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
The Transformation of Canadian Policies and
Programs to Recruit Foreign Labor: The Case
of Caribbean Female Domestic Workers, 1950's-
1980's

presented by

Ruth L. Harris

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Ph. D. degree in Sociology


Major professor

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**THE TRANSFORMATION OF
CANADIAN POLICIES AND PROGRAMS TO RECRUIT FOREIGN LABOR:
THE CASE OF CARIBBEAN FEMALE DOMESTIC WORKERS,
1950'S - 1980'S**

**By
Ruth L. Harris**

**A DISSERTATION
Submitted to
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DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY**

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ABSTRACT

THE TRANSFORMATION OF CANADIAN POLICIES AND PROGRAMS TO RECRUIT FOREIGN LABOR: THE CASE OF CARIBBEAN FEMALE DOMESTIC WORKERS, 1950's - 1980's

By

Ruth Harris

This study explores the relationships between collective action and social policy transformation in Canada. A community-based social movement in the 1970's protested punitive and restrictive changes in the policy to recruit domestic workers from the Caribbean operating since the 1950's. The research isolates community-based activists or advocates who represented the socially and legally disadvantaged immigrant domestic workers in negotiations with the government.

Historical documentary techniques and interviews were the primary sources of data. Documentary data illuminated transitions in immigration recruitment policy and recorded cases of advocacy. Interviews, obtained using a referral method, provided the histories of the social movement's composition, goals, impact and the effect of advocacy work on the lives of activists. Two propositions guided the research: Unequal relations between Canada and the Caribbean are directly related to changing contours of immigration policy; and Immigration policy transformation reflects the negotiated interests of responsive immigrant subpopulations within the receiving nation.

The findings of this research suggest direct correlations between advocacy and policy formation and implementation for foreign domestic workers. Domestic worker-based advocacy operates at various levels of social interactions and includes a wide range of groups working collectively. Voluntary organizers within the Caribbean immigrant community formed alliances with service agencies, trade unions and individuals, which built broad community support, but also increased the propensity for fragmentation and diversion of the movement's energy. Concrete legal changes for domestic workers were won through the social movement; alterations in their social situation did not simultaneously occur.

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**Dedicated to the memory of my mother,
Gussie Lee Stevens Harris
and my father who mothered me,
Ernest Albert Harris, Sr.**

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PART I

Overview of the Study

Chapter 1 - Introduction

**Chapter 2 - Collective Action and Public Policy
Transformation**

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CHAPTER ONE

Introduction

Statement of the Problem. In this study I explore the relationships between collective action and social policy transformation. Specifically, the study focuses on the nature and impact of community-based advocacy work in the Toronto area on foreign female domestic labor recruitment policies and programs as they relate to immigration policy. While there are many factors which contribute to the transformation of a nation's immigration policy (such as global crises, changes in the economic climate and political administrations, labor demands from the private sector, public sentiment, etc.), it appears that seldom are the actions of groups directly affected by the policy changes listed as significant contributing factors. Therefore, this study isolates activists as just one element in the conglomeration of social forces affecting policy.

The Canadian case study I have selected highlights the activities of one community of advocates who have worked on behalf of women from the Caribbean who entered Canada as domestic workers. The primary supporters of domestic workers are the women themselves who are former or current household workers brought to Canada to fill these occupations. They experience the reality of domestic life and are the people who have raised the critical issues about domestic service. However, a more customary definition of advocates also includes: lawyers, immigrant counselors, community and cultural workers,

volunteers, etc. They are men and women of various ages, racial backgrounds and track records of experience in an advocacy capacity. In this particular case all advocates' work centers around protecting the rights of immigrant women progressively disadvantaged by immigration policy practices and changes in the law.

A significant feature of the immigrants' situation is that they are considered highly vulnerable because of their tenuous legal status and their participation in the devalued occupational category of "private servants." Consequently, the role of advocates is an important component to examine in the unified actions of women who are domestic workers. Such direct and indirect challenges to the law serve as a microcosm reflecting the general relationship between collective action and public policy.

Selection of the Topic and Research Questions. The formulation of the research problem began with knowledge of three factors: (1) a common, but cursory reference to the West Indies Domestic Scheme in Caribbean migration literature, which officially recruited women from the Caribbean between 1955-1967 to Canada. The program continued under a more universal label thereafter; (2) fragmented information about a series of changes in Canadian immigration policy appeared to be relevant to all foreign domestics; and, (3) reference to the "Good Enough to Work, Good Enough to Stay" campaign in contemporary Canadian immigration policy on temporary labor. I propose to explore the relationships between these three factors.

The more general questions which guide this research are: How does the immigration policy of a state change over a given period of time?

Who participates in the initiation of change? What impact does the collective action of advocates have on change? Generally, what is the nature of the relationship between social policy and social movements?

The elements of this research project are grounded in several bodies of literature. Interestingly enough, although most work on blacks immigrating to Canada mention the West Indies Domestic Scheme, I have discovered only five historical works specifically on the topic.¹ Other writings stem mainly from Canadian government sources and do not relate specifically to the West Indies Domestic scheme but to the general program of Foreign Domestic Workers on Employment Authorization, a program began in the 1970's.² However, literature does exist on women in international migration.³

These studies give some insight into new patterns of international migration dominated by women from the Third World and the reasons these patterns emerged based on the conditions in the places of origin. The occupational destination for most of these international women are in assembly industries and service work. While studies of these migrating women investigate their participation in the paid labor force, little is written on formal laws which govern their entry and mobility or their political activities in the receiving nation.

Although the present study uses domestic workers' organizing as a research focus, it is not a study of domestic service. The category of maids was selected because it is generally considered a traditional black female job in North America, and in Canada it is viewed as a black female immigrant occupation.⁴ An impressive body of literature already exists for domestic service work generally. There, the

entry/exit, composition, conditions and context for private household domestic work are topics discussed at length.⁵ The more recent accounts of the industry often include impressions and reactions of women involved in the privatized relations of domination and subordination, both from the prospective of the employer and the employee.

Organizing is briefly mentioned in most accounts; however, the typical discussion suggests that organizing is a difficult task and rarely a sustained effort. The fact that ongoing formal organizations of domestics has been rare is to devalue their impact on the larger social structure during moments of their political activity. It is my impression that the collective action of devalued workers and their allies has had more of an impact on the society than is recognized, simply because they exist as viable members of their communities and possess identities that surpass their participation in paid employment.

Few documented cases of organizing exist; however more recently, the works of a cadre of Canadian Women Unionists have dealt with domestic workers' organizing.⁶ This present research is most informed by these Canadian efforts and is intended to help address this dearth of information. The decision to use the mass campaign as an organizing rubric was made to highlight the often overlooked contribution of collective activity by this typically atomized segment of the labor force.

In exploring Canadian literature on the status of Caribbean foreign domestics, I discovered the protest movement, "Good Enough to Work, Good Enough to Stay," which existed in various forms from approximately

1977 to 1981. The slogan became the rallying call for a campaign waged in support of foreign domestic workers. Women, who had been recruited from the Caribbean to work as domestics since the 1950's, were threatened in the 1970's by either the possibility of deportation from Canada or a change in immigration status--from automatic landed immigrant to temporary worker.⁷ The rationale of these organized women and their supporters was that if immigrants are fit for this type of temporary and necessary work, then they should also be considered suitable candidates for permanent citizenship. The goal of the "Good Enough to Work, Good Enough to Stay" campaign was to halt the implementation of a revised Canadian immigration policy and to seek changes in the laws. This slogan exposed the vulnerability of a segment of the subordinated developing world to the needs of an advanced industrial Center nation, typical in both colonial and neo-colonial relations.⁸

Knowledge of the Canadian campaign made me recall a prominent phrase that impressed me on a visit to London, England in 1979, "We Are Here Because You Were There." Emerging in the context of global and accelerated direct violence and structural discrimination, the British slogan is a rejoinder to persistent questions raised by agitated working class segments of the British society about the presence, permanence and growth of Third World immigrants in their midst. The logic of the phrase, "We Are Here Because You Were There" stems from the contact initiated by the British during their colonial era in these geographical areas. The presence of New Immigrants⁹ is the aftermath of this historical experience.

Both of these slogans express classic, popularized indictments of

those nations by an increasingly vocal immigrant community. They capture the discontent and conflict over the mechanics of incorporating new populations into the larger society. They also signal collective responses in the receiving nations by New Immigrants from the Third World of Africa, Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean. Such communities dramatically increased in size in many advanced industrial centers of North America and Western Europe after World War II. Understanding immigrants' collective responses in Canada or Great Britain is instructive for analyzing the unintended consequences to hegemonic centers used by displaced populations because of protracted colonial and neocolonial rule.

Finally, the selection of the topic involved a genuine convergence of my own experience and my sociological training. With a keen interest in race and race relations, attending college in Boston, Massachusetts had a profound affect on my development. There, I was exposed to various dimensions of the black experience which broadened my interests to include the issues of black social class and international relations. Interaction with Africans, West Indians, Cape Verdeans and black Americans from various states, enabled me to appreciate what I would later learn to call "black ethnicity."

Fascinated with accents not in the vernacular of my own black community made me curious about their origins. It was then that I began an investigation of West Indians and black community development, eventually writing my senior thesis on that segment of Boston's historical community. Subsequently, my Masters' thesis looked at West Indian migration inside and from the Caribbean. The present study is a continuation of this interest in another locale of the African

diaspora. It is intended not only to document the Caribbean immigrants' presence, but to understand their active participation in struggle and social change.

In general, my graduate career has afforded me the opportunity to sharpen my analysis and prepared me for the present study through course work on international migration, international development and social inequality. This training, coupled with extensive research experience on the African Diaspora Research Project, has molded my thinking about race, issues of sex and gender, class and labor relations, and national policy planning, all within a global context of Dependency and World Systems theories. Conceptually I view race, gender, class and national origin as more than coincidental demographic variables. They are persistent mechanisms of dominance which operate both within and between societies. Public policy is the manipulation of these overlapping ideologies and their translation into national and international agendas. The elemental selection and correlation of factors for this study draws on this broad base. Moreover, the decision to choose black working women as the subject of study is directly related to the fact that this endeavor would be dedicated to the memory of my mother and a tribute to all significant working women in my life.

Contributions of the Study. This study adds both to the refinement of theory and public policy applications. The confrontations symbolized by the slogans I have quoted reflect a unique phase in dynamic, historical social relations of conflict and struggle between globally linked dominant and subordinate groups. I am labelling this phase "Post-Neocolonialism."¹⁰ Two factors which make it distinctive

are its location in time and space and the composition of its actors. For the first point, such challenges are no longer external and comfortably geographically distanced from the core source of discontent. Rather, they have shifted from an inter-territory phenomenon to a newly constituted domestic problem inside the borders of industrial centers. It is this kind of internal strife in Canada on which this study focuses. Admittedly domestic disturbances in the social structure are not new; similar sloganeering such as "Last hired, first fired" or "Equal pay for Equal Work" by the historically oppressed segments of industrial populations notwithstanding.

Another locational factor is the size of the immigrant community. Size refers not only to its proportionate number but also the significance of the New Immigrant community as a "critical mass" in its contribution to the political and economic structure of the unit. In contrast to the United States, New Immigrant communities in selected Canadian and British cities far outnumber the historical racial/ethnic minority communities. Therefore, "minority-group" public policies and programs are conditioned by the presence of New Immigrants versus historical minority communities.¹¹ This brings us to the issue of the composition of new social actors. In addition to location, who comprises the new social actors is critical to our understanding of "Post Neocolonialism."

New Immigrant protest activities are directly related to a more permanent, internationalized populace and have identifiable global implications. Issues facing immigrants which may be similar to the more historically defined minority communities in industrial societies, take on a different flavor when foreign policy considerations of trade,

aid and political alliances are placed in the formula. Politically, governments which have participated in guestworker programs are faced with the dilemma of protecting their borders and extending basic human and citizenship rights to immigrant communities which have survived in a state of open hostility and vulnerability for decades. How do we know this? The investigation of the emergence and transformation of public policy reveals the significance of social context and social actors in policy change.

A focus on public policy highlights the role of the state as a legitimizing agent of and contributor to inequality. Social scientists have characterized the state in a variety of ways.¹² In this context the state is a concrete institution which serves the interests of the dominant class, but seeks to portray itself as serving the nation as a whole in order to obscure national, race, sex and class antagonisms. It represents an "illusory universality of community." Key ideas in this definition are ideology, consciousness and legitimacy.¹³ Public policy is seen as a formalization of the dominant ideology.

Alternative ideologies, formed in reaction to the dominant ideology and out of a recognition that power is unevenly distributed in society, are reduced to types of consciousness. Resistance is the articulation of consciousness and is often in the form of collective action. The goal of collective action is to acquire power as a resource to replace an opposing group's ideology and system of control and to institute an alternative set of values beliefs and institutions.¹⁴ Seen as a form of ideology, the transformation of public policy can be a combination of government initiatives and non-governmental factors. The two slogans, "Good Enough to Work, Good Enough to Stay" and "We Are Here

Because You Were There" above, characterize the nature of power relations between the host and immigrant societies. Moreover, they represent demands on the government for policy change from forces that have an alternative to the dominant ideology.

Methodology. Using the "Good Enough to Work, Good Enough to Stay" campaign as a starting point, the research strategy used for this study was a two-tiered process. In the first phase I used historical documentary/bibliographic techniques to collect information in Ottawa, the national capital. In the national archives and government departmental libraries, I obtained documents related to the campaign, the West Indies Domestic Scheme and more universal recruitment programs. Generally I was interested in the factors which contribute to policy formation and change. Consequently, much of the archival search focused on correspondence files directed to the Department of Employment and Immigration and internal/interdepartmental communication related to program recruitment, operations and subject categories such as domestics, the Caribbean, etc., over a 30 year period. In addition to getting background information on the existing programs, informational interviews with various departmental administrators in the Ottawa/Hull area provided referrals of individuals and organizations directly involved in the recent mass campaign, who were primarily located in the Toronto area.

Phase two of the research involved follow up with the referred informants in the Toronto area. Over an eight month period, between 1985 and 1986, fourteen interviews were arranged with individuals who were involved in the mass campaign. The only criteria used to select referred individuals was their willingness to participate and their

recollection of the mass campaign. Sufficient time had passed since the 1980-81 apex of the campaign to allow for adequate distancing from the specifics of the organizing event.

Organization of the Study. In the remainder of Part I, Chapter Two is the literature review of social movements and their relationship to policy transformation. In Chapter Three I raise methodological issues and present the specifics of the case study, the "Good Enough to Work..." campaign. In Part II public policy in the form of foreign labor recruitment discussed. In Chapter Four I discuss the formal Canadian immigration recruitment policy, i.e., the West Indies Domestic Scheme. The ideology of Universalism in Canadian recruitment and the articulation of dependent relations are the subject of Chapter Five.

Part III analyzes the role of social movements in social policy change. Chapter Six outlines the social backdrop of policy and mass campaign events, revealing two separate but sequential events are conjured up by questions about the campaigns with the slogan "Good Enough to Work, Good Enough to Stay." Chapter Seven focuses on the social organization of mass campaigns, especially the emergence of coalitions, the issues and around which groups converge and the impact on organizations involved. Chapter Eight evaluates the impact of the mass campaigns on various segments of the events. Here, hidden advocacy and the internal dynamics of community-based campaigns are also discussed. Chapter Nine returns to the guiding research questions in light of the analysis of the Canadian case study. Part IV consists of Chapter Ten highlighting conclusions and reassessing the implications of the study. The subsequent chapters in this study are as follows.

Chapter Two - Collective Action and Public Policy Transformation.

This chapter focuses on the policy transformation process from the point of view of organized citizens. Literature on collective consciousness and collective action are reviewed. Specifically the relationships between the variables social movements and public policy are outlined and the guiding research propositions are stated.

Chapter Three - Methodological Issues: Working Propositions and the Canadian Social Context. This chapter opens with a conceptual framework for addressing the guiding propositions for the study based on the specifics of the Canadian context. Immigrant status has been regularized in the Canadian context to the extent that an entire parastatal "immigrant services" industry has been constructed around this group. The official policy of Multiculturalism has sought to maintain the integrity of the heritage of Canadian immigrants. It is this secondary national policy which merges the issues of race and immigration in a formal sense. It details the two methodologies used for the data collection necessary to address the research propositions.

Chapter Four - The Transformation of Public Policy: The West Indies Domestic Scheme, 1955-1961. This chapter is the first of two policy discussions on foreign labor recruitment. The incorporation of the Caribbean into Canada's immigration policy under the West Indies Domestic Scheme (WIDS) is detailed from its inception to its maturity (preceding and during the decline of the West Indies Federation). Some comparisons of the provisions of earlier recruitment schemes to Canada are summarized and contrasted with provisions for the West Indies Domestic Scheme.

Chapter Five - The Reclamation of Power: Canada's Universal Immigration Policy, 1962-1976. This is the second policy chapter that begins with the transformation of the WIDS into a more universal program. It explores the evolution of contemporary relations between Canada and the Commonwealth Caribbean and the shift in power in Canada away from a conciliatory position with the English-speaking Caribbean.

Chapter Six - Immigration-Related Struggles Among Caribbean Peoples in Canada: Historical Developments. This chapter is the first of two on Social Movements. It provides the background on specific precursors to the formal social movements described in subsequent chapters on social movements. Advocates for Caribbean domestic workers fit into a history of support services and community organizing. Here the basic interface between immigration as an issue for advocates in Canada is outlined. The nature and form of interaction between advocates and immigration officials is described as both cooperative and conflictual.

Chapter Seven - Advocate Inter-Organizational Relations and Conflicts: Mass Campaigns for Domestic Workers. The chapter opens with a presentation of the specific case study of Caribbean foreign domestics in the Toronto area between 1977 and 1981, the period of most recent change in immigration policy affecting the recruitment of foreign domestic workers. The case study tests the proposition emerging from the conceptual framework. An in-depth look at two lead organizations in the mass campaigns are informative about the role of community networks and the ramifications of advocacy work on unintended segments, particularly advocacy organizations themselves.

Chapter Eight - Evaluating the Outcomes of Two Mass Campaigns:

Varving Visions of Success by Domestic Workers, Advocates and the State. In this chapter attention to both the external and internal outcomes of advocacy work is presented. Not only are the opinions of the state observed, but also the laborers on whose behalf the campaigns are waged. Interviews were particularly significant in revealing advocate assessments of their work on the personal and professional lives of domestics. Opinions about the success of the campaigns varied according to who was asked and the definitions of success in legal, political or social terms.

Chapter Nine - Summary and Analysis of Findings. Although not often a visible or acknowledged part of the social change equation, organized action does affect social policy, particularly its implementation. In this chapter two major research questions germane to social movements are discussed in light of the analysis of specific social movements for foreign domestic workers.

Chapter Ten - Conclusion and Recommendations. Here is a general summary, conclusion and recommendations for future research based on the findings. It reassesses of the basic research question, How does social policy change? in light of the preceding chapters. Related to this basic question is the evaluation of the role of collective action on policy change. The limits of the study are also outlined, as well as the substantive, theoretical and methodological contributions.

CHAPTER ONE - NOTES

¹See: Frances Henry, "West Indian Domestic Scheme in Canada," Social and Economic Studies 17(1) (1968): 83-91; Frances Henry and Pamela Wilson, "The Status of Women in Caribbean Societies. An Overview of Their Social, Economic and Sexual Roles," Social and Economic Studies 24(2) (June, 1975): 165-198; Jane Sawyer Turritin, "Networks and Mobility--Case of West Indian Domestic Workers from Montserrat," Canadian Review of Sociology and Anthropology 13(3) (1970): 305-320; Makeda Silvera, Silenced. Talks with working class West Indian Women about their lives and struggles as Domestic Workers in Canada. (Toronto: Williams-Wallace Press, Inc., 1983); Donald Moore, Don Moore: An Autobiography. (Toronto: Williams-Wallace Press, 1985).

²See: Canada. Office of the Minister of Employment and Immigration, "Domestic Workers on Employment Authorizations." Report of the Task Force on Immigration Practices and Procedures established by the Honourable Lloyd Axworthy, Minister of Employment and Immigration in September 1980. (April 1981).

³See: Roy S. Bryce-Laporte, "The New Immigration: The Female Majority," in Female Immigrants to the United States: Caribbean, Latin American, and African Experiences. Delores M. Mortimer and Roy S. Bryce-Laporte, eds. RIIES Occasional Papers No. 2 (Washington, D.C.: Research Institute on Immigration and Ethnic Studies, Smithsonian Institution, 1981); Judith Burgess and Meryl James-Gray, "Migration and Sex Roles: A Comparison of Black and Indian Trinidadians in New York City," in Female Immigrants to the United States: Caribbean, Latin American, and African Experiences. Delores M. Mortimer and Roy S. Bryce-Laporte, eds.: 85-111. RIIES Occasional Papers No. 2 (Washington, D.C.: Research Institute on Immigration and Ethnic Studies, Smithsonian Institution, 1981); Elsa M. Chaney, "Women Who go and the Women who Stay Behind," Migration Today 10 (3/4) (1982): 6-13; Jacklyn Cock, Maids and Madams. A Study in the Politics of Exploitation. (Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1980); Alejandra Cumsille, Carolyn Egan, Gladys Klestorny, Maria Terese Larrain, "Triple Oppression: Immigrant Women in the Labour Force," in Union Sisters, Women in the Labour Movement. Linda Briskin and Lynda Yang, eds.: 212-221 (Toronto: Women's Educational Press, 1983); Monica Gordon, "Caribbean Migration: A Perspective on Women," in Female Immigrants to the United States: Caribbean, Latin American, and African Experiences. Delores M. Mortimer and Roy S. Bryce-Laporte, eds. RIIES Occasional Papers No. 2 (Washington, D.C.: Research Institute on Immigration and Ethnic Studies, Smithsonian Institution, 1981); Mirjana Morokvasic, "Women in Migration: Beyond the Reductionist Outlook," in One Way Ticket: Migration and Female Labour, Annie Phizacklea, ed. (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1983); Annie Phizacklea, ed., One Way Ticket: Migration and Female Labour, (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1983); Michael J. Piore, Birds of Passage. Migrant Labor and Industrial Societies, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979); S. Ramcharan "The Economic Adaptation of West Indians in Toronto, Canada," The Canadian Review of Sociology and Anthropology 13(3) (1976):

295-305; Saskia Sassen-Koob, "Exporting Capital and Importing Labor: The Role of Women," in Female Immigrants to the United States: Caribbean, Latin American, and African Experiences. Delores Mortimer and Roy S. Bryce-Laporte (eds.) RIIES Occasional Papers No. 2 (Washington, D.C.: Research Institute on Immigration and Ethnic Studies, Smithsonian Institution, 1981); Estellie M. Smith, "Portuguese Female Immigrant: the 'Marginal Man'," International Migration Review 14(1) (1980): 77-92.

⁴For most countries that have a significant immigrant population, there are categories of work with which specific immigrant groups are associated, despite the actual composition of that work force. Agricultural labor in the United States' southwest region is viewed as a Mexican phenomenon; Transportation work in London is perceived as dominated by West Indians; Street sweepers in Paris are seen as an Algerian stronghold. In a similar fashion, Canadian domestic service has a black Caribbean persona.

⁵See: Cock, Maids and Madams.; Verta Mae Grosnover, Thursdays and Every Other Sunday Off. A Domestic Rap, (Garden City: Doubleday and Co., Inc. 1972); Trudier Harris, From Mammies to Militants: Domesticity in Black American Literature, (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1982); William H. Harris, The Harder We Run. Black Workers Since the Civil War, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982); David M. Katzman, Seven Days a Week. Women and Domestic Service in Industrializing America, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978). Genevieve Leslie, "Domestic Service in Canada, 1880-1920," in Women at Work Ontario, 1850-1930. Janice Acton et. al. eds.: 71-126. (Toronto: Canadian Women's Educational Press, 1974); Ann Oakley, The Sociology of Housework, (New York: Pantheon Books, 1974); Bridgid O'Farrell, Equal Employment Opportunity Policy, Unions and Women: An Industrial Union Alternative, Working Paper No. 54 (Wellesley: Wellesley College, Center for Research on Women, 1980); Margaret Prescod-Roberts and Norma Steele, Black Women: Bringing It All Back Home. (Bristol: Falling Wall Press, Ltd., 1980); Judith Rollins, Between Women: Domesticity and Their Employers, (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1985); Silvera, Silenced.; Lucy Salmon, Domestic Service, (New York: The MacMillan Co, 1897). United States Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Women in Domestic Work: Yesterday and Today, (January 1981); United States Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, "Immigration Restriction and the 'Scarcity' of Domestic Servants," Monthly Labor Review 25(1) (July 1927); United States Department of Labor, Employment Standards Administration, Private Household Workers, Data Pertinent to an Evaluation of the Feasibility of Extending Minimum Wage and Overtime Coverage Under the Fair Labor Standards Act, (1974); United States Department of Labor, Women's Bureau, A Report of a Consultation of the Status of Household Employment, Sponsors National Committee on Household Employment, YWCA of Metropolitan Chicago and Local Committee Women's Bureau, United States Department of Labor, Chicago Circle Campus, University of Illinois, (May 20, 1967); United States Department of Labor, Women's Bureau, Programs and Services of the Women's Bureau. How to Use Them..., (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1960).

⁶See: Linda Briskin and Lynda Yanz, eds., Union Sisters, Women in the Labour Movement, (Toronto: Women's Educational Press, 1983); Rachel Epstein, "Domestic Workers: The Experience in B.C.," in Union Sisters, Women in the Labour Movement, Linda Briskin and Lynda Yang, eds.: 222-237, (Toronto: Women's Educational Press, 1983); Rachel Epstein, "Domestic Workers Organizing--The Experience in B.C.," Resources for Feminist Research 10(2) (July 1981): 33-34; Laurell Ritchie, "Why Are So many Women Unorganized?" in Union Sisters, Women in the Labour Movement, Linda Briskin, and Lynda Yanz, eds.: 200-211 (Toronto: Women's Educational Press, 1983); Marijana Vukman-Tenebaum, "Organizing Domestic Workers in Ontario," Women and Trade Unions--Resources for Feminist Research, 10:2 (July 1981): 32-33; Julie White, Women and Unions, (Ottawa: Canadian Advisory Council of the Status of Women, 1980).

⁷"Landing" is a formal phase in the immigration process whereby people are admitted as potential permanent immigrants. They are admitted on the basis of selection standards implemented by Canada to determine if they can successfully establish themselves in Canada. Since 1976, selection standards include family relationships, education, language, skill, occupational experience, personal attributes and attainments, demographic considerations and labor market conditions. After a designated period of residence in the country (usually five years), they are eligible for applying for naturalization or full citizenship, which puts immigrants on the same footing as all Canadian citizens. Landed immigrant status is desirable because it implies the maintenance or reproduction costs for entrants will be assumed by Canada. Temporary immigrant status places the social maintenance burden on the sending nation.

