POLiTiCAL SUPPORT {N A HAUSA VILLAGE Thesis for the Degree of Ph. D. MICHEGAN STATE UNIVERSTTY RALPH HAROLD FAULKINGHAM 1 '9 7 O 1‘: :‘J-v‘. . .: T, q“ l . 4" fl‘.’ . ‘f: «T. 135 R A R I *? Michigan State i U12. 5 me‘iry illlflLTlflTlflHTl IIHITWTTIWW 31293 00112 4225 This is to certify that the thesis entitled Political Support in a Hausa Village 1 presented by Ralph Faulkingham has been accepted towards fulfillment ‘ of the requirements for 1 Ph. D. . AnthropO1°9Y degree 1n________ I Major profess? r Datemiezfiz’ 0-169 ABSTRACT POLITICAL SUPPORT IN A HAUSA VILLAGE by RALPH HAROLD FAULKINGHAM The thesis is an analysis of political processes in the Hausa village of Tudu, Niger Republic. Through a critical examination of the kinds of support generated and employed by various leaders in their competitions to control the village chiefship, it suggests a conceptual scheme for interpreting such political support processes. The first chapter details the various contexts within which the research and analysis were undertaken. The nature of the author‘s fieldwork and the village location and ecology are noted. This section also contains a lengthy critical review of the literature in political anthrOpology over the past thirty years, as well as an elaboration of the author's processual approach to the analysis of politics. Chapters 2 through 7 convey the historical, social, and cultural milieu within which the political processes occur. Connections to groups outside the community are scrutinized. After a description of village economics, the area's history and residents' world view are treated. This middle section concludes with considerations of both the residential and descent groupings which segment the village and the content of social roles. The final chapter includes a delineation of the villagers' values in which the support form of legitimacy is based. The normative roles Ralph Harold Faulkingham of the village chief are then set forth. Two social dramas depicting historical competitions for the chiefship are treated. The chapter concludes with the analysis of support marshalling processes. POLITICAL SUPPORT IN A HAUSA VILLAGE ‘Ralph.Harold Faulkingham A THESIS Submitted to Michigan State University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY Department of Anthropology 1970 r5- gel}?! To Linda Jonason.Faulkingham who has consistently and lovingly encouraged me in the pursuit of excellence ii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS The fieldwork and writing of the dissertation were greatly aided by the contributions of several dozen peeple to whom these acknowledge- ments can be but feeble recompense. Marc Piault. Guy Nicholas. Jean Rouch, and Edmond and Suzanne Bernus facilitated by obtaining permission to study in the Niger Republic. His excellency Boubou Rama, president of Niger's Assemble'e Nationals and Dioulde' Laya, director of the Centre Nige’rien de Recherche en Sciences Humaines graciously permitted me to conduct fieldwork in their country. In Madaoua Ronald Frazer and Matthew Morrison kindly let my wife and me live with them for four weeks while our house in Tudfi was being erected. Brian Kimmel brought us mail and supplies from Madaoua and kept our spirits high with his friendship. Elvin and Lolita Harbottle. Burt and Ruth Long. Jim and Mary Ver- Lee. and others in Niger also under the aegis of the Sudan Interior Mission extended to us unequivocally their friendship and frequent hospitality. In Tum, my debt to DigB 'dan Dille is beyond repayment, for he risked and underwent censure from his fellows mamr times for the infor- mation he freely gave to me. Xiaka and Abdfi likewise gave liberally of their time to explain events and relationships and never failed to make jokes of my awkwardness in their culture. Virtually all the villagers welcomed us as neighbors and shared their understandings of life with us. Collectively, they have given us our most profound hunan experience. At Michigan State University, Professors Marc J. Swartz. Alfred B. Hudson, and Charles C. Hughes helped me shape rough ideas into a iii research proposal. Professors Iwao Ishino and David M. Smith joined my committee after my fieldwork was complete and contributed immeasure ably to the develoPment of my thesis. While I was writing the disserta- tion, Professor Hughes helped enormously by sharing with me his breadth of schdlarship and sensitivity to the goals of science. His encourage- ments when my enthusiasm flagged and his careful and frequent comments on my draft capies have made this part of my education intellectually exciting. Through the fieldwork and dissertation I have had the rich pleasure of the presence of my wife Linda. who has helped me most in these tandem efforts. iv TABLE OF CONTENTS LIST OF TABLES ................................................ LIST OF FIGURES ................................................ CHAPTER ONE -- INTRODUCTION ................................... 1.1 General goals .......................................... 1.2 Nature of the research ................................. 1.3 The village setting .................................... 1.4 Theoretical orientation 000......0.0.00.0000000000000000 l.4.l Structure and process in political anthrOpology: an ovemew 000.00.00.00..0.0000000.00.000.000000..0 1.“.2 StruCtural-fmctional Views .0......0..0......0.0.0. lgugzgl The first generation eeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee 1.4.2.2 Second generation theorists .................. .4..22a MiCha-el Ge Smith eeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee .lfllv.2.2 DaVid EaSton 0.0.....0.....0.0....00.0. .“.2.2 Aida-n southan eeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee l*0 2.2 Edmmd LeaCh 0.000.000.0000..0000000000 1+. 2. 26 Max Gllleman ..0...0...........0.....00 I‘OCGSSUBJ. PerSPGCtl-VG eeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee Intrw‘uc't'ion 0.00.00.00.0000000000.0.0.0.00... Point of departure: the inadequacy of structural-functional approaches .......... e 030 28' StruCturGS eeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee 2b FunCtj-on 000......00000...0.0.0.0000... 3 03.20 Ideas .I...0..0...00.0.......0.......0. 3 r.) p- 0 .l-‘l-‘w FF i—l 6 won: HHHuHHHH NH HHHHH u. l} .4 one 2d Process eeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee 4 he anBJYSiS Of Process eeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee l} L} .3033 MethOd eeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee 03e 3b units or analysis eeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee .3. 30 Processual conceptual schemes ......... 1.4.4 The processual orientation in this thesis .......... 1.4.3. CHAPTER TWO "" TUDU AND ITS EXTERNAL RELATIONS eeeeeeeeeeeeeeee 2.1 Sta“ arld party .00...........0........000......00000000 2.1.1 The sous-Lréfet .................0...000.0...‘0..... 201.2 The sarkii 0.00..0..00.......00.0..0..00............ PAGE tate institutions which affect Tudfi ................... 61 21 Tax COHGCtions 0.0000.000000000000000000000000.0000 61 02.2 CUSt'oms 00.0.00...0000000000.00000.00.000.0000000000 63 2 3 2 4 N o N . NNNNU) NNNNN Adjudications .0.000..000......0000.00.00.00.0000000 64' ElGCtions 0000......00.0........0.0..000.000..0..0.. 65 til-0m]- institutions Within Tu‘ifi 00000000000000.0000... 66 The Village Chief ooooooooooooooooooooooococoon-coo. 67 The POliceman ococoa-co00.000000000000000.coococo-co 67 The party 08.de coco-cocoa.coco-00000000000000.0000 6? The 3011001 nococo00000000000cocoa-000.000.000.000... 69 N 0 0 O \nxnxnto 0 0 0 sroanaham 2.4 Relations with other villages and ethnic groups ....o... 73 CHAPTER THREE -- VILLAGE ECONOMY o.oooooooooo00.000000000000000 77 3.1 Food ...................................o............... 78 3.2 Occupations ............................................ 83 3.3 Markets, monetary exchanges ............................ 86 3.4 Labor-money exchanges outside the village .............. 86 CHAPTER.F0UR.-_ HISTORY oco0000000000000000000000...00000000000 90 4;1 Local views of beginnings .............................. 90 4.2 History and myths of Goobi'r beyond Tudu ............... 92 4.3 The rule of the Tuareg and the coming of the French .... 95 4.4 Village history ........................................ 98 CHAPTER FIVE -- WORLD VIEW .................................o.. 103 5.1 Notions of the universe ................................ 103 5.2 Spirit beings .......................................... 104 5.3 Notions about the nature of man ........................ 109 5.4 Notions of destiny ..................................... 112 5.4.1 Divination ......................................... 112 5.4.2 Healing ............................................ 114 5.4.3 Afterlife .......................................... 115 CHAPTER SIX -- GROUPINGS BY RESIDENCE AND DESCENT ........... 118 PAGE 0\ o RGSidence groups 0.000.00.00.000.00000...00..0000.000... 118 11 The 'daaki .0....0.000...000......0...00.0000.0..0.. 118 1.2 The gida 0.0....00...00.....0.0.0.0..I...0..0...00.0 119 1.3 The GIDA .00.00.00.00.00000.........0...0.00.00.0000 123 1 4 The ward 0.0.000.0.00.0.0...0.00.00.00.0000000...0.. 123 O\ 0 O\O\N O\O\O\O\I—' Descent groups 0......00...0.0.0.0...0.000.....000...... 124 .201 The clan 00......0000000000000.......0O..0.000...000 125 .202 The Clan segment ......000...0....00....000.0.0.0... 128 CHAPTER SEVEN “' SOCIAL ROLES coo-coococoon-000000000000ooooooo 133 7.1 KinShip r0163 00.0.0.0...0000.0..0.000.0.00.0...0.000.0. 133 7.1.1 Kinsmp teminOIOgy 000.0.0.0.00.00.00.000000000000. 133 7.1.2 The joking. conversation. and avoidance paradigm ... 138 7010201 JOKj-ng ralations coco-co00000000000000.0000... 139 7.1.2.2 Conversation relations ....................... 139 7010203 Avoidance relations ooooooo00000000000000.0000 140 3 The behavior-label discrepancies ................... 141 7 7.2 Marriage r0193 00000000000cocoa-000000.00coco-00.00.0000 1’42 7 3616611ng 3 31301156 onooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooo 143 7020101 EXOgamy and endogamy norms 00.000000000000000. IL“; 70201.2 Cousin marriage 00.000.00.000...oooooooooooooo 1145 .2 The wadding process 0.0.00.000.0000...0.000.000000.0 1u8 2 Qualifications to the wedding process norm ......... 150 POIyW 000.000.000.00.0.....0.0....0...0.0000..000 15L 0 .5 Hmband-wj'fe r0188 ......000000000.00.000.000.00.00. 152 703 Affirm]. relationShj-ps .00....00.0000000000000000000..00. 153 7.1+ Divorce .000......0000..0..0.00.00.000.00...0.0.0.000... 155 705 Patron-Client r0198 ......00000000000000000.0000......00 1% 706 Gift-giVj-ng r0168 0..0...0...0.00..00.......000000000... 159 7.7 Age and sex roles ......0.000.0......0.000.000.000000000 160 Infancy 0....0.0.0.0..00..000......00000.00.00.00.00 161' 7 l 7 2 Child-1100(1- ono.coco-0000.00...announces-0000000000... 163 7 3 we age r0193 oooooooooooooooooooooooo0000000000000 163 0701+ Female age r0168 00.00000000oooooooooooeoooooooooooo 165 7 5 7 6 Old age 0.00000000000000000000000000000000000000000. 166 Death .00....0..0000.00.00.000000000.0.0.0000...0.0. 167 Roles that are a function of time ...................... 168 .801 Days .00000....000.000.00000.0.0.....00..00.0...0... 1% 08.2 Months 0......O00...0.0..000.00...0......00.....0000 169 8 . .3 Years 00.0.0...00......0......0...0.000.00.0.00.0... 169 swam .000...0......0.0.0..0......00000000000000.00... 171 vii , 7 . a m u . a . Q; . I 1 . 4 . . x \ . ‘ . ; I D . J . z . CHAPTER EIGHT -- POLITICAL SUPPORT AND THE CHIEFSHIP .......... 8.1 IntrOdUCtion O..........OCCOOOOOOOIOOOOOO0.000.000.0000. 8.2 Values which the villagers share ....................... 8.2.1 The openrless value 0......00.000.000.00.00.0.0000... 8.2.2 The conservative valm 0.0....OOOOOOOOOOOOIOIIOOOIOO 8.2.3 The resignation value .............................. 02.4 The $01idarity value O00.0.0.0...IOOOOIOOIOOOOIOI... 8. Kaaka's qualifications for office ...................... 8 Villagers' expectations of the chief ................... C .1 Adjlldication .....OCOOOOCOOO.....OOCOOOOOOOOOOIOOOOO 4 .u.2 Taxes .....CCOCOOO0.0000...C......OCOCOOOCIOCOOCCOOO OuOB Guests ...OOOOOOOOOCOOOICO..........CIIOCOOCCIOCOOOO 4 h 0 Dances ......IOOOOIOOOOOOOOO0.00....00.000.00.000... 8. Competitions for the chiefship ......................... The Kaaka‘Naruwa diSPUte oooooooooooooooooooooon...o The Kaalca-Aaluu case OI.OO....OOOOOOOOOOOCOOOOOOOOO. O .l" Analysj's ...0.0.0..........OCOOOOOOOCOOOOOOI.0...... 5 l .502 Anal-3,313 O0.000.000.0000.........OOOOCOOOOOOOOOOOCI. 5 3 5 8- Anal-3,318 Of supports cocoon...cocoon-0000000.cocoon-coco .6.l Kaaka's legitimacy support in Tudfi ................. 8.6.2 Kaaka's power to develop more support .............. 8 3 u 8 8 8 8. 5 8 8 8 8 6 8 8.? conC1USions .....OOOCOOIOI...IO......OOOIOOOOOOOOOOCOOOO LIST OF REFERENCES ...IOOOOIOOOO..........OOOOOIIOIOOOOOO...... APPENDIX 000............0.0.0..........OOOOCOOCIOOOCO00.00.0000 viii PAGE 175 175 176 177 177 177 178 178 181 181 185 186 186 187 192 195 198 199 199 204 208 217 Table Table Table Table Table Table Table Table Table Table Table Table Table Table Table \0 (EV O\U\ C'U N H H O 13 12 13 11+ 15 LIST OF TABLES The Support Continuum Comparison of Tax Censuses 65.223 Performed for 1131111 during 1968 cocooooooo Occupational Specializations Location of Migratory Laborers during 1968-69 . Tuareg Chiefs at Azerori Patient Record of Abdfi during January, 1968 ... Village Clans Natal Residence of Wife Spouse Preferences Patrilateral Parallel Cousin Marriage Census .. Polygymr Female Divorce Census Summary M319 Divorce census SW13, 00000000000000.0000 Census Summary of Client-patron Ties Among Married Men Page Page Page Page Page Page Page Page Page Page Page Page Page Page Page 47 Figure 1 Figure 2 Figure Figure Figure Oxkntu Figure Figure 8 Figure 9 Figure 10 Figure 11 LIST OF FIGURES Climatic Conditions at Madaoua ................ Succession to the Office of Sarkii at md‘aoua ......COCO.........CCOOOOOIOOOOOOOOO Abdfi's Map Of the Earth 00000000000000.0000...- Gida of the Village Chief Kaaka ............... Clan Segments of the Ma'kiiri Clan ............ Terms of Reference for Collaterals and Descendants OI.0.000000000000000.000......l Terms for Patrilateral Relatives .............. Terms for Matrilateral Relatives .............. Terms of Reference for Affines ................ Cognitive Map of Age/Sex Roles ................ Kinship Chart of Rivals for Chiefship ......... Page Page Page Page Page Page Page Page Page Page Page 59 104 120 129 135 136 137 154 161 180 Chapter One Introduction 1.1 General goals. In this thesis I shall describe the culture and social relations which characterized the Hausa village of Tudu when I lived there in 1968 and 1969. This description. contained in Chapters 2 through 7 provides a background for the analysis in Chapter 8 of the political processes centering on the control of the village chiefship. In that. the final chapter. I attempt to show that the dominant form of support undergirding the present chief's control of the chiefship is his legitimacy and that this legitimacy gives him the flexibility to use his power as chief to generate even more support. With this first chapter I set forth for the reader the various contexts in which this study lies: the nature of my field research. the physical setting of the village. and the develOpment historically of the theoretical approach in political anthrOpology which underlies my analysis. In the ensuing chapters I begin with my descriptive focus being very broad in terms of time and space. and gradually I narrow it until in the last chapter I describe the activities of one man. Also I begin by considering relationships of relatively larger social units -- e.g. the village and the nation of Niger. and then conclude by exam- ining the relationships among individuals . 1.2 Nature of the researcgh. Under a grant from the U.S. National Institute of Mental Health ani a fellowship from the U.S. Public Health service. I carried out the research on which this thesis is based for two years beginning in September 1967. For three months in Paris. I 2 studied both the French language and the French ethnographic litera- ture on the Hausa. Before I settled into the village of has, I did some documentary research in Niamey. and continued throughout my stay to refer to government documents in the administrative offices at Madaoua. My wife and I lived in Tudh for the entire fifteen months of field research; there the villagers built us a house at the entrance to the household of the village chief. I collected data on the content and structure of personal and social relations in the manner practiced by three generations of anthropologists. With my informants ' help. I took a number of censuses. recorded the substance and meaning of rituals. and followed disputes in the village moot. However. I consider 11w most valuable data to be extenied cases of schisms between individuals and groups. The villagers ' varying interpretations of events . motives . causes. and implications in such conflicts laid bare cleavages and alle- giances as well as values. ideas. and meanings. The investigation of these contemporary conflicts led to m collecting two “social dramas” (Turner 1957391). which are described in 8.5. 1.3 W. Tudfi (trans. "small hill”) is located at 14 degrees. 0 minutes North latituie. and 5 degrees. 52 minutes East longitude in the Niger Republic. It is 25 kilometres north of the Nigerian border and more than 125 kilometres northeast of Sokoto. The village is situated near a well-traveled road. not far from the admin- istrative center of Madaoua. and fairly close to the Smian Interior Mission hospital at Galmi. Tuifi is in the arrondissement of Madaoua. which in turn forms part of the déQOent of Tahoua. one of seven such units into which the Republic has been administratively segmented. 3 The topography of the area (250-350 metres above sea level) is about evenly divided between broad plateaus and alluvial plains. averaging approximately 100 metres difference in elevation. The inter- face between these two tepographic features shows scars of continuing water erosion; widespread deposits of laterite testify to the effects of leaching. The alluvial valleys are coursed with meandering wadis. Farming is done both on the plateaus and on the plains; however. the most productive, hence valuable. land is near the wadis. The vegetation zone is low latitude steppe. with grass and thorny brush interSpersed occasionally with large trees. The climate may be divided into four seasons. The rainy season or Qéggmnaa lasts normally from June to mid-September. The winds emerge from the southwest in.the morning. By mid-day. the wind has ceased and clouds swell and converge. often forming thunderstorms which travel from east to west. géggg or harvest season follows in September and October. The winds prevail from the northeast and bring higher tem- perature and increasingly lower relative humidity. The harmattan season (lggggi) ensues from November through February. with frequent blustery northeast winds bringing dust and cool. dry air from the Sahara. The wind reverses in the bggggg_or spring wind season during March..April. and.May. when it blows from the southwest. As the tem- perature rises, so does the amount of moisture in the air and the consequent personal discomfort. On average the Madaoua arrondissement receives #7.? cm. of rain per’year. occuring almost entirely in thunderstorms. The onset of rains is not easily predicted. and this uncertainty often leads to hard- ships because of premature or tardy planting. The annual amount of rain Rainfall Temperature 19 2 -20cm 45°C- - -18 40 .a ~16 35 — /\'1“ IM/ -12 30 -— " ' —1o 25 — Ill \\ -. I/ 7.8 I-8 x/I ~..___,,,1\‘ / \\ -6 20 - // \\ l \ ,’ 41L; \ [I] \\‘\ b4 15 '1’ \ taz__. r-Z 10 a 0 l OLLLL .u o lo ' M A M J A s o N D 0 Maximum: Mean Monthly Rainfall Average; eeeeeeeeee Annual Means 47.7cm Minimum: ---------- Figure l Climatic Conditions at Madaoua 5 fluctuates a good deal as well. In 1968, approximately 22 cm. of rain fell. The average temperatures range from a low of 15°C in January to a high of l+000 in April. although I recorded a high of 52°C in April, 1968. On July 15, 1968. the population of Tudfi was 1171. being distri- buted in 122 households. These households form a compact village. whose residential boundaries roughly resemble an 800 metre equilateral triangle. All but 215 of the residents claim Tudfi as their place of birth. Of those who were born elsewhere. most (196) are women who live with their husbands and/ or children. reflecting local preferences for virilocal residence and village exogamy. The community contains a surprising amount of ethnic diversity. Fully one-sixth of the population are Adaraawaaz. tracing their descent to ancestors who lived approximately 100 km to the northwest. Most of the remainder identify themselves as Goobiraawaa. The untrained ob- server can easily differentiate those of Adi'r from those of GBobi'r: the Adaraawaa do not have facial scarification; the Goobiraawaa,«i on the other hand. have six lines on each cheek. sweeping in upward curves from the corners of the mouth towards the ears.3 Five women born out- side Tudfi are identified as Buuzuu (Bella) . the traditional serfs of the Tuareg. One of the school teachers is Togolese; the other two are Nigerien, one a Biahaushiiu from Zinder. the other a Tuareg with one of his wives and their three children from nearby Azerori. In the entire use area, this ethnic diversity is replicated. Six villages are Hausa, displaying nearly the same proportions of Goobiraa— waa ani Adaraawaa as in Tali. Another two villages, ZangBo and Gidan Igidis are occupied by Tuareg and Buuzuu. During the raimr season months of June through September. 1968. about 80 Fulani pastoralists set up a temporary camp in the valley west of Todd. Hausa of the Sokoto dialect is the language of the Adaraawaa and Goobiraawaa. The Fulani use Fulfulbe. and the Tuareg and Buuzuu speak Tamashek. However. Hausa is the language used between individuals who normally Speak differing languages. French is the language of the government and is the sole vehicle for school instruction. Rarely did I hear French spoken outside the schoolhouse, exoept among the school teachers or when someone greeted me for the first time, not knowing that I was comfortable speaking Hausa. .An inventory of the Hausa phonemes used in this thesis is given in the Append1X. The residents of Tudfi.differ somewhat from the Hausa described by Smith (1955. 1959. 1960. 1965). Smith's analyses have focused on social structural features of Urban and Moslem Hausa. Likewise the ethnography of urban and Moslem Maradi written by Mainet and Nicholas (1964) does not typify the sociocultural organization of Tudfi. The partial analyses by Greenberg (1946, l9h7). J. Nicholas (n.d.), and G. Nicholas (1966). H. Raulin.(l962). and N. Echard (1965), on the other hand. suggest striking similarities with organisation and custom in Tudu. These features will be discussed at appropriate junctures in the chapters that follow. 1.4 Theoretical orientation. I turn now to the necessarily lengthy treatment of the stimulating debate that has arisen over the ;past 30 years among those who analyse political phenomena according to the structural relationships they find existing among institutionalised social units. and between them and others who seek to make generalisa- ‘tions from the study of political processes. I do not intend in this 7 discussion to examine all the analytical perspectives5 in political anthropology: my aim is to clarify for the reader my theoretical orientation in the analysis in Chapter 8 of political processes Operat- ing in a particular’Hausa village. 1.4.1 Structure andgprocess ingpolitical anthropology: an over- _v_igg. Professorldeyer Fortes. on reading the proofs of A Handbook 2; ifs—wag; Lg! 99d. gum. in 1937. was stimulated to describe to the author. Isaac Schapera. the strikingly different political and legal institutions of the Tallensi (Fortes 1956:295). That stimulation soon resulted in African Political Systems. a comparative survey of political institutions south of the Sahara. which Fortes and E. E. Evans-Pritchard edited in 1940. It was with this publication ”that political anthro- pological science was established” (Gluckman 196324). Since that date this field of investigation has grown vigorously. with a minimum of agreement on definitions and goals and a great deal of debate over theories and methods. In fact. it would take a clever politician to extract a consensus of opinion from political anthrOpologists on a precise definition of the term ”political anthropology”. For Fortes and.Evans-Pritchard in 1940. this field of inquiry was the synchronic study of "the maintenance or establishment of social order. within a territorial framework. by the organized exercise of coercive authority through the use. or the possibility of use. of physical force" (Radcliffe-Brown 1940:xiv). By the mid-1950's. students of Radcliffe-Brown and the authors of African.Political Szgtems broadened the scope of political anthrOpology to include both examinations of the processes of structural change and the adaption of more useful criteria by which to differentiate and to 8 compare political systems. Yet they maintained their mentors' insistence that politics be confined to institutionalized activities. The publication in 1966 of Political Anthropology by Swartz. Turner. and Tlxlen marked a long-growing disaffection with structuralist formulations. Max Gluckman's studies of the Barotse (1955). Zulu (1940a. 1940b), and the "rituals of rebellion” (1954). and Turner's monograph of the Ndembu (1957) early on pointed the way to a yet more inclusive delineation of political anthrOpology. based on discerning regularities in political events. I now turn to examine in detail the structural and then the processual orientations to the analysis of politics. 1.4.2 Structural-functional views. 1.4.2.1 The first generation. At the opening of hostilities in World War II. barely thirty years ago. Britain was maintaining a global colonial empire with large numbers of govermnent employees administering Whitehall's interests in the colonies. Particularly in colonial Africa. these administrators were joined by a few highly ' trained social anthrOpologists. whose goals were descriptive and not strictly administrative. Eight of these scholars6 contributed articles to a survey of representative African polities . entitled African Political Systems (1940) . The preface by Radcliffe-Brown and intro- duction by Fortes and Evans-Pritchard set forth a methodological frame- work and outlined a typology of the political systems in Africa as a basis for comparative politics. The editors intended their book to be read not only by social anthropologists. but also by those who governed Britain's colonies in Africa (p.l). To date. African Political Systems ch 95 9 remains a benchmark in anthrOpological studies of politics. and many of its contributors have gone on to become prolific writers and highly regarded teachers. Significantly. both the preface and introduction lack an explicit theoretical7 orientation. Radcliffe-Brown has stated elsewhere. however. his and the other contributors' theoretical stance at the time: social systems and their constituent subsystems (g.g. political. kinship. 232;) are analagous to organic systems in form.and function. The elements composing social systems are networks or structures of social institutions whose arrangements of roles and interdependent functioning ensure the group's survival (Radcliffe-Brown 1952:9-14). ‘we may deduce then that such a theory is based on roles. the arrangement of their statuses in institutions, and the nature of interdependence among both statuses and institutions. Those roles. statuses. and institutions of any social system are political. Radcliffe-Brown argues. if they function to maintain or to establish "social order within a territorial framework. by the organized exercise of coercive authority through the use. or the possibility of use. of physical force” (19403xiv). In contrast to their lack of explicit theory formulation. the editors of African Political Systems have set forth a specific method- ology for the student of politics. Studies of as many political systems as possible are to be made; these in turn should be classified according to morphological type. Comparisons among similar types then lead to generalizations about the nature of all political systems. The book itself. in fact. is an example of this methodology. They assert, "It will be noted that the political systems described in this book 10 fall into two main categories: One group. which we refer to as Group A. consists of those societies which have centralized authority. administrative machinery. and judicial institutions--in short. a government--and in which cleavages of wealth. privilege. and status correspond to the distribution of power and authority. ...The other group. which we refer to as Group B. consists of those societies which lack centralized authority. administrative machinery. and constituted judicial institutions-in short. which lack government-~and in which there are no sharp divisions of rank. status. or wealth” (l9h035). The Groups B or stateless societies are further differentiated into those characterized by corporate lineage segments (g.g, the Nuer) and those distinguished by a pure kinship structure in which no segmentation takes place. such as the Bushman or the Kavirondo Bantu societies. Two concepts in particular have emerged in subsequent debate over the theoretical and methodological formulations of Radcliffe—Brown. Fortes. and Evans-Pritchard: force and equilibrium. Radcliffe-Brown used the concept of force as the primary criterion to distinguish the political from other subsystems within a social system. The editors of African.Pglitical Systems have written that ”the most significant characteristic distinguishing the centralized. pyramidal. state-like forms of government of the Ngwato. Bemba. etc.. from the segmentary political systems of the Legali. the Tallensi. and the Nuer is the incidence and function of organized force in the system. In the former group of societies. the principal sanction of a ruler's rights and prerogatives. and of the authority exercised by his subordinate chiefs. is the command of organized force. ...In societies of Group B...stabil- ity is maintained by an equilibrium (of force) at every line of cleavage 0! el par an: is str and anth Sine dent its pclq 11 and every point of divergent interests in the social structure" (Fortes and Evans-Pritchard 1940314). Equilibrium is an explicit requisite for.Radcliffe-Brown's theory of social systems. Like an organism. a social system is constituted of elements whose interdependence presupposes their maintaining a net balance. For Group A societies. this equilibrium exists between the power and authority of the government on the one hand and its obligation and responsibility on the other. In stateless societies. the balance is maintained among a number of segments. spatially juxtaposed and structurally equivalent (Fortes and Evans-Pritchard 19%0311-lb). JWithin this framework of theory. method. and concepts developed and explicated by Radcliffe-Brown. Fortes. and Evans-Pritchard. political anthrOpology formally had its beginning. In the nearly three decades since the publication of African Political S stems. a great many stue dents of politics have taken this book as their theoretical and method- ological bible. The number and quality of their studies demonstrates its significance. 1.h.2.2 Second ggneration theorists. 1.“.2.2a Michael GI Smith was perhaps the first political anthro- pologist in the generation.following the publication of Fortes' and EvanséPritchard's book to develop a specifically political theory to interpret political data. This was first contained in his essay. ”On Segmentary Lineage Systems" (1956). whose implications were also seminal in kinship studies of segmentary lineages. In his later works. 92325;- M _i_n_ m (1960). and ”A Structural Approach to Comparative Politics” (1966). Smith amplifies his original theoretical stance and 12 sets forth a methodology which has received wide and deserving atten- tion. Smith considers a government to be any social institution whose functions are ”the management. direction. and control of the public affairs of a given social group or unit. It'[government is at once a process. a structure. and an idea” (Smith 1960:15). As an analytical concept. government may be viewed as a system composed of two compon- ents: the political and the administrative. The former. Smith says. incorporates the ”decisions...taken about the ways in which public business shall be regulated and carried on and about the modes. functions. and aims of government." This political component "through which government is directed is a system of power relations . involving competition. coalition. compromise. and similar activities" (Smith 1960.15). The critical feature. then. of the political component of government is the concept of power. This represents a shift from Radcliffe-Brown's position that force. poten- tially or actually in use. is the primary characteristic of political relations. ~Smith uses the term ”power” as ”the ability to act effectively on persons or things. to take or secure favourable decisions...” (1960: 18.19). The shift. however. is not so great as the difference in terms suggests. for Smith regards force as the most important sanction in the use of power (1960:31.32). The administrative component of government is the ”authorized processes by which public affairs and activities are organized and conducted" (Smith 1960:16). Where power is characteristic of political relations. authority. that is. ”the right to make a particular decision and to command obedience”. is fundamental to the administrative system (Smith 1960:18). 