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This is to certify that the

dissertation entitled

ALLEGORY: IRIS MURDOCH'S MODE 0F EXPRESSION
A STUDY IN POST-MODERN STRUCTURES

presented by

Carol Hough Winters

has been accepted towards fulfillment
of the requirements for

 

 

 

 

Ph.D. degreein English
Major professor
Date May 2, 1984

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ALIEGORY: IRIS MURDOCH'S MODE OF EXPRESSION
A STUDY IN POST-MODERN STRUCTURES

by

Carol Hough Winters

A DISSERTATION

Submitted to
Michigan State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

Department of English
198k

Copyright by
CAROL HOUGH WINTERS
198h

ABSTRACT

ALLEGORY: IRIS MURDOCH'S MODE OF EXPRESSION
A STUDY IN POST-MODERN STRUCTURES

by

Carol Hough Winters

The term allegory is used all too often as a catch-all
. phrase with no discrimination between the differences in
meaning and function from pre-romantic to post-modern
criticism. Iris Murdoch's works have been subjected to
criticism that has not sought elucidation of the essential
characteristics of her work but has used criteria developed
from the romantics. This dissertation argues that Murdoch
does indeed write allegory but an allegory that is funda-
Inentally different from a romantic conception.

To this end. it will be necessary in Chapter I to
survey the development of allegorical theory seen against
a romantic background and then to ascertain the main char-
acteristics of a post-modernist conception of allegory.

In Chapter II the established critical view of Murdoch
lfiill be reviewed and its romantic tendancies of thematic
'treatment and symbolic notation will be shown to be an
:inadequate base of judgment. Finally. Chapters III and IV
vvill begin to fill the critical void by tracing the
elements of allegory in selected novels. Since Murdoch

jg; a professional philosopher. her prose writings concerning

aesthetic questions are used wherever appropriate. not as
after-thoughts for her fictional enterprises but as guiding

forces.

to my parents

Roy and Pauline Hough

ii

 

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Thank you is too simple an expression to account for
the complex interactions between a doctoral candidate
and those who surround him. It does not indicate the depth
of feeling nor the indebtness I owe to Dr. Roger Meiners
who not only suggested the original connection between
post-modern allegory and Iris Murdoch but who also patiently
edited the first draft of the manuscript. Nor does a
thank you adequately recognize Dr. William Johnsen's
generosity in accepting the task of seeing the dissertation
to completion. I have also appreciated the encouragement
of Dr. Linda Wagner and Dr. Cathy Davidson whose suggestions
have been valuable.

I would be remiss not to include a thank you to
Lorraine Hart, whose expertise in administrative matters
has been especially helpful.

Finally. a thank you does not express the feeling I
have for the breadth of commitment from my husband and
children. It has been Tom's steadfastness that has enabled
me to complete the program. This is not a formal acknowledg-
ment but an expression of truth.

iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter I Allegory: A Mode of Expression

 

 

A. Traditional Definition 1
B. De-valuation 4
C. Re-valorization 31
Chapter II Iris Murdoch: The Critics' Assessment
A. The Critics' Symbolic Approach 56
B. An Adaptation of That Symbolic Method 61
C. Criticism of the Symbolic Method 71
Chapter III Allegorical Structure in Representative Works:
Part One
A. Under the fig; 92
B. mg 911' 111
C. Bruno's Dream 129
Chapter IV Allegorical Structure in Representative Works:
Part Two ‘
A. The Black Prince 15h
B. Nuns and SoIdiers 180
C. The PhiIosopher's Pupil 198
Conclusion 223

iv

Chapter I

Allegory: A Mode of Expression

To stand before an Iris Murdoch novel is an experience
similar in kind to standing before an allegorical painting.
The weight of significant detail paralyzes the imagination
and sets the mind racing. Presented with the character
of John Robert Rosanov in The Philosopher's 2322;. we
don‘t know whether he is to be "read" as a personification
of the rational man. a mysterious bewitcher of others. or
a lecherous old man. Should the plot itself be cast in
terms of realism. mystery. romance. allegory or journalism?
All those elements are present and may be emphasized by
simply turning attention in a specific direction. For
instance. the story is realistic since its characters and
their actions use the physical world. There is no magic.
no miraculous intervention that saves them from the natural
consequences of their actions. The story also presents
a mystery both on the more banal level of a "who-dun-it"
(Did George try to kill his wife?) and the esoteric level
of philosophical speculation (Does George's intention or
his action constitute proof of his attempt to kill Stella?).
The story can also be viewed as a romantic interlude.
delimiting the fine strings of influence that bring Hattie
and Tom together. For that matter. romance's darker side
is explored in the relationship between George and Stella.

Another turn reveals the intellectual generalizations of

r1-

2

allegory that are displayed in the broad implications of
George's personification as the romantic man and his
opposite John Robert as the rational man. The allegorical
”feel" can even be seen in detail: Tom's wanderings
through the maze of pipework beneath the spa. mirror man's
intellectual walk through successive philosophical systems.
Further, the journalistic flavor of the entire book with
its reliance on the narrative flow of life cannot be
denied. ”N‘s” reporter status. his attention to factual
detail can nowhere be ignored. The problem. then. in
reading this kind of novel lies in the multitude of its
meanings. The meaning is not constricted wherein the
reader could follow intricate but seamless patterns of
symbolic design. but it is expanded with a "jumble"

of significant objects set before the reader. Objects
that come already imbued with meaning are traditional
hallmarks of allegory. For in that tradition emblems
are made by men and passed on to other men in an effort
to speak truth. And while the source of that truth
changes with time. its outlines do not.

It is difficult to know just where to begin1 in
establishing the roots of the ideas that form the base
of allegory. Perhaps if a passage from the Bible is
examined. under its aegis we can encompass allegory's
roots in religion. history. and rhetoric while seeing

its basic techniques in action.

A farmer went out to sow his seed. As he was
scattering the seed, some fell along the path. and

3

the birds came and ate it up. Some fell on rocky
places. where it did not have much soil. It sprang
up quickly. because the soil was shallow. But when
the sun came up. the plants were scorched. and they
withered because they had no root. Other seed fell
among thorns. which grew up and choked the plants.
Still other seed fell on good soil. where it produced
a crop. a hundred. sixty or thirty times what was
sown. . . . Listen then to what the parable of the
sower means: when anyone hears the message about
the kingdom and does not understand it. the evil
one comes and snatches away what was sown in his
heart. This is the seed sown along the path. What
was sown on rocky places is the man who hears the
word and at once receives it with joy. But since

he has no root. he lasts only a short time. When
trouble or persecution comes because of the word.
he quickly falls away. What was sown among the thorns
is the man who hears the word. but the worries of
this life and the deceitfulness of wealth choke it.
making it unfruitful. But what was sown on good
soil is the man who hears the word and understands
it. He produces a crop. yielding a hundred. sixty
or thirty times what was sown. 2 .

There are several allegorical characteristics that can

be seen. First. the parable is told by one who claims

to be God. so that the substantial truth of the utterance
cannot be questioned. The fact that Jesus cannot point
to something in the physical world as truth. but must
instead use the natural world to tell his hearers what
truth is like points to three things: truth requires
divine intelligence to be discerned. it exists beyond the
material world. and it is absent from the world. All

of these are evidenced in the arbitrary choice of the
seed as an example of the word of God; that is. there

is no natural reason for the kingdom of God to be like
a.seed. It could just as easily have been presented as

a mustard seed. a leavening agent, a treasure in a field,

 

4

a pearl of great price. or a dragnet. as it is presented
in the remaining parts of Matthew, thirteen. This
arbitrary placement of meaning. indeed the attitude that
invests any and all natural objects with meaning is seen
as an allegorical attitude. one that is exclusive to the
symbolic attitude.

I am proposing in this study that Iris Murdoch writes
a form of allegory. However. before pursuing that line
of reasoning. the term allegory must itself be accounted
for. as it is a word that comes to the twentieth century
full of conflicting meanings. It is a truism that nearly
all of modern thinking concerning allegory and the
subsequent reprehension of it. at least until the re-
assessment of the last several decades. stems from the
fundamentals of the romantic critical movement. In the
Anglo-American tradition. this usually means examining
the thought of Samuel Taylor Coleridge. His influential
devaluation of allegory may serve as a convenient place
to open the discussion:

. . . an Allegory is but a translation of abstract

notions into a picture language which is itself

nothing but an abstraction from objects of the

senses: the principal being more worthless even

than its phantom proxy. both alike unsubstantial

and the former shapeless to boot. 3
In another passage. Coleridge writes.

We may then safely define allegoric writing as the

employment of one set of agents and images with

actions and accompaniments correspondent. so as

to convey while in disguise. either moral qualities

or conceptions of the mind that are not in themselves
objects of the senses. or other images. agents. actions.

5

fortunes and circumstances. so the difference is

every-where presented to the eye or imagination

while the likeness is suggested to the mind: and

this connectedly so that the parts combine to form

a consistent whole.
Allegory becomes in his perspective a lifeless. devised
pattern that attempts to portray only another devised
pattern. The physical world is ignored while the life
of the mind is elevated. Coleridge argues that the mind
is too much involved in making allegories. that it patterns
things that do not fit together. while the imagination
alone sees the differences between objects. The tension
outlined here is found illustrated in Coleridge's theories.

. .

specifically in the polarity of his primary imagination

and secondary imagination. He illustrates their relation-

ship with this schema:

 

Reason Primary Imagination
Imagination (positive)
Understanding

Understanding Secondary Imagination
Fancy (negative)

Sense

Understanding in the primary imagination is an active
and positive force. whereby man detaches himself from
the flow of nature. objectifies what he has seen. and
posits new opinions and actions. Understanding in the
secondary imagination is a sensual activity. a trait

shared with animals and is an intuitive apprehension

«of the universe. Coleridge argues that to only pursue

positive understanding will turn man into a mechanical

6
animal as its main thrust is a detachment from nature.5
This single-minded pursuit is analogous to allegory.
for it ignores the physical necessity of the secondary
imagination's understanding. To be aware of the sensual
link to the physical maintains the primary imagination's
unity. Thus. the tension between the primary and secondary
imagination is not an exclusive one but is inclusive.
whose reliance on its polar status everywhere reminds
its reader of their interpenetration. Allegory becomes.
on the other hand. a truncated action that disregards a
vital ingredient.
If the Statesmgn's Manual were open in front of us.
we could not help seeing that Coleridge's prejudice
against allegory is written so that his valorization
of the symbol may be illuminated. The second half of
the paragraph that contains his definition of allegory
says t
On the other hand. a Symbol is characterized by a
Translucence of the Special in the individual or
of the General in the Especial or of the Universal
in the General. Above all by the translucence of
the Eternal through and in the Temporal. It always
partakes of the Reality which it renders intel-
ligible; and while it ennunciates the whole. abides
itself as a living part in that Unity. of which
it is the representative.
The symbol,then. is a real object that if meditated upon
will yield up its connection to the spiritual world.

Thus. the natural world corresponds to the supernatural

*wdth those correspondances discoverable. A metaphysical

 

 

7
truth is being claimed for the symbol that is not claimed
for allegory. In the symbol. the physical is not mean-
ingless. but charged with meaning; whereas allegory
admits that its objects are meaningless until they are
assigned meaning.7
While Coleridge establishes this symbolic link
between the natural and supernatural. he does not so
clearly define the mind's workings. For it is the
imagination that "gives birth to a system of symbols.
harmonious in themselves. and consubstantial with the
truths of which they are the conductors."8 Coleridge's
"conductor" is not the same kind of independent creator
that later romatics will describe. His imagination is
a participatory one: ”The living power and prime agent
of all human perception and as a repetition in the finite
mind of the eternal act of creation in the infinite
I.AM." 9 It does not create ex nihlo but discovers its
correspondance to the divine. seen in this quote from
Misses:
A post ought not to pick nature's pocket: let him
borrow. and so borrow as to repay by the very act
of borrowing. Examine nature accurately. but write
from recollection: and trust more to your imagination
than to your memory. 10
What Coleridge means by "recollection" is this:
Nothing affects me much at the moment it happens.
It either stupifies me. and I perhaps look at a
merry-make and dance-the-hay of flies. or listen
entirely to the loud click of the great clock.

or I am simply indifferent, not without some sense
of philosophical self-complacency. For a thing at

8

the moment is but a thing of the moment: it must

be taken up into the mind, diffuse itself through

the whole multitude of shapes and thoughts. not ,

one of which it leaves untinged. between not one

of which and it some new thought is not engendered. 11
His mind is not a passive receiver of truth but an active
participant which moves from sensual perceptions to
rational patterns. While he consistently builds man's
role in the perception process, he never claims for that
mind original knowledge. However. his articulation is
appropriated and expanded by later romantics who do claim
the mind's ability to create truth.

While it is impossible to give an accurate brief
representation of the diversity of the romantic tradition
and its later developments. I propose to let the position
of Benedetto Croce stand as the epitome of romantic think-
ing in the very moment of transition into characteristically
modern modes. Because of his historical position. Croce
must win for intuition a place in man's thinking. And(
in order to be convincing. intuition must be defined as
the mind's first action. Croce proposes to demonstrate
that in the world of art. as opposed to logic. intuition
is primary. It is essential to note that while Croce
deprecates his own action. carefully qualifying his position
on intuition as an adjunct to reason. he is actually
claiming intuition's superiority by privileging its
position. While this should place him firmly in the

Coleridgean tradition, it proposes some fundamental

modifications.

 

.I

b

H.

 
 

 

9
Since intuition manifests intself in the production
of images. whereas logic manifests itself in the production
of concepts. it will be instructive to examine images.
Both true and false images are engaged in a dialectical
struggle. As it is impossible in the physical world
to have purity, truth is constantly engaged in a struggle
to free itself from error. Thus. the identification of
a true image entails several transformations. Croce
begins the process by rehearsing Kant's theory of the
origin of a concept. Kant maintains that a concept
results from the unification of the intelligible with
the unintelligible. This fusion occurs when the idea
is articulated by its concrete form. Here is Croce's
divergence from Kant. For Croce argues that the necessary
duality of thought and image in Kant's system does not
in fact exist. Rather. Croce contends that thought
cannot exist without its image. nor can the image exist
without thought. To believe that thought and image can
be so separated is in fact to practice allegory.
The insurmountable difficulties of allegory are well—
known. so is its barren and anti-artistic character
known and universally felt. Allegory is the extrinsic
union. or the conventional and arbitrary juxtaposition
of two spiritual facts-~a concept or thought and an
image--whereby it is posited that Efli§ image must
represent that concept. 12
He is arguing against the outside thought's imposition on
an image for the same reason Coleridge resisted the

combination. Both wish to establish an unbroken line

between the physical and the spiritual. Further Croce

[‘1

 

's

".11

 

10
argues that allegory's action is a deliberate juxtaposition
of thought and image.

Croce regards allegory seriously. as he must. because
its form is a direct contradiction of his most basic axiom:
art is intuition. His critics at one point tried to chide
him on his reaction to allegory. claiming that it too
was a mode of expression. To answer their charges and
to garner authority for his own position. he reinforced
his opinion by referring to examples from the nineteenth
century German idealistic tradition and its predecessors.
For instance. he reminded his critics that Hegel called
allegory a "cold. squalid. product of the intellect. and
not of concrete intuition and profound feeling of imagina-
tion. . . ."13 Vischer too saw allegory as a dissolution
of the original relation between idea and image. He
called it an inorganic form surrounding itself with
mystery but not being itself a mystery. Further. he
used de Sanctis. Quintillian and Blair to warn against
allegory. further denigrating it as cryptography. a
practical art that makes a puzzle out of meaning.

. . . either the poet forgets the world of ends

for the world of imagination and abandons himself

altogether to poetical inspiration. . . . or he

is constantly introducing his world of ends into

his imaginative world. thus breaking up the aesthetic

coherence of the work and producing something that

is not poetry. and possesses solely a cryptographic

value. 1h
Out of this false image of allegory. then. comes the true

image. And for Croce the fusion of thought and image '

is manifested in the symbol. He defines it by using

u.

‘1

.n‘
on

‘\

 

§§~
\

11
Vischer's description of the symbol: the moment when
the idea dissolves in the representation is mirrored in
the way sugar dissolves in water. The idea can no longer
be extracted from its representation; it exists only as
a sign "of the yet to be discovered principle of unity
of the artistic image."15
The insistence on the opposition of symbol and allegory
is not. then. a quirky invention. It is a valorization of
the philosophical position that prefers man as the creator
of truth. The historicity of this position is traced
by Hans Gadamer in 23232 ghg Method. and begins with
Schelling's belief in the symbolic:
For the demand of the absolute artistic representation
is: representation with complete indifference. so
that the universal is wholly the particular. and the
particular at the same time wholly the universal
and does not simply mean it. 16
Gadamer finds the same concept in Solger who argues that
art is the existence of the idea. not the unformed idea.
Therefore, the union of sensible and insensible seen
in the symbol is not arbitrary but is the manifestation
of a real coincidence.
The resultant symbol of the romantics ought to be
a rich presentation. one that celebrates the presence
of the divine in the physical world. However. by the
twentieth century. the symbol is noted for its paucity.
How it came to that historical and philosophical position

is analyzed by Iris Murdoch. The symbol's decline is
figured by Kant's separation of the Sublime and the

In

LA.

W

C

'l

s.

12
Beautifulgl7for it is only in the Beautiful that the
symbol manifests itself. And in that position. no
emotion or good or even thought is allowed. While it
does have form. it is a conceptless one. a "self-contained
object. strictly purposeless. yet with an air of purpose.

”18 What has been taken from

existing for its own sake.
the symbol can be seen best if Kant's counter notion of

the Sublime is examined. Here it is that reason and morals
and emotions reside. While no object can be Sublime by
itself. its position as a thing to be contemplated by

the mind is insured. For instance. if we look at the sky
or mountains our minds try to satisfy their need for order.
Because of nature's size and complexity. the mind cannot
pattern what it sees. Thus. there isuboth a sense of
distress at the failure and paradoxically a feeling of
exhilaration at the mind's activity. This kind of

mixed experience containing both the pain of thwarted
imagination and the elation of the rational triumph

brings Kant to propose that man's ideal state must be
rational harmony among all things.19 His final movement
necessitates the interaction of the Beautiful and the
Sublime. so that it is only if one or the other notion

is emphasized that distorted theories arise. And it is
Murdoch's contention that the symbolists who are direct
descendents of the romantic movement chose only to em-

phasize the Beautiful. thus eliminating access to reason.

morals and emotion. "What they wanted were small, clean

13
resonant and self-contained things of which the image
or symbol was the type. What is beautiful must beseparate.
conceived on the analogy of'a sensible object."20
Before considering the implications for art of this
belief. let us consider the implications for man. In
Coleridge man is dignified: he maintains a place in the
divine order of things:- man:earth as God:heaven. In
Croce man and his intuitive ability can understand the
universe. Even in Kant the Sublime that man feels plus
his intuitive appreciation of the Beautiful make it
possible for him to exist with purpose. How then. have
we moved from man bursting with his own potential to man
surrounded by a void that is both menacing and meaningless?
If Kant's conception of reason that rests on the
substantial nature of truth is upheld. then man can
be seen as rational, free. educable. able to know himself,
superior. and responsible for his own actions. However.
if his reason is stripped of its conception of truth.
nothing transcends man and he is only what he does.
Morals become tools and man emerges as a brave will ready
To enact his sense of himself. Of course. this change
did not occur quickly and Murdoch sketches the historical
process. She begins. as indicated earlier. with the
separation of the Sublime and the Beautiful. Later in
Hegel's system. Kant's belief in reason is replaced with
a belief in self-knowledge. Hegel's man no longer looks

outside for confirmation of his knowledge and relies

1h
for access to truth on his organic relationship to the
divine. Later, Kierkegaard posits a man who is alone.
at war with everyone including himself. and whose only
contact with the outside is through religion. While
outside truth is still acknowledged. the possibility of
ever knowing that truth is slight. thus placing man in

21 Nor have recent trends

a position of turning inward.
in philosophy. existentialism and linguistic empiricism.
been able to lift man out of himself. As an example

of the kind of person that modernism praises. Murdoch
uses the heroes of Jean Paul Sartre. ”The individual

is the centre. but a solipistic centre. He has a dream
of human companionship. but never the experience. He

22 This man is isolated

touches others at the fingertips.”
with no divine purpose. He no longer has Newtonian
physics allowing Kant's a priori knowledge. and he no
longer has Hegel's "dialectical surge” that allows a
life-changing movement. There is always and only the
self. seeking knowledge of itself that is partial and
duplicitous.

There is an analogy between this isolated individual
and the isolated art object that is not random but is
an axiom stated by Murdoch. It brings us to consider
the implications of symbolism for art. The analogue
is borne out in the analysis of Roquentin and his desire

for an art object. The free. self—contained ego postulates

the existence of the free. self-contained art object,

15

"the timeless whole with its significance completely
contained within itself."23 This desired object has
many characteristics. one being its anti-language bias.

The symbol is not limited to the word and in fact its
meaning does not work with language connections. Rather.
its meaning is inherent in its being and depends on its
physical presence. Further. even the perspective on
language has changed from the past. When Coleridge
talked about Reason. Understanding. Memory. Fancy. the
words were thought to be connected with real forms that
existed in the divine world.24 Now, rather than nouns
representing these divine ideas. they have life only
within a cultural and grammatical context. Therefore.
any claims made for language as a point of access to
the divine are negated. Language is viewed as a way
of delimiting. interpreting. and predicting experience.
agreeing with Wittgenstein. ”The limits of my language
are the limits of my world."25 This introduces a relativity
into language hitherto unknown.

Further. there is a spatialized use of language that
disconcerts traditional narrative expectations. Joseph
Frank speaks to the problem. He contends that such
writers as Eliot and Pound break the narrative law of
literature by writing a spatialized poetry meant to be
read in a moment of time. not sequentially. Pound's

definition of the image. ”that which presents an

16

intellectual and emotional complex in an instant of time”
is meant not as a narrative process but as a fusion of
discrete ideas and emotions into a whole. This complex
does not proceed discursively: rather. it strikes the
reader's mind instantaneously. by frustrating the sequen-
tial drive of narrative. Thus. the meaning is enveloped
within the structure of the poem or novel and is complete
only after the entire cluster of images is understood.26

All meaning is contained within the poem and is there-
fore already present in the first word. Clifford Gay
also sees this as a characteristic of the symbol:
"The strength but also limitation of symbols is that they
tend to be static with all the ramifications of meaning
focused within the symbol."27 This spatialized use of
language stops time and if time stops. process does too.
The symbol's lack of movement is discerned by Frank also
when he argues that Proust's time is Bergson's ”real time."
In Proust the main character is not changed by time but I
uses it to symbolize those moments in his life when
transcendence was achieved. Proust can not be content
to simply describe these moments. as he could not if
he is to remain within the parameters of symbolic
presentation. He recreates the moments. doing so by
a sensual appeal to memory. The movement in such a
presentation exists in a forced link between the mind
of the character and the mind of the reader. These

spatialized presentations are "powerful juxtapositions :

n)

‘v
N.

(I)

'NI

I)

a!

“e

an
(I)

F'\‘
I‘.

17
of the ancient Renaissance. and modern worlds [which]
reduce all three elements to an unhistorical miscellany.

28 There is no causal

timeless and without origin.”
progression. no historical depth--all is fused into
a timeless whole.

The symbol. then. makes several claims: it is the
natural presentation of truth: its presence is real. and
its status gives man access to divine truth. That the
mind of man and the symbol work in conjunction with
each other is an explicit tenet in symbolism from
Coleridge onward. That the symbol no longer participates
in a substantial truth is the fact for which existentialism
is the evidence. Is it possible to demonstrate that the
symbol is not the ultimate expression of man's artistic
nature? To do so necessitates the reclamation of the
substantial nature of truth. a tenet on which allegory
is premised.

And this reclamation cannot be a simple statement
of allegory's superior status. For even the newer
developments in criticism that specifically question .

a symbolic bias toward literature are open to question.
Critics like Paul de Man and Fredric Jameson may work

out elaborate schemes of allegory in which literature is
considered in its philosophical status as an object and

it community relationships. but the phenomenom of Murdoch's
writing demonstrated in the introduction remains un-

accounted for. At best. it is considered a positive

18
gesture of inclusiveness. out of which the critic can
choose placement of his attention. and at worst it is
considered bad writing unworthy of attention. The
second opinion displays a value judgment and will be
dismissed on the grounds that it cannot be argued. The
first opinion will be given careful consideration. For
if its premises are logically construed. then literature
is transformed into a ”mine” whose value and shape is
mainly determined by the ”miner."29 This is not a naive
statement of a complex problem. for it recognizes the
significance of Murdoch's statement. "We are all structural-
ists now."30 Rather. it is a testimony to the continuing
symbolic relationship of the miner to his mine.

This can be seen in the works of Paul de Man. For
although he argues against the hold that the romantic
symbol has maintained on the critical mind. his arguments
concerning the nature of allegory do not release literature
either. Let us begin with his critique of the romantic
symbol. In ”The Rhetoric of Temporality" the problem
is posed in terms of the opposition of symbol and allegory.
Looking to their common purpose of transcending the
physical world. he sees their strong lines of congruence.
Further. he historicizes his position by examining
Coleridge's symbol finding its behaviour more allegorical
than symbolic. He argues that since Coleridge emphasized
the symbol's organic base. it should express itself in

increasingly physical terms. That it does not demonstrates

19
Coleridge's insistence that the invisible world is the
more important one.31
De Man also questions the symbol's claim of free
expression. He points out that language is not easily
disentangled from past meanings; and while man would
like to believe that he uses language. the fact is
language uses him. Further de Man examines the symbol's
claim to unify inner and outer truths. He uses a linguistic
structure to do this. repeatedly breaking down binary
oppositions. Although his many examples could be traced.
the action can be representedly seen in his opposition
of grammar and rhetoric. This is not a naive de-mystification
on his part but is a deliberate reaction against the
current practice from Barthes to Greimas of joining the
two distinct structures. For it is his argument that
such theorists ignore the question of what words mean and
confine themselves to how words mean.32 It is with this
background that de Man chooses to examine a rhetorical
question since the theorists claim it stands as an example
of how two structures conjoin.
. . . asked by his wife whether he wants to have
his bowling shoes laced over or laced under. Archie
Bunker answers with a question: "What's the difference?"
Being a reader of sublime simplicity. his wife replies
by patiently explaining the difference between lacing
over and lacing under. . . but provokes only ire.
”What's the difference” did not ask for difference
but means instead. ”I don't give a damn what the
difference is.” 33

De Man argues that the literal meaning of "What's the

difference” is non-existent for it is denied by the

20
figurative meaning. Thus. the reader is faced with a
structure that cannot be understood from a grammatical
point of view. The question can be asked but its meaning
is denied. This confusion is not a straightforward
opposition of literal and figurative. There it could
be decided which meaning the sentence called for. Here
there is an extra-textual confusion that will take
intervention to make the meaning clear.

Nor is de Man content to argue alone but calls on
several critics to support his argument. ‘Kenneth Burke
is one. whose concept of "deflection" is de Man's
example: "the rhetorical basis of language. . .operates
within grammatical patterns." 3% Another is Charles
Pierce whose insistence on a third party observer in
order for the sign to have a meaning keeps de Man's
distinction between grammar and rhetoric alive. Further.
de Man uses this method throughout Allegories 93 Reading.
interpreting Yeat's "Among School Children". Proust.
Rilke. Nietzche. and Rousseau as writers who maintain
distinctions.

This insistence on the true dis-unity of subject and
object is the first step in de Man's valorization of
allegory. By de-mystifying the symbol. he intends to
recreate a place for allegory. De Man defines the
mechanism of allegory as a ”relationship between sign
and its meaning [thai] is discontinuous. involving

an extraneous principle that determines the point and

21

manner at and in which the relationship is articulated."35
This is a restatement of the traditional juxtaposition
of subject and object in allegory. and he intends to
use it to sketch the historical devaluation of allegory.
De Man briefly returns to the medieval structure of
allegory in order to display its formal outlines. He
finds it characterized by its relationship to an outside
truth: and while he would not dispute that historical
fusion. he would dispute its metaphysical claims. For
he demonstrates that it is history that caused a shift
in belief from a substantial truth to a relative one.
Now there are only false polarities set up by a mind
able to control both subject and object. "priority has
passed from the outside world entirely within the
subject.”36

De Man argues that such a mind is Coleridge who claimed
to turn to nature for inspiration but who used nature
to image himself. De Man uses several arguments to
counter this inward movement. One easily suggested is
simply reversing Coleridge's position. While he may
assert that man comes first and creates wholes. it could
be equally asserted that nature comes first and creates
wholes. The second argument suggested is man's temporal
predicament. For although the romantic would like to
believe that nature changes while he remains the same.
his own aging body and changing perspective belie that

statement.37 The third argument against the romantic

22

conception of self is its philosophical position. De Man
uses Nietzsche's hill £2.22!2£'

The self which was at first the center of language

as its empirical referent now becomes the language _

of the center as fiction. as metaphor of the self.

What was originally a simple referential text

now becomes the text of a text. the figure of

a figure. 38
This definition of man's cosmic position is de Man's
preferred one. for he postulates that only by allegory
can man make sense of the world.

"Making sense" consists of two movements. First.
the false symbolic base of the object must be uncovered.
These may be found in three areas: nature, where the action
of similitude between self and landscape is a proprietary
moment: or a book. where the symbolic construction of
images is unraveled: or another man. where it is recog-
nized that first perceptions are figurations. The resultant
self—conscious structure. consisting of the original
figure together with its deconstruction. engenders a
second moment. Here the self creates its own interpre-
tation of the figure simultaneously aware that this
construction is open to error. In fact. it can never
be absolutely true because it proceeds from man's mind.
These second degree "narratives" are de Man's allegories.

Notice the negative aspect of this second moment.
For when the self realizes its own subjectivity. it also
realizes the text's subjectivity.

. . the very statement by which we assert that
the narrative is rooted in reality can be an

23

unreliable quotation: the very document, the

manuscript. produced in evidence may point

back. not to an actual event. but to an end-

less chain of quotations reaching as far back

as the ultimate transcendental signified God.

none of which can lay claim to referential

authority. 39
All becomes a text, so that any understanding is based
on a subjective agreement concerning the text's referent.
This agreement can be broken at will in order that the
structure may question itself. Each questioning produces
its own text. beginning the allegorical process again.

De Man has effectively devalued the romantic symbol.
but his valorization of allegory as a means of interpreting
literature does not release the mind's hold. If anything.
it accentuates the subjective nature of knowledge. And
if we are only exchanging one word for another without
a concurrent change of function. then a semantic game is
being played. Given de Man's insistence that symbol and
allegory's mechanizations are unimportant it is not
surprising that he should come to such conclusions about
literature. When it is remembered that symbol and allegory's
functions specify a differing view of the nature of
knowledge? then de Man's conclusions can be called into
question. For instance. Coleridge's model of the difference
between organic and inorganic form will demonstrate these
two views. Coleridge argues the symbol's organic base.

a physical relationship between the material and immaterial

worlds that naturally emerges. Thus. it is possible for

the ego to ascend from physical to spiritual truths.

24
Inorganic form. on the other hand. makes no such claim
to natural fusion. so that the ego cannot transcend.

Nor is Coleridge the only place to see this difference.
It is one moment in a history of difference as the two
words' etymologies will reveal. Allegory is a combination
of ééiEE and agoria which means ”other speaking." Symbol
is a combination of £22 and ballein which means a ”throwing
together" of word and thing. Thus. there is an insistence
on outside knowledge in allegory that is not found in
symbol. The symbol presumes a natural progression from
the physical to the divine that allegory denies.)+1 If the
historical moment believes in an outside truth then
allegory too can be a means to the divine: but if the
age does not then it becomes a statement of the lack of
knowledge. While de Man's allegories rest on an outside
knowledge. it is man's: and his own insistence that man
is forever implicated in subjectivity blurs any tra-
ditional meaning of allegory.

Is there any path out of the theoretical entanglement
of the subjective? Any way in which Murdoch's structures
may be allowed to stand allegorically? Fredric Jameson's
"dialectical criticism" would seem to offer just such a
divestment of self. For his theories are articulations of
the manner in which the self can begin to transcend its
limitations. And while he admits the unavoidable
centrality of self. he postulates self-consciousness of

that centrality as part of its cure.

25

His cure is dialectical criticism which moves in
a series of moments. the first of which is a description
of the problem in economic terms. After this initial
description there comes a second moment when that level
of thought is raised to another level. Here the very
things that looked like drawbacks are seen to be advantages.
and conversely what was thought to be the highest freedom
turns into an "iron-clad” limitation. This is not a
question of resolution but a re-orientation of vision.
Although there is a tendancy to suppress this moment
as it is a frightening one. if the new vision is accepted
the reward is an objective perspective. All is change--
problems. theories. categories. even ourselves--are subject
to change: ”the explanation. . . is inherent in the
initial description of the event. just as the geometrical
theorem is inherent in the initial definition."’+2 Not only
is the object seen but also our own selves are observed
working on that object. This brand of self-consciousness
is an externalizing process. a placement in history which
is distinguished from introspection.. The theory abstracted
from the original details has come full circle and takes
its place in an historical perspective. This final moment.
Jameson calls an allegorical action};3

However. its movement is based on a symbolic definition
not an allegorical one. In the introduction to Marxism ghg
EQEE Jameson sees his method working in this manner:

I have felt that the dialectical method can be
acquired only by a cencrete working through of

26
detail. by a sympathetic internal experience of the
gradual construction of a system according to its
inner necessity. 4h
Jameson's use of detail. then. is not an arbitrary
allegorical one: rather. it is a symbolic one. moving
from material to immaterial naturally. In The Political
Unconscious Jameson carefully articulates the manner
in which his criticism works. Because the mode of
interpretation establishes its own object. it will
be instructive to see if this. too. is symbolic. His
interpretative process contains three moments:
. . . which mark a widening out of the sense of
the social ground of a text through the notions.
first. of political history. in the narrow sense of
punctual event and a chroniclelike sequence of‘
happenings in time: then of society. in the now
already less diachronic and time-bound sense of a
constitutive tension and struggle between social
classes: and. ultimately. of history now conceived
in the vastest sense of the sequence of the modes
of production and the succession and destiny of
the various human social formations. from pre-
historic life to whatever far future history
has in store for us. 45
The physical fact lies at the base of his process. and
Jameson argues that it must be viewed in terms of its
symbolic significance. That is. social classes are
described and defined through the individual. This is
not presented as an arbitrary union but a genuine one.
several times making reference to "genuine? historical
theories. Out of this union two things occur simultan-
eously: the individual act is "transformed" into an
example of class antagonism and the individual act retains

its own historicity. In the final action the resultant

27
structure is transformed into its widest circle of meaning
and then analyzed in historical terms.
Lest the reader feel Jameson is verging on an arbitrary
interpretative schema. he deals complexly with the issue
of transformation proving to his satisfaction their
natural relationships. For the first phase he uses
Claude Levi-Strauss' work in myth to show the organic
relationships among the external rites of primitive
tribes. When Jameson moves into the second phase. the
same kinds of natural connections are posited:
The individual text retains its formal structure
as a symbolic act: yet the value and character of such
symbolic action are now significantly modified and
enlarged. On this rewriting. the individual utterance
or text is grasped as a symbolic move in an essentially
polemic and strategic ideological confrontation between
the classes. . . .
This insistence that the transformation of particular into
general is a symbolic act continues. The social classes
and institutions are not objects that have arisen arbitrarily
but are an outgrowth of the natural tendancy between the
dominant and repressed classes to fight for a place in
the society. Jameson carefully eases us from the concrete
to the abstract by insisting that the line between them is
an unbroken one.
The third step of Jameson's interpretative process
rests on the first two but also includes another dis-
tancing step. The act of self—consciously placing the

physical fact serves to point up its textual status.

They are ggconstructions. representations that can be

28

made to yield their unified system. The important aspect
of this movement for our purpose is the natural progression:
and consequently. the necessity that the truth is inherent
in the first event. In order to buttress these claims.
Jameson traces his abstract theory of modes of production
back to the individual event. This serves the two-fold
purpose of saving the individual from being swallowed
by history and demonstrating the living base of his system.

