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A CASE STUDY OF TELEVISION NEWS,
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LEONARDO ALBERTO SALAZAR

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**DISCOURSES ON TERRORISM AND NICARAGUA:
A CASE STUDY OF TELEVISION NEWS, IDEOLOGY,
AND CULTURAL IMPOVERISHMENT**

by

Leonardo Alberto Salazar

A DISSERTATION

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ABSTRACT

DISCOURSES ON TERRORISM AND NICARAGUA: A CASE STUDY OF TELEVISION NEWS, IDEOLOGY, AND CULTURAL IMPOVERISHMENT

By

LEONARDO ALBERTO SALAZAR

In this study I argue that the commercial TV discourse on terrorism and Nicaragua complements the language of the US Administration and attempt to explain how this complementarity is accomplished. In doing this, I use Habermas' social theory to derive analytical procedures for the analysis of the discourse and try to demonstrate the practical usefulness of these procedures to differentiate alternative discourses.

In the application of these analytical procedures to commercial TV discussions about the March 1986's House vote on Contra aid and the alleged Nicaraguan invasion into Honduras, I find that the commercial TV discourse on terrorism and Nicaragua in fact complements the Administration's language. This TV discourse is guided by what I call alienation rules, rules which are constituted by exclusionary configurations of meaning, a strategic logic, and an ideological WE-THEY dichotomy.

These rules shape a commercial TV discourse that excludes from public discussion both alternative forms of analysis and important forms of terrorism used by the US and allied governments and groups in Nicaragua and Central America; that poses practical political questions about

US-Nicaraguan peoples' relations in terms of choosing effective strategies for US (US and allies) to win THEM (Sandinistas, terrorists); and that contributes to obfuscate public discussion of terrorist practices of groups such as the Contras. Further, as long as this discourse follows what I call the giddiness of the Administration discourse and operates within its permissible language, it assumes a plastic character. Because of this, I claim that this discourse is ideological and that it helps, and is an expression of, processes of cultural impoverishment in the US.

In examining instances of public TV discourse on terrorism and Nicaragua, I find support to argue for the concrete practical usefulness of the analytical procedures to differentiate alternative discourses. Further, I suggest that this analysis points to the possibility of both institutionalizing an international public sphere and realizing an emancipatory potential of TV.

Finally, I suggest that this study illustrates contemporary expressions of the alienation inherent in the division of intellectual from manual labor and contributes to bring closer to historical concreteness Habermas' theoretical work.

To Claudia who knows what is to be silenced
To Juan Pablo who says he will not be silenced

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I would like to thank Thomas McCarthy for having made available to me the manuscripts of his translation of volume two of Habermas' communicative action theory.

In discussing previous proposal and draft, Jack Bain and Gerald Miller offered suggestions that were important for the final presentation of this dissertation. I am indebted to them.

I appreciate the help of Joseph Straubhaar in reading and discussing previous drafts and in formulating various recommendations that certainly helped the overall structuring of this work.

My interaction with Richard Peterson deeply marked what I consider to be my most productive learning during the years at Michigan State University. Through his teaching he showed me the way to intellectual independence, critical scrutiny, and self-confidence. Through his friendship I experienced solidarity. In dialoguing and working with him I found intellectual guidance, motivational support, and laborious supervision to finish this work. I could not expect more.

The whites told only one side.
Told it to please themselves.
Told much that is not true.
Only his own best deeds,
only the worst deeds of the indians,
has the white man told...

(Yellow Wolf, Nez Perce)

The tradition of the oppressed teaches
us that the "state of emergency" in
which we live is not the exception but
the rule.

(Walter Benjamin, Illuminations)

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Since 1981 the US Administration has repeatedly claimed that Nicaragua constitutes a threat to the security of the US and the whole continent, that Nicaragua is a terrorist country, that the Nicaraguan Government is a totalitarian regime, that it exports violence to other Central American countries, and that it is an enclave of communist Russia at the heart of America. These claims have been constantly challenged by different groups, scholars, international organizations such as Amnesty International and others, and by a significant number of Latin American governments. Further, it has been claimed that the US Administration's actions in Central America, e.g., the mining of the Nicaragua's harbors and the involvement of the CIA in the Contra war against Nicaragua at a time when the US Congress expressly prohibited this type of actions, in fact constitute a violation and repudiation of democratic norms. However strong these challenges and the contradictions embodied in these claims and counter-claims have been, while watching commercial TV network news I have noticed that it tends not to show positions that critically challenge the US Administration's claims about Central

America and Nicaragua in particular. Chiefly the US Administration claims are presented in these instances of TV networks news.

Motivating and Limiting Elements of the Study

In the fall of 1984, the President of Venezuela came to the United States. In his welcoming speech, President Reagan mentioned that Venezuela was the oldest democracy in South America. Further, he drew a parallel between Venezuela, El Salvador, and the Contras (a group which aims to overturn the Nicaraguan Government) to say that they represented the hope for freedom in the continent. In addition, Mr. Reagan claimed that it was necessary for the democratic people of the Americas to combat the communist, terrorist government of Nicaragua.

The remarks of the Venezuelan President were not broadcast along with President Reagan's. The next day, the New York Times briefly reported the moderate yet critical nature of the Venezuelan's speech. For instance, the Venezuelan President neither accepted Mr. Reagan's parallel nor endorsed the view that the Nicaraguan Government was terrorist.

Shortly after the above incident, commercial network TV news reported that the US and certain Central American countries, namely, El Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala, had claimed that the Contadora process (discussions promoted by Colombia, Panama, Mexico, and Venezuela with

the aim to negotiate peace in Central America) could get nowhere because of the intransigent position of the Nicaraguans; because the Nicaraguans demanded a condition for peace that the US stop supporting the Contras. However, National Public Radio reported that most other Latin American countries believed that the Nicaraguan position was reasonable.

In these two instances, commercial TV networks in the US predominantly broadcast the position of the US Administration and the countries that support it. No mention was made of conflicting views. Commercial TV viewers were thus exposed to only a partial vision of the events described above. Viewers were receiving only the official position of the US Administration on these matters.

These incidents suggest certain questions: What if these incidents illustrate a systematic practice (a routinary way of conceiving, formulating, and doing things) by all or some of the commercial TV networks? If so, what are the implications of that practice for the public's perception of social phenomena when these phenomena have been submitted to differential treatment by TV? What if the commercial TV discourse on terrorism and terrorists is just a partial picture of terrorism and terrorists? What if TV commercial practices work to preclude viewers from experiencing a complete picture of terrorism and

terrorists? What if the complete picture of terrorism would have to include terrorists that never appear as such on commercial TV? If this is so, then, how do commercial TV practices contribute to hide from audiences the complete picture of terrorism and terrorists? What can the unwanted (or wanted?) consequences of this partial experience be? Finally, if one thinks that it is important not to miss the completed discourse of terrorism and terrorists, what types of alternative practices can commercial TV institutionalize to provide an encompassing plurality of discourses? The answer to these questions could have profound social and political implications. It would imply a conflict between commercial TV communication practices with democratic principles --principles that purport to guarantee equal treatment, and possibilities of representation for all interests and positions in an issue. That is, commercial TV Practices may be creating a distorted perception of certain phenomena due to the omission of relevant information. A People with a truncated, or distorted vision of certain socio-political phenomena certainly are more prone than well informed people to be manipulated and led into behaviors that they might otherwise reject. Studies of the location and working of such communication practices could help to better understand the uses of language in political discourses and their social implications. The importance of what viewers may be missing on commercial TV discourses and

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of the above questions notwithstanding, these questions are infrequently addressed in the literature. This work is a modest attempt to address some of them.

Full exploration of the above questions would require studies of commercial TV communication practices and of the public perception of events that TV makes possible. This work aims to explore selected dominant TV communication practices, i.e., dominant because they determine the commercial TV discourse and because they cover the overwhelming majority of TV audience in the US, and to provide general answers to the above questions and specifically to the questions of whether commercial network TV provides a partial discourse of terrorism, how do these selected commercial TV practices contribute to hide from viewers a more encompassing picture of terrorism and terrorists, and what types of alternative practices can commercial TV institutionalize to provide a more democratic discourse about terrorism. If any, these answers will be forged in relation to communication practices a democratic society requires.

Before describing the content of each chapter, I consider it important to acknowledge some of the limitations of this study. These limitations are related to the specificity of the sample of commercial TV discourse on terrorism and Nicaragua that I will attempt to analyze (the commercial TV discussions of Contra aid in Congress and the

alleged Nicaraguan invasion into Honduras), the time period covered by the sample (three weeks on March 1986 during which these events occurred), the use of news instances from different formats of commercial TV (CNN 'all network TV news' versus ABC and CBS news), and the focus on Nicaragua as an example of the larger phenomenon of commercial TV discussion of terrorism, Central America, and the Third World in general. Among other things, these restrictions limit the type of generalizations that can be made from this study, they do not represent the entire range of commercial TV discussion about terrorism and Central America, and they may express diverse technological restrictions imposed on TV practices because of format differences. Nonetheless, I think these specific events and time period are important and controversial enough to test the democratic degrees of freedom of, and characterize, commercial TV practices in the US. Further, because of these controversiality and importance, they can illustrate US practices in relation to Nicaragua and other Third World countries.

Description of the Study

In Chapter II, to provide a theoretical framework to define terrorism, I will: (A) review the scholarly literature about terrorism in general (Bell, 1978; Laqueur, 1977, 1987; Sterling, 1981; Chomsky, 1986; 1987; Chomsky

and Herman 1979; Herman, 1982) and (B) on terrorism of states in particular (Shultz, 1986; Herman, 1982; Sloam, 1985; Stohl and Lopez, 1985). I will claim that some of these definitions are inadequate because they exclude important forms of terrorism and I will try to provide more encompassing definitions. In this discussion I will try to show the type of knowledge about terrorism already available and thematized in the scholarly and non-scholarly literature. This discussion will provide background on terrorism from which discussions in following chapters will draw.

In Chapter III, to focus the previous discussion in terms of the TV relationship to society, I intend to review the literature about the sociology of TV. In this sense, I intend to: (A) review approaches to the role of TV in society (Head, 1985; Lodziak, 1986; Smith, 1973). Doing that I will discuss pluralistic (Blumer, 1977; Blumer and Gurevitch, 1982; McQuail, 1983) and critical (Carey, 1981; Golding and Murdock, 1977; Hall, 1977, 1982; Hawkes, 1978; Laclau and Mouffe, 1985; Mouffe, 1988; Negt and Kluge, 1983) media theories. Following critics of pluralistic theories (Jessop, Bonnett, Bromley, and Ling, 1985; Murdock and Golding, 1977, Woollacott, 1982), I will argue the adequacy of critical theories for the issues at hand in this proposal. Then, I will discuss (B) culturalist (Carey, 1981; Hall, 1977, 1982; Lodziak, 1986; Real, 1986;

Williams, 1974, 1980), (C) political economy (Golding and Murdock, 1977; Murdock and Golding, 1982; Negt and Kluge, 1983; Negt, 1980), and (D) structuralist (Hawkes, 1978; Laclau and Mouffe, 1985; Mouffe, 1988; Robins, 1979) critical theories and their stance in terms of TV relation to society. Finally, following the previous discussion, I will (E) discuss the issue of discourse and TV analyses. On this basis, I will identify the objectives of my project as they fit into the existing literature.

In Chapter IV, I will discuss definitions of discourse and differentiate between them and I will present different types of terrorism discourse that have been discussed in the literature on mass media communication (Elliot, Murdock, and Schelensinger, 1983). I will provide (A) a general definition of discourse, I will differentiate between (B) partial and (C) democratic discourses. As an illustration of partial discourse I will (D) discuss the US Administration discourse on terrorism and Nicaragua against a contesting terrain of alternative discourses. Then, on this basis, I will (E) characterize the US Administration discourse. Further, in relation to TV discourses I will differentiate, as partial discourses, between (F) official discourse, (G) alternative discourse, and (H) oppositional discourse. Finally, I will argue (I) the need for a critical discourse to which my study will contribute.

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In Chapter V, I will argue that Habermas' communicative action theory (1975, 1979, 1984, 1987a) constitutes an appropriate critical alternative for the analysis of the terrorism discourse on TV. I will present Habermas' critical theory and methodology. In discussing Habermas' theory, I will present (A) Habermas' critical theory, (B) I will elaborate upon its relevance to TV as a mass communication institution, and (C) upon its implications as a theoretical framework for the analysis of TV.

Following Habermas' theory I will, in Chapter VI, draw normative implications for TV. I will discuss (A) the normative dimensions of the theory of communicative action and its implications for TV as a social institution. That is, I will discuss how in complex modern societies TV can serve as a forum in which democratic assessment of controversial issues can be guaranteed. From this discussion, I will propose that TV can serve as (B) a resource of education, socialization, and social integration, (C) a resource of democratization and autonomization, and (D) a resource for the reactivation and institutionalization of a universal public sphere. Finally, I will draw (E) implications for a democratic discussion about terrorism and Nicaragua, and advance (F) the thesis and relevant questions I want to address in this study.

In Chapter VII, I will follow Habermas' communication theory to propose a descriptive and critical analysis of the instances of commercial TV discourse about terrorism and Nicaragua. In this sense, I will attempt to develop analytical procedures for the presentation, description and critical analysis of the data, and I will discuss the implications of the proposed procedures for the formulation of the guiding rules of the discourse. In discussing the presentation of the discourse, I will (A) present guidelines for the transcription of the TV discourse. In discussing the description of the discourse, I will propose procedures for the description of (B) opportunities of participation in the terrorism discourse offered by TV networks, (C) claims advanced in the TV discourse, (D) the evidence and arguments presented in the TV discourse, and (E) the non-verbal components of the TV discourse. Relying on the normative features of Habermas' theory I will propose critical analytical procedures. I will develop standards for the critical appraisal of (F) opportunities, (G) claims, (H) evidence and arguments, and (I) non-verbal components that the TV discourse on terrorism embodies.

In Chapter VIII, I will make use of the descriptive procedures developed above and I will present the descriptive analysis of the commercial TV discourse case on terrorism and Nicaragua and I will summarize the main

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In Chapter VIII, I will make use of the descriptive procedures developed above and I will present the descriptive analysis of the commercial TV discourse case on terrorism and Nicaragua and I will summarize the main

claims advanced in the commercial TV discourse.

In Chapter IX, I will follow the critical standards elaborated in Chapter VII and discuss the critical assessment of the selected TV networks discourse on terrorism and Nicaragua. I will argue that, in fact, the selected TV network discourse on terrorism fail to meet the demands of democratic communication standards derived from Habermas' theory. And, I will provide a characterization of the defining rules of the commercial TV discourse.

In Chapter X, I will discuss the results of this study in terms of (A) clarity of analysis, (B) limits of data, and (C) controversial points. Following the discussion of results I will (D) assess this study in terms of the proposed thesis; then, I will (E) summarize the problems discussed and propose a comparative analysis to public TV discourse in order to address the institutional implications of the results and some of the problems treated.

From the previous analysis, I will, in Chapter XI, discuss the institutional implications in terms of an analysis of public TV discourse. In discussing the institutional implications of results, I will elaborate upon (A) a comparison in relation to the differences between TV discourses (PBS versus commercial networks). In doing this I will apply the analytical procedures of Chapter VII to instances of the PBS TV discourse on

terrorism and Nicaragua. Finally, I will (B) address the adequacy of the proposed procedures to identify real differences among possible alternative TV discourses and thus illustrating the practical implications of the ideal speech situation.

In Chapter XII, I will present the conclusions arrived at in this study by way of a summary of the study and a discussion of the remaining issues facing a critical analysis of the TV treatment of terrorism and Nicaragua.

CHAPTER II

ON DEFINING TERRORISM

In order to provide a theoretical framework to define terrorism, I will: review scholarly and non-scholarly literature about terrorism in general and on the terrorism of states in particular. I will claim that some of these definitions are inadequate because they exclude important forms of terrorism, and I will try to provide a more encompassing definition of terrorism.

Terrorism

The semantic battle between the different interests in the terrorist field is well expressed by the sentence 'One man's freedom fighter is another man's terrorist.' However, to study terrorism it is necessary to provide a working definition of the term. We need a definition that can establish, not as Jenkins (1981, 1985) argues, that 'One man's terrorist is everyone's terrorist.' But a definition that can clarify that individual terrorists as well as terrorist states, organizations, and/or groups have common characteristics that can be submitted to public discussion and can be rationally scrutinized by the interested person. To develop this, dissimilar approaches

can be used as sources for an adequate definition of terrorism. In this sense, I will borrow from discussions of terrorism that represent the views of critics and representatives of the status quo as well as that of scholars.

Bell (1978a,b), Laqueur (1977, 1987), and Sterling (1981) see terrorism as the systematic instrument of 'movements,' and they talk about transnational terror, thereby excluding State Terrorism from their analyses. Although the CIA (1981) differentiates between classes or types of terrorism, e.g., between 'Terrorism' and 'International Terrorism,' for purpose of analysis it holds a similar view to that of Bell, Laqueur, and Sterling. The CIA concentrates on the analysis of international terrorism, the "terrorism conducted with the support of a foreign government or organization and/or directed against foreign nationals, institutions or governments" (1985, P.1). A more inclusive definition of terrorism is used by Chomsky and Herman (1979a) and Herman (1982). They follow the Webster Collegiate Dictionary definition, '[terror] is a mode of governing, or of opposing government, by intimidation.' Chomsky and Herman (1979a, 1979b), Herman (1982) differentiate between 'Retail Terrorism,' which is practiced by 'isolate individuals or small groups' and 'Wholesale Terrorism,' that used by the state.

Israel's ambassador to the United Nations, Benjamin Netanyahu (1986), defines terrorism as "the deliberate and systematic murder, maiming, and menacing of the innocent to inspire fear for political ends" (p.9). President Reagan endorses this view and differentiates between terrorist and freedom fighters,

The people that are customarily called freedom fighters are fighting against organized military forces in what -- even if it is a civil war, it is a war. Terrorists, as I said before, are people who deliberately choose as a target to murder and maim innocent people who have no influence upon the things that they think of as their political goals.

And, therefore, those people must be treated as to what they are. And that is, they are base criminals (NYT; May 8, 1986; p.10).

Other attempts at defining terrorism concentrate mainly on the way terrorists operate and on their personal characteristics. For instance, Bouthoul (1975) singles out seven characteristics of terrorism. He claims: first, that terrorism is clandestine, i.e., the work of small and secret groups. Second, that terrorist actions are not conventional battles, i.e., they are not always attacks upon the enemy but upon innocent victims in order to induce fear. Third, that terrorists act in secrecy, i.e., in anonymous ways so they can produce higher levels of anxiety and fear to paralyze their targets. Further, anonymity and secrecy, Bouthoul argues, produce in the terrorist a 'paranoic emotion of infinite power.' Fourth, that terrorists have a tendency on the one hand, toward obsession, fanaticism and paranoia, and, on the other hand,

they manifest a compensation complex created by previous humiliations and frustrations. Fifth, that terrorism is, also, influenced by intellectual and ideological positions, e.g., 'patriotism, nationalism, racism, cultural intolerance, religious fanaticism and political dogma.' Sixth, that terrorists have a tendency for 'imitation techniques,' i.e., a successful terrorist act usually would turn the trick to a series of similar acts. Finally, that terrorists are inclined to the power of suggestion, e.g., they are controlled by fixed ideas.

Whether or not the influence of other factors such as the support of the state to terrorism and the influence of ideological forces are acknowledged, this way of characterizing terrorism tends to depend on the psychological profile of the terrorist and the way terrorists operate. In this sense, terrorism is defined as a psychological pathology and its irrational nature is stressed. Consequently, the social causes of terrorism are excluded from the analysis. Further, the systematic direct and indirect terrorism of states, i.e., the rational use of state violence motivated by economic and political considerations, is defined away. Moreover, considerations for an encompassing classification of terrorists, e.g., a classification based on the type of acts terrorists perpetrate, are obscured or precluded from being analyzed.

Political Terrorism

In contrast to Bouthoul (1975), the CIA (1981), Bell (1978a, 1978b), Laqueur (1977, 1987), and Sterling (1981), Buckley (1978), O'Neill (1978), and Shultz (1978) differentiate between international and political terrorism. Buckley (1978) defines terrorism as 'the use of threat or violence to instill fear' and political terrorism, he says, is the terrorism used to intimidate, subvert or destroy political processes and structures. Since most of the aims of political terrorism are international, i.e., the creation of new states, the liberation of colonies, the subversion of established governments, and so on, he notices an increasing connection between political and international terrorism. This has resulted from the constitution of fast growing international terrorist 'networks' of individuals and groups and the 'professionalization' of this activity. Buckley (1978) argues that in the last two decades or so, several organizations have been increasingly operating in association, e.g., the United Red Army attack of Lod International Airport, in May 1972, was a coordinated action with the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine. Further, he contends that the available evidence showing the United States' support for the 'Cuban exile terror' against the Castro's regime adds to the body of data supporting the claim that terrorism has become an

international enterprise. Though Buckley introduces the type of political terrorism perpetrated by states, he seems to concentrate on international, or extranational, terrorism, leaving out of his considerations the state terrorism directed against national populations.

Borrowing from the works of Crozier (1960), Thorton (1964), Walter (1969), and Wilkinson (1974) among others, Shultz (1978) conceptually differentiates political terrorism in terms of the rationalized use of violence against civilian targets such as schools, hospitals, airplanes, airports, factories, and other civilian targets. In agreement with Buckley (1978), Shultz (1978) argues further that there has been an intellectual neglect in the study of terrorism and political terrorism in particular, a lack of conceptual clarification about the different aspects and factors that determine the different types of terrorism. From his definition that political terrorism is a form of intentional, organized, and rationalized violence, he sets out to develop a typology of political terrorism based on what he considers to be the three categories and seven more important variables bearing on the nature of terrorism. He defines the following categories,

Revolutionary Terrorism is the use of 'extra normal forms of violence' to effect the fundamental socio-political process of a determined political system. It is the use of disruptive illegal mass violence to overthrow political regimes with the intend to create the conditions for 'overall social change.' For instance,

guerilla and revolutionary movements' violence is included here.

Sub-Revolutionary Terrorism is similar to revolutionary terrorism in the sense that it uses violence to effect changes in the socio-political process, but its aims are not to produce complete changes in the society instead it aims at specific political changes within the social system. Shultz considers this to be the broadest of the three categories because it includes the whole political spectrum. Among others, this category includes ethnic, religious, regional, anti-colonial, and re-actionary groups.

Establishment Terrorism is the use of 'extranormal' types of political violence by established political system (States) against internal as well as external enemies (Other states or groups).

Shultz (1978) explains that the above categories of terrorism are used by both national as well as international bodies and against national as well as international or extranational targets. He goes on to define seven important variables interacting with the above three categories to differentiate between types of terrorism. He defines the following seven variables:

Causes are the social, economic, political, and/or psychological factors underlying the conditions that lead to the use of political terrorism. Shultz differentiates long-term factors (among them social as well as political and economic inequities) and short-term factors (for instance, rapid upsurge of ethnic conflicts and/or government repression) as sub-divisions within the variable cause.

Environment is the various geographical factors conditioning the forms under which terrorism appears within the three basic categories. Shultz differentiates external (outside of the social system or nation state) as well as internal (limited to the boundaries of the nation state) components within this variable.

Goals are the short as well as long term aims of the terrorist action. The latter can be simultaneously aimed at both long and short term objectives, e.g., state terror

can be directed at both erradicating contemporary oppositional movements and at precluding the population for engaging in similar activities in the future.

Strategy is the intellectual (the implementation of plans, ideas) as well as the material (uses of men, weapons) uses of resources needed to accomplish the terrorist's goal. The issue here concerns too with determining the role (primary-secondary) of political terrorism in the overall terrorist scheme.

Means are all the capabilities (weaponry, media uses and tactical communication, electronic devices) and techniques (bombing, kidnapping, psychological intimidation, arson, chemical and bacteriological contamination) used to accomplish the goal(s) within the strategic formulation.

Organization is the formal structure needed for the preparation of plans and the application and coordination of the extranormal violence. Terrorism needs knowledge of the psychology of people, of their social forms of integration and habits, of geographical localities, and so on and so forth. To do this organizational structure is needed.

Participation refers to individual types who participate in terrorist activities, it includes the different types of both individuals who directly accomplish the terrorist act as well as the leaders or political intellectuals who use political terrorism to obtain their goals. The analysis of participation requires studies of the psychological profile of these individuals.

Shultz's typology is a significant contribution to the study of terrorism. It allows for comparisons across, between, and within these categories of terrorism. Moreover, Shultz focuses on political terrorism thereby making the central point of his typology the most important form of terrorism in operation today. With this he breaks ground for encompassing analyses of a very significant variety of political terrorism, that of state terrorism. Still, Shultz's typology, on the one hand, seems to include

all activities of revolutionary movements as terrorism. While some revolutionary practices may be terrorist, guerrilla movements which have support of the population and whose violence is a response to oppressive governments and directed against military targets cannot be included as terrorist practices. On the other hand, Shultz's typology does not make clear or does not address directly the type of terrorism which is the product of international sponsorship and cooperation between states, institutions and groups, or the variety of combinations between these entities, e.g., states associated with national as well as extra-national groups to operate at the national as well as the international level. This type of international cooperative terrorism has been recognized by scholars as well as leftist and rightist thinkers as one of the most important in contemporary times, especially in relation to state sponsored terrorism because of its systematic use of violence (Buckley, 1978; Chomsky, 1985, 1986, 1987; Herman, 1982; International Security Council (1986), Shultz, 1986; Stohl and Lopez, 1984). Further, by giving the status of 'causes' to certain oppressive practices of states, e.g., economic and political oppression, and perhaps because he considers these practices as not being 'extranormal' forms of violence, Shultz (1978) contributes to conceal the terrorist character of these oppressive practices. They may well constitute one of the most significant forms of state

terrorism.

The type of national as well as international cooperative terrorism associated with individuals and groups has been very well documented (Giner, 1982; Jenkins, 1975, 1985; Rapoport & Alexander, 1982). The terrorism perpetrated by states, whether it is at the national or international level or in cooperation with other entities or not, has been analyzed in the past in connection with fascist and, mainly, communist states (Arendt, 1979; Delmas, 1984; Merleau-Ponty, 1969; Rosen & Frank, 1975; Wellmer, 1984). Nonetheless, state terrorism has not recently been very well scrutinized. It is only in the 1980's, perhaps after the seizure of the US Embassy in Iran, that scholars and Western governments have started to pay serious attention to it (Mickolus, 1980; McCamant, 1984; Stohl and Lopez, 1984). I now turn to the terrorism of states, and will try to define this kind of terrorism and to provide a general classification of terrorists (individuals, groups, institutions, and states) according to what they do.

Terrorism of States

Chomsky and Herman's definition of wholesale terrorism encompasses Bell's, the CIA's, Laqueur's, and Sterling's definitions of international terrorism as well as Buckley's concerns with the international aspects of

terrorism in general. I will adopt a definition of state terrorism both similar to that of Chomsky and Herman and, at the same time, a definition that can overcome the limitations present in Shultz' typology. That is, I conceive of state terrorism as the terrorism sponsored by states inside as well as outside their own borders and carried out by the state's entities in isolation or in cooperation with other states and groups as well. That is, this type of political terrorism can be perpetrated in cooperation with other states as well as national and/or international groups and organizations. In this sense, I want to differentiate, too, between international terrorism perpetrated by isolated individuals, groups or organizations, and international terrorism sponsored by states. Thus, my definition and characterization will take as a starting point the convergence of three broad factors: the nature of the enactment and sponsorship of terrorism, i.e., states, groups, individuals; the nature of the broad causes and characteristics of terrorism and terrorists, i.e., social, political, psychological, and so on; and the nature of the interaction of the previous two broad factors, i.e., group-state, state-state, psychological-sociological-individual, state-sociological-political, and so on. The convergence of these factors determine a tridimensional plane of analysis instead of the bidimensional one implicit in Shultz' typology.

International and National State Terrorism.

According to the mood and the political realities of the times, Secretary of State Shultz (1986) makes the connection of terrorism with states:

Even more alarming has been the rise of terrorism sponsored by states. Many countries have joined the ranks of what we might call the "League of Terror" as full-fledged sponsors and supporters of indiscriminate and not so indiscriminate, murder (p.16).

The terrorism Shultz is referring to is the commonly called international state terrorism, or what Savater (1982a) calls state terrorism directed against the 'outside.' Addressing other type of state terrorism, Stohl and Lopez (1984) cite both Sean MacBride's speech at the 12th International Council Meeting of Amnesty International (1979) and Kuper (1981), to point out the terrorist activities of states such as those of Chile under Pinochet, Kampuchea (1975-76), East Timor (1975-76), Argentina under the latest military junta, and Bangladesh (1971), among others. These cases, Stohl and Lopez argue, provide strong empirical evidence of the growing importance of state violence as a terrorist tactic used by contemporary regimes. Following the American Heritage Dictionary, Stohl and Lopez (1984) define state terrorism as "a system of government that uses terror to rule" (p.7). With this they want, first, to differentiate terrorism from other types of states' actions such as oppression and repression while acknowledging the interconnection between the three. Of

these three states's activities, oppression would be the broadest phenomenon which provides the demarcation space in which repression and terrorism occur. And, second, they purport to point out the wider dimensions of state terrorism; that is, state terrorism is not only directed at the immediate victim of the terrorist act, e.g., the tortured political prisoner, but to the broader audience which will 'see' the terrorism's victim and will perceive "the persuasive advertisement of the power of the state" (p.9).

The type of terrorism Stohl and Lopez (1984) define can be classified as an internal to the state. Savater (1982a) calls it state terrorism directed against the 'inside', i.e., a national state terrorism directed at the state's population. This internal or national terrorism is most commonly associated with Third World and Second World countries. As I will discuss below, the so called Western democracies or First World countries, among others, engage primarily in international terrorism. For instance, Illustrations of national state terrorism are provided by the case of massive political exile in some Latin American countries. As the Paraguayan writer and poet Augusto Roa Bastos (1987) has put it, "[b]rutality and terror have closed off the sources of inspiration that nourish writers and artists and which give expression to the originality of a people" (p.218). This brutality and terror have been

determinant factors in the massive political exile I mentioned above. Rowe and Whitfield (1987) report that after the overthrow of Allende in Chile "thousands of Chileans were tortured and killed, imprisoned and forced abroad...." (p.230). They go on to say that by 1978 more than 100,000 Chileans had been forced into exile. Eduardo Galeano (1986), a Uruguayan writer, remarks that Uruguay, under dictatorships since the early 1970's, has become 'a vast torture chamber.' Rowe and Witfield (1987) estimate that 20% (300,000 persons) of the Uruguayan population have been forced into exile since 1972. These authors continue to say that this is a general condition of most of Latin America. They report that in Paraguay of the estimated 3,000,000 total population, 1,000,000 are in exile; in Argentina during the military dictatorship more than 30,000 persons 'disappeared;' in Cuba more than 10% (1,000,000 people) of the population are in exile; and more than 300,000 Haitians are in the same condition. Finally, they remark, that similar conditions exist in El Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala. The state terror implemented by the governments of El Salvador and Guatemala has been documented by McClintock in a two volume work (1985a, 1985b). This author provides evidence that the US Administration supports this terror. The case of Brazil under the military is analyzed by the Catholic Church (Arquidiocese de Sao Paulo, 1985).

Analyzing international state terrorism, Stohl (1984) argues that the international dimensions of state terrorism include three basic categories. These are: first, coercive diplomacy which includes two variants: diplomacy of violence and nuclear deterrence; second, clandestine terror; and, third, surrogate terrorism.

Coercive diplomacy is overt state's actions directed at making a noncompliant behavior of the target impossible or unbearable to continue. Within this category Stohl (1984) discusses that the diplomacy of violence is a subcategory exemplified in the last three decades by the 'shows of violence' in war as well as nonwar situations. Instances of the diplomacy of violence are: the 'Nixon-Kissinger Christmas bombing of Hanoi in 1972,' the recent US invasion of Grenada, and the mining of the Nicaraguan harbors by the CIA. Stohl argues that this type of terrorism is not restricted to the more powerful states, i.e., the Soviet Union and the US, but that the behavior of relatively powerful Third World states such as that of Israel in relation to its Arab neighbors, particularly the Palestinians, perhaps illustrate the most pervasive terrorist acts of violent diplomacy. The Russian interventions in 1953 in East Germany, in 1956 in Hungary, in 1968 in Czechoslovakia, and in 1979 in Afghanistan are other examples of the diplomacy of violence. A second subcategory of violent diplomacy, Stohl argues, is constituted

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by the doctrine of nuclear deterrence which is based on the 'threat of nuclear holocaust.' Stohl discusses that this doctrine keeps the populations of both the US and Russia as virtual hostages to the 'threat of destruction.' One may agree that indeed the virtual hostages are the populations of the so called superpower nations, however, the likely scenario of a nuclear war includes Europe as well, and the nuclear terror is felt in the whole world. Savater (1982b) argues that this type of terrorism as well as other types of political terrorism is the product of the increasing spreading of a 'military logic' at a worldwide level.

In opposition to the diplomacy of violence, Clandestine terror is constituted by states' covert actions aimed at inducing 'fear and chaos' in other governments in order to produce for the terrorist state favorable changes in or to weaken unfavorable movements. Stohl points out that 'excellent' examples of this state terrorism are the by now well known attempts by the CIA to assassinate Fidel Castro, the CIA's 'special operations' in "Guatemala, 1954; Indonesia, 1958; Iran, 1953; the Bay of Pigs, Cuba, 1961..." (Stohl, 1984, p.51), and the US Government's involvement in the overthrow of President Salvador Allende in Chile in 1973. Discussions by Chomsky (1985, 1987), Connell-Smith (1984), Herman (1982), and Schelesinger and Kinzer (1983) support the above illustrations. Other states implicated in clandestine terrorism have been Qadhafi's

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Lybia, Israel, and the Soviet Union. However, it has been difficult to find evidence that Russia in fact has been directly involved in clandestine terrorism. Nonetheless, both the US and the Soviet Union have been involved in providing weapons to terrorist groups and countries which support and practice terrorism.

Finally, Stohl (1984) differentiate surrogate terrorism as another type of international terrorism. He says that surrogate terrorism is defined by the 'help' that powerful states give to friendly states to keep power through violent means or to friendly groups to subvert the power of unfriendly states by the use of violence. This help can be provided through training of personnel, supplies of equipment, and the professionalization of security services, among other things. Because of the lucrative character of the international market for weapons, first as well as second and some third World countries participate in surrogate terrorism. Further, both superpowers provide assistance to friendly governments and groups to keep power through violent means (Alexander, 1984b; Chomsky & Herman, 1979a, 1979b; Gregor, 1982; Mattelart, 1979; van Hollen, 1984).

To Stohl's categories of international terrorism I think it useful to add what can be called a historical terrorism. This terrorism is rooted in the structures of oppression that have developed as a consequence of the

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exercise of political and military power and the economic pursuits of imperial states. This historical terrorism is a cross product of national and international terrorism. It is a product of the economic and military practices enacted by imperial powers upon subjugated peoples and its entwinement with the national terror of states and privileged groups. Since the end of the XVth century the history of the so called New World has been inscribed with this type of terrorism. In what he calls a historical Nemesis, Octavio Paz (1985) provides some cues to understand this type of terrorism in contemporary Latin America.

The fragmentation of our countries, the civil wars, their militarism and dictatorship were, naturally, not invented by the United States. Yet that nation bears a primordial responsibility, since it seized upon this state of affairs in order to turn a profit, to further its own interest, and to dominate. It has fostered divisions between countries, parties, and leaders; it has threatened to use force, and has not hesitated to use force every time it has seen its interest endangered; when this was to his advantage, it has backed rebellions or strengthened tyrannies.... It is tragic because U.S. democracy inspired the fathers of our Independence and our great liberals.... A historical Nemesis: the United States has been, in Latin America, the protector of tyrants and the ally of the enemies of democracy (p.169).

This structural terrorism that I call historical terrorism, Agyeman (1987) argues that it forms part, with others of the above state terrorism, of what he calls a Nonwestern view of terrorism.

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On Defining Terrorism: State Terrorism and General Characteristics of Terrorists

I think the above remarks provide encompassing grounds for a conceptualization of what terrorism is. Specifically, a conceptualization of what state terrorism is. This conceptualization, derived from both highest representatives as well as radical critics of the status quo, can be agreed upon by both radicals and conservatives participating in the discourse. This unproblematic conceptualization can be stated,

State terrorism is the state's support of deliberate and systematic murder, maiming, and menacing of the innocent inside as well outside its own borders, against its as well as foreign populations, in isolation as well as in cooperation with others, to inspire fear for political and economic ends.

Furthermore, now it is possible to formulate different characteristics that can qualify terrorists. Characteristics which, without disregarding such factors, are defined by the activities that terrorists engage in and not by the particular ideology or political position they hold nor by the alleged psychological pathologies of terrorists. In this sense, one can say that terrorists are:

-Individuals, groups, and/or governments, operating in isolation or in cooperation, that employ violence against national as well as international civilian targets and innocent populations to induce fear on these populations.

-Individuals, groups, and/or governments, operating in isolation or in cooperation, that manipulate information, at the national as well as the international levels, to induce fear and legitimize violence for political and economic aims.

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-Individuals, groups, and/or governments, operating in isolation or in cooperation, that use violence, at the national as well as the international level, against civilians targets and populations with the aim to destabilize legitimate governments and induce social and economic chaos.

-Individuals, groups, and/or governments, operating in isolation or in cooperation, that use violence, at the national as well as the international level, against civilians targets and populations with the aim to maintain illegitimate governments and oppressive and repressive structures.

I think that this multiplicity of forms of terrorism need to be taken into consideration for any serious study of the uses of violence in general, the dissemination of information about terrorism, and the institutionalization and constitution of terrorism discourses in communicative social interactions. It is through these type of considerations that significant contributions can be made to elucidate the conditions in which the uses of violence and their social implications can be understood. Conditions that can allow populations, affected by practices which constitute the multiple types of terrorism, to understand, without ambiguities or perhaps with all ambiguities, who the terrorists are. Moreover, as long as the above discussion of terrorism is part of the public common knowledge of humanity, ignoring it or just partially using it can further particular interests and preclude violent practices from being perceived as such.

It is my belief that a minimal condition for the understanding of terrorism and violence can start from a

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full exploration of the terrorism phenomenon in all its logic and multiplicity of forms. And I believe, as I will argue below in Chapter VI, that in modern complex democratic societies the mass media, specifically television, can be called on to play the role of democratic forums and educational resources where cultural, social, and political aspects of terrorism can be made the objects of critical discussion.

In the following chapters I will examine the interaction between specific instances of both public discussion about violence and terrorism and commercial television's practices. Further, I will try to place this interaction in the general context of television's relationship to society. Moreover, I will argue that commercial TV discourses ignores some of the structural violence that historically has been inscribed on some populations of Central America. This not only complements a US Administration discourse which aims at justifying an unjust foreign policy but obscures US people's understanding of both 'Nonwestern' forms of terrorism and historical politico-socio-economical situations in Central America and more specifically in Nicaragua. These TV discourses obstruct also the US public's understanding of the actual situation of terrorism in this region. By so doing, commercial TV practices help to perpetuate a situation of terror in Nicaragua. What has been said in

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this chapter will serve as a background and a yardstick to qualify the character of commercial TV discussions about terrorism and Nicaragua in the US.

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CHAPTER III

SOCIOLOGY OF TELEVISION

In modern societies TV plays an important role as an institution where public discussion about terrorism takes place and through which terrorist acts and terrorists are known. TV is a significant social stage where notions of terrorism and terrorists are publicly offered and formed. Thus, to begin to understand how the discourse about terrorism is socially organized and how TV discourses on terrorism affect and are affected by this social arrangement, here I will turn to more general background in terms of TV relationship(s) to society. In this chapter I intend to review the literature about the sociology of TV.

I intend, first, to review discussions about the role of TV in society. After this, I will discuss pluralistic and critical media theories. Following critics of pluralistic theories, I will argue for the adequacy of critical theories for the type of analysis about the TV discourse on terrorism and Nicaragua that I intend to pursue in this work. Then, within critical theories, I will differentiate between culturalist, political economy, and structuralist critical approaches and their stance in terms of TV relation to society. Finally, following the previous

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discussion, I will consider the issue of discourse and TV analyses. On this basis, I will identify the objectives of my project as they fit into the existing literature.

TV and Society

In the introduction to his edited Reader of Media Sociology (1970), Jeremy Tunstall identifies 16 areas of research within media sociology. He goes from the discussion of value-laden characteristic of media's interpretations and presentations through the history of both media and media research to the areas of organizational goals, media organizations and communication organizations. Further, he argues that both media audiences and audience research and American dominance in media and media research are legitimate areas of concern for media sociology. Though the relevance of all these areas to the role of TV in society cannot be contested, my main concern here will be to restrict the discussion to terms referring to the relationship between TV and the type of treatment, representation and participation of social agents and voices in the shaping of TV's contents and/or discourses, specifically as they relate to news. In this sense, the areas of most interest for this work will be the ones that Tunstall (1970) refers to as media content --including culture, news and violence--, media and politics, and the areas of theory, ideology, and methods.

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Discussing the role of news broadcasting in society and their mutual influence, Smith (1973) points out that,

[n]ews inevitably creates within an organization a kind of model of the entire political environment in which the station is operating; the influences that shape that model are fed into the programmes which ensue. At the same time, news weaves a secondary environment around every one of us who receives it. News tends to lay out the order of 'priorities' among the issues which confront society; it creates some of the doubts and fosters the certainties of that society, placing them all in a context of its own. Yet in every single society which contains broadcasting in any scale, the news is under instruction to be 'objective' (p.75).

The above last characteristic of news as an activity striving for objectivity has been persistently claimed by news organizations. Although, as will be shown below, there is a complex and non-consensual discussion (Gitlin, 1983, 1980, 1978; Head, 1985; Lodziak, 1986; McQuail, 1983; Quicke, 1976; Smith, 1973) about the objective, fairness, democratic, and similar qualities of TV's practices, the news networks continue to claim that they strive to provide an equilibrium, a non-artificial balance of representation between opposing claims and opinions and accurate presentation of facts and events. Head (1985) argues that "Western systems stress the values of news timeliness, accuracy, fairness, objectivity, professionalism, relevance, human interest, and independence from government control" (p.308).

Smith (1973) claims that the historical developments in and interaction between technology, i.e., new smaller, lighter and mobile equipment; nature of sponsorship, i.e.,

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from dependence on one sponsor to selling segments of time to several sponsors; and organizational techniques, i.e., incorporation of professional writers in the news' team and an increasing professionalism of broadcasters, contribute to give the news' bureau of broadcasting organizations an increasingly important role in the gathering and distribution of news to the population. More important, he says, these developments and interactions create conditions for an increasingly economic independent role of the news crew from organizational as well as extra-organizational constraints. However, the political scene in which TV broadcasting develops constitutes a different set of factors with relevant implications for TV broadcasting. One of the inherent constraints on broadcasting is the fact that it depends on governments' allocations of limited public airwaves. Governments thus may have more power over broadcasting than over press organizations. In this sense, Smith continues, press journalism differs from broadcasting journalism. The former develops within a tradition of disclosure, i.e., the journalist sees the function of journalism as not only representing what is happening in the world but as investigating and denouncing social processes. In this way journalism not only describes but influences the constitution and development of events (e.g., the tradition of muckraking). In a different manner, broadcasting develops within a tradition of realism and

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entertainment, i.e., the journalist conceives his/her professional function as mirroring or representing happenings in the world. This latter vision of journalism has provided news broadcasting with an ethics of fairness and objectivity, as Smith (1973) asserts, "[i]n the West at least broadcasting built its news ethics around an extremely highly developed sense of pure truthfulness" (p.102). Nonetheless, he warns, modern, complex societies have come to realize the difficulty in achieving this objectivity and truthfulness. It is impossible for the journalist to satisfy all the perspectives from which an event can be interpreted and seen, and so, Smith seems to imply, TV critics, students and scholars should concentrate on analyses of factors that contribute to configure news phenomenon other than the personal characteristics of the individual reporting the news. Smith differentiates between a 'news' view of the world, i.e., a view that cannot be objective and impartial, and an objective-realistic view. He directs us to look at the series of characteristics that make news broadcasting provide the public with "a 'news' view of the world rather than an 'objectivistic-realistic' view" (p.107). He differentiates six news criteria which determine the characteristic 'news view of the world:'

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2. The geographical criterion which determines what is important for local as well as for national news. This criterion favors the representation of the views of governments and important personalities since they are centralized manifestations of national and local audiences. Further this criterion favors the constitution of questions of national order as news.

3. The criterion of continuity which determines that an event that belongs together with a previous series of events will have priority as news.

4. The criterion of priority which favors the assembling of news for a 'mass audience.' This criterion determines and emphasizes the relationship between news and audience. In this sense 'humble heroism, folksy sentimentality,'... confirmation of 'stereotypical images' tend to be favored as news.

5. The criterion of technology which determines that certain events will be favored as news because they fit the technology of the medium. In the case of TV, disasters, violent happenings, dramatic events, and explosions would be more suited as news than peace or educative initiatives.

6. The structural criterion which determines that events and stories that help to maintain the interest of the audience within the format of the news programme will be included.

The above historical interrelations between technological development, organizational techniques, and nature of sponsorship plus the ethics of truthfulness and the criteria for the constitution of what counts as news contribute to contradictory practices and relationships. On the one hand, from Smith's argument, it seems that the above first three factors, i.e., technological development, organizational techniques, and nature of sponsorship, help to facilitate both TV conditions of economic independence and flexible ways of operation which, in turn, can contribute to further the circumstances in which practices

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leading to TV truthfulness can be institutionalized. On the other hand, government power over broadcasting and the characteristics of the news phenomenon tend to push in the opposite direction, mainly because of the built in distortion the phenomenon carries with it if it is to be constituted as such, i.e., as news. However, with respect to government power over TV, Williams (1979) argues that the issue is not free from ambiguities. For instance, Williams points out that

...after 1944 ...the FCC began to ...define the public interest in terms other than keeping the market open. It sought to introduce standards of social usefulness, of political fairness, and of public morality. In the period of the development of television, these attempts were redoubled, but the structure of existing institutions led to curious anomalies. Thus the Commission could revoke a station's license, but not really control the networks to which some of the stations belonged and others were affiliated. For most programme production, the networks were obviously responsible, yet the effective control were on stations (p.266).

Williams (1979) characterizes this situation as one of uneven competition between the networks, local stations, and state power. Smith (1973) seems to agree with Williams' argument and claims that the weight of the built in distortion of news phenomenon, rather than government interference, primarily determines the news vision of the world, a vision of the world that tends to follow the 'ethics of statemanship' rather than the ethics of truthfulness. In order to have a more complete view of reality, Smith proposes supporting the proliferation of

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Other types of broadcasting 'vessels' to catch reality, among them would be documentaries, current affairs, and other factual programs.

Regardless of whether one agrees or not with Smith's analysis about the mutual influence of TV and society and specifically about the characteristics of news or of the news vision of the world, still within the current experience of news, by whatever criteria they become to be defined as such, one can analyze the practices operating within and constituting what has already been defined as news. The issue, not of how news comes to be defined as such, but of the way stories and events are configured after they have been defined as news seems to have escaped Smith's analysis. Further, he seems to accept the claim that the restrictions inherent to the news phenomenon plus the government's power over the distribution of broadcasting licenses are fixed determinants of the way news come to be defined. Other writers such as Parenti (1986) have challenged this position. They have argued that the technological restrictions of broadcasting have been used as justifications to legitimate the view of the world of those who run TV organizations and society at large. For instance, Smith's view cannot explain why some events and facts which can be characterized as news according to his criteria do not reach TV's screens and other similar events and facts do. From similar points of view to that of

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Parenti, several positions have been advanced to explain not only the process of selection of TV's contents but the process of structuration of these contents after their selection as such, i.e., the processes that decide what is to be presented as news as well as how the presentation will be organized. In this way, these positions include in their field of analysis interpretations of different, complex and varied phases of the TV-society relationship.

These scholarly literature (Currant, Gurevitch, and Woollacott, 1982; Fejes, 1984; McQuail, 1983; Lodziak, 1986) on the issue of media's roles in society have constituted two general frameworks of analysis: pluralism and critical media theories.

Pluralism

In agreement with the so far discussed claims made by Western media, pluralistic positions (Blumler, 1979; Blumler and Gurevitch, 1982; McQuail, 1983) envision Western democratic societies as constituted by a body of social, political, and cultural groups and interests competing with each other on a non-predominant basis, i.e., in a way that no interest or group has an inherent advantage because of its social-structural position. The social 'function' of the media is seen as providing representation for all these groups and interests in an independent way, i.e., free from structural as well as ideological constraints. For instance, Shils (1957, 1962)

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argues that the effects of mass society, i.e., the weakening of traditions, the rationalization of social relations, the challenge to the power of authority, and so on, constituted a de facto strengthening of democracy and made the general population, i.e., the masses, the central engine empowering political and cultural processes. From a similar stance, Blumler and Gurevitch (1982) argue that pluralism sees society

as constituting a plurality of potential concentration of power... which are engaged in a contest for ascendancy and dominance. The mass media are then seen as a central means through which this contest is conducted and public support for one or another grouping or point of view is mobilized (p.261).

These latter authors point out that TV has both activated the public with respect to political matters and reduced the public's selectivity concerning exposure to party propaganda. This is because, Blumler and Gurevitch maintain, TV is required to impartially present 'all recognized standpoints' and parties' broadcasts. Moreover, they continue, TV needs to 'maintain an above-the-battle stance' in relation to political conflict, thus, TV is forced to be anti-partisan and/or non-partisan. In this sense, TV has to follow standards of "fairness, impartiality, neutrality and objectivity, at the expense of such alternative values as commitment, consistent loyalty and readiness to take sides" (p.248).

Because pluralistic oriented researchers have taken for granted that indeed TV provides a truly democratic forum for society, their research has tended to focus on audience effects, thereby neglecting the analysis of content and discourse. However, within pluralism, there have been a body of effect research models (Fejes, 1984), e.g., agenda setting, spiral of silence, knowledge gap, and dependency models, which have suggested the not so democratic qualities of TV's practices and the need to study audience effect within the broad society context. This research, too, has failed to provide analysis of TV's discourses. Nonetheless, discourses is the field of research that may provide the materials to clarify the still obscure TV-society relationship and to test the claims of pluralism. TV contents and discourses is one of the important areas of study in the so called critical studies literature.

Critical Media Theory

In contrast to pluralism, critical media theory conceives of society as constituted by diverse social, political, and cultural groups and interests competing with each other in predominant ways, i.e., critical theory claims that there exist dominant groups and interests which occupy privileged structural positions in society and take advantage of these positions in detriment of subordinated groups and interests. From this perspective, TV is seen as

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controlled by and concentrated on the hands of privileged societal groups and interests and, therefore, plays roles that confirm and reinforce the prevalent social order. However, critical theory, or some variants of it, acknowledges that TV plays this role in ambiguous and contradictory ways.