13 Inevitablyy the author contends. the structure of the political component is segmentary in order to maintain the system of power relations (which. it will be recalled. involve competition between comparable segments). while the administrative aSpect is hierarchical. so as to keep the authority structure intact (1956:49). Yet there is some overlap empirically: to the extent that the administrative com- ponent has a segmentary structure. to that degree administration is political. Conversely. whenever a hierarchical structure characterizes some political activities. this component becomes somewhat administrative. ‘With such an analytical framework in mind. M. G. Smith criticized the typology formulated by Fortes and.EvansePritchard in their ”Intro- duction” to Africaanolitical Systems. Definitive of the stateless (Group B) systems is the lack of an identifiable central political structure which transcends the maximal level of lineage segmenting. Because Evans-Pritchard tended to identify politics with such a centralized organization. he found political behavior in the Group B societies to take place ”cn.the more abstract plane of structural relations between.groups” (EvanséPritchard 1940:26#). rather than.in the groups themselves. 0f such a position Smith argues "that political relations are an aspect of social relations. not a Special mode of behaviour...It follows from this view that political relations or organization occur within groups as well as between them; and that Evans- Pritchard's definition of structural relations and pdlitical system in terms of one another is mistaken. and rules out a large body of relevant data from the study of political organization” (Smith 1956:44). Smith also criticized the very foundation of Fortes' and Evans- Pritchard's typdlogy: that some political systems are basically l4 segmentary. while others are hierarchical. Segmentation. Smith asserts in "0n.Segmentary Lineage Systems". is not unique to political systems of the Group B type: it is endemic to all polities. In segmentary lineage systems. ”political relations obtain within lineages as well as between them. and this holds true down to the lowest level of lineage organization. in so far as competition (which is inherently sgementary) develops over decisions involving policy." Likewise within any lineage segment. administrative activities are performed which are fundamentally hierarchical (Smith l956:51.52). States, or the Group.A societies. are similarly characterized both by segmentary competitions over the use of power and by a hierarchy of authority relations. In.1959. the pelitical scientist. David Easton. wrote of M. G. Smith's theoretical approach: The merits of Smith's analysis are clear. It.demon- strates beyond doubt that without an antecedent and articulate theoretical orientation to the study of primitive political life. comparison.and classification are apt to fall into grievous error. It indicates that to the extent that such a conceptualization exaggerates the structural locus of control over the use of force and sees this as the central political phenomenon. it is bound to neglect other equally if not.more significant variables. No longer will it be possible for students of primitive politics to ignore the power struggles that go on not only in lineage systems but also in all other primitive systems. quite comparable ‘ functionally to the conflicts over pelicy familiar to us in complex societies (pp. 22h-225). Although he argued in his essay. ”On Segmentary Lineage Systems”. against the use of Fortes' and Evans-Pritchard's typology. M. G. Smith fails to come up with criteria with which to distinguish types of political systems. This flaw is corrected in his most important work to date. Government,in Zazzau (1960). Here he elaborates his earlier theoretical formulation in tracing the history of the emirate of Zaria. Nigeria over 150 years. He has studied the structural changes which 15 took place during the Hebe. Fulani. and British-controlled governments. and from his analysis he has hypothesized three "laws of structural change". These laws purport to explain not only the changing inter- dependent relations between the political and administrative components in Zaria government, but also the structural changes endemic to any governmental system. In the ”Law of Differential Resistance." Smith states that "resistance to changes in the form of a system varies directly with their significance for the persistence of the system in its current form" (1960:313). Secondly. the ”Law of Self-Contradiction in Change” states that any attempt to change the form of a system by changes in that system's content is self-defeating. Finally. in the ”Law of Structural Drift.” changes in governmental structure are a function of internally generated political action.(Smith 1960:320). In.chernme t in,§ggggg. Smith gives us a clear statement of how we can differentiate political systems: ”The composition of competing political units varies widely from one society to another. and this variation provides an important reference point in the comparative study of governmental systems...” (p. 27). The use of structural composition as the lever to analytically distinguish types of polities is more thoroughly treated in Smith's most recent theoretical essay. ”A Structural Approach.to Comparative Politics” (1966). Since ”the critical element in government is its public character.” Smith argues. our criterion for making a typology is the composition of the publics of which governments are constituted (1966:115). He adds. ”Both in the analysis of particular systems and in comparative work. we should therefore begin by determining the corporate groups. offices. commis- sions. and categories. and by defining their several prOperties and 16 features” (1966:125). Exactly what sort of classification of politics would result from using such structural criteria is left unsaid. but promised (p. 115) in a future publication. In addition to his contributing a criterion for building a typology to the methodology of political anthrOpology. Smith has performed yeoman scientific service by broadening political analysis from the synchronic plane to the inclusion of the diachronic dimension as well. Of course. Government‘ig Zazzau is a demonstration of this kind of study. Radcliffe- Brown wrote that ”history consists primarily of idiographic enquires" and describes unique events: thus history differs from social anthro- pology which is essentially analytic. comparative. and generalizing (1952:2). Smith clarifies this confusion of theory and method. by pointing out the nomothetic nature of historical analysis from a social anthrop61ogical perSpective: The succession of relatively unique events which con- stitutes an historical sequence has to be examined for structural regularities. Such regularities are quite dis- tinct from others exhibited by temporal cross sectionS. Synchronic regularities isolate units and relations within static systems. Diachronic regularities reveal the out- lines of an order within processes of simultaneous continu- ity and change. The objective of diachronic analysis are to identify this order. to determine its constanqy. and to discover the logic which regulates it. The structure of a diachronic process consists of these elements and their interrelations (1962: 81+) . In fact. the test of any theory of structure and function in a given society rests in the history of that society (Smith 1962:83). M. G. Smith's theoretical and methodological formulations have represented a significant advance in political anthrOpology. He has 'maintained the structural-functional model with its equilibrium assumptions as propounded by Radcliffe-Brown. Likewise the reality which he examines is institutionalized behavior. again a feature of 17 earlier approaches. Yet Smith has added his well-reasoned theory of government as a way to interpret political activities. Perhaps his greatest contribution has been his defense of diachronic analyses of social behavior. 1.4.2.2b .David Easton. In 1959. David Easton crossed an academic bridge and attempted an evaluation of political anthropology to that date. He criticized Radcliffe-Brown's view of politics for being too narrow and M. G. Smith's scheme as too broad to be of much use. Then drawing on his own best known work. Th2 Political System (1953). he set out his own orientation to politics as well as some criteria for distinguishing political systems. Easton challenges Radcliffe-Brown's assertion that what is politi- cal necessarily involves the organized. authoritative use of force or its threat. According to Easton. such a qualification would exclude the Bushmen as a people with politics. Schapera (1956) showed in his study of’Bushmen bands how diSputes were adjudicated by elders: they also made decisions about collective courses of action for the hand. But. Easton asserts. we can hardly call this collection of all older men in a kin group a group organized for sanctioning the use or threat of force. for to include them in such a category would be to make the category meaning- less. And even if this were not so. there is no evidence that they undertake to implement their informal decisions or opinions. taken unanimously. by physical force. At the most. the collective coercion of the band is psycho- logical or moral in character. and to equate moral compul- sion with physical force would be to divest the idea of physical force of all meaning. The data would therefore compel Radcliffe-Brown to place Bushmen outside the cate- gory of those with political systems. and would thus contradict his implicit premise that all societies have some sort of political system (Easton 1959:217). 18 The difficulty with.Radcliffe-Brown's delineation of the political aSpects of society is that he shifts his conceptualization subtly from analytically distinguishing what is political to defining analytical relationships in terms of particular structures. which seem to depend on force or its threat as a political sanction (Easton 19593216). David.Easton trains his analytical sights oan. G. Smith when he criticizes the equilibrium assumptions which underlie Smith's struc- tural model. Smith's study of the changes in Zaria government struc- ture (1960) assumes an equilibrium in the structure; that is. a social system tends to return to a pro-existing point of stability when influenced by its environment. If this should 'fail. the system moves on to a new state of equilibrium. This assumption lleaves the impress sion that the members of a system have only one basic goal as they seek to cope with change or disturbances: namely to re-establish the old point of equilibrium or to move on to some new one. (When in fact) ...People at times may wish to take positive actions to destroy a previous equilibrium or even to achieve some new point of continuing disequilibrium (Easton 1966:1h6). In his discussion of Smith's essay on segmentary lineage systems. Easton.asserts that Smith's analytical isolation of two forms of governmental activities. the administrative and the political is not necessarily erroneous. but so broad conceptually that political anthro- pologists cannot use his schema to differentiate political systems effectively. In the place of Smith's failure to give us precise tools for analysis and comparison. Easton suggests a functional framework for interpreting and classifying political systems. 'What distinguishes a political act from any other kind of social act is ”that it is more or 19 less directly related to the formulation and execution of binding or authoritative decisions for a social system” (Easton 19593226). All political systems. Easton continues. may be functionally characterized by five kinds of activities. First. demands must be formulated and expressed in the form of alternative potential courses of action. Second legislative activities function to weigh these alternative demands and to make decisions in the form of binding rules. Next. administrative processes are necessary to implement the legislated decisions. Fourth. the political system involves adjudicative activ- ities where binding rules are invoked when a breach occurs. Finally. and most important in terms of comparison. are activities aimed at marshalling support. mobilizing Opposition. and developing solidarity (Easton 1959:227-228). Support activities can provide us with the necessary leverage to categorize types of political systems. Easton writes that support attaches to leaders in and out of office. to the administrative organi- zation. to the regime. 2,2, the rules of the game. and even to the viability of the political community. ”The mode of analysis I am suggesting here emphasizes the need to look for variations in political systems that emerge from the way support is generated and mobilized. How do members of a society organize to mobilize their resources. human and material. for or against the occupants of governmental roles and their decisions. the regime. and the community” (Easton.l959:230). Easton's functional definition of politics and his identification of support activities as a tool for comparing systems represent a significant increase in the political anthropologist's power of political analysis. Those Operating with a processual orientation have utilized 20 Easton's concept of support; in fact. the analysis of support activities forms the core of Chapter 8. 1.4.2.2c .Aidan Southall. ‘Where M. G. Smith has called for com- parison and generalization of politics on the basis of structural features. and Easton suggests support as a criterion for differentia- tion. Aidan Southall has constructed his typology using the degree of role differentiation to distinguish types of political organization. Smith's vocabulary of political differentiation includes ”corporation”. ”group”. ”office”. and ”status”. belying his structuralist orientation; Southall's and Easton's use of the concept of role shows their func- tionalist leanings. Southall considers social activities to be political when they are ”concerned with power. ultimately sanctioned by the use of physical force” (19653120). however remote this sanction.may be. Here he is in basic agreement with.Radcliffe-Brown and Smith. Like the theorists. excepting Easton. whose views I have discussed above. Southall views a social system as being in equilibrium. But this equilibrium is a balance of institutionalized social roles. not of structural categories. Further. although unpredictable mutations occur and external factors intrude. equilibrium. he states. will always be restored (19651132). In his research in northwest Uganda. Southall found.that the Alur political organization fits neither the Group A nor the Group B types prOposed by Fortes and EvansaPritchard. for both segmentary lineages and a centralized authority exist within the same society. Their func- tions. however. differ: lineages regulate succession and the perform- ance of rituals. while the central authority controls the use of force 21 both within the society and as a defense against external enemies. The personnel controlling the lineages and the central authorities could not be clearly differentiated. but their functions could be easily de- marcated. Southall proposed in.Alur Society (1953) that a third. intermediate category should be added to Fortes' and Evans-Pritchard's classifica- tion of political systems. This he preposed to call the segmentary state type. which is characterized by the presence of both central authority and segmentary lineages in a single society. and which the Alur represent. (At this point in time. however. Southall did not dis- agree with the structural basis of classification as set forth by the editors of African Political Systems. Yet in 1965. he argued for a typological continuum of polities. with role differentiationa as his lever to distinguish them. At one pole are those types whose political roles are highly specialized and institutionalized. At the other end. Southall places those societies with unspecialized political roles. Along this continuum. he distin- guishes nine separate types of political systems (l9653128.129). Smith's use of the structural categories of office and ”corpora- tion sole” to distinguish political systems is "both too cumbersome and incomplete". according to Southall. ”The matter can be dealt with more adequately in terms of the concept of role differentiation. which is applicable to all the analytic aspects of social action. including both the administrative and the policy varieties of the political aSpect” (19653120). 1.4.2.2d Edmund Leach. The unstated assumptions which underlie the methodological positions of Southall. Smith. and their intellectual 22 forefathers Radcliffe-Brown. Evans-Pritchard. and Fortes met a thor- ough challenge by Edmund Leach in his book Political Systems 2; Highland Burma (1954). Further. he prOposed a method of sociocultural analysis which dispensed with earlier presuppositions about structure and func- tion. Yet. in this book. Leach did not present criteria by which political systems could be classified and compared. Rather than suggest- ing of what.materials the framework of analysis should be composed. as the others had done. he questioned the very blueprint of that framework. Leach explains in the 1965 revision of Political Systems 2; Highland Burma that my own feeling at the time (1954) was that British Social Anthropology has rested too long on a crudely oversimplified set of equilibrium assumptions derived from.the use of organic analogies for the structure of social systems. Even so I recognized the great power of this type of equilibrium analysis and the difficulty of evading it within the general framework of current socio- logical theory. My book was an attempt to find a way out of this dilemma (ix). In his book. Leach characterizes the political processes among the Kachin over the previous 150 years as alternations and accommodations between two contrastive ideals. expressed in the Jinghpaw language as gumsa and gumlao. Gumsa ideas are autocratic. whereas egalitarianism characterizes the we ideal. These ”polar doctrines". Leach states. ”are actually presented to the actor through the medium of conflicting mythologies. any of which.might conveniently serve as a charter for social action” (l9653xiv). The actor makes his choice among these charters. Leach asserts. on the basis of which one enables him to gain access to office or the esteem which will lead to office. Leach recognizes that any attempt to interpret contradictory data in a systematic way involves equilibrium assumptions. and he solves this 23 dilemma by stating that the equilibrium lies not in the data but between the polar categories. gumsa and gumlao. He writes Considered as category structures the gumsa political order and the ggmlgg political order are alike ideal types which necessarily. at all times and in all places. corres- pond rather badly with the empirical facts on the ground. If this be so. it seems reasonable to enquire whether there is any analysable social process which can be attributed to the persistent discrepancy between the facts on the ground and the two polarized structures of ideal categories. The thesis of Chapters VII and VIII is that the outcome, for any one part of the Kachin region. is a long—phase political oscillation, though. since the facts at the end of the cycle are quite different from the facts at the be- ginning of the cycle. the "system on the ground" is not in equilibrium in the same way as the "system of ideas” (19653 xiii). In his Political Systems‘gf_§ighland Burma (1954) and in the later Rethinking.Anthropology (1961). Leach attacks the "prior category assumptions”. particularly equilibrium. which characterizes his pre— decessors' methodology. Concerning the application of theory to a par- ticular society. Leach says In my view. the facts of ethnography and of history can only appgar to be ordered in a systematic way if we impose upon these facts a figment of thought. “We first devise for ourselves a set of verbal categories which are nicely arranged to form an ordered system. and then we fit these facts to the verbal categories. and hey presto the facts are ”seen" to be systematically ordered: But in that case the sygtem is a matter of the relations between concepts and not of relations 'actually existing' within the raw factual data. as Radcliffe-Brown and some of his followers have persistently maintained. The or- ganic analogy is sometimes helpful. but society is‘ggg an organism. nor even a machine (19653xii-xiii). The systematic ordering of the often contradictory and non-repeti- tive ethnographic facts. Leach argues. involves the notion that the social structure of a society is in a state of stable equilibrium (1965! xi). Consequently. ”English social anthropologists...are strongly pre- judiced in favour of societies which show symptoms of "functional 24 integration". "social solidarity". "cultural uniformity". "structural equilibrium". Such societies. which might well be regarded as moribund by historians or political scientists. are commonly looked upon by social anthrOpologists as healthy and ideally fortunate. Societies which diSplay symptoms of faction and internal conflict leading to rapid change are on the other hand suspected of "anemia" and ”pathological decaLY" (195437). Leach insists that the equilibrium lies not "on the ground" in the data themselves. but in the theorists' conceptions about the society he is dealing with. Once social anthrOpologists are aware of this. they can deal with societies which are not assumed to be in stable equili- brium. In comparing socieites. Leach states that Radcliffe-Brown's in- structions to classify societies with reapect to the economic system. the political system. or the kinship system (19403xii) amount to no more of a scientific enterprise than classifying butterflies by color. size. and wing shape. For thegprior arrangement of categories ”creates an initial bias from which it is later extremely difficult to escape" (Leach 196183). Comparison should "take into account the whole range of institutional dimensions with which the anthrOpologist normally has to deal and must start from concrete reality--a local group of peeple --rather than from an abstract reality--such as the concept of lineage or the notion of kinship system" (Leach 19613104). This Leach has done in.Politica1 Systems pf Highland Burma. He finds the data are not systematically ordered. but explains them as expressions of the gumsa/gumlao model. It is at this level of abstrac- tion that the equilibrium exists. and sumh.models. Leach argues. form the basic elements in a valid comparison of societies (19613104). 25 Leach has represented an eclectic position in social anthrOpology. for he challenged a nearly sacred methodology with some bold ideas. His attacks on the "prior category assumptions” and equilibrium pre- suppositions of Radcliffe-Brown’s methodology have been an important contribution to political anthropology. Further he has shown that sociocultural analysis can proceed on a basis other than that of pre- conceived structural-functional categories. Lloyd Fallers' analysis of Basoga politics. appearing two years after Leach's study of the Kachin. is such a study. He considered political institutions as the "rules governing the legitimate use of power" rather than the social units to which such rules apply (195635). 1.4.2.2e Maxégluckman. In concluding this historical review of those theorists whose explanations are structural or functional. I wish to consider the work of Max Gluckman. However. Gluckman's thinking has been changing since his first major publication in 1940. and it defies final classification. I regard Gluckman as an intellectual bridge between.the explanations relying on structure and function and those which focus more on political processes. He has been a prolific writer. and he has taught many outstanding anthropologists at the University of’Manchester. Gluckman's first essay presaged his later concerns. His studies have focused on conflict and lack of.integration. while his contempor- aries were writing about structural integration and functional harmony. In ”Kingdom of the zulu of South.Africa". the initial article in African Pglitical S stems. he outlined the history of the Zulu nation in terms of the ascendency of the great king Shaka. the structure of his and his successors' turbulent kingdoms. and the conquest and rule of Zululand by 26 EurOpeans. Of this account and Of his succeeding treatments of the Zulu nation.(g,g, Rituals Of Rebellion in South-east.Africa. 19543 and "The Frailty in.Authority". 1956b). Gluckman says. "When I dealt with the indigenous political system. my main original contribution to an- thropological theory was my perceiving that in the Zulu.state there could occur rebellions. to replace the king. but not revolutions to destory the kingship itself and to establish some new kind Of political organiza- tion. This crucial point was driven home to me by the history Of the lulu nation" (196338). Rebellions. Gluckman pointed out in "The Frailty in Authority". have the aim Of replacing the occupants of statuses but never change in the arrangement of statuses (which he defines as revolution). Such rebellions. far from destroying the social order. support it. for "they resolve the conflicts which the frailty Of (personal) authority creates". Further a rebellion. whether actual or symbolic. serves to restate and to reinforce the values which underlie the political statuses (Gluckman 1951+! 19563! 195613328) e Gluckman's field and analytic experience over the years has led him to question recently some Of the assumptions Of both his own earlier work and the studies written by his contemporaries. He writes: I now abandon altogether the type Of organic analogy for a social system with which.Radcliffe-Brown worked. and which led me to Speak Of civil war as being necessary tO maintain the system. Social systems are not nearly as integrated as organic systems. and the processes working within them are not as cyclical or repetitive as are those in organic systems. Moreover. social systems are open to the influences Of changes in environment. and to changes due to relations which other social systems. as organic systems are not. I think therefore much more in terms Of series Of social processes. Operating within an ecological setting and the biOpsychical framework Of human life. as well as Of the restriction and action of a technology and a culture. These are never perfectly adjusted; and hence processes do in in. can P01. (511 “”9 H031 27 not cancel themselves out as in organic systems. We have ...tolthink of a field of social action in which we can delineate certain processes set in motion by a series of custmry institutions. which do largely “hang together” . but only largely. and not perfectly. These institutions . and the values and laws they embody. are often independent. discrepant. and oven conflicting (see WC Custom and Con- flict in Africa ani Turner's §_____chism andC ontin ui-fi—_ in a__n Africans ociety). The structure of such a field is much less rigid and self-consistent than it was thought to be by social anthropologists from the 1920's toabout 1950 (1963338 39) This statement demonstrates Gluckman's disaffection not only with organic analogies. but also with static equilibrium assunptions. He regards orgaflsed force as only one criterion for identifying political organization. and instead stresses the importance of ”custom” as a distinctive fora of political support. The frals of political analysis has bosons wider in Glucknan's writings; in 1963 he stated that ”the manner in which men collaborate and compete in uhng...decisions and in striving for power is influenced indeed by their ideas on roles. includim bureaucratic roles. but it is also set by the type of land and seem. the node of production. the type of weapons. means of counnication. These. _a_s_ Lo}; 3 (emphasis mine) networks of social relations. are the framework within which political roles are played...“ (Gluckman 1963348). Comparison and generalisation in political anthrOpology. Gluckman argues. could be pursued much more profitably if the units of caparison were not real social units. but abstract processes or social movements. He writes Van Gennep's concept of rites d__e_ m is the nest strik- ing example of how universally‘ this type of formulation can be applied. std of how fruitful it can be. If we can iso- late novenents of this type. then we can in try one social field attempt to analyse the interaction of different types of movements. as well as co-pare the types of movement in one social field with those in another. (1963383) . 28 Glucknan' s inpact in political anthropology has been great. His stress on the role of ”custom“ in rebellions scene to no to have been very inpcrtant. and I regard his adopting of processual units of analy- sis as very constructive in the building of theory for political anthro- P0100. 1.1».3 W- l.h.3.l Introductig. Glucknan's contributions to the analysis of political conflict. outlined above. have served as a bridge to an approach entirely different free the perspectives of the structural- functionalists. In the first place. Gluckman focused his attention on institutionalised social processes. particularly those where conflict between persons or groups occurred or where ideas and values were con- tradictory. Secondly. his analyses were much broader in terms of the aeeunt of data they would incorporate. He faulted Seith for his narrow structural approach which would put rebellions outside the political min. The manner in which men collaborate and compete in taking these decisions and in striving for power is influ- enced indeed by their ideas on roles . incluiing bureau- cratic roles. but it is also set by the type of lani and econosy. the node of production. the type of weapons. means of conunication. These. as well as networks of social relations. are the franework within which political roles are played; ani if we take them into account. re- bellions cannot be treated nerely as "acts of violence” which disturb the even working of administrative systens. Rebellions are. in Durkheim's sense. a noreal incident of the political processes of these states. andddeserve full analysis (Gluckean 19633148). Finally. Gluckman repuiiated the equilibriu usuptions of his testers. and colleagues. The dimensions of his thinking are most apparent in one of his stulents . Victor Turner. 29 Turner's Schism 9351. M}; 3g 5;; Brian Socieg (1957) takes Gluclnlan's processual approach one rather significant step forward when he focuses on events . whether institutionalised or not. occurring anong the Eds-bu over a period of ties. His methodology has been titled the "exteded case nethed.” ad represents a shift frat the nethod of using data for appropriate illustratienzto an “analysis of a series of 'cases' which consist of a succession of events affecting the sans group or idividuals." Cluck-an believes that "a far nors caplex view of a socialsystuenergesfronthistypeofnonographicnsthcd. adthatit wilLin turn influsme conparative stdies" (1963:“1). The basic con- tradiction of principles in Ndembu culture. natrilinsal descent ad virilocal residence. give rise to tensions which are expressed in fre- quent quarrels between neighbors ad kin. It is tin exteded case history of sons of these quarrels that Turner describes in his book. In a later publication (196+) . Turner criticises the structural categories “witchcraft" and ”sorcery” posed by Middleton ad Winter in their W 93m in M 521.99. (1963). The book is not very useful. he ccnteds. because of the authors' slavish devotion to taxonowy ty structural appearance. Maw of the cases cited could not possibly fit the neat dichotoq suggested by Bvans-Pritchard for the Zande in contrasting witchcraft with sorcery. In its place. Turner suggests the saidesprsad use of the sxteded case nethod. which nabs obvious the wide range of processes (repetitive and non-repetitive actions) clustering around the p_ra_c._ti_gg_s of witchcraft ad sorcery. Such analyses. he argues. will give a what we really aunt: an understanding of what is going on. Persistence with polar categories will not increase our understading and results in useless data bending to fit the - 30 preconceived categories . ”One is forced to the conclusion that a holistic or 'labelling' approach to the definitional problems discussed in this article is likely to sidetrack investigation from the stdy of actual behaviour in a social field context to an obsession with the proper pigeon-holing of beliefs ad practices as either ”witchcraft” or “sorcery” (Turner 1969:32b). The extended case method enables us to focus our analyses directly on what is occuring ”on the groud". rather than in an anthropologistis cerebru. This phenomenological methodology. with its stress on events rather than on structures is the basis for a number of articles appear- ing in Political W (1966) ad in _L9_c_a1_-;_.o_p_i, Politics (1968). The editors explicitly reject analysis ad comparison of politics in exclusively structural or functional categories . Instead they focus our attention on events with the following definition of what is politi- cal: ”Hhersver there are activities relating to the fonulation and implementation of public goals and/ or use of public power. these acti- vitnoad fluteswill be considered political whether or not they occur within or have relevance to any sort of govertmsntal structure” (Swarts 1968a32) . With this processual perspective towards the analysis of political phenomena. the institutionalisation of interpersonal relationships is not a "prior category assmaption" about the natm‘e of political activity. but a matter to be investigated. Rather. what is presmed is that various and sometimes contradictory goals characterise a conunity over space and time. and that individuals or groups compete for the goal of public power. A number of fruitful tupotheses have emerged from the processual view of politics. One is Turner's "political phase developments” 31 another is Swarts' treatment of the nature of competitions for public support (1966:9-26). Both of these I shall discuss below. 