⁸Colonialism and neocolonialism are two forms of imperialist domination where there exists: (1) economic control and exploitation and (2) political dependence and subjugation. The direct forms of domination are "classic colonialism" which exists when territories are geographically separated (e.g. Great Britain and India prior to 1947); or "internal colonialism" found in a single territory (e.g. White minority-ruled South Africa in 1988). "Neocolonialism" is an indirect form of control which typically uses an indigenous proxy for what is in fact foreign domination. Ostensibly, in neocolonialism formal political relations are symmetrical and less formal or encompassing than legalized colonial relations. (For a discussion of classic colonialism, internal colonialism and neocolonialism, see: Robert Blauner, Racial Oppression in America, (New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1972); Amilcar Cabral, Revolution in Guinea: Selected Texts by Amilcar Cabral, trans. and ed. Richard Handyside, (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1969); Aime, Cesaire, Discourse on Colonialism, translated by Joan Pinkham. (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1972); Theotonio Dos Santos, "The Structure of Dependence," American Economic Review 60 (May 1970): 231-236; Frantz Fanon, Black Skin, White Masks, translated by Charles Lam Markman, (New York: Grove Press, Inc. 1967); Johan Galtung, "A Structural Theory of Imperialism," Journal of Peace Research 8(2) (1971): 81-117; Albert Memmi, The Colonizer and the Colonized, Boston: Beacon Press, 1965; William K. Tabb, The Political

Economy of the Black Ghetto. (New York: W.W. Norton and Co., Inc. 1970).

⁹The North American phrase, "New Immigrant" (or "New Commonwealth Immigrant in the British case) does not simply refer to the recency of newcomers to a particular nation. The term suggests a qualitative divergence from earlier periods of immigration dominated by Europeans. Most notable is the visibility of these migrants. The New Immigration varies by geographical source--that is, the developing areas of the Third World of Africa, Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean, issues of race and color, religious differences, and other significant demographic factors. Work on the New Immigration contrast the social context and adjustment processes to the turn of the century European immigration in North America. (See: Roy S. Bryce-Laporte and Delores M. Mortimer, Caribbean Immigration to the United States, (Washington, D.C.: Research Institute on Immigration and Ethnic Studies, Smithsonian Institute, 1976); Norman Yetman, ed., Majority and Minority. The Dynamics of Race and Ethnicity in American Life, (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, Inc., 1985) (Fourth Edition).

¹⁰Post-Neocolonialism is not, however, liberation. Is it neo-internal colonialism or elaboration of immigrant enclaves? This is a combination of the logic of "internal colonialism" and the political-economy of "immigrant enclaves". The analogy of internal colonialism is often used to describe the subjugated positions of blacks in the United States or South Africa. Blauner's 4 part colonization complex (mode of entry, cultural impact, outside administrators and racism) does not conveniently capture events for black immigrant communities who dominant racial minority politics in places like Canada or Great Britain.

Immigrant enclaves typically discuss how established immigrant communities act as buffers for newcomers, providing mostly an economic structure of relations for employment, consumerism and cultural sharing. In the United States two ethnic groups usually associated with this idea are Asian communities, such as Chinese-Americans in California or Hispanic communities such as Cuban-Americans in Miami, Florida. Again I don't think the Canadian case is a direct comparison basically because of the formal role of the state in Canadian communities. (For a fuller discussion of these ideas see Robert Blauner, Racial Oppression in America.; Alejandro Portes, "Illegal Immigration and the International System: Lessons From Recent Legal Mexican Immigrants to the United States," in Minority and Minority. The Dynamics of Race and Ethnicity in American Life Norman R. Yetman, ed.: 408-419. (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, Inc., 1985).

¹¹This point was discussed by Malcolm Cross, a British urban sociologist, at a colloquium at Michigan State University during Winter, 1987. A good example of the significance of immigrants in shaping social legislation is the literature on recent trends in guestworker programs in both North America and Europe. The changing needs in the international division of labor and attempts to regain control over these populations have resulted in governments rethinking the programs. See: Franklin W. Knight, "Who Needs a Guest-Worker

Program? They Do and We Do," Caribbean Review 11(1) (Winter 1982): 46-47; 64; Mary M. Kritz, ed. U.S. Immigration and Refugee Policy: Global and Domestic Issues, (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1983); Mark J Miller and Martin Philip, Administering Foreign Worker Programs, Lessons from Europe, (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1982). Demetriou G. Papademetriou and Mark Miller, The Unavoidable Issue: U.S. Immigration Policy in the 1980's, (Philadelphia: Institute for the Study of Human Issues, 1983); Alejandro Portes, "Migration and Underdevelopment," Politics and Society 8(1) (1978): 2-47.

Another indicator of the importance of a critical mass is the development of race relations in Canada and Europe. Often contrasted with the United States, the issue of legal or immigrant status as a significant analytical dimension stands out in this literature (see Alejandro Portes, "Illegal Immigration and the International System: Lessons From Recent Legal Mexican Immigrants to the United States," in Minority and Minority. The Dynamics of Race and Ethnicity in American Life, Norman R. Yetman, (ed.): 408-419. (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, Inc., 1985); John Stone, Racial Conflict in Contemporary Society, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985).

¹²Public policy emerges based on need and occurs randomly. Nelson W. Polsby, "Policy Initiation in the American Political System," in The Use and Abuse of Social Science. Behavioral Research and Policy Making, Irving Louis Horowitz (ed.): 55-67. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 1975. 2nd Edition; Martin Rein, Social Science and Public Policy, (New York: Penguin Education, 1976); Alvin L. Schorr, "Public Policy and Private Interest," in The Use and Abuse of Social Science. Behavioral Research and Policy Making, Irving Louis Horowitz, ed.: 24-38, (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 1975).

For mainstream policy analysts, who initiates changes in policy is a pluralist process that starts depending on whether the problem it addresses is a crisis or chronic structural need. Typically, governments initiate crisis innovations in response to acute situations, such as urban riots. Solutions to persistent, cyclical problems which mandate long-term innovations, are most likely to arise as a result of outside demands on government, such as racism, sexism, democracy, equality (see Nelson W. Polsby, "Policy Initiation in the American Political System,"). In contrast, conflict theorists use a variety of definitions of the role of the state. Instrumentalists see the state as a tool manipulated by the capitalist class. Structuralists define and confine the role of the state to the maintenance of the structures of capitalist development, not ruled by a single class. See: David A. Gold, Clarence Y. H. Lo, and Erik Olin Wright, "Recent Developments in Marxist Theories of the Capitalist State," Monthly Review 27(5) (October, 1975): 29-43; David A. Gold, Clarence Y. H. Lo, and Erik Olin Wright, "Recent Developments in Marxist Theories of the Capitalist State Part 2," Monthly Review 27(6) (November 1975): 36-51.

¹³Ibid

¹⁴Chris Mullard, Race, Power and Resistance, (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1985).

CHAPTER TWO

Collective Action and Public Policy Transformation

Introduction. This chapter raises theoretical questions about the relationships between collective action and social policy change. The sociological literature that is most relevant to this discussion falls under the general category of Social Movements and their impact on Social Change. It focuses on voluntary associations and community involvement in Canadian immigration issues. Significant also are the links of the identities of local immigrant communities to their countries of origin outside of Canada. In this context social change is gauged by immigration policy transformations which affect global and internal social relations.

Policy formation and transformation are fairly abstract processes. Though policy changes elicit reactions, people do not respond to policy per se. Instead, their behavior is best understood as reactions to the concrete situations which are created by the actual implementation of policy initiatives which affect their lives. Piven and Cloward¹ capture this idea best when they state:

Workers experience the factory, assembly line, the foreman, the guards, the owner and the paycheck. They do not experience monopoly capitalism...People on relief experience the shabby waiting rooms, the case workers, the dole...They do not experience American social welfare policy...Tenants experience the leaking ceilings and cold radiators, the landlord...Not the banking, real estate and construction systems.²

In a similar way, foreign domestic workers in Toronto experience

Canadian immigration policy as the daily isolation, monotony, humiliation and insecurity of domestic service work; the madam, the immigration officer, the probing personal questions, and the persistent threat of either being fired and/or deported.

One dimension of the thirty years of Canadian immigration policy formation that is rarely discussed are the organized acts of people--individuals and organizations--who are disproportionately affected by changes in the law and its enforcement. We know that people respond at the local and international levels because letters are written, briefs are presented, audiences with officials are held and public demonstrations and educational campaigns are mounted. A good illustration of this is the intensive interaction with government agencies which preceded or accompanied each period of immigration policy change affecting black immigrant entry into Canada (specialized recruitment, universal recruitment, restricted recruitment, discussed in Chapters Four and Five). The sociological literature on collective behavior helps explain the nature, types and consequences of people's responses to social conditions and social change.

Universally, when domestics are dissatisfied with working conditions, often their only recourse is to quit the job, with or without notice. This action may or may not indicate an awareness of the connection between an employer and institutions in the larger society. For foreign domestics in Canada, their definition of the situation is shaped by a tenuous legal, immigrant status. The response of people to institutions like the Immigration department signals a type of consciousness of international affairs, institutional

arrangements and the recognition that its negative consequences extend beyond personalized experiences.

When people respond to objective conditions, they do so using a wide array of methods, some of which are acceptable and others that are unconventional in approach. The formal aspect of this activity is usually related to the use of existing, legitimate channels to funnel discontent. For instance diplomatic consultations or isolated appeal procedures set up by the Immigration department were available ostensibly to protect individual or group rights. The unconventional dimension focuses on the use of ameliorative and resistance social movements as strategies for exerting an impact on the formal structure, outside of the normal channels. Unconventional approaches for powerless people alienated from larger institutional structures become conventional avenues of resistance with some modicum of measurable success.

Since sustained social movements are dynamic phenomena which unfold over a period of time, they may utilize various strategies at different stages to reach their goals. The thrust of this dissertation investigates the unconventional collective responses of people, in the form of appeals, demonstrations, marches, etc. organized around a particular segment of the immigrant community. To be uncovered, generally, are the less documented collective experiences of domestic workers that use both formal and unconventional approaches to social change.

Noticeable changes in Canadian immigration policy has had a profound effect on the legal status, social adaptation and sense of

security of foreign women recruited as domestic workers over the past three decades. Government initiatives in the 1970's brought a tremendous amount of negative attention and treatment to this group. At that time, the falsification of applications and the growing number of illegal foreign immigrants were heavily reported in the media. As a result of a brief amnesty period initiated to regularize their status, a number of women were faced with deportation. This situation resulted in fairly dramatic responses by a significant segment of these women, and by the international and local community with which they are associated. The imminent forced departures of these women resulted in a series of marches and demonstrations on a number of government offices, letter campaigns and a series of news features highlighting the plight of foreign domestics and an exposure of their working and living conditions in Canada.

With the particular events in Canada around issues related to foreign domestics in mind, the following questions emerge: What factors lead to the initiation of change? Who are most directly affected by the changes in policy? How do the affected groups respond to policy changes? What impact do their responses have on the policy process? In order to gain theoretical insight into the concerns raised by these questions, this chapter investigates the effects of social movements, as a form of collective action, on social change. I review the most current trends in the literature on social movements/collective action and social change that attempts to reconnect areas which overlap in the discussion of dynamic social phenomenon that have evolved into discrete areas of study in the social sciences.

Definitions: Collective Action, Social Change. Collective behavior is typically improvised, non-institutional behavior that encompasses a continuum of action ranging from spontaneous crowds to organized purposeful social movements. Collective action is a form of collective behavior which is distinguished by a group consciousness and group actions. Often political, the group action can be multifaceted and discontinuous. Social movements are also a type of collective behavior, but are distinguished from collective action by deliberately focused and highly organized, successive activities that seek to promote or resist change. To study a particular social movement is to study activity within the ongoing dynamics of the larger society.

Most classical and contemporary collective behavior theorists are in agreement about the influence of social movements on social change.³ Social change is both a cause and a consequence of social movements. It is the "successful" outcome of both less organized collective action or more formalized social movements. In this study, social change is gauged by the nature of immigration policy transformations, which can be linked to pressures caused by collective action/social movements or government to government lobbying.

While the separate bodies of literature on social movements and social change are relevant to the present study, there are deficiencies in each. Social movement literature is dominated by social psychologists who view group behavior as an end in itself. The people involved, that is how individual personalities affect the dynamics of the movement, characterizes this literature.⁴ Despite what is known about interest groups and theories of revolution, only the primary affiliation of a single participant's existence in a specific,

identifiable social movement constitutes the subject for most research. Secondary affiliations or the notion of coalitions of organizations which converge around common interests are rarely discussed in this literature. Because they focus on the internal mechanics of group behavior, links to other organizations and the larger social structure is also often missing.

Similarly social change literature relies on a single level of analysis and focuses on macro issues or suprahuman factors, tending to ignore the intricacies of people in social movements as significant contributory factors. Social change theorists tend to ignore or deemphasize popular social movements as significant contributory factors to change in any event, short of national revolution.⁵ They view broad issues such as technology, societal conflicts or culture as contributing to social change.⁶ These structuralists sacrifice the contribution of people at the individual or group levels for establishing broad structural relations.⁷ The failure to adequately account for global historical developments and sufficient contextual items limits the social movements literature; and the absence of people in works on social change, has given rise to a third body of literature which synthesizes the ideas of social movements and social change.

In a detailed discussion below an interactive approach looks at both the process and impact of social movements and directly informs the present research. The review borrows primarily from the interactive approach, which provides the guiding research questions and contributes to the analytical framework in which events in Canada surrounding foreign domestics in the 1970's are assessed. The strength of the interactive approach is that it goes beyond origins and accounts

for both internal and external factors in looking at social movements, and thus connects estranged theoretical areas. The value of collective action literature is that it provides the classical explanations for the origins of collective behavior and social movements.

A limitation of the interactive approach which carries over from the social movement literature is an assumption that central social actors are people specifically involved as members of formal organized movements. Therefore, an aspect missing from the literature is the behind the scenes efforts of "ancillary" actors who are not formal members, but who provide the often unacknowledged technical assistance to social movement events. Examples of such ancillary actors may exist in separate organizations or as individuals who provide ongoing services to community members and community organizations. Collective Action literature helps to fill this void.

Theoretical Issues. Within the interactive approach framework, protest movements emerge in the context of struggle between various groups for power.⁸ Piven and Cloward suggest that political docility and political action are not natural states, but socially structured occurrences determined by the nature of institutional arrangements. These arrangements either preclude or promote action. When protest is possible among the poor or other alienated groups, the form and impact it can have are constrained by social structure in ways which usually diminish its extent and diminish its force.⁹

The origin of collective behavior and the collective conscious took primacy over other issues among early collective behavior theorists. Gustave LeBon, a 19th century founder of collective behavior theory, credits crowds, which do not direct or create civilizations, a part in

destroying the old forms, giving way to replacement by the new ones.¹⁰ Despite their amorphous nature, Gabriel Tarde felt crowds aided the diffusion of innovations through the individual.¹¹ For these early thinkers, even the atomized acts of defiance were considered movement events because they perceived individuals acting as members of a group and sharing a common set of protest beliefs.¹²

Therefore, the internal dynamics and the interaction with the larger society are both decisive factors in the development of any social movement. When a perceived institutional deficiency exists, it means that people either disagree with some of the prohibitions stated by conventional rules or they object to some behaviors that conventional rules permit.¹³ Roberts and Kloss argue that there are three master trends which have an "oppressive nature": bureaucratization, cultural imperialism (including racism, colonialism, and economic exploitation), and industrialization.¹⁴ These trends give rise to respectively, anti-bureaucratic, nativistic, and egalitarian social movements.¹⁵ Protest has become a legitimate activity for large groups of people over the last quarter century, and the experience of confrontation has been highly reinforcing.¹⁶

Revolutionary social movements aim at total societal transformation. Reform movements seek to effect alterations in group status, changes in mobility opportunities, legislative change on behalf of a moral principle, or minor adjustments in the distribution of power.¹⁷ Therefore, the goals of social movements may be to effect changes in the legal sphere, in various institutions, in patterns of interaction, etc. Since change can occur within individual interaction or for the general social structure, Toch¹⁸ suggests, "if the aim of

movements is the amelioration of discomfort, their success must be gauged in terms of their felt benefits rather than in terms of the objective changes they bring about."¹⁹

Origins. Social movements are viewed as reactions to change--either improvements in social conditions or increased repression. Two popular explanations exist for explaining the origin of social movements: (1) social movements as a reaction to change, usually discussed as Deprivation theory (absolute or relative)²⁰ and (2) the Interactive approach. The idea of absolute deprivation is best articulated by the Marxian position, whereby human fate is seen as predestined and determined by the deterioration of social relations, leading to eventual rebellion.²¹ Here, the level of discontent has to be fairly high, persistent and sweeping, where achievements are declining or falling below expectations or expectations are outstripping achievements.²²

Absolute deprivation is the analysis that social change theorists use most often because it addresses the totality of external structural relations which propels people to act. Absolute deprivation relates to the objective living conditions of people in terms of economic, social and political realities, but does not address how people actually process this reality. Rather it prescribes how they should respond, given the objective reality. They do not focus on how the dominant ideology dissipates action and misplaces the culprit for absolute deprivation in the realm of individual control and not the general social structure. More popular, however, is the notion of relative deprivation and the theory of rising expectations as an explanation for social movements.²³ It suggests that frustrations are produced by

general periods of economic and social improvement, which in turn, generate expectations that outpace the rate of actual economic and social gains.²⁴ Expectations are the product of events in the past and comparisons with a reference group that shares similar characteristics to varying degrees.²⁵

The usefulness of these ideas is that they provide benchmark for when social movements are likely to occur. However, they fail to account for why change occurs in some situations and not others. The emphasis on the individual or the internal dynamics of collective behavior has prevented the anticipation of contemporary occurrences such as the Civil Rights Movements in the United States.²⁶ So, the role of collectivities in making history is an underdeveloped area,²⁷ pursued by the Interactionists.

The central assumption of the Interactionists perspective is that concrete experience molds people's discontent into specific grievances against specific targets.²⁸ Regarding social movements as an interactive phenomenon, is to view them as ongoing features of social life.²⁹ Interactionists advocate an analysis of the social environments in which social movements are fomented, especially the impact of foreign or hostile elements on the movement. According to Piven and Cloward, institutional life aggregates people or disperses them; it molds group identity and draws people into the settings within which collective action can occur.³⁰ The international movement of people from the Third World to industrial nations fans this fire. Chasteen³¹ suggests social movements are a response to a hostile environment, where behavior is a product of the definition of "the enemy" by the movement at a particular point in time. He suggests that

the nature of the opposition directs the evolution of the social movement.

Social cleavages between and within societies fuel levels of discontent.³² Clark³³ defines social segmentation as two or more groups among whom there is little effective communication, few cooperative relationships, and in many cases overt hostility. The segments usually have cultural characteristics and have a "group consciousness." Clark makes two interesting propositions: (1) other things being equal, the more segmented a society, the more likely it will experience social movements, (2) if a society is segmented, this segmentation will likely determine the social base of most movements that emerge.³⁴

While these comments describe a situation in a single nation, it is applicable to interacting segments of the world system. Perhaps the best example of the interactive perspective is Manuel Castells' The City and the Grassroots (1983).³⁵ Castells assumes that social movements develop around three major issues: collective consumption, cultural identity and political mobilization. The first two issues are organized in a specific territory and mobilization against local governments as an arm of the state apparatus. He calls for a grounded theory of comparative urban social movements in order to discern social change. Within his framework are issues such as the class struggle, the autonomous role of the state, gender relations, ethnic and national movements and general citizen movements. Castells' central aim is to uncover grassroots mobilization and grassroots demands.³⁶ Once the origins of social movements are known, then the scope of the action can be accounted for by various measurements of the type of

social change that takes place.

Process Factors. The social actors give us a clue to the type of organizing that takes place and how they relate to the objectives of social movements. Once we know why social movements emerge, and who is most likely to be affected by changes in the society, then we can discuss the definitions, types and assumptions about social movements, that is, who is involved in social change and why? What are the goals and objectives of social movements? To address who participates in social movements and why, it is necessary to discuss the processes involved in social movements.

Social movements usually require such things as an ideology, group norms, a "consciousness of kind" among members of the movement and some kind of organization.³⁷ Canadian sociologists,³⁸ suggest three elements necessary for the mobilization of a social movement: (1) an ideology on which potential members can be united, (2) borrowed portions of already developed ideologies, and (3) indigenous notions.³⁹ Ideology provides a remedy for the deficiency; tells people what they have to do and what changes must take place in society as a whole if the deficiency is to be overcome.⁴⁰ Eradicating racial discrimination in immigration promotion and promoting the legal protection of working women were areas of persistent confrontations between immigrant organizations, trade unions and Canadian government regulatory agencies after World War II. Concomitantly on an international scale, Third World independence struggles for self-determination, equity and nationalism were pervasive themes.

The availability in the indigenous culture of appropriate values and norms greatly increases the probability of mobilization. It helps

convince people that the movement has some chance of succeeding; thus attracting supporters who would otherwise dismiss the movement as hopeless.⁴¹ It increases commitment to the movement and promotes coordinated action, contains internal norms to govern relationships among members, interprets and remedies the institutional deficiency to promote commitment.⁴²

Strategies should be congruent with its ideology of change and relate to the achievement or failure of a movement's goals. Strategies include the issue of mobilization of relevant social actors in a movement, attracting new recruits and maintaining membership through effective organization. Three possible outcomes exist if there is a contradiction between the ideology of change and the strategy employed: the goals of such movements will be modified, their strategies will be altered, or they will be considered failures.⁴³

The issue of mobilization is critical for the Canadian case study because mobilization entails organizing targeted groups and their allies. Allies or advocates, that is people who speak on behalf of affected members is quite significant since the personal and economic vulnerability of immigrant women working as domestics are often cited as the greatest barrier to organizing this labor sector for their own self-protection. A long history of racial discrimination, tenuous legal immigrant status and the sexual division of labor have made it difficult for domestics to protect themselves or hope for alternative routes out of this occupation besides marriage or returning to the place of origin. Therefore, advocates are typically on the front line of organizing for domestic workers. A set of advocates not typically referred to as such are foreign governments who play a critical role in

articulating the needs of its internationalized populations. When Caribbean governments express the grievances of its overseas citizens to Canadian officials, they operate as part of this coalition of advocacy interests.

Their motivation to join a movement is a function of the intersection of the movement's self-definition and the societal definition with the individual's (or nation-state's) interests and felt needs. Some analysts suggest that a movement, therefore, will only be able to recruit sufficient numbers to the extent that its self-definition generates specific appeal for disaffected groups in the society or it secures a societal definition of at least partial legitimacy.⁴⁴

The meaning of a movement to its adherents is a function of three factors: the societal definition of the movement; the movement's self-definition, and the adherent's or potential adherent's own definition, which is derived from his/her perception of the first two. Lauer cites Herberle's⁴⁵ identification of four types of people likely to find a movement attractive: those who believe in the righteousness of the cause; those who have an emotional attraction, those who have a traditional impetus; and those who anticipate personal gain through membership. He cites Hoffer⁴⁶ who characterizes recruits as deprived in some way, utilizing popular causes for acquiring self-definitions, i.e. power.

Members and Leaders. It is often the case that members of social movements are not necessarily the most deprived segments of the population nor even those who experience relative deprivation.⁴⁷ This is especially relevant for advocates for immigrants. People who

engage in a movement are most often rising or falling in the stratification system; they are somewhere in the middle and not at the top or bottom.⁴⁸ Geschwender⁴⁹ discusses the members as reflecting one or more of three temporal and one non-temporal factors in the predisposition toward participating in social movements. He suggests that rising expectations, relative deprivation and downward mobility are contributing temporal phenomena and offers the concept of status inconsistency as the non-temporal one.

Leaders are unusual people from an outsider's point of view because they appear maladapted to the goals and objectives of a social movement. In the forefront of domestic worker organizations are people who are not necessarily domestics. However, for the needs of the social movement, they must be able to identify with a social group to which they do not belong, they must possess special qualities that stimulate enthusiasm in a following; they must be sufficiently divorced from established institutions to be willing to challenge them, and they must have the uniqueness of character and experience to imagine unconventional solutions to problems.⁵⁰

When these normative positions are not adopted, Piven and Cloward accuse activists of working against disruption and concentrating their efforts on developing formally structured permanent organizations with a mass membership drawn from the lower classes. This occurs because an assumption exists that formal organization is the vehicle of power.⁵¹ For social movements that become specialized associations, the association itself is often converted into a source of power, prestige and even monetary rewards, especially for its leaders and the administrative staff. It becomes an end in itself. Organizational

maintenance becomes so important that the original goals of the movement may be reversed to save it.⁵²

The effect of equating movements with movement organizations and thereby requiring that protests have a leader, a constitution, a legislative program, or at least a banner before they are recognized is to divert attention from many forms of political unrest.⁵³ To the extent that social movements take on specific forms is the degree that observers miss out on informal contributions to social movements. Discrete appropriation of resources and time from individual employers is often not calculated into the formal fabric of social movements. Similarly the role of coalitions defies easy identification of a single leader or even specific members. Similarly, even diplomatic lobbying occurs at a quite obscure level.

Impact. Questions raised about the effects of social movements are: how much change is required before one can safely say that large scale change has occurred? Does the change have to be even throughout the society or its institutions? How does one determine transitory versus enduring change?⁵⁴

Any assessment of a social movement must take account of the actual effects of the movement, since a multitude of factors are ordinarily at work.⁵⁵ Even when we can identify certain changes that followed upon the activities of a movement, there is the bothersome question of whether those changes might not have taken place anyway. We can only work carefully, try to account for all possibilities, and acknowledge the tentative nature of any conclusions. An observed change may be the result of factors other than those provided by the movement, when there are no stable criteria for assessing the degree to

which changes are short-run or long-term.⁵⁶

According to Piven and Cloward,⁵⁷ the most useful way to think about the effectiveness of protest is to examine the disruptive effects of different forms of mass defiance on institutions, and then to examine the political reverberations of those disruptions.⁵⁸

Analysts in Canada suggest that although movements may have been compelled to modify their goals or abandon them completely, they have left their imprint on the Canadian social fabric. In some cases the legacy has taken the form of federal or provincial legislation. In other cases, the legacy is an addition to the Canadian culture. In the majority of cases efforts at effecting change have not yielded anticipated results, nonetheless, their activities have had important consequences for the changing nature of Canadian society.⁵⁹

Government leaders have three rather obvious options when an institutional disruption occurs: they may ignore it; they may employ punitive measures against the disrupters; or they may attempt to coopt them. Disruption is more likely to be ignored when the disrupted institution is not central to the society as a whole or to other more important groups. Repression is more likely to be employed when central institutions are affected. When government is unable to ignore the insurgents and is unwilling to risk the uncertain repercussions from the use of force, it will make efforts to conciliate and disarm the protestors.⁶⁰ Foreign relations hang in the balance of these decisions.