The adequacy of the liberal pluralist position has been challenged by critical scholars (Hall, 1982) on the grounds that this analysis takes for granted the unwarranted liberal ideal about the neutrality of the market (of materials and ideas). That is, these critics question whether capitalism guarantees equal opportunities for the satisfaction of interests and needs of the whole society. According to Hall, pluralism conceives of a social consensus that is reflected in TV practices, but this consensus is ideological because it only reflects the consensus of the status quo, which represents the interest of a minority and so is partial. Hall (1982) explains, "the claim is ideological, not because it is false but because it does not adequately grasp all the conditions which make freedom and impartiality possible" (p.86). In contrast to pluralism, critical theorists offer a broader array of possibilities to study what they consider to be the more relevant issue of the historical struggles between interests, classes, and groups with unequal power in society. For the most part, critical approaches envision

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TV's constitution of contents and discourses as part of and as an expression of these unequal societal struggles. In general terms, three main positions currently prevail within critical theory and TV studies: the culturalist, political economy, and structuralist approaches.

The Culturalist Perspective.

This critical approach has been defined by McLennan (1983) as one that "encompasses not one but a range of theoretical paradigms and traditions, from Weberian verstehen analysis, through the various strands of the culture-in-society perspective, to more straightforwardly marxist approaches" (p.6). In this sense, Grossberg (1986) points out that even in the work of one representative of culturalist studies, Stuart Hall, "[i]t is difficult to identify a single position or method, ..., or to assign specific arguments to a single theoretical level or "empirical" arena" (p.61). In relation to TV, culturalist thinkers argue for analyses of TV messages in their own right (Carey, 1975, 1981, 1983; Hall, 1977, 1982; Lodziak, 1986; Real, 1986; Williams, 1974, 1980). Culturalism explores the TV's role in producing social consent in terms of the interest of the dominant classes and the state. In analyzing critical studies, Real (1986) points out that culturalist theorists such as James Carey and Stuart Hall stress the notion of mass media, and TV in particular, as a

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site where struggle for meaning occurs. For instance, Carey (1975) in defining news stresses that,

...news is not information but drama; it does not describe the world but portrays an arena of dramatic forces and action; it exists solely in historical time; and it invites our participation on the basis of our assuming, often vicariously, social roles within it (p.9).

However, as Stuart Hall (1982) argues, this struggle is contextualized within a hegemonic environment. The understanding of TV within the context of this hegemonic environment would contribute to clarify the circumstances within capitalism that make possible the acceptance of unfreedom for freedom and of partiality for impartiality.

Critics of culturalist positions have argued (Jessop, Bonnett, Bromley, and Ling, 1985; Murdock and Golding, 1977, Woollacott, 1982) that culturalist studies have neglected the study of possible influences of economic and political structures on the shapings of media contents, that is, that culturalists overstate the autonomy of media discourse. Further, these critics claim that culturalists also overstate the case for the power of TV discourses and that they claim a too much ambitious aim for the approach. In this sense, Woollacott (1982) contends that some of the deficiencies of culturalism spring from the theoretical and methodological complexity it relies on. Further, Woollacott points out that the power culturalists attribute to TV discourses, e.g., the news' power to maintain hegemonic practices, is due primarily because of the news' reliance

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on "accredited sources in government and other institutions" (p.109). Because of this, Woollacott argues, it is difficult to see how TV 'operates as a field of ideological struggle.' One can add to these critiques that culturalism seems to be hunted by relativism, i.e., it fails to address the problem of how the objective assessment of the terrain of ideological struggle can be accomplished.

The Political Economy Perspective.

The political economy point of view, represented by the works of Garnham (1983), Golding and Murdock (1980), Murdock and Golding (1977), Negt and Kluge (1983), and Negt (1980) among others, emphasizes the primordial role played by the power of the economic structure of society in determining its modes of communication and cultural expressions. Negt (1980) takes as his starting point the notion that to study media from a critical theory perspective is to know that the media itself is not the central concern of the theoretician, "[t]he media does not constitute the core of critical media theory" (p.68). He contends that any critical study of TV and media should be conceived within the boundaries of a general social theory. Political economists approach the study of the mass media within a general social theory by focusing on the division of labor. For instance, in their 1983 study, Negt and Kluge

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distinguish between the sensory nature of the old and new media by arguing that both reflect a reified division of labor between the senses, i.e., as if senses were independent from each other. However, they argue that the circumstances calling for this specialization of the senses respond to different stages within the development of the means and organization of production within capitalism. In this way, the old media respond to Taylorism, which demands a fragmentation of the labor power in the interest of capitalist exploitation; thus, the traditional media also segment the social experience of the masses, e.g., radio has the monopoly of hearing, and TV together with the book and the newspaper monopolize seeing and reading. Further, the traditional or old media work independent from each other and from other economic organizations; at the most they constitute sectorial concentration. The new media, on the other hand, respond to a capitalist technological need to concentrate all social experience under and mediated by capital. This technological need renders Taylorism inoperant, that is, it requires a precise use of specific senses and at the same time a broad coordination of all senses, e.g., contemporary management demands specific sense perception concomitantly with overall notions of the working of the whole organization. This technological demand facilitates a concentration of the media organizations among themselves and with other organizations

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of the economy. Thus, in late capitalism one finds 'media conglomerates' which intensify the social effects of the old less concentrated media. The power of the media, Negt and Kluge point out, has increased in their new form. Now it is possible for the media conglomerates not only to offer programmes for all audiences but to target specific groups in the audience as totalities, that is, they can tailor production for audiences' 'entire life context,' thereby, making these target groups "the object of a concentrated opportunity for exploitation" (p.67). The role of the media is seen as creating a reified dispersed individuality and at the same time providing a sense of alienated communal experience without the necessary interpersonal bonds for a genuine life in community, as Negt and Kluge (1983) contend,

[t]he media conglomerate,..., organizes [people's] unity through an alienated reality, through what the people are not, that is to say, the cause of their merely abstract unity as individuals and the tearing apart of their needs. They are combined into individuals, but they experience this combination through the agency of capital.... Collectives come into being, but without self-regulating interpersonal relationships; there are satisfactions, but these are passive. What they are becomes organized, but minus their spontaneity. But even better: the appearance of this spontaneity is then added separately (p.69).

This power of the media conglomerate, Negt and Kluge point out, is discussed in the media discourse itself but because it is so obvious that it can direct the development of people's consciousness, the media try to downplay it. The media claim that their power has been exaggerated. This

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is because they want to hide the connection that makes media power incompatible with the media's economic private foundation. Accepting that they have this enormous power makes indefensible the private nature of media conglomerates. Again, Negt and Kluge write that under late capitalism

the company that runs the consciousness industry must try to conceal its social effect and ensure that it is underestimated, lest the basis on which its private entrepreneurial is founded be withdrawn (p.70).

From a similar standpoint Gurnham (1983) and Murdock and Golding (1977) call for a study of media within the boundaries of a general social theory. They criticize culturalist as well as structuralist approaches on the basis that these views neglect the determinacy of economic structures on media discourses. They consider culturalist as well as structuralist studies to be ideological since they do not show the connection between the economic base and the superstructural reflection, thereby, hiding the "historical context that gives [ideology] meaning an analytical advantage in examining the problems of the mass media" (Garnham, 1983, p.318).

The criticism against this position has been directed mainly to its allegedly economic reductionism and its narrow focus as a political economy of TV, and media in general, rather than paying attention to the broad issue of the political economy of society (Lodziak, 1986). However,

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as far as I can see in this review, the political economy approach has tried to put the question of media within the broader perspective of the political economy of society.

The Structuralist Perspective.

Theorists and media analysts such as Fiske (1984, 1985, 1986), Fiske and Hartley (1978), Hawkes (1977), Laclau and Mouffe (1985), Mouffe (1988) have been concerned with 'readings of media messages' as texts or discourses. Their main focus is the study of how media discourses produce meaning. In this sense, television is seen as discourse and has been granted, as in culturalist studies, an enormous ideological power. Structuralists have argued that television's discourses shape and define economic and political practices (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985). Further, some critics (Robins, 1979) argue that structuralism sees TV, as long as it is a vehicle of social discourses, as constituting the individual through penetration of the unconscious. Laclau and Mouffe (1985) offer a general theory of the constant constitution of reality, specifically social reality, through discourse. Since the term society implies a closure or 'suture' (a closed totality), they deny that society as such a closed system exists, or will ever come to exist. Thus the term society fails to properly characterize social bodies, what one experiences is a social formation, a social fabric in which a constant 'articulation' of antagonisms is being forged,

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in discourse, in a struggle between a plurality of social practices which aspire at hegemonic definitions of social relations. In their analysis of the 'vicissitudes of the concept of hegemony,' Laclau and Mouffe arrive at a redefinition of hegemony divested of all essentialism, e.g., conceptions of a social totality, and of any constitutive subject, e.g., the working class. In this sense, hegemony is a kind of constituting-constituted political game by which unarticulated elements or positions in the social formation become articulated in a discursive formation. From this point of view, hegemonic struggles increase as long as the social formation becomes more democratic. The more radical the democratic nature of the social formation the more political spaces are opened for unarticulated positions, therefore, the more possibilities for discursive struggles over articulation to exist. Laclau and Mouffe argue that since the Second World War, conditions developed for the constitution of a new hegemonic formation. The three basic conditions that made possible this new hegemonic articulation are:

1. The transition from an extensive to an intensive regime of accumulation characterized by the subsumption of all social relations under capital and the profit motive --a commoditization of all social relations.
2. The constitution of the Keynesian Welfare State, characterized by being ambiguous in fulfilling functions necessary to the regime of capital and at the same time creating conditions which undermine capital. The Welfare State is put under contradictory demands from both labor and capital --under the pressure of commodification and decommodification practices.

3. Finally, the new ambiguous cultural forms linked to the expansion of the means of mass communication play an important role. On the one hand, they contribute to the massifying and homogenizing practices of the social formation. On the other hand, they stimulate liberalizing and democratizing practices which question old privileges and status (pp.160-4).

Laclau and Mouffe write that the combined effect of these factors contributes to the emergence of new antagonisms and resistances that, in turn, will radicalize the formation of particularism, the demand for autonomy, and the possibility for new articulations in and of the social. These new articulations call for a new hegemonic formation in front of the utopian horizon of radical democratic struggles. In accordance with the above third basic condition, Fiske and Hartley (1978) contend that TV and language mediate reality, that experience is structured and apprehended through language. Like Laclau and Mouffe (1985), Fiske and Hartley defend the view that human beings are constituted and that they produce reality through language. The role of television is to enhance these constitution and production. This is why it is so important the study of TV practices to understand societal practices. And, in opposition to the political economy approach, Fiske and Hartley think that "the starting-point of any study of television must be with what is actually there on the screen" (1978, p.21). Fiske (1984) in his analysis of TV discourses has given a superior position to discourse over the subject. He defines the discourse-reader (-viewer,-

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subject) relationship as follows:

the subjectivities of readers are formed largely by their discursive experience, that is by the discourses available to them to make sense of their social experience, and of the multitude of texts that they meet (p.186).

Fiske agrees that there is a plurality of discourses struggling to articulate hegemonic discursive practices and that any discourse striving to produce significant social change should try to articulate the dominant social discourses of the moment, otherwise, it will lose the mass appeal necessary to be effective. From this position it is nearly impossible to conceive that any radical discourse can articulate positions and social elements to become hegemonic. In this sense Fiske's approach necessarily departs from a conservative position.

In her critique of structuralism, Robins (1979) contends that it is an Althusserian-Barthesian-Lacanian theoretical 'ingestion' that carries with it the limitations of these theorists. From Althusser it inherits both the idealism that ideology constitutes the subject and a disconnection of ideology from other spheres of reality. From the semiotics of Barthes, structuralism carries with it a high level of abstraction which handicaps its capacity for concrete analysis of TV and media in their historical context. Finally, Lacan introduces an uncritical edge into structuralism. In Robins words,

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The Lacanian ...theory of language..., is merely a reified apperception of the process of linguistic alienation as it now exists in capitalist society. It uncritically reflects the process of abstraction occurring in reality itself..., insofar as [it] fail[s] to recognize the alienated an alienating dimensions of that reality (p.369).

Thus against structuralist positions it has been argued that sometimes they lack the critical edge, that they depict the audience as a totally passive body, and/or, similar to culturalist studies, that they overstate the case for the power of television (Lodziak, 1986). Further, from the structuralist standpoint as discussed here (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985; Mouffe, 1988), it seems that the formation of hegemonic articulations in capitalism take a characteristic form mainly because of the existence of a discursively structured audience which historically has been pacified. Thus, the so called Western democracies have in fact increasingly provided ample opportunity for dissimilar views to compete in the articulation struggle, but because of historically cemented discursive conditions, the ones who take advantage of this openness are the structurally privileged, non-pacified social groups. From this, it seems that structuralism fails to analyze the differential economico-political conditions in which pacified audiences were structured and in which pacified and non-pacified groups are maintained.

Taken together, the differences and similarities among critical perspectives seem to point toward new trends

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that can help to better understand the workings of TV practices. Further, as the political economists contend and as it will be argued below, critical approaches together with some of the features presented by pluralist theory point out problems that call for a general theory of society to accomplish such an understanding. Within the confines of this theory the role of TV and media in the social fabric can be explored. Moreover, as it is becoming clear by now, and as it will be expanded below, these critical approaches give a significant importance to the notion of discourse to understand the workings of society and its institutions.

TV Analyses and Discourse

Lodziak (1986) summarizes the main shifts on television analyses that have come from the critical perspectives:

1. A shift of attention from isolated effects on individuals to a concern with ideological effects.
2. A shift in terms of conception of television power from messages to analyses of television in terms of its socio-political context.
3. A shift from messages conceived as stimuli to messages as a complex of phenomena, as coded discourse.
4. A recognition that individuals vary in their interpretations of television discourse.
5. A theoretical interest in the wide, rather than television, range of factors affecting individuals in society.
6. An interest in the study of television as a business within the capitalist system.

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7. An interest in the study of the roles that television plays as purveyor of the interest of the state and dominant groups by projecting their dominant ideology (pp.28-9).

To study television from the perspective of the above 'shifts', a programmatic research strategy would be required. Such strategy would include the development of methods of analysis that can explore the determinants of social production and reproduction, of television production, these determinants influence and expression in television own activities, and the relationship of these activities to audiences' ideological and material activities. In this sense, Lodziak (1986) goes on to argue for a critical alternative that can encompass the different issues brought about by the above three critical positions. He argues that perhaps the social influence of television by itself is negligible and that the social thinker should look to other factors that promote the 'development of motivational patterns' that lead to political apathy and induce people into private spaces which encourage the use of television. Lodziak argues that factors such as the availability of material (money) and immaterial (time) resources and the experiences of needs are far more important than informational factors in influencing people's ideological dispositions. He proposes analyses of the 'social totality' in order to understand the power of and roles television plays in society. He contends that one

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needs to differentiate between the powers that shape television production and the powers that shape social production and reproduction. The latter, he thinks, condition TV power. This point of view brings to the fore implications for understanding television's social influences in the context of relations of power and powerlessness. Thus, television would exert a more powerful ideological influence in affluent societies, that is, societies which can satisfy the material needs of their population and are in the power position to 'enact their myths.' In this way, the television role in shaping ideologies would be influenced by the type, degrees of quality, and degrees of diversity of discourses addressing people through television and by the material conditions of those societies. The latter, in turn, condition the quality and type of television discourses and the availability and type of work and leisure activities people engage in. This has important consequences for: (1) The study of TV social roles in relation to the access to television that societies offer, i.e., societies that provide more open TV-access to their people (England, Holland) versus societies whose political and economic structures restrict the public's access to television (Zaire), as reported by Head (1985); (2) analyses of both the space, e.g., solitary confinement versus public interaction, and time, e.g., active versus passive, that TV fills in people lives; and,

(3) TV roles in the reproduction of ideologies and the articulation of hegemonic discursive practices in affluent societies which may veil the latter's economic, political, and military practices aimed at the domination of less powerful societies.

Recent studies (Connell and Mills, 1985; Davis, 1985; van Dijk, 1985a, 1985b) claim the status of independent interdisciplinary field for discourse analysis. For instance, van Dijk (1985a) includes works from a diversity of psychological, sociological, anthropological, and philosophical discourses. Further, in his *Discourse and Communication* (1985b), van Dijk offers a collection of works related primarily to mass media and discourse analysis. In what follows van Dijk (1985a) presents the relevance of discourse analysis to the type of issues Lodziak (1986) differentiates in terms of TV studies.

Discourse analysis provides us with rather powerful, while subtle and precise, insights to pinpoint the everyday manifestations and displays of social problems in communication and interaction. It is here that we witness the realization of the macrosociological patterns that characterize our societies. Certainly discourse features may only be symptoms or fragmentary enactments of large problems: inequality, class differences, sexism, racism, power, and dominance of course involve more than text and talk. Yet discourse play a crucial role in their ideological formulation, in their communicative reproduction, in the social and political decision procedures, and the institutional management and representation of such issues (p.7, volume 4).

As I already said, the objective of this study will be to explore commercial TV discursive practices in the US as they relate to terrorism and Nicaragua. To do this I

intend to bring to bear Habermas' communication theory (1979, 1984, 1987a) on the problematic of discourse analysis. I will argue that Habermas' theory provides a perspective which encompasses the concern of the political economists with the social totality. However, in opposition to the political economy view, Habermas considers the symbolic structures and practices of society as a factor of first importance to understand the workings of power in society. Further, while acknowledging ideological struggles, Habermas provide rational grounding to assess these struggles. Moreover, in elucidating the interconnection of the economy, the state, and the public, he comes to locate the pragmatic aspects of the symbolic on a relevant social plane. Furthermore, without taking for granted the claims of pluralism, Habermas analyzes the conditions and dynamics that within capitalism maintain differential structures of power and argues the need for their dissolution. In this sense, he derives standards of communication practices that aim at making good the democratic claims of pluralism.

However, before turning to analyze Habermas' work in Chapters V and VI, I will, in the following chapter, discuss the issue of TV discourse(s) on terrorism, provide a broad definition of discourse, differentiate between partial and democratic discourses, and characterize what I call partial discourse.

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CHAPTER IV

DISCOURSES: US ADMINISTRATION AND TELEVISION DISCOURSES ON TERRORISM

In this chapter I will provide a general definition of discourse and differentiate between two types of discourse: partial and democratic. Subsequently, by way of analyzing the US Administration's discourse toward Nicaragua in particular, I will characterize what I call particularistic or partial discourse: A discourse which precludes a rational analysis of terrorism since it imputes the causality and agency of terrorism only to governments and groups which challenge the US Administration's positions. This is a discourse which fails to grasp structural historical conditions that have contributed to the institutionalization of a type of terror which is expressed, among other things, in the systematic institutionalization of hunger, rigid structures that guarantee the continuing economic dominance of minorities over a vast majority of people, and the denial of political rights to the majority. Further, I will present, as partial discourses, different types of discourse about terrorism that have been discussed in the literature on TV and terrorism. I will differentiate between official discourse,

alternative discourse, and oppositional discourse. Finally, I will argue the need for a critical discourse to which my study will contribute.

Discourse

I will conceive of discourse in broad terms as social practice, and will discuss two sub-types of discursive social practices. Then, I will define both particularistic or partial and democratic or encompassing forms of discourse as a way of setting the boundaries of a discursive spectrum against which discursive practices can be assessed.

Macdonell (1986) posits that discourse is primarily dialogical, therefore, it is social. She asserts "....The statement made, the words used and the meanings of the words used, depends on where and against what the statement is made" (p.1). She goes on to argue further that discourse is a type of language use which is identified in terms of an institutional association, a historical positioning, and a relational differentiation in terms of other discourse(s). Moreover, she writes, discourses highlight specific events and objects and obfuscate other objects and events. Finally, she concludes, discourses are not restricted to verbal signs, "....Whatever signifies or has meaning can be considered part of discourse" (p.4). In a similar vein, Duranti (1985) isolates two main concerns of socio-cultural studies of discourse. The first concern

refers to the need to study discourse in relation to its context of formulation. The second concern "is the need for a characterization of speech not simply as a tool for describing the world but also as a tool for changing the world" (p.196). In Duranti's view discourse is both a linguistic structure and a social process; its study requires the constitution of a bridge between discourse form and social context, thus, the discourse analyst should be 'running back and forth across the bridge.' Duranti characterizes discourses as speech events and he says that speech events

... must be seen as an intended bridge between the macro- and the microlevels of sociocultural analysis. In the same vein, the order of things that I deal with represents in most part an intermediate level between the two poles of socio-cultural orders, namely, the mode of production, transaction, and exchange that characterize a particular society, and some particular processes of interpersonal communication, namely, daily verbal interaction (1985, p.202).

Thus, Duranti argues, a socio-cultural perspective in discourse analysis should deal with the tension between social members' verbal interaction and participation as cooperative achievement. Verbal interaction is conceived "as social activity that can be understood only through the acceptance and interpretation of independent social norms and cultural expectations" (1985, p.206).

Thompson (1984) engages in a reconstructive analysis of the relationship between language (discourse) and ideology. Starting from an appraisal of critical and

pluralistic theories of ideology, Thompson makes connections between discourse and ideology. For him, discourses are social practices immersed in power struggles, in circumstances of conflict, and in social change. Speech, he says, is a 'practical competence.' In this sense he locates the study of discourse in terms of 'actually occurring instances of expression,' e.g., conversations between people, newspaper editorials, TV news, novels and so on; in terms of 'linguistic units that exceed the limits of a single sentences,' e.g., conversations and texts; and in terms of an 'interest between the relations of linguistic and non-linguistic activities,' e.g., connections between economic and language use in determined social contexts.

On Defining Discourse.

The above characterizations of discourse together with the previous discussion of critical and pluralist approaches to TV studies provide ways to conceive of discourse as social practice. Discourse is practice in the sense that discourse connects and gives directions and has the potential to dismantle and disorient the political, social, and cultural development of the basic skeleton of the social fabric.

In broad terms, one can say that discourse is a circumscribing dynamic social practice that symbolically expresses, reflects, and constructs economico-political

power relations, that conceals and reveals meaning by assigning signification to certain events, issues, or phenomena as well as taking signification from other issues, events, or phenomena. Discourse is constituted by social practices that not only circumscribe and distribute opportunities for participation in the production of symbolic events, the use of information sources, the manner of argumentation, and the deployment and representation of images, but that also express, reinforce, and participate in the production of forms and types of prevalent social relations. Further, insofar as discourse is both a product and expression of the social structure of a society, it embodies the social contradictions of that society. In this sense, discourse defines a framework, a social space from which members of a society can contribute to change, maintain, interpret, construct, and re-construct social reality. Insofar as discourse is a social practice from which people can change, maintain, interpret, construct, and re-construct reality, it is 'real' as opposed to 'ideal.' From this broad generalization, the first discourse sub-type can be defined.

Partial or Particularistic Discourse.

Peterson (1986) characterizes the official political practice in the US in the following way:

Like advertising, with its use of repetition and its appeals to the unconscious, contemporary politics makes truth claims and arguments in fragmented and arbitrary

ways that reveal a lack of argumentative seriousness if not an entirely open irony. It leans heavily on the self-referential features of language: with vivid images, crude assertions, and truncated arguments, it downplays the need for analysis or discussion of the historical events themselves (p.3).

Peterson's characterization is appropriate to define a discourse that instead of providing ground for the clarification of the issues in question, e.g., terrorism, manipulates the conditions for clarification in a way that obscures the possibilities of an understanding. When this discourse becomes dominant, it may help to maintain and reinforce unequal structures and social relationships in the society in question. Further, it can confuse, blind or neutralize possible agents, e.g., those who otherwise could challenge the legitimacy of the intentions and interests it represents. Thus, such discourse can create favorable avenues for differential power to be expressed and particular interests to be pursued at the expense of other particular interests, i.e., for power to be constituted as domination. Moreover, in this way partial discourses favor the institutionalization of undemocratic social and political practices and structures.

- One can argue that such a particularistic discourse fails to fulfil the communication and political requirements of a democratic society. This discourse demarcates a social practice that fails to provide conditions to bring disagreeing parties together. Thus, it neither allows for genuine scrutiny of conflicting reasons

and arguments nor does it contribute to rational democratic solutions for disagreements. It fails to contribute to the institutionalization of democratic structures in society. In the literature on persuasion, this partial discourse has been described as manipulative. Harre (1985) summarizes its main features: first, it intends to produce changes in the 'hearer' that are in the interest of the 'orator' but of which the 'hearer' is unaware. Second, it treats the 'hearer' as a thing and intends to affect him/her through 'causal mechanism.' And, third, the partial discourse embodies a contempt for the 'hearer.'

Democratic or Encompassing Discourse.

In contrast to particularistic discourse, one can conceive of discourse as a social space in which the reasons behind the creation of meaning and the expression of interests can be challenged in order to unveil hidden manipulations. In contrast to the partial discourse, a democratic discourse is an open language practice that, by accommodating in principle all perspectives on an issue, can guarantee the conditions for all meanings to be explored, all arguments to be grounded, and all motives to become clear. It is a discourse that, through the use of reasoned, uncoerced argumentation, provides the conditions for the symbolic exposure of differential oppressive power. Thus, it helps to bring to consciousness unjust, unequal economico-political social structures, thereby contributing

to further the conditions for their replacement. Following Habermas (1979, 1984, 1987a), a democratic discourse as I understand it provides the space in which all particular interpretations, interests, needs, desires, powers, and motivations can be discovered and/or rationally modified in behalf of agreements guided by democratic norms of 'generalizable interest.' It is a discourse that in contrast to manipulative persuasion embodies a concern with rational persuasion. It presents a 'moral structure' (Harre, 1985) by: first, without ignoring the 'orator's' interest, focusing primarily the 'hearer's' interest. Second, it intends to engage the 'hearer' in a rational dialogue and acknowledges the "hearer's powers of rational thought." And, third, it is concerned with a general raising of the "moral standard of all concerned" and supposes "the ultimate persuasive discourse as rational" (p - 127).

Contrasting Positions: Toward a Characterization of the US Administration's Discourse

As both illustration of partial discourse and preliminary step to the description and characterization of the TV discourse concerning this analysis, it will be useful, by way of a contrast to challenging discourses, to provide a general characterization of the US Administration's discourse so as to define the boundaries of a discursive spectrum against which the characteristics

of the US's commercial TV discourse on terrorism and Nicaragua, in our case study, can be assessed.

Since the first inauguration of President Reagan, Administration officials have accused Nicaragua of being a terrorist state. These accusations are usually tied to claims that connect the Nicaraguan Government with Cuba, Libya, and the USSR, and to statements about the 'threat of communism.' This discursive connection between terrorism and communism is said to be a historical one. The claim is made that terrorism is irrational and has been the exclusive weapon of communist subversion. Communism is said to be the archenemy of rational democracies, therefore any country associated with terrorism and communism must be the US's enemy and must be combated.

The Reagan Administration alleges other similar connections to justify its policies toward Nicaragua and to bring about the collapse of the Sandinista Government. The creation of and support to the Contras, Administration maneuvers for the approval by Congress of its requests for funding for the Contras, the economic embargo against Nicaragua, the mining of the Nicaraguan harbors, the accusations that Nicaragua had invaded Honduras, in March 1986 (with the consequently \$20 million in military aid to Honduras), and the US's Administration rejection of the rule of law of the World Court, testify to the intentions of the Reagan Administration with respect to Nicaragua. The

Central American Team of the Institute for Policy Studies adds,

[i]n february 1985, while campaigning to restore funds to the contras suspended in late 1984, President Reagan brazenly admitted to wanting "to remove" the Sandinista government -- or making it cry "uncle". The Administration's candor -- finally unveiling its long concealed objectives -- appeared to openly violate international agreements in the O.A.S. and U.N. charters, and the Boland Amendment, a law passed by Congress prohibiting U.S. efforts at toppling the Nicaraguan government (In Contempt of Congress, 1985, p.7).

Lately, the public has witnessed an increasing association of 'the communist threat,' 'terrorism' and the Nicaraguan Government by US Administration officials (Casey, 1985; Oakley, 1985a, 1985b; Reagan, 1985). For instance, Casey (1985) describes the terrorist network and its products,

. . . . This network may not be a component of but it works in unison with what the Soviets have developed into the most powerful weapons system the World has ever seen. This consists perhaps, not primarily, of the missiles capable of striking at the United States and most of its allies and the overwhelming conventional strength which can be projected into Europe and towards the Persian Gulf, but also of the weapons of aggressive subversion. It has succeeded in installing Communist governments in Angola, Ethiopia, South Yemen, Mozambique, Cambodia, and Nicaragua, and resulted in sending its conventional forces for the first time over the borders of the Soviet Union to occupy Afghanistan. It consists also of the system of the combination of active measures, political action and propaganda which the Soviets use to influence and manipulate popular opinion and political processes in the open societies of the World (pp.13-4).

In the same mood, Oakley (1985a), director of the Office for Counter Terrorism and Emergency Planning, states,

Cuba and Nicaragua provide the strongest encouragement and direct support for terrorist activities in other Latin American countries, particularly those with insurgency situations. They, of course, receive support from the Soviet bloc. In addition, Italian and possibly other leftist terrorists have found refuge in Nicaragua (p.3).

President Reagan (1986) gives his view of the
Nicaraguan Government:

.... It is a Communist dictatorship. It has done what Communist dictatorship do: create a repressive state security and secret police organization assisted by Soviet, East German and Cuban advisers; harassed, and in many cases expunged, the political opposition; and rendered the democratic freedoms of speech, press, and assembly punishable by officially sanctioned harassment and imprisonment or death (p.10).

Further, President Reagan (1985) speaks about the international terrorist network formed by North Korea, Libya, Iran, Cuba, and Nicaragua. In unison with Mr. Casey, Mr. Reagan's point of view is that this terrorist network is supported by the Soviet Union and works closely connected with the PLO, Red Brigades, the Baader-Meinhoff group, the ETA, the Tupamaros and the IRA. Of the members of the thus defined terrorist network, Nicaragua is one of most active members; this is so not only because of the actual engagement of Nicaragua in terrorist activities, but also because the Sandinistas are the fruit of terrorist training. Mr. Reagan, talking about Castro's terrorist activities, asserts that

Castro himself has acknowledged that he actively assisted the Sandinistas in the early 1970s when they were training in the Middle East with terrorist factions of the PLO (1985, p.2).

Mr. Reagan (1985) goes on to characterize the Sandinistas as being at the center of worldwide terrorism and as being one of the most virulent member of the so defined terrorist network,

.... The Sandinistas not only sponsor terror in El Salvador, Costa Rica, and Honduras -- terror that led recently to the murder of four U.S. Marines, two civilians, and seven Latin Americans -- they provide one of the world's principal refuges for international terrorists.

Members of the Italian Government have openly charged that Nicaragua is harboring some of Italy's worst terrorists. And we have evidence that in addition to Italy's Red Brigades, other elements of the world's most vicious terrorist groups -- West Germany's Baader-Meinhoff gang, the Basque ETA..., the PLO, the Tupamaros, and the IRA... have found a heaven in Nicaragua and support from that country's communist dictatorship (p.2).

Henry Kissenger (1986) adds,

From the outset, the Sandinistas have maintained close ties with Cuba and the Soviet Union. There are some 8,000 Cuban advisers now in Nicaragua, including at least 2,000 military advisers, as well as several hundred Soviet, East European, Libyan, and PLO advisers (p.15).

However, there has been an increasing amount of literature (Americas Watch Committee, 1982; Brody, 1985; Burbach and Flynn, 1984; Dixon, 1985; Institute for Policy Studies, 1985; and alternative Press such as The Nation and The Guardian) and public discussion that challenge such charges. For example, the Americas Watch Committee (1986), while recognizing that there have been and still are abuses by Nicaraguan officials, summarizes its findings with respect to the Reagan Administration's treatment of Human Rights in Nicaragua,

1. Far from being "the moral center" of policy toward Nicaragua, human rights has been used to justify a policy of confrontation.

2. To that end, human rights data have been distorted in the annual State Department Country Reports on Nicaragua, in White House informational handouts on Nicaragua, in speeches and public statements by senior officials and most notably, in the President's own remarks on Nicaragua.

3. Such misuse of human rights to justify military interference is in U.S.-Latin American relations an unprecedented debasement of the human rights cause.

4. Of particular concern is the administration's constant--and inaccurate--use of the term "totalitarian" to characterize Nicaragua (p.127).

In addition, evidence has been presented (Americas Watch Committee, 1984, 1986; Americas Watch Committee and the ACLU, 1982; Bonner, 1986; Brown, 1985) to show how US supported regimes and groups in Central America use terrorist practices against their own population, thus indicating that the Reagan Administration is, in fact, sponsoring terrorism in that region. In this regard, Eqbal Ahmad declares:

Today, those who condemn terrorism the most are among its primary sponsors. The Nicaraguan Contras, armed and aided by the United States, are terrorist by any definition. So is the Israeli-sponsored South Lebanon Army, which held 22 Finnish U.N. observers hostage only a few weeks ago. So are the militant Israeli settlers in the West Bank and Gaza (Los Angeles Times, 3-8-86).

In a similar vein, Brody (1985) presents a chronology of 397 Contra attacks on civilian populations from December 1, 1981 to November 30, 1984. These attacks can appropriately be classified as terrorist attacks. Brody states that "[the report] includes only attacks resulting

in the deaths, injury or kidnapping of civilians or the destruction of farmland or private or communal property" (p.153). What follows is a brief summary of the report by Brody.

In Namasli 01-18-83, the Contras killed at least 7 people when they were preparing to collect coffee in a plantation near the Honduran border. On 12-04-84, in Telpanelca, the Contras killed 21 coffee picker volunteers. In the Agronica Farm on 12-28-82, 70 coffee picker volunteers after long torture were assassinated by the Contras. In the state farm La Sorpresa on 11-14-84, 400 to 600 Contras men attacked destroying all the equipment and machinery and killing 17 of the civilian workers. In the Sumubila village on 04-17-84, the Contras attacked destroying hospital facilities, cacao warehouse, the electricity plant, the agrarian reform office, and the fumigation center, two civilian were killed and more than 30 kidnapped. In the town of Ocotal on 06-01-84, 500-600 Contras attacked the town destroying all its economic and civilian facilities, among other things they destroyed: the state owned lumber mill with a 14,000 daily feet wood processing capacity which produced jobs for 250 people; the electric company office; the building, machinery, and two tons of coffee of the processing plant; the commercial radio station; six grain storage silos together with 1,500 tons of corn, rice, sorghum, and beans; in the attack seven civilians were killed and several wounded.

Brody comments that in several of these attacks, the Contras left behind CIA made manuals instructing the population on how to sabotage the Nicaraguan economy, e.g., destroy roads and vehicles, cut electrical wires, puncture vehicle tires, leave lights on, plug toilets, and so on. Further, the CIA composed for the Contras the now famous 'Psychological Operations on Guerrilla Warfare' which explained how to use violence for propagandistic purposes. Moreover, the Americas Watch Committee states that

With respect to the human rights practices of the contras, we have examined the administration's claims for the moral character of these insurgents and find, to the contrary, that the contras have systematically engaged in the killing of prisoners and the unarmed, including medical and relief personnel; selective attacks on civilians and indiscriminate attacks; torture and other outrages against personal dignity; and the kidnappings and harassment of refugees. We find that the most violent abuses of human rights in Nicaragua today are being committed by the contras, and that the Reagan administration's policy of support for the contras is, therefore, a policy clearly inimical to human rights (1986, p.128).

Not only from the terrorism typology proposed in the first chapter of this study but from the Administration's own definitions, all the events and practices Brody and the Americas Watch Committee describe about the Contras' behavior are terrorist practices. From the point of view of the Reagan Administration's sponsorship of the Contras, these practices fall within the category of state terrorism. For motives that I am not going to explore here, the US Administration's official discourse about terrorism does not include these terrorist practices that can be imputed to it and/or to subordinate groups and friendly governments. In this sense Bonner (1986) comments,

In Nicaragua, human rights abuses by soldiers have been punished. As the result of one investigation, and the appointment of a special prosecutor, for example, thirteen individuals, including the commander of a security force unit, were sentenced for up to seventeen years for murder, torture, rape, and robbery. That doesn't happen in El Salvador. Some 40,000 civilians have been killed there in the past four years. Women have been raped. Villages have been plundered. Yet not one death squad member, not one officer who has carried out the massacres of peasants, not one soldier--with the exception of the national guardsmen who killed four American churchwomen and a civil defense guard--has been

convicted and sentenced for human rights crime (p.131).

US Administration Discourse on Terrorism and Nicaragua: A Characterization.

From the previous discussion, the official discourse on terrorism can thus be characterized in the following way:

- The US Administration's discourse about terrorism is directed against governments that do not share its economic and political positions, e.g., Nicaragua, Cuba.
- The US Administration's discourse portrays the Nicaraguan Government as an irrational form of government.
- The Nicaraguan Government is portrayed as a government that maintains its power through the use of violence.
- The Nicaraguan Government is usually associated with communism and characterized as an enemy of democracy.
- The Nicaraguan Government is associated with terrorist practices.
- The Nicaraguan Government is associated with threats to US national security and continental security.
- The US Administration's discourse ignores violent actions practiced by itself and its allies while at the same time imputing similar practices, as terrorist practices, to the Nicaraguan Government.
- The US Administration's discourse fails to take into consideration the historical structures that contribute to institutionalize a systematic use of economic-socio-political violence against the majority of people in certain Central American countries, e.g., El Salvador and Honduras.
- The US Administration's discourse ignores the voice of recognized personalities and international organizations when these voices contradict and challenge the US Administration's assertions.
- The US Administration's discourse accuses that the Media in general, but mainly television, are manipulated by terrorists and that television contributes to their survival.

-The US Administration's discourse is generally presented by reputed experts who claim the legitimacy of science and authority; however, it is a discourse that does not properly substantiate its evidence.

-Finally, the US Administration's discourse is a discourse that appears as grounded on reason but, at the same time, presents self-contained barriers that deny the possibility of scrutinizing this reason. It ignores positions that challenge its premises and tends to substantiate itself through its own self-understanding.

The above features illustrate the unstableness, deceitfulness, and fickleness, what we may call the giddiness of the Administration discourse. They also make clear why the US Administration's discourse is an instance of what I call particularistic discourse. Moreover, it serves to establish a discursive spectrum to assess the commercial TV discourse on terrorism about Nicaragua. Obviously, my choosing to instantiate the partial discourse with a characterization of the US Administration's discourse is an intentional one. It will help us locate the US's commercial TV discourse on terrorism and violence about Nicaragua in the spectrum undemocratic-democratic discourse in a way that is relevant to my study. However, it is not my intention to assert that the US Administration's discourse on terrorism is alone in the partial or undemocratic discourse extreme. One knows that other governmental as well as non-governmental discourses, leftist as well as rightist, share places in the undemocratic pole of discourse. Nonetheless, the US Administration's discourse is the relevant one for my

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purpose in this study.

TV Discourse on Terrorism

Although the term discourse is not frequently used in studies of terrorism and TV, TV discourses on terrorism have been addressed from different angles. For instance, Bassiouni (1982) argues that TV discursive practices help terrorists accomplish their goal, i.e., to psychologically intimidate populations and make them more prone to give in to terrorist demands. Further, he argues that TV discursive and material practices in relation to terrorism conflict with the interest of society in three areas: (1) TV disseminates information useful to terrorist. It can constitute itself in the 'intelligence arm' of the terrorist by broadcasting police activities and bargaining strategies, names of possible hostages, and operational tactics that other officials intend to use against terrorists. (2) TV can contribute to enhance the tension between terrorists and law enforcement officials, thus, making difficult possible negotiation between them. (3) Finally, TV posits a problem of 'crowd control' for police and other law enforcement officials, i.e., the necessary equipment that TV crews carry with them (lights, cameras) may make the terrorist more aware of the possibility of increasing TV coverage. Further, TV can convert a news event into an entertainment spectacle, thus, attracting people and augmenting the police's work and risk.

Other scholars such as Barton and Gregg (1982) concentrate on analyzing how TV discourse on terrorism is structured to enhance its credibility and authority. They argue that TV crews are shown on the scene, that contradictory information is eliminated, and that events are prioritized according to their inclusion of important political and social figures. All this is done to provide TV news discourses with an aura of credibility and authority. Barton and Gregg point out that this is expressed in the forms of 'predictions' which anticipate events and 'affirmation of network authority' by selecting, structuring, and presenting the news broadcast in a way that aggressively establishes the authority of the TV network. Barton and Gregg conclude that the result of this structuring of news is the production of a misleading discourse.

The above studies represent different types of discourse about terrorism and TV. Elliot, Murdock, and Schelensinger (1983) distinguish three types of discourses related to TV discourse about terrorism: the official, the alternative, and the oppositional.

The Official Discourse.

This type of discourse expresses the view of governments and states. In the case of the US, this view is represented by officials of the Reagan Administration and by intellectuals engaged in the 'war' against terrorism.

Elliot et al. cite English Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher as prescribing the appropriate behavior of broadcasting and the press. According to this view:

They must of course, report the facts. Nothing would be more damaging than misinformation and lack of balance. Yet the line is hard to draw for terrorism needs publicity. Newspaper and television coverage can provoke the very reaction the terrorist seeks. It can give the convicted criminals on hunger strike the myth of martyrdom they crave, but the true martyrs are the victims of terrorism (p.156).

William Casey (1985), former director of the CIA, distinguishes two factors on which terrorists depend: coverage by the media and the nature of urban modern societies. He argues that coverage by the media is the most important factor for terrorism's survival and asserts that

.... In this decade more people can be addressed by newspaper, television, radio, and magazines than ever before in history. What is more, the media is so effective that millions of people may learn of a terrorist attack that has taken place half a world away in a matter of minutes.... It is not accident that the vast bulk of the most heinous terrorist murders, bombings and hijackings take place... in cities that possess excellent communications links with the rest of the world.

The terrorist hopes that his deeds will be bannered on the six o'clock news throughout most of the developed world, will be commented on at length in the world's leading newspapers, and perhaps become the subject of everyday conversation (p.2).

Neither Thatcher's nor Casey's speeches present significant differences from the previous analysis of Bassiouni (1982). Neither does Laqueur (1987) when he argues that TV motivates and contributes to the 'spread' of terrorism. In his words, "... the journalist and the

television camera are the terrorist's best friend" (p.121). Furthermore, he says, "[t]he overall effect of the symbiotic relationship between the media and terrorism has been the exaggeration of the importance of terrorism, and its embellishment" (p.126). These comments represent scholars' and governments officials' versions of the official discourse on terrorism.

Elliot et al. (1983) point out further that the official discourse associates terrorism with communist subversion which, in turn, is characterized, together with terrorism, as being different (i.e., communists and terrorists are 'not proper members of society' --the terrorism of the PLO, the Symbionese Liberation Army, the Weathermen), as being threatening (i.e., the alleged power of these outsider or foreigner enemies serves to distance anyone from trying to understand their position lest he/she wants to be identified as an internal enemy -- the terrorism of Lybia), and as being irrational (i.e., not only terrorism and communism are irrational but whatever support these communists or terrorists enemies may have in the society --the irrationality of both the Sandinistas and the Americans supporting them).

The Alternative Discourse.

The alternative discourse is used by certain oppositional leaders and intellectuals. Elliot et al. (1983) describe the alternative view as one that 'appears'

to challenge the official discourse, but does not offer "a fundamental challenge to the claims to legitimacy found in the official discourse" (p.157). This view concentrates on the analysis of human costs and aims at the implementation of "strategies of political and social engineering designed to defuse the violence" (p.158). This alternative and the official views have been taken for granted as the only valid views about terrorism by such mass media scholars and terrorism experts as Alexander (1978, 1983, 1984), Altheide (1985), Bouthoul (1975), Cooper (1977), Fenyvesi (1977, 1984). For the most part, these experts tend to analyze the technical aspects influencing TV coverage of terrorism and/or the psychological profile of the individual terrorist, i.e., terrorism is defined as a psychological pathology and its irrational nature is stressed. Instances of this alternative discourse is the above study by Barton and Gregg (1982), which concentrates on the technological question of how TV exploits the phenomenon of terrorism, and Altheide's (1985) analysis of TV, which makes responsible the technology that makes TV possible for the way discourses are configured on TV. These analyses appear to be critical of the TV discourse, but do not offer any challenge to the legitimacy of the official discourse.

Elliot et al. point out that the alternative discourse at its most critical point reduces the importance of terrorism to the specter of nuclear confrontation

between the superpowers, i.e., terrorism is reduced to the future possibility of a nuclear war between the US and the Soviet Union. In this way the alternative discourse neglects the study of both national and international state terror.

The Oppositional Discourse.

This oppositional discourse on TV is represented by those who advocate the use of violence (the terrorists' sponsors and supporters) for political reasons. The representatives of this position provide two justifications for political violence: on the one hand, they justify the use of violence when the state has become a political, social, and economic repressive entity. On the other hand, violence is justified when the state has become an agent of colonialism in relation to other states or segments of its own population. Media analysts such as Carpini and William (1984) have pointed out that the oppositional view is largely ignored by both most media institutions and scholars and terrorism experts.

As we can see, the above TV discourses fail to include in their structure not only the voices that directly challenge their assertions but alternative type of discourses that offer different interpretations and analyses of terrorism as well as express social contradictions and relation of power inherent in those

interpretations, voices, and assertions. The official, alternative, and oppositional discourses Elliot et al differentiate as well as the US Administration's discourse on terrorism discussed above are instances, albeit not in the same way and degree, of what I have called partial or particularistic discourse.

The Need for a Critical Alternative Discourse

So far the definition of democratic and partial discourses and the instantiation of the partial discourse, I think provide ground to assert that the above Elliot et al.'s (1983) categorization needs elaboration and can be criticized at three levels: First, they do not seem to include a different kind of official discourse, that of certain governments which are increasingly arguing that the so called Western democratic societies, i.e., England, USA, France, and so on, engage in the same terrorist practices they accuse others of doing. A case in point is the argument the Nicaraguan Government has made at the International Court that the US engages in terrorist activities against Nicaragua. Second, in what Elliot et al. call oppositional view, they seem to include insurrectionary violence that national liberation movements mount against oppressive states. This violence is directed against political entities or institutions and has the support of significant segments of the population, e.g., guerrilla movements in countries such as Pinochet's Chile.

Though one can argue against this use of violence, it cannot be analyzed together with the problem of terrorism, i.e., a violence that, in contrast to terrorism, is not target against civilians but mainly against military objectives. Third, Elliot et al. fail to differentiate a fourth alternative, an alternative that without aligning with defenders of terrorism, and in the light of the available knowledge about terrorism, provides a way to challenge the other positions.

This fourth alternative, which may be called a critical alternative, has been developed in different forms at the level of mass media and TV studies by writers such Fishman (1978, 1980), Gerbner, Gross, Morgan, and Signorielli (1982), the Glasgow University Media Group (1976, 1980), and Knight and Dean (1982). This fourth alternative argues both that TV and other mass media structure information according to the views of representatives of the status quo and that current TV analyses about violence and terrorism are inadequate to scrutinize the biased representation of views about terrorism mass media, and TV in particular, provide.

In relation to state terrorism comprehensive studies of the press have being made. For instance, Chomsky and Herman (1979a,b), Herman (1982) have provided evidence that the press coverage of state terrorism, and terrorism in general, presents only the official and alternative

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discourses of terrorism. They argue that the press largely ignores the type of terrorism that certain states employ against their own population. Specifically, they claim that the press in the US has ignored the terrorist practices of such states as Brazil, Uruguay, Argentina, Paraguay, and Chile. These states have frequently been supporters of US's policies. Chomsky (1985, 1986, 1987), Chomsky and Herman (1979) argue further that the press has collaborated with US's administrations, and specifically the Reagan Administration, tendency to accuse unfriendly states of engaging in terrorist practices. Such is the case of Poland, Nicaragua, Cuba, Libya, and other countries that have been associated with the USSR and/or do not have friendly relationship with the US. I think that the type of analysis presented by Chomsky and Herman not only provides a critical alternative approach to the problem of terrorism, but also raises important questions about the adequacy of dominant media analyses of terrorism. For instance, they show that the terrorism that is presented in the mass media is by no means the most important form of terrorism; they substantiate the thesis that the state terrorism practiced by what the Reagan Administration has called 'mild' authoritarian states against their own population is by and large the most important form of contemporary terrorism and, at the same time, they explore the reasons or the interests that inhibit the mass media

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from treating this issue. Herman (1982) points out,

[o]n the state level, Begin's Israel in its Lebanese invasion and Botha's South Africa in regular assaults on their neighbors each kills more civilians across borders during an average month than Lybia does in a year. Indonesia has been engaged in a murderous assault on East Timor since 1975 that has resulted in the death of possibly a quarter of the Timorese population, over 200,000 people. Other Western clients states like South Korea have been abducting nationals from Western Europe, Japan and the United States, bribing foreign politicians, and intimidating people in places like Los Angeles on an excessive scale for several decades (p.63).

As I already discussed, the above critical approach(es) has been evolving toward a study of mass media, and TV in particular, as discourse (Connell and Miles, 1985, 1985b; Davis, 1985; Gerbner, 1985; van Dijk, 1983). In this sense, it defines TV as an important social ideological factor which participates in the construction and reproduction of social-political realities. This discourse focus will be the central concern of my analysis. Further, in spite of some critical attempts which have been made (as discussed here) at studying violence on TV and other media, specific analysis of actual TV discourse on terrorism are lacking, especially in the US. This study intends to contribute with the 'filling out' of this lacuna at the level of analyses of TV discourses on terrorism.

CHAPTER V

A CRITICAL ALTERNATIVE: HABERMAS' THEORY

So far I have argued for an encompassing analysis of the discussion of terrorism, one that includes 'western' as well as 'non-western' views of terrorism. I have discussed the problems related to the analysis of TV roles in society; and I have presented problems related to the theories and approaches dealing with this issue. Further, I have discussed the approaches currently used to analyze the terrorism discourse on TV; I defined partial and democratic discourses and I advanced the proposition that Habermas' theory of communication offers both an alternative which goes beyond the limitations of the actual discussion in the sociology of TV and an analytical framework to the study of discourses on TV. From this last point, in this chapter, I will argue that Habermas' communicative action theory (1975, 1979, 1984, 1987a) constitutes an appropriate critical alternative for analyses of TV discourses and, specifically, for political discourses such as the analysis of TV discourse on terrorism. I will discuss Habermas' critical theory and methodology and its implications for the study of TV practices.

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I will first refer to Habermas' critical theory and methodology. Second, I will discuss the implications of Habermas' theory for TV as a mass communication institution. And, third, following Habermas, I will discuss the interrelations between personality, society, and culture as to provide a theoretical normative framework to address the issue of TV discourse analysis.

Habermas' Critical Theory And Methodology

The conviction that the ideal of rational persuasion is inherently presupposed in the structure of communication has led Jurgen Habermas to differentiate out the components of this structure. This is a communication structure which counterintuitively presupposes that communicators can communicate without constraints so they can freely and transparently express their ideas, beliefs and emotions. Further, the absence of constraints will fulfill the conditions for these expressions to correspond truthfully, rightfully, and autentically to the respective perceptions of, norms accepted by, and inner experiences of the communicators. Habermas argues that without these presuppositions, however much they are violated in dailylife interaction, communication cannot occur. In this sense, Habermas' theory provides grounds for the assertion that rational and unavoidable, though not necessarily conscious, human commitment to democratic discourse is reiterated every time a sentence is uttered in speech. Let

us now discuss Habermas' work and its implications for a democratic discourse about terrorism.

