics and a wide range of huellectual abilities is the 0-S—D approach, which rec0gnizes the importance of cognitive, affective, social, and other aspects of development. The behavioristically oriented approaches focus almost exclusively on the range of behaviors generally identifiable as the 51 lower end of both the c0gnitive and moral developmental stages. The psychoanalytically oriented approaches focus on the middle range of those abilities. The 0-S-D approach considers the entire range of human behavior and deve10pment as valuable data for a values/moral theory. For this pluralistic democratic society it is extremely important that we do not fail to see the essentially undemocratic nature of both the traditional-authoritarian and the cultural- relativistic approaches to values/moral education. In pointing out how successful the Russian system of moral education is, Kohlberg and Turiel (1971) make the following statement: ...There is reason to believe that the Russian approach is more effective. As we describe later, however, it is more effective because authority and group conformity are deve10ped in much more powerful ways than in the traditional American system. we shall argue that to make traditional moral education effective is to make transparent its undemocratic and unconstitutional nature. (pp. 412—413) (italics added) Mubpos of this issue, in an analysis of Russian communism and musia's socialization process Sargent (1972, pp. 53-54) offers the finlowing commentary: The entire educational system is consciously designed to impart the values of the system in addition to providing the individual with the training necessary for him to take his place as a useful member of society. Again, the differences between this type of educational system and the type of educational system that is found in the United States, for example, is that there is a clear-cut, conscious effort to impart the values of the system to the individual. The system in the United States does the same thing, but it is not as clearly organized for that purpose. It would be very difficult to say that the educational system is in fact designed to do this. From the earlieSt grades we teach the children patriotic little 52 stories about the founding fathers, such as George Washington and the cherry tree, that are intended to present certain values to the child and at the same time present a good image of the American government. The fact that these stories are undoubtedly untrue and are therefbre, in this particular example, directly opposed to what the story is trying to teach does not seem to bother anybody. We teach other stories, such as the story about "the little train that could." We tell the children in essence that, if they try hard enough, they can do anything. We all know, of course, that this is not quite true, but we tell the story to children anyway. Another example is the story of the little train that left the tracks and got into all sorts of trouble. When he got back onto the tracks, he was happy, contented, and accepted. There are so many things that the story is teaching that it is hard to sort them out, but it is obviously suggesting that con- formity is good. It is also obviously indicating that acceptance by the group is a goal to be strived for, Which is, of course, just another way of looking at the conformity question. There- fore, we do, in the American educational system, from the very beginning, teach children values that we hope they will hold when they grow up. There- fore, our educational system is doing exactly the same thing as the educational system in the Soviet Union or any other country for that matter. This is one of the things that any educational system is designed to do. nus passage clearly amplifies the claim that the two nomothetic approaches, so long and widely used in our country, are undemocratic. The effectiveness of indoctrinative values/moral socialization can Miappreciated by considering the political and moral situation in whhfllour nation presently finds itself. That such a large segment 0fanalyze children's actual behavior in situations. They found 1u>basis for consistency or for anything called character. Both ofthe Prairie City studies reported above studied a much more limited number of children, all from one small town with a limited range of acceptable behavior patterns, and from the standpoint of ofluurpe0ple's ratings of the subjects' behavior and repuration. Although one would have had a difficult time predicting the Hartshorne and May findings, one could have rather easily predicted 64 the findings of the other two studies. Generally Speaking, people's superficial evaluations of other peOple's overt behavior patterns tend to persist, and if the circumstances are appropriate, as they were in Prairie City, the respondents will tend to meet up to the expectations of significant others. The Praire City studies, unfortunately, eSpecially in view of the sixteen years, great talent, and enormous amount of money invested in them, Operated from an incomplete theoretical base, dealt with the most superficial of content, never seriously approached the structure of moral development, and produced little that is useful in building a theory and opera— tional basis for values/moral education. Unfortunately both studies were built on what Kohlberg calls the "bag of virtues" approach. The passage quoted above from the Peck and Havighurst study clearly shows the terms in which they define moral character. Friendliness, affection, trustfulness, and other virtues are nice to have and nice to see in others, but they can hardly be used to define the basis of morality. What they actually studied, and found consistent, were certain superficial aSpects of the content of personality. 4. The Third-Force Movement in the Behavioral Sciences During the first half of the twentieth century the behavioral aflences were virtually dominated by behaviorism and psychoanalysis, empmfially the former. Within the last two decades there has emerged a.nm~so-called third,ferce in psychology that has been called by a varhny'of names, e.g., phenomen010gica1 psychology, gestalt psy- 6S ch010gy, self psychology, existential psychology, humanistic psychology and many others. It is a multifaceted movement, but transcending all the differences of its subgroups is the recognition that there is more to the story of human life than the forces of the external world or the environment. And that there is more to man qua man than mechanisms, conflicts, and pathology. What the Second Vatican Council did to the Catholic Church, the third-force movement in psycholOgy did to the behavioral sciences and education--it literally opened up the windows and let in some fresh air and new 1ight--or as Pope John called it, aggiornamento. 5. Recognition of the Affective The Sputnik crisis in 1958 generated an overzealous reactionary movement in education that overwhelmingly emphasized the c0gnitive aSpects of knowledge. The emphasis was on mathematics, science, and other disciplines that could produce technology. Science was nearly deified, and it was seen as the solution for all problems. The resultant scientism drastically influenced educational research, curriculum development, and instructional technology. The social Lmheavals of the 1960's somewhat reversed this trend, and a new consideration of the affective aspects of man's nature began to (weep into education. The somewhat overemphasis on quantitative approaches, emphasis on methodology for teaching content, and pmydumwtrics are still very much a part of the educational scene. Butcpncern for man's feelings, values, and sensitivity have begun tormwe into the mainstream of education. This movement has been 66 given renewed and powerful impetus by the recent political upheavals of which the Watergate scandal is the most important. Values and moral behavior are rapidly becoming significant issues for educators. 6. Instructional Simulation Recognition of the affective is one of the factors that led to the introduction into education of instructional simulation as a legitimate methodology. Games, role-playing, exercises, values clarification and confrontation techniques, and many other forms of techniques and procedures that can be grouped under the rubric of instructional simulation are in widespread use in schools. This factor has also opened new doors for acceptance of and interest in values/moral education. 7. Structuralism The modern acceptance in many sciences of the method of structuralism has Opened the door to a new era in theory, research, and application in the behavioral sciences. The implications for values/moral development are enormous and significant. Since structuralism is one of the three major components of the pr0posed ‘Umory for values development education to be treated in this dissertation it will be no more than mentioned here as one of the most contemporary forces in the field of values/moral development muleducation. Structuralism will be somewhat treated in Chapter 111,8nd.wi11 be fully described and applied in Chapter IV. 67 8. Jean Piaget Piaget's major work of more than half a century on intel- lectual development has helped open the door to entirely new concep- tualizations of the human mind, intelligence, and values and moral development. Known around the world primarily as a child psychologist and developmental psychologist, he is also a logician, mathematician, and philosopher. But his primary identification, and the one he prefers, is as a genetic epistemologist. As such he has studied the origin (or genesis) of knowledge, i.e., the problem of how the human mind comes to know anything and how this phenomenon progresses through deve10pmental stages. His relatively minor work on moral development, The Moral Judgment of the Child (1932) was one of the major factors that gave rise to Kohlberg's work, which will be mentioned shortly. His theory of intelligence and intellectual development, however, has been of much greater importance for the field of values/moral deve10pment in general, and Kohlberg in particular. Two other aSpects of Piaget's influence are of importance with reSpect to values/moral education. First, Piaget is one of the world's leading structuralists, and his theory of intelligence is a structural theory. Second, he has become one of the most influential figures in both psychology and education, and his ideas are becoming increasingly accepted and adopted. 68 9. John Dewey Dewey's influence in education, philosophy, and psycholOgy is so profound and so diverse that he is one of the most significant figures of this century. Of Special interest for values/moral education are his seminal ideas on values, morality, democracy, education, and many other subjects. At the turn of the century he proposed that certain aspects of human behavior proceeded through developmental stages, and this was one of the major factors in the initial work of Kohlberg. The congruence between Dewey's ideas and Piaget's ideas is remarkable and makes a major contribution to the psychological and philosophical foundation for the proposed theory of values develop- ment education. Dewey is a landmark figure in values/moral education, and he has provided some of the most useful and knowledgable ideas available. 10. Lawrence Kohlberg The work of Kohlberg constitutes the single most valuable recent advance in the values/moral field. His theoretical formu- lations and empirical findings are the major foundation on which a modern values development education theory can be built. Kohlberg has been working on the problem of values develop- ment for nearly twenty years, beginning with his graduate work at the University of Chicago in the late 1950's. His doctoral disser- ‘ tation (1958) marked the beginning of his systematic efforts to build 69 a structural-stage-develepmental theory about moral judgment. He has continued to work on the problem and has continuously refined and elaborated the theory and extended its application. Building on the work of Piaget and Dewey, Kohlberg applied the structural approach to the field of moral development and made it possible to go beyond the relatively superficial work that had been done previously. Conclusion This chapter has provided information about historical approaches in the field of values/moral development and education. The reviews of Hoffman and Kohlberg were summarized and critiqued. Four approaches to values/moral education were presented, described, and discussed, viz., (l) the traditional-authoritarian (absolute nomothetic), (2) the cultural-relativistic (relative nomothetic), (3) the absolute—relativistic (idiOgraphic), and (4) the organismic— structural-developmental (universal transactional). The problems of the first three were outlined and the potentiality of the fourth approach was presented as justifying this dissertation as an explor- ation into building a theory for values deve10pment education based on that approach. The nine factors which have influenced the field of values/ moral development and education were presented. This background will be seen as basic in the process of building a theory for values development education. CHAPTER THREE FUNDAMENTAL ISSUES Any approach, system, or theory in the behavioral sciences reflects an underlying conceptualization of man, the environment, the relationship between man and environment, and other significant issues or dimensions of human behavior. The conceptualization may be systematic or unsystematic, explicit or implicit or some combination. Every approach, system, or theory is founded on certain metatheoretical assumptions and on certain value judgments. In the words of Allport (1961, p. 84), "every...theorist is a philosopher, though he may not know it." In working towards the building of a theory for values deve10pment education it seems to be critically important that the fundamental underlying issues be identified, analyzed, integrated, and made explicit. The purpose of this chapter is to deal with this problem. The most fundamental issue is the view of'man that serves as the basis for the theory. A. Some Views of Man Dozens, even hundreds, of different views about the nature of man have been considered in philosophical terms. Several views are current in behavioral science. Three psychophilosophical views tend to dominate the behavioral sciences, especially psychology. Most of the positions about man that prevail in contemporary western mflture can be comfortably subsumed in these three views. Taken 70 ‘ . 71 together, behaviorism and psychoanalysis account for most of the positions. The third view, arbitrarily identified as organismic psychology, does not neatly and comfortably embrace all of the positions not included by the other two, but it does account for much of the balance. These three views are examined from the stand- point of their most important identifying and defining characteristics. This examination will not be extensive, but will point out the most important dimensions that need to be considered. Much of what is presented in this chapter is based on a review of a number of out- standing surveys and collations of the theories and systems of psychology. The key reviews of psychological literature in learning and deve10pment suggest the three views as a least common denominator among widely divergent philoSOphical positions. Although they differ on matters of organization and categorization, the editors, compilers, and authors following can be identified as representing one or more of three views: Theories of Child Development, A. L. Baldwin (1967); Interpreting Personality Theories, Second Edition, Bischof (1970); Theories of Personality, Second Edition, Hall and Lindzey (1970); Theories of Learning, Third Edition, Hilgard and Bower (1966); Theories of Develgpment, Langer, (1969); Theories and Systems of Psychology, Lundin, (1972); Learning: FTQCS§5353 Learning: Integf actions; and Learning: Theories, a three—volume set edited by Marx (1970); Systems and Theories in Psychology, Second Edition, lbrx and Hillix (1973); Schools of Psychoanalytic Thought, Munroe 0955); and Contemporary Theories and Systems in Psychology, Wolman, (1960). 72 The above sources are edited and written by psychologists. Taken as a whole the three views are represented. Some of these sources are highly objective, especially Hall and Lindzey (1970) and Baldwin (1967). Others must be read carefully with consideration of the author's bias, e.g., Langer (1969) and Lundin (1972). Following are additional sources that make reference to the three general views: Allport (1968), Brown, et a1 (1970), Elkind and Flavell (1969), Flavell (1963), Frick (1971), Fromm (1964), Goslin (1969), Hunt (1961), Lindzey and Aronson (1968), Maddi (1972), Murphy (1958), Mussen (1970), Rapaport (1951), Severin (1973), Skinner (1953, 1971), Vanderplas (1966), Werner (1948), Werner and Kaplan (1963), Wiggins et a1 (1971), and Wolman (1968). Before proceeding with the descriptions of the three views some basic issues must be clarified. First, several types of theories are identified in the literature, viz., learning theories, personality theories, general theories of behavior, and single-domain theories (see for example, Hall and Lindzey, 1970, pp. 17-19). General theories of behavior attempt to deal with a broader scope of behavioral phenomena and tend to be very comprehensive in scepe. Those theories that restrict their attention to certain types of behavioral events, e.g., perception, motor learning, memory, rote learning, auditory problems, etc., are single-domain theories. Since most personality theories attempt to be very comprehensive and deal with a wide range of factors, many reviewers consider them to be particular forms of general theories of behavior. For example, Hall and Lindzey virtually nuke personality theory and general theories of behavior synonomous. 73 Learning theories vary in their range of coverage, and may or not be general theories. Most of them are broad enough to be so classified. Different theorists and theories fall into different categories depending on the frame of reference. For example, theories about learning are usually specified as either learning theory or as cognitive theory. "Learning theory" is used almost exclusively to mean behavioristic learning theories. Social learning theory is one type of behavioristic learning theory; it emphasizes that learning takes place primarily in social relationships. Theories about learning that fall under organismic psychology are termed "cognitive theories" of learning. Another point of confusion centers on the issue of growth and development. Theories that are termed maturational, nativistic, or nativistic-maturational or normative or normative-maturational are based on the belief that growth and deve10pment are primarily or exclusively the result of the natural unfolding of the predeter- mined plan or program "wired-in" to the organism. The once-popular theory of Arnold Gessell (1954) is the clearest example of this view. For treatments of this position see Hunt (1961) and Zigler (in Marx, Learnigg: Interactions, 1970, Ch. 12). Sometimes this type of theory is referred to as a priorism or innateness. But the terms a priorism and innateness are not actually interchangable with maturational, nativistic, or normative. A distinction between these two sets of terms needs to be made. One can believe that the automatic unfolding of the nervous and hormonal systems is responsible for growth and ckweIOpment, but that the content of thinking must be learned from 74 the external environment. This position would be considered nativistic-maturational; and a person can accept this without accepting the innatist position. The a priorist or innatist holds for ideas or knowledge that are not derived from experience, but are somehow in the organism prior to birth or at birth. A good example of this view in contemporary science is the theory of linguistics of Noam Chomsky. In most respects Chomsky is an organismic theorist, but he holds for an innate core of base structure of syntax that is completely independent of experience. As Edwards and Pap (1973) point out, the philosophical issues involved in this discussion are very complex, and involve the classical arguments between the rationalists and the empiricists and many other factors. Most behaviorists would reject both the nativistic-maturational and a priorist beliefs, and line themselves up with the legical positivists or empiricists. Psychoanalysis, on the other hand, holds that basic instinctual drives and urges are present in the organism a priori, and that these instinctual forces are omnipotent at birth and must be controlled and tamed in the socialization process. The organismic theorist tends to reject both of these one-sided arguments, and holds for growth and development being created out of the interactions or transactions between the organism and the environment. The biological structures of the human body, however, must be present and must gradually and naturally mature in order for this process to take place. The extreme nativistic-maturational theorist holds that for intellectual development maturation of the body, especially the nervous and hormonal systems are both necessary and sufficient. 75 Most modern theorists in all three schools, behaviorism, psycho- analysis, and organismic psychology, see maturation as a necessary, but not sufficient condition for growth and deve10pment. Perhaps it would be best to take a more extended look at the three models or views of man as represented by behaviorism, psychoanalysis, and organismic psychology. 1. Behaviorism The roots of behaviorism are deep and complex, and go far back into the history of psychology, both as an independent scientific endeavor and as part of phiIOSOphy, especially to the tradition of the British empiricists, primarily Locke (1632-1704), Berkeley (1685-1753), and Hume (1711-1776). Two significant people, however, are the major contributors to its beginning as an identifiable and separate tradition in psychology. The first is the Russian physiologist, Pavlov, who discovered what is now known as classical, or respondent, conditioning. The second is John B. Watson, the man who took Pavlov's findings and used them as a platform on which he built a whole new science of psychology which he named "behaviorism." The event can even be traced to a particular time: in 1912 Watson presented the core of his ideas in a series of lectures at Columbia University. The essence of the lectures was published in the Psychological Review in 1913. According to Lundin (1972, p. 150), the article "set behaviorism afire and became known as the behaviorist's manifesto." The manifesto began with the following statement (Watson, 1913, p. 158): 76 Psychology as the behaviorist views it is a purely objective experimental branch of natural science. Its theoretical goal is the predication and control of behavior. Introspection forms no essential part of the methods, nor is the scientific value of its data dependent upon the readiness with which they lend themselves to interpretation in terms of consciousness. The behaviorist, in his efforts to get a unitary scheme of animal response, recognizes no dividing line between man and brute. The behavior of man, with all of its refinements and complexity, forms only a part of behaviorism's total scheme of investigation.1 The attack on introspection is Watson's adamant and total rejection of everything that Wundt held for in his psychology based on intro- spection. Similarly he rejects Titchener and the psychology he based on intrOSpection (structuralism). Titchener's was the old type of structuralism (now defunct) mentioned in Chapter II and IV of this dissertation. At first Watson's rejection of consciousness as a valid factor in psychology was somewhat confused and ambiguous. Again quoting Watson: The plans that I must favor for psycholog lead practically to the ignoring of consciOusness in the sense that the term is used by psychologists today. I have virtually denied that the realm of psyches is open to experimental investigation. I don't wish to go fUrther into the problem at present because it leads inevitably over into metaphysics. If you will grant the behaviorist the right to use consciousness in the same way as other natural scientists employ it--that is, without making consciousness a special object of observation-~you have granted all that my thesis requires... (Watson, 1913, p. 174) Note that in this statement Watson rejects the use of consciousness 'The Watson article is also available in Vanderplas (1966). 77 as an explanatory term in psychology, recommends it be virtually ignored, but does not do away with it completely. This is basically the position of what is now known as methodological behaviorism, which forms the basic tenet for a great many contemporary behaviorists. The belief allows for the existence of something called the "mind” or "consciousness," but disallows it as something that can or should be studied. Watson gradually swung to a more extreme position on the subject and eventually did away with the ”mind" and "consciousness”. His later position is contained in the following: He then who would introduce consciousness, either as an epiphenomenon or as an active force inter- jecting itself into the physical and chemical happenings of the body, does so because of Spiritualistic and vitalistic learnings. The behaviorist cannot find consciousness in the test tube of his science. He finds no evidence anywhere for a stream of consciousness, not even for one so convincing as that described by William James. He does, however, find convincing proof of an ever—widening stream of behavior. (This quotation is from Watson and McDougal], 1929, p. 26, but represents a position taken by Watson in 1919). Watson's strong statement wiped out the existence of the mind or its use as even a workable concept. All dualistic (mind-body) conceptual— izations were rejected and the behaviorist's monistic position was clearly stated: one body, no mind. This extreme position came to be known as radical behaviorism, and is represented today by B. F. Skinner (1953, 1971) and his followers. Many behaviorists today hold for the softer methodological behaviorism, and often resort to 'Hntervening variables" and "hypothetical constructs," introduced 78 into behaviorism by Edward'Tolman (1922, 1932, 1949, 1959). Hilgard and Bower (1966) offer the following statement that helps put the issue in perspective: When Tolman announced his purposive behaviorism (Tolman, 1922), ten years before his major book appeared, American psychology was still excited over the new be- haviorism of Watson. It was Tolman's contribution then to show that a sophisticated behaviorism can be cog- nizant of all the richness and variety of psychological events, and need not be constrained by an effort to build an engineer's model of the learning machine. With the diversification of behaviorism under the influence of Tolman and others, the old brittleness of Watsonian behaviorism has largely disappeared, and what virtues there are in the behavioristic position have ‘ now become part of the underlying assumptions of most American psychologists--without most of them thinking of themselves as behaviorists at all. (p. 219) Although much of what is said above is true, Tolman's pur— posive behaviorism is, in many ways, a radical departure from the major- ity of behavioristic theories. It is true that many behaviorists hold to a softer position than that of radical behaviorism, but not quite as soft as Tolman's. They use Tolman's intervening variables as media- tional principles, but tend to classify Tolman's theory as a cognitive theory of learning. In fact, Tolman's theory is a combination of field theory and behaviorism and is sometimes referred to as a cognitive field theory. In general behaviorism relies almost exclusively on empirical Inethods of investigation, and is strongly based on and allied with the :phdlosophical position known as logical positivism which grew out of tflie~renowned Vienna Circle. According to John Passmore (in Edwards, 1967, Vol 5, pp. 52—57): 79 Logical positivism is the name given in 1931 by A.E. Blumberg and Herbert Feigl to a set of philo- soPhical ideas put forward by the Vienna circle. Synonymous expressions include "consistent empiricism," "logical empiricism," "scientific empiricism,” and "logical ne0positivism." The name logical positivism is often, but misleadingly, used more broadly to include the "analytical” or "ordinary language" philosophies developed at Cambridge and Oxford. (p. 52) The positivists reject metaphysics and all transcendental ex- planations. They maintain that assertions in this framework are meaning— less because there is no way to verify them in experience. Epistemolo- gical theories of this kind are rejected with equal vigor. According to the positivists, there is no way to verify that our observations of the external world have any truth status. All we know is what we perceive with our senses through our experience. In essence, positivism reduces epistemology to psychology. Only science can tell us, with its empirical methods, the kind of information that can give us any understanding of the world. Philosophical speculation is rejected and replaced with the empirical methods of science. It is easy to see how behaviorism and logical positivism and empiricism are congruent. And although logical positivism, as a formal philosophical movement, is generally considered dead, it has left a powerful, enduring, and viable heritage that is extremely influential in today's psychology. Skinner is today's leading exponent of logical positivism. One of the major consequences of the behavioristic view and the empirical approach is the view of the human organism as either an ennny box or a sealed box. Either way the organism's internal workings arraineffable and irrelevant. All that can be known about the organism 80 is what can be observed and studied in the form of behavior. The human organism at birth is conceptualized as a tabula rasa, "blank slate" or "blank tablet." There are no innate ideas; no preformed knowledge or thoughts, and no meaningful consciousness. The infant is a bundle of reflexes that can be completely understood in terms of stimuli and re- sponses. All knowledge, information, and structure is in the environ- ment and comes to the child from the environment. In time the child will come to reflect its environment. Thus Jonas Langer (1969) has aptly named behaviorism "The Mechanical Mirror Theory." Like a mirror, the human organism mechanically reflects the reality of the external world. A basic issue for all views of man is the issue about whether man is active or passive. Behaviorism clearly sees man at the passive end of the continuum, and believes he becomes what he is because of the action of the environment on him. Man is a passive actor or patient on which the environment Operates. The world, according to this view, is a coherently organized and structured entity into which the child is born devoid of psychological content, and the child mechanistically comes to reflect his environment, Behaviorists do not deal with under- lying psychological processes, but view all psychological phenomena as behaviors which have little or no meaning unless they are observable, xneasurable, or potentially measurable. The environment is defined in terms of stimuli which affect laehavior, therefore physical events that have no detectable effect on theeorganism's behavior would not be considered part of its environment. 'Thtusthe environment is defined as those stimuli which impinge upon 81 the organism in some observable and potentially measurable way (Langer, 1969; Gewirtz, 1969). A stimulus is an environmental event that affects the response of the organism, and a response is any movement or action of the organ- ism that is under the control of the environmental stimuli. It must be emphasized, then, that for behaviorists it is meaningful to speak only in terms of S—R units; to talk of one without the other in the sense that either could exist by itself is meaningless. Behavior is defined in terms of its functional relationships to controlling stimuli, or as movements of the organism that are observable and that can be shown to be under the control of stimuli, Man is, therefore, seen very mech- anically as a machine whose behavior is triggered by an external agent. Behavior merely articulates what action is already suggested in and structured by the environment. The primary mechanisms by which organized external content is transmitted to the organism are classical (respondent) conditioning, the Pavlovian type, and Operant (instrumental) conditioning. All behaviorists accept these two types of learning as given. Some be- haviorists (Skinner, Bijou, Baer, Gewirtz, and many others) recognize the existence and role of respondent conditioning, but relegate it to a secondary role in learning, and ascribe practically all learning to Operant conditioning. Respondent conditioning is the pairing of an unconditioned stimulus to a conditioned stimulus so that the subject acquires the cmufitioned stimulus as part of its behavioral repertoire. Pavlov conditioned his dOgs to salivate at the sound of a bell by pairing 82 the ringing of the bell with the appearance of food (the unconditioned stimulus). In time the ringing of the bell elicited the salivation without the presence of the food. Behaviorists believe that many emotional responses in human beings are conditioned associations of this type. Fears, for example, can be acquired in this manner. Operant conditioning is based on an entirely different prin- ciple. It is best stated in Skinner's terms (1971) that "behavior is shaped by its consequences." In other words, if an act is followed by reward the act will tend to be repeated. Note that in reSpondent conditioning the reward (the food) is given before the event, whereas in operant condition the reward follows the event and shapes the behavior. One of the most powerful controversies in behavioristic psychology regards the role and importance reward. Some behaviorists maintain that learning takes place strictly through association. The mere fact that two things are temporally linked will cause them to be associated by the organism. The leading statement of this approach to learning is in the form of Edwin Guthrie's contiguity theory, later restated in mathematical form by W.K. Estes. Other behaviorists, a very large group, maintain that reward, or as they call it, reinforcement, is reouired for learning to take place. This principle dates far back in the history of psychology to Edward L. Thorndike's famous Law of Effesf, (see e.g. Lundin, 1972, pp. 127-133; Marx, Leagning} Theeries, 1970, pp. 52ff; and Hall and Lindzey, 1970, p. 418) which in principle asserted that responses which lead to satisfying consequences are, as he put it, "stamped in.” 83 And, he added, that the greater the satisfaction the better the bond. He also believed that responses which lead to unsatisfying consequences are "stamped out.” He made rewards and punishments diametrical Oppo- sites. Later he reformulated the principle and maintained that reward always strengthens the connection, but that punishment doesn't always weaken it (Lundin, p. 131). Building on Thorndike's Law of Effect, Clark Hull, one of the most significant figures in behaviorism, developed his reinfbrce- ment theory. Kenneth Spence, one of Hull's students, reformulated Hull's theory. It is one of the most influential theories in behavior- ism, and is generally referred to as the Hull—Spence Reinforcement Theory. Hull believed that the reason reward, or reinforcement, was effective was not because it satisfied, but because it acted on and reduced drive. In Lundin's words (1972, p. 176): "What streng- thened behavior was the reinforcement that reduced the drive." The Hull-Spence theory was later reformulated again by John Dollard and Neal Miller, but they brought in Freud's psychoanalytic formulations about human behavior and thereby helped father what is known as social learning theory, one of the most important occurrences in the field of values/moral development, as I mentioned in Chapter II. It is Dollard, Miller, Bandura. Walters, Sears, and many others who from the theoretical position of behavioristic social learning theory have engaged in so much work on the socialization process and values/moral education. The chief rival for domination in the behavioristic tradi- tion is the work of Burrhus Frederic Skinner. Skinner's work is in __— ”iv— 84 many ways the antithesis of Hull's. Hull's theory is complex, intricate, and loaded with intervening variables and hypothetical constructs. Skinner identifies with Watson and rejects all mentalistic concepts of any kind, is completely Opposed to deductive theorizing, such as Hull's, and may be described as an "empty organism" theorist. His highly controversial book, Beyond Freedom and Dignity (1971), vehe- mently argues against any mentalistic ideas at all, declares all such ideas prescientific vestiges of what he calls "autonomous man,” which he literally ridicules. Near the end of the book he says, however: In shifting control from autonomous man to the observable environment we do not leave an empty organ- ism. A great deal goes on inside the skin, and physiology will eventually tell us more about it. It will explain why behavior is indeed related to the antecedent events of which it can be shown to be a function. (p. 186) The context of his entire statement and argument is ostensibly inconsistent unless you realize that what he says is in the organism is purely physiological, and not mental. In this respect the term "empty organism” is consistently used in the literature. Skinner's position is (dearly revealed in his statements about the private world inside the skin: "It would be foolish to deny the existence of that private world, but it is also foolish to assert that because it is private it is of a different nature from the world outside. The difference is not in the stuff of which the private world is composed but in its accessibility." (p. 182) What could appear to be something mental in reality is merely an extension of the contingencies of reinforcement from the outside world, rooted in the physiological processes mentioned above. 85 Throughout the book Skinner rejects as prescientific all such notions as human nature, internal states, traits of character, capacities, abilities, feelings, personality, attitudes, beliefs, values, and the entire repertoire of psychological constructs used to describe and eXplain human behavior. What then does Skinner believe? He believes that all human behavior is the product of the environment through the process of operant conditioning. Skinner's theoretical position is sometimes referred to as radical behaviorism, inductive behaviorism (in contrast to Hull's deductive behaviorism), Skinnerian positivism, and by other terms. But the most common and probably most accurate descriptor is the one Hall and Lindzey (1970, Ch. 12) use, viz., Operant Reinforce- ment Theogy. Two of the best sources of information about Skinner's system are his 1953 book, Sciengevand;Humap_Behavior, and his previ- ously mentioned 1971 book, Beyond Freedom and Digpitv. The latter is particularly significant for the field of values/moral development and education. More will be said about it later. Skinner in many ways has extended and refined the behavior— istic tradition and view of man to its ultimate statement. He sees the environment as the source of virtually everything. He argues for the development of a science and a technology of human behavior built on the principles of operant conditioning, on the utilization of apprOpriate contingencies of reinforcement in the environment to shape and control human behavior in order to build a good world. He declares all aSpects of autonomous man as prescientific, including freedom and dignity, which are merely two sides of responsibility, as he defines 86 them. As a result, he makes completely explicit what is the underly- ing principle of all behaviorism: all human behavior is completely lawful, predictable, and determined. Skinner's position is the extreme poistion in contemporary behaviorism, and not all behaviorists accept his theoretical formula- tions or his principles. But he is somewhat of a phenomenon in the respect that he is so highly influential in spite of his extreme posi- tion. Skinner and his associates and followers have begun to permeate virtually every institution in our society with their principles and technology of behavior modification, or as it is more appropriately called, applied behavioral analysis. This is especially true in the world of education. From teaching machines, to programmed learning, to token economies in the classroom, Skinner's influence is pervasive and powerful. Behaviorism is not one unified movement in psychology. The social learning theorists, for example, that have already been mentioned, reject the idea that all human behavior can be explained in terms of respondent and operant conditioning. They argue strongly for, and have done a great deal of research work that they believe supports, the ideas of identification, imitation, and modeling as playing a large role in social behavior. The social learning theorists do not reject all of Skinner's position, they merely believe there is more to it than he says. In fact, social learning theorists have actively jumped on the Skinnerian bandwagon of behavior modification (see for example, Bandura, 1969). Gewirtz (1969) on the other hand, systematically analyzes all behavioristic positions, especially social learning theory, and 87 declares anything beyond the two elementary forms of conditioning as excess theoretical baggage that serves to hamper progress in under- standing human behavior. Gewirtz sees Skinner's system as the answer. One point of significance for education contained in the behavioristic approach is that the mechanisms of conditioning (and even the mechanisms of the social learning theorists beyond condition- ing) are presumed to account for all the observable quantitative growth of the child's behavior, or, in other words, growth is the acquisition of content. The emphasis here on "quantitative” and "acquisition" is purposeful in order to bring out the mechanistic conceptualization in behaviorism. The child is a passive receptor that quantitatively grows partly by maturation and mostly by continuous accumulation of the associations that it acquires from external sources. Growth and memory are thus accounted for in these terms. The major deve10pmenta1 hypothesis of behaviorism is that early conditioned associations affect the child's behavior later in life. Viewing man as a machine whose behavior is determined by the environment permits the behaviorist to see growth as a continuous process and learning as being fundamentally the same kind of procedure throughout the life span. Consequently, the idea of developmental stages is completely rejected. Of great significance in this view is the role of shaping and the inherent dependence of the human being throughout his life. Shaping is the procedure by which the controller modifies the contin- gencies of reinforcement in such a way as to gradually extinguish undesirable behaviors on the part of the subject. The child is 88 rewarded for his original gross efforts toward a goal. With each succeeding attempt only the behaviors closest to that which is desired are reinforced. Eventually the desired behavior is elicited from the child and only this is reinforced. This procedure on the part of the controller "shapes" the behavior of the child. This procedure is inherently dependency-inducing and dependency-maintaining. In fact, behavioristic theory declares that the child is born dependent upon the environment, will become increas- ingly dependent upon the environment, and because of the reinforcing effect of the environment growth itself ensures the increasing dependency of the human being as it gradually achieves adult status. To summarize what has been said and to particularly point out those features of behaviorism that especially relate to values/moral education, the human organism is conceived as a tabula rasa on which the environment will "write" the values, knowledge, and structure of the environment. The child is a passive victim of the environment. The environment must control the child early in life in order to shape and mold its behavior in such a way that it does not have a chance to gratify its powerful drives and urges that may be in Opposition to the needs prescribed by environment. Because all Inehavior is scientifically seen as completely lawful and predictable 2111 events are completely determined. Both free will and indeterminism arwe ruled out. Skinner is most adamant on this issue, but it is a gruneral tenet all across behavioristic schools of thought. Somewhat reljited to this is the view that the child is seen as heterotelic, arui new.as autotelic. In other words, the purpose of the human 89 being resides in the environment and not in the person. The organism is seen very mechanistically. It is really inappropriate in a sense to refer to an "organism” in behavioristic terms. Behaviorism readily adopts the mechanistic Newtonian physics concept of interaction. (Of course, this term interaction is also widely used today in many ways without consideration of its mechanistic significance.) Machines and parts of machines, and physical forces, interact with each other. The movement of a lever causes an Object to move; one gear turns another gear; turn a crank and something connected it to it will react. The entire concept of action-reaction is an integral part of the world of mechanics. It would be natural, then, to carry this kind of thinking and terminology over into a mechanistic view of man. The "mechanical mirror theory" is entirely consistent in using interactional concepts in describing man's relation- ship with the environment, which includes his relationships with other men. The important question that must be raised deals with the appropriateness of the application of mechanistic concepts to man qua organism. Behaviorists answer that mechanistic reflexes govern the acquisition of behavioral elements. Consistent with this view, then, it would be apprOpriate to look upon man's relationships with other men and other parts of his environment as interactions. Internal mental or psychological processes have little or'no meaning in behavioristic theory. Personality is seen as the atn:umulation of habits and associations. Language is learned by the saune procedures, but it also serves a very important function in the lizarming process in that it serves as a system of positive and negative 90 reinforcers that enhance and accelerate the learning process. Parents and educators shape the behavior of children mostly by reward and punishment, and partly (according to the social learning theorists) by the example they set. Parents and educators are primary sources of negative and positive reinforcement, and also serve as powerful models in the shaping and conditioning process. This brief, sketchy, and incomplete presentation of behavior- ism is an attempt to communicate the essential features of behavior- istic theory, a little about its origin, and has emphasized those aspects of the theory that are directly and indirectly important for the field of values/moral deve10pment and education. 2. Psychoanalysis Psychoanalysis is a type of therapy, a method of research, and a theory of man. Only the last of these will be considered here. The psychoanalytic view of man is highly complex, richly loaded with mythological concepts, and somewhat peculiar in that it owes its origin primarily to one man-~Sigmund Freud. And although much has been done since Freud's time, by both his followers and challengers within the psychoanalytic tradition, to modify its theoretical and phiIOSOphical concepts, much of contemporary psychoanalytic theory is still heavily rooted in Freud's basic ideas. SMucliof what follows is based on Langer (1969). His excellent present— atixnn of the enormous complexity of psychoanalytic theory is very 'readamle and is a faithful reflection of the theory. Several of the sources listed at the beginning of this chapter will augment and enrich title and Langer's presentation. Munroe (1955) is especially valuable also. 91 The basic thesis of the psychoanalytic theory is its concept- ualization of man as a conflicted being who is constantly torn between his instinctual passions and the unrelenting demands of the external world to restrict, control, and channel those passions. Man is always in this state of fundamental and continuous conflict between his natural instinctual impulses and the unnatural societal mores imposed upon him. Conflict is in part responsible for man's being driven to action and growth. But only gradually does man's physiological maturation, personality deve10pment, identity formation, and psycho- sexual development permit him to learn to control his passions and impulses and try to submit himself to the demands of his environ- ment. The battle is never won, but is always in process. This view, in contrast to the behavioristic view, pictures man as basically affective and irrational in nature. His essential psychological nature is desire, not reason. Instinct is the primary, efficient cause of mental life, and experience and environment are secondary, transforming elements that help to determine, channel, and influence the particular content and orientation of the individual mind. Since Freud's model of man placed so much emphasis on the affective, and since man's basic nature is seen as desire rather than reason, it is easy to understand why psychoanalytic theory has done relatively little to formulate an organized and integrated theory or'view of cognitive development, and consequently, this approach luis the least to say of any of the three approaches about the nature of'Inan's mind and the underlying epistemological problems. It is difficult, therefore, to place this approach on the 92 active-passive continuum discussed with the previous approaches. Man is involved in a war between his own internal nature and the external forces of his environment. And since the psychoanalytic approach has not sufficiently forged a theory of cognitive deve10pment it is difficult to conclude its stand on this dimension. Freud's ideas seem to suggest an epicyclic type of relationship between man and environment. This would involve a complex circular, feedback, and evolutionary process that would begin with the irrational infant's contact with the external reality of the world dynamically transforming him into the prerational child, who in similar fashion is transformed into an early form of rationality, and again eventually into more mature forms of rationality. But deeply embedded in this process is the parallel process of the organism's transformation of the general reality of the infant's world into the increasingly specialized realities of the developing organism's perception of and management of the environment. Thus man is both a victim of the environment and in conflict with its, but also tries to mold and structure the environment in a limited way. Freud assumed the infant is born with nothing more than irrational instinctual appetites that are biologically rooted. Like the organismic theory which follows, this theory assumes that the neonate's psychobiological organization constitutes the initial functional and structural foundation upon which development is predicated. These psychobiologically rooted functions are the organizing forces that differentiate with growth and transform the inborn structures into increasingly complex organizations that become partially subject ot the idiosyncratic nature of the individual's history of interaction with his 93 environment. Unlike organismic theory, however, the psychoanalytic approach centers its attention on the instinctual energy it assumes is the responsible agent for the functioning of these organismic structures. The nature of this energy is central to Freud's views leads to some of the most important aspects and theoretical constructs of the psychoanalytic theory. Freud postulated two types of hereditary instinctual energy that are operative from birth on. These two energies are both conflicting and complementary and form the basis of the nature of the organism. They are: l. Eros - the life instinct which stimulates activity, is constructive, life seeking, and life giving. Its energy is called libido, and it is responsible for the sexual-reproductive and self-preservative aims and drives of the organism. 2. Thanatos - the death instinct which is inhibitory in nature, its energy is destructive and death seeking. It is reSponsible for the aggressive and self— destructive tendencies of the organism. The aim of Eros is to stimulate and produce a state of excitation, and the aim of Thanatos is to inhibit and produce a state of tension- lessness. Probably the best known, most controversial, and certainly among the most important factors of the psychoanalytic model of man are tlw Freudian concepts of Id, Ego, and Superego. 94 The ld Freud assumed the neonate had nothing more than irrational instinctual appetites. Consequently, he considered the newborn infant to be, like other instinct-guided and instinct-driven animals, nothing but an "it" or id. The id is, therefore, the basic, fundamental, and most primitive part of man. It is pure desire, raw hedonism, and nonrational. It must be controlled, channeled, and dominated in order for the human animal to become a human being. There is a direct relationship between the irrational, instinctual, hedonistic energy of the neonate's Bros and the nonrational id, and Thanatos. For the primary function of the id is to gratify the instinctually generated needs of the infant, reestablish a state of tension— lessness sought by the inhibitory nature of Thanatos, and thus generate a stage of balanced homeostatis pleasure in the organism. Thus Freud postu- lated that the child's primary process of operation is to seek to fulfill and satisfy his basic bodily needs. The id, therefore, is said to operate according to the pleasure principle. The id is characterized by instinct, impulse, pleasure, and passion. The Ego Many of the child's wishes that are generated by the instinctual energy of the id are not capable of satisfaction. They are in conflict with the environment, and clash with the demands of the social world of'the infant. The id's primary process of Operation, the pleasure principle, comes into conflict with the "reality" of the iJrfant's world. There are two possible consequences of the 9S frustration the id endures: 1. It can remain in a state of unresolved tensions; or, 2. It can "learn” to cope with the external reality by using the unresolved tension to help transform some of the raw energy of the id into a new structure that can: a. cope with the frustrations and conflicts of reality; and b. handle the tension generated by the conflicts with reality. If the infant remains in the state of unresolved tension then it ceases to grow and deve10p normally and moves into pathological states. If the normal deve10pments of the second consequence take place, then part of the child's nonrational id is transformed into the earliest form of a rational structure that can begin to c0pe with reality and its frustration and concomitant tensions. It is this newly formed structure transformed from the id that Freud called the "I" or ego. This deve10pment normally commences sometime in the first year of life, according to Freud, and the child's personality is now composed of two structures. The ego is the secondary element, but becomes, in healthy development, the dominating structure. In this manner, a new secondary process comes into operation called the reality principle, which gradually supplants the id's primary process- jpleaSLue principle combination as the major, dominant determiner (If the*child's behavior, growth, and deve10pment. 96 The infant's developing perception is one of the major factors in inducing the deve10pment of the ego. The child's per- ceptual processes, along with its deve10ping intellect, are the factors that bring the infant to the point of conflict with reality. Thus the ego comes to be characterized by (1) increasingly more functional perception, (2) gradually developing reason, and (3) slowly developing control over instinctual energy, impulsive pleasure- seeking, and raw passion. Presentation of the ego concept requires some introduction to the psychoanalytic concept of defense mechanisms and to the concepts of preconscious, unconscious, and conscious. These extremely complex t0pics can only be covered very briefly, but they are especially important in this view of man. In order to cope with the frustrations of reality, the ego, in conflict with and against the wishes of the id, deve10ps a number of defense mechanisms. The most important one is repression, which is the process by which the ego prohibits the id from allowing some of the primary instinctual urges to come into the organism's consciousness. Consciousness is that part of the mental functioning which is in the most direct contact with the external world. It is the outer layer, so to speak, of the mind. It is composed of perceptions, cognitions, and feelings coming from the external reality; and of instincts and impulses from the internal reality that are permitted to cone into awareness by the ego. The unconscious is that part of the mind, or mental 97 operations, which is below the level of awareness, and contains the wishes, ideas, urges, etc. that have never come into consciousness because the ego has repressed them. It also contains the desires, ideas, etc. which have been suppressed by the ego. Suppression is the conscious equivalent of repression, and is the defense mechanism that operates when the ego consciously drives wishes, ideas, desires, etc. into the unconsciousness that have already come into conscious- ness. The preconscious concept is of special significance because it is the basis for the psychoanalytic therapeutic techniques of verbalization and free association. The preconscious is the layer between the conscious and unconscious. In this transitional zone of consciousness are the unconscious ideas that became connected with conscious verbal images that correspond to them. Verbal images of this type are residues from former perceptions, and become linked up with their unconscious counterparts in the preconscious. Another important defense mechanism is sublimation, or the process by which the ego diverts reality-conflicting instinctual energy into new forms. This is a creative process by which the ego permits forbidden or dangerous instincts to be channeled into socially accepted forms. Obviously, the concept of ego is highly complex. The ego controls all voluntary activity, operates numerous defense mechanisms, censors dreams during sleep, and generally regulates and controls the organism's behavior. It is sometimes referred to as the executive of the psyche. 98 The Superego One of the major functions of the ego is to cope with that part of the external reality that comprises the social environment, especially parents and other adults who make demands on the child's behavior, thoughts, and feelings. Adults impose and inject demands upon the child that create expectations, encourage and reward certain behaviors, and discourage or prohibit and punish other behaviors. Related to this complex of factors is one of the most important and complicated coping or defense mechanisms used by the ego, viz., the mechanism of identification, which will be explained in a moment. This mechanism is the primary agent responsible for the transformation of part of the ego into what Freud called the superego. The superego roughly corresponds to the general concept of conscience, but with highly technical aspects that go beyond the normal usage of that term. It is a highly differentiated part of the ego that functions as an ego surrogate, or alter ego, to mediate and modulate the ego's relationship with the external world. This transformation of part of the ego generates the third and final component of the human personality. It also elaborates one more important function of the ego, that is to be the mediator between the id and the superego. The impulsive id wants to satisfy its instinctual urges, which are usually in conflict with reality. The compulsive superego wants to impose its strict introjected societal and cudtural restraints and restrictions on the id. The ego must serveeas the rational mediator between these two conflicting parts of man ' 5 nature . 99 Identification Identification is an especially significant concept and process in psychoanalytic theory, with important deve10pmental implications. It deserves explanation. It is one of the many defense mechanisms employed by the ego to generate the superego and to mediate between the id and the superego. In the framework of psychoanalytic theory the term has a highly technical meaning somewhat different from both general usage and the interpretations from behaviorism and organismic psychology. It's special role in psychoanalytic theory is especially important for values/moral deve10pment. In general usage, identification is a term used to denote a process by which a person patterns his thoughts, feelings, or actions after another person who serves as a model. It involves attachment, admiration, and the desire to emulate the model. For the radical behaviorist it becomes simply a matter of stimulus- response patterning that can easily and simply be explained in terms of conditioning (see Gewirtz, 1969). For the social learning and mediation behaviorists it becomes a somewhat more complex and additional process that may include modeling, imitation, and possibly some hypothesized intervening variables (also see Gewirtz, 1969). But for Freud, and most psychoanalysts, the concept of identification is rich with meaning and one of the most significant mechanisms of personality change. Freud used the term in two ways: a. as the process by which one ego becomes like another ego; and 100 b. as the behavior-similarity outcome of that process. But he was talking about the process and outcome by which the complexities of the anaclitic child-parent relationships of the ego become transformed into the superego. So for the psychoanalysts the ordinary term "identification" used in various ways, both technical and general, becomes the highly specific term anaclictic identification. Simply, it involves the fact that the adult, especially the parent, uses sanctions against the child which are primarily psychological in nature, in that they threaten rejection or withdrawal of love. The child is totally dependent on the nurturance received and anticipated from the parent, and the threatened or actual withdrawal of this nurturance generates both fear and hostility in the child. The hostility, felt as a tendency towards aggression aimed at the parent, becomes intolerable to the child because of his love and admiration for the parent. In order to cope with this intolerable combination of fear, hostility, and aggression felt toward the parent, the child attempts to model the parentally-desired behaviors in order to avoid punishment, avert nurturance withdrawal, and please the parents. At the same time, he turns the aggression inward against himself. The results of this complex behavioral :huerchange are (l) conformity to the adult expectations, (2) adoption inhurojection of the parental attitudes and values, (3) internaliza- tioncHFthe parental values, and (4) creation of the superego. Anaclitic identification is more likely to result in ‘thenmdeling in the superego of the perceived expectations of the 101 parents rather than the modeling of the actual overt behavioral actions of the parents. If the parents are too demanding, too instrumental or utilitarian in their abuse of the child's nurturance- dependence, and create too strong an identification, then the process can lead to the deve10pment of a harsh, rigid, compulsive, guilt- ridden, and irrational superego. Sequences of Universal Stages in Development One of Freud's fundamental postulates was that human deve10pment is marked by a series of stages through which each individual passes, and that these stages are universal to all mankind. The characteristics and bases of these stages, their relationship generally to personality deve10pment and specifically to identity formation, and the significance invested in the psychosexual aspects of this deve10pment all clearly represent the particular character and orientation of psychoanalytic theory. They also form, along with the previously discussed topics (especially ego development), the basis for much of the controversy that has surrounded this theory from the outside and has splintered the tradition from within. The basic developmental thesis put forth is that personality development is based on and proceeds from the physiological maturation oftmfly zones, the particular mode of functioning of each of the snmcific zones, and the universal sequence of stages in which this maturation unfolds . A body zone (and its specific mode of functioning) is gacthmted by instinctual libidinal energy. The nature of the stage of 102 personality development related to that particular zone is dependent on the characteristics of that zone and the investment of libidinal energy (cathexis) there. Consequently, the nature of the person's adaptation and the coping mechanisms of the ego at each stage for each body zone determine the characteristics of the person's person- ality and identity, the nature and types of social interaction that take place, and the limits within which all these processes take place. Freud's claim that personality development is based on and determined by the investment of sexual energy in each of the bodily zones as the organism proceeds through the sequence of maturation of these zones. At each stage, and therefore for each zone, there will be specific and inevitable conflicts between the id, ego, and superego; and between internal reality and external reality. How these conflicts are handled, whether or not they are resolved, and the relative adequacy of the resolutions all will determine the specific character of the personality both then and later, and will determine the relative degree of health or pathology of the personality. Not only was Freud's general picture of development new and unusual, but what really mdae his theory radical at the particular time he introduced it was his belief that the psychosexual nature of ‘fiw personality started in infancy. To invest the infant with sexual mmndng and base its development on sexual activity was a most rmmflutionary idea in Freud's day, and very disturbing to those from a Rnfltanical or Victorian background. Erik Erikson, one of the foremost contemporary psycho- analYsts, has done an enormous amount of work with Freud's theories 103 and has elaborated a comprehensive development of the psychoanalytic psychosexual theory. He has attempted to chart the personality stages that derive from this theory and identify those that he believes are universal. Erikson postualtes what he calls the epigenetic principle, or the unfolding of these stages in a genetically determined sequence common to all men. Change and development occur because of and are caused by these maturationally predetermined shifts of instinctual energy from one body zone to another. Each resultant stage focuses on a particular body zone and has its own characteristic major crisis for the child to resolve. The child's personality, character, and health are determined by the manner and degree of success with which he meets and solves each succeeding crisis of each unfolding stage. Freud's original oral, anal, and genital stages have been elaborated by Erikson into eight major stages, each with its particular major zone or object of libidinal investment, and each with its peculiar crisis. Erikson's epigenetic plan of stages is very briefly summarized. 1. The Oral Stage During the first year of life the infant's libidinal hwestment is in the oral (mouth) zone of the body. The primary bkflogical and self-preservative functions of breathing, drinking, amieating dominate the child's interests, and gratification of the denies of this stage provide him with the satisfaction of the hmtinctual sexual urges of his id. Thus sucking, chewing, drinking, mm.related activities are the instruments of satisfaction. 104 The great significance of this stage for later personality development, according to both Freud and Erikson, is that the child's "taking-in" that is predominant in this stage forms the basis for later abilities crucial to his deve10pment. Thus incorporation is said to be the dominant mode of psychosexual functioning attributed to the oral zone, and lays the foundation for the child's later need for and ability to introject and identify (as previously explained). The major crisis of this stage is the crisis of trust. If the infant learns to depend on, trust, and be comfortable with those who take care of him during this critical stage, he will later be able to have healthy mechanisms of projection, introjection, and identification, all related to normal and healthy development of self concept, ego, and superego. Inadequate resolution leads to a tendency to mistrust. 2. The Anal Stage From about one to three years of age the child's instinctual urges shift from the oral erogenous zone to the anal erogenous zone, thus ushering in the second major psychosexual stage, which focuses on the important functions of retention and evacuation. These functions giwathe child an Opportunity to attempt to master his own impulses, bezuuonomous, and dominate those who care for him. The parents, in tun“ make major attempts during this stage to direct, control, inhibit, amielicit compliance. The child's mastery of and use of his anal- umfiflual musculature provides great libidinal gratification and this lays the groundwork for later conflicting psychosexual urges related 105 to autoerotic pleasure of retention and elimination--holding on and letting go. This stage lays the early ground work for the development of the superego, for personality characteristics related to the active- passive and outgoing-ingoing dimensions, and for levels and degrees of confidence in one's own abilities to master and control things. The major crisis of this stage is the crisis of autonomy. Adequate resolution leads to apprOpriate self-control, self-reliance, and self-determination. Inadequate resolution leads to patterns of shame and doubt, lack of self-confidence, and superego problems related to being evil and dirty. 3. The Phallic Stage The investment of libidinal energy and maturational zone orientation now shifts to the genital area, usually between the ages of three to five. This shift also involves the change in orientation from one of exclusively to self to that of another, and involves the primary identification of self with the parent of the same sex. It is in this period that the famed Oedipus Complex (for boys) and corresponding Electra Complex (for girls) is purported to take place. The child's primary mechanism is that of identification. This stage is critical for psychosexual orientation, and dwaeventual orientation depends significantly on the parent with whmnthe child forms his or her primary identification. The most immnnant factor of sexual identification at this point is the gaufiically determined sexual characteristics. Environmental factors are important but definitely secondary. 106 This period involves increased cognitive and psychomotor abilities which permits very significant developments growing out of play, imagination, activity, exploration, relationships with other children, manipulation of objects in the environment, and numerous other factors significant for both present and subsequent growth and development. The major cirsis of this stage is the Oedipal crisis, or the crisis of initiative versus guilt. Resolution of the Oedipal crisis is involved in the continuing transformation of part of the ego into the superego. Adequate resolution of this crisis leads to initiative which is manifested in the child's acquiring a reasonable and healthy sense of moral responsibility. Inadequate resolution leads to unreasonable guilt, overemphasis on obedience and self- punishment, and dysfunctional and pathological ego consequences. 4. The Latency Stage Adequate resolution of the Oedipal crisis of the preceding stage results in a reduction of libidinal energy investment in the genital zone, thereby starting a period of sexual retrogression or quiescence. Freud maintained that there was a reduction in biological sexual drives during this period of latency, which generally lasts fmmlabout the age of six until puberty. Some strongly disagree wifliFreud and maintain that the child's interest in sex will be Imuntained if environmental factors support it, and refute his Impothesis of a biologically-determined sexual latency period. Ekikson takes a middle position on this issue and maintains that 107 during this period the child tends to sublimate sexual energy into other modes of psychosocial functioning. Thus the child of this period is characterized by eagerness to learn and do things, to win recognition, to produce, to work and play with tools and implements, to develop skills, and to significantly increase social activity and do things with other children. The major crisis of this period is the crisis of industry versus inferiority. Adequate resolution leads to a sense of accomplishment, feelings of confidence, and a genuine sense of industry. Inadequate resolution leads to lasting feelings of inferiority, restriction of activities and social contacts, a possible conformist orientation, and tendencies to rely on the judgments of others rather than on one's own judgments. S. The Adolescent Stage This is the psychosexual stage of puberty and plays the leading role in determining the individual's later adult sexual behavior. A period of physiological revolution, puberty is a time of rapid growth, sexual maturity, tremendous internal conflicts and inconsistencies, and great concern for the feelings and acceptance of other peOple. The child's sexual impulses and urges now shift to members ofthe Opposite sex outside his family. The major crisis of this period is the crisis of identity. Nkmuate resolution results in an integrated personality with a coherent and consistent self concept, confidence in interpersonal 108 relations, the beginnings of a coherent view of life, and integration of childhood identifications. Inadequate resolution results in identity diffusion or the inability to integrate one's thoughts and feelings about himself and the perceived thoughts and feelings of others about him. Ego autonomy will not develop. Failure to develop an adequate self concept makes it difficult or impossible to form a coherent hierarchy of values, and life can become meaningless. The result may be a failure to make decisions about tasks, careers, and the personal and social roles one must fill. 6. The Genital Stage This is the stage of young adulthood when, according to Freud, the individual's instinctual energy and sexual gratification become fully centered on the genital zone, and the aim is to fulfill this gratification in another person. Erikson feels the person in this stage seeks close, personal, private, confidential relationships in which he can give himself and lose himself in another person. The major crisis of this stage is the crisis of intimacy versus isolation. Adequate resolution leads to a creative partnership with another person, gratification from intimacy, solidarity with (fibers, and significant development related to the selection of a mute and preparation for adult roles of husband and wife. Inadequate Itsohnion leads to isolation, the avoidance of intimate relation- ShipS, fear of losing oneself, excessive or complete concern with self, and withdrawal. 109 7. The Stage of Adulthood Freud viewed the ultimate goal of sexual deve10pment as the utilization of sexual pleasure for prOpagation. The intimacies of adult- hood spawn the need to generate and create. The main personal aim is to establish a family and create other significant relationships. The mature adult generalizes this generative and creative orientation to the social and cultural orders. He takes an interest in the affairs of the community, and becomes interested in education, tradition, the establishment of order, and the propagation, care, and rearing of children. The major crisis of this period is the crisis of‘generativity versus selflabsorption. Adequate resolution leads to concern for others, the desire to create, and to take care of others. Inadequate resolution leads to increased concern for self, lack of interest in the affairs of others and the community, lack of faith in the younger generations, personal stagnation, and impoverishment in interpersonal relations. 8. The Stage of Senescence The adult who has lived through the long period of adulthood will face this final stage in a way that is determined by the degree and nature of the success or failure of his adulthood. An adulthood full of successful interpersonal relationships and satisfactorily perceived accomplishments in work, community affairs, and the social order will tend to lead to a senescence with an integrated personality and a realistic view of the inevitability of 110 death. The major crisis of this stage is the crisis of disintegra- tion and death. Adequate resolution, resulting from ego integration, will lead to a healthy view of the entire life cycle, and an acceptance of death as the inevitable conclusion of that cycle and of being human. There will be a feeling of purpose, a belief in one's meaning- fulness, a lack of fear of death, and a feeling of oneness with others and with mankind. Inadequate resolution, due to ego disintegration, leads to a lack of purpose, a feeling of meaninglessness, failure to accept the life cycle and the inevitability of death, and despair. The conceptualization of the stages presented is a partial integration of Freud's and Erikson's views, mostly based on Erikson's own integration of them. There are those who would reject many aspects, or modify others, but there seems to be general agreement in psycho- analytic circles of the validity of the stage concept. Later it will become apparent that the Erikson-Freud stages just presented are not the same kind of stage as the deve10pmental stages of Piaget and Kohlberg. The main difference is that the organismic-structural- developmental stages that will be presented in Chapter IV are hier— archically integrated, whereas the stages just presented are not. In the psychoanalytic stages the person passes through one and on to the next, but the preceding stage is not reformulated and integrated in the next one. They follow one another, but are not related to each other. They are like independent hurdles to overcome. Psychoanalysis is peculiar in that it is the creation of one person. Freud, however, had some serious quarrels with his chief 111 disciples early in the history of the movement. Freud was virtually uncompromising about his view of the theory. Asia result, some of his closest associates broke with him and reformulated certain aspects of the theory. Of course, Freud himself also made many adjustments and changes in his theory over the years. But he never made the changes that were the source of conflict with his former colleagues. Before briefly mentioning the disputes and their authors a few final comments on Freud and his theory are of interest. As Hall and Lindzey (1970, p. 68) point out: No other psychological theory has been subjected to such searching and often such bitter criticism as has psychoanalysis. From every side and on every conceivable source, Freud and his theory have been attacked, reviled, ridiculed, and slandered. The only comparable case in modern science, in which both the theory and the theorist have been so ardently villified, is that of Charles Darwin whose evolutionary doctrine shocked Victorian England. Freud's chief offenses consisted of ascribing lustful and destructive wishes to the baby, attributing incestuous and perverted urges to all human beings, and explaining man's behavior in terms of sexual motivation. "Decent” peOple were infuriated by Freud's view of man and called him a libertine and a pervert. Also few theories have ever as deeply entrenched themselves in the fabric of our daily life and language as has Freudian psycho- analysis. Even relatively uneducated people who really know virtually nothing about Freud and his ideas talk in Freudian terms and look at life and other peOple in those terms. Defense mechanisms, ego, slips of the tongue, and numerous other Freudian ideas are part of our daily language and thought. After reviewing some of the major criticisms leveled against the man and the theory and attempting to answer those criticisms, 112 Hall and Lindzey (p. 72) conclude their section on Freud with the following: But a fine literary style and an exciting subject matter are not the main reasons for the great esteem in which Freud is held. Rather it is because his ideas are challenging, because his conception of man is both broad and deep, and because his theory has relevance for our times. Freud may not have been a rigorous scientist nor a first-rate theoretician, but he was a patient, meticulous, penetrating observer and a tenacious, disciplined, courageous, original thinker. Over and above all of the other virtues of his theory stands this one-~it tries to envisage a full- bodied individual living partly in a world of reality and partly in a world of make-believe, beset by conflicts and inner contradictions yet capable of rational thought and action, moved by forces of which he has little knowledge and by aspirations which are beyond his reach, by turn confused and clearheaded, frustrated and satisfied, hopeful and despairing, selfish and altruistic; in short, a complex human being. For many peOple, this picture of man has essential validity. There is no question about the fact that Freud has had enormous impact on our life and world of the twentieth century. He is considered by many to be the dominant figure in psychology in the first half of the twentieth century. Other Views Carl Jung was one of Freud's closest associates and an intimate friend. They broke with each other on both personal and professional grounds. Jung created his own psychoanalytic theory and therapy which came to be known as Analytical Psychology. Many of the basic Freudian concepts were retained, but one of Jung's chief arguments with Freud was about the latter's pansexualism. fi“ 113 Jung thought Freud erred in building his entire theory and therapy on man's sexual nature. Another point of major disagreement stemmed from Freud's uncompromising complete determinism. Jung accepted the role of the past and realized that causality was a major factor in human life, but he also believed the role of the future was important. In addition to the conditioning factors of the individual's personal history and his racial history, Jung believed man was also conditioned by his aspirations, aims, and dreams of the future. His theory combines both causality and teleology. One of the most controversial aspects of Jung's theory is his strong belief in the racial and cultural influence on personality. In addition to the infantile sources of personality, Jung believed that the individual inherited the effects of the cumulative experiences of previous generations. These influences are manifested in the individual's personal unconscious and also in the individual's share of the collective unconscious. The collective unconscious represents the universality in man's thinking and behavior, and is based, accord- ing to Jung, on the basic structural similarity of all human brains. Contained in the collective unconscious are the archetypes, or universal thought forms and images that existed as memory traces in all brains. Jung also gave a central role to the self} which is one of the archetypes represented in the collective unconscious. For the self to emerge into consciousness the various parts of the personality must be fully developed, which does not usually happen 114 until middle age. Jung was one of the first to create the concept of selfLactualization or selflrealization. There are some interesting parallels between Jung's ideas on this subject and cognitive and moral development in the Kohlberg scheme. Jung's influence in and beyond psychoanalytic circles was very large. Many.practicing psychoanalytic therapists practice Jung's brand of psychoanalysis rather than Freud's. Jung also contributed the concepts of introversion and extraversion to our daily language. Another of Freud's early associates to break with him was Alfred Adler. He and his colleagues founded a new approach to psychoanalysis that they called Individual Psychology. Whereas Freud stressed man's biological and instinctual nature and placed complete emphasis on the individual's past and causality in his absolute deterministic view, Adler, like Jung, stressed future goals, and his psychology was predominantly teleological. Adler gave stronger emphasis to man's inherently social nature than he did his individual and biological nature. He placed greater importance on man's ego and consciousness, whereas Freud and Jung stressed the unconscious and irrational. Adler also challenged Freud's sexual orientation. In discussing Adler's concept of the creative self; which Hall and Lindzey (1970, p. 127) consider to be his crowning achievement, they give the following summary of Adler's views: In summary, it may be said that Adler fashioned a humanistic theory of personality which was the antitheSis of Freud's conception of man. By endowing man with truism, humanitarianism, co-operation, creativity, uniqueness, and awareness, he restored to man a sense of dignity and worth 115 that psychoanalysis had pretty largely destroyed. In place of the dreary materialistic picture which horrified and repelled many readers of Freud, Adler offered a portrait of man which was more satisfying, more hOpeful, and far more complimentary to man. Adler's conception of the nature of personality coincided with the pOpular idea that man can be the master, and not the victim, of his fate. Adler's emphasis on the social aspects of man's existence were even more emphasized by the so-called social analysts whose theories are frequently referred to as the psychoanalytic social psychology theories. Some include Adler in this list, others do not. But all include Karen Horney, Erich Fromm, and Harry Stack Sullivan. Fromm's ideas on freedom, personality, love, and society are extremely valuable for values/moral deve10pment and education. His criticism of the highly competitive, ruthless, and basically selfish society forged by capitalism are penetrating, provocative, and powerful. He believes that it is virtually impossible for man to realize his full human nature in such a system. With equal vigor and eloquence he also shows how communism has failed to meet man's basic economic and human needs. He prOposes a society that he calls humanistic communitarian socialism. His ideas on this and related subjects are clearly stated in his books, e.g., The Sane Society (1955), The Art of Loving (1956), Beyond the Chains of Illusion (1962), and The Revolution of H0pe (1968). He also offers a solution to the determinism-indeterminism problem in the form of alternativism (The Heart of Man: Its Genius for Good gpd Evil, 1964). Fromm's psychOphilosophical writings offer much of value for a theory of values/moral deve10pment and education. 116 Fromm identified six character types: receptive, exploit- ative, hoarding, marketing, productive, and necrophilous-biophilous (attracted to death vs. life reSpectively). (See Hall and Lindzey, 1970, p. 132; and Lundin, 1972, pp. 284-285). Fromm's character types served as the basis for the typolOgy deve10ped by Peck (Peck and Havighurst, 1960) that was discussed in Chapter II. The other major psychoanalytic social analyst is Harry Stack Sullivan. His Interpersonal Theory of Psychiatry, or Theory of Interpersonal Relations is interesting for a number of reasons. First, it is a significant departure from orthodox or classical psychoanalysis in that Sullivan rejected Freud's libido theory and did not consider instinctual energy as an important source of motiva- tion. Second, he rejected Freud's idea that development was based primarily on the unfolding or maturation of the sexual instinct, and believed vigorously in the idea that development is primarily a social-psychological phenomenon. He postulated six deve10pmental stages (Sullivan, 1953; Hall and Lindzey, 1970, p. 146): (l) infancy, (2) childhood, (3) the juvenile era, (4) preadolescence, (5) early adolescence, and (6) late adolescence. Many of his ideas are highly congruent with organismic psychology. Another departure from traditional psychoanalytic doctrine is Sullivan also believed that personality is not set at an early age as Freud maintained. The final deviation from orthodox psychoanalysis may be the most important of them all, especially for values development education. Because of its point of departure from tradition this movement has come to be known as ego psychology or psychoanalytic ego an. .'_ mu .- 117 psychology. The fundamental distinguishing characteristic of this rather recent innovation in psychoanalysis is disagreement with Freud and the traditional followers over the major issue of ego development. Whereas Freud conceived the id as being the only part of the personality present at birth and that the ego grows out of it, the ego psychologists refute this hypothesis. It is their contention that both the id and the ego are present at birth, and that they gradually differentiate from each other. The gradual differentiation of the id and the ego is responsible for development of ego identity, or self concept. One of the major consequences of this theoretical change is the shifting of emphasis from the defense mechanisms to the adaptive, coping mechanisms that mediate between the id and the external environment. The ego psychologists contend there are three major steps in the process of ego development. They postulate that these steps, which involve the child's relationship with the environment, are crucial for the healthy deve10pment of a differentiated id and ego, and for the development of the ego as the instrument of rationality. The three steps are (Langer, 1969, pp. 24—25): 1. The development of the capacity to distinguish between the self and the world: 2. The development of the means of communication, especially between the child and his mother. 3. The achievement of adequate control over voluntary functions, or psychomotor development. 118 Step number one above has three prerequisite conditions: 1. The physiological maturation of perceptual organs and skills. 2. The transformation of prerational instinctual energy focused upon the self into rational energy for attending to and recognizing other things. 3. Partial deprivation of the child's needs and wishes to establish disequilibrium conducive to change. Ego psychologists maintain that there are three major causes of ego development: 1. The external environment. 2. Nonrational instinctual drives that are internal and inherited. 3. Rational instincts that possess controlling and regulatory functions. These are internal and inherited. It is the third in the last list, the hereditary rational instincts, that the ego psychologists stress for ego development. They maintain that Freud was wrong in assuming that the rational ego could be a transformation of the nonrational id. The material source of the ego'must be inherited intellectual functions activated by conflict- ;free instinctual energy which has the ability to control and regulate the intellectual mechanisms for perception, memory, action, experience, arui learning. Thus the ego has a functional autonomy and operates as 21 source of experience and behavior that is independent of both the itiand the environment. 119 The generally acknowledged pioneer of psychoanalytic ego psychology is Heinz Hartmann (see, for example, relevant comments by Munroe, 1955, p. 90). Hartmann's Egg Psycholegy_and the Problem of Adaptation (1958, translated by David Rapaport) is a recognized classic in this field. Other psychoanalytic theorists in ego psychology include R. M. Lowenstein, E. Kris, D. Rapaport, and Jane Loevinger. The last two deserve special attention. David Rapaport was a brilliant thinker and writer with a broad vision. He was attempting to bridge psychoanalytic theory with other types of theories from different psychological persuasions. He was especially interested in the work of Jean Piaget (one of the foundational theorists in organismic psychology and of special significance for values development education) and believed there was great potential for rapprochement between ego psychology and the work of the cognitive-deve10pmental psychologists such as Piaget. Rapaport's book, Organization and Pathology of Theught: Selected Sources (1951), is recognized as a masterpiece in psychological literature. It is a collection of noteworthy articles by some of the greatest thinkers in psychology, including Freud, Piaget, Lewin, Hartmann, Bleuler, Claparede, and others. Rapaport translated the articles and added his analysis and commentary to each one in such a way as to draw out the deepest meaning. The final chapter is Rapaport's own work and is an attempt to build toward a theory of thijfldng. Unfortunately, this brilliant psychologist's life was cut short in 1961 at the age of 49. Jane Loevinger deserves special attention because she has atteflmned.to develop a stage—developmental theory of ego development 120 that is greatly congruent with Kohlberg's cognitive-developmental theory of moral judgment, one of the basic building blocks in a theory for values deve10pment education (see Chapter IV). The congruence between Loevinger's and Kohlberg's work has been recognized by both Kohlberg (1969) and Loevinger (Loevinger and Wessler, 1970). Loevinger's stage-developmental ideas are based on the processes described earlier. She postulates that the course of healthy ego development can be seen as a sequential process of seven stages (Loevinger, 1966; and Loevinger and Wessler, 1970, Vol. I, Ch. 1). A brief description of the stages follows: 1. Presocial and Symbiotic — centers on differentiating "self" from "not self" and establishing a strong attachment to the mother. 2. Impulse Ridden - child begins to exercise his own will, but lacks voluntary control over impulses and does not yet know shame. Child is exploitive, dependent, does not understand rules of conduct, and believes that an action is bad merely because it is punished. 3. Opportunistic — Rules are understood but followed only for immediate advantage. Child more independent and more in control of his impulses. 4. Confbrmist - Child begins to internalize and obey rules just because they are rules. Interpersonal relations conceived in terms of actions rather than of feelings and motives. 121 S. Conscientious - Adolescent becomes introspective, self-conscious, and self-critical. Interpersonal relations seen more in terms of feelings than actions, and are more important. Morality now internalized; own principles take precedence over group's. Feels guilt. Inner standards of achievement become important. 6. Autonomous - Role differentiation, individuality, and self-fulfillment become conscious concerns. In interpersonal relations now recognizes inevitable mutual interdependence. More tolerant of attitudes and conflicts of others. More conscious and direct about COping with own conflicts. Conflicts are largely moral and internal. 7. Integrated - Achievement of a sense of integrated identity that transcends conflicting demands, role differentiation, and the unattainable. Appreciates and cherishes differences in others rather than merely tolerating them. Few people achieve this stage. Loevinger's work and much of what has been Offered by the other ego psychologists provide a fertile field for ideas related to values/moral deve10pment . Hartmann shows how far ego psychology has moved from some cxf Freud's doctrines, and how much less deterministic and environmental- istix:the theory has become. For example, Hartmann (1958, p. 31) says: 122 Thus the task of man to adapt to man is present from the very beginning of life. Furthermore, man adapts to an environment part of which has not, but part of which has already been molded by his kind and himself. Man not only adapts to the community but also actively participates in creating the conditions to which he must adapt. Man's environment is molded increasingly by man himself. The crucial adaptation man has to make is to the social structure, and his colla- boration in building it. Hartmann also recognizes man's capacity for rational action, and seems to have moved away from Freud's overwhelming emphasis on man's irrational nature (see Hartmann, 1958, pp. 64ff). In general the ego psychologists have moved increasingly in this direction of a more balanced picture of man, and generally open up the doors of reconciliation with other views of man, especially that of organismic psychology. In summary, the orthodox psychoanalysis of Freud presents a very grim view of man. Man is seen as possessed of irrational instinctual urges and forces internally that must be tamed, controlled, and channelled by the socialization process. Man is at war with himself internally, and is at war with the environment. In many respects psychoanalysis has much in common with the view of behaviorism, in that it sees the environment as the dominant factor in man's development, and in that man is seen as more on the passive side than the active side. Likewise, both views stress the shaping and controlling othhe child as early in life as possible before the irrational biological drives and tendencies gain the upper hand. Both views see thtahuman organism as a victim of his own passions. Psychoanalysis £1150 sees man as basically heterotelic rather than as autotelic. 