1.“.3.2 Point of do ure: the failure of structural-functional amuchss. Before I delineate in detail the major implications of processual analysis for political anthropology. it seems useful to me to present in summary form the weaknesses that processual analysts find with structural-functional approaches to the stdy of political phenom- ena. Two points will be stressed: (1) That exclusive preoccupation with institutionalised forms of political behavior unnecessarily ad arbitrarily limits the scope of our analyses: ad (2) that assmptions of equilibriu prevent us fram incorporating socially destructive events into our hypotheses. I shall. examine. therefore. four kids of emphasis in studies of social relations: structure. function. ideas. ad pro- l.h.3.2a Structures. That processual analysis has not caused an academic revolution is evidenced by the fact that today a ”great deal of work (is) being done by anthropologists ad by political scientists which insists upon limiting investigation to ”authoritative allocations”. with the implicit or explicit view that the main or only suitable topic for research is particular structures. what goes on inside ad among them ad. especially the assignment of authority within them” (Swarts 1968M?) . In his introduction to @949, Political S stems. Radcliffe-Brown called for comparison of political units on the basis of a morphological typology. There is no reason inherit in the data pensived by ethno- graphers to caspare societies on this structural basis. Leach has 32 pointedly rejected comparisons on this basis because the caaparisons are based on ; mgr; category formulations into which data are pigeon- holod. often badly. in example of this activity is the work of M. G. Smith. In his essay. “On Segmentary Lineage Systems“. he outlines a conceptualisation of govermaent (which I have treated in 1.4.2.2a above) which analytically separates political activities from those which are administrative. This segmentation. it seems to no is unwarranted. Swarts argues that in both components . ”neither competition for power nor the use of power is possible without the emport of the public". ad it is because support from a public is necessary both to struggles for power ad to what Smith calls “administration” that I believe it is premature ad perhaps unsound to insist on the separation of the to types of phenomena” (l968b:227.229). Smith himself admits that political action can occur in the admin- istrative sphere. ad 1.1.2.! ms; (l956:'+9). And Surts adds that con- flict (which Smith says takes place in the segmentary structure of the ' political component) ”can occur in the use of power. ...to put the use of power outside the realm of politics ad into a separate sphere called ”administration“...net only seems unwarranted. but also appears unnecessarily to reduce the sise of the universe of political phenomena on insufficient greuds" (l968b:2#0.21&1). Of what value then are Smith's structural categories of politics ad administration. when these cate- gories do not correspod well at all with the data? In a later essay. Smith opts for the structural category ”publics” which. he argues. is an idepodont variable in every polity ad hence useful for cuparison. ”By a public. then. I mean an oduring. presu- ably perpetual group with determinate boundaries ad membership. having fiW."' 33 an internal organisation ad a unitary set of external relations. an exclusive body of common affairs . ad autonov ad procedures adequate to regulate them” (1966:116). But such a unit is rarely found in reality. The history of international politics attests to the unedur- ing ad non-perpetual nature of publics as well as their flexible boundaries ad changing memberships. Since structural units are all susceptible to change either radically or through "the gnawixg of an udying worm” (Smarts l968a:l7). it does not seem useful to build our comparative methodology on such a shifting foundation. By saying this. however. I do not reject the utility of structural concepts. In fact. processual analysis must be able to state M is udergoing a process. a point Cohen has made in his review (1970) of Mimi Pglitics. 1.#.3.2b m. The functional definition of politics which Radcliffe-Brown gave in his introduction to Afrim Political Sntems may be faulted on a number of grounds. He wrote. ”In stdying political organisation. we have to deal with the maintenance or establishment of social order. within a territorial framework. by the organised exercise of coercive authority through the use. or the possibility of use. of plysical force“ (l9llO:xiv). In four aspects of this delineation of the political. I believe Radcliffe-Brown ad others . whose orientation is rooted in this definition. have unnecessarily restricted our analysis of politics. First. I would criticise the functional assuption that limits the consideration of what is political to those elements which involve the “maintenance or establishment of social order". While this is appropri- ate for an ideal model. it nonetheless excludes unnecessarily a large 31. body of factors important in am polity. For example. the Jacobins in 18th century France or the Weathermen in the United States have been important fence in their respective polities . but each bent on the disestablishment of the contemporary social order. The Ndembu. described by Turner (1957) are not a people whose political organisation may be characterised as maintaining or establishing social order. Idividual and group goals for power often result in continuing states of social disequilibrima. Secod. Radcliffe-Brown confines a political organisation to a particularntsrritory. This would exclude a number of societies of the bad or nomadic organisational level. who do not define (their political col-unity on territorial bases. In the village area of Tdt‘: before the entrance of the French in 1903. four separate ethnic ad political allegiances were detectable: Tuareg. Fulani. Goobiraawa. and Adaraawaa. with no distinguishable territorial boudaries separating them. Fw- thor. dyechronic analyses reveal the highly fluctuating nature of territorial boudariee. It would seem more useful (i4. encompassing of more data) in political analyses to drop the territorial requisite ad substitute a concept of public goals which is not restricted by temporal or spatial limitations. Third. political organisation concerns itself with the organised exercise of coercive authority. This reflects Radcliffe- ' s pro- clivity for institutionalised statuses . Two criticisms are relevant at this juncture. On the one had coercion may be and often is exercised in an unorganized ad unauthorised way. Revolutions are so common an occurrence in history that it seems unwarranted to preclude them ad other unauthorised acts of coercion from analytical consideration. 0n 35 the other had a great deal of activity that involves neither coercion nor the organised use of authority goes on in every political system. The competitions for the use of power in virtually all societies have vast implications for the viability of authorised statuses . Therefore they should be included in cm: analysis of the political. Fourth and finally. we should disabuse ourselves of the notion that the me of force or its threat is an idisponsible functional requirement for political organisation. Fortes ad Evans -Pritchard exemplify this point of view with their differentiation of centralised and segsentary polities: ”In our jdgaent. the most significant char- acteristic distinguishing the centralised. pyramidal. state-like fons of govermont of the Ngwato. Bombs. 932.. from the sepentary political systems of the Logoli. the Tallensi. ad the Nusr is the incidence ad function of organised force in the system. In the former group of societies. the principal sanction of a ruler's rights ad prerogatives. ad of the authority exercised by his subordinate chiefs. is the cos-and of organised force. ...In societies of Group B...etability is maintained by an equilibritm: (of force) at every line of cleavage ad every point of divergent interests in the social structure” (l9#0:14). Such a depedence on force as the 932 m m of politics inde- fensibly restricts the field of investigation. Schapera writes that ”organised force is only one of the mechanisms making for orderly life in am camsunity. ad to adopt it as the distinctive criterion of politi- cal organisation would msan neglectixg uduly the various others that help to unite people into self-governing groups” (1956:218). Easton (1959) pointed out that force is only one kid of political support. ad it has severe limitations in ad of itself as a means of support. It 36 seems to me that legitimacy. that is. appeals to "the values held by the individuals formulating. influencing. and being affected by political ends" (Swartz. Turner. and Tuden 1966:18). is a much.more widely used and effective means for securing compliance. In actual practice. no political organization can rely primarily on force. for “force itself rests on inter-personal relationships which in turn rest on something other than force" (Swartz. Turner. and Tuden 1966:15). David Easton is another theorist whose delineation of the function- al dimensions of the political system has led him to focus on institu- tionalized or normative activities. He locates "the Specifically political aspect of any society in its capacity to make and execute binding decisions" (Easton 1959:235). This making and executing bind- ing decisions. according to Easton. involves the five activities out- lined in 1.4.2.2b above: demands. legislation. administration. adjudi- cation. and support. However. his focus on formation and implementation of "binding decisions" obscures other data relevant. I believe. to our understanding of political processes. For example. with his scheme those societies undergoing paroxysms of revolution would have no politics since the capacity to make and execute binding decisions would be absent. I think it would be beneficial to our understanding if we could also focus on the activities which may not be normative. but which can and do change the content of roles and the rules of securing compliance to decisions. Easton's ideas of demand and support activites give us the leverage to analyse both normative and non-institutionalized activities. In fact. Easton does acknowledge that political events can exist outside of institutionalised activity; however. he focuses nearly all his 37 attention on the institutional aspects of politics. I think the distinc- tion is useful. but it should not be a barrier to research. analysis. and comparison. In cuaparing political systems. Easton falls back on the same in- depeuient variable as Southall: role differentiation. This seems to no to be a highly dependent variable. when we consider that the content of political roles can and does change over time. Hughes' analyses of the Eskimo (1960. 1965) and Swarts' essay on the Bena (1964) provide evidence of Just such changes. It appears to me that the processes of support marshalling and manipulation would be more widely useful in comparing political systems. because they are not arbitrarily confined to either institutional or non-institutional behaviors . l.b.§.2c M. Edmund Leach is to be lauied for his devastating criticisms (see l.”.2.2d above) of social anthropologists who assume that equilibrim cadets along the disparate behaviors they observe on the field. Leach contends that the data of the field researcher do not fora into neat categories by themselves. so the analyst is forced to order the data systematically at an abstract level. This Leach does' bythe use ofhis polarcategories. mandgflg. whichpurportto explain how individuals behave over time according to ccnflictim vtholcgies. Such analysis. I believe. assues that these cultural ideas persist indefinitely. Will this scheme be appropriate for the Kachins in 1970 or in 1990'! The danger most obvious to no in Leach's method is that analysis proceeds not from data but from the ideas that the anthropologist dis- tills frolhisdata.9 Itisawopinionthatsawcftheanalyses of Needhaa and “vi-Strauss cencern their ideas about other peoples' ideas. 38 Leach contends that ”comparison must always take into account the ‘ whole range of institutional dimensions with which the anthropologist normally has to deal and must start from concrete reality-q local group of people-~rather than fraa an abstract reality--such as the concept of lineage or the notion of kinship system” (1961le). This argument against ”prior category assumptions" is well taken: unfortun- ately Leach himself is subject to this very criticism when he limits his analysis to ”institutional dimensions". l.h.3.2d m. Glucknan's analyses of social process are sub- Ject to the same basic criticism I have proffered for structural. functional. and ideational orientations above: that the focus of analysis precludes considerations of significant activities which are not institutionalised. His brilliant analyses of ”rituals of rebellion” (195», 1956.. 1956b) tell us a great deal about the functional aspects of conflict: that institutionalised strife in one area of a political system has cdaesive functions at higher and lower levels. The shortcoming is. of course. that conflict is never always repetitive . predictable . and institutionalised. But stuiies of norma- tive structures. functions. ideas. and processes will inevitably focus on behavior which is institutionalised. since that is regarded as the only form of data worthy of recording. 1.10.3.3 The wis of process. Having evaluated and criticised theoretical positions which focus on institutionalised political behavior. ani having outlined in 1.14.3.1 saae of the distinctive features of the processual approach to politics. I believe it will be useful if I spell out in detail the method. units of analysis. ani kinds of generalizations that processual analysts work with. 39 1.4.3.3a figthgd. In contrast to structural-functionalists whose analytical model of the social system has led them to place particular stress on enduring groups and individual roles and their normative in- terconnections. those who claim to analyze process refuse to grant analytical primacy to such units and their interdependence. Instead process analysts seek to examine how these same units (groups and roles) come into being. change form or function. and possibly expire within the matrices of natural environment. individual motivation. and temporal events. It is on the basis of this process. then. rather than on the basis of the actual groups and roles. that those who have adepted this more recent perspective wish to generate scientific statements. The method most characteristic of the processual approach is the extended case method as exemplified in Chapter 8 of this thesis. in Swartz' studies (l96fl. 1966. and 1968c) and in Turner's ethnography (1957). The extended case method "studies the vicissitudes of given. social systems over time in a series of case studies. each of which deals with a major crisis in the selected system or in its parts. Data provided by this method enable us to apprehend not only the structural principles of that system but also processes of various kinds including those of structural change" (Turner 19643314). In his method the one using the processual approach does not reject the model of the structural-functionalist. and in his research he is continually searching for behavioral regularities which he can label institutions. He will seek to demonstrate how these various interlock- ing institutions function or fail to function in a social system. However. he is well aware that the actual units of social systems are subject to change. that their functions may atrOphy and that individuals 40 are often motivated to pursue goals which do not contribute to the maintenance of a particular social order. So he seeks to make general- izations about how these changes take place. The focus of research. therefore. is not an empirical structures a; 93 nor on their function- ing. but on what changes they urdergo in actual events. In analysis. however. the student of process attempts to explain under what conditions certain changes (whether repetitive or non-repetitive) :take place. and in what sequence. In an analytic sense then. those who focus on process seek to erect a structure (by which I mean an arrangement of interdepen- dent variables) which can account for changes in groups and roles over time. Turner has written a methodological charter for processual inquiry: Process theory involves a ”becoming“ as well as a ”being“ vocabulary. admits of plurality. disparity. con- flicts of groups. roles. ideals. and ideas. and since it is concerned with hman beings. considers such variables as ”goal” . ”motivation". "intention" . "rationality” . and "meaning”. Furthermore it lays stress on human biology. on the individual life-cycle. am on public health and pathology. It takes into theoretical account ecological and economic processes both repetitive and changing. It has to estimate the effects on local sub-systems of large- scale political processes in wider systems. These devel- opments have taken place as a result of the increased use of the extended case method (Turner 196M311». l.’+.3.3b Units of gglysis. Implicit in the extended case method is theiidea that processual analysts deal with both repetitive and non- repetitive actions. It seems useful at this juncture to delineate the follcadng units used in the analysis of processes: boundaries of analy- sis. public goals. groups. and competition for power. The bouniaries of policital processes cannot be restricted to territorial boundaries . to structural categories . or to ; priori seg- ments of time. In their place has been proposed the concepts of ”field" I41 and ”arena" as units of analytical space. “A field is defined by the interest an! involvement of the participants in the process being studied. an! its content incltsles the values. meanings. resources. and relationships employed by these participants in that process. The contents ami the organisation. as well as the membership. of the field change over time as new participants become involved; former partici- pants disengage; new resources . rules. meanings. or values are brought to bear or old ones are withdrawn; and relations within the field change” (Starts 1968as9). The field. as defined above. is the focus for the study of pro- cesses; however. given the flexibility in the field and the utility of demarcating the context of the field. Swarts finds it beneficial to delineate the dimensions of this wider analytical space which he calls an arena: It is practical and useful to mark off a social and cultural space arouni those who are directly involved with the field participants but are not themselves directly in- volved in the processes that define the field. The use- fulness of this second space would depend upon its focusing theoretical attention on important problems which might not have been so clear were we to proceed with the concept ”field" alone. The contents of this second space.... the “arena“. depend upon relations with participants in the field. but it incltmles more than the field. In addition to the actors who populate it. the arena also contains the repertory of values. meanings. and resources these actors possess. together with the relationships among themand sith members of the field. Values. meanings. ani resources possessed by the field participants but not em- ployed by them in the processes which constitute the field are also part of the arena (Swarts 196809). In the papers presented in Local-Level Pflitics the authors exploit the utility of these two units in their analyses. In order for events to be considered political. they should in- volve ”the determination an! implementation of public goals and/ or the #2 differential distribution and use of power within the group or groups concerted with the goals being considered“ (Swarts 1968a31). These two dimensions of the definition of politics by a processual analysts remind me particularly of Easton's categories of demand activities and support activities. however. I would maintain that competitions for power in a group actually take place in the determination and implementation of the public sod-I. Beginning with public goals as an attribute of politics has a nmaber of advantages over etructural-functioml definitions of the political. ”If we begin with public goals instead of the structures which strike us (the outside observers) as the basis vehicle for arriv- ing at these goals. we lot more of the world into our investigations by dropping the asemption that we know in advance the basic mechanisms of goal attainment or. at least. where these mechanisms are to be found. Without espousing a nineteenth-century radical positivism. it seems defensible to maintain that a definition of politics based on public goals rather than government or its functional equivalents. will let us look at more of what really happens" (Swarts l968a:3.'+). The groups involved in determining ani implementing public goals can be of varying constituents. They may be the corporate "public” de- lineated by Smith or the ”political amenity” as used by Easton. Or they may be less fcnal. lees enduring. .amimemhsrshipe may increase and decrease over time. Nicholas has isolated the dimensions of such a temporary grouping in his article on factions (1965. 1966). Barnes uses the concept of network to describe another sort of group (1968). In addition to the determination and implementation of publiczgoals. politics for the processual analyst concerns the “differential distribution 43 and use of power within the group or groups concerned with those goals”. Very frequently the control of public power is a goal for groups and/ or individmls . I accept Leach' s characterisation of Kachin individual motivation as perhaps universally applicable. The choice between the figs—a ad gu_m_la_q ideologies is made on the basis of which ideolog will allow the idividual to gain power (Leach 19653vi). Machiavelli's we had the same notions. It is most often the processes occurring in the competitions for power (often juxtaposed on the determining and implementixg of public goals) that provide us with the opportunity for analysis and comparison cross-culturally. 1.15.3.3c ggocessual conceptual schemes. The processes occurring in competitions for power have been the basis for a number of conceptual schemes which may be able to interpret a mac range of political be- havior. Specifically. these are the processes involved in marshalling support and udermining rivals for power goals. Swarte' study of support (Snrts. Turner. ad Tuden 196639-26) conteds that legitimacy is the most widely used ad most flexible form of political support. It seems to me (and to Easton) that a comparative analysis of the pro- cesses of support manipulation (particularly legitimation) would enable us to males some significant general statements about the nature of support processes. It is towed this end that my analysis in Chapter 8 proceeds. Further. Snrts‘ treatment of the m as a field for the implementation of public goals ad as a field for the process of mar- ehalling support in the form of legitimacy (1966) is a frame of analysis that is widely applicable in cooperative studies . 1. second area where students of process have attempted generalisa- tion is in the delineation of the processes which all polities undergo u. in times of social crises. This is Turner's "political phase develop- ment" (Swarts. Turner. ad Tuden 196662-37). It applies equally well to such large scale events as those which plunged Europe into World War I. ad to the village-level events in the competitions for the Kama village chiefehip between Kiaka ad Naruwa described in Chapter 8. 1.4.4 as maul orientation in this dissertation. With the preceding critique of analyses of political behavior as a foudation. I now malne explicit sy own orientation as it relates to the investiga- tion ad analysis of political support in the Hausa village of Tudfi. I fid weelf by ad large in agreement with the criticisms that recent process analysts have leveled against nary structural-functional studies. It seems to me that the exclusive devotion to investigating institutionalised behavior has been unfortunately restrictive . This restriction has led to the assmption that equilibrium is an empirical fact in the interplay of idividual role behaviors ad social groupings . It is ideed wise to broaden our scope of description ad analysis to inclde ad to consider such obvious empirical facts as conflict ad change in societies as well as competitions ad socially disruptive behavior in individuals. With our broadened scope of description. then. we are in a position to interpret both imtitutionalised ad non-institutionalised behaviors . But while we stress the examination of process. we must specify exactly what it is that is udergoing process. which. in turn. leads us back to such structural-functional tactics as the consideration of the coapoei- tion of groups. their functions. and of roles ad role functions (see Chapters 6 ad 7) in addition to treating public goals in politics. 45 Our aimoshould be to analyse behavior as best we can without being ”dual-011181110 (of. finger 1965:18-37). This means we must interpret behaviors by relating them to a particular arrangement of variables (structure) often on many levels (biological. psychological. cultural. ad social). Thus. in ay analysis of political support in Tudi. I have attempted to interpret some of the political processes which I observed there by relating them to the connected concepts of support. legitimacy. and power. I turn now to a treatment of these three terms and their relationships. The authors of the introduction to Political Anthropolgg consider support generally to include "arything that contributes to the formu- lation ad/ or implementation of political eds...” (Swarts. Turner. and Tden 1966le). In this sense them. support may attach to persons. to actions. to statuses. and/or to goals. The authors distinguish several different kids of support. but each may be classed as either based on coercion (force and threats) or rooted in the consensus of a public legitimacy. persuasion. and influence (pp. 9-23). In an analysis. legitimacy appears to be the most important form of support attaching to the village chief ad chiefship in not. By legitimacy. I mean a particular kid of support attaching to a person. action. or status on the basis of a positive commction between the person. action. or status. and the values which the group shares. To adequately explore the place of legitimacy in the process of support marshalling in Todd. then. I have had to make explicit those values widely shared in the village. Values are the commitments of idividuals to pursue ad to support certain directions or kids of action for the group as a whole. In this sense. then. values are modes of normative 46 orientation of action; ad I stress the fact that I regard values as ggneralised commitments and orientations. This is to distinguish values from goals which have specific objectives (after Parsons 1960:17l.l72) . These values are described in 8.2. While I agree with Swarts. Turner. and Tuden in their definition of support. I would view consensus and coercion as the polar extremities of a continuum along which one may plot new support types . rather than regarding them simply as dichotomous categories. Parsons (1963) distin- guishes these two support categories on the basis of the sanctions that are brought to bear to elicit support. Swarts. Turner. and Tden main- tain Parsons ' differentiation criterion. It seems to me that in both support categories. or in w terms. at both ends of the support continu- um. the individuals who reder support are motivated to do so on the basis of their values (after Spiro 1961). Romans treats all authority as being supported entirely by the willingness ofgrpeople to accept that authority (19503418). Whether a person supports a leader because the leader is a ”nice gw“ or because the leader confronts him with the extremely limited alternatives of compliance or death. the person is motivated to support the leader. In the first instance. the support is derived from certain values about what constitutes a ”nice guy": in the latter. the support is based on the fact that the individual values his own life more than any alternative. There are numerous cases . however. where individuals have demonstrated that this value is not universally shared; we call them martyrs. since they valued the alternative to death even less than death itself. This supports by contention that people are motivated according to the values they hold to reder support. People. of course. are not motivated to reder support when the support is forced. By force. I mean support rendered where the individual giv- ing the support has 93 alternative but to comply. This meaning of force differs from conventional usages of force which confuse force with threats (where alternative courses of action--however limited—are available) . To clarify the values I impute to the poles of this support con- tinua. I believe it would be useful to list a few. but by no means all. contrastive characteristics of both the consensual ad the coercive support extremes. Table 1 The Support Continual Characteristics 31; _thg ccmegual 221.0. 1. Huber of alternative courses of support rendering or re- fusal are great. 2. The impetus for rendering support is generalised (E.g. support it because it is ”good”). 3. The kid of support expected to be redered is general- ised. 4. The support desired is gen- eralised in tens of time. 5. Support is voluntarily prof- fered. 6. If the support uderlies a person. this person has a broad range of power uses (I.e. flexibility). 1. 2. 3. Chargcteristics p; _the_ coercion 921-. No alternative to a specific Support. The impetus is specific. The kid of support desired is specified. The support desired is tem- porally specific. Support is requisitioned. The one supported by coercion is limited to a specific use of power (I... inflexibility}. With these uderstadings of the dimensions of the support continuum. it is possible to plot the kinds of support Swarts. Turner. ad Tden #8 mention: legitimacy. influence. persuasion. threats. and force. Legitimacy. as I have used it above. is a generalized form of support one renders to a person. action. goal. or status on the basis of a correSpondance to one's values. In this sense, then. legitimacy may be located at the consensual end of the continuum. Influence appears to me to be conceptually located a bit to the right of legitimacy. for it is initiated by a person desiring support. but is based on an appeal to values and independently of inducements. and activations of commit- ments (Swartz. Turner. and Tuden 1966321). Persuasion as a device used by leaders to obtain support brings about changes in attitudes on the part of the potential supporters. generally on the basis of inducements (Kiaka promised Sa'iidu the title of Sarkin Noomaa if Sa'iidu would help him buy a Kanuri saddle in the gift-giving competitions of the Kiaka-Naruwa diapute--8.5.1). or on the basis of pointing out that failure to render support is a violation of previous commitments (after Swartz. Turner. and Tuden 1966:21). Persuasion then is a device whose goal is to elicit a particular kind of support based on more specific grounds than the values on which influence is based. Thus I would place per— suasion more to the coercion side than influence. according to the characteristics of this pole I outlined above. Threats are used by political leaders to marshall support that is Specific in its content. and specific in Spelling out the consequences for non-support; hence threats are more coercive than is persuasion. Finally, support may be marshalled by using force. which is the quintessence of coercion (spelled out in the right column above). At this point I wish to distinguish two very closely related con— cepts: power and support as they relate to a leader. I define this 1.9 form of power as the leader's capacity to secure compliance to his directives. Support. on the other had. is anything that contributes to the implementation of these public goals which advance the leader's interests. In the analysis of Kiika's support in Tdh (cmpur 3). it appears that Kiaka's support base of legitimacy gives him the power to generate more personal support ad even greater power. In fact. it seems that the more a leader uses his power to develop personal support. the more likely it is that his legitimacy will erode. since his pursuit of per- sonal goals will inevitably contravene social values. On the basis of thoanalysis inChapterS. Iwould alsoaddthataleadermayberestrain— ed from using his consensual power for personal goals by the presence of countervailing factors. For enmple. a person might hesitate to bannish an Opponent if he believes that such autocracy will udermine his legiti- macy to such an extent that another rival could rally enough opposition to his act to depose him. A further conceptual scheme should also be included. one which amounts to a paraphrase of Lord Actnn's dictum that ”power corrupts; absolute power corrupts absolutely.” As a leader obtains consensual support. he secures with it the power to commad compliance to his personal goals. As his legitimacy grows. he is increasingly inclined to use this power. which use erodes his legitimacy ad tempts the leader to resort to more expedient and efficient means to gain compliance - i.e. coercion .. which .m_ay udercut or replace his legitimacy as a support form. These arrangements of the concepts of legitimacy. power. and support appear to me to reflect the political processes in Tudh as I observed ad 50 learned about them. Whether such conceptual schemes are borne out in other polities is a matter for empirical investigations in various societies. I strongly suspect that they will hold true in those soci- eties where legitimacy is the dominant form of political support. And since legitimacy is the positive connection between an entity or process andthevalues people hold. Iwould expecttofidlegitimaoymore fre- quently used in polities where idividual value orientations are more congruent. and less freqmntly found where value orientations are plural- istic. 