This is to certify that the

thesis entitled

TOWARD A THEORY FOR
VALUES DEVELOPMENT EDUCATION

presented by

John S. Stewart

has been accepted towards fulfillment
of the requirements for

__PhD._____degree in Secondary Education
and Curriculum

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Date May 1, 1974

O-7639

ABSTRACT

TOWARD A THEORY FOR
VALUES DEVELOPMENT EDUCATION

This dissertation is an attempt to lay the initial ground-
work for a theory for values development education. It is, therefore,
preliminary and tentative, but it is based on well-established psycho-
logical and philosophical works, especially the work of John Dewey,
Jean Piaget, and Lawrence Kohlberg. Recognizing the need on the part
of educators for curricular guidelines, programs, and instructional
materials for values/moral education that are compatible with and
usable within the orientation of a pluralistic and democratic society,
the writer has attempted to bring together the contributions of the
three principal scholars named above, along with the contributions of
many other scholars, in such a way as to begin to provide the founda-
tion for meeting these needs.

Reviews of the values/moral education and development
literature are presented and critiqued. Four approaches to values/moral
education are presented: (1) the traditional-authoritarian, (2) the
cultural-relativistic, (3) the absolute relativistic, and (4) the
organismic-structural-developmental. The position is taken and
defended that the first three of these approaches are inconsistent with
democratic principles and/or are ineffective. The fourth position has
been chosen as the basis for values development education, and the
presentation, elaboration, support, and implications of this position
constitute the subject and substance of this dissertation.

The thesis is taken that each educator has a view of man that serves as the basis for his or her educational philosophy, methodology, and approach to teaching. The view may be implicit or explicit. The position is taken that the educator has a moral obligation to systematically develop and make explicit the individual's view of man. Three major views of man that tend to dominate western behavioral science are presented and critiqued: behaviorism, psychoanalysis, and organismic psychology. Existential psychology is also presented—as partly overlapping with organismic psychology, but as having some fundamental differences. Support is presented for organismic psychology as the most defensible view of man as the basis for values development education. Chapter 4 is a presentation of the organismic view, along with the methodology of modern structuralism and the theories of developmental psychology. Thus the *organismic-structural-developmental* cenceptual framework is an integration of these three orientations. Included are the cognitive-developmental stages of Piaget and the values/moral development stages of Kohlberg.

A major implication of this conceptual framework is that democracy (as a sociopsychological system) is both structure and process for values/moral development and education. That is, democracy is the methodological process that enhances, encourages, and maximizes values/moral development; and principled morality is essentially based on democratic moral principles democratically derived. From this standpoint the school is examined as a values/moral agent and the themes of education, curriculum, and values development are elaborated from the organismic-structural-developmental perspective.

One of the major theses of this dissertation is that the school is inherently a values/moral system, and that this role can be maximized for a pluralistic and democratic society if the school attempts to operate as a *just moral community*--that is if the school can be a place where justice is transactionally experienced in community with faculty, students, parents, and community as partners in the democratic process. A tentative plan for initiation of such a concept is presented, along with other recommendations for implementation of the conceptual framework of values development education.

Recommendations are made for further theoretical, philosophical, and empirical exploration and extension of the attempt to build toward a theory for values development education, as well as for practical applications of what has been presented.

TOWARD A THEORY FOR

VALUES DEVELOPMENT EDUCATION

By

John S. Stewart

A DISSERTATION

Submitted to
Michigan State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

Department of Secondary Education and Curriculum

1974

DEDICATION

TO CARLA

My Wife, my Love, and my Life.

It was her idea to get this degree, and her hard work that helped finance it and otherwise make it possible. And it is her Love that makes it all worthwhile. To her I can only say with all my Love:

> Grow old along with me!
> The best is yet to be,
> The last of life,
>   for which the first was made...*

---

*The opening lines of "Rabbi Ben Ezra," by Robert Browning.

SPECIAL ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

A dissertation in one sense is the individual creation of one writer--but only in a very limited sense is that true. This particular dissertation is an exemplification of the underlying principle that a dissertation is the product of complex transactions among many people whose contributions become focused and integrated through the individual creation of the author. Many people made this effort possible, some of whom deserve such special recognition that the words here can never do justice to them or their contributions.

For the past three years Dr. Ted W. Ward has served as advisor, chairman of my committee, teacher, mentor, professional colleague, and cherished friend. His continuous support, constructive criticism, and high expectations have both guided and inspired me. He is a rare and unusual person, and I am extremely fortunate and inestimably richer as a human being for having known him and for his being a very important part of my life. There are no words that could fully express my appreciation, respect, and affection for this man who has given to me so much of himself.

The other members of my committee are Dr. Mary Lea Schneider, Dr. Charles A. Blackman, and Dr. George Barnett. As a team they were excellent--as individuals they are superb. Dr. Schneider's scholarship, enthusiasm, and support have been very meaningful for me. She is a warm, sensitive, and humble person whose straightforward simplicity is disarming. Our mutual professional interests fortunately make possible an enduring professional and personal relationship, for which I am very happy. Dr. Blackman's view of education has been particularly helpful in my efforts to sort out some of my own questions, conflicts, and views. His quiet and humble nature tend to hide the depth of his conceptualizations and the power of his convictions. He is an especially fine person whose sincere interest in my personal and professional welfare means very much to me. Truly he has a "listening ear" and a warm heart, and is much appreciated. Dr. Barnett is one of those rare people whose special combination of qualities and talents mark him as a true educator and magnificent human being. His sense of fairness, his incredible sensitivity, and his wisdom are deeply appreciated and tremendously admired by many, especially this writer.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

xii

LIST OF TABLES

LIST OF FIGURES

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

The title of this dissertation--"Toward a Theory for Values
Development Education"--suggests two questions: why a theory for values
development education?, and why "toward?" To answer these questions is to
provide a statement of the problem investigated in this dissertation. The
answer to the first of the above questions constitutes a statement of the
need and answering the second constitutes a statement of the purpose.

A. Need

An educator in need of help with the practical problems
related to the role and influence of the school in values development
cannot at present turn to any one coordinated, integrated, consistent,
and comprehensive theory for guidance or decision-making. Many
scholars and researchers have attempted to deal with values, values
development, and values education, but this work has been done and
proceeds under many different rubrics often lacking systematic theory
from any particular disciplines. Consequently, there is a great need
for the creation of a theory for values development education that
systematically attempts to bring together the most relevant and use-
ful of the disciplinary data, theories, philosophies, and empirical
findings that have been contributed to this field. The needed theory
must be both philosophically sound and psychologically inte-
grated and justifiable. And, in the end, it must above all be

operationally efficacious, i.e., capable of being used by educators
in the field, capable of being translated into curriculum, and capable
of being used for staff and instructional development.

The urgency of this task can be immediately appreciated by
consideration of the state of our nation and the world today. The
major problems of our times are, directly or indirectly, crises of
values and morality. The second half of the twentieth century finds
our society confronted with a serious gap between our ability to deal
with technological problems and our ability to deal with social
problems. Technology has become our forte, our trademark, and our
shibboleth. But social problems have become our greatest weakness,
our most formidable threat to survival, and our most critical arena
for action. In the past we have relied heavily on the ability of our
educational system to help *produce* the human and nonhuman resources
necessary for the technological endeavor. Now we must ask our schools
and other elements of our total educational system to reevaluate and
reorient their goals, organization, methods, and staffing in order to
help *create* the nonhuman resources and *develop* the human resources
necessary for the social endeavor. The problems of our cities, ecology
and pollution, population control, anomie and apathy, significant
inequities in the distribution of wealth and other material and social
resources, racism, conflict and war, the crisis of our government
manifested by the so-called Watergate incident, and a multitude of other
problems of major proportions--these are among the many problems that

must be confronted by our total educational system if we are to survive
and contribute to the development of mankind.

The enormity of this task must not discourage the initiation
of many efforts to create new programs to meet the need described.
Several programs have been established, including one here at Michigan
State University, to build on and apply some of the major theories
and research findings that seem to be promising for use in creating
new approaches to the problem of values/moral education.[1]

Some of the most promising work that has been done that is
relevant to or directly in the area of values development, especially
moral development, has been carried out by behavioral scientists of
diverse orientations and a multitude of disciplines, but who share a
common set of assumptions about the nature of the human organism and
methods of research that can most appropriately and succinctly be
brought together under the rubric *organismic-structural-developmental*.
By bringing these three compatible orientations together we hope to
create a useful and powerful conceptual framework for work in values.
Of many possible approaches that could be taken the approach that
directly grows out of the organismic-structural-developmental concep-
tual framework seems to be the most useful and defensible, especially
for use in our pluralistic and democratic society. This choice is
explained and justified in the early part of this dissertation. This

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[1]The term *values/moral* is used throughout this dissertation to communi-
cate the overall interest in all types of values although the primary
focus is often on moral values. Values is the primary and inclusive
category; moral values are considered a subcategory of values, but is
considered to be the most important subcategory. Other categories
include esthetic values, religious values, and political values.

approach has been arbitrarily designated as *values development education,* with the full realization that others could apply different conceptual frameworks to the same name or perhaps a different name to our orientation. But the focus of *developmental* in the name communicates emphatically the importance of that aspect of values education stressed here.

If educational development programs concerned with values/ moral development are to be sound, there is a need to build a foundation for theory. Appropriate exploratory, descriptive, and collative research must continue to identify promising available components, establish logically consistent relationships between and among these components, locate the data from the appropriate empirical studies conducted in this area, and generate useful hypotheses. The specific need, then, is for a collative-descriptive study that will explore relevant sources from the behavioral sciences, moral philosophy, and education in order to identify and explore potential components for the foundation of the theory proposed earlier.

B. Purpose

The specific purpose of the dissertation is contained in the idea *toward* a theory, as expressed in the title. The purpose is to make a beginning toward building the needed theory. Some work has already been undertaken in this direction by the writer (Stewart, 1973). The dissertation incorporates some of that work and revises and extends it, and lays the groundwork for continuing efforts to build the theory,

and also provides suggestions for other areas, theories, and philosophical contributions that appear promising and useful for continued building of the theory.

The purpose is partly conceived as tentative and exploratory, but the "toward" is even more intended to convey that the task is to be only partially accomplished in this dissertation. Some of the work, especially the basic foundation on which the dissertation is built, is well supported in the literature. Three primary scholars are basic; their work provides the basic and central part of the theory initiated here, viz., John Dewey, Jean Piaget, and Lawrence Kohlberg. Many other substantial, respected, and validated contribution are also included.

Much more work needs to be done to build the theory and to point the way to its application, but this dissertation represents what is hopefully a worthy contribution to accomplishment of the purpose and fulfillment of the need.

C. Procedure

The procedure used to organize the outline of the dissertation and to work with the data is supported by and related to some metatheoretical assumptions that were made at the outset. These assumptions and their support are presented here in order to provide part of the rationale for what was done and why it was done in that manner.

If the dissertation were primarily collative, in the sense of searching for components that appeared to be promising for inclusion in a later development of the theory, then the procedure would have been simply to identify and outline those components. The collative and descriptive tasks are necessary and important, but not sufficient for building toward a theory for values development education. The heart of the dissertation is in the analysis of the components that were selected and the attempt made to synthesize those components into an integrated conceptual framework. The most crucial tasks, therefore, were essentially creative and demanded a metatheoretical conceptual framework to serve as a guide and basis for the work that was done and is here reported.

Metatheoretical Framework Underlying the Dissertation

Since this is an attempt to build the beginnings of a theory, the primary metatheoretical aspects are related to the meaning of theory and the approach of this kind of theory-building. Three useful resources regarding the nature and definition of theory provided the basis for the approach used. They will be briefly presented and discussed here. The three are: Chinoy (1968), Hall and Lindzey (1970), and Marx (1970).

Chinoy defines theory as follows (p. 27):

> ...theory, a body of logically interrelated proposi-
> tions that assert determinate relationships among the
> phenomena being studied.

This definition serves to succinctly describe what is attempted in this dissertation. Chinoy goes on to point out the need for defining concepts as part of the theory-building process, for without them description

and analysis would be impossible. But he also emphasizes that the theoretical significance of the concepts is in the relationships which can be established among the variables that the concepts represent. One of the main tasks of the present research is to identify the significant variables in values development, and then to proceed and offer, when possible, reasonably precise definitions of those concepts in order to build the necessary tools for identifying, establishing, and presenting the theoretically significant relationships that hopefully lie among these variables and concepts.

Chinoy also points out that the value of theory derives from its inclusiveness and generality. When concepts and variables can be appropriately categorized, the relationships among variables can be more readily seen, and inferences can be made. This makes it possible to make more parsimonious generalizations about the data, making the theory informative. Having thus identified the conditions under which the events related to the variables are most likely to occur, and the relationships that pertain to and among the variables, it becomes possible to make predictions based on the theory. The practical nature of theory becomes manifest in its ability to explain, organize, and predict the consequences of events which would, without the theory, makes little or no sense. Thus, Chinoy points out, theory has the characteristics of inclusiveness, generality, parsimony, informative, predictive, and practicality. It is these characteristics that were sought in pursuing the objectives of this study.

Hall and Lindzey (1970, pp. 9-15) define a theory in terms of its contents and functions; i.e., in terms of what it is and what

it does. A **theory** contains:

1. A **set of** empirical definitions (operational definitions), and

2. A **set of** logical propositions based on systematic relationships among relevant assumptions.

The **functions** of a theory include the following:

1. To incorporate known empirical findings into a logically consistent and reasonably simple framework.

2. To generate research in one or both of two ways:

   a. Systematically--generates specific research hypotheses to be empirically tested and validated or rejected.

   b. Heuristically--generates research by suggesting ideas, inducing disbelief or resistance, or inspiring new ways of thinking without explicit propositions being offered.

   3. To provide a means of systematically observing natural events without being overwhelmed or confused by the volume and complexity of details, relationships, and characteristics inherent in real life situations and phenomena. In other words, theory provides a lattice or conceptual filter through which phenomena may be observed in an organized and systematic way.

Building theory, Hall and Lindzey point out, proceeds as follows:

Step 1:   Inductive--take known data and create a conceptual

framework;

Step 2:   Deductive--take the conceptual framework and

generate research.

Among other important characteristics of theory, according to Hall and Lindzey, is the fact that theories are never true or false. The implications and derivations of theory may be either true or false, but the theory itself is either useful or not useful. If the theory is able to efficiently and effectively generate predictions or propositions about relevant events that are eventually verified (shown to be true), then the extent to which it can do this the more useful it is, and vice versa. Consequently, you can specify how a theory can be evaluated, but you cannot specify how a theory should be constructed. A theory is a set of conventions created by the theorist, who, in choosing a particular conceptual framework, is exercising a free, creative choice. The choice is, of course, as much as possible, based on particular evidence and specific grounds for the utility on which it will eventually be evaluated.

Marx (1972, p. 6) says that theory construction can be based on the following definition of theory:

> Like many concepts in science, theory is not readily definable to the satisfaction of all interested persons...however, the following definition may be advanced. *A theory is a provisional explanatory proposition, or set of propositions, concerning some natural phenomena and consisting of symbolic representations of (1) the observed relationships among independent (manipulated) and dependent (measured) events, (2) the mechanisms or structures presumed to underlie such relationships, or (3) inferred relationships and underlying mechanisms*

> *intended to account for observed data in the absence*
> *of any direct empirical manifestation of the rela-*
> *tionships.*

Marx (p. 9) describes the role of theory:

> Generally speaking, all theory may be viewed as having
> two major and complementary functions: it serves
> as a *tool,* to guide observation and so produce new
> and firmer facts, and it is a *goal* of science in
> that our ultimate objective is as complete an under-
> standing as possible of the natural world, including
> of course man and his artifacts.

Chinoy's definition and discussion about the need to

define concepts and describe the interrelationships of these concepts;

Hall and Lindzey's characterization of theory in terms of empirical

definitions (operational definitions), systematic relationships of

relevant assumptions, the systematic and heuristic generation of

research, the means of providing a conceptual filter or lattice by which

to observe phenomena, the building process of theory in both inductive

and deductive terms, the true-false distinction involved, and the

creative nature of theory; and Marx's definition in terms of provisional

explanatory propositions, observed relationships, underlying struc-

tures, inferred relationships, and the tool and goal functions of theory--

these three conceptualizations of theory and theory-building are all

highly congruent, frequently isomorphic, and together as an integrated

matrix describe the processes used in this dissertation, the goals

sought, and the outcomes achieved.

These metatheoretical assumptions were applied to a large

body of data, composed of theories, systems, empirical findings, philoso-

phical formulations and speculations, and conceptual models in order

to identify the most useful of the above factors, systematically relate them, and generally build an integrated base for a theory.

From this base, implications were drawn for (1) further development of the theory, (2) application to education in general, and (3) application to specific areas of education, curriculum instructional development, and the nature and structure of the school.

D. Specified Need for a Conceptual Framework in Values/Moral Education

Any attempt to deal with values, values education, morality, or moral education, of necessity, involves the taking of positions on a number of highly controversial significant issues. These positions may be consciously and reflectively taken, or they may be unconsciously assumed with reflection. In other words, you may systematically analyze the issues, investigate the problems, reflect on the data, and make an attempt to develop an integrated, consistent, and sound basis for holding, defending, and using a particular position. Or you may arrive at your position without systematic analysis or an attempt to integrate the components of your belief system into a justifiable or defensible position. Regardless of which route you take it is inevitable that you will, at least operationally or behaviorally, have a position that reflects your judgments and influences your actions with regard to values and morality. This position we will identify and label as one's BIAS.

Since all human beings, by their nature, have perceptual, cognitive, and affective limitations, no human being can presume to know absolute truth. Consequently, no matter how thoroughly, systematically, or scientifically one develops his belief system, it can

never be more than a *bias*. From a scholarly viewpoint, a rationally
developed bias, better called a *conceptual framework,* is practically
and morally superior to an irrationally conceived bias. The latter
would be properly called a *set of prejudices.* Furthermore, it is an
assumption of this thesis that anyone holding a significant and influential
role in the social system, and who is involved in the socialization process
itself, has a *moral obligation* to develop a conceptual framework and
not a set of prejudices. Parents, teachers, and clergy, directly, and
behavioral scientists, indirectly, are so deeply involved in the sociali-
zation process that the development of a conceptual framework with regard
to values education should be one of their highest priorities.

The claim for the practical superiority of a conceptual frame-
work is based on a number of foundational assumptions. First, a scienti-
fic investigation of the problem will make available to the investigator
a wider array of data than would otherwise be considered. An objective
search for information about values will bring into focus data from
many disciplines and over the entire sweep of history. Second, the analy-
sis of this data is more likely to generate a greater number and higher
quality of researchable hypotheses than would a narrow search of a
smaller segment of history or of a lesser number of disciplines. Third,
the exercise of systematizing and integrating the findings is likely to
produce more powerful and more usable strategies because of the oppor-
tunity to observe relationships that would otherwise go unnoticed.
Fourth, the opportunity to benefit from the mistakes, findings, insights,
and data of others becomes available. And fifth, the development of

a conceptual framework makes it possible to establish a basis for evaluation. That is, the decisions that enter into the selection of components for the framework can serve as the basis for the criteria by which one evaluates the effectiveness and the efficiency of his strategies. In general, the development of a conceptual framework makes it possible to see consistencies and inconsistencies, relationships, and applications that are not otherwise obvious and may not even be welcome, and it tends to provide the impetus for formative evaluation. All of these add up to the possibility of greater effectiveness, higher efficiency, and more enduring impact.

On the other hand, the claim for the moral superiority of a conceptual framework over a set of prejudices goes directly to the heart of the values issue, viz., justice. To the extent that one operates with a set of prejudices, the danger of making judgments and engaging in actions on the basis of invalid beliefs, unwarranted assumptions, and distorted and incomplete facts is always present. Judgments based on a set of prejudices make it difficult at best, and frequently impossible, to render justice to one's fellow human beings. If we think of justice as the process by which one resolves competing claims on the basis of equal human rights and the absolute value of each human life, then it becomes a moral imperative to develop the capacity to take the role and perspective of the other person. One cannot truly take the role and perspective of the other person if he is prejudging the situation and/or the person. Clearly, then, from the standpoint of morality, a conceptual framework is superior to a set of prejudices.

14

The practical and moral superiority of the conceptual framework approach becomes even more evident after an investigation of the historical development of approaches to values education. Because of its centrality in the affairs of life and the concomitant sensitivity in social, political, and economic arenas, values education has largely proceeded from positions of vested interest and emotional involvement. Consequently, in spite of occasional attempts to define rationally the parameters of values development, values education has more typically proceeded under a number of sets of prejudices. Not until recently have there been sustained attempts to develop a conceptual framework. The present state of world affairs, the immense and complex social problems of our culture, and the growing awareness of the need for a more universally accepted ethos that will enhance the potentiality of worldwide justice and peace make it imperative that there be developed a comprehensive, integrated, efficacious, and valid conceptual framework for values education. As behavioral scientists and educators intensely interested in this need and deeply involved in the problems, we have been aware of our own moral obligation to contribute to the development of such a conceptual framework. In the sections that follow we will attempt to identify some of the problems and some of the available theoretical formulations and paradigms that appear to be promising components of the conceptual framework.

E. Organization, Plan, and Content of the Dissertation

The organization and sequence of the dissertation proceeds from a brief review of approaches to values/moral education, partly

based on reviews of the literature by Hoffman (1970) and Kohlberg (1964) and complemented and supplemented by a presentation and analysis of a classification scheme for these approaches developed by Stewart (1973). In this way Chapter II deals with the background and overview of the subject.

The major assumption is made that all approaches to values/ moral development and education are based on an implicit or explicit view of the human organism, its nature, its capacities and potentialities, and the processes and procedures by which it grows and develops. In Chapter III these fundamental issues of the major prevailing views of man that tend to dominate the behavioral sciences and philosophy of education in western culture are presented and critiqued. Justification for the selection of organismic psychology as the most usable, most defensible, and most balanced presently available for the foundation of the theory for values development education is presented.

Chapter IV constitutes the major synthesis of the components considered for selection into the *organismic-structural-developmental* conceptual framework that serves as the foundation for *values development education*. Each of the three components, viz., organismic, structural, and developmental is extensively developed, defined, and integrated into the overall structure. Major theorists, researchers, and scholars are identified and their contributions presented. A major portion of Chapter IV is devoted to extensive presentations of the stages of Piaget and Kohlberg.

Two of the most important implications of the findings of the research and the integration of the theoretical frameworks of the

organismic-structural-developmental theory are presented in Chapter V.
They are that democracy constitutes advanced sociomoral development, and
democracy is also a major process by which such development is facili-
tated and achieved. Support for these theses is presented in order to
show the isomorphism of democracy and principled morality (high-level
moral development) and democracy as process for moral development.
The final section of this chapter is devoted to an attempt to identify,
define, and elaborate the characteristics or criteria for principled
morality. Kohlberg's major claim that justice is the core of
morality is shown to be consistent with and supported by other major
philosophers.

Chapter VI is an attempt to apply the organismic-structural-
developmental conceptual framework to the school, curriculum, and
education in general. The role of the school as a values/moral agent
is analyzed, with the major conclusions being that, in general, our
schools tend to be both unwise and ineffective values/moral agents.
Both the planned curriculum and the unplanned curriculum are evaluated.
Definitions of curriculum and curriculum theory are presented, and an
outline of a plan for curriculum theory is presented that is believed
to be consistent with the principles of the organismic-structural-
developmental view of man and education.

What is considered the single most important implication and
conceptual derivation of the entire theory, namely, the conceptualiza-
tion of the school as a just moral community, is presented, developed,
and supported in Chapter VII. The characteristics of the just moral
community are identified, the role of the teacher is elaborated, the

need for an ombudsman in schools as a means of implementing justice,
and the significance of responsibility are presented within the context
of the school as a just moral community.

Chapter VIII briefly summarizes the dissertation, and then
presents a number of recommendations with respect to the following
categories:

1. General application of the theory,

2. Psychological, philosophical, and methodological
    applications, and

3. Recommendations for the exploration of or extension
    of theories, theorists, systems, and conceptual frame-
    works to augment the development of the theory.

F. Conclusion

Two final thoughts are offered before asking the reader to make
the long, but hopefully fruitful, journey through the following chapter.
First, the theory that is the goal of the thesis is to respond to the
need for education as seen by one of the contemporary world's greatest
educational theorists, Jean Piaget. He says (in Ripple and Rockastle,
1964, p. 5):

> The principal goal of education is to create
> men who are capable of doing new things, not simply
> repeating what other generations have done--men
> who are creative, inventive, and discoverers. The
> second goal of education is to form minds which
> can be critical, can verify, and not accept every-
> thing they are offered. The great danger today
> is of slogans, collective opinions, ready-made
> trends of thought. We have to be able to resist
> individually, to criticize, to distinguish between
> what is proven and what is not. So we need

> pupils who are active, who learn early to find
> out by themselves, partly by their own spontaneous
> activity and partly through material we set up
> for them; who learn early to tell what is veri-
> fiable and what is simply the first idea to come
> to them.

The second thought comes from William James. To a graduate student who had done a critical thesis on his work, James wrote:

> Building up an author's meaning out of separate
> texts means nothing, unless you have first grasped
> the centre of his vision by an act of imagination.

This concern for the *center* of great men's vision has been the major guiding principle throughout the development of this work. For that reason many of the quotations included are longer than they otherwise might be in order to present the heart of the message within the context from which it comes, without misapplying the literal nature of the words. There is some planned redundancy, in the dissertation, especially where identical or related themes are presented in various ways and in several relationships. Wherever possible, the precise location of the quotations is included, citing including alternate locations when relevant. The richer meaning of the statement can thus be obtained by the reader who has the time, patience, and inclination to refer back into the sources used here.

The statement by William James is also offered in the hope that the reader will grasp the center of the writer's vision from the entire work, rather than the distorted vision that could come from reading only part or sections!

A *kiva* in the Pueblo Indian culture is a very special kind of building. It is usually a circular meeting place that serves a

multipurpose focal point for the most important community activities of the tribe. Ritual, ceremony, decision, discussion, and many other vital functions of the life of the tribe took place in the kiva. It served as a place to perpetuate the viability of the culture. The author would like to metaphorically think of this dissertation as a philosophical and psychological *kiva* where many people and many ideas have come together to enrich the culture of education. It is hoped that the reader will enjoy and be enriched by having come here and taken the patience to read and reflect. Hopefully, some readers will respond and offer critical guidance toward the larger task of continuing to build a needed theory for values development education.

CHAPTER TWO

BACKGROUND AND OVERVIEW

The literature on *values/moral development*[1] and education
is so massive that it precludes a truly meaningful review within
the scope and framework of this chapter. Hoffman (1970) and
Kohlberg (1964) have attempted extensive and systematic surveys
which provide a fairly broad picture of what is known about moral
development. These reviews should be read with the authors'
perspectives in mind. Hoffman's extensive treatment is apparently
biased by his orientation in behavioristic social learning theory.
Also, his review of the cognitive-developmental approach is predom-
inantly based on Piaget's (1932) preliminary, tentative, and explor-
atory work in the field of moral judgment. He devotes twelve pages
to an extensive critical analysis of Piaget's brief foray into this
field, and little more than four pages to Kohlberg's later, deeper,
more extensive, and empirically substantiated work. He erroneously
presents Kohlberg's work as a mere extension of Piaget's 1932 work.
It is true that Piaget was one of the major inspirations for Kohlberg's
beginning work in the late 1950's, and that Kohlberg's doctoral
dissertation (1958) reported his efforts to test Piaget's hypotheses
and stages. In the intervening years, however, Kohlberg has elabor-

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[1]The term used in this dissertation indicates the concern for a
person's development in reference to his moral code and system of
values.

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ated his theory more on the basis of Piaget's extensive work on intellectual development, and the early 1932 work has become relatively less significant. Hoffman bases his review on Kohlberg's early work, from 1958 to 1964. Considering that Hoffman wrote this review in 1970 it is strange that he failed to consider Kohlberg's later work, including reformulations of his stages based on empirical investigation beyond the 1958 paper. Hoffman's review is important for its extensive review and analysis of the work done on moral development from the perspective of social learning theory; this approach combines behaviorism and psychoanalysis. Social learning theory represents an attempt on the part of some moderate behaviorists to formulate Freud's findings and hypotheses in behavioristic terms and assumptions. Hoffman devotes sixty-eight pages to social learning theory, the position from which he works in the field of moral development.

Kohlberg's review is more balanced than Hoffman's but is substantially biased in the cognitive-developmental direction. Kohlberg's view of the other major approaches and the relation of Kohlberg's findings and position to Piaget's 1932 work are provided. Since the review was written in the early 1960's it has historical importance with reference to Kohlberg's theory.

The foundation for a theory of values/moral development and education lies in the historical approaches to values/moral education. A brief description of some of the major forces that have operated in this field follows. By examining the history of the issue broadly and especially considering the philosophical issues

rather than being limited to the almost exclusively psychological orientation taken by both Kohlberg and Hoffman, we gain perspective. The broad approach developed in this chapter serves as a conceptual base for the dissertation.

A. Approaches to Values Education

Approaches to values education can be classified in many ways. Any scheme will be somewhat arbitrary because the issues involved are complex. The dimensions of analysis and comparison are numerous: many factors cut across disciplinary and philosophical categories, and objectivity is difficult to achieve in such a highly controversial area. Any typology, of necessity, will be both arbitrary and artifactual.

Hoffman (1970) organized his analysis on the basis of three philosophical doctrines that he believes are central in the historical development of approaches to moral development. The three doctrines are: (1) original sin (possibly more appropriately labeled the doctrine of innate depravity), (2) innate purity, and (3) *tabula rasa*. The original sin doctrine demands early and continual intervention by the adult representatives of the established secular and sacred values in order to salvage what otherwise might become a "lost soul." The historical roots of this doctrine are deep and complex, but the contemporary representative, according to Hoffman, is psychoanalysis.

The second category, innate purity, is traced to Rousseau and to the belief that the newborn infant is basically good and pure,

but is being corrupted by society. This doctrine calls for protection

from the corrupting influence of the adult society for as long as that

is possible, but especially in the early years. Hoffman identifies

Piaget as the contemporary representative of this view.[2]

Hoffman's third approach, *tabula rasa*, is linked to

behaviorism. Hoffman suggests that behavioristic learning theory is

a direct descendant of the *tabula rasa* doctrine. Hoffman also indicates

that this approach has much in common with the doctrine of "original

sin" or innate depravity, especially in its demand for early adult

intervention in order to prevent the infant from proceeding on a

course of biological drive gratification. The interface between

behaviorism and psychoanalysis is largely responsible for the social

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[2]Hoffman's analysis of Piaget's position is decidedly in error.
There is no basis to claim that Piaget views the child as innately
pure. In fact, Piaget (1932, p. 99) states: "From the moral as
from the intellectual point of view, the child is born neither
good nor bad, but master of his destiny." Piaget's work is pri-
marily concerned with epistemological development, and he generally
eschews metaphysical arguments of this nature. Hoffman's judgment
may be based on his categorizing Piaget with humanistic psychology
and the existential movement, which judgment is in itself somewhat
incorrect. Certainly Piaget's orientation is in many ways humanistic,
and his personal philosophy, in those rare moments when it shows in
his writings, is broadly humanistic, but not existential. He is more
accurately classified as an organismic theorist whose primary
interest is in genetic epistemology. Another possible explanation
for Hoffman's judgment is that Piaget was for years Co-Director of
the **Institut J. J. Rousseau** in Geneva. This, in combination with
the fact that Piaget is in agreement with some of Rousseau's ideas
(but strongly opposed to many others) could lead to an over-gener-
alization on Hoffman's part. It would be more accurate to identify
humanistic psychology and existential psychology, or the so-called
"third force" movement, with the doctrine of innate purity.

learning theory movement, and which has invested deeply in the study

of the socialization process and moral development.

Whereas Hoffman classifies approaches to moral education by

using philosophical labels for his categories, he actually develops

them in psychological terms. Kohlberg (1964) describes his classifi-

cation procedure as a concern for degrees of internalization. His

three categories are: (1) behavioral, (2) emotional, and (3)

judgmental. The first of these he identifies with the concern for

the development of the common sense notion of "moral character"

which is based on conformity or resistance to temptation. Kohlberg

calls this the "bag of virtues" approach. In this traditional

approach, "character" is something one has or lacks. (Character,

in this sense, is defined in terms of a precise and specific list

of virtues to be acquired and possessed and vices to be avoided.)

This view of moral education can be appropriately labeled, according

to Kohlberg, as either the *moral character approach* or the *moral

conduct approach*. This approach is closely related to the behavior-

istic tradition.

Kohlberg's second category (emotional) he calls the *moral* ✗

emotion approach. The fundamental premise of this view is that the

child behaves morally in order to avoid feelings of guilt. Moral

education must focus on training procedures that will ensure interna-

lization of cultural and social standards, and conformity to those

standards. It is obvious that Kohlberg's "bag of virtues"

descriptor also applies to this approach. Cultural and social

standards are merely different lists of virtues. Both the behavior-

istic and the psychoanalytic schools have seen guilt and anxiety as major socialization factors.

The *moral judgment approach,* Kohlberg's third category, denotes the cognitive-developmental approach to moral judgment as developed by Kohlberg himself from the inspiration derived from the work of Piaget and the writings of Dewey. It focuses on the underlying judgment that forms the base of moral behavior.

The Hoffman and Kohlberg classifications are very useful for looking at approaches to values/moral education. Neither system, however, is sufficiently inclusive and both fail to account adequately for approaches based on different concepts of relativity in values/moral issues. To accommodate these problems, an extended classification scheme was proposed (Stewart, 1973) in which four types of approaches to values/moral education are identified:

1. Traditional-Authoritarian Approach (Absolute Nomothetic)

2. Cultural Relativistic Approach (Relative Nomothetic)

3. Absolute Relativistic Approach (Idiographic)

4. Organismic-Structural-Developmental Approach (Universal Transactional)

Each of these approaches is examined following in some detail and the whole is summarized in Table 2.1. The descriptions are an attempt to simplify some of the more peripheral issues and to focus on the more dominant and central tendencies of the major thrusts in values education that have emerged in western culture over the last several centuries. Underlying these four broad

general views are different conceptualizations of the human organism, the nature of the environment and society, and the nature of the interrelationships between man and his environment. It is impossible to explore these issues or conceptualizations without getting involved in philosophy, theology, psychology, sociology, social psychology, and anthropology. No attempt to clarify all these facets of this complex subject will be made. Rather an attempt will be made to present the essential elements of these four approaches.

To conceive of these four types of approaches as mutually exclusive and readily identifiable would be to extend the scheme too far. There are many similarities and points of overlap in the approaches, and a particular program of values education, moral education, or character education may have characteristics common to more than one approach. However, in any program some overriding or dominant thrust would identify it as predominantly reflecting one type, the views of man and society held by the builders of the program, would most likely belie underlying inconsistencies and conflicts in the social psychological and philosophical views of the designers.

1. The Traditional-Authoritarian Approach (Absolute Nomothetic)

The belief in absolute values that have meaning apart from and external to man is basic to the absolute nomothetic approach. It is man's responsibility to learn these values and live according to them, according to this view. Values are assumed to be embodied in the traditions of the society, and some-

times are believed to have been rendered either by a deity, a quasi-deity, or a charismatic figure from the past. Values are believed to be externally objective, i.e., they actually exist independent of human perception, cognition, or valuation. In this approach, following the established tradition is considered mandatory for legitimate membership in the society. Compliance and unquestioning obedience to authority is demanded. Among the sanctions employed by the social system are punishment, limitations on rewards, strict control of role, incarceration, and other forms of coercion. The methods employed to enforce these sanctions include indoctrination, shaping, modeling, fear-induction, guilt-induction, and various kinds of force, both physical and psychological.

The underlying view of man may be either the *tabula rasa* view or the inner depravity view. In either case, the environment is seen as transmitting the values, knowledge, and structure of external reality to the empty or irrational organism.

An important characteristic of this approach is an identifiable cluster of character traits or virtues, and its concomitant list of vices to be eschewed. Different cultures or subcultures may have different lists, beliefs, and laws, but each one believes that its values are the right ones. The approach is absolutistic, not relativistic. While there may be recognition that other values pertain in other cultures, and to some degree a tolerance of different values, they are not accorded the status of truth. Absolutism is the central and fundamental element in this approach, and the point that most clearly differentiates it from other approaches.

Absolutism is thus the rock on which is built the philosophy and methodology of the values/moral education and other aspects of the socialization process within this approach.

What has been described here is present in various societies. The approach is readily usable as a socializing technique in widely divergent cultures and subcultures. Political, social, economic, and religious groups who see themselves as diametrically opposed to each other on matters of doctrine, belief, faith, and goals have used and continue to use this approach to values education. Greater or lesser versions of it may be observed in practice or in history by analyzing the socialization processes of such otherwise different entities as the communist party apparatus in Russia, the Zuni Indians, the Catholic Church, the Boy Scouts, many Protestant and fundamentalist Protestant sects in North America, the Ku Klux Klan, the John Birch Society, many schools and many large corporations in the United States, the Orthodox wing of Judaism, traditional Sunday schools, primitive tribal societies, the Peoples Republic of China, the Black September Movement, the Black Power Movement, virtually all military organizations, and many athletic organizations.

The above list serves to remind that this method of socialization is widely adaptable and has been extensively used for many centuries. It has been severly criticized in the western world, especially in the United States, in recent years, and there may be a general trend away from it. But old approaches don't die easily; this approach is still very much alive, even in a pluralistic and democratic society.

The absolutist approach lends itself well to the techniques and theories of behaviorism, especially the operant conditioning model of B. F. Skinner's radical behaviorism. This approach, however, and behaviorism should not be identified as one, for the techniques of behaviorism are also applicable in other types of systems. But the underlying view of man as a passive product or victim of the environment is highly compatible with both behaviorism and the traditional-authoritarian approach. Proponents of this view generally stress the urgency of early indoctrination, exposure, and training lest competing views get a foothold in the impressionable, malleable, and fickle mind of the child. Attempts are usually made to restrict opportunities for exposure to other systems before the indoctrination process is complete and the innoculation against infection from rival belief and values systems is secure. The "untruths" of other systems are viewed as ridiculous, infectious, evil, and dangerous.

Two basic ideas characterize the traditional-authoritarian approach to values/moral education:

1. Values are *absolute*, and apply to all people, at all times, under all circumstances, in all places. Truth objectively exists, is known, and can be transmitted.

2. The source of values is the culture or society. Values are *nomothetic*.

These two primary characteristics are the basis for the proposal that the traditional-authoritarian approach be given the technical designation *absolute nomothetic*.

2. The Cultural-Relativistic Approach (Relative Nomothetic)

The cultural-relativistic approach has some points in common with the first approach, but also some major differences. The primary difference is its relativistic approach to values, even though this is not a complete relativism, since values are seen as being rather constant and general *within* a given society. Thus, the term is *cultural relativism*--differences across cultures, but authoritarian within a given culture. Other cultures are not only recognized as having different values, but their value systems are accorded equal truth status *for the members of that society*. Within any given society the values are considered "absolute" in a normative sense. Consequently, the members of the social system are socialized for conformity, acceptance, and adjustment. Normalcy, mental health, sanity, and related concepts form the virtue list of this approach.

Since this approach has largely grown out of the psycho-analytic tradition and the cultural anthropology that was heavily influenced by Freudian psychology, there is an underlying view of man as an organism in conflict. Man must learn to control his passions and subvert his desires. The cultural relativistic approach relies heavily on guilt as a primary socialization instrument and tool of values education. The induction of anxiety and the arousal of guilt are primary methods of inducing conformity to the norms of the group. Whereas the traditional-authoritarian approach is more likely to emphasize the collective conscience of the society, the cultural relativistic approach is more likely to emphasize getting along with one's peers and having satisfactory interpersonal relations.

Emotional sanctions and emotional rewards are heavily relied upon.
Whereas the traditional-authoritarian approach is characterized by
compliance and unquestioning obedience, the cultural-relativistic
approach is characterized by *identification* with authority, conformity,
and adjustment.

This approach also lends itself well to the techniques of
behaviorism. The combined influence of psychoanalysis and behavior-
ism have led to a concept of values education that reflects the
social learning theory branch of behaviorism. Dominated by the views
of man from psychoanalysis and behaviorism, this approach to values
education sees guilt as the basic factor and motive of morality.
Moral behavior thus rests on the necessity for the individual to
internalize the standards of society and control his impulses and
desires by focusing on the feelings of remorse, pain, and anxiety
that accompany his transgressions. One of the major mechanisms by
which this approach to socialization succeeds, according to the
psychoanalysts, is through the specialized and complex type of
identification known as anaclitic identification. This process
results in the child acquiring through introjection the values of
the parents. Whereas the traditional approach focuses on the
external consequences of acts and is less likely to consider inten-
tions and motivation, this approach focuses on internal feelings,
self-critical and self-punitive kinds of behavior, and guilt-inducing
anxiety.

The applications of this approach are most easily seen in
the mental health movement that was especially influential in the

late 1940's through the early 1960's. The values generally identified
with the American middle class that emerged after World War II were
very much reflections of this cultural-relativistic approach.
Morality based on nationalism, patriotism, loyalty, getting along
with the neighbors and peers, being a "nice guy," expressing one's
personality but within the boundaries prescribed by the group, and
seeking the rewards of recognition and approval are all related
to this approach.

Two basic ideas characterize the cultural-relativistic
approach to values/moral education:

1. Values are absolute within any given culture, but
    they are *relative* from culture to culture, society
    to society, or group to group.

2. The source of values is the local culture, society
    or group. Values are *nomothetic*.

The cultural-relativistic approach to values/moral education can thus
be categorized as *relative nomothetic*.

Although these two approaches, described above, differ in
many ways, in actual practice they have been combined. And in
many of the social systems presented in the long list exemplifying
the traditional-authoritarian approach this second approach can also
be recognized. For example, the virtues and prescribed vices of the
Boy Scouts, many religious groups and Sunday Schools, and many
business and industrial organizations are products of both approaches.
The combined influence of behaviorism and psychoanalysis, the two
dominant forces in the mainstream of American behavioral science

and education for more than half a century, can be seen freely mixed together in many of the common approaches to values education.

3. The Absolute Relativistic Approach (Idiographic)

Modern emphasis on individual freedom has led many people into the position that all values are relative, that there are no absolute ethical principles or moral rules. There are no standards or criteria by which one person can ultimately judge another, no justification in fact for one society or culture passing judgment on another. Thus the name of this approach clearly states its position: it is *absolutely true* that all values are *relative*. (Presumably, the only exception is the basic statement itself!) The roots of this belief are many and varied, but certainly the post-World War II reaction against tyranny, oppression, nationalism, racism, and other processes and systems that tend to enslave, dis-enfranchise, or arbitrarily restrict the rights and freedoms of some people by others in power is one of the major factors. Part of this broad movement is represented by existentialism, another by humanism, along with other philosophical and political movements that have attempted to raise the status of the individual up to where it is either equal to or superior to the group. From its cultural heritage as "the land of the free and the home of the brave," the United States draws a particularly strong bias toward individualism and anti-collectivism.

In part, the absolute relativistic approach is a general reaction against the first two approaches. Many people have seen

the consequences of traditional-authoritarian and adjustment approaches
to values--they have seen the atrocities of Hitler, Mussolini, and
Stalin; they have seen the excesses of power manifested by dictator-
ships; they have seen the pathology of racism; they have seen the
stifling, deadening, and crippling effects of conformity and adjust-
ment; they have seen inhumane acts committed by supposedly religious
people and by religious organizations in the name of absolute truth.
And in their reactions to the weaknesses, defects, and excesses of
authority, tradition, and adjustment they have swung to the other
extreme and declared all values to be arbitrary, relative, and
personal.

The absolute relativistic approach is more general and
pervasive than the other two--more a sort of attitude in one of the
major prevailing *zeitgeists* than a consciously programmed method
of socialization. However, it manifests itself in many of the
movements that have developed into major educational and sociali-
zation forces, e.g., sensitivity training, gestalt therapy, some
forms of "open" education, A. S. Neill's Summerhill approach,
situation ethics, the ethics of the drug culture, the "do-your-own-
thing" spirit, and many liberal and radical anti-authoritarian
programs and movements. The issue being raised here in connection
with these programs and movements is not their general philosophical,
educational, or social orientations, or the substantive aspects of
their goals, but only their position on the relativity of values.

The best way to illustrate the approach and to indicate
its consequences is to briefly describe what are probably its two

most striking exemplars in the field of education, viz., *the value-free curriculum* and *the values clarification approach*.

The *value-free curriculum* is based on the premise that since all values are relative, teachers and school administrators have no right imposing their own, the community's or anyone else's value system on the students. The goal, then is to make a conscious attempt to avoid all forms of moralizing and, insofar as possible, to eliminate expressions of the teacher's bias. Even comparative religion programs are to be avoided in order to preclude the possibility of religious indoctrination. Students are encouraged to believe that not only should they solve moral problems for themselves, but that their solutions are of equal value in the sense that no one can legitimately pass judgment on them, i.e., declare them objectively right or wrong. The emphasis is on individual freedom, spontaneous growth, and respect for rights of others to hold values that are different. (This last is often more claimed than realized.) Whereas the traditional-authoritarian approach makes the content of the values orientation of the school as explicit as possible, the absolute relativistic approach, in the form of the value-free curriculum, attempts to make it non-existent.

The *values clarification* approach accepts the premise of the value-free curriculum stated above, but provides a different answer to the problem. Rather than to attempt to eliminate any reference to values, this approach tries to focus the curriculum on values by consciously and systematically encouraging, even demanding, that students actively engage in activities that will

aid them in formulating and clarifying their own values. The teacher is permitted to express his own views, but only as an example of *one* way to look at things, and not as *the right* answer. The exponents of this approach maintain that the role of the school with respect to values/moral education is to avoid indoctrinating for specific values (content), concentrate on the process by which values are determined, and provide maximum opportunity for students to arrive at and act on their own values.

The value-free curriculum is mostly a generalized prevailing idea rather than a formal movement with specific leaders. The values clarification approach, on the contrary, is an organized movement with identifiable leaders, a self-acknowledged theory, texts and handbooks, dissemination methods and recommended exper- iences. The founder of the movement and its chief theoretician is Louis E. Raths. One of Raths' former students, Sidney B. Simon, has become the guiding spirit and nationally recognized leader of the values clarification movement. The other nationally known leaders, all of whom have worked with Simon, are Merrill Harmin, Leland W. Howe, and Howard Kirschenbaum. They have several centers of their own and some of their students have independently started satellite centers where teachers can receive training in the theory and techniques. Many workshops are held every year all over the United States, and numerous school districts have contracted for specific training programs led by the leaders of this movement.

In recent years the values clarification approach has become one of the most dominant, viable, and accepted methods of

values education in the United States. More than any other values

education approach we have mentioned it has an organized, clearly

identifiable and concrete program. The two most widely disseminated

publications of this movement are the following:

> Louis E. Raths, Merrill Harmin, and Sidney B. Simon.
>
> Values and Teaching: Working with Values in the
>
> Classroom. (1966),

and

> Sidney B. Simon, Leland W. Howe, and Howard Kirschenbaum.
>
> Values Clarification: A Handbook of Practical Strategies
>
> for Teachers and Students. (1972).

The first of these books is the foundational statement

of values clarification. The following quotations from Raths, Harmin,

and Simon (1966) illustrate their view of values education as an

exemplar of the absolute relativity approach:

> We believe that each person has to wrest
> his own values from the available array. As is
> elaborated later, values that actually penetrate
> living in intelligent and consistent ways are not
> likely to come any other way. (p. 10)

> We therefore see values as constantly being
> related to the experiences that shape them and
> test them. They are not, for any one person, so
> much hard and fast verities as they are the results
> of hammering out a style of life in a certain set
> of surroundings. After a sufficient amount of
> hammering, certain patterns of evaluating and
> behaving tend to develop. Certain things are
> treated as right, or desirable, or worthy. These
> tend to become our values.

> In this book we shall be less concerned with
> the particular value outcomes of any one person's
> experiences than we will with the process that he

uses to obtain his values. Because life is differ-
ent through time and space, we cannot be certain
what experiences any one person will have. We
therefore cannot be certain what values, what style
of life, would be most suitable for any person.
We do, however, have some ideas about what *processes*
might be most effective for obtaining values.
These ideas grow from the assumption that whatever
values one obtains should work as effectively as
possible to relate one to his world in a satisfying
and intelligent way. (p. 28)

The point has been made that our values tend
to be a product of our experiences. They are not
just a matter of true or false. One can not go
to an encyclopedia or to a textbook for values.
The definition that has been given makes this clear.
One has to prize for himself, choose for himself,
integrate choices into the pattern of his own
life. Information as such doesn't convey this
quality of values. Values come out of the flux
of life itself. (p. 36)

For now, it is important to note that our
definition of values and valuing leads to a
conception of these words that is highly personal.
It follows that if we are to respect a person's life,
we must respect his experience and his right to help
in examining it for values. (p. 36)

These statements demonstrate the personal relativity of

values and their relationship to the idiosyncratic circumstances

and contexts of the individual. Unfortunately, however, this

approach creates as many problems as it resolves. The problems are

inherent in the conflict that always comes with relativity in this

arena of life. The implication of the above statements and, indeed,

the underlying assumption throughout the entire book, is that these

principles apply to those within the band of normalcy, moderation,

and general acceptance. The values clarification theory is based

on constitutional and democratic principles. Yet democracy itself

cannot survive, nor can the freedom and rights of individuals survive,

if each individual is permitted altogether free rein "to do his own thing." Would, for example, Raths, Simon, *et al* hold for the application of their theory to individuals such as Hitler, Stalin, the local Mafia godfather? Or would this right to individualism be extended to the youngster who wants to burn the building down, shoot heroin, or simply drop out? The implicit tenet in the values clarification doctrine is, of course, that within a certain band of acceptable behavior (a rather wide band, most likely) the individual has the right to his own values.

As a matter of fact, early in the book the authors point out that certain behavior patterns are not good and need to be remedied. The theory was developed partly to provide some answers for the problems of the unacceptable behaviors of apathy, flightiness, uncertainty, inconsistency, drifting, overconforming, overdissenting, and role playing (pp. 5-6). The underlying principle that seriously negates or weakens the position of relativity is explicitly revealed in a long section on the relative, personal nature of values. Raths, Harmin, and Simon say:

> As teachers, then, we need to be clear that we cannot dictate to children what their values should be and what experiences they will have. We may be authoritative in those areas that deal with truth and falsity. In areas involving aspirations, purposes, attitudes, interests, beliefs, etc., we may raise questions, but we cannot "lay down the law" about what a child's values should be. By definition and by social right, then, values are personal things. (p. 37)

Their contention that "we may be authoritative in those areas that deal with truth and falsity" demonstrates either a simplistic

concept of truth or a basic flaw in their position. The statement is in conflict with the fundamental principles of values clarification presented throughout the remainder of the book. Herein lies the problem of a relativity approach to values. Recently Kirschenbaum (1973), one of the leaders in the movement, wrote a brilliant critique of the values clarification theory and raised numerous questions about the validity, logic, and consistency of the theory. Strangely, however, he did not recognize the relativity problem. In fact, he reaffirmed the basic relativity of values.

The underlying conceptualization of the human organism in the absolute relativistic approach is quite different from that of either of the preceding approaches. The organism is viewed as active, rational, and good. The role of the environment is recognized, but the individual is central and dominant. The methods of this approach are vastly different from the methods of the other two previously described. Those accepting the absolute relativistic position utilize the methods of group dynamics, values clarification,[3] sensitivity training, and other dynamic interpersonal and social techniques. Implicitly, they depend heavily on social and peer pressure, a fact that becomes apparent through study of their methodology.

The absolute relativistic approach deemphasizes the structure and organization of the external world, and asserts that

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[3]Their term for experiences in which a person is encouraged or forced to observe and, usually, to verbalize his moral judgments in the presence of peers or role models.

it is right and necessary that the individual assert himself, find

his own way, and recognize that there are no absolute values. This

approach to values/moral education and to life is an exemplar of

the existential branch of the so-called "third force" in psychology.

When the term "absolute relativistic" was first considered

as the label for this approach it was with a somewhat humorous

attitude. The juxtaposition of the two ostensibly contradictory

terms, however, truly communicates the central theme and problem

of this approach. Interestingly, the following statement was

recently found in the literature. David Rapaport (1951, p. 274)

says:

> ...This is prerequisite to that process by which thinking
> and knowledge of the world is freed of artless subjective
> realism, *and even of that brand of relativism which is
> itself conceived as something absolute*. (Italics added)

Two basic ideas characterize the absolute relativistic

approach to values/moral education:

1. Values are absolutely relative to the individual.

2. Consequently, in spite of the influence of the

   environment, the ultimate source of values is

   within *the individual*.

The absolute relativistic approach to values/moral education

can thus be categorized as *idiographic*.

4. The Organismic-Structural-Developmental Approach (Universal
   Transactional)

The organismic-structural-developmental approach differs
from the others in a number of highly significant ways and on a
number of crucial issues. It is the approach believed by the author
and his colleagues to be the most promising and fruitful approach to
values/moral education. Consequently, it is the one to which this
dissertation is devoted. A full elaboration of this approach will
be given in Chapter IV. Only a brief introduction will be offered
here. Organismic-structural-developmentalism is based on a different
view of man, the environment, and the relationship between them,
and differs significantly from the other views discussed so far.
As an organized approach to values education it is relatively new,
as are some of its theories and assumptions, but some of its histori-
cal roots can be traced back for many years. So in some ways it
can be called a new or modern approach, but it has not developed
ex nihilo. An understanding of its basic premises and its
different view of man will become somewhat clearer if we begin by
defining and explaining the terms we have used to label it:
organismic, structural, and developmental.

By *organismic* we mean the view of man that sees man as an
holistic, integrated, functional organism. Man is seen not as the
passive victim of the environment as with the behavioristic view,
nor as the instinctual, irrational being that needs to be subdued
by the environment as with the psychoanalytic view. The extreme
separation of organism and environment that characterizes those

two views of man is rejected by the organismic theorists. The

relationship between the organism and the environment is seen as

transactional.[4] Values do not exist in some objective form in the

environment; they are constructed by the organism both on its own

terms and on the terms of the culture, society, group, and family.

Organism and environment mutually influence each other in an

ongoing and cybernetic way.

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[4] The use of the term *transactional* is very significant here. A more
common word is *interactional*. However, the latter term is ambiguous,
misleading, and has several meanings. Many people use the term
interaction synonymously with our usuage of transaction. But for a
behavioristic view of man the term interaction has a mechanistic
connotation that would be anathema to the organismic user. The
distinctions involved in the two terms are clearly drawn by John
Dewey and Arthur F. Bentley in their book, *Knowing and the Known*.
Interaction is a term that reflects the relationship that exists
between two things acting on each other, against each other, in the
sense that they are balanced in some kind of causal interconnection.
Thus a gear interacts with another gear. In the behavioristic view
of man one organism is seen as interacting with another or with
the environment in the stimulus-response sense. Transaction, on
the other hand, was conceived by Dewey as depicting a different
state of events more total, organismic, and systematic. Consequently,
for Dewey, two machines interact, but two people transact. It is
in the full, rich sense outlined by Dewey that we offer the word
transaction as a much better descriptor of the relationships between
or among people and between a person and his environment. This
significant distinction has been effectively taken and applied by
those social scientists who operate in the domain identified as
transactional psychology, and is developed and elaborated in the
book, Explorations in Transactional Psychology, edited by Franklin
P. Kilpatrick. In order not to make the text cumbersome, we will
use the words transaction and interaction synonymously, but the
reader should be aware that, to us, a human interaction is not
reducible to the simplistic, two-part, cause-effect, action-reaction
mechanism suggested by some of the popular uses of the word
"interaction". For a full development of the concept and its
implications see Chapter IV.

In the organismic view, man is not seen as a machine that can be manipulated, as do the behaviorists; nor is he seen as a conflict-ridden pathological organism as in the psychoanalytic view. Man is seen rather as a dynamic healthy organism. Motivation comes primarily from within the organism, not from external sources. The organism is active, not passive.

Structural refers to the underlying, organized, dynamic, and universal patterns that characterize human behavior, especially thought. *Structuralism* is a method of investigation used by some social scientists, anthropologists, linguists, genetic epistemologists, and others to search for the fundamental determining organization which lies beneath the ostensibly disparate phenomena of human behavior. The overt, superficial, readily observable aspects of behavior are called *content*. The underlying organization beneath the content is called *structure*. This is *not* the old structuralism of psychology that prevailed as one of the major schools of thought in the early 1900's. At that time one of the leading psychologists of the day, Edward Tichener, taking off from the work of Wilhelm Wundt and his introspectionist methods, extended and elaborated introspection in order to ascertain the structural properties of the mind. He was not, however, using the contemporary concept of structure. The content-structure distinction was not part of that framework. Titchener's structuralism has long since died. Modern structuralism is a methodology used by Piaget in psychology and epistemology, Claude Lévi-Strauss and Edmund Leach in anthropology, Roman Jakobson and Noam Chomsky in linguistics,

Kohlberg in psychology, and others.

The content-structure distinction is one of the key features of the organismic-structural-developmental approach (which will frequently be referred to in this work as the O-S-D approach). Its importance rests in the potential resolution of the absolute-relative dilemma, and its enormous utility in the attempt to understand intellectual and moral behavior. A deeper understanding of human behavior is possible this way that is not obtainable by looking at only the content of behavior. Piaget's stages of intellectual development and Kohlberg's stages of moral development are structural stages.

The concept *developmental* is congruent with organismic and structural. To clarify the term some important distinctions must be made. First, development here does not mean maturation. *Maturational* or *nativistic* theories of development are based on the belief that development is an orderly and timely unfolding of the built-in, or "wired-in" characteristics and timetable of the nervous system and other systems of the body. A good example of this type of development is Arnold Gessell's (1954) theory. The major premise of this approach is that development is an automatic occurrence, provided of course that the organism receives the proper nourishment and some stimulation from the environment. For Gessell maturation was both a necessary and a sufficient condition for development.

Behaviorists view development in a different way, as the quantitative accumulation of more and more stimulus-response

connections, and the chaining together of these connections into
more complex behavior patterns which is frequently referred to as
the *associationistic* or *behavioristic* theory of development.
Mentalistic concepts and stages are rejected from this point of
view.

The two approaches described above explain development in
terms of built-in and automatically unfolding programming for change
or in terms of acquisition of the environmental structure by means
of stimulus-response mechanisms. Explanations of development in
these terms are seen by organismic psychologists as both incomplete
and partly false. They fail to account for development as the
result of the organism's continuous need to change, adjust, and
adapt to new conditions (both internal and external), changed
relationships, unfamiliar perceptions, and a myriad of other
imbalances that take place in and because of the dynamic trans-
actional exchanges between organism and environment. Development
from the organismic-structural-developmental perspective is seen as
the result of four general factors: biological maturation, experience,
social transmission, and internal equilibration (Piaget, 1970b, pp.
36-41; Piaget and Inhelder, 1969, pp. 152-159; Baldwin, 1967, Ch.9).
These and other aspects of development will be treated more fully
in Chapter IV.

In contrast to the other two views, this approach can be
thought of as *interactionistic* or *transactionistic* as well as
constructivistic. The organism participates in the developmental
process by constructing cognitive, moral, and other structures

through transaction with the environment.

Another major feature of this view is the recognition of a sequencing of developmental patterns. Intelligence and moral judgment, for example, both appear to proceed through qualitatively different, structurally whole, and hierarchically integrated stages that follow an invariant sequence. In summary, development is seen as a complex transactional process actively involving the organism and the environment, and including a universal structural base that develops in an invariant sequence of qualitatively different stages that become hierarchically integrated.

The organismic-structural-developmental conceptualization of the human organism offers a different basis for approaching values/moral education. First, such education is not seen as the transmission of existing values to an empty or conflicted organism, but as the means for stimulating the natural developmental processes of a dynamic organism. Second, universal patterns of values structures prove more fruitful than conceiving values as absolute or relative. The absolute-relative dichotomy grows out of the focus on content, which of course is relative to culture, society, and individual. Third, it becomes unnecessary to mold and shape young children into predetermined patterns of values/moral behavior. In fact indoctrination practices seem harmful and have a retarding effect on the development of mature intelligence and behavior.

The purpose of values/moral education now becomes the stimulation of universal structural development to encourage mature adult intelligence and principled moral judgment (the highest level

of moral judgment). The methodology of the O-S-D approach is based primarily on democratic involvement, developmental parenting, and developmental education. The methodology relies primarily on the induction of disequilibrium by creating optimal disparity between existing cognitive-values structures and new data. Values clarification and values confrontation techniques, instructional simulation techniques, active involvement in the daily life of the home, school, and community, and various forms of educational intervention may be productively and constructively employed in this process. The most important aspect of this approach as a form of education is the focus on the development of democratic community as the foundation for values/moral development.

Two basic ideas characterize the organismic-structural-developmental approach to values/moral education:

1. There are natural patterns of values/moral structures and behaviors that are *universal* to all human organisms.

2. These patterns occur in an invariant sequence of structural-developmental stages partly as a result of the *transactions* with the environment.

The O-S-D approach to values/moral education can thus be categorized as *universal transactional*.

TABLE 2.1

SUMMARY OF APPROACHES TO VALUES/MORAL EDUCATION

APPROACH	View of Human Organism	Primary Source of Values	Values Orientation	Deals With	Methods	Theoretical Support	Purpose	Sanctions	Kohlberg Level Orientation
TRADITIONAL AUTHORITARIAN (Absolute Nomothetic)	Tabula Rasa or Instinctual Energy. Needs to be controlled.	Environment	ABSOLUTE. Values are externally objective, independent of human perception, cognition, or valuation. They apply to all people, circumstances, time	Content	Indoctrination Shaping Modeling Coercion Fear-induction Guilt-induction Force	Mostly Behaviorism. Some Psycho-analysis. Innate Depravity	Compliance with authority. Unquestioning obedience. Moral "Character." Virtue.	Punishment and limited rewards. Strict control of role and status. Incarceration.	Primarily Level I. Some Level II. Stage 3A' (prime)
CULTURAL RELATIVISTIC (Relative Nomothetic)	Tabula Rasa or Instinctual Energy. Needs to be controlled.	Environment	RELATIVE to each individual. Values are relative between individuals but defined by and objectively exist in the person's own culture.	Content	Indoctrination Shaping Modeling Coercion Fear-induction Guilt-induction Adjustment counseling Peer pressure	Mostly Psycho-analysis. Some Behaviorism. Social Learning Theory.	Identification with authority. Conformity. Adjustment and social acceptance. Positive acceptance of control. Moral conduct.	Rewards and punishments. Social rejection. Role-restriction. Guilt. Anxiety.	Primarily Level II. Some Level I. Some Stage 3A' (prime)
ABSOLUTE RELATIVISTIC (Idiographic)	Holistic. Active. Innately good.	Primarily the Organism. Some Environment	RELATIVE to each individual. Values are subjectively determined by each individual from his own mind and conscience after rational reflection. No one may judge others' values.	Content	Reflection. Group dynamics. Values clarification and confrontation. Sensitivity training. Peer pressure. Existential experience.	Existential Philosophy. Existential Psychology. Humanism. Innate Goodness.	Acceptance of self and others. Positive social interaction. Personal growth. Peaceful cooperation and co-existence. Living in the here and now.	Individual self-approval. Group acceptance and rejection. Peer pressure.	Primarily a combination of Stage 4½=4 and Stage 5. Some Level II. Some Level I. Stage 2 behavior common.
ORGANISMIC STRUCTURAL DEVELOPMENTAL (Universal Transactional)	Holistic. Active. Neutral with respect to innate goodness or badness.	Trans-actional experience between organism & environment.	UNIVERSAL. Values biologically determined by the organism/structure developmentally in transaction with the individual in transactional experience.	Structure	Democratic involvement. Developmental education. Developmental Democracy. Induction of disequilibrium via optimal disparity. Values clarification and confrontation	Organismic psychology. Holism. Transactional, especially Modern structuralism. Cognitive Developmental Psychology.	Maximization of universal structural development through democratic living. Constructive attainment based on developing structural equilibrium to stimulate development. Distributive Justice.	Necessary restrictions imposed by natural developmental principles. Constructive attainment based on developing structural equilibrium to stimulate development.	Natural development through stages 4,5,6 with development. [0,1,11,111] as goal. Primarily orientation to Level III.

Concluding Remarks

There is some congruence between Hoffman's *tabula rasa*
approach, Kohlberg's moral character approach and the traditional-
authoritarian approach. Also, there is some congruence between
Hoffman's "original sin" approach, Kohlberg's moral emotion approach,
and the cultural-relativistic approach. Hoffman's innate purity
approach, Kohlberg's moral judgment approach, and the organismic-
structural-developmental approach have even more in common. Both
Kohlberg and Hoffman omitted any mention of a relativity approach.
In view of the fact that values/moral relativity has become such a
prominent one in our culture this is a serious omission. It would
not fit comfortably in any of Kohlberg's categories, although it
could be subsumed somewhat comfortably under Hoffman's innate purity
category.

Another interesting point that needs to be brought out is
that the behavioristically oriented and psychoanalytically oriented
approaches in all three categorizations place virtually no emphasis
on the higher mental processes and their role in moral development.
This fact is probably one of the reasons these approaches have failed
so much and have been of so little use to the educator interested in
promoting values/moral development. The only approach that looks at
a broad spectrum of human characteristics and a wide range of
intellectual abilities is the O-S-D approach, which recognizes the
importance of cognitive, affective, social, and other aspects of
development. The behavioristically oriented approaches focus almost
exclusively on the range of behaviors generally identifiable as the

lower end of both the cognitive and moral developmental stages.

The psychoanalytically oriented approaches focus on the middle range

of those abilities. The O-S-D approach considers the entire range

of human behavior and development as valuable data for a values/moral

theory.

For this pluralistic democratic society it is extremely

important that we do not fail to see the essentially undemocratic

nature of both the traditional-authoritarian and the cultural-

relativistic approaches to values/moral education. In pointing out

how successful the Russian system of moral education is, Kohlberg

and Turiel (1971) make the following statement:

> ...There is reason to believe that the Russian approach
> is more effective. As we describe later, however, it is
> more effective because authority and group conformity are
> developed in much more powerful ways than in the traditional
> American system. *We shall argue that to make traditional
> moral education effective is to make transparent its
> undemocratic and unconstitutional nature.* (pp. 412-413)
> (italics added)

Apropos of this issue, in an analysis of Russian communism and

Russia's socialization process Sargent (1972, pp. 53-54) offers the

following commentary:

> The entire educational system is consciously designed
> to impart the values of the system in addition to
> providing the individual with the training necessary
> for him to take his place as a useful member of
> society. Again, the differences between this type
> of educational system and the type of educational
> system that is found in the United States, for example,
> is that there is a clear-cut, conscious effort to
> impart the values of the system to the individual. The
> system in the United States does the same thing, but
> it is not as clearly organized for that purpose. It
> would be very difficult to say that the educational
> system is in fact designed to do this. From the
> earliest grades we teach the children patriotic little

stories about the founding fathers, such as George
Washington and the cherry tree, that are intended
to present certain values to the child and at the
same time present a good image of the American
government. The fact that these stories are
undoubtedly untrue and are therefore, in this
particular example, directly opposed to what the
story is trying to teach does not seem to bother
anybody.

We teach other stories, such as the story
about "the little train that could." We tell
the children in essence that, if they try hard
enough, they can do anything. We all know, of
course, that this is not quite true, but we tell
the story to children anyway. Another example is
the story of the little train that left the tracks
and got into all sorts of trouble. When he got
back onto the tracks, he was happy, contented,
and accepted. There are so many things that the
story is teaching that it is hard to sort them
out, but it is obviously suggesting that con-
formity is good. It is also obviously indicating
that acceptance by the group is a goal to be
strived for, which is, of course, just another
way of looking at the conformity question. There-
fore, we do, in the American educational system,
from the very beginning, teach children values that
we hope they will hold when they grow up. There-
fore, our educational system is doing exactly the
same thing as the educational system in the Soviet
Union or any other country for that matter. This
is one of the things that any educational system
is designed to do.

This passage clearly amplifies the claim that the two nomothetic

approaches, so long and widely used in our country, are undemocratic.

The effectiveness of indoctrinative values/moral socialization can

be appreciated by considering the political and moral situation in

which our nation presently finds itself. That such a large segment

of our adult population can either readily accept or apathetically

ignore the incredible abuses of power, the blatant dishonesty, and

the corrupt morality of people in high office is in part directly

attributable to the effectiveness of our long-standing commitment to tyrranical and dehumanizing forms of values/moral education.

The absolute relativistic approach, superior in many ways to the nomothetic approaches, in the end is probably not capable of making a truly significant or enduring contribution to values/moral development either. Its idiographic focus, in its own way, merely replaces a greater tyranny with a lesser one. Neither dependence nor independence is the answer to the complex problems of a huge pluralistic society in a world of many other troubled societies. What is needed is significantly greater numbers of people with highly developed intelligence and morality who realize that modern society's survival is contingent on a social system based on *interdependence*.

The idiographic approach lacks power also because its basic premise is established on the superficial relativity of content. It fails to take cognizance of the underlying universality of human behavior, human needs, and human intelligence. And it is this foundation of common humanness that may point the way to some solutions to our seemingly insurmountable problems. It is expected that the organismic-structural-developmental approach to values/ moral education, with its universal transactional orientation, can lead to some fruitful ways of understanding the problems, articulating the issues, and hopefully aid in creating some solutions.

B. Some Historical Factors

A survey of some important historical factors will be
considered in this section. A number of important and landmark
research projects were carried out in the field of values/moral
development and education, and some other factors are important
as elements that lead up to our contemporary situation in this
field.

1. The Hartshorne and May Studies

From 1924 to 1929 a monumental, and now classic, study
dealing with values/moral education was conducted. The undertaking
was the culmination of many years of prolonged discussion and
planning that grew originally out of the interest in the effects of
religious education on the development of "character." Three
separate requests for funding for research studies were made in the
early 1920's to the Institute of Social and Religious Research. The
Executive Secretary of that organization brought the three petitioning
organizations together with a group of experts that resulted in the
proposal to do a large, scientific, field-based study of children's
behavior in order to determine the effects of moral education, both
secular and religious. Hugh Hartshorne, then Professor of Religious
Education at the University of Southern California, and Mark May,
then Professor of Psychology at Syracuse University were obtained
as Co-Directors of the project. Hartshorne and May were appointed
to the faculty of Teachers College, Columbia University to conduct
the study under the immediate supervision of the reknowned

educator and psychologist, Edward L. Thorndike. The extensive five-year study was commissioned as the Character Education Inquiry, and the massive undertaking produced the following three volumes:

1. Studies in the Nature of Character: Volume I,
   Studies in Deceit. Hugh Hartshorne and Mark
   May. 1928.

2. Studies in the Nature of Character: Volume II,
   Studies in Service and Self-Control. Hugh
   Hartshorne, Mark May, and Julius B. Maller. 1929.

3. Studies in the Nature of Character: Volume III,
   Studies in the Organization of Character. Hugh
   Hartshorne, Mark May, and Frank K. Shuttleworth.
   1930.

The findings of this study were very disturbing and profoundly disappointing to the proponents and leaders of traditional-authoritarian and cultural-relativistic character education programs. In effect, what the Hartshorne and May studies revealed was that traditional forms of moral education, more generally known in those days as *character education*, were not only ineffective, but sometimes deleterious. Kohlberg and Turiel (1971, pp. 422-423) have summarized the major findings of the study. Part of their summary is presented here:

> The most definitive experimental study of children's moral character yet carried out was that of Hartshorne and May....Focusing one part of their study on honesty, which they defined as resistance to cheating and stealing in experimental situations, they found that:
>
> (1.) *The world cannot be divided into honest and dishonest people. Almost everyone cheats some of the time.* Cheating is distributed around an average level of moderate cheating, with only few people never cheating or cheating at almost every opportunity.
>
> (2.) *If a person cheats in one situation, it does not mean he will or will not cheat in another. There is*

very little correlation among cheating tests in different situations. In other words, it is not a character-trait of dishonesty which makes a child cheat in a given situation. If it were, it would be possible to predict that he would cheat in a second situation if he did in the first situation.

(3.) *People's verbal moral values about honesty have nothing to do with how they act.* People who cheat express as much or more disapproval of cheating as those who don't cheat.

(4.) *There is little correlation between teachers' ratings of honesty and actual experimental measures of honesty.*

(5.) *The decision to cheat or not is largely determined by expediency.* The tendency to cheat depended upon the degree of risk of detection and the effort required to cheat. Children who cheated in more risky situations also tended to cheat in less risky situations. Thus, noncheaters appeared to be primarily more cautious, rather than more honest, than cheaters.

(6.) *Even when honest behavior is not dictated by concern about punishment or detection, it is largely determined by immediate situational factors of group approval and example (as opposed to being determined by internal moral values).* Some classrooms showed a high tendency to cheat, while other classrooms in the same school, seemingly of identical composition, showed little tendency to cheat.

(7.) *Where honesty is determined by cultural value-forces, these values are relative or specific to the child's social class and group.* Rather than being a universal ideal, honest behavior was more characteristic of the middle class and seemed less relevant to the lower-class child.

The findings obtained by Hartshorne and May were not restricted to honesty. Exactly the same results were obtained in experimental studies of altruism (or service) and self-control. More recent researches, studying moral behavior under the title of "moral internalization," "conscience," or "resistance to temptation," have essentially used Hartshorne and May's measurement procedures and have obtained essentially the same results.

In addition to the findings reported above, the study also showed that, for the most part, attendance and participation in formal programs of character education, including sunday school and other religious programs, had virtually no effect on moral behavior. It was difficult for the investigators to differentiate children who had "character" training from children who did not. The systems of moral education they investigated included those that utilized practice toward certain kinds of behaviors that were identified as being virtuous or leading to virtue. Many of the procedures involved giving recognition and other forms of rewards to the children who manifested the desired behaviors. Some of the programs involved the usual telling and reading of stories about virtuous people and noble, heroic, and virtuous deeds. In those cases where there appeared to be some advantage gained toward character development from a particular program or specific approach, further investigation showed the difference to be insignificant or cancelled out by an opposite effect.

Some of the practices induced countervirtuous behavior. In order to gain the recognition and rewards used by the programs to motivate virtuous behavior, the children would frequently lie, cheat, or steal to fulfill the requirments. These and other deleterious results were generated by the pressures of the programs.

Discussing the futility of attempting to build character with the methods of these programs and the teaching of virtues, Hartshorne and May (Vol. I, 1928, pp. 378-379) say:

A man may possess all the virtues without being virtuous.
It is not the quality of the isolated act which distinguishes
the good man from the bad, but the quality of the *man* as
an organized and socially functioning self. We may add up
his characteristics, whether these be virtues or vices,
but the algebraic sum is not his character.

     To this attack on the concept of virtues as elements
of character has been added in more recent years the
attack on the virtues as unified traits. Not only does
character not consist of a sum of virtues, but the virtues
themselves are not psychological entities with any real
existence. They are not acts. They are classifications
of acts. To attribute to a man who acts honestly a
faculty or trait of honesty is like explaining the act
of remembering by referring it to some faculty of memory,
which our popular systems of mnemonics are supposed to
develop as one would train a muscle. Of course some
people remember better than others, but to refer this
difference to some mysterious and specilized power of
memory is to stuff our ignorance with words. Similarly,
to say that an honest act is caused by a man's honesty
is like saying that it is cold because the temperature
has fallen. Some men, it may be, can learn to be honest
more easily than others because of real mental differences
of the nature of which we are not as yet aware; but
whatever honesty a man possesses resides not in a
secret reservoir of honest virtue nor in the ideal of
honesty which he may hold before himself as worthy of
his best effort, but in the quality of the particular
acts he performs.

The authors proposed what they called *the doctrine of
specificity:* "According to this view a trait such as honesty or
dishonesty is an achievement like ability in arithmetic, depending
of course on native capacities of various kinds, but *consisting in*
the achieved skills and attitudes of more or less successful and
uniform performance." (p. 379)

The results of the study lead Hartshorne and May to a
generally relativistic and behavioristic position on the values/
moral issue. In view of the psychological *zeitgeist* of that time,
dominated by behaviorism and cultural relativity, this is not

surprising. Modern structuralism was not yet in vogue, and the study clearly revealed the inadequacies and dangers of the traditional approaches to character education. The impact of the findings would have long-lasting implications, and the study is viewed today as a landmark in the field.

Hartshorne and May performed a great service for the field of education, especially values/moral education, by systematically and empirically exposing the futility of the traditional methods, and by revealing the shortcomings of viewing the problem of moral development in terms of the acquisition of some mythical thing called "character," or, in Kohlberg's terms, the "bag of virtues."

Some of their other conclusions and recommendations about education are significant and foreshadowed many later and even some contemporary ideas. For a summary the reader is referred to Chapter XXVIII, Vol. 3, 1930. They represent a mixed bag that a behaviorist, a humanist, or an organismically inclined educator could selectively support. But whatever their recommendations might be, Hartshorne and May's findings were consistent, significant, and far-reaching.

2. The Havighurst and Taba Study

This study was conducted in 1942-43 by The Committee on Human Development, University of Chicago. The actual field work and subsequent reporting were done by Robert J. Havighurst, University of Chicago, and Hilda Taba, San Francisco State College, and fifteen collaborators from the University of Chicago. The study has come to be identified with its two principal investigators and resulted in

publication in 1949 of their report: <u>Adolescent Character and</u>

<u>Personality</u>. Whereas the Hartshorne and May studies were conducted

on subjects of wide age and grade range in a variety of types of

schools and communities in many locations, this later study was

conducted on mostly 11th graders all of whom were 16, and all of

whom were from a small midwestern community given the fictitious

name of Prairie City (the town immortalized as the famous Elmtown,

U.S.A.).

The designers of the study adapted many of the techniques

and instruments from the Hartshorne and May study, but substantially

augmented them and approached the task almost exclusively from the

standpoint of character reputation, rather than from the moral

behavior orientation that predominated in the older study.

The weaknesses of the study tend to outshine its strengths,

and its contribution to the field of moral development is limited,

especially in view of the more recent work of Kohlberg's. The

primary problem of the study is its foundation in the nebulous

entity "character." The authors define moral character as follows:

"Character is a word with many meanings. It is used here in the

current sense of 'moral character.' Thus, for the purposes of these

studies, character is that part of personality which is most subject

to social approval " (p. 3). This definition, along with numerous

other assumptions that are explicit and implicit throughout the

study, obviously are based on the nomothetic approaches to values/

moral education. Although there is occasional mention of character

development being influenced by the individual's internal personality

characteristics, even these are reduced to earlier influences from the environment. Outlining their postulates and assumptions the authors (pp. 5-7) make it clear that they view character as *acquired* from the environment. They say "...character, to a very great extent, is *learned* behavior...in three general ways." They are through: (1) reward and punishment, (2) unconscious imitation, and (3) reflective thinking. Even the third is presented primarily in terms of frequent practice, an environmental factor.

In general, the study contributes little that goes beyond Hartshorne and May studies. The investigators view character as a "bag of virtues"--their specific bag being *honesty, responsibility, loyalty, moral courage,* and *friendliness*. Their findings and conclusions are relatively superficial and of little value for an organismic-structural-developmental theory.

In view of Kohlberg's later work, their findings about the morality of teenagers are consistent with Kohlberg's findings that teenage morality is based on stereotyped role expectations, peer pressures, conformity, affectional ties, and an unsophisticated conceptualization of society.

One reason for reporting this study here is its historical place in the field of moral development. Also because of its relationship to the following study, and partly to show how difficult it was to get at the problem of moral development prior to Kohlberg's application of the principles of structuralism to the subject.

3. The Peck and Havighurst Study

A second major study of moral character grew out of the Prairie City research work by the Committee on Human Development at the University of Chicago. Whereas the Havighurst and Taba study approached the problem from a theoretical stance that is close to the behavioristic view of man and environment, and based its study on the dimension of moral reputation; the Peck and Havighurst study was built primarily on the psychoanalytic model, and approached the problem from the standpoint of motivation. Based on ten years of study of the psychoanalytic and neopsychoanalytic schools of thought, Robert Peck constructed a developmental theory about the psychodynamics of moral character. Specifically stimulated by Erich Fromm's Man for Himself (1947), Peck defined five psychogenically arranged character types: (1) amoral, (2) expedient, (3) conforming, (4) irrational-conscientious, and (5) rational-altruistic. The study was conducted on this theoretical base using this typology, and was reported in the following book:

> The Psychology of Character Development
> By Robert F. Peck with Robert J. Havighurst et al
> Published by John Wiley & Sons in 1960.

The basic assumption of the study was "that the child learns his moral values and his moral behavior from the people with whom he grows up." (p. 142) "The chief question therefore became," according to Peck, "precisely which people of which social influences have produced a given child's moral value system, and in what relative proportions have the various influences had their effect?" (p. 142)

Their conclusions included the idea that, contrary to previous findings, there is something that can be called individual character that is rather persistent and predictable over a period of time. They defined this in terms of attitudes and motives:

> Quite apart from the matter of relative standing, it has been found that most individuals tend to maintain *the same attitudes and motives* through the years, in major aspects of morality. The child who is deeply friendly and affectionate at ten, for instance, is most likely to show the same warm, trustful feelings for people at sixteen and seventeen. Conversely, the child who is deeply cowed, submissive, and yet covertly resentful toward people at ten is most apt to show just about the same reaction pattern at seventeen, even allowing for all the pressures and encouragement to become more independent as adolescence progresses.
>
> In short, if character be defined in terms of powerful, emotion-laden attitudes, as well as action patterns that tend to become habituated, the evidence indicates that there is indeed such a thing as individual character, and that it tends to persist through the years. (p. 165)

Evaluation of these findings must be in perspective with other studies and concepts. First, the Hartshorne and May findings were based on a massive and extensive study using empirical methods to analyze children's actual behavior in situations. They found no basis for consistency or for anything called character. Both of the Prairie City studies reported above studied a much more limited number of children, all from one small town with a limited range of acceptable behavior patterns, and from the standpoint of other people's ratings of the subjects' behavior and repuration. Although one would have had a difficult time predicting the Hartshorne and May findings, one could have rather easily predicted

the findings of the other two studies. Generally speaking, people's superficial evaluations of other people's overt behavior patterns tend to persist, and if the circumstances are appropriate, as they were in Prairie City, the respondents will tend to meet up to the expectations of significant others. The Praire City studies, unfortunately, especially in view of the sixteen years, great talent, and enormous amount of money invested in them, operated from an incomplete theoretical base, dealt with the most superficial of *content*, never seriously approached the *structure* of moral development, and produced little that is useful in building a theory and operational basis for values/moral education.

Unfortunately both studies were built on what Kohlberg calls the "bag of virtues" approach. The passage quoted above from the Peck and Havighurst study clearly shows the terms in which they define moral character. Friendliness, affection, trustfulness, and other virtues are nice to have and nice to see in others, but they can hardly be used to define the basis of morality. What they actually studied, and found consistent, were certain superficial aspects of the content of personality.

4. The Third-Force Movement in the Behavioral Sciences

During the first half of the twentieth century the behavioral sciences were virtually dominated by behaviorism and psychoanalysis, especially the former. Within the last two decades there has emerged a new so-called *third force* in psychology that has been called by a variety of names, e.g., phenomenological psychology, gestalt psy-

chology, self psychology, existential psychology, humanistic psychology
and many others. It is a multifaceted movement, but transcending all
the differences of its subgroups is the recognition that there is more
to the story of human life than the forces of the external world or
the environment. And that there is more to man *qua* man than
mechanisms, conflicts, and pathology. What the Second Vatican
Council did to the Catholic Church, the third-force movement in
psychology did to the behavioral sciences and education--it literally
opened up the windows and let in some fresh air and new light--or as
Pope John called it, *aggiornamento*.