123 Although not as exPlicit about it, psychoanalysis does present a materialistic and mechanistic view of man. This shows up especially in the anaclitic identification-introjection model of values development. The major point of departure from behaviorism is the psychoanalytic emphasis on all kinds of internal mechanisms that the behaviorist rejects as unnecessary. More recent movements in psychoanalytic circles, however, reveal a trend away from the rigid determinism, the instinctual emphasis, and the irrational factors. Jung, Adler, Horney, Fromm, Sullivan, Hartmann, and Loevinger all offer a more positive, more hopeful, less deterministic, less mechanistic, and less irrational view of man. There are frequent comments in the literature about the decline of psychoanalysis in terms of its popularity as a therapy and in its influence in psychology. There does seem to be a trend away from the harsh and dreary pronouncements of Freud and a trend of reconciliation with other psychological orientations, especially organismic psychology. Rapaport, as pointed out earlier, most clearly represents this trend. 3. Organismic Psychology Behaviorism and psychoanalysis more readily lend themselves to neater classification than does organismic psychology. Also, there is general agreement about their names. The third major view 1135 no one name that is used by all and recognized by all as its indentity. Furthermore, the third view is made up of a loose ftxieration of psychophilosophical systems and subsystems. The first tausk, therefore, will be to briefly identify the component systems 124 that make up this loose federation which, in Maslow's term, is sometimes refered to as "the third force" in psychology. The idea of the third force clearly indicates one characteristic of this collection of views, viz., that they originated or exist partly as a reaction against behaviorism and psychoanalysis. Many behavioral scientists have found the conceptualization of man in the other frameworks to be incomplete, inadequate, partly erroneous, and largely based on mechanistic, fragmented, and pathological orientations. It is believed by many that behaviorism and psychoanalysis relegate man to a status far beneath his nature and deny man any freedom, self- direction, or hope. Some of the orientations in this third force are: humanistic psychology, self psychology, individual psychology, phenomenological psychology, transactional psychology, perceptual psychology, holism, organismic psychology, organismic-developmental psychology, and others. In spite of major and minor differences among these there are several dominant factors that apply to all of them, principal of which is the viewing of the person as an organismic whole, and as a human being. Thus any of the following three terms could be supported as a class name for the entire movement: humanism, holism, or'organismic psychology. The problem with humanism is that it has so many nuaanings and it has complex philosophical aspects that create Ixrobflems in communication. It implies a variety of factors that may or'lnay not be important or included in the total psychological view 125 under consideration. And finally, it is a commonly used word in lay parlance for a variety of points of view which_confuses the issue even further. Use of the term humanism in some circles in education, for example, generates stereotyped responses, both pro and con. Holism, on the other hand, is so strange to so many people what the first response is frequently to want to correct its Spelling to "wholism." This necessitates an explanation of its derivation from the Greek. Not only does organismic turn out to be the least troublesome of the three, it also more positively communicates the basic meaning of the position. The most important point that needs to be communicated by this view vis-a-vis the other views, especially behaviorism, is that the focus of study and consideration is the human organism vs. S-R bonds, responses, reflexes, instinctual urges, ids, egos, SUperegos, contingencies of reinforcement, and all similar conceptualizations. "Organism" has the advantage of also being a neutral term with regard to philosophy and biology, as well as to sex, age, and function. The only problem presented by the word is that it does not lend itself to a one word title-- organismicism is too cumbersome and too difficult to say. All things considered organismic psychology does the job. One other advantage to the rubric of organismic psychology is tflmt it allows for inclusion of those aspects of other systems arui theories that are consistent with the organismic viewpoint. For eaxanqfle, many concepts and viewpoints of the psychoanalytic social 126 psychologists, and even more so those of the ego psychologists, are highly congruent with organismic psychology. Some of the ideas from Sheldon's psychobiological or constitutional psychology and from Cattell's psychostatistical or factor psychology are also very organismically oriented. The rubric is definitive enough to communicate a particular orientation, and yet loose enough to be broad and inclusive in its scope. These are three clearly identifiable theoretical orienta- tions that do not neatly fit into any of the three rubrics of behavior- ism, psychoanalysis, or organismic psychology. Previously mentioned were two theories that are hybrids, viz., Tolman's purposive behaviorism or cognitive field theory, and Kantor's interbehaviorism. Both of these are basically behavioristically rooted, but have strong affiliations with Lewin's field theory. The three remaining theories that do not neatly fit anywhere are Lewin's field theory, Gestalt psychology, and existential psychology. Lewin's orientation is generally holistic and somewhat organismic, but he concentrates primarily on the environmental factors, and his followers (e.g., Lippitt et al) have focused primarily on group dynamics. Gestalt psychology, originated by Max Wertheimer, Wolfgang Kohler, and Kurt Koffka, all of whom are now dead, was created in part as a reaction against behaviorism. Gestaltists are opposed to the molecular approach, the stimulus-response mechanical model, and the rejection of cormciousness that characterizes behaviorism. The orientation is gemunally holistic and quite compatible with organismic psychology. lflre primary focus of Gestalt psychology, however, is perception and 127 phenomenology, a much narrower focus than most personality and behavior theories. Now that all the founders of Gestalt are gone the movement as an organized force is somewhat dissipated. But this is.also partly because their contributions have been absorbed in varying degrees in practically all other systems in psychology. The third, and most difficult, of the theories to classify is existential psychology. As Lundin (1972, p. 292) says: "Existential psychology is not an organized system of psychology, but might better be considered a movement." Lundin devotes a chapter to the movement, and so do Hall and Lindzey (1970). It is the most philosophically oriented of all the psychological systems. Existential psychology grew out of the existential philosophy movement in Europe that peaked after World War II. The movement traces its historical roots back to Kierkegaard, and to some extent to Dostoyevsky. Hall and Lindzey (p. 553) credit the founding of the movement primarily to Martin Heidegger and Karl Jaspers. Hall and Lindzey appropriately point out the common antecedents and interconnections among existen- tialism, phenomenology, psychology, and Gestalt. Some prominent figures in existential psychology are two Swiss psychologists, lmdwig Binswanger and Medard Boss. Others are Rollo May and Adrian Van Kaam. Many organismic and humanistic psychologists have been partially influenced by and have contributed to the existential movement, e.g., Carl Rogers, Kurt Goldstein, Andras Angyal, (Bordon Allport, Abraham Maslow, and Gardner Murphy, to name only a few. Some of the principle tenets of existential psychology u 128 are what make it hard to classify neatly as falling into the organismic rubric, and they have a great deal to do with building a theory for values deve10pment education. First, existential psychology completely rejects determinism in all its forms, and maintains that man has free will and free choice, and can determine his own life. The followers of this movement reject the materialistic and mechanistic orientations of both behaviorism and psychoanalysis. Man is responsible for his own existence and can make of it what he will. Both hereditary and environmental explanations for man's behavior are rejected. The focus is on one individual. The emphasis is consistently on man in his existential situation, on human values, human existence, suffering, anxiety, death, and consciousness. Existential psychologists believe that psychology has defeated itself by swinging in the direction of natural science. Possibly the most important concept in the existential system is becoming. Man is always in the process of becoming, of changing, of growing, of becoming something new, of transcending. Many of the scientifically-grounded concepts and beliefs of psychOIOgy are rejected as unreal, misleading, and potentially destructive to any understanding of the human being or human existence. Thus, nmch of the work of even the organismic psychologists would be rejected. The idea of developmental stages, for example, is rejected. The entire approach of modern structuralism, and its search for underlying universailty in man's existence is anathema to the existent- ialist, who gives meaning only to man's existential reality. And organismic psychology recognizes both deterministic aspects and free aSpects of man's existence. Behaviorism and existential psychology “EA-.. . 1 z. i. .. . g 129 accept diametrically opposed extremes. For organismic psychology there is a middle position that more completely recognizes the complexities of this issue. As might be guessed, existentialists vigorously reject and deny the validity of logical positivism and the empirical methods of investigation of positivistic psychology. Organismic psychology rejects positivism, but accepts science and scientific method as a valid approach to understanding human behavior and existence. Thus it is difficult to classify existential psychology in any of the three rubrics. The only one with which there is any congruence or agreement at all is organismic psychology. But, for the most part, it is really in a class by itself. The major tie to organismic psychology is that many of the theorists who have been influenced by existential psychology or have recently moved in that direction are basically organismic theorists. The overlapping of humanistic psychology and existential psychology is substantial. And humanistic psychology falls more comfortably under the rubric of organismic psychology. Generally speaking, one can be a humanistic psychologist without being an existentialist; but one could not readily be an existential psychologist without being a humanist. Some of the principal organismic psychologists and their theories are listed below: i 1. Kurt Goldstein - Organismic Theory 2. Andras Angyal - Organismic Theory 3. Abraham Maslow - Holistic-Dynamic Theory 4. Prescott Lecky - Theory of Self-Consistency 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 130 Gordon Allport - Theory of the Individual Heinz Werner - Organismic-DevelOpmental Theory Jean Piaget - Genetic Epistemological Theory of Intellectual Development Lawrence Kohlberg - Cognitive-DevelOpmental Theory of Moral Judgment Carl Rogers - Theory of the Self John Dewey - no specific theory, but overall conceptualization of the human Organism in transaction with the environment, and other features of his psychology and phiIOSOphy are organismic O. J. Harvey, D. E. Hunt, and H. M. Schroder - Conceptual Systems Theory Jerome Bruner - Theory of Cognitive Development Bernard Kaplan - Organismic-Developmental Theory Gardner Murphy - Biosocial Theory of Personality Others who work or have worked from an organismic perspective but are not identified as originators of a specific theory, and whose names appear frequently in the literature, and many of whom are or have been associated with the people listed above include Elliot Turiel, Jonas Langer, Barbel Inhelder, David Elkind, Seymour Wapner, .John Flavell, James Mark Baldwin, Alfred L. Baldwin, Hans Furth, J. AkVicker Hunt, and Edmund Sullivan and his colleagues at the (hrtario Institute for Studies in Education, Toronto, Ontario. 131 Now that the parameters of the rubric organismic psychology have been delineated and some of the theorists and theories have been identified, some of the principles and tenets of this view follow. First, as previOusly mentioned, this is a holistic approach to man. Man is seen as an integrated functional whole, not as a series of differentiated parts or as an accumulation of stimulus- response bonds. Mind and body, and organism and environment are not seen as distinctly different entities that function independently or in opposition to each other. Rahter they are seen as different aSpects of one coordinated process in a transactional relationship. The human organism naturally exists in a state of organization, thus organismic theory stresses the unity, integration, coherence, and consistency Of the person. Man is intrinsically active and motivated and does not need to be primarily motivated by the environment. Man is seen, then, as active and autotelic; not as passive and heterotelic. Since the relationship between organism and environment is transactional, they influence and shape each other. The organism perceives and interprets the external world in his own terms, and constructs his knowledge of the world on his own terms. Conversely, he is also influenced by the external world, and adapts and changes to accommodate it. Organism and environment influence, mold, and shape each other. And even when the influence from the environment predominates, the receiving organism does not receive the environment as it is. Knowledge is not a copy of reality. Knowledge is a construction. In the same sense, values are not objective realities that 132 exist in the environment to be transmitted to the organism. The human organism is an inherently valuing creature that is continuously. evaluating the environment, itself, and the situational circumstances. The relationship with the environment is a selective-rejective one in which certain features, aspects, and actions are interpreted as valuable and necessary and are accepted, while others are interpreted as negative and are rejected. This continuous process is part of the organism's adaptation process, and leads to growth and development. DevelOpment is a transactional process that involves (1) the determining and limiting factors of genetic and maturational aspects of the organism's biological base, (2) the nature, quantity, and quality of the organism's direct experience with the environment, (3) the nature and orientation of the socialization process, including parental influences, educative influences, language, mores, sanctions, etc., and (4) the internal, self-regulating, self- generative process that modulates, mediates, and cybernetically regulates both the organism and its interpretation of the environment. This last factor is somewhat peculiar to the organismic view, viz., the positing of an equilibration process. The behavioristic view rejects any such idea completely. The psychoanalytic tradition, in its own way, does hold for such a process, especially the ego psychologists. But many organismic theorists specifically postulate the existence of an equilibration process, especially Piaget, Werner, Kohlberg, and their assoicates. One would not have to hold for an equilibration process, however, in order to be an organismic psychologist. 133 Organismic psychologists tend to give more recognition to both the existence of and the role of higher thought processes, or cognitive ability, in the life of the human being than do other views. Behaviorism treats higher thought processes as more complex types of S-R bonds and chains; psychoanalysis sees man as more affective and irrational and gives little attention to higher thought processes. Supporters of organismic psychology give ration- ality, thought, and reason a prominent place in the spectrum of human behavior. On the very important issue of determinism organismic psychologists differ sharply with both the behaviorists and the orthodox psychoanalysts on the one hand, and just as sharply with the existentialists on the other hand. The organismic position is probably similar to that of the ego psychologists, and falls some- where between the extremes of the behaviorists and the existentialists. Organismic psych010gists fully recognize the lawfulness of the world and behavior, but reject the idea that all events are determined completely by the impersonal forces of antecedent events. There is more selectivity in the sense that certain physical, social, and internal conditions may decidedly determine or restrict the range of choice available to anyone in any given situation. Retarded children, brain-damaged peOple, drug or alcohol addicts, those suffer- ing from any form of mental pathology, prisoners, slaves, those who are prisoners of any kind of ghetto or economic deprivation, and many others--these peOple live lives marked by restriction and characterized by limited or no choice in most or all areas of human 134 existence. But to decide the issue of determinism by looking only at this side of life is to miss the fact that with good health, a higher quality of education, and maximization of development one's options begin to both increase and become more obvious. To say that there is only one choice available at all times, and that this is not really a choice since the outcome is ”already in the cards,” so to speak, misses the fact that there are times when peOple have genuine alternatives available that make for different outcomes. On the other hand, to say that antecedent conditions have no effect whatsoever, that the present is in no way related to the past, and that any given moment is existential in its own right, is to ascribe a complete lawlessness to the universe that would be as paralyzing and hopeless as complete determinism. If through either of these conditions, complete determinism or complete indeterminism, man has no choice about anything then life becomes completely mechanistic or completely chaotic. The organismic psychologist holds for some- thing in between these extremes and allows for meaningful choice in. certain areas of life. In summary, organismic psychology views man as active, autotelic, and involved in his own growth and development. He is seen as organismic rather than as behavioristic. He is seen as humanistic rather than as mechanistic. And he is seen as holistic rather than as particularistic. He has consciousness, inner mental behavior, and is not sharply divided from his environment. Values, knowledge, and structure do not come only from the external world in a process of transmission, conditioning, or introjection. The 13S raw data of the world is received by the senses of the organism and is processed by the internal structure of the human mind and the organismic valuing process that is basic to biological existence and functioning, and is thus transformed in terms of the individual's being. Thus in transaction with the world the organism constructs knowledge and values. The process being a transactional one results in a great deal of congruence among individual views, but also allows for a reasonable degree of individuality. The congruence is also based on the fact that there seems to be a great deal of universality in the function and structure of the biopsychological organisms that make up the human species. Within the context and confines of a partially limiting and determining world the human organism has the capacity or potential for some degree of significant self-determination. B. Critique of the Views of Man The purpose of this chapter has been to provide the infor- mation necessary to attempt some resolution of the underlying issues of values development with the idea of building toward a theory for values deve10pment education. It has been claimed that each of us, whether he knows it or not, has an image of man underlying his actions in the world. It has been further claimed that the nature of this image will influence the way we teach and what we teach, and that any claim to prefessionalism demands that we examine our beliefs and make explicit our bias. In so doing it is hoped that a great deal of reflection on the issues will take place, and that out of 136 this process will emerge a more consistent, integrated, and effective teacher. And although it is also claimed that this holds true for any teacher teaching anything, that the burden of psychophilosophical reflection is particularly heaviest in the area of values/moral education. Which is another way of saying that it does, in reality therefore, pertain to all teachers, for all teachers are truly engaged in values/moral education, a claim which will be examined more closely in Chapter VI. The views that have just been presented in summary form represent the dominant and influential psychophiIOSOphical views that prevail in the behavioral sciences today--including education as an applied behavioral science. Two questions are important with respect ot these views vis-a-vis values/moral education: 1. What are the implications of these views for values/ moral education? 2. Which of these views or what combination of them is the most useful as a foundation for a theory for values development education? Before developing critiques of these views, it is necessary to point out that these three (or four, if existential psychology is looked at separately) are not considered exclusive, exhaustive, or Ldtimate. The claim here is only that they are the most influential Prevailing views in our culture, especially in terms of their influence in psychology and education. Second, any view of man created by man is of necessity incOmplete, inadequate, tentative, and inherently biased. We live 137 With a myth sometimes--a myth that is especially prevalent in our highly technologically successful culture--that scientific knowledge is factual, or real in some sense that other forms of knowledge are not. In view of the fact that the application of the scientific method is intended to produce information that is more reliable than either intuition or prejudice, it is understandable that the findings of science are often hypostatized as truth. But it is important to keep in mind, especially with regard to these psychophilOSOphical views of man, that all scientific research, be it in the so-called natural sciences or in the behavioral sciences, is a product of the minds of men. This imposes all the restrictions and qualifications of the human senses, human intellect, and human emotions--or, in short, it makes of all science, to some degree or another, human valuations. Dewey claimed that we really do not make statements of truth; we make warranted assertions. Some comments of Poincaré's are relevant on this point. In the Author's Preface of Science and Hypothesis he says: To the superficial observer scientific truth is unassailable, the logic of science is infallible; and if scientific men sometimes make mistakes, it is because they have not understood the rules of the game... But upon more mature reflection the position held by hypothesis was seen; it was recognized that it is as necessary to the experimenter as it is to the mathematician. And then the doubt arose if all these constructions are built on solid foundations. The conclusion was drawn that a breath would bring them to the ground. This sceptical attitude does not escape the charge of super— ficiality. To doubt everything or to believe everything are two equally convenient solutions; both dispense with the necessity of reflection. (Italics added) 138 And it is precisely this reflection that needs to engage the attention and commitment of educators in all arenas of education, but especially in the values/moral arena. But frequently instead we find the tentative claims of even partial findings assiduously applied in the classroom without either reflection on their warranted assertibility or consideration for future consequences. Nothing is more tentative than these views or models of man. As Abraham J. Heschel (quoted by Severin, 1973, p. 99) says of this very issue: "There is no issue about which so many contradictory statements have been made, no issue so important, no issue so obscure. Psychology, biology, sociology have sought to explore the nature of man. And yet man remains an enigma." But as tentative as they are they provide some direction, some guide— posts, and some clues. And they provide overall orientations that are either congenial or not congenial for certain educational purposes. Behavioral objectives, so popular at the moment, for example, are highly unlikely to ever emerge from the camp of the existential psychologists. Sensitivity groups, on the other hand, sue equally unlikely to emerge from radical behaviorism. And itis implications such as these, and many more important ones, fluu:need to be explored in connection with the building of theory fcJI'V'alues/moral education. The spirit expressed above guides the critique that follows. In view of some of the problems raised earlier about the views presented it seems more appropriate to think of fOUr rather than three, viz., behaviorism, psychoanalysis, existential psychology, and organismic PSyChOZOQy' 139 l. Critique of Behaviorism One useful way to begin a critique of this model of man is to examine it in its most extreme form, viz., radical behavior- ism. Skinner will loom large in this section, for Skinner is the contemporary apotheosis of radical behaviorism and the source of inspiration, leadership, and both theoretical and empirical support for the large body of Skinnerian behaviorists. These are few phiIOSOphical or psychological positions extant as extreme in its claims as this one. And it is safe to say without rancor or exaggeration, that there simply is no view of man available that is less hospitable to any holistic, humanistic, or organismic theory or approach of values or moral education! Skinner's blunt statements on this issue are unequivocal--in eliminating all mentalistic concepts, all internal psychological variables, and all ideas related to what he calls ”autonomous man," Skinner reduces all values/moral issues to questions of environmental control, contingencies of reinforcement, and positive and negative reinforcers. Skinner's complete statement on these matters is available in two sources: Science and Human Behavior (1953) and Beyond Freedom and Dignity (1971). Skinner even rejects all other behavioristic positions generally identified as S—R theories. His argument (1971, p. 15) is that even these require some kind of "inner man" to explain how the stimulus becomes converted to the response. It is here that he proclaims his most basic dictum: "Behavior is shaped and maintained by its consequences. Once this fact is recognized, we 140 can formulate the interaction between organism and environment in a much more comprehensive way" (p. 16). This is the operant conditioning model that is based on the principle that behavior Operates on the environment to produce consequences (operant behavior). This leads to Skinner's primary principles for all forms of education: 1. 2. The environment can be arranged in order to be studied to see which specific consequences are contingent upon which behaviors. The environment can be manipulated. Three major obstacles to implementation of Skinner's science of behavior exist. Skinner identifies them as: 1. 2. The traditional belief that man is free. The traditional belief that man has dignity (or worth). The fears and concerns related to the issue of control. That is, in the utilization of the science of behavior to create the ideal culture who is to construct and maintain the controlling environment? An analysis of Skinner's ideas reveals that his particular 15s of the terms freedom and dignity specifically refer to the positive and negative aspects of responsibility. His argument is that since the environment is the completely controlling factor in man's life, and all internal mental states are only myths, then it is preposterous to hold man responsible for anything. Since his behavior is caused there is no basis in fact for punishing or rewarding man for his actions or achievements. Skinner says (p. 18): 141 "Personal exemption from a complete determinism is revoked as a scientific analysis progresses, particularly in accounting for the behavior of the individual." It is ridiculous, he argues, to ascribe either blame or credit to man for anything. "A scientific analysis shifts the credit as well as the blame to the environment, and traditional practices can then no longer be justified" (p. 19). Thus the first two of the three obstacles listed above are shown by Skinner to be prescientific foundations for what he sees as the idiotic and crippling belief in the idea of "autonomous man." Until this notion is dispensed with once and for all we cannot apply the principles of his scientific approach to human behavior. The third question above Skinner sees as a "values" question. The question of control is the one he is least explicit or clear about. He says that the environment selects, much in the same way that natural selection operates in evolution, but in a much different time frame. His main argument seems to be that the natural selection of the controlling environment has some kind of inherent balance and control system that maintains equilibrium. This is a matter of values, in the ideas of traditional autonomous nmn, but it is a matter of arranging the contingencies of reinforce— ment for scientific man. Skinner defines values as positive and negative reinforcers. A few of Skinner's statements may help Clarify his position: Good things are positive reinforcers...The things we call had also have no common property. They are all negative reinforcers, and we are 142 reinforced when we escape from or avoid them. (1971, p. 98) When we say that a value judgment is a matter not of fact but of how someone feels about a fact, we are simply distinguishing between a thing and its reinforcing effect. Things them- selves are studied by physics and biology, usually without reference to their value, but the reinforcing effects of things are the province of behavioral science, which, to the extent that it is concerned with operant reinforcement, is a science of values. (1971, pp. 98-99) To make a value judgment by calling some- thing good or bad is to classify it in terms of its reinforcing effects. (1971, p. 99) ..."You ought to love your neighbor” may be converted into the two statements: (1) "The approval of your fellow men is positively reinforcing to you." and (2) "loving your fellow men is approved by the group of which you are a member," both of which may be demon- strated scientifically. (1953, p. 42 ) ..and we should not attribute behaving for the good of others to a love of others. In working for the good of others a person may feel love or fear, loyalty or obligation, or any other condition arising from the contingencies responsible for the behavior. A person does not act for the good of others because of a feeling of belongingness or refuse to act because of feelings of alienation. His behavior depends upon the control exerted by the social environ- ment. (1971, p. 105) ...The "norm" is simply a statement of the contingencies. (1971, p. 110) Skinner's system reduces everything related to values to reinforcers and contingencies in the environment. Morality is a matter of environmental control and conditioning. A peculiar thing occurs in this system, however-~the environment acquires the Characteristics the author removed from the organism. What is this enVironment of which Skinner speaks and to which he ascribes all 143 responsibility and value and control? In a strange way it seems as though Skinner has transferred the mentalistic entities, the mythical responsibility and values, the traits and characteristics he has rejected as prescientific nonsense from the person to the environment. If man is not responsible because he is not free, then how can the environment be held responsible unless it is free? But Skinner says all is determined. And yet he holds the environment blameworthy and praiseworthy. Skinner says the environment selects. He says this process is similar to the natural selection of the evolutionary process. But this raises interesting questions. Is this lawful or capricious? If the former it is completely determined. If the latter it is unscientific and meaningless. And if it is scientifically lawful, then it must be completely determined, in which case how can it be controlled? How can a deterministic system not permit autonomous man but permit autonomous environment? This leads to the idea that given a completely determined organism and environment the idea of a technology of behavior based on controlling, manipulating, mulshaping becomes as utterly absurd and prescientific as Skinner says is autonomous man. The environment selects, Skinner says. Selection implies relection, and both imply criteria. Criteria are values, which Skinner says are nothing but reinforcers. But what is the criteria base for these reinforcers? And, again, if they are part of the 1anUI deterministic system how can they be controlled and manipulated? Now all of this raises one of the most interesting questions 144 of all--who and what is the controller? Is he part of the environ! ment? Or is he a third party to the entire interaction between organism and environment? 15 he exempt from the controlling influence of the environment? Skinner'e entire argument results in a fully determined controller operating in a fully determined environment to establish fu11y determined contingencies of reinforcement to control a fully determined organism in order to shape his fully determined behavior. Skinner's scientific system becomes, then, the scientific counterpart of the prescientific autonomous man he rejects. Because in order for his system to work at least one part of it must be free of the lawful control. Otherwise we have an infinite regression of determinism and control, in which the controller (Skinner, for example) is deluding himself into believing he is controlling some- thing which cannot be controlled. In short, we have autonomous man! Unfbrtunately, Skinner has not only made some serious errors in his logic, he has also made some serious errors in perception. He has looked at what he frequently refers to as "the literature of freedom and dignity" through the rather limited vision of his own prejudices and has seen only the defects, failures, and problems of values/moral ideas and freedom, responsibility, and dignity. He has apparently not read or has distorted the readings in the literature 0f freedom and dignity that show more equilibrated forms of legic than What he condemns. Skinner's arguments about punishment, constraint, and freedom are interesting and bear a great deal of truth. He says, for example, that except for when man is under conditions of restraint he is least free when he is threatened with punishment. Consequently, 145 he says, the literature of freedom and dignity should reflect an opposition to punitive techniques of punishment, but in fact the holders of the autonomous man view have upheld and perpetuated such techniques. Of course, he fails to understand that much of the literature he identifies as the literature of freedom and dignity was in reality written by people who never understood the concepts. Very much of the literature has been written by peOple whose own level of development negates any true understanding of freedom, dignity, responsibility, justice, or morality. If Skinner would read the writings of Dewey, Rawls, Piaget, Perry, and many more he would see an entirely different picture, and a great deal of congruence with his own ideas about punishment, aversive techniques, and selfish domination of others. Having studied the literature that celebrates expiatory and restitutive forms of retributive justice, apparently Skinner has not found or has ignored or has not understood the literature of principled morality and distributive justice. Skinner has literally thrown out the baby with the bath water. The last section of Beyond Freedom and Dignity makes Skinner's position even more confusing. On page 179 he says: Whatever we do, and hence however we perceive it, the fact remains that it is the environment which acts upon the perceiving person, not the perceiving person who acts upon the environment. This is an interesting position. Throughout his writings he relegates the organism to the status of a passive, empty reactor, and elevates the environment to the status of an organic, dynamic actor. But for any given organism a large part of his environment 146 is made up of other people manipulating the contingencies of reinforcement that influence his behavior. Thus we are left with a problem regarding the organism. With respect to himself he is passive and reactive, but with respect to others he is dynamic and active. How can this be? But the concluding section of the book is the most puzzling. Skinner almost resorts to metaphysical arguments in order to give man a meaning not consistent with his other views. He attempts to restore some kind of dignity and freedom to man. But his arguments are hollow. Somehow the environment, which up to this point has been dynamic, active, and omnipotent, becomes both the product and tool of man. Some examples follow: It is only autonomous man who has reached a dead end. Man himself may be controlled by his environment, but it is an environment which is almost wholly of his own making...The evolution of a culture is in fact a kind of gigantic exercise in self-control. As the individual controls himself by manipulating the world in which he lives, so the human species has constructed an environment in which its members behave in a highly effective way. Mistakes have been made, and we have no assurance that the environment man has constructed will continue to provide gains which outstrip the losses, but man as we know him, for better or for worse, is what man has made of man. (pp. 196-197) When a person changes his physical or social environment "intentionally"--that is, in order to change human behavior, possibly including his own-- he plays two roles: one as a controller, as the designer of a controlling culture, and another as the controlled, as the product of a culture. There is nothing inconsistent about this, it follows from the nature of the evolution of a culture, with or without intentional design. (p. 197) 147 Man has "controlled his own destiny," if that expression means anything at all. The man that man has made is the product of the culture man has devised. (p. 198) But, on page 201 Skinner returns to his familiar theme: Science has probably never demanded a more sweeping change in a traditional way of thinking about a subject, nor has there ever been a more important subject. In the traditional picture a person perceives the world around him, selects features to be perceived, discriminates among them, judges them good or bad, changes them to make them better (or, if he is careless, worse), and may be held responsible for his action and justly rewarded or punished for its consequences. In the scientific picture a person is a member of a species shaped by evolutionary contingencies of survival, displaying behavioral processes which bring him under the control of the environment in which he lives, and largely under the control of a social environment which he and millions of .others like him have constructed and maintained during the evolution of a culture. The direction of the controlling relation is reversed: a person does not act upon the world, the world acts upon him. (Italics added) If these statements are put in the context of the entire book it is difficult to understand them. Skinner's major argument and life work is based on the unequivocal rejection of every thing represented by the term autonomous man. All internal states, feelings, values, beliefs, attitudes, consciousness, and intentionality--all are declared meaningless and absurd. The environment is made supreme and controlling. And above all else, our entire existence is determined. Pb argues that man must recognize the crisis that autonomous man has generated and use the enormous amount of scientific data already available to build and implement a science and technology of behavior, or we are probably doomed. And yet in the statements quoted above 148 Skinner maintains that man has "constructed an environment in which its members behave in a highly effective way." And the final enigmatic statement is in the two sentences with which he concludes the book: A scientific view of man offers exciting possibilities. We have not yet seen what man can make of man. Few peOple have exerted as much influence on our schools in recent years as Skinner! And few of the teachers and principals who have jumped on the bandwagon of behavior modification have examined the rationale that created and sustains it. Behavior modification is a process whereby a controller decides what is and what isn't desirable and undesirable behavior on the part of the students. The controller then proceeds to use all of the principles of operant reinforcement theory to scientifically shape the behavior of the student in order to extinguish the undesirable behavior and elicit the desirable behavior. In many instances the behavior being shaped is learning behavior involving content, knowledge, and skills. In many other cases the behavior being shaped is what is generally called deportment, and involves transforming the child more to the liking, whims, and needs of the controller (the teacher). How easily and completely fooled educators can be about the meaning and significance of the techniques of radical behaviorism is epitomized by the teacher who said in one of this writer's classes: "But I'm shaping my kids to be independent!" It is not difficult to realize that the implementation of Skinner's system is a form of indoctrination, by whatever words used to define that term. Important questions must be raised about 149 the issues Skinner discusses. Possibly the single most important question is: Is there such a thing as moral responsibility? Skinner would have to answer with a resounding ”No!”. Skinner is correct in claiming that eliminating freedom, dignity, and reSpon- sibility does eliminate values/moral issues from the scene. It is clear that Skinner's radical behaviorism can be used only as a source of control, conditioning, and shaping. This is nothing here to support a theory of values development education. A values/moral system based on complete environmentalistic control can only mean, from the standpoint of the student in our schools, a values/moral system based on predetermined values, which seems to be quite inconsistent with a pluralistic democratic society. In fact, a values/moral education program based on Operant reinforcement theory and utilizing all the techniques of behavior modification would be quite similar to the two nomothetic approaches identified in Chapter II, viz., the traditional-authoritarian approach and the cultural-relativistic approach. There is one major difference, however. A nomothetic approach based on operant reinforcement would be even more undemocratic for the simple reason that it is a very insidious technique. At least the content of the other nomothetic approaches was clear and the intentions were explicit. The message was to accept the standard value system, or else. Behavior modification techniques, however, are not explicit from the victim's point of view. One can be modified, shaped, and controlled without ever knowing or understanding it. Educators must look more closely at this procedure and its underlying implications. 150 In turning now to methodological behaviorism, or the milder form, many of the same points apply. The basic issues are really the same, and the differences are mostly only of degree or are technical. All knowledge, values, and structure are in the environment and are transmitted to the child in the process of socialization. The primary source of values/moral development is conditioning, imitation, and modeling. The primary motivation factors are fear and anxiety. Many of the social learning theorists have adopted behavior modification as one of the main forms of social control and values education. One difference between the two behavioristic camps relates to the issue of internalization. Skinnerians, of course, do not use such a term. But the social learning theorists believe that values are transmitted from the culture to the child and are gradually internalized by the child. The link with classical psychoanalysis is clear on this point. Learning the rules, values, moral standards, and norms of the society is no different from learning other aspects. As Turiel (in Mussen, Langer, and Covington, 1969, p. 93) points out: When the child behaves in a socially undesirable way he receives punishment. The association of punishment with particular situations and behaviors results in conditioned anxiety, causing the avoidance of certain behaviors. Individual differences in moral behavior are explained in terms of constitutional differences in conditionability. In further describing the process of moral development from the standpoint of learning theory (Turiel is, however, an organismic psychologist) he states: 151 Other subscribers to an internalization theory have posited more complex acquisition mechanisms than instrumental conditioning. For instance, Sears (1957) and Whiting (1960) have accepted the notion of a more global internal- ization of social rules, and Bandura and Walters (1963) have assumed that moral behavior is a result of reinforcement and modeling. However, these learning theorists agree with Eysenck (1960) in defining morality as conformity to cultural norms. Consequently, they all view moral development as increasing conformity to cultural standards, based on the assumption that the child directly internalizes the standards of his society... Basing their experiments on the inter- nalization theory, researchers have investigated the factors that lead the child to directly internalize his culture. The study of develop— ment is the study of increasing strength and accuracy of the internalization, so moral responses are measured for their strength and for how closely they approximate society's norms. (ibid, p. 93) For all behaviorists in general, then, the development of values/moral behavior is a matter of transmission from the external world to the child. In Skinner's system it is strictly a matter of behavior shaping and control. For the other behaviorists it is a matter of socialization for internalization by the child of the culture's moral standards. (This concept of internalization must not be confused with other uses of that term.) There is nothing active on the part of the child involved in the behavioristic view. The organism is still a passive receiver of the environmental values. Before leaving behaviorism two remaining issues need to be considered, viz., (l) the adequacy of this view of man, and (2) the relationship of behaviorism to democracy. 152 Regarding the adequacy of behaviorism as a view of man, and as an approach to the scientific study of man, there are numerous problems. At the outset there is the serious problem related to the fact that in order to consider or express the basic doctrines of behaviorism one must use all of the things denied existence by the behaviorists--primarily one must use the mind which presumably does not exist. Kaufman (in Edwards, 1967, Vol. 1, p. 270) cites A. O. Lovejoy's criticism from his "Paradox of the Thinking Behaviorist." Lovejoy, according to Kaufman, "sought to prove that 'behaviorism...belongs to that class of theories which become absurd as soon as they become articulate'." Kaufman summarizes Lovejoy's argument as follows: ...Lovejoy tried to show that the behaviorist does make cognitive claims; for example, he may claim to be aware of objects external to himself. But the moment the behaviorist makes such claims he involves himself in contradiction from which he can extricate himself only by denying that he knows anything-~which is an absurd alternative from the behaviorist's own point of View. Hence, the behaviorist must either contradict himself or lapse into absurdity. How can the behavioristic position be conceived or explained if their view of the human organism is correct. How, for example, could Skinner derive his entire system solely from the external contingencies of reinforcement? In a chapter entitled "Minds: What and Where in the World are They," Henry Veatch (in Scher, 1962, p. 322) in discussing the behaviorist's rejection of the phenomenon of intentionality makes the following point: From this standpoint the mere fact that the phenomenon of intentionality cannot properly be 153 integrated into the scientific universe does not as such constitute a sufficient reason for behaviorism. Nor is it entirely a matter of the mere arbitrary choice of standpoint either. For we would wonder whether the behaviorist himself, in the very act of understanding human behavior in the way he does, must not consider that such is the way in which human behavior presents itself to him. He will surely insist that he sees and understands it in this light. But this is tantamount to acknowledging that he thus intends the facts and data before him, and that they are thus intentionally present to him. In other words, considered simply as a human being who has ideas and theories about things, the behaviorist himself, in his very enterprise of confirming and developing his theory of behaviorism, will actually be viewing and understanding the facts and data of behavior in a way which that very theory of his would rule out as being either imprOper or impossible. It's simply a case of a man's left hand as a scientist not knowing what his right hand as a human being is doing. In another chapter in the same book, one entitled "Mind and Mechanical Models," Errol Harris (p. 467) maintains that the behaviorist's denial of consciousness can only be applicable to other people, and never to oneself. He points out that even the methodological argument is inadequate, and that science itself cannot exist without consideration of personal states of awareness. He says: ...If nothing private is to be accepted as scientific evidence, then no report of any observation made by others is admissible as it is the report of a private experience of perception and each scientist will be caught inescapably within the circle of his own observations which will be incommunicable... and perceptual experiences are no different from feelings in this respect. In such a predicament public fact ceases to have any meaning and science becomes impossible. 154 The chief claim of the behaviorists, from Watson to Skinner, has been the necessity of a science of behavior based on the model of the natural sciences. It is this claim that they use to bolster their argument that only observable behavior can be admitted as evidence, and that it is unnecessary and erroneous to postulate mythical concepts. Ironically, however, the entire structure of natural science, especially nuclear physics, rests on the inferred existence of certain kinds of particles, bodies, and energy that absolutely no one has ever seen. And even more ironical is the fact that Albert Einstein worked almost exclusively with his mind. Most of his formulations were mathematical and purely theoretical manipulations of mental concepts worked out in the private world of his own mind, which the behaviorists presume is nonexistent, irrelevant, or inadmissable as evidence. If the behaviorist will grant the physicist the right to infer unobservable events and bodies why is it not equally plausable and scientific to do so with the human mind? Piaget (in Mussen, 1970, p. 731) quotes a mathematician- philosopher friend of his as having said: "Empirical study of experience refutes empiricism!” Perhaps the behaviorist's reaction to the purely speculative kinds of introspection carried on in the late 19th century version of psychology is simply a great over- reaction. To discard the mind, consciousness, intentionality, and other significant aspects of human existence as meaningless, ‘ridiculous, or nonexistent is to deny the possibility of ever truly lnnderstanding the human organism, which after all, is the source 155 and actor of the behavior the behaviorist wants to study and understand. If there is one subject on which the behaviorists have revealed the inadequacy of their conceptualizations and theories it is in the area of language development. Chomsky and a host of others have demonstrated that the mechanisms of behaviorism are simply incapable of explaining the deve10pment of language in the child. Cazden (1972) thoroughly analyzes the processes involved in this complex deve10pment and learning achievement. One example of speech develop- ment that simply contradicts the behaviorist's explanation of human language is the discontinuity of infant babbling from later speech. As Cazden says (p. 59): We also used to think that learning to produce speech sounds developed by a process of gradual shaping from the randomly produced sounds of infant babbling. It now seems more likely that a discontinuity exists between prelinguistic babbling and true Speech behavior. Frequently, in a child's development there is a period of silence between babbling and speech. Furthermore, ...the sequence of emergence of sounds is incompatible in the two developmental phases. This and many other factors identified by Cazden render the behavior- istic argument at best inadequate, and frequently erroneous. Probably the most commonly cited argument against the behavioristic explana- tion for language in terms of reinforcement, S-R chaining, and Shaping is the fact that children are able to utter sentences they have never spoken before, have never heard spoken by anyone else, and for which they have never been reinforced or shaped. For an excellent trxeatment of this subject, including some of the points made here, see hfiller and McNeill (Ch. 26 in Lindzey and Aronson, 1968, Vol. III). 156 It is important to understand that we are not rejecting all there is in existence about behaviorism. The behaviorists have contributed significantly to the corpus of knowledge about the human organism and human existence. Conditioning is a fact of life, and organismic psychologists do not deny it. It plays a very important role in learning and in development. The major error of the behavior- ists is to take this one fact of human existence and project it into the whole model of man. Reinforcement (reward) is important in growth and deve10pment, and frequently can be essential to or influential in learning. But there is no justification for claiming that all learning, and all performance, and all existence is based on this one aspect of human nature. As Allport (1968, p. 77) comments: The trouble with our current theories of learning is not so much that they are wrong, but they are partial. They fit best the learning of animals and young children. The concepts of conditioning, reinforcement, identification, seem a bit hollow when the counselor tries to apply them to his work. To the term counselor, add educator, parent, and all socialization agents. The primary argument in rejecting behaviorism as a foundation for values/moral development and education is that it is based on an incomplete, partially erroneous, and potentially dangerous conceptualization of man. And it is the potentially dangerous aspects that need to be considered in the conclusion of this section. It will be remembered that earlier it was stated that.we need to consider the relationship of behaviorism to 157 democracy. In the final analysis it is this aspect of this View of man that is of the greatest significance for values education. The basic tenets of behaviorism can only lead to a nomothetic indoctrination form of values/moral education. The environmental- ism, determinism, mechanism, and empty passive organism planks in the behaviorist's platform are incapable of supporting any other form of education. Consequently, there is strong support for the belief that behaviorism and democracy are incompatible. This is a very strong claim, and needs to be supported. Carl Rogers (1969, p. 259) expresses a similar point of view in the opening paragraph of a chapter he entitles "Freedom and Commitment." He says: One of the deepest issues in modern life, in modern man, is the question as to whether the concept of personal freedom has any meaning whatsoever in our present day scientific world. The growing ability of the behavioral scientist to predict and to control behavior has brought the issue sharply to the fore. If we accept the logical positivism and strictly behavior— istic emphases which are predominant in the American psychological scene, there is not even room for discussion. The title of this chapter is then completely without meaning. If Rogers is correct, then as people, as educators, and as citizens we must become more aware of what is going on around us as thousands of unwitting people jump on the bandwagon of behaviorism as it makes its way through our schoOls. In an excellent analysis of our society and our schools Willis W. Harman raises some of the issues raised here. In the opening chapter of Purpel and Belanger's Curriculum and £5? Cultural Revolution (1972) Harmin postulates that we are in the. Inidst of a conceptual revolution that is going to determine the course 158 of our future for a long time to come. Two of the possible alternatives he envisions are (l) a person-centered society, or (2) a second-phase industrial state. He identifies four "meta-issues" or "issues behind the issues" that are involved in this conceptual revolution. The four, among many, that he chooses to cite as the most important are: l. A crisis in human image. 2. A crisis in authority. 3. A crisis in economic values. 4. A crisis in pluralism. He opens his discussion on the crisis in human image with the follow- ing statement: We have already noted, in discussing the possible conceptual revolution, that a conflict exists between the basic premises of a democracy-~that man is, by virtue of his trans— cendental nature, endowed with reason, will, and a valid sense of value--and the reduction- istic, deterministic, and physicalistic premises of the behavioral science, sociopolitical theory that our universities impart to their annual crop of budding sociologists and political scientists. The young social scientist receives a background in a sociology which has shifted from its earlier emphasis on the semiphilosophical humanities approach to an emphasis on techniques and empirical studies, with the implication that man is a creature of his drives, habits, and social roles, and in whose behavior reason and choice play no decisive part. In the courses he is offered in psychology this point of view is likely to be made even more eXplicit, with consciousness considered to be an inconsequential accompaniment to behavior governed by external stimuli and instinctive iurges... 0n the other hand, the concept of a transcendental, choosing, ultimately responsible 159 self’is essential to the entire theory of democratic government. (PP. 47-48) (Italics added) A little later Harmin cautions: "Currently in our society a potent emerging force pushes for a change in that image, in the direction of transcendent man; but thus far the power is on the side of the reductionists" (p. 49). He also points out that the crisis in authority involves "...the balance between authority based upon power and authority based upon voluntarily given respect” (p. 49). Now the two crises of human image and authority bear directly on the claim that behaviorism and democracy are incompatible. One of the basic propositions of this dissertation, especially this chapter, is that one's image of man will directly and indirectly manifest itself in one's teaching. The question becomes, then, is it possible for a view of man, and its accompanying technology, based on the premises of behaviorism to be able to create a democratic atmosphere? One of the leading philosophers of this century, Ralph Barton Perry, wrestled with this issue within the larger context of the meaning of freedom. In "What Does It Mean to be Free" (Perry, 1953) he defines freedom as effective choice. The he says: "Whatever prevents or reduces effective choice negates freedom. The enemies of freedom are more numerous than is commonly believed, and arise from causes that are often ignored, or are supposed to have nothing to do with freedom.” Among the enemies of freedom he includes biological, economic, and govern— mental forces that reduce or negate freedom. And then he makes the following statement which bears directly on my claim: 160 The remaining enemies of’freedom have to do with freedom of'the mind. If freedom consists in doing what one chooses the faculties of choice must exist and must be developed. Here the enemies of freedom are those lower forms of mentality in which a man most closely resembles a brute: reflex action, instinct, habit, fear, and combativeness. Whatever decerebtates man and deprives him of the higher control of ideas enslaves him. (p. 129) (Italics added) Perry has hit the nerve center of the behaviorism-democracy issue. It is precisely because the techniques of behaviorism's technology of human behavior rob man of conscious, rational choice that the claim is here made that behaviorism is opposed to freedom and undermines democratic living. If a child is being controlled by the insidious manipulation of his behavior through the careful arrangement of his contingencies of reinforcement then he is being manipulated to behave in a way designed by the controller and for the controller's benefits. And no matter how this is sugar-coated by the claims of the controller that he is doing this in the best interests of the child, the fact remains that it is completely external and hidden control. Also, to build an entire system based on the lower forms of human existence, on the child's reSponsiveness to reward and unconscious association, is to ignore, avoid, and negate his potential for higher forms of thought. And it is this potential on which depend the success of a democratic system. Perry clearly identifies this form of education and points out the basic issues. He says: But education of the sort which may be called "controlled indoctrination” is an enemy of freedom. The power of church, state, school, or public opinion, or of a monopoly of 161 the instruments of communication, may be so used as to impoverish and imprison the mind. One idea insinuated into the mind may take possession of it and exercise a hypnotic spell. Two or more ideas are better, but if these are methodically selected to suit the purpose of an authority, they still deny freedom. Whoever determines what alternative shall be made known to a man controls what that man shall choose from. He is deprived of freedom in prOportion as he is denied access to any ideas, or is confined to any range of ideas short of the totality of relevant possibilities. (p. 130) (Italics added) No better exemplar of "controlled indoctrination” is available than the techniques of applied behavioral analysis, the formal and technical name for the behavioral methods of control stemming from Skinner's operant reinforcement theory. In educational circles it is more commonly called behavior modification, and it works, we are told. But efficacy is not sufficient to justify the use of such a method. The essence of democracy is participation, involvement, and effective choice (freedom) along with responsible moral behavior. The essence of behaviorism is determinism, passivity, compliance, and control. And the most important human characteristics and capacities that are the foundation for freedom and democracy are the very things the behaviorists, in the name of science, have eliminated from the repertoire of permissable subjects for study, or have eliminated even as having no existence. It is the human mind that makes choices! Skinner may believe it is the environment-- he calls it selection. But the only part of the environment that makes choices is the human part-~and that means more human minds. Thus for the existence or survival of democracy there must be 162 human minds and human choices, and they must be involved. As Perry says: Control ceases to be external and merely coercive when men choose their controls, and submit to them voluntarily because they see and accept their reason...Here lies the moral ground of social institutions, and it is this which gives a moral and rational meaning to political democarcy. (p. 132) In the system proposed by the behaviorists there are two reasons why democracy and its foundations cannot exist: 1. Control is vested in the manipulating controller; and 2. The system is completely deterministic in nature, anyway, which negates the first reason. In fact, the entire argument could rest on the second issue above. The inherent incompatibility of behaviorism and democracy could be based on the determinism issue by itself. Obviously in a completely determined world there is no effective choice, and there can be no democracy. On this note the argument is concluded. The plea here is for educators to examine more closely the techniques, systems, and tools they use in their schools in order that they may make more effective choices in order that we may build a more effective democracy. Part of that task involves the creation of a theory and methodology for values development education, and it appears that behaviorism is not a suitable foundation for that endeavor. 163 2. Critique of Psychoanalysis It will not be necessary to spend as much time analyzing classical psychoanalysis as it took to examine behaviorism for the following reasons: 1. Some of the underlying issues are the same and have already been covered. 2. Psychoanalysis is not as influential in education as it once was or as behaviorism is. 3. Psychoanalysis seems to be losing much of its influence in general, both in the behavioral sciences and in our culture. 4. The more modern forms of psychoanalysis are moving away from the restricting dictums of Freud, and are becoming more compatible with the organismic view of man. This is especially true of psychoanalytic ego psychology. The two basic issues of classical psychoanalysis that have already been treated under behaviorism are its unbalanced emphasis on the environment as the source of values and its extreme determin- istic view. Whereas the environmentalism of behaviorism made man an empty, passive victim of the environment, psychoanalysis made man a hopelessly conflicted pathetic creature to be tamed by the environment for his own good as well as the good of society. Although the organism is not empty in this view, what it contains is negatively construed with regard to values/moral deveIOpment. 'The instinctual urges and irrational passions are not fertile 164 ground for a positive, healthy, self-directing involvement of the child in his own values development. The result is another unilateral nomothetic approach to values/moral education. Turiel summarizes the psychoanalytic conceptualization of moral deve10pment (in Mussen, Langer, and Covington, 1969, pp. 93-94): Psychoanalysts also have defined morality as conformity to cultural standards and have concept- ualized the problem in internalization terms, view- ing moral deve10pment as the incorporation of a set of rules and values that come from the external world (Freud, 1923). In this case, the child forms an ego—ideal consist- ing of his parents' standards; in turn, the parents are seen as the transmitters of cultural standards. The child is moralized when he manages to make the ego-ideal his own. The acquisition mechanism postulated by psychoanalytic theory is different than that of the learning theorists. The superego, which represents the standards (ego-ideal) and punitive functions (conscience) of the moral process, is acquired through a strong global identification with his parents that resolves the oedipal conflicts (Freud, 1923, 1924). [Note: the process Turiel refers to here is the one described earlier in this book as the anaclitic identification process that results in the introjection of the parents' values as perceived by the child.] Although psychoanalysts do not see the incorporation of rules as being as mechanical as learning theory, they do agree with learning theorists that the process is a direct internal- ization and that morality is mainly a cultural imposition on the individual. Society ensures its survival by imposing restrictions on the individual's destructive impulses (Freud, 1930) and since morality represents a negative imposi- tion on the individual, it must ultimately be viewed as a process regulated by sanction-— guilt (Freud, 1928).' Therefore, man's social or moral behavior is maintained through either external or internal sanction, with concepts such as guilt representing the internaliza- tion of external sanction. 165 In order to see how this doctrine can be translated into a values/ moral education program that reflects its basic nature, consider the following statements by a leading contemporary psychoanalyst, Bruno Bettelheim (in Sizer, et al, 1970, pp. 86-87): Certainly the psychoanalyst agrees with Nietzsche that morality is nourished by fear and that, in the final analysis, the content of morality is self—interest. After all, it is self-interest that makes one wish for eternal salvation, just as it is self-interest that makes one wish to succeed in the rat race. Where these types of self—interest differ is that the first leads to entirely different behavior from the second. But as for morality being based on fear, nowadays we want to remove fear from the life of the child. And as for the content of morality, we often insist that it should not be self-interest. In short, we want the child to obey a morality whose fundamental motives we do our best to remove. Bettelheim says that the current approaches fail to recognize the slow development of the child and demand more of him than he is capable of giving. A commendable criticism, but his solution is in keeping with the psychoanalytic view of the child as something that needs to be tamed. He says (ibid, p. 87): That is, one can live successfully and learn well in school as long as one's growing up begins with a very firm and stringent morality of absolutes, based on fear. Later, in the process of gaining maturity, one can slowly free oneself of some of the fear and begin to question its absolute tenets. It was a Darwin, as well as a Nietzsche and a Freud--raised for so much of their lives on a stringent and absolute morality based on fear-- who could later afford to question it ever more critically, but without ever losing too much of it to go to pieces as persons or to withdraw from the world in disgust. It was 166 precisely the absolute morality instilled in them as children which made them strong enough, later on in life, to try to reshape the world by their now more mature moral concepts. The mistake is that today too many believe that what ripe maturity can contain is therefore the best fare for immaturity. The mistake we still make is to hope that more and more citizens will have deve10ped a mature morality, one they have critically tested against experience, without first having been subject as children to a stringent morality based on fear and trembling. Essentially everything I shall say from here on is nothing but an elaboration of this notion. This passage makes the moral education program of psycho- analysis very explicit. It also reveals the innate depravity position of this model of man. It also makes moral education a dose of medicine that needs to be given to a pathological creature that hopefully will get well enough eventually to improve itself. This is a very dubious assumption in view of the psychoanalytic literature that shows how hard it is for adults to overcome the crippling effects of stringent and tyrranical childhood socialization agents. Bettelheim's pronouncements would have given great comfort to the early settlers of this country whose Puritanical rigidity was in keeping with this modern psychoanalyst's ideas, but it gives little guidance to a modern view of values/moral education for a pluralistic democratic society. Another major problem of the psychoanalytic view is that it goes to extremes in emphasizing the role of the parent. Surely parents are extremely important and tremendously influence their children. But surely they are not the absolute determiners of the Child's values. 167 Whereas the behavioristic view of man calls for the values/ moral educator to be a controller-programmer, the psychoanalytic view calls for the values/moral educator to be a dictator-therapist. Neither view is much compatible with a program for a democratic society. A final statement on classical psychoanalysis is on the issue of determinism. The literature portrays Freud as an absolute determinist, much in keeping with the extreme View of radical behavior- ism. To the extent that classical psychoanalysis holds to this view the arguments against this position hold as well for this view as for behaviorism. Fromm (1964), however, in an analysis of Freud's view attempts to correct this belief of Freud's determinism. His argument is too long to present here, but it certainly presents a softer picture of Freud. Fromm says: Yet neither Marx nor Freud were determinists in the sense of believing in an irreversibility of causal determinism. They both believed in the possibility that a course already initiated can be altered. They both saw this possibility of change rooted in man's capacity for becoming aware of the forces which move him behind his back, so to speak--and thus enabling him to regain his freedom. Both were--like Spinoza, by whom Marx was influenced considerably-- determinists and indeterminists, or neither determinists nor indeterminists. Both proposed that man is determined by the laws of cause and effect, but that by awareness and right action he can create and enlarge the realm of freedom. It is up to him to gain an optimum of freedom and to extricate himself from the chains of necessity. For Freud the awareness of the unconscious, for Marx the awareness of socio- economic forces and class interests, were the conditions for liberation. (p. 161) [For a full treatment of Fromm's analysis on this subject the reader should read the 168 entire passage from which this is quoted, and also Fromm's Beyond the Chains of Illusion, 1962] One would certainly have to have read a great deal of Freud's own writing in order to critically judge Fromm's interpretation of Freud. All that can be offered here is that Fromm's statement is at variance with many other interpreters of Freud. It is more in keeping with the views expressed by the social analysts' views of psychoanalysis, of which Fromm is a representative. The views of Horney, Fromm, Adler, and Sullivan have been summarized earlier. It is also more in keeping with the views of the ego psychologists than with Freud's views. Before leaving this discussion of Fromm it is worth pointing out that his views are clearly summarized in a passage in Beyond the Chains of Illusion (1962) entitled ”Credo” (Ch. 12) with which he closes that book. Not only is it an excellent statement of Fromm's views, it is a fair summary of the social analyst's position, and reflects much of what is believed by the ego psychologists. Above all it reflects how far both groups have proceeded away from and beyond the restrictive and dark image of Freud's classical psychoanalysis. In summary, it is safe to say that the older version of psychoanalysis, although differing in details and technicalities, is quite compatible with the behavioristic view with regard to values/ moral development and education. Consequently, it is of little help in building a viable theory for values deve10pment education for a modern, pluralistic democracy. Both relegate the human organism to the status of an automaton to be controlled by the environment. 169 Both deny the person any capacity or right to participate in his own development. And both.emphasize the overwhelming determinism of the environment. We can turn from this view of man with much more hOpe to the views of the more modern psychoanalysts already mentioned, but expecially the ego psychologists. In all fairness to Jung, however, his formulations contain some highly useful concepts and insights. His ideas on the influence of culture, the self, symbolization, the role of religion and mysticism in life, and many other ideas are fertile ground for values/moral exploration. His view of man incorporated rationality and thinking as an important aspect of man's being. His views on self actualization and self realization are highly compatible with similar ideas offered by a number of organismic theorists, especially Goldstein, Maslow, and Rogers. In general, his view of man is a healthy antidote to Freud's, and is considerably more positive, hOpeful, and balanced. The great contribution of the social analysts is their full conceptualization of the relationship between the organism and society. The role of society in the formation of the personality is a considerably more balanced picture than that of the classical psychoanalysts, and offers much help for a values development education theory. Some of the more valuable contributions of this group include Adler's ideas on style of life and the creative self; Fromm's basic needs, deve10pmental character types, alternativism, deep insights on the nature of our society, the role and nature of love, and other psych0philosophical ideas; Horney's ideas on basic 170 needs and the characteristics of neurotic behavior; and Sullivan's conceptualization of personality and personality deve10pment, cognitive processes, and the notion of the malevolent transformation. And possibly an even richer source of building blocks to bridge psychoanalytic theory with organismic theory is the work of the ego psychologists. Ego development, stage theory, equili- bration principles, the role of rationality and thinking, and many other features of ego psychology are tremendously harmonious with organismic psycholOgy. In conclusion, psychoanalysis in its classic form, rooted in Freud's theories, offers little help to the builders of a theory for values development education. Much of its character is quite consistent with behaviorism and is equally hostile to the idea of a healthy, rational, active organism living in a democratic environment. Those who built on the constructive ideas of Freud and went beyond them without being shackled by his pessimistic views and rigidity have contributed much that is worthwhile to the task of building a values/moral theory. It will take a great deal of time to fully explore and develop these contributions, a task for future work. 3. Critique of Existential Psychology There is little that this view of man can offer beyond what the general organismic view can offer. The holistic view of man, Opposition to dichotomizing man and environment and body and mind, and its overall humanistic orientation are virtually identical 171 with the views of organismic psychology, but do not appreciably extend them in any way. The emphasis on the idea of being-in-process and becoming are already part of the organismic view, but it is possible that the existential writers can enrich this concept for the build- ing of the theory. Existential psychology holds for some ideas that are in direct conflict with organismic psychology, and they are major obstacles to a synthesis of the two views. The extreme emphasis on the validity of existential phenomena, for example, is possibly an overreaction to the unbalanced empiricism and positivism of behavior- ism, but tends to ignore the contribution of a balanced and realistic utilization of empirical science in the world of human behavior. The existentialists fail to see that empirical science can be used as a valuable tool without hypostatizing or deifying it. Their extreme position on this point has resulted in a theoretical and philoSOphical myopia. Thus existentialists would tend to reject the potentially enormous contribution of modern structuralism, developmental psychology, and rational theory building. Their view of man is so idiographic that it again is as extreme in that direction as behaviorism is in the other direction. The undue emphasis on the individual removes man from his natural existence deeply involved with his fellow human beings in a state of interdependence. But of all the tenets of existential psychology the most untenable and divisive is the belief in complete indeterminism. Again, this is probably an overreaction to behaviorism and 172 psychoanalysis. The reason why this is so important for values development theory is because it eliminates responsibility, freedom, and dignity as completely and effectively as Skinner's complete determinism. If man lives only in the present existential situation, without any antecedent considerations, in a completely uncaused milieu then he is as enslaved as if he were completely determined. For if the individual must face each situation without any influence from the past then he faces a completely unknown world of change at all times. He is, therefore, at the mercy of the environment just as surely as he is in a world of pure causality. If the individual's fate is determined by the randomization of experience then how can he have any control or influence over his own life? In such a system he has no freedom, can accept no responsibility, and must be excused from all morality. This/is an extremely paradoxical and tragically ironic turn of events for a view of man designed to free man and enlarge his potential. The attempt by the existentialists to humanize man succeeds in isolating and paralyzing him. The grim picture of existential psychology painted here can be brightened a bit by considering that some of the most respected and competent organismic psychologists have been swinging in the direction of existential psychology, eSpecially Allport (new deceased), Maslow (deceased), Rogers, and Murphy. What needs to be done is to search out the influences responsible for this shift and explore its implications for both organismic psychology and values development education. _Again, a worthy project for extensive investigation. In the meantime the analysis 173 presented above seems to be a fair evaluation of the potential for this view of man with regard to values deve10pment education. 4. Critique of Organismic Psychology After nearly three years of extensive exploration of the psychophilosophical views of man presented in this chapter the great potential of organismic psychology appears to provide the greatest foundation for a values development education program for a pluralistic democratic culture. First, it is not given to the extreme positions on crucial issues that characterize the other three views. Consequently, it is not crippled by either extreme determinism or extreme indeterminism. Likewise, it is not distorted by an unbalanced picture of the nature of man, the environment, or the relationship between them. And its holistic orientation permits a much more complete, considerably richer, and more dynamic conceptualization of the human organism. The organism of organismic psychology is neither empty nor almighty. The breadth, depth, and diversification of the views that fall under this rubric are sufficiently congruent to provide powerful support for certain crucial claims, and yet discrepant enough to provide ample challenge to reification, deification, or "truthifica- tion" of any claims. This model emphasizes and focuses on man in the healthy state, but gives adequate recognition to the nature and reality of pathology. It tries to apply the methods of science to the elusive field of human behavior without canonizing empirical methods or unrealistically objectifying the findings of those methods. 174 Behaviorism has chosen to respond to the esoteric nature of the human mind and the difficulties of exploring it with either a complete rejection of its existence or a declaration of its irrelevancy. Organismic psychology, confronted with the same challenges and problems, has elected to attempt to understand the mysteries of the organism. Einstein is reputed to have said that the human organism is like a sealed clock--you can never open it but you can attempt to understand it. He never saw the particles and forces he treated theoretically on paper, but he never declared them nonexistent or irrelevant. Certainly the applications of his theories have proven the validity and efficacy of attempts to understand things that cannot be seen or directly observed. A helpful analogy to express this point is to view man as standing on the backside of a giant and complex tapestry. Anyone who has ever seen that side of a tapestry knows that what is observed is a confusion of threads with little or no hint of the intricate pattern on the other side. If an observer formed his final view on the basis of what is observable it would be partially correct, but hopelessly inadequate. To say that all we can ever know is the jumbled confusion of loose ends so let's declare them the nature of the tapestry and proclaim the pattern on the other side as nonexistent, irrelevant, and meaningless, is self—deceiving, counterproductive, and grossly misleading. We are in the strange position of being part of the tapestry while we try to analyze it, which considerably complicates the task. But the attempt is worthwhile and fruitful and, if we are to survive, it is absolutely necessary that we achieve a better understanding of ourselves, 17S our world, and our meaning. And so long as we try not to extrapolate way beyond our findings, and so long as we retain open minds, and so long as we recognize both our limitations and our potentialities, we may advance the cutting edge of exploration to unknown worlds. CHAPTER FOUR AN ORGAN I SMIC ~STRUCTURAL-DEVELOPMENTAL APPROACH TO VALUES DEVELOPMENT EDUCATION Four approaches to values/moral1 education have been identified in Chapter Two. Three of them were evaluated as educationally ineffective, conceptually inadequate, and philosophic- ally inappropriate for use in a pluralistic and democratic society. The three approaches deemed inadequate have been labeled according to their identifying characteristics as follows: 1. The Traditional-Authoritarian Approach (Absolute Nomothetic) 2. The Cultural—Relativistic Approach (Relative Nomothetic) 3. The Absolute Relativistic Approach (Idiographic) One of the major theses of this dissertation is that any approach to values/moral education is, of necessity, based on a psychophiIOSOphical view of man, and that a well-designed program will build on an examined view that is made explicit. Four major views of man have been considered, viz., behaviorism, psychoanalysis, 1The term values/Moral is used throughout this dissertation to communicate the overall interest in all types of values although the primary focus is often on moral values. Values is the primary and inclusive category; moral values are considered a subcategory of values, but is considered to be the most important subcategory. Other categories include esthetic values, religious values, and political values. 176 177 existential psychology, and organismic psychology. The first three views have been examined and judged as partially inadequate, incom- plete, and/or erroneous conceptualizations of man and his relation- ship with the environment. Consequently, they have been declared as generally not as useful as the fourth view to serve as foundations for a theory for values development education. This does not rule out the possibility of substantial contributions being made by any of these three views or their subdivisions, but it means that the general conceptualizations and positions on major issues are not viewed as warranted assertions. The fourth approach is identified here as organismic- structural-developmental. Organismic, structural, and developmental have been carefully chosen to represent the three dominant themes and basic thrusts. The use of the three terms as a unit is a construction of this writer. In the literature it is common to find the terms organismic, organismic psychology, organismic-deve10pmental and cognitive—deve10pmental. To a lesser extent structural-deve10p- mental is used. But it is precisely the combination of the three orientations and the conceptual significance of the integration that clearly identify the distinguishing characteristics of this conceptual framework for values/moral education. Since organismic-structural- developmental is such a cumbersome and technical term, values development education is frequently used in its place and is intended to be synonymous.2 For convenience both 0-8-0 and VDE 2 This is not intended as a claim that this is the only approach that 178 will be used where apprOpriate. A. Organismic Organismic and holistic are virtually synonymous. Tracing the origins of the two terms will help explicate the organismic position. Beckner (in Edwards, 1967, Vol. 5, p. 549) describes the origin of organismic as follows: The term "organismalism" was coined by the zoologist W. E. Ritter in 1919 to describe the theory that, in his words, "the organism in its totality is as essential to an explanation of its elements as its elements are to an explana- tion of the organism." Subsequent writers have largely replaced "organismal" with the more euphonious "organismic" as a title for this theory, for the many variations on its main theme, and for some subordinate but supporting doctrines concerning the teleological and historical character of organisms. Beckner proceeds to explain the common origins and partial affinity of organismic biology with the old vitalism. Organismic biology clearly rejects the belief in the vital life substance, or élan vital or entelechy, of vitalism; but agrees with vitalism in the rejection of purely mechanistic and materialistic doctrines about the nature of life and the biological nature of the organism. There are three major points on which organismic biologists agree, -—‘ ...could be thought of as values development education. Any approach that emphasizes the deve10pmental aspects of values education could readily be identified this way. Many approaches do not emphasize development or assume that development plays any significant role in ‘values education. Values clarification, for example, is not devalopmentally oriented, and it would seem to this writer that it ‘would not be appropriate to think of it as values deve10pment education, but as a methodology for values education. 179 according to Beckner, viz., (1) organic unity, (2) determining features of the whole, and (3) teleological behavior of organism. On these points Beckner offers the following brief summaries: Organic unity. Organic systems are so organized that the activities of the whole cannot be understood as the sum of the activities of the parts. All members of the school agree on this point. As the term ”organismic" implies, the most important example of such wholes is the single organism, but there are others, such as cells, organs, colonies, and some pOpulations. Determining features of the whole. The parts of organic wholes not—ohly exhibit patterns of behavior in virtue of their relations to other parts at the same level of organization, but in addition, some of the features of the parts at a given level are determined by the pattern of organization at higher (and, of course, at lower) levels of organization. This is the general form of the special thesis that the properties of the whole determine the properties of the part; and it seems to have the methodological consequence that a theory of the elements at a given level could not be complete without a theory of the elements at the higher levels. Woodger puts the point this way: the parts of organisms must be studied in situ, for we cannot learn how they would behave in situ by studying them in isolation. Teleological3 behavior 9f organisms. One 3The use of teleological here is not in any sense related to the spiritual or religious use of the term. Werner and Kaplan (1963, p.6) help clarify the use of teleological in organismic biology and psychology. They say: "It must be stressed that directiveness should not be understood to imply conscious effort toward an end, so-called 'subjective teleology.‘ Directiveness in the sense of 'objective teleology' is an observable characteristic of organismic behavior irrespective of any consciousness of ends on the part of the organism...Purposive or planning behavior, in particular, should not be confused with directiveness in its generic sense, though it is likely that planning behavior, consciously entertained in human beings, is a specialization of that general directiveness immanent in all organic activity." 180 kind of activity, which is a consequence of organization at a level higher than that of the organism's physical parts, is directive or teleological behavior. Directiveness is an aspect of organisms that is shown in their physiology, in the behavior of individual animals, and in the social systems of some animals; and an account of directiveness is not only legitimate but necessary. E. S. Russell argues that since directiveness (processes aimed at the production and maintenance of organic unities) is a fact, then a physiological process, or piece of animal behavior, cannot be understood until we understand its function or its goal. The above summaries of the principles of organismic biology are significant not only for tracing the origin of the term organismic, but also because they describe principles generally held by organismic psychologists to pertain in the psychological realm as well as in the biological. Most organismic theorists emphasize the biological foundations of the organism and stress the necessity of considering basic biological roots of psychological phenomena. Werner, Maslow, Goldstein, Angyal, and Piaget, to name only a few, are representative of this position. More Specifically for values development education, the biological foundation of behavior is manifested in the conceptualization of an organismic valuing process that plays a significant role in the formation and development of values. Holism can also be clearly traced to its originator. The word is an invention of Jan Christian Smuts (1870-1950), the former South African statesman, soldier, and scholar. He introduced the term holism in Chapter V., entitled ”General Concept of Holism." An excerpt from his "Summary" of that chapter presents the concept 181 as follows: Both matter and life consist of unit structures whose ordered grouping produces natural wholes which we call bodies or organisms. This character of "wholeness" meets us everywhere and points to something fundamental in the universe. Holism (from dlos = whole) [holos] is the term here coined for this fundamental factor operative towards the creation of wholes in the universe. Its character is both general and specific or concrete, and it satisfies our double require- ment for a natural evolutionary starting-point. Wholes are not mere artificial constructions of thought; they point to something real in the universe, and Holism is a real operative factor, a vera causa. There is behind Evolution no mere vague creative impulse or Elan vital, but something quite definite and specific in its operation, and thus productive of the real concrete character of cosmic Evolution. The idea of wholes and wholeness should therefore not be confined to the biological domain; it covers both inorganic substances and the highest manifestations of the human spirit. Taking a plant or an animal as a type of a whole, we notice the fundamental holistic characters as a unity of parts which is so close and intense as to be more than the sum of its parts; which not only gives a particular conformation or structure to the parts but so relates and determines them in their synthesis that their functions are altered; the synthesis affects and determines the parts, so that they function towards the "whole"; and the whole and the parts therefore reciprocally influence and determine each other, and appear more or less to merge their individual characters: the whole is in the parts and the parts are in the whole, and this synthesis of whole and parts is reflected in the holistic character of the functions of the parts as well as of the whole. There is a progressive grading of this holistic synthesis in Nature, so that we pass from (a) mere physical mixtures, where the structure is almost negligible, ...to (b) chemical compounds, where the structure is more synthetic 182 ...to (c) organisms, where a still more intense synthesis of elements has been effected, which impresses the parts or organs far more intimately with a unified character, and a system of central control, regulation and co—ordination of all the parts and organs arises; and from organism, again on to (d) Minds or psychical organs, where the Central Control acquires consciousness and a freedom and creative power of the most far-reaching character; and finally to (e) Personality, which is the highest, most evolved whole among the structures of the universe, and becomes a new orientative, originative centre of reality. All through this progressive series the character of wholeness deepens; Holism is not only creative but self-creative, and its final structures are far more holistic than its initial structures. ...As Holism is a process of creative synthesis, the resulting wholes are not static but dynamic, evolutionary, creative. ...The explanation of Nature can therefore not be purely mechanical; and the mechanistic concept of Nature has its place and justification only in the wider setting of Holism. In its organic application, in particular, the "whole" will be found a much more useful term in science than "life," and will render the prevailing mechanistic interpretation largely unnecessary. ...an organism is really a unified, synthesised section of history, which includes not only its present but much of its past and even its future. An organism can only be explained by reference to its past and its future as well as its present; the central structure is not sufficient and literally has not enough of it to go round in the way of explanation;... This passage communicates the depth and breadth of Smuts' conceptualization, but more than anything it shows that he does not intend that holism be a mere construction or symbol. It is not not something mysterious, ethereal, or magical either. It is a real operating fact in nature and existence, and it can be observed. On this point Smuts says: It is possible that some may think I have 183 pressed the claims of Holism and the whole too far; that they are not real operative factors, but only useful methodological concepts or categories of research and explanation. There is no doubt that the whole is a useful and powerful concept under which to range the phenomena of life especially. But to my mind there is clearly something more in the idea. The whole as a real character is writ large on the face of Nature. It is dominant in biology; it is everywhere noticeable in the higher mental and spiritual developments; and science, if it had not been so largely analytical and mechanical, would long ago have seen and read it in inorganic nature also. The whole as an operative factor requires careful exploration. That there are wholes in Nature seems to me incontestable. (p. 100) The contemporary organismic view of motivation is clearly stages by Smuts. Modern theorists agree that one of the basic factors of life is that motivation is intrinsic to life itself. Smuts maintains that the organism "is self-acting and self-moving " (p. 101). The organism is not like a machine or an artificial construction that requires external action, force, or motivation. "The source of its activity is internal and of a piece with itself, is indeed itself." The togetherness of its parts is not mechanical, as can be demonstrated by the inability to reconstruct a dismembered organism. The organism's power to maintain itself is also not mechanical. It takes in food and other forms of aliment not by mere mechanical addition, "but by a complete transformation, assimilation and apprOpriation into its own peculiar system of the material so taken in." Smuts' views are precisely the views of all organismic theorists on these particular points. Piaget, for example, describes both biological and intellectual functioning of the organism in the same terms used by Smuts. 