BETWEEN CREATION AND CRISIS:
SOVIET MASCULINITIES, CONSUMPTION, AND BODIES AFTER STALIN

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ABSTRACT

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The Soviet Union of the 1950s and 1960s existed in a transitional state, emerging recently from postwar reconstruction and on a path toward increasing urbanity, consumer provisioning, and technological might. Modernizing rhetoric emphasized not only these spatial and material transformations, but also the promise of full-fledged communism's looming arrival. This transformational ethos necessitated a renewal of direct attempts to remold humanity. Gender equality—or, at the very least, removing bourgeois strictures on women—remained a partially unfulfilled promise. Technological advances and the development of Soviet industrial capacity offered a new means of profoundly altering the lives of Soviet men and women. As other scholars have noted, Soviet women were the most obvious targets of these campaigns, but they were not alone in these projects. This dissertation argues that the Soviet state also directed intensive campaigns to remodel male consumptive and bodily practices in order to rid them of politically and socially destructive tendencies, making them fit for the modern socialist civilization under construction. Rooted in, but divergent from, Bolshevik *novyi byt* campaigns and Stalinist *kul'turnost* efforts, Soviet authorities actively sought to craft productive male citizens of a modern mold freed of the rough and coarse habits associated with working-class and village masculinities. Many of men targeted in these campaigns fell short of these stated aims.

Instead, they pursued and produced their own images of masculinity outside of these official reconstructive efforts. Thus, this dissertation places malleable images of masculinity at the intersection of post-Stalinist politics, economics, material culture, and sexuality by analyzing a wide range of previously classified Komsomol archival documents, letters to the Supreme Soviet, Soviet state records, published memoirs, newspapers, and literature.

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PREFACE

The central idea behind this study sprang from a simple question—what and how did Soviet men consume? More to the point how did the growth and development of light industry and the transformative nature of Soviet power during the 1950s and 1960s affect male consumptive habits? These questions appeared in my mind in a moment of eureka sometime during the long months of reading for my candidacy exams, largely as a result of pondering the implications of some of the fundamentals of queer theory to the broader Soviet experience outside of the realm of sexuality. Uncoupling essentialized assumptions about the relationship between gender and bodies—in some ways the heart of that diverse body of scholarship—prompted my desire to investigate the ways in which men entered the consumptive realm. Only traces of the pioneering work of individuals such as Judith Butler, Judith Halberstam, and David Halperin (to name a few) remain in this dissertation, but it felt necessary to acknowledge their influence in spawning my earliest impulses for writing.

These two questions posed above position this study between two overarching ideas about Soviet conceptions of hegemonic masculinity. On one pole, there is the image of the rugged, heroic worker toiling in hostile environs. On the other, is the "man in crisis", a creature hotly debated in popular media during the last Soviet decades. The problem with either of these figures is that they are mere archetypes, practically mythical in nature. Probing the ways in which men consumed and their consumptive patterns in turn replicated certain visions of masculinity serves to bring us closer to a picture of the lifeworld of men living and working under Soviet socialism. Yet, persistent material deficits and disparities between the Muscovite center and the Soviet hinterlands, among other issues, complicate this pursuit.

Encountering the archives with all of these ideas circulating in my head presented a number of challenges. Masculinities simultaneously appeared everywhere and nowhere. In the initial weeks of research, this dizzying array of potential source materials proved overwhelming. I then devised a strategy to overcome the increasingly insurmountable task at hand. I decided to read as broadly as possible and see what categories the authorities creating the archive found to be essential. The on-going declassification of Communist youth materials at the beginning of my research proved fortuitous, as it allowed access to previously hidden materials detailing sensitive (and often unsavory) aspects of Soviet life. These materials provided a window into the fears and anxieties of authorities monitoring perceived changes in youth behavior and attitudes and provided a jumping-off point to begin narrowing my searches.

Much of what is written in the chapters that follow focuses on Slavic men living in urban areas of European Russia. Occasional references to Central Asia, Siberia, and the Caucasus appear, but the majority of the sources examined in the course of research pertain to the former. All the same, this dissertation explores a number of attempts by party-state authorities to engage with male practices to remold and cultivate unified and properly Soviet attributes as whole. As such the study that follows does not pretend to be a definitive history of male consumptive habits in a state (and a system) increasingly wrapped up in material consumption. By selecting topics such as sex, alcohol abuse, drug use/addiction, and clothing for discussion, I've pursued the leads given to me by the authorities writing the various reports held in the archive. Moreover, these themes readily spring to the mind of many when they contemplate the global phenomenon popularly known as the "Sixties" and are therefore suggestive of fertile avenues for investigation.

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INTRODUCTION

The Soviet Union of the 1950s and 1960s existed in a transitional state—emerging recently from postwar reconstruction and on a path toward increasing urbanity, consumer provisioning, and technological might. Modernizing rhetoric emphasized not only these spatial and material transformations, but also the promise of full-fledged communism's looming arrival. This Promethean ethos necessitated a renewal of direct attempts to remold humanity. Stalin's rule diverted the revolutionary goal of crafting a socialist vision of mankind bereft of avarice and fit for harmonious living, swallowing broad swathes of society amid revolutionary upheaval. The post-Stalinist order intended to steer the Soviet engine back onto the path to communism, unmaking Stalinist deviations through intensified state control and popular participation as it re-engaged plans to develop the New Soviet Man.[1]

Gender equality—or, at the very least, removing bourgeois strictures on women—remained an under-fulfilled promise. Technological advances and the continued development of Soviet industrial capacity offered a new method of mediating the lives of Soviet men and women. As other scholars have noted, Soviet women were the most obvious targets of post-Stalinist campaigns to modernize and transform the domestic and interior realms. Women's magazines like *Rabotnitsa* pushed advances in home appliance technology as a means of freeing up domestic labors now deployable to public enterprise. Yet, women were not alone in these projects. This dissertation argues that the post-Stalinist Soviet state also directed intensive

[1] Understandings of the essential characteristics of the New Socialist/Soviet Man changed over the course of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. For a pan-European overview, see Eric Hobsbawm, "Man and Woman in Socialist Iconography," *History Workshop Journal* 6 (Autumn 1978): 121–138.

campaigns to remodel male consumptive and bodily practices in order to rid them of politically and socially destructive tendencies, making them fit for the modern socialist civilization under construction. Rooted in Bolshevik campaigns for *novyi byt* ("new way of life") and Stalinist *kul'turnost* ("culturedness") efforts, post-Stalinist Soviet authorities actively sought to produce productive male citizens of a modern mold freed of rough and coarse habits associated with working-class and traditional village masculinities. Unsurprisingly, perhaps, many of the men targeted in these campaigns fell short of these stated aims. Instead, they pursued and produced their own images of masculinity outside of these official reconstructive efforts. Thus, this dissertation places malleable visions of masculinity at the intersection of post-Stalinist politics, economics, material culture, and sexuality.

In their 1997 article, "Soviet Gender Contracts and Their Shifts in Contemporary Russia," sociologists Anna Temkina and Anna Rotkirch proclaimed, "much if not everything still needs to be told about men and masculinity in Russia."[2] Within the last decade or so, interest in the constructed and mediated nature of masculinity has grown among historians and social scientists working on Russia and the former Soviet Union—largely as an extension of women's studies in the region. Earlier women's studies scholarship understood men and masculinity as the center of power and privilege in the state, society, and the home. Viewing maleness as stable, they sought to examine the ways in which the Soviet state created spaces for gender equality and transformation as it mobilized women in the construction of socialism.[3] By the end

[2] Anna Temkina and Anna Rotkirch, "Soviet Gender Contracts and Their Shifts in Contemporary Russia," *Idäntutkimus: The Finnish Review of East European Studies* 2 (1997): 6–24.

[3] Women's emancipation and changing roles in Soviet society produced to a fertile environment for this kind of work. On women's histories and related studies of the Khrushchev (and later) periods, see, for example: Gail Warshofsky Lapidus, *Women in Soviet Society:*

of the 1980s, many women's studies scholars began to approach these questions from the lens of gender relations, seeing men's and women's roles and positions in society as defined by the interaction between the two categories rather than in isolation.[4] Work of this nature soon produced scholarship elucidating the historically rooted and malleable nature of masculinity.[5]

Masculinity as a concept and set of attributes does not exist as a timeless constant, nor are men a homogenous whole.[6] Time and place bind masculinities and within those contexts, a range of masculinities (in terms of both practices and gender relations) can be observed. The work of R. W. Connell directly informs this approach to engage multiple masculinities historically. Connell views the various masculinities appearing in a single historical context as functioning in an unequal relationship in which the hegemonic masculinity relegates others to positions of marginality, but without total negation. Connell's concept stresses masculine practices that reproduce domination rather than the more generalizing, binary structures associated with sex roles. In its original formulation, hegemonic masculine practices "embodied the currently most

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Equality, Development, and Social Change (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1978); Carola Hansson and Karin Liden, *Moscow Women: Thirteen Interviews* (New York: Pantheon, 1983); Melanie Ilič, Susan E. Reid, and Lynne Attwood, eds., *Women in the Khrushchev Era* (Houndmills, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004).

[4] Joan Scott's theoretical work is commonly cited as one of the general impulses behind this turn. See Joan W. Scott, "Gender: A Useful Category of Historical Analysis," *American Historical Review* 91, no. 5 (December 1986): 1053–1075.

[5] The idea of historically-embedded Russian/Soviet masculinities is developed in two notable edited collections. Barbara Evans Clements, Rebecca Friedman, and Dan Healey, eds., *Russian Masculinities in History and Culture* (New York: Palgrave, 2002); Serguei Oushakine, ed., *O muzhe(N)stvennosti: sbornik statei* (Moskva: Novoe Literaturnoe Obozreniie, 2002).

[6] Unlike the philosophy guiding many so-called "men's rights" groups that are occasionally lumped into masculinity scholarship, I do not believe an "authentic" masculinity to be under assault (either psychologically or structurally) by the forces of modernity or feminism. For a critique of the psychological philosophies underpinning these groups, see R. W. Connell, "A Very Straight Gay: Masculinity, Homosexual Experience, and the Dynamics of Gender," *American Sociological Review* 57, no. 6 (December 1992): 735–751.

honored way of being a man, [required] all other men to position themselves in relation to it, and [ideologically] legitimated the global subordination of women to men."[7]

Gender relations, then, must been understood as historically bound and subject to change. Applying sociological theories on masculinities to historical contexts, however, comes with some difficulties. Chief among these are that the specially designed data-gathering techniques used by sociologists studying contemporary problems are not typically available to historians. The historian must instead make use of incomplete and cryptic archival sources in order to piece together fragments of lost experiences. Nevertheless, both official sources (such as bureaucratic papers or sociological data) and memoirs both point to state attempts to construct visions of a hegemonic masculinity amidst a diversity of male experience in the post-Stalinist period.

The Soviet gender order did not function as a diametrically opposed set of sex-determined binaries (unlike in most Western, bourgeois democracies). Instead, a triangular model of gender relations positioned the party-state at the top, displacing the male patriarch as the head of the household. The state took up the role of authoritative mediation between men and women.[8] Soviet gender policies directly targeted family life as a means of revolutionary

[7] The concept of hegemonic masculinity has received broad application in sociological, historical, and criminological work since the late 1980s. Only in the last few years have Connell's concepts been adapted to the Russian/Soviet context(s) as will be discussed below. For discussion of this approach's application and subsequent critiques, see R. W. Connell and James W. Messerschmidt, "Hegemonic Masculinity: Rethinking the Concept," *Gender and Society* 19, no. 6 (December 2005): 829–859. The definition provided above can found on p. 832. For more on hegemonic and multiple masculinities, see R. W. Connell, *Masculinities*, 2nd ed. (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 2005).

[8] The notion of the party-state as the mediator and manipulator of the Soviet gender order can be found in a number of works. On the "triangular model" see Temkina and Rotkirch, "Soviet Gender Contracts" and Sarah Ashwin, "Introduction: Gender, State and Society in Soviet and Post-Soviet Russia," in *Gender, State and Society in Soviet and Post-Soviet Russia*, ed. Sarah Ashwin (London and New York: Routledge, 2000), 1–29. For the ways in which Stalinist-era film reproduced this triangular relationship, see Lilya Kaganovsky, *How the Soviet Man Was*

transformation. Anthropologist Katherine Verdery identifies this triangular model as a characteristic feature of all Eastern European socialist societies.[9] Soviet-style gender policies fostered a paternalistic relationship between state and society that rendered men as dependent subjects by unseating them as uncontested heads of households. Doing so broke the traditional, patriarchal method of family organization and facilitated the creation of structures aiming to produce greater gender equality. According to Verdery, "the reason was that socialist regimes pushed an industrialization program that was (perforce) labor-intensive and capital-poor, necessarily requiring the labor power of everyone regardless of sex. More than any ideological commitment, this fact produced socialism's emphasis on gender equality and the policies that facilitated it."[10] In order to facilitate the entrance of women into industrial production and the building of socialism, the state provided public services designed to alleviate the stress and toil of domestic labor. Cafeterias, daycares, and washing facilities pooled together what would have previously been individual labors in the home, freeing women to work in a public capacity—at least according to the plan. Plans for the spread of public services recalled the emancipatory visions of Alexandra Kollontai, linking Khrushchevian modernism with the Bolshevik revolution. In practice, however, gender relations remained unequal. Men typically held higher positions in the Soviet state and party hierarchies and stood in symbolically as the builders and defenders of communism in the form of the rugged worker and the brave soldier. Soviet ideology assigned the role of worker-mother to women. The emancipation of women from

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Unmade: Cultural Fantasy and Male Subjectivity Under Stalin (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2008).

[9] Verdery does not use the phrase "triangular model" and instead refers to the process by which the party-state placed itself between men and women as the head of the family as "socialist paternalism." Katherine Verdery, *What Was Socialism, and What Comes Next?* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), 64-69.

[10] *Ibid*., 64.

traditional, patriarchal oppression served as a vehicle to redirect their energies toward the production and reproduction of the Soviet state.[11]

Even as the state took on a paternalistic role in the family, Zhanna Chernova argues that men remained "answerable to the state and responsible for the quality of [their] family's life" while at the same time state policies effectively "excluded the category of fatherhood."[12] Legal structures typically favored women in terms of custody and paternity disputes, as well as social services for child support. This alienated Soviet fathers as it pushed them further outside of the domestic realm, leaving their performance in the building of socialism as the only option for proving their masculinity.[13] After 1968, new laws slightly diminished structural discrimination against fathers by making greater allowances for paternity claims and visitation rights. However, a greater emphasis on motherhood beginning in the 1970s continued to marginalize men in the realm of parenting. Soviet sociologists pointed to a problem of "absentee fathers" (*bezottsovshchina*) and their hands-off approach to parenting—thus publically debating the longstanding nature of Soviet fatherhood. Natalia Baranskaia's acclaimed 1969 novella "A

[11] Ashwin, "Introduction."

[12] Zhanna Chernova, "The Model of 'Soviet' Fatherhood: Discursive Prescriptions," trans. Liv Bliss, *Russian Studies in History* 51, no. 2 (Fall 2012): 38, 40. According to her, Soviet gender policy in the first decades after the revolution typically believed a woman's claims concerning paternity. This had a secondary functional in addition to the breaking of patriarchal norms and privileges. As the state was ill equipped to support all Soviet children, it tasked fathers with financially supporting their offspring while removing other paternal rights. The 1944 Family Law changed this arrangement as it removed much of the financial responsibility for fathering a child while leaving the sense of alienation from the domestic sphere intact.

[13] Sergei Kukhterin, "Fathers and Patriarchs in Communist and Post-Communist Russia," in *Gender, State and Society in Soviet and Post-Soviet Russia*, ed. Sarah Ashwin (London and New York: Routledge, 2000), 71–89. Unlike Chernova, Kukhterin sees Soviet gender policies as rendering the Soviet husband/father as a superfluous member of the familial triad, leaving work in the form of service to the state as their own means of shoring up claims to masculinity.

Week Like Any Other" carefully depicts this facet of the "double burden" in which a working mother returns from the lab every day to tend to a household while her (generally passive) husband leisurely recedes into the background of domestic life.[14]

For the late Soviet period, most studies of men focus on the subject and surrounding discourse of the "man in crisis" emerging in the 1970s. The "man in crisis" emerged almost as a testament to the success of Soviet gender policies aiming to liberate women from the domestic realm and cycles of childbirth and childrearing. During de-Stalinization, the re-legalization of abortion and lessening restrictions on divorce forged lasting structures cementing Soviet women's greater independence from the home. However, these changes also directly impacted demographics. Families in European Russia continued to shrink and splinter causing Slavic birthrates to decline. Yet in Central Asia where policies aiming for gender equality had less of an effect, birthrates markedly rose. The same policies were in force throughout the Soviet Union, but a number of factors dulled their impact outside of the comparatively more urban and industrial European Russia.[15]

Demographers and journalists bemoaned the loss of male primacy in Soviet society, as well as more tangible aspects of masculine decline such as lower life expectancy, higher rates of morality, and well-documented patterns of dangerous misadventure. The crisis discourse argued that Soviet men experienced a critical loss of prestige both inside their homes and on the public stage, simultaneously infantilized and marginalized by Soviet gender policies. It also framed men as victims of their nature, barely responsible for their risky behavioral patterns and

[14] Natalya Baranskaya, *A Week Like Any Other: A Novella and Short Stories*, trans. Pieta Monks (London: Virago, 1989), 1-62.

[15] Lynne Attwood, *The New Soviet Man and Woman: Sex-Role Socialization in the USSR* (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1990).

compulsions. Sociobiological conversations cast men as the weaker sex—demographically marginal compared to women (a legacy of the Second World War), biologically inferior due to their lower life expectancies, and acutely susceptible to maladies associated with modernization (anomie and ennui). The "normalcy" of the late Soviet years meant that men of this generation could not readily stand in the pantheon of Soviet heroes like their fathers who proved themselves by building socialism or battling fascism.[16]

Sociologists Elena Zdravomyslova and Anna Temkina, however, identify another motive in framing Soviet men as in crisis. In discussing the failure of Soviet men to live up to their potential, they recognize the deployment of Aesopian language meant to conceal a deeper critique. "In late Soviet discourse, the 'crisis of masculinity' was a metaphor that camouflaged the acknowledgment of a social malaise. The improbability of performing traditional male roles, due to restrictions on liberal rights (to property, to political freedom, and freedom of conscience), was implicitly posited as the reason for the destruction of true masculinity."[17] Not only had the party-state's paternalism diminished man's dominion over the family, but also by limiting other areas of free masculine self-actualization, it removed the possibility of asserting an authentic masculinity. This discursive analysis reveals the persistence of essentialized understandings of gender based at least partially on a European bourgeois model. Ownership of personal property and a role as "breadwinner" provides men with the ability to assert their independence—casting the dependence wrought by socialist paternalism as inherently un-masculine and emasculating.

Historians in the last few years have begun to explore the ways in which the post-Stalinist order facilitated the production and shaping of masculinities outside of this notion of a "man in

[16] Elena Zdravomyslova and Anna Temkina, "The Crisis of Masculinity in Late Soviet Discourse," trans. Liv Bliss, *Russian Studies in History* 51, no. 2 (Fall 2012): 13–34.

[17] *Ibid.*, 16.

crisis". Drawing on the insights of Connell and other contemporary gender theorists, this branch of scholarship departs from earlier examinations centered on sex roles. Erica Fraser contends that the Second World War permanently changed ideas about Soviet masculinity, creating a structure in the postwar period capable of producing multiple masculinities, including a new type of postwar soldier, the cosmonaut, and the physicist.[18] Yet, each of these roles localizes "maleness" in positions of official labor and defense—a rather conventional take on the performance of masculinity in the Soviet Union. Women's employment challenged the idea of the male "breadwinner" but it never truly displaced it as high-paying, prestigious positions in industrial management and the party-state apparatus remained largely staffed by men.

Examining films and debates amongst producers, writers, and officials, Marko Dumančić has argued that these cultural products projected alternative images of masculinity that significantly departed from Stalinist cinema's depictions of unwavering strength and sacrifice in the name of socialism.[19] Masculine imagery on the silver screen acted as a vehicle through which Khrushchev-era reforms symbolically remade the social order by renovating collective identity. Liberal, reform-minded filmmakers deployed fallible and ideologically ambiguous male characters in order to counter dominant archetypes of Stalinist cinema in their attempts to depict Soviet life in a more realistic fashion. Release of many of these films prompted a larger conversation about the political and ethical nature of the Soviet system. Ethan Pollock also draws on these kinds of cultural sources to locate the *bania* (traditional Russian bathhouse) as a "sacred space" for the performance of masculinity in the postwar period. As the state

[18] Erica L. Fraser, "Masculinities in the Motherland: Gender and Authority in the Soviet Union During the Cold War, 1945-1968" (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 2009).

[19] Marko Dumančić, "Rescripting Stalinist Masculinity: Contesting the Male Ideal in Soviet Film and Society, 1953-1968" (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of North Carolina, 2010).

constructed more bathhouses as part of a larger effort to provide public services, men flocked to the *bania* and encoded it as a masculine gathering site for communion outside of the (feminine) domestic sphere. This all-male site allowed bathers the freedom to negotiate senses of masculinity outside of the state's purview.[20]

Each of these scholars see the postwar and post-Stalinist periods as creating decisively different social conditions that made ideals of masculinity malleable, recoding the meaning of the "New Soviet Man" in order to adapt to contemporary conditions or allowed for the existence of individual visions of masculinity. This dissertation also locates Soviet masculinities in this shifting context by examining the ways in which party-state authorities attempted to mold suitable male practices to exist in the new, modern Soviet Union. However, I contend that debates over consumptive and bodily practices are crucial to understanding post-Stalinist masculinities by tracing a particular modernizing vision of manhood between the New Soviet Man's creation during the revolution and his fall into "crisis" in the last years of Soviet socialism.

Envisioning the "Thaw" and Post-Stalinism

The reform program associated with the "Thaw" and de-Stalinization targeted essential features of Soviet political, economic, and cultural structures in order to galvanize a revolutionary spirit of transformation and egalitarianism. After removing the perceived deviations from the Leninist mantle fostered by Stalinism, Khrushchev's leadership would steer the Soviet Union back onto the appropriate course. His 1956 "Secret Speech" denounced Stalinist repression of innocent

[20] Ethan Pollock, "'Real Men Go to Bania': Postwar Soviet Masculinities and the Bathhouse," *Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History* 11, no. 1 (Winter 2010): 47–76. The *bania* also plays a central role in Dan Healey's studies of homosexual culture in late imperial and early Soviet Russia. See Dan Healey, *Homosexual Desire in Revolutionary Russia: The Regulation of Sexual and Gender Dissent* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001).

party members and inadvertently initiated a constrained public conversation about the crimes of the past. As a part of this process, some repressed party members received amnesty and made their return from the "little *zona*" back to Soviet life. Conscious of his own hand in filling labor camps, Khrushchev carefully limited his denunciations to the purging of loyal party members during the "Great Terror" of 1937 and glossed over other crimes such as collectivization and dekulakization, the forced migration of various ethnic groups, and repression of prisoners of war. Nevertheless, even these limited openings in popular discourse brought about a renewed critical attitude to art, literature, and journalism. Measures promoting socialist legality limited the reach of the secret police and use of overtly violent means of state control. Such reforms went a long way to ease the pervasive climate of fear.[21]

Observers and the first wave of scholars and analysts viewed the Khrushchev era with optimism, taking his reform program as evidence of the awakening of a new Soviet Union. Edward Crankshaw, writing in the midst of Khrushchev's tenure as Soviet premier, noted the grandiose ambition of the post-Stalinist project of modernization. Referring to plans for industrial outputs under the first seven-year plan, he wrote, "the new targets make the post-war dreams of Stalin look shabby and old-fashioned" as the Soviet state endeavored to take on a role of global primacy.[22] Industrial expansion of this magnitude meant for Crankshaw that the Soviet state now needed to embark on a mission of supplying more goods and services to the

[21] Limiting the reach of state security forces did not, however, generate a climate of political openness. Student groups organizing politically oriented study groups and lectures still faced the likelihood of denunciation and arrest. Komsomol cells carefully monitored political attitudes and the appearance of deviation could result in profoundly negative consequences for work and study.

[22] Edward Crankshaw, *Khrushchev's Russia*, 2nd ed. (Baltimore: Penguin, 1962), 26.

population in order to "keep the great State machine going and to allow it to develop."[23] Post-Stalinist transformations, of course, were not absolute—something that the violent suppression of the Hungarian uprising in 1956 made abundantly clear. Dissident Marxist historians Roy and Zhores Medvedev attempted to balance the erratic nature of this period as it swung between reform and steps backward.[24] The Medvedevs credit Khrushchev's failed agricultural campaigns as particularly ruinous economic blunders resulting in the need to purchase foreign grain for the first time in either imperial Russian or Soviet history—pointing to limits of this scientifically guided transformation.

For much of the last half of the twentieth-century, the experiences of artists, intellectuals, and dissidents of all stripes dominated the ways in which scholars and other readers outside the Soviet Union viewed the Khrushchev and Brezhnev years.[25] The liberal intelligentsia's perspective largely set understandings and the chronologies of change occurring after Stalin's death. Events such as the December 1953 publication of Vladimir Pomerentsev's article, "On Sincerity in Literature" challenging the doctrine of socialist realism, or the 1962 publication of Aleksandr Solzhentisyn's prison camp novella *One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich* (both in the "thick" journal, *Novyi mir)* indicated to members of this milieu that seismic transformations

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[23] *Ibid.,* 28.

[24] Roy A. Medvedev and Zhores A. Medvedev, *Khrushchev: The Years in Power*, trans. Andrew R. Durkin (New York: W. W. Norton, 1978).

[25] Vladimir Kozlov has made a similar claim about the Russian-language historiography of post-Stalinism written after 1991, describing it as infected with "the disease of dissident-centrism" (*bolezn' dissidentotsentrizma*) due to a narrow focus on the actions and writings of the liberal-oppositionist intelligentsia in Moscow and Leningrad. His recent document collection compiles examples of "everyday" dissent and other actions falling outside of this framework such as complaint, right-wing protest, and non-urban acts of opposition. See V. A. Kozlov and S. V. Mironenko, eds., *Kramola: Inakomyslie v SSSR pri Khrushcheve i Brezhneve 1952-1982 gg.* (Moskva: Materik, 2005).

were underway in the core of the Soviet system. Not only did they challenge the ideological structures at play, both writers were outside the establishment and relative nobodies prior to the "success" of these publications.[26] This period of relative creative freedom emboldened youthful members of the intelligentsia, encouraging them to more honestly approach the past and present in their work. Later suppression of this freedom galvanized a small, but closely watched dissident movement demanding (among other things) the rule of law and an end to censorship.[27] Intensive focus on the intelligentsia, though, distorts the lived experience of Soviet socialism.[28] Open dissent did not factor into the average Soviet citizen's life. Some even openly decried the publication of critical works like those mentioned above, writing letters expressly aligned with the system.[29] Recent oral histories of the "Soviet baby boomer" generation indicate that many educated members of society lived without ever knowing a true dissident in their circles. As

[26] In the case of Solzhenitsyn, this was his first finished piece of literary prose based on his experiences of working in a prison camp. He sent his manuscript to Lev Kopelev, an acquaintance from the Gulag, now in a position to help as a freelance editor for *Novyi mir*. On the legacy of this novella, see Andrew Wachtel, "One Day--Fifty Years Later," *Slavic Review* 72, no. 1 (Spring 2013): 102–117.

[27] The work of Liudmilla Alexeyeva, a prominent Moscow-based human rights activist, is a good place to start in approaching the topic of dissidents. See Liudmilla Alexeyeva and Paul Goldberg, *The Thaw Generation: Coming of Age in the Post-Stalin Era* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1993). For more comprehensive treatments of this topic, see Joshua Rubenstein, *Soviet Dissidents: Their Struggle for Human Rights* (Boston: Beacon, 1980); Liudmilla Alexeyeva, *Soviet Dissent: Contemporary Movements for National, Religious, and Human Rights*, trans. Carol Pearce and John Glad (Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press, 1985).

[28] This is not to suggest that this line of inquiry has disappeared. See, for example, Vladislav Zubok, *Zhivago's Children: The Last Russian Intelligentsia* (Cambridge, MA and London: Belknap, 2009). The difference between Zubok's approach and earlier histories is that he considers the postwar Soviet intelligentsia to be a specific historical formulation inspired by (and in the mold of) Boris Pasternak. *Zhivago's Children* functions as a collective biography of this generation.

[29] See, for example, Denis Kozlov, "'I Have Not Read, But I Will Say': Soviet Literary Audiences and Changing Ideas of Social Membership, 1958-1966," *Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History* 7, no. 3 (Summer 2006): 557–597.

Donald Raleigh asserts, the average person "lived in search of the Soviet dream—or the next sliver of sausage—steering clear of the KGB the best that they could."[30]

Recently scholars have turned to the reinvestigation and deconstruction of the "Thaw" and other Khrushchevian shibboleths of reform. Michel Foucault's influence (often via the applications of Oleg Kharkhordin and Stephen Kotkin) on much of this work looms large.[31] Standing the reform platform on its head, many of these scholars see the post-Stalinist party-state's aim as to penetrate further into the everyday lives of its citizenry in order to speed along communism's arrival. This approach reflects a broader trend in the recent Anglophone historiography of Russia and the Soviet Union that focuses on the application of modern technologies of rule, modes of surveillance, population politics, and subject formation.[32] Even as the Gulag camps partially emptied out during the mid-1950s, revisions to the legal code expanded the state's capacity to discipline individual behavior. If the ability for the "secret police" to arrest and prosecute political crimes diminished, now the police (*militsiia*) took up the task of ordering everyday conduct. Petty hooliganism replaced Article 58 as the violation of the

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[30] Donald J. Raleigh, *Soviet Baby Boomers: An Oral History of Russia's Cold War Generation* (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 244. See also Donald J. Raleigh, *Russia's Sputnik Generation: Soviet Baby Boomers Talk About Their Lives* (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2006).

[31] Oleg Kharkhordin, "Reveal and Dissimulate: A Genealogy of Private Life in Soviet Russia," in *Public and Private in Thought and Practice: Perspectives on a Grand Dichotomy*, ed. Jeff Weintraub and Krishan Kumar (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997), 333–363; Stephen Kotkin, *Magnetic Mountain: Stalinism as Civilization* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1995). This influence is particularly visible in the literature pertaining to housing, design, and material culture (to be discussed below).

[32] In addition to the works listed in the note above, see also David L. Hoffmann and Yanni Kotsonis, eds., *Russian Modernity: Politics, Knowledge, Practices* (New York: St. Martin's, 2000); Peter Holquist, *Making War, Forging Revolution: Russia's Continuum of Crisis, 1914-1921* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002); Jochen Hellbeck, *Revolution on My Mind: Writing a Diary under Stalin* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006).

day, as the police rounded up drunks, brawlers, and other disturbers of the Soviet idyll in increasing numbers. As Brian LaPierre has argued, the Soviet legal system transformed these characteristic features of rough masculinity common to the country's factory towns into criminal acts—thus greatly extending the reach of jurisprudence into the everyday.[33] Issuance of the code of communist morality in 1961 crystallized these impulses by legitimating comradely interference into personal matters. Citizen policing of the actions of their neighbors replaced state terror as a means of ensuring loyalty and decorum.[34] Lines between the Khrushchev and Brezhnev years have also blurred as a result of on-going scholarly projects conceptualizing the greater post-Stalin era as a distinct historical formation rather than simply veering from Khrushchevian reform to Brezhnevian revanchism.

A second theme in this literature has been to engage with everyday actors in these processes and to complicate notions of the "Thaw" and de-Stalinization as periods of extensive top-down reform and systemic overhaul. Work of this type reveals the contested nature of reform during this period, at times stressing certain dialogic features at work in the remaking of the system. Stalin's death forced both authorities and average citizens to come to terms with Stalinism as they collectively debated the future of the Soviet system. However, not all citizens welcomed the rebukes of Stalinism contained in the "Secret Speech" or various programs

[33] Brian LaPierre, "Making Hooliganism on a Mass Scale: The Campaign Against Petty Hooliganism in the Soviet Union, 1956-1964," *Cahiers du Monde russe* 47, no. 1/2 (January 2006): 349–376. Instead of a ten or twenty-year term in the camps, the hooligan spent only a matter of days behind bars.

[34] Deborah A. Field, *Private Life and Communist Morality in Khrushchev's Russia* (New York: Peter Lang, 2007). On citizen policing and *druzhiny*, see also Gleb Tsipursky, "Citizenship, Deviance, and Identity: Soviet Youth Newspapers as Agents of Control in the Thaw-era Leisure Campaign," *Cahiers du Monde russe* 49, no. 4 (October 2008): 629–650.

associated with de-Stalinization.[35] Miriam Dobson's study of Gulag amnesties sheds light on the at times contradictory impulses underlying reform efforts through her analysis of the popular hostility to returnees and the regime's shifting and unstable relationship with the returned *zek*. This unease symbolized the general swerving between liberalizing tendencies and comparatively repressive crackdowns characteristic of Khrushchev's tenure.[36] The question of the reliability of Soviet youth also continued to occupy authorities during this time—a theme that will be brought out in various chapters of this dissertation. Youth authorities closely monitored behaviors and harshly condemned hooliganism and non-conformism among their charges at the same time that rates of juvenile delinquency continued to rise.[37] Technological advances also allowed authorities more opportunities to peer behind closed doors and attempt to remake humanity from inside. The particular role that consumer goods, the private apartment, and interior design played in these campaigns is discussed below.

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[35] See the essays contained in Polly Jones, ed. *The Dilemmas of De-Stalinization: Negotiating Cultural and Social Change in the Khrushchev Era* (London and New York: Routledge, 2006). Jones characterizes the essays in this collection as united by the idea that "the cardinal dilemma of de-Stalinization, and what remained the focus of negation throughout the Khrushchev era, was the prerogative to direct and control social and cultural change." See p. 5.

[36] Miriam Dobson, *Khrushchev's Cold Summer: Gulag Returnees, Crime, and the Fate of Reform after Stalin* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2009) and *idem*, "'Show the Bandit-Enemies No Mercy!': Amnesty, Criminality and Public Response in 1953," in *The Dilemmas of De-Stalinization*, 21–40.

[37] Ann Livschiz, "De-Stalinizing Soviet Childhood: The Quest for Moral Rebirth, 1953-58," in *The Dilemmas of De-Stalinization*, 117–134; Juliane Fürst, "The Arrival of Spring? Changes and Continuities in Soviet Youth Culture and Policy between Stalin and Khrushchev," in *The Dilemmas of De-Stalinization*, 135–153.

Soviet Consumption Regimes

A "nylon curtain" divided the globe (in György Péteri's evocative formulation) during the Cold War. More transparent and porous than the iron of Churchill's metaphor, nylon's characteristics succinctly capture the manner in which the Communist East and Capitalist West openly contested systemic superiority and the means of modernization.[38] Economic and cultural authorities intended this component of the Cold War to penetrate deeply into the daily lives of the Soviet citizenry and at the same time sought to curry international favor by broadcasting socialism's achievements to the globe. Heightened opportunities for Soviet women to shop and consume served as a means of demonstrating the superiority of socialism by beating capitalism at its own game. As subsequent chapters in this dissertation will argue, the Khrushchev era did not entirely restrict the field of consumption to women as it targeted male consumptive (in both the forms of vice and material goods) practices for remodeling.[39]

The study of consumption inside the Soviet Union began with the practitioners of classical Sovietology, Western economists, and other "Russia watchers" of the early Cold War. Increased attention on the part of Soviet authorities to the production of consumer goods and material satisfaction of the population spoke to the changing nature of the post-Stalinist Soviet system. Following the austerity surrounding postwar reconstruction and prolonged material

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[38] Nylon also references the mid-twentieth century faith in the transformative power of synthetics for consumerism shared by modernizers in both the first and second worlds. György Péteri, "Nylon Curtain -- Transnational and Transsystemic Tendencies in the Cultural Life of State-Socialist Russia and East-Central Europe," *Slavonica* 10, no. 2 (November 2004): 113–123.

[39] Susan E. Reid, "Cold War in the Kitchen: Gender and the De-Stalinization of Consumer Taste in the Soviet Union Under Khrushchev," *Slavic Review* 61, no. 2 (Summer 2002): 211–252. On the (at times ambivalent) response to Western consumer items, see Susan E. Reid, "Who Will Beat Whom? Soviet Popular Reception of the American National Exhibit in Moscow, 1959," *Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History* 9, no. 4 (Fall 2008): 855–904.

depravity, the championing of improved material provisioning by members of the post-Stalinist regime served as one indicator of a different type of Soviet leadership in the making. Economic reforms pertaining to industrial production facilitated over the 1950s a growth of non-food consumer durables and the assortment of goods produced for sale, ranging from clothing and footwear to consumer electronics and other items of use in daily life. Egalitarian wage reforms sought to lower the pay of upper-level bureaucrats and administrators in order to bring closer in line with other citizens.

Commenting on the period before reform, Jan Prybyla noted, "even by minimal standards the Soviet citizen in 1953 was still shoddily clad, deplorably housed, poorly equipped in household goods, fed primarily on bread and cereals, and working forty-eight hours a week."[40] Khrushchev-era reforms instituted improved provisioning of both consumer goods and public services (such as health services, housing, pensions, and maternity assistance). The prevailing logics of the day (built, at least in part, on modernization theory) led M. E. Ruban also to conclude that both greater quantities and larger assortments of consumer goods brought to market in the mid-1950s had directly improved Soviet standards of living.[41] Western forecasts optimistically predicted the Soviet economy's ability to continue to grow in its provisioning capacity without any negative effects. Yet, due to their comparatively low starting points, increased production figures still meant that the Soviet Union lagged behind much of North American and Western Europe according to the assumptions underlying these studies. They also

[40] Jan S. Prybyla, "The Soviet Consumer in Khrushchev's Russia," *Russian Review* 20, no. 3 (July 1961): 194–205.

[41] M. E. Ruban, "Private Consumption in the USSR: Changes in the Assortment of Goods, 1940-1959," *Soviet Studies* 13, no. 3 (January 1962): 237–254.

pointed out that some Soviet consumers also complained about levels of provisioning—particularly concerning the quality and quantity of available housing stock and services.[42]

Vera Dunham's work brought a renewed critical interest in the materiality of Soviet life. For her, the postwar Stalinist regime sponsored the cultivation of "middle-class values" as a tool of legitimation known as the "Big Deal," currying favor and loyalty by granting the swelling ranks of the *nomenklatura* access to desired consumer goods and other special privileges. Echoes of Trotsky's charge of revolutionary Thermidor can be heard in this claim, as he had long ago condemned Stalin's supposed abandonment of Bolshevik values. James Millar applied Dunham's general framework to the 1970s in order to understand how the late socialist regime bargained with the people, trading loyalty and political passivity for material well-being and greater freedom within personal networks. Both the Stalinist and Brezhnevian incarnations swapped moral righteousness and egalitarian ideals for material incentives. Gradual erosion of the state's power to exert force on the citizenry in order to generate compliance during the 1950s and 1960s meant that the Brezhnev-era state had to rely ever more on this type of bargaining—openly turning acquisitive attitudes and "on the side" (*nalevo*) marketing into an everyday part of socialist life.[43] Other studies of Soviet consumption policies have reflected on the paternalistic nature of the management of material goods and manipulation of persistent shortage. For the Stalinist party-state, provisioning of goods and services functioned in tandem with state surveillance techniques. Shortages of both raw agricultural and finished consumer products gave

[42] B. A. Grushin, *Chetyre zhizni Rossii v zerkale oprosov obshchestvennogo mneniia: Zhizn' 1-ia epokha Khrushcheva* (Moskva: Progress-Traditsiia, 2001), 118-158.

[43] Vera S. Dunham, *In Stalin's Time: Middleclass Values in Soviet Fiction* (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1976); James B. Millar, "The Little Deal: Brezhnev's Contribution to Acquisitive Socialism," *Slavic Review* 44, no. 4 (Winter 1985): 694–706.

the state tremendous leverage over consumption, animating demands for popular loyalty and individual labor output in exchange for material provisioning.[44]

Communist party authorities during the 1950s and 1960s paid particular attention to the question of technological development as both a means of modernizing the Soviet economy and as a tool of besting the West in the Cold War. The chemical industry embodied both of these aspects due to wide-ranging applications of its products. Synthetic fibers promised to provide inexpensive, durable, and stylish clothing for the masses in a way not previously possible. As early as 1950, Soviet chemists developed fibers like kaplon suitable for producing women's stockings. Even if the initial quality of synthetics may have left much to be desired, they offered a tangible glimpse of the future. Synthetic solutions to the problems of modern living became intoned in official ideology in May 1958 when a Central Committee plenum produced the dictum, "communism is Soviet power plus the electrification of the whole country plus the chemicalization of the national economy."[45] This update of Lenin's famous definition of communism referenced the past and recast the Soviet project now as one attuned to improving everyday provisions, forging a link between the revolution and the contemporary situation. According to the Central Committee's report, "heavy industry and science and technology have now reached the level where we, with no detriment to the ongoing preferential development of heavy industry and of the country's defense capabilities, may significantly accelerate the increase in consumer goods production, so as to ensure the population, in the next five to six years, a

[44] Lewis H. Siegelbaum, "'Dear Comrade, You Ask What We Need': Socialist Paternalism and Soviet Rural 'Notables' in the Mid-1930s," *Slavic Review* 57, no. 1 (Spring 1998): 107–132.

[45] Natalia Lebina, "Plus the Chemicalization of the Entire Wardrobe," trans. Liv Bliss, *Russian Studies in History* 48, no. 1 (Summer 2009): 33–45.

sufficient supply of fabrics, clothing, footwear, and other goods."[46] Khrushchev in particular held out hope in the possible material advances from the chemical industry. He saw synthetic fibers as not only the means by which the clothing problem could be solved, but also an actual superiority over products made in a traditional manner.

Mass housing projects begun in the late 1950s made perhaps even more of an impact on the general population. Khrushchev pledged to solve the "housing question" once and for all in 1957, embarking on a decisive step that would place the country on a path to full communism. Inspired by contemporary trends in international modernism, Soviet architects and planners designed five- and seven-story panel apartment buildings by applying mass production technology to housing. The Soviet urbanite would move out of the communal apartment and into a private dwelling space. Individual apartments (*otdel'nye kvartiry*) captured the ordinary citizen's imagination, becoming an object of intense desire. However, these new apartments proved difficult to obtain in spite of the massive numbers under construction throughout the 1960s, setting ultimately unfulfillable expectations for the post-Stalinist order.[47]

Others have considered the individual apartment and its attendant appliances as embedded with modern technologies of rule that allowed state surveillance behind closed doors. This branch of scholarship sees official unease with the individual apartment, casting it as a site of potential deviation from the norms of communist morality. Modern apartments offered a means of reaching into personal life and internally reordering the Soviet population. Old housing stock resisted these technologies of rule due to their inherent diversity and ad hoc

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[46] As quoted in *Ibid.*, 37.

[47] Steven E. Harris, *Communism on Tomorrow Street: Mass Housing and Everyday Life after Stalin* (Washington, DC and Baltimore: Woodrow Wilson Center Press and Johns Hopkins Press, 2013).

internment as communal apartments. *Mikroraiony*, modern microdistricts providing all necessary housing and services, offered the chance for authorities to construct housing permeated with socialist values from scratch. International modernist aesthetics built on the principles of minimalist, utilitarian design overturned the fussy, ornate style associated with Stalinism. Modern wares symbolically de-Stalinized the apartment by providing individual space lacking the bourgeois trappings of the private realm (*poshlost'*).[48] Moving Soviet citizens to newly built towns or districts promised the ability to forge socialist lifestyles. Lived reality, though, did not often match planners' visions. Chronic shortages slowed construction of planned amenities, leisure facilities, and public services. High-modernist planning techniques deployed in building these "cities of the future" eliminated the organic hustle-and-bustle of urban life—now inadvertently replaced with alienation and stifling boredom.[49]

Susan Reid's work on the individual apartment and interior design has proved influential in understanding not only these spaces, but also post-Stalinist everyday life and the cultural contours of the "Thaw". In her analysis, the drive to outfit individual apartments with modern labor-saving appliances (such as dishwashers and vacuum cleaners) demonstrates the way in which Soviet authorities sought to discipline female bodies behind closed doors as they measured and calculated movements down to every step. Saving time in the home meant for women increased freedom to engage in socially productive work and other public acts. Bottlenecks in production tempered these panoptic aims, preventing many individual apartments

[48] Iurii Gerchuk, "The Aesthetics of Everyday Life in the Khrushchev Thaw in the USSR (1954-64)," in *Style and Socialism: Modernity and Material Culture in Post-war Eastern Europe*, ed. Susan E. Reid and David Crowley (Oxford and New York: Berg, 2000), 81–99.

[49] On Tol'iatti as a model for the Soviet "cities of the sixties", see Lewis H. Siegelbaum, "Modernity Unbound: The New Soviet City of the Sixties," in *The Socialist Sixties: Crossing Borders in the Second World*, ed. Anne E. Gorsuch and Diane P. Koenker (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2013), 66–83.

from receiving their intended outfitting and freeing residents to construct their own individualized domestic realms against planners' wishes.[50]

Chapter Outline

This dissertation is comprised of four individual cases studies of male consumptive and bodily practices: alcohol use/abuse, narcotics consumption, menswear, and sex. It makes use of a number of different kinds of sources, including archival documents pertaining to the high politics of the Communist party, Communist youth organizations, and the Soviet government, as well as newspapers. These sources provide an entrance into both the anxieties and actions of party-state officials as they confronted deviations from perceived notions of how the New Soviet Man should act. The voices of non-state actors, such as physicians and social science researchers, provide another layer in which to approach consumptive behaviors on the level of practice. Memoirs, letters, and other individual sources facilitate access to the thoughts (as well as performances) of individuals. Cultural sources allow for analysis of representations, as well as approaches to sides of life not typically found in official discourse. Each chapter may be read individually, but taken as a whole, they reveal interlocking processes by which party-state and industrial authorities targeted male consumptive practices for renovation and modernization.

[50] Susan E. Reid, "Destalinization and Taste, 1953-1963," *Journal of Design History* 10, no. 2 (1997): 177–201; Susan E. Reid, "The Khrushchev Kitchen: Domesticating the Scientific-Technological Revolution," *Journal of Contemporary History* 40, no. 2 (April 2005): 289–316; Susan E. Reid, "The Meaning of Home: 'The Only Bit of the World You Can Have to Yourself'," in *Borders of Socialism: Private Spheres of Soviet Russia*, ed. Lewis H. Siegelbaum (New York and Houndmills, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 145–170. For other scholars' analyses of decorating the individual apartment, see Victor Buchli, "Khrushchev, Modernism, and the Fight Against Petit-bourgeois Consciousness in the Soviet Home," *Journal of Design History* 10, no. 2 (1997): 161–176; Christine Varga-Harris, "Homemaking and the Aesthetic and Moral Perimeters of the Soviet Home During the Khrushchev Era," *Journal of Social History* 48, no. 3 (Spring 2008): 561–589; Harris, *Communism on Tomorrow Street*.

Specialized historiographies concerning the individual consumptive practices under study will be dealt with in each chapter.

The first chapter takes up perhaps the most commonly associated consumptive practice of Soviet men—alcohol and the rough masculinity built around hard-drinking homosociobility. The modernizing impulses of the Khrushchev era informed anti-alcohol campaigns in their attempts to treat alcoholism as a medical condition. Abusers could have their productive and social value restored through new forms of treatment. Inspired by this new approach to alcoholism, some women wrote to the Supreme Soviet to demand state intervention in their home into order to treatment their husbands or other male relatives. Party-state authorities debated and planned various measures to combat alcoholism in the Soviet setting, passing in 1958 the first comprehensive reform program since the revolution. The medicalized approach to treatment did not remain uncontested, as older models emphasizing individual weakness persisted in certain corners. This contestation over the nature of alcoholism in the end hindered official efforts to deal with alcohol abuse.

Chapter two moves away from this commonplace to a consideration of one particularly understudied aspect of the Soviet experience—the use of illegal narcotics. Analyzing recently declassified Komsomol archival materials, as well as memoirs and medical texts, this chapter considers the way in which Soviet authorities embedded deviance into the flesh of Soviet drug consumers, labelling them "*narkomany*" irrespective of their specific usage patterns and practices. Case histories demonstrate that drug use in the Soviet Union was neither an act of dissent nor a Western import. Instead, these predominantly male users fashioned alternative identities and leisure practices around narcotic consumption specific to their own, localized settings. Their taste for drugs may suggest participation in the transnational counterculture or

global “hippiedom” of the era, however declassified Komsomol reports point to these practices as components of a rough masculinity cultivated by working-class youth.

The site of investigation shifts in the third chapter from substance abuse to masculine forms of material consumption. Examining the place of menswear in the Soviet fashion industry, this chapter argues that design authorities pushed for a sartorial revolution meant to renovate male consumptive habits and demonstrate the modernity of the Soviet system. The *stiliaga*—a Western-aping Soviet hipster—stands out in the historiography as the prototypical dandy and consuming male of the post-Stalin era. However, this chapter argues that a taste for clothing did not automatically place the Soviet man of the 1950s and 1960s into a netherworld of social exclusion. Soviet style authorities writing in *Zhurnal mod* and other related publications dictated a notion of male fashion that revolved around cultivating a proper sense of occasion and embrace of modern styling. Their designs followed foreign fashions—with a particular nod to the classical British tailoring of Savile Row—while at the same time incorporating the latest domestically produced synthetics. Style authorities, if conservative in their tastes, opened up the realm of material consumption for Soviet men through their advice on what to purchase and how to dress.

The final chapter investigates the ways in which party-state, Komsomol, and scientific authorities confronted changing sexual mores during the 1950s and 1960s, seeking new means of governing the actions of Soviet bodies. This chapter considers three different scenarios in which issues related to dangerous expressions of sexuality threatened socialist morality and the conditions for the building of a harmonious society. Recently declassified materials from the Komsomol archive point to this period not being one merely of sexual liberation, but also of rising instances of sexual violence. Authorities blamed these instances on youth failing to

uphold communist morality in a way that blurred the line between attacker and victim. The arrival of foreign students from the "third world" and questions of sex and comparative privilege threatened the pursuit of "friendship among nations." The final section examines the ways in which the recently revived Soviet social science complex sought to come to terms with unstable male bodies and mediate their troubling desires. Soviet sociologists and pedagogical experts sought to head off further erosion of the socialist family through their measurements and prescriptions, keenly aware of the contemporary shift in gender relations and family structures in the West. Their work reveals an acute concern about the nature of male sexual practices prior to, as well as conceptually outside of, the late Soviet "crisis of masculinity."

CHAPTER ONE:

Tearing Down The "Men's Club": Alcohol Politics and Masculinity

I've revalued
I undervalued
the absolute alcohol of arctic Kolyma
Veuve Clicquot and the moonshine of Ryazan
the stars of brandyness
the brassy pine medallions on liquor labels
the torn remains of crayfish like limbs on Kulikovo's battlefield
and beer in steins with helmets like the seven knights of fable
the warming feel of friendship
of alcoholic friendship
shared hangovers the agonies of hell
which if one's in a bunch of good old friends
are easily survived.