Habermas (1979, 1984, 1987a) tries to develop a theory of rationality that makes intelligible the evolution of the human species as such. This theory tries to make intelligible the past, present, and potentialities of future as well as the social institutions of the human species. Habermas wants to provide an ambitious analytic-interpretative framework which, taking a critical-reconstructive position, aims to overcome the limitations in the works of Marx as well as of Weber, of Durkheim as well as of Parsons, and of Mead as well as of the earlier generation of critical theorists, i.e., Adorno, Horkheimer, and Marcuse, among others. Criticizing Weber's concept of rationality, Habermas (1970, 1973) proposes consistently to differentiate the standpoint of labor (work) from that of interaction (linguistic communication). He assumes that it is possible to understand social development through a historical reconstruction of the transformations and the intercourse of labor and interaction where these types of action possess distinctive rationalities.

On the one hand, labor (Habermas, 1970b), which in the process of historical learning precedes linguistic communication, emerges from the need to control nature and organize primitive societies in terms of objective necessity --in terms of the control of nature for physical

survival. In this process of the control of nature man and women have developed a nomological purposive rationality that governs their relations with nature, and, in turn, this purposive rationality is expressed through the achievement of the most effective ways to obtain goals. It is possible to distinguish two components of human labor, practical and theoretical. The practical is expressed as laboring and as instrumental action; in its most abstract form, the theoretical is expressed as the knowledge generated by the empirical-analytic sciences, i.e., natural sciences and social sciences such as economy, conventional sociology, and political science, which aim at producing nomological, predictive knowledge. On the other hand, interaction, linguistic communication, develops out of the combination of socially organized labor and the organization of the family. This combination produces the demarcation of social roles, which, in turn, are consensually secured (legitimated) by rules of communicative action. Interaction is shaped by a practical, political rationality, which is irreducible to rules of instrumental action. This rationality is expressed, in practical terms, through the process of reaching mutual understanding and, in theoretical terms, as the knowledge of the interpretative or hermeneutical sciences.

Habermas points out that, in the process of social development, the impulse of objective necessity, in the

struggle to dominate nature, has made the instrumental rationality of the empirical-analytic sciences achieve a tremendous level of development. As a consequence instrumental rationality has penetrated all areas of human activity, and human beings have come to see purposive rationality as the only possible rationality. In this sense, technical rationality has penetrated the endeavors of human interaction, of practical rationality in the form of ideology or distorted communication.

In his analysis of historical materialism, Habermas (1979) proposes to understand the process of social development through the acceptance of a social learning principle: Societies learn how to use the knowledge generated in the process of human cooperation. This process evolves in terms of the individual's learning capabilities which, in interaction, create, change, and overthrow structures and institutions to solve problems that threaten society. Thus, there is an interaction between the learning capabilities of individuals and the development of societies; the product of this interaction is expressed and perpetuated through the symbolic structures of the lifeworld, which is constituted, in the modern era, by the differentiated areas of cognitive-instrumental (science), moral-practical (morality), and aesthetic-expressive (art) 'complexes of knowledge.' In summary, social learning occurs at two levels of knowledge: that of man's and

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women's relations with nature --instrumental action; and that of human interaction --communicative action. However, the development of technological knowledge has not been accompanied by a similar development in the structure of moral consciousness (practical social knowledge in interaction). As a consequence, a domination of humans by both humans and their products has been established through the application of instrumental rationality at the level of social interaction. As Habermas says, this domination shapes relations of production and these relations of production can only be replaced when the institutional framework of a society is overthrown. Then the accumulated potential knowledge can be put into work to solve the social system problems. The replacement of the organization of labor, in turn, gives shape to the institutional structure a society has at a determined historical moment. This institutional structure limits the applicability of the technological knowledge that has been generated so that a gap emerges between the potential knowledge and the knowledge actually applied. This gap produces conflicts in the social system that, in turn, create the conditions for evolutionary changes in the mode of production and at the level of social relations. But, Habermas (1979) remarks, the gap between the potential and implemented knowledge is not enough to "bring about the overthrow of the relations of production and an evolutionary renewal of the mode of

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production" (p.146). It is necessary that pertinent changes in the evolution of individuals' motivation and moral development have occurred in order to bring about renewals in the institutional framework of societies.

A reconstruction of human cooperation in history, Habermas (1979) argues, will allow us to trace the different and correlated stages of development at the level of communication (individual's competences) and at the level of practical social knowledge, i.e., structures of moral consciousness as social normative knowledge gained in interaction (societies's competences): (1) A first stage of symbolically mediated interaction characterized by an imperative mode of communication in which communicators do not exchange places and speaking and acting are not separated; this communicative stage determines a preconventional stage of moral development in which "only the consequences of actions are evaluated in cases of conflict" (p.156). (2) A second stage of propositionally differentiated speech characterized by the separation of speaking and acting and the interchangeability of positions between communicators. At this stage, social roles are constituted and norms are separated from actions. A conventional stage of moral development, in which motives can be judged independently of actions and their consequences, corresponds to this propositionally differentiated speech stage. (3) Finally, a third stage of

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argumentative speech at the individual competence level, which is characterized by the justification or grounding of validity claims in speech (validity claims of comprehensibility of the utterance, veracity of the speaker, truth of the propositional content, and rightness according to accepted norms) in order to legitimate actions. This stage is correlated with a postconventional stage of moral development in which norms are judged according to universal principles.

The above stages (Habermas, 1979) of moral development and communicative competence characterize principles of social organization which, in turn, condition forms of social integration and their respective 'categories of burden' : (1) 'Neolithic Societies' and 'Early Civilizations' with the problem of "demarcating society from external nature Power over nature came into consciousness as a scarce resource" (p.165). In these type of societies, legitimation of power was achieved through myth and magic. (2) 'Developed Civilizations' regulated by a collective political order characterized by the problem of "the self-regulation of the social system.... Legal security came to consciousness as a scarce resource" (p.165). In these civilizations, legitimation of power and domination is accomplished through religious, ethical, or philosophical authority. (3) 'The Modern Age' characterized by the autonomization of the economy and the

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problem of "a self-regulated exchange of the social system with external nature.... Value came into consciousness as a scarce resource" (p.165). Here, the sub-systems of the economy and the state, with their respective steering media of money and power are differentiated out of the lifeworld to constitute what Habermas calls the 'system.'

Legitimation is achieved in term of a natural law (exchange of equivalents) and a neutral science. At this form of social integration human beings became conscious of the formation of ideologies (distorted communication).

Scientific rationality removed the veil of religious and philosophical ideologies, but at the same time, science and purposive rationality have contributed to technocratic ideologies. In this era the grounds for legitimation of power are problematized. (4) Finally, 'Postmodern Societies' characterized by a "primacy of the scientific and educational systems" and "the problem of self-regulated exchange with internal nature" (p. 165). The scarce resource here is the supply of motivation and meaning.

Legitimation becomes more problematic, the separation between purposive and practical rationality is more necessary, and social integration, as opposed to system integration, should be justified in terms of practical, political rationality. Legitimation needs to be achieved through political procedures and presuppositions. The separation between the social system, the lifeworld, and

their different logics becomes more apparent. Further, purposive rationality in the sphere of the lifeworld and domination of humans by humans can no longer be justified on rational grounds. Humanity liberated itself from the problems of objective necessity in the realm of the relationships with nature, therefore, the need of human labor to dominate nature has been reduced to minimal limits, the differentiation between practical and instrumental rationality can more properly be made, and the exposure of the economic and the bureaucratic-administrative system's (instrumental action) penetration into the symbolic structures of the lifeworld (communicative action) cannot longer be masqueraded. The conditions favorable to the development of totalizing ideologies have perished.

Communication, Society, and Implications for TV as a Mass Communication Institution

As was already mentioned, Habermas (1970a, 1979, 1984) argues that in the use of language humans already anticipate or assume as an 'a priori' the conditions for a democratic discourse. By examining these conditions, Habermas reconstructs an ideal speech situation that can provide standards against which actual communication practices can be assessed. Specifically, Habermas argues that four validity claims are raised in speech: the claim to comprehensibility (what is said is intelligible), the

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claim to truth (what is said is true according to the knowledge available), the claim to rightness (what is said is right according to the general normative standards of a society), and the claim to truthfulness (what is said corresponds to the sincere intentions of the speaker). Habermas contends that the claim to intelligibility can be redeemed immediately by linguistic analysis. The claim to truthfulness can be checked against subsequent behavior of the speaker. The other two claims can be challenged and judged as valid or unjustified by reliance on Ideal Speech Situations, that is, situations in which there are no barriers that could interfere with the process of communication. The requirement for an ideal speech situation is the symmetrical exercising of power which entails equal opportunities for all potential participants in conversation to participate, apply, and choose speech acts. In other words, the ideal speech situation provides the opportunity for all preconceptions to be exposed, all intentions to become clear, and all privileges to be excluded.

Habermas claims that the ideal speech situation is anticipated in the structure of communication. As Thompson (1981) summarizes, this anticipation of the ideal speech situation in communication constitutes a rational principle of universality; that is, it is as universal and rational as the use of language itself. In everyday communication

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the raising and acceptance of the validity claims is carried out against a consensus background. Without it communication either breaks down or communication is taken to what Habermas calls 'Discourse.' In Discourse the validity claims are challenged through argumentation and, when symmetrical condition of power are granted, the ideal speech situation is anticipated. Then agreements about those claims can only be achieved when they embody a generalizable interest. Thus, Habermas provides a rational connection between everyday speech (communicative action) and the principle of universality; that is, a connection based on the structure of communication and not on mere subjective choice.

Thompson (1981) reconstructs Habermas' argument to support the ideal speech situation thesis:

1. The process of communication implies that it is possible for at least two subjects to come to an agreement about a state of affairs.
2. To come to an agreement implies that it is possible to distinguish between a genuine and a deceptive agreement.
3. A genuine agreement is an agreement induced by the force of better argument alone.
4. The force of better argument prevails if and only if communication is not hindered through external and internal constraints.
5. Communication is not hindered through internal and external constraints if and only if for all potential participants there is a symmetrical distribution of chances to select and employ speech-acts.
6. A situation in which there is symmetrical distribution of chances to select and employ communicative,

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constative, representative, and regulative speech-acts is an ideal speech situation.

7. Therefore, the process of communication implies the possibility of an ideal speech situation.

Habermas concedes that his ideal speech situation based on pure intersubjectivity is, precisely, an ideal. The daily life circumstances in which speech occurs do not present the characteristics of symmetrical relations of power that allow for the development of pure intersubjectivity and the actual challenging of those validity claims raised in speech. Nonetheless, it is a practical ideal rationally derived from the structure of communication. As Habermas (1970a) explains:

The speech situation, which is determined by pure intersubjectivity, is an idealization. The mastery of dialogue-constitutive universals is not synonymous to the capability of actually establishing the ideal speech situation. But communicative competence does mean the mastery of the means of construction necessary for the establishment of an ideal speech situation. No matter how the intersubjectivity of mutual understanding may be deformed, the design of an ideal speech situation is necessarily implied with the structure of potential speech, even that of intentional deception, is oriented toward the idea of truth (p.144).

One may expect that advanced democracies and their institutions have the 'capability' to provide communication conditions that approach those required by Habermas' ideal, e.g., Television can serve as a forum where the conditions in which the ideal speech situation is possible are approximated to a reasonable extent. However, it is Habermas' (1970b) contention that, in fact, within advanced capitalism the penetration of purposive rationality into

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all spheres of the cultural lifeworld, through scientization and technologization of areas regulated by interaction, has taken ideological roles; through it an unjustifiable system of political and economic domination is legitimized. This invasion of purposive rationality into all social spheres requires and imposes a depolitization of the population. Further, it risks the institutionalization of a cybernetic-like system of domination in which there would no longer be any need for psychological manipulation because women and men would have achieved a stage of self-domination. They would have given up their capacity and right to take autonomous decisions to the maintenance requirements of the economic-bureaucratic system. In Habermas' (1970b) words, "men would make their history with will, but without consciousness" (p.118). To avoid this 'nightmare of self-domination' and take advantage of the liberating potential that the scientific-technological apparatus provides at the level of domination of nature, it would be necessary, Habermas remarks, to energize the public sphere in a way that all people can recognize the political nature of social life and resist the invasion of technical-purposive rationality into the realm of practical rationality. In Habermas' (1970b) words,

A new conflict zone,..., can only emerge where advanced capitalist society has to immunize itself, by depoliticizing the masses of the population, against the questioning of its technocratic background ideology: in the public sphere administered through the mass media.

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For only here is it possible to buttress the concealment of the difference between progress in systems of purposive-rational action and emancipatory transformations of the institutional framework, between technical and practical problems (p.120).

The Intersections of Personality, Society, and Culture: A Theoretical Normative Framework for the Analysis of TV

The communicative ethics implicit in the structure of argumentation has its natural links with related developments at the individual level. In the process of socialization, Habermas (1979) argues, the individual develops linguistic, cognitive, interactive, and expressive competences which correspond to the validity claims raised in speech. In his *Communication and the Evolution of Society* (1979), Habermas writes,

[w]e suspect that there is a connection between patterns of socialization, typical developments of adolescence, corresponding solutions to the adolescent crisis, and the forms of identity constructed by the young--a connection that can explain deep-seated, politically relevant attitudes. This problem leads one to reflect on moral development and ego-identity, a theme that takes us naturally beyond this to a fundamental question of critical social theory, viz. to the question of the normative implications of its fundamental concepts (p.70).

Habermas continues to summarize basic points of convergence between the related fields of ego psychology (E.H. Erikson, N. Sanford), developmental psychology (L. Kohlberg, J. Piaget), and symbolic interactionism (N.K. Denzin, G.H. Mead). Habermas summarizes six of such basic convergence points: (1) the ability of adults to speak and act is intimately connected with linguistic, cognitive,

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motivational, and interactive developments; (2) these developments occur through irreversible stages which unfold in a rationality crescendo, i.e., "each higher stage implies the preceding stage in the sense of a rationally reconstructible pattern of development" (pp.73-4); (3) this developmental process is crisis ridden and discontinuous. Crises are solved by destructuring previous learning and, when the solution is successful, the new learning will be the basis for solving subsequent crises; (4) in the process of development individuals gain increasing autonomy which is shown in the acquired competences to solve problems related to external nature and social events and facts (cognitive competences), to symbolic structures of culture and society, of the lifeworld (interactive competences), and to internal nature (expressive competences); (5) the mastering of these competences determines the structuring of the ego identity. But it is through the mastering of interactive competences that the individual, first, is socialized (childhood) by integrating itself into the symbolic structures of a social system and, second, is individualized (adolescence through adulthood) by gaining an increasing autonomy in relation to the social system, thus interactive competences are crucial for the development of ego-identity; finally, (6) these processes of apprehending external symbolic structures (socialization) and achieving autonomy (individuation)

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constitute a learning mechanism and an independent principle respectively.

Despite the above convergences, Habermas (1979) argues that there are no well developed theories of personality development. It is Habermas' intentions to bridge the gap between the theory of communication and the normative foundations of social theory through a theory of socialization which takes into consideration interactive (moral development) as well as internal needs (motivational development) aspects of ego-identity. Taking Kohlberg's theory of moral development as his starting point, Habermas (1979) differentiates three age levels which, according to whether the individual is required to employ complete or incomplete reciprocity in its interactions with others, are further analyzed into seven stages of the moral development the individual goes through from childhood to adolescence (see pp.78-90 and schema 4, p.89):

To level I corresponds the pre-school period characterized by pre-operational thought and natural identity. At this level only actions and actual action consequences (gratifications and punishment) are morally relevant. At level I, incomplete reciprocity requirements indicate that the child is at stage 1 (maximization of pleasure/avoidance of pain through obedience). On the other hand, complete reciprocity indicates that the child is at stage 2 (maximization of pleasure/avoidance of pain through exchange of equivalents).

To level II corresponds the school period characterized by concrete operational thought and role identity. At this level the child learns to play social roles as a competent member in interaction. At level II the symbolic universe of the child expands and actions begin to be understood as the fulfillment or violation 'of temporally generalizable behavioral expectations'. At level II only

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incomplete reciprocity is required. When incomplete reciprocity is expected from persons tied to one's reference group, the child is at stage 3 of moral development (concrete morality of primary groups). When incomplete reciprocity is expected from systems of norms then the child is at stage 4 (concrete morality of secondary groups valid for the political community).

To level III corresponds the period of adolescence characterized by formal-operational thought and the achievement of an autonomous ego-identity. At this level the youth experiences further expansion of the symbolic universe and learns to question the validity of norms and roles. Furthermore, the youth learns to reason and to judge norms from moral principles. At level III complete reciprocity is required and stages are defined according to the degree to which motivations are symbolically structured. When motivations are not symbolically structured, the youth is at stage 5 (contractual-legalistic orientations of civil liberties and public welfare valid for all legal associates). When motivations are culturally bound (symbolically structured) but still seen monologically as the individual's property, the youth is at stage 6 (conscience orientation of moral freedom valid for all as private persons). Finally, when motivations are culturally bound or symbolically structured and seen as interactively (communally) derived, the youth is at stage 7 (communal procedures to redeem normative validity claims of moral and political freedom valid for the whole world community).

The development of ego-identity has its counterpart to moral development in its close relations to instinctual processes. For Habermas (1979), the development of ego-identity is an ambivalent 'dangerous' process in which socially developed interactive capacities and moral judgment put pressure on action motivations. But, at the same time, depending on whether instinctual-internal needs find adequate expression in communication processes, action motivations can restrict the consistency between moral judgment and the action called for. Thus, in conflictual moral situations, unconscious forces may take over

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processes of rational decisions for actions in order to avoid or defend against conflict. Habermas wants to argue that for the development of ego-identity it is not only necessary to reach a level of moral ego-autonomy, but also a concomitant level of ego-strength to enact the actions moral judgment calls for. To reach this level of individual ego-identity, society should allow, not only for the development of a morally autonomous individual, but for the development of an independent individual who can freely express, articulate, and shape her/his internal needs in the interpretative sphere of the culture. This stage of societal development is achieved in postmodern societies (as defined above). Its counterpart at the individual level is achieved with the passage from stage 6 to stage 7 of moral development in which "need interpretations are no longer assumed as given, but are drawn into the discursive formation of the will" (Habermas, 1979; p.93).

This process of identity formation occurs intertwined with and affected by interrelation processes between cultural and societal structures. These ego-developmental, societal, and cultural structural components are immerse in a symbolic lifeworld. Together they constitute a porous structure that allows for their mutual influence and interdependence. In an 'idealized projection' of an undistorted reproduction of the lifeworld, Habermas (1987b) argues, we can foresee a culture formed by a

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'constant revision of traditions,' a society in which legitimation of power rests on formal and discursive 'procedures for establishing and grounding norms,' and a personality structured in a risky process of self-direction.

However, as we have seen, in history a different process marked by power distortions in the interaction between social structures and institutions have occurred. In late capitalist societies there exists an ambiguous conflictive process of interaction between the 'imperative' demands of the differentiated spheres of the social system and the social lifeworld. In one of his recent works, Habermas (1987a) expands the latter argument and contributes to further the understanding of the role of the mass media in advanced capitalist societies. Using the postulates of his communication theory, he provides a detailed analysis of the intercourse between the social system and the social lifeworld. I think the importance of his argument to understand this lifeworld-system's intercourse justifies the following long summary:

(1) From the institutional perspective of the lifeworld, the private sphere is constituted by the nuclear family and its function of socialization. Further, the public sphere is constituted by communicative networks, i.e., the mass media, and their functions of cultural reproduction and social integration mediated by public opinion. From the systemic perspective of the economy, the family is viewed as the 'private household'. And, from the systemic perspective of the state, the public sphere is seen as the relevant environment to 'procurement of legitimation'. The interchanges between these 'parallel'

spheres of the system and lifeworld occur as follows: From the perspective of the system, wages are exchanged for labor and goods and services are exchanged for consumer demand (in the economy), and organizational performances are exchanged for taxes and political decisions are exchanged for mass loyalty (in the state bureaucracy). From the perspective of the lifeworld, social roles are constituted parallel to the interchanges of the system. The roles of the employee and consumer are parallel to interchanges in the economy, and the roles of the client and the citizen are parallel to interchanges at the state level. The lifeworld's roles of employee and client of the state are legally tied to system's organizational contexts. The lifeworld's roles of consumer and citizen are organizationally independent and are economically and politically unquantifiable. The role of consumer and citizen have functions of symbolic reproduction in the lifeworld. When the system logic invades, through its media of money and power, the domain of symbolic reproduction of the lifeworld then pathological disturbances make themselves apparent as a loss of meaning.

(2) This loss of meaning appears as 'a one-sided style of life and a bureaucratic dessication of the political public sphere'. According to Habermas, the cause of the loss of meaning is 'the monetarization and bureaucratization of everyday practice both in the private and public sphere.' This constitutes a reification in the symbolic reproduction of the lifeworld which produces a desintegration of these spheres of life. The private sphere is weakened when it is invaded by the economy's logic, then, consumerism, individualism, competition, and motives for performance start shaping behavior and producing the one-sided life style of the utilitarian specialist. The public sphere is undermined by the bureaucratic administration's logic which defines practical questions in terms of technical ones. Then, political decisions are disconnected from concrete context of life, thus, precluding the institutionalization of practices of freedom. This devaluation of the public and private sphere is accompanied by, what Habermas calls, a cultural impoverishment. Both reification and cultural impoverishment 'threatens the lifeworld.'

(3) The cultural impoverishment results as a consequence of the specialization of the complexes of knowledge of science, morality, and art, their institutionalization in expert cultures, and their disconnection from the communicative practices of everyday life, of the cultural tradition. Thus, the references to the objective world,

the socially constituted world, and the world of inner experiences that speakers make through the validity claims they raise in each utterance, i.e., truth, correctness, and sincerity claims, become and develop separated in the expert cultures. Further, this separation demands a professionalization of each expert culture which, in turn, produces their distantiation from the everyday communicative practices of the common person. In this sense, cultural traditions become relegated to secondary planes and lose their political force. (the above discussion is a summary of Habermas' argumentation taken from the second volume of his Theory of Communicative Action, 1987a, pp.318-31).

However, Habermas points out that the above discussion does not explain why these pathologies expressed by both the reification and cultural impoverishment of everyday communicative practices occur. These pathologies constitute a paradox in relation to the 'utopia of reason' of the Enlightenment. In other words, Habermas wants to explain why is it that capitalism is unable to retain the close connection among the 'cognitive-instrumental, moral-practical, and expressive moments' of the premodern lifeworld before their constitution, under capitalism, as the knowledge complexes of science, morality, and art of the 'experts culture.'

Habermas (1987a) explains the processes of reification and cultural impoverishment of the lifeworld through a model of the basic contradictions of capitalism and their displacement in advanced capitalism. First, the contradiction between social production and private appropriation of surplus value creates crisis tendencies in the economy which are managed by state intervention. The

state set the 'boundary conditions' in which the private enterprise operates and implement strategies to compensate or avoid the 'side effects' of its own intervention. As a consequence, not only does the intervention of the state manage crisis tendencies in the economy but it absorbs them into its system with the consequence of overburdening its capacity to satisfy clients' demands. Second, the contradiction between the societal principles that govern capitalism and democracy: on the one hand, democracy requires that the process of capital accumulation be limited by socio-political determinations of the lifeworld, i.e., democracy requires public discussion to solve the problems related to the social production and distribution of goods in order to satisfy the needs of the population; in other words, democracy requires that these problems be solved in interaction through the social roles of consumer and citizens. On the other hand, capitalism requires that the privatized economy be severed from normative regulations of the lifeworld. As a consequence the state procures the loyalty of the population through welfare promises and restriction of discussions in the public sphere. Finally, the burden on the state is expressed in the contradiction that it has to compensate the structurally underprivileged classes through social welfare investment and, at the same time, it has to guarantee conditions for the economic expansion of private business,

e.g., the state expends to provide incentives for private business and improve the infrastructure. Thus, the state has to assume the paradoxical role of pacifying social conflict while it furthers the conditions that promote social conflict.

Habermas (1975, 1979, 1987a) contends that as long as the state succeeds in implementing policies to circumvent crisis tendencies originating in the economic sub-system, these crisis tendencies are transposed in the form of 'reification effects' into the structures of communicative action. This transposition occurs by way of an alteration in the relational structure implicit in the roles of consumer, wage laborer (worker and employee), client, and citizen. When the state assumes the role of pacifier of social conflicts, which originally were under the form of class conflicts, it 'normalizes' the role of the wage laborer, at the level of the economy, by tying it to wage negotiations, increases in salary, which, in turn, have a direct strengthening effect on the consumer role. But, because of the intervention of the state, a parallel alteration occurs at the level of interchanges between the lifeworld and the administrative state system. Direct political participation is neutralized, the citizen role is diminished, and expectations about the compensatory functions of the state are raised, the client role is 'blown-up'. On the one hand, the political rights of the

citizen are universally recognized while, at the same time, political participation is curtailed in a way that the state can keep the loyalty of the masses without having to confront direct problems of legitimation. On the other hand, the welfare state rewards the masses, in the role of clients, to compensate for the loss of political participation. Habermas argues that it is primarily in the spaces of the 'blown-up' role of the client and the strengthened consumer role that new potentials for conflict are being developed in advanced capitalism. These potentials for conflict develop because the above compensatory distortions effected by the procedures of mass democracy and welfare state policies enhance the complexity ('in expansion and density') of both the state administration and the economy. This augmented complexity of the system carries with it the need to assimilate areas of the symbolic reproduction of the lifeworld to the imperatives of the economy and the state administration. These system pressures on lifeworld functions of symbolic reproduction (which do not follow the instrumental logic of systemic reproduction) increase the possibilities that the symbolic structures of the lifeworld will clash with the requirements of the system.

Nonetheless, Habermas (1987a) contends that the expression of reification and cultural impoverishment processes at the lifeworld level do not appear in the

classical form of dominant consciousness, i.e., as totalizing ideologies. This is because the class conflicts implicit in the contradictory structure of the capitalist economy are difused by the interventions of the welfare state. The pacification of class conflict occurs in such a way that the empirical (economic) foundations of class conscioussness are lost, i.e., the implementation of welfare policies obscures the nature of the conflict between producers and owners of the means of production over the distribution and appropriation of the socially, cooperatively produced stuff of the economy. Besides this, the separation of the spheres of science, morality, and art constitutes another factor which precludes the communication structures of everyday life from accepting 'the structural violence of ideologies.' Advanced capitalist practices have to find a way to substitute for the lost functions of ideologies. These latter are fulfilled, in a new way, by the severing of connections between the specialized spheres of knowledge and the everyday communicative practices of society. Thus, instead of ideological domination, in advanced capitalism there exist cultural impoverishment and conscioussnes fragmentation; in place of revolutionary consciousness, there is an uncoupling of expert culture from everyday communication. Thus Habermas argues that the role of a critical theory of society would have to explain the

cultural impoverishment and consciousness fragmentation while studying the circumstances in which a 'recoupling' of expert cultures and everyday communication can occur.

Against the backdrop of a critique of society and of a critique of theories of society, Habermas (1987a) defines the task of a critical theory of society: to critically assess why and how modern societies do not make full use of the learning potential open to them and to uncover the inadequacies of social-scientific theories for 'deciphering the paradoxes of societal rationalization.' With respect to the latter, Habermas (1987a) characterizes three contemporary relevant approaches to the study of society: Against the theory of structural differentiation (R. Bendix, C. Wright Mills, B. Moore), he argues that it is dominated by a one-sided view of society which precludes it from grasping the pathological symptoms of society as such, it does not differentiate enough between system and lifeworld. Against the system-theoretical approach (N. Luhmann, T. Parsons), Habermas contends that it is insensitive to the deformations presented at the level of 'socially integrated domains of actions' and overgeneralizes the importance of the economy. Finally, against the action theoretical approach (Mead, Durkheim) Habermas argues that it ignores the complexity of the economic system and overemphasizes the importance of the lifeworld.

In terms of the critique of society, Habermas (1987a) starts from an appraisal of the work of the Frankfurt School to differentiate six areas to which a critical theory of society should direct its energies: to the forms of integration in postliberal societies, to the processes of family socialization and ego-development, to the aspects of mass media and mass culture, to the potential for protest in modern societies, to the theory of art, and to the critique of positivism and science.

It is the above aspect of mass media and mass culture which constitutes the point relevant to my concern in this analysis. In this regard, Habermas' theory of communicative action helps us see the ambivalent character of the mass media --more specifically TV in the present time. Against the pessimistic view of Horkheimer and Adorno, who argue that TV both transforms the liberating potential of modern culture into mass stereotypes and reinforces a system of social control, Habermas argues that TV not only can reinforce a system of social controls and neutralize the liberating potential of modern cultures but, at the same time, it maintains alive the liberating potential of the bourgeois public sphere. Instead of simply eliminating the public sphere, TV concentrates and decontextualizes communication aimed at reaching understanding. By decontextualizing communication, Habermas writes, TV situates its discourses in terms of an open

encounter with oppositional public voices. In Habermas' terms (1987a), this ambivalent character of the mass media springs from the following contradictions:

1. The broadcasting networks are exposed to competing interests; they are not able to smoothly integrate economic, political and ideological, professional and aesthetic viewpoints;
2. normally the mass media cannot, without generating conflict, avoid the obligations that accrue to them from their journalistic mission;
3. the programs do not only -- or even for the most part -- reflect the standards of mass culture; and even when they take the trivial forms of popular entertainment, they may contain critical messages -- "popular culture as popular revenge";
4. ideological messages miss their audience because the intended meaning is turned into its opposite under conditions of being received against a certain subcultural background;
5. the inner logic of everyday communicative practice sets up defenses against the direct manipulative intervention of the mass media; and
6. the technical development of electronic media does not necessarily move in the direction of centralizing networks, even though "video pluralism" and "television democracy" are at the moment not much more than anarchist visions (p.391).

For an encompassing theoretical normative framework to analyze TV discourses one would have to consider an aspect that has been neglected until now in this discussion: the non-verbal component of TV discourses. In this respect, I think it is relevant to consider a discussion of the 'paleosymbolic' that Habermas carried out in the early seventies.

Habermas (1970a) defines a pre-linguistic level of communication that he calls the 'paleosymbolic'. The paleosymbolic represents communication on the opposite extreme of pure intersubjectivity, i.e., the ideal speech situation. It does not "allow for public communication in the strict sense of the word" (p.125). Nor paleosymbols allow for a satisfactory organization of experience, e.g., of objects and events in the world. Gouldner (1976) differentiates between ideology, as a symbol system of public communicability, and paradigm, as a paleosymbolic system of restricted communicability. For Gouldner the paleosymbolic is irrational in opposition to the rationality of ideologies. Both Gouldner and Habermas borrow from Arieti (1967) who defines the paleosymbol as a preconceptual level of cognition, that is,

...a particular mental cognitive construct which stands for something that exists in external reality. Thus it has symbolic value, but this value remains private to the individual who experiences it. It cannot be shared with anybody else, unless it is translated into other cognitive forms; and yet... it has an external counterpart (p.68).

At the individual level Habermas argues that adult, autonomous individuals can be characterized by the capacity to attain motivations at a level of conscious linguistic understanding. In fact, Habermas (1970a) differentiates three psychological conditions for the individual according to the ability level of communicating publicly: Neurosis and the use of defense mechanism are controlled by the

paleosymbolic. In this two cases the paleosymbolic interferes with the use of grammatical language. A third case is constituted by the capacity of creative uses of language, in which a genuine integration of the paleosymbolic into linguistic communication is possible. Here emancipated individuals convert the paleosymbolic into publicly available communication. At a sociological level, the use of paleosymbols that are not converted into public communication represent the level of repression of a determined society. At this level, Gouldner (1976) argues, is that the paleosymbolic constitutes the shared, restricted "languages of everyday life learned during primary socialization as children.... The paleosymbolic ... implicates central persons, nuclear social relations, and the affectively laden gratifications and securities associated with them" (p.225). In Habermas' words (1970a),

[t]he greater the share of prelinguistically fixed motivations which cannot be freely converted in public communication, the greater the deviance from the model of pure communicative action. I would propose to make the empirical assumptions that these deviations increase correspondingly to the varying degree of repression which characterize the institutional system within a given society; and that in turn, the degree of repression depends on the developmental stage of the productive forces and on the organization of authority, that is of the institutionalization of political and economic power (p.146).

I think that the notion of the paleosymbolic provides an analytical point of view for an examination of the non-verbal components of the TV discourse. As Kellner (1979) contends, paleosymbols are used in TV to create

negative or positive scenes. For example, Kellner argues, blacks have been presented in film and TV through paleosymbolic images that associate them with evil and danger. "Likewise, paleosymbolic images have portrayed women as foolish house wives, evil schemers, or voluptuous sex-objects" (p.18). In advertising sexuality is manipulated through the paleosymbolic, e.g., a sex symbol caressing a product, thereby, associating it with sex, eroticism, beauty, and so on. In this sense, and in contrast to Gouldner, Kellner acknowledges a rational and ideological use of the paleosymbolic on TV discursive practices. In agreement with Kellner, I think that the use of images evocative of paleosymbols function as a rational complementary practice, albeit evoking irrational associations, to what is said on TV. In commercial TV both image and message are deployed in ways that complement each other to produce dominant partialized discourses.

In the next chapter I will attempt to draw some of the normative implications of Habermas' theory for an empirical analysis of TV practices.

CHAPTER VI

NORMATIVE IMPLICATIONS FOR TELEVISION ANALYSES

TV as an institution of the public sphere works at the conjunction, or at the boundary connections of the structures of the social lifeworld and social system. In this privileged position TV discursive practices cannot only reflect and express social practices but constitute themselves as socio-economico-politico-cultural practices. Further, TV responds to the imperatives of the rationality of the lifeworld, to communicative rationality regulating processes of reaching understanding. Thus, TV discursive practices can constitute a site where the invasion of instrumental rationality, reification processes, and symptoms of cultural impoverishment in the lifeworld can be assessed. At the same time, it is a site where processes of resistance to, and emancipation from, this invasion, reification, and impoverishment take place. In summary, TV as an institution of the public sphere constitutes a site where the imperative rationality requirements of the system and lifeworld may clash. In order to provide an empirically oriented framework by which TV discursive practices can be assessed in the terms outlined above, I will, in this chapter, derive practical normative implications for TV

discourse analyses from the postulates of Habermas' critical theory, and, in the next chapter, I will follow with analytical procedures derived from the notion of the ideal speech situation. In this chapter I will discuss the normative dimensions of Habermas' communication theory and how they bear on TV as an institution of the public sphere. That is, based on Habermas' theory, I will contend that in complex modern societies TV can serve as a forum which contributes to guarantee democratic assessment of controversial issues. I will argue that TV can be used as a resource of education, socialization, and social integration, as a resource of democratization and autonomization, as a resource of the reactivation and institutionalization of a universal public sphere, and I will draw some implications for a democratic TV discussion of terrorism and Nicaragua. Finally, I will advance the thesis that the US's commercial TV discourse on terrorism and Nicaragua is complementary to the Administration's language, and raise the questions of how this complementarity works and is achieved.

Normative Dimensions of the Theory of Communicative Action:
Implications for TV as a Social Institution

Thomas McCarthy (1978) defines the intention of Habermas' theory of communicative competence as being "to provide normative-theoretical foundations for social inquiry" (p.333). According to McCarthy these

normative-theoretical foundations are provided by the theory of communicative action and a complementary, 'bridge' theory of socialization. As Bernstein (1983) puts it,

For Habermas the type of rationality and rationalization process appropriate for communicative action at once provides a telos (a formal-procedural one) for orienting our praxis and a standard--or at least a necessary condition--for evaluating the degree to which a substantive form of life satisfies this telos, one which is "always already" implicit in communicative action (p.188).

In this sense, Habermas wants to make good the promise of the Enlightenment and continue the work of the Frankfurt School of Social Research under the premise that an autonomous ego and an emancipated society can only be developed in conjunction.

As we have seen, in the theory of communicative action Habermas argues that in speech human beings always make four type of validity claims: the claim to intellegibility, the claim to sincerity, the claim to truth, and the claim to rightness. These claims are based on an implicitly accepted background consensus. However, when this consensus is broken and these claims are challenged, communicators resort, in the case of claims to truth, to theoretical discourse to validate the truth of the statement made and/or, in the case of claims to rightness, to practical discourse to redeem the correctness of the norm being invoked. As was mentioned before, the claims to intelligibility can be redeemed through

grammatical analysis of the sentences uttered and the claims to sincerity can be checked against the subsequent actions of speakers. It is practical discourse that is relevant to our concern here. For it is through the notion of practical discourse that Habermas provides the rational foundation for redeeming normative validity claims and for grounding the notion of the ideal speech situation itself. Practical discourse is inherently related to the notion of communicative action and interaction by which humans deal with issues that concern the world of cultural traditions (through processes of mutual understanding they 'renew and transmit cultural traditions'), the world of society (through processes of coordinating actions they follow and develop norms that integrate them in society and establish solidarity) and the world of inner nature (through processes of socialization they constitute and develop their personalities). Theoretical discourse, on the other hand, relates to issues of the external world of facts and objects (true statements about objective reality). Thus, it is the type of rationality implicit in practical discourse that can allow communicators to detect the structural distortions created by the invasion of the logic of purposive rationality (system) into the realm of communicative action (lifeworld). Further, the necessary normative requirement for achieving consensus in discourse is that the claimants base their discussion on the

presupposition that they take into consideration the interest of all those potentially affected by the discourse. And, to achieve this consensus based on a generalizable interest, it is necessary that all asymmetrical relations of power be suspended so that all participants in the discourse can have the same opportunity for participation in an argumentation without restriction. In this way, the only motivation behind the communicators in discourse would be an interest in reaching understanding and rational agreements. McCarthy (1978) defines this counterfactual conditions of the ideal speech situation as,

...an "illusion" constitutive of the very meaning of rational argumentation; in making it we anticipate a form of life characterized by "pure" (unconstrained and undistorted) intersubjectivity. Thus the universal pragmatic conditions of possibility of rationally justifying norms of action or evaluation have themselves a normative character. The search for the fundamental principles of morals properly begins with a reflective turn, for these principles are built into the very structure of practical discourse (p.325).

For Habermas the conditions in which the ideal speech situation is possible constitute a 'discourse-ethical' universal

that only through the communicative structure of a moral argumentation involving all those affected is the exchange of roles of each with every other forced upon us. Only an actually carried out discourse offers any guarantee of the possibility of objecting to any norm that does not fulfill the following condition: that the consequences and side-effects for the satisfaction of the interest of every individual which are expected to result from a general observance of the norm, can be accepted with good reason by all (1982, p.257).

It is in the conjunction of postmodern societies and a stage of moral development in which motivations can be assessed discursively that the conditions for a discourse ethical universal are made possible. It is in this conjunction also that an enhanced role of the mass media are achieved. More specifically media such as television can provide an adequate forum for both direct and indirect human interaction. Through TV it becomes possible to institutionalize the practices of freedom and the reactivation of the public sphere that the strategic requirements of systems have undercut. Assuming that Habermas is correct, the ideal speech situation offers both the normative standards and the procedural conditions through which democratic societies, by way of their institutions of public communication (other social institutions include the family and the school), can guarantee part of the appropriate social conditions for the development of autonomous and free individuals who, in turn, can be able of securing the evolution and make possible the perfectibility of these democratic societies. As Ferrara (1985) writes,

[i]n the public sphere, precisely because the stakes and the risks are so much higher, and often involve unaware (and obviously unconsenting) others, moral actors in general -- and in particular politicians, who are entrusted the destiny of many others -- should never step beyond the limits of what can be validated by consensus in the ideal speech situation (pp.73-4).

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One can add that television as a primary modern medium between inherently social-political human beings with their different interests, views, and interpretations, should appropriately be normed by the standards of the ideal speech situation. Further, in all societies but more legitimately so in societies in which public speech has been institutionalized, one can analyze communication practices against the yardstick of a hypothetical ideal speech situation.

Thus from the above and the discussion in the previous chapter, we can at least differentiate three interrelated areas in which TV practices can contribute to processes of socialization and social integration, to the development of democratic structures and autonomous individuals, and to the institutionalization of practices of freedom and democracy by which traditions can interact with each other and can be transmitted and renewed: As a resource of education, as a forum in which social issues and conflicts can be discussed without restriction, and as a resource for both the reactivation and institutionalization of a universal public sphere.

TV as a Resource of Education, Socialization and Social Integration.

If the practice of unrestricted argumentation can be socially institutionalized as a TV practice, then TV can become an important cultural institution whose positive

impact can be felt on the ego-developmental and social-evolutionary processes that Habermas discusses. For, not only can processes of argumentation be learning processes themselves, i.e., the engagement in argumentation can inculcate in the practioners democratic ways of solving issues, but through argumentation we can learn about our mistakes and about how to correct them. This type of learning experience can contribute to individuals' critical integration into their culture and to the formation of flexible, undogmatic structures both at the individual as well as social levels. In this respect some recent studies (Wartela and Reeves, 1985; Watkins, 1985) provide support for believing in the potential of the educative and social integrative role of TV in modern societies. For instance, Watkins (1985) in analyzing the literature on TV, children, and adolescents finds theoretical and empirical evidence to treat TV as an interactive dominant activity which produces an internalization effect on children and adolescents. Watkins defines TV as and interactive activity because it provides "a constant series of interactions with social, cultural, and personal information that lead to the child becoming a functioning member of society" (p.323). He explains that TV interaction has an internalization effect because it helps to internalize, as a socially defined activity, beliefs, concepts, and values which children, adolescent, and, one may add, adults hold. In a situation

of unrestricted argumentation one can expect that the quality of this interaction would be affected in a way that encourages the internalization by viewers of open, undogmatic, and democratic structures. Finally, Watkins writes, TV interaction is a dominant activity in the sense that: (1) "it is an activity in which most American children participate" (p.328); (2) "there is considerable consistency in the social values portrayed within the media messages received through television" (p.329); (3) "there is considerable effort involved in understanding the symbol system of television" (p.330); and (4) "there are certain set of behavioral or cognitive outcomes that have been causally linked to television viewing" (p.331).

TV as a Resource of Democratization and Autonomization.

If both processes of unrestricted argumentation and the symmetry condition required by the ideal speech situation are institutionalized in the form of TV practices, then TV can serve as a democratic forum through which individuals can make their voices heard. For instance, Downing (1984) analyzes how different types of alternative media, in diverse parts of the world, have constituted themselves in vehicles for opinions which usually do not have access to mainstream media. And, although Downing does not include a TV example, this does not preclude the possibility that the potential democratic use of TV can be put to full use. As Downing (1984) puts

it, "we need to observe how rapidly these new media are multiplying, just in case the examples cited in this study should be thought of as the only instances which could be discovered!" (p.3). A case in point is the development that in the US cable television is taking; an increasing number of local access cable stations are being put into operation. Anderson (1975) discusses public access TV projects and programs put into operation in the early seventies. In New York, he cites, among others, projects such as the Video Access Center, the Alternative Media Center, the Open Channel, the Survival Arts Media, and the Watts Community Communication Bureau which aim to develop interactive community TV and to provide a forum for programs and topics of discussion that do not have access to commercial network TV. Anderson provides the schedule for July, 1973 of one of these projects,

Here is a sampling from Teleprompter's Public Access Program schedule...: "Candy from Strangers," "Real State with Rosemarie," "African Community," "Broadway Hispano," "Feminist News Analysis," "Homosexual Renaissance," "Friends of Haiti," "Black Sons and Daughters for Liberation," "The Julius Lester Show," "Children's Video," "Harlem Better Business Bureau," "City College Report," "Harlem Residents Speak", "Community Newsreel," "Spotlight on Block Associations," and "National Organization for the Reform of Marijuana" (p.84).

One of the problems for the development of interactive community TV, Anderson (1975) argues, is governmental regulations which favor commercial network and big capital to take advantage of the possibilities of cable

TV. However, there have been recent developments which show that even within the actual structures it is possible to have more representativeness, at least within the traditional political sphere, of a broader part of the political spectrum. A case in point is the national C-Span cable network, in which socio-political issues are discussed with the participation of the general public and professionals and institutions that usually do not have access to mainstream TV. This case points to the concrete possibility of using the emancipatory potential of TV.

These type of TV practices can contribute with the formation of autonomous individuals able to objectively analyze and to criticize the preconceptions of their own culture. For instance, TV can have an informal formative role which can allow for members of society to discuss and challenge the role of social institutions, i.e., among others the educative, legislative, military, and the own communication systems. These institutions may be reproducing social structures that solidify an unjust economico-socio-political order. This can be a way of TV contributing with the development of autonomous individuals able to challenge their own society and willing to bring about the changes for a just democratic order.

TV as a Resource for the Reactivation and Institutionalization of a Universal Public Sphere.

If the structure of ideal argumentation can be adopted as TV practice, then the process of argumentation in TV may make possible the symmetry condition by which the only factors determining the reaching of understanding will be the force of the better argument and the motivation to cooperatively search for the truth. Thus, this process of reaching understanding is aimed at 'convincing a universal audience;' the procedure of argumentation in TV will establish the rules that discussants engaged in processes of reaching understanding will follow. This normatization occurs in such a way that they can:

- thematize a problematic validity claim and,
- relieved of the pressure of action and experience, in a hypothetical attitude,
- test with reasons, and only with reasons, whether the claim defended by the proponents rightfully stands or not (Habermas, 1984, p.25).

Thus, this normatization is aimed at reaching 'rationally motivated agreements.' And, finally argumentation in TV as the producer of cogent arguments can redeem or reject validity claims thereby transforming opinion into knowledge or invalidating it as mere subjective choice. Thus, the production of cogent argument is aimed at 'the discursive redemption of validity claims.'

The adoption of this structure of ideal argumentation as a TV practice can provide for societies a

means of reactivating and institutionalizing the public sphere. This can be done by virtue of guaranteeing a public space in which discussions of public issues can be conducted and addressed to a universal audience, with the participation of all interested, and solutions provided through rational redemption of validity claims in discourse. Further, these types of communication practices can help to neutralize the effects of and challenge an unjust economic order in which only privileged members of society have the power of access to the economic resources, which in turn, make possible access to the communication media. Moreover, these neutralization and challenge of this economic order may pressure to open access to the communication media by majorities, which, in turn, can help to promote conditions for the challenging of that unjust economic order.

Against this possibility of reactivating and institutionalizing the public sphere through the adoption of the structure of the ideal speech situation as TV practice, the claims that both the size and passivity of the audience are antithetical to that same possibility surely cannot be avoided. However, this is an open issue that can only be resolved empirically. As McCarthy (1984) tells us:

There is, however, another type of medium that also serves to reduce the amount of interpretive energy needed in particular action situations and thus to enhance coordination and reduce risks; it does so by "condensing"

rather than replacing consensus formation in language. Although they remain tied in the end to lifeworld contexts, these "generalized forms of communication" can be technologically enhanced and organizationally mediated. Thus writing, the printing press, the electronic media make it possible to free communication from narrow spatio-temporal limitations and to employ it in multiple contexts; such mass media play a central role in the formation of various "public spheres", with both authoritarian and emancipatory potential (p.406, note 16).

In spite of pessimistic analyses against the emancipatory potential of TV (Streeter, 1987), and specifically cable TV, experimental cable TV such as C-Span in the US stands as a moderate yet succesful experience of TV serving a more general public interest. Moreover, the question of whether 'a passive audience' can preclude the activation of a public sphere through TV is by no means free from ambiguities. As the case of cable TV franchise in Houston shows (Garay, 1983), there can be audience participation when it perceives that its interest is at stake, and this participation can make a difference --as the Houston's population did when in 1972-73 they rejected an attempt to monopolize the cable system of the whole city. The same case shows that audiences apathy contributes to further conditions in which political and economic corruption can rampantly operate --as in 1978-79 when the lack of information and participation of the same Houston population allowed corrupt politicians and cable companies' representatives to form the type of monopoly previously rejected. Another case in point is the creation of Channel 4 in England (Blanchard and Morley, 1982; Lambert, 1982)

which is the product of the public pressure brought by the Welsh community on England society. Although the effectiveness of Channel 4 to incorporate unrepresented voices of society is part of and depends on the power and ideological struggles occurring in the English society, it is an unsettled matter and it constitutes a promising experiment with new economic conceptions of supporting TV, i.e., a mix between state and commercial TV, and alternative ways of programming TV, i.e., Channel Four contracts programs from different, alternative sources and does not impose criteria or standards for the making of programs.

For instance, Monaco (1978) argues that the problems precluding the realization of the full democratic potential of broadcasting are political and structural problems. He reminds us that "[t]elelevision could have been wired rather than broadcast from the beginning, had we made a collective decision to do so. The governing rules of media... are economic and political rather than technological" (p.9).

Among the measures he recommends are that:

- All broadcast media must be forced to pay rent for their use of public airwaves...

- Industrial democracy must be carried to the point where consumers and workers have more control over the business of media than investors.

- In short, product has to replace profit as the media motive and access has to be guaranteed on a basis of equality (p.21).

At the international level, recent analyses of trends of television, and other related industries like cinema support the possibility of integrating into television practices the requirements of the ideal speech situation. For instance, Mattelart, Delcourt, and Mattelart (1984) analyze the paradoxes of a television industry that is increasingly becoming international. Their intention is to show how these recent developments in the TV industry open or widen an international space in which both struggles over emancipation and oppression occur and contradictory practices are exposed. Significant here is the direct transfer of knowledge about TV (i.e., without taking into consideration specific social, political, economic, and cultural conditions of the receiving countries), with its, sometimes, devastating ideologico-politico-socio-economical effects on countries receiving the transfer. But, at the same time, this has brought responses from the receiving countries in the forms of challenges to the 'validity' and 'competence' of the knowledge received. These challenges can, in turn, influence developments in the transferring countries. A case in point, albeit an indirect one, is the response of Latin American scholars, in the form of independent critical research, to the strong influence of prevalent American schools' understanding of TV. This Latin American critical tradition has contributed to both the diminishing role of

positivistic inspired TV research and the opening of new research horizons in the US.

Another contradictory practice is the universalization of production, i.e., the creation of programs aimed at an universal audience with the ambivalent consequences of homogenizing, "reducing contradictions, and absorbing latent conflicts" (Mattelart, Delcourt, and Mattelart, 1984, p.100) and, at the same time, this universalization brings the acceptance of ideals of liberty, individuality, and freedom, mainly based on American ideology, to a global stage. In this sense, the latter authors write:

No paradox is more crying than that between the emergence of flexible and decentralised information networks of 'self-controlled' modernity under American influence and the Pentagon's strategies of brute force against the liberation movements of Central America, which takes us back to the old models of gunboat imperialism (p.105).

We can reasonably argue that public participation depends on the type, quality and openness both of economico-political structures and the treatment given to issues of social concern in the political arena and by institutions of public communication. Thus there is an interrelations between the openness of economico-political structures and of public discussions about those issues, and the motivation of the public to participate in the resolution of the issues in question. The institutionalization of communication practices inspired by the ideal speech situation cannot be successfully

implemented in politically closed systems, i.e., authoritarian regimes. But once societies reach stages at which the institutionalization of these practices is possible, then the exercising of public communication can push for unconstrained communication conditions, for the encounter, transmission, and renewal of cultural traditions, and for solutions of contradictions and dissolution of unjust power relations at other levels of social relations.

Implications for the Democratic Discussion of Terrorism and Nicaragua

It is against the possibility of ideal argumentation on TV that I will contrast the broadcasting practices of some of the US's commercial TV organizations. Specifically, I will analyze information about terrorism, violent actions and related issues as it is presented by these TV organizations in the US. To do this I will rely on selected TV discussions about Nicaragua.