184 In the first of Smuts' statements quoted, the long passage, there are two particular points worthy of elaboration. First, he claims that the concept of "wholes" will be more useful in science than "life," and that such a view will render the mechanistic views unnecessary. The full rich meaning of holism is clear in Smuts' ideas on this point. He feels that the mechanistic approach to scientific explorations of the concept life have rendered the term virtually meaningless because it has resulted in life being something the organism possesses. He says: "The concept of life is too vague to be definable and pinned down to a definite content, it is liable to be hypostatized into a substance or a force apart from the organism which it denotes” (pp. 109-110). In other words, he says, life has come to be viewed by mechanistic science as a specific type of mechanism. He suggests the substitution of the concept "whole" for the concept "life” in both philosophy and science in order to help rectify this state of affairs. His rationale for this point clearly exemplifies the difference between the behavioristic View of man and the organismic view of man, and helps support the claim that the latter is a more suitable foundation for a theory for values development education. Smuts says: A living organism is not an organism plus life, as if life were something different and additional to it; it is just the organism in its unique character as a whole, which can be closely defined. The sense in which it differs from a chemical compound considered as a whole is also capable of accurate definition; and thus it is quite unnecessary to resort to the dubious concept of mechanism in order to describe the living organ- ism or, as I perfer to call it, the holistic organism. The concept of the whole enables us 185 to use a technical scientific terminology, which is not vitiated by pOpular usage, and which is capable of accurate definition and description. (p. 110) It is the view that an organism plus life is the foundation for understanding human behavior that leads to the incomplete, inadequate, and partially erroneous conceptualization of man, motivation, and socialization in behaviorism. It is, for example, from this idea that the notion of external motivation and the need for transmission of the structure of the external world to the child originates. The holistic view leads to the idea that the organism participates in the growing and learning process. It is the difference between values acquisition versus values development. The second point mentioned earlier is his reference to the necessity of considering the past, present, and future of the organism in any attempt to understand or explain the organism, as well as the need to include the field. Contemporary organismic theorists stress the need to include the diachronic, synchronic, teleological, and transactional field aspects of human existence in order to understand the person. The behaviorists, especially the radical behaviorists such as Skinner, maintain that only the history of antecedent reinforcements and contingencies plus the immediate environmental contingencies are sufficient to understand and shape the organism and its behavior. Again, this factor helps clarify the difference between the holistic view of the organismic psycho- logists and the mechanistic view of the behaviorists. Holism and Evolution must be read in its entirety to 186 fully appreciate the scepe of Smuts' vision for the holistic concept and to realize how much this one statement adumbrates the full development of the organismic-holistic viewpoint that prevails today. So many of Smuts' ideas, e.g., on mind, personality, and organism- environment relationships, are identical to or highly congruent with the ideas that exemplify organismic viewpoints today, nearly half a century since Smuts published his book. But as Frick (1969, 1971) points out, there is a real paradox with respect to Smuts and his influence. In spite of the fact that Smuts coined the word which has become so widely used, and in spite of the fact that he so clearly stated the position which has been so widely adopted, Smuts is rarely mentioned in the literature and rarely cited. Prick traces the origins of the term and partly the movement to Smuts, and reviews his key ideas. Hall and Lindzey (1970, p. 298) briefly acknowledge Smuts' influential role in the deve10pment of organismic theory. And Angyal (1941, p. 2) in a brief footnote acknowledges that he borrowed the term "holism” from Smuts. But such citations and references are unusual. But the elaboration of holism provided by Smuts has made it possible to show that holism and organismic are virtually synonymous as was stated at the beginning. The agreement between the ideas presented by Beckner and those presented by Smuts should be clear. This agreement is plainly manifested in the literature. Werner and Kaplan (1963) refer to "the organismic- holistic orientation." Baldwin (1967, p. 496) says: "In Opposition to this atomistic point of view [i.e., S-R theory] is a holistic 187 or organismic view, according to which all changes in human behavior involve the total organism because the organism is an integrated whole." Herbert Feigl (in Feigl, Scriven, and Maxwell, 1958, p. 414), in a section that echoes Smuts without reference to him, reflects the synonymity of the terms: ”It is conceivable that much of what is called 'emergent novelty' on the chemical and biological levels of complexity may ultimately be explained in terms of the organismic or holistic features of the laws of atomic and molecular dynamics..." In spite of the synonymous nature of the two terms, organ- ismic has been selected for inclusion in the identifying name of the preposed theory for values development education. Four reasons support this decision. First, organismic more explicitly and dramatically emphasizes the focus on life and the human organism as the base for such a theory and approach to values/moral education. Organismic more forcefully exposes the hiatus between the supported view of man and the rejected views of the other major models. Second, the biological foundation of human behavior so widely accepted by the preponents of this view is reflected more by organismic than by holistic. Third, organismic has a less mystical ring to it than does the other term. And fourth, from a practical standpoint organismic presents less problems. People without a background in psychology or philosophy frequently have never seen or heard holism or holistic and want to correct what they believe is a misspelling by adding a "w" to the beginning. They may never 'have heard organismic either, but at least they have heard its root or variations. 188 Organismic, then, clearly states the foundational position of the organismic-structural-developmental approach to values develop- ment education. For further clarification of the organismic position we turn now to John Dewey. John Dewey and Oyganismic P§ychology John Dewey's organismic-holistic orientation is pervasive in his extensive writings. His 1937 speech to the College of Physicians, for example, clearly enunciates his basic organismic position. A brief excerpt from that speech (Dewey in Ratner, 1939, p. 820), entitled ”The Unity of the Human Being,” follows by way of illustration: These instances of the use of ”unity" may, however, provide a suggestion from which it is safe to set out. Whatever else the unity is or is not, it at least means the way in which a number of different persons and things work together toward a common end. This working together exists in action operation, not as a static object or collection of objects. It is this kind of unity that seems to me to give the clew to understanding the unity of the human being. We can recognize and identify a man as a single object, a numerical unit, by observation which marks out boundaries, as we note that the bounded object moves as a whole. In that way you recognize me as a single object standing here on the stage before you. That is the way in which we recognize a rock, tree or house as a single object, as a unity and whole. But that which makes a rock a single whole is the inter- action of swarms of molecules, atoms, and electrons; its unity is an affair of the way elements work together. The boundaries by which we mark off a human being as a unit are very different from the energies and organization of energies that make him a unified human being. We can observe the boundaries at a single moment. We can grasp 189 the unity only, so to speak, longitudinally --—only as something that goes on in a stretch of time. It is not found in any number of crossectional views. The diachronic element to which Dewey refers at the end of this passage highlights the holistic emphasis he maintains throughout, and is reminiscent of Smuts' statements. Dewey proceeds from this passage to emphasize the necessity of completing the understanding of the human being by considering his internal processes only from the standpoint of their interactions with the environment. Again this is one of the hallmarks of organismic theory. One of Dewey's landmark statements is his article, "The Reflex Arc Concept in Psychology" (1896; also reprinted in Dennis, 1948). This statement is a criticism of the use of the reflex arc concept as the basic unit of psychology, and coming approximately seventeen years before Watson's launching of behaviorism the article is frequently described as a renunciation of behaviorism prior to behaviorism. Dewey's basic organismic view is reflected throughout the article, as for example in the following passages: As a result, the reflex arc is not a comprehensive, or organic unity, but a patchwork of disjoined parts, a mechanical conjunction or unallied processes. What is needed is that the principle underlying the idea of the reflex are as the fundamental psychical unity shall react into and determine the values of its constitutive factors. More specifically, what is wanted is that sensory stimulus, central connections and motor responses shall be viewed, not as separate and complete entities in themselves, but as divisions of labor, functioning factors, within the single concrete whole, now designated the reflex arc. (Dennis, 1948, p. 356)(Italics added) 190 The discussion up to this point may be summarized by saying that the reflex arc idea, as commonly employed, is defective in that it assumes sensory stimulus and motor response as distinct psychical existences, while in reality they are always inside a coordination and have their significance purely from the part played in maintaining or reconstituting the coordina- tion; and (secondly) in assuming that the quale of experience which precedes the "motor" phase and that which succeeds it are two different states, instead of the last being always the first reconstituted, the motor phase coming in only for the sake of such mediation. The result is that the reflex arc idea leaves us with a disjointed psychology, whether viewed from the standpoint of development in the individual or in the race, or from that of the analysis of the mature consciousness. (p. 357) Dewey's constant plea for integration, unity, and wholeness is apparent whether he is discussing the molecular unit of individual behavior or the molar units of social behavior. Another little piece in the larger mosaic of Dewey's organismic psychology appears in his analysis of the moral life (Part II of Dewey and Tufts, 1932; also available separately as Dewey, 1960). The emphasis on wholeness and integration is a thread running throughout this statement, and the following quotation is offered to show both the holistic emphasis and the organismic principle of internal motivation: The identity of self and an act, morally speaking, is the key to understanding the nature of motives and motivation. Unless this unity is perceived and acknowledged in theory, a motive will be regarded as something external acting upon an individual and inducing him to do something. When this point of view is generalized, it leads to the conclusion that the self is naturally, intrinsically, inert 191 and passive, and so has to be stirred or moved to action by something outside itself. The fact, however, is that the self, like its vital basis the organism, is always active; that it acts by its very constitution, and hence needs to external promise of reward or threat of evil to induce it to act. This fact is confirmation of the moral unity of self and action. (p. 152) Practically all of Dewey's main themes are organismic- holistic. These themes run through all of his works, for example, his opposition to sharp distinctions between means and ends, his development of the idea of experience, the focus on growth as the dynamic of life, his reconstructionism, the conceptualizations of education and democracy and the intimate relationship between them, in fact, his entire social philOSOphy, and certainly his phiIOSOphy of transactionalism. Dewey's organismic orientation is summarized by Allport (1968, p. 349) as follows: He has taught his readers to be wary of "clefts and bunches." His insistence upon the complete process of coordination leads them to be suspicious of the fragments produced by neat analysis. When the laboratory wheels turn and the knives cut, and some exuberant investigator holds up an excised segment of behavior for acclaim, Deweyites are not edified. They know that true statements cannot be made about fragments snatched from their natural context. They have little use for a psychology that isolates separate functions within the total course of experience, and prefer a thoroughgoing organismic psychology, preferably one that has a strong social emphasis. Dewey is generally considered to be one of the founders and principal supporters of the psychological system that was called functionalism and ran parallel to Titchener's old structuralism.4 For an explanation of this old structuralism and its distinction 192 The latter died with Titchener in the late twenties (see Lundin, 1972), but the spirit of functionalism remained vigorous in its transformation into organismic psychology, which is interesting in view of the fact that Angyal (1941, p. 78n) points out: "'Organ' does not mean originally only a material structure. The greek word dpyavov means 'tool' in general." This discussion of Dewey's organismic psychology naturally leads us to the next aspect of the organismic approach, viz., transactionalism, which is a very important concept for organismic psychology in general, and for the organismic-structural-development- a1 approach to values development education in particular. Transaction and the Transactional Organism The term transactional was introduced in this dissertation in Chapter II when the O-S-D approach was described as "transactional universal," as differentiated from the nomothetic and idiographic approaches. Nomothetic, in this usage, refers to the locus of values being in the external world and being transmitted to the organism as normative, obligatory, and legitimate. Whether absolute or relative, values come to the person from the society and the culture. Idiographic refers to the internal, personal, and idiosyncratic locus of values--values come from the person's own ...from the modern structuralism, to be discussed later in this chapter and which forms the middle component of the organismic- structural-developmental approach, see Chapter III. 193 mind, are relative to the experience of each individual, and are not legitimately subject to external or objective judgment. Idio- graphic thus incorporates both the internal origin and the relativity of values. Organismic psychologists believe that both the nomothetic and idiographic explanations of the origin and nature of values are incomplete and partially incorrect. Values do not have an objective existence apart from the human minds that create them. And human minds do not create values ex nihilo——in fact, many organismic psychologists argue that it is not correct to think of the human mind or personality as strictly individual. Glad (in Scher, 1962, p. 521), for example, in a chapter entitled "'Mind' as an Organismic Integration," introduces the concept interpersonality as a way of saying that mind and personality are not strictly idiographic or tha manifestations or products of an individual. As Glad states: The term interpersonality is intended to convey a human-being-in-the-world who in some fashion accomplishes a sense of adequacy. The term implies a being who manages himself in some integrative relationship to the world. Of the many possible ways of experiencing, the interpersonality selects some relatively, useful and satisfying form or sense or model of the meaning of his self-world relationship. Glad's concept is a way of expressing the transactional nature of mind and personality, and of indicating that man's existence is transactional. Transaction as a technical term in the organismic-holistic orientation is a contribution primarily of John Dewey, partly in cooperation with one of his associates late in his career, 194 Arthur Bentley. Schneider (in Boydston, et al, 1970, p. 110) points out that the terminological change from interaction to trans- action by Dewey and Bentley in the 1940's "calls attention to the basic thesis of [Dewey's] work of 1896 in which he was already insisting that individual agent and social sphere of action are not two separate agents interacting but two co-Operating 'factors' in conduct." Dewey's transactional orientation is clearly evident in the landmark article already cited in this dissertation, his 1894 statement entitled ”The Reflex Arc Concept in Psychology." And, as Leys (Boydston, et al, p. 134) points out, Dewey's transactional conceptualization of human beings in society was becoming more and more evident in the 1920's and 1930's. Human Nature and Conduct (Dewey, 1922) emphasizes the transactional in the inherent social nature of morality. Leys says: In describing the conflicts and malfunctionings of society, Dewey was trying to get away from a conception of human beings as entities with a fixed nature that were adjusting to or manipulating an environment, another set of entities with a fixed nature. What he was talking about was a process, an interaction, a transaction, in which nouns referred to the changing features of a partially indeterminate situation. What may possibly be the earliest use by Dewey of the word "transaction" is a statement from his article ”Conduct and Experience," Chapter 22 in P§ychologies of 1930 (edited by Murchison, 1930): The structure of whatever is had by way of immediate qualitative presences is found in the recurrent modes of interaction taking place between what we term organism, on one side, and environment, on the other. This inter- action is the primary fact, and it constitutes a trans-action. Only by analysis and 195 selective abstraction can we differentiate the actual occurrence into two factors, one called organism and the other, environment. This fact militates strongly against any form of behavior- ism that defines behavior in terms of the nervous system or body alone. (p. 411) (Italics added) And as Dewey and Bentley (1949, p. ll6n) point out, Dewey's use of the word "integration” in Logic, The Theory of Inquiyy (1938) is comparable to their use of transaction. Thorough treatment of "transaction" is in the Dewey and Bentley book entitled Knowing and the Known, published in 1949. It is the culmination of a four-year inquiry by the authors into the terminological and conceptual problems of epistemology, and could easily have been entitled "A Transactional Approach to Epistemology." The authors point out that in the history of inquiry presentations of the nature of action in the world have evolved from early reports in terms of selflaction to later reports in terms of interaction, and finally to the most recent reports in terms of transaction. The word action they use "as a most general character- ization for events where their durational process is being stressed " (p. 68). The older approach to understanding nature stressed the imminence of action. In this view "things are viewed as acting under their own powers,"S very much like the ideas of children in the early preoperational period of thinking as described by Piaget, Werner, and other organismic psychologists. Clouds, for example, are seen as possessing the power of action and move across the sky 5 Dewey and Bentley (1949), p. 108. 196 under their own power. This is what Dewey and Bentley mean by self- action. Galileo and Newton ushered in a new era of understanding in these events with the laws of motion and mechanics. Newton's third law Of motion was particularly important; it stated that action and reaction are equal and Opposite. Interaction, then, according to Dewey and Bentley is "where thing is balanced against thing in causal interconnection."6 The ”interaction" of Newtonian mechanics was applied to the problem of epistemology, psychology, and sociology and is reflected in the behavioristic and psychoanalystic concept— ualizations of human nature and behavior. It is the interactional view of life that is largely responsible for many of the supposed divisions and dichotomies that create many misunderstandings. The cognitive-affective, mind-body-soul, mind-brain, subject-object, secular-sacred, and many other separations of functions and processes into hypostatized entities or realities are products of a push-pull type Of mechanical causality rooted in an interactionistic model Of nature. Dewey and Bentley make some Observations along these lines and recommend a transactional approach: The epistemologies, logics, psychologies, and sociologies today are still largely on a self- actional basis. In psychology a number Of tentative efforts are being made towards an interactional presentation, with balanced components. Our position is that the tradition- al language currently used about knowings and knowns (and most other language about behaviors, as well) shatters the subjectmatter into Ibid. 197 fragments in advance Of inquiry and thus destroys instead of furthering comprehensive Observation for it. We hold that Observation must be set free; and that, to advance this aim, a postulatory appraisal Of the main historical patterns Of Observation should be made, and identifying namings should be provided. Our own procedure is transactional, in which is asserted the right to see together, extensionally and durationally, much that is talked about conventionally as if it were composed Of irreconcilable separates. We do not present this procedure as being more real or generally valid than any other, but as being the one now needed in the field where we work. In the same spirit which physicists perforce use both particle and wave presentations we here employ both interactional and transactional Observation. Important specialized studies belong in this field in which the organism is made central to attention. This is always legitimate in all forms Of inquiry within a transactional setting, so long as it is deliber- ately undertaken, not confusedly or with "self- actional” implications. As place-holders in this region of nomenclature we shall provisionally set down behavior-agent and behavior-object. They represent specialized interactional treat- ments within the wider transactional presentation, with organisms or persons or actors named uncertainly on the one hand and with environ- ments named in variegated forms on the other. (pp. 68-69) The above passage helps place "transactional", as an epistemological and scientific approach, in perspective with self- actional and interactional, but only hints at the deeper meaning of transaction, per se. Near the end Of their epistemological treatise, Knowing and the Known, the authors present what they call "A Trial Group Of Names" (Chapter 11) that could be used in a transactional approach to epistemology and inquiry. The following eleven terms and their accompanying text, taken from the long list in the book, are presented because they directly or indirectly 198 amplify the meaning of transaction and its other forms: Actor: A confused and confusing word; Offering a primitive and usually deceptive organi- zation for the complex behavioral transactions the organism is engaged in. Under present postulation Actor should always be taken as postulationally transactional, and thus as a Trans-actor. Behavior: A behavior is always to be taken transactionally: i.e., never as of the organism alone, any more than of'the environment alone, but always as of the organic-environmental situation, with organisms and environmental objects taken as equally its aspects. Studies of these aspects in provisional separation are essential at many stages of inquiry, and are always legitimate when carried on under the transactional framework, and through an inquiry which is itself recognized as transactional. Transactionally employed, the word "behavior" should do the work that "experience" has sought to do in the past... Cosmos: Commonly presents "universe as system." If the speaking—knowing organism is included in the cosmos, and if inquiry proceeds on that basis, cosmos appears as an alternative name for Fact. Environment: Situations, events, or Objects in connection with organism as Object. Subject to inquiry physically, physiologically, and in full transactional treatment, behaviorally. Inquiry: A strictly transactional name. It is an equivalent Of knowing, but preferable as a name because Of its freedom from "mentalistic" associations. Interaction: This word, because Of its prefis, is undoubtedly the source of much of the more serious difficulty in discussion at the present time... When transactional and interaction- al treatments come to be explicitly distinguished, progress in construction should be more easily made. For the general theory Of knowings and knowns, the interactional approach is entirely rejected under our procedure. Knowings: Organic phases Of transactionally Observed behaviors... 199 Knowns: Environmental phases of transaction- ally observed behaviors... Organism: Taken as transactionally existent in cosmos. Presentations of it in detachment or quasi-detachment are to be viewed as tentative and partial. SelfLAction: Used to indicate various primitive treatments of the known, prior in historical deve10pment to interactional and transactional treatments. Rarely found today except in philosophical, logical, epistemological, and a few limited psychological regions of inquiry. Transaction: The knowing-known taken as one process in cases in which in older discussions the knowings and knowns are separated and viewed as an interaction. The knowns and the named in their turn taken as phases of a common process in cases in which otherwise they have been viewed as separated components, allotted irregular degrees of independence, and examined in the form of interactions. (Chapter 11) The organismic-holistic orientation of transactional should be clear. Holism, in the propositions of Smuts, and transactionalism, in the prOpositions of Dewey both envision a synthesized and integrated cosmos in which the systems, subsystems, components, and organisms are not only intimately related to each other, but mutually give each other meaning. The interdependence of such a system is explicitly manifested in the Dewey and Bentley usage of knowings, knowns, and organism. What the organism knows, what there is to be known, and the organism that knows are all interdependent and mutually-determining phases of a transactional cosmos. The genetic epistemology of Piaget (1970a, 1971), the naturalistic humanism of Dewey (1929), the organismic-deve10pmentalism of Werner (1948), the c0gnitive-developmentalism Of Kohlberg (1969), the biosocial person- ality of Murphy (1947, 1958)--these and many other conceptual 200 frameworks reflect transactional-organismic views of the human-being- in-the-world. The transactional approach has been utilized in a variety of ways in many branches of psychology and education. It has been especially useful in theoretical and empirical investigations of perception. The work in this area has been carried on by a number of investigators, and a compilation of some of their investigations and findings is reported in Explorations in Transactional Psychology (Kilpatrick, 1961). Toch and MacLean (in Campbell and Hepler, 1970) summarize much of the philOSOphy and theory, along with the empirical findings, and draw out the implications of the transactional view for communication, education, research, and audiovisual applications. Several scholars employ the transactional view in attempts to understand the human mind in Scher (1962). Cantril's chapter, "A Transactional Inquiry Concerning Mind," is especially pertinent. Getzels and a number of associates (e.g., in Morrison and McIntyre, 1972, Ch. 1) have developed a conceptual framework for studying classrooms and groups as social systems. The model they employ clearly identifies the idiographic and nomothetic dimensions of the social system. Based on this model they describe three approaches or styles of classroom leadership, viz., the idiographic style, the nomothetic style, and the transactional style. The idiographic style stresses the needs of the individual rather than the demands of the institution, and makes the particular educational setting at any moment the reflection of the idiosyncratic patterns Of the individuals. The nomothetic style emphasizes the requirements 201 of the institution and society, stresses appropriate role behavior, and views education as the transmission of knowledge from the environment to the learner. The idiographic style emphasizes the personalization of roles; the nomothetic style emphasizes the socialization of personality. Getzel et al see the transactional style as intermediate to the other two, but not as a compromise between them. Both institutional needs and personal idiosyncracies are considered, and each is modified to accommodate the other, depending on the particular situation. The emphasis in any given situation will depend on the ability of the leader to make the ostensibly conflicting needs of institution and individual actually augment the development of both. The transactional style leads to the building of what the authors call a ”climate," and what might preferably be called community. Whereas the idiographic and nomothetic styles are equally rigid and brittle because Of their rigidity and lack of balance, the transactional style is marked by the strength that comes from optimal flexibility. In the transactional community the focus shifts back and forth from idiographic to nomothetic demands in a dynamic pattern. The transactional style is viewed by Getzel, et al "as the ideal-type model of the classroom as a social system: (a) each individual identifies with the goals of the system so that they become part of his own needs; (b) each individual believes that the expectations held for him are rational if the goals are to be achieved; (c) he feels that he belongs to a group with similar emotional identifications and rational beliefs" (p. 32). 202 The Getzels model is an excellent example of the applica- tion of the transactional approach to the classroom. There are many obvious parallels between the leadership styles of that conceptual framework and the approaches to values/moral education presented earlier in this dissertation. The advantages of a transactional approach can be seen in both applications. Later in this dissertation the notion of democracy as transactional society or transactional community will be presented as the Optimal mode of educational intervention for maximizing deve10pment. The congruent relationships appertaining among organismic, holistic, and transactional should be obvious. An argument could be advanced in each case that any one of the three terms could serve as the first unit in the identification of the proposed approach to values deve10pment education. Organismic is still the preferred term, however, since it is the most comprehensive and basic for the key notion of focusing on the living organism as the heart of values development. In view of all that has been said, though, this writer has considered the potential values of a coined term such as interorganismic to replace organismic. Such a term could possibly convey more forcefully the transactional inter- dependence of organisms in holistic community. But the name of the approach as it has already been devised, viz., organismic-structural- developmental, is sufficiently complicated and long. But, more importantly, the notion of interorganismic is already contained in the concept of organismic. The argument is offered that if organismic truly incorporates all that is meant by both holistic and transactional, 203 then the prefix "inter" would merely be redundant. All forms of deve10pment--inte1lectual, values/moral, ego/ self, perceptual, and others-—are viewed as taking place within a holistic framework as a result of the transactions between the organism and the environment, which in turn are viewed as parts of a larger whole. This last point is crucial for completing the organismic picture. Angyal expresses it as follows (1952, p. 133): ...the human being comports himself as if he were a whole of'an intermediate order. By this I mean a "part-Gestalt," like, for example, the cardio- vascular system, or the central nervous system, each of which is a whole, an organization of many parts, but at the same time a part with regard to its superordinate whole, the body. The human being is both a unifier, an organizer of his immediate personal world, and a participant in what he conceives as the superordinate whole to which he belongs. In another statement Angyal (1941, p. 20) describes ”The Organism as a Dynamic Whole": Some phenomena Of nature exist in the form of static structures, others in the form of reversible or irreversible processes. Examples of the first are geometrical forms, of the second, waterfall, wind, combustion, etc. The existential form of the organism is dynamic. This has been formulated by Jennings in his much quoted statement that "The organism is a process." In the last analysis, "organism” and "life" are identical concepts. The first term places emphasis on the structural, the second on the dynamic aspect. The two aspects are inseparable from each other. The essential characteristics of the organism are, however, more clearly revealed in its function than in its morphological features. The morphological structure is subordinated to the functional organization which has a logical primacy over it. If one calls a dead animal an "organism" one implies previous function, since without this implication a corpse is Obviously only a morphological pattern. Each organ is-- 204 as the word implies--a tool of the organism. The heart of the dead animal can be called a tool only with regard to its previous function. When one speaks of any organ it is always implied that it has a function in the total economy of the organism--even though our knowledge of this function may on occasion be quite inadequate-- otherwise it would not deserve the name of an organ. One has to study life as a dynamic whole. In every whole there is a leading principle according to which it is organized. Thus the necessity arises of defining the leading principle of organization of the biological total process. The problem can be stated as follows: What is the general pattern which the organismic total process fellows? An adequate definition of the general pattern of the biological total process is not only of great theoretical interest but has far-reaching consequences for the actual study of the organism. Every organismic part process is a manifestation of the dynamism of the total organism. The part processes gain their meaning from the general pattern of functional organiza- tion and can be correctly understood only in the context of this organization. In these two statements Angyal captures the spirit and meaning of organismic, holistic, and transactional; and also synthesizes the functionalism of Dewey and the holism of Smuts. Much of what he says here will also come alive in the treatments of structural and developmental that follow, especially in the conceptual frameworks offered by Piaget and Kohlberg. Angyal's presentation of life and organism as identical concepts is precisely what Smuts said in his statement quoted earlier. The organismic view of man and his role and meaning the world stand in stark contrast to the alternative view of behaviorism. And it is this difference that becomes most pronounced in considerations related to values/moral issues. The behavioristic .205 view offers no basis for meaningful support for the most important aspects of valuing and morality, viz., some degree of self- determination, freedom, responsibility, and viable organismic processes that make decision, judgment, and action possible. The organismic conceptualization not only gives these factors meaning and viability, it makes them central to the life process itself. Organismic, therefore, is a necessary and powerful base in which to root the structural and developmental components of a comprehensive theory for values deve10pment education. B. Structural The terms structural, structuralism, and structure are widely used in the behavioral sciences and the physical sciences, but unfortunately with a multitude of meanings and variations. Wherever these terms are encountered they cannot be understood without knowledge of the user's orientation, the context of the use, or explication by the author. Even within a given discipline the terms have divergent meanings. Parsons, Durkheim, and Weber have all worked in the discipline of sociology, but their application of these terms varies. A behavioristic psychologist does not mean by structure what an organismic psychologist means by the same term. Skinner and Piaget may both refer to structure, but Skinner's use would have absolutely nothing to do with Piaget's meaning for the same word. For Skinner the word could refer to an arrangement or an organization, or would be purely descriptive. For Piaget the same word is highly technical, very complex, and is the heart of his 206 approach and his theory. Skinner, in fact, would declare Piaget's structure an anachronism left over from prescientific "autonomous man". In addition to these disciplinary and investigatory differences in the use of these words, there are significant historical differences in the discipline of psychology. Early in this century Edward Titchener bestowed the names of structuralism and functionalism on the two major schools of thought at that time. Structuralism was the school he founded, based on the work of Wilhelm Wundt, that broke the mind into elements of consciousness, or static structures, that could be investigated by the method of instrospection. Titchener's structuralism was sometimes called. introspectionism. Dewey and others were strongly Opposed to this conceptual framework and studied instead mental processes or functions. Human behavior was studied and evaluated in terms of its usefulness for survival and adaptation, and not for the static properties that could be attributed to the mind. Structuralism died in the late twenties along with Titchener and is now of historical interest only. Functionalism was somewhat broad and general and was not tremendously fruitful per se, but many of its basic principles and approaches were widely accepted and it was gradually absorbed into the mainstream of psychology, especially organismic psychology. The atomistic, molecular, mechanistic, and introspectionistic structuralism was replaced by the atomistic, mechanistic, and environmentalistic behaviorism of Watson. The structuralism of today is not related to the structuralism 207 of Titchener at all, and is more utilized by the organismic psychologists than any others. The approach to the presentation of the structural component of the organismic-structural-develop- mental approach to values deve10pment education will begin with the general approach of structuralism, then clarify the meaning and use of structure. Then it will be possible to make what is for us the all-important distinction between content and structure that forms part of the foundation of both the Piaget and Kohlberg theories, and makes it possible for values development education to resolve some of the problems inherent in the nomothetic and idiographic approaches to values/moral education. Structuralism Structuralism is many things, among which could be included (1) an intellectual movement in the French tradition, (2) a mode Of thought that can be found in many disciplines, but especially psychology, anthropology, linguistics, sociology, and economics, and (3) a method of scientific investigation particularly useful in the behavioral sciences. Categories one and two above will not be treated here, for they are not germane to this dissertation. Howard Gardner's The_guest for Mind (1972) thoroughly explores these issues, as well as number three and other aspects of . 7 . . structuralism. Our focus here W111 be on structuralism as a method (Sardner's book is a summary of structuralism in general; it also inlmmarizes the work and theories of both Piaget and Levi—Strauss, in genetic epistemology and anthropology, respectively. Other 'valuable resources include Lane (1970) and Piaget (1970c, 1972) 208 in organismic-deve10pmental psychology. Gardner (1972, p. 170) defines structuralism as follows: A method or approach rather than a care- fully formulated catechism, structuralism is an attempt to discern the arrangements of elements underlying a given domain isolated by an analyst. The structuralist notes variations in these arrangements; he then attempts to relate the variations by Specific rules whereby one can be transformed to another... The structuralist is particularly eager to find underlying regular- ities among seemingly disparate phenomena, since a ”determination of basic structures” will result in simplification of a mass of data as well as confirmation of the existence of laws governing that domain. This is a very general statement that implies more than it makes explicit. The focus on underlying regularities and ostensibly disparate phenomena are the crucial factors here. Gardner (p. 10) points out that structuralists and structuralism are distinguished and characterized by the following convictions summarized as: 1. That there is structure underlying all human behavior and intellectual functioning; 2. That this structure can be revealed by orderly analysis and scientific investigation; 3. That this structure has cohesiveness and meaning; and 4. That structures have generality, or some degree of interdependence (some psychologists call this transferability, but it basically refers to the fact that many behaviors can be related to the same structure(s) and that many structures can be 209 related to a particular behavior pattern). Claude Levi-Strauss is one of the principals in the structuralist movement. He is a contemporary anthrOpologist who has applied the method of structuralism to cultural anthropology and who has attempted to analyze social institutions, kinship relation— ships (especially the avunculate), marriage rites and customs, totemism, linguistics and speech, and human intelligence. As both Gardner (p. 148) and Edmund Leach (in Manners and Kaplan, 1968, p. 542) point out, Levi-Strauss believes that all human behaviors are manifestations of an underlying code or language. The human mind, by its inherent biologically-based organization and functional properties regulates and determines all human behavior, including social relationships. This "language" or code is not unlimited, inasmuch as the mind Operates within certain ranges, and can be decoded. Structuralism is based on this view and is an approach to decoding human behavior in order to ascertain the underlying structural components. Two major assumptions that, according to Gardner (p. 13) identify the work of structuralists are (1) that investigation of diverse groups from many cultures, children, adults, primitives, moderns, and others, can shed light on all human experience and reveal the underlying common ground of human nature, and (2) that the distinctive characteristics of human beliefs, deve10pment, and institutions is a reflection of the fundamental nature of human thought rooted in the biological structure of the organism and its mind. Both of these assumptions are certainly characteristic of the 210 work of Piaget, Werner, and Kohlberg. Lane's view of structuralism is along the same lines. He says (1970), p. 31): Structuralism, then, is a method whose primary intention is to permit the investigator to go beyond a pure description of what he perceives or experiences..., in the direction of the quality of rationality which underlies the social phenomena in which he is concerned. He identifies ”the distinctive properties of structuralism" (pp. 13-14) in the following terms: 1. "In the first place it is presented as a method whose scope includes all human social phenomena, no matter what their form, thus embracing not only the social sciences proper...but also the humanities...and the fine arts. This is made possible by the belief that all manifestations of social activity...constitute languages, in a formal sense.” He equates this with a code that can be deciphered, as mentioned above. 2. "Probably the most distinctive feature of the structuralist method is the emphasis it gives to wholes, to totalities." Lane contrasts the structuralist's emphasis on wholes with the more traditional analytic, atomistic approach to the social sciences. "They insist that the whole and the parts can be properly explained only in terms of the relations that exist between the parts. The essential quality of the structuralist method, and its fundamental tenet, lies 211 in its attempt to study not the elements of a whole, but the complex network of relationships that link and unite those elements." 3. "Next, structuralism seeks its structures not on the surface, at the level Of the observed, but below or behind empirical reality...What the observer sees is not the structure, but simply the evidence and product of the structure. On the other hand, though the structure of any activity is not itself what can be seen, it can only be derived from what is seen." It is this hallmark of the structuralist approach that is so important, as was mentioned earlier, to the work of Piaget and Kohlberg, and which permits such a deep understanding of values/moral behavior. The methodology that constitutes structuralism Gardner calls its strategic aspect. The belief that structures are reflections of the biological nature and properties of the organism and the holistic emphasis he refers to as its organismic aspect. He identifies a third aspect not yet mentioned, viz., its fermal aspect. This refers to the tendency on the part of many structuralists to "...formalize all relationships through some sort of logical model or system" (p. 172). This last element is especially true of Piaget, who has been trying to formalize in mathematics and logic the operations of the human mind for many years. Gardner cites as an example of the formal aspect the well-known French group of mathematicians whole individual members remain anonymous in the 212 literature, and who sign themselves as "Nicolas Bourbaki" or "N. Bourbaki." This group, frequently discussed by Piaget, has attempted to identify what they call the mother structures that are the foundations of all mathematics. As Piaget (1970a, p. 24) points out, these are called mother structures because they can be differentiated or combined to generate all other mathematical structures. The three Bourbaki structures are named (l) the algebraic structure, (2) the order structure, and (3) the topological structure. The nature of these structures is beyond the scope of this dissertation, but the Bourbaki and its findings are good examples of structuralism and structures. In addition to the people and contributions already mentioned, other notable contributions in the main stream of structur- alism have been the linguistic investigations and theories of Ferdinand de Saussure, Roman Jakobson, and Noam Chomsky; the work of anthrOpologist Edmund Leach, and the conceptual systems theory of O. J. Harvey, David Hunt, and Harold Schroder (1961). Before moving on to structure per se, one final distinction needs to be made. Piaget (1970c, Ch. VI) distinguishes between global structuralism and analytic structuralism.8 The former he identifies as the kind of structuralism that deals with social groups and the emergence of social relations, and appears to be a more descriptive kind of structuralism, and is exemplified by the work 8For a different use Of the same terms, global and analytic structures, see Schroder and Suedfeld (1971, p. 193) where Bieri refers to Witkin's work employing these terms. 213 of the French sociologist of the early twentieth century, Emile Durkheim. Another sociologist, himself a collaborator of Durkheim, was Marcel Mauss, and Piaget and Levi-Strauss regard him as an analytic structuralist because, in his studies of the gift, he dealt with what Piaget calls "transformational interactions.” In other words, Mauss investigated the underlying relationships that pertained in gift-giving in various cultures in order to ascertain the explanatory factors that could be used transformation- ally to explain similar practices in other places. A second point of difference between global and analytic is the fact that the former, according to Piaget, "holds to systems of observable relations and interactions, which are regarded as sufficient unto themselves," whereas "the peculiarity of authentic (analytic) structuralism is that it seeks to eXplain such empirical systems by postulating 'deep' structures from which the former are in some manner derivable" (1970, Ch. VI). Note that Piaget refers to the analytic form as "authentic." This is a very significant point for values development theory because the critical factor in the distinction between global and analytic is the content-structure distinction. Global structur- alists do not make this distinction and are not concerned with the decoding of human behavior and social phenomena in the formal, transformational sense that was explicit in the definitional statements presented earlier. It is understandable that Piaget views global as not being authentic structuralism, for it is the analytic type that really fits the identifying framework and the 214 global does not. The structural theories of Piaget, Kohlberg, Chomsky, and Harvey, Hunt, and Schroder are truly analytic forms of structuralism. All postulate underlying cognitive-affective structures that are involved in the transformation of the content data Of the external world into organismic terms, and the trans- formation of organismic structures into the particular content of a given individual or given culture. Piaget, Kohlberg, and Harvey, Hunt and Schroder talk about content and structure; Chomsky talks about surface structure and deep structure. The hallmark of Chomsky's theory is his transformational grammar, which he believes to be based on an innate kernel or core (a priorism); whereas, Piaget, Kohlberg, and Harvey, Hunt and Schroder all view cognitive structure as being constructed by the organism in transaction with the environment. As Piaget says (1970c, p. 140): There is no structure apart from construction, either abstract or genetic." Structure If human behavior, including thinking, can be considered a code that can be deciphered with the methodology of structuralism, then the code must be based on elements, organization, and relation- ships that can be systematicallly conceptualized. Such conceptual- izations would represent the inferred structures of human behavior that are rooted in the biological nature of the organism and manifest themselves in thought, language, and action. The structure under consideration is that of analytic structuralism, and not the generalized descriptive concept of structure of global 215 structuralism. Cognitive structures are presumed to exist in the psychobiological functioning of the human mind, and are inferred from systematic investigations and analysis of thought. Piaget and his associates have spent more than fifty years trying to fashion a theory of intellectual Operation and development. The Geneva school considers structure to be one of the basic aspects of intelligence. Piaget's most concise definition of structure is the following (1970c, p. 44): ...a structure is a systematic whole of self- regulating transformations... He elaborates this a little with the following (p. 5): As a first approximation, we may say that a structure is a system Of transformations. Inasmuch as it is a system and not a mere collection of elements and their prOperties, these transformations involve laws: the struc- ture is preserved or enriched by the interplay of its transformation laws, which never yield results external to the system nor employ elements that are external to it. In short, the notion of structure is comprised of three key ideas: the idea of wholeness, the idea of transformation, and the idea of self-regulation. First, let us deal with wholeness. Piaget (1970c, p. 7) distinguishes between structures and aggregates, "the former being wholes, the latter composites formed of elements that are independent of the complexes into which they enter." The crucial factor here is the independence of the elements in an aggregate. Both structures and aggregates are made up of elements, but as Piaget says: "the elements of a structure are subordinated to laws, and it is in terms of these laws that the structure qua whole or system is defined." He offers as an illustration the system of whole numbers in another 216 discussion on the wholeness of structure (1970a, p. 22) as follows: ...a structure is a totality; that is, it is a system governed by laws that apply to the system as such, and not only to one or another element in the system. The system of whole numbers is an example of a structure, since there are laws that apply to the series as such. Many different mathematical structures can be discovered in the series of whole numbers. One, for instance is the additive group. The rules for associativity, commutativity, transitivity, and closure for addition all hold within the series of whole numbers. On this same point in another statement (1970c, p. 7) Piaget says: ...the integers do not exist in isolation from one another, nor were they discovered one by one in some accidental sequence and then, finally, united into a whole. They do not come upon the scene except as ordered, and this order of the integers is associated with structural properties (of groups, fields, rings, and the like), which are quite different from the properties of number individuals, each of which is even or odd, prime or non-prime, and so on. Consider a pile of bricks, an aggregate of elements, and an identifiable composite. No one brick depends upon another for its existence or its meaning. If there is any wholeness to the aggregate of bricks it is elemental and not relational. But, as Piaget points out, the whole numbers exist only in relation to each other in an ordered sequence. The aggregate of bricks could be assembled in parts, but whole numbers were not invented or created individually and independently and then assembled into a system. The whole number system reflects the systematic properties of the human mind and has a holistic totality, not a composed totality. The whole numbers are not mere elements, they are intrinsically a structural whole. 217 This structural wholeness is manifested in the logical consistency of organized thought—patterns and the unity Of relation- ships in language. It reveals itself in classification, for example. You would not sort trees into evergreen, deciduous, and tall. Nor would you sort materials into hard, soft, and purple. There is a logical inconsistency in these categories that violates the wholeness of the structures involved. It is important to Observe in these examples that the logical concepts and the wholeness are not properties of the things being classified. They are structural properties in the human mind. From the trees' perspectives, so to speak, there is nothing wrong with sorting them into the above three categories for there are deciduous, evergreen, and tall trees. Trees exist as trees; the categories into which they are sorted are creations Of the mind and reflect the wholeness of cognitive structures. The second key idea of structure is transfbrmation. Structures are not static images, they are systems of change. The whole numbers, again, can be transformed in many ways, and when they are the transformations are systematic and lawful. The changes may involve time or the rearrangement of elements, or both. One number can be transformed into another, e.g., l + 1 = 2, in a transformation of elements. The cognitive structure involved in the concept ”child” incorporates temporal change; any given child changes with time and different children have different ages, a notion related to time. Piaget frequently relates a story about his walking through the woods with one of his children. In the course of the walk many snails were seen by the young child, who 218 believed they were the same snail in every case. The child was unable to cognitively reconstruct the transformations from event to event in time and space, and realize that the snails were all different. The child's incomplete structures were unable to cope with the laws Of transformation. Later, with more mature structures, the older child would have no difficulty with this situation. The systematic nature of the laws of transformation require that changes in one direction or dimension are compensated for by equivalent changes in the other dimension or direction. If a round ball of clay is rolled out into a sausage without any clay being removed all the changes in shape and size will be balanced out. A young child will be unable to cope with these transformations and will not be able to understand that the amount of clay has remained the same. A child with fully developed cognitive structures will be able to attend to these simultaneous transformations and conserve his concept of the amount of matter involved. A true structure is preserved in the face of change. A final illustration of the transformational nature of structures is available in language. As Chomsky has elucidated, a child can take the transformational rules of the base structure of language and generate a wide variety of sentences with the same words, without having been taught to do so and without being aware of the process. The human mind functions according to these transformational rules that are lawful. The third idea Piaget presented as basic to the idea of structure is that of selflregulation. Piaget (1970c, pp. 13-14) describes Or to put 219 this as follows: The third basic property of structures is, as we said, that they are self-regulating, self- regulation entailing self—maintenance and closure. Let us start by considering the two derivative prOperties: what they add up to is that the transformations inherent in a structure never lead beyond the system but always engender elements that belong to it and preserve its laws. Again an example will help to clarify: In adding or subtracting any two whole numbers, another whole number is Obtained, and one which satisfies the laws of the "additive group" of whole numbers. It is in this sense that a structure is "closed," a notion perfectly compatible with the structure's being considered a substructure of a larger one; but in being treated as a substructure, a structure does not lose its own boundaries; the larger structure does not "annex" the substructure; if anything, we have a confederation, so that the laws of the substructure are not altered but conserved and the intervening change is an enrichment rather than an impoverishment. it a bit differently, Piaget (1970a, p. 23) says: The third characteristic is that a structure is self-regulating; that is, in order to carry out these laws of transformation, we need not go outside the system to find some external element. Similarly, once a law of transformation has been applied, the result does not end up outside the system. Referring to the additive group once again, when we add one whole number to another, we do not have to go outside the series of whole numbers in search of any element that is not within the series. And once we have added the two whole numbers together, our result still remains within the series. We could call this closure, too, but it does not mean that a structure as a whole cannot relate to another structure or other structures as wholes. Any structure can be a substructure in a larger system. It is very easy to see that the whole numbers are a part of a larger system, which includes fractional numbers. These similar passages point out the self—regulating characteristic of structure by emphasizing the structure's capacity to preserve 220 its own integrity by following logical principles of Operation and staying within itself. Now it can be seen that the three characteristics are succinctly brought together in Piaget's definition of structure quoted earlier: "a structure is a systematic whole of self- regulating transformations." The concept of structure plays a very important role in Piaget's theory and in Kohlberg's theory as well. Its meaning will become clearer as more of the details of those theories are presented. A very brief synOpsis of Piaget's basic theory of intelligence will put the notion of structure more in perspective. Piaget's Basic Cognitive Theory9 Piaget conceives intelligence as adaptation and says that it is comprised of three major components: content, function, and structure. 9This summary is a brief presentation of an enormously complex and extensive theory. Piaget's own writings are substantially represented in the bibliography of this dissertation and should be consulted for a complete understanding of the theory. A widely recognized comprehensive and authoritative resource is the summary, analysis, and critique of Piaget done by Flavell (1963). Other resources on this subject include: Athey and Rubadeau (1970), A. L. Baldwin (1967), Beard (1969), Boyle (1969), Brown (1970), Elkind (1970), Elkind and Flavell (1969), Furth (1969, 1970), Gardner (1972), Ginsburg and Opper (1969), Gorman (1972), Hunt (1961), Langer (1969), Lavatelli (1971), Schwebel and Raph (1973), Sigel and Hooper (1968), Tanner and Inhelder (1971), and Wadsworth (1971). Two other resources especially useful for a quick introduction to Piaget that are comprehensive and easy to understand are: Maier (1969) and Pulaski (1971). 221 Content is the observable raw data of intelligent behavior-- it is what we see, hear, and generally perceive of someone's behavior. Content is the most superficial aspect of intelligence and it is enormously influenced by and considerably determined by the organism's environment. Vocabularly, for example, is the most superficial part of language and is a reflection of the individual's society and culture. Intellectual content varies considerably from culture to culture, society to society, family to family. It is the content aspect of intelligence that constitutes the major part of behavior sampled by the conventional psychometric intelligence tests from which IQ scores are derived. For any given individual, then, the content of intelligence is a function primarily of age and environment, and is enormously malleable. Function, on the other hand, is the biologically-rooted invariant part of intelligence. It is the way the organism transacts with the world. It is a mode of intellectual functioning that consists of two basic processes, viz., organization and adaptation. Organization is the underlying systematic pattern of relationships that characterize the human mind. Organization makes it possible for the mind to interpret and process the input it receives. Adaptation is the external process that is possible because of the underlying organization. The human mind adapts to the world in two ways: it assimilates and it accommodates. Assimilation is the process whereby the mind receives data from the world in terms 0f existing knowledge, familiar patterns, the known. It is the side of adaptation by which the world is transformed to fit the 222 organism; it is the taking in and operating on the input in terms of the person. Accommodation, on the other hand, is the complementary process by which the environment Operates, so to speak, on the organism and forces the mind to change its internal fUnctioning in terms of the external world. The organism perceives a familiar event-- it sees an animal that it immediately recognizes as a dog. This is possible because the organism already possesses the cognitive apparatus that makes it possible. The organism sees a new animal, one that it has never seen before and for which it has nothing to relate it to—- now it must either force the concept of the perceived strange animal into an existing category or it must create a new category, "cat". The first process of taking the dog into the already established category, "dog" is assimilation. However, when the organism attempts to assimilate the unfamiliar animal, it cannot proceed. SO it must accommodate. It creates a new cognitive category. Now it can assimilate the new event into the new category. The complementary processes of assimilation and accommoda- tion are related to each other in another sense, also. That is, they form a dynamic equilibrium in this process of trying to regulate cognitive activity. The mind seeks to keep things in balance, and growth (quantitative change) and deve10pment (qualitative change) proceed through the continuous process of going through cycles of equilibrium--disequilibrium--equilibrium--disequilibrium. This process is one of the most crucial aspects of the organismic-struc- tural-developmental approach. It is called the equilibrium process. It is one of the central features in Piaget's theory and also plays 223 a major role in Kohlberg's theory. Function is obviously a very complex part of intelligence. It is function that firmly roots intelligence in the basic biological organismic processes of the human being. Whereas content is malleable and externally influenced, function is invariant and internally determined. Consequently, it is function that is so much determined by genetic factors. Structure is that aspect of intelligence that Piaget postulates as the bridge between the superficial content and the biologically based invariant function. Cognitive structure is the organized mental component of intelligence. Cognitive structure is created through functioning and manifests itself in content. Flavell (1963, p. 17) says: ...What are structures in Piaget's system? They are the organizational properties of intelligence, organizations created through functioning and inferable from the behavioral contents whose nature they determine. As such, Piaget speaks of them as mediators interposed between the invariant functions on the one hand and the variegated behavioral contents on the other. And in the words of two other Piaget scholars, Ginsburg and Opper (1969, p. 22): If we accept that Piaget's theoretical framework is based on the concept of psycho- logical structures, how can we go about describing them? One way to describe them is by using common language. We can say that the Child classifies Objects or that his moral judgment is "objective," and so forth. As a result of the tendencies toward adaptation and organization, new structures are continually being created out of the Old 224 ones which will be employed to assist the individual in his interaction with the world. Looking at the matter another way, structures are necessary for adaptation and organization. One could neither adapt to the environment nor organize one's processes if there were no basic structures available at the outset. On the other hand, the very existence of a structure, which by Piaget's definition is an organized totality, entails the necessity for organiza- tion and adaptation. There are, however, important differences between the invariant functions and the structures. As the individual progresses through the life span, the functions will remain the same but the structures will vary, and appear in a fairly regular sequence. Another way of saying this is that intellectual development proceeds through a series of stages with each stage characterized by a different kind of psychological structure. An individual of any age must adapt to the environment and must organize his responses continually, but the instruments by which he accomplishes this-- the psychological structures--will change from one age level to another. For example, both the infant and the adult will organize and adapt; but the resulting psychological structures are quite different for the two periods. So we can see from these statements that a structure may be a system of classification, that it is an organized totality, and that.it is an instrument for adapting and organizing. Thus a structure is an organizational thought-pattern that undergoes transformations in its dynamic relationship with the environment, but Operates in a self- regulating way in order to maintain continuity, stability, and equilibrium both for itself and the organism. The transformations that structures undergo are equilibrated, or dynamically balanced and self-regulated, in increasingly more complex, integrated, and effective ways with maturation, experience, and transaction with the environment. For example, a child of five is able to classify 225 (sort) beads and cats into two categories or structures. But a child of ten can do something the child of five cannot do, viz., classify the beads into subcategories vs. the whole category. That is, the ten-year old can understand that if she has ten yellow beads and five brown beads, that she has more beads than yellow beads. Most five-year-olds do not have the cognitive capacity to permit this operation. In other words, the child's structures dealing with classification are not sufficiently equilibrated to cope with this task. The child's inherited reflexes thus become transformed into action structures capable of grasping, sucking, smiling, and other actions. These structures eventually become equilibrated at a higher level of development permitting them to be coordinated into more complex structures that will enable the child to control the movements of eyes and hands to accomplish a task. Eventually the child's more advanced structures will permit symbolic representa- tion of these actions, and later he will be able to coordinate the symbolic representations with concrete actions. And even later, if he is able to equilibrate his structures at the highest level of human thought, he will be able to perform cognitive operations on other cognitive operations without the use of concrete objects or actions, e.g., he will be able to think about thoughts, contemplate the pOssible outcomes of three different courses of action and their Opposite courses, and make hypotheses about the predicted outcomes. These advanced Operations will involve highly complex structures of classification, seriation, proportion, reciprocity, time, causality, 226 and many others, and the complex interrelationships among all these things. The basic theory just presented is what is generally referred to as Piaget's stage-independent portion of his overall theory. The stage-dependent portion will be presented in a later section that covers the developmental component of organismic- structural-developmental. At this point a more detailed examination of the content-structure distinction is possible. Content versus Structure Earlier it was pointed out that the psychometric approach to intelligence tends to concentrate on the superficial aspects of content, and tends to lead to a quantitative assessment of an individual's intellectual abilities. Likewise, in the values/moral area the nomothetic and idiographic approaches to education focus on content and superficially assess the values/moral deve10pment of individuals. A structural approach to this problem makes it possible to go beyond content and attempt to more objectively assess one's values/moral development. Perhaps the difference could be expressed as the difference between judging and evaluating, if judging can be construed as the drawing of a prejudicial conclusion v/f based on a superficial weighing of evidence against the standard of one's own beliefs or the standards of society's norms; and evaluating can be construed as deriving a.warranted assumption from an analysis of sufficient data objectively obtained and compared with universal patterns of behavior scientifically determined. The structural 227 approach makes it possible, therefore, to arrive at qualitative evaluations of values/moral deve10pment and to create instructional programs to induce such development. The content-structure distinction is critical for this purpose. Content is the easily obtained and readily observable aspect of behavior. Structure is the covert underlying logical reasoning that generated the answer. If a person is presented with a mathematical problem to solve, the answer to the problem would be the content. To arrive at the structure the person would have to explain how the answer was calculated and what logic was used. If a person is asked to make a judgment about the worth of something, a prOposed law for the legalization Of the possession, sale, and use of marijuana, for example, the answer might be either that the proposed law is good or bad. This response deals with content. Appropriate probing questions could be directed to this person that would elicit the reasoning behind the judgment. Perhaps the reSpondent would give an in-depth justification for the rejection of such a law on the grounds that it would lead to the breakdown of social order, the rejection of legally constituted authority, and the deterioration of family life. Further probing might reveal that the person believes that man does not have the right to legalize something that violates the established standards of God, tradition, and accepted morality. The elaboration of the person's justification for the content answer is beginning to reveal the structure of the person's thought. Notice that the response given in the example above reveals an underlying thought-pattern that is consistently 228 expressive of the acceptance of Objective authority as the source of law and morality. The response suggests a structural posture that is likely to remain consistent across other content dimensions on which this person could be probed. Another person presented with the same problem and same probing questions might also answer that the proposed law legalizing marijuana is bad, but the reason is that is will make it dangerous to be around people who use the drug because they may rob you to get enough money to support their drug habit. The respondent argues that laws are to protect him and his property from dangerous criminals, and that society should not allow people to do bad things like take drugs because he will have to be afraid. He further argues that peOple should not want to take drugs because he knows that they are bad for you. Notice that both Of these individuals answered that the prOposed law is a bad law. The content of their answers is the same. One could conclude on this basis that they are morally good or bad, depending on which side of the issue the judge happens to support. The judge could even conclude that the individuals were equally mature with respect to the morality of this issue. The first person's justification, however, was in terms of objective law and order and established authority. The second person's justification is qualitatively quite different. His reasoning is completely in terms of himself as an individual actor, and is based on perceived personal danger that would ensue as the result of enactment of such a law. It is important to recognize that both individuals may Speak 229 in terms of "society" and that both express fear. But both of these issues, society and fear, are handled from a different perspective and justification in each case. The second respondent uses the word "society," but in a very concrete and personal sense as a perceived entity that protects him. His fear is a personal fear related to his own welfare and fear itself is concretely envisioned as bodily threat. The first respondent seems to see society in terms of social order and legitimate authority. His Structure is considerably more abstract than that of the second respondent. His fear may also include the fear of personal danger, but it goes beyond this to the fear of social breakdown. This brief consideration of two concrete examples begins to reveal the nature of structure as distinguished from content. The superficial attitude or opinion expresses is Shown to be content that can be identical across people who as individuals may be signifi- cantly different in their structural development. The empirical research of many structuralists has revealed what seems to be a limited number of distinct patterns of structural thought-patterns and logic systems that are indicative of universality of human behavior and the human mind. What appears on the surface to be an unlimited range of human potentiality seems to be underneath a more attenuated range of possible behavior. Thus cultural and ethical v/’ relativity may well be applicable to the content of human behavior, but not to the structure. Looking only at acts, customs, dress, mores, folkways, and many other facets of individual and social existence can lead to a relativistic view. Looking at the meaning 230 behind these human behavior patterns can lead to an understanding of the basic universality of structure, process, and deve10pment. Another important issue in behavioral science that needs to be reexamined in terms of structuralism is the alleged discrepancy between attitude and behavior. The literature of social psychology includes a massive amount of theoretical and empirical reports on theories of attitude formation, attitude change, and methods of intervention for attitude Shaping.10 This literature abounds with discussions about the differences between what people say and do about given issues. Much of this theoretical and empirical work has been done in the behavioristic stimulus-response tradition and has been conducted on what we are calling content. It is hypothesized here that the discrepancies are largely the product of content analysis that could be resolved with structural analysis.11 Turiel (in Travers, 1973, pp. 750-755) discusses this issue and Offers support for the hypothesis that the inconsistencies between cognitive judgment and action are related to content, and that when an 10Abelson et a1 (1968), Bem (1970), Cohen (1964), Greenwald, Brock, and Ostrom (1968), Hovland, Janis, and Kelley (1953), Insko (1967) Jahoda and Warren (1966), Kieslar, Collins, and Miller (1969), Sherif and Sherif (1967), Thomas (1971), Triandis (1971), and Zimbardo and Ebbesen (1969). 11Another factor is that within the conceptual frameworks used in the attitude research attitudes are conceived as different from behavior, which leads to many misunderstandings. The problem is not one of a discrepancy between attitudes, which are a form of behavior, and action, which is another form of behavior; but a discrepancy between two different forms of behavior which can be resolved with a different kind of analysis. This point is excellently presented by Burhans (1971) and Miller (1967), along with Turiel (1973) as mentioned above. 231 individual's behavior is examined structurally there is considerably more consistency. Turiel, in the same source, cites an example that illustrates the difference between content and structure and how this distinction can aid in evaluating judgments of value and moral development. First, a few technical terms need to be clarified. Piaget maintains that children's thought is characterized by a number of distinct qualities that make it difficult or impossible for children adequately to make judgments that are within the range of adult thought. These characteristics include what Piaget calls realism, which in turn leads to types of childish thought called animism and artificialism. Realism is the view that my point of view is everybody's point of view. The small child believes that other people see what he sees regardless of differences in position or perspective. As a result of this they believe that inanimate things are alive (animism) and that people are responsible for all things in the sense that they cause them (artificialism). Turiel (1969, p. 109) points out that a child's moral judgments are influenced by these sorts of thinking. Young children link events in the real world that are unrelated, as when the child believes that a catastrophe immediately following a misdeed constitutes automatic punishment for the misdeed. Piaget calls this the belief in "immanent justice".(Piaget, 1932). For example, a young child in one of Piaget's stories stole some apples from an orchard. On his way home after this deed, the child crossed a bridge which broke causing him to fall into the river. Children of 6 or 7 will insist 232 that it wOuld not have happened if he had not committed the trans— gression. To ascertain the child's level of development on this issue one would have to ask who caused the event to happen and how did it happen. If the child insists that the bridge broke because the boy stole the apple without any additional factor of causality being introduced (such as, "God did it,") then he believes in immanent justice. If, however, the child introduces intermediate elements into the picture and explains the misdeed in terms of God, or his parents, or other sources of power that caused the event, then we would not explain the cognitive process in terms of immanent justice in Piaget's sense. As Turiel points out, the person explaining the events in terms of direct causality of events is using a lower level of thought than the person who introduces intermediate steps of causality involving a more complex picture of the world and life events. Thus, on the surface, two ostensibly similar answers (content) are based on two different types of structure. Now let us consider an adult explaining the same events in terms of God punishing an individual for Stealing by causing him to be hurt in a natural disaster. IS the adult using a childish mode of thought? Is the adult invoking immanent justice? Possibly either of these is true, or there is a third possibility, viz., that the adult is processing the data in a completely different way and coming to a conclusion that appears to be similar, but in reality involves complex concepts of eschatology, retribution, and other elements of theology. In order to understand the adult's 233 level of values development we would have to explore the structure of his reasoning to see if it is a childish belief in immanent justice, a more sophisticated form of childish thinking involving the linking up of two events in terms of a third causal event, or an even more sophisticated form of thinking involving complex structural relationships among time, causality, world views, and other abstract concepts. The point is that the three peOple may all be Operating with the childish structure of immanent justice; or other more mature structures Of expiatory justice, retributive justice, or distributive justice may be involved, each of which is respectively more sophisticated than the preceding one. Consequently, to get a fuller understanding of the individual's level of values development we must distinguish between content and structure. In the definition given earlier by Piaget, " a structure is a systematic whole of self-regulating transformations." The three characteristics of wholeness, transformation, and self- regulation along with their systematic interrelationships may be seen in terms of the concepts of justice just presented. If justice is seen as a cognitive structure, and the various types of justice seen as increasingly more equilibrated forms of the same principle, then the meaning of wholeness, transformation, and self-regulation can be understood. The quality, logic, complexity, and integration of the higher forms of justice are clearly superior to the immanent justice of the child, yet each is an integrated whole on its own terms. Each form is a characteristic pattern of thought that uses its own type of logical rules (no matter how illogical the lower 234 forms may appear to one capable of the higher forms) and maintains its own balance of relationships with other concepts. The immanent justice structure relates things that logically appear to the child to be related. For the child, animism, artificialism, and other properties define the way the world really is. Thus the justice structure of that child is a consistent whole integrated with his ideas about causality. The transformations he makes, therefore, (a transformation being a change from one state to another) are in these terms. Little children of this period may believe that the sun and the moon follow them around, that rocks are alive, and that the vacuum cleaner really does have a monster in it. Why is it not logical, then, that the bridge would punish the child for stealing the apples a few minutes before? A child at this stage will transform the data of the real world on his own terms, in harmony with other cognitive and affective factors consistent with that stage. An Older child, or an adult, will each in his own way at his level do the same thing. But the wholeness and the nature of the transformations, in each case, will be characteristic. The self-regulating characteristic is evident in these considerations in that the integrity of the structure is maintained with the consistency of the logic applied to the different Situations. The IOgdc of immanent justice, the logic of expiative justice, the logic 0f retributive justice, and the logic of distributive justice are a11 of varying degrees of quality, complexity, and sophistication. But each maintains its own balance and its own harmony with itself and the other cognitive structures in the minds of the individuals 235 involved. The decisions and judgments made in each case may appear to be Similar, and that is the content. The underlying structure, however, is vastly different. Looking only at the former can easily lead us to erroneous conclusions about the person's values. Attempts to understand the underlying structure will permit us a fuller, deeper, and richer understanding of the individual and his values. One final example is presented to further demonstrate the content-structure distinction and how it can be related to the differ- ent approaches to values/moral education described earlier in this dissertation. Let us consider an investigator who presents a dilemma to a subject. The dilemma involves an important moral conflict faced by the protagonist of the story whose name is Heinz. This dilemma is one of many used by Kohlberg in his investi- gations of moral deve10pment, and is presented here:12 In EurOpe, a woman was near death from a Special kind of cancer. There was one drug that the doctors thought might save her. It was a form of radium that a druggist in the same town had recently discovered. The drug was expensive to make, but the druggist was charging ten times what the drug cost him to make. He paid $200 for the radium and charges $2,000 for a small dose of the drug. The Sick woman's husband, Heinz, went to everyone he knew to borrow the money, but he could only get together about $1,000 which is half of what it cost. He told the druggist that his wife was dying, and asked him to sell it cheaper or let him pay later. But the druggist said, "No, I dis- covered the drug and I'm going to make money 12This dilemma appears in many of Kohlberg's articles and is also available in Kohlberg and staff (1973). 236 from it." So Heinz got desperate and broke into the man's store to Steal the drug for his wife. Now let us imagine that the subject of this investigation tells the investigator that he believes that Heinz Should steal the drUg to save his wife's life. Can the investigator come to any conclusions about the moral deve10pment of the subject with this information? For the traditional-authoritarian operating from an absolute nomothetic point of view the answer would be Simple-—look to the moral law which is very explicit on this point. Stealing is wrong, the subject is immoral. If the moral code makes allowances for limited exceptions based on circumstances the problem is still relatively easy to solve, for the code will be explicit about those conditions and will provide an appropriate authority to evaluate the situation and render a decision. Whatever the circumstances the evaluation will be based on the content of the act vis-a-vis the objective moral code. For the cultural-relativist the answer may be more difficult to derive, but it will still be based on content and the code of the society. The absolute relativist, if he is consistent with his beliefs, will be unable to render a judgment on any basis other than his own personal opinion, which will be based on his judgment of the content of the act. The structuralist would say that there is no way of knowing anything about the moral development of the subject by knowing his decision on the moral dilemma. Nor would knowing anything about the circumstances, context, Situation, or environ- 237 ment give you any definitive clues. He would insist that in knowing the subject's choice we have only tapped the content of his judgment. That is, we have only observed the overt verbal indications of the subject's behavior. We do not know anything about the cognitive operations that lie behind the superficial statement of content. We know nothing about the deeper processes by which the subject made that decision. By this we do not mean the situation or the context (for that is also related to content), but the logical operations of thinking that took place in the subject's mind. We have not tapped the structure of the person's mind. To elucidate, let us consider some possible reasons that could be offered for Heinz to steal the drug. One may say that Heinz should steal the drug because if he doesn't he will be punished for letting his wife die. Or he may say Heinz should steal the drug because he needs her in marriage and in the home to take care Of him, to cook and sew, and to make him happy. Or he may make his decision in terms of the mutual love they share, and because it is the thing that "any good husband" would do for his wife. Or, finally, he may say that the deeper law of his society, or that the law of the Christian society in which he lives requires that a husband love, honor, and protect his wife, and that he should give first obedience to that law and steal the drug to save his wife. The structuralist would begin to recognize, in each of these cases, different levels of structural deve10pment, and would probe with appropriate questions in order to determine 238 more of the subject's mental operations used in arriving at the judgment. For example, suppose that the investigatOr has probed, and that he has extensively explored the reasoning behind the subject's original simple "Yes”. Further suppose that the four answers offered above are actually the answers from four different subjects, all of whom answered the dilemma in the affirmative, and that in each case he has gotten complete statements consistent with the type of thinking already given. Based on this information the structuralist would be able to evaluate the responses of the subjects in terms of the theoretical and empirical formulations of Piaget and Kohlberg that reveal and elaborate the universal patterns of judgment on cognitive-moral issues and their deve10pment sequence. Whereas the nomothetic and idiographic investigators arrived at judgments based on social or personal codes of prescribed behavior, the structuralist would, arrive at evaluations of moral deve10pment based on objective data about how the human organism in transaction with the environment constructs values/moral orientations from the universal patterns of intellectual processing performed by the human mind. Conclusion The second component of the organismic-structural- developmental position has been presented by first explaining structuralism, a methodology of scientific investigation that is particularly fruitful for exploring the intellectual and affective aSpects of human existence in order to better understand values/moral 239 development. Then the nature of structure was examined as a way of conceptualizing one major aspect of intelligence. Further explication of this concept was made available through the larger framework from which it comes in terms of the stage-independent portion of Piaget's theory. This set the stage for a fuller development of the important distinction between content and structure which is so important to the values development theory. It should be apparent that the structural component forms a natural bridge between the organismic and developmental components. The concept of structure and the methodology of structuralism are inherently holistic and transactional, and wholeheartedly organismic. Structuralism is actually an application of the basic tenets of organismic psychology. Piaget's definition of structure reveals the organismic nature of the concept explicitly in wholeness, transfbrmation, and selfLregulation. But structures are constructed in the course of organismic transactions--this structure elaboration, or morphogenesis, constitutes the diachronic aspect of organismic progress. Its synchronic counterpart is provided by the process, or function, that makes the transactions possible. The synchronic aspects of ontogenesis generate the diachronic structure that provides stability, continuity, and integration to a dynamic organism in an ever- changing environment. But, as Piaget says (1970c, p. 62): Of course, human structures do not arise out of nothing. If it be true that all structures are generated, it is just as true that generation is always a passing from a simpler to a more complex structure, this process, according to 240 the present state of our knowledge, being endless. So there are certain givens from which the construction of logical Structures takes off, but these "data" are not primordial in any absolute sense, being merely the start- ing point for our analysis, nor do they "contain" what is, in the course of construction, "derived" from and "based" on them. We called these initial structures behind which we cannot go "general coordinations of actions," meaning to refer to the connections that are common to all sensorimotor‘coordinations. These ”general coordinations of actions" in the sensorimotor neonate are the foundations for the construction of knowledge from the practical intelligence of this first period in life to higher forms of adaptation. But what of the nature of these structures about which we have had so much to say? Piaget (1970c, p. 44) says of them: ...structures are not observable as such, being located at levels which can be reached only by abstracting forms of forms or systems of the h . . nt degree; that 15, the detection of structure calls for a special effort of reflective abstraction. But the reflective abstraction reveals not only the nature of the particular structure and the individual in whose mind it functions, but it reveals the nature of the human organism itself and the wider world of all human beings. But the nature of this human organism is not static, it proceeds in time. Structures do not merely exist, they develop. As Piaget (1970c, pp. 140-141) makes so clear: But in areas where genesis [deve10pment] obtrudes on everyday observation, as in the psychology of intelligence, one cannot help but become aware that structure and genesis are necessarily interdependent. Genesis is simply transition from one structure to another, nothing more; but this transition always 241 leads from a "weaker" to a "stronger" structure; it is a "formative" transition. Structure is simply a system of transformations, but its roots are Operational; it depends, therefore, on a prior formation of the instruments of transformation--transformation rules or laws. Thus far, then, the organismic and structural portions of the foundation for a theory for values development education have been described. But a holistic organism with dynamic structures can only be fUlly understood in the course of its development. Con- sequently, it is to development, the final third of the foundation, that attention is now given. C. Developmental The term development presents the same problem as structure, viz., it has many meanings in the behavioral sciences and phiIOSOphy. The use of the term in the organismic-Structural-developmental conceptual framework is highly specific but consistent with its meaning in organismic psychology, organismic-developmental psychology, and structural—developmental psychology. Within these orientations two peOple are largely responsible for the basic theoretical formulations of developmental psychology: Jean Piaget and Heinz Werner. DevelOpment as conceptualized by Werner and Piaget is better understood against other conceptualizations, especially the maturational and associationistic frameworks. In Chapter III of this dissertation the notion that growth and deve10pment are largely or exclusively the result of the natural unfolding of the predetermined play or program "wired-in" 242 to the organism was presented as the maturational, nativistic, nativistic-maturational, normative, or normative-maturational theory of development. As recently as twenty years ago this theory had many supporters in American psychology, especially as it was articulated by its leading exponent, Arnold Gessell. A few statements by Gessell will make clear the extreme emphasis placed on maturation and will exemplify development as conceptualized within this framework. Gessell (1954) makes the following statement: From the moment of fertilization, intrinsic and extrinsic factors cooperate in a unitary manner; but the original impulse of growth and the matrix of morphogenesis are endogenous rather than exogenous. The so-called environ- ment, whether internal or external, does not generate the progressions of development. Environmental factors support, inflect, and specify; but they do not engender the basic forms and sequences of ontogenesis. (p. 354) Gessell recognizes that the organism's environment enters into the picture, he refers to it as "acculturation." He cautions that "the distinction between maturation and acculturation must not be drawn too Sharply" and clearly renders the role of the environment to a subordinate role. He says: ...the maturational mechanism...literally establish the basis patterns of behavior and of growth career... By growth we do not mean a mystical essence, but a physiological process of organization which is registered in the Structural and functional unity of the individual. In this sense the maturational matrix is the primary determinant of child behavior. Growth is a unifying concept which resolves the dualism of heredity and environment. Environ- mental factors support, inflect, and modify; but they do not generate the progressions of develop- 243 ment... Neither physical nor cultural environ- ment contains any architectonic arrangements like the mechanisms of growth. Culture accumulates; it does not grow. The glove goes on the hand; the hand determines the glove. (p. 358) The glove-hand metaphor clearly reveals Gessell's position. He and his associates conducted extensive longitudinal studies of infancy and childhood and published extensive reports on the precise age periods that constituted normal development (maturation). 