5. Recognition of the Affective

The Sputnik crisis in 1958 generated an overzealous
reactionary movement in education that overwhelmingly emphasized
the cognitive aspects of knowledge. The emphasis was on mathematics,
science, and other disciplines that could produce technology. Science
was nearly deified, and it was seen as the solution for all problems.
The resultant *scientism* drastically influenced educational research,
curriculum development, and instructional technology. The social
upheavals of the 1960's somewhat reversed this trend, and a new
consideration of the affective aspects of man's nature began to
creep into education. The somewhat overemphasis on quantitative
approaches, emphasis on methodology for teaching content, and
psychometrics are still very much a part of the educational scene.
But concern for man's feelings, values, and sensitivity have begun
to move into the mainstream of education. This movement has been

given renewed and powerful impetus by the recent political upheavals of which the Watergate scandal is the most important. Values and moral behavior are rapidly becoming significant issues for educators.

6. Instructional Simulation

Recognition of the affective is one of the factors that led to the introduction into education of instructional simulation as a legitimate methodology. Games, role-playing, exercises, values clarification and confrontation techniques, and many other forms of techniques and procedures that can be grouped under the rubric of instructional simulation are in widespread use in schools. This factor has also opened new doors for acceptance of and interest in values/moral education.

7. Structuralism

The modern acceptance in many sciences of the method of structuralism has opened the door to a new era in theory, research, and application in the behavioral sciences. The implications for values/moral development are enormous and significant. Since structuralism is one of the three major components of the proposed theory for values development education to be treated in this dissertation it will be no more than mentioned here as one of the most contemporary forces in the field of values/moral development and education. Structuralism will be somewhat treated in Chapter III, and will be fully described and applied in Chapter IV.

8. Jean Piaget

Piaget's major work of more than half a century on intellectual development has helped open the door to entirely new conceptualizations of the human mind, intelligence, and values and moral development. Known around the world primarily as a child psychologist and developmental psychologist, he is also a logician, mathematician, and philosopher. But his primary identification, and the one he prefers, is as a *genetic epistemologist*. As such he has studied the origin (or genesis) of knowledge, i.e., the problem of how the human mind comes to know anything and how this phenomenon progresses through developmental stages. His relatively minor work on moral development, The Moral Judgment of the Child (1932) was one of the major factors that gave rise to Kohlberg's work, which will be mentioned shortly. His theory of intelligence and intellectual development, however, has been of much greater importance for the field of values/moral development in general, and Kohlberg in particular.

Two other aspects of Piaget's influence are of importance with respect to values/moral education. First, Piaget is one of the world's leading structuralists, and his theory of intelligence is a structural theory. Second, he has become one of the most influential figures in both psychology and education, and his ideas are becoming increasingly accepted and adopted.

9. John Dewey

Dewey's influence in education, philosophy, and psychology is so profound and so diverse that he is one of the most significant figures of this century. Of special interest for values/moral education are his seminal ideas on values, morality, democracy, education, and many other subjects. At the turn of the century he proposed that certain aspects of human behavior proceeded through developmental stages, and this was one of the major factors in the initial work of Kohlberg.

The congruence between Dewey's ideas and Piaget's ideas is remarkable and makes a major contribution to the psychological and philosophical foundation for the proposed theory of values development education.

Dewey is a landmark figure in values/moral education, and he has provided some of the most useful and knowledgable ideas available.

10. Lawrence Kohlberg

The work of Kohlberg constitutes the single most valuable recent advance in the values/moral field. His theoretical formulations and empirical findings are the major foundation on which a modern values development education theory can be built.

Kohlberg has been working on the problem of values development for nearly twenty years, beginning with his graduate work at the University of Chicago in the late 1950's. His doctoral dissertation (1958) marked the beginning of his systematic efforts to build

a structural-stage-developmental theory about moral judgment. He has continued to work on the problem and has continuously refined and elaborated the theory and extended its application.

Building on the work of Piaget and Dewey, Kohlberg applied the structural approach to the field of moral development and made it possible to go beyond the relatively superficial work that had been done previously.

Conclusion

This chapter has provided information about historical approaches in the field of values/moral development and education. The reviews of Hoffman and Kohlberg were summarized and critiqued. Four approaches to values/moral education were presented, described, and discussed, viz., (1) the traditional-authoritarian (absolute nomothetic), (2) the cultural-relativistic (relative nomothetic), (3) the absolute-relativistic (idiographic), and (4) the organismic-structural-developmental (universal transactional). The problems of the first three were outlined and the potentiality of the fourth approach was presented as justifying this dissertation as an exploration into building a theory for values development education based on that approach.

The nine factors which have influenced the field of values/moral development and education were presented. This background will be seen as basic in the process of building a theory for values development education.

CHAPTER THREE

FUNDAMENTAL ISSUES

Any approach, system, or theory in the behavioral sciences reflects an underlying conceptualization of man, the environment, the relationship between man and environment, and other significant issues or dimensions of human behavior. The conceptualization may be systematic or unsystematic, explicit or implicit or some combination. Every approach, system, or theory is founded on certain metatheoretical assumptions and on certain value judgments. In the words of Allport (1961, p. 84), "every...theorist is a philosopher, though he may not know it." In working towards the building of a theory for values development education it seems to be critically important that the fundamental underlying issues be identified, analyzed, integrated, and made explicit. The purpose of this chapter is to deal with this problem. *The most fundamental issue is the view of man that serves as the basis for the theory.*

A. Some Views of Man

Dozens, even hundreds, of different views about the nature of man have been considered in philosophical terms. Several views are current in behavioral science. Three psychophilosophical views tend to dominate the behavioral sciences, especially psychology. Most of the positions about man that prevail in contemporary western culture can be comfortably subsumed in these three views. Taken

70

together, *behaviorism* and *psychoanalysis* account for most of the positions. The third view, arbitrarily identified as *organismic psychology*, does not neatly and comfortably embrace all of the positions not included by the other two, but it does account for much of the balance. These three views are examined from the standpoint of their most important identifying and defining characteristics. This examination will not be extensive, but will point out the most important dimensions that need to be considered. Much of what is presented in this chapter is based on a review of a number of outstanding surveys and collations of the theories and systems of psychology. The key reviews of psychological literature in learning and development suggest the three views as a least common denominator among widely divergent philosophical positions. Although they differ on matters of organization and categorization, the editors, compilers, and authors following can be identified as representing one or more of three views: Theories of Child Development, A. L. Baldwin (1967); Interpreting Personality Theories, Second Edition, Bischof (1970); Theories of Personality, Second Edition, Hall and Lindzey (1970); Theories of Learning, Third Edition, Hilgard and Bower (1966); Theories of Development, Langer, (1969); Theories and Systems of Psychology, Lundin, (1972); Learning: Processes; Learning: Interactions; and Learning: Theories, a three-volume set edited by Marx (1970); Systems and Theories in Psychology, Second Edition, Marx and Hillix (1973); Schools of Psychoanalytic Thought, Munroe (1955); and Contemporary Theories and Systems in Psychology, Wolman, (1960).

The above sources are edited and written by psychologists. Taken as a whole the three views are represented. Some of these sources are highly objective, especially Hall and Lindzey (1970) and Baldwin (1967). Others must be read carefully with consideration of the author's bias, e.g., Langer (1969) and Lundin (1972).

Following are additional sources that make reference to the three general views: Allport (1968), Brown, et al (1970), Elkind and Flavell (1969), Flavell (1963), Frick (1971), Fromm (1964), Goslin (1969), Hunt (1961), Lindzey and Aronson (1968), Maddi (1972), Murphy (1958), Mussen (1970), Rapaport (1951), Severin (1973), Skinner (1953, 1971), Vanderplas (1966), Werner (1948), Werner and Kaplan (1963), Wiggins et al (1971), and Wolman (1968).

Before proceeding with the descriptions of the three views some basic issues must be clarified. First, several types of theories are identified in the literature, viz., learning theories, personality theories, general theories of behavior, and single-domain theories (see for example, Hall and Lindzey, 1970, pp. 17-19). General theories of behavior attempt to deal with a broader scope of behavioral phenomena and tend to be very comprehensive in scope. Those theories that restrict their attention to certain types of behavioral events, e.g., perception, motor learning, memory, rote learning, auditory problems, etc., are single-domain theories. Since most personality theories attempt to be very comprehensive and deal with a wide range of factors, many reviewers consider them to be particular forms of general theories of behavior. For example, Hall and Lindzey virtually make personality theory and general theories of behavior synonomous.

Learning theories vary in their range of coverage, and may or not be general theories. Most of them are broad enough to be so classified. Different theorists and theories fall into different categories depending on the frame of reference. For example, theories about learning are usually specified as either *learning theory* or as *cognitive theory*. "Learning theory" is used almost exclusively to mean behavioristic learning theories. *Social learning theory* is one type of behavioristic learning theory; it emphasizes that learning takes place primarily in social relationships. Theories about learning that fall under organismic psychology are termed "cognitive theories" of learning.

Another point of confusion centers on the issue of growth and development. Theories that are termed *maturational, nativistic, or nativistic-maturational* or *normative* or *normative-maturational* are based on the belief that growth and development are primarily or exclusively the result of the natural unfolding of the predetermined plan or program "wired-in" to the organism. The once-popular theory of Arnold Gessell (1954) is the clearest example of this view. For treatments of this position see Hunt (1961) and Zigler (in Marx, Learning: Interactions, 1970, Ch. 12). Sometimes this type of theory is referred to as *a priorism* or *innateness*. But the terms *a priorism* and *innateness* are not actually interchangable with *maturational, nativistic,* or *normative*. A distinction between these two sets of terms needs to be made. One can believe that the automatic unfolding of the nervous and hormonal systems is responsible for growth and development, but that the content of thinking must be learned from

the external environment. This position would be considered

nativistic-maturational; and a person can accept this without

accepting the innatist position. The *a priorist* or innatist holds

for ideas or knowledge that are not derived from experience, but are

somehow in the organism prior to birth or at birth. A good example

of this view in contemporary science is the theory of linguistics

of Noam Chomsky. In most respects Chomsky is an organismic theorist,

but he holds for an innate core of base structure of syntax that is

completely independent of experience. As Edwards and Pap (1973) point

out, the philosophical issues involved in this discussion are very

complex, and involve the classical arguments between the rationalists

and the empiricists and many other factors. Most behaviorists would

reject both the nativistic-maturational and *a priorist* beliefs, and

line themselves up with the logical positivists or empiricists.

Psychoanalysis, on the other hand, holds that basic instinctual

drives and urges are present in the organism *a priori*, and that these

instinctual forces are omnipotent at birth and must be controlled

and tamed in the socialization process. The organismic theorist

tends to reject both of these one-sided arguments, and holds for

growth and development being created out of the interactions or

transactions between the organism and the environment. The

biological structures of the human body, however, must be present

and must gradually and naturally mature in order for this process

to take place. The extreme nativistic-maturational theorist holds

that for intellectual development maturation of the body, especially

the nervous and hormonal systems are both necessary and sufficient.

Most modern theorists in all three schools, behaviorism, psycho-
analysis, and organismic psychology, see maturation as a necessary,
but not sufficient condition for growth and development.

Perhaps it would be best to take a more extended look at
the three models or views of man as represented by behaviorism,
psychoanalysis, and organismic psychology.

1. Behaviorism

The roots of behaviorism are deep and complex, and go
far back into the history of psychology, both as an independent
scientific endeavor and as part of philosophy, especially to the
tradition of the British empiricists, primarily Locke (1632-1704),
Berkeley (1685-1753), and Hume (1711-1776). Two significant people,
however, are the major contributors to its beginning as an identifiable
and separate tradition in psychology. The first is the Russian
physiologist, Pavlov, who discovered what is now known as classical,
or respondent, conditioning. The second is John B. Watson, the man
who took Pavlov's findings and used them as a platform on which he
built a whole new science of psychology which he named "behaviorism."
The event can even be traced to a particular time: in 1912 Watson
presented the core of his ideas in a series of lectures at Columbia
University. The essence of the lectures was published in the
Psychological Review in 1913. According to Lundin (1972, p. 150), the
article "set behaviorism afire and became known as the behaviorist's
manifesto." The manifesto began with the following statement
(Watson, 1913, p. 158):

> Psychology as the behaviorist views it is a
> purely objective experimental branch of natural
> science. Its theoretical goal is the predication
> and control of behavior. Introspection forms no
> essential part of the methods, nor is the
> scientific value of its data dependent upon the
> readiness with which they lend themselves to
> interpretation in terms of consciousness. The
> behaviorist, in his efforts to get a unitary
> scheme of animal response, recognizes no dividing
> line between man and brute. The behavior of man,
> with all of its refinements and complexity, forms
> only a part of behaviorism's total scheme of
> investigation.[1]

The attack on introspection is Watson's adamant and total rejection

of everything that Wundt held for in his psychology based on intro-

spection. Similarly he rejects Titchener and the psychology he

based on introspection (structuralism). Titchener's was the old

type of structuralism (now defunct) mentioned in Chapter II and IV

of this dissertation.

At first Watson's rejection of consciousness as a valid

factor in psychology was somewhat confused and ambiguous. Again

quoting Watson:

> The plans that I must favor for psychology lead
> practically to the ignoring of consciousness in
> the sense that the term is used by psychologists
> today. I have virtually denied that the realm
> of psyches is open to experimental investigation.
> I don't wish to go further into the problem at
> present because it leads inevitably over into
> metaphysics. If you will grant the behaviorist
> the right to use consciousness in the same way
> as other natural scientists employ it--that is,
> without making consciousness a special object
> of observation--you have granted all that my
> thesis requires... (Watson, 1913, p. 174)

Note that in this statement Watson rejects the use of consciousness

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[1]The Watson article is also available in Vanderplas (1966).

as an explanatory term in psychology, recommends it be virtually

ignored, but does not do away with it completely. This is basically

the position of what is now known as *methodological behaviorism*,

which forms the basic tenet for a great many contemporary behaviorists.

The belief allows for the existence of something called the "mind"

or "consciousness," but disallows it as something that can or should

be studied.

Watson gradually swung to a more extreme position on the

subject and eventually did away with the "mind" and "consciousness".

His later position is contained in the following:

> He then who would introduce consciousness, either
> as an epiphenomenon or as an active force inter-
> jecting itself into the physical and chemical
> happenings of the body, does so because of
> spiritualistic and vitalistic learnings. The
> behaviorist cannot find consciousness in the test
> tube of his science. He finds no evidence anywhere
> for a stream of consciousness, not even for one
> so convincing as that described by William James.
> He does, however, find convincing proof of an
> ever-widening stream of behavior.
> (This quotation is from Watson and McDougall,
> 1929, p. 26, but represents a position taken
> by Watson in 1919).

Watson's strong statement wiped out the existence of the mind or its

use as even a workable concept. All dualistic (mind-body) conceptual-

izations were rejected and the behaviorist's monistic position was

clearly stated: one body, no mind. This extreme position came to

be known as *radical behaviorism*, and is represented today by

B. F. Skinner (1953, 1971) and his followers. Many behaviorists

today hold for the softer methodological behaviorism, and often resort

to "intervening variables" and "hypothetical constructs," introduced

into behaviorism by Edward Tolman (1922, 1932, 1949, 1959). Hilgard and

Bower (1966) offer the following statement that helps put the issue in

perspective:

> When Tolman announced his purposive behaviorism
> (Tolman, 1922), ten years before his major book appeared,
> American psychology was still excited over the new be-
> haviorism of Watson. It was Tolman's contribution
> then to show that a sophisticated behaviorism can be cog-
> nizant of all the richness and variety of psychological
> events, and need not be constrained by an effort to
> build an engineer's model of the learning machine.
>
> With the diversification of behaviorism under the
> influence of Tolman and others, the old brittleness of
> Watsonian behaviorism has largely disappeared, and what
> virtues there are in the behavioristic position have
> now become part of the underlying assumptions of most
> American psychologists--without most of them thinking
> of themselves as behaviorists at all. (p. 219)

Although much of what is said above is true, Tolman's *pur-

posive behaviorism* is, in many ways, a radical departure from the major-

ity of behavioristic theories. It is true that many behaviorists hold

to a softer position than that of *radical behaviorism,* but not quite

as soft as Tolman's. They use Tolman's intervening variables as media-

tional principles, but tend to classify Tolman's theory as a cognitive

theory of learning. In fact, Tolman's theory is a combination of field

theory and behaviorism and is sometimes referred to as a cognitive field

theory.

In general behaviorism relies almost exclusively on empirical

methods of investigation, and is strongly based on and allied with the

philosophical position known as logical positivism which grew out of

the renowned Vienna Circle. According to John Passmore (in Edwards,

1967, Vol 5, pp. 52-57):

> Logical positivism is the name given in 1931 by
> A.E. Blumberg and Herbert Feigl to a set of philo-
> sophical ideas put forward by the Vienna circle.
> Synonymous expressions include "consistent empiricism,"
> "logical empiricism," "scientific empiricism," and
> "logical neopositivism." The name logical positivism
> is often, but misleadingly, used more broadly to include
> the "analytical" or "ordinary language" philosophies
> developed at Cambridge and Oxford. (p. 52)

The positivists reject metaphysics and all transcendental ex-
planations. They maintain that assertions in this framework are meaning-
less because there is no way to verify them in experience. Epistemolo-
gical theories of this kind are rejected with equal vigor. According
to the positivists, there is no way to verify that our observations of
the external world have any truth status. All we know is what we
perceive with our senses through our experience. In essence, positivism
reduces epistemology to psychology. Only science can tell us, with
its empirical methods, the kind of information that can give us any
understanding of the world. Philosophical speculation is rejected and
replaced with the empirical methods of science.

It is easy to see how behaviorism and logical positivism and
empiricism are congruent. And although logical positivism, as a formal
philosophical movement, is generally considered dead, it has left a
powerful, enduring, and viable heritage that is extremely influential in
today's psychology. Skinner is today's leading exponent of logical
positivism.

One of the major consequences of the behavioristic view and
the empirical approach is the view of the human organism as either an
empty box or a sealed box. Either way the organism's internal workings
are ineffable and irrelevant. All that can be known about the organism

is what can be observed and studied in the form of behavior. The human organism at birth is conceptualized as a *tabula rasa*, "blank slate" or "blank tablet." There are no innate ideas; no preformed knowledge or thoughts, and no meaningful consciousness. The infant is a bundle of reflexes that can be completely understood in terms of stimuli and responses. All knowledge, information, and structure is in the environment and comes to the child from the environment. In time the child will come to reflect its environment. Thus Jonas Langer (1969) has aptly named behaviorism "The Mechanical Mirror Theory." Like a mirror, the human organism mechanically reflects the reality of the external world.

A basic issue for all views of man is the issue about whether man is *active* or *passive*. Behaviorism clearly sees man at the passive end of the continuum, and believes he becomes what he is because of the action of the environment *on* him. Man is a passive actor or patient on which the environment operates. The world, according to this view, is a coherently organized and structured entity into which the child is born devoid of psychological content, and the child mechanistically comes to reflect his environment. Behaviorists do not deal with underlying psychological processes, but view all psychological phenomena as *behaviors* which have little or no meaning unless they are observable, measurable, or potentially measurable.

The environment is defined in terms of stimuli which affect behavior, therefore physical events that have no detectable effect on the organism's behavior would not be considered part of its environment. Thus the environment is defined as those stimuli which impinge upon

the organism in some observable and potentially measurable way (Langer, 1969; Gewirtz, 1969).

A stimulus is an environmental event that affects the response of the organism, and a response is any movement or action of the organism that is under the control of the environmental stimuli. It must be emphasized, then, that for behaviorists it is meaningful to speak only in terms of S-R units; to talk of one without the other in the sense that either could exist by itself is meaningless. Behavior is defined in terms of its functional relationships to controlling stimuli, or as movements of the organism that are observable and that can be shown to be under the control of stimuli. Man is, therefore, seen very mechanically as a machine whose behavior is triggered by an external agent. Behavior merely articulates what action is already suggested in and structured by the environment.

The primary mechanisms by which organized external content is transmitted to the organism are classical (respondent) conditioning, the Pavlovian type, and operant (instrumental) conditioning. All behaviorists accept these two types of learning as given. Some behaviorists (Skinner, Bijou, Baer, Gewirtz, and many others) recognize the existence and role of respondent conditioning, but relegate it to a secondary role in learning, and ascribe practically all learning to operant conditioning.

Respondent conditioning is the pairing of an unconditioned stimulus to a conditioned stimulus so that the subject acquires the conditioned stimulus as part of its behavioral repertoire. Pavlov conditioned his dogs to salivate at the sound of a bell by pairing

the ringing of the bell with the appearance of food (the unconditioned stimulus). In time the ringing of the bell elicited the salivation without the presence of the food. Behaviorists believe that many emotional responses in human beings are conditioned associations of this type. Fears, for example, can be acquired in this manner.

Operant conditioning is based on an entirely different principle. It is best stated in Skinner's terms (1971) that "behavior is shaped by its consequences." In other words, if an act is followed by reward the act will tend to be repeated. Note that in respondent conditioning the reward (the food) is given before the event, whereas in operant condition the reward follows the event and shapes the behavior.

One of the most powerful controversies in behavioristic psychology regards the role and importance reward. Some behaviorists maintain that learning takes place strictly through *association*. The mere fact that two things are temporally linked will cause them to be associated by the organism. The leading statement of this approach to learning is in the form of Edwin Guthrie's *contiguity theory*, later restated in mathematical form by W.K. Estes.

Other behaviorists, a very large group, maintain that reward, or as they call it, *reinforcement*, is required for learning to take place. This principle dates far back in the history of psychology to Edward L. Thorndike's famous Law of Effect, (see e.g. Lundin, 1972, pp. 127-133; Marx, Learning: Theories, 1970, pp. 52ff; and Hall and Lindzey, 1970, p. 418) which in principle asserted that responses which lead to satisfying consequences are, as he put it, "stamped in."

And, he added, that the greater the satisfaction the better the bond. He also believed that responses which lead to unsatisfying consequences are "stamped out." He made rewards and punishments diametrical opposites. Later he reformulated the principle and maintained that reward always strengthens the connection, but that punishment doesn't always weaken it (Lundin, p. 131).

Building on Thorndike's Law of Effect, Clark Hull, one of the most significant figures in behaviorism, developed his *reinforcement theory*. Kenneth Spence, one of Hull's students, reformulated Hull's theory. It is one of the most influential theories in behaviorism, and is generally referred to as the Hull-Spence Reinforcement Theory. Hull believed that the reason reward, or reinforcement, was effective was not because it satisfied, but because it acted on and reduced drive. In Lundin's words (1972, p. 176): "What strengthened behavior was the reinforcement that reduced the drive." The Hull-Spence theory was later reformulated again by John Dollard and Neal Miller, but they brought in Freud's psychoanalytic formulations about human behavior and thereby helped father what is known as *social learning theory*, one of the most important occurrences in the field of values/moral development, as I mentioned in Chapter II. It is Dollard, Miller, Bandura, Walters, Sears, and many others who from the theoretical position of behavioristic social learning theory have engaged in so much work on the socialization process and values/moral education.

The chief rival for domination in the behavioristic tradition is the work of Burrhus Frederic Skinner. Skinner's work is in

many ways the antithesis of Hull's. Hull's theory is complex, intricate,
and loaded with intervening variables and hypothetical constructs.
Skinner identifies with Watson and rejects *all* mentalistic concepts
of any kind, is completely opposed to deductive theorizing, such as
Hull's, and may be described as an "empty organism" theorist. His
highly controversial book, Beyond Freedom and Dignity (1971), vehe-
mently argues against any mentalistic ideas at all, declares all such
ideas prescientific vestiges of what he calls "autonomous man," which
he literally ridicules. Near the end of the book he says, however:

> In shifting control from autonomous man to the
> observable environment we do not leave an empty organ-
> ism. A great deal goes on inside the skin, and
> physiology will eventually tell us more about it. It
> will explain why behavior is indeed related to the
> antecedent events of which it can be shown to be a
> function. (p. 186)

The context of his entire statement and argument is ostensibly
inconsistent unless you realize that what he says is in the organism
is purely physiological, and *not* mental. In this respect the term
"empty organism" is consistently used in the literature. Skinner's
position is clearly revealed in his statements about the private world
inside the skin: "It would be foolish to deny the existence of that
private world, but it is also foolish to assert that because it is
private it is of a different nature from the world outside. The
difference is not in the stuff of which the private world is composed
but in its accessibility." (p. 182)

What could appear to be something mental in reality is merely
an extension of the contingencies of reinforcement from the outside
world, rooted in the physiological processes mentioned above.

Throughout the book Skinner rejects as prescientific all such notions
as human nature, internal states, traits of character, capacities,
abilities, feelings, personality, attitudes, beliefs, values, and the
entire repertoire of psychological constructs used to describe and
explain human behavior.

What then does Skinner believe? He believes that all human
behavior is the product of the environment through the process of
operant conditioning. Skinner's theoretical position is sometimes
referred to as radical behaviorism, inductive behaviorism (in contrast
to Hull's deductive behaviorism), Skinnerian positivism, and by other
terms. But the most common and probably most accurate descriptor is
the one Hall and Lindzey (1970, Ch. 12) use, viz., Operant Reinforce-
ment Theory. Two of the best sources of information about Skinner's
system are his 1953 book, Science and Human Behavior, and his previ-
ously mentioned 1971 book, Beyond Freedom and Dignity. The latter is
particularly significant for the field of values/moral development and
education. More will be said about it later.

Skinner in many ways has extended and refined the behavior-
istic tradition and view of man to its ultimate statement. He sees
the environment as the source of virtually everything. He argues
for the development of a science and a technology of human behavior
built on the principles of operant conditioning, on the utilization
of appropriate contingencies of reinforcement in the environment to shape
and control human behavior in order to build a good world. He declares
all aspects of autonomous man as prescientific, including freedom
and dignity, which are merely two sides of responsibility, as he defines

them. As a result, he makes completely explicit what is the underly-
ing principle of all behaviorism: all human behavior is completely
lawful, predictable, and determined.

Skinner's position is the extreme poistion in contemporary
behaviorism, and not all behaviorists accept his theoretical formula-
tions or his principles. But he is somewhat of a phenomenon in the
respect that he is so highly influential in spite of his extreme posi-
tion. Skinner and his associates and followers have begun to permeate
virtually every institution in our society with their principles and
technology of *behavior modification,* or as it is more appropriately
called, *applied behavioral analysis.* This is especially true in the
world of education. From teaching machines, to programmed learning,
to token economies in the classroom, Skinner's influence is pervasive
and powerful. Behaviorism is not one unified movement in psychology.
The social learning theorists, for example, that have already been
mentioned, reject the idea that all human behavior can be explained
in terms of respondent and operant conditioning. They argue strongly
for, and have done a great deal of research work that they believe
supports, the ideas of identification, imitation, and modeling as
playing a large role in social behavior. The social learning theorists
do not reject all of Skinner's position, they merely believe there
is more to it than he says. In fact, social learning theorists have
actively jumped on the Skinnerian bandwagon of behavior modification
(see for example, Bandura, 1969).

Gewirtz (1969) on the other hand, systematically analyzes
all behavioristic positions, especially social learning theory, and

declares anything beyond the two elementary forms of conditioning as excess theoretical baggage that serves to hamper progress in understanding human behavior. Gewirtz sees Skinner's system as the answer.

One point of significance for education contained in the behavioristic approach is that the mechanisms of conditioning (and even the mechanisms of the social learning theorists beyond conditioning) are presumed to account for all the observable *quantitative growth* of the child's behavior, or, in other words, growth is the *acquisition* of content. The emphasis here on "quantitative" and "acquisition" is purposeful in order to bring out the mechanistic conceptualization in behaviorism. The child is a passive receptor that quantitatively grows partly by maturation and mostly by continuous accumulation of the associations that it acquires from external sources. Growth and memory are thus accounted for in these terms. The major developmental hypothesis of behaviorism is that early conditioned associations affect the child's behavior later in life. Viewing man as a machine whose behavior is determined by the environment permits the behaviorist to see growth as a continuous process and learning as being fundamentally the same kind of procedure throughout the life span. Consequently, the idea of developmental stages is completely rejected.

Of great significance in this view is the role of shaping and the inherent dependence of the human being throughout his life. Shaping is the procedure by which the *controller* modifies the contingencies of reinforcement in such a way as to gradually extinguish undesirable behaviors on the part of the subject. The child is

rewarded for his original gross efforts toward a goal. With each succeeding attempt only the behaviors closest to that which is desired are reinforced. Eventually the desired behavior is elicited from the child and only this is reinforced. This procedure on the part of the controller "shapes" the behavior of the child.

This procedure is inherently dependency-inducing and dependency-maintaining. In fact, behavioristic theory declares that the child is born dependent upon the environment, will become increasingly dependent upon the environment, and because of the reinforcing effect of the environment growth itself ensures the increasing dependency of the human being as it gradually achieves adult status.

To summarize what has been said and to particularly point out those features of behaviorism that especially relate to values/moral education, the human organism is conceived as a *tabula rasa* on which the environment will "write" the values, knowledge, and structure of the environment. The child is a passive victim of the environment.

The environment must control the child early in life in order to shape and mold its behavior in such a way that it does not have a chance to gratify its powerful drives and urges that may be in opposition to the needs prescribed by environment. Because all behavior is scientifically seen as completely lawful and predictable all events are completely determined. Both free will and indeterminism are ruled out. Skinner is most adamant on this issue, but it is a *general* tenet all across behavioristic schools of thought. Somewhat related to this is the view that the child is seen as heterotelic, and not as autotelic. In other words, the purpose of the human

being resides in the environment and not in the person.

The organism is seen very mechanistically. It is really inappropriate in a sense to refer to an "organism" in behavioristic terms. Behaviorism readily adopts the mechanistic Newtonian physics concept of interaction. (Of course, this term interaction is also widely used today in many ways without consideration of its mechanistic significance.) Machines and parts of machines, and physical forces, interact with each other. The movement of a lever causes an object to move; one gear turns another gear; turn a crank and something connected it to it will react. The entire concept of action-reaction is an integral part of the world of mechanics. It would be natural, then, to carry this kind of thinking and terminology over into a mechanistic view of man. The "mechanical mirror theory" is entirely consistent in using interactional concepts in describing man's relationship with the environment, which includes his relationships with other men. The important question that must be raised deals with the appropriateness of the application of mechanistic concepts to man *qua* organism. Behaviorists answer that mechanistic reflexes govern the acquisition of behavioral elements. Consistent with this view, then, it would be appropriate to look upon man's relationships with other men and other parts of his environment as interactions.

Internal mental or psychological processes have little or no meaning in behavioristic theory. Personality is seen as the accumulation of habits and associations. Language is learned by the same procedures, but it also serves a very important function in the learning process in that it serves as a system of positive and negative

reinforcers that enhance and accelerate the learning process. Parents
and educators shape the behavior of children mostly by reward and
punishment, and partly (according to the social learning theorists) by
the example they set. Parents and educators are primary sources of
negative and positive reinforcement, and also serve as powerful models
in the shaping and conditioning process.

This brief, sketchy, and incomplete presentation of behavior-
ism is an attempt to communicate the essential features of behavior-
istic theory, a little about its origin, and has emphasized those
aspects of the theory that are directly and indirectly important for
the field of values/moral development and education.

2. Psychoanalysis

Psychoanalysis is a type of therapy, a method of research,
and a theory of man. Only the last of these will be considered here.
The psychoanalytic view of man is highly complex, richly loaded with
mythological concepts, and somewhat peculiar in that it owes its origin
primarily to one man--Sigmund Freud. And although much has been done
since Freud's time, by both his followers and challengers within the
psychoanalytic tradition, to modify its theoretical and philosophical
concepts, much of contemporary psychoanalytic theory is still heavily
rooted in Freud's basic ideas.[2]

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[2]Much of what follows is based on Langer (1969). His excellent present-
ation of the enormous complexity of psychoanalytic theory is very
readable and is a faithful reflection of the theory. Several of the
sources listed at the beginning of this chapter will augment and enrich
this and Langer's presentation. Munroe (1955) is especially valuable
also.

The basic thesis of the psychoanalytic theory is its concept-
ualization of man as a conflicted being who is constantly torn between his
instinctual passions and the unrelenting demands of the external world to
restrict, control, and channel those passions. Man is always in this
state of fundamental and continuous conflict between his natural
instinctual impulses and the unnatural societal mores imposed upon
him. Conflict is in part responsible for man's being driven to
action and growth. But only gradually does man's physiological
maturation, personality development, identity formation, and psycho-
sexual development permit him to learn to control his passions and
impulses and try to submit himself to the demands of his environ-
ment. The battle is never won, but is always in process.

This view, in contrast to the behavioristic view, pictures
man as basically affective and irrational in nature. His essential
psychological nature is *desire, not reason*. Instinct is the primary,
efficient cause of mental life, and experience and environment are
secondary, transforming elements that help to determine, channel,
and influence the particular content and orientation of the individual
mind. Since Freud's model of man placed so much emphasis on the
affective, and since man's basic nature is seen as desire rather than
reason, it is easy to understand why psychoanalytic theory has done
relatively little to formulate an organized and integrated theory
or view of cognitive development, and consequently, this approach
has the least to say of any of the three approaches about the nature
of man's mind and the underlying epistemological problems.

It is difficult, therefore, to place this approach on the

active-passive continuum discussed with the previous approaches. Man

is involved in a war between his own internal nature and the external

forces of his environment. And since the psychoanalytic approach

has not sufficiently forged a theory of cognitive development it is

difficult to conclude its stand on this dimension. Freud's ideas seem

to suggest an epicyclic type of relationship between man and environment.

This would involve a complex circular, feedback, and evolutionary process

that would begin with the irrational infant's contact with the external

reality of the world dynamically transforming him into the prerational

child, who in similar fashion is transformed into an early form of

rationality, and again eventually into more mature forms of rationality.

But deeply embedded in this process is the parallel process of the

organism's transformation of the general reality of the infant's world

into the increasingly specialized realities of the developing organism's

perception of and management of the environment. Thus man is both

a victim of the environment and in conflict with its, but also tries

to mold and structure the environment in a limited way.

Freud assumed the infant is born with nothing more than

irrational instinctual appetites that are biologically rooted. Like

the organismic theory which follows, this theory assumes that the

neonate's psychobiological organization constitutes the initial

functional and structural foundation upon which development is predicated.

These psychobiologically rooted functions are the organizing forces that

differentiate with growth and transform the inborn structures into

increasingly complex organizations that become partially subject ot the

idiosyncratic nature of the individual's history of interaction with his

environment. Unlike organismic theory, however, the psychoanalytic approach centers its attention on the instinctual energy it assumes is the responsible agent for the functioning of these organismic structures.

The nature of this energy is central to Freud's views leads to some of the most important aspects and theoretical constructs of the psychoanalytic theory. Freud postulated two types of hereditary *instinctual energy* that are operative from birth on. These two energies are both conflicting and complementary and form the basis of the nature of the organism. They are:

1. *Eros* - the *life instinct* which stimulates activity, is constructive, life seeking, and life giving. Its energy is called *libido*, and it is responsible for the sexual-reproductive and self-preservative aims and drives of the organism.

2. *Thanatos* - the *death instinct* which is inhibitory in nature, its energy is destructive and death seeking. It is responsible for the aggressive and self-destructive tendencies of the organism.

The aim of Eros is to stimulate and produce a state of excitation, and the aim of Thanatos is to inhibit and produce a state of tension-lessness.

Probably the best known, most controversial, and certainly among the most important factors of the psychoanalytic model of man are the Freudian concepts of *Id, Ego,* and *Superego.*

The Id

Freud assumed the neonate had nothing more than irrational instinctual appetites. Consequently, he considered the newborn infant to be, like other instinct-guided and instinct-driven animals, nothing but an "it" or *id*. The id is, therefore, the basic, fundamental, and most primitive part of man. It is pure desire, raw hedonism, and nonrational. It must be controlled, channeled, and dominated in order for the human *animal* to become a human *being*.

There is a direct relationship between the irrational, instinctual, hedonistic energy of the neonate's Eros and the nonrational id, and Thanatos. For the primary function of the id is to gratify the instinctually generated needs of the infant, reestablish a state of tension-lessness sought by the inhibitory nature of Thanatos, and thus generate a stage of balanced homeostatis pleasure in the organism. Thus Freud postulated that the child's *primary process* of operation is to seek to fulfill and satisfy his basic bodily needs. The id, therefore, is said to operate according to the *pleasure principle*. The id is characterized by instinct, impulse, pleasure, and passion.

The Ego

Many of the child's wishes that are generated by the instinctual energy of the id are not capable of satisfaction. They are in conflict with the environment, and clash with the demands of the social world of the infant. The id's *primary process* of operation, the *pleasure principle,* comes into conflict with the "reality" of the infant's world. There are two possible consequences of the

frustration the id endures:

1. It can remain in a state of unresolved tensions; or,

2. It can "learn" to cope with the external reality by
    using the unresolved tension to help transform some
    of the raw energy of the id into a new structure that
    can:

    a. cope with the frustrations and conflicts of
        reality; and

    b. handle the tension generated by the conflicts
        with reality.

If the infant remains in the state of unresolved tension then it
ceases to grow and develop normally and moves into pathological
states. If the normal developments of the second consequence
take place, then part of the child's nonrational id is transformed into
the earliest form of a rational structure that can begin to cope
with reality and its frustration and concomitant tensions. It is this
newly formed structure transformed from the id that Freud called the
"I" or *ego*.

This development normally commences sometime in the first
year of life, according to Freud, and the child's personality is now
composed of two structures. The ego is the secondary element, but
becomes, in healthy development, the dominating structure. In this
manner, a new *secondary process* comes into operation called the
reality principle, which gradually supplants the id's primary process-
pleasure principle combination as the major, dominant determiner
of the child's behavior, growth, and development.

The infant's developing perception is one of the major factors in inducing the development of the ego. The child's perceptual processes, along with its developing intellect, are the factors that bring the infant to the point of conflict with reality. Thus the ego comes to be characterized by (1) increasingly more functional perception, (2) gradually developing reason, and (3) slowly developing control over instinctual energy, impulsive pleasure-seeking, and raw passion.

Presentation of the ego concept requires some introduction to the psychoanalytic concept of defense mechanisms and to the concepts of preconscious, unconscious, and conscious. These extremely complex topics can only be covered very briefly, but they are especially important in this view of man.

In order to cope with the frustrations of reality, the ego, in conflict with and against the wishes of the id, develops a number of defense mechanisms. The most important one is *repression,* which is the process by which the ego prohibits the id from allowing some of the primary instinctual urges to come into the organism's *consciousness.*

Consciousness is that part of the mental functioning which is in the most direct contact with the external world. It is the outer layer, so to speak, of the mind. It is composed of perceptions, cognitions, and feelings coming from the external reality; and of instincts and impulses from the internal reality that are permitted to come into awareness by the ego.

The *unconscious* is that part of the mind, or mental

operations, which is below the level of awareness, and contains the wishes, ideas, urges, etc. that have never come into consciousness because the ego has repressed them. It also contains the desires, ideas, etc. which have been *suppressed* by the ego. *Suppression* is the conscious equivalent of repression, and is the defense mechanism that operates when the ego consciously drives wishes, ideas, desires, etc. into the unconsciousness that have already come into consciousness.

The *preconscious* concept is of special significance because it is the basis for the psychoanalytic therapeutic techniques of verbalization and free association. The preconscious is the layer between the conscious and unconscious. In this transitional zone of consciousness are the unconscious ideas that became connected with conscious verbal images that correspond to them. Verbal images of this type are residues from former perceptions, and become linked up with their unconscious counterparts in the preconscious.

Another important defense mechanism is *sublimation,* or the process by which the ego diverts reality-conflicting instinctual energy into new forms. This is a creative process by which the ego permits forbidden or dangerous instincts to be channeled into socially accepted forms.

Obviously, the concept of ego is highly complex. The ego controls all voluntary activity, operates numerous defense mechanisms, censors dreams during sleep, and generally regulates and controls the organism's behavior. It is sometimes referred to as the executive of the psyche.

The Superego

One of the major functions of the ego is to cope with that part of the external reality that comprises the social environment, especially parents and other adults who make demands on the child's behavior, thoughts, and feelings. Adults impose and inject demands upon the child that create expectations, encourage and reward certain behaviors, and discourage or prohibit and punish other behaviors. Related to this complex of factors is one of the most important and complicated coping or defense mechanisms used by the ego, viz., the mechanism of *identification*, which will be explained in a moment. This mechanism is the primary agent responsible for the transformation of part of the ego into what Freud called the *superego*.

The *superego* roughly corresponds to the general concept of *conscience*, but with highly technical aspects that go beyond the normal usage of that term. It is a highly differentiated part of the ego that functions as an ego surrogate, or alter ego, to mediate and modulate the ego's relationship with the external world. This transformation of part of the ego generates the third and final component of the human personality. It also elaborates one more important function of the ego, that is to be the mediator between the id and the superego. The impulsive id wants to satisfy its instinctual urges, which are usually in conflict with reality. The compulsive superego wants to impose its strict introjected societal and cultural restraints and restrictions on the id. The ego must serve as the rational mediator between these two conflicting parts of man's nature.

Identification

Identification is an especially significant concept and
process in psychoanalytic theory, with important developmental
implications. It deserves explanation. It is one of the many
defense mechanisms employed by the ego to generate the superego
and to mediate between the id and the superego. In the framework
of psychoanalytic theory the term has a highly technical meaning
somewhat different from both general usage and the interpretations
from behaviorism and organismic psychology. It's special role in
psychoanalytic theory is especially important for values/moral
development.

In general usage, identification is a term used to denote
a process by which a person patterns his thoughts, feelings,
or actions after another person who serves as a model. It involves
attachment, admiration, and the desire to emulate the model. For
the radical behaviorist it becomes simply a matter of stimulus-
response patterning that can easily and simply be explained in terms
of conditioning (see Gewirtz, 1969). For the social learning and
mediation behaviorists it becomes a somewhat more complex and additional
process that may include modeling, imitation, and possibly some
hypothesized intervening variables (also see Gewirtz, 1969).

But for Freud, and most psychoanalysts, the concept of
identification is rich with meaning and one of the most significant
mechanisms of personality change. Freud used the term in two ways:

a. as the *process* by which one ego becomes like another
ego; and

b. as the behavior-similarity *outcome* of that process. But he was talking about the process and outcome by which the complexities of the anaclitic child-parent relationships of the ego become transformed into the superego. So for the psychoanalysts the ordinary term "identification" used in various ways, both technical and general, becomes the highly specific term *anaclictic identification*.

Simply, it involves the fact that the adult, especially the parent, uses sanctions against the child which are primarily psychological in nature, in that they threaten rejection or withdrawal of love. The child is totally dependent on the nurturance received and anticipated from the parent, and the threatened or actual withdrawal of this nurturance generates both fear and hostility in the child. The hostility, felt as a tendency towards aggression aimed at the parent, becomes intolerable to the child because of his love and admiration for the parent. In order to cope with this intolerable combination of fear, hostility, and aggression felt toward the parent, the child attempts to model the parentally-desired behaviors in order to avoid punishment, avert nurturance withdrawal, and please the parents. At the same time, he turns the aggression inward against himself. The results of this complex behavioral interchange are (1) conformity to the adult expectations, (2) adoption by introjection of the parental attitudes and values, (3) internalization of the parental values, and (4) creation of the superego.

Anaclitic identification is more likely to result in the modeling in the superego of the *perceived* expectations of the

parents rather than the modeling of the actual overt behavioral actions of the parents. If the parents are too demanding, too instrumental or utilitarian in their abuse of the child's nurturance-dependence, and create too strong an identification, then the process can lead to the development of a harsh, rigid, compulsive, guilt-ridden, and irrational superego.

Sequences of Universal Stages in Development

One of Freud's fundamental postulates was that human development is marked by a series of stages through which each individual passes, and that these stages are universal to all mankind. The characteristics and bases of these stages, their relationship generally to personality development and specifically to identity formation, and the significance invested in the psychosexual aspects of this development all clearly represent the particular character and orientation of psychoanalytic theory. They also form, along with the previously discussed topics (especially ego development), the basis for much of the controversy that has surrounded this theory from the outside and has splintered the tradition from within.

The basic developmental thesis put forth is that personality development is based on and proceeds from the physiological maturation of body zones, the particular mode of functioning of each of the specific zones, and the universal sequence of stages in which this maturation unfolds.

A body zone (and its specific mode of functioning) is activated by instinctual libidinal energy. The nature of the stage of

personality development related to that particular zone is dependent

on the characteristics of that zone and the investment of libidinal

energy (cathexis) there. Consequently, the nature of the person's

adaptation and the coping mechanisms of the ego at each stage for

each body zone determine the characteristics of the person's person-

ality and identity, the nature and types of social interaction that

take place, and the limits within which all these processes take place.

Freud's claim that personality development is based on and determined

by the investment of sexual energy in each of the bodily zones as

the organism proceeds through the sequence of maturation of these zones.

At each stage, and therefore for each zone, there will be

specific and inevitable conflicts between the id, ego, and superego;

and between internal reality and external reality. How these conflicts

are handled, whether or not they are resolved, and the relative

adequacy of the resolutions all will determine the specific character

of the personality both then and later, and will determine the relative

degree of health or pathology of the personality.

Not only was Freud's general picture of development new

and unusual, but what really mdae his theory radical at the particular

time he introduced it was his belief that the psychosexual nature of

the personality started in infancy. To invest the infant with sexual

meaning and base its development on sexual activity was a most

revolutionary idea in Freud's day, and very disturbing to those from

a Puritanical or Victorian background.

Erik Erikson, one of the foremost contemporary psycho-

analysts, has done an enormous amount of work with Freud's theories

and has elaborated a comprehensive development of the psychoanalytic
psychosexual theory. He has attempted to chart the personality stages
that derive from this theory and identify those that he believes are
universal. Erikson postualtes what he calls the *epigenetic principle,*
or the unfolding of these stages in a genetically determined sequence
common to all men. Change and development occur because of and are
caused by these maturationally predetermined shifts of instinctual
energy from one body zone to another. Each resultant stage focuses
on a particular body zone and has its own characteristic major
crisis for the child to resolve. The child's personality, character,
and health are determined by the manner and degree of success with
which he meets and solves each succeeding crisis of each unfolding
stage. Freud's original oral, anal, and genital stages have been
elaborated by Erikson into eight major stages, each with its particular
major zone or object of libidinal investment, and each with its
peculiar crisis. Erikson's epigenetic plan of stages is very
briefly summarized.

1. The Oral Stage

During the first year of life the infant's libidinal
investment is in the oral (mouth) zone of the body. The primary
biological and self-preservative functions of breathing, drinking,
and eating dominate the child's interests, and gratification of the
desires of this stage provide him with the satisfaction of the
instinctual sexual urges of his id. Thus sucking, chewing, drinking,
and related activities are the instruments of satisfaction.

The great significance of this stage for later personality
development, according to both Freud and Erikson, is that the child's
"taking-in" that is predominant in this stage forms the basis for
later abilities crucial to his development. Thus *incorporation* is
said to be the dominant mode of psychosexual functioning attributed
to the oral zone, and lays the foundation for the child's later need
for and ability to introject and identify (as previously explained).

The major crisis of this stage is the *crisis of trust*. If
the infant learns to depend on, trust, and be comfortable with those
who take care of him during this critical stage, he will later be
able to have healthy mechanisms of projection, introjection, and
identification, all related to normal and healthy development of
self concept, ego, and superego. Inadequate resolution leads to
a tendency to mistrust.

2. The Anal Stage

From about one to three years of age the child's instinctual
urges shift from the oral erogenous zone to the anal erogenous zone,
thus ushering in the second major psychosexual stage, which focuses on
the important functions of retention and evacuation. These functions
give the child an opportunity to attempt to master his own impulses,
be autonomous, and dominate those who care for him. The parents, in
turn, make major attempts during this stage to direct, control, inhibit,
and elicit compliance. The child's mastery of and use of his anal-
urethral musculature provides great libidinal gratification and this
lays the groundwork for later conflicting psychosexual urges related

to autoerotic pleasure of retention and elimination--holding on and letting go. This stage lays the early ground work for the development of the superego, for personality characteristics related to the active-passive and outgoing-ingoing dimensions, and for levels and degrees of confidence in one's own abilities to master and control things.

The major crisis of this stage is the *crisis of autonomy*. Adequate resolution leads to appropriate self-control, self-reliance, and self-determination. Inadequate resolution leads to patterns of shame and doubt, lack of self-confidence, and superego problems related to being evil and dirty.

3. The Phallic Stage

The investment of libidinal energy and maturational zone orientation now shifts to the genital area, usually between the ages of three to five. This shift also involves the change in orientation from one of exclusively to self to that of another, and involves the primary identification of self with the parent of the same sex. It is in this period that the famed *Oedipus Complex* (for boys) and corresponding *Electra Complex* (for girls) is purported to take place. The child's primary mechanism is that of identification.

This stage is critical for psychosexual orientation, and the eventual orientation depends significantly on the parent with whom the child forms his or her primary identification. The most important factor of sexual identification at this point is the genetically determined sexual characteristics. Environmental factors are important but definitely secondary.

This period involves increased cognitive and psychomotor abilities which permits very significant developments growing out of play, imagination, activity, exploration, relationships with other children, manipulation of objects in the environment, and numerous other factors significant for both present and subsequent growth and development.

The major cirsis of this stage is the *Oedipal crisis,* or the *crisis of initiative versus guilt.* Resolution of the Oedipal crisis is involved in the continuing transformation of part of the ego into the superego. Adequate resolution of this crisis leads to initiative which is manifested in the child's acquiring a reasonable and healthy sense of moral responsibility. Inadequate resolution leads to unreasonable guilt, overemphasis on obedience and self-punishment, and dysfunctional and pathological ego consequences.

4. The Latency Stage

Adequate resolution of the Oedipal crisis of the preceding stage results in a reduction of libidinal energy investment in the genital zone, thereby starting a period of sexual retrogression or quiescence. Freud maintained that there was a reduction in biological sexual drives during this period of latency, which generally lasts from about the age of six until puberty. Some strongly disagree with Freud and maintain that the child's interest in sex will be maintained if environmental factors support it, and refute his hypothesis of a biologically-determined sexual latency period. Erikson takes a middle position on this issue and maintains that

during this period the child tends to sublimate sexual energy into other modes of psychosocial functioning. Thus the child of this period is characterized by eagerness to learn and do things, to win recognition, to produce, to work and play with tools and implements, to develop skills, and to significantly increase social activity and do things with other children.

The major crisis of this period is the *crisis of industry versus inferiority*. Adequate resolution leads to a sense of accomplishment, feelings of confidence, and a genuine sense of industry. Inadequate resolution leads to lasting feelings of inferiority, restriction of activities and social contacts, a possible conformist orientation, and tendencies to rely on the judgments of others rather than on one's own judgments.

5. The Adolescent Stage

This is the psychosexual stage of puberty and plays the leading role in determining the individual's later adult sexual behavior. A period of physiological revolution, puberty is a time of rapid growth, sexual maturity, tremendous internal conflicts and inconsistencies, and great concern for the feelings and acceptance of other people.

The child's sexual impulses and urges now shift to members of the opposite sex outside his family.

The major crisis of this period is the *crisis of identity*. Adequate resolution results in an integrated personality with a coherent and consistent self concept, confidence in interpersonal

relations, the beginnings of a coherent view of life, and integration of childhood identifications. Inadequate resolution results in identity diffusion or the inability to integrate one's thoughts and feelings about himself and the perceived thoughts and feelings of others about him. Ego autonomy will not develop. Failure to develop an adequate self concept makes it difficult or impossible to form a coherent hierarchy of values, and life can become meaningless. The result may be a failure to make decisions about tasks, careers, and the personal and social roles one must fill.

6. <u>The Genital Stage</u>

This is the stage of young adulthood when, according to Freud, the individual's instinctual energy and sexual gratification become fully centered on the genital zone, and the aim is to fulfill this gratification in another person. Erikson feels the person in this stage seeks close, personal, private, confidential relationships in which he can give himself and lose himself in another person.

The major crisis of this stage is the *crisis of intimacy versus isolation*. Adequate resolution leads to a creative partnership with another person, gratification from intimacy, solidarity with others, and significant development related to the selection of a mate and preparation for adult roles of husband and wife. Inadequate resolution leads to isolation, the avoidance of intimate relationships, fear of losing oneself, excessive or complete concern with self, and withdrawal.

7. The Stage of Adulthood

Freud viewed the ultimate goal of sexual development as the utilization of sexual pleasure for propagation. The intimacies of adulthood spawn the need to generate and create. The main personal aim is to establish a family and create other significant relationships. The mature adult generalizes this generative and creative orientation to the social and cultural orders. He takes an interest in the affairs of the community, and becomes interested in education, tradition, the establishment of order, and the propagation, care, and rearing of children.

The major crisis of this period is the *crisis of generativity versus self-absorption*. Adequate resolution leads to concern for others, the desire to create, and to take care of others. Inadequate resolution leads to increased concern for self, lack of interest in the affairs of others and the community, lack of faith in the younger generations, personal stagnation, and impoverishment in interpersonal relations.

8. The Stage of Senescence

The adult who has lived through the long period of adulthood will face this final stage in a way that is determined by the degree and nature of the success or failure of his adulthood.

An adulthood full of successful interpersonal relationships and satisfactorily perceived accomplishments in work, community affairs, and the social order will tend to lead to a senescence with an integrated personality and a realistic view of the inevitability of

death.

The major crisis of this stage is the *crisis of disintegration and death.* Adequate resolution, resulting from ego integration, will lead to a healthy view of the entire life cycle, and an acceptance of death as the inevitable conclusion of that cycle and of being human. There will be a feeling of purpose, a belief in one's meaningfulness, a lack of fear of death, and a feeling of oneness with others and with mankind. Inadequate resolution, due to ego disintegration, leads to a lack of purpose, a feeling of meaninglessness, failure to accept the life cycle and the inevitability of death, and despair.

The conceptualization of the stages presented is a partial integration of Freud's and Erikson's views, mostly based on Erikson's own integration of them. There are those who would reject many aspects, or modify others, but there seems to be general agreement in psychoanalytic circles of the validity of the stage concept. Later it will become apparent that the Erikson-Freud stages just presented are not the same kind of stage as the developmental stages of Piaget and Kohlberg. The main difference is that the organismic-structural-developmental stages that will be presented in Chapter IV are hierarchically integrated, whereas the stages just presented are not. In the psychoanalytic stages the person passes through one and on to the next, but the preceding stage is not reformulated and integrated in the next one. They follow one another, but are not related to each other. They are like independent hurdles to overcome.

Psychoanalysis is peculiar in that it is the creation of one person. Freud, however, had some serious quarrels with his chief

disciples early in the history of the movement. Freud was virtually

uncompromising about his view of the theory. As a result, some of his

closest associates broke with him and reformulated certain aspects

of the theory. Of course, Freud himself also made many adjustments

and changes in his theory over the years. But he never made the

changes that were the source of conflict with his former colleagues.

Before briefly mentioning the disputes and their authors a few final

comments on Freud and his theory are of interest.

As Hall and Lindzey (1970, p. 68) point out:

> No other psychological theory has been
> subjected to such searching and often such bitter
> criticism as has psychoanalysis. From every side
> and on every conceivable source, Freud and his
> theory have been attacked, reviled, ridiculed, and
> slandered. The only comparable case in modern
> science, in which both the theory and the theorist
> have been so ardently villified, is that of
> Charles Darwin whose evolutionary doctrine shocked
> Victorian England. Freud's chief offenses
> consisted of ascribing lustful and destructive
> wishes to the baby, attributing incestuous and
> perverted urges to all human beings, and explaining
> man's behavior in terms of sexual motivation.
> "Decent" people were infuriated by Freud's view of
> man and called him a libertine and a pervert.

Also few theories have ever as deeply entrenched themselves

in the fabric of our daily life and language as has Freudian psycho-

analysis. Even relatively uneducated people who really know

virtually nothing about Freud and his ideas talk in Freudian terms and

look at life and other people in those terms. Defense mechanisms,

ego, slips of the tongue, and numerous other Freudian ideas are part

of our daily language and thought.

After reviewing some of the major criticisms leveled

against the man and the theory and attempting to answer those criticisms,

Hall and Lindzey (p. 72) conclude their section on Freud with the following:

> But a fine literary style and an exciting
> subject matter are not the main reasons for the
> great esteem in which Freud is held. Rather it is
> because his ideas are challenging, because his
> conception of man is both broad and deep, and
> because his theory has relevance for our times.
> Freud may not have been a rigorous scientist nor
> a first-rate theoretician, but he was a patient,
> meticulous, penetrating observer and a tenacious,
> disciplined, courageous, original thinker. Over
> and above all of the other virtues of his theory
> stands this one--it tries to envisage a full-
> bodied individual living partly in a world of
> reality and partly in a world of make-believe,
> beset by conflicts and inner contradictions
> yet capable of rational thought and action,
> moved by forces of which he has little
> knowledge and by aspirations which are beyond
> his reach, by turn confused and clearheaded,
> frustrated and satisfied, hopeful and despairing,
> selfish and altruistic; in short, a complex
> human being. For many people, this picture
> of man has essential validity.

There is no question about the fact that Freud has had enormous impact on our life and world of the twentieth century. He is considered by many to be the dominant figure in psychology in the first half of the twentieth century.

Other Views

Carl Jung was one of Freud's closest associates and an intimate friend. They broke with each other on both personal and professional grounds. Jung created his own psychoanalytic theory and therapy which came to be known as *Analytical Psychology*. Many of the basic Freudian concepts were retained, but one of Jung's chief arguments with Freud was about the latter's pansexualism.

Jung thought Freud erred in building his entire theory and therapy on man's sexual nature.

Another point of major disagreement stemmed from Freud's uncompromising complete determinism. Jung accepted the role of the past and realized that causality was a major factor in human life, but he also believed the role of the future was important. In addition to the conditioning factors of the individual's personal history and his racial history, Jung believed man was also conditioned by his aspirations, aims, and dreams of the future. His theory combines both causality and teleology.

One of the most controversial aspects of Jung's theory is his strong belief in the racial and cultural influence on personality. In addition to the infantile sources of personality, Jung believed that the individual inherited the effects of the cumulative experiences of previous generations. These influences are manifested in the individual's personal unconscious and also in the individual's share of the collective unconscious. The collective unconscious represents the universality in man's thinking and behavior, and is based, according to Jung, on the basic structural similarity of all human brains. Contained in the collective unconscious are the *archetypes*, or universal thought forms and images that existed as memory traces in all brains.

Jung also gave a central role to the *self*, which is one of the archetypes represented in the collective unconscious. For the self to emerge into consciousness the various parts of the personality must be fully developed, which does not usually happen

until middle age. Jung was one of the first to create the concept of *self-actualization* or *self-realization*. There are some interesting parallels between Jung's ideas on this subject and cognitive and moral development in the Kohlberg scheme.

Jung's influence in and beyond psychoanalytic circles was very large. Many practicing psychoanalytic therapists practice Jung's brand of psychoanalysis rather than Freud's. Jung also contributed the concepts of *introversion* and *extraversion* to our daily language.

Another of Freud's early associates to break with him was Alfred Adler. He and his colleagues founded a new approach to psychoanalysis that they called *Individual Psychology*. Whereas Freud stressed man's biological and instinctual nature and placed complete emphasis on the individual's past and causality in his absolute deterministic view, Adler, like Jung, stressed future goals, and his psychology was predominantly teleological. Adler gave stronger emphasis to man's inherently social nature than he did his individual and biological nature. He placed greater importance on man's ego and consciousness, whereas Freud and Jung stressed the unconscious and irrational. Adler also challenged Freud's sexual orientation. In discussing Adler's concept of *the creative self*, which Hall and Lindzey (1970, p. 127) consider to be his crowning achievement, they give the following summary of Adler's views:

> In summary, it may be said that Adler
> fashioned a humanistic theory of personality which
> was the antithesis of Freud's conception of man.
> By endowing man with truism, humanitarianism,
> co-operation, creativity, uniqueness, and awareness,
> he restored to man a sense of dignity and worth

that psychoanalysis had pretty largely destroyed.
In place of the dreary materialistic picture
which horrified and repelled many readers of
Freud, Adler offered a portrait of man which
was more satisfying, more hopeful, and far more
complimentary to man. Adler's conception of
the nature of personality coincided with the
popular idea that man can be the master, and not
the victim, of his fate.

Adler's emphasis on the social aspects of man's existence

were even more emphasized by the so-called *social analysts* whose

theories are frequently referred to as the *psychoanalytic social

psychology theories.* Some include Adler in this list, others do not.

But all include Karen Horney, Erich Fromm, and Harry Stack Sullivan.

Fromm's ideas on freedom, personality, love, and society are extremely

valuable for values/moral development and education. His criticism

of the highly competitive, ruthless, and basically selfish society

forged by capitalism are penetrating, provocative, and powerful.

He believes that it is virtually impossible for man to realize his

full human nature in such a system. With equal vigor and eloquence

he also shows how communism has failed to meet man's basic economic

and human needs. He proposes a society that he calls *humanistic

communitarian socialism.* His ideas on this and related subjects

are clearly stated in his books, e.g., The Sane Society (1955),

The Art of Loving (1956), Beyond the Chains of Illusion (1962),

and The Revolution of Hope (1968). He also offers a solution to the

determinism-indeterminism problem in the form of *alternativism*

(The Heart of Man: Its Genius for Good and Evil, 1964). Fromm's

psychophilosophical writings offer much of value for a theory of

values/moral development and education.

Fromm identified six character types: receptive, exploit-
ative, hoarding, marketing, productive, and necrophilous-biophilous
(attracted to death vs. life respectively). (See Hall and Lindzey,
1970, p. 132; and Lundin, 1972, pp. 284-285). Fromm's character
types served as the basis for the typology developed by Peck (Peck
and Havighurst, 1960) that was discussed in Chapter II.

The other major psychoanalytic social analyst is Harry Stack
Sullivan. His *Interpersonal Theory of Psychiatry*, or *Theory of
Interpersonal Relations* is interesting for a number of reasons.
First, it is a significant departure from orthodox or classical
psychoanalysis in that Sullivan rejected Freud's libido theory and
did not consider instinctual energy as an important source of motiva-
tion. Second, he rejected Freud's idea that development was based
primarily on the unfolding or maturation of the sexual instinct, and
believed vigorously in the idea that development is primarily a
social-psychological phenomenon. He postulated six developmental
stages (Sullivan, 1953; Hall and Lindzey, 1970, p. 146): (1) infancy,
(2) childhood, (3) the juvenile era, (4) preadolescence, (5) early
adolescence, and (6) late adolescence. Many of his ideas are highly
congruent with organismic psychology. Another departure from traditional
psychoanalytic doctrine is Sullivan also believed that personality
is not set at an early age as Freud maintained.

The final deviation from orthodox psychoanalysis may be
the most important of them all, especially for values development
education. Because of its point of departure from tradition this
movement has come to be known as *ego psychology* or *psychoanalytic ego*

psychology.

The fundamental distinguishing characteristic of this
rather recent innovation in psychoanalysis is disagreement with
Freud and the traditional followers over the major issue of ego
development. Whereas Freud conceived the id as being the only part
of the personality present at birth and that the ego grows out of it,
the ego psychologists refute this hypothesis. It is their contention
that both the id and the ego are present at birth, and that they
gradually differentiate from each other.

The gradual differentiation of the id and the ego is
responsible for development of ego identity, or self concept. One
of the major consequences of this theoretical change is the shifting
of emphasis from the defense mechanisms to the adaptive, coping
mechanisms that mediate between the id and the external environment.

The ego psychologists contend there are three major steps
in the process of ego development. They postulate that these steps,
which involve the child's relationship with the environment, are
crucial for the healthy development of a differentiated id and ego,
and for the development of the ego as the instrument of rationality.
The three steps are (Langer, 1969, pp. 24-25):

1. The development of the capacity to distinguish
   between the self and the world.

2. The development of the means of communication,
   especially between the child and his mother.

3. The achievement of adequate control over
   voluntary functions, or psychomotor development.

Step number one above has three prerequisite conditions:

1. The physiological maturation of perceptual organs
   and skills.

2. The transformation of prerational instinctual
   energy focused upon the self into rational
   energy for attending to and recognizing other things.

3. Partial deprivation of the child's needs and wishes
   to establish disequilibrium conducive to change.

Ego psychologists maintain that there are three major causes of ego development:

1. The *external environment*.

2. *Nonrational instinctual* drives that are internal
   and inherited.

3. *Rational instincts* that possess controlling and
   regulatory functions. These are internal and
   inherited.

It is the third in the last list, the hereditary rational instincts, that the ego psychologists stress for ego development. They maintain that Freud was wrong in assuming that the rational ego could be a transformation of the nonrational id. The material source of the ego must be inherited intellectual functions activated by conflict-free instinctual energy which has the ability to control and regulate the intellectual mechanisms for perception, memory, action, experience, and learning. Thus the ego has a functional autonomy and operates as a source of experience and behavior that is independent of both the id and the environment.

The generally acknowledged pioneer of psychoanalytic ego psychology is Heinz Hartmann (see, for example, relevant comments by Munroe, 1955, p. 90). Hartmann's Ego Psychology and the Problem of Adaptation (1958, translated by David Rapaport) is a recognized classic in this field. Other psychoanalytic theorists in ego psychology include R. M. Lowenstein, E. Kris, D. Rapaport, and Jane Loevinger. The last two deserve special attention. David Rapaport was a brilliant thinker and writer with a broad vision. He was attempting to bridge psychoanalytic theory with other types of theories from different psychological persuasions. He was especially interested in the work of Jean Piaget (one of the foundational theorists in organismic psychology and of special significance for values development education) and believed there was great potential for rapprochement between ego psychology and the work of the cognitive-developmental psychologists such as Piaget. Rapaport's book, Organization and Pathology of Thought: Selected Sources (1951), is recognized as a masterpiece in psychological literature. It is a collection of noteworthy articles by some of the greatest thinkers in psychology, including Freud, Piaget, Lewin, Hartmann, Bleuler, Claparède, and others. Rapaport translated the articles and added his analysis and commentary to each one in such a way as to draw out the deepest meaning. The final chapter is Rapaport's own work and is an attempt to build toward a theory of thinking. Unfortunately, this brilliant psychologist's life was cut short in 1961 at the age of 49.

Jane Loevinger deserves special attention because she has attempted to develop a stage-developmental theory of ego development

that is greatly congruent with Kohlberg's cognitive-developmental theory

of moral judgment, one of the basic building blocks in a theory for

values development education (see Chapter IV). The congruence

between Loevinger's and Kohlberg's work has been recognized by both

Kohlberg (1969) and Loevinger (Loevinger and Wessler, 1970).

Loevinger's stage-developmental ideas are based on the

processes described earlier. She postulates that the course of healthy

ego development can be seen as a sequential process of seven stages

(Loevinger, 1966; and Loevinger and Wessler, 1970, Vol. I, Ch. 1).

A brief description of the stages follows:

1. *Presocial and Symbiotic* - centers on differentiating
   "self" from "not self" and establishing a strong
   attachment to the mother.

2. *Impulse Ridden* - child begins to exercise his own
   will, but lacks voluntary control over impulses
   and does not yet know shame. Child is exploitive,
   dependent, does not understand rules of conduct, and
   believes that an action is bad merely because it is
   punished.

3. *Opportunistic* - Rules are understood but followed only
   for immediate advantage. Child more independent and
   more in control of his impulses.

4. *Conformist* - Child begins to internalize and obey
   rules just because they are rules. Interpersonal
   relations conceived in terms of actions rather than
   of feelings and motives.

5. *Conscientious* - Adolescent becomes introspective,
   self-conscious, and self-critical. Interpersonal
   relations seen more in terms of feelings than actions,
   and are more important. Morality now internalized;
   own principles take precedence over group's. Feels
   guilt. Inner standards of achievement become
   important.

6. *Autonomous* - Role differentiation, individuality,
   and self-fulfillment become conscious concerns. In
   interpersonal relations now recognizes inevitable
   mutual interdependence. More tolerant of attitudes
   and conflicts of others. More conscious and direct
   about coping with own conflicts. Conflicts are
   largely moral and internal.

7. *Integrated* - Achievement of a sense of integrated
   identity that transcends conflicting demands, role
   differentiation, and the unattainable. Appreciates
   and cherishes differences in others rather than
   merely tolerating them. Few people achieve this
   stage.

Loevinger's work and much of what has been offered by the other ego
psychologists provide a fertile field for ideas related to values/moral
development.

Hartmann shows how far ego psychology has moved from some
of Freud's doctrines, and how much less deterministic and environmental-
istic the theory has become. For example, Hartmann (1958, p. 31) says:

> Thus the task of man to adapt to man is present
> from the very beginning of life. Furthermore,
> man adapts to an environment part of which has not,
> but part of which has already been molded by his
> kind and himself. Man not only adapts to the
> community but also actively participates in
> creating the conditions to which he must adapt.
> Man's environment is molded increasingly by
> man himself. The crucial adaptation man has to
> make is to the social structure, and his colla-
> boration in building it.

Hartmann also recognizes man's capacity for rational action, and seems to have moved away from Freud's overwhelming emphasis on man's irrational nature (see Hartmann, 1958, pp. 64ff). In general the ego psychologists have moved increasingly in this direction of a more balanced picture of man, and generally open up the doors of reconciliation with other views of man, especially that of organismic psychology.

In summary, the orthodox psychoanalysis of Freud presents a very grim view of man. Man is seen as possessed of irrational instinctual urges and forces internally that must be tamed, controlled, and channelled by the socialization process. Man is at war with himself internally, and is at war with the environment. In many respects psychoanalysis has much in common with the view of behaviorism, in that it sees the environment as the dominant factor in man's development, and in that man is seen as more on the passive side than the active side. Likewise, both views stress the shaping and controlling of the child as early in life as possible before the irrational biological drives and tendencies gain the upper hand. Both views see the human organism as a victim of his own passions. Psychoanalysis also sees man as basically heterotelic rather than as autotelic.

Although not as explicit about it, psychoanalysis does present a

materialistic and mechanistic view of man. This shows up especially in

the anaclitic identification-introjection model of values development.

The major point of departure from behaviorism is the psychoanalytic

emphasis on all kinds of internal mechanisms that the behaviorist

rejects as unnecessary. More recent movements in psychoanalytic circles,

however, reveal a trend away from the rigid determinism, the instinctual

emphasis, and the irrational factors. Jung, Adler, Horney, Fromm,

Sullivan, Hartmann, and Loevinger all offer a more positive, more

hopeful, less deterministic, less mechanistic, and less irrational

view of man. There are frequent comments in the literature about

the decline of psychoanalysis in terms of its popularity as a therapy

and in its influence in psychology. There does seem to be a trend

away from the harsh and dreary pronouncements of Freud and a trend

of reconciliation with other psychological orientations, especially

organismic psychology. Rapaport, as pointed out earlier, most clearly

represents this trend.

3. Organismic Psychology

Behaviorism and psychoanalysis more readily lend themselves

to neater classification than does organismic psychology. Also,

there is general agreement about their names. The third major view

has no one name that is used by all and recognized by all as its

identity. Furthermore, the third view is made up of a loose

federation of psychophilosophical systems and subsystems. The first

task, therefore, will be to briefly identify the component systems

that make up this loose federation which, in Maslow's term, is sometimes
refered to as "the third force" in psychology. The idea of the third
force clearly indicates one characteristic of this collection of
views, viz., that they originated or exist partly as a reaction
against behaviorism and psychoanalysis. Many behavioral scientists
have found the conceptualization of man in the other frameworks to
be incomplete, inadequate, partly erroneous, and largely based on
mechanistic, fragmented, and pathological orientations. It is
believed by many that behaviorism and psychoanalysis relegate man
to a status far beneath his nature and deny man any freedom, self-
direction, or hope.

Some of the orientations in this third force are: humanistic
psychology, self psychology, individual psychology, phenomenological
psychology, transactional psychology, perceptual psychology, holism,
organismic psychology, organismic-developmental psychology, and
others. In spite of major and minor differences among these there
are several dominant factors that apply to all of them, principal
of which is the viewing of the person as an organismic whole, and as
a human being. Thus any of the following three terms could be
supported as a class name for the entire movement: *humanism, holism,
or organismic psychology.*

The problem with humanism is that it has so many
meanings and it has complex philosophical aspects that create
problems in communication. It implies a variety of factors that may
or may not be important or included in the total psychological view

under consideration. And finally, it is a commonly used word in lay parlance for a variety of points of view which confuses the issue even further. Use of the term humanism in some circles in education, for example, generates stereotyped responses, both pro and con.

Holism, on the other hand, is so strange to so many people what the first response is frequently to want to correct its spelling to "wholism." This necessitates an explanation of its derivation from the Greek.

Not only does organismic turn out to be the least troublesome of the three, it also more positively communicates the basic meaning of the position. The most important point that needs to be communicated by this view vis-a-vis the other views, especially behaviorism, is that the focus of study and consideration is the human organism vs. S-R bonds, responses, reflexes, instinctual urges, ids, egos, superegos, contingencies of reinforcement, and all similar conceptualizations. "Organism" has the advantage of also being a neutral term with regard to philosophy and biology, as well as to sex, age, and function. The only problem presented by the word is that it does not lend itself to a one word title-- organismicism is too cumbersome and too difficult to say. All things considered *organismic psychology* does the job.

One other advantage to the rubric of organismic psychology is that it allows for inclusion of those aspects of other systems and theories that are consistent with the organismic viewpoint. For example, many concepts and viewpoints of the psychoanalytic social

psychologists, and even more so those of the ego psychologists, are highly congruent with organismic psychology. Some of the ideas from Sheldon's psychobiological or constitutional psychology and from Cattell's psychostatistical or factor psychology are also very organismically oriented. The rubric is definitive enough to communicate a particular orientation, and yet loose enough to be broad and inclusive in its scope.

These are three clearly identifiable theoretical orientations that do not neatly fit into any of the three rubrics of behaviorism, psychoanalysis, or organismic psychology. Previously mentioned were two theories that are hybrids, viz., Tolman's purposive behaviorism or cognitive field theory, and Kantor's interbehaviorism. Both of these are basically behavioristically rooted, but have strong affiliations with Lewin's field theory. The three remaining theories that do not neatly fit anywhere are Lewin's field theory, Gestalt psychology, and existential psychology. Lewin's orientation is generally holistic and somewhat organismic, but he concentrates primarily on the environmental factors, and his followers (e.g., Lippitt et al) have focused primarily on group dynamics. Gestalt psychology, originated by Max Wertheimer, Wolfgang Kohler, and Kurt Koffka, all of whom are now dead, was created in part as a reaction against behaviorism. Gestaltists are opposed to the molecular approach, the stimulus-response mechanical model, and the rejection of consciousness that characterizes behaviorism. The orientation is generally holistic and quite compatible with organismic psychology. The primary focus of Gestalt psychology, however, is perception and

phenomenology, a much narrower focus than most personality and
behavior theories. Now that all the founders of Gestalt are gone
the movement as an organized force is somewhat dissipated. But
this is also partly because their contributions have been absorbed
in varying degrees in practically all other systems in psychology.

The third, and most difficult, of the theories to classify
is *existential psychology*. As Lundin (1972, p. 292) says: "Existential
psychology is not an organized system of psychology, but might better
be considered a movement." Lundin devotes a chapter to the movement,
and so do Hall and Lindzey (1970). It is the most philosophically
oriented of all the psychological systems. Existential psychology
grew out of the existential philosophy movement in Europe that
peaked after World War II. The movement traces its historical
roots back to Kierkegaard, and to some extent to Dostoyevsky. Hall
and Lindzey (p. 553) credit the founding of the movement primarily
to Martin Heidegger and Karl Jaspers. Hall and Lindzey appropriately
point out the common antecedents and interconnections among existen-
tialism, phenomenology, psychology, and Gestalt. Some prominent
figures in existential psychology are two Swiss psychologists,
Ludwig Binswanger and Medard Boss. Others are Rollo May and
Adrian Van Kaam. Many organismic and humanistic psychologists have
been partially influenced by and have contributed to the existential
movement, e.g., Carl Rogers, Kurt Goldstein, Andras Angyal,
Gordon Allport, Abraham Maslow, and Gardner Murphy, to name only a
few.

Some of the principle tenets of existential psychology

are what make it hard to classify neatly as falling into the organismic

rubric, and they have a great deal to do with building a theory for

values development education. First, existential psychology

completely rejects determinism in all its forms, and maintains that

man has free will and free choice, and can determine his own life.

The followers of this movement reject the materialistic and mechanistic

orientations of both behaviorism and psychoanalysis. Man is responsible

for his own existence and can make of it what he will. Both hereditary

and environmental explanations for man's behavior are rejected. The

focus is on one individual. The emphasis is consistently on man in

his existential situation, on human values, human existence, suffering,

anxiety, death, and consciousness. Existential psychologists believe

that psychology has defeated itself by swinging in the direction of

natural science. Possibly the most important concept in the existential

system is *becoming*. Man is always in the process of becoming, of

changing, of growing, of becoming something new, of transcending.

Many of the scientifically-grounded concepts and beliefs of psychology

are rejected as unreal, misleading, and potentially destructive to

any understanding of the human being or human existence. Thus,

much of the work of even the organismic psychologists would be

rejected. The idea of developmental stages, for example, is rejected.

The entire approach of modern structuralism, and its search for

underlying universailty in man's existence is anathema to the existent-

ialist, who gives meaning only to man's existential reality. And

organismic psychology recognizes both deterministic aspects and free

aspects of man's existence. Behaviorism and existential psychology

accept diametrically opposed extremes. For organismic psychology there is a middle position that more completely recognizes the complexities of this issue. As might be guessed, existentialists vigorously reject and deny the validity of logical positivism and the empirical methods of investigation of positivistic psychology. Organismic psychology rejects positivism, but accepts science and scientific method as a valid approach to understanding human behavior and existence.

Thus it is difficult to classify existential psychology in any of the three rubrics. The only one with which there is any congruence or agreement at all is organismic psychology. But, for the most part, it is really in a class by itself. The major tie to organismic psychology is that many of the theorists who have been influenced by existential psychology or have recently moved in that direction are basically organismic theorists. The overlapping of humanistic psychology and existential psychology is substantial. And humanistic psychology falls more comfortably under the rubric of organismic psychology. Generally speaking, one can be a humanistic psychologist without being an existentialist; but one could not readily be an existential psychologist without being a humanist.

Some of the principal organismic psychologists and their theories are listed below:

1. Kurt Goldstein - Organismic Theory

2. Andras Angyal - Organismic Theory

3. Abraham Maslow - Holistic-Dynamic Theory

4. Prescott Lecky - Theory of Self-Consistency

5. Gordon Allport - Theory of the Individual

6. Heinz Werner - Organismic-Developmental Theory

7. Jean Piaget - Genetic Epistemological Theory of

   Intellectual Development

8. Lawrence Kohlberg - Cognitive-Developmental Theory

   of Moral Judgment

9. Carl Rogers - Theory of the Self

10. John Dewey - no specific theory, but overall

    conceptualization of the human

    organism in transaction with the

    environment, and other features of

    his psychology and philosophy are

    organismic

11. O. J. Harvey, D. E. Hunt, and H. M. Schroder -

    Conceptual Systems Theory

12. Jerome Bruner - Theory of Cognitive Development

13. Bernard Kaplan - Organismic-Developmental Theory

14. Gardner Murphy - Biosocial Theory of Personality

Others who work or have worked from an organismic perspective
but are not identified as originators of a specific theory, and whose
names appear frequently in the literature, and many of whom are or
have been associated with the people listed above include Elliot Turiel,
Jonas Langer, Bärbel Inhelder, David Elkind, Seymour Wapner,
John Flavell, James Mark Baldwin, Alfred L. Baldwin, Hans Furth,
J. McVicker Hunt, and Edmund Sullivan and his colleagues at the
Ontario Institute for Studies in Education, Toronto, Ontario.

Now that the parameters of the rubric organismic psychology have been delineated and some of the theorists and theories have been identified, some of the principles and tenets of this view follow. First, as previously mentioned, this is a holistic approach to man. Man is seen as an integrated functional whole, not as a series of differentiated parts or as an accumulation of stimulus-response bonds. Mind and body, and organism and environment are not seen as distinctly different entities that function independently or in opposition to each other. Rahter they are seen as different aspects of one coordinated process in a transactional relationship. The human organism naturally exists in a state of organization, thus organismic theory stresses the unity, integration, coherence, and consistency of the person.

Man is intrinsically active and motivated and does not need to be primarily motivated by the environment. Man is seen, then, as active and autotelic; not as passive and heterotelic.

Since the relationship between organism and environment is transactional, they influence and shape each other. The organism perceives and interprets the external world in his own terms, and constructs his knowledge of the world on his own terms. Conversely, he is also influenced by the external world, and adapts and changes to accommodate it. Organism and environment influence, mold, and shape each other. And even when the influence from the environment predominates, the receiving organism does not receive the environment as it is. Knowledge is not a copy of reality. Knowledge is a construction.

In the same sense, values are not objective realities that

exist in the environment to be transmitted to the organism. The human organism is an inherently valuing creature that is continuously evaluating the environment, itself, and the situational circumstances. The relationship with the environment is a selective-rejective one in which certain features, aspects, and actions are interpreted as valuable and necessary and are accepted, while others are interpreted as negative and are rejected. This continuous process is part of the organism's adaptation process, and leads to growth and development.

Development is a transactional process that involves (1) the determining and limiting factors of genetic and maturational aspects of the organism's biological base, (2) the nature, quantity, and quality of the organism's direct experience with the environment, (3) the nature and orientation of the socialization process, . including parental influences, educative influences, language, mores, sanctions, etc., and (4) the internal, self-regulating, self-generative process that modulates, mediates, and cybernetically regulates both the organism and its interpretation of the environment. This last factor is somewhat peculiar to the organismic view, viz., the positing of an equilibration process. The behavioristic view rejects any such idea completely. The psychoanalytic tradition, in its own way, does hold for such a process, especially the ego psychologists. But many organismic theorists specifically postulate the existence of an equilibration process, especially Piaget, Werner, Kohlberg, and their assoicates. One would not have to hold for an equilibration process, however, in order to be an organismic psychologist.

Organismic psychologists tend to give more recognition to both the existence of and the role of higher thought processes, or cognitive ability, in the life of the human being than do other views. Behaviorism treats higher thought processes as more complex types of S-R bonds and chains; psychoanalysis sees man as more affective and irrational and gives little attention to higher thought processes. Supporters of organismic psychology give rationality, thought, and reason a prominent place in the spectrum of human behavior.

On the very important issue of determinism organismic psychologists differ sharply with both the behaviorists and the orthodox psychoanalysts on the one hand, and just as sharply with the existentialists on the other hand. The organismic position is probably similar to that of the ego psychologists, and falls somewhere between the extremes of the behaviorists and the existentialists. Organismic psychologists fully recognize the lawfulness of the world and behavior, but reject the idea that all events are determined completely by the impersonal forces of antecedent events. There is more selectivity in the sense that certain physical, social, and internal conditions may decidedly determine or restrict the range of choice available to anyone in any given situation. Retarded children, brain-damaged people, drug or alcohol addicts, those suffering from any form of mental pathology, prisoners, slaves, those who are prisoners of any kind of ghetto or economic deprivation, and many others--these people live lives marked by restriction and characterized by limited or no choice in most or all areas of human

existence. But to decide the issue of determinism by looking only

at this side of life is to miss the fact that with good health, a

higher quality of education, and maximization of development one's

options begin to both increase and become more obvious. To say that

there is only one choice available at all times, and that this is

not really a choice since the outcome is "already in the cards,"

so to speak, misses the fact that there are times when people have

genuine alternatives available that make for different outcomes.