From what I have discussed so far, and taking into consideration the communication principles of democracy, one would expect that,

- by democratic principles, every individual should have the right to be an active participant in TV discussions of public matters, i.e., all individuals should have access to TV, the right to make their views public, and the right to engage in argumentation with those who differ or have contrasting positions to theirs;

- experts about the matter in question, e.g., scholars on Latin America, Central America, Nicaragua, and terrorism

should participate to inform the public about their criteria for adopting and defending the positions they hold. Further,

- members of other societies directly or indirectly affected by the discourse must have the right to present and defend their views and concerns about the issues in question. Moreover,

- it should be a responsibility of TV institutions to promote open discussions that will put in historical perspective the historical events and issues.

Finally, given the actual conditions of internationalization of the economy and the political sphere, one would expect as necessary for a just interaction between people and nations that the political, normative and privileged boundaries of individual states be overcome, e.g., rules such as the fairness doctrine, the personal-attack rules, the political-editorial rule, and the equal-time rule (Shapiro, 1976) conceived to govern the internal debates in the US should become law and be applied to debates concerning other people and countries.

Concomitantly, there should be an strengthening of the power of institutions such as the UN in conjunction with a reduction or abolition of privileges that certain states hold within these organizations, e.g., veto powers which allow certain states to legally restrict, manipulate, or preclude from happening discussions of interest to other states. Even more, these normative boundaries need to be overcome with respect to barriers that impede the necessary direct communication for the discussion of differences, the exposition and justification of motives, and the democratic

right of people to be informed and take autonomous and free decisions. In this sense TV, and media in general, should have rights and duties which aim to promote discussions in the public interest. For instance, given the importance and direct concern to the Nicaraguans of the political decisions taken in the US, one would expect the Nicaraguans to have the right to come to the US or be consulted via TV and argue their views about the issues in question. Thus one may state that,

-the parties more directly involved and affected by the discourse must have priority to inform the public about their reasons for their positions. In this sense, Nicaraguans officials and civilians as well as US Administration officials, Congress representatives, and common citizens should have equal right to argue their positions in public.

With the previous considerations of democratic societies and discourses and the ideal speech situation in mind, I would like now to present the thesis I intend to substantiate in this analysis.

Thesis and Relevant Questions

From what has been said so far in this work and in contrast with both my definition of democratic discourse and what occurs in the ideal speech situation proposed by Habermas, my thesis is that the US's dominant TV discourse about terrorism in relation to Nicaragua is defined by an uncritical representation of the US's foreign policy positions, the use of statements originating from

governmental sources, and the use of evidence that is not explored or followed up. In sum, a discourse that frames terrorism in terms of the Administration's language, presenting information and analyses favorable to the Administration's political stance, and excluding or minimizing the representation of alternative critical voices and political positions, and ignoring alternative critical sources of information and of forms of analyses.

From the previous thesis, I want to challenge the claims to truth, rightness, and sincerity implicitly raised in the dominant TV discourse about terrorism. I want to argue:

1. That the dominant TV discourse about terrorism and violence in Nicaragua complements the language of the US Administration; that is, the Administration's and the TV discourses have an unitary character.
2. That the dominant TV discourse excludes alternative views and political positions from the discussion and contributes to legitimate in the public's perception the claims made by the US Administration. Thus, the legitimization role of commercial TV can be contested on rational grounds.
3. That the dominant TV discourse fails to provide the appropriate treatment for the historical events, i.e., there is a lack of adequate historical analysis, the historical conditioning of the issues and events are not brought up or discussed in the commercial TV discourse.
4. Since the Administration discourse contradicts, repudiates, and violates the norms proper to Western democratic societies, the complementarity role of dominant TV discourse helps to stabilize illegitimate structures of power: Knowing the US Administration's position in relation to Nicaragua, the issue of legitimization brings to the fore problems of power and domination incompatible with the notion of rational democratic societies.

In view of the previous considerations about the ambiguous role of TV in democratic societies, one needs to pay attention to the possible contradictions implicit in TV discourses and to analyze the dynamics of interaction between the different views presented in these discourses. In this sense, it is relevant to raise the questions: How does this complementarity work? How is this complementarity constructed? How are the inevitable contradictions dealt with in the discourse?

To substantiate these propositions and answer these questions, I will analyze commercial TV discussions which occurred between the second and fourth weeks of March 1986. These discussions were related to: 1. The issue of Congressional approval of the Reagan Administration's request to provide the Contra rebels with \$100 million to continue their war against the Nicaraguan Government, and 2. the US Administration's claim that large contingents of Nicaraguan troops had invaded Honduras.

CHAPTER VII

ANALYTICAL PROCEDURES

From the discussion of Habermas' theory in the two previous chapters, the analytic procedures I intend to use can be formulated in the following way:

The type of research I am proposing here requires two phases or moments of analysis, one descriptive and the other interpretative. First, the presentation and characterization of the discourse on terrorism as it develops in the selected instances of TV discourse. And second, a contrast of this discourse against the backdrop of the requirements of a democratic discourse and its location in the partial versus democratic discourse spectrum. In this chapter I will discuss both descriptive and interpretative procedures as well as sampling and transcription criteria. First, I will discuss sampling procedures; second, I will discuss criteria for the transcription of the discourse; third I will propose procedures for the description of the opportunities of participation in, of the claims advanced in, of the evidence and arguments presented in, and of the non-verbal components of the selected instances of TV discourse; and, fourth, I will propose procedures for the critical

assessment of the opportunities of participation in, the claims advanced in, of the evidence and arguments presented in, and of the non-verbal components of the selected instances of TV discourse.

Sampling Procedures

Because of the polemical nature and diversity of opinions surrounding the discussion of aid to the Contras and the alleged invasion of Nicaraguan troops into Honduras, I chose those events as my case study to analyze commercial and public TV discourses on terrorism about Nicaragua. I think these events provide relevant data for the type of analysis that I intend to accomplish here.

To analyze those events as they are discussed on TV discourses, I will restrict my analysis to news broadcast by ABC, CBS, CNN, and PBS. I selected the period from the 13th to the 31th of March 1986 because this period constitutes a 'natural block' which boundaries are the Presidential speech on aid to the Contras and the discussion about the US bombing of Lybia. Thus, during that period most of the discussion about the two selected events occurred, i.e., it includes TV discussions previous to the Presidential speech on aid to the Contras of 03-16-86, the Presidential speech itself, discussions following the Presidential speech, discussions about the House vote on Contra aid, and discussions about the Nicaraguan invasion into Honduras. In Chapters VIII and IX, I will analyze all

(monday-friday) news broadcasts of the commercial networks ABC and CBS during that period and a sample of seven story news instances of CNN. Further, in Chapter X, I will discuss the results obtained in chapters VIII and IX. In chapter XI I will contrast the analysis of the commercial TV discourse on terrorism and Nicaragua to two instances of the PBS McNeil-Lehner News Hour with the intention of showing relevant differences and similarities to alternative non-commercial news broadcasts. In doing this, I want to test also the usefulness of the analytical procedures developed here to compare alternative discourses.

In the qualitative methodology literature one finds primarily two options about sampling procedures: one suggests random sampling over large periods of time, the other indicates taking whole events as one's material of analysis, i.e., exhaustive scrutiny of case studies. I have taken the latter path of analysis; in this way I think that the sample sizes of the commercial TV broadcasts are representative of the TV discussion about the events in question and they satisfy the sampling criteria recommended by among others Krippendorff (1980), Miles (1983), Miles and Huberman (1984), and Light (1983). As I mentioned, the contrast to public TV broadcasting news does not aim to be an exhaustive analysis of the public broadcasting discourse. However, by way of an illustration, it aims at showing

differences and similarities between alternatives discourses and test the usefulness of the analytical procedures. In this sense, the non-representativeness of the PBS sample does not invalidate the aim of this analysis. Ultimately, this sampling procedures should be satisfactory to show empirical connections between 'micro' understandings of social actions and practices, and 'macro' understandings of social structures (Forester, 1983).

Criteria for the Presentation of TV Discourses on Terrorism and Nicaragua

To accomplish the presentation of the selected instances of TV news discourses, I will develop procedures borrowing from the transcriptive procedures developed by Hartley and Montgomery (1985, see appendix). The data will be presented by (I) Dividing the news discussions in terms of story sections, i.e., in terms of how on TV news broadcasts related parts of news stories are separated; (II) separating the story sections in terms of shot sections; i.e., in terms of the shot sequences that accompany the different language interventions that constitute each story section; (III) determining the type of camera position and the camera positioning of the images on the screen. In this sense, the shots will be classified as CU (close up), MS (middle shot), and LS (long shot) and respective variation within each category, e.g., close middle shot, middle close up, middle to close shot, and so

on. (IV) I will describe the scene presented in each shot section. In this regard, the voices, images, actions, movements of the camera, and screen identifications will be described and commented upon. (V) Finally, the words spoken in each shot section will be transcribed.

Analytical Procedures for the Description of TV Discourses on Terrorism and Nicaragua

To accomplish the description of TV news discourses I propose four levels of analysis: analyses of the opportunities of participation in the discourse, of the claims made by the participants, of the evidence and argumentative procedures used by the participants, and of the non-verbal components of the discourse.

Analysis of opportunities. This analysis describes the social identification of the participants in the discourse. By social identification I mean the association of the participants with institutions, political entities, and, in general, with the points of view the participants present or are associated with. The analysis of opportunities allows for both an appraisal of the symmetry condition the discourse provides and a mapping out of the ideas and views constituting the discourse.

Analysis of claims. This analysis describes and classifies the claims made by the participants in the discourse. This description and classification allows for an identification, according to the participants in the TV

discourse, of who the terrorist are, whom are they associated with, what they do, how are they identified, what are the social, economic, political, and historical characteristics of the terrorist in the discourse, and so on.

Analysis of evidence and argumentative procedures.

This analysis aims to describe the structure and relationship of the evidence and arguments presented in the discourse with respect to claims about who the terrorist are, what they do, whom they are associated with, how are they associated, what their history, social, political, and economic conditions are, and the like.

Analysis of the non-verbal components.

For my purpose I think that a paleosymbolic analysis can be accomplished, in a descriptive phase, by classifying the type of scenes accompanying the utterances in the discourse. The questions to answer here can be formulated in terms of, what type of scenes relates to type of verbal descriptions, how are type of discussions represented by the scenes depicted, and so on and so forth.

Analytical Procedures for the Critical Interpretation of TV Discourses on Terrorism and Nicaragua

The second phase will contrast the findings of the descriptive phase with the ideal speech situation, will locate them in relation to the partial-democratic discourse spectrum, and will analyze how those selected instances of

terrorism discourse bear on the institution of television as an educative resource, a democratic forum, and an institution of the public sphere. This analysis entails an interpretation of the selected TV discourses on terrorism and Nicaragua against the backdrop of both the symmetry of power relations condition and the truth, rightness, and sincerity claims of the ideal speech situation. However, because of the characteristics and social implications of the television institution the main critical concern will relate to the rightness claim implicit in the ideal speech situation. In other words, the discourse will be assessed in terms of whether TV, as analyzed in the selected instances of discourse, provides appropriate conditions for the exposition and scrutiny of all the possible claims associated with the selected discourse and in terms of what implications these analyses have in terms of the TV institution as an educative resource, as democratic forum, and a public sphere resource. To accomplish this interpretation, the characterizations done in the descriptive levels of analysis will be contrasted with the following standards derived from the postulates of the ideal speech situation:

Standards for the opportunities of participation.

The analysis here concerns with whether the actual participants represent all the potential participants in the discourse. The critical type of questions in need of

answer can be: whether representatives of the US as well as the Nicaraguan governments participate in the discourse, whether representatives of the status quo as well as oppositional groups participate in the discourse, whether symmetrical opportunities of participation are guaranteed for all participants, whether the claims advanced are given a fair opportunity of scrutiny, what implications do the answers found here have for commercial and public TV as educative resource, democratic forum, and public resource, and the like.

Standards for the claims advanced. According to the requirements of the ideal speech situation, the critical point here is whether the claims advanced can be redeemed according to the accepted norms of a democratic discourse. The critical type of questions that need to be answered are: Whether the claims made about the identification of the actors (i.e., terrorists, freedom fighters, and so on) in the discourse are right or according to the knowledge and norms available, whether the claims made about whom the actors are associated with are right or according to the available norms and knowledge, whether the claims made about the actors activities are correct or according to the available norms and knowledge, how do the answers obtained here bear on commercial and public TV as a learning resource, as a democratic forum, and as a public sphere's institution, and so on and so forth.

Standards for the use of evidence and argumentative procedures. According to the requirements of the ideal speech situation, the critical point here is whether the conditions are granted for both the employment of appropriate argumentative procedures and evidence and for satisfactory scrutiny of the evidence and argumentative procedures used. The type of critical questions that need to be answered are: whether commercial and public TV personnel scrutinize the different claims in similar fashion or provides similar treatment to all claims; whether the evidence presented is related to the claims advanced and how is the reception of this evidence by TV personnel; whether the argumentative procedures allows for a fair presentation of arguments backed by enough relevant information, so that it can be possible to determine which are the more plausible reasons or better grounded arguments. Finally, what is the relevance of the what we find to commercial and public TV as an educative resource, as a democratic forum, and as an institution of the public sphere.

Standards for the use of the non-verbal components. According to the analysis of the paleosymbolic, the critical questions here should be related to whether the imagery depicted helps to clarify what has not been spoken, whether the spoken words clarify the images depicted, whether the interrelationships of imagery and

words help to understand the issues in questions or whether these relations obscure the possibility of understanding, whether the images employed are or can be translated into public communication, whether the deployed images may be invoking paleosymbolic associations. Finally, what are the implications of the answers found here for commercial and public TV as an educative resource, as a democratic forum, and an institution of the public sphere.

The results of both the above characterization and critical contrast with the requirements of the ideal speech situation will allow and will provide grounds for the differentiation of the rules that guide the discourse about terrorism and Nicaragua as it develops on the selected instances of TV news programs. Now, in the following chapter I will describe the commercial networks TV discourse, in Chapter IX I will critically assess this discourse, in Chapter X I will discuss the results of the commercial TV discourse analysis, and in Chapter XI I will analyze instances of the public TV discourse and contrast it to the results obtained in the analysis of the commercial TV discourse.

CHAPTER VIII

DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS

In this and in the following chapters I will proceed to a characterization of the commercial TV discourse based on the news transcriptions (see appendix for a sample of the transcriptions). In this chapter I will attempt a descriptive analysis of the discourse following the analytical steps outlined in the previous chapter.

Descriptive Analysis of Selected Instances of the Commercial TV Discourse on Terrorism and Nicaragua

Selected Discussion about Congress Vote on Contra Aid and Nicaraguan Invasion into Honduras

Analysis of Opportunities.

ABC. For the most part, the participants defining the terms of the discourse are political experts associated or identified with the status quo (Congressmen and Administration officials) and ABC personnel (anchorpersons, reporters, commentarists, and so on). A minimum role is played by foreign officials and common citizens. The foreign officials are either representatives of the Nicaraguan Government or of the Contras. However, the latters' views are overwhelmingly represented by US

Administration officials and members of Congress. Common citizens are represented by public opinion polls about Contra aid and by translated quotations and brief questionings of Nicaraguan people. Political experts from other Central American countries are represented by ABC personnel paraphrasings and commentaries. The US political experts who question the positions of the Administration are not represented.

CBS. In a similar way to ABC, CBS's participants in the discourse are overwhelmingly associated the Administration and associated institutions and persons. However, CBS introduces new participants in the discourse such as experts from organizations different from the US Congress or US and Nicaraguan administrations representatives, e.g., members of the American Enterprise Institute, pollster, independent political scientist, and Catholic and Jewish representatives. There is participation of citizens from Nicaragua. Again representatives of organizations and independent citizens who radically challenge the US Administration's Central American policies are absent from the CBS's broadcasts.

CNN. In a similar vein as the above, CNN overwhelmingly represents the claims of the US Administration. This is done through direct participation of officials and members of Congress and through commentaries, quotations, and introductions made by CNN

reporters. The oppositional claims are the claims of Congresspersons against Contra aid. There is indirect representation, through translation, of Sandinistas officials. The Contra directly participate through their representatives and indirectly through US Administration officials', Congress representatives's and CNN personnel interventions. There is direct participation of US common citizens and indirect participation of Nicaraguan citizens (through translation) as well as of US citizens (through polls). There is direct as well as indirect participation of other Central American officials. The participation of US citizens and political experts who challenge the policy and claims of the US Administration is absent from the discourse.

In summary, there is an overwhelming direct participation in the construction of the discourse by US Administration officials, legislators, and TV people; there is a minimal direct participation by representatives of the Contras and the Sandinistas. However, there is an overwhelming indirect participation of the Contras' voice through US Administration officials, legislators, and TV personnel. The indirect participation, or representation, of the Sandinistas in the discourse is minimal and the participation of people who challenge the basic premises of the US Administration's discourse is practically non-existent.

Analysis of Claims.

The basic claims advanced in the stories can be classified as claims of the Administration, claims of the Opposition, claims of the Sandinistas, claims of the Contras, claims of other participants, and claims of the TV personnel.

The Administration Claims.

The claims of the Administration can be marked within the boundaries of the President's speech which was nationally broadcasted on the 16th of March 1986. In this sense we can say that the claims of the Administration refer either to the Sandinistas or to the Contras and they are presented directly by Administration officials and indirectly through TV persons' representations. TV personnel represent claims by providing direct quotations, paraphrasing claims made by other people, and advancing claims that others have made but without necessarily presenting the person(s) who made the claim.

ABC: the Administration claims about the Sandinistas. The Administration claims that Sandinistas are subverting the democracy of neighbor countries (March 13-16-19-25-27), that Sandinistas represent a threat to the US' and continental's security, that Sandinistas are associated with Soviets, Cubans, East Germans, and members

of international terror, i.e., PLO, Italy's Red Brigades, Qadhafi, Khomeini, that the Sandinista terror includes assaults against ethnic and religious groups, e.g., the Jews have been desecrated, that Sandinistas are drug traffickers, that Sandinistas are criminals without boundaries that Sandinistas have refused the help of the US (March 16), that Sandinistas not only are sponsoring terror in El Salvador, Costa Rica, Guatemala, and Honduras but that they provide a sanctuary for international terror (March 16-20), that communist Sandinistas deceive the democracies of the continent and are training radical communists from all Caribbean and South America (March 13-16-18-26), that Sandinistas are violent enemies of peace and freedom (March 16-19-20-21), that Sandinistas are unreasonable and it is impossible to negotiate with them (March 16-27), that Sandinistas invaded Honduras (March 25-26), that the fate of Central America depends on the US Congress approval of aid to the Contras (March 27).

ABC: the Administration claims about the Contras. The Administration claims that the Contras are a strong democratic resistance, that the Contras are helping the security of the US and eliminating the threat of terrorism, that the Soviet Union, Castro, Arafat, Qadhafi, and Khomeini already decided to support the Sandinista communists so Americans should make their decision to support the Contras (March 16), that the Contras are for

freedom (March 16-18-19-20), that the Contras are freedom fighters struggling for the whole community of Central America (March 16-19-27), that the military pressure of the Contras will make the Sandinistas move toward negotiations (March 27), that all Americans are in debt to the Contras and should help them (March 16-18-19-20), that Americans who do not support the Contras either are at best indifferent and irresponsible to the communist killing or support them (March 16-19-20).

ABC: representations of the Administration claims. ABC persons reproduce claims that Nicaragua is subverting its neighbors, that Nicaragua is increasing its means of repression and killing such as construction of new prisons, using attack dogs, and application of electrical devices to the body of prisoners (March 13), that the US President consider himself a Contra freedom fighter (March 14-21), that US troops are not going to be sent to the battle field, that the US President will oppose dictatorships from both right and left, that the delay in aid will cost the Contras's health and will give the Sandinistas time to kill the Contras, and that the Sandinistas are a threat to the US (March 14), that the denial of Contra aid will make millions of Latin Americans look for refuge in the US, that the Presidential speech drew a near 3-1 favorable response, that Latin American leaders support the Contra aid package (March 17), that

people are pressuring Congressmen, through media ads, to support the Contra aid (March 18), that the President is willing to compromise in the Contra aid issue, that the compromise will withhold for 90 days money to the Contras to see the results of the Contadora group peace initiative or to see whether the Sandinistas start a serious dialogue with the opposition, lift the state of emergency, state of siege, and grant freedom of the press and of churches, that the patriotism of members of Congress voting against Contra aid was in question (March 19), that the President is determined to battle on the issue of Contra aid (March 20-21), that the Contra aid was defeated because the President started the battle late, that the defeat on Contra aid may have been because of tough rethoric used by Administration officials, that the issue of Contra aid will not be framed in tough language, that the issue of Contra aid is a matter of consciousness, that the Contra aid ultimately will be won (March 20), that the Sandinistas invaded Honduras (March 24-25-28), that as many as 2000 Sandinista troops penetrated into Honduras, that Sandinistas' helicopters overflew the Honduras territory to coordinate the actions (March 24), that the Sandinistas attacked four times over the week end, that many of the Contras have no weapons to defend themselves, that the US Administration is doing what it can to help its Honduran friends, that the US Government is notifying the public about its response to the

Sandinista aggression (March 25), that US helicopters will transport Honduras troops to the border with Nicaragua, that the US troops will stay away from the battle field, that the Contras are whipping the Sandinistas badly (March 25-26), that US officials are amazed with the Sandinistas' action, that it is false that the Administration is dramatizing the Honduras situation to obtain the Contra aid in Congress, that the President of Honduras requested US aid for his troops (March 26), that the Sandinista invasion into Honduras helps the President's request for Contra aid and that shows the danger that an unchecked Sandinista Government poses to the region, that the issue is a matter of aiding the Contras or aiding the communists (March 27), that the Central American countries are in fact backing the Contras but do not want to admit it (March 28).

CBS: the Administration claims about the Sandinistas. The Administration claims that Sandinistas are subverting the democracy of neighbor countries (March 13-16), that Sandinistas represent a threat to US and continental security (March 13-14-16-21-27), that Sandinistas are part of the West-East confrontation (March 16-20), that Sandinistas are undesirable communists (March 13-16-17-20-21), that Sandinistas are associated with Soviets, Cubans, East Germans, and members of international terror, i.e., PLO, Italy's Red Brigades, Qadhafi, Khomeini (March 13-14-16-21), that Sandinistas deceive the

democracies of the Continent (March 13), that Sandinistas are making a dramatic military build up in Central America (March 19), that Sandinistas are training radical communists from all the Caribbean and South America, that Sandinistas not only sponsor terror in El Salvador, Costa Rica, Guatemala, and Honduras, but that they provide a sanctuary for international terror, that Sandinistas are drug traffickers (March 16), that Sandinista terror includes assaults against ethnic and religious groups, e.g., the Jews have been desecrated (March 16-19), that Sandinistas are criminals without boundaries (March 14-16), that Sandinistas are violent enemies of peace and freedom (March 16-21), that Sandinistas are unreasonable and it is impossible to negotiate with them, that Sandinistas have refused the help of the US (March 16), that Latin American people condemn the Sandinistas (March 17), that Sandinistas invaded their neighbors, that this invasion certainly makes very clear what the Administration has been saying about Daniel Ortega and the Sandinistas, that the whole World will see much more clearly now the nature of the Sandinistas (March 25), that the government of Honduras has said that its sovereignty was violated and that it was under attack by the Sandinista army, that the Sandinistas neither believe in democracy nor freedom, that what the Sandinistas believe is making a sucker of the United States of America (March 26), that no one believes that

Sandinistas will enter in dialogue, that the Administration is asking to set a client to fight the Sandinistas not Americans' sons, that the Administration wants to provide air defense to those who are being slaughtered (March 27).

CBS: the Administration claims about the Contras. The Administration claims that the Contras are for freedom (March 16-21), that the Contras are not only the equivalent of the Founding Fathers but of French, Hungarian, and Britton resistance fighters (March 14-16), that Contras are freedom fighters struggling for the whole community of Central America (March 16-19), that Contras are helping the security of the US and eliminating the threat of terrorism (March 14-16), that Contras are the hope to eliminate the communist threat in Central America (March 13-14-16-17), that all Americans are indebted to the Contras and should help them (March 16-21), that the Soviet Union, Castro, Arafat, Qadhafi, and Khomeini already decided to support the Sandinista communists so Americans should make their decision to support the Contras (March 16-17), that Latin American people support the Contras, that most American support the President (March 17), that Americans who do not support the Contras are either at best indifferent and irresponsible to the communist killing or support them, that Contras are a strong democratic resistance (March 16), that the House's vote constitutes a betrayal of the Contras (March 20), that the Contras are

being slaughtered in Honduras (March 27).

CBS: representations of the Administration claims. CBS personnel reproduce claims that the US President wants the Contra aid badly, that Nicaragua is subverting its neighbors, that the Sandinistas are implementing campaigns of misinformation, that the Sandinistas are communists (March 13), that the Sandinistas are associated with Cuba (March 21), that the Contras are fighting communism, that the Contras are freedom fighters, that the US President considers himself a Contra freedom fighter, that the Sandinistas are a threat to the US, that something must be done now to stop the threat (March 14), that the Sandinistas are making a military build-up in Nicaragua (March 19), that a Nicaraguan fighting force of 1500 has crossed the border into Honduras (March 24), that US military pilots have received orders to help carry Honduran troops to the front (March 25), that the helicopters will stay ten miles away from the fight (March 26), that President Reagan will give millions of new dollars in military aid to the Hondurans, that US officials wasted no time in exploiting the alleged Sandinista invasion into Honduras (March 25), that this is an all out Sandinista invasion (March 25-26), that some Sandinistas may be trapped and that another 3000 Nicaraguans may soon launch a reinforcement attack (March 25-26), that the fighting in Honduras is urgent, that the US Administration

received a letter from President Ascona of Honduras saying "[m]y Government has confirmed the presence of Sandinista armed forces in Honduran territory" (March 26), that there is no exaggeration about the Nicaraguan threat and invasion (March 27-28), that President Ortega reversed his early statements and now openly confirms that his Cuban and Soviet aided troops did strike into Honduras and may again (March 31). That the vote is a vote in favor of military aid to the Contras or in favor of the communists (March 14), that the Presidential speech drew 2-1 favorable response, that the Latin American people support the Contra aid package, that polls commissioned by the US Information Agency in Central America back-up the US Administration's claims (March 17), that the President is determined to battle on the issue of Contra aid (March 20-21), that the Contra aid ultimately will be won (March 17), that the Contras trapped Sandinista battalions in Honduras (March 25-26).

CNN: the Administration claims about the Sandinistas. The Administration claims that Sandinistas are subverting the democracy of neighbor countries, that the Sandinistas represent a threat to US and continental security, that Sandinistas are part of the West-East confrontation, that the Sandinistas are associated with Soviets, Cubans, East Germans, and members of international

terror, i.e., PLO, Italy's Red Brigades, Qadhafi, Khomeini, that Sandinistas not only sponsor terror in El Salvador, Costa Rica, Guatemala, and Honduras but that they provide a sanctuary for international terror, that the Sandinistas are training radical communists from all Caribbean and South America, that Sandinista terror includes assaults against ethnic and religious groups, e.g., the Jew temples have been desecrated and Jewish people have been intimidated, that Sandinistas are drug traffickers, that Sandinistas are criminals without boundaries, that Sandinistas are violent enemies of peace and freedom, that Sandinistas are unreasonable and it is impossible to negotiate with them, that Sandinistas have refused the help of the US (March 16), that Sandinistas are undesirable communists (March 16-20), that Latin American people condemn the Sandinistas and understand the significance of pressuring them into a political process (March 17), that in response to Sandinista armed attacks into sovereign Honduran territory, the President of Honduras requested urgent US military assistance (March 25), that American helicopters and their pilots will not go near the fighting zone (March 25-26).

CNN: the Administration claims about the Contras. The Administration claims that the Contras are for freedom, that the Contras are not only the equivalent of the Founding Fathers but to French, Hungarian, and British

resistance fighters, the Contras are freedom fighters struggling for the whole community of Central America, that the Contras are a strong democratic resistance, that the Contras are helping the security of the US and eliminating the threat of terrorism, that the Contras are the hope to eliminate the communist threat in Central America (March 16), that all Americans owe support to the Contras (March 16-22), that the Soviet Union, Castro, Arafat, Qadhafi, and Khomeini already decided to support the Sandinista communists so Americans should make their decision to support the Contras, that Americans who do not support the Contras are either at best indifferent and irresponsible to the communist killing or support them (March 16), that the situation in Nicaragua is not going to improve thus Contra aid is necessary (March 20), that the Contra aid will avoid a flow of refugees from Nicaragua to the US as it happened with Cuba and Vietnam (March 17), that the Contra vote in the House was a dark day for freedom (March 20), that the House's vote does not reflect the informed and considered will of the American people (March 22), that the people of the US are understanding better how just and good the Contra cause is (March 20), that the Administration is willing to compromise on the Contra aid issue (March 17).

CNN: representations of the Administration claims. CNN persons reproduce claims that there is substantial support for the Administration's policy from

Central American people, that Central American leaders, in private, support the Administration's policy, that a recent poll shows that Central American people support Contra aid, that in general the American people support the President's speech on Nicaragua, that the phone calls from Americans show 71% approval for the President's speech, that there is a cautious optimism of Administration's officials about approval of Contra aid, that conservative groups are showing their support for the President's policies, that on the basis of the issues at stake there can be no compromise on Contra aid, that the Sandinistas are militarily powerful, that the Sandinistas are spreading subversion and threatening the security of all Latin America, that the Sandinistas are a threat to strategic points like the Panama Canal (March 17), that the House vote on Contra aid is a temporary setback, that the President pledges to deliver only defensive weapons, that the House vote gives Sandinistas a license to hunt, that the President is sending harsh signals to Nicaragua and Moscow (March 20), that the opponents of Contra aid engage in personal attacks toward the President, that the President is willing to make minor changes in his Contra aid proposal to gain Congressional approval, that the President continues to push for military aid for the Contras, that any less than what the President asks for the Contras will be too little and that any delay will be too late, that the

Administration wants Congress to get the facts first hand from Nicaragua (March 22), that as many as 1600, perhaps as many as 2000 Sandinista soldier have crossed into Honduras, that apparently the Sandinistas want to wipe out the Contra rebels operating from Honduras, that the President will ask Congress for \$20 million dollars in help to the Honduran Government (March 24-25), that there has been no call for US troops (March 25), that the Contras are doing well battling the Sandinistas, that the US got involved in the situation after the President of Honduras wrote to President Reagan, that a third group of Sandinista soldiers crossed the border with Honduras, that the Contras are struggling despite heavy air support to the Sandinista forces from across the border in Nicaragua, that there are three Sandinista battalions inside Honduras, that each battalion is comprised of 600 soldiers, that one battalion is trying to withdraw, a second has been trapped by the Contras, and a third has withdrawn into Nicaragua and it is trying to help the other battalions (March 26).

The Opposition Claims.

The claims of the opposition are formulated mainly by Democrat politicians and can be framed within the Democrat response to the Presidential speech on March 16th 1986.

ABC: the Opposition claims. The claims stress that the opposition agrees with the President about the US goals in Central America, that the disagreement is about the ways the President wants to achieve these goals, that this disagreement is shared by the majority of Americans, that the Sandinistas are subverting its neighbors, that the Sandinista betrayed the promise of their own revolution, that Nicaragua can never become a base for Soviet militarism, that the Sandinistas should restore political freedoms to Nicaraguans and let their neighbors develop in peace, that the US needs the Contra money to solve internal problems, that the US should look for negotiated solutions in Central America, that the US President does not want to give negotiations a chance, that the Contra leaders were part of the Somoza's regime, that Sandinista's atrocities pale besides of those of the Contras, that the Contras' atrocities have been subsidized by US tax payers' dollars (March 16), that there are too many parallels between the Central American situation and Vietnam, that all Latin American leaders are opposed to Contra aid (March 17), that the US people are opposed to Contra aid (March 16-18), that the Contras cannot win from the Sandinistas (March 16-19), that the US will have to go directly into combat with the consequence that Americans will die (March 13-16-20), that the Nicaraguan attacks on neighboring states may spill over into wholesale US support

for the Contras (March 25), that there is an enormous offensive under way but it is in doubt whether it is a public relations offensive by the US Administration or a military offensive by the Sandinistas, that the US Administration is torpedoing negotiations with Congress, that the US Administration is playing 'Rambo' in Nicaragua (March 26), that the US Administration is displaying a new McCarthyism and playing old red baiting tactics, that it is time to have a bipartisan agreement about what the US will do in Central America before the body bags start coming back once again (March 27).

ABC: representations of the Opposition claims. ABC persons point out the presence in Congress of some groups opposed to Contra aid and who are worried about another Vietnam, that Latin American leader oppose Contra aid (March 17), that despite pressures on some members of Congress they still are against Contra aid (March 18), that the Administration and its followers are questioning the patriotism of members of Congress who oppose Contra aid (March 19), that the Contra issue is a matter of consciousness, that there is a division in the country about this issue, that Administration officials are blamed for the defeat because of their partisan attacks on the opposition (March 20), that the opposition agrees that Nicaragua invaded Honduras and supports aid to the latter, that President Ortega overplayed his hand (March 25), that

not everyone in Congress was convinced of the veracity of reports of the Nicaraguan invasion (March 26).

CBS: the Opposition claims. The claims stress that the US President wants to engage American troops against the Sandinistas, that the request of Contra aid is going to cost too much money in the long run, that the engagement in Central America will end in another Vietnam (March 14), that the opposition agrees with the President about the US goals in Central America, that the disagreement is about the ways the President wants to achieve these goals, that this disagreement is shared by the majority of Americans, that the Sandinistas are subverting their neighbors, that the Sandinistas betrayed the promise of their own revolution, that Nicaragua must never become a base for Soviet militarism, that the Sandinistas should restore political freedoms to Nicaraguans and let their neighbors develop in peace, that the US should look for negotiated solutions in Central America, that the US President does not want to give negotiations a chance, that the Contra leaders were part of the Somoza's regime, that Sandinista's atrocities pale besides of those of the Contras, that the Contras' atrocities have been subsidized by US tax payers' dollars (March 16), that the policy is wrong because it inevitably will get Americans directly involved in the war (March 16-17-20), that the President should pay attention to internal

problems (March 14-16), that the US Government should focus on non-lethal aid to the Contras (March 21), that the lethal aid to the Contras can be used for killing and for terrorist acts (March 21), that the Nicaraguan Government has become notorious for its ability to turn public and international opinion against it in critical moments (March 25), that the Administration is playing Rambo in Nicaragua, that the Senate should not be blinded by Sandinista policy, that Senators should not use Daniel Ortega's latest example of stupidity as cover to vote for Contra aid (March 26), that before loosing the dogs of war in Central America, diplomacy should be exhausted, that if Nicaragua is truly a threat to the US, the US should use American boys, that the US's present approach in Central America has taken on the appearance of a holy war, that as all holy wars it is driven by a fanatical impulse, that this impulse is an ideological compulsion to rid Central America of the communist demon (March 27).

CBS: representations of the Opposition claims. CBS persons reproduce oppositional claims that the Contra aid will bring another Vietnam (March 14), that some people oppose the President's remarks about the Sandinistas' behavior, despite pressure to vote for Contra aid, some Congresspersons responded negatively to that pressure (March 17), that Democrats promise the President a fight on Contra aid (March 21), that Democrats are accusing

the Administration of torpedoing a compromise (March 26), the Democrats want a compromise that calls for face to face negotiations with the Sandinistas and a second Congressional vote on military aid (March 26-27), the Democrats want no money to be delivered for 6 months (March 27).

CNN: the Opposition claims. The claims stress that the opposition agrees with the President about the US goals in Central America, that the disagreement is about the ways the President wants to achieve these goals, that this disagreement is shared by the majority of Americans, that the Sandinistas are subverting its neighbors, that the Sandinista betrayed the promise of their own revolution, that Nicaragua must never become a base for Soviet militarism, that the Sandinistas should restore political freedoms to Nicaraguans and let their neighbors develop in peace, that the US needs the Contra money to solve internal problems, that the US should look for negotiated solutions in Central America, that the US President does not want to give negotiations a chance, that the Contra leaders were part of the Somoza's regime, that Sandinista atrocities pale besides of those of the Contras, that the Contras' atrocities have been subsidized by US tax payers' dollars (March 16), that the President has provided no indication of a long term American policy (March 17), that the

Administration is engaging the US step by step in a military situation that will bring Americans to war (March 16-20), that the President will have to better demonstrate and articulate his policy and demonstrate that the diplomatic option is not available to convince the American people of the need for Contra military aid (March 20), that Administration officials were inefficient, worked against themselves, and degraded the Contra aid debate (March 20), that the President's policy is a policy of hostility (March 16-22), that the Administration's policy will bring Americans to their death, that the US should never go into a war which in the best hope is going to be a bloody stalemate (March 22), that there are other alternatives to the Administration's policy (March 16-22), that there is no similarity between the request to assist the Contras and the request to assist the Honduran Government, that according to the Rio treaty all of the American nations have agreed that in the event that there is an aggression by one nation to another to help the country in which the aggression is taken place (March 25).

CNN: representations of the Opposition claims. CNN persons reproduce the claims that the opposition wants the President to withdraw his Contra aid request and compromise, that the opposition has a 15 vote lead to defeat Contra aid (March 17), that the White House's red baiting tactics backfired and contributed to

the President's defeat in the House, that the Opposition continues to work on their own proposal which will likely include some military aid to the Contras (March 20), that the Opposition's proposal will require negotiations with the Sandinistas before any Contra money is released (March 20-22), that the Opposition agreed to a second House vote in April (March 20), that the President's compromise plan is a false promise of negotiation, that the President's compromise plan is a trap door leading to deeper military involvement in Central America, that some members of the Opposition agree that the President will receive Senate approval for some form of military aid to the Contras, that the Opposition is ready for a fight (March 22), that Congressional opposition support the President's request to aid Honduras, that opponents of Contra aid say that there is no comparison between the Contra and the Honduras requests for assistance, that the Nicaraguan invasion of Honduras is a tremendous blunder by Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega, that had the Nicaraguan invasion happened last week, it could have altered the outcome of the House vote on Contra aid (March 25).

The Sandinista Claims.

The claims of the Sandinistas are represented by direct statements by Nicaraguan officials and by representations made by TV persons.

ABC: the Sandinista claims. The Sandinista claims are represented by Nicaraguan officials affirming that Nicaragua will not enter in dialogue with any force financed by the US (March 14), that the Sandinistas strongly deny that any invasion occurred, that the accusation of invasion is a clear attempt of the US Administration to get funds (March 25), that at no moment in the past, present, or future has or will Nicaragua become an aggressor (March 28).

ABC: representations of the Sandinista claims. ABC persons reproduce the claims that the Sandinistas will not negotiate while there is US military aid going to the Contras (March 14-28), that Sandinistas claim it will not make any difference whether the Contra aid is approved or not, that they will beat the Contras (March 18), that the Administration's policies are monstrosities, that recent Contra attacks aim to convince the US that they are still a viable force, that the Sandinistas are answering the Contras' attacks and that they killed 115 of them, that up to the last young boy the Sandinistas are determined to fight (March 19), that the Sandinistas are accusing the Catholic Church of treason, that the Church has been used by the US and by the Contras who are now assassinating the Nicaraguan people (March 27), that the Senate vote approving aid to the Contras is an immoral act, that it is incredible that in the week Christ

was crucified the US Senate approved the crucifixion of Nicaragua, that the US is intervening in Nicaraguan affairs, that this could lead to another Vietnam in Central America, that the Sandinistas want to engage in direct dialogue with the US, that Mr. Reagan is the chief of the Contras, that the Sandinistas ask for the creation of a multinational peace keeping force along the Honduran-Nicaraguan border, that the Sandinistas warned that any aircraft that flights near the Nicaraguan borders risks being shot down by Nicaraguan forces, that the Sandinistas say that now the Nicaraguan-Honduran border is a war zone, that the Sandinistas admit they destroyed several Contra training camps but they maintain they did not invade Honduras (March 28).

CBS: the Sandinista claims. The claims stress that the US Government is recruiting Nicaraguan officials to spy for the US, that the Contras cannot win the war, that the Contras do not have political support in Nicaragua, that the Contras represent a past that the Nicaraguan people do not want (March 13), that the Contras are not match for the Sandinistas, that the Nicaraguan people should be alert against the US Government's declaration of war, that the Nicaraguan people should resist and win, that the Nicaraguan Government sees the no vote as a movement for peace (March 20), that the Sandinistas deny very strongly that they have had any type

of aggression on the Honduran territory, that Nicaraguans are not in the Honduras territory (March 25).

CBS: representations of the Sandinista claims. CBS persons reproduce the claims that the Sandinistas accuse the US Government of recruiting Nicaraguan official to spy against the Nicaraguan Government (March 13), that the pro-Sandinista Government newspapers in Nicaragua accuse the US Government of declaring war to Nicaragua and alert the Nicaraguan people to resist and win, that the Sandinistas are calling the House vote a move for peace (March 20), that the Sandinistas claim there has been no invasion (March 25).

CNN: the Sandinista claims. There is direct presentation of Sandinista claims that the alleged invasion into Honduras is an outrageous lie on the part of the Reagan Administration, that the US Administration is trying to get a political excuse to provide the \$100 million to the Contras and to intervene militarily in Nicaragua (March 25).

CNN: representations of the Sandinista claims. CNN persons reproduce the Sandinista claims that Mr. Reagan's speech was filled with lies, slanders, and threatening insults, that Mr. Reagan's speech constitutes a "growl of war from Washington", that Mr. Reagan's speech is a monstrosity, that the charges about persecution of Jews

and cocaine traffic were all lies, that Mr. Reagan wants to justify Washington's plans to destroy the Nicaraguan revolution, that the Sandinistas do not want to exacerbate the explosive situation in Central America (March 17), that the Sandinistas call the House vote a major setback but not defeat for Mr. Reagan, that whatever the final outcome of the Contra debate, the Sandinistas are prepared to continue the fight, that the Sandinistas are not going to negotiate with the Contras, that the destruction of Sandinismo is not up for compromise (March 20), that the Sandinistas deny the charges of invading Honduras (March 25-26), that the Sandinistas have called for the formation of a peace keeping force to monitor the border under the supervision of the Contadora nations group, that Sandinista leaders acknowledge that artillery fire may have fallen on the Honduran side of the border, that the Sandinistas insist the White House is trying to create an artificial conflict to justify the request of aid to the Contras, that Sandinistas claim they dealt heavy blows to the Contras, that in the northern provinces Soviet supplied helicopters gun ships are flushing out what is left of the Contras (March 26).

The Contra Claims.

The claims of the Contras are expressed directly by Contra representatives and indirectly by TV persons and US Government representatives.

ABC: the Contra claims. The claims refer to the poor conditions of their fighting, fighting only with rifles, to their need for help (March 18), to the temporary character of the House vote against aid because there is so much at stake that Congress will reconsider, to the disappointment and difficult situation for the Contras, to the help that the vote against aid give to the Sandinistas, to the problems this vote put for the people who want a democratic, political solution in Central America, to the determination of the Contras to continue the fight (March 20).

ABC: representations of the Contra claims. ABC persons reproduce the claims that the Contras are pleading for help to the US, that no one is criticizing the Soviets for giving weapons to the Sandinistas, that they need help and ask the American people for such help, that they fight for the liberty of Nicaragua, that the contras received new weapons through the help of private US citizens, that they are handicapped by the limited type of supply they get, that they need missiles, anti-aircraft guns, and small aircraft to combat Soviet tanks and sophisticated helicopters the Sandinistas have, that without fresh supplies and ammunition they will lose the war (March 18), that the Contras have beaten the Sandinistas in Honduran territory and have killed 200 of them while have lost 40 of their own troops (March 26).

CBS: the Contra claims. The claims refer to the damage the Contras are inflicting in the Nicaraguan economy (March 18), to the need for Contra aid because it is essential for peace (March 19), that the House no vote is a stunning blow and a disappointment to the Contras (March 20), that Mr. Reagan is a leader for the Contras (March 21).

CBS: representations of the Contra claims. CBS persons reproduce the claims that the Contras are pleading for help from the US, that Contra aid is necessary to force peace in Central America (March 17), that Contra leaders express disappointment about the House's vote results (March 20), that the Contras fight the Nicaraguan Government (March 27).

CNN: the Contra claims. CNN presents the Contra claims that the House vote constitutes an astounding blow to thousands of Nicaraguans, that these Nicaraguans are struggling for democracy and that they confront overwhelming odds in their struggle (March 20).

CNN: representations of the Contra claims. CNN persons reproduce the Contra claim that they are disappointed with the results of the House's vote (March 20).

The Other Participant Claims.

The claims of other participants are made by persons representing independent institutions, by common citizens themselves, by representatives of governments other than the US and Nicaragua, and by representations of the TV persons. They can be classified as the Expert and the Common Citizen claims.

ABC: the Other Participant claims. There were no direct intervention by other participants in ABC broadcasts.

ABC: representations of the Expert claims. ABC persons represent the claims of a Honduran official that the Sandinistas attacked the sovereignty of Honduras, that Honduras will repel the Sandinista attack totally and completely (March 25), that the Honduran armed forces presented two Sandinista prisoners (March 26). ABC represents the claims of a Nicaraguan priest that in Nicaragua there is no justice and without justice there is no salvation (March 27).

ABC: representations of the Common Citizen claims. Besides the presentation of polls showing that the majority of Americans are against Contra aid, ABC represents Nicaraguan common citizens' claims that the situation in Nicaragua is calmer now, that the war does not advance (March 19), that the American Government should approve funding for the Contras, that the American

Government should overthrow the Sandinistas, that President Reagan should get the support he needs, that Contra aid should be approved, that the American Congress should liberate the Nicaraguans, that the Americans should overthrow the communist (March 27).

CBS: the Expert claims. Experts claim that the Contra aid issue does not affect US people's lives, that Americans are not convinced that the President's claim that Sandinistas, if not stopped in Nicaragua, will end up in San Diego or Texas is true, that both the concern and skepticism among American about deepening the US's military involvement and the fear that the current military involvement in Central America can become another Vietnam are very healthy, that Democrats are frightened in a way that they are going to end up in the wrong side of the issue, i.e., voting against Contra aid (March 14), that the President's claims about Sandinistas' mistreatment of Jews in Nicaragua are false (March 19), that Honduran officials believe the Sandinista incursion does not represent a major threat to the security of Honduras, that Honduran officials claim the limit where reality ends and imagination begins is very difficult to establish in the Honduran situation (March 26).

CBS: representations of the Expert claims. CBS persons represent experts' claims that the Contra aid discussion is not a big issue outside

Washington, that most Americans are not excited about the alleged Central American crisis, that the politicians are afraid the US people are going to blame them for another Vietnam, that the politicians are afraid of being label soft on communism (March 14), that things will not get better in Nicaragua, that Nicaragua is heading for chaos (March 18), that Honduran officials publicly give the impression that they see the Sandinista action as not very much of a threat, that Honduran officials publicly express the Sandinista incursion is a serious threat to their sovereignty, that in private Honduran officials discount the severity of the incursion, that Honduran officials worry about going to the beach and about the weather, that the Honduran Government does not think the incursion is a big deal, that off the record Honduran officials are calling the incursion a propaganda ploy, that it is all part of Mr. Reagan's attempt to get Contra aid (March 25), that Honduran officials think the Sandinistas defied the demands of the Honduran Government to stay out of Honduran territory, that Honduran officials are worried that the use of US helicopters will drag Honduras into the middle of an American political debate about Contra aid, that Honduran officials believe the US Government's impression of what is happening in Honduras could be exaggerated by highly partisan politicians (March 26), that the size of the Nicaraguan troops participating in the incursion seems to

be deliberately exaggerated, that the exaggeration came from the Contras (March 27).

CBS: the Common Citizen claims. CBS presents direct participation of common US citizens claiming that the US Government should give peace a chance in Central America (March 27).

CBS: representations of the Common Citizen claims. CBS personnel represent common citizens' claims that people in Nicaragua complain that the situation is getting worst every day, i.e., nothing to cook, no oil, no rice, no eggs, that the Nicaraguan people cannot afford to feed their families, that the Sandinista Government keeps on raising the food prices constantly, that Nicaraguans live under a regime that puts them into jail if they say something (March 18), that people displaced by the war have lost all, that their homes have been destroyed and they have had to leave their property (March 20).

CNN: the Expert claims. Experts' claims presented are of a Latin American official who says that interventions of any kind are counterproductive, that interventions are against all international laws, that it is a decision of any country to ask what they want or need, that she does not know of any country asking the United States for any help of that kind (Contra aid) (March 17).

CNN: representations of the Expert claims. CNN persons reproduce the claim that Mr. Reagan's speech ignores Latin America's wishes to promote stability through negotiations (March 17), that Honduran military sources say that as many as 15 choppers are lifting Honduran troops to the Nicaraguan border (March 26).

CNN: the Common Citizen claims. CNN presents the claims of US common citizens that it does not matter what the Contra aid package does, the American people need to keep on doing because the Contras are still hungry, that it is not important to have cars and houses what is important is to help people, that it is important to feed the Contras and help them to take back the revolution that the Sandinista communists stole from them, that if the Contras get help, Americans will not need to go and fight in Central America, that it is not right if the US cannot stop communism in Nicaragua and help its friends, that the US should give aid to the Contras otherwise the communists may take over South America and venture to come to the US, that money will not help the Contras, that the President made a convincing case for the need for Contra aid, that when Congress cannot make a decision it kicks it out and does something else or does nothing, that the Contra money should be put to better use like in education, that the Americans do not have to support the Contras, that the money is needed in the US for other things, that the US

has a commitment to protect the continent and this area of the world, including Nicaragua (March 20).

CNN: representations of the Common Citizen claims. CNN persons reproduce claims of Nicaraguans that people in Nicaragua do not have problems with the Sandinista Government, that the Nicaraguan people do not fear confiscation by the Sandinista Government, that Nicaraguans do not like the Sandinista Government, that Washington could help with the Sandinista Government (March 17). CNN reproduce claims of Americans that Americans are not giving up despite of what happens in the House, that Americans need to do more in relation to the Contra issue, that one of the reasons to help the Contras is Americans' kids, that every delay in aid hurts the Contras' chances (March 20).

The TV Personnel Claims.

The claims of TV persons generally consist of interpretation, commentaries, and explicit and implicit claims made by TV persons about the Administration, about the Opposition, about the Sandinistas, about the Contras, and about the general situation.

Claims about the Administration.

ABC. ABC persons claim that the Administration tries to get first hand appraisal of the Nicaraguan situation (March 13-14), that the President and

his Administration put great effort to get the Congress's approval for Contra aid but without significant results (March 13-14-17-18), that there is manifestation of support for the President's policy in Central America (March 17-18), that the US Government is reinforcing democratic teaching and reforms in the Contra organization (March 18), that the Administration is willing to compromise on Contra aid but that this compromise may not be taken as such by many people (March 19), that the House's vote against Contra aid is a big lost for the President (March 20), that still the rhetorical battle for Contra aid will continue to be tough (March 20), that American analysts are mystified as to why the Sandinistas attacked Honduras (March 24), that American helicopters will soon begin to fly Honduran soldiers to the border with Nicaragua (March 25-26), that American officials are announcing their response to aggression, that the politicians support the President (March 25), that Americans are well out of the combat zone, that the Administration is moving quickly to take advantage of the Sandinistas' actions, that Administration official bridled about suggestions that the Administration is manipulating the situation in Honduras to get Contra aid, that the Administration is worried about a new communist foothold in the mainland of the Americas (March 26), that the signs for the President to get Contra aid are good, that the debate in the Senate was long and the language

strong, that the Administration policy has proven to be highly controversial and divisive, that Administration officials grew confident about Contra aid when the Nicaraguan incursion into Honduras turned up, that US officials exploited the news about the incursion to the Congress to get up with a prime example of why an unchecked Sandinista Government poses a danger to the region, that the US President agreed to a 90 days Contra aid delate in order to test the Sandinistas' sincerety for negotiations (March 27).