5. 7. 9. 51 NOTES In my description I have taken the liberty of using pseudonyms where approPriate in order to protect the anonymity of the villagers. The -aawaa suffix to words denoting areas may be translated "peOple of...." Thus Adaraawaa means peeple of Ada'r. the Kanaawaa are the peOple of Kano. Hausaawaa denotes people of Hausaland. etc. See I. Urvoy. l9#2, pp. 39-44 for diagrams of facial scarifications and the people they identify. Baahaushi is the masculine singular form of Hausaawaa (see note 2 above) and implies a Hausa male. Baagoobiri would be a Gdobi'r male and Baa'adari should be translated "male from Adi'r". The evolutionary perspective. which seeks to interpret the growth of increasingly larger and more complex polities in the world, is one such orientation which complements the structuralist and pro- cessual modes of analysis quite nicely. The evolutionists (see Fried 1967, Sahlins 1961. 1968. Sahlins and Service 1960. Service 1966. Steward 1955. White l959.‘Wolf 1966. and Worsley 196# among others) maintain that a polity expands in terms of territory and papulation at the expense of other polities because its ability to exploit energy resources (an aSpect of social organization) is greater than the others'. Using this hypothesis. these investiga- tors have been able to interpret the appearance of increasingly more complex forms of social organization. Maszluckman. I. Schapera. Audrey Richards. K. Oberg. S. F. Nadel. Gunther Wagner. Meyer Fortes. and E. E. Evans—Pritchard. Since the terms ”theory.” "method" and “technique” are used a great deal in the following pages. it will be useful to define them. I regard a theory as a systematic attempt to interpret reality; a method as the application of a theory to a particular body of data; and a technique as the actual procedures of collecting data. Southall defines role differentiation as ”...the number of distinct roles to which separate meaning is attached in any social system and the process whereby the number and definition of roles so dif- ferentiated alter“ (19652121). Leach himself assures us that the Kachins think in terms of the gumsa/gumlao doctrines. Other ideational analysists have not been so careful. Chapter Two Tdh and Its External Relations In the proceeding chapter I set forth the various contexts within which this study has taken place. The present chapter might also be regarded as backgroud for what follows; however. because the institu- tions. groups. activities. ad persons discussed in this section so prefoudly ad continually affect the village residents . I do not believe that such relationships ad effects should be relegated to the category of context. My viewpoint for this discussion and for the following chapter on economics is as a neutral observer. is the thesis advances. the reader will become aware of v perspective becoming more cognitive. as I seek to describe how the villagers act ad explain their own actions. There are three categories of groups outside the village with when the residents have a number of relations: the national goverment ad party. the canton chief (91kg) ad his staff. ad members of other villages ad ethnic groups. After treating the first two categories in terms of themselves . I describe their relationships with Tdh inhab- itants. 2.1 State and ESE!- The Nig‘rien govern-ant has divided the country into seven administrative areas or W. each of which has been further segmented into arrodissements. Tdi is one of approxi- mately 100 villages in the Madauoa arrodissement. which with six other arrodissements font the deent of Tahaoua. Each ddpartement is is administered by a Mile and each arrodissement is supervised by a 52 53 £9.19!!!» Both of these officials are employees of the Ministry of Interior ad are subject to periodic transfer. For the residents of Tudt‘i. the m—gpfigt affects them more than ary other goverment offi- cial; however. Niger's president. M. Hamani Diori. is regarded as the charismatic. though distant. ruler of the country. His person symbol- ises the state's existence ad legitimacy. ad oaths and praise songs1 are spontaneously and individually uttered in his behalf. The goverrment apparatus throughout the nation is paralleled by the structure of Niger's political party. the 2322 Pmssiste Nig‘rien (PPN) . which emerged after World War II as a territorial section of the Rassemblement D‘mocra_t:_igue Africain (RDA) . Since Niger received autonoq within the French community in 1958. the PPR-RDA has struggled with the power of the traditional canton chiefs (in Hausa the canton chief is called mg) ad with the appeal of the Marxist Sawaba (Hausa-freedom) party. The contest with the Sawaba party was virtually over by 1960. ad the PPR-RDA was declared the only legal party in Niger. Today. it continues to be the sole party in the nation. although it has mass appeal ad displays a wide divergeme of political viewpoints. The party's confrontation with the canton chiefs continue. Party cadres at every level of goverxmental organisation expose cases of auto- cratic ad unpatriotic behavior on the part of the chiefs ad engage in a plethora of activities2 to legitimate both party and state in the aide of Nig‘riens. (By legitimacy I mean a positive connection between an entity or process ad the values theigroup holds.) To consolidate the position of the party over the canton chiefs. councils of locally- elected deputies were instituted in each arrodissement beginnim in De- cember. 1962. This council. as a half-party. half-government body. 54 advises the mag-M in his administration ad aide his implementa- tion of governaont policies. tasks which were entirely the province of the 92f; d; @533 before. In Tdt‘: the council is regarded as having attontuated somewhat the legitimacy of the canton chiefs . because the council deputies are believed to be defeders of the peasants when the .s_s_._r_ki_:_i_ extorts high fines in court cases. While no resident of Tudi related a case where . deputy intervened on his behalf. um described the deputy Si'aadi.3 a deputy in the council. in consistently favorable terms. That the innovation of the council has met the party's goals is evidenced in the following conversation I had with an informant. D133. RF: Dig}. is gig (Hausa-importance. bigness. respect) inherited or acquired? Dig}: Let me give you the case of Si'aadh. He was born a peasant. Through hard work ad Allah's favor. he has changed hiuelf. until nowhehas7or8 trucks. 3ofthemtrailertrucks. Be acquired girma in our eyes because he gives people free rides on his trucks. ad when he gives out loans. people pay him back without his prodding. This year he told Diori (Niger's president) that the crops in this area were very poor. Diori asked the sarkii about the crops. ad he replied that they were good. He said that because he did not want to males Diori unhappy. Diori then ordered the sons rsfot to give a report. ad the sous-pr‘fet confined what SI'aadh had told Diori. With the peasants Si'aadfi has gig because of his generosity ad because they know he will be fair with them. since he is a peasant. Regardless of what the sarkii does. he has since he is an aristocrat. When a man goes to see Si'aad he greets him with. ”l gaisheeki" (Hanan-Greet- ings to you-roservod for addressing a fellow peasant). RF: Even though he is a deputy? Digit Yes. he is still greeted that way. But when you approach the sarkii. you say. ”Rinki shi da'di" (Hausa--May your life be long). because he is an aristocrat. The sarkii inherited his gig. whereas Sl'aadi acquired his through the blessing of Allah. RF: Well. tell me what the sarldi does for you. Digit He 1.; Q sarkii. No peasant can live without boirg ruled by a sarkii. A peasant--what does he know? The earkii tells a peasant what to do. If there is a squabble over the vil- lago chiefship. he sottloe it. He collects taxes. Ho settles disputes that are not settled in the villages. 55 RF: 'Which girma is better--S§'aadfi's or the sarkii's? Digs: 'What do you mean. which girma is better? They both have it. If I give you 10 francs and Abdu inherits 10 francs from his father. would you ask me which money is worth more? The sous-prefet and the sarkii affect the villagers more than the deputies in the arrondissement council. and it is to a consideration of their roles that I address myself in 2.1.1 and 2.1.2. Before treating these matters. however. I must make explicit a value that the villagers hold which permeates the relations between rulers of various kinds and the residents of Tudfi. For the villagers. an absolute hierarchical seg- mentation exists between the talakaawaa (peasants) and the sirfiakii (ruler class). The most significant characteristic of this segmentation is that the saraakii have an.g_prigri right to rule the lives of the talakaawaa. The changing control of the GBobi'r Hausa--from the Tuareg conquest through the French occupation (see Chapter 4) and to the nation- al Niger government4--has not diluted this class segmentation. In fact the respective conquerors have all been regarded as siriakii. since they demonstrated their rights to rule. Now the word sariakii generally in- cludes not only rulers. but all who are close to those in authority, as well as all educated peOple. A peasant in the presence of any person of the aristocracy expects to act respectfully and submissively. This is an sepect of the conservative value which I discuss in 8.2.2. This dichotomy of ruler-peasant is replicated widely in Hausa culture. much as it is among the Banyoro (Beattie 1960348). Children regard their elders in the same way that their elders regard the siraakii, and school children treat their teachers as rulers. This segmentation of people into two classes is generally ascriptive. and those who are viewed as rulers (whether they be of the siriakii class or fathers and school teachers) demonstrate the legitimacy of that rulership by securing 56 coapliance to their orders. 2.1.1 The gag-mfg; who administers the arrogigsuent of Madaouaisregardedasthemestpcwerfulmanintheareabythevflhg- are. It is his task to supervise the entire range of governmental pro- grams. To the community residents the proverb. "Even the ants move only on orders of the .s_o_u_s_- r‘fet". is only a slight Imperbole. His duties are to maintain schools . roads . ccmnunications . health programs . to adjudicate inter—village or inter-tribe disputes . and to collect and forward tax monies. These tasks are unierstood well by the peasants; however. in their discussions with me. they stressed his adjuiicative and tax collecting roles. There are a number of other official roles perfonsed by persons employed by the gag-prefecture. The adjoint acts for the 592% when the latter is absent. Insuffi. the present bookkeeper. is also treasurer and clerk to the a_gug-QLGfecture. Zuusuu is the judge who handlesancrininal cases takentohinfrcmvillages. Finally. the arrondissement police enforce compliance with directives emanating from the wfifecture. Enforcement sanctions include threats of imprison- ment. lashings. ani fines. Often in village sects. when defendants fail to pay their fines. they are threatened with hair; sent to the police. While I as living in T111171. this tactic always produced quick payment. as the police have a reputation for physical brutality. 2.1.2 The 35g. The structure of official roles in the 5&1!- pr‘fectm is paralleled by the g_a_1;k_ii_ an! his staff. Since the French conquest of Niger. there has been a steady diminution of the power avdhbletothefl;whenomehemafeudallord.heisnawa lower-level functionary in the national government. although the prestige 3:: co: The chi foe asp: 0.13. low 57 of his title grants him mamr powers not apparent from an examination of his official roles. As a member of Niger's government. the 95511; confirms village chiefs. aids in tax collection. and handles civil dis- putes . His unofficial roles include the collection of tribute (see the Hake-Nam dispute in 8.5) and the perfomance of yearly sacrifices. while the collection of the tax is the legal responsibility of the gpgg-M. the g_s._r_h_i_ sends out his representatives to the villages to cajole both villagers aui chiefs to pay their taxes. Coercion by force is illegal (3,3. it contravenes a state statute); yet it is re- garded by villagers and the Laid; as legitimate (Lg. it has a positive connection to shared values) and is sometimes used--usually a lashing. The .s_a_r__ki_i_ has the responsibility of recomnding successors to village chiefs for appointment by the mm. This role makes him the focus of successor rivalries. since his support is important for an aspirant to the village chiefship (see 8.5). The adjudication of civil cases is also hardled under the gaggi's aegis. His aides hear all cases appealed to his office from villagers . where adjuiication at that level has been unsuccessful. Before Niger's iniependence. the 5% would openly accept gifts from defemiants who sought to influence his decisions. I hesitate to use the word "bribe" in this context. because of its connotation of corruption in English. A gift given in this manner generally assured the defendant that no fine would be assessed against him. The gift itself was quite substantial-min sorcery cases it was consistently lb.000t31‘1-oand amounted to a severe financial setback for the defendant. From an analytic stanipoint. the gift demonstrated support for the g_a_._1;_ki.i_ himself; whereas compliance to an assessed fine would indicate 011 f0: 58 support for the regime. Since independence this procedure has been declared illegal. although I believe it continues in a clandestine way. Formerly. the _sarfli; was the channel for vast amounts of tribute. thegreaterpartofwhichhepassed ontotheemirathibiri. This tribute has diminished greatly. ani no longer does the m transmit a share to his emir. This tribute is collected in the fem of yearly taxes on markets. butchers. ani smithies. Tudh paid a total of 7.800 CFA in 1968 for its 15 smithies. Further. the 9% is expected to honor faning by yearly donning the traditional sheepskin. and by hoeing several rows of millet on his farm. Finally. the gr__ld.i_ is expected to sacrifice a black bull annu- allyonbehalf ofthe non-Muslims inthe cantontopropiatiate the spirit Tasana. The_s__ar_1g.i_hasastafftoaidhiminhis tasks. Theyincludethe 'Dan Gnldiiai who aids the mg; in tax collections. the Hagiaji or executive assistant. a Koranic Judge. and the gagg's personal police force. The rules of succession to the office of 93;; place priority on the eldest livirg brother of the present ”Lg. then the incumbent's sons according to primogeniture. and finally the patrilateral parallel male cousin of tin incumbent. These rules only rank iniividuals' eligibility and in no way actually predetermine succession. The crucial test for succession is the support of the eeir and more recently the colonial and national goverrnents. Historically. the French installed Dan. as Laid; in 1903. His younger brother mam succeeded him in 1917. In 1928 Tawieye's eldest son Muusaa became __sarfli_;_ and after he died six years later. his next youmer brother Misha-min became .s___arld.i___ of la fa ch Him ibl. “01111 363;) E I DElle 1903-1916 Tavfiaye 1917-1926 Jibt‘x l959~present Muusaa 1928-1934 Mfiuhamin 1936- 1957 Figure 2 Succession to the Office of Sgkii at Madaoua (Carter 19663164). ham Hausa in the arrondissement regard the removal of Mfmhemnzm all his replacement by Jibfi as illegitimate. In fact. people talkedofMiuhamminas thoughhewere stillg_a_r_k_i_.i__inl968. and they referred to Jib?! as the puppet of the French. In Tudfi Jibu is respected because he has the backing of Niger's governnent and because of his office. Mduhammin. on the other hand. is revered in song and legend. The crux of the illegitimacy of Jibu's status rests on three factors: Muuhammin was deposed without consultation with the village chiefs (see the conservative value in 8.2.2). Second. Mfiuhammin's removal was in violation of a long-standing principle of the parallel rulerships of mg and m- fet: no interference in succession matters in the other's domain. These two reasons would have rendered aw successor to Ma‘zuhammin illegitimate. Thirdly. Jibu was low down in the rank of possible successors. The office should have gone to one of Mt‘mhamlin's younger brothers or sons before Jibx‘: would have been elig- ible. Jibfi's actual ascension to the office was lengthy. By custom. the nomin‘ travels to each village in the canton to exchange gifts with the respective chiefs in order to confirm his succession and their support. Previous nominee had been selected by the emir and had won confimation oasil shoul both migh succe mug 60 easily from the village chiefs. I believe this confirmation custom should be viewed as reinforcing ad reaffirming the villagers‘ support both for the one nominating the sarkii ad for the authority code in general. since there is virtually no doubt that the nomid would asst-e the office of sarkii. J ibu took one year in his exchanging of gifts . ad he became acquainted with all the village chiefs. In one enter- taining ad enlightening conversation with lasdunfin ad Digé. two of ny neighbors in Tdh. I learned of contrasting local. attitdes toward J ibh's succession. Their discussion. which follows. highlights the values of resignation. solidarity. ad conservation described in 8.2. lasinin: Before a new sarkii is put in. there is always a space of time when cadidates go aroud ad give out gifts to the village chiefs-nusually a belt of calico. If the village chiefs . representing the peasants . approve of one particular cadidate. then he is put in. You see. the peasants are the ones who put in the village chiefs: then the chiefs say when they want for sarki_____i_. \ at: Tell me about the installation of Jibu. Digit Si'aadh. the deputy in Madaoua. said that Jibfi would be sarkii. He did this after examining the heirs of Tawiaye ad Dall'e. haul-3n: But this appointment was provisional. Jibfi had to go aroud ad win the approval of the village chiefs. RF: Since Sa 'aadu had chosen J ibi. was it not obligatory for the chiefs to agree on J ibd? batman: Not at all.... Dig}: Nonsense! lash-3n: ....Jibt‘: took a whole year after Muuhamman was removed. . Hewentfromvillagetovillagegivingoutgifte. In the end all the chiefs said they approved of Jibu and he was installed. RF: Did they choose J ibu‘! lasinin: Yes. the asants did. Dag3 (gngrily): laeuman. the choice was between J ibfi ad whom? lasuuaan: The choice was to approve or to disapprove him. Digh . The choice was made by Si'aadi. He put Jib?! in. not us. do you hear? lasfuman: Jibu never would be sarki____i_ if we did not approve him. Dig} But we had no choice— to choose another. lash-3n (defensively): If Jibu were no good. we would net approve . him. So Sa'aadu would have selected someone else to see if we approved him or not. ga tic set 01‘ Yea Var Catt 61 Digd: Stupid: The powers of selection are Sa'aadfi's: we have only to approve his choice. Badman: No. he could choose a thousand ad we would refuse every onetillhecomestotheonewewant. Dig‘: And when have we ever disapproved of the nomin‘ for La;- kii? Minimum: laughing): Never: But peasants should agree with _ the choices of their rulers. It is obligatory. Dig}: That's true. 2.2 State institutions which affect Tdi. Having treated the or- ganisation of governmental agencies which are important to the village residents. I turn now to a consideration of the various ways these agencies influeme the lives of village inhabitants. In this section. I treat four specific institutions of village-government interaction: tax collection. customs. adjudication of disputes. ad elections. 2.2.1 Tax collections. More than any other governaental institu- tion tax collection affects the Hausa of Tudh. it every turn in my re- search. whenever I quissed people on population. livestock. farming. or kinship. I was accused of abetting tax registrars with my probing «so great is the fear of tense. In 1968. each adult (person over 12 years) was requiredtylawtopayaheadtaxofl300 CPA.“ Also people were taxed for their animals: camel. #75011; horse. lI'SOCF'A: cow or bull. 280CFA; donkey. 1550131: goat or lamb. 80CFA. Table 2 Comparison of Tax Censuses Tax Reggter at Madaoua g: Cegus Date 5 September 1968 15 July 1968 Taxable adults 3&3 7 SI. Total population 584 11141 Goats ad sheep 686 931 Cattle 125 152 Donkeys 42 133 Horses 31 76 Camels 9 3 9! in m6e “tr 62 Tax rates have risen over 300% since idepedence. while per capita annual income in Niger has not increased significantly over its 1960 level of 10.0000FA. The ratio of tax to income appears to have becase oppressive: however. not all adults nor their animals are enrolled on the tax register. A comparison of my census ad the tax register demon- strates this disparity. For the tax year which ran from 7 October 1968 to 6 October 1969. the m-pr‘fecture calculated that the residents of Tdd owed 560.510 CFA in taxes . This is an average of nearly 1+6OOCFA for each of the village's 122 households . If everyone were properly enrolled on the tax register. the average household tax for this period would have been 9400 cm. ’ The tax collecting responsibilities belong to the chief at the village level. The 33$ occasionally has sent his subordinates to Tudi to encourage payment. often by making an example of a tax delinquent who is lashed severly in public. In the village. the chief Kiaka has come to regard tax collection as a horrendous burden. It puts both of his censtitmncies at contradictory purposes: the government expects him to enroll all adults on the tax register ad to collect the tax promptly: the villagers. on the other had. ezqaect him to enroll as few adults ad animals as he can: further. they desire to pay their taxes at the latest possible moment. Kiaka while he often appears greatly worried about the contradictory tax demands placed on his status as chief. has nonetheless managed to meet the villagers' demands. while to the 339;. he presents himself as struggling against his stubborn villagers. ad thereby partially fulfills the flu expectation. Kiaka has used this particular circumstance g1 tn hr. of 1.346.; . 63 to maintain his considerable political support. a topic I detail in 8.“.2. Parenthetically. I am surprised that the villagers do not believe the _s_a_£_lg._i_ is aware of the discrepancy between papulation ad tax register. My Judicious inquiries in Madaoua about Jibfi tend to support the villa- gers‘ belief. However. I strongly suspect that the _sir_l_d._i. does know of the gap. but fids himself in circumstances similar to the village chiefs: he must try to meet the contradictory expectations of both super- and subordinate constituencies: the village chiefs and the _s__o_u_s_-pr6fecture. And the response of the government has been simply to raise taxes. 2.2.2 Cmtoms. Customs agents have angered nmeerous villagers with their over-sealous attempts to tax the illicit border trade between Niger ad Nigeria. In one case which I obtained and substantiated. customs agents confiscated two sheep ad a goat from villagers who were returning from the Bil'ke market near Madaoua. The agents reasoned that themenhadboughttheanimals inNigeriaadhadfailedtopaycustoms duties: the punishment was seizure. Later. on the dg of the confisca- tion. the douaniers sold these same animals ad retained the proceeds themselves. I would estimate such seizures are rather infrequent. per- haps once a month. along the much travelled road from Bil'ke. The response of the villagers to these seizures was characteristic resigna- tion (see 8.2.3). When I asked the victims of the seizure described above if they could appeal. their response was that the douaniers had given gifts to efficials workim for the gag-m ad for the 2r__kii_ ad that am complaint would be construed as a defamation of a govern- ment official's character. a punishable offense. The customs agents have no legitimacy for the residents of Tall. not because of the tyranm of their confiscation-1380:» must expect some tyranxy from rulers"--. but pr at pr 80: des be . one Hit} 6+ because the agents make visiting ad trading with friends ad relatives across the border in Nigeria difficult. 2.2.3 Adjudications. Disputes. ad civil ad criminal cases are adjudicated by a number of arrodissement specialists. if they are un- resolved at the village level. The overwhelming majority of cases are settled however. in the villages. 0f 67 cases I recorded in Tudh during aw residence then. only two were appealed to courts in Madaoua. For disputes between residents of different villages. where a moot convened by the tee village chiefs fails to agree on a settlement. the police in Madaoua are the first level of appeal. There. threats of lashing. im- prisonment. or fines are used. However. if the disputants are still un- able to agree on a settlement. their case goes to the 3213-31223. whose prestige of office ccmmads rapid agreement of all disputes. The Legg- 2r_s_g_s_§ has the further responsibility of settling disputes between people belonging to different ethnic groups. In one such case. some Hausa near Tedd complained that Fulani cattle had destroyed a large section of their millet fields. The Fulani canplained that the Hausa had circumscribed their waterhole with millet fields ad thus the destruction was inevitable . The gag-m ruled that a right-of-way be established to the water hole. ad that the Fulani compensate with one cow the farmer who lost the most millet. Both groups were unhappy with the jdgment. but complied with its demands. In the villages. the distinction between civil ad criminal cases is not relevant until a case fails adjdication at the village level. The Hausa distinguish g_h_i_ri_ disputes to be settled. from shiari'i. cases where a Muslim or national law has been violated. When cases of marriage. divorce. adultery. sorcery. ad farm boudaries are unsettled (1' ft of had “'2‘ its: 65 at a village moot. they are sent to the magistrate at the gglgii's head- quarters. The magistrate. often with a panel of Muslim ad non-Muslim advisers. hears cases of appeal ad renders judgments. There is no appeal on such civil cases from the magistrate. In criminal cases. usually involving murder. assault. theft. ad paternity disputes. the police coduct an investigation ad may recom- med a trial in the arrodissement court. known as Zuushu's court. after the name of the presiding judge. By law. all criminal cases should be handled by the police ad the federal courts. In fact. the majority of such cases are quietly settled at the village level. In general. whether the case be a matter of gh_1_r_i_ or shiari'i' the principals are highly motivated to settle their differences locally. There a moot of their elders ad peers examines charge ad countercharge ad salons witnesses. Only when both principals agree does the moot recomed that the chief(s) fine them according to their respective guilt (the meet is treated in detail in 8.4.1). This procedure is much preferred to either the Napoleonic Code operating in the government (i._e_. Zuusfru's) court or the Koranic law of the magistrate's court. A further iducement to local settlement is that fines escalate precipi- tously as one goes from village moot to the Madaoua courts. 2.2.4 Elections. Another institution which affects Tudd is the periodic elections. On 22 March. 1968. local balloting in the election of deputies to the arrodissement council took place. I observed the balloting. ad from nary inquiries learned that the procedures followed had been exactly those of preview: elections. In the mornirg the adjoint arrived with votixg lists. ballots. envelopes. ad a ballot box. These items be placed in the station-house and drummers were smoned to ab ‘1) th; cm on in "ID “1 exp; degc the. lrfl‘ 66 assemble the people of the vallyy's villages. When.150-200 men.had gathered. the adjoint told them that they would be voting for the scum! cil members on that day; this was their opportunity to support their siriakii. After the adjoint sped off in his Land Hover. the local school director began to read each name aloud from the voter list. As each.name was called off. the school director's assistant passed a ballot with the names of the deputies who had been selected by the party to another’man.who inserted each slip into an envelope. sealed it and deposited it in a padlocked ballot box. None of the men whose names were called entered the stationphouse or otherwise indicated awareness that his name had been.mentioned. .Rather there was general chatter about the new chauffeur the adjoint had and the change in wind direction. After two hours. (11 of the approximately 1.100 names had been.read. and the voting had been completed. The adjoint returned at noon. thanked the assembly for their participation. and drove off with the ballot box.to Madaoua. The party slate was elected unanimously in the entire ggggndissement. My questions about local ideas of elections elicited the following information: the slate was chosen by the siriakii in Madaoua: this was their right: it is the duty of the peasants to support their rulers (an example of the conservative and solidarity values). The party merely facilitated by the ritual of balloting an expression of peasant.1oyal support for the siriakii. On.ana1ysis. this event further exemplifies the ruler—peasant dichotomy I outlined above. 2.3 National institutions within 11.3%. In addition to the above- described institutions of village-state interaction. there are within the village itself two governmentally sanctioned statuses (the chiefship and the police) and three groups instituted from outside the community st: st; 101 an: ODE ins you sele He a ing eSco the 67 (the two party cadres and the school). As might be eXpected these in- stitutions are interpreted quite differently from village and party or state parapectives. 2.3.1 The village chief. The state views the village chief as the lowest level civil servant. He is exPected to eXpedite tax collection and settle diaputes and civil cases. The state pays the village chief one per cent of the tax he collects; however. this commission is not paid if tax.payments are tardy. The present chief Kiaka last collected his rebate in 1959. the year before the tardiness qualification was instituted. 2.3.2 The policeman. In 1964. the Jeunesse Nationale (the party's youth movement) assembled many of Tudu's young men and asked them to select one of their number to be the local gendarm . The village's best wrestler Allisan was chosen. He was given a beret and shirt as uniform. He assists both the national government and the village chief in summon- ing defendants. plaintiffs. and witnesses to moots and trials. and escorts defendants to Madaoua. For his services.Allasin is not paid by the government; however. Kaaka gives him approximately 25% of the fines he collects in village moots. 2.3.3 The party cadres. Four years before the PPN-RDA instituted the governmental role of policeman in Tudu. it had initiated two groups to counterbalance any chiefly tendencies toward autocracy in the village. These groups are known as the 'Yan Kombitee (Hausa-comité members) and the 'Yan.klmita'r (local section of the Jeunesse Nationals). The 'Zgg Kombitee are Iisaa. Aaluu. and Kammai who were selected by the villagers at a party-called assembly. Their appointed tasks were to preside at 68 moots when Kiaka was absent and to guarantee that Kiaka adjudicated fairly. 0n am issue when the three were unanimous. the chief was obligated to comply. Their sanction was their right to rpport any prevarication on the chief's part to the party headquarters in Madaoua. However the three appointees are all classificatory sons of the chief. and regard aw crit- icism of their father as inconsonant with their roles as his sons. The '33 K3mbit3e have been counpletely inactive since their selection. Marv people are completely unaware of the M's existence. The '_I_a_n llmiti'r are five young men each elected from the village's five wards. Like the membership of the '95 K3mbit3e. the five youths are classificatory sons of the village chief. Their official task is to investigate the testimony of disputants in meets or trials and to present evidence to the '23.