Considerable time is required to develop an institutionalized response, and so it is only when a government has had to face a social movement over a long period of time that it can be expected to respond

in a highly institutionalized manner. In modern society, interaction with the state is the most important external interaction in which a social movement engages. The government may respond with indifference, accommodation or obstruction. Reactions depend on the degree of threat or disruption and the perceived validity of claims. Governments engage in both accommodation and obstruction. Even when government officials perceive that a movement has valid grievances, they will usually want to limit its relatively threatening activities, such as demonstrations, pickets, and sit-ins.

Groups in power respond to discontent by proposing reforms with which they have experience and which consist mainly of extending established "rights" to new groups or to new institutional arenas. Political leaders propose reforms that are in a sense prefigured by institutional arrangements that already exist. They are drawn from a repertoire provided by existing traditions. Government makes efforts to reintegrate disaffected groups and to guide them into less politically disturbing forms of behavior. It moves to isolate them from potential supporters in order to diminish the morale of the movement. The more far-reaching changes do not occur within the movement, but in the political context which nourished the movement in the first place; government's responses not only destroy the movement, they also transform the political climate which makes protest possible. Piven and Cloward conclude: "Protesters win, if they win at all, what historical circumstances has already made ready to be conceded."⁶¹

Lauer⁶² quotes Turner and Killian concerning "success" of a social movement. A movement may be judged to be successful if the

number of members continues to increase, if the organizational structure is maintained, and if the values of the movement are realized. Some observers will define a movement as successful even though it may not achieve any of its original goals, while other will maintain that success must involve at least a partial realization of movement ideals. It happens that unanticipated and even undesirable changes may result from movement activities. Often leaders are coopted by lucrative employment opportunities or, at least, given more attention than the targeted victims of a movement by the media or government officials. The movement may even impede the very kinds of change it supposedly advocates.⁶³ The notion of unintended and unanticipated consequences of social action has a long history in sociology⁶⁴ and is applicable to social movements as well as to social action in general.⁶⁵

Summary and Working Propositions. This research relies on an interactionist perspective which links literature on social movements/collective action to social change. The purpose of this review is not to establish the degree to which collective action/social movements leads to social change, but to establish and document social action as a central part of the transformation process. Collective action plays a more significant role in social change than people give credit because it can be amorphous in terms of the level of interaction, structure, duration and social actors. Lack of identifiable structure, participants and goals often leads to the failure to extend proper credit to social actors for change. This has the effect of demoralizing participants in social movements and often works to delegitimize their grievances, despite the fact that these

grievances are often tacitly incorporated into public policy positions.

Disruptions are not ignored by the state because source countries and their immigrants in general are central to the Canadian mosaic. Conciliatory postures are taken by the state to disarm protestors. The system is sensitive to and adjusts itself to public rumblings--social discord. Protest is legitimate activity that arises in response to the structure of racism, colonialism, and economic exploitation as one master trend that affects cultural identity (race, class, gender, nationality issues) of new Caribbean entrants and accounts for nationalistic or human rights-type agitations by people from developing societies.

The role of the state is to dissipate the force of disruptive social movements. A strategy often employed is offering differential rewards to identifiable elements within social movements, whether protests are instigated at the level of nation-state or competing interests within Canadian society. Such techniques rely on clearly identifiable organizational elements in social movement events. So, the issue of organizational form can be critical for effective goal-attainment by a social movement and, concomitantly, a source of vital information for the social movement's opposition. The state grants legitimacy to segments of a movement and may also confer the status of invisibility and lack of credibility on others.

Theoretically both social docility and political action are socially structured by institutional arrangements, molding people's discontent or grievances against specific targets. The degree of segmentation determines the degree of and social basis for social

movements. Existing social cleavages in Canada are exacerbated by population transfers and fuels activism. Reformist social movements seek to close the gap by gaining access to resources, privileges and power. In Canadian society they seek changes in group status, changes in mobility, equitable distribution of resources and fulfillment of moral principles of pluralism. This study focuses on the legal sphere for measurable changes; both perceived and actual changes in the law are assessed.

Process factors for social movements include: ideology, organization and membership. Ideologies are based on prior dilemmas faced by discontented groups. Operating as a window for looking at the problem, it identifies what is wrong, who is responsible for it, and who are the victims. Necessary for increasing commitment and promoting coordinated action, it governs organizational structure, membership and interprets events. The types of people involved range from true believers to opportunists. Those afforded the luxury of joining usually are not the most depressed segments of the population and are often motivated by humanitarian reasons or threats of eventual downward social mobility for themselves. Structurally, many collective action/social movement organizations are informal and characterized by a great deal of fluctuation. Years of experience with Caribbean migration resulted in predictable institutional responses to protest activities, representative of the three decades of struggle. Questions related to the validity of multiple causation in explaining social phenomenon are: Does protest play a role at all in social change? Are all protestors given credit for their actions by social policy makers? How do we know what we know about the Canadian case?

Research questions. Questions concerning social movements are:

(a) what constitutes an "organized" social movement? what is the significance of precise (identifiable) organization to the goals of a social movement? (b) are all significant actors accounted for by social movement literature? how do social movement theorists account for invisible, ancillary actors? The central questions related to social change are: (a) how do we measure social change? (b) of the social actors, who gets credit for (or benefits from) social change? of the social actors, who are the unsung heroes (or who loses) in the policy transformation process?

In this study, it is assumed that immigration policy transformations can be assessed at two levels of analysis--global links between the Center and the Periphery and internal social relations in Canada. Based on these linkages and relationships, two working propositions guide the study.

(1) Unequal relations between Canada and the Caribbean are directly related to changing contours of immigration policy. These changes in policy reflect the conflicting and contradictory interests of the interacting regions and are the compromises between the Center and Periphery.

A. If control of advantageous structural relations of trade, aid, investment and labor supplies are to be maintained within the Caribbean region, then concessions are made in Canadian immigration requirements.

B. If some economic and political advantages are to accrue to Caribbean governments, then they become major actors in instigating immigration programs in terms of their own interests.

(2) Not unrelated to globally linked interests at the state level, immigration policy transformation reflects the negotiated interests of responsive immigrant subpopulations within the receiving nation.

A. If changes in immigration policy affect selected subpopulations in substantial and adverse ways (real or perceived), then political activism to modify the policy is a likely outcome.

B. If benefits accrue to participants in policy transformation, only formally organized subpopulations will reap direct benefits from the state (i.e. credit, status, material rewards, recognition, etc.).

In summary this chapter outlines classic definitions and issues in collective action and social movements literature. Important in this context is the relationship between social movements and social change. The measurable impact of a social movement is apparent by the kind of reactions they elicit in formal state actions. The fact that government responds at all gives credit to social movements bestows a modicum of legitimacy to their influence. In a similar way the state can also withhold rewards and recognition in order to demoralize participants. In the next chapter the process of investigating protracted, discontinuous social movements in Canada is outlined.

CHAPTER TWO - NOTES

¹Frances Fox Piven and Richard A. Cloward, Poor People's Movements. Why They Succeed, How They Fail, (New York: Pantheon Books, 1977).

²Ibid, p. 20).

³Robert H. Lauer, ed. Social Movements and Social Change, (Carbondale and Edwardsville: Southern Illinois University Press, 1975) p. xiii; Edgar Chasteen, "Legal Change. Public Accommodations: Social Movements in Conflict," in Social Movements and Social Change, Robert H. Lauer (ed.): 156-173 Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1975, p. 157; Herberle, 1951; Blumer, 1951; Lang and Lang, 1961; Park and Burgess, 1942--as cited in Maurice Jackson, "The Civil Rights Movement and Social Change," in Social Movements and Social Change. Robert H. Lauer, ed.: 174-189 (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1975).

⁴Although social movement theorists see movements as more than just economic phenomena which include factors of prestige, power and psychic gratification. See Armand L. Mauss, Social Problems as Social Movements, (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1975); Glock, in Robert H. Lauer, ed. Social Movements and Social Change, (Carbondale and Edwardsville: Southern Illinois University Press, 1975). They are consumed by a concern with evolution or stages, an implicit premise of determinism, a greater interest in culture than groups, orientation to material rather than ideal factors, the dominance of the quantitative approach, and a preference for functional equilibrium explanations. See Maurice Jackson, "The Civil Rights Movement and Social Change," in Social Movements and Social Change. Robert H. Lauer, ed.: 174-189 (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1975).

⁵Killian, 1964 as cited Ibid, p. 175.

⁶see Comte, Spencer, Sorokin, White, Campbell in Robert H. Lauer, Social Movements and Social Change. p. xiii.

⁷Maurice Jackson, "The Civil Rights Movement." p. 175.

⁸Robert H. Lauer, Social Movements and Social Change, p. xvii.

⁹See Piven and Cloward, Poor People's Movements, pp. 3-7. Change may also be resisted when people become discontented because they believe there are insufficient institutional guides, including values, norms and/or individuals to direct their behavior. S.D. Clark, "Movements of Protest in Postwar Canadian Society," in Prophecy and Protest: Social Movements in Twentieth-Century Canada Samuel D. Clark, J. Paul Grayson, Linda M. Grayson, (eds.): 409-423 (Toronto: Gage Educational Publishers, 1975). Clark depicts collective behavior as a struggle against normlessness or as the "strain for consistency."

Therefore, various theorists conclude that social movements are more successful if their values and norms encompass sentiments already known to be strongly held in society. Samuel D. Clark, J. Paul Grayson, Linda M. Grayson, Prophecy and Protest: Social Movements in Twentieth Century Canada, (Toronto: Gage Educational Publishing Limited, 1975), p. 13).

¹⁰Gustave LeBon, 1960: 17-18, as cited in Robert H. Lauer, Social Movements and Social Change.

¹¹Turner & Killian, 1957, as cited in Robert H. Lauer, Social Movements and Social Change.

¹²See Piven and Cloward, Poor People's Movements, p. 4. The classical works of Comte, Toynbee, Weber, Durkheim, etc. investigated the fusion of individual minds on interaction as cited in Maurice Jackson, "The Civil Rights Movement."

¹³Clark, Grayson, Grayson, Prophecy and Protest:

¹⁴Ron E. Roberts and Robert Marsh Kloss, Social Movements: Between the Balcony and the Barricades, (St. Louis: C.V. Mosby, 1979).

¹⁵Lauer, Social Movements and Social Change, p. xvii.

¹⁶Ibid, p. 192.

¹⁷A competing dichotomy exists where theorists differentiate between societal change which involves alterations in patterns of interaction, and cultural change which refers to modification of social norms, belief systems, symbolic systems, values, or technology (Ibid)

¹⁸Toch (1965) cited in Lauer, Social Movements and Social Change.

¹⁹cited in Lauer, Social Movements and Social Change, p. xxvi.

²⁰Glock proposed five different types of deprivation: economic, organismic (bodily), ethical (value conflicts), psychic (value ambiguity/anomie), and social (belonging/status) (Ibid, p. xvi).

²¹Etzioni and Etzioni cited in Jackson, "The Civil Rights Movement."

²²Clark, "Movements of Protest in Postwar Canadian Society."

²³Using the idea of relative deprivation, several writers have designed typologies for understanding the emergence of social movements; notable are the works of: Armand L. Mauss, Social Problems as Social Movements; Neil J. Smelser, Theory of Collective Behavior, (New York: The Free Press, 1962); Denton E. Morrison, "Some Notes Toward Theory on Relative Deprivation, Social Movements and Social Change," American Behavioral Scientist 14(5) (May/June 1971): 675-690. For instance, Morrison (1971) developed five structural conditions

necessary for the emergence of social movements in situations of relative deprivation: (1) a large number of people must experience the deprivation, (2) there must be a certain "density" of the deprivation--interaction and communication must exist, (3) there must be similar roles and statuses among those experiencing the relative deprivation, (4) there must be a stratification system with well-defined boundaries and obvious power differences between the strata, and (5) the existence of voluntary associations in the society facilitates the rise of the movement because they suggest that change can come about through voluntary collective efforts. Similarly Smelser (1962) outlines six conditions which are conducive for social movements.

²⁴de Tocqueville, 1955; Cohn, 1957; Rush and Denisoff, 1971, as cited in Lauer, Social Movements and Social Change.

²⁵Terrence H. White, "Canadian Labour and International Unions in the Seventies," in Prophecy and Protest: Social Movements in Twentieth Century Canada. Samuel D. Clark, J. Paul Grayson and Linda M. Grayson, (eds.): 288-306 (Toronto: Gage Educational Publishing, Limited, 1975), p. 291.

²⁶Edgar Chasteen, "Legal Change in Public Accommodations: Social Movements in Conflict," in Social Movements and Social Change. Robert H. Lauer (ed.): 156-173 (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1975).

²⁷Lauer, Social Movements and Social Change, p. xiii.

²⁸Piven and Cloward, Poor People's Movements, p. 21.

²⁹Blumer, 1966 cited in Lauer, Social Movements and Social Change, p. 47.

³⁰Piven and Cloward, Poor People's Movements, p. 21.

³¹Chasteen "Legal Changes in Public Accommodations."

³²This type of analysis has been used most often in understanding the emergence of revolutionary social movements on both global and national scales. See: Cabral, Revolution in Guinea; Memmi, The Colonizer and the Colonized. (see Memmi, 1965; Cabral, 1969). Independence movements to end colonial relations between nations have been made analogous to internal insurrections, such as ghetto revolts in the United States, within a single nation (see Tabb, The Political Economy of the Black Ghetto). Persistent and systematic conditioning of the population acts as a means of social control and also aggravates the situation (see George L. Beckford, Persistent Poverty. Underdevelopment in Plantation Economies of the Third World, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1972); Walter Rodney, How Europe Underdeveloped Africa, (Washington, D.C.: Howard University Press, 1974).

³³Clark, "Movements of Protest in Postwar Canadian Society."

³⁴Ibid, p. 21).

³⁵Manuel Castells, The City and the Grassroots. A Cross-Cultural Theory of Urban Social Movements, (London: Edward Arnold Publishers, Ltd., 1983).

³⁶Ibid, p. xvii.

³⁷Rush and Denisoff, 1971: 185; Killian, 1964: 430 cited in Lauer, Social Movements and Social Change.

³⁸Clark, Grayson, Grayson, Prophecy and Protest.

³⁹If prospective supporters of a social movement have been in the habit of cooperating in day-to-day activities, the likelihood of their also cooperating in a social movement is greater (Ibid, p. 15-17).

⁴⁰Most movements are heterogeneous in composition, providing not only differences about what is a viable strategy for achieving a particular goal, but also differences about which goals to pursue. The stated goals may contain a certain amount of rhetoric. A movement can recruit members only if it convinces people that it possesses a viable and legitimate strategy as well as a desirable goal. Chasteen states the success or failure will hinge on the ability of the movement to persuade the public of the superior merit of its position (Chasteen, "Legal Change in Public Accommodations," p. 159).

⁴¹Clark, Grayson and Grayson, Prophecy and Protest, pp. 12-18.

⁴²Ibid

⁴³Lauer, Social Movements and Social Change, p. xx.

⁴⁴Ibid, p. 58.

⁴⁵Herberle (1951) cited in Ibid.

⁴⁶Hoffer (1951) cited in Ibid.

⁴⁷Ibid, p. 57.

⁴⁸Ibid, p. xvi.

⁴⁹Geschwender, 1968 as cited in Ibid.

⁵⁰See Clark, "Movements of Protest in Postwar Canadian Society." So popular was this way of thinking in the 1960's that the following is an ideal type crusader. Lotz (Jim Lotz, Understanding Canada. Regional and Community Development In a New Nation, (Toronto: NC Press, Limited, 1977, p. 127), in reference to community development workers, states:

A community development worker needs patience, plenty of humility, and stamina. A sense of humour is vital. Since community development workers, at least in theory, are on tap 24 hours a day, seven days a week, they need an understanding family and friends. Unless community development workers are willing to learn, and to assimilate and disseminate information rapidly from a variety of sources, their technical skills will be useless. Workers need a sense of discipline, and an ability to organize their own lives. Others will suffer if they don't practice what they preach. Finally, the worker must be an optimist, but also needs to remember that it is always darkest just before the bottom drops out of things.

⁵¹Piven and Cloward, Poor People's Movements.

⁵²Clark, Grayson and Grayson, Prophecy and Protest.

⁵³Others reject the notion of consensus, routinization and organization as viable processes for all social movements. For instance, Piven and Cloward's Poor People's Movements, basic assumption is that mass protest and disruption are the unique features that lower-class groups exert on political life.

⁵⁴Jackson, "The Civil Rights Movement."

⁵⁵Lauer, Social Movements and Social Change, suggests we must have knowledge about the kind of change that has occurred; a knowledge of the population characteristics; the structure of the society; the kind or kinds of deprivation involved; and the way in which the situation is defined before we can link specific changes with specific kinds of movements.

⁵⁶For instance, some suggest that the civil rights movement is over because the same historical factors which created it have not changed. This raises questions about the validity of factors identified as contributing to social movements.

⁵⁷Piven and Cloward, Poor People's Movements.

⁵⁸Both institutional and extra-institutional changes are imputed to the movement. For instance, the types of impact of the civil rights movement include: law-making, law-interpreting and law-enforcing (Lauer, Social Movements and Social Change) as well as economic, educational and religious institutional change.

⁵⁹Clark, Grayson and Grayson, Prophecy and Protest, p. 424-427).

⁶⁰Piven and Cloward, Poor People's Movements, pp. 27-31.

⁶¹Ibid, p. 27-36.

⁶²Turner and Killian, 1957 in Lauer, Social Movements and Social Change, p. 199.

⁶³Feuer, 1969 cited in Lauer, Social Movements and Social Change.

⁶⁴Schneider, 1971 cited in Lauer, Social Movements and Social Change.

⁶⁵Lauer, Social Movements and Social Change.

CHAPTER THREE

Methodological Issues: Working Propositions and the Canadian Social Context

Introduction. This chapter maps out the strategy for uncovering activities and social actors involved in the transformation of Canadian immigration policy affecting foreign domestics. The guiding propositions of the study outlined at the end of Chapter Two suggest that social actors exist at two distinct, but interrelated levels--the structural level of formal diplomatic communications between net-receiving and sending nations in Canada and the Caribbean, respectively; and confrontations between local community groups who reflect various interests within Canada's internal social relations and the central government. It is necessary to disaggregate social actors in the process by understanding what changes occurred, who influenced the shift, what adverse effects to the quality of life were realized for the actors and assessing the benefits or disadvantages realized by opposing sides of the confrontation.

Activists include a conglomeration of forces which range from formal officials representing governments to multipurposed community organizations and individuals in strategic locations within local communities. A common perception is that policy-makers mold formal public policy. What or who informs their decisions? My contention is that the responses of people affected by the policy are considerable and are often interwoven into the policy process. Yet the failure to

disaggregate the contributing elements results in policy-makers taking full credit or blame for adverse outcomes. Often missing are the social actors whose efforts go undocumented in the written accounts of the procedures. It is the invisible, faceless, powerless ones who most often set the tone for articulate policy-makers and their own vanguard.

The objectives of this study are two-fold: (1) to trace the thirty year evolution of the West Indian Domestic Scheme from its inception to the most recent universally worded policy and programmatic changes in the early 1980's, first as a persistent feature of Canadian and Commonwealth Caribbean societies, and secondly as a contributor to the development of Canadian social relations; and (2) to present a case study of a recent struggle of black foreign domestics in the Toronto area in the late 1970's, and to investigate the collective responses to foreign domestic immigration policy shifts as one feature of the policy formulation and transformation process and as a reflection of evolving race, class, gender and nationality relations in Canada.

Case Study. The "Good Enough to Work, Good Enough to Stay" Campaign was the starting point for analysis of events in Canada. It was the source of interviews and initial document search. I used earlier events, such as audiences with the Immigration department and letters during the 1950's and the 1960's as precipitating or background events to the campaign. This campaign was selected because it represented a "classic" case of a social movement because it had identifiable goals, objectives, strategies, members, leaders, stages, organization, etc. Does it fit the reality of ancillary and international social actors? I was curious about the proverbial

"invisibility" of people, who are usually powerless, whose stories were not told. The questions I asked at the onset of the project were: what actually happened in the Good Enough to Work, Good Enough to Stay" campaign for foreign domestic workers in Canada--that is, when did it begin? who was involved? what did they do or accomplish? how did the campaign affect the participants? My intent was to go beyond what was written about one group--INTERCEDE, the single formally documented aspect of this challenge to immigration policy that was published around 1981.

Research Strategy

Archives. In order to understand how policy changed, between November 1985 and April 1986, I traveled from East Lansing, Michigan to Ottawa Canada on four different occasions to the Employment and Immigration Department, the Multicultural Department and the Public Archives. I gathered information on Canadian immigration policy relevant to recruited domestic workers. The departmental libraries' personnel directed me to the current situation on foreign domestics and their activities. The Public Archives was where I reviewed historical material from the departments of Labour, Citizenship, External Affairs and Immigration. My focus was limited primarily to correspondence (internal and extra-departmental) files and reviewing immigration policy and procedure manuals used by immigration offices.

I chose to focus on correspondence files for the topic for several reasons. First, it appeared to be the best barometer of direct contact between the public and government agencies compared to formal instructions given to immigration officers who process people seeking

admission in the countries of origin and at the points of entry to the country. I was most interested in the innocuous manipulations that resulted in the need for instructions. A review of each source of information yielded a greater range of observable topics and social actors in the correspondence files.

Secondly, correspondence records allowed for a behind-the-scenes view of the policy process. While people within government departments enthusiastically dispensed published briefs and monographs on topics relevant to the study in Ottawa, these represented the official government positions and directed me to the Secretary of State department, which houses the Multiculturalism Secretariat, the traditional agency handling issues related to race. What this study attempted to do was, in part, identify and describe the process by which these official positions are derived. Correspondence files offered a point of entry into these less visible negotiations and often included the political considerations of decisions. Government motives for decisions were often articulated either in the body of a document or implied in hand-written comments in the margin of both internal and external correspondence. Letters, memoranda, research briefs, conference proceedings, published materials, etc. indicate not only who contacted the departments, they also gave some clue to the reactions of departments to queries, initiatives and demands about Caribbean immigration. Thus, I have tried in Chapters Four and Five to maintain the integrity of historical periods by using the common names of the period and extensively quoting the voices of the social actors.

Insights gained from archival sources propelled me beyond the nuances of published policy statements and conjecture. Generally,

systematic record-keeping allowed for cross-checking sources between concerned government departments. Because of these overlaps, I discovered the extensive range of departments affected by special recruitment programs (e.g. Manpower and Immigration, Unemployment Insurance Commission, External Trade Commissions, Labor, Health and Human Services, etc.), guaranteeing that the decision to implement a policy or program was no whimsical notion, but a deliberate and calculated plan of action whose costs and benefits had been weighed. I was able to piece together historical scenarios after reviewing records of mainly Immigration and Labour.

Two inherent weaknesses of the archival research process exist. First, archival research is biased toward written communications. It assumes a high level of literacy and voluntary interaction with the government by the public. If an individual or organization did not write to a government agency concerning an immigration matter for instance, then for all practical purposes they do not exist. A corrective measure for this study was to supplement the written records with personal interviews of people active throughout this period. A second limitation is the nature of archival procedures related to accessibility and the need to rely heavily on archives personnel and bureaucracies. This type of dependence elicits a persistent gnawing feeling that "I'd missed something" because I was at the mercy of the cataloguers. I was not quickly set at ease when the Immigration section archivist informed me that only 4-7 per cent of all government documents are kept in Canadian archives; an increase over previous periods! She assured me that even less is preserved in the United States.

One way of countering the possibility of missing significant pieces of the puzzle was working closely with the archivists and constantly elaborating as much as possible the research topic and agenda.

Archivists have intimate knowledge of the collection because they have organized it. In this respect the Immigration Archivist, Bennett McCardle was quite invaluable in this process and facilitated my research from East Lansing through calls, letters and notification about new findings. She also put me in contact with archivists responsible for both the Labour and Health and Human Services sections.

Statue of limitations on the data limits the type of information reviewed, in this case it was largely restricted to work before 1974 because materials after that date were either unavailable for public use or still a part of an active departmental record. Because all information is public, and the release for research was not judged subversive, there were ways to request inaccessible files. Letters and telephone calls were made to the Department of Employment and Immigration requesting access to current files. I received a call from Ottawa desiring further information on my interest, but no subsequent reply.

A third limitation of archival research relates to the protracted nature of the process. Data collection in archives is inherently tedious and slow. Several stages in the process are time consuming. Canadian privacy laws protect the rights of individuals, and dictates that the names of persons be removed prior to opening a file to a researcher. Because an archivist had to read all these materials in preparation for use, I had to notify the office several weeks in advance in order for this process to begin.

Using finder's guides typically developed by the researcher using the classifications of materials, such as: bibliographies, special series, manuscripts, departments, Members of Parliament, etc. Some files were additionally classified as secret volumes because they covered sensitive materials and required special permission for use. Most of the records used for this study are classified as secret files and I had to meet with the Chief Archivist to gain access to the materials as a registered researcher with research privileges. Requested materials were reviewed and flagged for copying. Photocopies were mailed to East Lansing after several weeks.

Interviews. I conducted informational interviews while in Ottawa, about the topic with five department employees and obtained the names of potential informants in the Toronto area knowledgeable about the "Good Enough to Work..." Campaign for foreign domestics. In order to assess what happened in the campaign, I interviewed selected participants in the events. The sample was not random. I relied on referrals from the network of activists supplied to me in Ottawa and with whom I met and informally talked. In total thirty-six names were given to me. A key question in the interview guide asked for additional referrals, so the list grew as I talked to more people and certain names were mentioned by more than one person. Interviews were conducted with persons whom I could find, had some recollection of the campaign and were willing to talk about it. I traveled from East Lansing, Michigan to Toronto, Ontario four times between May to September, 1986. Fourteen interviews were conducted--twelve in person and two on the telephone.

With the consent of the participants, interviews were conducted at

a site selected by the subject. Interviews lasted from 45 minutes to 1-1/2 hours, were tape recorded and covered issues ranging from their recollection of precipitating events to the campaign, their role/involvement, an assessment of the success of the movement and its affect on their personal lives (See Interview Guide in Appendix A). Interestingly enough the slogan "Good Enough to Work, Good Enough to Stay," which I used to capture the essence of a movement, conjured up more than one movement in the participants' recount of events. Eventually, the vision of a specific and identifiable movement occurring in a particular year was corrected to include a range of activities, spanning several years and embodying a number of slogans involving the rights of foreign domestic workers.