'These models of development dealt with both gross (molar) patterns and characteristics and extremely specific (molecular) actions and behaviors. Gessell's work was extremely influential and even received a great deal of exposure in the popular press. Many parents closely followed the development of their children with Gessell's charts and tables as their guides, and many an anxious parent consulted a physician or a psychologist about his or her child's deviation from those authoritative norms. Environmental stimulation may be required or important for evoking, eliciting, or supperting the behavior patterns that emerge, but the basic nature of the pattern was built into the system by the genes. Learning takes place as the result of action from the environment impinging on the organism, but the readiness, the effect- iveness and the degree of learning will reflect the genetic pattern- ing. Thus deve10pment in this theory is the unfolding of the behavior patterns in accordance with the maturational processes and timetable. The extreme view of this position sees maturation as both the necessary and sufficient condition for development. A 244 more moderate view would hold that maturation is the necessary, dominant, and determining condition, but that the environment and learning can partially influence superficial aspects of behavior, but only within the strict confines of the maturational program and timetable. In contrast to and diametrically opposite to the matura- tional theory of development is a theory that can be called environmentalistic. This theory is readily recognizable as the developmental orientation of behaviorism and is frequently referred to in the literature as the associationistic, behavioristic, or learning theory approach. Radical behaviorism, as epitomized by the conceptual framework of B. F. Skinner, is the extreme formula- tion of the environmentalistic theory of development. Environment- alists recognize the existence of the organism as a manifestation of genetic forces, and realize that the presence and nature of the mechanisms of learning are determined by biogenetic factors. The importance of these factors, however, is minimal with regard to deve10pment, which is held to be primarily a function of the environment. DevelOpment is the process by which the organism acquires the structure of the environment through the mechanisms of association, instrumental and Operant conditioning, and possibly imitation and identification. The underlying principle is that human behavior is a reflection of the external world, which is why Langer (1969) calls this "the mechanical mirror" theory of develop— ment. Concepts like mind and personality are viewed as sets or 245 patterns of Specific behavioral responses to Specific stimuli in the environment. Development in this view is the quantitative accumulation of apprOpriate stimulus-response patterns acquired through mechanical interaction with the environment. In neither the maturational nor the environmental theory of development does the human organism take an active part in the developmental process. In both cases the child is the victim and the receptor. Obviously this is contrary to the organismic and structural conceptual frameworks presented earlier, and as can be expected deve10pment is conceptualized quite differently from these perspectives. The term development takes on a fundamentally' different and considerably more complex meaning in the organismic- structural-developmental approach to which we now turn our attention, beginning with some brief comments about Werner's orthogenetic principle of development. The Orthogenetic Principle One of the generally accepted central propositions of the organismic-developmental conceptual framework is Werner's ortho- genetic principle (Werner, 1948, pp. 40ff; 1957, pp. 126ff; Werner and Kaplan, 1963, pp. 7ff)13. Werner adapted the correspond— ing biological principle and applied it to behavioral deve10pment. 13This highly complex principle is only briefly discussed here. For more complete presentations and for discussions about some of the ramifications and implications the following resources, in addition to the ones cited above, are recommended: Baldwin (1967), Beilin (1971), Harris (1957), and Langer (1969, 1970). 246 The basic principle is succinctly stated as follows (Werner, 1957, p. 126): Developmental psychology postulates one regulative principle of development; it is an orthogenetic principle which states that wherever development occurs it proceeds from a state of relative globality and lack of’differentiation to a state of increasing differentiation, articula- 9/ tion, and hierarchic integration. This principle has the status of an heuristic definition. Though itself not subject to empirical test, it is valuable to developmental psychologists in leading to a determination of the actual range of applicability of developmental concepts to the behavior of organisms. (italics added) These concepts are more readily observable in the biological realm than they are in the behavioral realm, but their meaning will become more clearly apparent when the Piaget and Kohlberg Stages are presented later. Differentiation, for example, is clearly evident in cellular development in the embryo. The initial single- cell union of the egg and Sperm soon divides into 2, then 4, then 8, etc. At first these cells are similar, but soon they begin to take on different characteristics and functions--they become differentiated. Eventually the global undifferentiated State of the embryo becomes a highly complex system of cells, organs, and relationships involving differentiation, articulation, and inte- gration. The intellectual development of the child follows the same kind of course. Initially the world of the infant is the "blooming, buzzing confusion" of William James. The infant is unable to differentiate himself from other objects or persons in his environment, motor movements are gross and uncoordinated, and notions of space, time, cause and effect, and other aspects of 247 perception and cognition are fused (syncretic). Gradually the cognitive and motor aspects begin to differentiate, the separation of objects is perceived and influences the child's behavior, and many other elements of the environment become differentiated. Even emotional deve10pment follows a similar course beginning with the global excitement of the neonate which gradually differentiates into fear, anger, joy, and eventually other discrete emotional responses. Differentiation then involves the transition from syncretic to discrete. The articulation Werner mentions refers to another dimension of development, viz., from the diffuse to the articulated. At first cells, actions, perceptions, cognitions and other elements of biology and behavior are general, uncoordinated, and lack organization. AS ontogenesis progresses these elements become articulated and manifest coordination, interdependence, and organiza- tion. AS Baldwin (1967, pp. 502ff) points out the organism also progresses from the initial rigid and labile state to one that is eventually flexible and stable. Young children manifest rigidity in their behavior in many ways. They tend to use the same patterns of behavior even when they are not successful. Insistence on hearing the same story over and over, being carried the same way, and many other tendencies on the part of children for repetitive acts are manifestations of the rigidity of the early phases of development. Development brings less reliance on these patterns and behavior becomes marked by increasing flexibility in 248 action and thought. The rigidity of early deve10pment is related to the instability of this period. Moods, interests, and attention Shift back and forth from one thing to another very quickly and inconsistently. Emotions are fragile and sensitive and easily shattered by relatively unimportant events. Along with the flexibility gained through deve10pment comes the stability that is possible with increased ability to c0pe. Hierarchical integration refers to the gradual subordina- tion of parts to wholes and the qualitative transformations whereby elements of systems move to higher levels in a new and more integrated form. The syncretic and unarticulated thoughts of the young child become not only differentiated and articulated but organized into a system that is capable Of superior understanding. Coordination and cooperation become possible where only independent and egocentric behavior persisted. The capabilities and behaviors of the old stage become more complex and powerful as a result of the new integrations at the higher stage. Primarily hierarchical integration refers to the fact that the structures of the earlier stage are not lost, destroyed, are replaced but are transformed into more complex, more mature, and more effective structures at the higher stage. Baldwin (1967, p. 504) offers the following concise summary of the orthogenetic principle: In summary the orthogenetic principle states that a developmental process goes from the undifferentiated, syncretic, diffuse, rigid, unstable organization to the differentiated, articulated, flexible, and hierarchically 249 organized system that is better adapted to the demands of a heterogeneous, variegated environ- ment. The orthogenetic principle is manifested in the structural-deve10pmental theories of Piaget and Kohlberg, as well as the conceptual systems theory of Harvey, Hunt, and Schroder (1961), and the stages of Murphy's biosocial theory of personality (Murphy, 1947, 1958). And many years before Werner the principle is adumbrated in the analytic psychology of Jung (see Hall and Lindzey, 1970, p. 111). Piaget's equilibration process, which will be discussed later, has an intimate relationship to the orthogentic principle of Werner, which in fact raises the interesting subjeCt of the overall relationship of Werner's and Piaget's theories. The two theories differ on some Significant points but in general are highly congruent. Flavell (1963, p. 44ln) makes the following observation: ...it would be worthwhile exploring the possibil- ity of bringing the best of Piaget and Werner together under a single theoretical roof. Werner's theory is much closer to Piaget's than is any other, both in theoretical content and in basic developmental philosophy. So far as the writer knows, however, no one has yet made a serious try at theoretical integration... In spite of the lack of an overall systematic integration of the two theories, there is considerable interrelating of them by many developmental scholars, and the orthogenetic principle is one of the most frequently mentioned interfaces. 250 Development The concept of development will be presented throughout this section of the dissertation primarily by elaboration of the many facets of deve10pment and the developmental stages that will be presented. Several preliminary comments will aid the presentation, in addition to the orthogenetic principle already discussed. Within the organismic-deve10pmental framework there are certain terminological and conceptual distinctions sometimes made between change versus deve10pment, maturation versus development, growth versus deve10pment, and learning versus development. First, development is a form of change, but the terms are not synonymous. Maier (1969, pp. 3ff) offers the following distinction: Development must be differentiated from change. Change implies a transition from one state to another, while development focuses upon the dynamic, one-directional elements of change. Development, therefore, is a process; change is a product. The fOrmer takes place within systems which are defined by their structures and their inherent dynamic processes. Maier uses the term change here in a somewhat ambiguous way, but the ambiguity is helpful. The transition from one state to another he calls change, which is consistent with the statement of this writer above that development is a form of change. But then he switches meanings and makes change the product of transition. Both ways of looking at change help differentiate it from development. The unidirectional and structural aspects of deve10pment are fundamental to the meaning of that term. As the orthogenetic principle expresses, development is in the direction from the global 251 undifferentiated state to the differentiated, hierarchically integrated state. Except in cases of brain damage, trauma, and other forms of pathology, development is progressive and not regressive, as an overall general trend. This last qualification is to allow for the temporary ostensible regressions during transition periods, when lower behavioral patterns are used after the development of higher patterns. And, except for pathology, even when lower forms are used in the presence of higher forms the latter are Still intact and available. There are situational circumstances that call for lower forms of coping strategies and intellectual structures. A fully deve10ped abstract thinker on occasion finds it quite helpful to use concrete forms of intellectual operation. This is not regression, but merely a form of adaptation. Even a highly intelligent person uses his fingers for counting in certain situations even though he is fully capable of performing the operation abstractly. The distinction between maturation and development is also clarified by Maier (p. 3). He says: Originally, development was a biological term having to do with physically observable growth in size or structure in an organism over a period of time. When applied to the behavioral Sciences, it denotes the temporally linked processes, the progressive changes in adaptive functioning... maturation suggests organic growth, while development relates to sociopsychological develop- ment. DevelOpment in this sense refers to an integration of constitutional and learned changes which make up an individual's ever-developing personality. Maturation can best be conceived in the O-S-D conceptual framework as 252 experience-free change. Thus the organic change that takes place primarily as the result of biological systems, especially the nervous system and the hormonal system, can be considered maturational change. Experience-free is not intended to convey the idea of an organism in a vacuum. Obviously the organism needs all the aliments provided by the environment in the way of nutrition, air, and other material aspects of sustenance. But this is essentially a biological protess and not a learning process from the standpoint of tissue need. The Situations in which one eats are going to reSult in both maturation and development. The material resources will be aliment for the biologically-based maturational change, and the sociopsychological transactions will be aliment for development. By experience-free, then, is meant the change that takes place solely as a result of the internal processes of the organism assuming that appropriate aliment is provided--this is maturation. Maturation is one of the factors responsible for development, which will be covered later. It is a necessary, but not sufficient condition for deve10pment. The final distinction to be clarified is between growth and development. Both Werner (1957, p. l36n) and Langer (1969, p. 3) distinguish between growth as quantitative change and deve10pment as qualitative change. The quantitative accumulation of vocabulary, for example, can be thought Of as growth, but not as development. An argument can be offered that the kind of change discussed by behavioristic theories of deve10pment are strictly speaking in these terms growth. Langer (1969) in fact maintains that the "mechanical mirror theory" accounts for only growth in terms of the 253 quantitative accumulation of stimulus-response patterns. This is an important theoretical distinction that can in a very deep sense convey the difference between behaviorism and organismic psychology. This distinction will become more evident when the criteria for deve10pmental Stages are presented. And, of course, it should be pointed out that behaviorists completely reject the notion of stages and the notion of change as postulated by organismic- develOpmental theories, as well as the entire structuralist approach to human behavior. From the structuralist point of view the growth vs. deve10pment distinction takes on added meaning. Much of what we would call growth (quantitative change) could be classified as content, e.g., the growth in vocabulary, the memorization Of the multiplication tables, and Similar acquisitions. There is no structural change involved in these tasks, and therefore no development. Growth, then, is basically quantitative change in content; development is qualitative change in structure. The importance of this distinction becomes evident when it is realized that growth is reversible while deve10pment is not (except, as pointed out earlier, in cases of trauma, pathology, etc.). One can memorize the multiplication tables today and forget them next week. One can respond to conditioning procedures today and have the conditioned responses be extinguished next week. One cannot have a fully deve10ped cognitive structure for classification this . l4 . . . week and not have it next week . The distinction between growth 4The qualification "fully deve10ped" is very significant and is 254 and development is, therefore, useful for distinguishing two kinds of change, as well as for distinguishing between the theoretical positions of behaviorism and organismic psychology. The distinction between learning and development is one of the most controversial, important, and complex issues Of contemporary psychology. It is much too large an issue to be adequately covered here. It is important, however, to make clear that the deve10pmentalist subordinates learning to development. Of Piaget's position Maier (1969, pp. 89-90) says: ...Piaget conceives learning as a function of development. Learning cannot explain development, while stages of development can in part explain learning. For the learning theorist, however, deve10pment is perceived either as an independent process, a part of the primary process of learning, or as a function of learning. A more common behavioristic view of the relationship is to see development and learning as equivalent termS--learning = deve10pment. Piaget (l970d, pp. 713-717) discusses this issue at length. He begins by stating: If we give the name learning to every form ...included here because cognitive structures do not develop all of a piece, or overnight, or in all-or-nothing manner. They gradually develop and go through a transition period during which they may be very unstable. A child may be able to perform a simple classifi- cation problem this week and not be able to perform it next week if the task is presented during the transition period. Once fully developed, however, the structure will be permanent and will be available for cognitive operations at any time. This is not true, as pointed out above, for accumulations through rote memorization or conditioning procedures that have been terminated. Conditioned responses may not only be extinguished by cessation of reward, they may also be eliminated by counter measures. Cognitive structures cannot be eliminated by such procedures. 255 of cognitive acquisition, it is obvious that deve10pment only consists of a sum or a succession of learning situations. Generally, though, the term is restricted to denote essentially exogenous acquisitions, where either the subject repeats responses, parallel to the repetition of external sequences (as in conditioning), or the subject discovers a repeatable response by using the regular sequences generated by some device, without having to structure or reorganize them himself through a constructive step-by-step activity (instrumental learning). If we accept this definition of learning, the question arises whether development is merely a succession of learned acquisitions (which would imply a systematic dependency of the subject on the objects), or whether learning and deve10pment constitute two distinct and separate sources of knowledge. Finally, there is, of course, the possibility that every acquisition through learning in fact represents only a sector or a phase of development itself, arbitrarily provided by the environment...but remaining subject to the general constraints of the current deve10pmental stage. The early part of the above statement presents both the general position of the behaviorist and the more restricted behavioristic position that limits the meaning of learning to "exogenous acquisition” acquired through condition. The essential point here, with regard to Piaget viS-a-vis the behaviorist is the rejection of the total dependency of the learner on the environment and the conceptualization of the learner by Piaget as an active participant in the process of constructing knowledge. The heart of Piaget's genetic epistemology is the emphasis on the active role of the learner. Piaget says (p. 714): To present an adequate notion of learning one first must explain how the subject manages to construct and invent, not merely how he repeats and COpies. 256 Later in the same article (p. 715) he says: Remember also that each time one prematurely teaches a child something he could have discovered for himself, that child is kept from inventing it and consequently from understanding it completely. This Obviously does not mean the teacher should not devise experimental Situations to facilitate the pupil's invention. Piaget's conceptualization of development and learning, with the latter being subordinate to the former has enormous implications for education--as can be seen from the statements quoted above it tremendously affects the roles of teacher and Student. These roles are quite differently defined and implemented in a curriculum built on the behavioristic model versus a curriculum built on the organismic-structural-developmenta1 model. Piaget has expressed himself frequently and clearly on this point (Piaget, 1970a, 1970b, 1970d, 1970f), but especially in his description of the learner as an active constructor and the teacher as an organizer-mentor ”stimulating initiative and research” (Piaget, 1972, p. 16). This requires that the teacher know not only his own subject matter but also know the ”development of the child's or adolescent's mind” (p. 17). And it is based on "the basic principle of the active methods...which may be expressed as follows: to understand is to discover, or reconstruct by rediscovery..." (p. 20). Piaget's notion of the learner's role is described by Gardner (1972, p. 77) as follows: ...we find the child fulfilling...a role celebrated in all of Piaget's work: that of an experimenter or investigator who modifies his conceptions of the world as a result of his actions upon it and his observation of their consequences. From the deve10pmentalist's point of view, then, learning and deve10pment are not identical. Learning is dependent on deve10pment and requires the active involvement of the learner in the learning process, which in turn stimulates, supports, and augments the construction of knowledge required for development to occur and progress. Before specific learning can take place the learner must already have apprOpriate cognitive structures that will permit the assimilation of the events and encourage any necessary accommodation. The learner cannot, therefore, merely learn by association or reinforcement. A child can appear to learn because he or she has acquired specific verbal responses as the result of operant conditioning. But this is an automatic mechanical reaction involving the acquisition of content without understanding or the ability to apply the knowledge in new and varied situations significantly different from the contingencies used to elicit the reSponses. What has been learned here is a set of responses that are not likely to affect development. For a deeper form Of learning, involving true understanding and independ- ent application of the knowledge to other Situations, the child's cognitive structures must be sufficiently deve10ped to permit meaningful processing of the data. Summarizing what has been presented so far on this tOpic, development has been differentiated from change, maturation, growth, and learning, and has been defined as a type of change characterized as being: 9. 258 orderly unidirectional irreversible qualitative hierarchically integrated progressively differentiated increasingly articulated actively created (constructed by the biological and genetic aspects of the human organism in transaction with the environment functionally superior to but dependent on learning. Further elaboration of this concept and its important role in values development education will reveal the manifestations and operation of the above characteristics, and will enrich the meaning of development for itself and for its interdependent role in the entire organismic-structural-developmenta1 conceptual framework. The additional topics required to complete this picture are the following: 1. The relationship of development, structure, and function. The egocentrism—perspectivism dimension of the deve10pment of the self. Stage development a. criteria of developmental stages b. review synopsis of Piaget's theory 259 c. Piaget's stages of intellectual deve10pment 4. Four factors responsible for deve10pment a. Genetic emergence, organismic growth, organic maturation b. Experience c. Social transaction d. Equilibration 5. Kohlberg's Cognitive-Developmental Theory of Moral DevelOpment. I-n.‘ Relationship of DevelOpment, Structure, and Function Without structure, development would be reduced to the quantitative accumulation of content, processes, skills, and response patterns. Without development, structure would be nothing more than a static concept describing relationships among concepts, actions, and images at a given moment without regard for the temporal continuitv of these events. The hyphen between structural-deveZormentaZ is as important as either of the components itself. Structure is constructed through development; development is the ontogenesis and elaboration of structure. Since it is the historical continuity provided the organism by its structures these are presented as the diachronic elements of organismic existence. Were it not for the relative stability and strength of cognitive structures, for example, the organism would have no mind, so to speak. It is the continuity of the structures that makes it possible for the functional invariant 260 of assimilation to Operate. Without structure to assimilate the world into the intake is meaningless. If the organism ingested food without the structure of the alimentary system the food would be unavailable for utilization by the organism as the aliment for deve10pment. The food is ingested, processed, transformed into the elements required by the organism, absorbed in this form, and then utilized for development. Likewise the raw data of the world is perceived, assimilated into the existing structures of the human mind on its own terms, processed, transformed into meaningful data in relationship to the organism's structures and needs, and becomes responsible for some form of behavior (thinking, imagining, acting, etc.). The relatively stable element in this system and process is the cognitive structure. It is dynamic, it changes (accommodation), and it is part of a complex network of other dynamic, changing structures. But it is the relative stability of individual structures and the enormous stability of the entire complex network of structures that makes it possible for the individual to have an identity, knowledge, and continuity of consciousness rather than a meaningless stream of conscious sensations. Thus structure is conceptualized as being the diachronic aspect of the organism's transactions with the world. Structure exists in and is built by the functional aspects of the organism that are rooted in its biological nature and described by Piaget as the functional invariants. They are functional because they are responsible for the organism's adapta- tion; they are invariant because they are genetically determined, 261 operate as part Of the biophysiological system, and do not change with environment. Although the functional aspects Of existence Operate continuously it is only their Operation at a given moment that determines the nature Of the particular transaction in process. Therefore function qua function is continuous, but function qua transaction is located in time, so to speak. It is function that provides the action Of the moment for the continuously existing structures. Thus function represents the synehronie element Of organismic existence. DevelOpment is the product Of the synchronic-diachronic transaction which involves the internal transaction between the elements and systems within the organism and the external transaction with the environment. The entire process is manifested by content. The important point for consideration here is the recognition that the deve10pmenta1 stages tO be presented later are structural stages. Stage and structure are so intimately related that neither has meaning without the other, and, therefore, structure and development are likewise intimately intertwined. Structure exists in terms Of stage development, and stage sequence is development through structural transformation. Eggcentrism-Perspectivism Dimension Of Self Development may be viewed along this dimension as the deve10pment from the total egocentrism Of the newborn infant to relative levels Of perspectivism Of the mature adult tO some hypothetical ideal state Of total perspectivism in which the human 262 being would be totally capable Of taking the perspective Of others. This hypothetical upper end Of the continuum may or may not be attainable, and discussion of it would lead into metaphysics and other aspects Of philosophy, and possibly mysticism and theology, at levels which are beyond the scope Of this paper. From the standpoint Of values deve10pment, however, the possibility Of total perspectivism does raise some intriguing and relevant questions and ideas that would be worth extensive investigation and development. FOr our purposes we will deal only with the more mundane aspects Of this dimension of development, which in them- selves are of great significance for values development. In a sense, perspectivism is possibly the single most important dimension in that it is the foundation for the development of justice, which in turn, is the foundation for moral deve10pment, which is the foundation for values development. Piaget, in most Of his writings, has elaborated his ideas on egocentrism and egocentricity. In some Of his later (writings he has stated that he made an unfortunate choice Of words when he originally developed his ideas on this subject, because of the more common, or colloquial, uses Of the word in terms Of selfishness, egoism, and related ideas. For Piaget the term has a highly technical meaning and refers to the inability on the part Of the newborn infant tO distinguish in any way or sense the concepts Of ser’and not self; Adults take these ideas so much for granted that they find it difficult tO comprehend the state Of the newborn infant and the young child. It is ironic that the 263 more perspectivistic one becomes the more difficult it is to even conceive Of being completely without a concept Of self. The infant's lack Of self-concept is even apparent in its inability tO comprehend that its body is part Of itself. Observations Of infants and their actions on their own bodies will make this Obvious. Associated with the lack Of concept Of self are numerous interesting and important characteristics Of the infant's cognitive development. The child from birth to about three months of age has no concept Of space, time, or causality; nO concept Of Object permanence; no concept Of intentionality. That is, the child does not comprehend up, down, back, front, the passage Of time, the fact that if it does something with its hand that it can cause something else to happen. It is aware Of only those things that are in its immediate line Of vision. Anything not in its sight simply does not exist. The idea Of "out Of sight, out Of mind" is exactly how things are for the young infant. The child is the center Of his own world, a demanding and absolute tyrant, but without any realization that he is. Prior tO Copernicus the inhabitants Of the planet earth believed that they were at the center of the universe and all other bodies revolved around them. They at least knew, however, that there were other bodies in the universe besides earth. The child is at the center Of his universe but doesn't know that he is, doesn't know that there is a universe, and doesn't even have cognitive knowledge, in the adult sense, that he exists. The Copernican revolution changed things for the 264 inhabitants Of earth. But the child's development away from the egocentric state is very slow and fragmented, and does not move in a straight line up to perspectivism. As the child's cognitive development proceeds, he gradually deve10ps the idea Of self, and becomes aware Of the fact that there are other selves like himself in the world. But with each major developmental progression, marked by great increases in cognitive capacity, there is a concomitant resurgence Of egocentrism in thought. For example, the last and very important period Of development comes when the child is about ten to twelve years Old. At this time he begins tO move from what Piaget calls the period‘of’ooncrete operations, a sophisticated and advanced state Of intellectual development in which the child is able to perform complex mental Operations, but the use Of these abilities is limited to concrete applications and situations. The period Of development the child moves into at this time Piaget calls the period of formal operations, the last stage Of cognitive deve10pment that is, in its fully developed state, the mature form Of adult thought. This is a time when the young adolescent finds himself with some Of the tools of adult thought, but without the experience that puts them in perspective. Consequently, he sees the world the way it is, can imagine the way it should be, and manifests the social criticism that characterizes adolescent behavior and frustrates and annoys adults. This is the resurgence Of egocentrism at the advanced stage Of formal Operations, and it is difficult for the young teenager with the new mental capacities he now possesses to understand how things could possibly 265 be so fouled up, especially when it is clear to him how easy it would be to straighten things out and solve the problems. In other words, he sees things from his own egOcentric point of view, and is unable tO take on the role or perspective Of others on these matters. Progressive differentiation from a subjective perspective to an Objective perSpective requires cognitive deve10pment, direct physical contact with the environment, and substantial Opportunity for interpersonal experience in the form of role-taking. Only as the child's concept of self develops can the child begin to understand that others truly exist independent Of himself, not for his pleasure or utility, and that they have views, perspectives, knowledge, and experiences different from his own. Thus the attainment of moral-ethical ability is wholly dependent on this progressive development Of self. Kohlberg, well aware of the significance Of Piaget's contributions on this aspect Of human deve10pment, made the egocentrism-perspectivism dimension 3 major factor in theory and empirical studies. Robert Selman, one Of Kohlberg's principal associates, has extended Kohlberg's formula- tions on egocentrism and role-taking in cognitive and moral develop- ment. Selman (1971, 1973) has developed stages Of role- taking based on the idea that role-taking is the ability to take social perspective. His stages are predicated on cognitive development and function as prerequisites for moral development. Thus there seems to be a temporal relationship of these three stages with Piaget's stages prerequisite for Selman's which are 266 in turn prerequisite for Kohlberg's. Earlier, in connection with the content-structure distinction, the notions of realism, animism, and artificialism were introduced as concepts used by Piaget to describe some characteristics of childish thought. “These are manifestations Of the basic egocentrism Of the young child. The significance Of egocentrism for values development education is enormous. In fact, it could be considered one Of the most important and central facets of values/moral development. Consider, for example, the nomothetic approaches to values/moral education presented in Chapter II. Much Of the curriculum content Of approaches based on tradition, authority, conformity, and compliance is beyond the comprehension of the young children for whom the programs are designed. This point is particularly exemplified by the highly complex, abstract, and Often mystical concepts of religious education programs. Children are required, in these programs, to understand the idea of a triune god, the complexities of the dual role Of Jesus Christ in Christian theology as both human and divine, eschatological and soteriological conepts, genesis, Original sin, and many other complex and abstract ideas. The ability of children to parrot the verbal content Of behavior desired by adults (which Piaget appropriately calls "psitticism") combined with the tendency of adults to see children as little adults (which Piaget appropriately calls "adultomorphism") leads most adults to believe that children really understand religion as taught in these programs merely because the children can use the words. A concrete 267 and vivid examples of the relationship of egocentrism to values/ moral development is the young child's inability to understand and Operationalize the Golden Rule. This principle for social justice requires formal Operational (adult) cognitive development not generally developed by children even in our advanced culture until around age 10 or higher, even with the more advanced children. Most children do not develop the ability to deal with the Golden Rule until the teenage years, and even then on a limited basis. Yet the Golden Rule is one Of the mainstays of both secular and religious education in the early years of childhood. COOperation among children is demanded by adults in the preschool years, kindergarten, and elementary school long before they are capable of comprehending what the adults mean by COOperation. The religious and theological concepts of the religious education programs, the Golden Rule, cooperation and much Of the morality imposed on children clearly requires the ability to take the perspective Of the other person, which requires the recognition Of the self as a person. The concept of egocentrism and the long, steep, and difficult path from egocentrism to perspectivism are foundational aspects of values/moral deve10pment Of the first order. The meaning of egocentrism can be seen in the Piaget and Kohlberg stages which will be presented in a later section. 268 Stage Development15 Another key element in the deve10pmental aspect of this view of man is the concept of stage. Not all aspects of development are conceived as stage-related or stage-developmental. Much somatic and perceptual development is believed not to be stage-related, but most cognitive and much affective development is believed to be stage? developmental. Man's progress from the primitive sensorimotor modes of thought and action found in the newborn infant to the mature forms of logic-hypothetical modes Of thought and action in the fully deve10ped human being is seen as the result Of having progressed through variously conceived stages Of growth and development. Again, the conceptualizations Of these stages are varied from researcher to researcher and school to school, but there is a general pattern of common agreement. Generally speaking, the once popular concept of 5The concept stage is very controversial in psychology. Behaviorists generally deny the validity Of the concept completely and tend to hold for the idea Of continuous growth in quantitative terms as described in several places in this dissertation. Some psychologists find the concept of stage very useful, but in a purely descriptive sense. Other psychologists, the Freudian psychoanalysts, for example, use the stage concept in more than a descriptive sense, believe the organism does progress through definite developmental stages, but do not use the structural-stage notion. The psychosexual-egostages of Erik Erikson are developmental and meet some Of the criteria presented here, but not all of them (see Erikson, 1963, and Maier, 1969). For the different points of view and the associated polemics the following resources are valuable: Brown (1970), Flavell (1963), Green, Ford, and Flamer (1971), Harris (1957), Kessen (Ch. 4 in Brown, 1970), Kohlberg (1968b, 1969), Langer (1969, 1970), Maier (1969), and Piaget (1970d). But one of the most valuable Of all references is Tanner and Inhelder (1971) which contains the proceedings of four lengthy work sessions attended by some Of the major figures in child and developmental psychology in which are many debates about the stage issue. 269 automatically unfolding maturational stages, mentioned earlier, and supported by Gessell and his associates, has largely been supplanted by the concept Of developmental stages that require the involvement Of the child in relationship to his environment for stage development and progress. Within the framework of the organismic-structural- developmental view many theories and types Of stages have been presented, but the work of Piaget has been the most influential and generally accepted, and is the most representative. Piaget's stages meet all of the criteria for deve10pmental stages presented earlier as well as those to be presented, and they are structural stages. Furthermore, and of great importance, Piaget's theory has been subjected to exten- sive and intensive empirical investigation, and continues to receive substantial support and confirmation. Regarding the validation Of Piaget's theory Adler (in Athey and Rubadeau, 1970, p. S) says: A number Of psychological investigators have tried to assess the validity of Piaget's studies, since the original ones are Often lacking in scientific control or statistical analysis. Indeed, many persons have started their work with the express intention Of disproving many of Piaget's contentions about children's concepts of causality, number, etc. (e.g, Deutsche, 1973; Estes, 1956). It is for this reason that the evidence in favor Of the theory is all the more impressive. The overwhelming majority of studies have shown that the sequence Of development outlined above [the Piaget stages] is an accurate portrayal Of mental growth. Studies with the mentally retarded (Inhelder, 1943), children in other cultures (Price-Williams, 1961; Dodwell, 1960) have in general found the same stages Of develop- ment occurring in the same chronological order. The relatively few exceptions (Estes, 1956) have tended to be less competent investigations. Adler, in the above statement, and Sigel and Hooper (1968) point out 270 much of the validation research on Piaget's theory has centered around the important issue Of the invariant sequence Of the stages and also the issue Of the ages Of the children in the various stages as reported by Piaget. Both of the above sources assert that the majority of the studies have confirmed the findings of Piaget with reSpect to the existence Of the stages as they are described by Piaget and the invariant sequence. The age issue is interesting in that so much controversy exists about the fact that many investigators (e.g., Laurendeau and Pinard, 1962) have found wide differences in the ages that children pass through the stages from one culture to another, and that these reports show wide divergence from the ages reported by Piaget for the children in Geneva that he has studied for so many years. Laurendeau and Pinard (1962) find as much as three years separating the children in Martinique and the children in Montreal, with the latter that much ahead of the former in attaining various levels of development. Children from lower socioeconomic backgrounds and rural communities also develop more slowly. Considering Piaget's own position on the age relationship to the stages it is puzzling why there is so much controversy about the subject, especially the attempt to use these Observations as a refutation of the theory. As Piaget frequently points out, the fundamental criterion is the invariant sequences Of the stages and not the age at which any particular children or groups pass through the stages. Piaget has frequently asserted that the ages he has found and the age ranges he uses are not the ages in which all other children are presumed tO 271 pass through the stages. In one discussion (in Tanner and Inhelder, 1971, Vol. IV, p. 13), for example, he says: The minimum programme for establishment of stages is the recognition Of a distinct chrono- logy, in the sense of a constant order of'succession. The average age for the appearance Of a stage may vary greatly from one physical or social environment to another: for example, if the children Of New Guinea, studied by Margaret Mead, manage to understand, like those of Geneva, certain structures Of Euclidian geometry, they may do so at a much later or much earlier age. Whether Older or younger is Of little importance, but one could not speak Of stage in this connexion, unless in all environments the Euclidian structures were established after and not before the topological structures considered as primitive.16 Thus the issue of the invariant order of appearance Of the stages is crucial to Piaget's theory, but the ages during which different children enter or pass through the stages is not. In Chapter 3 of Psychology and Epistemology (1971) Piaget discusses the findings of various researchers that confirm his prOposed invariant sequence and also the variations in age for entry and passage into and through the stages. Maier (1969, p. 91n) cites studies conducted in New York, Japan, and West Africa which upheld the validity of Piaget's hypotheses. Sigel and HOOper's Logical Thinking_in Children: Research Based on Piaget's Theory (1968) brings together in one 16The relationship of the Euclidian to the topological structures is not germane to the discussion here, but it is an interesting and important point in Piaget's theory, and relates to the Bourbaki mother structures mentioned in this dissertation in the section on Structural. For Piaget's discussion on this subject, see Ch. 2 in ngetic Epistemology (1970a), Ch. 2 in Structuralism (1970c), and Sect. III, Ch. 3 in The Psychology Of the Child (Piaget and Inhelder, 1969). 272 volume much of the relevant and most competent research that has been done on the validation of the theory. In addition to the reports Of the research there is systematic critical analysis Of various aspects of the theory. The authors point out that the research reported in that volume concentrates primarily on the area of deve10pment that Piaget calls concrete Operations. It is this area, however, that is of great importance for many Of the school-age years. As Sigel and Hooper point out, and as is well known among those familiar with Piaget's work, an extensive presentation, critical evaluation, and report Of relevant research dealing with Piaget's entire theory is presented in John Flavell's The Developmental PsychOlOgy of Jean Piaget (1963). Regarding the stages themselves and passage through them Piaget (1972) has the following to say: In order to understand certain basic phenomena through the combination Of deductive reasoning and the data Of experience, the child must pass through a certain number Of stages characterized by ideas which will later be judged erroneous but which appear necessary in order to reach the final correct solution. (p. 21) ...it is highly probable that there is an Optimum rate of development, to exceed or fall behind which would be equally harmful. But we do not know its laws, and on this point as well it will be up to future research to enlighten us. (p. 23) These two passages highlight certain points that lead naturally to the criteria or characteristics of developmental stages. Development is viewed in this conceptual framework as occurring through a series of universal structural stages. The many presentations 273 Of these stages, based on Piaget, emphasize the following defining criteria or characteristics outlined by Beilin (in Green, Ford, and Flamer, 1971, p. l87n), Inhelder (in Brown, 1970, p. 21), Kohlberg (1968b, p. 1021; 1969, p. 352), and Piaget (in Tanner and Inhelder, 1971, Vol. IV, p. 13): 1. Invariant sequence. Progression through the stages follows a constant order of succession, or invariant sequence. Cultural, social, and physical environment may seriously influence the time of entry into any given stage, the length of time spent in that stage, and the final stage attained. But the order Of progression is fixed. The time it takes to move into or through a given stage is not necessarily related to the entry or passage time for any other stages. Any particular individual may or may not attain the highest stage in the sequence, or may conclude his or her development at any of the stages. Certain cultures are partially determining in this respect, and may provide environmental conditions that encourage, inhibit, or so drastically restrict the probability of higher- stage attainment that individuals of the highest stage(s) are not tO be found at all in certain given cultures. 274 Qualitative differences. Each stage represents a qualitative difference from the other stages. This difference is reflected in the modes Of thinking, problem solving behaviors, and COping strategies available to the individual at different stages. The essential point here is that the difference in stages is not a matter of more or less knowledge Of facts, the size of one's vocabulary, or the number of response patterns. The difference is measured in terms Of the quality of reasoning and thinking. Structural wholeness or integrity. This is the holistic aspect of structure characterized by the integrity or unity of the underlying characteristic patterns or thought-organization. A response to a problem or a question does not reflect merely the specific response to that specific problem or question. Rather it reflects the capacity of the child to use the logic involved in the solution and to apply the same thought-pattern tO other problems. In the realm of moral development, for example, this structural integrity would be manifested in the child's relatively consistent use Of certain justice structures to the solution of moral dilemmas. A child who has not yet attained 275 reversible thought will manifest this condition generally in the solution Of problems. Hierarchical integration. The stages form a sequence Of increasingly differentiated and integrated cognitive structures with each succeeding stage incorporating the critical aspects of the preceding stages, but in a more complex, more coordinate, and more equilibrated way. Each stage is a more mature, articulated, and more systematic organization that grows out of and retains many aspects of the preceding stage or stages. Higher stages do not merely replace lower stages; they displace, or more correctly, reintegrate the lower stages. Many Of the functions of the preceding stages are retained, but with new structures available to apply to them either alone or in connection with the structures used at the previous stages. This aspect is manifested by the fact that the patterns, logic, and characteristics Of the earlier stages can still be seen in the behavior Of individuals who have attained higher stages. Intrastage Development. Movement into a new stage does not involve immediate attainment Of the characteristics and capabilities Of that stage. There is an initial period Of formation 276 (genesis) and a subsequent period of attainment. At first the application Of the new abilities is uneven, unsteady, and inconsistent. During this period Of formation there is a resurgence of egocentrism related to the attainment of new intellectual powers without the ability to consistently or apprOpriately use them. As the new abilities become more coordinated and integrated the cognitive structures gradually become more equilibrated, egocentrism subsides, and mastery of the stage has been achieved. This marks the period Of attainment. 6. Interstage construction. The structure of each stage represents the fulfillment Of the previous stage and the foundation for the next one. Thus each stage has the aspect Of achievement with respect to the preceding stage and an aspect of preparation for the one that will follow. Another way Of looking at it is to see each stage as an intact structure of its own and yet serving as a bridge between the ones on either side Of it in time. The central hypothesis contained in this theory as manifested by these characteristics Of the stages is that development is an organized and coherent process Of sequential qualitative changes. 277 Each stage derives from preceding ones, is an holistic structure on its own; it anticipates and lays the foundation for those to follow. Thus deve10pment and growth may be pictured as an ever-widening and ever-rising progressively more complex spiral in which the present loops evolve on past lOOps, anticipating and grounding future potential loops. Brief Review/SynOpsis Of Piaget's Theory Before proceeding to the presentation of Piaget's stages for cognitive deve10pment a brief review Of the stage—independent part Of his theory will augment what was presented earlier in the section on Structural and add meaning to the stages about to be presented. Piaget's general hypothesis is that cognitive development is a coherent process of successive qualitative changes of cognitive structures, each structure and its concomitant change deriving from the preceding structure. In this process successive structures do not replace prior ones, they incorporate them, resulting in qualitative change and an increasing hierarchization. This development proceeds through an invariant sequence Of qualitatively different, integrated, non-age dependent periods or stages. This deve10pmental process is based on the organism's continuous relationship with its environment. The organism thereby participates in the structuring of its own knowledge and the construction of its own environment in a never-ending cycle Of continuous transaction. The organism and environment, however, are not two stable entities that are distinct from one another. They cannot meaningfully 278 be discussed separately. The external environment, or "outside world," or "external reality," is constantly impinging on the organism causing change in the organism. But the organism is constantly responding to the environment causing change in the environment. Both types Of change happen as a result of the transaction between the organism and environment. The means by which this dynamic interchange takes place and induces growth and development in the organism, according to Piaget, is through the role of functional invariants, especially the equilibration process. In Piaget's biologically based model Of intelligence and development there are prOperties other than neurological structures that are inherited and that affect cognitive development and make intellectual progress possible. They are called functional invariants and consist Of the twin complementary functions Of organization and adaptation. Organization is the underlying coherence or holistic pattern Of integrative relationships of systems that gives meaning and action to the organism. Corresponding to this inner pattern is the dynamic outer aspect Of biological and intellectual functioning that constitutes adaptation. Piaget uses biological concepts to describe the organism's attempts to cope with its environment and conceptualizes adaptation as consisting of the complimentary processes Of assimilation and accommodation. These are not two separate and distinct functions, but are two aspects of one integrated process and are constantly occurring. Assimilation takes place when the organism Operates on the environment and takes the environment in on the organism's terms. 279 It reflects the capability Of the organism tO handle new situations and new problems with its present stock of knowledge, reflexes, or schemata. When assimilation occurs it means that the organism has adapted without fundamental change and can handle the situation presented to it. Accommodation is the other half Of the process and takes place when the environment Operates on the organism. It is the process of change through which the organism becomes able to manage situations that are at first too difficult and cannot be handled with present knowledge, reflexes, or structures. Accommodation, therefore, means that the organism has changed in order to adapt. When the organism confronts a new situation it attempts to assimilate. If it is unable to assimilate the experience into its existing repertoire of structures then it must do one Of two things; it must either enlarge or in some way change one of its existing structures or it must create a new structure to reflect the new situation. With the creation Of the new structure the organism can now assimilate the new situation. Thus the basic process is assimilation and the one to which the organism must constantly return. This dynamic process thus consists of a continuous inter- change with the environment causing a constant recycling from equili- brium to disequilibrium to equilibrium and on and on. The equilibrium process is the way the person transacts business with the environment, and is the mode of intellectual functioning, and the basis for intellectual growth and development. The Operation Of the invariant functions and the construction 280 of the cognitive structures manifest themselves behaviorally in content, the most superficial aspect Of intellectual Operation. By superficial it is not meant to denote unimportant. Content is extremely important, reflects the nature of the individual's society, family, and culture, and makes up a great deal Of human existence. The superficiality is primarily related to its ease Of Observation, measurement, and evaluation relative tO function and structure. It is superficial from a more qualitative standpoint, however, also. To evaluate an individual's cognitive, moral, or affective development, ability, or potential structly from content, as is dOne to a large extent by intelligence tests, personality inVentories and tests, and moralistic judgments Of behavior is to engage in gross misrepres- entation and considerable error. This brief review Of Piaget's theory brings us to the stages of cognitive development he has derived and elaborated from more than fifty years of extensive investigation of children and youth. Piaget, over the years, has been inconsistent in his presentation of the stages and the terminology. Sometimes he refers to three great periods or stages, and at other times he refers to four. In recent years he is more likely to refer to four, and the difference is significant in that the difference between preporational thought and concrete operational thought is great enough and qualitatively different enough to justify them as constituting two separate stages. The above is not intended to convey any confusion on Piaget's part about the content or meaning of the periods, but only a difference in labeling and reporting the data. Presentations Of Piaget's stages 281 may be found in part or in whole in many Of Piaget's own extensive writings, or those Of his associates and collaborators. Also, there are literally dozens Of analyses, interpretations, critical reviews, and many other presentations Of the stages in the numerous and continuously proliferating articles and books about Piaget and his work. Piaget's own writings and the many works about him are well represented in the bibliography Of this dissertation, and these represent the sources Of the data for the stages presented in the set of Tables 4.1, following. The stages are presented with the following sequences and organization: Table 4.1A Sensorimotor Stage Table 4.18 - Preoperational Stage Table 4.1C Stage of Concrete Operations Table 4.1D Stage Of Formal Operations It is very important in view Of the preceding discussion about the relationship between the stages and ages that the general age ranges presented in these tables is merely an indication Of broad patterns Observed in Western culture. They are not in any way definitive, authoritative, or prescriptive. 282 TABLE SET 4.1 PIAGET 's STAGES? OF COGNIT_‘1_VE DEVELOPMENT T'ABEE' '4"."1A"" s' '13” Esp” mono R" "s'TA' “GE" General age range: Birth tO approximately 18 months to 2 1/2 years. Perceptions and movements or actions constitute the child's intellectual instruments, which is the reason for the name of this stage. Child is born with basic, minimal reflexes (sucking, crying, grasping, gross motor movements, etc.) which become action structures (schemes). Prerepresentational--the child does not mentally represent Objects or actions. Preverba1--no language until the latter part of this stage. Egocentrism total at first, gradually lessens, but remains dominant throughout. Operates as though self is whole world and causes all events. Intelligence in the infant is displayed in his actions. Direct action upon reality. NO Object permanence at first; begins to deve10p around four months. At first: no concept of Space; no concept of cause and effect relationships; no concept of time (before and after). Only gradually do these concepts develop with experience. 283 Piaget refers to sensorimotor intelligence as practical intelligence and outlines six substages of sensorimotor deve10pment beginning with birth, and during which the neonate moves from total egocentrism, simple reflexes, and complete dependence to an ever-increasing practi- cal mastery Of his world of Objects and persons, gradual but limited differentiation of self, and increasing reliance on his or her own abilities. Children vary tremendously in age of transition from. substage to substage, and also manifest behaviors of several substages simultaneously. The substages and approximate general age periods are as follows: 1. Reflexes—-(Birth to about 1 month)—-Exercises ready- made schemes based on reflexes. Becomes proficient with use of sucking, crying, swallowing, grasping, gross motor movements. 2. First differentiations--(Approximately l to 4 months)-- Primary circular reactions (i.e., coordination Of motor habits and perceptions through constant repetition of a behavioral pattern until the pattern is smoothed out and mastered)--Now the child can adapt to new situations. 3. Reproduction-~(Approximately 4 to 8 months)--Secondary circu- lar reactions (i.e., coordination Of primary circular reactions to form intentional acts)-- Still involves repetition of simple behavior patterns to achieve mastery, but now these are used to preserve interesting sights and make 284 experiences last. This is the rudimentary beginning of the child's experimentation and attempts to modify its world. 4. COordEnation of’secondary schemas--(Approximately 8 to 12 months)--Applies familiar schemes previously mas- tered to new situations through a systematic com- bination of these schemes. For example, can move an Object out Of the way in order to reach another Object. 5. Experimentation--(Approximately 12 to 18 months)--Develops tertiary circular reactions (i.e., devises new schemes as a response to novel circumstances or features Of an object)--Makes new discoveries, pursues and explores these discoveries and their consequences, thereby creating new schemes. Actively experiments. 6. Representation--(Approximately 18 to 24 months to 30 months)--Invents new means through mental combina- tions. For the first time can consider various alternative strategies without actually having to perfOrm them. Begins symbolic representation. Language is only one form Of symbolic representa- tion (Piaget prefers to use the linguist's term "semiotic function.") "This fUnction is the abi— lity to represent something by a sign or a symbol or another Object. In addition to language the semiotic function includes gestures, either idio- syncratic or, as in the case of the deaf and dumb language, systematized. It includes deferred imitation, that is, imitation that takes place when the model is no longer present. It includes drawing, painting, modeling, It includes mental imagery, which I have characterized...as internal- ized imitation. In all these cases there is a signifier which represents that which is signi- fied, and all these ways are used by individual children in their passage from intelligence that is acted out to intelligence that is thought. Language is but one among these many aSpects Of the semiotic function, even though it is in most instances the most important." (Piaget, 1970a, pp. 45-46) T' 'A'B'L'E" "4 .‘1'B"-__' "P-REOL'EE' ”RA" T'To'mj's Tact ' General age range: 2 or 3 years to 7 or 8 years. Preconceptual period in which child can symbolize (thought, representation), but cannot perform Operations. That is, he can differentiate signifiers (words, images), from what is signified~(the Objects or events tO which the thoughts, images, representations refer). But he cannot integrate his thoughts into networks Of thoughts in which he can reverse his thinking (reversi- bility is necessary for true Operational thought, accord- ing tO Piaget). Actions are internalized and, therefore, represented, but thought is not liberated from perceptions. Thus the child in this perception-bound state will make decisions based on perceptual clues when confronted with a con- flict between cognitions and perceptions. Child cannot reason simultaneously about a part of the whole and the whole itself (class inclusion). Begins to acquire language-—first symbols, then concepts-— this is the most important development in this stage. Begins to develop imagery, but imperfectly--images are a product of and not a cause Of mental activity. Thought is not organized into rules and concepts. Does not mentally represent a series Of actions. Gradually becomes less dependent on direct sensorimotor actions. 287 Speech goes through two major deve10pmental periods: 1. Egocentric speech~-(2 years tO 4 or 5 years)-- no communication or intent to communicate in the adult sense. Speaks in the presence of others, but without intention that others should hear his words. Speaks "according to himself" but not "for himself." When he says he speaks for others he actually speaks from his own point of view. Piaget calls noncon- versations Of this type collective monologues. In many cases it is the thinking of actions out loud. 2. Socialized speech-~(by ages 5, 6, 7)--begins to actually communicate and exchange ideas, and intends that others should hear him and listen. Since cooperation depends on socialized speech, and for other reasons, this development has important implications for values development education. Definitions are functional and not abstract, e.g., a hole is to dig, a fork is to eat with, Mommy is for taking care of me. Ability tO take social perspective is limited, e.g., does not understand that he or she is a brother or sister to his or her own siblings. 288 The long preoperational period is best thought of'as consis- ting cf mo substages as follows: 1. Eggppnceptual_§pbstage of Preoperational Though£_ Age range: Approximately 18 months or 2 years to about 4 l/2 years. Lacks ability to deve10p true concepts. Language is acquired slowly, and thinking is still considerably tied to action. Imitation is largely unconscious. Child reproduces and simulates movements and ideas of Others without realizing he does. This form of ego- centrism is responsible for the child's indig— nation when accused Of copying from another child; he believes he actually invented or re- discovered what he first saw in or by another. This is a very important aspect of childish intelligence with great implications for values/moral development and education. Preconceptual thinking involves the following sig- nificant characteristics: Transduction-~a term borrowed by Piaget from Stern (see reasoning from particular to particular). ”The child's reasoning is concerned only with individual cases and does not attain to logical necessity. This is why it is transductive." (p. 184) 289 The child's transductive reasoning is exemplified by believing the sun and the moon are alive because they move by them- selves. Deduction (reasoning from general to particular) and induction (reasoning from the particular tO the general) are not yet part of the child's cognitive repertoire. Syncretism-elinks together things which are unrelated, and see relationships in terms Of global perceptions. Tendency to connect everything with everything else. Realism--belief that one's point Of view is the only point of view, and therefore everyone's point of view. Artificialism—-belief that all things and events are caused by people. Animism--be1ief that inanimate Objects are alive. Intuitive Substage of Preoperational Thought Age range: Approximately 4 1/2 years to about 7 or 8 years. Thinking has progressed to the point where the child can give reasons for beliefs and actions and can form some concepts. 290 The child's thinking is intuitive and not logical in the Operational sense (as in the stage of Concrete Operations), i.e., the child's thought is not reversible. Rather the child's preopera- tional intuitive reasoning is characterized by what Piaget formerly called articulated intuitions (1966, p. 132) and what he now calls semilogic (1970a, p. 50). This new term is descriptive Of the half-logic used by the child in the sense that the child reasons in only one direction. This kind Of reasoning leads to the discovery of dependency relationships and even to covariation (variatiOns in one Object are correlated with variations in another Object), but not to conservation. Consequently the child will realize that when you roll a ball of clay into a long thin sausage that it becomes thinner and also longer, but will not be able to coordinate the coveriation and realize that the piece of clay is still the same amount or mass. This is what Piaget means by semilogic and one-directional thinking that lacks reversibility. He refers to this as a logic of’functions versus a logic of operations. 291 Still unable to make mental comparisons and must build them up with actions. Perception is centereaL i.e., child can only perceive one aSpect, or feature, or area at a time. Assumes the one perceived is the dominant or controlling aSpect and makes judgments accord- ingly. PreOperational thought is thus percep- tion bound. Thinking is considerably advanced over the precon- ceptual substage, but is still unsystematic, inconsistent, impressionable, and egocentric. The entire preOperational stage, although an enormous step forward from the sensorimotor stage, is still limited in may ways. The limitations, which stand out in comparison to more mature forms of thought, especially adult thought, revolve around several major factors that influence the child's COgnitive deve10pment at this stage. They are primarily concerned with the following: 1. Egocentrism 2. Irreversibility 3. Transductive reasoning 4. Centering S. Inability to focus on transformations 292 ZFELE 4.1C - STAGE OF CONERFIE OPERATIONS General age range: Approximately 7 or 8 years to about 11 or 12. The child, for the first time, becomes capable Of true thought, i.e., of operational thought.‘ An operation is an internalized action that is reversible. By internalized is meant that it can be carried out in thought alone without actually having to do it physi— cally. By reversible is meant that the thought process is two-directional, i.e., it can start from a point or position, proceed to another point Of position, then trace itself back to the starting point. Addition, fOr example, is reversible-~it can be reversed by sub- traction. Operational thought always involves a trans- fOrmation of part Of a system, but something is always conserved, something remains invariant. In addition, for example, the number 6 can be arrived at by adding 2 + 4, 1 + 5, or 3 + 3, but the sum is invariant. Operations are always related to systems of Operation, or structures. NO Operation can take place by itself. Operational thought makes it possible for the child to relate events to other events and the whole Of which they are part. The child's reasoning, therefOre, becomes logical. The enormous limitation of this stage, however, is that the new powers Of Operational thinking are limited to Thus concrete things and situations. In other words, the child can truly engage in Operational thought, but only with regard to Objects and not tO abstract or hypothetical events. Propositional thought, hypo- thetico-deductive reasoning, and other forms of reasoning that involve purely abstract contents are beyond the capacity Of the concrete Operational child. This is one Of the reasons why lecturing in general, but especially on abstract subjects, is virtually useless in the elementary school and sometimes in the middle school. classification, seriation, numbering, combining, separating, dividing and substituting, as well as many other forms of thought-systems can be manipulated and reversed but only with concrete (real) objects, i.e., the internal manipulation of Objects that are, or have been, perceived. NO longer perception-bound-—can make cognitive logical decisions rather than perceptual decisions. Decenters. Takes into account more than one or two (or more) aspects or features Of something at once, i.e., takes into account all the salient features Of Objects and events. NO longer dominated by certain forms Of egocentrism. Is now aware that others can have a point Of view different from one's own. Begins tO seek validation 294 of ideas through relationships and transactions with others. Child can now truly speak ”for himself" and not just "according to himself." Child for the first time becomes truly social with non- egocentric speech, and can cooperate in a truly reciprocal way. One Of the most important developments of this period is the achievement of conservation, or the ability to conserve. This is the ability to hold constant certain features, dimensions, qualities, and character- istics Of an Object or situation when another aspect changes. (For example, if you change the shape of a clay ball right in front Of the child's eyes, he will believe that you have also changed its weight, mass, etc., if he is still preoperational.) Conservation is a very significant and complex aSpect Of intelli- gence, and it is not achieved in all ways at the same time. The structures permitting conservation are usually deve10ped for particular categories at the following ages: number 5-6 substance (mass) 7-8 area 7-8 weight 9-10 volume 11-12 295 This order is not rigidly prescriptive, and individual children will vary significantly on this aspect. A child may conserve weight before substance, for example. These are only general guidelines. But it can be seen that, except for number, the child does not conserve until the beginning Of concrete operations, then gradually acquires the other structures. Notice that the ability to conserve volume does not typically deve10p until the latter part of the period of concrete operations, and frequently not until the transition to formal Operations, and sometimes not until the early part Of formal operations. This ability is extremely important for social development, and is, therefore, Of major importance for values deve10pment. Human relationships depend on the ability to hold the relationship constant in the face of numerous changes. adj lijnu ion viinoupori bne ,anoiinreqo Oieronoa 30 Jon aomiIQmoa bus ,anoiinioqo inmroi oi noiiiensit .anoijsioqo [smrol lo lihq virus ed: liinu lsiaoa do? insiioqmi viwmorixo 2i vjilids aidT oansiioqmi 10(Bm lo ,OTOiOiodi ,ai bus ,Jnomqolovob bneqob aqidanoiislor remnH .inomqolovob aeulsv 103 mi innianoo qidanoijclev an: bled 03 villids ed: no .zusgritrhi 2nrcrtonnrn"it) O uni erii 296 TABLE 4.1D - STAGE OF FORMAL OPERATIONS General age range: Generally begins about 11 or 12 and may be well deve10ped by 15 or 16, but this is not well established. Final stage of intellectual development, or adult thought. Prior to this stage, the child has been able to deal with actions, Objects, and images but has not been able to deal with ideas not linked to these other things. Abstract and formal thought now possible with which the person can perform Operations upon Operations. The internal manipulation Of concepts, relations, and prOpositions. The name of the stage derives from its major characteristic; the ability to consider the form of an argument rather than only its content; the abstract rather than the concrete. This makes possible what is known as hypothetico-deductive reasoning; i.e., the person can reason about hypotheses, or possibilities, and draw conclusions about the out- come. Therefore, can deal with the possible as well as the existing and the real. "If-then" type of thinking. Scientific reasoning. Can subordinate reality to possibility. Can deal with all classes Of a problem: present, past, future, verbal, nonverbal, real, imaginary, etc. 297 Operations are coordinated and not dealt with in isolation. True understanding Of causation. Can deal with prOportion, analogy, inference. Issues and principles become important--can see things as they "ought" to be rather than only what "is". Can Operate reflectively. Egocentrism usually increases when development proceeds to a new stage, and the person must cope with new and untried fields, Operations, and ideas. It subsides as the person masters the new with experience. This phenomenon is especially noticeable with entry into formal Operations, and manifests itself in the rebellion and social criticism of the young adolescent who is severely critical of things as they are because he sees how they could be and should be. But, of course, he sees them largely from his own perspective without the more mature outlook that may come with experience. Therefore, this early stage takes the form of naive idealism characterized by omnipotence of thoughts. Fbrmal operations is critically important for values development in many ways, but especially because it is a necessary condition for mature human relation- ships that depend On reciprocity, conservation, reversibility, perspectivism, and other aspects Of human intelligence that do not become fu1ly present This 298 and Operational until this period Of cognitive deve10pment. One Of the most important prerequisites for moral judgment, for example, is the ability to take social perspective and see things the way others see them , imagine the consequences and implications of several lines of action, and apply principles. This involves a complex preocess called mutual simultaneous reciprocity, or the ability to know that you are aware of x, that the other person is aware of x, that you are aware of the other person's awareness of x, and his awareness Of your awareness of his awareness, and so on ad infinitum to an infinite regress, and the ability to do these things simul- taneously. Another major formal operational logical principle, the inverse of'the reciprocal, is required for complex social relationships. period of deve10pment does not take place all of a piece, and probably proceeds through at least three substages. 299 Factors in Development Piaget postulates four major factors that contribute to development (1966, Ch. VI; 1970b, pp. 36-41; 1970d, pp. 719-722; and Piaget and Inhelder, 1969, pp. 152-159). The factors are: 1. Genetic emergence, organismic growth, organic maturation 2. Experience 3. Social transaction (social transmission) 4. Equilibration The first three factors are considered classical factors of develop- ment. The fourth factor is postulated by Piaget because the extensive research conducted by him and his associates indicates that the first three fail to account for all the elements of develop- ment, and that a cybernetic, or self-regulating factor is required to account for the complete program of ontogenesis. Piaget's treatment Of experience is somewhat different than the classical interpretation of that term, also. The complete matrix of all four factors and the addition Of the equilibration process as conceptual- ized by Piaget is very much in keeping with the organismic-holistic view of man and the transactional view of the relationship between man and the environment. Each of the four factors will be discussed briefly. 1. Genetic Emergence, Organismic Growth, Organic Maturation Piaget assigns an important role to the biological factors in the development of intelligence, which of course is essential for values/moral development. He particularly emphasizes the role of the central nervous system and the endocrine system inasmuch as these have so much to do with providing the basic biological structures and coordinations necessary for intelligent behavior. The invariant sequence Of the appearance Of the stages is cited by Piaget as evidence of the Operation of maturation in deve10pment. Maturation, however, is conceived by Piaget (and other organismic-developmental psychologists) as being only a necessary and very important factor, but certainly not a sufficient factor. As part of the proof of the insufficiency of maturation to explain intelligence and development is the fact that there is such a significant variation in age of onset and duration of stay regarding the stages. More than the mere automatic unfolding of a "wired-in" maturational program is indicated by this variation depending on sociocultural factors. What then is the role of heredity and maturation? Piaget feels that very little is actually known about the precise role of this factor, or the precise relationship between the nervous system and behavior. His premise on this subject is that the maturation of the nervous system primarily determines the range of potentiality for deve10pment and Opens up the possibilities that then must be fulfilled through the other factors in accordance with the limitations of the stages and their sequence. He says (1970d, p. 720): Thus the effects of maturation consist essentially Of Opening new possibilities for development, that is, giving access to structures which could not be evOlved before these possibilities were Offered. But between possibility and actualization, there must intervene a set of other factors such as 301 exercise, experience, and social interaction. In the passage immediately preceding the one quoted he rejects the notion Of "innate ideas," in spite of the claims Of Lorenz. In other places (1970a, 1970c) he similarly rejects the same notion as postulated by Chomsky with regard to language. Piaget's rooting of intelligence in the biological nature of the organism must not be underestimated. His position on this is made clear in one of his most important statements, viz, "The Biological Problem of Intelligence," (1952, Introduction; also available with annotation by David Rapaport, 1951, Ch. 7). A few excerpts from this statement follow: An investigation Of the origin of intelligence must necessarily face the relationship between the mind and the biological organization... Verbal or reflective intelligence rests on practical or sensory-motor intelligence, which in turn is supported by acquired and recombined habits and associations. Habits and associations presuppose the system of reflexes rooted in the anatomic and morphological structure Of the organism. Consequently, there is a certain continuity between intelligence and the purely biological processes of morphogenesis and adapta- tion to the environment. What is the meaning of this continuity? Clearly, intellectual development is deter- mined by certain hereditary factors. He then states that there are two groups Of such hereditary factors, viz., (l) the biological limiting aspects of the nervous system, sense organs, and perceptual appratus that not only allow us to know the external world, but by their construction limit the range of sensations that can be received by the organism; and (2) the functional invariants that make adaptation possible and provide the 302 basis for the construction of intelligence through transactions with the environment. The two factors, as Piaget points out, both limit the capacity of the organism and also provide for an apprehension of the external world that Opens up enormous possibilities for intellectual deve10pment, going beyond the maturational factor by constructing knowledge not available to any other organism. The immense power of formal Operational thought must not be ignored. As insignificant as the human organism may be in the infinity of the cosmos, and as limited as the perceptual range of the human being may be, the potentialities Of the human mind are magnificent to contemplate. Heredity, genetics, maturation--these components of this first factor of deve10pment must be seen, then, in prOper perspective. They plan an important part in determining the nature and adaptation of the human organism, but they also open up vistas and potentiality for a wide range and longitudinally protracted human deve10pment. 2. Experience Experience is the organism's direct, unmediated contact with the world. The child must actually experience the Objects and actions of the environment in order to deve10p. The child cannot, for example, develop Object permanence unless it can experience Objects appearing and disappearing over a period of time. In order to develop structures for classification he must directly experience Objects to classify. The construction of knowledge and intelligence must come through the active process of adaptation 303 which necessarily implies that the organism is going to be engaged in a continuous transacting relationship with the world. Piaget generally distinguishes two kinds of experience (e.g., in 1970b). But in a comprehensive presentation of his theory (1970d, pp. 720-721) he identifies three types of experience: exercise, physical experience, and logicomathematical experience. The first of these is rarely mentioned and is not emphasized by Piaget and will be briefly explained. The other two types Of experience he considers very important for the construction of intelligence, especially the third type. Exercise "...involves the presence of Objects on which action is exerted but does not necessarily imply that any knowledge will be extracted from these Objects" (p. 720). This type Of experience, Piaget feels, is helpful in consolidating reflexes, such as sucking, which improves with repetition. Physical experience is direct contact with objects, acting on them, and drawing knowledge from them. In a sense, the child extracts the knowledge from the Object, as when he learns that apples are red and that fur is soft. The important point here is that the source of knowledge here is the direct physical contact with the objects. Piaget maintains that this does not mean that the child merely records or duplicates the Object, but that the child assimila- tes the Object, thus actively structuring the knowledge about the Object. But the child assimilates the perceptions Of the Object to an existing structure. An example of physical experience is the weighing of Objects and discovering that the heaviest are not always 304 the largest. The essential point here is that the child discovers properties and characteristics about the object. Logicomathematical experience is a higher order type of experience in which Objects are acted upon but the knowledge derived from the experience is not knowledge of the objects per se, but knowledge of the actions on the Objects. It is the coordination of the actions that generates the knowledge. A simple example, frequently cited by Piaget, will illustrate logicomathematical experience. A five year old child, sitting on the ground playing with some stones and counting them, first puts them in a row and counts ten stones. Then he counted them in the other direction, then in a circle, and so on with various configurations. Delighted, the child was fascinated to discover that no matter what he did with the stones there were still ten. Through this experience he discovered a property of number, viz., that number will remain constant regardless of which way you count or the configuration of the Objects. Notice that the child discovered not a property of the Objects, but a prOperty of the idea of number. This notion was derived internally from his actions on the Objects. The anecdote illustrates logicomathematical experience and clearly shows the difference between it and physical experience. The importance of Piaget's distinctions of the different types of experience is very much related to his entire concept of genetic epistemology and his belief in the active role of the child. These ideas serve as the foundation for his recommendations for an active curriculum very similar to Dewey's ideas on experience 305 and an experiential curriculum. Piaget differentiates between individual and coordinated actions, and between simple and reflective (sometimes he calls it reflexive) abstraction. Briefly, he (1970a, pp. 16-19) maintains that individual actions lead to simple abstraction, or the derivation of knowledge from Objects themselves from actions performed upon the Objects, which leads to physical knowledge. Coordinated actions lead to reflective abstraction, or the construction of knowledge from the coordination of actions, i.e., from the Operations, the mental coordination and transformation of the actions which leads to logicomathematical knowledge. One of the most important aspects Of Piaget's analysis and interpretation, which is much tOO complex an issue to deve10p here, is that the coordination of actions described above is related to the deve10pment of logic, rather than logic deve10ping from langauge as maintained by many psychologists. Piaget (1970a, pp. 18-19) says: Now all these forms of coordinations have parallels in logical structures, and it is such coordination at the level of action that seems to me to be the basis of logical structures as they deve10p later in thought. This, in fact, is our hypothesis: that the roots Of logical thought are not to be found in language alone, even though language coordinations are important, but are to be found more generally in the coordinations of actions, which are the basis of reflective abstraction. I do not intend to go into biology; I just want to carry the regressive analysis back to its beginnings in psychology and to emphasize again 306 that the formation of logical and mathematical structures in human thinking cannot be explained by language alone, but has its roots in the general coordination of actions. Piaget sees experience, the active involvement Of the child, as one of the most important factors in all forms of intellectual development. As with maturation, experience is seen as necessary but not a sufficient condition for development. 3. Social Transaction (Social Transmission) The role Of culture, society, and socialization agents is clearly recognized by Piaget as being of fundamental significance for development. He Opens a chapter devoted to "Social Factors in Intellectual Development" (1966, Ch. V1) with the following statement: The human being is immersed right from birth in a social environment which affects him just as much as his physical environment. Society, even more, in a sense, than the physical environment, changes the very structure Of the individual, because it not only compels him to recognize facts, but also provides him with a ready-made system of signs, which modify his thought; it presents him with new values and it imposes on him an infinite series of obligations. It is therefore quite evident that social life affects intelligence through the three media Of language (signs), the content Of interaction (intellectual values), and the rules imposed on thought (collective logical or pre-logical norms). Clearly, Piaget assigns an important role to the formative influence of the environment in the form of society. There is one important condition he puts on this influence which is of special importance to educators, viz., that the influence of the environment is affected and even limited by the individual's readiness to assimilate the 307 signs, values, and logic he identifies as being the media of social transmission. On this point he says (1970d, p. 721): In fact, both social or eduCational influences and physical experience are on the same footing in this respect, they can have some effect on the subject only if he is capable Of assimilating them, and he can do this only if he already possesses the adequate instruments or structures (or their primitive forms). In fact, what is taught, for instance, is effectively assimilated only when it gives rise to an active reconstruction or even reinvention by the child. This statement not only recognizes the limitations Of environmental influence vis-a-vis the child's readiness and ability to assimilate the heteronomous forces, but reasserts emphatically Piaget's major thesis that deve10pment is a transactional constructive process involving an inherently active organism. The role Of the environment here is not the unilateral heteronomous power Of the behavioristic conceptualization in which the child is molded, shaped, and formed into the image Of the external world. Piaget and Inhelder (1969, p. 156) make this explicit: Socialization is a structuration to which the individual contributes as much as he receives from it, whence the interdependence and isomor— phism Of "operation" and "cooperation." Even in the case of transmissions in which the subject appears most passive, such as school-teaching, social action is ineffective without an active assimilation by the child, which presupposes adequate Operatory structures. The position espoused by Piaget on this subject is clearly an organismic-structural-developmenta1 conceptualization of the transactional relationship between the organism and the environment. For this reason it seems inconsistent for Piaget to use the term "social transmission," so reminiscent of the behavioristic view of 308 the passive organism receiving the transmission of the environment. For this reason, and in keeping with the constructivist conceptual- ization of cognitive and values/moral deve10pment that characterizes Piaget's theory, it seems more apprOpriate to refer to this factor Of development as "social transaction" rather than "social transmission." 