Perhaps. this can be best exampled by examining one
of Jameson's series of transformations. He proposes to
analyze Frye's system of romance which he argues rests
on the binary opposition of good and evil. It is his
contention that the form of such an opposition carries
physical residue from its original historical formulation.
And if the reader agrees with this premise. then he must
ultimately agree that Frye's final step carries that same
historical element.

History itself becomes the ultimate ground as well

as the untranscendable limit of our understanding

in general and our textual interpretations in

particular. 47
Using this untranscendable ground. Jameson argues that
good and evil are not natural opposites but solely found
in language. To give credence to his statement he uses
Derrida's theories on this subject. the main thrust of
which is the necessarily privileged position of the first
term. Thus. the resultant structure is not a natural one

but is set up with specific values already in mind. Man

29

determines that good is better than evil and so puts it
first. The action successfully marginalizes the devalued
term. Derrida claims that such an action is the remainder
of ”metaphysical thinking" but Jameson steps back from
even that term to see its historical content. He attributes
it to Nietzsche who postulated that the positive and
negative terms of the binary opposition could be seen
in terms of good and evil. Hence. Jameson argues. the
origins of the_binary opposition rest on ethical considera—
tions not metaphysical ones. This is a point that must
be sorted out in material terms because the difference
in vieWpoints reflects differing positions on truth.
If good and evil are metaphysical terms. then they exist
as essences beyond the physical world: if however. good
and evil are ethical considerations. then they exist as
contracts of behaviour. Jameson favors the ethical
consideration and for this reason moves Nietzsche's
thought back to its historical foundation. It is
psychological in nature and he argues that man tends
to consider evil that which is other than himself. 'Evil
only characterizes whatever is radically different from
the subject. Thus. Jameson proves the historical content
in Frye's system.“8

However. what is the form that will complete Jameson's
system of criticism? It is collective dialectic--that
moment of transformation when the about to be dominant

class recognizes its own historical placement. And just

30
as he dismantled Frye in order to show the misconception
on which that system is based. so he dismantles the
collective dialectic in order to show the truth on
which his system is based. That truth is History. the
empirically based system that is not to be interpreted
within any hardened theory.

Thus our thought no longer takes official problems
at face value. but walks behind the screen to assess
the very origin of the subject-object relationship
in the first place. #9

This fusion of subject and object by the process of
dialectical transformation is an example of symbolic

thinking from Coleridge onward. No matter the "allegorically
articulated" schemes. the end is always the symbolic whole.

When finally. even the passions and values of a
particular social formation find themselves placed
in a new and seemingly relativized perspective by
the ultimate horizon of human history as a whole.
and by their respective positions in the whole
complex sequence of the modes of production. both
the individual text and its ideologemes know a final
transformation. and must be read in terms of what

‘I will call the ideology hf form. that is. the symbolic
messages transmitted to us by the coexistence of
various sign systems which are themselves traces or
anticipations of modes of production. 50

Allegory is only a moment in the interpretative process.
that point.
in which a text is systematically rewritten
in terms of some fundamental master code. . .
On this view. then. all ”interpretation" in the
narrower sense demands the forcible or imper-
ceptible transformation of a given text into an
allegory of its particular master code. . . . 51
Is the best answer to the symbol's hold on the critical

world going to be an exhausted assertion that there is

31
no way out of the linguistic tangle save a constantly
renewed map of the convolutions of subjectivity or a
reminder to account for subjectivity within a human
system of interpretation? So long as it is maintained
that truth is found within either the individual con—
sciousness or its perception then the trap remains snapped
shut. It will take a radical departure from the belief
in the relativistic nature of truth as well as a recognition
of the absence of truth in the physical world to be able
to contest the effectiveness of the symbol. It will
also make necessary a mode of expression capable of
illustrating such a juxtaposition of objects. Iris
Murdoch offers a beginning with her criticism of the
Kantian tradition. But her critical moment suggests
only negative commentary. What is needed is a positive
moment for an alternative to the symbol to be expressed.
Such a moment is my statement that Iris Murdoch writes
a form of allegory. However. its implicit nature in her
work necessitates an instrument that will force it to
be explicit. Walter Benjamin. whose valorization of
German Baroque Drama is not a local event but is the
specific statement that can account for both the particular
and general aspects of Murdoch's works. is such an
instrument. Therefore. Walter Benjamin's position on

52will be explored

allegory as a viable mode of expression
and the lines of congruence between Iris Murdoch and him

established.

32

Walter Benjamin writes in the introduction to his
Illuminations: "It is not a matter of reducing distances
but of keeping them."53 That he sees distinctions marks
him as an unusual thinker. one who is consciously going
against the mind's desire for unity. How he manages to
retain the distance between appearance and essence can
first be seen in his attack on the romantic symbol. It
is necessary for him to specify the romantic symbol
because he differentiates between it and the theological
one. The latter names the true notion of the mysterious
fusion of subject and object. something not given over
to intellectual speculation but affirmed by faith. With
that notion he has no argument. However. with the romantic
symbol he has several arguments. whose historical base
leads him to metaphysics. Benjamin's historical arguments
point out the false unification of the symbol. While it
tries to convince itself that the beautiful is naturally-
connected to the divine. it cannot. And instead it must
content itself with an emphasis on the objects' similarities
not attending to their differences. Further. the men
who praised the symbol (He specifies Goethe and Cruzer)
neglected to examine allegory. thus privileging their
own term and ignoring the other.

Benjamin's metaphysical arguments challenge the symbol's
claim to embody an idea. However. his challenge is not just
a polarization in Coleridge's sense of the term. but

Benjamin ”deconstructs it. radically challenging its

33

claim to perform the unitary act the Romantic critics
held it capable of.”54 Not only does the symbol fail to
unify subject and object. it also fails to be transcendent.
By returning to Cruzer Benjamin demonstrates that his
definition of symbol implies a relationship to the
artistic symbol and that such a relationship is a
fplastic" one. The significance here is that this rela-
tionship holds the symbol in the human world.
In the plastic symbol the essence does not strive
for the extravagant. but. obedient to nature. adapts
itself to natural forms. penetrates and animates
them. That conflict between the infinite and the
finite is therefore resolved by the former becoming
limited and so human. 55
Further. the romantic symbol denies time: ”the measure
of time for the experience of the symbol is the mystical
instant in which the symbol assumes the meaning into
its hidden. and if one might say so. wooded interior."56
The stress on the symbol's momentary quality takes it
out of any progression and freezes it. To so ignore
such a basic ingredient in life demonstrates that the
symbol is not the all encompassing image it claims to be.
Keeping distances is a worthy activity in Murdoch's
thought also. It is only by recognizing the differences
between objects that man can possibly peer out of his
subjectiveness. For Murdoch the term "un-selfing"57
defines both what needs to be kept distinct and the action
of doing do. First. self and other need to be kept

separate. for only a conscious effort to see the other

34

person as he is will counter the ego's efforts to see
all in terms of itself. Some of the difficulty of this
movement can be seen in her modification of Plato's
Allegory hf hhg ghzg. She adds a stage to the soul's
ascent to the Good wherein the soul stops by the fire
thinking he now resides in the light of the Good. But
the fire is a picture of his own ego and while self-
scrutiny can look like the Good. it is not.58 More of
the difficulty of the ego's outward movement can be seen
in the action of falling in love. When a person falls

59

in love. he attends perhaps for the first time to
another person. But there is a strong pull from the
ego to only take what it needs from the other person
or to re-write him totally.

Second. the action of unselfing occurs in a variety
of ways. One of Murdoch's examples is the process of
learning a language. The learner is confronted with a
structure whose intricacy and size convinces him that
not only will the task of learning be difficult he will
also never finish. However. he attends to the subject
and as he does so begins to acquire some knowledge of the
language's reality.60 Not only does this move him out of
himself. it also points him in the direction of truth.

Another of Murdoch's examples is the process of changing
an opinion. She uses a common-sense situation: a mother-

in-law who dislikes her new daughter-in-law. Whatever

the girl does is "silly" and "vulgar" and the mother-in-law

35

cannot stand the girl. However. the mother-in-law later
proposes to look at the girl again. She does so and finds
for love of her son that the girl is not "silly" but "gay".
not "vulgar" but "spontaneous." The mother-in-law. in
fact. reverses her opinion.61 The keeping of distances.
then. requires not only conscious action but also a moral
commitment. These actions of the mind are real for
Murdoch and are used as preliminaries for her methods
of keeping things distinct. These are best embodied
in the terms prayer. attention. and contemplation. whose
meanings intertwine. Prayer is an acknowledgment that
truth exists outside of man and that his proper approach
is the traditionally humble one. Attention. on the other
hand. is the patient looking at the physical world. It
is an attempt to see the outlines of stones and people.
not in order to see what they might symbolize in the
spiritual world. but to see them in their resplendent
uniqueness. Contemplation is. then. meditating on the
juxtaposition of the object of prayer and the object of
attention.

All of these arguments against unification are not
just exercises in deconstruction. Benjamin makes them
so that he may put forward his own mode of expression--
allegory. For it is allegory that will keep the distinctions
alive. and it is an investigation into the form of allegory

that yields structures able to hold meaning.

36

Allegory's form is marked by several features. one
of which is the substantial nature of truth. Bainard
Cowan says of Benjamin.

The notion of truth intended by Benjamin is not

the Aristotelian one of truth as an ade uatio

existing in relation between sign and signified.

but rather the Platonic conception of truth as

a transcendent reality. . . . 62
His reliance on this premise is a subject which Benjamin
"treats."63 He not only makes outright statements. "As
essences. truth and idea acquire that supreme metaphysical
significance expressly attributed to them in the Platonic
system."6ubut he also writes opinions on the manner in
which this Platonic truth comes to man. One is his
discussion of the word concept. a term specially designed
to carry a mediative meaning between man and the truth
he desires. Since it is man who thinks the concept. it
is not a pure form but is the only one available in which
truth may be represented: "For ideas are not represented
in themselves. but solely and exclusively in an arrange-
ment of concrete elements in the concept: as the figuration
of these elements."65 Another treatise is contained in
an analogy: "Ideas are to objects as constellations

are to stars."66

This means that just as stars have no
natural relationship to the idea of a constellation. so
ideas do not participate in the star's make-up. The two
are independent of each other: they belong to fundamentally

different worlds.

37

Equally so are Murdoch's arguments to be taken seriously.
She does not name her mode of expression allegory but calls
it the novel. However. it is within its structure that
Benjamin's distinctions are maintained. For it is here
that the otherness of truth is allowed existence in the
form of people. "mutually independent centers of signifi-
cance."67 Her Platonism. which insists on independent forms
of truth is continually asserted in her novels. However.
hers is not a naive Platonism. whose soul's ascent to the
light of the Good is unhindered: rather. her Platonism
accepts the same ambiguities that Plato displayed in the
, Timmaeus. There the way to the Good was encumbered by
distorted language forms. making knowledge partial.

Her contemplation of Plato's opinions will reveal
more of the obstacles. Plato's objection to writing
is well—known:

Writing spoils the direct relationship to truth

in the present. Since truth (relation to the time-

less) exists for incarnate beings only in the

immediate consciousness. in live dialectic.

writing is precisely a way of absenting oneself

from truth and reality.
Murdoch agrees with Plato. finding it impossible that
man with his necessarily humble place in the universe
could ever give correct form to the eternal forms. He
uses language that can not rid itself of either its
public meaning or entirely make known its private meaning.

thus contenting himself with a mixture of the two. This

‘historical and subjective base of language makes true

 

38

presentation of truth impossible. However. Plato becomes
her prime example of the artist who must use this dis—
torted form to articulate his position. Both Murdoch
and Benjamin have faith in the efficacy of writing.
Cowan points out that "The conclusion of Benjamin's
prologue in brief is that the form of philosophical
writing is an allegory of truth."69 Writing is the place
for the hgpresentation of truth. Murdoch says. "The care-
ful responsible skillful use of words is our highest
instrument of thought and one of our highest modes of
being."70

These sorts of contradictory assertions lead one
to ask how it is that truth is known at all? If man's
concepts are subjective. if his ideas bear no natural
relationship to an object. how is it that he knows
truth? This is undeniably a complex transaction for
Benjamin. as our intellectual ability. that area capable
of understanding an idea. is inextricably bound to our
subjective self. And that subjective self always has
an intention. It is at this point that Benjamin makes
a distinction between the approach to truth and knowledge.
The latter presupposes an object. and in order to know
that object (that is. to gain possession of it) man will
falsely arrange the physical world or falsely arrange
his own mind. ”Truth." on the other hand."is an intentionless
state of being. made up of ideas."71 Approach to truth

then is "a total.immersion and absorption in it."72

39

The pattern that is apprehended in a representation of
truth comes not from the mind but from the idea itself.
When the truth is even partially absorbed. the resultant
structure will be a representation of truth. whose outlines
will remain viable. As evidence of his conviction. Benjamin
cites Plato's theory of Forms. Leibniz's Monadology. and
Hegel's Dialectic.

How truth can be absorbed can be seen in Benjamin's
explanation of the part beauty plays in the action.
He reasons with Plato that truth is the content of beauty.
thus ascribing to beauty a functional role. While
practicalities usually indicate an inferior position.
in this case it does not. For ideas have no form apart
from their existence in beauty: "This representational
impulse in truth is the refuge of beauty. . . . Its
brillance. . . provokes pursuit by the intellect. and
it reveals its innocence only by taking refuge on the
altar of-truth."73

Murdoch admires too the Platonic connection between
beauty and truth. using the connection to secure a lasting
place for the particulars of the physical world. Natural
beauty if properly contemplated results in "self-forgetful
pleasure in the sheer alien pointless independent existence

"7“ which is a

of animals. birds. stones. and trees.
representation of truth. This insistence on an independent
existence forces man to recognize his own small place in

the world. This is not a devaluing of man. but an

#0

acknowledgment of his appropriate place. Further. Murdoch
includes art in her connection of beauty and truth. For
she holds that great art can also be a point of access
to truth. Admittedly art is fraught with dangers.75 but
she argues that if Plato can himself use such forms as
the Charioteer. and Demi—Urge. he does so in the same
manner that all great artist's do--to illustrate not their
own personalities but truth.

While these arguments outline the philosophic base
on which post-modern allegory rests. they do not outline
the form of allegory itself. And if Benjamin is going
to claim that allegory is a mode of expression. he must
bring that form into sharp relief. He begins by re-
claiming strength for language showing that historically
language claims an access to truth. Benjamin delves
into history and finds that allegory comes from the work
of humanist scholars attempting to decipher hieroglyphs.
They in turn are the Egyptian attempt to represent Adam's
naming of God's creation--an act that claims perfect
unification of subject and object. It is Benjamin's
argument that Plato wrote his theories with these concepts
in mind. Had he not believed in the "deification of the
verbal concept" his theories would not have been possible.
However. to use Adam and Plato as examples of linguistic
purity has unavoidable consequences. The first is to

admit the now fallen and thus imperfect view of man.

41
and the second is to acknowledge Plato's deep distrust
of writing.

Such an acknowledgment of the impurity of allegory's
form necessitates certain conclusion on Benjamin's part.
The disjunction of the physical and the natural worlds
is assumed. Cowan in describing this aspect of the
allegorical experience does so in negative terms.
Whereas the symbol strives to convince of the fulness of
the physical world. allegory argues for its emptiness.
The most important problem then is how meaning will be
assigned. For if the physical and spiritual conjunction
is an arbitrary one. then the person coming to that
combination years later has no certain point of access.
Entire systems are inevitably forgotten. "Any person.
any object. any relationship can mean absolutely any-
thing else."77

While this multiplicity of meanings for allegory
could be seen as a devastation. and de Man and Jameson
do fall back on symbolic constructs. Benjamin transforms
the various meanings into a strength. He argues that
when man realizes the world is not inherently significant.
he can let go of it and be transformed into the divine
world. As he willingly sees the limits of the physical.
so he. then comes to see the limitless divine. Thus.
the image becomes not the plastic symbol of totality
that the romantics would suggest but a ”rune" whose

symbolic beauty "evaporates when the light of divine

#2

learning falls upon it." 78 Nor is his choice of the
:rune an accident. Its relationship to writing cannot
be missed. so that his insistence that writing is both
truthful and subjective is underlined. No total meaning
is available in the rune: there is only ambiguity.
Benjamin begins to sound like another orotund apology
for subjectivity and even more so when he says.

That is to say it (the object) is not quite incapable

of emanating any meaning or significance of its own:

such significances it has. it acquires from the

allegorist. He places it within it and stands be-

hind it: not in a psychological but in an ontological
sense. 79

Benjamin argues that the very self—denying form of \
allegory stands as evidence of the objectivity of
truth. making man's subjectivity an effect not a cause.
To view allegory as a death's head is to see that all
earthly things are effects and must collapse. for they
end in death. But it is also to see a simultaneous
salvational aspect. This action. Wolin calls the inversion
' of allegory.80 He argues that this salvational aspect
can be seen in all systems of meaning: in Freud as a
complete cure: in Christianity as the kingdom of heaven:
in Marx as the concept of class consciousness--all of which
are examples of an "Utopian impulse."

In order to understand this impulse, Benjamin has
moved into theological realms. He argues that to stay

on aesthetic levels is to end in paradox. but a move to

theology brings "an appreciation of the transcience of

43
things. and the concern to rescue them for eternity. . . . 81

For the system cannot be free unless man loses all and
"wakeCsjup under the eyes of God."82 This divine is
not a naive assumption but a metaphor that demonstrates
the juxtaposition of subject and object.

Unless this discussion continues to resemble a
symbolic presentation. its formal inclusion of time
will be demonstrated. It is Benjamin's assertion that
nature does not display the ”idealized and the transfigured
fact of nature" as the symbol does. but sees nature as
a "facies hippocratia of history as a petrified. primordial
landscape." To stand as an example of allegory's involve-
:ent with time. the death's head is significant.

Everything about history that. from the very

beginning has been untimely. sorrowful. unsuccess-

ful. is expressed in a face--or rather in a death's

head. And although such a thing lacks all "symbolic"

freedom of expression. . . . nevertheless this is

the form in which man's subjection to nature is

most obvious and it significantly gives rise not

only to the enigmatic question of the nature of

human existence as such. but also of the biographical

historicity of the individual. 83
If this were a symbolic relationship it would claim to
be a self-sufficient. self-contained structure. standing
before its observer as the embodiment of the divine.
Rather. the death's head claims to be a sign of the de-
composition of life. one that cannot signify itself but
must wait for completion from a source outside itself.8u
It reveals the allegorical relationship between nature

and God. For the natural action of the body becoming

AM
a corpse reveals the exiguousness of man's existence
in the physical world. The utter lack of any means to
stop the body's progression is seen as a sign that the
profane world is robbed of its sensuous fulness. robbed
of any inherent meaning it might possess.85

Murdoch's recognition of the necessity of including
time comes in the negative form of commentary on Sartre's
hero in.hh Nausea. Roquentin recognizes that he cannot
give meaning to his life until it is over: that its
meaning comes at its conclusion. However. Murdoch
argues that the pattern Roquentin affixes to his life
is subjective. He cannot wholly remove himself from
society. thus his view of wholeness is contaminated by
himself .86'

Even language. that traditional bulwark of‘objective
patterning. is stripped of its ability to say the truth.
She. too. sketches the development of the language and
argues that it is a movement away from an Adamic act
of naming towards a circumscribing experience. Murdoch
further examples her position by pointing out language's
implication in time. She does recognize that it is possible
to name things in terms of an "ordinary language”-—an
empirical use where meanings are attached to things. But.
she maintains. that such a material language will not
work for the immaterial. While the word's meaning can
remain stable. individual concepts of the meaning will

inevitably change. Understanding then does not occur

45
by moving from a personal to an impersonal system.
but it occurs by a recognition of the subjective nature
of a word's meaning. Murdoch recognizes that Sartre's
reaction to this claim is his internal monologue. but
her answer comes back through Luckac's complaint that to
so reduce the actual life of a man to a one dimensional
presentation necessarily limits him.

Allegory is then an effect that in the final analysis
goes away "empty-handed." Benjamin's example of this
final action is his speculation on the nature of evil.

It exists as allegory. thus only as an object of the
subjective. In the Bible. Satan promises Eve knowledge
of good and evil, but God the creator of all is said to
have looked at his creation and pronounced it good.
”Knowledge of evil therefore has no object. There is no
evil in the world: it arises in man himself. with the
desire for knowledge. . . . 87 Even the knowledge of

good is in a secondary position. coming as it does
through man and having no object for him. The knowledge
of good and evil is therefore ”nonsense” in a Kierkegaardian
sense. "This knowledge. the triumph of subjectivity and
the onset of an arbitrary rule over things. is the origin

88 Thus. allegory exists

of all allegorical contemplation."
only in abstraction. making it a subjective relationship
between the concrete thing and God.

The allegorist may desire to restore ultimate meaning

to the universe. but since he recognizes the subjective

#6
bias of even that desire. he must satisfy himself with a
"will to meaning." 89 Knowledge by itself cannot yield
truth because of its implication in its own object.
Because knowledge is illusory. because allegory is an
action of the subjective mind. Benjamin's sort of
allegory must content itself with g structure of meaning
and not phg structure of meaning.

Wolin's example of this action is the death of Christ.
which perfectly portrays the hollowness of natural life.
It is an entirely mechanical link between the physical
and the divine: that is. it takes an outside action to
complete its meaning. "In the unpredictability of its
appearance which is to say its complete lack of 'motivation'
by preceeding events and behavior. the miracle-ending. .
sums up. . . the structure of allegory.90 Thus. allegory
is not strictly dialectical in nature unless it is a
metaphysical dialectic. Rather. allegory moves because
whatever partial representation of truth existing~in it
follows the dictates of its own essence.

The mixed nature of allegory is seen everywhere in
Murdoch. For her conviction that truth does exist and
does make itself known in the physical world is evidenced
in her belief in morality. in codes of justice. in the
"spark" that makes a man give up a crust of bread in

91

a concentration camp. Equally is her conviction of

man's insurmountable subjectivity in evidence.

#7
Each of us lives and chooses within a partly private.
partly fabricated world: and although any particular
belief might be shown to be "merely fantastic" it is
false to suggest that we could. even in principle.
"purge” the world we confront of these personal elements.
This is good. it makes us human. 92
Notice. though. the redeeming point of this subjectivity.
It enables us to retain individuals. Their minds are the
most particular things about them and to casually dismiss
them or to ”write" them into a story is not an option.
To so concern herself with the individual moves Murdoch's
allegories into the realm of morality. For their concerns
with form making always carry the moral weight of right
and wrong. Wrong form making is a delusion of the ego
that wishes to retain its central position. Against
these tendancies there is the unique individual. Murdoch's
valorization of the novel accomplishes this counter motion.
For it is the novel. in the nineteenth-century sense of
the word. that can accomodate both the real person and the
form given to his life. Right form making comes from
the desire to create art. Art for Murdoch. as philosophical

representation for Benjamin. must have form because it is

the means of truth's embodiment.

NOTES

1Edward Said. Beginnings (New York: Basic Book
Publishin . 1975). p. 36. "Any worker in discursive
language Tnovelist. philosopher. critics. or historians)
must use language to delimit the linguistic object he
studies and deals with. During this primary delimitation
the object is created. . . . The process of delimitation
is what Saussure calls "establishing a viewpoint."

2Matthew 13:3-8. David Richter. Fable's Egg
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1975). p. 19. poses
a dichotomy between fable and allegory illustrated by
the difference between the biblical parable of the weeds
and the good samaritan. He expands this difference into
a theory that prefers fable over allegory. I would suggest
it is more instructive to emphasize both structures' need
for an outside interpretant than to see the difference in
representation.

3Samuel Taylor Coleridge. ghg Collected Worhg 2: Samuel
Ta lor Coleridge. ed. R.J. White. vol.*6 : La Sermons
(P¥inceton: Princeton University Press. 1972 . p. 30.
0.8. Lewis agrees with Coleridge in Alle or of Love
(London: Oxford University Press. 1959). p. 437 He says.
"The allegorist leaves the given--his own passions--
to talk of that which is confessedly less real. which is
a fiction."

“I.A. Richards. The Portable Coleridge (New York:
The Viking Press. 195 ). p. 399.

5Cwen Barfield. What Colerid e Thou ht (Middletown.
Conn.: Wesleyan University Press. 1973 . p. 101.

6Coleridge. p. 30. Edwin Honig. Dark Conceit
(London: Faber and Faber. 1959). p. 1B.‘§p5££§‘direotly
to Coleridge's polarity and finds it false. written to
favor the symbol.

7Hans-Georg Gadamer. Truth and Method (New York:
The Seabury Press. 1975). p. 66.

8Coleridge. p. 30.
9Barfield. Coleridge. p. 74.

1°Elizabeth Schneider. Samuel Taylor Coleridge
(New Yerk: Holt. Rinehart and Winston. 1965). p. #73.

11Ibid.

48

#9

12Benedetto Croce. Guide pp Aesthetics. trans. Patrick
Romanell (South Bend. Indiana: Regnery/Gateway Inc.. 1965).
p. 22.

13Benedetto Croce. ”On the Nature of Allegory."
The Criterion 3 (April. 1925): #05.

1”Ibid.. p. #10.

15Croce. Guide. p. 23. Jorge Luis Borges in Other
In uisitions. trans. Ruth Simms (Austin: University of
Texas PFess. 196#). p. 50. puts forward an interesting
argument against Croce. Borges uses Chesterton's defense
of allegory: "Man knows that there are in the soul
tints more bewildering. more numberless. and more nameless
than the colours of an autumn forest: . . . . Yet he
seriously believes that these things can every one of
them. in all their tones and semi-tones. in all their
blends and unions. be accurately represented by an
arbitrary system of grunts and squeals. He believes that
an ordinary civilized stockbroker can really produce out
of his own inside. noises which dennote all the mysteries
.of memory and all the agonies of desire." Borges continues.
”Sometimes. then. language can correspond to this ungraspable
reality and when it is done it is through allegories."
However. his use of sometimes betrays his own symbolic base.

16Gadamer. p. 69. Owen Barfield. Savin phg Appearances
(London: Faber and Faber. 1957). p. 15 . presents a theory
of "participation" that looks as if refutes this position.
But when its structure is examined it reveals its symbolic
base. For instance. his use of imagination will demonstrate
this base. For modern man. unable to return to innocence.
a point of access is needed to the imagination and that
point is memory. By this man.makes the outward appearance
into inward experience. With participation we reclaim
our natural relationship to the divine. Cyrus Hamlin.
"The Conscience of Narrative: Toward a Hermenutics of
Transcendance." hp! Literary Histor 13 (Winter. 1982).
p. 218. also connects memory an t e internalization of
outward experience. There he uses St. Augustine's con-
fessions as his example of the process. Hamlin then steps
back including the reader of any text. This reader must
use his memory. thus subjectifying the relationship between
himself and the text. '

17Iris Murdoch. "The Sublime and The Good.” Chicago
Review 13 (Autumn. 1959): #3.

50

18Iris Murdoch. "The Sublime and The Beautiful
Revisited." Yale Review #9 (Winter. 1960): 2#9.

19Murdoch. "The Sublime and The Good.” pp. #3-5.

20Murdoch. ”Revisited." p. 259.

21Iris Murdoch. The Sovereignty 2; Good (New York:
Schocken Books. 197177 p. 8. Here she porfrays modern
man as the hero of almost all contemporary novelists:
he knows at all times what he is doing: he aims for
total knowledge of a situation: his thought is attached
to the specific: his reality is not private but open
to other persons: his will is isolated from belief.
reason. feeling. and yet somehow remains at the center
of his being. This man can also be found in her "The Sublime
and The Good." pp. #9, 50. and ”Revisited." pp. 250-#2.

22Iris Murdoch. Sartre: The Romantic Rationalist
(Cambridge: Bowes and Bowes. 1953). P. 25.

23Murdoch. "The Sublime and The Good." p.,51.

2I'iBarfield. Appegrancep. p. #8.

25Murdoch. Sartre. p. 29.

26Joseph Frank. The Widenin Gype (New Brunswick.
New Jersey: Rutgers Ufiivers ty see. 1963). p. 1#. gives
Flaubert's Madame Bovary as a specific example. In the
country fair scene the action occurs on three levels:
in the street among the speech-making officials. and
between Emma and Rodolphe watching from the window.
Flaubert disrupts the temporal sequence and fixes the
reader's attention on the sets of relationships. It may
be true that each level of action can be read as a
complete unit. but to not see on the third level that
Rodolphe is courting Emma at exactly the same time that
the prize is being given for the best pig is to miss
the passage's extended meaning.

27Gay Clifford. The Transformation of Allegory
(London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. 197#77 p. 11.

28Frankp p. 59.

29Rene Welleck. Conce ts p; Criticism (New Haven:
Yale University Press. 1953). p. 57. "If there is any
safe generalization in literary history it is this: that
the desire for a certain kind of product does not neces-
sarily beget the power to produce it. while it does tend
to beget the illusion that it has been produced." >

51

3°Michael o. Bellamy. "An Interview with Iris Murdoch."
Contemporary Literature 18 (Spring. 1977): 135-

31Paul de Man. "The Rhetoric of Temporality." in
Interoretation: Theory and Practice. ed. Charles Singleton
(Baltimore: The John Hopkins Press. 1967). pp- 176-79-

Owen Barfield in The Rediscovery‘p;_Meanin and Other Essgys
(Middletown. Conn.: es eyan nlverSlty ess. 1977). P- 103.
argues a similar point.

 

32Iris Murdoch. "Metaphysics and Ethics." in.Th§ Nature
2; Meta h sics. ed. D.F. Pears (Londoni Macmillan and Co..
Ltd.. 1937). p. 100. traces the collapse of the distinction
between what words mean and how they mean. Moore made
a crucial distinction between what things are good and
what the word good means. He claimed that the word
was indefinable: and while he believed in good's external
reality. he wanted philosophers to stop worrying over
old questions and concern themselves with something they
could hope to answer. This indicates the turn of thought
that subsequent philosophers were to take. Old questions
of truth and falsehood were replaced with descriptive
instances in which good was defined behavioristically.

33Paul de Man. Alle cries p; Readihg (New Haven:
Yale University Press. 1979). p; 9. He practices another
such interpretation on Yeat's ”Among School Children."
Traditionally. the last line. "How can we know the dancer
from the dance?" has been interpreted to stand for the
unity between form and matter. De Man points out that
the image of the tree that comes before the image of the
dancer makes a good parallel: to ask if the tree is its
leaf or blossom or bole is similar to asking if the dancer
is himself or the dance. However. if the last question
is asked literally. then focus is placed on the arbitrary
relationship between the dancer and the dance. Rather than
seeing how well all respective differences are glossed.
the literal question focuses on the difference and the
juxtapositional nature of their relationship. Two things
that are after all separate cannot be identified. This
is not a choice between the literal and the figurative:
"The two readings have to engage each other in direct
confrontation for the one reading is precisely the error
denounced by the other and has to be undone by it."

3I'lIbid” p. 8.
35de Man. "Rhetoric." p. 192.

36Ibid.. p. 180. De Man's post-structuralism is
unexpectedly reinforced by some of William Empson's

52

arguments in Thg Structure of Com lex Words (Norfolk.
Conn.: James LaughIin. 19317? p. 350, which demonstrates
how widely these methods of thinking have permeated
modern frames of reference. Empson begins with the
equation A is B and is careful to point out that this

is not a situation in which B is an adjective which
would attach it to the noun. nor is it a term used to
introduce a complex predicate. It is a grammatical
form wherein A and B are two objects joined by is. To
so identify A with B is a remnant of an earlier identity
where each name had a privileged position. So that. he
who sets the grammar sets the meaning.

37Ibid., p. 190.
38de Man. Allegorieg. p. 112.

39Ibid., p. 204. Stanley Fish in ”A Reply to John
Reichert: or How to Stop Worrying and Learn to Love
Interpretation.” Critical Inquiry 6 (Autumn. 1979)! 175.
concurs: "The interpretation constrains the facts rather
than the other way around and also constrains the kinds
of meanings one can assign to those facts."

uoE.H. Gombrich. Symbolic Images (London: Phaidon
Press. 1972). p. 189. traces the "tradition in which
the symbol is set up counter to mere discursive reason.”
And while he everywhere keeps the distinction plain.
he privileges the symbol.

anonig. p. 15. This simple opposition does not
illustrate the symbolic nature of Honig's work. While
he traces the historical development of allegory and
defines it as a viable method of expression he denies
it full powers of representation.

uzFredric Jameson. Marxism and Form (Princeton: Princeton
University Press. 1971). p. 354.

u31bid.. p. 328. He also on p. 399 addresses the
problem: "For it is clear that class consciouness itself--
in those societies in which it exists as an existential
fact—-is an allegorical mode of thought. . . .”

“L‘Ibid” p. xi.

uSFredric Jameson. The Political Unconscious (Ithaca.
New Ybrk: Cornell UniverSlty Press. 1931). p. 75.

“61bid., p. 85.

“7Ibid.. p. 100.

53

uaIbid- 9 PP. 113-15 o

u9Ibid.. p. 3#1.
SOIbid.. p. 76.
511bid.. p. 58.

52Walter Benjamin. The Origin 2: German Tragic Drama.
trans. John Osborne (Thetford. Norfolk: Lowe and Brydone
Printers Ltd.. 1977). p. 162. C.S. Lewis too calls .
allegory a mode of expression. but his phrase means
something quite different from Benjamin's. Lewis
restricts allegory to a rhetorical method.

53Walter Benjamin. Illuminations. trans. Harry Zohn
(New York: Harcourt Brace and WorId. 1955). xliii.

suBainard Cowan. "Walter Benjamin's Theory of Allegory."
New German Critique 22 (Winter. 1981). p. 111.

55Benjamin. Origin. p. 16#.
56Ibid.. p. 165.

57Murdoch. Soverei t . p. 6#. This same concept can
be seen in her ghg Fire ghg The §hh: HEY Plato Banished
the Artists (Oxford: Oxford Ufiiversity Press. 1977). P- 68:
alsowin her "Against Dryness: A Polemical Sketch."
Encounter 16 (January. 1961). p. 19.

58Murdoch. Sovereighpy. p. 9#.

59Ibid.. p. 3#. acknowledges her debt to Simone Well
for the actual word attention. saying that she means it
to be a term that will "express the idea of a just and
loving gaze directed upon an individual reality. I believe
this to be the characteristic and proper mark of the active
moral agent." This link between attention and morality .
is not casual: in fact. the task of reifying ethics as a
proper concern for philosophy is one of Murdoch's major
themes. It is her conviction that moral terminology
constitutes a representation of truth and not just a
practical valuing action.

6°Ibid.. pp. 17-23.

61Ibid.. p. 87.

62Cowan. p. 113.

63Benjamin. Origin, p. 28. The concept of the action of
a treatise is important. Benjamin prefers this form of

5#

discourse as it does not claim to be truth but merely to
be a representation of truth. Therefore. there is not
the temptation for closure than an argument presupposes.
nor is there any false supposition that truth is inherent
in the structure.

6“Ibid” p. 30.

65Ibid.. p. 3#.

66Ibid.

67Murdoch. "Revisited.” p. 257.

68Murdoch. Fire. p. 22.

69Cowan. p. 11#.

7QMurdoch. Fire. p. 87.

71Benjamin. Origin. p. 36.
72Ibid.. p. 32.

73Ibid.. p. 31.

7“Murdoch. Sovereignty. p. 85.

75Murdoch, Fire. p. 12#. points out that Plato distrusted
art because it was a copy of a copy thus being open to
considerable mis-use by an unscrupulous artist.

76Benjamin. Origin. p. 167( Angus Fletcher. Allegory:
The Theory of a S bolic Mode Ithaca. New York: Cornell
fUHiverslty‘PTess. 1965). p. 21. touches on this aspect
when he says. "the oldest idea about allegory. that it
is a human reconstitution of divinely inspired messages.
a revealed transcendental language which tries to
preserve the remoteness of a properly veiled godhead."
Gombrich. too. points out allegory's divine background:
the Egyptians "carved one picture for each thing in their
temples. . . . Thus. each picture was a kind of under-
standing and wisdom and substance. given all at once.
and not discursive reasoning and deliberation.” p. 158.

77Benjamin. Origin. p. 175.