On the other hand, to say that antecedent conditions have no effect

whatsoever, that the present is in no way related to the past, and

that any given moment is existential in its own right, is to ascribe

a complete lawlessness to the universe that would be as paralyzing

and hopeless as complete determinism. If through either of these

conditions, complete determinism or complete indeterminism, man

has no choice about anything then life becomes completely mechanistic

or completely chaotic. The organismic psychologist holds for some-

thing in between these extremes and allows for meaningful choice in

certain areas of life.

In summary, organismic psychology views man as active,

autotelic, and involved in his own growth and development. He is

seen as organismic rather than as behavioristic. He is seen as

humanistic rather than as mechanistic. And he is seen as holistic

rather than as particularistic. He has consciousness, inner mental

behavior, and is not sharply divided from his environment. Values,

knowledge, and structure do not come only from the external world

in a process of transmission, conditioning, or introjection. The

raw data of the world is received by the senses of the organism and
is processed by the internal structure of the human mind and the
organismic valuing process that is basic to biological existence
and functioning, and is thus transformed in terms of the individual's
being. Thus in transaction with the world the organism constructs
knowledge and values. The process being a transactional one results
in a great deal of congruence among individual views, but also
allows for a reasonable degree of individuality. The congruence is
also based on the fact that there seems to be a great deal of
universality in the function and structure of the biopsychological
organisms that make up the human species. Within the context and
confines of a partially limiting and determining world the human
organism has the capacity or potential for some degree of significant
self-determination.

B. Critique of the Views of Man

The purpose of this chapter has been to provide the infor-
mation necessary to attempt some resolution of the underlying issues
of values development with the idea of building toward a theory for
values development education. It has been claimed that each of us,
whether he knows it or not, has an image of man underlying his
actions in the world. It has been further claimed that the nature
of this image will influence the way we teach and what we teach, and
that any claim to prefessionalism demands that we examine our beliefs
and make explicit our bias. In so doing it is hoped that a great
deal of reflection on the issues will take place, and that out of

this process will emerge a more consistent, integrated, and effective teacher. And although it is also claimed that this holds true for any teacher teaching anything, that the burden of psychophilosophical reflection is particularly heaviest in the area of values/moral education. Which is another way of saying that it does, in reality therefore, pertain to all teachers, for all teachers are truly engaged in values/moral education, a claim which will be examined more closely in Chapter VI.

The views that have just been presented in summary form represent the dominant and influential psychophilosophical views that prevail in the behavioral sciences today--including education as an applied behavioral science. Two questions are important with respect ot these views vis-a-vis values/moral education:

1. What are the implications of these views for values/ moral education?

2. Which of these views or what combination of them is the most useful as a foundation for a theory for values development education?

Before developing critiques of these views, it is necessary to point out that these three (or four, if existential psychology is looked at separately) are not considered exclusive, exhaustive, or ultimate. The claim here is only that they are the most influential prevailing views in our culture, especially in terms of their influence in psychology and education.

Second, any view of man created by man is of necessity incomplete, inadequate, tentative, and inherently biased. We live

with a myth sometimes--a myth that is especially prevalent in our highly technologically successful culture--that scientific knowledge is factual, or real in some sense that other forms of knowledge are not. In view of the fact that the application of the scientific method is intended to produce information that is more reliable than either intuition or prejudice, it is understandable that the findings of science are often hypostatized as truth. But it is important to keep in mind, especially with regard to these psychophilosophical views of man, that all scientific research, be it in the so-called natural sciences or in the behavioral sciences, is a product of the minds of men. This imposes all the restrictions and qualifications of the human senses, human intellect, and human emotions--or, in short, it makes of all science, to some degree or another, human valuations. Dewey claimed that we really do not make statements of truth; we make *warranted assertions*. Some comments of Poincaré's are relevant on this point. In the Author's Preface of <u>Science and Hypothesis</u> he says:

> To the superficial observer scientific truth is unassailable, the logic of science is infallible; and if scientific men sometimes make mistakes, it is because they have not understood the rules of the game...

> But upon more mature reflection the position held by hypothesis was seen; it was recognized that it is as necessary to the experimenter as it is to the mathematician. And then the doubt arose if all these constructions are built on solid foundations. The conclusion was drawn that a breath would bring them to the ground. This sceptical attitude does not escape the charge of superficiality. *To doubt everything or to believe everything are two equally convenient solutions; both dispense with the necessity of reflection.* (Italics added)

And it is precisely this reflection that needs to engage the attention and commitment of educators in all arenas of education, but especially in the values/moral arena. But frequently instead we find the tentative claims of even partial findings assiduously applied in the classroom without either reflection on their warranted assertibility or consideration for future consequences.

Nothing is more tentative than these views or models of man. As Abraham J. Heschel (quoted by Severin, 1973, p. 99) says of this very issue: "There is no issue about which so many contradictory statements have been made, no issue so important, no issue so obscure. Psychology, biology, sociology have sought to explore the nature of man. And yet man remains an enigma." But as tentative as they are they provide some direction, some guide-posts, and some clues. And they provide overall orientations that are either congenial or not congenial for certain educational purposes. Behavioral objectives, so popular at the moment, for example, are highly unlikely to ever emerge from the camp of the existential psychologists. Sensitivity groups, on the other hand, are equally unlikely to emerge from radical behaviorism. And it is implications such as these, and many more important ones, that need to be explored in connection with the building of theory for values/moral education. The spirit expressed above guides the critique that follows. In view of some of the problems raised earlier about the views presented it seems more appropriate to think of four rather than three, viz., *behaviorism, psychoanalysis, existential psychology,* and *organismic psychology.*

1. Critique of Behaviorism

One useful way to begin a critique of this model of
man is to examine it in its most extreme form, viz., radical behavior-
ism. Skinner will loom large in this section, for Skinner is the
contemporary apotheosis of radical behaviorism and the source of
inspiration, leadership, and both theoretical and empirical support
for the large body of Skinnerian behaviorists.

These are few philosophical or psychological positions
extant as extreme in its claims as this one. And it is safe to
say without rancor or exaggeration, that there simply is no view of
man available that is less hospitable to any holistic, humanistic,
or organismic theory or approach of values or moral education!
Skinner's blunt statements on this issue are unequivocal--in
eliminating all mentalistic concepts, all internal psychological
variables, and all ideas related to what he calls "autonomous
man," Skinner reduces *all* values/moral issues to questions of
environmental control, contingencies of reinforcement, and positive
and negative reinforcers. Skinner's complete statement on these
matters is available in two sources: Science and Human Behavior
(1953) and Beyond Freedom and Dignity (1971).

Skinner even rejects all other behavioristic positions
generally identified as S-R theories. His argument (1971, p. 15)
is that even these require some kind of "inner man" to explain
how the stimulus becomes converted to the response. It is here
that he proclaims his most basic dictum: "Behavior is shaped and
maintained by its consequences. Once this fact is recognized, we

can formulate the interaction between organism and environment in a much more comprehensive way" (p. 16). This is the operant conditioning model that is based on the principle that behavior *operates* on the environment to produce consequences (operant behavior). This leads to Skinner's primary principles for all forms of education:

1. The environment can be arranged in order to be studied to see which specific consequences are contingent upon which behaviors.

2. The environment can be manipulated.

Three major obstacles to implementation of Skinner's science of behavior exist. Skinner identifies them as:

1. The traditional belief that man is free.

2. The traditional belief that man has dignity (or worth).

3. The fears and concerns related to the issue of control. That is, in the utilization of the science of behavior to create the ideal culture who is to construct and maintain the controlling environment?

An analysis of Skinner's ideas reveals that his particular use of the terms *freedom* and *dignity* specifically refer to the positive and negative aspects of *responsibility*. His argument is that since the environment is the completely controlling factor in man's life, and all internal mental states are only myths, then it is preposterous to hold man responsible for anything. Since his behavior is caused there is no basis in fact for punishing or rewarding man for his actions or achievements. Skinner says (p. 18):

"Personal exemption from a complete determinism is revoked as a scientific analysis progresses, particularly in accounting for the behavior of the individual." It is ridiculous, he argues, to ascribe either blame or credit to man for anything. "A scientific analysis shifts the credit as well as the blame to the environment, and traditional practices can then no longer be justified" (p. 19).

Thus the first two of the three obstacles listed above are shown by Skinner to be prescientific foundations for what he sees as the idiotic and crippling belief in the idea of "autonomous man." Until this notion is dispensed with once and for all we cannot apply the principles of his scientific approach to human behavior.

The third question above Skinner sees as a "values" question. The question of control is the one he is least explicit or clear about. He says that the environment *selects*, much in the same way that natural selection operates in evolution, but in a much different time frame. His main argument seems to be that the natural selection of the controlling environment has some kind of inherent balance and control system that maintains equilibrium. This is a matter of values, in the ideas of traditional autonomous man, but it is a matter of arranging the contingencies of reinforcement for scientific man. Skinner defines values as positive and negative reinforcers. A few of Skinner's statements may help clarify his position:

> Good things are positive reinforcers...The
> things we call bad also have no common property.
> They are all negative reinforcers, and we are

reinforced when we escape from or avoid them.
(1971, p. 98)

> When we say that a value judgment is a
> matter not of fact but of how someone feels about
> a fact, we are simply distinguishing between a
> thing and its reinforcing effect. Things them-
> selves are studied by physics and biology,
> usually without reference to their value, but the
> reinforcing effects of things are the province
> of behavioral science, which, to the extent that
> it is concerned with operant reinforcement, is
> a science of values. (1971, pp. 98-99)

> To make a value judgment by calling some-
> thing good or bad is to classify it in terms
> of its reinforcing effects. (1971, p. 99)

> ..."You ought to love your neighbor" may be
> converted into the two statements: (1) "The
> approval of your fellow men is positively
> reinforcing to you." and (2) "loving your
> fellow men is approved by the group of which
> you are a member," both of which may be demon-
> strated scientifically. (1953, p. 42)

> ...and we should not attribute behaving for the
> good of others to a love of others. In working
> for the good of others a person may feel love
> or fear, loyalty or obligation, or any other
> condition arising from the contingencies
> responsible for the behavior. A person does not
> act for the good of others because of a feeling
> of belongingness or refuse to act because of
> feelings of alienation. His behavior depends
> upon the control exerted by the social environ-
> ment. (1971, p. 105)

> ...The "norm" is simply a statement of the
> contingencies. (1971, p. 110)

Skinner's system reduces everything related to values

to reinforcers and contingencies in the environment. Morality is

a matter of environmental control and conditioning. A peculiar

thing occurs in this system, however--the environment acquires the

characteristics the author removed from the organism. What is this

environment of which Skinner speaks and to which he ascribes all

responsibility and value and control? In a strange way it seems as though Skinner has transferred the mentalistic entities, the mythical responsibility and values, the traits and characteristics he has rejected as prescientific nonsense from the person to the environment. If man is not responsible because he is not free, then how can the environment be held responsible unless it is free? But Skinner says all is determined. And yet he holds the environment blameworthy and praiseworthy.

Skinner says the environment selects. He says this process is similar to the natural selection of the evolutionary process. But this raises interesting questions. Is this lawful or capricious? If the former it is completely determined. If the latter it is unscientific and meaningless. And if it is scientifically lawful, then it must be completely determined, in which case how can it be controlled? How can a deterministic system not permit autonomous man but permit autonomous environment? This leads to the idea that given a completely determined organism and environment the idea of a technology of behavior based on controlling, manipulating, and shaping becomes as utterly absurd and prescientific as Skinner says is autonomous man.

The environment selects, Skinner says. Selection implies rejection, and both imply criteria. Criteria are values, which Skinner says are nothing but reinforcers. But what is the criteria base for these reinforcers? And, again, if they are part of the lawful deterministic system how can they be controlled and manipulated?

Now all of this raises one of the most interesting questions

of all--who and what is the controller? Is he part of the environ-
ment? Or is he a third party to the entire interaction between
organism and environment? Is he exempt from the controlling influence
of the environment? Skinner'e entire argument results in a fully
determined controller operating in a fully determined environment to
establish fully determined contingencies of reinforcement to control
a fully determined organism in order to shape his fully determined
behavior. Skinner's scientific system becomes, then, the scientific
counterpart of the prescientific autonomous man he rejects. Because
in order for his system to work at least one part of it must be free
of the lawful control. Otherwise we have an infinite regression of
determinism and control, in which the controller (Skinner, for
example) is deluding himself into believing he is controlling some-
thing which cannot be controlled. In short, we have autonomous man!

Unfortunately, Skinner has not only made some serious
errors in his logic, he has also made some serious errors in perception.
He has looked at what he frequently refers to as "the literature
of freedom and dignity" through the rather limited vision of his own
prejudices and has seen only the defects, failures, and problems of
values/moral ideas and freedom, responsibility, and dignity. He has
apparently not read or has distorted the readings in the literature
of freedom and dignity that show more equilibrated forms of logic than
what he condemns. Skinner's arguments about punishment, constraint,
and freedom are interesting and bear a great deal of truth. He says,
for example, that except for when man is under conditions of restraint
he is least free when he is threatened with punishment. Consequently,

he says, the literature of freedom and dignity should reflect an opposition to punitive techniques of punishment, but in fact the holders of the autonomous man view have upheld and perpetuated such techniques. Of course, he fails to understand that much of the literature he identifies as the literature of freedom and dignity was in reality written by people who never understood the concepts. Very much of the literature has been written by people whose own level of development negates any true understanding of freedom, dignity, responsibility, justice, or morality. If Skinner would read the writings of Dewey, Rawls, Piaget, Perry, and many more he would see an entirely different picture, and a great deal of congruence with his own ideas about punishment, aversive techniques, and selfish domination of others.

Having studied the literature that celebrates expiatory and restitutive forms of retributive justice, apparently Skinner has not found or has ignored or has not understood the literature of principled morality and distributive justice. Skinner has literally thrown out the baby with the bath water.

The last section of Beyond Freedom and Dignity makes Skinner's position even more confusing. On page 179 he says:

> Whatever we do, and hence however we perceive it,
> the fact remains that it is the environment
> which acts upon the perceiving person, not the
> perceiving person who acts upon the environment.

This is an interesting position. Throughout his writings he relegates the organism to the status of a passive, empty reactor, and elevates the environment to the status of an organic, dynamic actor. But for any given organism a large part of his environment

is made up of other people manipulating the contingencies of
reinforcement that influence his behavior. Thus we are left with
a problem regarding the organism. With respect to himself he is
passive and reactive, but with respect to others he is dynamic and
active. How can this be?

But the concluding section of the book is the most
puzzling. Skinner almost resorts to metaphysical arguments in order
to give man a meaning not consistent with his other views. He
attempts to restore some kind of dignity and freedom to man. But
his arguments are hollow. Somehow the environment, which up to this
point has been dynamic, active, and omnipotent, becomes both the
product and tool of man. Some examples follow:

> It is only autonomous man who has reached a
> dead end. Man himself may be controlled by his
> environment, but it is an environment which is
> almost wholly of his own making...The evolution
> of a culture is in fact a kind of gigantic
> exercise in self-control. As the individual
> controls himself by manipulating the world in
> which he lives, so the human species has constructed
> an environment in which its members behave in a
> highly effective way. Mistakes have been made,
> and we have no assurance that the environment man
> has constructed will continue to provide gains
> which outstrip the losses, but man as we know him,
> for better or for worse, is what man has made
> of man. (pp. 196-197)

> When a person changes his physical or social
> environment "intentionally"--that is, in order to
> change human behavior, possibly including his own--
> he plays two roles: one as a controller, as the
> designer of a controlling culture, and another
> as the controlled, as the product of a culture.
> There is nothing inconsistent about this, it
> follows from the nature of the evolution of a
> culture, with or without intentional design.
> (p. 197)

> Man has "controlled his own destiny," if
> that expression means anything at all. The man
> that man has made is the product of the culture
> man has devised. (p. 198)

But, on page 201 Skinner returns to his familiar theme:

> Science has probably never demanded a more
> sweeping change in a traditional way of thinking
> about a subject, nor has there ever been a more
> important subject. In the traditional picture a
> person perceives the world around him, selects
> features to be perceived, discriminates among
> them, judges them good or bad, changes them to
> make them better (or, if he is careless, worse),
> and may be held responsible for his action and
> justly rewarded or punished for its consequences.
> In the scientific picture a person is a member of
> a species shaped by evolutionary contingencies
> of survival, displaying behavioral processes which
> bring him under the control of the environment in
> which he lives, and largely under the control of
> a social environment which he and millions of
> others like him have constructed and maintained
> during the evolution of a culture. The direction
> of the controlling relation is reversed: *a
> person does not act upon the world, the world
> acts upon him.* (Italics added)

If these statements are put in the context of the entire book it

is difficult to understand them. Skinner's major argument and life

work is based on the unequivocal rejection of every thing represented

by the term autonomous man. All internal states, feelings, values,

beliefs, attitudes, consciousness, and intentionality--all are

declared meaningless and absurd. The environment is made supreme and

controlling. And above all else, our entire existence is determined.

He argues that man must recognize the crisis that autonomous man has

generated and use the enormous amount of scientific data already

available to build and implement a science and technology of behavior,

or we are probably doomed. And yet in the statements quoted above

Skinner maintains that man has "constructed an environment in which its members behave in a highly effective way." And the final enigmatic statement is in the two sentences with which he concludes the book:

A scientific view of man offers exciting possibilities. We have not yet seen what man can make of man.

Few people have exerted as much influence on our schools in recent years as Skinner! And few of the teachers and principals who have jumped on the bandwagon of behavior modification have examined the rationale that created and sustains it. Behavior modification is a process whereby a controller decides what is and what isn't desirable and undesirable behavior on the part of the students. The controller then proceeds to use all of the principles of operant reinforcement theory to scientifically shape the behavior of the student in order to extinguish the undesirable behavior and elicit the desirable behavior. In many instances the behavior being shaped is learning behavior involving content, knowledge, and skills. In many other cases the behavior being shaped is what is generally called deportment, and involves transforming the child more to the liking, whims, and needs of the controller (the teacher). How easily and completely fooled educators can be about the meaning and significance of the techniques of radical behaviorism is epitomized by the teacher who said in one of this writer's classes: "But I'm shaping my kids to be independent!"

It is not difficult to realize that the implementation of Skinner's system is a form of indoctrination, by whatever words used to define that term. Important questions must be raised about

the issues Skinner discusses. Possibly the single most important question is: Is there such a thing as moral responsibility? Skinner would have to answer with a resounding "No!". Skinner is correct in claiming that eliminating freedom, dignity, and responsibility does eliminate values/moral issues from the scene. It is clear that Skinner's radical behaviorism can be used only as a source of control, conditioning, and shaping. This is nothing here to support a theory of values development education. A values/moral system based on complete environmentalistic control can only mean, from the standpoint of the student in our schools, a values/moral system based on predetermined values, which seems to be quite inconsistent with a pluralistic democratic society. In fact, a values/moral education program based on operant reinforcement theory and utilizing all the techniques of behavior modification would be quite similar to the two nomothetic approaches identified in Chapter II, viz., the traditional-authoritarian approach and the cultural-relativistic approach. There is one major difference, however. A nomothetic approach based on operant reinforcement would be even more undemocratic for the simple reason that it is a very insidious technique. At least the content of the other nomothetic approaches was clear and the intentions were explicit. The message was to accept the standard value system, or else. Behavior modification techniques, however, are not explicit from the victim's point of view. One can be modified, shaped, and controlled without ever knowing or understanding it. Educators must look more closely at this procedure and its underlying implications.

In turning now to methodological behaviorism, or the milder form, many of the same points apply. The basic issues are really the same, and the differences are mostly only of degree or are technical. All knowledge, values, and structure are in the environment and are transmitted to the child in the process of socialization. The primary source of values/moral development is conditioning, imitation, and modeling. The primary motivation factors are fear and anxiety. Many of the social learning theorists have adopted behavior modification as one of the main forms of social control and values education. One difference between the two behavioristic camps relates to the issue of internalization. Skinnerians, of course, do not use such a term. But the social learning theorists believe that values are transmitted from the culture to the child and are gradually internalized by the child. The link with classical psychoanalysis is clear on this point. Learning the rules, values, moral standards, and norms of the society is no different from learning other aspects. As Turiel (in Mussen, Langer, and Covington, 1969, p. 93) points out:

> When the child behaves in a socially undesirable
> way he receives punishment. The association of
> punishment with particular situations and
> behaviors results in conditioned anxiety, causing
> the avoidance of certain behaviors. Individual
> differences in moral behavior are explained in
> terms of constitutional differences in
> conditionability.

In further describing the process of moral development from the standpoint of learning theory (Turiel is, however, an organismic psychologist) he states:

Other subscribers to an internalization
theory have posited more complex acquisition
mechanisms than instrumental conditioning. For
instance, Sears (1957) and Whiting (1960) have
accepted the notion of a more global internal-
ization of social rules, and Bandura and Walters
(1963) have assumed that moral behavior is a
result of reinforcement and modeling. However,
these learning theorists agree with Eysenck
(1960) in defining morality as conformity to
cultural norms. Consequently, they all view
moral development as increasing conformity to
cultural standards, based on the assumption
that the child directly internalizes the
standards of his society...

Basing their experiments on the inter-
nalization theory, researchers have investigated
the factors that lead the child to directly
internalize his culture. The study of develop-
ment is the study of increasing strength and
accuracy of the internalization, so moral
responses are measured for their strength and
for how closely they approximate society's
norms. (ibid, p. 93)

For all behaviorists in general, then, the development of

values/moral behavior is a matter of transmission from the external

world to the child. In Skinner's system it is strictly a matter

of behavior shaping and control. For the other behaviorists it is

a matter of socialization for internalization by the child of the

culture's moral standards. (This concept of internalization must

not be confused with other uses of that term.) There is nothing

active on the part of the child involved in the behavioristic view.

The organism is still a passive receiver of the environmental

values.

Before leaving behaviorism two remaining issues need to

be considered, viz., (1) the adequacy of this view of man, and

(2) the relationship of behaviorism to democracy.

Regarding the adequacy of behaviorism as a view of man,
and as an approach to the scientific study of man, there are
numerous problems. At the outset there is the serious problem
related to the fact that in order to consider or express the
basic doctrines of behaviorism one must use all of the things
denied existence by the behaviorists--primarily one must use the
mind which presumably does not exist. Kaufman (in Edwards, 1967,
Vol. 1, p. 270) cites A. O. Lovejoy's criticism from his "Paradox
of the Thinking Behaviorist." Lovejoy, according to Kaufman,
"sought to prove that 'behaviorism...belongs to that class of theories
which become absurd as soon as they become articulate'." Kaufman
summarizes Lovejoy's argument as follows:

> ...Lovejoy tried to show that the behaviorist
> does make cognitive claims; for example, he
> may claim to be aware of objects external to
> himself. But the moment the behaviorist makes
> such claims he involves himself in contradiction
> from which he can extricate himself only by
> denying that he knows anything--which is an
> absurd alternative from the behaviorist's own
> point of view. Hence, the behaviorist must
> either contradict himself or lapse into absurdity.

How can the behavioristic position be conceived or explained
if their view of the human organism is correct. How, for example,
could Skinner derive his entire system solely from the external
contingencies of reinforcement? In a chapter entitled "Minds: What
and Where in the World are They," Henry Veatch (in Scher, 1962,
p. 322) in discussing the behaviorist's rejection of the phenomenon
of intentionality makes the following point:

> From this standpoint the mere fact that the
> phenomenon of intentionality cannot properly be

integrated into the scientific universe does not
as such constitute a sufficient reason for
behaviorism.

Nor is it entirely a matter of the mere
arbitrary choice of standpoint either. For we
would wonder whether the behaviorist himself,
in the very act of understanding human behavior
in the way he does, must not consider that such
is the way in which human behavior presents
itself to him. He will surely insist that
he sees and understands it in this light. But
this is tantamount to acknowledging that he
thus intends the facts and data before him, and
that they are thus intentionally present to him.
In other words, considered simply as a human
being who has ideas and theories about things,
the behaviorist himself, in his very enterprise
of confirming and developing his theory of
behaviorism, will actually be viewing and
understanding the facts and data of behavior in
a way which that very theory of his would rule
out as being either improper or impossible. It's
simply a case of a man's left hand as a scientist
not knowing what his right hand as a human being
is doing.

In another chapter in the same book, one entitled "Mind
and Mechanical Models," Errol Harris (p. 467) maintains that the
behaviorist's denial of consciousness can only be applicable to
other people, and never to oneself. He points out that even the
methodological argument is inadequate, and that science itself
cannot exist without consideration of personal states of awareness.
He says:

> ...If nothing private is to be accepted as
> scientific evidence, then no report of any
> observation made by others is admissible as it
> is the report of a private experience of
> perception and each scientist will be caught
> inescapably within the circle of his own
> observations which will be incommunicable...
> and perceptual experiences are no different
> from feelings in this respect. In such a
> predicament public fact ceases to have any
> meaning and science becomes impossible.

The chief claim of the behaviorists, from Watson to Skinner, has been the necessity of a science of behavior based on the model of the natural sciences. It is this claim that they use to bolster their argument that only observable behavior can be admitted as evidence, and that it is unnecessary and erroneous to postulate mythical concepts. Ironically, however, the entire structure of natural science, especially nuclear physics, rests on the inferred existence of certain kinds of particles, bodies, and energy that absolutely no one has ever seen. And even more ironical is the fact that Albert Einstein worked almost exclusively with his mind. Most of his formulations were mathematical and purely theoretical manipulations of mental concepts worked out in the private world of his own mind, which the behaviorists presume is nonexistent, irrelevant, or inadmissable as evidence. If the behaviorist will grant the physicist the right to infer unobservable events and bodies why is it not equally plausable and scientific to do so with the human mind?

Piaget (in Mussen, 1970, p. 731) quotes a mathematician-philosopher friend of his as having said: "Empirical study of experience refutes empiricism!" Perhaps the behaviorist's reaction to the purely speculative kinds of introspection carried on in the late 19th century version of psychology is simply a great over-reaction. To discard the mind, consciousness, intentionality, and other significant aspects of human existence as meaningless, ridiculous, or nonexistent is to deny the possibility of ever truly understanding the human organism, which after all, is the source

and actor of the behavior the behaviorist wants to study and understand.

If there is one subject on which the behaviorists have revealed the inadequacy of their conceptualizations and theories it is in the area of language development. Chomsky and a host of others have demonstrated that the mechanisms of behaviorism are simply incapable of explaining the development of language in the child. Cazden (1972) thoroughly analyzes the processes involved in this complex development and learning achievement. One example of speech development that simply contradicts the behaviorist's explanation of human language is the discontinuity of infant babbling from later speech. As Cazden says (p. 59):

> We also used to think that learning to produce speech sounds developed by a process of gradual shaping from the randomly produced sounds of infant babbling. It now seems more likely that a discontinuity exists between prelinguistic babbling and true speech behavior. Frequently, in a child's development there is a period of silence between babbling and speech. Furthermore, ...the sequence of emergence of sounds is incompatible in the two developmental phases.

This and many other factors identified by Cazden render the behavioristic argument at best inadequate, and frequently erroneous. Probably the most commonly cited argument against the behavioristic explanation for language in terms of reinforcement, S-R chaining, and shaping is the fact that children are able to utter sentences they have never spoken before, have never heard spoken by anyone else, and for which they have never been reinforced or shaped. For an excellent treatment of this subject, including some of the points made here, see Miller and McNeill (Ch. 26 in Lindzey and Aronson, 1968, Vol. III).

It is important to understand that we are not rejecting all there is in existence about behaviorism. The behaviorists have contributed significantly to the corpus of knowledge about the human organism and human existence. Conditioning is a fact of life, and organismic psychologists do not deny it. It plays a very important role in learning and in development. The major error of the behaviorists is to take this one fact of human existence and project it into the whole model of man. Reinforcement (reward) is important in growth and development, and frequently can be essential to or influential in learning. But there is no justification for claiming that all learning, and all performance, and all existence is based on this one aspect of human nature. As Allport (1968, p. 77) comments:

> The trouble with our current theories
> of learning is not so much that they are wrong,
> but they are partial. They fit best the learning
> of animals and young children. The concepts
> of conditioning, reinforcement, identification,
> seem a bit hollow when the counselor tries to
> apply them to his work.

To the term counselor, add educator, parent, and all socialization agents.

The primary argument in rejecting behaviorism as a foundation for values/moral development and education is that it is based on an incomplete, partially erroneous, and potentially dangerous conceptualization of man. And it is the potentially dangerous aspects that need to be considered in the conclusion of this section.

It will be remembered that earlier it was stated that we need to consider the relationship of behaviorism to

democracy. In the final analysis it is this aspect of this view of man that is of the greatest significance for values education. The basic tenets of behaviorism can only lead to a nomothetic indoctrination form of values/moral education. The environmental-ism, determinism, mechanism, and empty passive organism planks in the behaviorist's platform are incapable of supporting any other form of education. Consequently, there is strong support for the belief that behaviorism and democracy are incompatible. This is a very strong claim, and needs to be supported.

Carl Rogers (1969, p. 259) expresses a similar point of view in the opening paragraph of a chapter he entitles "Freedom and Commitment." He says:

> One of the deepest issues in modern life,
> in modern man, is the question as to whether
> the concept of personal freedom has any meaning
> whatsoever in our present day scientific world.
> The growing ability of the behavioral scientist
> to predict and to control behavior has brought
> the issue sharply to the fore. If we accept
> the logical positivism and strictly behavior-
> istic emphases which are predominant in the
> American psychological scene, there is not even
> room for discussion. The title of this chapter
> is then completely without meaning.

If Rogers is correct, then as people, as educators, and as citizens we must become more aware of what is going on around us as thousands of unwitting people jump on the bandwagon of behaviorism as it makes its way through our schools. In an excellent analysis of our society and our schools Willis W. Harman raises some of the issues raised here. In the opening chapter of Purpel and Belanger's Curriculum and the Cultural Revolution (1972) Harmin postulates that we are in the midst of a conceptual revolution that is going to determine the course

of our future for a long time to come. Two of the possible alternatives

he envisions are (1) a person-centered society, or (2) a second-phase

industrial state. He identifies four "meta-issues" or "issues behind

the issues" that are involved in this conceptual revolution. The four,

among many, that he chooses to cite as the most important are:

1. A crisis in *human image*.

2. A crisis in *authority*.

3. A crisis in *economic values*.

4. A crisis in *pluralism*.

He opens his discussion on the crisis in human image with the follow-

ing statement:

> We have already noted, in discussing the
> possible conceptual revolution, that a conflict
> exists between the basic premises of a
> democracy--that man is, by virtue of his trans-
> cendental nature, endowed with reason, will,
> and a valid sense of value--and the reduction-
> istic, deterministic, and physicalistic premises
> of the behavioral science, sociopolitical theory
> that our universities impart to their annual
> crop of budding sociologists and political
> scientists.
>
> The young social scientist receives a
> background in a sociology which has shifted from
> its earlier emphasis on the semiphilosophical
> humanities approach to an emphasis on techniques
> and empirical studies, with the implication
> that man is a creature of his drives, habits,
> and social roles, and in whose behavior reason
> and choice play no decisive part. In the
> courses he is offered in psychology this
> point of view is likely to be made even more
> explicit, with consciousness considered to be
> an inconsequential accompaniment to behavior
> governed by external stimuli and instinctive
> urges...
>
> *On the other hand, the concept of a*
> *transcendental, choosing, ultimately responsible*

> *self is essential to the entire theory of*
> *democratic government.* (pp. 47-48)
> (Italics added)

A little later Harmin cautions: "Currently in our society a potent emerging force pushes for a change in that image, in the direction of transcendent man; but thus far the power is on the side of the reductionists" (p. 49). He also points out that the crisis in authority involves "...the balance between authority based upon power and authority based upon voluntarily given respect" (p. 49).

Now the two crises of human image and authority bear directly on the claim that behaviorism and democracy are incompatible. One of the basic propositions of this dissertation, especially this chapter, is that one's image of man will directly and indirectly manifest itself in one's teaching. The question becomes, then, is it possible for a view of man, and its accompanying technology, based on the premises of behaviorism to be able to create a democratic atmosphere? One of the leading philosophers of this century, Ralph Barton Perry, wrestled with this issue within the larger context of the meaning of freedom. In "What Does It Mean to be Free" (Perry, 1953) he defines freedom as *effective choice*. The he says: "Whatever prevents or reduces effective choice negates freedom. The enemies of freedom are more numerous than is commonly believed, and arise from causes that are often ignored, or are supposed to have nothing to do with freedom." Among the enemies of freedom he includes biological, economic, and governmental forces that reduce or negate freedom. And then he makes the following statement which bears directly on my claim:

> *The remaining enemies of freedom have to do
> with freedom of the mind.* If freedom consists in
> doing what one chooses the faculties of choice
> must exist and must be developed. Here the
> enemies of freedom are those lower forms of
> mentality in which a man most closely resembles
> a brute: reflex action, instinct, habit, fear,
> and combativeness. *Whatever decerebtates man
> and deprives him of the higher control of
> ideas enslaves him.* (p. 129) (Italics added)

Perry has hit the nerve center of the behaviorism-democracy issue.

It is precisely because the techniques of behaviorism's technology

of human behavior rob man of conscious, rational choice that the

claim is here made that behaviorism is opposed to freedom and

undermines democratic living. If a child is being controlled by

the insidious manipulation of his behavior through the careful

arrangement of his contingencies of reinforcement then he is being

manipulated to behave in a way designed by the controller and for

the controller's benefits. And no matter how this is sugar-coated

by the claims of the controller that he is doing this in the best

interests of the child, the fact remains that it is completely

external and hidden control. Also, to build an entire system

based on the lower forms of human existence, on the child's

responsiveness to reward and unconscious association, is to ignore,

avoid, and negate his potential for higher forms of thought. And

it is this potential on which depend the success of a democratic

system. Perry clearly identifies this form of education and points

out the basic issues. He says:

> But education of the sort which may be
> called "controlled indoctrination" is an
> enemy of freedom. The power of church, state,
> school, or public opinion, or of a monopoly of

> the instruments of communication, may be so
> used as to impoverish and imprison the mind.
> One idea insinuated into the mind may take
> possession of it and exercise a hypnotic spell.
> Two or more ideas are better, but if these
> are methodically selected to suit the purpose
> of an authority, they still deny freedom.
> *Whoever determines what alternative shall be*
> *made known to a man controls what that man*
> *shall choose from.* He is deprived of freedom
> in proportion as he is denied access to any
> ideas, or is confined to any range of ideas
> short of the totality of relevant possibilities.
> (p. 130) (Italics added)

No better exemplar of "controlled indoctrination" is available than

the techniques of *applied behavioral analysis,* the formal and

technical name for the behavioral methods of control stemming from

Skinner's operant reinforcement theory. In educational circles it

is more commonly called *behavior modification,* and it works, we

are told. But efficacy is not sufficient to justify the use of

such a method.

The essence of democracy is participation, involvement, and

effective choice (freedom) along with responsible moral behavior.

The essence of behaviorism is determinism, passivity, compliance,

and control. And the most important human characteristics and

capacities that are the foundation for freedom and democracy are

the very things the behaviorists, in the name of science, have

eliminated from the repertoire of permissable subjects for study,

or have eliminated even as having no existence. It is the human

mind that makes choices! Skinner may believe it is the environment--

he calls it selection. But the only part of the environment that

makes choices is the human part--and that means more human minds.

Thus for the existence or survival of democracy there must be

human minds and human choices, and they must be involved. As

Perry says:

> Control ceases to be external and merely
> coercive when men choose their controls, and
> submit to them voluntarily because they see and
> accept their reason...Here lies the moral
> ground of social institutions, and it is this
> which gives a moral and rational meaning to
> political democarcy. (p. 132)

In the system proposed by the behaviorists there are two reasons why

democracy and its foundations cannot exist:

1. Control is vested in the manipulating controller;

   and

2. The system is completely deterministic in nature,

   anyway, which negates the first reason.

In fact, the entire argument could rest on the second issue above.

The inherent incompatibility of behaviorism and democracy could be

based on the determinism issue by itself. Obviously in a completely

determined world there is no effective choice, and there can be no

democracy.

On this note the argument is concluded. The plea here is

for educators to examine more closely the techniques, systems, and

tools they use in their schools in order that they may make more

effective choices in order that we may build a more effective

democracy. Part of that task involves the creation of a theory and

methodology for values development education, and it appears that

behaviorism is not a suitable foundation for that endeavor.

2. Critique of Psychoanalysis

It will not be necessary to spend as much time analyzing classical psychoanalysis as it took to examine behaviorism for the following reasons:

1. Some of the underlying issues are the same and have already been covered.

2. Psychoanalysis is not as influential in education as it once was or as behaviorism is.

3. Psychoanalysis seems to be losing much of its influence in general, both in the behavioral sciences and in our culture.

4. The more modern forms of psychoanalysis are moving away from the restricting dictums of Freud, and are becoming more compatible with the organismic view of man. This is especially true of psychoanalytic ego psychology.

The two basic issues of classical psychoanalysis that have already been treated under behaviorism are its unbalanced emphasis on the environment as the source of values and its extreme deterministic view. Whereas the environmentalism of behaviorism made man an empty, passive victim of the environment, psychoanalysis made man a hopelessly conflicted pathetic creature to be tamed by the environment for his own good as well as the good of society. Although the organism is not empty in this view, what it contains is negatively construed with regard to values/moral development. The instinctual urges and irrational passions are not fertile

ground for a positive, healthy, self-directing involvement of the

child in his own values development. The result is another unilateral

nomothetic approach to values/moral education. Turiel summarizes the

psychoanalytic conceptualization of moral development (in Mussen,

Langer, and Covington, 1969, pp. 93-94):

> Psychoanalysts also have defined morality as
> conformity to cultural standards and have concept-
> ualized the problem in internalization terms, view-
> ing moral development as the incorporation of a
> set of rules and values that come from the external
> world (Freud, 1923).
>
> In this case, the child forms an ego-ideal consist-
> ing of his parents' standards; in turn, the parents
> are seen as the transmitters of cultural standards.
> The child is moralized when he manages to make the
> ego-ideal his own. The acquisition mechanism
> postulated by psychoanalytic theory is different
> than that of the learning theorists. The superego,
> which represents the standards (ego-ideal) and
> punitive functions (conscience) of the moral
> process, is acquired through a strong global
> identification with his parents that resolves
> the oedipal conflicts (Freud, 1923, 1924).
> [Note: the process Turiel refers to here is
> the one described earlier in this book as the
> anaclitic identification process that results
> in the introjection of the parents' values as
> perceived by the child.]
>
> Although psychoanalysts do not see the
> incorporation of rules as being as mechanical as
> learning theory, they do agree with learning
> theorists that the process is a direct internal-
> ization and that morality is mainly a cultural
> imposition on the individual. Society ensures
> its survival by imposing restrictions on the
> individual's destructive impulses (Freud, 1930)
> and since morality represents a negative imposi-
> tion on the individual, it must ultimately be
> viewed as a process regulated by sanction--
> guilt (Freud, 1928). Therefore, man's social or
> moral behavior is maintained through either
> external or internal sanction, with concepts
> such as guilt representing the internaliza-
> tion of external sanction.

In order to see how this doctrine can be translated into a values/
moral education program that reflects its basic nature, consider
the following statements by a leading contemporary psychoanalyst,
Bruno Bettelheim (in Sizer, et al, 1970, pp. 86-87):

> Certainly the psychoanalyst agrees with
> Nietzsche that morality is nourished by fear
> and that, in the final analysis, the content of
> morality is self-interest. After all, it is
> self-interest that makes one wish for eternal
> salvation, just as it is self-interest that
> makes one wish to succeed in the rat race.
> Where these types of self-interest differ is
> that the first leads to entirely different
> behavior from the second.
>
> But as for morality being based on fear,
> nowadays we want to remove fear from the life
> of the child. And as for the content of
> morality, we often insist that it should not
> be self-interest. In short, we want the
> child to obey a morality whose fundamental
> motives we do our best to remove.

Bettelheim says that the current approaches fail to recognize the
slow development of the child and demand more of him than he is
capable of giving. A commendable criticism, but his solution is
in keeping with the psychoanalytic view of the child as something
that needs to be tamed. He says (ibid, p. 87):

> That is, one can live successfully and learn well
> in school as long as one's growing up begins with
> a very firm and stringent morality of absolutes,
> based on fear. Later, in the process of gaining
> maturity, one can slowly free oneself of some of
> the fear and begin to question its absolute tenets.
>
> It was a Darwin, as well as a Nietzsche and
> a Freud--raised for so much of their lives on a
> stringent and absolute morality based on fear--
> who could later afford to question it ever
> more critically, but without ever losing too
> much of it to go to pieces as persons or to
> withdraw from the world in disgust. It was

precisely the absolute morality instilled in
them as children which made them strong enough,
later on in life, to try to reshape the world
by their now more mature moral concepts.

The mistake is that today too many believe
that what ripe maturity can contain is therefore
the best fare for immaturity. The mistake we
still make is to hope that more and more
citizens will have developed a mature morality,
one they have critically tested against
experience, without first having been subject
as children to a stringent morality based on
fear and trembling. Essentially everything I
shall say from here on is nothing but an
elaboration of this notion.

This passage makes the moral education program of psycho-

analysis very explicit. It also reveals the innate depravity position

of this model of man. It also makes moral education a dose of

medicine that needs to be given to a pathological creature that

hopefully will get well enough eventually to improve itself. This

is a very dubious assumption in view of the psychoanalytic literature

that shows how hard it is for adults to overcome the crippling effects

of stringent and tyrranical childhood socialization agents. Bettelheim's

pronouncements would have given great comfort to the early settlers

of this country whose Puritanical rigidity was in keeping with this

modern psychoanalyst's ideas, but it gives little guidance to a

modern view of values/moral education for a pluralistic democratic

society.

Another major problem of the psychoanalytic view is that

it goes to extremes in emphasizing the role of the parent. Surely

parents are extremely important and tremendously influence their

children. But surely they are not the absolute determiners of the

child's values.

Whereas the behavioristic view of man calls for the values/
moral educator to be a controller-programmer, the psychoanalytic
view calls for the values/moral educator to be a dictator-therapist.
Neither view is much compatible with a program for a democratic
society.

A final statement on classical psychoanalysis is on the
issue of determinism. The literature portrays Freud as an absolute
determinist, much in keeping with the extreme view of radical behavior-
ism. To the extent that classical psychoanalysis holds to this view
the arguments against this position hold as well for this view as for
behaviorism. Fromm (1964), however, in an analysis of Freud's
view attempts to correct this belief of Freud's determinism. His
argument is too long to present here, but it certainly presents a
softer picture of Freud. Fromm says:

> Yet neither Marx nor Freud were determinists
> in the sense of believing in an irreversibility
> of causal determinism. They both believed in
> the possibility that a course already initiated
> can be altered. They both saw this possibility
> of change rooted in man's capacity for *becoming
> aware of the forces which move him* behind his
> back, so to speak--and thus enabling him to
> regain his freedom. Both were--like Spinoza,
> by whom Marx was influenced considerably--
> determinists *and* indeterminists, or neither
> determinists *nor* indeterminists. Both proposed
> that man is determined by the laws of cause and
> effect, but that by awareness and right action
> he can create and enlarge the realm of freedom.
> It is up to him to gain an optimum of freedom
> and to extricate himself from the chains of
> necessity. For Freud the awareness of the
> unconscious, for Marx the awareness of socio-
> economic forces and class interests, were the
> conditions for liberation. (p. 161)
> [For a full treatment of Fromm's analysis on
> this subject the reader should read the

                    entire passage from which this is quoted, and
                    also Fromm's Beyond the Chains of Illusion, 1962]

One would certainly have to have read a great deal of Freud's

own writing in order to critically judge Fromm's interpretation of

Freud. All that can be offered here is that Fromm's statement is

at variance with many other interpreters of Freud. It is more in

keeping with the views expressed by the social analysts' views

of psychoanalysis, of which Fromm is a representative. The views of

Horney, Fromm, Adler, and Sullivan have been summarized earlier.

It is also more in keeping with the views of the ego psychologists

than with Freud's views. Before leaving this discussion of Fromm

it is worth pointing out that his views are clearly summarized in a

passage in Beyond the Chains of Illusion (1962) entitled "Credo"

(Ch. 12) with which he closes that book. Not only is it an excellent

statement of Fromm's views, it is a fair summary of the social

analyst's position, and reflects much of what is believed by the

ego psychologists. Above all it reflects how far both groups have

proceeded away from and beyond the restrictive and dark image of

Freud's classical psychoanalysis.

        In summary, it is safe to say that the older version of

psychoanalysis, although differing in details and technicalities, is

quite compatible with the behavioristic view with regard to values/

moral development and education. Consequently, it is of little

help in building a viable theory for values development education for

a modern, pluralistic democracy. Both relegate the human organism to

the status of an automaton to be controlled by the environment.

Both deny the person any capacity or right to participate in his own development. And both emphasize the overwhelming determinism of the environment.

We can turn from this view of man with much more hope to the views of the more modern psychoanalysts already mentioned, but expecially the ego psychologists. In all fairness to Jung, however, his formulations contain some highly useful concepts and insights. His ideas on the influence of culture, the self, symbolization, the role of religion and mysticism in life, and many other ideas are fertile ground for values/moral exploration. His view of man incorporated rationality and thinking as an important aspect of man's being. His views on self actualization and self realization are highly compatible with similar ideas offered by a number of organismic theorists, especially Goldstein, Maslow, and Rogers. In general, his view of man is a healthy antidote to Freud's, and is considerably more positive, hopeful, and balanced.

The great contribution of the social analysts is their full conceptualization of the relationship between the organism and society. The role of society in the formation of the personality is a considerably more balanced picture than that of the classical psychoanalysts, and offers much help for a values development education theory. Some of the more valuable contributions of this group include Adler's ideas on style of life and the creative self; Fromm's basic needs, developmental character types, alternativism, deep insights on the nature of our society, the role and nature of love, and other psychophilosophical ideas; Horney's ideas on basic

needs and the characteristics of neurotic behavior; and Sullivan's conceptualization of personality and personality development, cognitive processes, and the notion of the malevolent transformation.

And possibly an even richer source of building blocks to bridge psychoanalytic theory with organismic theory is the work of the ego psychologists. Ego development, stage theory, equili- bration principles, the role of rationality and thinking, and many other features of ego psychology are tremendously harmonious with organismic psychology.

In conclusion, psychoanalysis in its classic form, rooted in Freud's theories, offers little help to the builders of a theory for values development education. Much of its character is quite consistent with behaviorism and is equally hostile to the idea of a healthy, rational, active organism living in a democratic environment. Those who built on the constructive ideas of Freud and went beyond them without being shackled by his pessimistic views and rigidity have contributed much that is worthwhile to the task of building a values/moral theory. It will take a great deal of time to fully explore and develop these contributions, a task for future work.

3. Critique of Existential Psychology

There is little that this view of man can offer beyond what the general organismic view can offer. The holistic view of man, opposition to dichotomizing man and environment and body and mind, and its overall humanistic orientation are virtually identical

with the views of organismic psychology, but do not appreciably
extend them in any way. The emphasis on the idea of being-in-process
and becoming are already part of the organismic view, but it is possible
that the existential writers can enrich this concept for the build-
ing of the theory.

Existential psychology holds for some ideas that are in
direct conflict with organismic psychology, and they are major
obstacles to a synthesis of the two views. The extreme emphasis on
the validity of existential phenomena, for example, is possibly an
overreaction to the unbalanced empiricism and positivism of behavior-
ism, but tends to ignore the contribution of a balanced and realistic
utilization of empirical science in the world of human behavior. The
existentialists fail to see that empirical science can be used as
a valuable tool without hypostatizing or deifying it. Their extreme
position on this point has resulted in a theoretical and philosophical
myopia. Thus existentialists would tend to reject the potentially
enormous contribution of modern structuralism, developmental
psychology, and rational theory building.

Their view of man is so idiographic that it again is as
extreme in that direction as behaviorism is in the other direction.
The undue emphasis on the individual removes man from his natural
existence deeply involved with his fellow human beings in a state
of interdependence.

But of all the tenets of existential psychology the most
untenable and divisive is the belief in complete indeterminism.
Again, this is probably an overreaction to behaviorism and

psychoanalysis. The reason why this is so important for values

development theory is because it eliminates responsibility, freedom,

and dignity as completely and effectively as Skinner's complete

determinism. If man lives only in the present existential situation,

without any antecedent considerations, in a completely uncaused

milieu then he is as enslaved as if he were completely determined.

For if the individual must face each situation without any influence

from the past then he faces a completely unknown world of change at

all times. He is, therefore, at the mercy of the environment just

as surely as he is in a world of pure causality. If the individual's

fate is determined by the randomization of experience then how can

he have any control or influence over his own life? In such a

system he has no freedom, can accept no responsibility, and must

be excused from all morality. This is an extremely paradoxical and

tragically ironic turn of events for a view of man designed to free

man and enlarge his potential. The attempt by the existentialists

to humanize man succeeds in isolating and paralyzing him.

The grim picture of existential psychology painted here

can be brightened a bit by considering that some of the most

respected and competent organismic psychologists have been

swinging in the direction of existential psychology, especially

Allport (now deceased), Maslow (deceased), Rogers, and Murphy.

What needs to be done is to search out the influences responsible

for this shift and explore its implications for both organismic

psychology and values development education. Again, a worthy

project for extensive investigation. In the meantime the analysis

presented above seems to be a fair evaluation of the potential for this view of man with regard to values development education.

4. Critique of Organismic Psychology

After nearly three years of extensive exploration of the psychophilosophical views of man presented in this chapter the great potential of organismic psychology appears to provide the greatest foundation for a values development education program for a pluralistic democratic culture. First, it is not given to the extreme positions on crucial issues that characterize the other three views. Consequently, it is not crippled by either extreme determinism or extreme indeterminism. Likewise, it is not distorted by an unbalanced picture of the nature of man, the environment, or the relationship between them. And its holistic orientation permits a much more complete, considerably richer, and more dynamic conceptualization of the human organism. The organism of organismic psychology is neither empty nor almighty.

The breadth, depth, and diversification of the views that fall under this rubric are sufficiently congruent to provide powerful support for certain crucial claims, and yet discrepant enough to provide ample challenge to reification, deification, or "truthification" of any claims. This model emphasizes and focuses on man in the healthy state, but gives adequate recognition to the nature and reality of pathology. It tries to apply the methods of science to the elusive field of human behavior without canonizing empirical methods or unrealistically objectifying the findings of those methods.

Behaviorism has chosen to respond to the esoteric nature of the human mind and the difficulties of exploring it with either a complete rejection of its existence or a declaration of its irrelevancy. Organismic psychology, confronted with the same challenges and problems, has elected to attempt to understand the mysteries of the organism. Einstein is reputed to have said that the human organism is like a sealed clock--you can never open it but you can attempt to understand it. He never saw the particles and forces he treated theoretically on paper, but he never declared them nonexistent or irrelevant. Certainly the applications of his theories have proven the validity and efficacy of attempts to understand things that cannot be seen or directly observed. A helpful analogy to express this point is to view man as standing on the backside of a giant and complex tapestry. Anyone who has ever seen that side of a tapestry knows that what is observed is a confusion of threads with little or no hint of the intricate pattern on the other side. If an observer formed his final view on the basis of what is observable it would be partially correct, but hopelessly inadequate. To say that all we can ever know is the jumbled confusion of loose ends so let's declare them the nature of the tapestry and proclaim the pattern on the other side as nonexistent, irrelevant, and meaningless, is self-deceiving, counterproductive, and grossly misleading. We are in the strange position of being part of the tapestry while we try to analyze it, which considerably complicates the task. But the attempt is worthwhile and fruitful and, if we are to survive, it is absolutely necessary that we achieve a better understanding of ourselves,

our world, and our meaning. And so long as we try not to extrapolate

way beyond our findings, and so long as we retain open minds, and so

long as we recognize both our limitations and our potentialities,

we may advance the cutting edge of exploration to unknown worlds.

CHAPTER FOUR

AN ORGANISMIC-STRUCTURAL-DEVELOPMENTAL APPROACH

TO VALUES DEVELOPMENT EDUCATION

Four approaches to values/moral[1] education have been

identified in Chapter Two. Three of them were evaluated as

educationally ineffective, conceptually inadequate, and philosophic-

ally inappropriate for use in a pluralistic and democratic society.

The three approaches deemed inadequate have been labeled according

to their identifying characteristics as follows:

1. The Traditional-Authoritarian Approach (Absolute

Nomothetic)

2. The Cultural-Relativistic Approach (Relative

Nomothetic)

3. The Absolute Relativistic Approach (Idiographic)

One of the major theses of this dissertation is that any

approach to values/moral education is, of necessity, based on a

psychophilosophical view of man, and that a well-designed program

will build on an examined view that is made explicit. Four major

views of man have been considered, viz., *behaviorism, psychoanalysis,*

---

[1]The term *values/moral* is used throughout this dissertation to
communicate the overall interest in all types of values although
the primary focus is often on moral values. Values is the primary
and inclusive category; moral values are considered a subcategory
of values, but is considered to be the most important subcategory.
Other categories include esthetic values, religious values, and
political values.

existential psychology, and *organismic psychology.* The first three
views have been examined and judged as partially inadequate, incom-
plete, and/or erroneous conceptualizations of man and his relation-
ship with the environment. Consequently, they have been declared
as generally not as useful as the fourth view to serve as foundations
for a theory for values development education. This does not rule
out the possibility of substantial contributions being made by any
of these three views or their subdivisions, but it means that the
general conceptualizations and positions on major issues are not
viewed as warranted assertions.

The fourth approach is identified here as *organismic-
structural-developmental.* *Organismic, structural,* and *developmental*
have been carefully chosen to represent the three dominant themes
and basic thrusts. The use of the three terms as a unit is a
construction of this writer. In the literature it is common to find
the terms organismic, organismic psychology, organismic-developmental
and cognitive-developmental. To a lesser extent structural-develop-
mental is used. But it is precisely the combination of the three
orientations and the conceptual significance of the integration that
clearly identify the distinguishing characteristics of this conceptual
framework for values/moral education. Since organismic-structural-
developmental is such a cumbersome and technical term, *values
development education* is frequently used in its place and is
intended to be synonymous.[2] For convenience both O-S-D and VDE

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[2]This is not intended as a claim that this is *the only* approach that

will be used where appropriate.

A. Organismic

Organismic and *holistic* are virtually synonymous. Tracing

the origins of the two terms will help explicate the organismic

position. Beckner (in Edwards, 1967, Vol. 5, p. 549) describes the

origin of organismic as follows:

> The term "organismalism" was coined by the
> zoologist W. E. Ritter in 1919 to describe the
> theory that, in his words, "the organism in its
> totality is as essential to an explanation of
> its elements as its elements are to an explana-
> tion of the organism." Subsequent writers have
> largely replaced "organismal" with the more
> euphonious "organismic" as a title for this
> theory, for the many variations on its main
> theme, and for some subordinate but supporting
> doctrines concerning the teleological and
> historical character of organisms.

Beckner proceeds to explain the common origins and partial affinity

of organismic biology with the old vitalism. Organismic biology

clearly rejects the belief in the vital life substance, or *élan*

vital or entelechy, of vitalism; but agrees with vitalism in the

rejection of purely mechanistic and materialistic doctrines about

the nature of life and the biological nature of the organism. There

are three major points on which organismic biologists agree,

...could be thought of as values development education. Any approach
that emphasizes the developmental aspects of values education could
readily be identified this way. Many approaches do not emphasize
development or assume that development plays any significant role in
values education. Values clarification, for example, is not
developmentally oriented, and it would seem to this writer that it
would not be appropriate to think of it as values development
education, but as a methodology for values education.

according to Beckner, viz., (1) organic unity, (2) determining

features of the whole, and (3) teleological behavior of organism.

On these points Beckner offers the following brief summaries:

> Organic unity. Organic systems are so
> organized that the activities of the whole
> cannot be understood as the sum of the activities
> of the parts. All members of the school agree
> on this point. As the term "organismic" implies,
> the most important example of such wholes is the
> single organism, but there are others, such as
> cells, organs, colonies, and some populations.

> Determining features of the whole. The
> parts of organic wholes not only exhibit patterns
> of behavior in virtue of their relations to
> other parts at the same level of organization, but
> in addition, *some* of the features of the parts
> at a given level are determined by the pattern of
> organization at *higher* (and, of course, at lower)
> levels of organization. This is the general form
> of the special thesis that the properties of the
> whole determine the properties of the part; and
> it seems to have the methodological consequence
> that a theory of the elements at a given level
> could not be complete without a theory of the
> elements at the higher levels. Woodger puts the
> point this way: the parts of organisms must
> be studied *in situ,* for we cannot learn how they
> would behave *in situ* by studying them in isolation.

> Teleological[3] behavior of organisms. One

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[3]The use of *teleological* here is not in any sense related to the
spiritual or religious use of the term. Werner and Kaplan (1963, p.6)
help clarify the use of teleological in organismic biology and
psychology. They say: "It must be stressed that directiveness
should not be understood to imply conscious effort toward an end,
so-called 'subjective teleology.' Directiveness in the sense of
'objective teleology' is an observable characteristic of organismic
behavior irrespective of any consciousness of ends on the part of
the organism...Purposive or planning behavior, in particular,
should not be confused with directiveness in its generic sense,
though it is likely that planning behavior, consciously entertained
in human beings, is a specialization of that general directiveness
immanent in all organic activity."

kind of activity, which is a consequence of
organization at a level higher than that of the
organism's physical parts, is directive or
teleological behavior. Directiveness is an
aspect of organisms that is shown in their
physiology, in the behavior of individual
animals, and in the social systems of some
animals; and an account of directiveness is
not only legitimate but necessary. E. S. Russell
argues that since directiveness (processes aimed
at the production and maintenance of organic
unities) is a fact, then a physiological process,
or piece of animal behavior, cannot be understood
until we understand its function or its goal.

The above summaries of the principles of organismic

biology are significant not only for tracing the origin of the term

organismic, but also because they describe principles generally

held by organismic psychologists to pertain in the psychological

realm as well as in the biological. Most organismic theorists

emphasize the biological foundations of the organism and stress

the necessity of considering basic biological roots of psychological

phenomena. Werner, Maslow, Goldstein, Angyal, and Piaget, to name

only a few, are representative of this position. More specifically

for values development education, the biological foundation of

behavior is manifested in the conceptualization of an *organismic*

valuing process that plays a significant role in the formation and

development of values.

Holism can also be clearly traced to its originator. The

word is an invention of Jan Christian Smuts (1870-1950), the former

South African statesman, soldier, and scholar. He introduced the

term holism in Chapter V., entitled "General Concept of Holism."

An excerpt from his "Summary" of that chapter presents the concept

as follows:

Both matter and life consist of unit structures whose ordered grouping produces natural wholes which we call bodies or organisms. This character of "wholeness" meets us everywhere and points to something fundamental in the universe. Holism (from ὅλος = whole) [*holos*] is the term here coined for this fundamental factor operative towards the creation of wholes in the universe. Its character is both general and specific or concrete, and it satisfies our double requirement for a natural evolutionary starting-point.

Wholes are not mere artificial constructions of thought; they point to something real in the universe, and Holism is a real operative factor, a *vera causa*. There is behind Evolution no mere vague creative impulse or *Élan vital*, but something quite definite and specific in its operation, and thus productive of the real concrete character of cosmic Evolution.

The idea of wholes and wholeness should therefore not be confined to the biological domain; it covers both inorganic substances and the highest manifestations of the human spirit. Taking a plant or an animal as a type of a whole, we notice the fundamental holistic characters as a unity of parts which is so close and intense as to be more than the sum of its parts; which not only gives a particular conformation or structure to the parts but so relates and determines them in their synthesis that their functions are altered; the synthesis affects and determines the parts, so that they function towards the "whole"; and the whole and the parts therefore reciprocally influence and determine each other, and appear more or less to merge their individual characters: the whole is in the parts and the parts are in the whole, and this synthesis of whole and parts is reflected in the holistic character of the functions of the parts as well as of the whole.

There is a progressive grading of this holistic synthesis in Nature, so that we pass from *(a)* mere physical mixtures, where the structure is almost negligible, ...to *(b)* chemical compounds, where the structure is more synthetic

...to *(c)* organisms, where a still more intense
synthesis of elements has been effected, which
impresses the parts or organs far more intimately
with a unified character, and a system of central
control, regulation and co-ordination of all
the parts and organs arises; and from organism,
again on to *(d)* Minds or psychical organs, where
the Central Control acquires consciousness and a
freedom and creative power of the most far-reaching
character; and finally to *(e)* Personality, which
is the highest, most evolved whole among the
structures of the universe, and becomes a new
orientative, originative centre of reality. All
through this progressive series the character of
wholeness deepens; Holism is not only creative
but self-creative, and its final structures are
far more holistic than its initial structures.
...As Holism is a process of creative synthesis,
the resulting wholes are not static but dynamic,
evolutionary, creative. ...The explanation of
Nature can therefore not be purely mechanical;
and the mechanistic concept of Nature has its
place and justification only in the wider setting
of Holism. In its organic application, in
particular, the "whole" will be found a much more
useful term in science than "life," and will
render the prevailing mechanistic interpretation
largely unnecessary.

...an organism is really a unified,
synthesised section of history, which includes
not only its present but much of its past and
even its future. An organism can only be explained
by reference to its past and its future as well
as its present; the central structure is not
sufficient and literally has not enough of it
to go round in the way of explanation;...

This passage communicates the depth and breadth of Smuts'
conceptualization, but more than anything it shows that he does
not intend that holism be a mere construction or symbol. It is
not not something mysterious, ethereal, or magical either. It is
a real operating fact in nature and existence, and it can be
observed. On this point Smuts says:

It is possible that some may think I have

pressed the claims of Holism and the whole too
far; that they are not real operative factors,
but only useful methodological concepts or
categories of research and explanation. There
is no doubt that the whole is a useful and
powerful concept under which to range the
phenomena of life especially. But to my mind
there is clearly something more in the idea.
The whole as a real character is writ large on
the face of Nature. It is dominant in biology;
it is everywhere noticeable in the higher mental
and spiritual developments; and science, if it
had not been so largely analytical and mechanical,
would long ago have seen and read it in inorganic
nature also. The whole as an operative factor
requires careful exploration. That there are
wholes in Nature seems to me incontestable. (p. 100)

The contemporary organismic view of motivation is clearly

stages by Smuts. Modern theorists agree that one of the basic

factors of life is that motivation is intrinsic to life itself.

Smuts maintains that the organism "is self-acting and self-moving "

(p. 101). The organism is not like a machine or an artificial

construction that requires external action, force, or motivation.

"The source of its activity is internal and of a piece with itself,

is indeed itself." The togetherness of its parts is not mechanical,

as can be demonstrated by the inability to reconstruct a dismembered

organism. The organism's power to maintain itself is also not

mechanical. It takes in food and other forms of aliment not by

mere mechanical addition, "but by a complete transformation,

assimilation and appropriation into its own peculiar system of the

material so taken in." Smuts' views are precisely the views of all

organismic theorists on these particular points. Piaget, for

example, describes both biological and intellectual functioning

of the organism in the same terms used by Smuts.

In the first of Smuts' statements quoted, the long passage, there are two particular points worthy of elaboration. First, he claims that the concept of "wholes" will be more useful in science than "life," and that such a view will render the mechanistic views unnecessary. The full rich meaning of holism is clear in Smuts' ideas on this point. He feels that the mechanistic approach to scientific explorations of the concept life have rendered the term virtually meaningless because it has resulted in life being something the organism possesses. He says: "The concept of life is too vague to be definable and pinned down to a definite content, it is liable to be hypostatized into a substance or a force apart from the organism which it denotes" (pp. 109-110). In other words, he says, life has come to be viewed by mechanistic science as a specific type of mechanism. He suggests the substitution of the concept "whole" for the concept "life" in both philosophy and science in order to help rectify this state of affairs. His rationale for this point clearly exemplifies the difference between the behavioristic view of man and the organismic view of man, and helps support the claim that the latter is a more suitable foundation for a theory for values development education. Smuts says:

> A living organism is not an organism *plus* life,
> as if life were something different and additional
> to it; it is just the organism in its unique
> character as a whole, which can be closely defined.
> The sense in which it differs from a chemical
> compound considered as a whole is also capable of
> accurate definition; and thus it is quite
> unnecessary to resort to the dubious concept of
> mechanism in order to describe the living organ-
> ism or, as I perfer to call it, the holistic
> organism. The concept of the whole enables us

to use a technical scientific terminology, which
is not vitiated by popular usage, and which is
capable of accurate definition and description.
(p. 110)

It is the view that an organism *plus* life is the foundation for

understanding human behavior that leads to the incomplete, inadequate,

and partially erroneous conceptualization of man, motivation, and

socialization in behaviorism. It is, for example, from this idea

that the notion of external motivation and the need for transmission

of the structure of the external world to the child originates.

The holistic view leads to the idea that the organism participates

in the growing and learning process. It is the difference between

values *acquisition* versus values *development*.

The second point mentioned earlier is his reference to the

necessity of considering the past, present, and future of the

organism in any attempt to understand or explain the organism, as

well as the need to include the field. Contemporary organismic

theorists stress the need to include the diachronic, synchronic,

teleological, and transactional field aspects of human existence in

order to understand the person. The behaviorists, especially the

radical behaviorists such as Skinner, maintain that only the history

of antecedent reinforcements and contingencies plus the immediate

environmental contingencies are sufficient to understand and shape

the organism and its behavior. Again, this factor helps clarify

the difference between the holistic view of the organismic psycho-

logists and the mechanistic view of the behaviorists.

Holism and Evolution must be read in its entirety to

fully appreciate the scope of Smuts' vision for the holistic concept
and to realize how much this one statement adumbrates the full
development of the organismic-holistic viewpoint that prevails today.
So many of Smuts' ideas, e.g., on mind, personality, and organism-
environment relationships, are identical to or highly congruent with
the ideas that exemplify organismic viewpoints today, nearly half
a century since Smuts published his book. But as Frick (1969, 1971)
points out, there is a real paradox with respect to Smuts and his
influence. In spite of the fact that Smuts coined the word which
has become so widely used, and in spite of the fact that he so clearly
stated the position which has been so widely adopted, Smuts is
rarely mentioned in the literature and rarely cited. Frick traces
the origins of the term and partly the movement to Smuts, and
reviews his key ideas. Hall and Lindzey (1970, p. 298) briefly
acknowledge Smuts' influential role in the development of organismic
theory. And Angyal (1941, p. 2) in a brief footnote acknowledges
that he borrowed the term "holism" from Smuts. But such citations
and references are unusual.

But the elaboration of holism provided by Smuts has made
it possible to show that holism and organismic are virtually
synonymous as was stated at the beginning. The agreement between
the ideas presented by Beckner and those presented by Smuts
should be clear. This agreement is plainly manifested in the
literature. Werner and Kaplan (1963) refer to "the organismic-
holistic orientation." Baldwin (1967, p. 496) says: "In opposition
to this atomistic point of view [i.e., S-R theory] is a *holistic*

or *organismic* view, according to which all changes in human behavior involve the total organism because the organism is an integrated whole." Herbert Feigl (in Feigl, Scriven, and Maxwell, 1958, p. 414), in a section that echoes Smuts without reference to him, reflects the synonymity of the terms: "It is conceivable that much of what is called 'emergent novelty' on the chemical and biological levels of complexity may ultimately be explained in terms of the organismic or holistic features of the laws of atomic and molecular dynamics..."

In spite of the synonymous nature of the two terms, organismic has been selected for inclusion in the identifying name of the proposed theory for values development education. Four reasons support this decision. First, organismic more explicitly and dramatically emphasizes the focus on life and the human organism as the base for such a theory and approach to values/moral education. Organismic more forcefully exposes the hiatus between the supported view of man and the rejected views of the other major models. Second, the biological foundation of human behavior so widely accepted by the proponents of this view is reflected more by organismic than by holistic. Third, organismic has a less mystical ring to it than does the other term. And fourth, from a practical standpoint organismic presents less problems. People without a background in psychology or philosophy frequently have never seen or heard holism or holistic and want to correct what they believe is a misspelling by adding a "w" to the beginning. They may never have heard organismic either, but at least they have heard its root or variations.

Organismic, then, clearly states the foundational position
of the organismic-structural-developmental approach to values develop-
ment education. For further clarification of the organismic position
we turn now to John Dewey.

John Dewey and Organismic Psychology

John Dewey's organismic-holistic orientation is pervasive
in his extensive writings. His 1937 speech to the College of
Physicians, for example, clearly enunciates his basic organismic
position. A brief excerpt from that speech (Dewey in Ratner, 1939,
p. 820), entitled "The Unity of the Human Being," follows by way of
illustration:

> These instances of the use of "unity" may, however,
> provide a suggestion from which it is safe to set
> out. Whatever else the unity is or is not, it at
> least means the way in which a number of different
> persons and things work together toward a common
> end. This *working together* exists in action
> operation, not as a static object or collection
> of objects. It is this kind of unity that seems
> to me to give the clew to understanding the unity
> of the human being.
>
> We can recognize and identify a man as a
> single object, a numerical unit, by observation
> which marks out boundaries, as we note that the
> bounded object moves as a whole. In that way
> you recognize me as a single object standing
> here on the stage before you. That is the way
> in which we recognize a rock, tree or house as
> a single object, as a unity and whole. But that
> which makes a rock a single whole is the inter-
> action of swarms of molecules, atoms, and electrons;
> its unity is an affair of the way elements work
> together. The boundaries by which we mark off
> a human being as a unit are very different from
> the energies and organization of energies that
> make *him a unified human being.* We can observe
> the boundaries at a single moment. We can grasp

> the unity only, so to speak, longitudinally
> ---only as something that goes on in a stretch
> of time. It is not found in any number of
> crossectional views.

The diachronic element to which Dewey refers at the end of this passage

highlights the holistic emphasis he maintains throughout, and is

reminiscent of Smuts' statements. Dewey proceeds from this passage

to emphasize the necessity of completing the understanding of the

human being by considering his internal processes only from the

standpoint of their interactions with the environment. Again this is

one of the hallmarks of organismic theory.

One of Dewey's landmark statements is his article, "The

Reflex Arc Concept in Psychology" (1896; also reprinted in Dennis,

1948). This statement is a criticism of the use of the reflex arc

concept as the basic unit of psychology, and coming approximately

seventeen years before Watson's launching of behaviorism the article

is frequently described as a renunciation of behaviorism prior to

behaviorism. Dewey's basic organismic view is reflected throughout

the article, as for example in the following passages:

> As a result, the reflex arc is not a *comprehensive,*
> *or organic unity,* but a patchwork of disjoined
> parts, a mechanical conjunction or unallied processes.
> What is needed is that the principle underlying
> the idea of the reflex arc as the fundamental
> psychical unity shall react into and determine
> the values of its constitutive factors. More
> specifically, what is wanted is that sensory
> stimulus, central connections and motor responses
> shall be viewed, not as separate and complete
> entities in themselves, but as divisions of
> labor, functioning factors, within the single
> concrete whole, now designated the reflex arc.
> (Dennis, 1948, p. 356)(Italics added)

. . .

> The discussion up to this point may be
> summarized by saying that the reflex arc idea,
> as commonly employed, is defective in that it
> assumes sensory stimulus and motor response as
> distinct psychical existences, while in reality
> they are always inside a coordination and have
> their significance purely from the part played
> in maintaining or reconstituting the coordina-
> tion; and (secondly) in assuming that the quale
> of experience which precedes the "motor" phase
> and that which succeeds it are two different
> states, instead of the last being always the
> first reconstituted, the motor phase coming in
> only for the sake of such mediation. The result
> is that the reflex arc idea leaves us with a
> disjointed psychology, whether viewed from the
> standpoint of development in the individual or
> in the race, or from that of the analysis of the
> mature consciousness. (p. 357)

Dewey's constant plea for integration, unity, and wholeness is

apparent whether he is discussing the molecular unit of individual

behavior or the molar units of social behavior.

Another little piece in the larger mosaic of Dewey's

organismic psychology appears in his analysis of the moral life

(Part II of Dewey and Tufts, 1932; also available separately as

Dewey, 1960). The emphasis on wholeness and integration is a

thread running throughout this statement, and the following quotation

is offered to show both the holistic emphasis and the organismic

principle of internal motivation:

> The identity of self and an act, morally
> speaking, is the key to understanding the nature
> of *motives* and *motivation*. Unless this unity
> is perceived and acknowledged in theory, a
> motive will be regarded as something external
> acting upon an individual and inducing him to
> do something. When this point of view is
> generalized, it leads to the conclusion that
> the self is naturally, intrinsically, inert

and passive, and so has to be stirred or moved
to action by something outside itself. The fact,
however, is that the self, like its vital
basis the organism, is always active; that it
acts by its very constitution, and hence needs to
external promise of reward or threat of evil to
induce it to act. This fact is confirmation of
the moral unity of self and action. (p. 152)

Practically all of Dewey's main themes are organismic-

holistic. These themes run through all of his works, for example,

his opposition to sharp distinctions between means and ends, his

development of the idea of experience, the focus on growth as the

dynamic of life, his reconstructionism, the conceptualizations of

education and democracy and the intimate relationship between them,

in fact, his entire social philosophy, and certainly his philosophy

of transactionalism. Dewey's organismic orientation is summarized

by Allport (1968, p. 349) as follows:

He has taught his readers to be wary of "clefts
and bunches." His insistence upon the complete
process of coordination leads them to be suspicious
of the fragments produced by neat analysis.
When the laboratory wheels turn and the knives
cut, and some exuberant investigator holds up
an excised segment of behavior for acclaim,
Deweyites are not edified. They know that true
statements cannot be made about fragments
snatched from their natural context. They have
little use for a psychology that isolates separate
functions within the total course of experience,
and prefer a thoroughgoing organismic psychology,
preferably one that has a strong social emphasis.

Dewey is generally considered to be one of the founders and

principal supporters of the psychological system that was called

functionalism and ran parallel to Titchener's old *structuralism*.[4]

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[4]For an explanation of this old *structuralism* and its distinction

The latter died with Titchener in the late twenties (see Lundin, 1972),

but the spirit of functionalism remained vigorous in its transformation

into organismic psychology, which is interesting in view of the fact

that Angyal (1941, p. 78n) points out: "'Organ' does not mean originally

only a material structure. The greek word ὄργανον means 'tool' in

general."

This discussion of Dewey's organismic psychology naturally

leads us to the next aspect of the organismic approach, viz.,

transactionalism, which is a very important concept for organismic

psychology in general, and for the organismic-structural-development-

al approach to values development education in particular.

Transaction and the Transactional Organism

The term *transactional* was introduced in this dissertation

in Chapter II when the O-S-D approach was described as "transactional

universal," as differentiated from the nomothetic and idiographic

approaches. Nomothetic, in this usage, refers to the locus of

values being in the external world and being transmitted to the

organism as normative, obligatory, and legitimate. Whether absolute

or relative, values come *to* the person *from* the society and the

culture. Idiographic refers to the internal, personal, and

idiosyncratic locus of values--values come from the person's own

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...from the modern *structuralism*, to be discussed later in this
chapter and which forms the middle component of the organismic-
structural-developmental approach, see Chapter III.

mind, are relative to the experience of each individual, and are
not legitimately subject to external or objective judgment. Idio-
graphic thus incorporates both the internal origin and the relativity
of values.

Organismic psychologists believe that both the nomothetic
and idiographic explanations of the origin and nature of values are
incomplete and partially incorrect. Values do not have an objective
existence apart from the human minds that create them. And human
minds do not create values *ex nihilo*--in fact, many organismic
psychologists argue that it is not correct to think of the human
mind or personality as strictly individual. Glad (in Scher, 1962,
p. 521), for example, in a chapter entitled "'Mind' as an Organismic
Integration," introduces the concept *interpersonality* as a way of
saying that mind and personality are not strictly idiographic or
tha manifestations or products of an individual. As Glad states:

> The term *interpersonality* is intended to
> convey a human-being-in-the-world who in some
> fashion accomplishes a sense of adequacy. The
> term implies a being who manages himself in
> some integrative relationship to the world.
> Of the many possible ways of experiencing, the
> *interpersonality* selects some relatively,
> useful and satisfying *form* or *sense* or *model*
> of the meaning of his self-world relationship.

Glad's concept is a way of expressing the transactional nature of
mind and personality, and of indicating that man's existence is
transactional.

Transaction as a technical term in the organismic-holistic
orientation is a contribution primarily of John Dewey, partly in
cooperation with one of his associates late in his career,

Arthur Bentley. Schneider (in Boydston, et al, 1970, p. 110)

points out that the terminological change from interaction to trans-

action by Dewey and Bentley in the 1940's "calls attention to the

basic thesis of [Dewey's] work of 1896 in which he was already

insisting that individual agent and social sphere of action are not

two separate agents interacting but two co-operating 'factors' in

conduct." Dewey's transactional orientation is clearly evident in

the landmark article already cited in this dissertation, his 1894

statement entitled "The Reflex Arc Concept in Psychology." And, as

Leys (Boydston, et al, p. 134) points out, Dewey's transactional

conceptualization of human beings in society was becoming more and

more evident in the 1920's and 1930's. Human Nature and Conduct

(Dewey, 1922) emphasizes the transactional in the inherent social

nature of morality. Leys says:

> In describing the conflicts and malfunctionings of
> society, Dewey was trying to get away from a
> conception of human beings as entities with a
> fixed nature that were adjusting to or manipulating
> an environment, another set of entities with a
> fixed nature. What he was talking about was a
> process, an interaction, a transaction, in which
> nouns referred to the changing features of a
> partially indeterminate situation.

What may possibly be the earliest use by Dewey of the word

"transaction" is a statement from his article "Conduct and Experience,"

Chapter 22 in Psychologies of 1930 (edited by Murchison, 1930):

> The structure of whatever is had by way of
> immediate qualitative presences is found in the
> recurrent modes of interaction taking place
> between what we term organism, on one side,
> and environment, on the other. This inter-
> action is the primary fact, and it constitutes
> a *trans-action*. Only by analysis and

> selective abstraction can we differentiate the
> actual occurrence into two factors, one called
> organism and the other, environment. This fact
> militates strongly against any form of behavior-
> ism that defines behavior in terms of the
> nervous system or body alone. (p. 411)
> (Italics added)

And as Dewey and Bentley (1949, p. 116n) point out, Dewey's use of

the word "integration" in Logic, The Theory of Inquiry (1938) is

comparable to their use of transaction.

Thorough treatment of "transaction" is in the Dewey and

Bentley book entitled Knowing and the Known, published in 1949. It

is the culmination of a four-year inquiry by the authors into the

terminological and conceptual problems of epistemology, and could

easily have been entitled "A Transactional Approach to Epistemology."

The authors point out that in the history of inquiry

presentations of the nature of action in the world have evolved

from early reports in terms of *self-action* to later reports in terms

of *interaction,* and finally to the most recent reports in terms of

transaction. The word *action* they use "as a most general character-

ization for events where their durational process is being stressed "

(p. 68). The older approach to understanding nature stressed the

imminence of action. In this view "things are viewed as acting

under their own powers,"[5] very much like the ideas of children in the

early preoperational period of thinking as described by Piaget,

Werner, and other organismic psychologists. Clouds, for example,

are seen as possessing the power of action and move across the sky

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[5]Dewey and Bentley (1949), p. 108.

under their own power. This is what Dewey and Bentley mean by self-action.

Galileo and Newton ushered in a new era of understanding in these events with the laws of motion and mechanics. Newton's third law of motion was particularly important; it stated that action and reaction are equal and opposite. Interaction, then, according to Dewey and Bentley is "where thing is balanced against thing in causal interconnection."[6] The "interaction" of Newtonian mechanics was applied to the problem of epistemology, psychology, and sociology and is reflected in the behavioristic and psychoanalystic conceptualizations of human nature and behavior. It is the interactional view of life that is largely responsible for many of the supposed divisions and dichotomies that create many misunderstandings. The cognitive-affective, mind-body-soul, mind-brain, subject-object, secular-sacred, and many other separations of functions and processes into hypostatized entities or realities are products of a push-pull type of mechanical causality rooted in an interactionistic model of nature. Dewey and Bentley make some observations along these lines and recommend a transactional approach:

> The epistemologies, logics, psychologies, and
> sociologies today are still largely on a self-
> actional basis. In psychology a number of
> tentative efforts are being made towards an
> *interactional* presentation, with balanced
> components. Our position is that the tradition-
> al language currently used about knowings and
> knowns (and most other language about behaviors,
> as well) shatters the subjectmatter into

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[6]Ibid.

fragments in advance of inquiry and thus
destroys instead of furthering comprehensive
observation for it. We hold that observation
must be set free; and that, to advance this
aim, a postulatory appraisal of the main
historical patterns of observation should be
made, and identifying namings should be
provided. Our own procedure is *transactional*,
in which is asserted the right to see together,
extensionally and durationally, much that is
talked about conventionally as if it were
composed of irreconcilable separates. We do
not present this procedure as being more real
or generally valid than any other, but as
being the one now needed in the field where we
work. In the same spirit which physicists perforce
use both particle and wave presentations we here
employ both interactional and transactional
observation. Important specialized studies
belong in this field in which the organism is
made central to attention. This is always
legitimate in all forms of inquiry within a
transactional setting, so long as it is deliber-
ately undertaken, not confusedly or with "self-
actional" implications. As place-holders in this
region of nomenclature we shall provisionally
set down *behavior-agent* and *behavior-object*.
They represent specialized interactional treat-
ments within the wider transactional presentation,
with organisms or persons or actors named
uncertainly on the one hand and with environ-
ments named in variegated forms on the other.
(pp. 68-69)

The above passage helps place "transactional", as an

epistemological and scientific approach, in perspective with self-

actional and interactional, but only hints at the deeper meaning of

transaction, *per se*. Near the end of their epistemological

treatise, Knowing and the Known, the authors present what they call

"A Trial Group of Names" (Chapter 11) that could be used in a

transactional approach to epistemology and inquiry. The following

eleven terms and their accompanying text, taken from the long list

in the book, are presented because they directly or indirectly

amplify the meaning of transaction and its other forms:

Actor: A confused and confusing word;
offering a primitive and usually deceptive organi-
zation for the complex behavioral transactions the
organism is engaged in. Under present postulation
Actor should always be taken as postulationally
transactional, and thus as a Trans-actor.

Behavior: A behavior is always to be taken
transactionally: i.e., never as *of* the organism
alone, any more than *of* the environment alone,
but always as of the organic-environmental situation,
with organisms and environmental objects taken as
equally its aspects. Studies of these aspects in
provisional separation are essential at many
stages of inquiry, and are always legitimate when
carried on under the transactional framework, and
through an inquiry which is itself recognized as
transactional. Transactionally employed, the word
"behavior" should do the work that "experience"
has sought to do in the past...

Cosmos: Commonly presents "universe as
system." If the speaking-knowing organism is
included in the cosmos, and if inquiry proceeds on
that basis, cosmos appears as an alternative name
for Fact.

Environment: Situations, events, or objects
in connection with organism as object. Subject
to inquiry physically, physiologically, and in
full transactional treatment, behaviorally.

Inquiry: A strictly transactional name.
It is an equivalent of knowing, but preferable
as a name because of its freedom from "mentalistic"
associations.