The opportunity to speak to people who participated in the "Save the Seven" and the "Good Enough to Work..." campaigns broadened the understanding of the transformation of public policy affecting foreign domestic workers. Personal recollections were a major complement to the written documentation gathered in Canadian libraries and the National Archives.

Of the fourteen people interviewed, nine were women and five were men; eleven were black and of Caribbean descent and three were white. Two immigration lawyers were interviewed; seven people worked in community service agencies; two were retired; two were currently domestics; one was a school principal. Four of the fourteen had entered Canada as domestics, including the school principal and community agency workers. For analytical purposes the fourteen interviews were divided as follows: Old Guard/Garveyites = 2 (Interviews #5, #6); Immigration Lawyers = 2 (Interviews #1, #10);

Community Workers = 7 (Interviews #2, #3, #4, #7, #8, #9, #13);

Politicized Domestics = 3 (Interviews #11, #12, #14).¹

The interviews had a two-prong purpose of first, completing the pictures of what happened in the mass campaigns. The voices of actual participants complement written accounts of the social movements and elucidates the policy process. As discussed in previous chapters, the policy formation process is the art of compromise between opposing sides and within allied positions of immigration issues. While the primary conflict between the government and the community are apparent, one community activist hinted that compromise was also an integral part of the internal dynamics of organizing the immigrant community response to an announced policy:

...[I]t took a lot of work, you know, figuring out exactly what our response was going to be and we had to, of course, juggle the demands that the women were making and some of the community advocates; in particular the lawyers, who tended to lean much more in the direction of what the government would more readily agree to.²

Secondly, by focusing on how advocates evaluate their activities, personal interviews reflect their feelings about the nature of activism and the efficacy of social movements in social change. Just as advocates donate time, money and resources to which they have access to the movement, a corollary to this hidden dimension is the support system of family and friends on which the advocates rely. One volunteer noted:

If you want an easy life, don't get into this line of work. You've got to be able to take a certain amount of pressure, to be extremely motivated and believe very firmly in what you're doing. Because you're going to get opposition or indifference,³ which can be even worse, from lots of quarters.

Moreover, interviews affirm the significance of less formalized, "hidden advocacy" as a salient feature of community based advocacy work, discussed later in the chapter.

Insights into the "formal structural relations" linked to trade, aid, investment and, most relevant here, immigration policies governing the admission of people from the Caribbean into Canada were gained through government documents. "Concessions" are measured by the degree of policy change over time; "restrictions" are operationalized by historically contrasting the changed policy against pre-1955 policy. Social relations operate at the level of local communities and represent inequalities of race, gender and nationality as features of internal social relations in Canada also comes from primary and secondary documented accounts. The notion of "disadvantage" is limited to entering groups from the Caribbean and applies to their entry and subsequent placement and mobility within the Canadian employment structure.

"Political activity" refers to collective action/social movements and involves the full range of events from appealing directly to Canadian governmental offices to seeking advice and counselling with alternative racial or immigrant services community groups; activities such as demonstrations, mass meetings, educational campaigns, and letters to policy makers. Both the social aspects of organized activity and the political action itself, are included in this discussion. Who constitutes the segments of "organized" groups emerges from personal interviews and issues of legitimacy or "credit" for their activity is measured by groups referenced in government briefs and immigration correspondence files.

A Methodological Note. Where do black immigrant women go who seek help for work-related problems or difficulties in their personal life? They communicate directly with families in their countries of origin or seek out agencies that cater to their special needs. More often, they are "discovered" by people who are in some way plugged into the larger structure or who are knowledgeable about how the system works. Much of what is known about the activities and networks of powerless people, be they racial minorities, women, immigrants, etc., is best understood through their own experiences. Ethnographies and interviewing are common methods for gaining information about groups with strong oral traditions and reference groups become critical for either of these techniques. Often uncovered serendipitously are formal organizations and individuals who may meet the needs of people alienated from larger societal institutions;⁴ these are the advocates for categories of people such as foreign domestic workers. Therefore, it is important to appreciate the Canadian context where the state has incorporated non-systemic approaches.

The Setting: Canadian Social Context. Immigrant status has been regularized in the Canadian context to the extent that an entire parastatal "immigrant services" industry has been constructed around this group. The official policy of Multiculturalism has sought to maintain the integrity of the heritage of Canadian immigrants. Interestingly enough, today, whether one is born or naturalized in Canada, if one is non-European, the primary source of reference in the most formal or casual conversation remains the place of origin. Because of this fact, Caribbean women in Canada as domestics enter an established and identifiable immigrant community regardless of their

occupation.

This contextual factor is significant to the extent that it sets the stage for discussion of collective action in an advocacy capacity in the most recent decade of Caribbean entry into Canada. Lobbyists for Caribbean domestics fit into a history of supportive services for women entering Canada as household workers. The integration of these workers into the society, beyond their contribution to the economy, has been problematic for the Canadian government and often requires intervention by non-governmental sectors who operate as allies of affected recruited immigrants.

Social Actors. The sphere of workers as social actors who consciously attempt to impact policies related to the structure of work is expanding. There are a host of independent immigrant services advocacy agencies, who have as their general mandate the protection of foreign workers in Canada and overseeing the implementation of immigration policy. The plight of foreign domestics is just one of many activities in which advocates are engaged. Typically the thrust of their agitation is directed toward discriminatory practices in the public sector. Encouraging domestic service workers to organize around their own interests, such advocacy groups have represented the plight of maids, foreign and citizen, to government policy-makers and have acted as liaisons with unions.

The literature on advocacy work for foreign domestics in Canada generally falls into two categories: (1) women and trade union issues, focusing on domestic work as a labor category, (2) immigrant community services, representing governmental attempts to accommodate new immigrants and fulfill its policies of Multiculturalism, and community

relations where voluntary groups address issues relevant to "visible minorities" in Canada. The second category forms the population from which informants were selected for interviews.

Women and Trade Unions. In North America unions have been noticeably slower to take up the challenge of organizing foreign labor, especially domestic workers. On the limited scale that it has occurred, the movement has been led by feminists in trade unions who connect their struggles in the public workplace with the privatized experiences of other working women.⁵ Structural isolation has consistently made the domestic sector difficult to regulate. The Canadian literature on trade unionism is a vital source of class analysis of domestic service.⁶ The fact that the issues are covered by women who have been marginal members of the union movement, suggest that the convergence of feminism and workers' rights is evident.

Facing a serious membership crisis, the increasing role of women in unions is challenging the organizations to make women's issues legitimate union issues.⁷ The transformation of domestic service into a predominately black institution further decelerated the rate of organization because of persistent discrimination on race, sex and job category criteria within the union movement itself.⁸ Miki Keda Silvera's Silenced has a working class focus, and develops more fully the dimension of racial oppression to her analysis of ten foreign domestic workers. In a cursory fashion, Silvera challenges the validity of such slogans as "wages for housework" as a viable rallying point for black women in light of the history of domestic service and the fact that black women generally seek to leave domestic service as soon as possible, rather than reform it.⁹ Other writers who combine

the themes of race and class expose the problematic nature of feminist slogan of "sisterhood" with the complexities of power relations of domination and subordination inherent in the woman-as-mistress and woman-as-servant dyad. Added to this are the dynamics of race.¹⁰

Conditions under which formal domestic organizations have been most successful are first, when the women work for an agency funded by the government. This facilitates organization because: (1) they have a common employer, (2) they have occasion to meet and talk with each other and (3) they have secure immigrant status. When live-in domestics decide to organize they require assistance, initially, from people with more freedom of movement and time and with more experience at organizing in Canada.¹¹ A danger exists when outside organizations direct the campaign, but do not simultaneously train enough domestics to assume leadership roles after initial victory. Secondly, when organized domestics have permanent financing and organizational structure, found in a union charter, efforts may also be successful.¹²

Immigrant Community Services. The federal government assumes responsibility for providing services to immigrants, such as counseling abroad, at arrival, receptions, accommodations, employment and programs to promote integration of these communities into the broader society. An entire governmental and parastatal industry has been constructed around this segment of the society, which exists separate and apart from the mainstream. Propelled by government initiatives, immigrant services are self-perpetuated entities. In keeping with the national policy of Multiculturalism,¹³ since the 1970's both federal and provincial governments have instituted agencies to trouble-shoot and

assist the rapidly growing immigrant communities. Predictably, such agencies must address concerns by such community members as foreign domestics.

The provincial initiatives are the most colorful in assisting the visible minority communities.¹⁴ The service providers must be cognizant of changes in immigration laws and immigration policy because of the intimate connection between their organization's mandate and this policy. A Race Relations Unit was established in 1982 amid growing indications of increasing racial tensions. Its mandate was to ensure a Canadian body of research and support for efforts to improve understanding among Canadians of various racial backgrounds. In addition to research, a wide variety of community-based organizations have been supported in developing programs to combat racism. Local governments, professional organizations and unions are also participating in this effort.¹⁵

Such services, like the implementation of Multiculturalism, are largely the responsibility of provincial governments. The limitations of these programs are evident in the tightly prescribed scope. Programs differ in the clientele they may serve. Most programs are geared to women who have not been in Canada more than three years--for others are limited to certain occupations--temporary workers are not eligible for most adjustment and adaptation services. The euphemism, "Immigrant and Visible Minority Women", is used to distinguish racial and ethnic groups in the Canadian mosaic. It is often difficult to discern where visible minority women who are temporary immigrants who wish to become landed citizens, fall within these distinctions. Most government initiatives have focused on "immigrant Women", with "visible

minorities" receiving more recent attention.

Literature at the federal level is largely limited to conference proceedings assessing women's priority and monitoring government funded local initiatives. Priority areas defined by the government for immigrant women include: language training in one of the official languages (English or French), employment and training, health and social services, public education system, and individual, community and family life. The extent to which they promote advocacy work for foreign domestics consists of attempting to control the voluntary initiatives of community groups. Perhaps the most relevant to this study underwritten by the federal government is a mammoth Canadian document: Domestic Workers on Employment Authorization, published in 1981 by the Ministry of Employment and Immigration which details the changes in the federal regulations to protect the interests of foreign domestics. Most of the activity of community volunteers and immigrant services have been shaped by this policy.

Government-sponsored initiatives and trade union initiatives must be separated from voluntary organizations which have come out of racial and ethnic communities themselves. Books, such as Speaking of Racism (1985), deal with the subtleties and institutional forms of Canadian race relations and the individual and collective strategies to combat and endure this oppression.¹⁶ Significantly, they list community organizations which are often immigrant's first choice when confronted with a crisis.¹⁷

A Note on Language. In this study I use race as a central analytical factor with its own dynamic that provides greater explanatory power for social phenomena. Race operates on a variety of

levels: economic, social, political and cultural. The sociolegal significance of race allows for the discussion of policy in a particular place. The terminology attached to this dimension helps amplify the political significance of race. The labels Negro, coloured, black, African are deliberately used throughout the study and symbolize the historical progression of associated language with race. The use of the terms is helpful in maintaining the integrity of documentary sources. The term "coloured" for instance in the Canadian context is used to refer to people of both African descent and Asian descent.¹⁸

The term "Caribbean" or "Commonwealth Caribbean" are the preferred terms used to identify what is popularly called the "West Indies" or the "British West Indies." The Caribbean in this study usually refers to the English-speaking territories of the Caribbean that were formal colonial possessions and received independence directly from Great Britain. The common expression "West Indies" was the name of the official unitary government during the short-lived West Indies Federation (1958-1962).¹⁹

Similarly, the term "girls" is often employed in the archival records to refer to adult women of legal age, who are working and often are the primary breadwinners for their families, who come to work in Canada as domestics. Household Service Workers was a preferred term for a while for "domestic", "maid", or "servants". The treatment of these women is symbolic of the devaluation of women in general and their contribution to both production and reproduction of the larger society. Understanding the importance of the public and private issues which confine women to devalued roles points out the social

significance of sex and gender in policy formation. In this context the issues of biology, children, female-headed households, protection, docility and double standards, etc. contribute to the lowered social status of immigrant women.

Class, a summary status concept is narrowly used here to refer to occupations within the division of labor. The social significance of class as it relates to the system of rewards (power, mobility, access to resources and opportunities, etc.) are tailored by the combination of issues of race, national origin, and sex.

Subsequent chapters present the actual analysis of the data. Policy is the focus of Part II and Part III looks at the people involved in the case study of local collective action in response to changes in immigration. Chapter 4 takes as its point of departure the fact that Canadian immigration policy was quite restrictive vis a vis the Third World for most of the first half of the twentieth century. This study focuses on the lifting of such restrictions in the post-World War II period. The one example from which the study draws most evidence is the West Indies Domestic Scheme, an experiment in restricted recruitment from the English-speaking Caribbean. The experimental period lasted from 1955 to 1962.

After 1962 when political events in the Caribbean and Great Britain prompted a switch in Canadian policy from specialized movements from targeted geographical areas to a more universal and inclusive policy to govern all entries. Chapter 5 focuses on the demise of specialized movements and the advent of universalism and non-discrimination as strategies applied to Canadian immigration policy. The significance of non-immigration issues, such as trade, aid and investments on

immigration policy characterize the structural relations between the Caribbean and Canada. Immigration is essentially used as a pawn in foreign relations between the two areas. In 1976 a new Immigration Act was adopted and the policy of universalism was working to the definite disadvantage of the Caribbean and its citizens, despite the significant influx of immigrants from the region after 1962.

Part III focuses on community based collective action and adds to written accounts of the campaigns by incorporating renditions of the events by actual participants in the protests that spanned several years. Chapter Six focuses on background events leading to two mass campaigns between 1977 and 1981 around the domestic worker issue. Chapter Seven outlines elements in the social organization of collective action manifested in the form of coalitions within Toronto's immigrant community. It focuses on the internal dynamics within the loose coalition of actors in the domestic worker campaigns. Chapter Eight evaluates the impact of this action from a variety of perspectives, essentially focusing on interactive dimensions of the work. Chapter Nine revisits the guiding research propositions in acts as a summary to this section. It evaluates the propositions in light of the origin, form and impact of contemporary Caribbean community-based social movements. Chapter Ten concludes the study.

CHAPTER THREE - NOTES

¹The 14 personal interviews were broken down as follows:

<u>Interview #</u>	<u>Category</u>
1	Lawyer
2	Community Worker
3	Community Worker
4	Community Worker
5	Old Guard
6	Old Guard
7	Community Worker
8	Community Worker
9	Community Worker
10	Lawyer
11	Domestic
12	Domestic
13	Community Worker
14	Domestic

²Interview #2.

³Interview #2.

⁴See Bettylou Valentine, Hustling and Other Hard Work: lifestyles in the ghetto. (New York: Free Press, 1978).

⁵See M. Fitzgerald, C. Guberman, M. Wolfe, eds., Still Ain't Satisfied: Canadian Feminism Today, Toronto: The Women's Press, 1982.

⁶Especially relevant are the works of Briskin and Yang, Union Sisters; the work of Acton, et al, Women at Work; White's Women and Unions; and the special issue of Resources for Feminist Research (1981), all of which acknowledge the need to organize domestic work.

⁷Dominated by an ethos of business unionism, such unions do not take new organizing seriously. Unions rarely consider the small amount of union dues generated by domestics to be worth the time and money involved in organizing. As greater awareness of the artificiality of the separation of work from non-work experiences of politics, family and leisure is gaining support, feminist writers advocate unions taking up social issues as well as economic ones.

Linda Briskin, "Women and Unions in Canada. A Statistical Overview," in Union Sisters. Women in the Labour Movement. Linda Briskin and Lynda Yanz (eds.): 28-43. (Toronto: Women's Educational Press, 1983); Laurell Ritchie, "Why Are So many Women Unorganized?" in Union Sisters. Women in the Labour Movement, Linda Briskin, and Lynda Yanz, (eds.): 200-211, (Toronto: Women's Educational Press, 1983) p. 208; Cumsille et al, "Triple Oppression: Immigrant Women in the Labour Force," p. 221.

⁸See Harris, The Harder We Run; Cock, Maids and Madams. Since domestic work has been transformed into a predominately "visible minority women" domain, it is a rather sensitive issue that is frequently mentioned as an area needing further study by feminists. Therefore, direct involvement beyond ideological identifications are weak.

⁹Silvera's Silenced, p. 122.

¹⁰Silvera, Silenced; Angela Davis, Women, Race and Class. (New York: Vintage Books, 1983). 1st Vintage Books edition. Rollins, Between Women.

¹¹Rachel Epstein, "Domestic Workers: The Experience in B.C.," in Union Sisters, Women in the Labour Movement, Linda Briskin and Lynda Yang, (eds.): 222-237, (Toronto: Women's Educational Press, 1983), p. 234.

¹²Marijana Vukman-Tenebaum, "Organizing Domestics in Ontario," Women and Trade Unions--Resources for Feminist Research 10:2 (July 1981): 32.

¹³Multiculturalism, a national mandate in 1971, was the mechanism through which government officially intervened in demonstrating Canada's willingness to incorporate diverse segments of the Canadian mosaic into a unified, pluralistic society. The policy is aimed at non-Charter populations in Canada, i.e. of English or French descent.

¹⁴Agencies such as the Family Service Association of Metropolitan Toronto and the Cross-Cultural Communication Centre, the Immigrant Women's Job Placement Centre, the Immigrant Women's [Health] Centre, etc. provide services and produce literature for distribution and instruction for members and the community and offer in-service training for service providers in these agencies. Representative works include the handbook by Juliette M. Christiansen, Anne Thornley-Brown, Jean A. Robinson, West Indians in Toronto, Implications for Helping Professions, (Toronto: Family Service Association of Metropolitan Toronto, n.d.) for family counsellors of Caribbean clients; the booklet, Enid Lee, Letters to Marcia, A Teacher's Guide to Anti-Racist Education, (Toronto: Cross Cultural Communication Centre, 1985); Immigrant Women's Centre, Immigrant Women's Health Handbook: A Book by and for Immigrant Women, (Toronto: The Immigrant Women's Centre, 1981); Barb Thomas and Charles Novogrodsky, Combatting Racism in the Workplace: A Course for Workers, (Toronto: Cross Cultural Communication Centre, 1983); L.L. Schachter, (Researcher) Affirmative Action for Visible Minorities, submitted to the Affirmative Program, Ontario Region, Canada Employment and Immigration, Toronto, 1984. All attempt to address institution-specific problems that confront visible minority immigrant women.

¹⁵Canada, Multiculturalism, "Multiculturalism and the Government of Canada," Minister of Supply and Services Canada, 1984.

¹⁶Typically such works as Silvera's Silenced, Talbot's Growing Up Black in Canada (1984), Head's Adaptation of Immigrants: Perceptions of Ethnic and Racial Discrimination (1980) are written in this tradition.

¹⁷In the case of foreign domestics organizations such as: The Jamaican-Canadian Association, International Committee Against Racism, INTERCEDE, Negro Citizenship Association, Universal African Improvement Association, Home Base Services Center, etc. come to mind for organizing marches, letter-writing campaigns, and initiating litigation on behalf of domestic workers harassed because of their status as immigrants.

¹⁸The term "black" is my term of preference. It refers to people of African-descent living in Africa or the African diaspora. Black is employed as a less cumbersome nomenclature than African-American, Afro-American, African-Canadian, Afro-Canadian, African-Caribbean, Afro-Caribbean, West Indian, Caribbean black, etc. Alternatives terms such as New World Africans, a pan-Africanist label, refers to people of African descent in the western hemisphere and consciously attempts to eliminate artificial geographical barriers between blacks in the diaspora. It obscures distinctions necessary for this study, however.

¹⁹A misnomer, the term was applied by early colonial explorers who used the term, "West Indies", to distinguish between European overseas possessions in the "Old World" of Asia and the "New World" in the Western hemisphere. Imposed during the days of Columbus' travels, the term West Indies was coined when the explorers got lost on their way to India. Since the independence era of the 1950's and 1960's, it is quite important for newly independent countries to name or rename themselves as a means of distancing themselves from a colonial past.

PART II

Immigration Policy

- Chapter 4 - The Transformation of Public Policy--The West Indies Domestic Scheme, 1955-1961**
- Chapter 5 - The Reclamation of Power: Canada's Universal Immigration Policy, 1962-1976**

CHAPTER FOUR

The Transformation of Public Policy: The West Indies Domestic Scheme, 1955-1961

Introduction. Public policy is the formalization of a nation's dominant ideology and provides guidelines for all agents of the government. Public policy refers to both formal laws and the translation of legislation into specific programs. It negotiates the power relations between agencies of the government and is responsible for incorporating new groups into the society. National immigration policy and programs are one type of public policy implementation, which reflects global power dynamics and critically shapes internal social relations.

In this chapter a dominant feature of contemporary Canadian immigration policy is discussed. Foreign labor recruitment governs the recruitment, admission, composition, tenure and assignment of people to the labor force. The Immigration Act of 1952 officially opened the door for thirty years of intensive labor recruitment to Canada. Moreover, it permitted the establishment of a socioeconomically diverse black immigrant presence in Canada that constituted a "critical mass" in social policy formation and development.¹ There were three ways that blacks entered Canada as potential permanent immigrants in the 1950's: (1) as sponsored close relatives of Canadian citizens, (2) as unsponsored individuals of exceptional merit (i.e., humanitarian reasons or as potentially outstanding Canadian citizens),² and

(3) as employer-sponsored special group movements of labor such as farm workers, nurses or domestics, which were bilateral government sanctioned work schemes. Both unsponsored individuals and employer-sponsored special movements involved discretionary recommendations of immigration officials and required Order-in-Council permission to enter. This authorization classified the last two categories as exceptions, allowing circumvention of existing regulations governing permanent immigrants.

The West Indies Domestic Scheme (WIDS) is an employer-sponsored special group movement program, which serves as a concrete example reflecting Canadian recruitment policy transformation over three decades. Its preconditions, inception and transformation are outlined and are discussed in terms of occupational preference, national origins and immigrant status in Canada. From the onset of the program in 1955 until its culmination and demise³ the domestic scheme was virtually a political mechanism, i.e., "the carrot," used to maintain control of faltering British colonies in the English-speaking Caribbean within the shifting world economy, via Canada. Canada was in an ascendant position in the world community, being called upon to assume a more direct role in international affairs. Courted by various sectors in the international community (Great Britain, newly independent governments in Asia and those approaching independence in the Caribbean) Canada was pressured to modify its position in international relations away from a Eurocentric focus to more interactions with the Third World. Acquiescence to this external pressure radically altered previous decades of highly restrictive practices toward non-Europeans.

However, Canada's capitulation was not totally the act of a weak or battered nation. Far from being benign, the immigration policies adopted were structured in the economic and political interest of Canada as it actively strived to cultivate advantageous relations with the most profitable nations in the Caribbean: Jamaica, Guyana, Trinidad, while simply accommodating others.

Several periods of recruitment policy modifications are notable between 1950 and 1981 which roughly correspond to Canada's changing occupational preference, the national origin of recruits and their social and legal status in Canada. In 1950 a separate governmental department responsible for immigration policy and practices was launched. Over three formative decades the Immigration department underwent several reorganizations, revising its mandate each time.⁴ Formal recruitment policy emphasized citizenship, then occupational preference, and finally legal status; all three issues were contributing factors in policy formation and change. Charges of racial discrimination were persistent for all periods, despite the Canadian government's oscillating postures of justification, acquiescence and denial of the charges. Until the 1970's, the recruitment of foreign workers was accompanied by their nearly automatic consideration for citizenship. Today, the twin objectives of Canadian immigration policy remain attracting a permanent settler population and fulfilling economic requirements.

The recruitment of labor from the Caribbean to Canada developed over three overlapping periods. Prior to the 1950's recruitment was decidedly Eurocentric for all occupational categories and citizenship

was guaranteed upon entry in Canada. Four Immigration Acts in 1952, 1962, 1968 and 1976 were critical watersheds that effected the programmatic implementation of these immigration policies. Phase I is characterized by the selective recruitment of farm and domestic workers. The Immigration Act of 1952 governed "Alien Labour" and introduced employer-sponsored group movements from selected regions of the world. The WIDS of 1955 was developed as one program that was implemented as a result of this Act. Although entries came from the Caribbean, a non-traditional geographical source, like the Europeans eventual citizenship was guaranteed.

Phase II in labor recruitment implementation became apparent with the transformation to Universalism. The Immigration Act of 1962 officially ended special group movements and promised non-discrimination and universal admission from all part of the world. Occupational preference for new immigrants was welcomed from any country in the world using a single admission standard (experience, skills and education), although preference was decidedly in favor of professional and skilled occupations. This Act changed the formal mechanics of labor recruitment promotion, and the selection and placement of new workers. The 1968 Immigration Act reaffirmed the validity of universal admission criteria but changed the structure of labor recruitment by redefining admission criteria. Unskilled work such as domestic service was now included as a necessary and valid entry criteria. Universalism did not contradict the practice of guaranteeing eventual Canadian citizenship to newcomers.

Phase III began in the 1970's and marked the transformation to more restrictive entries in terms of occupational qualifications and

citizenship was no longer guaranteed, as temporary immigrant status was used more often. The Immigration Act of 1976 was critical because it repealed the 1952 Alien Labour Act and the Immigration Appeal Board of 1967 and ended the possibility of automatic landing for recruited workers in Canada. The 1981 program for Foreign Domestics on Employment Authorization was a result of this Act. The rationale for this last change was that Canada had to be concerned with the social responsibility for immigrant labor already in Canada. Universalism and its successor policies are the subject of Chapter 5.

Background to WIDS

The era of free immigration to Canada operated uncontrolled and unregulated between 1845 to 1924, the period when blacks entered from both the United States and the Caribbean on a minuscule scale. After 1924 the vast majority of immigrants to Canada were of European extraction.⁵ Limitless economic opportunities and the availability of entrepreneurial farming land were touted as key attractions for potential permanent white citizens.⁶ Industrial expansion related to the war industry in the 1940's brought prosperity and a new consumerism to urban centers and, subsequently, labor needs for the industrial and service sectors.