78Ibid.. 176. Benjamin extends this runic character-
ization to the image also. finding in Ritter's work a
direct statement that "every image is a form of writing."
This leads Benjamin to conclude. "he gets to the very
heart of the allegorical attitude. In the context of
allegory the image is only a signature. only the monogram
of essence. not the essence itself in a mask,” p. 21#.

 

55
79Ibid.. 18#.

80Richard Wolin. Walter Benjm min: An Aesthetic of
Redemption (New York: Columbia UniverSlty Press. 1982). p. 70.

81Benjamin. Qpigih. p. 223.
82Ibid., 232.
83Ibid., p. 166.
8“Wolin. p. 67.

85Cowan. p. 119.

86Murdoch. ghhppp. p. 11.
87Benjamin. Qpigih. p. 233.
éBIbid.

89Wolin. p. 72.

90Cowan. p. 118.

9zMurdoch. Sovereignty. p. 73.

92Iris Murdoch. ”The Darkness of Human Reason.”
Encounter 27 (July. 1966), p. #9.

Chapter II
Iris Murdoch: The Critics' Assessment

In the first chapter I have argued that the
opposition between symbolism and allegory is not a
mere polarity. They do not exist in a tension that
invites resolution but are juxtaposed positions that
exist with mutually exclusive principles. Therefore.
to insist that allegory is a viable mode of expression
necessitates an understanding of its structure and
mechanics. This is Walter Benjamin's stated purpose
and his writings stand as an articulation of the nature
of allegory. This understanding of allegory is not
so well understood by English and American criticism
at it ought to be. Indeed. the term is used by Iris
Murdoch herself with its traditional trappings. In an
early article entitled. "Against Dryness: A Polemical
Sketch." she argues that the twentieth-century novel
is characterized by either a "journalistic" or "crystal-
line" approach. The difference between them is the dif-
ference between shapelessness and "quasi-allegory." She
further assesses that the modern novel is closer to the
eighteenth century rationalistic allegories and moral tales.
than it is to her preferred nineteenth century novels.1 In
another article. Murdoch answers Kermode's direct question

about the nature of "crystalline" by saying. "There is a

56

57

tendency. . . to produce a closely-coiled. carefully
constructed object wherein the story. . . is the import-
ant thing and. . . suggests a particular. fairly clear
moral."2 The similarity between this and Coleridge's

definition of allegory is striking. Each shuns the
abstract and lifeless quality of traditional allegory.

It is no surprise. then. when Murdoch's critics
use this same traditional definiton as a kind of weapon
against her. A sampling of the critics will illustrate
their general reaction to several of her works. Kemp
call her "semi-allegorical”. a writer concerned not with
people but themes. And while he finds those themes
worthy of treatment. he argues that such an emphasis
causes insufficient characterization. The resultant
work is a highly patterned one: and although he calls
it "aesthetically pleasing". it is condemned for its
unreality.3 Slade says of hphpqhhg Soldiers that it is
a story for "highbrows. . . whose intimations of Immanence
allow you to take the romance allegorically.”u Reviewing
the same novel. Lehmann-Haupt finds it ". . . a Christian
allegory. which examines various courses of conduct in
a world where God (Guy) is dead" and suggests that it
would be wise to read Murdoch lightly. Any other attempt
transforms her work into "religious clap-trap."5 Updike
also complains that Nuns and Soldiers resembles an allegory.
especially if Guy and his twelve relations are analyzed.6

Sage calls Murdoch's style a "loose form of allegory"

58

used to "express the provisional nature of one's world
picture." The manner in which the writing is allegorical
or provisional is not developed. and Sage is content
to speculate on the abstract meaning of a few images.
For instance. she postulates that the image of the London
underground "demonstrates the fragility of mental space
unsupported by the colours and perspectives of the art
of material life."7 Raban calls Thg Sacred hhh Profane
‘hpyp Machine a series of "stately tableaux”. ”allegorical
scenes" in which the characters behave self-consciously
in the allegorical form.8

The perceived structuring element. a substitution
of the real for the unreal is condemned as is the use
of typed characters. Personification is an old trick
of allegory and the complaints that Murdoch uses it are
numerous. Kuehl finds only two categories of characters
hng. and Thp unicorn: the enchanters. who are mysterious.
magical and powerful creatures: and the enchanted. who are
impotent. ignorant and powerless. These two groups are
in constant conflict and stand as an allegory of the
conflict between knowledge and illusion. Locked as
they are in this ”metaphysical fantasy” the characters
are consigned to acting out their types.9 When Sullivan
examines Flight zppp the Enchanter and describes it as

an "allegory of power" in which the "enslaved individuals"

willingly give themselves to their enslavers, we have

59
the feeling that Sullivan is acting as a commentary on
Kuehl not Murdoch.10 Van O'Connor exemplifies the
complaint against personification by saying that Murdoch's
"characters are interesting puppets and interesting
symbols. and she can make them dance or place them erect

11 The critics do not see real

in an eerie green light.
people but only an intellectual action that privileges
the idea. I

This mechanistic judgment is extended to Murdoch's
delineation of theme. Gindin postulates that her first
four novels' titles parallel their themes. In ghggp
phg hp: planned ways of life (logical patterns) are seen
as nets that may entrap certain elements of reality but
cannot contain all of reality. In Flight Epph php Enchanter
the relationship between enchanter and his enchanted is
explored: in Sandcastle the relationship between art and
life is exhibited in the form of a middle-aged school
teacher's affair with an artist: and in $22.22;; the
material bell becomes a symbol of "the effort of humans

12 German too sums

to construct their own salvation."
up her themes: 'thpp p p hpp portrays Wittgenstein's
search for precision of language: The Flightthgh php
Enchanter traces the tragic paths of illusions: Sandcastle
explores the relationship between the portrait and its
live subject: and h Severed 323g discusses the nature of

good manners.13 Even Scholes. an early defender of Murdoch

as a "contemporary allegorist” who teaches her audience

60

to read allegorically. cannot conceal his traditional
base. For while he defines her worlds as being full
of "meanings but devoid of a meaning” he specifically
describes Th2 Unicorn as a novel where "every scene.
every character. and every event. . . contributes to
the plot or the meaning--usually to both simultaneously.1u

Iris Murdoch's fiction. then. seen in this circum-
scribed fashion is traditionally allegorical. with all
its attendant pejorative weight. It will be instructive
to examine one of these mechanistic readings in order
to demonstrate its typical process. Ann Grossman's
interpretation of h Severed Head rests on the premise
that it parallels Plato's Allegory pf phg ngg with a
certain twist. While his allegory consists of both the
illustration proper and its explanation. it is in the
explanation that Plato interprets correctly his allegory:
the cave is a figure of man's aspiration to knowledge
consisting of two moments. In the first moment. man
is pictured as being bound and chained in an underground
pit with a fire behind and a wall in front. The images
that the fire throws on the wall are thought to be true.
In the second moment. man is freed and walks into the
sunlight. seeing for the firSt time objects as they
truly are. Plato completes his explanation with an
explicit rendering of the figure's elements: the prison
is the world of sight and the firelight is the sun.15

Grossman argues that if Murdoch's modification of Plato

61
is understood. a correct interpretation of h Severed
hphg is ensured. She relates Murdoch's change in Plato.
Out of his allegory. Murdoch draws three moments for the
ascent to knowledge: worshipping the shadows while still
chained: worshipping the fire when first released: and
finally emerging into the light of the sun. Murdoch
concentrates on the second moment. where she postulates
that the fire stands for self and presents a temptation
to the freed prisoner to stop and contemplate himself.
The desire to be self-involved is exceedingly strong.
while the desire to emerge into the hard light of the sun

is felt by only a few.16

There is. then. a juxtaposition
of the novel with its source that indicates a traditionally
allegorical relationship. Its real elements. the characters
and the setting. are locked inside a figuring structure
that refuses to allow them any movement and instead
consigns them to dull imitation.

Rather than limiting this novel to a static re-
write of Plato's allegory. perhaps if it is considered
in a movement-oriented analysis. one based on the coming
to consciousness of the characters in time. they can
be rescued from their captivity. The recognition that
time does not cease will not cancel the novel's obvious
relationship to Plato. but it will enable the characters
to exist in a world not already pre-drawn for them.

In the opening of h Severed Head Martin Lynch-Gibbon

and Georgie Hands are seen relaxing in front of a fiew

62
that is designed to recall the first stage in Plato's
allegory. "The room had a glitter. . . as of some half-
described treasure cavern." (SH. 7) The images that the
fire throws on the wall are as mundane and innocuous as the
pair of lovers in front of it. In the course of their
conversation many ”truths” are uttered. but their existence
in front of a fire sounds a warning. Like the false
images that Plato's fire makes. so Martin's images are
false. It is not a shock to discover that Martin is not
unhappily married as he claimed with Georgie but is quite
happy in his position between two women.

Martin is shown next in front of another fire. a .
"bright fire of coal and wood. . . glowing and murmmering
in the grate and intermittent lamps lit with a soft gold
the long room. . . ." (SH. 27) This attractive fire burns
at Martin's home where he lives with his wife Antonia.
Because of the parallel to the first stage's fire. we
are led to speculate about the possibility of more lies.
The narrative reveals that the suspicions are justified.
for Antonia tells Martin that she's having an affair with
her analyst. Palmer. Her statement "see what things are
like hpfl" stands as a challenge to Martin to rouse him—
self toward an understanding of the situation. That this
is a first step of consciousness can be seen in Murdoch's
addition of the lamp light. Martin is no longer only seeing
images on the wall but can now see the fire itself. "The

familiar world of ways and objects within which I had lived

63

for so long received me no more." (SH. #1) This fire of
the ego is a resting point only. Thus. when Antonia
suggests a menage de trdis and Martin submits. the
arrangement can only be thought of as temporary.

Following the form of the allegory. the prisoner's
next step is into the light of the sun. so that whomever
.Martin sees away from the fire and in an outside light
will be analogous to the sun. "Great orange flares at
Hyde Park Corner showed us the way into Knightsbridge.
and by their light I stole a glance at my companion." (SH. 71)
His companion is a woman. the only fact that this dim
light reveals. And if it were not for the meaning con-
ferred by Plato. the hint of her significance might be
missed. What cannot be ignored is Martin's slow emergence
into consciousness. His knowledge of Antonia's affair
forces him to take a new look at all his surroundings.

However. in the next scene Martin returns again
to the fire. the "drawing room was full of golden fire-
light" and just as the prisoner in the cave not only ascended
to new levels but also sometimes returned to previously
known levels. so Martin is returning to familiar places.
The motive for such behavior is simple: it is painful
to stand in the sunlight. There objects are revealed as
they are not as they are desired to be. In this golden
room are Antonia and Palmer. and here Martin stays. In this
state of willed ignorance. Martin describes Honor Klein.

the woman seen in the outside light. "like some insolent

6#
and powerful captain. returning booted and spurred
from a field of triumph. the dust of battle yet upon
him. confronting the sovereign power who he was now
ready if need be to bend to his will." (SH. 72)

The highly poetic form of his impression of Honor
yields interesting speculations. Why is such an ornate
simile used in a false situation. whereas such plain
language is used in the real situation? Perhaps.

Murdoch is demonstrating Plato's feelings about art.

His distrust of art and the artist are well known as is
his insistence that truth does not dwell in written
language. While the language may be accounted for by
suggesting that it materializes his distrust. more

subtly is the possibility that Murdoch is mirroring
Plato's practice. He may say that language begets false-
hood but he must use language to do so. His writings. too.
contain very ornate similes and metaphors. whose only
purpose is not to beautify the presentation but to

attempt to represent truth. Martin is also attempting

to embody Honor. and however much the truth of her may be
clouded by his imagination. his attempt remains. Further.
Martin has not tried this kind of representation before.
so that his new knowledge of the outlines of his life is
linked to his articulation. Consciousness brings a desire
to see the true forms of the objects facing it.

The narrative moves to the light of another fire

where Martin's mistress meets his wife. ?The interview

(A)

C)

65
took place in Palmer's drawing room. the purple velvet
curtains were drawn now upon the evening. . . lit by a
dancing firelight. surrounded us like a wicked forest."
(SH. 107) However. this fire is no longer comfortable:
Martin's knowledge presents another obstacle. causing
him frustration and despair. a condition that will continue
as long as he remains in the firelight. Later. in a scene
that intensifies the untenability of Martin's position.
he is again in front of a fire. ”The fire was burning
brightly but there was no one there.” (SH. 116) This
time he is alone. and perhaps he will. as he contemplates
the images of the fire with his new knowledge come to an
understanding of his position. He says. "I shook myself
out of these dreams." (SH. 116) rightfully identifying
his life up to this point. He then moves to the dining
room where. "Candles were burning still in the silver
candlesticks on the long table. making of the room a cave
of warm dim luminosity. . . ." (SH. 116) Notice that the
light does not change. but Honor is there: and since
Martin's first experience of her was a perception of truth,
each time she appears. a further glimpse of truth should be
expected. As in the ornate simile. she is seen in an
artistic light. sitting at the dining room table with a
Japanese Samuri sword in front of her. When Martin
attempts to question her motives for telling Antonia
and Palmer about his mistress. he only received a cryptic

comment on justice. This is an idea that cannot be

66
discussed in the cave: it requires the light of the sun.
The single possible approach to justice in these circum-
stances is art and Martin's request that Honor "demonstrate"
the sword's capacity gives evidence to the serious intent
of art to outline truth. Honor declines to merely Show
the sword. insisting that its use must always by done
with a purpose. the "use of them is not merely an art
but a spiritual exercise.” (SH. 120) Therefore. when she
slices the sword through Palmer and Antonia's napkins.
her intent to indict their behaviour can not be ignored.
Juxtaposed to this artistic revelation is another
and equally important one:
The light from the candlesticks shon upon her
[Antonié] golden head and his [Palmer soft silver
one. They watched me. smiling. she infinitely soft
and tender. he candid. confident. brilliant..Across
the white bed their shoulders leaned together. and
they glanced at me out of a centre of white and
golden light. I closed the door on them as one
closes the door of some rich reliquary or glorious
triptych. The light was left within. (SH. 135)
Martin's perception of Antonia and Palmer as religious
figures tempts him to worship them and it looks as if
a mysterious revelation has been effected. However. if
this scene is considered with the set of controls used
on other parts of the novel. it will be seen that it
cannot be a revelation. No outside light has shone
upon the twosome. so that none of the three has moved
from the cave. Further. the suggestion that Antonia

and Palmer can be viewed in religious terms displays

the kind of false transcendence that Murdoch constantly

67

rejects. The scene is presented as if all differences
have been smoothed over. as if Antonia and Palmer can
be considered religious symbols. And this position
could be maintained if Martin would choose to stay with
them and forget the feeling that their relationship is
not right.

However. he does not so choose nor can he forget and
his movement forces him to meet Honor again. this time
in ”the bleak musty cavern that was Palmer's cellar."
(SH. 136) Here. Honor talks to Martin poetically. calling
him. '"The knight of infinite humiliation." 'Art effects
its claim for revelation as these words cause Martin
to partially recognize the truth. He literally fights
with Honor. and it will be from both this physical contact
and her outline of truth that he will begin his final
ascent to full consciousness.

Up to this point. Martin has been wholly self-
involved. not even seeing others. He has been content
to contemplate only his reactions to them. a use of people
that Murdoch abhors. Now he apprehends the otherness of
Honor. and in so doing falls in love with her. In
Murdochian terms falling in love can be an avenue to
truth. as it concentrates on the other person. admits of
his unique existence. and so creates a space for the mind
to perceive the absolute otherness of truth. Love allows
Martin to pass the fire of his own ego: now he is ready

to see things as they truly are.

68
However. these "things" are not pleasant.

I crossed the room and opened a door. . . .I came
out into the hall. A little light from the street
lamp in front. coming through the open door of one
of the front rooms. showed me the stairs. I began
to mount the stairs. . . .Once on the upper landing
I could see the line of light under the door of
Honor's room. I hesitated only a moment. I advanced
to the door and knocked. After so much breathless
silence the sound of the knock seemed thunderous

. .I opened the door. For a moment the light
dazzled me. I saw opposite to me a large double
divan bed. The room was brightly lit. Sitting up
in this bed and staring straight at me was Honor.
She was sitting sideways with the sheet over her
legs. Upwards she was as tawny and as naked as a
ship's figurehead. . . .Beside the bed a naked
man has hastily engaged in pulling on a dressing
gown. It was immediately and indubitably apparent
that I had interrupted a scene of lovers. The
man was Palmer. (SH. 159)

Movement toward truth is painful: consoling images melt
away. and Martin is faced with an absolute otherness
that does not consider his ego at all. Martin has the
choice to descend again to the comforts of the cave or
to continue his path toward truth. There is no sunlight
yet. Martin has left both the cave and the fire and is
seeing true forms. but they are not yet illuminated by
sunlight. This suffering becomes too intense and Martin
descends again. "It had been raining for days. A bright
fire was burning and the lamps were all on." (SH. 189)
He and Antonia are together seeking a return to innocence.
However. Martin has knowledge that he didn't possess at
the beginning. making a return to innocence impossible.
Thus. Martin seeks out Honor and this time finds her

in the full light of the sun. "The bright sun made the

69

sombre room seem bleak and soulless. . . ." (SH. 190)
However. sunlight is not comfortable. It does not placate
the ego: it does not offer any false hope: and while
Martin tells Honor he loves her. there is no romantic
embrace. Honor replies instead:

Ybur love doesn't live in the real world. I'm an

object of fascination a severed head such as

primitive tribes and alchemists used to use.

annointing it with oil putting a morsel of gold

upon its tongue to make it utter prophecies. (SH. 22#)
Notice that art continues its ability to outline truth
even in the light of the sun. Honor reveals to Martin
his false opinion of her. Perhaps trying to properly
respond or else acting in the only way he knows. Martin
falls down to worship Honor. While this might be a correct
response to truth. it is not a correct response to another
human being. Although Honor has been consistently pre-
sented as an instrument of truth. she is not its embodi-
ment. Murdoch will not allow that. That would strip Honor
of her humanity and turn her into an object. a false whole
assuming a oneness with truth that cannot occur on a human
level. Thus. Honor's response is appropriate. "You are
living on dreams." (SH. 226)

The choice that now faces Martin is identical to the
one that has repeatedly presented itself: he may return
to the cave or he may remain in the sunlight. Actually.
the choice is not so cleanly offered. He cannot return

to ignorance. as Antonia's next revelation demonstrates.

She confesses as affair with Martin's brother asking

70

Martin to accept this "fact" as he did her relationship
to Palmer. She argues. "After all you were unconsciously
living it before. Perhaps we were all a little in a dream.
Now it has come fully to consciousness. and things will
be all right.” (SH. 229)

However. things cannot be all right. Martin possesses
knowledge and has had experiences which have changed
him. He can wilfully return to the cave. but it will
be stripped of his comfortable past and pretty illusions.
Or he can stand alone in the sunlight attempting to see
what is truly there. He chooses to stand and in this
condition Honor returns to him. He says. "We have lived
together in a dream up to now. When we awake will we find
each other still?" (SH. 252) In equal acknowledgment
of their precarious situation. Honor replies. "Well.
we must hold hands tightly and hope that we can keep
hold of each other through the dream and out into the
waking world." (SH. 252) Each knows that the waking world
is not warm and comfortable but cold and hard and in-
habited by only a few people. The necessity of their
movement to reach these heights is established as is the
preservation of the form of reaching that goal. It is
the ability to act in two directions simultaneously
that has traditionally marked allegory's distinctive
form. There is a surface action that spins through episodes

so ordered as to mark a deeper action in the spiritual world.

71

Perhaps the critics' claim that Murdoch writes
allegories is well-taken. For although I argued in the
beginning of this interpretation that it is a movement-
oriented one. and indeed Martin's progress is marked
by his coming to consciousness. the stages he attains
are mechanical ones that explicitly parallel Plato's
allegory. The major difference between my interpretation
and Ann Grossman's is that I chose to emphasize the
particular working out of Martin's ascent to knowledge
rather than the scheme itself. However. the coercive
influence of the scheme is everywhere evident, marking
out significant objects and insisting that they be
assigned meaning in a particular manner. The form tends
to gloss differences in the novel. It does not explain
the spark of attraction between.Martin and Honor: or how
it is possible that Martin chooses to love the person
most painful to his own ego: or how it is that he chooses
the path of good at all.

The same complaint can be registered against those
critics who interpret h Severed hphg in terms of Freud.
If this most "myth ridden" novel. one that Murdoch herself

17 were wholly

declares is an example of giving into myth.
examined. it would be seen that although it would be
easier to subsume all the novel's parts under a Freudian
analysis. some significant pieces of the story line simply
would not cooperate. Instead of being able to explain

the significance of the work in terms of traditional

72

allegory. the novel shows itself to be larger than its
explanation. And however exacting those tracings of
influence are. they do not suffice as adequate descriptions
of either Murdoch's structure or its meaning. We come
away from reading her novels with a sense of frustration
at the jumble of mythical objects. not knowing which
one to pursue in order to produce the "right" interpreta-
tion. We are annoyed at Murdoch with what appears to
be a deliberately ambiguous series of choices. We rail
along with the critic who opened Nphp ghg Soldiers.
read its opening line. "Wittgenstein.” and said. "I am
rather crossly aware that this must be an important clue
that I could only follow up by reading Wittgenstein."18

On this level. the critic usually comes to Murdoch's
novels with a pro-conceived theory from which meanings
are created. And whatever the point of view is. dominated
by language theory. patterns of imagery. archetypal
motifs. psychology. history or sociology. the critic
uses it to tame her multi-faceted surface. Even the
systems of Jameson and de Man collapse into this category
of complaint. For although theirs are sophisticated
theories which illuminate the working of subjectivity.
they remain as spokesmen for the visual horizon of man's
knowledge. No where is this more succinctly stated than
in Leonard Kriegel's propsed indictment of Murdoch:
"We were. . .expecting something more. some synthesis

of myth and contemporaneity that will do what great

73

art alone can do. fuse past and present and future into
a vital crystallization of our world."19 Walter Benjamin
names this variety of criticism. ”self-absorbed
fantasizing. seeking to insinuate itself into the place
of the creator. . . .a subjective criticism that eats
everything alive."20

It is this voracious aspect of interpretation that
impels Murdoch to say. "I'm against the intrusion into
literary criticism of jargonistic theories. I don't
think it helps. One has to keep a very open mind about
literature and just look and respond to the work with
one's whole self."21 Murdoch is not alone in her suspicion
of theories. There are several critics when faced with
her prodigious detail and mythical objects. who reveal
genuine frustration concerning the manner in which an
approach may best be accomplished.

One such critic. Elizabeth Dipple. will illustrate
my point. On one hand. Dipple postulates that Murdoch's
objects acknowledge the "realist paradox of formless
form. . .by her careful decisions to distract and
crowd the forefront with the pleasures and confusions of

22 She argues that the explosion of detail

contingent life."
is a moral commitment of Murdoch's to the novel form.

whose form-making action wills order out of chaos. But

once having said this. Dipple does not recognize the logical

necessity of accounting for the motives of such an action.

7#

For when Dipple describes the novels proper. she
does so in mythical terms. tending to read them as
Coleridgean allegories. Thus. the cast of characters
in‘h Fairly Honorable Defegp are transformed: Tallis
becomes Jesus Christ: Julius King. Satan: Morgan. the
human soul: and Leonard. God the Father. While it is
true that this formulation originates from Murdoch and
is perhaps the reason why Dipple so confidently presents
it. if its context is understood. the reader can see
that Murdoch is not suggesting a final interpretative
scheme for the novel but is enjoying a game with her
interviewer:

Q. Would it be valid to say that thairly Honorable
Defeat is a fable about the failure of the artist
(JuIius King) to control his artwork without the
interference of the saint (Tallis Browne)? Julius
King's dramatic demonstration of Rupert Foster's
hypocrisy results in Rupert's death: in fact. chaos
reigns until the saint steps in and restores order--
a chore which Julius. as the artist. was supposed to
perform. Is there any connection between this allegory
and the relationship between the ethical and the
aesthetic ideas which Tallis and Julius seem to
represent? Does the book imply that art is properly
a function of morality?

Murdoch:

A. Of course. that book is a theological myth. I
think hardly anybody notices this. but it doesn't
matter: it's just something in the background. Julius
King is. of course. Satan. and Tallis is a Christ
figure. and Tallis' father (Leonard Browne) is God
the Father. who finds that it's all gone wrong.

Q. Yes. I was struck by Julius' demonic nature as
well as the crucifixion image of Tallis pushing his
empty pushcart up the road in Notting Hill.

A. And then Morgan (Tallis' estranged wife and Julius'
former mistress) is the human soul. for which the two
protagonists are battling. When Julius recognizes who
Tallis is. he can't help loving him. But obviously the

75

story has to stand up without this kind of structure
being too evident.

Q. Julius is a sort of Old Testament "instrument of
justice”. as he calls himself. and his real Jewish
name is Kahn. Is there any significance to this?

A. Yes. this stuff about being an "instrument of

justice" is a kind of double-talk. but there's

something in it. too. 23
Throughout the interview Murdoch points out the dangers
'of such reductions. She makes distinctions between
”critics' talk” and novelists' work. between the form
that poetry needs and the superior formlessness of the
novel. between the temptation to impose form and the moral-
ity not to. Indeed. formlessness plays a requisite part
in her entire aesthetic. Therefore. it would be incon-
sistent with the rest of her thought to consider her
scheme of h Fairly Honorable Defeat binding.

This short presentation of Dipple's approach may give
the impression that she is blindly practicing symbolistic
criticism and to an extent that is true. But her
explanation of Thp Unicorn will demonstrate explicitly
her implicit unease at such theoretical breakdowns of
Murdoch. The beginning of the explanation doesn't sound
too promising: "this is the first large allegory in
which a character interprets and enacts the role of God."2u
Dipple argues that an understanding of Hannah Crean—Smith
will ensure a correct understanding of the novel. Hannah

is presented as a type of Christ. whose sacrificial role

in the novel parallels the spirit of Christ's life. However.

76

Dipple immediately expands her interpretation: Hannah
is also Platonic Good and love. Each of these explanations
is skillfully executed. resting on evidence from the
novel itself. They lack. and their number bears this
out any finality of position. Dipple is aware of this
problem and repeatedly reminds herself that Murdoch resists
interpretation. that indeed it is impossible to be content
with searching out sources and expanding them into a
theory. But she does not expand her theoretical horizons
to include any rationale for Murdoch's peculiar structures.

Another critic who reveals the same limitation is
Frank Baldanza. He takes up the question of classifying
Murdoch's novels by disagreeing specifically with a
current term used to describe them. "philosophical
novelist." He feels that this term only limits Murdoch
and argues that she is a realist. However. her brand
of realism is unusual and forces Baldanza to invent a
new term. "transcendental realism." This he intends
will include both her use of physical detail and myth.
He argues that Murdoch uses realistic settings. plots.
and characters but in such a manner that the devices
catapult the characters into mythic situations. For
example. Martin's mundane walk'to the basement for wine
"erupts" into a confrontation with a goddess. ”This
eruption of the unexpected is a testimony to the richness

0f reality, and it is not an anti-real element."25

77

How is it that Baldanza maintains his definition
of wrestling with a goddess as realism is not pursued.
so that the rationale behind its structure is ignored.
Rather than discussing why Murdoch uses myth to portray
people. Baldanza limits himself to the mythic situations
themselves. For instance. he interprets Uhggp phg fig:
as a presentation of two contrasting visions of life:
the artist (Jake) and the saint (Hugo). The saint.
who practices the contemplative life. attains a vision
that is incommunicable: whereas the artist. who creates
physical things. can not attain a vision. His sole
concern is the problem of representing the saint's vision.
Thus. the saint moves beyond the concrete world to the
spiritual. while the artist remains tied to the concrete.
Again. in discussing another novel. I§§.§2ll Baldanza
presents his interpretation in mythical terms. He casts
each character in terms of his or her spirituality.
the plot in terms of struggle to religious consciousness.
and the setting in terms of a "latter day garden."26

The tension that exists between Baldanza's term
and its application is a result of his desire to classify
Murdoch. He wants to reconcile the opposing tendencies
in her work and tries to organize them on an hierarchial
scale. When she resists such neat classification. rather
than turning to the impetus behind the work and speculating
on its nature. Baldanza uses his terminology as a

judgmental tool. With it he finds Murdoch too "crystalline."

78
writing a "self-contained. fabulistic allegory."27 I
would suggest that rather than the work not being able
to "suppress" a I"natural tendency" toward allegory.
Baldanza cannot suppress his need to classify. This is
not to cast an aspersion on his fine commentary. For
his artist/Saint metaphor. as well as his alien/god
metaphor do open up aspects of Murdoch's structures.
but the point is made in order to demonstrate the critical
habit of expanding parts into wholes.
Another critic who feels the pressure to reduce
Murdoch works to patterns and her resistence to that.
is William Hall. In the opening of his article on
Bruno's pppgh. he confidently proposes two patterns
with which to group all her novels: form (male) and
female (contingency). However. he too backs away from
the application of his own pattern.
I am not suggesting here that each of Miss Murdoch's
novels exists in a crude allegorical structure and that
once the key is discovered the doors of perception fly
open. . . .I am merely suggesting that there are times
. . . .when the existence of a "master reference"
controls and even dictates the particular view of
two worlds in the specific novel where it occurs. 28
Who decides the ”master reference" and its appropriate
application Hall leaves unexplained.
In A.S. Byatt's Degpees pi Freedom the same kinds of
' tensions come to the fore. Initially Byatt sets herself
the task of examining characters and judging their varying

degrees of freedom. I want to describe a Byatt rendering

of one of Murdoch's novels. so that the kinds of problems

79

Byatt encounters begin to emerge. Her interpretation
discusses The Unicorn and begins with Murdoch's own
acknowledgment that the novel draws on LeFanu's definition
of a good ghost story: that is. a story in which the
protagonist's own guilt pursues him. Byatt concentrates
on the psychological ramifications of this kind of guilt
in strict Freudian terms. The resultant explanation of
the characters' motivations and of the relationships
among them in terms of neurosis and taboo is illuminating.
From this viewpoint. Effingham's love of Hannah can be
spoken of in Oedipal terms and her suffering can be
viewed as an "obsessional neurotic fantasy."29

However. an unexplained phenomenon occurs. Rather
than closing the discussion. Byatt continues it within
the parameters of another structure. a religious one.
Here Hannah is interpreted as a type of Christ: Riders.
the Platonic perspective on life: Gaze. the Christian
view: Gerald. the avenger: Denis. the Ideal Christian: and
Violet. the Calvinist. This is a traditionally allegorical
reading and indeed Byatt senses an "allegorical feeling”
in the novel.30 Why is she irresistibly drawn to include
such an interpretation? As in the case of Baldanza's
criticism. Byatt is experiencing difficulty in classification.
For Thp Unicorn is unmistakeably moral in its concerns. The
world it creates may be partially explained by its inhabitants'
psychological motivations. but it cannot be totally explained

in that manner. Byatt's slide from psychology to religious

80

terminology is a just recognition of the nature of the
novel.

However. there is yet the difficulty of describing
that world. For to read Murdoch in a purely Christian
or Platonic perspective is as limiting as to read her
works in a purely Freudian manner. Byatt grapples
with the problem when she speculates on the nature of
Murdoch's structures. In them she sees two levels of
meaning: the concrete and the mythical. She argues that
the author uses her characters to present her own ideas.
thus writing a ”philosophic myth.”31 Using this term as
a tool. the author again turns to ghp Unicorn and finds
that the novel contains too much myth. Ate and her
attendant meanings over-ride the concrete events. making
it impossible to believe in Hannah's suffering. .I would
suggest that Byatt's own term is heavily weighted in
favor of finding only mythical structures. While she
maintains that Murdoch's work is her base. she is actually
working from a premise that can only find myth. An attitude
is needed that would allow Byatt to discuss the manner
in which Murdoch uses the myth of Ate. uses Plato. uses
Christianity to create a fictional world for her characters:
and if this attitude could be invoked then the structural
uses of these metaphors would be made plain. It could be
seen that structurally it is impossible to believe in
Hannah's suffering. for Murdoch carefully undercuts the
Christ image my making Hannah selfish and imperfect.

81

In fact. Murdoch undercuts all myths including her own
favored one. the truth-giving nature of death. by making
a minor character the recipient of that vision. Not only
does Effingham have his great vision ”Love is all" while
trapped in a bog. but he also promptly forgets that vision
when he is rescued. What is needed then is not another
theory with which to reduce a writer's world to a symbolic
statement but an attitude that will recognize the necessity
for clearly understanding the author's theoretical base.

This attitude would result in a critic who is
sensitive to the nuances in a work. seeking to uncover
the author's connections. Donna Gerstenberger is such
a critic but even she doesn't wholly concentrate on the
interrelationships between Murdoch's fictive enterprise
and her theoretical base. Perhaps. the fault lies with
the choice of novels to interpret. For Gerstenberger
examines Thg Unicorn: and since this is a novel that the
critics consistently reduce to philosophic statements.
it is difficult to see its individual merits. Gerstenberger
finds the usual elements of Feudal Christianity. classical
virtue. and Gothic setting that most critics find. Certainly
these mythic elements exist. but it doesn't seem useful to
argue which set of outside paraphenalia to place over the
work as a grid marking lines of congruence. Rather. it
is more useful to meditate as Gerstenberger suggests on
what the author means when she says Hannah was to have

been a type of Christ who became ”unsuitable” for the role.32

82

When that quote is followed to its source. it becomes
an ironic commentary on the difficulty of seeing anything
directly. For the source is an interview between Murdoch
and Ruth Heyd. However. their actual conversation is
not reproduced. Heyd writes only a "reasonably accurate
representation” after the fact.33

. . .Miss Murdoch spoke of Hannah Crean-Smith of

Thp Unicorn. and how she eluded the pattern laid

down by her creator. . . .Hannah became involved

in falsehood and guilt herself. Her personality

took unforeseen paths of development until she

became an unsuitable image of redemption. 3#
In attempting to reach the source. I wrote Murdoch a
letter asking if Hannah's "unsuitibility" was the result
of a human. a dogmatic. or a novelistic limitation. She
replied. "Hannah's limitations. her highly ambiguous
obsessions. are her own. not those of the novel. or the
author. (As I see it)"35 Thinking about this kind of
statement forces a return to the novel. Murdoch offers
no other avenue. For her purposeful limitation of per-
spective requires a sensitive reading of the work itself.
If there is agreement between the critic and the author's
pronouncement on her work, then the appropriate path is
an elucidatory one delimiting Hannah's unsuitibility:
or if the critic disagrees there must be an equal attempt
to make clear the area of disagreement. The point becomes.
then. not to prove if the world of Gaze can be construed

as analogous to Yeat's ”Calvary" but to demonstrate how

it is such an implication either adds to or detracts

83
from Hannah's perceived role.

Another example of the criticism being suggested is
Rubin Rabinovitz's disquisition of the significance of
the bell in the novel of the same name. That bell has
been the subject of much speculation. and it will be
instructive to digress a moment in order to see the many
interpretations assigned to it. Kaehele sees ”opposing
standards of morality” in the two bells: the medieval
bell stands for the ”ethics of love" and the modern one

"36 For Gindin. the

stands for the ”ethics of judgment.
bell is a ”postulant". a hopeful symbol of man's effort

to construct his own way of salvation.37 Baldanza views
the bell as a complex of meaning that includes religious
and sexual meanings.38 Byatt adopts Fraser's contention
that the bell stands for lost order and faith.39 Are there.
then. as many meanings for the bell as there are critics

to read the work? If the critic insists on his own
interpretation. the answer is yes: if however the critic
judges it proper to stay within the confines of the
novelistic world. the answer is no. But this negative
response has a curious twist. For it does not mean that
there is a single correct interpretation of the bell's
meaning-~that would result in traditional allegory. Rather.
and this is the point that Rabinovitz illuminates. the

bell's significance is to be found in its differing mean-

ing to each of the novel's characters.

8#

The bell becomes not an object with one meaning but
an object given meaning by its several observers. Each
meaning is the "correct" one and stands as a summary of that
speaker's value system.uo The same relationship could be
said to exist between the various critics and their
several interpretations of the bell. Their comments
serve to show their own value systems. The critic who
would apply outside theories to a work of art is betraying
his position in an earlier and more naive world or
worse betraying his own proprietary interest in literature.
Simply becoming self-conscious about the value system
being applied is not sufficient nor is it possible to see
objectivily what the text is doing on its own. that implies
a Jamesonian relationship to the work that ignores its
own base in subjectivity. Murdoch's structures demand
a recognition of both the text's subjectivity and the
reader's subjectivity.