Interaction: This word, because of its
prefis, is undoubtedly the source of much of the
more serious difficulty in discussion at the
present time... When transactional and interaction-
al treatments come to be explicitly distinguished,
progress in construction should be more easily
made. For the general theory of knowings and
knowns, the interactional approach is entirely
rejected under our procedure.

Knowings: Organic phases of transactionally
observed behaviors...

Knowns: Environmental phases of transaction-
ally observed behaviors...

Organism: Taken as transactionally existent
in cosmos. Presentations of it in detachment
or quasi-detachment are to be viewed as tentative
and partial.

Self-Action: Used to indicate various
primitive treatments of the known, prior in
historical development to interactional and
transactional treatments. Rarely found today
except in philosophical, logical, epistemological,
and a few limited psychological regions of inquiry.

Transaction: The knowing-known taken as one
process in cases in which in older discussions
the knowings and knowns are separated and viewed
as an interaction. The knowns and the named in
their turn taken as phases of a common process
in cases in which otherwise they have been
viewed as separated components, allotted irregular
degrees of independence, and examined in the form
of interactions. (Chapter 11)

The organismic-holistic orientation of transactional should

be clear. Holism, in the propositions of Smuts, and transactionalism,

in the propositions of Dewey both envision a synthesized and integrated

cosmos in which the systems, subsystems, components, and organisms

are not only intimately related to each other, but mutually give

each other meaning. The interdependence of such a system is

explicitly manifested in the Dewey and Bentley usage of knowings,

knowns, and organism. What the organism knows, what there is to be

known, and the organism that knows are all interdependent and

mutually-determining phases of a transactional cosmos. The genetic

epistemology of Piaget (1970a, 1971), the naturalistic humanism of

Dewey (1929), the organismic-developmentalism of Werner (1948), the

cognitive-developmentalism of Kohlberg (1969), the biosocial person-

ality of Murphy (1947, 1958)--these and many other conceptual

frameworks reflect transactional-organismic views of the human-being-in-the-world.

The transactional approach has been utilized in a variety of ways in many branches of psychology and education. It has been especially useful in theoretical and empirical investigations of perception. The work in this area has been carried on by a number of investigators, and a compilation of some of their investigations and findings is reported in Explorations in Transactional Psychology (Kilpatrick, 1961). Toch and MacLean (in Campbell and Hepler, 1970) summarize much of the philosophy and theory, along with the empirical findings, and draw out the implications of the transactional view for communication, education, research, and audiovisual applications. Several scholars employ the transactional view in attempts to understand the human mind in Scher (1962). Cantril's chapter, "A Transactional Inquiry Concerning Mind," is especially pertinent.

Getzels and a number of associates (e.g., in Morrison and McIntyre, 1972, Ch. 1) have developed a conceptual framework for studying classrooms and groups as social systems. The model they employ clearly identifies the idiographic and nomothetic dimensions of the social system. Based on this model they describe three approaches or styles of classroom leadership, viz., the idiographic style, the nomothetic style, and the transactional style. The idiographic style stresses the needs of the individual rather than the demands of the institution, and makes the particular educational setting at any moment the reflection of the idiosyncratic patterns of the individuals. The nomothetic style emphasizes the requirements

of the institution and society, stresses appropriate role behavior, and views education as the transmission of knowledge from the environment to the learner. The idiographic style emphasizes the personalization of roles; the nomothetic style emphasizes the socialization of personality. Getzel *et al* see the transactional style as intermediate to the other two, but *not* as a compromise between them. Both institutional needs and personal idiosyncracies are considered, and each is modified to accommodate the other, depending on the particular situation. The emphasis in any given situation will depend on the ability of the leader to make the ostensibly conflicting needs of institution and individual actually augment the development of both. The transactional style leads to the building of what the authors call a "climate," and what might preferably be called *community*. Whereas the idiographic and nomothetic styles are equally rigid and brittle because of their rigidity and lack of balance, the transactional style is marked by the strength that comes from optimal flexibility. In the transactional community the focus shifts back and forth from idiographic to nomothetic demands in a dynamic pattern. The transactional style is viewed by Getzel, *et al* "as the ideal-type model of the classroom as a social system: (a) each individual *identifies* with the goals of the system so that they become part of his own needs; (b) each individual believes that the expectations held for him are *rational* if the goals are to be achieved; (c) he feels that he *belongs* to a group with similar emotional identifications and rational beliefs" (p. 32).

The Getzels model is an excellent example of the application of the transactional approach to the classroom. There are many obvious parallels between the leadership styles of that conceptual framework and the approaches to values/moral education presented earlier in this dissertation. The advantages of a transactional approach can be seen in both applications. Later in this dissertation the notion of democracy as transactional society or transactional community will be presented as the optimal mode of educational intervention for maximizing development.

The congruent relationships appertaining among organismic, holistic, and transactional should be obvious. An argument could be advanced in each case that any one of the three terms could serve as the first unit in the identification of the proposed approach to values development education. Organismic is still the preferred term, however, since it is the most comprehensive and basic for the key notion of focusing on the living organism as the heart of values development. In view of all that has been said, though, this writer has considered the potential values of a coined term such as *interorganismic* to replace organismic. Such a term could possibly convey more forcefully the transactional interdependence of organisms in holistic community. But the name of the approach as it has already been devised, viz., organismic-structural-developmental, is sufficiently complicated and long. But, more importantly, the notion of interorganismic is already contained in the concept of organismic. The argument is offered that if organismic truly incorporates all that is meant by both holistic and transactional,

then the prefix "inter" would merely be redundant.

All forms of development--intellectual, values/moral, ego/ self, perceptual, and others--are viewed as taking place within a holistic framework as a result of the transactions between the organism and the environment, which in turn are viewed as parts of a larger whole. This last point is crucial for completing the organismic picture. Angyal expresses it as follows (1952, p. 133):

> ...the human being comports himself *as if he were a whole of an intermediate order.* By this I mean a "part-Gestalt," like, for example, the cardio-vascular system, or the central nervous system, each of which is a *whole,* an organization of many parts, but at the same time a *part* with regard to its superordinate whole, the body. The human being is both a *unifier,* an organizer of his immediate personal world, and a *participant* in what he conceives as the superordinate whole to which he belongs.

In another statement Angyal (1941, p. 20) describes "The Organism as a Dynamic Whole":

> Some phenomena of nature exist in the form of static structures, others in the form of reversible or irreversible processes. Examples of the first are geometrical forms, of the second, waterfall, wind, combustion, etc. The existential form of the organism is dynamic. This has been formulated by Jennings in his much quoted statement that "The organism is a process." In the last analysis, "organism" and "life" are identical concepts. The first term places emphasis on the structural, the second on the dynamic aspect. The two aspects are inseparable from each other. The essential characteristics of the organism are, however, more clearly revealed in its function than in its morphological features. The morphological structure is subordinated to the functional organization which has a logical primacy over it. If one calls a dead animal an "organism" one implies previous function, since without this implication a corpse is obviously only a morphological pattern. Each organ is--

as the word implies--a tool of the organism. The
heart of the dead animal can be called a tool only
with regard to its previous function. When one
speaks of any organ it is always implied that it
has a function in the total economy of the
organism--even though our knowledge of this
function may on occasion be quite inadequate--
otherwise it would not deserve the name of an
organ.

One has to study life as a dynamic whole.
In every whole there is a leading principle
according to which it is organized. Thus the
necessity arises of defining the leading principle
of organization of the biological total process.
The problem can be stated as follows: *What is
the general pattern which the organismic total
process follows?* An adequate definition of the
general pattern of the biological total process
is not only of great theoretical interest but has
far-reaching consequences for the actual study
of the organism. Every organismic part process
is a manifestation of the dynamism of the total
organism. The part processes gain their meaning
from the general pattern of functional organiza-
tion and can be correctly understood only in the
context of this organization.

In these two statements Angyal captures the spirit and

meaning of organismic, holistic, and transactional; and also synthesizes

the *functionalism* of Dewey and the *holism* of Smuts. Much of what he

says here will also come alive in the treatments of *structural* and

developmental that follow, especially in the conceptual frameworks

offered by Piaget and Kohlberg. Angyal's presentation of life and

organism as identical concepts is precisely what Smuts said in his

statement quoted earlier.

The organismic view of man and his role and meaning

the world stand in stark contrast to the alternative view of

behaviorism. And it is this difference that becomes most pronounced

in considerations related to values/moral issues. The behavioristic

view offers no basis for meaningful support for the most important

aspects of valuing and morality, viz., some degree of self-

determination, freedom, responsibility, and viable organismic processes

that make decision, judgment, and action possible. The organismic

conceptualization not only gives these factors meaning and viability,

it makes them central to the life process itself. *Organismic,*

therefore, is a necessary and powerful base in which to root the

structural and *developmental* components of a comprehensive theory

for values development education.

B. Structural

The terms *structural, structuralism,* and *structure* are

widely used in the behavioral sciences and the physical sciences, but

unfortunately with a multitude of meanings and variations. Wherever

these terms are encountered they cannot be understood without

knowledge of the user's orientation, the context of the use, or

explication by the author. Even within a given discipline the terms

have divergent meanings. Parsons, Durkheim, and Weber have all

worked in the discipline of sociology, but their application of

these terms varies. A behavioristic psychologist does not mean by

structure what an organismic psychologist means by the same term.

Skinner and Piaget may both refer to structure, but Skinner's use

would have absolutely nothing to do with Piaget's meaning for the

same word. For Skinner the word could refer to an arrangement or

an organization, or would be purely descriptive. For Piaget the

same word is highly technical, very complex, and is the heart of his

approach and his theory. Skinner, in fact, would declare Piaget's structure an anachronism left over from prescientific "autonomous man".

In addition to these disciplinary and investigatory differences in the use of these words, there are significant historical differences in the discipline of psychology. Early in this century Edward Titchener bestowed the names of *structuralism* and *functionalism* on the two major schools of thought at that time. Structuralism was the school he founded, based on the work of Wilhelm Wundt, that broke the mind into elements of consciousness, or static structures, that could be investigated by the method of instrospection. Titchener's structuralism was sometimes called *introspectionism*. Dewey and others were strongly opposed to this conceptual framework and studied instead mental *processes* or *functions*. Human behavior was studied and evaluated in terms of its usefulness for survival and adaptation, and not for the static properties that could be attributed to the mind. Structuralism died in the late twenties along with Titchener and is now of historical interest only. Functionalism was somewhat broad and general and was not tremendously fruitful *per se*, but many of its basic principles and approaches were widely accepted and it was gradually absorbed into the mainstream of psychology, especially organismic psychology. The atomistic, molecular, mechanistic, and introspectionistic structuralism was replaced by the atomistic, mechanistic, and environmentalistic behaviorism of Watson.

The structuralism of today is not related to the structuralism

of Titchener at all, and is more utilized by the organismic

psychologists than any others. The approach to the presentation

of the structural component of the organismic-structural-develop-

mental approach to values development education will begin with

the general approach of *structuralism*, then clarify the meaning

and use of *structure*. Then it will be possible to make what is for

us the all-important distinction between *content* and *structure* that

forms part of the foundation of both the Piaget and Kohlberg

theories, and makes it possible for values development education to

resolve some of the problems inherent in the nomothetic and

idiographic approaches to values/moral education.

Structuralism

Structuralism is many things, among which could be included

(1) an intellectual movement in the French tradition, (2) a mode of

thought that can be found in many disciplines, but especially

psychology, anthropology, linguistics, sociology, and economics, and

(3) a method of scientific investigation particularly useful in

the behavioral sciences. Categories one and two above will not be

treated here, for they are not germane to this dissertation.

Howard Gardner's The Quest for Mind (1972) thoroughly explores

these issues, as well as number three and other aspects of

structuralism.[7] Our focus here will be on structuralism as a method

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[7]Gardner's book is a summary of structuralism in general; it also
summarizes the work and theories of both Piaget and Lévi-Strauss,
in genetic epistemology and anthropology, respectively. Other
valuable resources include Lane (1970) and Piaget (1970c, 1972)

in organismic-developmental psychology.

Gardner (1972, p. 170) defines structuralism as follows:

> A method or approach rather than a care-
> fully formulated catechism, structuralism is an
> attempt to discern the arrangements of elements
> underlying a given domain isolated by an analyst.
> The structuralist notes variations in these
> arrangements; he then attempts to relate the
> variations by specific rules whereby one can
> be transformed to another... The structuralist
> is particularly eager to find underlying regular-
> ities among seemingly disparate phenomena, since
> a "determination of basic structures" will
> result in simplification of a mass of data
> as well as confirmation of the existence of
> laws governing that domain.

This is a very general statement that implies more than it makes

explicit. The focus on underlying regularities and ostensibly

disparate phenomena are the crucial factors here. Gardner (p. 10)

points out that structuralists and structuralism are distinguished

and characterized by the following convictions summarized as:

1. That there is structure underlying all human

   behavior and intellectual functioning;

2. That this structure can be revealed by orderly

   analysis and scientific investigation;

3. That this structure has cohesiveness and meaning;

   and

4. That structures have generality, or some degree of

   interdependence (some psychologists call this

   transferability, but it basically refers to the

   fact that many behaviors can be related to the

   same structure(s) and that many structures can be

related to a particular behavior pattern).

Claude Lévi-Strauss is one of the principals in the structuralist movement. He is a contemporary anthropologist who has applied the method of structuralism to cultural anthropology and who has attempted to analyze social institutions, kinship relationships (especially the avunculate), marriage rites and customs, totemism, linguistics and speech, and human intelligence. As both Gardner (p. 148) and Edmund Leach (in Manners and Kaplan, 1968, p. 542) point out, Lévi-Strauss believes that all human behaviors are manifestations of an underlying *code* or *language*. The human mind, by its inherent biologically-based organization and functional properties regulates and determines all human behavior, including social relationships. This "language" or code is not unlimited, inasmuch as the mind operates within certain ranges, and can be decoded. Structuralism is based on this view and is an approach to decoding human behavior in order to ascertain the underlying structural components.

Two major assumptions that, according to Gardner (p. 13) identify the work of structuralists are (1) that investigation of diverse groups from many cultures, children, adults, primitives, moderns, and others, can shed light on all human experience and reveal the underlying common ground of human nature, and (2) that the distinctive characteristics of human beliefs, development, and institutions is a reflection of the fundamental nature of human thought rooted in the biological structure of the organism and its mind. Both of these assumptions are certainly characteristic of the

work of Piaget, Werner, and Kohlberg.

Lane's view of structuralism is along the same lines. He says (1970), p. 31):

> Structuralism, then, is a method whose
> primary intention is to permit the investigator
> to go beyond a pure description of what he perceives
> or experiences..., in the direction of the
> quality of rationality which underlies the
> social phenomena in which he is concerned.

He identifies "the distinctive properties of structuralism" (pp. 13-14) in the following terms:

1. "In the first place it is presented as a method whose scope includes all human social phenomena, no matter what their form, thus embracing not only the social sciences proper...but also the humanities...and the fine arts. This is made possible by the belief that all manifestations of social activity...constitute languages, in a formal sense." He equates this with a code that can be deciphered, as mentioned above.

2. "Probably the most distinctive feature of the structuralist method is the emphasis it gives to wholes, to totalities." Lane contrasts the structuralist's emphasis on wholes with the more traditional analytic, atomistic approach to the social sciences. "They insist that the whole and the parts can be properly explained only in terms of the *relations* that exist between the parts. The essential quality of the structuralist method, and its fundamental tenet, lies

in its attempt to study not the elements of a whole,
but the complex network of relationships that link
and unite those elements."

3. "Next, structuralism seeks its structures not on the
surface, at the level of the observed, but below or
behind empirical reality...What the observer sees
is not the structure, but simply the evidence and
product of the structure. On the other hand, though
the structure of any activity is not itself what
can be seen, it can only be derived from what is seen."
It is this hallmark of the structuralist approach
that is so important, as was mentioned earlier, to
the work of Piaget and Kohlberg, and which permits
such a deep understanding of values/moral behavior.

The methodology that constitutes structuralism Gardner calls
its *strategic aspect*. The belief that structures are reflections
of the biological nature and properties of the organism and the
holistic emphasis he refers to as its *organismic aspect*. He identifies
a third aspect not yet mentioned, viz., its *formal aspect*. This
refers to the tendency on the part of many structuralists to
"...formalize all relationships through some sort of logical model
or system" (p. 172). This last element is especially true of Piaget,
who has been trying to formalize in mathematics and logic the
operations of the human mind for many years. Gardner cites as an
example of the formal aspect the well-known French group of
mathematicians whole individual members remain anonymous in the

literature, and who sign themselves as "Nicolas Bourbaki" or "N. Bourbaki." This group, frequently discussed by Piaget, has attempted to identify what they call the *mother structures* that are the foundations of all mathematics. As Piaget (1970a, p. 24) points out, these are called mother structures because they can be differentiated or combined to generate all other mathematical structures. The three Bourbaki structures are named (1) the algebraic structure, (2) the order structure, and (3) the topological structure. The nature of these structures is beyond the scope of this dissertation, but the Bourbaki and its findings are good examples of structuralism and structures.

In addition to the people and contributions already mentioned, other notable contributions in the main stream of structuralism have been the linguistic investigations and theories of Ferdinand de Saussure, Roman Jakobson, and Noam Chomsky; the work of anthropologist Edmund Leach, and the conceptual systems theory of O. J. Harvey, David Hunt, and Harold Schroder (1961).

Before moving on to structure *per se*, one final distinction needs to be made. Piaget (1970c, Ch. VI) distinguishes between *global structuralism* and *analytic structuralism.*[8] The former he identifies as the kind of structuralism that deals with social groups and the emergence of social relations, and appears to be a more descriptive kind of structuralism, and is exemplified by the work

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[8] For a different use of the same terms, global and analytic structures, see Schroder and Suedfeld (1971, p. 193) where Bieri refers to Witkin's work employing these terms.

of the French sociologist of the early twentieth century,
Emile Durkheim. Another sociologist, himself a collaborator of
Durkheim, was Marcel Mauss, and Piaget and Lévi-Strauss regard him
as an analytic structuralist because, in his studies of the gift,
he dealt with what Piaget calls "transformational interactions."
In other words, Mauss investigated the underlying relationships
that pertained in gift-giving in various cultures in order to
ascertain the explanatory factors that could be used transformation-
ally to explain similar practices in other places. A second point
of difference between global and analytic is the fact that the
former, according to Piaget, "holds to systems of observable
relations and interactions, which are regarded as sufficient unto
themselves," whereas "the peculiarity of authentic (analytic)
structuralism is that it seeks to explain such empirical systems
by postulating 'deep' structures from which the former are in some
manner derivable" (1970, Ch. VI).

Note that Piaget refers to the analytic form as "authentic."
This is a very significant point for values development theory
because the critical factor in the distinction between global
and analytic is the content-structure distinction. Global structur-
alists do not make this distinction and are not concerned with the
decoding of human behavior and social phenomena in the formal,
transformational sense that was explicit in the definitional
statements presented earlier. It is understandable that Piaget
views global as not being authentic structuralism, for it is the
analytic type that really fits the identifying framework and the

global does not. The structural theories of Piaget, Kohlberg, Chomsky, and Harvey, Hunt, and Schroder are truly analytic forms of structuralism. All postulate underlying cognitive-affective structures that are involved in the transformation of the content data of the external world into organismic terms, and the transformation of organismic structures into the particular content of a given individual or given culture. Piaget, Kohlberg, and Harvey, Hunt and Schroder talk about content and structure; Chomsky talks about surface structure and deep structure. The hallmark of Chomsky's theory is his transformational grammar, which he believes to be based on an innate kernel or core (*a priorism*); whereas, Piaget, Kohlberg, and Harvey, Hunt and Schroder all view cognitive structure as being constructed by the organism in transaction with the environment. As Piaget says (1970c, p. 140): *There is no structure apart from construction,* either abstract or genetic."

Structure

If human behavior, including thinking, can be considered a code that can be deciphered with the methodology of structuralism, then the code must be based on elements, organization, and relationships that can be systematicallly conceptualized. Such conceptualizations would represent the inferred *structures* of human behavior that are rooted in the biological nature of the organism and manifest themselves in thought, language, and action. The structure under consideration is that of analytic structuralism, and not the generalized descriptive concept of structure of global

structuralism. Cognitive structures are presumed to exist in the
psychobiological functioning of the human mind, and are inferred
from systematic investigations and analysis of thought.

Piaget and his associates have spent more than fifty
years trying to fashion a theory of intellectual operation and
development. The Geneva school considers structure to be one of
the basic aspects of intelligence. Piaget's most concise definition
of *structure* is the following (1970c, p. 44):

> ...a structure is a systematic whole of self-
> regulating transformations...

He elaborates this a little with the following (p. 5):

> As a first approximation, we may say that a
> structure is a system of transformations.
> Inasmuch as it is a system and not a mere
> collection of elements and their properties,
> these transformations involve laws: the struc-
> ture is preserved or enriched by the interplay
> of its transformation laws, which never yield
> results external to the system nor employ
> elements that are external to it. In short, the
> notion of structure is comprised of three key
> ideas: the idea of wholeness, the idea of
> transformation, and the idea of self-regulation.

First, let us deal with *wholeness*. Piaget (1970c, p. 7)
distinguishes between structures and aggregates, "the former being
wholes, the latter composites formed of elements that are independent
of the complexes into which they enter." The crucial factor here
is the independence of the elements in an aggregate. Both structures
and aggregates are made up of elements, but as Piaget says: "the
elements of a structure are subordinated to laws, and it is in terms
of these laws that the structure *qua* whole or system is defined."
He offers as an illustration the system of whole numbers in another

discussion on the wholeness of structure (1970a, p. 22) as follows:

> ...a structure is a totality; that is, it is a
> system governed by laws that apply to the system
> as such, and not only to one or another element
> in the system. The system of whole numbers is an
> example of a structure, since there are laws that
> apply to the series as such. Many different
> mathematical structures can be discovered in the
> series of whole numbers. One, for instance is
> the additive group. The rules for associativity,
> commutativity, transitivity, and closure for
> addition all hold within the series of whole
> numbers.

On this same point in another statement (1970c, p. 7) Piaget says:

> ...the integers do not exist in isolation from
> one another, nor were they discovered one by
> one in some accidental sequence and then,
> finally, united into a whole. They do not
> come upon the scene except as ordered, and this
> order of the integers is associated with
> *structural* properties (of groups, fields, rings,
> and the like), which are quite different from
> the properties of number individuals, each of
> which is even or odd, prime or non-prime, and
> so on.

Consider a pile of bricks, an aggregate of elements, and an

identifiable composite. No one brick depends upon another for its

existence or its meaning. If there is any wholeness to the

aggregate of bricks it is elemental and not relational. But, as

Piaget points out, the whole numbers exist only in relation to each

other in an ordered sequence. The aggregate of bricks could be

assembled in parts, but whole numbers were not invented or created

individually and independently and then assembled into a system.

The whole number system reflects the systematic properties of the

human mind and has a holistic totality, not a composed totality.

The whole numbers are not mere elements, they are intrinsically a

structural whole.

This structural wholeness is manifested in the logical consistency of organized thought-patterns and the unity of relationships in language. It reveals itself in classification, for example. You would not sort trees into evergreen, deciduous, and tall. Nor would you sort materials into hard, soft, and purple. There is a logical inconsistency in these categories that violates the wholeness of the structures involved. It is important to observe in these examples that the logical concepts and the wholeness are not properties of the things being classified. They are structural properties in the human mind. From the trees' perspectives, so to speak, there is nothing wrong with sorting them into the above three categories for there are deciduous, evergreen, and tall trees. Trees exist as trees; the categories into which they are sorted are creations of the mind and reflect the wholeness of cognitive structures.

The second key idea of structure is *transformation*. Structures are not static images, they are systems of change. The whole numbers, again, can be transformed in many ways, and when they are the transformations are systematic and lawful. The changes may involve time or the rearrangement of elements, or both. One number can be transformed into another, e.g., 1 + 1 = 2, in a transformation of elements. The cognitive structure involved in the concept "child" incorporates temporal change; any given child changes with time and different children have different ages, a notion related to time. Piaget frequently relates a story about his walking through the woods with one of his children. In the course of the walk many snails were seen by the young child, who

believed they were the same snail in every case. The child was unable to cognitively reconstruct the transformations from event to event in time and space, and realize that the snails were all different. The child's incomplete structures were unable to cope with the laws of transformation. Later, with more mature structures, the older child would have no difficulty with this situation.

The systematic nature of the laws of transformation require that changes in one direction or dimension are compensated for by equivalent changes in the other dimension or direction. If a round ball of clay is rolled out into a sausage without any clay being removed all the changes in shape and size will be balanced out. A young child will be unable to cope with these transformations and will not be able to understand that the amount of clay has remained the same. A child with fully developed cognitive structures will be able to attend to these simultaneous transformations and conserve his concept of the amount of matter involved. A true structure is preserved in the face of change.

A final illustration of the transformational nature of structures is available in language. As Chomsky has elucidated, a child can take the transformational rules of the base structure of language and generate a wide variety of sentences with the same words, without having been taught to do so and without being aware of the process. The human mind functions according to these transformational rules that are lawful.

The third idea Piaget presented as basic to the idea of structure is that of *self-regulation*. Piaget (1970c, pp. 13-14)

describes this as follows:

> The third basic property of structures is,
> as we said, that they are self-regulating, self-
> regulation entailing self-maintenance and closure.
> Let us start by considering the two derivative
> properties: what they add up to is that the
> transformations inherent in a structure never lead
> beyond the system but always engender elements
> that belong to it and preserve its laws. Again
> an example will help to clarify: In adding or
> subtracting any two whole numbers, another whole
> number is obtained, and one which satisfies the
> laws of the "additive group" of whole numbers.
> It is in this sense that a structure is "closed,"
> a notion perfectly compatible with the structure's
> being considered a substructure of a larger one;
> but in being treated as a substructure, a structure
> does not lose its own boundaries; the larger
> structure does not "annex" the substructure; if
> anything, we have a confederation, so that the
> laws of the substructure are not altered but
> conserved and the intervening change is an
> enrichment rather than an impoverishment.

Or to put it a bit differently, Piaget (1970a, p. 23) says:

> The third characteristic is that a structure is
> self-regulating; that is, in order to carry out
> these laws of transformation, we need not go
> outside the system to find some external element.
> Similarly, once a law of transformation has been
> applied, the result does not end up outside
> the system. Referring to the additive group
> once again, when we add one whole number to
> another, we do not have to go outside the series
> of whole numbers in search of any element that
> is not within the series. And once we have
> added the two whole numbers together, our result
> still remains within the series. We could call
> this closure, too, but it does not mean that a
> structure as a whole cannot relate to another
> structure or other structures as wholes. Any
> structure can be a substructure in a larger
> system. It is very easy to see that the whole
> numbers are a part of a larger system, which
> includes fractional numbers.

These similar passages point out the self-regulating characteristic

of structure by emphasizing the structure's capacity to preserve

its own integrity by following logical principles of operation and staying within itself.

Now it can be seen that the three characteristics are succinctly brought together in Piaget's definition of structure quoted earlier: "a structure is a systematic whole of self-regulating transformations." The concept of structure plays a very important role in Piaget's theory and in Kohlberg's theory as well. Its meaning will become clearer as more of the details of those theories are presented. A very brief synopsis of Piaget's basic theory of intelligence will put the notion of structure more in perspective.

Piaget's Basic Cognitive Theory[9]

Piaget conceives intelligence as adaptation and says that it is comprised of three major components: *content, function,* and *structure.*

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[9] This summary is a brief presentation of an enormously complex and extensive theory. Piaget's own writings are substantially represented in the bibliography of this dissertation and should be consulted for a complete understanding of the theory. A widely recognized comprehensive and authoritative resource is the summary, analysis, and critique of Piaget done by Flavell (1963). Other resources on this subject include: Athey and Rubadeau (1970), A. L. Baldwin (1967), Beard (1969), Boyle (1969), Brown (1970), Elkind (1970), Elkind and Flavell (1969), Furth (1969, 1970), Gardner (1972), Ginsburg and Opper (1969), Gorman (1972), Hunt (1961), Langer (1969), Lavatelli (1971), Schwebel and Raph (1973), Sigel and Hooper (1968), Tanner and Inhelder (1971), and Wadsworth (1971). Two other resources especially useful for a quick introduction to Piaget that are comprehensive and easy to understand are: Maier (1969) and Pulaski (1971).

Content is the observable raw data of intelligent behavior--
it is what we see, hear, and generally perceive of someone's behavior.
Content is the most superficial aspect of intelligence and it is
enormously influenced by and considerably determined by the organism's
environment. Vocabularly, for example, is the most superficial part
of language and is a reflection of the individual's society and
culture. Intellectual content varies considerably from culture to
culture, society to society, family to family. It is the content
aspect of intelligence that constitutes the major part of behavior
sampled by the conventional psychometric intelligence tests from
which IQ scores are derived. For any given individual, then, the
content of intelligence is a function primarily of age and environment,
and is enormously malleable.

Function, on the other hand, is the biologically-rooted
invariant part of intelligence. It is the way the organism transacts
with the world. It is a mode of intellectual functioning that
consists of two basic processes, viz., organization and adaptation.
Organization is the underlying systematic pattern of relationships
that characterize the human mind. Organization makes it possible
for the mind to interpret and process the input it receives.
Adaptation is the external process that is possible because of the
underlying organization. The human mind adapts to the world in
two ways: it assimilates and it accommodates. *Assimilation* is
the process whereby the mind receives data from the world in terms
of existing knowledge, familiar patterns, the known. It is the
side of adaptation by which the world is transformed to fit the

organism; it is the taking in and operating on the input in terms of the person. *Accommodation,* on the other hand, is the complementary process by which the environment operates, so to speak, on the organism and forces the mind to change its internal functioning in terms of the external world. The organism perceives a familiar event-- it sees an animal that it immediately recognizes as a dog. This is possible because the organism already possesses the cognitive apparatus that makes it possible. The organism sees a new animal, one that it has never seen before and for which it has nothing to relate it to-- now it must either force the concept of the perceived strange animal into an existing category or it must create a new category, "cat". The first process of taking the dog into the already established category, "dog" is assimilation. However, when the organism attempts to assimilate the unfamiliar animal, it cannot proceed. So it must accommodate. It creates a new cognitive category. Now it can assimilate the new event into the new category.

The complementary processes of assimilation and accommodation are related to each other in another sense, also. That is, they form a dynamic equilibrium in this process of trying to regulate cognitive activity. The mind seeks to keep things in balance, and growth (quantitative change) and development (qualitative change) proceed through the continuous process of going through cycles of equilibrium--disequilibrium--equilibrium--disequilibrium. This process is one of the most crucial aspects of the organismic-struc- tural-developmental approach. It is called *the equilibrium process.* It is one of the central features in Piaget's theory and also plays

a major role in Kohlberg's theory.

Function is obviously a very complex part of intelligence. It is function that firmly roots intelligence in the basic biological organismic processes of the human being. Whereas content is malleable and externally influenced, function is invariant and internally determined. Consequently, it is function that is so much determined by genetic factors.

Structure is that aspect of intelligence that Piaget postulates as the bridge between the superficial content and the biologically based invariant function. Cognitive structure is the organized mental component of intelligence. *Cognitive structure is created through functioning and manifests itself in content.* Flavell (1963, p. 17) says:

> ...What are structures in Piaget's system? They are the organizational properties of intelligence, organizations created through functioning and inferable from the behavioral contents whose nature they determine. As such, Piaget speaks of them as mediators interposed between the invariant functions on the one hand and the variegated behavioral contents on the other.

And in the words of two other Piaget scholars, Ginsburg and Opper (1969, p. 22):

> If we accept that Piaget's theoretical framework is based on the concept of psychological structures, how can we go about describing them? One way to describe them is by using common language. We can say that the child classifies objects or that his moral judgment is "objective," and so forth.
>
> As a result of the tendencies toward adaptation and organization, new structures are continually being created out of the old

ones which will be employed to assist the
individual in his interaction with the world.
Looking at the matter another way, structures
are necessary for adaptation and organization.
One could neither adapt to the environment
nor organize one's processes if there were no
basic structures available at the outset. On
the other hand, the very existence of a structure,
which by Piaget's definition is an organized
totality, entails the necessity for organiza-
tion and adaptation. There are, however,
important differences between the invariant
functions and the structures. As the individual
progresses through the life span, the functions
will remain the same but the structures will
vary, and appear in a fairly regular sequence.
Another way of saying this is that intellectual
development proceeds through a series of *stages*
with each stage characterized by a different
kind of psychological structure. An individual
of any age must adapt to the environment and
must organize his responses continually, but
the instruments by which he accomplishes this--
the psychological structures--will change from
one age level to another. For example, both
the infant and the adult will organize and
adapt; but the resulting psychological structures
are quite different for the two periods.

So we can see from these statements that a structure may be a

system of classification, that it is an organized totality, and that it

is an instrument for adapting and organizing. Thus a structure is

an organizational thought-pattern that undergoes transformations in

its dynamic relationship with the environment, but operates in a self-

regulating way in order to maintain continuity, stability, and

equilibrium both for itself and the organism. The transformations

that structures undergo are equilibrated, or dynamically balanced

and self-regulated, in increasingly more complex, integrated, and

effective ways with maturation, experience, and transaction with

the environment. For example, a child of five is able to classify

(sort) beads and cats into two categories or structures. But a child of ten can do something the child of five cannot do, viz., classify the beads into subcategories vs. the whole category. That is, the ten-year old can understand that if she has ten yellow beads and five brown beads, that she has more beads than yellow beads. Most five-year-olds do not have the cognitive capacity to permit this operation. In other words, the child's structures dealing with classification are not sufficiently equilibrated to cope with this task.

The child's inherited reflexes thus become transformed into action structures capable of grasping, sucking, smiling, and other actions. These structures eventually become equilibrated at a higher level of development permitting them to be coordinated into more complex structures that will enable the child to control the movements of eyes and hands to accomplish a task. Eventually the child's more advanced structures will permit symbolic representation of these actions, and later he will be able to coordinate the symbolic representations with concrete actions. And even later, if he is able to equilibrate his structures at the highest level of human thought, he will be able to perform cognitive operations on other cognitive operations without the use of concrete objects or actions, e.g., he will be able to think about thoughts, contemplate the possible outcomes of three different courses of action and their opposite courses, and make hypotheses about the predicted outcomes. These advanced operations will involve highly complex structures of classification, seriation, proportion, reciprocity, time, causality,

and many others, and the complex interrelationships among all these things.

The basic theory just presented is what is generally referred to as Piaget's stage-independent portion of his overall theory. The stage-dependent portion will be presented in a later section that covers the *developmental* component of organismic-structural-developmental. At this point a more detailed examination of the content-structure distinction is possible.

Content versus Structure

Earlier it was pointed out that the psychometric approach to intelligence tends to concentrate on the superficial aspects of content, and tends to lead to a quantitative assessment of an individual's intellectual abilities. Likewise, in the values/moral area the nomothetic and idiographic approaches to education focus on content and superficially assess the values/moral development of individuals. A structural approach to this problem makes it possible to go beyond content and attempt to more objectively assess one's values/moral development. Perhaps the difference could be expressed as the difference between *judging* and *evaluating,* if judging can be construed as the drawing of a prejudicial conclusion ✓ based on a superficial weighing of evidence against the standard of one's own beliefs or the standards of society's norms; and evaluating can be construed as deriving a warranted assumption from an analysis of sufficient data objectively obtained and compared with universal patterns of behavior scientifically determined. The structural

approach makes it possible, therefore, to arrive at qualitative evaluations of values/moral development and to create instructional programs to induce such development.

The content-structure distinction is critical for this purpose. Content is the easily obtained and readily observable aspect of behavior. Structure is the covert underlying logical reasoning that generated the answer. If a person is presented with a mathematical problem to solve, the answer to the problem would be the content. To arrive at the structure the person would have to explain how the answer was calculated and what logic was used. If a person is asked to make a judgment about the worth of something, a proposed law for the legalization of the possession, sale, and use of marijuana, for example, the answer might be either that the proposed law is good or bad. This response deals with content. Appropriate probing questions could be directed to this person that would elicit the reasoning behind the judgment. Perhaps the respondent would give an in-depth justification for the rejection of such a law on the grounds that it would lead to the breakdown of social order, the rejection of legally constituted authority, and the deterioration of family life. Further probing might reveal that the person believes that man does not have the right to legalize something that violates the established standards of God, tradition, and accepted morality. The elaboration of the person's justification for the content answer is beginning to reveal the structure of the person's thought. Notice that the response given in the example above reveals an underlying thought-pattern that is consistently

expressive of the acceptance of objective authority as the source of law and morality. The response suggests a structural posture that is likely to remain consistent across other content dimensions on which this person could be probed.

Another person presented with the same problem and same probing questions might also answer that the proposed law legalizing marijuana is bad, but the reason is that is will make it dangerous to be around people who use the drug because they may rob you to get enough money to support their drug habit. The respondent argues that laws are to protect him and his property from dangerous criminals, and that society should not allow people to do bad things like take drugs because he will have to be afraid. He further argues that people should not want to take drugs because he knows that they are bad for you. Notice that both of these individuals answered that the proposed law is a bad law. The content of their answers is the same. One could conclude on this basis that they are morally good or bad, depending on which side of the issue the judge happens to support. The judge could even conclude that the individuals were equally mature with respect to the morality of this issue. The first person's justification, however, was in terms of objective law and order and established authority. The second person's justification is qualitatively quite different. His reasoning is completely in terms of himself as an individual actor, and is based on perceived personal danger that would ensue as the result of enactment of such a law.

It is important to recognize that both individuals may speak

in terms of "society" and that both express fear. But both of these issues, society and fear, are handled from a different perspective and justification in each case. The second respondent uses the word "society," but in a very concrete and personal sense as a perceived entity that protects him. His fear is a personal fear related to his own welfare and fear itself is concretely envisioned as bodily threat. The first respondent seems to see society in terms of social order and legitimate authority. His structure is considerably more abstract than that of the second respondent. His fear may also include the fear of personal danger, but it goes beyond this to the fear of social breakdown.

This brief consideration of two concrete examples begins to reveal the nature of structure as distinguished from content. The superficial attitude or opinion expresses is shown to be content that can be identical across people who as individuals may be significantly different in their structural development. The empirical research of many structuralists has revealed what seems to be a limited number of distinct patterns of structural thought-patterns and logic systems that are indicative of universality of human behavior and the human mind. What appears on the surface to be an unlimited range of human potentiality seems to be underneath a more attenuated range of possible behavior. Thus cultural and ethical relativity may well be applicable to the content of human behavior, but not to the structure. Looking only at acts, customs, dress, mores, folkways, and many other facets of individual and social existence can lead to a relativistic view. Looking at the meaning

behind these human behavior patterns can lead to an understanding

of the basic universality of structure, process, and development.

Another important issue in behavioral science that needs

to be reexamined in terms of structuralism is the alleged discrepancy

between attitude and behavior. The literature of social psychology

includes a massive amount of theoretical and empirical reports on

theories of attitude formation, attitude change, and methods of

intervention for attitude shaping.[10] This literature abounds with

discussions about the differences between what people say and do

about given issues. Much of this theoretical and empirical work

has been done in the behavioristic stimulus-response tradition and

has been conducted on what we are calling content. It is hypothesized

here that the discrepancies are largely the product of content

analysis that could be resolved with structural analysis.[11] Turiel

(in Travers, 1973, pp. 750-755) discusses this issue and offers

support for the hypothesis that the inconsistencies between cognitive

judgment and action are related to content, and that when an

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[10]Abelson et al (1968), Bem (1970), Cohen (1964), Greenwald, Brock, and Ostrom (1968), Hovland, Janis, and Kelley (1953), Insko (1967) Jahoda and Warren (1966), Kieslar, Collins, and Miller (1969), Sherif and Sherif (1967), Thomas (1971), Triandis (1971), and Zimbardo and Ebbesen (1969).

[11]Another factor is that within the conceptual frameworks used in the attitude research attitudes are conceived as different from behavior, which leads to many misunderstandings. The problem is not one of a discrepancy between attitudes, which are a form of behavior, and action, which is another form of behavior; but a discrepancy between two different forms of behavior which can be resolved with a different kind of analysis. This point is excellently presented by Burhans (1971) and Miller (1967), along with Turiel (1973) as mentioned above.

individual's behavior is examined structurally there is considerably
more consistency.

Turiel, in the same source, cites an example that illustrates
the difference between content and structure and how this distinction
can aid in evaluating judgments of value and moral development.
First, a few technical terms need to be clarified. Piaget maintains
that children's thought is characterized by a number of distinct
qualities that make it difficult or impossible for children
adequately to make judgments that are within the range of adult
thought. These characteristics include what Piaget calls *realism*,
which in turn leads to types of childish thought called *animism* and
artificialism. Realism is the view that my point of view is
everybody's point of view. The small child believes that other
people see what he sees regardless of differences in position or
perspective. As a result of this they believe that inanimate
things are alive (animism) and that people are responsible for all
things in the sense that they cause them (artificialism). Turiel
(1969, p. 109) points out that a child's moral judgments are
influenced by these sorts of thinking. Young children link events
in the real world that are unrelated, as when the child believes that
a catastrophe immediately following a misdeed constitutes automatic
punishment for the misdeed. Piaget calls this the belief in
"immanent justice" (Piaget, 1932). For example, a young child in
one of Piaget's stories stole some apples from an orchard. On his
way home after this deed, the child crossed a bridge which broke
causing him to fall into the river. Children of 6 or 7 will insist

that it would not have happened if he had not committed the trans-
gression. To ascertain the child's level of development on this
issue one would have to ask who caused the event to happen and how
did it happen. If the child insists that the bridge broke because
the boy stole the apple without any additional factor of causality
being introduced (such as, "God did it,") then he believes in
immanent justice. If, however, the child introduces intermediate
elements into the picture and explains the misdeed in terms of
God, or his parents, or other sources of power that caused the
event, then we would not explain the cognitive process in terms
of immanent justice in Piaget's sense. As Turiel points out, the
person explaining the events in terms of direct causality of events
is using a lower level of thought than the person who introduces
intermediate steps of causality involving a more complex picture of
the world and life events. Thus, on the surface, two ostensibly
similar answers (content) are based on two different types of
structure.

Now let us consider an adult explaining the same events in
terms of God punishing an individual for stealing by causing him
to be hurt in a natural disaster. Is the adult using a childish
mode of thought? Is the adult invoking immanent justice? Possibly
either of these is true, or there is a third possibility, viz.,
that the adult is processing the data in a completely different
way and coming to a conclusion that appears to be similar, but in
reality involves complex concepts of eschatology, retribution, and
other elements of theology. In order to understand the adult's

level of values development we would have to explore the structure

of his reasoning to see if it is a childish belief in immanent

justice, a more sophisticated form of childish thinking involving

the linking up of two events in terms of a third causal event, or an

even more sophisticated form of thinking involving complex structural

relationships among time, causality, world views, and other abstract

concepts. The point is that the three people may all be operating

with the childish structure of immanent justice; or other more mature

structures of expiatory justice, retributive justice, or distributive

justice may be involved, each of which is respectively more

sophisticated than the preceding one. Consequently, to get a

fuller understanding of the individual's level of values development

we must distinguish between content and structure.

In the definition given earlier by Piaget, " a structure

is a systematic whole of self-regulating transformations." The

three characteristics of wholeness, transformation, and self-

regulation along with their systematic interrelationships may be

seen in terms of the concepts of justice just presented. If justice

is seen as a cognitive structure, and the various types of justice

seen as increasingly more equilibrated forms of the same principle,

then the meaning of wholeness, transformation, and self-regulation

can be understood. The quality, logic, complexity, and integration

of the higher forms of justice are clearly superior to the immanent

justice of the child, yet each is an integrated whole on its own

terms. Each form is a characteristic pattern of thought that uses

its own type of logical rules (no matter how illogical the lower

forms may appear to one capable of the higher forms) and maintains its own balance of relationships with other concepts. The immanent justice structure relates things that logically appear to the child to be related. For the child, animism, artificialism, and other properties define the way the world really is. Thus the justice structure of that child is a consistent whole integrated with his ideas about causality. The transformations he makes, therefore, (a transformation being a change from one state to another) are in these terms. Little children of this period may believe that the sun and the moon follow them around, that rocks are alive, and that the vacuum cleaner really does have a monster in it. Why is it not logical, then, that the bridge would punish the child for stealing the apples a few minutes before? A child at this stage will transform the data of the real world on his own terms, in harmony with other cognitive and affective factors consistent with that stage. An older child, or an adult, will each in his own way at his level do the same thing. But the wholeness and the nature of the transformations, in each case, will be characteristic. The self-regulating characteristic is evident in these considerations in that the integrity of the structure is maintained with the consistency of the logic applied to the different situations. The logic of immanent justice, the logic of expiative justice, the logic of retributive justice, and the logic of distributive justice are all of varying degrees of quality, complexity, and sophistication. But each maintains its own balance and its own harmony with itself and the other cognitive structures in the minds of the individuals

involved. The decisions and judgments made in each case may appear
to be similar, and that is the content. The underlying structure,
however, is vastly different. Looking only at the former can easily
lead us to erroneous conclusions about the person's values.
Attempts to understand the underlying structure will permit us a
fuller, deeper, and richer understanding of the individual and his
values.

One final example is presented to further demonstrate the
content-structure distinction and how it can be related to the differ-
ent approaches to values/moral education described earlier in this
dissertation. Let us consider an investigator who presents a
dilemma to a subject. The dilemma involves an important moral
conflict faced by the protagonist of the story whose name is
Heinz. This dilemma is one of many used by Kohlberg in his investi-
gations of moral development, and is presented here:[12]

> In Europe, a woman was near death from a
> special kind of cancer. There was one drug that
> the doctors thought might save her. It was a
> form of radium that a druggist in the same town
> had recently discovered. The drug was expensive
> to make, but the druggist was charging ten times
> what the drug cost him to make. He paid $200
> for the radium and charges $2,000 for a small
> dose of the drug. The sick woman's husband,
> Heinz, went to everyone he knew to borrow the
> money, but he could only get together about
> $1,000 which is half of what it cost. He told
> the druggist that his wife was dying, and
> asked him to sell it cheaper or let him pay
> later. But the druggist said, "No, I dis-
> covered the drug and I'm going to make money

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[12]This dilemma appears in many of Kohlberg's articles and is also
available in Kohlberg and staff (1973).

>from it." So Heinz got desperate and broke
>into the man's store to steal the drug for his
>wife.

Now let us imagine that the subject of this investigation tells the investigator that he believes that Heinz should steal the drug to save his wife's life. Can the investigator come to any conclusions about the moral development of the subject with this information? For the traditional-authoritarian operating from an absolute nomothetic point of view the answer would be simple--look to the moral law which is very explicit on this point. Stealing is wrong, the subject is immoral. If the moral code makes allowances for limited exceptions based on circumstances the problem is still relatively easy to solve, for the code will be explicit about those conditions and will provide an appropriate authority to evaluate the situation and render a decision. Whatever the circumstances the evaluation will be based on the content of the act vis-a-vis the objective moral code.

For the cultural-relativist the answer may be more difficult to derive, but it will still be based on content and the code of the society. The absolute relativist, if he is consistent with his beliefs, will be unable to render a judgment on any basis other than his own personal opinion, which will be based on his judgment of the content of the act.

The structuralist would say that there is no way of knowing anything about the moral development of the subject by knowing his decision on the moral dilemma. Nor would knowing anything about the circumstances, context, situation, or environ-

ment give you any definitive clues. He would insist that in knowing

the subject's choice we have only tapped the *content* of his judgment.

That is, we have only observed the overt verbal indications of the

subject's behavior. We do not know anything about the cognitive

operations that lie behind the superficial statement of content.

We know nothing about the deeper processes by which the subject

made that decision. By this we do not mean the situation or the

context (for that is also related to content), but the logical

operations of thinking that took place in the subject's mind.

We have not tapped the *structure* of the person's mind.

To elucidate, let us consider some possible reasons that

could be offered for Heinz to steal the drug. One may say that

Heinz should steal the drug because if he doesn't he will be

punished for letting his wife die. Or he may say Heinz should

steal the drug because he needs her in marriage and in the

home to take care of him, to cook and sew, and to make him happy.

Or he may make his decision in terms of the mutual love they share,

and because it is the thing that "any good husband" would do for

his wife. Or, finally, he may say that the deeper law of his

society, or that the law of the Christian society in which he lives

requires that a husband love, honor, and protect his wife, and that

he should give first obedience to that law and steal the drug to

save his wife. The structuralist would begin to recognize, in

each of these cases, different levels of structural development,

and would probe with appropriate questions in order to determine

more of the subject's mental operations used in arriving at the judgment. For example, suppose that the investigator has probed, and that he has extensively explored the reasoning behind the subject's original simple "Yes". Further suppose that the four answers offered above are actually the answers from four different subjects, all of whom answered the dilemma in the affirmative, and that in each case he has gotten complete statements consistent with the type of thinking already given.

Based on this information the structuralist would be able to evaluate the responses of the subjects in terms of the theoretical and empirical formulations of Piaget and Kohlberg that reveal and elaborate the universal patterns of judgment on cognitive-moral issues and their development sequence. Whereas the nomothetic and idiographic investigators arrived at judgments based on social or personal codes of prescribed behavior, the structuralist would arrive at evaluations of moral development based on objective data about how the human organism in transaction with the environment constructs values/moral orientations from the universal patterns of intellectual processing performed by the human mind.

Conclusion

The second component of the organismic-structural-developmental position has been presented by first explaining *structuralism*, a methodology of scientific investigation that is particularly fruitful for exploring the intellectual and affective aspects of human existence in order to better understand values/moral

development. Then the nature of *structure* was examined as a way
of conceptualizing one major aspect of intelligence. Further
explication of this concept was made available through the larger
framework from which it comes in terms of the stage-independent
portion of Piaget's theory. This set the stage for a fuller
development of the important distinction between *content* and
structure which is so important to the values development theory.

It should be apparent that the structural component forms
a natural bridge between the organismic and developmental components.
The concept of structure and the methodology of structuralism
are inherently holistic and transactional, and wholeheartedly
organismic. Structuralism is actually an application of the basic
tenets of organismic psychology. Piaget's definition of structure
reveals the organismic nature of the concept explicitly in
wholeness, transformation, and *self-regulation.*

But structures are *constructed* in the course of organismic
transactions--this structure elaboration, or morphogenesis, constitutes
the *diachronic* aspect of organismic progress. Its *synchronic*
counterpart is provided by the process, or function, that makes
the transactions possible. The synchronic aspects of ontogenesis
generate the diachronic structure that provides stability,
continuity, and integration to a dynamic organism in an ever-
changing environment. But, as Piaget says (1970c, p. 62):

> Of course, human structures do not arise
> out of nothing. If it be true that all structures
> are generated, it is just as true that generation
> is always a passing from a simpler to a more
> complex structure, this process, according to

the present state of our knowledge, being
endless. So there are certain givens from
which the construction of logical structures
takes off, but these "data" are not primordial
in any absolute sense, being merely the start-
ing point for our analysis, nor do they "contain"
what is, in the course of construction, "derived"
from and "based" on them. We called these
initial structures behind which we cannot go
"general coordinations of actions," meaning to
refer to the connections that are common to all
sensorimotor coordinations.

These "general coordinations of actions" in the sensorimotor neonate

are the foundations for the construction of knowledge from the

practical intelligence of this first period in life to higher forms

of adaptation. But what of the nature of these structures about

which we have had so much to say? Piaget (1970c, p. 44) says of them:

...structures are not observable as such,
being located at levels which can be reached only
by abstracting forms of forms or systems of the
n^{th} degree; that is, the detection of structure
calls for a special effort of reflective abstraction.

But the reflective abstraction reveals not only the nature of the

particular structure and the individual in whose mind it functions,

but it reveals the nature of the human organism itself and the wider

world of all human beings.

But the nature of this human organism is not static, it

proceeds *in time*. Structures do not merely exist, they develop.

As Piaget (1970c, pp. 140-141) makes so clear:

But in areas where genesis [development]
obtrudes on everyday observation, as in the
psychology of intelligence, one cannot help
but become aware that structure and genesis
are necessarily interdependent. Genesis is
simply transition from one structure to another,
nothing more; but this transition always

> leads from a "weaker" to a "stronger" structure;
> it is a "formative" transition. Structure is
> simply a system of transformations, but its
> roots are operational; it depends, therefore,
> on a prior formation of the instruments of
> transformation--transformation rules or laws.

Thus far, then, the organismic and structural portions of the

foundation for a theory for values development education have been

described. But a holistic organism with dynamic structures can

only be fully understood in the course of its development. Con-

sequently, it is to development, the final third of the foundation,

that attention is now given.

C. Developmental

The term *development* presents the same problem as structure,

viz., it has many meanings in the behavioral sciences and philosophy.

The use of the term in the organismic-structural-developmental

conceptual framework is highly specific but consistent with its

meaning in organismic psychology, organismic-developmental

psychology, and structural-developmental psychology. Within these

orientations two people are largely responsible for the basic

theoretical formulations of developmental psychology: Jean Piaget

and Heinz Werner. Development as conceptualized by Werner and

Piaget is better understood against other conceptualizations,

especially the maturational and associationistic frameworks.

In Chapter III of this dissertation the notion that growth

and development are largely or exclusively the result of the

natural unfolding of the predetermined play or program "wired-in"

to the organism was presented as the *maturational, nativistic,*
nativistic-maturational, normative, or *normative-maturational* theory
of development. As recently as twenty years ago this theory had
many supporters in American psychology, especially as it was
articulated by its leading exponent, Arnold Gessell. A few
statements by Gessell will make clear the extreme emphasis placed
on maturation and will exemplify development as conceptualized
within this framework. Gessell (1954) makes the following statement:

> From the moment of fertilization, intrinsic
> and extrinsic factors cooperate in a unitary
> manner; but the original impulse of growth
> and the matrix of morphogenesis are endogenous
> rather than exogenous. The so-called environ-
> ment, whether internal or external, does not
> generate the progressions of development.
> Environmental factors support, inflect, and
> specify; but they do not engender the basic
> forms and sequences of ontogenesis. (p. 354)

Gessell recognizes that the organism's environment enters into the
picture, he refers to it as "acculturation." He cautions that "the
distinction between maturation and acculturation must not be
drawn too sharply" and clearly renders the role of the environment
to a subordinate role. He says:

> ...the maturational mechanism...literally
> establish the basis patterns of behavior and
> of growth career... By growth we do not mean
> a mystical essence, but a physiological process
> of organization which is registered in the
> structural and functional unity of the
> individual. In this sense the maturational
> matrix is the primary determinant of child
> behavior.
>
> Growth is a unifying concept which resolves
> the dualism of heredity and environment. Environ-
> mental factors support, inflect, and modify; but
> they do not generate the progressions of develop-

> ment... Neither physical nor cultural environ-
> ment contains any architectonic arrangements
> like the mechanisms of growth. Culture
> accumulates; it does not grow. The glove goes
> on the hand; the hand determines the glove.
> (p. 358)

The glove-hand metaphor clearly reveals Gessell's position. He and

his associates conducted extensive longitudinal studies of infancy

and childhood and published extensive reports on the precise age

periods that constituted normal development (maturation). These

models of development dealt with both gross (molar) patterns and

characteristics and extremely specific (molecular) actions and

behaviors. Gessell's work was extremely influential and even

received a great deal of exposure in the popular press. Many

parents closely followed the development of their children with

Gessell's charts and tables as their guides, and many an anxious

parent consulted a physician or a psychologist about his or her

child's deviation from those authoritative norms.

Environmental stimulation may be required or important for

evoking, eliciting, or supporting the behavior patterns that

emerge, but the basic nature of the pattern was built into the system

by the genes. Learning takes place as the result of action from the

environment impinging on the organism, but the readiness, the effect-

iveness and the degree of learning will reflect the genetic pattern-

ing. Thus development in this theory is the unfolding of the

behavior patterns in accordance with the maturational processes and

timetable. The extreme view of this position sees maturation as

both the necessary and sufficient condition for development. A

more moderate view would hold that maturation is the necessary,
dominant, and determining condition, but that the environment and
learning can partially influence superficial aspects of behavior,
but only within the strict confines of the maturational program and
timetable.

In contrast to and diametrically opposite to the matura-
tional theory of development is a theory that can be called
environmentalistic. This theory is readily recognizable as the
developmental orientation of behaviorism and is frequently referred
to in the literature as the *associationistic, behavioristic,* or
learning theory approach. Radical behaviorism, as epitomized by
the conceptual framework of B. F. Skinner, is the extreme formula-
tion of the environmentalistic theory of development. Environment-
alists recognize the existence of the organism as a manifestation
of genetic forces, and realize that the presence and nature of the
mechanisms of learning are determined by biogenetic factors. The
importance of these factors, however, is minimal with regard to
development, which is held to be primarily a function of the
environment. Development is the process by which the organism
acquires the structure of the environment through the mechanisms
of association, instrumental and operant conditioning, and possibly
imitation and identification. The underlying principle is that
human behavior is a reflection of the external world, which is why
Langer (1969) calls this "the mechanical mirror" theory of develop-
ment.

Concepts like mind and personality are viewed as sets or

patterns of specific behavioral responses to specific stimuli in the environment. Development in this view is the quantitative accumulation of appropriate stimulus-response patterns acquired through mechanical interaction with the environment.

In neither the maturational nor the environmental theory of development does the human organism take an active part in the developmental process. In both cases the child is the victim and the receptor. Obviously this is contrary to the organismic and structural conceptual frameworks presented earlier, and as can be expected development is conceptualized quite differently from these perspectives. The term *development* takes on a fundamentally different and considerably more complex meaning in the organismic-structural-developmental approach to which we now turn our attention, beginning with some brief comments about Werner's *orthogenetic principle of development*.

The Orthogenetic Principle

One of the generally accepted central propositions of the organismic-developmental conceptual framework is Werner's *orthogenetic principle* (Werner, 1948, pp. 40ff; 1957, pp. 126ff; Werner and Kaplan, 1963, pp. 7ff)[13]. Werner adapted the corresponding biological principle and applied it to behavioral development.

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[13]This highly complex principle is only briefly discussed here. For more complete presentations and for discussions about some of the ramifications and implications the following resources, in addition to the ones cited above, are recommended: Baldwin (1967), Beilin (1971), Harris (1957), and Langer (1969, 1970).

The basic principle is succinctly stated as follows (Werner, 1957,

p. 126):

> Developmental psychology postulates one
> regulative principle of development; it is an
> *orthogenetic principle which states that wherever*
> *development occurs it proceeds from a state of*
> *relative globality and lack of differentiation to*
> *a state of increasing differentiation, articula-*
> *tion, and hierarchic integration.* This principle
> has the status of an heuristic definition.
> Though itself not subject to empirical test, it
> is valuable to developmental psychologists in
> leading to a determination of the actual range
> of applicability of developmental concepts to
> the behavior of organisms. (italics added)

These concepts are more readily observable in the biological realm

than they are in the behavioral realm, but their meaning will

become more clearly apparent when the Piaget and Kohlberg stages are

presented later. Differentiation, for example, is clearly

evident in cellular development in the embryo. The initial single-

cell union of the egg and sperm soon divides into 2, then 4, then

8, etc. At first these cells are similar, but soon they begin to

take on different characteristics and functions--they become

differentiated. Eventually the global undifferentiated state of

the embryo becomes a highly complex system of cells, organs, and

relationships involving differentiation, articulation, and inte-

gration. The intellectual development of the child follows the

same kind of course. Initially the world of the infant is the

"blooming, buzzing confusion" of William James. The infant is

unable to differentiate himself from other objects or persons in

his environment, motor movements are gross and uncoordinated, and

notions of space, time, cause and effect, and other aspects of

perception and cognition are fused (syncretic). Gradually the

cognitive and motor aspects begin to differentiate, the separation

of objects is perceived and influences the child's behavior, and

many other elements of the environment become differentiated. Even

emotional development follows a similar course beginning with

the global excitement of the neonate which gradually differentiates

into fear, anger, joy, and eventually other discrete emotional

responses. Differentiation then involves the transition from

syncretic to discrete.

The articulation Werner mentions refers to another

dimension of development, viz., from the diffuse to the articulated.

At first cells, actions, perceptions, cognitions and other elements

of biology and behavior are general, uncoordinated, and lack

organization. As ontogenesis progresses these elements become

articulated and manifest coordination, interdependence, and organiza-

tion.

As Baldwin (1967, pp. 502ff) points out the organism

also progresses from the initial rigid and labile state to one that

is eventually flexible and stable. Young children manifest

rigidity in their behavior in many ways. They tend to use the

same patterns of behavior even when they are not successful.

Insistence on hearing the same story over and over, being carried the

same way, and many other tendencies on the part of children for

repetitive acts are manifestations of the rigidity of the early

phases of development. Development brings less reliance on these

patterns and behavior becomes marked by increasing flexibility in

action and thought. The rigidity of early development is related to the instability of this period. Moods, interests, and attention shift back and forth from one thing to another very quickly and inconsistently. Emotions are fragile and sensitive and easily shattered by relatively unimportant events. Along with the flexibility gained through development comes the stability that is possible with increased ability to cope.

Hierarchical integration refers to the gradual subordination of parts to wholes and the qualitative transformations whereby elements of systems move to higher levels in a new and more integrated form. The syncretic and unarticulated thoughts of the young child become not only differentiated and articulated but organized into a system that is capable of superior understanding. Coordination and cooperation become possible where only independent and egocentric behavior persisted. The capabilities and behaviors of the old stage become more complex and powerful as a result of the new integrations at the higher stage. Primarily hierarchical integration refers to the fact that the structures of the earlier stage are not lost, destroyed, are replaced but are transformed into more complex, more mature, and more effective structures at the higher stage.

Baldwin (1967, p. 504) offers the following concise summary of the orthogenetic principle:

> In summary the orthogenetic principle states
> that a developmental process goes from the
> undifferentiated, syncretic, diffuse, rigid,
> unstable organization to the differentiated,
> articulated, flexible, and hierarchically

organized system that is better adapted to the demands of a heterogeneous, variegated environment.

The orthogenetic principle is manifested in the structural-developmental theories of Piaget and Kohlberg, as well as the conceptual systems theory of Harvey, Hunt, and Schroder (1961), and the stages of Murphy's biosocial theory of personality (Murphy, 1947, 1958). And many years before Werner the principle is adumbrated in the analytic psychology of Jung (see Hall and Lindzey, 1970, p. 111). Piaget's *equilibration process*, which will be discussed later, has an intimate relationship to the orthogentic principle of Werner, which in fact raises the interesting subject of the overall relationship of Werner's and Piaget's theories. The two theories differ on some significant points but in general are highly congruent. Flavell (1963, p. 441n) makes the following observation:

> ...it would be worthwhile exploring the possibility of bringing the best of Piaget and Werner together under a single theoretical roof. Werner's theory is much closer to Piaget's than is any other, both in theoretical content and in basic developmental philosophy. So far as the writer knows, however, no one has yet made a serious try at theoretical integration...

In spite of the lack of an overall systematic integration of the two theories, there is considerable interrelating of them by many developmental scholars, and the orthogenetic principle is one of the most frequently mentioned interfaces.

Development

The concept of development will be presented throughout this section of the dissertation primarily by elaboration of the many facets of development and the developmental stages that will be presented. Several preliminary comments will aid the presentation, in addition to the orthogenetic principle already discussed.

Within the organismic-developmental framework there are certain terminological and conceptual distinctions sometimes made between change versus development, maturation versus development, growth versus development, and learning versus development.

First, development is a form of change, but the terms are not synonymous. Maier (1969, pp. 3ff) offers the following distinction:

> Development must be differentiated from change. *Change* implies a transition from one state to another, while development focuses upon the dynamic, one-directional elements of change. Development, therefore, is a process; change is a product. The former takes place within systems which are defined by their structures and their inherent dynamic processes.

Maier uses the term change here in a somewhat ambiguous way, but the ambiguity is helpful. The transition from one state to another he calls change, which is consistent with the statement of this writer above that development is a form of change. But then he switches meanings and makes change the product of transition. Both ways of looking at change help differentiate it from development. The unidirectional and structural aspects of development are fundamental to the meaning of that term. As the orthogenetic principle expresses, development is in the direction from the global

undifferentiated state to the differentiated, hierarchically

integrated state. Except in cases of brain damage, trauma, and other

forms of pathology, development is progressive and not regressive,

as an overall general trend. This last qualification is to allow

for the temporary ostensible regressions during transition periods,

when lower behavioral patterns are used after the development of

higher patterns. And, except for pathology, even when lower forms

are used in the presence of higher forms the latter are still

intact and available. There are situational circumstances that

call for lower forms of coping strategies and intellectual structures.

A fully developed abstract thinker on occasion finds it quite

helpful to use concrete forms of intellectual operation. This is

not regression, but merely a form of adaptation. Even a highly

intelligent person uses his fingers for counting in certain

situations even though he is fully capable of performing the

operation abstractly.

The distinction between maturation and development is

also clarified by Maier (p. 3). He says:

> Originally, *development* was a biological term
> having to do with physically observable growth in
> size or structure in an organism over a period of
> time. When applied to the behavioral sciences,
> it denotes the temporally linked processes, the
> progressive changes in adaptive functioning...
> *maturation* suggests organic growth, while
> *development* relates to sociopsychological develop-
> ment. Development in this sense refers to an
> integration of constitutional and learned changes
> which make up an individual's ever-developing
> personality.

Maturation can best be conceived in the O-S-D conceptual framework as

experience-free change. Thus the organic change that takes place

primarily as the result of biological systems, especially the nervous

system and the hormonal system, can be considered maturational change.

Experience-free is not intended to convey the idea of an organism

in a vacuum. Obviously the organism needs all the aliments provided

by the environment in the way of nutrition, air, and other material

aspects of sustenance. But this is essentially a biological process

and not a learning process from the standpoint of tissue need. The

situations in which one eats are going to result in both maturation

and development. The material resources will be aliment for the

biologically-based maturational change, and the sociopsychological

transactions will be aliment for development. By experience-free,

then, is meant the change that takes place solely as a result of

the internal processes of the organism assuming that appropriate

aliment is provided--this is maturation. Maturation is one of the

factors responsible for development, which will be covered later.

It is a necessary, but not sufficient condition for development.

The final distinction to be clarified is between growth

and development. Both Werner (1957, p. 136n) and Langer (1969, p. 3)

distinguish between growth as quantitative change and development

as qualitative change. The quantitative accumulation of vocabulary,

for example, can be thought of as growth, but not as development.

An argument can be offered that the kind of change discussed by

behavioristic theories of development are strictly speaking in

these terms growth. Langer (1969) in fact maintains that the

"mechanical mirror theory" accounts for only growth in terms of the

quantitative accumulation of stimulus-response patterns. This is an important theoretical distinction that can in a very deep sense convey the difference between behaviorism and organismic psychology. This distinction will become more evident when the criteria for developmental stages are presented. And, of course, it should be pointed out that behaviorists completely reject the notion of stages and the notion of change as postulated by organismic-developmental theories, as well as the entire structuralist approach to human behavior. From the structuralist point of view the growth vs. development distinction takes on added meaning. Much of what we would call growth (quantitative change) could be classified as content, e.g., the growth in vocabulary, the memorization of the multiplication tables, and similar acquisitions. There is no structural change involved in these tasks, and therefore no development. Growth, then, is basically quantitative change in content; development is qualitative change in structure. The importance of this distinction becomes evident when it is realized that growth is reversible while development is not (except, as pointed out earlier, in cases of trauma, pathology, etc.). One can memorize the multiplication tables today and forget them next week. One can respond to conditioning procedures today and have the conditioned responses be extinguished next week. One cannot have a fully developed cognitive structure for classification this week and not have it next week[14]. The distinction between growth

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[14]The qualification "fully developed" is very significant and is

and development is, therefore, useful for distinguishing two kinds

of change, as well as for distinguishing between the theoretical

positions of behaviorism and organismic psychology.

The distinction between learning and development is one

of the most controversial, important, and complex issues of

contemporary psychology. It is much too large an issue to be

adequately covered here. It is important, however, to make clear

that the developmentalist subordinates learning to development. Of

Piaget's position Maier (1969, pp. 89-90) says:

> ...Piaget conceives *learning as a function of
> development*. Learning cannot explain development,
> while stages of development can in part explain
> learning. For the learning theorist, however,
> development is perceived either as an independent
> process, a part of the primary process of learning,
> or as a function of learning.

A more common behavioristic view of the relationship is to see

development and learning as equivalent terms--learning = development.

Piaget (1970d, pp. 713-717) discusses this issue at

length. He begins by stating:

> If we give the name *learning* to every form

...included here because cognitive structures do not develop all of
a piece, or overnight, or in all-or-nothing manner. They gradually
develop and go through a transition period during which they may
be very unstable. A child may be able to perform a simple classifi-
cation problem this week and not be able to perform it next week if
the task is presented during the transition period. Once fully
developed, however, the structure will be permanent and will be
available for cognitive operations at any time. This is not true,
as pointed out above, for accumulations through rote memorization
or conditioning procedures that have been terminated. Conditioned
responses may not only be extinguished by cessation of reward,
they may also be eliminated by counter measures. Cognitive structures
cannot be eliminated by such procedures.

of cognitive acquisition, it is obvious that
development only consists of a sum or a
succession of learning situations. Generally,
though, the term is restricted to denote
essentially exogenous acquisitions, where either
the subject repeats responses, parallel to the
repetition of external sequences (as in
conditioning), or the subject discovers a
repeatable response by using the regular
sequences generated by some device, without
having to structure or reorganize them himself
through a constructive step-by-step activity
(instrumental learning). If we accept this
definition of learning, the question arises
whether development is merely a succession
of learned acquisitions (which would imply
a systematic dependency of the subject on the
objects), or whether learning and development
constitute two distinct and separate sources
of knowledge. Finally, there is, of course,
the possibility that every acquisition through
learning in fact represents only a sector
or a phase of development itself, arbitrarily
provided by the environment...but remaining
subject to the general constraints of the
current developmental stage.

The early part of the above statement presents both the

general position of the behaviorist and the more restricted

behavioristic position that limits the meaning of learning to

"exogenous acquisition" acquired through condition. The essential

point here, with regard to Piaget vis-a-vis the behaviorist is the

rejection of the total dependency of the learner on the environment

and the conceptualization of the learner by Piaget as an active

participant in the process of *constructing* knowledge. The heart

of Piaget's *genetic epistemology* is the emphasis on the active

role of the learner. Piaget says (p. 714):

To present an adequate notion of learning one
first must explain how the subject manages to
construct and invent, not merely how he
repeats and copies.

Later in the same article (p. 715) he says:

> Remember also that each time one prematurely
> teaches a child something he could have discovered
> for himself, that child is kept from inventing
> it and consequently from understanding it
> completely. This obviously does not mean the
> teacher should not devise experimental situations
> to facilitate the pupil's invention.

Piaget's conceptualization of development and learning, with the latter being subordinate to the former has enormous implications for education--as can be seen from the statements quoted above it tremendously affects the roles of teacher and student. These roles are quite differently defined and implemented in a curriculum built on the behavioristic model versus a curriculum built on the organismic-structural-developmental model. Piaget has expressed himself frequently and clearly on this point (Piaget, 1970a, 1970b, 1970d, 1970f), but especially in his description of the learner as an active constructor and the teacher as an organizer-mentor "stimulating initiative and research" (Piaget, 1972, p. 16). This requires that the teacher know not only his own subject matter but also know the "development of the child's or adolescent's mind" (p. 17). And it is based on "the basic principle of the active methods...which may be expressed as follows: *to understand is to discover, or reconstruct by rediscovery...*" (p. 20). Piaget's notion of the learner's role is described by Gardner (1972, p. 77) as follows:

> ...we find the child fulfilling...a role
> celebrated in all of Piaget's work: that of an
> experimenter or investigator who modifies his
> conceptions of the world as a result of his
> actions upon it and his observation of their
> consequences.

From the developmentalist's point of view, then, learning and development are not identical. Learning is dependent on development and requires the active involvement of the learner in the learning process, which in turn stimulates, supports, and augments the construction of knowledge required for development to occur and progress. Before specific learning can take place the learner must already have appropriate cognitive structures that will permit the assimilation of the events and encourage any necessary accommodation. The learner cannot, therefore, merely learn by association or reinforcement. A child can appear to learn because he or she has acquired specific verbal responses as the result of operant conditioning. But this is an automatic mechanical reaction involving the acquisition of content without understanding or the ability to apply the knowledge in new and varied situations significantly different from the contingencies used to elicit the responses. What has been learned here is a set of responses that are not likely to affect development. For a deeper form of learning, involving true understanding and independent application of the knowledge to other situations, the child's cognitive structures must be sufficiently developed to permit meaningful processing of the data.

Summarizing what has been presented so far on this topic, *development* has been differentiated from change, maturation, growth, and learning, and has been defined as a type of change characterized as being:

1. orderly

2. unidirectional

3. irreversible

4. qualitative

5. hierarchically integrated

6. progressively differentiated

7. increasingly articulated

8. actively created (constructed by the
   biological and genetic aspects of the
   human organism in transaction with the
   environment

9. functionally superior to but dependent on learning.
Further elaboration of this concept and its important role in
values development education will reveal the manifestations and
operation of the above characteristics, and will enrich the
meaning of development for itself and for its interdependent role
in the entire organismic-structural-developmental conceptual
framework. The additional topics required to complete this picture
are the following:

1. The relationship of development, structure, and
   function.

2. The egocentrism-perspectivism dimension of the
   development of *the self*.

3. Stage development

   a. criteria of developmental stages

   b. review synopsis of Piaget's theory

  c. Piaget's stages of intellectual development

 4. Four factors responsible for development

  a. Genetic emergence, organismic growth, organic

   maturation

  b. Experience

  c. Social transaction

  d. Equilibration

 5. Kohlberg's Cognitive-Developmental Theory of Moral

  Development.

Relationship of Development, Structure, and Function

Without structure, development would be reduced to the quantitative accumulation of content, processes, skills, and response patterns. Without development, structure would be nothing more than a static concept describing relationships among concepts, actions, and images at a given moment without regard for the temporal continuity of these events. The hyphen between *structural-developmental* is as important as either of the components itself. Structure is constructed through development; development is the ontogenesis and elaboration of structure.

Since it is the historical continuity provided the organism by its structures these are presented as the *diachronic* elements of organismic existence. Were it not for the relative stability and strength of cognitive structures, for example, the organism would have no mind, so to speak. It is the continuity of the structures that makes it possible for the functional invariant

of assimilation to operate. Without structure to assimilate the world into the intake is meaningless. If the organism ingested food without the structure of the alimentary system the food would be unavailable for utilization by the organism as the aliment for development. The food is ingested, processed, transformed into the elements required by the organism, absorbed in this form, and then utilized for development. Likewise the raw data of the world is perceived, assimilated into the existing structures of the human mind on its own terms, processed, transformed into meaningful data in relationship to the organism's structures and needs, and becomes responsible for some form of behavior (thinking, imagining, acting, etc.). The relatively stable element in this system and process is the cognitive structure. It is dynamic, it changes (accommodation), and it is part of a complex network of other dynamic, changing structures. But it is the relative stability of individual structures and the enormous stability of the entire complex network of structures that makes it possible for the individual to have an identity, knowledge, and continuity of consciousness rather than a meaningless stream of conscious sensations. Thus structure is conceptualized as being the diachronic aspect of the organism's transactions with the world.

Structure exists in and is built by the functional aspects of the organism that are rooted in its biological nature and described by Piaget as the *functional invariants*. They are functional because they are responsible for the organism's adaptation; they are invariant because they are genetically determined,

operate as part of the biophysiological system, and do not change
with environment. Although the functional aspects of existence
operate continuously it is only their operation at a given moment
that determines the nature of the particular transaction in process.
Therefore function *qua* function is continuous, but function *qua*
transaction is located in time, so to speak. It is function that
provides the action of the moment for the continuously existing
structures. Thus function represents the *synchronic* element of
organismic existence.

Development is the product of the synchronic-diachronic
transaction which involves the internal transaction between the
elements and systems within the organism and the external transaction
with the environment. The entire process is manifested by content.

The important point for consideration here is the
recognition that the developmental stages to be presented later are
structural stages. Stage and structure are so intimately related
that neither has meaning without the other, and, therefore,
structure and development are likewise intimately intertwined.
Structure exists in terms of stage development, and stage sequence
is development through structural transformation.

Egocentrism-Perspectivism Dimension of Self

Development may be viewed along this dimension as the
development from the total egocentrism of the newborn infant to
relative levels of perspectivism of the mature adult to some
hypothetical ideal state of total perspectivism in which the human

being would be totally capable of taking the perspective of others.
This hypothetical upper end of the continuum may or may not be
attainable, and discussion of it would lead into metaphysics and
other aspects of philosophy, and possibly mysticism and theology,
at levels which are beyond the scope of this paper. From the
standpoint of values development, however, the possibility of
total perspectivism does raise some intriguing and relevant
questions and ideas that would be worth extensive investigation and
development. For our purposes we will deal only with the more
mundane aspects of this dimension of development, which in them-
selves are of great significance for values development. In a
sense, perspectivism is possibly the single most important dimension
in that it is the foundation for the development of justice, which
in turn, is the foundation for moral development, which is the
foundation for values development.

Piaget, in most of his writings, has elaborated his
ideas on egocentrism and egocentricity. In some of his later
writings he has stated that he made an unfortunate choice of words
when he originally developed his ideas on this subject, because
of the more common, or colloquial, uses of the word in terms of
selfishness, egoism, and related ideas. For Piaget the term has
a highly technical meaning and refers to the inability on the part
of the newborn infant to distinguish in any way or sense the
concepts of *self* and *not self*. Adults take these ideas so much
for granted that they find it difficult to comprehend the state of
the newborn infant and the young child. It is ironic that the

more perspectivistic one becomes the more difficult it is to
even conceive of being completely without a concept of self. The
infant's lack of self-concept is even apparent in its inability
to comprehend that its body is part of itself. Observations of
infants and their actions on their own bodies will make this
obvious.

Associated with the lack of concept of self are numerous
interesting and important characteristics of the infant's cognitive
development. The child from birth to about three months of age
has no concept of space, time, or causality; no concept of object
permanence; no concept of intentionality. That is, the child does
not comprehend up, down, back, front, the passage of time, the fact
that if it does something with its hand that it can cause something
else to happen. It is aware of only those things that are in its
immediate line of vision. Anything not in its sight simply does
not exist. The idea of "out of sight, out of mind" is exactly
how things are for the young infant. The child is the center of
his own world, a demanding and absolute tyrant, but without any
realization that he is. Prior to Copernicus the inhabitants of
the planet earth believed that they were at the center of the
universe and all other bodies revolved around them. They at least
knew, however, that there were other bodies in the universe
besides earth. The child is at the center of his universe but
doesn't know that he is, doesn't know that there is a universe,
and doesn't even have cognitive knowledge, in the adult sense,
that he exists. The Copernican revolution changed things for the

inhabitants of earth. But the child's development away from the

egocentric state is very slow and fragmented, and does not move

in a straight line up to perspectivism. As the child's cognitive

development proceeds, he gradually develops the idea of self, and

becomes aware of the fact that there are other selves like himself

in the world. But with each major developmental progression,

marked by great increases in cognitive capacity, there is a

concomitant resurgence of egocentrism in thought. For example,

the last and very important period of development comes when the

child is about ten to twelve years old. At this time he begins

to move from what Piaget calls the *period of concrete operations*,

a sophisticated and advanced state of intellectual development in

which the child is able to perform complex mental operations, but

the use of these abilities is limited to concrete applications and

situations. The period of development the child moves into at this

time Piaget calls the period of *formal operations*, the last stage

of cognitive development that is, in its fully developed state,

the mature form of adult thought. This is a time when the young

adolescent finds himself with some of the tools of adult thought,

but without the experience that puts them in perspective.

Consequently, he sees the world the way it is, can imagine the way

it should be, and manifests the social criticism that characterizes

adolescent behavior and frustrates and annoys adults. This is the

resurgence of egocentrism at the advanced stage of formal operations,

and it is difficult for the young teenager with the new mental

capacities he now possesses to understand how things could possibly

be so fouled up, especially when it is clear to him how easy it would be to straighten things out and solve the problems. In other words, he sees things from his own egocentric point of view, and is unable to take on the role or perspective of others on these matters.

Progressive differentiation from a subjective perspective to an objective perspective requires cognitive development, direct physical contact with the environment, and substantial opportunity for interpersonal experience in the form of role-taking. Only as the child's concept of self develops can the child begin to understand that others truly exist independent of himself, not for his pleasure or utility, and that they have views, perspectives, knowledge, and experiences different from his own. Thus the attainment of moral-ethical ability is wholly dependent on this progressive development of self. Kohlberg, well aware of the significance of Piaget's contributions on this aspect of human development, made the egocentrism-perspectivism dimension a major factor in theory and empirical studies. Robert Selman, one of Kohlberg's principal associates, has extended Kohlberg's formulations on egocentrism and role-taking in cognitive and moral development. Selman (1971, 1973) has developed stages of role-taking based on the idea that role-taking is the ability to take social perspective. His stages are predicated on cognitive development and function as prerequisites for moral development. Thus there seems to be a temporal relationship of these three stages with Piaget's stages prerequisite for Selman's which are

in turn prerequisite for Kohlberg's.

Earlier, in connection with the content-structure distinction, the notions of *realism, animism,* and *artificialism* were introduced as concepts used by Piaget to describe some characteristics of childish thought. These are manifestations of the basic egocentrism of the young child. The significance of egocentrism for values development education is enormous. In fact, it could be considered one of the most important and central facets of values/moral development. Consider, for example, the nomothetic approaches to values/moral education presented in Chapter II. Much of the curriculum content of approaches based on tradition, authority, conformity, and compliance is beyond the comprehension of the young children for whom the programs are designed. This point is particularly exemplified by the highly complex, abstract, and often mystical concepts of religious education programs. Children are required, in these programs, to understand the idea of a triune god, the complexities of the dual role of Jesus Christ in Christian theology as both human and divine, eschatological and soteriological conepts, genesis, original sin, and many other complex and abstract ideas. The ability of children to parrot the verbal content of behavior desired by adults (which Piaget appropriately calls "psitticism") combined with the tendency of adults to see children as little adults (which Piaget appropriately calls "adultomorphism") leads most adults to believe that children really understand religion as taught in these programs merely because the children can use the words. A concrete

and vivid examples of the relationship of egocentrism to values/ moral development is the young child's inability to understand and operationalize the Golden Rule. This principle for social justice requires formal operational (adult) cognitive development not generally developed by children even in our advanced culture until around age 10 or higher, even with the more advanced children. Most children do not develop the ability to deal with the Golden Rule until the teenage years, and even then on a limited basis. Yet the Golden Rule is one of the mainstays of both secular and religious education in the early years of childhood. Cooperation among children is demanded by adults in the preschool years, kindergarten, and elementary school long before they are capable of comprehending what the adults mean by cooperation. The religious and theological concepts of the religious education programs, the Golden Rule, cooperation and much of the morality imposed on children clearly requires the ability to take the perspective of the other person, which requires the recognition of the self as a person.

The concept of egocentrism and the long, steep, and difficult path from egocentrism to perspectivism are foundational aspects of values/moral development of the first order. The meaning of egocentrism can be seen in the Piaget and Kohlberg stages which will be presented in a later section.