}; KombitSe. They have never done this . The five also act as the local representatives of the party. In late 1968 after only a few volunteers had turned out to repair the track between Tudh and DutsB. the 'Y_a_n filmitfi'r were asked to muster all the youth of the village to expedite the work. Every young man in the village turned out. One of the five explained to me that after he threatened to report these un- willing to work as unfaithful to the party. all of his ward's youth de- parted to the track. It is feared that one who is accused in Madaoua of not liking the party will be fined 1+.OOCFA and be whipped. although I found no evidence that this has ever occurred to villagers in Tudt‘i. It is clear that the goals of imtituting these two groups have been circmvented by the election of men who are sons of the village chief. They regard their obligation to support their father to be greater than their loyalty to the more distant and abstract rules of party and laws of state (the solidarity value—see 8.2.“). In fact. their selection was not engineered by the chief nor by the party representatives. Mary of ch' e1: J an Schoj Tm} from 69 those attending the selection reported to me that the villagers were . asked to nominate several of their own people for the posts. after which the eight would be elected to the respective two groups. All the people were well aware of this bald attempt to emasculate the position of their chief. and consequently only classificatory sons were nominated. By electing the chief's sons. the villagers met the requirements of the party representatives and insured the groups' impotence. 2.3.1!» The school. It appears that the village school has begun to affect the villagers. aai I enq>ect its impact to increase in the future. The village is the site where the valley's first school was built. in 1950. In 1966. this mud structure was supplemented by the construction of a cinder block and steel school house. When I arrived in Tali in January 1968. there were two classes. each containing three grades: at the beginning of the 1968-69 school year. a third teacher was added. The new school director Amen taught the most senior grade. Abdou Ala taught the fourth and fifth grades. while Jean Asim‘ instructed the lower three grades. Before June 1969 none of the students had gone on to secondary school in Madaoua. On that date. however. all 12 of the sixth graders passed their enmens 513 premier _dgggg and were given scholarships to further education in Madaoua. Some 70 students from Tudh attended the school during the 1968-69 year. along with 28 pupils from other villages in the area. Some of the villagers regard the schooling as a distinctly good innovation. simply because with an education their children could become employed in a high-paying Job and could support their parents and other kinsmen. The three school teachers were evidence to both pxmils and their parents of the desirability of an education. Each is well—dressed, (n CC av ha 8.“ ch: 7O conversant in French (a highly respected ability). well paid. and sup- porting a number of dependants in their distant natal villages. Maw of the villagers accept the introduction of western-style education. although most are not consciously aware of the implications of such education for profound culture change. The nature of the positive attitudes toward the school is illustrated in the following case. . Abdt‘i came to me with his somlgadi. a student. after school one day in December 1968. Agadi's head displayed a large swelling. Abdh was enraged as he described to me that Arman the school director had struck lgadi for not reciting his lessons properly. The blow was delivered with such force that kgadi lost consciousness. Abdh proffered the reasonable observation that Agadi would not be motivated to learn with the burden of fear that Amman might strike him again for failure. So great was Abdh's concern for his son's high motivation to do well in school that he contemplated aloud taking a complaint to the 223.11.113.23- Later in the day. Kiaka reported that he would not support Abdi's com- plaint. When I asked. “Don't you think Abdh has a case. since lgadi became unconscious.” the chief replied that Abdh knew his son did poorly in school. but sought to blame the instructors; Amen was in the right. To my question W7". Kiaka responded. ”Because lgadi was faking un- consciousness. Do you not know the nature of children? He wanted to avenge Amman's striking him by pretending that Amman hurt him badly. He hoped his father's complaint would cause Amman to be transferred out of Tudh. when the Egg-grit}; put the school here in the first place. we saw that the school would be a good chance for all of us. because our children would become French. get good jobs arwl support us with all . _ ' 'un'rn T1“ Ye 15 So ”0 it. The rat for farm of a of t.‘ “at that. 71 their money. Then we would not have to worry any longer about famines. Ies. lgadi was being very disrespectful of his father by not doing his lessons correctly. Amman was right to strike him.” The school does generate some strong negative emotions. however. Only 15% of the children eligible for schooling have been enrolled. Kiaha has enrolled three of the ten eligible children in his household. While the education of children is regarded as a valuable economic in- vestment. it will take children from their villages and their farms. Someone must till the fields and practice the crafts. it is argued; ”One cannot eat money.” I suspect a number of fathers are unwilling to commit themselves to an untried and tenuous path to financial secur- ity. when the traditional ones have been more reliable. if tedious. The 70 school children from Tudt‘i are scattered throughout the village . rather than being from only a few households. Marv fathers. it appears . take both paths for future security by placing just one or hue of their children in school. while the others learn their fathers‘ skills. Un- fortunately for Niger' s educational program. fathers generally enroll the duller and less enterprising children in school. for they regard farmingasmore demandingofmindandbow. The school's effect can be measured in the different expectations of school children and non-school children. To several 12 yeareelders of the latter category I posed the question. ”When you become big. what will you do?” For the school pupils of the same age. I asked them to write an essay on thesame topic. Below are samples of each. first that of a non-school boy. Umarh.(.transicrihdd and translated from Hausa): If Allah gives me the money. I shall bw a strong table and go to Madaoua or Tahoua and buy every kind of canteen supplies and return here and put the supplies on the table and sell them for a profit. When the table gets too heavy 72 with supplies. I shall build shelves in a mud house and have a canteen here in this town. if Allah gives me the money. If the money becomes much. I shall take out 100.000 francs and tell 11de (his father) to go to Mecca. That's that. Then if I have more money. I'll go and get millet ami buy it. Then I'll put it into a building. When fam- ine comes. I'll take it out and sell the grain at a good price. If no one has any money. then I'll give it out one headload for two headloads to be returned at harvest time. I would like one wife. maybe two. and lots of chil- dren to do my work. And now the brief essay (translated from French) by Huseeni who attends school: At the bottom of my heart. I think I want to become a school teacher. The school. teacher is a director of school. He would know French well and would write it well. It is a good occupation. I would want to be a school teacher be- cause he malnes much money. He gets nearly 30.000 francs ($120.00) each month. He marries the beautiful women. He marries even the female teachers. He commands even the teachers at his side. He teaches the pupils well. He clothes his wife and his children. He eats good food. He would not even have left his parents naked. He protects them against poverty. He worries over nothing. There he is happy. joyous. content. He buys whatever he wishes. He washes himself. He is clean. The day of the National Assembly. he comes out of his house as if he were a presi- dent. He arrives at the assembly. He sits down on a chair. To go to town. he doesn't walk. The outstanding feature differentiating these fantasies appears to me to be the contrast between Uumarh's wish to achieve prestige measured in traditional terms: trades. has mam children. and takes the pilgrim- age to Mecca. and Hfiseeni's desire to become successful. in terms diffused to Niger by the French; speaks French. dresses well. sits in chairs. and rides in automobiles. Further Uumarh couches his dreams in the passive voice and in phrases indicating that Allah controls his destirv; Hfiseeni. on the other hand. projects himself as a school teacher actively shaping his own world. Both. however. show concerns for monetary security and for the care of their parents. In terms of their present behavior. Of. iz 73 these two boys. born at about the same time. have little to do with each other. Uumarfi aggressively sells kerosene at the area markets and sub-contracts franchises to younger boys. while Huseeni plays soccer. practices his French whenever he can. especially to younger pupils. and acts as a quasi-servant to Jean Azimé. 2.4 Relations with other villages and ethnic groups. The resi- dents of Tudu have many agnatic. affinal. and friendship ties with residents of other villages nearby. Dutse and Irufwia. perhaps because of their proximity. are more closely joined to Tudu.with these ties. The market cycle of seven days brings people from various villages into close contact. The Tudfi area valley has two of these markets: the Tuesday market at Tudfi and the Thursday evening market at Dutse. The week's most important market occurs at'Galma all day onLMondays. On a dry season Monday I counted over 200 residents of Tudu at Galma. The market while obviously the occasion for buying and selling. is also the time for socializing with residents of other villages. All these extra- village relationships lead me to state that the Tudu is a corporate unit only in terms of residential space. its chief. and occupational special- izations. Economic. religious. and kin ties are not so localized. The Kansas have a number of relations with the Fulani. Tuareg. Buuzuu. and the EurOpean expatriates. The most numerous of these connec- tions is with the pastoral Fulani who live during the dry season in the 22; d2 gag west of Tudu. .An economic symbiosis exists between many Hausa and Fulani: the Hausa sell grain and in return buy dairy products; further. Fulani cattle pasture among millet and sorghum stalks after harvest and fertilize the soil with their manure. There is no inter- marriage between the Hausa and Fulani. more by custom than by jural rule. 74 although some Goobiraawaa Hausa claim that the spirit Irzanzana makes a Biagoobiri-Fulani marriage barren. Relations on the whole between Fulani and Hausa appear to me to be like those between unrelated Hausa. In fact many informants used this idiom to describe the relationships. Ties between the Tuareg of Gidan Igidis and Hausa. on the other hard. are marked by a general lack of friendliness and social inter- course. This extends generally to Buusuu—Hausa relations. although two men in Tum have taken Buusuu wives. Proverbs are told of Tuareg treachery and exploitative cunning. although I never witnessed an example. I recorded no marriages between Hausa and Tuareg. An elaborate anthology has develOped about EurOpean eXpatriates. They are believed to be few in number. all kinsmen. proui. and powerful.‘ conquerors. holders of the money printing press. and Christian. My primary task upon entering the village for the first tims was to convince young children that neither I nor my wife had the slightest intention of eating them. In Hausaland. the boogey man is Caucasian. The most per- sistent contacts between villagers and Em'opeans occur through mission- aries of the Sudan Interior Mission. The Rev. Elvin Harbottle. a Canadian. makes fortnightly visits to ma where he preaches and coun- sels the community‘s two Christians whom he has taught to read Hausa. Several more Sudan Interior Mission missionaries operate the hospital at Galmi to which virtually every adult villager has gone at least once in his lifetime for medical assistance. These missionaries are gener- ally regarded favorably. particularly the Rev. Harbottle who demonstrates a profound interest in and knowledge of Hausa culture. 1. 75 NOTES One such praise song: I sing of Diori's government. May Allah grant us much good fortune. For Diori. may Allah be thanked. For Diori. may Niger be thanked. Even where a daughter's bastards are ldlled. I sing of Diori's government. May Allah grant us much good fortune. A battle against Niger would not turn out well. Diori. husbami of A'isa: the great warriors. I praise the government of Diori. Allah has given us great good fortune. The Sawaba party member: whatever he became-—whether a minister or a treasurer. At first he followed the true path: Now he does not even approach the way of truth. Songs were taught to school children after iniependence by a party cadre which came to T1113. The following two were sung to me in 1968: a. We are grateful for the land of Niger since she has Allah's blessings. Niger's boundary with Mali lies to the west. We border Dahomey. We are grateful for the land of Niger. since she has Allah's blessings. The land of Niger: here we plant millet and sorghum. Niger. here we plant peanuts. We are grateful for the land of Niger since she has Allah's blessings. Niger. we cultivate beans and take them to Dahomey. They buy and eat them there. b. chorus: Repairers of the world: Elephant: Elephant partyli stanzas: l. The elephant harvests all the sorghun for herself: The camel“ must resigpihimself to nothing. 2. llgabi son of NW scorns mediocrity. 3. The pilgrim Si'aadu son of Biala repairs the world. . it. You ( pl.) ride elephants of whom it is said they march tirelessly. 5. The elephant catches the camel. subdues him. and cuts the long-necked one. 76 i. The elephant (party) is the pepular name for the PPN-RDA. ii. The camel symbolizes the outlawed Sawaba party. iii. Algabi 'dan Mfiuhamman and Sa'aadfi.'Dan.Bala are deputies from the Madaoua arrondissement to the National.Assembly. 3. Si'aadfi.has since been elected to the Assembles Nationals at Niamey. h. 50 francs CFA are by statute equivalent to 1 French franc. Thus guiing my sejour in Niger. lOOCEA could be exchanged for about US . l. TL‘ 3C di PO' cm In Th1 ic of hr COn' 1ab< and dime] 1"“ Chapter Three Village Economy The focus of this chapter is on the question. How do the Hausa of Tudfi obtain their living? .My answer is divided into four broad cate- gories: (l) the production. distribution. and consumption of food. (2) occupational specialisations. (3) markets. and (4) exchanges of labor for money outside the village. The first three of these economic dimensions have been manifested in village institutions that have persisted for decades and perhaps even for centuries. Yet the fairly recent institution of labor-money exchanges outside the village appears to be significant not only for its economic impact but also for its potential to radically alter the Weltanschaulng of may villagers. A rather large difficulty presents itself as I seek to treat the econoaw of Tudfi: the village itself cannot reasonably be considered an economic unit in the sense that it can be treated as a political unit. This is because the village is not isolable economically. nor do econom- ic exchanges take place between villages as villages or between villagers of different communities on the basis of their residence in a particu- lar’village. Rather. food production. distribution. and consumption center on the household. The occupational specialisations. markets. and labor-money exchanges. on the other hand. occur in the matrix that trans- cends the village. Thus with this warning to the reader not to expect to see the village as an economic unit. I launch into a description of the various economic dimensions I perceived in the village. My viewpoint. as in the preceed- ing chapter. is as an impartial observer. 7? m f“ 78 3.1 M. The primary focus of food production in the village is cultivation of millet and sorghum: however. there is a supplemental horticulture of beans and groundnuts. The dairy and meat products of goats. sheep. and a few cows are another secondary source of food. The occasional hunting of rabbits ani guinea fowl adds to the meager meat diet of the villages. As a rule. however. the residents of Twit have a sufficient and nutritious diet (D. Nicholas. 1965): I recorded no cases of actual starvation. My estimate for the amount of land under millet an! sorghm produc- tion in 1968 is 1100 hectares. Every household cultivates several plots. and often these plots are widely separated from one another. generally some in the valley and others on the plateau. The cultivation of the poorer plateau land is recent and was initiated only when all the nearby valley land had been alienated. Tenure rights refer not to the land 21; 9;. but to its use to pro- duce crops. Thus the one who first clears the bush from‘land has the right to grow his crops there. However. should he allow it to lie fal- low for four or more years. another person may claim usufruct rights by reclearing the lani. The rights to land use are inherited by sons and by unsarried daughters. and are often sold or leased. but according to certain restrictions. Since adjacent plots are often tilled by siblings. a person desiring to lease or to sell his plot must give the option to his brothers and sisters first. A flat valley plot of a hectare might sell for 2.000 to 15.0000FA. depending on the seller's urgency for money. Leases often run for several years and are subject to various forms of payment: either a royalty of 25% of the crop or more frequently. a flat fee paid initially. Good arable. unalienated land is abuxiantly 79 available: however. it is generally far from Tudfi and demands enormous labor to clear it of brush for cultivation. The labor required on the farms is not. as among the Muslim Hausa. limited to men. Rather. the men of Tudh appear to have the best of Muslim and Magusaawaal worlds: an Islamic inheritance pattern rendering to men twice the farm land that their sisters inherit. and a Maguzaawaa labor system where both men and women work the household plots. Custom- arily the man possessing farm plots recruits his wife ani children to help him in cultivation. He also joins his wife ani children in working on her plots. They share their harvests in jointly-owned grain bins. In addition to working on his own and his wife's farms. a man is obliged to contribute one day's labor in seven to the fans of the household head. While the labor pattern discussed in the preceding paragraph gener- ally holds true for the planting ani harvestirg aspects of horticulture. another fan of labor organisation is used for tilling. Three hoeings are done throughout the rairy season in order to cut down weed growth and to keep the earth soft. hence absorptive. Tilling is arduous work. and the Hausa farmer prefers to have each hoeing done in a single day: consequently. he marshalls the labor of a m or hoeing group to facilitate his tilling. The villagers distinguish three types of gang am of which may be med: brideservioe. clientship,(see 7.5). and con- tract. In the first instance. a gim may be sponsored by a man's daughter's fianc‘ as his brideservice: in this case he marshalls perhaps 20 of his friends who corporately might till a hectare or more in a day. The farmer himself provides neither compensation nor refreshment for this labor which his daughter's fianc‘ is obliged to do for one day 80 annually for seven years. The 51313 organiser is able to recruit his fellows on the basis of his pledge to participate in a gim for each of their respective fathers -in-law. A gm; may also be organized by a man's client. My chief informant Dig? described just such a 35m done on his behalf on August 27. 1968. Fourteen days ago I gave aw client Mfiusali who lives in Duts3 ZOOCFA as a gift. Then 8 days ago. I gave him another gift of 300CFA. Also it has been a month since I gave him a hoe I had made. So today. Mfiusali decided to recognise aw generosity by giving me a . He recruited ll of his friends and relatives (Dig lists their names). Miusali did not pay them for their work: he will just work in the gin; that they do. After they worked till the sun reached its senith. they came to my da. I gave them kola nuts I had 7 :u bought for 125CFA. tuuwoo porridge) which my wife had cooked. and 200CFA worth of cooked meat. They really worked hard for me: I am very pleased with Mfiusali. In addition to the above two forms of 3. a. a person may secure a great amount of labor by making a contract with the village's Sarkin Noomaa (chief of farming) to organise a gm. The prestigious title of Sarkin Noomaaz in Tudfi is presently possessed by Sidau who became Sarkin Noomaa in the mid-1940's when he purchased the title from the sarkii in Madaoua for 50.0000FA. Sidau became eligible to purchase this title when be harvested more than 1.000 headloads (circa 1.500 bushels) of grain in one year and when the pre- vious title-holder failed to produce this sum. Should Sidau himself fail in am year to reach a harvest of at least 1,000 headloads. arw villager who has produced this amount may petition the sarkii to withdraw the title from Sidau and convey it to him (on payment of 5.000cm). The Sarkin Noomaa has the right to receive a tribute of 100 head- loads of grain and a ram's leg from aw others in the village who harvest more than 1.000 headloads. The Sarkin Noanaa. further. has the right to command all the young men in the village to do farm work for him ani for 81 those who arrange contracts with him. Those who refuse to work for the _S_g_;rkin__; M have occasionally been fined by the village moot. His role performances require the §_a_r__k_i_p_ M to annually give the village chief 200 headloads of grain as tribute. Also he acts as the ultimate defense against famine: when the grain in any gig; is exhausted. the residents may obtain an interest-free loan of grain from the §_a_r_k_ip_ M's bins. to be repaid at harvest. Finally the WWW- vides seed for any who may have consumed his own supply as food. Should a villager come to the MM and request a M. the two would decide on a particular day and a price. usually between 3.000 and 5.000CFA. Then the §_g._r__k_i_._n_ m would sumnon the m Simiarii (head of the young men) and commnd that the young men hoe on the farmer's plots on that agreed day. During the Him: the m m recruits young girls who sing to their male counterparts as they work. Praise singers and drummers urge the men to work vigorously. At noon. nary of the village's women bring a milk ad porridge refresher. and in the evening. all the young men eat 13211322 and the meat of several rams. The Sagan 3.9.29.5 pays for the food and entertaiment and gives each worker a measure of salt (about one pound) . The usage of the three forms of gm is illustrated in the record of fans labor recruited by Iisuu in 1968 (see Table 3). Iisuu is the village's wealthiest man. ad his use of the gém far exceeds that of all the villagers: however. every farmer uses the three kids ofgéng in roughly the same proportions. 82 Table 3 Gina performed for Iisuu during 1968 Person organizing King of 8512? Compensation the gayze Silau clientship none Miinu clientship none Iilaa brideservice none Hakimi brideservice none Sarkin.Noomaa contract 1.5000FA Edda brideservice none Iibrihiimi brideservice none Hassin clientship 7OOCEA Mundii contract 1.1000EA 'Kiarami brideservice none Dbodoo brideservice none lfiota contract 1.5000FA Sarkin Noomaa contract 50 headloads of grain W clientship 1.0000“ and 1 bag of groundnuts San Allih clientship 500cm and a belt of a cloth Sarkin Noomaa contract 6.0000FA The villagers do not own.a great deal of livestock. On July 15. 1968. the total livestock population was 567 goats. 36” sheep. 152 cows. 133 donkeys. and 76 horses.3 The dairy products of goats' and cows' milk are widely used: but the local values about these animals do not attach to eating their>meat or drinking their milk. ‘When I asked my informants who owns the goats. sheep. and cows. I was told that both men and women do. but that they use them for different purposes: ”The men use their goats. cows. and sheep for sacrifices and to sell for tax- es. The women use their animals to sell to buy clothes. for putting on dances. or for their daughters' trousseaux." ‘When I inquired who owned more. I received the reply. ”The women. They have the patience not to sell a female animal when hard-pressed--unlike a man." The actual cone sumption of meat is meager: on.average a cow. 20 goats. and nine sheep are slaughtered in Tudfi.each month: additionally. chickens and roosters 83 are more frequently eaten. The cow's milk is used to make furs. a dish of milk ad millet. while goat's milk is fed to babies before their mothers} breast milk flows ad during weaning. 3.2 Occfltions. The Hausas have the well-deserved reputation for their plethora of occupational specialisations. particularly trading. The residents of Tudu confirm this view. as 47 discrete occupations are practiced. I distinguish an occupational specialisation from its parent category of role specialization in that the former is deliberately pecuniary for its practitioner. However. the villagers do distinguish two broad categories of occupations: those that men inherit from their fathers ad those that they choose. Very often a man does not ad is not encouraged to follow his father's occupation if he believes he can generate more profit doing something else. Yet for a first son ad only a first son. a great deal of value attaches to his practicing the same occupation as his father. Table 1+ Occmtional Smcialisations Occmtion Practiced 3 males Practiced by females Traders: General item sellers Canteen operators Kerosene sellers Cloth sellers Grain sellers Pepper sellers Kola nut sellers Tobacco sellers NNNV WP l-“ONN Craftsmen: Smiths Tanners Basket weavers Butchers Calabash carvers afi'é'tfi 84 Table # (continued) Occgpgtional Specializations Occupation ngcticed by males-” Practiced by females Craftsmen: House builders Tailors Carpenters Bed.makers Calabash tailors .Roof beam cutters Mat weavers 3 Potters 3 l—' H mums.) Primary'Produesrs: Onion and tomato growers 1 Firewood.gatheress 1 Bean cake bakers 26 Groundnut cake bakers 25 Spice gatherers Groundnut oil makers Porridge makers Stew’mhkers Furs makers to I-‘U vt-‘(DU Entertainers: Drummers: E. und uwi oo sq: za Knife dancers Fiddlers Gourd shakers Praise singers O‘NNUHNNO‘ Providers of services Diviners Laborers Barbers Brokers (in trading) ‘Water carriers Cassava carriers Kola carriers Shepherd of cows Hair dresser 1 HHI—‘Nknkms i 85 The occupations are inherited and are localized in the three largest clans: the Ma'kiiri clan is known for its smiths. the Muuhammin clan for its tanners. and the Allikii clan for weaving winnowing baskets. A number of myths cluster on blacksmithing. and it is regarded. not unsur- prisingly. as the most important village craft. Formerly. iron had to be smelted. for which a vast amount of labor was required.“ Now the steel from rails and automobiles is the source of the smiths' metal supply. The hoes. knives. scythes. and axes are hammered generally just before the rains when their demand is greatest. and their price is cons sequently high. In a day. two blacksmiths ordinarily are able to manus facture enough items to net them a profit of about 1.0000FA. The black- smiths. tanners. and basket weavers all sell their wares at the local marketS. Table h depicts the remarkable diversity of occupations practiced in the village. Most of the general traders practice their occupations by buying items at the usually less expensive Nigeria markets and selling them in local more expensive ones. The canteen Operators have been given goods on credit by shop owners in.Madaoua and Galmi. Their mark up is about 20%. The remaining traders ply the local markets and canvass the village. The primary producers are for the most part women who sell their foods in the village throughout the day or during the Sunday evening market. One of the village men has begun an irrigated farm during the dry season on which he raises onions and tomatoes that he sells locally. For both the men and.wmmen. occupations are secondary to the demands of farming in the rainy season. The income that a person makes in his occupation is entirely his own. [CD 31 86 3.3 MarketsI monetary engages. While the residents of Tudfi en- gage in numerous monetary transactions every day both within the village and in the markets of other villagers. the exchange activity is at its peak in the Tuesday evening market held in Tudfi. The market ensues as traders begin setting up stalls around “PM and ends at approximately 9PM. The bustling and dickering characteristic of urban markets is absent here as buyer and seller know each other and use the occasion of transaction as the opportunity for conversation. On average the market contains about 150 sellers whose goods are displayed on grass mats. Unlike larger markets, prices are fairly standardized. except for the stranger. Ex- changes are almost entirely in Nigerien or Nigerian currency; bartering is nearly non-existent. The market is the exclusive fief of the §_a_1_°_lgi_n_ m or chief butcher who acts in market matters much as the village chief does in village affairs. He collects SCFA from each seller. ad- judicates disputes. and regulates grain prices to benefit buyers. So institutionalised are the market activities that I did not learn of the m M's role until I had been in the village nine months. While I was there, he adjudicated no disputes. _ 3.1} Labor—mono exc es outside the . In addition to selling goods in local markets. the villagers sell their labor in two distinct ways: by going to distant cities during the dry season and by digging limestone for the Cimenterie at Malbasa, some 50 kilometres to the West. By far the more important is the labor migration of the men (see Table 5). After the harvest is complete. nearly all the able males averaging between perhaps 15 and 1+0 years begin to make such Jour- ney preparations as mending clothes . consulting diviners for auspicious days for traveling. and raising the large sum of money needed to travel .TArsa flIaIWZ j l 1 In new; how 87 Table 5 Location of Migratory Laborers during 1968-69 City Number of men we of work generally done Abidjan, Cote d'Ivoire 21 Loading ships. carrying water Accra. Ghana 20 Carrying water Angwanlalle. Nigeria 1 Selling medicines Bangi, Niger 20 Packing groundnuts Birnin Tsaba. Nigeria 1 Packing cassava Eula, Mali 1 Selling medicines Dogon Doutohi. Niger 1 Selling medicines Filingue, Niger 1 Selling medicines Gidan Runji, Niger 39 Packing roundnuts . cutting firewood Ibadan, Nigeria 5 Picking kola nuts , building mud houses Kaduna. Nigeria 2 Cutting firewood Kano. Nigeria 18 Packing groundnuts 'Kaura, Nigeria 19 Shelling groundnuts. carrying water Keita, Niger 3 Drumming Lagos. Nigeria 2 Carrying water Madaoua. Niger 3 Petty trading Hafara. Nigeria 1 Carrying water Maguri, Mali :1 Selling medicines Makurdi. Nigeria 2 Carrying. water Malalebe, Niger 1 Coolcing for school teacher Maradi. Niger 14 Carrying water Maguranci, Haute Volta 4 Selling medicines Niamey. Niger 1 Selling medicines Tahoua. Niger 5 Butchering Takuradi, Ghana 1 Loading ships Tsibiri, Niger 1 Building mud houses Uurno, Nigeria 1 Selling medicines Zinder. Niger 2 Carrying water Total 191 Adult males in village: 2&3 long distances. Those departing are given gifts by members of their respective households before they depart in two's and three's aboard trucks which ply the road near the village. This exodus generally begins in late October: by mid-December all who are going have left. In February and March the glad homecomings begin. Most men return with newly-acquired clothes . a few thousand francs . gifts for members of their households. and tales of strange people and places. Even if a man has 88 as in 88 returned with nothing, he is praised. for he has not had to eat the household's grain while he was away. Since I was in Tudfi only a short time, I am unable to assess very well the long term impact of the dif- ferential acculturations of the village's men. Indications of this effect may be garnered from the following data: the pantheon of spirits contains several who live in such places as Makurdi. Lagos. and Abidjan and whose actions are much less predictable than local spirits. Fur- ther. when I commented to an informant that a certain villager seemed hostile to me. he replied. ”That's because he hasn't seen the world and is still afraid of writing; I have been out to work and I am no longer a stupid peasant." Arw reasonable study of these phenomena would re- quire diachronic comparisons . Approximately five households began in 1965 to dig for limestone in the hills to the north of the village. The Soci‘te Nigerienne do Cimenterie offered to pay ZOOCFA for each sack of appronmately lOOkg. In 1968 the total had reached 30 participating households. I estimate that villagers in 1968 were paid about 110.000CFA for the limestone they had mined with their pikes andlhoes. I expect the number of villagers. especially women and children. who work for the Cimenterie will continue. as digging for limestone has proven to be a sure if arduous source of income. The labor also has its dangers: to date four people have been killed when holes they were tunneling collapsed. h) 89 NOTES ”Maguaaawaa" is the term used by the Muslim Hausa of Kane and Katsina to identify the Hausa-speaking pagans in these emirates (see Green- berg l9h6:13). Most of the villagers in Tudfi identify themselves as "Erna” which translates as pagan. I'have hesitated to equate ”A'rna" with "Maguzaawaa' since Greenberg uses the latter term to identify a peeple unaffected by Islam. The A'rna of Tudfi have obviously been profoundly influenced by the culture of Muslims about them; consequently they should not be given the label "pagan" with- out qualification. The Sarkin Noomaa status is the subject of a brilliant analysis by Cw Nicholas who compares the roles of the Sarkin Noomaa with the Northwest Coast practices of potlatch (19675. My propensity for figures led one interviewee to respond to m ques- tion about livestock with "2 horses. 