Rabinovitz's discussion of the bell not only uncovers
the subjectivity of the bell's meaning but also elucidates
that meaning in terms of the reader's subjectivity. Thus.

“1 and each character

the bell becomes the ”voice of love”.
who speaks about the bell shows his or her incapacity for
perfect love. His analysis is not an imposition of his
will. rather it is a revelation based on the text and

its relationship to both character and reader. There is
an implicit acknowledgment that in order not sink into

”self-absorbed fantasizing" the critic must attend both

85
to the totality of the author‘s fictive world and the
reader's relationship to it.

Apart from a certain attractiveness of spirit is there
any reason for such a tolerant gesture? Heyd's commendation
of this ”mature” attitude is not sufficient. noris her
argument that the position figures Murdoch's moral

commitment to see others.)+2

If the argument is restricted
to a Murdochian world than either reason would be
adequate as they form the base of her perspective.
However. to advance them as aesthetic arguments does not
credit their local beginnings. It is only when Heyd
joins these two reasons to Murdoch's "commitment to
formlessness" that she touches an area of aesthetic
inquiry deserving examination. A "commitment to formlessness"
is exclusive of a commitment to form. which is simply
another mode of expressing the opposition of allegory
and symbolism. In "The Sublime and The Beautiful Revisited."
Murdoch examines the symbolist's position and delineates
its inadequacies. Hers is not a cursory analysis but
is a carefully constructed counter-argument which expresses
her suspicion of Kantian aesthetics. Nor is her opposition
limited to this single article. Versions of it can be
found as early as her first book on Sartre (fiartre:
The Romantic Rationalist. 1953) and her current book
on Plato (Thp Fire and The Sun. 1981)

The main opposition centers around Kant's distinction

between the sublime and the beautiful. The beautiful

86

he defines as "the conceptless harmony between the

imagination and the understanding.“+3

and here he places
art. stripping it of reason and emotion. The symbolists
appropriated Kant's concept and turned art into a kind
of ”quasi-thing". a symbol that can be understood only
by intuition and limited to a small. visible object.
Here is the base of Murdoch's argument against the
”crystalline” novel. Its solipsistic nature is anti-
thetical to her perspective. In order to give weight

to her argument she traces the use of Kant through
Hegel from whom the symbol gathered "the self locked

in struggle with itself to Kierkegaard who closed the

#4 Turning to even more modern

system of self-interest.
descendents of Kant. Murdoch briefly describes two trends:‘
existentialism and linguistic empiricism. whose self-
centeredness and dream of precision mark them as Kantian.
She is necessarily compressing intricate subjects as I am
in order to force into relief their common ground. Her
purpose is to indicate the symbol's function in modern
literature and to set the background for her work.

This literalness of the symbol is precisely the
argument that Walter Benjamin uses against the modern
symbol. He argues that the mis-conceived use of the
symbol as a vehicle which claims to combine the material
with the transcendent results not in a true union but
in a "plastic" symbol that contents itself with a human

union of disparate parts.“5

87

The reminder that symbolism is presenting an impossible
wholeness of vision is not merely a space-making activity
for the philosopher's own theory but is a radical indica—
tion that to hold the symbolist's view is to espouse a
certain metaphysic. That metaphysic is the adequacy of
human knowledge. discussed in the first chapter and shown
by Murdoch to be a direct result of Kantian aesthetics.
He believes that we define ourselves by our ability to
reason. Thus. to place art in the camp of non-reason
relegates it to a pleasant but unnecessary role. As it
is incapable of telling the truth or even allowing emotion
it becomes mere ego-play.

Murdoch sets herself the task of redefining art's
position in life and in so doing sets forth her own
metaphysic. It is her contention that Kant's theory of
the sublime can be made. with certain modifications.
into a theory of art. In the sublime. Kant recognizes
two things: the formless nature of the world and an
emotional reaction to that understanding. Whereas Kant
retreats into "defiant pride in the free power of his
reason.”6 feeling his superiority to all around him.
Murdoch sees other people. thus coming to a recognition
that his ego is not alone nor is it most important. By
shifting her line of vision from the natural world to
other men. Murdoch elevates the other person to primacy
and the emotions as a necessary road to that discovery.

This she does in full recognition of the difficulty of

88

such a move. Not only does the ego militate against such
a re-orientation but it also dislikes the discipline
involved in seeing the other person. Such a vantage
point necessitates the tolerance. respect. love and
freedom spoken of in chapter one. It also commands
that chapter's recognition of the Kantian formlessness
of the world. Murdoch speaks to this subject:

And. somehow. we live in a literary atmosphere.

When we tell stories or when we write letters.

we are making a form out of something which might

be formless. and this is one of the deep motives

for literature. or for art of any sort: that one

is defeating the formlessness of the world. . .

by giving form to something which is perhaps

alarmingly formless in its original condition--

a sort of rubble. It is as if we live in a kind

of rubble World. and we are always making forms.#7
The desire to impose form and the moral commitment not
to is the telling distinction of Murdoch's aesthetic.
It is easy enough to claim the formlessness of the world.
but it is difficult to practice in the realm of art.
For the basic difference between art and life is that
art requires a form while life does not. Thus. to create
art requires a continual compromise between constriction
and expansion. In the life of the artist. this dialectic
exists as allegory: in the world of the critic. it exists
as methodology. How is it that the critic can be said
to truly see the other work? That is. how does the
author's world find just explication in the critic's
commentary. That subject forms the base of chapter three.

where a methodology and its implementation in three of

Murdoch's novels are presented.

NOTES
1Murdoch. ”Against Dryness." p. 18.

2Frank Kermode. ”House of Fiction: Interviews with
Iris Murdoch." Partisan Review 30 (1963): 63.

3Peter Kemp. "The Flight Against Fantasy: Iris Murdoch's
The Red and The Green.” Modern Fiction Studies 15 (Autumn.

'T969TT'#OBT"'-‘T"_' TTTTTT'T'TT'T”

“George Slade. "A Romance for Highbrows.” New York Times
Book Review (January #. 1981): 1#.

 

5Christopher Lehmann-Haupt. "Books of 'The Times':
Nuns and Soldiers." New York Times (January 6. 1981): 20.

6John Updike. "Worlds and Worlds." The New Yorker
57 (March 23, 1981): 150. —"—"—"

7Lorna Sage. "The Pursuit of Imperfection." Critical
Quarterly 17 Summer. 1977): 67.

8Jonathan Raban. "Iris Murdoch." Encounter 72
(July. 1979): 74.

9Linda Kuehl. "Iris Murdoch: The Novelist as Magician/
The Novelist as Artist." Modern Fiction Studies 15
(Autumn. 1969): 3#8.

10Zohreh Sullivan. "The Contracting Universe of Iris
Murdoch's Gothic Novels." Modern Fiction Studies 15
(Autumn. 1969): 562.

11William Van O'Connor. "Iris Murdoch and The Formal
and The Contingent." in his hp! University Wits and Thgqhhg
pf Modernism (Champlain: Southern IllanlS UniveFEIty
Press, 196;): p. 7 a

12James Gindin. "Images of Illusion in the Work of
Iris Murdoch.” Texas Studies ih Language and Literature
2 (Summer. 1960): 178-95.

13Howard German. ”Allusions in the Early Novels of
Iris Murdoch." Modern Fiction Studies 15 (Autumn. 1969):
368. 368. 376.

1“Robert Scholes. The Fabulators (New York: Oxford
University Press. 1967). p.‘107.

15Ann Grossman. ”Icon and Idols in Murdoch's h Severed
Head." Studies ih Modern Fiction 18 (1977): 96.

89

9O

16Murdoch. Sovereignty. p. 96.

17Kermode. "House of Fiction.” p. 6#.

18Rosemary Dinnage. "Inside. Outside.” The Times
Literary Supplement (September 15. 1980): 951.

19Leonard Kriegel. "Iris Murdoch: Everybody Through the
Looking-Glass.” quoted in Charles Shapiro. Contem orar
British Novelists (Carbondale: Southern IllanlS University

Press, 1%5fi P. 63..
20Benjamin. Origin. p. 53.
21Bellamy. p. 137.

22Elizabeth Dipple. Iris Murdoch. Work for the Spirit
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1982). p. 69.

23Bellamy. pp. 136-7.
2“Dipple. p. 69.

25Frank Baldanza. Iris Murdoch (New York: Twayne
Publishers. Inc.. 197#). p. 72.

26Ibid.
271bid.. p. 174.

28William Hall, "Bruno's Dream: Technique and Meaning
in the Novels of Iris Murdoch." Modern Fiction Studies
15 (Autumn. 1969): #33.

29A.s. Byatt. De see 9; Freedom (London: Barnes and
Neble. Inc.. 1965). p. 1 8.

30Ibid.. p. 159.
31Ibid.. p. 186.

32Donna Gerstenber er. Iris Murdoch (Lewisburg: Bucknell
University Press. 1975 . p. #1.

33Ruth Heyd. ”An Interview with Iris Murdoch." University
9; Windsor Review 1 (Spring. 1965): 139.

3”Ibid” p. 1#2.
35Letter from Iris Murdoch. October 19. 1983.

91

36Sharon Kaehele and Howard German. ”The Discovery
of Reality in Iris Murdoch's The Bell.” Publications of
the Modern Language Association 82 (December. 1967): 557.

37Cindin. p. 180.
38

 

Baldanza. p. 73.

39Byatt. p. 76.

uoRubin Rabinovitz. Iris Murdoch (New York: Columbia
University Press. 1968). P- 27-

ulIbid.

#zHeyd. pp. 139-40.

:BMurdoch. ”The Sublime and The Beautiful Revisited."
p. 2 8.

““Ibid.. p. 250.

usBenjamin. Origin. p. 16#.
#6Murdoch. "Revisited." p. 268.
47Dipple. p. 277.

Chapter III

Allegorical Structure in Representative Works:
Part One

In an early book review, Iris Murdoch poses some
important critical questions that serve a dual purpose:
they disclose her allegorical view of knowledge as well
as suggest the critic's attitude toward structure.

How does one judge a large-scale theory of this

sort? Clearly there is no point in just saying

impatiently, well is it true or not? The question
is. how much will it explain. how much light will

it throw. what will it connect with what? 1
Answering these questions necessitates a concentration
on the work itself. a patient. quiet looking at the
structure in order to determine its parameters.
pecularities and laws of existence.

The fact that such boundaries are not aimed at
defining a unified structure is one of the allegorical
principles of Murdoch's criticism. It is a principle
that carries with it a recognition that while the human
mind seeks unity it must settle for contingency. She
finds the Canetti "book. . .full of starting points.
embyro theories. sudden independent illuminations."2
These observations are not condemnatory. rather they
remind the reader that not only is form the imposition
of the writer but also that all knowledge is partial
and impure.

Structure for Murdoch consists of a series of open-

ended events or thoughts that continually question

92

93

their right of existence by a double movement: first.
in a centrifugal manner. and second. in a centripetal
one. These are displayed in the action of a Murdochian
plot. Here discrete actions are so ordered as to form
a pattern. However. hers is not an unbroken symbolic
design: rather. it admits the interruption of the
irrational into both mental and physical worlds. These
bits do not conform to the pattern and indeed impel the
entire design into a new configuration. much like the
workings of a kaleidescope. The entirely unforeseen
developments or thoughts act as mirrors of the disjunctive
allegorical movement of the world. just as the old and
new patterns encourage speculation as to their uses.

This is. fundamentally. the attitude of the allegorist.
For the allegorist understands what is at stake in
deliberately patterning events. Thus. the ”stops and
starts" are not seen as flaws in what could be a perfect
structure if only it were refined: rather these fragments
become a "rune" in the fullest sense of Walter Benjamin's
term.3 They act as contemplative signposts by which both
reader and writer can partially reclaim or forge new
knowledge. This is the allegorical attitude. a stance
that cannot be slipped on and off as it proves itself
useful. This is an approach to the nature of the self.
its relationship to the world. and the constitutive power

of language.

9#

For Murdoch's mode of allegory. it is in prose that
language recognizes contingency. She describes prose
as the "word which is lived."u suggesting that here is
the place for the formlessness of the physical world
to be introduced to the form—making nature of the word.
In prose there is an openness to contingency that poetry
dispels. There is a lack of closure that allows the
writer to work in the centrifugal mode while acknowledg-
ing the existence of the centripetal. Perhaps. this
paradox can best be understood in terms of the meanings
and interrelationships of two words: grammar and thought.
Grammar is the set of patterned conventions that provides
the vehicle for the writer's thought to exist. It is
based on a community agreement about the constitution
of appropriate meaning and is everywhere bound by history.
Thought. on the other hand. is the private use of grammar.
Man's mind is not limited to typical operations nor is it
restrained by history. For example. consider the term.
repentence. There are a number of public conventions
that make up the word's meaning. Otherwise. it would
not be,this particular word that would fit a person's
situation. However. the use that the individual makes
of the word will be entirely his own.5

The manner in which grammar modifies and prescribes
thought. and the reciprocal action of thought changing
what grammar will allow to be said is an example of the

tension inherent in allegorical structure. When we move

95
from a consideration of the abstract nature of that
structure to a specific description of it. the practical
question of how to describe such an action presents
itself. I would like to suggest a schema that will
allow such a description to move in the two already
stated directions of allegory. directions that are not
opposed to one another but modify each other's form.
One direction will take the reader inside the work. It
will be mainly a descriptive act. whose object is to
understand the world presented to it. No judgment will
be involved. rather a rummaging hand and a curious
gaze will be employed so that the kind of world presented
can be known. Its various inhabitants will be named
as well as the design that their lives take. Benjamin's
instruction to immerse ourselves if truth is our goal

6 Thus clothed in the specific

will be taken seriously.
characters and events we will be prepared to begin the
second movement of the schema.

This centripetal action will hinge on the question
that asks the purpose of these various worlds. That
is best answered with the term allegorical structure.
whose purpose I am arguing is to "edify. explain. and
provoke reflection."7 These allegorical structures will
be incomplete. necessarily so. based as they are on an
allegorical theory of knowledge. They are meant to

educate in Benjamin's sense of that word. That is.

they are not designed to dictate any behaviour or

96

attitude or belief but to isolate. explore and display
something that is sometimes true. sometimes not but a
something that has never been so presented before.8
This will allow the object to fully occupy its own place.'

Further. these allegorical structures are moral in
that they are personal expressions designed to not
explore the self but to explore the other. They exist
to treat subjects. subjects whose common concern is the
human condition. To think and write about the human
condition is Murdoch's desire: to choose the novel-form
to do so is appropriate.9 For it is in this open form
that the individual can truly meet others. She will
illustrate several themes: love with its various mani-
festation and infestations. the necessary in life. random
causes and their effects. good and its limitations. pain
as a teacher. death without consolation. and the virtuous
life as the good life. This list certainly does not
exhaust all of Murdoch's subjects. but it does indicate
the major concerns of her writings. In using these
subjects as larger indicators of various novels' meanings.
there is an obvious danger of petrifying those meanings
into symbolic images. It will be necessary. then. to
remember that allegory is subjective. While it is
premised on the otherness of truth. it is formed by the
mind and as such is in error. Therefore. conscious effort

must be made to move from a position before it becomes

rigid.

97

This chapter and the following one will study
the structures of representative works from Murdoch's
prolific writings. I will examine both early and late
novels. loosely following a chronological order. However.
chronology is not the measuring stick: representation is.
For it is one of the major contentions of this dissertation
that allegory is everywhere expressed in Murdoch. Therefore.
just as any work could have been chosen to represent her
allegorical structures. so it is that the following six

have been chosen: Under the Net (195#). Bruno's Dream (1969).

 

'_I'_h_e_ Else}. Prince (1973). Eggs _a_n_d_ Soldiers (1980) and
.222 Philosopher's Pppii (1983).

I will also adopt the conventional mode of beginning
with her first paragraphs mainly to establish a familiar
pattern for the reader. This mode is not without danger
given Murdoch's conviction that any choice of beginning
involves an imposition of form that necessarily conflicts
with the formless universe. However. keeping in mind
that form may be imposed by "sorting out and emphasizing
and attending to harmonious patterns which are already

10 we will begin.

latent in the universe"
Iris Murdoch's first novel thpp php up; was the
public beginning of her career as a novelist. She had
written and destroyed five novels. so she knows some-
thing of the difficulties of beginnings. Her reception
by the critics equally reflects a difficulty of beginning.

For they tried to include her in the "Angry Young Man"

98
school and pointed to her main character as evidence.
Jake is a liberal. who detests the establishment. scorns

rent payments or profitable work. generally making a lot

11

of noise but not.possessing much power. However. Jake

is not so easily categorized. For instance. his politics

are practiced for expediency. his social behaviour is

simply inattention. and his personality is lackadaisical.

Before being caught up in rebuttals. it would be best

to take Jake's advice. "Starting a novel is opening a

door on a misty landscape: you can still see very little

but you can smell the earth and feel the wind blowing." (UN. 277)

When I saw Finn waiting for me at the corner of
the street I knew at once that something had gone
wrong. Finn usually waits for me in bed. or lean-
ing up against the side of the door with his eyes
closed. Moreover. I had been delayed by the strike.
I hate the journey back to England anyway: and
until I have been able to bury my head so deep
in dear London. that I can forget that I have
ever been away I am inconsolable. . . .On this
occasion too the bottles of cognac which I
always smuggle had been taken from me by Customs.
so that when closing time came I was utterly
abandoned to the torments of a morbid self-
scrutiny. . . .Trains are bad for the nerves at
the best of times. What did people have nightmares
about before there were trains? So all being con-
sidered. it was an odd thing that Finn should be
waiting for me in the road. (UN. 7)

Two people are introduced in this opening paragraph.

the narrator and Finn. Although no physical descriptions
occur several facts can be deduced: Jake habitually D
associates with Finn, who fulfills a purely functional
role: Jake has just returned from a trip having had a
bad day: he has a few quirks: and generally he prefers

his own thoughts. While the outlines of Jake's world

99
are barely sketched. the fact that it is the narrator's
world is firmly presented. Both the first-person point
of view. surely a most coercive viewpoint. and the past
tense corroborate this fact. There is no attempt to
maintain an illusion of fictive immediacy.

The narrator's subjectivity manifests itself as the
novel proceeds. Jake tosses out a few facts: name. age.
height. hobbies. occupation as if those could be used
for taking his measure. The usefulness of this kind of
information is limited: and it is only when Jake tells
the reader that the most important fact about him is his
"shattered nerves" that anything like self-revelation
occurs. He refuses to discuss the origin of those
shattered nerves. saying. "That's another story. and
I'm not telling you the whole story of my life.” (UN. 23)
What is interesting about this statement is not only
Jake's unwillingness to expose all aspects of himself
but also his insistence that story-makingcan conceal.
In an early visit to Mrs. Tinckham's shop Jake says.

But I gritted my teeth against speech. I wanted

to wait until I could present my story in a more

dramatic way. The thing had possibilities. but as

yet it lacked form. If I spoke now there was always
the danger of my telling the truth: when caught
unawares I usually tell the truth and what' s duller

than that? (UN, 20)

Truth. according to Jake. lacks form and drama. two
things he prizes. It also makes its appearances in a

dialogue setting: and while he can recognize it. he does

not welcome it. At one point Jake talks about his

100
dislike of Finn in similiar terms. Finn is capable of
making "objective statements when these are the last
things that one wants. like a bright light on one's
headache.” (UN. 9) Jake uses prose. then. to obfuscate
truth. His introduction of Hugo best examples this
practice. The novel has progressed sixty pages before
Jake introduces Hugo: "I omitted to mention earlier that
I am acquainted with Belfounder.“ (UN. 60) The belated
placement and its casual tone deliberately belie the
importance of their relationship. Hugo is Jake's
antagonist and his narration is seen not so much as the
traditional exposition of character but as a screening
device that high-lights and shadows at will. Each episode
presented is suspiéiously read. so that the reader asks
not so much what has happened as what it is that the
author is trying to conceal.

What is hidden in Hugo's introduction is the narrator's
relationship to Hugo and other characters: an allegorical
structure of morality is being built. not simply a
chronicle of events. There are relatively few characters
in number (the measure being the abundance of persons in
later Murdochian novels) and what is known about them
is limited. Since Jake can turn his attention where he
wills. the amount of space he gives to himself and to
other people reflects his value system. The first paragraph
gives an indication of the novel's center of interest and

it is Jake. He finds himself enormously interesting

101

allowing others an existence when they relate to him.
For instance. his friend Finn could be a very interesting
character. He is Irish. truthful. humble. a drinker.
and a philosopher. However. Jake Shows no curiousity
about these facts or about their possible arrangement
that might result in a true outline of Finn. They
are only revealed because they relate to Jake. Dave
Gellman could also be a very interesting character.
He is a philosophy teacher with all sorts of different
friends. However. Jake doesn't explore Dave's life but
only allows him an existence as it relates to himself.
This deliberate rejection of the reality of another
person is the pattern of Jake's treatment of other people.

This is true also of the crucial relationship with
Hugo. He has been called by critics. a saint. Vulcan.
a mythical father. the philosopher of silence. and
Wittgenstein himself. There is at least some truth
in such reactions. but they do.not do justice to Hugo
nor do they express the basic problem that Murdoch sets
herself to solve. Traditionally the outline of character
is ascertained by an examination of the character's
words. his actions. and others' reactions to him. Because
ghhpp‘phg‘hgp is written in the first person. only the
third kind of knowledge is possible. Therefore. any
true outline of Hugo is impossible. Jake's carefully
selected picture is intended to dazzle the reader by

using massive amounts of deatil to build an impenetrable

102

personage. Any counter motion must begin with the discrete
elements of the picture presented. An allegorical structure
for all its form of subjectivity is based on the substantial
nature of truth. Thus. some true bits and pieces of Hugo
should emerge.

Jake begins with an historical description of Hugo.
All these ”facts" bring a measure of satisfaction. but one
that does not bear close scrutiny. For if we ask what
.we really know about Hugo. the answer is nothing yet.
lInstead of illuminating the real Hugo. the historical
sketch only serves to screen him. (This is a favorite
device of Murdoch's.) It is only when Hugo's feelings
about the making of set pieces in fireworks are disclosed
that any portion of his real self is revealed.

The peculiar problems of the set piece delighted

Hugo and inspired him: the trigger-like relation

of the parts. the contrasting appeal of explosion

and colour. the blending of pyrotechnical styles.

the methods for combining eclat with duration. the

perennial question of the coda. . . .I think what

pleased him most about them was their impermanence.

I remember his holding forth to me once about what

an honest thing a firework was. It was so patently

just an ephemeral spurt of beauty of which in a

moment nothing more was left. (UN. 61)
Hugo's position to the concrete is manifested. He enjoys
the set pieces because they involve all his senses not
because they present a pleasing form. He does not have
a structure that he is trying to articulate: he has
only the discrete workings of the concrete elements.

However. this is not a simple reversal of attention.

for Hugo does use the parts to form a whole. There is

103

a sorting out that cannot be denied. but it is a pattern-
making that allows theSe bits of detail to be wholly
themselves while simultaneously being part of a whole.
The conflict between the organizing mind and the un-
organized flux stands in highest relief in this section:
and it is a conflict unresolved. While Hugo is uncertain
of the manner in which the detail and the whole come
together. he is certain that theory is not the answer.

. . .the newspapers began to talk. and to refer ,

to them as works of art. and to classify them into

styles. This so much disgusted Hugo that it parae

lysed his work. (UN. 61)
The passage from which this quote is taken invites
further speculation. What is Jake's influence on it?
He does not pretend to be writing a faithful reproduction
of a particular episode but has melded several incidents
together. Thus. when he blatantly theorizes. ”I think
what pleased him most about them was their impermanence."
the untruthfulness of the statement can be assumed. Hugo's
intention to become a watch-maker. a trade in which the
permanent relationship of parts is its important feature.
proves that Jake is just theorizing. A blend of objective
fact and personal fantasy are being offered as character
description. 'How much the two can or cannot be separated
will become clearer if Hugo's character development is
followed.

Jake first met Hugo in a cold-cure hospital. That

meeting does not dissolve into a romantic recognition of

10#
kindred souls. Jake is quite hostile toward Hugo. and he
responds with silence. It is during this initial phase
that Jake physically describes Hugo. so that it is hardly
surprising when the description doesn't add any knowledge.
And while Jake repeats that the two of them discussed
art. politics. literature. religion. history. science.
society. and sex. the lack of any kind of account makes
it impossible for those objects to add anything either.
What is reported is a combination of the philosophical
discussions between Jake and Hugo. But this account
must be approached with caution for Jake's relationship
to philosophy is suspect. Jake reconstructs their
discussions in terms of an opposition: the man with the
vision who cannot speak versus the man without the vision
who can speak. ”I have never met a man more destitute
than Hugo of anything which could be called a metaphysic
or general Weltanschauung." (UN. 65) The problems of de—
scribing the indescribable are worked out under the eyes
of the reader.

Jake's feeling that he is forced into such a theoretical
construction is the actualization of his narrative position.
It is hip story and he will tell it as he wishes. However.
he is blocked by Hugo's reliance on detail. his abhorence
of general theories. and his distrust of the ability
to say anything correctly.. They stand at opposing poles
best exemplified by their differing uses of the word.

dramatic. Jake wants to make a drama of everything and

105
indeed he will not speak until he does. Hugo. on the
other hand. complains that drama is used not convey
anything accurately but to impress. to persuade. to
cause a certain effect on.the hearer. He further argues
that language carries this descriptive element. that it
is its nature to carry both speaker and hearer away from
truth. To push this conviction to its logical conclusion
is to opt for silence. And Jake does place Hugo among
those whose ideal is pregnant silence.

What is too often glossed in explanations of ghhpp
phg HE! is the implication of holding such a position.
Silence can not be the conclusion of artistic endeavor.
for that results in non-existence. which is ignorance
and lack. not knowledge and fulness. In an interview
almost ten years after writing this novel. Murdoch says
of her intention:

It plays with a philosophical idea. The problem
which is mentioned in the title is the problem of
how far conceptualizing and theorizing. which from
one point of view are absolutely essential. in fact
divide you from the thing that is the object of
theoretical attention. 12

The traditional use of this bit of first-hand theorizing
is to polarize silence and speech. to turn Hugo into a
Wittgensteinian figure. That interpretation may indeed
work. but it does not allow an alternative. And there
is an alternative suggested. From one point of view

conceptualizing and theorizing are necessary. as they

are the vehicle through which the detail exists. Silence

106
becomes. then. not the ideal where the thing can be
viewed with a steady eye. but a signal of frustration.
the mark of defeat. Form. under these terms. becomes the
constant attempt to say what is true. In other words.
it becomes allegory.

However. Jake's use of form does not follow this
alternative. In early conversations between Hugo and him.
Jake reports that Hugo does look at each thing: indeed.
that he does not wish to stand silent before the concrete
but constantly describes in order to understand it.
However. later Jake ignores Hugo's attempts at description
and generalizes him as the philosopher of silence. Further—
more Jake has written this account long after the meetings I
and has even produced a book based on them. so that to
even pretend to present the original discussion is
impossible. The action of imposing form has occured too
many times. its habit too ingrained. Most importantly,
form tends to remove reality from itself. concentrating
as it must on the abstract qualities in a situation. This
determining nature of form can be seen in the following
passage:

I can picture him now. as I so often saw him during

those conversations. leaning far forward in his

chair biting his knuckles as he picked up some

hot-headed remark of mine. . . ."You mean? . . .

he would say. and then he would rephrase what I

had said in some completely simple and concrete

way. which sometimes illuminated it enormously.

and sometimes made nonsense of it entirely. (UN. 6#)

Jake’s reconstruction uses its detail deceptively. The

picture of an intense Hugo biting his nails and ponderously

107

thinking through a remark is an end in itself. There
is no corresponding presentation of an actual statement
made by Jake and its subsequent treatment by Hugo. There
is no illumination or exposure: there is only Jake's
picture of Hugo. His existence as a separate person has
vanished. Jake has invested Hugo with a viewpoint and
rigorously denies the real Hugo any chance of changing
that perspective. Further. Jake insists that Hugo must
be angry with him since he stole his ideas and put them
in a book. The ensuing plot complication turns on this
conception. Jake's adventures in pubs and movie sets
all occur with the thought to regain Hugo's good opinion.
They are climaxed in a final conversation between Hugo
and Jake. However. this time there is a marked difference
in Jake and his conception of himself.

I was waiting for the sun to set. I had been back

at Goldhawk Road now for several days. The sun-

light moved very slowly on the white wall of the

Hospital. casting a long shadow from a ledge

halfway up the wall. . . .The wall was glaring

white at mid-day. but toward evening the glare

was withdrawn and a softer light glowed as if

from within the concrete. showing up little

irregularities in the stone. Occasionally a

bird flew along between the windows and the wall.

but looking always more like a false bird on a

string than a real bird that would fly away

somewhere else when it has passed the Hospital

and go perhaps and perch upon a tree. Nothing

grew upon the wall of the Hospital. . . .and even

in imagination the wall would resist me and remain

smooth and white. (UN, 221)
If this descriptive passage is compared with the opening
paragraph of the novel. several startling changes can

be seen. While the form is still first person. this

108

person is struggling to describe something other than
itself. There is more attention to detail-~the sun
and its glare. the wall and its whiteness. the bird and
its appearance. The style is flat-~subject. verb. object.
And there is little attempt at varying the length or
structure of the sentences. Along with the new attention
to detail. there is also a resistence to the imagination's
greening. The description offers no drama. no color. only
an attempt to empty self from the description.

Several events have occured that are causing Jake
to take this new outward direction. Their resolution
hinges on Jake's knowledge that he has completely mis-read
a previous situation. For instance. not only is Hugo
not angry with Jake. but he doesn't recognize the book's
ideas as his own. Anna's conception of the mime theater
is hers. not Hugo's: Jean Pierre can write a prize winner.
not junk: Sadie loves Jake. not Hugo: and Jake's reply
to these revelations is. ”I didn't realize all. . . .
I might have behaved differently.” (UN. 256)

He has based his actions and beliefs on erroneous
interpretations: and those actions have culminated in
a tangle. Jake. who has lived his life based on the
premise that he is a free creature. has come face to
face with a world that will not bend to him. Neither
the situations nor the people involved will be subsumed
under his control. They continually escape his under-

standing and manipulation. The world that Murdoch

109

creates is an ambiguous one. There is conflict between
the mind that would order and the thing that resists
such placement. The novel's conclusion demonstrates
Jake's new conception of the nature of the world.

All work and all love. the search for wealth and

fame. the search for truth. life itself. are made‘

up of moments which pass and become nothing. . .

So we live: a spirit that broods and hovers over

the continual death of time. the lost meaning.

the unrecaptured moment. the unremembered face.

until the final chop chop that ends all our

moments and plunges that spirit back into the

void from which it came. (UN. 275)
If this version of ”All is vanity" can stand as a summary
of life. what belief can prompt continuation? After
considering the options and at the promptings of his
own inner self. Jake elects the truth-saying possibility
of art. It is during his last conversation with Hugo
that this option emerges distinctly. Hugo urges Jake
to pursue his trade of writing. just as he intends to
pursue his of watch-making. Jake responds.” And what
about the truth?. . . .What about the search for God?”
(UN. 258) elicits this answer from Hugo. ”What more do
you want?. . . .God is a task: God is detail. It all lies
close to your hand." (UN. 258) Rather than the mysterious
search for a truth that lies beyond. Hugo is suggesting
that all that can be known of truth is here and now and
.is to be found by a patient sorting out of the concrete
whether in watches or words. The tension is not between

the artist and the saint. that pre-supposes the anterior

symbolic richness of the saint's vision. The tension

110

is between the saying power of the word and the distorting
power of that same word. And the structure of the novel.
moving from writing for concealment to writing for
revelation bears out this tension's existence as well
as man's proper response.

However. it is a response noted for its barely
perceptible movement. After all. Jake's attempt to
follow Hugo's injunction is this novel and its imperfections
and deficiencies have been well noted. Jake's nerves are
not just shattered this once. but have been shattered
before. And since there is no record of a previous cure.
there is no assurance that he didn't affect one in a
similar manner. However tenuous. though. Jake has
taken the first step toward making art. In a Murdochian
world this is a moral decision to turn from inward to out-
ward contemplation and to commit it to writing. It places
highest value on the other person and in Jake's case can
be seen in his new attitude toward Anna. He no longer has
a "picture of Anna". now ”Anna really existed as a separate
being and not as a part of myself.” (UN. 268) Jake began
the novel living only for himself: he ends the novel able
to recognize his mistakes. The novel's ending does not
consist of neat solutions: it does not offer platitudes
about the virtuousness of the artistic life: it does not
propose a pattern of living that others should follow.
Rather it is marked by Jake's recognition of the difficulty

in seeing the other. Therefore. the tiniest detail. truly

111
seen. contains value and is worthy of exploration. His
change is slow and victory is not secure. What can be
sought is some small approach to the other that will
describe it as it is. That this exploration is hampered
by man's limited knowledge is axiomatic in allegorical
structures.

.Detail is the base of Jake's new appreciation for the
world. Through it he hopes to find truth. and through it
Murdoch establishes her hold on the physical world. For
only an aesthetic that places faith in the otherness of
truth can dare to place faith in the reality of the other
person. To move. then. with this emphasis to $22.22;;
will make its choice as the second novel to be examined
less mystifying. For it is the novel considered by the
critics to be Murdoch's most naturalistic one.13 Whatever
naturalistic may mean in other contexts. in criticism
it generally means that the critic feels the writer has
taken an objective stance toward his subject. endeavored
to be free of formal structures. and presents the subject
in minute. observeable detail. Further. by its explicit
reliance on the physical. naturalism is opposed to any
spiritual. intellectual or fictitious theories of meaning.
To place Th2 2gp; in the camp of naturalism. then. is not
just to recognize its reliance on the concrete. but it is
to assign to it a deterministic view of man's life and
actions, However, within the confines of the same criticism.

there is an opposite pull.. While recognizing the naturalistic

112
bent of IQ§.§2llv there is a simultaneous recognition
of its idealistic element. This may cause frustration
for the naturalists but for the allegorist it is the
paradoxical expression of allegory's form. How this
paradox manifests itself can be seen in the opening
paragraphs.

Dora Greenfield left her husband because she was .
afraid of him. She decided six months later to return
to him for the same reason. The absent Paul. haunting
her with letters and telephone bells and imagined
footsteps on the stairs had begun to be the greater
torment. Dora suffered from guilt. and with guilt
came fear. She decided at last that the persecution
of his presence was to be preferred to the persecu-
tion of his absence.

Dora was still very young. though she vaguely
thought of herself as past her prime. She came
of a lower middle-class London family. Her father
had died when she was nine years old. and her
mother. with whom she had never got on very well.
had married again. When Dora was eighteen she
entered the Slade school of art with a scholar-
ship. and had been there two years when she
encountered Paul. The role of an art student .
suited Dora. It was indeed the only role she had
ever been able whole-heartedly to play. . . . she
had been happy. (TB. 7)

In these opening paragraphs. Murdoch introduces the

first of several main characters by allowing the reader

to see both Dora's thinking and her external appearance.
_This melding of outside and inside. Simultaneously claims
a third person narrational objectivity and demonstrates
the mind's effect on objects. To so yoke these divergent
perspectives is to forge a technique that recognizes the
mind's use of detail for idealistic purposes. Dora's
mind is more emotional than rational. as seen in her

reaction to her image in a mirror:

113

. . .she looked good. She had a round well-formed

face and a large mouth that liked to smile. Her eyes

were a dark slaty blue and rather long and large. . .

This was attractive. Her figure was by no means what

it had been. (TB. 16
The minute details. natural progression and tone all
indicate an objective description. However. the next
paragraph presents a different picture:

. Feeling fat and hot. . .Dora squeezed herself in
. . .Her skirt was tight. Her high- heeled shoes

were tight too. She could feel her own perspiration

and. . .that of others. (TB. 16)
Which description is the real one? Which set of facts
can be held up as a true description of Dora? Both are
products of her mind. Both relate "facts" about her
appearance and are used in a positive and negative
manner. Depending on the state of mind that observes.
the facts are made to fit either description. In this
instance. the mind is influenced by a change in the physical
surroundings. The hot day is affecting Dora's outlook.