In times of prosperity when there is a scarcity of labour in Canada, there is always a proposal to bring in classes of labour which at other times is neither sought nor welcomed.⁷

The Director of Immigration's lament in 1942 actually signalled a boom period of growth for the Canadian economy which would last until the late 1960's. Immediately following World War II, all immigration declined. In 1948 the total number of immigrants was 125,414; by 1949

it fell to 95,217 and estimates for 1950 projected about 75,000 entries. Public officials called attention to the severity of the labor shortage in the legislature and with the governor.⁸ Canada was unwaivering in its policy to blatantly discourage the entry of African or Asian people. Despite acknowledgment of the labor shortage, the government routinely rejected requests for agricultural labor and domestic workers from the British West Indies.⁹ Priority was reserved for European workers. Interestingly enough, so determined was Canada to stick to its policy that in a memo of 13 March, 1947 it was proposed that:

...A few hundred Spanish workers from the southern [United] States help us in the sugar beet area of Ontario...I understand that a considerable number of these people come north into Michigan every year and that they perform on the whole quite satisfactory work...This...we had in fact once considered, but...it would seem...much simpler, when they have the machinery all established, to bring in a few more West Indians themselves than for us to have to set up the machinery ourselves.¹⁰

The official justification was that Canada was obligated to accommodate bulk movements of European displaced persons.¹¹

The adaptability of black immigrants to life in Canada was seen as quite improbable. This position was articulated by the Director of Immigration:

...[I]t is not possible to encourage the movement of coloured, or partly coloured, immigrants from tropical or sub-tropical countries, since they are difficult to fit into our way of life and become integrated into the community. There is also a tendency for some employers to endeavor to obtain their services on a lower wage scale than the prevailing basis and, in the event of lay-off, to discharge them first or pressure is brought to bear by other employees to take such action. In addition, the climatic conditions affect them more adversely than European immigrants and as they are accustomed to a lower standard of living, they tend

to form isolated and undesirable pockets in Canadian communities.¹²

This vociferous attitude continued until the 1950's. Evidence of the restrictions are notable in Table 1 below, where entries from the Caribbean did not exceed more than 100 for most of the years listed.

TABLE 1

Negro Immigration to Canada by
Country of Last Permanent Residence,
Fiscal Year 1945-46 to 1952-53

FISCAL YEAR	TOTAL	NEGRO	%TOTAL	-----SOURCE COUNTRIES-----				
				USA	B.W.I.	Bermuda	W.I.	Other
1945-46	31,081	127	0.40	52	65	1	1	8
1946-47	66,990	153	0.23	43	89	--	1	20
1947-48	79,194	196	0.25	111	72	--	1	12
1948-49	125,603	210	0.16	75	108	7	6	14
1949-50	86,422	207	0.23	79	105	7	3	13
1950-51	85,356	154	0.18	67	69	2	3	13
1951-52	211,220	164	0.08	73	65	4	10	12
1952-53	144,692	206	0.14	84	80	8	7	27

Source: Department of Citizenship and Immigration. R.G. 26/Volume 124, File 333-6, part 1. Correspondence. June 23, 1954. To: Dpty Minister. From: Dir. Subject: Immigration Policy-Coloured Persons from the B.W.I.

Diplomatic necessity ushered in a new phase of Canadian immigration policy, theoretically superseding the traditional emphasis of bolstering its permanent European citizenry. In July, 1950 Canada instituted an "open door" policy with respect to New Immigrants through the enactment of Order-in-Council P.C. 2856. In reality, it began a period of reluctant tolerance of closely monitored entries from non-European locations. Immigrants would be carefully selected

according to their suitability and desirability in light of Canadian social and economic requirements.¹³ The rationale for restrictive enforcement was given in a confidential memorandum to the Immigration Minister from the Director in 1951:

This policy has been based on unfavourable experience with respect to negro settlements such as we have in Halifax, the generally depressed circumstances of the negro in Canada and an understanding that the Canadian public was not willing to accept any significant group of negro immigrants...I do not feel that in the short run we can place the negro on the same basis as other immigrants under the suitable and desirable sections of P.C. 2856.¹⁴

Despite these objections by June 10, 1952, the Minister of Immigration in a Memorandum to the Cabinet announced the extension of classes being admitted as warranted for blacks on several grounds:

In support of Canada's close trade relations with that area, numerous complaints received charging Canada with discrimination against the Negro, for humanitarian reasons and to bring Negroes into line with the broader immigration policy under Order-in-Council P.C. 2856.¹⁵

However, the policy did not match the practice, since up to 1955 directives were given that the total admitted for permanent residence in a single year was not to exceed 100 for all classes of black immigrants.

Continuing the maintenance of the European flavor and fabric of Canadian society was of utmost importance to the implementors of public policy. So reluctant were they to admit black immigrants that the enforcement of Eurocentric immigration became quite expensive and erratic. In 1952 several immigration acts governing alien labor were amended to aid foreign labor recruitment. By 1953 Assisted Passage Loan Funds were created to facilitate European recruitment. British

subjects from Australia, New Zealand and South Africa were also welcomed. Conspicuously, the West Indies, also a part of the British Commonwealth along with members in Africa and Asia, were excluded. This provision for British subjects did not prevent the active recruitment from non-Commonwealth countries. A 1953 letter from the Director of Immigration to the Agricultural Attache with the Netherlands Embassy read in part:

The supply from Germany and the United Kingdom while substantial, has never been and is not now adequate to meet the demand. Any addition to the supply that might be brought to Canada from Holland would be most welcome...The Toronto area would be most suitable for domestics from Holland. In and near Toronto there are a substantial number of immigrants from Holland and in the district church and other suitable affiliations would be available.¹⁶

The issue of severely restricting black entries festered as a proverbial thorn in the side the Immigration Department. Appeals to employ labor from the British West Indies had been mounted for nearly a decade by private Canadian employers vacationing in the Caribbean, individual naturalized citizens and immigrant civic organizations with relatives and members in the Caribbean, and by the Caribbean governments directly.¹⁷

Withstanding negative public opinion, the purported factors mitigating against Caribbean immigration to Canada ranged from negative public reactions, breach of immigration regulations, social problems of marriage with Canadian citizens, reproductive costs of providing social services such as medical care for an unspecified period of residence in Canada, adaptability to conditions and climate in Canada, fear of setting precedent for other British West Indies entries.¹⁸

Nonetheless, favorable meetings with representatives from the British

West Indies confirmed a special groups movement agreement of domestic workers several years later in July, 1955. What prompted this action?

Internal Factors Contributing to The WIDS. Social, economic and political issues were contributing factors to the change in immigration policy for the special movement of Caribbean domestics. It was reasoned that the labor scarcity caused by the diminishing supply of domestics from European sources could be met from the Caribbean with minimal increases in administrative costs since the infrastructure for their reception and distribution would be handled through existing facilities. Socially, greater control over the selection of potential permanent immigrants and apparent continuity of employment in domestic service was enhanced under this bilateral agreement compared to European domestic movements where the retention rate of women in domestic service was low.¹⁹ The government anticipated that a conciliatory posture, a relaxation of existing laws and seemingly mutually beneficial exchanges could be tolerated by the system, because care was taken to devise stringent controls on the selection, entry and mobility of limited numbers of immigrants.

Officials were intimately familiar with the ramifications of a "successful" WIDS program for Canada from the onset of the venture. The West Indies Domestic Scheme of the 1950's was not Canada's first attempt at recruiting women as domestic workers from the Caribbean. A short-lived program in 1921 brought skilled domestics from the French-speaking island of Guadeloupe. Initially a popular concept, the program was terminated and most of the unmarried women returned to the island, along with children born in Canada.²⁰

A sense of control over the situation was evident on both sides of the bilateral agreement. Despite the drawbacks--difficulty in terminating employment if the need for domestics continued, handling negative reactions from employers losing a known commodity due to short-term contracts, or a presumably lengthy stay by Caribbean workers in Canada to justify high transportation costs--Canadian officials openly stated:

...[T]here is little danger of these girls, once admitted, leaving domestic employment to seek higher wages in industry for there are very limited opportunities for them in Canada in other than domestic service.²¹

Similarly, in advertising for recruits, the Jamaican government admitted that for practical reasons welfare liaison services were unnecessary because the women were admitted to Canada as potentially permanent immigrants and in quite inconsequential numbers. As mere protocol, Caribbean officials solicited the cooperation of the West Indies Trade Commissioner with the Canadian Department of Labour, responsible for reception and placement.²²

Yearly follow-up on the status of WIDS women was critical to this sense of control. Follow-up surveys showed that while a number of the WIDS women changed jobs, few left domestic service in their first year. This seemed to verify the assumption that Caribbean women were more inclined to remain in domestic employment than women from other areas. Early reports indicated that a small percentage transferred to other employers in order to get better wages, working conditions, or because they wished to be placed in homes located close to friends.²³ In addition, unlike women from Europe, participants in the WIDS performed well in homes with children.²⁴

Recommendations for continuing the program were justified based on the quality of trained workers coming to Canada. Canadian officials noted early that women were hand-picked by the island governments who used quite acceptable standards of selection. Nonetheless:

...It should be noted that the limited number of girls brought in under this program has made it possible for the supply countries to make a careful selection and it should further be noted that placements in Canada were made in better class homes. A movement of workers of this type in volume might produce less satisfactory results...²⁵

Systematic evaluations of the early years of the program, from 1955 to 1958 were fairly positive. Satisfied with the early participants in the program, the Immigration Department felt there was something to be learned from the organization they have in the Caribbean to train domestics:

...that consideration be given to the possibility of even sending somebody from Indian Affairs Branch to the British West Indies to study their organization, as it could be very useful in the training of [North American] Indian girls for this type of employment.²⁶

While the concrete internal labor situation and logistical considerations were legitimate factors, the bottom line on this arrangement was to maintain and possibly increase trade with the imminent West Indies Federation. Economically the tactic was to foment strong diplomatic relations with the strategically located region, especially as it facilitated international trade by placating the expressed desires of Caribbean governments which had been brought to the attention of the Immigration department through Trade Commissioners stationed in the Caribbean.

Canada's trade with the British West Indies and favorable feelings in the region towards Canada were being dissipated by the apparent refusal to allow admission to citizens (black and non-black) of the British West Indies.²⁷ For instance the situation in Jamaica was particularly complex, where 483 Jamaicans were admitted to Canada in 1951 compared to 129 in 1950. Figures in Table 3 demonstrate that the bulk of these immigrants were not classified as "Negro." Acceptance into Canada opened up a series of complications for the Trade Commissioners in the region who handled immigration matters.²⁸ For Immigration representatives the most embarrassing situations were with Jamaicans of Asian descent, i.e., Chinese, Indians and Syrians, whose ethnic content is in fact a mixture of Asian and African. Most were described as quite ordinary types, but others were characterized as clearly in the upper social classes:

...[T]he Chinese control, in Jamaica, almost the entire food stuffs trade and constitute the channel through which Canadian dried, pickled and canned fish, flour, meat products and many other foods reach the Jamaican consumer.²⁹

The Trade Commissioner in Port-of-Spain admonished Ottawa officials for potentially jeopardizing economic relations generally with the British West Indies. He stated that over 1500 Canadian firms have trading connections in the colonies with a volume of exports which, despite exchange difficulties, have ranged between \$30 and \$80 million dollars since World War II. Mention was also made of transportation investments by Canadian National Steamships and Trans Canada Airlines and such private investments as the Aluminum Company of Canada in British Guiana and Jamaica bauxite and public utilities in some colonies:

It always must be kept in mind that the peoples of the British Caribbean when not hampered by exchange difficulties buy up to \$40 per head per annum of Canadian goods, even now the figure is close to \$25 per capita or about \$43 million per annum. As the colonies are moving steadily in the direction of self government and federation Canadian public relations must be handled with care...there is a long history of migration to Canada; that Canada is looked upon as the "big brother" of the British colonies in these parts; that the accumulated goodwill is such a valuable asset to Canada that it must be carefully tended.³⁰

While suggestions for the British West Indies becoming a province of Canada were considered quite untenable on both sides, the reality of the political significance of the Caribbean to Canada was quite evident. The Trade Commissioner further cautioned:

Racial consciousness and nationalism are well known phenomena among the non-European peoples of the world today. It is with such persons and not with white British colonial officials and white West Indians that Canadian officials and business men increasingly will have to deal...[A] tolerant immigration policy which would permit the entry of a restricted number of persons of British Caribbean birth irrespective of their racial origin is essential...Although such a policy would not satisfy the extremists, it would give the moderates a basis for countering criticism of a policy of closer commercial and other relations with Canada...³¹

As the volume of applications and rejections increased, Trade Commissioners advised that Immigration responsibilities no longer be handled by their personnel.

The amount of time devoted to attempts to sooth ruffled feathers in connection with Canadian immigration decisions seems far too much but appears unavoidable so long as we operate a policy of racial discrimination but do not admit it.³²

The actual political precedent for the West Indies Domestic Scheme was an agreement to admit labor from India, Ceylon and Pakistan in 1954, amending Order-in-Council P.C. 2115 which had

restricted Asian immigration since 1930. A similar agreement was sought with the West Indies, the British Honduras and British Guiana, reportedly for humanitarian reasons and to bring blacks in line with the broader immigration policy under Order-in-Council P.C. 2856.³³ Despite the Order-in-Council P.C. 2856 which permitted labor entry from India, Ceylon and Pakistan the year before, the WIDS was the first experiment in special groups movement recruitment from a non-traditional area paralleling eastern and southern European recruitment.³⁴ In light of the 1954 Asian precedent setting agreement, why was the Caribbean targeted for recruitment of domestics?

With political independence coming to these former and existing British colonial territories, efforts were made to continue the lucrative economic relations, albeit under a reconstituted form of political control. The pending federation of the Caribbean territories was not a coincidental factor; and unlike in Asia, Canada sought to gain an early advantage in the Caribbean. Significant was the early external pressure exercised on Canada, by the British West Indies governments and by the regional Canadian Trade Commissioners on their Departments of Labour and Immigration.³⁵

Canada was most conciliatory towards the idea of a domestic scheme in the pre-West Indies Federation period (1958-1962). They became more cautious in the first two years of the Federation. By 1961 when the demise of the experiment was evident, Canada distanced itself from special movement schemes generally. How were WIDS participants selected? Some island


governments (or their citizens) requested admission to enter the program. More significant politically was the fact that certain islands were targeted by Canada for recruitment.

International Advocacy for The WIDS. Lobbying efforts from the advanced industrial international community had a direct impact on Canadian policy development at this time. Formal proposals by Caribbean governments were the final impetus for a domestic scheme. The British Colonial Office interceded, on behalf of representatives of the British West Indies, for Canadian recruitment of domestics. Political and economic leverage was exerted by both Barbados, the most easterly of the English-speaking territories in the Caribbean bordering on the Atlantic, and Jamaica, an island interspersed among the larger Spanish-speaking territories in the western Caribbean. [See Map] A proposal for a controlled scheme of emigration from Barbados was routed to Ottawa through British diplomatic channels in February, 1955.³⁶ The proposal explained that traditional emigration outlets, such as Panama or the United States, were closed and the Barbados government sought alternative destinations for various classes of its citizens. The United Kingdom, just recovering from a devastating World War II, had committed to the concept of limited immigration of domestic workers and urged Canada to follow its lead.³⁷

In a follow-up visit to Ottawa Barbados representatives offered to assume full training responsibilities if the Canadian government might be prepared to admit trained women as

FIGURE 1

Map of English-Speaking Eastern Caribbean Islands



domestics. Reluctant to circumvent existing immigration regulations and traditional practices, Canadian officials made no immediate decision on the proposal.³⁸ Immediately following the Barbados proposal, Jamaica inquired about an arrangement to admit domestics on a temporary basis for one or two years. The Jamaican government relied on the weight of economic trade relations to impress upon Canada the significance of Canada acting as an outlet for excess population. They were prepared to establish an agency in Canada with responsibility to ensure that Jamaican domestics honored their commitments and were returned to the island following their period of service in Canada. Jamaica's case was much more compelling in light of the fact that the majority of applications for admission from the Caribbean came from that island. The documentation of the importance of the trade ties described by the Trade Commissioners, and the perceived importance of that island in the imminent West Indies Federation was a final incentive.

Administratively, Canada would have preferred to deal with only one government. However, the Barbadians had made the first formal request and if priority had been given to the Jamaican proposal, political ground would have been sacrificed regionally, since most of the British controlled territories were located in the eastern Caribbean. Besides, the Barbadians had impressed the Canadian officials with administrative arrangements and guaranteed cooperation. By June 1955, the Canadian Cabinet approved the admission of 100 Caribbean domestics. Final arrangements for the domestic scheme to Canada included both Barbados and Jamaica.³⁹

The West Indies Domestic Scheme (WIDS) was inaugurated on June 15th, 1955, when the Canadian Privy Council Office agreed:

- (a) that 100 women suitable for domestic workers be admitted from the British West Indies on an experimental basis, the scheme to be reviewed one year hence (75 to be selected from Jamaica and 25 from Barbados);
- (b) that the Department of Citizenship and Immigration and the Department of Labour be authorized to complete arrangements with the responsible government authorities in Jamaica and Barbados respecting the selection of these prospective immigrants and the return to their country of origin if those found to be unsuitable for domestic service;
- (c) that such controls as were needed be exercised administratively by the Department of Citizenship and Immigration and the Department of Labour; and,
- (d) that persons admitted under this scheme be granted landing upon arrival in Canada.⁴⁰

Canada determined which countries would participate in the program and the selection of the women was the responsibility of the local governments, acting on behalf of the Canadian government. The processing of applicants was no different than procedures in effect for immigrants from the region, except local government agents assumed activities normally taken by the Canadian Trade Commissioner. Applicants were to be suitably qualified single women in the age group 21-35 years⁴¹, in good physical and mental health, of good character, who agreed to remain in domestic employment for at least one year. The government of Canada did not advance transportation on behalf of persons admitted under this scheme. These women had to have a minimum of 5 years formal education, with preference given to those with higher qualifications. They had to be of good character and comply with the Canadian Immigration Act and Regulations. Most significant, "landing"

was granted upon arrival and their residence in Canada would count towards the acquisition of domicile and ultimate Canadian citizenship.⁴² Forms stating the terms and conditions of employment were prepared for both potential domestics and employers.

The isolation of Barbados and Jamaica was not long lasting. Canada had a keen interest in the participation of specific islands and formalized relations with the larger lucrative territories of British Guiana and Trinidad, adding them to the program in 1956. In addition, news of the scheme spread quickly throughout the region. Within just a few years the list of participants quickly increased from two islands and a total of 100 women in 1955, to eleven territories and 280 women by 1959.⁴³ Quotas for each participating unit is listed in Table 2 below.

Selection. British Guiana, St. Vincent and St. Lucia, were anxious to participate and sent delegations making direct inquiries to Ottawa.⁴⁴ Typically, their appeals were reflective of depressed economic conditions in the region and resulting high unemployment rates. British Guiana convincingly used the close tie of bauxite to the Canadian aluminum industry to gain early admission into the program in 1956. Moral appeals to increase the domestic quota from British Guiana because of the cut-back in consumption of bauxite by the Canadian aluminum industry fell on unsympathetic ears as their quota was never increased throughout the program.⁴⁵ Not all governments making personal appeals were automatically included in WIDS. Grenada, British Honduras and St. Kitts were others eager to participate, but were initially refused individual quotas until the formation of the West Indies Federation in 1958. Apparently the size, resources and

Table 2
West Indies Domestic Scheme Participants, 1955-59

1955 (100)	Jamaica= 75, Barbados=25
1956 (200)	Jamaica=100, Barbados=40, Trinidad=30, Br. Guiana=30
1957 (230)	Jamaica=100, Barbados=40, Trinidad=30, Br. Guiana=30 St Lucia=15, St Vincent=15
1958 (230)	Jamaica=100, Barbados=40, Trinidad=30, Br. Guiana=30 St Lucia=15, St Vincent=15
1959 (280)	Jamaica=104, Barbados=42, Trinidad=32, Br. Guiana=30 St Lucia=16, St Vincent=16, Dominica=9, Grenada=9 St Kitts=9, Antigua=9, Montserrat=4.

Source: RG 76/Volume 838, File 553-36-6-644, part 3. Brief. From: Assistant Chief, Administration Division. To: Miss V. King, Canadian Citizenship Branch. Re: Movement of Domestic Workers from the British West Indies. November, 1957. 2 pages.

RG 76/Volume 838, File 553-36-655, part 5. Savingram. From: Governor-General, The West Indies. To: WICIR Governors and Administrators (excluding British Guiana and British Honduras). Re: Emigration of West Indian Women to Canada as Domestic Workers. 18th June, 1959. 5 pages.

strength of these economies were not seen as significant to Canada. The stated objection to the smaller islands was apprehension of their ability to maintain quality standards of selection and training for potential domestic servants.⁴⁶

Despite the refusals, Grenada persistently sought a quota. Their 1957 request caused Ottawa a bit of embarrassment when the British West Indian Trade Commissioner in Montreal reportedly informed Grenadian representatives that a personal visit and application in Ottawa facilitated receiving a quota, revealing the political nature of the program. Tiny islands were eliminated from the competition in light of the cost of sending a delegation to Ottawa with only the meagre

financial resources of colonial budgets, offering "people" as their lone resource for Canada.⁴⁷ Race was a blatant factor in these discussions. The disapproving attitude of the WIDS by Mr. Pickersgill, who would become the Minister of Immigration reflected the thinking of the agency:

...[A]ny large movement of coloured workers to Canada would create a situation that would be undesirable, particularly for the immigrants...Canada had not yet been successful in bringing its own native Indian population up to a satisfactory social and economic situation, and...nobody would wish to create a new problem such as might arise if large-scale immigration of coloured people into this country was permitted at this time.⁴⁸

The fact that not all overtures were made towards Ottawa further highlighted the political nature of the WIDS. Trinidad was the only truly "recruited" government, which had to be convinced of the benefits of the scheme by Canadian representatives. Canada held the fact that private Trinidadian citizens had made requests to be included in WIDS as leverage in these negotiations.⁴⁹ Other Caribbean territories were quite reluctant to participate in the special group movement, from economic and social points of view. Besides Trinidad, the Leeward Islands of Dominica, Antigua, Montserrat, initially showed no interest in the WIDS. Characterizing their collective position, Trinidad stated in 1956 that their country was in a different position in that they themselves were short of domestics and unemployment was reasonably low. Similarly the Leeward Islands were already moaning the loss of a share of their population to the United Kingdom.⁵⁰ However, Trinidad's Minister of Labour capitulated and conceded to the arrangement in 1956, admitting that they:

[W]ould have to fall in line with the other islands as naturally he had expected at some future time to be confronted as to what his Government had done to develop opportunities for the migration of his peoples to Canada and, therefore, would not consider refusing to cooperate.⁵¹

Once the quota had been granted, it was difficult diplomatically for Canada to withdraw it.⁵²

A Canadian intra-governmental agency, the "Caribbean Group," monitored the developing relationship between Canada and the Caribbean. One report in 1957 candidly stated the officials' annoyance toward the enthusiastic targeting of Canada for emigration:

Most of the island governments have a positive almost aggressive approach to the question of migration privileges for their people. Public statements by responsible officials indicate the belief that a Federated British West Indies within the Commonwealth will be able by consistent pressure to persuade Canada to ease its Immigration Regulations. The goal is completed [sic] equality for British West Indies' residents with other British subjects under the immigration Act and Regulations.⁵³

As a rejoinder to this situation, the Director of Immigration stated in 1957:

...[I]mmigration must not have the effect of altering the fundamental character of the population and Canada is perfectly within her rights in selecting persons whom we regard as desirable future citizens.⁵⁴

WIDS operated for nearly 12 years before its genuine merger with universal immigration criteria and other geographical areas (discussed in Chapter 5). Generally, workers entered as single individuals or family units into either pre-determined occupational placements or as a general pool of labor to be assigned by either the Department of Labour's National Employment Service or Unemployment Insurance

Commission, the Department of Immigration, or directly by employers.⁵⁵ Placement for women in the WIDS was pre-selected. WIDS varied from European recruitment with respect to passage loans, reception, training, numbers admitted, length of indenture in domestic work, and government monitoring. The Assisted Passage Loan Fund, an incentive for European recruitment, was only a passing thought in 1958 for the WIDS.⁵⁶

Who were the participants in the WIDS?

Composition. Blacks from various social classes in the Caribbean were admitted under the WIDS. The issue of setting quotas for all the entries from the British West Indies, comparable to the 300 set for India, was raised as an early agenda item for the West Indies Federation,⁵⁷ but never achieved. The policy permitted coloured workers when they were coming to assured employment and their employers were aware of their racial origin.⁵⁸ In 1956 it was reasoned that:

Generally speaking, the domestics, nurses, nurses' aides, male psychiatric nurses and orderlies are the types of coloured immigrants from the B.W.I. whose services are in demand in Canada. However, according to our statistics, less than half of the immigrants from the B.W.I. each year are of negro ethnic origin.⁵⁹

Despite a significant East Indian presence in several Caribbean territories, initially Asians were barred from participating in the WIDS⁶⁰; first by exclusionary Canadian laws barring Asians, then as a standard practice by black-controlled Caribbean governments jostling for some modicum of power against an entrenched Asian entrepreneurial class.

From 1946 to 1955, the proportion of black persons included in the overall movement of immigrants from the Caribbean averaged 21%, or

one-fifth of the total. [See Table 3] Between 1955 to 1960, the proportion increased to an average of more than 50%. For instance, in 1956, black Caribbean entry represented 82% or 416 out of 504 of the total blacks entries, which was attributed to the special domestic movement. Interestingly enough, blacks represented only half of all entries from the Caribbean. Relatedly, in 1957 a total of 795 persons from the Caribbean were authorized by special legislation (595 were "exceptional merit" cases and 200 were part of the domestic scheme). For 1958, 423 special merit cases were admitted from the Caribbean, 230 of whom were domestics. By 1959 and 1960, seven out of ten immigrants to Canada from the Caribbean were black. In addition, the figures for 1961 report that about 6,000 foreign students were enrolled at Canadian universities, of whom 2700 are from Commonwealth countries. The West Indies stood first on the list with 946, Hong Kong second with 613.⁶¹

Canada wished to bolster its professional ranks, but in this period filling politically-motivated quotas were more important than the potential for future immigrants' work outside of domestic service. The distribution of this migrating group was especially earmarked for service occupations. [See Table 4] For black entries in 1956 257 out of 504 or 51% were steered to lower level service sector employment. Even in the professional category, 57 out of 80 or 71% were in the medical industry alone as graduate nurses, physicians and surgeons. Requests for such special categories of workers were not unusual. A Saskatchewan Director of Psychiatric Services in Department of Health, requested authorization in 1956 for entry of young men from Trinidad to enroll in a course that Province established for training psychiatric

nurses. He stated the "these coloured persons had particularly suitable personalities for that type of work."⁶²

While the composition of the recruits adds credence to the popularity of the concept "brain drain" as characterizing migration between the Center and the dependent Periphery nations, even this phenomenon is masked by the data. According to the statistics the movement of non-professionals outstrips professional categories five times over. In reality the drain of professionals is compounded by the fact that women working in professional occupations in their own countries were admitted as unskilled workers under the WIDS.