1 ram. 15 hens. 2 roosters. l8 chicks. a few thousand ants. and a pesty European inquisitor.” The organization of this labor is discussed in Echard (1965). Chapter Four History In this chapter I seek to locate Tudfi in the context of historical events that have occurred in this part of the western Sudan over the past several centuries. The region of Tudfi is near the northwestern limits of the former Hausa state of GBobi'r and close to Adi'r. once the fief of the Sultan of Agades. Since the fifteenth century the area has been successively con- trolled by'GBObi'r, the Songhai, Kanem and Sokoto empires, and within the last 100 years by the K61 Gross Tuaregs and the French. For a short Space of eight years at the turn of this century. Tudfi.was nominally British Colonial territory. 4.1 Local views of beginnings. In July, 1968, I asked the village chief Kiaka for the history of succession to the title of ”chief of blacksmiths". which he held at the time. As I pressed his memory. he reSponded that before him Jimrau.was chief. He followed 'Dan Tsoofuwaa who had succeeded Na'alla, the chief of blacksmiths before the intro- duction of coinage. Then Na'alla's father Gwiaya held the position after 'Dan Ma'kiiri. When I asked Kaaka who held the position before 'Dan Ma'kiiri. he replied that I would pierce the beginning of the world with further questions. While at the time I treated this as his ration- alization for lack of more knowledge. statements by others in a similar vein, along with the concensus of several old men that.Allah created the world no more than fifteen generations before their own have con- vinced me that Kiaka was being straight forward. Oral traditions in Tudfi therefore do not have the same time depth as in areas where extensive 90 91 genealogies and events recollections serve to legitimate institutions or individuals ' aspirations . It is believed by both Adaraawaa and Goobiraawaa in Tudfi that Allah created Aadamfi and Hiawa'fiu (Adam and Eve) at the beginning. Their off- spring are the founders of the world's ethnic groups: Hausa. Fulani. Buusuu. Tuareg. "southerners". and Europeans. The Hausas then dispersed into separate groups in different regions--the original Hausas were at Sokoto. the Kanaawaa at Kano. the Katsinaawaa at Katsina and Maradi. the Adaraawaa at Gibale. and the Goobiraawaa at Tsibiri. One man asserted that the Goobiraawaa formed into two areas: those of Gaobi'r-Tmih (Madaoua) and those of Tsibiri. Since the majority of villagers are Goobiraawaa, and all the villa- gers regard the village as being part of GBobi'r. I shall stress the interconnections between Tudi and GBobi'r. The villagers reckon that. at the beginning. GBobi'r ruled the world. The Hausas of Sokoto followed. then GBobi'r restored its pre-eminence for a generation. The Tuareg succeeded and were themselves succeeded in twenty-six years by the French and the British. who in 1960 let each of their areas rule itself because. according to villagers, they became tired of ruling. The first king of Ghobi'r, according to village infoments. was Mii Nassiri. In fact. according to historical records. Mii Nassiri was king of Gaobi'r at Tsibiri from 1886—94. When I asked Kiaka about the kings of GBobi'r. he mentioned Mii Nassiri as the first king. but sang a song1 of Baawia Jan Gt‘irsau a king of GBobi'r whom he could not locate temporally. but ”he came after M31 Nash-i". Historically. Baawia Jan Gt‘lreau reigned despotically from 1776-81}. at me 32% Sim the ari. Olaf hist tion 92 Tudfi residents relate that the entire country between them and Tsi- biri was slowly pepulated. From north of Bouza (about 50 km to the north) Gwaaya imigrated to Galma (15 km to the north). His son's son Na'alli then founded Tudfi. His descendants constitute the majority of the village's residents today. The remaining villagers' ancestors im- migrated more recently. 4.2 History and myths of GBobi'r beyond Tudi. Most, if not all historians who have written of the Goobiraawaa trace their history in the same fashion. A group of Caucasoids came from the north and east in the seventh century. conquered the indigenous Negroid pepulation of Air (in central Niger). and settled among them as a ruling aristocracy. The first emir of Sokoto Mohommadu Belle regarded the GBobi'r aristoc- racy as COptic, originally from Arabia (in.Arnett 1922312). Urvoy follows Belle when he states, "...d'abord i1 ne peut atre question de faire venir tout le peuple gobir noir d’Arabie par les deserts de Libye et de Bilma. Il rests l'arrivée vers 19 VII6 ou VIIIe siEcle probable- ment, d'un groups do nomades blancs originaires d'Egypte ou d'Arabie; pout-3tre meme chrétien ou paien et fuyant la conquete musulmane de l'Egypte" (1936zlh2). Séré de Rivieres (19653155), Johnston (1967:15). and Rodd (l926:20#) concur. not surprisingly, since they quote the same sources as Urvoy; Hogben and Kirk-Greene. on the other hand. arrive at the same conclusion but by means of the testimony of contemporary'Gaobi'r aristocrats that "the Gobirawa have a genealogy of over 125 kings and claim descent...from the nomadic Capts or Kibdawa. in Arabia. Their history. as preserved in the records of the ruling house, shows a migra- tion from Kabila, north of Mecca. to Gubur (Gobir) in the Yemen and 93 thence through Khartoum and Bornu to Ashen...” (Hogben and Kirk-Greene 1966x368). While the Hausa of Tudfi give no such account of GBobi'r's founding. they. nonetheless. are well aware of the aristocrat-peasant (siriakii- talakaawaa) dichotomy in GBobi'r and in all of Hausaland. This arrange- ment. goes the legend. was dictated by Allah when all peoples were created: some are to rule: others including all the residents of Tait. are directed to follow unquestioningly. the rule of the aristocracy (see 2.1). Conquerors who replace an aristocracy are granted the same legitimacy as the former rulers. Residents of nearby Madaoua who claim to descent from GBobi'r rulers vehemently insist their origins are eastern. not local or ”peasant-ish". Greenberg writes that the Daura myth of Hausa origins exists ”every- where in Hausa territory” (191+6312). Tudi‘i must be excepted. According to this legend. a great here Bayajidda came to Daura (a small city east of Katsina) from the northeast. perhaps Baghdad. There he killed a snake which terrorized the community from a well. In gratitude the queen married him, arxl their seven sons became the founders of the Hausa city-states of Kano. Katsina. GBobi'r. Zassau (Zaria). Rano. Biram, and Daura (Bovill 19683225). Both the Tudfi and Daura legends. while ixdubitably different. provide a charter for the aristocrat- peasant dichotomy and give a clue to conquest from outside Hausaland. Historians believe that the caucasoid Goobiraawaa who migrated to Air in the seventh century conquered the Hausas living there and inter- married with them. According to Urvoy. ”...la fusion ‘tait totalement achev‘e au 11. sicle. i l'arriv‘edes Tuaregs Sandals. qui consid‘rirent lee Gobirs cone de pure noirs" (19358243). 914 By the beginning of the 11th century, Kel Gross and Kel Owi Tuaregs of Air had caused both the southerly migration of Goobiraawaa and the transfer of their capital from Tsin Shaman (near Agades) to Birnin Lalle. nearly 300 kilometres to the south. Palmer reports that the Goobiraawaa had settled their present capital Tsibiri by 1200 (1928. Vol. III385) e Tsibiri is about 120 kilometres south of Birnin Lalle. For the next seven centuries . the Goobiraawaa carried on sporadic warfare with the Katsinaawaa. As the empires of Songhai and Kanem- Bornu reached their respective seniths in the 16th century. G‘oobi'r was conquered in 151.3 by Askia Mohammed and the king of GBobi'r was slain (Johnston 1967313). 881“ de Riviires claims that Songhai's vassal state of Kebbi ruled GBobi'r for the remainder of that century and until 1671& (19653162.163). However is the tides of the war with Katsina shifted occasionally to Katsina's advantage in the 15th and 16th centuries. GBobi'r found itself subject to Hanan-Bornu through the latter's vassal, Katsina. With the decline of the empires of Songhai and Kanem-Bornu. GBobi'r's armies marched in the 17th. 18th and 19th centuries from the borders of Bornu to Air. to Kebbi in the west. and as far south as Ilorin. In the mid-17th century the Goobiraawaa near Madaoua plundered the cara- vans which passed from the Fezzan through Air ard on to Kebbi. This brought about a number of reprisals from the Kel Gress Taureg. who pressured the Goobiraawaa even further to the south. In 1731+, Babari, the 92nd king of eaobi'r led his armies into Zamfm (currently in Nigeria between Sokoto and Katsina) and established his rule over Sokoto. Kebbi. Dendi. Konni. Arewa, Adar. Katsina, and Zamfara. He had consolidated the GBobi'r factions , built a fortified“ capital at Alkalawa. and had with- stood the Tuareg attempts to dislodge the Gaobi'r from their capital. t 00 the Kia Gm} 95 In.1804 the Fulani preacher Usuman Dan.Fodiyo launched a jihad to cleanse the Hausa states of rulers unfaithful to Allah. The most per- sistent resistance to the jihad came from the strongest Hausa state at the time, GBobi'r. Until 1808, the Sokoto forces backing Fodiyo had not been able to win a decisive victory over the Goobiraawaa. In that year, however, they drove the Goobi'r armies from their capital at.A1ka- lawa forcing many Goobiraawaa to their former capital Tsibiri, 75 kilo~ metres to the east. In Alkalawa, the Fulani conquerors installed a vassal to rule the Goobiraawaa remaining in that area. Between.1814 and 1836, Sokoto engaged its armies in trying to put down a number of Goobi'r revolts, which led to the extension of Sokoto sovereignty to Madaoua and the Tudu area. In fact, a decisive battle was fought in 1835 at Dakurawa (Johnston calls it Gawakuke, 19673131) some 20 kilo- metres southeast of Tudu.which solidified Sokoto control of western GBobi'r. The rule of western Goobi'r was given to Zoodii, a war-lord of the Kel Gress Tuareg, who had pledged faithfulness to the Sultan at Sokoto. “.3 The rule of the Tuareg and the coming of the FrenchI From as early as the 11th century, the Kel Gress and Kel Owi Tuaregs of.Air had been pressing the Goobiraawaa to the south. This process continued, till at the end of the 19th century the Tuaregs were masters of GBobi'r (Rodd 1926:392). .As the 19th century were on, the power of Sokoto waned, and the Goobiraawaa of Tsibiri were able to reintegrate Alkalawa into Goobi'r without serious opposition. In western.GBobi'r, the Kel Gress Tuareg continued the control given them by the Sultan of Sokoto; however. in the last third of the century, the Tuareg attacked Sokoto at Gwadabawa. Kiaka reported hearing his father recount the Tuareg battles at.Gwadabawa. Gwaya, and Nurnu in what is now the northdwest state of Nigeria. 96 According to Si'iidu, the oldest man in Tudu, the Tuareg took over effective rule of the Tudfi area from the "Hausas" of Sokoto 26 years before the French fought the Kel Gress at.Galma in 1901. I am inclined to accept this figure, as Si'iidu.was consistently correct on dating events that I could corroborate from written sources. That the Taureg have exercised control of the area is evidenced from Kiaka's recollec- tion of a list (Table 6) of the Kel Gress Tuareg chiefs at Azerori. The dates following some of the names I obtained from documents in.Madaoua. Table 6 Tuareg chiefs at.Azerori 1. Tembalz 11. steal 1833-1866 2. Mayumma 12. ‘Wfigayi 1867-1887 3. Kuusuru 13. 'Dan Niisli #. Kiacaa 1M. .Agwalaawaa 5. Alishetfi 15. Mnlut 1887-1903 6. Warzigan 16. zeedii II 1904-1916 7. Zoodii I 17. Mihaa 1917-1921 8 . Bubakir 18 . wurikyat 1921-1956 9. Ahialaami l9. Algaahi 1956-1966 10. Mai Jikai I do not believe that Kiaka is recounting the succession accurately. as he later told me that Basal had invested Kiaka's father Jimrau as village chief and that years‘ before that Jimrau's father Ne'ella, had been installed by‘WBgayi. ‘Wfigayi followed Bfidil as a Tuareg chief. Bfidil's rule comes much too early for him to have invested Kiaka's father as chief. However, the list does testify to the considerable influence of the Tuareg in.Tudu.for at least the last 150 years. These years when the Tuareg ruled Tudfi.are recalled with oaths of bitterness, particularly by the Adareawea whose ancestors fled Tuareg raids to the north. .A few of the Goobiraawaa related incidents of the Tuareg kidnapping women and children and burning households. 97 Tudt‘l was in a position different from neighboring villages when the Tuaregs were in power, for it was a center for blacksmithing. Echard writes (1965) that with their conflicts with the Fulani of Sokoto and the Adaraawaa, the Tuareg were dependent on blacksmiths in Adi'r and western GBobi'r for arms. Blacksmiths in Tudfi told me that their ances- tors had always remained on good terms with the Tuareg, who shared their war booty with the smiths in return for swords and spears. Kiaka mentioned that his father J imrau had accoznpanied the Tuareg forces towards Sokoto in the latter part of the 19th century as a repairman for weapons broken in battle. Kiaka describes one of Jimrau's homecomings as follows: "He brought back sheep. One time when he went warring with the Tuareg in the west, he brought back 700 sheep. All the villages in the area were summoned to the open space that lies on the road to Gilma. Praise singers were there. It was announced that men and women, and even boysuall in fact who cultivate cropsnshould come and receive a lamb to kill and roast.” After the Congress of Berlin in 1883/4, which set off the European scramble for claims of African. territory, the area of Tudfi was claimed first by France, then Britain, and then France again. Until June 11}, 1898, the area was nominally French; on that date, however, France ceded to Britain all lends within an arc of 100 miles of Sokoto. This created logistical problems for French comamiers who were greatly detoured in their cmunications between Say and Zinder. Their pressure on the French goverment brought about the treaty of London on May 29, 1906, which gave Niger and Nigeria the border they share today. The French entered the Tudu area suddenly and zealously in 1901. In a battle well-remembered in the village, the French and their mercenaries 98 killed thousands of Kel Gress warriors at Galma on June 18. The next day they returned to kill the wounded, according to elders who witnessed the event. That evening the French camped at Irfiufwi, just a kilometre from Tudfi. The Tuareg warlord'Warzagan came and surrendered there. This two-day event was the limit of resistance to the newest conqueror in western GBobi'r; there have been no armed revolts since that time. Curi- ously, the battle at.Galma was fought in British-claimed territory, a fact which no source I consulted explained. Shortly after the Galma battle the French appointed Dalle, a Goobi'r Viceroy and the man who had identified the Tuaregs' location at Galma for the French, as the Egg; d3_g§gtgg for the Madaoua area. His rule was circumscribed by the installation of a military sous-prefecture at Madaoua in 1914. Since that date the arrondissement of Madaoua has Operated with this tandem structure, even with national independence in 1960 (see 2.1). 4.4 Village history. The residents of Tudfi claim that the village was founded by Na'alla who had left Galma with his dependents and allies, because of a quarrel with the chief there. He was confirmed in his position as chief of Tudfi, according to Kaaka, by the Tuareg leader, 'Wfigayi, who ruled in.Azerori from 1867-1887. Jimrau, Na'alla's first son became the second chief of Tudfi, installed by the Tuaregs at Aierori. While Jimrau was village chief, the French commandant came to the village and asked for its chief. He was told Jimrau was in the bush smelting ore. He then asked to Speak to Jimrau's "brother". Tamaatau, Jimrau's patri- lateral parallel cousin came and was given a paper certifying that he was village chief. ‘When Jimrau returned he did not contest the investiture, 99 being uncertain of the likely French reSponse. However, Timaatau agreed that at his own death, the certificate of office would be returned to the younger Jimrau. This agreement was met in 1910. In 1926, again while Jimrau was smelting iron ore in the bush, a colonial official came to the village searching for delinquent taxPayers, and being piqued that Jimrau was absent, invested Kaaka as chief, an event I relate in 8.3. Kaaka, as of this writing remains village chief in Tudfi. The village today is composed of six wards: Angoowa, Adaraawaa, Kaliba, Saabon.Gaarii, Milleelaa, and Hayagaaga. A recitation of their respective histories will be useful to the understanding of contemporary events. Angoowa is the original ward where Na'alli settled in the last century. As the raiding by the Tuareg plagued Ada'r villages to the north and west, refugees came first to Na'alli, then to Jimrau seeking sanctuary. These chiefs granted these Adi'r immigrants permission to live in the village, and today the descendants of these immigrant refugees live in the ward known as Adaraawaa, although the Adaraawaa themselves only inhabit 13 of the ward's 32 households. The residents of Kalibia are Goobiraawaa tanners who trace their patrilineal descent to Doodoo, who left Gilma with Na'alla. .At one time their residence was about one kilometre northwest of Angoowa, but when the sous-prefet ordered a residential centralization of all village units in the arrondissement in 1965, Kalibi moved to an area adjacent to Angoowa. Saabon.G§arii was founded between 1910 and 1926 by 'Dan GeegEe, Jimrau's younger brother. The two brothers lived in adjacent households, but they quarreled. To avoid exacerbating relations, 'Dan 100 Geegee moved his household out of lngoowa and some 300 metres to the northeast. His descendants now reside in 15 households in Saabon Gaarii. Milleela, composed of 29 households, traces decent to Naomoo, an- other younger brother to Jimrau. Naomoo's son Baalii related the follow- ing history to me: ”Mdlleeli is composed of Naomoo's sons. Some 63 years ago, because the animals of the town were tramping on our crops, we left lngoowa and went east to Kaliagee (5 In 3). Then 30 years later, we got up and went to Duts3 (1 km E) for the same reason we departed from lngoowa. Finally at the command of the white man three years ago, we returned and now live adjacent to lngoowa on the east.” Other villagers recount the same chronology but contend that the cause was different. Abdfi said, "When.Jimrau was chief, he fought with the Tuareg, and while he was away, Noomoo was here ensorcelling Jimrau's children. Jimrau and Noomoo hated each other and could never agree on anything. So Noomoo and his dependents left and moved to Kaliagee. Then when Kaaka accused them of destroying our farms with their cattle, Noomoo's sons went to Dutse. Then three years ago, the gggggpggfgt,told all the outlying wards they would have to centralize to make communications easier.” To this day relations between Kiaka and the residents of Milleeli are polite at best (the events related in 8.5.1 account for the tone of these rela- tions). Hayagaagi maintains a semi-independent status from Tudh from its location 3 kilometres to the southwest. Kiaka told me that Tamaatau backed Naruwa when Naruwa sought to wrest the chiefship from Kiaka in 1933 (see 8.5.1). 'When the attempt was unsuccessful, both Naruwa and Timiatau.left the village. Narwwa's offspring live in Kware, some 35 km to the north, and are effectively integrated with a village there. lOl Timistau and his dependents founded Hayagaagi. Tamaatau's oldest living son, Amman, gave a different cause for the fission: "The M113. Dille had put all the people of Tudfi to work on the road. But the sons of Timiatau were given an unfair share of the work by J imrau, so we left when Jimu failed to equalize the load.” Today, relations between Hayagaagi and Tudfi are friendly, and Timiatau's sons are sup- portive of Kiaka. The residents of Hayagaagi have a headman who ad- ,judicates disputes and transmits taxes to Kiaka. Kiaka remains the effective communications broker between Hayagaagi ani the govermnental institutions at Madaoua. 1. 102 NOTES The song: "Baawia baa shii d3. daa'din gamB. Baawia Jan Gfirsau” (gloss: Baawia did not have good luck. Baawia Jan Gfirzau). Kiaka explained that Baawia had beheaded mamr of his own peeple and was killed in the same fashion. Sére de Rivieres reports (19653157) that Baawia was killed in a battle against Katsina in 1781+. Chapter Five World'View In Chapter u, I located the village of Tudfi in the temporal world with which we are familiar; in this chapter I shall examine the world as perceived by the villagers themselves. The world view of the Tudh Hausa reflects elements of both the theology of Islam and the belief system of the Magusaawaa Hausa. Yet while the historical roots of local ontological and cosmological ideas appear to be divergent, the meta- physical system is fairly consistent and readily articulated by all but the very young. A thorough description of this body of ideas is a Herculean task and one which I postpone to an ensuing publication. In this chapter I outline only briefly local notions about the universe, spirit beings, the nature of man, and destiny. 5.1 Notions of the universe. To the Hausa the universe is shaped like an enormous cube, containing three levels: that of hell on the bottom, then the realm of man and animals in the middle, and the kingdom of Allah at the top. The lower two levels are surrounded by walls on four sides which support the middle and top levels. The sun and moon, who when they are no longer visible, are being driven in a black chariot back to their starting points in the east. The stars and planets are explained as holes in the top level through which shines the light of Allah's sun. At the middle level, there are weak spots such as caves or bodies of water -- even wells, through which one might accidentally slip into hell. Figure 3 is a cepy I made of.Abdfi'e sand diagram depicting the layout of the middle level of the universe. He estimated 103 10’4 O Mecca d Kano Figure 3 Abdfi's Map of the Earth it would take a camel train 50 days to go from one wall to another. ‘When I asked what was outside the walls, Abdfi.simply shrugged and replied, "No one knows; no one has ever dared look." These views of the universe are shared by.A'rna (nonnMuslim, see note 1, p. 89) and.Muslims alike in trust. ' 5.2 Spirit beings. The villagers maintain that all things and events have ultimate beginnings with Allah. A few'hundred years ago he fashioned the universe from his own dung and later made man.and animals from the earth's dirt. The first people were Aadamfi.and Hiwa'h.who were told by Allah to produce many children to present to him. As the years went by, and their offspring increased, Hiwa'fi suggested to Aadamfi that; Allah.might be capricious and could destroy all their children, if they presented them to him. To guard against that possibility, they hid half their children. ‘Allah then called for the presentation, and when 105 he perceived that he was reviewing only half of humanity, he uttered to the progenitors, "You have hidden half your children. I did not tell you to do this, but since you have hidden them, they shall remain so forever.” 'With this myth the Hausa eXplain the origin of all Spirits, who while human-like in emotions and actions are yet invisible. The story also gives a rationalization for man's inclinations both to pre- serve his own household and to be deceptive in his actions. Both spirits and people are expected to pray to Allah and to obey his commands, although the Spirits are regarded as much.more faithful than their human counterparts. While the villagers often utter words of praise and of prayer to Allah, most regard him as remote and occa- sionally unsuSpecting of human caprice. But the spirits are very near, vigilant, and demanding in their roles as Allah's henchmen and as man's intercessors with Allah. Four spirit genres may be distinguished: the raafdanii and the malaa'iikfi, both of great concern to Muslims because of their supposed prOpinquity to Allah's ear, and the two varieties of iljaanuu: the bfiggii and the mhushee who are the focus of the religious attention among the.A’rna of Tudh. The number of béggii is beyond reckoning, it is said, but each area of Hausaland has a special relationship to a few bfiggii. In the village, I was consistently able to elicit a list of more than #0 bfiggii from infommants. Every A'rna villager claims to have inherited a relationship with two to as many as five bfiggii. This inheritance pattern is pre- dominantly patrilineal, although many said that they had inherited at least one béggii relationship from their mothers' agnates. One finds two varieties of local M: the mtggants and the M daa'dii, both of whom require annual animal sacrifices from those peOple who 106 claim a connection to them. In Tudfi the household heads ideally provide the sacrificial animals for all agnates born in the gidg. These animals are taken to the clan member whose clan role is to slay the animal, drain its blood onto the ground for the bfiggii to drink, and to give the carcass back to its bearer, who in turn roasts and distributes the meat for consumption within his giga. In return for these blood sacrifices, I was told, the mfiugfinta will be inclined not to bring disease and mis- fortune, whereas the maasiu daa'dii may bring abundant harvests, many children and vigorous health. The ideal is only occasionally realized as peOple do not regularly perform their sacrifices, complaining that they cannot afford the animals. Therefore they take their chances that the mfiugfinta will not seek revenge; but when misfortune does strike, the A'rna are quick to sacrifice an animal in order to limit or to reverse the effect of the mhughnta attack. The bfiggii are the focus of attention of an association, composed of 36 women and four men in the villages of Tudfi.and DutSE, who call them- selves the :yam bBorii (the béggii children). Membership to this group is limited to those who are believed to have been possessed by one or more of the béggii. The sign of possession is chronic chest and stomach pain highlighted by periods of hysteria. The symptoms, it is stated, can only be relieved when the subject is initiated into the :yam bBorii. The initiate learns how to control this possession and to please the bdorii by dancing publicly. The dances of the Vyam boorii take place sporadically: there were 20 such dances in 1968. It was explained to me that the :yam bBorii perform an extremely valuable service in the community: most of the villagers do not meet their sacrifice require- ments, and the bdorii become very diSpleased. The dances of the possessed 107 flatter the bBorii, for to them the dancing is a highly sensual experi- ence. This inclines them to overlook the failure of the villagers to sacrifice. The 'yam bborii may be viewed as a quasi-kinship group. Nearly all the members were born in distant villages and their ties to agnates have become minimal or no longer extant. The H QED-gr}; refer to each other as sister and brother, with seniority based on the length of membership in the association. Their chief, known as the Sarkin Baorii is referred to within the group as “household head”. Finally the members have the right to take grain from each other's bins when stores are ex- hausted. The _b_8_g_l;ii_ and the associations centering on them in Hausaland havebeen the subject of a nmber of lengthy analyses (e.g. Greenberg 1946, J. Nicholas n.d.. Tremearne 1914). In addition to the 3:93;. the urns of Tnda maintain an active belief in the existence of 13 spirits called ml‘iushee. It appears that the miushee spirits are important only to residents in the Tudfi area: inquiries elsewhere about their existence brought only stares of per- plexity. My inforsants stated that the miushee are soldier spirits who accompanied the French conquerors into the valley and who decided not to depart with the French. Their task in the valley communities is to protect the residents from overly vengeful p393; aui from deceitful men attempting to exploit or to harm others. Unlike the m. the mfimhee do not require sacrifices nor is a relationship to one heritable. Rather the miushee spirits, I was informed, choose a familiar who demon- strates soldier-like qualities: physical strength and integrity. This fellow is struck with bouts of lwsteria and head pains, a sign of spirit possession. His cure can come about only through joining the m mfiushee association and performing dances which please the miushee. 108 This association of 22 men is presently supervised by the flame boyant, charismatic Abdfi. He is regarded as the ultimate source of all knowledge on the minshee and is their only legitimate spokesman. I suspect that his understandings of the mfiushee borrow heavily from his experiences as a soldier for the Free French in World war 11.2 During the public dances of the Lygm,mfiushee, which occur about half as fre- quently as the dances for the bfiggii,.Abdu.leads his subordinates in progressively more difficult and more rapid steps. When the leader has become frenzied, he fills to the ground on his buttocks, spews saliva, then Jumps to his feet and lunges at the crowd, all the while swinging his short horsewhip. The terrified children flee while their elders chuckle nervously. At this juncture Ade: often shouts out revelations of wrong doing such as ”Aalii is sleeping with his brother's wife:", or ”The thief who stole Kurma's money is Mai Daaw3a3”, and "It is Hiawa's cows who trampled Miinuuds millet." 'When‘Abdfids frenzy ceases, he claims he knew nothing of what he had spoken, that in fact, the mfiushee were speaking through his possessed body. Abdfi, with his extremely perceptive mind, his occupation as a diviner-counselor, and his network of clients (the‘:z§m_mfiushee) is in a position to find out these wrong doings. Often his revelations become cases for the village moot, and if other evidence supports what he stated while supposedly spirit-possessed (this occurs about 60% of the time), Abdfi, his role, and the mfiushee gain legitimacy. From the per- Spective of any villagers-~particularly those who are Objects of his revelations--this legitimacy is regarded an uncontrolled power. They seek to impugn his credibility by pointing out his failures: some men regard.Abdfi.as a monstrous charlatan and refer to him as Abdu.Maahiukicii 109 (Abdfi, the crazy man). To this opposition, Abdfi coyly replies that he bears no malice; it is only the mfiushee who speak through him, a tactic that has produced a number of religious skeptics. The Muslims in Tudfi view the A'rna focus on the b§ggii and muushee Spirits as unfortunate. Like the A'rna, they too accept the existence of these Spirits without question; however. they maintain that their knowledge of Allah, obtained from maalams, has freed them from being con- cerned with the A'rna Spirits, so that they may concentrate their worship on the raafdanii, the maalda'iikfi, and Allah himself. Several Muslims told me that people who sacrifice animals will never see Allah's reward (i.e. heaven). The A'rna, on the other hand, state that the Muslims are correct in their religious practices; but the non-Muslims cannot quit sacrificing I was told, since Allah's first command is that sons should follow the "inheritance" of their fathers. There is no debate in the village on these issues and no attempt at proselytizing to either per- sPective. The groups get along well, and their daughters marry each other's sons, the wives taking on the religious customs of their husband's household. For many of the A'rna, however, Islam is identified with modernity, cities, and sophistication; and several dozen.A'rna men appear to be part of a process of conversion to practicing Islam: they sacri- fice to their Spirits when they must and also meet the Islamic require- ments of praying five times daily. I suSpect that their sons may choose the second "inheritance” in the years to come. 5.3 Notions about man. The Hausa maintain that man is persistently striving to maximize his personal interests, often to the detriment of social ends. 