A reverse transformation occurs when Dora sits down
in her seat and finds herself being shamed into giving
it up for an older woman. Dora does not wish to give up her
seat but does so anyway. This time the mind triumphs
over the physical. However. the mind's action has a
distinctly different nature than the physical act. The
exact distinction can be seen in Dora's reaction to two
male traveling companions. She flirts with the younger one
and begins to feel a reciprocal appreciation. However.

one of his remarks in the continuing conversation be-

tween the two men suddenly turn a physical event into a ‘

11#
mental one. The two have been discussing the importance
of a particular bell. The older man says. ”We hope to
have a lot of you young people visiting us at Imber."
(TB, 21) That single place name has a violent effect on
Dora. and she is faced with the peculiar demands of a
mental event. Just as the question of whether to give
up a seat to an elderly person causes a moral problem.
so the question of flirting with an incoming member to
a religious lay coMmunity causes one too. Natural reasons
do not suffice as a rationale for Dora's reaction. There
is an ethical element in the mental event that refuses
to be contained in the environment: a moral cast that in-
habits the mind's working:

A sort of tension between naturalism and idealism is
developing. Dora's mind is ”working" on all the facts.
re-writing them to resemble her own fears and mis-givings.
This will not diminish as the novel progresses but will
show itself in larger forms. For while Dora is certainly
one of the novel's important story lines. she is not the
main one. That has to do with the existence of Imber Court.
a country estate that has been transformed into an Anglican
lay community attached to Imber Abbey. The persons in-
volved in this lay community all face. in varying degrees
of intensity. the same paradox presented in the opening
paragraphs: the interrelationship of the natural and the

ideal.

115

Why is Dora allowed to introduce Imber Court? Why not
save that description for a more sympathetic character.
One of the most interesting on-going laws of the Murdochian
world is that other people and other things have an
independent existence. While their perceptions cannot
be controlled. their unalterable existence can be insisted
upon. To use a hostile viewppint to describe an object
or person is an act of faith in the potency of the other.
No where is this faith better rewarded than in Dora's.
description of Imber Court and Abbey.

. .Dora gave a gasp of surprise. A large house

faced them. from a considerable distance away.

down an avenue of trees. The avenue was dark. but

the house stood beyond it with the declining sun

slanting across its front. It was a very pale grey.

and with a colorless sky of evening light behind

it. it had the washed brilliance of a print. In the

centre of the facade a high pediment supported by

four pillars rose over the line of the roof. A green

copper dome curved above. At the first floor level

the pillars ended at a balustrade. and from there

a pair of stone staircases swept in two great curves

to the ground. (TB. 27)
This intense concentration on detail is concerned with
line. color. and arrangement in the object it confronts.
The analogy between the house and a painting is not a
casual one but is written to display the manner in which
Murdoch judges that emotion may be purged from a situation.
Dora is able to move beyond her usual emotional response
by considering the aesthetic value of the scene. Later
in the novel. when Dora's life is so complicated and sub-

jective that she no longer feels as if even Imber Court

116
has a life. she goes to the National Gallery for the
same purging action.
This habit of minute observation continues into
Dora's decription of landscape so completely that a

drawing can be made.

 

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This landscape is no fantasy. It has a physical reality
that will wet anyone's feet if a wrong turn is taken
and bump anyone's head if the location of a tree is
forgotten.

Dora also introduces the bell of the title. There
are actually two bells in the novel: the new one. whose
coming was discussed on the train. and a medieval one.
whose disappearance is a focal point of legend. The
opposition of naturalism and idealism surfaces in the two
theories associated with the medieval bell. One side
believes that the the time of convent dissolution. the bell
had been thrown into the lake to save it from being melted

down.

117

The other side believes:

. . .that one of the nuns had a lover. . . . It

was not known who the nun was. The young man was

seen climbing the wall once or twice and ended up

by falling and breaking his neck.

The Abbess called on the guilty nun to confess.

but no one came forward. Then the Bishop. . .also

demanded that the guilty one should confess. When

there was still no response he put a curse on the

Abbey. and as the chronicler puts it. the great

bell "flew like a bird out of the tower and fell

into the lake."

The guilty nun was so overwhelmed by this

demonstration that she forthwith ran out of the

Abbey gates and drowned herself in the lake. (TB. #2)
The first explanation is the natural one. clearly stating
its causal relationship: the second explanation is the
idealistic one. depending on the mind's imaginative leaps.
Dora attaches herself to the second explanation which sets
up crosscurrents of influence that resemble earlier
alternations. For although the idealistic story does
capture Dora's interest. the portion of it that interests
her is not the "miracle” but the nun. It is the natural
element that her mind fixes one.

Chapter four introduces the second center of conscious-
ness. Toby Gashe. He espouses a brand of idealism that
is completely at odds with the world. He is the young.
the naive. the satisfied. the ”happy” man. His is the
cloistered virtue whose expression is a confident summation
of others. Thus. Toby pronounces James Tayper Pace ”manly”.
Michael Meade ”weedy”. Catherine Fawley ”beautiful". Dora
"mischievous”. and Nick Fawley ”a drunk.” This self-

confident attitude will be tested as the novel unfolds

118

but essentially Toby maintains a naive outlook. He
wrestles with but refuses to recognize the ambiguity of
existence. The world according to Toby can easily be
divided into right and wrong.

It may seem as if Toby's idealism should belong to
the leader of a religious community. but it is only when
we are introduced to Michael that we understand idealism.
too. has its complexities depending on which epistemological
system it attaches itself to. In chapter six. Murdoch
opens Michael's mind for inspection. a mind that finds
it difficult to determine the difference between dream
and reality. so that the symbol's desire to subsume all is
pictured. When.Michael dreams he thinks himself awake and
in this state believes he sees the nuns standing on the
shore of Imber Lake. pulling a body from it. But this
scene is a dream. The only reality is the "overwhelming
sense of evil" (TB 80) which Michael is convinced comes
from inside himself. The tension between idealism and
naturalism is not in the polar expression of dreaming
and waking or in the traditional idealistic refusal to
dwell on the natural but in the more complex act of the
natural and hence symbolic expression of idealism. Michael's
spiritual beliefs assign a place for the natural working
out of either good or evil. His founding principle for the

community best exemplifies this process: there are people

"hunted by God" who need a half-way place to live and

119
work out their relationship to God. Idealism. then. is
not a simple choice of earth or heaven: it is the invest-
ment of the natural with a spiritual significance.

If Michael's idealism is set against Dora's character
another of its characteristics is revealed. She acts on
feeling while Michael acts on thought. He willfully
turns from the dream to his tasks for the day. These
tasks are then presented with bits of historical detail
in order to objectify them. Michael's view of these
duties is encased in an interesting metaphor-~soldiering.
"The metier of soldiering. with its absolute requirements
and its ideals of exactness and devotion had caught his.
imagination." (TB. 88) Soldiering demands a replacement
of self as the ultimate measure with an outside standard.
There are attitudes. definitions. and actions that have
their base in a structure external to the self. Certain
actions are judged right. others wrong: so that soldiering
becomes a moral action. There are. however. two kinds
of soldiers: those who do not question the hierarchy
and those who do.

The two sermons by Michael and James Tayper Pace will
act as examples of their opposing perspectives. James
first defines the good life in terms of living. "without
any image of oneself." (TB. 132) Conversely. Michael
defines that same good life as having. "some conception
of one's capacities." (TB. 201) James moves into a

diatribe against the study of personality which suggests

120

that the measure of all things is internal rather than
external. Knowledge of God's law and strict adherence to
it is James' argument for living the good life. He says.

The good man does what seems right. what the rule

enjoins. without considering the consequences.

without calculation or prevarication. knowing

that God will make all for the best. . . .He does

the best thing. breaking through the complexities

of situations. and knows that God will make the best

fruitful. (TB. 133)
Michael. on the other hand. proposes that knowledge of
self makes possible positive action. A person could then
estimate his spiritual strength and expend it judiciously.

We must not. for instance. perform an act because

abstractly it seems to be a good act if in fact it is

so contrary to our instinctive apprehensions of spirit-

ual reality that we cannot carry it through. that is.

cannot really perform it. . . .We must not arrogate to

ourselves actions which belong to those whose spiritual

vision is higher or other than ours. (TB. 205)
To close his sermon. James uses the bell as an image of
good. whose voice cannot help but be used. "A bell is made
to speak out. What would be the value of a bell which was
never rung? It rings out clearly. . . ."(TB 136) James
grounds the image by linking his bell with both Imber
Court's new bell and Catherine Fawley. who will make her
entrance into the nunnery. For James. a soldier dutifully
carries out those orders handed to him. His idealism is
an abstract one. divorced from the physical world. It
espouses an interest in humanity but is actually anti-
human. desiring to move beyond the world and join itself
to the perfect other. Murdoch makes this point in her prose

writings. arguing that the symbolists may have believed

121
in an external truth. but it led them to institutions
and dogmas. not people. Dogmas admit no imperfection.1u
Surely. the definition of idealism that would strip it
of any human connection makes it unintelligible.
Michael. too. uses the image of the bell for the
close of his sermon but toward a very different end.
The bell is subject to the force of gravity. The
swing that takes it down must also take it up. We
too must learn to understand the mechanism of our
spiritual energy. and find out where. for us. are
the hiding places of our strength. . . .We must
work. from inside outwards. through our strength.
and by understanding and using exactly that energy
which we have. acquire more. . . .This is the.
struggle. . . . (TB 205)
His bell is not an abstraction but a real one subject
to physical laws. Its working mirrors those of the
spiritual laws: that is. spirituality must be expressed
through a particular physical being. Thus. Michael's
form of soldiering is a mixture of self and outside
authority. While he does not negate God's law. he subjects
it to affirmation by the individual. Thus. perfectibility
may be the goal but it is an impossible one.
James' and Michael's resemblance to the two forms
of allegory can hardly be ignored. James with his insis-
tence on substituting the unreal for the real. on the
external nature of truth. and man's perscribed path to that
truth mirrors traditional allegory. All of its desire
to purify the human is shown as is the bloodless result.

Michael. conversely. figures post-modern allegory. While

he retains a conception of external truth. he recognizes

122
that it is forever implicated in subjectivity. This
allegory is a structure that must question itself. but
there is also the undeniable element of truth.

For Michael there is a self-serving motive behind
this mixture. If the reader is unacquainted with Th2 hp};
it may come as a shock to find that Michael is a homosexual
involved earlier with Nick and currently attracted to
Toby. If the reader is acquainted with Thg hgii.
Michael's sermon on man's imperfection may bring a sly
remark as to his powers of ratiocination or it may move
the conflict to more abstract levels. But that would
miss the paradox on which Michael and Murdoch insist.

When Murdoch locates the origins of homosexual love
within the very nature of man and further sets it against
his spiritual nature. she is suggesting the outline of
the paradox. Here is no dogmatic pronouncement on the
sin of sodomy: rather it is a careful probing of the moral
problems that arise from a practice of homosexuality. The
moral weight placed on Michael's shoulders after the in-
cidents with Nick and Toby is a real one. The motives
and intentions that Michael displays are not simply
wrong: they are mixtures of right and wrong. And they
reveal the nature of moral questions. Thus. not only is
the Platonic chain from appearance to reality that begins
itself in erotic love conjured but also the goodness. the
rightness of the movement is raised. Perhaps. then.

homosexual love can be. at the very least. a beginning

123
point of knowledge: and while man cannot claim to have
knowledge of the way in which the transformation from
imperfect to perfect love occurs. he can be certain
that it does. When Michael denies Nick any human con-
tact in the poignant moment when they salute each other
across the lake. we reflect not only on the difficulty
of perfected love. but also its necessity.

Finally. Michael recognizes that James' injunction
against self-study has merit:

. . .that if one departs from a simple apprehension

of certain definite commandments one may become

absorbed in the excitement of a spiritual drama

for its own sake. (TB. 207)

Excitement and drama are emotional words that summon

the imagination. an element that Michael considers part
of his soldiering. Consistently in Murdoch. the imagina-
.tion is presented as untrustworthy. Just as Jake's
imagination leads him into constant illusionary story-
making so Michael's imagination does the same.

The mental event is being proffered as superior to
the physical event. If we follow Dora's development.
the same superiorty is seen. For it is only when she
counters her emotions and thinks that she moves toward
the good. For instance. her stay at Imber becomes such
a subjective experience that her mind. "had eaten up
its surroundings. that everything was now subjective."
(TB. 183) Out of fear Dora flees to London where her

flight to the National Gallery acts as a recurrent

12#
version of Murdoch's idealism. Dora's consciousness
can not devour the pictures. They have their own presence.
their own authority. their own dignity. and their own
unalterable existence. These structures not only refuse
subservience to Dora's mind. but they also act as intima-
tions of a reality that exists beyond the physical
.the great light spaces of Italian pictures.

more vast and southern than any real South. the

angels of Botticelli. radiant as birds. delighted

as gods. and curling like the tendrils of a vine.

the glorious carnal presence of Susanna Fourment.

the tragic presence of Margarethe Trip. the solemn

world of Piero della Francesca with its early-

morning colours. the enclosed and gilded world

of Crivelli. (TB. 191)
Renewed by this contact. Dora returns to Imber. However.
her idealistic vision lasts only a few hours. Moreover.
when Dora attempts to turn the community into a picture
she fails. Coming upon the group silently Dora does
not reveal herself but instead studies them much as She
studied the pictures in the Gallery. She notes the
lighting. the composition of the figures. their differing
expressions and physical characteristics. But the
community is not a picture. Its individual parts are
not so much paint and paper: they are human beings who
act on their own. who can change their relationship to
other parts of the picture and who may get up and walk
out of the arrangement altogether.

Michael. too. does not long privilege the idealistic.

Although he presents a picture of self-control to the

Abbess. it is a picture that is not true. Nor does the

125

pattern he imposed on Catherine or Toby or Nick remain
true. Each one violently rejects the place that Michael
has given him. Catherine is not a devoted accolyte:
Toby is not a homosexual partner: and Nick's surface
cynicism masks despair.

The pattern which he had seen in his life had

.existed only in his own romantic imagination.

At the human level there was no pattern. (TB. 312)
No where is this lack of pattern more evident then in
Nick's last act. He commits suicide and this act forces
Michael to face the inadequacies of his idealism. He
has arrogated to himself the making of significant
patterns while ignoring their implication in subjectivity.
Michael no longer prays or soldiers. The remaining emblem
of his idealistic life is the Mass.

. . .not consoling. not uplifting. but in some way

factual. It contained for him no assurance that all

would be made well that was not well. It simply

existed as a kind of pure reality separate from

the weaving of his own thoughts. . . .the Mass

existed and Michael existed beside it. (TB. 313)
The term emblem in order to describe the nature of the
Mass and its relation to life serves to illuminate one of
Murdoch's allegorical structures-~man's place in the
universe. Emblem has a literal base that means "an in-
sertion". to ”throw in." In this specific case. the
central mystery of the Mass is the insertion of God into
the world. If Michael's perspective of the Mass is
examined. it is seen not as a symbolic expression of the

fulness of any divine/human union. but rather as an allegorical

lack of fulness. Its existence is certain. but its meaning

126
is not. The Mass becomes one of Walter Benjamin's
signs. That is. it is only a Sign. only a signature. only
a fragment of the truth it originally presented.15 It is
not a palpable expression of truth. but a rune. Indeed.
Michael comes away from the celebration of the Mass not
with a strengthened belief in the existence of God but
with only a tenuous indication that something external
does exist.

He must also faCe in this allegorical struCture that
life may be meaningless. one wholly given to wrong
patterning. When Michael says. "He thought of those
against whom he had offended. and gathered them about him
in this perhaps endless and perhaps meaningless attention."
(TB. 31#) he is not making an existential cry against the
meaninglessness of the universe. For that to be true.
he would have to retain a conception of the centrality
of his own self. Nor is he making a plea for the essentially
idealistic character of life. For that to be true. he
would have to retain a sense of the spiritual nature of
reality. He is coming to the recognition that he can
never know the other who proclaims sins. timetables. and
significances and who does so from a position Michael
cannot find and with a scale he cannot discern.

However. the purpose of the novel is not only to
illuminate our sense of lack. it is also to suggest the
power of language. Language has forced Michael's recog-

nition of his inadequate idealism. It has revealed his

127

love of Nick and Toby and his beliefs about the Mass.
While his silence before the Abbess felt perfect. it was
not. His position required the truth that only language
could convey. Examples of the falseness of silence are
multiple and lead to the same conclusion: the fulness
of the symbol must give way to the rune of allegory.1'6
Only the recognition that truth is represented by lan-
guage will allow man to begin a movement toward truth.
For while the rune can claim to give only a partial view.
it does so truthfully. '

One such truth that Murdoch writes is pain's ability .
to teach. Early in Michael's life the pain of Nick's
betrayal discloses the outside world's judgment of their
relationship. Michael agrees with that judgment. practicing
what he considers a vice. Here. he could have learned
that vices are not easily discarded: indeed their
pressures tend to become more subtle. But he does not.
instead learning to hide pain. This turn inward becomes
deeper in his relationship with Toby and re-acquaintance
with Nick. There Michael's ego uses the young man for
his own purpose. Though he loves Nick. too. he makes no
effort to see the situation from Nick's viewpoint. In
fact. that perspective is repressed completely. Thus. -
when Nick commits suicide it is a surprise. That act is
, is so incomprehensible. its ramifications so unknowable.
that Michael must reflect on it before any sense can be

made of it. He must tediously separate himself from Nick

128

thus separating emotion from fact. Just as the rune
demands the "divine light of learning" for it to make
sense. so this fragmentary action can only command Michael's
interpretation. The suicide's real meaning is denied. for
Nick cannot come back and give an account of his motives.
Such a recognition questions our entire conception of
reality. It is neither solely subjective nor objective.
but an imperfect mixture of the two. existing under the
aegis of extreme pain.

Pain teaches a hard lesson. one that is unconsoling
to the ego and brutal in its judgment. Under it Michael
reassesses his past and is forced to admit his failure
with Nick. MiChael cannot begin again but must carry
the burden of his failure forever. There is only a small
mitigating element in this knowledge. Although time
cannot be reversed. distance will allow survival. This
distance can lead in a negative fashion providing the
ego space to re-clothe itself. Michael sees this danger.
"The first agony passed and Michael found himself still
living and thinking. Having at first feared to suffer
too much. he later feared to suffer too little. or not
in the right way." (TB. 311) However. the distance can
also confirm his original recognition that the self is
small. its actions imperfect and its salvation unintel-
libible. The intense feeling will certainly pass. but
the truth doesn't need to. Thus. the survival of the self '

can take on virtuous external dimensions.

129

For Michael that means a continuing involvement in
Catherine's life. Whether or not that selfless action can
continue indefinitely. Murdoch leaves open. Throughout
the novel. Michael has begun his life again. and at each
turn those beginnings have failed. Why does Murdoch
tell a story that is skeptical of its own conclusions?
Why present a main character whose self-knowledge is
faulty and whose idealism is destructive? One of the
tenets of post-modern allegory is its subjective nature.
And while it is the single form that admits the necessity
of external truth. it equally admits its involvement in
subjectivity. Murdoch recognizes this:

Each of us lives and chooses within a partly private.

partly fabricated world. and although any particular

belief might be shown to be "merely fantastic" it is

false to suggest that we could. even in principle.

”purge" the world we confront of these personal

elements. 17

The fabricated particularity of human experience is
again taken up in Bruno's Dream. However. the detail
of this novel is continually informed by mortality and
this knowledge will further reveal allegory's ability to
express truth. The sense of urgency that death engenders
is seen in the novel's first paragraph.

Bruno was waking up. The room seemed to be dark.

He held his breath. testing the quality of the

darkness. wondering if it was night or day. morn-

ing or afternoon. If it was night that was bad and

might be terrible. Afternoon could be terrible too

if he woke up too early. The drama of sleeping and

waking had become preoccupying and fearful now that

consciousness itself could be so heavy a burden.

One had to be cunning. He never let himself doze
in the mornings for fear of not being able to fall

130

asleep after lunch. The television had been

banished with its false sadnesses and its images

of war. Perhaps he had nodded off over his book.

He had had that dream again. about Janie and Maureen

and the hatpin. He felt about him and began to push

himself up a little on his pillows. his stockinged
feet scrabbling inside the metal cage which lifted

the weight of the blankets off them. Tight bedclothes

are a major cause of bad feet. Not that Bruno's feet

minded much at this stage. (BD. 3)

Bruno's mind is working and judging the time of day and
itself. both sleeping and waking. The outside world
intrudes but its presence is not so important as Bruno's
mind. After all. it only "seems" dark to Bruno: it could
be either night or day. Further. the one making the
observation that. "Tight bedclothes are a major cause of
bad feet." also pronounces a judgment on Bruno. "Not that
Bruno's feet minded much at this stage.” In this first
paragraph three elements compete and will continue to
compete throughout the novel: Bruno's mind. physical reality
and the author's mind.

In the first chapter Bruno predominates and the strength
of his«mind is presented vividly. He rehearSes the move-
ment of his day. repeating it as a litany to ward off
the deeper workings of his mind. That is not altogether
successful as the physical parts of his day call to mind
people who in turn trigger images. These images sometimes
are mere sense apparitions but usually reflect his
judgment on the people he knows. For the reader these

musings act as an introduction to the novel's other

characters and exemplify the fabrications of the human

 

131

mind. For instance. Bruno relegates Adelaide to the
place of only a servant. Nigel. who treats him with
kindness. brings sweeter but no less selfish thoughts
to mind. and his son-in-law. Danby. is rejected as a
fool. Bruno hasn't seen his son Miles for ten years.
but he denigrates Miles anyway. Bruno is convinced that
Miles dislikes him because of an affair that Bruno had.
While there is no logical connection between the two
subjects. conjuring his affair allows Bruno to think
about the two central persons in his life--his wife.
Janie. and his mistress. Maureen. Thoughts about them
always cause Bruno's emotions to surge. inevitably bring?
ing him the image of Janie's death bed. Bruno cannot.
face the fact that he refused to go to her. "How well he
knew this particular rat-run of his mind. He must not,
must not become so upset or he would not sleep at night
and sleepless nights were torture." (BD. 16)

Bruno's pitiless summing up of others together with
his self-protective ego emerge in the first chapter.
His body is dying. but his consciousness is as alive as
ever and it purrs along saving Bruno from facing things
he doesn't wish to. subsuming the irritating things by
simply turning away from them. Each subject is introduced
in this manner. If Bruno's mind touches some unresolved
hurt. it skitters away and onto a new subject.

The relationships. which are in the first chapter so
summarily handled. are expanded in succeeding chapters.

In fact. the break between chapters one and two is so

132

complete and so contradictory that the author must be
vying for attention. Chapter one closes with Bruno
crying for himself and his lost opportunities. From
the general tone of the chapter and the promise of the
novel's title the same kind of inwardness is expected to
continue for the novel's duration. However. chapter two
presents an entirely new mind. ’Danby Odell's interpretation
of facts casts doubt on Bruno's preceeding interpretations.
Adelaide is not just a maid. she is Danby's mistress. And
neither is Danby simply a fool. The distance between
Bruno's judgment and the truth of Danby's character is
best exemplified by examining the "comical" aspect of
his wife's death. Bruno had been appalled that any hus-
band could find his wife's death comical. Gwen had jumped
off a bridge to save a child that had fallen in. It
turned out that the child could swim and so swam to shore
while Gwen had had a heart attack and drowned.

It was just like Gwen. he [Danby told himself. . . .

It was just the sort of lunatic hing she would do.

It was typical. Comic really. (BD. 26)
Bruno's mis-understanding of comic is a serious indication
of his habit of mind. It'is also a prelude to Danby's

statement. "We all live in a private dream world most

of the time." (BD. 25) and will be repeatedly proven to
be true. Connections between people are like the
connections between chapters one and two. Although the
personnel may stay the same. the meaning changes from

person to person. Bruno's first chapter summation of

133
all the characters is then seen not as the confused
mis-statements of an old and sick man but as a pro-
prietary act.

In Chapter three we are introduced to Nigel. who is
not performing Bruno's nursing duties. but is acting in
an unusual manner. Nigel does not exist solely to plump
pillows and rub cramps out of old men's feet: he is a
mystic who practices the intricacies of his religion
with seriousness.

Nigel in black shirt. black tights. rotates. with
out-stretched arms. . . .Nigel turns and turns. thin
as a needle. thin as a straight line. narrow as a
slitlet through which a steely blinding light attempts
to issue forth into the fuzzy world.

Concentric universe. Faster and faster now sphere
within sphere revolves and sings. . . .the speck of
dust the invisible slit in the skin through which it
all sinks down and runs away.

Two indistinct and terrible angels encircle the
earth. embracing. enlacing. tumbling through cir-
cular space. both oned and oneing in magnetic joy.
Love and Death. pursuing and pursued.

The sounds diminish and in the empty pallid azure
the golden quoit spins away. At last. it has become
a spot of radiance. a stain of gold. a fading. flash-
ing laser beam. a single blinding point of light
which absorbs all light unto itself.

Nigel clutches his heart. He gasps. he groans.
he reels. The presence is agony. punishment. stripes.
the extended being tortured into a single point.
Annilhilation. All.i§ 222- (BD. 27.8)

Compare this vision with Bruno's from the first chapter:

What had happened to him and what was it all about
and did it matter now that it was practically all
over. he wondered. It's all a dream. he thought.

one goes through life in a dream. it's all too hard.
Death refutes induction. There is not "it" for it

to be all about. There is just the dream. its tex-
ture. its essence. and in our last things we subsist
only in the dream of another. a shade within a
shade. fading. fading, fading. (BD. 9)

131+
The striking point of difference between these visions
is the vantage point. Nigel looks outside himself and sees
wonderful mysteries: Bruno looks inside himself and sees
nothing but illusions. Death presents the only avenue
for Bruno to move outside himself. Thus. it is appropriate
to ask in what sense he means. "Death refutes induction."
There is the logical interpretation that death is the
mortal severance between the particular and the general.
On this definition. Bruno can see no general truth nor
can he imagine the reality of death. Its presence means
more than logic can define. Further if death did
succumb to deduction. it would pre-suppose an intelligible
world. In Murdochian terms. that premise is seriously
questioned. For Bruno standing in death's way and still
mis-understanding those around him is a particular example
of the unintelligibility of the world.

,There is. however. another definition of the sentence.
The verb refute carries the physical residue of beating
back or checking something: and the noun induction carries
within it a physical act of initiation into a previously
mysterious thing. Thus. the sentence may be understood
as. "Death beats back an initiation into its mysteries."
While the first definition rests on a belief in the
subjective nature of death. this definition rests on a
belief in its objective nature. Nigel's vision is
exemplary of this possibility and his placement of the

union of love and death outside consciousness clearly

135
brings him into conflict with Bruno's mind and its
dreaming. This conflict between minds is a constantly
underscored theme in Bruno's gaggm. for it mirrors the
conflict between symbolic and allegorical modes of expression.
When we are given access to Miles' mind in chapter
six. we see that the poetry that Bruno dismissed as
nonsense is the very core of Miles' life. The chapter
begins with a quotation from his Notebook 2; Particulars.
32;. j. a journal that occupies his mind. Certainly his
father doesn't fill his thoughts. The ten year estrange-
ment has made it possible for Miles to pass judgment on
his father just as Bruno has done on Miles. He has
frozen his father in an instant of time and then carried
that image with him._ It will take a shock for his judg-
ment to be altered. a shock which comes in the form of
'a letter from Danby asking Miles to visit his father.
The reaction is pure Milesian:
He did not want this now. He did not want emotions
and memories and scenes and unmanageable unforsee-
able situations. He did not want to go through the
rigmarole of forgiving and being forgiven. It would
all be play-acting. It would be something hopelessly
impure. And it might delay. it might offend. it might
preclude forever the precious imminent visitation
of the god. (BD. 69)
Miles' personality stands in vivid relief herel.8 He
dislikes the messy real world. preferring instead a
carefully ordered existence centered around himself. His

selfishness is tremendous. For his only thought about

his father is the effect a meeting will have on himself.

136
There is no indication of any attention given to Bruno's
sickness or feelings.

Miles‘ solipsism perfectly mirrors Bruno's. He. too.
in imagining his meeting with Miles. does not think about
Miles. He is discussed in terms of an object to which
Bruno can confess and purge his conscience. This desire
for forgiveness and reconciliation exists only on the
level of subjectivity. It is important to realize that
this kind of attitude can only be handled in the manner
that Miles suggest, by a "rigmarole". an illusionary act
of forgiveness. To suggest that man can re-channel his
feelings by an act of will is not possible. Just as Bruno
has no control over the feelings that ”surge" when certain
subjects are touched on. so Miles has no control.

There is another possibility for forgiveness and
reconciliation. an alternative view as to their nature
and function. Both terms can be viewed from a legal
rather than an emotional perspective. Forgiveness thus
becomes an act of will in which the person who has a
right to demand vengeance instead surrenders his claim.
Reconciliation seen from this angle becomes an action
done with the purpose of restoring communication. While
feelings still exist. they are not given credence. The
action taken becomes the important fact. However. this
is possible only if both forgiveness and reconciliation
exist independently. That is. the terms contain an

unalterable standard of their own. Neither man can

137
accept these conditions. Miles rejects the definition
as too idealistic. hence impossible. and Bruno can not
see beyond himself far enough to admit anything else
might exist. '

However. others do exist and Miles' second wife.
Diana. also enters into the novel's fundamental rela-
tionships. She describes her first meeting with Miles
in these terms and in so doing describes herself:

. . .it was. in some extraordinary way. the perfect

working out of a dream. She had been searching for

Miles. She recognized him at once. . .she had dreamed

of a separated man. a sad austere secluded man. a

man with a great sorrow. an ascetic. (BD. 63)

Diana is an orderly person and Murdoch describes in detail
the manner in which Diana passes time: embroidery. flower
arranging. cooking. gardening. reading. playing records--
each carefully controlled. In fact. when Diana's sister

_ Lisa needs a place to live. Diana and Miles are apprehen-
sive about an interruption of their smooth life. But more
importantly Diana's bland version of order does not even
disturb Bruno's dreaming. She has no place in Bruno's
mind at all.

He insists on treating others as if. ”They are a
part of my life-dream. . . .they are immersed in my
consciousness like specimens in formalin." (BD. 10) And
the author exhibits the same attitude. Her placement
of persons in separate chapters and her insistence that

the person thinking be allowed to turn others into objects.

all point to the separateness of individuals. the

138
impossibility of knowing another person. Can this be
the only purpose behind the allegorical structure of
the novel? Are we to agree with Danby that, "We all
live in a private dream world most of the time?” I don't
think so. for the reality of other persons asserts it-
self throughout the novel. Just as the rune asserts it
rights of existence. so other people assert their individé
uality. And as Bruno attempts to place others in his
life. those others attempt to place him and each other
in their lives. Consequently, there is high-speed
mixing of persons; and since gaggm is the operative
word. I will trace its movement in Diana's and Bruno's
lives. . .
Diana lives "her dream picture of herself" but is
shocked toward reality when she discovers that Miles
and Lisa are in love. Nigel is the informer and he_
says. "Let them trample over you in their own way."
(BD. 238) forcing her to consider a version of reality
that exists outside her. She wants to turn away. but
Nigel won't let her.
A human being hardly ever thinks about other people.
He contemplates fantasms which resemble them and
which he has decked out for his own purposes. Miles'
thoughts cannot touch you. His thoughts are about .
- Miles. This too you must see and forgive. (BD. 238-9)
Still Diana resists the movement into reality. "It's all
so mean. . . .It all seems like a dream now. a nightmare.

with nothing clear." (BD. 239) Nigel counters. "It is

mostly a dream. Diana. Only little pieces are clear and

139
they don't necessarily fit together." (ED. 239) To
which Diana responds. "You've just talked nonsense to
me." (BD. ZHO)

The word nonsense bears examination. On the surface
Diana is accusing Nigel of being silly and absurd. He
agrees. "Of course. of course. I am the nonsense priest
of the nonsense god." But there is a Kierkegaardian
sense of this word which is at least in part adopted by
Walter Benjamin and is appropriate for Nigel's description.
Nonsense occurs when language is used to describe someé
thing that is not an empirical fact. For instance.
if someone says. "God became man." the sentence does not
function logically. The words are grammatical but incom-
mensurable with conceptual reality. Since the statement
breaks the rules of language description. it may either
be a correct description or an incorrect one. If it is
neither. it is nonsense. However. Kierkegaard postulates
a fourth possibility for language description. one that
does not depend on logic. Language may not describe a
verifiable fact but it still may serve to identify a fact.
This is the way religious language "works." While "God
became man" does not identify an empirical fact. in religious

terms it offers a saying of the central mystery of Christ-
19

Diana's reply to Nigel transforms him into a symbol.

ianity.

one incapable of being grasped by the intellect alone.

Just as Jesus Christ becomes a symbol of the mysterious

1#0
union of the natural and the divine. so Nigel becomes
a symbol of the same union. In this perspective. Nigel
changes from an odd bit of mechanical play to an attempt
on Murdoch's part to insert God into the story. Chapter
three is our introduction to Nigel. The present tense
in which he is consistently presented throughout the
novel is an authorian reminder of the eternal quality
that God's nature demands and of those claims made for
Nigel. Further. the metaphoric language gives evidence
of the artist's attempt to describe the indescribable.
Murdoch cannot say. "He is this." and point to an object,
so she is forced into metaphor. Nigel's creative activity
in the novel is a reflection of that activity of God's
which according to major traditions must confound logic.
In another passage. Nigel's godlikeness is under-
scored. He listens to a philosophical conversation
between Miles and Lisa;
”If by eternity is understood not endless temporal
duration but timelessness. he lives eternally who
lives in the present.”
"Not how the world is but that it is is the mystical."
"Whereof we cannot speak. "
"Thereof we must be silent." (BD. 88)
The utter indescribability of the eternal makes meaningful
speech impossible. thus raising the spectre of distortion.
The endpoint of symbolic knowledge is after all silence.
However. Nigel is not God; he is merely God's representa-

tive. Murdoch must make this distinction if she is to retain

allegorical structure. And she does so by demonstrating

141
Nigel's humanity in two places: a conversation between
Nigel and Bruno and a drama between Nigel and his brother.
Nigel and Bruno frequently have conversations about God.
Nigel does not have all the.answers: his temporal existence
precludes omniscience. Thus. when he claims that death
is something beautiful. something that he could be in
love with. he is admonished by an older Bruno. "You're
young. Nigel. You can't see death." Nigel's understanding
of death is. than. not a mystical vision but a limited
understanding.

Similarly by its subject matter and past tense the
drama between Nigel and Will displays Nigel's limitations.
In this scene Nigel has emotions and desires with a will
to carry them out. Nigel sneaks into Will's room and
sets up an ingenious "machine" (This word Murdoch uses
to connote cause and effect in the empirical and emotional
worlds.) which pins Will against opposite ends of the
bed. Unable to move. Nigel works his will upon his
brother. It is within this human framework that Nigel
tells Diana Lisa and Miles are in love. His divine
advice comes from a very human source. Nigel explains
his double role this way:

May be this is how God appears now in the world.

a little unregarded crazy person whom everyone

pushes aside and knocks down and steps on. Or it

can be that I am the false god. . . .The false

god is the true God. Up any religion a man may

climb. (BD. 23?)

Nigel's implication in the human world with all its

ambiguities have made it impossible to insist on a

142
theological status. Murdoch allows him to fade from
the scene. finally moving completely off stage. However.
the reality of his helping Bruno and Diana begin to see
the relationship of love and death remains. This isn't
hopeless confusion on Murdoch's part; rather. it is an
articulation of the ambiguous nature of allegorical
structures. Nigel cannot be a theological symbol; he is
a man.

There is yet one more element necessary before a
final consideration of the structure of love and death
can be made. and that is Bruno's movement from dream
to reality. Chapter one establishes his movement, best
explained as a gathering of attention toward death. His
continuing subjectivity can best be seen in his own attitude
toward God. I will quote the passage extensively as it
covers Bruno's life-time.

When I was very young. . . .I thought of God as a
great blank thing. rather like the sky, in fact
perhaps He was the sky. all friendliness and pro-
tectiveness— and fondness for little children. . .