Stage Development[15]

Another key element in the developmental aspect of this view

of man is the concept of *stage*. Not all aspects of development are

conceived as stage-related or stage-developmental. Much somatic and

perceptual development is believed not to be stage-related, but most

cognitive and much affective development is believed to be stage-

developmental. Man's progress from the primitive sensorimotor modes

of thought and action found in the newborn infant to the mature forms

of logic-hypothetical modes of thought and action in the fully

developed human being is seen as the result of having progressed

through variously conceived stages of growth and development. Again,

the conceptualizations of these stages are varied from researcher to

researcher and school to school, but there is a general pattern of

common agreement. Generally speaking, the once popular concept of

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[15]The concept *stage* is very controversial in psychology. Behaviorists
generally deny the validity of the concept completely and tend to
hold for the idea of continuous growth in quantitative terms as
described in several places in this dissertation. Some psychologists
find the concept of stage very useful, but in a purely descriptive
sense. Other psychologists, the Freudian psychoanalysts, for example,
use the stage concept in more than a descriptive sense, believe the
organism does progress through definite developmental stages, but do
not use the structural-stage notion. The psychosexual-egostages of
Erik Erikson are developmental and meet some of the criteria presented
here, but not all of them (see Erikson, 1963, and Maier, 1969). For
the different points of view and the associated polemics the following
resources are valuable: Brown (1970), Flavell (1963), Green, Ford,
and Flamer (1971), Harris (1957), Kessen (Ch. 4 in Brown, 1970),
Kohlberg (1968b, 1969), Langer (1969, 1970), Maier (1969), and Piaget
(1970d). But one of the most valuable of all references is Tanner
and Inhelder (1971) which contains the proceedings of four lengthy
work sessions attended by some of the major figures in child and
developmental psychology in which are many debates about the stage
issue.

automatically unfolding maturational stages, mentioned earlier, and

supported by Gessell and his associates, has largely been supplanted

by the concept of developmental stages that require the involvement

of the child in relationship to his environment for stage development

and progress. Within the framework of the organismic-structural-

developmental view many theories and types of stages have been presented,

but the work of Piaget has been the most influential and generally

accepted, and is the most representative. Piaget's stages meet all of

the criteria for developmental stages presented earlier as well as

those to be presented, and they are structural stages. Furthermore,

and of great importance, Piaget's theory has been subjected to exten-

sive and intensive empirical investigation, and continues to receive

substantial support and confirmation. Regarding the validation of

Piaget's theory Adler (in Athey and Rubadeau, 1970, p. 5) says:

> A number of psychological investigators have
> tried to assess the validity of Piaget's studies,
> since the original ones are often lacking in
> scientific control or statistical analysis. Indeed,
> many persons have started their work with the
> express intention of disproving many of Piaget's
> contentions about children's concepts of causality,
> number, etc. (e.g, Deutsche, 1973; Estes, 1956).
> It is for this reason that the evidence in favor
> of the theory is all the more impressive. The
> overwhelming majority of studies have shown that
> the *sequence* of development outlined above
> [the Piaget stages] is an accurate portrayal
> of mental growth. Studies with the mentally
> retarded (Inhelder, 1943), children in other
> cultures (Price-Williams, 1961; Dodwell, 1960)
> have in general found the same stages of develop-
> ment occurring in the same chronological order.
> The relatively few exceptions (Estes, 1956) have
> tended to be less competent investigations.

Adler, in the above statement, and Sigel and Hooper (1968) point out

much of the validation research on Piaget's theory has centered around

the important issue of the invariant sequence of the stages and also

the issue of the ages of the children in the various stages as

reported by Piaget. Both of the above sources assert that the

majority of the studies have confirmed the findings of Piaget

with respect to the existence of the stages as they are described by

Piaget and the invariant sequence.

The age issue is interesting in that so much controversy

exists about the fact that many investigators (e.g., Laurendeau and

Pinard, 1962) have found wide differences in the ages that children

pass through the stages from one culture to another, and that these

reports show wide divergence from the ages reported by Piaget for

the children in Geneva that he has studied for so many years.

Laurendeau and Pinard (1962) find as much as three years separating

the children in Martinique and the children in Montreal, with the

latter that much ahead of the former in attaining various levels of

development. Children from lower socioeconomic backgrounds and

rural communities also develop more slowly. Considering Piaget's own

position on the age relationship to the stages it is puzzling why

there is so much controversy about the subject, especially the

attempt to use these observations as a refutation of the theory. As

Piaget frequently points out, the fundamental criterion is the

invariant sequences of the stages and not the age at which any

particular children or groups pass through the stages. Piaget has

frequently asserted that the ages he has found and the age ranges he

uses are not the ages in which all other children are presumed to

pass through the stages. In one discussion (in Tanner and Inhelder,

1971, Vol. IV, p. 13), for example, he says:

> The minimum programme for establishment of
> stages is the recognition of a distinct chrono-
> logy, in the sense of a *constant order of succession*.
> The average age for the appearance of a stage may
> vary greatly from one physical or social environment
> to another: for example, if the children of
> New Guinea, studied by Margaret Mead, manage to
> understand, like those of Geneva, certain structures
> of Euclidian geometry, they may do so at a much
> later or much earlier age. Whether older or
> younger is of little importance, but one could not
> speak of stage in this connexion, unless in all
> environments the Euclidian structures were
> established *after* and not before the topological
> structures considered as primitive.[16]

Thus the issue of the invariant order of appearance of the stages is

crucial to Piaget's theory, but the ages during which different

children enter or pass through the stages is not. In Chapter 3 of

Psychology and Epistemology (1971) Piaget discusses the findings of

various researchers that confirm his proposed invariant sequence and

also the variations in age for entry and passage into and through

the stages. Maier (1969, p. 91n) cites studies conducted in New York,

Japan, and West Africa which upheld the validity of Piaget's

hypotheses. Sigel and Hooper's Logical Thinking in Children:

Research Based on Piaget's Theory (1968) brings together in one

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[16] The relationship of the Euclidian to the topological structures
is not germane to the discussion here, but it is an interesting and
important point in Piaget's theory, and relates to the Bourbaki
mother structures mentioned in this dissertation in the section on
Structural. For Piaget's discussion on this subject, see Ch. 2 in
Genetic Epistemology (1970a), Ch. 2 in Structuralism (1970c), and
Sect. III, Ch. 3 in The Psychology of the Child (Piaget and
Inhelder, 1969).

volume much of the relevant and most competent research that has been done on the validation of the theory. In addition to the reports of the research there is systematic critical analysis of various aspects of the theory. The authors point out that the research reported in that volume concentrates primarily on the area of development that Piaget calls concrete operations. It is this area, however, that is of great importance for many of the school-age years. As Sigel and Hooper point out, and as is well known among those familiar with Piaget's work, an extensive presentation, critical evaluation, and report of relevant research dealing with Piaget's entire theory is presented in John Flavell's The Developmental Psychology of Jean Piaget (1963).

Regarding the stages themselves and passage through them Piaget (1972) has the following to say:

> In order to understand certain basic phenomena
> through the combination of deductive reasoning and
> the data of experience, the child must pass
> through a certain number of stages characterized
> by ideas which will later be judged erroneous but
> which appear necessary in order to reach the final
> correct solution. (p. 21)
>
> ...
>
> ...it is highly probable that there is an optimum
> rate of development, to exceed or fall behind which
> would be equally harmful. But we do not know its
> laws, and on this point as well it will be up
> to future research to enlighten us. (p. 23)

These two passages highlight certain points that lead naturally to the criteria or characteristics of developmental stages. Development is viewed in this conceptual framework as occurring through a series of universal structural stages. The many presentations

of these stages, based on Piaget, emphasize the following defining

criteria or characteristics outlined by Beilin (in Green, Ford,

and Flamer, 1971, p. 187n), Inhelder (in Brown, 1970, p. 21),

Kohlberg (1968b, p. 1021; 1969, p. 352), and Piaget (in Tanner

and Inhelder, 1971, Vol. IV, p. 13):

> 1. *Invariant sequence.* Progression through the
>   stages follows a constant order of succession,
>   or invariant sequence. Cultural, social, and
>   physical environment may seriously influence
>   the time of entry into any given stage, the
>   length of time spent in that stage, and the
>   final stage attained. But the order of
>   progression is fixed. The time it takes to
>   move into or through a given stage is not
>   necessarily related to the entry or passage
>   time for any other stages. Any particular
>   individual may or may not attain the highest
>   stage in the sequence, or may conclude his or
>   her development at any of the stages. Certain
>   cultures are partially determining in this
>   respect, and may provide environmental
>   conditions that encourage, inhibit, or so
>   drastically restrict the probability of higher-
>   stage attainment that individuals of the
>   highest stage(s) are not to be found at all
>   in certain given cultures.

2. *Qualitative differences.* Each stage represents a qualitative difference from the other stages. This difference is reflected in the modes of thinking, problem solving behaviors, and coping strategies available to the individual at different stages. The essential point here is that the difference in stages is not a matter of more or less knowledge of facts, the size of one's vocabulary, or the number of response patterns. The difference is measured in terms of the quality of reasoning and thinking.

3. *Structural wholeness or integrity.* This is the holistic aspect of structure characterized by the integrity or unity of the underlying characteristic patterns or thought-organization. A response to a problem or a question does not reflect merely the specific response to that specific problem or question. Rather it reflects the capacity of the child to use the logic involved in the solution and to apply the same thought-pattern to other problems. In the realm of moral development, for example, this structural integrity would be manifested in the child's relatively consistent use of certain justice structures to the solution of moral dilemmas. A child who has not yet attained

reversible thought will manifest this condition generally in the solution of problems.

4. *Hierarchical integration.* The stages form a sequence of increasingly differentiated and integrated cognitive structures with each succeeding stage incorporating the critical aspects of the preceding stages, but in a more complex, more coordinate, and more equilibrated way. Each stage is a more mature, articulated, and more systematic organization that grows out of and retains many aspects of the preceding stage or stages. Higher stages do not merely replace lower stages; they displace, or more correctly, reintegrate the lower stages. Many of the functions of the preceding stages are retained, but with new structures available to apply to them either alone or in connection with the structures used at the previous stages. This aspect is manifested by the fact that the patterns, logic, and characteristics of the earlier stages can still be seen in the behavior of individuals who have attained higher stages.

5. *Intrastage Development.* Movement into a new stage does not involve immediate attainment of the characteristics and capabilities of that stage. There is an initial period of *formation*

(genesis) and a subsequent period of *attainment.*
At first the application of the new abilities
is uneven, unsteady, and inconsistent. During
this period of formation there is a resurgence
of egocentrism related to the attainment of
new intellectual powers without the ability to
consistently or appropriately use them. As the
new abilities become more coordinated and
integrated the cognitive structures gradually
become more equilibrated, egocentrism subsides,
and mastery of the stage has been achieved.
This marks the period of attainment.

6. *Interstage construction.* The structure of
each stage represents the fulfillment of the
previous stage and the foundation for the
next one. Thus each stage has the aspect of
achievement with respect to the preceding
stage and an aspect of *preparation* for the
one that will follow. Another way of looking
at it is to see each stage as an intact
structure of its own and yet serving as a
bridge between the ones on either side of it
in time.

The central hypothesis contained in this theory as manifested by
these characteristics of the stages is that development is an
organized and coherent process of sequential qualitative changes.

Each stage derives from preceding ones, is an holistic structure on its own; it anticipates and lays the foundation for those to follow. Thus development and growth may be pictured as an ever-widening and ever-rising progressively more complex spiral in which the present loops evolve on past loops, anticipating and grounding future potential loops.

Brief Review/Synopsis of Piaget's Theory

Before proceeding to the presentation of Piaget's stages for cognitive development a brief review of the stage-independent part of his theory will augment what was presented earlier in the section on Structural and add meaning to the stages about to be presented.

Piaget's general hypothesis is that cognitive development is a coherent process of successive qualitative changes of cognitive structures, each structure and its concomitant change deriving from the preceding structure. In this process successive structures do not replace prior ones, they incorporate them, resulting in qualitative change and an increasing hierarchization. This development proceeds through an invariant sequence of qualitatively different, integrated, non-age dependent periods or stages. This developmental process is based on the organism's continuous relationship with its environment. The organism thereby participates in the structuring of its own knowledge and the construction of its own environment in a never-ending cycle of continuous transaction.

The organism and environment, however, are not two stable entities that are distinct from one another. They cannot meaningfully

be discussed separately. The external environment, or "outside world," or "external reality," is constantly impinging on the organism causing change in the organism. But the organism is constantly responding to the environment causing change in the environment. Both types of change happen as a result of the *transaction* between the organism and environment. The means by which this dynamic interchange takes place and induces growth and development in the organism, according to Piaget, is through the role of functional invariants, especially the equilibration process.

In Piaget's biologically based model of intelligence and development there are properties other than neurological structures that are inherited and that affect cognitive development and make intellectual progress possible. They are called *functional invariants* and consist of the twin complementary functions of *organization* and *adaptation*. Organization is the underlying coherence or holistic pattern of integrative relationships of systems that gives meaning and action to the organism. Corresponding to this inner pattern is the dynamic outer aspect of biological and intellectual functioning that constitutes adaptation.

Piaget uses biological concepts to describe the organism's attempts to cope with its environment and conceptualizes adaptation as consisting of the complimentary processes of *assimilation* and *accommodation*. These are not two separate and distinct functions, but are two aspects of one integrated process and are constantly occurring. Assimilation takes place when the organism operates on the environment and takes the environment in on the organism's terms.

It reflects the capability of the organism to handle new situations and new problems with its present stock of knowledge, reflexes, or schemata. When assimilation occurs it means that the organism has adapted without fundamental change and can handle the situation presented to it.

Accommodation is the other half of the process and takes place when the environment operates on the organism. It is the process of change through which the organism becomes able to manage situations that are at first too difficult and cannot be handled with present knowledge, reflexes, or structures. Accommodation, therefore, means that the organism has changed in order to adapt. When the organism confronts a new situation it attempts to assimilate. If it is unable to assimilate the experience into its existing repertoire of structures then it must do one of two things; it must either enlarge or in some way change one of its existing structures or it must create a new structure to reflect the new situation. With the creation of the new structure the organism can now assimilate the new situation. Thus the basic process is assimilation and the one to which the organism must constantly return.

This dynamic process thus consists of a continuous interchange with the environment causing a constant recycling from equilibrium to disequilibrium to equilibrium and on and on. The *equilibrium process* is the way the person transacts business with the environment, and is the mode of intellectual functioning, and the basis for intellectual growth and development.

The operation of the invariant functions and the construction

of the cognitive structures manifest themselves behaviorally in
content, the most superficial aspect of intellectual operation. By
superficial it is not meant to denote unimportant. Content is
extremely important, reflects the nature of the individual's society,
family, and culture, and makes up a great deal of human existence.
The superficiality is primarily related to its ease of observation,
measurement, and evaluation relative to function and structure.
It is superficial from a more qualitative standpoint, however, also.
To evaluate an individual's cognitive, moral, or affective development,
ability, or potential structly from content, as is done to a large
extent by intelligence tests, personality inventories and tests,
and moralistic judgments of behavior is to engage in gross misrepres-
entation and considerable error.

This brief review of Piaget's theory brings us to the stages
of cognitive development he has derived and elaborated from more
than fifty years of extensive investigation of children and youth.
Piaget, over the years, has been inconsistent in his presentation of
the stages and the terminology. Sometimes he refers to three great
periods or stages, and at other times he refers to four. In recent
years he is more likely to refer to four, and the difference is
significant in that the difference between preporational thought and
concrete operational thought is great enough and qualitatively
different enough to justify them as constituting two separate stages.
The above is not intended to convey any confusion on Piaget's part
about the content or meaning of the periods, but only a difference
in labeling and reporting the data. Presentations of Piaget's stages

may be found in part or in whole in many of Piaget's own extensive writings, or those of his associates and collaborators. Also, there are literally dozens of analyses, interpretations, critical reviews, and many other presentations of the stages in the numerous and continuously proliferating articles and books about Piaget and his work. Piaget's own writings and the many works about him are well represented in the bibliography of this dissertation, and these represent the sources of the data for the stages presented in the set of Tables 4.1, following.

The stages are presented with the following sequences and organization:

Table 4.1A - Sensorimotor Stage

Table 4.1B - Preoperational Stage

Table 4.1C - Stage of Concrete Operations

Table 4.1D - Stage of Formal Operations

It is very important in view of the preceding discussion about the relationship between the stages and ages that the general age ranges presented in these tables is merely an indication of broad patterns observed in Western culture. They are not in any way definitive, authoritative, or prescriptive.

TABLE SET 4.1

PIAGET'S STAGES OF COGNITIVE DEVELOPMENT

TABLE 4.1A - SENSORIMOTOR STAGE

General age range: Birth to approximately 18 months to 2 1/2
years.

Perceptions and movements or actions constitute the child's
intellectual instruments, which is the reason for the
name of this stage.

Child is born with basic, minimal reflexes (sucking, crying,
grasping, gross motor movements, etc.) which become
action structures (schemes).

Prerepresentational--the child does not mentally represent
objects or actions.

Preverbal--no language until the latter part of this stage.

Egocentrism total at first, gradually lessens, but remains
dominant throughout. Operates as though self is whole
world and causes all events.

Intelligence in the infant is displayed in his actions.
Direct action upon reality.

No object permanence at first; begins to develop around
four months.

At first: no concept of space; no concept of cause and
effect relationships; no concept of time (before and
after). Only gradually do these concepts develop
with experience.

Piaget refers to sensorimotor intelligence as *practical intelligence* and outlines six substages of sensorimotor development beginning with birth, and during which the neonate moves from total egocentrism, simple reflexes, and complete dependence to an ever-increasing practical mastery of his world of objects and persons, gradual but limited differentiation of self, and increasing reliance on his or her own abilities. Children vary tremendously in age of transition from substage to substage, and also manifest behaviors of several substages simultaneously. The substages and approximate general age periods are as follows:

1. *Reflexes*--(Birth to about 1 month)--Exercises ready-made schemes based on reflexes. Becomes proficient with use of sucking, crying, swallowing, grasping, gross motor movements.

2. *First differentiations*--(Approximately 1 to 4 months)-- Primary circular reactions (i.e., coordination of motor habits and perceptions through constant repetition of a behavioral pattern until the pattern is smoothed out and mastered)--Now the child can adapt to new situations.

3. *Reproduction*--(Approximately 4 to 8 months)--Secondary circular reactions (i.e., coordination of primary circular reactions to form intentional acts)-- Still involves repetition of simple behavior patterns to achieve mastery, but now these are used to preserve interesting sights and make

experiences last. This is the rudimentary beginning
of the child's experimentation and attempts to
modify its world.

4. *Coordination of secondary schemas*--(Approximately 8 to 12
months)--Applies familiar schemes previously mas-
tered to new situations through a systematic com-
bination of these schemes. For example, can move
an object out of the way in order to reach another
object.

5. *Experimentation*--(Approximately 12 to 18 months)--Develops
tertiary circular reactions (i.e., devises new
schemes as a response to novel circumstances or
features of an object)--Makes new discoveries,
pursues and explores these discoveries and their
consequences, thereby creating new schemes.
Actively experiments.

6. *Representation*--(Approximately 18 to 24 months to 30
months)--Invents new means through mental combina-
tions. For the first time can consider various
alternative strategies without actually having to
perform them. Begins symbolic representation.
Language is only one form of symbolic representa-
tion (Piaget prefers to use the linguist's term
"semiotic function.") "This function is the abi-
lity to represent something by a sign or a symbol
or another object. In addition to language the

semiotic function includes gestures, either idio-

syncratic or, as in the case of the deaf and dumb

language, systematized. It includes deferred

imitation, that is, imitation that takes place

when the model is no longer present. It includes

drawing, painting, modeling, It includes mental

imagery, which I have characterized...as internal-

ized imitation. In all these cases there is a

signifier which represents that which is signi-

fied, and all these ways are used by individual

children in their passage from intelligence that

is acted out to intelligence that is thought.

Language is but one among these many aspects

of the semiotic function, even though it is in

most instances the most important." (Piaget,

1970a, pp. 45-46)

TABLE 4.1B - PREOPERATIONAL STAGE

General age range: 2 or 3 years to 7 or 8 years.

Preconceptual period in which child can symbolize (thought,

representation), but cannot perform operations. That

is, he can differentiate *signifiers* (words, images)

from what is *signified* (the objects or events to which

the thoughts, images, representations refer). But

he cannot integrate his thoughts into networks of

thoughts in which he can reverse his thinking (*reversi-*

bility is necessary for true operational thought, accord-

ing to Piaget).

Actions are internalized and, therefore, represented, but

thought is not liberated from perceptions. Thus the

child in this perception-bound state will make decisions

based on perceptual clues when confronted with a con-

flict between cognitions and perceptions.

Child cannot reason simultaneously about a part of the whole

and the whole itself (class inclusion).

Begins to acquire language--first symbols, then concepts--

this is the most important development in this stage.

Begins to develop imagery, but imperfectly--images are a

product of and not a cause of mental activity.

Thought is not organized into rules and concepts.

Does not mentally represent a series of actions.

Gradually becomes less dependent on direct sensorimotor

actions.

Speech goes through two major developmental periods:

1. *Egocentric speech*--(2 years to 4 or 5 years)--

    no communication or intent to communicate in the adult sense. Speaks in the presence of others, but without intention that others should hear his words. Speaks "according to himself" but not "for himself." When he says he speaks for others he actually speaks from his own point of view. Piaget calls nonconversations of this type *collective monologues*. In many cases it is the thinking of actions out loud.

2. *Socialized speech*--(by ages 5, 6, 7)--begins to

    actually communicate and exchange ideas, and intends that others should hear him and listen. Since cooperation depends on socialized speech, and for other reasons, this development has important implications for values development education.

Definitions are functional and not abstract, e.g., a hole is to dig, a fork is to eat with, Mommy is for taking care of me.

Ability to take social perspective is limited, e.g., does not understand that he or she is a brother or sister to his or her own siblings.

The long preoperational period is best thought of as consis-
ting of two substages as follows:

1. <u>Preconceptual Substage of Preoperational Thought</u>

    Age range: Approximately 18 months or 2 years to
    about 4 1/2 years.

    Lacks ability to develop true concepts.

    Language is acquired slowly, and thinking is still
    considerably tied to action.

    Imitation is largely unconscious. Child reproduces
    and simulates movements and ideas of others
    without realizing he does. This form of ego-
    centrism is responsible for the child's indig-
    nation when accused of copying from another
    child; he believes he actually invented or re-
    discovered what he first saw in or by another.
    This is a very important aspect of childish
    intelligence with great implications for
    values/moral development and education.

    Preconceptual thinking involves the following sig-
    nificant characteristics:

    Transduction--a term borrowed by Piaget from
    Stern (see reasoning from particular to
    particular). "The child's reasoning is
    concerned only with individual cases and
    does not attain to logical necessity.
    This is why it is transductive." (p. 184)

The child's transductive reasoning is
exemplified by believing the sun and the
moon are alive because they move by them-
selves. Deduction (reasoning from general
to particular) and induction (reasoning
from the particular to the general) are
not yet part of the child's cognitive
repertoire.

Syncretism--links together things which are
unrelated, and see relationships in terms
of global perceptions. Tendency to connect
everything with everything else.

Realism--belief that one's point of view is
the only point of view, and therefore
everyone's point of view.

Artificialism--belief that all things and
events are caused by people.

Animism--belief that inanimate objects are
alive.

2. Intuitive Substage of Preoperational Thought

Age range: Approximately 4 1/2 years to about 7
or 8 years.

Thinking has progressed to the point where the
child can give reasons for beliefs and actions
and can form some concepts.

The child's thinking is intuitive and not logical in the operational sense (as in the stage of Concrete Operations), i.e., the child's thought is not reversible. Rather the child's preoperational intuitive reasoning is characterized by what Piaget formerly called *articulated intuitions* (1966, p. 132) and what he now calls *semilogic* (1970a, p. 50). This new term is descriptive of the half-logic used by the child in the sense that the child reasons in only one direction. This kind of reasoning leads to the discovery of dependency relationships and even to covariation (variations in one object are correlated with variations in another object), but not to conservation. Consequently the child will realize that when you roll a ball of clay into a long thin sausage that it becomes thinner and also longer, but will not be able to coordinate the coveriation and realize that the piece of clay is still the same amount or mass. This is what Piaget means by semilogic and one-directional thinking that lacks reversibility. He refers to this as a *logic of functions* versus a *logic of operations*.

Still unable to make mental comparisons and must

    build them up with actions.

Perception is *centered*, i.e., child can only perceive

    one aspect, or feature, or area at a time.

    Assumes the one perceived is the dominant or

    controlling aspect and makes judgments accord-

    ingly. Preoperational thought is thus percep-

    tion bound.

Thinking is considerably advanced over the precon-

    ceptual substage, but is still unsystematic,

    inconsistent, impressionable, and egocentric.

The entire preoperational stage, although an

enormous step forward from the sensorimotor stage,

is still limited in may ways. The limitations,

which stand out in comparison to more mature forms

of thought, especially adult thought, revolve around

several major factors that influence the child's

cognitive development at this stage. They are

primarily concerned with the following:

      1. Egocentrism

      2. Irreversibility

      3. Transductive reasoning

      4. Centering

      5. Inability to focus on transformations

TABLE 4.1C - STAGE OF CONCRETE OPERATIONS

General age range: Approximately 7 or 8 years to about 11 or

12.

The child, for the first time, becomes capable of true

thought, i.e., of *operational thought*. An *operation*

is an *internalized* action that is *reversible*. By

internalized is meant that it can be carried out in

thought alone without actually having to do it physi-

cally. By reversible is meant that the thought process

is two-directional, i.e., it can start from a point or

position, proceed to another point of position, then

trace itself back to the starting point. Addition,

for example, is reversible--it can be reversed by sub-

traction. Operational thought always involves a trans-

formation of part of a system, but something is always

conserved, something remains invariant. In addition,

for example, the number 6 can be arrived at by adding

2 + 4, 1 + 5, or 3 + 3, but the sum is invariant.

Operations are always related to systems of operation,

or structures. No operation can take place by itself.

Operational thought makes it possible for the child to relate

events to other events and the whole of which they are

part. The child's reasoning, therefore, becomes logical.

The enormous limitation of this stage, however, is that the

new powers of operational thinking are limited to

concrete things and situations. In other words, the child can truly engage in operational thought, but only with regard to objects and not to abstract or hypothetical events. Propositional thought, hypo-thetico-deductive reasoning, and other forms of reasoning that involve purely abstract contents are beyond the capacity of the concrete operational child. This is one of the reasons why lecturing in general, but especially on abstract subjects, is virtually useless in the elementary school and sometimes in the middle school.

Thus classification, seriation, numbering, combining, separating, dividing and substituting, as well as many other forms of thought-systems can be manipulated and reversed but only with concrete (real) objects, i.e., the internal manipulation of objects that are, or have been, perceived.

No longer perception-bound--can make cognitive logical decisions rather than perceptual decisions.

Decenters. Takes into account more than one or two (or more) aspects or features of something at once, i.e., takes into account *all* the salient features of objects and events.

No longer dominated by certain forms of egocentrism. Is now aware that others can have a point of view different from one's own. Begins to seek validation

of ideas through relationships and transactions with others.

Child can now truly speak "for himself" and not just "according to himself."

Child for the first time becomes *truly social* with non-egocentric speech, and can cooperate in a truly reciprocal way.

One of the most important developments of this period is the achievement of *conservation,* or the ability to conserve. This is the ability to hold constant certain features, dimensions, qualities, and character-istics of an object or situation when another aspect changes. (For example, if you change the shape of a clay ball right in front of the child's eyes, he will believe that you have also changed its weight, mass, etc., if he is still preoperational.) Conservation is a very significant and complex aspect of intelli-gence, and it is not achieved in all ways at the same time. The structures permitting conservation are usually developed for particular categories at the following ages:

number	5-6
substance (mass)	7-8
area	7-8
weight	9-10
volume	11-12

This order is not rigidly prescriptive, and individual children will vary significantly on this aspect. A child may conserve weight before substance, for example. These are only general guidelines. But it can be seen that, except for number, the child does not conserve until the beginning of concrete operations, then gradually acquires the other structures. Notice that the ability to conserve volume does not typically develop until the latter part of the period of concrete operations, and frequently not until the transition to formal operations, and sometimes not until the early part of formal operations.

This ability is extremely important for social development, and is, therefore, of major importance for values development. Human relationships depend on the ability to hold the relationship constant in the face of numerous changes.

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TABLE 4.1D - STAGE OF FORMAL OPERATIONS

General age range: Generally begins about 11 or 12 and

may be well developed by 15 or 16, but this is not

well established.

Final stage of intellectual development, or adult thought.

Prior to this stage, the child has been able to deal

with actions, objects, and images but has not been

able to deal with ideas not linked to these other

things.

Abstract and formal thought now possible with which the

person can perform operations upon operations.

The internal manipulation of concepts, relations, and

propositions.

The name of the stage derives from its major characteristic;

the ability to consider the *form* of an argument

rather than only its content; the abstract rather than

the concrete.

This makes possible what is known as *hypothetico-deductive*

reasoning; i.e., the person can reason about hypotheses,

or possibilities, and draw conclusions about the out-

come. Therefore, can deal with the possible as well

as the existing and the real. "If-then" type of

thinking. Scientific reasoning.

Can subordinate reality to possibility.

Can deal with all classes of a problem: present, past,

future, verbal, nonverbal, real, imaginary, etc.

Operations are coordinated and not dealt with in isolation.

True understanding of causation.

Can deal with proportion, analogy, inference.

Issues and principles become important--can see things

as they "ought" to be rather than only what "is".

Can operate reflectively.

Egocentrism usually increases when development proceeds to

a new stage, and the person must cope with new and

untried fields, operations, and ideas. It subsides

as the person masters the new with experience. This

phenomenon is especially noticeable with entry into

formal operations, and manifests itself in the

rebellion and social criticism of the young adolescent

who is severely critical of things as they are

because he sees how they could be and should be. But,

of course, he sees them largely from his own perspective

without the more mature outlook that may come with

experience. Therefore, this early stage takes the

form of naive idealism characterized by omnipotence

of thoughts.

Formal operations is critically important for values

development in many ways, but especially because

it is a necessary condition for mature human relation-

ships that depend on reciprocity, conservation,

reversibility, perspectivism, and other aspects of

human intelligence that do not become fully present

and operational until this period of cognitive development. One of the most important prerequisites for moral judgment, for example, is the ability to take social perspective and see things the way others see them , imagine the consequences and implications of several lines of action, and apply principles. This involves a complex preocess called *mutual simultaneous reciprocity,* or the ability to know that you are aware of x, that the other person is aware of x, that you are aware of the other person's awareness of x, and his awareness of your awareness of his awareness, and so on ad infinitum to an infinite regress, and the ability to do these things simul- taneously. Another major formal operational logical principle, *the inverse of the reciprocal,* is required for complex social relationships.

This period of development does not take place all of a piece, and probably proceeds through at least three substages.

Factors in Development

Piaget postulates four major factors that contribute to development (1966, Ch. VI; 1970b, pp. 36-41; 1970d, pp. 719-722; and Piaget and Inhelder, 1969, pp. 152-159). The factors are:

1. Genetic emergence, organismic growth, organic maturation

2. Experience

3. Social transaction (social transmission)

4. Equilibration

The first three factors are considered classical factors of development. The fourth factor is postulated by Piaget because the extensive research conducted by him and his associates indicates that the first three fail to account for all the elements of development, and that a cybernetic, or self-regulating factor is required to account for the complete program of ontogenesis. Piaget's treatment of experience is somewhat different than the classical interpretation of that term, also. The complete matrix of all four factors and the addition of the equilibration process as conceptualized by Piaget is very much in keeping with the organismic-holistic view of man and the transactional view of the relationship between man and the environment. Each of the four factors will be discussed briefly.

1. Genetic Emergence, Organismic Growth, Organic Maturation

Piaget assigns an important role to the biological factors in the development of intelligence, which of course is essential for values/moral development. He particularly emphasizes the role of the

central nervous system and the endocrine system inasmuch as these

have so much to do with providing the basic biological structures

and coordinations necessary for intelligent behavior. The invariant

sequence of the appearance of the stages is cited by Piaget as

evidence of the operation of maturation in development.

Maturation, however, is conceived by Piaget (and other

organismic-developmental psychologists) as being only a necessary

and very important factor, but certainly not a sufficient factor.

As part of the proof of the insufficiency of maturation to explain

intelligence and development is the fact that there is such a

significant variation in age of onset and duration of stay regarding

the stages. More than the mere automatic unfolding of a "wired-in"

maturational program is indicated by this variation depending on

sociocultural factors.

What then is the role of heredity and maturation? Piaget

feels that very little is actually known about the precise role of

this factor, or the precise relationship between the nervous

system and behavior. His premise on this subject is that the

maturation of the nervous system primarily determines the range

of potentiality for development and opens up the possibilities

that then must be fulfilled through the other factors in accordance

with the limitations of the stages and their sequence. He says

(1970d, p. 720):

> Thus the effects of maturation consist essentially
> of opening new possibilities for development, that
> is, giving access to structures which could not be
> evolved before these possibilities were offered.
> But between possibility and actualization, there
> must intervene a set of other factors such as

exercise, experience, and social interaction. In the passage immediately preceding the one quoted he rejects the notion of "innate ideas," in spite of the claims of Lorenz. In other places (1970a, 1970c) he similarly rejects the same notion as postulated by Chomsky with regard to language.

Piaget's rooting of intelligence in the biological nature of the organism must not be underestimated. His position on this is made clear in one of his most important statements, viz, "The Biological Problem of Intelligence," (1952, Introduction; also available with annotation by David Rapaport, 1951, Ch. 7). A few excerpts from this statement follow:

> An investigation of the origin of intelligence must necessarily face the relationship between the mind and the biological organization...

> Verbal or reflective intelligence rests on practical or sensory-motor intelligence, which in turn is supported by acquired and recombined habits and associations. Habits and associations presuppose the system of reflexes rooted in the anatomic and morphological structure of the organism. Consequently, there is a certain continuity between intelligence and the purely biological processes of morphogenesis and adaptation to the environment. What is the meaning of this continuity?

> Clearly, intellectual development is determined by certain hereditary factors.

He then states that there are two groups of such hereditary factors, viz., (1) the biological limiting aspects of the nervous system, sense organs, and perceptual appratus that not only allow us to know the external world, but by their construction limit the range of sensations that can be received by the organism; and (2) the functional invariants that make adaptation possible and provide the

basis for the construction of intelligence through transactions with the environment.

The two factors, as Piaget points out, both limit the capacity of the organism and also provide for an apprehension of the external world that opens up enormous possibilities for intellectual development, going beyond the maturational factor by constructing knowledge not available to any other organism. The immense power of formal operational thought must not be ignored. As insignificant as the human organism may be in the infinity of the cosmos, and as limited as the perceptual range of the human being may be, the potentialities of the human mind are magnificent to contemplate.

Heredity, genetics, maturation--these components of this first factor of development must be seen, then, in proper perspective. They plan an important part in determining the nature and adaptation of the human organism, but they also open up vistas and potentiality for a wide range and longitudinally protracted human development.

2. Experience

Experience is the organism's direct, unmediated contact with the world. The child must actually experience the objects and actions of the environment in order to develop. The child cannot, for example, develop object permanence unless it can experience objects appearing and disappearing over a period of time. In order to develop structures for classification he must directly experience objects to classify. The construction of knowledge and intelligence must come through the active process of adaptation

which necessarily implies that the organism is going to be engaged in a continuous transacting relationship with the world.

Piaget generally distinguishes two kinds of experience (e.g., in 1970b). But in a comprehensive presentation of his theory (1970d, pp. 720-721) he identifies three types of experience: *exercise*, *physical experience*, and *logicomathematical experience*. The first of these is rarely mentioned and is not emphasized by Piaget and will be briefly explained. The other two types of experience he considers very important for the construction of intelligence, especially the third type.

Exercise "...involves the presence of objects on which action is exerted but does not necessarily imply that any knowledge will be extracted from these objects" (p. 720). This type of experience, Piaget feels, is helpful in consolidating reflexes, such as sucking, which improves with repetition.

Physical experience is direct contact with objects, acting on them, and drawing knowledge from them. In a sense, the child extracts the knowledge from the object, as when he learns that apples are red and that fur is soft. The important point here is that the source of knowledge here is the direct physical contact with the objects. Piaget maintains that this does not mean that the child merely records or duplicates the object, but that the child assimilates the object, thus actively structuring the knowledge about the object. But the child assimilates the perceptions of the object to an existing structure. An example of physical experience is the weighing of objects and discovering that the heaviest are not always

the largest. The essential point here is that the child discovers
properties and characteristics *about the object.*

Logicomathematical experience is a higher order type of
experience in which objects are acted upon but the knowledge derived
from the experience is not knowledge of the objects per se, but
knowledge of the actions on the objects. It is the coordination of
the actions that generates the knowledge. A simple example, frequently
cited by Piaget, will illustrate logicomathematical experience. A
five year old child, sitting on the ground playing with some stones
and counting them, first puts them in a row and counts ten stones.
Then he counted them in the other direction, then in a circle, and so
on with various configurations. Delighted, the child was fascinated
to discover that no matter what he did with the stones there were
still ten. Through this experience he discovered a property of
number, viz., that number will remain constant regardless of which
way you count or the configuration of the objects. Notice that the
child discovered not a property of the objects, but a property of
the idea of number. This notion was derived internally from his
actions on the objects. The anecdote illustrates logicomathematical
experience and clearly shows the difference between it and physical
experience.

The importance of Piaget's distinctions of the different
types of experience is very much related to his entire concept
of genetic epistemology and his belief in the active role of the
child. These ideas serve as the foundation for his recommendations
for an *active curriculum* very similar to Dewey's ideas on experience

and an *experiential curriculum*.

Piaget differentiates between individual and coordinated

actions, and between simple and reflective (sometimes he calls it

reflexive) abstraction. Briefly, he (1970a, pp. 16-19) maintains

that individual actions lead to *simple abstraction*, or the derivation

of knowledge from objects themselves from actions performed upon

the objects, which leads to *physical knowledge*. Coordinated actions

lead to *reflective abstraction*, or the construction of knowledge from

the coordination of actions, i.e., from the operations, the mental

coordination and transformation of the actions which leads to

logicomathematical knowledge.

One of the most important aspects of Piaget's analysis

and interpretation, which is much too complex an issue to develop

here, is that the coordination of actions described above is related

to the development of logic, rather than logic developing from

langauge as maintained by many psychologists. Piaget (1970a,

pp. 18-19) says:

> Now all these forms of coordinations have
> parallels in logical structures, and it is such
> coordination at the level of action that seems
> to me to be the basis of logical structures
> as they develop later in thought. This, in
> fact, is our hypothesis: that the roots of
> logical thought are not to be found in language
> alone, even though language coordinations are
> important, but are to be found more generally
> in the coordinations of actions, which are the
> basis of reflective abstraction.
>
> ...
>
> I do not intend to go into biology; I just want
> to carry the regressive analysis back to its
> beginnings in psychology and to emphasize again

that the formation of logical and mathematical
structures in human thinking cannot be explained
by language alone, but has its roots in the
general coordination of actions.

Piaget sees experience, the active involvement of the child, as one

of the most important factors in all forms of intellectual development.

As with maturation, experience is seen as necessary but not a

sufficient condition for development.

3. Social Transaction (Social Transmission)

The role of culture, society, and socialization agents

is clearly recognized by Piaget as being of fundamental significance

for development. He opens a chapter devoted to "Social Factors in

Intellectual Development" (1966, Ch. VI) with the following statement:

The human being is immersed right from birth
in a social environment which affects him just as
much as his physical environment. Society, even
more, in a sense, than the physical environment,
changes the very structure of the individual,
because it not only compels him to recognize facts,
but also provides him with a ready-made system
of signs, which modify his thought; it presents
him with new values and it imposes on him an
infinite series of obligations. It is therefore
quite evident that social life affects intelligence
through the three media of language (signs), the
content of interaction (intellectual values),
and the rules imposed on thought (collective
logical or pre-logical norms).

Clearly, Piaget assigns an important role to the formative influence

of the environment in the form of society. There is one important

condition he puts on this influence which is of special importance

to educators, viz., that the influence of the environment is affected

and even limited by the individual's readiness to assimilate the

signs, values, and logic he identifies as being the media of social

transmission. On this point he says (1970d, p. 721):

> In fact, both social or educational influences
> and physical experience are on the same footing
> in this respect, they can have some effect on the
> subject only if he is capable of assimilating them,
> and he can do this only if he already possesses
> the adequate instruments or structures (or their
> primitive forms). In fact, what is taught, for
> instance, is effectively assimilated only when it
> gives rise to an active reconstruction or even
> reinvention by the child.

This statement not only recognizes the limitations of

environmental influence vis-a-vis the child's readiness and ability

to assimilate the heteronomous forces, but reasserts emphatically

Piaget's major thesis that development is a transactional constructive

process involving an inherently active organism. The role of the

environment here is not the unilateral heteronomous power of the

behavioristic conceptualization in which the child is molded,

shaped, and formed into the image of the external world. Piaget and

Inhelder (1969, p. 156) make this explicit:

> Socialization is a structuration to which the
> individual contributes as much as he receives
> from it, whence the interdependence and isomor-
> phism of "operation" and "cooperation." Even in
> the case of transmissions in which the subject
> appears most passive, such as school-teaching,
> social action is ineffective without an active
> assimilation by the child, which presupposes
> adequate operatory structures.

The position espoused by Piaget on this subject is clearly

an organismic-structural-developmental conceptualization of the

transactional relationship between the organism and the environment.

For this reason it seems inconsistent for Piaget to use the term

"social transmission," so reminiscent of the behavioristic view of

the passive organism receiving the transmission of the environment. For this reason, and in keeping with the constructivist conceptualization of cognitive and values/moral development that characterizes Piaget's theory, it seems more appropriate to refer to this factor of development as "social transaction" rather than "social transmission."

4. Equilibration

The three factors presented thus far, maturation, experience, and social transaction, are all major factors that partially account for human development. But each individually and all together are unable to account for development. They are all necessary, but not sufficient conditions. Piaget postulates a fourth factor that not only fills the gap but coordinates and regulates the other three. It is one of the most controversial aspects of his theory and one of the most hotly debated issues of organismic-developmental psychology. It is also an extremely complex subject that cannot be more than briefly outlined here. It is, however, a crucial factor in values development education theory inasmuch as it (1) plays a foundational role in most structural-developmental stage theories, especially Piaget's and Kohlberg's, and (2) it is one of the most essential elements in the proposed theory insofar as educational intervention is concerned.

The need for the equilibration process as an explanatory principle in development is offered by Piaget (1970d, p. 724) as follows:

> The problem then becomes that of understanding
> how the fundamental structures of intelligence can
> appear and evolve with all those that later
> derive from them. Since they are not innate,
> they cannot be explained by maturation alone.
> Logical structures are not a simple product of
> physical experience; in seriation, classification,
> one-to-one correspondence, the subjects's
> activities add new relations such as order and
> totality to the objects. Logicomathematical
> experience derives its information from the
> subjects own actions..., which implies an auto-
> regulation of these actions. It could be alleged
> that these structures are the result of social or
> educational transmission. But as we saw..., the
> child must still understand what is transmitted,
> and to do this the structures are necessary. More-
> over, the social explanation only displaces the
> problem: how did the members of the social
> group acquire the structures in the first place?

Piaget goes on to point out that all levels of development involve

the coordination of actions in ways that involve the characteristics

of logical properties and structures, and that these coordinations

involve corrections and self-regulations. He points out that similar

regulatory mechanisms are characteristic at all levels of organic

life. These cybernetic processes are essential for functioning and

maintenance of life in the biological realm, allow for the correction

of errors, and make development and growth possible. Applying the

same principle to cognitive development and cognitive structures

he says (pp. 724-725):

> Thus it seems highly probable that the
> construction of structures is mainly the work of
> equilibration, defined not by balance between
> opposite forces but by self-regulation; that is,
> equilibration is a set of active reactions of the
> subject to external disturbances, which can be
> effective, or anticipated, to varying degrees.

This fourth factor of development that regulates the other

factors and provides the major impetus for development involves

the organism in a constant process of alternating back and forth
from equilibrium to disequilibrium to equilibrium and so on and so on.
Equilibrium is not a static concept of balance in the sense of homeo-
stasis, which is more generally conceived as a static balance of
forces in a closed system. Equilibrium is a dynamic process of
continuously active forces operating in an open system. Thus a
condition of dynamic equilibrium does not involve a state of rest,
but an ongoing process of maximum activity attempting to compensate
for imbalances caused by transactions between the organism and the
environment. It is a self-regulatory, or cybernetic process that makes
it possible for the organism to develop.

The development comes about as the result of the organism's
continuous need to change, adjust, and adapt to new conditions, changed
relationships, unfamiliar perceptions, and a myriad of other imbalances
in its dynamic spatio-temporal existence in a complex environment.
Perturbations and disturbances impinge on the child's system and he
immediately acts and reacts to compensate. This continuous flow of
energy stimulates and excites the child in such a way that he becomes
an active, structuring participant in the organism-environment
transaction, rather than a passive observer-recipient of the messages
and structure of the environment. It is through the constant action
of the equilibration process in conjunction with other factors that
the child energizes and perfects his psychomotor skills, creates
his cognitive representations of himself and his world, and develops
his affective responses and systems.

Piaget and Inhelder (1969, p. 157) further clarify the

equilibration process as follows:

> An internal mechanism...is observable at the
> time of each partial construction and each
> transition from one stage to the next. It is
> a process of equilibrium, not in the sense of a
> simple balance of forces, as in mechanics, or
> an increase of entropy, as in thermodynamics, but
> in the sense--which has now been brought out so
> clearly by cybernetics--of self-regulation; that
> is, a series of active compensations on the part
> of the subject in response to external disturbances
> and an adjustment that is both retroactive (loop
> systems or feedbacks) and anticipatory, constituting
> a permanent system of compensations.

Equilibration, then, is at the heart of the process by which the
human mind constructs and reconstructs reality, integrates and
reintegrates at ever higher levels of development the structures that
give the organism both stability and flexibility, and transacts with
the world.

In summary, development is seen to be the result of four
major factors that consider both internal and external forces
believed to be responsible for ontogenesis. The organismic-
structural-developmental theory attempts to incorporate a balanced
view of development into its conceptual framework. The internal
factors of maturation and equilibration are biologically rooted and
somewhat determined and limiting, yet allow for a wide range of
potentiality for human development. The external factors of experience
and social transaction are under heteronomous control, but are still
not unilateral and unrealistically controlling.

The principles of the conceptual framework developed thus
far lay the foundation for the theory of moral development that
follows. At the same time, the Kohlberg theory is also an exemplar

of the total organismic-structural-developmental system.

Kohlberg's Cognitive-Developmental Theory of Moral Development

Probably the single most fruitful exploration into values

development that has been done to date is the work of Lawrence Kohlberg,

currently Professor of Education and Social Psychology at Harvard

University. Kohlberg's early explorations as a doctoral student at

the University of Chicago in the late 1950's resulted in the original

presentation of his theoretical framework and empirical support in

his doctoral dissertation, "The development of modes of moral

thinking and choice in the years 10 to 16," finished in December,

1958. Since then he has elaborated his conceptual framework into a

theory that has gained wide attention in the behavioral sciences,

has undergone extensive empirical validation, and is demonstrating

its practical utility in a variety of applications in education,

family and child sciences, and prison reform. The theory is

variously referred to as the *Cognitive-Developmental Theory of*

Moralization, or the *Cognitive-Developmental Theory of Moral*

Judgment, or *Moral Development,* or by the abbreviated name Kohlberg

himself uses in informal speech, *Moral Development Theory.*

One of the hallmarks of a good theory is the power to

generate research and debate on a broad front in scientific circles.

Kohlberg's seminal ideas have demonstrated this power by generating

a great deal of activity in many places, including his own base in

the Laboratory for Human Development at Harvard where he and numerous

faculty and students conduct research to further develop the theory

through extensive field work. Notable among his associates there are

Elliot Turiel and Robert Selman. Among other sites that have been

engaged in testing his ideas, further developing the theory,

disseminating the information, and seeking to make practical

applications, one that is especially active is the Ontario Institute

for Studies in Education (OISE) at the University of Toronto, where

Edmund Sullivan, Clive Beck, and others have done some outstanding

work.[17] Kohlberg's theory is an outstanding example of the organismic-

structural-developmental approach.

The basis, background, and major tenets of Kohlberg's theory

have been summarized by Kohlberg (1972b, p. 183) as follows:

> A cognitive-developmental theory of moralization
> holds that there is a sequence of moral stages for
> the same basic reasons that there are cognitive
> or logicomathematical stages, that is, because
> cognitive-structural reorganizations toward the
> more equilibrated occur in the course of interaction
> between the organism and the environment. In the
> area of logic, Piaget holds that a psychological
> theory of development is closely linked to a
> theory of normative logic. Following Piaget, we
> claim the same is true in the area of moral
> judgment.
>
> A "cognitive-developmental" theory of
> moralization is broader than Piaget's own theory,
> however. By cognitive-developmental I refer to
> a set of assumptions common to the moral theories
> of Dewey and Tufts (1932), Mead (1934), Baldwin
> (1906), Piaget (1932), and myself. All have

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[17]At Michigan State University, the Values Development Education
Program, initiated by Ted Ward and John Stewart, functions as a
translation center for spelling out practical implications of research
and theory. The primary focus is the integrating of the work of
Piaget, Kohlberg, Dewey, and numerous other contributers to values and
values education into an integrative eclectic model for values
development education for practical application by secular and
religious educators and administrators.

postulated (a) *stages* of moral development
representing (b) *cognitive-structural transforma-
tions* in conception of self and society. All
have assumed (c) that these stages represent
successive modes of *"taking the role of others"* in
social situations, and hence that (d) the social-
environmental determinants of development are
its opportunities for role-taking. More generally,
all have assumed (e) an *active* child who structures
his perceived environment, and hence, have
assumed (f) that moral stages and their develop-
ment represent the *interaction* of the child's
structuring tendencies and the structural features
of the environment, leading to (g) successive
forms of equilibrium in interaction. This
equilibrium is conceived as (h) a level of
justice, with (i) change being caused by dis-
equilibrium, where (j) some optimal level of
match or discrepancy is necessary for change
between the child and the environment.

The heart of the theory is contained in the structural-

stage development and the role of justice as the core of morality.

The structural-stage development is founded on the principles of

structuralism presented earlier, which makes the important

distinction between *content* and *structure*. In any given moral

situation and on any given moral dilemma, then, the choice of the

respondent is the content, and the underlying organized pattern of

thought that constitutes that subject's logic and reasoning forms

the structure. As Kohlberg says (ibid, p. 230):

> Since moral stages are defined as *structure*
> of values, not as *content* of values, choice on
> our dilemmas is not always determined. A stage
> four law and order subject may opt for not
> stealing the drug out of respect for law and
> property rights, as he may opt for stealing out
> of respect for marital responsibility and for
> the value society puts on human life. We call
> the choice "content" and the stage characteristics
> "structure".

This will become more explicit with an understanding of the stages

themselves, which will be presented shortly.

At a workshop on moral development theory Kohlberg (1973a) emphasized what he has said in his writings: "The core of morality ia a sense of justice. Moral action is action to promote justice." Consequently, Kohlberg sees democracy as the major way to maximize moral development. In his words: "The democratic system is conducive to moral development because it helps the individual experience and see justice." Later we will develop these points and their relationship to the stages. But at the outset it is important to understand, as Kohlberg makes clear, that justice and morality are isomorphic. This isomorphism is revealed in the way Kohlberg defines some critical terms. At the workshop he gave the following definitions:

1. *Morality*--an integrating and directing *principle.* Morality is what defines an organized unit of the personality.

2. *Moral principle*--A moral principle is a principle for resolving competing claims for action.

3. *Moral decision*--involves a conscious conflict between two lines of action and the attempt to choose the better in the face of tempt- tion. This involves strong emotional involvement.

Relating these statements to the preceding ones the relationship of morality and justice is clear. The integrating and directing prin- ciple (morality) is a sense of justice. Or, to put it another way, the criteria by which one resolves moral conflict, competing claims

for action, are the principles of justice at the core of that person's personality. Consequently, to truly understand someone's level of moral development you must determine that person's developmental level of justice. And that is precisely what the Kohlberg stages are all about: the underlying principles of justice used by people from the lowest stages to the highest and most mature.

"What logic is in the cognitive domain," Kohlberg says (1972b, p. 194; 1973a) "justice is in the moral domain." Earlier the point was made in reference to Piaget's theory that one of the most important factors in development is the acquisition of reversibility of thought (logic). Reversibility is the ability to look at an event, action, or idea backwards and forwards--being able to mentally retrace one's steps and perceive the issue from all sides. It is easy to see, then, how Kohlberg is able to make the claim for justice as the equivalent of logic. For justice is the ability to see relationships in a conflict from all points of view, both backwards and forwards. If one is unable to see his own point of view and others' points of view both ways, then obviously one cannot resolve the conflict justly. And what improves with moral maturity, with movement up the moral stages, is the ability to take the other's perspective and to resolve conflicts at ever higher qualitative levels of justice. Or to use the terminology of the structural-developmentalist, as one moves up the stages one's ability to resolve claims becomes increasingly equilibrated. Higher level justice is a more equilibrated form of justice than lower level justice, and is rooted in more equilibrated structures.

These issues, stage development and justice, will become
more meaningful in conjunction with the stages, but having them in
mind beforehand will result in a more penetrating understanding of
the meaning of Kohlberg's stages, which are presented following.

Moral Development Stages--Preliminary Discussion

In what sense are the preceding statements regarding the
stages being structural and developmental defensible? First, they
are structural because they define and represent deep, underlying
structures of thought patterns, logic, and perspective that are used
by people in the resolution of moral conflicts and dilemmas. They
are not particular solutions to particular problems, i.e., they
are not content, they are not attitudinal, they are not choices.
They reflect and manifest the core of one's moral nature. They are
not quantitative, i.e., they are not determined by how many times
a person makes a particular choice, or how many things a person
knows about moral matters. The conditions are these: if a person
demonstrates the making of a moral choice by employing a particular
kind of structural logic that genuinely represents the characteristics
of a particular stage (or if he demonstrates the rejection of the logic
of the earlier stages), if he focuses on salient concerns for that
stage, and if he understands and employs concepts of justice
consistent with that stage, then the person is either in that stage
of moral development or is in transition to it. Another way of saying
this is that if the person does not truly have the underlying structure,
then he cannot use the logic, take the perspective, and meaningfully

employ the concepts of that stage, and, therefore, is not develop-

mentally in that stage. On the other hand, if he can do and show these

things only once, then he must have the structures or be in the process

of attaining and developing them. Practically, in the actual evalua-

tion of a particular person, efforts are made to elicit structural

responses as often as possible. This is not done to obtain a certain

number of responses that can be added up to demonstrate the acquisition

of the stage; rather it is a practical matter of accepting the

limitations of observational procedures and testing instruments,

and needing to corroborate initial judgments in order to reduce

measurement error. If there were perfectly reliable instruments

with absolute validity only *one* observation would be needed in order

to determine the stage. And, too, the problem is compounded by the

sometimes very difficult problem of separating structure from content,

especially at the higher stages.

With regard to the developmental aspect, the stages are

truly developmental in the sense that they meet the criteria laid

out earlier for developmental stages:

1. They form an invariant sequence that is culturally

    universal.

2. Qualitative differences in the behavior patterns

    from one stage to another.

3. Each stage constitutes a structural wholeness with

    an underlying characteristic of thought-organization.

4. They form a hierarchical sequence in that each higher

    stage incorporates the abilities and structures of the

stages below, but at a more complex level, in a more
integrated and articulated form, and in a more
systematic way. Each stage, in other words, is a
reintegration of the stages that precede it, and
qualitatively is more equilibrated. Any solutions
to moral problems at the higher stage are more
equilibrated solutions that resolve the problems
the lower stage could not resolve at all or could
resolve in a less satisfactory and mature way.

5. Each stage contains an initial period of formation
   and a subsequent period of attainment.

6. Each stage is interrelated to the preceding and
   following ones and represents achievement and preparation.

Also, these stages do not form an automatic maturational
sequence. They are not "wired in" and do not merely unfold with
the passage of time and the attainment of either physical or
cognitive development. Different individuals pass through the
stages at earlier or later times, take more or less time to pass
through each stage, and may cease to develop beyond particular
stages or go on to the highest stages. Many adults have never and
will never get beyond some of the lower stages. Very few adults
in any culture, including our own, ever make it to the last two
stages, especially the sixth. "Stage six people" are rare indeed.
The reasons for these variations parallel the reasons for variations
in cognitive development, and are intimately related to the same
factors of development. Relating these factors to moral development

we find the following:

1. *Genetic emergence, organismic growth, organic maturation.*
   The nervous system, the endocrine system, and other
   physiological systems of the human body must have
   developed to the extent necessary for the cognitive
   development required for the perspectives underlying
   the structures of moral judgment at a given stage.

2. *Experience.* Likewise, the child must have a cognitively
   and socially enriched environment in order to permit
   physical experience, logico-mathematical experience,
   and social experience to take place. The less rich
   this environment and its opportunities for appropriate
   experiences, the less likely will be the child's
   development to higher stages, and vice versa. A
   restrictive environment restricts opportunities for
   conflict, which is the fuel for development.

3. *Social transaction.* This factor is especially important
   for moral development. Opportunities for role-taking
   are especially critical. Some societies and cultures
   are by nature at lower stages of moral development,
   and consequently never provide opportunities for
   certain kinds of information or action to even be seen
   or used. Kohlberg (1969) cites, for example, a
   number of his cross-cultural studies that show that
   people in isolated villages in the Yucatan and in Turkey
   move through the stages more slowly, less of them get

to the intermediate stages, and nobody gets to the
highest stages. It is difficult for us to imagine
that the inhabitants of the three cultures studied by
Ruth Benedict in the 1920's and 1930's and reported
by her in the classic book, Patterns of Culture,
could have even developed much beyond the two
or three basic stages, and certainly would not have
been very likely to have ever gotten to the last
two. The Dobu and Kwakiutl cultures are generally
Stage 1 and 2 cultures. The Zuni Indian culture
could probably be used as a magnificent example of a
Stage 4 culture, but rather than offering opportunity
for Stage 5 development, the Zuni most likely would
have deliberately exterminated any Stage 5 behavior.
Thus the role of social transaction is two-sided.
On one hand the individual cannot assimilate and
benefit from the opportunities in the culture until
he is ready, but, on the other hand, if the culture
doesn't provide the appropriate opportunities the
individual will not even get a chance to deal with
the issues that will enable him to be ready and to
grow to and beyond them.

4. *Equilibration*. The nature of one's capacity to
deal with conflict, and thus to develop, will have
an enormous influence on the rate of progression
through the stages and the stage of final

attainment. The research of Kohlberg (1969, 1973a, 1973b), Kohlberg, Scharf, and Hickey (1972), Rest (1971), Selman (1971, 1973), Turiel (1966, 1969, 1973), and Blatt and Kohlberg (1973) clearly supports the idea of the equilibration process and its influence on the variations of stage progression and duration.

The Kohlberg stages are exemplars of the structural-developmental model that has been presented, and are similar in nature and organization to the Piagetian stages. In fact, the intimate relationship between the cognitive stages of Piaget and the moral stages of Kohlberg is an important aspect of values development education theory. This relationship is clearly manifested and clarified in the presentation of the Kohlberg stages that follows.

The stages as presented in this dissertation are based on some of the latest research findings of Kohlberg and his associates, and include some significant changes from the presentations of the stages as presented in earlier publications of Kohlberg, Turiel, and others. Support for these changes is contained primarily in two articles, viz., Kohlberg (1972b, 1973b) and tape recordings and notes of the proceedings of the workshop held by Kohlberg and his staff at Harvard University in July 1973 (Kohlberg, 1973a).[18] Much of this material has not yet been disseminated widely by Kohlberg, especially the significant changes involving the ages of entry into

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[18] The author of this dissertation attended the workshop, took extensive notes, and recorded most of the sessions. The notes and recordings have been retained.

the higher stages.

The most important of these changes involves a downshifting of the stages; i.e., a general realignment of the stages to reflect the progress in the data analysis, especially on the longitudinal studies that have been carried on by Kohlberg since the time of his dissertation. He has continued to conduct exhaustive and intensive interviews with part of his original sample of boys. These have taken place every three years. The original subjects, as was mentioned earlier, were between the ages of 10 and 16 when Kohlberg started. In 1972, Kohlberg conducted his last round of research on them at the subject's ages of about 25 to 31.

At the workshop (Kohlberg, 1973a) and in one of his more recent papers (Kohlberg, 1973b) Kohlberg revealed that in the earlier phases of his work he did not sufficiently consider the difference between content and structure. One of the most important consequences has been a general tendency to have considered many statements by his research subject as being at higher stages than now believed. In a widely disseminated paper (Kohlberg and Kramer, 1969) it was stated that there seemed to be no evidence for adult stages of moral judgment from a developmental standpoint (i.e., stages that actually develop in the adult years), and that the higher stages were reached in the high school years. Any stage change after this was considered some kind of temporary regression or stabilization, or regression followed by stabilization. One of the most important revisions of the theory now makes allowance for the fact that Kohlberg has developed considerably more sophisticated interview and scoring procedures

that make it possible to more adequately differentiate between content

and structure. Using these, he has reviewed the data from his

longitudinal studies and other studies. Kohlberg now concludes

that it is highly unlikely, maybe even impossible, that Stages 5

and 6 could develop before the early twenties. The earliest that he

himself has seen the development of Stage 5 in his research sample

is age 23. So it seems that the upper limit of development in the

teenage high school years is Stage 4. Stage 5 is most likely an

adult stage that may come in the twenties, and Stage 6 is either a

phenomenon of the late twenties, the early thirties, or possibly

even later.

A reanalysis of the cases he believed showed "regression"

from Stage 4 to Stage 2 in some of his college subjects now reveals

that they are in a transition stage from Stage 4 to Stage 5 that he

is calling at this time $4\frac{1}{2}$. More about this will be said later,

after the presentation of the stages.

Another major readjustment in the stage presentation is the

reclassification of some behavior that was formerly believed to be

Stage 4 to a new form of Stage 3 which Kohlberg calls "3A prime".

In other ways there have been more diffuse and general

changes that relate to the content-structure problem and they are

reflected mostly in the need to be careful when interpreting statements

that are really lower in structural properties than the content seems

to indicate. It is quite possible that the content-structure problem

is considerably related to a problem pointed out many years ago by

Piaget in his book, The Moral Judgment of the Child (originally

published in 1932, English translation published in 1948). He claimed that children are especially receptive to the desires of adults and will make strenuous efforts to do and say what adults, especially parents, want them to do and say in certain situations. Consequently, he said children tend to "parrot" adult terminology without any understanding of the meaning of the words, or any correspondence between *their* meaning of the word and the adult meaning of the word. Piaget called this behavior *psitticism*. In their book, The Psychology of the Child, Piaget and Inhelder (1969, p. 21) make reference to a similar concept viewed from the other side of the perspective. They use the term "adultomorphism" to refer to the tendency on the part of adults to structure or view the behavior of children in terms of adult experience. The combination of psitticism and adultomorphism may account for much adult behavior towards, misunderstandings of, and inappropriate socialization techniques used with children. Exploration of the traditional-authoritarian and the cultural-relativistic adjustment approaches to values education in the area of religious socialization and religious education may reveal that the childish statements about God and other religious concepts are psitticisms interpreted by adults from their adultomorphic standpoint as true understandings of adult religious beliefs. This can lead adults to interpret compliance and adjustment behavior as true religious behavior. Kohlberg's research and theory provides insight into this problem. As Kohlberg frequently states (see, for example, Kohlberg, 1968a) each child is in his own way and at his own level truly a *moral philosopher* who will construct

and interpret reality on his own terms and make his moral decisions

on the basis of his own structural level of development, using the

logic and concepts familiar, understandable, and meaningful to him.

Piaget's and Kohlberg's approaches are more productive than

earlier approaches to the relationship between cognitive development

and moral judgment because they purposely avoid evaluation of the

behavior of children in terms of right and wrong answers. They both

found their insights through attempts to understand the human mind

and the way it functions rather than through searches for right and

wrong answers. Consequently, both Piaget's and Kohlberg's stage-

structure schema are attempts to reveal the inner structural processes

of the human mind, rather than the classification of the superficial

and relativistic content manifested in the answers to problems.

Moral Development Levels and Stages[19]

Kohlberg distinguishes between *levels* and *stages*. He

found that there existed a rather long general period of time in the

life of a child when the concept of morality has no operational

meaning, a period labeled the *Premoral Period*. Moral development

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[19]Much of the data, stage descriptions, examples, and other content is either directly taken from the writings of Kohlberg and his associates, or has been adapted from those writings. In some cases their statements or figures have been adapted, abbreviated or elaborated. The information comes from many different papers, scoring manuals, and other data prepared by Kohlberg, his staff and sources. To specifically identify a sole source for any statement, or to try to affix specific credit would be an impossible task. The sources are shown in the bibliography.

subsequently proceeds through three broad developmental periods designated as *levels*. Each level describes the overall characteristics of moral judgment that are predominant for each of two specific *stages* within that level. Each level, then, has two stages, for a total of six stages. If we include the premoral period as Stage 0, there are, then, seven general developmental periods in the life of the human beings, with respect to the development of moral judgment.

Table 4.2 is an overall picture of the levels and stages, the approximate earliest age likely for each stage to develop, the Piaget stage required for each Kohlberg stage, and the basic cognitive tasks prerequisite for the moral judgment of the stage in each case.

Table Set 4.3 is a comprehensive summary of each stage and level. The organization of each stage is designed to reflect the developmental sequence of events. Cognitive development is a prerequisite for social role-taking perspective, which in turn is a prerequisite for moral development. In other words, until the child has attained a certain level of cognitive development he will not be able to perform the cognitive tasks called for by the social role-taking perspective. The latter is required in order for the person to use the perspective necessary for a given level of moral judgment. For example, one cannot make Stage 2 moral judgments unless he has discovered the reciprocity involved in taking the perspective of self and other, which cannot be understood unless he has attained the level of concrete operations involving the development of cognitive reciprocity and reversibility.

The broad general age ranges given are merely guidelines and not developmental timetables showing when "normal" people achieve a particular stage. As was pointed out earlier, individuals go through the stages at different rates, achieve the stages at different times, and *may or may not pass beyond a given stage*. And, of course, the cognitive development level is a major determining factor in these sequential changes. The broad general age range should be reviewed in conjunction with the section discussion school distribution at the end of each stage.

Several specific factors or aspects have been cited at every stage in order to provide a thread of continuity running through the developmental scale. These factors are conception of rights, value of life, and justice. These are critical factors at the heart of moral judgment.

At the end of most stages are presented two substages. These substages represent a lesser equilibrated and more equilibrated form of the stage. Generally speaking, the more typical progression for an individual will involve going through the "A" substage, then the "B" substage, then moving on to the "A" substage of the next higher stage, and so on. However, Kohlberg believes that his data show that not all people do it this way, and that some people go from one "A" to the next "A" without achieving the more equilibrated "B" substage. He also syas that people tend to stabilize at the "B" substage of their terminal stage regardless of how they procceded through the earlier stages, skipping the "B"'s or not. This is not universal, however, and people can terminate their development at

the "A" substage of any given stage. Many authoritarians, for example, probably never achieve the more equilibrated 3-B and remain at the "3-A Prime" developmental plateau.

One other point to bear in mind while studying the stages is that, generally speaking, a person is never at only one stage at any given time, with the exception, of course, of Stage 1. Individuals will ordinarily be at two or three stages, making some judgments over the group of stages. Each person is likely to have a modal stage--the one at which at least 50% of his judgments are being made at that time. For example, a teenager may be making about 60% of his judgments at Stage 3, his modal stage, and 20% at Stage 4, 15% at Stage 2, and 5% at Stage 1. This would indicate that he is in transition to Stage 4, but is still making some judgments at the two lower stages. As he moves on up to Stage 4 the percentage of judgments made at the lower stages should drop considerably.

The gap between Stage 4 and Stage 5, i.e., between Conventional Morality at Level II and Principled Morality at Level III, is a major gap that is never bridged by the vast majority of people, even in an advanced democratic society. And for those who do make it to Stage 5, only a small percentage go on to Stage 6. One of the most fruitful areas for research is how to stimulate this development, how to bridge this gap, how to develop principled morality in more of our people.

A thorough study of the levels and stages should be made by keeping in mind the understanding of the foundational components: organismic, structural, and developmental.

TABLE 4.2

Overview of Kohlberg Levels and Stages

Level/Stage	Name	Approximate Earliest Age	Piaget Stage Required	Prerequisite Cognitive Tasks
Level 0	Premoral Period			
Stage 0-A	Amoral Stage	Extends to 4	Sensorimotor and Preconceptual Substage	
Stage 0-B	Premoral Stage of Egocentric Judgment	To about 6	Preconceptual and Intuitive Substage	
Level I	Period of Preconventional Morality			
Stage 1	Punishment and Obedience Orientation	No earlier than 5 or 6 7-8 likelier	Transitional from Intuitive Substage to Early Concrete Operations	Categorical Classification
Stage 2	Instrumental Relativist Orientation	7-8 earliest 9-10 likelier	Concrete Operations	Reversibility (Logical Reciprocity)

TABLE 4.2 (cont'd)

Level II	Period of Conventional Morality		
Stage 3	Interpersonal Concordance Orientation	10-11 earliest 11-12 likelier	Formal Operations Substage 1	Inverse of Reciprocal; Mutual Simultaneous Reciprocity
Stage 4	Law and Order (or Conscientious) Orientation	12-14 earliest 14-16 likelier	Formal Operations Substage 2	Able to order triads of Propositions or Relations
Stage 4½	(Stage of Cynical Ethical Relativism beyond Conventional, but not Principled Morality)	High School earliest, College likely	*(This is not a true stage insofar as not part of the invariant sequence. Only few go through it).*	
Level III	Period of Postconventional, Autonomous, or Principled Morality		
Stage 5	Social Contract Legalistic Orientation	Early 20's, Mid-late 20's likelier	Formal Operations Substage 3	Hypothetico-Deductive Reasoning
Stage 6	Universal Ethical Principle Orientation	Unlikely before late 20's, Early 30's likelier, if at all.	Sustained responsibility for welfare of others; irreversible real-life moral choices; high stimulation, reflection, and conflict.	

TABLE SET 4.3

KOHLBERG'S LEVELS AND STAGES
OF MORAL DEVELOPMENT

TABLE 4.3A - PREMORAL PERIOD

Morality, *per se,* has no meaning. In the early part (sensorimotor) of the period the child's actions are his judgments. Later (preoperational) he begins to be able to think about his actions, but not in a cognitive or social sense.

Selman's Social Role-Taking:	Emerging understanding that others have subjective perspectives.

Stage 0-A - Amoral Stage

Definition of Stage:	Not a moral stage. Moral questions have no meaning. Actions are judgments.
Broad general age range:	Birth to about 4-4½
Cognitive Development Level:	Covers sensorimotor stage to early preconceptual substage of preoperational stage.
Selman's Social Role-Taking Perspective:	Subject has a sense of differentiation of self and other but fails to distinguish between the social perspective of other and self.

Kohlberg's Socio-Moral Perspective: Not applicable. No moral
perspective possible.

Stage 0-B - Premoral Stage of Egocentric Judgment

Definition of Stage: The child makes judgments of good
on the basis of what he likes and
wants or what helps him, and bad on
the basis of what he does not like
or what hurts him. He has no concept
of rules or of obligations to obey or
conform independent of his wish.
Egocentric valuing.

Broad general age range: From about 4-4½ to as late as 6 or 7.

Cognitive Development Level: Intuitive substage of preoperational
stage.

Selman's Social Role-Taking Perspective: Subject views self and other
as subjects who think about their
actions as separate perspective takers,
but assumes that all others will have
views similar to his own.

Kohlberg's Socio-Moral Perspective: The perspective of right or values
is that of the individual actor in
terms of his wishes and needs and
unaware of other perspectives.

TABLE 4.3B - LEVEL I - PRECONVENTIONAL MORALITY

At this level, the child is responsive to cultural rules and labels of good and bad, right or wrong, but he interprets the labels in terms of either the physical or hedonistic consequences of action (punishment, reward, exchange of favors) or the physical power of those who enunciate the rules and lables. The level is divided into the following two stages:

Stage 1 - The Punishment and Obedience Orientation

Definition of Stage:

The punishment and obedience orientation. The physical consequences of action determine its goodness or badness regardless of the human meaning or values of these consequences. Avoidance of punishment and unquestioning deference to power are values in their own right, not in terms of respect for an underlying moral order supported by punishment and authority (the latter is Stage 4).

Characteristics of Stage:

Avoidance of "bad" acts (a trouble-avoiding set).

Concern for consequences, not intentions. No consideration of
   intentions.

Lack of awareness of relativity of values.

Egocentrism dominant and leads to:

> *Moral realism* - the tendency to regard duty and value attached
>
>> to it as self-subsistent and independent of the mind.
>
> *Objective responsibility:* Standards of judgment and

motivation are both external.

Immanent justice: Belief in existence of automatic

punishments which emanate from things themselves.

Conception of rights: No real conception of a right. "Having a

right" to do something equated with "being right",

obeying authority.

Reciprocity form: Based on submitting obedience as price for

freedom from punishment. Equality not present.

OBEY AND BE SAFE.

Value of Life: No differentiation between moral value of life and

its physical or social status value. One should not

kill, but there is no general obligation to preserve

the lives of others.

Justice: Fairness is the law of Talion: An eye for an eye, a

tooth for a tooth. Retaliation is automatic response

to committing an act, regardless of intention or

motive.

Stage 1-A: Orientation to obedience to power and to rules. Punish-

ment or application of a negative label automatically

makes action wrong. Concern about avoiding physical

damage to person or property but not for the overall

welfare of the person.

Stage 1-B: Orientation to concrete deceit. Wrong deeds must be

paid for by punishment. Heroes and authorities

and other special people merit special treatment, payment
and reward.

School distribution: Will find some children at Stage 0-B in early
elementary school. Some will be exclusively at Stage 1
all through elementary school from K through 6. K through
3 will generally be almost all Stage 1. Gradually Stage 2
should begin to be evident from grade 3 and up, and Stage 1
will slowly recede. However, Stage 1 behavior is still very
prominent in middle school-junior high grades, and even in
high school. A lot will be determined by the socio-economic
class of the community and the prevailing atmosphere in the
home life. Lower SES homes generally do not provide the
role-taking necessary for more rapid development in the
social and moral domains.

Stage 2 - The Instrumental Relativist Orientation
Definition of Stage:

The instrumental relativist orientation. Right action consists of
what instrumentally satisfies one's own needs and occasionally the
needs of others. Human relations are viewed in terms such as those of
the market place. Elements of fairness, reciprocity, and equal sharing
are present, but they are always interpreted in a physical, pragmatic
way. Reciprocity is a matter of "you scratch my back and I'll scratch
yours," not loyalty, gratitude or justice.

Broad general age range: From about 7 or 8 to about 12 to 14.

Cognitive Development Level Required: Concrete Operations Stage

        required. Cannot be Stage 2 until logical reciprocity,

        or reversibility is present.

Selman's Social Role-Taking Perspective:

Stage 2:   The discovery that other can view

                  the self as a subject just as the

                  self can view the other as a

                  subject; the child can view the

                  relation of self and other from

                  other's viewpoint.

Stage 2-A: Subject is aware that his own

                  subjectivity is under scrutiny

                  by the other and that his view of

                  other is based, in part, on other's

                  view of the self.

Stage 2-B: Subject is aware that other not

                  only can take the self's perspective,

                  but also that other is aware of

                  the self taking other's perspective.

Kohlberg's Socio-Moral Perspective: Sees things from the perspective

        of isolated individuals who value things subjectively

        considering other individuals and themselves. The

        perspective differs from Stage 1 in the awareness of

        different perspectives, whereas Stage 1 has a single

        perspective defined by authority, rules and reality.

Stage 2 differs also in its ability to see a perspective behind rules and practices differing from that of the individual forced to accommodate to the rule. This is the perspective of a rational or calculating individual authority or a group of individuals who set up the practice or value in terms of its instrumentality to individual ends.

Characteristics of Stage:

Basically hedonistic (operationally, not cognitively or philosophically). It is a naive instrumental hedonism. The "Playboy Philosophy" is an example.

Egocentrism still influential, but diminishes as self-concept develops. Begins to reflect increasing awareness of one's own ego-needs and ego-interests, and of the exchange of ego-interests for self-gain. Moral realism still present, but diminishing. Values becoming relative. Tendency to define with respect to private needs.

Inadequate and immature base for morality that becomes evident with increased intellectual development. In extremes leads to cynicism typical of so-called juvenile delinquents (reciprocity in terms of using and controlling other people). Can lead to an instrumental power orientation that is based on dominating and controlling other people for its own sake and the ego rewards this behavior brings.

Unilateral respect of Stage 1 begins to diminish and be replaced with ideas related to egalitarian denial of the superiority of authorities and adults.

Conception of rights: Rights are factual ownership and possession

rights. Each person has a right to do what he wants

with himself and his possessions, even if it conflicts with

the rights of others. No adequate solution to this

conflict exists at this stage.

Value of life: The value of a human life is seen as instrumental to

the satisfaction of the needs of its possessor or of other

persons. Decision to save life is relative to, or to be

made by, its possessor. (Differentiation of physical and

interest value of life, differentiation of its value to

self and to other.)

Justice: Fairness is "coming out even". But still takes the

perspective of the individual actor. Law of Talion

expiatory justice still present.

Stage 2-A: An orientation to the "you scratch my back and I'll

scratch yours" way of doing things from the point of

view: "What am I going to get out of it?" Element of

reciprocity present, but without sense of justice.

Stage 2-B: What the self is going to get out of the instrumental

exchange is still dominant, but now the consideration of

what the other gets out of it enters, along with the idea

of coming out even. Elementary justice involved. A clear

sense of the concrete rights of others, i.e., that if I

have a right so does the other, and a judgment of the other

by concretely putting oneself in the other guy's place.

School distribution: Stage 2 should start to creep in about grade 3,

and gradually become even with and finally dominant

over Stage 1, especially by late elementary and early

middle-junior high. However, Stage 2 behavior is still

a major force in the morality and decision-making of the

young adolescent in high school. And, or course, some

people become fixated instrumental egoists and remain

at this stage all their lives. The socioeconomic

status and other environmental factors will play a large

role in determining the rate and extent of progression.

The moral atmosphere of the school will be very

significant. The morality of the market place and

politics contains a great deal of Stage 2 orientation.

TABLE 4.3C - LEVEL II - CONVENTIONAL MORALITY

At this level, the individual perceives the maintenance of the expectations of his family, group, or nation as valuable in its own right, regardless of immediate and obvious consequences. The attitude is not only one of *conformity* to personal expectations and social order, but of loyalty to it, of actively maintaining, supporting, and justifying the order and identifying with the persons or group involved in it. Behavior based on conformity to stereotyped and traditional role expectations. Moral value is in performing good or right roles. Characterized by fusion of person and role. Moral judgments at this level are based on role-taking and legitimately perceived expectations. Praise and blame, and approval and disapproval are very important. Moral stereotyping is common in which good and bad are defined in terms of socially-accepted categories of virtues and vices. Positive, active, and empathic moral behavior becomes possible. Duty and moral goodness defined in terms going beyond mere obedience to an actual service to other persons or institutions, or to a concern about the feelings of others. Responsibility becomes subjective at this level to the extent that standards of motivation (to conform) have been largely internalized. However, standards of judgment are still external. This level consists of the following two stages:

Stage 3 - The Interpersonal Concordance Orientation

Definition of Stage:

The interpersonal concordance or "good boy-nice girl" orientation.

Good behavior is what pleases or helps others and is approved by them. There is much conformity to stereotypical images of what is majority or "natural" behavior. Behavior is frequently judged by intention--"he means well" becomes important for the first time, and is frequently used. One earns approval by being "nice". This stage is easily observable in much typical teenage behavior, the peer group ethic, and the "one of the boys" phenomenon. The socialization process for females in our society has, until recently, been over-whelmingly oriented to Stage 3 morality. It is at this stage that the Golden Rule first becomes meaningful and operationalizable, even though it is an immature application involving "putting yourself in the other guy's shoes", but without considering all the claims objectively as from the standpoint of not knowing which place would be yours.

Broad general age range:	From about 10 or 11 on, but starts to become more prevalent and predominant beginning about 12 or 13. No upper limit because many people never get beyond this stage, or if they do they retain many of its characteristics and make many moral judgments on this basis.
Cognitive Development Level Required:	Formal Operations Stage, Substage 1. Formation of the inverse of the reciprocal

(i.e., understanding the two different forms of opposites). Capacity to form negative classes (e.g., the class all not-mammals, not-crows, not-students, etc.) and to see relations as simultaneously reciprocal (e.g, to understand that liquid in a U-shaped tube holds an equal level because of counterbalanced pressures). Social and moral behavior at this stage involves these kinds of relationships in the social and moral domain. Operationalization of the Golden Rule, for example, involves the inverse of the reciprocal and mutual simultaneous reciprocity.

Selman's Social Role-Taking Perspective:

Stage 3:   Perspectives are taken in a mutual and simultaneously systematic way rather than in a sequential manner.

Stage 3-A:	Subject realizes that both self and other can consider each other's point of view simultaneously and mutually. Subject steps outside the two-person situation and achieves a third-person perspective on the dyadic interaction. This means that the person can perform the following cognitive operations: "I know that he's thinking about me thinking about him; and I know that I'm thinking about him thinking about me." And, further, the person can imagine himself a third person looking at the two people performing these operations about each other.
Stage 3-B:	Subject sees all other as being able to achieve a third person perspective.
Kohlberg's Socio-Moral Perspective:	Sees things from the perspective of a group, a role-class, or a mutual dyad which has shared

and expectations and consciously orients to these norms and expectations as shared. At Stage 1 there is no true perspective, because the person sees things only one way, his way. At Stage 3, however, the perspective is shared because individuals engage in sharing and see the necessity of sharing.

Characteristic of Stage:

Sociocentric orientation becomes very influential as the child moves out of the confines of family and into deep involvements with others in the social world.

Imitation and identification are common. Use of adult moral cliches and stereotypes appear.

Intentionality becomes very important, and tends to be overworked.

Approval and disapproval of others is tremendously important.

This is a small group or dyadic perspective, not a society perspective. Society is viewed somewhat as another person, not as an organized system.

Conception of rights: The conception of right is subordinated to the conception of good or nice. One has the right to do as one pleases, as in Stage 2, but one does not have the right to do evil as defined by the group in which one is a member.

Value of life: The value of a human life is based on the empathy and

affection of family members and others toward its possessor.

Life is more valuable than property because it is the

object of much greater empathy and affection. May

manifest an empathic revulsion for killing. The value of

human life, as based on social sharing, community, and love,

is differentiated from the instrumental and hedonistic

value of life. Applicable also to animals.

Justice: Fairness is trying to make everyone happy. Considers every-

one *directly* involved. But justice is embedded in concern

for others' approval and personal conformity. Stage 3

justice, generally then, is a form of retributive justice

in which an attempt is made to balance things out, but

in terms of love, affection, gratitude, and immediate

social relationships.

There are three forms of Stage 3:

Stage 3-A: The "be nice" form of Stage 3 that involves the social

perspective as described above, but without much considera-

tion for justice. It involves the role-taking but has

not adequately worked out an integrated form of justice.