'When people gossip about a fellow villagers who has cheated someone else, one nearly always hears the utterance, "well, isn't that just human nature?” It is believed that the best protection the community 110 has against these tendencies is to keep actions public. The person who spends time by himself, talks to himself, and does not easily converse with others is suSpected of seeking to pursue his own private goals at his fellows' expense. When I pressed my informants to tell me why silence ani private actions are potentially hsmful, I was told that only sorcerers need privacy and desire no conversation. If a healthy child dies suddenly, or if some other similar mis- fortune strikes a household, the calamity is attributed to one of two sources. Either the household head has failed to propitiate a m which provoked its vengeance, or he is the object of a sorcerer's attack. A diviner then determines which of these is the actual cause of misfortune. Most often the diviner indicates a 133$ is diapleased, and to assuage its anger, an animal sacrifice is prescribed. Occa- sionally, however, the root of a man's trouble is identified as sorcery. The villagers could recount a total of only 42 instances over the previ- ous 67 years where sorcery has been divined as the source of misfortune. Sorcery is usually assumed to be the work of a neighbor or kinsman who has become a sorcerer by making a private agreement with lljana, the most fearsome 13933;. Such a person, it is believed, out of a desire to secure a good harvest of‘millet and sorghun without having to arrange the gm nomally required, initiates contact with Aljana by secretly taking a calabash of cow's milk to the bush and leaving it lthere for a few days. If when he returns there is no milk remaining, he is assured that Aljana has agreed to grant him the rich harvest he wants in return for a sacrifice of ”something with two legs”. After the person has had a good harvest, his bill falls due; he can pay Aljana with a rooster or a person. Here a person has a; moral choice: he can either sacrifice a lll rooster to.lljana or nominate a particularly troublesome neighbor or kineman-perhaps one he has quarreled with--for the béggii,to molest and mutually to kill and to eat. I was told that any person who refused to hire a ggyyg was miserly: such people are said to be so morally corrupt that they inwariably chose to give Aljana a human victim.rather than a rooster. Up to 1960, a diviner who determined that his client had been the object of a sorcerer's attack took his divination to the village moot. If the moot disagreed.with the divination, using such.evidence as the character of the accused and whether his crops had been good that.year, the diviner was told to do his divining more carefully, in which case he always prescribed a sacrifice to one of his client's b§g§ii. If, on the other hand, the moot agreed with the divination, the accused was taken to the ggrkii in Madaoua who either dismissed the case if the accused.paid him a fine of 4,0006FA or sent the accused to the village of’Gumbin.Kan5, nearly 80 kilometres west of Madaoua. There the accused.was given.swamp water to drink. If he vomited it, he demon? strated.his innocence: had the water been swallowed, he showed his guilt and had to pay the gggkii,8,000CEA. (I give a case of such an occurrence in 8.5.3). .According to my informants' accounts, some 22 villagers have been set to Gumbin.Kan3, and all but five were ”proven” guilty. Upon the return of the sorcerers to the village, there was no further punish- ment: howover, any person shown to be a sorcerer was feared and could never hold a village office. In 1960 a law was promulgated by the 5933-3913} which treated accusations of sorcery as defamations of character. .Anyone so defamed could take his accuser to Zuuzfiu’s court to be prosecuted. This act had 1.12 the effect in.Tudh of shunting off the moot's role in sorcery cases. For no longer did diviners dare make their charges of sorcery public, lest the ones so charged take them.to court under the new'law; Obviously sorcery beliefs could not be legislated out of existence, and new means were necessary to control sorcery in Tudu. tAs a prominent diviner,.Abdh. innovated a procedure for sorcery control which other diviners quickly adopted. If.Abdh.determined that his client were the object of a sorcer- er's attack, he would take him to the bush, wash him, and sacrifice a goat’and rooster to.lljana. The goat's blood, it is said, would cause Aljana to cease her molestations: the rooster sacrifice implored.l13ana both to avenge the client's misfortune in the sorcerer's household and to refuse to make a contract with the sorcerer again. On returning to the village, Abdfi.would initiate a whispering campaign against the sor- cerer,nwho learned of his indictment by ostracismi but he was powerless to seek redress in.Zuuzhu's court since no overt accusation of sorcery had been.made against him. Sorcery beliefs in Tudh.provide people with strong motivations to be gregarious and to avoid quarrels. One is hesitant to be silent, alone, or bickering, lest he be accused of being a sorcerer. Further, people are reticent to exacerbate quarrels, for they may become onscr- celed. 'While sorcery beliefs have these social control functions, I believe that the villagers pay a high.psychological price, since hostile emotions are relentlessly proscribed. 5.4 Notions of destigx. 5.h.1 Divination. Divination is the occupational Specialization of nine men in.TudEh These men, particularly the above mentioned.Abdfi, 113 are well known far beyond the village confines. An informal census of my neighbors and informants reveals that, on average, a man consults a diviner once a month, while wanen rarely visit one at all. The diviner's skills are to predict lucky days and to diagnose the cause of misfortunes, such as poor harvests, illnesses, deaths, and even bad luck. All the diviners claim to have guidance from the b§_o_r_i_i_ or miushee when they are actually making a divination. Abdu told me that his mother taught him the divining skills she had learned from her brother: other diviners likewise reported that they had acquired their talents from their mother's agnates. No aura of the supernatural envelopes the diviners: rather, they are regarded as craftsmen who have learned how to extract knowledge from the spirits. When a person wishes to consult a diviner, he simply goes to the diviner's household and asks the diviner to ”look into” things for him. The diviner invites the client inside his sleeping hut, ard alone the two probe into the cause for the client's visit. The client relates all he knows on the matter at hand, arr! the diviner interrogates him thoroughly. If the client is desirous of picking a luclqr day to travel, the diviner asks 25CFA, writes with his fingers on the ground, inter- prets the arrangement of the sand, and states confidently that, for example, "the 20th day of the month will be lucky if you are traveling south." The client then departs. If the matter concerns a misfortune of some kind that has struck the client's household, he and the diviner talk at great length on the subject, exploring every etiological possi- bility. The diviner then states the fee he will charge to make a divination. Customarily, the two then clicker a bit before the client pays about 25%, promising the rest when the difficulty has ceased. The 114 diviner then.writes on the sand or takes a long walk alone in the bush (where he supposedly talks with the spirits) before rendering his divina- tion. Most often the diviner identifies a spirit who is causing the misfortune and tells his client to take a sacrifice to his clan sacri- ficer or to consult a healer. The divination process serves a valuable psychotherapeutic function, for the diviner encourages his client to detail all his hostilities and to relate the events which brought them on. The client is motivated to reveal all that he knows, because he believes that the diviner can correctly diagnose his difficulties only when.he knows all that has occurred. Further, the client has the assurance that the diviner is pledged to secrecy. Divination then.may be viewed as the client's appor- tunity for personal catharsis. Indeed, the Hausas are well aware of this function and occasionally'joke about "frustrated people who consult diviners often". 5.4.2 Healigg. The village also numbers ten healers among its residents. Their occupation is to provide medicines (often powdered herbs and roots) for minor ailments and to sell potions and charms for sexual and financial success. Many have capitalized on the presence of the missionary hospital at Galmi by directing their patients to take both their medicine and the ”white man's medicine". ‘When their patients recover quickly, the healer collects a substantial fee. Abdu, who doubles as a diviner and as a healer, described to me his healings during Janur ary’l969; these are detailed in Table 7. 115 Table 7 Patient record of 11de during Jammry 1969 (translated from Abdfi's description) Patients Reason for visit Result _F_e_e_ l. Saalia's daughter She became Herbs given; BOOOCFA from Hayagaagi hysterical she recovered 2. lba'rti of Dutse Plagued by the Washed with henna, 7SOCFA boorii, Aljana sent to Galmi; she (chest pains) recovered 3. Barau Failure to have Powdered roots SOOCFA an erection sewn in belt. He recovered 1+. Bljumi Attacked by the Herbs given; she lOOOCFA bBorii. Izanzana recovered (back pains) 5. Allisin Failure to have Herbs given; BOOCFA an erection he recovered 6. 7.3111 of Laadama Attacked by the Washed with henna, 400cm Bljana (chest sent to Galmi; she pains) recovered 7. A'isheti of Attacked by the Washed with henna; HOOCFA Galma bdcrii, lljana she recovered (chest pains) 8. hagi Spitting up She drank powdered lOOCFA blood roots: she's paid as an better advance 9. 'Dan Diijee Attacked by the Washed with herbs; ZSOCFA boorii, Sirauniya he recovered (thigh pains) 10. Diijee Attacked by the Washed with henna; SOOCFA bBorii. Kuurii she recovered Wder pains) 5.4.3 Afterlife. The villagers' views on the afterlife are discre- pant. Muslims and those generally familiar with Islamic eschatology had a fairly clear set of beliefs, while most of the Afirna appeared to have no belief in life after death. The Muslims stated that after death, 116 a person's life leaves his body and goes to Allah's kingdom. There the raafianii take out their books on the individual to see if he has been true to his ”inheritance". They weigh his good works against his evil ones. Should the former outweight the latter, the person is dis- patched to hell and burned. For the one consigned to Allah's kingdom, he will be granted 70 wives, hoe only cool ground and be free of the iljinuu. ‘When I asked the A'rna about the afterlife, the most consistent response I received was the typical mocking-theéMuslims humor I heard daily, ”If one of our ancestors would come back and tell us, we could tell you; but if one has never seen an ancestor, how can he know that his ancestors are yet alive somewhere, much less what lies on the other side of death?" 2. 117 NOTES Each Spirit may be identified by the particular benefit or mis- fortune he or she brings. Anne, for example, is a mugunta who causes pains deep in the chest. Maalam Alhaaji as one of the maasuu daa' dii is able to help school children and maalams read well. Greenberg details the distinguishing characteristics of 69 bcorii in his ethnography of the Maguzaawaa (194600-39) . As evidence of the secretions of Abd1‘1's war eacperience to the nature of the m1‘1___u_§____hee, one might note that the dances of the 'amy amm1‘1ushee replicate military drilling. Abd1‘1 as head bellows such commands as "Allez. Vite, Vite'” "View”, and when one of his charges marches incorrectly, he shouts, "Ah, non, ce 11 'est pas ga'" The names of a few Spirits reflect a. French military origin: a. "Konmxardan" from Commandant b. "Kabran Sakitar" from Capitaine and Secretaire c. ”Brigadiyee" from Bridadier. Chapter Six Groupings by Residence and Descent Up to this point in the thesis I have treated Tudu as an undiffer- entiated whole. But in this and the subsequent two chapters I shall be considering the various groups, roles, and some of the individuals in the village. In this particular chapter, I shall direct attention to the principal organizational and orientational foci in Tudu, the groupings based on residence and on descent. The importance of each category of groups is not entirely uniform for all the villagers; in the dominant clanawhich controls the chiefship, for example, descent is more immediate as an_organizational basis than is residence. For the remaining village.clans, the idiom of social group differentiation is ”Si-dance e 6.1 Residenceggggpg. In this section, I shall consider the four levels of residential groups. The term.;gg§ki, the Hausa word for sleeping hut, is used to identify the smallest unit of residence. Several‘lgggkifs compose a household (gigg). The village households. in turn, are grouped into larger residential units that are also termed QIQA (I shall write the word for this larger unit with capital letters to differentiate it from the household). Each.§;QA'is located in one of the five wardsl into which the village is divided. 6.1.1 The 'daaki is typically occupied by a nuclear family, although more than 20% of village fathers have two or more wives each of whom live in separate 'daaki's. Thus some fathers belong to more than one nuclear family and 'daaki. 118 119 By physical appearance, most M's in the village are round, and generally about 12 feet in diameter. The base of the M is a mud well about four feet high, on which has been placed a cone-shaped thatch roof. Inside, one customarily finds two or three beds made from millet stalks. On one sleeps the father alone, on the second the mother sleeps, often with a suckling child, and on the third bed the pre-puber- ty children sleep. The Lda__a_k_i_ is an economic unit for the production, preparation, and consumption of food, having its own grain bin (s). The father has his own fields on which he, his wife,thdren, and clients work. In almost all cases, the mother has been given either by her father or by her hus- band a separate plot for which she alone is responsible, arrl whose craps she is free to sell for her own profit. The mother ani her daughters carry water and prepare the food, while the boys tend the chickens, goats, and sheep. The mother and her children eat their food jointly, while the father is given his food to eat separately, often with his friends or brothers . 6.1.2 The g'da. The next larger unit is the gage; or household, which the villagers regard as the most important unit of residence. If one were visiting the village and asked an inhabitant where he lived, he would reply with the name of his giggle. The household is generally named after the most senior male living there: a father or the eldest of brothers. Figure 4 depicts a typical ,gig‘, although this is somewhat larger than most. The gi_._d_a;_ goes through a cycle of growth and segmentation, which I describe by beginning at the form that the Hausa regard as ideal. This gida is based on an extended family, with the father as household head. 120 The numbers on the kinship chart are keyed to their referants' sleeping location in the compound. The asterisk signifies a cooking hut. Circles with no numbers are grain bins. The rectangular figures in the compound denote mud-roofed struc- tures, while the circular numbered figures exemplify thatched structures. The gida is enclosed with a millet-stalk fence. Scale is 12250. Figure 4 Gida of the Village Chief, Kiaka 121 His wives, sons, and unmarried daughters reside there, as do his sons' wives and their children. The household head's mother might live in his 5:133, along with a divorced sister and perhaps a client. When the father dies, his eldest son generally becomes the next head of the gig; however, his brothers have been given their inheritance of farm plots at their father's death, and there are few restraints keeping them from segmenting off to form their own households. The brothers who remain as one gidggafter their father has died are praised as models of brother- ly behavior. That they are singled out for comendation makes it appar- ent that such a circumstance is not common. Indeed, on July 15,"-1968, only 12 households in Tud1‘1 contained all the living sons of a deceased father. Six months later, all but three of these had segmented. In sum. the gig structure appears to change as follows: (1) extended family; (2) joint family for a short time; (3) family with one married man, his wife (wives), and children; and (4) an extended family again. The gi_d_a_ does not usually segment all at one time. Rather, some brothers may build millet stalk fence between their sleeping huts and grain binsiand those of other brothers, rendering the gig}; two separate households. Later, brothers within each of these two segments may further divide their joint residence. The reasons given for segmenting are generally two: conflict over farm plot boundaries or pique because one brother took too much grain from his Brbther's bins. There seems to be yet another more fundamental incentive for residential unit cleav- age, and that is the great prestige of being a household head. Until a man heads a household, he is not considered to be fully mature. since he is dependent on a brother or father. It is considered a grievous breach of respect to segment the gig; while the father lives, and I re- corded only two cases of it occurring. 122 ‘In terms of function, the gigs; is the primary unit of food produc- tion, whereas the nuclear families are the units of consumption. The household head controls a number of farm plots. Over the years, with the labor of his dependents , he has cleared and cultivated new farm plots in order to provide enough food for his growing household. .At the same time he often assigns his sons particular sections to produce their own food. However, they are obliged to work on his plots in addition to their own. ‘When a man dies, his sons exercise usufruct rights over their own sections, and his plots are divided between his sons and unmarried daugh- ters (with sons receiving equal shares and daughters receiving half- shares). The grain a man harvests from his section he stores in his own M's grain bins. The household head generally harvests more than heads of the nuclear families in the gid_a_, and should thedependent brothers or sons run out of grain before the next harvest, they may freely take from the household head's bins. In actual practice, brothers accuse the head of being stingy with his grain and the household head chafes with his brothers over the quantity of grain they remove from his bins. Each has a good incentive to preserve his own supply, for at the new harvest, the grain from the previous harvest may be sold, with the profits going solely to the M of the grain bin. Aside from its economic functions, the gig; as a unit annually gives sacrificial animals to the matsiafii (priest) of the household head's clan. Further the household head kills arooster at the entrance to the household's compound at the Id-el-Kabir festival. Both the rooster and the other sacrificial animals are generally the property of the household head or of his wives. He may request a deperdent's animal, however. The sacrifices are considered as protection against 123 the spirits causing disease, death, and misfortune for all the members of the gidg whether they belong to the clan of the gidg head or not. Finally, the household functions in the regulation of marriage to the extent that marriage is proscribed with another member of the gidg, and sexual intercourse between non-Spouses is considered incest whether the household members are related or not. 6.1.3 The GIDA. The third unit of residence is rather loosely defined and merges with being a descent group. As noted before, this unit is also called a 912A and is a composite of distinct gidg_whose heads regard themselves as brothers. The villagers, of course, use the same word for both.meanings, although the context generally clarifies their reference. The QIQA households may be located adjacent to one another, although in many cases when a gidg segments, enough space is not immediately available and a new gigg will have to be constructed elsewhere. Yet these gidg, however far removed from each other they may be Spatially, are still termed a gggg. This unit has but one economic function: when the grain stores of one household are exhausted, its head may borrow grain from another glgfl_household, and repay that grain without interest at harvest. Its other functions I consider in the next section when the GIDA is analyzed as a descent group. 6.1.4 The ward. Several QIQA are customarily joined in wards, which are mere Spatial units and have no corporate functions, although a ward's residents often regard themselves to be more closely related than with residents of other wards. Between.wards is an Open Space, generally used as a path. Historically, the wards of Saabon.G5ari, Hayagaagi, Kala'bfi, and Milleela have actually been moved to different 124 locations (see 4.4). Whereas the QED; is considered both as a residence and as a descent group, the ward is not in any way a descent group. As a household grows, clients are often acquired. Some move into their patron’s gigs, and when the patron dies, the client sets up his own gigs, often nearby. These clientS' households are not considered part of the QIQA which ensued from the segmenting of a gigg between brothers; however, they form part of the ward. 6.2 Descent grogps. Overlapping the obvious agnatic bases of the gig; and.§12§_residence groups are the groupings of descent: the clan and clan segment. M. G. Smith has written of the Hausa of Nigeria that, "despite the agnatic basis of domestic groups..., Hausa kinship is pre- vailingly bilateral, except among the political aristocracy and urban Muslim intelligensia" (l965:147,l48). Elsewhere he states that Hausa descent is "markedly bilateral" (1954121). On the other hand, Greenberg, in referring to the Maguzaawaa HauSa, writes that The widest social grouping based on kinship is the patrilineal sib. Though sibs are not closely localized, there is a tendency for one sib to be the dominant group in a given.locality. Since there are many sibs, the membership in.any of them is quite small, being sometimes not.more than three or four compounds with a total population of about 100 individuals. The sib performs no political function: there are no sib meetings or officers. The sib also lacks any discernible religious function. The fact that in the main the members of a sib worship the same dieties is because rites are inherited in the same patrilineal line as the head- ship efficach compound, so that Since all the members of the same sib have presumably the same descent, they also worship the same Spirits (Greenberg 1946322). Where Smith asserts that descent is reckoned bilaterally, Greenberg implies that descent is unilineal, since patrilineal clans are found. I believe that this contradiction is more apparent than real. Smith him- self stated that bilaterality does not hold among the political 125 aristocracy. The data I collected in Tud1‘1 support the statements of both Smith and Greenberg. ‘Where competition was acute for political roles, the ideology and practice of patrilineal descent reckoning were present. Where such competition was lacking, residential groups became the primary units or orginization and orientation, with the consequence that descent groups and descent reckoning were unintportant. The units of descent groupings are not easily factored out from those of resi- dence. There are two terms which the villagers used consistently to imply agnatic groups: saari'i, which I translate as clan, and .G__IDA, which I gloss as clan segment. I have imputed these English meanings on the basis of the structure and function of these groups in Tudfi although other authorities on the Hausa have given different meanings. Abraham in his dictionary (1962) translates gu_1;i_'_e_ (same word as zaari'i but in the dialect of Kano Hausa) as "descendents” or "offSpring”. Smith, likewise, translates the word as "issue" and inplies that a saari'a‘. includes all ”those tracing descent to him (a man) through females as well as males” (1965:148). 6.2.1 The clan. I identify the saari'i as a clan because virtu- ally any villager, when he identifies a person as an agnate, but is unable to trace all the linkages of kinship joining them, states that they belong to the same saari'i. A few of the older men are aware of all the linkages, but this knowledge is not generally known. My identi- fication of the zaari'i as a clan follows the criteria most anthropolo- gists use to denote a clan (although Murdock uses the term ”sib”). The zaari'i is identified by name: that of either the founder or of an important male agnate still living. Each saari'a‘. has an occupational Specialisation for its male members. Further, each zaari'i includes one 126 Table 8 Village Clans Clan Number of clan members Population who are household heads Ma'kiiri" 67 632 M1‘1uhamm5n 20 187 Allakai 11 120 Maalim 5 68 Gwaani 4 35 Si'iid1‘1 3 111 Bagirbi 2 17 Mai Taguwa 2 22 (Client households) 8 49 *The clan names given here are the founders' names; they are not con- sistently used, and often merely the name of a prominent member will suffice to identify the clan. man, a matsiafii, to whom clan members bring animals for sacrifice. Fin- ally, the highly valued office of village chief is the sole possession of one clan. The census in Table 8 shows the numerical preponderance of the blacksmiths of Ma'kiiri clan. It is this clan which "owns" the chiefship and after which the village draws its name. This evidence corroborates Greenberg's statement that ”there is a tendency for one sib to be the dominant group in a given locality" among the non-Muslim or Maguzaawaa Hausa (1946:22). Only the Ma'kiiri and Mfiuhammin clans are localized in Tudfi. The other clans I have listed in Table 8 are only segments and their "brother” segments in other villages are virtually non-existent. The history of the village reveals a process of individual client- ship primarily to members of the Ma'kiiri clan.which has given rise to the formation of other village clans. Na'alli and his younger brother Gwiaya, both sons of Ma'kiiri, the largest clan's founder, came to Tud1‘1 from Gilma with their dependents and built their household. They were both blacksmiths, and they practiced their occupation in their gida. Two 127 tanners from Gilma came and attached themselves to Na'alli. From these clients has descended the clan called M1‘1uhamm5n. The makai and 1451 Taguwa clan segments likewise have their beginnings in clientship. Both these men fled wars between the Tuareg and.the Adaraawaa in the north and became clients of Jimrau.who succeeded Na'alla as village chief. Gwaani's origin is not known, although he became client to a household head in the Muuhammin clan. Members of the Maalim clan do not claim a common descent; only a common occupation. Three of its five household heads claim the Same father. He and the heads of the remaining two households each came to Tudfi and became prestigious clients of Jimrau. Presently, there are eight households headed by clients of still other household heads. I SXpect their descendants will form clan segments over time. sa'iidn and Bagirbi clan segments do not fit this clientship pattern. After hearing Sd'iidh, Sd'iidfils mother divorced her husband in Ada'r, came to Tudfi, and married Jimrau, bringing her son with her. Sa'iidfi grew up in Jimrau's household and was treated as a sister's son by Jimrau. The Bigirbi clan segment has similar beginnings. Bigirbi's wife divorced him and took her two Sons to Tudfi where she married a patrilateral parallel cousin of the chief. 'While the origins of the smaller clans rest in clientship. these clans should not be regarded as client clans, as I obtained no evidence of contemporary subordination on the basis of the former client-patron relationship between individuals. The members of the smaller clans do not think of their clans as a unit apposable to the Ma'kiiri clan; thus I have refrained from terming the clan differentiation as either phratries or moities. 128 6.2.2 ghe clan sew. Within the village, the clans of Ma'kliri and Muuhammin are composed of several local clan segments2 or’glgg, As I pointed out above, the term etymologically denotes a household. Yet, while the original gigg_divides residentially into still other gigg, which may be some distance apart, the brothers who initiated the segmenting are still collectively referred to as a.§;Q§, even though the term no longer implies residential proximity and economic interdependence. In this con- text then. the term.§;2§ refers to a group of brothers who claim the same father and to their agnatic offspring; hence. it may preperly be labeled a descent group. Of all the village clans. only the Ma'kiiri clan.members maintain sharp genealogical separations among their various clan segments. In other clans, these segmental distinctions are unimportant, and a person more than likely will not be sure whether his father's father belonged to one particular QIQ§_or another. He will simply state that he like his father's father, belongs to such - and - such a clan. The difference in genealogical concerns between the Ma'kiiri and other clans is a result, I believe. of different clan functions. The Ma'kiiri clan corporately owns the chiefship, and competitions for it occur only'betueen.members of this clan. Other clans do not have such corporate property and func- tion.merely as occupational guilds. The genealogical relations of the Ma’kiiri clan segments are outlined in Figure 5. While its role as the possessor of the village chiefship sharply distinguishes the Ma'kiiri clan from the other village clans in terms of function. the competitions for contrcl of the chiefship point up their differences in structure. ‘Within the village. the only hard and fast rule for succession eligibility to the chiefship has been membership in 129 'DAN BAA'U (9).?!1 r-Gwfiaya TMATAU (Hayagaaga) -Mn wins.“ (u) .53; _Damodo ——-- DOODOO ($.22 Ma'kiiri—u (founder) LGAUCI (2) ,2 e 'DAN GEEGEE (12) .gg LNa'alli e NOOMOO (23) .lZl bNARUWA (2),gl MAI WAAKEE (£0.22 L-Jimrau Km (3).22 Notes: a. Capital letters denote the names of the clan segments existing presently. b. The numbers in parentheses indicate the total number of house- holds affiliated to the segment. c. The underlined numbers refer to the clan segment's population. Figure 5 Clan Segments of the Ma'kiiri Clan 130 the Ma'kiiri clan. Many informants stated that a preference exists for an incumbent's eldest lineal son, while others said the younger brother of the incumbent would be the more likely candidate for the chiefship. The actual history of succession to the chiefship displays no clear rule of agnatic succession; in fact, the French intervened in.l926 to install a chief of their own choice. Yet this appointee (Kiaka) has been able to maintain his control of the chiefship only by competing effectively for support within the village. As competitions for support have developed in the history of the village, the various clan segments of the dominant clanthave been beset by two sets of forces: those of uniting with other segments and those of competing with still others. In the competition for the control of the chiefship, leaders (whether the chief or aSpirants to his office) seek to ally their own QIQA with weaker clan segments and to oppose segments wherein a leader has the same ambition. The most common form of making alliances within the clan.has been the arranging of patrilater- al cousin marriages. Such marriages often occur between members of dif- ferent clan segments. although many take place within the same QIQA, Their function is to assert or strengthen defunct or weakened ties between brothers, whether actual or classifactory. Kiaka once confided that he arranged for his daughter to marry his own patrilateral parallel cousin, Boys. in order to show he considered Boyd to be a brother. qu3 claims he ani Kiaka belong to the same 995 since their respective fathers were brothers. His use of the term.§;2grdoes not reflect a struc- tural change. rather it is the idiom of alliance. Alliances with other QIQA.both‘within and without the Ma'kiiri clan.are also formed on the basis of the three remaining fonns of cousin marriage. 