I have never thought much about Jesus Christ. I
suppose I took him for granted. It was the great

big blank egg of the sky that I loved and felt so
safe and happy with. . . .Later it was different.

it was when I first started to look at spiders. . .
I don' t know that I imagined God as having thought it
all out. but somehow He was connected with the pattern.
He was the pattern. He was those spiders which I
watched in the light of— my electric torch on summer
nights. There was wonderfulness. a separateness. it
was the divine to see those spiders living their ex-
traordinary lives. Later in adolescence it allbbe-
came confused with emotion. I thought that God was
Love. a big sloppy love that drenched the world
with big wet kisses and made everything all right.

I felt touched by myself. I loved God. . .
Afterwards He became less. He got drier and pettier

1&3
and more like an official who made rules. . . .
There was no innocence and no radiance then. I
stopped loving Him and began to find Him de-
pressing. Then He receded altogether. He became
something the women did. . .I met Him again. most
often in country churches. . . .He was something
rather lost and pathetic. a little crazed perhaps.
and small. I felt sorry for Him. if I had been able
to take Him by the hand it would have been like
leading a little child. . . .Later on again He
was simply gone. He was nothing but an intellectual
fiction. an old hypothesis. a piece of literature.
(BD. 100)
Bruno's first thoughts of God are tied to family and
self. God does not exist as a separate entity and.
indeed. the Old Testament concept of sin that gave a
measure of the distance between God and man is missing.
Bruno's nineteenth century patronization of God shines
forth: and since he has no objective set of measure-
ments. he keeps his muzzy feelings. The next stage.
too. retains this emotional attachment. While Bruno's
discussion of pattern looks as if he is turning outward.
he is not. The suggestion of an early American typology
made between spiders and God lacks that era's insistence
on God's utter otherness. Unlike Job who met God and was
moved to worship the unseen. Bruno meets God and is moved
to worship the seen and his ability to see it. The next
stage is full of Bruno's personal reactions. He emphasizes
the "I"--"I thought". "I felt". "I experienced". "I was”.
and culminating in "I was deeply touched by myself."
This final statement shows a romantic consciousness in
the full flavor of its self-confidence. In Murdoch's

world. it is true that adolescence and a certain kind of

14a

unsconscious middle-age have this feeling of confidence
and well-being. God's role is to applaud man's successes
and understand his failures. Bruno is in possession of
his very attractive self.

Yet again. Bruno's conception of God shifts. Now the
self must face its tendency to judge. Innocence yields
to knowledge which admits the concept of judgment. But
the concurrent knowledge of God as other is lacking. and
the statement. "I stopped loving him.” expresses the
attitude of a still triumphant self. Bruno continues
to ignore any conception of an external God. Although he
endeavors to belittle God. his existence is still presumed.
Finally, Bruno expunges even God's existence. God has not
just died; that is. he wasn't a force in history who
because of ineffectiveness decided to absent himself.
Bruno argues that God never existed.. It is as if all the
other stages were false ones written to soothe a conscious-
ness that does not wish to face its own solipsism. The
absolute voraciousness of the self is established. If
Bruno's final view of God is correct. then Bruno's own
existence is in question. _When he dies and is forgotten
by others. it will be as if he never existed either. Since
this is intolerable to his ego. it is the ego that initiates
a true looking outside itself to death.

Bruno :

He stared at his old red dressing gown hanging on

the door. a big shrouded thing in the dim light.
Why had it somehow become the symbol of his death?

1#5

The old dressing gown would still be there when

they returned with relief from the funeral and

began to get out the bottles. and then someone

would say. ”Bruno's gone. but there's his poor

old dressing gown still hanging on the door."

(BD. 17)
This image of death is an unusual one and warrants
questioning. The dressing gown's irrefutable and par-
ticular existence as "Bruno's gown" makes it the vehicle
for displaying Bruno's existence. There will be a dividing
time between Bruno's existence and non-existence. While
this can be interpreted as a source of comfort. it can
also be interpreted as a source of disquiet. If Bruno
is not a dream. then what can his death mean?

"Do you know what I think?" said Bruno. staring

hard at the dressing gown in the dim light. "I

think God is death. That's it. God is death." (BD. 102)
Facing death in Murdochian terms causes either a return
to the character's dream world or a step into reality.
That is. it either admits the triumph of subjectivity
of the personality or its objectivity. The final chapter
displays all of the characters in varying attitudes
towards death. Only Bruno and Diana take the step into
reality. .That reality for both of them is the otherness
of death. How is it that they face death without consolation.
for it is necessary that they do to avoid utter subjectivity.

While the opening sentence of chapter thirty-two
mirrors chapter one, "Bruno was waking up." his concerns
are now altered.

Waking up was different now. It was a kind of entry

into pain which was like a very slow quiet entry
into warm water. The pain was not physical pain. . . .

1#6

There were sudden wrenches with a sense of some-

thing inward griping and collapsing. . . .This

other pain was of the mind. or somehow of the

whole being as if in the doomed animal mind and

body were fusing into almost diaphanous ectoplasm.

. . . .The return from sleep into this ectoplasmic

consciousness was always misery. I am still here.

he thought. (BD. 298)

Although there are no longer dreams or worries about
daily existence. there remains Bruno's consciousness.
an object that no longer function in familiar patterns:

He felt as if the centre of his mind was occupied

by a huge black box which took up nearly all the

space and round which he had to edge his way. Names

not only of people but of things eluded him. (BD. 299)
His mind can now discern abstractions. such as the passage
of time. It is a visible movement to him. so that the
parade of bedpan. soup. visitor. reading. and moaning
are not apprehended as fragments of his whole day but
savored for their unique individuality. Bruno is no longer
"writing" persons and things into his pattern. This new
perception of time and things extends to his Past as well.
Those personal pictures no longer cause a surge of emotion.
They have become incredibly detailed images of past events.
Bruno does not wish to re-make them; he is content to view
them as a catalog of discrete events.

Bruno thinks. "I am dying. . .but what is it like?
(BD. 300) In describing the nature of his death. he
locates it in the present. "the whimpering fraility of
his being which so dreaded extinction." He is fearful

and recognizes that this fear staves off the destruction

of the "structure of his personality." He attempts to

1&7

marshal his dignity. "some old habit of uprightness."
that will help him. But he is convinced that dignity
isn't enough, "There is another important thing." (BD. 301)
He wishes desparately for a belief in God which would
fulfil that function; equally he turns to thoughts of
the women in his life hoping they will fulfil the same
function. As he pictures ‘Maureen. his memory fixes on
something else. Instead of seeing her only in relation
to himself. he looks carefully and notices that her hat
matches her chessmen. Had she done that on purpose?
For the first time. Maureen has an independent existence.

The other thing that Bruno must see is other people.
But this is not an easy task. His mind races.

I am at the centre of the great orb of my life.

thought Bruno. until some blind hand snaps the

thread. I have lived for nearly ninety years

and I know nothing. . . .And if there is some-

thing that matters now at the end it must be the

only thing that matters. . . .It looks as if it

would have been easy to be kind and good since it

is so obvious now that nothing else matters at all.

But of course then one was inside the dream. . . .

He had loved only a few people and loved them so

badly. so selfishly. . . .Was it only in the

presence of death that one could see so clearly

what love ought to be like? (BD. 30#)
Bruno understands finally in the face of "this presence"
that his wife had not wanted to curse him at the end.
she had wanted to forgive him. He understands that what
death has to teach is how he ought to have lived his life.

This is. however. an incommunicable vision. His

mind has raced through these thoughts: it has spanned

years of memories in order to come to its conclusion.

148

But his knowledge remains locked within himself. Bruno's
audible words during this time make no sense if removed
from the context of his thought patterns. They are
nonsense in the double-edged Kierkegaardian definition and
as such incomprehensible to anyone else. They bespeak a
direct confrontation with a spiritual fact. At this
point. at the novel's conclusion and after Bruno's last
words. Murdoch sinks the reader into the present tense.
confronting us with the image of Bruno's old dressing
gown. In the novel's beginning. Murdoch writes. "The
dressing gown had moved forward toward him and was standing
at the foot of the bed." This is not a clumsy metaphor
but a reminder of an earlier action. that of Bruno putting
on the dressing gown.

it was quite easy. really. The left hand held

the bed post while the right lifted down the

dressing gown and with the same movement slid

itself a little into the right sleeve. The right

hand lifted on high. the sleeve runs down the

arm. Then the right hand rests flat against the

door a little above shoulder height. while the

left leaves the bed post and darts into the left

arm hole. (BD. 37)
This act is the single instance in the novel of Bruno
existing in the present. The other person presented in
this manner is Nigel. whose entire being is echoed in
Bruno's action. Murdoch attempts to write into her
language the body of death as it is faced by one man.
Its mystery. one that somehow culminates in the fusion

of the particular and the universal, is gestured toward

by the image of the dressing gown. In the action of putting

149
it on. there is no self-pity, resentment. fantasy. or
despair; there is only the intense concentration of the
consciousness to complete the act. So it is that the virt-
uous life consists not in any great moment of forgiveness
or reconciliation but in the conscious momentary exercise
of discrete tasks. Man. who is bound by time. is constrained
to treat each moment as if it were his last. Death as
the extinction of consciousness is pre-figured by the passing
of every moment.

Life. then. becomes not a future of unlimited possibility
but an already accomplished series of actions. "Seen from
the point of view of death. the product of the corpse is
.life."20 is one of Benjamin's axioms. Its introduction
at this point serves to remind that as his death's-head
was transformed into an angel's countenance. it was done
.so within the limitation of baroque allegory. Certainly
the critic Benjamin was skeptical about such a transforma-
tion. Just so is Murdoch skeptical about the aspirations
of her characters. For she affords them no angel's
countenance. no promise of access into that reality.

Death is the decisive act. after which "There was no
getting anything up off the floor.” (BD. 37)

To have knowledge of this cessation should bring
energy to life as its scarcity is underscored. For
Bruno this knowledge comes too late: so it is that any
hope for its fruition rests with Diana. However. she

twists away from the pain that death brings. not knowing

150
if she will be "utterly changed by it" or simply forget
it. This is a true ambiguity. one that inheres in all
allegorical structures. Only the symbol pretends a full
explanation; allegory admits its limitations. Death
cannot teach: it cannot explain. It is a transition
and what it transposes to cannot be known. Thus. Murdoch's
hesitation to name the meaning of death is a recOgnition ‘
of this ambiguity. To say that death is a transformation
or-a struggle or punishment or the wages of sin is not
to articulate its meaning but rather to state a "reading"
of the rune of death. There can be no explanation. There
can only be intimations from one who has earned the
right to speak. Bruno is such an one. as is Diana. They
are not mouthing philosophies. up-rooted from someone's
life. but come as witnesses from the face of death. Thus.
when Bruno claims that death means living a good life
it comes to the reader with the force of a lived experience.
as when Diana claims. "Love is death." She means that
self must die in order to love properly.

A final note: it is the thought of death that instructs
not the act. This brings to the fore the incontestible
fact that death is non-deceptive. Because of the finality
of its action. because of its equal certainty. placing
men in a position from which to contemplate its meaning
allows the author to display her own most deeply held beliefs.
For Murdoch that is the absolute particularity of each

person and each situation. It is also the necessity for

151
that person to attempt to say himself. This isn't a
facile sort of dream story but a real attempt to see the
configurations of a particular self over and against the
configuration of the other. The resulting outline is
distinct yet influenced by that other. That is. the fact
that death comes to all is not to be seen as a comfortable
vat in which to fall but as a stone on which to inscribe
the actualities of a life.

The intricate movements of the three novels examined
demand that each be read for its own sake.. The interpene-
tration.between the centrifugal and centripetal forces
make each a unique presentation of differing subjects.
Murdoch's commitment to the particular and her distrust of
the general cause her to force her readers to see each
novel as an entity. Her commitment to allegory equally
forces dintinctive understandings. For these novels
come to the reader as other persons come to the novels'
main characters--runes on which the imagination works
but equally runes that exist with their own meanings.
Certain subjects offer themselves as allegorical structures
capable of articulating the meaning of life. Chapter

four will continue the search.

NOTES

1Iris Murdoch. "Mass. Might. and Myth." Spectator
209 (September 7. 1962): 337.

2Ibid.

3Benjamin. Origin. p. 176.
“Murdoch. "Revisited." p. 263.
5Murdoch. Sovereignty, p. 26.
6Benjamin. Origin. p. 36.
7Murdoch. "Revisited." p. 256.
8Benjamin, Origin. p. 28.

9This concept is found in.Murdoch's Sovereignty, p. 87;
and her Fire. p. 86. It is also found in W.K. Rose.
"Iris Murdoch. Informally," London Magazine 8 (June. 1969): 72.

10Murdoch. Fire. p. 12.

11Kenneth Allsop. The Anggy Decade (British Book Centre:

12Kermode. "House." p. 65

13Byatt.p. 73; Gerstenberger,p. 32; James Hall. Egg
lunatic Giant in thg Drawin Room (Bloomington: Indiana
University Press. 19 . p. 191: Stephen Wall. ”The bell
in Egg Bell." Essays in Criticism 13 (1963): 265; and
George Whiteside. "The Novels of Iris Murdoch." Studies
in Modern Fiction 7 (Spring. 1964): 37.

1I'l'Murdoch. "Revisited," p. 264.

15Benjamin. Origin. p. 184.
161bid., p. 176.

17Murdoch. "Darkness.” p. 49.

18This concept permeates Murdoch's work: Sovereiggty.

p. 8h; "The Sublime and The Good." p. pp. 44— 3 "Revis1ted."
p. 2 7.

152

153
19Martin Heinecken. The Moment Before God (Philadel-
phia: Muhlenberg Press. 1936), p. 71.

20Benjamin. Origin. p. 218.

Chapter IV

Allegorical Structure in Representative Works:
Part Two

If we refuse to yield to the ordinary temptations
of treating Iris Murdoch's works as traditional allegories.
the result is a larger picture of her structures as post-
modern allegories. These structures maintain a world
with sharp corners and distinctive people. The particular-
ities of their lives stand in vivid relief. And once
the reader has become acquainted with Hugo Belfounder.
or Michael Meade. or Bruno Greensleeves. it is impossible
to imagine them differently. A sense of their uniqueness
pervades each of the novels: and whether we are engaged
in contemplating what it would have been like to have
over-heard the direct conversations between Hugo and Jake.
or meditating on Michael's final assertion that the fact
of the Mass remains in his life. or relunctantly following
Bruno into the exiguousness of last things. the knowledge
that they unalterably exist remains. It also remains
that partial knowledge of them acts as a spring-board to
truly see their variety of personality and contexts.

In this fourth chapter it is my intention to demonstrate
that Murdoch's allegorical structures are necessarily
unwilling to give into closure. Her opinions on the
subject are well-known as is their base in the paradoxical

1

relationship between closure and openness. This is a

154

155

true paradox. not a seeming one. Life is fundamentally a
"jumble": and while man's propensity toward form is also
fundamental. it can never be known completely. Therefore.
the knowledge that man can expect to gain is partial
and subject to illusion. so that to pretend to completion
results in distortion. _The three novels examined in chapter
three exhibited several structures for knowledge. versions
of experience which might result in understanding. In
EEQE£.£E§ 333. art offers Jake that possibility: in Egg 221;.
a disciplined emptying of self offers Michael another
avenue: and in Bruno's Qgggm. a direct confrontation
with death offers yet another avenue. Each of these is
qualified by Murdoch. so that ease of approach is frus-
trated. However. the possibility of an avenue toward
truth is retained. This fourth chapter will concentrate on
three of Murdoch's later works: 22£.§l§25 Prince. Nugg gag
Soldiers. and Egg Philosopher's 2322;.. I will demonstrate
that Murdoch's increasing emphasis on the lack of closure
in life reflects allegory's position on the nature of
knowledge and the nature of man. The earlier versions
of experience which might have seemed to lead to know-
ledge is here rescinded in favor of something more ambiguous.
This is not pessimisn but a concentration on the stringencies
of mortal existence.

Egg.§lggk Prince is ostensibly a study of the love
affair between Bradley Pearson and Julian Baffin. Once

more. we will begin with the first paragraph. However,

156
here at the very outset of the story an interesting
phenomenon occurs. one that already resists closure.
There are three possibilities offered for a first
paragraph: and within these there are other starting
points suggested. so that the ability to point to an
absolute beginning is wrested from the reader. He
is. instead. allowed to see some of the contingencies
of authorial decision in establishing a beginning. The
first paragraph in the book's arrangement is written by
the editor of Bradley Pearson's work. P. Loxias:

I am in more than one way responsible for the
work that follows. The author of it. my friend
Bradley Pearson. has placed the arrangements for
publication in my hands. In this humble mechanical
sense it is through my agency that these pages now
reach the public. I am also the "dear friend" (and
such) who is referred to and at times addressed
in the book. I am not however an actor in the drama
which Pearson recounts. My friendship with Bradley
Pearson dates from a time in our lives posterior to
the events here narrated. This has been a time of
tribulation when we needed and happily found in
each other the blessings of friendship. I can say
indeed with confidence that were it not for the
encouragement and sympathy which I was able to give
to Bradley. this story would probably have remained
untold. Those who cry out the truth to an indifferent
world too often weary. fall silent or come to doubt
their own wit. Without my help this could have been
so with Bradley Pearson. He needed someone to be-
lieve him and someone to believe in him. He found
me. his alter Egg. at the time needful. (BP. ix)

The exact structure of the relationship between Loxias
and Pearson is not explained. nor are Loxias' credentials
as an editor displayed: rather the feeling that exists
between the two men is emphasized. They are close friends
and Loxias claims that without his friendship Pearson

could not have written the story. This emphasizes an

157
emotion that has less to do with the author's feeling
toward the work or himself than with an emotion toward
another human being. There is. then. a connection ten-
uously established between art and the emotion of love:
it is love that will facilitate the creation of art.
This connection will be made repeatedly throughout the
novel finally accruing to itself the weight of an actuality.
Further. there is an intricate relationship between time
and art that is suggested. The events that comprise
the "story" of the love affair cannot be seen as an object
until their sequence is complete. That is. the beginning.
the middle. and the end cannot be known until all three
have had time to come into existence. Moreover. once
that has happened. the person emerging at the end of the
sequence is different from the one who began. There is
a distorting action of memory that becomes bound to both
the other person and the workings of language. The effect
that such a distortion has on the story is devastating--
nothing is truth. or. conversely. everything is true.
The second "first" paragraph is written by Bradley
Pearson and begins his forward.
Although several years have now passed since the
events recorded in this fable. I shall in telling
it adopt the modern technique of narration. allowing
the narrating consciousness to pass like a light
5 along its series of present moments. aware of the
past. unaware of what is to come. I shall. that is.
inhabit my past self and. for the ordinary purposes
of story-telling. speak only with the apprehensions
of that time. a time in many ways so different from

the present. . . .A work of art is as good as its
creator. It cannot be more so. Nor. such as he in

158

this case is. can it be less. The virtues have

secret names: they are. so difficult of access.

secret things. Everything that is worthy is secret.

I will not attempt to describe or name that which

I have learnt within the disciplined simplicity of

my life as it has latterly been lived. I hope that

I am a wiser and more charitable man now than I was

then--I am certainly a happier man--and that the

light of wisdom falling upon a fool can reveal.

together with folly. the austere outline of truth.

(BP. 11)
The first sentence establishes the problem of distortion.
Art has a tendency to lie. to falsify the truth in order
to present a complete form to its beholder. For Bradley's
juxtaposition of the terms events and fable give evidence
of the tendency of art to be false. The events that ‘
Bradley mentions are discrete happenings. a jumble of
actions whose impetuses and motives remain hidden. The
fable to which Bradly refers is the body of the story
that follows his forward. and the word itself conveys
the fictitious nature of the art object that follows.
The word fable means even more than story or tale a
fictitious composition whose structure is intended to
perform simultaneously a real action and point to an
abstract meaning. This sounds suspiciously close to
traditional allegory. and it will be the point of this
explication to keep the distinction between traditional
and post-modern allegory plain.

Further. Bradley's Jamesian explanation of the
story's formal approach is an extension of the definition
of fable. This story is his and he will tell it as he

wishes. Thus. he establishes his authority over the

159
events. and however much he promises to be impartial
in their presentation the impossibility of that task
remains paramount in the reader's mind. To so promise
that he will narrate the beginning of the story with
the same mind as he had at the beginning of the events
is simply not a promise he can keep. Time has taken
his earlier innocence. and the new knowledge that he has
cannot keep itself from influencing his present story-
telling. Bradley's claim is far from innocent. Like
Jake before him. he sits in the power position.

Finally. Bradley's assertion that "everything that
is worthy is secret" holds the key to his aesthetic
position. He believes that not only is it impossible
to say truth. but that_it is also not a proper role for
the artist. That is. knowledge of ultimate things is so
esoteric that access is managed only by steady contem-
plation that may or may not be rewarded with a Platonic
understanding of reality. Bradley claims knowledge that
literally cannot be said: its very nature denies access.
So. at the very beginning. we are confronted with an
aesthetic and philological antimony: whereas Bradley's
viewpoint resembles the symbolist tradition with its
emphasis on the ineffability of the word. Murdoch herself
consistently upholds that tradition which would insist
upon the linguistic essence of truth. Thus. there is
a strong oppositional pull between the author and her

character. a pull that will take complicated turns.

160

Why. then. does Bradley bother to write an account
of the events at all. His own words. "that the light of
wisdom falling upon a fool can reveal. . .the austere
outline of truth." give a certain clue. Here is an
attitude toward truth that is not inconsistent with his
stated aesthetic. Bradley believes truth to be wholly
other than himself. something whose visual quality is
all that can be known of it. Bradley's predicament is
that his outline consists of words not brush strokes or
notes. so that the picture he is painting is comprised
of words. How he deals with such a deeply divisive tool
will be the meat of the book.

The third "first" paragraph is also written by Bradley
and begins the story proper.

It might be most dramatically effective to begin
the tale at the moment when Arnold Baffin rang me

up and said. "Bradley. could you come round here.
please. I think that I have just killed my wife."

A deeper pattern however suggests Francis Marloe

as the first speaker. the age or housemaid (these
images would appeal to him who. some half an hour
before Arnold's momentous telephone call. initiates
the action. For the news which Francis brought me
forms the frame. or counterpoint. or outward packag-
ing of what happened then and later in the drama of
Arnold Baffin. There are indeed many places where I
could start. I might start with Rachael's tears. or
Priscilla's. There is much shedding of tears in this
story. In a complex explanation any order may seem
arbitrary. Where after all does anything begin?

That three of the starting points I have mentioned
were causally independent of each other suggests
speculations. doubtless of the most irrational kind.
upon the mystery of human fate. (BP. 22)

To follow Bradley through the various choices of a proper
beginning is to follow a man searching for structures

of meaning. His search for a pattern is the action of

161

a man wanting to find the order for that sequence. As
he thinks about possible patterns. the refusal of the
discrete events to form their own order suggests to him
that any order he gives will be a devised one. However,
Bradley ignores this subject and settles on Arnold's
phone call as the starting point. Bradley is looking as
a good symbolist for the natural beginning: his inability
to find it raises interesting problems.

Murdoch says that a good question to ask an author
is what he fears.2 And that question is particularly apt
in this situation. What does Bradley Pearson fear? The
answer is simply that he is afraid of non-order. not just
dis—order. that would suggest that a discovery would
result in order. He fears that no order exists. that
the world is fundamentally irrational. Throughout his
story-telling. he turns from the implications of an
irrational universe. Much as Pythagorus' society kept
silent on the subject of irrational numbers. so Bradley
will remain silent on the irrational nature of the universe.
Whether or not he can maintain that silence will mark
in a reverse fashion his belief in the unsayable nature
of truth. By keeping silent about the irrational. .
Bradley will be upholding his aesthetic principle while
at the same time confirming what he fears. However.
these are observations that will be best dealt with later.

The object now must be to suggest the particulars of

the world presented in The Black Prince. Since the point

162

of view is so determinably first person. the particular
that ought to be considered first is Bradley himself.
There are many facts about his life that he willingly
relates. any of which could be pursued for the length
of a novel. For instance. his background as a shop-
keeper's son is brought up repeatedly. so that his
movement from lower class to middle class could have
been traced. It isn't though. and only a recurring
dream gives evidence of his climb. Or the story could
have centered on his career. describing not only his
adequate rise to middle management but also the British
civil system. It doesn't though..and only passing references
are made to his professional life. Or the story could
have revolved around his life-long ambition to be a writer.
Again it doesn't. and writing is only mentioned as some-
thing he wants to do. Or the story could have followed
his marriage to Christian. tracing its beginning and
following it to its demise. It doesn't though. and only
bits and pieces of their relationship surfaces. The main
story-line does not follow any of these possibilities.
Bradley elects not to include them. Rather the facet of
his personality that he chooses to display is his irrational
self. relating in agonizing detail his love affair with
Julian. His structure. then. implicitly recognizes the
irrational nature of the universe. The necessity of impos-
ing a form becomes Bradley's major enterprise.

Since falling in love figures heavily in Murdoch's

aesthetic theory, tracing its movement will illuminate

163

one aspect of the pull between Bradley and her. Bradley's
”fall" is first of all a totally irrational act. There is
no reason for him to be attracted to Julian: indeed. there
is every reason not to be. He is after all a confirmed
bachelor. moving through his routine with precision.
Nor is Bradley a sensual man as his early rejection of
Rachel's advances demonstrates. .So it is with surprise
that Bradley finds himself hopelessly in love. He cannot
even trace the origin of the moment and he needs to. For
if there is no origin. their love is an accident. .That '
thought frightens Bradley. Although he has chosen to
display his irrational side. he will not yet reckon with
that choice and so contents himself with the accomplished
fact.

The most outstanding aspect of his love is its earth-
shaking quality:

. . .nothing really prepared me for this blow. And

it was a plgg. I was felled by it physically. I felt

as if my stomach had been shot away. leaving a gaping

hole. My knees dissolved. I could not stand up. I

shuddered and trembled all over. my teeth shattered

. . . .I had become some sort of God. (BP, 211)
What sort of god Bradley becomes is the true subject of
his love. For falling in love forces that person to a crises
point. It is a dangerous cross-roads. one turn will take
the person back into himself while the other will take -
him outward. Thus. his love may become even more self-
involved. concentrating on his own feelings and responses.

or he may become less self-involved concentrating on his

beloved.

164

It looks in the beginning as if Bradley is going to
take the preferred second turn. seeing in Julian "every-
thing in the world." (BP. 213) There are other moments.‘
too. when love has that salubrious effect. Bradley refutes
his own theoretical position on Shakespeare. "No high
theory about Shakespeare is any good. not because he's
so divine but because he's so human." (BP. 247) He also
promises to re-evaluate Arnold's works and forgives Christian.
Even Bradley's physical appearance changes. Nearly every-
one tells him that he looks twenty years younger. Indeed.
his capacity for looking at others with pity seems endless
as does the self-less quality of that gaze seem bottomless.

All signs point to a genuine falling in love. However.
deceive. What looks like a shock. making one person
aware of another. becomes another method for the ego to
increase itself.3 Bradley's new view of the world may
resemble true love. but his inner thoughts betray a
different emphasis.

I felt that I was. at every instant. creating

Julian and supporting her being with my own. . .

How false it is to say that love is blind. I could

even judge her. I could even condemn her. . . .I

was a god and I was involved with her in some

eternal activity of making to be which was of sole

and absolute value. (BP. 214)
The ego is not easily deflected. Rather it is an organism
whose first duty is to protect itself. and whose first

action consists of maintaining its superiority.

However. Bradley is not a naive person. His nearly

165
sixty years have taught him some things about himself.
When he analyzes his falling in love. he recognizes his
false loss of self. He compares his action with the action
of worshipping God and finds his weakness.
A mystic's heaven on earth must be just such an
endless contemplation of God. Only God has (or would
have if He existed) characteristics at least not
totally inimical to the continuance of the pleasures
of adoration. . . .He is changeless. To remain thus
posed in the worship of a human being is. from both
sides of the relationship. a much more precarious
matter. . . . (BP. 250)
The "precarious" nature lies in the moving quality of
human life as much as it does in the less than perfect
human. It also lies in the ego's ability to take from
the object of adoration what it needs for survivial. In
another novel Henry and Cato. Murdoch deals with this subtle
facet of the ego. There. Cato. whose sole object in life
is the constant adoration of God. finds that his worship
is not really fixed on God but on himself. He has been
captivated by the picture of his worshipping God. So it
is in this situation with Bradley. he is seduced by the
picture of his falling in love and what it will do for him.
I had not forgotten that I was soon going to
start writing the greatest book of my life. I
knew that the black Eros which had felled me
was consubstantial with another and secret
god. (BP. 242)
The question becomes what Julian can do for him. and
this betrays the subjective nature of his love. It also

casts doubts on its sponteneity. Consider his state

of mind before meeting Julian:

166

The trouble was that the dark blaze. whose absence
I had deplored in Arnold's work. was absent here as
well. I could not fire and fuse these thoughts. these

people. into a whole thing. . . .However. I felt. as
we argfists can feel. the proximity of enlightenment.
BP,

Bradley is expecting a life-changing event: in fact he
needs such an event to put his artistic powers in motion.
What Bradley will ultimately find is that his ego has
taken from Julian what it needs to survive. The structure
of that relationship is a symbolic one: Bradley has
completed both sides of the relationship. What Bradley
finds now is a more locally understood falseness. seen
best in his treatment of others.

Three examples will Rachel Baffin. Priscilla. and
Julian herself. Rachel. early in the novel. asks for
Bradley's help and is ignored. She and her husband have
had a serious quarrel:

"I shall never forgive him. Be my witness now. I

shall never forgive him. Never. never. never. Not

if he were to kneel at my feet for twenty years.

A woman does not forgive this ever. She won't save

a man at the end. If he were drowning. I'd watch!

. . . and I won't forgive you either for having
seen me like this with my face bruised to pieces

and heard me talk horribly like this. (BP. 41)

The glimpse that these words give of Rachel's desperation
will climax in the novel's conclusion. For now. although
Bradley hears the words. he refuses their meaning. keeping
Rachel and her problems at a distance. He does agree to
be her friend but forgets her when he falls in love with

Julian. Any plea that she makes for further friendship.

any reminder of his pledge to stand beside her. any hint

167
of the awful feelings running through her mind is
squelched. Bradley does not even offer her a sympathetic
ear.

The rejection of Rachel is paralled by Bradley's
treatment of his sister. Priscilla. too. comes to Bradley
with serious problems. She is leaving her husband. an act
which causes depression. However. Bradley's thought is
the problem that Priscilla causes him. She asks for
understanding. for sympathy. for attention and is rejected.
Bradley pushes his sister from him. not only refusing to
listen but also passing her off to anyone else. Whenever
Priscilla raises an idea to help herself. Bradley under-
mines her. continually causing Priscilla to face her age.
her economic status. and her ugliness. He simply refuses
her any claim on his life. Nowhere is this more clearly
seen than in Bradley's reaction to her death. While he
and Julian are in the country-side. he receives news of
Priscilla's suicide. His reaction. ”I can't come now. . . .
I can't-~come--now. Get on with with arrangments--get
hold of Roger Saxe. . . .I'll come when I can." (BP. 333)
is selfish. He understands what has happened: he doesn't
understand what claim it makes.

Finally. his relationship with Julian is built on
falseness. Repeatedly Julian questions Bradley. When
he tells her that he fell in love while they were discus-
sing Shakespeare. she replies. "Only tggg! Bradley. you
terrify me. Honestly I think you should think twice

168

about this. Aren't you just acting out of some momentary
impulse?" (BP. 283) Or at another point, she says.
"You don't seem to know me at all. Are you sure its gg
you love?” (BP. 272) Or her most penetrating observation.
Your love must be very-—what's the word-~solipsistic
if you don't even imagine or speculate what I might
feel."(BP, 274) Bradley's lies and insensitivity would
argue that indeed he doesn't love Julian. They do not
have an equal relationship. but one that Bradley cir-
cumscribes. It is his decision how much and what to
tell Julian. Her only task is to accept all that he says.

One of the major premises that undergirds Murdoch's
definition of art is its ethical nature.“ True art is
synonomous with the Good and will at all times reflect
the outlines of just behaviour. This behaviour takes two
directions: one in actions toward others and the other in
treatment of events. The first direction dictates that a
‘ true falling in love is characterized by modesty. chastity.
and respect. There is no desire for possession. no place
given to the self. The analogy is then extended to art.
It too is treated with modesty. chastity. and respect.
This is not a chance analogy. rather there is a Platonic
line of contiguity between physical love and love of the
divine. The purifying of the self from human relationships
is then seen as a physical picture of the relationship
between art and man. Seen from this perspective, it is

not too strong to insist that Bradley's indifference to

169

others. his insistence that they fit his "script" is the
action of a false artist. one who is not looking for
the outlines of reality but is rather creating false
wholes that will sustain his own viewpoint.

The making of false wholes is a temptation that the
author resists. for she extends her narration through
six end-pieces. It has been suggested that these endings
offer a demonstration of the author's discomfort with
the first person narrative.5 I would like to suggest that
they display the author's conviction that art can lie. that
it "is a false presence and a false present."6 In 22$.ElE2
gag Egg §gn. Murdoch attaches great weight to Plato's
suspicion of artistic form. his conviction that art by
making wholes pretends that the distance between appearance
and reality does not exist. And in Egg Biggg Prince
there is a working out of this conviction. Each of the
end pieces offers to the reader an "interpretation" of
the story that has just been told. Not only do they serve
to describe the weakness of art. they also stand as
commentary on the allegorical structure of the novel.
Bradley's story is a runs and needs an allegorist to
assign it a meaning. Those meanings are as different as
the people writing them.

The first written by Bradley describes the events
occurring after a phone call from Rachel. This phone
call parallels Arnold's call at the story's beginning
with the exception that Arnold is lying on the floor dead.

170
Through a series of accidents Bradley is accused of
murdering Arnold. At first. he is unwilling to name
Rachel as the killer and then later is unable to do so.
No one believes his story. ”The court saw me. . .as a
fantastical man." (BP. 401)

Next is a set of end-pieces placed under the heading
"Four Postscripts by Dramatis Personae." However. they
are anything but fictitious persons from Bradley's world.
nor are they persons from the author's world. They are
people in their own right demanding attention. Christian
begins her postscript with a pattern of qualification. a
type of self-defense that will be seen in all the post-
scripts. "the whole book seems to me to be sort of off
key." (BP. 406) Christian argues that Bradley did kill
Arnold. although excusing him. She thinks him mad and
offers his "rather creepy" postscript and his attachment
to his “teacher" in prison as evidence. She does exist
apart from Bradley and will insist that she be seen in
that light. Lest that point be missed. there is a final
shock that secures Christian's independence. Her signature
is Christian.ngtbourne. Immediately the reader's mind
wonders at the circumstances that brought Christian and
Bradley's office-mate together. Bradley is right when
he says. ”An inch away from the world one is accustomed
to there are other worlds in which one is a complete
stranger." (BP. 392)

The next postscript is written by Francis Marloe.

It is a parody of the psychological world. and its use

171
of various theories and patterns of behaviour to explain
the individual. Francis names Bradley a classic case
of the "Oedipus Complex.”

To say so is perhaps banal. Most men love their

mothers and hate their fathers. Many men. because

this is so. hate and fear all women in adult life.

(Adored mama is never alas forgiven for going to

bed with detested papa!) Such was the case with

Bradley. (BP. 411)

Francis explains all contingencies and even removes

P. Loxias. claiming that he is only Bradley in disguise:
"The narcissism of the deviant eats up all other characters
and will tolerate only one: himself." (BP. 415) This is

in reality what Francis has "done" to Bradley. He has
eaten him alive. subsuming his uniqueness under theoretical
umbrellas. Again, there is a final strike that under-‘
scores this point.

A subscription list for my forthcoming work Bradley

Pearson. The Paranoiac From the Paper Shop. is now

open c7o the publisher. letters to my consultin rooms

will be forwarded from the same address. (BP.16)
The newly self—proclaimed "Psychological Consultant" has
indeed feasted on Bradley.

While Rachel's postscript presents a subtler feasting.
it is. nonetheless. a voracious act. Rachel appropriates
each of Bradley's assertions and dismantles them. For
instance. Bradley may describe himself as "ironical and
sardonic and restrained and idealistic." but he is in

reality. "quite without dignity. . .absurd. . .a bore."