Stage "3-A Prime":

The Authoritarian Orientation. This is an orientation to

"law and order" within the conventional mode, but without

a *social-system* perspective. The orientation of this type

of person is to maintain law *for its own sake.* Lacks a

real understanding of society, but believes that without

laws you have chaos. Sees the breaking of one law as the beginning of all law and order breaking down. The stereotypical *authoritarian personality,* who sees himself in a chain or line of command with people above and people below, who must give and take orders, is consistent with Stage 3-A Prime. It is a categorical orientation to *maintaining* fixed rules, to maintaining respect for legitimate authority, even though aware of good motives and roles involved in moral choice. One of the crucial points that separates this from Stage 4 is the lack of societal orientation that involves seeing society as an integrated system.

Stage 3-B: This is the more equilibrated form of Stage 3 that involves a more integrated sense of justice. Orientation to maintaining, mutual expectations that you be good, but asks the question, "Are the other's expectations that you be good themselves good?" Uses the Golden Rule role-taking to decide fairness in moral issues, and reflects on own motives.

School distribution: This is an important stage for junior high and senior high schools. Stage 3 may enter the scene as early as ages 10 or 11, but more likely to come around 11, 12, and on. This is the dominant stage in the high school. Keep in mind that this stage enters the scene with the advent of Formal Operations and the resurgence of egocentrism that comes with these new and untried cognitive

powers. Knowledge of the combination of early formal
operations and Stage 2 and Stage 3 moral behavior can
contribute a lot to an understanding of the teenage peer
group ethic, the social criticism, and many other
hallmarks of the young adolescent high school student.

Stage 4 - The Law and Order (or Conscientious) Orientation

Definition of Stage

The "law and order" orientation. The individual is oriented toward
authority, fixed rules, and the maintenance of the social order. Right
behavior consists of doing one's duty, showing respect for authority,
and maintaining the given social order for its own sake. Orientation
to society's point of view, to the perspective of the generalized
other or the majority, and to maintaining a stable social system and
one's own character. (Where an apparently Stage 3-A Prime orientation
clearly rests on this point of view, it is scored Stage 4. The Stage 4
orientation need not be rigidly rule-oriented, however.) A considera-
tion of consequences for the group or society including the impact
of the act upon the general *expectations* of members of society. Does
not necessarily mean that one's orientation is to the "establishment"
society. One can be an anti-establishment Stage 4 person and apply
the same orientation to a counter-society. For example, one could
be a radical Marxist Stage 4 who conceives society as a Marxist
Utopia. The central issue is that the Stage 4 person sees society
itself as an entity that takes precedence over the individual.
The individual exists to serve society. This is the view of society

as outlined by the sociologist, Emile Durkheim, earlier in this century. The main problem with the Stage 4 morality is that it subordinates, or even ignores, the individual and civil rights of man. This is a genuine taking-the-perspective-of-the-system orientation. But, relatively speaking, this is a high-level and sophisticated point of view.

Broad general age range: Some adolescents 12 to 14 are beginning to move into this stage, but they are more likely to around 15, 16, or 17. This is the modal stage in the United States, and is a terminal stage for a large percentage of our population.

Cognitive Development Level Required: Formal Operations Stage, Substage 2. Capacity to order triads of propositions or relations (e.g., to understand that if Bob is taller than Joe and Joe is shorter than Dick, then Joe is the shortest of the three). Ability to understand systems, and that the whole is more than the sum of its parts.

Selman's Social Role-Taking Perspective:

Stage 4:	Subject realizes that both self and other understand that both parties can remove themselves hypothetically from the situation and view its dynamics.
Stage 4-A:	Subject realizes that mutual perspective-taking does not

always lead to complete
understanding; social conventions
are seen as necessary because
they are understood by all
members of the group and are
used as a means of communicating
to others and of understanding
other's behavior and reactions.

Stage 4-B: Subject is aware of the
relativity of individual and
social group perspectives, that
each other interprets the
social "facts" according to
his own system of analysis
which is influenced by his
own history, his social system,
emotional state, and so on.

Kohlberg's Socio-Moral Perspective: Sees things from the perspective
of the public or the generalized member of society who
belongs to several groups or mutual dyads, and who has
developed a perspective toward that which is common to
all groups, i.e., to society as a system.

Characteristics of Stage:

Sociocentric orientation with the emphasis on formalized and
institutionalized aspects of society.

Interpersonal relationships are characterized by very firmly established mutual expectations.

Moral order is seen mainly as a matter of rules. These rules may be legal, religious, or moral, or all of these. Stage 4 person hesitates to make exceptions to rules, regardless of needs, motives, or consequences of or for the individual. The structural aspect of this concern, however, is not the Stage 1 orientation of fear, but the genuine concern for the social order and the possibility that exceptions can lead to social crisis and breakdown. Has some sense of hierarchy of rules, e.g., rules of life are higher than rules of property, but society is higher than individual life. This may lead to seeing something as morally right though legally wrong.

Duty and "doing one's duty" are central to this orientation. Duty is defined in terms of *responsibilities* awarded to individuals by the social order, and the individual is obligated to fulfill these responsibilities, for which he is equally compensated and rewarded. Respect is earned by performing "dutifully".

Merit should be rewarded by the system, and every individual must contribute to society. "A good day's pay for a good day's work." Social inequality is allowed where it is reciprocal to effort, moral conformity, and talent. But unequal favoring of the "idle", the "immoral", the poor, students, and other noncontributing and/or nonconforming members of the society is strongly rejected.

An important point to keep in mind about Stage 4 is that it is

not an orientation to creating an ideal social and legal

system. But it is an orientation to maintain the *existing*

system *as it is*, with its system or rewards and punishments,

laws, and moral order.

A major difference between Stage 4 and Stage 1 is that the higher

stage is an authority-maintaining system, and not merely

an authority-obeying perspective. It is not a direct

internalization of parental authority and taboos (Freud's

view); and it is not a direct internalization of the

prevailing adult beliefs, rules, standards, and virtues

and vices (Durkheim's view). It is a sequential, structural

development that emerges from the preceding stages. Kohlberg

believes that it has a more "rational" core than most

scientists have believed regarding this level of morality

and social order.

Conception of rights: Rights are legitimate claims earned by virtue

of one's contribution to the society.

Value of life: Life is conceived as sacred in terms of its place in

the categorical moral or religious order of rights and

duties. The right to life, however, does not take clear

priority over all other moral obligations. A serious

violation of a major law, for example, can legitimately

result in capital punishment, and this is seen as moral.

Value of human life generally and primarily rests on the

rule "thou shalt not kill", but this is seen as a negative

rule more than a positive one; and it rests more on the
rule than it does on life for its own sake. A sense of life
as having value beyond its pleasure, but not absolutistic
about life being of value regardless of its uses. Human
life is seen as categorically higher and better than
animal life. Generally speaking, the value of life is
somewhat dependent upon the value of its service to
the group, the state, the society, or God.

Justice: Also defined in terms of the system or social order of
roles and rules which are shared and accepted by the
entire community, and which constitute the community. The
individual's situation must always be considered within the
context and framework of the larger system. Equality is
manifested in terms of the uniform and regular administra-
tion of the law. Stage 4 justice is primarily a principle
for social order rather than for personal moral choice.
Consequently, it is an attempt to apply the restitutive
form of retributive justice in a true "balance-the-scales"
manner. Vengeance (Stage 1) is not emphasized because
"two wrongs don't make a right". But an offender must
pay his debt to society. The justice perspective of
Stage 4 is that of the "average moral agent". That is, in
resolving competing claims one should do what is best for
society. (Average rather than ideal.)

Stage 4-A: Emphasizes the societal point of view to the extent that the individual's point of view is either not considered or is so subordinate as to be frequently ignored. Society's and the individual's point of view are not seen as mutual.

Stage 4-B: Integration of the moral and social and legal into a higher form of social view that recognizes the mutuality of the individual and society. The crux of the issue is that the orientation to society's point of view by the individual involves adherence to internal "moral" values and rights which are felt to be also society's values, such as life, liberty, and property. In this more equilibrated form of Stage 4 there is some recognition of the individual rights and point of view of a person. Whereas Stage 4-A orients to the society as a system of fixed rules with the prospect of disintegration resulting from deviations, Stage 4-B orients to what is behind the rules, the purpose of the law, the wishes of the majority, and the moral law as the consensus of society's norms. The B form is clearly more advanced over the A form, but it is still a morality based on "society's point of view" which is still unquestioned as the basis for morality. It is still a morality of rules, and not of principles.

School distribution: Stage 4 is very important to the high school. It is possible, but not likely, for it to develop around 12 to 14. However, it is quite possible that it will develop in a substantial number of students after age 14.

Therefore, the 10th, 11th, and 12th grades should contain many budding and fairly well developed Stage 4's. The educational approaches for these students is very important and challenging, especially if the school is interested in moving them in the direction of principled morality.

Stage 4½ - The Stage of Cynical Ethical Relativism

This is not a "true" stage in the sense that it is not part of the invariant sequence of the other stages. Only a minority of people go through it, and a person can get from Stage 4 to Stage 5 without having gone through 4½.

It is an important stage or period, however, for many reasons. It is a recent addition to Kohlberg's theory and resolved a significant theoretical dilemma related to the structure-content issue. In most of the articles published by Kohlberg and his associates there is frequent mention of the people who left high school supposedly in transition to Stage 5, went to college, appeared to "regress" to Stage 2, and then later returned to Stage 5 and stabilized. Kohlberg now realizes that his seeing them as having regressed to Stage 2 was an error based on his confusion of content and structure. This will become clearer with a picture of Stage 4½ and its relationship to both Stage 4 and Stage 5. Kohlberg has observed the phenomenon primarily with young college students.

Some students who reach Stage 4 in high school and are totally capable of understanding and taking society's point of view, leave the more sheltered and protected atmosphere of home, where for the most part they are not required to make major irreversible moral decisions that truly test their own beliefs and values, and go to college. In college they enter a "moratorium experience" in which they are exposed to a wide variety of conflicting views on life, morality, law, and religion without having to make major decisions or commitments. There is a tendency at this point to become very

cynical and relativistic about beliefs and values. The combination of moratorium and cognitive conflict about one's own values leads to the belief that all values are relative, that all societies have equal claim to validity, and that no one can really say that anyone's values are superior to anyone else's. This is a manifestation of the absolute relativity discussed earlier.

On the surface these people appear to revert back to Stage 2 egoistic instrumental relativism as their moral base. It is not a true regression to an immature stage, however. The egoism or relativism is not the concrete, egocentric personal point of view of the individual making a decision on pure whim and wish. The person has developed the Stage 4 capacity to take society's point of view, understands the nature of society, but now rejects the claim of Stage 4 to priority and validity. This is an abstract, philosophical examination of the choice between society's point of view and the individual's point of view. Social duty is understood, but it is questioned from the point of view of the individual who can step outside society's viewpoint.

Seeing society's point of view as not necessarily valid, the $4\frac{1}{2}$ person goes on to question the validity of all moral views, concludes that everything is relative. In the process, he also questions the validity of the moral view itself, i.e., is there any basis for morality at all? Terms like "good", "bad", "right", and "wrong" shouldn't be used at all. In a sense, the stage $4\frac{1}{2}$ person fits the cliche about "throwing the baby out with the bath water." Seeing the inadequacy of stage 4 morality, and unable to

to understand Stage 5 principled morality, the 4½ person abandons the entire idea of morality.

Stage 4½, then, involves people who reach the highest form of conventional morality, step outside of it, question it, reject it, but have no adequate resolution to the conflict. They are beyond conventional morality, but have not yet developed principled morality. The question is whether or not this is a transitional stage that leads to Stage 5. Apparently it may be, but not necessarily. Kohlberg says that in many cases it does lead to principled morality, but that in many cases it does lead to principled morality, but that in others it does not, and the people can remain at Stage 4½ permanently. He cites as examples of adults who remained at Stage 4½ Hitler, Stalin, and possibly some of the people involved in the present Watergate scandal.

TABLE 4.3 D - LEVEL III - POSTCONVENTIONAL, AUTONOMOUS, OR PRINCIPLED MORALITY

The individual makes a clear effort to define moral values and principles that have validity and application apart from the authority of the groups or persons holding them and apart from the individual's own identification with the groups. This is a lawmaking and anthropocentric orientation. Law is distinguished from moral principle. Sees law as being rationally created for the benefit of society and mankind and to protect the rights of the individual. Laws are not sacred and can be changed for just cause. Recognizes the possibility of conflict between what is rationally right for the individual and what is legally right according to society. Individual is justified in breaking the law when the law is immoral or unjust, e.g., when the law violates moral principles that deal with fundamental human rights. Recognizes true worth of individual and his role in society. Responsibility becomes completely subjective in that both standards of judgment and standards of motivation are internal.

Stage 5 - The Social Contract Legalistic Orientation

Definition of Stage:

The social-contract legalistic orientation (generally with utilitarian overtones). Right action tends to be defined in terms of general individual rights and of standards that have been critically examined and agreed upon by the whole society. There is a clear awareness of the relativism of personal values and opinions and a corresponding emphasis upon procedural rules for reaching consensus. Aside from what is constitutionally and democratically agreed upon, right action

is a matter of personal values and opinions. The result is an emphasis

upon the "legal point of view", but with an additional emphasis upon the

possibility of changing the law in terms of rational considerations

of social utility (rather than freezing it in terms of Stage 4 "law

and order"). Outside the legal realm, free agreement, and contract,

is the binding element of obligation. The "official" morality of

the American government and Constitution is at this stage. Theoretical

and abstract view of society as existing for and organized to serve

people, the general welfare of all people, and to facilitate human

existence. Distinction between person and role.

Broad general age range: Kohlberg now believes this to be an adult

stage that is not likely to develop until the middle or

late 20's. He maintains that the earliest he has seen

Stage 5 in any of his research subjects is age 23.

Cognitive Development Level Required: Formal Operations Stage, Substage 3.

True, full formal thought. Hypothetico-deductive reasoning.

Construction of all possible combinations of relations and

systematic isolation of variables. In addition, Kohlberg

believes that attainment of this stage also requires personal

experience involving responsibility for the self; values

conflict; identity questioning and crisis; and the understand-

ing of the need for commitment (anticipated commitment).

Selman's Social Role-Taking Perspective: The subject is aware of

the relativity of individual and social group perspectives.

Instead of incorporating all social information, the

subject weighs and orders certain social data to predict

behavior of Self and Other in complex social situations
or in situations where all relevant social information
is not available.

Kohlberg's Socio-Moral Perspective: Strives for an objective or
rational perspective not dependent on being a member of a
particular society. Rational social organization or social
contract perspective. This is a perspective for defining
the way any society should operate and make laws based
on the recognition of universal individual values and
rights. It is also a perspective on what any individual
must accept or commit himself to if he is to be a member
of society. The individual and the social, at conflict at
$4\frac{1}{2}$, are reconciled by the social contract. The social
contract implies that commitment to society and its laws
is contingent on society recognizing individual rights and
values, but that the maintenance of individual rights
and values depends upon a society to protect them.

Characteristics of Stage:

Society is designed to protect the rights of individuals.

Operational morality is in terms of the utilitarian principle of
"the greatest good for the greatest number". The maximiza-
tion of good.

Stage 5 attempts to resolve the problems left unresolved by Stage 4.
Stage 4 morality provides no clear answer for the following
issues:

1. Obligations to persons outside one's own social order.

2. Obligations to persons who do not accept the rules of one's social order.

3. Social change and the creation of new norms and laws. Stage 5 allows for the rational creation of laws *ex nihilo* for the benefit of individuals and society. Attention shifts from defending the law to creating legislation to maximize the welfare of individuals who make up the society, thereby creating an entirely different concept of law and respect for law.

The primary mechanisms by which these problems, and other problems, are resolved is through the *social contract* and *constitutional democracy.*

The *social contract,* the basis of Stage 5 law and morality is a justice conception which presupposes reciprocity of the partners to the agreement and equality between them prior to the agreement, though the form of the agreement takes priority over substantive justice, once agreement has been reached. Contract and due process are fundamental, and since contracts cannot be binding without the liberty of the contractees, liberty typically takes precedence over the other elements of justice (reciprocity and equality) in the Stage 5 view. Consequently, and this is important, the typical Stage 5 conception of distributive justice is one of equality of opportunity, that is, equality of formal liberty to attain substantive equality.

Constitutional Democracy is the procedural arrangement by which law

and society become rational, because they rest on consent,

provide equal representation for self-interest, and include

a Bill of Rights protecting individual liberties (i.e., natural

rights that are prior to and take precedence over law and

society). These arrangements, which comprise constitutional

democracy, are more important than the concrete rules they

generate, and the enforcement of those rules. Whereas

a Stage 4 person deems it more important to seek a conviction

on a particular criminal, the Stage 5 person believes it

immeasurably more important that the criminal be accorded

due process.

The Stage 5 conception of morality is based on the same principles, thereby

providing a rational basis for moral decisions (the

resolution of competing claims). The rational person

attempts to take the legal point of view as presented

because it is "objective" and provides a basis for

ajudicating conflicting claims. It is recognized, however,

that the legal point of view can be in conflict with the

moral or human point of view. In such cases the individual

must make a personal choice usually in favor of human

welfare and rights, but must take responsibility for it

as a personal choice not recognized by law.

Beyond social or personal contract, duty is a matter of personal

moral choice in terms of self-chosen values.

Stage 5 defines a rational or a moral point of view different from

society's point of view of Stage 4 or the individual

actor's immediate point of view of lower stages. The

judge, for example, must not only consider the view of

society or of the law, but must reconcile it with a

rational or moral point of view which everyone should

take (universalizability).

Conception of rights: A conception of unearned, universal, individual

or human rights in addition to rights linked to role or

status.

Value of life: Life is valued both in terms of its relation to

community welfare and in terms of being a universal

human right. The obligation to respect the basic right

to life is differentiated from the generalized respect

for the socio-moral order. The general value of the

independent human life is a primary autonomous value not

dependent upon other values.

Justice: Stage 5 rejects expiation and retribution and believes

that punishment is not punitive. Sees the purpose of

punishment as only: a) rehabilitation of the offender,

and b) to maintain law in order to maintain society. In

resolving moral conflicts the Stage 5 person would take

the perspective of the impartial spectator (rather than

the average moral agent of Stage 4), and attempt to

resolve the conflict in terms of what is right for the

individual and the greatest good of the greatest number.

Stage 5-A: An orientation to social welfare and social contract consistent with the rights and welfare of individuals. Right action tends to be defined in terms of general rights and in terms of standards which have been critically examined and agreed upon by the whole society. There is a clear awareness of the relativism of personal values and opinions and a corresponding emphasis upon procedural rules for reaching consensus. Aside from what is socially agreed upon, right or wrong is a matter of personal values and opinion. The result is an emphasis upon the social point of view, but with an emphasis upon the possibility of changing law in terms of rational considerations of social utility. Outside the legal realm, free agreement and contract are the binding elements of obligation, in the context of considerations of welfare. While life is the basic primary human right, its value in the concrete case is decided by the owner in light of hedonistic and social utilitarian considerations.

Stage 5-B: An orientation to a primary concern for the universal rights or the self-development and perfection of individuals as human beings. Recognizes the Stage 5 social contract but intuitively feels that individual human beings and their rights take some moral precedence over a societal perspective. Life is a basic human right, but it is also something qualitatively higher or sacred—this sacredness is independent of direct

religious or social authority.

School distribution: Unlikely to occur at all in high school
according to Kohlberg, although it would seem possible
for some people to show some signs of Stage 5 thinking.

Stage 6 - The Universal Ethical Principle Orientation
Definition of Stage

The universal ethical-principle orientation. Right is defined by
the decision of conscience in accord with self-chosen ethical
principles that appeal to logical comprehensiveness, univerality,
and consistency. These principles are abstract and ethical (The
Golden Rule, the categorical imperative); they are not concrete
moral rules like the Ten Commandments. At heart, these are universal
principles of justice, of the *reciprocity* and *equality* of the human
rights, and of respect for the dignity of human beings as *individual
persons.* An orientation to respect for human personality (treat
each as an end, not as a means) and to principles of justice (equity
or moral equality of persons) as *principles* defining decisions and
duties. As principles, the values of respect for persons and justice
are used as consistent primary grounds of decisions which are
universalizable and which represent a universal "moral point of
view". There is a clear awareness of, and resolution of, the
problem of ethical relativity and skepticism by appeal to such
universalizable principle of human morality. This viewpoint integrates
the Stage 5 and 5-B perspectives.

Broad general age range: This is an adult developmental stage that
is not likely to come until the late 20's at the very
earliest, and more likely in the 30's or beyond. Kohlberg
maintains that this is a very rare stage attained by only
a small percentage of the population in our culture. Some
cultures have no Stage 6 people (or Stage 5 either).

Cognitive Development Level Required: Formal Operations complete.
In addition, Kohlberg believes that advancement to
this stage would require personal experience involving
sustained responsibility for the welfare of others;
irreversible moral decisions in actual life situations;
and high level cognitive stimulation, conflict, and
reflection.

Kohlberg's Socio-Moral Perspective: Orients to a perspective of
rational ethical theory or principle. Differs from Stage 5
in that it orients to definite moral principles of justice,
rather than actual social laws, which all men could agree
upon or would contract into, and by which the law can be
judged in particular cases. Orients to the "original
position" in moral decisions, to a perspective on what is
right which anyone in the situation (or in society) would
adopt if he didn't know which person in the situation he
were to be.

Characteristics of Stage:

An all-encompassing anthropocentric orientation that sees the self as

      part of and actively involved in humanity and history.

      Recognizes intrinsic worth of human individuality as

      applying universally. Sees consequences of personal

      actions in the world and historical perspective.

The abstract, universal principles of this stage are justice, reciprocity,

      equality of human rights, equity, and genuine respect for

      individuals.

Differentiates principles and rules. Rules are prescriptive solutions

      for concrete, specific situations. Principles are

      abstract guidelines for making decisions that can be

      applied to many situations and represent a mode of

      choosing that can be universalized (i.e., that we would

      want all men everywhere in the same situation to apply).

      Principles allow for exceptions; rules generally do not.

      The ultimate principle is the principle of justice,

      which is the core of morality, according to Kohlberg.

Trust is important for itself at this stage, i.e., it needs no

      justification beyond its role in maintaining principled

      human relationships.

Only at Stage 6 are rights and duties correlative. Every right

      implies a duty, and every duty implies a right. For

      example, at Stage 5 life is a universal right, but it

      is not a universal duty (obligation) to save it; but at

      Stage 6 life is a universal right that implies a universal

obligation to save it, no matter who the person is to be saved. Anything that is not universalizable is not a duty, e.g., "give up all your money to the poor". This is not universalizable because it cannot be logically or practically accomplished. If all the rich gave all their money to the poor, then the rich would be poor and the poor rich, and the situation would have to be reversed to an infinite regression.

The Golden Rule becomes fully operationalizable at Stage 6. The Stage 6 person is able to step out of and above the issue, take everybody else's role simultaneously, consider all the possible claims of everyone, and resolve it by taking the position that he does not know who would be in any given situation. This involves "ideal role-taking".

Reflective Equilibrium: The way you get equilibrium is to try out various principles against your intuition about how to resolve actual dilemmas. Analyze for when they fit and when they don't; rework your intuitive solutions of the principle or both until the situation is justly resolved. When the balance is achieved you have *reflective equili-brium*. Kohlberg says it can only be fully achieved at Stage 6, partly because of the justice orientation of Stage 6.

Each stage resolves the conflicts left unresolved by the preceding stage. Stage 6 resolves the major problem left unresolved at Stage 5, viz., the relationships and conflicts involving

law, morality, justice, and *utility.* Utility violates justice in many ways. Utility sounds just, Kohlberg says, because it treats each man as one, but then it adds them up, which fails to consider the rights of the individual. Or to put it another way, when you maximize the good (the principle of utility) you must, of necessity, forget about the rights and claims of the minority. Consequently, you must forget the individuality and the respect for the human personality of those people, which is an unjust solution. Stage 6 attempts to resolve this dilemma by a higher form of justice. (See the Justice section following.)

Value of life: Life is not only a basic right, but there is a basic obligation toward the lives of any other human beings. This obligation is defined in terms of respect for the personality of the other rather than by the physical survival or hedonistic interests of the other as such. *The value of life does not need external justification.*

Justice: Where Stage 4 took the perspective of the average moral agent, and Stage 5 took the perspective of the impartial spectator, or impartial moral agent, Stage 6 takes the perspective of the ideal moral agent. This involves a consideration of all perspectives and all claims from an objective standpoint (not knowing who's role would belong to whom, especially the agent's role), and then taking the perspective of the *least advantaged* and doing

what is best for that individual.

There are no A and B stages for Stage 6. Stage 6 is the integrated
and equilibrated resolution of both Stages 5-A and 5-B
and to be in Stage 6 implies that equilibrium has been
attained in the moral sphere.

This last statement requires one final statement about the possibility
of a Stage beyond this one. Kohlberg is working on this
problem and believes that Stage 6 represents the final
equilibrated stage in the moral domain, but that there may
be the possibility of a metaethical and religious, mystical,
or philosophical stage beyond this in which the person who
has resolved the moral issues now integrates them into a
cosmic view and reconciles himself with the universe, mankind,
God, or some other abstract existence. He calls this
possibility Stage 7.

D. Conclusion

The three components of the organismic-structural-develop-
mental conceptual framework have been explored. Some aspects have been
treated in some depth, some lightly, and some have been omitted. But
overall the meaning of the three terms, individually and as an integrated
unit, has been sufficiently drawn out to point the way towards a founda-
tion for a theory for values development education.

The fact that, in spite of the length of this section, more
has been omitted than included is testimony to the enormity of the
subject and its available resources. The exploration has been
fruitful, however, and has revealed a solid base of data for use in
values development education.

Two main tasks remain. First, what has been started here
must be extended, refined, and further elaborated. Second,
the implications of the conceptual framework for values development
education need to be extracted and explicated. Both of these tasks
must be continuous programs, the first will be continued in
subsequent work, and the second will be somewhat explored in the
rest of this dissertation.

CHAPTER FIVE

DEMOCRACY: STRUCTURE AND

PROCESS FOR VALUES DEVELOPMENT

Of all the implications that can be derived from the

organismic-structural-developmental conceptual framework for values/

moral[1] development none is more clear nor more significant than the

relationship between development and democracy, and what it means

for education. Democracy is revealed (1) as advanced cognitive and

moral structural development, and (2) as the socialization process

by which that advanced structural development is attained.

Kohlberg's research (supported by other conceptual frame-

works)[2] clearly reveals that *principled morality*[3] (Level III in his

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[1]As pointed out earlier, the use of the construct *values/moral* through-
out this dissertation is intended to communicate the overall interest
in the broad field of values even though much of the focus here is
on moral values. Moral values are considered as the primary values
and serve, in many ways, as exemplars of other types of values and
especially as prime manifestations of the valuing process.

[2]Many other theories and research findings clearly reveal similar notions.
The highest stage of conceptual systems theory as formulated by Harvey,
Hunt, and Schroder (1961), labeled the *stage of interdependence,* is in-
dicative of the democratic and principled orientation. Dewey's (1916)
fourth stage in the development of logical thought is highly congruent
with Piaget's formal operations, Kohlberg's Level III, and advanced
stages of other theories. The same holds true for Murphy's (147,
1958) third and final stage, labeled *integrated* and *creative*; Sullivan's
(1953; also see Hall and Lindzey, 1970; and Bischof, 1970) *syntaxic
mode of thinking;* Angyal's (1941, 1965) advanced developmental orienta-
tion called *homonomy.* Werner's *orthogenetic principle,* described in
Chapter IV of this dissertation, serves as an integrating concept for
all of these mentioned above.

[3]The concept of *principled morality* has been fully developed in connec-
tion with Kohlberg's theory in Section C of Chapter IV of this disser-
tation, and will not be repeated here. An understanding of the term
is presumed for this chapter.

theory) is isomorphic with *democracy* as a way of life and a social

order. This is a profound claim that requires explication and support.

Both Piaget and Kohlberg (also supported by other research

and theoretical frameworks)[4] further demonstrate that democratic pro-

cesses, procedures, and environments facilitate development in general,

and particularly the cognitive and moral development identified by them

as *formal operational* and *principled morality*, respectively. This

also is a significant and profound claim that requires elaboration.

These two claims are not only the most important implications

of the organismic-structural-developmental conceptual framework, they

also constitute the basis for engineering the educational applications

of the framework. As such they are the bridge from the theory and

philosophy of values development to the schools and classrooms where

its meaning will be tested and applied. Values development education

is not intended to be basic science or speculative philosophy--it is

intended to be a systematic integration of scientific theories and

findings and philosophic speculations and investigations into a concep-

tual framework that can serve as a rational basis for educational

renewal, curriculum design and development, instructional design and

development, and preservice and inservice teacher education. These are

the functions that require engineering in its technical sense.

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[4]Many of the frameworks and developmental stages mentioned in footnote
2 will also support this point. Others also help, e.g., Loevinger (1966),
Isaacs (1956), Havighurst and Taba (1949), Peck and Havighurst (1960),
Sullivan, Grant, and Grant(1957), and the many writings of Gordon
Allport, Erick Fromm, Abraham Maslow, and Carl Rogers, some of which are
included in the bibliography of this dissertation.

If democracy is truly both structure and process for values/
moral development, then democracy becomes the basis for the engineering
and the guiding principle that must permeate the design, development,
renewal, and education proposed above. Also, if democracy as struc-
ture and process is defensible as the foundation for curriculum then
we are eminently fortunate since the orignial purpose of seeking a
valid and viable theory for values development education was to pro-
vide a conceptual framework that would be applicable in and congruent
with our pluralistic democratic society. In this respect the results
of the search for the components of a theory for values development
education have been happily serendipitous.

Three themes or theses will constitute the substance of this
chapter. They are:

1. The structural properties of principled morality are
   isomorphic with the nature of democracy.

2. Functional democracy is the developmental process that
   facilitates structural moral development.

3. The identification of the characteristics of principled
   morality is the criteria for the implementation, opera-
   tion, and renewal of democratic community.

Each of these ideas will be discussed in turn and in terms of the
organismic-structural-developmental notion of values development edu-
cation presented in the preceding chapters of this dissertation.

A. Isomorphism of Democracy and Principled Morality

Democracy has many meanings and is an extremely controversial and emotionally-loaded concept. Its primary identification is in sociopolitical and governmental connotations.[5] Although its use here will necessarily and intentionally have many sociopolitical and governmental implications and aspects, these are not the primary focus and interest here. Values, morality, society, and law are all intimately related aspects of man's interpersonal and corporate existence, and they cannot help but have political and governmental overtones. But the focus is on the relationship between democracy as a mode of living, a way of thinking, and a basis for morality, especially as revealed by the organismic-structural-developmental conceptualization of human existence. The orientation is psychological, axiological, epistemological, and pedagogical. The ultimate intention, of course, in view of the fact that the conceptualization of education and the school as agents of social reconstruction underlies the values development education approach, is that the principles that grow out of that approach will be useful as data for consideration in sociopolitical improvement as part of maximizing man's potentiality and existence.

One critical interface between the sociopolitical aspects of democracy and the educational aspects is that the generally accepted exemplars of a democratic system are to some extent meaningless,

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[5] For an excellent, concise, and articulate presentation of *democracy* and its various meanings see L.T. Sargent's Contemporary Political Ideologies, Rev. Ed. (1972), Ch. 4.

incapable of implementation, and possibly incomprehensible to large

numbers of people in our nation and the rest of the world unless the

educational systems provide for maximum dissemination of democratic

methods and principles, and opportunities for individual development

in order to insure implementation of those methods and principles.

In other words, democracy as a sociopolitical institution and a form

of government is not possible unless there are enough people in the

citizenry to support and operate such a system. This is clear if the

elements of a democratic political and governmental system are considered.

As presented by Sargent (1972, p. 67) they are:

1. Citizen involvement in political decision making
2. Some degree of equality among citizens
3. Some degree of liberty or freedom granted to or
   retained by the citizenry
4. A system of representation
5. An electoral system--majority rule.

White and Lippitt (1960) conducted an extensive survey of

world-wide opinions about the meaning of democracy. They found that:

> At least on the verbal level, there is throughout
> the world an encouraging amount of agreement that democracy
> ought to mean at least four things: *people's rule, freedom,
> responsibility to cooperate, and concern for the individual.*
> (p. 12) (Italics added)

By integrating these two lists we can arrive at the following five

elements central to and partially defining democracy:

1. Rule of, by, and for the people

   a. Majority rule

   b. Involvement in the decision-making process

2. Freedom

3. Responsibility and opportunity to cooperate (participate)

4. A system of representation

5. Concern for the individual.

It is interesting to note that all five of the above aspects of democracy require cognitive development and moral development. The potential success of democracy, or in fact its initiation, will be primarily determined by the ability of the citizens in these areas of human development. Presented in the form of a question the problem becomes: "What level of development is required to initiate, operate, and sustain democracy as a means of social order, governmental control, and general way of life?" A review of the above five criteria makes obvious and ridiculous that infants are incapable of forming and maintaining a democracy. At what point in human development, then, does democracy become a genuine possibility? It would appear that the answer cannot be given in precise terms about a certain point. Obviously, as outlined in the developmental stages of Piaget and Kohlberg, human beings capable of democratic living very gradually, quite slowly, and very unevenly. Democracy itself, then, is a developmental phenomenon. The thesis under discussion here is that this developmental phenomenon called democracy proceeds through a long, complex, and difficult series of stages during which landmark achievements make possible new and higher potential for understanding and participation in the democratic community. And that these capacities are not fully available until adulthood with the development of full formal operational thinking and the development of principles morality--an achievement, by the may, that unfortunately is made by a small minority of our population. If the criteria

for creating and sustaining an optimal or an ideal democratic community are not present until formal operational principled morality, then it logically follows that democracy is inherently a formal operational principled morality phenomenon. This correlativity between the criteria of democracy and the criteria of human development are what constitute the hypothesized isomorphism of principled morality and democracy.

First, the relationship of the individual and society will be established, from which the equivalence of community and democracy will be presented, followed by the nature of the inextricable union of democratic community with moral principles.

Dewey provides an excellent starting point by providing a clear definition of both individual and society in transactional terms. He says (1897, in Archambault, 1964, pp. 429-430):

> In sum, I believe that *the individual* who is to be educated *is a social individual,* and that *society is an organic union of individuals*. If we eliminate the social factor from the child we are left only with an abstraction; if we eliminate the individual factor from society, we are left only with an inert and lifeless mass. (Italics added)

But what is it that creates this transactional bond and identification? Dewey says it is both what people share together and how they share it. He says (1944, p. 4):

> Society not only continues to exist *by* transmission, *by* communication, but it may fairly be said to exist *in* transmission, *in* communication. There is more than a verbal tie between the words common, community, and communication. Men live in a community in virtue of the things which they have in common; and communication is the way in which they come to possess things in common. What they must have in common in order to form a community or society are aims, beliefs, aspirations, knowledge--a common understanding--like-mindedness as the sociologists say.

The individual and society exist together in organic union and in a creative morphogenesis that gives each other meaning. Thus community is established as the natural human condition, and it is based on the shared and the sharing. The next question follows logically: can community as so defined exist generally, i.e., in any form, or does community exist in a particular form? Dewey is explicity on this point. He says (1927, pp. 148-149):

> Regarded as an idea, democracy is not an alternative to other principles of associated life. *It is the idea of community life itself.* It is an ideal in the only intelligible sense of an ideal: namely, the tendency and movement of some thing which exists carried to its final limit, viewed as completed, perfected. Since things do not attain such fulfillment but are in actuality distracted and interfered with, democracy in this sense is not a fact and never will be. But neither in this sense is there or has there ever been anything which is a community in its full measure, a community unalloyed by alien elements. The idea or ideal of a community presents, however, actual phases of associated life as they are freed from restrictive and disturbing elements, and are contemplated as having attained their limit of development...Only when we start from a community as a fact, grasp the fact in thought so as to clarify and enhance its constituent elements, can we reach an idea of democracy take on a veridical and directive meaning only when they are construed as marks and traits of an association which realizes the defining characteristics of a community. (Italics added)

Dewey roots the ideas and ideals of community and democracy in the functional and practical of life, and not in the visionary dreams of a utopia. The developmental nature of community as a democracy is clearly expressed by Dewey in the above passage. All that he describes in terms of overcoming the "restrictive and disturbing elements" is what has been described earlier as the slow process of cognitive and moral development necessary to "reach an idea of democracy which is not utopian." The "veridical and directive meaning" of the idea of democracy must be

interpreted, he says, in terms of "the traits of an association which realizes the defining characteristics of a community." Relating this to the five criteria for the definition of a democracy presented earlier, and to the level and stage descriptions given in the previous chapter for Level III, and Stages 5 and 6 reveals the congruence of associated living, social contract, constitutional democracy, respect for individual personality, and the settlement of competing claims through the principles of distributive justice.

One of the hallmarks of true community in democratic terms, especially in a pluralistic democracy, is the acceptance and respect accorded diversity and uncertainty. Again Dewey and Kohlberg are in agreement at the highest conceptualized levels of development. Dewey (1916, Ch. VI) describes four stages of logical thought that follow a developmental sequence such as Piaget's and Kohlberg's stages. The fourth stage in Dewey's sequence is characterized by the seeking of inference rather than proof, by aiming "at pushing out the frontiers of knowledge" and seeking to go "from the known to the unknown." (p. 210) Uncertainty, ambiguity, contingency, and exploration are actively sought. These are the characteristics described by Piaget as identifying the stage of formal operations and the scientific mind, which are shown by both Selman and Kohlberg (as described and cited in Chapter IV) to be prerequisites for principled morality. These are described by Piaget, Kohlberg, Dewey, Harvey, et al, and many others as precisely the characteristics not found in the concrete-thinking, security-seeking, rule-oriented personalities that define those at lower levels of human development. Dewey uses an interesting

term to describe the person with the type of logical thought at the most advanced stage--for such a person, Dewey says (p. 214): "The observable world is a democracy." What he means in context is that the more advanced mind sees the alternatives, options, uncertainties, and diversities as representatives of potentially equal value until inquiry is brought to bear on the situation. Through reflection, discussion, and exploration value and meaning are established, but not in terms of truth, or fact, or rules--but in terms of warranted assertions, inference, and flexible principles. And it is these characteristics and methods that define and explicate the principled moral person who seeks to build a community founded on rational reflection, social contract, and distributive justice. The Level III person seeks a social order created by man with functional laws, moral principles, and a dynamic form of community that seeks to remedy injustice by remaking the laws and the principles to serve the best interests of people. For the Level III person, as Dewey says, "The observable world is a democracy." As Dewey says (1944, p. 87):

> A democracy is more than a form of government; it is primarily a mode of associated living, of conjoint communicated experience. The extension in space of the number of individuals who participate in an interest so that each has to refer his own action to that of others, and to consider the action of others to give point and direction to his own, is equivalent to the breaking down of those barriers of class, race, and national territory which kept men from perceiving the full import of their activity.

Does this mean that all forms of diversity are welcome and necessary for community *qua* democracy to exist? Obviously such a condition would be absurd. Certain forms of diversity are inherently

destructive to community and to life itself. Any rational person would agree that Hitler, Charles Manson, the Boston Strangler, those who advocate offensive violence for selfish interests, and other kinds of people whose pathologies, inadequacies, or deprivations make it impossible for them to constructively participate in community must somehow be restrained, excluded or controlled. One of the criteria by which a community can be evaluated, however, as being truly democratic, truly a community, and truly of principled morality is the manner and rationale by which such cases are handled. One cannot justifiably claim to build a democratic community by the application of nondemocratic principles to its establishment, development, or protection. For the use of nondemocratic methods negates the very essence of the principles allegedly being protected. Dewey (1948, 1960) provides for this problem with his conceptualization of responsibility and punishment as deriving from principled justice and a forward-looking view of punishment and accountability. Piaget (1932), likewise, sees punishment in terms of only the protection of society's self-interest and the education and development of the individual. Kohlberg's level III principled morality rejects all notions of retributive justice, including expiatory and restitutive, and builds the notions of responsibility, justice, and accountability in terms of distributive justice, equality, and equity.

An interim recapitulation of the argument thus far shows first, that society and the individual were conceptualized as existing in transactional terms and as forming the basis of community, communication, and shared interests. Community was then defined

in terms of democracy. Dewey equates democracy and community, maintaining that democracy is the very idea of community itself. Such a conceptualization was presented as necessarily going beyond the toleration of diversity and absolute truth to respect for diversity, the welcoming and seeking of inference rather than truth, and the tolerance of ambiguity. Even the methods of treatment of destructive and pathological diversity were shown to be a measure of the quality of democratic community, and that humanitarian, principled, and just treatment of such cases clearly identifies such a community.

Additional support for the isomorphism of democracy and principled morality can be demonstrated by an examination of the conceptualizations of individual-society relationships at the various Kohlberg levels. Level I, on the basis of empirical findings, is shown to be primarily an idiographic orientation with no understanding of the individual as part of a social order, and with moral judgments made from the standpoint of an independent actor. The egocentrism of this orientation negates the possibility of understanding a socio-moral order that is the basis of democracy in the terms thus far described. Level II is a nomothetic orientation with recognition of the individual, but as a servant of and inferior to the social system. Both of these orientations are unbalanced in the sense that either the individual or society is made superior to the other. The unbalanced relationship in both cases has the effect of vitiating the balanced transactional relationship between individual and society that makes democracy a system based on conjoint living, equality of class, race, and other distinguishing and differentiating character-

istics.

Level I morality is an operational mode of living based on an organismic egocentrism that will not even permit the moral agent to recognize that there is another point of view than his own, or that if there is it is unimportant, not really different, or inferior. The Level I person is truly incapable of being a fully participating member of a community, of comprehending the meaning of community, or cognitively or otherwise being able to utilize justice structures other than expiatory. The most that can be expected from a Level I moral agent is the dim shadow of community and social order that comes from knowing that there is a concept of morality slightly higher than one's own that is preferred, as revealed by the research of Kohlberg (1969, 1971b, 1972, 1973a, 1973b), Kohlberg and Turiel (1971), Turiel (1966, 1969, 1973), Blatt and Kohlberg (1971), and especially Rest (1971) and Rest, Turiel, and Kohlberg (1969). The rule-oriented and law-obeying Level I person is developmentally a long way from being a fully participating, deeply involved, and profoundly committed member of a democratic community. The idiographic egocentrism of the Level I person is antithetical to both democracy and community in the mature and deep sense of those terms.

Although an enormous qualitative progression above Level I, the moral orientation of Level II is still profoundly inadequate as a basis for democracy. The major problems incapable of resolution with Level II morality are the most central defining issues of true democracy, viz., human and civil rights, the just balance of the rights of the individual vis-a-vis the society, the acceptance of

diversity and healthy rebellion, the orientation to renewal, and the positive and primary recognition of the legal and moral right of individual life. The fusion of role and personality characteristic of this level of development make true democracy impossible. The application of justice in a democracy frequently requires the differentiation of person and role. One of the most serious obstacles to the creation and implementation of democracy at Level II is the orientation to tradition, fixity of law, maintenance of the system, orientation to rigidly applied rules (rather than principles), and the objective superiority given to society. The justice structure of Level II is oriented to quantitative "balance-the scales" solutions to legal and moral conflicts. And, furthermore, the moral order and the legal order are not sufficiently differentiated to render justice to the principled violator of an unjust law with a legitimate cause. Martin Luther King's Level III nonviolent protest against the unjust laws of segregation put him in the Alabama jail, where he was strongly condemned by his Level II clergymen brethern in April of 1963.[6] Level II is incapable of providing a solid, durable, or just basis for

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[6]Dr. King's eloquent response to the eight Alabama clergymen is available from the Fellowship of Reconciliation, Box 271, Nyack, N.Y. It is reprinted from the June 1963 Liberation. King's statement is one of the most exemplary Stage 6 analyses of the difference between an unjust law versus a just law and the moral obligation of the individual to nonviolently, and with love, resist, protest, and break the law with willingness to accept the penalty of the society for so doing. It clearly shows the differentiation between law and morality. The rhetoric of Stage 6 comes alive in this truly magnificent and historic statement. The morality and law perspective of the clergymen is equally elucidating of the Stage 4 orientation.

democracy and community in the sense described earlier by John Dewey.
In a Level II society the incomplete mutation of democracy is far from
what Dewey described as "the idea of community life itself." The
Level II concept of democracy is an instrument to the preservation of
the status quo, which is anathema to the dynamic concept of Dewey's
Level III concept of democracy which must always involve the recon-
struction of the social order. Preservation of the status quo means
remaining with the present which is so firmly rooted in the past.
It is a generally accepted idea in biology, cultural anthropology,
history, physics, and many other areas of human knowledge that to stand
still is to move backwards. Life is inherently dynamic and always in
process--to stand still is ultimately to perish.

If the case presented so far is accepted, which is not taken
for granted here, but merely rested for the time being, it remains to
positively support the idea that Level III principled morality is
inherently democratic. The point cannot be gained by default. The
primary support for viewing principled morality, as defined by Kohlberg,
as democratic in nature rests on a number of defining characteristics
of that level. First, the conceptualization of the relationship
between the individual and society is clearly on democratic grounds.
Society is not granted objective existence, nor is it superior to the
individual. It is, rather, seen as the instrument created by the
natural social tendencies of man to protect the rights of individuals
and to maximize opportunity for full participation in the society.
Participation is one of the most important aspects of democracy. On
this point Dewey says: (1937, in Ratner, 1939, p. 400):

> The keynote of democracy as a way of life may be
> expressed, it seems to me, as the necessity for
> the participation of every mature human being
> in formation of the values that regulate the
> living of men together which is necessary from
> the standpoint of both the general and social
> welfare and the full development of human beings
> as individuals.

The social contract view of law and morality characteristic

of Stage 5 builds the moral order on the basis of universal and equal

participation in the decision-making process. And participation is

further stimulated by virture of the *law-making* perspective and the

perceived right of the people to reconvene whenever necessary to change

the laws that were agreed upon and accepted as binding. The law is

based not on tradition, or authority, or on objective existence--the

law is made by man, for man, and to be changed by man when it is

revealed to be unjust.

In another statement Dewey (1932, pp. 364-367; in Ratner 1939,

p. 775) brings together his ideas on reflective morality, inquiry,

experimentalism, and democracy in the following statement that is

clearly support for the Level III position:

> To assume the existence of final and unquestionable
> knowledge upon which we can fall back in order to settle
> automatically every moral problem involves commitment to
> a dogmatic theory of morals. The alternative method may
> be called experimental. It implies that reflective
> morality demands observation of particular situations,
> rather than fixed adherence to *a priori* principle; that
> free inquiry and freedom of publication and discussion
> must be encouraged and not merely grudgingly tolerated;
> that opportunity at different times and places must be
> given for trying different measures so that their effects
> may be capable of observation and of comparison with
> one another. *It is, in short the method of democracy,*
> of a positive toleration which amounts to sympathetic
> regard for the intelligence and personality of others,

even if they hold views opposed to ours, and of
scientific inquiry into facts and testing of
ideas. (Italics added)

Once again democracy and principled morality can be seen as isomorphic.

Another characteristic of Level III morality consistent with democracy is the perceived differentiation of role and person. Status, respect, privilege, and power are not seen as inhering in a role per se, nor are they arbitrarily accorded to the occupant of a valued role. There is a clear differentiation of role and person at Level III. This difference is precisely the difference between Level II's establishment-oriented view of justice, that stands in the way of the administration of justice on a principled moral basis; and Level III's view of justice which is based on the democratic application of moral principles in its evaluation of the law and the person.

Concluding this section on the justification of the premise that principled morality and democracy are isomorphic, the claim is based on the fact that the cognitive and moral requirements and orientations of Level III, in contrast with those of Levels I and II, are the only ones that permit full participation in the sociopolitical and governmental processes that constitute democracy from that point of view; and more importantly permit participation, involvement, and commitment in the organic union of individuals that Dewey identifies as society. Level III morality is the moral order that makes possible the full human, civil, and individual rights that constitute the foundation for true democracy. One generally cannot make truly just decisions, grant equality of membership to all, and clearly differ-entiate law and morality from any other perspective than one that

bases its morality on universal ethical principles, recognition of the value of human life for its own sake, and a reconstructive view of individual, society, law and morality. Only principled morality meets these criteria--and only democracy fulfills them. Democracy and principled morality are isomorphic and are, in fact, two ways of looking at the same fundamental human process.

B. Democracy as Process for Values/Moral Development

Kohlberg's research contains ample support for the idea that people exposed to democratic processes and environments over a long period of time tend to develop faster and farther through the structural-developmental stages he proposes in his theory. Piaget strongly advocates the use of what he calls "active methods" of education in order to facilitate cognitive development. Throughout his writings he has emphasized that children allowed to experiment, explore, and question--actively experience the world with their own minds and bodies--progress through the cognitive-developmental stages more easily and to qualitatively higher levels. One of the keystones of Dewey's educational philosophy and moral philosophy is *experience*. The concept of experience for Dewey had a breadth and depth that goes beyond the present discussion, but it is sufficiently congruent with Piaget's concept of "active" and Kohlberg's emphasis on "role-taking" for the terms to be based in a foundation that could be called the *democratic process of development and learning*.

Kohlberg (1973a) maintains that the democratic system is conducive to moral development because it helps the individual to

experience justice, which he sees as the core of morality. But the extent of democracy and the developmental value go beyond morality to many other forms of development, especially cognitive development. But then, cognitive development has already been shown to be intimately related and prior to moral development. What is possible in a democratic system that gives impetus to development is the opportunity for role-taking, responsibility, and active involvement.

The relationship between the structural aspect of democracy as principled morality, already discussed, and the functional aspect of democracy as process for values/moral development is most likely intimately related to the equilibration process, operational thinking and reversibility. In fact, Kohlberg and Piaget (Kohlberg, 1972b, p. 194) argue that what logic is in the cognitive domain, justice is in the social domain. The meaning behind this statement is based on the recognition of both logic and justice as ideal forms of equilibrium. Consequently, the ability to perform operations, that is, reversible thinking, is the basis for both logic and morality. This kind of cognitive-moral ability comes about through the *construction* of knowledge and justice through the long process of development characterized by continuous transaction with the environment and one's own thoughts.

In Chapter IV it was pointed out that Piaget attributes development to the following four factors: (1) biogenetic emergence, (2) experience, (3) social transaction, and (4) equilibration. The last three of these factors play an enormous role in the social world in which the child lives, and it is from this standpoint the structure

of the environment and the transactions with adults and peers are going to be profoundly influenced by whether the atmosphere is democratic or not.

In order to develop this point two sets of rubrics can be related. First, in Chapter II of this dissertation the four approaches to values/moral education so frequently mentioned were presented as being:

1. The Traditional-Authoritarian (Absolute Nomothetic)

2. The Cultural-Relativistic (Relative Nomothetic)

3. The Absolute-Relativistic (Idiographic)

4. The Organismic-Structural-Developmental (Transactional Universal)

Second, in a series of well-known research studies conducted by Lewin, Lippitt, and White (1939) and White and Lippitt (1960) three terms were introduced into the literature. The terms from these classic studies have become a rich part of the vocabulary of the behavioral sciences and are: *autocracy, democracy,* and *laissez-faire*. The words themselves are not original, but the use of them to describe social relationships and leadership styles in the behavioral sciences was an innovation. White and Lippit (1960, p. 12) differentiate the terms as follows:

> "Autocracy" here implies a high degree of control by the leader without much freedom by the members or participation by them in group decisions, while both "democracy" and "laissez-faire" imply a low degree of control by the leader. "Democracy" is distinguished from "laissez-faire," however, by the fact that in it the leader is very active in stimulating group discussion and group decisions, while in laissez-faire he plays a passive, hands-off role.

These two sets of rubrics will now be combined with a some-
what broader application of the Lewin, Lippitt, and White terms to
describe three generalized approaches to life, education, and social-
ization. The four approaches to values/moral education will be re-
grouped by combining the two nomothetic approaches. The integration
of the classifications result in the following classification and
application:[7]

1. *Nomothetic education:* Characterized by an *autocratic*

    approach to the *transmission* of the knowledge

    and values of the *environment* (culture, society,

    family, school, etc.)

2. *Idiographic education:* Characterized by a *laissez-*

    faire approach to the personal *artifaction*[8] of

    knowledge and values from the idiosyncracies

    of one's own mind and experience.

3. *Transactional education:* Characterized by a *democratic*

    approach to the *construction* of knowledge and

    values through the transaction between the person

    and the environment.

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[7]As with many typologies the categories exist only in theory, but
serve as useful organizers. Whether or not these three exist in pure
form is irrelevant to the discussion. They can be used to communicate
a point even though they can be viewed as straw men. Also, there is a
high degree of correspondence between the integration of my three
categories with Lewin, Lippitt, and Whites and the model proposed by
Getzels et al used as an example of *transactional* and discussed and
cited in Section A of Chapter IV.

[8]*Artifaction* is a coined word, an adaptation of *artifact*, serving to
distinguish between the constructive process stressed by Piaget and

Now considering Piaget's factors of development vis-a-vis this last model for three types of education and socialization processes may be helpful in demonstrating the developmental power of democracy. First, Piaget's factor of biogenetic influence is of relatively little importance with respect to this issue. There are complex relationships between socioeconomic status, socialization patterns, and genetic factors that undoubtedly come into play in the determination of the type of experience a child experiences. But these are certainly beyond the scope of this dissertation and will not be discussed here.

The factor of *experience* viewed from the perspective of the three types of education, however, is a highly significant and relevant issue. The two types of experience considered important for development by Piaget are *physical experience* and *logicomathematical experience*, especially the latter. Both, however, depend enormously on the opportunities available in the environment for cognitive, affective, and social stimulation. Nomothetic education would be most likely to characterize a home and school that places great emphasis on unilateral relationships between adults and children, with the children playing a passive, accepting, complying role. The adults would be most likely to carefully manipulate the environment in order to expose the child to only those influences that would be seen as conducive to the indoctrination of the adult ideas and

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...and the more relativistic and existential process that characterizes the idiographic orientation. There is no pejorative connotation implied.

values. This form of education is generally characterized by rigidity, programmed life schedules, and reliance on authority. The nomothetic model of education, whether in the home or in the school, is generally counterproductive for principled moral development and democratic orientation to life. A major factor considered so important by Kohlberg, the opportunity for role-taking, is conspicuously absent in this type of environment. The research of Harvey, Hunt, and Schroder (1961), Roeach (1960, 1968, 1973), Adorno et al (1950), and White and Lippitt (1960) and many others supports the claims of Piaget and Kohlberg that autocratic-nomothetic education is not conducive to the development of principled morality and democratic outlooks.

The type of experience provided by idiographic education is likewise not supportive of the personal-social development that leads to the flexible kind of self-discipline required for democratic living and principled morality. Considerable light is shed on this issue by the White and Lippitt report (Ch. 8). They open the chapter with the following statement:

> Persons who assume that children are little untamed animals, that they never want to do anything but play, and that the more freedom they have the better they like it, may find surprising the fact that in these experiments the boys showed a strong preference for democracy with its controls as compared with laissez-faire. In laissez-faire they had more nearly complete freedom (outwardly, at least) than in democracy; yet they liked democracy much better. Why? The probable answers are more complex than might at first be supposed, and they are of interest partly because they have a bearing on certain "progressive" theories of child rearing and education.

The authors offered as the main reason for the rejection of the laissez-faire approach that it provided no adult initiative or leadership, which made it impossible for the children to experience a sense of accomplishment that can come from appropriate guidance and constructive feedback. The lack of goals, clear limits, and time perspectives contributed to an unclear picture of the child's environment, his relation to it, and the potentialities present in the situation. All of this, according to White and Lippitt, resulted in a reduced clearness of cognitive structure. The overly permissive atmosphere of the laissez-faire approach produced not democracy, social cohesion, and community, but anarchy. A sense of belonginess and group unity has been shown by both Kohlberg and Piaget to be of extreme importance for cognitive and moral development. Not, and this must be empahsized, in the sense that the group provides norms, pressure, and demand for conformity, but in the sense that social unity and participation provides the required transactions and role-taking so essential for construction of knowledge and simulation of moral development. A further danger of the laissez-faire approach is that it frequently leads, as White and Lippitt, and many others, have pointed out, to a desire for tyranny to fill the vacuum created by anarchy. On this issue of adult leadership Piaget is quick to point out, as he does in many places (e.g. in 1972) that the active method of education calls for the teacher to be active also. But not as a tyrant, dispenser of truth, or authority. But rather as a stimulator, organizor, mentor, and highly competent democratic group leader.

Clearly Piaget is in favor of an active child immersed in a rich environment with plenty of opportunity for exercise, physical experience, and logicomathematical experience. But the environment must be appropriate for his developmental level, and this requires a knowledgable and competent professional parent and educator who can wisely arrange the environment so that it is rich with aliment for development but not stifling or chaotic. Likewise Kohlberg would specify an environment tremendously rich in opportunity for interchange, role-taking, and discussion on values/moral issues, and a rich variety of situations involving conflict and decision that can induce the appropriate amount of disequilibrium necessary for stimulation of development. But Kohlberg would certainly not interpret this to mean that the child should be "thrown to the winds" or completely left to his own devices.

The primary factor of experience as exemplified by the democratic atmosphere is the opportunity for role-taking, the exposure to and experiencing of justice and morality that will lead him above and beyond the egocentrism and expiatory attitudes of Level I orientations, and the active involvement in the daily democratic operation in the home and school. The child needs to be, to the limit of his ability at each developmental stage, included in the decision-making process of the home and the school. One of the most important features of a democratic atmosphere is the absence of fear in the free give-and-take of dialectic. A child free to express his opinions and ask questions, regardless of how stupid, childish, or preposterous they may appear to the adults, is able to explore the breadth and

depth of his developing mind without fear, embarrassment, or shame.
Consequently, he can have an opportunity to test his beliefs and
values against the experience and diversity of his world. It is this
atmosphere and this process that characterizes democratic living
that enhances cognitive and moral development. As White and Lippitt
point out, the advantage of democracy is that it provides an optimal
amount of freedom and order in a balanced combination allowing the
child to explore and investigate without being hurt, suffering ridicule,
or destruction of his self concept. Transactional education, utilizing
democratic methods, builds community and stimulates moral development.

The social transaction (transmission) factor of development
has really been largely covered in the preceding discussion. The
only comments still required are to specifically make clear that the
home, school, and community are enormously influential in the life of
a child from a developmental standpoint because they control the kinds
of experience available, prohibited, and encouraged. And, of great
importance for cognitive and moral development, they make available
the total spectrum of communication, including language, which is
one of the most essential elements of the developmental process.
Language can be an instrument of nomothetic-autocracy, of idiographic-
laissez-faire, or of transactional-democracy.

White and Lippitt (1960, pp. 244-245) summarize the results
of their research on autocracy, laissez-faire, and democracy by
listing the six psychological conditions their evidence suggests
"that fosters the development and maintenance of a democratic social
system...." They are:

1. Open-mindedness to influence from others.
2. Self-acceptance or self-confidence in initating one's own contributions and expressing one's needs.
3. Realism about the objective nature of task situations and interpersonal situations.
4. Freedom from status-mindedness.
5. Fairness about equality of rights and opportunities.
6. Friendliness and good will in attitudes and actions towards others.

It seems likely that these traits or values tend to foster democracy and that democracy, in turn, tends to foster their development in the individual.

In another section they offer some additional comments relevant to the discussion here (p. 222):

One implication is obvious: to develop conscientious individuals who are able to make democracy harmonious, workable, and efficient, parents (and teachers) need to combine warmth of affection with consistency of discipline. Needlessly severe discipline, antidemocratic in its essence, is also antidemocratic in its effects.

Another implication is less obvious: since conscientious individuals are especially likely to be repelled by the confusion and the cross-purposes of anarchy, they are especially in need of making a clear distinction between orderly autocracy and orderly democracy. If this distinction is not clear in their minds they may be especially ready to accept a dictator who insists that his own rule is the only alternative to anarchy.

The six psychological conditions offered in the first quotation support and augment the conditions offered by Piaget and Kohlberg, and reach the same conclusion that these foster democracy and democracy fosters development.

The final quotation adds the affective side of the picture and reveals the necessity for the delicate balance so difficult to achieve in the form of love and constructive discipline. With this delicate balance the six factors presented by White and Lippitt, and the active involvement called for by Piaget, and the role-taking

and justice experience required by Kohlberg all present an integrated
picture of the community-democracy isomorphism of Dewey and the democ-
racy-principled morality isomorphism proposed earlier. It is no small
wonder that democracy and development are both so difficult to achieve.
It is no small wonder that such a large percentage of our adult pop-
ulation never manages to cross over the giant qualitative hurdle from
the conventional morality of Level II to the principled morality of
Level III. White and Lippitt touch on the problem in the final
quotation when they point out the problem of the conscientious indi-
vidual. It is the Stage 4 (Kohlberg) conscientious law and order
morality that is especially troublesome with this regard, and it is
this stage that is the model stage in our culture. This leaves the
problem of taking maximum advantage of the developmental powers of
democratic procedures to lead more people to the democratic structure
of principled morality. The inherent relationship between this
function and structure should provide us with some clues to augment
this process. The next section will attempt to explore some of the
specific criteria that may help point the way for values development
education.

C. Criteria for Principled Morality

By attempting to identify the criteria for the capacity and
use of principled morality the criteria for democracy are also being
explored. The isomorphism between democracy and principled morality
has already been discussed and supported. The creation of and con-
tinued life of a democracy necessarily depend on some substantial

percentage of the population of such a community being identifiable

as rational moral human beings. Since democracy has also been shown

to be the process by which principled morality is ultimately developed,

and that transactional education, characterized by a democratic

approach to the construction of knowledge and values, is the educational

method by which that development is facilitated, then the criteria

presented here also relate to the goals of education.

Another complex set of issues is raised by these criteria,

as well as by the issues presented earlier in this chapter, viz., the

relationship of these criteria to the views and models of man presented

in Chapter III which were held to be so essential to the formulation

of both a theory for values/moral education and for a theory for

education in general. In Chapter III, for example, the claim was made

that the behavioristic view of man is basically incompatible with a

democratic system of education. By placing the four views of man

(behaviorism, psychoanalysis, existentialism, and organismic psychology)

alongside the three types of education just presented (nomothetic,

idiographic, and transactional) an interesting relationship may be

observed. Behaviorism and classical psychoanalysis roughly, but

closely, correspond to nomothetic education; existential psychology

and idiographic education bear a similar correspondence; and there

is an even clearer relationship of correspondence between organismic

psychology (in the broad sense defined in Chapter III) and trans-

actional education.

The importance of this set of issues vis-a-vis the criteria

for principled morality is partly in view of the fact that these
criteria would have completely different meanings, or be considered
meaningless, from the perspective of the other views of man, and
would, consequently, have greatly different implications for education.
Of even greater importance from the standpoint of this dissertation
and a theory for values development education is the claim that the
organismic-structural-developmental approach to values/moral education
is compatible with, supportive of, and educationally more defensible
for a pluralistic democratic society. The point is illustrated by
the program for education created out of the radical behaviorism of
B. F. Skinner in contrast to the program for education being proposed
from the base of organismic psychology in general, and organismic-
structural-developmental psychology in particular. Behavior modifi-
cation involves the utilization of controlling techniques to shape
the person according to the values of the controller, without the
knowledge of or informed consent of the passive learner in order to
achieve the goals desired by the controller. This procedure involves
the exploitation of and continued extension of dependency and depen-
dency-inducing procedures, most of which are easily identifiable as
Level I and Level II in nature. The behavioristic view of man,
especially as revealed in those behavioristic theories tied to the
reinforcement-reward paradigm, builds its entire model of man and
education on the basis of primarily Level I developmental charac-
teristics. To build this kind of a view of man is to deny that man
is capable of the very capacities that are claimed by the organismic-
structural-developmental psychologists, philosophers, and educators

to be necessary for and isomorphic with democracy, community, and principled morality. The basis for morality and the criteria for its maximum development will be explored with these points in mind.

Justice as the Core of Morality

Before exploring the criteria for principled morality a few words will be said about Kohlberg's claim that justice is the core of morality (Kohlberg, 1971b, p. 62ff; 1972b, p. 196, 208, 221; 1973a). In one statement he says (1971b, pp. 62-63):

> Our major and most controversial claim is that the only "true" (stage 6) moral principle is justice. We shall claim that human welfare is always the core of morality, but that, at the principled level, welfare considerations subsumed under the heading "justice" take whenever there is conflict between the two, and that there is no strong "principle" for deciding between the various alternatives other than justice.

In view of all that has preceded this discussion in this dissertation, justice becomes supremely important for education, and more specifically for values development education. The primacy of justice integrates the claim that community and democracy are isomorphic with the claim that democracy and principled morality are isomorphic.

In a more straightforward statement Kohlberg (1973a) simply says:

> The core of morality is a sense of justice. Moral action is action to promote justice.

Earlier (Chapter IV) Kohlberg's definition of a *moral principle* (1973a) was given as "a principle for resolving competing claims for action." Kohlberg's position on the relationship of justice and morality is very much consistent with some of the positions in the

complex theory of justice offered by John Rawls (1971)[9]. In an

introductory section where Rawls presents the main idea of justice as

fairness, he distinguishes two meanings of justice both of which are

consistent with what Kohlberg said above. Rawls (p. 10) says:

> In these preliminary remarks I have distinguished
> the concept of justice as meaning a proper balance
> between competing claims from a conception of justice
> as a set of related principles for identifying the
> relevant considerations which determine this balance.

It would seem that Kohlberg means by justice both of the notions

offered in this statement by Rawls. Kohlberg sees justice as a proper

balance between competing claims, and further sees morality in the

form of moral principles as the system for creating this balance.

The relationship between justice and principled morality

is further elaborated by Charles Fried (1970, Chap. IV). Fried intro-

duces the principle of morality as follows:

> First, the domain in which the concept of morality
> (as I now define it) applies is the domain of all ends
> and actions which impinge in any significant way on other
> persons....

> Second, the principle which specifies the concept
> of morality is an expression of the concepts of equality,
> of impartiality, and of regard for all persons as ends
> in themselves.

The second paragraph is an excellent exemplar of Stage 6 as defined

by Kohlberg, especially insofar as it emphasizes the need to recog-

nize persons as ends rather than as means. Considering Fried's

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[9]Rawls' theory of justice is a landmark contribution to the philosophy
and psychology of this important subject. Its depth and complexity
are such that to attempt to summarize or include it here would be a
serious error. Kohlberg (1972b, 1973a) considers Rawls' theory an
exemplar of Stage 6. Rawls (460n, 461n) recognizes Kohlberg's

definition and specification of the nature of morality as stated above,
the following statement clearly shows the similarity of his view and
Kohlberg's view that the core of morality is justice. Fried says
(p. 45):

> In this and the succeeding section I shall argue
> for the proposition that *the principle of morality is
> the most general principle applicable to ends and actions
> having significant impingements on other persons.* (Italics
> added)

Fried then ties the entire argument together with an analysis of
reciprocity and the principle of morality. He defines reciprocity in
the following terms (p. 52):

> Reciprocity is the recognition of the other
> participants in a transaction as entities having ends and
> rational ends. That recognition is not just a formality,
> a brief concession preceding the working out of the ele-
> ments of the end itself. The recognition of this quality--
> I shall call it human personality, or personality--must
> be part of the structure of the end itself. The recog-
> nition of personality must, therefore, be part of the
> ordering principle of the end.

He proceeds from this definition of reciprocity to the following
statement of the principles of morality (p. 53):

> The principle of morality...is the *general*
> principle expressive of the *general* recognition of
> human personality (defined as the characteristic
> of having rational ends) in any dealing with other
> persons. To summarize, the principle of morality
> accomplishes this recognition by requiring that
> the most general principle of transactions place
> all persons in a position of parity. In this way
> the equality of all persons at the most general
> level is the starting point for any more partic-
> ular principle. Why does this equality or impar-
> tiality of the principle of morality express
> recognition of personality? My thesis is: all

...contribution, some similarities to his work, and some differences.

persons are alike in respect to the characteristic
that they conceive of themselves as entities having
ends and rational ends; and any essential preference
between persons entails a violation of reciprocity
in the direction of using the other person as an
instrument.

Fried's logic and analysis clearly bring together morality,

personality, principle, equality, and justice in such a way as to make

clear the meaning of Kohlberg's Level III, especially Stage 6, princi-

pled morality. The congruence of Piaget, Dewey, and Fried with regard

to the issues mentioned above as well as the nature of human intel-

ligence in terms of reversible operational thought and its relation-

ship to morality and justice is a valuable contribution to values

development theory.[10]

Barnett and Otis (1961, p. 163), describing the ideas of

Elijah Jordan[11] on this same subject point out that:

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[10]Two points of interest: Fried, Kohlberg, and Rawls are all Harvard
professors. Fried and Rawls have exchanged views—in fact, Fried
recognizes Rawls as one of many important sources of his ideas. As
noted in footnote 9, Rawls and Kohlberg have transacted. In fact,
"Philosopher 3" used by Kohlberg in various places (e.g. 1972b) as an
example of Stage 6 is a student of Rawls! But neither Fried nor
Kohlberg have mentioned each other in the literature. A combined
effort of the three scholars could possibly produce some interesting
contribution to the advancement of the subject. Second, Fried (pp.
244, 246, 247) recognizes the work of Piaget and acknowledges Piaget
as a valuable source. As a final comment, Fried's book, An Anatomy
of Values is a true scholarly contribution to the field of values/
moral development.

[11]Elijah Jordan (1875-1953). Education: The Philosophy of Elijah
Jordan. Jordan's writings on values/moral issues are eloquent,
penetrating, and highly congruent with the O-S-D framework in many
respects.

> *Justice is simply the principle of wholeness or
> completion of things, i.e., the perfect realization of
> all human ends in harmonious accord with one another is
> perfect justice.* Justice is not a special act or pro-
> nouncement encountered in a court of law, but the qual-
> itative synthesis of all acts. That is, the act which
> may be adjudged a just act is one which fits into the
> scheme of things in such a way as to sustain the whole
> of action. Justice, then is a type of relational
> complex to be maintained and developed so that the
> whole of life activities may go on; it is not something
> "got" or "had" by the individual. Realizing one's
> interest, in which a particular is the point of reference
> for the act, and realizing justice, in which the whole
> is the point of reference for the act, are polar oppo-
> sites for Jordan.

This eloquent statement seems to synthesize much of what has been

identified as an organismic-structural-developmental approach to

values/moral education. The emphasis on the "wholeness" of things

represented by justice as a principle that brings harmony among people

is precisely what values/moral education is all about. The organismic-

structural-developmental conceptual framework attempts to integrate

the richly developed notions of community, democracy, and morality by

Dewey; the idea that values development consists in ethical inter-

vention for stimulation of normal organismic development consists in

ethical intervention for stimulation of normal organismic development

to principled morality; and the "wholeness" of intellect and emotion

contained in the developmental theory of Piaget. The principles

expounded in the statement by Barnett and Otis are incapable of

fruition without the kind of intellectual and moral development that

characterizes the principled morality described by Kohlberg. As

Nathanson says of Dewey's idea of democracy (Nathanson, 1951, p. 90):

> ...we have to see democracy itself, not merely as a

political mechanism, but as an overarching moral ideal. What does it take to see democracy this way? It takes individual human beings with the intellectual and moral capabilities to reconstruct our social order so that it not only moves in the direction of democracy but also contains institutions, especially schools, that are capable of perpetuating and renewing the individuals, the schools, and the community as a whole. Some of those individual abilities and personality characteristics are revealed by the theories and philosophies used to build the organismic-structural-developmental conceptual framework, especially the criteria of high-level human development implicit and explicit in the formal operational mode of thought and principled morality.

Having established the theses related to the relationships among the concepts of justice, morality, principles, community, personality, and democracy, the task remains to begin to establish some of the criteria neceaasry to achieve the democratic way of life embodied in the operationalization of principled morality. The list that follows is an initial attempt to identify some of these criteria. Certainly there may be more, but the ones presented here are definitely basic. The following six factors may be thought of as personality characteristics prerequisite for and commensurate with principled morality, or as the constituents of a *just moral personality*:

1. Formal operational intelligence

2. Perspectivism

3. Habitual reflective tendencies

4. Sensitivity

5. Responsibility

6. Homonomy.

1. Formal Operational Intelligence

Intelligence, as defined by Piaget as the capacity for adaptation, is the most essential and basic component of the moral person. Piaget's conceptualization of this factor will not be developed here inasmuch as it has been substantially presented in Table 4.1D, Chapter IV. What makes this level of intelligence necessary for principled morality is primarily the ability for full reversible thinking, the ability to subordinate reality to possibility, the maximum capacity for conservation of abstract transformations (which form the basis of the primary human relationships of friendship, love, trust, respect, etc.), and the complex nature of propositional reasoning. In order to fully transform the conceptualization of formal operational intelligence from the realm of scientific thinking to the realm of human relationships it must be realized that the two realms are basically the same. Scientific thinking and procedure is not necessarily a different type of thinking or intelligence from the nonscientific, it is primarily a different application.

Since intelligence has been so fully treated in Piagetian terms, the application of intelligence to the values/moral realm will be extended by a consideration of the role of intelligence in the moral life as seen by Elijah Jordan. In his explanation of "the good Life" Jordan explores the meaning of "Integrity or Personal

Wholeness" (1949, Chap. XIV).[12] Intelligence is one of the factors

he includes, of which he says: (p. 147):

> ...we shall use the terms as the capacity of comprehension,
> and we mean by this, not merely its power to identify
> objects or its power of synthesis over objects, but also,
> as a variation of the latter, its power to integrate the
> personal capacities and to express in full the whole meaning
> of personality. It is the intelligence alone, or what is
> better called the intellect, that enables the person to
> see himself in terms of all his capacities, his self. It
> is the same intellect that enables the person to *see
> himself whole*, to make himself whole through and by means
> of the intelligence itself. Personality in this connec-
> tion is nothing more than the organic unity of all the
> physical and the mental functions, as effected and main-
> tained by intelligence.

Man's intellect, therefore, integrates him, makes him whole, makes it

possible for him to be far more than merely intelligent, far more than

clever, and far more than a biological mechanism. Jordan's concep-

tualization takes man beyond the passive, receptive, reactive being of

the behaviorists; beyond the irrational slave of instinctual drives

as conceived by the psychoanalysts; and beyond the collection of

quantitative traits, IQ's and factors of the psychometricians. It

is the fully-developed intelligence that makes it possible for man to

understand himself and his role in a world of many selves with whom he

must transact in some rational manner that enables him and others to

not only survive, but enables them to transcend the otherwise over-

whelming exigencies and potentially destructive forces of his exis-

tential situation. To be a person, in Jordan's terms, is to be

fully intelligent--but not in the instrumental terms of intelligence

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[12]The page referencing here is to the abridged version of Jordan's
The Good Life, edited and abridged by F. O. Wiggins.

as a commodity or a possession--but in the sense of being fully moral.

This is elucidated by Jordan's view of the moral situation and the ability of the intellect in moral terms to transform the situation (pp. 147-148):

> A moral situation, then, for the moral compre-
> hension, or intelligence, is a situation in which all
> the capacities of the person are fused and concentrated
> upon an object with respect to the good. This pulling
> myself together and directing myself to some end is
> my *act*, by which I mean to alter not only the world
> but also myself and to state the altered world and the
> altered self as a new systhesis....
>
> The intelligent act is, then, the process of
> objectification of mind, the process in which mind
> comes to terms with the structures of nature and takes
> them over as the instruments in which it embodies
> itself....

This view of the transforming and synthetic aspect of intelligence applied to moral situations is quite similar to what Dewey means in his experiential view of growth as the only moral end. Dewey abhors many of the traditional dichotomies that are so common in philosophy and psychology, for he feels that they fragment and distort life and man's attempt to understand life. One of the dichotomies so rejected is the means-ends division. He prefers to talk in terms of ends-in-view (1966). On growth he makes two relevant statements. First, he says (1960, p. 172):

> Our personal identity is found in the thread of continuous
> development which binds together these changes. In the
> strictest sense, it is impossible for the self to stand
> still; it is becoming, and becoming for the better or the
> worse. It is in the *quality* of becoming that virtue
> resides. We set up this and that end to be reached, but
> *the* end is growth itself. To make an end a final goal
> is but to arrest growth.

In a related statement (1948, p. 177) he says:

> The end is no longer a terminus or limit to be reached.
> It is the active process of transforming the existent
> situation. Not perfection as a final goal, but the
> ever-enduring process of perfecting, maturing, refining
> is the aim in living. Honesty, industry, temperance,
> justice, like health, wealth and learning, are not
> goods to be possessed as they would be if they expressed
> fixed ends to be attained. They are directions of
> change in the quality of experience. *Growth itself
> is the only moral "end."* (Italics added)

The integration of the ideas of Jordan and Dewey result in

a view of the moral person as one characterized by the intellectual

power to comprehend the moral issues of the self and the world, the

ability to apply this power to transform the self and the situation

with justice, and the recognition of the need for continuous growth.

Jordan (pp. 148-149) makes it clear that intelligence is

inadequate for the ultimate solution to moral problems because of

the necessity to transcend the knowable. Man is restricted by the

limitations of consciousness, which create the problem of making it

possible for man to comprehend the *problems* of God, freedom, immor-

tality, etc., in terms of intelligible and *possible solutions,* but

without any assurance that man will necessarily find solutions to

these problems. Many answers to moral problems must come then

through the corporate mind through the development of culture.

In spite of these problems and limitations, however, Jordan concludes

(pp. 149-150):

> Intelligence, comprehension, the act in which
> thought integrates itself, knowing in its universal
> forms, is therefore the highest active function of
> the individual. But an active function or capacity
> is what is meant by virtue. Intelligence is then, as
> knowledge, the summation of all virtue and the totality

of his obligation for the human individual. The first
and highest, and at the last, the only, obligation of
the individual is the obligation to know.

The consequence of both Jordan's and Dewey's conceptualizations of the role of intelligence for growth, development, and principled morality is that educators have a *moral obligation*, especially if they wish to establish and perpetuate democracy, to maximize to the fullest capacity of the school the opportunity for every child to achieve formal operational intelligence. From this discussion it is hoped that the significance of this aspect of human development can be seen to be one of the most important of the criteria for principled morality.

2. Perspectivism

The ability to differentiate *self* from *not-self* is absolutely essential for virtually any kind of morality, but that it must be fully developed in order to permit principled morality. The latter requires extremely advanced ability to put oneself in the place of the other, to see and feel his situation and comprehend the limitations and consequences inherent in the moral conflict at issue. Without advanced perspectivism, distributive justice and equity are simply impossible. The subject of perspectivism, however, has been extensively developed in Section C of Chapter IV and will not be repeated here.

Morality, Kohlberg and Piaget repeatedly tell us, requires role-taking, which, of course, is perspectivism in action. Kohlberg defines role-taking in the following terms (1969, p. 349):

> ...social cognition always involves *role-taking*, i.e.,
> awareness that the other is in some way like the self,
> and that the other knows or is responsive to the self
> in a system of complementary expectations. Accordingly
> developmental changes in the social self reflect par-
> allel changes in conceptions of the social world.

Selman (1973a) prefers to call this process *social perspective taking*.

According to Selman it involves (1) the ability of the child to under-

stand his own view of the world, (2) to understand that the other has

a view also and that it is different, and (3) the coordination of these

two different views as they relate to his own. But, of course, at

Level III this would also require the ability to impartially stand

aside mentally from the process and perceive both self and other and

the relationship from the perspective of an impartial spectator.

Distributive justice and equity are based on this ability. To better

understand social perspective taking and its developmental progression,

the reader should refer to Table Set 4.3 in Chapter IV and follow the

presentation of Selman's stages in conjunction with Kohlberg's stages.

Kohlberg (1973c, pp. 632-633) makes an important distinction

between role-taking in the logical realm versus role-taking in the moral

realm:

> Our theory assumes that new moral structures presuppose
> new logical structures, i.e., that a new logical stage
> (or substage) is a necessary but not sufficient condition
> for a new moral stage. It assumes, however, that moral
> judgments (or moral equilibrium) involves two related
> processes or conditions absent in the logical domain.
> First, moral judgments involve role-taking, taking the
> point of view of others conceived as *subjects* and
> coordinating those points of view, whereas logic involves
> only coordinating points of view upon objects. Second,
> equilibrated moral judgments involve principles of
> justice or fairness. A moral situation in disequilibrium
> is one in which there are unresolved conflicting claims.

This point essentially brings together (1) why it is necessary to view perspectivism as a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for principled morality as somewhat apart from intelligence itself; (2) Selman's view of role-taking as "social perspective taking" requiring the complex coordination of subjective points of view; and (3) the reason for the coordination of Piaget's stages of structural logic with Kohlberg's stages of structural values in order to relate logic and morality in equilibrated justice structures to form principled morality.

One of the important ancillary aspects of this complex set of relationships is brought out by Piaget (1932, p. 397):

> The morality of the autonomous conscience does not tend to subject each personality to rules that have a common content: it simply obliges individuals to "place" themselves in reciprocal relationship with each other *without letting the laws of perspective resultant upon this reciprocity destroy their individual points of view*. (Italics added)

The point made here is more critical than may be first apparent. At Level II unequilibrated justice structures can result in a perspectivism that can lead to conformity and the concomitant reduction of self-identity, which in turn is partly responsible for the fusion of role and personality that can be responsible for a great deal of injustice to individuals in the name of preservation of the social order.[13] Cattell's concept of *the law of coercion to the biosocial*

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[13]Some interesting light can be shed on this subject by a study of the processes of opinion change as proposed by Kelman (1961). Kelman provides a very useful model that distinguishes *compliance, identification,* and *internalization.* There is a great deal of correspondence between these three processes as he describes them and Kohlberg's Level I, Level II, and Level III, respectively.

mean (see Hall and Lindzey, 1970, pp. 399-400) is closely related.
Cattell denotes the tendency for environmental influences to limit the
expression of genetic potentialities and diversities through the
action of socialization agents when they systematically repress, reject,
or shape behavior to conform to the narrow limits of a particular
family, society, or culture. In her classic Patterns of Culture (1934),
Ruth Benedict extensively describes the environmental "coercion" that
strongly shapes the members of the society to the "biosocial mean" so
vividly manifested in the Dobu, Kwakiutl, and Zuni cultures. The same
phenomenon is described by Riesman, *et al* (1953) in The Lonely Crowd
as "the other-directed man."

In the values/moral area of life this can be an especially
limiting and growth-retarding factor if not carefully anticipated by
parents and educators. The use of *values clarification* techniques,
for example, especially when used with teenagers can produce results
exactly opposite of those intended by the designers and users of the
prescribed methodology. Teenagers, as can be understood through
Kohlberg's Stage orientation, are notoriously susceptible to peer
group pressures that can powerfully induce coercion to the mean.
Values/moral educators need to be on the alert for this phenomenon
and consider its implications for facilitating development to prin-
cipled morality. The unequilibrated perspectivism of Level II can
become a negative element in development if not carefully handled.

In conclusion, it cannot be emphasized too strongly that
one of the most essential elements of a values/moral education
program must be every conceivable opportunity for the students to

engage in "social perspective taking." It is fundamental to cognitive development, it is essential for moral development, it is a major prerequisite for principled morality, and it is one of the keystones of democratic living. Egocentrism is the mortal enemy of democracy and principled morality.

3. Habitual Reflective Tendencies

Formal operational intelligence provides the capacity to reflect; perspectivism makes it mutual and reversible. But neither guarantees that the individual will reflect. Intelligent and perspectivistic people can be impulsive, lazy, and even apathetic. They also can be none of these but merely be busy, harried, and overworked. Our society and its incredible tempo are not conducive to reflection, but more conducive to packaged solutions, panaceas, and preprogrammed answers provided by those alleged to be experts. Principled morality and democracy demand reflection as habitual characteristics of concerned, involved, and participating citizens. The mass media can be friend or enemy on this source. For many it provides instant solutions and packaged prescriptions. For others it is the medium of enlarged awareness of the issues.