The occupational backgrounds of the WIDS women usually were not in domestic science.

...in St. Lucia of the twenty six girls who were trained (for a quota of sixteen) nine were clerks, six teachers, one a telephone operator, five seamstresses, one a housekeeper, two shop assistants and two nurses. You will observe that none of the girls were listed as domestics. The same situation existed in Grenada. The reason for this absence of servants is probably that very few of the domestic servant class in either St. Lucia or Grenada would have sufficient education to enable them to "take" the courses offered.⁶³

When direct experience was absent, training programs sufficed to meet the quotas. Training facilities varied from island to island. Most emphasized: cooking, housewifery, laundry work, child care, health education, citizenship, sewing, marketing, etc. In Barbados they taught general domestic science with the principal emphasis on cooking. They also taught the proper care and maintenance of electrical equipment, the simple pressing and cleaning of garments, the setting of and waiting on tables, the making of beds and general housekeeping and even some instruction on proper diets and food

values.⁶⁴ Barbados had established five training schools by 1959 to ensure an on-going pool of applicants for WIDS. Even before it received a quota, St. Kitts built a modern and well-equipped school to provide domestic science courses that could train domestic servants throughout the Leewards.⁶⁵ The social impact of the WIDS had serious implications for the Caribbean community and Canada.

TABLE 3
Numerical and Percentage Distributions of
Blacks from the West Indies
in Canada, 1946-1961

<u>YEAR</u>	<u>NEGRO</u>		<u>OTHER</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
	<u>Total</u>	<u>(%)</u>		
1946	89	.23	305	394
1947	72	.20	280	352
1948	108	.28	281	389
1949	105	.26	299	404
1950	69	.19	295	364
1951	65	.10	596	661
1952	80	.11	630	710
1953	112	.13	784	896
1954	122	.14	727	849
1955	262	.33	531	793
1956	416	.39	642	1,058
1957	497	.43	665	1,162
1958	661	.55	531	1,192
1959	807	.67	389	1,196
1960	814	.70	354	1,168
1961 (7 mos.)	567	.79	150	717
TOTALS	4,846	.39	7,459	12,305

Source: RG 26/Volume 124, File 3-33-6, part 2. Memorandum.
From: A/General Executive Assistant to the Director
of Immigration. To: J.S. Gross, Executive
Assistant to the Deputy Minister. Re: Immigration
from The West Indies. September 7, 1961. 2 pages.

Table 4
Intended Occupations in Canada for
All Black Immigrants, 1956

1. <u>Professional</u>	
Accountants and Auditors	4
Chemists (other than pharmacists)	4
Draughtsmen and designers	1
Chemical engineers	1
Civil engineers	1
Laboratory technicians and assistants	3
Graduate nurses	52
Physicians and surgeons	5
Teachers and professors	4
Other professional workers	<u>5</u>
	80
2. <u>Clerical</u>	
Stenographers and typists	10
Other clerical workers	<u>16</u>
	26
3. <u>Service Occupations</u>	
Nurses' aides	12
Domestics	235
Other non-professional service workers	<u>10</u>
	257
4. <u>Manufacturing, Mechanical, Etc.</u>	
Automobile mechanics and repairmen	10
Dressmakers and seamstresses	5
General labourers	<u>6</u>
	21
5. <u>Various other occupations</u>	32
6. <u>Dependent wives and children</u>	88
<hr/>	
Grand Total	504

Source: Immigration From the British West Indies since World War II.
 RG 76/Volume 830, File 552-1-644, part 2. Memo. From: Director, Department of Citizenship and Immigration. Immigration Branch. To: Deputy Minister. Re: Admission of persons from the British West Indies. Ottawa, March 10, 1958. 4 pages.

Social Consequences. A seemingly innocuous program, the Domestic Scheme fulfilled the Canadian government's worse fear,⁶⁶ opening the floodgates of black immigration from the Caribbean, an economically unstable region with a questionable political future. Reflecting uncertainty in the regional political climate, in mid 1959 even the Canadian Embassy in Havana was flooded with applications by Jamaicans resident in Cuba to enter Canada as household servants, as news spread of the acceptance of 104 Jamaican women into Canada.⁶⁷ Similarly, women still in the islands were placing advertisements in Canadian newspapers, once they learned of the success of the initial program. Because the WIDS accommodated the requests of employers, the most the government could do was warn immigration officers that some of the requests from Canadian employers for named persons resulted from this practice.⁶⁸ In the same year a miscommunication resulted from island officials directly contacting Canadian employers about the arrival of their delegated domestics. When more employers arrived at the airport than there were women, the result that Canadian labor officials were put in the embarrassing position of practically "bartering" the domestics.⁶⁹

By 1960 Canadian officials were expressing the view that training may not solve all the problems in connection with the placement of women. Rather, their attitude toward the performance of housework was now the decisive factor.⁷⁰ It was not sufficient that the women did not leave domestic service, or received prior training in domestic work. A 1961 brief stated that while Canada has a real and continuing need for domestic servants, the admission of workers from the Caribbean is only a short-term remedy for the situation because a high percentage

endeavor to leave this type of employment for other occupations within a relatively short period after arrival.

Essentially, the Canadian government feared the development of racial pockets within its borders and constantly encouraged a wider distribution of black immigrants across the country.⁷¹

At present there are indications that the domestics cling together and as a result there is little real opportunity to determine whether the British West Indies negro can be absorbed as an immigrant in this country.⁷²

When black civic organizations offered their services to assist in the adjustment to Canadian life, the Immigration Department's reaction was tolerant. While speaking favorably in 1956 about the Negro Citizenship Association, the director added:

I thought the most successful immigrants in our country were the ones who did not depend too much on the guidance and association of their former citizens but those who sought guidance and friendship amongst their fellow Canadians. I think the girls should decide themselves once here as to what associations and organizations they should join.⁷³

As the number of Caribbean entries increased concerns were raised about the social responsibility and reproductive costs Canada was expected to take for this group. Although at the end of one year the women on the WIDS were eligible for landed immigrant status, it was necessary for a period of some years to elapse before they attained full Canadian citizenship. In the interim the Immigration Department assumed responsibility for indigent immigrants. After the first year they became the responsibility of the municipality in which they resided. Should any of the domestics become ill before they become citizens, they may be subject to some of the provisions in the

Immigration Act (Section 19 and Section 70) and returned at Canadian Government expense under deportation proceedings.⁷⁴ Enforcement of the regulations were more complicated when the question of relatives sponsored by women admitted as domestics was involved.⁷⁵

Adding to the social costs of the program, Canada also faced the dilemma that women chosen as domestic servants are often from the lower classes in their own countries, in which case the relatives they sponsor are likely to be unskilled workers and dependents. The Canadian regional immigration offices report:

We have received more applications (especially for illegitimate children) from West Indian nurses than from West Indian domestics....One outstanding feature of the West Indies cases is that the majority of the single domestics have children. Another is that their fiance who is also single has children to support...⁷⁶

Canada wished to avoid a situation similar to Great Britain. The estimated coloured population in the United Kingdom was approximately 200,000 in 1958. Largely from the West Indies, these persons were mostly:

untrained and unskilled merchant seamen who had come to the United Kingdom during periods of shortages of seamen to man ships and who, when there was no more need for their help, remained in England and formed groups in Cardiff, Liverpool, Tyneside, Manchester, Birmingham and London areas....Most of the West Indians who have migrated to Great Britain in recent years have received no detailed and accurate information before their departure concerning living and working conditions, with the result that many moved prior to giving full study to what their migration really involved with consequent failures in some cases and injury to their feelings when they were treated as strangers and differently to what they had expected."⁷⁷

If domestics are from a higher social level, they are unlikely to

remain in domestic service for any appreciable length of time.⁷⁸

There had always been a bias toward individuals with ambition enough to rise above domestic service. In the early years of the program it was noted that:

...girls from St. Vincent and St. Lucia probably would be a better type, for permanent domestic service, than many of those from the larger islands. The latter are better educated and would take this means of getting into Canada with the ultimate hope of taking other employment after their domestic contract is fulfilled.⁷⁹

The political necessity of conceding the selection of the participants in the WIDS program to a floundering confederated West Indies eventually turned Canada's attitude sour.⁸⁰ The West Indies Federation preferred not to separate the issue of free trade and freedom of movement for its citizens.⁸¹ This was a threatening situation in light of pending 1962 Immigration Regulations in Great Britain which placed grave restrictions on Commonwealth immigration into Britain. That coupled with Great Britain virtually deserting its colonies by joining the European Economic Community, sent panic throughout Canada and the Caribbean. Canada was aware of conventional protests mounted in the Caribbean in response to announced British restrictions related to: an assumed inalienable right to emigrate to Great Britain, the presumption of implicit United States and Canadian obligations to the region, and the perception that the restrictions were based on color and race.⁸² A dramatic letter from the Commissioner for Canada in Port of Spain in 1961 laid out the ramifications of the change in policy in Britain on North America:

For generations this has been an accepted right, indeed an obligation of Britain in payment of the exploitation and wrongs committed during the colonial regime. (I do not subscribe to that theory, but

simply cite it as a condition of thought that is commonly accepted and seldom if ever challenged locally)...

The idea that political independence would create new and terrifying problems was not stressed and submerged in the comforting belief that it is possible to have political independence without economic independence--that the ex-colonial power, the United States and to a lesser extent Canada, were obligated, or at least expected...to come forward with even more aid....Meanwhile the cornerstones of their existence are threatened by the possibility that Britain will join the Economic Community.

...Should the British restrictions come to pass, inevitably this will increase the pressures on us to allow more West Indians into Canada. ...whatever move the British take in this field, almost regardless of whether the restrictions are real or token, this will develop pressure on Canada.⁸³

By 1961 Canada was admitting that the hopes of the West Indies Federation had been dashed and they had lost control of the WIDS. In light of changes in British regulations, Canada had to reconsider its position on immigration in general and especially special group movements from the Caribbean in order to regain control over its immigration program.

Our chief dilemma seems to be that we are ambivalent as to what it is that we are trying to do. Are we trying to pick domestics whose attitude to household service is good and who will be content to remain in household service and be good domestics on a career basis? Or are we using the domestic movement as a means of selecting a higher class of girl who will not stay in domestic service any longer than necessary, but will move out after a year into the occupation for which she is best suited, and be in the long run a greater credit to herself, her race, and to Canada?

If the new Regulations go through, we will no longer have to use the domestic movement as a disguised method of bringing a higher type of West Indies girl to Canada. I do not really believe we are doing it now to any great extent; but I think when we know what the new Regulations will be, that we should sit down and decide once and for all what we ourselves

are trying to do with the domestic movement from the West Indies.⁸⁴

Canada resorted to its old rationale for restricting immigration from the Caribbean: social problems and climatic conditions. While claiming that there was no discrimination based on color, race or creed in the Immigration Act and Regulations in 1961, officials did admit that differential treatment based on citizenship and geography is authorized by Section 20 of the Regulations.⁸⁵

In Chapter Five the consequences of Universalism are discussed. Caribbean governments become much more vocal about advocating for their citizens using the weight of the structure of dependent relations between Canada and the Caribbean region. In response, over the next fifteen years Canada transfers dependent international immigration practices with the Caribbean into dependent social relations within its borders. Chapter Five investigates the ramifications of immigration on Canada's perception of the Caribbean and black immigrants generally.

CHAPTER FOUR - NOTES

¹Between 1946-1970, black immigrants went from a seventh place ranking among entering ethnic groups to third place, just behind British and Italian immigrants, since 1966 Grace M. Anderson, "Immigration and Social Policy," in Canadian Social Policy Shankar A. Yelaja (ed.): 107-129 (Waterloo, Ontario: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 1978), p. 115.

²Sometimes unsponsored immigrants were distinguished individuals, but typically they were known commodities to Canada, having graduated from Canadian universities with needed skills or had served in the Canadian armed services. Before the 1950's blacks were also admitted to Canada with temporary status as students. According to P.C. 2856, a person who, having entered Canada as a non-immigrant, enlisted in the Canadian Armed Forces and having served in such Forces has been honorably discharged, may be granted admission to Canada provided he can comply with the provisions of the Immigration Act.

Intradepartmental correspondence, Citizenship and Immigration.
June 21, 1951, From: C.E.S. Smith, Dir. To: Deputy Minister.
Re: Admission of Coloured or Partly-Coloured Immigrants to Join the Canadian Armed Forces. RG 76/Volume 830, File 552-1-644, Part 1.

³The demise of the WIDS coincided with the failure of the West Indies Federation. The West Indies Federation was an experiment in unitary government attempted by the British-controlled colonies of the Caribbean between 1958 to 1962. Federation was seen as a viable alternative for these remnants of a fading British Empire no longer able to fully support its outlying territories in the Caribbean. The decline in enthusiasm for the WIDS began during this period of intense negotiation with The West Indies government.

⁴In 1950 the Department of Citizenship and Immigration was created. Its responsibilities included monitoring overseas entries and administration of Native Indian affairs. It worked closely with the Department of Labour which actually placed immigrants occupationally in Canada. In 1966 the Department of Manpower and Immigration officially replaced the Department of Citizenship and Immigration, as skills ostensibly became the sole entrance requirement. By 1976 the Department of Employment and Immigration replaced the Department of Manpower and Immigration and the rights of recruited workers were clearly separated according to their permanent or temporary status Freda Hawkins, Canada and Immigration, Public Policy and Public Concern, (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1972).

Before 1950, the Department of Mines and Resources along with External Affairs handled immigration matters. The Canadian Trade and Commerce Commissioners located overseas since the turn of the century acted as agents for immigration issues when an immigration consulate

did not exist. Therefore, Trade and Commerce Commissioners in Kingston, Jamaica and Port-of-Spain, Trinidad acted as immigration proxies for the British West Indies. The nearest consulate was in Caracas, Venezuela.

⁵The Director of Immigration remarked in 1942 in response to a request for colored servants from the West Indies, "Canada's coloured population has not increased rapidly and while that is to some extent due to our climate it is also due in no small measure to the immigration policy that has been pursued for years. The Immigration regulations reflect the immigration policy and while there is not what one would call a colour line, there is something that comes very close to a racial line, for example, immigration of the Asiatic races has been strictly controlled in recent years...I did not make the regulations that I have to administer and yet I recognize that these were framed with the purpose of encouraging certain types of immigrants and discouraging others and among the latter is immigration of the negro race."

Correspondence. Department of Mines and Resources. To: Mr. Birks, From: Director Immigration, Re: Movement of coloured servants from the West Indies, Ottawa, 8th April, 1942, 2 pages. RG 76/Volume 838, File 553-36-644 Part 1.

He continues in a subsequent memo, "In many respects coloured immigration is similar to Asiatic immigration. As you know the control of Chinese is under a special Act which all but excludes these people, Japanese immigration has been handled under a gentlemen's agreement, and other Asiatic immigration is largely excluded under P.C. 2115 of September, 1930, which is a continuation of a regulation made in January, 1923. The Asiatics admissible under that regulation are limited to wives and unmarried children under 18 of Canadian citizens.

Correspondence. TO: Hon. Mr. Crerar, From: Director of Immigration, Re: Coloured Domestics from British West Indies. Ottawa, April 17, 1942, 3 pages. RG 76 Volume 83-84/346, Box 18, File 58506-6-4-533, pt. 1.

⁶Immediately after World War II in 1946, a group movements technique began with 2,876 soldiers who had served with the British Army were brought to Canada for employment on farms. The International Refugee Organization provided free transportation to immigrants to Canada.

⁷Correspondence. From: Director, Immigration, TO: Hon. Mr. Crerar. Re: Coloured Domestics from British West Indies. Ottawa, April 17, 1942, 2 pages. RG 76/Volume 83-84/346, Box 18, File 58506-6-4 533 Part 1.

⁸Correspondence notes a number of factors which produced the decline, such as the cost of passage to Canada from Europe. The intention of the government is to encourage immigration up to the absorptive capacity. Proposal to buy the "Georgic" to transport passengers and to encourage immigration.

Correspondence. From: N.A. Robertson, Secretary to the Cabinet; TO: Memorandum to the Cabinet, Privy Council Office, Ottawa, October 30, 1950, 3 pages. RG 76/Volume 831, File 552-1-649.

House of Assembly draws the attention of the Governor to the fact that there is an acute shortage of labour in both industry and agriculture. Definite prospects for temporary emigration of appreciable numbers of both men and women to Canada during the summer and early autumn. Possibilities for cheap transport under special charter with Trans Canada Airlines.

Correspondence. From: Speaker, House of Assembly, To: His Excellency the Governor. Ottawa, 1st June, 1954, 1 page. RG 27/Volume 292, File 1-26-69-1, Part 1.

⁹Correspondence. From: Guy Perrin, Commissioner for Labour Office, Barbados. To: Humphrey Mitchell, Minister of Labour. Re: Barbadians as Agricultural Workers in Canada. Barbados, 5th march 1947, 1 page; Correspondence. From: W.H. Crawford, Sr., Barbados Parliament. To: Hon. Paul Martin, Minister of National Health and Welfare, Canada. Re: Agricultural Workers from Barbados to Canada. Bridgetown, June 16, 1954, 2 pages; Correspondence. From: D. Leo Dolan, Director, Canadian Government Travel Bureau. To: MacNamara, Director of Labour. Re: Agricultural Workers from Barbados. Ottawa, 15, June, 1954, 2 pages; Correspondence. From: Don F. Brown, M.P. To: A.H. Brown, Deputy Minister of Labour. Re: Barbados Immigration. Ottawa, June 25, 1954. 1 page; Correspondence. From: George V. Haythorne. To: A. MacNamara. Re: Farmworkers from West Indies. Ottawa, 13 March, 1947, 1 page. RG 27/Volume 292, File 1-26-69, part 1.

¹⁰Correspondence. From: George Haythorne, Department of Labour. To: A. MacNamara. Re: Farm workers from the West Indies. Ottawa, 13 March 1947. 2 pages. RG 27/Volume 292, File 1-26-69, Part 1.

¹¹Canada was an Executive member of the Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees since its inception in 1938. After 1943 and reaffirmed in 1946, priority was given to the resettlement of stateless people from Germany, Austria, Spain and Italy.

Brief. Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees. no date; Correspondence. From: James Colley, Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees. To: Mr. A. MacNamara, Deputy Minister of Labour. Re: European domestic scheme. Ottawa, 20 March, 1947, 1 page; Correspondence. From: Ruth A. Hamilton, Supervisor Women's Division. To: A. MacNamara, Deputy Minister Labour. Re: Importation of Domestic from Europe. Ottawa, 22 March 1947, 2 pages; Others supporting the proposal for additional labor: RG 27/Volume 278, File 1-26-3-1, Part 1. Correspondence. From: Hector Dupuis. To: Arthur MacNamara, Deputy Minister, Labour.

Re: Immigration of Domestic Aids. Montreal, April 25, 1947. 2 pages; Minutes. Quebec Regional Advisory Board, Labour Department. Re: Immigration of Domestic Aids from European Displaced Persons Camps to Canada. Montreal, April 25, 1947. 6 pages. RG 27/Volume 278, File 1-26-3-1, Part 1.

¹²Correspondence. From: C.E.S. Smith, Director. To: M. B. Palmer, Canadian Government Trade Commissioner, Kingston, Jamaica. Re: Reply to letter re immigrants from Jamaica. Ottawa, no date, 2 pages. RG 76/Volume 830, File 552-1-644, Part 1.

¹³Admission of blacks from places other than the United States initially decreased after this policy change, despite the fact that applications skyrocketed because of the discontinuation of the United States as a traditional destination. [see table 1]

¹⁴Blacks were not absolutely barred from Canada. The types of cases admitted were based on compassionate grounds, as nurses, blacks with good qualifications and a guaranteed job, and temporary entry for service in the Canadian Armed Forces. The Canadian public and labour organizations were noted as specific advocates against black entry. Embarrassing realities, such as the Ontario anti-discrimination laws and resistance to working under black soldiers commissioned as officers added to the decision.

Memorandum. From: Director, Immigration. To: Minister. Re: Admission of Coloured or Partly-Coloured Persons. Ottawa, September 12, 1951, 4 pages. RG 76/Volume 830, File 552-1-644, Part 1.

¹⁵Relevant to black immigrants, the Minister recommended:
3. (a) That approval be given under paragraph 4 of P.C. 2856 of June 9, 1950 to the admission of Negroes who are the husband or wife; the son or daughter, brother or sister, step-brother or step-sister, half-brother or half-sister, together with husband or wife and unmarried children; the father or mother; the grand-parents; the orphan nephew or niece under twenty-one years of age; fiance(e)s or minor children or adoption; providing an application for their admission to Canada is submitted by a legal resident of Canada who can receive and care for the proposed immigrants.

(b) Applications for the admission of persons not coming within the classes outlined above to be dealt with on their individual merits.

Memorandum to Cabinet. From: Walter E. Harris, Minister of Immigration. Re: Admission of Restricted Classes of Immigrants. Ottawa, June 10, 1952, 2 pages. RG 26/Volume 123, File 3-32-24.

¹⁶Arrivals for European domestic recruitment schemes could enter under 3 categories: assisted passage, church sponsorship or self-payers. Although all were expected to work as domestics for at least one year, depending on the entrance category, e.g. self-payers, there was no obligation to do so.

Correspondence. From: W.W. Dawson, Director Immigration. To: Dr. A.S. Tuinan, Agricultural Attache, Netherlands Embassy. Re: European Domestic Schemes. Ottawa, October 1953, 3 pages. See RG 27/Volume 278, File 1-26-3-1, Part 4.

¹⁷The push for recruitment from the British West Indies was mounted on a variety of fronts.

Correspondence. From: Director. To: Mrs. A.C. Hardy. Re: Reply to request for B.W.I Domestic. Ottawa, 27th April, 1942, 1 page; Correspondence. From: Director. To: George L. Patterson. Re: Request for B.W.I Domestic. Ottawa, 27th April, 1942, 1 page; Correspondence. From: Beverley Matthews, McCarthy & McCarthy Barristers, Solicitors, etc. To: C.E.S. Smith, commissioner of Immigration. Re: Shortage of domestic help. Toronto, 6th December, 1945, 1 page.; Correspondence. From: A.L. Joliffe, Director. To: Beverley Matthews. Re: Female servants from Jamaica. 19th December, 1945, 1 page; Correspondence. From: C.R. Stollmeyer, Trade Commissioner. To: C.E.S. Smith, Commissioner of Immigration. Re: Employment for Domestic from Montserrat. Montreal, 22nd July, 1947. 1 page; Correspondence. From: C.E.S. Smith, Commissioner. To: C.R. Stollmeyer. Re: Female Domestic. August 11, 1947 1 page.; Correspondence. From: Canadian-West Indian League. To: Commissioner of Immigration. Re: Barbados winter residents requests for coloured domestics from the B.W.I. Montreal, March 15, 1948, 1 page; Correspondence. From: Rev. Constantine Perry, African Methodist Episcopal Church. To: Hon. Dr. J.A. Glen, Minister of Mines and Resources. Re: Domestic Servants. Toronto, March 16, 1948, 2 pages; Correspondence. From: P.T. Baldwin, Asst. Commissioner. To: H.C. Collier, Canadian West Indian League. Re: Coloured domestics from B.W.I. Ottawa, March 20th, 1948, 1 page; Correspondence. From: Acting Minister. To: Reverend W. Constantine Perry, D.D., African Methodist Episcopal Church. Re: B.W.I. Domestic. Ottawa, 2nd April, 1948.; Correspondence. From: Office of the High Commissioner for Canada, London. To: Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, Ottawa. Re: Migration to Canada from Barbados. London, March 3, 1955, 2 pages. RG 76/Volume 838, File 553-36-644, Part 1.

Correspondence. From: A.L. Joliffe, Director, Mines and Resources. To: A. MacNamara, Deputy Minister, Department of Labour. Re: Jamaican Labour. Ottawa, 29th March, 1947, p. 1; Correspondence. From: W.C. Perry, Paster African Methodist Episcopal Church, Toronto. To: Jean Francois Pouliot, Parliament. Re: West Indian domestic and labor. Toronto, March 20, 1948, 1 page; Correspondence. From: Pat Conroy, Labour Attache, Canadian Embassy. To: A.H. Brown, Deputy Minister of Labour. Re: Summary of Meeting with Barbados Delegation. Washington, D.C. August 5, 1954, 2 pages; Correspondence. From: A.H. Brown. To: Pat Conroy, Labour Attache, Canadian Embassy, Washington, D.C. Re: Barbados Minister of Labour and Labour Commissioner. Ottawa, August 10, 1954, 1 page; Memorandum. From: A.H. Brown. To: Mr. Gregg. Re: Summary of Meeting with Barbados Minister of Labour and Labour Commissioner. Ottawa, August 10, 1954, 3 pages. RG 27/Volume 292, File 1-26-69, Part 1.

¹⁸Three examples illustrate this point. Factors against the importation of immigrants from the Caribbean:
 Negroes at the present time are receiving more favourable treatment from an immigration point of view than are citizens of India, Pakistan and Ceylon despite the fact that we have agreements with these three countries. If we broaden the admissible classes of negroes by entering into an immigration agreement, then I think we can reasonably expect to receive representations for a broadening of the regulations with respect to admission to Canada from the three countries mentioned.

If the admission of Negroes in relation to the population of Canada is to be maintained at the same level as that of East Indian, and it could be argued that it should, it will be necessary to step up the rate of Negro immigration.

It is not by accident that coloured British subjects other than the negligible numbers from the United Kingdom are excluded from Canada. It is from experience, generally speaking, that coloured people in the present state of the white man's thinking are not a tangible community asset, and as a result are more or less ostracized. They do not assimilate readily and pretty much vegetate to a low standard of living. Despite what has been said to the contrary, many cannot adapt themselves to our climatic conditions. To enter into an agreement which would have the effect of increasing coloured immigration to this country would be an act of misguided generosity since it would not have the effect of bringing about a worthwhile solution to the problem of coloured people and would quite likely intensify our own social and economic problem.

Memo. From: Director. To: Deputy Minister. Re: A Review of Immigration from the British West Indies. Ottawa, January 14, 1955. 6 pages. RG 26/Volume 24, File 333-6, Part 1.

¹⁹Extract from Minutes of Cabinet Conclusion--Top Secret. From: R.B. Bryce, Secretary to the Cabinet. Re: Immigration: Admission of Domestic from Jamaica. May 6, 1955 Ottawa. 2 pages. RG 27/Volume 292, File 1-26-69-2, Part 1.; Memorandum. From: A.H. Brown, Deputy Minister of labour. To: Mr. Gregg. Re: Jamaican Domestic. Ottawa, May 13, 1955. 2 pages. RG 27/Volume 292, File 1-26-69-2, Part 1.