(BP. 419) His love interests are all "dreams" that he

has concocted to cover the thinness of his life. This

172

consistent deflection effectively sets her opinion against
him. thus placing Bradley's story in doubt. Since she
continues to accuse Bradley of murdering her husband. the
reader is forced to choose sides.

In Julian's postscript the fact of Arnold's death
is the fundamental occurrence. All else is theory.
which is not to suggest that Julian views everything
through theoretical lenses. Indeed. she refutes some
of her mother's "facts" against Bradley. Rather. she
is aware of the workings of her own mind. Although she
does not refute the claims that Bradley makes. she
doubts their truthfulness from her perspective. 8

A letter. for instance. is quoted. Did I write this

letter (Did he keep it?) It seems inconceivable. And

the things that I said. (Supposedly.) Surely. they

are the invention of another mind. Sometimes the

reactions of the child are too childish. (BP. 424)
Julian also uses this opportunity to present her aesthetic
and restates Bradley's artistic problem: "Art is secret
secret secret. . . .Art is public public public.” (BP. 425)
Her opposition. like Bradley's. rests on a belief in the
ego's ability to discover reality. Julian argues that.
"The worshipping attitude concentrates on self. The
worshipper kneels as Narcissis kneels to gaze into the
water." (BP. 427) However. her position is successfully
attacked by its own outcome in Bradley's life. He doesn't
find reality at the end of his affair with Julian. he
finds that most of the premises he has acted from are false.

The opposition of silence and words leads to the

final postscript written by P. Loxias. He summarizes

173
and exposes the other postscript writers' weaknesses:
Mrs. Baffin lies to protect herself. Mrs. Belling
to protect Mrs. Baffin. . . .Dr. Marloe. who told
the truth at the trial. pusillanimously fails to
repeat it now. I am told he has been threatened
by Mrs. Baffin's solicitors. . . .Each piece is
self-advertisement ranging from the vulgar to the
subtle. (BP. 428)
Art does lie. Indeed the novel rests on that knowledge.
At its beginning Bradley meditates on the problem:
How can one describe a human being “justly"? How
can one describe oneself? With what an air of false
coy humility. with what an assumed confiding simplicity
one sets about it: "I am a puritan“ and so on. Faugh!
How can these statements not be false? Even "I am
tall" has a context. (BP. 84)
How can the limitations of the subjective be overcome?
A solution can be seen in Bradley and Arnold's opposing
aesthetics. Bradley says. "Art comes out of endless
restraint and silence." (BP. 51) "It is the condensing and
refining of a conception almost to nothing." (BP. 145)
Arnold counters with. "If the silence is endless there
isn't any art!" (BP. 51) For Bradley silence means cutting
himself off from other people in order to look into himself
for truth. Restraint becomes an ordering process from
within. Arnold. on the other hand. admits the necessity
of other people for art to exist. He is not defending
their chatter but is locating truth in externals. Nor
is he blind to the imperfections of such a position:
"I live with an absolutely continuous sense of failure.

I am always defeated. always. Every book is the wreck

of a perfect idea." (BP. 178)

174

While the two men do hold opposing viewpoints.
Bradley's is not as iron-clad as his statements would
suggest. For he does tell his story. indicating faith
in the power of language. Nor is this faith merely
grudgingly given at the novel's end. It has existed
throughout the story in the form of Bradley's feelings
about letters.

I am. I must confess. an obsessive and superstitious

letter-writer. . . .I invest letters with magical

power. To desiderate something in a letter is. I

often irrationally feel. tantamount to bringing

it about. A letter is a barrier. a reprieve. a -

charm against the world. an almost infallible

method of acting at a distance. (And it must

be admitted. of passing the buck.) It is a way

of bidding time to stop. (BP 64)
The most important point here is the primitive power
ascribed to written language. It will bring about the
writer's wishes just as surely as the words of sacred
ssripture will be fulfilled. They both carry the same
kind of outlines of reality. Further. the letter exists.
it can be handled. it can be seen. Bradley's words best
define this fact: "A letter can be endlessly re-read
and re-interpreted. it stirs imagination and fantasy.
it persists. it is red-hot evidence." (BP. 190) This red-
hot evidence has particular truth for Bradley's story.
It is the accidental reading of a letter that causes
the story's climax.

While visiting Bradley. Rachel accidently reads a

letter from Arnold in which he declares his love for

Christian. After reading this. Rachel says to Bradley.

175

"You don't know what you've done. I shall never never
never forgive you." (BP. 373) and runs from his flat.
However. the story does not follow her but remains with
Bradley. Thus. Rachel's call brings Bradley to a local
set of runes. The action is past. Arnold lies dead.
his head bashed in with a poker. The scene is described
. to the smallest detail. which is the ball of paper that
was Arnold's letter to Bradley. Bradley takes the
letter and burns it. washes the poker. replaces it.
and calls the police. When they arrive they find quite
different runes--Bradley's fingerprints on the poker and
his bloody footprints throughout the house. The letter
that would have established a motive is forever gone.

The power of the written word. both to condemn and
save. is figured in this final scene. Bradley. who has
steadfastly maintained silence stands condemned by that
silence. It is at this point that the purpose of Murdoch's
structure becomes clear. The drama sets the stage for
Bradley's final meditations: and while he would have
nothing to meditate on if that drama had not occurred.
it is his meditation that brings meaning to the events.
His postscript begins with a new sense of the difficulty
of expression.

But if after reflection and with deliberation one

attempts with words to create bridges and to open

vistas one soon finds out how puny is one '3 power

to describe or connect. (BP. 392)
Before the story. Bradley did not feel any of this

difficulty: now he understands some of the frustrations

176

that Arnold expressed to him earlier. The "bridges" that
will "open vistas" are seen now not as obvious and self-
explanatory but as hidden and meaningless from one person
to the next.

In a series of dialogues with P. Loxias (Indeed. his
description raises them to Socratic exercises in the
. invention of wisdom.). Bradley further meditates on the
difficulty:

About these things. my dear fellow. we in our

seclusion have often spoken. in our times of quiet-

ness together. with words. whose meaning glowed out

of an ineffable understanding. like flames upon

dark water. So friends. so spirits. ultimately con-

verse. It was for this that Plato. in his wisdom.

forbade the artists. Socrates wrote nothing. neither

did Christ. Almost all speech which is not illumined

is a deformation of the truth. And yet: I am writing

these words and others whom I do not know will read

them. With_and by this paradox I have lived. dear

friend. in our sequestered peace. (BP. 403)
However. Bradley can not yet agree to the word's power.
He tries several explanations of Arnold's death: "said
various things. changed my mind. told the truth. then
lied. then broke down. was impassive. then devious. then
abject." (BP. 393) and learns that none works. Indeed.
the only recourse he has is to write down the events and
assign their structure meaning.

Bradley's story gives unity to a series of events.
that can. of course. be discarded as the postscripts
give evidence. But his story does exist in the manner

of the red-hot letter. It is his attempt to outline

truth during which he finds.

177

My love for Julian-had somehow brought about this

death. . . .At some point in a black vision I appre-

hended the future. I saw this book. which I have

written. I saw my dearest friend P.L.. I saw myself

'a new man. altered out of recognition. . . .She somehow

was and is the book. the story of herself. . . .It is

my gift to her and my final possession of her. From

this embrace she can never now escape. (BP. 400)

Notice that Bradley clings to a sense of destiny about

his love affair. a clinging that betrays his desire to ‘
continue to work his will on events. While Bradley does
understand that love requires a movement outside self.

he hesitates to take the final step. That would mean
divesting himself of all claims. He would have to admit

the chance that brought Julian into his life. Bradley
clings to the fated feeling he has for the events.unwilling
to release his hold on them. He is still trying to possess
them with words as he possessed Julian.

He also continues to yearn for the "brink of silence. . .
where articulate forms negate themselves and vanish into
ecstasy. Whether words can travel that path. through
truth. absurdity. simplicity to silence I do not know. . . .
(BP. 404) Bradley may yearn for the remainder of his
life. but he has learned something of the true paradox
of silence and words. For as much as he desires the
_ whole of a symbolic silence. he desires to remember the
"real being of those who have figured as my characters."
(BP. 404) To do that will cost him the comfort of a
total vision. The "random detail of her [Priscilhg

wretchedness" (BP. 404) and the reality of Julian.

‘ the one who "Eternally. . .escape [s] my embrace." (BP. 404)

178
make a total submersion of them into his mind impossible.
The last glimpse of Bradley is a report by Loxias.
and it is surely a just ending that Bradley be turned into
a rune. Loxias describes Bradley's death. and if the
description can be trusted. then we see that Bradley's
approach to death. as Bruno's before him. allows him
to see finally all objects in their uniqueness. As
Bradley is dying he asks to be told the end of the opera
Rosenkavalier (which mirrors his and Julian's relationship).
Loxias tells Bradley that Octavian leaves the Marschallin
and finds a lover his own age. Bradley responds. "Well.
that was right. wasn't it?” (BP. 431) Facing death. he
relinquishes all possessive rights to Julian. In so doing
he maintains his own individuality for at the end of Loxias'
postscript there is this observation:
And Bradley existed. Here upon the desk as I write.
there stands the little bronze of the buffalo lady. .
Also a gilt snuff-box inscribed A Friend'g Gigi. And.
Bradley Pearson's stor . which I made him tell. re-
mains too. . . . (BP. 432)
The discrete. tangible runes act as testimony to their
function as art objects. They can with language be
explored and partially understood but never wholly known.
Art created by humans should remind. as it did Bradley.
7 that "We are creatures of a day. nothing much. We do not
understand ourselves. we lack reality. . . ."7 There is
no escape from subjectivity. .

However. it should also remind that regardless of

art's shortcomings and its tricks. "Art tells the only

179

truth that ultimately matters. . . .And after art there
is. let me assure you all, nothing.” (BP. 432) This is
truly the allegorical attitude that informs Murdoch's
structure. The fact that the structure endlessly questions
its own right of existence. endlessly mocks its own
pretensions to wholeness. endlessly qualifies its own
insights. does not preclude its function of illuminating
for its reader that. "The careful responsible skillful
use of words is our highest instrument of thought and one
of our highest modes of being. . . ."8

It does. however. erect a less optimistic set of
parameters for art than does ggggg thg‘flgt. At the close
of that novel. Jake was looking toward his artistic en-
deavor as a positive step. one that held the promise of
fulfillment and even justification for life. While his
optimism may be qualified by his character. the claims
made for art are unqualified. T g Bigggqggigge contains
no such optimism. On the contrary. not only does the
structure qualify the meaning of success. it also limits
expectations. Bradley admits that his story is faulty.
There are no claims to a grand creation only a humble
doing of the thing itself. While Jake proceeds under an
illusion. Bradley has thrown off all illusions and claims
nothing. His telling becomes not Jake's positive action
but a quiet doing of the only thing he can. This requires

an act of faith on the writer's part that only allegory

180
can satisfy. For it is only allegory that promises even
partial truth.

A determination to do what can be done can also be
seen as the fundamental purpose of the fifth novel to
be examined. Nuns and Soldiers. It is ostensibly a dual
story of Anne Cavidge's quest for God and an account of
Gertrude and Tim's love affair. I would like to suggest
that these stories sketch Iris Murdoch's contrasting views
of the individual: one. a reclamation of the contemplative's
worth. and the other. an indictment of the actioneoriented
personality. All this anticipates the larger purposes of
the book. For now the task is to introduce the world
that the novel displays.
"Wittgenstein--"
"Yes?" said the Count.
The dying man shifted on the bed. rolling his head
rhythmically to and fro in a way that had become
habitual only in the last few days. Pain?
The Count was standing at the window. He never sat
down now in Guy's presence. He had been more familiar
once. though Guy had always been a sort of king in
his life: his model. his teacher. his best friend.
his standard. his judge: but most especially some-
thing royal. Now another and a greater king was
present in the room. (NS. 1)
There are three minds shown in this opening interchange:
the Count. Guy. and the author. each confronting death.
Although not much is said. the foundation for their
several personalities and their interactions is laid.
Guy calls to his mind the philosopher Wittgenstein.
and before critics scatter in all directions establishing
connective links between his philosophy and the novel.9

it should be pointed out that Guy names Wittgenstein in

181
order to castigate his limitations. Later in the scene.
Guy uses the phrases. "the whole of logical space" and
"the upper side of the cube." (NS. 2) and the incoherence
of the language seems to the Count and to Gertrude evidence
of his deterioration. Few of Guy's utterances as he is
dying come to the level of articulation or explanation
as he acknowledges. "Our worlds wax and wane with a difference.
We belong to different tribes." (NS. 5)

The Count's reaction is especially dis-heartened.

He places Guy in a superior role. which his own needs
require. thus actually hindering him from understanding.

He fears Guy's last words as they may reveal something
unpleasant. He shies away from any close relationship.
blaming Guy's incoherent language on pain-killing chemicals.
The Count wants to behave ”correctly" until the end." He
wants to maintain his own self and so turns his face from
his friend.

The author's mind is more covertly revealed. It
displays itself in one instance: the first description of
Guy. His restless demeanor and his utterances are as
inexplicable to the author as they are to the Count.

While the Count blames medicine. the author blames pain.

An author who admits no knowledge of a character's motives
is not refusing the rights of creation. nor is she creating
an illusionary independence. She is insisting that her
own knowledge of human character is partial. It is an

explicit acknowledgment that there is no point at which

182
all motivations and connections can be made plain. A
fully coherent shared world of fact among humans simply
does not exist.

It is essential. therefore. when discussing Murdoch's
fictions to speak as much of structure as of character
and the way in which the relationship between characters
becomes structural. The relationship of parts to the
whole will come to be seen as a statement of allegorical
intention. The allegorist interprets the fact and assigns
their arrangement a meaning. A good example occurs
shortly after Guy's death. Gertrude. Anne. Manfred
and the Count are having cocktails. The participants
exchange pleasantries. composing a picture of solicitous
friendship. However. Murdoch's excursion into their
respective minds reveals something quite different.
Gertrude is occupied in thinking of her earlier meeting
with Tim Reede and castigating herself for not conducting
it better. The Count is thinking about his love for
Gertrude. convincing himself that he must keep it quiet.
Anne is thinking about the approaching Easter season.
wishing to be alone in order to worship. Murdoch returns
to Gertrude's mind showing its thoughts'of the Count and
his love for her. Believing the others in the group
are thinking about her, too. that "They watch me for signs
and they think I am better but I am not." (NS. 144). she
sadly remembers the reason for their supposed watching.

All these distinctive thought patterns demonstrate that

183
neither physical proximity nor a common event insure
common meaning.

This structure of the separateness of minds is used
again in a meeting between Tim and Gertrude. This meeting
is not a social situation but one of lovers.

"Yes. yes. yes." said Tim. ”We keep saying it. and

it's true. But. . .so. . .?" Tim was thinking. we

do love each other. there's no doubt about that

thank God. but now she's back in London she may

decide she just wants a love affair. . . ." "If

you just want an affair--do say--tell me now--"

"Do you just want a love affair?"

"NO . 0'

”Neither do I. I want the long eternal thing.”

"Good. I want it too. You were right about that in

France. Either this is nothing or it's everything."

(NS. 231)

It would appear that here is a true interchange. Gertrude
and Tim are literally reading each other's thoughts. But
this is only momentary and as they look at each other.
they think of their own conditions. Tim is worried that
Daisy. his mistress of many years. might show up at the
studio. Gertrude is worried about the impropriety of her
love affair with Tim. This return to self is natural

and it is divisive.

There is a structure of mis-understanding built that
is underscored by a multitude of ineffective relationships.
These "missed lives" turn on the question of who loves
whom. The Count loves Gertrude who loves Tim who loves
both Gertrude and Daisy: Anne loves the Count who loves
Gertrude. etc.. and Manfred loves Anne who loves the

Count who loves Gertrude. etc. This ambiguity of importance.

this mixing of story-lines is seen in the situation of the

183

Count and Tim. In the novel's beginning. it seems that
the Count is to be an important character. After all.
he is the only friend permitted to see Guy at the end.
he is Guy's suggestion for Gertrude's new husband. and the
author describes the Count's background and present position
at length. He sees himself "as a soldier. but a very
ordinary soldier with a soldier's dullness and circum-
scribed lot and extremely small chance of glory." (NS. 14)

As in The Bell this concept of soldiering is important.
For after Guy's death. it is the Count who.

. . .helped in the funeral-arrangements. He made

a list of Guy's office friends who should be

notified. He helped to move the furniture in the

flat. He was continually. deferentially. available.

But he was not. . .actually necessary. (NS. 116)
The Count's soldiering makes possible not the fulfillment
of his own needs but-the needs of greater beings. Perhaps.
this is why after the lengthy description which builds
reader expectation. Murdoch abandons him and replaces
him with another "soldier". Tim Reede.

Tim describes himself as.

sometimes a soldier of fortune. a raffish footloose

fellow. a drinker. a wandering cadger. a happy-go

lucky figure in a shabby uniform (not of course as

an officer) who lives from day to day avoiding un-

pleasantness and procuring small fairly innocuous

satisfactions. (NS. 77)
While the Count's soldiering serves others. Tim's serves
himself. And it seems that he is the more selfish of the
two. However. when their common goal of consolation emerges.

the Count merely succeeds in performing a more sophisticated

form of selfishness.

184
Tim is also described at length. His attachment to
Daisy and the complicated string of events that led him
to Guy are detailed. His involvement with Gertrude is
also recounted: their first meeting. their holiday together
in France. their love. their break-up. the reunion--all
are treated in great detail. In an article entitled.
"The Sublime and The Good" Murdoch argues that the human
mind is "stunned" by life's particularity. Stunned is
the precise adjective that fits Gertrude and Tim's
,story. Its length and un-evenness begets a desire to
impose order. to make sense out of the chaotic string of
events. However. yielding to this desire always makes the
other person into someone false. ~
. . .because we are ourselves sunk in a social whole
which we allow uncritically to determine our reactions.
or because we see each other exclusively as so determined.
Or we may fail to see the individual because we are
completely enclosed in a fantasy world of our own into
which we try to draw things from outside. not grasping
their reality or independence. making them into dream
objects of our own. 10
There is a counter motion to this voracrious action—-
a love that seeks to see the other person as he is. To
practice it will take self-less concentration. The ego
will struggle at every turn. for it will not easily give
up its control of the mind's energy. But it is Murdoch's
contention that the mind can be set in the direction
of the other and that something true can be known. There
are two characters who represent this outward gaze. Guy

and Anne. It is not an accident that proportionally

speaking so little space is given to them. Rather. it

185
is an authorial comment on the lack of such activity.

In order to see Guy and Anne truly. it is necessary
to pay attention to the particularity of their minds.

For while I would like to sum up Guy by saying he is
Murdoch's example of a "linguistic empiricist" and to sum

up Anne by saying she is Murdoch's example of the "good
person". those abstractions would have no meaning. What

is needed is a specific display of each person: then general
observations will be in order.

Guy has already been introduced but his personality
remains skeletal. He is only seen in three direct conver-
sations: with the Count. with Anne. and with Gertrude. The
first conversation's fragmentariness is marked by an almost
exclusive reliance on ideas. He conjures Wittgenstein.
Schopenhauer. Mauthner. Kraus. not as individuals. but
as thinkers who tried to outline reality. As he faces
death. Guy recognizes that these thinkers were unsuccessful.
His religiously held belief in the efficacy of reason is
disappearing: his belief that his "thoughts would wander-
in infinite space" is illusionary. This particular phrase
comes from Paradise ngt and it is spoken by Belial. who
Murdoch has elsewhere described as a practicioner of
Kant ' s Sublime . .

. . .when we confront the awful contingency of nature

or of human fate and return into ourselves with a

proud shudder of rational thought. How abject we are.

and yet our consciousness is of infinite value. 11
It is just this belief in the power of human thought that

Guy is losing. He has ordered his life around the power

186
of reason. a fact continually commented on by other
characters. For instance. his friendship with the
Count is practiced on strictly reasonable terms. Guy
took the time to notice the Count and draw him out.
However. Guy's friendship has limitations:
The Count was a phenomenon. Guy liked phenomena.
Guy never asked quite the questions which the Count
wanted. . . .he did ask. . .about the Count's child-
hood. his parents. his beliefs. And it was not just
the precision of the questions which charmed the
Count. it was the expectation of the answers. which
had to be simple. direct. lucid. truthful. and
uttered with a certain calm dignity. This method
of.questioning did elicit truth. but with an almost
deliberate limitation. as if there were a definate
periphery of things which Guy did not want to know.
(NS. 14
Guy wishes to know only the Count's rational side. practicing
Kant's theory of the harmony possible between creatures
of reason. And there is harmony but only on this level.
When the Count reveals his passionate. confused or fanatic
side to the reader. we feel as if it is a valuable part
of him. Guy never allows the Count's emotional side to
emerge and uses his strength of will to keep it contained.
Equally so are Tim. Sylvia. and Gertrude kept within?
rational boundaries. Thus. when Guy faces death and wishes
to discuss his feelings with the Count. there is no
established path to travel. His attempts to do so are greet-
ed with fear. He and the Count do not touch each other.
they can not face each other. and now at the end even

conversation fails. The Count stays within the confines

of the "game" that Guy has taught him so well.

187

The second conversation between Guy and Anne is
marked by its accidental nature. There is no reason
for them to converse--they aren't friends. Thus. Guy's
request to see Anne must be treated strictly as a meeting
of minds. Guy's comment. "You will stay until I go. and
after too." (NS. 64) is made from this perspective. Anne
_is to be his witness. his vehicle of immortality. Thus.
when he sets up the game of rationality. it is not sur-
prising that Anne plays it. They discuss ideas. defining
and describing them as precisely as possible. However.
as they are setting the limits. it becomes apparent that
they are not conversing as much as they are trying to
understand what the other means. In answer to guy's
question about her leaving the convent. Anne answers.
"I changed my views about religion." To Guy's probing
inquiry. "Lost your faith--?” (NS. 65) Anne replies with a
more personal view of what she means. While Guy moves the
conversation from topic to topic. Anne counters with a
deepening process. Although he attempts to elicit abstract
definitions and descriptions. Anne forces him to personalize
his thought. For instance. when they discuss virtue and
vice. Guy says.

"We are selectively decent. if we are decent at all.

We each have one or two virtues which we cultivate.

not much really. . . ."

A. "What's yours?”
G. "My--? Oh nothing high. Something like accuracy. (NS. 68)

His wish to be accurate reflects his belief in the impersonal.

but his subsequent comment reflects his growing desire to

188

be personal. "But you asked me if... .when I wanted
punishment. . .I wanted it for anything in particular. . . ."
(NS. 69) Perhaps. he is willing to personalize the con-
versation. That can't be known because Anne is frightened
by this turn. While she has been consistently personaliz-
ing the conversation. Anne is not ready for any one else's
personality to emerge and so blocks Guy by saying. "I think
I am tiring you. Gertrude said I musn't stay long!” (NS. 70)
Anne has turned the tables on Guy. It is she who refuses
the emotional involvement.

The third conversation is marked by its formal outlines.
It takes place between husband and wife Shortly before his
death. Guy's endearments and Gertrude's recognition that
"Guy was suddenly present to her. all present. with his
whole tenderness. his whole love. his real being." (NS. 94)
would seem to belie Guy's unemotional nature. However.
his is not a passionate love and this meeting is a paradigm
of their married life. Guy speaks to Gertrude in "calm
and dull" tones: and while the subject may be passionate.
his discussion of it is not. Guy reminds Gertrude of
their love for each other: but rather than speaking freely.
he exercises his will one final time and draws the
'parameters of her future. This is not a power play but is
an attempt to live this last scene by the principles that
have guided his life.

Guy refuses to face emotions. for they do not lend

themselves to control and authority. He turns to a precise

189
existence without contingency that looks to itself for
guidance and moves confidently within the world. For
this perspective to be valid. several premises must be
true: first. that the will is capable of such movement:
second. that the outside world consists of objects and
facts that can be known: and third. that language is only
public language. Each character's reaction to Guy demon-
strates the limitations of such a view. The Count would
have liked to tell Guy more about himself but was not
allowed: Anne felt that Guy wanted to say more than he
did: and Gertrude felt a passion that she was not allowed
to express. The structure that Guy has appropriated for
himself is Kant's man-god. a figure criticized amply by
Murdoch.

While Guy's viewpoint rests on reason. Anne's rests
on contemplation. She had decided to become a nun in
order to give "her life for a quiet conscience. A fugitive
and cloistered virtue was better than none." (NS. 56)
This early decision parallels Guy's wish to live an
ordered life. but her method is radically different:

She had lived a long time with the practice of

prayer. not as a regular intermittent willed routine.

but as a total mode of being. She had lived with the
passion of Christ. . . .She had lived. with a sweet
and natural ease. somehow inside the doctrine of the

Trinity. surrounded by the spiritual stream which

united Father. Son and Paraclete. (NS. 59)

Her method demands that the follower look outside himself

for meaning. However. the action. "the narrowing of her

will. the widening of His" (NS. 60) does not bring

190
satisfaction. And like the condemnation of false shelter
that Milton eschews. Anne leaves the convent. Hers is
not a simple crises of faith. For it isn't that she no
longer believes the dogma. it is a feeling that the dogma
is insufficient. Anne brings this ambivalence with her
when she comes to Gertrude.

Further. Anne approaches her conversation with Guy
with the same ambiguity. Thus. when Guy asks her if she
has lost her faith. it is not surprising that she has such
trouble forming an answer. Some sense of the utter per-
'sonal quality of her faith must be seen. Guy may believe
that careful questioning will elicit precise answers. but
he is unaware of the personal twist that words take.
Language is not the precise tool that Guy envisions it
to be: rather it is an intricate network of concepts. whose
rapidity of change is only challenged by the depth of
change. The words remain the same. Jesus is a name that
has a common meaning. but the concept changes with time.
Jesus. as a concept, is an historical token. an allegorical
rune. whose full meaning can never be known and whose
partial meaning can only be understood in terms of the
historical context that surrounds it.

The impossibility of complete knowledge does not.
wholly deter Anne. She continues to talk with Guy.
doing so with faith that the conversation will allow truths
to be said. And it does. although the truths are not

always flattering to Anne. Her turn outward in the

191
convent has led her to be concerned with only her position
in regard to dogma. As she and Guy are discussing the
meaning of judgment, he comments that he wants a judgment
on his life. Anne suggests. "Don't you think others may
need it. want it. too?" (NS. 67) Guy counters. ”Oh may
be. but I'm only interested in my own case. Like you."
(NS. 67) Anne's interest in life is selfish and however
much she may serve others outwardly it is her own position
that commands her attention. For instance. she persistently
judges others. She says. A I

"I funked it driving. Manfred drives too fast!" '

G. "You are censorious. I've been noticing it. . .You
will judge people. . . .I see you as a judge. a holy
judge in our lives. . . .You shall dispense justice.”

Am I censorious. Anne wondered. She certainly found it.
harder than she had expected to accept the tempo of
worldly lives. . . .People irritated her. even Gertrude
did. She disliked being marked off as "holy or ”a nun."
Yet did she not feel different. superior? Yes. A
terrible admission. (NS. 106)
This resurgence of her ego is frightening. for it reminds
Anne that those years in the convent may have been spent
falsely.
How pride supports me. . . .How unbroken it is.
Have I really changed at all, can people change?
That death in life which she attempted: to refuse
false gods. to undo the self. . . .Was it not
imaginary? (NS. 110)
Her pride must be mastered if she is truly to enter the
contemplative life. Conversation with Guy will not help '
for that becomes a satisfying kind of intellectual play.
Neither will judging other people for that results in a
false sense of man's capabilities. The manner suggested

is a re-orientation process. whose beginning is small.

192

Anne picked up a stone. They were so similar. yet

so dissimilar. . . .The shapes. very like. were

never exactly the same. Each one. if carefully

examined, revealed some tiny significant individ-

uating mark. . . .Anne said to herself. what do my

thoughts matter. what do their details matter. . . .

Look at these stones. (NS. 107)—"—

She has been carelessly walking on these stones not realiz-
ing they have an existence of their own. They mean nothing
to her. and yet. ”There they are." (NS. 108) Throughout
the novel these small stones make their appearance. and
their ineluctible individuality continually prods Anne

to look at them.

There is an event in Anne's life that also forces her
mind outward. an event which strips Anne's mind of its
dogma. Jesus Christ comes to her in a vision. But this
vision rapidly is transformed into a visitation. For when
she wakes and walks into her kitchen. she sees him
physically there. Until this point. her encounter mirrors
Mary Magdeline's. The manner and mode of the meetings are
similar. only the result is different. For while Mary's
faith is increased. Anne's faith is negated. Mary's
triumphant risen Lord is replaced with a defeated Christ.
who has "a strange pallor. the pallor of something which
had long been deprived of light. . . .beardless. with
wispy blond hair. . . .thin and of medium height." (NS. 290)
Anne persists that he must be Christ. trying to prove it
with his crucifixion wounds. He does confirm the basic

fact of his historical death. "And they did not pierce
my hands. They drove nails through my wrists. The flesh

193

of my hands would have torn away." (NS. 291) but simul-
taneously denies it any lasting significance: "If there
were wounds they have healed. If there was suffering it
has gone and is nothing." (NS. 291) Christ also confirms
her need of salvation. But this salvation is not the dog-
matic one. When Anne asks. ”Sir. what shall I do to be
saved?" she receives the same kind of answer that the
rich young ruler received from Christ. She. too. is given
a particular command. "You must do it all yourself. you
know.” (NS. 291) and equally with the ruler cringes at
the thought of fulfilling it. She. too. had thought
that salvation was what the dogma said it was. But now
She hears 9

"As for salvation. anything you can think about

it is as imaginary as my wounds. I am not a magician.

I never was. You know what to do. Do right. refrain

from wrong. (NS. 292)
Christ even further particularizes his command. He shows
her a flat grey stone but refuses to declare its meaning.
to give Anne the "miracle" she desires. Consistently
Jesus turns the dogma into the particular. ”You must be
the proof. The work is yours." (NS. 292) However. the
command is too great. for Anne cannot endure the loss
of her dogma.

She took a staggering step forward and tried to

touch his arm with her right hand. He moved back

and one of her fingers just brushed the rolled-

up sleeve of his shirt. she felt the texture

of the rough material. Then she felt a searing

pain in her hand and her eyes closed. (NS. 293)

When Anne returns to consciousness and sees only the

stone. her mind begins to work against the authenticity

194

of the visitation. However. her body forces her mind
to accept the reality: "one of the fingers on her right
hand was raw. the skin abrased. as if it had been burnt.
She gazed at it." (NS. 294) Anne has been personally
touched by Christ. He is her Christ. not part of a vast
dogmatic tradition which she must join. There is a dif-
ference between this personal view and a subjective per-
spective. and this distinction will mark the manner in
which the allegorist approaches his object too. The
personal perspective looks outside itself. It attempts
to use all of its senses to describe the exact outlines
of the object in sight. A subjective perspective. on the
other hand. re-writes the object in terms of the ego's
needs. Attention to the details of the visitation renew
in Anne a desire for worship and prayer. the nature of
which is "quiet. wordless and blank." (NS. 323) This turning
toward the particular is the kind of outward movement
that the true Murdochian contemplative must have. In the
light of her personal visitation. Anne is able to look at
her last conversation with Guy and say.

Perhaps he had simply wanted to say certain words

aloud to somebody: justice. purgatory. suffering.

death. He had wanted to feel that their precise

meaning was there somewhere. kept safe by someone.

even just at one moment existent in thought. (NS. 241)
For a friend. then. Anne can allow that individual's
particularity to exist: he can be through her.

But for Tim. Anne's attitude remains inflexible.

She is never surprised at unpleasant revelations about

195
him. Only as she meditates on her Christ does this
attitude change. For that meditation causes her to separate
the institutional Christ from her personal one. As she
looses her hold upon the historical doctrines. she is con-
fronted with.
. . .only a man hanging up in unspeakable bleeding
anguish. of which for the first time she was able
to grasp the details. She felt appalled and sick:
and with the loss of that old safety. morally taint-
ed and astray. . . .She had gained pleasure from
thinking of Tim and Daisy as corrupt and evil. (NS. 355)
To see the detail is to see the human and that must bring
about a change in attitude toward all persons. That is
not an easy task. but one the contemplative finds
necessary.
Her unbroken pride had separated her from Gertrude.
her vanity had nearly drowned her in Cumbria. .
Why had she not imagined Daisy's loneliness. . . .
Anne had been too absorbed in her own hopes. . .
to have any thought to spare for catastrophes which
her selfless masochistic morality might be bringing
about in Daisy's life. (NS. 495)
Anne is seeing how it is that her pride has prevented
her from seeing other people. Just as Michael in The Bell
faced his pride. so Anne is facing hers. She makes many
discoveries about herself: her falling in love with the
Count had been totally selfish. "she had not been interested
in his interest in Christ. only in his interest in her."
(NS. 495: her noble thoughts about being an "anchoress"
in the world were mere illusions: in fact. every move
that she has made since leaving the convent has been self-

serving. What can possibly be left after this kind of

self-evaluation? That is. how is it possible to be good?

196

Michael thought that fulfilling duties and recognizing
the reality of the Mass was the way. but Anne goes be-
yond that. To fulfill duty? Yes. but with the knowledge
that one is probably doing so for selfish reasons. To
deny self? Yes. but with the knowledge that to do so will
probably be impossible. To believe in eternal structures?
Yes. but with the knowledge that humans can never truly
know much about those structures. This is the allegorical
attitude for it recognizes its limitations. Mainly what
humans have is the here and now. Anne reaches in her
purse and touches the "elliptical grew stone. slightly
chipped at one end. which her Visitor had shown to her and
left behind him as a sign." (NSm 499) This stone is her
sign. not the world's. It is a private showing. one that
speaks to her of the smallness of human endeavor. that
reminds her of the failure of Christ's mission.

He was a failure. a pathetic deluded disappointed

man who had come to an exceptionally sticky end. . . .

Could she relive his journey and his passion while

knowing that he was after all not God? (NS. 500)

There are no dogmas left for Anne. no permanent
background against which or upon which Anne may work.
She must erect both the background and the pattern: surely,
a more isolated position than Michael's. He at least had
the sacrament of the Mass left. What sacrament does Anne
have? For Murdoch a sacrament "provides an external visible
place for an internal invisible act of the spirit."12

And for Anne that sacrament is love. a love that must

enact both sides of the relationship. This doesn't

197

gggp exceptionally harsh. it ig harsh. For under these
conditions there is no place for the ego to hide. no
resting point about which it can gather its consolations.
no center for it to act from. For the ego there is only
knowledge. First. knowledge that life makes no sense:
and second. that one must live a good life.

At least she thought it is possible to help people.

to make them happier and less anxious. This is some-

how. I can't at the moment think how. both possible

and necessary because of those final endings. (NS. 501)
The first moment of knowledge could lead to despair. but
it is Murdoch's contention that man. even against his will.
"somehow" knows that eternal things exist. ‘From the
humblest recognition that some things really are better
than others comes a certainty that value exists not within
the individual but outside him.13 And this is the salvational
aspect of allegory. It is what makes it an optimistic
form. We are not embroiled in endless structures as de Man
insists or limited by the latest theological symbol as
Jameson's History would suggest. Moral action. then. is
not only possible but a constant choice that each person
makes. Anne's Christ is real. his objective existence
and her love of him. however failed on both sides. offers
a method of living a good life.

Anne's sacrament of love. an act in which she con-
structs both sides. is somehow given meaning in the face
of death. Like Michael before her. her confrontation

with death. first in Guy's physical death and, second. in

the death of herself. brings her to a mystical assurance

198

that virtuous action is the way. Anne strives to attain
the good. something that has a ”metaphysical position but
no form." 1“

Murdoch presents an austere picture. stringent in its
claims and noble in its outlines. For it claims that we
can seek others and not ourselves. that we can be realistic
to the point of personal painfulness. that we can "cease"
to be in the ego-ridden self. and that we can know some-
thing of eternal structures. This outline is distinguished
by love. a term whose premise is variety. That is. love
gives us the ability to see the particulars of another person.
to see his unique place in the world.