The tendency to critically evaluate all sides of the issue, to search and seek, to explore, and to reflect must become part of the life-style of the democratic person. Level III principled morality is dependent upon this approach to moral problems. The schools must do all possible to encourage, model, and require that students think and reflect.

4. Sensitivity

Sensitivity is related to perspectivism, but goes far beyond it. One could be coldly perspectivistic, in a sense, and be able to truly "see" the other person's point of view, understand it, and comprehend its significance, and yet be unable to "feel" that point of view. It could be argued that by definition perspectivism would be impossible without the unified knowing and feeling. It serves a useful purpose, however, to make the distinction between what is being viewed here as a more cognitively oriented perspectivism and a more affectively oriented sensitivity, knowing full well that in the holistic organism they are really substantially the same.

Sensitivity, as presented here, not only includes the more affective orientation, but also a conative aspect. The sensitive person not only knows something about the other person's situation, not only can feel it, but also wants to do something about it, to take some action in order to render justice. Sensitivity, then is an emphatic response that goes beyond and transcends perspectivism and understanding.

Vulnerability is another important factor that can be included in the total picture of sensitivity with regard to the moral aspects of human relationships. The fully developed human being living in a democratic community based on principled morality and true concern for the welfare of other human beings necessitates the willingness and ability to make oneself vulnerable. Otherwise much moral action would be impossible. The principled moral person must be willing to take risks in order to give viability to his principles.

It is one thing to know about an injustice, feel the injustice, and intelligently create a solution--but it is something else entirely to be willing to make oneself vulnerable enough to want to ameliorate the injustice in spite of the potential threat to one's own position, or possibly one's own life. This by no means implies that all principled people must be saints, heroes, or altruists. It only means that within reasonable limits, which admittedly are hard to define, the moral person's sensitivity should be able to carry him or her beyond understanding and feeling to positive action.

The sensitivity aspect of morality can also be described in terms of the distinction between *reaction* and *response,* two concepts that are also related to perspectivism. Reaction may be conceptualized as being an approach to another person based on one's own perspective, needs, and desires--an action or view based on one's own values rather than the values of the other. Response, on the other hand, may be conceptualized as the positive manifestation of a true understanding of and sensitivity to the other person from his or her perspective and situation, rather than from the position of the self. The distinction can be thought of in terms of the difference, mentioned earlier in this dissertation, between *judging* and *evaluating.* Reacting is judging, accepting or rejecting on the basis of one's own needs, interests, or welfare. Responding is sensitively evaluating the other person's situation in order to offer constructive assistance, if it is desired, or sensitively withholding assistance if it is not desired or needed. Reacting is exemplified by the authoritarian parent who knows best beyond any shadow of a doubt, and listens to the child

without hearing, pronounces judgment, and issues commands. Responding

is best exemplified by all that is embodied in Carl Rogers' client

centered therapy. The sensitivity of the principled moral person is

characterized by a high ability to respond to other human beings with

a deep sense of empathic justice.

Langer (1970, p. 768), in the conclusion of his summary of

Werner's theory says:

> A holistic conception implies that mental acts are feelings
> as well as judgments. This means that they are both con-
> ceptual and motivated acts: the stuff of mental life
> and development is evaluative conduct.

In another source Langer (1969a, p. 36) points out that the equilibra-

tion process concerns not only the cognitive perception of disequili-

brium, but must also involve the feeling of disequilibrium. The

person, in order to change, must both *know* and *feel* a discrepancy.

Oliver and Bane (1971, Ch. 9) describe a program for moral

education that includes Kohlberg's theory and other valuable guides

to curriculum construction in this area. Their program was almost

exclusively built on the intellectual aspects of moral dilemmas and

public values issues. The program has been evaluated as highly

successful. The authors explicitely raise the objection, however,

that the element most conspicuously absent in the program and the

students' reactions was a personal sensitivity for the issues. They

say (p. 261): "One could argue...that we should be more concerned

with moral sensitivity than with moral reasoning."

Skolnick and Skolnick (1971, Introduction) describe in

detail the tragically blunting effects on the sensitivity of children

by the misuse of power by socializing agents, especially parents.
The physical punishment, verbal abuse, psychological torture, and
authoritarian controls heaped on children leads to insensitivity,
hostility, and pathology. The widespread nature of these problems
apparently goes beyond what most people realize. Kohlberg's findings
on the relatively small number of people who achieve principled
morality are most likely in part a product of this problem.

Socialization agents, especially parents and teachers, pro-
bably do an enormous injustice to children and seriously inhibit and
retard their moral development and sensitivity by forcing children to
report on the alleged misbehaviors of their peers, spy on other child-
ren, and instrumentally use children to achieve classroom and home
management by giving power and status to children beyond the cognitive
and moral capacity of the children to handle such techniques. Powerful
support for this thesis is contained in Piaget's The Moral Judgment
of the Child (1932), in which he reveals how much parental behavior
violates the values/moral orientations of children in destructive
ways. Piaget remarks (p. 191):

> ...the majority of parents are poor psychologists and
> give their children the most questionable of moral
> trainings. It is perhaps in this domain that one
> realizes most keenly *how immoral it can be to believe*
> *too much in morality, and how much more precious is*
> *a little humanity than all the rules in the world.*
> (Italics added)

To this Piaget adds the following observations and comments about
parents (p. 192):

> ...the "average parent" is like an unintelligent govern-
> ment that is content to accumulate laws in spite of the

contradictions and the ever-increasing mental confusion
which this accumulation leads to; the pleasure taken in
inflicting punishments; the pleasure taken in using
authority, and the sort of sadism which one sees so
often in perfectly respectable folk, whose motto is that
"the child's will must be broken," or that he must be
"made to feel a stronger will than his."

Such a form of education leads to that perpetual
state of tension which is the appanage of so many fam-
ilies, and which the parents responsible for it attri-
bute, needless to say, to the inborn wickedness of the
child and to original sin. But frequent and legitimate
in many respects as is the child's revolt against such
methods, he is nevertheless inwardly defeated in the
majority of cases.

It is difficult to say how one becomes a sensitive person.

It may be speculated that it is partly the result of growing up in an

atmosphere in which sensitivity is given along with love and interest,

and in which children are rewarded and not punished for showing their

feelings, caring about all forms of life, and being tender. Sensi-

tivity is probably also deeply rooted in experiencing pain and depri-

vation to some extent, and in being allowed to express these aspects

of life. The socialization process in our society for boys is very

effective in preventing sensitivity, and should be able to give us

some clues as to what not to do and what to do. Certainly the growing

child needs to be exposed to those situations that provide opportun-

ities for deep involvement with another person or with an animal,

but a kind of involvement that has some potential risks included,

where there can be some pain and loss. Most likely sensitivity is

one of the most difficult human characteristics to try to develop in

others, for it requires that you move along the very fine line that

divides overprotection from recklessness. The objective is to let

children experience hurt, pain, rejection, and loss up to the point, but not beyond, where it causes them to draw completely into themselves, withdraw from others, and be unwilling to take future risks and expose themselves to hurt and loss.

Some effort must be made to more certainly establish the factors responsible for sensitivity if principled morality, genuine community, and enduring democracy are ever to replace the dissension, moral chaos, war, and immense social injustice that characterizes life in the latter part of the twentieth century.

5. Responsibility

The kind of responsibility that leads to and is involved in principled morality is characterized by the willingness and ability to make irreversible significant life decisions that involve the welfare of oneself and/or the welfare of others, along with the willingness to fully accept the consequences of those decisions, and be able to help the other person cope with those consequences.

This kind of ability and willingness most likely grows out of a long history of ever-increasing exposure to responsibility in kinds and amounts appropriate to the developmental stages. There may be other significant factors and generators of moral responsibility at this high level, e.g., major crises. It is highly unlikely, however, that responsibility of this type can be produced by commanding, preaching, and coercion. Dewey's experiential approach so consistent with Piaget's active approach applies here if it applies any place. The developmental levels and stages provide clues to parents and

teachers as to the readiness and need for the proper amounts and types
of responsibility that can be experienced by children through active
involvement in the management and concern for the classroom, school,
home, and community. They should have every appropriate opportunity
for participating in the decision-making process that controls their
lives.

Piaget (1966, Ch. VI) elaborates on the close and active
relationships that pertain among the factors of intellectual develop-
ment, active reciprocity among young children in order to develop
logic and justice structures, and the intimate connection between
operation and *co-operation*. He says (p. 164):

> ...it is precisely by a constant interchange of thought
> with others that we are able to decentralise ourselves...
> to coordinate internally relations deriving from different
> viewpoints. In particular, it is very difficult to see
> how concepts could conserve their permanent meanings
> and their definitions were it not for co-operation; the
> very reversibility of thought is thus bound up with a
> collective conservation without which individual thought
> would have only an infinitely more restricted mobility
> at its disposal.
>
> ...logical thought is necessarily social, the fact
> remains that the laws of grouping constitute general forms
> of equilibrium which express both the equilibrium of
> inter-individual interaction and that of the operations
> of which every socialized individual is capable when he
> reasons internally in terms of his most personal and
> original ideas. To say that an individual arrives at
> logic only through co-operation thus simply amounts to as-
> serting that the equilibrium of his operations is
> dependent on *an infinite capacity for interaction with
> other people and therefore on a complete reciprocity.*
> (Italics added)

Piaget shows that intellectual development and social development are
inextricably bound together and develop in transaction with each
other. Cooperation helps develop operational thought. Cooperation

involves responsibility. One cannot assume responsibility for anything or anyone without mentally and socially cooperating. Thus social perspective taking (role-taking), cooperation, and intellectual operations all combine in the active experiential program to *construct* intelligence, develop perspectivism, and build the foundations of democratic community that can lead to principles morality and the fulfillment of democracy.

The development of responsibility is one of the major aspects of personality that is closely connected with the two factors of development postulated by Piaget as being very much under the control of the environment, viz., experience and social transaction (transmission). How important the culture can be is demonstrated by the retardation of individuation and personality by restrictive cultures that provide little variety in the way of experience or encouragement for personality development. Werner (1948, p. 458) cites the study done by Sherman and Henry (1933) among the "hollow folk" from the hollows among the mountains of rural Virginia. Few individual differences among children were found below the age of five, and the most primitive areas even children as old as twelve showed minimal differentiation in personality patterns. The reason offered is the lack of participation in the activities and goals of the community life among these people. As Werner says (p. 467):

> The normal growth of personality is not an autistic, self-dependent process, but part of that whole development culminating in a balanced polarity of ego and world. Personality normally grows and becomes differentiated as against the growth and differentiation of the social world.

Piaget (1966, p. 159) emphasizes the role of language in this same

respect. Language transactions with adults aid tremendously in the

building up of meanings and values that enable social development

and the extension of the capacity for responsible behavior.

The development of responsible moral capacity is more likely

to occur in what Moore and Anderson (in Goslin, 1969, Ch. 10) call

"clarifying educational environments." They present four principles

for designing such educational environments (p. 585):

> 1. *Perspectives Principle.* One environment is more
> conducive to learning than another if it both permits and
> facilitates the taking of more perspectives toward what-
> ever is to be learned.
>
> 2. *Autotelic Principle.* One environment is more
> conducive to learning than another if the activities
> carried on within it are more autotelic.
>
> 3. *Productive Principle.* One environment is more
> conducive to learning than another if what is to be
> learned within it is more productive.
>
> 4. *Personalization Principle.* One environment
> is more conducive to learning than another if it:
> (1) is more responsive to the learner's activities,
> and (2) permits and facilitates the learner's taking
> a more reflexive view of himself as a learner.

These four principles convey the kind of learning environment that is

congruent with all that has been prescribed by Piaget, Dewey, Kohlberg,

and the other organismic-structural-developmentalists for all factors

of development. But their importance for the criteria for the devel-

opment of principled morality is especially pertinent, and hopefully

obvious. Regarding, in particular, the development of responsibility,

principles two and three are especially relevant. In an autotelic

environment, where the learner is experiencing every possibility,

within the reasonableness of safety to self and others, for self-directing activities that make it possible for him to construct knowledge and moral structures, responsibility is most likely to become an important and natural part of the child's developing personality. This is especially true if what he is doing is genuinely productive (not in the sense of the Protestant work ethic or the instrumental values of the marketplace or some traditional-authoritarian orientation that views work per se as inherently noble) in the Piagetian sense of generating physical and logicomathematical cognitive structures. Moore and Anderson's four principles clearly enunciate the meaning of transactional education conducive to the many factors of principles morality, but responsibility has been highlighted here.

A natural outgrowth of a transactional education environment is the opportunity for exploration, challenge, healthy and normal rebellion, questioning, and openness. Unfortunately, in traditional educational environments (nomothetic) these behaviors are punished, prevented, and penalized. The price for exploration and moral challenge in many of our schools is too high to permit Level I and Level II youth to indulge themselves in this kind of behavior that can be so developmentally productive, especially for awareness of an assumption of responsibility. The consequences of this condition is to generate an enormous amount of passivity, compliance, and conformity on the part of the majority, a great deal of pathological behavior on the part of those left out of the reward system of the schools, and an incredible amount of money, time, attention, reward, and

honor given to the very small minority who become stars in the achievement-oriented moral atmosphere of the school that worships primarily athletic superstars and secondarily academic medal winners. The end result of this kind of system hurts the winners, the faceless masses of the majority, and the antisocial losers. A deep and thorough analysis of the third level of morality defined by Kohlberg and of the deeper meaning of democracy provided by Dewey and others reveals that none of the patterns described is likely to develop the kinds of citizens that can actively and meaningfully build a democratic society that is truly built on the principles of distributive justice.

6. Homonomy

If there is one concept that can coordinate, integrate, and epitomize all that is meant by principled morality, democracy, community, personality, and development it is Andras Angyal's concept of *homonomy*. It will only be briefly developed here in order to show its importance for the criteria of principled morality. Its importance for values development education in general deserves a more complete treatment.[14] [15]

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[14]Angyal's two major statements on this subject are contained in Foundations for a Science of Personality (1941) and Neurosis and Treatment: A Holistic Theory (1965). The former is his first attempt to develop the concept; the latter is a fuller and revised attempt in response to misunderstandings to the first one. It should not go unmentioned that Angyal was truly a brilliant theoretician, experienced medical and psychiatric practitioner, and extremely articulate and eloquent writer. He is also one of the least recognized organismic psychologists. His professional association at Brandeis University with the better known Kurt Goldstein and the most well known of all,

Briefly, Angyal saw life "as a process of self-expansion," and essentially "a self-governing process." The trend toward self-expansion he saw as most characterized by what he called *autonomy*. By this term he meant the tendency to move away from the control of the environment (*heteronomy*) that characterizes the early part of the organism's life, during which it is completely helpless and dependent. One of his definitions of autonomy is (1941, pp. 32-33):

> By this is meant that the organism does not represent merely an inactive point, in which various causal chains intersect--as mechanistic philosophy assumes--but is, to a large extent, a *self-governing* entity. The biological process is not a resultant of external forces, but is, in part, governed by specifically biological endogenous factors. The organism itself is, to a large extent, the cause of its functions, that is, it is endowed with spontaneity. We could also say that the organism possesses a certain degree of "freedom," if we use the term in the sense of Spinoza and call free that which acts according to its own inherent nature, according to its intrinsic law, and not under the compulsion of exogenous forces.

Angyal recognized that the organism lives in a world in which much of life is under the control of heteronomous forces, by which he meant "governed from outside" versus "governed from inside" for autonomous (1941, p. 33n).

All organismic processes, and life itself, involved the tension between these two forces. Angyal conceptualizes the rela-

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...Abraham Maslow, constitutes part of the major core of organismic and humanistic psychology.

[15]Citations will not be used much here inasmuch as all the terms, concepts, and quotations are readily in the two sources cited in footnote 14.

tionship as follows (1965, p. 6):

> Every organismic process can be characterized by the
> ratio $a : h$, where a stands for autonomy, h for heter-
> onomy. The values of both a and h must be greater than
> zero, but they vary for different processes. The ratio
> varies from individual to individual and from species
> to species....
>
> The organismic process shows a definite trend
> toward an increase of the relative value of a in the
> $a : h$ ratio, i.e., *a trend toward an increase of*
> *autonomy*. This trend has no fixed objective but only
> a general direction. At each stage of the biological
> process the tendency is toward a situation marked by
> a greater degree of autonomy that the preceding
> situation, even if this tendency cannot always be
> carried through.

Now Angyal recognized that there were apparent contradictions in this

trend, and that life was not characterized by a steady linear trend

from heteronomy to autonomy. His description of the actual events in

this trend are very similar to the uneven, sometimes discontinuous,

and occasionally unequilibrated type of development characterized by

Werner's orthogenetic principle and Piaget's equilibration process.

Angyal described regressive episodes in which there was a reduction

of autonomy and a corresponding increase in heteronomy. He saw this

phenomenon of "regression" as falling into two categories: "passive

setback and strategic retreat." (1965, p. 7) Passive setback

described those situations in life where a person was definitely

moving in the direction of autonomy, was strongly attempting to

maximize his self-governing processes, but was outdone by stronger

heteronomous forces. A man swimming upstream against a current

stronger than he could overcome is an example used by Angyal. The

swimmer is, from his perspective with respect to the stream, moving

in a positive direction; but the stream was actually carrying him backward with respect to the bank of the river.

"Strategic retreat" similarly involved a generally "progressive direction" on the part of the organism, but involves the backing off of a situation involving untenable or overwhelming circumstances, in which the organism regresses to a more primitive mode of operation to gather forces for a later advance.

Angyal points out (1941, p. 38) that if the a (autonomy) part of the formula is reduced to zero we have a purely physical process, rather than a true organismic transactional process. Reducing the h (heteronomy) component to zero produces a completely "free" entity exempt from all external influence (e.g. the concept of the soul, which he offers to illustrate this situation). He says: "In the realm of organismic happenings we find neither entirely heteronomous nor entirely autonomous processes. There is life only where in the ration $a : h$ the values of both a and h are positive and greater than zero."(1941, p. 38)

The usefulness of Angyal's formula and conceptualization is enhanced by the realistic flexibility he ascribes to it to describe the vicissitudes of life. As he makes clear (1941, p. 39): "... we find *marked variations in the importance of autonomous and heteronomous determinations in...lives*." Angyal summarizes the concept and its description of the life of the organism as follows (1941,

pp. 41-42):[16]

> If one now considers the organismic total process with regard to the *a:h* ratio, one discovers *a definite trend in the organismic total process toward an increase of the relative value of a in this ratio, that is, a trend toward an increase of autonomy.* This trend does not have a fixed objective but only a general direction. At each stage of the biological process the tendency is toward a situation which is characterized by a greater degree of autonomy than the preceding situation. The organism does not always succeed in progressing toward greater autonomy, and under heteronomous environmental influences may even be thrown back to a stage of diminished autonomy. This, however, occurs through external compulsion and not by the activity of the organism.

Now the utility of Angyal's conceptualization, terms, and formula is great and could be productively applied to a wide variety of situations. It could be used, for example, to evaluate and describe the four approaches to values/moral education, the three types of education described earlier, and educational environments, classroom management methods, and many other facets of curriculum and instruction. The purpose here, though, is not to do this but to have the autonomy-heteronomy distinction as conceptualized by Angyal to serve as the preamble and foundation for his concept of *homonomy,* on which the discussion will now focus.

Angyal recognized that the individual striving for self-assertion, self-control, mastery of his environment, and freedom from the heteronomous control of the environment was expressing a natural organismic process and direction in life--but that it omitted

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[16]The redundancy here is purposeful in order to clearly communicate the meaning of the terms, the application of the principle and formula, and to convey the feeling Angyal intends.

much of some of the most important aspects of existence that are distinctly human, viz., the need for and tendency to involve oneself in other people, the community, and the world in a way that cannot be manifested by or fulfilled by self-determination, self-government, and mastery.

Likewise Angyal recognized that the environment, the external world, does not always nor necessarily represent antagonistic forces that are in opposition to the organism. That much of what exists in and reveals itself to the organism from the environment is nurturant, productive, constructive, and positive. If we view the organism as the victim of the heteronomous forces we have an incomplete, erroneous, and mechanistic conception of man as a passive victim--precisely the view of the behavioristic conceptualization of man founded on the one, and only partial, aspect of man's nature that functions in terms of reward, punishment, and conditioning. On the other hand, if we see the organism as the victim of his instinctual drives, irrational passions, and egoistic needs striving to assert his autonomy in such a way that he is always at war with the external world and his own internal processes, we have the equally unbalanced view of man of the classical psychoanalysts. Autonomy and heteronomy, then, describe and manifest very important aspects of man and life, but only part of the organism and only part of the story. Angyal solved this problem through the concept of *homonomy* which more clearly unites and holistically represents man than many other formulations. The complete picture of man through the three components or aspects of *heteronomy*, *autonomy*, and *homonomy* efficiently and effectively sum-

marize the holistic, transactional, and integrated view of man that

emerges from the organismic-structural-developmental conceptual

framework.

What is homonomy? Angyal defines it within the broader

context of other related issues as follows (1941, pp. 172-173):[17]

> While the trend toward increased autonomy aims at the
> domination of the surroundings, the characteristic
> attitude toward superindividual wholes is rather a
> kind of submerging or subordination of one's individ-
> uality in the service of superindividual goals. In
> this latter trend a person seeks union with larger
> units and wishes to share and participate in something
> which he regards as being greater than his individual
> self. This principle reminds one of the concept of
> Eros, the great uniting principle, except that the Eros
> of the ancient Greeks was thought of as a cosmic force,
> while the concept which we are formulating here refers
> exclusively to personality occurrences. For this
> principle we propose the term *"trend toward homonomy,"*
> that is, a trend to be in harmony with superindividual
> units, the social group, nature, God, ethical world
> order, or whatever the person's formulation of it may
> be. I wish again to emphasize that for the present
> purpose it is entirely immaterial whether such formu-
> lations are founded in reality or whether they are
> illusory. The particular formulation of a given person
> is not of immediate importance in this context. Only
> the fact that a trend toward homonomy is easily dis-
> cernable in everyone's life is important. I do not
> mean by this only that everybody has some moments in
> his life when he thinks of "higher things." If such
> attitudes were only exceptional phenomenon, they would
> be of interest only as *curiosa,* and they would have
> little significance for the study of personality. I
> hope, however, that [these] discussions...show with
> sufficient clarity that the trend toward homonomy
> penetrates the whole realm of human life. Pure man-
> ifestations of this trend may be rare, but in combin-

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[17]The definition of homonomy is presented in the total context of
this long statement of Angyal's partly because its meaning is enhanced
by the manner and picture in which it is embedded. Also, no para-
phrasing of its meaning can do the justice to its richness as the elo-
quence of Angyal's superb and articulate prose.

ation with other trends it is a practically constant
co-determinant of behavior. The trend toward homonomy,
because of its combination with other tendencies, may
be obscured and distorted, but it is my contention that
without it human behavior cannot be understood.

Homonomy as presented above is conceived as a slowly developing aspect, force, and capacity of one's personality that is central to the formation of the holistic human being as a principled moral person. Distributive justice is homonomous morality. Democracy is homonomous community. Principled morality is the integration of justice and personality in democratic community. The ultimate expression of morality, then, is the democratic life of just moral personalities living in a just moral community based on the trend toward homonomy that makes it all possible.

These relationships, and a fuller picture of homonomy, are contained in the following statement of Angyal's (1965, p. 16):

> In the context of the topic of this book, the homonomous
> trend in the so-called higher aspects of human life,
> such as art, is less important than its expression in the
> relationship of one person to another, of husband and
> wife, child and parent, among friends. These relation-
> ships may have all kinds of patterns and qualities, but
> they always extend beyond the individuality of the par-
> ticipants. They clearly show that in the human being
> life is not contained within his individual self; it
> extends into the world and particularly into other
> human beings. *What we call love is a manifestation of*
> *the homonomous trend in the relationships among people,*
> *and in a more general sense the whole concept of homonomy*
> *could be equated with love.* (Italics added)

The above passage moves homonomy clearly into the realm of everyday life, squarely where Angyal intended that it be. And it clearly moves it into the moral realm in both the broad and specific meanings of that concept. Furthermore, homonomy is not something that one

acquires with advanced development, it is both process and product,
function and structure, warp and woof of development--it is both
the developmental process and the structure of principled morality
fully embodied.

It is extremely important to point out that Angyal makes
it clear that the ostensible disparity or antagonism between the auton-
omy-heteronomy dimension and the homonomous trend is only an apparent
conflict. The two trends are seen as two phases or aspects of a more
inclusive trend or process, much in the same way as Piaget sees the
ostensibly opposing trends of assimilation and accommodation as merely
the twin aspects of one unitary process.

The reader is reminded of the connection between Angyal's
concepts of autonomy, heteronomy, and homonomy and the statement of
his quoted earlier in this dissertation (Section A, Chapter IV) about
the individual being part of "a whole of an intermediate order."
(1952, p. 133)

Angyal's ideas also relate to similar ideas of Harvey,
Hunt, and Schroder (1961) and their *conceptual systems theory*. The
fourth and final stage of structural-development in the conceptual
systems, self systems, and cognitive structures of the individual
represents the *stage of interdependence*. Viewing the infant as char-
acterized by *unilateral dependence* (Stage 1); then progressing to
a stage of resistance to external restraints so readily observed in
the typical negativism and ubiquitious "No!"'s of the young child,
a stage they call *negative independence* (Stage 2); followed by a
progression to *conditional dependence and mutuality* (Stage 3) char-

acteristic of older children and youth; and then moving finally to the

stage of *interdependence* (Stage 4)--this theory presents a develop-

mental sequence quite parallel to, congruent with, and structurally

related to both Piaget and Kohlberg's stages.

Of interest here in connection with Angyal's homonomy is

Harvey et al's description of the stage of interdependence (pp. 106

and 194):

> In the fourth stage mutuality and autonomy are
> integrated so that neither interferes with the other and
> yet both are important. We refer to this integration as
> *positive interdependence*. (p. 106)

> Stage IV systems involve the integration of the
> major forms of subject-object relatedness so that
> behavior is no longer primarily determined by either an
> external criterion, by opposition, or by some type of
> dependent relationship. The criterion for behavior is
> maximally abstract, emerging as informational standards.
> *Behavior is neither dependent on external rules or
> other people, nor counterdependent upon these anchors--
> it is maximally interdependent.*

The relationship of these statements to Angyal's homonomy is self-

evident. And the congruence and isomorphism of the stages of Dewey

(logical thought), Piaget (intelligence), Kohlberg (moral development),

Harvey, et al (conceptual systems), and many others mentioned in

throughout this dissertation is self-evident and striking.

One final coordination of ideas will complete the develop-

ment of the full meaning of homonomy and its importance for principled

moral development. Piaget (1968, p. 65) says:

> Personality implies cooperation and personal autonomy.
> It is opposed both to *anomie*, the complete absence of
> rules, and to complete heteronomy, abject submission
> to the constraints imposed from without. In this sense,
> the person and the social relationships he engenders
> and maintain are interdependent.

Piaget further augments his concept of personality by saying (1972, p. 90):

> ...an entire concept of personality could be defined by terming it a reciprocal "rapport."

And finally (1972, pp. 111-112):

> We have stated that the two correlative aspects of personality are independence and reciprocity. In contrast to the individual who has not yet reached the state of "personality," and whose characteristics are to be oblivious of all rules and to center on himself whatever interrelations he has with his physical and social environments, the person is an individual who situates his ego in its true perspective in relation to the ego of others. He inserts it into a system of reciprocity which implies simultaneously an independent discipline, and a basic de-centering of his own activity. The two basic problems of ethical education are, therefore, to assure this de-centering and to build this discipline.

In these statements Piaget summarizes personality and its development in terms of reciprocity of rapport, cooperation, and interdependence. All of these, as he states, define personality and its development in terms of the *transactions* of developing egos in the context of a social system that fosters both individual and social development. But Piaget beautifully summarizes the entire idea and succinctly expresses the meaning behind all these concepts in the following statement (1972, p. 117):

> Mutual respect thus substitutes for the heteronomy characteristic of unilateral respect, an independence necessary to its own functioning and recognizable from the fact that individuals obligated by it participate in the elaboration of the rule that obligates it. Mutual respect is therefore also a source of obligations; however, it engenders a new type of obligations which no longer impose only ready-made rules, strictly speaking, but also the method that creates them. *This method is none other than reciprocity, not only as an exact balancing of good and*

> *bad but as the mutual coordination of points of view*
> *and actions.*

Now the picture is complete and the circle is closed. For in these statements Piaget has brought together principled morality, justice as equity, and the development of personality as an interdependent existence in a democratic community of other interdependent organisms. The full development of the individual is part of the full development of the community--and the full development throughout the community in order to bring about the "mutual coordination of points of view and actions," which organismically and culturally lives in homonomy.

Piaget sees *logic* as equilibration of intelligence. Kohlberg sees *justice* as equilibration of morality. Perhaps *homonomy* is the equilibrated integration, or *metaequilibration* of both logic and morality, of intelligence and justice.

D. Conclusion

This chapter has dealt with three major factors of values development education that derive from the organismic-structural-developmental conceptual framework: (1) that democracy is isomorphic with principled morality; (2) that functional democracy is the process that facilitates moral development; and (3) that there are certain identifiable characteristics, or criteria, that define principled morality. The characteristics/criteria related to (3), viewed as necessary, but neither sufficient nor exhaustive were identified as: (a) formal operational intelligence, (b) perspectivism, (c) habitual reflective tendencies, (d) sensitivity, (e) responsibility

and (f) homonomy.

To conclude and synthesize these elements a very brief discussion of the nature of the moral person will be presented. Rawls (1971, p. 505) says:

> Moral persons are distinguished by two features: first they are capable of having (and are assumed to have) a conception of their good (as expressed by a rational plan of life); and second they are capable of having (and are assumed to acquire) a sense of justice, a normally effective desire to apply and to act upon the principles of justice, at least to a certain minimum degree.

Thus Rawls says two characteristics mark the moral person, viz., a rational plan of life that is a conception of the good; and a sense, of justice with a desire to apply it and act on it. Without too much strain it can be claimed that the first of Rawls' criteria is contained in a systhesis of intelligence, perpsectivism, and habitual reflective tendencies. By a rational plan of life as a conception of the good Rawls must certainly mean the application of fully developed intelligence to the reflection on the nature of human existence, the various perspectives from which that can be viewed, and the continual attempt to examine those issues and reflect on them as a way of continuously building a philosophy by which to live. But, as Rawls rightly points out, this would only be half of the story. An intelligent person of low moral development could likewise reflect on the meaning, nature, and opportunities of life and make use of his knowledge of the weaknesses, passions, and desires of his fellow human beings in order to exploit, enslave, and demean them. The world has suffered much, and continues to suffer much from such as these.

Thus Rawls' second criteria--a sense of justice--is the other necessary condition for the moral person. It seems as though this criteria is met by the augmentation of intelligence, perspectivism, and reflection by the last three criteria presented earlier, viz., sensitivity, responsibility, and homonomy. A person who has fulfilled Rawls' first criteria and has formed a rational plan and conception of the good could not apply them in other than a just manner if he were truly a sensitive human being with a positive and constructive feeling for others and compassion in its best sense. Responsibility, as it was defined earlier, involved not only the ability but the willingness to make the serious, uncertain, and irreversible life decisions that affect the welfare of himself and others. For such a person the desire to apply his principles of justice and to act positively on them would necessarily constitute justice as much as the idea of justice. And if he were truly homonomous in addition, then all of the criteria laid down by Rawls would be fulfilled.

There seems to be a great deal of congruity, therefore, between Rawls' notion of the moral person and the characteristics of the principled moral person in Kohlberg's terms as developed in this and the last chapter.

Another test of the criteria presented here would be to examine the view of the moral person as conceived by Elijah Jordan. Jordan (1949, pp. 93-94) says:

> But the point of special emphasis here is that the moral person is the whole person. There is nothing in the person by nature which he should get rid of. We have said that "morality" implies a person endowed by

nature and culture with *all* the capacities and capabil-
ities which are possible to him and that these capaci-
ties and powers should be cultivated and developed to
the highest point possible to them. The moral person
must be the most intelligent person that it is within
him to become; he should possess the most competent
will that his nature will permit; he should have the
most delicate, sensitive temperament that is possible.
He should be able to think all things, do all things,
feel all things. It is here that many of our traditional
ideas are inadequate or downright false. Some of them
would have morality merely in a brilliant intelligence,
a capacity to know; for some, morality is an active
will and a ready power to act; to still others, the
moral life is a life of feeling with feeling developed
in intensity or quality or both to the highest point.
There is no reason to emphasize one at the expense of
the others. The highest type of moral character is
found in the balanced harmony of all these powers, where
each is developed proportionately with the rest.

But not only are these natural capacities to
be developed to the full and in perfect balance. The
cultural capacities must be developed in the same way
and to the same degree. Finally, the specifically
moral quality will be a synthesis of these natural and
cultural qualities into the most effective harmony of
them that is possible.[18]

One's initial response might be, "What else is there to say?" This is

truly an outstanding summary of the nature of the moral person, or the

rational person, or the principled person--whatever words one chooses

to label the type of human being described. Jordan describes two

general categories of qualities that need to be developed: (1) natural,

and (2) cultural. These seem to correspond to the organismic and en-

vironmental, respectively; and to the autonomous and heteronomous,

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[18]Jordan's full statement should be read in order to appreciate the
thoroughness and sensitivity with which he constructed his model of
the moral person. The statement is cut short here only to keep this
already long treatise from being any longer.

respectively. But the excellence of Jordan's summary is that it goes beyond both of these and holistically integrates them into a conceptualization as close to homonomous as it appears possible.

In his natural qualities he has accounted for (1) the wholeness of the person in the sense of the full development of all his capacities; (2) the maximum development of intelligence; (3) the most competent will; and (4) the most delicate sensitivity. These seem to correspond rather well with the criteria of intelligence, perspectivism, reflection, sensitivity, responsibility, and homonomy. Jordan's notions of intelligence, sensitivity and wholeness would seem to more than cover the intelligence, perspectivism, sensitivity and reflection of our scheme. His notion of will, in conjunction with wholeness, seems to correspond well with our idea of responsibility.

Jordan's cultural qualities viewed within the holistic framework he so strongly emphasizes seems to embody all that is meant by homonomy. The balance, harmony, and synthesis on which he builds his conceptualization presents a fully equilibrated structural presentation of the moral person.

The central theme of this chapter has been to build a bridge from the organismic-structural-developmental framework to its application in a theory for values development education that can be used in educational systems. But two essential criteria are required for that task: (1) that the theory be both philosophically and psychologically integrated and defensible; and (2) that it be congruent with and usable in our pluralistic democratic society. An attempt to satisfy these requirements has been made in this chapter. Teilhard

de Chardin (1965) has identified two critical faults of democracy as
it has been operationalized thus far. These faults he maintains have
"enfeebled and vitiated the democratic vision of the World, one affecting
its personalism, and the other affecting its universality." (p. 25)
What he means is that our version of democracy does not truly
give respect to man's personal integrity; and that by confusing
mass and crowd with totality we have misrepresented the true meaning
of universality. We have encouraged the instrumental use of man as
an object, we have fostered all kinds of provincialisms and other forms
of divisiveness, e.g., nationalism, racism, sexism, and the idealiza-
tion of each little cell of which we are a member, rather than seeing
ourselves in relation to the geniune totality of our entire world and
our entire culture as part of the total culture of all mankind. Conse-
quently, he says, our misunderstanding of democracy "rather than freeing
man has merely emancipated him." He says:

> The resources we enjoy today, the powers and secrets
> of science we have discovered, cannot be absorbed by
> the narrow system of individual and national divisions
> which have so far served the leaders of the world.
> *The age of nations is past. The task before us now,*
> *if we would not perish, is to shake off our ancient*
> *prejudices, and to build the earth.*

Teilhard's vision transcends all the things we strive so hard to talk
about in our schools, and fail so miserably to achieve because of our own
misunderstandings of democracy. The point of the whole idea of a theory
for values development education is to try to light one small candle in
a very dark world that may help point the way to how a real teacher in a
real school can help himself or herself, his or her colleagues, and their
students to try to become *just moral personalities* in and through the

potential for homonomy that is the very life blood of a *just moral community.*

CHAPTER SIX

VALUES DEVELOPMENT AS EDUCATION

The literature is replete with statements from many sectors of our society that express basic dissatisfaction with our schools. That our schools are not satisfactory is both a truism and a significant crisis. If there is any validity to the claims made in Chapter Five, then the dissatisfaction with our educational system becomes a mandate for renewal in order that our society and the world may survive. For if democracy is structurally the form of development that makes true freedom possible, and if democracy is also the functional process that facilitates and maximizes that development, then educators are morally obligated to commit themselves to re-examine our educational system in order to reconstruct education in such a way as to have education maximally serve the interests of freedom rather than serve to retard the development of freedom.

We have much rhetoric. The need is for action. And intelligent action must be based on sound inquiry, the purpose of which is to devise a philosophical and psychological program that is consistent with the nature of the human organism both as an individual and as an "interindividual"--two sides of one human nature. The problem with our present programs is not so much that they are not good or not right, or not effective (although some particular programs would deserve any or all of these criticisms)-- the problem is mainly that they are incomplete, fragmented, and not

coordinated. Our schools are, in large part, the reflection of tradition, the needs of vested interest groups, and a basically uninformed (with respect to education) public. The one potentially unifying element of the confusion and noise is the fact that whatever one's view of education is, whatever one's conceived purpose of education may be, and whatever one's convictions are about the needs of children, they are all related to values. So many of the arguments about education rage on about what should be taught, how it should be taught and by whom it should be taught as though they were all talking about different things. Knowledge, jobs, citizenship, the three R's, skills, arts, humanities, interpersonal skills, and on and on--these are some of the things that form the content and basis of the arguments about education. But is it a matter of one or more of these being the purpose and content of education? Or is it possible that these are primarily issues of *value* that all need to be achieved in some way by the total educational system, which includes the home, the school, the community, and above all the individual learner?

Immediately preceding the title page of a book is the anecdotal dialogue from which comes the title of that book:[1]

"The name of this book is CHILDREN AGAINST SCHOOLS.

What do you think?"

"Children against schools? That's good."

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[1] Children Against Schools, edited by Paul S. Graubard. See bibliography.

"Why?"

"Cause that's just the way it is."

<div align="right">
Kenneth J., 19

East Harlem
</div>

The claim being offered here as the basic reason for children being against schools is that schools are truly against children. Frequently failing to consider the human needs and the developmental processes of young human beings, the values of the school are often incompatible with the values of the children *qua human beings*. The values of infants, children, and youth are *dynamic, transactional, developmental values*--the values of the school are often *static, nomothetic, information values*. The purpose of this chapter is to explore some of these issues and to try to continue to provide information and material for engineering the bridge between people and education, the engineering alluded to so briefly in Chapter V.

Examination of these issues will be done through the following three themes:

A. The school as a values/moral agent

B. Education, curriculum, and values development

C. The school as a *just moral community*.

Themes A. and B. above will constitute the content of this chapter. Because the section on theme C., the just moral community, is important enough to deserve being significantly highlighted, and because it is long enough to deserve a separate chapter, it will be presented in Chapter VII. More than any other place in this dissertation the concepts *values, values/moral,* and *development* are to be interpreted in the broadest possible meanings of those terms.

A. The School as a Values/Moral Agent

The first point that needs to be clarified at the outset on this issue is that the school is a values/moral agent. This is true whether educators want it that way or not; whether parents want it that way or not; or whether it happens by purpose and design or unwittingly without a plan.

There are many who believe that all values are relative, that no one may legitimately stand in judgment of anyone else's values, and consequently, that no person or institution has the right to teach, preach, inculcate, indoctrinate, or foster a particular value system. These people, as well intentioned as they may be, fail to see that this point of view itself is a highly loaded value system that cannot be expressed or operationalized without reflecting itself or directly structuring the school, and thereby doing the very thing its supporters are attempting to eschew. The mere fact that these people would have a school at all reflects, communicates, and directly teaches a particular value system. The selective-rejective criteria they would use to design, equip, staff, and operate the school are all founded on, supportive of, and teach a particular value system. These people may wish to claim that their values do not operate *de jure*, and they may even wish to maintain that they do not operate *de gratia*. But the acid test would be for them to demonstrate and prove that they do not operate *de facto*.

A value-free curriculum is impossible both logically and practically. And even if that were not true, even if such a

thing would be possible it would be undesirable and even dangerous--
dangerous in the sense that it would be counter-productive for
survival. Life is an organismic process of continuous valuing.
At every moment of its existence the human organism is perceiving,
receiving, interpreting, processing the data in conjunction with its
existing cognitive-affective structures, biological structure,
physiological needs, and all other aspects of its holistic existence.
The organism that survives, and even more important, the organism
that operates both effectively and wisely for its own sake and the
sake of others is an organism that must develop the finest valuing
system of which it is capable. Such a proposition includes the
notion that the finest valuing system incorporates at its center
the metavalue aspect that guides its effectiveness and wisdom--this
is the highest of all human functions, namely the integration of the
six factors of maximum development presented in Chapter V (intelligence,
perspectivism, reflection, sensitivity, responsibility, and homonomy),
along with all other factors that represent man's highest capacities.
Call it *rationality*, call it *maximum humanness*, call it *actualization*--
whatever it is called it is that which ultimately makes the organism
maximally human.

Since the human organism is born virtually helpless, nearly
completely dependent, and unable to survive without nurturance and
the essentials for existence, it is absurd to believe that the
organism at birth, which is in reality a human *animal*, can ever
become a human *being* without the four factors Piaget maintains are
necessary for development, viz., maturation, experience, social

transaction, and equilibration. The transition from animal to human being is accomplished through the process we generally call *socialization*, which includes the functions provided by home, school, community, friends, and all factors that determine or contribute to growth and development.

How can any socialization agent perform its socializing role without a value base and without communicating values? How can there be transactions between human beings without those transactions being value-transactions? Obviously socialization, of which education in the technical and formal sense, is the business of transacting in values. Schools exist because of values, deal with values, communicate values, and construct and reconstruct values. To remove values and valuing from schools is to remove schools from existence.

If the above discussion successfully presents the case for the necessary logical nature and practicality of the value-based curriculum, it only hints at the danger aspect. To deal with this issue a specialized use of some terminology will be introduced that will be helpful as a framework and base through the discussions in this chapter. The terms *knowledge* and *wisdom* will be presented as a criteria base.

Knowledge versus Wisdom[2]
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Gardner (1972, p. 107) briefly describes Piaget's distinction

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[2]Apparently Piaget makes a critical and useful distinction between these terms. The source for this information is Howard Gardner's The Quest for Mind, p. 107. Unfortunately, the primary source, Piaget's own development of the distinction is not available in

between knowledge and wisdom:

> Piaget makes a key distinction between
> *wisdom*--which is the end result of an inter-
> action between objective knowledge and personal
> values, and constitutes the particular domain of
> philosophy--and *knowledge,* which requires built-
> in controls and fixed criteria for truth and
> thus belongs to the realm of science.

Piaget makes this distinction, as becomes evident from reading Gardner's complete statement, in connection with an even larger issue that Piaget frequently, and with increasing vigor in recent years, raises (1970a, 1970b, 1970c, 1970d, 1970e, 1970f), viz., the polemical and divisive relationship that exists between science and philosophy, which he feels has been distorted and counterproductive to the advancement of both science and philosophy. In fact, Piaget's *genetic epistemology* is a manifestation of his resolution of the problem in bringing psychology and philosophy together as the most productive way of exploring, understanding, and extending epistemology. Dewey is in great agreement on this same issue, as is most evident when he explains his conceptualization of *naturalistic humanism* in Experience and Nature (1929, pp. 2-3; 6-7; 40) and in "From Absolutism to Experimentalism" (in Ulich, 1954, pp. 625-626). What is revealed by an analysis of both Dewey's and Piaget's positions on this issue is the congruence and isomorphism of naturalistic humanism and genetic epistemology. This is both the origin and manifestation of Piaget's knowledge-wisdom distinction, which can be very useful in

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...English. The writer of this dissertation does not speak or read French, and develops the distinction on the basis of what little Gardner says about it and my own intuitive understanding and elaboration of the concept. The original sources in French are fully cited by Gardner in a footnote on pp. 266-267 (Gardner, 1972).

considering values/moral issues with respect to education, curriculum, evaluation, and community.

Knowledge is the result of inquiry, the objective data obtained through scientifically-controlled exploration based on criteria, consideration of variables, and the seeking of inference rather than proof. More broadly applied, which is necessary for use here, knowledge is what we know as a result of perception, assimilation, accommodation, and the general intellectual processing of the world through the mind. The content of most subject matter is knowledge. Vocabulary developed through transactions with other people in order to arrive at generally accepted meanings that make communication possible is knowledge. In a sense, knowledge is the content of intelligence based on the construction of cognitive structure. But it isn't simply content, it is the factual, cognitive data of the content-structure relationship in our minds. The hyphen is a necessary part of the conceptualization. Knowledge by itself can be applied in any direction, for any means, and without regard for the ends-in-view.

Wisdom is the "product" of the transaction between knowledge and experience in such a way as to create an evaluative synthesis in terms of other knowledge, values, an understanding of the past, comprehension of the present situation, and anticipation of the future. Intentions, consequences, implications, potentialities, and above all, moral issues must be brought to bear against knowledge to *create* wisdom.

The distinction cannot be drawn in terms of knowledge and

wisdom being relatively equivalent to facts and values, respectively.
Knowledge involves values and has no meaning in terms of evaluations
and values bases. And wisdom is not merely values. Obviously one
can apply the criteria used to describe the terms and objectively obtain
knowledge about ice cream, and as a result like ice cream, or value
ice cream. The knowledge-wisdom distinction would not call the
result of this experience wisdom. Wisdom is a much broader and
deeper concept that involves a more holistic application of the
capacities of the human mind to an evaluation of experience,
relationships, and meaning. All that is meant by knowledge incorporated
into the criteria for principled morality (intelligence, perspectivism,
reflection, sensitivity, responsibility, and homonomy) gives
a deeper and richer interpretation of the meaning of wisdom.

Another distinction that was made earlier, between
judging and *evaluating,* is a related issue. One could judge on the
basis of inadequate and distorted knowledge. Now according to the
definition of knowledge given here, this would be somewhat incorrect,
in that knowledge is objectively and scientifically obtained. But
much of what we believe we "know" is in reality only prejudice. But
even if we grant that someone has genuine knowledge in the sense
defined, but has not placed that knowledge in perspective with wisdom,
the most that one can do is judge. If one has integrated that
knowledge, however, in such a way as to have transformed it into
wisdom, then one can truly evaluate rather than merely judge.

Wisdom depends to a great extent on the cognitive and moral
maturity of the individual and the ability of that person to

transcend the value of knowledge itself. The knowledge derived from science and the application of the scientific method combined transactionally, multidimensionally, and holistically with the personal values one constructs through the application of philosophic inquiry creates wisdom. Piaget and Dewey, then intersect on this importatn issue and provide a way of not only advancing understanding, but also provide an excellent conceptual tool to use for evaluating educational elements.

To complete the picture, however, one more component is necessary. Having differentiated knowledge and wisdom, it is now necessary to differentiate *wisdom* from *effectiveness*.

Effectiveness versus Wisdom[3]

Wisdom has been presented in qualitative terms that can be used as the values base or criteria against which to measure the goals, objectives, functions, personnel, and other aspects of the school.

Effectiveness is another qualitative term dealing with the degree to which goals and objectives are accomplished. An effective program is one that accomplishes what it set out to accomplish. An ineffective program is one that fails to accomplish its goals or objectives.

Consequently we can derive a four-cell matrix for evaluating an educational element, as shown below in Figure 6.1:

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[3] The other distinction that could be made here, the distinction between *efficiency* and *effectiveness*, is omitted as unnecessary for the purposes outlined. Only the two qualitative dimensions are being considered.

FIGURE 6.1

Cell Matrix for Evaluating Wisdom and
Effectiveness of Educational Goals

		EFFECTIVE	INEFFECTIVE
WISE		1. Wise goals Accomplished	2. Wise goals Not accomplished
UNWISE		3. Unwise goals Accomplished	4. Unwise goals Not accomplished

The topic under investigation here is the school as a

values/moral agent. One more factor needs to be included, in fact it

is the factor that is to be evaluated, and that is the program, or

curriculum of the school. This requires one final distinction between

the planned and the unplanned curriculum.[4]

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[4]The term *unplanned curriculum* is used here rather than the more
popular term, "the hidden curriculum." The former is more inclusive
and makes provision for all aspects of the curriculum that were not
planned; whereas, the latter term is appropriately limited to only
those aspects of the operation of the school that are beneath the
surface, not as obvious. The term "hidden curriculum" also, in
contexts where it is most frequently found, has a pejorative connota-
tion that does not apply to all aspects of the unplanned curriculum.
Another term that is related is the "the unstudied curriculum."
See The Unstudied Curriculum: Its Impact on Children, edited by
Norman Overly (1970). Clarification of the term *planned curriculum*
must include the important point that "planned" does not necessarily
mean that the plan is created always with consideration for the needs
of the learners as the primary objective. Some aspects of the
planned curriculum, e.g., the physical plant and personnel selection,
are often made intentionally with the efficiency, control, and other
needs of the organization and its staff as the primary objectives.
Many such aspects of the planned curriculum may be in conflict with
the needs of the learners.

Planned versus Unplanned Curriculum

The *planned curriculum,* as its name implies, refers to those

aspects of the school that are purposely, knowingly, and objectively

placed in the curriculum with a rationale. A series of courses in

mathematics, planned for a specific age and grade level, with a

progressive and logical sequence of topics, methods, and materials is

an example of part of the planned curriculum.

The design of the physical plant, prepared with the needs of

the inhabitants in mind, the demands of the size of the population,

the traffic patterns, and the need for control, etc., is part of the

planned curriculum. The personnel, the criteria by which they are

selected, the assignments they are given, and all other related matters

are all part of the planned curriculum.

In short, the planned curriculum is the totality of the

human and nonhuman resources of the school, their organization and

arrangement, and the systematic plan by which they are to be

implemented.

The *unplanned curriculum* is all that happens in the school

that was not included in the plan, either by omission or commission;

what was not nor was likely to be anticipated; and all of the complex

personal, interpersonal, social, and informal organizational trans-

actions that both overtly and covertly develop as the school actually

operates. The unplanned curriculum grows out of many things, and is

a very complex element of the operation of the school. Some of it

is obvious, much of it needs to be inferred.

The distinction between these two components of the curriculum

is not always clear, precise, and mutually exclusive. Some aspects

of the school are readily identifiable as part of the planned

curriculum, e.g., the building, the course offerings, the syllabi,

the staff members, and the textbooks. Other aspects of the school

are readily classified as part of the unplanned curricula, e.g.,

the affections and hostilities that develop between members of the

faculty, or between students and faculty, or the cliques that

form among the students. Much of the unplanned curriculum, however,

is less easily classifiable as one or the other, and is a mixture of

both. A textbook, as an example of the planned curriculum, for

example, may have been carefully selected, written by an expert in

the field of study, and well integrated into the plan and execution

of the course. Unknown to the teacher and unanticipated by the

teacher there may be something in the textbook that generates deep

and serious negative reactions from the students that are not directly

expressed, but are manifested only by tension in the classroom,

resistance to the teacher, or refusal to read the assignments. A

large number of students in the class may have deep feelings about

perceived distortions and misrepresentations that often characterize

the presentation of the history of the United States in many classes

and textbooks. A textbook on American history, observed by the

writer, written by two Columbia University scholars, was bound in

an obviously patriotically oriented cover with red, white, and blue

stars and stripes. The Civil War was presented as a conflict among

brothers, and made it appear as though that war were nothing more

than a family squabble. To present the significant, powerful, and

destructive aspects of a four-year blood bath that cost thousands of

lives, and nearly caused the permanent separation of the nation

into two permanently divided camps, to say nothing of the racial

implications whose effects are still felt more than a hundred years

later, in the euphemous terms of a conflict among brothers constitutes

a distortion of truth. Imagine this text being used in a classroom

for whom the issues of freedom, race, and war are highly inflammable

and sensitive subjects--then what seems so simply part of the

planned curriculum can clearly be seen as also part of the unplanned

curriculum, with all of the potential consequences.

As an interim summary of basic concepts, the following three

terminological and conceptual distinctions have been made:

1. knowledge versus wisdom

2. effective versus wise

3. planned curriculum versus unplanned curriculum.

In addition a matrix was presented, Fig. 6.1, to aid in the analysis.

With these conceptual tools an analysis of the school as a values/

moral agent can now be briefly explored. The exploration is intended

not to be a statistically documented report of a complex scientific

study, but a stimulating evaluation stemming from the organismic-

structural-developmental conceptual framework presented in Chapters IV

and V that indicate the need for considerable future studies that can

test the theses or propositions presented here.

The discussion will proceed from the following four theses

or propositions:

1. The unplanned curriculum is less wise but
   more effective as a values/moral agent than
   the planned curriculum.

2. The conflict between the unplanned and the planned
   curriculum seriously inhibits values/moral
   development.

3. Many schools are generally negatively effective
   values/moral agents.

4. A school cannot be both wise and effective until
   it systematically coordinates its curriculum by
   planning for the integration of knowledge and
   wisdom.

1. The Unplanned Curriculum is Less Wise but More Effective than the Planned Curriculum

An examination of the goals and objectives of most schools in the United States would reveal intentions to graduate intelligent, skillful, productive, and wise citizens who would be able to successfully proceed to college and/or productively earn a living in honest and law-abiding occupations, and who would actively participate in the democratic process necessary for the growth and survival of our representative democracy. Furthermore, they would be reflections of the founding documents of this nation, dedicated to equality, freedom and justice for all regardless of race, color, creed, sex, and many other classifications.

The planned curriculum of the typical American school

includes courses in government, citizenship, and many aspects of social studies, liberal arts, and the humanities. The credos of most schools profess belief in self-determination, honesty, courage, open minds, and dozens of humanistic propositions. The planned curriculum is designed to accomplish all the goals and objectives that would make possible a truly democratic nation, with law-abiding, concerned, and involved citizens. The rhetoric of the goals, the school boards, the parents, the faculty, the textbooks, and the classes would lead one to expect that our educational system would produce people characterized by the criteria for principled morality described in Chapter V.

The literature of educational reform and many of the events of our day indicate a possible discrepancy between these goals and and the results. Why is this so?

Part of the answer may be that the planned curriculum is both unwise and ineffective. Probably it is considerably more ineffective than unwise. It is unwise because it removes the content of knowledge (as distinguished from the scientific process of acquiring knowledge) from the context of the lives of the students. It is unwise because it fails to include proper methods by which students can truly learn, apply, and habituate the scientific methods, the principles of inquiry, and the open minds required to create and understand true knowledge. It makes knowledge into something that already exists, is external to the learner, is objective and correct, and must be transmitted to the learner by authority, conditioning, and other autocratic methods.

Even the knowledge of democracy--*especially* the knowledge of democracy--
is often taught in this manner.

This subject will provide one exemplar that tends to support
the thesis, where it occurs as described here. Democracy is often
"taught" in our schools by teacher authorities, in autocratic settings,
with "authoritative" textbooks, as an established practice that actually
exists. Many learners know that what is taught frequently does not
exist--possibly not in his school, probably not in his home, and
frequently not in our country. He is taught that one of the keystones
of true democracy is the principle that one is innocent until proven
guilty, and that justice involves due process. The opportunities for
our millions of students to observe or experience this process and
this justice in our schools, especially our high schools, are so
limited that the subject would be better removed from the planned
curriculum. Can a student in a typical American school be given a fair
trial (hearing, or whatever) if he is believed to be a violator of
some rule of the school or in disagreement with a member of the
faculty--regardless of whether he is innocent or guilty, right or
wrong? Generally speaking, probably not.

On this, and many other subjects, the typical American
student knows that he must do all in his power to obey, comply, and
conform with the established social order and structure of the
school if he has any intentions of earning the diploma he has been
taught by his parents, his school, and all other authorities to be
one of the most important documents in his young life. Achievement
at any price is sometimes the powerful message of the unplanned

curriculum. When that is true it overpowers anything to the contrary
that may come from the planned curriculum.

The planned curriculum says that all people are equal,
deserve equal dignity, and should be treated as brothers and sisters.
The unplanned curriculum says you must at all times prove yourself
superior to your peers if you want any of the rewards, honors, status,
or power that are shown to be important in the school, the community,
and our nation.

The planned curriculum says that you must explore, inquire,
seek, question, challenge, and forever remain open to growth and
new ideas. The gifted, the clever, and the skilled know that these
principles apply mainly to the accepted and limited subjects, questions,
issues, and factors that are in accord with the established order of
the school. Furthermore, generally speaking, there are accepted
times, methods, and places where this highly limited behavior is
permitted--and knowing this and applying this will win the small
minority of gifted, clever, and physically superior students the
praise, the power, the glory, the awards, the gold statues, the
letters, and the letters of recommendations.

The point is that the planned curriculum is ostensibly
designed to foster all the ideals and goals of democracy, freedom,
justice, and America--but it actually is frequently very ineffective
in implementing these things. It is hypothesized here that the
unplanned curriculum is the more powerful, pervasive, and dominating
curriculum of the school. In that sense it is postulated that it is
very effective, and fits cell 3 in the matrix of Fig. 6.1. Kohlberg,

in many of his writings, maintains that at best approximately 25%

of the population of America makes it to Level III principled morality

and that most likely not more than 5% make it to Stage 6. These are

conservative estimates based on his research. He believes these

figures are high (1973).

2. The Conflict Between the Two Curricula Inhibits Values/Moral

 Development.

The transactional effect of the discrepancy between the

planned and unplanned curricula may be the source of much of the

conflict, unrest, and rebellion in the schools; and possibly one of

the reasons why so many youth accuse adults of being hypocrites. To

practice injustice without preaching justice is not nearly as

disturbing as practicing injustice while preaching justice. To the

sensitive formal operational, highly exploratory teenager, experiencing

the resurgence of egocentrism mentioned by Piaget (discussed in

Table 4.1D in Chapter IV), the new power he has with which he can see

the potentialities of what "ought" to be is discordant with what he

sees as existing.

What can respect for others mean to a student told that this

is the way he should live (in the planned curriculum) when he is

treated (in the unplanned curriculum) by the faculty with little or

no respect in many situations? One of the issues on which this is

particularly acute and revealing is the subject of mistakes. Being

able to make mistakes is one of the least discussed but one of the

most important aspects of learning. Many aspects of the school are

oriented toward reward for "right" answers and punishment for "wrong" answers. Much of what is judged, graded, and punished as wrong today turns out to be right, partially right, or irrelevant tomorrow with the new knowledge gained from the advancements of science, technology, wisdom, or experience. The experiential method prescribed by Dewey, which is nearly identical with the active method prescribed by Piaget, actually calls for an optimal amount of opportunity for "mistakes." The equilibration process is founded on the belief that opportunity for disequilibrium and the chance to process it is what leads to a new equilibration at a more integrated higher structural stage. Consequently, experiential and active approaches require the kind of experience that encourages risk-taking that can lead to error, misjudgment, and mistake, Dewey (1944, p. 197) speaking here of manual training says:

> Morover, opportunity for making mistakes is
> an incidental requirement. Not because mistakes
> are ever desirable, but because overzeal to
> select material and appliances which forbid a
> chance for mistakes to occur, restricts
> initiative, reduces judgment to a minimum, and
> compels the use of methods which are so remote
> from the complex situations of life that the
> power gained is of little availability.

But when talking about moral reconstruction and moral development (1948, p. 175) he says:

> Mistakes are no longer either mere unavoidable
> accidents to be mourned or moral sins to be
> expiated and forgiven. They are lessons in wrong
> methods of using intelligence and instructions
> as to a better course in the future. They are
> indications of the need of revision, development,
> and readjustment.

Mistakes, or rather the opportunities to make mistakes, are part of

the lifeblood of continued learning. And in the planned curriculum

they are encouraged in the form of exhaltations to try and try

again, to take chances, to attempt to answer difficult questions,

and in many other ways. But in the real life of the unplanned

curriculum many students know that mistakes of all kinds are among

the most serious transgressions one can commit. It is the achievers,

the students with the right answers, the students with the high scores,

the stars that can do everything right that generally rise to the

top and usually win the laurels of the planned curriculum.

The conflict between the planned curriculum and the unplanned

curriculum can literally tear the young person apart. But unlike

the disequilibrium that is constructive and conducive to cognitive and

moral growth, this kind of disequilibrium can frequently lead to

personal defeat, apathy, fear, and anxiety that can crystallize

rigid thinking, fixation at low levels and stages, and prevent

exploration that can lead to developmental progress.

3. Schools are Generally Negatively Effective Values/Moral Agents.

To a certain extent this claim is based on the great amount

of activity in schools that is congruent with cell no. 3 in Fig. 6.1.

Considering the orientations presented by Levels I and II of Kohlberg's

developmental program, it can be observed that the schools engage in

a great deal of behavior that is based exclusively or mostly on the

use of power, punishment, reward, instrumental use of people as objects,

and various kinds of payment for appropriate behavior. Unfortunately,

education has for decades has generally accepted the fundamental view

of man propounded by both the behaviorists and the psychoanalysts, but especially the former. Not only elementary and high schools, but all forms and levels of higher education, including doctoral programs, are considerably based on the belief in the need for external motivation, reward and punishment, quantitative evaluations, and orientations to concrete and fixed thinking. Authority is usually respected and encouraged. Questioning is frequently discouraged, politely ignored, punished, or removed by expelling the offender.

Kohlberg identifies the moral orientation of most schools at Levels I and II, with a predominant mixture of Stages 1 and 4 (Kohlberg, 1970b, 1971b, 1973a). In view of his most recent theoretical reformulations based on his latest empirical findings, which resulted in his creating Stage 3A' (prime), it would seem that his evaluation should be revised. Much behavior of educators is readily identifiable as consistent with the *authoritarian orientation*.

Support for Kohlberg's claims comes from other sources that have also reported on the characteristics of schools and teachers whose data contribute to the rationale for the proposed negative effectiveness of teachers and schools as values/moral agents. Fedigan (1973, p. 766) reports on the findings obtained from an application of the conceptual systems theory (Harvey, Hunt, and Schroder, 1961) to determine the characteristics of preservice (prospective) teachers, inservice teachers and principals and superintendents as follows:[5]

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[5]This report by Fedigan is a deviation from the general practice followed throughout this dissertation to report from primary sources. In this case the summary of the theoretical framework, its particular application to teacher behavior, and integration with finding from

1. *Harvey's Four Systems.* The four levels or nodal points along the basic concrete-abstract dimension were defined as systems by Harvey (1966; 1970), and specifically related to teaching behaviors by Murphy and Brown (1970).

The latter derived the following characteristics: System 1 teachers view authority as the highest good, see questions as having one answer and thus discourage divergent thinking, and reward conformity and rote learning. System 2 teachers are characterized by inconsistency and uncertainty in functioning in a manner rather similar to System 1 teachers. System 3 teachers show high affiliative needs, based on mutuality and group consensus rather than rules. Being more abstract in functioning than System 1 or 2 teachers, they will encourage more pupil self-expressions. System 4 teachers regard knowledge as tentative rather than absolute, are able to consider situations from other points of view, and, being cognitively complex themselves, tend to encourage more complex functioning.

In a study of several thousand liberal arts students, Harvey (1970) found that 35 percent represented System 1 functioning, 15 percent System 2 functioning, 20 percent System 3 functioning, and 7 percent represented System 4. Propsective teachers differed slightly from the liberal arts students; however, among practicing teachers the percentage of System 1 was 55, there were almost no System 2 teachers, System 3 teachers went down to 15 percent, and only 4 percent represented System 4 functioning. Also, 75 percent of principals and 90 percent of superintendents in Colorado, Wyoming, Utah, and New Mexico represented System 1 functioning.

In further studies, Harvey (1970) noted that liberal arts students and Air Force Academy cadets become significantly more abstract from the freshman to the senior year; Whereas,

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...several reporters seemed more advantageous and concise. For some related studies on similar issues see also Harvey, White, Prather, Alter, and Hoffmeister (1966) and Harvey, Prather, White, and Hoffmeister (1968).

at two major teacher training institutions, the
incidence of System 4 individuals decreased from
a high in the sophomore year all the way
through graduate training. The result appears
to be due to socializing influences of the
schools of education.

Apparently there are complex factors at work here. A

significant percentage of educators are conceptually concrete

thinkers, passive, dependent, autocratic, and operate at relatively

low and middle levels of moral development. Many of the people

attracted to education seem to have these personality character-

istics, which in turn are reinforced and further extended by the

socialization practices of many schools of teacher education. The

graduates of these schools, in turn, enter into an educational

system that is already characterized by the same tendencies and

practices. Certainly a significant part of the blame can be placed

on the schools that prepare teachers. Not only do they seem to

attract and reinforce the personalities described above (which most

likely coincide with the personality characteristics of many teacher

educators themselves), but the programs focus primarily on subject

matter content, methodology and classroom management, and related

problems. Teacher trainees are not generally required to engage in

any kind of research or give serious consideration to the meaning,

application, and development of theory. And philosophy of education

is quite incidental to the entire program in the form of survey

courses that for the most part require no philosophical thinking on

the part of the prospective teacher. Of major importance, also is

the fact that many teacher preparation programs provide none or little

exposure to developmental psychology. Consequently, it is possible in many institutions for an undergraduate student in education to go through four years of school, graduate with a bachelor's degree and a teaching certificate without ever having to have seriously grappled with any of the major issues of education, without ever having had to formulate any systematic philosophy of education or even a outline of a set of beliefs, without ever having had to learn much of anything about the human beings they are going to teach and how they develop. What little is taught in many schools about the child is usually from the behavioristic model--conditioning, contingencies of reinforcement, S-R bonds, and behavior modification techniques.

Much of the conceptual paraphernalia of education is presented, for the most part, along with the psychometric techniques and management techniques, in packaged programs to be applied with little critical examination. The achievement orientation, the lock-step graded system, tracking, grades, behavioral objectives, IQ's, and dozens of other models, programs, and ideas are presented without any serious discussion about their validity, their meaning, or their morality. Jerome Bruner has remarked (1959, reprinted in Noll and Noll, 1968, p. 168):

> I do not wish to mince words. The educational and cultural level of the majority of American teachers is not impressive. On the whole they do not have a good grasp of the subject matter that they are teaching; courses on method will not replace the absent subject matter. In time and with teaching experience this deficeincy is often remedied. But in so many cases there is no time: the turnover in the teaching profession as we all know is enormous; the median number of years of teaching before departure for marriage or mother-hood is around three.

The content of Bruner's comments are limited in scope and do not extend to the major issues of discussion here. But the principle he is expressing is very important.

Without a doubt the teacher is probably the single most important factor in the educational system. But she or he is still part of a system. And as Gagné says (1966):

> The idea that teachers can by themselves bring about the changes required to modernize education is itself part of what needs changing. Teachers cannot possibly do all of the things they are supposed to do, or that they say they are responsible for doing. They do not have the time, not to mention the capabilities, to design curricula, execute curricula, design instruction, execute instruction, guide individual development, measure individual progress and consult with parents.

Loubser (1971, in Beck, Crittenden, and Sullivan, Chapter 5), in what he admits is a "working paper" on the subject of the role of the school in moral development, tentatively concludes that the school seems to be an inhibitor of moral development. His analysis concludes as follows (p. 178):

> It [further theorizing, documentation, and codification] will without doubt introduce countless qualifications and perhaps even many reversals in the generalizations. But the broad strokes in which the picture was painted are enough to elucidate the main outline of the argument, which I contend would survive closer scrutiny.
>
> In essence, the argument is that is we accept the ideal-type concept of moral action as developed in the first part of the paper, it is evident that the social structural arrangements in most schools inhibit the development of the components of moral action. Schools, by default or design, tend to obstruct rather than encourage the development of:

A. moral commitment and moral involvement with
others as whole persons and with moral issues.

B. universal moral principles and the inclusive-
ness of the human moral community.

C. moral autonomy, respect for others as
autonomous moral agents, and moral liberty
as a value in society.

D. moral reason and the generalized capacity for
moral flexibility.

There is general, and even precise, agreement with much of what has been said here and in Chapter V. on this matter. Schools appear generally not to be effective or wise values/moral agents.

4. Both Wisdom and Effectiveness Require Coordination of the

Planned and the Unplanned Curriculum.

In a sense this thesis is peculiarly stated, but it communicates the essence of the point. What is meant, in part, is that much of the present planned curriculum needs to be revised, some discarded, and all of it reviewed in respect to its contribution to the development. Beyond this it means that much of what constitutes the unplanned curriculum should be incorporated into the planned curriculum and coordinated with the planned curriculum. Ideally this would result in one unified curriculum. But not in reality. For no matter how much or what is planned, students and educators, being people, will always create an unplanned curriculum above, beyond, and beneath the planned curriculum. But the point is that the latter does not have to be negative or counterproductive, nor do the positive aspects of the present unplanned curriculum have to be unplanned or hidden. Furthermore, much of the present unplanned curriculum reflects the genuine and more important needs of the students than does the

planned curriculum that presently exists.

The investment of most of the resources of the educational system in *knowledge* with considerably less regard for the *wisdom* and *values* aspects, and with little regard for the transactional relationship between them, is not only unnecessary, it is dangerous and will become increasingly so if our economic, social, political, and moral problems grow from crises to disasters. Wisdom without knowledge is impossible. Knowledge without wisdom is potentially dangerous and disastrous, as Alfred Nobel, for one small example, discovered. We must *educate* people, not train them.

Conclusion

Considering the six aspects of principled morality presented in Chapter V., and the factors considered in this chapter, as criteria for evaluating the capacity of our schools to provide the kinds of experiences required for values/moral development, in general the conclusion would have to be that many of our schools are either failing miserably or are rather low on the scale. There are exceptions, of course, and the picture would certainly be an uneven one across the nation. There are many schools trying to do a good job, but overall the nature of our schools, the way they are organized and operated, and the training and experience of the staffs, and the pressures from the parents and community tend to add up to a rather grim picture.

Elementary schools are probably considerably advanced over the secondary schools. For the most part, however, schools in general are designed for students to be passive, uninvolved, standardized, protected, told, decided for, thought for, and herded. The conceptualization of man on which our schools base their curricula, operation, and organization is a very confused and mixed bag, but by and large it is still a carryover from the inner depravity ideas of the Puritans with large doses of behaviorism and psychoanalysis thrown in. The emphasis is on the transmission of the culture to the students, and education is something you *give to* people, and teaching is something you *do to* them. Add to this the standardization, the overemphasis on roles and facades, the pyramid hierarchy structure, the emphasis on right answers and production, the achievement orientation, the compartmentalization, and the entire office and factory atmosphere, much of which has been inherited from the business-industrial-military complex that has dominated our society and our schools for decades. Top this off with the type of preparation for teaching that is offered in many of our schools of education, the fear of the parents and the community, and the Level I and II orientation of the people who operate the schools. It all adds up to an educational system conducive to the retardation of values/moral development.

In answer to the question about the wisdom of the schools as values/moral agents, the schools appear very unwise. They seem to have not made good choices about the role of the school, nor have they made good choices about how to organize and operate the school. The planned curriculum is ostensibly based on objectives and goals that

are good, but the execution of the plan seems to be unrelated to the stated and implied goals.

One of the main problems that prevents educators from being good values/moral agents is the powerful anti-intellectual, anti-theoretical, and anti-philosophical bias that prevails among educators in the field. Teachers, for the most part, tend to be prescriptive, pragmatic, and concrete; they are usually looking for packaged panaceas to solve their immediate problems. There is little evidence that teachers have given much thought to their role as values/moral agents except in the sense that they see a need for children and youth to be tamed, controlled, and shaped. The way to achieve moral development is to build on the resources of *people*, not things. Instructional materials, strategies, designs, and kits are all useful, valuable, and needed--but they must be tools in the hands of professional educators, and not crutches for inadequate and insecure custodians and authorities.

There is no question that educators are harried, overworked, and involved in a field overwhelmed with constant pressures from the community, from the boards, and from the students. But there must be both the time and the willingness on their parts to investigate the nature of the values/moral problem, and to attempt to gather the data that is available to help them reformulate their roles with respect to development. But it is rare to find an educator at any level who has heard of the work that has been done on this aspect of their work. The Hartshorne and May studies, Piaget's work on moral judgment, Kohlberg's work, and much more have been available for years.

The excuses offered for this are many, but most of them relate to busy schedules, pressing demands, and the knowledge and understanding it would take on their part to evaluate and apply the work that has been done. To a certain extent this is a legitimate response. But not entirely. Teachers, principals, and administrators are among the most active participants in workshops, conferences, and programs on dozens of contemporary issues. Announce a workshop on behavior modification or some other device to control children and achieve classroom management, and teachers will be there in large numbers. Announce an institute on accountability, budgeting, or other administrative matters and the principals and administrators will flock to the site. The only program on values education that has attracted widespread attention and support, as well as application, is values clarification. But few educators have seen more than the positive side of this methodology (which is substantial). But there are significant problems with values clarification, also. As pointed out in Chapter II, values clarification involves an underlying belief in the relativity of values, which is a significant problem. The theory and methodology also, when examined in depth, reveal that if it were applied as presented it could lead to great frustration on the parts of both students and educators. For there is little chance that educators are going to permit children to apply the principles of values clarification, and its idiographic-relativistic orientation to any other than superficial problems and issues. The techniques of values clarification also tend to lead, when working with teenagers especially to a tendency to conformity, which is purportedly

contrary to the basic philosophy its proponents and users profess to support. And, finally, values clarification is basically a relatively superficial program that is not developmentally oriented. It has the appeal, the attractiveness, and the fun that too easily lends itself to appearing to be a panacea. Without a doubt it is a valuable resource and it has made an enormous contribution to education, but it is certainly not without major faults, and not a panacea.

In conclusion, schools as they are presently constituted are not only basically ineffective and unwise values/moral educators, and they not only do little to contribute to the development of principled morality, they actually retard, inhibit, and prevent much of the very development that makes democratic life possible--which purportedly is the purpose for which they should be most concerned. Schools are capable of being considerably more effective and wise values/moral educators. Many rich and valuable theoretical, philosophical, and empirical formulations and findings are available on which to build. Some of the most important ones have been reviewed in this dissertation. A beginning is being made to translate them into the kinds of models and methods that can be used to inform the educators and help them apply them to their own professional development and to the development of their students. But some major problems need to be examined and resolved in order to make much of this possible. First, there needs to be a major reorientation of priorities in both inservice and preservice teacher education programs if values/moral education is going to be given the attention it needs. Second, programs for parents must be designed and implemented to

complement and support the programs for schools. Third, some help

must come in general from the population at large in terms of the

realization of the fact that the problems we face today are, at their

roots, values/moral issues. As Piaget (1972) points out, full

developmental education, both cognitive and moral, is a necessary

condition for the establishment of democracy, world order, and peace.

He says that governments have an *obligation* to provide this kind of

education to their populations, and to the extent that they fail this

responsibility, to that extent they deprive their constituents of

freedom.

Yes, schools are values/moral agents, and it is one of the

most important responsibilities the school has to meet. Anyone involved

in education at all should attempt in whatever ways possible to augment

and support the schools' efforts to that end.

B. Education, Curriculum, and Values Development

The following conceptualizations of curriculum and curriculum

theory are offered as a basis for a developmental approach to education

and the school:

Curriculum Theory

A *curriculum theory* is a conceptual framework for system-

atically, effectively, and wisely linking warranted assumptions about

the nature of man, the nature of society, the process of learning, and

the purpose of education.

Purpose of Curriculum Theory

To provide a sound basis for making *effective* and *wise* decisions about all the components of the curriculum.[6]

Curriculum

A curriculum then consists of the following:

1. Human resources: students, educators, parents, and community.

2. A curriculum theory.

3. Criteria for *effective* and *wise* to serve as the values base for making curriculum decisions.

4. A statement of goals and objectives.

5. A plan for the selection, organization, and actualization of the human resources.

6. A plan for the selection, organization, and implementation of the process by which the goals and objectives will be achieved.

7. A plan for the selection and organization of the appropriate content.

8. A plan for evaluation of all the components of the curriculum in terms of the values base for *effective* and *wise*.

9. A plan for the development and renewal of all aspects of the curriculum, especially the human

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[6] See Section A. of this chapter for definitions and clarification of the terms *effective* and *wise*.

resources on which the entire curriculum

is founded.

The general framework provided by this conceptualization of curriculum and curriculum theory lends itself to application in a variety of ways and under a variety of different views of man, society, learning, and education. It does, however, make the human resources central and basic, and would be most appropriate for a democratic process of education. It is a dynamic view of curriculum.

The organismic-structural-developmental conceptual framework is not only a useful, valid, and powerful way to look at values/moral education, but is equally applicable and viable for the entire process of education. In fact, values/moral education cannot be meaningful or effective if planned or executed by itself. It must be an integral part of the entire curriculum and operation of the school, and the school itself must be viewed in all that it does as a values/moral agent.

As a matter of practical concern it is essential that every teacher know something about the human organism, how it functions, how it thinks, how it grows and develops. Everyone has a view of man. It may be incomplete, inaccurate, contradictory, or any number of other things, but it is there in the teacher's mind and it operates in the transactions with the children. Very few teachers have systematic and explicit views of man; most have unsystematic and implicit views that have not been thought out, validated, or integrated.

Many teachers have unconsciously or blindly accepted the
assumptions about both man and society held by the behaviorists
and the psychoanalysists, on top of which they have grafted the
rhetoric of humanistic psychologists. But the core concepts that really
identify the foundations of the positions have been overlooked, ignored,
or simply not understood. Some of the basic points of disagreement
among these views of man are completely irreconcilable. How can you
possibly believe at one and the same time that man is born a *tabula*
rasa on which the external world (the society and culture) writes and
to which transmits all knowledge, values, and structure; and that
man is not born a *tabula rasa,* but is born with certain fundamental
action schemas which in transaction with the external environment
are constructed by the organism into knowledge, values, and structure?
Blind acceptance of inherently conflicting ideas is easy if you have
not been encouraged to look at the underlying assumptions that went
into the creation of the curriculum, organization, method, or materials
that you are using. But for values/moral education it is vital to
consider which way you view this particular issue, and dozens more
about the nature of man. Your views and assumptions affect how you
teach, what you teach, and when you teach. As a case in point,
teachers talk about controlling, shaping, and contingencies of
reinforcement without realizing what Skinner and the other behaviorists
mean by them. They do not realize that the underlying assumptions
of this view are contrary to much of what they believe, and that Skinner
rejects and ridicules all the assumptions of what he calls "autonomous
man", but especially freedom, dignity, responsibility, and most of the

humanistic ideas the same teachers profess so strongly to believe.
Reflection on these issues is necessary prior to adopting the methods
and the underlying philosophy.

One major purpose for having educators wrestle with these
problems and questions is to enable them to use the curriculum theory
they create as the basis for decision-making. The eight components of
curriculum other than the curriculum theory itself should be based on
the theory. The theory should be the guiding light in the decision-
making process. Of course, the theory should also be included in the
ongoing and continuous process of renewal.

Earlier it was said that the concept of curriculum presented
here is a dynamic one. This is meant to differentiate it from the
more traditional views of curriculum as prescriptions for what students
should learn and what and how teachers should teach. The curriculum
approach proposed here is meant to be a dynamic program for planned
intervention to maximize human, social, and world development. Man
is conceived as organismic, holistic, inherently active and motivated,
capable of enormous flexibility, and having an enormous capacity to
adept and change. Investigators have discovered that the arc of human
potentialities is not infinite; it is limited. But even within the
available range of potential there are enormous degrees of freedom.
Related to the issue of potentiality, one of Piaget's beliefs is of
special interest to educators. He (1972, pp. 13-15) believes
that except for some highly specialized kinds of aptitudes, such as
for music, that generally speaking most human beings do not truly
possess special aptitudes for mathematics, science, and other

curricular orientations. He claims that the extensive research of the Geneva school lends no support for the claim to the special aptitudes so strongly upheld by the psychometricians. He maintains that what eventually appears as aptitudinal orientation is a product of the curriculum and the school. The learners tend to react to the lessons and the process, but do not truly lose or gain aptitudes. If the schools were operated properly, he claims, most children would be able to master most skills.

Turning briefly to the purpose of education, Dewey sees education as one of the chief instruments for the continuous reconstruction of society. If a curriculum built on a developmental model were successful, and increasing numbers of people were able to reach formal operational intelligence and principled moral development, then society could gradually be reconstructed in Level III terms. But this is contrary to one of the most predominant ideas about the purpose of education, namely that education is to transmit, sustain, and support the existing culture and tradition. Essentially this is a static view of culture, education, and life, and potentially destructive to a dynamic reconstructive view of life and education. In a dynamic reconstructive view of life and education that is consistent with the organismic-structural-developmental framework, the purpose of education may be more appropriately viewed as the way to:

1. Maximize individual human development,

2. Build and sustain a democratic society based on principled morality,

3. Extend these principles to contribute to the

building of an integrated, unified world at peace,

in universal harmony and prosperity, in which all

human beings would have an equal opportunity to

fully develop.

None of these is possible if the school is seen as the instrument of

tradition and transmitter of existing values. Naturally the continuity

of human life must be maintained, and the rich heritage of tradition

and human struggle must be communicated to children and youth. But

not for the purpose of indoctrination into the ways of the past, but as

part of the great body of wisdom and knowledge available to help guide

decisions about important issues.

This issue of the purpose of education is probably one of

the toughest and most explosive issues for educators in the field

to face. Not only do they have their own philosophy to work out,

they must cope with the varied, and often diametrically opposed views

of parents, community leaders, board members, their own faculty

members, and the students. Central to this issue is one of the

thorniest problems of all: the rights, roles, and responsibilities

of the students versus the rights, roles, and responsibilities of

the parents. On this issue converge all the philosophical, moral,

legal, and justice factors one can imagine. The competing claims

are extremely difficult to resolve, especially in view of the enormous

discrepancies in the developmental levels and stages of all concerned.

The problem is especially acute when the student is developmentally

more advanced than his parents, or even the teachers or principal to

whom he is supposed to look for leadership and guidance. This is not

a rare problem in the junior and senior high school years when many

young people are already at Stage 4.

The complex problem of the competing claims of three principle

elements of the purpose of education issue are: school, parents, and

students. This set of issues is central to values/moral education and

critical to the idea of the school as a just moral community. It is

also a fundamental problem for the construction of a democracy.

Unfortunately, it is such a sensitive and potentially explosive issue

that it is rarely faced head-on. Key questions in this issue include:

1. What is the relationship between parent and child?

   Is the child the "property" of the parent, over which

   the parent has proprietary rights?

2. Do the parents have the right to own and control the

   school?

3. Is the purpose of the school to execute the educational

   goals, plans, and desires of the parents?

These three questions must be explored by all three of the parties

involved if some of the present confusion is to be reduced or

resolved. This statement is not meant in a general sense, but in

a particular sense, meaning that in each community and school this

kind of discussion must take place. That is part of what is meant

by developmental education for democracy and principled morality.

A guide to the discussion, and a guide to the types of problems that

will have to be faced, as well as an indication of the hurdles to

overcome, are the Piaget and Kohlberg theories and stages. Obviously,

if a Level III principal is discussion these issues with Level I

parents there are going to be some real problems, and it is going to

be difficult, if not impossible for the parents to understand their

relationship with their child in any other than proprietary, instru-

mental, and autocratic terms. And it is going to challenge the

principled morality of this particular principal, who is concerned

equally with the welfare of both child and parents, to deal with this

problem.