131 Thus in Tudh, both the reality and ideolog of patrilineal descent groupings are associated with political competition. In clans where such competitions is lacking, the ideology of agnation is largely absent, and the residential unit of the g_i_d_a_ is more important functionally to clan members than the descent units of zaari'i and §_ID_A. Such an arrage- ment allows us to clarify the apparent contradiction posed at the begin- ning of this section between statements by Smith and by Greenberg. Smith wrote that Hausa kinship is bilateral "except among the political aristoc- racy“ (19653148). While the Ma'kiiri clan is not in any sense regarded as a royal or aristocratic clan in Tudh, it functions as one, and its uni- lineal descent reckoning is more pronounced because of its political can- petitions than is partilineality in other village clans. Greenberg found patrilineal sibs among the Maguzaawaa Hausa (1946322), arfi in a later publication, he wrote that the ”pagan” Hausa on conversion to Islam lose clan functions: exoganw, land owning features, names, and political roles (1914?). Therefore Tudt‘l may be excepted from Smith's statement about the predominantly Muslim Hausa of Nigeria on the grounds that the village residents, for the most part, have not converted to Islam, or we may treat Smith's , exception for political aristocracies as applying to the Ma'kiiri clan. 132 NOTES 1. I mentioned in Chapter 4 that Hayagaaga is a sixth and semi-autono- mous ward. The national government regards it as apart of the village of Tudfi; the villagers, however, maintain that it is separate, and I follow the villagers' point of view. 2. I have used the term "clan segment" rather than the more ordinary term ”lineage”. I do this for the reason that a lineage connotes cleavages between collaterals at some point in time, and closer»links with closer collaterals and.weaker ties to more distant collaterals. This is not the case in Tudu. ‘A strong cleavage may occur between'brothers in a.GIDA: each segment then builds alliances with collaterals in other»GIDA, whether these collaterals be close or distant. The resulting blocs are termed GIDA as well. Chapter Seven Social Roles In this chapter I shall consider a number of disparate phenomena whose only common denominator is reflected in the title above. I discuss first those roles individuals normally perform as members of kinship groups. Then I treat the customary behaviors eXpected of individuals in the marriage process and with affines. Third, I describe the dyadic roles that patrons and clients normally have, as well as what is expected of persons who are joined to others on the basis of reciprocal gift exr changes. Fourth, the normative roles that are based on one's age and sex come under scrutiny. I conclude with a consideration of the roles that are a function of time. 7.1 Kinship roles. The most significant relationships for individ- uals in Tudfi are those Joining a person to his kinsmen and to his affines. Even relations between non-relatives are construed in the idiom of kinship and affinity. The study of these relationships, it seems to me, can be done best by’a description of the kinship terminology and by a discussion of the various roles which the different kinship terms denote. 7.1.1 Kinship terminolggy. There are several features about the Hausa kinship system which defy its ready classification into categories generally used by anthrOpologists. It has been axiomatic in social an- thrOpology that kinship terminology evidences social structure, although Robert.Murphy has dissented from this viewpoint in his well-argued essay on Tuareg kinship (1967). The terminology used by the residents of Tudfi does not reflect the reckoning of patrilineal descent. Greenberg noted 133 134 this feature of the Maguzaawaa Hausa when he wrote that "the emphasis on the paternal line, so marked in all aspects of Maguzawa social life, receives no Special recognition in the kinship terminology” (1946:19). The terms are given in Figures 6, 7, 8, and 9 and are based on a male ego. For a female ego, the terminology is exactly the same, except where male ego refers to his wife as mitaataa, a female ego refers to her husband as mijinaa. As can be deduced from the figures, the terminology is Iroquoisan at ego's generation, (using Murdock's schema 19493223), whereas at all other generations, only the criteria of generation and sex distinguish consan- guines. However, relative age differentiates how one addresses men referred to as‘figbgg. Only those affines who are classificatory parents to ego's wife and those of ego's own generation are distinguished from consanguine relatives. Elsewhere affines are merged with egofs kindred. The greater degree of descriptive kinship terminology in ego's generation indicates an intensity of role differentiation for these relatives. In fact, as I pointed out in Chapter 6, extended and joint families divide between brothers, and competitions for political roles are cause for much of this fission. Those terms are similar to those Greenberg gives for the Maguzaawaa (1946220); however, in his schedule, the terms gag, yég, :kgni, and Lkggg§,('kaun§) apply both to ego's siblings and to his cross and parallel cousins: whereas in Tudh.these terms are confined to siblings and parallel cousins. Finally, I should add that the terms given in.the charts are extended so far as one can trace a connection. The long-standing propinquity and dominance of the Tuareg might account for the adoption of Tuareg-like terms for cross-cousins. Nicolai- sen gives the terms abubaz (m) and tabuazat (f) for the Kel Ferwan Tuareg 135 elder elder younger younger sister brother brother sister [ClN' (i) (:>= _44£§ lékl-_f Z45»: <:) ‘zf: magaajii maagaa- 'kane saraa- 'kauna sunri- Jiiyn . 'kii 4; d0 .9..- $1.9..- 9.5%... ..Q. faari kuuwaa kuuwaa ikii Adi) A23) 6) A jikanyi jiika jiika jikanyi jiika jikanyi jikanyi jiiki * This term applies to the first son ego and his wife procreate. If the first child were a girl, the term would be 'giya t; farin. Figure 6 Terms of Reference for Collaterals and Descendants father's younger sister father's younger brother ||———— Quake father's elder sister father's elder brother 'diiya Notes: a. The terms idg and 'diiya are used for all relatives who are genealogically one generation below ego. b. Terms of reference are in lower case letters; whereas terms of address are in capital letters. For all generations other than that of ego's parents. ego addresses his kinsmen by name. Figure 7 Terms for Patrilateral Relatives mother ' s elder sister mother ' s elder brother 0 Kicks Q n... Notes: mother' s younger sister mother ' s younger brother 137 2m“ —( )yfia l—< I we I I? fiuba msiaji [—0 'dliya Q miagaajiiya waa F—O tibbazniya ‘uba ll 2313A Q tabbashl l [—u 0 tibbazniya J—‘Q 'da INNR ‘fi—tabbishi LO 'dliya —O 'kauni II in? sfiuriikii 'Q'fiuba O saraakuuwaa [__Q 'da l BAABA r —<] Ikgne l—O . diiya -O tibbazniya fl 'da hubs 'L' . L BAABA Q tabbashi —L_O 'diiya r O tibbazniya uuwaa ll INNJl tabbishi uuwaa INNR ll '1 a. The terms _'_d_g_ and 'diiya are used for all relatives who are genealogically one generation below ego. b. Terms of reference are in lower case letters: whereas terms of address are in capital letters. For all generations other than that of ego's parents, ego addresses his kinsmen by name. Figure 8 Terms for Matrilateral Relatives 138 (1936:451), while Miner lists the terms ababash and tababasht for the Timbuctoo Tuareg (1953:160), and Murphy states that the Kel Oui Tuareg use the terms fibubgg_and tabubaz for cross-cousins (1967:168). These are quite close to the Hausa tahhashi and tibbazniya. In fact, while the Hausa of the former emirates of Kano and Zaria, as described by Greenberg and Smith, possess Hawaiian-type terminology, the Hausa of Tudfi and their Tuareg neighbors use terms which may be classed as Iro- quoisan. The acculturative influences of Islam and the Tuareg on the Tudfi.Hausa are fascinating topics: however, they are beyond the sc0pe of the present analysis. At this juncture, I merely point out the differ- ences between Nigerian Hausa terms and those used by the Tudfi.Hausa, and posit the linguistic origin of the villagers' terms for cross cousins. There are a number of factors which tend to minimize the divisive nature of conflicts between kinsmen, eSpecially brothers. One is the joking, conversing, and avoidance paradigm (see Radcliffe—Brown 1952). This is a set of role behaviors which reinforce the hierarchical ranking of ego's relatives, so that no one in ego's household occupies a kinship status that is structurally equivalent to his. Another factor, to be taken up below, is the preference for parallel cousin marriage. 7.1.2 The_joking,gconversation, and avoidance_paradigm. The villa- gers often class relatives according to the behavior that is expected to Operate between them: 333g}; (playing), for relatives one jokes with; hiirgg (talking), for relatives one may converse with, but never jokingly; and koomiya (modesty, reSpect), for those with whom one avoids contact. These behaviors are reciprocal. One may generalize that waggii is appro- priate between relatives of alternate generations, cross cousins, and between those affines referred to as magaajii, maagaajiiya, ialigishi. 139 Hiiggg applies to Spouses, siblings, parallel cousins, and kinsmen of parents' generation, and all kinsmen of ego's children's generation. However, between parents and their first child, there is koomiya. Koomiyi relations also obtain between affines referred to by the terms saraakuuwa and siuriikii. 7.1.2.1 The joking relations have been formally merged with the Is- lamic custom of shaaraa, where during the month after Ramadan, a person may demand up to lOCFA from any and each of his matrilateral cross-cousins and his maternal grandparents. Further, one jests deprecatingly with cross cousins and grandparents throughout the year. Analytically, we may say that these joking relations exist between people who have little occasion to come into conflict. Either they live in separate households, or if they live in the same household, their great difference in ages rules out common interests over which they might conflict. ‘While in the abstract, my informants denied that joking relations exist between a person and FaSi and MoBr, their own joking behavior toward these relatives and towards BrSo, BrDa, SiSo, and SiDa contradicted their statements. 7.1.2.2 Conversation relations. The hiiggg relations are colored by the juxtaposition of relative age as a determinant of role behavior. Between half and full siblings, there is a great deal of common interest, particularly for the males. Their intimacy in residential and working areas makes the practice of avoidance impossible, and there is the very great possibility (and actuality) of conflict. A mild avoidance is in play which calls for no jesting or accusations, and for the use of the im- personal subject or passive voice in conversations. Also mitigating con- flict are the age distinctions. Younger siblings are expected to defer to elder siblings, whether collateral or classificatory. Any older siblings 140 should help younger siblings in bridewealth arrangements. These sibling behaviors are extended to parallel cousins: however, the seniority distinction is based on the relative age of the linking relatives (fathers or mothers) regardless of the relative ages of the parallel cousins them- selves. H_i_._i_r_a_a_ behavior is expected between peOple whose statuses are labeled fiu_b_a_ and w and those termed _1_d_a_ and Lilia. Tensions often exist between fathers and sons for the sons are anxious to divide their father's household after they become married and thereby become household heads themselves, thus pre-empting their father's role and relegating him to the status of tsoohoo or old man. The effusion of aw infonnants' denials of such ambition only serves to confirm the existence of such goals. However, like the relationship between siblings, age is to be deferred to. One of the solutions to these conflicting centripetal- centrifugal tendencies is ,patrilateral parallel cousin marriage which tends to retard the functional bifurcation of a man's extended family, and reasserts the tsoohoo's position as family head. Between children and their parents' collaterals, the relationships are much less formal and appear to border on joking. The relationship to mother and her kins- men is regarded as h_i_i_r;a_g, but the tie is without the strains of the father-son relationship. However, relations are not of the joking variety. More than any other relationship, Hausas eXpress emotionally positive words about mothers . Frequently a mother lives with her s one after she has been widowed. 7.1.2.3 Avoidance relationjg. The avoidance or koomiyi relations obtain between parents and their first child and between ego and those he refers to as shuriikii and saraakuuwa. The first child avoidance is a 141 typically Islamic feature and may reflect both the first son's likelihood of succeeding his father in his father's institutionalized roles and the incipient mutual antagonism that this possibility entails. This avoid- ance is expressed in the Spatial separation of parents and their first child, who ideally, after weaning and until marriage lives with its maternal grandmother. The rationalization for this common practice (52% of a sample of first children in the village told me they lived with a person called kégkg in their childhood) is that the mother's mother is lonesome and needs a daughter's child to remind her of her daughter. This joking, conversation, and avoidance paradigm reflects how the Hausa categorize the behaviors one is expected to assume vis-a-vis vari- ous relatives, and while the schema generally holds true in actual role performances, there are some discrepancies. For example the category of behavior labeled hiiggg is much closer to avoidance than to joking in its normative expressions. The difference between hiiggg and koomiya be- haviors lies in the fact that with the former rule individuals perforce have a great deal of contact (e.g. brothers) and the actual physical avoidance prescribed by the latter norm would be impossible to practice. 7.1.3 The behavior-label discrepancies. 'While it is generally un- derstood in social anthrOpology that ego has very similar relationships with those peOple he refers to by the same term (according to the dogma that a kinship term is a role label), the data I have collected in Tudti show a number of discrepancies between terms and behavior, and between the hypothetical statements by informants and their own behavior. In the village, for example. one refers to cross cousins' children by the same terms for one's lineal children. Yet, in actual behavior, people treat all their cross cousins' descendants as cross cousins and frequently 142 marry them, a relationship totally proscribed and non-existent with lineal descendants. Further, parallel cousins are referred to by the same terms as siblings: however, there exists a strong preference for patrilateral parallel cousin marriage. These discrepancies suggest to me that we social anthrOpologists should not expect terminological and behavioral congruencies in kinship roles, rather, that the lack of fit suggests either changing structural relationships and role redefinitions or that behavior may not always conform to cultured programming. Merely attributing such cases to "cultural lag" seems to be an unsatisfactory answer, for it begs the ques- tion of the processes of changes in kinship systems. Murphy has advanced the notion that "kinship terms are neither mere labels of social status nor simple expressions of basic binary distinctions in the cognitive map of the family. Rather, they may also serve to mask and counterfeit social relationships and thus function to conceal from their users the social system as it actually operates” (Murphy 19673164). It appears to me that in Tudfi, the ideology of extended family unity is preserved with the extension of sibling terms to parallel cousins, and extended family end- ogamy (patrilateral parallel cousin marriage) reinforces this unity in the face of strong fissive tendencies in households where there is com- petition for political roles. 7.2 Marriage roles. The normative roles between husband and wife (or wives) are much the same as those described by Smith for the Hausa of the Zaria Emirate (1965:142-147): however, the Islamic custom of wife seclusion is not practiced. In detailing these roles, I shall present first some census data and their interpretations: then I shall discuss the process of getting married, and finally the husbanddwife and codwife roles themselves. 143 7.2.1 Selecting a Spouse. 7.2.1.1 [Expgamygand endogamy norms.» AS may be deduced from Table 9, there is a mild statistical preference for obtaining wives from outside the village. However, villagers state hypothetically that a marriage between two residents of the same village is better, because it streng- then ties between their reSpective extended families. Yet, when I asked men from whence they preferred to take their wives, they replied that women from other villages are better. because they would not easily be running off to their own kinsmen in times of squabbles with their husbands. Further, when marrying a woman from outside one's village, one is not Table 9 Natal Residence of'Wife tVillage Raw total Percentgge (all) 287 10013 Tush 116 40% Other villages in the area: 7O 25% Dutai 14 ' Irfiufwa .5 Saabon Gida 1 Areewa 7 Gabis 23 Gide 8 Hayagaagi 11 Zango 1 Villages outside the immediate area 101 35% worried with avoiding the affines referred to by the terms sunriikii and siriakuuwaa. 'When I inquired of these same men whether they would prefer to have their daughters marry outside or inside the village. their re- sponse may be summarized with, ”If she married outside the village, who of her kinsmen would be able to defend her interests if She got into trouble with her affines?” The statistical data seem to reflect these 1H4 contradictory preferences: the choices are nearly evenly Split between exogamy and endogamy. Nearly all wives move to their husbands' households on.marriage. Some women. who have been widowed or divorced and who live with and are dependent economically on their children. become married again and do not move to their new husbands' household. The husband already has at least one wife in his own household who prepares his food. and he treats his more recent wife who lives elsewhere with periodic visits and with small gifts. In only one case in five did this sort of marriage result in childbirth. For the most part. the women are beyond their menopause when such marriages are made. Table 10 Spouse Preferences Relationship of spouses Raw Total E ressed as Egpgessed as § g of total of kin marriages All marriages 287 100% Non-kinsmen 204 71% Kinsmen 83 29% 100% Patrilateral parallel 52 18% 63% *cousins Patrilateral cross 9 3% 11% cousins Matrilateral parallel 7 3% 8% cousins Matrilateral cross 15 5% 18% cousins *Ego is male While this is no clear tendency for either village exogamy or village endogamy. one must marry outside the household. Mating with anw'member of a household is considered incest. and I recorded no cases of such cir- cumstances. Table 10 shows that the people of Tudfi in seven out of ten 145 cases marry non-kinsmen. Of those marriages where kinsmen marry, patri- lateral parallel cousin predominates. 7.2.1.2 Cousin.marriage. The selection of Spouses has several facets which.must be covered. First. virtually all the several.dozen peeple I questioned on the matter stated that the best marriage was between cross cousins. One's affines are thus one's kindred. and avoid- ance rules are not in force; in fact. one jokes with all cross cousins. Further. the bridewealth exchange is greatly reduced. 'Why then do cross cousin marriages account for only 8% of the total number of village marriage if they are so highly valued? Typically. the rights to select a spouse are reserved to father's elder brother. He should arrange a marriage which strengthens an extended family's economic. political. or prestige position; however. the marriage should stand a good chance of lasting. Since there are few sanctions preventing two people who refuse to remain.married from obtaining a divorce. father's elder brother strong- 1y suggests a spouse to his younger brother's child. but he rarely forces a marriage between these two peOple. Obviously. as the advantages of an arranged marriage increase in importance. the more forcefully will father's brother press his brother's child to comply with his choice. Bridewealth traditionally has been raised by the members of several house- holds. whose heads were related collaterally. for one of their sons. Since the man had few if any other sources of income, he accepted his father's brother's selection of a spouse. and the bridewealth was quickly raised and conveyed to the kinsmen of the bride. More and more frequently. such leverage cannot be used. since men are able to raise the bridewealth virtually alone by working in one of the large West African cities during dry season (see 3.4). 'This independence is partially reflected in the 146 declining percentage of marriages between kinsmen; however. sometimes cross cousins will marry of their own accord. Marriages between matrilateral parallel cousins are infrequent and reflect. for the most part. the choices of the marriageables themselves. Patrilateral parallel cousin marriage. on the other hand. is a signifi— cant village phenomenon. accounting for 18% of all marriages and 63% of all marriages between kinsmen. The great majority of these marriages are between a man and a woman whose fathers are brothers; in most of the rest the links are grandfathers who are brothers. Patrilateral parallel cousin marriage does not occur between kinsman who live in the same household. Two cultural sanctions exist in this marriage form to motivate the couple to accept their fathers' brothers' selection. A man.dishonors the tie his father and father's brother have if he refuses to marry the lat- ter's daughter and is considered an enemy of extended family harmony if he does not contribute to the extended family's solidarity by reinforcing it with a marriage to his father's brother's daughter. The second sanc- tion relates to the integrity of the status of old man as tsoohoo. .A man. it is said. does not like to see his descendant extended family segment into joint families. An old man whose grandchildren go against the fissive tendencies by rejoining lineal groups in their act of patrilateral 'parallel cousin marriage is highly respected. Many individuals who are partners in such marriages have told me they yearn for divorce. but that it will be postponed until their father's father dies. so as not to dis- honor his waning days. Turning from a cognitive to a structurally analytic preSpective I have found that the incidence of patrilateral parallel cousin marriage.is 147 diSprOportionately high in the Ma'kiiri clan which "owns" the village chiefship. The figures presented in Table ll demonstrate this difference. It is my belief that marriages between patrilateral cousins become more Table 11 Patrilateral Parallel Cousin.harriage Census Clan Number of patrilateral Total marriaggg. Percentage: the parallel cousin_IPPglg in clan ratio of PFC marriages marriages to all marriages Allikai 2 26 7.7% Mai Taguwa 0 3 0% Baagirbix O 2 0% si'iidh 1 10 10% Maalam 2 13 15.4% award. 0 7 0% Mfiuhamman 6 48 12% Ma'kiiri 1+1 145 29% frequent when competition between clan segments increases. In the case of the Ma'kiiri clan. competitions for the chiefship have divided some brothers' descendants. while leading other brothers to form alliances by arranging patrilateral parallel cousin marriages. This is discussed at length in Chapter 6. The Hausa describe marriage with a cousin.as ggmggizfimfinta: this category is segmented into two types of marriages: ggmi or forced and 8332313 or love. At first glance one is tempted to simply equate gag; marriages with the parent categony. zfimfinta. However. the terms do not clearly denote the actual behavior. In actuality sByayza marriages are those where the partners have not given strong objection to the marital arrangements made by their respective fathers' brothers. 9&2; marriages. on the other hand. are those where the couples sternly cpposed the union. Most patrilateral parallel cousin.marriages fall into this latter category. 148 7.2.2 The wedding process. The wedding itself is a process which. in the case of the individuals' first marriage generally lasts about seven years. I would estimate that most men complete the wedding process at between 22 and 30 years of age, whereas the women reach the same point between their 15th and 18th birthdays. The Hausa cognitive mapping of this process divides marriage into seven stages: 1. The asking of the bride. After courting several young girls. a youth suggests to his father's elder brother that he would like to marry a particular girl. If the uncle objects. he will direct his nephew's attention to the partner of his choosing. ‘Whether the uncle agrees with the nephew or the youth accedes to his superior's choice. the youth sends the wife of another father's brother to the household of the girl he is to marry. The aunt gives the girls' mother and father a gift of perhaps 75OCFA (to be divided in three portions: two for the mother and one for the father) and tells them that her nephew wishes to marry their daughter. If the girl’s father's brother agrees. then the formal asking ensues, where the two uncles arranging the marriage negotiate the amount of bride- wealth and gifts which will be exchanged. At this juncture. the youth's uncle gives a gift of l5OOCFA to the girl's uncle which he distributes among her close matrilateral and patrilateral kinsmen. 2. The brideservice. Once the "asking" is complete. the youth is obliged annually to help cultivate his fiance's father's (sfiuriikii) fields. This requirement is most frequently met by the youth's organizing a party of perhaps 20-30 of his peers who jointly hoe his sfiuriikii's fields. He does this once yearly until the bride is taken from her father's household. and in addition he gives his fiance's parents 500CEA and 30 headloads of millet at each of the two annual festivals (Id-el-Fitr and Id-el-Kabir). 149 3. The marriage tying. After seven years of brideservice, the arranger-uncles formally supervise the transfer of bridewealth from the youth's kinsmen to the bride's kinsmen. In many cases bridewealth may be pledged. but not transferred at this time. Over the ensuing years. the bridewealth will be paid. This is usually 5.000CFA. At this occa- sion. a Muslim priest'(m§§l§m) is summoned to give the benediction of Allah and the bridewealth is then distributed to the bride's kinsmen. 4. The trousseau gifts. ‘Within the next six months. the classi- ficatory mothers of the youth carry a number of body cloths. blouses. and pairs of shoes to the bride. There is a formal presentation. and drumming and praise-singing ensue. 5. The bride washing. The bride's friends gather in her household a few weeks after the trousseau gifts have been given. There they dance and sing while the bride's grandmothers (lineal and collateral) wash the nearly naked bride with henna and hot water. This process is re- peated for six consecutive days. 6. The groom washing. On the evening that the bride receives her last washing. the groom receives his bathing. It is administered in his arranger-uncle's household by his grandmothers and is accompanied by drumming and praise singing. 7. The carrying of the bride. The final customary event occurs on the day after the groom is washed. Then. friends. kinsmen. and neighbors gather at each of the partners' households. The groom mounts a horse. and with his retinue of well-wishers. drummers. and praise-singers. he rides to the household of the bride. Both the bride and groom cover their eyes during this time--out of koomiyi in the presence of their affines. it is said. Once the groom's party has arrived, the bride is placed on 150 a camel's back with her*mother's younger sister. As the bride wails. her peers bid her farewell with songs. and the parties of bride and groom join in a procession of porters carrying the items. especially calabashes needed to set up housekeeping. Upon arriving at the household of the groom. the partners are secluded in separate dwellings while the drummers entertain the guests. Late that night the groom will go to sleep with his bride. 7.2.3 Qualifications to the wedding process norm. This scenario of events is consistently followed in first marriages. I observed no deviation from it in the 12 marriages I recorded during my research period. The bridewealth sum of 5.000CFA given from the groom's to the bride's kinsmen reflects only a small part of the exchange. In one typical marriage. the total value of money'and goods which the groom's kinsmen conveyed to the bride's household over the seven.years was about 50.000CEA; while the worth of gifts given from bride's kin to groom totalled about half that.much. In marriages between cross cousins. these figures are reduced substantially: while in a typical patrilateral paral- lel cousin marriage. the value of these exchanges would be cut by nearly two-thirdS. Often. the seven years' brideservice is not completed before the bride is carried to her husband's household. In cases where the girl is pregnant. all the arrangements are speeded up. so that the bride is carried a few months before her delivery. This marriage is no less legitimate (nor is the child) than the longer process: however. the groom is chided for his over-eagerness. and his kinsmen complain of having to raise large sums of money quickly. After the bride has been carried. the groom.completes his seven years' brideservice. 151 The rights of uxorium and genetrician are conveyed to the groom after the bride has begun residence in the household. Connubium rights for the Adaraawaa bride begin after the asking of the bride: whereas for the Goobiraawaa bride. these rights are granted after the marriage is tied. This is the ideal. In practice. the Goobiraawaa bride conforms to the Adaraawaa custom. but in a clandestine way. Second and succeed- ing marriages are much less elaborate and involve generally only the transfer of bridewealth. a few gifts and one year's brideservice. 7.2.4 Eglygxgx,is practiced by the Hausa of Tudfi. though its pres- tige is not reflected in its incidence. The polygynous marriage is taken as a sign of prosperity. for the husband raises the bridewealth for Table 12 Polygyny Number of married.men: 205 Men residing with one wife: 139 Men residing with two wives: 45 Men residing with three wives: 6 Number of men with two or more wives. but residing with one: 15* I"All but one has two wives: the exception is the village chief who resides with one wife but is married to four others. all living outside Tudfi. second and ensuing marriages himself. The men regard this marriage form as a guarantee of many children and thereby security in old age when they will be dependent on them. 'Women have given contradictory state- ments about polygyny. Some remark about the economic advantages of di- viding the chores of the household. Yet. on other occasions. these women decry the burden of jealousy which ensues when a husband favors one wife. I suspect that the latter remarks result in part from the local 152 perception that.Eur0peans diSparage polygynous marriages. However, both tendencies have been institutionalized in the Hausa language: the gener- al term for co~wife is kiishi 3. whose root. kiishi. is translatable as "jealousy”. ‘When referring to her co-wife. a woman uses the same terms she uses for her sisters. yaa and fkauna. 7.2.5 Husband-wife roles. The roles of husband and wife generally display economic and prestige goals. rather than affective qualities. Neither is oriented to demand security. whether economic or emotional. from the other. The husband obtains his material security through father. brothers. than children. and his emotional satisfaction from his mother. The woman. on the other hand. looks to her children for both economic and emotional security and to her brothers for protection when her husband mistreats her. Yet. by each other they can realize their security goals through their children: further, marriage for each repre- sents a rite de passggg and an increase in prestige. The normative expectations of each other are sexual and economic. The man expects to have sexual intercourse with his wife whenever he wishes. to be provided with.meals. and to be presented with children. He expects his wife to demur to his wishes consistently. The wife. on the other hand. desires her husband to have sexual intercourse with her exclusively. or if she is a co-wife. to divide his sexual favors equally. In terms of their daytime behavior. husband and wife have little to do with each other. By custom. a man eats with his friends or brothers. while his wife eats with her children. .At night a man.may have inter- course with his wife after which she returns to her own bed, where she sleeps with her infant children. Both have their separate incomes; 153 however. the husband provides the nuclear family's food. while the woman clothes herself and her children with her earnings. 7.3 Affinal relationships. Relations with affines are generally characterized by avoidance of koomiyi. 'When a person greets his Spouse's parent he characteristically drOps to one knee and utters a greeting with eyes cast down. More frequently. however. a man seeks to avoid greeting his parents-in-law'altogether.1 It is impossible. generally. for a woman to practice such avoidance with her husband's parents. for she lives in their household or close to it. There she comes under the frequently heavy hand of her husband's mother. who rather zealously gives her an inordinate share of the household's labor to perform. The formal nature of relations between a woman and her husband's parents changes greatly after she hears her first child: she has proved her worthiness. There- after. relations become warmer until evidences of genuine affection can be perceived. especially'betweenimother-inrlaw'and daughter-in-law. Between a person and his (or her) Spouse's younger siblings and their spouses. there exist joking relations. If the leviate or sororate were practiced they would be potential mates. Greenberg's description of the Kano Maguzaawaa fits the Hausa of Tudfi: ”In the camaraderie of this relationship those involved call each other "husband" and "wife". but sexual play never proceeds as far as actual intercourse. It must be pointed out. however. that no junior levirate and sororate exists at the present time. though some of the older men say'that it was formerly customary to replace a husband or wife who had died by a.younger brother or sister from the same household" (Greenberg 1946:21). One of the sanctions a wife uses to prevent her husband from mis- treating her (failure to sleep with her or beating her) is to return to ”—— ll Q S saraakuuwaa I Q siuriikii Osfiuriikii ~ ~ —