Something happens after a prolonged and continuous
reading of Murdoch's works. The temptation to string
events together. to type—cast characters. to explain the
significance of a work fades and the sheer joy of reading
about and contemplating such a variety of individuals
emerges. Accidental? No. an adjunct to the allegorical
structure. For allegory is the mode that allows the
particularity of others to stand: it alone offers a method
of seeing their true outlines. pg; Philosopher's Pupil
does not disappoint these expectations but ingeniously
creates a crowded world of individuals. all of whom vie

for attention. The ”purple Prolixity"15

of its prose and
the ”harlequinade"16 of its characters' lives may be
intended as condemnations by critics but seen in the

light of Murdoch's belief in the moral reality of the

199
particular. its expansiveness stands as proof of the fun-
damental value of human life. The details of the novel
will speak for themselves.
A few minutes before his brainstorm. or whatever it
was. took place. George McCaffrey was having a quarrel
with his wife. It was eleven o'clock on a rainy March
evening. They had been visiting George's mother. Now
George was driving along the quayside. taking the
short-cut along the canal past the iron foot-bridge.
It was raining hard. The malignant rain rattled on
the car like shot. Propelled in oblique flurries it
assaulted the windscreen. obliterating in a second
the frenetic strivings of the windscreen wipers. Little
demonic faces composed of racing raindrops appeared
and vanished. The intermittent yellow light of the
street lamps. illuminating the grey atoms of the
storm. fractured in sudden stars upon the rain-
swarmed glass. Bumping on cobbles the car hummed and
drummed. (PP. 1)
This opening paragraph contains several characteristics
to be noted. First. the details are used to form short
descriptive sentences that are reminiscient of latter
portions of Under the Net. There. Jake used this kind
of descriptive technique to see the outlines of the physical
world. Here. while the descriptive attitude is certainly_
one gesture. it is not the only one. The weighted
emotional terms--malignant. shot assaulted. obliterating.
frenetic. demonic. fractured. bumping--might well describe
a military action instead of a snow storm. Further. the
narrator readily admits his emotional bias when he ack-
nowledges in the first sentence his uncertainity about
George McCaffrey's action. The writer both admits he
was not an eye-witness and assaults the view that physical
things can be objectively described. This might not be

startling if the novel were written in the first person.

200
There the bias of the writer is expected. but this novel
is written in the supposedly ”objective" third person.

Well the narrator should confess his lack of know-
ledge. For the quarrel that he proceeds to recount in
detail from the intricate converstaion between George
and his wife to the car sliding in the quay is not even
based on first-hand observation. The writer's contact
with the scene is Stella's description: and as we come
to know. she has little claim to objectivity. However.
these details are all we have. That makes them important.
and the event that they comprise also makes them important.
This event will haunt George throughout the novel. and
the interpretation that he gives to its supposed details
will literally change his life.

George and his wife's quarrels are so habitual that
full attacks are no longer necessary. It is enough to
bring up names. phrases. snatches of old disagreements:
their minds and bodies can travel down those well-worn
tracks automatically. George strikes Stella. causing
the car to careen and then jumps out the door in order
to get away. At this point the car is perched on the edge
of an embankment.

He fell against the back of the car. bracing his

feet against the rough stones of the quay and trying

to push with open palms upon the back window. He

felt the rainy muddy glass. . . .

Then he fell headlong on the stones. Nothing was
there. no car. no figure. nothing. (PP.

The question is: did George deliberately push the car?

Are his intentions to do so proof enough? Or is the

201
testimony of the witness to his actions needed? What
George did or didn't do becomes a philosophical question
of the reliability of inner or outer proofs. Just as
allegory and symbolism do not neatly oppose one another.
inner and outer proofs will not be resolved in terms of
a simple opposition.)

The account offered is done so in terms of an absent
third person. a narrator who is never part of any direct
action. Part ii in the Prelude written by the narrator
introduces him to the reader.

I am the narrator. . . .This book is not about me

. . . .I shall call myself "N." But as far as this

drama is concerned I am a shadow. . . .I am an ob-

server. a student of human nature. moralist. a man:
and will allow myself here and there the discreet

luxury of moralizing. (PP. 16)

"N" makes it sound as if objectivity is possible. as if

a careful description of events and the people enacting.
them will contain a truthful account. It presumes a
shared world of fact capable of description in common
language. Murdoch. of course. accepts no such premise

and has on several occasions articulated her opposition.17
Further. the overt reference to moral activity corroborates
the suspicion. Morality simply defined as rules of con-
duct may work for a narrator who promises non-interference.
but morality defined as a unique world view (as Murdoch
does) will not so function. Morality on those terms

becomes not just a judgment of action but a recognition

that people act because they view the world in a certain

202
manner. Therefore to promise "discreet moralizing" is
to promise the impossible. The moral person knows it is
impossible to comment on only a part of another person.
recognizing that any comment carries an interpretation
of the other person's life. Thus. the opening scene.
indeed the entire novel. becomes "N“'s judgment on the
events and the characters who act in them.

Seen in this light. ”N"'s introduction to the town
and its people takes on curious overtones. ”N" purports
to offer an historical sketch of the town. It is after
all "N"'s town. Ennistone. He portrays its physical
setting. its community activities. its general atmosphere.
its remains of other inhabitants: the Roman Bridge. the
megaliths. the medieval village. the eighteenth century
structures. and the local celebrities. Ennistone's history
as a spa is recounted in minute detail as well as a
description of each building. The McCaffrey family history
is given. with information as far back as George's great-
great grandfather and as recent as George himself. All
of the chronicle is offered in an affable manner as
fact. but is permeated by oblique moral commentary. For
instance. when the narrator discusses the community life.
he mentions Ennistone's ”responsible citizens" being en-
gaged in ”worthwhile activities" (PP. 17) It looks as
if "N" is accounting for the context. But when he juxta-
poses "worthwhile citizens" with ”it is characteristic of

our town to have many of these" his ironic judgment is plain.

203
The chronicle then reveals its subjective bias.
For there is a duplicitous role to this narrator.
It displays itself in "N"'s unwillingness to say with
certainty that an event actually happened. In the first
paragraph. "N” qualifies George's action by calling it a
"brainstorm or whatever it was.” Later the narrator
scruplously informs the reader that there are "several
different versions" of the Fiona Gates' story as well
as a mis-understanding about the exact cause of George's
son's death. In many other incidents the narrator reveals
his unwillingness to close entirely any area of life.' This
attitude does not demonstrate weakness on his part. but
displays a certain generosity of spirit. thus allowing
him to really look at the other person. He says at
one point.
I confess that I cannot offer any illuminating
explanation. Every human being is different.more
absolutely different and peculiar than we can goad
ourselves into conceiving: and our persistent desire
to depict human lives as dramas leads us to see "in
the same light” events which may have multiple inter-
pretations and causes. (PP. 76)
What Story is the narrator telling? It may be George
McCaffrey's. In that case. the details of his back-
ground and present activities would be of some importance.
His thoughts about his wife. his teacher. and his family
would carry the main thrust of the novel's meaning. Or the
story may be about John.Robert Rosanov. In that case. his

history as a philosopher. his relations to his grand-

daughter Hattie. the manner in which he touches so many

204
lives would be of most importance. There is a "story”
about each of the novel's characters. an interest in
their particular minds that cannot be ignored. The narrator
does not favor one character over another. nor does he
elevate one at the expense of the other. This multiplicity
of story lines is a concrete example of allegory: it is a
purposeful structuring that forces the reader to choose.
This choice will involve taking on the moral viewpoint
of that character and so altering the perspective on
everyone else. In this novel. there is not a valorization
of one perspective as there is in other novels. ‘Tpg
Philosopher's Pppil makes all roles and choices available
to the reader. Even those roles and commitments of which
Murdoch elsewhere approves are singularly absent in this
novel. Readers are forced to declare themselves. And when
they admit an attraction for. or begin an examination of
one of the characters. they show their own areas of interest.
They also example a philosophical position that argues
meaning is conferred by the subject and not the object.
The narrator alludes to this in his description of George.
Calling him a violent man. "N" says.
The causes of a habit of violence are mysterious and
not often lucidly studied. since those who take an
intelligent interest in violent cases usually have
deep psychological reasons for preferring certain
explanations. (PP. 74)
Therefore. when I state that I am going to examine George

McCaffrey and John Robert Rosanov. I am already declaring

myself to be structuring Murdoch's world in terms what are

205
partially my own.

George is a violent man. a "fact" agreed upon by almost
everyone. His brother wants to give him electric shocks:
his sister-in-law. his mistress. and other townspeople want
to save him from himself: his teacher wants him to cease
existence: his wife wants him to conform to her idea of
manhood: even his mother wishes he weren't so impossible.
George crashes around. wishing he could drown the babies
in the pool. wishing he could kill wife and/or teacher.
wishing he could 393 out the sense that he has of himself.

However. George's understanding of himself is a dis-
continuous one. That is. his thinking reveals a different
man than the one who acts. and George is desparately trying
to unite the two. He specifically speaks of this two-
sided nature. "As on similar occasions in the past. he felt
a cleavage between himself and the George who did things."
(PP. 14) One manifestation of this tension can be seen
in his recurring fantasy about Stella. when he

Dreams. of drowning someone. as it might be Stella.

and burying the corpse in a wood and visiting the

uiet grave regularly. . .and no one ever suspected.

PP. 13)
The dream is to kill: what is the reality? When the accident
occurs during their argument. does he really try to kill
Stella? Does his intention to push the car count as an
actual thing? Does his mind's activity have substance.
or does only the overt act of pushing?

He kept on recalling the incident with the car.

He remembered the huge sickening sound of the car
entering the water. . . .But he could not clearly

206
see what had happened just before. Had he actually
ushed the car. could he have done that? Was he
simply imagining that he had put his hands on the
back window and braced his feet on the cobbled quay
and made the car move forward? Surely. that was
fantasy. . . .(PP. 357)
Since he can remember the intention with such lucidity.
perhaps it is only the act that is important for George.
Perhaps it is this side of the dichotomy that will confer
actuality for him. To put it this way is to invoke Murdoch's
entire investigation of the relationship between public

18 In conversation with John

action and private thought.
Robert Rosanov. George asks.

If I pushed the car does that mean I intended to

kill her? What was I thinking at just that moment? .

Did I intend to drive the car into the canal? (PP. 223)
He must know if he has done the action and needs to find
someone who observed the accident. At the same moment
when he was either pushing or not pushing the car. he
looked toward the bridge and "saw that there was a figure
on it. a tall figure in a long black coat.” (PP. 6) This
is the witness that George needs to find. For the other
person at the scene. Stella. refuses to give an answer.
When George asks her pointedly if he ”made” the accident
happen. she counters. "You mean you don't remember?" (PP. 505)
and then hastens to assure him that it was an accident. This
is directly opposite her assessment to "N."
N. "Like trying to kill you?"
S. "Well--he tried in a sense--but--"

"He pushed the car."

"Yes. I can still see so clearly his hands pressed
on the back window. . . .(PP. 371)

207
Here she admits in the only sense that is important to
George that he did try to kill her. If the public act
equals the inner intent to murder. then George is guilty.
However. George is not privy to this information and must
yet rely on the witness in the black coat.

George finds that Father Bernard is that witness and
asks if the priest saw what happened. Father Bernard
answers. ”You jumped out as the car went over the edge.

Of course you didn't try to push it. It was an accident."
(PP. 510) This answer does not relieve George. For if

he is to find meaning only in action. he has no reality yet.
He is still limited to the inner. still the man who must
prove his existence by an action.

This need for action can be seen in his relationship
with his former teacher John Robert Rosanov. Their
association encompasses many years and is marked by mutual
mis-understandings. John Robert dislikes George but denies
him any act. When accosted and goaded by George. John
Robert refuses to become involved on any level. Rosanov
ignores George. telling him their relationship has been
an illusion. George is obliged to agree with John Robert
and as a result redoubles his efforts to force John Robert
to act. Finally. the philosopher acts in the form of a
letter. one designed "to 22; George abSolutely. to exclude
him totally. . . ." (PP. 459) George's first reaction to
the letter is despair: he doesn't care to exist in a world

where he and John Robert have no connection. However.

208

a change in perspective causes George to view the letter
as a "merciful” climax to their long relationship. By this
act he has gotten beyond John Robert. Seemingly. George's
confidence in the reality-conferring rank of the act
has paid off. but there is a final test.

Stella tells George that he not only did not try
to kill her but that if he insists on leaving her. she
will go to Rosanov (She had been his student too.). Whereupon.
"George leapt to his feet. 'You'll talk to him about me. . . .
(PP. 524) Whether it is the denial of his action or the
thought that his relationship with John Robert could con-
tinue through Stella that sets George's mind to kill
Rosanov is not known. but he does purpose to do just
that. The mixing of thought and action remains in force.

George goes to John Robert's room and finds him
sleeping. He pushes the bed to the filled bath tub and
throws John Robert into the water. repeatedly pushing
his head under. Satisfied that he has killed John
Robert, George leaves thinking.

. . .this is the first day. the first hour. of the

new world in which everything will be entirely dif—

ferent. I have undergone a cosmic change. every

atom. every particle is changed. . .I have done

what I had to do. I have had the courage. the

devotion. to do it. (PP. 556)
By this act. done in full consciousness. George secures
his reality. But it is short-lived and lacking in the
relief that George imagined it would bring. For he has

neglected to take into account the moral side of man.

Thus. after his act. he is unprepared for the remorse

209
he feels. "He felt the pain beginning: it was starting
to spread inside him. the crippling awful pain of absolute
remorse. . . ." (PP. 556)

Before his act George saw only its symbolic nature.
only its abstracted and synthesized meaning. He failed
to understand that "It is retrospectively that we give
the thing a structure."19 This quote has a double reference.
Within the novel it is ascribed to John Robert: outside
it comes from Murdoch's own.monograph to the Aristotelian
Society. "Nostalgia for the Particular.” One of its
concerns is the manner in which man bestows meaning.
Murdoch contends that the symbolic method which claims to
apprehend significances immediately in actuality assigns
meaning to an experience after the fact. This means in
terms of the limited point here that it is man thinking
who assigns meaning. not man acting. This is the crux of ,
George's problem: he has assumed that action is the way
to meaning and is devastated when he finds the opposite
to be true. Thus. if he thought he had pushed the car.
that was the important point. The intention impels the
action.

Therefore. the ensuing confusion as to whether John
Robert commited suicide or was murdered is not important.
Indeed. all the ambiguities of an event are not important.
What is being falsely compounded is the difference between
the clarity of an experience and the clarity of a concept.

Murdoch argues that an experience may be clear in that

 

210
its physical elements can be vivid and non-ambiguous.
but the observer may choose to describe it from one of

2° Thus. while Stella may admit that

several angles.
George physically pushed the car. from her point of view
he did not intendto kill her. And the priest. trying
as he was to give the answer that would "save" George.
also denies George's action. thus hoping to deny the
intention. Facts never exist by themselves: they are
always used. What is needed. then. is a self-conscious
understanding of the role that concepts play. George is
not simply a sum of his actions. and no belated commentary
on those actions can produce the man in his fulness.
Neither is man simply a mind. as the character of
John Robert Rosanov demonstrates. He is first intro-
duced when "N" remarks that John Robert is one of the
famous persons of Ennistone. a philosopher of international
repute. The "fact" of his existence causes different
reactions in different persons: Brian McCaffrey describes
him as a "charlatan". Alex McCaffrey "fell madly in love"
as did Tom McCaffrey. the priest. Pearl Scotney and probably
several other unnamed people. He has a powerful person-
ality. one that is totally committed to the mind and its
functions. so that he judges people by how well they ”do"
philosophy. It is on these terms that he dismisses George
from his life and recognizes Stella's merits. Joyce

Carol Oates has observed that John Robert is reminiscent

of earlier ”enchanter” figures. such as Hugo Belfounder

211
or Mischa Fox.21 But there is a gap that separates the
personalities of the earlier enchanters from John Robert.
and that is the ironical contempt in which he holds
himself. For when the author opens John Robert's mind.'
John Robert was tired of his mind. He was tired of
his strong personality and his face and the effect
he had upon people. He often thought about death. But
something still remained which bound him to the world.
It was not philosophy. . . .
Now every morning as he assumed the burden of conscious-
ness he reflected upon its strangeness: the mystery of
mind. so general and so particular. . . .All those days
and nights he had spent with the many and the one. how
little wisdom they had brought him. now when thoughts
were changing into living sense. and appearance and
reality contended inside his frame. . . .a large pain.
The point of solipsism. often missed. was that it
abolished morality. So if the pain he felt seemed like
a spiritual pain. must he not be the victim of a mistake?
(PP. 130)
The picture offered here is not the one of a confident
man pursuing his ideal. In fact. John Robert describes
himself as having long been beyond that. of having absorbed
all theories. constructed his own and found even that lacking.
His theory is deficient not just because a belief in the
ideal could not be maintained. Now he must relinquish
his belief in the mind that construes its own ideal. To
remember the point at which Murdoch left Anne Cavidge will
put John Robert's problem in context. She faces her life
as a contemplative not with the confidence that she can
necessarily build her own religion but with the confidence
that it is a worthwhile activity of the mind. John Robert
began his career at the level of Anne's confidence and

has come to see.

 

212

. . .it all as though some substance. . .had
rotted away into scraggy fibres: and beyond was
chaos. the uncategorized manifold. the ultimate~
jumble of the world. before which the metaphysican
covers his eyes. (PP. 131) \e

The mind as an instrument seeking reality has not failed
John Robert: in fact. his mind's work is forcefully
sketched. Its rigorous logic. its desire for simplicity.
and its ceaseless activity are made plain. But his mind

has brought him the knowledge that reality is formless.
Before confronting the effect that this knowledge has on
Rosanov. it will be educative to see the rudiments of his
mind's activity in a philosophical conversation. He selects
the priest as a conversant. and they begin with the subject
of God.

J.R."Do you believe in God?"
F.B."No."
"Come. anything counts as belief these days!"
"No . 0'
”So you're an odd sort of priest.”
"Yes . N
"You reject God?"
"Yes.
"It is not enough to reject him. you must hate him. "
"Do you hate him?"
”I abominate the concept."
Father Bernard said.”So do I." but in a whisper.
"Why do you whisper. do you think he's listening?"
"I don't believe in a personal God.”
"You mean 'God' isn't a name?"
"But I believe in a spiritual reality. "
"What does 'reality' mean here. what is 'spiritual',
could you give examples?” (PP.185)

The conversation is nearly a parody of the drive for
conceptual clarity which excludes emotion. believing that
specified language may bring forth at least textual if

not transcendent truth. In the same manner the two discuss

salvation. Christ. religion. suffering. narcissim. morality,

 

 

213

faith. love--always in accurate ordinary language with
the purpose of giving form to those concepts. In Father
Bernard's case the most important concept is love. de-
fined as "Ioving others as ChristeeI mean loving Christ
in them." (PP. 191) Such love verifies its existence by
the sheer persistence of love in the world. Morality is
John Robert's most important concept. defined as a lived
"ambiguity" which is verified by man's innate sense of
duty.

However. it is exactly this concept of morality that
causes his problems. For if everything is ambiguous
how can the particular move to the universal. And if
the particular does not transform itself into the general.
how does any meaning exist? As a test for his own theory
of how the particular and universal unite. John Robert
postulates the act of suicide. His movement from intention
to act sets him opposite George. and the mis-match between
them runs throughout the novel. Their reunion is exemplary.
George visits the philosopher at home. where their con-
versation is a marked contrast to the one between John
Robert and the priest. George begins with a personal
comment. "I'm glad to see you.” (PP. 141) and tries to
discuss personal matters with him. None of this is
successful and so he becomes even more personal. There is
yet no response from John Robert. Finally George launches
into an emotional appeal. "You stole my reality. you stole

my consciousness. you're the only person who can give them

214
back to me." (PP. 145) Still John Robert does not
respond insisting that there is "no structure here to
make sense of the language you are using. there is no
context for any conversation between us." (PP. 145)
John Robert's definition of human relationships does not
include George's emotion and his appeal therefore goes
unanswered. Incapable of conversing in the manner that
John Robert does allow. George retreats. This pattern of

emotional appeal and refusal continues throughout the r

 

remainder of their meetings. as
The final communication between the two men is the
aforementioned letter. And while it will never be known
if the letter caused George to kill John Robert. it is
certain that George never knew either what caused John
Robert to write the letter. For that involves a relation-
ship with his grand-daughter that even he can hardly admit
to. She has come to stay at Alex McCaffrey's ”Slipper
House.” Through a combination of complex circumstances
a drunken group of young people invites itself to the
house. The events that transpire are very confused and
equally unplanned. While several confrontations occur.
nothing of any substance happens. The particular event
- that causes John Robert's jealousy is George's part in.
the ”Slipper House RiotI" The paper reports that George
broke in the house and "did something." Immediately
John Robert believes that his grand-daughter has been

”compromised.” Thus. he writes the letter to George

215

intending it to signal that ”he had thereby finally
finished with George and could forget him." (PP. 434)

Having settled George's position in his life. John
Robert turns to the problem of the riot itself. His
handling of that situation reveals the inadequacies of a
man who depends solely on thinking. He determines to
treat the riot as a philosophical problem and employs
his usual method of socratic questioning. Just as
he coerced the priest into definition and exemplification.
so he approaches Hattie. ' ‘
J.R."I mean--what you read in the paper--was it true?“
H. "No. of course not! It was horrible spiteful journalism--

it upset us very much."

"So George McCaffrey was not in this house?"

"Well. he was. but--”

"So it was true. an some of it was true?"

"Yes. but--” (PP. 442)
This mode of questioning continues and the mass of damning
evidence against Hattie builds: George was in the house.
Tom was invited in. Pearl did leave her alone. Hattie did
tell someone John Robert wanted her to become acquainted
with Tom-—all and more true "facts" about the riot. This
pitch of interrogation continues until John Robert's
bias cannot be missed. He is convinced something terrible
occured during the riot and his mind will not be satisfied
until Hattie confesses. However. there is no terrible
secret to reveal and Hattie cries. "Oh I can't explain
exactly. but it wasn't anyone's fault--" (PP. 444)
H. "What's wicked is that article that you're so obsessed

with. you got all that stuff out of the article. it's

all just spiteful lies. you haven't proof. Well. have
you?

216

J.R."Strong possibilities amount to proof.”
H. YPerhaps they do in philosophy. but I prefer to believe

what I can see clearly."

"That's in philosoph too. But what you see clearly can

be false!” (PP, 467
The account of the riot indicates that John Robert's
interpretation of the facts is not correct. He is
confused. full of prejudice and judgments from other
situations. He was not at the riot nor is he now going
to seriously attend to the testimony of one who was there.
Tom offers to tell the truth and John Robert says. ”The
details don't matter. It is all sufficiently bad to be
fatal." (PP. 421) John Robert's prejudice is against
detail: he prefers the fabrications of theory. And this
prejudice has serious consequences. For the lack of
attention to detail. the inability to see that philosophy
is tied to detail. causes him to miss the human element
in a given theory. He has spent his life attending to
theoretical configurations. believing that they somehow
outline the face of the universal. He does not under-
stand that the abstract theory was once a particular in
a man's mind. John Robert has long desired. fgq‘ppipg
gpwp nothing 233 Egg ppppg. . . .The crystalline truth.
not a turgid flood of mucky half-truths not even half-
truths. but desecrating obfuscations. harryings. muddyings.
taunting vilifications of the truth." (PP. 132) He has
never attained that goal and his actions indicate a

realization that he never will. Not only is the object

non-existent. but also the desire itself is fostered by

217
a limited mind.

If Murdoch is vilifying the man of thought. what is
it that she promotes? It has been speculated that she
puts forward a long familiar Platonic argument seen in
the person of the novel's survivior. Father Bernard.22
His Platonism is seen in a letter to "N." In that letter
he espouses an idealism that does attempt to trace the
form of the good. However. if attention is given to
the details of Father Bernard's ideal. an unusual kind
of structure emerges. Here are some excerpts:

What do I preach? That there is no God. that even

the beauty of Christ is a snare and a lie. "Nothing

exists except God and the soul:” and when one has
understood that. one knows that there is no God.

For what is real and true look at these stones.

this bread. this spring of water. these sea waves.

this horizon with its pure untroubled line. . . .

I cannot go on. It is sacrilege to utter words

which are bound to be mis-understood. . . .

There is no beyond. there is only here. the
infinitely small, infinitely great and utterly
demanding present. (PP. 570771)

The priest is not attempting to move beyond this world
into the realm of forms. He argues that the details

of the physical are the spiritual truths. Contemplation
of the particular does not lead to the mystical. but
reveals the significance of that particular alone.

If indeed we consider how contemplation may dis-

cover (or create) an immediate form within its

object we may even feel it possible to re-estab-
lish the significance of the world by turning all

experience into contemplation. 23
This kind of contemplation guarantees both the reality
of the particular and the mind observing it. By letting

go of a need to generalize experience. by allowing the

218

full existence of others. Father Bernard understands
not only the inarticulate privacy of our world but also
its truthfulness.

It seems as if Father Bernard's kind of contemplation
lies close to the symbolic. especially when he declares
it "sacrilege" to utter words which are bound to be
mis-understood. Perhaps a vision of the particular is
what Murdoch is suggesting. But her feelings against the
false synthesizing movement of the symbolic action are
too deeply held to allow such an interpretation. She is
acknowledging the limits of language. Surely. John Robert
‘should have realized that words could not contain the
whole of any experience. For the proof of the experience
is the experience itself. A paltry explanation does not
preclude the existence of a rich experience: in fact.
acknowledgment of the experience's paltriness leads to
simultaneous acknowledgment of the experience's depth.
Thie acknowlegment of lack is a distinction of allegory.
whici dialectically moves from the level of the particular
to the universal. Murdoch's contemplation thus offers
a place for the eternal to be represented. Her method
effectively silences the romantic's desire for the beyond
by demonstrating that meaning is found here and now. This
is not a validation of the ego. for in this structure
the self does not look inward.

But how is it that the other thing can be justly seen?

To say something will be explained would not be impossible

219

if contexts could be established. But to say jpgp imposes
a moral judgment whose limitations cannot be established.
For when Father Bernard declares that Rosanov failed
because ”Metaphysics and the human sciences are made
impossible by the pgnetration.p£ morality ippg‘ppg moment
32 moment conduct 3; ordinary lifg: the understanding of
this fact lg religion." (PP. 571) he is making the obser-
vation that all human endeavor is moral. Objectivity
is not only impossible. it is not desireable. Throughout
the novel this lack of objectivity is consistently
underscored. We live in a world'that is fundamentally
ambiguous because its "facts" are interpreted by unique
minds.

. . .we confer meaning not only upon the ethical

and religious systems. but upon the physical world

too. in that we see it as the correlative of our

needs and intentions. 24
What remains? Perhaps only failure: the failure of
George's symbolic act which needed a meaning derived
from an inward structure. or the failure of John Robert's
life which needed a meaning derived from an outward
structure. It is. however. possible that Murdoch is
proposing that meaning is fundamentally discrete. It
isn't that meaning is anti-order: in fact. it consists
of separation and order as a primary activity. But it
does recognize that the resultant structure is necessarily
unique. It is not intended as a pattern for anyone else

to appropriate. just as it is not intended as a true

 

220

outline of the universal. It is intended to display the

 

workings of a mind upon a detail which leads at once to
rigidity (It is after all phig pattern.) and flexibility
(It is only pp; pattern.) Murdoch's allegorical structure
is. as promised. not the easy opposition of inner and
outer proof. No such separation can be made by the sub-
jective mind. Its knowledge is necessarily ambiguous.
However. it is based on the substantial nature of truth.

so that the mind can confidently look outside itself. Such

 

a guarantee offers the only possibility for lasting meaning.

 

NOTES

1This concept is found in Murdoch's. "The Sublime
and The Good." p. 55: "Revisited." p. 271: Sovereigpty.
E. 86: and "The Novelist as Metaphysician." Egg Listener
3 (March 16. 1950): 474.

2Murdoch. Sovereignty. p. 72.

3Murdoch. Fire. p. 36.

“Ibido! p. 720
5Baldanza. p. 168.

6Murdoch. Fire. p. 66.

7Ibid., p. 84.
8Ibid.. p. 87.

9Dipple. p. 313.

10Murdoch. "The Sublime and The Good." p. 52.

11Murdoch. Sovereignty. p. 81.

lzIbido’ p. 69.

13Ibid.. p. 61.

1“'Ibidg p. 73.

15David Lehman. "Water Torture." Newsweek (June 20,
1983): 75-

16Joyce Carol Oates. "love and Other Illusions." New
York Times Book Review (July 17. 1983): 20.

17This opposition to common language is found in Murdoch's.
"Vision and Choice in Morality." Dreams gpg Self—Knowled e.
Aristotelian Society. Supplementary Volumne 30 (1956). p.
39: "Metaphysics and Ethics." Egg Nature pf Meta h sics.
ed. D.F. Pears (London: Macmillan and 50.. Ltd.. 1957). p.
102: "Revisited." p. 254: and Sovereignty, pp. 11-28.

18This concept is found in Murdoch's. "Nostalgia for
the Particular.” Proceedings 9; the Aristotelian Society
52 (1952): 246.

19Ibid.. p. 259.

221

 

 

222

20Ibid.. p. 252.

21Oates. p. 21.

22Ibid., p. 20.

23Murdoch. "Nostalgia." p. 256.

2L""Murdoch. "Novelist." p. 476.

 

 

Conclusion

Conclusions are nearly as difficult as beginnings.
For just as the beginning of a piece is arbitrary. so
the ending is no less arbitrary. And while I can not
simply stop. allowing the work to wither. it is not
possible to properly conclude either. That "properly" '
in the laws of rhetoric demands a judgmental position.
one that brings to maturity questions raised at the outset
of this work. In the writings of Iris Murdoch this is not
an easy task. For keeping in mind her dislike of closure
and of rounding off a situation will make necessary an
‘adjustment of the usual attitude. Form may be the great
temptation of art as it falsely gives pattern to events
and confidence to their arranger. but just as Murdoch must
admit the necessity of form for art's existence. so there
is a necessity here for a formal conclusion.

This dissertation has pursued the main question of
whether or not allegory can be considered a viable mode
of expression. It has examined the distinction between
allegory and symbolism finding that adherence to either
aesthetic is premised on exclusive theories of knowledge.
I have argued that symbolism relies on a'subjectivist
theory of knowledge that by the twentieth century can
no longer claim to transcend humanity. Symbolism has
become bogged down by its own inwardness. Allegory. on

the other hand. is a mode of expression based on an

223

224
objectivist theory of knowledge. And while post—modern
allegorical theory no longer believes in an eternal
and immutable source of knowledge. thus lacking the naivete
of traditional allegory. it continues to believe in an
outside source of truth. I have argued that man's
relationship to this truth is ambiguous. made so by his
subjectivity. For post-modern forms of allegory do not
claim to set up true outlines of a spiritual world. nor
do they claim to present truth. They are representations
of truth and as such perform two functions: (1) the
necessary use of detail to ensure the value of the physical
world. and (2) their hollow structure to ensure the
otherness of truth. Because of the objective nature of
these runes and equally because of their implication in
subjectivity. they become signs for men to read. Their
paucity becomes their strength just as their multiplicity
becomes their claim to truth.

So it is that when the critics in Chapter II complain
that Murdoch writes allegory they are Saying more than
they know. Although they argue that their positions
toward her works are objective. they demonstrate in their
use of the term allegory the symbolist's abhorence for it.
Thus. their positidns are proprietary in nature and already
prejudiced to find only symbolic wholes. When they
examine her work and find bits and pieces that refuse
to settle into a relationship of parts to whole. they

necessarily judge that work to be inferior. I argued

 

225
that what was needed to correct this perspective is not
just an inclusion of narrative movement. for that merely
ignores the problem. but a re-orientation of vision.
The object of the vision is to be the author's work
itself. and the approach to that object is to be a
careful examination of the detail.

In that spirit. I offered a methodology of examination.
one that focused on two moments: the centrifugal and the
centripetal. While the first one must concentrate on the
detail of the author's work. the second moment concentrates
on the purposes of that work's structure. By remaining
aware of the oppositional pull that inheres in these
moments it becomes possible to see that Murdoch's abundant
detail mirrors the contingency of human life. while her
structures are runes meant to be read as signs. For the
meaning in any allegorical structure is necessarily an
assigned one. Thus. an examination of Upggp Egg Np:
reveals a structure that explains the manner in which
man is to become aware of the detail that surrounds him.
It figures the painful process of the ego looking out-
ward and seeing that something other than itself has
existence. The novel's structure also causes reflection
on the uneasy duality in language. between its need to'
say an experience for that experience to exist and the
distortion that occurs in that saying. No resolution
is offered for that duality but at least its position is

articulated. The Bell demonstrates that while man can.

 

226
use of detail he notices as he wishes. to do so is an
act of illusion. As the reader follows Michael's recog-
nition of his deceptive ego. he is educated in the many
guises that the ego can affect. These powerful masks are

reflected again in Bruno's Dream. But there the detail

 

asserts its own existence and refuses to be subsumed

into any one person's mind. By using several characters
and presenting them in disjunctive moments. the author
confirms that the only manner in which the ego may see

its true outline is against detail. The structure is a
treatise on this subject which uses as its most powerful
subject the ego's recognition of its own extinction. The
open-ended nature of the treatise is repeated more strongly
in Egg Blggk Prince. where its hesitancies of beginning
and ending force the reader to reflect on the arbitrary
nature of assigning significance to any detail. .Significance
comes entirely from its interpreter. Thus. Bradley's
movement from silence to speech figures as a just re-
cognition of the interpreter's importance. It is also

a confirmation of language's limitations yet its unique-
ness. This strength of language together with its
weakness demonstrates the manner in which man uses the
-detail around him and is in turn used by the detail. The
working out of this equation is shown in Nppg gpg Soldiers.
There. the method that Anne and Guy use to interpret the
detail reflects their own needs. The individuals in that

novel create their own structures and play out their

 

 

227

implications. However. there is equal attention to the
detail. Thus. the author's emphasis on it causes reflection
as to the way in which a careful contemplation of the other
can bring true outlines of self. Anne's re-orientation of
vision comes not from her working on the facts but from
the facts working on her. These facts because of their use
by man. remain implicated in his subjectivity. and no-
where is this more clearly seen than in‘Tpg Philosopher's
‘Egpil. There the structure stands for man's predicament:
his placement in the world makes it impossible for him to
move beyond it. Murdoch's structure forces the reader.
to not only recognize this as the character's dilemma
but also as his own. Thus. the vantage point from which
one interprets this novel reveals the interpreter's own
bias. And rather than this structure becoming yet one
more subtly articulated argument for symbolism. its
recognition that it is only one interpretation among
many secures for it an allegorist's position.

These reflections are not intended to sum up Murdoch.
nor do they intend a right conclusion. They are written
to indicate the manner in which the detail and the abstract
interrelate to bring into being a structure. That these
structures are allegories is the point of their articulation:
that they prove the viability of allegory is the argument
of the dissertation. But what can not be argued and must
not be missed for its importance in Murdoch's thought.

is the moral cast of these structures. They are not

 

 

228
created to exist in isolation or to be examples of beauty
or to exercise the intellect: rather. they are created
to illuminate the manner in which man may become aware
of something other than himself. Whether it is through
creation of art. or suffering without thrills. or death
without consolation. or the effects of wandering causes.
or the importance of the virtuous life. or the impossibility
of transcending subjectivity. Murdoch's structures. which
can be given many meanings. are written to remind man
that his existence is a moral one. To prefer allegory
as the form most able to fulfill man's desire for mean-
ingful existence. we must with Jacob Bohme prefer

"the value of sound over silent profundity." 1

NOTES

1Benjamin. Origin. p. 201.

229

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A Fairly Honorable Defeat. Middlesex: Penquin Books Ltd..
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”Hegel in Modern Dress.” The New Statesman and Nation 53
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Henry and Cato. Middlesex: Penquin Books Ltd.. 1976.
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"Knoging fine Void." Spectator 197 (November 2.1956):
13-1

"Mass. Might. and Myth." Spectator 209 (September 7. 1962):
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"The Novelist as Metaphysician." The Listener 43 (March 16.

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The Sandcastle. London: Chatto and Windus. 1957.

Sartre: The fiomantic Rationalist. Cambridge: Bowes and
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The Sea. The Sea. Middlesex: Penquin Books. 1980.
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