4. Equilibration The three factors presented thus far, maturation, experience, and social transaction, are all major factors that partially account for human development. But each individually and all together are unable to account for development. They are all necessary, but not sufficient conditions. Piaget postulates a fourth factor that not only fills the gap but coordinates and regulates the other three. It is one of the most controversial aspects of his theory and one Of the most hotly debated issues Of organismic-developmental psychology. It is also an extremely complex subject that cannot be more than briefly outlined here. It is, however, a crucial factor in values development education theory inasmuch as it (1) plays a foundational role in most structural-deve10pmental stage theories, especially Piaget's and Kohlberg's, and (2) it is one Of the most essential elements in the proposed theory insofar as educational intervention is concerned. The need for the equilibration process as an explanatory principle in deve10pment is Offered by Piaget (1970d, p. 724) as follows: 309 The problem then becomes that Of understanding how the fundamental structures of intelligence can appear and evolve with all those that later derive from them. Since they are not innate, they cannot be explained by maturation alone. Logical structures are not a simple product of physical experience; in seriation, classification, one-to-One correspondence, the subjects's activities add new relations such as order and totality to the Objects. Logicomathematical experience derives its information from the subjects own actions..., which implies an auto- regulation of these actions. It could be alleged that these structures are the result Of social or educational transmission. But as we saw..., the child must still understand what is transmitted, and to do this the structures are necessary. More- over, the social explanation only displaces the problem: how did the members of the social group acquire the structures in the first place? Piaget goes on to point out that all levels of development involve the coordination Of actions in ways that involve the characteristics of logical prOperties and structures, and that these coordinations involve corrections and self-regulations. He points out that similar regulatory mechanisms are characteristic at all levels of organic life. These cybernetic processes are essential for functioning and maintenance of life in the biological realm, allow for the correction of errors, and make deve10pment and growth possible. Applying the same principle to cognitive development and cognitive structures he says (PP. 724-725): Thus it seems highly probable that the construction of structures is mainly the work of equilibration, defined not by balance between Opposite forces but by self-regulation; that is, equilibration is a set of active reactions of the subject to external disturbances, which can be effective, or anticipated, to varying degrees. This fourth factor of development that regulates the other factors and provides the major impetus for development involves 310 the organism in a constant process Of alternating back and forth from equilibrium to disequilibrium to equilibrium and so on and so on. Equilibrium is not a static concept of balance in the sense of homeo- stasis, which is more generally conceived as a static balance of forces in a closed system. Equilibrium is a dynamic process of continuously active forces Operating in an Open system. Thus a condition of dynamic equilibrium does not involve a state of rest, but an ongoing process of maximum activity attempting to compensate for imbalances caused by transactions between the organism and the environment. It is a self-regulatory, or cybernetic process that makes it possible for the organism to develop. The deve10pment comes about as the result of the organism's continuous need to change, adjust, and adapt to new conditions, changed relationships, unfamiliar perceptions, and a myriad of other imbalances in its dynamic spatiO-temporal existence in a complex environment. Perturbations and disturbances impinge on the child's system and he immediately acts and reacts to compensate. This continuous flow of energy stimulates and excites the child in such a way that he becomes an active, structuring participant in the organism-environment transaction, rather than a passive Observer-recipient of the messages and structure of the environment. It is through the constant action of the equilibration process in conjunction with other factors that the child energizes and perfects his psychomotor skills, creates his cognitive representations of himself and his world, and develops his affective responses and systems. Piaget and Inhelder (1969, p. 157) further clarify the 311 equilibration process as follows: An internal mechanism...is observable at the time of each partial construction and each transition from one stage to the next. It is a process of equilibrium, not in the sense of a simple balance of forces, as in mechanics, or an increase of entropy, as in thermodynamics, but in the sense--which has now been brought out so clearly by cybernetics--Of self-regulation; that is, a series of active compensations on the part of the subject in response to external disturbances and an adjustment that is both retroactive (loop systems or feedbacks) and anticipatory, constituting a permanent system Of compensations. Equilibration, then, is at the heart Of the process by which the' human mind constructs and reconstructs reality, integrates and reintegrates at ever higher levels of development the structures that give the organism both stability and flexibility, and transacts with the world. In summary, development is seen to be the result of four major factors that consider both internal and external forces believed to be responsible for ontogenesis. The organismic- structural-developmental theory attempts to incorporate a balanced view Of deve10pment into its conceptual framework. The internal factors of maturation and equilibration are biologically rooted and somewhat determined and limiting, yet allow for a wide range of potentiality for human deve10pment. The external factors Of experience and social transaction are under heteronomous control, but are still not unilateral and unrealistically controlling. The principles of the conceptual framework deve10ped thus far lay the foundation for the theory Of moral deve10pment that follows. At the same time, the Kohlberg theory is also an exemplar 312 of the total organismic-structural-developmental system. Kohlberg's Cognitive-Developmental Theory of Moral Development Probably the single most fruitful exploration into values deve10pment that has been done to date is the work of Lawrence Kohlberg, currently Professor of Education and Social Psychology at Harvard University. Kohlberg's early explorations as a doctoral student at the University of Chicago in the late 1950's resulted in the original presentation of his theoretical framework and empirical support in his doctoral dissertation, "The development of modes Of moral thinking and choice in the years 10 to 16," finished in December, 1958. Since then he has elaborated his conceptual framework into a theory that has gained wide attention in the behavioral sciences, has undergone extensive empirical validation, and is demonstrating its practical utility in a variety of applications in education, family and child sciences, and prison reform. The theory is variously referred to as the Cognitive-Developmental Theory of MOralization, or the Cognitive-Developmental Theory of'Mbral Judgment, or Moral Development, or by the abbreviated name Kohlberg himself uses in informal speech, Mbral Development Theory. One of the hallmarks of a good theory is the power to generate research and debate on a broad front in scientific circles. Kohlberg's seminal ideas have demonstrated this power by generating a great deal of activity in many places, including his own base in the Laboratory for Human Development at Harvard where he and numerous faculty and students conduct research to fhrther develop the theory through extensive field work. Notable among his associates there are Elliot Turiel and Robert Selman. Among other sites that have been engaged in testing his ideas, further developing the theory, disseminating the information, and seeking to make practical applications, one that is especially active is the Ontario Institute for Studies in Education (OISE) at the University of Toronto, where Edmund Sullivan, Clive Beck, and others have done some outstanding work.17 Kohlberg's theory is an outstanding example of the organismic- structural-developmental approach. The basis, background, and major tenets of Kohlberg's theory have been summarized by Kohlberg (1972b, p. 183) as follows: A cognitive-deve10pmental theory of moralization holds that there is a sequence of moral stages for the same basic reasons that there are cognitive or logicomathematical stages, that is, because cognitive-structural reorganizations toward the more equilibrated occur in the course of interaction between the organism and the environment. In the area of logic, Piaget holds that a psychological theory of development is closely linked to a theory Of normative logic. Following Piaget, we claim the same is true in the area of moral judgment. A "cognitive-developmental" theory of moralization is broader than Piaget's own theory, however. By cognitive-developmental I refer to a set of assumptions common to the moral theories Of Dewey and Tufts (1932), Mead (1934), Baldwin (1906), Piaget (1932), and myself. All have 17At Michigan State University, the Values Development Education Program, initiated by Ted ward and John Stewart, functions as a translation center for spelling out practical implications of research and theory. The primary focus is the integrating of the work of Piaget, Kohlberg, Dewey, and numerous other contributers to values and values education into an integrative eclectic model for values deve10pment education for practical application by secular and religious educators and administrators. 314 postulated (a) stages Of moral development representing (b) cognitive-structural transforma- tions in cOnception Of self and society. All have assumed (c) that these stages represent successive modes of "taking the role of'others" in social situations, and hence that (d) the social- environmental determinants of development are its opportunities for role-taking. More generally, all have assumed (e) an active child who structures his perceived environment, and hence, have assumed (f) that moral stages and their develop- ment represent the interaction of the child's structuring tendencies and the structural features of the environment, leading to (g) successive forms of equilibrium in interaction. This equilibrium is conceived as (h) a level of justice, with (i) change being caused by dis- equilibrium, where (j) some Optimal level of match or discrepancy is necessary for change between the child and the environment. The heart of the theory is contained in the structural- stage development and the role Of justice as the core of morality. The structural-stage deve10pment is founded on the principles of structuralism presented earlier, which makes the important distinction between content and structure. In any given moral situation and on any given moral dilemma, then, the choice of the respondent is the content, and the underlying organized pattern of thought that constitutes that subject's logic and reasoning forms the structure. As Kohlberg says (ibid, p. 230): Since moral stages are defined as structure of values, not as content of values, choice on our dilemmas is not always determined. A stage four law and order subject may Opt for not stealing the drug out of respect for law and property rights, as he may Opt for stealing out of respect for marital responsibility and for the value society puts on human life. We call the choice "content" and the stage characteristics "structure". This will become more explicit with an understanding of the stages themselves, which will be presented shortly. At a workshop on moral development theory Kohlberg (1973a) emphasized what he has said in his writings: "The core of morality ia a sense of justice. Moral action is action to promote justice." Consequently, Kohlberg sees democracy as the major way to maximize moral development. In his words: "The democratic system is conducive to moral deve10pment because it helps the individual experience and see justice." Later we will develop these points and their relation- ship to the stages. But at the outset it is important to understand, as Kohlberg makes clear, that justice and morality are isomorphic. This isomorphism is revealed in the way Kohlberg defines some critical terms. At the workshOp he gave the following definitions: 1. Mbrality--an integrating and directing principle. Morality is what defines an organized unit Of the personality. 2. Moral principle—-A moral principle is a principle for resolving competing claims for action. 3. MOral decision—-involves a conscious conflict between two lines of action and the attempt to choose the better in the face of tempt- tion. This involves strong emotional involvement. Relating these statements to the preceding ones the relationship of morality and justice is clear. The integrating and directing prin- ciple (morality) is a sense of justice. Or, to put it another way, the criteria by which one resolves moral conflict, competing claims 316 for action, are the principles of justice at the core of that person's personality. Consequently, to truly understand someone's level of moral development you must determine that person's develop- mental level of justice. And that is precisely what the Kohlberg stages are all about: the underlying principles Of justice used by people from the lowest stages to the highest and most mature. "What logic is in the cognitive domain," Kohlberg says (1972b. p. 194; 1973a) "justice is in the moral domain." Earlier the point was made in reference to Piaget's theory that one of the most important factors in development is the acquisition of reversibility of thought (logic). Reversibility is the ability to look at an event, action, or idea backwards and forwards--being able to mentally retrace one's steps and perceive the issue from all sides. It is easy to see, then, how Kohlberg is able to make the claim for justice as the equivalent of logic. For justice is the ability to see relationships in a conflict from all points of view, both backwards and forwards. If one is unable to see his own point of view and others' points Of view both ways, then Obviously one cannot resolve the conflict justly. And what improves with moral maturity, with movement up the moral stages, is the ability to take the other's perspective and to resolve conflicts at ever higher qualitative levels of justice. Or to use the terminology of the structural- developmentalist, as one moves up the stages one's ability to resolve claims becomes increasingly equilibrated. Higher level justice is a more equilibrated form of justice than lower level justice, and is rooted in more equilibrated structures. 317 These issues, stage development and justice, will become more meaningful in conjunction with the stages, but having them in mind beforehand will result in a more penetrating understanding of the meaning of Kohlberg's stages, which are presented following. Moral Development Stages--Preliminary Discussion In what sense are the preceding statements regarding the stages being structural and developmental defensible? First, they are structural because they define and represent deep, underlying structures of thought patterns, logic, and perspective that are used by people in the resolution Of moral conflicts and dilemmas. They are not particular solutions to particular problems, i.e., they are not content, they are not attitudinal, they are not choices. They reflect and manifest the core of one's moral nature. They are not quantitative, i.e., they are not determined by how many times a person makes a particular choice, or how many things a person knows about moral matters. The conditions are these: if a person demonstrates the making of a moral choice by employing a particular kind Of structural logic that genuinely represents the characteristics of a particular stage (or if he demonstrates the rejection of the logic of the earlier stages), if he focuses on salient concerns for that stage, and if he understands and employs concepts of justice consistent with that stage, then the person is either in that stage of moral development or is in transition to it. Another way of saying this is that if the person does not truly have the underlying structure, then he cannot use the logic, take the perspective, and meaningfully 318 employ the concepts of that stage, and, therefore, is not develop- mentally in that stage. On the other hand, if he can do and show these things only once, then he must have the structures or be in the process of attaining and deve10ping them. Practically, in the actual evalua- tion Of a particular person, efforts are made to elicit structural responses as often as possible. This is not done to Obtain a certain number of responses that can be added up to demonstrate the acquisition of the stage; rather it is a practical matter Of accepting the limitations of Observational procedures and testing instruments, and needing to corroborate initial judgments in order to reduce measurement error. If there were perfectly reliable instruments with absolute validity only one observation would be needed in order to determine the stage. And, too, the problem is compounded by the sometimes very difficult problem of separating structure from content, especially at the higher stages. With regard to the developmental aspect, the stages are truly developmental in the sense that they meet the criteria laid out earlier for deve10pmental stages: 1. They form an invariant sequence that is culturally universal. 2. Qualitative differences in the behavior patterns from one stage to another. 3. Each stage constitutes a structural wholeness with an underlying characteristic of thought-organization. 4. They form a hierarchical sequence in that each higher stage incorporates the abilities and structures of the 319 stages below, but at a more complex level, in a more integrated and articulated form, and in a more systematic way. Each stage, in other words, is a reintegration of the stages that precede it, and qualitatively is more equilibrated. Any solutions to moral problems at the higher stage are more equilibrated solutions that resolve the problems the lower stage could not resolve at all or could resolve in a less satisfactory and.mature way. 5. Each stage contains an initial period of formation and a subsequent period of attainment. 6. Each stage is interrelated to the preceding and following ones and represents achievement and preparation. Also, these stages do not form an automatic maturational sequence. They are not "wired in" and do not merely unfold with the passage of time and the attainment of either physical or cognitive deve10pment. Different individuals pass through the stages at earlier or later times, take more or less time to pass through each stage, and may cease to develop beyond particular stages or go on to the highest stages. Many adults have never and will never get beyond some of the lower stages. Very few adults in any culture, including our own, ever make it to the last two stages, especially the sixth. "Stage six peOple" are rare indeed. The reasons for these variations parallel the reasons for variations in cognitive development, and are intimately related to the same factors Of development. Relating these factors to moral development 320 we find the following: 1. Genetic emergence, organismic growth, organic maturation. The nervous system, the endocrine system, and other physiological systems of the human body must have deve10ped to the extent necessary for the cognitive development required for the perspectives underlying the structures Of moral judgment at a given stage. Experience. Likewise, the child must have a cognitively and socially enriched environment in order to permit physical experience, logico-mathematical experience, and social experience to take place. The less rich this environment and its Opportunities for apprOpriate experiences, the less likely will be the child's deve10pment to higher stages, and vice versa. A restrictive environment restricts opportunities for conflict, which is the fuel for development. Social transaction. This factor is especially important for moral deve10pment. Opportunities for role-taking are especially critical. Some societies and cultures are by nature at lower stages of moral deve10pment, and consequently never provide Opportunities for certain kinds of information or action to even be seen or used. Kohlberg (1969) cites, for example, a number Of his cross-cultural studies that show that people in isolated villages in the Yucatan and in Turkey move through the stages more slowly, less of them get 321 to the intermediate stages, and nobody gets to the highest stages. It is difficult for us to imagine that the inhabitants Of the three cultures studied by Ruth Benedict in the 1920's and 1930's and reported by her in the classic book, Patterns of Culture, could have even developed much beyond the two or three basic stages, and certainly would not have been very likely to have ever gotten to the last two. The Dobu and Kwakiutl cultures are generally Stage 1 and 2 cultures. The Zuni Indian culture could probably be used as a magnificent example of a Stage 4 culture, but rather than offering opportunity for Stage 5 development, the Zuni most likely would have deliberately exterminated any Stage 5 behavior. Thus the role of social transaction is two-sided. On one hand the individual cannot assimilate and benefit from the Opportunities in the culture until he is ready, but, on the other hand, if the culture doesn't provide the appropriate Opportunities the individual will not even get a chance to deal with the issues that will enable him to be ready and to grow to and beyond them. Equilibration. The nature of one's capacity to deal with conflict, and thus to develop, will have an enormous influence on the rate of progression through the stages and the stage of final 322 attainment. The research Of Kohlberg (1969, 1973a, 1973b), Kohlberg, Scharf, and Hickey (1972), Rest (1971), Selman (1971, 1973), Turiel (1966, 1969, 1973), and Blatt and Kohlberg (1973) clearly supports the idea of the equilibration process and its influence on the variations of stage progression and duration. The Kohlberg stages are exemplars of the structural- developmental model that has been presented, and are similar in nature and organization to the Piagetian stages. In fact, the intimate relationship between the cognitive stages of Piaget and the moral stages of Kohlberg is an important aspect Of values development education theory. This relationship is clearly manifested and clarified in the presentation of the Kohlberg stages that follows. The stages as presented in this dissertation are based on some of the latest research findings of Kohlberg and his associates, and include some significant changes from the presentations of the stages as presented in earlier publications Of Kohlberg, Turiel, and others. Support for these changes is contained primarily in two articles, viz., Kohlberg (1972b, 1973b) and tape recordings and notes of the proceedings of the workshop held by Kohlberg and his staff at Harvard University in July 1973 (Kohlberg, 1973a).18 Much Of this material has not yet been disseminated widely by Kohlberg, especially the significant changes involving the ages of entry into 18 . . The author of this dissertation attended the workshop, took extensive notes, and recorded most Of the sessions. The notes and recordings have been retained. 323 the higher stages. The most important of these changes involves a downshifting Of the stages; i.e., a general realignment Of the stages to reflect the progress in the data analysis, especially on the longitudinal studies that have been carried on by Kohlberg since the time of his dissertation. He has continued to conduct exhaustive and intensive interviews with part of his original sample of boys. These have taken place every three years. The original subjects, as was mentioned earlier, were between the ages of 10 and 16 when Kohlberg started. In 1972, Kohlberg conducted his last round Of research on them at the subject's ages of about 25 to 31. At the workshop (Kohlberg, 1973a) and in one of his more recent papers (Kohlberg, 1973b) Kohlberg revealed that in the earlier phases of his work he did not sufficiently consider the difference between content and structure. One Of the most important consequences has been a general tendency to have considered many statements by his research subject as being at higher stages than now believed. In a widely disseminated paper (Kohlberg and Kramer, 1969) it was stated that there seemed to be no evidence for adult stages of moral judgment from a deve10pmental standpoint (i.e., stages that actually develop in the adult years), and that the higher stages were reached in the high school years. Any stage change after this was considered some kind Of temporary regression or stabilization, or regression followed by stabilization. One Of the most important revisions of the theory now makes allowance for the fact that Kohlberg has deve10ped considerably more SOphisticated interview and scoring procedures that make it possible to more adequately differentiate between content and structure. Using these, he has reviewed the data from his longitudinal studies and other studies. Kohlberg now concludes that it is highly unlikely, maybe even impossible, that Stages 5 and 6 could deve10p before the early twenties. The earliest that he himself has seen the development of Stage 5 in his research sample is age 23. SO it seems that the upper limit of deve10pment in the teenage high school years is Stage 4. Stage 5 is most likely an adult stage that may come in the twenties, and Stage 6 is either a phenomenon of the late twenties, the early thirties, or possibly even later. A reanalysis of the cases he believed showed Uregression" from Stage 4 to Stage 2 in some Of his college subjects now reveals that they are in a transition stage from Stage 4 to Stage 5 that he is calling at this time 4%. More about this will be said later, after the presentation Of the stages. Another major readjustment in the stage presentation is the reclassification of some behavior that was formerly believed to be Stage 4 to a new form of Stage 3 which Kohlberg calls ”3A prime”. In other ways there have been more diffuse and general changes that relate to the content-structure problem and they are reflected mostly in the need to be careful when interpreting statements that are really lower in structural properties than the content seems to indicate. It is quite possible that the content-structure problem is considerably related to a problem pointed out many years ago by Piaget in his book, The Moral Judgment of the Child (originally 325 published in 1932, English translation published in 1948). He claimed that children are eSpecially receptive to the desires of adults and will make strenuous efforts to do and say what adults, especially parents, want them to do and say in certain situations. Consequently, he said children tend to "parrot" adult terminology without any understanding of the meaning of the words, or any correspondence between their meaning of the word and the adult meaning of the word. Piaget called this behavior psitticism. In their book, The Psychology Of the Child, Piaget and Inhelder (1969, p. 21) make reference to a similar concept viewed from the other side Of the perspective. They use the term ”adultomorphism" to refer to the tendency on the part of adults to structure or view the behavior of children in terms Of adult experience. The combination of psitticism and adultomorphism may account for much adult behavior towards, misunderstandings of, and inappropriate socialization techniques used with children. Exploration Of the traditional- authoritarian and the cultural-relativistic adjustment approaches to values education in the area of religious socialization and religious education may reveal that the childish statements about God and other religious concepts are psitticisms interpreted by adults from their adultomorphic standpoint as true understandings of adult religious beliefs. This can lead adults to interpret compliance and adjustment behavior as true religious behavior. Kohlberg's research and theory provides insight into this problem. As Kohlberg frequently states (see, for example, Kohlberg, 1968a) each child is in his own way and at his own level truly a moral philosopher who will construct 326 and interpret reality on his own terms and make his moral decisions on the basis of his own structural level of development, using the logic and concepts familiar, understandable, and meaningful to him. Piaget's and Kohlberg's approaches are more productive than earlier approaches to the relationship between cognitive deve10pment and moral judgment because they purposely avoid evaluation of the behavior of children in terms of right and wrong answers. They both found their insights through attempts to understand the human mind and the way it functions rather than through searches for right and wrong answers. Consequently, both Piaget's and Kohlberg's stage- structure schema are attempts to reveal the inner structural prOcesses of the human mind, rather than the classification of the superficial and relativistic content manifested in the answers to problems. Moral Develppment Levels and Stages19 Kohlberg distinguishes between levels and stages. He found that there existed a rather long general period of time in the life of a child when the concept of morality has no operational meaning, a period labeled the Premoral Period. Moral deve10pment 19Much Of the data, stage descriptions, examples, and other content is either directly taken from the writings of Kohlberg and his associates, or has been adapted from those writings. In some cases their statements or figures have been adapted, abbreviated or elaborated. The information comes from many different papers, scoring manuals, and other data prepared by Kohlberg, his staff and sources. To specifically identify a sole source for any statement, or to try to affix specific credit would be an impossible task. The sources are shown in the bibliography. 327 subsequently proceeds through three broad developmental periods designated as levels. Each level describes the overall characteristics of moral judgment that are predominant for each Of two specific stages within that level. Each level, then, has two stages, for a total of six stages. If we include the premoral period as Stage 0, there are, then, seven general developmental periods in the life of the human beings, with respect to the development Of moral judgment. Table 4.2 is an overall picture of the levels and stages, the approximate earliest age likely for each stage to deve10p, the Piaget stage required for each Kohlberg stage, and the basic cognitive tasks prerequisite for the moral judgment Of the stage in each case. Table Set 4.3 is a comprehensive summary Of each stage and level. The organization of each stage is designed to reflect the developmental sequence of events. Cognitive deve10pment is a prerequisite for social role-taking perspective, which in turn is a prerequisite for moral development. In other words, until the child has attained a certain level of cognitive development he will not be able to perform the cognitive tasks called for by the social role- taking perspective. The latter is required in order for the person to use the perspective necessary for a given level Of moral judgment. For example, one cannot make Stage 2 moral judgments unless he has discovered the reciprocity involved in taking the perspectiveaof self and other, which cannot be understood unless he has attained the level Of concrete operations involving the development of cognitive reciprocity and reversibility. 328 The broad general age ranges given are merely guidelines and not deve10pmental timetables showing when "normal” people achieve a particular stage. As was pointed out earlier, individuals go through the stages at different rates, achieve the stages at different times, and may or may not pass beyond a given stage. And, of course, the cognitive development level is a major determining factor in these sequential changes. The broad general age range should be reviewed in conjunction with the section discussion school distribution at the end Of each stage. Several specific factors or aspects have been cited at every stage in order to provide a thread Of continuity running through the developmental scale. These factors are conception Of rights, value of life, and justice. These are critical factors at the heart of moral judgment. At the end Of most stages are presented two substages. These substages represent a lesser equilibrated and more equilibrated form Of the stage. Generally speaking, the more typical progression for an individual will involve going through the ”A” substage, then the "B" substage, then moving on to the ”A” substage of the next higher stage, and so on. However, Kohlberg believes that his data show that not all peOple do it this way, and that some people go from one "A" to the next "A" without achieving the more equilibrated "B” substage. He also syas that peOple tend to stabilize at the ”B" substage of their terminal stage regardless Of how they proceeded through the earlier stages, skipping the "B"'s or not. This is not universal, however, and peOple can terminate their deve10pment at 329 the "A" substage of any given stage. Many authoritarians, for example, probably never achieve the more equilibrated 3-B and remain at the "3-A Prime" deve10pmental plateau. One other point to bear in mind while studying the stages is that, generally Speaking, a person is never at only one stage at any given time, with the exception, of course, Of Stage 1. Individuals will ordinarily be at two or three stages, making some judgments over the group of stages. Each person is likely to have a modal stage--the one at which at least 50% of his judgments are being made at that time. For example, a teenager may be making about 60% of his judgments at Stage 3, his modal stage, and 20% at Stage 4, 15% at Stage 2, and 5% at Stage 1. This would indicate that he is in transition to Stage 4, but is still making some judgments at the two lower stages. As he moves on up to Stage 4 the percentage of judgments made at the lower stages should drop considerably. The gap between Stage 4 and Stage 5, i.e., between Conventional Morality at Level II and Principled Morality at Level III, is a major gap that is never bridged by the vast majority of people, even in an advanced democratic society. And for those who do make it to Stage 5, only a small percentage go on to Stage 6. One of the most fruitful areas for research is how to stimulate this development, how to bridge this gap, how to deve10p principled morality in more of our people. A thorough study of the levels and stages should be made by keeping in mind the understanding of the foundational components: organismic, structural, and developmental. 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In the early part (sensorimotor) Of the period the child's actions are his judgments. Later (preOper- ational) he begins to be able to think about his actions, but not in a cognitive or social sense. Selman's Social Role-Taking: Emerging understanding that others have subjective perspectives. Stage O-A - Amoral Stage Definition of'Stage: Not a moral stage. Moral questions have no meaning. Actions are judgments. Broad general age range: Birth to about 4-4% Cognitive DevelOpment Level: Covers sensorimotor stage to early preconceptual substage Of preoperational stage. Selman's Social Role-Taking Perspective: Subject has a sense of differentiation of self and other but fails to distinguish between the social perspective of other and self. 333 Kohlberg's Socio—Moral Perspective: Not applicable. No moral perspective possible. Stage O-B - PremoraZ Stage of'Egaeentrie Judgment Definition of Stage: The child makes judgments of good on the basis of what he likes and wants or what helps him, and bad on the basis of what he does not like or what hurts him. He has no concept of rules or of obligations to obey or conform independent of his wish. Egocentric valuing. Broad general age range: From about 4-45 to as late as 6 or 7. Cognitive Development Level: Intuitive substage of preOperational stage. Selman's Social Role-Taking Perspective: Subject views self and other as subjects who think about their actions as separate perspective takers, but assumes that all others will have views similar to his own. Kohlberg's Socio-Moral Perspective: The perspective of right or values is that of the individual actor in terms of his wishes and needs and unaware of other perspectives. 334 TABLE 4.3B - LEVEL I - PRECONVENTIONAL MORALITY At this level, the child is responsive to cultural rules and labels of good and bad, right or wrong, but he interprets the labels in terms of either the physical or hedonistic consequences of action (punishment,~ reward, exchange of favors) or the physical power of those who enunciate the rules and lables. The level is divided into the following two stages: Stage Z - The Punishment and Obedience Orientation Definition of'Stage: The punishment and obedience orientation. The physical consequences of action determine its goodness or badness regardless of the human meaning or values of these consequences. Avoidance of punishment and unquestioning deference to power are values in their own right, not in terms of respect for an underlying moral order supported by punishment and authority (the latter is Stage 4). Characteristics of'Stage: Avoidance of "bad" acts (a trouble-avoiding set). Concern for consequences, not intentions. No consideration of intentions. Lack of awareness of relativity of values. Egocentrism dominant and leads to: Moral reaZism — the tendency to regard duty and value attached to it as self-subsistent and independent of the mind. Objective responsibility: Standards of judgment and 335 motivation are both external. Immanent justice: Belief in existence of automatic punishments which emanate from things themselves. Conception of rights: No real conception of a right. "Having a right" to do something equated with "being right", obeying authority. Reciprocity form: Based on submitting obedience as price for freedom from punishment. Equality not present. OBEY AND BE SAFE. Value of Life: No differentiation between moral value of life and its physical or social status value. One should not kill, but there is no general obligation to preserve the lives of others. Justice: Fairness is the law of Talion: An eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth. Retaliation is automatic response to committing an act, regardless of intention or motive. Stage Z-A: Orientation to obedience to power and to rules. Punish- ment or application of a negative label automatically makes action wrong. Concern about avoiding physical damage to person or property but not for the overall welfare of the person. Stage Z-B: Orientation to concrete deceit. Wrong deeds must be paid for by punishment. Heroes and authorities 336 and other special people merit special treatment, payment and reward. School distribution: Will find some children at Stage 0—8 in early elementary school. Some will be exclusively at Stage 1 all through elementary school from K through 6. K through 3 will generally be almost all Stage 1. Gradually Stage 2 should begin to be evident from grade 3 and up, and Stage 1 will slowly recede. However, Stage 1 behavior is still very prominent in middle school—junior high grades, and even in high school. A lot will be determined by the socio-economic class of the community and the prevailing atmosphere in the home life. Lower SES homes generally do not provide the role-taking necessary for more rapid deve10pment in the social and moral domains. Stage 2 - The Instrumental Relativist Orientation Dgfinition of Stgge: The instrumental relativist orientation. Right action consists of what instrumentally satisfies one's own needs and occasionally the needs of others. Human relations are viewed in terms such as those of the market place. Elements of fairness, reciprocity, and equal sharing are present, but they are always interpreted in a physical, pragmatic way. Reciprocity is a matter of "you scratch my back and I'll scratch yours," not loyalty, gratitude or justice. 337 Broad general age range: From about 7 or 8 to about 12 to 14. Cognitive DevelOpment Level Required: Concrete Operations Stage required. Cannot be Stage 2 until logical reciprocity, or reversibility is present. Selman's Social Role-Taking Perspective: Stage 2: The discovery that other can view the self as a subject just as the self can view the other as a subject; the child can view the relation of self and other from other's viewpoint. Stage Z-A: Subject is aware that his own subjectivity is under scrutiny by the other and that his view of other is based, in part, on other's view of the self. Stage 2-B: Subject is aware that other not only can take the self‘s perspective, but also that other is aware of the self taking other's perspective. Kohlberg's Socio-Moral Perspective: Sees things from the perspective of isolated individuals who value things subjectively considering other individuals and themselves. The perspective differs from Stage 1 in the awareness of different perspectives, whereas Stage 1 has a single perspective defined by authority, rules and reality. 338 Stage 2 differs also in its ability to see a perspective behind rules and practices differing from that of the individual forced to accommodate to the rule. This is the perspective of a rational or calculating individual authority or a group of individuals who set up the practice or value in terms of its instrumentality to individual ends. Characteristics of'Stage: Basically hedonistic (operationally, not cognitively or philosophically). It is a naive instrumental hedonism. The "Playboy Philosophy" is an example. Egocentrism still influential, but diminishes as self-concept develops. Inadequate Unilateral Begins to reflect increasing awareness of one's own ego- needs and ego-interests, and of the exchange of ego- interests for self—gain. Moral realism still present, but diminishing. Values becoming relative. Tendency to define with respect to private needs. and immature base for morality that becomes evident with increased intellectual development. In extremes leads to cynicism typical of so-called juvenile delinquents (reciprocity in terms of using and controlling other people). Can lead to an instrumental power orientation that is based on dominating and controlling other people for its own sake and the ego rewards this behavior brings. respect of Stage 1 begins to diminish and be replaced with ideas related to egalitarian denial of the superiority of authorities and adults. 339 Conception of rights: Rights are factual ownership and possession rights. Each person has a right to do what he wants with himself and his possessions, even if it conflicts with the rights of others. No adequate solution to this conflict exists at this stage. Value of life: The value of a human life is seen as instrumental to Justice: Stage Z-A: Stage 2-B: the satisfaction of the needs of its possessor or of other persons. Decision to save life is relative to, or to be made by, its possessor. (Differentiation of physical and interest value of life, differentiation of its value to self and to other.) Fairness is ”coming out even”. But still takes the perspective of the individual actor. Law of Talion expiatory justice still present. An orientation to the "you scratch my back and I'll scratch yours" way of doing things from the point of view: "What am I going to get out of it?" Element of reciprocity present, but without sense of justice. What the self is going to get out of the instrumental exchange is still dominant, but now the consideration of what the other gets out of it enters, along with the idea of coming out even. Elementary justice involved. A clear sense of the concrete rights of others, i.e., that if I have a right so does the other, and a judgment of the other by concretely putting oneself in the other guy's place. 340 School distribution: Stage 2 should start to creep in about grade 3, and gradually become even with and finally dominant over Stage I, especially by late elementary and early middle-junior high. However, Stage 2 behavior is still a major force in the morality and decision—making of the young adolescent in high school. And, or course, some people become fixated instrumental egoists and remain at this stage all their lives. The socioeconomic status and other environmental factors will play a large role in determining the rate and extent of progression. The moral atmosphere of the school will be very significant. The morality of the market place and politics contains a great deal of Stage 2 orientation. 341 T E . - LEVEL II'é' ONVENTIONAL MDRALITY At this level, the individual perceives the maintenance of the expectations of his family, group, or nation as valuable in its own right, regardless of immediate and obvious consequences. The attitude is not only one of conformity to personal expectations and social order, but of loyalty to it, of actively maintaining, supporting, and justifying the order and identifying with the persons or group involved in it. Behavior based on conformity to stereotyped and traditional role expectations. Moral value is in performing good or right roles. Characterized by fusion of person and role. Moral judgments at this level are based on role-taking and legitimately perceived expectations. Praise and blame, and approval and disapproval are very important. Moral stereotyping is common in which good and bad are defined in terms of socially—accepted categories of virtues and vices. Positive, active, and empathic moral behavior becomes possible. Duty and moral goodness defined in terms going beyond mere obedience to an actual service to other persons or institutions, or to a concern about the feelings of others. Responsibility becomes subjective at this level to the extent that standards of motivation (to conform) have been largely internalized. However, standards of judgment are still external. This level consists of the following two stages: Stage 3 - The Interpersonal Concordance Orientation Definition of'Stage: The interpersonal concordance or "good boy-nice girl" orientation. 342 Good behavior is what pleases or helps others and is approved by them. There is much conformity to stereotypical images of what is majority or "natural" behavior. Behavior is frequently judged by intention--”he means well” becomes important for the first time, and is frequently used. One earns approval by being "nice". This stage is easily observable in much typical teenage behavior, the peer group ethic, and the "one of the boys" phenomenon. The socialization process for females in our society has, until recently, been over- whelmingly oriented to Stage 3 morality. It is at this stage that the Golden Rule first becomes meaningful and Operationalizable, even though it is an immature application involving "putting yourself in the other guy's shoes", but without considering all the claims objectively as from the standpoint of not knowing which place would be yours. Broad general age range: From about 10 or 11 on, but starts to become more prevalent and predominant beginning about 12 or 13. No upper limit because many peOple never get beyond this stage, or if they do they retain many of its characteristics and make many moral judgments on this basis. Cognitive DevelOpment Level Required: Formal Operations Stage, Substage 1. Formation of the inverse of the reciprocal 343 (i.e., understanding the two different forms of opposites). Capacity to form negative classes (e.g., the class all not-mammals, not—crows, not- students, etc.) and to see relations as simultaneously reciprocal (e.g, to understand that liquid in a U-shaped tube holds an equal level because of counterbalanced pressures). Social and moral behavior at this stage involves these kinds of relationships in the social and moral domain. Operationalization of the Golden Rule, for example, involves the inverse of the reciprocal and mutual simultaneous reciprocity. Selman's Social Role-Taking Perspective: Stage 3: Perspectives are taken in a mutual and simultaneously systematic way rather than in a sequential manner. Stage 3-A: Stage 3-B: Kohlberg's Socio—Moral Perspective: 344 Subject realizes that both self and other can consider each other's point of view simul- taneously and mutually. Subject steps outside the two-person situation and achieves a third-person perspective on the dyadic interaction. This means that the person can perform the following cognitive Operations: "I know that he's thinking about me thinking about him; and I know that I'm thinking about him thinking about me." And, further, the person can imagine himself a third person looking at the two people performing these operations about each other. Subject sees all other as being able to achieve a third person perspective. Sees things from the perspective of a group, a role-class, or a mutual dyad which has shared Characteristic of'Stage: 345 and expectations and consciously orients to these norms and expectations as shared. At Stage 1 there is no true perspective, because the person sees things only one way, his way. At Stage 3, however, the perspective is shared because individuals engage in sharing and see the necessity of sharing. Sociocentric orientation becomes very influential as the child moves out of the confines of family and into deep involvements with others in the social world. Imitation and identification are common. Use of adult moral cliches and stereotypes appear. Intentionality becomes very important, and tends to be overworked. Approval and disapproval of others is tremendously important. This is a small group or dyadic perspective, not a society perspective. Conception Society is viewed somewhat as another person, not as an organized system. of rights: conception of good or nice. The conception of right is subordinated to the One has the right to do as one pleases, as in Stage 2, but one does not have the right to do evil as defined by the group in which one is a member. 346 Value of life: The value of a human life is based on the empathy and Justice: affection of family members and others toward its possessor. Life is more valuable than prOperty because it is the object of much greater empathy and affection. May manifest an empathic revulsion for killing. The value of human life, as based on social sharing, community, and love, is differentiated from the instrumental and hedonistic value of life. Applicable also to animals. Fairness is trying to make everyone happy. Considers every- one directly involved. But justice is embedded in concern for others' approval and personal conformity. Stage 3 justice, generally then, is a form of retributive justice. in which an attempt is made to balance things out, but in terms of love, affection, gratitude, and immediate social relationships. There are three forms of Stage 3: Stage 3-4: Stage "3-A The ”be nice” form of Stage 3 that involves the social perSpective as described above, but without much considera- tion for justice. It involves the role-taking but has not adequately worked out an integrated form of justice. Prime": The Authoritarian Orientation. This is an orientation to ”law and order” within the conventional mode, but without a social-system perspective. The orientation of this type of person is to maintain law for its own sake. Lacks a real understanding of society, but believes that without 347 laws you have chaos. Sees the breaking of one law as the beginning of all law and order breaking down. The stereo- typical authoritarian personality, who sees himself in a chain or line of command with peOple above and peeple below, who must give and take orders, is consistent with Stage 3-A Prime. It is a categorical orientation to maintaining fixed rules, to maintaining respect for legitimate authority, even though aware of good motives and roles involved in moral choice. One of the crucial points that separates this from Stage 4 is the lack of societal orientation that involves seeing society as an integrated system. Stage 3-B: This is the more equilibrated form of Stage 3 that involves a more integrated sense of justice. Orientation to main- taining, mutual expectations that you be good, but asks the question, "Are the other's expectations that you be good themselves good?" Uses the Golden Rule role- taking to decide fairness in moral isSues, and reflects on own motives. School distribution: This is an important stage for junior high and senior high schools. Stage 3 may enter the scene as early as ages 10 or 11, but more likely to come around 11, 12, and on. This is the dominant stage in the high school. Keep in mind that this stage enters the scene with the advent of Formal Operations and the resurgence of egocentrism that comes with these new and untried cognitive 348 powers. Knowledge of the combination of early formal Operations and Stage 2 and Stage 3 moral behavior can contribute a lot to an understanding of the teenage peer group ethic, the social criticism, and many other hallmarks of the young adolescent high school student. Stage 4 - The Law and Order (or Conscientious) Orientation Definition of‘Stage The "law and order" orientation. The individual is oriented toward authority, fixed rules, and the maintenance of the social order. Right behavior consists of doing one's duty, showing respect for authority, and maintaining the given social order for its own sake. Orientation to society's point of view, to the perspective of the generalized other or the majority, and to maintaining a stable social system and one's own character. (Where an apparently Stage 3-A Prime orientation clearly rests on this point of view, it is scored Stage 4. The Stage 4 orientation need not be rigidly rule-oriented, however.) A considera- tion of consequences for the group or society including the impact of the act upon the general expectations of members of society. Does not necessarily mean that one's orientation is to the ”establishment" society. One can be an anti-establishment Stage 4 person and apply the same orientation to a counter—society. For example, one could be a radical Marxist Stage 4 who conceives society as a Marxist Utopia. The central issue is that the Stage 4 person sees society itself as an entity that takes precedence over the individual. The individual exists to serve society. This is the view of society 349 as outlined by the sociologist, Emile Durkheim, earlier in this century. The main problem with the Stage 4 morality is that it subordinates, or even ignores, the individual and civil rights of man. This is a genuine taking—the-perspective-of-the-system orientation. But, relatively speaking, this is a high-level and sophisticated point of view. Broad general age range: Some adolescents 12 to 14 are beginning to move into this stage, but they are more likely to around 15, 16, or 17. This is the modal stage in the United States, and is a terminal stage for a large percentage of our population. Cognitive DevelOpment Level Required: Formal Operations Stage, Substage 2. Capacity to order triads of propositions or relations (e.g., to understand that if Bob is taller than Joe and Joe is shorter than Dick, then Joe is the shortest of the three). Ability to understand systems, and that the whole is more than the sum of its parts. Selman's Social Role-Taking Perspective: Stage 4: Subject realizes that both self and other understand that both parties can remove themselves hypothetically from the situation and view its dynamics. Stage 4-A: Subject realizes that mutual perspective-taking does not 350 always lead to complete understanding; social conventions are seen as necessary because they are understood by all members of the group and are used as a means of communicating to others and of understanding other's behavior and reactions. Stage 4-B: Subject is aware of the relativity of individual and social group perspectives, that each other interprets the social "facts" according to his own system of analysis which is influenced by his own history, his social system, emotional state, and so on. Kohlberg's Socio-Moral Perspective: Sees things from the perspective of the public or the generalized member of society who belongs to several groups or mutual dyads, and who has developed a perspective toward that which is common to all groups, i.e., to society as a system. Characteristics of Stage: Sociocentric orientation with the emphasis on formalized and institutionalized aspects of society. 351 Interpersonal relationships are characterized by very firmly established mutual expectations. Moral order is seen mainly as a matter of rules. These rules may be legal, religious, or moral, or all of these. Stage 4 person hesitates to make exceptions to rules, regardless of needs, motives, or consequences of or for the individual. The structural aspect of this concern, however, is not the Stage 1 orientation of fear, but the genuine concern for the social order and the possibility that exceptions can lead to social crisis and breakdown. Has some sense of hierarchy of rules, e.g., rules of life are higher than rules of property, but society is higher than individual life. This may lead to seeing something as morally right though legally wrong. Duty and "doing one's duty” are central to this orientation. Duty is defined in terms of responsibilities awarded to individuals by the social order, and the individual is obligated to fulfill these responsibilities, for which he is equally compensated and rewarded. Respect is earned by performing "dutifully". Merit should be rewarded by the system, and every individual must contribute to society. "A good day's pay for a good day's work." Social inequality is allowed where it is reciprocal to effort, moral conformity, and talent. But unequal favoring of the "idle", the "immoral", the poor, students, and other noncontributing and/or nonconforming members of the society is strongly rejected. An important point to keep in mind about Stage 4 is that it is not an orientation to creating an ideal social and legal system. But it is an orientation to maintain the existing system as it is, with its system or rewards and punishments, laws, and moral order. A major difference between Stage 4 and Stage 1 is that the higher stage is an authority—maintaining system, and not merely an authority-obeying perspective. It is not a direct internalization of parental authority and taboos (Freud's view); and it is not a direct internalization of the prevailing adult beliefs, rules, standards, and virtues and vices (Durkheim's view). It is a sequential, structural deve10pment that emerges from the preceding stages. Kohlberg believes that it has a more "rational" core than most scientists have believed regarding this level of morality and social order. Conception of rights: Rights are legitimate claims earned by virtue of one's contribution to the society. Value of life: Life is conceived as sacred in terms of its place in the categorical moral or religious order of rights and duties. The right to life, however, does not take clear priority over all other moral obligations. A serious violation of a major law, for example, can legitimately result in capital punishment, and this is seen as moral. Value of human life generally and primarily rests on the rule ”thou shalt not kill", but this is seen as a negative Justice: 353 rule more than a positive one; and it rests more on the rule than it does on life for its own sake. A sense of life as having value beyond its pleasure, but not absolutistic about life being of value regardless of its uses. Human life is seen as categorically higher and better than animal life. Generally speaking, the value of life is somewhat dependent upon the value of its service to the group, the state, the society, or God. Also defined in terms of the system or social order of roles and rules which are shared and accepted by the entire community, and which constitute the community. The individual's situation must always be considered within the context and framework of the larger system. Equality is manifested in terms of the uniform and regular administra- tion of the law. Stage 4 justice is primarily a principle for social order rather than for personal moral choice. Consequently, it is an attempt to apply the restitutive form of retributive justice in a true "balance-the—scales" manner. Vengeance (Stage 1) is not emphasized because "two wrongs don't make a right”. But an offender must pay his debt to society. The justice perspective of Stage 4 is that of the ”average moral agent". That is, in resolving competing claims one should do what is best for society. (Average rather than ideal.) Stage 4-A: Stage 4-8: 354 Emphasizes the societal point of view to the extent that the individual's point 0f view is either not considered or is so subordinate as to be frequently ignored. Society's and the individual's point of view are not seen as mutual. Integration of the moral and social and legal into a higher form of social view that recognizes the mutuality of the individual and society. The crux of the issue is that the orientation to society's point of view by the individual involves adherence to internal “moral" values and rights which are felt to be also society's values, such as life, liberty, and property. In this more equilibrated form of Stage 4 there is some recognition of the individual rights and point of view of a person. Whereas Stage 4-A orients to the society as a system of fixed rules with the prospect of disintegration resulting from deviations, Stage 4—B orients to what is behind the rules, the purpose of the law, the wishes of the majority, and the moral law as the consensus of society's norms. The B form is clearly more advanced over the A form, but it is still a morality based on "society's point of view" which is still unquestioned as the basis for morality. It is still a morality of rules, and not of principles. School distribution: Stage 4 is very important to the high school. It is possible, but not likely, for it to develop around 12 to 14. However, it is quite possible that it will develop in a substantial number of students after age 14. 355 Therefore, the 10th, 11th, and 12th grades should contain many budding and fairly well deve10ped Stage 4's. The educational approaches for these students is very important and challenging, especially if the school is interested in moving them in the direction of principled morality. 356 Stage 4% - The Stage of anical Ethical Relativism This is not a "true” stage in the sense that it is not part of the invariant sequence of the other stages. Only a minority of people go through it, and a person can get from Stage 4 to Stage 5 without having gone through 4%. It is an important stage or period, however, for many reasons. It is a recent addition to Kohlberg's theory and resolved a significant theoretical dilemma related to the structure-content issue. In most of the articles published by Kohlberg and his associates there is frequent mention of the people who left high school supposedly in transition to Stage 5, went to college, appeared to "regress” to Stage 2, and then later returned to Stage 5 and stabilized. Kohlberg now realizes that his seeing them as having regressed to Stage 2 was an error based on his confusion of content and structure. This will become clearer with a picture of Stage 43 and its relationship to both Stage 4 and Stage 5. Kohlberg has observed the phenomenon primarily with young college students. Some students who reach Stage 4 in high school and are totally capable of understanding and taking society's point of view, leave the more sheltered and protected atmosphere of home, where for the most part they are not required to make major irreversible moral decisions that truly test their own beliefs and values, and go to college. In college they enter a ”moratorium experience” in which they are exposed to a wide variety of conflicting views on life, morality, law, and religion without having to make major decisions or commitments. There is a tendency at this point to become very 357 cynical and relativistic about beliefs and values. The combination of moratorium and cognitive conflict about one's own values leads to the belief that all values are relative, that all societies have equal claim to validity, and that no one can really say that anyone's values are superior to anyone else's. This is a manifestation of the absolute relativity discussed earlier. On the surface these people appear to revert back to Stage 2 egoistic instrumental relativism as their moral base. It is not a true regression to an immature stage, however. The egoism or relativism is not the concrete, egocentric personal point of view of the individual making a decision on pure whim and wish. The person has developed the Stage 4 capacity to take society's point of view, understands the nature of society, but now rejects the claim of Stage 4 to priority and validity. This is an abstract, philOSOphical examination of the choice between society's point of view and the individual's point of view. Social duty is understood, but it is questioned from the point of view of the individual who can step outside society's viewpoint. Seeing society's point of view as not necessarily valid, the 4% person goes on to question the validity of all moral views, concludes that everything is relative. In the process, he also questions the validity of the moral view itself, i.e., is there any basis for morality at all? Terms like ”good", ”bad", "right", and "wrong” shouldn't be used at all. In a sense, the stage 4% person fits the cliche about ”throwing the baby out with the bath water." Seeing the inadequacy of stage 4 morality, and unable to 358 to understand Stage 5 principled morality, the 4% person abandons the entire idea of morality. Stage 4%, then, involves peOple who reach the highest form of conventional morality, step outside of it, question it, reject it, but have no adequate resolution to the conflict. They are beyond conventional morality, but have not yet developed principled morality. The question is whether or not this is a transitional stage that leads to Stage 5. Apparently it may be, but not necessarily. Kohlberg says that in many cases it does lead to principled morality, but that in many cases it does lead to principled morality, but that in others it does not, and the people can remain at Stage 4% permanently. He cites as examples of adults who remained at Stage 4% Hitler, Stalin, and possibly some of the peOple involved in the present Watergate scandal. 359 IABLE 4.3D - LEVEL III - POSTCONVENTIONAL, AUTONOMOUSL_OR PRINCIPLED 'hl ITY The individual makes a clear effort to define moral values and principles that have validity and application apart from the authority of the grOUps or persons holding them and apart from the individual's own identification with the groups. This is a lawmaking and anthropocentric orientation. Law is distinguished from moral principle. Sees law as being rationally created for the benefit of society and mankind and to protect the rights of the individual. Laws are not sacred and can be changed for just cause. Recognizes the possibility of conflict between what is rationally right for the individual and what is legally right according to society. Individual is justified in breaking the law when the law is immoral or unjust, e.g., when the law violates moral principles that deal with fundamental human rights. Recognizes true worth of individual and his role in society. ReSponsibility becomes completely subjective in that both standards of judgment and standards of motivation are internal. Stage 5 - The Social Contract Legalistic Orientation Definition of’Stage: The social-contract legalistic orientation (generally with utilitarian overtones). Right action tends to be defined in terms of general individual rights and of standards that have been critically examined and agreed upon by the whole society. There is a clear awareness of the relativism of personal values and opinions and a corresponding emphasis upon procedural rules for reaching consensus. Aside from what is constitutionally and democratically agreed upon, right action 360 is a matter of personal values and opinions. The result is an emphasis upon the "legal point of view”, but with an additional emphasis upon the possibility of changing the law in terms of rational considerations of social utility (rather than freezing it in terms of Stage 4 "law and order"). Outside the legal realm, free agreement, and contract, is the binding element of obligation. The "official" morality of the American government and Constitution is at this stage. Theoretical and abstract view of society as existing for and organized to serve_ people, the general welfare of all peOple, and to facilitate human existence. Distinction between person and role. Broad general age range: Kohlberg now believes this to be an adult stage that is not likely to develop until the middle or late 20's. He maintains that the earliest he has seen Stage 5 in any of his research subjects is age 23. Cognitive Development Level Required: Formal Operations Stage, Substage 3. True, full formal thought. Hypothetico-deductive reasoning. Construction of all possible combinations of relations and systematic isolation of variables. In addition, Kohlberg believes that attainment of this stage also requires personal experience involving responsibility for the self; values conflict; identity questioning and crisis; and the understand- ing of the need for commitment (anticipated commitment). Selman's Social Role-Taking Perspective: The subject is aware of the relativity of individual and social group perspectives. Instead of incorporating all social information, the subject weighs and orders certain social data to predict Kohlberg's behavior of Self and Other in complex social situations or in situations where all relevant social information is not available. Socio-Moral Perspective: Strives for an objective or rational perspective not dependent on being a member of a particular society. Rational social organization or social contract perspective. This is a perspective for defining the way any society should operate and make laws based on the recognition of universal individual values and rights. It is also a perspective on what any individual must accept or commit himself to if he is to be a member of society. The individual and the social, at conflict at 4%, are reconciled by the social contract. The social contract implies that commitment to society and its laws is contingent on society recognizing individual rights and values, but that the maintenance of individual rights and values depends upon a society to protect them. Characteristics of‘Stage: Society is designed to protect the rights of individuals. Operational morality is in terms of the utilitarian principle of "the greatest good for the greatest number”. The maximiza- tion of good. Stage 5 attempts to resolve the problems left unresolved by Stage 4. Stage 4 morality provides no clear answer for the following issues: 362 l. Obligations to persons outside one's own social order. 2. Obligations to persons who do not accept the rules of one's social order. 3. Social change and the creation of new norms and laws. Stage 5 allows for the rational creation of laws ex nihilo for the benefit of individuals and society. Attention shifts from defending the law to creating legislation to maximize the welfare of individuals who make Up the society, thereby creating an entirely different concept of law and respect for law. The primary mechanisms by which these problems, and other problems, are The social resolved is through the social contract and constitutional democracy. contract, the basis of Stage 5 law and morality is a justice conception which presupposes reciprocity of the partners to the agreement and equality between them prior to the agreement, though the form of the agreement takes priority over substantive justice, once agreement has been reached. Contract and due process are fundamental, and since contracts cannot be binding without the liberty of the contractees, liberty typically takes precedence over the other elements of justice (reciprocity and equality) in the Stage 5 view. Consequently, and this is important, the typical Stage 5 conception of distributive justice is one of equality of opportunity, that is, equality of formal liberty to attain substantive equality. 363 Constitutional Democracy is the procedural arrangement by which law and society become rational, because they rest on consent, provide equal representation for self-interest, and include a Bill of Rights protecting individual liberties (i.e., natural rights that are prior to and take precedence over law and society). These arrangements, which comprise constitutional democracy, are more important than the concrete rules they generate, and the enforcement of those rules. Whereas a Stage 4 person deems it more important to seek a conviction on a particular criminal, the Stage 5 person believes it immeasurably more important that the criminal be accorded due process. The Stage 5 conception of morality is based on the same principles, thereby providing a rational basis for moral decisions (the resolution of competing claims). The rational person attempts to take the legal point of view as presented because it is ”objective" and provides a basis for ajudicating conflicting claims. It is recognized, however, that the legal point of view can be in conflict with the moral or human point of view. In such cases the individual must make a personal choice usually in favor of human welfare and rights, but must take responsibility for it as a personal choice not recognized by law. Beyond social or personal contract, duty is a matter of personal moral choice in terms of self—chosen values. Stage 5 defines a rational or a moral point of view different from Conception 364 society's point of view of Stage 4 or the individual actor's immediate point of view of lower stages. The judge, for example, must not only consider the view of society or of the law, but must reconcile it with a rational or moral point of view which everyone should take (universalizability). of rights: A conception of unearned, universal, individual or human rights in addition to rights linked to role or status. Value of life: Life is valued both in terms of its relation to Justice: community welfare and in terms of being a universal human right. The obligation to respect the basic right to life is differentiated from the generalized respect for the socio—moral order. The general value of the independent human life is a primary autonomous value not dependent upon other values. Stage 5 rejects expiation and retribution and believes that punishment is not punitive. Sees the purpose of punishment as only: a) rehabilitation of the offender, and b) to maintain law in order to maintain society. In resolving moral conflicts the Stage 5 person would take the perspective of the impartial spectator (rather than the average moral agent of Stage 4), and attempt to resolve the conflict in terms of what is right for the individual and the greatest good of the greatest number. Stage 5-4: Stage S-B: 365 An orientation to social welfare and social contract consistent with the rights and welfare of individuals. Right action tends to be defined in terms of general rights and in terms of standards which have been critically examined and agreed upon by the whole society. There is a clear awareness of the relativism of personal values and opinions and a corresponding emphasis upon procedural rules for reaching consensus. Aside from what is socially agreed upon, right or wrong is a matter of personal values and Opinion. The result is an emphasis upon the social point of view, but with an emphasis upon the possibility of changing law in terms of rational considera- tions of social utility. Outside the legal realm, free agreement and contract are the binding elements of obliga- tion, in the context of considerations of welfare. While life is the basic primary human right, its value in the concrete case is decided by the owner in light of hedonistic and social utilitarian considerations. An orientation to a primary concern for the universal rights or the self—development and perfection of individuals as human beings. Recognizes the Stage 5 social contract but intuitively feels that individual human beings and their rights take some moral precedence over a societal perspective. Life is a basic human right, but it is also something qualitatively higher or sacred-—this sacredness is independent of direct religious or social authority. School distribution: Unlikely to occur at all in high school according to Kohlberg, although it would seem possible for some people to show some signs of Stage 5 thinking. Stage 6 - The Universal Ethical Principle Orientation Definition of'Stage The universal ethical-principle orientation. Right is defined by the decision of conscience in accord with self-chosen ethical principles that appeal to logical comprehensiveness, univerality, and consistency. These principles are abstract and ethical (The Golden Rule, the categorical imperative); they are not concrete moral rules like the Ten Commandments. At heart, these are universal principles of justice, of the reciprocity and equality of the human rights, and of respect for the dignity of human beings as individual persons. An orientation to respect for human personality (treat each as an end, not as a means) and to principles of justice (equity or moral equality of persons) as principles defining decisions and duties. As principles, the values of respect for persons and justice are used as consistent primary grounds of decisions which are universalizable and which represent a universal ”moral point of view". There is a clear awareness of, and resolution of, the problem of ethical relativity and skepticism by appeal to such universalizable principle of human morality. This viewpoint integrates the Stage 5 and S-B perspectives. 367 Broad general age range: This is an adult deve10pmental stage that is not likely to come until the late 20's at the very earliest, and more likely in the 30's or beyond. Kohlberg maintains that this is a very rare stage attained by only a small percentage of the population in our culture. Some cultures have no Stage 6 peOple (or Stage 5 either). Cognitive DevelOpment Level Required: Formal Operations complete. In addition, Kohlberg believes that advancement to this stage would require personal experience involving sustained responsibility for the welfare of others; irreversible moral decisions in actual life situations; and high level cognitive stimulation, conflict, and reflection. Kohlberg's Socio-Moral Perspective: Orients to a perspective of rational ethical theory or principle. Differs from Stage 5 in that it orients to definite moral principles of justice, rather than actual social laws, which all men could agree upon or would contract into, and by which the law can be judged in particular cases. Orients to the ”original position" in moral decisions, to a perspective on what is right which anyone in the situation (or in society) would adopt if he didn't know which person in the situation he were to be. 368 Characteristics of Stage: An all-encompassing anthropocentric orientation that sees the self as part of and actively involved in humanity and history. Recognizes intrinsic worth of human individuality as applying universally. Sees consequences of personal actions in the world and historical perspective. The abstract, universal principles of this stage are justice, reciprocity, equality of human rights, equity, and genuine respect for individuals. Differentiates principles and rules. Rules are prescriptive solutions for concrete, specific situations. Principles are abstract guidelines for making decisions that can be applied to many situations and represent a mode of choosing that can be universalized (i.e., that we would want all men everywhere in the same situation to apply). Principles allow for exceptions; rules generally do not. The ultimate principle is the principle of justice, which is the core of morality, according to Kohlberg. Trust is important for itself at this stage, i.e., it needs no justification beyond its role in maintaining principled human relationships. Only at Stage 6 are rights and duties correlative. Every right implies a duty, and every duty implies a right. For example, at Stage 5 life is a universal right, but it is not a universal duty (obligation) to save it; but at Stage 6 life is a universal right that implies a universal The Golden 369 obligation to save it, no matter who the person is to be saved. Anything that is not universalizable is not a duty, e.g., ”give up all your money to the poor”. This is not universalizable because it cannot be logically or practically accomplished. If all the rich gave all their money to the poor, then the rich would be poor and the poor rich, and the situation would have to be reversed to an infinite regression. Rule becomes fully operationalizable at Stage 6. The Stage 6 person is able to step out of and above the issue, take everybody else's role simultaneously, consider all the possible claims of everyone, and resolve it by taking the position that he does not know who would be in any given situation. This involves ”ideal role—taking". Reflective Equilibrium: The way you get equilibrium is to try out Each stage various principles against your intuition about how to resolve actual dilemmas. Analyze for when they fit and when they don't; rework your intuitive solutions of the principle or both until the situation is justly resolved. When the balance is achieved you have reflective equili- brium. Kohlberg says it can only be fully achieved at Stage 6, partly because of the justice orientation of Stage 6. resolves the conflicts left unresolved by the preceding stage. Stage 6 resolves the major problem left unresolved at Stage 5, viz., the relationships and conflicts involving 370 law, morality, justice, and utility. Utility violates justice in many ways. Utility sounds just, Kohlberg says, because it treats each man as one, but then it adds them up, which fails to consider the rights of the individual. Or to put it another way, when you maximize the good (the principle of utility) you must, of necessity, forget about the rights and claims of the minority. Consequently, you must forget the individuality and the respect for the human personality of those peOple, which is an unjust solution. Stage 6 attempts to resolve this dilemma by a higher form of justice. (See the Justice section following.) Value of life: Life is not only a basic right, but there is a basic Justice: obligation toward the lives of any other human beings. This obligation is defined in terms of respect for the personality of the other rather than by the physical survival or hedonistic interests of the other as such. The value of life does not need external justification. Where Stage 4 took the perspective of the average moral agent, and Stage 5 took the perspective of the impartial spectator, or impartial moral agent, Stage 6 takes the perspective of the ideal moral agent. This involves a consideration Of all perspectives and all claims from an objective standpoint (not knowing who's role would belong to whom, especially the agent's role), and then taking the perspective of the least advantaged and doing 371 what is best for that individual. There are no A and B stages for Stage 6. Stage 6 is the integrated and equilibrated resolution of both Stages S-A and 5-8 and to be in Stage 6 implies that equilibrium has been attained in the moral sphere. This last statement requires one final statement about the possibility of a Stage beyond this one. Kohlberg is working on this problem and believes that Stage 6 represents the final equilibrated stage in the moral domain, but that there may be the possibility of a metaethical and religious, mystical, or phiIOSOphical stage beyond this in which the person who has resolved the moral issues now integrates them into a cosmic view and reconciles himself with the universe, mankind, God, or some other abstract existence. He calls this possibility Stage 7. 372 D . Conclusion The three components of the organismic-structural-develop- mental conceptual framework have been explored. Some aspects have been treated in some depth, some lightly, and some have been omitted. But overall the meaning of the three terms, individually and as an integrated unit, has been sufficiently drawn out to point the way towards a founda- tion for a theory for values development education. The fact that, in Spite of the length of this section, more has been omitted than included is testimony to the enormity of the subject and its available resources. The exploration has been fruitful, however, and has revealed a solid base of data for use in values development education. Two main tasks remain. First, what has been started here must be extended, refined, and further elaborated. Second, the implications of the conceptual framework for values development education need to be extracted and explicated. Both of these tasks must be continuous programs, the first will be continued in subsequent work, and the second will be somewhat explored in the rest of this dissertation. CHAPTER FIVE DEMOCRACY: STRUCTURE AND PROCESS FOR VALIRES DEVELOPMENT Of all the implications that can be derived from the organismic-structural-deve10pmental conceptual framework for values/ morall development none is more clear nor more significant than the relationship between deve10pment and democracy, and what it means ' for education. Democracy is revealed (1) as advanced cognitive and moral structural development, and (2) as the socialization process by which that advanced structural development is attained. Kohlberg's research (supported by other conceptual frame- works)2 clearly reveals that principled morality3 (Level III in his 1As pointed out earlier, the use of the construct values/moral through- out this dissertation is intended to communicate the overall interest in the broad field of values even though much of the focus here is on moral values. Moral values are considered as the primary values and serve, in many ways, as exemplars of other types of values and especially as prime manifestations of the valuing process. 2Many other theories and research findings clearly reveal similar notions. The highest stage of conceptual systems theory as formulated by Harvey, Hunt, and Schroder (1961), labeled the stage of interdependence, is in- dicative of the democratic and principled orientation. Dewey's (1916) fourth stage in the development of logical thought is highly congruent with Piaget's formal Operations, Kohlberg's Level III, and advanced stages of other theories. The same holds true for Murphy's (147, 1958) third and final stage, labeled integrated and creative; Sullivan's (1953; also see Hall and Lindzey, 1970; and Bischof, 1970) syntaxic mode of thinking; Angyal's (1941, 1965) advanced developmental orienta- tion called homonomy. Werner's orthogenetic principle, described in Chapter IV of this dissertation, serves as an integrating concept for all of these mentioned above. 3The concept of principled morality has been fully deve10ped in connec- tion with Kohlberg's theory in Section C of Chapter IV of this disser- tation, and will not be repeated here. An understandingcflfthe term is presumed for this chapter. 373 374 theory) is isomorphic with democracy as a way of life and a social order. This is a profound claim that requires explication and support. Both Piaget and Kohlberg (also supported by other research and theoretical frameworks)4 further demonstrate that democratic pro- cesses, procedures, and environments facilitate deve10pment in general, and particularly the cognitive and moral development identified by them as fbrmal operational and principled morality, respectively. This also is a significant and profound claim that requires elaboration. These two claims are not only the most important implications of the organismic—structural-developmenta1 conceptual framework, they also constitute the basis for engineering the educational applications of the framework. As such they are the bridge from the theory and philosophy of values development to the schools and classroOms where its meaning will be tested and applied. Values development education is not intended to be basic science or speculative philosophy--it is intended to be a systematic integration of scientific theories and findings and philosophic speculations and investigations into a concep- tual framework that can serve as a rational basis for educational renewal, curriculum design and development, instructional design and development, and preservice and inservice teacher education. These are the functions that require engineering in its technical sense. 4Many of the frameworks and developmental stages mentioned in footnote 2 will also support this point. Others also help, e.g., Loevinger (1966), Isaacs (1956), Havighurst and Taba (1949), Peck and Havighurst (1960), Sullivan, Grant, and Grant(l957), and the many writings of Gordon Allport, Erick Fromm, Abraham Maslow, and Carl Rogers, some of which are included in the bibliography of this dissertation. 375 If democracy is truly both structure and process for values/ moral deve10pment, then democracy becomes the basis for the engineering and the guiding principle that must permeate the design, development, renewal, and education proposed above. Also, if democracy as struc- ture and process is defensible as the foundation for curriculum then we are eminently fortunate since the orignial purpose of seeking a valid and viable theory for values development education was to pro- vide a conceptual framework that would be applicable in and congruent with our pluralistic democratic society. In this respect the results of the search for the components of a theory for values development education have been happily serendipitous. Three themes or theses will constitute the substance of this chapter. They are: 1. The structural properties of principled morality are isomorphic with the nature of democracy. 2. Functional democracy is the developmental process that facilitates structural moral development. 3. The identification of the characteristics of principled morality is the criteria for the implementation, Opera- tion, and renewal of democratic community. Each of these ideas will be discussed in turn and in terms of the organismic-structural-developmenta1 notion of values development edu- cation presented in the preceding chapters of this dissertation. 376 A. Isomorphism of Democracy and Principled.Mbrality Democracy has many meanings and is an extremely controver- sial and emotionally-loaded concept. Its primary identification is in sociopolitical and governmental connotations.S Although its use here will necessarily and intentionally have many sociopolitical and govern- mental implications and aspects, these are not the primary focus and interest here. Values, morality, society, and law are all intimately related aspects of man's interpersonal and corporate existence, and they cannot help but have political and governmental overtones. But the focus is on the relationship between democracy as a mode of living, a way of thinking, and a basis for morality, especially as revealed by the organismic-structural-developmental conceptualization of human existence. The orientation is psychological, axiological, epistemo- logical, and pedagogical. The ultimate intention, of course, in view of the fact that the conceptualization of education and the school as agents of social reconstruction underlies the values development education approach, is that the principles that grow out of that approach will be useful as data for consideration in sociopolitical improvement as part of maximizing man's potentiality and existence. One critical interface between the sociopolitical aspects of democracy and the educational aspects is that the generally accepted exemplars of a democratic system are to some extent meaningless, 5For an excellent, concise, and articulate presentation of democracy and its various meanings see L.T. Sargent's Contemporary Politieal ideologies, Rev. Ed. (1972), Ch. 4. 