CBS. CBS persons claim that the US President needs to change a lot of minds in Congress to win Contra aid, that the President will have to convince the American people and Congressional skeptics that the US security is threatened by the Sandinistas (March 14), that the trust of President Reagan's campaign is "Vote more military aid to the Nicaraguan rebels, vote with me or help the communists", that the President is "in joy" for Americans' reaction to his Contra aid speech, that polls conducted in Central America support Administration's claims for the Contras (March 17), that Administration officials work hard lobbying Congress for Contra aid (March 17-19), that Americans by the thousands are calling Congress and the White House because of the Contra issue, that conservatives groups donated a helicopter for the Contra cause (March 17), that the US Administration not

only wants to support the Contras but looks for alternative groups which can direct the opposition in Nicaragua, that the problem is that such groups do not exist (March 18), that Republicans and the President consider a compromise on Contra aid (March 19), that the Administration efforts at the House failed and some officials were appealing even to religion, that Administration's officials think they lost nothing with the House's vote, that they are going to win in the Senate and in the House next time, that the Administration's claim about the darkest day of freedom is certainly to encourage the Contras and to warn the Sandinistas, that the statement about the darkest day of freedom was written by Communication Director Pat Buchanans, who set the rough tone for the debate, that still the rhetorical battle for Contra aid will continue to be tough (March 20), that there will not be any more questioning of anyone patriotism (March 21), that US Administration officials wasted no time in exploiting the alleged Sandinista incursion of Honduras, that the Administration has nothing but bipartisan support of Congress to give the aid the Hondurans asked, that some Congressmembers wander as to whether the show down with Lybia was planned to help get aid for the Nicaraguan Contras but for now there is no proof of this (March 25), that Washington is taken more soldiers to the border and keeping the heat on the Sandinistas (March 26), that there

have been no exaggerations of the still yet to be seen supposedly large Nicaraguan invasion force operating in neighboring Honduras (March 27).

CNN. CNN persons claim that by most counts the Administration faces an up-hill battle in Congress, that the lobbying of the Administration on Congress is intense, that conservative groups demonstrate their support for Mr. Reagan's Central American policy, that it is uncertain whether or not the Presidential speech won him any votes but that it did spark an avalanche of phone calls, that the Administration not only support insurgency in Nicaragua but also in Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia, and other parts (March 17), that the President will come back to Congress again and again until the Contra battle is won, that the House's vote was a significant defeat because of the strong stand the President took about the Contra issue (March 20), that President Reagan invoked his emergency powers to send \$20 millions in military assistance to Honduras, that the call for US aid has led to questions about the safety of US personnel (March 25), that the US helps the Hondurans to battle, that Mr. Reagan's aid to Honduras means that they will get some Stinger anti-aircraft missiles, M-16 rifles, ammunition, and some landing craft (March 26).

Claims about the Opposition.

ABC. ABC persons claim that more than half of the American people oppose Contra aid, that there are direct demonstrations against Contra aid (March 17), that the opposition accuses the Contra of being Somocistas (March 18), that Democrats have their own counter-proposal about compromise but one that is going to be unacceptable to the Administration (March 19), that the Contra issue has also been an emotional one for the opposition (March 20), that the opposition supports aid to Honduras, that still the American people continue to think that the House did the right thing when it voted against Contra aid (March 25).

CBS. CBS persons claim that members of Congress are urging the US President to compromise on Contra aid (March 13), that members of the opposition remain bitterly opposed to Contra aid (March 17), that the vote depends on how some Democrats conservatives vote, that the opposition allows another vote on compromised Contra aid next month (March 19), that the opposition support the President's actions with respect to the situation in Honduras (March 25).

CNN. CNN persons claim that Democrats continue to work on their own proposal, that the Democrats' proposal will require negotiations previous to the release of any funds to the Contras, that the House promised a

second vote on Contra aid (March 20), that the compromise proposed by the President is not what Democrats want (March 22), that the Opposition support President Reagan's move to help Honduras (March 25).

Claims about the Sandinistas.

ABC. ABC persons indirectly claim that the Sandinistas are subverting their neighbors, that the Sandinistas are increasing their means of torture (March 13), that the Sandinistas are communist, that the Sandinistas have been well armed by the Soviets (March 18), that the Sandinista are a totalitarian regime, that the Sandinistas have the biggest military force in Central America, that Sandinistas hide their losses in the war, that the Sandinista soldiers are strikingly young, that the Sandinistas have deployed troops and weapons all over the northern borders (March 19), that the Government of Nicaragua sent a large number of troops across the border into Honduras, that the Sandinista troops are searching for Contras operating in the area, that as many as 2000 troops penetrated into Honduras, that the Sandinistas want to knock out the Contras before they get the aid (March 24), that at least two Sandinista battalions of about 1500 men attacked during the weekend, that the two Sandinista units are trapped and breaking up in panic, that the Sandinistas are helping the President to make his case, that the Sandinistas made the military mistake of not committing

enough troops against the Contras, that last spring Ortega's highly publicized visit to Moscow helped to keep the Contra program alive and this time his troops' visit to Honduras may have the same effect (March 25), that the Nicaraguan is a marxist government (March 27), that the Sandinistas' took advantage of Good Friday, the holiest of days, to condemn the US Senate approval of aid to the Contras, that the Sandinistas are making veiling threats to the American military presence on Honduras, that thousands of Nicaraguan troops are on alert with their Soviet tanks facing Honduras, that Nicaragua now acknowledges it did carry out the attack against the Contras, that the Sandinistas do not acknowledge that the Contra camp is inside Honduras, that the Sandinistas by attacking so deeply into Honduras have forced the whole question of the Contras out into the open and that perhaps they wanted to do just that (March 28).

CBS. CBS persons claim that the Sandinista economy is mangled, that Sandinista mismanagement contributes to make life tougher every day in Nicaragua, that the basic food staples e.g., meat, eggs, beans, are near impossible to find in Nicaragua, that the Sandinistas keep rising prices of these basic products, that some people in Nicaragua are afraid of going against the Sandinistas and even talking about it, that support for the Sandinistas is strong among the next generation of

Nicaraguans (March 18), that the Sandinistas' newspapers claim the US is planning to invade, that the Sandinistas already have a war at their hands and actions are going on in the Honduran border, that despite the vote in the House the Sandinistas continue to press their war against the Contras, that the Sandinista troops chasing the Contras are tough, experienced, and dedicated, that the Sandinistas got a public pledge from Fidel Castro to give them more military aid as long as the US assists the Contras (March 20), that the Sandinistas received US bipartisan condemnation for their incursion into Honduras (March 25), that remnants of the Sandinista forces are reportedly isolated and trying to escape back into Nicaragua, that three battalions of Sandinistas tried four times to overrun the main Contra camp but did not succeed, that some Sandinistas prisoners were taken, that there have been more than 35 Sandinista attacks across the Honduran border in the last two years, that the Sandinista attack this week was by far the largest (March 26).

CNN. CNN persons claim that official mouths and doors were shut for journalists seeking answers to the charges made by the US Administration about the Sandinistas, that the Sandinista response to Mr. Reagan's speech has been low key (March 17), that the no vote in the House did not elicit immediate reactions by the Sandinistas (March 20), that 1500 Sandinistas crossed the border into

Honduras (March 25-26), that the Hondurans have captured at least two Sandinista soldiers, that the captured Sandinistas were taken to Tegucigalpa and paraded before reporters, that the Sandinistas are marxist, that the Sandinista incursion was designed to deal a fatal blow to the Contras (March 26).

Claims about the Contras.

ABC. ABC persons claim that the Contras are certainly in need of US help, that the Contras are anti-communist, that the Contras are growing and that many of the Contras are very young and they could not have been Somocistas, that few of the Contras' key commanders were members of Somoza's Guard, that the Contras are not receiving army supplies, that the Honduran Government delayed the US humanitarian aid, that this aid consists of tons of food, and minor supplies such as napsacks, cantines, boots, small radios, etc., that some of the Contra groups are also receiving new weapons, that these limited supplies and the prospect of more US aid have boosted the Contras' morale, that the Contras are baddly battered, that because of these new supplies the Contras are now starting a new offensive against the Sandinistas, that because of lack of supplies the Contras had given up control of the borders to the Sandinistas, that the Contras still have kept positions deep inside Nicaragua, that the

US aid would buy the supplies the Contras need, that the Contras have added a new democratic wrinkle to their training, that for the first time they are training officers with discussions about democracy and all the intricacies surrounding the aid they are receiving, i.e., why Mr. Reagan supports them, why some congressmen object, where the aid is coming from, and the like, that the Contras' democratic lessons are a direct outcome of the US Government pressure to change the Contra movement into something the US Congress can support (March 18), that the Contra troops are very near Nicaraguan towns, that for the past several months the Contras have not done ambushes in which Sandinista soldiers and some civilians were killed, that the Contras have started hit and run attacks on the Sandinistas, that they have knocked out a power plant and a tobacco cooperative and burned several warehouses in the last few days (March 19), that despite the bravery of the Contras, they do not have a bright future against the Sandinistas (March 21), that the Contras have been fighting the Sandinistas for four days inside Honduras (March 25).

CBS. CBS persons claim that the strengthened Contras will create more problems for the Sandinistas, that the Contras intend to cripple the Nicaraguan economy (March 18), that the fact that people are unhappy in Nicaragua does not mean they like the Contras, in fact people are looking for an alternative to

both the Sandinistas and Contras (March 12), that the Contras have carried a series of sabotage attacks near the border with Honduras (March 20), that about 2000 US backed Contra rebels cut off the retreat of Sandinista battalions retreating from Honduras (March 26), that the Contras fight the Sandinista Government, that initial details of the incursion are said to have come from the Contra radio network (March 27).

CNN. CNN persons claim that Contra leaders were disappointed because of the House vote, that there is the possibility of a Contra offensive coming from Honduran territory (March 20).

Claims about the General Situation.

ABC. ABC persons claims that there is actually a battle in the US, albeit a democratic and emotional one, going on for Contra aid (March 13-17-18-19-20), that the negotiations tended to overshadow the Contra debate in Congress, that the situation in Nicaragua, even in towns at rifle range from the Contras, is surprisingly normal (March 19), that the battle in Honduras may be over before Americans helicopters get involved because the Contras have entrapped the Sandinistas, that the war in Central America has just escalated, that in Washington President Reagan is doing what he can to help Honduras, that no one in Washington is sure why Nicaragua's Ortega chose this moment to go after the Contras, that the general

conviction is that the invasion will do more harm than good to Ortega (March 25), that there is quite a debate about what is going on in Honduras, that in Congress not everyone was convinced of the alleged situation in Honduras, that these doubts were not helped by words that President Ascona of Honduras was taking a vacation, that likewise President Reagan was taking his vacation, the gulf of Sidra notwithstanding (March 26), that a measure to restrict military aid to the Contras was strongly defeated, that it is difficult to get first hand information about what is happening and not happening in Honduras, that in Nicaragua there is no hard evidence that the force of their soldiers is in trouble, that in Nicaragua there is always a certain restlessness about the Sandinistas' critics, that in Nicaragua thousand of Catholics crowded into a church to hear Cardinal Obando, a critic of Sandinistas, that the Church service turned into a protest rally condemning the Sandinistas, that the anti-Nicaraguan Government attacks in Nicaragua spilled outside the Church, that public criticism was extraordinary but not the prevailing attitude in Nicaragua (March 27), that thousands of Nicaraguan troops are on alert facing Honduras with their Soviets tanks, that in the Honduran side there have been lingering questions about American pressure to make Honduras ask for the \$20 million aid, that until Honduras and other Central American countries get a peace agreement they feel the Sandinistas

will honor they don't want to admit they are backing the Contras (March 28).

CBS. CBS persons claims that there is a bipartisan congressional interest in having a direct appraisal of the situation in Nicaragua, that there is a Congress interest in knowing whether the Administration wants to overthrow the Sandinista Government (March 13), that Republican Congresspersons are having a close look at Nicaragua in Managua, that these Republicans would like to overthrow the Sandinista Government, that some are calling the Contra aid issue a debate over a dirty little war, that this debate has become one of the dirtiest little foreign policy squabbles since Vietnam, that the Contra debate is not a big issue outside Washington, that most American are not excited about the alleged Central American crisis, that both for and against Contra aid groups are using emotions to get more Americans to care, that many are afraid of being labelled communist (March 14), that the Contra issue has been a very emotional one (March 17-20), that the situation in Nicaragua is critical for the people there, that people in Nicaragua are unhappy but they cannot find an alternative to both Contras and Sandinistas (March 18), that there are compromise talks about Contra aid in Washington (March 19), that the Contra aid battle will continue, that the Hondurans are sending troops to the borders because they worry the Sandinistas may cross the

borders, that because of the war there is a population of displaced people in Nicaragua (March 20), that the climate is one of battle in Washington (March 25), that there are small groups of protesters waiting for the President, that in Washington the Senate debate was exploding, that the Senate vote is getting little attention in Nicaragua and Honduras, that to many Nicaraguans Holy Thursday celebration seemed more important, that other Nicaraguans were at the beach, that Hondurans were at mass too and their President at the beach (March 27), that questions such as how many Sandinista elite troops were inside Honduras, whether they won or lost the fight, how deep they went into Honduras all remain unanswered (March 31).

CNN. CNN persons claim that in the US the climate is one of battle between the Administration and the Opposition on the issue of Contra aid, that common Americans are engaged in the Contra issue (March 17-20), that there are Americans who have given up all that they have in order to help the Contras (March 20), that there have been demonstrations and encounters between pro- and against-Contra groups (March 22). CNN persons claim that the climate in Nicaragua is one of mixed response (March 17), that most of the people in Managua were about their business seemingly unaware that Nicaragua was a focus of attention (March 17-20), that the Administration is sending officials to Central America to examine the effect of the

House's vote on regional security (March 18), that thousands of Sandinista troops prepare for a possible Contra offensive, that Honduras is amassing its troops by the Nicaraguan border, that there are fears of a confrontation between Nicaragua and Honduras (March 20), that delegations from the US are visiting Nicaragua prior to the compromise vote in the House in April (March 22), that the general situation in Congress is one of support for President Reagan's actions in Honduras (March 25), that in Managua it is hard to believe that a war is going on, that most governmental offices are closed, that Sandinista leaders remain on alert to the tense border situation, that there is a new dimension of escalation of the long war Sandinistas and Contras have been fighting, that Hondurans have joined the battle on their own soil, that in the US Senate leaders failed to reach agreement about what conditions should be attached to Contra aid (March 26).

Analysis of Evidence and Argumentative Procedures.

ABC. Beyond the use of images to complement what is said, the evidence to support these claims is based almost exclusively on the opinions of Congressmembers, US Administration's positions and reports, and ABC persons's reports and commentaries. Almost completely absent are the opinions of the Sandinista representatives as well as those of citizens who challenge both the US Administration's

claims and the claims of members of Congress who oppose the US Administration's Central American policies. Thus there is an overwhelming presentation of opinions favoring the status quo positions. Contradictory claims are presented, e.g., the possibility of aggressive behavior by the Contras, the implicit claim that the US Administration's proposal may not be adequate, and the poll's results showing the public in accord with the House's vote against contra aid. However, the reasons and evidence behind these or US Administration's claims are not explored. Further, the ABC persons' interventions can be characterized as repetitive, for the most part, of US Administration's claims, i.e., ABC's persons usually start and develop their interventions referring to some phrases or assertions made by US Administration officials. These interventions either aim at the introduction of oppositional voices or constitute independent assessments by ABC's persons.

CBS. Similarly CBS complements oral interventions with the deployment of images which purport to corroborate the formers. The evidence is primarily based on US Administration officials and Congressmembers. However, there exists the presentation of opinion evidence by experts and common citizens who are not in obvious association either with governments or Congress. The participation of TV persons is for the most part to paraphrase and/or comment upon the opinions and claims of

US Administration officials. Nonetheless, TV persons provide some commentaries and introduce opinions of experts and common citizens; these latter are done by providing translations of opinions from Central American people. The opinions and claims of political experts and citizens who radically challenge the claims and opinions of the US Administration are absent from the discourse. Although some contradictory claims are presented, e.g., the possibility that the President may be lying, the contradiction between the political discussion on Contra aid and the polls' results showing that the American people constantly have been against Contra aid, the fact that the American people do not believe the Sandinistas are a threat to the security of the US and the constant assertions on the contrary by the US Administration, there is no attempt at clarificatory argumentation following the deployment of these contradictory assertions.

CNN. CNN too relies for the most part on the opinions of the status quo, i.e., opinions of US Administration officials and Congresspersons. However, CNN introduces direct opinions of common citizens in a more extensive way than CBS and ABC. There are Sandinistas' and Nicaraguan common citizens' voices participating in the discourse through reporters' translations. Further, CNN introduces the direct participation of political experts from Central America, e.g., the Panamanian Ambassador, who

challenges the view of the US President, e.g., she denies that Latin American officials agree with the President and the Contras. Like ABC and CBS, CNN does not present nor represent the claims of US groups who radically challenge the claims of the status quo in the US. Finally, in general there is no discussion or exploration of the contradictions presented in the discourse; the discourse is restricted to the presentation of assertions and complementary images but there is no opportunity for the confrontation of contradictory assertions nor for their elucidation through argumentation.

Analysis of the Non-Verbal Components.

ABC, CBS, and CNN. The images deployed on the selected networks news broadcasts usually tend to corroborate what is being talked about. I suggest that the images fulfill at least three interdependent and usually simultaneous functions: as the center of what is being described or narrated, as the accompanying complement of what is being asserted in speech interventions, and as points of reference, as reminders of the speech contents. First, the images remind viewers that the speech is about Central America, Contras, Sandinistas, Congress, and the like, e.g., TV's persons introduce or make independent assessments of the stories and events by accompanying the image of the anchorperson (there usually appear small windows) with symbols, pictures, and written words on the

screen that evoke the content of the speech (ABC March 13, CBS March 13, CNN March 17); further, the independent assessments of reporters usually occur having as a background images that evoke the persons, things, and events they are referring to, e.g., the Congress and the White House (ABC March 20, CBS March 14, CNN March 17). Second, the images work as complements of what is being said, e.g., the images following the TV persons' introductions of events and other people's interventions reinforce a sense of being there where the event is happening, the images work as complements of the reality that is being asserted. Moreover, when reporters introduce or comment upon the statements of other people, the image of these people appear in ways that support the reporters' characterizations in their introductions (see ABC March 13, CBS March 13, CNN March 17). Finally, the images function as center or points of reference of the narrative, in general when the TV person is describing something (events, locations, situations, and so on), the images appear as what is being narrated or described (see ABC March 17, CBS March 18, CNN March 20). Most of the time these images, in shot sequences, fulfill these functions simultaneously.

Characterization of the Terrorists on the Instances of Commercial TV Discourse

In summary, we can conclude that the main claims of the selected TV instances about who the terrorists are are

as follows:

-Although contradictory claims are presented, in general the dominant commercial TV discourse indicates that there operates a terrorist network integrated by Nicaragua, Lybia, Iran, Cuba, North Korea, East Germany, and the Soviet Union

-The commercial TV discourse identifies the Nicaraguan Government as providing sanctuary for terrorist groups such as PLO factions, Red Brigade, and the Baader-Meinhoff group among others.

-The commercial TV discourse identifies the Nicaraguan Government as sponsoring terror in Honduras, El Salvador, Guatemala, Costa Rica, and other Latin American countries.

-The dominant TV discourse identifies the Nicaraguan Government as being undesirable, communist, violent, dictatorial, aggressive, barbarous, and irresponsible.

-The dominant TV discourse identifies the Nicaraguan Government as positing a threat for peace and security in the US and the American Continent.

CHAPTER IX

CRITICAL ANALYSIS

So far we have reviewed the literature on terrorism and discussed 'western' as well as 'non-western' views of terrorism; we placed this discussion on a background of TV broad relations to society, discussed problems that arise in the analysis of TV roles in society, and, from the literature on the sociology of TV, analyzed the 'shift' toward analyses of TV broadcasts as discourses in the context of a broad social theory; we discussed the approaches used to analyze the TV discourse on terrorism, defined partial and democratic discourses, and suggested Habermas' theory of communication as a critical alternative social theory to analyze the TV discourse on terrorism; we discussed Habermas' theory, suggested the ideal of democratic discourse as a practical possibility for TV, and Habermas' ideal speech situation as a standard to assess TV discursive practices; and, from the ideal speech situation, we derive analytical procedures to describe and critically interpret the selected instances of commercial TV discourse on terrorism and Nicaragua. In the last chapter we used the analytical descriptive procedures to describe this commercial TV discourse. Against the backdrop of the ideal

of a democratic discourse, here we will proceed to make a critical assessment of the material presented in the preceding description. I will critically assess opportunities, claims, argumentative procedures, and the non-verbal components of the discourse.

Critical Analysis of the Commercial TV Discourse on Terrorism and Nicaragua

Before going into the details of assessing the discourse on the terms defined above, a preliminary general evaluation of the discourse seems to be appropriate. I think that one can differentiate at least two levels at which the discourse can be evaluated: first, an analysis on the level of conceptualization of terrorism, i.e., at the level of definitions and forms of terrorism, and another analysis on the level of the actual prevalent conceptualization the discourse embodies, i.e., the form of terrorism and terrorists the discourse actually refers to. First I want to comment on the former level.

I want to argue that one of the important roles the commercial TV discourse on terrorism and Nicaragua plays is that of serving as a circumscribing device, as a veiling screen, as if one were viewing a picture that by being superimposed on another picture precludes one from perceiving the other. I am talking about the types of terrorism discussed in Chapter II. The instances of the TV discourse analyzed here seems to be making the

representation of a reality which obfuscates the perception of, perhaps, other more important realities. The more pervasive types of terror operating in Nicaragua, e.g., the historical terror of oppression and domination, the clandestine terror, the diplomacy of terror, and other types of terror discussed previously, are defined away in the instances of TV broadcasts object of our analysis. As seen in Chapter II, this is the terror of some groups and governments in North, Central, and South America. Perhaps, this is the most important ideological role commercial TV practices play in shaping the discourse on terrorism about Nicaragua. This type of limitation puts a straight jacket, as it were it immobilizes, it makes rigid the conditions affecting the organization of the commercial TV discourse on terrorism and Nicaragua. Thus, it fails to expand or to introduce already existing open possibilities for the constitution of an encompassing, democratic discourse about terrorism in the US. From the discussion in Chapter IV, one can say that this discourse expresses the pervasive influence of the power of the Administration on defining the terms in which social symbolic practices are to be organized and conducted in the US. At the same time this discourse expresses basic social antagonisms, and forms and types of prevalent social relations in the US society. These social contradictions and relations instantiate forms and types of undemocratic practices that in a distorted way

come to pass as if they were the democratic practices that they are obstructing. In this way, this TV discourse constitutes a reified social space in which there is no opportunity for a full rational, democratic exploration of conflicts and disagreements. Thus, it obscures the possibility of bringing to public discussion structural economico-political power practices which bear on these cultural discursive practices. This is a social space that contributes to legitimize, as democratic, manipulatory practices which favor particular interests and exclude other particular interests.

Because of the above, this discourse precludes alternative forms of social relations from being publicly discussed and is an illustration of alienating practices of commercial TV. This reified social space limits the possibility of institutionalizing a democratic discourse where rational persuasion can work for the benefit of agreements guided by democratic norms of 'generalizable interest.' So in the name of a reified, petrified notion of democracy, commercial TV practices confront the US viewers with a partial, undemocratic discursive space. Commercial TV practices fail to go beyond the limits of the permissible discourse defined on the terms of the US Administration's language; by doing this, commercial TV helps to constitute as valid and legitimate the partialized, ideological US Administration discourse on

terrorism and Nicaragua. With this introductory note, let us pass to assess the partial dominant TV discourse on its own terms.

Critical Assessment of Opportunities.

There are differences between the three networks in terms of how they include the various participants in the discourse, e.g., ABC provides less opportunity for direct participation of common citizens, experts, and foreign officials than CNN and CBS do. But, from the descriptive analysis of opportunities (allocation of time to, the representation of, and the presentation of) there is a clear similarity between the three networks in terms of a quantitative asymmetry favoring the US Administration's positions and/or claims. Thus, ABC, CBS, and CNN networks provide a discourse which presents similar homogeneous contours.

Although one can argue that a quantitative disproportion in the representation, presentation, and time allocation of the different positions can produce bias or distortions, it does not necessarily follow that in fact this is occurring. On the contrary, a quantitative disproportion may well be fairly representing the actual composition of the population, e.g., there are in the US more US Congressmen, US Administration officials, and politicians of the status quo than both foreign national officials and politicians of a determinate country, and US

politician and political experts who challenge the positions of the status quo. Thus, the relative quantitative disproportion in the representation of views can but may not be an accurate measure of bias or a reflection of the most widely held views. What is of importance here is the differential qualities of opportunity and reception that is given to the contrasting positions. Nonetheless, it is important to notice that the voices of the politicians, experts, and common people who challenge the claims of the Administration are not directly included in the discourse, nor do TV persons assume the role of representing these challenging claims. Had these people participated in the discourse or, at least, in some way TV persons presented their claims, the viewers could have had a qualitative opportunity to evaluate very different views about the Contras, the Sandinistas, the motivations of the US Administration, and the general characteristics of the situation in Nicaragua.

With the above analysis I am suggesting that, even within the boundaries of the taken for granted partialized and dominant definition of terrorism, the TV instances looked upon here fail to provide the minimal procedural conditions for the constitution of a democratic discourse. In this sense, this commercial TV discourse fails to minimally guarantee, at the two conceptualization levels discussed here, the symmetry requirement pertinent to the

democratic standard of the ideal speech situation.

Critical Assessment of Claims.

From the descriptive analysis, the commercial TV discourse's main claims about who the terrorists are refer to: (1) Sandinista Nicaragua belonging to a terrorist network integrated by the Soviet Union, Cuba, Lybia, North Korea, and East Germany among others, (2) Sandinista Nicaragua providing sanctuary to terrorist groups such as PLO factions, Red Brigade, and Baader-Meinhoff, (3) Sandinista Nicaragua sponsoring terrorism in El Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala, and Latin America in general, (4) Sandinista Nicaragua being a threat for peace and security of the US and of the whole continent, (5) Sandinista Nicaragua as being undesirable, communist, violent, totalitarian, aggressive, and irresponsible among other adjectifications.

The above claims contrast to the characterization of the Contras which refer to: (1) Contras struggling for democracy and freedom in the whole community of Central America, (2) Contras struggling against the terrorist Sandinistas, (3) Contras helping the United States to eliminate the security threat by struggling to get rid of terrorism in the Americas, (4) Contras representing the hope to finish the communist threat in Central America. In this context Americans should help the Contras not only

because of the cause of freedom and democracy the Contras carry, but also because of what they have already done. Americans already are in debt to them and should repay in kind. Furthermore, because the terrorist network chose to help the Sandinista communists, Americans should take the decision to support the Contras.

The above classification of who the terrorists and the freedom fighters are gives the commercial TV discourse a reflective character in relation to the discourse of the US Administration, i.e., the commercial TV discourse reflects in a more complex way the Administration discourse to US viewers. However, in this TV discourse contradictory claims are brought to bear on the above dominant characterizations. For instance, the democratic response makes two challenging claims to the US Administration's characterization of the Contras: (1) that the Sandinista 'atrocities pale against those of the Contras' (however, the opposition recognizes the Contras can be reformed), and (2) that the Contras military leaders in fact struggled against freedom under the Somoza regime (however, the opposition recognizes these leaders are a few). (3) The Administration's claim that the Sandinistas are oppressing religious groups, especially the Jews, is contested by an expert member of the Jewish community. (3) The Administration's claim that Sandinistas, if not stopped, will end up in Texas is challenged by an expert political

analyst on the grounds that the American people do not believe the claim to be true. Nonetheless, these contradictory claims are not explored; they do not address adequately the issues either of the Sandinistas' characterization as terrorists or of the Contras' as freedom fighters, as one should expect from discussions outside commercial TV. Moreover, it is important to notice that TV persons take care to dismiss some of these challenges, e.g., it is stressed that the US Administration is reinforcing democratic teaching to the Contras (ABC March 18), that the US Administration exploited the incursion into Honduras to come up with a prime example of why an unchecked Sandinista Government poses a danger to the region (ABC March 27), that there is confusion about the yet to be seen Sandinista invasion into Honduras but that the President says there is no exaggeration (CBS March 27), that US Administration officials confirmed there was a Sandinista invasion into Honduras (CBS March 28), and that US diplomats emphasize that President Ortega now openly confirms that his Cuban and Soviet aided troops did strike against Honduras and may again (CBS March 31). The commercial TV discourse instead of taking a more critical role in relation to the Administration language, assumes, borrowing the term from Peterson (1988), a 'plastic' character (i.e., it is molded according to what we called the giddiness of the Administration's discourse), takes for

granted the Administration's claims about the terrorist nature of the Sandinista Government and, by doing that, precludes the thematization in the public domain of both the Administration's claims and the claims which do not follow the rules of the Administration's discourse, and, therefore, works against the possibility of their public assessment. In other words, the commercial TV discourse complements the US Administration's discourse.

Thus in accord with the discussion in Chapter II and IV, the above claims can be challenged on the grounds that they do not correctly represent the actual public knowledge and discussion about the Nicaraguan situation:

(1) The charges of terrorism have not been substantiated by the Administration itself or by any other US or international institution. On the contrary, organizations such as the Americas Watch Committee (1986) have stated that the US Administration has manipulated the issue of human rights in Nicaragua to justify a policy of confrontation, that in White House's as well as State Department's reports and "in speeches and public statements by senior officials and most notably, in the President's own remarks on Nicaragua" (p.127) data on human rights in Nicaragua have been distorted.

(2) It has been extensively argued in the main as well as alternative press and in scholarly discussions that Nicaragua is far from representing a security threat to the

US or the continent. It has been argued, even by representatives of the US military establishment, that the US has the power to militarily, and by conventional means, take control of the most important cities of Nicaragua in few days. And, as Butler (1986) points out, the Sandinistas have been willing to discuss with the US Administration the issue of security. Further, she remarks, Nicaragua is not as well militarily equipped as are its neighbors Panama and Honduras.

(3) Claims about the aggressive, authoritarian, communist, and irresponsible nature of the Nicaraguan Government have been publicly contested, for example in the Americas Watch Report (1986): "Of particular concern is the Administration's constant--and inaccurate--use of the term 'totalitarian' to characterize Nicaragua" (p.127). For instance, the accusations of Nicaraguan invasion into Honduras has been challenged on different grounds in several discussions and articles in The Nation, Public Radio, The Guardian, C-Span TV, and other media. The communist nature of the Nicaraguan Government has been publicly refuted on economical as well as political grounds (Chomsky, 1985; Coraggio and Irvin, 1985; Harris, 1985). The irresponsible and aggressive characteristics of the Sandinistas have been publicly contested too. For instance, there have been evidence of Sandinista's mistreatment of the Miskito Indians, but the Sandinistas themselves

recognize this as a mistake. The fact that Nicaragua has taken and insists in taking its international disputes to the rule of international law and its acceptance of international intermediaries, e.g., the Contadora group, goes against the implicit accusations of dogmatism and irresponsibility.

(4) The fact that the Sandinistas have strong ties with the Soviets nobody denies. However, they have strong ties to the Western world too. For example, of the \$2.5 billion of assistance received by the Nicaraguans until mid 1985 only 25% came from socialist governments and the Eastern Block (Conroy, 1985; Butler, 1986). Further, the maintenance of strong ties to Moscow does not necessarily mean an association or identification with the policies of the Soviets. The position of the Contadora countries challenges this notion.

(5) The need to help the Contras is not recognized by a significant portion of the US population. There is a significant part of the US public who challenge the position of the US Administration on these matters. The thousands of Americans helping the Nicaraguan Government in Nicaragua as well as in the US testify to the above assertion. Further, the public opinion polls, the discussion, and protest activities of groups in universities and cities, as reported by alternative press such as The Guardian and the Nation, add to that evidence.

(6) The supposedly democratic inclinations of the Contras have been challenged by innumerable organizations and individuals in the US and abroad. The evidence presented against the terrorist conduct of the governments of El Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala, and of the Contras have been more conclusive than the evidence presented against the Sandinistas (Amnesty International 1984, 1985; Americas Watch Committee, 1982; Brody Report, 1985; Institute for Policy Studies, 1985; Barry and Preusch, 1986; Dickey, 1985; Dixon, 1985). As we already discussed in Chapter IV, Brody (1985) presents a chronology of 397 Contras' attacks on civilian population from December 1, 1981 to November 30, 1984. He states that "[the report] includes only attacks resulting in the deaths, injury or kidnapping of civilians or the destruction of farmland or private or communal property" (p.153). Of the 397 attacks, Brody presents an exhaustive investigation of 28 of them. It is worth to repeat here that in these attacks, the Contras left CIA made manuals instructing the population on how to sabotage the Nicaraguan economy and the CIA notorious 'Psychological Operations on Guerrilla Warfare' which instructed how to use violence for propagandistic purposes. Moreover, continuing with the discussion in Chapter IV, the Americas Watch Committee (1986) has refuted the claims about the morality of the Contras and has found that the Contras engage in systematical killings "of prisoners and

the unarmed, including medical and relief personnel; selective attacks on civilians and indiscriminate attacks; torture and other outrages against personal dignity; and the kidnappings and harassment of refugees" (p.128).

The claims advanced in the commercial TV discourse not only fail to challenge the claims of the US Administration but, in general, these claims pose the question of Nicaragua in terms of technical issues about the successful conduct of a US foreign policy, i.e., whether the US Administration's initiatives are leading to a direct involvement of American troops in combat or in terms of the Contras' effectiveness or ineffectiveness in waging war against the Sandinistas; therefore, to the danger of creating another Vietnam with the consequence of Americans facing death in Central America. So, it is not only that the basic premises of the US Administration's Central American policy are not questioned, i.e., the US interference in the internal affairs of Nicaragua and the US power to decide the fates of the Nicaraguan people. But, it is established that Americans share a consensual agreement over the substance of the policy. The disagreement is a technical procedural one about how to implement the policy while, at the same time, minimizing the risks of direct American involvement in the region's battle fields. The discourse is reduced to discussions about providing answer to the technical inquiry of finding

the most effective way for US (Americans, Contras) to win the battle against THEM (Sandinistas, Soviets). Borrowing from Habermas, one can say that in the TV discourse treated here political, practical questions are dealt with as if they were instrumental, technical questions. Again, in this way the commercial TV discourse on terrorism and Nicaragua obfuscates the possibility that further analyses of the connections between economico-political power structures can become and be explored publicly. Also, it illustrates the invasion of system requirements into the cultural lifeworld.

Critical Assessment of the Use of Evidence and Argumentative Procedures.

From the descriptive analysis of the arguments and evidence procedures, it can be argued that there are dissimilar conditions of exploration and reception of the claims advanced. For instance, after the denial of the so called invasion of Honduras by the Nicaraguan official, there is no opportunity for the Nicaraguan to expand or argue her commentaries; instead TV persons affirm that Democrats as well as Republicans agree that the invasion did take place, related opinions of both Democrats and Republicans are presented, and TV persons reinforce the view that indeed the invasion took place. Sometimes TV reporters appear to be doubting the claims of the Administration, but usually they end up providing

commentaries that corroborate what the Administration is saying. In this regard, the brief interventions arguing or exposing the Nicaraguan Government's positions are not taken seriously. The claims that challenge the positions of the Administration, e.g., the claims made by the Sandinista official, are ignored by TV personnel. Thus, there is no opportunity to advance arguments in support of these claims and the Administration's claims are taken for granted. For the most part, the evidence presented by Administration officials, Congresspersons, and experts to support the propositions of the Administration relies on references to previously emitted unsubstantiated opinions. Further, this evidence relies too on references to the Administration own qualifications about the Sandinistas, e.g., because the Sandinistas are communists, therefore, they are aggressive or viceversa. In summary, the predominant logic of the argumentation process is a strategic one of elucidating the best and more effective ways, e.g., how to win the battle against Sandinism-communism with a minimum of human and material risks to the US, to reach a pre-established goal, i.e., the elimination of the Sandinista Government in Nicaragua. This way, we can say that the argumentation process of commercial TV broadcasts contributes to their plastic character and is controlled by a 'strategic-military logic'.

What can be called the movement or dynamics of the discourse is a circumscribed one. It is circumscribed because, however plastic it may be, the boundaries within which the discourse is built are limited by a strategic logic and a rigid differentiation between a constantly positively presented, always present US and a constantly negatively represented, almost absent THEM.

Critical Assessment of the Non-Verbal Components

The proposed three functions of the discourse's images can be critically assessed in terms of the evocations they bring forth and the relationships of these evocations with the actors and messages depicted in the discourse. In this way, it can be seen that TV discourses can connect and disconnect signifiers in order to assemble associative configurations of meaning not only through what is explicitly shown but through what is systematically hidden.

As previously stated, TV images remind viewers about what the spoken message refers to. However, the way the chosen images fulfill this function not only reminds the viewers who the actors are, e.g., small windows show the US flag, the inscription CONTRA AID, and the Nicaraguan map to differentiate actors and geographical regions in the discourse, but the spatial arrangement of the flag, the inscription, and the map evokes the nature of the relationship between the actors, e.g., the CONTRA AID

phrase is inscribed on top of the US flag. This spatial arrangement provides associations and helps to fix a specific type of relationship between the Contras and US and Nicaraguan peoples which is ambiguously established in the spoken message. It could have had a different evocation had not the US flag (patriotic paleosymbolic evocation of US Americans) and the Nicaraguan map (a geographical region representing a people) been used. For instance, the evocation would have been very different had the small window presented pictures of Mr. Reagan and Mr. Calero (one of the Contra leaders) instead of the US flag and the Nicaraguan map.

To the above it may be added that the way in which the anchorperson positions her/himself in relation to the viewer, i.e., making eye contact with the camera and interpreting for the viewer (not addressing the viewer directly), constitutes an authoritative image that positions the viewer in a passive role and calls for uncritical acceptance of what is being provided by the screen.

The screen images complement the reality of what is being said by showing that the report comes from the site where the event is unfolding or by showing certain 'data' corroborating the assertions made. This reinforces the authoritative, expert image of reporters and anchorpersons and implicitly states the objective character of the

discourse. However, in its attempts to be objective and truthful, or perhaps because of certain 'mistakes', the screen cues viewers as to the extent commercial TV practices go in fabricating or accomodating reality to the perceived needs of the circumstances. For instance, in the CBS's broadcast of March 26 two alleged captured Sandinistas soldiers are shown. However, in one instance, at a moment when the soldiers are being taken to a press conference site, on the lower screen it appears: May 1985. This indicates that these scenes were taken at that time, nonetheless, they were being shown as instances of events supposedly occurring in March 1986! A similar situation occurs with the CNN's broadcast of March 20. In this instance an extensive report of a Contra supporter in Texas is shown, but, in one specific shot, in the lower screen it appears: August 07, 1985. Again, this shows the extent to which commercial TV practices can go to stretch reality and be 'objective.' Whether these instances of commercial TV practices intended to corroborate what is being presented or whether these instances were non-intended mistakes, they bring to viewers' awareness that what they may be getting from commercial TV news is not as accurate and objective a reality as it appears to be, that what they are getting is a constructed package.

Finally, in our proposition TV images can work as center of the narrative. Here the images unfold

accompanying the narrative, e.g., the reporter describes a region and its people as images of the region and its people appear on the screen. One can say that here also the images purport to establish the credibility, authority, and objectivity of TV broadcasts. However, the type of narratives and images can fulfill ideological functions which reinforce the general rules within which the discourse is constructed. In the case discussed here, for the most part, the events in the Central American region are depicted in a language and imagery of war that reinforce the notion that the Sandinistas (THEY) are in a superior position (ABC March 19), that the Contras (our friends) are in a precarious condition (ABC March 18), these images and the words spoken interplay so as to give the impression that the Contras are not winning the war not because of lack of effectiveness or unpopularity (e.g., the fact that they were effective before is shown in words and images, ABC March 19) but because they do not have adequate supplies. Here also the technological premises of the commercial TV discourse can be seen: the questions are framed in terms of who is winning or what are the circumstances in which winning is possible, but questions such as to what extent is it right for the US to attempt to overthrow the Nicaraguan Government and/or to what extent should the US interfere with other nations' affairs are not addressed.

These images of war contrast with the rational debates, with the 'battles' of words, taken place in the US. The scenery as a whole constitutes paleosymbols that evoke situations of danger and irrationality associate with THEM (aggressiveness, violence, war) and situations of security and rationality associate with US (peaceful coexistence, democratic debates, possibility of understanding). As an example, had commercial TV explored images and words to analyze motivations and historical, political, and economic circumstances related to Americans and Nicaraguans relationships and/or had commercial TV shown and explored the circumstances leading Americans and Nicaraguans to work together in crops, hospitals, and constructions as one gets from alternative media and information sources, commercial TV would had offered the American public a more complete picture from which to learn about Central America and Nicaragua in particular.

Nonetheless, avoiding contradictions is not possible, i.e., there are too many dissenting voices about this issue in the US society and they find their ways of expression through other media, thus TV network is pressured to, at least, minimally consider these dissenting voices. Further, if they want to practice journalism, they have to address issues of objectivity and fairness. It is in the intercourse of 'objectivity' and 'fairness' (e.g., to a special about the Contras, a special about the

Sandinistas follows, or viceversa), that contradictions are exposed. And, though the effectiveness of "our" friends is shown, sometimes it appears that by "our" means violence, injustice, and killing is perpetrated (CBS March 18). This helps to provide an aura of democratic complexity to commercial TV practices when in fact this TV discourse parallels the range of official acceptable debate.

In summary, I hope to have indicated how the commercial TV discourse on terrorism and Nicaragua illustrates alienating communication practices that constitute a partial discourse which, in turn, fail to provide conditions for the democratic discernment of contradictory claims at two levels: first, at the broad level of the existing knowledge about terrorism, i.e., at the level of the discussion in Chapter II. And, second, at the narrow level of the taken for granted conceptualization of terrorism of the Administration discourse. Further, this suggests that, whether viewers are exposed to commercial network news (ABC and CBS) or to commercial all news network (CNN), there are no broadcast differences due to format differences, the important practices influencing the shaping of the discourse are political and not technological requirements of the TV machinery. Moreover, I think this discussion indicates, contrary to Elliot et al.'s (1983) analysis, the social existence of an alternative discourse on terrorism from which commercial TV

discourses can be enriched, but an alternative discourse that, instead, commercial TV practices exclude from consideration.

Commercial TV as an Education-Social Integration, Democratic-Autonomization, and Cultural-Public Sphere Resource.

This critical assessment of the commercial TV discourse on terrorism and Nicaragua shows that the commercial TV practices operating in the construction of this discourse underutilizes the actual potential of TV as an education-socialization resource. Commercial TV provides a symbolic environment within which developing individuals can learn and can be socialized, but only within limited conceptions of democratic practices. Commercial TV practices constituting the discourse on terrorism and Nicaragua underutilize the TV potential as a democratization-autonomization resource, i.e., the experiences adult individuals can have through TV in respect to this discourse precludes the opening of more ample democratic horizons since it obfuscates both the presentation and scrutiny of dissenting voices and the possibility of public discussion of the interpenetrations of economic, political, and cultural practices. Moreover, these experiences provide a limited opportunity to challenge the dominant assumptions of the culture, thereby, they work in the direction of blocking autonomization processes. Finally, the practices intervening in the

configuration of the commercial TV discourse on terrorism underutilize TV's potential as a resource for the reactivation-institutionalization of the public sphere. As long as these TV practices operate to obfuscate dissenting voices, to restrict the challenging of the Administration, and to restrict the public access to political discussion, they operate also to restrict and to obstruct a reactivation and institutionalization of a public sphere in which full democratic participation can take place, cultural traditions can 'cross their horizons', and processes of reaching understanding, directed at universal audiences, can occur.

Attempt to Define the Guiding Rules of the Discourse

From both the descriptive and critical analysis above, one can, in general terms, distinguish some of the main rules structuring the narrative of the commercial TV discourse on terrorism and Nicaragua. I think that at least three types of general mutually complementary Alienation rules can be differentiated. They are expressed by exclusionary configurations of meaning, a strategic logic and an ideological WE-THEY dichotomy.

The exclusionary rules are expressed by the systematic barring of alternative forms of analyses, conceptualizations, and points of view from the commercial TV discussions. These rules contribute to make 'invisible' certain types of terrorism which are enacted by the US

Administration and associated groups and governments.

The strategic rules are constituted by a technical logic of means-end relationships. The shaping of the commercial TV discourse on terrorism and Nicaragua follows strategic rules that circumscribe the discussion in terms of making the best choices to, minimizing the risks involved, successfully accomplish the foreign policy toward Nicaragua of the US Administration. In this way these strategic rules work to shape a commercial TV discourse which both complements and helps to legitimize the Administration practices against Nicaragua and treats practical issues as technical ones.

The ideological rules are constituted by a WE-THEY dichotomy. As has been shown, in the three networks' news stories the narrative follows a clear 'WE-THEY' dichotomy. At first it appears as if there are two radically different (the metaphor of battle is constantly used) positions on the issue about US foreign policy in Central America. But, the whole stories are underlied, are constitutive of a discourse defined in terms of a dichotomy between US (the democratic, fighters for freedom Americans and Contras) and THEM (the terrorist, aggressive, communist Sandinistas and terror network society). All the narrative develops upon a taken for granted assumption that there is a common enemy threatening the US and the Western world; therefore it should be fought. The disagreements presented are related

to the form that the fight can take, and/or to the appropriate decisions to win, but neither the legitimacy and rightness of the US Administration's assumptions nor the reasons and justification for and nature of the fight are genuinely questioned or explored. Also this ideological dichotomy helps to obscure the identification, according to its own definitions, of the the US Administration's terrorists.

These alienation rules show how the pervasiveness of the power of the Administration transpires in the shaping of the commercial TV discourse on terrorism and Nicaragua. Figure 1 is an attempt to qualify the general rules that govern the narrative.

Figure.1

WITHIN THE PERMISSIBLE TERMS OF DISCUSSION DEFINED BY THE
US ADMINISTRATION,

HOW SHOULD

WE
US, Contras, Honduras,
El Salvador, the West
Freedom, Peace, Democracy
Heroism, Legitimacy, Justice
Humanism, Responsibility

SELECT THE CORRECT STRATEGY TO WIN

THEM?
Nicaragua, Moscow, Lybia,
North Korea, the East
Oppression, Aggression, Communism
Deception, Illegitimacy, Injustice
Totalitarianism, Irresponsibility

CHAPTER X

DISCUSSION OF RESULTS

Before we analyzed the commercial TV discourse on terrorism and Nicaragua, we proposed the thesis that the commercial TV discourse uncritically represents the US's foreign policy positions, and defines and frames terrorism and the Nicaraguan situation in terms of the Administration's language. It is a discourse that does not go beyond what the Administration defines as permissible discourse, it complements the language of the Administration, it excludes alternatives views and political positions, it fails to provide appropriate treatment to the historical events related to Nicaragua, and helps to stabilize illegitimate structures of power. In this section, I will assess the study in terms of the proposed thesis. However, before doing this I will address the results of this study in terms of clarity of analysis, limits of data, and controversial points.

Clarity of Analysis

To provide a clear explicative analysis of the TV discourse on terrorism and Nicaragua one would have to reconstruct a diversity of levels or layers of the

discourse's determinants in order to shed light on its deep as well as its surface constituents. In this sense, one would have to rely on historical analyses of the US and its relation with Nicaragua and other Central American countries, their positioning in a world historical context, and cultural practices which have sedimented through that history in the US; on historical analyses of the development of other discourses in the US, e.g., the discourse on communism, their influence in the US culture, and their interplay with other discourses, e.g., the discourse on terrorism; on an encompassing analysis of the intercourse of political and economic power and their impact on the configuration of TV practices, i.e., on analyses of economico-political practices influencing the shaping of TV discourses and organizations, e.g., commercial vs public TV; on the analysis of the conceptions and practices of democracy in the US and how they bear on TV practices; and on the cultural 'moods' of the time, e.g., the 'new patriotism and chauvinism' in the US, and their bearing on TV practices. One would have also to position the discourse on terrorism and Nicaragua in relation to related discursive development that may bring new circumstances to play in the formation and opening of different social spaces. These may create new conditions in which these related discursive practices intersect between themselves and with the public. For instance, in our case

the irruption of the Iran-Contra affair in the public domain certainly interferes in multiple ways with subsequent public discussions about the ongoing Sandinista-Contra issue in the US.

All This, among other things, shows the difficulty of analyzing in its entirety the historical circumstances and the social conditions bearing on the workings of commercial TV, and TV in general, and on the organization of its specific discourses, e.g., discourse on terrorism. Consequently, this difficulty points also, in a direct way, to the limitations of this study. However, I think that the type of research required to understand the commercial TV discourse on terrorism and Nicaragua and its multiple implications and determinations cannot be undertaken in one work; it would have to be a programmatic body of research. The type of study undertaken here can hope to shed light on one of the surface layers constitutive of the commercial TV discourse on terrorism and Nicaragua, i.e., at what one may call the level of how the discourse is assembled on the TV screen. Here one can aim also at distinguishing the deep regulators operating at the screen assemblage level of the discourse. Of course, these difficulties and limitations facing this analysis does not diminish the importance of the issue analyzed here. The specific historical space marked by these two or three weeks of discourse on terrorism and Nicaragua, left profound sequelae for the

lives and future possibilities of the people of Nicaragua.

Also, the type of qualitative analysis undertaken here encounter considerable difficulties. One is the scarcity of similar studies, i.e., of others' analytical experiences that one could learn from, and the quantity of raw material that this type of analysis provides posits limitations in terms of the specificity level that one can go in analyzing the organization of the discourse. Because of my limitations of time, I chose, what I consider to be, an intermediary path of analysis in the hope of grasping enough meaning while at the same time being able to grasp the connection between more general levels of the discourse organization. The extent to which I could go over these and other limitations to accomplish a clear analysis is for the reader to decide.

Limits of Data

Of course the representativeness of the selected TV broadcasts is limited to the specific events analyzed here, to the specific type of TV activity in which they are constituted, i.e., commercial TV news broadcasts and the specific time lapsus in which they occurred, i.e., these three weeks of March 1986. In this sense this analysis cannot make broad generalizations. However, as long as the commercial TV broadcasts analyzed here represent events which are rich in consequences for the regions and the peoples involved, as long as the news broadcasts constitute

an important and credible source of information, as long as news provides types of knowledge that, in turn, can influence people's conceptions and political practices, the data analyzed here can provide important political insights. It can provide insights among other things, to the level of justice, democracy, and cultural richness and political flexibility both operating in the US social formation and that the US exercises toward Nicaragua at this historical moment. If this is correct, it is in this sense that I think the data treated here are pregnant with practical, political implications. The way commercial TV shapes political issues for the US people undercuts the democratic ideas which the US society claims to live by. Instrumental rationality dictates ways for the organization of the commercial TV political discourse on terrorism and poses technical choices as if they were democratic decisions. These TV practices illustrate a type of political alienation and are working against the democratic possibility of an informed, conscious, and responsible people to correct distortions and corruptions in the exercising of political power. Finally, the commercial TV discourse on terrorism and Nicaragua may be revealing to certain extent the level of hypocrisy, mainly among the political leaders, about democracy and the level of reification of, or of petrification of, democratic practices operating in the US society as a whole.