- Vasilii Aksenov (from *The Burn*)[1]

In the closing days of 2011, the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation issued a decree requiring police to help individuals in a visible state of intoxication to a place where they can receive medical attention.[2] Intending to deal with a perceived blight of public drunkenness on the streets of Russian cities, this decree also harkened back to Soviet consumptive policies that utilized the long arm of the law to place the intoxicated under the supervision of medical authorities. This judicio-medical approach to countering male hooligan behavior crystallized in

[1] Vassily Aksyonov, *The Burn: A Novel in Three Books (Late Sixties-Early Seventies)*, trans. Michael Glenny (New York: Random House, 1984), 47. Unlike his early work that made him one of the most popular writers of the 1960s, *The Burn*'s debauched scenes and criticisms of neo-Stalinist tendencies in the Brezhnev era rendered this work unpublishable in the Soviet Union. Later work on an almanac of underground writing led to his exile in 1980. This reference utilizes the publication's transliteration of the author's name.

[2] "Prikaz Ministerstva vnutrennikh del Rossisskoi Federatsii ot 21 Dekabria 2011 G. N 1228 'Ob uvertzhdenii instruktsii o poriadke dostavelenniia lits, nakhodiashchikhsia v obshchestvennikh mestakh v sostoianii alkogol'nogo, narkoticheskogo ili inogo toksicheskogo op'ianeniia i utrativshikh sposobnost' samostoiatel'no peredvigat'sia ili orientirovat'sia v okruzhaiushchei obstanovke, v meditsinskiie organizatsii," *Rossiskaia gazeta* (February 29, 2012), http://www.rg.ru/2012/02/29/pianstvo-dok.html.

the form of the modern sobering-up station—a ubiquitous feature in the urban landscape of the Soviet city. This chapter takes as its epigraph a portion of text from Vasilii Aksenov's *The Burn* (*Ozhog)*—a complex, jazz-influenced novel exploring the Gulag city of Magadan in the 1940s and 1950s and post-Stalinist intellectual underground of Moscow. Driven along by a free-flowing alcoholic escapism, the plotline leads its central characters to the "Men's Club"—a watering-hole where men regularly line up with to ease their early morning hangovers with beer—as well as a term in a sobering-up station. Amongst the myriad themes of this work stands a celebration of the bottle uniting the membership in Aksenov's "Men's Club," as well acting as a vehicle for realizing creative and individual freedom against the strictures of the Soviet system.

Clichés abound in writing about alcohol in Russia and its nationals' supposedly uncontrollable attraction to vodka. The general starting point for these associations stems from an oft-repeated legend that the lords of yore caught between East and West pledged their allegiance to Orthodox Christianity instead of Islam due to the latter's prohibition on imbibing spirits.[3] But as a few scholars have argued in recent years, alcohol consumption can also be used as an entrance into approaching various intersections between political, social, and cultural formations in both imperial Russia and the Soviet Union. For this chapter, alcohol and its associations with a certain form of rough masculinity serve as a starting point in investigating the ways in which post-Stalinist reform efforts combined with notions of transformative potential in the 1950s and 1960s to reshape male practices. The ways in which men and masculine spheres of existence were targeted in these projects allows for a further examination of the ways consumptive politics functioned to manipulate gender norms in Soviet society as a means of

[3] For an exploration of this commonplace, see Boris M. Segal, *The Drunken Society: Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism in the Soviet Union. A Comparative Study* (New York: Hippocrene, 1990), 2-16.

further progressing toward a socialist ideal.[4] The more incisive anti-alcohol campaign of the perestroika years has been given significant attention in the historical literature.[5] But looking back at the first attempts at tackling the ever-rising levels of alcohol consumption in the postwar years under Khrushchev's leadership does more than just set the scene. Recent studies of this period of Soviet history have emphasized the role material consumption (and appropriate attitudes toward it) played in the Khrushchev period. This body of literature has mostly focused on the ways in which scientific approaches to daily life sought to remodel female realms of existence in order to remove vestiges of the capitalist-patriarchal past from their domestic routines and more fully integrate them into Soviet society, thus quickening the move into a full-fledged Communism.[6]

An examination of a cache of letters sent to both members of the Supreme Soviet and various media outlets in the late 1950s and 1960s further uncovers a popular engagement with consumptive politics directed at Soviet men and their drinking practices. These letters also reveal the manner in which some women activated these politics inside their homes.[7] Popular

[4] Outside of the rough masculinity associated with working-class traditions, ex-*zeks* also had their own drinking rituals. See Dobson, *Khrushchev's Cold Summer*, 109-132.

[5] For some recent accounts of the perestroika alcohol reforms, see Stephen White, *Russia Goes Dry: Alcohol, State and Society* (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996) and A. V. Nemtsov, *Alkogol'naia istorii rossii: noveishei period* (Moskva: Knizhnii dom "Librokom," 2008).

[6] A notable exception to this characterization (though slightly later in time) is the recent work of Lewis Siegelbaum on the life of the automobile in the Soviet Union. In regard to the role of the car in male homosociability, see Lewis H. Siegelbaum, "Cars, Cars, and More Cars: The Faustian Bargain of the Brezhnev Era," in *Borders of Socialism: Private Spheres of Soviet Russia*, ed. Lewis H. Siegelbaum (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 82–103 and *idem*, "On the Side: Car Culture in the USSR, 1960s-1980s," *Technology and Culture* 50, no. 1 (2009): 1–23.

[7] In his study of the origins and implementation of perestroika-era alcohol reforms, Stephen White argues that despite earlier moves in his career as Stavropol' *kraikom* secretary

responses to Khrushchev-era alcohol reform efforts indicate that for many Soviet women, the battle against men's penchant for drink represented in their minds one of the last hurdles in overcoming the lingering personality defects of the capitalist order. Taming the "green dragon" would in turn hasten the radiant future now supposedly on the horizon. In order to do so, some of these women took up the pen as their sword; writing directly to members of the Supreme Soviet to ask for state intervention in their family lives as a means of curing their husbands', brothers', and sons' problems with alcohol. These letter writers were not radicals who sought state support in all familial disputes or quarrels, but instead wrote impassioned pleas of last resort, requesting that Soviet authorities intercede where they could not hope to succeed. Local authorities could not or would not provide the necessary support, leaving these women without any choice but to call on the highest rungs of Soviet power. Moreover, these women believed that they would get the help that they asked for as they saw their requests as directly in line with contemporary ideas on proper socialist living and morality. The period's spirit of reform merged with the scientific-technological discourse to facilitate greater possibilities for reshaping the individual. The letter writers covered here seized this opportunity to invite state intervention into their personal lives as a means of correcting the behavior of their errant male relatives.[8]

Yet, as will also be explored in this chapter, the transformative language embedded in conversations about alcoholism did not remain uncontested. By the mid-1960s, a backlash

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against the proliferation of vice in Soviet culture, Mikhail Gorbachev's initial goals as Soviet premier did not include alcohol reform. Instead, only after public pressure mounted in the form of letter-writing campaigns (and apparently, the more intimate activism of his wife, Raisa Gorbacheva) did this issue receive a central position in his agenda. White, *Russia Goes Dry*, 64-70.

[8] To be precise, the notion of the Soviet system as having the ability to transform humanity is not new to the Khrushchev period, but the ways in which science and technology were to be explicitly used to harness and hone human energy into building communism does depart from its Leninist and Stalinist antecedents.

against the idea of alcoholism as a medical condition (and treatable as such) arose in the press and among the debates of policymakers. Proponents of alcohol reform at this time pointed to other means of changing the behavior of drunkards, hooligans, and alcoholics through renovation of leisure activities and trade, as well as the use of hard labor in order to teach proper socialist attitudes towards life and work. The inherent contradictions of this debate limited authorities' ability to implement comprehensive policy, issued instead in a piecemeal fashion over the course of the decade.

Alcohol, Masculinity, and the Soviet State

Popular associations of alcohol with masculinity and spheres of male homosociablity are by no means unique to the post-Stalin era and have a long history in Russian culture. Alcohol traditionally served as an essential ingredient in and vehicle for male bonding among Russian workers and peasants alike. These associations persisted in spite of various temperance activities and reform efforts initiated during the late imperial and Soviet periods, typically on the part of members of the bourgeoisie or intelligentsia.[9] Within working-class and peasant cultures, consumption of hard liquor in particular acted as a marker of one's masculinity and sexual maturity, with those failing to join in or keep up the pace with his compatriots commonly derided in gendered terms as "*baba*s," (an unflattering term for peasant women) "wet hens," or "red

[9] While the scholarship on alcohol as a problem in Russian/Soviet society is enormous, in recent years there has been a growth in historical treatments of alcoholism as a lens into various kinds of political-social relations and cultural formations. For example, see Laura L. Phillips, *Bolsheviks and the Bottle: Drink and Worker Culture in St. Petersburg, 1900-1929* (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 2000); Patricia Herlihy, *The Alcoholic Empire: Vodka & Politics in Late Imperial Russia* (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2003) and Kate Transchel, *Under the Influence: Working-Class Drinking, Temperance, and Cultural Revolution in Russia, 1895-1932* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2006).

maidens."[10] The endurance of these practices created problems for the Soviet state seeking to engineer not only a new type of state and society, but also a new type of individual to inhabit it. If the Soviet state was to build the "new Soviet man" with the worker as its foundation, these habits made for an unharmonious marriage.

Prohibition as a solution to this problem in the post-revolutionary years, while debated, proved unfeasible to the Stalin administration due to the state's substantial revenues generated from alcohol taxation and the pressing needs of funding for industrialization.[11] At the same time, persistence of alcohol consumption in the workplace threatened to destabilize industrialization efforts due to absenteeism, shoddy work habits, and "blue Mondays." This bind resulted in industrial policies that officially punished workers for not showing up on time and banned drink on the shop floor, while drinking persisted virtually everywhere else. Not only did the young Soviet state battle these pre-revolutionary traditions, but it also created its own masculine alcohol practices. In the words of historian Irina Takala, the distribution of "Stalin's one-hundred grams" among Red Army soldiers fighting in the Second World War further ritualized daily drinking among an entire generation of men and compounded associations with male sociability and heroic virility. By the end of October 1941, alcohol sales on the home had stopped on Stalin's order in order to funnel supplies to the front (as well as to the dachas and apartments of the Soviet elite). In response, theft of supplies headed toward the front and illegal

[10] Phillips, *Bolsheviks and the Bottle*, 31-32. The drinking solely of beer, for example, would also be considered to be "feminine" in this context. "Red maidens" here also serves as a jab against the temperance activism of skilled workers aligned with, or subscribing to, socialist politics.

[11] *Ibid.*, 25-26. Phillips positions this debate as part of the larger struggle in Lenin's succession, with Stalin favoring alcohol taxes as a means of paying for industrialization, whereas Bukharin advocated general prohibition. With Bukharin's removal and later trial, the former won out.

home distillation sharply rose.[12] In the wake of the war's destruction, alcohol production fell sharply, but due to the intensive reconstruction efforts of the late-1940s, factories soon opened and began to replenish supplies.

Scientific and medical understandings of alcoholism in Russia were subject to the same kinds of ideological contestation that other fields endured during both the political and cultural revolutions of 1917 and 1930. In the first decade after the revolution, debate over alcoholism centered on the research poles of social hygiene and the psychology of the individual positing alcoholism as a mental disorder. Soviet social hygienists considered all disease a "bio-social" problem, though unlike their counterparts elsewhere, they placed the emphasis on society as the primary catalyst and therefore the source to be treated rather than other superstructural symptoms.[13] To do so, researchers working in the State Institute for Social Hygiene advocated the use of persuasive propaganda to convince the habitual (*bytovoi*) alcoholic that their behaviors were undesirable and ultimately a problem of consciousness. Greater variability in treatment regimens existed among psychiatrists. Those supporting outpatient treatment as suitable for alcoholics did not believe that it was good practice to remove the patient from their normal environment, arguing that remaining in their current places of employment and social circles would help them build proper defenses against temptation. However, the majority of the

[12] The practice of distributing vodka to Soviet soldiers actually began on the eve of the Second World War, when soldiers fighting in the Winter War of 1939-1940 were provided with a daily ration of 100g in order to ward off freezing temperatures. During the war against fascism, the actual type and amount of alcohol distributed to the Red Army depended on a number of factors, including the relative location of the company. For example, soldiers fighting in the Caucasus could receive 200g of fortified wine or 300g of table wine in addition to their daily vodka. I. R. Takala, *Veselie Rusi: istoriia alkogol'noi problemy v Rossii* (Sankt-Peterburg: Izdatel'stvo "Zhurnal 'Neva'," 2002), 245-248.

[13] Susan Gross Solomon, "David and Goliath in Soviet Public Health: The Rivalry of Social Hygienists and Psychiatrists for Authority over the *Bytovoi* Alcoholic," *Soviet Studies* 41, no. 2 (April 1989): 254–275.

profession at the time instead advocated the placement of the habitual alcoholic in psychiatric hospitals or colonies (*koloniia*)—measures that had a corollary in the pre-revolutionary period, but had become the default method of treatment in the 1920s. According to psychiatrist P. P. Brukhansky, this practice had developed from a growing unwillingness on the part of regular hospitals to deal with the difficult behavior of alcoholics and not for any higher ideological or methodological reason.[14]

The Sovnarkom issued a decree in April 1927 that mandated forced treatment of an alcoholic if determined to be "socially dangerous" by an examining board and by the end of the decade, work on alcoholism as a social disease had come to end as a result of the party's ban on social research during the cultural revolution.[15] By the 1930s, responsibility for alcohol problems rested with the individual and its abuse considered constituent of criminal activity. A propensity towards alcohol, like other licentious behavior, illustrated the individual's weak-willed nature, lack of discipline, and moral degeneration—an understanding that would remain constant virtually throughout Stalin's lifetime. In spite of these prohibitions, immoderate drinking continued to be tolerated among party members, generally only resulting in expulsion when it interfered with an individual's work.[16]

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[14] *Ibid.,* 259-265. In Brukhansky's work, he subdivided alcoholics into three groups to determine whether or not they actually needed this level of psychiatric-medical attention. He argued that those suffering delirium tremens or other psychological disturbances as the result of their alcoholism needed psychiatric help, but the majority of alcoholics simply suffered from "social traumas" that had to be addressed elsewhere.

[15] *Ibid.,* 267.

[16] Edward D. Cohn, "Disciplining the Party: The Expulsion and Censure of Communists in the Post-War Soviet Union, 1945-1961" (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Chicago, 2007), 461-470.

Beginning in the early 1950s, Soviet health and police authorities started to reevaluate their attitudes toward alcohol abuse, adopting an approach that favored medical treatment of the individual, albeit in a loosely criminalized capacity. Embracing the concept of alcoholism as a medical condition did not mean an end to use of punitive methods in combating it. Instead, the two models were partially welded together and functioned in tension through the 1950s and 1960s. The "sobering-up station" (*vytrezviteli*) attached to the police station for the detention of those found in a state of intoxication had always been a visible feature of Soviet life, but during the twilight of Stalin's rule, Soviet leaders increasingly sought to bring a medicalized approach in the struggle with the country's unruly drunks. Writing to the Council of Ministers in March 1952, deputy secretary of the Latvian SSR, M. Ia. Pludon complained about the lack of suitable facilities in Riga for housing the intoxicated and proposed the establishment of a different type of sobering-up station—one outfitted with 20-30 beds and appropriate medical equipment and staff.[17] In this regard, the "drunk tank" moves from a prison cell to something more closely resembling a hospital room (albeit one with guards). Stalin personally signed off on Pludon's proposal. His proposal also met with an enthusiastic response from the deputy minister of state security, P. N. Mironenko.[18]

[17] GARF f. R-5446, op. 86a, d. 7927, l. 94 as published in E. Iu. Zubkova and T. Iu. Zhukova, eds., *Na "kraiu" sovetskogo obshchestva: sotsial'nye marginaly kak ob"ekt gosudarstennoi politiki 1945-1960-e gg.* (Moskva: Rosspen, 2010), 236-237.

[18] GARF f. R-5446, op. 86a, d. 7927, l. 93 and *ibid*., l. 97, as published in *Na "kraiu" sovetskogo obshchestva*, 237-239. Walter Connor has argued that these renovated stations did not succeed in providing the kind of medical treatment suggested by Pludon. Material deficiencies aside, even if every station did not receive a complete overhaul along these lines, other evidence points to an expanded network of treatment and a change in approach. See Walter D. Connor, *Deviance in Soviet Society: Crime, Delinquency, and Alcoholism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972).

The years after Stalin's death also witnessed a partial delegation of policing powers over behavior in daily life to the community level in the form of the comrades' courts and volunteer police bands known as *druzhiny*.[19] Soviet courts also prosecuted everyday offenses in greater numbers than ever before, introducing a law in 1956 that officially differentiated petty hooliganism from its more malicious variant and covered its more routine incarnations.[20] Individual sentences for hooliganism were reduced from the multiyear stints of incarceration meted out during the Stalinist period to only three-to-fifteen days at this time. However, the Procuracy (the Soviet state's prosecutor's office) widened its net in order to punish as many offenders as possible by expanding the number of prosecutable offenses. This allowed the courts to turn the offense of petty hooliganism into a flexible means of punishing undesirable behavior upsetting the norms of socialist life, targeting everything from the utterance of obscenities to domestic disputes or drunken street brawling. At the heart of these measures was an attempt to control and correct the alcohol-fueled behavioral patterns of male sociability and patriarchal conflict within the family. As Brian LaPierre asserts, these individuals became criminals "not by lashing out at the Soviet state, but by engaging in the masculine rituals of drinking, cursing and

[19] In addition to these developments, Gleb Tsipursky has also written about youth newspapers as yet another alternative compliance-enforcement mechanism in the 1950s and early 1960s. See Tsipursky, "Citizenship."

[20] Brian LaPierre argues that by broadening the category of hooliganism in this manner, Soviet law transformed millions of citizens into deviant outsiders virtually overnight, as in earlier years they would not have been punished for these same behaviors. In doing so, this had the unintended and counterproductive effect of introducing this newly created group of offenders to the criminal world that then set some on a life of crime that they would not have previously considered prior to their arrest. See LaPierre, "Making Hooliganism" and *idem.*, "Redefining Deviance: Policing and Punishing Hooliganism in Khrushchev's Russia, 1953-1964," Ph.D. Dissertation (Chicago: University of Chicago, 2006).

fighting: working class displays of machismo that were an everyday occurrence in the entertainment-free world of the Soviet factory town."[21]

Complementing these efforts to ensure proper socialist behavior on the ground through expansive and pliable legislation and the mobilization of the citizenry to enforce compliance, reform efforts also reactivated the authority of local soviets (councils) in their communities as a means of maximizing the efficiency of governance by delegating power away from the center. Local soviets now were in charge of handling routine administrative affairs in their districts, but as Stephen Bittner has argued, in actuality became "courts of first instance," swamped with the task of deciding on petitions and complaints over fines, pension applications, and other mundane problems of daily life. Central authorities directed citizens to write to local authorities first, instead of addressing all issues to the Kremlin.[22] However, as will be evidenced below, frustrations with the inefficacy of local and regional level authorities combined with the habits of the Stalin era to prompt petitioners to send their complaints directly to the members of the Supreme Soviet, often addressing their letters directly to Comrades Khrushchev, Voroshilov, or Brezhnev.

Domestic production and consumption of alcoholic beverages continued to rise during the postwar period. On the supply side, the amount of alcoholic beverages legally produced in the Soviet Union (according to one study) rose from approximately 620 million liters to 1.12 billion liters in just the ten-year period from 1955 to 1965 (of this, vodka and other strong liquor

[21] LaPierre, "Making Hooliganism," 357.

[22] Stephen V. Bittner, "Local Soviets, Public Order, and Welfare after Stalin: Appeals from Moscow's Kiev Raion," *Russian Review* 62 (2003): 281–293.

amounted to 472.3 and 748.4 million liters respectively).[23] These figures suggest a modification of the types of alcohol in production in the 1950s and 1960s, but certainly do not indicate an effort to combat alcohol abuse on this side of the equation. Estimates vary regarding average individual consumption and official statistics on this question remain unavailable for this period. What emerges from these rough estimates is that the postwar Soviet Union, on average, was consuming greater and greater amounts of alcohol each year. This postwar boom should not be seen as solely a Russian or Soviet problem, but rather as visible across the entire European continent. The main difference in the Soviet context is that drinking practices changed, growing steadily in amount from the 1950s to the 1980s, but also moving away from the occasional celebratory binge to an increasingly ubiquitous aspect of daily life. These factors certainly played a role in initiating the first attempts at comprehensive alcohol reform since the 1920s with the issuance of a Central Committee resolution to "fight against drunkenness and alcoholism" in December 1958.[24]

Prior to this resolution, newspapers had published articles heralding this new direction, singling out alcohol abuse as a lingering problem in Soviet society. In August 1954, *Pravda* published an article entitled "For Healthy Living" (*Za zdorovyi byt*) that positioned Soviet health authorities as the experts in combating "social diseases" and therefore a crucial agent in the building of communism—a battle that would be won in tandem with rising living and cultural conditions in the postwar period. According to the author, alcohol abuse still acted as stumbling block on this journey and "the most harmful relic of capitalism." A healthy socialist lifestyle

[23] Vladimir G. Treml, *Alcohol in the USSR: A Statistical Study* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press Policy Studies, 1982), 16. These numbers do not take into consideration the illegal production of *samogon* (Russian moonshine).

[24] Nemtsov, *Alkogol'naia istorii rossii*, 62-63.

could not be created in this environment as alcohol abuse undermined the family as an institution. "Yielding to his bad habits, [the alcoholic] forgets his obligations to the family, to his wife, and to his children. In many cases, he drinks away his earnings and leaves his family without the means to exist, and this produces disharmony and thus the family is destroyed."[25] Kurshov suggests that stronger measures for the medical treatment of alcoholics need to put into place as a means of combatting alcoholism. Moreover, the full mobilization of society to bring to trial more cases of drunkenness would aid in waging the battle for a healthy approach to daily living.

Official attempts to place the treatment of alcoholism deeper within a hybrid medical-criminal realm created a groundswell among many Soviet women, who not only echoed the ideas behind these measures, but demanded further state action in providing and ensuring treatment. With the exception of those landing in a sobering-up station after a run-in with a local *militsioner*, medical treatment for alcoholism remained voluntary. However, as evidenced in letters written to members of the Supreme Soviet in the 1950s and early 1960s, many women did not find relief in these and other proposed measures that still left the onus of treatment on the abusers. These women demanded that the Soviet state take a role in mandating and overseeing treatment for their unrepentant alcoholic husbands, brothers, and sons. As criminal punishments and the supposed scorn of one's comrades did not seem to have a lasting effect, these female letter-writers seized on the transformative ideas inherent in this new approach to alcoholism. Petitioners pleaded for state intervention to correct problems in their families, and in the process, articulate the characteristics of the proper Soviet man of the future.

[25] S. Kurshov, "Za zdorovyi byt," *Pravda* (August 6, 1954), 2. At the time of writing, Kurshov served as the deputy Minister of Health. I have preserved the gendered pronouns as they appear in the article.

"I Educate the Youth, but I Am Not Strong Enough to Raise My Husband"

As petitioners of outside support, be it from the party or the state, many Soviet women in the postwar period sought mediation in even the most intimate corners of their lives. The fact that women took up the pen to complain to the state as an attempt to cure their husband's or son's drunkenness should not come as a surprise. Sarah Ashwin refers to women as traditional "allies of the [Soviet] state in the struggle for sobriety" mobilized to cleanse the home of alcohol abuse during the 1920s.[26] The question of marital stability loomed large for party workers in a country experiencing the severe tensions arising from demobilization and the return to the family. Both those deployed and those that stayed behind routinely faced extreme hardship from the years of warfare. In the course of their lives away from spouses, (male and female) soldiers and wives often entered into relationships outside of their marriage that, along with any other experiential discrepancies in their years apart, now had to be addressed in some capacity after the war's conclusion. While certainly to a lesser degree than in actual occurrence, increasingly these conflicts occurred in public arenas with the party and state assuming an ever-larger role in the everyday lives of the Soviet population.[27]

Unlike party practices of the 1930s in which party committees rarely ruled on the intimate and sexual conduct of members, by the 1950s there was something of a *volte-face*, as

[26] Ashwin, "Introduction," 12. She quotes Trotsky as stating that "'the first place must be taken by women' in the struggle against drunkenness, 'for nothing bears so hard upon the working woman, and especially upon the working mother, as drunkenness.'" This theme is also echoed in Kukhterin, "Fathers and Patriarchs." Kukhterin view state-supported anti-alcohol activism on the part of women as a means of breaking patriarchal authority and opening up the peasant household to the revolution.

[27] Scholarly treatments of the party's greater penetration of the intimate realms of Soviet life will be treated below, whereas this chapter will make an argument for letter writing as a means of mobilizing the state apparatus' role in *byt*.

these same committees now routinely meditated conflicts on marital fidelity, child support payments, and attitudes toward the family in an unprecedented manner.[28] Behavior in one's "private life" had always been an object of concern (particularly for party members) but, in the words of one scholar, "there were other, more serious things to worry about" in the prewar period.[29] In the late-1940s and early-1950s party authorities received letters from women denouncing their husbands for marital indiscretions, abusive attitudes toward the family, as well as criminal offenses—and importantly—the party acted on them. The reason cited by both Sheila Fitzpatrick and Edward Cohn for this shift in attitudes can be pointed back to successive restrictions placed in the 1936 and 1944 family laws. By 1944, divorces could only be granted through a court hearing and carried a fee between 500 and 2000 rubles.[30] Even if one could afford this fine, members of these courts were given the mission of ensuring marital stability. Adultery did not usually constitute an acceptable reason for granting a divorce, though early in the postwar period, if the straying spouse had entered into full cohabitation with another individual and had set up house, this would make cases for divorce stronger. However, after 1949, the Supreme Court chastised lower courts for not following their mandate by accepting cohabitation as a suitable condition for divorce.[31] At the same time that obtaining a divorce

[28] Sheila Fitzpatrick, *Tear Off the Masks!: Identity and Imposture in Twentieth-Century Russia* (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2005) and Edward D. Cohn, "Sex and the Married Communist: Family Troubles, Marital Infidelity, and Party Discipline in the Postwar USSR, 1945-1964," *Russian Review* 68 (2009): 429–450.

[29] Fitzpatrick, *Tear Off the Masks!*, 240. She also notes that one key exception to this characterization is that party officials considered decadent sexual behavior to be indicative of harboring other dangerous, anti-Soviet attitudes.

[30] Under the 1936 law, the fee had been between 100 and 200 rubles.

[31] Fitzpatrick, *Tear Off the Masks!*, 255-257.

increased in difficulty, the party became less and less likely to expel a member for behavioral problems of this nature, except only in the most extreme cases.

The Khrushchev-era party eagerly sought to mobilize citizens on the ground to monitor and persuade one another to uphold the moral standards of Soviet life rather than utilizing top-down disciplining measures. By strengthening laws on the financial responsibilities of fathers to their children while curtailing avenues for divorce, the party created a situation in which Soviet citizens were further encouraged to petition it (already an ingrained habit from the campaigns for greater activism under Stalin) for redress of their problems at home.[32] Without the need to fear the party's purging mechanism as before, these citizens became more open to discussing domestic problems in a politicized space, and therefore, politicizing the home to a greater degree. However, as Cohn has argued, rank-and-file party cadres were generally unmotivated or unwilling to enter into their comrades' lives in this manner and these practices ultimately resulted in the empowerment of local party secretaries.[33]

Not only was the party ever more inclined to intervene in these matters after the war, but also the tone of female writers had dramatically changed. During the purges, women had often written on behalf of their husbands in a supportive manner. Letter-writers after the war, on the other hand, inundated their prose with feelings of anger, resentment, and betrayal.[34] Of course,

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[32] C.f. Cohn, "Sex and the Married Communist," 435. He states that the party's expanding role in the family as a meditating force was a "natural outgrowth" of the 1944 law as it encouraged "male Communists" to pay child support and uphold the divorce statutes through more informal practices rather than the ritualized purging of the 1930s.

[33] Ibid., 445.

[34] Fitzpatrick, *Tear Off the Masks!*, 250-254. This change in tone also reflects a change in circumstances. While the wife-writers of the 1930s had been largely appealing for review of their husband's cases during the purges, the postwar world now presented other marital problems.

other motivations also existed for writing. Some sought state intervention as transformative solutions that would eliminate hindrances to both the proper functioning of their home lives and society. Conceptualizing their letters addressed below solely as "denunciations" of anti-Soviet behavior would be to mischaracterize their asserted motives in treating and correcting problems their husbands' and sons' alcohol abuse that placed familial and social stability in peril. In this spirit, these women drew on bits of the scientific-technical, modernist discourse through activation of medical tropes and a language of renovation prevalent during the Khrushchev era to make claims on proper Soviet masculinity, as well as larger conceptions on correct Soviet attitudes toward marriage, family, and labor and the state's role in ensuring compliance with these models.

In March 1960, the Supreme Soviet received an impassioned hand-written letter from K. A., a resident of Kamensk in Rostov oblast', suggesting certain changes to the recent draft law regarding the treatment of alcoholism.[35] Complaining of an alcoholic husband who drank away the family's money and psychologically terrorized her and their two children, she invites the state to intervene where she cannot hope to succeed. To cure her husband of his proclivity to drink and debauchery, she advocates the establishment of specialized correctional-labor colonies so that individuals can overcome their addictions, but continues to work in order to send much-needed money back home to their families. Over the course of the letter, she utilizes multiple rhetorical strategies to directly open her family up to the correcting powers of the state in order

[35] GARF f. R-7523, op. 45, d. 350, ll. 244-245 as published in *Na "kraiu" sovetskogo obshchestva*. However, the editors of the aforementioned volume did not reproduce this letter in full, omitting (for unknown reasons) many of the passages that will be discussed below. Secondly, I have chosen to not print the names of the letter-writers as a means of protecting their personal privacy in such sensitive matters.

to physically and morally reorient her husband and ensure that their household can eventually become a truly "Soviet" family.

In writing to the authorities, K. A. continually weaves together tropes from both the official world of Soviet politics and the domestic realm of familial relations. Through this framing, her husband's violations geometrically multiply. Not only does he disrupt harmonious relations within the house, his behavior directly contradicts the *kul'turnyi* (cultured) norms of Soviet everyday life that authorities had exhorted the population to follow since the mid-1930s.[36] Describing her husband's behavior at home after a bender, K. A. writes:

> He does not live a normal life, like people live, and does not give a normal life to the family. He has no interest in the cinema or outward things or the life of the country, only in a bottle of wine. […] This behavior on the part of a father reflects the formation of consciousness and character of the children. He does not serve as an example of a hard worker (*khoroshii truzhenik*), or a conscientious Soviet person (*soznatel'nyi sovetskii chelovek*). One time our son wanted to escape from home, saying to his comrades that he was ashamed of his father's behavior.[37]

The language employed in this portion of the letter is worth considering concerning her petitioning of the state for intervention into her married life. In contrasting her husband's behavior with a normality framed in the context of film viewing and committed interest in national affairs, she is explicitly activating ideological cornerstones of proper Soviet conduct.

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[36] By the time of the Second Five-Year Plan (1933-1937), Stalin began emphasizing the need to rectify individual desires with state goals of industrialization. Soviet socialism was not only to be about industrial might, but it also was to be concerned with raising the cultural level of its citizens by encouraging them to live in a *kul'turnyi* manner through practicing good personal hygiene, taking in edifying leisure activities (such as reading and film viewing), as well as the promise of material consumption (though tempered by scarcity). For two detailed treatments of *kul'turnost*, see Lewis H. Siegelbaum, *Stakhanovism and the Politics of Productivity in the USSR, 1935-1941* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 210-246 and David L. Hoffmann, *Stalinist Values: The Cultural Norms of Soviet Modernity, 1917-1941* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2003), 118-145.

[37] GARF f. R-7523, op. 45, d. 350, l. 244ob. This passage cannot be found in the Zubkova and Zhukova volume.

Furthermore, in calling into question his abilities as a father, the author is also directly engaging with then-current rhetorical commonplaces in Soviet discourse about a renewed emphasis on the nuclear family. By the mid-1950s, the destruction wrought by alcohol abuse on family relations had entered official discourse as one of its primary negative attributes. Whereas during Stalin's tenure immoderate drinking most commonly received censure when connected to poor working habits, in the Khrushchev era, the family setting emerged as the site of concern. It should be no surprise then that K. A. explicitly links her petition with the threat of familial degeneration. Her husband's binges disrupt order in the home, setting a bad example for the children and threatening their development. Instead of being a proper role model for his son through hard work and conscientious behavior, the father instead represents an object of shame. This juxtaposition of the personal and the public occurs again on the following page, as she compounds the danger her husband poses to the family as one to society as a whole:

> He does not accept my suggestions to get a divorce or go voluntarily to be treated, so what am I to do? As a Communist I cannot allow this to go on any further and have the children grow up and be raised in this unhealthy family environment. Sometimes he goes crazy (*dokhodit do sumasshedshiia*), ready to maim or kill the family. He and other alcoholics like him do not understand observation of labor discipline and working as desired, in their own private work or in labor agreements with state or collective farms. It would be very good if there was a law issued for all able-bodied men to work only at a permanent job and work without fail.[38]

In 1958, her husband spent 10 days in jail, presumably for the same kind of behavior detailed above. On the day of writing, he had been picked up by the local *militsiia* once again. Not only would this time have taken away from his twin duties of providing for his family and working for state industry, but the moral stigma as a Communist of being married to someone who continually violated the norms of Soviet society makes marital and familial relationships

[38] GARF f. R-7523, op. 45, d. 350, l. 245. This passage also cannot found in the Zubkova and Zhukova volume.

untenable for her. By drawing out his crimes against both the civil and political realms in this passage, K. A. attempts to mobilize the state into the domestic realm through all available rhetorical strategies, painting her husband simultaneously as an abuser, a poor father, a criminal, and a shirker from the job site—each incompatible with socialist society, but taken as a whole indicative of a social plague. She concludes this letter with a positioning of herself as a proper Soviet person who has worked "without rest since [she] was twenty" at the ZhKO *kombinat* in the artificial fibers industry and as an educator (*vospitatelem*) and now as a commandant. Unlike her husband and others like him, she presents herself as the polar opposite—a hard-working moral agent, serving both the nation's industrial and ideological needs. In spite of these attributes though, she does not have the strength or ability to "raise [her] husband" and pleads for the state to "rid [her] of this misery."[39]

K. A.'s complaints were not unique in this regard. Another woman, A. B. wrote demanding the enactment of laws forcing compulsory treatment as in her estimation, "the majority of our women are exhausted from the drunken lives of their husbands and their long brutal bullying."[40] This writer spoke from her own personal experience, wishing that her alcoholic husband would receive treatment and relieve the family of its misery. "I am a mother of four children and believe me that it is difficult to live in these conditions. Now if he were to be taken away, I would be able to work and live peacefully and the children would not see the rough side of life (*griaznoi zhizni*). I am not the only one who suffers like this, as we are but one

[39] GARF f. R-7523, op. 45, d. 350, l. 245ob. For an in-depth treatment of the centrality of artificial fibers to visions of modernity in the former Soviet Bloc, see Eli Rubin, *Synthetic Socialism: Plastics and Dictatorship in the German Democratic Republic* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2008).

[40] GARF f. R-7523, op. 45, d. 351, l. 142.

of the many families."[41] Contemporary initiatives and draft legislation held the promise of this kind of invasive action. However, A. B. complained of their hitherto inaction on this question, reminding those in the Supreme Soviet that delay meant the loss of Soviet families and children to this way of life.

There is evidence in the archive of an official response to pleas of this nature. In April 1960, Ianushevskii, the city psychiatrist (*gorodskii pskhiaktor*) employed by the Ministry of Health in Moscow, wrote to Z. U., a resident of the city's Baumanskii *raion*, that if her husband was willing to consent to treatment for his alcoholism that he would be held accountable in his adherence to its guidelines.[42] For Z. U., however, this was not the desired end of her letter-writing campaign. Earlier she had written letters to both the editor of *Pravda* and to Khrushchev asking for help in the treatment of her husband after her previous requests to the local assistant party secretary, the local prosecutor's office, a representative of the civil courts, her husband's boss, and other lower level authorities had failed.[43] When she went to the local psychological clinic (*psikhonevrologishii dispanser*), she was told by a doctor there, "He drinks, so he will drink and when he has the white fever, then take him to the psychiatrist for treatment."[44] Clearly this was not a sustainable treatment policy for curing alcoholism. The only help that she could find was from the local *militsiia*, who would lock up her husband when caught engaging in a hooligan act. According to Z. U., while her husband was a habitual alcoholic who drank every

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[41] *Ibid*., l. 143.

[42] GARF f. R-7523, op. 45, d. 351, l. 238.

[43] GARF f. R-7523, op. 45, d. 351, ll. 233-236 and l. 237 as published in *Na "kraiu" sovetskogo obshchestva*, 245-249.

[44] *Ibid*., 246. "White fever" here refers to delirium tremens. In other words, when he experiences psychological or physiological symptoms from alcoholism, then only those symptoms will be treated.

day, at the age of 36, if cured, "he could still do a lot for society."[45] She argues in a follow-up letter addressed to the Supreme Soviet that men like her husband are unable to help themselves or be helped by their families due to a lack of willpower or the strength to fight. Instead, what it is needed is the power of the Soviet state to require medical treatment of alcoholics through the force of law. After the 1958 resolution regarding the intensification of the struggle against alcohol failed to implement such a measure, Z. U. says that her husband immediately quit the treatment program that he had begun, interpreting this inaction on the part of the state as a sign of the law being on the side of his drinking habits.[46]

Mothers of alcoholic sons also expressed feelings of powerlessness without the intervention of the Soviet state. One letter-writer, a certain Kh. I., wrote directly to Voroshilov to plead for a law that would force her son into treatment, as he could not be persuaded any other way.[47] This son had been tried in both the comrades' court, and twice in civil court, where he was sentenced to fifteen days in jail (probably for petty hooliganism). Like in the previous case, she also embedded her pleas within the context of proper Soviet behavior. However, where K. A. had understood her husband's failure to be in his individual misalignment with Soviet morality, Kh. I. was mystified that a son of old party members could possibly succumb to these trappings. Despite the fact that his father was a veteran of the civil war, a party member since 1921, and now the boss of a factory in the transportation industry, their son still "grew up to be such a monster (*vyros takoi urod*)."[48] Like K. A., Kh. I. wishes for the creation of a law that would provide state muscle to usher alcoholics into treatment programs not as a punishment, but

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[45] *Ibid*., 247.
[46] GARF f. R-7523, op. 45, d. 351, l. 239.
[47] GARF f. R-7523, op. 45, d. 351, ll. 39-40.
[48] *Ibid.,* 39ob.

to change a "monster" into a fully Soviet man, arguing that it would also be "useful to the state to isolate them from the vodka…and return these people to life."[49]

A son's struggle with alcoholism could create suffering for the entire family. One mother from Tbilisi, M. S., wrote in April 1960 that her son's alcoholism had not only caused much grief and worry, but it had also upset the stability of her son's marriage by preventing them from starting a family.[50] The mother hoped that contemporary initiatives would result in treatment for her son, but to this point, her wish had been in vain. Her story resembles the others discussed here. Her son and his associates "guzzle up" (*propivaiut*) his paycheck, leaving the family with nothing. Despondent at the time of writing, M. S. believed that no one remained to which to turn for help. An earlier stint in a treatment facility ordered by his labor collective ended when he decided to quit. The potential for more severe actions loomed, as she indicates that discussion of firing her son from his job and dismissing him from the party had already begun. M. S. desired the enactment of a law that would "treat alcoholics of their desire," transforming their behaviors and attitudes rather than merely punishing their transgressions. "It is true that they are sick and need to be treated separately from the mentally ill. Until this time, there has been nowhere to put alcoholics for treatment other than psychological clinics (*psikhbol'nitsy*) where they are afraid to go and are ashamed."[51] Her complaints echo the sentiments of Soviet researchers at the time. Some experts considered failures on the part of local medical administrators to ensure that patients stayed for the duration of their treatment a central cause in the persistence of alcoholism. "Frequently all the medical care given to these persons is in the form of a peculiar process of

[49] *Ibid.*, l. 40-40ob.
[50] GARF f. R-7523, op. 45, d. 351, ll. 130-131.
[51] *Ibid.*, l. 131.

sobering up or temporary isolation with a view to breaking off the drinking bout."[52] Even after treating the symptoms, the alcoholic patient needed to be observed in his home life in order to determine what environment factors drew him to drink. For these purposes, they recommended producing various forms of educational-cultural work for the dissemination of information on the effect of alcohol on both human and social bodies.

These women not only appealed for individual treatment of their male relations, but also targeted sites of masculine sociability in order to curb drinking, and in turn, generate socialist living conditions. In a group letter from the city of Bobriusk in the Belarussian SSR signed predominately by women, the authors complained of the ways in which the behaviors of the tavern and the ubiquitous presence of alcohol seeped into other public spaces.[53] "In most cases, every grocery store has been turned into a tavern, crowded with workers and young people sharing bottles of vodka both in the stores and on the corners. There is no need to travel far for vodka, leave any factory gate or garage and around the corner there is a store with vodka, not to mention snack bars, tearooms, cafeterias, or restaurants."[54] By drawing on images of factories and garages, the authors of letter directly link long-standing associations of working-class masculinity and male sociability and the subsequent difficulties of their integration into a socialist society with the contagion of vodka in their city. Before the revolution, the consumption of alcohol on the shop floor marked key moments in the lives of male workers.

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[52] D. D. Fedotov and E. A. Babaian, "The Organization of Therapeutic and Prophylactic Work in the Control of Alcoholism," in *Alcoholism*, ed. A. A. Portnov, trans. United States Joint Publications Research Services (Washington, D.C.: United States Joint Publications Research Service, 1961), 9. This is a translation from a Soviet medical textbook published originally published in 1959 under the title *Alkogolizm*.

[53] GARF f. R-7523, op. 45, d. 348, ll. 64-65.

[54] *Ibid*., l. 64.

The tradition of *prival'naia* (the new employee's somewhat obligatory purchase of drinks for his new co-workers) served to cement comradely bonds and create a compact in which they would show the new guy the ropes. With the passage of laws designed to increase productivity in the 1920s, vodka lost its official place in the factory and was pushed out of the gates and into dark corners, where superiors generally overlooked (or turned a blind eye toward) its consumption.[55] Vodka served not only to consolidate bonds within the working-class, but could also demarcate boundaries below the class level. The practice of purchasing vodka for a senior worker could act as a fee for learning the trade, becoming a payment extracted from the unskilled by established workers and thus dividing, rather than uniting, Soviet workers.[56] Persistence of these traditions more than four decades after the revolution would provoke intense debate among Soviet authorities (as will be discussed later in this chapter).

The letter-writers also cast public transportation as a site dominated by masculine alcohol practices by stating that the bus running between Bobriusk and Mogilev functioned as a drunken carnival, with the driver and passengers alike taking periodic breaks for the purchase and consumption of vodka along the route. Once arriving in Mogilev, vendors at the train station compete in a brisk vodka trade, "without a thought of the hundreds of thousands of families who are starving because the drinker in their home storms out to the store and spends not only their last kopeck, but [trades away] their last stitch of clothing (*ne tol'ko posledniie groshi, no i*

[55] Phillips, *Bolsheviks and the Bottle*, 49-71.

[56] Transchel, *Under the Influence*, 134-135. Transchel's analysis of this phenomenon focuses on the 1920s when industrialization caused a swelling of the ranks of workers that pitted older, often skilled, proletarians against unskilled peasants. While this type of contestation would not be relevant to the postwar years, as will be discussed below, authorities still viewed young unskilled workers as having certain difficulties integrating into working life.

posledniie triapki)."[57] To reclaim these spaces in the name of public order, the letter writers propose measures that built from the failures of previous initiatives. Banning the sale of vodka would not work, as the local stores lacked sufficient material provisions, pushing would-be shoppers to open-air markets and non-state vendors. According to the authors, when this policy had been locally instituted, the stores soon returned to selling vodka in order to keep their storefronts open. Instead, they suggest that special stores for liquor sales should be opened that close at seven in the evening. Perhaps extraordinarily in this instance, they ask for a sales plan not to be set (like for all other Soviet retail outlets) and to just "assume that the less sold, the better." Like the other letters discussed above, the Bobriusk group also advocated further intervention from the state and asked for the criminalization of turning minors onto alcohol, off-site sales, and placing alcoholics on a labor regimen in special medical treatment colonies.

Indeed, the way in which alcohol continued to underpin homosocial bonds among men in spite of forty years of Soviet power became a target of these letter-writers. Operating in a liminal area between official scorn and unofficial celebration, women complained of the ways men covered for one another when it came to issues of the bottle—creating dense networks, seemingly impenetrable without the state's help. A group letter written by women from Kamensk (including K. A.) from April 1960 points directly to these ties as causing continued inaction on the question of alcohol abuse.[58] Their appeals to the Supreme Soviet are in a spirit of last resort, as local authorities are unable or unwilling to help due to this male collusiveness. Asking where they can go to get real help in the treatment of their alcoholic husbands, they write: "We go to the *militsiia* station and they say that he is not committing any hooligan acts

[57] GARF f. R-7523, op. 45, d. 348, l. 64.

[58] GARF f. R.7523, op. 45, d. 351, ll. 140-141.

and that it is his to drink away (*on zhe ne khuliganit*, *veshchi propivaet svom*), so what are we to do about it? We only have the right to do anything if he commits a crime. We go to the prosecutor's office – same answer!"[59] Clearly in the case of the local *militsiia* and procuracy, it is a question of willingness to apply contemporary statutes in regard to petty hooliganism. However, as the matter is up to their discretion, the writers of this letter understand their inaction to be a form of protecting these practices. It also points to different understandings as to what constitutes a violation of the social order. Punishing alcohol abusers only when their behavior crossed the legal line into hooliganism meant that plenty of alcoholics and drunkards went without reprisal or treatment. Instead, writers like K. A. and other members of the Kamensk group sought to further expand the state's purview into the "private" realm by asking for authorities not only to discipline legal violations, but also to compel treatment in cases where their misdeeds remained concealed from society—thus, further contesting prevailing notions on the boundaries between public and private.[60]

Letter writers also often invoked the labor collective as a reason for the persistence of a man's alcohol problem, issuing only a slap on the wrist if any punishment was given at all. For the Kamensk letter writers, when appealing to help from their husbands' place(s) of work, they could succeed in having him criticized by the collective and possibly subjected to a trial of his peers that could result in dismissal for repeated offenses, but this penalty would not provide real

[59] *Ibid*., l. 140ob.

[60] As Lewis Siegelbaum and others have argued, notions of a strict divide between the public and private along the Western bourgeois model do not necessarily apply to the Soviet context. Instead, these fields remained multi-layered, porous and subject to negotiation and revision. Lewis H. Siegelbaum, ed., *Borders of Socialism: Private Spheres of Soviet Russia* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006).

material help and could put the family in jeopardy if he was fired.[61] In the case of Z. U., her husband's boss would not even temporarily withhold his salary and allow Z. U. to collect it in order to prevent him spending it all on alcohol on payday.[62] In this context, Soviet women suffering from their husband's alcoholism then had to choose between the financial instability due to their husband's unemployment or that resulting from his continued employment. A. P., a female pensioner from the Belorussian SSR, identifies this as conspiratorial arrangement on a systemic level. According to her, "Everyone drinks, including Communists… You can see it in the day in the workplaces, courts, *militsiia* and others. All of our bosses have a friendship with the bottle, drink together, and defend each another."[63] With this kind of systemic abuse in the organs of power addressing their claims, last-ditch appeals to the state were the only choice left in the battle.

These letters offer a chance to reflect on the ways in which Soviet citizens conceived of their position vis-à-vis the state and the extent of their belief in the transformative possibilities of the system. In understanding the language and vocabulary of appeals to the state, Stephen Kotkin's concept of "speaking Bolshevik" has proved enduring, though not without controversy.[64] For Kotkin, the workers of Magnitogorsk learned to varying degrees how to speak this language of self-identification, using official vocabulary and a working knowledge of

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[61] *Ibid.*

[62] GARF f. R-7523, op. 45, d. 351, l. 233, as published in *Na "kraiu" sovetskogo obshchestva*, 246.

[63] GARF f. R-7523, op. 45, d. 347, ll. 31-37. For this particular passage, see l. 32ob.

[64] Kotkin, *Magnetic Mountain*, 217-237. Two former students of his notably reacted to this concept in a short article that posited the existence of an illiberal subjectivity among Soviet citizens that cannot be explained in such gain-seeking terms. See Igal Halfin and Jochen Hellbeck, "Rethinking the Stalinist Subject: Stephen Kotkin's 'Magnetic Mountain' and the State of Soviet Historical Studies," *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas* 44 (1996): 457–463.

the rules of the Stalinist system in order to rhetorically align their subject position within it. According to him, "it was not necessary to believe. It was necessary, however, to participate as one believed—a stricture that appears to have been well understood, since what could be constructed as direct, openly disloyal behavior became rare."[65] Moreover, the relatively closed nature of the Soviet system during the 1930s produced a situation that limited the possibilities for unbelief, creating a space in which Marxist, Leninist, or Stalinist ideas largely shaped the consciousness of Soviet citizens and determined its boundaries. While this same kind of systematic analysis of subjectivity for the post-Stalinist period remains to be written, in a recent article about whistleblowing behaviors under Khrushchev, Gleb Tsipursky has argued for a nuanced view of Soviet subjectivity that allows for the coexistence of personal goals in appealing to the state with a belief in the general principles of the action, though with a priority on the former.[66] This comes into being through an identifiable shift in the language of Khrushchev-era whistleblowers who picked up on then-current emphasis on individuals actively aiding the state, as well as in the significant presence of falsifications utilized to the ends of personal gain. Even in the latter cases, these goals do not necessarily equate to an act of resistance or subversion on the part of the writer, but rather show the ways in which citizens could participate in state initiatives even when doing so for their own benefit.

Volunteerism and scientific approaches of the post-Stalin period offered Soviet citizens a way to personalize their visions of the Communist future through a modification of the paternalist relationship between state and citizen found in the 1930s. In the admittedly limited circumstance of pursuing medicalized approaches to treating alcoholism, authorities galvanized a

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[65] Kotkin, *Magnetic Mountain*, 220.

[66] Gleb Tsipursky, "'As a Citizen, I Cannot Ignore These Facts': Whistleblowing in the Khrushchev Era," *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas* 58 (2010): 52–69.

popular belief in the transformative potentialities of the system. In conceptualizing alcoholics as medical patients deserving of treatment and reintegration into society, this approach not only answered the personal pleas of women seeking to stabilize their home, but also gave their individual families a chance to return to the larger Soviet family. It could conceivably be argued that the contextualizing of family problems like an alcoholic father/husband within the framework of social blights serves to theoretically position the writer more favorably in terms of response than one that did not address issues of interest to the state. In practice these letters indicate that the authors understood their personal problems not to be only their own, but to have repercussions for their neighbors, communities, or Soviet society as a whole. Requesting state intervention in order to solve these issues does not represent gamesmanship or cynical self-interest, but addresses foundational problems in both the public and domestic realms and offers an understanding of the individual's life as situated within the larger whole of the Soviet collective. The relationship between the letter-writers and the state is not exclusively that of patron and client either. With eyes on the ground, letter writers (like those in Bobriusk) offer practical solutions to the problems that both they and Soviet authorities wished to correct. In pointing out to officials the policies that do not seem to work (and why), the letter writers are directly concerned with improving the system. The distance between seeking supposedly individual advantages and general belief is nonexistent in this scenario.