377 incapable of implementation, and possibly incomprehensible.to large numbers of people in our nation and the rest of the world unless the educational systems provide for maximum dissemination of democratic methods and principles, and opportunities for individual development in order to insure implementation of those methods and principles. In other words, democracy as a sociopolitical institution and a form of government is not possible unless there are enough peOple in the citizenry to support and operate such a system. This is clear if the elements of a democratic political and governmental system are considered. As presented by Sargent (1972, p. 67) they are: 1. Citizen involvement in political decision making 2. Some degree of equality among citizens 3. Some degree of liberty or freedom granted to or retained by the citizenry 4. A system of representation 5. An electoral system--majority rule. White and Lippitt (1960) conducted an extensive survey of world-wide opinions about the meaning of democracy. They found that: At least on the verbal level, there is throughout the world an encouraging amount of agreement that democracy ought to mean at least four things: people's rule, freedom, responsibility to cooperate, and concern for the individual. (p. 12) (Italics added) By integrating these two lists we can arrive at the following five elements central to and partially defining democracy: 1. Rule of, by, and for the people a. Majority rule b. Involvement in the decision—making process 2. Freedom 3. Responsibility and opportunity to cooperate (participate) 378 4. A system of representation 5. Concern for the individual. It is interesting to note that all five of the above aspects of democracy require cognitive development and moral development. The potential success of democracy, or in fact its initiation, will be primarily determined by the ability of the citizens in these areas of human development. Presented in the form of a question the problem becomes: "What level of development is required to initiate, Operate, and sustain democracy as a means of social order, governmental control, and general way of life?" A review of the above five criteria makes obvious and ridiculous that infants are incapable of forming and main- taining a democracy. At what point in human development, then, does democracy become a genuine possibility? It would appear that the answer cannot be given in precise terms about a certain point. Obviously, as outlined in the developmental stages of Piaget and Kohlberg, human beings capable of democratic living very gradually, quite slowly, and very unevenly. Democracy itself, then, is a developmental phenomenon. The thesis under discussion here is that this developmental phenomenon called democracy proceeds through a long, complex, and difficult series of stages during which landmark achievements make possible new and higher potential for understanding and participation in the democratic community. And that these capacities are not fully available until adulthood with the development of full formal Operational thinking and the devel- Opment of principles morality-~an achievement, by the may, that unfor- tunately is made by a small minority of our population. If the criteria 379 for creating and sustaining an optimal or an ideal democratic community are not present until formal operational principled morality, then it logically fellows that democracy is inherently a formal Operational principled morality phenomenon. This correlativity between the criteria of democracy and the criteria of human development are what constitute the hypothesized isomorphism of principled morality and democracy. First, the relationship of the individual and society will be established, from which the equivalence of community and democracy will be presented, followed by the nature of the inextricable union of democratic community with moral principles. Dewey provides an excellent starting point by providing a clear definition of both individual and society in transactional terms. He says (1897, in Archambault, 1964, pp. 429-430): In sum, I believe that the individual who is to be educated is a social individual, and that society is an organic union of‘individuals. If we eliminate the social factor from the child we are left only with an abstraction; if we eliminate the individual factor from society, we are left only with an inert and lifeless mass. (Italics added) But what is it that creates this transactional bond and iden— tification? Dewey says it is both what people share together and how they share it. He says (1944, p. 4): Society not only continues to exist by transmission, by communication, but it may fairly be said to exist in transmission, in communication. There is more than a ver— bal tie between the words common, community, and communi— cation. Men live in a community in virtue of the things which they have in common; and communication is the way in which they come to possess things in common. What they must have in common in order to form a community or society: are aims, beliefs, aspirations, knowledge—~a common under- standing--like-mindedness as the sociologists say. 380 The individual and society exist together in organic union and in a creative morphogenesis that gives each other meaning. Thus community is established as the natural human condition, and it is based on the shared and the sharing. The next question follows logically: can community as so defined exist generally, i.e., in any ferm, or does community exist in a particular form? Dewey is explicity on this point. He says (1927, pp. 148-149): Regarded as an idea, democracy is not an alternative to other principles of associated life. It is the idea of community life itselfl It is an ideal in the only in- telligible sense of an ideal: namely, the tendency and movement of some thing which exists carried to its final limit, viewed as completed, perfected. Since things do not attain such fulfillment but are in actuality distracted and interfered with, democracy in this sense is not a fact and never will be. But neither in this sense is there or has there ever been anything which is a community in its full measure, a community unalloyed by alien elements. The idea or ideal of a community presents, however, actual phases Of associated life as they are freed from restrictive and disturbing elements, and are contemplated as having attained their limit of development...0nly when we start from a com- munity as a fact, grasp the fact in thought so as to clarify and enhance its constituent elements, can we reach an idea of democracy take on a veridical and directive meaning only when they are construed as marks and traits of an association which realizes the defining characteristics of a community. (Italics added) Dewey roots the ideas and ideals of community and democracy in the functional and practical of life, and not in the visionary dreams of a ut0pia. The developmental nature of community as a democracy is clearly expressed by Dewey in the above passage. All that he describes in terms of overcoming the "restrictive and disturbing elements" is what has been described earlier as the slow process of cognitive and moral development necessary to ”reach an idea of democracy which is not utopian." The "veridical and directive meaning" of the idea of democracy must be 381 interpreted, he says, in terms of "the traits of an association which realizes the defining characteristics of a community." Relating this to the five criteria for the definition of a democracy presented earlier, and to the level and stage descriptions given in the previous chapter fer Level III, and Stages 5 and 6 reveals the congruence of associated living, social contract, constitutional democracy, respect for individual personality, and the settlement of competing claims through the principles of distributive justice. One of the hallmarks of true community in democratic terms, especially in a pluralistic democracy, is the acceptance and reSpect accorded diversity and uncertainty. Again Dewey and Kohlberg are in agreement at the highest conceptualized levels of development. Dewey (1916, Ch. VI) describes four stages of logical thought that fellow a developmental sequence such as Piaget's and Kohlberg's stages. The fourth stage in Dewey's sequence is characterized by the seeking of inference rather than proof, by aiming "at pushing out the frontiers of knowledge" and seeking to go "from the known to the unknown.” (p. 210) Uncertainty, ambiguity, contingency, and exploration are ac- tively sought. These are the characteristics described by Piaget as identifying the stage of formal Operations and the scientific mind, which are shown by both Selman and Kohlberg (as described and cited in Chapter IV) to be prerequisites for principled morality. These are described by Piaget, Kohlberg, Dewey, Harvey. et al, and many others as precisely the characteristics not found in the concrete- thinking, security-seeking, rule—oriented personalities that define those at lower levels of human deve10pment. Dewey uses an interesting 382 term to describe the person with the type of logical thought at the most advanced stage-~for such a person, Dewey says (p. 214): "The ob- servable world is a democracy." What he means in context is that the more advanced mind sees the alternatives, options, uncertainties, and diversities as representatives of potentially equal value until inquiry is brought to bear on the situation. Through reflection, discussion, and exploration value and meaning are established, but not in terms of truth, or fact, or rules—-but in terms of warranted assertions, inference, and flexible principles. And it is these characteristics and methods that define and explicate the principled moral person who seeks to build a community founded on rational reflection, social contract, and distributive justice. The Level III person seeks a social order created by man with functional laws, moral principles, and a dynamic form of community that seeks to remedy injustice by remaking the laws and the principles to serve the best interests of people. For the Level III person, as Dewey says, "The observable world is a democracy." As Dewey says (1944, p. 87): A democracy is more than a form of government; it is primarily a mode of associated living, of conjoint communicated experience. The extension in space of the num— ber of individuals who participate in an interest so that each has to refer his own action to that of others, and to consider the action of others to give point and direc- tion to his own, is equivalent to the breaking down of those barriers of class, race, and national territory which kept men from perceiving the full import of their activity. Does this mean that all forms of diversity are welcome and necessary for community qua democracy to exist? Obviously such a condi- tion would be absurd. Certain forms of diversity are inherently 383 destructive to community and to life itself. Any rational person would agree that Hitler, Charles Manson, the Boston Strangler, those who advocate offensive violence for selfish interests, and other kinds of people whose patholOgies, inadequacies, or deprivations make it impossible for them to constructively participate in community must somehow be restrained, excluded or controlled. One of the criteria by which a community can be evaluated, however, as being truly democratic, truly a community, and truly of principled morality is the manner and rationale by which such cases are handled. One cannot justifiably claim to build a democratic community by the application of nondemocratic principles to its establishment, devel- Opment, or protection. For the use of nondemocratic methods negates the very essence of the principles allegedly being protected. Dewey (1948, 1960) provides for this problem with his conceptualization of reSponsibility and punishment as deriving from principled justice and a forward—looking view of punishment and accountability. Piaget (1932), likewise, sees punishment in terms of only the protection of society's self-interest and the education and development of the individual. Kohlberg's level III principled morality rejects all notions of retributive justice, including expiatory and restitutive, and builds the notions of responsibility, justice, and accountability in terms of distributive justice, equality, and equity. An interim recapitulation of the argument thus far shows first, that society and the individual were conceptualized as existing in transactional terms and as forming the basis of commun- ity, communication, and shared interests. Community was then defined 384 in terms of democracy. Dewey equates democracy and community, maintaining that democracy is the very idea of community itself. Such a conceptualization was presented as necessarily going beyond the toleration of diversity and absolute truth to respect for diversity, the welcoming and seeking of inference rather than truth, and the tolerance of ambiguity. Even the methods of treatment of destructive and patholOgical diversity were shown to be a measure of the quality of democratic community, and that humanitarian, principled, and just treatment of such cases clearly identifies such a community. Additional support for the isomorphism of democracy and principled morality can be demonstrated by an examination of the conceptualizations of individual-society relationships at the various Kohlberg levels. Level I, on the basis of empirical findings, is shown to be primarily an idiographic orientation with no understanding of the individual as part of a social order, and with moral judgments made from the standpoint of an independent actor. The egocentrism of this orientation negates the possibility of understanding a socio- moral order that is the basis of democracy in the terms thus far described. Level II is a nomothetic orientation with recOgnition of the individual, but as a servant of and inferior to the social system. Both of these orientations are unbalanced in the sense that either the individual or society is made superior to the other. The unbal- anced relationship in both cases has the effect of vitiating the balanced transactional relationship between individual and society that makes democracy a system based on conjoint living, equality of class, race, and other distinguishing and differentiating character- 385 istics. Level I morality is an operational mode of living based on an organismic egocentrism that will not even permit the moral agent to recognize that there is another point of view than his own, or that if there is it is unimportant, not really different, or inferior. The Level 1 person is truly incapable of being a fully participating member of a community, of comprehending the meaning of community, or cognitively or Otherwise being able to utilize justice structures other than expiatory. The most that can be expected from a Level I moral agent is the dim shadow of community and social order that comes from knowing that there is a concept of morality slightly higher than one's own that is preferred, as revealed by the research of Kohlberg (1969, 1971b, 1972, 1973a, 1973b), Kohlberg and Turiel (1971), Turiel (1966, 1969, 1973), Blatt and Kohlberg (1971), and especially Rest (1971) and Rest, Turiel, and Kohlberg (1969). The rule-oriented and laW~obeying Level 1 person is developmentally a long way from being a fully participating, deeply involved, and pro- foundly committed member of a democratic community. The idiographic egocentrism of the Level I person is antithetical to both democracy and community in the mature and deep sense of those terms. Although an enormous qualitative prOgression above Level I, the moral orientation of Level II is still profoundly inadequate as a basis for democracy. The major problems incapable of resolution with Level II morality are the most central defining issues of true democracy, viz., human and civil rights, the just balance of the rights of the individual vis-a-vis the society, the acceptance of 386 diversity and healthy rebellion, the orientation to renewal, and the positive and primary reCOgnition of the legal and moral right of individual life. The fusion of role and personality characteristic of this level of deve10pment make true democracy impossible. The appli- cation of justice in a democracy frequently requires the differentia- tion of person and role. One of the most serious obstacles to the creation and implementation of democracy at Level II is the orientation to tradition, fixity of law, maintenance of the system, orientation to rigidly applied rules (rather than principles), and the objective superiority given to society. The justice structure of Level II is oriented to quantitative "balance-the scales" solutions to legal and moral conflicts. And, furthermore, the moral order and the legal order are not sufficiently differentiated to render justice to the principled violator of an unjust law with a legitimate cause. Martin Luther King's Level III nonviolent protest against the unjust laws of segregation put him in the Alabama jail, where he was strongly condemned by his Level II clergymen brethern in April of 1963.6 Level II is incapable of providing a solid, durable, or just basis for 6Dr. King's eloquent response to the eight Alabama clergymen is available from the Fellowship of Reconciliation, Box 271, Nyack, N.Y. It is reprinted from the June 1963 Liberation. King's statement is one of the most exemplary Stage 6 analyses of the difference between an unjust law versus a just law and the moral obligation of the indi— vidual to nonviolently, and with love, resist, protest, and break the law with willingness to accept the penalty of the society for so doing. It clearly shows the differentiation between law and morality. The rhetoric of Stage 6 comes alive in this truly magnificent and historic statement. The morality and law perspective of the clergymen is equally elucidating of the Stage 4 orientation. 387 democracy and community in the sense described earlier by John Dewey. In a Level II society the incomplete mutation of democracy is far from what Dewey described as "the idea of community life itself." The Level II concept of democracy is an instrument to the preservation of the status quo, which is anathema to the dynamic concept of Dewey's Level III concept of democracy which must always involve the recon- struction of the social order. Preservation of the status quo means remaining with the present which is so firmly rooted in the past. It is a generally accepted idea in biology, cultural anthropology, history, physics, and many other areas of human knowledge that to stand still is to move backwards. Life is inherently dynamic and always in process--to stand still is ultimately to perish. If the case presented so far is accepted, which is not taken for granted here, but merely rested for the time being, it remains to positively support the idea that Level III principled morality is inherently democratic. The point cannot be gained by default. The primary support for viewing principled morality, as defined by Kohlberg, as democratic in nature rests on a number of defining characteristics of that level. First, the conceptualization of the relationship between the individual and society is clearly on democratic grounds. Society is not granted objective existence, nor is it superior to the individual. It is, rather, seen as the instrument created by the natural social tendencies of man to protect the rights of individuals and to maximize opportunity for full participation in the society. Participation is one of the most important aspects of democracy. On this point Dewey says: (1937, in Ratner, 1939, p. 400): 388 The keynote of democracy as a way of life may be expressed, it seems to me, as the necessity for the participation of every mature human being in formation of the values that regulate the living of men together which is necessary from the standpoint of both the general and social welfare and the full deve10pment of human beings as individuals. The social contract view of law and morality characteristic of Stage 5 builds the moral order on the basis of universal and equal participation in the decision-making process. And participation is further stimulated by virture of the law—making perspective and the perceived right of the peOple to reconvene whenever necessary to change the laws that were agreed upon and accepted as binding. The law is based not on tradition, or authority, or on objective existence--the law is made by man, for man, and to be changed by man when it is revealed to be unjust. In another statement Dewey (1932, pp. 364—367; in Ratner 1939, p. 775) brings together his ideas on reflective morality, inquiry, experimentalism, and democracy in the following statement that is clearly support for the Level III position: To assume the existence of final and unquestionable knowledge upon which we can fall back in order to settle automatically every moral problem involves commitment to a dogmatic theory of morals. The alternative method may be called experimental. It implies that reflective morality demands observation of particular situations, rather than fixed adherence to a priori principle; that free inquiry and freedom of publication and discussion must be encouraged and not merely grudgingly tolerated; that opportunity at different times and places must be given for trying different measures so that their effects may be capable of observation and of comparison with one another. It is, in short the method of democracy, of a positive toleration which amounts to sympathetic regard for the intelligence and personality of others, 389 even if they hold views opposed to ours, and of scientific inquiry into facts and testing of ideas. (Italics added) Once again democracy and principled morality can be seen as isomorphic. Another characteristic of Level III morality consistent with democracy is the perceived differentiation of role and person. Status, respect, privilege, and power are not seen as inhering in a role per se, nor are they arbitrarily accorded to the occupant of a valued role. There is a clear differentiation of role and person at Level III. This difference is precisely the difference between Level II's establishment-oriented view of justice, that stands in the way of the administration of justice on a principled moral basis; and Level III's view of justice which is based on the democratic application of moral principles in its evaluation of the law and the person. Concluding this section on the justification of the premise that principled morality and democracy are isomorphic, the claim is based on the fact that the cognitive and moral requirements and orientations of Level III, in contrast with those of Levels I and II, are the only ones that permit full participation in the sociopolitical and governmental processes that constitute democracy from that point of view; and more importantly permit participation, involvement, and commitment in the organic union of individuals that Dewey identifies as society. Level III morality is the moral order that makes possible the full human, civil, and individual rights that constitute the foundation for true democracy. One generally cannot make truly just decisions, grant equality of membership to all, and clearly differ- entiate law and morality from any other perspective than one that 390 bases its morality on universal ethical principles, recognition of the value of human life for its own sake, and a reconstructive view of individual, society, law and morality. Only principled morality meets these criteria--and only democracy fulfills them. Democracy and principled morality are isomorphic and are, in fact, two ways of looking at the same fundamental human process. B. Democracy as Process for values/Mbral Development Kohlberg's research contains ample support for the idea that people exposed to democratic processes and environments over a long period of time tend to develop faster and farther through the struc- tural-developmental stages he proposes in his theory. Piaget strongly advocates the use of what he calls "active methods" of education in order to facilitate c0gnitive development. Throughout his writings he has emphasized that children allowed to eXperiment, explore, and question--actively experience the world with their own minds and bodies--progress through the cognitive-developmental stages more easily and to qualitatively higher levels. One of the keystones of Dewey's educational philosophy and moral philOSOphy is experience. The concept of experience for Dewey had a breadth and depth that goes beyond the present discdssion, but it is sufficiently congruent with Piaget's concept of "active" and Kohlberg's emphasis on "role-taking" for the terms to be based in a foundation that could be called thei democratic process of’development and learning. Kohlberg (1973a) maintains that the democratic system is conducive to moral development because it helps the individual to 391 experience justice, which he sees as the core of morality. But the extent of democracy and the developmental value go beyond mOrality to many other forms of development, especially cognitive development. But then, cognitive development has already been shown to be intimately related and prior to moral development. What is possible in a demo- cratic system that gives impetus to development is the opportunity for role-taking, responsibility, and active involvement. The relationship between the structural aspect of democracy as principled morality, already discussed, and the functional aspect of democracy as process for values/moral development is most likely intimately related to the equilibration process, Operational thinking and reversibility.‘FIn fact, Kohlberg and Piaget (Kohlberg, 1972b, p. 194) argue that what logic is in the cognitive domain, justice is in the social domain. The meaning behind this statement is based on the recognition of both lOgic and justice as ideal forms of equili- brium. Consequently, the ability to perform Operations, that is, reversible thinking, is the basis for both logic and morality. This kind of cognitive-moral ability comes about through the construction of knowledge and justice through the long process of development characterized by continuous transaction with the environment and one's own thoughts. In Chapter IV it was pointed out that Piaget attributes development to the following four factors: (1) biogenetic emergence, (2) experience, (3) social transaction, and (4) equilibration. The last three of these factors play an enormous role in the social world in which the child lives, and it is from this standpoint the structure 392 of the environment and the transactions with adults and peers are going to be profoundly influenced by whether the atmosphere is demo— cratic or not. In order to deve10p this point two sets of rubrics can be related. First, in Chapter II of this dissertation the four approaches to values/moral education so frequently mentioned were presented as being: 1. The Traditional-Authoritarian (Absolute NOmothetic) 2. The Cultural-Relativistic (Relative Nomothetic) 3. The Absolute-Relativistic (Idiographic) 4. The Organismic—Structural-Developmental (Transactional Universal) Second, in a series of well-known research studies conducted by Lewin, Lippitt, and White (1939) and White and Lippitt (1960) three terms were introduced into the literature. The terms from these classic studies have become a rich part of the vocabulary of the behavioral sciences and are: autocracy, democracy, and laissez-faire. The words them- selves are not original, but the use of them to describe social rela- tionships and leadership styles in the behavioral sciences was an innovation. White and Lippit (1960, p. 12) differentiate the terms as follows: "Autocracy" here implies a high degree of control by the leader without much freedom by the members or participation by them in group decisions, while both "democracy" and "laissez-faire" imply a low degree of control by the leader. "Democracy" is distinguished from "laissez-faire," however, by the fact that in it the leader is very active in stimulating group dis- cussion and group decisions, while in laissez-faire he plays a passive, hands-off role. 393 These two sets of rubrics will now be combined with a some- what broader application of the Lewin, Lippitt, and White terms to describe three generalized approaches to life, education, and social- ization. The four approaches to values/moral education will be re- grouped by combining the two nomothetic approaches. The integration of the classifications result in the following classification and application:7 1. Nomothetic education: Characterized by an autocratic approach to the transmission of the knowledge and values of the environment (culture, society, family, school, etc.) i 2. Idiographic education: Characterized by a laissez- faire approach to the personal artif’action8 of knowledge and values from the idiosyncracies of one's own mind and experience. 3. Transactional education: Characterized by a democratic approach to the construction of knowledge and values through the transaction between the person and the environment. 7A3 with many typologies the categories exist only in theory, but serve as useful organizers. Whether or not these three exist in pure form is irrelevant to the discussion. They can be used to communicate a point even though they can be viewed as straw men. Also, there is a high degree of correspondence between the integration of my three categories with Lewin, Lippitt, and Whites and the model proposed by Getzels et al used as an example of transactional and discussed and cited in Section A of Chapter IV. 8Artifaction is a coined word, an adaptation of artifact, serving to distinguish between the constructive process stressed by Piaget and 394 Now considering Piaget's factors of development vis-a-vis this last model for three types of education and socialization pro- cesses may be helpful in demonstrating the developmental power of democracy. First, Piaget's factor of biogenetic influence is of relatively little importance with respect to this issue. There are complex relationships between socioeconomic status, socialization patterns, and genetic factors that undoubtedly come into play in the determination of the type of experience a child experiences. But these are certainly beyond the scope of this dissertation and will not be discussed here. The factor of experience viewed from the perspective of the three types of education, however, is a highly significant and rele- vant issue. The two types of experience considered important for development by Piaget are physical experience and logicomathematical experience, especially the latter. Both, however, depend enormously on the Opportunities available in the environment for cognitive, affective, and social stimulation. Nomothetic education would be most likely to characterize a home and school that places great emphasis on unilateral relationships between adults and children, with the children playing a passive, accepting, complying role. The adults would be most likely to carefully manipulate the environ- ment in order to expose the child to only those influences that would be seen as conducive to the indoctrination of the adult ideas and ...and the more relativistic and existential process that character- izes the idiographic orientation. There is no pejorative connotation implied. 39S values. This form of education is generally characterized by rigidity, programmed life schedules, and reliance on authority. The nomothetic model of education, whether in the home or in the school, is generally counterproductive for principled moral development and democratic orientation to life. A major factor considered so important by Kohlberg, the opportunity for role-taking, is consPicuously absent in this type of environment. The research of Harvey, Hunt, and Schroder (1961), Roeach (1960, 1968, 1973), Adorno et a1 (1950), and White and Lippitt (1960) and many others supports the claims of Piaget and Kohlberg that autocratic-nomothetic education is not con- ducive to the development of principled morality and democratic outlooks. The type of experience provided by idiographic education is likewise not supportive of the personal-social deve10pment that leads to the flexible kind of self-discipline required for democratic living and principled morality. Considerable light is shed on this issue by the White and Lippitt report (Ch. 8). They Open the chapter with the following statement: Persons who assume that children are little untamed animals, that they never want to do anything but play, and that the more freedom they have the better they like it, may find surprising the fact that in these experiments the boys showed a strong prefer- ence for democracy with its controls as compared with laissez-faire. In laissez-faire they had more nearly complete freedom (outwardly, at least) than in democ- racy; yet they liked democracy much better. Why? The probable answers are more complex than might at first be supposed, and they are of interest partly because they have a bearing on certain "progressive" theories of child rearing and education. 396 The authors offered as the main reason for the rejection of the laissez-faire approach that it provided no adult initiative or lead- ership, which made it impossible for the children to experience a sense of accomplishment that can come from appropriate guidance and constructive feedback. The lack of goals, clear limits, and time perspectives contributed to an unclear picture of the child's environ- ment, his relation to it, and the potentialities present in the sit- uation. All of this, according to White and Lippitt, resulted in a reduced clearness of c0gnitive structure. The overly permissive atmosphere of the laissez-faire approach produced not democracy, social cohesion, and community, but anarchy. A sense of belonginess and group unity has been shown by both Kohlberg and Piaget to be of extreme importance for cognitive and moral development. Not, and this must be empahsized, in the sense that the group provides norms, pressure, and demand for conformity, but in the sense that social unity and participation provides the required transactions and role- taking so essential for construction of knowledge and simulation of moral development. A further danger of the laissez-faire approach is that it frequently leads, as White and Lippitt, and many others, have pointed out, to a desire for tyranny to fill the vacuum created by anarchy. On this issue of adult leadership Piaget is quick to point out, as he does in many places (e.g. in 1972) that the active method of education calls for the teacher to be active also. But not as a tyrant, diSpenser of truth, or authority. But rather as a stimulator, organizor, mentor, and highly competent democratic group leader. 397 Clearly Piaget is in favor of an active child immersed in a rich environment with plenty of opportunity for exercise, physical experience, and logicomathematical experience. But the environment must be appropriate for his developmental level, and this requires a knowledgable and competent professional parent and educator who can wisely arrange the environment so that it is rich with aliment for development but not stifling or chaotic. Likewise Kohlberg would specify an environment tremendously rich in opportunity for inter- change, role—taking, and discussion on values/moral issues, and a rich variety of situations involving conflict and decision that can induce the appropriate amount of disequilibrium necessary for stimula- tion of deve10pment. But Kohlberg would certainly not interpret this to mean that the child should be ”thrown to the winds” or completely left to his own devices. The primary factor of experience as exemplified by the democratic atmOSphere is the Opportunity for role-taking, the exposure to and experiencing of justice and morality that will lead him above and beyond the egocentrism and expiatory attitudes of Level I orien- tations, and the active involvement in the daily democratic operation in the home and school. The child needs to be, to the limit of his ability at each developmental stage, included in the decision—making process of the home and the school. One of the most important features of a democratic atmOSphere is the absence of fear in the free give-and-take of dialectic. A child free to express his opinions and ask questions, regardless of how stupid, childish, or preposterous they may appear to the adults, is able to explore the breadth and 398 depth of his deve10ping mind without fear, embarrassment, or shame. Consequently, he can have an Opportunity to test his beliefs and values against the experience and diversity of his world. It is this atmosphere and this process that characterizes democratic living that enhances cognitive and moral deve10pment. A5 White and Lippitt point out, the advantage of democracy is that it provides an optimal amount of freedom and order in a balanced combination allowing the child to explore and investigate without being hurt, suffering ridicule, or destruction of his self concept. Transactional education, utilizing democratic methods, builds community and stimulates moral development. The social transaction (transmission) factor of development has really been largely covered in the preceding discussion. The only comments still required are to Specifically make clear that the home, school, and community are enormously influential in the life of a child from a developmental standpoint because they control the kinds of experience available, prohibited, and encouraged. And, Of great importance for cognitive and moral development, they make available the total spectrum of communication, including language, which is one of the most essential elements of the developmental process. Language can be an instrument of nomothetic-autocracy, of idiographic- laissez-faire, or of transactional-democracy. White and Lippitt (1960, pp. 244-245) summarize the results of their research on autocracy, laissez—faire, and democracy by listing the six psych010gical conditions their evidence suggests "that fosters the development and maintenance of a democratic social system....” They are: 399 l. Open-mindedness to influence from others. 2. Self—acceptance or self-confidence in initating one‘s own contributions and expressing one's needs. 3. Realism about the objective nature of task situations and interpersonal situations. Freedom from status-mindedness. Fairness about equality of rights and Opportunities. Friendliness and good will in attitudes and actions towards others. J3 O\U1 It seems likely that these traits or values tend to foster democracy and that democracy, in turn, tends to foster their development in the individual. In another section they offer some additional comments relevant to the discussion here (p. 222): One implication is Obvious: to develop conscientious individuals who are able to make democracy harmonious, workable, and efficient, parents (and teachers) need to combine warmth of affection with consistency of discipline. Needlessly severe discipline, antidemocratic in its essence, is also antidemocratic in its effects. Another implication is less obvious: since conscientious individuals are especially likely to be repelled by the confusion and the cross-purposes of anarchy, they are especially in need of making a clear distinction between orderly autocracy and orderly democracy. If this distinction is not clear in their minds they may be especially ready to accept a dictator who insists that his own rule is the only alternative to anarchy. The six psychological conditions offered in the first quota- tion support and augment the conditions Offered by Piaget and Kohlberg, and reach the same conclusion that these foster democracy and democracy fosters development. The final quotation adds the affective side of the picture and reveals the necessity for the delicate balance so difficult to achieve in the form of love and constructive discipline. With this delicate balance the six factors presented by White and Lippitt, and the active involvement called for by Piaget, and the role-taking 400 and justice experience required by Kohlberg all present an integrated picture of the community-democracy isomorphism of Dewey and the democ- racy-principled morality isomorphism proposed earlier. It is no small wonder that democracy and deve10pment are both so difficult to achieve. It is no small wonder that such a large percentage of our adult pop- ulation never manages to cross over the giant qualitative hurdle from the conventional morality Of Level II to the principled morality of Level III. White and Lippitt touch on the problem in the final quotation when they point out the problem of the conscientious indi- vidual. It is the Stage 4 (Kohlberg) conscientious law and order morality that is especially troublesome with this regard, and it is this stage that is the model stage in our culture. This leaves the problem of taking maximum advantage of the deve10pmental powers of democratic procedures to lead more people to the democratic structure of principled morality. The inherent relationship between this function and structure should provide us with some clues to augment this process. The next section will attempt to explore some of the specific criteria that may help point the way for values development education. C. Criteria for Principled.Morality By attempting to identify the criteria for the capacity and use of principled morality the criteria for democracy are also being explored. The isomorphism between democracy and principled morality has already been discussed and supported. The creation of and con- tinued life of a democracy necessarily depend on some substantial 401 percentage Of the population of such a community being identifiable as rational moral human beings. Since democracy has also been shown to be the process by which principled morality is ultimately deve10ped, and that transactional education, characterized by a democratic approach to the construction of knowledge and values, is the educational method by which that deve10pment is facilitated, then the criteria presented here also relate to the goals of education. Another complex set of issues is raised by these criteria, as well as by the issues presented earlier in this chapter, viz., the relationship of these criteria to the views and models of man presented in Chapter III which were held to be so essential to the formulation of both a theory for values/moral education and for a theory for education in general. In Chapter III, for example, the claim was made that the behavioristic view of man is basically incompatible with a democratic system of education. By placing the four views of man (behaviorism, psychoanalysis, existentialism, and organismic psychology) alongside the three types of education just presented (nomothetic, idiographic, and transactional) an interesting relationship may be observed. Behaviorism and classical psychoanalysis roughly, but closely, correspond to nomothetic education; existential psychology and idiographic education bear a similar correspondence; and there is an even clearer relationship Of correspondence between organismic psychology (in the broad sense defined in Chapter III) and trans- actional education. The importance of this set of issues vis—a-vis the criteria 402 for principled morality is partly in view of the fact that these criteria would have completely different meanings, or be considered meaningless, from the perspective of the other views of man, and would, consequently, have greatly different implications for education. Of even greater importance from the standpoint of this dissertation and a theory for values development education is the claim that the organismic-structural-developmental approach to values/moral education is compatible with, supportive of, and educationally more defensible for a pluralistic democratic society. The point is illustrated by the prOgram for education created out of the radical behaviorism of B. F. Skinner in contrast to the program for education being proposed from the base of organismic psychology in general, and organismic- structural-developmental psychOIOgy in particular. Behavior modifi- cation involves the utilization Of controlling techniques to shape the person according to the values of the controller, without the knowledge of or informed consent of the passive learner in order to achieve the goals desired by the controller. This procedure involves the exploitation of and continued extension of dependency and depen- dency-inducing procedures, most of which are easily identifiable as Level I and Level II in nature. The behavioristic view of man, especially as revealed in those behavioristic theories tied to the reinforcement-reward paradigm, builds its entire model of man and education on the basis of primarily Level I developmental charac- teristics. To build this kind of a view of man is to deny that man is capable of the very capacities that are claimed by the organismic- structural-developmental psych010gists, phiIOSOphers, and educators 403 to be necessary for and isomorphic with democracy, community, and principled morality. The basis for morality and the criteria for its maximum development will be explored with these points in mind. Justice as the Core Of Morality Before exploring the criteria for principled morality a few words will be said about Kohlberg's claim that justice is the core of morality (Kohlberg, 1971b, p. 62ff; 1972b, p. 196, 208, 221; 1973a). In one statement he says (1971b, pp. 62-63): Our major and most controversial claim is that the only "true" (stage 6) moral principle is justice. We shall claim that human welfare is always the core of morality, but that, at the principled level, welfare considerations subsumed under the heading "justice" take whenever there is conflict between the two, and that there is no strong ”principle" for deciding between the various alternatives other than justice. In view of all that has preceded this discussion in this dissertation, justice becomes supremely important for education, and more speci- fically for values development education. The primacy of justice integrates the claim that community and democracy are isomorphic with the claim that democracy and principled morality are isomorphic. In a more straightforward statement Kohlberg (1973a) simply says: The core Of morality is a sense of justice. Moral action is action to promote justice. Earlier (Chapter IV) Kohlberg's definition of a moral principle (1973a) was given as "a principle for resolving competing claims for action." Kohlberg's position on the relationship of justice and morality is very much consistent with some of the positions in the 404 . . 9 complex theory Of Justice offered by John Rawls (1971) . In an introductory section where Rawls presents the main idea of justice as fairness, he distinguishes two meanings of justice both of which are consistent with what Kohlberg said above. Rawls (p. 10) says: In these preliminary remarks I have distinguished the concept of justice as meaning a proper balance between competing claims from a conception of justice as a set of related principles for identifying the relevant considerations which determine this balance. It would seem that Kohlberg means by justice both of the notions offered in this statement by Rawls. Kohlberg sees justice as a proper balance between competing claims, and further sees morality in the form of moral principles as the system for creating this balance. The relationship between justice and principled morality is further elaborated by Charles Fried (1970, Chap. IV). Fried intro- duces the principle of morality as follows: First, the domain in which the concept of morality (as I now define it) applies is the domain of all ends and actions which impinge in any significant way on other persons.... Second, the principle which specifies the concept of morality is an expression of the concepts of equality, of impartiality, and of regard for all persons as ends in themselves. The second paragraph is an excellent exemplar of Stage 6 as defined by Kohlberg, e5pecially insofar as it emphasizes the need to reCOg- nize persons as ends rather than as means. Considering Fried's 9Rawls' theory of justice is a landmark contribution to the philosophy and psychology of this important subject. Its depth and complexity are such that to attempt to summarize or include it here would be a serious error. Kohlberg (1972b, 1973a) considers Rawls' theory an exemplar of Stage 6. Rawls (460m, 46ln) recognizes Kohlberg's 405 definition and specification of the nature of morality as stated above, the following statement clearly shows the similarity of his view and Kohlberg's view that the core of morality is justice. Fried says (p. 45): In this and the succeeding section I shall argue for the prOposition that the principle of‘morality is the most general principle applicable to ends and actions having significant impingements on other persons. (Italics added) Fried then ties the entire argument together with an analysis of reciprocity and the principle of morality. He defines reciprocity in the following terms (p. 52): Reciprocity is the recognition of the other participants in a transaction as entities having ends and rational ends. That recognition is not just a formality, a brief concession preceding the working out of the ele- ments of the end itself. The recognition of this quality-- I shall call it human personality, or personality--must be part of the structure of the end itself. The recog— nition of personality must, therefore, be part of the ordering principle of the end. He proceeds from this definition of reciprocity to the following statement of the principles of morality (p. 53): The principle of morality...is the general principle expressive of the general recognition of human personality (defined as the characteristic of having rational ends) in any dealing with other persons. To summarize, the principle of morality accomplishes this reCOgnition by requiring that the most general principle of transactions place all persons in a position of parity. In this way the equality of all persons at the most general level is the starting point for any more partic- ular principle. Why does this equality or impar- tiality of the principle of morality express recognition of personality? My thesis is: all ...contribution, some similarities to his work, and some differences. 406 persons are alike in respect to the characteristic that they conceive of themselves as entities having ends and rational ends; and any essential preference between persons entails a violation of reciprocity in the direction of using the other person as an instrument. Fried's logic and analysis clearly bring together morality, personality, principle, equality, and justice in such a way as to make clear the meaning of Kohlberg's Level III, especially Stage 6, princi- pled morality. The congruence of Piaget, Dewey, and Fried with regard to the issues mentioned above as well as the nature of human intel- ligence in terms of reversible operational thought and its relation- ship to morality and justice is a valuable contribution to values development theory.10 Barnett and Otis (1961, p. 163), describing the ideas of 11 Elijah Jordan on this same subject point out that: 10Two points of interest: Fried, Kohlberg, and Rawls are all Harvard professors. Fried and Rawls have exchanged views--in fact, Fried reCOgnizes Rawls as one of many important sources of his ideas. As noted in footnote 9, Rawls and Kohlberg have transacted. In fact, "Philosopher 3" used by Kohlberg in various places (e.g. 1972b) as an example of Stage 6 is a student of Rawls! But neither Fried nor Kohlberg have mentioned each other in the literature. A combined effort Of the three scholars could possibly produce some interesting contribution to the advancement of the subject. Second, Fried (pp. 244, 246, 247) recognizes the work of Piaget and acknowledges Piaget as a valuable source. As a final comment, Fried's book, An Anatomy_ of Values is a true scholarly contribution to the field of values/ moral development. 11Elijah Jordan (1875-1953). Education: The Philosophy of Elijah Jordan. Jordan's writings on values/moral issues are eloquent, penetrating, and highly congruent with the O—S-D framework in many respects. 407 Justice is simply the principle of'wholeness or completion of things, i.e., the perfect realization of all human ends in harmonious accord with one another is perfect justice. Justice is not a Special act or pro- nouncement encountered in a court of law, but the qual- itative synthesis of all acts. That is, the act which may be adjudged a just act is one which fits into the scheme of things in such a way as to sustain the whole of action. Justice, then is a type of relational complex to be maintained and developed so that the whole of life activities may go on; it is not something "got” or "had" by the individual. Realizing one's interest, in which a particular is the point of reference for the act, and realizing justice, in which the whole is the point of reference for the act, are polar oppo- sites for Jordan. This eloquent statement seems to synthesize much of what has been identified as an organismic-structural-developmental approach to values/moral education. The emphasis on the "wholeness" of things represented by justice as a principle that brings harmony among peOple is precisely what values/moral education is all about. The organismic- structural-developmental conceptual framework attempts to integrate the richly developed notions of community, democracy, and morality by Dewey; the idea that values development consists in ethical inter- vention for stimulation of normal organismic development consists in ethical intervention for stimulation of normal organismic development to principled morality; and the ”wholeness" of intellect and emotion contained in the developmental theory of Piaget. The principles expounded in the statement by Barnett and Otis are incapable of fruition without the kind of intellectual and moral deve10pment that characterizes the principled morality described by Kohlberg. As Nathanson says of Dewey's idea of democracy (Nathanson, 1951, p. 90): ...we have to see democracy itself, not merely as a 408 political mechanism, but as an overarching moral ideal. What does it take to see democracy this way? It takes individual human beings with the intellectual and moral capabilities to reconstruct our social order so that it not only moves in the direction of democ- racy but also contains institutions, especially schools, that are capable of perpetuating and renewing the individuals, the schools, and the community as a whole. Some of those individual abilities and personality characteristics are revealed by the theories and philoso- phies used to build the organismic-structural-developmental conceptual framework, especially the criteria of high-level human development implicit and explicit in the formal operational mode of thought and principled morality. Having established the theses related to the relationships among the concepts of justice, morality, principles, community, per- sonality, and democracy, the task remains to begin to establish some of the criteria neceaasry to achieve the democratic way of life embodied in the Operationalization of principled morality. The list that follows is an initial attempt to identify some of these criteria. Certainly there may be more, but the ones presented here are defin- itely basic. The following six factors may be thought of as person— ality characteristics prerequisite for and commensurate with prin- cipled morality, or as the constituents of a just moral personality: 1. Formal Operational intelligence 2. PerSpectivism 3. Habitual reflective tendencies 4. Sensitivity 409 5. ReSponsibility 6. Homonomy. 1. Formal Operational Intelligence Intelligence, as defined by Piaget as the capacity for adaptation, is the most essential and basic component of the moral person. Piaget's conceptualization of this factor will not be devel- oped here inasmuch as it has been substantially presented in Table 4.1D, Chapter IV. What makes this level of intelligence necessary for principled morality is primarily the ability for full reversible thinking, the ability to subordinate reality to possibility, the maximum capacity for conservation of abstract transformations (which form the basis of the primary human relationships of friendship, love, trust, respect, etc.), and the complex nature of prOpositional reasoning. In order to fully transform the conceptualization of formal operational intelligence from the realm of scientific thinking to the realm of human relationships it must be realized that the two realms are basically the same. Scientific thinking and procedure is not necessarily a different type of thinking or intelligence from the nonscientific, it is primarily a different application. Since intelligence has been so fully treated in Piagetian terms, the application of intelligence to the values/moral realm will be extended by a consideration of the role of intelligence in the moral life as seen by Elijah Jordan. In his explanation of "the good Life" Jordan explores the meaning of "Integrity or Personal 410 12 . . Wholeness" (1949, Chap. XIV). Intelligence 15 one of the factors he includes, of which he says: (p. 147): ...we shall use the terms as the capacity of comprehension, and we mean by this, not merely its power to identify objects or its power of synthesis over objects, but also, as a variation of the latter, its power to integrate the personal capacities and to express in full the whole meaning of personality. It is the intelligence alone, or what is better called the intellect, that enables the person to see himself in terms of all his capacities, his self. It is the same intellect that enables the person to see himself’whole, to make himself whole through and by means of the intelligence itself. Personality in this connec— tion is nothing more than the organic unity of all the physical and the mental functions, as effected and main- tained by intelligence. Man's intellect, therefore, integrates him, makes him whole, makes it possible for him to be far more than merely intelligent, far more than clever, and far more than a biological mechanism. Jordan's concep- tualization takes man beyond the passive, receptive, reactive being of the behaviorists; beyond the irrational slave of instinctual drives as conceived by the psychoanalysts; and beyond the collection of quantitative traits, IQ's and factors of the psychometricians. It is the fully-developed intelligence that makes it possible for man to understand himself and his role in a world of many selves with whom he must transact in some rational manner that enables him and others to not only survive, but enables them to transcend the otherwise over- whelming exigencies and potentially destructive forces of his exis- tential situation. To be a person, in Jordan's terms, is to be fully intelligent--but not in the instrumental terms of intelligence 12The page referencing here is to the abridged version of Jordan's The Good Life, edited and abridged by F. O. Wiggins. 411 as a commodity or a possession-~but in the sense of being fully moral. This is elucidated by Jordan's view of the moral situation and the ability of the intellect in moral terms to transform the situation (pp. 147-148): A moral situation, then, for the moral compre- hension, or intelligence, is a situation in which all the capacities of the person are fused and concentrated upon an object with respect to the good. This pulling myself together and directing myself to some end is my act, by which I mean to alter not only the world but also myself and to state the altered world and the altered self as a new systhesis.... The intelligent act is, then, the process of objectification of mind, the process in which mind comes to terms with the structures of nature and takes them over as the instruments in which it embodies itself.... This view of the transforming and synthetic aspect of intelligence applied to moral situations is quite similar to what Dewey means in his experiential view of growth as the only moral end. Dewey abhors many of the traditional dichotomies that are so common in philosophy and psychOIOgy, for he feels that they fragment and distort life and man's attempt to understand life. One of the dichotomies so rejected is the means-ends division. He prefers to talk in terms of ends-in-view (1966). On growth he makes two relevant statements. First, he says (1960, p. 172): Our personal identity is found in the thread of continuous deve10pment which binds tOgether these changes. In the strictest sense, it is impossible for the self to stand still; it is becoming, and becoming for the better or the worse. It is in the quality of becoming that virtue resides. We set up this and that end to be reached, but the end is growth itself. To make an end a final goal is but to arrest growth. 412 In a related statement (1948, p. 177) he says: The end is no longer a terminus or limit to be reached. It is the active process of transforming the existent situation. Not perfection as a final goal, but the ever-enduring process of perfecting, maturing, refining is the aim in living. Honesty, industry, temperance, justice, like health, wealth and learning, are not goods to be possessed as they would be if they expressed fixed ends to be attained. They are directions of change in the quality of experience. Growth itself is the only moral "end." (Italics added) The integration of the ideas of Jordan and Dewey result in a view of the moral person as one characterized by the intellectual power to comprehend the moral issues of the self and the world, the ability to apply this power to transform the self and the situation with justice, and the recognition of the need for continuous growth. Jordan (pp. 148-149) makes it clear that intelligence is inadequate for the ultimate solution to moral problems because of the necessity to transcend the knowable. Man is restricted by the limitations Of consciousness, which create the problem Of making it possible for man to comprehend the problems of God, freedom, immor- tality, etc., in terms of intelligible and possible solutions, but without any assurance that man will necessarily find solutions to these problems. Many answers to moral problems must come then through the corporate mind through the deve10pment of culture. In spite of these problems and limitations, however, Jordan concludes (pp. 149-150): Intelligence, comprehension, the act in which thought integrates itself, knowing in its universal forms, is therefore the highest active function of the individual. But an active function or capacity is what is meant by virtue. Intelligence is then, as knowledge, the summation of all virtue and the totality 413 of his obligation for the human individual. The first and highest, and at the last, the only, obligation of the individual is the obligation to know. The consequence of both Jordan's and Dewey's conceptualiza- tions of the role of intelligence for growth, development, and prin- cipled morality is that educators have a moral obligation, eSpecially if they wish to establish and perpetuate democracy, to maximize to the fullest capacity of the school the Opportunity for every child to achieve formal Operational intelligence. From this discussion it is hoped that the significance of this aspect of human development can be seen to be one of the most important of the criteria for principled morality. 2. Perspectivism The ability to differentiate self from not-self is abso- lutely essential for virtually any kind of morality, but that it must be fully deve10ped in order to permit principled morality. The latter requires extremely advanced ability to put oneself in the place of the other, to see and feel his situation and comprehend the limitations and consequences inherent in the moral conflict at issue. Without advanced perspectivism, distributive justice and equity are simply impossible. The subject of perSpectivism, however, has been exten- sively deve10ped in Section C of Chapter IV and will not be repeated here. Morality, Kohlberg and Piaget repeatedly tell us, requires role—taking, which, of course, is perspectivism in action. Kohlberg defines role-taking in the following terms (1969, p. 349): 414 ...social cognition always involves role-taking, i.e., awareness that the other is in some way like the self, and that the other knows or is responsive to the self in a system of complementary expectations. Accordingly developmental changes in the social self reflect par- allel changes in conceptions of the social world. Selman (1973a) prefers to call this process social perspective taking. According to Selman it involves (l) the ability of the child to under- stand his Own view of the world, (2) to understand that the other has a view also and that it is different, and (3) the coordination of these two different views as they relate to his own. But, of course, at Level III this would also require the ability to impartially stand aside mentally from the process and perceive both self and other and the relationship from the perspective of an impartial Spectator. Distributive justice and equity are based on this ability. To better understand social perspective taking and its developmental progression, the reader should refer to Table Set 4.3 in Chapter IV and follow the presentation of Selman's stages in conjunction with Kohlberg's stages. Kohlberg (1973c, pp. 632-633) makes an important distinction between role-taking in the logical realm versus role-taking in the moral realm: Our theory assumes that new moral Structures presuppose new IOgical structures, i.e., that a new logical stage (or substage) is a necessary but not sufficient condition for a new moral stage. It assumes, however, that moral judgments (or moral equilibrium) involves two related processes or conditions absent in the logical domain. First, moral judgments involve role-taking, taking the point of view of others conceived as subjects and coordinating those points of view, whereas IOgic involves only coordinating points of view upon objects. Second, equilibrated moral judgments involve principles of justice or fairness. A moral situation in disequilibrium is one in which there are unresolved conflicting claims. 415 This point essentially brings together (1) why it is necessary to view perspectivism as a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for principled morality as somewhat apart from intelligence itself; (2) Selman's view of role-taking as "social perspective taking" requiring the complex coordination of subjective points of view; and (3) the reason for the coordination of Piaget's stages of structural logic with Kohlberg's stages of structural values in order to relate IOgic and morality in equilibrated justice structures to form principled morality. One of the important ancillary aSpects of this complex set of relationships is brought out by Piaget (1932, p. 397): The morality of the autonomous conscience does not tend to subject each personality to rules that have a common content: it Simply obliges individuals to "place" themselves in reciprocal relationship with each other without letting the laws of’perspective resultant upon this reciprocity destroy their individual points of view. (Italics added) The point made here is more critical than may be first apparent. At Level II unequilibrated justice structures can result in a perspec- tivism that can lead to conformity and the concomitant reduction of self-identity, which in turn is partly responsible for the fusion of role and personality that can be responsible for a great deal of injustice to individuals in the name of preservation of the social 13 order. Cattell's concept of the law of'coercion to the biosocial 13Some interesting light can be shed on this subject by a study of the processes of opinion change as proposed by Kelman (1961). Kelman provides a very useful model that distinguishes compliance, identification, and internalization. There is a great deal of corres- pondence between these three processes as he describes them and Kohlberg's Level I, Level II, and Level III, respectively. 416 mean (see Hall and Lindzey, 1970, pp. 399-400) is closely related. Cattell denotes the tendency for environmental influences to limit the expression of genetic potentialities and diversities through the action of socialization agents when they systematically repress, reject, or shape behavior to conform to the narrow limits of a particular family, society, or culture. In her classic Patterns of Culture (1934), Ruth Benedict extensively describes the environmental "coercion" that strongly shapes the members of the society to the "biosocial mean" so vividly manifested in the Dobu, Kwakiutl, and Zuni cultures. The same phenomenon is described by Riesman, et al (1953) in The Lonely Crowd as "the other-directed man." In the values/moral area of life this can be an eSpecially limiting and growth-retarding factor if not carefully anticipated by parents and educators. The use of values clarification techniques, for example, especially when used with teenagers can produce results exactly opposite of those intended by the designers and users of the prescribed methodology. Teenagers, as can be understood through Kohlberg's Stage orientation, are notoriously susceptible to peer group pressures that can powerfully induce coercion to the mean. Values/moral educators need to be on the alert for this phenomenon and consider its implications for facilitating deve10pment to prin- cipled morality. The unequilibrated perspectivism of Level II can become a negative element in development if not carefully handled. In conclusion, it cannot be emphasized too strongly that one of the most essential elements of a values/moral education program must be every conceivable Opportunity for the students to 417 engage in "social perspective taking." It is fundamental to cognitive deve10pment, it is essential for moral development, it is a major pre- requisite for principled morality, and it is one of the keystones of democratic living. Egocentrism is the mortal enemy of democracy and principled morality. 3. Habitual Reflective Tendencies Formal Operational intelligence provides the capacity to reflect; perspectivism makes it mutual and reversible. But neither guarantees that the individual will reflect. Intelligent and perspec- tivistic people can be impulsive, lazy, and even apathetic. They also can be none of these but merely be busy, harried, and overworked. Our society and its incredible tempo are not conducive to reflection, but more conducive to packaged solutions, panaceas, and preprOgrammed answers provided by those alleged to be experts. Principled morality and democracy demand reflection as habitual characteristics of con- cerned, involved, and participating citizens. The mass media can be friend or enemy on this source. For many it provides instant solutions and packaged prescriptions. For others it is the medium of enlarged awareness of the issues. The tendency to critically evaluate all sides of the issue, to search and seek, to explore, and to reflect must become part of the life-style of the democratic person. Level III principled morality is dependent upon this approach to moral problems. The schools must do all possible to encourage, model, and require that students think and reflect. 418 4. Sensitivity Sensitivity is related to perSpectivism, but goes far beyond it. One could be coldly perSpectivistic, in a sense, and be able to truly "see" the other person's point of view, understand it, and com- prehend its Significance, and yet be unable to "feel" that point of view. It could be argued that by definition perspectivism would be impossible without the unified knowing and feeling. It serves a useful purpose, however, to make the distinction between what is being viewed here as a more cognitively oriented perspectivism and a more affectively oriented sensitivity, knowing fpll well that in the holistic organism they are really substantially the same. Sensitivity, as presented here, not only includes the more affective orientation, but also a conative aspect. The sensitive person not only knows something about the other person's Situation, not only can feel it, but also wants to do something about it, to take some action in order to render justice. Sensitivity, then is an emphatic reSponse that goes beyond and transcends perspectivism and understanding. Vulnerability is another important factor that can be included in the total picture of sensitivity with regard to the moral aspects of human relationships. The fully developed human being living in a democratic community based on principled morality and true concern for the welfare of other human beings necessitates the willingness and ability to make oneself vulnerable. Otherwise much moral action would be impossible. The principled moral person must be willing to take risks in order to give viability to his principles. 419 It is one thing to know about an injustice, feel the injustice, and intelligently create a solution-~but it is something else entirely to be willing to make oneself vulnerable enough to want to ameliorate the injustice in Spite of the potential threat to one's own position, or possibly one's own life. This by no means implies that all prin- cipled people must be saints, heroes, or altruists. It only means that within reasonable limits, which admittedly are hard to define, the moral person's sensitivity should be able to carry him or her beyond understanding and feeling to positive action. The sensitivity aSpect of morality can also be described in terms of the distinction between reaction and response, two concepts that are also related to perspectivism. Reaction may be conceptual- ized as being an approach to another person based on one's own per- Spective, needs, and desires--an action or view based on one's own values rather than the values of the other. Response, on the other hand, may be conceptualized as the positive manifestation of a true understanding of and sensitivity to the other person from his or her perspective and situation, rather than from the position of the self. The distinction can be thought of in terms of the difference, mentioned earlier in this dissertation, between judging and evaluating. Reacting is judging, accepting or rejecting on the basis of one's own needs, interests, or welfare. Responding is sensitively evaluating the other person's situation in order to offer constructive assistance, if it is desired, or sensitively withholding assistance if it is not desired or needed. Reacting is exemplified by the authoritarian parent who knows best beyond any shadow of a doubt, and listens to the child 420 without hearing, pronounces judgment, and issues commands. Responding is best exemplified by all that is embodied in Carl ROgers' client centered therapy. The sensitivity of the principled moral person is characterized by a high ability to respond to other human beings with a deep sense of empathic justice. Langer (1970, p. 768), in the conclusion of his summary of Werner's theory says: A holistic conception implies that mental acts are feelings as well as judgments. This means that they are both con- ceptual and motivated acts: the stuff of mental life and development is evaluative conduct. In another source Langer (1969a, p. 36) points out that the equilibra- tion process concerns not only the cognitive perception of disequili- brium, but must also involve the feeling of disequilibrium. The person, in order to change, must both know and feel a discrepancy. Oliver and Bane (1971, Ch. 9) describe a program for moral education that includes Kohlberg's theory and other valuable guides to curriculum construction in this area. Their program was almost exclusively built on the intellectual aspects of moral dilemmas and public values issues. The program has been evaluated as highly successful. The authors explicitely raise the objection, however, that the element most conspicuously absent in the program and the students' reactions was a personal sensitivity for the issues. They say (p. 261): "One could argue...that we should be more concerned with moral sensitivity than with moral reasoning." Skolnick and Skolnick (1971, Introduction) describe in detail the tragically blunting effects on the sensitivity of children 421 by the misuse of power by socializing agents, e5pecially parents. The physical punishment, verbal abuse, psychological torture, and authoritarian controls heaped on children leads to insensitivity, hostility, and pathology. The widespread nature of these problems apparently goes beyond what most people realize. Kohlberg's findings on the relatively small number of people who achieve principled morality are most likely in part a product of this problem. Socialization agents, e5pecially parents and teachers, pro- bably do an enormous injustice to children and seriously inhibit and retard their moral deve10pment and sensitivity by forcing children to report on the alleged misbehaviors of their peers, Spy on other child- ren, and instrumentally use children to achieve classroom and home management by giving power and status to children beyond the cognitive and moral capacity of the children to handle such techniques. Powerful support for this thesis is contained in Piaget's The Moral Judgment of the Child (1932), in which he reveals how much parental behavior violates the values/moral orientations of children in destructive ways. Piaget remarks (p. 191): ...the majority of parents are poor psych010gists and give their children the most questionable of moral trainings. It is perhaps in this domain that one realizes most keenly how immoral it can be to believe too much in morality, and how much more precious is a little humanity than all the rules in the world. (Italics added) To this Piaget adds the following observations and comments about parents (p. 192): ...the "average parent" is like an unintelligent govern- ment that is content to accumulate laws in Spite of the 422 contradictions and the ever-increasing mental confusion which this accumulation leads to; the pleasure taken in inflicting punishments; the pleasure taken in using authority, and the sort of sadism which one sees so often in perfectly reSpectable folk, whose motto is that "the child's will must be broken," or that he must be "made to feel a stronger will than his." Such a form of education leads to that perpetual state of tension which is the appanage of so many fam- ilies, and which the parents reSponSible for it attri— bute, needless to say, to the inborn wickedness of the child and to original sin. But frequent and legitimate in many respects as is the child's revolt against such methods, he is nevertheless inwardly defeated in the majority of cases. It is difficult to say how one becomes a sensitive person. It may be Speculated that it is partly the result of growing up in an atmosphere in which sensitivity is given along with love and interest, and in which children are rewarded and not punished for showing their feelings, caring about all forms of life, and being tender. Sensi- tivity is probably also deeply rooted in experiencing pain and depri- vation to some extent, and in being allowed to eXpress these aspects of life. The socialization process in our society for boys is very effective in preventing sensitivity, and should be able to give us some clues as to what not to do and what to do. Certainly the growing child needs to be exposed to those situations that provide Opportun- ities for deep involvement with another person or with an animal, but a kind of involvement that has some potential risks included, where there can be some pain and loss. Most likely sensitivity is one of the most difficult human characteristics to try to develop in others, for it requires that you move along the very fine line that divides overprotection from recklessness. The objective is to let 423 children experience hurt, pain, rejection, and loss up to the point, but not beyond, where it causes them to draw completely into themselves, withdraw from others, and be unwilling to take future risks and expose themselves to hurt and loss. Some effort must be made to more certainly establish the factors reSponsible for sensitivity if principled morality, genuine community, and enduring democracy are ever to replace the dissension, moral chaos, war, and immense social injustice that characterizes life in the latter part of the twentieth century. 5. Responsibility The kind of reSponsibility that leads to and is involved in principled morality is characterized by the willingness and ability to make irreversible significant life decisions that involve the welfare of oneself and/or the welfare of others, along with the willingness to fully accept the consequences of those decisions, and be able to help the other person cope with those consequences. This kind of ability and willingness most likely grows out of a long history of ever-increasing exposure to responsibility in kinds and amounts appropriate to the developmental stages. There may be other Significant factors and generators of moral reSponsibility at this high level, e.g., major crises. It is highly unlikely, how- ever, that responsibility of this type can be produced by commanding, preaching, and coercion. Dewey's experiential approach so consistent with Piaget's active approach applies here if it applies any place. The developmental levels and stages provide clues to parents and 424 teachers as to the readiness and need for the proper amounts and types of responsibility that can be experienced by children through active involvement in the management and concern for the classroom, school, home, and community. They should have every appropriate opportunity for participating in the decision-making process that controls their lives. Piaget (1966, Ch. VI) elaborates on the close and active relationships that pertain among the factors of intellectual deve10p:’ ment, active reciprocity among young children in order to develop logic and justice structures, and the intimate connection between operation and co—operation. He says (p. 164): ...it is precisely by a constant interchange of thought with others that we are able to decentralise ourselves... to coordinate internally relations deriving from different viewpoints. In particular, it is very difficult to see how concepts could conserve their permanent meanings and their definitions were it not for co-operation; the very reversibility of thought is thus bound up with a collective conservation without which individual thought would have only an infinitely more restricted mobility at its disposal. ...1ogical thought is necessarily social, the fact remains that the laws of grouping constitute general forms of equilibrium which express both the equilibrium of inter-individual interaction and that of the operations of which every socialized individual is capable when he reasons internally in terms of his most personal and original ideas. To say that an individual arrives at logic only through co-operation thus simply amounts to as- serting that the equilibrium of his operations is dependent on an infinite capacity fer interaction with other people and therefore on a complete reciprocity. (Italics added) Piaget Shows that intellectual development and social development are inextricably bound together and develop in transaction with each other. COOperation helps develop operational thought. Cooperation 425 involves responsibility. One cannot assume responsibility for anything or anyone without mentally and socially cooperating. Thus social perSpective taking (role-taking), cooperation, and intellectual oper- ations all combine in the active experiential prOgram to construct intelligence, deve10p perspectivism, and build the foundations of democratic community that can lead to principles morality and the ful- fillment of democracy. The development of responsibility is one of the major aspects of personality that is closely connected with the two factors of devel- opment postulated by Piaget as being very much under the control of the environment, viz., experience and social transaction (transmission). How important the culture can be is demonstrated by the retardation of individuation and personality by restrictive cultures that provide little variety in the way of experience or encouragement for person- ality development. Werner (1948, p. 458) cites the study done by Sherman and Henry (1933) among the "hollow folk" from the hollows among the mountains of rural Virginia. Few individual differences among children were found below the age of five, and the most primi- tive areas even children as old as twelve showed minimal differentia- tion in personality patterns. The reason offered is the lack of participation in the activities and goals of the community life among these people. As Werner says (p. 467): The normal growth of personality is not an autistic, self-dependent process, but part of that whole devel- opment culminating in a balanced polarity of ego and world. Personality normally grows and becomes dif- ferentiated as against the growth and differentiation of the social world. 426 Piaget (1966, p. 159) emphasizes the role of language in this same respect. Language transactions with adults aid tremendously in the building up of meanings and values that enable social development and the extension of the capacity for reSponsible behavior. The development of reSponsible moral capacity is more likely to occur in what Moore and Anderson (in Goslin, 1969, Ch. 10) call "clarifying educational environments." They present four principles for designing such educational environments (p. 585): l. Perspectives Principle. One environment is more conducive to learning than another if it both permits and facilitates the taking of more perspectives toward what- ever is tO be learned. 2. Autotelic Principle. One environment is more conducive to learning than another if the activities carried on within it are more autotelic. 3. Productive Principle. One environment is more conducive to learning than another if what is to be learned within it is more productive. 4. Personalization Principle. One environment is more conducive to learning than another if it: (1) is more reSponsive to the learner's activities, and (2) permits and facilitates the learner's taking a more reflexive view of himself as a learner. These four principles convey the kind of learning environment that is congruent with all that has been prescribed by Piaget, Dewey, Kohlberg, and the other organismic-structural-developmentalists for all factors of deve10pment. But their importance for the criteria for the devel- 0pment of principled morality is especially pertinent, and hopefully obvious. Regarding, in particular, the development of responsibility, principles two and three are especially relevant. In an autotelic environment, where the learner is experiencing every possibility, 427 within the reasonableness of safety to self and others, for self- directing activities that make it possible for him to construct knowledge and moral structures, responsibility is most likely to become an important and natural part of the child's deve10ping per- sonality. This is especially true if what he is doing is genuinely productive (not in the sense of the Protestant work ethic or the instrumental values of the marketplace or some traditional-authori- tarian orientation that views work per se as inherently noble) in the Piagetian sense of generating physical and logicomathematical cog- nitive structures. Moore and Anderson's four principles clearly enunciate the meaning of transactional education conducive to the many factors of principles morality, but responsibility has been highlighted here. A natural outgrowth of a transactional education environ- ment is the Opportunity for exploration, challenge, healthy and normal rebellion, questioning, and Openness. Unfortunately, in traditional educational environments (nomothetic) these behaviors are punished, prevented, and penalized. The price for exploration and moral chal- lenge in many of our schools is too high to permit Level I and Level II youth to indulge themselves in this kind of behavior that can be so deve10pmentally productive, eSpecially for awareness of an assump— tion of reSponsibility. The consequences of this condition is to generate an enormous amount of passivity, compliance, and conformity on the part of the majority, a great deal of pathological behavior on the part of those left out of the reward system of the schools, and an incredible amount of money, time, attention, reward, and 428 honor given to the very small minority who become stars in the achieve- ment-oriented moral atmosphere of the school that worships primarily athletic superstars and secondarily academic medal winners. The end result of this kind of system hurts the winners, the faceless masses of the majority, and the antisocial losers. A deep and thorough analysis of the third level of morality defined by Kohlberg and of the deeper meaning of democracy provided by Dewey and others reveals that none of the patterns described is likely to develop the kinds of citizens that can actively and meaningfully build a democratic society that is truly built on the principles of distributive justice. 6. Homonomy If there is one concept that can coordinate, integrate, and epitomize all that is meant by principled morality, democracy, com- munity, personality, and development it is Andras Angyal's concept of homonomy. It will only be briefly developed here in order to show its importance for the criteria of principled morality. Its importance for values development education in general deserves a more complete treatment.14 15 14Angyal's two major statements on this subject are contained in Foundations for a Science of Personality (1941) and Neurosis and Treatment: A Holistic Theory (1965). The former is his first attempt to develop the concept; the latter is a fuller and revised attempt in response to misunderstandings to the first one. It should not go unmentioned that Angyal was truly a brilliant theoretician, experienced medical and psychiatric practitioner, and extremely articulate and eloquent writer. He is also one of the least recognized organismic psychologists. His professional association at Brandeis University with the better known Kurt Goldstein and the most well known of all, 429 Briefly, Angyal saw life "as a process of self—expansion," and essentially "a self-governing process." The trend toward self- expansion he saw aS most characterized by what he called autonomy. By this term he meant the tendency to move away from the control of the environment (heteronomy) that characterizes the early part of the organism's life, during which it is completely helpless and dependent. One of his definitions of autonomy is (1941, pp. 32-33): By this is meant that the organism does not represent merely an inactive point, in which various causal chains intersect--as mechanistic philosophy assumes--but is, to a large extent, a selngoverning entity. The biolog- ical process is not a resultant of external forces, but is, in part, governed by Specifically biological endo- genous factors. The organism itself is, to a large extent, the cause of its functions, that is, it is endowed with spontaneity. We could also say that the organism possesses a certain degree of "freedom," if we use the term in the sense of Spinoza and call free that which acts according to its own inherent nature, according to its intrinsic law, and not under the com- pulsion of exogenous forces. Angyal recognized that the organism lives in a world in which much of life is under the control of heteronomous forces, by which he meant "governed from outside" versus "governed from inside" for autonomous (1941, p. 33n). All organismic processes, and life itself, involved the tension between these two forces. Angyal conceptualizes the rela- ...Abraham Maslow, constitutes part of the major core of organismic and humanistic psychology. 15Citations will not be used much here inasmuch as all the terms, concepts, and quotations are readily in the two sources cited in footnote l4. 430 tionship as follows (1965, p. 6): Every organismic process can be characterized by the ratio a : h, where a stands for autonomy, h for heter- onomy. The values of both a and h must be greater than zero, but they vary for different processes. The ratio varies from individual to individual and from species to Species.... The organismic process shows a definite trend toward an increase of the relative value of a in the a : h ratio, i.e., a trend toward an increase of autonomy. This trend has no fixed objective but only a general direction. At each stage of the biological process the tendency is toward a situation marked by a greater degree of autonomy that the preceding Situation, even if this tendency cannot always be carried through. Now Angyal recognized that there were apparent contradictions in this trend, and that life was not characterized by a steady linear trend from heteronomy to autonomy. His description of the actual events in this trend are very Similar to the uneven, sometimes discontinuous, and occasionally unequilibrated type of development characterized by Werner's orthogenetic principle and Piaget's equilibration process. Angyal described regressive episodes in which there was a reduction of autonomy and a correSponding increase in heteronomy. He saw this phenomenon of "regression" as falling into two categories: ”passive setback and strategic retreat." (1965, p. 7) Passive setback described those situations in life.where a person was definitely moving in the direction of autonomy, was strongly attempting to maximize his self-governing processes, but was outdone by stronger heteronomous forces. A man swimming upstream against a current stronger than he could overcome is an example used by Angyal. The swimmer is, from his perspective with respect to the stream, moving 431 in a positive direction; but the stream was actually carrying him backward with reSpect to the bank of the river. "Strategic retreat" similarly involved a generally "pro- gressive direction" on the part of the organism, but involves the backing off of a situation involving untenable or overwhelming cir- cumstances, in which the organism regresses to a more primitive mode of Operation to gather forces for a later advance. Angyal points out (1941, p. 38) that if the a (autonomy) part of the formula is reduced to zero we have a purely physical process, rather than a true organismic transactional process. Redu- cing the h (heteronomy) component to zero produces a completely "free" entity exempt from all external influence (e.g. the concept of the soul, which he offers to illustrate this situation). He says: "In the realm of organismic happenings we find neither entirely heteron- omous nor entirely autonomous processes. There is life only where in the ration a : h the values of both a and h are positive and greater than zero."(1941, p. 38) The usefulness of Angyal's formula and conceptualization is enhanced by the realistic flexibility he ascribes to it to describe the vicissitudes of life. AS he makes clear (1941, p. 39): "... we find marked variations in the importance of‘autonomous and heter- onomous determinations in...lives." Angyal summarizes the concept and its description of the life of the organism as follows (1941, 432 pp. 41-42):16 If one now considers the organismic total process with regard to the a:h ration, one discovers a definite trend’in the organismic total process toward an increase of’the relative value of'a in this ratio, that is, a trend toward'an increase of’autonomy. This trend does not have a fixed objective but only a general direction. At each stage of the biological process the tendency is toward a Situation which is characterized by a greater degree of autonomy than the preceding situation. The organism does not always succeed in progressing toward greater autonomy, and under heteronomous environmental influences may even be thrown back to a stage of dimin- ished autonomy. This, however, occurs through external compulsion and not by the activity of the organism. Now the utility of Angyal's conceptualization, terms, and formula is great and could be productively applied to a wide variety of situations. It could be used, for example, to evaluate and describe the four approaches to values/moral education, the three types of edu- cation described earlier, and educational environments, classroom management methods, and many other facets of curriculum and instruc- tion. The purpose here, though, is not to do this but to have the autonomy-heteronomy distinction as conceptualized by Angyal to serve as the preamble and foundation for his concept of homonomy, on which the discussion will now focus. Angyal reCOgnized that the individual striving for self- assertion, self-control, mastery of his environment, and freedom from the heteronomous control of the environment was expressing a natural organismic process and direction in life-—but that it omitted l6The redundancy here is purposeful in order to clearly communicate the meaning of the terms, the application of the principle and formula, and to convey the feeling Angyal intends. 433 much of some of the most important aSpects of existence that are distinctly human, viz., the need for and tendency to involve oneself in other peOple, the community, and the world in a way that cannot be manifested by or fulfilled by self-determination, self-government, and mastery. Likewise Angyal recognized that the environment, the external world, does not always nor necessarily represent antagonistic forces that are in Opposition to the organism. That much of what exists in and reveals itself to the organism from the environment is nurturant, productive, constructive, and positive. If we view the organism as the victim of the heteronomous forces we have an incomplete, erroneous, and mechanistic conception of man as a passive victim--precisely the view of the behavioristic conceptualization of man founded on the one, and only partial, aSpect of man's nature that functions in terms of reward, punishment, and conditioning. On the other hand, if we see the organism as the victim of his instinctual drives, irrational passions, and egoistic needs Striving to assert his autonomy in such a way that he is always at war with the external world and his own internal processes, we have the equally unbalanced view of man of the classical psychoanalysts. Autonomy and heteronomy, then, describe and manifest very important aspects of man and life, but only part of the organism and only part of the Story. Angyal solved this pro- blem through the concept of homonomy which more clearly unites and holistically represents man than many other formulations. The com- plete picture of man through the three components or aspects of heteronomy, autonomy, and homonomy efficiently and effectively sum- 434 marize the holistic, transactional, and integrated view of man that emerges from the organismic-structural-deve10pmental conceptual framework. What is homonomy? Angyal defines it within the broader context of other related issues as follows (1941, pp. 172-173):17 While the trend toward increased autonomy aims at the domination of the surroundings, the characteristic attitude toward superindividual wholes is rather a kind of submerging or subordination of one's individ- uality in the service of superindividual goals. In this latter trend a person seeks union with larger units and wishes to share and participate in something which he regards as being greater than his individual self. This principle reminds one of the concept of Eros, the great uniting principle, except that the Eros of the ancient Greeks was thought of as a cosmic force, while the concept which we are formulating here refers exclusively to personality occurrences. For this principle we prOpose the term "trend toward homonomy," that is, a trend to be in harmony with superindividual units, the social group, nature, God, ethical world order, or whatever the person's formulation of it may be. I wish again to emphasize that for the present purpose it is entirely immaterial whether such formu- lations are founded in reality or whether they are illusory. The particular formulation of a given person is not of immediate importance in this context. Only the fact that a trend toward homonomy is easily dis- cernable in everyone's life is important. I do not mean by this only that everybody has some moments in his life when he thinks of "higher things.” If such attitudes were only exceptional phenomenon, they would be of interest only as curiosa, and they would have little significance for the study of personality. I hope, however, that [these] discussions...show with sufficient clarity that the trend toward homonomy penetrates the whole realm of human life. Pure man- ifestations of this trend may be rare, but in combin- 17The definition of homonomy is presented in the total context of this long statement Of Angyal's partly because its meaning is enhanced by the manner and picture in which it is embedded. Also, no para- phrasing of its meaning can do the justice to its richness as the elo— quence of Angyal's superb and articulate prose. 