Controversial Points

Of the controversial points that can be raised about this work, the ones inherent to Habermas' formulations are of clear importance. However, I do not think that this is the place to address them. There is currently a debate going on between Habermas and his critics (Bernstein, 1983, 1985; Ingram, 1987; Thompson & Held, 1982), and Habermas has argued the programmatic character of his work. However, one of the most controversial points that can be addressed here concerns the idea of the ideal speech situation. That is, to the claim that the ideal speech situation is presupposed every time that a sentence is uttered, there are frequently raised the counterclaims that this is not necessarily so and that the ideal speech situation constitutes an utopia. Habermas (1982) has answered that the taken for granted everyday life consensus is not only obtained under the presuppositions of the ideal speech situation, i.e., perhaps most of people's communication occurs under the premise of an already existing cultural consensus. But, if this cultural consensus has been broken, then to arrive at rational understandings and agreements, i.e., valid consensus, it is necessary that the practices inherent in the ideal speech situation be put into operation. I think that this is the case in relation to the discourse on terrorism and Nicaragua, i.e., there is no cultural consensus in the US about the Nicaraguan

situation; nonetheless, commercial TV practices preclude certain ideas and positions from participation in political discussions. This way commercial TV practices may be contributing to the achievement of a distorted consensus based on partial and limited information, obstructing the possibility of arriving at a rational agreement and mutual understanding, helping in the establishment of relations of power based on domination, and constituting alienating intellectual practices. Moreover, whether or not the 'scientific' foundations of Habermas' theory are sound, his interpretative dialectics, as Bernstein (1983) rightly points out,

...can orient our collective praxis in which we seek to approximate the ideal of reciprocal dialogue and discourse, and in which the respect, autonomy, solidarity, and opportunity required for the discursive redemption of universal normative validity claims are not mere abstracts "oughts" but are to be embodied in our social practices and institutions (p.195).

From Bernstein's remarks one can argue that starting from the notion of a historically rooted democratic discourse, for example a discourse that consider the discussion carried out in Chapter II and IV, the ideal speech situation (in this sense of a historical democratic discourse) can concretely work as a normative standard, without discarding the claim to universality, to assess, as to their 'democratic degrees of freedom,' discursive practices.

As to the antagonisms or contradictions inherent to the findings of this work, e.g., contradictions related to peoples' negative attitudes toward Contra aid. It can be said that the polls presented in the TV broadcasts themselves contradict what I have been saying here about the ways the commercial TV discourse complements the Administration's discourse, i.e., one can claim that the public of the US are skeptical about what the discourse is implying. But to say that the discourse is partialized and undemocratic is not to affirm that the commercial TV discourse has a decisive impact on peoples' conceptions, attitudes, and practices. By pointing out the limited way by which this discourse is constituted one does not assume that the public cannot have a negative reception and, perhaps, a contradictory interpretation of it. One does not assume that peoples fail to see the contradictions of the discourse or that they cannot have antagonistic responses to them. Neither does the fact that the public do not approve of Contra aid shows that the premises and rule components of the discourse have not been accepted. Nor do peoples' negative attitudes toward Contra aid reveal their commitment to oppose politically Contra aid. Another related point can be made against the seemingly simple categorization made in this analysis, i.e., it can be argued that the results of this study are too much 'either/or' e.g., that they do not address the full

complexity, ambiguity, and contradictions of commercial TV discursive practices. To this I can reply that indeed the practices constituting this commercial TV discourse categorize and follow simple analysis and comparisons between actors, ideological positions, cultural practices and so on. The plasticity of this discourse constitutes a compatible environment for, and is primarily shaped by, the Administration's language. And, as we already discussed, this discourse is regulated by rigid 'alienation' rules, i.e., exclutionary configurations of meaning, an ideological WE-THEY dichotomy and a strategic logic. One can advance different hypotheses for this being so, however, I think that, on the one hand, as I will argue below, the fact that this discourse embodies issues between the US and another country greatly contributes for, and facilitates the simple differentiations presented in the discourse, i.e., it makes easier for the Administration's power to set the permissible limits of construction and operation of the commercial TV discourse and to impose the simple categorizations of its language. Also, it makes it easier for the 'new chauvinistic moods' of the time to be expressed. To test this proposition, it will be necessary to make comparative analyses between similar discourses when they related to 'internal' and 'external' issues (issues that have versus issues that do not have 'immediate' consequences for the US society), e.g., the

commercial TV discourse on terrorism and Nicaragua versus the commercial TV discourse on the Iran-Contra affair. On the other hand, the type of economico-political structure of society and the TV organization can be a related element interacting with the type of issues treated in the discourse. This, in turn, can help to determine the type of influence political power exercises in the shape of, and the possibility that 'cracks' within the dominant political and economic powers find their ways of expression in TV discourses. This proposition can be tested through analyses of alternative TV organizations which may express alternative practices, e.g., public TV versus commercial TV discourses. Then, from the above discussion, what is needed is a research expansion into the ways social practices intercept to organize this discourse in society. It is necessary a research of the organization and fields of operation of this discourse, i.e., a research program that will address the above questions.

Nonetheless, as it was discussed in Chapter IX, one of the functions of the commercial TV discourse on terrorism and Nicaragua may be found in what it excludes. Not only what the discourse excludes in relation to the voices and positions that are barred from it but in relation to the conception of terrorism itself. In this sense this discourse is framed within the dictates of what the Administration defines as terrorism and avoids the

thematization in the public sphere of the other, and perhaps more pervasive, forms of terrorism that I discussed in Chapter II. Perhaps, it is here where the commercial TV discourse on terrorism and Nicaragua plays its more important ideological function. This latter contributes to obfuscate the level of dominating and oppressing terror that has been brought about by practices enacted by the US and subordinated governments and groups in Nicaragua and other Third World countries. This ideological function obscures relations between rationality and domination.

Assessment of the Study in Terms of the Proposed Thesis

In summary, the results of the study of the selected TV instances of discourse offer support for the thesis examined in this work. The instances of commercial TV discourse scrutinized here in fact constitute partial discursive practices which complement and have an unitary character with the Administration's language. However this discourse appears to present alternative and oppositional voices, indeed it leaves out critical positions that offer substantial challenge claims and alternative forms of analysis to those of the Administration. It also fails to put in historical perspective the discussion about Nicaragua. Given the circumstances of, the role played by the US in, and the importance of the recent Nicaraguan history for the actual situation in Nicaragua and US-Nicaragua relations, it becomes imperative, more so because

of the importance of the concerning issues, that analyses of these relations and situation be put into this historical perspective. By not doing so, the commercial TV discourse denies the public the possibility of a proper rational understanding of the Nicaraguan situation. This way, the commercial TV discourse on terrorism and Nicaragua helps to legitimize in the public view the oppressive foreign policy toward Nicaragua of the US Administration. As was discussed in the critical analysis, it is important to acknowledge the contradictions present in the discourse. These contradictions can open avenues for critical receptions of this discourse. Nonetheless, language interventions in the discourse tend to minimize or to provide solutions, or dissolutions for these contradictions, which are compatible with the Administration's claims. These attempts to solve or dissolve the antagonisms or practical contradictions of the discourse contribute to the plasticity and giddiness of the commercial TV discourse on terrorism and Nicaragua. As I mentioned above, perhaps it is because the discourse analyzed here refers to issues 'external' to the US society and represents a position of the US Administration against another state (an alleged 'marxist-lenninist state') and not, for example, against a group of US citizens, that the power of the Administration in delimiting the boundaries of what is permissible in the construction of the commercial

TV discourse can be so influential. Thus, maybe that because of these circumstances, challenges to the dominant politico-economic power are denied space in, and the power of the Administration can clearly be the dominant one in the shaping of these commercial TV discursive practices.

Also, these results suggest that, in fact, this discourse expresses an instance of the reification of the communicative processes of the lifeworld, i.e., as Habermas says 'practical questions are defined in terms of technical ones... and political decisions are disconnected from concrete contexts of life,' and of the processes of cultural impoverishment, or cultural disconnections between the expert cultures from the communicative practices of everyday life, i.e., this discourse neither contributes to an integration of the knowledge available at the level of what one may call the 'culture of the expert on terrorism' into the everyday communication of the common individual nor does it contribute to a substantial, encompassing intercourse between the two. In this way, this discourse fails to provide a social space from which relevant knowledge of the experts culture, connected and recycle into the everyday lifeworld, necessarily provides challenges to the principles and norms operating in the structuring of the Administration discourse. Then, it fails also to provide conditions in which action coordinations between participants, following new critical principles,

norms, and rules of discourse construction, can open channels of solidarity between American and Nicaraguan peoples. Finally, by rigidifying these processes of mutual understanding and action coordination, this commercial TV discourse is contributing to create cementing, dogmatizing conditions not appropriate for the development of autonomous and strong individuals.

Thus, this type of discourse confronts and provides resistance to democratizing practices of the US social formation. This reification and cultural impoverishment embodied in this discourse points in a direct way to the basic social antagonisms produced, at this historical moment, by the alienation inherent in the division of intellectual from manual labor. It illustrates also the fetichizing, ideological function of certain intellectual activities under capitalism. And, as Peterson (1988) remarks,

we can note that many of [these alienated intellectual practices] not only rely upon and develop knowledge, but also act upon cognitive functions: on the effects and forms of knowledge and knowledge flow, etc. So far as these intellectual practices represent a kind of politics, they do so in a way that often bears directly in the formation of the conditions and forms of action. They frequently involve a politics concerned with the shaping of agency as much as with the pursuit of specific outcomes in a more familiar sense (p.14).

Summary of Problems

In our discussion of the clarity of analysis, we see the problem of the difficulty of analyzing in its

completeness the historical circumstances and social conditions bearing on the construction and workings of commercial TV discourses and TV discourses in general. This problem calls for a research program, for an interdisciplinary research program addressing all the above issues bearing on the commercial TV discourse on terrorism and Nicaragua. A second problem points to difficulties researchers face on doing qualitative analysis of this type. These are difficulties in terms of quantity of raw material and a lack of similar types of work done. The former problem I think is a matter of accumulating practical research experience and, ultimately, of individual choice as to what level of concreteness one wants to address the data. For instance, this discourse can be analyzed as a complete 'macro-speech' act in isolation and/or in relation to other macro-speech acts, it can also be analyzed in terms of a detailed pragmatic classification of the speech acts it contains, or, as I attempted to do here, it can be assessed in terms of the validity claims it embodies. These approaches require different amounts of efforts and ways of addressing the issues.

In terms of limitations of the data, an important limitation is constituted by the specificity of content and time of the material studied here. So, the importance of the issue notwithstanding, the claims made from the results obtained in this study cannot go beyond the specific issue

about the Sandinista-Contra controversy as it is treated in these instances of commercial TV broadcasts. Nonetheless, this analysis provides important insights about the political climate, the interplay of domination and rationality in contemporary US, and the meaning of this interplay for Central American and Third World peoples in general.

Among other controversial points, we saw the limitations of Habermas' theoretical work necessarily carry over to analyses that spring from his theory. In this regard, I pointed out both Habermas' acknowledgement of the programmatic character of his work and the current interlocutions between Habermas and his critics. However, the practicality of the ideal speech situation as a viable normative standard has been questioned. I have argued that through the notion of a historically rooted democratic discourse, analytical procedures derive from the ideal speech situation, as the ones used here, can be useful to concretely assess the democratic degrees of freedom of discursive practices. This can be done without necessarily giving up the claims to universality of the ideal speech situation. This argument directs us toward the possibilities of these analytical procedures to differentiate alternative discourses, but it does not show how these analytical procedures can be useful in differentiating alternative discourses.

Finally, I pointed out that this analysis can be criticized for its lack of complexity, it can be said that it fails to show, or that it does not grasp enough, the ambiguities presented in commercial TV practices. As I mentioned, I think that this can be tested through analyses of similar discourses when they embody 'external' versus 'internal' issues, and/or of discourses produced by alternative organizations, for example public and commercial TV. I will try to analyze instances of public TV discourse in an attempt to illustrate possible differences between alternative TV practices.

It is to test the usefulness of the ideal speech situation, the analytical procedures derived from it, and the possibility of alternative TV practices in the US, that I will turn in the next chapter to study the institutional implications of the results so far discussed in this work. To do that I will analyze instances, from the same time period of March 1986, of the public (PBS) TV discourse on terrorism and Nicaragua.

CHAPTER XI

COMMERCIAL VERSUS PUBLIC TELEVISION DISCOURSES

In analyzing the institutional implications of the results, I will apply the analytical procedures to selected instances of public TV discourse, elaborate upon both a comparison between TV discourses (PBS versus commercial networks), and discuss the adequacy of the proposed procedures to identify real differences among possible alternative TV discourses and thus illustrate the practical implications of the ideal speech situation.

Institutional Implications of Results

To accomplish this analysis of the institutional implications of results, I will use the descriptive and critical procedures developed in this work to explore a sample of the PBS TV discourse. The following analysis is by no means an exhaustive exploration of the differences between the public and commercial TV discourses on terrorism and Nicaragua. The intention here is to show, if any, relevant differences between these discourses and to assess the developed procedures in terms of their usefulness to detect real practical differences between alternative discourses. For this purpose, I chose two of

MacNeil-Lehrer News Hour (see note 1). Of course, I do not claim that the selected PBS broadcasts are representative of the discourse constituted in the MacNeil-Lehrer News Hours. However, I think the material contained in the selected MacNeil-Lehrer broadcasts are enough for my purpose here, i.e., to show relevant differences between the public and commercial TV discourses and to assess the usefulness of the analytical procedures employed. To do that I will analyze the two selected broadcast instances of the PBS MacNeil-Lehrer News Hour, I will compare this analysis with the results of the commercial network broadcasts analyzed previously, and I will discuss the practical usefulness of the analytical procedures.

Analysis of the Selected PBS TV Discourse on Terrorism and Nicaragua.

Descriptive Analysis.

Analysis of Opportunities.

In the selected PBS broadcasts, the participants in the configuration of the discourse are US political experts associated with the status quo, Sandinista representatives, and other professionals, mainly from the mass media, who represent a broad section of the political spectrum in the US.

Analysis of Claims.

The claims can be classified as claims of the Administration, Claims of the opposition, claims of the Sandinistas, claims of the Contras, claims of other participants, and claims of the TV personnel.

The Administration Claims.

The claims of the Administration can be summarized as follows: the claims that recent valid polls show that the Central American people condemn the Sandinistas and support aid to the Contras, that the Central American leaders have their reasons as to how they express their positions, that Central American leaders are concerned about the situation in Nicaragua, that they understand the significance of putting pressure on the Sandinistas in order to bring them to a political approach (March 17), that the communist Sandinistas invaded Honduras, that the communist Sandinistas decided that since they won a vote in Congress they had a golden opportunity to go into Honduras, finish the Contras and, at the same time, intimidate Honduras, that there have been some three hundred incursions by the communist Sandinistas into Honduras, that this was the biggest incursion and that they penetrated 15 to 20 kilometers inside Honduras, that this is a serious incremental increase in the level of conflict, that no one could predict that Ortega would increase the level of conflict following the Sandinista victory in the

US Congress, that this invasion was another unwise movement of Mr. Ortega similar to his hurried trip to Moscow after the last time he won a vote on the US Congress, that the Sandinistas are subverting Honduras, El Salvador, and Costa Rica, that Latin American leaders say one thing in public but in private they are asking for the US to keep the pressure on the Sandinistas (March 25).

PBS Representations of the Administration Claims.

PBS people represent the claims that Mr. Reagan's speech had an overwhelming positive response from the US people, that there is popular support in Central America for Mr. Reagan's policy (March 17), that US helicopters will help Honduras into action against Nicaraguan forces, that 1500 Sandinista men invaded Honduras to go after the Contras, that Honduras asked Washington for \$20 million dollars in emergency aid, that two Sandinista battalions invade Honduras, that 850 Sandinista men are trapped inside Honduras (March 25).

The Opposition Claims.

The opposition claim that there is no doubt that the Sandinistas invaded Honduras, that it was surprising that Nicaragua would violate the Honduran borders, that there is a bipartisan support in the US to repel the Sandinista invasion, that the US President has the full approval of bipartisan leadership in this case,

that the opposition approves of the \$20 millions in emergency aid to Honduras, that there should be a joint venture in the hemisphere to resist any efforts by the Nicaraguans to impose threats on their neighbors by overt invasion, by the use of aggressive offensive weapons, and/or by the establishment of Soviet bases, that Democrats stay by their willingness to support the President in supporting regional security in the area, that the opposition does not feel that it is wise for the US to sponsor insecurity in the region by sending Contra troops which, by the best available intelligence, cannot overthrow the Sandinista Government, that the Sandinistas attacked Honduras not because the House vote denied aid to the Contras but because Sandinistas are expecting the aid to come and they decided to make a pre-emptive attack, that everybody says that the US has to protect the fragile democracies in Central America, that virtually all the countries in Latin America disagree with supporting the Contras, that it will be an enormous risk for the American Government to concoct a lie about an invasion and later on it becomes established that it was a kind of monumental joke, that there is no sound policy for the US to provide a proxy war in Nicaragua (March 25).

PBS Representations of the Opposition Claims.

PBS people represent the claims of the opposition that the majority of the phone calls they

received were negative about the President's speech (March 17), that the Nicaraguan invasion into Honduras was a tremendous blunder and an aggression by a nation into another nation, that President Ortega is a blunderer (March 25).

The Sandinista Claims.

The claims of the Sandinistas are represented by direct participation of a Nicaraguan official affirming that the alleged Nicaraguan invasion of Honduras is a complete fabrication, that Sandinistas have not attacked Honduras, that this allegation is very timely for the Administration's purposes, that these allegations come when the Administration is trying to get the \$100 millions for the Contras, that the Administration is fabricating a lot of things to convince Congress that Sandinistas are a threat to their neighbors, that Sandinistas deny categorically the allegations of invasion into Honduras, that this allegations can lead to dangerous a situation for the Central American countries and the US itself, that the US Government is trying to portray Nicaragua as an aggressive nation toward Honduras and the other Central American countries, that one of the things that worries the Sandinistas is the easiness with which the Reagan Administration fabricates so many lies, that the Administration said that Sandinistas were giving aid to

Brazilian, Argentinian, and Uruguayan guerrillas while these respective governments denied that they even have guerrilla movements, that the accusations stay there and perhaps this is what the US Government is trying to do, that the US Government wants to portray Nicaragua as an aggressor in order to have the political base for an intervention in Central America, that the Hondurans denied any invasion several times and for several days to admit it late, but that that admission can be because of the pressure the US exerts on Latin American countries to get support for its policies, that there are a lot of Contra bases on Honduran territory which launch attacks against the Nicaraguan territory, so that there may have been some clashes along the borders, that the Sandinistas may be everything the US Government says they are but that Sandinistas are not so naive to do what the US wants them to do and give the US the opportunity of calling them aggressive and that the US has been right, that the US Congressmen are not liars but when the President says something about Nicaragua they may believe the President's lies in the first place, that it is not the same the one who invented the lie and the one who reacted to the lie, that the Sandinistas have not made, are not making, and will not make an aggression toward Honduras (March 25).

PBS Representations of the Sandinista Claims.

PBS persons represent the claims of the Sandinistas that the Sandinistas deny all accusations about invasion of Honduras, that the invasion story is a complete fabrication, that there are constant arm clashes along the border between Honduras and Nicaragua, that the Contras use Honduran bases to operate against Nicaragua (March 25).

The Contra Claims.

The claims of the Contras are only represented through the claims of the Administration and the PBS persons representation of the Administration's claims. So, in the instances of the PBS discourse analyzed here there is not direct participation of the Contras.

The Other Participant Claims.

The claims of other participants are made exclusively by experts representatives of the media institution across the US. In this sense, the instances of PBS News analyzed here do not present direct common citizens', other governments', and/or other institutions' claims.

The Expert Claims.

The claims of experts are presented by media professionals who claims that the Latin American

leaders are not backing the Contras, that Mr. Reagan passes the Contra off as the last defense of Nicaragua's threatened neighbors, that day by day the White House's case for its Nicaraguan non-policy grows ever more feeble, that the White House's resort to red-baiting and innuendo only go to show how desperate it is for a prop, that the reality is ever more apparent, that some Contras admit they are mercenaries in the pay of the CIA, that support in Nicaragua for the bloodlust of the Contras is ebbing, that the Contras are doing a big fade, that even the double of the Contra aid package is not going to help the Contras depose the Sandinistas, that the Contra issue may not be a big deal for US people but that the tenor of the mail is indisputably clear: over 90% against the President, that readers and writers believe that the use of US tax payers funds for Contra aid amounts to US subsidy of terrorism, that US people do not buy the red scare rhetoric coming from the Administration, that the US people want money going to Central America to make friends not to foment discord, that the President's speech was dramatic, inspiring, and wrong, that probably the President's speech did convert some people, that Buchanan served as a stalking horse for the President, that the President is responsible for the statement about red scare, that the regime in Nicaragua is a marxist regime but a legitimate one, that the US President has made no convincing case against the

Nicaraguan regime, that there is no evidence that the Sandinistas do not represent the will of the Nicaraguan people, that political will left to itself can work, that self-determination has an amazing power, that the US should move back and let the Nicaraguan people tender their own business. That the White House must hang tough, that the White House either give the Contras the aid they need or take responsibility for the demise of freedom in Nicaragua and the spread of marxism to other nations in the Americas, that Nicaraguan jails will be more fuller of people with ideas of free speech and the like if Americans buy the dream that the Sandinistas, if left unbothered, would reform themselves toward democracy, that opposition accuses the US and the Contras of fomenting unrest, the opposition wants more time for the "Contadora Process" to work, the opposition accuses the Administration of rebuffing Sandinista peace initiatives, that Contadora is not going to do one iota of difference in resolving the troubles of Central America, that the United States can and should prevent the extension of Soviet military power near its border, the Administration should not give a blank check to a disjointed rebel effort that cannot win a civil war and, likely, couldn't govern if it did, that people are generally sympathetic with Mr. Reagan's position on Contra aid, that Americans are not terribly aware of Central America or Nicaragua, that US people will go to

considerable lengths to prevent another Cuba, that probably the Presidential speech did not change to many minds, that the President needed to make a better case for the Contras, that there is a real concern about the people who are leading the Contras, that Americans know what are they fighting against but that it is very difficult to know what are they fighting for, that Americans would like to know who the ones are the Contras are leading, that Americans would like to know better explanations about the charges of atrocities committed by the Contras, that Americans would like to know what hope do the Contras have of negotiating with the Sandinistas and what type of mechanism could they hope to establish if they were to assume power, that the situation in Nicaragua is very serious, that Mr. Reagan and Mr. Buchanan did not go too far with their red scare tactics, that the chance for democracy in Nicaragua was seven years ago, that the US did not take the initiative then to move democracy into Nicaragua, that the US should be more concerned with containing the Sandinistas from exporting revolution, that the US should help the opposition in Nicaragua, that the Contras cannot do the job, that it is absurd to suggest that a marxist regime will reform itself, that reform will come to Nicaragua when Nicaragua's neighbors united sufficiently to bring enough pressure on the Nicaraguans to haust the Sandinistas, that without the US that pressure cannot be brought on the

Sandinistas, that the primary concern for the US is that there is an enemy at its door step (March 17), that Honduras faces a dilemma, i.e., it does not want to admit that Contras have been operating from its territory, that now the Honduran Government has become sufficiently alarmed with the Sandinistas' audacity and scope of operation that it has decided to do, first, something privately and quietly, but because the US went public they reluctantly went along, that the Administration was astonished with the Sandinista invasion, that the Sandinistas seem to be working for the CIA, that because of the Sandinista invasion surely Congress will vote for Contra aid, that perhaps the Sandinista were expecting a Contra attack and decided to pre-empt it, or that the Sandinistas wanted to dismantle the Contras before US aid reached them (March 25).

The PBS Personnel Claim.

Claims about the Administration.

PBS persons claim that the President spoke over the Congress' head to make the pitch for the \$100 million dollars for the Contras (March 17), that it was only after several days that the Administration admitted that there was any confirmation by the Honduras Government about the Nicaraguan invasion (March 25).

Claims about the Opposition.

PBS persons claim that top House democrats were highly critical of the Nicaraguan invasion (March 25).

Claims about the Sandinistas.

PBS persons claim that Nicaragua has denied everything about the invasion into Honduras (March 25).

Claims about the Contras.

PBS persons claim that the Contras are US supported anti-Sandinistas guerrillas (March 25).

Claims about the General Situation.

PBS persons claim that Honduras charges that more than 1500 Nicaraguan troops crossed its borders, that the story about the Nicaraguan invasion broke in Washington, that information about the Nicaraguan invasion seems to be coming more out of Washington than Honduras (March 25).

Analysis of Evidence and Argumentative Procedures.

In the PBS broadcast being analyzed here there is little use of images as evidence of what is being asserted or discussed. There is argumentation between the participants in the discourse and contradictory opinions are contrasted and argued for. There is a broad array of

opinions that constitute the discourse. In this sense, the discourse is constituted by conservative, moderate, and more critical positions about the Nicaraguan situation and the US policy in Central America. There is presentation of opinions challenging the premises of the US Administration policy in Central America. There is extensive presentation of the Sandinista position. The Contra position is not presented by Contra representatives but it is represented in the position of the US Administration. There is no direct presentation of common citizens claims but they are represented in the claims of the media experts. In general, the different positions about the issue are presented and argued for through discussions between media experts and in a less degree by members of Congress.

Analysis of the Non-verbal Components.

There is no deployment of images to corroborate what is being said. Contrary to commercial broadcasts, there are no complementary or center functions of the non-verbal components. However, images in the PBS discourse are used as reminders of what is the discussion or report about, i.e., small windows showing the silhouette of a soldier, dollar signs filled with the color of the US flag, and the inscription CONTRA AID. The other uses of images are the ordinary ones of showing the persons participating in discussions.

Critical Analysis.

As in the analysis of commercial broadcasts, the PBS instances of the discourse on terrorism and Nicaragua fail to include more encompassing conceptualizations and views about terrorism. Thus, in these instances, there is no opportunity for the thematization of important forms of terrorist practices US supported groups and governments have engaged and continue engaging in Nicaragua and Central America in order to maintain a state of affairs favorable to their particular interests. In this respect, the PBS instances of discourse fulfil the same ideological function of contributing to obscure the possibility that important forms of domination in Central America, specifically in Nicaragua, and their connections with US Administration's practices in the region, can be publicly discussed in the US. As I discussed in previous chapters, this can be the most important ideological function the TV discourse on terrorism and Nicaragua plays in the United States. With this in mind, let's turn to critically assess the PBS discourse at the conceptualization level of terrorism the TV discourse in the US takes for granted.

Critical Assessment of Opportunities.

In those instances, the PBS discourse does not provide ample opportunity for different actors to participate in the discourse, e.g., common citizens, US

political experts other than members of Congress, foreign political experts, and Contra representatives are excluded from the discourse. However, through the participation of media experts, a broad spectrum of opinions and views are brought to bear in the constitution of the discourse. Not only conservative and moderate but critical positions with respect to the US Administration's stances are exposed and argued for to considerable length. The Sandinistas are given the opportunity to discuss their position and elaborate upon the US policy and practices in Nicaragua and other Central American countries.

However the PBS discourse fulfils the same ideological function of obfuscating from public discussion important forms of terrorism in Nicaragua and Central America, yet within the parameters of the dominant notion of terrorism it scores favorably against the commercial networks' discourse and in terms of providing a less partialized discourse in the US.

Critical Assessment of Claims.

Just because the Presidential speech and the Democratic response were not broadcast on PBS, PBS practices appear not to present the discourse about terrorism and Nicaragua in the strict terms of the Administration's language. While presupposing these speeches, PBS seems to play less into the hands of the

prevalent powers of the US society. However, this is not to argue that the PBS position is, in fact, an alternative to network TV. I think that a desirable democratic discourse will have to include and provide ample opportunity for argumentation and criticism of all positions regardless of their political stances. It is in this way that contributions for making possible the achievement of rational and real democratic decisions, i.e., based on the will of well informed citizens, can be made.

Nonetheless, it can be said that the PBS discourse plays less of a complementary role to the Administration discourse. While the commercial networks' discourse complements the Administration discourse at both the level of excluding different conceptualizations of terrorism and the level of the taken for granted, prevalent conception of terrorism, the PBS discourse only plays a complementary role at the former level. At the latter level, the PBS discourse presents more critical challenges to the Administration discourse, e.g., the legitimacy of the US policy and intervention on other countries affairs are questioned, the legitimacy of the Sandinista Government and the right to self-determination of the Nicaraguan people are argued for. Further, in the PBS discourse there is more room for the rational evaluation of claims between the participants.

Critical Assessment of the Use of Evidence and
Argumentative Procedures.

In contrast to the commercial networks discourse, in the PBS discourse there is more challenging of the claims made by the participants. In fact the role of the PBS persons is practically reduced to formulate those challenges. So, it is not only that the PBS practices allow for more discussion and argumentation about the deployed claims but that there is more critical challenging of these claims. But it can be argued that the challenging made to the Sandinistas' claims is stronger (a challenging of content) than the challenging made to the representatives of the Administration and other members of the US Government (a challenging of form), e.g., in contrast to the interview of the Nicaraguan Ambassador where the anchorman places in doubt everything the Nicaraguan says, in the interview of the Congresspersons very few challenges of content are posed. Still there is a critical challenging to the claims of the Administration and its associates not only through the presentation of individuals critical of the Administration and its associates but through the anchorpersons' questioning, e.g., in the interviewing of the members of Congress (PBS March 25), and, perhaps more important, through putting into confrontation the different opinions expressed, e.g., the interviewing of the three newspapers editors (PBS March 17).

Critical Assessment of the Non-Verbal Components.

In a general way it can be said that the instances of the PBS discourse analyzed in this section do not use images as corroborators of the deployed claims and descriptions. In contrast to the commercial networks discourse, in the PBS discourse there is a minimal use of paleosymbols. The reminders used, i.e., small windows with phrases and figures which evoke the matter being treated, also differ from the ones of the commercial network discourse. While the latter may directly evoke regions and identification of people, i.e., Americans (the US flag) identified with the Contras (the inscription CONTRA AID) and the Nicaraguan people (map of Nicaragua), the former may evoke things identified with people, i.e., American money (dollar signs filled with the US flag colors) identified with the Contra fight (the inscription CONTRA AID and the soldier silhouette). However, both uses of reminders remain ambiguous in their possible exegeses.

Comparative Analysis in Relation to Public and Commercial Network TV Discourses.

As we have anticipated the public and commercial discourses about terrorism and Nicaragua differ and converge in significative ways.

On the one hand, both discourses preclude from public discussions the thematization of the different types of terrorism and, thus, they work against the possibility

of a public identification of significant forms of terrorist practices being enacted in Nicaragua and other Central American countries. In previous chapters, I have already argued that the US foreign policy and practices in Central America are not innocent in terms of those obfuscated terrorism practices, i.e., the US directly enacts practices of terror and the US foreign policy contributes to maintain some of those and other terrorist practices, e.g., terrorist practices of governments and groups such as of Duarte's Government and Death Squads groups in EL Salvador. So, by not broadening the discussion about terrorism, TV practices contribute to legitimize both the US Administration's practices of terror against certain nations and a foreign policy aimed at imposing and helping to maintain situations of political and economic domination in Nicaragua and other Central American countries. This situation poses the question of the social role of TV and its discourse about terrorism and Nicaragua as it bears on power relations. TV may be contributing to establish and sediment asymmetrical power relations, i.e., power as domination in the US society, Nicaragua, and other Central American societies. In other words, by not treating the issue TV discourses on terrorism may be helping to further the conditions where certain people constitute and exercise power practices of domination and, at the same time, helping to disempower and to suppress the will of other

peoples. In Habermas' words TV practices may be contributing to the preservation and organization of meanings that legitimate asymmetrical relations of power and domination which are incompatible with democratic conceptions of society. In this way, TV practices may help to restrict social spaces where non-dominant relations of power can establish productive democratic relationships. Again, these considerations suggest that TV practices may be contributing to what Habermas calls cultural impoverishment of the lifeworld. That is, because the discussion about terrorism is kept within the confines of the sphere of the expert's culture, the sphere of the lifeworld of society, of the cultural space of the common citizen, is denied the possibility of critical enrichment. In this being so, the social conditions in which autonomous individuals can develop and the democratic potential, in terms of the general processes of will formation of the citizenry are curtailed, and part of the liberating potential and the social democratic gain of the knowledge generated in the specialized culture of the expert is lost. Again, this suggests that TV discourses help to obfuscate the intersections between practices guided by strategic rationality and domination. And, by so doing, these TV discursive practices are ideological practices which illustrate a contemporary case of the alienating role intellectual practices assume in modern societies.

On the other hand, the public and commercial discourses about terrorism and Nicaragua differ in terms of the critical possibilities they bring to bear to the Administration permissible discourse. As we saw, the commercial discourse assumes a plastic character and plays a complementary role to the discourse of the Administration. Thus, it helps to legitimate the view of terrorism and identify the terrorism's agents, sponsors, and supporters (the THEYs) so defined by the US Administration while, at the same time, it contributes to exclude from public scrutiny the so defined terrorism when it is practiced by the friends and members of the Administration (the WEs). In this way, the commercial TV discourse serves a double obfuscation of terrorist practices: First, it excludes certain views and concepts about terrorism thereby helping to publicly obfuscate certain terrorist practices that so called democratic people engage in. And, second, it does not treat as terrorist, or it does not treat at all, the practices of the US Administration and certain of its associates which are terrorist practices by the own definitions of the Administration. This is a double obfuscation which is done even in circumstances when the credible evidence heavily weighs against the Administration and associates. In contrast to the commercial TV discourse, the instances of public TV discourse offer more critical stances to the

discursive manipulations of the US Administration. Public TV practices do not assume the plastic character of commercial TV practices and do not take for granted the terrorist actors, supporters, and sponsors defined by the Administration permissible discourse. Further, public TV practices open possibilities for the identification, according to the definitions of the Administration, of the Administrations's terrorists. In this sense, public TV practices allow for the shaping of a discourse which offers viewers a condensation of contradictory, antagonistic views. This discourse embodies views which are closer to the knowledge available about terrorism and Nicaragua than the views commercial TV practices show. That is, in relation to the commercial TV discourse, the public TV discourse improves the possibilities of activation of public political processes of will formation, of taking public decisions grounded on practical reason, and of energizing political attitudes favorable to the autonomization of individuals and to the stabilization of democratic practices. This public TV discourse open alternatives which can help to expose levels of political alienation constituted by the practices it embodies and by certain intellectual practices in the US society.

Moreover, the results of this analysis point to the important possibility that TV can help to establish processes of intra- as well as inter- cultural and societal

communication which, in turn, have potential for an activation and interconnection of the citizen role across societies. One can say the this potential for the activation of an inter- and across- national citizen role is a necessary one due to the present internationalization of the economy and the overt political interdependence of states. I think this constitutes one of the important emancipatory potentials of TV. This is a potential for the activation of an international public sphere. At a related level, this suggests the need to expand analyses of the system and lifeworld intercourse to include these and other international and across national considerations.

Some can argue that format significantly contributes to the above differences. However, it can be argued that although there are format differences between commercial and public TV news, it seems that the format is not influencing the variety and quality of participation of peoples and opinions in the PBS discourse. For instance, the PBS discourse presents a broader spectrum of contrasting voices than that of CNN (all networks news) where, because of format differences, one would expect the reverse to be the case. Of course, because the PBS format is an intermediary between news and current affairs programs, the MacNeil-Lehrer News Hour format allows more time for current issues to be discussed. In this regard it can be said, for example, that there are differences in

opportunity of participation and in quality of content and discussion because of format differences between PBS and ABC and/or CBS news. However, a preliminary analysis of commercial TV current affair programs for the same period of March 1986 (ABC Nightline) did not show differences (in terms of participation, quality of discussion and argumentation, and use of non-verbal components) between Nightline and ABC and CBS news. Again, this suggests, in agreement with Parenti (1986), that the differences between commercial and public TV news does not respond to format differences but to politico-economic power practices in the US society. In this way commercial TV, in terms of the discourse on terrorism and Nicaragua, acritically conforms to the political language of the US Administration.

The Differentiation of Alternative TV Discourses: The Practical Dimensions of the Ideal

As one can see, the analytical procedures developed from the democratic requirements of the ideal speech situation allow the differentiation of alternative discourses. It is possible to differentiate not only the converging aspects of the discourses but the diverging aspects as well. The ideal speech situation permit to 'judge' alternative discourses in terms of a democratic standard. That is, in this case, it made possible to argue that the public TV discourse scores closer to a democratic discourse than the commercial TV discourse does while, at

the same time, it made possible also to assess the aspects which characterize both discourses as limiters of the possibilities of learning, as precluders of the activation of democratic processes of political will formation, and as alienating practices. In allowing this, these analytical procedures showed that they are useful not only in making absolute differentiations among discursive practices but in making evaluations in terms of 'degrees', or of qualities, of closeness to standards of democratic practices, in terms of 'democratic degrees of freedom' of discursive practices. Furthermore, they allowed to evaluate the degree of institutionalization of democratic practices in the concrete organizations of public and commercial TV networks in the US. Finally, they helped to elaborate upon the possible social implications of TV discourses. This, I hope, forms part of the practical aspects of the ideal.

Notes

- (1) Due to limitation of equipment I could not record more MacNeil-Lehrer news at the time the events were unfolding, and I was unable to get transcripts about those events either from PBS or from any other institution.

CHAPTER XII

CONCLUSION

In this chapter, I will present the conclusions arrived at in this study by way of a summary of the study and a discussion of the remaining issues facing a critical analysis of the TV treatment of terrorism and Nicaragua.

Summary of the Study

I started this study with the suspicion that in some instances commercial TV was denying the US public certain political perspectives. The latter were bringing to the public claims that contradicted the predominant views of the US Administration, thus, they could have an influence in expanding the political horizon of public communication in the US. Then, taking as a point of departure commercial TV discussions about the so called Central American crisis I formulated questions whose answers could let me to test the soundness of my motivating suspicion. What struck me as a salient issue was the repeated claim in these TV discussions that violent, terrorist practices were being put to work in Central America by the Sandinista Government of Nicaragua. However, discussions in other media such as National Public Radio and newspapers such as the Nation and

the Guardian and other communication media were constantly, albeit in different degrees, considering claims that contradicted the main allegations made on commercial network TV.

The search in Chapter II allowed me to discuss and formulate an expanded conception of terrorism. This conception takes into consideration a tridimensional plane in order to analyze the issue of terrorism. In this conception the nature of the enactment and sponsorship of terrorism (i.e., states, groups, individuals), of the broad causes and characteristics of terrorism and terrorists (i.e., historical, social, political, economical, psychological), and of the interaction of these two previous broad factors (i.e., state-group, historical-state-state, economic-political-group, and so on, and so forth) converge to constitute an encompassing view from which to explore the intersections of terrorist practices. Borrowing from scholarly as well as ordinary daily life discussions, this encompassing view point condensed a broad spectrum of the knowledge available against which I conducted the examinations of the selected instances of TV discourse about terrorism and Nicaragua.

In Chapter III, the analysis of the general discussion of TV relations to society provided a starting point for the exploration of TV discourses about terrorism and Nicaragua. This analysis determined a choice between

critical and pluralistic theories. The latter were discarded because they take for granted the same assumptions that my suspicion was forcing me to question, i.e., the democratic claims of TV organizations in the US. Within critical theory, I explored differences and similarities between culturalist, political economy, and structuralist approaches, and some of the criticism made against these approaches. In this discussion I considered the question of TV and its products in terms of power relations in society and introduced the notion of discourse as an important analytical concept to understand the social workings of TV. Further, the scrutiny of critical approaches suggested that the proper scope of the analysis of TV within the social context could be constituted by a research programme within the confines of a general social theory. I suggested that Habermas' communication theory provides an adequate social framework to examine TV discursive practices in the US. I proposed that Habermas' theory addresses the concerns of the critical approaches as well as critically scrutinizes the conditions in which democratic practices can be institutionalized.

In Chapter IV I narrowed down the discussion to the specific issue of discourse. I briefly discussed relevant literature on the general topic of discourse. In doing this, I defined discourse as a social practice which may have significant implications for the political, social,

and cultural components of the social fabric. Then, I defined two contrasting poles of discourse: particularistic and democratic discourses. Further, by way of a contrast to opposing positions, the US Administration discourse about terrorism was characterized as a giddy, i.e., deceitful, unstable, and fickle, and as a partial or particularistic discourse. Similarly, some of the scholarly work on TV discourses about terrorism showed that TV in general constitutes and reproduces three types of particularistic discourse: the official or governmental (i.e., the discourse of people and institutions engaged in the 'war against terrorism'), the alternative (i.e., the discourse of people who want to minimize 'the cost of terrorism'), and the oppositional (i.e., the discourse of people and institutions 'agents and sponsors of terrorism') discourses. I suggested that these TV discourses constitute a particularistic discourse which fails to provide an encompassing analysis of the phenomenon of terrorism, i.e., it fails to provide an alternative discourse that without aligning with any of these three categories of TV discourse offers a position from which to critically address these TV discourses. Finally, I argued the need for a critical alternative discourse to which this study attempts to contribute.

In Chapter V, I discussed Habermas' theory and tried to formulate its implications for TV discursive practices.

I explored Habermas' theory implications for institutions of mass communication. I presented Habermas' analyses as they make connections between the systemic (the economy and the state) and the symbolic (cultural lifeworld) components of society. Also, I tried to show, on the one hand, how processes of personality formation, of reaching understanding, and of cultural reproduction depended on and were constitutive of the social lifeworld. And, on the other hand, how the interferences of the social system's requirements into these processes of reproduction of the lifeworld were expressed through reification and cultural impoverishment pathologies of the social. Moreover, following Habermas, I proposed that TV as a mass communication institution can be a site of expression of clashes between system and lifeworld requirements. And I argued that Habermas' theory provides an encompassing theoretical-normative framework from which to analyze TV.

In Chapter VI, I discussed the normative implications of Habermas' theory for TV analyses. Further, drawing from Habermas' theory of communication, I distinguished three interrelated areas of TV practices intercourse with society and the individual. I proposed that TV can function as a resource of education, socialization, and social integration, as a resource of democratization and autonomization, and as a resource for the reactivation and institutionalization of a universal

public sphere.

In proposing TV as a resource of education, socialization, and social integration, I argued that the more the practices of democratic discourses are institutionalized in TV, the more TV can contribute to the undogmatic ego-development of individuals and their social integration. Undogmatic individuals can, in turn, hammer out a more democratic society. TV can contribute with furthering the formation of flexible, undogmatic, and democratic structures at both individual and social levels.

In proposing TV as a resource of democratization and autonomization, I suggested that the more discursive practices of unrestricted argumentation and symmetrical opportunities of participation in discourse formation are institutionalized as TV practices, the more TV can open the opportunity for substantial democratic forums to be put into operation. The substantial democratic discussion of social, political, and economic issues can posit challenges to the present preconceptions and practices of a society. This public thematization of contradictions and challenging of assumptions can contribute to general processes of self-formation by which autonomous, able, and willing individuals can challenge their own society and bring about changes favoring the general institutionalization of practices of freedom and justice.

In proposing TV as a resource of the reactivation and institutionalization of the public sphere, I suggested that the more the structure of ideal argumentation is institutionalized as TV practice, the more TV can provide a social mean of reactivating and institutionalizing a public democratic sphere. I claimed that this last aspect of the social functioning of TV brings with it enormous consequences for activating direct processes of intercultural, intersocial, and interpolitical understanding between peoples across the globe. Finally, I developed some implications for a democratic discussion of terrorism and Nicaragua and proposed to examine the thesis and relevant questions I wanted to address in this study.

Next, from Habermas' notion of the ideal speech situation, in Chapter VII, I developed procedures for the analysis of selected instances of commercial TV discourse on terrorism and Nicaragua. I proposed two levels of analysis, one descriptive and another critical, by which descriptions and critical assessments of the opportunities, claims, argumentative procedures, and non-verbal components of TV discourses could be accomplished.

Using the descriptive procedures, in Chapter VIII I analyzed the commercial TV discourse and advanced a characterization of the commercial TV discourse about terrorism and Nicaragua as one that tends to describe the Nicaraguan Government as the central agent and promoter of

terrorism in Central America, as a central point in an international terrorist network formed, among others, by governments such as those of Russia, Lybia, Iran, North Korea, and Cuba and by groups such as PLO factions, Red Brigade, and the Baader-Meinhoff. And, I pointed out that although commercial TV discourse embodies contradictory claims, it excludes claims that challenge the basic premises of the US Administration discourse.

I critically assessed, in Chapter IX, the commercial TV discourse on terrorism. This assessment led me to indicate that the analyzed instances of commercial TV discourse failed to provide the minimal conditions for the constitution of a democratic discourse.

I suggested that the commercial TV discourse did not address critical questions either at the level of current discussions about terrorism (e.g., as discussed in Chapter II), or at the level of the definitions of the Administration permissible discourse. From the former point of view, I indicated that this specific commercial TV discourse failed to address, perhaps, the most important forms of terrorism operating in Nicaragua, i.e., historico-politico-economic forms of terrorist practices used primarily by the US Government and contemporary forms of terrorism that groups such as the Contras use against civilian populations in the region. From the point of view of the Administration permissible discourse, the claims

advanced in the commercial TV discourse not only failed to challenge the claims of the Administration discourse, but they posed the question of terrorism and Nicaragua in terms of technical procedures of how to conduct the US policy in the region, i.e., in terms of determining the most effective ways to implement the US policy in Nicaragua and Central America. In this way the commercial TV discourse tends to legitimize a non-existent consensual agreement in the US society about the acceptance of the basic premises of the US policy toward Nicaragua and Central America.

I argued that the above illustrates how in this TV discourse instrumental rationality intersects with practices of domination. In addition, I suggested that the commercial TV discourse provides dissimilar conditions for the exploration and reception of the claims advanced in a way that it favors the claims of the Administration. And that, at the same time, the evidence presented in favor of the Administration is self-referential: first, in the sense that, for the most part, it relies on previous statements and opinions emitted by Administration officials and experts identified with the Administration, and, second, in the sense that it relies also on the Administration's own forced definitions, e.g., the claim that because the Sandinistas are communists they are terrorists.

Furthermore, I suggested that the nonverbal-components of the discourse tend to evoke paleosymbols

which associate, on the one hand, the Sandinistas with aggression, irrationality, chaos, violence, and so on, and, on the other hand, the US Administration and allies with rationality, order, peaceful debates, and a commitment to democracy.

Through this critical analysis, I characterized this commercial TV discourse as plastic in the sense that it was molded by the giddiness of the Administration discourse. However, I qualified this plasticity as occurring within rigid boundaries, i.e., these boundaries were defined by alienation rules which, in turn, were constituted by exclusionary configurations of meaning, a strategic logic, and an ideological WE-THEY dichotomy. I suggested that this commercial TV discourse illustrates types of historically specific workings of the basic alienation of the division of labor, and of contemporary ideological intellectual practices which not only work to achieve political goals but also shape the conditions in which political action can occur. Then, I indicated that commercial TV practices operating in the construction of this discourse underutilize the TV potential as resource for education and socialization, for democracy and autonomization, and for reactivation and institutionalization of the public sphere. In concluding the critical assessment, I proposed, as I mentioned above, that the general alienation rules guiding the commercial TV discourse about terrorism and Nicaragua

were defined by exclusionary practices, a strategic logic, and an ideological WE-THEY dichotomy by which, among other things, WE (the US, Contras, Honduras, EL Salvador, the West) are associated with freedom, peace, democracy, heroism, justice, humanism, and responsibility, and THEY (Nicaragua, the Soviet Union, Lybia, North Korea, the East) are associated with oppression, aggression, communism, deception, totalitarianism, illegitimacy, and irresponsibility.

In Chapter X, I discussed the findings of this study in terms of clarity of analysis, limits of data, controversial points, and made an assessment of the results in terms of the thesis and questions I wanted to substantiate and address in this study.

In discussing the clarity of the analysis, I called attention to the need for a programmatic analysis of the commercial TV discourse on terrorism and Nicaragua, i.e., a research program that includes the study of the historical circumstances in which the commercial TV discourse develops, of its interception with other discourses, of the influences of economic and political practices on the organization of commercial TV practices, of the actual cultural circumstances surrounding the commercial TV discourse in the US, and so on. I recognized that all these considerations indicate the difficulties one encounters in undertaking a study like this one. These limitations

notwithstanding, I hope to have shed light on how this TV discourse is organized at the screen level, on the type of rules governing its organization, on the ways it may constrain democratic discussions about terrorism and Nicaragua in the US, on the ideological functions of this discourse, and on the alienation the intellectual practices constituting this discourse are expressing.

In discussing the limitations of the data, I pointed out that no broad generalizations can be made from this study, but that as long as commercial TV is an important source of public information, as long as the events discussed are important for the people involved, and as long as the discussed information can influence people's political conceptions and practices, this study sheds light on the levels of democratic practices, and for that matter on the levels of undemocratic practices, being exercised by the US Administration in the US, in Nicaragua and other Central American countries. I suggested that the commercial TV discourse undercuts the democratic ideas the US society claims to live by.

In discussing the controversial points, I acknowledged that the controversy surrounding Habermas' considerations is important for this study, but that there is a debate going on between Habermas and his critics and that Habermas has recognized the programmatic character of his work. Nonetheless, I believe that for the type of TV

discussion of our analysis the presuppositions of the ideal speech situation are important since the discussion about terrorism and Nicaragua is characterized by a lack of consensus in the US. In this case, it is necessary that the practices inherent in the ideal speech situation be put to work to arrive at rational, democratic understandings about the situation in Nicaragua and Central America. Because these democratic practices were not in operation in the shaping of the commercial TV discourse, commercial TV practices contribute in the US to a distorted, ideological consensus based on limited information. Further, I argued that there is no contradiction between the findings of this work, i.e., the complementarity of the commercial TV discourse in relation to the official discourse, and the fact that a majority of US people express negative positions toward Contra aid. This is not a contradiction, because this study does not presuppose that TV discourses necessarily has a decisive impact on people's conceptions attitudes and practices, and it does not address the issue of the public reception of the discourse. I pointed out that the circumstances influencing this commercial TV discourse called for comparative analyses; on the one hand, between related discourses such as the commercial TV discourses on terrorism and Nicaragua and the discourse on the Iran-Contra affair; and, on the other hand, between discourses produced by TV organizations which are founded

on different economico-political structures, e.g., public vs commercial TV.

Finally, I argued that these results provided support for the thesis addressed in this study and suggested that an analysis of the public TV discourse on terrorism and Nicaragua could shed light on the practical uses of the ideal speech situation, on the usefulness of the analytical procedures, and on the possibility of differentiating alternative TV political discourses in the US.

In trying to elucidate some of the previous problems, in Chapter XI, in analyzing the institutional implications of the results, I applied the analytical procedures to public TV broadcasts and compare them to commercial TV network broadcasts. The results here showed that these two TV discourses converge and diverge in important ways.