The question of whether or not these letter-writers can be understood as somewhat outside of the norms of Soviet society is also a vital, yet thorny, issue. Certainly in one sense the act of taking time from one's daily life to pen letters to state authorities is not something in which every individual engaged. But while these women may be unusual in their actions, their faith in the power of the Soviet state to help where no one else can should not reflect something

odd about their beliefs. The state still encouraged the spirit of activism found in these letters in spite of contemporary attempts to delegate power to local and regional authorities handling everyday concerns. This kind of mutual engagement, however skewed in the state's favor in terms of power dynamics, still represents confidence in the ability of this interaction to produce something favorable to both state and society. If these women did not believe that the goals of the state and their own personal desires overlapped to a certain degree, even these acts of clear desperation (in some cases) would be futile.

Rhetorically referencing an anticipated move toward the communism of the future does more than simply align the speaker within the larger political and social programs of the party. In recognizing individual conditions in one's daily life that prevent the development of communism, speakers are engaging with an imaginary communism that witnesses relief from their current pressures and hardships. Attaining communism in this regard then becomes a discursive space in which individual desires can be activated on a society-wide level. As the alcoholic husband impedes the march forward, in the communist society of the future he will return home from work sober with the week's pay packet in hand. Or for others, they will move out of the communal apartment into a space of their own, outfitted with the material conveniences made possible by the same scientific-technological revolution ushering in this transformation. Indeed, in many ways, these desires attained a more significant position in popular opinion due to the emphasis that Khrushchev had put on the fulfillment of material promises as well as his own expressions of the need to combat alcohol abuse in Soviet society.

Reform Efforts in Khrushchev's Wake

Analyzing alcohol reform debates during the 1960s may seem rather peculiar when compared to sweeping and dramatic efforts made either in the early twentieth century or during *perestroika*. The continued growth of alcohol abuse and associated losses over the course of the Brezhnev years prompted Gorbachev to act. Certainly the results of these reform efforts were minimal in comparison. Yet, this was not a time of absolute silence on the question of alcohol abuse.[67] Debates over alcohol and its proper consumption often occurred in public, with Soviet citizens directly dialoguing with authorities through their letter-writing efforts, reactions to draft resolutions, and party and Komsomol meetings. Directly connected to larger conversations about the social ills of hooliganism and parasitism, alcohol itself remained a hot-button issue throughout the course of the 1950s and 1960s. Discussion of the harmful effects of immoderate drinking habits and alcoholism often appeared in the pages of press—usually in the form of an individual or select group's transgressions and not always in connection with anti-hooligan or anti-parasite campaigns. *Izvestiia* singled out employees of an unnamed Omsk restaurant in 1960 for flagrantly violating trade laws set as part of the post-1958 reinvigorated struggle against drunkenness that restricted the amount of vodka served to customers by selling them 200 grams at a time. When these same customers ended up spending the night in a sobering-up station, waitresses supposedly went around and told them to tell the police that they had been drinking

[67] In his study of the genesis of Gorbachev's anti-alcohol campaign, Stephen White points to the period between 1963 and 1985 as lost years in the long-term struggle, arguing that "the problem was 'resolved' simply by simply discontinuing the publication of any information about it." While state publishing authorities may have declined to issue precise statistics on domestic alcohol production and consumption, this did not signal the end of a public conversation about Soviet drinking habits. White, *Russia Goes Dry*, 31.

elsewhere.[68] It is safe to assume that other restaurants also violated trade laws, but as the article's title indicates, the question of guilt did not rest solely with individual abusers. Both Soviet authorities and citizens at all levels were in some way responsible for the persistent blight of alcohol abuse.

Discussion of the "alcoholism question" picked up again in the pages of the Soviet press in late 1964 and 1965. One clipping in particular sparked a torrent of debate. In June 1965, a 12-year-old young pioneer from Krivoi Rog wrote to the editors of *Izvestiia* complaining that his father did not work and loafed about drinking vodka. But if Vitya Tsarevsky's story ended there, the ensuing reaction would not have been as strong. Tsarevsky recounted that a few days earlier that his mother had confronted his father about his drinking—to which he responded with a savage beating that placed her in the hospital. Worse yet, the residents in Vitya's building adopted a permissive attitude toward his father's actions. If not for his pal Seryozha's father, an ambulance would not have even been called for his mother. Now, penniless due to his father's persistent drinking, Vitya swore to become a public prosecutor when he grew up in order to go after drunkards, but for now wished only that he could live peaceably like Seryozha's family. Incensed by his story, members of *Izvestiia*'s editorial staff supposedly hopped on a plane to Krivoi Rog to question the neighbors and get to the bottom of how this collective had failed little Vitya.[69] In response to this letter's publication, the paper received hundreds of letters giving support to a public campaign against drunkenness.[70]

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[68] Iu. Dement'eva, "Kto vinovat?," *Izvestiia* (June 21, 1960), 6.

[69] "'Moi papa p'et': pismo v redaktsiu," *Izvestiia* (June 15, 1965), 3.

[70] Selections from these responses were printed three days later. See A. Dolenko and E. Maksimova, "Delo vovse ne semeinoe," *Izvestiia* (June 18, 1965), 5.

The outrage over Vitya's story coincided with the gathering of a commission a few months earlier to inquire into the effect of existing alcohol legislation and to develop new measures combating immoderate drinking practices. While not to suggest that Vitya's story may have been fabricated, the letter appears to be another variation on the themes elucidated earlier in this chapter. Unfortunately the great number of these incidents of "domestic hooliganism" appearing in the press or housed in archives makes these events appear, if not commonplace, then at least a part of daily life for many.[71]

That year Latvian Party leader Ian Eduardovich Kalnberzin organized a commission staffed by leading functionaries of the Komsomol, the all-union council of trade unions, the Ministry of Health, and other prominent organizations in order to analyze and address reportedly rising rates of alcohol abuse and create new methods to combat this development. At the same time, a second commission with overlapping membership was put together to look into the question of criminality among Soviet youth. Shared rosters give insight into the way in which Soviet authorities approached this issue. Linking alcohol and criminality in this manner reveals the severity of the threat to the social order caused by immoderate drinking in the minds of authorities. Earlier anti-hooligan campaigns had made a similar connection, but now authorities appeared to be specifically zeroing in on substance abuse as a principal motivating factor in disruptions to socialist living.

[71] As a crime traditionally defined in Soviet law as crimes disturbing public order, Brian LaPierre argues that anti-hooligan statutes were inverted and extended to apply to cases of domestic violence or abuse over the course of the mid-1950s to the mid-1960s. Ambiguous legal statutes forced lower-level legal authorities and law enforcement officials to decide on their own the boundaries of public and private, and thus, what constituted a public offense. See Brian LaPierre, "Private Matters or Public Crimes: The Emergence of Domestic Hooliganism in the Soviet Union, 1939-1966," in *Borders of Socialism*, 191–207.

The commission solicited the opinions of a various authorities with wide expertise encompassing medicine, law, education, youth issues, and sport in order to gather the research materials needed to plan new resolutions. Their proposals elucidate the competing claims over the source of alcoholism and alcohol abuse, as well as the contradictory nature of the hybrid judicio-medical approach utilized during the Khrushchev years. While each organization provided differing plans that privileged certain approaches over others, in general they all favored a course of educational-cultural work in concert with concrete measures. These measures sought to directly renovate consumptive patterns through modification of trade policies, the institution of more stringent legal penalties, and the continued use of medical treatment. The imagined target at the center of these debates was typically a male worker, frequently a teenager or young adult, beholden to habits and attitudes incompatible with the modern Soviet society under construction. A combination of old and new factors were thought to contribute to these unhealthy attitudes, namely a permissive climate surrounding the bottle in factories and other jobsites, as well as a disconnection between authorities and citizens as to what constituted appropriate leisure activities. Their plans illustrate the fact that Soviet authorities never fully accepted the idea of the alcoholic as the victim of a disease, even while pushing for medicalized approaches. Instead, certain cultural factors remained in play as contributing factors to the condition's development.

As discussed earlier, the production and consumption of alcohol rose significantly over the course of the postwar years. By the mid-1950s, alcohol sales in general had exceeded prewar levels—with vodka sales alone nearly doubling between 1950 and 1955. All across the board,

sales of beer, wine, and cognac steadily rose across the 1950s and the 1960s.[72] Average vodka sales gradually grew from 3.4 liters per person in 1950 to 7.7 liters per person in 1964. During the same period, beer sales increased in a less uniform manner from 7 liters per person in 1950 to a high of 13.4 liters in 1961 before easing down to 12.5 in 1964. Production figures of both alcoholic and non-alcoholic beverages testify to the growth and development of Soviet light industry geared toward consumables during the 1950s and early 1960s that provided greater numbers of goods for market. Between 1957 and 1964, production of mineral water more than doubled, shooting up from roughly 322 million bottles to 702 million. The production of fruit juice even surpassed this level of growth—tripling in the same time span from 90 million bottles to 297 million.[73]

Reorienting both the type and style of drinking functioned as a central point for discussion within these debates. As a visible sign of educational and cultural efforts at work, changing the ways in which Soviet citizens drank would act as a vehicle for the remolding of attitudes toward alcohol consumption and erosion of older ways of drinking rooted in worker and peasant cultures. Immoderate drinking habits structured around vodka were to be replaced with the consumption of less potent substances—not only non-alcoholic beverages, but also beer and low-alcohol wines. In terms of concrete measures to divert attentions elsewhere, various organizational authorities recommended a shift in production away from vodka to other drinks.

[72] GARF f. 7523, op. 83, d. 1202, l. 21. The figures used here come from the material gathered by Kalnberzin's committee, which is particularly helpful reflecting the information that they used to create policy.

[73] GARF f. 7523, op. 83, d. 1202, l. 24.

Committee members suggested increasing the available selection of fruit and vegetable juices, mineral water, as well as a concocting a domestically produced analog for Coca-Cola.[74]

While other alcoholic beverages were available at the time, shifting consumption away from hard liquors and *samogon* would require increased production of alternatives or the purchase of costly imports. As drinking practices were not uniform across the Soviet Union, proposed solutions needed to fit a variety of locales. At a meeting of the commission in April 1965, M. Ia. Parshikov, mentioned that in Latvia, for example, the local population favored lower alcohol wines, whereas in the "difficult regions" of Siberia, residents consumed only hard liquor. However, to the same speaker, combating vodka through limiting production or replacing it with a less alcoholic substance opened the door for illegal *samogon* distillation to take its place. More complex solutions that would successfully steer consumption were needed, including an overhaul of alcohol pricing. "What are the current prices [for alcoholic products]? They are generated from alcohol content. *Moskovskaia* vodka costs 13 rubles and 70 kopecks; *Zhigulevskoe* beer, 20 kopecks; table wine, 16 kopecks; and semi-sweet wine, 23 kopecks. The drinker only knows and understands the price. Obviously, in addition to increasing production and beer and wine, prices are going to have to be lower in relation to vodka."[75] The implication here is that alcohol reformers could not be hasty in the elimination of hard spirits—an action that would give lifeblood to the traditional *samogon* industry. Trade needed to effectively compete with the illegal *samogon* market by providing drinkers with incentives to purchase less intoxicating beverages through favorable pricing. Pegging prices to alcohol content taught the prospective drinker that all that mattered was the number of degrees, rendering the beverage

[74] GARF f. 7523, op. 83, d. 1202, l. 143.
[75] GARF f. 7523, op. 83, d. 1202, ll. 148-149.

under question simply an alcohol delivery mechanism. While this understanding may work for those seeking only their daily fix, it stood directly in the way of creating a culture of refined and leisurely drinking distinct from the traditions detailed above.

Commission members also looked westward to Europe and southward to the Caucasus for examples of how alcohol could be celebrated and enjoyed in a manner distinct from vodka's bacchanalia. Parshikov cited the beer bars of Brussels as a positive example for emulation. In discussing emulation of European drinking patterns, commission members also fell into the trap of thinking that beer and wine-oriented drinking cultures automatically decreased drunkenness. Kalnberzin declared at one session, "In Germany and Czechoslovakia, they drink a lot, yet there are no drunkards. Order must be brought. Culture in consumption and sale must begin today and all else is to be liquidated."[76] Beer bars and cafes had existed in the Soviet Union, but at the time of their meeting all beer bars in Moscow and Leningrad had closed down. Speaking at the commission, one individual stated that "In 1958, in accordance with the resolution on the fight against alcoholism, many snack bars in Moscow and Leningrad where one could drink a mug of beer were closed. Now there is nowhere to drink a mug of beer. It is popular now to use a barrel, along with kvas marked 'beer.' Why not do as before and let a man go and drink in a cultured manner?"[77]

Cafes selling only beer, dry wine, and mixed drinks would also keep consumption indoors and away from apartment yards, parks and other public sites of life. Wrenching drinking out into the open and funneling it into these designated spaces and thus subject to the eyes of

[76] GARF f. 7523, op. 83, d. 1203, l. 119.
[77] GARF f. 7523, op. 83, d. 1203, l. 132.

onlookers would encourage moderation.[78] To ensure this transformation, others suggested deploying greater numbers of police to chase drinking out of parks and courtyards. But Soviet authorities had a difficult past with these types of establishments. Earlier incarnations had failed in their task to promote moderate drinking, becoming instead sites of drunkenness and the target of complaints by locals for illegally selling liquor on the premises or for allowing customers to bring their own supplies.[79] *Kokteil' Kholl* (Cocktail Hall), Moscow's only Western-style bar in the 1940s and 1950s, shuttered in 1954 due to complaints about its debauched goings-on and its association as a *stiliagi* gathering place.[80] However, commission-meeting stenograms do not indicate any discussion of these failures. Whether an act of selective remembrance or the result of steadfast faith in the transformative potential of Soviet power, the development of public leisure spaces discouraging drunkenness remained a pillar of consumptive policy.

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[78] Soviet policymakers were not alone in trying to reconfigure public sties for drinking as a means of eliminating undesired behaviors. In examining the establishment of "beverage rooms" following prohibition in Ontario in 1934, Craig Heron has noted how this new type of saloon directly targeted working-class male drinking traditions by not allowing patrons to congregate around the bar, stand while drinking, order more than a single beer at a time, or gamble. These venues, like Soviet cafes, received criticism for failing to live up to their modernizing mandate. Craig Heron, "The Boys and Their Booze: Masculinities and Public Drinking in Working-Class Hamilton, 1890-1946," *Canadian Historical Review* 86, no. 3 (September 2005): 411–452.

[79] Stephen Kotkin relates a few anecdotes regarding the popularity of Magnitogorsk cafes selling alcohol under the table against planners' intentions in the early 1930s. See Kotkin, *Magnetic Mountain*, 189-190.

[80] Located on Gorky Street across from Red Square, *Kokteil' Kholl* attracted predominately foreign tourists, members of the Soviet elite, and the *stiliagi*. The bar served champagne, fine spirits and their own concoctions, such as *Maiak* ("beacon" or "lighthouse") comprised of cognac, an egg yolk, and a liqueur, at high prices. One patron remembers a drink costing as much as one-tenth of his monthly rent. For a scholarly discussion, see Juliane Fürst, *Stalin's Last Generation: Soviet Post-War Youth and the Emergence of Mature Socialism* (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), 229-230. See also "Kokteil-kholl na Tverskoi," http://architip.livejournal.com/21126.html.

In the greater stream of Soviet history, proposals to renovate drinking habits outside of a prohibitory context were not all together novel. During the mid-1930s, Stalin and Anastas Mikoyan orchestrated the development and expansion of refined champagne, table wine and liqueur production facilities that would serve as emblems of the good life on the horizon for all. Through adoption of methods suitable for mass production, these past luxuries would be stripped of their bourgeois associations and recast as suitable for proletarian celebration. A glass of Soviet champagne or Armenian cognac could be raised to the democratic principles enshrined in the 1936 "Stalin" Constitution or the heroic labor production of the Stakhanovites. These beverages were believed to allow for the cultivation of *kul'turnye* drinking habits, far distant from the drunken despair characterizing capitalism and tsardom.[81]

The outbreak of war and its subsequent devastation interrupted light industrial production, but manufacture of these bottled indulgences soon rebounded during the course of postwar reconstruction and soon reached prewar production levels. However, so did that of vodka. If transformation of the economic base did not eradicate drunkenness in Soviet society, then other efforts would have to do so. Commission members debating anti-drunkenness measures did not rely on the old language of *kul'turnost* even as they discussed the idea of changing consumptive habits through increasing production of lower and non-alcoholic beverages and introducing of new products for the market. They did not focus on the creation of luxurious beverages, but rather on expanding the production and selection of available beverages. Emphasizing beer and wine, rather than champagne, they sought to guide workingmen away from vodka and cultivate acceptable, leisurely drinking practices within local

[81] On the genesis of the Soviet champagne industry, see Jukka Gronow, *Caviar with Champagne: Common Luxury and the Ideals of the Good Life in Stalin's Russia* (Oxford and New York: Berg, 2003), 17-30.

bars and cafes.[82] Similarities in approach with earlier efforts can be found in their discussions (particularly in regard to the idea of raising cultural levels in order to modify behaviors), but those involved in the debates also sought to use science to unlock the key to eradicating alcoholism. Various proposals insisted on the need for educational and prophylactic lectures, films, and print materials, the intent of these cultural products was to raise awareness of the harm caused by alcoholism to both the individual and society. Medicine provided the clues in solving the puzzle and dissemination of this knowledge would help the population understand the need to change their attitudes and behaviors—thus serving both as prophylaxis and as an instrument of rehabilitation. Soviet technological advances and the growth of light industry and consumer provisioning could answer the question through overcoming material deficits and satisfying needs. Even so, the various organizations and individuals involved in this debate disagreed over both the nature of the problem and the best ways to approach it.

Of the tools used to diagnose and understand the root of immoderate drinking, the recently revived Soviet social sciences played a valuable role. Via survey work and other research methods, Soviet sociology provided authorities with material evidence in support of the struggle against various social problems on the ground level. For these precise purposes, the Supreme Soviet commissioned a study on alcoholism in the Central Black Earth region to be jointly conducted by sociologists in the Soviet Academy of Social Sciences, legal scholars at Voronezh' State University, and a detachment from the *militsiia*'s higher school.[83] The

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[82] Under prewar Stalinism, little attention was paid to developing the Soviet beer industry as it was thought to belong realm of the everyday and thus not an appropriate symbol of luxury. There were initiatives to expand beer production during the late 1930 but like in other areas of light industrial production, the war interrupted their fulfillment. *Ibid.*, 29-30.

[83] GARF f. 7523, op. 83, d. 1202, ll. 201-209. "Summary of the Results of Sociological Research into the Causes of Alcoholism in the Oblasts of the Central Black Earth region." The

researchers studied two separate population groups: surveying on the one hand, 1334 workers and professionals in the region and on the other, 1738 convicts sentenced to corrective labor colonies in the region who had committed crimes due to inebriation or in association with alcohol. Virtually all of those who were surveyed were men, with women making up only 8.3% of the sample and the distribution across age groups is stated to be equal. More than three-quarters identified as workers. No information is provided in the report in regard to the selection process or why this largely rural, agricultural zone was singled out as the site for the study. It is possible to speculate that those conducting the study imagined rural Russia to be an area particularly susceptible to this "vestige of the past."

The themes of the report reflect a general concern with the political and cultural level of alcoholics, as well as with the behavior and leisure practices of worker youths. Two-thirds of the total surveyed were neither party nor Komsomol members—with the percentage of the unaffiliated among the convict sample rising above 78%. Approximately half were not currently engaged in any educational activity, either at an institution or independently in study groups. More than a third responded that they typically spent their free time watching television. Half stated that they had grown up in poor material circumstances—unsurprising considering that only twenty years earlier, the territory under study had been subjected to a brutal Nazi occupation. More than one-third also reported that they did not participate in any sort of socially edifying work outside of their jobs. From these numbers, the researchers drew the conclusion that "the reasons and conditions creating drunkenness lie in insufficient educational and ideological work."[84]

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report was submitted to the committee in 1965, but it does not indicate when the Supreme Soviet commissioned the study.

[84] *Ibid*., l. 203.

Most respondents reported good or adequate relations within their families, though for those in failing marriages or the divorced and widowed, they cited these conditions as the primary reason for their drinking. Others connected their drinking with general material deficiencies (*material'nuiu neobespechennost'*), ingrained habits or traditions (such as regular drinking with their work comrades or family), celebrating payday or festivities, or in some cases, alone out of boredom. From the report, it is impossible to determine the exact manner by which respondents were questioned about the frequency or root causes of their drinking habits. More than half stated that they drank only occasionally (*sluchaino*) and less than five-percent admitted to daily consumption. Yet, if they were asked to self-report via the selection of one of only a few categories, it is reasonable to assume that shame, denial, or the lack of specificity of terms like "occasionally" or "periodically" colored their answers. In spite of these obstacles, the report provided authorities with evidence supporting the conclusions drawn elsewhere—namely that ideological and cultural work could tackle the rising rates of alcoholism, particularly among young Soviet workingmen. At the same time, when the individuals under study were queried about the general causes of alcoholism hundreds citied poor living conditions, material deprivation, and the lack of quality recreational opportunities or cultured leisure sites. Others also stated the need for increases in alcohol prices, restricting alcohol sales in some manner or even a "dry law."

Debate over the behavior of young workers spilled over into the reports and proposals of a number of Soviet organizations. While drunkenness and alcoholism were not thought to be the exclusive to the realms of workingmen, authorities often used their associated practices as examples of harmful attitudes towards drink in need of targeting for elimination. Of these, drinking rituals structured around payday or on the jobsite most commonly appeared in the

reports. A report sent from the procuracy's office complained of a railway construction factory in Novosibirsk that once received the distinction of being a "communist labor collective" that devolved into a state of drunken anarchy on payday—a glaring disjunction and grave offense to the title in the mind of the author. However, neither the factory administration nor the trade union administration had done anything to stop this situation—even after the local *militsiia* had made arrests.[85] The Sormovo factory took up this matter for themselves by erecting a booth shaped like a bottle of *Osobaia Moskovskaia*-brand vodka where known drunkards received their wages, effectively shaming them in front of others on payday—an action loaded with symbolism in regard to working traditions.[86]

The Komsomol's report to the commission took the most aggressive line against drinking in the workplace, arguing that the first offense should be punishable by immediate dismissal. Their proposal also directly chastised trade union authorities for abetting drunkenness through their use of dismissal only as a punishment of last resort. The Komsomol's approach stressed the need for a total revolution in the lives of young workers by modernizing their living and working conditions as a means of providing the material conditions for ideological and cultural development. To do so, Komsomol authorities insisted on the creation of new living quarters on factory premises that provided young workers with ample opportunities for cultured leisure—embracing reading, sport, and exercise in their hours off.[87] Combating boredom in the hours off

[85] GARF f. 7523, op. 83, d. 1203, l. 73.

[86] P. San'ko, "Vospitatel'naia butylka," *Izvestiia* (April 11, 1964), 3.

[87] The link between physical culture and sobriety had been a part of Komsomol discourse as early as the mid-1920s. Here the conversation about explicitly about leisure instead of the more nebulous concept of *kul'tura* updates their rhetoric by adding a new dimension. Miriam Dobson has also illustrated the acute concern expressed by Soviet authorities over the behaviors of working youth in the post-Stalin period. She cites officials complaining of a lack of proper

work and thus heading off the urge to consume alcohol functioned as the uniting theme in their proposals. Komsomol authorities wished to continually engage Soviet youth in some manner of activity, filling idle hands with books or hammers and not the bottle. They also advocated other sweeping changes, such as an expansion of enrollment quotas in higher education (*vuzy*), the construction of milk bars and cafes, as well as increased production and distribution of non-alcoholic beverages, sporting equipment, and musical instruments to youth organizations. To address the issue of harmful payday traditions, they recommended promotion of cultured trade practices that prompted young workers to spend their money on consumer goods instead. Komsomol authorities viewed the problem as more than just a question of leisure or education. The same report urged a change in labor laws to allow seventeen-year olds seeking to go into industrial trades to begin learning from older workers in a sort of apprenticeship divorced from notions of servitude or bondage. However, those working with youth would face heavy scrutiny and be subject to dismissal from their position if they themselves engaged in any kind of impertinent behavior.[88]

For their part, the trade union administration did not necessarily favor the kind of extensive reform proposed by the Komsomol representatives. Trade union authorities recommended an approach that heavily relied upon administrative fines and in extreme circumstances, compulsory medical treatment, combined with educational prophylactic work to deter alcohol abuse. The idea was that their collective should discipline those drunkenly violating the social order or showing up to work intoxicated by handing out relatively steep fines of 10-25 rubles, rather than receiving an automatic administrative punishment. Underlying this

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facilities in which working youth could productively spend their leisure time. This idleness, authorities argued, directly contributed to increased instances of hooliganism and criminality. Dobson, *Khrushchev's Cold Summer*, 125.

[88] GARF f. 7523, op. 83, d. 1202, ll. 131-138.

is an emphasis on the rehabilitation of the offender and the ability for the collective to mete out justice.

Further complicating the authorities' struggle to fashion a uniform approach to dealing with alcoholism, debate also ensued over the nature of alcoholism itself. Was it a disease or illness necessitating medical treatment as physicians asserted? Or rather, as other voices proclaimed, was alcoholism the result of a weak-willed individual surrounded by a permissive collective and curable solely through labor? If consensus could not be established as to the roots of alcoholism, proper prophylactic measures could not be planned and implemented. These debates represented larger fissures in the thinking undergirding the system, pulling between approaches rooted in scientific rationality and the volunteerism of socialist construction that forged Soviet mentalities through work—each with deep antecedents in the very foundation of the Soviet system. The Khrushchev era may have privileged a scientific-technological approach, but volunteerism never disappeared from the frame, at times providing the engine animating development.[89] Moreover, the question of compulsory treatment for alcoholics stood at the heart of advocating one form of treatment over another, figuring prominently in many proposals and reports.

V. Pleshevenaia, an *Izvestiia* staff correspondent, satirized the conditions supposedly existing in the special medical facilities opened following the 1958 decree in her December 1964 feuilleton, "The Life of Sober Alcoholics." Pleshevenaia recounted her journey to a treatment facility outside of Minsk where she encountered healthy men (at least to her eye) sitting around

[89] Khrushchev-era Siberian building projects demonstrate the coexistence of these principles, as hundreds of thousands of *komsomol'tsy* enthusiastically travelled to eastward to work on massive building projects such as the Bratsk hydroelectric station. The spirit of Stalinist Prometheanism could still at this time inspire heroic sacrifice and exertion of human will at a time when science and technology reigned supreme. For a discussion at these campaigns, see Petr L. Vail' and Aleksandr A. Genis, *60-e: mir sovetskogo cheloveka* (Ann Arbor: Ardis, 1988).

in an idyllic conditions—watching television, casually reading and even drinking vodka smuggled in through the fence—all while supposedly undergoing treatment for alcoholism. What these men needed, according to the author, was a term of hard labor.[90] Her charges did not go unanswered. Shortly after publication, one man posted a letter to the Ministry of Health and *Izvestiia* in response to Pleshevenaia's story and the wider issue of contemporary approaches to alcoholism. The author attacks the stereotypically propagated image of the alcoholic in Soviet society, arguing that all approaches take as their basis the teenaged youth "who had not managed to learn about working life, but instead abused spirits"—in other words, the young hooligan. According to the author, these approaches neglected those of advanced age, those with families and many years of working experience that could still be valuable in serving their professions. Placing wayward youth in corrective labor facilities may succeed in teaching them useful skills and the value of work, but such a place would not be suitable for those who have spent their lives working, as they already possessed these specialized skills. For the latter, labor would not be transformative in the same sense as they had already spent most of their lives working and cannot be so easily remolded in this manner—or, in the author's words, "a man is not as primitive as a robot."[91] The author of this memo challenged this idea of punitive reform, insisting instead on more individualized treatment regimens that would take into consideration the background of the patient-offender.

Others also questioned privileging medicine's role in combating alcoholism. *Pravda* staff writer Zakhar Dicharov urged the creation of laws ordering the compulsory treatment of alcoholics, but through a regimen that combined medical treatment and labor. Like

[90] V. Pleshevenaia, "Zhizn' trezvykh alkogolikov," *Izvestiia* (December 24, 1964), 4. All of the individuals in the treatment facility described by Pleshevenaia were male.

[91] GARF f. 7523, op. 83, d. 1205, ll. 48-51.

Pleshevenaia, Dicharov remained skeptical of alcoholism as a medical condition, arguing instead that it was a "harmful, dangerous habit" rather than a disease. His outrage stemmed for the newspaper's receipt of letters from Soviet women like those described above lamenting their husbands' ruin and the degeneration of their families due to vodka. Even so, somatic evidence of alcohol's harm still influenced Dicharov's perspective, as he included in his list of maladies the birth of "feeble-minded" children to alcoholics. Yet, at the same time, he did not condemn alcohol *in toto* and instead repeated the line that cultural-education work needed to address the question of proper leisure activity for young Soviet men and coercive methods should be used to punish egregious offenders.[92] Others were even more condemnatory than Dicharov, arguing that alcohol was merely "a matter of will" and that clinics merely gave the unabashed an excuse for their behavior. For this author, only through compulsion and the disciplining of those covering for alcoholics would solve the problem and restore, as the article's title said, the worker's honor.[93]

However, these statements did not reflect a clear shift in outlook among members of the medical community. One physician agreed that certain kinds of cultural and educational work could succeed in deterring drunkenness, particularly among youth. "We must give thought…as to what we should do to keep our people, especially young people, from thinking that the use of alcoholic beverages is in some way a manifestation of heroism. We often condemn a man not

[92] Z. Dicharov, "S takim perezhitkom miritsia nel'zia!," *Pravda* (August 7, 1964), 4. This likely references a condition now glossed as fetal alcohol syndrome, believed to result from a mother's heavy drinking during pregnancy though Dicharov does not explore the issue of alcoholism among women.

[93] N. Troian, "Dorozhit' trudovoi chest'iu," *Izvestiia* (August 20, 1965), 3.

because he drinks but because he misbehaves when drunk."[94] However, distinctions between alcoholics and everyday alcohol abusers were getting lost in the conversation condemning medical treatment. Those deemed to be chronic alcoholics rather than just drunken hooligans should be compulsively treated in mental institutions and that the number of these facilities needed to be increased to guarantee proper assistance, even if the system could be abused by those seeking to get time off from their jobs or to avoid jail sentences. D. D. Fedotov, a prominent researcher into the question of alcoholism, did not support the idea that encouraging consumption of beer or wine instead of vodka would necessarily lead to the desired results. Writing seven years earlier, he stated: "Many people understand that vodka is harmful and consider wine and beer to have a few useful qualities and therefore not harmful. At root, this is false. All alcoholic beverages, strong or weak, contain one and the same intoxicating ingredient. Chronic drinkers of beer and wine can easily become attracted to vodka (*Privyknut' k pivu ili vinu i stat' khronicheskim alkogolikom tak zhe legko, kak i privyknut' k vodke*)."[95] Not only did these supposedly less harmful drinks serve as a potential gateway to something stronger, Fedotov pointed to European examples, arguing that statistics revealed that alcohol-related deaths and illnesses, as well as related crimes, still occurred in places such as France where wine made up the majority of consumed spirits. On the question of medicine's role in treating alcoholism, Fedotov wrote that alcoholism constituted a "serious disease (*tiazheloe zabolevanie*) of the entire organism," but the cause for its development lie in an individual's "drunkenness, bad habits…incorrect behavior, weakness of will or lack of discipline, and permissive attitude toward

[94] "Pokonchit' so zlom," *Izvestiia* (July 1, 1965), 4.

[95] D. D. Fedotov, *O vrede alkogolizma* (Moskva: Izdatel'stvo "Znanie", 1958), 4-5.

drinking spirituous beverages."[96] Elsewhere, Fedotov claimed that in spite of this relationship, chronic alcoholism still merited intense scientific research and the expansion of appropriate facilities geared to its treatment.[97]

By the end of the year, these debates produced only one significant change in the official line on alcoholism and alcohol abuse. Introducing minors to either alcohol or narcotic substances now constituted a listed crime in the RSFSR criminal code carrying a possible 10-year sentence. In tandem with educational-cultural efforts to deter alcohol consumption of youth, this provision aimed to sever the continuance of traditions such as the *prival'naia* that inducted Soviet youth into the world of hard drinkers. Ongoing debate centering on these same issues would prompt the passage of laws in 1967 ordering compulsory treatment for not only charged with a criminal offense, but also other violations of public order or labor discipline in the Russian Republic, soon followed by similar legislation in other republics. Compulsory treatment typically meant a sentence to a *profilaktoriia* administered by the police organs, combining treatment with hard labor and thus merging the clinic with the jail cell.[98] This represented a hardening of the line taken against alcoholics by the mid-1960s that did not entirely abandon the medicalized approach developed during the Khrushchev-era, but instead refigured these ideas in a punitive capacity. Even so, this did not end the Soviet battle against drink, as rates of consumption continued to rise over the Brezhnev years.

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[96] *Ibid*., 8.

[97] Fedotov and Babaian, "Organization of Therapeutic and Prophylactic Work," 9-10.

[98] Connor, *Deviance in Soviet Society,* 65-68.

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Over the course of the 1950s and 1960s, a shift in understandings of alcoholism opened new possibilities for its elimination. Soviet authorities now increasingly considered alcoholism as a medical condition, prompting the expansion of appropriate facilities to treat it rather than simply (or only) acting in a punitive capacity. However, letters written to the Supreme Soviet call into question the success of this initiative. Petitioning the state to treat their alcoholic husbands and sons, Soviet women complained that the 1958 resolution that supposedly strengthened anti-alcohol measures failed to address their relatives. Lacking the force of law, treatment remained, in essence, voluntary. Yet, rather than dismiss contemporary medical understandings of alcoholism, these letter-writers demanded stronger laws compelling their husbands and sons to undergo treatment as a means of transforming them and thus allowing a return to proper Soviet living. In their critiques, these women launched an offensive against a vision of masculine sociability structured around drinking, positioning the family as victims of these un-Soviet, un-modern practices. In their eyes a combined judicio-medical approach held the promise of providing a new vision of Soviet men free from long-standing working-class drinking traditions. Publication of earlier drafts of the December 1958 anti-drunkenness measures actively solicited popular discussion and response, but the actual impact of these letters on policy decisions remains unclear. Even so, their preservation in the archive allows for an understanding of the centrality of debates over alcohol use/abuse and state intervention to conceptions of reforming masculinity in years after Stalin's death.

A few months after Khrushchev's ouster in October 1964, the Supreme Soviet called on a group of its members to reexamine existing approaches to combating alcoholism. Asking the advice of various party-state organizations, committee members debated the proper balance

between cultural-educational work, trade regulations, policing, and treatment. In these conversations, members outlined a means of refashioning male drinking habits by substituting the consumption of hard-spirits with lighter beverages and forcing them into designated spaces and out of sites of public life in conjunction with the possibility of greater punitive actions. At the same time, a public debate in the pages of the Soviet press took place over the nature of alcoholism. Questioning medical treatment as the most viable means of reforming alcoholics and alcohol abusers, journalists and vocal citizens insisted on the role of labor in transforming the individual. These debates boiled down to a general hardening of the line against alcohol abuse in Soviet society, urging greater penalties and forced treatment (either medically or through labor), representing an intensification of punitive power within this struggle. As a result of this reexamination of the alcohol question, new laws were issued at the end of the year that made introducing a minor to alcohol or narcotic substances a crime (the latter to be covered in the next chapter). But, this did not render anti-alcohol initiatives into solely a police affair. Prophylactic work in the form of educational and cultural efforts continued as the main device in steering the youth away from drink. Policies seeking to modify consumption habits on the production end reinforced these efforts, encouraging purchase of less or non-alcoholic beverages and other consumer items. Through these means, the state promoted an agenda of modernizing the habits of its citizens—particularly the young, male, and working-class—looking westward and comparing domestic habits unfavorably. Popular contestation over the nature of alcohol abuse and addiction ultimately hindered the success of these efforts. The zigging and zagging taken in the course of reform limited the effectiveness of these measures, setting the stage for the continuance of the Soviet Union's love affair with the bottle that would prompt (and undermine) Gorbachev's alcohol reform efforts during *perestroika*.

CHAPTER TWO:

The New Soviet *Narkoman*: Drugs and Youth

Karen Shakhnazarov's 2008 film, *The Vanishing Empire* (*Ischeznuvshaia imperiia*), paints an increasingly familiar picture of life during the Brezhnev years as it follows the exploits of a small group of privileged, West-obsessed Muscovite youth. Shakhnazarov situates his characters within an internationally recognizable student milieu, yet with a distinctly Soviet touch.[1] The lead character, Sergei, and his pals spend most of their free time selling pilfered rare books in order to pay for expensive black market jeans and bootleg rock records. Another of Sergei's associates plays in an English-language pop ensemble calling themselves "Red Trousers," shown repeatedly playing a cover of Dutch psychedelic band Shocking Blue's song, "Venus." During one performance's set break, a few Red Trousers go with Sergei and his friend, Styopa to an empty room and perform a recognizable ritual of another kind. As one band member hollows out a cigarette, the less rebellious Styopa suspiciously inquires about this activity. When Sergei responds that they are smoking "grass," Styopa storms out declaring that he is not a *narkoman* (drug addict). The others continue until interrupted by the Red Trousers' frontman, yelling that they entire hallway reeks of marijuana.

Like everything else desired by Sergei's group, the film's implication is that their casual drug habits are inspired by international youth culture beamed in from the West, factoring in marijuana as another item in their consumptive array. Other than a quip about being a "democrat" and "dissident", Sergei and his cohort appear not to be concerned with politics. Only the pursuit of pleasure occupies their attentions. As the film progresses, their hedonism

[1] *Ischeznushaia imperiia*, dir. Karen Shakhnazarov (Moskva: Mosfil'm, 2008).

gradually destabilizes and unmakes Sergei's life as he loses his first love, his mother, and his place at the university. This coming of age story ends as Sergei experiences an awakening amid the ruins of Khorezm's ancient capital, Kunia-Urgenich, deep in the sands of modern day Turkmenistan. Thirty years later, he bumps into Styopa at an airport and the two reminisce on the temporally and culturally distant childhood that they shared. The ending of Shakhanazov's film rehabilitates Sergei's character, transforming the once-delinquent *fartsovshchik* (black marketer) into a successful Farsi translator. His past deeds are implied to be merely part-and-parcel of the time in which he grew up; the way one lived under late socialism.

The "imaginary West" (in anthropologist Alexei Yurchak's lexicon) occupied a privileged position during the last Soviet decades.[2] Some Soviet youth, like Sergei and his companions, feverishly sought after emblematic products of the West—clothing, jazz and rock records, Marlboro cigarettes, and other distinctly branded ephemera. These desires did not necessarily reflect anti-Soviet attitudes as authorities imagined. Reality remained more complicated. As Donald Raleigh's recent oral history of the "Soviet baby boomers" demonstrates, the internationalist spirit fostered by Soviet education created a generation more tuned in to outside developments.[3] Increasingly aware of their surroundings due to limited relaxations in cultural barriers to the wider world, this generation participated and interacted with global youth culture in their own ways. Recent studies linking Soviet youth with burgeoning international youth culture have examined consumptive practices surrounding various Western goods inside the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc. Yet, perhaps the most infamous development of the "long sixties"—casual narcotics use among youth—does not factor into these

[2] Alexei Yurchak, *Everything Was Forever, Until It Was No More: The Last Soviet Generation* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006).

[3] See Raleigh, *Soviet Baby Boomers*.

studies. Much of this is likely due to the considerably lower profile narcotics use played in comparison to other consumptive practices. Unlike the persistent concerns over alcoholism and alcohol abuse discussed in the previous chapter, the use of illegal narcotics occupied a more marginal social position. Lacking the cloak of tacit approval that allowed certain drinking practices to continue, for most individuals, drug use inside the Soviet Union remained an almost unspeakable secret. Comparable levels of heated debate in official channels appear not to have existed. At the same time, the practices of certain working-class young men stood at the center of official anxieties. Recent declassification of formerly top-secret archival materials offers an opportunity to examine this under-studied area of Soviet society and culture.

Never a mass phenomenon among Soviet youth, rising instances of drug use over the course of the 1950s and 1960s did challenge the notion that the revolution had destroyed the kind of social conditions in which drug use and addiction arise. However, instead of resorting to harsh punitive measures, youth authorities worked to provide ideologically correct recreational activities and educational opportunities that would subvert these desires. By the end of the Khrushchev years, official tactics shifted to increasingly favor force—mobilizing street patrols and specialized brigades to stop drug distribution and production at the source, combined with stricter anti-narcotics legislation. But this is more than a narrative of police action and party control. Young *narkomany* (the generic term used by Soviet authorities for users and addicts alike), while countering the vision of the "new Soviet man" meant to live under future communism, do not fit into neat categories of dissidents or oppositionists. Stories from the archive paint a more complicated picture. Casual narcotics consumption functioned as an alternative leisure practice for some as an integral part in shaping rough masculinities. For others, drug processing and distribution provided additional income outside of official labor—

even going as far as facilitating the purchase of valuable deficit goods and engagement in forms of conspicuous consumption. Analysis of narcotics use and trafficking also provides another angle to comprehend the critical role in which the second economy played in the satisfaction of desires during the later decades of Soviet socialism that official channels could never possibly meet.

The handful of Cold War-era studies that examined drug use in the Soviet Union typically imported explanatory models generated from Western cases emphasizing the ruptures caused by modernization and perceived similarities with global youth culture. With only limited access to research materials, these studies typically built off of press clippings and published medical reports generally lacking in transparency. Writing in the 1970s, criminologist David E. Powell ascribed three motives for drug use among youths in the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc—experimentation with a "modern, sophisticated substitute" for alcohol, coping with the pains of adolescence, and "act[ing] out a feeling of political alienation [where] the use of drugs symbolizes the rejection of 'the system'."[4] In making these claims, testimonies printed in newspaper sources from various nations in the Eastern Bloc are cited as evidence. However, the ideological boundaries involved in publishing on such a sensitive subject as drug addiction means that these sources should be treated with great caution. Moreover, to universalize youth lives in states with such varied experiences as the GDR, Romania, and the Soviet Union does not

[4] David E. Powell, "Drug Abuse in Communist Europe," *Problems of Communism* (July-August 1973): 31–40. In particular, the point about expressing a rejection of the Soviet system suggests the reading of active dissent into all actions outside of officially mandated practices and thus forcing a false binary in the realm of motivations.

reflect recent historical work indicating divergences in relative prosperity, material culture, and ideological control.[5]

Soviet authorities generally viewed the causes for drug use through the prism of a social problem, frequently citing some sort of abnormality in the individual's life as a reason for these desires. Drug users either grew up in broken or abusive homes, were tempted by the hedonism showcased in Western films, or came from an ethnic group in which drug use represented an insufficiently modern, pre-Soviet cultural practice.[6] While stated causes may have differed, it is intriguing that Soviet authorities mirrored their Western counterparts in seeing a deviant "otherness" inherit in drug users.[7] Actual prophylactic work appears to have been limited, preferring silence to a frank discussion. As Soviet authorities continued to publicly deny the existence of any real drug problem, sociologist A. A. Gabiani began designing research models to study narcotics use and addiction in the late 1960s. Over the course of the 1970s, Gabiani's research team interviewed 878 addicts in the Georgian SSR in order to establish their social

[5] The three volumes edited by David Crowley and Susan Reid each explore the diverse cultural experiences had under socialism throughout the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. See Susan E. Reid and David Crowley, eds., *Style and Socialism*; *idem*, eds., *Socialist Spaces: Sites of Everyday Life in the Eastern Bloc* (Oxford and New York: Berg, 2002) and *idem*, eds., *Pleasures in Socialism: Leisure and Luxury in the Eastern Bloc* (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 2010).

[6] For summaries of these claims in English, see: Powell, "Drug Abuse in Communist Europe," and John M. Kramer, "Drug Abuse in the USSR," in *Soviet Social Problems*, ed. Anthony Jones, Walter D. Connor, and David E. Powell (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991), 94–118.

[7] On the influence of the "labeling tradition" within sociology of deviance on Western drug policy, see Nigel South, "Debating Drugs and Everyday Life: Normalisation, Prohibition, and 'Otherness'," in *Drugs: Cultures, Controls, and Everyday Life*, ed. Nigel South (London: Sage, 1999), 1–15.

background and motivations operating behind their turn toward narcotic consumption.[8] Of those interviewed, the majority were young men under the age of 30, with a median age of 25. Most had first experimented with drugs during their adolescence or young adulthood, initially trying either hashish or morphine. A second study conducted during the mid-1980s in the Georgian SSR corroborates the general findings of research conducted in the previous decade.[9] As in the previous study, male workers living in urban areas were found to be the most likely consumers of a range of narcotics. Hashish remained the most commonly used drug, with morphine in second place, and opium in third. Due to the specific geographical and temporal limitations of these studies, these findings should not be considered to be universal for the wider Soviet experience. At the same time, they do provide a basis from which to compare earlier documentation in grasping to understand the spread and consumption of narcotics throughout the Soviet space. Gabiani's work provides a rare glimpse into this darkened topic, but the history of drug use during the "long sixties" must be instead pieced together through scattered archival documentation only now undergoing the process of declassification.

[8] For an English language analysis of Gabiani's report, see James A. Inciardi, "Drug Abuse in the Georgian SSR," *Journal of Psychoactive Drugs* 19, no. 4 (October-December 1987): 329–334. Inciardi criticizes the research methods involved in the study, stating that the report "shows clearly that the researchers were unfamiliar with many of the anthropological techniques that have been structured for studying drug users in their natural settings. In addition the limited sample description and primitive reporting techniques suggest that, in general, the researchers had little experience with studying drug users."

[9] A. A. Gabiani, "Narkomaniia: Gor'kii plody sladkoi zhizni," *Sotsiologicheskie issledovaniia* 14, no. 1 (1987): 48–53. Through interviews with approximately 500 *narkomany*, Gabiani and his team report that 86.5% of the men were aged under 35 and 66.5% under the age of 30.

Drugs and the Global "Long Sixties"

Across the European continent, narcotics use experienced a gradual decline from the interwar period until the late 1950s. Throughout the nineteenth century, opiates were legally available in a variety of medicinal preparations, tonics, and other popular remedies through Europe and North America. Around the time of the First World War calls to strengthen anti-narcotics legislation (particularly concerning opium and cocaine) spread throughout the continent as their use was tied to prostitution and other vices plaguing society. Drug consumption reached a high point in the 1920s, prompting various international and state-level authorities to redouble their efforts to minimize drug abuse in both Europe and North America. International organizations took the lead in encouraging states to monitor and regulate the production and distribution of medical narcotics.[10]

The carnage of the Second World War exposed a new generation to a variety of narcotics. Doctors administered morphine and other opium alkaloids to the war-wounded in the course of treatment. Others consumed doses of stimulants distributed by military command. At the war's conclusion, abandoned Wehrmacht military stations and depots housed vast supplies of narcotics. Allied forces worked quickly to stabilize the situation in response to the burgeoning black market for all sorts of products, particularly narcotics. However, these activities did not resemble the hierarchical international drug trade that would emerge later in the twentieth century. Instead, most dealers were simply everyday individuals scrambling to make ends meet amidst the ruins of postwar Europe, selling only what they happened across. Even so, the

[10] For an overview of narcotics use in the Western world prior to 1945, see David T. Courtwright, *Forces of Habit: Drugs and the Making of the Modern World* (Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard University Press, 2001).

European drug scene continued to shrink and age during the 1950s, made up primarily of older, longtime users.[11]

All of this would be stood on its head over the course of the 1960s. As historian Arthur Marwick has argued, the sweeping changes wrought during the "long sixties" do not fit neatly into a ten-year period between 1960 and 1970.[12] Cultural formations and social mores changed unevenly throughout Europe and North America from the period of postwar reconstruction through the early 1970s. A number of factors contributed to the growth of youth subcultures/counterculture and drug use in the West—namely, rising incomes, youth-targeted marketing, and the rise of an international youth culture. By the end of the 1950s, Western European economies had by-and-large stabilized, culminating in the gradual rise in income that facilitated expenditures on non-essentials. This meant more money in the pockets of working youth—particularly young (often unmarried) male workers—for spending at the pub or on consumer items (like fashionable clothing and records). Systemic changes occurring during the sixties afforded a wider portion of the population a taste of the good life through consumerism. For a much smaller subset, the purchase of narcotics entered into this mix.[13] The choice to consume narcotics reflected a more subversive approach to consumption, undermining the socio-political context in which consumer society emerged while still directly participating in it. At the

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[11] Robert P. Stephens, *Germans on Drugs: The Complications of Modernization in Hamburg* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2007), 10-45.

[12] Arthur Marwick, *The Sixties: Cultural Revolution in Britain, France, Italy, and the United States, c.1958-c.1974* (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1998).

[13] Using the research of sociologist Lewis Yablonsky, Arthur Marwick estimates that less than 0.1% of the American population in 1967 could be considered in some way participating in hippiedom. This figure includes professionals (in Yablonsky's words) "who use psychedelic drugs, interact, and closely associate with totally dropped-out hippies, yet maintain 9-5 jobs or student status." *Ibid.*, 480.

same time, casual dabbling in drugs—particularly marijuana—did not necessarily signify conversion to hippiedom or radicalism, but for many (if not most) fellow travelers or "weekend hippies" merely represented the fashionable and seductively illegal pastime of the day.[14] Even while those claiming greater authenticity may have looked them down upon these individuals, the kind of social changes that made these practices more permissible are significant.

In the Soviet Union, de-Stalinization during the 1950s and early 1960s in the realm of culture heralded greater international access for its citizens. This trend crystallized in two significant developments: international youth festivals and decreased barriers for international tourism that brought outsiders into the country combined with increased opportunities for travel outside of the Soviet Union for a privileged few.[15] Yet even as these new opportunities afforded some Soviet youth the chance of making contact with their foreign counterparts, their interactions were much more limited than those of the Western European counterculture linked together through various transnational networks.[16] Soviet youth may have been able to find out about the drug scene through oblique references in the press (and perhaps more directly from Polish and other Eastern Bloc music magazines), but official prohibitions hindered direct

[14] Marwick quotes one British hippie lambasting "weekend hippies" for their pretension and naïveté: "The people I hate are the King's Road type…weekend hippies. They wear what they call groovy clothes. They have long hair. But they're about as plastic as the cover of that tape recorder case. Maybe they have a pair of jeans like me—but when they first get outside you can still smell the moth-balls because they've had them hanging around all the year...they just take them out and wear them up town one night, smoke one joint and really think they've tuned in, they've done it all." *Ibid.*, 488.

[15] Anne E. Gorsuch, *All This Is Your World: Soviet Tourism at Home and Abroad after Stalin* (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2011).