²⁰Correspondence. To: Gerald W. Birks, From: Director Department of Mines and Resources, Re: Negative response to request for movement of coloured servants from the West Indies. Ottawa, 8th April 1942, 2 pages. RG 76/Volume 838, File 553-36-644 Part 1.

²¹Draft Memorandum to Cabinet. From: Department of Citizenship and Immigration, Department of Labour. To: Department of Labour. Re: Admission of Domestic from B.W.I. Ottawa, May, 1955. 9 pages. RG 27/Volume 292, File 1-26-69-2, Part 1.

²²Draft Memorandum to Cabinet: From: Department of Citizenship and Immigration, Department of Labour. Re: Admission of Domestic

from the B.W.I. Ottawa, May, 1955, 9 pages. RG 27/Volume 292, File 1-26-69-2, Part 1.; Correspondence. From: Laval Fortier. To: The Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Labour, Kingston, Jamaica, B.W.I. Re: Administrative and operational details for 75 domestics. Ottawa, August 15, 1955. 6 pages. RG 27/Volume 292, File 1-26-69-2, Part 1.; Memo. From: CWE, Unemployment Insurance Commission. To: Director, Special Services Branch, Department of Labour. RE: Domestic Workers - B.W.I./Form UIC 851 - Draft Revision. Ottawa, August 17, 1955. 4 pages. RG 27/Volume 292, File 1-26-69-2, Part 1.; Advertisement. From: C. Greaves Hill, Acting Permanent Secretary to the Ministry of Labour. To: "The Daily Gleaner" Re: Notice Ministry of Labour Employment of Female Household Helps in Canada. Kingston, Jamaica, 21st September, 1955. 3 pages. RG 27/Volume 292, File 1-26-69-2, Part 1.

²³Employer/Domestic Telephone Survey. Questions and Forms; Tabulations and summaries of comments as given in interviews with domestics and their employers and comments of the N.E.S. officers who conducted the interviews at Toronto, Montreal, Ottawa and Hull.

Report. From: D.E.S. To: Toronto-Montreal Attn: R.E.O. Re: B.W.I. Domestic Project - Special Report. 13 February 1956. 4 pages. RG 27/Volume 292, File 1-26-69-2, Part 2.

Correspondence. From: Deputy Minister. To: Colonel Laval Fortier, Deputy Minister, Department of Citizenship and Immigration. Re: British West Indian Domestics. Ottawa, March 13, 1956. 4 pages. RG 27/Volume 292, File 1-26-69-2, Part 2. ;

Memo. From: Ruth A. Hamilton, Co-ordinator of Women's Employment, unemployment Insurance Commission. To: Director, Special Services Branch, Department of Labour. Re: Survey on B.W.I. Project. Ottawa, 9 March 1956. 9 pages. RG 27/Volume 292, File 1-26-69-2, Part 2.

²⁴Correspondence. From: A.H. Brown, Deputy Minister of Labour. To: C.E.S. Smith, Acting Deputy Minister, Department of Citizenship and Immigration. Re: British West Indian Domestics. Ottawa, January 25, 1956. 3 pages. RG 76/Volume 838, File 553-36-644, Part 2.

It has been our experience that a certain number of the Greek immigrants designated on arrival as domestic workers drift away from this type of employment. Apparently they were readily absorbed into other employment, or were married soon after arrival.

Correspondence. From: W. Thomson, Director of Employment. To: C.E.S. Smith, Director of Immigration. Re: Group Movements: B.W.I., Greece, Malta. Ottawa, 29 November, 1957. 2 pages. RG 76/Volume 838, File 553-36-6-644, Part 3.

²⁵Correspondence. From: Deputy Minister. To: Colonel Laval Fortier, Deputy Minister, Department of Citizenship and Immigration. Re: British West Indian Domestics. Ottawa, March 13, 1956. 4 pages. RG 27/Volume 292, File 1-26-69-2, Part 2.

²⁶Memorandum. From: Laval Fortier, Deputy Minister of Citizenship and Immigration. To: The Minister. Re: Training School for Domestics in Barbados and Jamaica. Ottawa, May 29, 1956. 1 page. RG 26/Volume 124, File 333-6, Part 1.

27 Memo. From: Baldwin, Acting Director. To: Mr. D.A. Reid. Re: Necessary Revision Directive No. 61. Ottawa, December, 1951, 1 page; Intradepartmental Correspondence. From: C.E.S., Director To: Chief, Admissions Division. Re: Revision of Directive No. 61 - Coloured or partly coloured immigrants and non-immigrants. Ottawa, January 2, 1952, 2 pages; Intradepartmental Correspondence. Re: Admission of coloured or partly coloured people from B.W.I., Ottawa, September 8, 1951, 1 page. RG 76/Volume 830, File 552-1-655, Part 1.

28 The territories covered by the two Trade Commissioners concerned are: Port of Spain, Trinidad: Trinidad, Barbados, Windward and Leeward islands, British, French and Dutch Guiana and the French West Indies. Kingston, Jamaica: Jamaica, the Bahamas and British Honduras.

From: The Canadian Embassy, Caracas, Venezuela. To: The Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, Canada. Re: Immigrant Entry to Canada of Coloured Persons Bearing British Passports. Caracas, June, 1953, 9 pages. RG 76/Volume 830, File 552-1-644, Part 1.

29 Correspondence. From M.B. Palmer, Canadian Government Trade Commissioner. To: C.E.S. Smith, Commissioner of Immigration. Re: Recent admission of Jamaicans to Canada. Kingston, Jamaica. December 20, 1951, 1 page.; Correspondence. From: E.M. Gosse, Canadian Trade Commissioner. To: Director of Immigration. Re: Ban on Asiatic Immigrants. Kingston, Jamaica, October 9th 1951, 2 pages.; Correspondence. From: E.M. Gosse, Canadian Trade Commissioner. To: Director of Immigration. Re: Jamaican Immigrants. Kingston, Jamaica, October 10, 1951, 2 pages. RG 76/Volume 830, File 552-1-644, part. 1.

30 The early thrust of Trade Commissioner comments was for the Immigration Department to exercise restraint in open discrimination against the British West Indies.

Correspondence. From: T.G. Major, Canadian Trade Commissioner. To: Acting Director of Immigration. Re: Immigration to Canada. Port of Spain, Trinidad, 17th May, 1950, 2 pages; Brief. From: T.G. Major, Canadian Trade Commissioner. Port of Spain, Trinidad, August 31, 1951, 3 pages. RG 76/Volume 830, File 552-1-644, Part 1.

31 Memorandum. From: R.R. Parlour. To: P.V. McLane. Re: Immigration. Port of Spain, Trinidad, 6 May, 1953, 7 pages.; Correspondence. From Wm Frederick Bull, Deputy Minister. To: Laval Fortier, Deputy Minister. Re: Trade Commissioner at Port of Spain. Ottawa, May 14, 1953, 1 page; Correspondence. From: P.V. McLane, Canadian Trade Commission. To: W.F. Bull, Deputy Minister of Trade and Commerce. Re: Immigration. Port of Spain, Trinidad, 9th May, 1953, 1 page; Inter-Office Correspondence. From: F.L. Casserly. To: M.B. Palmer. Re: Immigration. Ottawa, May 22, 1953, 3 pages; Minutes. Present: Trade and Commerce--J.H. English, L.H. Ausman, Roger Parlour; Immigration--Laval Fortier, C.E.S. Smith; External--Hector Allard, Lionel Roy, C.H. West. Ottawa, June 19, 1953, 11:00 a.m., 2 pages.; Memorandum. From: Director To: File. Re:

Meeting with External Affairs, Trade and Commerce and Citizenship and Immigration. Re: Immigration at Trade Commissions. Ottawa, June 19, 1953, 2 pages; Correspondence. From: M.B. Palmer, Canadian Government Trade Commissioner. To: W. F. Bull, Deputy Minister of Trade and Commerce. Re: Immigration. Kingston, Jamaica, May 22, 1953, 1 page. RG 76/Volume 830, File 552-1-644, Part. 1.

³²Memorandum. From: R.R. Parlour. To: P.V. McLane. Re: Immigration. Port of Spain, Trinidad, 6 May, 1953, 7 pages. RG 76/Volume 830, File 552-1-644, Part. 1.

³³This regulation provides for the admission of British subjects from Great Britain, Northern Ireland, the Free State, Newfoundland, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa and the United States of America, who are British subjects by reason of birth or naturalization in one or other of the countries names. This order was designed to shut off immigration from other parts of the Empire from which immigrants might come who are not wanted.

Correspondence. To: Hon Mr. Crerar, From: Director, Department of Immigration, Re: Domestic from British West Indies, Ottawa, April 17, 1942, 3 pages. RG 76/Volume 83-84/346, Box 18, File 58506-6-4-533, Part 1.

³⁴As federally coordinated programs, some special movements were arranged directly with targeted countries (Greece, Malta, Portugal, Italy and Spain); others were requests of special interests ("Railway Agreement," "Agricultural Families - Canada-Dominion Sugar Company," "Dutch Farmers' Sons," "Immigrant Farm Families for Open Placement," "British Youth Movement") and continued to be restricted to traditional areas of northwestern Europe, such as The Netherlands, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Belgium, France, Switzerland, United Kingdom and Ireland.

Memo. From: L.M. Hunter, Director of Immigration. To: Chief, Settlement Division. Re: Group and Special Movements. October 29, 1959, 7 pages. RG 76/Volume 838, File 553-36-644, Part 5.

³⁵Correspondence. From: Laval Fortier; To: Director of Immigration, Re: Agreement with West Indies, British Honduras and British Guiana, Ottawa, December 1, 1954, 1 page. RG 26/Volume 124, File 333-6, Part 1; Correspondence. From: Walter E. Harris, To: Memorandum to Cabinet, Re: Admission of Restricted Classes of Immigrants, June 10, 1952, 2 pages. RG 26/Volume 123, File 3-32-24.

³⁶Correspondence. From: W.I.J. Wallace, Colonial Office. To: Frederick Hudd, Esq., C.B.E. Re: "Proposal for controlled emigration from Barbados of specified types of worker" London. 24 February, 1955. 3 pages. RG 76/Volume 830, File 552-1-644, Part 2.

³⁷Barbados worked out a domestic scheme with the United Kingdom's National Institute of Houseworkers (N.I.H.). The N.I.H., subsidized by the British government, had the expressed purpose of raising the status of domestic workers by instituting a high level of training and assisting in employment placement.

Proposal. From: W.I.J. Wallace, Colonial Office. To: Frederick Hudd, Esq., C.B.E. Re: Proposal for controlled emigration from

Barbados of specified types of workers. London, 24th February, 1955. 3 pages. RG 76/Volume 830, File 552-1-644, Part 2.

³⁸Coinciding with the timing of the Barbados proposal, the British Colonial Office also encouraged Canada to participate in a "Caribbean Group," to set up a Colombo Plan type aid program for the forthcoming British Caribbean Federation. The group had representatives from the Departments of Trade and Commerce, Finance and External Affairs, and from the Bank of Canada.

Correspondence. From: Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs. TO: Deputy Minister, Department of Citizenship and Immigration. Re: "Caribbean Group" for aid program for forthcoming British Caribbean Federation. Ottawa December 3, 1956 2 pages. RG 76/Volume 830, File 552-1-644, Part 2.

³⁹Ibid

⁴⁰Confidential Record of Cabinet Decision. Privy Council Office. Re: Immigration; admission of British West Indians for domestic service. Ottawa. June 15th, 1955. 1 page. RG 27/Volume 292, File 1-26-69-2, Part 1.

⁴¹By 1956 an additional provision was added that the women should be without children. The selection criteria and procedure after selection was outlined for each government and included the following areas: Education and Experience, Health, Character, Travel Documents, Transportation to be paid by women, preference for Group Movement of women, Advance Notification to Canada, Undertaking (Contract), Time of Arrival.

Correspondence. From: Laval Fortier, Deputy Minister. TO: J.F. Ramphal, Esq., Commissioner of Labour, Georgetown, British Guiana. RE: Administrative and operational details with respect to plan to admit 30 domestic, 1956. Ottawa, May 25, 1956. 6 pages. See RG 76/Volume 838, File 553-36-644, Part 2.

⁴²"Non-immigrant" status was not practical for several reasons: (1) termination of employment at the end of the stated period would be difficult. It was unrealistic to suppose that the employer of a girl who has given satisfactory service, the need for which still existed, could be convinced that she should be returned home to be replaced by another girl of unknown quality; (2) representations for extension of temporary stay which may be difficult to refuse as it would be contrary to Canadian views on equality to allow the girls in this category to remain in Canada for an indefinite period without the benefit of permanent status. In general depriving those coming forward under this plan of status landing, would be interpreted by many as an attempt at forced labour and charges of discrimination would inevitably result; (3) in the course of two or more years of residence in Canada, they will have become accustomed to a standard of living superior to that of their own country of origin and it would be regarded by many as an injustice to insist upon their return.

Draft Memorandum to Cabinet. From: Department of Citizenship and Immigration, Department of Labour. To: Department of Labour.

Re: Admission of Domestic from B.W.I. Ottawa, May, 1955. 9 pages. RG 27/Volume 292, File 1-26-69-2, Part 1.

43 The 1955 movement was highly satisfactory, in fact the Department of Labour reported that it was the best movement of domestics from anywhere subsequent to World War II.

Brief. From Assistant Chief, Administration Division. To: Miss V. King, Canadian Citizenship Branch. Re: Movement of Domestic from the British West Indies. November 29, 1957 2 pages. RG 76/Volume 838, File 553-36-6-644, Part 3.

44 Memo. From: W.W. Dawson, Department of Labour, Special Services Branch. To: A.H. Brown. Re: Domestic - British Guiana. Ottawa, March 15, 1956. 3 pages. RG 27/Volume 293, File 1-26-71-2; Correspondence. From: John H. English, Assistant Deputy Minister. To: D.B. Laughton, Esq., Canadian Trade Commissioner, Port of Spain. Re: Immigration - Domestic Servants. no date, 1 page. RG 76/Volume 838, File 553-36-6-644, Part 3; Memo. For File: Department of Citizenship and Immigration. Immigration Branch. Re: St. Lucia and St. Vincent Scheme. February 4, 1957. 2 pages. RG 76/Volume 838, File 553-36-6-644, Part 3.

45 Visit of Dr. Jagan, Minister of Trade and Industry and Mr. Beharry, Minister of Natural Resources, recently from London and having discussions with the International Bank and the State Department. Inquired about increasing immigrants, particularly domestics...while the demand for domestic servants was not necessarily related to general economic conditions, nevertheless the present degree of unemployment did not suggest encouraging prospects for stepping up immigration from British Guiana to Canada.

Restricted Numbered Letter. From: N.A. Robertson, Canadian Embassy, Washington, D.C. To: Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, Ottawa, Canada. Re: Immigration into Canada from British Guiana. August 1, 1958 2 pages. RG 76/Volume 838, File 553-36-556.

46 Report of visit with Mrs. Phyllis Allfrey, Minister of Social Affairs with CES Smith and Guy Smith, Canadian Commissioner discussing Canadian immigration program for 1959 as it affects the Federation of The West Indies. "There is no desire on the part of the West Indies Federal authorities to have larger numbers come to Canada who are not successfully placed in employment, thereby not bettering their lot."

Minutes. From: C.E.S. Smith. RE: West Indian Immigration. April 8, 1959. 4 pages. RG 76/Volume 830, File 552-1-644, Part 3.

47 "...I'd just as soon not have this domestic movement. I'd sooner be picking people from B.W.I. on the basis of education skill, etc. If we have to keep it going and I fear we do at least until the New Act & Regulations make a change possible, I'd sooner give a quota of 25 to Br. Honduras than increase the B.W.I. quota (except possibly for Barbados and Granada [sic] which I'm told have done the best training job....

Memo. From: Director, To: Deputy Minister. Re: B.W.I. Domestic Scheme. September 6, 1957. 2 pages. RG 76/Volume 838, File 553-36-6-644, Part 3. ; Correspondence. From: Roy W. Blake, Canadian Trade Commissioner. To: C.E.S. Smith, Director, Immigration Branch. Re: Grenada Quota for B.W.I Domestic Scheme. Port of Spain, Trinidad, August 29, 1957. 1 page. RG 76/Volume 838, File 553-36-6-644, Part 3. Memo. From: Director of Immigration. To: Deputy Minister. Re: Proposed movement of domestics from British Honduras. June 16th 1961. 1 page. RG 26/Volume 124; File 3-33-6, Part 2.

48 Meeting with P.A. Cummings, Minister of Labour, Health and Housing in the British Guiana government, who U.K. High Commissioner asked Mr. Gregg to meet, while attending meeting as an observer in London on W.I. Federation. Cummings wished to discuss possibilities of British Guiana being included in any future movements of domestics from the Caribbean area. Pickersgill of Immigration outlined details of plan, and indicated that he would not be in favor of including all of the various islands in the B.W.I. in subsequent movements, because of the problems that might arise if all the smaller islands were included.

Memo. From: W.W. Dawson, Department of Labour, Special Services Branch. To: A.H. Brown. Re: Domestic - British Guiana. Ottawa, March 15, 1956. 3 pages. RG 27/Volume 293, File 1-26-71-2.

49 You might wish to take into consideration the possibility of extending the movement so that suitable girls from other areas in the West Indies might be included. The publicity given to the Barbadian and Jamaican movement has aroused some interest in Trinidad and other areas in the West Indies and individuals have written from these areas seeking a similar employment opportunity.

Correspondence. From: A.H. Brown, Deputy Minister of Labour. To: C.E.S. Smith, Acting Deputy Minister, Department of Citizenship and Immigration. Re: British West Indian Domestics. Ottawa, January 25, 1956. 3 pages. RG 76/Volume 838, File 553-36-644, Part 2.

50 Numbered Letter. From: The Office of the Commissioner for Canada, Port of Spain, Trinidad, T.W.I. To: Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, Ottawa. Re: Immigration into Canada - Domestic Workers Scheme. August 15th, 1958. 3 pages. RG 76/Volume 838, File 553-36-644, Part 4.

The only place where the immigration problem was raised was in St. Kitts, which did not have a quota. That island has just put up a modern and well-equipped school which is going to provide domestic science courses and they think that they can guarantee suitably trained domestic servants and would be glad to do so in the event that we are prepared to extend the scheme to include them.....I think it is a mistake to imagine that there are great pressures for immigration from the Leeward Islands.

Memo. From: Office of the Commissioner for Canada. Department of External Affairs, Port of Spain, Trinidad, T.W.I. To: Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, Ottawa. Re:

Domestic Workers from The West Indies. Port of Spain, Trinidad, June 6, 1958. 2 pages. RG 76/Volume 838, File 553-36-644, Part 4.

51 Hon. Albert Gomes, Minister of Labour stated that only 6% were unemployed, many of whom were unemployable. There is not the same need for finding employment for their inhabitants as in Barbados. Correspondence. From: C.E.S Smith, Foreign Trade Service. To: Lt. Col. Laval Fortier, Deputy Minister, Citizenship and Immigration. Re: Site Visit to Port of Spain, Trinidad. Port of Spain, Trinidad, 10 May, 1956. 1 page. RG 76/Volume 838, File 553-36-644, Part 2.

52 Trinidad is not particularly interested as they have no surplus domestics or other labour. However, since they have had a quota for one year they might object from a diplomatic point of view if it were now withdrawn or reduced.

Memo. For File: Department of Citizenship and Immigration. Immigration Branch. Re: St. Lucia and St. Vincent Scheme. February 4, 1957. 2 pages. RG 76/Volume 838, File 553-36-6-644, Part 3.

53 Briefing. Re: Immigration from the British West Indies. June 30, 1957 Ottawa, 3 pages; RG 76/Volume 830, File 552-1-644, Part 2. Correspondence. From C.E.S. Smith, Director of Immigration To: Mr. G. McInnes, Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs Re: Requested Information to assist "Caribbean Group" study of "Colombo Plan" type aid program for British Caribbean Federation. Ottawa, January 17, 1957. 3 pages. RG 76/Volume 830, File 552-1-644, Part 2.

54 Ibid

55 Memo. From: Eastern District Superintendent. To: L.M. Hunter, Director of Immigration. Re: Department of Labour - Immigration Responsibilities. October 31, 1960, 2 pages. RG 76/Volume 835, File 553-30, Part 2.

56 "If at a later date the number of applications from Western points increased, and if the number admitted from the British West Indies were increased, then consideration could be given to providing assisted passage on a recoverable basis to this group of domestics."

Confidential Memorandum. From: Laval Fortier. To: The Minister. Re: The British West Indies. Ottawa, September, 8, 1958. 1 page. RG 76/Volume 838, File 553-36-644, Part 4.

Anticipating inclusion on par with other sending nations, British Guiana sent domestics with Imm. Form 510 acknowledging receipt of a Government of Canada loan for \$25 towards the payment of inland transportation, including meals; although no authorization had been given for dispersal of the form by Ottawa.

Correspondence. From: A.L. Tosland, Assistant to Director, Employment Service. To: D.M. Sloan, Chief, Administration Division, Department Citizenship & Immigration. Re: Domestics from British Guiana's inland travel loans. Ottawa, 28 October, 1959. 3 pages. RG 76/Volume 838, File 553-35-556.

57 The Cabinet Committee on Immigration, after reviewing Cabinet Document No. 142-58 dealing with immigration from The West Indies, recommended on August 11th, 1958, as follows:

- a. That the present policy of admitting sponsored close relatives, domestic servants (200) and individual cases of merit be continued for the time being;
- b. That there be discussion with the Government of The West Indies Federation at the earliest possible moment, at which time consideration might be given to entering into an agreement similar to the one with India concerning the admission of immigrants from The West Indies. Increase from 200 to 250; visa requirements waived; WIDS does not count toward total immigrants for West Indies.

Memorandum to Cabinet. From: Allen L. Fairclough, Minister of Citizenship and Immigration. Re: Immigration from The West Indies. April 23, 1959. 3 pages. RG 76/Volume 838, File 553-36-556.

58 Memo. From: Director Department of Citizenship and Immigration, Immigration Branch. To: Deputy Minister. Re: Admission of persons from the British West Indies. Ottawa, March 10, 1958. 4 pages. RG 76/Volume 830, File 552-1-644, Part 2; Memo. From: Director of Immigration. To: J.B. Cross, executive Assistant to the Deputy Minister. Re: Minister's holiday in The West Indies. March 17, 1961. 8 pages. RG 76/Volume 830, File 552-1-644, Part 3.

59 Memo. From: Director, Department of Citizenship and Immigration, Immigration Branch. To: Deputy Minister. Re: Admission of persons from the British West Indies. Ottawa, March 10, 1958. 4 pages. RG 76/Volume 830, File 552-1-644, Part 2.

60 "...Apparently the islands, in their selection of domestics, are still excluding girls of East Indian (or mixed East Indian and negro) origin. This question was raised in 1956 when "Asians" were still excluded. Since the regulations were amended in May, 1956, when "Asian" was deleted, there is, theoretically at least no difference between persons of Asian racial origin and other origins, as the admissible classes defined in section 20 are based on nationality and geographical location."

Memorandum. From: Director, Department of Citizenship and Immigration. To: Deputy Minister. Re: Immigration from the West Indies. September 12, 1958. 3 pages. RG 76/Volume 838, File 553-36-644, Part 4.

61 If a quota is proposed, we may have difficulty in persuading the Federal Government to accept the same as India, viz., 300 per annum, which is considerably less than half of what they have been getting on the "special merit" system.

Memorandum. From: Director, Department of Citizenship and Immigration. To: Deputy Minister. Re: Immigration from the West Indies. September 12, 1958. 3 pages. RG 76/Volume 838, File 553-36-644, Part 4.

There is no discrimination, based on colour, race or creed as such in the Immigration Act and Regulations. Differential treatment based on citizenship and geography is authorized by Section 20 of the

Regulations. If there are any grounds for the suggestion that our immigration laws are in any way discriminatory, they relate to the categories set out in Regulation 20.

Correspondence. From: George F. Davidson. To: Charles E. Hendry, Esq, Director, School of Social Work, University of Toronto. Re: Response to letter on Canada's Immigration policy with respect to the West Indies. Ottawa, May 5th, 1961. 6 pages. RG 26/Volume 124, File 3-33-6, Part 2.

⁶²Memo. From: Director Department of Citizenship and Immigration, Immigration Branch. To: Deputy Minister. Re: Admission of persons from the British West Indies. Ottawa, March 10, 1958. 4 pages. RG 76/ Volume 830, File 552-1-644, Part 2.; Memo. From: Director of Immigration. To: J.B. Cross, executive Assistant to the Deputy Minister. Re: Minister's holiday in The West Indies. March 17, 1961. 8 pages. RG 76/Volume 830, File 552-1-644, Part 3.

⁶³Report on site visits to Barbados, St. Lucia and Grenada. In Barbados the approach to the Scheme is most thorough-going and farsighted. They have established five separate schools that are more or less in continuous session. Attached is copy of "Advice To West Indian Women Recruited for Work in Canada as Household Helps", which is a 15 page pamphlet.

Numbered Letter. From: Commissioner for Canada, Port of Spain, Trinidad. To: Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, Ottawa. Re: Training for Domestic - Canadian Immigration Quota. November 4, 1959. 2 pages. RG 76/Volume 838, File 553-36-644, Part 5.

⁶⁴Summary. Re: Housecraft Training Centre. Detailed Scheme. (Stamped date: June, 1956) 1 page. RG 76/Volume 838, File 553-36-644, Part 2.

⁶⁵Only in Antigua were any facilities actually in existence. Memo. From: Office of the Commissioner for Canada. Department of External Affairs, Port of Spain, Trinidad, T.W.I. To: Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, Ottawa. Re: Domestic Workers from The West Indies. Port of Spain, Trinidad, June 6, 1958. 2 pages. RG 76/Volume 838, File 553-36-644, Part 4; Numbered Letter. From: Commissioner for Canada, Port of Spain, Trinidad, W.I. To: Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, Ottawa. Re: The Training of Domestic Servants in the Leeward Islands. August 27th, 1959. 2 pages. RG 76/Volume 838, File 553-36-644, Part 5.

⁶⁶In 1942 the Immigration Director explained, that if Canada opened the door for coloured workers, "...the movement would not end with half a dozen but would soon reach hundreds if the supply at the other end did not run out."

Correspondence. Department of Mines and Resources, Immigration Branch. To: Gerald W. Birks, From: Director, Re: Movement of coloured servants from the West Indies, Ottawa, 8th April, 1942, 2 pages. RG 76/Volume 838, File 553-36-644, Part 1.