43S ation with other trends it is a practically constant co-determinant of behavior. The trend toward homonomy, because of its combination with other tendencies, may be obscured and distorted, but it is my contention that without it human behavior cannot be understood. Homonomy as presented above is conceived as a slowly devel- Oping aspect, force, and capacity of one's personality that is central to the formation of the holistic human being as a principled moral person. Distributive justice is homonomous morality. Democracy is homonomous community. Principled morality is the integration of justice and personality in democratic community. The ultimate expres- sion of morality, then, is the democratic life of just moral person- Q.’ alities living in a just horal community based on the trend toward homonomy that makes it all possible. These relationships, and a fuller picture of homonomy, are contained in the following statement of Angyal's (1965, p. 16): In the context of the topic of this book, the homonomous trend in the so-called higher aspects of human life, such as art, is less important than its expression in the relationship of one person to another, of husband and wife, child and parent, among friends. These relation- ships may have all kinds of patterns and qualities, but they always extend beyond the individuality of the par- ticipants. They clearly Show that in the human being life is not contained within his individual self; it extends into the world and particularly into other human beings. What we call love is a manifestation of the homonomous trend in the relationships among people, and in a more general sense the whole concept of'homonomy could be equated'with love. (Italics added) The above passage moves homonomy clearly into the realm of everyday life, squarely where Angyal intended that it be. And it clearly moves it into the moral realm in both the broad and Specific meanings of that concept. Furthermore, homonomy is not something that one 436 acquires with advanced development, it is both process and product, function and structure, warp and woof of development-~it is both the developmental process and the structure of principled morality fully embodied. It is extremely important to point out that Angyal makes it clear that the ostensible disparity or antagonism between the auton- omy-heteronomy dimension and the homonomous trend is only an apparent conflict. The two trends are seen as two phases or aspects of a more inclusive trend or process, much in the same way as Piaget sees the ostensibly opposing trends of assimilation and accommodation as merely the twin aspects of one unitary process. The reader is reminded of the connection between Angyal's concepts of autonomy, heteronomy, and homonomy and the statement of his quoted earlier in this dissertation (Section A, Chapter IV) about the individual being part of "a whole of an intermediate order." (1952, p. 133) Angyal's ideas also relate to Similar ideas of Harvey, Hunt, and Schroder (1961) and their conceptual systems theory. The fourth and final stage of structural-development in the conceptual systems, self systems, and cognitive structures of the individual represents the stage of'interdependence. Viewing the infant as char- acterized by unilateral dependence (Stage 1); then progressing to a stage of resistance to external restraints so readily observed in the typical negativism and ubiquitious ”No!”'s of the young child, a stage they call negative independence (Stage 2); followed by a progression to conditional dependence and mutuality (Stage 3) char- 437 acteristic of older children and youth; and then moving finally to the stage of interdependence (Stage 4)--this theory presents a develop- mental sequence quite parallel to, congruent with, and structurally related to both Piaget and Kohlberg's stages. Of interest here in connection with Angyal's homonomy is Harvey et al'S description of the stage of interdependence (pp. 106 and 194): In the fourth stage mutuality and autonomy are integrated so that neither interferes with the other and yet both are important. We refer to this integration as positive interdependence. (p. 106) Stage IV systems involve the integration of the major forms of subject-object relatedness so that behavior is no longer primarily determined by either an external criterion, by opposition, or by some type of dependent relationship. The criterion for behavior is maximally abstract, emerging as informational standards. Behavior is neither dependent on external rules or other people, nor counterdependent upon these anchors-- it is maximally interdependent. The relationship of these statements to Angyal's homonomy is self- evident. And the congruence and isomorphism of the stages of Dewey (IOgical thought), Piaget (intelligence), Kohlberg (moral development), Harvey, et a1 (conceptual systems), and many others mentioned in throughout this dissertation is self-evident and striking. One final coordination of ideas will complete the develop- ment of the full meaning of homonomy and its importance for principled moral deve10pment. Piaget (1968, p. 65) says: Personality implies cooperation and personal autonomy. It is Opposed both to anomie, the complete absence of rules, and to complete heteronomy, abject submission to the constraints imposed from without. In this sense, the person and the social relationships he engenders and maintain are interdependent. 438 Piaget further augments his concept of personality by saying (1972, p. 90): ...an entire concept of personality could be defined by terming it a reciprocal "rapport." And finally (1972, pp. 111—112): We have stated that the two correlative aspects of personality are independence and reciprocity. In contrast to the individual who has not yet reached the state of "personality," and whose characteristics are to be oblivious of all rules and to center on himself whatever interrelations he has with his physical and social environments, the person is an individual who situates his ego in its true perspective in relation to the ego of others. He inserts it into a system of reciprocity which implies simultaneously an inde- pendent discipline, and a basic de-centering of his own activity. The two basic problems of ethical edu- cation are, therefore, to assure this de-centering and to build this discipline. In these statements Piaget summarizes personality and its development in terms of reciprocity of rapport, cooperation, and interdependence. All of these, as he states, define personality and its deve10pment in terms of the transactions of deve10ping egos in the context of a social system that fosters both individual and social deve10pment. But Piaget beautifully summarizes the entire idea and succinctly expresses the meaning behind all these concepts in the following statement (1972, p. 117): Mutual respect thus substitutes for the heteronomy characteristic of unilateral reSpect, an independence necessary to its own functioning and recognizable from the fact that individuals obligated by it par- ticipate in the elaboration of the rule that obligates it. Mutual respect is therefore also a source of obligations; however, it engenders a new type of obligations which no longer impose only ready-made rules, strictly Speaking, but also the method that creates them. This method is none other than reci- procity, not only as an exact balancing of‘good and 439 bad but as the mutual coordination of‘points of‘view and actions. Now the picture is complete and the circle is closed. For in these statements Piaget has brought together principled morality, justice as equity, and the development of personality as an interdependent exis- tence in a democratic community of other interdependent organisms. The full development of the individual is part of the full development of the community-~and the full development throughout the community in order to bring about the "mutual coordination of points of view and actions," which organismically and culturally lives in homonomy. Piaget sees l0gic as equilibration of intelligence. Kohlberg sees justice as equilibration of morality. Perhaps homonomy is the equilibrated integration, or metaequilibration of both logic and mor- ality, of intelligence and justice. D. Conclusion This chapter has dealt with three major factors of values development education that derive from the organismic-structural- developmental conceptual framework: (1) that democracy is isomorphic with principled morality; (2) that functional democracy is the process that facilitates moral deve10pment; and (3) that there are certain identifiable characteristics, or criteria, that define principled morality. The characteristics/criteria related to (3), viewed as necessary, but neither sufficient nor exhaustive were identified as: (a) formal Operational intelligence, (b) perspectivism, (c) habitual reflective tendencies, (d) sensitivity, (e) responsibility 440 and (f) homonomy. To conclude and synthesize these elements a very brief discussion of the nature of the moral person will be presented. Rawls (1971, p. 505) says: Moral persons are distinguished by two features: first they are capable of having (and are assumed to have) a conception of their good (as expressed by a rational plan of life); and second they are capable of having (and are assumed to acquire) a sense of justice, a normally effective desire to apply and to act upon the principles of justice, at least to a certain minimum degree. Thus Rawls says two characteristics mark the moral person, viz., a rational plan of life that is a conception of the good; and a sense, of justice with a desire to apply it and act on it. Without too much strain it can be claimed that the first of Rawls' criteria is contained in a systhesis of intelligence, perpsectivism, and habitual reflective tendencies. By a rational plan of life as a conception of the good Rawls must certainly mean the application of fully developed intelli- gence to the reflection on the nature of human existence, the various perspectives from which that can be viewed, and the continual attempt to examine those issues and reflect on them as a way of continuously building a philosophy by which to live. But, as Rawls rightly points out, this would only be half of the story. An intelligent person of low moral development could likewise reflect on the meaning, nature, and Opportunities of life and make use of his knowledge of the weak- nesses, passions, and desires of his fellow human beings in order to exploit, enslave, and demean them. The world has suffered much, and continues to suffer much from such as these. 441 Thus Rawls' second criteria--a sense of justice—-is the other necessary condition for the moral person. It seems as though this criteria is met by the augmentation of intelligence, perSpectivism, and reflection by the last three criteria presented earlier, viz., sensitivity, responsibility, and homonomy. A person who has fulfilled Rawls' first criteria and has formed a rational plan and conceptiOn of the good could not apply them in other than a just manner if he were truly a sensitive human being with a positive and constructive feeling for others and compassion in its best sense. ReSponsibility, as it was defined earlier, involved not only the ability but the willingness to make the serious, uncertain, and irreversible life decisions that affect the welfare of himself and others. For such a person the desire to apply his principles of justice and to act positively on them would necessarily constitute justice as much as the idea of justice. And if he were truly homonomous in addition, then all of the criteria laid down by Rawls would be fulfilled. There seems to be a great deal of congruity, therefore, between Rawls' notion of the moral person and the characteristics of the principled moral person in Kohlberg's terms as developed in this and the last chapter. Another test of the criteria presented here would be to examine the view of the moral person as conceived by Elijah Jordan. Jordan (1949, pp. 93-94) says: But the point of Special emphasis here is that the moral person is the whole person. There is nothing in the person by nature which he should get rid of. We have said that "morality" implies a person endowed by 442 nature and culture with all the capacities and capabil- ities which are possible to him and that these capaci- ties and powers should be cultivated and developed to the highest point possible to them. The moral person must be the most intelligent person that it is within him to become; he should possess the most competent will that his nature will permit; he should have the most delicate, sensitive temperament that is possible. He Should be able to think all things, do all things, feel all things. It is here that many of our traditional ideas are inadequate or downright false. Some of them would have morality merely in a brilliant intelligence, a capacity to know; for some, morality is an active will and a ready power to act; to still others, the moral life is a life of feeling with feeling developed in intensity or quality or both to the highest point. There is no reason to emphasize one at the expense of the others. The highest type of moral character is found in the balanced harmony of all these powers, where each is developed proportionately with the rest. But not only are these natural capacities to be developed to the full and in perfect balance. The cultural capacities must be developed in the same way and to the same degree. Finally, the specifically moral quality will be a synthesis of these natural and cultural qualities into the most effective harmony of them that is possible.18 One's initial reSponse might be, "What else is there to say?” This is truly an outstanding summary of the nature of the moral person, or the rational person, or the principled person--whatever words one chooses to label the type of human being described. Jordan describes two general categories of qualities that need to be developed: (1) natural, and (2) cultural. These seem to corrCSpond to the organismic and en- vironmental, reSpectively; and to the autonomous and heteronomous, 18Jordan's full statement should be read in order to appreciate the thoroughness and sensitivity with which he constructed his model of the moral person. The statement is cut short here only to keep this already long treatise from being any longer. 443 respectively. But the excellence of Jordan's summary is that it goes beyond both of these and holistically integrates them into a concep- tualization as close to homonomous as it appears possible. In his natural qualities he has accounted for (l) the whole- ness of the person in the sense of the full development of all his capacities; (2) the maximum development of intelligence; (3) the most competent will; and (4) the most delicate sensitivity. These seem to corre5pond rather well with the criteria of intelligence, perSpectivism, reflection, sensitivity, responsibility, and homonomy. Jordan's notions of intelligence, sensitivity and wholeness would seem to more than cover the intelligence, perspectivism, sensitivity and reflection of our scheme. His notion of will, in conjunction with wholeness, seems to correspond well with our idea of responsibility. Jordan's cultural qualities viewed within the holistic framework he so strongly emphasizes seems to embody all that is meant by homonomy. The balance, harmony, and synthesis on which he builds his conceptualization presents a fully equilibrated structural pre- sentation of the moral person. The central theme of this chapter has been to build a bridge from the organismic-structural-deveIOpmental framework to its application in a theory for values deve10pment education that can be used in educational systems. But two essential criteria are required for that task: (1) that the theory be both philosophically and psy- chologically integrated and defensible; and (2) that it be congruent with and usable in our pluralistic democratic society. An attempt to satisfy these requirements has been made in this chapter. Teilhard 444 de Chardin (1965) has identified two critical faults of democracy as it has been operationalized thus far. These faults he maintains have "enfeebled and vitiated the democratic vision of the World, one affecting its personalism, and the other affecting its universality." (p. 25) What he means is that our version of democracy does not truly give respect to man's personal integrity; and that by confusing mass and crowd with totality we have misrepresented the true meaning of universality. We have encouraged the instrumental use of man as an object, we have fostered all kinds of provincialisms and other forms of divisiveness, e.g., nationalism, racism, sexism, and the idealiza- tion of each little cell of which we are a member, rather than seeing ourselves in relation to the geniune totality of our entire world and our entire culture as part of the total culture of all mankind. Conse- quently, he says, our misunderstanding of democracy "rather than freeing man has merely emancipated him." He says: The resources we enjoy today, the powers and secrets of science we have discovered, cannot be absorbed by the narrow system of individual and national divisions which have so far served the leaders of the world. The age of’nations is past. The task befere us now, if’we would not perish, is to shake off’our ancient prejudices, and to build the earth. Teilhard's vision transcends all the things we strive so hard to talk about in our schools, and fail so miserably to achieve because of our own misunderstandings of democracy. The point of the whole idea of a theory for values development education is to try to light one small candle in a very dark world that may help point the way to how a real teacher in a real school can help himself or herself, his or her colleagues, and their students to try to become just moral personalities in and through the 445 potential for homonomy that is the very life blood of a just moral community. CHAPTER SIX VALUES DEVELOPMENT AS EDUCATION The literature is replete with statements from many sectors of our society that express basic dissatisfaction with our schools. That our schools are not satisfactory is both a truism and a Significant crisis. If there is any validity to the claims made in Chapter Five, then the dissatisfaction with our educational system becomes a mandate for renewal in order that our society and the world may survive. For if democracy is structurally the form of develop- ment that makes true freedom possible, and if democracy is also the functional process that facilitates and maximizes that development, then educators are morally obligated to commit themselves to re- examine our educational system in order to reconstruct education in such a way as to have education maximally serve the interests of freedom rather than serve to retard the development of freedom. We have much rhetoric. The need is for action. And intelligent action must be based on sound inquiry, the purpose of which is to devise a philOSOphical and psychological program that is consistent with the nature of the human organism both as an individual and as an ”interindividual"-—two sides of one human nature. The problem with our present programs is not so much that they are not good or not right, or not effective (although some particular prOgramS would deserve any or all of these criticismS)-- the problem is mainly that they are incomplete, fragmented, and not 446 447 coordinated. Our schools are, in large part, the reflection of tradition, the needs of vested interest groups, and a basically uninformed (with respect to education) public. The one potentially unifying element of the confusion and noise is the fact that whatever one's view of education is, whatever one's conceived purpose of education may be, and whatever one's convictions are about the needs of children, they are all related to values. So many of the arguments about education rage on about what should be taught, how it should be taught and by whom it should be taught as though they were all talking about different things. Knowledge, jobs, citizen- ship, the three R's, Skills, arts, humanities, interpersonal skills, and on and on--these are some of the things that form the content and basis of the arguments about education. But is it a matter of one or more of these being the purpose and content of education? Or is it possible that these are primarily issues of value that all need to be achieved in some way by the total educational system, which includes the home, the school, the community, and above all the individual learner? Immediately preceding the title page of a book is the anecdotal dialogue from which comes the title of that book:1 ”The name of this book is CHILDREN AGAINST SCHOOLS. What do you think?" "Children against schools? That's good.” 1Children Against Schools, edited by Paul S. Graubard. See bibliography. 448 ”Why?" "Cause that's just the way it is.” Kenneth J., 19 East Harlem The claim being offered here as the basic reason for children being against schools is that schools are truly against children. Frequently failing to consider the human needs and the deve10pmental processes of young human beings, the values of the school are often incompatible with the values of the children qua human beings. The values of infants, children, and youth are dynamic, transactional, developmental values—-the values of the school are often static, nomothetic, information values. The purpose of this chapter is to explore some of these issues and to try to continue to provide information and material for engineering the bridge between people and education, the engineering alluded to so briefly in Chapter V. Examination of these issues will be done through the following three themes: A. The school as a values/moral agent B. Education, curriculum, and values development C. The school as a just moral community. Themes A. and B. above will constitute the content of this chapter. Because the section on theme C., the just moral community, iS important enough to deserve being Significantly highlighted, and because it is long enough to deserve a separate chapter, it will be presented in Chapter VII. More than any other place in this dissertation the concepts values, values/moral, and development are to be interpreted in the broadest possible meanings of those terms. 449 A. The School as a Values/Moral Agent The first point that needs to be clarified at the outset on this issue is that the school is a values/moral agent. This is true whether educators want it that way or not; whether parents want it that way or not; or whether it happens by purpose and design or unwittingly without a plan. There are many who believe that all values are relative, that no one may legitimately stand in judgment of anyone else's values, and consequently, that no person or institution has the right to teach, preach, inculcate, indoctrinate, or foster a particular value system. These people, as well intentioned as they may be, fail to see that this point of view itself is a highly loaded value system that cannot be expressed or Operationalized without reflecting itself or directly structuring the school, and thereby doing the very thing its supporters are attempting to eschew. The mere fact that these peOple would have a school at all reflects, communicates, and directly teaches a particular value system. The selective-rejective criteria they would use to design, equip, staff, and Operate the school are all founded on, supportive of, and teach a particular value system. These peOple may wish to claim that their values do not operate de jure, and they may even wish to maintain that they do not operate de gratia. But the acid test would be for them to demonstrate and prove that they do not operate de facto. A value-free curriculum is impossible both logically and practically. And even if that were not true, even if such a 450 thing would be possible it would be undesirable and even dangerous-- dangerous in the sense that it would be counter-productive for survival. Life is an organismic process of continuous valuing. At every moment of its eXistence the human organism is perceiving, receiving, interpreting, processing the data in conjunction with its existing cognitive-affective Structures, biological structure, physiological needs, and all other aspects of its holistic existence. The organism that survives, and even more important, the organism that Operates both effectively and wisely for its own sake and the sake of others is an organism that must deve10p the finest valuing system of which it is capable. Such a proposition includes the notion that the finest valuing system incorporates at its center the metavalue aspect that guides its effectiveness and wisdom--this is the highest of all human functions, namely the integration of the six factors of maximum deve10pment presented in Chapter V (intelligence, perspectivism, reflection, sensitivity, responsibility, and homonomy), along with all other factors that represent man's highest capacities. Call it rationality, call it maximum humanness, call it actualization-- whatever it is called it is that which ultimately makes the organism maximally human. Since the human organism is born virtually helpless, nearly completely dependent, and unable to survive without nurturance and the essentials for existence, it is absurd to believe that the organism at birth, which is in reality a human animal, can ever become a human being without the four factors Piaget maintains are necessary for deve10pment, viz., maturation, experience, social 451 transaction, and equilibration. The transition from animal to human being is accomplished through the process we generally call socialization, which includes the functions provided by home, school, community, friends, and all factors that determine or contribute to growth and development. How can any socialization agent perform its socializing role without a value base and without communicating values? How can there be transactions between human beings without those transactions being value-transactions? Obviously socialization, of which education in the technical and formal sense, is the business of transacting in values. Schools exist because of values, deal with values, communi— cate values, and construct and reconstruct values. To remove values and valuing from schools is to remove schools from existence. If the above discussion successfully presents the case for the necessary logical nature and practicality of the value-based curriculum, it only hints at the danger aspect. To deal with this issue a specialized use of some terminology will be introduced that will be helpful as a framework and base through the discussions in this chapter. The terms knowledge and wisdom will be presented as a criteria base. Kppwledge versus Wisdom2 Gardner (1972, p. 107) briefly describes Piaget's distinction 2Apparently Piaget makes a critical and useful distinction between these terms. The source for this information is Howard Gardner's The Quest for Mind, p. 107. Unfortunately, the primary source, Piaget's own development of the distinction is not available in 452 between knowledge and wisdom: Piaget makes a key distinction between wisdom—-which is the end result of an inter— action between objective knowledge and personal values, and constitutes the particular domain of philosophy--and knowledge, which requires built- in controls and fixed criteria for truth and thus belongs to the realm of science. Piaget makes this distinction, as becomes evident from reading Gardner's complete statement, in connection with an even larger issue that Piaget frequently, and with increasing vigor in recent years, raises (19703, 1970b, 1970c, 1970d, 1970e, 1970f), viz., the polemical and divisive relationship that exists between science and philosophy, which he feels has been distorted and counterproductive to the advancement of both science and philosophy. In fact, Piaget‘s genetic epistemology is a manifestation of his resolution of the problem in bringing psychology and philosophy together as the most productive way of exploring, understanding, and extending epistemology. Dewey is in great agreement on this same issue, as is most evident when he explains his conceptualization of naturalistic humanism in Experience and Nature (1929, pp. 2-3; 6-7; 40) and in "From Absolutism to Experimentalism” (in Ulich, 1954, pp. 625-626). What is revealed by an analysis of both Dewey's and Piaget's positions on this issue is the congruence and isomorphism of naturalistic humanism and genetic epistemology. This is both the origin and manifestation of Piaget's knowledge-wisdom distinction, which can be very useful in ——_ ...English. The writer of this dissertation does not speak or read French, and develops the distinction on the basis of what little Gardner says about it and my own intuitive understanding and elabor- ation of the concept. The original sources in French are fully Cited by Gardner in a footnote on pp. 266—267 (Gardner, 1972). 4S3 considering values/moral issues with respect to education, curriculum, evaluation, and community. Knowledge is the result of inquiry, the objective data obtained through scientifical1y-controlled exploration based on criteria, consideration of variables, and the seeking of inference rather than proof. More broadly applied, which is necessary for use here, knowledge is what we know as a result of perception, assimilation, accommodation, and the general intellectual processing of the world through the mind” The content of most subject matter is knowledge. Vocabulary developed through transactions with other peOple in order to arrive at generally accepted meanings that make communication possible is knowledge. In a sense, knowledge is the content of intelligence based on the construction of cognitive structure. But it isn't simply content, it is the factual, cognitive data of the content-structure relationship in our minds. The hyphen is a necessary part of the conceptualization. Knowledge by itself can be applied in any direction, for any means, and without regard for the ends-in-view. Wisdom is the ”product” of the transaction between knowledge and experience in such a way as to create an evaluative synthesis in terms of other knowledge, values, an understanding of the past, conmaehension of the present situation, and anticipation of the future. Intentions, consequences, implications, potentialities, and above all, moral issues must be brought to bear against knowledge to create wisdom. The distinction cannot be drawn in terms of knowledge and 454 wisdom being relatively equivalent to facts and values, respectively. Knowledge involves values and has no meaning in terms of evaluations and values bases. And wisdom is not merely values. Obviously one can apply the criteria used to describe the terms and objectively obtain knowledge about ice cream, and as a result like ice cream, or value ice cream. The knowledge-wisdom distinction would not call the result of this experience wisdom. Wisdom is a much broader and deeper concept that involves a more holistic application of the capacities of the human mind to an evaluation of experience, relationships, and meaning. All that is meant by knowledge incorporated into the criteria for principled morality (intelligence, perspectivism, reflection, sensitivity, responsibility, and homonomy) gives a deeper and richer interpretation of the meaning of wisdom. Another distinction that was made earlier, between judging and evaluating, is a related issue. One could judge on the basis of inadequate and distorted knowledge. Now according to the definition of knowledge given here, this would be somewhat incorrect, in that knowledge is objectively and scientifically obtained. But much of what we believe we "know" is in reality only prejudice. But even if we grant that someone has genuine knowledge in the sense defined, but has not placed that knowledge in perspective with wisdom, the most that one can do is judge. If one has integrated that knowledge, however, in such a way as to have transformed it into wisdom, then one can truly evaluate rather than merely judge. Wisdom depends to a great extent on the cognitive and moral maturity of the individual and the ability of that person to 455 transcend the value of knowledge itself. The knowledge derived from science and the application of the scientific method combined transactionally, multidimensionally, and holistically with the personal values one constructs through the application of phiIOSOphic inquiry creates wisdom. Piaget and Dewey, then intersect on this importatn issue and provide a way of not only advancing understanding, but also provide an excellent conceptual tool to use for evaluating educational elements. To complete the picture, however, one more component is necessary. Having differentiated knowledge and wisdom, it is now necessary to differentiate wisdom from effectiveness. . ,. 3 Effectiveness versus Wisdom Wistm has been presented in qualitative terms that can be used as the values base or criteria against which to measure the goals, objectives, functions, personnel, and other aspects of the school. Effectiveness is another qualitative term dealing with the degree to which goals and objectives are accomplished. An effective program is one that accomplishes what it set out to accomplish. An ineffective program is one that fails to accomplish its goals or objectives. Consequently we can derive a four-cell matrix for evaluating an educational element, as Shown below in Figure 6.1: ——; 3The other distinction that could be made here, the distinction between efficiency and effectiveness, is omitted as unnecessary for the purposes outlined. Only the two qualitative dimensions are being considered. 4S6 FIQHHE6.1 Cell Matrix for Evaluating Wisdom and Effectiveness of Educational Goal§_ EFFECTIVE INEFFECTIVE WISE 1. Wise goals 2. Wise goals Accomplished Not accomplished UNWISE 3. Unwise goals 4. Unwise goals Accomplished Not accomplished The tOpic under investigation here is the school as a values/moral agent. One more factor needs to be included, in fact it is the factor that is to be evaluated, and that is the program, or curriculum of the school. This requires one final distinction between the planned and the unplanned curriculum. 4The term unplanned curriculum is used here rather than the more popular term, "the hidden curriculum." The former is more inclusive and makes provision for all aspects of the curriculum that were not planned; whereas, the latter term is appropriately limited to only those aspects of the Operation of the school that are beneath the surface, not as obvious. The term "hidden curriculum" also, in contexts where it is most frequently found, has a pejorative connota- tion that does not apply to all aspects of the unplanned curriculum. .Another term that is related is the "the unstudied curriculum." See The Unstudied Curriculum: Its Impact on Children, edited by Norman Overly (1970). Clarification of the term planned curriculum must include the important point that "planned" does not necessarily mean that the plan is created always with consideration for the needs 0f the learners as the primary objective. Some aspects of the planned curriculum, e.g., the physical plant and personnel selection, are often made intentionally with the efficiency, control, and other needs of the organization and its staff as the primary objectives. Many such aspects of the planned curriculum may be in conflict with the needs of the learners. 457 Planned versus Unplanned Curriculum The planned curriculum, as its name implies, refers to those aspects of the school that are purposely, knowingly, and objectively placed in the curriculum with a rationale. A series of courses in mathematics, planned for a specific age and grade level, with a progressive and logical sequence of tOpics, methods, and materials is an example of part of the planned curriculum. The design of the physical plant, prepared with the needs of the inhabitants in mind, the demands of the size of the population, the traffic patterns, and the need for control, etc., is part of the planned curriculum. The personnel, the criteria by which they are selected, the assignments they are given, and all other related matters are all part of the planned curriculum. In short, the planned curriculum is the totality of the human and nonhuman resources of the school, their organization and arrangement, and the systematic plan by which they are to be implemented. The unplanned curriculum is all that happens in the school that was not included in the plan, either by omission or commission; what was not nor was likely to be anticipated; and all of the complex personal, interpersonal, social, and informal organizational trans- actions that both overtly and covertly develop as the school actually Operates. The unplanned curriculum grows out of many things, and is a very complex element of the operation of the school. Some of it is obvious, much of it needs to be inferred. The distinction between these two components of the curriculum 458 is not always clear, precise, and mutually exclusive. Some aspects of the school are readily identifiable as part of the planned curriculum, e.g., the building, the course offerings, the syllabi, the staff members, and the textbooks. Other aspects of the school are readily classified as part of the unplanned curricula, e.g., the affections and hostilities that develop between members of the faculty, or between students and faculty, or the cliques that form among the students. Much of the unplanned curriculum, however, is less easily classifiable as one or the other, and is a mixture of both. A textbook, as an example of the planned curriculum, for example, may have been carefully selected, written by an expert in the field of study, and well integrated into the plan and execution of the course. Unknown to the teacher and unanticipated by the teacher there may be something in the textbook that generates deep and serious negative reactions from the students that are not directly expressed, but are manifested only by tension in the classroom, resistance to the teacher, or refusal to read the assignments. A large number of students in the class may have deep feelings about perceived distortions and misrepresentations that often characterize the presentation of the history of the United States in many classes and textbooks. A textbook on American history, observed by the writer, written by two Columbia University scholars, was bound in an obviously patriotically oriented cover with red, white, and blue stars and stripes. The Civil War was presented as a conflict among brothers, and made it appear as though that war were nothing more than a family squabble. To present the significant, powerful, and 459 destructive aspects of a four-year blood bath that cost thousands of lives, and nearly caused the permanent separation of the nation into two permanently divided camps, to say nothing of the racial implications whose effects are still felt more than a hundred years later, in the euphemous terms of a conflict among brothers constitutes a distortion of truth. Imagine this text being used in a classroom for whom the issues of freedom, race, and war are highly inflammable and sensitive subjectS--then what seems so simply part of the planned curriculum can clearly be seen as also part of the unplanned curriculum, with all of the potential consequences. As an interim summary of basic concepts, the following three terminological and conceptual distinctions have been made: 1. knowledge versus wisdom 2. effective versus wise 3. planned curriculum versus unplanned curriculum. In addition a matrix was presented, Fig. 6.1, to aid in the analysis. With these conceptual tools an analysis of the school as a values/ moral agent can now be briefly explored. The exploration is intended not to be a statistically documented report 0f a complex scientific study, but a stimulating evaluation stemming from the organismic- structural-deveIOpmental conceptual framework presented in Chapters IV and V that indicate the need for considerable future studies that can test the theses or prOpositions presented here. The discussion will proceed from the following four theses or propositions: 460 l. The unplanned curriculum is less wise but more effective as a values/moral agent than the planned curriculum. 2. The conflict between the unplanned and the planned curriculum seriously inhibits values/moral deve10pment. 3. Many schools are generally negatively effective values/moral agents. 4. A school cannot be both wise and effective until it systematically coordinates its curriculum by planning for the integration of knowledge and wisdom. I. The Upplanned Curriculum is Less Wise but More Effective than the Planned Curriculum An examination of the goals and objectives of most schools in the United States would reveal intentions to graduate intelligent, skillful, productive, and wise citizens who would be able to successfully proceed to college and/or productively earn a living in honest and law-abiding occupations, and who would actively participate in the democratic process necessary for the growth and survival of our representative democracy. Furthermore, they would be reflections of the founding documents of this nation, dedicated to equality, freedom and justice for all regardless of race, color, creed, sex, and many other classifications. The planned curriculum of the typical American school 461 includes courses in government, citizenship, and many aspects of social studies, liberal arts, and the humanities. The credos of most schools profess belief in self-determination, honesty, courage, Open minds, and dozens of humanistic propositions. The planned curriculum is designed to accomplish all the goals and objectives that would make possible a truly democratic nation, with law-abiding, concerned, and involved citizens. The rhetoric of the goals, the school boards,' the parents, the faculty, the textbooks, and the classes would lead one to expect that our educational system would produce people characterized by the criteria for principled morality described in Chapter V. The literature of educational reform and many of the events of our day indicate a possible discrepancy between these goals and and the results. Why is this so? Part of the answer may be that the planned curriculum is both unwise and ineffective. Probably it is considerably more ineffective than unwise. It is unwise because it removes the content of knowledge (as distinguished from the scientific process of acquiring knowledge) from the context of the lives of the students. It is unwise because it fails to include proper methods by which students can truly learn, apply, and habituate the scientific methods, the principles of inquiry, and the Open minds required to create and understand true knowledge. It makes knowledge into something that already exists, is external to the learner, is objective and correct, and must be transmitted to the learner by authority, conditioning, and other autocratic methods. 462 Even the knowledge of democracy--especially the knowledge of democracy-- is often taught in this manner. This subject will provide one exemplar that tends to support the thesis, where it occurs as described here. Democracy is often "taught" in our schools by teacher authorities, in autocratic settings, with ”authoritative” textbooks, as an established practice that actually exists. Many learners know that what is taught frequently does not exist--possibly not in his school, probably not in his home, and frequently not in our country. He is taught that one of the keystones of true democracy is the principle that one is innocent until proven guilty, and that justice involves due process. The Opportunities for our millions of students to observe or experience this process and this justice in our schools, especially our high schools, are so limited that the subject would be better removed from the planned curriculum. Can a student in a typical American school be given a fair trial (hearing, or whatever) if he is believed to be a violator of some rule of the school or in disagreement with a member of the faculty-~regardless of whether he is innocent or guilty, right or wrong? Generally speaking, probably not. On this, and many other subjects, the typical American Student knows that he must do all in his power to obey, comply, and conform with the established social order and structure of the school if he has any intentions of earning the diploma he has been taught by his parents, his school, and all other authorities to be one of the most important documents in his young life. Achievement at any price is sometimes the powerful message of the unplanned 463 curriculum. When that is true it overpowers anything to the contrary that may come from the planned curriculum. The planned curriculum says that all people are equal, deserve equal dignity, and should be treated as brothers and sisters. The unplanned curriculum says you must at all times prove yourself superior to your peers if you want any of the rewards, honors, status, or power that are Shown to be important in the school, the community, and our nation. The planned curriculum says that you must explore, inquire, seek, question, challenge, and forever remain open to growth and new ideas. The gifted, the clever, and the skilled know that these principles apply mainly to the accepted and limited subjects, questions, issues, and factors that are in accord with the established order of the school. Furthermore, generally speaking, there are accepted times, methods, and places where this highly limited behavior is permitted--and knowing this and applying this will win the small minority of gifted, clever, and physically superior students the praise, the power, the glory, the awards, the gold statues, the letters, and the letters of recommendations. The point is that the planned curriculum is ostensibly designed to foster all the ideals and goals of democracy, freedom, justice, and America—-but it actually is frequently very ineffective in implementing these things. It is hypothesized here that the unplanned curriculum is the more powerful, pervasive, and dominating curriculum of the school. In that sense it is postulated that it is very effective, and fits cell 3 in the matrix of Fig. 6.1. Kohlberg, 464 in many of his writings, maintains that at best approximately 25% of the pOpulation of America makes it to Level III principled morality and that most likely not more than 5% make it to Stage 6. AThese are conservative estimates based on his research. He believes these figures are high (1973). 2. The Conflict Between the Two Curricula Inhibits Values/Moral Development. The transactional effect of the discrepancy between the planned and unplanned curricula may be the source of much of the conflict, unrest, and rebellion in the schools; and possibly one of the reasons why so many youth accuse adults of being hypocrites. To practice injustice without preaching justice is not nearly as disturbing as practicing injustice while preaching justice. To the sensitive formal operational, highly exploratory teenager, eXperiencing the resurgence of egocentrism mentioned by Piaget (discussed in Table 4w1I)iJlChapter IV), the new power he has with which he can see the potentialities of what "ought" to be is discordant with what he sees as existing. What can respect for others mean to a student told that this is the way he Should live (in the planned curriculum) when he is treated (in the unplanned curriculum) by the faculty with little or no respect in many situations? One of the issues on which this is particularly acute and revealing is the subject of mistakes. Being able to make mistakes is one of the least discussed but one of the most important aspects of learning. Many aspects of the school are 465 oriented toward reward for ”right" answers and punishment for "wrong" answers. Much of what is judged, graded, and punished as wrong today turns out to be right, partially right, or irrelevant tomorrow with the new knowledge gained from the advancements of science, technology, wisdom, or experience. The experiential method prescribed by Dewey, which is nearly identical with the active method prescribed by Piaget, actually calls for an optimal amount of opportunity for "mistakes." The equilibration process is founded on the belief that opportunity for disequilibrium and the chance to process it is what leads to a new equilibration at a more integrated higher structural stage. Consequently, experiential and active approaches require the kind of experience that encourages risk-taking that can lead to error, misjudgment, and mistake, Dewey (1944, p. 197) speaking here of manual training says: Morover, Opportunity for making mistakes is an incidental requirement. Not because mistakes are ever desirable, but because overzeal to select material and appliances which forbid a chance for mistakes to occur, restricts initiative, reduces judgment to a minimum, and compels the use of methods which are so remote from the complex situations of life that the power gained is of little availability. But when talking about moral reconstruction and moral deve10pment (1948, p. 175) he says: Mistakes are no longer either mere unavoidable accidents to be mourned or moral sins to be expiated and forgiven. They are lessons in wrong methods of using intelligence and instructions as to a better course in the fUture. They are indications of the need of revision, development, and readjustment. Mistakes, or rather the opportunities to make mistakes, are part of 466 the lifeblood of continued learning. And in the planned curriculum they are encouraged in the form of exhaltations to try and try again, to take chances, to attempt to answer difficult questions, and in many other ways. But in the real life of the unplanned curriculum many students know that mistakes of all kinds are among the most serious transgressions one can commit. It is the achievers, the students with the right answers, the students with the high scores, the stars that can do everything right that generally rise to the tOp and usually win the laurels of the planned curriculum. The conflict between the planned curriculum and the unplanned curriculum can literally tear the young person apart. But unlike the disequilibrium that is constructive and conducive to cognitive and- moral growth, this kind of disequilibrium can frequently lead to personal defeat, apathy, fear, and anxiety that can crystallize rigid thinking, fixation at low levels and stages, and prevent exploration that can lead to developmental progress. 3. Schools are Generally Negatively Effective Values/Moral Agents. To a certain extent this claim is based on the great amount of activity in schools that is congruent with cell no. 3 in Fig. 6.1. Considering the orientations presented by Levels I and II of Kohlberg's deve10pmental program, it can be observed that the schools engage in a great deal of behavior that is based exclusively or mostly on the use of power, punishment, reward, instrumental use of peOple as objects, and various kinds of payment for appropriate behavior. Unfortunately, education has for decades has generally accepted the fundamental view 467 of man propounded by both the behaviorists and the psychoanalysts, but especially the former. Not only elementary and high schools, but all forms and levels of higher education, including doctoral programs, are considerably based on the belief in the need for external motivation, reward and punishment, quantitative evaluations, and orientations to concrete and fixed thinking. Authority is usually respected and encouraged. Questioning is frequently discouraged, politely ignored, punished, or removed by expelling the offender. Kohlberg identifies the moral orientation of most schools at Levels I and II, with a predominant mixture of Stages 1 and 4 (Kohlberg, 1970b, 1971b, 1973a). In View of his most recent theoretical reformulations based on his latest empirical findings, which resulted in his creating Stage 3A' (prime), it would seem that his evaluation should be revised. Much behavior of educators is readily identifiable as consistent with the authoritarian orientation. Support for Kohlberg's claims comes from other sources that have also reported on the characteristics of schools and teachers whose data contribute to the rationale for the proposed negative effect- iveness of teachers and schools as values/moral agents. Fedigan (1973, p. 766) reports on the findings obtained from an application of the conceptual systems theory (Harvey, Hunt, and Schroder, 1961) to determine the characteristics of preservice (prospective) teachers, . . . 5 inservice teachers and principals and superintendents as follows: 5This report by Fedigan is a deviation from the general practice followed throughout this dissertation to report from primary sources. In this case the summary of the theoretical framework, its particular application to teacher behavior, and integration with finding from 468 l. Harvey’s Four Systems. The four levels or nodal oints along the basic concrete—abstract dimension were defined as systems by Harvey ‘ (1966; 1970), and specifically related to teach— ing behaviors by Murphy and Brown (1970). The latter derived the following character- istics: System 1 teachers view authority as the highest good, see questions as having one answer and thus discourage divergent thinking, and reward conformity and rote learning. System 2 teachers are characterized by inconsistency and uncertainty in functioning in a manner rather similar to System 1 teachers. System 3 teachers Show high affiliative needs, based on mutuality and group consensus rather than rules. Being more abstract in functioning than System 1 or 2 teachers, they will encourage more pupil self- expressions. System 4 teachers regard knowledge as tentative rather than abSOlUte, are able to consider situations from other points of view, and, being cognitively complex themselves, tend to encourage more complex functioning. In a Study of several thousand liberal arts students, Harvey (1970) found that 35 percent represented System 1 functioning, 15 percent System 2 functioning, 20 percent System,3 functioning, and 7 percent represented System 4. Propsective teachers differed slightly from the liberal arts students; however, among practicing teachers the percentage of System 1 was 55, there were almost no System 2 teachers, System 3 teachers went down to 15 percent, and only 4 percent represented System 4 functioning. Also, 75 percent of principals and 90 percent of superintendents in Colorado, Wyoming, Utah, and New Mexico represented System 1 functioning. In fhrther studies, Harvey (1970) noted that liberal arts students and Air Force Academy cadets become significantly more abstract from the freshman to the senior year; Whereas, ...several reporters seemed more advantageous and concise. For some related studies on similar issues see also Harvey, White, Prather, Alter, and Hoffmeister (1966) and Harvey, Prather, White, and Hoffmeister (1968). 469 at two major teacher training institutions, the incidence of System 4 individuals decreased from a high.in the sophomore year all the way through graduate training. The result appears to be due to socializing influences of the schools of education. Apparently there are complex factors at work here. A significant percentage of educators are conceptually concrete thinkers, passive, dependent, autocratic, and operate at relatively low and middle levels of moral development. Many of the peOple attracted to education seem to have these personality character- istics, which in turn are reinforced and further extended by the socialization practices of many schools of teacher education. The graduates of these schools, in turn, enter into an educational system that is already characterized by the same tendencies and practices. Certainly a significant part of the blame can be placed on the schools that prepare teachers. Not only do they seem to attract and reinforce the personalities described above (which most ilikely coincide with the personality characteristics of many teacher educators themselves), but the programs focus primarily on subject matter content, methodology and classroom management, and related problems. Teacher trainees are not generally required to engage in any kind of research or give serious consideration to the meaning, application, and deve10pment of theory. And phiIOSOphy of education is quite incidental to the entire program in the form of survey courses that for the most part require no philosophical thinking on the part of the prospective teacher. Of major importance, also is the fact that many teacher preparation programs provide none or little 470 exposure to deve10pmental psychology. Consequently, it is possible in many institutions for an undergraduate student in education to go through four years of school, graduate with a bachelor's degree and a teaching certificate without ever having to have seriously grappled with any of the major issues of education, without ever having had to formulate any systematic philosophy of education or even a outline of a set of beliefs, without ever having had to learn much of anything about the human beings they are going to teach and how they deve10p. What little is taught in many schools about the child is usually from the behavioristic model--conditioning, contingencies of reinforcement, S-R bonds, and behavior modification techniques. Much of the conceptual paraphernalia of education is presented, for the most part, along with the psychometric techniques and management techniques, in packaged programs to be applied with little critical examination. The achievement orientation, the lock-step graded system, tracking, grades, behavioral objectives, IQ'S, and dozens of other models, programs, and ideas are presented without any serious discussion about their validity, their meaning, or their morality. Jerome Bruner has remarked (1959, reprinted in N011 and Noll, 1968, p. 168): I do not wish to mince words. The educational and cultural level of the majority of American teachers is not impressive. On the whole they do not have a good grasp of the subject matter that they are teaching; courses on method will not replace the absent subject matter. In time and with teaching experience this deficeincy is often remedied. But in so many cases there is no time: the turnover in the teaching profession as we all know is enormous; the median number of years of teaching before departure for marriage or mother- hood is around three. 471 The content of Bruner's comments are limited in sco e and do not P extend to the major issues of discussion here. But the principle he is expressing is very important. important part of a Without a doubt the teacher is probably the single most factor in the educational system. But she or he is still system. And as Gagné says (1966): The idea that teachers can by themselves bring about the changes required to modernize education is itself part of what needs changing. Teachers cannot possibly do all of the things they are supposed to do, or that they say they are responsible for doing. They do not have the time, not to mention the capabilities, to design curricula, execute curricula, design instruction, execute instruction, guide individual development, measure individual progress and consult with parents. Loubser (1971, in Beck, Crittenden, and Sullivan, Chapter 5), in what he admits is a "working paper" on the subject of the role of the school in moral development, tentatively concludes that the school seems to be an inhibitor of moral development. His analysis concludes as follows (p. 178): It [further theorizing, documentation, and codification] will without doubt introduce countless qualifications and perhaps even many reversals in the generalizations. But the broad strokes in which the picture was painted are enough to elucidate the main outline of the argument, which I contend would survive closer scrutiny. In essence, the argument is that is we accept the ideal-type concept of moral action as deve10ped in the first part of the paper, it is evident that the social structural arrangements in most schools inhibit the development of the components of moral action. Schools, by default or design, tend to obstruct rather than encourage the development of: 472 A. moral commitment and moral involvement with others as whole persons and with moral issues. B. universal moral principles and the inclusive- ness of the human moral community. C. moral autonomy, respect for others as autonomous moral agents, and moral liberty as a value in society. D. moral reason and the generalized capacity for moral flexibility. There is general, and even precise, agreement with much of what has been said here and in Chapter V. on this matter. Schools appear generally not to be effective or wise values/moral agents. 4. Both Wisdom and Effectiveness Require Coordination of the Planned and the Unplanned Curriculum. In a sense this thesis is peculiarly stated, but it communi- cates the essence of the point. What is meant, in part, is that much of the present planned curriculum needs to be revised, some discarded, and all of it reviewed in respect to its contribution to the develop- ment. Beyond this it means that much of what constitutes the unplanned curriculum should be incorporated into the planned curriculum and coordinated with the planned curriculum. Ideally this would result in one unified curriculum. But not in reality. For no matter how much or what is planned, students and educators, being people, will always create an unplanned curriculum above, beyond, and beneath the planned curriculum. But the point is that the latter does not have to be negative or counterproductive, nor do the positive aspects of the present unplanned curriculum have to be unplanned or hidden. Furthermore, much of the present unplanned curriculum reflects the genuine and more important needs of the students than does the 473 planned curriculum that presently exists. The investment of most of the resources of the educational system in knowledge with considerably less regard for the wisdom and values aspects, and with little regard for the transactional relation- ship between them, is not only unnecessary, it is dangerous and will become increasingly so if our economic, social, political, and moral problems grow from crises to disasters. Wisdom without knowledge is impossible. Knowledge without wisdom is potentially dangerous and disastrous, as Alfred Nobel, for one small example, discovered. We must educate people, not train them. Conclusion Considering the six aspects of principled morality presented in Chapter V., and the factors considered in this chapter, as criteria for evaluating the capacity of our schools to provide the kinds of experiences required for values/moral development, in general the conclusion would have to be that many of our schools are either failing miserably or are rather low on the scale. There are exceptions, of course, and the picture would certainly be an uneven one across the nation. There are many schools trying to do a good job, but overall the nature of our schools, the way they are organized and operated, and the training and experience of the staffs, and the pressures from the parents and community tend to add up to a rather grim picture. 474 Elementary schools are probably considerably advanced over the secondary schools. For the most part, however, schools in general are designed for students to be passive, uninvolved, standardized, protected, told, decided for, thought for, and herded. The conceptual- ization of man on which our schools base their curricula, Operation, and organization is a very confused and mixed bag, but by and large it is still a carryover from the inner depravity ideas of the Puritans with large doses of behaviorism and psychoanalysis thrown in. The emphasis is on the transmission of the culture to the students, and education is something you give to people, and teaching is something you do to them. Add to this the standardization, the overemphasis on roles and facades, the pyramid hierarchy structure, the emphasis on right answers and production, the achievement orientation, the compartmental- ization, and the entire office and factory atmosphere, much of which has been inherited from the business-industrial-military complex that has dominated our society and our schools for decades. Top this Off with the type of preparation for teaching that is offered in many of our schools of education, the fear of the parents and the community, and the Level I and II orientation of the people who Operate the schools. It all adds up to an educational system conducive to the retardation of values/moral deve10pment. In answer to the question about the wisdom of the schools as values/moral agents, the schools appear very unwise. They seem to have not made good choices about the role of the school, nor have they made good choices about how to organize and Operate the school. The planned curriculum is ostensibly based on objectives and goals that 475 are good, but the execution of the plan seems to be unrelated to the stated and implied goals. One of the main problems that prevents educators from being good values/moral agents is the powerful anti-intellectual, anti- theoretical, and anti-philosophical bias that prevails among educators in the field. Teachers, for the most part, tend to be prescriptive, pragmatic, and concrete; they are usually looking for packaged panaceas to solve their immediate problems. There is little evidence that teachers have given much thought to their role as values/moral agents except in the sense that they see a need for children and youth to be tamed, controlled, and shaped. The way to achieve moral deve10p- ment is to build on the resources of people, not things. Instructional materials, strategies, designs, and kits are all useful, valuable, and needed--but they must be tools in the hands of professional educators, and not crutches for inadequate and insecure custodians and authorities. There is no question that educators are harried, overworked, and involved in a field overwhelmed with constant pressures from the community, from the boards, and from the students. But there must be both the time and the willingness on their parts to investigate the nature of the values/moral problem, and to attempt to gather the data that is available to help them reformulate their roles with respect to development. But it is rare to find an educator at any level who has heard of the work that has been done on this aspect of their work. The Hartshorne and May Studies, Piaget's work on moral judgment, Kohlberg's work, and much more have been available for years. 476 The excuses offered for this are many, but most of them relate to busy schedules, pressing demands, and the knowledge and understanding it would take on their part to evaluate and apply the work that has been done. To a certain extent this is a legitimate response. But not entirely. Teachers, principals, and administrators are among the most active participants in workshops, conferences, and programs on dozens of contemporary issues. Announce a workshop on behavior modification or some other device to control children and achieve classroom management, and teachers will be there in large numbers. Announce an institute on accountability, budgeting, or other administrative matters and the principals and administrators will flock to the site. The only program on values education that has attracted widespread attention and support, as well as application, is values clarification. But few educators have seen more than the positive side of this methodology (which is substantial). But there are significant problems with values clarification, also. As pointed out in Chapter 11, values clarification involves an underlying belief in the relativity of values, which is a Significant problem. The theory and methodology also, when examined in depth, reveal that if it were applied as presented it could lead to great frustration on the parts of both students and educators. For there is little chance that educators are going to permit children to apply the principles of values clarification, and its idiographic-relativistic orientation to any other than superficial problems and issues. The techniques of values clarification also tend to lead, when working with teenagers especially to a tendency to conformity, which is purportedly 477 contrary to the basic phiIOSOphy its prOponents and users profess to support. And, finally, values clarification is basically a relatively superficial program that is not developmentally oriented. It has the appeal, the attractiveness, and the fun that too easily lends itself to appearing to be a panacea. Without a doubt it is a valuable resource and it has made an enormous contribution to education, but it is certainly not without major faults, and not a panacea. In conclusion, schools as they are presently constituted are not only basically ineffective and unwise values/moral educators, and they not only do little to contribute to the development of principled morality, they actually retard, inhibit, and prevent much of the very deve10pment that makes democratic life possible-—which purportedly is the purpose for which they should be most concerned. Schools are capable of being considerably more effective and wise values/moral educators. Many rich and valuable theoretical, phiIOSOphical, and empirical formulations and findings are available on which to build. Some of the most important ones have been reviewed in this dissertation. A beginning is being made to translate them into the kinds of models and methods that can be used to inform the educators and help them apply them to their own professional develop- ment and to the deve10pment of their students. But some major problems need to be examined and resolved in order to make much of this possible. First, there needs to be a major reorientation of priorities in both inservice and preservice teacher education programs if values/moral education is going to be given the attention it needs. Second, programs for parents must be designed and implemented to 478 complement and support the programs for schools. Third, some help must come in general from the population at large in terms of the realization of the fact that the problems we face today are, at their roots, values/moral issues. As Piaget (1972) points out, full developmental education, both cognitive and moral, is a necessary condition for the establishment of democracy, world order, and peace. He says that governments have an obligation to provide this kind of education to their pOpulations, and to the extent that they fail this responsibility, to that extent they deprive their constituents of freedom. Yes, schools are values/moral agents, and it is one of the most important responsibilities the school has to meet. Anyone involved in education at all should attempt in whatever ways possible to augment and support the schools' efforts to that end. B. Education, Curriculum, and values Develppment The following conceptualizations of curriculum and curriculum theory are offered as a basis for a deve10pmental approach to education and the school: Curriculum Theory A curriculum theory is a conceptual framework for system- atically, effectively, and wisely linking warranted assumptions about the nature of man, the nature of society, the process of learning, and the purpose of education. 479 Purpose of Curriculum Theory To provide a sound basis for making effective and wise decisions about all the components of the curriculum. Curriculum .———— A curriculum then consists of the following: 1. Human resources: students, educators, parents, and community. A curriculum theory. Criteria for effective and wise to serve as the values base for making curriculum decisions. A statement of goals and objectives. A plan for the selection, organization, and actualization of the human resources. A plan for the selection, organization, and implementation of the process by which the goals and objectives will be achieved. A plan for the selection and organization of the appropriate content. A plan for evaluation of all the components of the curriculum in terms of the values base for effective and wise. A plan for the development and renewal of all aSpects of the curriculum, especially the human 6See Section A. of this chapter for definitions and clarification of the terms effective and wise. 480 resources on which the entire curriculum is founded. The general framework provided by this conceptualization of curriculum and curriculum theory lends itself to application in a variety of ways and under a variety of different views of man, society, learning, and education. It does, however, make the human resources central and basic, and would be most appropriate for a democratic process of education. It is a dynamic view of curriculum. The organismic-structural-developmental conceptual framework is not only a useful, valid, and powerful way to look at values/moral education, but is equally applicable and viable for the entire process of education. In fact, values/moral education cannot be meaningful or effective if planned or executed by itself. It must be an integral part of the entire curriculum and Operation of the school, and the school itself must be viewed in all that it does as a values/moral agent. As a matter of practical concern it is essential that every teacher know something about the human organism, how it functions, how it thinks, how it grows and develops. Everyone has a View of man. It may be incomplete, inaccurate, contradictory, or any number of other things, but it is there in the teacher's mind and it Operates in the transactions with the children. Very few teachers have systematic and explicit views of man; most have unsystematic and implicit views that have not been thought out, validated, or integrated. 481 Many teachers have unconsciously or blindly accepted the assumptions about both man and society held by the behaviorists and the psychoanalysists, on top of which they have grafted the rhetoric of humanistic psychologists. But the core concepts that really identify the foundations of the positions have been overlooked, ignored, or simply not understood. Some of the basic points of disagreement among these views of man are completely irreconcilable. How can you possibly believe at one and the same time that man is born a tabula rasa on which the external world (the society and culture) writes and to which transmits all knowledge, values, and structure; and that man is not born a tabula rasa, but is born with certain fundamental action schemas which in transaction with the external environment are constructed by the organism into knowledge, values, and structure? Blind acceptance of inherently conflicting ideas is easy if you have not been encouraged to look at the underlying assumptions that went into the creation of the curriculum, organization, method, or materials that you are using. But for values/moral education it is vital to consider which way you view this particular issue, and dozens more about the nature of man. Your views and assumptions affect how you teach, what you teach, and when you teach. As a case in point, teachers talk about controlling, shaping, and contingencies of reinforcement without realizing what Skinner and the other behaviorists mean by them. They do not realize that the underlying assumptions of this view are contrary to much of what they believe, and that Skinner rejects and ridicules all the assumptions of what he calls "autonomous man", but especially freedom, dignity, responsibility, and most of the 482 humanistic ideas the same teachers profess so strongly to believe. Reflection on these issues is necessary prior to adopting the methods and the underlying philosophy. One major purpose for having educators wrestle with these problems and questions is to enable them to use the curriculum theory they create as the basis for decision-making. The eight components of curriculum other than the curriculum theory itself Should be based on the theory. The theory should be the guiding light in the decision- making process. Of course, the theory should also be included in the ongoing and continuous process of renewal. Earlier it was said that the concept of curriculum presented here is a dynamic one. This is meant to differentiate it from the more traditional views of curriculum as prescriptions for what students should learn and what and how teachers Should teach. The curriculum approach proposed here is meant to be a dynamic program for planned intervention to maximize human, social, and world development. Man is conceived as organismic, holistic, inherently active and motivated, capable of enormous flexibility, and having an enormous capacity to adept and change. Investigators have discovered that the arc of human potentialities is not infinite; it is limited. But even within the available range of potential there are enormous degrees of freedom. Related to the issue of potentiality, one of Piaget's beliefs is of special interest to educators. He (1972, pp. 13-15) believes that except for some highly specialized kinds of aptitudes, such as for music, that generally speaking most human beings do not truly possess special aptitudes for mathematics, science, and other 483 curricular orientations. He claims that the extensive research of the Geneva school lends no support for the claim to the special aptitudes so strongly upheld by the psychometricians. He maintains that what eventually appears as aptitudinal orientation is a product of the curriculum and the school. The learners tend to react to the lessons and the process, but do not truly lose or gain aptitudes. If the schools were operated prOperly, he claims, most children would be able to master most skills. Turning briefly to the purpose of education, Dewey sees education as one of the chief instruments for the continuous reconstruct- ion of society. If a curriculum built on a developmental model were successful, and increasing numbers of people were able to reach formal Operational intelligence and principled moral development, then society could gradually be reconstructed in Level III terms. But this is contrary to one of the most predominant ideas about the purpose of education, namely that education is to transmit, sustain, and support the existing culture and tradition. Essentially this is a static view of culture, education, and life, and potentially destructive to a dynamic reconstructive view of life and education. In a dynamic reconstructive view of life and education that is consistent with the organismic-structural-developmental framework, the purpose of education may be more appropriately viewed as the way to: l. Maximize individual human development, 2. Build and sustain a democratic society based on principled morality, 3. Extend these principles to contribute to the 484 building of an integrated, unified world at peace, in universal harmony and prosperity, in which all human beings would have an equal opportunity to fully deve10p. None of these is possible if the school is seen as the instrument of tradition and transmitter of existing values. Naturally the continuity of human life must be maintained, and the rich heritage of tradition and human struggle must be communicated to children and youth. But not for the purpose of indoctrination into the ways of the past, but as part of the great body of wisdom and knowledge available to help guide decisions about important issues. This issue of the purpose of education is probably one of the toughest and most explosive issues for educators in the field to face. Not only do they have their own phiIOSOphy to work out, they must cope with the varied, and often diametrically Opposed views of parents, community leaders, board members, their own faculty members, and the students. Central to this issue is one of the thorniest problems of all: the rights, roles, and responsibilities of the students versus the rights, roles, and responsibilities of the parents. On this issue converge all the philosophical, moral, legal, and justice factors one can imagine. The competing claims are extremely difficult to resolve, especially in view of the enormous discrepancies in the deve10pmental levels and stages of all concerned. The problem is eSpecially acute when the student is developmentally more advanced than his parents, or even the teachers or principal to whom he is supposed to look for leadership and guidance. This is not 485 a rare problem in the junior and senior high school years when many young peOple are already at Stage 4. The complex problem of the competing claims of three principle elements of the purpose of education issue are: school, parents, and students. This set of issues is central to values/moral education and critical to the idea of the school as a just moral community. It is also a fundamental problem for the construction of a democracy. Unfortunately, it is such a sensitive and potentially explosive issue that it is rarely faced head-on. Key questions in this issue include: I. What is the relationship between parent and child? Is the child the "property" of the parent, over which the parent has proprietary rights? 2. Do the parents have the right to own and control the school? 3. Is the purpose of the school to execute the educational goals, plans, and desires of the parents? These three questions must be explored by all three of the parties involved if some of the present confusion is to be reduced or resolved. This statement is not meant in a general sense, but in a particular sense, meaning that in each community and school this kind of discussion must take place. That is part of what is meant by developmental education for democracy and principled morality. A guide to the discussion, and a guide to the types of problems that will have to be faced, as well as an indication of the hurdles to overcome, are the Piaget and Kohlberg theories and stages. Obviously, if a Level III principal is discussion these issues with Level I 486 parents there are going to be some real problems, and it is going to be difficult, if not impossible for the parents to understand their relationship with their child in any other than proprietary, instru- mental, and autocratic terms. And it is going to challenge the principled morality of this particular principal, who is concerned equally with the welfare of both child and parents, to deal with this problem. Small group discussions among educators, parents, and students may be a way to approach this problem. An entire school- community-student program could be designed and implemented to approach this issue, and even the attempt to carry out such a program would in itself begin to build democratic community. Dewey (1928; also in Ratner, 1939, p. 605) offers some insight on some of these issues in the following statement: The art of education is one in which every person is compelled whether he will or not to take an interest, because it so intimately concerns his own conduct. A person may begin with a narrow interest, one that cares only about, say, the education of his own children or of members of his own profession. But he does not go far before he is forced to note that he is building on a sandy foundation because of deficiencies due to earlier education. Professional education has its results limited and twisted because of the general state of education. Surveying that, it appears that its improvements cannot be made secure merely by better training of teachers. Parent, school officials, taxpayers have the last word, and the character of that word is depend- ent upon their education. They man and do block or deflect the best laid plans. That is the circle in which education moves. Those who received education are those who give it; habits already engendered deeply influence its course. It is as if'no one could be educated in the full sense until everyone is developed 487 beyond the reach of'prejudice, stupidity, and apathy. There is no possibility of complete escape from this circle. Education returns upon itself in such a multitude of ways as to render out of the question any short cut solution. It is a matter of accelerating momentum in the right direction, and of increasing the effective energy of the factors that make for removing Obstacles. (Italics added) The problem raises more questions than can possibly be explored in this brief treatment, but if nothing more than the magnitide and severity of the problem is brought out, along with the urgent need for teacher education programs, educators in the fields, and other interested parties to make serious attempts to develop Strategies to cope with it, then the purpose here is accomplished. The italicized portion of the above quotation emphasizes the fact that education cannot devote itself to the implementation of only the parents needs, wishes, and desires-~regardless of the fact that they are paying the taxes that support the school. This statement cannot be emphasized too strongly. If we are to build a more solid foundation on the ”sandy foundation" Dewey mentions, we must go beyond the limitations, prejudices, and undemocratic views that characterize all or most of us as parents, teachers, or students. There may be "no possibility of complete escape from this circle," as Dewey himself points out above, but part of the escape is directly determined by whatever attempts are made to build democracy. For as Dewey himself points out about democracy and how it survives (1908; also in Ratner, 1939, p. 721): 488 ...unless democratic habits of thought and action are part of the fiber of a people, political democracy is insecure. It can not stand in isolation. It must be buttressed by the presence of’democratic methods in all social relationships. The relations that exist in educational institu- tions are second only in importance in this respect to those which exist in industry and business, perhaps not even to them. (Italics added) Again, the italicicized portion highlights the point made so frequently here that democracy cannot be something merely talked about in classes, practiced among the faculty, or in any isolated sector--it must be the warp and woof, the life of the school--to weave the fabric is to build the just moral community. Part of the democratic and moral life of the school must include a great deal of active protection for the child from the immoralities and undemocratic practices of both the school and the parents. This means the school must walk a tightrope to survive, and it means the faculty of the school must have some courage, a lot of insight regarding their own behaviors, and a genuine interest in the child as a human being. One of the most demanding responsibili- ties on this score, especially by parents and also by educators, is to remember the child's unique right to his own existence, his own meaning, and his own purpose. It would be difficult to defend a legal, social, or moral justification for viewing children as the property of parents or the instruments of educators. It is simply a fact of life, painful for most peOple to face, but true, that children are truly used quite frequently by adults—-used in the Stage 2 terms of instrumental relativism and naive hedonism. One of the great tragedies 489 of life is the fact that parents frequently see their offspring as extensions of their own egos, instruments to the fu1fillment of their own unrequited dreams, and the means of propagating their own names, images, and values. At the moment of birth a child becomes a separate fact of life, an individual in his or her own right, a full member of the human race—-not to be owned, used, or dominated by any other person or persons. The great and magnificent challenge of parenthood is to help the inherently dependent and helpless infant to grow and deve10p as rapidly as possible, within the framework of healthy deve10pmental sequence and time, into a fu11, richly endowed, independent human being in its own right as quickly, as effectively, and as widely as possible. Children should not owe parents a debt for bringing them into the world or caring for them. The child should and hopefully will become a moral human being who will be grateful for all that he or she was given, but Should not have to bear the burden of unnecessary obligation that can cripple the normal development of the individual to be an independent person. The resolution of this problem comes about by virtue of the fact that each generation gives to the next what it received. The moral obligation of the individual is not to pay a debt to his parents, but to truly give of himself the totality of his meaning to his own children. A most eloquent and powerful statement of this phiIOSOphy comes from the diary of Gluckel von Hameln (1644-1724). Writing her memoirs for her children (in Ulich, 1954, p. 664) she expressed the message stated above by means of the following allegorical story: 490 A bird once set out to cross a windy sea with its three fledglings. The sea was so wide and the wind so strong, the father bird was forced to carry his young, one by one, in his strong claws. When he was half-way across with the first fledgling the wind turned to a gale, and he said, "My child, look how I am struggling and risking my life in your behalf. When you are grown up, will you do as much for me and provide for my old age?" The fledgling replied, "Only bring me to safety, and when you are old I Shall do everything you ask of me." Whereas the father bird dropped his child into the sea, and it drowned, and he said, "So shall it be done to such a liar as you." Then the father bird returned to Shore, set forth with his second fledgling, asked the same question, and receiving the same answer, drowned the second child with the cry, "You, too, are a liar!" Finally he set out with the third fledgling, and when he asked the same question, the third and last fledgling replied, ”My dear father, it is true you are struggling mightily and risking your life in my behalf, and I shall be wrong not to repay you when you are old, but I cannot bind myself. This though I can promise: when I am grown up and have children of my own, I shall do as much for them as you have done for me." Whereupon the father bird said, "Well spoken, my child, and wisely; your life I will spare and I will carry you to shore in safety." This does not mean that parents should have nothing to say about the schools, or that they should not be involved in the curriculum. On the contrary, they should be deeply involved in a way that will become more clear through the concept of the just moral community. What is meant is that parents do not have the right to ask the school to teach the students to adopt the prejudices, inadequacies, and distortions of the parents. If the philosophy of parental control and operation of the school were completely operationalized we could forget about eliminating racism, Sexism, and numerous other injustices in our life. 491 The O—S-D approach helps to provide a way out of this problem by emphasizing deve10pment rather than specific content. Rather than teach children what to believe, the school could better help children learn how to more adequately construct one's beliefs with regard to both knowledge and wisdom. The purpose of the school should be to help the students become both effective and wise. Beyond this problem of the parents are the problems of deciding to what extent the function of the school is to prepare children for working in society. And if the schools do have a respon- sibility to prepare students for their place in society, for which place do they prepare students? Existing roles, future roles, or what? Should the local community have the right to demand that the school concentrate on preparing the students to eventually work in the industry that is the lifeblood of and dominates the town and its politics and economics? Should the school transmit the values of the existing culture and society? Or should the schools serve as change agents and help learners to build a different world? These are thorny problems, but they must be faced by educators. The importance of job preparation and skill deve10pment must be a major part of the curriculum. Certainly no one can be a full member of a society or community unless he or she is able to earn a living, make a contribution to the welfare of the community, and experience the fulfillment and satisfaction that derives from creative, productive work. The problem is not a matter of choice, the problem is only a matter of emphasis. As Murphy (1958, p. 216) says: 492 An educational system which prepares people simply for the ways of living which are regarded as traditionally desirable is not an education permitting intelligent choices. And an educa- tional system preparing only for the fulfill- ment of a technical role is even less likely to permit humanity that view of the possibilities from which intelligent decisions can be derived. Murphy brings together two major themes stressed in this chapter: (1) preparation for traditional living is neither desirable nor conducive to effective and wise choices so essential for democratic community, and (2) preparation for work is insufficient for the fulfillment of both the individual and the culture. All the components of a developmental curriculum can be brought together by realizing that developmental education means education for the deve10pment of the total personality. A person as a total human being is many things, among which are: person qua person, friend, lover, mate, worker, parent, child, citizen, learner, teacher, and many more. To exclude preparation for any of these important roles is to create a hiatus in the curriculum and a lacuna in the person. The importance of this type of education is stressed by Dewey (1948, p. 209): Personality must be educated, and personality cannot be educated by confining its operations to technical and specialized things, or to the less important relationships of life. Full education comes only when there is a responsible share on the part of each person, in proportion to capacity, in shaping the aims and policies of the social groups to which he belongs. This fact fixes the significance of democracy. Synthesizing all the ideas presented in the many sections of this dissertation with regard to the meaning of education as 493 deve10pment for democracy, principled morality, and holistic experience is accomplished by the following statement by Piaget (1970b, pp. 159-160) who clearly enunciates the essence of deve10p- mental curriculum: ...traditional education theory has always treated the child, in effect, as a small adult, as a being who reasons and feels just as we do while merely lacking our knowledge and experience. So that, since the child viewed in this way was no more than an ignorant adult, the educator's ” task was not so much to form its mind as simply to furnish it; the subject matter provided from outside was thought to be exercise enough in itself. But the problem becomes quite different as soon as one begins with the hypothesis of structural variations. If the child's thought is qualitatively different from our own, then the principal aim of education is to form its intellectual and moral reasoning power. And since that power cannot be formed from outside, the question is to find the most suitable methods and environment to help the child constitute it itself, in other words, to achieve coherence and objectivity on the intellectual plane and reciprocity on the moral plane. It is therefore of fundamental importance for the new school to know what the structure of the child's thought is, and what the relations are between infantile and adult mentality. In this summary Piaget brings the organismic-structural- developmental conceptual framework together with curriculum to provide the basis for developmental education for the total personality. All that has been presented thus far can now serve as the basis for one of the most important aspects of the entire values deve10pment theory, namely, the just moral community, to which we now turn in Chapter VII. CHAPTER SEVEN THE SCHOOL AS A JUST MORAL COMMUNITY The time has come to transform the theory and philosophy of organismic-structuraZ-deveZopmental into the reality of values develop- ment education. Earlier we said we were not scientists, but engineers-- engineers trying to build bridges. Now a bridge is a very special kind of structure. In one sense it is a road, and as such it makes it possible for you to go from one place to another. But a bridge is more than just a road, it is a road over something that otherwise is un- reachable. One other quality of a bridge is important, it is possible not only to go over, but over and back-~it is a two-way road over some kind of a chasm, or obstacle, or body of water. A bridge is a very special kind of instrumentality--it is the instrument to transaction. Theory1 is a bridge. It is a bridge from what is believed to the reality of what is. The organismic- structural-deve10pmental theory2 is trying to make possible a way to get from the immense, complex, and multidisciplinary data about values/ moral knowledge to the operational settings of education in order to 1"Theory” here will be used to mean theoretical and philosophical aspects of the conceptual framework. 2Reference here to the O-S-D theory is not intended to negate the title of the dissertation which emphasizes "toward a theory" nor to convey the idea that the theory is yet created. It is merely a con- venience to simplify the writing. 494 495 transform that knowledge into practical wisdom for educators (know- ledge and wisdom are used here in the Specialized sense described in Section A. of Chapter VI). And that is only possible if the trans- action is completed by the educators responding so that the theory may constantly be renewed in order to make it progressively valuable in the field. Our theory tells us that there is a very special kind of wisdom that can be built in the educational world-—a kind of wisdom that makes possible the reconstruction of the school and its poteng tial to participate in the reconstruction of society. No single con- cept from the organismic-structural~developmental theory more embodies, represents, and creates that potential wisdom than the concept of the just moral community. For it is in the conceptualization of the school as a just moral community that the potential exists for transforming the school into a powerful community that can augment, enrich, and reconstruct the democratic world in which most of us want to live. None of what has been said is any way whatsoever intended to be mere rhetoric, idle dreaming, or visionary speculation. The world is a continuous imperfection. There are three basic ways to approach that reality: (1) with pessimism and despair; (2) with optimism and blind hope; or (3) with Dewey's meliroism and recognition of the potential for constructive, positive, and realistic change that can be brought about by enough people searching for the knowledge to create the wisdom that can be actively applied to the problems of the real world. Within the context, purpose, and goals of this dissertation and the organismic- 496 structural-developmental theory the notion of a just moral community is a melioristic goal for which a number of peeple intend to strive-- knowing that such a thing may never in full bloom be seen, but for which the community effort to build it is in fact the goal itself. The idea of a just moral community has an abstract and vague aura about it that makes it appear esoteric and gossamer, or unreal. But it is as real as the meanings of the three words themselves. It is nothing more than the application of all the concepts, empirical findings, and principles that have been presented as the guts of the theory. Justice, morality, and community have all been defined, de- scribed, explored, and exemplified. The idea now is to see them come alive in the school. Since it is widely agreed that American schools are institutions that have practiced the injustices, immorality, and nondemocratic practices that have generated the massive litera- ture of protest that has all but inundated us in recent years, then we need to explore the application of the principles of values devel- Opment education theory to see if there are ways in which schools can be instruments of justice, models of principled morality, and the living embodiment of true community. The type of justice that characterizes the just moral commun- ity is the distributive justice of Level III, especially Stage 6. An 3The discussion here will use all the terminology and conceptualiza— tions of the preceding chapters without explanation. The reader's familiarity with those ideas is presumed here. 497 arbitrary distinction is made here between equality as representing the quantitative aspects of justice, and equity as representing the qualitative aspects.4 Generally speaking the lower forms of justice characteristic of the earlier stages are more inclined towards emphasis on equality with little emphasis on equity. As structural develop- ment pregresses, and justice becomes more equilibrated, the ratio lends to shift in the opposite direction. Stage 4 is generally charac- terized by a relatively more rigid application of law calling for equality, "balance the scales," and similar notions. But individual circumstances are considered, the quality of a man's reputation and record are noted, and other factors enter into judgments. So even with the law and order orientation of Stage 4 there is some element of equity, and it is more equilibrated than similar notions at lower stages, but considerably less equilibrated than the same concept at Level III. Thus retributive justice is primarily characterized by an emphasis on equality, with some consideration for equity. Level III principled morality is especially characterized by distributive justice that represents not only a more equilibrated type of justice, and not only a greater emphasis on equity than equal- ity, but significantly enriches the principle by a finer and.more equilibrated sense of discrimination, which makes possible a more just distribution of the elements of justice. The discrimination refers 4There are few subjects in all of philosophy that are more complex and controversial than justice. The oversimplifieation here hOpefully will not seriously distort the issue or misrepresent the meaning of justice. But a certain degree of arbitrariness is necessary in order to communi- cate the basic points without drowning in a sea of complexity and quali— fications. 