[16] Not only did these individuals communicate across national lines, these transnational networks facilitated drug smuggling across the continent. Enterprising members of the counterculture could drive to the Balkans or travel to North Africa in order to bring supplies back to their home base. For more on these patterns, see Stephens, *Germans on Drugs*.

participation. Influenced by external cultural developments, some members of Soviet society crafted their own version of the global counterculture in response to local conditions. These micro-scenes may have taken their cues from abroad, but the system of meanings and practices developed therein remained their own. Groups reflected their external influences and modeled their self-representation on their imaginings of Western subcultures such as hippies, rockers, or punks.[17] Some groups even openly rejected the use of narcotics—picking and choosing their messages from an array of diverse global countercultural slogans, credos, and practices.[18]

By the 1970s, global drug trafficking rings emerged ready to supply persistent demand for their products. Where small-scale smuggling efforts made by daring members of the European counterculture accounted for most of the continent's international drug traffic in the preceding decades, organized multinational networks soon rose to take their place. Modernizing efforts in the developing world contributed to this development, as industrialization, increased trade, and the migration of workers to Europe and North America from developing nations built the infrastructure for these networks.[19] As these efforts effectively shrank the globe by facilitating faster transportation and communication, similar projects transformed remote regions of the Soviet Union during the second half of the twentieth century. Authorities noted that these transportation networks allowed for more dynamic trading patterns bringing goods to market in the second economy, as well as speeding migration from the Caucasus and Central Asia into

[17] Soviet hippies appeared on the Soviet scene after the period covered in this dissertation. Their numbers were few, but visible enough to receive satirical descriptions in popular magazines like *Krokodil*. Vasilii Boiarintsev's memoirs are a good place to start. See his *My -- Khippi* (Moskva and San Fransisco: Izdatel'telckii dom "R&F," 2004).

[18] William Jay Risch, "Soviet 'Flower Children'. Hippies and the Youth Counter-culture in 1970s Lviv," *Journal of Contemporary History* 40, no. 3 (July 2005): 565–584. One hippie group studied by Risch reportedly espoused "Against Narcotics" as one of their slogans.

[19] Stephens, *Germans on Drugs*, 88-120.

Soviet cities—particularly to Moscow and Leningrad.[20] To be clear, there is no evidence to suggest that more than a few of these new urban migrants participated in the drug trade.

The *narkomany* encountered by Komsomol authorities and *druzhiny* during the 1960s do not appear to have fit the mold of the Western counterculture. As will be detailed below, these Soviet drug consumers' practices were rooted in local and regional systems of cultural meaning. In the working-class factory towns of the Russian republic, narcotics use functioned as part of an array of rough masculine signifiers directly at odds with hippie aesthetics. The next section briefly covers the history of drug practices throughout imperial Russian and Soviet spaces, detailing the ways in which authorities encountered and monitored narcotic consumption. This is followed by a two-part analysis of how individual consumers, the Komsomol, and Soviet medical authorities constructed understandings of *narkomaniia*.

Illicit Pleasures

Soviet authorities typically considered drug use to be a relic of the capitalist past and a characteristic feature of the bourgeois nations of the West. While this chapter largely focuses on official policies and Soviet drug cultures in the 1950s and 1960s, illegal narcotics use did not suddenly appear on the scene. The years after the First World War and the Russian Civil War found the young Soviet republic in a battle with narcotics. Abuse and addiction could be partially attributed to complications arising from the treating of the war-wounded, yet others in Soviet society turned to narcotics for recreational purposes. Those seeking the latter often favored cocaine, which circulated in the urban cafes and nightclubs during the first years of

[20] Jeff Sahadeo, "Druzhba Narodov or Second-Class Citizenship? Soviet Asian Migrants in a Post-Colonial World," *Central Asian Survey* 26, no. 4 (December 2007): 559–579. The post-WWII years witnessed large migrations from (former) colony to metropole throughout Europe. Yet in the Soviet case, these migration patterns were more limited and carefully structured than elsewhere in on the continent.

young Soviet republic. Ease of acquisition and the drug's ability to bolster courage endeared it to the *besprizornye* (homeless children) filling urban streets in the years after the civil war that used it to fortify themselves for criminal activities.[21] Particularly troubling for authorities in the newly founded workers' and peasants' state, proletarians appeared to have been the most frequent consumers of cocaine. In his study of 400 cocaine-addicted criminals, physician A. M. Rapoport noted that 34.75% of his cases (a plurality) were from worker backgrounds, while 20.5% came from the peasantry.[22]

By the mid-1920s, the Soviet state actively endeavored to end illegal narcotic consumption and production within the nascent union. In Autumn 1924, a commission staffed by the heads of various party-state organizations concluded an investigation into current measures taken toward this end. The state needed a system to monopolize and regulate the legal cultivation of raw opium in the Central Asian republics for the production of morphine and other medicinal preparations, as well as the importation and exportation of other narcotics. The commission suggested significant changes to the legal code in order to enforce the state's monopoly on narcotics. Statute 215 of the legal code imposed up to a 300-ruble penalty and a year's forced labor without detention for the illegal manufacture, possession, or sale of "strong-acting and poisonous substances." Another statute ordered a jail sentence of at least six months for trade in restricted substances.[23] In November of the same year, the Soviet state created a monopoly on the manufacture and distribution of all "strong-acting substances" (including

[21] Anne E. Gorsuch, *Youth in Revolutionary Russia: Enthusiasts, Bohemians, Delinquents* (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2000), 152.

[22] Mary Schaeffer Conroy, "Abuse of Drugs Other Than Alcohol and Tobacco in the Soviet Union," *Soviet Studies* 42, no. 3 (July 1990): 447–480.

[23] RGASPI f. 151, op. 1, d. 47, l. 8-23 as published as "Opium i narkotiki v SSSR," *Istoricheskii arkhiv* no. 3 (2003): 91-98.

opiates and cocaine salts) under the jurisdiction of Sovnarkom and the Commissariat of Health. However, at this time no laws existed criminalizing hashish consumption—a gross oversight in the estimation of physician A. L. Kamaev who disputed the substance's supposedly non-addictive properties by noting that users often consumed it on a daily basis. During the 1920s, the issue of narcotics abuse occupied the attentions of many medical experts who debated the nature of its cause, pointing to a variety of environmental and biological factors. Drug addiction was to be overcome through a combination of medical treatment and educational-cultural work.[24]

Internationally the Soviet Union maintained a general silence about illicit drug consumption and trafficking during Stalin's lifetime. A 1953 report to the United Nations Commission on Narcotic Drugs stated that "the evil of drug addiction has been eliminated in the USSR as a result of the fundamental economic and social reforms of 1917 and the continued rise in the well-being of the workers."[25] The report asserted that the illegal manufacture or distribution of drugs within the Soviet Union did not occur and that close monitoring of medical narcotics rendered drug addiction impossible. The tone of these reports changed in the years following Stalin's death to acknowledge the existence of morphine (and other painkiller) addiction as a result of poor treatment methods for injuries sustained during the war or in the

[24] Conroy, "Abuse of Drugs."

[25] United Nations Commission on Narcotic Drugs, "Summary of Annual Reports of Governments relating to Opium and other Narcotic Drugs, 1953," E/NR.1953/Summary, 20. While particularly useful for a comparative international perspective, these reports should not be read uncritically. They only contain what Soviet authorities reported to the United Nations and are therefore not necessarily as reliable as internal documentation for comprehending the situation as authorities understood it. Of course neither of these types of sources can ever provide a complete understanding of something as private as drug use or addiction.

management of chronic disease.[26] The Ministry of Health issued a special order in April 1957 urging caution among medical practitioners in prescribing narcotics, as well as resolutions strengthening storage and distribution policies aimed at stemming abuse and illegal sale. These resolutions also required the central registration of known drug addicts under clinical supervision for the first time, though treatment was not compulsory.[27] These reports to the United Nations only acknowledged a few hundred persons registered as addicted to morphine or opium with the exact number not pinned down. As will be demonstrated below, these numbers (due in part to these narrow selection criteria) do not paint the whole picture of drug use in the years after Stalin's death.

Opium poppies were legally cultivated on carefully guarded state-run farms to supply Soviet hospitals with painkillers. Much of the supply was produced on an estimated 98 *sovkhozy* (state farms) in the Issyk-Kul region of Kirghizia.[28] Once harvested, the opium crop was to be turned over directly to the overseer of the farm and the quantity noted at the time of delivery. The overseer then transferred the day's total harvest to a warehouse that would then send daily deliveries to a special receiving center run by the Ministry of Health.[29] Under the watch of health officials, these legally produced narcotics were to stay out of the hands of underground traffickers. Yet, these barriers were not impenetrable. Collective farms in Western Russia, Ukraine, and the Caucasus cultivated cannabis plants for the creation of industrial hemp fibers—

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[26] United Nations Commission on Narcotic Drugs, "Summary of Annual Reports of Governments relating to Opium and other Narcotic Drugs, 1955," E/NR.1955/Summary, 50.

[27] United Nations Commission on Narcotic Drugs, "Summary of Annual Reports of Governments relating to Opium and other Narcotic Drugs, 1956," E/NR.1956/Summary, 7, 54-55.

[28] Maral Madi, "Drug Trade in Kyrgyzstan: Structure, Implications and Countermeasures," *Central Asian Survey* 23, no. 3–4 (December 2004): 249–273.

[29] United Nations Commission on Narcotic Drugs, E/NR.1956/Summary, 38.

though without the same security measures as the risk of addiction was considered minimal. The natural growth of wild cannabis varieties did not appear to have alarmed Soviet authorities either.[30] Internal cultivation and theft were not the only concerns of Soviet authorities. By the end of the 1960s, the trafficking of narcotics from elsewhere (primarily Afghanistan and Southeast Asia) through Soviet territory into Europe came onto the radar of both KGB and Interpol agents who christened one of these established routes the "Baikal path (*Baikalskii put'*)."[31]

Over the course of the late-1950s and 1960s, youth authorities registered an uptick in the numbers of *narkomany*, particularly in Central Asia and the Caucasus, as well as in Siberian and southern Russian cities, such as Novosibirsk, Omsk, and Kuibyshev. Rising arrest rates and confiscations alarmed these authorities believing that the future of Soviet youth was at stake in this deepening battle against the drug trade. In their understanding of the situation, not only did the consumption of *anasha* (smokeable hashish) and other drugs result in the need for medical and psychiatric care, but also led directly down the road to a life of, often violent and sexual, crime. Yet at the same time, hashish remained in a legal grey area as the criminal code listed only distribution as a punishable offense. *Narkomany* supposedly operated out of "dens" (*pritony*) centered on all varieties of debauched activity. As havens of both illicit pleasures and depraved violence, the existence of these *pritony* presented the Soviet state with the challenge of subversive group activity, albeit on a social, rather than expressly political, level. However, as

[30] *Ibid*. In the UN report, it is noted that the variety of cannabis legally cultivated was thought to contain such little "resinous substance" as to be not potent enough to warrant concern over its consumption. Furthermore, tincture of cannabis no longer was in use in Soviet pharmacology at this time.

[31] Z. V. Korobkina and V. A. Popov, *Narkobiznes i narkomaniia v XX veke*, Izdanie 3-e (Vladimir: Vladimirskii gosudarstvennyi pedagogicheskii universitet, 2002), 30.

spaces that lured Soviet youth away from study, work, and civic engagement, they did indeed constitute a political problem. In a report signed by leading judicial and educational officials, including the head of the procuracy, A. Kruglov, these dens served as a direct conduit to the destruction of Soviet youth, as contact with these "antisocial elements" places them directly on "the path to the commission of crime."[32]

Youth authorities also encountered the use of opiates—particularly in the republics of Central Asia. One internal Komsomol report alleges that more than 90% of the opium consumed in the country was cultivated in the alpine regions of Kirghizia, most notably in the Issyk-Kul valley and Tien Shan oblast'. Farm workers on state-run opium plantations diverted supply through black market channels for cash, subverting the system set up to prevent such occurrences. Opium poppies were also found growing in the Semipalatinsk and Uighur regions of eastern Kazakhstan.[33] Fueled by the orientalist writings of foreign travelers, these areas of Russian (and later Soviet) Turkestan had long ago entered popular imagination as sites of exotic practices—particularly in regard to opium consumption. According to one English visitor to the region, Russian imperial rule had sought to curtail these practices by putting an end to local cultivation, though it did continue to spill over from neighboring areas. Yet, opium cultivation continued in Bukhara. From there it was smuggled elsewhere and used in a variety of preparations (reduced to an oil and mixed in with food, drank as a liquid known as *kuknar khanas*, chewed, or smoked).[34] Russian colonial officials and intellectuals based in Turkestan worried about slippage in cultural markers between ethnic Russian colonizers and local

[32] RGASPI f. 1-m, op. 1s, d. 128, l. 19.

[33] RGASPI f. 1-m, op. 1s, d. 133, ll. 1-27.

[34] Annette M. B. Meakin, *In Russian Turkestan: A Garden of Asia and its People* (London: George Allen, 1903), 68.

populations. These anxieties were particularly acute in regard to one's choice of intoxicants, seeing these practices as imbued with ethno-cultural markers. Members of the Russian colonizing population were not to consume hashish or opium, nor were Muslims to drink alcohol in order to maintain a symbolic hierarchy of colonizer and colonized.[35]

Opium had also been consumed in the area of modern Kyrgyzstan as a traditional medicine in the form of a tea to ward off fatigue and toothaches prior to Soviet rule. The practice of smoking opium spread from China at the end of the nineteenth century to a limited degree, though the anti-narcotic policies of the Soviet Union prevented its widespread adoption.[36] Unlike the complex history of opium use in Soviet space, morphine abuse in the postwar period was thought to have generally stemmed from the time of the Great Patriotic War when it was the most commonly available painkiller in Soviet medical stations. Due to serious injuries sustained during combat many found themselves addicted to the drug—a condition that did not dissipate with the war's conclusion. Cocaine even made its way onto Soviet streets, though like morphine, as a product often stolen from medical facilities and pharmacies and illegally sold by drug traders.

Soviet authorities recognized and cooperated with United Nations' efforts to quell the global drug trade. In the minds of Soviet authorities, only a thin line separated the world of the drug dealer from that of the dangerous criminal. Tales from around the country closely associated the narcotics trade with an unofficial market in knives, guns, and even murder. From this environment sprung a kind of Soviet gangster, living on the margins of society. Depleting human and material resources in search of personal profit rendered these smugglers and dealers

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[35] Jeff Sahadeo, *Russian Colonial Society in Tashkent, 1865-1923* (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2007), 75.

[36] Madi, "Drug Trade in Kyrgyzstan," 251.

prototypical social parasites in the eyes of Soviet authorities. Police investigations alleged that for those caught selling narcotics that it was often their primary means of subsistence. The perceived relationship between criminal activity and narcotic consumption made these activities all the more conspicuous in Soviet society. Most criminal acts committed by addicts were thought to be motivated by the need to acquire drugs or as random acts committed in a haze of narcotic delirium. Or, for those selling narcotics, their activities were viewed through the lens of parasitic speculation—as in the case of the Turkmen SSR where discussion surrounding the drafting of an anti-parasite law explicitly targeted the narcotics trade.[37] Other union republics followed suit in the late 1950s and 1960s by initiating specialized campaigns against narcotics production, sale, and consumption.

The crimes committed by users often fell under the category of hooliganism. But authorities also linked even more serious violations of the social order to drug use. In Alma-Ata, local police tied the commission of a number of heinous crimes (*opasnye prestulpeniia*) to 70 teenaged *narkomany* in 1962. Hashish-smoking youths violently fought in the streets of Baku and Alma-Ata, sometimes ending in murder. Others stood accused of committing sex crimes against young women. Authorities alleged that the drug prompted these aggressive outbursts. In response, police in various locales raided residences maintained by dealers. Omsk police arrested one young man registered in Tashkent named P. for the possession of 13.5kg of hashish. Over the course of two years, P. had sold more than 80kg of hashish in a number of Soviet cities. More than 150 individuals bought from P. and usually committed thefts in order to finance their expenditures. In this manner, P.'s hashish business created a network of petty crime plaguing the

[37] V. Krylov, "Zakon priniat' neobkhodimo," *Turkmenskaia iskra* (May 23, 1957), 2.

towns that he visited. Elsewhere in Kirgizia, authorities confiscated over 130kg of opium from a single trader valued at more than 6500 rubles.[38]

These activities were not limited to the Soviet periphery. In February 1964, the Moscow *militsiia* arrested two men identified as Firsov and Korikin for "systemically smoking *anasha* and selling it to teenagers" for one ruble a packet in the Tekstil'shchiki district of the city—an area located within Moscow's proletarian-encoded southeastern region.[39] While in clear violation of laws forbidding narcotics, as well as acting as a negative influence on Soviet youth, police officials soon realized that these two men were only the end of a longer distribution chain. A few days later, three *militsiia* workers arrested two other men, Kurban Azhibaev and Aziam Iusupov, for selling *anasha* in Moscow's central market. After interrogating the men in these two cases, the evidence suggested a connection. Both Firsov and Korikin mentioned that they received their supply of *anasha* from an individual going by the name of Kerim. A witness identified Kurban Azhibaev as this mysterious person of interest, stating that Firsov had once introduced her to him as "Kerim". Unfortunately for the investigators, they were not able to trace the next link in the chain.

Other arrests in the city pointed a certain migratory pattern in the drug trade. Police investigations uncovered drug networks processing and smuggling *anasha* and opium out of Central Asia for sale in Moscow, Leningrad, and other major population centers. Like the cases discussed above, police apprehended a man named Dadashev from the Azeri SSR for selling *anasha* in the Zhdanov farm market. He apparently arrived in Moscow for the express purpose

[38] RGASPI f. 1-m, op. 1, d. 133, ll. 9-12. In keeping with the wishes of the archive, I have redacted the names of individuals appearing in these cases.

[39] Their case is presented as part of a longer narrative found in GARF f. R-9474, op. 16, d. 850, l. 2-29 as published in Zubkova and Zhukova, *Na "kraiu" sovetskogo obshchestva*, 255-274.

of selling narcotics without seeking any other kind of work (though the small quantity of 38 grams on his person at the time of arrest would perhaps suggest otherwise).[40] Narcotic products harvested in Central Asia and the Caucasus passed into other parts of the Soviet Union through state transportation networks on ships, trains, and airports, and even through the mail, via *blat'* arrangements worked out with various officials. In this manner, hashish and opiates turned up for sale in town markets, restaurants, train stations, movie theaters, and street corners throughout the country.[41]

The case of Seid Ormaly Ismailov, who went by the nickname "the prince," also suggests the existence of a cartel-like drug trade in the Soviet Union. After his arrest in 1965 for distribution of narcotics in Saratov, "Prince" Ismailov's story came to light. Since 1959 he had not been registered at any official place of work, instead setting up a distribution network to bring *anasha* out of Tashkent, Andizhan, and Namangan for sale in southern Russia. Ismailov is said to have bought *anasha* at the source for 10-12 rubles per kilogram, which he then sold in 300-400g blocks to local dealers for 20 rubles per 100g, who in turn split these blocks into a smaller amount that they referred to as a "big *bash*" that sold for one ruble.[42] Not only violating the social order through his distribution of narcotics, Ismailov's activities demonstrated a

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[40] *Ibid*., 264.

[41] RGASPI f. 1-m, op. 1s, d. 666, ll. 45-46. The word *blat'* directly translates as "pull," but it refers to the kinds of informal, everyday practices of using one's own personal connections and social network to make special arrangements in order to receive desired services or goods. For a scholarly analysis of these practices and their effect on the Soviet economy, see Elena V. Ledeneva, *Russia's Economy of Favors: Blat, Networking, and Informal Exchange* (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998).

[42] RGASPI f. 1-m, op. 1s, d. 405, l. 15. A "bash" is reported elsewhere in this document to equal 2-3 grams, or approximately 5 doses for smoking.

multifaceted attack on the Soviet system through its organization of a criminal network, speculation, and shirking of socially useful labor.

Narcotic production and distribution also could be quite profitable for those willing to take the risks, even potentially affording them a lifestyle of flashy, conspicuous consumption unobtainable through labor in an official institution. In the Issyk-Kul *raion* of the Kirghiz SSR, a dealer named A. managed to acquire a Volga automobile and a house for 5000 rubles despite not working in a state institution or in any other official capacity.[43] Investigators believed that the money for these expensive possessions came from the theft and sale of various drugs from local medical distribution points. In the same way that the *stiliagi,* young Soviet hipsters enamored with Western fashions and culture, utilized their acquisition and ostentatious display of desirable Western clothing as a means of asserting their own vision of masculinity, drug trafficking provided men like A. with the means to engage in conspicuous consumption and acquire rare and valuable items.[44] The purchase of an automobile, the deficit good par excellence, became all the more striking in his Kirghiz setting. In 1977, there were only 17 cars for every 1000 persons in Kirghizia—a number roughly comparable to other Central Asian republics, but with only a little more than half of the density found in the Russian republic.[45] Certainly more than a decade

[43] RGASPI f. 1-m, op. 1s, d. 133, ll. 21-22.

[44] On the relationship between the *stiliaga*'s clothes and alternative conceptions of masculinity, see Mark Edele, "Strange Young Men in Stalin's Moscow: The Birth and Life of the Stiliagi, 1945-1953," *Jahrbücher Für Geschichte Osteuropas* 50 (2002): 37–61.and Fürst, *Stalin's Last Generation*. This subject will also be taken up in the next chapter.

[45] Lewis H. Siegelbaum, *Cars for Comrades: The Life of the Soviet Automobile* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2008), 240. For 1977, the RSFSR had a car density of 26 for every 1000, while Estonia and Lithuania numbered 61 out of 1000 and 50 out of 1000 respecively.

earlier, A.'s purchase of a Volga (the top of the line for passenger vehicles at the time) would have aroused suspicion, and perhaps, admiration or envy.

Collective farm workers could also generate profits on the side from their cultivation of opium poppies. By selling portions of their crop to others for illegal processing, these *kolkhozniki* raked in approximately 130-150 rubles per kilogram. After transformation into consumable opium, it would now fetch (in the estimates of one official) between 600-1000 rubles per kilogram on the streets of the Kirghiz republic and presumably more once smuggled out of Central Asia into Soviet Russia.[46] For these reasons, men like A. fit the mold of the social parasite in many ways, whose eradication had occupied authorities since the late 1950s. Seeking to eliminate speculation in the second economy, anti-parasite laws targeted the kinds of misappropriation of state-owned property rampant throughout the country—like the channeling of opium poppies into the underground drug market. Not only were drug dealers living off the second economy, but they also engaged in a parasitism in a more traditional sense through the shirking of socially useful labor during a time when the transition to communism appeared imminent.[47] Their activities also went beyond typical definitions of parasitism as they traded in goods often considered contraband in and of themselves.

Convictions for drug trafficking indicate a tendency toward growth over the course of the 1960s. In 1961, 231 individuals were convicted on charges under articles 224 and 225 of the RSFSR criminal code. In 1963, this number spiked to 620 and dropped back down to 472 the

[46] RGASPI f. 1-m, op. 1s, d. 133, ll. 21-22.

[47] Sheila Fitzpatrick, "Social Parasites: How Tramps, Idle Youth, and Busy Entrepreneurs Inhibited the Soviet March to Communism," *Cahiers du Monde russe* 47, no. 1/2 (January 2006): 377–408.

following year.[48] While the small number of prosecutions may suggest drug trafficking as only a minor issue in postwar society, accounts from local and regional Komsomol organizations reporting drug use among their charges point to the contrary. Many young offenders presumably received discipline through means other than custodial punishments in concordance with prevailing social practices utilizing instead various rituals of collective shaming and (re)education. For this reason, the numbers of those detained by the police or brought before their collective do not necessarily match prosecution figures. The language used in the relevant articles of the criminal code also hindered successful prosecution. In a document drawn up by the Supreme Court's General Practice Department (*Otdel obobshcheniia sudebnoi praktiki*), they argue that common misinterpretations of article 224 led prosecutors to the conclusion that money must change hands (or an analogous exchange) in order to constitute the sale of narcotics. According to the unnamed author, "such an interpretation of marketing (*sbyta*) is false and leads to mistakes in the resolution of specific cases."[49] Personal possession of *anasha* did not constitute a crime under article 224. But, an even bigger problem loomed for Supreme Soviet. "General passivity to *anasha* smokers (of which there are many among minors and young adults) in the people's courts causes them to remain out of public view and feeling this lack of control, they continue in their use of narcotics. Some of them then embark on a path of criminality (*vstaiut i na prestupnyi put'*) starting first with the marketing and speculation in narcotics."[50]

[48] Zubkova and Zhukova, *Na "kraiu" sovetskogo obshchestva*, 259.
[49] *Ibid*., 265.
[50] *Ibid*., 273.

Identifying Users: Youth, Class, and Gender

Founded in its earliest incarnation in 1918, the All-Union Leninist Young Communist League (more commonly known as the Komsomol) functioned as a vehicle for the upbringing and socialization of youth, serving to channel their energies toward revolutionary goals. Authorities defined the category of youth broadly, setting eligibility requirements between the ages of 14 and 28. Prior to entrance in the Komsomol, younger Soviet children could take part in related youth organizations such as the Octobrists and Pioneers. By the mid-1960s, the Komsomol hosted more than 19.4 million members in its ranks—a sizable number, but certainly not accounting for every eligible young person living in the Soviet Union.[51] Membership was never mandatory, though most Soviet youth joined out of some combination of social convention, peer pressure, and increased potential for upward mobility as a successful Komsomol career provided a solid foundation for later acceptance into the Communist Party.

Certain indicators suggest that the unifying power of the Komsomol as the principle organizers of young life had waned in the postwar period. Public opinion work commissioned by *Komsomol'skaia Pravda* in the mid-1960s demonstrates a variety of conflicting opinions about the nature of the organization and its mission in society as understood by its members. While the overwhelming majority of those polled stated that they believed education and socialization to be the Komsomol's primary function, many were also uncertain as to whether or not it always succeeded in meeting these goals.[52] When asked about the main problems with

[51] Allen Kassof, *The Soviet Youth Program: Regimentation and Rebellion* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1965).

[52] B. A. Grushin, *Chetyre zhizni Rossii v zerkale oprosov obshchestvennogo mneniia: epokha Brezhneva, tom 1* (Moskva: Progress-Traditsiia, 2003). In response to a question about whether or not the Komsomol today met its main objectives, 52.3% responded that it did so only partly or sometimes. Only 27.5% clearly responded in the affirmative, while 15% did not answer

contemporary Komsomol organizations, the most common answers were that the organizations placed too many demands on members, were overly involved in members' lives, and did not understand members' personal interests.[53] One 27-year old male respondent from Moscow wrote: "Komsomol work has been reduced to the collection of dues. Everything else is in the background."[54] Another respondent, a 27-year-old female Komsomol instructor from the Sverdlovsk oblast', argued that, "Our most important task—the upbringing of the youth—is done insufficiently. This is partly because [the Komsomol] has to address other questions handled by other organizations, administrations, labor unions, etc."[55] It was not the case that the youth lacked the desire to participate in the Komsomol or were not politically or socially engaged, but rather that the organization that was supposed to be vehicle for their development appeared to many to be solidifying into an inflexible bureaucracy that often failed to meet their own expectations. In this way, youth authorities and the youth were growing alienated from one another.

Even so, the Komsomol did not remain a static organization throughout Soviet history. The Khrushchev years marked a shift away from rigid top-down control inside Komsomol organizations. Lower-level Komsomol organizations were encouraged to allow youth to develop their own clubs as a means of more successfully engaging their interests while remaining within the organization's ideological parameters. This change in direction also served a second

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the question at all. For complete statistics on this particular question, see p. 73. In his study of hippies and rock fans in 1970s L'viv, William Risch also attributes alienation from state-sponsored youth organizations as one of the reasons compelling these individuals to form other associations. See Risch, "Soviet 'Flower Children'."

[53] Grushin, *Chetyre zhizni Rossii, epokha Brezhneva, tom 1*, 74-75.

[54] *Ibid.*, 65. While not signing his name, he did identify as a worker and an eight-year Komsomol member.

[55] *Ibid.*, 67.

purpose—to target non-conformist youth through providing socially acceptable leisure activities that promoted collectivity as a preventative measure.[56] Many members may have relished their time spent partaking in these new youth initiative groups, but their enthusiasm did not translate to everyone. As to not to overstate the case, it must be emphasized that while drug use appears more prevalent in archival documentation than previously thought, it should not be understood as a mass phenomenon among Soviet youth.

Youth authorities in both the Komsomol and *militsiia* often struggled to formulate effective policy for preventing the spread of drugs in their jurisdictions. These frustrations often boiled over into contests and open quarrels between the organizations concerning how to best deal with this problem. One of the themes found in debates between Komsomol and *militsiia* officials is the apparent unwillingness of local and regional Komsomol authorities to implement policies that would generate the kind of ideological work necessary to stop youth from using *anasha* and other drugs. The Central Committee of the Komsomol tasked two party members living in Saratov in 1965 to investigate this issue in their city.[57] In their report, they respond that the city's drug-using population appeared to be growing younger (with the nucleus in the age group of 14-17), as well as the total numbers of users in local factories and workplaces were chronically underreported. They provided the standard go-to explanations of the day—namely a general lack of quality educational work among the youth, insufficient attention to the needs of

[56] Gleb Tsipursky, "Having Fun in the Thaw: Youth Initiative Clubs in the Post-Stalin Years," *Carl Beck Papers in Russian and East European Studies*, no. 2201 (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2012).

[57] RGASPI f. 1-m, op. 1s, d. 405, ll. 6-16.

teenagers, and the dearth of cultured activities for working youth.[58] In the course of their investigation, they also revealed that many of the living quarters for workers failed to meet the preconditions for the development of these kinds of activities. One dormitory was located on the outskirts of town on the territory of a former prison camp where the barbed wire could still be seen and inhabited by a population perceived as criminal to the point that residents were afraid to leave at night. In this atmosphere, intoxication and violence prevailed.[59]

Moreover, according to their research into the matter, one in every two Komsomol members employed at local Enterprise No. 1 smoked *anasha*. Each of the examples in this report show how young, male industrial workers gradually lost interest in the quality of their work shortly after first smoking hashish, leading them to shoddy work habits and absenteeism, as well as petty crime and a general "atmosphere of tolerance, impunity, and even indifference to Komsomol workers, economic leaders, and social organizations."[60] To blame for this situation were the leaders in workplace and local Komsomol organizations, including the assistant organizational director of Enterprise No. 1. He professed to have no knowledge of a regional Komsomol resolution on the fight against *anasha* or the number of *narkomany* employed at the factory. One *komsomolets* (male Komsomol member) working there, a certain G., was arrested with 18 *bashei* of *anasha* and fired. After finding work elsewhere, he was caught again the

[58] It should be noted here that this focus on the practices of working youth partially mirrors the phenomenon Brian LaPierre discusses regarding attempts to stem worker-hooliganism through the promotion of cultured leisure at the workplace and holding managers responsible for violations occurring during their employees' free time. However, chronic underfunding meant that the sites of leisure often failed to fulfill their aim. LaPierre, "Redefining Deviance: Policing and Punishing Hooliganism in Khrushchev's Russia, 1953-1964."

[59] RGASPI f. 1-m, op. 1s, d. 405, ll. 10-11.

[60] RGASPI f. 1-m, op. 1s, d. 405, ll. 7-8.

following month with 21 *bashei*. During all of this, the authors allege that the factory Komsomol committee had full knowledge of G.'s activities, but "stood on the sidelines" and allowed the *militsiia* to take the lead.[61] The Saratov *militsiia* had arrested and prosecuted 62 individuals for distribution of narcotics between 1963 and 1965, seizing 34 kilograms of *anasha* and 3000 ampoules of morphine in the process.

Yet in his letter to Central Committee of the Komsomol from October 1965, Saratov oblast' Komsomol secretary Kochetkov emphasized only the successes had there in combating the spread of narcotics. Kochetkov states that in that year, Komsomol authorities had become acquainted with almost every user in the oblast' and that local *druzhiny* had stepped up their efforts on the streets and in the factories, resulting in numerous arrests, confiscations, and the shuttering of known sales points in local markets. Prophylactic work in the oblast' also improved, with the reading of around 200 lectures on the dangers of drugs, as well as intensive work within local Komsomol organizations to target *anasha* consumption. As a counter to the allure of drugs, recreational activities were to be sponsored in the form of camps for working youth and houses of culture with a variety of thematic clubs like amateur radio, sailing, aviation, and youth cinema were to be opened.[62] In other words, in response to criticisms of their failure to properly engage local youth, Saratov oblast' Komsomol organizations had attempted to activate the standard "carrot and stick" measures of the post-Stalin years—increased community policing and bombardment with Soviet culture. As a result of this reinvigorated approach, Kochetkov concludes his letter with a statistical report indicating that the number of active users

[61] RGASPI f. 1-m, op. 1s, d. 405, ll. 8-9.

[62] RGASPI f. 1-m, op. 1s, d. 405, ll. 71-74.

(*zanimiushikh narkomanei*) in his jurisdiction under the age of 25 declined from 531 to 446 between 1964 and 1965.[63]

These numbers certainly do not point to the whirlwind turnaround expected from the tone of his writing. They are also remarkably higher than the prosecution numbers cited above would indicate. For this reason, it is perhaps safe to assume that in dealing with youth offenders, authorities often chose not to mete out custodial punishments, but to discipline them in another manner. Kochetkov's experience in Saratov should not be considered unique. At the Orenburg tractor parts factory, two young male workers fell into similar patterns. Arriving to work dejected and agitated, the two were found to be under the influence of *anasha*. However, the factory Komsomol organization was said to have not looked into the matter of its members' drug usage—the extent of which only came to light months later when another of their members was arrested for selling *anasha* in the city.[64]

In linking young male factory workers with narcotics consumption, youth authorities reveal the ways in which these practices failed to live up to promulgated understandings of the New Soviet Man and commonly accepted masculine practices. While the party-state may have governed in the name of the worker, it did not seek to rule in his, at times unruly, image. Within the hierarchies of masculinities that developed after World War II, the position of the worker fell in status to a different set of various postwar heroes, such as the soldier, the scientist, and the cosmonaut.[65] The labor that acted as the basis of proving their masculine virility had been

[63] RGASPI f. 1-m, op. 1s, d. 405, l. 75.

[64] RGASPI f. 1-m, op. 1s, d. 666, l. 47.

[65] Fraser, "Masculinities in the Motherland." Fraser contends that in the visual iconography of the Cold War that these positions were filled by youthful, virile men.

culturally diminished, effectively marginalizing the worker within Soviet society.[66] Their decisions to dabble in *anasha* and other substances stood at odds with contemporary advice literature campaigns deploying male Soviet sporting heroes as exemplars of masculinity through healthy living, physical discipline, and steadfast devotion.[67] However, the behavior of these young workers should not necessarily be read as acts of resistance or deviance, but as selective departures from ascribed norms to fashion self-images and leisure activities outside the confines of the Komsomol. Within the context of expressed disillusionment with the Komsomol as the organizers of young life, the fact that the offenders above went for long periods without serious punishment suggests that they were not alone in their (at least partial) rejection of Komsomol values inside the ranks. Indeed, as Brian LaPierre noted in his study of hooliganism during this period, often the very activities that the anti-hooligan campaign sought to eradicate occurred in the leisure sites meant to combat them.[68] The growth of reported drug use over the 1960s suggests this to be a snowballing phenomenon, gaining speed at the same time that networks spreading narcotics inside Soviet space also appear to be expanding—providing accessible alternatives to official leisure practices for those that knew where to look.

Soviet authorities utilized the language of addiction freely, creating a concrete, singular image of drug use that failed to take into consideration any diversity in practices and the possibility of more recreational patterns. For this reason, much of the data available in Soviet

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[66] C.f. Connell, *Masculinities*, 54-55.

[67] For the athlete as a model of *kul'turnost*, see Julie Gilmour and Barbara Evans Clements, "'If You Want to Be Like Me, Train!': The Contradictions of Soviet Masculinity," in *Russian Masculinities in History and Culture*, 210–222. It is worth noting that athlete biographies at times were cleansed of inconvenient facts that did not correspond with these images of health and duty (such as struggles with alcohol or promiscuity).

[68] LaPierre, "Redefining Deviance," 66-68.

sources (published or otherwise) makes it difficult to flesh out details on the level of practice. The growing body of literature examining post-Soviet drug cultures suggests a great range in consumptive practices dependent on a variety of socio-economic, geographic, and generational factors. The ruptures created by the demise of the Soviet state certainly created new circumstances, but one lesson to be drawn from this work is that it would be prudent not to theorize the existence of a singular Soviet drug culture.[69]

Sources such as the letters discussed in the previous chapter are scarce. Inspired by the Khrushchev-era initiative aiming to provide medical treatment for alcoholism, the local prosecutor from Vichuga, A. Gorbunov, wrote to the Supreme Soviet in 1960 urging for the creation of similar measures for dealing with the specter of drugs in his town. Like other documents of the period, his letter indicates that Vichuga's working youth appeared to be particularly at risk to falling into patterns of habitual drug use—in this case, clinical painkillers like morphine, bromural, and luminal (perhaps legacies of the inabilities to successfully treat dependencies developed during, or as a result of, the war).[70] Gorbunov's language recalls the formulations used by other letter-writers concerning alcohol, as he refers to *narkomany* as "suffering" from their addictions (*stradaiushchii narkomaniei*). Their drug-addled condition compelled them to break into pharmacies or steal money in order to abate withdrawal symptoms.

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[69] Sociologists Hilary Pilkington and Elena Omel'chenko have produced a large body of work dealing with youth and drug practices in post-Soviet Russia. See, for example, Hilary Pilkington, "'For Us it is Normal': Exploring the 'Recreational' Use of Heroin in Russian Youth Cultural Practice," *Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics* 22, no. 1 (March 2006): 24–53; Hilary Pilkington, "Beyond 'Peer Pressure': Rethinking Drug Use and 'Youth Culture'," *International Journal of Drug Policy* 18 (2007): 213–224 and Elena Omel'chenko, "'You Can Tell By The Way They Talk': Analyzing the Language Young People in Russia Use to Talk About Drugs," *Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics* 22, no. 1 (March 2006): 54–72.

[70] GARF f. R-7523, op. 45, d. 351, ll. 106-107 as published in Zubkova and Zhukova, *Na "kraiu" sovetskogo obshchestva*, 253-255.

Urging authorities to consider a law that would forcibly treat *narkomany*, he writes: "In all other treatment cases, it is only with the consent of the patient and thus often does not achieve the desired results because when the desire for narcotics becomes great, the patient will often leave treatment."[71] As authorities placed a premium (at least rhetorically) on the elimination of drunkenness and associated maladies in their attempts to construct proper socialist living conditions, Gorbunov's letter recommends not overlooking the social harm wrought by *narkomaniia*. "Drug addiction is not a lesser evil than alcoholism and to it we must bring decisive action (*reshitel'nuiu bor'bu*).[72]

Examinations of memoirs and literary sources provide another angle to conceptualizing the roles played by drug consumption. Growing up on the rough-and-tumble streets of Syzran, a factory city in the Samara oblast', memoirist David Gurevich recalls occasionally smoking hashish with local toughs. However, unlike his classmate and paid protector Lyokha Beletsky, Gurevich was merely a traveler in this world, experimenting with *anasha* only in passing.

> I enjoyed getting high with Lyokha: the ritual of burning the sticky black paste, the stuffing of a cigarette, and, most of all his priestly mien as he went through these motions. But…we had little in common... A shared high did not make Shurik [ed: a feared local hood] and me friends: I was still an alien, a target for little barbs that could rip hostility open at any moment. With this strain, smoking was not much fun, and my 'addiction' did not last. On the other hand, my 'nice' friends would have had a seizure if I had suggested we pitch in for a joint. In retrospect, it was as if the whole town has seen *Reefer Madness*. Hash was the Devil's seed, but booze was another matter.[73]

Hashish consumption stood at odds with the values of Soviet society at large, but it did not render the user a dissident or oppositionist. Instead, for Syzran street toughs, *anasha* functioned

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[71] *Ibid*., 254.

[72] *Ibid*., 255.

[73] David Gurevich, *From Lenin to Lennon : A Memoir of Russia in the Sixties* (San Diego: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1991), 52.

as another tool of distinction in their arsenal, combining with their "their faces shaded by their hats' visors; their fake gold teeth; their spitting, aimed from between the teeth with firing-range accuracy; their hands-in-the-pockets stances; the cigarettes held between thumb and forefinger," to forge visible signs of a rough masculinity outside of hegemonic Soviet masculinity.[74] In this manner, narcotics could serve as a means of articulating a fluid identity, even while popularly derided as a socially alien practice.

Gurevich's ability to casually consume hashish while remaining within Soviet society suggests that its use did not automatically mark one as an outsider even if the practice itself remained well outside the bounds of official morality. One Saratov resident interviewed by Donald Raleigh echoed these sentiments, recalling *anasha* as widely available, cheap, and commonly smoked by the city's local toughs. "Marijuana grows everywhere. It's very widespread. They used to sell it for kopecks, and this meant that anyone could try it."[75] Not exclusively the provenance of outlaws, narcotic consumption in the Khrushchev era did provide a means of fashioning alternatives to the boredom of Soviet factory town life. A natural product of southern Russia's (and elsewhere) geography, *anasha* consumption held a variety of meanings. Tradition meant that it did not necessarily hold the same novelty as for the postwar generation of North America or Western Europe. Yet, at the same time, its consumption during the "long sixties" merged with global youth trends—whether or not individuals in Saratov and other Soviet locales were conscious of this fact.[76]

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[74] *Ibid*., 48.

[75] Donald J. Raleigh, *Soviet Baby Boomers: An Oral History of Russia's Cold War Generation* (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 126.

[76] Donald Raleigh's comparative analysis of Soviet "baby boomers" in both Moscow and Saratov suggests that the latter were not as likely to be aware of the global "hippie" culture in the

While official discourse often minimized the issue of drug use in Soviet society, it does make a fleeting appearance in one of the most popular works of 1960s youth prose—Vasilii Aksenov's *A Ticket to the Stars* (*Zvezdnyi bilet*).[77] Aksenov's Soviet Bildungsroman tells the story of a group of middle-strata Moscow teenagers making their way to the Estonian coast in order to experience a different life. Eventually they leave their bohemia for jobs at a local fishing collective. This narrative arc may appear to loosely fit in with accepted Soviet storytelling conventions, but the author's depiction of their non-conformist adventures breaks this mold. On the one hand, the protagonists of the story fit the mold of *stiliagi* through their love of Western jazz, dance, and clothing. On the other, their decision to abandon their beach idyll and mature into Soviet workers passes these interests off as the mere folly of youth. It is in this context that narcotics briefly appear in the story. When walking along the beach, Dimka encounters an old friend from his Moscow neighborhood, Peter Fram. In course of their greetings, the two make a few not-so-subtle references to drug use and dealing:

> He took Dimka's arm, led him aside and offered him a cigarette.
> 'Is it doctored?' Dimka inquired.
> 'Don't worry, I don't deal in that any longer. I'd rather have my health.'
> 'Ah, you are getting wise, Fram, wise and bald. Tell me, how old are you?'
> 'Just a quarter of a century.'
> 'A bit early to go bald, isn't it?'
> 'I indulged in some excesses during my youth, you know…But now that's all over and I intend to live closer to nature.'[78]

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same way that their Moscow counterparts may have been. Two primary factors created this situation: distance from breaking currents in cultural life due to its provincial location and its status as a closed city.

[77] Vasilii Aksenov, *A Ticket to the Stars*, trans. Andrew R. MacAndrew (New York: Signet, 1963). The original Russian edition was first published in 1961.

[78] *Ibid.*, 78. In the original text, Dimka asks if the cigarette is *chistaia*, which is more commonly translated as "clean" or "pure". It is difficult to ascertain the exact adulterant under discussion.

Not only does this brief exchange chalk up drug use to youthful indiscretion, it also presents the user as reformable—though not without some traces of the past in the form of lost physical beauty.

This was not the first time Aksenov had engaged in this line of reasoning. In a 1960 article written for *Literaturnaia gazeta,* Aksenov describes the trial of four university-aged Muscovites charged with selling stolen morphine.[79] The chain of events leading to their arrest began with Liudmila Voitenko, an 18-year-old employee at an alkaloid factory, who managed to steal a kilogram of morphine and doled out small quantities to her friend, Valerii Kaliuzhnii, over time. This distribution chain continued on, as Kaliuzhnii gave it to Valentina Fridman, who in turn, sold it at 35 rubles per gram to a man from Tbilisi with the three dividing up the profits. Aksenov did not dismiss these individuals as the spoiled scions of privilege. He instead points out that Kaliuzhnii grew up in a working-class family. Called to the center of Moscow by the seductive cries emitted from jazz clubs, this young proletarian became corrupted by his casual interactions with inhabitants of the city's demimonde (like Voitenko and Fridman). To save young people like him from similar falls, Aksenov urged Komsomol organizations to create youth clubs that would address a moral and aesthetic education for these "impoverished souls." As others have noted, it is difficult not to hear the author's own voice in each of these stories. Aksenov actively participated in the social milieus featured in his fiction and expressed a lifelong infatuation with jazz. His autobiographical *In Search of Melancholy Baby* (*V poiskakh grusnogo*

[79] Vasilii Aksenov, "Printsy, nishchie dukhom," *Literaturnaia gazeta* (September 17, 1960), 2. Aksenov's picture of the underworld departs from the much darker portrait painted by writer and filmmaker Yuri Brokhin. Brokhin's exposé of Soviet organized crime during the 1960s and 1970s links Fridman in with gambling and speculation rings run by gangland bosses with a penchant for violence. See Yuri Brokhin, *Hustling on Gorky Street: Sex and Crime in Russia Today*, trans. E. B. Kane and Yuri Brokhin (New York: Dial Press, 1975).

bebi), paints the author's youth spent as one of the *stiliagi* immersed in Moscow nightlife, of whom he wrote about in *A Ticket to the Stars* and elsewhere.[80]

These works portray drug use among Soviet youth in two different, yet overlapping, manners. In Gurevich's memoir, hash smoking serves as one of several tools of distinction available to those cultivating an image of rough masculinity and possibly living on the margins of society.[81] The theme of marginality returns in Aksenov's journalism and fiction, but here these practices exist within a fashionable demimonde at odds with Gurevich's street toughs. The role of location may lie at the heart of this difference. Aksenov's description of the 1960 trial also touches upon the relatively unexplored facet of women in Soviet drug cultures. Little is mentioned in the archival documentation examined in the course of this research about female drug users outside of the corrupting influence of *pritony* on young women, as authorities worried that intoxication would lead young Soviet women down a path leading to extramarital sexual relations, pregnancy, and ultimately prostitution.[82]

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[80] For a discussion of the nature of the autobiographical in his oeuvre, see Cynthia Simmons, "The Poetic Autobiographies of Vasilij Aksenov," *The Slavic and East European Journal* 40, no. 2 (Summer 1996): 309–323.

[81] This association between hashish consumption and elective marginalization also appears in the recollections of regulars of the Saigon coffeehouse in Leningrad during the Brezhnev years (even though cheap alcohol remained the drug of choice). Saigon served as a meeting place for members of Leningrad's diffuse bohemian milieu. See Elena Zdravomyslova, "Leningrad's Saigon: A Space of Negative Freedom," trans. Liv Bliss, *Russian Studies in History* 50, no. 1 (Summer 2011): 19–43.

[82] There is some discussion in the archival record of the perceived dangers of young women's contact with men (particularly of a sexual nature) who engaged in any sort of drinking and/or any hooligan activities was thought by these authorities to be poisonous, automatically resulting in their fall into marginalization and away from the officially acceptable behavioral patterns. This suggests that in within Soviet gender discourse what might be ideologically inappropriate for men could have impacts of greater severity for women. See, for example, RGASPI f. 1-m, op. 1s, d. 128, ll. 116-123.

The stigmatization of narcotics as socially alien to Soviet practices has resonances in contemporaneous, transnational anxieties over perceived drug problems. In West Germany, public fears over the rising number of drug-related crimes in the late-1960s and early-1970s associated this development with the recent appearance of the figure known as the "drop out" (*Gammler*). Typically a young male in his late teens or twenties, the "drop out" symbolically attacked socially accepted notions of hard work, cleanliness, and masculinity through his labor shirking and disheveled appearance crystallized in his long, shaggy hair. West German criminologists initially pointed to foreign presences such as African-American soldiers and guest workers as the source of illegal narcotics in the country. Belief that drugs would result in the disintegration of accepted mores effectively encoded these practices as antithetical to (West) German society.[83] These authorities also imbued the relationship between distributors and consumers with a racial/cultural dimension. Guest workers supposedly sold deadly narcotics to young German consumers, fuelling an on-going backlash against their presence in the Federal Republic.[84]

By the late 1960s, Komsomol-affiliated units specialized in combating narcotics were deployed in the major cities of Moscow, Leningrad, Tbilisi, and Kiev, as well as other high-risk areas with known drug problems. These units conducted regular raids to stop manufacture and distribution at known source points. Propaganda tactics shifted to not only address the connection between narcotic use and crime, but to also point out the detrimental effects on both one's health and on society in the form of antisocial, parasitical behavior. Moreover, authorities

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[83] Klaus Weinhauer, "The End of Certainties: Drug Consumption and Youth Delinquency in West Germany," in *Between Marx and Coca-Cola: Youth Cultures in Changing European Societies, 1960-1980*, ed. Axel Schildt and Detlef Siegfried (New York and Oxford: Berghahn, 2006), 376-397.

[84] Stephens, *Germans on Drugs*, 91.

began to understand the problem as one with the ways working youth spent their free time. One report from 1967 indicates that across the Soviet Union, the majority of *narkomany* entering treatment or who were sent to special facilities identified as workers and most were also under the age of 30. An increase in the numbers of young users prompted these measures—citing that in 1966 alone, more than 700 adolescent Muscovites had been detained in connection with drugs. Union-wide the number of *narkomany* was said to have increased by a factor of eight from 1956 to 1965 according the Ministry of Health. By then thousands in urban areas of the RSFSR appeared on police registers as known users—including 1597 in Moscow oblast', 2143 in Leningrad oblast', 2150 in Novosibirsk oblast', and 1053 in Kuibyshev oblast'. Over 11,000 *narkomany* appeared on police registers in the Turkmen SSR, roughly a 1000 each in both the Kazakh and Uzbek SSRs, and 393 in Kirghizia. In terms of concrete measures, a June 1964 Council of Ministers resolution outlawed the cultivation of certain potent cannabis varieties used in the production of hashish. This was followed a year later by a Central Committee resolution aiming to strengthen counter-narcotics work. Authorities worked to confiscate processed narcotic substances in ever-greater quantities throughout the mid-to-late 1960s. In Omsk oblast authorities seized 650kg of hashish, 75 liters of opium tincture, and 4kg of morphine from dealers in 1966. In the Kirghiz SSR, 931kg of raw opium and 2213kg of hashish were confiscated in the same year. However, in a sobering tone, this same report also states that while efforts were improving, the country was far from shutting down all the *pritony* and distribution points.[85]

Komsomol workers also took interest in the personal motivations for drug use. According to a declassified report from 1967, 1000 known users of narcotics in the Turkmen

[85] RGASPI f. 1-m, op. 1s, d. 666, ll. 43-53.

SSR were interviewed in order to elucidate the reasons for their turning to drugs. While the methods used to gather these statistics are unknown, they do provide a small glimpse into the world of Soviet drug culture. Nearly a third indicated that their usage began as a result of treatment for an injury or illness. Twenty-two percent (the second largest segment) stated that they first began using drugs as a result of casual encounters within their social circles or at parties (*v restul'tate sluchainogo znakomstva v kompaniiakh i na vecherinkakh*). A tenth of the respondents attributed their use to practices within their family. Amongst the surveyed group, the most common substances consumed were opium and various medicinal preparations such as morphine and codeine.[86] Even if the Turkmen case cannot be directly applied to the Soviet Union as a whole (particularly due to the prominence of opiate use displayed here), the citing of mismanaged medical treatment or use within certain social networks as the two driving motivations does link it in with similar narratives found elsewhere.