Small group discussions among educators, parents, and

students may be a way to approach this problem. An entire school-

community-student program could be designed and implemented to approach

this issue, and even the attempt to carry out such a program would in

itself begin to build democratic community.

Dewey (1928; also in Ratner, 1939, p. 605) offers some

insight on some of these issues in the following statement:

> The art of education is one in which every
> person is compelled whether he will or not to
> take an interest, because it so intimately concerns
> his own conduct. A person may begin with a narrow
> interest, one that cares only about, say, the
> education of his own children or of members of
> his own profession. But he does not go far
> before he is forced to note that he is building
> on a sandy foundation because of deficiencies due
> to earlier education. Professional education has
> its results limited and twisted because of the
> general state of education. Surveying that, it
> appears that its improvements cannot be made
> secure merely by better training of teachers.
> Parent, school officials, taxpayers have the last
> word, and the character of that word is depend-
> ent upon their education. They man and do block
> or deflect the best laid plans. That is the
> circle in which education moves. Those who
> received education are those who give it;
> habits already engendered deeply influence its
> course. *It is as if no one could be educated
> in the full sense until everyone is developed*

beyond the reach of prejudice, stupidity, and
apathy.

> There is no possibility of complete escape
> from this circle. Education returns upon itself
> in such a multitude of ways as to render out of
> the question any short cut solution. It is a
> matter of accelerating momentum in the right
> direction, and of increasing the effective energy
> of the factors that make for removing obstacles.
> (Italics added)

The problem raises more questions than can possibly be explored in

this brief treatment, but if nothing more than the magnitide and

severity of the problem is brought out, along with the urgent need

for teacher education programs, educators in the fields, and other

interested parties to make serious attempts to develop strategies

to cope with it, then the purpose here is accomplished. The italicized

portion of the above quotation emphasizes the fact that education

cannot devote itself to the implementation of only the parents needs,

wishes, and desires--regardless of the fact that they are paying the

taxes that support the school. This statement cannot be emphasized

too strongly. If we are to build a more solid foundation on the

"sandy foundation" Dewey mentions, we must go beyond the limitations,

prejudices, and undemocratic views that characterize all or most

of us as parents, teachers, or students.

There may be "no possibility of complete escape from this

circle," as Dewey himself points out above, but part of the escape

is directly determined by whatever attempts are made to build democracy.

For as Dewey himself points out about democracy and how it survives

(1908; also in Ratner, 1939, p. 721):

> ...unless democratic habits of thought and action
> are part of the fiber of a people, political
> democracy is insecure. *It can not stand in
> isolation. It must be buttressed by the presence
> of democratic methods in all social relationships.*
> The relations that exist in educational institu-
> tions are second only in importance in this
> respect to those which exist in industry and
> business, perhaps not even to them. (Italics
> added)

Again, the italicicized portion highlights the point made so frequently

here that democracy cannot be something merely talked about in classes,

practiced among the faculty, or in any isolated sector--it must be the

warp and woof, the life of the school--to weave the fabric is to build

the just moral community.

Part of the democratic and moral life of the school must

include a great deal of active protection for the child from the

immoralities and undemocratic practices of both the school and the

parents. This means the school must walk a tightrope to survive, and

it means the faculty of the school must have some courage, a lot of

insight regarding their own behaviors, and a genuine interest

in the child as a human being. One of the most demanding responsibili-

ties on this score, especially by parents and also by educators, is to

remember the child's unique right to his own existence, his own meaning,

and his own purpose. It would be difficult to defend a legal, social,

or moral justification for viewing children as the property of

parents or the instruments of educators. It is simply a fact of

life, painful for most people to face, but true, that children are truly

used quite frequently by adults--used in the Stage 2 terms of

instrumental relativism and naive hedonism. One of the great tragedies

of life is the fact that parents frequently see their offspring as extensions of their own egos, instruments to the fulfillment of their own unrequited dreams, and the means of propagating their own names, images, and values. At the moment of birth a child becomes a separate fact of life, an individual in his or her own right, a full member of the human race--not to be owned, used, or dominated by any other person or persons. The great and magnificent challenge of parenthood is to help the inherently dependent and helpless infant to grow and develop as rapidly as possible, within the framework of healthy developmental sequence and time, into a full, richly endowed, independent human being in its own right as quickly, as effectively, and as widely as possible. Children should not owe parents a debt for bringing them into the world or caring for them. The child should and hopefully will become a moral human being who will be grateful for all that he or she was given, but should not have to bear the burden of unnecessary obligation that can cripple the normal development of the individual to be an independent person. The resolution of this problem comes about by virtue of the fact that each generation gives to the next what it received. The moral obligation of the individual is not to pay a debt to his parents, but to truly give of himself the totality of his meaning to his own children.

A most eloquent and powerful statement of this philosophy comes from the diary of Gluckel von Hameln (1644-1724). Writing her memoirs for her children (in Ulich, 1954, p. 664) she expressed the message stated above by means of the following allegorical story:

A bird once set out to cross a windy sea with its
three fledglings. The sea was so wide and the
wind so strong, the father bird was forced to
carry his young, one by one, in his strong claws.
When he was half-way across with the first
fledgling the wind turned to a gale, and he said,
"My child, look how I am struggling and risking
my life in your behalf. When you are grown up,
will you do as much for me and provide for my
old age?" The fledgling replied, "Only bring
me to safety, and when you are old I shall do
everything you ask of me." Whereas the father
bird dropped his child into the sea, and it
drowned, and he said, "So shall it be done to
such a liar as you." Then the father bird
returned to shore, set forth with his second
fledgling, asked the same question, and
receiving the same answer, drowned the second
child with the cry, "You, too, are a liar!"
Finally he set out with the third fledgling,
and when he asked the same question, the third
and last fledgling replied, "My dear father, it
is true you are struggling mightily and risking
your life in my behalf, and I shall be wrong
not to repay you when you are old, but I cannot
bind myself. This though I can promise: when
I am grown up and have children of my own, I shall
do as much for them as you have done for me."
Whereupon the father bird said, "Well spoken,
my child, and wisely; your life I will spare and
I will carry you to shore in safety."

This does not mean that parents should have nothing to
say about the schools, or that they should not be involved in the
curriculum. On the contrary, they should be deeply involved in a
way that will become more clear through the concept of the just
moral community. What is meant is that parents do not have the
right to ask the school to teach the students to adopt the
prejudices, inadequacies, and distortions of the parents. If
the philosophy of parental control and operation of the school
were completely operationalized we could forget about eliminating
racism, sexism, and numerous other injustices in our life.

The O-S-D approach helps to provide a way out of this problem by emphasizing development rather than specific content. Rather than teach children what to believe, the school could better help children learn how to more adequately construct one's beliefs with regard to both knowledge and wisdom. The purpose of the school should be to help the students become both effective and wise.

Beyond this problem of the parents are the problems of deciding to what extent the function of the school is to prepare children for working in society. And if the schools do have a responsibility to prepare students for their place in society, for which place do they prepare students? Existing roles, future roles, or what? Should the local community have the right to demand that the school concentrate on preparing the students to eventually work in the industry that is the lifeblood of and dominates the town and its politics and economics? Should the school transmit the values of the existing culture and society? Or should the schools serve as change agents and help learners to build a different world? These are thorny problems, but they must be faced by educators.

The importance of job preparation and skill development must be a major part of the curriculum. Certainly no one can be a full member of a society or community unless he or she is able to earn a living, make a contribution to the welfare of the community, and experience the fulfillment and satisfaction that derives from creative, productive work. The problem is not a matter of choice, the problem is only a matter of emphasis. As Murphy (1958, p. 216) says:

> An educational system which prepares people
> simply for the ways of living which are regarded
> as traditionally desirable is not an education
> permitting intelligent choices. And an educa-
> tional system preparing only for the fulfill-
> ment of a technical role is even less likely
> to permit humanity that view of the possibilities
> from which intelligent decisions can be derived.

Murphy brings together two major themes stressed in this chapter:

(1) preparation for traditional living is neither desirable nor

conducive to effective and wise choices so essential for democratic

community, and (2) preparation for work is insufficient for the

fulfillment of both the individual and the culture.

All the components of a developmental curriculum can be

brought together by realizing that developmental education means

education for the development of the total personality. A person as

a total human being is many things, among which are: person *qua*

person, friend, lover, mate, worker, parent, child, citizen,

learner, teacher, and many more. To exclude preparation for any

of these important roles is to create a hiatus in the curriculum

and a lacuna in the person. The importance of this type of education

is stressed by Dewey (1948, p. 209):

> Personality must be educated, and personality
> cannot be educated by confining its operations
> to technical and specialized things, or to the
> less important relationships of life. Full
> education comes only when there is a responsible
> share on the part of each person, in proportion
> to capacity, in shaping the aims and policies
> of the social groups to which he belongs. This
> fact fixes the significance of democracy.

Synthesizing all the ideas presented in the many sections

of this dissertation with regard to the meaning of education as

development for democracy, principled morality, and holistic

experience is accomplished by the following statement by Piaget

(1970b, pp. 159-160) who clearly enunciates the essence of develop-

mental curriculum:

> ...traditional education theory has always
> treated the child, in effect, as a small adult,
> as a being who reasons and feels just as we do
> while merely lacking our knowledge and experience.
> So that, since the child viewed in this way was no
> more than an ignorant adult, the educator's
> task was not so much to form its mind as simply
> to furnish it; the subject matter provided from
> outside was thought to be exercise enough in
> itself. But the problem becomes quite different
> as soon as one begins with the hypothesis of
> structural variations. If the child's thought is
> qualitatively different from our own, then the
> principal aim of education is to form its
> intellectual and moral reasoning power. And
> since that power cannot be formed from outside,
> the question is to find the most suitable methods
> and environment to help the child constitute it
> itself, in other words, to achieve coherence
> and objectivity on the intellectual plane and
> reciprocity on the moral plane.
>
> It is therefore of fundamental importance
> for the new school to know what the structure of
> the child's thought is, and what the relations
> are between infantile and adult mentality.

In this summary Piaget brings the organismic-structural-

developmental conceptual framework together with curriculum to

provide the basis for developmental education for the total

personality.

All that has been presented thus far can now serve as

the basis for one of the most important aspects of the entire values

development theory, namely, the *just moral community*, to which we

now turn in Chapter VII.

CHAPTER SEVEN

THE SCHOOL AS A JUST MORAL COMMUNITY

The time has come to transform the theory and philosophy of *organismic-structural-developmental* into the reality of *values development education*. Earlier we said we were not scientists, but engineers-- engineers trying to build bridges. Now a bridge is a very special kind of structure. In one sense it is a road, and as such it makes it possible for you to go from one place to another. But a bridge is more than just a road, it is a road *over* something that otherwise is un- reachable. One other quality of a bridge is important, it is possible not only to go over, but over and back--it is a two-way road over some kind of a chasm, or obstacle, or body of water.

A bridge is a very special kind of instrumentality--it is the instrument to transaction. Theory[1] is a bridge. It is a bridge from what is believed to the reality of what is. The organismic- structural-developmental theory[2] is trying to make possible a way to get from the immense, complex, and multidisciplinary data about values/ moral knowledge to the operational settings of education in order to

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[1]"Theory" here will be used to mean theoretical and philosophical aspects of the conceptual framework.

[2]Reference here to *the* O-S-D theory is not intended to negate the title of the dissertation which emphasizes "toward a theory" nor to convey the idea that the theory is yet created. It is merely a con- venience to simplify the writing.

transform that *knowledge* into practical *wisdom* for educators (know-
ledge and wisdom are used here in the specialized sense described in
Section A. of Chapter VI). And that is only possible if the trans-
action is completed by the educators responding so that the theory
may constantly be renewed in order to make it progressively valuable
in the field.

Our theory tells us that there is a very special kind of
wisdom that can be built in the educational world--a kind of wisdom
that makes possible the reconstruction of the school and its poten-
tial to participate in the reconstruction of society. No single con-
cept from the organismic-structural-developmental theory more embodies,
represents, and creates that potential wisdom than the concept of the
just moral community.

For it is in the conceptualization of the school as a just
moral community that the potential exists for transforming the school
into a powerful community that can augment, enrich, and reconstruct
the democratic world in which most of us want to live. None of what
has been said is any way whatsoever intended to be mere rhetoric,
idle dreaming, or visionary speculation. The world is a continuous
imperfection. There are three basic ways to approach that reality:
(1) with pessimism and despair; (2) with optimism and blind hope; or
(3) with Dewey's meliroism and recognition of the potential for
constructive, positive, and realistic change that can be brought about
by enough people searching for the knowledge to create the wisdom
that can be actively applied to the problems of the real world. Within
the context, purpose, and goals of this dissertation and the organismic-

structural-developmental theory the notion of a *just moral community*

is a melioristic goal for which a number of people intend to strive--

knowing that such a thing may never in full bloom be seen, but for

which the community effort to build it is in fact the goal itself.

The idea of a just moral community has an abstract and vague

aura about it that makes it appear esoteric and gossamer, or unreal.

But it is as real as the meanings of the three words themselves. It

is nothing more than the application of all the concepts, empirical

findings, and principles that have been presented as the guts of the

theory. *Justice, morality,* and *community* have all been defined, de-

scribed, explored, and exemplified. The idea now is to see them come

alive in the school. Since it is widely agreed that American schools

are institutions that have practiced the injustices, immorality,

and nondemocratic practices that have generated the massive litera-

ture of protest that has all but inundated us in recent years, then

we need to explore the application of the principles of values devel-

opment education theory to see if there are ways in which schools

can be instruments of justice, models of principled morality, and the

living embodiment of true community.[3]

The type of justice that characterizes the just moral commun-

ity is the distributive justice of Level III, especially Stage 6. An

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[3]The discussion here will use all the terminology and conceptualiza-
tions of the preceding chapters without explanation. The reader's
familiarity with those ideas is presumed here.

arbitrary distinction is made here between *equality* as representing

the quantitative aspects of justice, and *equity* as representing the

qualitative aspects.[4] Generally speaking the lower forms of justice

characteristic of the earlier stages are more inclined towards emphasis

on equality with little emphasis on equity. As structural develop-

ment progresses, and justice becomes more equilibrated, the ratio

lends to shift in the opposite direction. Stage 4 is generally charac-

terized by a relatively more rigid application of law calling for

equality, "balance the scales," and similar notions. But individual

circumstances are considered, the quality of a man's reputation and

record are noted, and other factors enter into judgments. So even

with the law and order orientation of Stage 4 there is some element

of equity, and it is more equilibrated than similar notions at lower

stages, but considerably less equilibrated than the same concept at

Level III. Thus retributive justice is primarily characterized by

an emphasis on equality, with some consideration for equity.

Level III principled morality is especially characterized

by distributive justice that represents not only a more equilibrated

type of justice, and not only a greater emphasis on equity than equal-

ity, but significantly enriches the principle by a finer and more

equilibrated sense of discrimination, which makes possible a more just

distribution of the elements of justice. The discrimination refers

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[4]There are few subjects in all of philosophy that are more complex and controversial than justice. The oversimplification here hopefully will not seriously distort the issue or misrepresent the meaning of justice. But a certain degree of arbitrariness is necessary in order to communicate the basic points without drowning in a sea of complexity and quali-fications.

to the greater ability to evaluate qualitatively the entire situation under consideration with the capacity to differentiate more subtle issues and finer distinctions. At Level I most decisions are made quickly in terms of black and white. At Level II black and white still predominate, but a few shades of gray are introduced, and decisions are characterized by more reflection. At Level III justice becomes more than a mere continuum with extensive variations in shades of gray. Rather it becomes a multicolored and three-dimensional conceptualization with complex interrelationships and coordinated discriminations.

Distributive justice, in this discussion, represents the evaluation of competing claims and the distribution of justice with consideration for both the qualitative and quantitative aspects, with the tendency for more emphasis on quality than quantity. Consequently, distributive justice is a flexible, harmonious, and integrated equilibration of both equality and equity. In all cases the emphasis would be on the attempt to render justice with maximum consideration for the value of human life as the primary value without qualification or justification, and with due regard for the consideration of personality.

Dewey (1960, p. 107) says:

> The meaning of justice in concrete cases is something to be determined by seeing what consequences will bring about human welfare in a fair and even way.

and (p. 114):

> But equity, or impartiality, of interest is a matter of quality not of quantity...

And Piaget (1932, p. 285) says:

> Finally, ...mere equalitarianism makes way for a more subtle conception of justice which we may call "equity," and which consists in never defining equality without taking account of the way in which each individual is situated.

The just moral community, in its full state of development, would be characterized by principled morality based on distributive justice, emphasizing equity.

The *moral* component of the concept of the just moral community needs no further elaboration. It has been fully developed in Chapters IV and V. As stated in the paragraph immediately preceding, the just moral community is characterized by principled morality.

The *community* aspect of just moral community has been fully developed in Chapter V, to which one more major contribution will be made. The conceptualizations given in terms of Sargent's and White and Lippitt's notions of democracy; Dewey's vision of democracy and community as isomorphic; and Angyal's and related ideas about homonomy comprise a rich, full-bodied, and multidimensional picture of the meaning of *community*. The final component to be added in order to clarify the definition of community comes from Newmann and Oliver (in Purpel and Belanger, 1972, Ch. 8, pp. 207-208). They define community as follows:

> A community is a group
>
> (1) in which membership is valued as an end in itself, not merely as a means to other ends;
> (2) that concerns itself with many and significant aspects of the lives of members;
> (3) that allows competing factions;
> (4) whose members share responsibility for the actions of the group;

(6) whose members have enduring and extensive personal contact with each other.

This working definition omits residence, political units, occupations, etc. as necessarily valid boundaries by which to distinguish one community from another.

This definition is highly congruent with much of the earlier presentations of the same subject.

Plan for Initiating a Just Moral Community

The above definition, in combination with the other elements, provides an excellent foundation for building goals, objectives, and criteria for the just moral community, and a framework in which to plan concretely the application of justice and moral principles in a school.

At this point a proposed integration of the various elements of a complete program for building the foundation and operational principles of the school as a just moral community can be made. The following elements are recommended as the basis for such a program:

1. The primary units of the basic organismic-structural-developmental theory, especially:

   a. Piaget's stages of intellectual development

   b. Kohlberg's stages of moral development

   c. The four factors of development

2. The six criteria for principled morality:

   a. Formal operational intelligence

   b. Perspectivism

   c. Habitual reflective tendencies

     d. Sensitivity

     e. Responsibility

     f. Homonomy

3. The curriculum theory presented at the beginning of Section B of this chapter.

4. The integrated criteria and characteristics of democratic community, including those presented from:

     a. Sargent, Section A of Chapter V.

     b. White and Lippitt, Section A of Chapter V.

     c. Newmann and Oliver, Section C of Chapter VI.

5. A plan for initiating, maximizing, and sustaining the participation and involvement of at least the following people or groups:

     a. The students

     b. The entire staff of the school (professional, para-professional, ancillary, office, custodial, etc.)

     c. The central administration of the school district

     d. Parents or guardians

     e. Relevant community members

     f. Other appropriate people and/or groups.

6. A plan for designing a decision-making process.

It is believed that this preliminary and tentative outline of elements could serve as the starting point for an initial meeting at which the feasibility of the concept, exploration of the possibility and method of implementation, and a decision could be reached about whether or not to proceed with continued exploration of the concept of the school as a just moral community.

Three considerations must be taken into account in considering the above plan. *First,* participation in the program would not be based on prior knowledge, experience, or education. One would not have to be or have anything more than what he or she is as a person at the moment in time that the program begins. Part of the object of building a just moral community is the convening of people of all levels of education, interest, religious, political, and other orientations. Individual contribution would depend on the person's competence, knowledge of issues, and willingness to speak, learn, and share whatever the issue or situation needed, and not on status, rank, or strength.

Second, initial discussions would have to include the subject of power, conflict, and the typical "games people play" in order to manipulate, coerce, and control. The spirit with which the program starts is very important, and generally people will attempt to go with the spirit of the thing at the beginning if the tone set from the outset is made clear, is delicately handled, and enthusiastically presented.

Third, and of primary importance, is the recognition that the success of the program would not only be whatever degree of progress is made toward the actual building of the ideal or conceptualized just moral community--in fact, it would be primarily the actual bringing together of the people in the task, their participation, and their personal and interpersonal contributions that would be the essence of the program. The active education of Piaget and the experiential education of Dewey would literally come alive in the process--and is is in this process that people would grow and develop, if the organismic-

structural-developmental theory has any validity. Reaching some mythical end goal of a pure just moral community is irrelevant--striving, building, trying, and working at it would create the educational atmosphere conducive to development.

The just moral community is the working together--not the product of an object, or a thing, or an end. The just moral community would be created through the communion of shared intelligence, shared effort, and shared love--in short, through the communion of homonomy.

Characteristics of the Just Moral Community in the School

Dewey has provided a very concise description of the school that clearly defines the just moral community. Discussing moral principles in education he summarizes as follows (1959b, pp. 43-44):

> I sum up, then, this part of the discussion by asking your attention to the moral trinity of the school. The demand is for social intelligence, social power, and social interests. Our resources are (1) the life of the school as a social institution in itself; (2) methods of learning and of doing work; and (3) the school studies or curriculum. In so far as the school represents, in its own spirit, a genuine community life; in so far as what are called school discipline, government, order, etc., are the expressions of this inherent social spirit; in so far as the methods used are those that appeal to the active and constructive powers, permitting the child to give out and thus to serve; in so far as the curriculum is so selected and organized as to provide the material for affording the child a consciousness of the world in which he has to play a part, and the demands he has to meet; so far as these ends are met, the school is organized on an ethical basis. So far as general principles are concerned, all the basic ethical requirements are met. The rest remains between the individual teacher and the individual child.

The above statement synthesizes practically all of the components that have been included in this dissertation as the foundation for the

organismic-structural-developmental approach to education in general,
and to values development education in particular.

The school is a community by virtue of the amount of time
the inhabitants spend in it, the nature of the activities that go
on there, and the extent of the influence on all involved. The
school's influence is enormous, pervasive, and enduring in terms of
its moral, social, political, and economic values. The school has an
opportunity to be and a moral obligation to be a constructive force
in the lives of all who live in it. The impact of the school must
be measured in terms of what kind of community it represents, and
that the major factor in that experience is the kinds of relationships
and organization that exist among the staff and how these aspects of
the community are communicated to, shared with, and built with the
students. What has always been a major part of the unplanned curri-
culum should be made into the major part of the planned curriculum.
At present the planned and unplanned curricula work against each other,
with the planned curriculum largely negated by the more powerful
organic message of the hidden curriculum But in the just moral com-
munity approach the curriculum would be integrated, and the content
and process would be part of the mainstream of the school.

For example, in the attempt to work out the problems of
living together, growing together, and building community all the real
life conflicts and problems would become natural subjects for study,
research, investigation, debate, discussion, etc. Students and
faculty together would work on these problems in such a way as to
draw on the expertise and competence of the staff while encouraging

the development of these skills and competencies by the students at their level of development.

Of primary importance for the students is how the staff functions in its deliberations and how it works out its problems of living and working as a team. It is rather senseless to talk to the students about democracy, tolerance, equality, and similar concepts if the members of the staff cannot demonstrate them in action. By showing respect to each other and to the students they could help the students gradually learn the true meaning of respect. By going beyond tolerance to celebration of the differences among the members of the staff they could build a solid foundation for communicating the meaning of pluralism in a democratic society.

In the just moral community the present priorities would be reversed. The primary resources would be people, and the secondary resources would be the material and conceptual tools. Each teacher and each student would be viewed as his/her own best resource.

With a book the content is the message and the book is the medium. But for a teacher the person is both the medium and the message. In fact it is more likely that the teacher is more message than medium. A teacher cannot merely talk about justice, a teacher must be just, and must help the students grow into higher forms of justice. A teacher cannot merely talk about democracy, a teacher must be democratic, and help the students become democratic. A teacher cannot talk about due process, a teacher must use due process, and help the students grow into the idea.

The essence of democracy is not voting, representation, majority, etc. These are merely the means by which democracy operates, and not its ends. Democracy is intelligent moral action practiced in a community that strives to maximize human development, insure and diffuse freedom, and create a positive peace built on the presence of goodwill rather than on the absence of fighting. Democracy is not acting dependently or independently; it is acting interdependently. A member of a democratic community is a full human being, intelligent and sensitive, acting interdependently with other similar human beings in order to simultaneously and transactionally develop both the capacity of the individual and the community as a whole.

This last point is especially significant in terms of the capacity of the just moral community to contribute the development of personality. Piaget talks about personality as "reciprocal rapport," or the reconciliation of the autonomy of the individual and the autonomy of society. Harvey, Hunt, and Schroder talk about positive maximum interdependence. Glad talks about "interpersonality." Cattell talks about "syntality" and "synergy," in contrast to "personality" and "energy." It is generally recognized among all organismic psychologists that the individual's existence, meaning, and personality is created and defined in terms of other individuals for whom the same is true. And, if development proceeds far enough, all these forces converge and expand simulataneously into Angyal's "homonomy." This is what the just moral community is all about.

Consequently, through community the full meaning of experience, democracy, and development converge to promote man and society. Discussing the formation of ethical values through mutual respect Piaget points out that mutual respect is the source of obligations. But these obligations not only impose the rules they create but the method that creates them. And he says "this method is none other than reciprocity, understood not only as an exact balancing of good and bad but as *the mutual coordination of points of view and actions.*" This beautiful idea is the basis for the just moral community, built on the striving for consensus, equity, and distributive justice.

Thus through the just moral community the linkages for curriculum development, staff development, values development, and learner development are an integral part of the content and the process of the school itself. The building of the linkages in the real-life activity of the community fosters both the community and its members. You build curriculum primarily by developing the human resources in the community. The development of these human resources enhances the values development of the community members, which in turn creates the need for curriculum renewal and continued development to a higher level. In this respect the components of curriculum, presented earlier, take on added meaning. For the staff and students would be involved in the construction and implementation of the curriculum as part of the ongoing activity of the just moral community. The nature, degree, and amount of involvement would, of course, be dependent upon the developmental level of the individual. An eighth grade student would not,

of course, be involved to the extent of or at the level of his teacher. But he/she would be involved, and the linkages would be operative. Curriculum building and development become important parts of the life of the school rather than tasks to be done with, or to be done by experts, or to have done to you.

In this type of curriculum the intellectual development and the values/moral development are coordinated. The educational activities would consist of a multitude of active investigations, experiments, team projects, and any kind of activity called for by the needs of the individuals and the community. Knowledge, skills, and ethical development would occur naturally in meaningful context. Or as Piaget puts it: "...the school as a center of real (and experimental) activities carried out in common so that logical intelligence may be elaborated through action and social exchanges."

The role of the teacher in this type of education becomes quite different from the traditional role of authority, teller, officer. Carl Rogers speaks of the role of the teacher as "facilitator." Piaget speaks of the role as "organizer-mentor." Both of these are fine, but to think of the teacher as a *developer* may be even more to the point. Developmental education is the process of aiding, encouraging, and stimulating the natural developmental potential of the human being in all aspects of life. This means providing the human and material resources in sufficient quantity, of appropriate quality, and in proper configuration so as to maximize personal, social, and cultural development to the highest levels and stages possible.

In a democratic society the school should be the epitome of
all we mean by freedom, justice, and democracy. That is what we mean
by the school as a just moral community.

The Teacher in a Just Moral Community

The role of the teacher in the just moral community is central
and critical. Consequently, the education and the development of the
teacher become two of the most important aspects of teacher selec-
tion and teacher preparation, both preservice and inservice. Pro-
fessional members of the faculty must be informed and competent about
the latest theories, philosophies, and empirical findings of develop-
mental psychology, socialization research, and values/moral develop-
ment.

The dual nature of the teacher as both medium and message,
mentioned earlier, becomes significantly highlighted in the role of
a values/moral agent, and especially in a school that sees values/
moral development as one of the primary roles of the school. A point
that must be emphasized is that it is not a matter of *modeling*, not
a matter of merely being a good example, that is the issue here--what
must be understood clearly is that the significance of the teacher for
values/moral development is in the actual transactional involvement
of the just moral community. The teacher is not a model or an example--
she or he is only part of the transaction that exemplifies and models
values and morality. The idea of example or model, or hero symbol,
and other like terms are related to the nomothetic and character
approaches of values/moral education where it is hoped that the

students will acquire by transmission the qualities of the model or the hero. It is a matter of identification. This is *not* how students learn values and morality; this is more likely how they discover the difference between what people say and what they do that sets up the basis for the generation gap, the respect gap, and the hypocrisy syndrome.

In the O-S-D approach in the just moral community the teacher and the student *live* and *are* values and morality in their transactions, in which they explore the realities of everyday life, the real moral problems they both face, the seeking of resolution and solution to actual problems in the full spirit of inquiry. To miss this point is to miss the concept of the just moral community.

To clarify the point consider a rather typical behavior in schools. An impressionable normal teenager idolizes a teacher and supposedly "models" the teacher's behavior. Kelman (1961) calls this "identification" and points out the major problems involved. First, the adopted behavior tends to be used superficially only so long as the model remains a positive figure for the learner, and generally mostly in the presence of the model. When the model is not present the behavior is not as likely to be demonstrated. Second, when the model becomes a negative figure for the student, as frequently happens in schools where a student simply "loves" a teacher one day, receives a rebuff, a low grade, or some kind of rejection the following week, and then "hates" the teacher, the superficially adopted behavior tends to be dropped.

The concept of the teacher as a *transactional values/moral agent* involves *imitation,* which is widely recognized as normal behavior for children and youth, but the imitation would be merely part of a more complex relationship that involves a deeper factor, namely, the factor of working together, jointly exploring the problem, and giving the child a chance to assimilate and accommodate, and thus achieve an equilibrated behavioral pattern that goes beyond and deeper than modeling. Some psychologists would call this *internalization,* a term avoided in this dissertation because of its multitude of meanings in the literature. Also, from the O-S-D theoretical framework the behavior is more appropriately thought of as having been learned in the developmental sense.

The significance for the teacher is that he or she has participated in the same process and has had a chance for the same development to have taken place. The teacher cannot get by with merely modeling a behavior in the presence of the student and then behaviorally expressing an opposite response in the absence of the student. A teacher, for example, could model honesty, openness, and consideration for the students in the classroom, and then proceed to the teachers' lounge and engage in contradictory behavior--a phenomenon not unfamiliar to any teacher. Thus modeling is conceived as a superficial, role-playing device; whereas *transactional involvement* is a developmental role taking opportunity for both teacher and learner.

A very important implication of values development education theory is that education and development of the faculty becomes more

important, relatively, than the education and development of the students. The meaning of this paradoxical statement is that the developmental capacity of the school's contribution to the students' development is greatly determined by and limited by the developmental level of the faculty. The need for continuous growth and development of the faculty is critical. And in a just moral community approach this would be even more important, but also more feasible. More important because the students should be able to develop beyond what the present type of school usually generates; and more feasible because the opportunity for faculty development is inherently more available through the dynamic values/moral atmosphere of the just moral community.

The implications for teacher education (preservice) should be obvious, but they will not be explored here inasmuch as that is a subject so great that it deserves exhaustive and deep exploration and investigation. For the sake of completeness, however, it is merely recognized and acknowledged here.

Another major implication somewhat related to what has been said above, is that teachers will need to do all in their power to learn how to become more aware of themselves and their consistencies and inconsistencies. They will need to become more aware of themselves as their own single best resource for teaching. Their role as values/moral agent requires that they become more alert, for example, to (1) the use of immoral means to achieve moral ends, and (2) the use of moral means to achieve immoral ends. Both kinds of experience are rather common in present-day schools. An example of

(1) above is the use of collective punishment to resolve behavioral problems in the classroom or school. To unjustly punish a large number of people in order to justly punish one anonymous law-breaker is both immoral and unjust, and can be counterproductive for the teaching of justice. An example of (2) above is to use the enthusiasm, spirit, and community commitment of sensitive teenagers to foster prejudice, divisiveness, and even hatred in the name of school pride and achievement. Much of what goes on in the world of athletics, for example, goes far beyond the bounds of normal ordinary fun and school spirit. The animosities, vicious behavior, and even violent behavior that has frequently occurred at athletic events is a manifestation of this issue. Teenagers are inherently vibrant, dynamic, and enthusiastic for the most part, especially when it comes to those aspects of school life that are relevant and meaningful for them. This is a manifestation of the potential for moral commitment. To misuse this positive factor to generate antidemocratic and immoral behavior is tragic and antithetical to everything the school represents in a democratic society.

Even more serious manifestations of these principles may occur in the administration of the school. When convenient and suitable for the faculty often many of the rules and laws of the school are ignored, broken, or changed. The same laws and rules are usually rigidly adhered to and strictly applied in the dealings with students--and generally in the name of law, order, and justice. This problem and the underlying principle is well stated by Martin Luther King (1963, p. 8):

Let us turn to a more concrete example of just
and unjust laws. An unjust law is a code that
a majority inflicts on a minority that is not
binding on itself. This is difference made
legal. On the other hand a just law is a code
that a majority compels a minority to follow
that it is willing to follow itself. This is
sameness made legal.

Let me give another explanation. An unjust law
is a code inflicted upon a minority which that
minority had no part in enacting or creating
because they did not have the unhampered
with to vote. Who can say that the legislature
of Alabama which set up the segregation laws
was democratically elected? Throughout the
state of Alabama all types of conniving
methods are used to prevent Negroes from becoming
registered voters and there are some counties
without a single Negro registered to vote
despite the fact that the Negro constitutes
a majority of the population. Can any law set
up in such a state be considered democratically
structured?

In every school with which the writer has been associated this

type of behavior has been observed frequently. It is one of the

most serious problems with which the faculty of any school must

grapple. In a just moral community it would be one of the highest

priority items on one of the first agenda.

This specific problem is only an example, an important

one to be sure, of the many ways in which students are victimized

in schools. It would be one of the most significant parts of

the manifesto or creed of a just moral community that no methods

that demean, derogate, dehumanize, or destroy would be knowingly

tolerated or ignored. And teachers would do all in their

power to recognize in themselves and their own need for personal

development the many obvious and subtle behaviors in all of us that

contribute to this problem. On this issue Furbee (1973, p. 158) says:

> Like our political institutions, education is hopefully moving toward a broader democracy in which each person is free to develop his interests and abilities. The movement is apparent in the way teachers relate to groups of students; presumably there are less suppression and control for their own sake. Herein rests the enigma with which teachers are now faced: maintaining order consistent with democratic values. It appears that teachers want their classrooms to reflect the greater democratic political system within which they function, the inconsistency being their use of autocratic methods of control within a democratic society. Repression, isolation, humiliation, corporal punishment, etc., seem inconsistent in a society of equals. Only in an autocratic system can corporal punishment and other autocratic practices exist wherein one human being demonstrates his superiority over lesser human beings in order to maintain his status.

The just moral community would have to conduct an extensive and in-depth exploration of the major issue of management and control in the school and classroom. No democratic institution can function or survive without control. Control is an inherent part of the justice and ethics of community. The question is not one of control versus no control--it is a question of what kind of control is consistent with and enhancing for democratic living. On face value, however, it would seem that certain practices may well be inherently antithetical and counterproductive to democracy, community, and principled morality: e.g., corporal punishment, collective punishment, psychological abuse, physical abuse, and compulsory "volunteering."

The final fact to mention in terms of the role of the

teacher in a just moral community is the positive factor of the incredibly great opportunity that involvement in a just moral community offers for the personal and professional growth and development for the teacher. Also, the excitement, enthusiasm, and commitment that come from the building of an homonomous community is truly one of the most fulfilling, rewarding, and transcending experiences that can happen to a human being.

The Need for an Ombudsman

The idea of a just moral community creates a need for the presence of an objective mediator, impartial judge, and values/moral leader. This role could be filled by the presence of a professional ombudsman on the faculty of the school.

The selection of such a person would have to be one of the most meticulously and sensitively handled personnel matters of the school. The person appointed to this position would have to possess the personality, intelligence, and moral development highly congruent with what has been described in earlier sections of this dissertation. The right person in this carefully defined position could be one of the greatest factors in the success of such a venture.

This point will not be further developed at this time, but needs to be fully explored in a thorough development of the concept of the just moral community. It also serves as a bridge to one of the key elements of a just moral community: *responsibility.*

Responsibility in and for the Just Moral Community

One of the most significant and paradoxical aspects of our society is the great emphasis placed on individual responsibility, individual freedom, and self-determination while at the same time we stress group membership and identification, loyalty and conformity to group norms, and the surrender of personal goals for the welfare of the group. On the one hand we idolize the rugged individualist-- Horatio Alger, the empire-builder, the conqueror, the pioneer, the explorer; while on the other hand we idolize the self-sacrificing martyr, the person who renounces his own private ambitions for the welfare of the group, sacrifices his own dreams and perhaps even his life for others, the philanthropist, the humanitarian, the noble idealist whose concern is not for self but for mankind. At one and the same time we profess that the individual is supreme and that there is something greater and more important than the individual.

The conflict between autonomy and heteronomy has many more facets than the one just presented. For in a sense, either of the courses mentioned above could be derived from either autonomy or heteronomy. One could, for example chart a life of individualism based on self-chosen concepts about that being the only way to fulfillment, or one could live that way because it is an ideal held up by the group and fostered in every aspect of the socialization process. In the same way, one could arrive at martyrdom, social welfare, or humanitarianism (there is no implication that these are the same) by way of self-determination and reflective choice, or by way of social-cultural conditioning and the socialization process.

In short, one could go either way through conscious choice or through slavish conformity to group standards.

Either way the individual is involved in the struggle between egoism and altruism, attempting to reconcile them in some kind of personally fulfilling and socially acceptable balance. But Dewey and Angyal both tell us that this is not a satisfactory solution to the problem. Either of these, or some combination of them, constitutes an adjustment of an isolated self, which Dewey and Angyal say is neither efficacious nor possible in view of the inherently social nature of human existence. The Self has no origin, existence, or meaning in isolation. How then could an isolated self even exist, let alone effect a satisfactory solution to the struggle between egoism and altruism? In fact, does not the mere juxtaposition of the terms "isolated" and "self" constitute an impossibility? Are not these words and concepts mutually exclusive? Dewey says the relationships formed in our social environment are more important than adjustments of isolated selves. The O-S-D theory not only strongly supports Dewey's claim, but indicates that he may not have stated the case strongly enough. Practically every organismic psychologist has emphasized the transactional nature of personality development-- development of the Self.

If human existence, then is rooted in, dependent on, and fulfilled through relationships it becomes self-evident that some kind of moral order must exist in order for these relationships to develop, deepen, to be mutually beneficial, and to survive. This moral order, which could be conceived as love (homonomy) in its many forms,

cannot truly exist except in a state of freedom. For the kind of moral order under question is not an order of coercion, tyranny, or command, but the kind of order that is based on cooperation and reciprocity. Such an order of human relationships can therefore occur freely when there is justice. Justice is the necessary foundation of reciprocity and cooperation. And justice, in turn, demands responsibility. Without a meaningful sense of responsibility on the part of human beings in social intercourse there can be no viable concept of justice. For justice is the dynamic manifestation of individual responsibility in transaction. An individual is not capable of participating in a social system or moral order unless he is capable of distinguishing himself from others, and consequently the needs, interests, and rights of both himself and others, and the interrelationships among these. All of this is not possible unless the individual has developed as an independent Self, which can only happen through healthy growth as the result of the proper kinds of experience.

Thus Dewey's conceptualization of the moral self and the moral life has an internal consistency that is also consistent with the knowledge of human nature and human behavior that comes to us from developmental psychology, social psychology, and theories of cognitive development. And furthermore, it is highly consistent with the rich conceptualization of the moral person provided by Elijah Jordan, which was presented in Chapter V. The rest of this discussion on responsibility rests on the idea of the moral person that merges

from the integration Dewey's and Jordan's views. From this standpoint
then, the idea of *responsibility* will be presented.

The notion of responsibility is one of the fundamental
factors in the articulation and integration of the overlapping, con-
joint, and interdependent worlds of the Self and the World. The
capacity for responsible behavior, as strongly emphasized earlier in
this dissertation, provides the fulcrum for the balance between
the interests of the individual and the merging of that interest
in those things that go beyond him, transcend him, and enlarge him--
the homonous existence of which Angyal so eloquently speaks.

Traditional views of responsibility have been in terms of
retributive justice, in terms of expiation, restitution, and balance.
They have been, as Dewey points out, retrospective views of responsi-
bility that holds people accountable for the past. This is the view
of Levels I and II that Kohlberg so clearly elaborates. The results
of such a view are the separation of ends and means, the pharasaical
rigidity and legalism that characterizes much of the justice in the
world, and many other types of behavior so prevalent in nomothetic
systems of justice and values/moral education. We must grow beyond
such views to principled morality and more equilibrated forms of
justice based on deep interpretations of equality tempered, augmented,
and enriched by the qualitative justice of equity. Dewey's view of
responsibility is prospective, holding people accountable for their
actions only as a means of growth and development. It is future
oriented, puts ends and means in proper perspective and relationship
with each other and with life, encourages openness between people,

is flexible, and creates the fertile atmosphere for the development of qualitative forms of responsibility. The traditional approach denies the capacity for responsible behavior, assumes man is evil and needs to be regulated and controlled, and sets man and society in opposition to each other. But Dewey's approach not only recognizes man's capacity to be responsible, but evokes it, encourages it, and nourishes it. And thus the capacity for responsible behavior becomes the fulcrum that puts man and society in balance with each other.

It is this balance that provides the opportunity for man to freely choose to develop a moral order based on responsiblilty. The order is not ordained and predetermined, but is left for man to determine. The balance between man and society can be destroyed or upset. Or it can be constantly in the process of being built or restored. And this process has its own reciprocal transaction in that the energy and action that goes into the building and developing of any unit in this complex process builds and develops the other units. Whatever one man does to contribute to the growth of another contributes also to his own growth, and to society as a whole. Thus the growth factor becomes a creative and geometric process. The struggle between egoism and altruism can now be seen in a different light. What an individual does to further his own self-growth in a Dewey and Jordan system increases his ability to enhance the welfare of both himself and others. What fosters growth in one person generates growth in others and in society.

The basic problem of the conflict between egoism and altruism is no longer relevant if we hold people accountable for their actions in such a way as to make it possible for them to grow and modify their future behavior. The egoism-altruism view sets up an unnecessary and spurious dichotomy requiring that human action be evaluated in terms of this duality. But much of human behavior cannot be so neatly classified. Furthermore, the pejorative connotation of egoism clouds the issue and leads you to believe that what one does for oneself is necessarily self-centered and selfish. Likewise, the abnegative connotation of altruism belies the nature of acts that are truly performed with unselfish motives but also benefit the doer, or do not involve renunciation at all.

From a developmental orientation attempting to establish responsibility for positive modification of behavior it is inappropriate to evaluate one's behavior in these terms. What we need to do in assessing the quality of our own and others' acts is to reflect on the consequences of those acts for ourselves and others. Did this particular act encourage growth; contribute to the development of ourselves, others, and society; enhance the opportunity for all concerned to express the human potential of the transaction? Or is the effect of this act contrary to these objectives?

As mentioned earlier, the customary approach to responsibility encourages people to weigh the costs and the rewards of their acts. Each person and each act has a price. Human relationships become forms of business relationships exactly like those in the

marketplace. Reciprocity becomes instrumentalism and cooperation becomes a contract (Kohlberg Stage 2). There is little opportunity for true learning or growth in this kind of system without appropriate experience, as Dewey, Piaget, and Kohlberg all emphasize, and without the guidance of mature values/moral educators. Approbation and re- probation become external reinforcements that tend to crystallize the person's moral development at Levels I and II, and tend to stultify the potential for development to more mature and creative forms of behavior and relationships at the level of principled morality. The traditional approaches are conducive to viewing other people instru- mentally as utilities whose purpose is to satisfy one's own needs. The so-called "Playboy Philosophy" that is more popular than we may want to recognize or admit exemplifies this level of morality and human relationships. This same philosophy and form of moral behavior characterizes much of our society in politics, business, and education. It is a powerful, pervasive, and influential model of human relation- ships in our culture.

Part of the program of the school as a just moral community is to explore these subjects openly, freely, and with courage in order to force us to ask ourselves those disturbing questions about our own use of these behaviors. Done appropriately this is what operational- izes Piaget's model of equilibration which induces the cognitive and moral growth that both Piaget and Kohlberg describe in their theories and their stages. We must explore these questions. We must ask if we have grown--truly grown--as individuals, as learners, as teachers,

as members of a community that will eventually be seen to extend beyond the walls of the school to the local society, the nation, and hopefully to the world.

These questions cannot be asked, and the developmental potential realized in the present system of education. For these questions involve justice, and the present system is not built on the type of justice such a view requires. Dewey's, Piaget's, Kohlberg's, and Jordan's concepts of responsibility, in order to be realized in the actions of us in the reality of our everyday worlds, must be stimulated, encouraged, supported, and actively promoted in the home and in the school. The school must play a vital and prominant role in this process--the school must be developmentally oriented and developmentally operated.

In summary, responsibility is a major part of the curriculum and the methodology of the school as a just moral community. The soundness of this concept relies heavily on the meaning and role given to responsiblity, for responsibility is a key factor in the rapprochement between the individual and the society. If love, peace, justice, and all the other euphonious elements of humanistic and democratic rhetoric are ever to become more than dreams, more than credos, more than constitutions and declarations--then people as individuals and as members of society must accept responsibility for their own actions and the interdependent relationship of those actions with similar selves in a complex and troubled world. The concept of responsibility that could emerge from a just moral community

concept of school could help point the way to development that would be manifested in actions that lead youth away from the immaturity of retributive justice to the progressive maturity of cooperation . based on equity. Our educational system needs a theory of values/ moral education that is not based on man's weaknesses and lowest forms of behavior, but one that considers the enormous potential for growth and development. Dewey's philosophy, especially his conceptualization of responsiblity, replaces the blindness of retributive justice with the vision of intelligent reflection that could enable man to distribute material and spiritual wealth with equity and equality. Dewey replaces might with the mind and makes it possible for man himself to plant and cultivate the seed of growth firmly in the rich soil of humanity. In a world such as Dewey's man could possibly discover how enormous is his capacity to do good. There are many who would say that responsibility as conceived by Dewey is unrealistic and impractical with man as he is today. But I believe that Dewey's vision saw beneath the surface of man's exterior to the rich inner core where the potential exceeds the performance. And regardless of how impractical his view may appear, we really do not know until an attempt is made to operationalize it.

The usual reaction to statements such as this is that now is not the time, or such visions are only for dreamers and sermons-- in the reality of the world, they say, such things are impossible. But a man who faced one of the most firmly rooted and unbending injustices of our time refused to accept this idea that there is a

right time to stimulate action for development that will insure

survival and spread freedom and democracy. He ignored the cynics,

and the apathetic, and the nay-sayers. He soundly condemned the

moderate who insists that all things work out in time. His name is

Martin Luther King, and he said (1963, pp. 10-11):

> I had also hoped that the white moderate would
> reject the myth of time. I received a letter this
> morning from a white brother in Texas which said:
> "All Christians know that the colored people will
> receive equal rights eventually, but it is possible
> that you are in too great of a religious hurry.
> It has taken Christianity almost 2000 years to
> accomplish what it has. The teachings of Christ
> take time to come to earth." All that is said
> here grows out of a tragic misconception of time.
> It is the strangely irrational notion that there is
> something in the very flow of time that will in-
> evitably cure all ills. Actually time is neutral.
> It can be used either destructively or construc-
> tively. I am coming to feel that the people of
> ill-will have used time much more effectively than
> the people of good will. We will have to repent
> in this generation not merely for the vitriolic
> words and action of the bad people, but for the
> appalling silence of the good people. We must
> come to see that human progress never rolls in
> on wheels of inevitability. It comes through the
> tireless efforts and persistent work of men willing
> to be co-workers with God, and without this hard
> word time itself becomes an ally of the forces
> of social stagnation. We must use time creatively,
> and forever realize that the time is always ripe
> to do right. Now is the time to make real the
> promise of democracy, and transform our pending
> national elegy into a creative psalm of brotherhood.
> Now is the time to lift our national policy from
> the quicksand of racial injustice to the solid
> rock of human dignity.

King's message coming from his life commitment as Christian

minister, must not be lost or rejected because of the religious

context in which he phrases it. The message is that time is not the

solution to our problems of injustice and unprincipled morality.

Time is not the solution to inadequate and ineffective schools.

Time is not the solution to the crises and disasters that threaten

the survival of our nation and the peace of the world. Time is no

excuse for anything that has not been done--it is the life opportunity

for all the things that can be done and need to be done. And one

thing that needs to be done is to make our schools places where

children can become fully human and build a world for billions of

fully human brothers and sisters.

King said one other thing of significance for us here.

He as a minister, condemned the church for being a follower and not

a leader for the cause of justice. Many see the school as the reflec-

tion of the society in which it exists, and the servant of that society.

Others see the school as fulfilling its role of servant best by

being the principal agent of renewal and reconstruction. What Martin

Luther King said of the church is here offered to apply to the school

(p. 14):

> So here we are moving toward the exit of the
> twentieth century with a religious community largely
> adjusted to the status quo, standing as a tail-
> light behind other community agencies rather than
> a headlight leading men to higher levels of justice.

Education must stop being a tail-light--education must be a headlight,

a beacon pointing the way with all the resources at its command to

maximizing the humanity of the children it holds captive in its

buildings.

There are those who would say that the comments just

made have no place in what is supposed to be a scholarly document

such as a dissertation. But the writer of this dissertation says
that scholarship is of no value, and science is of no value, and
slavish conformity to the traditions of dissertation structure is
of no value unless the writer invests his entire being in the creation
of a document that hopefully someone will read and use.

Science and engineering without values and principled
morality are both empty and dangerous. A dissertation attempting
to contribute the development of a theory for values development
education for use by those, including the author, who truly want
to help the present generation of children passing through our schools
build a better world, had better include the full investment of
their own commitment to a better world. Without that, the degree
for which this is partial fulfillment is worthless.

The organismic-structural-developmental framework makes
possible a way to conceptualize values/moral education in such a
way as to maximize the potential of the school for human development.
There are many ways this can be done, one of them is through concep-
tualizing the school as a just moral community.

CHAPTER EIGHT

SUMMARY, RECOMMENDATIONS
AND CONCLUSION

Three functions are served by this chapter. First a brief
recapitulation of the content, purpose, and structure of the
dissertation are presented. Second, some recommendations are derived
from the attempt to build a theory for values development education.
The recommendations are concerned with suggestions for further
theoretical development, ideas for research, and suggestions for
application to educational situations. Third, a synthesizing statement
attempt to capture the essence of the theme and the scope of what
has been attempted in the dissertation.

A. Summary

The dissertation began with a statement of purpose; a
theory for values/moral development and education has never been
more sorely needed than at this particular time in history. World
conditions, the present economic technological, political, and social
problems that face our nation; the unrest, confusion, and
distress that constitute one of the most visible elements of our
educational system as it tries to make its way through a transitional
period from the incredible certainty that once characterized the
authoritarian education of past generations to the incalculable
uncertainty of the future; and the frightening rate of change

529

appears to be accelerating at a geometric rate--these and many

more factors cry out for some guidance, some indicators, some

direction. The contemporary period appears to be the most confused,

troubled, and chaotic period mankind has ever known. And yet we

enjoy the benefits of technology, affluence, and mobility that

were beyond the wildest imaginations of people only a few generations

ago. It is incredible that our period can be described by the

following statement:

> It was the best of times, it was the worst of
> times, it was the age of wisdom, it was the age
> of foolishness, it was the epoch of belief, it
> was the eopch of incredulity, it was the
> season of Light, it was the season of Darkness,
> it was the spring of hope, it was the winter of
> despair, we had everything before us, we had
> nothing before us, we were all going direct
> to Heaven, we were all going direct the other
> way--in short, the period was so far like the
> present period, that some of its noisiest
> authorities insisted on its being received, for
> good or for evil, in the superlative degree of
> comparison only.

Thus the opening paragraph of Charles Dickens' A Tale of Two Cities,

written in the 19th century, describes the 18th century, and

unwittingly foreshadows even more intense dilemmas of the twentieth

century.

But as the twentieth century draws to a close and the pace

of life continues to accelerate, as the frightening combination

of a shrinking earth and a rising population generate tensions,

fears, and wars that surpass anything that has gone before--in such

times as these there is a need for a restructured system of education

that can help the on-coming generations survive the follies, problems,

and foolishness of the past and present generations.

There is a growing realization in the minds of an ever-increasing number of educators that the business of the schools, in all of its domains, disciplines, and dimensions, is a matter of values. This dissertation, then, is one attempt, probably among hundreds or thousands of contemporary attempts, to contribute to the information available to the educator as he ponders that problem and looks for some guidance.

In Chapter II it was pointed out that the attempts at "character education" that were so popular in the earlier part of this century, that were so naive and so ineffective, have been shown by research to be of little or no avail, and that what they conceived of as "character" very likely never did nor does now exist. Four approaches to values/moral education were defined and described. In review, (1) traditional-authoritarian (absolute nomothetic), (2) cultural relativistic (relative nomothetic), (3) absolute relativistic (idiographic), and (4) organismic-structural-developmental (universal transactional). The first two were named nomothetic because they hold the belief that values objectively exist in the external world and must be transmitted to the child. The third approach was given its name and idiographic orientation because it holds for a belief in the complete relativity of all values and explains their origin as stemming from the idiosyncratic and existential nature of the lone individual. The fourth approach, the organismic-structural-developmental, is an attempt to show values as being the transactional product of the relationship of the individual

and his environment as he constructs knowledge and values through a series of progressive, invariant, and universal developmental stages.

Both the nomothetic and idiographic approaches are believed to be unsoundly based, impossible to operationalize, and inconsistent with the pluralism and democracy that characterize the reality and ideal of our society.

The organismic-structural-developmental approach was offered as the approach that can be psychologically sound, philosophically defensible, compatible with a pluralistic and democratic social system, and capable of being operationalized effectively and wisely in our schools. Consequently, it was the approach selected to constitute the substance and content of the dissertation and its attempt to build toward a theory for values development education.

The claim was made in Chapter III that any approach to teaching and particularly any approach to values/moral education is inherently based on a view of man--a conceptualization of the nature, purpose, and functioning of the human organism. Such a view is generally implicit in the mind of the educator, and often is not systematically developed through investigation and reflection. The further claim was made that of the multitude of views, models, and conceptualizations of man in existence, three of them predominate in the behavioral sciences of western culture. One of these views was somewhat subdivided to allow for the impossibility to completely subsume existentialism under another view. The result was the presentation of four basic views of man that influence most of the thinking,

planning, theorizing, research, and operation of our educational system. The four views are: behaviorism, psychoanalysis, existentialism, and organismic psychology.

Behaviorism was generally rejected as a meaningful base for values development theory because of its complete determinism, mechanistic view of the human organism, incomplete consideration of all aspects of human nature, and the conclusion that it is inherently incompatible with democratic life. Psychoanalysis was found to be also basically deterministic, focused on the more primitive, irrational, and pathological aspects of human nature, and provided little useful information about learning. It was pointed out, however, that the classical (orthodox) psychoanalysis of Sigmund Freud is losing its influence in contemporary behavioral science, and is being reformulated and replaced by other psychoanalytic theories that are more useful for values development education. The orientation generally recognized by the name *psychoanalytic ego psychology*, especially, was found to be highly congruent with many aspects of values development education theory. Existential psychology was discovered to contain much of use for the theory, and much in common with the psychological base that was selected. But existential psychology also has basic propositions and tenets that are irreconcilable with values development education and make it partially inappropriate, e.g., the rejection of any form of determinism, the disdain for science and scientific methods, and the focus on the individual as the major unit of existence. The other view of man, namely, organismic psychology was found to be the most balanced, complete,

and usable system available in which to root a values development

education theory, and it was extensively presented and developed,

along with two other units that are related to it, grow out of it,

and naturally complete the entire theoretical base necessary for

the theory. Thus organismic psychology, the methodology of

structuralism, and the developmental view of human progress in

ontogenesis were combined into the organismic-structural-developmental

view that is both philosophically defensible and psychologically

supported in such a way as to make the entire conceptual framework

the most usable, sound, and complete basis for values development

education theory.

   Chapter IV, therefore, was an attempt to present, explain,

define, and clarify this entire conceptual framework. Of special

significance for this conceptual framework is the work of John Dewey,

Jean Piaget, and Lawrence Kohlberg. Piaget's theory of cognitive

development was presented, along with a presentation of his four

major stages of intellectual development, as well as some of the

important substages. Kohlberg's theory of moral development was

rather extensively developed and elaborated, especially his structural-

stage-developmental organization of the natural development of the

human organism with regard to values/moral development. His levels

and stages were presented in depth, from a number of unifying

aspects, and in such a way as to trace values/moral development

from infancy to mature adulthood. Dewey's many contributions

were integrated in and used as coordinating threads for much of the

entire theory, along with the work of many other psychologists and

philosophers.

Three of the most important implications and outcomes
of the organismic-structural-developmental conceptual framework
were presented and developed in Chapter V. The three themes
follow:

1. The structural properties of principled morality
   are isomorphic with the nature of democracy.

2. Functional democracy is the developmental process
   that facilitates structural moral development.

3. The identification of the characteristics of
   principled morality as the criteria for the
   implementation, operation, and renewal of
   democratic community.

Thus values development education, conceptualized from this framework,
shows that democracy is both a high and mature form of values/moral
development, and the method or process by which it is achieved.
Because of the importance of these two implications, the criteria
or characteristics of principled morality (Level III) were partially
identified and described. They consist primarily, in this
preliminary, exploratory, and tentative attempt, of the following
six characteristics: (1) formal operational intelligence,
(2) perspectivism, (3) habitual reflective tendencies, (4) sensitivity,
(5) responsibility, and (6) homonomy. These were defined and
explained, and their importance for values/moral development and
for the organismic-structural-developmental theory were discussed.

The implications of this for general and values/moral

were explored in Chapter VI. First, the school was evaluated and discussed as a values/moral agent. It was pointed out that the school, by its nature, organization, and operation is inherently and inescapably a values/moral agent, and that as the school is presently constituted it is both an ineffective and unwise moral agent. Two major aspects of school operation were identified: the planned curriculum and the unplanned curriculum. Many of the problems that lead to the schools lack of effectiveness and wisdom with regard to values/moral development were traced to this division and the concomitant problems. A definition of curriculum and a theory of curriculum were presented that are believed highly compatible with values development education and operationalizable for both general education and values/moral education.

One of the single most important aspects of the entire theory and of the entire dissertation was presented and developed in Chater VII, namely, *the concept of the school as a just moral comimnity*. The claim is made that the school as presently organized and operated is inherently counterproductive for and inhibitory of values/moral development, and that for major and significant positive contributions towards values/moral development, the school really needs to be structurally changed. It is not any *physical* structure but rather the underlying organization, operation, and broadly, the curriculum that is implied. A plan for initiating structural change in order to transform a school into a just moral community was presented. The characteristics of the just moral community as it pertains to the school were described. The role of the teacher in

such an organization was explained and described, along with criteria

for the faculty of a "just moral community" sort of school.

Important implications and potentialities of such a system for the

development of the members of the faculty and for the students were

described. It was pointed out that one of the most important needs

of this sort of school is for a professionally competent person who

can serve in the role of *ombudsman* to insure, protect, and mediate

in such a way as to insure that justice and principled morality

will be preserved and maximized. One of the major components of the

school as a just moral community is the factor of responsibility; how

it is conceptualized and operationalized was discussed. The chapter

was concluded with the claim that the idea of a just moral community

is not a utopian scheme or some abstract philosophical idea for

dreams and speculation. Its meaning, promise, and possibility were

presented in terms of being possible, here and now, if

enough people with vision, courage, and professional competence are

willing to take certain steps. The factor of time was discussed,

inasmuch as one of the major excuses for not doing many important

things is the claim that the time is not appropriate or that in due

time all things eventually work out anyway. The plea was made for

rejection of this excuse and the need to see the relevance and potential

and possibility of the school as a just moral community *here* and *now*.

The dissertation, in summary, is an attempt systematically

to lay the groundwork for the building of a theory for values

development education that can be practical, sound, and feasible.

B. Recommendations

Throughout the dissertation in the commentary itself there are numerous suggestions for application, further exploration, and the need for research. This section will not be an attempt to collate all of those, although some of the items contained here have been stated previously. The main purpose here is to highlight and specify some applications of the tentative theory established thus far, and to point the way towards further development of the theory itself, additional applications, and some specific questions or problems worthy of investigation.

Some General Applications of the Theory

1. Exploration of the concept of the *just moral community* for specific adoption as a pilot program in a school.

2. Continued adoption of what Dewey calls "experiential methods" and what Piaget calls "active methods" of education. The depth and application of these concepts goes far beyond what is actually being used in schools today. More than anything, what is needed is an investigation of the application of these concepts as general principles, not merely as specific applications for particular courses, or problems, etc.

3. Implementation of programs for staff development that include an in-depth exploration of the underlying

psychological and philosophical principles, views,
models, and theories that are being used explicitly
and implicitly by educators, in order that:

a. Rationales can be developed to support the
   curriculum, instruction, methodology, materials,
   etc., or show which of those in use are not
   justified by the existing evidence.

b. Inconsistencies can be identified that may be
   indicative of elements of the curriculum contra-
   dicting each other, and even producing trans-
   actions that are deleterious to the welfare
   and development of the learners.

4. Field testing of the general and specific recommenda-
   tions and implications of the theory for evaluation
   of their utility and for renewal of the theory.

5. Extensive investigation of one of the major possible
   implications of the developmental components of the
   theory, especially the stages of Piaget and Kohlberg,
   viz., the implication that specialized forms of
   education that are oriented to particular careers,
   particular disciplines, and narrow applications of
   the curriculum content should be delayed until the
   general attainment of formal operational intelligence,
   and for those topics and issues where appropriate,
   until the development of Kohlberg's Stage 3, the
   Stage of Interpersonal Concordance. Much of what

is done in elementary, middle and junior high, and
early high school curricula is meaningless, incompre-
hensible, or even harmful for the education of
children unable to cope with the personal, social,
and intellectual demands of present curricula for
which they are developmentally unprepared. This
problem is especially critical in the formal demands
for affectively-oriented aspects of the planned
curriculum, and much of the unplanned curriculum,
in which mature forms and understanding of cooperation
are required. Disciplinary codes, school rules, and
many of the bureaucratic demands made on children
are literally beyond their comprehension on more than
a verbal level, and frequently not even comprehensible
on that level.

6. Elimination or modification of the lock-step graded
system of education. The developmental theories,
for which there is enormous support and documentation,
make it clear that there is no justification for
this system from the standpoint of the needs of the
child as a human being.

7. The elimination or modification of the grade system of
evaluation. Generally, this can be stated as the
recommendation for the replacement of the achievement-
competition-external reward model of education for
developmental-cooperation-intrinsic reward model of

education. This is probably one of the most important
areas of our educational system that needs immediate
alternation in terms of the organismic-structural-
developmental model.

8. Education should be more general and focus on holistic
   personality development and especially prepare students
   for personal, interpersonal, and social behavior,
   participation, and involvement. Most simply stated,
   what is needed is more focus on structural development
   and less focus on the transmission of content.
   Content should be used as instrumental to structural
   development, rather than as an end in itself. Content
   should be *used* rather than *taught*.

9. Education should include preparation for major life
   decisions, life crises, and potentially traumatic
   events, e.g., death of a family member or friend,
   or even an animal; divorce, remarriage, illness, and
   other aspects of everyday life that children need to
   learn to cope with according to their developmental
   level.

10. Consideration should be given to the creation of the
    professional position described in Chapter VII, the
    ombudsman. Such a person should be on the staff of
    every school, or available in a system of schools,
    regardless of the adoption or rejection of the idea
    of the just moral community. The presence and

availability of a neutral, open, unbiased, and just person to whom students, teachers, and other inhabitants of the school may turn could be one of the greatest contributions to the development of justice in the school and the reduction of problems.

11. Review, investigate, and research the use of audio-visual methods of instructional technology that have become so widely used in our schools. They have made enormous contribution to the schools, but from a developmental standpoint they constitute a potential danger. Piaget (1970b, pp. 74-75) points out the advantages of audiovisual instruction, but also makes it clear that certain applications supplant the "active method" and thus can be counter-productive to developmental learning. Many audio-visual techniques support passive, uninvolved, and superficial roles by students.

12. A greater articulation and rapprochement between secular and religious education is urgently needed. The separation of church and state, and the many recent laws controlling the treatment of religion in schools is definitely supported and recognized as necessary in order to preserve the vitally needed separation of these elements of our society in order to protect freedom and democracy. But religion is one of the most significant elements of

man's history and needs to be included in the

curriculum, but as a normal part of man's life, not

as indoctrination for a particular point of view or

religion, not even Christianity. All of man's

approaches to the issue of religion should be made

available to students, including all the formal

and organized religions, the less formal and informal

movements, and also agnosticism, and atheism. These

should be presented in an unbiased, non-prosletzying

manner, with great sensitivity. The didactic, dead,

and cold approaches used to prevent criticism from

parents and vested interest groups are not the answer,

either. They may serve to present religion and

spirituality as dead, irrelevent, and unexciting

aspects of the past. But the spiritual aspects of

human life (the word spiritual here being used in

the broadest sense), man's hunger for knowledge

and his feeling of mystery, and the meaning of life,

and related factors should be incorporated into the

normal curriculum of the school in ways appropriately

attuned to developmental progress.

Application of the Theory to Teacher Education

If the theory has any validity, and if the implications

for education that have been presented and discussed, then the

implications for teacher education are enormous, extensive, and far-

reaching. The organismic-structural-developmental conceptual frame-
work points to a wholly different kind of education. The present
system is both the product and the supporter of the existing teacher
preparation programs. In fact, it is proposed that unless and until
there is significant change in teacher education programs the
success of the organismic-structural-developmental model is seriously
limited and/or inhibited.

Many of the criticisms offered about general education
apply equally or more so to teacher education programs. There is
much that goes on in the world of teacher education that has not
been systematically integrated or investigated. Behavior modification
techniques are used and taught side-by-side with the humanistic
orientations and techniques without so much as a question about
their compatibility and without recognition that the underlying
views of man should be investigated, question, and correlated.
This oversight is one of the most serious problems that exist in
teacher preparation programs.

But of everything that could be said about the implications
of the O-S-D theory regarding teacher education programs, nothing
could be more important than the recommendation that here is where
the idea of a just moral community needs to exist more than any
other place. Even a cursory examination of the prevailing practices,
and even brief interviews with preservice undergraduate teacher
education students, and observations of the behavior of faculty
members reveals it is sad to say, more injustice, dehumanization,
and violation of human, individual, civil, and other rights than one

cares to admit. The prevailing model of teacher preparation is strongly married to the long-standing and powerful and pervasive behavioristic model that has dominated our higher centers of learning for more than half a century. And the marriage has been reinforced in recent years by the resurgence of behaviorism in the form of Skinnerian influence--without enough reflection about what Skinner represents and what his theory implies. Many faculty members have adopted the theory, philosophy, and methodology of radical behaviorism without realizing that it is based on the refutation, ridicule, and proposed disposal of all that is meant by the term "autonomous man". Ironically the same faculty members hold "autonomous man" as their most precious doctrine in order to support their own existence, their academic freedom, and their professional standing.

The inspiration, leadership, and direct influence that programs of teacher education potentially represent is largely nullified by the same problems, inconsistencies, and lack of justice that make our general educational system the subject of so much justified criticism. The problem is serious--very serious--if we are truly interested in the survival of our democratic way of life. The true implementation of a democratic way of life requires an educational approach that is carefully maintained and developed as a reflection of the values of that way of life.

Psychological, Philosophical, and Methodological Applications

    1. Both Piaget and Dewey call for a new look at the
        relationship between philosophy and science, especially

between philosophy and psychology. As was pointed out

earlier, Dewey's conceptualization of *naturalistic*

humanism (Dewey, 1929) and Piaget's conceptualization

of *genetic epistemology* (Piaget, 1970a, 1970b,

1970c, 1970d, 1970e, and 1970f) make the same plea

for intelligent articulation between these two bodies

of knowledge and methodologies. According to both

Dewey and Piaget, both science and philosophy would

benefit from a greater confluence of these two great

streams. On the specific issue of epistemology,

especially, both Dewey and Piaget claim there is

much to gain by an interdisciplinary effort. Piaget,

in fact, adopted the term "genetic epistemology" from

James Mark Baldwin to describe his genetic (ontogenetic)

approach to the construction of knowledge as he could

actually study it by investigating the minds of real

live children, rather than from speculation based on

adult thought.

2. A related recommendation is a plea for the reduction or

elimination of what is sometimes referred to as

"scientism." The application of the principles and

methodology of the natural, or physical, sciences is

simply not appropriate to the problems, circumstances,

or subjects of behavioral science. What the natural

scientist can do in the way of experimental controls

is generally not possible in behavioral science, and

especially in schools. And yet, in the name of
science much work has been done that has led to
pseudoscientific applications in psychology and
education. This is especially true in psychometrics
and statistics. The application, for example, of the
principles of normal distribution, the Gaussian curve,
and the principles of random selection to the problems
of individual learners, individual classrooms, and
especially to evaluation and grading has led to
not only a great deal of scientism, pseudoscience, and
related problems, it has literally led to enormous
injustice. The application of normal statistics
and random distribution, for example, to the "curve"
for determination of rewards in a learning group
is tremendously unjust and unscientific. Classrooms
do not represent normal distributions nor do they
represent random statistical selection. Grading on
this basis is immoral and unjust; on the basis of
the theory offered in this dissertation, it is
educationally counterproductive.

3. The attempt to formulate the foundations for a
theory for values development education has made
manifest the need for interdisciplinary and trans-
actional research work and theory building, rather
than disciplinary or multidisciplinary interaction
approaches. True integration and coordination of

theory and research, depends on building on the
contributions that perspectives and disciplines
make together transactionally, not merely the
adding toegther of the various individual points of
view.

4. Piaget and Kohlberg have both shown the great contri-
butions that can come from the application of the
methodology of *structuralism* to psychological and
educational problems. This methodology needs to
be applied to many more problems in this field.

5. Kohlberg's work has demonstrated again the importance
sophisticated longitudinal research. More research
of this sort is needed to seriously examine the effects
of the contemporary infatuation with behavioral
objectives as the answer to educational planning,
curriculum building, and accountability. It may be
shown that the short-term gains that meet limited
behavioral objectives do not hold up when viewed
longitudinally structurally, holistically, and
developmentally.

6. Another issue that needs full exploration with regard
to values/moral education is the problem of
determinism. Behaviorism and psychoanalysis generally
represents a strongly deterministic position, and
existential psychology vehemently holds an indeter-
ministic position. As has been pointed out in this

dissertation, neither position provides adequate support
for a theory of values/moral development or education--
in fact, both positions negate the entire basis for
moral responsibility. Organismic psychology presents
a view that recognizes that many aspects of life are
fully determined, but the many aspects of life are
not determined, and that there is considerable room for
individual freedom and responsibility. This complex
issue, one of the most fundamental for values develop-
ment education, was only briefly treated in several
places, and needs subsequent development as part of
the program of more complete building of a theory
for values development education.

7. A major and complex issue for extensive exploration is
the set of factors that related to moral judgment
versus moral action, and the temporal order and ratio
of influence of these aspects of values/moral behavior.
Work that is both directly and indirectly related to
this issue has been done and continues to be done by
Kohlberg, Turiel, Rest, Piaget, and others. (Each of
these has been cited in the dissertation and the
bibliography).

8. The theory and the stages, in particular, need to be
developed in terms of their relationships to many
issues of which the following are only a sampling:
love, friendship, marriage, sex, religion, creativity, etc.

9. The role of crisis in values/moral development needs to be thoroughly explored. Do crises inhibit, accelerate, crystallize, or affect values/moral development in particular and predictable ways?

10. A full exploration and much research needs to be conducted on the values/moral implications of collective responsibility and collective punishment. Earlier in this dissertation it was claimed that the use of collective punishment is detrimental to the structural development of morality, especially principled morality.

11. The criteria and characteristics of principled morality, partially identified in this dissertation need to be further explored for other aspects and for the nature and role of the six that have been proposed.

12. Techniques and instruments for evaluation of the developmental levels and stages that extend and deepen those that have been developed by Kohlberg and his associates. Particularly is there a need for instruments suitable for the use of educators in the field.

13. Training methods for helping educators effectively, wisely, and efficiently become professionally competent in values development education needs to be created, expanded, and elaborated.

14. The author of this dissertation hypothesizes that

learning the theory of values development education
is conducive to values/moral development or is
at least a major factor in initiating that development.
This hypothesis needs to be tested.

15. Studies need to be conducted to ascertain the role
of athletics and sports in values/moral development.
These programs constitute a major part of the curriculum
of our schools. Two preliminary hypotheses on this
subject are offered here: (1) participation in programs
of physical education, properly handled, with due
consideration for all individuals and their holistic
development, could be a major positive factor for
values/moral development; and (2) athletic programs
as they are presently constituted in American schools,
with enormous emphasis on winning, on competition, on
Level I morality, and with their rewards going to the
few physically accelerated and well-developed
individuals at the expense of the many who are less
well endowed, are generally counterproductive to the
development of Level II or Level III morality, and
not only inhibit such development, but tend to
crystallize development at Level I, especially Stage 2.
These important and complex issues need to be
systematically explored.

16. The relationships between levels of values/moral
development and career orientations need to be

studied. Are there particular careers, professions,
and occupations in which the nature of the work
is characterized by particular levels and stages of
moral development? The hypothesis offered here is that
there is a highly probable relationship.

17. A worthwhile study could be conducted to determine
any possible relationship between the rearing of
children and moral development of the parents or
guardians. In what ways and how much does the
responsibility for raising children influence the
moral development of the parents?

18. The importance of transition states and inter-stage
development an hypothesized by the proponents of
developmental theories needs further exploration. The
extensive literature on this subject needs to be
thoroughly collated, evaluated, and introduced more
completely into the theory.

19. Certain claims have been made by the author in this
dissertation about the relationships among the various
models of man and the Kohlberg levels and stages.
Behaviorism, for example, has been hypothesized as
primarily focusing on Level I morality, and the lower
levels of cognitive development; and further, that
it has developed its entire model of man on this
basis. This hypothesis needs extensive exploration,
documentation, and evaluation.

20. The use of discovery learning techniques and guided
    learning techniques needs to be explored vis-a-vis
    the values development theory. These are very important
    and significantly different educational methods. They
    need to be particularly studied with reference to
    their application to values/moral development, and
    not just cognitive development.

21. The concept of *moratorium* with regard to values/moral
    development needs to be thoroughly explored, researched,
    and documented. Kohlberg (1973a), for example,
    claims that one of the major advantages of children
    leaving home and going off to college is that it
    provides the young adult with an opportunity to
    leave the predominantly Level II atmosphere of the
    typical American home and experience at college new
    ideas, new disequilibrium in terms of self-identity
    and values issues, but within the framework of an
    environment that allows this kind of exploration
    without the problems of making serious irreversible
    major life decisions--or in other words, it permits
    values/moral exploration during a "moratorium"
    experience. The implications of the *moratorium*
    concept are very great; study and research is needed
    to determine that it is functional.

22. Ways must be found to encourage, permit, and support
    the attitude, consideration, and implementation of

research by the classroom teacher. Not the well-known kind of action research that was supposed to lead to the advancement of knowledge for the field, which is not the issue here, but the attitude and execution of research by the teacher in order to enhance the application of Piaget's active methods in the classroom, learn more about the students, and generally develop and maintain a professional attitude, rather than a technician's attitude.

Additional Theories, Systems, and Conceptual Frameworks Identified for Further Exploration in Respect to the Theory of Values/Moral Development

1. Harvey, Hunt, and Schroder's *Conceptual Systems Theory* and all of its derivatives and explorations.

2. Milton Rokeach's work on the open and closed mind, which is very much related to conceptual systems theory.

3. The philosopher Rollo Handy's work on values theory.

4. The great amount of work done by the psychoanalytic ego psychologists mentioned frequently in this dissertation.

5. The stage-developmental theory of Jane Loevinger (Loevinger is an ego psychologist).

6. The authoritarian personality as explored in the classical studies of Adorno, Frendkel-Brunswik, Levinson, and Sanford (1950).

7. The six-stage model for the development of linguistics proposed by W. Labov (1964; also cited by Miller and McNeill, 1969, p. 779). There appear to be some relationships between this model and some of the stage-developmental models included in this dissertation.

8. The work of the philosopher Elijah Jordan, whose work was partially, but only briefly incorporated in the dissertation.

9. The theory of justice proposed by John Rawls (1971).

10. The general systems theory proposed by L. von Bertalanffy.

11. The general theory of action proposed by Talcott Parsons and Edward Shils, and others (Parsons and Shils, 1951).

12. The work on cognitive "plans" by George Miller, Eugene Galanter, and Karl Pribram (1960).

13. The interesting ideas about values/moral education proposed by the philosopher Gerald H. Paske (1969).

14. The anthropology of Claude Lévi-Strauss.

15. The prolific and rich writings of Erich Fromm, who has had much to say on the subject of values and morality.

16. Contributions from significant scholars in the fields of communication theory, linguistics, and the social psychological subdivision that deals with attitude theory and attitude change.

17. The work of the Ontario Institute for Studies in Education, especially that of Edmund Sullivan,

Clive Beck, David Hunt.

18. The work on matching models, the use of optimal disparity, and related issues done by Turiel, Kohlberg, David Hunt, Bruce Joyce, and Marsha Weil, and others.

19. The work of the *values clarification* people and movement, some of which has been included in this dissertation.

20. The curriculum theories and related work of Hilda Taba, J. W. Getzels, H. A. Thelens, and many others.

21. The conceptual framework for analyzing educational systems developed by Getzels, Guba, Thelens, and others that was included in the dissertation.

22. And, as a final point, all of the work of the numerous organismic psychologists whose work has been partially included, mentioned, or alluded to throughout the dissertation but especially in Chapters III and IV.

C. Conclusion

A dissertation this long deserves a brief conclusion. It also deserves the sharing of the spirit with which the writer created it.

The principle of justice is one of the dominant themes that runs through this work and partially binds it together. The concern for the school is the other principle theme. The concern for both, frankly, is because the greater part of my life has been spent

living, attending, and working in social institutions that have
been so full of injustice that I have become especially sensitive to
this issue. The schools in which I have been a student and the
schools in which I have worked have all been characterized by many
things, but injustice was dominant--principally, injustice to the
students. I care very deeply about this issue, and that is why I
am in this profession, and that is why I am interested in helping to
build a theory, and educational programs, and practices that can
help contribute, in some way, however small, to helping our schools
become better instruments of justice and democracy.

This dissertation represents the midstream culmination
of a period of enormous personal and profession growth and develop-
ment. I say midstream, because I hope and intend that growth and
development will never stop. This dissertation has also been a
true labor of love. In spite of its length it contains less than
half of what I had originally conceived as its content. And now at
the end, looking back at what is in it, I feel like John Steinbeck
must have felt when he wrote the following strange and beautiful
dedication for his great novel, East of Eden:

PASCAL COVICI

Dear Pat,

You came upon me carving some kind of little figure out of wood and you said, "Why don't you make something for me?"

I asked you what you wanted, and you said, "A box."

"What for?"

"To put things in."

"What things?"

"Whatever you have," you said.

Well, here's your box. Nearly everything I have is in it, and it is not full. Pain and excitement are in it, and feelings good or bad and evil thoughts and good thoughts--the pleasure of design and some despair and the indescribable joy of creation.

And on top of these are all the gratitude and love I have for you.

And still the box is not full.

JOHN

"And still the box is not full." There is so much more that needs to be done to change this from "Toward a Theory for Values Development Education" to "A Theory for Values Development Education" that it seems from this perspective to be an impossible task. But things tend to look impossible when you have worked hard to create and have grown weary from the labor. Tomorrow the remaining task will look as exciting as the beginning of this one.

There has been a joy and an excitement in this entire creation--so much so that I feel again exactly as John Steinbeck did in another part of East of Eden.

> Sometimes a kind of glory lights up the
> mind of a man. It happens to nearly everyone.
> You can feel it growing or preparing like a
> fuse burning toward dynamite. It is a
> feeling in the stomach, a delight of the
> nerves, of the forearms. The skin tastes
> the air, and every deep-drawn breath is sweet.
> Its beginning has the pleasure of a great
> stretching yawn; it flashes in the brain
> and the whole world glows outside your eyes.
> A man may have lived all of his life in the
> gray, and the land and trees of him dark and
> somber. The events, even the important ones,
> may have trooped by faceless and pale. And
> then--the glory--so that a cricket song
> sweetens his ears, the smell of the earth
> rises chanting to his nose, and dappling
> light under a tree blesses his eyes. Then a
> man pours outward a torrent of him, and yet
> he is not diminished. And I guess a man's
> importance in the world can be measured by the
> quality and number of his glories. It is a
> lonely thing but it relates us to the world.
> It is the mother of all creativeness, and
> sets each man separate from all other men.

And so I feel about what has happened over the past three years; I feel that way about this dissertation; I feel that way about the idea of a theory for values development education that may help make

some child's life somewhere someday a little better because it
was created; and I especially feel that way about the idea of a
just moral community being attempted somewhere, someday, in some
school. And for whatever minute contribution this can make to the
realization of that dream, I shall feel grateful and happy.

Schools do not have to be places that children hate--
they do not have to be places where children hate to go and race
to leave. They can be (and some few certainly are) places where
people live and grow and come alive in a way that can happen in no
other place. Learning is one of the most enjoyable things in all of
life--I absolutely love to learn. Perhaps that is why I also
absolutely love to teach. And the thing I love most about teaching
is that it is sheer delight to see the fantastic feeling that comes
over the learner when he has discovered something new, has extended
himself beyond what he was, has found a new dimension of himself
and life. That is a magnificent transaction!

Values development education is a theory, an idea, a plan,
and it is also a hope and a dream--as is all that comes under the
name *education*. The organismic-structural-developmental conceptual
framework offers a better hope for any form of values/moral education
that I have yet seen. It is not perfect, it is not utopian, and
it is not the last answer to anything. It is merely one giant
step in the direction of trying to improve something that has been
around for a long time--a type of education that is intended to help
people grow and to help them and us make a better world. Teilhard
de Chardin said:

> To us for whom new sciences have opened
> space and time with dimensions unsuspected by
> our fathers there are now new challenges. We
> can no longer measure our efforts by old
> achievements, no matter how exalting these
> were in their own time.[1]

To me that's what education is all about--moving forward, renewing

our lives and our worlds. That's what theory, and research, and

scholarship are all about, too. Otherwise they are dead and have

no meaning. One final quotation, and again from the beautiful

mind of Teilhard de Chardin:

> The March Forward. Progress, if it is to
> continue, will not happen by itself. Evolution,
> by the very mechanism of its syntheses, is
> constantly acquiring greater freedom. In
> practice, what steps must we take in relation to
> this forward march? I see two, which can be
> summarized in five words:
> > a great hope,
> > in common.

"A great hope, *in common*"--that's what this dissertation represents

to me. For I am a dreamer who believes that education is one of the

greatest forces for good that man possesses. And when man stops

dreaming the world turns gray. I didn't write this dissertation

merely to fulfill the requirements for a degree--I wrote it as part

of a great dream that I hope will become part, just a small part,

but a part of "a great hope, *in common*."

---

[1] Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, <u>Building the Earth</u> (1965).

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