498 to the greater ability to evaluate qualitatively the entire situa- tion under consideration with the capacity to differentiate more subtle issues and finer distinctions. At Level I most decisions are made quickly in terms of black and white. At Level 11 black and white still predominate, but a few shades of gray are introduced, and decisions are characterized by more reflection. At Level III justice becomes more than a mere continuum with extensive variations in shades of gray. Rather it becomes a multicolored and three-dimensional con- ceptualization with complex interrelationships and coordinated dis- criminations. Distributive justice, in this discussion, represents the evaluation of competing claims and the distribution of justice with consideration for both the qualitative and quantitative aspects, with the tendency for more emphasis on quality than quantity. Con- sequently, distributive justice is a flexible, harmonious, and inte- grated equilibration of both equality and equity. In all cases the emphasis would be on the attempt to render justice with maximum consideration for the value of human life as the primary value with- out qualification or justification, and with due regard for the consi- deration of personality. Dewey (1960, p. 107) says: The meaning of justice in concrete cases is some- thing to be determined by seeing what consequences will bring about human welfare in a fair and even way. and (p. 114): But equity, or impartiality, of interest is a matter of quality not of quantity... 499 And Piaget (1932, p. 285) says: Finally, ...mere equalitarianism makes way for a more subtle conception of justice which we may call "equity,” and which consists in never defining equality without taking account of the way in which each individual is situated. The just moral community, in its full state of deve10pment, would be characterized by principled morality based on distributive justice, emphasizing equity. The moral component of the concept of the just moral commun- ity needs no further elaboration. It has been fully developed in Chapters IV and V. As stated in the paragraph immediately preceding, the just moral community is characterized by principled morality. The community aspect of just moral community has been fully developed in Chapter V, to which one more major contribution will be made. The conceptualizations given in terms of Sargent's and White and Lippitt's notions of democracy; Dewey's vision of democracy and community as isomorphic; and Angyal's and related ideas about homonomy comprise a rich, full-bodied, and multidimensional picture of the meaning of community. The final component to be added in order to clarify the definition of community comes from Newmann and Oliver (in Purpel and Belanger, 1972, Ch. 8, pp. 207-208). They define community as follows: A community is a group (1) in which membership is valued as an end in itself, not merely as a means to other ends; (2) that concerns itself with many and significant aspects of the lives of members; (3) that allows competing factions; (4) whose members share responsibility for the actions of the group; 500 (6) whose members have enduring and extensive personal contact with each other. This working definition omits residence, political units, occupations, etc. as necessarily valid boundaries by which to distinguish one community from another. This definition is highly congruent with much of the earlier presenta— tions of the same subject. Plan for Initiating a Just Moral Community The above definition, in combination with the other elements, provides an excellent foundation for building goals, objectives, and criteria for the just moral community, and a framework in which to plan concretely the application of justice and moral principles in a school. At this point a prOposed integration of the various elements of a complete program for building the foundation and Operational principles of the school as a just moral community can be made. The following elements are recommended as the basis for such a program: 1. The primary units of the basic organismic—structural- developmental theory, especially: a. Piaget's stages of intellectual deve10pment b. Kohlberg's stages of moral development c. The four factors of development 2. The six criteria for principled morality: a. Formal Operational intelligence b. Perspectivism c. Habitual reflective tendencies 6. 501 d. Sensitivity e. Responsibility f. Homonomy The curriculum theory presented at the beginning of Section B of this chapter. The integrated criteria and characteristics of democratic community, including those presented from: a. Sargent, Section A of Chapter V. b. White and Lippitt, Section A of Chapter V. c. Newmann and Oliver, Section C of Chapter VI. A plan for initiating, maximizing, and sustaining the participation and involvement of at least the following peOple or groups: a. The students b. The entire staff of the school (professional, para— professional, ancillary, office, custodial, etc.) c. The central administration of the school district d. Parents or guardians e. Relevant community members f. Other appropriate people and/or groups. A plan for designing a decision-making process. It is believed that this preliminary and tentative outline of elements could serve as the starting point for an initial meeting at which the feasibility of the concept, exploration of the possibility and method of implementation, and a decision could be reached about whether or not to proceed with continued exploration of the concept of the school as a just moral community. 502 Three considerations must be taken into account in considering the above plan. First, participation in the program would not be based on prior knowledge, experience, or education. One would not have to be or have anything more than what he or she is as a person at the moment in time that the program begins. Part of the object of building a just moral community is the convening of people of all levels of education, interest, religious, political, and other orienta- tions. Individual contribution would depend on the person's competence, knowledge of issues, and willingness to speak, learn, and share what- ever the issue or situation needed, and not on status, rank, or strength. Second, initial discussions would have to include the subject of power, conflict, and the typical "games people play" in order to manipulate, coerce, and control. The spirit with which the program starts is very important, and generally people will attempt to go with the spirit of the thing at the beginning if the tone set from the outset is made clear, is delicately handled, and enthusiastically presented. Third, and of primary importance, is the recognition that the success of the program would not only be whatever degree of progress is made toward the actual building of the ideal or conceptualized just moral community--in fact, it would be primarily the actual bring- ing together of the peOple in the task, their participation, and their personal and interpersonal contributions that would be the essence of the program. The active education of Piaget and the experiential edu- cation of Dewey would literally come alive in the process--and is is in this process that people would grow and develop, if the organismic- structural-developmental theory has any validity. Reaching some mythi- cal end goal of a pure just moral community is irrelevant--striving, building, trying, and working at it would create the educational atmos- phere conducive to development. The just moral community is the working tOgether--not the product of an object, or a thing, or an end. The just moral community would be created through the communion of shared intelligence, shared effort, and shared love-~in short, through the communion of homonomy. Characteristics of the Just Meral Community in the School Dewey has provided a very concise description of the school that clearly defines the just moral community. Discussing moral prin- ciples in education he summarizes as follows (1959b, pp. 43-44): I sum up, then, this part of the discussion by asking your attention to the moral trinity of the school. The demand is for social intelligence, social power, and social interests. Our resources are (l) the life of the school as a social institution in itself; (2) methods of learning and of doing work; and (3) the school studies or curricu- lum. In so far as the school represents, in its own spirit, a genuine community life; in so far as what are called school discipline, government, order, etc., are the expres- sions of this inherent social spirit; in so far as the methods used are those that appeal to the active and construc- tive powers, permitting the child to give out and thus to serve; in so far as the curriculum is so selected and organized as to provide the material for affording the child a consciousness of the world in which he has to play a part, and the demands he has to meet; so far as these ends are met, the school is organized on an ethical basis. So far as general principles are concerned, all the basic ethical requirements are met. The rest remains between the individual teacher and the individual child. The above statement synthesizes practically all of the components that have been included in this dissertation as the foundation for the 504 organismic-structural—developmenta1 approach to education in general, and to values deve10pment education in particular. The school is a community by virtue of the amount of time the inhabitants spend in it, the nature of the activities that go on there, and the extent of the influence on all involved. The school's influence is enormous, pervasive, and enduring in terms of its moral, social, political, and economic values. The school has an opportunity to be and a moral obligation to be a constructive force in the lives of all who live in it. The impact of the school must be measured in terms of what kind of community it represents, and that the major factor in that experience is the kinds of relationships and organization that exist among the staff and how these aspects of the community are communicated to, shared with, and built with the students. What has always been a major part of the unplanned curri- culum should be made into the major part of the planned curriculum. At present the planned and unplanned curricula work against each other, with the planned curriculum largely negated by the more powerful organic message of the hidden curriculum But in the just moral com- munity approach the curriculum would be integrated, and the content and process would be part of the mainstream of the school. For example, in the attempt to work out the problems of living together, growing together, and building community all the real life conflicts and problems would become natural subjects for study, research, investigation, debate, discussion, etc. Students and faculty together would work on these problems in such a way as to draw on the expertise and competence of the staff while encouraging 505 the development of these skills and competencies by the students at their level of development. Of primary importance for the students is how the staff functions in its deliberations and how it works out its problems of living and working as a team. It is rather senseless to talk to the students about democracy, tolerance, equality, and similar concepts if the members of the staff cannot demonstrate them in action. By showing respect to each other and to the students they could help the students gradually learn the true meaning of respect. By going beyond tolerance to celebration of the differences among the members of the staff they could build a solid foundation for communicating the meaning of pluralism in a democratic society. In the just moral community the present priorities would be reversed. The primary resources would be people, and the secondary resources would be the material and conceptual tools. Each teacher and each student would be viewed as his/her own best resource. With a book the content is the message and the book is the medium. But for a teacher the person is both the medium and the message. In fact it is more likely that the teacher is more message than medium. A teacher cannot merely talk about justice, a teacher must be just, and must help the students grow into higher forms of justice. A teacher cannot merely talk about democracy, a teacher must be demo- cratic, and help the students become democratic. A teacher cannot talk about due process, a teacher must use due process, and help the students grow into the idea. 506 The essence of democracy is not voting, representation, major- ity, etc. These are merely the means by which democracy operates, and not its ends. Democracy is intelligent moral action practiced in a community that strives to maximize human development, insure and diffuse freedom, and create a positive peace built on the presence of goodwill rather than on the absence of fighting. Democracy is not acting depen- dently or independently; it is acting interdependently. A member of a democratic community is a full human being, intelligent and sensitive, acting interdependently with other similar human beings in order to simultaneously and transactionally develop both the capacity of the individual and the community as a whole. This last point is especially significant in terms of the capacity of the just moral community to contribute the development of personality. Piaget talks about personality as "reciprocal rapport," or the reconciliation of the autonomy of the individual and the auto- nomy of society. Harvey, Hunt, and Schroder talk about positive maxi- mum interdependence. Glad talks about "interpersonality." Cattell talks about "syntality" and ”synergy,” in contrast to "personality" and "energy." It is generally recognized among all organismic psy- chologists that the individual's existence, meaning, and personality is created and defined in terms of other individuals for whom the same is true. And, if deve10pment proceeds far enough, all these forces converge and expand simulataneously into Angyal's ”homonomy." This is what the just moral community is all about. 507 Consequently, through community the full meaning of experi- ence, democracy, and development converge to promote man and society. Discussing the formation of ethical values through mutual respect Piaget points out that mutual respect is the source of obligations. But these obligations not only impose the rules they create but the method that creates them. And he says "this method is none other than reciprocity, understood not only as an exact balancing of good and bad but as the mutual coordination of'points of’view and actions." This beautiful idea is the basis for the just moral community, built on the striving for consensus, equity, and distri- butive justice. Thus through the just moral community the linkages for curriculum deve10pment, staff development, values development, and learner development are an integral part of the content and the process of the school itself. The building of the linkages in the real-life activity of the community fosters both the community and its members. You build curriculum primarily by developing the human resources in the community. The development of these human resources enhances the values development of the community members, which in turn creates the need for curriculum renewal and continued development to a higher level. In this respect the components of curriculum, presented earlier, take on added meaning. For the staff and students would be involved in the construction and implementation of the curriculum as part of the ongoing activity of the just moral community. The nature, degree, and amount of involvement would, of course, be dependent upon the deve10p- mental level of the individual. An eighth grade student would not, 508 of course, be involved to the extent of or at the level of his teacher. But he/she would be involved, and the linkages would be operative. Curriculum building and development become important parts of the life of the school rather than tasks to be done with, or to be done by experts, or to have done to you. In this type of curriculum the intellectual development and the values/moral development are coordinated. The educational activi- ties would consist of a multitude of active investigations, experi- ments, team projects, and any kind of activity called for by the needs of the individuals and the community. Knowledge, skills, and ethical development would occur naturally in meaningful context. Or as Piaget puts it: "...the school as a center of real (and experi— mental) activities carried out in common so that logical intelligence may be elaborated through action and social exchanges." The role of the teacher in this type of education becomes quite different from the traditional role of authority, teller, officer. Carl Rogers speaks of the role of the teacher as "facilitator." Piaget speaks of the role as "organizer-mentor." Both of these are fine, but to think of the teacher as a developer may be even more to the point. Developmental education is the process of aiding, encouraging, and stimulating the natural developmental potential of the human being in all aSpects of life. This means providing the human and material resources in sufficient quantity, of appropriate quality, and in proper configuration so as to maximize personal, social, and cultural develop- ment to the highest levels and stages possible. 509 In a democratic society the school should be the epitome of all we mean by freedom, justice, and democracy. That is what we mean by the school as a just moral community. The Teacher in a Just Moral Community The role of the teacher in the just moral community is central and critical. Consequently, the education and the development of the teacher become two of the most important aspects of teacher selec- tion and teacher preparation, both preservice and inservice. Pro- fessional members of the faculty must be informed and competent about the latest theories, philosophies, and empirical findings of deve10p- mental psychOIOgy, socialization research, and values/moral develop- ment. The dual nature of the teacher as both medium and message, mentioned earlier, becomes significantly highlighted in the role of a values/moral agent, and especially in a school that sees values/ moral deve10pment as one of the primary roles of the school. A point that must be emphasized is that it is not a matter of modeling, not a matter of merely being a good example, that is the issue here--what must be understood clearly is that the significance of the teacher for values/moral development is in the actual transactional involvement of the just moral community. The teacher is not a model or an example-- she or he is only part of the transaction that exemplifies and models values and morality. The idea of example or model, or hero symbol, and other like terms are related to the nomothetic and character approaches of values/moral education where it is hOped that the 510 students will acquire by transmission the qualities of the model or the hero. It is a matter of identification. This is not how students learn values and morality; this is more likely how they dis- cover the difference between what people say and what they do that sets up the basis for the generation gap, the respect gap, and the hypocrisy syndrome. In the O-S-D approach in the just moral community the teacher and the student live and are values and morality in their transactions, in which they explore the realities of everyday life, the real moral problems they both face, the seeking of resolution and solution to actual problems in the full spirit of inquiry. To miss this point is to miss the concept of the just moral community. To clarify the point consider a rather typical behavior in schools. An impressionable normal teenager idolizes a teacher and supposedly "models" the teacher's behavior. Kelman (1961) calls this "identification" and points out the major problems involved. First, the adopted behavior tends to be used superficially only so long as the model remains a positive figure for the learner, and generally mostly in the presence of the model. When the model is not present the be- havior is not as likely to be demonstrated. Second, when the model becomes a negative figure for the student, as frequently happens in schools where a student simply "loves" a teacher one day, receives a rebuff, a low grade, or some kind of rejection the following week, and then "hates" the teacher, the superficially adopted behavior tends to be dropped. 511 The concept of the teacher as a transactional values/moral agent involves imitation, which is widely recognized as normal behavior for children and youth, but the imitation would be merely part of a more complex relationship that involves a deeper factor, namely, the factor of working together, jointly exploring the problem, and giving the child a chance to assimilate and accommodate, and thus achieve an equilibrated behavioral pattern that goes beyond and deeper than modeling. Some psych010gists would call this internalization, a term avoided in this dissertation because of its multitude of meanings in the literature. Also, from the O—S-D theoretical framework the behavior is more appropriately thought of as having been learned in the developmental sense. The significance for the teacher is that he or she has participated in the same process and has had a chance for the same development to have taken place. The teacher cannot get by with merely modeling a behavior in the presence of the student and then behaviorally expressing an Opposite response in the absence of the student. A teacher, for example, could model honesty, Openness, and consideration for the students in the classroom, and then proceed to the teachers' lounge and engage in contradictory behavior-~a phenomenon not unfamiliar to any teacher. Thus modeling is conceived as a superficial, role-playing device; whereas transactional involvement is a developmental role taking opportunity for both teacher and learner. A very important implication of values development education theory is that education and development of the faculty becomes more 512 important, relatively, than the education and development Of the students. The meaning of this paradoxical statement is that the deve10pmental capacity of the school's contribution to the students' development is greatly determined by and limited by the deve10pmental level of the faculty. The need for continuous growth and development of the faculty is critical. And in a just moral community approach this would be even more important, but also more feasible. More important because the students should be able to develop beyond what the present type of school usually generates; and more feasible because the opportunity for faculty development is inherently more available through the dynamic values/moral atmosphere of the just moral community. The implications for teacher education (preservice) should be obvious, but they will not be explored here inasmuch as that is a subject so great that it deserves exhaustive and deep exploration and investigation. For the sake of completeness, however, it is merely recognized and acknowledged here. Another major implication somewhat related to what has been said above, is that teachers will need to do all in their power to learn how to become more aware of themselves and their consistencies and inconsistencies. They will need to become more aware of them- selves as their own single best resource for teaching. Their role as values/moral agent requires that they become more alert, for example, to (l) the use of immoral means to achieve moral ends, and (2) the use of moral means to achieve immoral ends. Both kinds of experience are rather common in present-day schools. An example of 513 (1) above is the use Of collective punishment to resolve behavioral problems in the classroom or school. To unjustly punish a large number of people in order to justly punish one anonymous law-breaker is both immoral and unjust, and can be counterproductive for the teaching of justice. An example of (2) above is to use the enthusiasm, spirit, and community commitment of sensitive teenagers to foster prejudice, divisiveness, and even hatred in the name of school pride and achievement. Much of what goes on in the world of athletics, for example, goes far beyond the bounds of normal ordinary fun and school spirit. The animosities, vicious behavior, and even violent behavior that has frequently occurred at athletic events is a mani- festation of this issue. Teenagers are inherently vibrant, dynamic, and enthusiastic for the most part, especially when it comes to those aspects of school life that are relevant and meaningful for them. This is a manifestation of the potential for moral commitment. To misuse this positive factor to generate antidemocratic and immoral behavior is tragic and antithetical to everything the school represents in a democratic society. Even more serious manifestations of these principles may occur in the administration Of the school. When convenient and suitable for the faculty Often many of the rules and laws Of the school are ignored, broken, or changed. The same laws and rules are usually rigidly adhered to and strictly applied in the dealings with students-~and generally in the name of law, order, and justice. This problem and the underlying principle is well stated by Martin Luther King (1963, p. 8): Let us turn to a more concrete example of just and unjust laws. An unjust law is a code that a majority inflicts on a minority that is not binding on itself. This is difference made legal. On the other hand a just law is a code that a majority compels a minority to follow that it is willing to follow itself. This is sameness made legal. Let me give another explanation. An unjust law is a code inflicted upon a minority which that minority had no part in enacting or creating because they did not have the unhampered with to vote. Who can say that the legislature of Alabama which set up the segregation laws was democratically elected? Throughout the state of Alabama all types of conniving methods are used to prevent Negroes from becoming registered voters and there are some counties without a single Negro registered to vote despite the fact that the Negro constitutes a majority of the population. Can any law set up in such a state be considered democratically structured? In every school with which the writer has been associated this type of behavior has been observed frequently. It is one Of the most serious problems with which the faculty of any school must grapple. In a just moral community it would be one of the highest priority items on one of the first agenda. This specific problem is only an example, an important one to be sure, of the many ways in which students are victimized in schools. It would be one of the most significant parts of the manifesto or creed of a just moral community that no methods that demean, derogate, dehumanize, or destroy would be knowingly tolerated or ignored. And teachers would do all in their power to recognize in themselves and their own need for personal development the many obvious and subtle behaviors in all of us that 515 contribute to this problem. On this issue Furbee (1973, p. 158) says: Like our political institutions, education is hopefully moving toward a broader democracy in which each person is free to deve10p his interests and abilities. The movement is apparent in the way teachers relate to groups of students; presumably there are less suppression and control for their own sake. Herein rests the enigma with which teachers are now faced: maintaining order consistent with democratic values. It appears that teachers want their classrooms to reflect the greater democratic political system within which they function, the inconsistency being their use of autocratic methods of control within a democratic society. Repression, isolation, humiliation, corporal punishment, etc., seem inconsistent in a society Of equals. Only in an autocratic system can corporal punishment and other autocratic practices exist wherein one human being demonstrates his superiority over lesser human beings in order to maintain his status. The just moral community would have to conduct an extensive and in-depth exploration of the major issue of management and control in the school and classroom. NO democratic institution can function or survive without control. Control is an inherent part of the justice and ethics of community. The question is not one of control versus no control--it is a question of what kind of control is consistent with and enhancing for democratic living. On face value, however, it would seem that certain practices may well be inherently antithetical and counterproductive to democracy, community, and principled morality: e.g., corporal punishment, collective punishment, psychological abuse, physical abuse, and compulsory "volunteering." The final fact to mention in terms of the role of the 516 teacher in a just moral community is the positive factor of the incredibly great opportunity that involvement in a just moral community offers for the personal and professional growth and develop- ment for the teacher. Also, the excitement, enthusiasm, and commit- ment that come from the building of an homonomous community is truly one of the most fulfilling, rewarding, and transcending experiences that can happen to a human being. The Need for an Ombudsman The idea of a just moral community creates a need for the presence of an objective mediator, impartial judge, and values/moral leader. This role could be filled by the presence of a professional ombudsman on the faculty of the school. The selection Of such a person would have to be one of the most meticulously and sensitively handled personnel matters of the school. The person appointed to this position would have to possess the personality, intelligence, and moral development highly congruent with what has been described in earlier sections of this dissertation. The right person in this carefully defined position could be one of the greatest factors in the success of such a venture. This point will not be further developed at this time, but needs to be fully explored in a thorough development of the concept of the just moral community. It also serves as a bridge to one of the key elements Of a just moral community: responsibility. 517 Responsibility in and for the Just Moral Community One of the most significant and paradoxical aspects of our society is the great emphasis placed on individual responsibility, individual freedom, and self-determination while at the same time we stress group membership and identification, loyalty and conformity to group norms, and the surrender of personal goals for the welfare of the group. On the one hand we idolize the rugged individualist-- Horatio Alger, the empire-builder, the conqueror, the pioneer, the explorer; while on the other hand we idolize the self-sacrificing martyr, the person who renounces his own private ambitions for the welfare of the group, sacrifices his own dreams and perhaps even his life for others, the philanthropist, the humanitarian, the noble idealist whose concern is not for self but for mankind. At one and the same time we profess that the individual is supreme and that there is something greater and more important than the individual. The conflict between autonomy and heteronomy has many more facets than the one just presented. For in a sense, either of the courses mentioned above could be derived from either autonomy er heteronomy. One could, for example chart a life of individualism based on self—chosen concepts about that being the only way to fulfillment, or one could live that way because it is an ideal held up by the group and fostered in every aspect of the socialization process. In the same way, one could arrive at martyrdom, social welfare, or humanitarianism (there is no implication that these are the same) by way of self-determination and reflective choice, or by way of social-cultural conditioning and the socialization process. 518 In short, one could go either way through conscious choice or through slavish conformity to group standards. Either way the individual is involved in the struggle between egoism and altruism, attempting to reconcile them in some kind of personally fulfilling and socially acceptable balance. But Dewey and Angyal both tell us that this is not a satisfactory solution to the problem. Either of these, or some combination of them, constitutes an adjustment of an isolated self, which Dewey and Angyal say is neither efficacious nor possible in view of the inherently social nature of human existence. The Self has no origin, existence, or meaning in isolation. How then could an isolated self even exist, let alone effect a satisfactory solution to the struggle between egoism and altruism? In fact, does not the mere juxtaposition of the terms "isolated" and ”self" constitute an impossibility? Are not these words and concepts mutually exclusive? Dewey says the relation- ships formed in our social environment are more important than adjust- ments of isolated selves. The O-S-D theory not only strongly supports Dewey's claim, but indicates that he may not have stated the case strongly enough. Practically every organismic psychologist has emphasized the transactional nature of personality development-- development of the Self. If human existence, then is rooted in, dependent on, and fulfilled through relationships it becomes self-evident that some kind of moral order must exist in order for these relationships to develop, deepen, to be mutually beneficial, and to survive. This moral order, which could be conceived as love (homonomy) in its many forms, 519 cannot truly exist except in a state Of freedom. For the kind of moral order under question is not an order of coercion, tyranny, or command, but the kind of order that is based on cooperation and reci- procity. Such an order of human relationships can therefore occur freely when there is justice. Justice is the necessary foundation of reciprocity and cooperation. And justice, in turn, demands re- sponsibility. Without a meaningful sense of responsibility on the part of human beings in social intercourse there can be no viable concept of justice. For justice is the dynamic manifestation of individual responsibility in transaction. An individual is not capable of participating in a social system or moral order unless he is capable of distinguishing himself from others, and consequently the needs, interests, and rights of both himself and others, and the interrelationships among these. All of this is not possible unless the individual has developed as an independent Self, which can only happen through healthy growth as the result of the proper kinds Of experience. Thus Dewey's conceptualization of the moral self and the moral life has an internal consistency that is also consistent with the knowledge of human nature and human behavior that comes to us from deve10pmental psychology, social psychology, and theories of cognitive development. And furthermore, it is highly consistent with the rich conceptualization of the moral person provided by Elijah Jordan, which was presented in Chapter V. The rest of this discussion on responsibility rests on the idea of the moral person that merges 520 from the integration Dewey's and.lordan's views. From this standpoint then, the idea of responsibility will be presented. The notion of responsibility is one of the fundamental factors in the articulation and integration of the overlapping, con- joint, and interdependent worlds of the Self and the World. The capacity for responsible behavior, as strongly emphasized earlier in this dissertation, provides the fulcrum for the balance between the interests of the individual and the merging of that interest in those things that go beyond him, transcend him, and enlarge him-- the homonous existence of which Angyal so eloquently speaks. Traditional views of responsibility have been in terms of retributive justice, in terms of expiation, restitution, and balance. They have been, as Dewey points out, retrospective views of responsi- bility that holds peOple accountable for the past. This is the view of Levels I and II that Kohlberg so clearly elaborates. The results of such a view are the separation of ends and means, the pharasaical rigidity and legalism that characterizes much of the justice in the world, and many other types of behavior so prevalent in nomothetic systems of justice and values/moral education. We must grow beyond such views to principled morality and more equilibrated forms of justice based on deep interpretations of equality tempered, augmented, and enriched by the qualitative justice of equity. Dewey's view of responsibility is prospective, holding people accountable for their actions only as a means of growth and development. It is future oriented, puts ends and means in proper perspective and relationship with each other and with life, encourages openness between people, 521 is flexible, and creates the fertile atmosphere for the development Of qualitative forms of reSponsibility. The traditional approach denies the capacity for responsible behavior, assumes man is evil and needs to be regulated and controlled, and sets man and society in Opposition to each other. But Dewey's approach not only recognizes man's capacity to be responsible, but evokes it, encourages it, and nourishes it. And thus the capacity for responsible behavior becomes the fulcrum that puts man and society in balance with each other. It is this balance that provides the Opportunity for man to freely choose to develop a moral order based on responsiblilty. The order is not ordained and predetermined, but is left for man to determine. The balance between man and society can be destroyed or upset. Or it can be constantly in the process of being built or restored. And this process has its own reciprocal transaction in that the energy and action that goes into the building and deve10ping of any unit in this complex process builds and develops the other units. Whatever one man does to contribute to the growth of another contri- butes also to his own growth, and to society as a whole. Thus the growth factor becomes a creative and geometric process. The struggle between egoism and altruism can now be seen in a different light. What an individual does to further his own self—growth in a Dewey and.Iordan system increases his ability to enhance the welfare of both himself and others. What fosters growth in one person generates growth in others and in society. 522 The basic problem of the conflict between egoism and altruism is no longer relevant if we hold people accountable for their actions . in such a way as to make it possible for them to grow and modify their future behavior. The egoism-altruism view sets up an unnecessary and spurious dichotomy requiring that human action be evaluated in terms of this duality. But much of human behavior cannot be so neatly classified. Furthermore, the pejorative connotation Of egoism clouds the issue and leads you to believe that what one does for oneself is necessarily self-centered and selfish. Likewise, the abnegative connotation of altruism belies the nature of acts that are truly performed with unselfish motives but also benefit the deer, or do not involve renunciation at all. From a developmental orientation attempting to establish responsibility for positive modification of behavior it is inappropriate to eva1uate one's behavior in these terms. What we need to do in assessing the quality of our own and others' acts is to reflect on the consequences of these acts for ourselves and others. Did this particular act encourage growth; contribute to the development of ourselves, others, and society; enhance the opportunity for all concerned to express the human potential of the transaction? Or is the effect of this act contrary to these objectives? As mentioned earlier, the customary approach to responsibi- lity encourages peOple to weigh the costs and the rewards of their acts. Each person and each act has a price. Human relationships become forms of business relationships exactly like those in the 523 marketplace. Reciprocity becomes instrumentalism and COOperation becomes a contract (Kohlberg Stage 2). There is little Opportunity for true learning or growth in this kind of system without appropriate experience, as Dewey, Piaget, and Kohlberg all emphasize, and without the guidance of mature values/moral educators. Approbation and re- probation become external reinforcements that tend to crystallize the person's moral development at Levels I and II, and tend to stultify the potential for deve10pment to more mature and creative forms of behavior and relationships at the level of principled morality. The traditional approaches are conducive to viewing other people instru- mentally as utilities whose purpose is to satisfy one's own needs. The so-called "Playboy Philosophy" that is more popular than we may want to recognize or admit exemplifies this level of morality and human relationships. This same philosophy and form of moral behavior characterizes much of our society in politics, business, and education. It is a powerful, pervasive, and influential model of human relation- ships in our culture. Part of the program of the school as a just moral community is to explore these subjects openly, freely, and with courage in order to force us to ask ourselves those disturbing questions about our own use of these behaviors. Done apprOpriately this is what Operational- izes Piaget's model of equilibration which induces the cognitive and moral growth that both Piaget and Kohlberg describe in their theories and their stages. We must explore these questions. We must ask if we have grown--truly grown-~as individuals, as learners, as teachers, 524 as members of a community that will eventually be seen to extend beyond the walls of the school to the local society, the nation, and hopefully to the world. These questions cannot be asked, and the developmental potential realized in the present system of education. For these questions involve justice, and the present system is not built on the type of justice such a view requires. Dewey's, Piaget's, Kohlberg's, and Jordan's concepts of responsibility, in order to be realized in the actions of us in the reality of our everyday worlds, must be stimulated, encouraged, supported, and actively promoted in the home and in the school. The school must play a vital and prominant role in this process--the school must be developmentally oriented and deve10pmentally operated. In summary, responsibility is a major part of the curriculum and the methodology of the school as a just moral community. The soundness of this concept relies heavily on the meaning and role given to reSponsiblity, for responsibility is a key factor in the rapprochement between the individual and the society. If love, peace, justice, and all the other euphonious elements of humanistic and democratic rhetoric are ever to become more than dreams, more than credos, more than constitutions and declarations--then people as individuals and as members of society must accept responsibility for their own actions and the interdependent relationship of those actions with similar selves in a complex and troubled world. The concept of responsibility that could emerge from a just moral community 525 concept Of school could help point the way to development that would be manifested in actions that lead youth away from the immaturity of retributive justice to the prOgressive maturity of cooperation based on equity. Our educational system needs a theory of values/ moral education that is not based on man's weaknesses and lowest forms of behavior, but one that considers the enormous potential for growth and development. Dewey's philosophy, eSpecially his con- ceptualization of responsiblity, replaces the blindness of retributive justice with the vision of intelligent reflection that could enable man to distribute material and spiritual wealth with equity and equality. Dewey replaces might with the mind and makes it possible for man himself to plant and cultivate the seed of growth firmly in the rich soil of humanity. In a world such as Dewey's man could possibly discover how enormous is his capacity to do good. There are many who would say that responsibility as conceived by Dewey is unrealistic and impractical with man as he is today. But I believe that Dewey's vision saw beneath the surface of man's exterior to the rich inner core where the potential exceeds the performance. And regardless Of how impractical his view may appear, we really do not know until an attempt is made to Operationalize it. The usual reaction to statements such as this is that now is not the time, or such visions are only for dreamers and sermons-- in the reality of the world, they say, such things are impossible. But a man who faced one of the most firmly rooted and unbending injustices of our time refused to accept this idea that there is a 526 right time to stimulate action for development that will insure survival and spread freedom and democracy. He_ignored the cynics, and the apathetic, and the nay-sayers. He soundly condemned the moderate who insists that all things work out in time. His name is Martin Luther King, and he said (1963, pp. lO-ll): I had also hoped that the white moderate would reject the myth of time. I received a letter this morning from a white brother in Texas which said: "All Christians know that the colored people will receive equal rights eventually, but it is possible that you are in too great of a religious hurry. It has taken Christianity almost 2000 years to accomplish what it has. The teachings of Christ take time to come to earth." All that is said here grows out of a tragic misconception of time. It is the strangely irrational notion that there is something in the very flow of time that will in- evitably cure all ills. Actually time is neutral. It can be used either destructively or construc- tively. I am coming to feel that the people of ill-will have used time much more effectively than the peOple of good will. We will have to repent in this generation not merely for the vitriolic words and action of the bad people, but for the appalling silence of the good people. We must come to see that human progress never rolls in on wheels of inevitability. It comes through the tireless efforts and persistent work of men willing to be co-workers with God, and without this hard word time itself becomes an ally of the forces of social stagnation. We must use time creatively, and forever realize that the time is always ripe to do right. Now is the time to make real the promise of democracy, and transform our pending national elegy into a creative psalm of brotherhood. Now is the time to lift our national policy from the quicksand of racial injustice to the solid rock of human dignity. King's message coming from his life commitment as Christian minister, must not be lost or rejected because of the religious context in which he phrases it. The message is that time is not the 527 solution to our problems of injustice and unprincipled morality. Time is not the solution to inadequate and ineffective SChOOlS. Time is not the solution to the crises and disasters that threaten the survival of our nation and the peace of the world. Time is no excuse for anything that has not been done--it is the life Opportunity for all the things that can be done and need to be done. And one thing that needs to be done is to make our schools places where children can become fully human and build a world for billions of fully human brothers and sisters. King said one other thing of significance for us here. He as a minister, condemned the church for being a follower and not a leader for the cause of justice. Many see the school as the reflec— tion of the society in which it exists, and the servant of that society. Others see the school as fulfilling its role of servant best by being the principal agent of renewal and reconstruction. What Martin Luther King said of the church is here Offered to apply to the school (p. 14): So here we are moving toward the exit of the twentieth century with a religious community largely adjusted to the status quo, standing as a tail- light behind other community agencies rather than a headlight leading men to higher levels of justice. Education must stop being a tail-light-—education must be a headlight, a beacon pointing the way with all the resources at its command to maximizing the humanity of the children it holds captive in its buildings. . There are those who would say that the comments just made have no place in what is supposed to be a scholarly document 528 such as a dissertation. But the writer of this dissertation says that scholarship is of no value, and science is of no value, and slavish conformity to the traditions of dissertation structure is of no value unless the writer invests his entire being in the creation of a document that hopefully someone will read and use. Science and engineering without values and principled morality are both empty and dangerous. A dissertation attempting to contribute the development of a theory for values development education for use by those, including the author, who truly want to help the present generation of children passing through our schools build a better world, had better include the full investment of their own commitment to a better world. Without that, the degree for which this is partial fulfillment is worthless. The organismic-structural-developmental framework makes possible a way to conceptualize values/moral education in such a way as to maximize the potential of the school for human development. There are many ways this can be done, one of them is through concep- tualizing the school as a just moral community. till "we? .CHAPTER EIGHT SUMMARY, RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION Three functions are served by this chapter. First a brief recapitulation of the content, purpose, and structure of the dissertation are presented. Second, some recommendations are derived from the attempt to build a theory for values development education. The recommendations are concerned with suggestions for further theoretical development, ideas for research, and suggestions for application to educational situations. Third, a synthesizing statement attempt to capture the essence of the theme and the scope of what has been attempted in the dissertation. A . Summary The dissertation began with a statement of purpose; a theory for values/moral development and education has never been more sorely needed than at this particular time in history. World conditions, the present economic technological, political, and social problems that face our nation; the unrest, confusion, and distress that constitute one of the most visible elements of our educational system as it tries to make its way through a transitional period from the incredible certainty that once characterized the authoritarian education of past generations to the incalculable uncertainty of the future; and the frightening rate of change 529 530 appears to be accelerating at a geometric rate--these and many more factors cry out for some guidance, some indicators, some direction. The contemporary period appears to be the most confused, troubled, and chaotic period mankind has ever known. And yet we enjoy the benefits of technology, affluence, and mobility that were beyond the wildest imaginations of people only a few generations ago. It is incredible that our period can be described by the following statement: It was the best of times, it was the worst of times, it was the age of wisdom, it was the age of foolishness, it was the epoch of belief, it was the eopch of incredulity, it was the season of Light, it was the season of Darkness, it was the spring of hope, it was the winter of despair, we had everything before us, we had nothing before us, we were all going direct to Heaven, we were all going direct the other way-~in short, the period was so far like the present period, that some of its noisiest authorities insisted on its being received, for good or for evil, in the superlative degree of comparison only. Thus the Opening paragraph of Charles Dickens' A Tale of Two Cities, written in the 19th century, describes the 18th century, and unwittingly foreshadows even more intense dilemmas of the twentieth century. But as the twentieth century draws to a close and the pace of life continues to accelerate, as the frightening combination of a shrinking earth and a rising population generate tensions, fears, and wars that surpass anything that has gone before--in such times as these there is a need for a restructured system of education that can help the on-coming generations survive the follies, problems, 531 and foolishness of the past and present generations. There is a growing realization in the minds of an ever- increasing number of educators that the business of the schools, in all of its domains, disciplines, and dimensions, is a matter of values. This dissertation, then, is one attempt, probably among hundreds or thousands of contemporary attempts, to contribute to the information available to the educator as he ponders that problem and looks for some guidance. In Chapter II it was pointed out that the attempts at “character education” that were so popular in the earlier part of this century, that were so naive and so ineffective, have been shown by research to be of little or no avail, and that what they conceived of as ”character” very likely never did nor does now exist. Four approaches to values/moral education were defined and described. In review, (1) traditional-authoritarian (absolute nomothetic), (2) cultural relativistic (relative nomothetic), (3) absolute relativistic (idiographic), and (4) organismic-structural-developmental (universal transactional). The first two were named nomothetic because they hold the belief that values objectively exist in the external world and must be transmitted to the child. The third approach was given its name and idiographic orientation because it holds for a belief in the complete relativity of all values and explains their origin as stemming from the idiosyncratic and existential nature of the lone individual. The fourth approach, the organismic-structural-developmental, is an attempt to show values as being the transactional product of the relationship Of the individual 532 and his environment as he constructs knowledge and values through a series of progressive, invariant, and universal developmental stages. Both the nomothetic and idiographic approaches are believed to be unsoundly based, impossible to Operationalize, and inconsistent with the pluralism and democracy that characterize the reality and ideal of our society. The organismic-structural~developmental approach was Offered as the approach that can be psychologically sound, philoso- phically defensible, compatible with a pluralistic and democratic social system, and capable of being operatiOnalized effectively and wisely in our schools. Consequently, it was the approach selected to constitute the substance and content of the dissertation and its attempt to build toward a theory for values development education. The claim was made in Chapter III that any approach to teaching and particularly any approach to values/moral education is inherently based on a view of man--a conceptualization of the nature, purpose, and functioning of the human organism. Such a view is generally implicit in the mind of the educator, and Often is not systematically developed through investigation and reflection. The further claim was made that of the multitude of views, models, and conceptualizations of man in existence, three of them predominate in the behavioral sciences Of western culture. One of these views was somewhat subdivided to allow for the impossibility to completely subsume existentialism under another view. The result was the presenta- tion of four basic views of man that influence most of the thinking, 533 planning, theorizing, research, and operation of our educational system. The four views are: behaviorism, psychoanalysis, existentialism, and organismic psychology. Behaviorism was generally rejected as a meaningful base for values development theory because of its complete determinism, mechanistic view of the human organism, incomplete consideration of all aspects of human nature, and the conclusion that it is inherently incompatible with democratic life. Psychoanalysis was found to be also basically deterministic, focused on the more primitive, irrational, and pathological aspects of human nature, and provided little useful information about learning. It was pointed out, however, that the classical (orthodox) psychoanalysis of Sigmund Freud is losing its influence in contemporary behavioral science, and is being reformulated and replaced by other psychoanalytic theories that are more useful for values development education. The orientation generally recognized by the name psychoanalytic ego psychology, especially, was found to be highly congruent with many aspects of values develop- ment education theory. Existential psychology was discovered to contain much of use for the theory, and much in common with the psychological base that was selected. But existential psychology also has basic propositions and tenets that are irreconcilable with values development education and make it partially inappropriate, e.g., the rejection of any form of determinism, the disdain for science and scientific methods, and the focus on the individual as the major unit of existence. The other view of man, namely, organismic psychology was found to be the most balanced, complete, 534 and usable system available in which to root a values deve10pment education theory, and it was extensively presented and developed, along with two other units that are related to it, grow out Of it, and naturally complete the entire theoretical base necessary for the theory. Thus organismic psychology, the methodology of structuralism, and the deve10pmental view of human progress in ontogenesis were combined into the organismic-structural-developmental view that is both philosophically defensible and psychologically supported in such a way as to make the entire conceptual framework the most usable, sound, and complete basis for values deve10pment education theory. Chapter IV, therefore, was an attempt to present, explain, define, and clarify this entire cenceptual framework. Of special significance for this conceptual framework is the work of John Dewey, Jean Piaget, and Lawrence Kohlberg. Piaget's theory of cognitive development was presented, along with a presentation of his four major stages of intellectual development, as well as some of the important substages. Kohlberg's theory of moral development was rather extensively deve10ped and elaborated, especially his structural- stage-developmental organization of the natural development of the human organism with regard to values/moral deve10pment. His levels and stages were presented in depth, from a number of unifying aspects, and in such a way as to trace values/moral development from infancy to mature adulthood. Dewey's many contributions were integrated in and used as coordinating threads for much of the entire theory, along with the work of many other psychologists and 535 philoSOphers. Three of the most important implications and outcomes of the organismic-structural-developmental conceptual framework were presented and deve10ped in Chapter V. The three themes follow: 1. The structural properties of principled morality are isomorphic with the nature of democracy. 2. Functional democracy is the developmental process that facilitates structural moral development. 3. The identification of the characteristics of principled morality as the criteria for the implementation, operation, and renewal of democratic community. Thus values deve10pment education, conceptualized from this framework, shows that democracy is both a high and mature form of values/moral development, and the method or process by which it is achieved. Because of the importance Of these two implications, the criteria or characteristics of principled morality (Level III) were partially identified and described. They consist primarily, in this preliminary, exploratory, and tentative attempt, of the following six characteristics: (1) formal Operational intelligence, (2) perspectivism, (3) habitual reflective tendencies, (4) sensitivity, (5) responsibility, and (6) homonomy. These were defined and explained, and their importance for values/moral development and for the organismic-structural-developmental theory were discussed. The implications of this for general and values/moral 536 were explored in Chapter VI. First, the school was evaluated and discussed as a values/moral agent. It was pointed out that the school, by its nature, organization, and Operation is inherently and inescapably a values/moral agent, and that as the school is presently constituted it is both an ineffective and unwise moral agent. Two major aspects of school Operation were identified: the planned curriculum and the unplanned curriculum. Many of the problems that lead to the schools lack of effectiveness and wisdom with regard to values/moral deve10pment were traced to this division and the concomitant problems. A definition of curriculum and a theory of curriculum were presented that are believed highly compatible with values development education and operationalizable for both general education and values/moral education. One of the single most important aspects of the entire theory and of the entire dissertation was presented and developed in Chater VII, namely, the concept of the school as a just moral comunity. The claim is made that the school as presently organized and operated is inherently counterproductive for and inhibitory of values/moral development, and that for major and significant positive contributions towards values/moral development, the school really needs to be structurally changed. It is not any physical structure but rather the underlying organization, Operation, and broadly, the curriculum that is implied. A plan for initiating structural change in order to transform a school into a just moral community was presented. The characteristics of the just moral community as it pertains to the school were described. The role of the teacher in 537 such an organization was explained and described, along with criteria for the faculty of a "just moral community" sort of school. Important implications and potentialities of such a system for the development of the members Of the faculty and for the students were described. It was pointed out that one of the most important needs of this sort of school is for a professionally competent person who can serve in the role of ombudsman to insure, protect, and mediate in such a way as to insure that justice and principled morality will be preserved and maximized. One of the major components of the school as a just moral community is the factor of responsibility; how it is conceptualized and Operationalized was discussed. The chapter was concluded with the claim that the idea of a just moral community is not a utOpian scheme or some abstract philosophical idea for dreams and speculation. Its meaning, promise, and possibility were presented in terms of being possible, here and now, if enough peOple with vision, courage, and professional competence are willing to take certain steps. The factor of time was discussed, inasmuch as one of the major excuses for not doing many important things is the claim that the time is not appropriate or that in due time all things eventually work out anyway. The plea was made for rejection of this excuse and the need to see the relevance and potential and possibility of the school as a just moral community here and now. The dissertation, in summary, is an attempt systematically to lay the groundwork for the building of a theory for values development education that can be practical, sound, and feasible. 538 B. Recommendations Throughout the dissertation in the commentary itself there are numerous suggestions for application, further exploration, and the need for research. This section will not be an attempt to collate all of those, although some of the items contained here have been stated previously. The main purpose here is to highlight and specify some applications of the tentative theory established thus far, and to point the way towards further deve10pment of the theory itself, additional applications, and some specific questions or problems worthy of investigation. Some General Applications of the Theory 1. Exploration of the concept of the just moral community for specific adOption as a pilot program in a school. Continued adoption of what Dewey calls "experiential methods” and what Piaget calls "active methods" of education. The depth and application of these concepts goes far beyond what is actually being used in schools today. More than anything, what is needed is an investigation of the application of these concepts as general principles, not merely as specific applications for particular courses, or problems, etc. Implementation of programs for staff development that include an in-depth exploration of the underlying 539 psychological and philosophical principles, views, models, and theories that are being used explicitly and implicitly by educators, in order that: a. Rationales can be deve10ped to support the curriculum, instruction, methodology, materials, etc., or show which of those in use are not justified by the existing evidence. b. Inconsistencies can be identified that may be indicative Of elements of the curriculum contra- dicting each other, and even producing trans- actions that are deleterious to the welfare and deve10pment of the learners. Field testing of the general and specific recommenda- tions and implications of the theory for evaluation of their utility and for renewal of the theory. Extensive investigation of one of the major possible implications of the developmental components of the theory, especially the stages of Piaget and Kohlberg, viz., the implication that specialized forms of education that are oriented to particular careers, particular disciplines, and narrow applications of the curriculum content should be delayed until the general attainment of formal Operational intelligence, and for those topics and issues where appropriate, until the development of Kohlberg's Stage 3, the Stage of Interpersonal Concordance. Much of what 540 is done in elementary, middle and junior high, and early high school curricula is meaningless, incompre- hensible, or even harmful for the education of children unable to cope with the personal, social, and intellectual demands of present curricula for which they are deve10pmentally unprepared. This problem is especially critical in the formal demands for affectively-oriented aspects of the planned curriculum, and much of the unplanned curriculum, in which mature forms and understanding of cooperation are required. Disciplinary codes, school rules, and many of the bureaucratic demands made on children are literally beyond their comprehension on more than a verbal level, and frequently not even comprehensible on that level. Elimination or modification of the lock-step graded system of education. The developmental theories, for which there is enormous support and documentation, make it clear that there is no justification for this system from the standpoint of the needs of the child as a human being. The elimination or modification of the grade system of evaluation. Generally, this can be stated as the recommendation for the replacement of the achievement- competition-external reward model of education for deve10pmental-cooperation-intrinsic reward model of 10. 541 education. This is probably one of the most important areas of our educational system that needs immediate alternation in terms of the organismic-structural- develOpmental model. Education should be more general and focus on holistic personality development and especially prepare students for personal, interpersonal, and social behavior, participation, and involvement. Most simply stated, what is needed is more focus on structural development and less focus on the transmission of content. Content should be used as instrumental to structural development, rather than as an end in itself. Content should be used rather than taught. Education should include preparation for major life decisions, life crises, and potentially traumatic events, e.g., death of a family member or friend, or even an animal; divorce, remarriage, illness, and other aspects of everyday life that children need to learn to cone with according to their developmental level. Consideration should be given to the creation of the professional position described in Chapter VII, the ombudsman. Such a person should be on the staff of every school, or available in a system of schools, regardless of the adoption or rejection of the idea of the just moral community. The presence and 11. 12. 542 availability of a neutral, open, unbiased, and just person to whom students, teachers, and other inhabitants of the school may turn could be one of the greatest contributions to the development of justice in the school and the reduction of problems. Review, investigate, and research the use of audio- visual methods of instructional technology that have become so widely used in our schools. They have made enormous contribution to the schools, but from a deve10pmental standpoint they constitute a potential danger. Piaget (1970b, pp. 74—75) points out the advantages of audiovisual instruction, but also makes it clear that certain applications supplant the "active method” and thus can be counter- productive to deve10pmental learning. Many audio— visual techniques support passive, uninvolved, and superficial roles by students. A greater articulation and rapprochement between secular and religious education is urgently needed. The separation of church and state, and the many recent laws controlling the treatment of religion in schools is definitely supported and recognized as necessary in order to preserve the vitally needed separation of these elements of our society in order to protect freedom and democracy. But religion is one of the most significant elements of man's history and needs to be included in the curriculum, but as a normal part of man's life, not as indoctrination for a particular point of view or religion, not even Christianity. All of man's approaches to the issue of religion should be made available to students, including all the formal and organized religions, the less formal and informal movements, and also agnosticism, and atheism. These should be presented in an unbiased, non-prosletzying manner, with great sensitivity. The didactic, dead, and cold approaches used to prevent criticism from parents and vested interest groups are not the answer, either. They may serve to present religion and spirituality as dead, irrelevent, and unexciting aspects of the past. But the spiritual aspects of human life (the word spiritual here being used in the broadest sense), man's hunger for knowledge and his feeling of mystery, and the meaning of life, and related factors should be incorporated into the normal curriculum of the school in ways appropriately attuned to developmental progress. Application of the Theory to Teacher Education If the theory has any validity, and if the implications for education that have been presented and discussed, then the implications for teacher education are enormous, extensive, and far- 544 reaching. The organismic—structural—developmental conceptual frame- work points to a wholly different kind of education. The present system is both the product and the supporter of the existing teacher preparation programs. In fact, it is proposed that unless and until there is significant change in teacher education programs the success of the organismic—structural-developmental model is seriously limited and/or inhibited. Many of the criticisms offered about general education apply equally or more so to teacher education programs. There is much that goes on in the world of teacher education that has not been systematically integrated or investigated. Behavior modification techniques are used and taught side—by-side with the humanistic orientations and techniques without so much as a question about their compatibility and without recognition that the underlying views of man should be investigated, question, and correlated. This oversight is one of the most serious problems that exist in teacher preparation programs. But of everything that could be said about the implications of the O—S-D theory regarding teacher education programs, nothing could be more important than the recommendation that here is where the idea of a just moral community needs to exist more than any other place. Even a cursory examination of the prevailing practices, and even brief interviews with preservice undergraduate teacher education students, and observations of the behavior of faculty members reveals it is sad to say, more injustice, dehumanization, and violation of human, individual, civil, and other rights than one 545 cares to admit. The prevailing model of teacher preparation is strongly married to the long-standing and powerful and pervasive behavioristic model that has dominated our higher centers of learning for more than half a century. And the marriage has been reinforced in recent years by the resurgence of behaviorism in the form of Skinnerian influence-~without enough reflection about what Skinner represents and what his theory implies. Many faculty members have adopted the theory, philosophy, and methodology of radical behaviorism without realizing that it is based on the refutation, ridicule, and proposed disposal of all that is meant by the term "autonomous man". Ironically the same faculty members hold "autonomous man" as their most precious doctrine in order to support their own existence, their academic freedom, and their professional standing. The inspiration, leadership, and direct influence that programs Of teacher education potentially represent is largely nullified by the same problems, inconsistencies, and lack of justice that make our general educational system the subject of so much justified criticism. The problem is serious-—very serious--if we are truly interested in the survival of our democratic way of life. The true implementatiOn of a democratic way of life requires an educational approach that is carefully maintained and deve10ped as a reflection of the values of that way of life. Psychological, Philosophical, and Methodological Applications 1. Both Piaget and Dewey call for a new look at the relationship between phiIOSOphy and science, especially between philosophy and psychology. As was pointed out earlier, Dewey's conceptualization of naturalistic humanism (Dewey, 1929) and Piaget's conceptualization of genetic epistemology (Piaget, 1970a, 1970b, 1970c, 1970d, 1970e, and 1970f) make the same plea for intelligent articulation between theSe two bodies of knowledge and methodologies. According to both Dewey and Piaget, both science and phiIOSOphy would benefit from a greater confluence of these two great streams. On the specific issue of epistemology, especially, both Dewey and Piaget claim there is much to gain by an interdisciplinary effort. Piaget, in fact, adopted the term "genetic epistemology" from James Mark Baldwin to describe his genetic (ontOgenetic) approach to the construction of knowledge as he could actually study it by investigating the minds of real live children, rather than from speculation based on adult thought. A related recommendation is a plea for the reduction or elimination of what is sometimes referred to as "scientism." The application of the principles and methodology of the natural, or physical, sciences is simply not appropriate to the problems, circumstances, or subjects of behavioral science. What the natural scientist can do in the way of experimental controls is generally not possible in behavioral science, and 547 especially in schools. And yet, in the name of science much work has been done that has led to pseudoscientific applications in psychology and education. This is especially true in psychometrics and statistics. The application, for example, of the principles of normal distribution, the Gaussian curve, and the principles of random selection to the problems of individual learners, individual classrooms, and especially to evaluation and grading has led to not only a great deal of scientism, pseudoscience, and related problems, it has literally led to enormous injustice. The application of normal statistics and random distribution, for example, to the "curve" for determination of rewards in a learning group is tremendously unjust and unscientific. Classrooms do not represent normal distributions nor do they represent random statistical selection. Grading on this basis is immoral and unjust; on the basis of the theory offered in this dissertation, it is educationally counterproductive. The attempt to formulate the foundations for a theory for values deve10pment education has made manifest the need for interdisciplinary and trans- actional research work and theory building, rather than disciplinary or multidisciplinary interaction approaches. True integration and coordination of 548 theory and research, depends on building on the contributions that perspectives and disciplines make together transactionally, not merely the adding toegther of the various individual points of view. Piaget and Kohlberg have both shown the great contri- butions that can come from the application of the methodology of structuralism to psychological and educational problems. This methodology needs to be applied to many more problems in this field. Kohlberg's work has demonstrated again the importance sophisticated longitudinal research. More research of this sort is needed to seriously examine the effects of the contemporary infatuation with behavioral objectives as the answer to educational planning, curriculum building, and accountability. It may be shown that the short-term gains that meet limited behavioral objectives do not hold up when viewed longitudinally structurally, holistically, and developmentally. Another issue that needs full exploration with regard to values/moral education is the problem of determinism. Behaviorism and psychoanalysis generally represents a strongly deterministic position, and existential psychology vehemently holds an indeter- ministic position. As has been pointed out in this 549 dissertation, neither position provides adequate support for a theory of values/moral development or education-- in fact, both positions negate the entire basis for moral responsibility. Organismic psychology presents a view that recognizes that many aspects of life are fully determined, but the many aspects of life are not determined, and that there is considerable room for individual freedom and responsibility. This complex issue, one of the most fundamental for values develop- ment education, was only briefly treated in several places, and needs subsequent development as part of the program of more complete building of a theory for values development education. A major and complex issue for extensive exploration is the set of factors that related to moral judgment versus moral action, and the temporal order and ratio of influence of these aspects of values/moral behavior. Work that is both directly and indirectly related to this issue has been done and continues to be done by Kohlberg, Turiel, Rest, Piaget, and others. (Each of these has been cited in the dissertation and the bibliography). The theory and the stages, in particular, need to be developed in terms of their relationships to many issues of which the following are only a sampling: love, friendship, marriage, sex, religion, creativity, etc. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 550 The role of crisis in values/moral development needs to be thoroughly explored. DO crises inhibit, accelerate, crystallize, or affect values/moral deve10pment in particular and predictable ways? A full exploration and much research needs to be conducted on the values/moral implications of collective responsibility and collective punishment. Earlier in this dissertation it was claimed that the use of collective punishment is detrimental to the structural development of morality, especially principled morality. The criteria and characteristics of principled morality, partially identified in this dissertation need to be further explored for other aspects and for the nature and role of the six that have been proposed. Techniques and instruments for evaluation of the developmental levels and stages that extend and deepen those that have been developed by Kohlberg and his associates. Particularly is there a need for instruments suitable for the use of educators in the field. Training methods for helping educators effectively, wisely, and efficiently become professionally competent in values development education needs to be created, expanded, and elaborated. The author of this dissertation hypothesizes that 15. 16. 551 learning the theory of values development education is conducive to values/moral development or is at least a major factor in initiating that deve10pment. This hypothesis needs to be tested. Studies need to be conducted to ascertain the role of athletics and Sports in values/moral development. These programs constitute a major part of the curriculum of our schools. Two preliminary hypotheses on this subject are offered here: (1) participation in programs of physical education, properly handled, with due consideration for all individuals and their holistic development, could be a major positive factor for" values/moral development; and (2) athletic programs as they are presently constituted in American schools, with enormous emphasis on winning, on competition, on Level I morality, and with their rewards going to the few physically accelerated and well-developed individuals at the expense of the many who are less well endowed, are generally counterproductive to the development of Level II or Level III morality, and not only inhibit such development, but tend to crystallize deve10pment at Level I, especially Stage 2. These important and complex issues need to be systematically explored. The relationships between levels of values/moral development and career orientations need to be l7. 18. 19. 552 studied. Are there particular careers, professions, and occupations in which the nature of the work is characterized by particular levels and stages of moral development? The hypothesis offered here is that there is a highly probable relationship. A worthwhile study could be conducted to determine any possible relationship between the rearing of children and moral development of the parents or guardians. In what ways and how much does the responsibility for raising children influence the moral development of the parents? The importance of transition states and inter-stage development an hypothesized by the prOponents of developmental theories needs further exploration. The extensive literature on this subject needs to be thoroughly collated, evaluated, and introduced more completely into the theory. Certain claims have been made by the author in this disseration about the relationships among the various models Of man and the Kohlberg levels and stages. Behaviorism, for example, has been hypothesized as primarily focusing on Level I morality, and the lower levels of cognitive development; and further, that it has deve10ped its entire model of man on this basis. This hypothesis needs extensive exploration, documentation, and evaluation. 20. 21. 22. 553 The use of discovery learning techniques and guided learning techniques needs to be explored vis-a-vis the values development theory. These are very important and significantly different educational methods. They need to be particularly studied with reference to their application to values/moral development, and not just cognitive development. The concept of moratorium with regard to values/moral development needs to be thoroughly explored, researched, and documented. Kohlberg (1973a), for example, claims that one of the major advantages of children leaving home and goingoff to college is that it provides the young adult with an opportunity to leave the predominantly Level II atmOSphere of the typical American home and experience at college new ideas, new disequilibrium in terms Of self-identity and values issues, but within the framework of an environment that allows this kind of exploration without the problems of making serious irreversible major life decisions--or in other words, it permits values/moral exploration during a "moratorium" experience. The implications of the moratorium concept are very great; study and research is needed to determine that it is functional. Ways must be found to encourage, permit, and support the attitude, consideration, and implementation of 554 research by the classroom teacher. Not the well- known kind of action research that was supposed to lead to the advancement of knowledge for the field, which is not the issue here, but the attitude and execution of research by the teacher in order to enhance the application of Piaget's active methods in the classroom, learn more about the students, and generally develop and maintain a professional attitude, rather than a technician's attitude. Additional Theories, Systems, and Concgptual Frameworks Identified for Further Exploration in ReSpect to the Theory of Values/Moral DevelOpment 1. Harvey, Hunt, and Schroder's Conceptual systems Theory and all of its derivatives and explorations. Milton Rokeach's work on the open and closed mind, which is very much related to conceptual systems theory. The philOSOpher Rollo Handy's work on values theory. The great amount of work done by the psychoanalytic ego psychologists mentioned frequently in this dissertation. The stage-developmental theory of.Iane Loevinger (Loevinger is an ego psychologist). The authoritarian personality as explored in the classical studies of Adorno, Frendkel-Brunswik, Levinson, and Sanford (1950). 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 555 The six-stage model for the development of linguistics proposed by W. Labov (1964; also cited by Miller and McNeill, 1969, p. 779). There appear to be some relationships between this model and some of the stage-developmental models included in this dissertation. The work of the philosopher Elijah Jordan, whose work was partially, but only briefly incorporated in the dissertation. The theory of justice proposed by John Rawls (1971). The general systems theory proposed by L. von Bertalanffy. The general theory of action prOposed by Talcott Parsons and Edward Shils, and others (Parsons and Shils, 1951). The work on cognitive "plans" by George Miller, Eugene Galanter, and Karl Pribram (1960). The interesting ideas about values/moral education proposed by the philosopher Gerald H. Paske (1969). The anthropology of Claude Levi-Strauss. The prolific and rich writings of Erich Fromm, who has had much to say on the subject of values and morality. Contributions from significant scholars in the fields of communication theory, linguistics, and the social psychological subdivision that deals with attitude theory and attitude change. The work of the Ontario Institute for Studies in Education, especially that of Edmund Sullivan, 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 556 Clive Beck, David Hunt. The work on matching models, the use of optimal disparity, and related issues done by Turiel, Kohlberg, David Hunt, Bruce Joyce, and Marsha Neil, and others. The work of the values clarification peOple and movement, some of which has been included in this dissertation. The curriculum theories and related work of Hilda Taba, J. W. Getzels, H. A. Thelens, and many others. The conceptual framework for analyzing educational systems developed by Getzels, Guba, Thelens, and others that was included in the dissertation. And, as a final point, all of the work of the numerous organismic psychologists whose work has been partially included, mentioned, or alluded to throughout the dissertation but especially in Chapters III and IV. C. Conclusion A dissertation this long deserves a brief conclusion. It also deserves the sharing of the Spirit with which the writer created it. The principle of justice is one of the dominant themes that runs through this work and partially binds it together. The concern for the school is the other principle theme. The concern for both, frankly, is because the greater part of my life has been spent U1 U! \1 living, attending, and working in social institutions that have been so full of injustice that I have become especially sensitive to this issue. The schools in which I have been a student and the schools in which I have worked have all been characterized by many things, but injustice was dominant--principally, injustice to the students. I care very deeply about this issue, and that is why I am in this profession, and that is why I am interested in helping to build a theory, and educational programs, and practices that can help contribute, in some way, however small, to helping our schools become better instruments of justice and democracy. This dissertation represents the midstream culmination of a period of enormous personal and profession growth and develop- ment. I say midstream, because I hope and intend that growth and development will never stop. This dissertation has also been a true labor of love. In Spite of its length it contains less than half of what I had originally conceived as its content. And now at the end, looking back at what is in it, I feel like John Steinbeck must have felt when he wrote the following strange and beautiful dedication for his great novel, East of Eden: 558 PASCAL COVICI Dear Pat, You came upon me carving some kind of little figure out of wood and you said, "Why don't you make something for me?" I asked you what you wanted, and you said, "A box." "What for?" ”To put things in.” "What things?" "Whatever you have,” you said. Well, here's your box. Nearly everything I have is in it, and it is not full. Pain and excitement are in it, and feelings good or bad and evil thoughts and good thoughts-~the pleasure of design and some despair and the indescribable joy of creation. And on top of these are all the gratitude and love I have for you. And still the box is not full. JOHN 559 ”And still the box is not full." There is so much more that needs to be done to change this from "Toward a Theory for Values Development Education" to "A Theory for Values Development Education" that it seems from this perspective to be an impossible task. But things tend to look impossible when you have worked hard to create and have grown weary from the labor. Tomorrow the remaining task will look as exciting as the beginning of this one. There has been a joy and an excitement in this entire creation--so much so that I feel again exactly as John Steinbeck did in another part of East of Eden. Sometimes a kind of glory lights up the mind of a man. It happens to nearly everyone. You can feel it growing or preparing like a fuse burning toward dynamite. It is a feeling in the stomach, a delight of the nerves, of the forearms. The skin tastes the air, and every deep-drawn breath is sweet. Its beginning has the pleasure of a great stretching yawn; it flashes in the brain and the whole world glows outside your eyes. A man may have lived all Of his life in the gray, and the land and trees of him dark and somber. The events, even the important ones, may have trOOped by faceless and pale. And then--the glory--so that a cricket song sweetens his ears, the smell of the earth rises chanting to his nose, and dappling light under a tree blesses his eyes. Then a man pours outward a torrent of him, and yet he is not diminished. And I guess a man's importance in the world can be measured by the quality and number of his glories. It is a lonely thing but it relates us to the world. It is the mother of all creativeness, and sets each man separate from all other men. And so I feel about what has happened over the past three years; I feel that way about this dissertation; I feel that way about the idea of a theory for values development education that may help make 560 some child's life somewhere someday a little better because it was created; and I eSpecially feel that way about the idea of a just moral community being attempted somewhere, someday, in some school. And for whatever minute contribution this can make to the realization of that dream, I shall feel grateful and happy. Schools do not have to be places that children hate-- they do not have to be places where children hate to go and race to leave. They can be (and some few certainly are) places where people live and grow and come alive in a way that can happen in no other place. Learning is one of the most enjoyable things in all of life—-I absolutely love to learn. Perhaps that is why I also absolutely love to teach. And the thing I love most about teaching is that it is sheer delight to see the fantastic feeling that comes over the learner when he has discovered something new, has extended himself beyond what he was, has found a new dimension of himself and life. That is a magnificent transaction! Values development education is a theory, an idea, a plan, and it is also a hope and a dream-~as is all that comes under the name education. The organismic-structural-deve10pmental conceptual framework offers a better hope for any form of values/moral education that I have yet seen. It is not perfect, it is not utOpian, and it is not the last answer to anything. It is merely one giant step in the direction of trying to improve something that has been around for a long time-~a type of education that is intended to help people grow and to help them and us make a better world. Teilhard de Chardin said: 561 To us for whom new sciences have Opened space and time with dimensions unsuspected by our fathers there are now new challenges. We can no longer measure our efforts by old achievements, no matter how exalting these . . . l were in their own time. To me that's what education is all about-—moving forward, renewing our lives and our worlds. That's what theory, and research, and scholarship are all about, too. Otherwise they are dead and have no meaning. One final quotation, and again from the beautiful mind of Teilhard de Chardin: The March Forward. Progress, if it is to continue, will not happen by itself. Evolution, by the very mechanism of its syntheses, is constantly acquiring greater freedom. In practice, what steps must we take in relation to this forward march? I see two, which can be summarized in five words: a great hOpe, in common. "A great hope, in common"--that's what this dissertation represents to me. For I am a dreamer who believes that education is one of the greatest forces for good that man possesses. And when man stops dreaming the world turns gray. I didn't write this dissertation merely to fulfill the requirements for a degree-~I wrote it as part of a great dream that I hOpe will become part, just a small part, but a part of "a great hOpe, in common." 1Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, Building the Earth (1965). BIBLIOGRAPHY AND GENERAL REFERENCES BIBLIOGRAPHY AND GENERAL REFERENCES Abelson, R. P., Aronson, E., McGuire, W. J., Newcomb, T. M., Rosenberg, M. J., and Tannenbaum, P. H. (Eds.) Theories of Cognitive Consistency: A Sourcebook. Chicago: ‘Rand McNally and Co., 1968. Adorno, T. W., Frankel-Brunswick, E., Levinson, D. J., and Sanford, R. N. The Authoritarian Personality. New York: Harper, 1950. Allport, G. W. Becoming: Basic Considerations for a Psychology . of'Personality. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1955. Allport, G. W. Pattern and Growth in Personality. 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The justice structure of the prison-a theory and an intervention. The Prison Journal, Autumn-Winter, 1972, Vol. LI, No. 2. (Also available in L. Kohlberg, Collected Papers on Moral DevelOpment and Moral Education. Cambridge: Laboratory of Human Development, 1973.) L. and Staff. Standard Scoring Manual. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Laboratory of Human Development, Harvard University, 1973. 579 Kohlberg, L. and Turiel, E. Moral development and moral education. In G. Lesser (Ed.), Psychology and Educational Practice. Chicago: Scott, Foresman, 1971. Pp. 410-465. (Also available in L. Kohlberg, Collected Papers on Moral Development and Moral Education. Cambridge: Laboratory of Human Development, 1973.) Kramer, R. B. Changes in moral judgment response pattern during late adolescence and young adulthood: Retrogression in a deve10pmental sequence. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Chicago, 1968. I Krathwohl, D. R., Bloom, B. S., Masia, B. B. Taxonomy of'thcational Ojbectives. 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