In September 1972, these heightened anti-narcotics efforts received codification by the passage of a Russian Republic Supreme Soviet resolution mandating special medical treatment for drug users. Those evading treatment procedures or persisting in their usage of drugs now would receive a penalty of one-to-two years in a labor re-education center where they would also undergo medical treatment. A May 1974 Supreme Soviet resolution furthered these efforts through the institution of stricter judicial penalties for various crimes associated with the drug trade. Possession, manufacture, distribution, or sale of illegal narcotics now carried a jail sentence of up to 10 years (with the term rising potentially up to 15 years for repeat offenders). Cultivation of opium poppies and certain varieties of hemp could also result in a five-year

[86] RGASPI f. 1-m, op. 1s, d. 666, ll. 44-45. Other responses included "to lift their spirits" (7%), in prison (5%), and due to family or work troubles (2%).

sentence. Those playing host to a *priton* or introducing others to narcotics were now subject to a five-to-ten year sentence for the former and up to 5 years for the latter.

Hedrick Smith, a longtime foreign correspondent for the *New York Times*, recalled that Soviet authorities redoubled counter-narcotics efforts in the 1970s also through stiffening the penalties imposed on distributors and repeat offenders. In his conversations with physicians, he noted that rampant bribery of medical practitioners and laboratory assistants facilitated the channeling of pharmaceutical-grade narcotics into illegal trading rings. This assertion is supported by archival documentation reporting the abuse of fraudulent prescriptions in increasing the supply of drugs in underground markets.[87] Scientists in Moscow even synthesized LSD, causing a scandal in 1972 at the Institute for Natural Compounds—though the authorities kept this story out of the press, even as it occasionally circulated at fashionable parties in the city.[88]

Treating *Narkomany*: Medicine and the Body

As seen in the previous chapter, Soviet authorities treaded a fine line between treatment and punishment for substance abusers. Comparatively narcotics use and abuse received less attention

[87] See, for example, RGASPI f. 1-m, op. 1s, d. 666, l. 46.

[88] Hedrick Smith, *The Russians* (New York: Ballantine, 1976), 238-239. The use of psychoactive drugs occasionally appeared in tandem with occultist and mystical practices as gateways to physical and spiritual transformation within secretive intelligentsia circles. For Iurii Mamleev's Moscow-based *Iuzhinskii pereulok* group, drugs, alcohol and sex fueled explorations of the dark side of human existence in rituals that one historian has likened to Aleister Crowley's infamous "Golden Dawn." While little is known about Mamleev's group, its membership included at various times other influential members of the Soviet occultist underground. On the relationship between drugs and mysticism, see Birgit Menzel, "Occult and Esoteric Movements in Russia from the 1960s to the 1980s," in *The New Age of Russia: Occult and Esoteric Dimensions*, ed. Birgit Menzel, Michael Hagemeister, and Bernice Glatzer Rosenthal (Munich and Berlin: Verlag Otto Sagner, 2012), 151-185.

from both policymakers and researchers than alcoholism. Decades of Soviet power had supposedly significantly reduced narcotics usage by transforming popular morality and expanding medical services. Soviet medical literature of the period typically focuses on contemporary conditions in capitalist countries as fostering drug addiction. At the same time, cases in the Soviet Union are de-emphasized, touting the state's measures in bringing about its near-elimination. According to psychiatrist V. V. Borinevich, drug addiction could still be encountered as a "persistent vestige of the past in some Central Asian republics."[89] As evidenced above, by the 1950s and 1960s, claims that the revolution had totally swept away these kinds of social maladies received qualification within official rhetoric. Some Soviet researchers admitted in professional publications that a marginal group of users still existed, but claimed that their number continued (and would continue) to shrink. For this reason, alcoholism still occupied the most prominent place in the narcology literature. Researchers interested in studying non-alcohol related instances of *narkomaniia* faced significant barriers. Some only received permission to proceed with their studies if they accepted that their results would not appear in print, effectively chilling publication on the topic—particularly in open use volumes.[90]

Early Soviet authorities endeavored to eradicate substance abuse and vice as an emblem of the revolution's transformational power. Soviet hygienists perhaps represented the most radical tendencies of all branches of state power in their plans to cleanse daily life of backwardness and vestiges of the capitalist order. A network of surveillance technologies sought to permeate everyday life and encourage new ways of healthy living thought to not only improve

[89] V. V. Borinevich, *Narkomanii: Klinika, patogenez i lechenie morfinizma, kodeinizma, opiomanii i drugikh opiinyx narkomanii.* (Moskva, 1963), 4-5.

[90] On this point, see Alisher Latypov, "On the Road to 'H': Narcotic Drugs in Soviet Central Asia," *Central Asia Research Paper* no. 1 (August 2012): 1-35.

human existence, but also demonstrate political reliability. Expanded medical care acted as the lynchpin of these projects by creating a system of facilities for treatment, recovery, and cultured relaxation. Planners' aims vastly exceeded their reach—particularly in the provinces and non-Russian republics due to a lack of funds and other material impediments. For narcotics users and addicts, the institution of the *narcodispanser* (outpatient clinic) provided medical care in order to relieve them of their afflictions. These facilities existed within a medico-judicial complex that also utilized a combination of labor and medicine to treatment addicts within the walls of the *profilaktoriia*.[91]

I. V. Strel'chuk's multi-edition text, *Klinika i lechenie narkomanii* (*The Diagnosis and Treatment of Addiction*) stands as a classic of Soviet medical research into the question of alcohol and drug addiction. In addition to a thorough discussion of the somatic effects of alcohol and best practices in treatment, Strel'chuk also briefly covers the symptoms of morphine, hashish, and other narcotic use.[92] Much of his research was carried out in the prewar period, though later editions updated the literature and included new findings. Discussion of morphine addiction makes up the largest non-alcohol related section of the text. Strel'chuk linked a great deal of morphine abuse to the clinic, as injured or ill patients developed an attraction toward the drug in the course of their treatment and independently continued use. Others in his care began using due to the influence of their comrades or as a result of their own desires. Consumption quickly progressed from experiential euphoria to psychosis and dependency, resulting in the total degradation of the individual. "Already the first injection, either due to imitation, curiosity, or a

[91] For more on the role of social hygiene in revolutionary Russia, see Tricia Starks, *The Body Soviet: Propaganda, Hygiene, and the Revolutionary State* (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 2008).

[92] I. V. Strel'chuk, *Klinika i lechenie narkomanii*, 3rd ed. (Moskva: Medgiz, 1956).

doctor's orders, arouses their desires for the artificial euphoria brought on by the drug."[93] Strel'chuk's analysis of the bodily harm caused by morphine addiction cited various maladies caused by individual injections, resulting in infections, the creation of abscesses in the user's skin, and other visible markers of drug abuse. Graphic images accompanying the text leave little to the imagination, presenting the male body in an emaciated, broken state covered in the lesions and other visible signs of the violence of drugs. More abstractly, habitual morphine (or opium) use resulted in declining physical strength, memory loss, and mental illness. While earlier Soviet physicians had written of these types of effects, postwar medicine began to study and understand withdrawal (*abstinentnyi sindrom*) as a serious condition necessitating certain measures and care. Withdrawal symptoms contributed not only to a user's addictive cycle, but also presented problems in administering medical treatment.[94] The effects resulted in both psychological and physical disturbances making care difficult, as well as potentially perilous. Even so, it was imperative not to give in to the patients' requests for a substitute narcotic. Other medicinal preparations were dispensed in the course of treatment, providing not only an effective, but also "humane" (*gumannyi*) means of ridding the user of their desires.

For Strel'chuk, success depended on a lengthy course of medical treatment in a specialized facility. "The success of treatment depends on the length of the patient's stay in the treatment facility and the method of treatment. We are deeply convinced of the fact that poor results in the treatment of morphine addicts (*morfinistov*), like with alcoholics, stems from an insufficient term of treatment. The longer treatment lasts, the greater chance of recovery. We

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[93] *Ibid*., 263.

[94] Mary Schaeffer Conroy argues that this amounts to one of the few substantive changes in medical approaches to narcotics' addiction among Soviet specialists in mid-20th century. See Conroy, "Abuse of Drugs."

believe that the minimum length of treatment for a morphine addict is six months because only this amount of time eliminates the disturbance in [the patient's] neurodynamics (*v neirodinamike*)."[95] But even this lengthy hospital stay did not totally complete the process of reforming the addict. Medical treatment might alleviate physical withdrawal, but lingering desires and frustrations could still lead the addict back into old habits, therefore necessitating changes in the patient's living and working conditions. Regardless, Strel'chuk remained confident that sustained medical therapy provided the key to transforming drug addicts—going as far as to state, "the pessimism that exists on this question lacks sufficient grounds."[96] He took a holistic approach to treating *narkomany*, detailing a prescribed proper diet for recovery, caloric intake, and mechanisms to prevent relapse.[97] Recovering patients were to continue visiting a specialist after discharge for at least two years in order to guarantee the success of the cure. The pervasive tendency to view hashish as a less serious drug carried over in Strel'chuk's assessment of treatment measures. Habitual usage developed slower than that of opiates, though psychological disturbances marked the transition to abuse of the drug. Lacking the kind of withdrawal symptoms associated with opiates and alcohol, hashish users did not require the same overly invasive therapies to relieve them of their habits.

Like Strel'chuk, V. V. Borinevich restricts his analysis of *narkomaniia* to the realm of the clinic. Citing the less than 200 patients under treatment for opiate abuse and addiction in Turkmen medical and psychiatric facilities "over the years" (*v techenie piada let*), Borinevich's

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[95] Strel'chuk, *Klinika i lechenie narkomanii*, 271.

[96] *Ibid*., 272.

[97] Strel'chuk recommends a diet consisting of soups, vegetable purees, chicken, milk, strong coffee, vitamin-rich juices, and sweets. Daily rations were to consist of no fewer than 4000 calories. Upon discharge from the treatment facility, familial supervision and labor were believed to be strong enough forces to help prevent a return to use.

numbers minimize the spread of drug use in the area.[98] In identifying Central Asia as the primary site of domestic narcotics abuse, this presentation of such small figures provides evidence to support oft-repeated claims that *narkomaniia* no longer existed as a serious social problem in the Soviet Union. Like Strel'chuk, Borinevich's study draws heavily on foreign texts and largely displaces drug use/abuse as endemic to Western bourgeois societies. His approach critiques a tendency in foreign scholarship to credit attraction to narcotics to the presence of psychological disturbances. Borinevich instead argues that while some individuals suffering from mental illness or depression may be drawn to narcotics, social factors play a significant role in drug use. Earlier Soviet medical literature on *narkomaniia* typically emphasized certain social factors and unhygienic living conditions as attracting individuals to drug use rather than the presence of psychological illnesses. Social hygienists of the 1920s most exemplify this tendency by associating domestic disorder and uncleanliness as catalysts of (typically male) substance abuse.[99] Borinevich's work departs from this earlier account due to consideration of other factors, yet he still privileges social conditions as key to understanding and explanation drug use and addiction. Accordingly, he concludes that this is why young drug addicts were (supposedly) so rarely met in Soviet Central Asia by the 1960s. Under the modernizing gaze of Soviet biopower the social influences contributing to the spread of opiate addiction had been swept away, thus limiting patient ranks to long-time users consumed by past traditions.[100]

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[98] Borinevich, *Narkomanii*, 11. The breakdown of patients is as follows: 142 for opium addiction, 31 for morphine abuse, 17 for codeine addiction, and 6 for promedol abuse.

[99] Starks, *The Body Soviet*.

[100] As an openly-accessibly medical publication, the validity of these two statements should be questioned. Pressure to present drug use as a waning or nearly non-existent phenomenon in this literature means that claims on patient numbers are not necessarily accurate.

Like Strel'chuk, Borinevich's sample size is rather small. The role of the "high" (*eiforii*) in creating addicts, rather than existing psychological illness, acts as a central component of his investigation. Of the 108 patients in this study, the numbers are split evenly as to whether or not their first experience with opium produced a euphoric state.[101] In exploring attraction and the effects of opium on individuals, Borinevich's text presents short individual case histories that provide a window into the lives of his patients. These texts must be understood as a product of clinic built upon unreliable patient interviews and mediated through the diagnostic gaze of the physician. At best these case histories provide a means of understanding the ways Soviet physicians and researchers at the time approached their subjects and how they diagnosed and cataloged their conditions. With information scarce as to individual practices at this time, they do provide a small glimpse into this subject when read with care.

Twenty-eight year-old patient Kh.'s story of addiction depicts how a young man who typically played by the rules of Soviet life succumbed to opium's allure. He first smoked opium in his mid-twenties at a friend's suggestion during holiday celebrations. The drug created a feeling of all-encompassing warmth and "everything around him became unusually sweet and pleasant—music, conservations with comrades, faces—everything appeared radiant and serene."[102] Concerns about work or his home disappeared, leaving only tranquility. Prior to this day, he claimed to have studied well as a child, worked conscientiously on geological expeditions, engaged in social work, and did not experience any serious psychological maladies or psychological disturbances. However, according to the case presented in the text, patient Kh. soon began to consume opium two-to-three times weekly and then daily in order to return to the

[101] Borinevich, *Narkomanii*, 20-22. Fifty-seven (52.8%) patients said that they experienced a "high" their first time, while 51 (47.2%) did not.

[102] *Ibid*., 22.

state of mind he experienced the first time. After a month or so of this behavior, his daily ritual shifted to smoking every morning before heading to work. It is at this time that certain noticeable changes in his character surfaced, rendering this once conscious worker lazy and inattentive. Instead of achieving his sought after high, he now consumed opium daily simply to "return to normal."[103] It was this point that he went to an outpatient clinic (*dispanser*) on his own volition in order to end his addiction.

While patient Kh. is said to have actively chased after the euphoric state reached on his first experience with opium, the other half of Borinevich's cases expressed different motivations. Instead of a blissful high, they felt lightheaded or sick. Borinevich cites certain social pressures as causing these individuals to continue their consumption of opium despite the negative effects. One case details a patient that first encountered opium in the form of *ter'iak* (a traditional medical preparation containing opium), given to him by a fellow soldier during his time in the army as a remedy for his reoccurring colds. The effects of the drug repulsed Patient K. Kh., yet its supposedly curative powers encouraged him to continue use. Prior to this introduction, he had dutifully cared for his ailing mother, bringing home a large portion of his monthly pay to support her. Self-medication soon resulted in full-blown addiction as consumption of *ter'iak* shifted to smoking opium to abate his cravings. Already fraught relations with wife further soured as he took up with another woman that supplied him with more opium. As time passed, continued drug use changed Patient K. Kh.—exemplified in his failing to care for his mother and daughter, leaving the latter to drop out of her studies. After his mother's intervention he entered treatment. In a similar vein, another patient in Borinevich's study started consuming opium in order to ward off morning hangovers caused by his alcoholism. In this case, the drug created an adversity to

[103] *Ibid*., 23.

alcohol, though ultimately shifting addiction from one vice to another. Once addicted to opium, the patient felt an intense physical revulsion whenever he consumed alcohol. From this case, Borinevich argues that generally speaking, alcohol did not pave a path to narcotics use—an idea circulating in Soviet medical thought since the 1920s.[104]

None of the cases presented by these researchers consider the possibility of a more casual path of drug consumption. Instead, debilitating addiction is treated as the inevitable consequence of use. For Soviet authorities, proclaiming addiction's looming specter rendered the use of narcotics (particularly of the "hard" variety described here) absolutely deviant and poisonously corruptive. By presenting no possible alternate path of use, medical and psychiatric authorities closed off the chance narcotics could be understood as an alternative leisure practice. Narcotics use meant abuse and therefore was inherently alien to Soviet society. Pessimism existed in official quarters as to the ability for medical treatment to fully restore the addict. Reporting on drug use in Alma-Ata, the teacher A. G. Luk'ianenko wrote, "Even if narcotic addiction can be overcome by medical treatment, repairing the degradation of the individual is not always possible. The user will always remain mentally disabled. As the Indian proverb goes, action creates a habit, a habit creates character, and character creates destiny."[105]

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As this chapter has demonstrated, narcotics use in the 1950s and 1960s cannot be reduced to a single set of practices or meanings. The kind of recreational marijuana use seen in the West merged with traditional practices from Central Asia and the Caucasus that eluded the narrow category of *narkoman* deployed by Soviet judicial and medical authorities. Similarity in usage

[104] *Ibid*., 24-25, 32-35.

[105] RGASPI f. 1-m, op. 1, d. 133, l. 9.

patterns, though, does not necessarily equate to participate in global hippiedom or other transnational youth cultures of the sixties. Some women did consume narcotics, but both drug consumption and trafficking more typically afforded men the ability to craft a rough masculinity that did not mesh well with existing tenets of Communist morality. For traffickers and dealers, the narcotics business provided a means of accumulating wealth on the margins of the Soviet economy—an activity in which they were certainly not alone. The second economy played an essential function in supplying Soviet citizens with deficit goods throughout the seventy-odd years of the country's existence. During the post-Stalinist years, a combination of increasing incomes and state-promoted consumerism amid material deficits served to further embed these practices into the fabric of daily life. By adding narcotics traffic into this picture, we expand our understandings of the multitude of desires under socialism and the means by which the state reacted and grappled with their fulfillment. Finally, reevaluation of the motivations underlying narcotics consumption among Soviet youth shine light on the ambiguous nature of engaging in unofficial leisure practices that cannot be simply reduced into a dichotomous framework of compliance/dissent.

Since news of Soviet drug use and trafficking typically stayed out of the press, archival documentation detailing arrests, confiscations, and other anti-narcotics activity revives these lost fragments of the past. The mid-1960s crackdown on use corresponds directly with official changes in youth policy "from above." Drug use certainly informed growing concerns over the (mis)behavior of Soviet youth among Komsomol authorities, even if it may not have topped the list. From this vantage point, official initiatives to more forcibly deal with the problem of youth *narkomany* are part and parcel of a return to top-down mechanisms within the Komsomol to manage youthful deviance within Soviet society, becoming ever more acute after the 1968

Czechoslovak crisis that would herald the end of many of the liberalizing efforts undertaken during Khrushchev-era de-Stalinization campaigns.

While this is only a start in probing the local, national, and transnational realities of drug production, trade, and consumption in the Soviet Union, the use of recently declassified archival material allows entrance into the fears and anxieties of Soviet officials never publically shared. As declassification of sensitive materials in archives throughout the former Soviet space continues, opportunities increase for the probing of local and regional specificities of usage and trade patterns and thus further de-centering understandings of Soviet socialism. This story of young men on the margins and the drug trade demonstrates another way in which consumption during late socialism served as a central tool in their self-fashioning. This theme outside of the realm of vice will be continued in the next chapter.

CHAPTER THREE:

Mod and the Modern Man: Clothing Practices and the Soviet Male Consumer

"Clothing is the general index of a person's cultural level."
- N. Kofman (1957)[1]

"The most important thing in our clothing is that it must correspond to time and to place. There is one type for the factory or office. Another for paying visits or going to the theater. And a third for playing sports."
- G. Dubrovskaia and N. Maksimenko (1961)[2]

Almost as soon as his plane touched down on the Tashkent runway in late 1961, veteran journalist Harrison Salisbury noted the transformed environs surrounding him. A longtime Russian correspondent for the *New York Times*, this was hardly his first visit to the Soviet Union. The "ancient Asian mud hovels" he reportedly encountered on a previous trip to Soviet Central Asia in the early 1950s were nowhere to be found. Instead, a modern city appeared before his eyes, complete with "a new modernistic railroad station to replace the sooty train shed…new movie houses and in the great central square before the Navoi Opera House a huge new hotel in a faithful imitation of the grandiose architecture which Stalin's bad taste made standard."[3] To occupy this transformed landscape, the modern Soviet man shed what Salisbury perceived as a marker of backwardness, embracing "better clothing (the tie and the white shirt, I saw, had

[1] N. Kofman, "Garderov devushki," *Zhurnal mod* (Winter 1957), 40ob. Henceforth, *Zhurnal mod* will be abbreviated as *ZM*.

[2] G. Dubrovskaia and N. Maksimenko, "Vy u sebia doma," *ZM* (Summer 1961), prilozhenie.

[3] Harrison E. Salisbury, *A New Russia?* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1975), 7-8. The text was first published in 1962.

finally conquered the Russian male)."[4] Excluding the orientalist assumptions in his prose, the question remains as to when, exactly, this sartorial revolution took place.

The two preceding chapters of this dissertation examined the relationships between masculinity and consumption through the lens of substance abuse. Efforts to curb alcohol and narcotics abuse functioned dualistically in this manner, charting both a mass phenomenon (in the former) and socially marginal practice (in the latter). In this chapter, the site of investigation shifts to that of material consumption, and in particular, male clothing practices and socialist fashion. The arrival of technologies meant to manage the appearance of men during this time further served to sand off their rough edges, transforming them into visibly appropriate inhabitants of a changing state. As this chapter will demonstrate through the process of a detailed excavation of Soviet menswear in the 1950s and 1960s, the purposeful cultivation of fashion served as a means of reshaping the attitudes and behaviors of men during this period of systemic transformation—even if at first glance, men's designs appear a mere footnote to this period of history. Fashion authorities used advice on how to dress as a means of expanding the power of contemporary design onto male bodies, opening Soviet men up to the modernizing gaze of socialist consumption.

The suit-and-tie image of a cultivated masculinity is not, contrary to the insistent messages of advertisers, truly timeless. Indeed, it is not even timelessly masculine. Instead, symbolic meanings of clothing practices exist as socially constructed phenomena. As art historian Anne Hollander argues, the suit exists as a quintessentially modern garment, expressing

[4] *Ibid*., 9. The italics are mine.

unity, coherence and the "formal authority of modern practical design."[5] Born out of an artistic embrace of neo-classical principles in the late-eighteenth and early-nineteen centuries, modern men's tailoring represented a break from Rococo frills and embellishments. Over the course of the following centuries, certain details and cultural meanings associated with suiting would change, but the general forms persisted. This type of tailoring aims to effect the natural, allowing for unencumbered mobility without disturbing the flow of the costuming. When movement periodically ceases, well-positioned folds return the suit to its original state. "All of this combines an invincible harmony of independent design with ease of use and a true echo of underlying bodily shape and action," writes Hollander. "It is universally flattering, because it does not insist on specific bodily detail. It reflects the modern [a]esthetic principles that were conceived out of Neo-classic aspirations in the late eighteenth century, just like modern democratic impulses…propos[ing] an ideal of self-perpetuating order, flexible and almost infinitely variable."[6]

Male encounters with material consumption, particularly when of a vestimentary nature, remained a fractured arena during Europe's modern era, as participation and indulgence could quickly slip into a netherworld of social exclusion. Even with the growing popularity of men's magazines at the fin-de-siècle, the world of dress presented many obstacles to readers. Advice columnists policed the line between acceptably masculine and effete practices—the latter

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[5] Anne Hollander, *Sex and Suits: The Evolution of Modern Dress* (New York: Kodansha International, 1994), 5. The comment applies to an entire genre of men's tailoring and not just suiting as such. Hollander also considers men's fashion to be historically more trendsetting and less conservative than women's fashions. Modern men's tailoring, born out of neo-classicism sought a new form of dress, whereas women's fashions still were governed by old rules of dress emphasizing a "variegated display"—creating a lasting separation in form between men and women. The decline of the prominence of the suit in much of the contemporary world has served to partially close this gap.

[6] *Ibid*., 9.

realized in the personage of the dandy.[7] When perceived to be excessive by the standards of the day, this mode of dress historically connoted dandyism, thus impugning the wearer's claims to masculinity. Dandyism in the Russian context may have originated as early at the start of the eighteenth century. Leading fashion historian Ol'ga Vainshtein locates the cultivation of aristocratic sartorial habits in Peter I's clothing reforms that brought European-style dress to the Russian empire, mandating certain types of outfits on specific days, as well as bringing bright colors to men's garments. The prototypical Russian fop of the eighteenth century, Prince Kurakin, kept an elaborate wardrobe and rumor has it that he possessed a matching snuffbox for each outfit. By the age of Catherine, the model of the dandy or fop drifted out of the ranks of the nobility down to the members of mid-level social stations seeking to use a conspicuously aristocratic manner of dress as a means of symbolic elevation. In doing so, these *petimetry* broke with patriarchal norms mandating restrained dress for men, thus perilously positioning their own claims on masculinity.[8]

Following in the wake of the revolution and civil war, the early Soviet state typically looked scornfully upon the frivolity of fashion, associating its non-utilitarian forms and embellishments as inherently bourgeois in nature. At the same time, a new generation of artists endeavored to set the foundation for clothing practices fit for a post-revolutionary world. Soviet

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[7] Even so, as argued by Justin Bengry, the intended message of the dandy's alterity could be subverted by queered readings of the texts and images. While magazines such as the interwar British publication *Men Only* ostensibly produced scathing portraits of the effeminate male clothed in excessive fashions, the use of "subtle code, images, and doublespeak" resulted in the cultivation of a secondary audience seeking out advice on these outsider practices. See the author's "Courting the Pink Pound: Men Only and the Queer Consumer, 1935-39," *History Workshop Journal* 68 (Autumn 2009): 122–148.

[8] Ol'ga Vainshtein, "Russian Dandyism: Constructing a Man of Fashion," in *Russian Masculinities in History and Culture*, 51–75; *idem*, *Dendy: Moda, literatura, stil' zhizni* (Moskva: Novoe Literaturnoe Obozreniie, 2006).

design historian T. Strizhenova asserts that prior to 1917, mass production of clothing barely existed in Russia with only three-percent of total output coming from mechanized industry and the rest sewn by traditional methods in handicraft (*kustarnyi*) shops. The mass devastation wrought by civil war and the difficult path toward industrialization meant that a fully mechanized textiles industry would not emerge until the mid-1930s. Even so, desire to act in this arena did not idly await these technological advances. Acclaimed designer Nadezhda Lamanova organized a workshop at the beginning 1919 in order to utilize design as a means of bringing enlightenment to the masses via an aesthetic revolution. That same year the first school for training individuals in textiles and design geared toward producing rationalized, purposeful clothing for the masses opened in the Sokol district of Moscow. Bolsheviks saw in clothing a powerful site for transformation, merging symbols of economics, culture, hygiene, and political loyalty.[9]

Artists from various groups presented a range of programs seeking to transform the Soviet aesthetic landscape throughout the 1920s and thus materializing the revolutionary zeitgeist through an emphasis on functionality and practicality in dress. Mass clothing, according to their schemes, departed from the old unhygienic and physically constricting forms in order to free the body for a full range of movements necessary for work and other activities. Constructivist designers in particular sought to bring geometric abstraction to clothing design as a means of starting from scratch and eliminating gender separation that rendered women's bodies a site of flamboyant decoration and overt sexuality. Both an underdeveloped infrastructure for mass production and NEP culture tempered their aims, leaving these ambitious plans ultimately

[9] T. Strizhenova, *Iz istorii sovetskogo kostiuma* (Moskva: Sovetskii khudozhnik, 1972). The author characterizes pre-revolutionary textiles production as prominently that of "feudal manufacturing."

unrealized.[10] The political fissures wrought by NEP placed fashion in a precarious position, as popular associations with the loathed figure of the "nepman" rendered even Lamanova's radical reinventions suspect.[11] Their experiments with mass clothing functioned in a vacuum as the majority of the country still went about in their traditional manner.

Moscow's Central House of Clothing Design would open in 1934 under the leadership of Nadezhda Makarova, a former student of Lamanova. This same year witnessed the arrival of a number of Soviet luxuries. This opening symbolized, along with Soviet champagne, the first victories of socialism in creating a better life for all with attendant material provisions, as well as more directly a revived interest in fashionable clothing. As before, the change occurred more in the realm of ideology rather than any directly accessible arena. For high-ranking members of the party-state bureaucracy, though, the good life was already at hand. Their positions of privilege afforded access to luxurious items of both foreign and domestic provenance.[12] From this first center for fashion design would eventually spring a network of studios, workshops, and sales points with branches in major cities throughout the country.[13] Soviet fashion did not exist under the authority of a single industrial body. Instead, a number of diverse institutions, such as the

[10] Even if the economic realities of the 1920s in the Soviet Union hindered their ability to reinvent fashion for a mass socialist audience, these ideas functioned as a template for the postwar socialist countries of East-Central Europe. See Djurdja Bartlett, *FashionEast: The Spectre That Haunted Socialism* (Cambridge, MA and London: MIT Press, 2010).

[11] Sergey Zhuravlev and Jukka Gronow, "Krasota pod kontrolem gosudarstva: osobennosti i etapi stanovlennia sovetskoi mody," *The Soviet and Post-Soviet Review* 32, no. 1 (2005): 1–92. Lamanova would ultimately spend a few months in prison as a "class enemy" in the late 1920s.

[12] At the time of his arrest in 1937, NKVD chief Genrikh Iagoda's personal wardrobe included 22 suits, 21 coats, and a number of dress shirts and ties—the majority of which were from foreign manufacturers. Other personal items included over a thousand bottles of rare wines, a video camera, as well as additional luxuries. See *Ibid.*, 23.

[13] For a brief overview of shopping in the Soviet Union, see Marshall I. Goldman, "Retailing in the Soviet Union," *Journal of Marketing* 24, no. 4 (April 1960): 9–15.

Ministry of Light Industry, the Ministry of Trade, the Ministry of Everyday Services and others handled various facets. Decentralized authority lent a certain degree of independence to designers and other fashion workers.[14] For the purposes of this chapter, however, the focus will be on the ways in which fashion discourse operated to shape understandings of male consumption and how these messages were received and negotiated. Dressing beautifully, yet simply, became enshrined in the logics of Stalinist *kul'turnost*—serving as a mechanism for visibly raising the cultural level of the population. Persistent shortages in mass-produced clothes meant that much of the work fell to tailors working either independently or in an affiliated workshop to fill orders, and thus often circumventing the plans of modernizing designers.

Something resembling a Soviet fashion industry had existed since the mid-1930s, but only during the post-Stalin years did the economy begin to adequately address the question of mass provisioning of material goods—particularly in the realm of clothing.[15] As discussed above, the suit did not suddenly appear in Russia during this time. Indeed, Lenin's modest European dress (i.e. suit and tie) could be seen in portraits and on statues everywhere. Mass exhortations to adopt these principles of male dress, however, marked a symbolic departure from the image of the worker and warrior to one of comparative refinement that would be comfortable in the postwar Soviet Union.

The personage of the *stiliaga* looms large in the cultural imaginary as an emblem of the consuming male subject under socialism. An object of scorn or mockery, the *stiliaga* stood out less for his characteristic interest in Western material culture than for his apparent frivolity and violations of Soviet etiquette and regimes of taste. In the historiography, the *stiliaga* returns as

[14] Sergey Zhuravlev and Jukka Gronow, "Fashion Design at GUM, the State Department Store at Moscow," *Baltic Worlds* 3, no. 2 (June 2010): 28–33.

[15] Zhuravlev and Gronow, "Krasota pod kontrolem gosudarstva," 12.

the quintessential male consumer and follower of fashion under socialism (or more often, as was the case in Soviet periodicals, fashion victim). Feverish pursuit of deficit goods and ostentatious self-fashioning forged a powerfully singular image, though one marked with deviance and thus suggestive of the dandy's socially dangerous liminality. Yet, *stiliagi* were not alone in world of men's fashion. As will be argued below, the Soviet fashion industry cultivated a refined sense of masculine elegance centered on the suit and other elements of bourgeois men's tailoring. Advice literature promoted men's development of good taste in clothing by instructing them on the proper type of dress for every occasion. Contrary to clichés about an abundance of dull grey and beige in the Soviet urban landscape, domestically produced fashion literature contained bright splashes of color and sporty designs. Short of the "parrot"-like display of the *stiliaga*, the average male consumer was urged to dress the part for his modern surroundings.

From the Pages of the Soviet Fashion Press: Style Authorities and Tastemakers

"Why are there so few designs for men in fashion journals and how should a man dress?" inquiring readers in the mid-1950s asked the editors of Moscow-based *Zhurnal mod*, the leading Soviet journal for fashion and clothing design. One reader from Severoural'sk asked for advice as to the appropriate occasions for wearing a suit and when to wear tie or a vest. The journal's editorial staff responded in the Winter 1956 issue with a brief piece updating the public as to contemporary trends in men's clothing and provided various style tips. "Recently, forms in men's suiting have softened (*stala bolee miagkoi*)—jackets are now narrower and shorter, pants are narrow without constraining movement. According to this year's fashion, pants can be cuffed (up to five centimeters) or uncuffed. The vest is again an integral part of the suit and can be of a different fabric than the suit or the same. Popular colors for men's clothes are beige,

grey, dark blue, and green."[16] The bodies of Soviet men were to be clothed in fashionably cut clothing, made from seasonably appropriate fabrics colored with an eye toward style—at least discursively.

Men were not typically the primary recipients of this kind of advice. The nascent fashion industry in the Soviet Union typically targeted women as both the consumers of the designs and as the audience for their lifestyle-shaping advice and bodily surveillance. The overwhelming majority of fashion coverage in specialized publications such as *Zhurnal mod* depicted female models of all ages and answered letters from women about how to dress for various occasions and how to clothe their children. Rather than act as a sales catalogue, the journal typically used artistic sketches early on to "bring to the reader characteristic features of existing fashion trends, develop clothing culture, and inculcate love for contemporary clothing, and not just for decoration, but also for the organized individual."[17] Clothing advice also served as a means of disciplining errant bodies. In the words of editor and designer S. Razumovskaia, "We wish to remind our readers that beautiful clothing obliges women to monitor their gait and gestures. We Soviet women do not sufficiently consider this."[18] Dressing in style seismically affected the entire body, forcing it to comply with and match the beauty of the outfit with graceful movements and flattering postures. Moreover, according to Ol'ga Vainshtein, women's fashions emphasized above all modesty and moderation. Women's magazines such as *Rabotnitsa*

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[16] "Muzhskoi modelei," *ZM* (Winter 1956), 38-39. It is worth mentioning that another reader wrote a letter to the journal's editorial staff with a similar complaint in 1962. Indeed, as noted elsewhere in this chapter, the Soviet press did tend to focus on women's designs and styles. See *ZM* (Spring 1962), 2.

[17] S. Razumovskaia, "Ob izobrazitel'nom iazkie zhurnala," *ZM* (Autumn 1957), 41.

[18] *Ibid*.

(Worker Woman) and *Krest'ianka* (Peasant Woman) instructed readers to cultivate a stylish appearance, but only to a point—avoiding excess at all costs.

Soviet style authorities delineated clear dictums about what to wear for certain occasions, espousing a vision of a unique Soviet fashion system.[19] Overdressing for work, for example, in heavy makeup or eye-catching jewelry fit for an evening out violated these rules (and in the circumstance described, popularly connoted sexual availability according to these same writers). Items such as the plain black skirt illustrated a different side to these principles—namely that of reusability. Ownership of this one item allowed the individual to craft a theoretically endless number of outfits by simply changing their top. Reusability thus also helped solve the equation of fitting fashion's in-built obsolescence into the planned economy by simultaneously encouraging consumption and frugality.[20] This type of disciplining did not pertain solely to the Soviet context, evidenced by the fact that related foreign advice literature also appeared in translation. For example, a translation of article by the Swedish author Elsa Hagdahl entitled, "Dress Smartly" appeared as a supplement in one issue of *Zhurnal mod*. Hagdahl listed ten maxims for women's dress that roughly corresponded with those of Soviet style authorities, including "be clean and proper," "follow general fashion rules and do not get caught up in high

[19] On the institutional genesis of postwar Soviet fashion, see Zhuravlev and Gronow, "Krasota pod kontrolem gosudarstva," 29-45.

[20] Ol'ga Vainshtein, "Female Fashion, Soviet Style: Bodies of Ideology," in *Russia Women Culture*, ed. Helena Goscilo and Beth Holmgren (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1996), 64–93.

fashion," "be able to combine the beautiful with the practical," and "above all, have good taste."[21]

Rectifying fashion and luxury under socialism had at least as much to do with ideology as with the realities of the planned economy. The ability to produce an endless stream of varied, complicated pieces simply did not exist. Plans guided production and in order to fulfill these plans, factory authorities preferred to repeatedly use static designs. But style authorities found workarounds for this problem. Simple, relatively stable designs such as the black skirt discussed above were well suited to mass production. For other types of clothing, designers standardized individual pieces suited for recombination in order to produce some of the variations seen in periodicals or in films. This emphasis on simple, replicable designs did not only stem from industrial concerns. As designer and style authority Liudmila Efremova wrote in 1960, "If you examine the changes in fashion during the last decade, you must agree that they are logical and have moved toward easier and more modern forms. Clothes have become simpler and more respondent to today's understandings of beauty and harmony and the surrounding environment—with smooth lines and an absence of bulky, absurd styling."[22]

State retail outlets sold ready-to-wear assortments, though a combination of high prices and limited supply acted as a significant barrier to the would-be consumer. On the other end of the spectrum, tailors in department store ateliers crafted garments to measure. Produced either from patterns circulated in magazines or as original creations, these workshops and individual tailors functioned as a means of satisfying desires incompatible with the planned economy.

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[21] El'sa Khagdal' (Elsa Hagdahl), "Umenie odevat'sia," trans. N. Ul'ianova, *ZM* (Spring 1958), prilozhenie, pp. 1-4. Additional parts to this text were published as supplements in the other three issues released in 1958.

[22] Ludmila Konstantinova Efremova, *O kul'ture odezhdy* (Moskva: Gosudarstvennoe izdatel'stvo "Iskusstvo," 1960), 28.

However, the home persisted as the most common manufacturing site for clothing. Printed patterns and sewing instructions accompanied fashion texts, serving as a reminder of the shortages of the command economy. Seated at the sewing machine, *haute couture* dreams met the banality of the everyday.

Zhurnal mod's editorial staff clearly considered fashion advice to function within the larger social project of acculturation. While Hagdahl's supplement focused explicitly on dress etiquette, the following year the journal serialized I. Kokh's "On Cultured Behavior" which framed fashion within the context of *vospitanie*, proper manners and social practice. Kokh's series focused on questions such as how to hold one's hands, when and when not to sit down, how to mind one's speech, and various questions about proper hygienic practices, as well as social etiquette in a number of common scenarios.[23] Elsewhere, the journal's staff listed "battling middlebrow tastes" as an essential task in promoting good, socialist attitudes toward material culture.[24]

Despite the historiographic concentration on women's clothing practices, men also appeared in the pages of the Soviet fashion press decked out in modern designs corresponding to the changing seasons and whims of tastemakers. Furthermore, even if the majority of fashion-related texts considered clothing (and consumption more broadly) to fall within the scope of the

[23] I. Kokh, "O kul'ture povedeniia," *ZM* (Winter 1959), prilozhenie, pp. 1-4. This is a four-part series appearing in each issue for 1959.

[24] A. Chekalov, "O stil'e," *ZM* (Spring 1959), 1. Svetlana Boym's cultural excavation of the term *meshchanstvo* that posits that Soviet authorities inherited the pre-revolutionary Russian intelligentsia's opposition to all things "middle-class" or "middlebrow" informs my interpretation here. See her *Common Places: Mythologies of Everyday Life in Russia* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994), esp. p. 66-73.

feminine, this does not eliminate other readings.[25] For the most part, during the 1950s and 1960s, Soviet menswear designers kept to a relatively conservative image. They outfitted their sketched models in two- and three-buttoned suits, sports coats, ties, and other menswear articles common to European and North American societies of the time. But even if these images did not appear as exciting as their female counterparts, the fashion press still acted as an instrument of acculturation and disciplinary technology—subtly shaping men's practices to fit in the modern world under construction around them.

Soviet fashion designers and writers carefully advised men not only on what to wear, but when and how to wear it. Individual pieces functioned in concert with one another as an ensemble, each with an intended use. There were outfits for work and those for play—as well as a range of items that fit somewhere along this spectrum.[26] The types of clothing worn for these occasions could be broken down even further depending on the nature of labor or leisure activity. For industrial work, the designers offered functional clothing suited for the factory floor. For a typical day at the office (*v uchrezhdenii*), they insisted instead on the primacy of the suit, complete with a dress shirt and a tie. The elements of the proper varied within certain general guidelines. This environment necessitated muted colors that did not "stand out" (*ne markikh tonov*), typically with a single-breasted wool coat in a thick-woven fabric that could be one-,

[25] Sociologist Olga Gurova contends that general messages about the role of fashion in everyday life were often gender-neutral in their context, even if the consumption of fashion remained gendered feminine in the Soviet Union during the mid-20th century. For a brief discussion of this issue, see her "The Art of Dressing: Body, Gender, and Discourse on Fashion in Soviet Russia in the 1950s and 1960s," in *The Fabric of Cultures: Fashion, Identity, and Globalization,* ed. Eugenia Paulicelli and Hazel Clark (London and New York: Routledge, 2009), 73–91.

[26] Gurova makes a related claim that for style authorities knowing how to dress intrinsically meant understanding the way to properly dress for an occasion. Strict rules existed for attire in regard to the setting and purpose. *Ibid.,* 84-86.

two-, or three-buttoned. The cut of the coat sleeves should be just long enough to reveal the shirt cuffs. Underneath should be worn a shirt in a solid complementary color other than white with either a solid or patterned tie. The consumer also had the option of wearing a velvet coat in dark brown, grey, blue, or green. Outside the office designers recommended other types of suits. The "leisure suit" (*vykhodnii kostium*) offered a more "distinguished" (*otlichaetsia strogost'iu form*) variant and typically could be differentiated from its workplace cousin in 1956 by its double-breasted jacket and narrow, cuff-less trousers. For special or formal occasions, designers instructed the reader to wear a tuxedo (*smoking*) in either black or dark blue with a starched white shirt and bowtie. Above all, stylemakers insisted on balance in a man's wardrobe as "the stylistic unity of a man's clothes is reached by having the right mix of individual items so that they create harmony and are pleasing to the eye."[27] In short, a man's fashion sense could not be lifted off the racks and brought up to the counter for purchase. Instead, it required crafting and cultivation. The discerning eyes of designers and style writers intervened to provide seasonally updated advice to ensure this desired harmonic balance, shaping male consumer attitudes and behaviors through the technologies of printed media and thus engaging Soviet men as material consumers and targets of modernizing, lifestyle-shaping advice.

Style authorities reiterated this formula for proper men's attire—emphasizing that suiting should reflect a "collected" and "elegant" image.[28] The words, "Contemporary, Elegant, Comfortable" sat atop the masthead of an Autumn 1958 spread—intoning these concepts as a mantra.[29] At the same time, dark colors and well-made fabrics reinforced this image of

[27] *Op. cit.*, "Muzhskoi modelei."
[28] A. Kuglichev, "Nastupaet ocen'," *ZM* (Autumn 1958), 1.
[29] "Sovremmeno, elegantno, udobno," *ZM* (Autumn 1958), 20-21.

refinement. A variety of outfits could produce this desired image. Depending on the occasion, the wearer could select from a jacket-and-slacks combination, patterned suits, or tuxedos. Fashionable accessories, like seasonable hats, cigarettes, and various reading materials furthered the idea of a distinctly masculine type of elegance. As much of men's attire consisted of establishing an ensemble from individual pieces, style authorities sought to educate men as to how to best achieve modern and appropriate looks. According to one article from 1960, the first step when selecting an item should be establishing the suitability of such an item for conditions such the weather or the wearer's age or shape. Next one considered the proportions of the item and how it fit into the overall outfit. They cautioned that just because something was thought to be fashionable that did not mean that it should automatically be worn. Finally, a consideration had to be made for color and how various pieces fit together within a color palette.[30]

Style authorities did not limit their efforts to solely the workingman's suit or eveningwear. The Winter 1955 issue of *Zhurnal mod* featured a set of four items under the heading of "pajamas" (*pizhami*) each with a slightly different function. Unlike the other suits and work-wear depicted in the pages of the journal, these housecoats and robes sought to bring a fashionable, modern appearance to men inside their home life—a task that the author considered a priority, stating that "this type of clothing is a necessity for every man."[31] Artists encoded messages about gender roles in the home in their depictions of home clothing. While displaying the various garments under question, designers also drew a newspaper or book in the model's hand—indicating an edifying leisure activity. On the other hand, women's domestic clothing designs often incorporated the apron or placed women in poses suggestive of cleaning, cooking,

[30] D. Glagolev, "Eto reshaet ansembl'," *ZM* (Winter 1960), 35.

[31] L. Kramarenko, "Pizhami," *ZM* (Winter 1955), 11.

or some other kind of domestic labor. The juxtaposition of these contrasting images gendered the home as site of work for women and rest for men—reproducing the concept of the "double burden." (See Figure 1) Returning from work or leisure, a housecoat made from a light fabric and of "free" fit provided the Soviet man a garment fit for his modern surroundings with a touch of elegance. During the winter, men's clothes for the home also included heavier-weight sweaters and vests. In both instances, the emphasis remained on producing leisurely comfort. Yet, this vision of luxurious domesticity still had to meet the demands of the planned economy, a reality noted by the author who acknowledged that the artists employed in the All-Union House of Fashion (*Obshchesoiuz dom modelei*) were working to tailor their designs for mass production in order to ensure availability. But, this kind of luxury had its place. The author warned: "However beautiful and elegant these pajamas may be, they must never be confused with the clothes one wears outside of the home."[32]

[32] *Ibid.*

Figure 1: "For the Home," *ZM* (Winter 1958), 27.
For interpretation of the references to color in this and all other figures, the reader is referred to the electronic version of this dissertation.

As the tempo of housing construction quickened in the early 1960s, so did the need for stylish housewear. One essay from 1961 on how to furnish modern apartments concludes with a section on the dress of its inhabitants. It begins by first setting the scene of arrival. "You receive your new apartment and all is in order. It is clean and cozy. Soon after arrival, you are in a good mood. But how does this new caretaker (*khoziaika*) look in her home? She's in an old housecoat, with un-styled hair, and in worn-out slippers."[33] The authors point out the sharp contrast between this well-dressed woman when at work, yet in the modern setting of her new

[33] Dubrovskaia and Maksimenko, "Vy u sebia doma," *op. cit.* The translation of the term "caretaker" here serves to identify the special relationship Soviet tenants had to their apartments. Rather than private owners, they were granted apartments from the state with an understanding that they were to maintain the property.

apartment, she reverts to an unkempt state. As identified above, changing clothes after returning from work remained necessary. Yet, the domestic setting still required a certain attentiveness to dress. For men this meant wearing a special housecoat over their pajamas for lounging. The language deployed in this article and elsewhere makes it clear that residents in modern apartment blocks had a duty to match and uphold the beauty of their settings—underwritten here by style authorities as an essential component in the caretaker role assigned to occupants.

Luckily for readers, style authorities also provided instruction on the appropriate men's clothing for leaving the house. Asserting that, "for the contemporary man, it is difficult to be completely indifferent to sport, whether as a sportsman or fan," designers presented the sports suit.[34] Where suits for professional settings or formal occasions required darker, muted fabrics and shades, the components of the sport suit deployed vibrant, bright colors like greens, yellows, and reds—though in some instances, designers featured the sports suit in "for work" spreads. Taking its influence from the world of sport, the upper part of the coat provided a looser fit in order to allow for a greater range of movement and then tapered downward. The accompanying design calls to mind the "V-shape" of the athlete's body with its broad shoulders and slim waist. Widened lapels stylistically balanced out this extra room in the coat. The wearer could choose a complementarily colored or patterned shirt to accompany this suit. The pants matched the fabric of the coat, but in a contrasting color. The less formal nature of this outfit also allowed for a greater range of choices in footwear such as sandals, moccasins, or boots as long as they fit the season. Three different models accompanied the text, each wearing a different variation corresponding to the general principles outlined in the text. One, referred to as the "poly-sport

[34] A. Chermenykh and L. Lalemina, "Sovremennyi muzhskoi kostiumy," *ZM* (Spring 1956), 34-35.

type," further incorporated features such as snap-buttons on the sleeves and waist of the coat, displayed in bold red wool fabric that did not taper in the waist.

Summer of that year brought a more casual set of principles for menswear. Men's summer suits utilized lighter fabrics such as a heavy cotton or silk. Shirts featured a wide range of colors and patterns. Casual occasions called for an unbuttoned shirt collar or the possible replacement of a tie with a scarf. One model presented in the Summer 1956 of *Zhurnal mod* clearly demonstrates this easy-going image. Rather than a suit coat, the model wears an unzipped collarless beige jacket and an open-collared orange-checked shirt tucked in to creased brown slacks. The bouquet carried in his right hand while leisurely tucking the other into his jacket pocket suggests that he awaits the arrival of a date (or that he may be in en route to a party). This telling accessory provides instruction on not only what to wear for the summer, but specially also subtly indicates standards of masculine comportment in courting rituals. Another wears a light-colored suit of summer-weight wool and carries an unlit cigarette in one hand and an open cigarette case in another, compounding the image of seasonal stylishness with luxury and smoking.[35] Flowers, cigarettes, and other symbolic items carried clues to the reader as the relationship between fashion and behavior. In this manner, the simple act of learning to dress carried with it other information molding behaviors and attitudes toward material consumption.

Soviet designers in the mid-1950s also conjured up outfits specifically for sport and leisure. Indeed, clothing for sport played an essential role in fashion coverage and appeared in nearly every issue. Advice on the appropriate attire for various leisure activities served multiple ends. Outside of the express purpose of informing readers how to dress, it also functioned to promote messages of public health and fitness by encouraging readers to explore local parks in

[35] "Letnie kostiumy," *ZM* (Summer 1956), 6-7.

the summer or go skiing in the winter. These images bolstered certain consumptive visions as well, as both the sketched and photographed models often carried articles of luxury and modern consumer technology. The importance of this sport clothing to the Soviet fashion industry can be seen in the prominent position given to it in competitions where it constituted a separate category for judging.[36]

"When going down the road, who among us has not thought about an outfit (*kostium*) for the journey?" one 1956 article inquired. The authors recommended that clothing for going on an excursion should be "quite simple in cut, modest in decoration, free in movement, and of a plain color and made from heavy cotton or coarse wool depending on the season." What this meant for men is that a wide number of options existed that could fit under this rubric, though only jackets made from cotton or wool were specifically mentioned. The model shown in the background is shown in a loose-fitting cotton outfit of dark red. Additional pockets had been sewn into both the shirt and the pants presumably in order to carry needed items for a hike or walk in the woods.[37] Another variation indicated that this type of attire "not only served as morning dress (*uterennyi tualet*), but was also for the beach or sanitarium park."[38] Depictions of these "road outfits" (*dorozhnyi kostium*) often featured a passenger car in the background, suggesting the

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[36] See for example, V. Arlova, "Itogi konkurs," *ZM* (Summer 1956), 16-28. Arlova provides coverage of the 1955 competition in which the top prize for a sports collection was 2000 rubles—the same monetary amount as given to the designer of the best collection of "everyday" clothing (*bytovoi odezhdi*). Estonian designer M. Ia. Kaarma's collection "Daily Wear" (*Na kazhdyi den'*) won first place.

[37] "Letnye kostium," *ZM* (Summer 1956), 9. Recommendations for women in this essay were more specific. For a road trip, the authors recommended dresses and skirts worn with jackets of varying lengths. Pants of varying lengths were also appropriate and were "especially good-looking for tall, slender women." The ways in which style authorities categorized bodies and clothing will be discussed below.

[38] "Na otdykhe," *ZM* (Summer 1956), 33. In the accompanying image, the man is reading a newspaper and thus suggestive of cultured leisure.

potential accessibility of more individualized modes of travel.[39] Rather than the crowded metro car or the bus, these visions of touring the Soviet countryside in a personal automobile (and the appropriate clothes to do so) speak to changing consumer expectations and options, as well as directly addressing members of the Soviet elite. The repeated appearance of the car in spreads depicting clothes "for travel" or "the road" intend these journeys to be of an internal nature and not of the international jet-setting typically found in fashion publications originating from Western Europe or the United States.