On one side, I argued that both discourses fail to bring to public consideration important forms of terrorism. Among these forms are the types of terrorism that have been and are being directly enacted by the US and by subordinate governments and groups in Nicaragua and in other Central American countries. Thus, I suggested that by not bringing these important forms of terrorism to public consideration, both public and network TV contribute to legitimize these forms of terrorism. Further, these TV practices may be

contributing to a reification of pseudo-democratic practices and to what Habermas calls the cultural impoverishment of the lifeworld, i.e., the disconnection between expert culture and popular culture. Again, I argued that this constituted an illustration of the ideological function of intellectual practices in the US and I suggested that this reification and cultural impoverishment pointed directly to the alienation inherent in the division of labor at this historical moment.

On the other side, I argued that the public and commercial TV discourses differ in terms of the critical possibilities they bring to bear on the permissible Administration discourse. I maintained that public TV offers more challenges to the Administration discourse than network TV does. Public TV allows for more contradictory voices to participate in the organization of its discourse, thus public TV improves the possibilities of activation of political processes based on more rational discussions. This way, the public TV discourse does not present the plastic characteristic of the commercial TV discourse and opens possibilities for public discussion of alternative views and analyses. The latter can help to bring to peoples' understanding the alienation of both public TV own practices and certain intellectual practices in the US.

I also suggested that the results of the analysis in this chapter direct one's attention to the possibility

that TV can encourage processes of communication at a global level. This cross and international communication has potential for the activation and interconnection of the citizen role across societies. And, this international interconnection of the citizen role may be necessary because of the increasing internationalization of the economy and interdependence of states. In my view, this constitutes the concrete possibility of the institutionalization of a universal, international public sphere and of the realization of a utmost liberating potential of TV.

Remaining Issues Facing a Critical Analysis of the Treatment of Terrorism and Nicaragua on TV

The remaining problems facing a critical analysis of the TV discourse on terrorism have been already mentioned in different ways throughout the discussion in this work. Perhaps it will be useful to conclude this study by presenting these issues in a more orderly form.

It is my understanding that the findings of this work directly suggest the need for studies at the level of the public. The issue of the influence of the TV discourse on people's conceptions, motivations, and practices about terrorism, Nicaragua, the US foreign policy, and related problems, suggests itself as a primary field of research that need to be addressed. Questions such as how the peoples' different historical background, political

positions, cultural tradition, and the like, and how the TV discourse on terrorism and Nicaragua affects people's responses to the situation in Central America need to be addressed in order to grasp the social workings of this TV discourse in the public terrain. In the process of public reception of this discourse one can imagine responses that express radicalizations against as well as in favor of the US Administration policies, apathy toward as well as engagement in the shaping of this political process, acceptance of as well as angry responses to the TV discourse, and so on and so forth.

The study of the influences of dominant economic and political practices of the US on the shaping of TV is a field of research already suggested by the discussion on the sociology of TV. Further explorations upon the works done in this area, specially the research done in the area of the political economy of TV, and the controversial implications advanced by Habermas require to be undertaken to shed light on the limitations these politico-economic practices impose on the organization of an encompassing and democratic US TV discourse about terrorism and Nicaragua. This type of research cannot only help to understand the workings of the power relations influencing the shaping of the TV discourse on terrorism, but to elucidate ways and strategies for their neutralization. The study of contemporary TV organizations and practices in other

countries, e.g., England, France, and TV experiments of certain developing countries, can be pertinent and can be sources of learning for TV policy making in the US.

The mapping out of the relations between the different political discourses in the US (i.e., the interconnections and disruptions between, among others, the discourses about communism, terrorism, democracy, vietnam, and the important discourse about what is to be 'American') and their bearing on the organization of TV political discourses is an important field of study. This mapping out can advance our understanding of the ideological restrictions operating in the organization of TV discourses and of the conditions surrounding the possibilities of their transformation in the US. This type of research can shed light on the actual relations between expert cultures and popular cultures, on their bearing on Habermas' suggestion of processes of cultural impoverishment, or for that matter, on processes of cultural enrichment, and on bringing Habermas' theory closer to historical concreteness. As Peterson (1988) indicates, this can be done exploring the contemporary connections with, and within the context of, the basic alienation inherent in the division of manual from intellectual labor.

Moreover, the pertinent work to develop, refine, and draw implications and strategies for TV research from Habermas' social and communication theory is in need of

further study and expansion. In my conception, one of the areas in critical TV research and in the tradition of critical theory that offers more potential for fruitful practical results is the further exploration of the practical and theoretical derivations from Habermas' theory.

Now I cannot offer any further elaboration on how the above problems can be addressed, but I truly hope that my modest efforts in this work contribute to shed light on the understanding of the organization of the TV discourse on terrorism, of the democratic limitations inherent to this discourse, and of the concrete possibilities for the constitution of a more democratic discourse on the US TV.

Finally, it is my belief that a minimal condition for a mutual understanding of the discourse on terrorism and its working in the US culture can start from the public exploration and discussion of the problems posed in this work. It is my belief that in modern complex democratic societies TV can be called on to play the role on an educational and public sphere resource. This resource can be used by contemporary men and women in the search to bring to consciousness the miscarriages of the present, learn from the mistakes of the past, and find the necessary motivations to hammer the realization of a just future. This consciousness may bring forth the realization that the foundations of US contemporary society in some ways are

constituted and fed by injustices of the past and of the present, and by the manipulations and interceptions of rationality and domination. If this is so, one can hope, as Habermas (1987b) borrowing from Walter Benjamin could have put it, that public discussions of the obfuscated terrorism can serve as present anamnestic redemptions of past injustices. These injustices can be communicatively redeemed in the form of a universal historical solidarity and alternative dealienating practices directed toward the contemporary fulfilment of the unfulfilled promises of a future.

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APPENDIX

DATA PRESENTATION SAMPLE

DATA PRESENTATION SAMPLE

ABC, CBS, CNN
Address to the Nation
March 16, 1986

- I. STORY SECTION= 1
- II. SHOT NUMBER= 1
- III. TYPE OF FRAMING= CU* (no camera movement)
- IV. DESCRIPTION OF THE SCENE= Voice of President. On screen Mr. Reagan making eye contact with the camera. He is in the Oval Office. Through the speech the zoom brings the close and widens the scene. During the speech a partial map of the Western Hemisphere is presented
- V.
Mr. Reagan

My fellow Americans:

I must speak to you tonight about a mounting danger in Central America that threatens the security of the United States. The danger will not go away; it will grow worse, much worse, if we fail to take action now. I'm speaking of Nicaragua, a Soviet ally on the American mainland only two hours flying time from our own borders. With over a billion dollars in Soviet-bloc aid, the communist government of Nicaragua has launched a campaign to subvert and topple its democratic neighbors.

Using Nicaragua as a base, the Soviets and Cubans can become the dominant power in the crucial corridor between North and South America. Established there, they will be in a position to threaten the Panama Canal, interdict our vital Caribbean sea lanes, and, ultimately, move against Mexico. Should that happen, desperate Latin peoples by the millions would begin fleeing north into the cities of the Southern United States, or to wherever some hope of freedom remained.

* CU= close up shot
MS= middle shot
LS= long shot

The United States Congress has before it a proposal to help stop this threat. The legislation is an aid package of \$100 million for the more than 20,000 freedom fighters struggling to bring democracy to their country and eliminate this communist menace and its source. But this \$100 million is not an additional 100 million. We're not asking for a single dime in new money. We are asking only to be permitted to switch a small part of our present defense budget--to the defense of our own southern frontier.

Gathered in Nicaragua already are thousands of Cuban military advisers, contingents of Soviets and East Germans, and all the elements of international terror--from the PLO to Italy's Red Brigades. Why are they there? Because as Colonel Qadhafi has publicly exulted: "Nicaragua means a great thing, it means fighting America near its borders--fighting Amerixa at it doorstep."

For our own security the United States must deny the Soviet Union a beachhead in North America. But let me make one thing plain: I'm not talking about American troops. They are not needed; they have not been requested. The democratic resistance fighting in Nicaragua is only asking America for the supplies and support to save their own country from communism.

The question the Congress of the United States will now answer is a simple one: Will we give the Nicaraguan democratic resistance the means to recapture their betrayed revolution or will we turn our backs and ignore the malignancy in Managua until it spreads and becomes a mortal threat to the entire New World? Will we permit the Soviet Union to put a second Cuba, a second Lybia, right on the doorstep of the United states?

How can such a small country pose such a great threat? Well, it is not Nicaragua alone that threatens us, but those using Nicaragua as a privileged sanctuary for their struggle against the United States.

Their first target is Nicaragua's neighbors. With an army an militia of 120,000 men, backed by more than 3,000 Cuban military advisers, Nicaragua's Armed Forces are the largest Central America has ever seen. The Nicaraguan military machine is more powerful than all its neighbors combined.

This map represents much of the Western Hemisphere. Now, let me show you the countries in Central America where weapons supplied by Nicaraguan communists have been found: Honduras, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala. Radicals from Panama to the south have been trained in Nicaragua, but the

Sandinistas, but the Sandinista revolutionary reach extends well beyond their immediate neighbors. In South America and the Caribbean, the Nicaraguan communists have provided support in the form of military training, safe haven, communications, false documents, safe transit, and, sometimes, weapons to radicals from the following countries: Colombia, Ecuador, Brazil, Chile, Argentina, Uruguay, and the Dominican Republic. Even that is not all, for there was an old communist slogan that the Sandinistas have made clear they honor: The road to victory goes through Mexico.

If maps, statistics, and facts aren't persuasive enough, we have the words of the Sandinistas and Soviets themselves. One of the highest level Sandinista leaders was asked by an American magazine whether their communist revolution will, and I quote, "be exported to El Salvador, then Guatemala, then Honduras, and then Mexico? He responded, "That is one historical prophecy of Ronald Reagan that is absolutely true."

Well, the Soviets have been no less candid. A few years ago, then Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko noted that Central America was, quote, "boiling like a cauldron" and ripe for revolution. In a Moscow meeting in 1983 Soviet Chief of Staff Marshal Ogarkov declared: "Over two decades--there are Nicaragua"--I should say, "there was only Cuba in Latin America. Today there are Nicaragua, Grenada, and a serious battle is going on in El Salvador." But we don't need their quotes; the American forces who liberated Grenada captured thousands of documents that demonstrated Soviet intent to bring communist revolution home to the Western Hemisphere.

So, we're clear on the intentions of the Sandinistas and those who back them. Let us be equally clear about the nature of their regime. To begin with, the Sandinistas have revoked the civil liberties of the Nicaraguan people, depriving them of any legal right to speak, to publish, to assemble or to worship freely. Independent newspapers have been shut down. There is no longer any independent labor movement in Nicaragua nor any right to strike. As AFL-CIO leader Lane Kirkland has said, "Nicaragua's head long rush into the totalitarian camp cannot be denied by anyone who has eyes to see."

Well, like communist governments everywhere, the Sandinistas have launched assaults against ethnic and religious groups. The capital's only synagogue was desecrated and firebombed--the entire Jewish community forced to flee Nicaragua. Protestant Bible meetings have been broken up by raids, by mob violence, by machineguns.

The Catholic Church has been singled out--priests have been expelled from the country, Catholics beaten in the streets after attending mass. The Catholic primate of Nicaragua, Cardinal Obando y Bravo, has put the matter forthrightly. "We want to state clearly," he says, "that this government is totalitarian. We are dealing with an enemy of the Church."

Evangelical pastor Prudencio Baltodano found out he was on a Sandinista hit list when an army patrol asked his name. "You don't know what we do to the evangelical pastors. We don't believe in God," they told him. Pastor Baltodano was tied to a tree, struck in the forehead with a rifle butt, stabbed in the neck with a bayonet--finally, his ears were cut off, and he was left for dead. "See if your God will save you," they mocked. Well, God did have other plans for Pastor Baltodano. He lived to tell the world his story--to tell it, among other places, right here in the White House. I could go on about this nightmare--the black list, the secret prisons, the Sandinista-directed mob violence. But as if all this brutality at home were not enough, the Sandinistas are transforming their nation into a safe house, a command post for international terror.

The Sandinistas not only sponsor terror in El Salvador, Costa Rica, Guatemala, and Honduras; terror that led last summer to the murder of four US Marines in a cafe in San Salvador. They provide a sanctuary for terror. Italy has charged Nicaragua with harboring their worst terrorists, the Red Brigades.

The Sandinistas have even involved themselves in the international drug trade. I know every American concerned about the drug problem will be outraged to learn that top Nicaraguan Government officials are deeply involved in drug trafficking. This picture (on screen a picture of men taking or putting bags into an airplane), secretly taken at a military airfield outside Managua, shows Federico Vaughn, a top aid to one of the nine commandantes who rule Nicaragua, loading an aircraft with illegal narcotics, bound for the United States. No, there seems to be no crime to which the Sandinistas will not stoop; this is an outlaw regime.

If we turn for a moment to our map, it becomes clear why having this regime in Central America imperils our vital security interests. Through this crucial part of the Western Hemisphere passes almost half our foreign trade, more than half our imports of crude oil, and a significant portion of the military supplies we would have to send to the NATO alliance in the event of a crisis. These are the chokepoints where the sealanes could be closed.

Central America is strategic for our Western alliance, a fact always understood by foreign enemies. In World War II, only a few German U-boats, operating from bases 4,000 miles away in Germany and occupied Europe, inflicted crippling losses on US shipping right off our southern coast.

Today Warsaw Pact engineers are building a deep water port on Nicaragua's Caribbean coast, similar to the naval base in Cuba for Soviet-built submarines. They are also constructing, outside Managua, the largest military airfield in Central America, similar to those in Cuba, from which Russian Bear bombers patrol the US east coast from Maine to Florida.

How this this menace to the peace and security of our Latin neighbors, and ultimately ourselves, suddenly emerge? Let me give you a brief history.

In 1979 the people of Nicaragua rose up and overthrew a corrupt dictatorship. At first the revolutionary leaders promised free elections and respect for human rights. But among them was an organization called the Sandinistas. Theirs was a communist organization, and their support of the revolutionary goals was sheer deceit. Quickly and ruthlessly, they took complete control.

Two months after the revolution, the Sandinista leadership met in secret and, in what came to be known as the "72-hour Document," described themselves as the vanguard of a revolution that would sweep Central America, Latin America, and finally, the world. Their true enemy, they declared: the United States.

Rather than make this document public, they followed the advice of Fidel Castro, who told them to put on a facade of democracy. While Castro viewed the democratic elements in Nicaragua with contempt, he urged his Nicaraguan friends to keep some of them in their coalition, in minor posts, as window dressing to deceive the West. "And that way," Castro said, "you can have your revolution and the Americans will pay for it."

And we did pay for it. More aid flowed to Nicaragua from the United States in the first 18 months under the Sandinistas than from any other country. Only when the mask fell, and the face of totalitarianism became visible to the world, did the aid stop.

Confronted with this emerging threat, early in our Administration I went to Congress and, with bipartisan support, managed to get help for the nations surrounding

Nicaragua. Some of you may remember the inspiring scene when the people of El Salvador braved the threat and gunfire of communist guerrillas, guerrillas directed and supplied from Nicaragua, and went to the polls to vote decisively for democracy. For the communists in El Salvador it was a humiliating defeat. But there was another factor that communists never counted on, a factor that now promises to give freedom a second chance, the Freedom Fighters of Nicaragua.

You see, when the Sandinistas betrayed the revolution, many who had fought the old Somoza dictatorship literally took to the hills and, like the French Resistance that fought the Nazis, began fighting the Soviet-bloc communists and their Nicaraguan collaborators. These few have now been joined by thousands.

With their blood and courage, the Freedom Fighters of Nicaragua have pinned down the Sandinista army and bought the people of Central America precious time. We Americans owe them a debt of gratitude. In helping to thwart the Sandinistas and their Soviet mentors, the resistance has contributed directly to the security of the United States.

Since its inception in 1982 the democratic resistance has grown dramatically in strength. Today it numbers more than 20,000 volunteers and more come every day. But now the Freedom Fighters' supplies are running short, and they are virtually defenseless against the helicopter gunships Moscow has sent to Managua.

Now comes the crucial test for the Congress of the United States. Will they provide the assistance the Freedom Fighters need to deal with Russian tanks and gunships, or will they abandon the democratic resistance to its communist enemy?

In answering that question, I hope Congress will reflect deeply upon what it is the resistance is fighting against in Nicaragua. Ask yourselves, what in the world are Soviet, East Germans, Bulgarians, North Koreans, Cubans, and terrorists from the PLO and the Red Brigades doing in our hemisphere, camped on our own doorstep? Is that for peace?

Why have the Soviets invested \$600 million to build Nicaragua into an armed force almost the size of Mexico's, a country 15 times as large as 25 times as populous. Is that for peace?

Why did Nicaragua's dictator, Daniel Ortega, go to the Communist Party Congress in Havana and endorse Castro's call for the worldwide triumph of communism? Was that for

peace?

Some members of Congress ask me, why not negotiate? That's a good question, and let me answer it directly. We have sought, and still seek, a negotiated peace and a democratic future in a free Nicaragua. Ten times we have met and tried to reason with the Sandinistas; ten times we were rebuffed. Last year we endorsed church-mediated negotiation between the regime and the resistance. The Soviets and the Sandinistas responded with a rapid arms buildup of mortars, tanks, artillery, and helicopter gunships.

Clearly, the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact have grasped the great stakes involved, the strategic importance of Nicaragua. The Soviets have made their decision: to support the communists. Fidel Castro has made his decision: to support the communists. Arafat, Qadhafi, and the Ayatollah Khomeini have made their decision: to support the communists. Now we must make our decision. With Congress' help, we can prevent an outcome deeply injurious to the national security of the United States. If we fail, there will be no evading responsibility, history will hold us accountable. This is not some narrow partisan issue; it is a national security issue, an issue on which we must act not as Republicans, not as Democrats, but as Americans.

Forty years ago Republicans and Democrats joined together behind the Truman doctrine. It must be our policy, Harry Truman declared, to support peoples struggles to preserve their freedom. Under that doctrine, Congress sent aid to Greece just in time to save that country from the closing grip of a communist tyranny. We saved freedom in Greece, then. And with that same bipartisan spirit we can save freedom in Nicaragua today.

Over the coming days I will continue the dialog with members of Congress, talking ot them, listening to them, hearing out their concerns. Senator Scoop Jackson, who led the fight in Capitol Hill for an awareness on the danger in Central America, said it best: "On matters of national security, the best politics is not politics."

You know, recently one of our most distinguished Americans, Clare Boothe Luce, had this to say about the coming vote: "In considering this crisis, Mrs. Luce said, " my mind goes back to a similar moment in our history: back to the first years after Cuba had fallen to Fidel. One day during those years, I had lunch at the White House with a man I had known since he was a boy, John F. Kennedy. 'Mr. President', I said, 'no matter how exalted or great a man may be, history will have time to give him no more than one sentence. George Washington, he founded our country.

Abraham Lincoln, he freed the slaves and preserved the Union. Winston Churchill, he saved Europe.' And what, Clare,' John Kennedy said, 'do you believe my sentence will be? 'Mr. President,' she answered, 'your sentence will be that you stopped the communists, or that you did not.'"

Well, tragically, John Kennedy never had the chance to decide which that would be. Noe leaders of our own time must do so. My fellow Americans, you know where I stand. The Soviets and the Sandinistas must not be permitted to crush freedom in Central America and threaten our own security on our own doorstep.

Now the Congress must decide where it stands. Mrs. Luce ended by saying: "Only this is certain. Through all time to come, this the 99th Congress of the United States, will be remembered as that body of men and women that either stopped the communists before it was too late, or did not."

So, tonight I ask you to do what you have done so often in the past. Get in touch with your Representative and Senators and urge them to vote yes; tell them to help the Freedom Fighters. Help us prevent a communists takeover of Central America.

I have only three years left to serve my country; three years to carry out the responsibilities you entrusted to me; three years to work for peace. Could there be any greater tragedy than for us to sit back and permit this cancer to spread, leaving my successor to face far more agonizing decisions in the years ahead? The Freedom Fighters seek a political solution. They are willing to lay down their arms and negotiate to restore the original goals of the revolution, a democracy in which the people of Nicaragua choose their own government. That is our goal also, but it can only come about if the democratic resistance is able to bring pressure to bear on those who have seized power.

We still have time to do what must be done so history will say of us: We had the vision, the courage, and good sense to come together and act, Republicans and Democrats, when the price was not high and the risks were not great. We left America safe, we left America secure, we left America free, still a beacon of hope to mankind, still a light unto the nations.

Thank you, and God bless you.

ABC, CBS, CNN
Democratic Response
March 16, 1986

I. 1

II. 1

III. CU

IV. Voice of Senator. On screen Senator Sasser making eye contact with the camera. He sits behind a large desk with a US flag on one side and a Democratic flag on the other. On lower screen: Sen. JIM SASSER (D) Tenn.

V.

Mr. Sasser

Good evening, I am Jim Sasser from Tennessee. First, let me say that we agree in the Congress with the President about what our goals should be in Central America. We agree that the Sandinista Government has betrayed the promise of its own revolution, it suppresses the freedom of its own people and it is supporting subversion against its neighbor El Salvador. We agree that Nicaragua must never become a base for Soviet military adventurism in this hemisphere. I repeat never. We want the Government of Nicaragua to restore political freedom to its own people and to let its neighbors develop in peace. But our disagreement is with the ways the President is trying to achieve these goals. This disagreement is shared by a majority of Americans and by a majority of their elected representatives in the Congress.

Tonight at a time of belt tightening at home, when thousands of family farms are failing and hundred of thousands of young Americans are seeing their college loans eliminated, the President seeks an additional 100 million dollars to expand the undeclared war being fought in Nicaragua. Our concern is that the President is seizing military options before he is exhausted the hope of a peaceful solution. We believe the United States should grasp the initiative, seeking peace through negotiation, before taking a faithful step that could lead to war in Central America.

Now the President calls the Contras Freedom Fighters. He is even compared them to our Founding Fathers. When in fact most Contra military leaders fought against freedom as members of the Somoza's regime hated security force and national guard. The President has spoken tonight of Sandinista's atrocities and certainly they exist. But Sandinista's atrocities by all unbiased accounts pale besides those of the Contras which tragically have been subsidized by your tax dollars. Let's face facts neither side has

clear hands in this war. The Administration has given the Contras at least 100 million dollars in the last five years and they can even tell us how that money was expended. It produced no military successes, none. And now they seek 100 million dollars more. So, the question must be asked, does the President policy have any real chance of success? Now, to be fair about it, the Contra army could become a thorn in the flesh of the Sandinistas but almost no body believes the Contras can win a military victory. If the President's goal is the military overthrow of the Sandinistas, then he should tell us so. Because that goal simply cannot be achieved without the United States military involvement in a long costly and bloody war.

Well, I recently returned from Central America, there I met with the Democratically elected leaders of the four countries that border Nicaragua: Guatemala, Honduras, Costa Rica, and El Salvador. These leaders all want the Sandinistas contained within their own borders but they are all concerned that the United States has not given Latin American own Contadora Peace Process a fair chance to work. The President has said that we've made every effort to negotiate. But the fact is he broke off negotiations just last year. The Sandinistas claim now a willingness to resume these talks. So we say let's put the Sandinistas to the test, do they really want negotiations? When I returned from Central America I proposed that we withhold military aid to the Contras, that we seek a cease fire between the Contras and the Sandinistas and that we initiate a bold program to force Nicaragua to bargain in good faith. If the Sandinistas refuse to negotiate, it may then be necessary as an absolute last resort to fund and certainly to reform the Contra army. But we say let's try negotiation first. Unhappily the President rejected this proposal in favor of immediate military aid to the Contras. So, this is really the heart of our differences with the President, he proposes a wider war in Nicaragua now. Well, as a father of a seventeen years old son I say Mr. President let's not rush blindly into that quagmire. We've done that before. We believe the hour calls for statesmanship and certainly not rushed action and certainly not divisive rhetoric that needlessly politicizes what should be a sober bipartisan national debate. We should learn from history, and recent events have shown that when our nation is together as we were in the Philippines, then we succeed. But when we are divided as we were in Beirut, then we fail often with tragic results.

The American people want a more enlightened policy in Central America and our great nation deserves one. So, let us call on our diplomatic skills, upon our patience, upon our wisdom, and most of all upon our great democratic

tradition to achieve a balanced bipartisan policy in Central America and a course of action that has a realistic chance of success. And also a policy that we as Americans don't have to be ashamed of. Thank you and God bless you.

ABC World News Tonight
March 13, 1986
2 min 10 sec
About House Vote on Contra Aid

I. 1 (2 min 10 sec)

II. 1

III. CU (no camera movement)

IV. Voice of Anchorman, Ted Koppel. On the screen a close up of Ted Koppel making eye contact with the camera. On the upper right side of screen a small window showing a three dimensional representation of the Nicaraguan territory, with the inscription -nicaragua- across it, a flag of the US, and on the upper side, above the US flag, of the window the inscription: CONTRA AID. All these is showed having as a background a map of Central America with the part corresponding to Nicaragua highlighted

V.

-Ted Koppel

Much of the battle over new military aid for the Contra forces in Nicaragua has been fought between the White House and Capitol Hill. Today the President was looking for additional ammunition and found it in the lobby of the State Department. Here is ABC Jeanne Meserve.

II. 2

III. MS to CU (camera movement)

IV. Voice of reporter. On screen middle shot (from above) of President Reagan examining captured arms in display boxes (from the text, the weapons were Sandinista weapons); on the left upper side of screen, a red band diagonally crosses with the inscription: STATE DEPT. Then, President Reagan is shown on a podium getting ready to give an speech, next the camera moves from President Reagan and goes through a row of people sitting at the side of the podium, among them the Secretary of State and the Vicepresident and some Contra fighters (from the text).

V.

-Reporter

The President was given a tour of captured arms and documents, which the Administration says prove that Nicaragua is subverting its neighbors. Corroborating testimony was given by formers Central American combatants...

II. 3

III. CU (no camera movement)

IV. Voice of President Reagan. On the screen, close up of President Reagan addressing the camera.

V.

-President Reagan

These weapons and the testimony that we have seen and heard demonstrate the magnitude of the sophisticated communist's efforts to undermine democracy in this hemisphere. And, to deceive us in the process...

II. 4

III. CU to MS (camera movement)

IV. Voice of reporter. On the screen, a series of close up shots of aerial pictures showing different types of buildings (from the text these are new Nicaraguan prisons). Then, superimposed on the last previous pictures a map with the inscription: Nicaragua. These images are shown over a background of a metal-net wall. Subsequently, under the Nicaraguan map the phrase KILL WITH ATTACK DOGS appears followed by the phrase TORTURE WITH CATTLE PRODS. Finally, a close up shot of Secretary of State Shultz declaring in Congress, then the camera moves to provide a close up of Senator Arlen Specter and goes back to Shultz.

V.

-Reporter

ABC News has obtained these classified photographs which are purported to be pictures of newly constructed Nicaraguan prisons. These pictures will be declassified and sent to Capitol Hill along with documentation of what the US says is mistreatment of prisoners in Nicaragua. Intelligent sources report that the Nicaraguans are using attack dogs to kill prisoners and that they are torturing others by applying electrical cattle prods to their genitals. But despite its best efforts the Administration is having problems convincing even members of its own party to support Contra aid. On Capitol Hill today Senator Arlen Specter asked Secretary of State Shultz if he meant to say that the Administration's goals was the overthrow of the Sandinista regime.

II. 5

III. CU (no camera movement)

IV. Voice of Shultz and Specter. On screen close ups of Shultz and Specter as the former is being questioned in Congress. On the lower screen the inscriptions: GEORGE SHULTZ Secretary of State and Sen ARLEN SPECTER (R) Pennsylvania, as they speak.

V.

-Shultz

I will make a deal with you, you don't put words in my mouse and I won't put doors in your mouse.

-Specter

I don't think you answer the question and I don't understand the Administration's policies in Nicaragua. And I would like to be supportive of the Administration's policies but I will not be unless I understand what your policy is, what it seeks to achieve.

II. 6

III. CU (no camera movement)

IV. Voice of reporter. On the screen, close up of reporter making eye contact with the camera and having as background flags (from different countries) posted in front of the State Department's building. On lower screen, the inscription: Jeanne Meserve The State Department.

V.

-Reporter

The White House is sponsoring a trip to Managua for a large group of Congressmen. They leave tomorrow morning to assess the Nicaraguan situation first hand. It is yet another attempt by the Administration to win hearts, minds, and votes in Capitol Hill. Jeanne Meserve, ABC News, The State Department.

ABC World News Tonight

March 25, 1986

4 min 27 sec

About Sandinista Invasion into Honduras

I. 1 (1 min 48 sec)

II. 1

III. CU (no camera movement)

IV. Voice of Peter Jennings, anchorman. Direct eye contact with the camera. In the right corner of screen a frame with a Central America map section of Honduras and Nicaragua; in the lower part of the frame the word INCURSION and a red arrow starting in Nicaragua and pointing in the direction of Honduras.

V.

-Anchorman

American Helicopters will soon begin to fly Honduran soldiers to the border of their country with Nicaragua. The Nicaraguans had crossed the line in this case and they are fighting the Contras inside Honduras. In this report it appears that Nicaraguans may be in trouble, ABC Peter Collins is there...

II. 2

III. LS to MS to CU (camera movement)

IV. Voice of the reporter. Shots of a Contra camp from an airplane. A Central America map section with Honduras and Nicaragua; presentation of a graphic showing how the Sandinista attack was performed; on the screen: ATTACKED BY 1500 TROOPS. Shots of Contra troops in a camp and in the field; shots of the surrounding mountains.

V.

-Reporter

It is here that the Contra base camps are located and it is here that at least two Sandinista battallions of about 15 hundred men attacked over the weekend. These Contra troops have been fighting the Sandinistas for four days and according to US intelligence sources are whipping them badly. The two units are reported trapped and breaking up in panic, but Honduras apparently fears Nicaragua may send more troops across its borders.

II. 3

III. CU (no camera movement)

IV. Voice of translator. On the screen Lisandro Quesada declaring to reporter from Quesada's desk. On the upper left corner of screen: Voice of Translator. On the lower part of screen: Lisandro Quesada Honduran Govt Spokesman.

V.
-Translator

It is an attack in our sovereignty and we will reject it and repel it totally and completely

II. 4

III. LS to MS (camera movement)

IV. Voice of reporter. Shots of Honduras troops in formation; the camera follows four American helicopters going over the Honduran troops. Shots of Sandinista troops in formation; shots of Daniel Ortega (Nicaraguan President) and Sergio Ramirez (Nicaraguan Vice-President) reviewing the troops; then Nicaraguan soldiers in formation and greeting with their machine gun Sandinista helicopters going over them; the camera follows the helicopters to come down and focus on a tank brigade. Finally, the reporter talks directly and makes eye contact with the camera.

V.
-Reporter

Honduras has almost no capacity to move its forces by air, so that job will be done by US helicopters, some are already here others apparently still to come. US analysts believe that Sandinistas made two tremendous mistakes. First, they apparently believe President Reagan would eventually wins his battle in Congress to give the Contras military aid and so they decided to try to destroy the Contras before the help arrive. By not waiting until a crucial House vote next month, they have helped the President made his case. And second, they made the military mistake of not committing enough forces to do the job against the Contras. Unless the Sandinistas reinforce their trapped units this battle may be over before American helicopters get very much involved but whatever the immediate outcome here, the war in Central America has just escalated.

I. 2 (2 min 16 sec)

II. 5

III. CU

IV. Voice of anchorman. On screen anchorman directly addresses the camera; eye contact. On the upper right corner of screen the same frame as in shot 1.

V.
-Anchorman

As we suggested while the military action continues in Honduras, in Washington President Reagan is doing what he can to assist the Honduran as quickly as possible. Here is our White House correspondent, Sam Donaldson.

II. 6

III. MS (no camera movement)

IV. Voice of reporter. Shots of Larry Speaks in the Press Conference Room of the White House. A copy of the letter President Reagan sent to notify Congress about the emergency aid to Honduras; on top of letter photos of President Reagan and Speaker Tip O'Neill; superimposed on the letter: "...UP TO \$20 MILLION IN EMERGENCY MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO HONDURAS."

V.

-Reporter

For the second day in a row Press Secretary Larry Speaks came to the White House's briefing room to announce the US response to aggression. President Reagan is notifying Congress that he is making available up to \$20 million dollars in emergency military assistance to Honduras. Vice-President Bush explains the reasons this way:

II. 7

III. CU (no camera movement)

IV. Voice of Vice-President Bush. He addresses the reporter.

V.

-Vice-President

The President of Honduras has made ah... a request for certain support for his country and we will give him that support.

II. 8

III. MS to LS to CU (camera movement)

IV. Voice of reporter. Shots of heavy machinery (Caterpillar) moving heavy boxes. Shots of troops entering a helicopter; on the left upper screen: File. Helicopter taking off, the camera follows it. Shot of Donald Regan.

V.

-Reporter

Honduras wants conventional battle field arms to include air defense weapons but in addition US helicopters, already in the country, would be used to airlift Honduras troops into the battle area. If US pilots flight them, White House Chief of Staff Regan says, they will stay away from the actual fighting.

II. 9

III. CU (no camera movement)

IV. Voice of Donald Regan (White House Chief of Staff). On screen he addresses the reporter.

V.

-Regan

Our equipment will be used, our pilots will be used but we were not go any where near where the... ahhh the invasion of the... Nicaraguan troops into Honduras has taken place.

II. 10

III. MS to CU (no camera movement)

IV. Voice of reporter. Shots of Nicaraguan officials in an office of the UN. Shot of the Nicaraguan Ambassador to the UN.

V.

-Reporter

In the face of invasion charges by US officials, Nicaraguan officials insist it isn't true.

II. 11

III. CU to MS (no camera movement)

IV. Voice of Nicaraguan Ambassador (Nora Astorga) to the UN. Shots of her giving a Press Conference and addressing the reporters; on lower screen: Nora Astorga Nicaraguan Amb to UN.

V.

-Ambassador

First of all let me just deny it very strongly. This is a clear and transparent attempt on the part of the US Administration to try to secure some funds...

II. 12

III. MS to CU (no camera movement)

IV. Voice of reporter. Shots of Senators Bob Dole (R) and Thomas Foley (D) giving declarations inside Congress.

V.

-Reporter

But in Capitol Hill Democrats as well as Republicans supported aid to Honduras and suggested Nicaragua's Ortega has overplayed his hands.

II. 13

III. CU to MS to CU (no camera movement)

IV. Voice of Rep. Foley and Senator Dole. Shot of Rep. Foley addressing the camera directly; eye contact; on lower screen: Rep Thomas Foley Majority Whip. Shot of reporters taking notes. Back to Rep. Foley. Then, shot of Senator Dole while he addresses reporters; on lower screen: Sen Robert Dole Majority Leader.

V.

-Foley

If Nicaragua persists in attacks on ahh... neighboring states, this may spill over into wholesale US support for the Contras.

-Dole

I imagine it will come up in the debate... I mean... it seems to me that they may have shot themselves in the foot.

II. 14

III. MS to CU (camera movement, zoom)

IV. Voice of reporter. Shot of reporter in the White House garden. Use of zoom from medium to a close range; on lower screen: Sam Donaldson The White House.

V.

-Reporter

No one here is quite sure why Nicaragua's Ortega chose this moment to go after the Contras but everyone seems convinced that it will do him more harm than good. Last spring Ortega's highly publicized visit to Moscow helped keep the Contra aid program alive. Now his troops' visit to Honduras may have the same effect.

I. 3 (23 sec)

II. 15

III. CU (no camera movement)

IV. Voice of anchorman. He addresses directly the camera; eye contact; on upper right side of screen a frame: ABC News Washington Post POLL. The whole screen is taken by a table showing the poll result: ABCNEWS Washington Post POLL CONTRA AID Approve of House Vote +- 3.5% YES 60% NO 35%. Return to anchorman; this time the frame changes to a Central American map with Nicaragua highlighted; an enlarged section showing Nicaragua in the right side of frame; an American Flag on the left side of frame; and on upper side of frame: CONTRA AID.

V.

-Anchorman

That is the politicians view in support for the President. It remains to be seen if the public mind is also shifted in the President's favor. The latest ABC News-Washington poll completed yesterday shows the American people on the whole believe the House of Representatives did the right thing last week when it voted against military aid for the Contras. Senate debate on aid for the Contras is scheduled to begin tomorrow.

CBS Evening News
 March 17, 1986
 2 min 10 sec
 About House Vote on Contra Aid

I. 1 (2 min 10 sec)

II. 1

III. CU (camera movement, zoom)

IV. Voice of anchorman. On screen close up of Dan Rather positioned to the right of screen; on left side of screen the identification of the program CBS EVENING NEWS with DAN RATHER. Then, the camera slowly moves and uses the zoom to just show a close up of Dan Rather.

V.

-Anchorman

This is the CBS Evening News. Dan Rather reporting. "Vote more military aid for the Nicaraguan rebels, vote with me or help the communist." That is the trust of President's Reagan campaign to sue Congress, he followed up his nationwide speech last night with more today. White House's correspondent Bill Plante reports.

II. 2

III. CU (camera movement, zoom)

IV. Voice of reporter and Mr. Reagan. On screen a close up of Mr. Reagan, then the camera, through the zoom, widens the scene to show that Mr. Habbib is sitting side by side with Mr. Reagan. Subsequently, the camera goes back to a close up of the President who looks toward Mr. Habbib. On upper left side of screen White House.

V.

-Reporter

The President in joy by reaction to his speech and still confidently pursuing aid for the rebels joked when told that Sandinista leader Daniel Ortega said Mr. Reagan has lost his senses about Nicaragua.

-Mr. Reagan

It takes one to know one...

II. 3

III. CU (Camera movement)

IV. Voice of reporter. On screen a close up of Mr. Habbib, then the camera, through the zoom, widens the scene to show Mr. Habbib and Mr. Reagan side by side.

CBS Evening News
 March 17, 1986
 2 min 10 sec
 About House Vote on Contra Aid

I. 1 (2 min 10 sec)

II. 1

III. CU (camera movement, zoom)

IV. Voice of anchorman. On screen close up of Dan Rather positioned to the right of screen; on left side of screen the identification of the program CBS EVENING NEWS with DAN RATHER. Then, the camera slowly moves and uses the zoom to just show a close up of Dan Rather.

V.

-Anchorman

This is the CBS Evening News. Dan Rather reporting. "Vote more military aid for the Nicaraguan rebels, vote with me or help the communist." That is the trust of President's Reagan campaign to sue Congress, he followed up his nationwide speech last night with more today. White House's correspondent Bill Plante reports.

II. 2

III. CU (camera movement, zoom)

IV. Voice of reporter and Mr. Reagan. On screen a close up of Mr. Reagan, then the camera, through the zoom, widens the scene to show that Mr. Habbib is sitting side by side with Mr. Reagan. Subsequently, the camera goes back to a close up of the President who looks toward Mr. Habbib. On upper left side of screen White House.

V.

-Reporter

The President in joy by reaction to his speech and still confidently pursuing aid for the rebels joked when told that Sandinista leader Daniel Ortega said Mr. Reagan has lost his senses about Nicaragua.

-Mr. Reagan

It takes one to know one...

II. 3

III. CU (Camera movement)

IV. Voice of reporter. On screen a close up of Mr. Habbib, then the camera, through the zoom, widens the scene to show Mr. Habbib and Mr. Reagan side by side.

V.

-Reporter

Ambassador Philip Habbib the President's special envoy just back from Central America argue that polls show people in the region approve of the US's position even if many in the US are skeptical.

II. 4

III. CU (no camera movement)

IV. Voice of Mr. Habbib. On screen a close up of Mr. Habbib; on lower screen Philip Habbib Special Envoy for Central America.

V.

-Mr. Habbib

The majority of Central Americans first of all condemn the situation inside Nicaragua and secondly the majority supports the aid to the Contras.

II. 5

III. MS (no camera movement)

IV. Voice of reporter. On screen a group of soldiers sitting on rustic wood benches. Then, a series of close ups of some of the soldiers, they seem to be concentrated as they watch down to the floor. Next, another middle shot at a half of the group of soldiers followed by a close up at two soldiers.

V.

-Reporter

That poll backs up Administration's claims for the Contras, some of whom listen to reports of the President's speech last night at a base camp in Costa Rica. The White House says the poll was commissioned by the US Information Agency but couldn't say exactly when it was done.

II. 6

III. MS to CU (no camera movement)

IV. Voice of reporter. On screen a middle shot of Secretary of State Shultz as he delivers a speech, the shot is taken from the back of the audience so some of them appear in this way. Then, another middle shot of the audience, this time from one side of the room, followed by a close up of Mr. Schultz.

V.

-Reporter

Secretary of State Shultz turned up the heat as he continues the Administration's campaign for thursday vote on the House.

II. 7

III. CU (no camera movement)

IV. Voice of Mr. Shultz. On screen a close up of Mr. Shultz addressing the audience.

V.

-Mr. Shultz

So this week in the United States is going to be our time to stand up and be counted on.

II. 8

III. MS to CU (camera movement)

IV. Voice of reporter. On screen a middle shot of phone receptionists in a room, the camera slowly moves to show the size of the room and the number of receptionists; on upper left screen the inscription: Capitol Hill. Next, a woman is shown talking on the phone as she opens a telegram. This is followed by middle shots of a truck carrying a helicopter, the truck is being parked in front of Congress. Then, shots of policemen coming toward the camera, they are bringing a man and taken him to a police car.

V.

-Reporter

Thousands did contact the White House and Congress. The Capitol switchboard was crowded with calls. At the other end of Pennsylvania avenue an aid said calls were two to one on Mr. Reagan's favor. Conservatives carried a helicopter to a spot near the Capitol and announced they were donating it to the Contras to evacuate the wounded. A scold broke out with bystanders who objected.

II. 9

III. MS to CU (camera movement)

IV. Voice of reporter and Speaker O'Neill. On screen a middle shot of Mr. O'Neill as he walks toward the camera, the camera follows him to a close up.

V.

-Reporter

Feelings were running high every where. House's Speaker Thomas P. O'Neill remains bitterly opposed as Mr. Reagan gains votes for Contra aid.

-Mr. O'Neill

I think that our policy is wrong every inch of the way. You are just not going to get there with military might without getting ourselves into it.

II. 10

III. CU (no camera movement)

IV. Voice of reporter. On screen middle close up of reporter reporting from the gardens of the White House.

V.

-Reporter

White House's aids said there are now only a dozen or so of votes short. Votes that they think Mr. Reagan can get this week. No one here wants to appear overconfident but they think that their strategy has worked and the Congress will give the President all or most of what he wants for the Contras. Bill Plante CBS News the White House.

CBS Evening News
 March 26, 1986
 4 min 20 sec
 About Sandinista Invasion into Honduras

I. 1 (2 min 8 sec)

II. 1

III. CU (no camera movement)

IV. Voice of anchorman. On screen a close up of Dan Rather; on upper screen a small window showing a partial map of Central America with the regions corresponding to Honduras and Nicaragua highlighted, on the map the words: HONDURAS NICARAGUA.

V.

-Anchorman

.... Richard Schlesinger is following the battle reports in Honduras and Phil Jones is following the fighting on Capitol Hill.

II. 2

III. LS to MS (camera movement, zoom)

IV. Voice of reporter. On screen a long shot of helicopters on the air, the camera follows the helicopters and with the zoom approximates one of them to a middle shot, on upper left screen: Eastern Honduras. Then, a side long to middle shot of a helicopter appears as it flies over a line of trees. Noise of helicopters' engines accompanies the scenes.

V.

-Reporter

At daybreak American pilots started ferrying Honduran soldiers to the remote border area where remnants of the Sandinistas forces are reportedly isolated and trying to escape back into Nicaragua.

II. 2

III. MS (camera movement, zoom)

IV. Voice of reporter. On screen a middle shot of a helicopter landing. Then, a long shot of a large group of soldier, the camera's zoom bring the group to a closer middle shot. Subsequently, another middle shot of a helicopter lifting a package on the air.

V.

-Reporter

Fourteen American helicopters are being used to move between 5 and 6 hundred Honduran troops to the mountain's jungles east of the capital. American officials say the helicopters will stay about ten miles from any fighting.

II. 3

III. CU (camera movement, zoom)

IV. Voice of reporter. On screen a partial map of Central America; on it the words: HONDURAS NICARAGUA identifying the respective regions. Through the zoom details of the Honduran-Nicaraguan border are shown and arrows coming from Nicaragua and pointing to Honduras appear, at the end of arrows the figure of a soldier stands and a light intermitently goes on and off.

V.

-Reporter

Informed sources said three battalions of Nicaraguans' troops try four times on Sunday to overrun the main rebel camp about fifteen miles inside Honduras. They did not succeed and about two thousand US backed Contra rebels cut off they retreat.

II. 4

III. MS to CU (camera movement)

IV. Voice of reporter. On screen a close middle shot of a wounded soldier coming toward the camera, some people come along helping him; on lower screen: May 1985. Then, the wounded soldier and another one appear sitting in separated chairs in front of the camera.

V.

-Reporter

Some prisoners were taken and Honduras authorities showed two of them to the news media.

II. 5

III. MS to CU (camera movement)

IV. Voice of reporter. On screen a military truck firing ground to air missiles is shown. Then, shots of soldiers on a road, some of them run toward a bush vegetation. Subsequently, a middle shot of soldiers manipulating a cannon appear on the screen.

V.

-Reporter

There have been at least 35 Nicaraguan attacks across the Honduran border in the past two years. The one this week was by far the largest.

II. 6

III. CU (no camera movement)

IV. Voice of reporter. On screen close up of Mr. Schlensinger, on the background some houses can be seen.

V.

-Reporter

The Reagan Administration says the Sandinistas try to mount an all out invasion but the Honduran Foreign Minister stop far short of that. He says only the Nicaraguans defied his Government's demand that Sandinistas soldiers stay out of Honduras.

II. 7

III. CU (no camera movement)

IV. Voice of Honduran Foreign Minister. On screen Mr. Lopez Contreras; on lower screen: Carlos Lopez Contreras Honduran Foreign Minister.

V.

-Mr. Lopez Contreeas

This incursion does not represent a mayor threat to the security of Honduras.

II. 8

III. MS (camera movement)

IV. Voice of reporter. On screen a middle shot of two helicopters on the ground, their engines are running. Then, the zoom widens the scene to a long shot and shows that instead of two there are several helicopter on a line. Noise of the helicopters' engines accompany the images. Following this, a middle shot of two helicopters landing is shown followed by long shots of a helicopter on the air.

V.

-Reporter

Lopez worries the use of American helicopters will drag Honduras into the middle of an American political debate, over the Administration 100 hundred million dollars aid package to the Contras. Washington's impression of what is happening here, says Lopez, could be exaggerated by highly partisan politicians.

II. 9

III. CU (no camera movement)

IV. Voice of Mr. Lopez Contreras. On screen a close up of Mr. Lopez Contreras

V.

-Mr. Lopez Contreras

The limits where reality begins and imagination continues is very difficult to establish.

II. 10

III. MS (camera movement)

IV. Voice of reporter. On screen a middle shot of a military tank, soldiers can be seen on top of the tank. The tank moves toward the camera. On upper screen: Northern Nicaragua. Then, middle shots of soldiers going down a mount. This is followed by a middle shot of soldier walking toward the camera. Subsequently, a military tank with two soldiers on top of it is shown.

V.

-Reporter

Washington is keeping the heat on the Sandinistas. More soldiers to the border and the Reagan Administration is starting to talk about the possibility of another Nicaraguan attack into Honduras soon. Richard Schlensinger, CBS News, Tegucigalpa, Honduras.

I. 2 (2 min 12 sec)

II. 11

III. MS to CU (camera movement, zoom)

IV. Voice of reporter. On screen a middle shot of Congress; on lower left screen: Phil Jones CBS News. Then, the zoom slowly brings the dome of the building to a close up. Next is a middle shot of an audience in a White House's conference room. This is followed by a close up of Larry Speakes addressing the audience, the close up of Speakes is reduced to a small window and below the window: "...my government has confirmed the presence of Sandinista armed forces on Honduran territory."

V.

-Reporter

Here at home as the Senate's debate on aid to the Nicaraguan Contras begins the Administration was emphasizing the urgency of the fighting in Honduras. White House's spokesman Larry Speakes read a letter from the Honduran President received yesterday stating, "My Government has confirmed the presence of Sandinista armed forces on Honduran territory."

II. 12

III. MS (no camera movement)

IV. Voice of reporter. On screen a middle shot of Secretary of State's spokesman, part of the audience can be seen.

V.

-Reporter

Officials were clearly irritated by suggestions of exaggerations.

II. 13

III. CU (no camera movement)

IV. Voice of Secretary of State's spokesman. On screen a close of Mr. Redman; on lower screen: Charles Redman State Dept. Spokesman.

V.

-Mr. Redman

The Government of Honduras ought to know whether its national sovereignty has been violated, whether it is under attack by the Sandinista army. It has so said.

II. 14

III. CU (no camera movement)

IV. Voice of Senator. On screen a close up of Mr. Kennedy; on lower screen: Sen. Edward Kennedy D-Massachusetts.

V.

-Mr. Kennedy

This Administration has done best when they has played the statesman and no when they play Rambo. And this Administration is playing Rambo in Nicaragua...

II. 15

III. CU (no camera movement)

IV. Voice of reporter. On screen alternate close ups of Senator declaring to the press. Then, a picture of the seal of the US President and beside it the donkey symbol of the Democrats; on lower screen: REJECTED: U.S. seeks face to face negotiation with Sandinistas. Then, the words in lower screen change: REJECTED: Second vote on military aid that could not be vetoed.

V.

-Reporter

Even before the debate began today Democrats accused the Administration of torpedoing a compromise. A compromise that calls for face to face negotiations with the Sandinistas and a second Congressional vote on military aid that could not be vetoed by the President.

II. 16

III. MS (no camera movement)

IV. Voice of reporter. On screen a drawing representing a middle shot of the Senate chamber; on lower screen: Artist: Don Juhlin.

V.

-Reporter

On the Senate's floor the debate was mostly along party lines.

II. 17

III. MS to CU (no camera movement)

IV. Voice of senator. On screen the same previous drawing but this time there is a representation of a small window on right screen with a drawing representing a close up of Mr. Leahy. On lower screen: Voice of: Sen. Patrick Leahy D-Vermont.

V.

-Mr. Leahy

What I ask the Senate is not to be blinded by Sandinista policy, such as the recent attack on Contra camps in Honduras. For Senators to use as latest example of Daniel Ortega's stupidity as cover to vote for this aid is really allowing themselves to be swept away by word fever.

II. 18

III. Ms to CU (no camera movement)

IV. Voice of Senator. On screen same as shot 17 but this time the small window is on left screen and the representation is of Mr. Helms. On lower screen: Voice of: Sen. Jesse Helms R-North Carolina.

V.

-Mr. Helms

They don't believe in democracy, they don't believe in freedom. What they believe in is making a sucker out of the United States of America.

II. 19

III. CU (camera movement, zoom)

IV. Voice of reporter. On screen close up of Phil Jones as he addresses the camera; as he talks the zoom slowly brings him closer.

V.

-Reporter

It appears the Administration has enough votes to get its Contra aid package through the Republican controlled Senate, but is going to be close and it will not be the strong bipartisan message the Republicans leaders have hope to send the Sandinistas. Phil Jones, CBS News, Capitol Hill.