Even if persistent shortages and low wages meant that off-the-rack fashion remained out of the hands of the majority, these images of plenty still located their visions within the realm of the possible. A country trip remained feasible for many, even if one could not wear the latest fashions while doing so. Subtle promotion of a leisurely stroll served the ends of encouraging edifying recreation and physical invigoration—both central to the party-state's aims in building a strong and healthy citizenry through physical culture. In other scenarios, models stood in front of framed artwork, suggestive of a day spent walking through Moscow's Tretiakov Gallery adorned in finery. These images featured both men and women in semi-formal dress posed with serious expressions indicative of the event as a special occasion. In this manner, the fashion pressed promoted a version of cultured leisure that incorporated material and cultural modes of consumption. For those lucky (or well-connected) enough to secure visas for foreign travel, style authorities recommended packing a suitcase with a variety of items—including a colorful jacket and light pants for sunny days, a two-piece suit for weekends and evenings, a sweater and coat

[39] For other examples of *dorozhnie kostiumy* and other clothing for travel, see: *ZM* (Summer 1957), 26-27 and "Sport putishestviia," *ZM* (Autumn 1957), 38-39.

for inclement weather, and pajamas for the hotel.[40] "*Malyi turizm*"—an embrace of the outdoors that promoted the exploration of the natural landscape—existed as another alternative for recreation. Like others forms of travel, it also came bundled with its own style principles and gear. Style authorities suggested more rugged outfits appropriate for the comfort in the outdoors and equipped with a number of pockets useful in carrying needed items for a trip into the woods or along a mountain trail. Other "necessary details" included loose-fitting trousers that narrowed in the leg.[41] These features on tourism-related outfitting shared not only style information, but suggested related consumptive activity accompanying leisure activity. Both sets of activities subtly instructed readers in proper recreation activities—encouraging both domestic travel and the exploration of the Soviet landscape closer at hand. These activities also necessitated proper comportment and requisite consumptive activities, such as the acquisition of specialized equipment for hiking or a personal car for more distant travel plans.

Style authorities also brought their modernizing message to bear on industrial clothing and other garments intended for manual labor, seeking to transform the realm of work through a symbolic makeover—and thus employing a broad definition of fashionable apparel perhaps unrecognizable to Western designers. Emphasizing propriety and novelty, these clothes extended the properly attired and clean-cut image of the Soviet man into the factory. "Clothing for work must meet the characteristics of modern industry, technology, and equipment. It is important that it is not only comfortable, but also beautiful. Sloppy clothes are incompatible with the Soviet people's attitude toward labor."[42] This did not mean that a total re-conception of

[40] V. Arlova, "V turichestkoi poezdke," *ZM* (Summer 1958), 41.

[41] "Po turistikim tropam," *ZM* (Spring 1961), 36-37.

[42] "Udobno i krasivo," *ZM* (Autumn 1959), 35.

factory and work clothes had occurred. Rather, designers sought to update coveralls and protective suits with an eye toward their cut, as well as improving (in their words) their "elegance." Innovative fibers technology provided a means of fulfilling these aims. Along these lines, artists designed uniforms for urban service workers, such as taxi drivers, metro conductors, and doormen. These designs sought to visually organize their presence in the city, "making them an integral part of the modern urban ensemble and modern architecture."[43] A similar claim can also be made regarding style authorities design and selection of special outfits for youth engaged in summer agricultural labor on nearby *kolkhozy* and *sovkhozy*. Even for farmers, clothing could capture a distinctly modern sense of beauty and purpose when working in the fields.[44]

Menswear also appeared at the annual international fashion competition held to celebrate garment design and production throughout the Eastern Bloc. Overshadowed in both quantity of designs and press coverage by women's clothing, extraordinary artisanship in executing everyday suits and formal wear still drew applause. At the 1956 congress, representatives from the design world celebrated examples of luxury created in fraternal socialist nations—praising in particular East German garment workers for their "carefully crafted and impeccably tailored"

[43] S. Kheiker, "Zavodov, kolkhozov, stroek," *ZM* (Winter 1959), 30-31. Kheiker indicated at the end of this article that technological advances had not caught up with designers' ambitions as they "waited on the textiles industry for new fabrics that could be used to combine beauty, design, and functionality." On socialist urban planning in the 1960s, see Elke Beyer, "Planning for Mobility: Designing City Centers and New Towns in the USSR and the GDR in the 1960s," in *The Socialist Car: Automobility in the Eastern Bloc*, by Lewis H. Siegelbaum (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2011), 71–91.

[44] Under Khrushchev's leadership, school curricula of the late 1950s and early 1960s emphasized practical knowledge in the form of cultivating agricultural and technological skills. Summer farming trips for young urbanites served as the hands-on component of this education. See, for example, Medvedev and Medvedev, *Khrushchev*, 143-145. For related fashion advice for working on the *kolkhoz* during summer break, see D. Glagolev, "Devushkam i iunosham," *ZM* (Summer 1964), 29.

suits and singling out the Progress factory's tuxedos in terms of craftsmanship.[45] In comparison with other socialist nations, East Germany stood head and shoulders above the others in textile production and design. The advanced state of the GDR's chemical industry facilitated their ability to turn out superior synthetic fabrics for use in a range of consumer applications.

Fashion houses from capitalist countries presented different challenges. A 1958 article by Liudmila Efremova, entitled "What is Parisian Fashion and How Do the Women of Paris Dress?" served at least two ends for readers.[46] On one hand, it broadly answered the titular question and thus provided information on a topic that few could approach first hand. On the other, it subtly demonstrated the systemic differences between socialist and capitalist conceptions of fashion. French fashion could be divided into two general categories—*haute couture* which advanced ideas about fashion as an art form and clothes meant for everyday wear and popular consumption. The clothes worn in the famed Paris fashion shows typically fell into the former category and thus were not typically available in stores, as in the author's words, "their general task is the export of fashion ideas." The women of Paris instead dressed modestly. "On the streets of Paris, we saw not one woman dressed in the latest fashion," wrote Efremova. Runway clothes were impractical and exaggerated, not to mention to quickly dated. The average French woman supposedly resembled her Soviet counterpart—often sewing her own dresses and seeking propriety. This commentary clearly suggested that the Soviet garment industry did not deprive individuals of fashionable clothes. On the contrary, it endeavored to fulfill the same needs as those women living in the ostensible fashion capital of the world. While this message

[45] R. Timchenko, "VI Mezhdunarodnyi Konkurs," *ZM* (Spring 1956), 36-41. On the East German fashion industry, see Judd Stitziel, *Fashioning Socialism: Clothing, Politics and Consumer Culture in East Germany* (Oxford and New York: Berg, 2005).

[46] L. Efremova, "Chto takoe Parizhaia moda i kak odevaet'sa zhenschiny Parizha?," *ZM* (Autumn 1958), 24-25.

directly concerned women, it has similar implications for menswear—namely in the realm of material production. Soviet industry managed to keep up the pace in terms of producing fresh, modern items (even if not in sufficient quantities). Yet, as Larissa Zakharova has demonstrated, Soviet designs did seek inspiration from Western fashion houses. Party-state officials authorized informational exchanges as a means of benefitting from Western experience and technological advances. The design house of Christian Dior held the most visible influence in this regard, as evidenced by press coverage and the June 1959 Moscow exhibition of their clothing attended by tens of thousands. Dior's design principles crept into Soviet mass production. Their famed "New Look" quickly became orthodox for the design of women's dresses during the early 1960s.[47]

Men's designs received periodic updates and minor stylistic changes over the course of the 1950s and 1960s. While the clothes tended to fit into the categories discussed above, stylistic elements, such as fabrics, weaves, colors, collar shapes, and button number and placement, underwent reworking. Often these changes arrived in the Soviet Union from designers working elsewhere in the Eastern Bloc. A 1958 report from the eighth international fashion congress unveiled both men's suits and leisure clothing with sharper lines and made from new fabrics featuring bold checks (and other designs) for the spring predominately from the GDR.[48] One article from Spring 1959 acknowledged that change in men's fashions occurred more rarely than for women, yet still existed. Showcasing examples from the recent fashion congress in Bucharest, two bold designs were introduced featuring thick horizontal stripes and checks.

[47] In an unpublished report, Efremova is less critical of Parisian *haute couture* than in the article described above, instead praising Christian Dior's design abilities and stating that Soviet artists could stand to learn from them. See Larissa Zakharova, "Dior in Moscow: A Taste for Luxury in Soviet Fashion Under Khrushchev," in *Pleasures in Socialism*, 95-119.

[48] D. Glagolev, "O muzhskoi odezhde," *ZM* (Spring 1958), 10-11.

Designs now sought to achieve a "more natural figure" by removing cotton padding in order to provide a truer silhouette. This also meant the shortening of jacket lengths by 1-2 cm and the narrowing of trouser legs. These shifts also marked a slight widening of available colors in menswear. In addition to the traditional black, deep blues were incorporated into eveningwear. New models featuring these principles were shown at the recent international fashion congress in light greys and browns. Accompanying color palettes utilized a wide range of earth tones, as well shades of blue and purple. "For modern fashion, the characteristics are: complex and soft, collected and not clashing, no bright or flashy colors."[49] Another update from Winter 1959-1960 stated, "The general features of modern clothing—simplicity, a defined silhouette, laconicism, soft lines—are to be found in men's clothing."[50] Other details, such as the width and color of ties, changed periodically over the years.

If Paris functioned as the citadel of women's fashion, for menswear (perhaps unsurprisingly) Soviet style authorities looked to London. Unlike most features in *Zhurnal mod*, British menswear received top billing in a story about a trip to London in the fall of 1961. Liudmila Efremova marveled at the apparent uniformity of dress among the British male population, as many could be seen in dark grey suits with "rather small waists and not overly narrow trousers that create the characteristic silhouette of 'reasonably dressed' London." The ubiquity of white-collar workers in black coats and grey trousers carrying umbrellas were particularly impressive. Her assessment of women's clothing did not favor as well, remarking that Parisiennes typically turned out in a more elegant manner than Londoners.[51] Savile Row-

[49] D. Glagolev, "Novoe v muzhskoi odezhde," *ZM* (Spring 1959), 20-21.
[50] S. Kheiker, "Muzhskaia odezhda," *ZM* (Winter 1959), 19.
[51] L. Efremova, "Na ulitsakh Londona: letom 1961 goda," *ZM* (Spring 1962), 31-32.

inspired tailoring entered into Soviet fashion via the work of Polish designers in 1962. Their suits incorporated narrow trousers and generally favored a tighter, form-following fit—and represented, by the standards of the day, a significant leap in men's fashions.[52] Eastern Bloc fashion houses incorporated these general principles into their menswear in the early-to-mid 1960s while each following their own artistic visions. The occasional presence of the so-called "ticket pocket" on men's suit jackets during this period also reflects the influence of British tailoring on Soviet and Eastern Bloc menswear. Others mentioned the characteristic fussiness of "London dandies [who] sometimes spend an entire day selecting a necktie." Rather than a dismissal of these habits, this comment conveyed the importance of the tie for men's suits—a task that is "not easy, but rather the full manifestation of an individual's taste." A single tie would not suffice. Instead, the journal encouraged men to engage in the consumption of these items, as regular wear would result in a "loss of form and freshness" even as they followed other style dictums.[53]

Artist D. Glagolev also made pronouncements on the required holdings of a man's wardrobe. Above all he needed an everyday suit with two or three buttons, crafted from a wool or wool blend. To stay up with the style of the day, the suit should have narrow lapels and form-fitting trousers. After purchasing this everyday suit, the next necessary item was that of an evening suit in a "more expensive and dressy fabric" worn with a white shirt, coordinating waistcoast, and black leather-soled shoes. A sporting-style suit was also recommended "not only for youth, but also the middle-aged" in either a bright solid color or multicolored pattern. Spring and fall weather required a demi-season coat, as well as a light cotton suit for summer. Domestic

[52] D. Glagolev, "Poiski prodolzhaiutsia," *ZM* (Fall 1962), 16-19.

[53] V. Martynova, "Galstuk," *ZM* (Winter 1962), 38.

settings called for the home wear discussed above, identified here as a loose jacket and pants.[54] Here the emphasis is not on acquiring an endless number of items, but carefully selecting a functional wardrobe in keeping with contemporary style principles and suitability. As men's fashions received only minor updates from year-to-year, purchasing a suit or two would be sufficient for the average man as long as he took proper care. For Efremova, a well-cut "evening suit" could last in a man's wardrobe for two or three years without going out of style. "Fashion in men's clothing is more stable, but that does not mean that one can be hasty and utilize an outdated style."[55] In 1963, L. Slapak expanded Glagolev's wardrobe recommendations, increasing the number of items deemed essential for the Soviet male urbanite. Spalak's vision of the ideal male consumer envisioned possession of a "demi-season coat, an evening suit, two suits for work, one or two pairs of trousers, a number of shirts and ties, two-three pairs of shoes, and an overcoat."[56] Potential holdings did not end there, but Spalak's list served as a guide to everyday essentials.

These purchasing recommendations functioned to activate male consumer desires, encouraging the Soviet man to go out and buy the right kind of clothing to cultivate an individual style. Glagolev's writings also praised attentiveness and concern in regard to a man's dress. Removing the negative stigma associated with such dandy-like behavior, the well-dressed and cultured Soviet man carefully selected his clothes and understood how to do so. As discussed above, senses of occasion and propriety largely guided this process. But others details remained vital. In one essay on men's shirts from 1961, Glagolev criticized haphazard approaches to

[54] Glagolev, "Novoe v muzhskoi odezhde".

[55] Efremova, *O kul'ture odezhdy*, 54.

[56] L. Spalak, "Muzhskaia odezhda," *ZM* (Summer 1963), 37.

selecting a shirt to go with an outfit. He argued instead that the shirt played the most significant role, as it most expressed an individual's distinctive characteristics.[57] The summer's heat further emphasized this definitive role of the shirt as the wearer shed heavier outer layers. Glagolev's article underlined the variety of options available to men, pointing to a wide variety of fits, colors, and fabrics from which to select their summer look. This type of article not only provided instruction, but also functioned as an advertisement for the development of Soviet consumer industries suggesting evermore variety and availability. It also subtly implicated Soviet men in these new consumer utopias by simultaneously berating their traditional approaches to self-fashioning and providing a bounty from which to now do so in the appropriate manner. "Fabric assortments have widened. Here, they have been infiltrated by printed ornamental designs, which in the past were not considered masculine. Take, for example, the famous 'Indian cucumber' or polka dots."[58] Much of this expansion continued to stem from Eastern European imports, as Estonian, Czech, and other fraternal socialist design houses featured prominently in the accompanying models. In expanding the available options, style authorities thus also gently reformulated relationships between design and gender. But in this command fashion environment, these modifications did not risk forging the threatening liminality of the dandy by instead subtly rewriting the gendered scripts of dress.

[57] D. Glagolev, "Muzhskaia rubashka," *ZM* (Summer 1961), 33.

[58] *Ibid*. The "Indian cucumber" pattern referred to by Glagolev resembles a paisley design.

Categorizing Bodies Through Clothing

Like the women's bodies discussed by Ol'ga Vainshtein, clothes for Soviet men underwent a similar process of categorization.[59] Designers and tastemakers identified certain types of clothing to fit the bodies of larger-sized men. Nearly every design published in *Zhurnal mod* came with an advisory comment specifying recommended sizes. This process reflects a desire not only to categorize the bodies of women, but all Soviet individuals, whether it be by age, size, body shape, or other metrics. For men with heavier and larger frames, clothing of a boxy, flowing cut served to cloak and conceal their bodies. While suits often carried limited sizing recommendations (often between size 46 and 52), garments such as a "free-flowing men's blouse" (*svobodnaia muzhskaia blusa*) lacked such, suggesting appropriateness for man of any size. As mentioned in the previous chapter, athletic prowess remained a hallmark of official understandings of masculinity during this period. Bodies that fell outside of this framework necessitated concealment from public view. The degree of categorization did not quite match that exerted on women. No designs created specifically for middle-aged or elderly men surfaced in the course of research, but authorities did make occasional recommendations as to what these individuals should wear.[60] For men's clothing, the primary distinction was between designs meant for children, youth, or adults.

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[59] Vainshtein argues that "plump women" in particular were the object of targeted fashion advice, resulting in effective marginalization. Women who fell into this category were urged to select clothing that disguised their figure by covering up and not drawing "excessive attention" to their waistline. This is connected to larger set of connected binary oppositions that Vainshtein sees as at work in women's magazines between young/old, tall/short, thin/plump, creating an ideal type and excluding all others. See her article, "Female Fashion, Soviet Style," 78-87.

[60] See, for example, *ZM* (Summer 1961), 1. When reporting on new trends for the season, the essay briefly mentions that "older men" could wear two-button jackets with their leisure suits.

After experiments in unisex clothing for all Soviet children undertaken during the 1920s and 1930s, gender distinction in children's clothing materialized by the late 1940s as even young girls appeared in posters and other media adorned in stylized dresses and ribbons. These divisions were enforced in many rural areas regardless of fashion by traditional rules of dress dictating that girls were never to wear pants.[61] Children's fashions contained markers of their adolescence, such as shorts, knee socks, and oversized unisex jackets, stylistically separating them from adulthood. But a precise point transforming the child into a man (at least in terms of clothing) does not appear to have existed. Instead a fluid transition point between childhood and youth styles created a space of liminality. One image from 1958 captures this concept (see Figure 2). Two rows of boys of approximately the same age are seen holding hands adorned in the selections from the spring season. While being visually linked together in a chain, their manner of dress lacks uniformity. Some are shown in miniature replicas of adult menswear—suit jackets, ties, slacks—while others appear in articles of clothing clearly signifying childhood—namely, the aforementioned knee socks and shorts. While the captions for the clothes do not specify an age group, only mentioning the word *mal'chik* (boy), uniform sizing recommendations are listed for each set of garments. What comes through most clearly in this image is the idea of transitioning to manhood through the destabilized combination of these two sets of stylistic signifiers. The top-half of the model's body may point to either childhood or adulthood, with the inverse occurring on the bottom—thus subverting the opposition between childhood/adulthood.[62]

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[61] Catriona Kelly, *Children's World: Growing Up in Russia, 1890-1991* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2007), 379-380, 384.

[62] The fact that various fashion houses throughout the Eastern Bloc produced these outfits suggests one plausible explanation for this lack of unity.

Figure 2: Spring 1958 collection for boys, *ZM* (Spring 1958, 37).

Valerii Rodos, son of repressed NKVD colonel Boris Rodos, fondly recalls in his memoir receiving his first grownup suit as a young boy.

> My grandfather did not work as he was around seventy, but at one time he'd been a tailor—a men's tailor. Evidently quite chic (*klassnym*). For my sixth birthday he stitched for my present a full three-piece suit in dark grey with faint checks. There were four buttons on the waistcoat—more than could fit on my stomach. On the jacket there were not only pockets on the outside, but also hidden on the inside. And on the pants there was even a little pocket for a watch! I was so delighted that I only sat for one fitting. I wore it everywhere, even when I met Comrade Stalin, so that after a few months it was worn out beyond repair.[63]

The symbols and associations tied up in that beloved suit are numerous. Not only did it evoke fondness for a loved one, it also signified a personal transformation. Wearing it out on every occasion, it cloaked Rodos in respectability and acted as a profound step toward adulthood. Even if this suit did not mark a full transition toward manhood, it did give him the ability to be in

[63] Valerii Rodos, *Ia - syn palacha: Vospominaniia* (Moskva: OGI Chastnyi Arkhiv, 2008), 13. Born in 1940, this incident would have occurred in 1946.

the company of the most important of men. As Lilya Kaganovsky argues, Stalin acted as the ultimate arbiter of Soviet masculinity during his lifetime.[64] His suit gave the young Rodos the opportunity for recognition from the supreme signifier.

Alternatively, renowned menswear designer and couturier for the Soviet elite, Aleksandr Irmand first gravitated toward his future vocation out of necessity. During his childhood in provincial Magnitogorsk, Irmand's mother gave him a pair of *semeinye trusy* (short pants) that he did not find up to par. Irmand took his *trusy* to his mother's Singer sewing machine, hemming and reshaping them until they fit according to his wishes. After displaying his creation in the courtyard, other boys commissioned him to do the same for them.[65] What compelled these local boys to seek out alterations for their clothing remains unknown—whether it was a received image that they sought to replicate or simple peer pressure. Yet, even if motivated by their own stylistic self-conception, they clearly sought to present a certain image to the limited public of their neighborhood.

Irmand's forays into self-creation continued into his adolescence, as he studied textiles at a local technicum and eventually used his skills to become, at least according to him, one of the first *stiliagi* in Magnitogorsk, appearing there in the early 1960s. Membership in this brotherhood of trendsetters stemmed less from the wearing of a specific uniform than an independent attitude toward fashion. The phenomenon first appeared in Moscow in the immediate postwar years, as well-positioned youth sought after rare Western items trickling into the country as a result of Lend-Lease and trophy confiscations. A number of variations existed as to the form of their displays, but generally speaking, *stiliagi* took their cues from Western

[64] Kaganovsky, *How the Soviet Man Was Unmade*.

[65] Anastasiia Iushkova, *Aleksandr Irmand: "Ia odeval Brezhneva..."* (Moskva: Novoe Literaturnoe Obozreniie, 2008), 28-29.

media as well their own imaginings of possible Western trends. Over the course of the next two decades, the *stiliagi* phenomenon spread out of the capital into the provinces. Irmand counts his first glimpse of local *stiliagi* as "a revolutionary moment in my life, especially creatively."[66] For Irmand, his memory of being a *stiliagi* in Magnitogorsk consisted of acquiring and wearing piped-legged trousers (*briuki-dudochki*) and parading down the local "Brodvei"—*ulitsa* Pushkina. His friend and future sewing partner, Misha, eventually agreed to craft a pair of these desired trousers for Irmand. When he finally received his longed for *briukhi*, he discovered that Misha had sewn for him not trousers with a fashionable slim silhouette, but flares modeled after army uniforms. Only after alterations made by a neighbor did Irmand receive his *dudochki*, and thus his badge of entry. This young *modnik* would eventually become, in Anastasiia Iushkova's words, "the man that dressed every Soviet man in the second half of the twentieth century."[67]

Official youth styles typically departed somewhat from the relatively conservative dress patterns of adults through a slight widening of the boundaries of the permissible. These modifications expressed an acknowledgement of the teenager/young adult as a distinct entity by style authorities. Bright, festive clothing allowed a space for an expression of youthful energies while still operating within the general parameters of the guidelines for dress discussed above. As one *Zhurnal mod* article from 1959 stated, "The *joie de vivre* (*zhizneradostna*) and freshness of our youth is found in their clothing."[68] For young men in 1956, designers crafted looks appropriate for study and work, incorporating signifiers of masculine propriety (such as the necktie), while at the same time forgoing certain standard suiting elements. Zippers and metal

[66] *Ibid.,* 33.
[67] *Ibid.,* 18.
[68] *ZM* (Winter 1959), 31.

snaps replaced buttons on their close-fitting coats that borrowed details from sportswear. Captions revealed the influence of sporting on these outfits by identifying the female versions of these jackets as of the "sporting type." Generally speaking, these types of sporting outfits were intended for everyday wear; evenings out and festivities required other types of dress. Like other kinds of clothing, youth-oriented designs received periodic updates. For example, style authorities pointed to suits with chemise shirts and dark ties as being Winter 1959's look. Distinctive youth style also can be read in their haircuts as both models feature longer hair slicked back into quiffs—a slight, but visible departure from the closely-cropped hairstyles of men depicted in other collections that year.[69] Later in the decade, brow-length hairstyles accompanied youth designs.[70]

For the upcoming 1957 youth festival, *Zhurnal mod* presented a special collection geared toward young attendees. The celebratory atmosphere of the event necessitated concrete exemplification in clothing. Festival clothes were to be "dressy" (*nariadnyi*), yet simple and proper, as well as incorporative of national design elements. To further affect the progressive nature of Soviet youth, designers incorporated new synthetic fabrics, reflective of the Soviet Union's embrace of (and commitment to) modern consumer technologies. The carnival portion of the festival's proceeding would feature national dress, in which Soviet youth were to incorporate traditional Russian designs into their outfits. The author, A. Sudakevich, instructed youth that they "only needed to bring taste, variety, creativity, and fun" to their planned outfits in

[69] "Iunosheskaia odezhda," *ZM* (Winter 1956), 30-31.

[70] For example, see "Dla molodezhi," *ZM* (Autumn 1958), 20-21.

order to affect the desired characteristics.[71] Details such as the addition of Russian ornamental patterns to an otherwise fashionable outfit fit the requirements of emphasizing modernity and nation. Intriguingly, this latter half of the equation did not factor into the man's outfit accompanying the article. While the dresses of his two female companions featured decorative designs, his outfit instead resembles an updated version of the sporting costumes described above with a bold yellow horizontal stripe matching both his yellow shirt and their dresses. The author merely stated that "a man's simple summer outfit of a shirt and pants can become cheerful and festive if you add a bright burst of sun or a wide-brimmed sombrero, and with a half-mask and a cheerful rattle, he is ready for the ball."[72]

During the 1960s, designers crafted men's looks that broke away from tradition alongside standard attire. One outfit for Spring 1960 featured a waist-length coat that combined features of the double-breasted suit jacket and sportswear.[73] Other designs incorporated a variety of different collars and zippers as stylistic touches in clothes for leisure, such as lounging at the dacha or on a summer holiday. Characteristically, youth styles also utilized a larger color palette than adult fashions. Even so, youth styles ultimately represented recognizable variations on standard themes—placing their specified clothing within a range of acceptable sartorial models. Sport designs and bright colors allowed for expression without iconoclasm.

Aleksandr Irmand's ascendance up the ranks of the Soviet fashion establishment during the Brezhnev years brought with it characteristically bolder men's designs. Gravitating toward the experimental side of the industry while working for the main branch of the Central House of

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[71] A. Sudakevich, "Navestrachu festivaliu," *ZM* (Summer 1957), 20-21. This is my translation of the phrase, "*Nuzhno tol'ko vnesti v nikh vkus, raznoobraznie, vydumku, shutku*."

[72] *Ibid*., 21.

[73] "Devushkam i iunosham," *ZM* (Spring 1960), 25.

Fashion, Irmand sought to break away from convention. Like Soviet designers before him, he looked fondly on Parisian fashion, but instead of Christian Dior, his cohort received inspiration from Pierre Cardin and Chanel. At the first Moscow Festival of Fashion held in 1967, Cardin exhibited a collection inspired by Gagarin's 1961 space flight that struck them as brilliant. Chanel's bouclé suits with gold trim also made a profound impression on Irmand and his cohort. "The festival of fashion for us artists was manna from the heavens suddenly falling upon on heads. It gave a great impetus for the growth of our fashion."[74] Irmand also travelled internationally to attend foreign fashion exhibitions. These trips directly shaped his personal vision of fashion in multiple ways, as he also assisted in licensing of foreign fashion companies for production inside the Soviet Union. Notably, he flew to Amsterdam to select outerwear designs by the Macintosh company for this purpose.

Not only did his designs grace the pages of *Zhurnal mod* from the late 1960s until the Soviet Union's demise, Irmand also dressed prominent individuals including Leonid Brezhnev and his circle, filmmaker Andrei Tarkovsky, and Taganka theater director Iurii Liubimov.[75] This stage provided yet another means of disseminating information about men's styles to the whole country. Certainly one could hardly fail to notice the Soviet premier's outfits captured in

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[74] Iushkova, *"Ia odeval Brezhneva,"* 47.

[75] After his first order from Brezhnev, the Soviet premier was apparently so taken aback by the design that he gave Irmand two watches from the First Moscow Clock Factory. By the early 1970s, Irmand regularly designed custom clothing for both business and leisure for Brezhnev. His account suggests that Brezhnev rather enjoyed items of luxury, particularly hand-tailored clothing. One anecdote related by Irmand concerns Brezhnev's desire for a denim suit. Ambassador Anatolii Dobrynin had brought Brezhnev a denim suit from the United States, yet it did not fit. So, he hired Irmand to make replicas. However, matching buttons were not to be found in the Soviet Union. In the end, the needed buttons were made to order by a Leningrad factory. After the suit's completion, it apparently became a favorite of Brezhnev's, wearing it often in his free time. The success of this suit also encouraged Irmand to enter its special buttons into production. See *Ibid.*, 63-66.

ubiquitous posters and television appearances. Yet, even as Irmand and his colleagues made advances in the realm of menswear, limited productive capacities hindered the mass availability of their work. According to him, these issues were magnified in the non-European republics. On a trip to examine menswear production in Tbilisi, Irmand witnessed firsthand the problem: "We approached one lady who was seated and stitching together sleeves. A jacket hung on a mannequin. But the sleeve did not hang down. Instead it stood straight up. How could this happen? Typically, the designer makes a pattern with special notches: it connects the back with the front and sleeves and then you stitch it all together."[76] Limited technical abilities surely acted as hindrance to popularizing fashion, but this is only one problem associated with the Soviet fashion system. Industrial inflexibility also accounted for systemic shortage. Other problems with men's embrace of fashion will be discussed in the next section.

Na ulitse

Soviet fashion journals suggested a cornucopia of consumer goods readily available for purchase, yet this did not necessarily speak to everyone's reality. Design scholar Djurdja Bartlett characterizes the postwar growth of fashion in the Soviet Union and Eastern Bloc as an acquiescence to the desires of a "new socialist middle class" in return for their political loyalty. Unlike old practices restricting these behaviors to members of the *nomenklatura*, the party-state encouraged this middle class to consume openly and enact displays of their position through attractive dress. Advice literature now beckoned this stratum of society to follow global sartorial rules in order to mirror their foreign counterparts. But as these instructions came as part of

[76] *Ibid.*, 53-55. His experiences in Western clothing factories, such as that he witnessed in Strasbourg, are written about in an opposing manner, praising them for their organization, level of work, cleanliness, and mechanistic punctuality.

package of retooling the means by which the party-state ruled, they carried a political message as well. The shift toward Western fashion sense and aesthetics, according to Bartlett, stemmed from socialism's failure to create the new woman as promised. With this came a return to avowedly feminine styles of dress—symbolized in dresses and hats.[77] Yet, even if fashions of the 1950s and 1960s did display marked gender differences, this does not explain the masculine versions of luxury and fashionable dress discussed above. Men may have been minor players in the fashion world, but they still participated in the game.

In his writings, émigré author A. Korin presented one facet of this disconnection between the everyman and fashion, namely that ready-to-wear garments remained out of the budget of many (if not most) citizens. Items spoken of as necessities by style authorities such as a men's wool suit cost 160 rubles, whereas as one made from a poly-wool blend were listed at 100 rubles according to Korin's calculations. Overcoats were priced at 150 rubles for pure wool and 100 for a poly-wool blend. A white cotton shirt, 6 rubles and a tie, 1.50. Moreover, men's suits cost roughly double that of women's—adding another barrier to male consumption. Low monthly salaries meant that putting together a suit in the manner suggested above remained prohibitively expensive. For example, while a Soviet minister received 1000 rubles a month, a worker with high qualifications or hazardous work conditions made only 120-170 rubles per month. The disparity between pay and material goods was even higher for others such as workers of lower and middle qualifications (50-90), medical doctors (70-80), policemen (70), and students (50-

[77] Bartlett, *FashionEast*. See esp. ch. 5. What exactly a "socialist middle class" means is not precisely explained, but presumably this refers to the administrative and clerical ranks filling offices rather than factory floors whose numbers grew under late socialism.

80).[78] This left a small range of Soviet elites, such as high-ranking members of the intelligentsia, party-state bureaucrats, industrial managers, and military officers with the ability afford even the most spartan of luxuries at state prices.[79]

But this is only one angle from which to examine the relationship between fashion advice and actual consumption. Department stores and markets were not the only place to obtain desired garments. Sales points also held stocks of high quality fabrics available for considerably lower prices. Korin lists top-quality suiting fabrics as available for 35-40 rubles per meter. Sewing patterns often accompanied the texts of fashion and women's magazines, leaving only the next step of finding someone with the ability to cut, shape, and stitch it altogether.[80] As the state-set prices for quality tailors ran high, many simply chose to do it themselves out of necessity. To meet demand, the talented could roll their abilities into a business on the side.[81] For the Spring 1960 issue, *Zhurnal mod* presented detailed instructions on how to fit and sew a

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[78] A. Korin, *Sovetskaia rossiia v 40-60 godakh* (Frankfurt/Main: Possev-Verlag, 1968), 115-116.

[79] Mervyn Matthews, *Privilege in the Soviet Union: A Study of Elite Life-Styles Under Communism* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1978), 21-27. His data from the early 1970s indicates lower monthly salaries than Korin. For example, Matthews lists the salary of a First Secretary of Union Republic as 810 rubles (with bonus or "thirteenth-month" pay). The point remains the same that off-the-rack clothing was priced too high for the average earner to indulge with any frequency.

[80] Larissa Zakharova argues that the process of hiring seamstresses for the creation of custom evening dresses was actually more expensive than they would have been at state stores if available. See her essay "Dior in Moscow," 104.

[81] Zhuravlev and Gronow state that roughly 30% of all Soviet citizens could sew and create their own clothes in the 1980s. There were a number of ways that individuals could gain this skill. In rural families, techniques were often passed down to the next generation. Those without access to familial know-how could also sign up for commonly offered sewing and fabrication classes. Girls were often taught these skills as a standard part of their education. See Zhuravlev and Gronow, "Krasota pod kontrolem gosudarstva," 46-47.

stylish men's suit.[82] The pattern took as its model a Czechoslovak suit with a modern silhouette and narrow trousers from the GDR recently showcased at the tenth international fashion congress. Both countries were renowned for their cutting edge designs among socialist nations. The act of self-creation could often be more desirable than competing with other shoppers, as in Korin's experience, "readymade clothing sewn in domestic factories is often defectively cut and out of style." For better goods, he suggested seeking out Eastern Bloc imports.[83] Ownership of a stylish Finnish suit in particular acted as a status symbol for men under late socialism due to its perceived superiority in craftsmanship, design, and quality of materials.[84]

A thin line separated the encouraged youth dress described above and that of the much-derided *stiliaga*. Vainshtein argues that *stiliagi* represented modern Soviet dandies who violated social conventions through their relentless pursuit of the new, thus calling forth their pre-revolutionary forefathers.[85] While some may have stood out from the pack, the dress of these young *modniki* did not all fit the wild stereotype propagated by the Soviet press. Writers and

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[82] "Predlozheno na X mezhdunarodnom kongresse," *ZM* (Spring 1960), 14.

[83] Korin, *Sovetskaia rossiia v 40-60 godakh*, 115-117. Contrary to received wisdom, Korin suggests that Muscovites and Leningraders brought along large amounts of money on business-related trips to mid-level cities such as Tambov, Omsk, and Karaganda where imported clothing could be more readily found as "provincials are always much more conservative" in their consumptive habits. For example, Donald Raleigh's Saratov interview subjects indicate the *kommandirovka* to Moscow or Leningrad as a means of stocking up on deficit consumables. Others interviewed enlisted relatives based in these cities to send them packages stocked with these goods. Korin's and Raleigh's reports are not, however, mutually exclusive. It is certainly conceivable that availability depended on location and that, as Korin suggests, expensive clothing may have been hurriedly purchased in areas with more individuals of higher income (such as Moscow, Leningrad, and republican capitals). There is also the temporal dimension that further opens up possibilities. Raleigh's interviewees are discussing the 1970s, whereas Korin's anecdotal reports were from the early-1960s at the latest. See Raleigh, *Soviet Baby Boomers: An Oral History of Russia's Cold War Generation*.

[84] Zhuravlev and Gronow, "Krasota pod kontrolem gosudarstva," 51.

[85] Vainshtein, *Dendy*, see ch. 16.

artists for *Komsomol'skaia Pravda* and *Krokodil* tended to emphasize the absurd and iconoclastic elements in these fashions, but these depictions must also be understood as attempts to deride what was viewed as subversive youth activity rather than a necessarily accurate picture of their look. For every stylized "parrot," plenty of others simply sought to find or produce fashionable clothing. This quest resulted in a variety of sartorial combinations not easily reduced to the satirical images found in the Soviet press.

Claiming to be one of the first *stiliagi* in Leningrad, Valentin Tikhonenko gravitated early in his youth to Western European fashion. Arranging to meet with visiting foreigners, particularly Finns, in order to purchase goods otherwise impossible to find, Tikhonenko soon began selling them to others. "It was not a business, but rather a one-man spectacle in which the script, direction, and scene dynamics belonged personally to me. And the foreigners were the costumers."[86] But the clothes that Tikhonenko bought and sold to fashion-hungry Leningraders did not fit the outrageous *stiliagi* stereotype. Others purchased fabric and hired seamstresses to create their Western-inspired original clothing.[87] The act placed them in an even more liminal space. Rather than participating in speculation through illegally purchasing foreign goods, these individuals engaged in an activity (at least in part) encouraged by fashion magazines. Breaking the rules and crossing over into unsanctioned forms of consumption occurred then when they chose to explicitly draw attention to themselves through, as one *Zhurnal mod* column put it,

[86] Valentin Tikhonenko, "Tarzan v svoem otchestve," *Pchela* no. 11 (Oct.-Nov. 1997). http://www.pchela.ru/podshiv/11/tarzan.htm.

[87] Tikhonenko's story also appears in Ol'ga Vainshtein's analysis of *stiliagi*.

"gaudy" and "tasteless" displays—thus violating the desirably unifying and stabilizing image of men's tailoring described by Hollander.[88]

Breaking the rules of style was the *stiliaga*'s crime according to style authorities. "There's nothing wrong with modern tailoring as *stiliagichestvo* lies not in the clothes, but in the wrongheaded (*durnoi*) manner that he wears them."[89] In this case, the *stiliaga* stands out as prime audience for the journal's advice. His (as the stereotypical *stiliaga* operated within a predominately masculine subculture) deviant embrace of bad taste placed him outside of contemporary rules governing aesthetics and material culture, marking his consumptive habits as decadent in a time when restrained, socially productive methods of consumption were encouraged. Rather than faulting the *stiliaga* for his taste in Western material culture, the Soviet fashion press condemned his manner of putting it all together, as well as his general attitude toward fashion. As *Zhurnal mod* occasionally ran columns on Western European designs, they could not easily be charged with a militant provincialism. Accordingly, style authorities pushed the *stiliaga* conceptually out of the boundaries of fashion, arguing that his attire constituted a "caricature of fashion."[90]

Readers' letters excerpted in *Zhurnal mod* indicate popular confusion over distinctions between style (*stil*') and *stiliagichestvo*. One letter complained, "Pipe-legged trousers are criticized everywhere, but that's all you print in your journal." Another stated, "The designs appear too immodest and call to mind '*stiliagi*,' who are criticized in Soviet literature and art." The journal's respondent cautioned readers in jumping to these conclusions and emphasized their

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[88] *ZM* (Winter 1959), 31.

[89] Chekalov, "O stil'e", *op. cit*.

[90] Elena Chaika, "O vkusakh sporiat: otvechaem chitateliam," *ZM* (Winter 1959), inside front cover.

designs' alignment with good taste, referring to *stiliagi* as "individuals who are internally barren and do not contribute anything good to society." While slim-cut trousers remained in fashion for men, the difference was one of degree and intent. *Stiliagi* violated these sartorial codes by wearing "exorbitantly narrow trousers and fatally bright shirts."[91] Indeed, this positioning of style versus *stiliagichestvo* reappeared in various issues of the journal. By policing the line between proper and immoderate modes of clothing consumptive, designers, artists, and journalists justified their vocation while recognizing its awkward fit in a socialist society.

At the XI International Congress of Fashion, the Romanian delegation reported on the need to specifically cultivate good taste in clothes among socialist youth.[92] The delegation complained that the advances in socialist material culture and attendant technologies were being overlooked by youth who chose to dress instead in a "permissive" (*legkomysliia*) and "frivolous" manner. As with other fashion advice, the delegation wanted to steer youth toward practicality, stating their clothes should be above all "easy" and "sporty" and that their eveningwear should also incorporate these characteristics. Color in clothing for young men aged 16-18 was to match the season—earth tones for winter, spring, and autumn and brighter shades (like light blue, light grey, and sand) for summer. The delegation believed colors like purple, black, brown and dark grey to be inappropriate for this age. Nor were ties to be worn except for solemn occasions. In this manner, the Romanian delegation attempted to craft a youthful style complete with its own

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[91] "O chem govoriat pis'ma," *ZM* (Fall 1961), 52. Others complained to the journal about the need for fashion altogether. A certain Comrade Aksenova objected to what she perceived as the manner in which rapid changes in Soviet fashion made otherwise functional clothing obselete, to which the editorial staff agreed. "She's right—there is no reason to sew a new coat every season if last year's model is still in good shape (*dobrotno*) and beautiful." Such were the complexities of negotiating fashion "from above". See *ZM* (Spring 1962), 2.

[92] "Odezhda molodezhi i vospitanie vkusa: doklad Rumyskoi delegatsii na XI mezhdunarodnom kongresse mody," *ZM* (Winter 1960), prilozhenie.

markers of distinction while remaining within the general scope of socialist fashion. Their program sought to rein in a deviant frivolity laden with tones of individualism, while still giving socialist youth something that they could call their own. Yet, if Vainshtein is right in characterizing the average *stiliaga* as a fashion-conscious trendsetter rather than a voracious collector of all things Western, this kind of program would not work as its rules remained too rigid to permit avant-garde self-styling. Iconoclastic celebration of the individual spirit through clothing courted charges of excess, leaving fashion largely in the hands of style authorities. Soviet fashion authorities remained conscious of this distinction, arguing that they endeavored to create beautiful, purposeful clothing for youth rather than serving "a bunch of slaves to fashion with narrow, limited interests."[93] Designers walked a tightrope, periodically updating styles in a gradual and functionalist manner and steered away from radical, artistic departures.

By the end of the 1960s, significant growth in light industrial production had brought fashion closer to everyday experiences of the average citizen. According to historians Sergei Zhuravlev and Jukka Gronow, it was at this time that "fashion actually became an important part of everyday life."[94] Or, at least enough so that citizens reportedly started refusing to purchase unfashionable items. This transformation occurred mostly along generational lines, as older Soviet citizens did not typically flock toward fashion. On the opposite end of the age spectrum, youth tended to be the most visible proponents. Surveys conducted by Soviet sociologists L. N. Zhilina and N. T. Frolova in the late 1960s confirm this embrace of fashion as a concept and

[93] "Devushkam i iunosham," *ZM* (Spring 1964), 20.

[94] Zhuravlev and Gronow, "Krasota pod kontrolem gosudarstva," 82.

behavior-guiding force.[95] Unlike in the West, fashion under socialism did not (according to the authors) contribute to the same patterns of social stratification. "Fashion [under socialism] acquires a more democratic and popular (*obshchedostupnyi*) character. The purchase of universally fashionable items already depends on material prosperity, qualifications, the quantity and quality of an individual's labor, the tempo of economic growth in the country and individual regions, the level of manufactured goods in wide circulation, their quality and quantity, and the level of education and culture of the people."[96] Some of the individuals surveyed indicated frustrations with the planning of fashion as it occurred in the Soviet system. Lacking what they viewed as the requisite spontaneity required in being modern, they looked to the West for instruction on how to fashionably dress—an activity thwarted by the difficulty in accessing up-to-the-minute information. Others expressed a greater range of understandings of fashion as representing or expressing modernity, beauty, utility, or individuality. Frolova reported in a subsequent article the items most desired in their surveys.[97] When asked what they would most like to receive for their birthdays, the majority indicated special consumer durables such as magnitophones (magnetic tape recorders), electric guitars, motorcycles, film recorders, cars, and other high-priced items. Unfortunately, Frolova does not indicate their sex of the respondents for these goods. However, as a few others specifically mentioned certain items of men's clothing, these results provide insight into trends among young Muscovite youth during the late 1960s.

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[95] L. N. Zhilina and N. T. Frolova, *Problemy potrebleniia i vospitanie lichnosti* (Moskva: Izdatel'stvo "Mysl'", 1969). In their study of the role and meaning of fashion in everyday life, they surveyed 469 Muscovite students in classes 9-10 and 346 of their parents.

[96] *Ibid.*,127.

[97] N. T. Frolova, "A v mode li sut'?," in *Moda: Za i protiv*, ed. V. I. Tol'stikh (Moskva: Izdatel'stvo "Iskusstvo," 1973), 204–221.

These items included "fashionable suede shoes," athletic suits (*kostium dzhersi*), nylon jackets (*kurtka iz bolon'i*) and shirts, as well as other sporting goods.

Reflections on Men and Material Consumption

The above analysis examined the ways in which fashion and style discourses shaped both male bodies and consumptive habits. Now the task is to situate this within a wider range of male consumptive relationships. In studying everyday shopping practices under late socialism, Elena Striazhkina highlights the existence of an explicit discursive gendering of archetypes (or "linguistic clichés" as per the author)—the "petty-bourgeois woman" (*meshchanka*) and the (male) "soulless philistine" (*bezdukhovnyi obyvatel'*).[98] While both theoretically were chided for their obsession with material goods and comfort, an essential difference existed between how men and women related to these objects and engaged in consumptive practice. Women, unlike men, were viewed as active participants in the provisioning of everyday life—directly involved in the practices of shopping, acquisition, and urban foraging common to the period. The difficulties associated with these activities made them near-daily occurrences and rather time consuming, eating up hours away from work and the home. This positioned men outside of the general shopping experience and thus the "details of everyday life." According to Striazhkina, scenarios from 1970s and 1980s films portray the man sent on a shopping trip as a source of amusement. Confusion with basic items and tasks associated with provisioning rendered the

[98] Elena Striazkina, "The 'Petty-Bourgeois Woman' and the 'Soulless Philistine': Gendered Aspects of the History of Soviet Everyday Life from the Mid-1960s to Mid-1980s," trans. Liv Bliss, *Russian Studies in History* 51, no. 2 (Fall 2012): 63–97.

man foolishly helpless.[99] Special shopping trips, such as those undertaken in conjunction with a *komandirovka*, were considered an appropriately masculine enterprise due to the "extraordinary" nature of these ventures. The "everyday," then, remained a remote land for the Soviet man under late socialism.

What emerges from Striazhkina's analysis is the gendering of the everyday as female, producing a hierarchy that fixes women's domain as the management of everyday realities. As the discussion in this chapter has demonstrated, men did not exist in isolation from material consumptive practices. Fashion designers' attempts to cultivate male consumptive patterns broke with traditional understandings of gender roles. The *stiliaga's* obsession with style called into his question his claims to masculinity, rendering him lacking in relation to hegemonic Soviet masculinity that shunned style.[100] Style authorities sought to expand the gap between these two poles by constructing a uniquely Soviet sense of men's style.

Hostility toward the material consumption, though, did not mean that men did not have their own consumptive practices. Rather, male consumptive domains are to be more often found in the realm of the extraordinary—constituent of items and practices not directly associated with the daily provisioning making life possible. The car stands as perhaps the item most associated

[99] These gendered attitudes toward material provisioning can be seen as a pattern in the socialist countries of Eastern Europe. Yet, as argued by Jill Massino, the Romanian setting during the 1980s presents an intriguing exception. Men, by and large, saw the act of queuing in lines in order to acquire deficit goods as a function of their patriarchal duty to their families during this time of economic crisis. See her essay, "From Black Caviar to Blackouts: Gender, Consumption, and Lifestyle in Ceausescu's Romania," in *Communism Unwrapped: Consumption in Cold War Eastern Europe*, ed. Paulina Bren and Mary Neuberger (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 226–249.

[100] Elena Zdravomyslova and Anna Temkina suggest that this characteristic lack of style was a means of self-fashioning under socialism. See Zdravomyslova and Temkina, "Crisis of Masculinity," 19-20.

with men.[101] The private automobile existed both inside and outside of the "everyday" in Soviet society—available and accessible in theory, yet difficult to acquire in practice for many (if not most). Even after acquiring a car, servicing it proved another matter. Demand overwhelmed supply, both in terms of car maintenance and needed parts. Car owners often turned to personal networks and the second economy in order to keep their vehicles' properly supplied and roadworthy. As argued by Lewis Siegelbaum, these actions should not be seen as purely speculative, but also generative of networks instrumental in the exchange of information of goods and materiel that "provided a critical part of Soviet car culture…formed in parallel to party, trade union, voluntary, or other legally constituted bodies, and [that] in a sense represented the sociocultural side of the second or parallel economy."[102] Amidst shortage and delay, repair garages and amateur clubs facilitated the development of a homosocial sphere in order to tend to and in celebration of automobility. Simplicity of design, published advice literature, and in the case of the Zhiguli, built-in repair kits, facilitated individual maintenance of the private car. Even so, auto repair necessitated some degree of technical ability. Soviet schools provided one site for their knowledge, where young boys in particular eagerly took up mechanical training. Fathers passed to their sons other tricks of the trade. No formal limitations barred young women from participating in these activities, but tradition dictated that the operation of heavy machinery remained gendered as a man's field.[103]

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[101] On the interface between Soviet masculinities and automobility, see Siegelbaum, "Cars, Cars, and More Cars." For a comparative approach that stresses certain shared features among "second world" car cultures, see Luminita Gatejel, "The Common Heritage of the Socialist Car Culture," in *The Socialist Car*, 143–156.

[102] Siegelbaum, "On the Side," 11.

[103] *Ibid.*

The private automobile, perhaps even more so in the Soviet context, also proved seductively alluring as an article of distinction providing men with a heightened social status. As Corinna Kuhr-Korolev argues, even riding along as a passenger imparted "the possibility of doing things that were denied to others and offered some relief from routine."[104] For one memoirist, it embodied desire incarnated in steel. She mentioned her first love affair at sixteen only by the name of the model that he drove—Moskvich. It provided the setting for a first kiss and the previously unknown feelings that came with it, none of which can be considered exclusive to the Soviet experience. Yet, the rarity of the private car compounded its desirability—perhaps even more so for a teenager. Years later, she reflected: "By November I had a new suitor and I left poor 'Moskvich.' Was it a love affair? Of course. But a love affair with a *personal (sobstvennym)* Moskvich. It was a symbol of the glamorous life, a symbol feeding the ambition of hope."[105]

This distinction between the "everyday" and the "extraordinary" did not completely govern the masculine consumptive field. As mentioned above, *Zhurnal mod* prominently featured the cigarette as a quintessentially masculine fashion accessory by often pairing smoking with both casual suiting and formal wear. The cigarette does not fit neatly into the above dichotomy between the everyday and the extraordinary. It exists both as a luxury (particularly in the sense of superfluity) and as an artifact of the everyday. Images of tobacco enjoyed as a symbol of masculine refinement convey a relatively conservative message. As tobacco

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[104] Corinna Kuhr-Korolev, "Women and Cars in Soviet and Russian Society," in *The Socialist Car*, 189.

[105] Iren Andreeva, *Chastnaia zhizn' pri sotsialisme: otchet sovetskogo obyvateliia* (Moskva: Novoe Literaturnoe Obozreniie, 2009), 18-19. Indeed, Andreeva had a rather atypical experience with cars for a Soviet woman, as she bought, sold, and owned multiple cars between the 1960s and 1980s. For those stories, see pp. 25-35.

consumption increased during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries in Russia, these various products and consumptive practices soon stabilized as a distinctively male enterprise. Late imperial advertisers commonly linked sexual virility and pleasure with smoking as a means of displaying this connection, symbolically thwarting consumer culture's threat of emasculation. These tropes celebrated sites of masculine sociability and power—the tavern, the prizefighter's ring, and the smoking room—severing class lines and recoding this corner of consumerism as a safe space for a man's participation.[106] Mechanized rolling technologies furthered the growth of tobacco use in the late nineteenth century, particularly in the form of *papirosy*: stubby, paper tubes filled with tobacco and attached to a long, primitive filter. Delivering potent, concentrated blasts of nicotine, these vessels also acts as little consumable incarnations of modernity. This jump in consumption sparked intense debate over the effect of tobacco on Russian society. Like their counterparts elsewhere, late imperial and Bolshevik public health authorities expressed particular concern regarding smoking by women and youth, fearing that tobacco would arouse sexual desire and lead to a loss of physical beauty—in addition to more general attacks on nicotine's somatic effects.[107]

Cigarettes in particular held a variety of meanings in Soviet society. Anti-vice propaganda often portrayed the stereotypical hooligan with a cigarette between his lips and a bottle in his hand. Many young men turned this symbol on its head, viewing smoking as an essential marker of participation in lad culture or as one of the guys. Youth (particularly young

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[106] Sally West, "Smokescreens: Tobacco Manufacturers' Projections of Class and Gender in Late Imperial Advertising," in *Tobacco in Russian History and Culture: The Seventeenth Century to the Present*, ed. Matthew P. Romaniello and Tricia Starks (New York: Routledge, 2009), 102–119.

[107] Tricia Starks, "*Papirosy*, Smoking, and the Anti-Cigarette Movement," in *Tobacco in Russian History and Culture*, 132–147.

men) who made a point of not smoking risked the recognition and conference of their maturity (or masculinity) by their peer group.[108] The editorial decision to photograph men frocked in finery with cigarettes in the pages of *Zhurnal mod* further highlights the paradoxical position of tobacco in Soviet society. By pairing a tuxedo or a business suit with a cigarette, style authorities opened up the field of clothing (and material consumption more broadly) to a male audience. Encoding outfits with a signifier of rough masculinity such as tobacco lent these articles of clothing a greater degree of legitimacy, spreading the message that style and luxury did not solely belong in the realm of the feminine.

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As the various studies in this dissertation have shown, Soviet authorities actively sought during the 1950s and 1960s to reconstruct the Soviet man, modernizing his practices to match the changes then underway. The promotion of fashion and luxury among male consumers updated the Stalinist acculturating mission, spreading its message throughout the increasingly urban population. However, the message of menswear departed from older notions of promoting hygienic living. Modern menswear signified a man in tune with the changing world around him. He dressed the part of an inhabitant of contemporary Soviet society, clothed in the advances of socialist consumer industries. Fashion and fashion advice served as a means of both satisfying growing consumer desires and a technology to centrally organize daily life by delineating dress and comportment—opening men up to the surveillance technologies of modern design. The enlistment of men in these processes represents a more totalizing aim than previously identified.

[108] For an analysis of smoking practices among Russian youth, see Catriona Kelly, "'The Lads Indulged Themselves, They Used to Smoke...': Tobacco and Children's Culture in Twentieth-Century Russia," in *Tobacco in Russian History and Culture*, 158–182.

For the period under study, style authorities sought to clothe men in a manner befitting and complimentary to the increasing urban and technologically driven Soviet landscape. The suit as a unified object presented an opportunity to recast its male population in a modern mold, effectively sanding off the rough edges—even if these ambitions outmatched material realities.

Figure 3: Suiting and Smoking, *ZM* (Winter 1962), 28.

CHAPTER FOUR:

Sexual Bodies in the Post-Stalinist Landscape

"Morality – that is what will destroy the old society of exploitation and unite all working people around the proletariat building the new communist society."
- V. I. Lenin (1920)[1]

The previous chapters examined practices associated with individual consumptive items, as well as the party-state's attempts to mediate their usage. The discussion moves here to consider a range of issues connected to male sexuality and sexual practice that provoked anxious responses from authorities. Characterizing and charting the evolution of sexual mores presents a number of difficulties for the scholar. The intrinsic specificity of experience problematizes all attempts at generalization. Generation, location, social background and other such variables further contribute to this problem. Yet a number of commonalities defined and shaped the Soviet sexual landscape. Limitations on space and privacy from the view of others built prohibitive barriers to sexual expression. Families typically shared rooms in bustling communal apartments with their adolescent or even recently married children, often with sheets and makeshift dividers to demarcate individualized spaces. Prefabricated individual apartments—the great urban development of the Khrushchev years—proved difficult to acquire, particularly for singles and young newlyweds, and often necessitated a long wait.[2] Official strictures on visiting a hotel in one's registered place of residence closed off yet another option. Personal cars were not common enough in the immediate post-Stalin era to usher in the same kind of youth sexual

[1] V. I. Lenin, *Polnoe sobranie socheniniia*, tom 41 (Moskva: Izdatel'stvo politicheskoi literatury, 1981), 311.

[2] Single men and women typically were not eligible to receive an apartment of their own. They had to seek out rooms for rent or live in worker dormitories. Planners designed the individual apartment as a site for the generation of the socialist family.

revolution occurring in America during the same period. Contraceptive deficits due to high demand and persistent shortage also stood in the way.[3] The first nation to legalize abortion paradoxically remained outside of the West's liberalizing sexual climate of the twentieth century marked by "the pill" (both as a symbol and a technology) and heady discourses of emancipation.

But in spite of these spatial and material prohibitions, changes were underway. As scholars such as Vladimir Shlapentokh, Anna Rotkirch, and Deborah Field have noted, the Soviet Union did not exist in complete isolation from a shifting global landscape of sexual mores during the second half of the twentieth century.[4] Over the course of the 1950s and 1960s, the Soviet population experienced a general modification of popular attitudes toward acceptance of premarital and extramarital sex—even if this occurred more gradually and less radically than in other Western societies and remained largely absent from official rhetoric. Shlapentokh views the year 1953 as the symbolic breaking point in which popular attitudes towards love, marriage, and sexuality slowly began to depart from the prewar Stalinist model that enshrined romantic

[3] Consider the following statement made in an autobiography of a woman born in 1937: "We got married. Those were happy years. I loved him enormously. I tried to always be by his side. The whole day I was longing to see him again. And my heart was beating anxiously when, at last, he came home. But we did not have 'sex' during all those thirteen years that I lived together with him. Although we protected ourselves [condoms and interrupted intercourse], I was chronically pregnant. It looked like this: we were terrified [of a pregnancy], made it, then I was pregnant – again all those horrors: a suffocating headache, nausea, vomiting, irritation – then an abortion with all its pleasant attributes, then we were not allowed to, and then the circle began again. What kind of sex can you talk about!!!" From Anna Rotkirch, "'What Kind of Sex Can You Talk About': Acquiring Sexual Knowledge in Three Soviet Generations," in *Living Through the Soviet System*, ed. Daniel Bertaux, Paul Thompson, and Anna Rotkirch (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 2005), 93–119. Quotation at 96-97.

[4] Vladimir Shlapentokh, *Love, Marriage, and Friendship in the Soviet Union: Ideals and Practice* (New York: Praeger, 1984); Anna Rotkirch, *The Man Question: Loves and Lives in Late 20th Century Russia* (Helsinki: University of Helsinki, Department of Social Policy, 2000); Field, *Private Life and Communist Morality*. Shlapentokh's sociological work on private life in the Soviet Union advanced the notion of a post-Stalinist "retreat" into the family and/or sexual life as a means of existing apart from the regime, though this strict state/society divide has been critiqued in some recent works such as the essays in Siegelbaum, *Borders of Socialism*.

love (and sex) within the context of a lifelong marriage. Even though the moment of Stalin's death could not have ushered in change overnight, it is certain that political factors associated with de-Stalinization and reform shaped these moral transformations. Political reform resulted in a freer atmosphere that facilitated a newfound ability to approach questions of romance and sexuality by both the creative intelligentsia and social scientists. A liberalizing climate in regard to literary censorship during the "Thaw" facilitated the publication of works that penetrated into private aspects of life with greater accuracy, including themes of intimacy and implied sensuality. Moreover, the decline of popular adherence to official ideology triggered by the secret speech's revelations may have prompted some relaxations in popular morality.

Other factors preceding Stalin's death also contributed to these long-term developments. As acknowledged in a previous chapter, the war placed heavy burdens on marriages and other intimate relationships, as it separated spouses and partners for years at a time within a context of uncertainty regarding postwar return. Some undoubtedly chose to move on, sure that their husbands would not survive as depicted in the 1957 blockbuster film, *The Cranes are Flying* (*Letiat zhuravli*). Pronatalist policies, such as the 1944 family law, lent official tolerance (if not outright encouragement) to non-marital sexual relationships by broadening the availability of state child support payments as a means of boosting the birth rate.[5] For the post-Stalin era,

[5] Greta Bucher, *Women, the Bureaucracy, and Daily Life in Postwar Moscow, 1945-1953* (Boulder, CO: East European Monographs, 2006), 137-140. Bucher argues, "no other state assumed [this level of economic responsibility for children] and no other state brought such pressure to bear on all women to realize their destiny and fulfill their social obligations to have children as if no consideration other than selfishness stood in the way of all women raising several children." See also Mie Nakachi, "N. S. Khrushchev and the 1944 Family Law: Politics, Reproduction, and Language," *East European Politics and Societies* 20, no. 1 (2006): 40–68. Nakachi's analysis of the 1944 family law also has implications for Soviet gender contracts, as she argues that it expanded the field of legitimate reproduction to two sites—the married family and the non-marital/adulterous relationship. The law created legal recognition for the category

twinned policies legalizing abortion and the laxening of strictures regarding divorce proceedings further augmented the nature of state's surveillance over sexuality.

The decision to open, even if by a small degree, a window to the rest of the world also had ramifications. An American foreign correspondent working in the Soviet Union recalled:

> Public kissing and hand-holding was Just Not Done in Moscow—until young Russians saw other people doing it during the 1957 Youth Festival. Now occasionally I have seen young people kissing by the Moskva river wall, or walking arms around waists. A young man and his girl were celebrating International Women's Day at the National Hotel in 1961 by dancing with both arms around each other. When they kissed at the end of the tune, this was too much for an older Muscovite. 'Why don't you just go find a bedroom somewhere!' She snapped.[6]

This moment, an unprecedented opening of the Soviet Union to the outside world, served for many onlookers as a breaking point that led to a joyous outpouring of emotion and popular engagement with global youth culture. Saxophonist Aleksei Kozlov, a leading member of Moscow's jazz demimonde, remembers this moment as a great "mistake" on the part of Soviet authorities, setting into motion "the beginning of the collapse (*krakha*) of the Soviet system." The festival made possible to non-*frontoviki* a comparison with how things were in the "West," even from a limited vantage point, and briefly facilitated democratic sentiments. In his recollections, festival nights marked the end of the official program as festivalgoers started to freely mingle with one another during these two weeks (though at some risk of interference by police and vigilantes). Out in the temperate summer air, Soviet citizens and foreign attendees discussed and debated politics, art, music, and fashion. This radiant atmosphere also conjured the spirit of romance in an unprecedented manner. Kozlov attributes this development to "beautiful, warm weather; the general euphoria of freedom, friendship, love and ties with

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of "single mother," while at the same time minimizing paternal responsibility required under the law's 1936 incarnation.

[6] Aline Mosby, *The View from No. 13 People's Street* (New York: Random House, 1962), 162.

foreigners; and most importantly—pent-up rage (*nakopivshiisia protest*) against puritanical pedagogy, lies, and the unnatural." He claims to have not taken part in this micro "sexual revolution," but heard many stories detailing amorous couplings between Soviet citizens and foreign delegates.[7]

Singular significance, however, should not be attributed to the 1957 youth festival. The work of scholars Mark Edele, Juliane Fürst, and Elena Zubkova has also brought to light a greater sociocultural unmooring inside the postwar Soviet Union wrought by the effects of the Second World War. Fusing both of these perspectives on changing sexual mores provides insight into the dynamics of Soviet society.[8] The long and disastrous years of fighting and deprivation forged a society longing for release and searching for a more normal (and less iconoclastic) existence. The new possibilities generated by domestic and international openings under the "Thaw" supplied these opportunities, thus creating a structure with expanded options.[9]

The story of Soviet sex, though, is not solely one of gradual liberation. Sex remained an arena of active contestation as youth authorities battled to control sexuality outside of officially

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[7] Aleksei Kozlov, *Kozel na sakse - i tak vsiu zhizn'...* (Moskva: Vagrius, 1998). See ch. 5. Due to state surveillance and actively patrolling of hotels and dormitories, these trysts developed quickly "with no courtship or false pretenses" and away from the eyes of others in park fields and wooded areas. For another account of the youth festival, see G. Alex Jupp, *A Canadian Looks at the USSR: A Firsthand View of Russian Life During the World Youth Festival* (New York: Exposition Press, 1958). Jupp shares Kozlov's sentiment that Soviet authorities "took as calculated risk" in organizing the event and that "it was an unprecedented opportunity to really see how young people looked and dressed."

[8] In addition to the works previously mentioned in this dissertation, see also Elena Zubkova, *Russia after the War: Hopes, Illusions, and Disappointments, 1945-1957*, trans. Hugh Ragsdale, The New Russian History (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1998).

[9] I am influenced in my thinking here by the work of William Sewell on the way in which individual agency can operate within larger structures. See William H. Sewell Jr., *The Logics of History: Social Theory and Social Transformation* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005).

approved arenas (namely inside marriage). Manifestations of deviant youth sexuality challenged the idea that authorities had eliminated such impulses in the New Soviet Man. In particular, an unstable male body, replete with powerful and unsettling desires, lies at the heart of official anxieties. Even as sexual mores slowly changed on the ground, party-state authorities sought new means to govern Soviet bodies by actively monitoring and shaping attitudes and behaviors.

This chapter will chart three distinct arenas in which officials and experts confronted sex during the 1950s and 1960s. The first section analyzes the ways in which Komsomol officials reacted to evidence of shifting sexual attitudes among their charges, as well as the manner in which they dealt with graver violations of the social order, including instances of rape and sexual violence. Rather than explicitly target violent male sexual behavior, authorities blurred the line between aggressor and victim—blaming both for deviating from the codes of socialist morality and the failures of moral education. From there, discussion moves to a consideration of the means by which the arrival of foreign university students during this period took on the character of a sexual panic that delimited the boundaries of *druzhba narodov* ("friendship among nations") over the twinned issues of sex and material privilege. Analysis will then turn to the revival of the social sciences and sexology, as well as other mechanisms for generating sexual knowledge.

Sex, Violence, and the Komsomol

Nearly all expressions of sexuality among adolescents and teenagers troubled Komsomol and party officials, as well as many employed in legal and educational fields. For youth authorities, early sexual activity served as an indicator of socially destabilizing forces. Internal reports occasionally mentioned permissive attitudes toward sex or youth engaging in "cohabitation" as

suggestive of criminality and delinquency.[10] Young women typically bore the brunt of these negative associations. Authorities in Alma-Ata (Kazakh SSR) recorded 42 known examples of girls "of easy virtue" (*legkogo povedenie*) under the age of 18 in their accounting of the city's blights alongside drug addicts and common criminals. The majority of these girls were said to "cohabit" with adult men and carry venereal diseases.[11] Use of vague terminology in Komsomol reports such as "of easy virtue," "licentiousness," (*razpushchenost'*) or "harlotry" (*razvrat*) impedes re-construction of these events. Some accounts are suggestive of monetary or material exchange, yet never make direct charges of prostitution. Even so, the linkage of venereal disease infections effectively criminalizes these women, as the spreading of such constituted a punishable offense. Venereal disease clinics also provided a direct means of overseeing sexual activities and thus peering through the bedroom door, as the police carefully monitored patient lists.

In the realm of sexuality, Soviet medical record keeping largely focuses on women's interactions with physicians. Outside of VD treatment, men did not as routinely come under the clinic's gaze. Abortion statistics, for example, are invoked repeatedly in Komsomol reports as tangible evidence of youth sexuality. Expressing alarm over rising rates of abortions in the early 1960s, Komsomol officials scolded young women for engaging in premarital sex and warned of negative consequences. Pointing not only to potential complications arising from abortions, they cited infertility and other related reproductive maladies as providing sufficient grounds for divorce in a 1962 report composed by the Komsomol's sporting and defense *otdel'* sent to the

[10] "Cohabitation" is my translation of *sozhitel'stvo*, a word often used euphemistically in Soviet parlance to refer to non-marital sexual activity. By translating it literally I seek to preserve this circumlocution.

[11] RGASPI f. 1-m, op. 1, d. 133, l. 28.

Komsomol Central Committee. This cast a thinly veiled threat that a woman's singular decision to engage in premarital sex could ultimately result in a lifetime of loneliness and unfulfilled potential.[12] Threats of this type are directly in line with the general preventative strategies employed by physicians and disseminators of official ideology during this period. Both Deborah Field and Amy Randall have pointed out that the medical profession actively tried to dissuade women from receiving abortions via threats of injury, sterility, and ultimately unhappiness.[13] Sociologist Elena Zdravomyslova also argues that these strategies played out to the desires of officials, prompting agonizing decisions for women contemplating termination of their pregnancies. According to her, attending physicians often used insufficient anesthetic, which "can be interpreted as a form of state-organized punishment for the sin of having sex without reproduction."[14]

For Komsomol authorities, however, concerns went beyond resultant complications as they connected together rising numbers of clinical abortions, venereal disease infections, and sexual assaults as intertwined phenomena illuminating persistent moral failings of Soviet youth. The themes expressed here move from concerns over declining Slavic birth rates to evidence suggesting earlier sexual experiences as connected with juvenile delinquency and criminality.[15]

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[12] RGASPI f. 1-m, op. 1, d. 28, ll. 116-123.

[13] Field, *Private Life and Communist Morality*; Amy E. Randall, "'Abortion Will Deprive You of Happiness!': Soviet Reproductive Politics in the Post-Stalin Era," *Journal of Women's History* 23, no. 3 (2011): 13–38.

[14] Elena Zdravomyslova, "Hypocritical Sexuality of the Late Soviet Period: Sexual Knowledge and Sexual Ignorance," in *Education and Civic Culture in Post-Communist Countries*, ed. Stephen Webber and Ilkka Liikanen (Houndmills, Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001), 156.

[15] According to the report, the percentage of abortions in the RSFSR in the early 1960s were "significantly higher" than in the Central Asian republics. The statistic cited to support this assertion is that in the first half of 1961, there were 171 abortions (and 277 in urban areas) for

A collection of forces such as practically non-existent sexual education in primary and secondary schools, the prevalence of alcohol use/abuse among youth, and the negative influence of erotic imagery in both foreign and domestic films forged (according to the report's author) newly permissive attitudes toward sex among Soviet youth. Official reticence to incorporate meaningful sex education into school curricula gave greater weight to fictional depictions of sensuality. In addition to gossip and obscene jokes in school hallways, these films proved quite influential in the acquisition of sexual knowledge. Cathy Young (née Ekaterina Jung) recalls that even though "there was little we could learn about sex from the silver screen" due to the censor's scissors, both she and her classmates still looked to both Soviet and imported films for glimpses into the sexual realm due to their otherwise limited avenues for accessing this kind of information.[16]

According to Komsomol records, of the more than 2.3 million clinical abortions performed in 1961, more than 100,000 of the patients were under the age of 18—a number said to have risen each year. Statistics generated from spot checks of abortions performed on minors revealed that their pregnancies resulted from: regular sexual intercourse (52.8%), chance or occasional sexual activity (41.7%), or rape (5.5%). In the data indicating rising numbers of venereal disease infections among young persons, authorities read improper attitudes toward sex—particularly among those in their twenties. As part of a punitive regime that criminalized the spreading of venereal disease, clinics carefully monitored patients seeking treatment.

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every 100 live births in the Soviet Union. The all-union ratio for 1961 is 138:100. See RGASPI f. 1-m, op. 1, d. 28, l. 116.

[16] Cathy Young, *Growing Up in Moscow: Memories of a Soviet Girlhood* (London: Ticknor & Fields, 1989), 168-169. Young's experience also matches Anna Rotkirch's analysis regarding the means by which the first two generations of Soviet youth primarily garnered information about sex. While Rotkirch highlights the role of foreign romantic fiction in creating knowledge for young Soviet readers, film also fits in this framework. See *op. cit.*, "'What Kind of Sex'."

Physicians registered 594 cases of syphilis and gonorrhea among minors in 1960 and 628 cases in 1961. The authors working in the Komsomol's sporting and defense *otdel'* blamed three primary factors in the spread of VD among youth—intoxication, prostitution, and homosexuality. "Drunkenness contributes to the transmission of venereal disease. Seventy-seven percent of men and 28% of women were infected in a state of intoxication. As a result of amoral behavior, they often do not know who infected them. Only half of the cases can identify the source of their infection."[17] If the authorities' insistence in connecting alcohol to risky sexual activity can be thought to be at least logically consistent, their assertions about homosexuality were of a much more specious nature. The evidence provided for such is only as follows: "One of the sources of venereal disease is homosexuality, which exists among adolescents. In Minsk alone, there are roughly 300 *pederasty* and of the 23 persons there infected with syphilis, 11 are *pederasty*."[18]

Direct criticism of (young) male sexuality surfaces in the Komsomol's suggestion of factors constituent of a "rape culture" at work in Soviet society. Or, at the very least, a blind eye toward sexual violence among members of the public.[19] Soviet authorities typically avoided all public discussion of rape and sexual violence. Despite this silence, the numbers of reported rapes had steadily risen since 1954.[20] Rare mention outside of specialist criminological

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[17] RGASPI f. 1-m, op. 1, d. 28, l. 119.

[18] *Ibid*. I've chosen to not translate the word used in the report, as the choice of *pederast* over the medical(ized) term *gomoseksualist* ("homosexual") connotes criminality (even though Soviet law criminalized all male same-sex activity) as well as furthering notions of deviancy, thus providing an insight into the mindset of the report's author(s).

[19] On the ways in which violence governs gender/sexual relations outside of the actual sex act, see also Elena Zdravomyslova, "A Cultural Paradigm of Sexual Violence Reconstructed from a Woman's Biographical Interview," in *Models of Self: Russian Women's Autobiographical Texts*, ed. Marianne Liljeström, Arja Rosenholm, and Irina Savkina (Helsinki: Kikimora, 2000), 207–228.

[20] Fürst, "The Arrival of Spring?," ref. 16.

literature pointed to rape as a constituent feature of the decadent morals of the capitalist West or occasionally acknowledged the actions of a few domestic deviants. This silence merged with gendered codes of sexual behavior to produce a culture that at the very least did not wish to confront rape and sexual violence. When discussed in the Soviet press, legal professionals and pedagogical authorities often attributed instances of rape as a result of improper upbringing or poor moral/sexual education. Aleksandr Shpeer, writing for *Literaturnaia gazeta* in 1966, claimed that after reviewing a number of recent rape cases that all parties involved shared false notions regarding manhood and femininity, and held only "utilitarian views of intimate relations."[21] Shpeer and his contemporaries generally localized sexual violence in the rough masculine camaraderie of the *dvor* that exalted force and marginal criminal activity. In the same breath as he condemned the actions of young rapists, Shpeer also ridiculed their victims for their behavior. He mockingly suggests the need for protecting society against "these girls who drink as if they were one of the guys and put on an obscene show with their dancing."[22]

Sexlogist Igor Kon claims that "rape constituted 90 to 95% of all Soviet sex offenses" during the 1960s caused (at least in part) by a "low sexual culture"—though the exact meaning of this statement remains rather opaque.[23] Physician Mikhail Stern attributes certain propensities toward sexual violence as a product of the institutionalized state violence of the Soviet system and the lingering effects of the Gulag on social relations. According to him, "rape is a logical consequence of the kind of sexual frustration and relations between the sexes that

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[21] Aleksandr Shpeer, "Trudnaia tema," *Literaturnaia gazeta* (July 2, 1966), 2.

[22] *Ibid*.

[23] Igor S. Kon, *The Sexual Revolution in Russia: From the Age of the Czars to Today*, trans. James Riordan (New York: Free Press, 1995), 211-222. It is possible that Kon is referring to other listed crimes associated with sexuality such as homosexuality or prostitution.

exist in the USSR."[24] Both theories leave much to be desired. Neither provides much in the way of explanation and the latter, in particular, falsely mitigates actual victimhood and removes agency and culpability from the offender. They also, by virtue of their framing, produce virtually untestable truisms, muddying more than they elucidate. Moreover, as one prominent scholar suggests, these silences have been mirrored in historical writing as little is known about rape in the postwar Soviet Union.[25]

A better place to look for explanations is in the gender order governing sexuality in the postwar epoch. Commenting on Soviet sexual relations, Deborah Field states, "Sexual continence thus placed different requirements on each gender…men and boys had to resist their own desires, whereas women and girls had to resist men."[26] The Soviet Union was not alone in this particular ordering of sexual behavior. American feminist scholar Dianne Herman advanced a similar claim in 1984 about contemporaneous American sexual codes:

> In this country people are raised to believe that men are sexually active and aggressive and women are sexually passive and submissive. Since it is assumed that men cannot control their desires, every young woman is taught that she must be the responsible party in any sexual encounter. In such a society men and women are trained to believe that the sexual act involves domination. Normal heterosexual relations are pictured as consisting of an aggressive male forcing himself on a female who seems to fear sex but unconsciously wants to be overpowered. […] Our culture can be characterized as a rape culture because the image of heterosexual intercourse is based on a rape model of sexuality.[27]

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[24] Mikhail Stern and August Stern, *Sex in the Soviet Union*, trans. Marc E. Heine (London: W. H. Allen, 1981), 169. It is difficult to classify the nature of this work. Stern worked as a medical doctor prior to his sentencing to a prison in the early 1970s. His writing combines elements of both a scientific study and a dissident/prison camp memoir.

[25] Dan Healey, "Comrades, Queers, and 'Oddballs': Sodomy, Masculinity, and Gendered Violence in Leningrad Province of the 1950s," *Journal of the History of Sexuality* 21, no. 3 (September 2012): 496–522.

[26] Field, *Private Life and Communist Morality*, 54.

[27] Dianne Herman, "The Rape Culture," in *Women: A Feminist Perspective*, ed. Jo Freeman, 3rd ed. (Palo Alto, CA: Mayfield, 1984), 20–38.

Herman asserts that instances of rape often result from men trying to prove their masculinity to other men through "displays of dominance" over women. Following from both Field's characterization of the gendered nature of Soviet sex and Herman's theorization of rape, it is clear that the Soviet Union and the United States of the mid-to-late twentieth century shared certain essential elements of this model.

Police reports from urban areas around the country indicate that the abduction and assault of women often occurred in populated public spaces. According to Komsomol authorities, "characteristic of these actions is the lack of complaints of the victims and this impunity leads to bold, cynical crime." Pervasive fears of reporting these crimes to the police render arrest and prosecution statistics incomplete at best. The effective immunity given to offenders further points to the existence of a "rape culture" that normalizes violence within sexual relations. Those stories preserved in the archive, though, do provide clues into the vicious nature of this culture of rape. According to the sporting and defense *otdel*'s report, instances of attempted rape reportedly grew in the RSFSR by 41% between 1958 and 1961.[28] More than half of those prosecuted at this time were youth (commonly defined by Soviet authorities as under the age of 25).[29] The Presidium issued a decree in February 1962 meant to strengthen penalties for what it viewed as the most heinous sex crimes—including "rape when committed by a group of persons or a particularly dangerous recidivist or when accompanied with particularly grave consequences and also the rape of a minor." These offenses now carried a penalty of eight to 15 years in

[28] Significant barriers to reporting always complicate official rape statistics. It is safe to assume that numbers of actual incidents are also much higher than police totals would suggest.

[29] In 1961, 1142 boys aged between 14 and 18 were prosecuted for rape, as well as 4127 aged between 18 and 25. The corresponding figures for 1960 are respectively listed as 251 and 1807.

prison.[30] Absent from this decree were measures meant to punish more routine (and presumably more common) instances of rape.

The story of the Sazonov gang (consisting of 16 young men) operating in Kuibyshev illustrates the particularly brazen character noted by the authorities. Gang members lured or abducted girls from the premises of a local school for workers and took them to a neighboring courtyard where they were assaulted. Police investigations allege that this group raped 32 women (of which 30 were minors) all in the same manner and charged the members with a total of 83 counts.[31] The fact that these abuses occurred repeatedly in open spaces testifies to a public unwillingness to confront these criminal actions—further evidenced by reports that a number of the victims had been abducted a second, and even a third, time. That same year in Moscow, another group operating out of a home on Gorky Street, one of the city's main thoroughfares, stood accused of more than 60 rapes.[32] Volgograd authorities reported the commission of two instances of rapes by groups of minors on the same day in November 1963.[33] The fact that these (and other criminal) activities occurred in groups of youth particularly raised alarm in authorities. One report stated that of crimes committed by adolescents, more than 60% were in groups—calling forth the specter of unhinged adolescents harboring depraved desires.[34] Dan

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[30] For the text of this decree, see *Current Digest of the Soviet Press* 14, no. 7 (March 14, 1962), 4.

[31] The total number of victims is not listed in the *otdel*'s report, but can be found in RGASPI f. 1-m, op. 28, l. 107.

[32] *Ibid*.

[33] RGASPI f. 1-m, op. 260, l. 11.

[34] RGASPI f. 1-m, op. 128, l. 1. This report also mentions that a group of adolescents in Kuibyshev recently committed 100 rapes. It is unclear whether or not this was the Sazanov group mentioned above. Also c.f. Herman, "The Rape Culture," 25. She writes, "one of the most overlooked aspects of rape is that it is frequently a group phenomenon...The rapist in a

Healey has also suggested in a recent article that rape of women could even be used to create a context for generating consent for homosexual encounters. In cases of male-male sexual relations (or rape), violence against effeminate men could even act as a shield for their identities as they reasserted their masculinity and dispelled any aura of "queerness."[35]

If expert opinion blurred the line between attack and victim in rape cases, women's supposedly uncharacteristic entrance into debauched lifestyles provoked even more consternation. Locating sexual desire inside the male body, authorities needed to find a reason for their choice. Komsomol officials regularly invoked ineffective parenting and/or a lack of education as one (or as a partial) explanation. Another explanation commonly cited revolved around a discourse of "fallen women." Through their contact with men and intoxicating substances, this narrative goes, young women entered a world of profligate sex said to lead to unwanted pregnancies, prostitution, VD infections, and even addiction. Accordingly, men seduce women by evenings in restaurants and at dances that later end behind closed doors. Missing from this narrative are ideas of consent and other ambiguities of desire. Pathologization of female sexual desire cloaks these stories in seduction and depravity. Discussing four Alma-Ata women fitting this description, Komsomol authorities wrote: "Conversations with the aforementioned women, their neighbors, and relatives found that they regularly visited public

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group rape is not only expressing his hostility toward women and asserting his masculinity to himself but also proving his manhood to others." Kon also makes a similar connection when discussing sexual violence in the early 1990s. See his *The Sexual Revolution in Russia*, esp. ch. 12.

[35] Healey, "Comrades, Queers, and 'Oddballs'." Here Healey deploys a close analysis of two court cases set in "urban-type settlements" outside of Leningrad in order to examine the ways in which homosexuality and queerness operated in the postwar, semi-urban Soviet context. These environs necessitated that men desiring same-sex relations develop strategies for concealment, as well as for producing proper spaces for fulfilling these desires. In one case, the defendant regularly used offers of sex with his wife as a means of attracting men to him, thus serving as a "means of exchange between men." Physical or psychological violence against the wife functioned to create a space for male-male sex within a "regime of silence."

gathering places (*obshchestvennye mesta*) in the city, made the acquaintance of men, visited restaurants with them [as well as] dens of iniquity (*pritony*), and performed sexual services for them."[36] Another group of four "victims of depravity" (*zhertvy razvrata*), known around town as the "black four," quit attending school to partake regularly in drinking parties where they were said to dance in the nude and pose for pornographic photographs. Their story came to the attention of authorities after checking in to a clinic for gonorrhea treatment.[37]

Komsomol authorities, as demonstrated in previous chapters, regularly invoked the need to mobilize cadres and rework plans for mass pedagogy (*vospitanie*) in order to inculcate communist values among Soviet youth and combat antisocial behavior—such as sexual violence. Examining Komsomol reports and communiqués contained in formerly classified folders from this period reveals persistent anxieties about a world out of step with the purported mores of the party-state. Violations subsumed under the heading of petty hooliganism accounted for a great deal of Soviet juvenile delinquency and criminality during the 1950s and 1960s. But this does not tell the whole story. Youth criminality as a whole appeared on the rise during the 1950s and 1960s. In just the two years between 1960 and 1962, the number of youth offenders doubled. Robberies accounted for a little over 15% of all crimes committed by youth and rape, 9.6%. Forty-two percent of these perpetrators were classified as workers. Students in professional-technical schools made up another 17.3%, as well as those studying under the general curriculum, 13.5%. Only 13% could be considered as true parasites or layabouts (*tuneiadtsy*).[38] These figures meant that authorities could not simply blame criminality on social marginals. A

[36] RGASPI f. 1-m, op. 133, l. 68.
[37] *Ibid*.
[38] RGASPI f. 1-m, op. 1, d. 28, ll. 33-35.

network of educational-correctional facilities for minors administered by the *militsiia* existed throughout the Soviet Union geared toward instilling communist values. In the early 1960s, this system consisted of 102 children's "holding centers," (*detskikh priemnika-raspredeliteliia*) 36 educational colonies, and 22 labor colonies. The numbers entering these facilities gradually increased during this time, rising from 53,013 in 1959 to 57,862 in 1960 and 61,889 in 1961. Boys and young men comprised the vast majority of the interned, but special facilities also existed for girls and young women (including six designated educational colonies).[39]

The question of male youth engaging in (at least according to official statistics) rising instances of sexual violence reveals a different picture of this period. In light of these circumstances, the promulgation of the tenets of communist morality at this time suggests an active attempt on the part of authorities to head off this dark facet of life. Following Khrushchev's speech at the XIV Komsomol Congress in 1961 calling on *komsomol'tsy* to fight against violations of communist morality in everyday life, special sessions were conducted that targeted promiscuity and sexual assault among youth. In late 1962, members of the Moscow division of the Komsomol conducted sessions regarding two separate group rape cases—thus combating the pervasive climate of silence. News of these sessions quickly rose to the regional committee and *militsiia* administration, ultimately resulting in the arrests of the offenders.[40] However, as common for the period, authorities persisted in treating offenses of this nature as a result of ignorance and a lack of sound moral education—the same explanation given for otherwise consensual expressions of youth sexuality. Komsomol members also participated in these actions. Reports of *komsomol'tsy* participating in criminal activity did not necessarily

[39] RGASPI f. 1-m, op, 1, d. 28, ll. 132-144.

[40] RGASPI f. 1-m, op. 1, d. 28, ll. 182-185.

suggest total waywardness within the "elite" of Soviet youth. However, they do say something about the level of political-educational work being conducted in various local cells. This countered assertions that society and parents were largely to blame for creating errant juveniles.[41] For example, of the seven young men accused of raping a girl at the "Communism" swine kolkhoz in the remote Amu-Dar'inskogo region of the Kara-Kalpak ASSR, four were members of the local Komsomol organization and students at the "Krupskaia" secondary school.[42]

Inculcating the tenets of communist morality required the enlistment of upstanding citizens beyond reproach. Citing the work of Mikhail Kalinin—a party leader and longtime member of Stalin's inner circle—VLKSM Central Committee member A. G. Luk'ianenko insisted that morality was not only taught in a classroom, but also by example.[43] Even though their work necessitated a more active role than simply teaching by example, these instructors still needed to live in the prescribed manner. The issuance of the ten tenets in 1961 placed a greater onus on the ranks of educators to uphold the moral standards of the day. Recently declassified Komsomol materials reveal official anxieties concerning the question of cadres. When schools and various institutions received blame for producing young deviants, Komsomol authorities often held the lifestyles of instructors and supervisors to blame. Bad behavior on the part of teachers generated serious repercussions. Both youth and judicial authorities placed a high degree of faith in education's ability to produce upright citizens. One internal Komsomol report from 1962 argued, "judicial practice shows that 75% of youths convicted for hooliganism

[41] See, for example, RGASPI f. 1-m, op. 1, d. 29, l. 3.

[42] RGASPI f. 1-m, op. 1, d. 28, ll. 66-67.

[43] See RGASPI f. 1-m, op. 1, d. 133, ll. 32-33.

dropped out of school. More than 50% of the convicted did not take part in lessons or in social work. Ninety percent of adolescents brought before a court did not have a seventh-grade education."[44] By failing to hold their charges accountable, or by inculcating negative social attitudes, school administrations and teachers helped to create disorder.[45]

Reports of teachers and school administrators failing to uphold communist morality cropped up throughout the country. Their violations ranged from the grave and violent to the relatively mundane, such as a trip to a "sobering-up station." On the latter end of this scale, Komsomol authorities criticized the "insensitive, bureaucratic attitude" taken by school faculties toward students resulting in failures in their pedagogical missions. The case of K., a student living in the village of Udarnoe in the Sakhalin oblast', crystallized these visions. Despite his performance as a top pupil and his dedication to social work, the administration expelled K. after a fight with another student. Central Komsomol authorities recognized that the administrations followed the rules, but took them to task for applying them in such as rigid fashion. K. had served as a local Komsomol leader and led summer agricultural work brigades. Outside of his quarrel with the other student, K. represented the model young Soviet citizen in the making. However, the termination of his studies forced him into another world. K. began tending local fields and petitioned the school for re-admittance to no avail. Defeated by his failures, he later confessed that he then gravitated towards crime, committing a series of thefts out of desperation.[46]

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[44] RGASPI f. 1-m, op. 1, d. 128, ll. 8-27. Statistics quoted on l. 13.

[45] On the problem of cadres in postwar military training, see Fraser, "Masculinities in the Motherland," 44-45.

[46] RGASPI f. 1-m, op. 1, d. 128, l. 16.

Teachers engaging in sexual relationships with their charges gave particular alarm to Komsomol authorities. One teacher in the town of Pushkino (Moscow *oblast'*) committed suicide after stories of his "cohabitation" with a student surfaced in 1962. Rumor had it that the teacher had engaged in similar relationships with other students and that the student in question had previously "systemically cohabited" with other students.[47] An Alma-Ata *fizkul'tura* instructor stood accused of turning his home into a site for drunken orgies with teenaged girls.[48] Youth authorities in the Uzbek SSR strongly condemned reports that that some local teachers had engaged in unlawful sexual relationships with students and other minors. Tajik authorities also brought one teacher to trial for raping a female student in the fifth course and then afterwards "cohabiting" with her.[49] In another disturbing case, a teacher confessed to the rape of a girl in the third course.[50]

At the other end of the spectrum from traditional pedagogy existed the institution of the DTK (*Detskii-trudovoi koloniia*, or children's labor colony). This instrument of last resort in modifying the behavior of errant youths acted as a combination of juvenile detention facility and boarding school. But the cadres in these facilities did not always measure up to standard. One former student in the Vilnius DTK complained:

> I studied upwards of a year in this school (*v uchilishche*) and was moved into the second course. I want to say that I received no education (*vospitanie*) in this school. There was no order, only absolute chaos. The director was ignorant of these conditions and his deputy was a drunk and rarely showed up. The children often found him drunk in a restaurant in town and brought him home. All the

[47] RGASPI f. 1-m, op, 1, d. 128, l. 5.
[48] RGASPI f. 1-m, op. 1, d. 133, l. 33.
[49] RGASPI f. 1-m, op. 1, d. 260, l. 13.
[50] RGASPI f. 1-m, op. 1, d. 28, ll. 66-67.

> power is in the hands of the upperclassmen, who take from the younger children uniforms, meals, etc.[51]

When the supervisor and his deputy left the facility on weekends, the upperclassmen organized two-day orgies of drink and sex. The author of the letter complains that this atmosphere "taught him to drink" as the upperclassmen took money sent by his aunt and forced him to buy vodka. An attorney commenting on this situation alleged that the administration further contributed to the low level of education through the use of "anti-pedagogical measures" such as beatings, the punitive cutting of hair, and deprivation of food.[52]

DTK administrators maintained statistics on their charges, connecting together youth criminality, substance abuse and premature sexual experiences. A 1963 report indicated that 90.7% of students interned in DTKs consumed alcohol, often drinking together with their comrades on the street or in more discreet locations. These behaviors directly contributed to their criminal activities. One thousand three hundred and eighty-five of those adolescents then serving in a DTK were sentenced for sex crimes (*polovye prestuplenie*)—or roughly one-tenth of the more than 10,500 adolescent offenders. Their report also remarked that 57% of their charges reported feeling sexual needs and that 52% onanistically satisfied these urges.[53] In this context, these stray anecdotes serve to ascribe sexual desires among adolescents to the realm of deviancy. Their presence in this particular group connoted to the authorities not the "normal" presence of adolescent sexuality, but rather markedly degenerate traits necessitating correction. To be certain, the actions of these youth do not reflect the behavior of the vast majority. However, these instances of sexual violence or profligacy described in this section raised the ire of

[51] RGASPI f. 1-m, op. 1, d. 28, l. 42.
[52] RGASPI f. 1-m, op. 1, d. 28, l. 43.
[53] RGASPI f. 1-m, op. 1, d. 128, ll. 36-37.

Komsomol authorities especially, perhaps, due to their awareness of changing sexual attitudes throughout members of this generation.

Returns and Arrivals

Attempts to "de-Stalinize" the party-state apparatus during the 1950s and early 1960s sought to preserve the Soviet system in essence while reckoning with those deviations attributed to the cult of personality. Re-examination of the cases against and quiet amnesty of political prisoners falsely sentenced in the preceding decades functioned not only as a key element of this process. Gulag amnesties also serve as a symbol for de-Stalinization as a whole, occurring in a contentious and circuitous manner within the chambers of the Soviet political elite. Popular anecdotes tell of returnees fatefully bumping into their denouncers or interrogators on the street, leaving both parties stunned and forced to confront the divergent paths of the Stalinist experience.[54] Fears surrounding the return of the forgotten were also imbued with the specter of sexual deviance. Men sentenced under article 121 (approved in 1934) of the penal code for sodomy were not eligible for amnesty as they were considered to be common criminals rather than political prisoners, as well as those sentenced for other sex crimes. Even though few early memoirists were willing to tackle the subject of same-sex relations within the camps (and the often-violent social degradation that accompanied these acts) pervasive rumors coded the Gulag experience with it.[55] In the process of reviewing legal codes as part of de-Stalinization, article

[54] Indeed, Iurii Trifonov's *The House on the Embankment*, one of the most popular works of Soviet urban prose, takes this idea of diverging paths as its theme.

[55] Anthropologist Adi Kuntsman has illuminated the recurrent theme of disgust in Gulag memoirs written by members of the intelligentsia (political prisoners) who contrasted their positions vis-à-vis the criminal populations (depicted as homosexual). In Varlam Shamalov's writing, for example, male-male relations in the camps are described as subhuman and compared to animals. See her article, "'With a Shade of Disgust': Affective Politics of Sexuality and Class in Memoirs of the Stalinist Gulag," *Slavic Review* 68, no. 2 (Summer 2009): 308–328.

121 received no attention, remaining on the books until 1993. As one scholar put it, "the decision, whether consciously taken or not, to retain the Stalinist prohibition against sodomy in the de-Stalinized criminal codes was perhaps born of the fear that returnees from the brutality of camp life could carry 'mental infection' to society, spreading the 'perversions' of Gulag existence."[56] Popular disgust over this "infection" spreading in society at large represented an assault on notions of compulsory heterosexuality as a marker of Soviet masculinity. Dan Healey has asserted that "the police and courts were labeling more and more male homosexuals with the collaboration of forensic medical specialists" as annual sodomy convictions during the 1960s and 1970s grew by a rate of 40 percent.[57] Fear of the male Gulag survivor's imagined desires sent out shockwaves of panic among the Soviet state and citizenry during this time of trickling return.

The arrival of foreign students from Africa, Latin America, and the Middle East by the hundreds to the Soviet capital and other cities in the early 1960s brought about a different set of anxieties and challenges to hegemonic conceptions of Soviet masculinity and corresponding notions of sexual privilege. With the opening of People's Friendship University (later to be named in honor of the first post-colonial leader of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Patrice Lumumba) Soviet authorities began actively recruiting students from both nations only recently

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[56] Healey, *Homosexual Desire*.

[57] *Ibid.*, 246. Analyzing the available archival evidence, Healey writes on p. 260: "…in the ordinary justice system, the number of men convicted for both voluntary and aggravated sodomy was much lower than rates in the 1960s and later." On gay life during and after de-stalinization, see *idem*., "Moscow," in *Queer Sites: Gay Urban Histories Since 1600*, ed. David Higgs (London and New York: Routledge, 1999), 49-56. Here he argues that the Soviet state's monopolization of living space and criminalization of homosexuality created a "culture of the toilet" for same-sex desiring men, pushing them to claim public spaces for sexual fulfillment.

emerging from the grip of colonial authorities and those still subjugated under imperial rule.[58] In the preceding years, thousands of foreign students had enrolled throughout the Soviet Union—the majority of whom were from China. What made the People's Friendship University different was its explicit goal of attracting citizens from "dependent territories" and developing nations that had recently thrown off the yoke of imperialism. International anti-communist forces condemned this development, questioning the Soviet Union's intent in creating their specialized educational programs. South African officials declared, "it is Moskow's [sic] aim to teach students from developing countries to become communist agitators" and that the creation of separate universities for these students amounted to open hypocrisy and a Soviet version of apartheid.[59]

During the 1957 international youth festival, Soviet youth had encountered (and were said to have positively received) small delegations from these nations. As historian Vladislav Zubok writes of these meetings, "the sympathies of Russian students, male and especially female, belonged to tall and handsome Africans from Ghana and Kenya, as well as Indians and delegates from African countries. In the eyes of the Russians their appearance and dress were exotic, and they were surrounded by the aura of the anticolonial liberation movements."[60] Yet,

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[58] People's Friendship University was not the only one of its kind in the Soviet Bloc. For example, East German officials opened an "ideological college" in Bogensee (north of Berlin) in the early 1960s that actively recruited African (and other foreign) students. See South African National Archives Repository (henceforth NAR). BTS 24/65. "Germany Opens 'Ideas War College' for Africans," *The Star* (Johannesburg), March 9, 1961. Other specialized universities or university divisions existed in Budapest, Berlin (GDR), Bernau (GDR), Warsaw, and Krakow. See NAR. BTS 24/65. "'Universities' for African Communists," *The Star* (Johannesburg), October 26, 1960.

[59] NAR. BTS 24/65. Internal report entitled, "Racial Discrimination," dated December 7, 1960.

[60] Zubok, *Zhivago's Children*, 108.

as will be shown below, memoirs written by some of these students reflect tension and open hostility between Soviet students and Third World student populations centered on themes of comparative sexual and material privilege.

In November 1960, a young Liberian student by the name of William Nmle Appleton arrived in icy Moscow to enroll in the engineering faculty of People's Friendship University. Prior to his arrival, Appleton had actively been seeking a scholarship to a Western university in order to pursue his studies, but had made the acquaintance of a certain Kuprianov in the Liberian capital of Monrovia who urged him to put in an application to study in the Soviet Union without even finishing the coursework for his high school diploma. Later writing in his memoir, *Friendship University Moscow*, after his return, Appleton would come to refer to Kuprianov as a "talent scout" charged with recruiting for the newly opened university in order to build up Communist agitational cadres in Africa via the promise of a free education. Appleton's memoir is openly polemical, seeking to warn others about the dangers of accepting Soviet scholarships and their nefarious aims on the African continent (though, interestingly he claims his allegiances are loosely Pan-African, with the intent of encouraging non-alignment). In this effort he is far from alone. A number of African students who became disillusioned with Soviet education spoke out in interviews and wrote press releases in the same realm (and were perhaps encouraged to do so by apartheid and imperial supporters). However, Appleton's memoir also offers a window into race relations during the early 1960s, partly in regard to the experience of explicit sexual tensions arising from the appearance of male African students on the streets and in the dormitory residences of the Soviet capital.[61]

[61] William Nmle Appleton, *Friendship University Moscow: The Student Trap* (Stuttgart: Editiones Pro Libertate, 1965). The "trap" that he refers to in the title comes from Appleton's claim that these students often arrived in Moscow "illegally" as per their home countries'

Certainly, students like Appleton experienced a certain level of privilege not given to other Soviet students, which directly contributed to this tense atmosphere. In addition to free tuition and housing, African students at the People's Friendship University received a monthly stipend of 900 rubles (compared to the 280-420 rubles received by Soviet students), a one-time clothing allowance of 3000 rubles, paid airfare to visit their homes twice yearly, and supposedly preferential treatment in housing.[62] International students, like Appleton, also maintained another source of relative privilege. Often members of growing post-colonial middle and upper classes, their families provided a secondary source of income that improved their lifestyles and facilitated material consumption and travel. On top of all of these factors, students in possession of their passports from home could travel to Western countries during holidays, providing them with not only a freedom of movement denied to all but a few Soviet students, but also precious access to foreign material goods (such as European clothing, books, and records) whose presence further intensified social tensions in the dormitories when they returned to start the new semester. According to Appleton, the playing of African music, jazz and other Western records in the dormitory initially served to create friendships with young Russians interested in hearing these rare records. However, university and local Komsomol authorities ultimately decided to ban these listening parties in 1961 through a new rule forbidding reception of guests in

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restrictions, and therefore the Soviet state had the ability to manipulate them into doing its bidding through denial of their passports (if they had them to begin with) or some form of exit visa, thus "trapping" them indefinitely behind Soviet borders. On the displacement and foreignness of "blackness" in centuries of Russian history, see Kesha Fikes and Alaina Lemon, "African Presence in Former Soviet Spaces," *Annual Review of Anthropology* 31 (2002): 497–524.

[62] John Pittman, "Soviet University for Underdeveloped Countries," *New Age* (Cape Town), January 19, 1961. Other accounts dispute Appleton's assertion. Pittman quoted Friendship University rector Sergei Rumiantsev as stating that students from the "third world" were chosen at least partially on their family conditions—with those from the poorest backgrounds awarded entrance.

individual dormitory rooms, though they continued in a less open fashion.[63] This change in housing policy, permitting guests only to visit in special receiving rooms, resulted from a growing anxiety about an inversion in the proper channels for cultural exchange, and as well be demonstrated below, a profound anxiety about interracial coupling.

The physical presence of African and other "third world" men on the streets of Moscow triggered the most volatile responses due to persistent fears about their potential sexual interaction with Russian women. Like the panic regarding the importation of Gulag sexual practices (especially homosexuality) back into mainstream Soviet society, popular myth-making constructed these students as a virulent sexual "other" that threatened to unseat the dominance of Soviet hegemonic masculinity—even if this community numbered only a few thousand by the end of the 1960s. Soviet journalist Yelena Khanga asserts in her memoir that stereotypes about the sexual virility of black men (and women) were common in Soviet Russia. "Given the small number of blacks in my country, I don't have any idea how this belief made its way into the mind of the average Russian. It's hard to place the blame on popular Western culture, because we were isolated for so long from celluloid images of black men as superstuds and black women as hot mamas."[64] Appleton sees these tropes as motivating a specific type of discrimination based on fears of black sexuality. "You see, whatever anyone says, there *is* racial discrimination in Russia. It does not take the form of forbidding us to eat in certain restaurants, or of turning us

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[63] Appleton, *Friendship University Moscow*, 5, 22-23, 38.