CNN Prime News
 March 20, 1986
 8 min 18 sec
 About House Vote on Contra Aid

- I. 1 (22 sec)
- II. 1
- III. CU (no camera movement)
- IV. Voice of anchorman (Bernard Shaw); direct address to camera, eye contact, in the right corner of screen a picture of White House.

V.
 -Anchorman

...there was a vote on contra aid today in the House of representatives. Members voted against the President's one hundred million request to aid the rebels fighting the Sandinista Government. As expected the vote was close: two-hundred-twenty-two to two-hundred-ten. The White House is calling the defeat a temporary setback and Administration officials immediately work on a new Contra aid strategy. We have two reports beginning with CNN's Pam Olson in Capitol Hill.

- I. 2 (1 min 52 sec)
- II. 2
- III. MS (camera movement)
- IV. Voice of reporter (Pam Olson). The camera follows Secretary of State Schultz coming out of Congress as he goes to his car. Then, it shows Speaker O'Neill in his office receiving a pair of boxing gloves. Immediately O'Neill is presented speaking in the House of representatives.

V.
 -Reporter

Administration officials lobbied on Capitol Hill to the very end but it did no good. Armed with his new boxing gloves, courtesy of Marbing..., House Speaker Tip O'Neill hit the House floor swinging.

- II. 3
 - III. MS (no camera movement)
 - IV. Voice of Speaker O'Neill (D). Shot of Speaker addressing the House. On the lower part of screen the inscription: Rep. Thomas O'Neill (D) House-Speaker.
- V.
 -O'Neill

I see us becoming engaged step by step in a military situation that brings our boys directly... into the fighting.

II. 4

III. MS (no camera movement)

IV. Voice of Representative Robert Michel. Shot of Rep. Michel addressing O'Neill (looking in his direction). On the lower part of screen the inscription: Rep. Robert Michel (R) Minority Leader.

V.

-Rep. Robert Michel

You are wrong, you are wrong, you are wrong...

II. 5

III. LS (no camera movement)

IV. Voice of reporter. Shot of the inside of the House.

V.

-Reporter

The Administration even has the support of a long time critic, Claude Pepper (D)

II. 6

III. MS (no camera movement)

IV. Voice of Claude Pepper addressing the House. On the lower side of the screen the inscription: Rep. Claude Pepper (D) Fla.

V.

-Rep. Claude Pepper

Yes what is the better way than the President has proposed, what is it? For the nations of the Western Hemisphere to joint us in throwing these Communists out, but until they do it let us speak for ourselves" (voices of acclamation and approval)

II. 7

III. LS (no camera movement)

IV. Voice of reporter. A table with the votation's result superimposed on a general view of the House's inside.

V.

-Reporter

But in the end it wasn't good enough

II. 8

III. MS (no camera movement)

IV. Voice of Speaker O'Neill. O'Neill in the podium addressing the Representatives.

V.

-O'Neill

The resolution is not agreed upon, on a motion we must reconsider it late upon the day...

- II. 9
- III. LS (no camera movement)
- IV. Voice of reporter. Return to shot 6.
- V.
- Reporter

Sixteen Republicans defected to joint two-hundred-six Democrats to defeat the President's proposal

- II. 10
- III. CU (no camera movement)
- IV. Richard Gephardt speaking from his office. In the lower part of screen the inscription Rep. Richard Gephardt (D) Mo.

- V.
- Gephardt

Until the President's policy is better articulated to the American People and until it is demonstrated that the diplomatic option is no available and not workable, the American people are not for continuing military aid to the Contras in that country.

- II. 11
- III. CU (no camera movement)
- IV. John McCain speaking from his office. A bookcase as background. Lower screen inscription Rep. John McCain (R) Ariz.

- V.
- McCain

Indeed I think that it is a serious setback, I don't think the war is over, however, because I don't think that the situation in Nicaragua will improve perceptibly and we will be revisiting this issue.

- II. 12
- III. MS (no camera movement)
- IV. Voice of reporter. On the screen Patrick Buchanans (White House Press Secretary) in his office.
- V.
- Reporter

Some Administration's losses according to democratic leaders came from White House's red baiting tactics, which back fired.

- II. 13
- III. CU (no camera movement)
- IV. Michael Barnes speaking from his office. Lower screen's

inscription Rep. Michael Barnes (D) Md.

V.

-Barnes

I think that Pat Buchanan was one of... our secret weapons.

II. 14

III. CU (no camera movement)

IV. Thomas Foley speaking from his office. On the lower screen: Rep. Thomas Foley (D) Wash.

V.

-Foley

...He degraded the debate and he was ineffective...

II. 15

III. CU (no camera movement)

IV. Voice of reporter. On screen a close up of reporter making eye contact with the camera. The Congress building as a background. On lower screen: Pam Olson CNN Washington.

V.

-Reporter

Meanwhile, House Democrats continue to work on their own authority proposals which are likely to include some form of military assistance, but, rather than only promises to pursue negotiations with the Sandinista Government, the legislation will require them before any money are released.

I. 3 (2 min 47 sec)

II. 16

III. MS (no camera movement)

IV. Voice of Larry Speakes, White House's Spokesman. On screen a middle shot of Larry Speakes speaking from a White House's conference room. On lower screen: PRIME NEWS.

V.

-Speakes

Today's vote in the House of representatives was a dark day for freedom...

II. 17

III. MS (no camera movement)

IV. Voice of reporter. Shot at journalist sitting in the conference room. On lower screen: Charles Bierbauer CNN Reporting.

V.

-Reporter

The President's statement read by spokesman Larry Speakes now will come back to Congress again and again until the

battle is won.

II. 18

III. MS (no camera movement)

IV. Voice of Larry Speakes. On screen a middle shot of Larry Speakes; on lower screen: Larry Speakes White House Spokesman

V.

-Speakes

We are gaining ground, we are winning converts. The next battle will bring us the victory that this just and good cause rightly deserves.

II. 19

III. MS to CU to MS (no camera movement)

IV. Voice of reporter. On screen Larry Speakes leaves the podium and Senators Bob Dole and Richard Lugar come to the podium in the White House's conference room. Camera zoom gives a close up of senators. Then a close up of Senator Lugar. Finally, a close up of a CNN Journalist. On lower screen: Charles Bierbauer CNN Reporting.

V.

-Reporter

The next battle begins in the Senate tuesday, the House will take the cause up again in April 15th. Senate's Foreign Relation chairman Richard Lugar heisted a summont to the White House saying that the President is willing to make changes.

II. 20

III. MS (no camera movement)

IV. Richard Lugar speaking from the White House's conference room. Lower screen: Sen. Richard Lugar (R) For. Rel. Chmn.

V.

-Lugar

I think that a significant suggestion the President made to Bob and to me was that we consider an ammendment to the bill that is now in front of the Senate that will incorporate the pledge that he made in the executive order...

II. 21

III. MS to LS to CU (camera movement)

IV. Voice of reporter. On the screen, shots of Contra troops coming to the camera. Camera moves to show troops outside (in the patio) of a building. Then, a close up of a soldier. Return to shot 4 and 6. Close up of a Contra

leader (Arturo Cruz)

V.

-Reporter

The President has pledge in the last minute message to the House to delivery only defensive weapons to the Contras while pursuing a ninety days effort to bring the Sandinistas into negotiations (the screen changes to the House of Representatives). Whise House officials suggest the President wants the vote because that pledge was an executive order and could not be written into the House's bill and because Speaker Tip O'Neill promised a second vote on an ammended bill after Easter. (On the screen contra leader). Contra leaders who have been part of the Reagan's lobbying campaign in Washington were disappointed.

II. 22

III. CU (no camera movement)

IV. Voice of Arturo Cruz. On screen Arturo Cruz (a US flag as background); on lower screen: Arturo Cruz United Nicaraguan Opposition.

V.

-Cruz

...This constitutes an astounding blow, I hope you understand, to thousands of Nicaraguans that today are confronting overwhelming odds in their struggle for Democracy in our countries.

II. 23

III. CU to MS (camera movement)

IV. Voice of reporter. On screen Sandinista troops in formation in what appears to be a public place in Nicaragua (Managua?). The camera gives a close up of a soldier. Then, moves to show troops in military formation.

V.

-Reporter

White House officials said the delay is a bad signal and give the Sandinistas license to hunt and the President's words were a deliberately harsh a signal to Managua and Moscow.

II. 24

III. CU (no camera movement)

IV. Reporter in front of White House (in gardens). Lower screen: Charles Bierbauer CNN White House.

V.

-Reporter

The President's high visibility lobbying efforts will continue right were he left off. Though, the House's vote

was a significant defeat because the President took such strong stand, still White House officials predict ultimate victory. Charles Bierbauer, CNN, the White House.

I. 4 (1 min 12 sec)

II. 25

III. CU (no camera movement)

IV. Anchorwoman Christ reading the news. Eye contact with the camera. On the upper left corner of screen a Central America map section identifying Nicaragua and with the inscription 'REACTION'

V.

-Anchorwoman

In Managua the Sandinista Government's radio called the House vote a major setback for President Reagan and for the contras but not defeat, CNN Lucia Newman reports from Managua

II. 26

III. CU to MS to CU

IV. Voice of reporter. On the screen CU of a Sandinista leader addressing the public. This is followed by shots of people in a public market in Managua. Then, shots of troop mobilization in Nicaragua, trucks full of soldiers are seen in the road (on the lower screen: Lucia Newman CNN reporting). A map of Nicaragua and Honduras showing the location of Contra troops in the Nicaraguan-Honduras border. Shots of Honduran troops coming down from trucks (these troops were in the Honduras-Nicaragua border expecting possible confrontation). Again, Sandinista's convoys on the road. Finally, shots of the Nicaraguan President giving a speech.

V.

-Reporter

The no vote brought no immediate reaction from Sandinista leaders who privately had anticipated the outcome. There was no outpouring of emotion either from the man in the street who went about his business as usual, but further north, the heat is on (Sandinista troops on the screen), as Sandinista soldiers by the thousands prepare for a possible Contra offensive, from across the Honduras' borders where the Contras are based. Honduras has responded by amassing its troops by the Nicaraguan borders (Honduras troops are shown) and tension is escalating amidst fears that an incident could prop a major confrontation between the two neighboring countries. The Sandinistas said whatever the final outcome of the Contra aid vote they are prepared to keep fighting the Contras, not negotiate with them as President Reagan wants. While Managua (Daniel

Ortega on screen) isn't yet responding to the vote it has made its policy clear, the issue isn't the one-hundred million dollar to the Contras but rather the Administration insistency in destroying them which the government here said is not up to compromise. Lucia Newman, CNN, Managua.

I. 5 (2 min 5 sec)

II. 27

III. CU (no camera movement)

IV. Voice of anchorman. On screen CU of anchorwoman making eye contact with the camera.

V.

-Anchorman

There is a man in Texas, a vietnam veteran, who is waging his own war of source against the Sandinista Government in Nicaragua. This man has sold almost everything he owns to finance his campaign for the Contras. He said that he is not giving up despite of what happens today in the House of Representatives. CNN Frank Seltzer has the story in Fort Worth.

II. 28

III. MS to CU to MS

IV. Voice of reporter. On the screen a man attending phone calls. On the lower screen CNN PRIME NEWS Forth Worth, Texas. A shot of red boxes with the inscription "F.D.N. NICARAGUAN FREEDOM FIGHTERS `With God and Patriotism We will Defeat Communism'".

V.

-Reporter

This is how Garry Bennett spends most of his day on the phone. Bennet is trying to get people to help him help the Contras. While Congress was turning down on Contra aid, Bennett was telling people more needs to be done.

II. 29

III. MS (no camera movement)

IV. Bennett on the phone; on the lower screen: Gary Bennett Texans for a a Free Nicaragua.

V.

-Bennett

...it doesn't matter what the package bill does, we need to keep on doing, they are still hungry.

II. 30

III. MS to CU to MS (Camera movement)

IV. Voice of reporter. On the screen a man with a little girl in his lap and a boy following him. A shot of Bennett

working on the motor of a car; on the lower screen: Aug, 7, 1985.

V.

-Reporter

For the past year and a half Bennett has been giving his time and his money to send food, clothing, and medicine to the people fighting the Sandinista Government troops. He even brought three children back with him, so they may get regular meals and medical treatment (on the screen a man carrying a girl and two boys following him). Most of what Bennett does he does with his own money and it is very little of that. He gave up his fifty-thousand dollars a year job, sold his two corvettes and many other things (on the screen the inscription: August the 7th, 1985) to help pay for his crusade. That means his children sometimes have to do without but his sixteen years old son Gary says he doesn't mind (on the screen sixteen years old Gary)

II. 31

III. CU (no camera movement)

IV. Voice of Bennett's son. CU of Bennet 16 years old son. On the lower screen: Gary Bennett Son.

V.

-Bennett's son

It is really not that important having cars, having houses in different places, helping people that what it is all about.

II. 32

III. CU (no camera movement)

IV. Voice of the reporter. On the screen CU of Bennett.

V.

-Reporter

And Bennett, a Vietnam veteran, says his son is one of the reasons he is working so hard.

II. 33

III. CU (no camera movement)

IV. Voice of Bennett. On the screen CU of Bennett talking to the reporter.

V.

-Bennet

When I can help to feed the Contras and let these people go back in the revolution and take back the revolution as the Sandinista communists stol from them, then I don't have to go down, my son doesn't have to go down. I have three sons and a daughter. I don't want them down there fighting.

II. 34
 III. MS to CU (no camera movement)
 IV. Voice of reporter. On the screen MS of Bennett and the reporter.
 V.
 -Reporter

Bennett had hoped Congress would help the Contras, now he hopes a compromise can be struck but he says everyday debate in aid hurts the Contras' chances.

II. 35
 III. CU (no camera movement)
 IV. Voice of Bennett. On the screen CU of Bennett talking to the reporting.
 V.
 -Bennett

It is something that is not right and it is not right if the US cannot stop communism down there and help our friends. Where would we draw the line at? If you can't help your friends, who you can help?

II. 36
 III. MS to CU
 IV. Voice of reporter. On the screen CU of Bennett. Shot of a young woman preparing a box with medicines. LS of people filling boxes in a big room. CU of a box containing medicines. MS of Bennett and another man closing a box. Finally, a MS of the small hispanic type girl.

V.
 -Reporter

So no matter what the ultimate outcome might be, Bennett and his helpers will expend their time and money to make sure the people of the US help the Contras in Nicaragua. (a picture of the small girl Bennett brought from the Contra's camp)

I. 6 (1 min)
 II. 37
 III. MS (No camera movement)
 IV. Voice of anchorwoman and anchorman. Eye contact with the camera.
 V.
 -Anchorwoman

Now as Americans await tomorrow's vote in the Senate on US aid to the Contras, we want to hear how some of them feel about the still unresolved issue.

-Anchorman

So in several cities around the country today we asked, How do you feel about giving more US aid to the Nicaraguans rebels? Here are some of the answers as America speaks out.

II. 38

III. MS (no camera movement)

IV. Voice of a man. On the screen a young black man in front of a bank. Superimposition of the inscription: How do you feel about giving more aid to the Nicaraguans rebels? On the upper screen: AMERICA SPEAKS OUT.

V.

-Man

Go for, because if the communist take over South America they can venture to come up in here... I agree with President all the way.

II. 39

III. MS (no camera movement)

IV. Voice of a young white woman in the streets of a big city. Superimposition of the same inscription as shot 36.

V.

-Woman

I don't think money would have help them out

II. 40

III. MS (no camera movement)

IV. Voice of a white middle age man on a street of a big city. The same inscription as in shot 36.

V.

-Man

I think he made a pretty convincing case for the fact that it was needed...ahhh but it is like other things that Congress addresses, when they cannot make a decision, they kick it out and do something else. Or don't do anything rather.

II. 41

III. MS (no camera movement)

IV. Voice of a black young woman. Inscription as in shot 36.

V.

-Woman

Put the money in somewhere else in which it can be used, like education.

II. 42
 III. MS (no camera movement)
 IV. Voice of a young white man. Same shot 36's inscription.
 V.
 -Man

Why do we have to support them, we need the money here for other things.

II. 43
 III. MS (no camera movement)
 IV. Voice of older white man. Same shot 36's inscription.
 V.
 -Man

I think that the US has basically a commitment to protect this continent and this area of the world, Nicaragua is part of that.

CNN Evening News

March 25, 1986

2 min 30 sec

About Sandinista Invasion into Honduras

I. 1 (1 min 58 sec)

II. 1

III. CU to MS to LS (no camera movement)

IV. Voice of reporter. On the screen, a middle to close up shot of President-Reagan walking toward the camera in one external hall of the White House. Then, middle shots of soldier (Contras according to text) passing by and going away from the camera in what seems to be a farm house, on the background more soldier sitting on the ground and resting their backs on the front brick wall of the house. Subsequently, a military convoy (Sandinistas according to the text) of several trucks in a road and advancing toward the camera. Finally, a long shot, from an airplane, of a training camp (Contras according to text); several buildings and what appears to be an airplane field.

V.

-Reporter

President Reagan invoked his emergency powers to send 20 million dollars in military assistance to Honduras. President Jose Ascona asked for the help after fifteen-hundred Sandinista troops reportedly crossed the border into Honduras over the weekend. According to Reagan Administration officials, Nicaraguans forces are attacking anti-Sandinistas training camps and medical facilities.

II. 2

III. CU (no camera movement)

IV. Voice of State Department Spokesman (Charles Redman). On the screen close up of Redman reading a report in a State Department's conference room. On the lower part of screen the inscription: CHARLES REDMAN State Department Spokesman.

V.

-Charles Redman

In respond to the arm attacks into sovereign Honduras territory, President Ascona formally requested urgent US military assistance to include assisting in lifting Honduran troops as necessary and other materiale assistance in order to repel this and future Sandinista attacks.

II. 3

III. CU (no camera movement)

IV. Voice of reporter, then Nora Astorga, Nicaraguan Ambassador to the UN. On the screen, Nora Astorga giving declarations to the reporter.

V.

-Reporter

Nora Astorga, Nicaragua's Ambassador to the UN denies the charges.

-Nicaraguan Ambassador

As I said, an outrageous lie on the part of the Reagan Administration that is trying to find the political excuse for...on the first hand, to have the one-hundred million dollars and on the second hand to try to do a direct military intervention against Nicaragua.

II. 4

III. CU to MS (camera movement)

IV. Voice of reporter and Thomas O'Neill as he walks toward the camera coming for a building (the camera follows him). On the lower screen the inscription: THOMAS O'NEILL (D) House Speaker. Then, a middle close up shot of the reporter.

V.

-Reporter

Congressional leaders from both parties supported President Reagan's move, but some opponents of military aid to the Contras say that there is no comparison between the two requests for assistance.

II. 5

III. CU (no camera movement)

IV. Voice of Thomas O'Neill, Speaker of the House. On the screen a close up of Thomas O'Neill declaring outside of Congress. On the lower screen the inscription Rep. THOMAS O'NEILL (D) House Speaker.

V.

-Thomas O'Neill

This is no a similarity at all, we ahh... we hold onto the Rio treaty...under the Rio treaty all of the nations of the hemisphere have agreed that in the event that there is an aggression by one nation to another to go into the country and aid the country in which the aggression is taken place.

II. 6

III. MS to CU (nocamera movement)

IV. Voice of Reporter and White House's Chief of Staff Donald Regan. On the screen a middle to close up shot of Donald Regan together with Senator Dole and others walking toward the camera in the hall of a building. Then, a close up of Donald Regan declaring to reporters. On lower part of screen the inscription: DONALD REGAN White House Chief of

Staff.

V.

-Reporter

But the call for US aid has let to questions about the safety of US personal.

-Donald Regan

If we use our helicopters, yes American pilots will fly them but they will go no where near where the Nicaraguans troops are.

II. 7

III. CU (no camera movement)

IV. Voice reporter. On the screen close up of reporter in front of the US Department of State. On lower screen the inscription: CAROL WIIK CNN State Department.

V.

-Reporter

Administration officials stress that there has been no call for US troops and no plans to invoke the war power act which would require an eventual congressional approval if US forces are put in danger. Carol Wiik CNN the State Department.

I. 2 (32 sec)

II. 8

III. CU (no camera movement)

IV. Voice of Anchorwoman. On the screen a close up of Chris Curle (anchorwoman). On the upper left side of screen a small window showing a picture of soldiers; on the right side of this window a flag of the US and below it the inscription: Contra AID. On lower part of screen the inscription: CHRIS CURLE CNN Evening News.

V.

-Anchorwoman

The Nicaraguan incursion, the largest in six years, comes just two days before the US Senate is to vote on aid to Nicaraguan rebels. President Reagan is asking the Congress for a 100 million dollars to the Contras. The House rejected the request last week but the Republican controlled Senate appears to support the President. House's Speaker Tip O'Neill calls the Nicaraguan invasion of Honduras a tremendous blunder by Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega when O'Neill says it could have altered the outcome of the House vote had it happened last week.

PBS McNeil-Lehner News Hour
 March 17, 1986
 12 min 34 sec
 About House Vote on Contra Aid

I. 1 (1 min 33 sec)

II. 1

III. CU (no camera movement)

IV. Voice of anchorman. On screen close up of anchorman. On upper left screen a small window showing its lower left side the inscription: CONTRA AID; on the lower right side the silhouette of a soldier with a weapon hands up; on the background of small screen dollar signs (\$) filled in with the colors of the US flag.

V.

-Anchorman

White House's spokesman said the response to President Reagan's televised appeal for Contra aid support has been overwhelmingly positive, but House's Speaker O'Neill and other anti-aid Democrats said the majority of their calls were negative about last night's appeal.

II. 2

III. MS to CU (camera movement)

IV. Voice of anchorman. On screen a middle shot of President Reagan and special envoy Philip Habbib sitting side by side in a room at the White House. The camera takes a close up of Mr. Habbib and then the camera moves to show the previous middle shot.

V.

-Anchorman

Mr. Reagan met at the White House this morning with his special Central America's envoy Philip Habbib who reported that there was popular support there for US policy.

II. 3

III. MS to CU (camera movement)

IV. Voice of Mr. Habbib and reporters' voices. On screen middle shot of Mr. Habbib and the President. Then, the camera zooms to provide a close up of Mr. Habib. On middle of screen: Mr. PHILIP HABBIB Special Envoy to Central America. Next, a middle shot of the group of reporters behind a sofa were Mr. Schultz and Mr. Poindexter sit. Subsequently, the camera shows close ups of Mr. Habbib and Mr. Reagan. Finally, a middle shot of Mr. Reagan and Mr. Habbib.

V.

-Mr. Habbib

There is a recent poll we run, a perfectly authentic one which shows the majority of Central Americans first of all condemn the situation inside Nicaragua and, secondly, the majority supports the aid to the Contras.

-Man Voice

And what about the Central American leader. Why aren't any of them backing the Contras?

-Mr. Habbib

I wouldn't say that's necessarily so, they have their reasons as to how they express their positions.

-Woman Voice

So are you saying that they support...

-Mr. Habbib

I am saying that ...

-Woman Voice

All the leaders support...

-Mr. Habbib

I am saying that they are concerned about the situation in Nicaragua, that they have... they are stating their positions quite clearly, that they understand the significance of putting pressure on the Sandinistas in order to bring them to a different approach, political approach.

II. 4

III. CU

IV. Voice of anchorman. On screen close up of anchorman making eye contact with the camera

V.

-Anchorman

Senate majority leader Robert Dole said today the Senate will vote friday or earlier next week, at the latest, on the 100 million dollar Contra aid package. The House votes thursday after ten hours of debate that begins wednesday. Charley...

(later in the Focus section of the PBS McNeil-Lehner News Hours)

I. 2 (3 min 8 sec)

II. 5

III. CU (no camera movement)

IV. Voice of anchorman. On screen close up of anchorman making eye contact with the camera.

V.

-Anchorman

[the President spoke] about the Contra aid debate out of Washington last night. He spoke over the head of Congress to the American people on television, making the pitch for the 100 million dollar in aid to the anti-government guerrillas in Nicaragua. By the end of the week it may be over. The House votes thursday, the Senate on friday or the first of next week. On this monday night of this final week of debate we follow Mr. Reagan out of Washington to see how the issue was playing elsewhere. Our vehicles are newspaper editorials and newspaper editors. First we have excerpts from editorials that have appeared in papers throughout the country as read for our recordings by the editors who wrote them.

II. 6

III. CU (no camera movement)

IV. Voice of editors of different US newspapers. On the screen the text of each editorial identified by its respective newspaper and the editor's name reading the editorial.

V.

-Joe Geshwiler, The Atlanta Constitution.

President Reagan passes the Contras off as the last defense of Nicaragua's threatened neighbors. Yet no one in his administration can name a single Central American Leader who supports his Contra policy. Not a one Day by day the White House's case for its Nicaraguan non-policy grows ever more feeble. Its resort to red-baiting and innuendo only go to show how desperate it is for a prop.

-Don Feder, The Boston Herald

The White House must hang tough...either give the Contras the aid they need, or take responsibility for the demise of freedom in Nicaragua and the spread of marxism to other nations in the Americas.

-Kendra McConnell, Detroit Free Press

The reality is ever more apparent: some Contras, by their own admission, are no more than mercenaries in the pay of the Central Intelligence Agency; support among Nicaraguans for the bloodlust of the Contra program is ebbing; the Contras are doing a big fade; most unbiased experts say that \$100 million in aid even double that, will not help the Contras depose the Sandinista government.

-Tom Dearmore, San Francisco Examiner

We suspect that Nicaraguan jails will be much fuller of people with ideas of free speech and the like; if Americans ever buy the dreamy idea that the Sandinistas, left unbothered, would reform themselves toward democracy.

-B.H. Ackelmier, The Indianapolis Star

The opposition...says that it is the United States and the Contras, not the Sandinistas, who are fomenting unrest. The opposition wants more time for the 'Contadora process' to work and accuses the Administration of rebuffing Sandinista peace initiatives...Contadora has not and is not likely to make one iota of difference in resolving the troubles of Central America. To ask that the process be pursued is, in effect, to settle for the status quo.

-Jim Hampton, The Miami Herald

The simplistic choice between military commitment to the Contras on the one hand and surrender to Soviet expansionism on the other is a fool's choice. The United States can and should prevent the extension of Soviet military power near its border. It should not, however, write a blank check to a disjointed rebel effort that experts agree cannot win a civil war and likely couldn't govern if it did... Preoccupation with the weak Contra option may close off negotiated alternatives and thus make future use of U.S. troops more likely.

I. 3 (7 min 53 sec)

II. 7

III. CU (no camera movement)

IV. Voice of anchorperson. On screen anchorman making eye contact with the camera. Then, close ups of Bob Blandauer (Editor of the Portland Oregonian), of Mary Lawrence (Editor of the Indianapolis News), and of Arthur Wilcox (Editor of the The Charleston News and Courier. Next, the camera goes back to a close up of the anchorman. What follows is a conversation between these editors and the anchorman.

V.

-Anchorman

Now to a mix up among three editors. From Portland, Oregon, Bob Blandauer, editorial page editor of the Portland Oregonian. From Public Station KUET, Tucson, where she happens to be tonight, Mary Lawrence, editorial page writer for the Indianapolis News. And, from Public Station WEITV, Charleston South Carolina, Arthur Wilcox, editor of The Charleston News and Courier.

Mr. Wilcox, did President Reagan make any converts last night on TV?

-Mr. Wilcox

It's hard to say. From my point of view, I think that in the part of the country where we publish our newspaper, people are generally sympathetic with Mr. Reagan's position on this. I hope he made some converts in Washington.

-Anchorperson

You see, when you say that people are generally supportative. But are they supportative in a very strong way. Is it a major issue in Charleston South Carolina.

-Mr. Wilcox

It is not a major issue in the sense that I am getting a lot of letters to the editor and a lot of phone calls. We're like other Americans, we are not terribly aware of Central America or Nicaragua. Our feelings about Soviet incursion into this hemisphere is strong. And I will say that if you take a sample of opinions in my locality, you will find that people will be willing to go to considerable lengths to prevent what Mr. Reagan warned about the creation of another Cuba.

-Anchorman

Bob Landauer, in Portland Oregon. Is it a big deal out there?

-Bob Landauer

Is not as big a deal James as good local planning fight, but the tenure of the mail is indisputably clear. Well over of 90% of the mail that come in play on similar themes and those themes are against the President. The readers and the writers say they believe that the use of US tax payers funds for these aid package amounts to US subsidy of

terrorism, they say that they don't buy the red scare rethoric coming from the Administration and they say that they want any aid going into Central America to build friends not foment discord.

-Anchorman

And that is essentially the position of your newspaper that you just annouciated too. Correct?

-Bob Landauer

That is

-Anchorperson

What did you make of the President speech last night? Did he turn you around? Or do you think that he turned around any of your folks in Portland?

-Mr. Landauer

Well I am sure the President... I feel the President was effective, dramatic, inspiring, and wrong. So he didn't convert me. He probably did convert some people. I would expect the leaders of our countries to be that influential.

-Anchorperson

Mary Lawrence how is it playing in Indianapolis?

-Mary Lawrence

Well it probably didn't change too many people's minds. It probably would have gone a lot further toward doing that if President Reagan had made a better case to support the Contras. He made a very plain, what a miserable regime the Sandinista set up in Nicaragua, but there is a real concern about the people who are leading the Contra revolution. We now what we are fighting against but it is not very clear what we are fighting for.

-Anchorperson

What would you like to heard about the Contra that you haven't heard yet?

-Mary Lawrence

We would like to know who the ones are they are leading. I would like to know better explanations of charges of atrocities on the part of the Contras. What kind of

mechanism could they hope to establish if they were to assume power? What hope do they have of negotiating with the Sandinistas? How do they play with the opposition within Nicaragua?

-Anchorperson

Is it a story that people in Indianapolis seem to care about a lot?

-Mary Lawrence

Well, I think they are concerned with the vote, but it's not causing them to write in to the paper.

-Anchorperson

Mr. Wilcox, the question that Bob Landauer raised about the red scare tactics, I think it was the terms he used about the Reagan administration. What your comment on that? Do you think the President and Pat Buchanan and others have gone too far?

-Mr. Wilcox

No I don't think so. I think ah... the situation is very serious, ah... I think that Mr. Reagan has hurt some feelings and trotted on some toes but I feel that the pain has awoken a few people perhaps to how others see them. No, I don't think he is overdrawing the situation. It's a serious situation.

-Anchorperson

Bob Landauer?

-Bob Landauer

I believe the red scare rhetoric is no longer really playing very well Jim. The...

-Anchorperson

Specifically, what do you call red scare rhetoric?

-Bob Landauer

I believe that the Pat Buchanan's article that you referred to, for example, has the President's Chief Communication aid serving as a stalking horse for the President. So, I personally and our editorial page has put the responsibility for those statements to the President. We

have ..., we make no apology and the US should make no apology for exporting ideas that advance the cost of political liberty, but the President has made no case to my mind that the regime in Nicaragua, which we do regard as a marxist regime, is other than a legitimate regime, a legitimate government. We recognize it, we have seen no convincing evidence that it doesn't represent the current will of the Nicaraguan people and we do believe that political will left to itself, self-determination has an amazing power as both the Philippines and Haiti has shown to work wonders. We should move back and let the Nicaraguan people tender their own business.

-Anchorperson

Do you buy that Mary Lawrence?

-Mary Lawrence

Well, the chance to really move for Democracy was seven years ago when Somoza was knot out of office and the US didn't take the initiave then to move him out and to get Democracy in. I think we should be more concerned right now with containing the regime from exporting revolution and with giving support to the opposition, but I will be very reluctant to support aid to the Contras. I don't think it can do the job.

-Anchorperson

Mr. Wilcox what do you think would happen in Nicaragua if we left it along and let it run its course as Bob Landauer suggests.

-Mr. Wilcox

I think it is absurd to suggest that a marxist regime will reform itself as we would like to see it reform itself. In my opinion, reform will only come when Nicaragua's neighbors united sufficiently to bring enough pressure on the Nicaraguans to haust the Sandinista Government. And what those neighboring nations do depend to a great extend, maybe entirely on what the United States does. The United States can serve as a rallying point for them. Without the United States, there will be no rallying point and no pressure brought on the Sandinistas.

-Anchorperson

Do you share Mary Lawrence's concerns about the conduct of the Contras Mr. Wilcox?

-Mr. Wilcox

Yes I shared her concerns but that I think it is a very difficult thing to balance their bad conduct against the bad conduct of the other side, that's not the issue. As far as the United States is concerned, the issue for the United States is that there is an enemy in its door step and that's what we should be primarily concern with.

-Anchorperson

Orray, Mr. Wilcox in Charleston thank you. Bob Landauer in Portland thank you. And Mary Lawrence of Indianapolis in Tucson thank you. Charley...

PBS McNeil-Lehner News Hour
March 25, 1986
25 min 9 sec
About Sandinista Invasion Into Honduras

I. 1 (1 min 17 sec)

II. 1

III. CU (no camera movement)

IV. Voice of anchorman. On the screen close up of anchorman making eye contact with the camera; on left upper side of screen a window showing a partial map of Central America with the regions corresponding to Nicaragua and Honduras highlighted and identified with their respective names.

V.

-Anchorman

...US helicopters will help Honduras troops into action against Nicaraguan forces. It follows the decision of President Reagan to provide 20 million dollar worth of emergency military assistance to the Hondurans. They asked for the help in repelling what they said was a fifteen-hundred men Nicaraguan invasion force that came to attack bases of the US supported anti-Sandinista Contra guerrillas. Nicaragua has denied everything, a spokesman at the Nicaraguan Embassy in Washington said the incursion charge was a complete fabrication but he said there were constant arm clashes along the border between the two countries because the Contras use Honduran bases for their operations against Nicaragua.

II. 2

III. CU (no camera movement)

IV. Voice of anchorwoman. On the screen close up of anchorwoman making eye contact with the camera.

V.

-Anchorwoman

Top House democrats who last week let the fight against President Reagan's 100 million dollar aid package were highly critical of the Nicaraguan action. Speaker Thomas Tip O'Neil said the Nicaraguan military action was a tremendous blunder and an aggression by a nation into another nation. He was joined in his criticism by House democratic leader Jim Wright who also said the Contra aid issue will be reconsidered by the House. A Senate vote on the Contra aid request is scheduled for thursday.

(later in the Focus section of the PBS McNeil-Lehner News Hour)

I. 2 (5 min 36 sec)

II. 1

III. CU (no camera movement)

IV. Voice of anchorwoman and interviewee (William Beecher, Journalist from the Boston Globe). On the screen close up of anchorwoman and interviewee looking at and talking to each other).

V.

-Anchorwoman

... that country (Honduras) charges that more than fifteen-hundred Nicaraguan troops crossed its borders. Today Honduras appealed to Washington and received in return 20 million dollar in emergency military aid. Nicaragua has continue to deny reports of an invasion. The story broke in Washington yesterday and secret Administration briefing on Capitol Hill only admitted it today that it was any confirmation from the Honduras Government in its capital of Tegucigalpa. Here again to describe this diplomatic maneuvering is William Beecher chief diplomatic correspondent of the Boston Globe. Bill first of all just to put this to rest, is there any doubt whatsoever that this invasion by Nicaraguans into Honduras occurred?

-Mr. Bill (Boston Globe)

Well, Honduras said it occurred, the US said it occurred. Nicaragua denies it. Take your choices now, those are the three major of sources.

-Anchorwoman

But, just base on...

-Mr. Bill

I would assume now that something certainly has occurred, yes.

-Anchorwoman

We seem to be getting more information out of Washington than Honduras about what actually happened. Why is that?

-Mr. Bill

Well, Honduras phases a dilemma here. Over the last four years in which the Contras have been operating from bases in Honduras it has been an open secret but Honduras never

wanted to admit that it is allowing its territory to be so used. There has been cross border fighting, there has been some smaller raids and Honduras by and large has turned its back rather than protesting publicly, rather than reacting militarily. It really would rather that the situation not escalate but now with the significant force of Sandinista troops coming across the border apparently the new government in Honduras has become sufficiently alarmed at this audacity and scope of the operation, unprecedented in side if we can believe these claims, has decided that it has to do something first privately and quietly in appealing to the US for military aid. When the US went public with that, then the Hondurans reluctantly said yes we asked for the aid.

-Anchorwoman

Was... was... the Reagan Administration surprised by what happened?

-Mr. Bill

Surprised is greatly understated. Astonished is perhaps a better characterization. You know... in one respect ah...ah... because after the House of Representatives had initially voted down the Administration request for 27 million dollar in aid to the Contras, and then Daniel Ortega the next day went to Moscow to ask for military aid. That turned around that vote and that... the Congress voted for humanitarian aid. This time shortly after the fact that the House turned down at least initially 100 million dollar request ah... Nicaragua sent forces overtly into Honduras in fairly significant numbers and they have to understand where that will lead. It raises the question of whether Ortega or his schedule works for the CIA. That's not a serious commend but it really is... it is so mal adroit? that in political terms I don't think is too much question now that the Hill will vote for something for the Contras.

-Anchorwoman

Right, Jim Wright reported early saying that he thought they will get that a little bit later. Base on what members of Congress and you have been told, what specifically is going on in this operation?

-Mr. Bill

That is really hard to know with any...ah... certainty from this distance. There is one report that the Nicaraguans had pick up intelligency that the Contras might be planning to come across and stage some operation into Nicaragua and

perhaps attacked to pre-empt that. That's one report unconfirmed. There are others that ... it hopes that before additional money, arms and such come from the United States to Nicaragua... I'm sorry to the Contras that perhaps this was a chance to look... to ahh... to hit them and send them rillyng but a force of fifteen-hundred really would not be sufficient to do that, so it is really quite puzzling.

-Anchorwoman

And the Contra force is about of what side...

-Mr. Bill

They are estimated anywhere from eighteen to twenty-thousand. Those are perhaps exaggerated but those are the estimates.

-Anchorwoman

Where are going this 20 million dollar package? What are they suppose to do? And do you see this in any way involving US troops in the conflict?

-Mr. Bill

The aid package not in of itself, they are talking about air defense missiles, ahhh...armed the helicopters, spare parts, and things of that sort. But at the same time the President authorized General Galdund? the commander of the southern command who went down there today to allow the use of American transport helicopters to move some Honduran units closer to the border. That is not part of the aid package and yet there is always the danger that helicopters moving troops close to where there is fighting could in fact become in danger and there are American crew men in those helicopters.

-Anchorwoman

And there is much concern about that...

-Mr. Bill

There is so much concern, the Administration all day has been saying they won't go anywhere near the fighting but of course there is concern.

-Anchorwoman

Oray, we will come back so don't go away. Jim...

I. 3 (7 min 9 sec)

II. 1

III. CU (no camera movement)

IV. Voices of anchorman and interviewee (Nora Astorga, Nicaraguan Ambassador to the UN). On the screen close ups of the anchorman and the ambassador talking to each other).

V.

-Anchorman

Yes, we get the Nicaraguan view of what is happening now. For Nicaragua as we have heard has officially denied its forces made an incursion into Honduras. A spokesman called it a complete fabrication. Nicaraguan Ambassador to the United Nations is Nora Astorga, she was a member of the Sandinista movement during Nicaragua civil war and was Deputy Foreign Minister from 1981 through 85. Ambassador, A complete fabrication? There are no Nicaraguan troops in Honduras.

-Nicaraguan Ambassador

That's a complete fabrication. There has not been an aggression against the Honduran territory on our part. And I think... we think about that, you know, because it comes at a time when the Reagan Administration is trying to have the funds, the 100 million funds, so they are just fabricating a lot of things to try to convince Congress that we are a real threat to our neighbors. So, we are saying and denying it categorically, we have not made an invasion to the Honduran territory.

-Anchorman

Senator Duranburger? who is chairman of the Senate Intellegency Committee said this afternoon that there were seventeen-hundred Nicaraguan troops, two batallions, one across the border into Honduras ... one of the batallions left but there are still 850, he have been told, from reliable sources that are trapped inside the Honduran border. You are saying that this is totally wrong...

-Ambassador

Yes,...yes...

-Anchorman

There are not Nicaraguans troops in Honduras as we speak.

-Ambassador

That's right...we want to deny it categorically because this is very dangerous you know. It is dangerous because it can lead to another thing. First, they are trying to portray Nicaragua as an aggressive nation toward Honduras and the other Central American countries, then they are trying to help Honduras, they are sending their planes, their military aid, and then the troops, so it could evolve in something very dangerous for the Central American region and, of course, for the United States.

-Anchorman

But if there are no Nicaraguans troops in Honduras, what would be the point in the US claiming there are and sending this 20 million dollars and all of that,... I mean that will be very easily found out. Would it not?

-Ambassador

Yes this is one of the things that really worries us, you know, how the Reagan Administration fabricates so many lies and so easily. After...for example when they said that we were supporting and giving aid to the Brazilians, Uruguayans, and Argentinians, and then these three governments said: what are you talking about, we don't even have guerrilla forces. But the thing stays there and may be this is what President Reagan is trying to do. I mean to get one point in trying to portray Nicaragua as an aggressor, trying to have the political base for an intervention of the US in the Central American region.

-Anchorman

How do you explain then the Honduran Government officially asking the US for 20 million in aid and the Honduran Government also said today that there was no question that... they...they even named the provinces and the towns where your troops are in Honduras. I mean... why would they lie about that.

-Ambassador

I think you should ask yourself that and also the Honduran Government. Because on Friday when the US began to trying to make the story, Honduras said no. On monday, they said no twice again and today in the morning they said it was not true. And now they say there are some ...ahh some Nicaraguan troops inside Honduras. Wouldn't it... this be out of the pressure that the US has been exerting over Honduras and other Central American and Latin American

countries to have a support for its policies and...that's a good question that you should ask the Honduran Government.

-Anchorman

Is your spokesman... your government spokesman in Washington while denying, saying the same thing you are saying that there are no Nicaraguan troops in Honduras. Did say, however, that there are arm clashes all the time between Honduras... between the Contras and Nicaraguan troops along the border. Is this what it might be that there are more Nicaraguan troops involved or are you suggesting that there are no Nicaraguan troops involved in any arm clash along the border that might have gone over into Honduras or whatever.

-Ambassador

Well as you know the Hondurans... in the Honduran territory there have been a lot of bases of the Contra revolutionary, there are now a lot of bases there and there are a lot of Contras that have been chase out of Nicaragua that are now in the Honduran territory. And they have been launching attacks against our territory, so there may have been some clashes along the border in...in our territory. But we are saying that we haven't get into Honduras but there have been some military activity in the border of Nicaragua and Honduras.

-Anchorman

But Nicaraguan troops do not go over onto the Honduran side

-Ambassador

No, we did not. And I think you also can give us a credit. You know we might be everything that the US says we are but at least I don't think that we are that naive to do what the US wants us to do and to give him the opportunity of saying that we are an aggressive nation and that he has been right all this time, you know...

-Anchorman

What about the point that Bill Beecher made and many members of Congress including the Speaker of the House who, as you know, let the fight against aiding the Contras call President Ortega today a blunderer, and that for he be doing something like this at a time when the Senate was about to take up this issue... What's going on... I am trying to figure this out and I am having trouble and a lot

of people are, help me out. What is happening?

-Ambassador

When you said a false thing, a false fact like President Reagan's lie, like he has been saying about Nicaragua, specially this one, then you have reactions of people that believe that in the first place, so what I am trying to tell you now is that it is not true and that the Administration is basing a decision on something that is totally, totally false.

-Anchorman

They should understand what you are saying: the President of the US, the leaders of the Honduran Government, the Chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee and all these other people who said that there are Nicaraguan troops in Honduras are all liars.

-Ambassador

What I am saying is that we have not aggressed Honduras and that I want that to be ...aah strong, you know, we have not made an aggression toward Honduras and we are not going to do it in the future and we have not done it in the past. And if you have reacted to an information that is false, then you might make a mistake because there is not the same the one who invented the lie and the one that react to that lie. So, you have two different things over there, but the thing is that we have not done it and that's for sure and I can...I can deny that very very strongly because that's not true.

-Anchorman

Ambassador, thank you. Charlie...

I. 4 (11 min 7 sec)

II. 1

III. CU to MS (no camera movement)

IV. Voice of anchorwoman and two Congressmen (Rep. D-Thomas Foley and Rep. R-Henry Hyde). On the screen close up and middle shots of the anchorman and the two Congressmen talking to each other.

V.

-Anchorwoman

Now to the view of two Congressmen who have been in the opposite side of the Contra aid issue, Representative Henry Hyde, a senior Republican on the House Foreign affair Committee and a supporter of Contra aid and House Democrat

Thomas Foley an opponent of such aid. First gentlemen a very quit question, after listening to this interview and base on what you have learned over the last few hour, do you have any doubt that this invasion occurred?

-Democrat

I don't

-Republican

I certainly don't

-Anchorwoman

Were you surprised?

-Democrat

Surprise that the invasion took place?

-Anchorwoman

Yes

-Democrat

Yes, it is surprising to me that Nicaragua would violate the borders of Honduras because the expected reaction in the US is exactly what has occurred. There has been a bipartisan support for efforts to assist the Honduran Government in repelling this invasion and there is no doubt that an overwhelming support in the House will be given to that kind of effort if it were required. The President actually acted under section 506 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 and we have done after consultation with the full approval of bipartisan leadership.

-Anchorwoman

So you approve of the 20 million dollars in emergency aid...

-Democrat

Yes, but we have said that with those that propose the Contra aid that we should seek to join with others in the hemisphere in resisting any efforts by Nicaragua to impose threats against its neighbors by overt invasion as in this case or by the use of aggressive offensive weapons or by the establishment of Soviet bases and we stay by our willingness to support this President or any President in

supporting that kind of regional security in the area, but we do not feel on the other hand that is wise posing for the United States to sponsor exactly the opposite kind of thing by sending Contras into Nicaragua with the purpose of overthrowing the government which the best intellegency information is that they cannot do.

-Anchorwoman

We will pursue that point of the reverse process in just a moment but Congressman Hyde do you see any justification... any possible justification for example provocation from the Contras that might have justified this action.

-Republican

Well, I think tha Sandinista communists decided that since they won a vote in Congress, that is to say aid to the Contras military and humanitarian aid was turned down that they have a golden opportunity to go in and finish the Contras if they could, and intimidate Honduras at the same time. Contrary to what the Ambassador said there have been some three-hundred incursions since 1979 by the Nicaraguans, the Sandinista communists into Honduras. This was the biggest one however, fifteen to twenty kilometers inside the border of Honduras and so that is what make this so serious and an incremental increase in the level of conflict.

-Anchorwoman

Well, let me just be clear on part of what you said, I mean as I think I hear what you were saying you are blaming Congressman Foley and his colleges, his Congressional colleges who supported Contra aid for actually encoraging this action.

-Republican

I didn't quite understand the question. Congressmam Foley opposed Contra aid.

-Anchorwoman

I mean uhh... that's right opposing Contra aid as being an encouragement...

-Republican

No, I don't think they encouraged this action, I don't think that anybody predicted that Ortega and whoever does

the thinking for that group would increase the level of conflict following their victory in Congress. I think they would expect them to relax some of the pressure on human rights in there to reward the denial of aid to the Contras. I think this was another unwise, imprudent move by the Sandinistas similar to Mr. Ortega's hurried trip to Moscow after the last time he won a vote.

-Democrat

Let's not go over the central disagreement here. It is the opinion of intelligence agencies that the Sandinistas expected the aid to be forthcoming in future votes in the Congress. It is their impression not that they would not see Contras getting aid but that the Contras will be getting aid. And what Mr. Speaks said today, it was forty-eight hours after the House rejected aid to the Contras that the invasion occurred. That's implying that it was because of the vote against Contra aid last week that this invasion occurred. His position as I understand it was directly refuted by Donald Regan, the Chief of Staff of the White House when the Speaker called him and asked point in blank. He said that the opinion of this Administration that the Sandinistas have invaded Honduras because they have received a signal that the aid is not coming because of the vote last week. So, I don't think we ought to get into that it's simply not true that the Sandinistas believe that they have a free shot in Honduras because aid was rejected, in fact, they believe that aid is coming and Senator Lugar, the republican chairman of the Foreign Affair Committee said this afternoon to a spokesman that he believes it was a result of the Sandinistas expecting aid to come and a pre-emptive attack on that basis.

-Anchorwoman

It is what they are saying...

-Republican

Let me say that it is protest to much Mr. Foley. I don't know what the Sandinistas' motives were nor do you. You are saying that it has nothing to do with the vote ahh...ahh... against the ahh... the vote denying aid to the contras. I am not suggesting that it did, I am just saying that the timing is fortuitous for that scenario. But I think that a very interesting thing that Mr. Foley didn't say initially is that his colleges and the people who think as he does are going to resist a Soviet base on this hemisphere and the use of heavy weapons and that sort of things but omitted to say that any resistance to subversion of El Salvador, of Honduras, and Costa Rica which is the way the

Sandinistas are going, they are not marching across borders except they did over the weekend stupidly but the subversion that is going on is something that Mr. Foley and his people don't seem equip to deal with.

-Democrat

Everybody says that we ought to protect the fragile Democracies in the region: Costa Rica, Honduras, Guatemala, El Salvador. Today there is the position of virtually all the countries in Latin and Central America that we should not support the Contras. We should not do so, including countries like Costa Rica that Mr. Hyde is concerned about in which a newly elected President of that country has said that he does not favor Contra support.

-Republican

You see, what happens is that they say one thing publicly because they are not sure that the Democrats in Congress will let us be down there supporting resistances to the communist in Nicaragua. Honduras has not said publicly they want us to aid the Contras but privately they all say please help keep the pressure on the Sandinistas.

-Anchorwoman

But let me ask you. You have just heard Ambassador Astorga, you know, vehemently denying more than once that there was an invasion. What evidency do you have that an invasion actually took place.

-Democrat

We have the statements of our own intelligence agencies, the statement of the Honduran Government, and whatever report the press is making from the actual country involved. Now is in a remote area of the country, the press may be relying on Honduran Government reports or intelligence's, but let me just say that it would be an enourmous risk, beyond comprehension for the American Government to concoct a lie about an invasion of batallions strentgh, of Nicaraguan forces going into Honduras and then have later on it establish that that was a kind of some monumental joke. I mean no administration in its right mind ...

-Republican

You will see some Sandinista prisoners taken...

-Democrat

Yes we will see some Sandinista prisoners, we don't disagree on that.

-Anchorwoman

Ok. Let me ask you this. You heard Jim Right saying that this was probably going to change the attitude in the House toward Contra aid. That it will be brought back up. What do you think...

-Democrat

We expect that for it to be brought back any way, we are sure...

-Anchorwoman

But what are the chances of it.

-Democrat

Well see, no one knows what the consequences would be of the vote when is taken on the fifteen of April. There will be a vote, there will be probably several alternatives available to members of Congress, they can work their will and make their decisions.

-Anchorwoman

But what's going to be the attitudes of people like you who voted against the aid given this development...

-Democrat

I will tell you my attitude. There is no sound policy for the US to supply a proxy war in Nicaragua. I oppose the invasion of Honduras by Nicaragua and I think that the US should provide necessary assistance to Honduras to resist that, or any other government that is affected that way, but I do not feel that the way to protect the interest of Latin America or the security of the US is to go across the border ourselves by proxy and provide American weapons and American fundings.

-Anchorwoman

We have to go. I assume that you feel the opposite...

-Republican

I couldn't disagree more...

-Anchorwoman

Oray, on that note I am sure this Contra aid question is not going away, we will have you both back. Thank you.

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