[64] Khanga's own origin story provide a unique viewpoint on the Soviet experience. She is the daughter of Zanzibari revolutionary Abduallah Khanga and Lily Golden-Khanga, whose African-American father and Polish-Jewish mother emigrated from the United States to the Soviet Union in 1931. Unlike most American immigrants to the Soviet Union in the 1920s and 1930s, the Goldens elected to renounce their American citizenship and live permanently as Soviet citizens. Yelena Khanga and Susan Jacoby, *Soul to Soul: A Black Russian American Family 1865-1992* (New York and London: W. W. Norton, 1992), 160.

off buses, or of forcing us to live in certain designated areas of town. Racial discrimination in Russia finds violent expression as a result, chiefly of sexual rivalry. And of course it usually takes place when the Russians have been drinking heavily." Acquaintances and colleagues of Appleton's were violently beaten for socializing with Russian girlfriends during his two-and-a-half years in Moscow—even resulting in the arrest of a Russian girl by a band of *komsomol'tsy* for doing the twist with Cameroonian student, François Nganjo—an unacceptable dance step with an inappropriate partner. In addition to the others, Appleton himself claims that a group of Russian toughs slashed him with a knife in a fight over his German date at a party at the Hotel Moskva.[65] In each of these cases, the *militsiia* turned a blind eye and permitted violence against African students to continue and complaints to higher authorities went without reaction.[66]

Four Russian students attacked Somali student Abdulhamid Mohammed Hussein at a Moscow State University party in 1960 in a dispute over his date. KGB and Ministry of Higher Education (Minvuz) investigators let the Russian students go as they claimed they had only been defending the girl from being insulted by a rude foreigner. Concerning Hussein, the case is complicated by his multiple previous run-ins with Soviet authorities for drunkenness and fighting, culminating in his expulsion from an MGU dormitory.[67] Regardless, in this incident,

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[65] Appleton, *Friendship University Moscow*, 39-43.

[66] South African government officials also acknowledged these prohibitions on intermingling. See *op. cit*. "Racial Discrimination."

[67] Julie Hessler, "Death of an African Student: Race, Politics, and the Cold War," *Cahiers du Monde russe* 47, no. 1/2 (January 2006): 33–64. For a specific discussion of Hussein's case, see p. 36-37. Of the many causes said to prompt the sexual tension between Russian and African students, Hessler points to the significant gender imbalance between students brought from "Third World" countries. More to the point, she states that the evidence suggests there were no African female students present in the first years of the 1960s—a statement which is directly contradicted by Appleton's memoir (which is not cited in Hessler's

the word of the Russian students proved more convincing to the KGB and Minvuz agents. Others complained that the authorities refused to grant diplomas to the Soviet wives of these foreign students and blacklisted them from employment.[68] UPI correspondent Aline Mosby also claims that the decision to reinstitute gender-segregated housing at Moscow University stemmed from official displeasure with Soviet girls dating Africans (and other foreign students).[69]

Andrew Amar, a Ugandan student who travelled to the Soviet Union from London in 1959 to enroll in Moscow University, records in his memoir other tactics used by Komsomol activists in university dormitories to prevent liaisons between Soviet women and foreign students.[70] Amar claims that *komsomol'tsy* stationed in each floor carefully watched the comings and goings of all visitors to the rooms of African and Arab students—closely monitoring the movements of Soviet girls. Activists would suddenly burst into rooms in order to break up conversations or invite the female visitors back to their rooms. In other cases, they carefully inspected the mandatory visitors' log held off of the first floor's vestibule in order to later lodge slanderous complaints. Amar writes:

> We had some guests in a room in the main building. It was after 11:30 p.m., the zero hour by which all guests must leave, but we did not notice the time. Soon there was a knock on the door. A Komsomol activist asked why we still had guests. We said we were just finishing our drinks. But as our guests left the building the Komsomol accosted them, and then began a regular interrogation of the Russian girl who had been among the guests. She was not allowed to have her passport until the next morning, when she was again interrogated. We later learned that her house warden had received a poison-pen letter from the University Komsomol, blackening and

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article). Though, it is worth noting that he too points to the gender imbalance between African students as a motivating force to seek out Russian female companionship.

[68] NAR. BTS 24/65. Report entitled "Three Ex-Bursary Holders of the University of Moscow Complain of Soviet Methods."

[69] Mosby, *The View from No. 13 People's Street*, 156.

[70] Andrew Richard Amar, *A Student in Moscow* (London: Ampersand Ltd., 1961).

slandering her personal character and demanding she should be stopped form meeting African students. Such were the indignities to which we were subjected.[71]

A precedent existed for this invasive policing of sexual relations by militant *komsomol'tsy*. The 1957 youth festival lives on in popular memory as the summer in which Soviet women freely coupled with members of foreign delegations arriving during this unprecedented opening of the borders for cultural exchange. On one level, as Kristin Roth-Ey demonstrates, Soviet visual iconography created for the festival celebrated the spirit of romance between citizens and delegates as an extension of the ideals of friendship and peace amid the Cold War. Yet, on another, roving bands of *druzhiny* marched through public places during the festival, detaining those engaging in licentious behavior and breaking the codes of communist morality. Rumors circulated that those Soviet women caught participating in intimate acts with foreign delegates had their heads shaven by Komsomol bands or were shipped off elsewhere.[72] Russian men found in sexual situations with foreign women do not appear to have received the same kind of vitriolic scorn. Kim Chernin, an American in Moscow at the time of the festival recalls coming across a partially undressed young Russian man with a foreign woman on the banks of the Moskva River. The *druzhiny* that found the couple merely shined their flashlights

[71] *Ibid.,* 34-35.

[72] Kristin Roth-Ey, "'Loose Girls' on the Loose?: Sex, Propaganda, and the 1957 Moscow Youth Festival," in *Women in the Khrushchev Era*, ed. Melanie Ilič, Susan E. Reid, and Lynne Attwood (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 75–94. On the basis of archival evidence and testimonies in various memoirs, Roth-Ey argues that there is reason to believe that, at least in some cases, these rumors are true. Head shaving also was a common method of publicly shaming *stiliagi*, cutting their Western-influenced hairstyles down to something socially appropriate for a young Soviet man. However, what might have amounted to a few incidents became in the Russian imaginary a full-blown embodiment of sexual decadence. Persistent rumor regarding the birth of biracial children as a result of these couplings is also suggestive in this regard.

on them, made a few jokes, and then left.[73] These incidents represent the popular cultural privilege held by Soviet (but primarily, Russian) men over regulating sexual boundaries and the appropriateness of various sexual scenarios. Komsomol policing activities generated a sense of isolation that caused many African students to "seek the company of students from the West and from uncommitted countries in preference to that of Russians."[74]

Threats to sexual privilege by the arrival of students from exotic locales were further compounded by a popular mythology purporting the relative affluence of these students and their access to desirable foreign consumer goods. In his fictionalized memoir, dissident artist Alexander Kaletski reflects on his friendship with a Sudanese student of architecture whose position as a "Turkbu" prince and son of a diplomat facilitated a grandiose lifestyle in Moscow, who even the "golden youth" of their circle envied.

> He was handsome, intelligent, and talented, and sure that each girl would fall in love with him at first sight. He had everything a Russian girl dreams about – washed-out blue jeans with dark spots where pockets had once been, a foreign accent, a tape recorder, and a car. When Youssef drove his ivory-colored Volkswagen, not only girls, but everybody would turn to stare at him, because Youssef was one of the few blacks in Moscow. Before he came to the Soviet Union, he had studied in all the best universities in Europe, and had been thrown out of each one because of his propensity for cognac.[75]

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[73] Kim Chernin, *In My Mother's House* (New Haven: Ticknor & Fields, 1983), 277 as cited in Roth-Ey, "'Loose Girls on the Loose?".

[74] NAR. BTS 24/65. Formerly "confidential" report from the Office of the High Commissioner for the United Kingdom, Cape Town entitled, "Notes on Foreign Students in the Soviet Union" dated February 22, 1960. Quotation on p. 3.

[75] Alexander Kaletski, *Metro: A Novel of the Moscow Underground* (London: Methuen, 1985), 19. This work, while classified as a novel, is generally understood to be a semi-autobiographical reflection on his life as a student and actor in the Moscow Children's Theatre from the mid-1960s until his emigration in 1975. The character of Youssef plays a central role in the lead character's emigration to Israel, as on his return to Sudan he uses his contacts to send him an invitation. While living in New York City, he would achieve fame in the "West" first for his cardboard-medium paintings, and then later, for this novel/memoir. Regarding the "Turkbu", this group appears to be an invention of Kaletski's imagination.

In this litany of status-generating possessions appear many of the (now clichéd) items that allowed a Soviet citizen to live in the "imaginary West"—jeans, a tape recorder, and a car.[76] In the personage of the foreign student echoes of the affluent and connected *stiliagi* resound, but unlike those Soviet playboys, the ability to actually travel to the West and bring back foreign goods with regularity annihilated the competition in this local economy. During his graduate studies at Moscow University (MGU) in the mid-1960s, William Taubman also recalled these associations with affluence and foreign, particularly African, students. In drawing out certain incongruities between Soviet attitudes toward racial discrimination in the United States and its presence in the motherland, Taubman anonymously cites one Russian student as stating, "oppressed colonial masses, hell. […] Half of them are tribal chiefs. No wonder some are disappointed here. They had it better back home."[77]

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[76] In addition to the examples provided above, a passage from David Gurevich lends further support to the way in which ideas of sexual and material privilege blended together at Soviet universities: "Arabs and Africans were warm in their sheepskin coats, they wore blazers and jeans, they drank Cutty Sark and smoked Winstons. Unlike the Vietnamese they seemed to be loaded. As a good Soviet citizen, I was resentful. Every day *Pravda* reported loans extended to Ghana and plants built in India—all out of fraternal duty. Why did this money go to Joe Blow from Accra—so he could spend it on Levi's and Winstons? And do you think Joe showed gratitude? He strutted around the dorm, decked out in shmattes [ed: Yiddish for clothes] to die for. And you should seen the long-legged blondes who came to Joe's parties—lured by the perfume and pantyhose, what else? The very sight of them was a daily blow to my white-male pride." See Gurevich, *From Lenin to Lennon*, 118.

[77] William Taubman, *The View from Lenin Hills* (New York: Coward-McCann, 1967), 126. Other attitudes he encountered were more complicated. In more than one conversation he heard students condemn the treatment of blacks in the United States, while in the next breath the assignation of certain demeaning mental and physical traits along racial lines—arguing that blacks possessed a comparative lack of intelligence, a diminished moral sense, and innate preference for hot climates. Within this conversation, one student went so far as to say, "You have twenty million of them, so you know, eh? No wonder you've got problems in the States." Again though, the primary complaints against African students themselves was their comparative affluence, ownership of desirable consumer goods (particularly clothing), and their alleged tastes for Russian women.

In a more provincial locale with lower levels of material provisioning, the relative prosperity of foreign students would have stood in even starker relief. One 1963 Komsomol report from Alma-Ata alleges that some local girls in the area "sold themselves" (*prodaiutsia*) to Iraqi students studying at a nearby aviation school for blouses, stockings, and cash. Their comparative privilege also shined through in their behavior, as some reportedly smashed televisions and wrecked furniture while studying at the institute—resulting in their dismissal and return home. "On the day of their departure, a few hundred girls waited at the airport, many of whom were [enrolled] in the 8-10 courses. Girls begged the Iraqis, 'never forget our radiant meeting,' 'send presents.' etc."[78] Similar events also occurred in coastal port cities, where local girls mingled with arriving foreign sailors. Komsomol authorities bemoaned the existence of a Novorossiisk club where foreign crews drank, sang, and danced with "lovely girls" (*simpatichnye devushki*) from town, filling the club with "hooting, screeching, and convulsions issued in different languages."[79] Their presence also meant increased opportunities for the purchase of all manner of scarce foreign goods and contraband, which then circulated throughout the local bazaar.

Violence and discrimination against African students in general erupted into a mass protest on the streets of the Moscow on December 19, 1963, following the death of Ghanaian student Edmund Assare-Addo, a medical student at the institute in Kalinin (Tver') whose corpse was found on the outskirts of the city near the MKAD (the major ring highway that typically serves as the dividing line between Moscow proper and the oblast' environs).[80] He was said to

[78] RGASPI f. 1-m, op. 1, d. 133, ll. 109-110.
[79] RGASPI f. 1-m, op. 1, d. 256, ll. 4-5.
[80] Hessler, "Death of an African Student," 33-34.

be marrying his Russian girlfriend within the week, though an autopsy revealed only the consumption of alcohol and no evidence of foul play. While numbering only in the hundreds, African students from around the Soviet Union descended on the capital to make known their grievances regarding popular attitudes toward their presence. One scholar has argued that despite the potentially mitigating circumstances in the case of Hussein, his assault functioned as a symbol of the second-class status of Africans in a land where racism supposedly had been eradicated and can only be considered tangentially related to the actual death. When Soviet authorities did tacitly own up to the existence of racially motivated violence and other forms of discrimination, they attributed it to criminality or non-socialist attitudes carried over from the past.[81] However, while second-class citizens in one respect, individual privilege and the international aims of the Soviet Union within the Cold War context provided these students with an outlet to the foreign media to vent their complaints.

Earlier in 1960, a group of African students were expelled from Soviet universities for academic underperformance and behavioral transgressions. Theopilius Okonkwo, a Nigerian medical student expelled from Moscow University in 1960, harshly condemned his experience in the Soviet Union, decrying demands for totalitarian toadying and forced separation from other students. Anti-communist countries quickly jumped on these stories, using them as cultural weapon in the Cold War. Officials married testimonies of manipulation at the hands of Soviet educational officials and tales of racial discrimination with other anti-communist messages. One South African newspaper declared in 1960, "The Russians have a single object—to capture

[81] *Ibid.,* 38.

Native [i.e. African] minds. They are lavish with money, effort and advice."[82] As the anti-communist power on the African continent, South African government officials took particular interest in cases of African students travelling to the Soviet Union as indicated by archival collections. South African officials urged the United States to expand educational opportunities by providing bursaries for these students to study there as a means of combating communist indoctrination, though in the early 1960s, a few hundred did transfer.[83] Memoirists like Amar and Appleton wrote off testimonies of positive experiences in the Soviet Union by other foreign students as the result of bribes or compulsion. Likewise with denunciations of expelled students like Okonkwo, Soviet authorities endeavored to "sow suspicion and mistrust among the Africans left in Moscow in order to keep them weak and disunited" according to Amar.[84]

Soviet authorities remained keen to downplay these tensions. Moscow-based Progress Publishers internationally issued *We are from Friendship University*, a collection of brief stories written by foreign students extolling the virtues of the Soviet education system, in 1965.[85] The unnamed editors arranged at the front of the book a collection of photographs showcasing the ethnic diversity of the university. African, Latin American, and Asian students are seen together drawing schematics, observing laboratory experiments, and discussing scholarship. For the

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[82] NAR. BTS 24/65. "Russia Woos Students from All Africa," *The Star* (Johannesburg) August 4, 1960.

[83] NAR. BTS 24/65. Secretary for External Affairs report entitled, "African Students in Communist Countries" dated October 13, 1960. African students wishing to leave Soviet and Eastern Bloc universities were instructed by the U. S. Department of State to return tot heir home countries and then apply for admission to American universities. On the United States' decision not to expand financial support, see M. S. Handler, "U.S. Denies Aid for Africans Marooned in Eastern Europe," *The New York Times*, October 11, 1960. For reports of those that did transfer from Soviet to American universities, see NAR. BTS 24/65. "Black Students Quit Red Lands for U.S.," *The Star* (Johannesburg), October 13, 1960.

[84] Amar, *A Student in Moscow*, 54.

[85] *We Are from Friendship University* (Moscow: Progress, 1965).

purposes of this chapter, however, the final photograph in this array deserves particular attention. In the foreground stands Cameroonian student Joseph Akkema Fondem with his presumably Russian wife Tamara's arm draped across his shoulder while both stare transfixed at their son, Felix, held aloft by Fondem. Fondem's account of his experience at Peoples' Friendship University diverges greatly from those of Appleton and Amar. He repeatedly touts the friendly reception that he received from Russians and mentions that he was not the only African student to marry a Russian woman.

> We were once invited to a Moscow plant where the workers gave us a warm welcome and that's where I met a young Russian girl, Tamara Blinova. It must have been funny to watch our conversation: I could hardly speak Russian then, as I had only arrived a few months before, and she didn't know a word of English. The only thing I knew about her when we parted was her name and telephone number. […] In spite of all the difficulties in conversation, Tamara kept up our friendship until I learned to speak fairly well. Soon afterwards we were married.[86]

Other students repeated this trope of friendliness, insisting that the Soviet Union had been nothing but welcoming to foreign students—often contrasting their experience with the cold reception met in Western Europe.[87] Nepalese student Ghana Man Bajracharya lashed out at the negative attention given to the university in Western media. "They don't like the fact that students of young sovereign countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America are getting their education in the Soviet Union and will use this knowledge to build a new life when they return home. […] We can distinguish our friends from our enemies. We have heard about universities where coloured students are forced to have an armed escort. We haven't

[86] *Ibid.*, 68.

[87] For examples of such, see in *Ibid.* the accounts of T. Ekokobé (p. 42-43), Ngandji François (p. 47), Sheikh Mohammed Ali (p. 76-77), and Pokuniall Ramlall (p. 101-102).

forgotten the case of James Meredith in the United States."[88] While individual experiences may have differed, it is clear that both sides hypocritically fanned the flames of racism as a tool in the cultural Cold War. Sex stood out prominently in these tensions, threatening to topple racialized, hegemonic conceptions of masculine privilege and as a menacing (if imagined) symbol of invasion. Sexual anxieties merged with tropes of material privilege, envisioning arriving "third world" students as comparatively wealthy and able to use their advantages to (unintentionally) marginalize Soviet men.

Knowing Sex: Soviet Social Scientists and State Surveillance

By the mid-1960s, a revived social sciences complex returned research into sexuality and intimate spheres of life to academic discourse, as well as the public arena in a more limited fashion. For the first time in nearly forty years, sociologists also conducted intensive survey work and scientific study on the Soviet family, examining material practices, lifestyles, divorce, and in a minimal capacity, sexuality. Social science functioned as another modernizing tool geared toward identifying and correcting the recalcitrant behavior of the New Soviet Man. Domestic publication of works on male sexual disorders spiked between 1970 and 1980 with 24 titles (compared to four in the preceding decade and seven between 1917 and 1960). During this initial reawakening of Soviet sexology, male pathologies received the overwhelming share of attention of scholars and medical practitioners.[89] On another level, as Anna Temkina and Anna

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[88] *Ibid.*, 107.

[89] Lev Shcheglov, "Medical Sexology," in *Sex and Russian Society*, ed. Igor S. Kon and James Riordan (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1993), 152–164. Regarding the attention given to male pathologies, Shcheglov writes "the principle motive for women to turn to a sexopathology doctor is a lack of sexual satisfaction…" On the other hand, Laurie Essig claims that "the gaze of [Soviet] medico-psychiatric experts was not, however,

Rotkirch have pointed out, the field of sexology/sexopathology (as well as that of criminology) also provided a space for research and discussion of otherwise taboo "social problems" such as prostitution and homosexuality.[90] Still, Elena Zdravomyslova contrasts this period of heightened sexual knowledge among researchers with a pervasive "sexual ignorance" that severely restricted the ways in which sex could be discussed in public.[91] Below the official public sphere, *samizdat* authors and distributors did not typically rank matters of gender and sexuality high on their list of publishing priorities, effectively minimizing these topics within intelligentsia discourses. Silence on these topics had lasting effects in terms of actual knowledge of bodily function, contraceptive methods, prevention of disease transmission, as well as other matters related to sexual health or technique. The lack of a specialized sex education program in Soviet schools until 1983 epitomized this prolonged sexual silence in the public sphere.

Soviet sociologists took up scientific examinations of the family and composed studies that were disseminated in a broader fashion. Under this heading, sociologists explored topics such the role of Soviet families in producing ideal citizens, proper gender roles within families, as well as a version of sex education (*polovoe vospitanie*). Anatolii Grigorevich Kharchev led this particular field of inquiry from the time of the Soviet sociology's rebirth in the Khrushchev period until his death in 1987. In this first edition of his influential, *Marriage and the Family in*

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generally focused on men. Most of those who became objects of psychiatric and medical intervention during the Soviet regime were women." The discrepancy here appears to be one of definition as to what it means to be an object of the "expert gaze". Shcheglov's numbers indicate that the majority of late Soviet sexological (published) works focused on male sexual pathologies. The source of Essig's claim is not as easily verifiable, as this portion of her work is largely derived from participant observation in Moscow and St. Petersburg's "queer" scenes during the 1990s, as well as interviews with activists and two imminent sexologists, Dmitrii Isaev and Igor Kon. See Laurie Essig, *Queer in Russia: A Story of Sex, Self, and the Other* (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 1999), 28.

[90] Temkina and Rotkirch, "Soviet Gender Contracts."

[91] Zdravomyslova, "Hypocritical Sexuality."

the USSR (1964), Kharchev charts the changing nature of attitudes towards these institutions among members of the Soviet population—charting the erosion of various patriarchal norms. Survey work conducted among newlyweds in Leningrad indicated that more than three-quarters believed love and friendship to be the basis for a long-lasting, happy marriage. In spite of material deficits that often left newlyweds without spaces of their own, other indicators such as not seeking parental consent and the near-disappearance of dowry (*pridanoe*) payments (and other such traditional practices) in even remote areas suggested an increasingly independent and modern vision of matrimony stripped (of many) of the patriarchal features of the past. Even in the parts of Central Asia where forced marriage practices such as "bride-kidnapping" were said to be common, Soviet power had made significant inroads into eliminating these traditions. Examining ZAGS registrations for three areas in 1959, Kharchev concluded from the data that in the overwhelming majority of marriages both partners were close in age, suggesting partnerships based on mutual agreement. The growth of marriages between members of different national groups, as well as religious backgrounds, also served as evidence of the Soviet socialism's modernizing features.[92]

Other factors pointed to changes within basic family structures, rendering them under the progress of socialism "considerably more equal and unified, though there may be exceptions to this rule."[93] Kharchev placed prime emphasis on the role of the family in producing the ideal

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[92] A. G. Kharchev, *Brak i sem'ia v SSSR: opyt sotsiologicheskogo issledovaniia* (Moskva: Izdatel'stvo sotsial'no-ekonomicheskoi literatury "Mysl'," 1964). See ch. 5, "Brak v SSSR." Regarding the study of ZAGS registrations in 1959, the areas under consideration were Kiev, Tiumen, and Mginskogo raion in the Leningrad oblast—thus giving a cross-section of contemporary Soviet society. Each provided similar results. In the majority of cases, the groom was not more than four years' older than the bride. For this particular study and subsequent analysis, see p. 186-190.

[93] *Ibid.*, 241.

citizen of tomorrow as the site in which an individual developed their character, attitudes, tastes, and inclinations. Soviet science working under the Marxist-Leninist mantle would bolster these efforts to produce an upstanding, moral citizen. He attributed marital infidelity and other related problems not to the ethics underpinning the Soviet family, but rather certain vestiges of the bourgeois past that continued to plague relationships, evidenced in the persistence of acquisitive, materialist tendencies (*meshchanstvo*) and alcoholism.[94] When discussing power within a marriage, Kharchev admits that some men still hold on to pre-revolutionary values that cause them to exert patriarchal control over their wives. The advances of Soviet light industry provide an answer to this dilemma in the form of consumer appliances to help in maintaining the home. "The steady growth of production of home appliances (*bytovykh mashin*) provides a guarantee that in the near future every Soviet family will be able to, with minimal resources, mechanize housework."[95]

As a model for the socialist family, Kharchev holds up the example of the Zhurbin family, heroes of Vsevolod Kochetov's eponymous novel, later made into a 1954 film as *Bol'shaia sem'ia* (A Big Family). The father diligently works as a foreman in a healthy factory collective. The mother's primary occupation is that of a housekeeper. Rather than reflect bourgeois tendencies, this division of labor is mutually agreed upon as a necessity as "her work is a prerequisite allowing other family members to engage in socially productive labor."[96] Their sons suffer various tragedies, but in each instance, the family rallies together and lends mutual support. Under the leadership of their father, the Zhurbins fearlessly overcome every obstacle in

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[94] A. G. Kharchev, *Sem'ia v Sovetskom obshchestve: vospitaem chelovek budushego* (Leningrad: Lenizdat, 1960).

[95] Kharchev, *Brak i sem'ia v SSSR*, 253-254.

[96] Kharchev, *Sem'ia v Sovetskom obshchestve*, 52.

their path. For Kharchev, this is the manner in which they demonstrate the superiority of the socialist family over its bourgeois counterpart. He also praised masculine bravery and courage as vital parts of love and marriage, equating chivalrous sacrifice with a demonstration of manhood.[97]

Great successes though did not mean that all problems had been eliminated in Kharchev's eyes. Poor organization of youth leisure activities contributed to alcohol abuse with "fatal (*pagubno*) effects on sexual morals." He states that the majority of girls who engage in premarital sex do so under the effects of alcohol and not "for the sake of love."[98] This meant that young people were often entering into marriage already with sexual experience—a factor that, according to his research, often led to strife and divorce. Marko Dumančić has recently demonstrated that film served as a one technology of reordering male and female relations beginning in the early 1960s. Cinematic depictions of romance and friendship between the sexes peered into interior, domestic realms. By showing men in intimate situations outside of work, these films expanded the place of the new Soviet man in the home. Realistic depictions of marital discord, though, raised the ire of film viewers and critics.[99]

Changing sexual attitudes among Soviet youth stands at the heart of the work sociologist Sergei Golod (himself a student of Igor Kon). Beginning in the mid-1960s, Golod conducted the first intensive survey work expressly on the sexual behavior of Soviet youth since the 1920s. His dissertation took a historically minded, Marxist-Leninist approach to the question of sexual

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[97] *Ibid.*, 77-78.

[98] Kharchev, *Brak i sem'ia v SSSR*, 203.

[99] For an analysis of the ways in which post-Stalinist cinema reshaped presentation of male roles within the family and profoundly expanded portrayals of female heroines, see Dumančić, "Rescripting Stalinist Masculinity," ch. 3.

governance, conceptualizing the relationship between the Soviet state and the individual to be a productive one in which gender and sexual equality could be established once and for all. Under the tenets of communist morality, real love (defined here as "truly serious, tested, deep, and stable relationship") functioned as the basis for contemporary sexual relations.[100] Love of this kind was said to be a significant life event and to last for a considerable portion of one's life. Golod's view of sex differed from Stalinist repressive policies without removing the site of legitimate sexual activity from the committed relationship. Surveying secondary school students at ten Leningrad *vuzy* during the 1964-1965 academic year, Golod found respondents relatively tolerant of premarital sex. Forty-five percent answered that they considered premarital sex to be justifiable and acceptable (*opravdyvaiu*). Thirty-three percent were ambivalent in their responses and only 22% condemned it outright. When conducting a follow-up study seven years later at the same institutions, he found the numbers to be relatively stable. Other studies by Golod also revealed more complex dynamics as to the appropriateness of sexual activity. Ninety percent said that it should be with a romantic partner (*s liubimom/oi*), approximately a third said with a friend, and only a quarter, with a casual acquaintance.[101] The urban-rural divide also further disaggregated these figures as, according to Golod, migrants and others closely connected with village life were subject to its "authoritarian principles and direct social control from the family

[100] S. I. Golod, "Sociological Problems of Sexual Morality," *Soviet Sociology* no. 8 (1969): 3–23. The article is an English-language translation of his dissertation *avtoreferat* (a lengthy extended abstract).

[101] For discussion of these various studies, see S. I. Golod, *XX vek i tendentsii seksual'nykh otnoshenii v Rossii* (Sankt-Peterburg: Izdatel'stvo "Aleteiia," 1996), 45-71 and *idem*, "Sex and Young People," in *Sex and Russian Society* (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1993), 135–151.

and the immediate neighboring environment."[102] As Soviet industrialization drew more and more people away from the village over the course of the mid-twentieth century, urban life broke these traditional bonds and reformulated worldviews. A double standard still existed in which men were more likely to approve of premarital sexual activity for themselves, as well as women being more likely to approve of it for men than themselves.

Soviet sociologists working on family and sex typically utilized surveying techniques as their primary means of generating data. Yet, pedagogical experts' examinations of these topics often lacked the same rigor, based instead on notions of inherent biological differences between the sexes and assumptions about proper gender behavior.[103] That did not prevent them from occupying leading roles in these discussions. Antonina Khripkova's work on youth sex education placed an emphasis on sexual difference, stating that pedagogues could not persist in practices that ignored biological and social differentiation between men and women or pretended that these did not exist.[104] Characteristic of Soviet sex education of this period, Khripkova's work focused on hygienic questions and warnings of the danger early sexual activity. She chides all youth sexual activity outside of marriage as unproductive and potentially harmful, warning that pregnancy can occur even outside of insertive intercourse. This prohibitive stance extended

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[102] Golod, "Sex and Young People," 136. To be clear, this was not the only location in which this kind of double standard existed. Golod cites a study conducted in Lithuania in 1985 that indicated that "some 47 percent of the boys were in favor 'for themselves', but only 23 percent of them approved of pre-marital sex 'for girls'. The female response was similar: only 10 per cent considered such relations permissible 'for themselves' and 22 per cent 'for boys'…" See p. 138.

[103] Lynne Attwood makes this point in her thorough study of scientific approaches to sex difference and *polovie vospitanie* under late socialism. See Attwood, *New Soviet Man and Woman*.

[104] A. G. Khripkova, *Voprosy polovogo vospitaniia (lektsii, pochitannye dla uchitelei goroda Rostov-na-Donu)* (Rostov-na-Donu: Ministerstvo Prosveshcheniia RSFSR, 1969).

to masturbation—an act that she viewed as having profound social ramifications. "Engaging in onanism draws individuals into their own experiences and causes them to avoid others. They become withdrawn from the collective and easily slip into pessimism and despair."[105] Like Kharchev, Khripkova advocates delaying sex among youth and channeling these energies into sport or socially edifying activities.

These sex-negative messages spilled over into literature geared toward a teenaged reading audience. Written in a conversational style, works such as N. Dolinina's *The Mark of a Man* (*Zvanie muzhiny*) sought to inculcate socially productive values while teaching young readers how to grow up to be a "real man." (*nastoiashchii muzhchina*)[106] Dolinina criticized the look of contemporary male teenagers, comparing them unfavorably with the boys of her youth growing up in the immediate postwar years that aped military fashions. "I do not like—I must admit—guys in long curls with the slimness of a woman, with hands that do not know hard work, dressed in almost-feminine (*poluzhenskikh*) clothing."[107] The critique is not so much in the exact manner of dress as it is in an unhealthy focus on appearances at the expense of cultivating masculine values like courage, resoluteness, and both spiritual and physical strength. Juxtaposed alongside one another, Dolinina suggests the long-standing cliché of contemporary youth's comparative lack of (martial) masculinity. This attitude would soon merge with decreasing Slavic birth rates and the social visibility of women to produce a public debate over the existence of a crisis of Soviet masculinity by the mid-1970s.

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[105] *Ibid.*, 93.

[106] N. Dolinina, *Zvanie muzhiny* (Sverdlovsk: Sredne-Ural'skoe knizhnoe izdatel'stvo, 1970).

[107] *Ibid.*, 13.

For developing courage (and related attributes), young men needed to learn to discipline themselves, undergoing a course of, what another author in this field called, "spiritual training." (*dukhovnaia trenirovka*)[108] As part of this undertaking, young men were not to prematurely rush into romantic encounters, instead controlling and sublimating these desires. "A young man (*iunosha*)—part teenager, part child—experiences intimacy with another, not a spiritual closeness or love, but rather as only a desire for a woman. This comes to a tragic end: not of love, but something from which children are born."[109] Dolinina offers no direct solution to this predicament. Instead she warns of the ruined lives to come from early intimacies and cautions others to avoid this path. She even brings up the issue of rape between acquaintances—a subject not often discussed—to provide further evidence of the danger of young love.

Dolinina recounts the case of two classmates that had grown up together and spent a great deal of time in one another's company, yet had never felt the need to make a declaration of love. On the night of the young man's eighteenth birthday, the two of them celebrated with friends, consuming a great deal of vodka in the course of the evening. After retiring to another room, the evening took on a different character. At one point, the mother of the daughter opened the door and surveying the scene, called the police and declared that her daughter had been raped. At trial, the daughter repeated that she did not remember anything that happened, and as she was seventeen on the night of his eighteenth birthday, the court sentenced the young man to eight years in prison. According to the boy:

> When we left home, I kissed Galia a few times and she returned my kisses. There [at the party], not feeling any resistance, I permitted myself too much. Two or three times Galia said "don't" (*ne nado*). After kissing, we became intimate. […] I hope

[108] See Liubov' Kabo, *O samom glavnom v tvoei zhizni* (Sverdlovsk: Sredne-Ural'skoe knizhnoe izdatel'stvo, 1970).

[109] Dolinina, *Zvanie muzhiny*, 28.

> that you will properly understand me. If a man does not encounter resistance, and even to some extent feels encouraged, he will not resist the temptation to have a woman. That's what happened with me and look at the result. An eight-year term—that's no joke.[110]

The story told by Dolinina may very well be apocryphal, but she deploys it here to send a message. Even though popular values might consider what happened between Galia and the unnamed boy to be a "personal matter," Soviet law punished acquaintance rape as a crime. She argues that the law "protects women above all" even when they are at fault—though her reasoning in this regard rarely rises above the use of certain commonplaces of victim-blaming (loss of femininity, women wearing trousers). Regarding legal protections, even if this were the case, serious prohibitions to reporting (as mentioned above) provided little shelter. This text treats male sexual desires as almost-insurmountable biological impulses, an idea that explains the purportedly common belief in their absolute innocence when arrested and tried in such cases. Dolinina states, "truly, all are guilty—of irresponsibility (*bezotvetstvennosti*)."[111] By moving the emphasis away from a criminal act of violation to one of personal responsibility, she reinforces the commonplace of uncontrollable male desire. As Anna Rotkirch has noted in her study of late Soviet sexual autobiographies, the threat of violence cast a long shadow over intimacies. These autobiographies depict stilted and clumsy interactions between men and women in the dating process, leading some men to force themselves on their dates (in their own recollections) out of a lack of knowledge on how else to woo or seduce.[112]

The nature of Soviet sexological literature also allowed for a limited surfacing of the silenced persona of the sexual minority. As sociologist Laurie Essig writes, "in the public realm,

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[110] *Ibid.*, 30.
[111] *Ibid.*, 33.
[112] Rotkirch, *Man Question*, 71.

queers existed only as *objects* of laws and cures. Legal, psychiatric, and medical 'experts' attempted to label, punish, and even change those whose sexual practices were non-normative."[113] Psychiatric tools used to quell political dissent were also used to target gender dissent. In its most extreme incarnation, "the cure" took the form of drug and/or hormonal therapy, and in some instances, surgery. Evidence on sex change operations remains scanty, but the testimonies that survive indicate that female-to-male procedures were vastly more common due to Soviet medicine's non-recognition (and at times, pathologization) of female sexual desire. Women possessing same-sex desires "incurable" by other means meant only that their inner male needed to be physically realized. The physician's scalpel corrected and realigned bodies to correspond to their desires in a manner deemed appropriate for socialist society. Authorities instead utilized incarceration under anti-sodomy laws as the primary means of disciplining errant, same-sex desiring male bodies—largely due to the fact that female-female sex did not technically constitute a crime (though a persistent police officer could issue a charge of hooliganism under certain circumstances).[114] As mentioned above, prosecutions under article 121 did increase during the 1960s and 1970s, facilitated by the development of new forensic

[113] Essig, *Queer in Russia,* ix. The use of "queer" here reflects a contemporary vantage point and is an anachronistic usage. Essig explains that this is her attempt to discuss those labeled in the Soviet Union as *seksual'nye men'shinstva* (sexual minorities), defined as "all those engaged in sexual practices that are not socially acceptable/dominant."

[114] On transsexuality in the late Soviet and post-Soviet periods, see *Ibid.*, 35-46 and David Tuller, *Cracks in the Iron Closet: Travels in Gay & Lesbian Russia* (Boston and London: Faber & Faber, 1996), 155-167. According to Tuller, "although the Soviet health ministry did not officially acknowledge transsexualism as a classifiable condition until the late 1980s, a few doctors had been performing sex-change surgery quietly for more than twenty years. But given the lack of public discussion of the issue, only a minuscule number of people learned about the procedure and sought help." Tuller also contends that the preponderance of female-to-male sex change operations directly contrasts the situation in the United States in which male-to-female operations were more common.

techniques used for identification through close measurement and study of the (male) body in hope that it would give up its secrets.[115]

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As the barriers to depicting sex in popular media gradually fell under *glasnost*, the message of Soviet sex educators did not change overnight. Vigorous dialogue about sex (in both the contexts of debating social ills and "how-to" information) made Igor Kon a celebrity due to his publications and appearances on television chat shows. Other "expert" voices, however, continued to repeat older messages within this thawed climate, as they still referred to homosexuality as a sexual perversion, read deviancy in female sexual desire, and castigated premarital sex.[116] Some also still insisted on the necessity of strict gender divisions in upbringing and sex education. Yefim D. Marysis and Iurii K. Skripkin wrote in their *The ABCs of Family Life*:

> The family as well as nursery school and grade and secondary school bear the responsibility for bringing up boys and young men in the spirit of male virtue. They must be engaged in conversations about their responsibilities to the Motherland and the family… He must understand that a real man is noble, firm, stable, somewhat restrained in expressing his emotions as well as in speech and actions, logical, objective, strong and kind. The primary responsibility for creating a foundation of manliness in boys must rest with fathers and grandfathers, not mothers and

[115] Healey, *Homosexual Desire*, 239-240. Healey mentions that experts devised methods of supposedly scientifically uncovering homosexuals such as measuring of the tone of sphincter muscles (to identify the "passive" partner) or stimulating the prostate in order to see if arousal occurred. These developments in the 1960s and 1970s stand as part of a long legacy of junk science used in a medico-judicial capacity to diagnose sexual deviance in the modern age.

[116] For scholarly discussion of sex in *glasnost*-era media, see Masha Gessen, "Sex in the Media and the Birth of the Sex Media in Russia," in *Postcommunism and the Body Politic*, ed. Ellen E. Berry (New York: New York University Press, 1995), 197–228. She understands these positions to be, at least in part, a response to the perceived demands of the reading public as well as the result of decades of relative ignorance due to a lack of rigorous scientific inquiry.

> grandmothers. Unfortunately, too many fathers entrust too much of their sons' upbringing to women![117]

Conversely, Marysis and Skripkin also emphasized the necessity of cultivating a proper sense of femininity in girls in order to ensure functional familial relations in adulthood. Indeed, this conversation on essentialized sex difference intensified under Gorbachev as a response to the widespread perception of a "demographic crisis" plaguing Soviet Russia that had been gaining ground since the Brezhnev years. According to the experts in these debates, only by increasing ethnically Russian women's desires to reproduce could declining birthrates be headed off. This meant reestablishing domesticity and reducing their publicity, adding another link in the chain of state intervention into the realm of sexuality.

The story of sex during the Soviet century is one of contestation. The New Soviet Man's desires proved troubling to party-state authorities, as they wished to channel energies into production and reproduction. Delayed sexual emancipation along Western lines in the Soviet Union speaks to at least a partial success of these efforts. During the period of de-Stalinization, party-state authorities confronted evidence of shifting sexual mores among Soviet youth. Within this setting, they also faced disturbing indicators of unstable male bodies that challenged the image of the harmonious socialist society. Falling birth rates amid rising rates of divorce and alcoholism merged with anxieties over the place of men in Soviet society to forge a full-blown "crisis of masculinity" during the last years of Soviet power lasting up until the present. In this manner, the project of recasting humanity came full circle.

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[117] Quoted in *Ibid.*, 216.

CONCLUSION

This dissertation has argued that post-Stalinist party-state authorities utilized consumptive politics as a means of shaping and transforming masculine practices in order to make them suitable for socialist life. Communism's arrival never came, replaced instead by a perilous transition to market economics. Capitalist ethics permeated gender relations, forging a "new Russian man" whose claims to masculinity were predicated on wealth and conspicuous consumption. Soviet visions of masculinity understood the role of consumption as a civilizing tool—providing the "good life" for socialist citizens, but never in excess. Cultivating proper attitudes among men toward consumption served as means of stripping away antisocial behaviors and practices, forging a distinctly modern Soviet man. Archival evidence indicates that authorities actively contested rough masculine practices of drinking, narcotics use, and violence through policies directed at their consumptive habits. Such manifestations associated with working-class masculinities threatened the aims of post-Stalinist modernizers in the party-state apparatus. These campaigns, though, were not applied onto passive subjects. Some men negotiated, evaded, and ignored party-state attempts to remold their practices, hindering the reach of reconstructive efforts.

Instability and unease regularly colored the relationship between Soviet modernizing authorities and their worker/peasant objects. *Novyi byt* and *kul'turnost* campaigns, cloaked in modern hygienic thought and intelligentsia values, sought to build the New Soviet Man from existing stock. These projects intensified under the scientific-technological ethos of the post-Stalin party-state aiming to prepare Soviet society for communism's arrival. Domestic technologies like vacuum cleaners and refrigerators acted as labor-saving devices, theoretically freeing Soviet women to pursue work outside of the home. Modernizing technologies targeting

men took a different approach. Party-state authorities engaged male consumptive practices on a variety of fronts. Efforts to stem alcohol abuse and narcotics consumption sought to strip men of their bad habits, freeing up their energies for socially useful labor. Outside of the realm of vice, design authorities encouraged Soviet men to engage in the consumption of fashionable clothing. Advice on how to dress cultivating a masculine sense of taste that would help situate Soviet men in their modern environments. The need for fashionable clothing meant bringing men into the consumptive realm—teaching them how to select garments and the appropriate quantities for purchase. Style authorities treaded a thin line as they sought to reshape men's sartorial habits without pushing them into the perilous world of the arch dandy of the postwar period, the *stiliaga*. This meant encouraging moderation above all in both dress and consumptive practice.

Lived, material environments shaped by planners and designers, though, often failed to produce the desired harmonious characteristic. Boredom and a lack of amenities in factory towns and working-class districts may have pushed young men to pursue dangerous pleasures. Anti-hooligan legislation helped to police the streets, but party-state officials also had other methods of controlling these behaviors in mind. Visions of cultured leisure—including relaxed, mannered forms of drinking—could provide an outlet for these desires. Street cafes where a man could drink responsibly took drinking out of dark corners and into the light of the Soviet public. Recreation facilities, milk bars, and other forms of entertainment could provide youth with socially edifying activities. However, many of these aims fell short—never making it off the drafting board. Shortages undercut the ability for cities to build these venues, as well as for light industry to produce enough fashionable clothing. Medical treatment offered a scientific solution appropriate to the age for curing addiction. Popularization of medical approaches to combating alcohol and drug dependency galvanized public support, as letters poured into the Supreme

Soviet asking for state invention in the home. However, competing perceptions of medical treatment's leniency or displacement of moral responsibility for the addict's behavior helped unmake many possible transformative successes.

Rising rates of rape and sexual violence casts another light on the unease party-state authorities felt toward the New Soviet Man under construction. Expressions of consensual youth sexuality challenged official morality and provoked the Komsomol leadership to action. Graver instances of sexual violence furthered their concerns about the true nature of Soviet youth—particularly the behavior of young men. However, even as they localized male sexual desire as a destabilizing force, persistent anxieties regarding female sexuality led youth authorities and social scientists to blur the line between attacker and victim, warning men of the penalties for loss of control. The arrival of "third world" students in the early 1960s forged a sexual panic of another kind. Young Soviet men often conceived of these students as sexual rivals whose comparative material privilege provided an edge in the sexual economy. Educational authorities encouraged the close monitoring and interference in interracial coupling between foreign (particularly African) men and Soviet women. Incidents occasionally turned violent with Soviet men harassing foreign students and their female companions. Finally, a revived Soviet social science complex turned its gaze toward Soviet men, seeking to elucidate and correct behaviors inside family and sexual life. By the 1970s, social scientists and pedagogical authorities advocated for the need to resurrect understandings of differentiated sex roles in order to head off the dissolution of the Soviet family.

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The end of Soviet power and the transition to capitalism in post-Soviet spaces brought vast and often catastrophic changes to the conditions of everyday life. During transition, conversations about the "man in crisis" continued to snowball as public health services declined and the opening of borders facilitated the spread of cheap consumer goods, low-grade alcohol, and narcotics. In the midst of these transformations appeared a new vision of the Russian man who used conspicuous consumption and social position as a means of demonstrating his masculinity. The post-Soviet economic free-for-all that accompanied the Yeltsin years presented an unprecedented opportunity for these figures to gain previously unimaginable wealth and positions of power. As captains of industry, media moguls, or *biznesmeny*, these men had a level of access and control that bested even that of the old party apparatchik or KGB agent. Outside of the oligarch—perhaps the symbol of Russian 1990s—this capitalist ethos sunk into the consciousness of many young urbanites. These capitalist masculinities sat beside militarized visions of masculinity at the end of the twentieth and beginning of the twenty-first centuries as defining pillars—displacing the heroic (and quintessentially Soviet) worker icon once and for all. The transition era glorified competition, strength, and aggression. These characteristics are visible in the rise of the "new Russian" and the militarization of society during the Chechen wars. Market ideas have also directly shaped many young men's hesitant attitudes toward military conscription—creating a sense of lost time that could be better spent pursuing future careers.[1]

[1] Peter Letini, "Hegemonic Masculinities in Russia," in *In Search of Identity: Five Years Since the Fall of Communism* (Melbourne: Centre for Russian and Euro-Asian Studies, University of Melbourne, 1996), 157–167; Maya Eichler, *Militarizing Men: Gender, Conscription, and War in Post-Soviet Russia* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2012), 67-72.

At the same time, the growth of various youth subcultures beginning in the mid-1980s brought new ways of performing gender. *Glasnost* diminished publishing constraints—a decisive blow to attempts by the party-state and Komsomol to craft a uniquely Soviet monoculture. As this dissertation as shown, some of the values and practices associated with subcultural life did not appear out of thin air. However, the withering of Soviet censorship ended the ability for Communist party officials to articulate a singular set of values for the New Soviet Man to live by.[2] Urban youth in particular took advantage of *glasnost* to read up on Western life and used this knowledge to forge distinctive groups. *Panky* (punks), *rokery* (rockers), and skinheads joined *stiliagi* and *khippi* (hippies) in the panoply of Soviet youth cultures thriving during perestroika, united only by their non-normative practices and desire for group identification (*neformaly*). Material consumption and symbolic displays of distinction allowed groups to create difference (even if only insiders could discern their codes).[3] Capitalism further facilitated the growth of youth culture through commercial reproduction. Drugs flowed into youth scenes, becoming "virtually universal" according to one scholar. Entrepreneurs monetized subcultural style by selling various signifiers of participation on the open market. During the early years of transition, some youth also gravitated toward harder images of masculinity (most notably skinheads)—moving away from the aesthetics and ethics of other *tusovki*.[4]

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[2] As Alexei Yurchak and others have noted, the ability for the Komsomol to ensure compliance with official morality had already nearly vanished by the time of *glasnost*.

[3] Hilary Pilkington, *Russia's Youth and Its Culture: A Nation's Constructors and Constructed* (London and New York: Routledge, 1994).

[4] Hilary Pilkington, "Farewell to the Tusovka: Masculinities and Femininities on the Moscow Youth Scene," in *Gender, Generation and Identity in Contemporary Russia*, ed. Hilary Pilkington (London and New York: Routledge, 1996), 236–263. On drugs, see p. 240-242.

Triumphalist attitudes toward this newfound freedom of information and expression, though, can overshadow the multiplication of social problems generated by the unmaking of the Soviet system. The idea of the worker experienced further cultural devaluation as the meaning of labor shifted from serving the state (and the construction of communism) to the pursuit of individual wealth. Capitalism reinforced notions of work as the means of proving masculinity. Male unemployment compounded a sense of helplessness and desperation as marginalization in the domestic sphere persisted due to their loss of status as breadwinners. Many men found acclimation to housework trying, as women typically viewed their position as overseers of the domestic realm as a type of female power. Their marginality in both the labor market and the home often resulted in familial tension spiraling into depression, alcoholism, and divorce.[5]

Russian men are not unique in this regard. Rhetorical invocations of the "man in crisis" pop up in post-industrial societies throughout North America and Europe. There are at least two points from which it is possible to discuss linkages in the perceived ills plaguing contemporary conceptions of masculinity. One is to examine the conditions created by the fall of the socialist states of the "second world." Citizens of Eastern European socialist nations witnessed the sudden end of public services and state employment during the late 1980s and early 1990s,

[5] Sarah Ashwin and Tatyana Lytkina, "Men in Crisis in Russia: The Role of Domestic Marginalization," *Gender and Society* 18, no. 2 (April 2004): 189–206. Ashwin and Lytkina's essay is based on fieldwork in provincial Syktyvkar (Komi Republic) and Samara and therefore provides a broader view as to the situation in Russia as whole than would a similar study conducted in Moscow or St. Peterburg. It is also worth noting that the joblessness of pensioners did not create the same noticeable tensions. Interviewees generally considered retirement a "socially legitimate form of economic inactivity" (p. 200). See also Marina Kiblitskaya, "'Once We Were Kings': Male Experiences of Loss of Status at Work in Post-Communist Russia," in *Gender, State and Society in Soviet and Post-Soviet Russia*, 90–104.

creating similar scenarios as discussed above.[6] The decline of male-dominated industrial work throughout North America and Europe also continues to generate persistently high unemployment rates among men. Specific conditions vary depending on location, but male joblessness, loss of breadwinner status, and an apparent difficulty transitioning to the post-industrial labor market has prompted an on-going, transnational conversation about "men in crisis." However, the dearth of services in contemporary Russia geared toward acclimating men to changing structural conditions hinders integration. Cultural notions that link work to masculinity speak to barriers to seeking and receiving help, asserting that a "real man" would be able to find work and deal with his problems in all circumstances.[7]

Future work will be necessary in continuing to piece together the myriad ways men participated in the consumptive realm under the last decades of socialism, seeking linkages between the past and post-Soviet practices. Grounded analysis of how the processes differed in remote, rural, and non-Russian corners of the Soviet Union will provide vital contributions to our understanding of men as consuming subjects and objects of state control.

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[6] Masculinities research in the former socialist states of Eastern Europe is starting to reach the publication stage. See, for example Libora Oates-Indruchova, "The Void of Acceptable Masculinity During Czech State Socialism: The Case of Radek John's *Memento*," *Men and Masculinities* 8 (2006): 428–450; Katarzyna Wojnicka, "(Re)constructing Masculinity *a la Polonaise*," in *Men and Masculinities Around the World: Transforming Men's Practices*, ed. Elizabeta Ruspini et al. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 71–83.

[7] A notable exception to this rule is Barnaul's Altai Regional Crisis Center for Men, discussed in Rebecca Kay and Maxim Kostenko, "Men in Crisis or in Critical Need of Support? Insights from Russia and the UK," *Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics* 22, no. 1 (March 2006): 90–114.

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