⁶⁷Correspondence. From: R.W. Clark, Vice Consul, Canadian Embassy. To: Director of Immigration, Department of Citizenship and Immigration, Ottawa. Havana, Cuba, July 3, 1959. 1 page. RG 76/Volume 838, File 553-36-644, Part 5.

⁶⁸Correspondence. From: W. Thomson, Director, Employment Service. Unemployment Insurance Commission. National Employment Service. To: W.R. Baskerville, Director, Immigration Branch, Department of Citizenship and Immigration. Ottawa, 18 November, 1959. 3 pages. RG 76/Volume 838, File 553-36-644, Part 5.

⁶⁹Memo. From: for Eastern District Superintendent, Department of Citizenship and Immigration. To: Chief, Operations Division, Ottawa Re: Non-Immigrants from the West Indies. October 14, 1959. 3 pages. RG 76/Volume 838, File 553-36-644, Part 5.

⁷⁰...We were pleased to learn of the efforts being made by the governments of those islands to train the women who are emigrating to Canada, but we are not as convinced as Mr. Smith is that training will solve all the problems in connection with the placement of these women. In our opinion it is their attitude toward the performance of housework that decides whether or not they are satisfactory. Tables deal with length of time in first job, nature of 2nd job during 1st year, number of jobs held in first year, who left the country, distribution in Canada, etc. by island/territory.

Correspondence. From: W. Thomson, Director of Employment Service. Unemployment Insurance Commission, National Employment Service. To: W.R. Baskerville, Director of Immigration, Department of Citizenship and Immigration. Re: Statistical data about the 1959 and 1960 movements of women from The West Indies and British Guiana. Ottawa, 5 July, 1961. 17 pages. RG 76/Volume 839, File 553-36-644-1.

⁷¹The problem of West Indies immigration is greater than simply locating employers for prospective immigrants. It would be hypocritical for Canada not to make it clear that we have grave reservations about large-scale immigration of persons who may represent a potential problem in Canada. There has been a steady increase in West Indian immigration and continuation of present policy offers the best opportunity for developing a larger movement which is acceptable to Canadians and satisfies the West Indies.

Correspondence. From: W.R. Baskerville, Director of Immigration. To: Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, Ottawa. Re: Response to Question on Immigration from the West Indies. Ottawa, February 26, 1960. 2 pages. RG 76/Volume 830, File 552-1-644, Part 3.

⁷²Hope to achieve a wider distribution of these immigrants in order to avoid building up racial "pockets".

Memorandum. From: Laval Fortier Deputy Minister of Citizenship and Immigration. To: The Acting Minister. Re: British West Indies Programme, 1958. Ottawa, January 6, 1958. 2 pages. RG 76/Volume 838, File 553-36-644, Part 4.

73Correspondence. From: C.E.S. Smith, Director. To: J.F. Ramphal, Commissioner of Labour, Department of Labour, Georgetown, British Guiana. Re: Negro Citizenship Association of Toronto and change in regulation for people of Asian origin. Ottawa, June 4, 1956. 2 pages. RG 76/Volume 838, File 553-36-644, Part 2.

74Correspondence. From: C.R. Stollmeyer, Commissioner for the West Indies British Guiana and British Honduras. To: C.E. Smith, Assistant to the Deputy Minister, Department of Citizenship & Immigration. Re: Question on responsibility for landed immigrant domestics. Montreal, December 12th, 1958. 1 page. RG 26/Volume 124, File 3-33-6, Part 2. Correspondence. From: C.E.S. Smith, Assistant to Deputy Minister. To: C.R. Stollmeyer, Commissioner for The West Indies, British Guiana and British Honduras. Re: Responsibility for landed domestics. Ottawa, December 15, 1958. 2 pages. RG 26/Volume 124, File 3-33-6, Part 2.

75In 1961, 107 applications were filed by domestics for the admission of close relatives: parents (5), sisters (35), brothers (20), illegitimate children (5), legitimate children (3), fiancées (39).

Memorandum. From: A/Chief of Operations. To: Head of Secretariat. Re: Domestics from the West Indies. July 19, 1961. 2 pages. RG 76/Volume 839, File 553-36-644-1.

76Comments from field staff. "Approximately half of the applicants claim racial discrimination if their applications are not approved and they do this quite openly. Obviously, the existence of illegitimate children was concealed from visa staff so that the domestic could meet our selection criteria" (Eastern District Superintendent).

Memorandum. From: A/Chief of Operations. To: Head of Secretariat. Re: Domestics from the West Indies. July 19, 1961. 2 pages. RG 76/Volume 839, File 553-36-644-1. .

77Estimated Size of the Coloured Population in Britain
(Approximate figures 1954)

Country	----Negroes Born in-----			Other	
	Africa	West Indies	U.K.	Coloured	TOTAL
England	25,500	18,500	7,250	35,000	86,250
Scotland	1,500	500	250	3,000	5,250
Wales	3,000	1,000	2,500	2,000	8,500
Total	30,000	20,000	10,000	40,000	100,000

The present estimated figures for coloured population has approximately doubled, it being approximately 200,000. It is presumed that a large proportion of this increase comes from the West Indies. Racial riots in the United Kingdom prior to the present and particularly after the First Great War and during the depressions in England of the 20's and 30's...reason for the riots was due to the claim that these unskilled persons were taking jobs away from the regular inhabitants.

Memorandum. From: C.E.S. Smith, Assistant to Deputy Minister. To: The Deputy Minister. Re: Future Immigration from West Indian Federation and Outside Colonies in the Caribbean Areas. Ottawa, September 15, 1958. RG 76/Volume 830, File 552-1-644, Part 2.

78In a Brief prepared for the Minister's use the following was noted:

...While Canada's chief need at the present time is for very highly qualified and skilled persons, such as professional people, artisans and tradesmen, there is still a demand for domestic workers and other persons in what might be called the service occupations. The nurses and domestics from the West Indies have worked in reasonably well with the Canadian economy and we are very appreciative of their contribution to our society. Special authority must be obtained for the admission of domestics and others who are admitted because of their occupational qualifications but it must be remembered that any of these, once they are established in Canada, can apply for the admission of any of the close relatives admissible under existing immigration regulations.

...The economies of our two countries are different and so is the make-up of our peoples. Because of these factors, integration is sometimes a difficult process and we must be careful, not only for our sake, but for the sake of would-be immigrants from The West Indies, that those admitted will not have trouble in establishing themselves. Admission to Canada, from The West Indies, has shown a slow but steady increase over the past fifteen years and I think this has been achieved smoothly and satisfactorily. We consider our present policy operates in the best interests of both our countries.

Memo. From: Director of Immigration. To: J.B. Cross, executive Assistant to the Deputy Minister. Re: Minister's holiday in The West Indies. March 17, 1961. 8 pages. RG 76/Volume 830, File 552-1-644, Part 3.

79**Memo. For File: Department of Citizenship and Immigration. Immigration Branch. Re: St. Lucia and St. Vincent Scheme. February 4, 1957. 2 pages. RG 76/Volume 838, File 553-36-6-644, Part 3.**

80With Federation, (1) All correspondence in connection with domestics had to be funneled through the Commissioner's Office in Port of Spain and Canada discontinued corresponding with officials of the island governments as done in the past; (2) the Federal Government was responsible for the assignment of the numbers of domestics to the respective islands; (3) the Federal Government was responsible for the supervision of the selection and training and preparation of the girls to come forward to Canada.

Numbered Letter. From: R.G.C. Smith, Office of the Commissioner for Canada, Port of Spain. To: Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, Ottawa. Re: The Emigration Problem for the West Indies. October 24, 1961. 3 pages. RG 76/Volume 830, File 552-1-644, Part 3.

81Numbered Letter. From: The Office of the Commissioner for Canada, Port of Spain, Trinidad, T.W.I. To: Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, Ottawa. Re: Immigration into Canada - Domestic

Workers Scheme. August 15th, 1958. 3 pages. RG 76/Volume 838, File 553-36-644, Part 4.

82Numbered Letter. From: R.G.C. Smith, Office of the Commissioner for Canada, Port of Spain. To: Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, Ottawa. Re: The Emigration Problem for the West Indies. October 24, 1961. 3 pages. RG 76/Volume 830, File 552-1-644, Part 3.

83Ibid

84Memorandum. From: George F. Davidson. To: A/Director of Immigration. Re: West Indies Domestics. Ottawa, August 29, 1961. 2 pages. RG 76/Volume 839, File 553-36-644-1.

85"Canada has never encouraged the movement of any appreciable number of immigrants from the West Indies. From our experience in the past as well as our knowledge of working and living conditions generally in the West Indies, not to mention the extreme climatic differences between our two countries, it is simply not realistic to think of promoting large scale immigration from that area at the present time. To encourage these people to migrate would, it is felt, not only pose both social and economic problems, but would create hardship for both the newcomers themselves and the Canadian community as a whole."

Correspondence. From: George F. Davidson. To: Charles E. Hendry, Esq, Director, School of Social Work, University of Toronto. Re: Response to letter on Canada's Immigration policy with respect to the West Indies. Ottawa, May 5th, 1961. 6 pages. RG 26/Volume 124, File 3-33-6, Part 2.

CHAPTER FIVE

The Reclamation of Power: Canada's Universal Immigration Policy, 1962-1976

Introduction. In this chapter I describe how the West Indies Domestic Scheme (WIDS), although overshadowed numerically by larger general Caribbean immigrants, remained a dominant feature of immigration ideology governing movements from the region. The WIDS was politically necessary, but socioeconomically undesirable, both from the point of view of Caribbean entries and the receiving Canadian society. Admitting unskilled workers from the Caribbean during a preference period for professional and highly skilled workers was the basic compromise between these regions. From the perspective of the Caribbean the WIDS ultimately stifled the aspirations of Caribbean people by confining their social mobility to the realm of menial service work. Caribbean women continued to conspicuously enter Canada destined for work as domestics with distinctive social disadvantages. This status basically reified the Canadian public's perception of all movements from the Caribbean. Contrary to popular belief, domestics comprised only 15% or less of all immigrants from the Commonwealth Caribbean countries.¹ Common perceptions did not match this reality. The fear was that unskilled workers would constitute the bulk of movements from the Third World. The experiment in Caribbean domestic worker preference in the 1950's tailored Canada's cautious relations with the Caribbean and other parts of the Third World.

Canadian immigration policy matured at a rapid pace. It moved from a reluctant and defensive position, replacing unjustifiable quotas with more "objective" admission standards of skills, education and experience, eventually eliminating special group movements and making immigration a peculiar incentive for deepening the dependency between the two regions. The 1962 Immigration Act was elitist to the extent that it recognized three main considerations for admission to Canada: (1) economic qualifications to become established in Canada without difficulty and contribute to the country's economic and cultural welfare, (2) humanitarian considerations for dependent spouses/children or refugees, and (3) social considerations of admission of other close relatives not normally dependent upon their sponsors in Canada.² An emphasis on the economic solvency of the individual necessitated an emphasis on the skilled professions and existed in stark contrast to the special group movement of domestics.

The policy of universalism in the 1960's solidified Canada's formal position on immigration and laid the foundation for immigration restrictions in the 1970's. Restricted entry continued despite its logic of non-discrimination and more diplomatic language. Universalism had the twin affects of assuaging strained local debates around the issues of skills, personal suitability and delicate international relations with partners in the Caribbean, while facilitating the reclamation of control over the volume and composition of new entries.

The issues to be discussed in this chapter include: (1) the demise of the WIDS as a formal program, (2) the use of the structure of Canadian-Caribbean relations by the Caribbean governments to press for

Canadian immigration concessions, (3) tendencies inherent in the mechanics of immigrant practices that disadvantaged Caribbean entries, and (4) the social consequences of universalism for Canadian internal social relations.

From Specific to Universal Practices: Demise of WIDS

Canada distanced itself from politically motivated special movements by the end of 1961 when it was apparent that it would have to take more responsibility for global power shifts. However, it took five years to actually implement a universal standard making the WIDS legally unnecessary as a special movement. Recognizing that emigration was a politically sensitive issue in the Caribbean, the Canadians had to soft-pedal their intentions. It bowed to pressure from the Caribbean governments and self-consciously countered local accusations of discrimination and double standards.

The 1962 Regulations were viewed as capricious actions taken in response to changes in the United Kingdom Immigration Act and not based on the reality of the situation in Canada or the Caribbean. The British Nationality Act of 1948 existed as a virtual open door policy which held that the Commonwealth was a potential source of labor, defining all Commonwealth persons as British citizens with the right to enter and settle in the United Kingdom.³ Canada had no corresponding labor mandate nor open invitation or territories politically dependent upon it.

Throughout the 1950's in Great Britain immigration from the Caribbean and Indian subcontinent were immediately associated with domestic racial problems, emotionally discussed by legislators and lay

people. Racial tensions were described in terms of cultural differences, contrasting lifestyles and distinctive rates of disease and criminal activity. In actuality conflicts were a direct function of the fluctuating demand for labor and the government's inability to fulfill the social needs of immigrants. Housing shortages, limited educational opportunities and overextended social welfare programs confronted new immigrants to Great Britain and the government was slow to address their situations. These problems were bantered about in public debates for several years, however, the most compelling events legitimating and accelerating state actions were the 1958 so-called race riots in Nottingham and London. At that time the Caribbean community and their property were open targets of attacks. In contrast, the resources of a more stable economy and no history of mass violence further distinguished Canada from the British experience.

Between 1955 and 1960, 161,450 people immigrated to Great Britain from the Caribbean.⁴ As discussion of a new Commonwealth Immigration Act was introduced, migrants who had come just to work were forced to choose a place to permanently settle. In an eighteen month period between 1961 to June, 1962, 98,090 people entered Great Britain from the Caribbean in anticipation of the change.⁵ The 1962 Act withdrew the right of entry from Commonwealth citizens, making admission on the bases of secured employment, skill or armed services vouchers as dependents of immigrants and as students.

Canada had never been as significant a destination for Caribbean immigrants as Great Britain or the United States. Still, the regulations were attacked on a variety of fronts, but mostly as a continuation of Canada's former, openly restrictive policy. In light

of the existence of the WIDS, it was unclear how the 1962 regulations would affect a movement that was in operation, regularized through training programs and expected by the public. When Canada unilaterally made the decision to modify the Immigration Regulations, this baffled island governments who were confident about the continuation of the eight year old WIDS arrangement. The demand for domestics in Canada had not slackened, as eager employers continued to advertise and search for domestic help through the Immigration department. In addition, Caribbean governments were persistent in their requests for increases in the existing quotas.

Reactions to the change in policy varied throughout the region--some were immediate and scathing, like Jamaica. Jamaica threatened to dissuade skilled workers needed at home from migrating and offer no assistance in completing arrangements for migration to Canada of skilled workers.⁶ Others such as Barbados offered more reasoned arguments for urging the continuation of Caribbean immigration to Canada. In his indictment of Canadian immigration policy, Errol Barrow of Barbados stated:

A government has to lead from in front; a government cannot wait to find out what the attitudes of little, isolated groups of people in that community may happen to be in order to formulate its policy. I am not satisfied that on the question of immigration the Canadian government has ever led from anywhere but far in the rear of public opinion...I think that a government ought to stop hiding behind such shibboleths as housing problems, problems of accommodation, and problems of integration and give the lead from in front and not trail so dismally behind.

Barrow suggested that the "liberalization" of the immigration policy of 1962 simply allowed Caribbean immigrants who have special skills or who

have relatives in Canada to enter without any great formality. Despite this, only 1500 people from the Caribbean (including 250 domestics under special visa arrangement) entered Canada out of 75,00 entries in 1962. In the same period, 4,500 people went to Britain from Barbados alone, and about 12,000 from Jamaica. Before Britain's restrictive immigration legislation came into force in 1962 it had taken nearly 40,000 immigrants from the islands in the first six months of 1962; the last six months they accepted only 4,000.⁸ Dissatisfied Caribbean leaders had the support of the local Canadian press which also described the policy shift as irrational and weakly justified.⁹ By 1963 internal correspondence of the Immigration department reflected the ill-fated timing of the Canadian decision:

A disagreeable choice confronts us. We have three alternatives: to discontinue the movement completely, with the possibility of alienating the island governments; to "phase it out", either by a 25% reduction annually, or by a 50% reduction in 1964 and discontinuance in 1965; or to continue the quota as established over the last five years...To reduce or eliminate the quotas would cause a most unfortunate crisis in our relations with the West Indies.¹⁰

Canada has been the object recently of much adverse criticism in the island press for its "discriminatory immigration practices"...The impact of terminating the quotas at this time would undoubtedly be defined by the press as a further discriminating step in restricting immigration to Canada on the grounds of colour and could well create an atmosphere wherein the island authority for political considerations, would be impelled to take a much stronger stand against the discontinuation of the quotas than they intend or would wish to do...you might consider withholding your decision to discontinue these for the time being.¹¹

It was clear that Canada wished to stop the WIDS, but it also understood that Caribbean governments were not prepared to lose another

potential destination for their citizens. In the early 1960's a series of conferences were held and scholarly papers written discussing the nature of future relations between the historically linked regions. The role of the state was considered paramount. The Caribbean requests for favorable terms of migration to Canada was not undertaken with the spirit of noblesse oblige on the part of Canada. It was an act of reciprocity for enduring economic and political relations between the regions. The collective conclusion of Caribbean governments in 1964 was that:

...topics of recent significance...can only be resolved ultimately in the realm of governmental contact. Unlike the now dead question of political union, foreign aid and immigration are and will continue to be of significance. An imaginative programme to attract immigrants from the non-white world could compensate somewhat for past shortcomings. Canada needs additional population urgently, and this the West Indies can offer.¹²

Caribbean leaders and observers suggested that the principal ways that Canada can help the economic and social development of the Caribbean is by furnishing aid in the form of capital and technical assistance, providing markets for Caribbean products, and by relieving population pressure through encouragement of emigration to Canada.¹³ Errol Barrow of Barbados, offered tax concessions, dividends, provision of building materials, duty free concessions, sites set aside by government, and a lower wage structure as attractions for more Canadian investment.

Generally there was a call to establish a development fund to be financed by Canada, the United States and the United Kingdom to allow Caribbean governments to stimulate development programs at reasonable interest rates.¹⁴ The general consensus was that Canada's role in

the Caribbean extended far beyond acting as an outlet for excess population. Most concluded that trade, aid and investments, in addition to the issue of emigration, were pivotal issues in the relationship. Canadian officials agreed with this logic only in part, concluding:

We can best help the West Indies, not by encouraging their people to migrate here in large numbers, but by provision of capital and technical aid combined with markets which will enable the different territories to utilize more effectively their natural resources, including their abundant supply of labour. Canada's chief policy for the region should be to assist this effort with capital and technical assistance and the guarantee of markets for the basic West Indian products.¹⁵

Structure of Dependent Canada-Caribbean Relations

It is necessary to characterize the structure of relations between Canada and the Commonwealth Caribbean as dependent because of asymmetrical trade and financial relations, reliance primarily on a single natural resource for export and unequal social relations. Politically Canada participated in colonial and neocolonial relations with the Caribbean through its North Atlantic partnership. As long as Great Britain maintained formal relations with the Caribbean and the United States acted as the regional caretaker, Canada benefited through its Commonwealth membership and close political alliance with the United States.¹⁶

The major attractions of the Caribbean for Canada was that it was within the Canadian orbit of influence because of its: accessible economic frontier, Commonwealth membership, use of British legal rules and the English language, security for private enterprises, and historical connection with Canadian history. Geopolitically the

Commonwealth Caribbean was seen as more stable than its Latin American neighbors; and Canada encouraged it to take the lead in contributing to the stability of the region.¹⁷ The failure of the West Indies Federation was a significant fillip of the region's importance to Canada. It was noted:

Canada's direct and indirect interests suggest not merely that she must follow Caribbean affairs closely, but wherever possible try to influence them. These British communities in the past virtually ignored their Latin neighbours. But their attitude of indifference is changing, and for Canada that change may be important.¹⁸

With the decline of the British hegemony in the region and the unpopularity of United States direct dominance and intervention, Canadian investments in the region dictated an ascendant role in the region. Economics was the strongest link between the two regions, dating back to the 19th century and culminating in the still existing 1926 Canadian-West Indies Trade Agreement and the 1958 Commonwealth Caribbean Assistance Programme.¹⁹ In 1960 Canada's direct investment in the Caribbean was \$120 million dollars, which exceeded its investment in Europe, Australia and Asia and was surpassed only by larger investments in Latin America.²⁰ The Caribbean was Canada's second largest market in the Commonwealth in 1961, and in Jamaica 50% of the private investment was Canadian. The structure of Canadian-Caribbean relations was vertically integrated and included trade, extractive industries, small manufactures, banking and insurance, transportation and public utilities and tourism.²¹ The weakest link remained immigration.

Far from wishing to increase the domestic worker quota as the Caribbean governments constantly requested, Canada was anxious to put

an end to an arrangement which was no longer relevant to current immigration procedures. Yearly domestic worker quotas for the Caribbean had become a minimum number to admit rather than a maximum.²² The purpose of the innocuous WIDS in 1955 was to admit a specific number of unsponsored immigrants as trained domestics, even though they did not have relatives in Canada to act as sponsors.²³ Once admitted and landed the women could sponsor their relatives. Cancelling the scheme was justified in this way:

Although the West Indies have been in the preferred sponsorship group for some years this has not yet caused too much concern because many of the negroes already in Canada were multi-generation residents of this country and had no family ties in the West Indies. The substantial unsponsored immigration of West Indians since 1955 is changing this. Our census figures reflect an increase in the negro population of Canada from 18,000 in June, 1951 to 32,000 in June 1961. Immigration from the West Indies since, June 1961 has been approximately 7,000...we may be facing a West Indian sponsorship explosion.²⁴

This reasoning suggests that migration involves more than just economics. Unlike other Canadian contributions, it has significant social implications for the Canadian community.²⁵ Eliminating special group movements engendered a commitment to accept workers in specific unskilled occupations, during the first few years of the policy as a gesture to convince Caribbean governments that this would not change Canada's commitment to the region:

...in the longer run it might become a good deal easier for us to get rid of the quota system if we could show on the basis of one or two year experience that the application of the regulations in the ordinary way could be depended upon to allow more servants to move than had been admitted in the past....reconciling ourselves to having to continue the present domestic quotas for another year and to find ways and means of allowing some modest increase

in the numbers of unskilled workers admitted to Canada in 1965.²⁶

It was not without reservations that policy makers considered the ramifications of admitting unskilled workers. Some asked the question: Why do we even consider approving the admission of unskilled and uneducated persons as domestic servants in light of the fact that they soon find their way into other lines of work in competition with the Canadian unemployed?²⁷ The answer was obvious, but problematic:

It is mainly to meet the pressure by influential persons seeking domestics for their own employ...If our basic criterion for the admission of domestic servants is the shortage of workers willing to perform this work in Canada it is difficult to justify refusal of other workers in similar situations....The argument for admission of unqualified workers to meet short-term labour needs, could provide the loop-hole by which immigrants could circumvent our selection policies en masse.²⁸

Although taking a dilatory path, universalism eventually took root as the dominant tendency in Canadian policy.²⁹ The Canadian position was classic and had the complicity of Caribbean development assistance demands:

In this age immigration is not and cannot be an effective solution to the problems of overpopulation, poverty, underemployment and unemployment. Such immigration merely transfers the problem rather than solving them. The root of the problem of overpopulation and underemployment is lack of economic opportunities in the countries concerned and in the final analysis the only solution is for the world community to aid these countries in improving their economies.³⁰

While we shall ensure by all appropriate means the application of uniform selection standards and provide adequate service to potential immigrants on a universal basis without regard to race, colour or creed, we must also ensure that we do not undermine international efforts through aid programs to narrow the gap between rich and poor nations...we do not have motives for discrimination we are fully willing

to respect any expressed wishes of the governments of developing countries, and to the extent this makes it possible, observe the freedom of the individual.³¹

Caribbean governments were reluctant to rely on the good will of the Canadians. By 1965 when implementation appeared inevitable, the collective position was that Canada should consider domestics as a "skilled" occupation, making WIDS as a special movement unnecessary, but would still guarantee entry of Caribbean people. Other vocal elements claimed WIDS-type agreements condemn Caribbean women to virtual second-class status in Canada. For instance, the West Indian Association of Ottawa made direct appeals to the governments involved (Jamaica, Trinidad & Tobago, Guyana, Barbados and the Leeward and Windward Islands) to review the existing agreements and consider cancelling them.³² Individual citizens also brought the inequities of the program to the attention of the Caribbean public. In Guyana an article published in the newspaper of the People's National Congress in 1964 and meant to embarrass the opposition People's Progressive Party was written by a black Guyanese living in Canada who was interviewed during a visit to British Guiana. The impassioned article received the attention of Canadian immigration officials in the region and was passed on to the Ottawa headquarters. The newspaper feature read in part:

I am surprised that ANY Government, more so a so-called peoples' Government can allow its young womanhood to be exported like so much chattel, without ensuring that they are justly paid for their hire and not treated as third-rate citizens in a land alien to their characteristic make-up and the culture of which they will never be allowed to assimilate...I cannot see, however, how much unemployment will be alleviated by sending 30 of your girls at a time on what when one truly knows

can be described only as 20th century form of indentured labour.³³

However from the point of view of the Caribbean governments, the existing scheme was not operating to the disadvantage of the Caribbean in political terms because immigration was a strong bargaining chip. No attempt was made to cancel the scheme. Only British Guiana, now under the control of the African-controlled People's National Party, relinquished its quota in 1965. In response to their quota notification for 1965 Guyana responded:

Government is at present endeavouring to secure the return to this country of those Guianese who had left and are now residing in the United Kingdom in order that they should assist in the development of the country. Similar action may also be taken in the future where Guianese are residing elsewhere...the Government would not wish to continue participation in a Plan which would not be in consonance with the repatriation Scheme.³⁴

Although Canada welcomed this position, they saw it as a political maneuver to court the new ruling party's overseas constituency who were largely of either African or Portuguese origin. Nonetheless, Canada lamented that Guyana's decision was not widely held throughout the region.³⁵

Without the open consent of Caribbean governments, modifying immigration in favor of skilled workers required dubious actions by immigration officials. Canada simultaneously sought to discredit the WIDS scheme by highlighting irregularities existing since 1955 known to Canadian authorities by blaming island governments' corruption of the selection process. To insure a systematic decrease in the flow of immigrants from the Caribbean differential practices for admitting non-European immigrants were implemented, digressing from the

non-discrimination rhetoric of "universalism."

By 1967 a portfolio of irregularities in island-initiated selection, the unsuitability of immigrants and their lack of skills was systematically compiled to support this action.³⁶

Persistent arguments for eliminating the WIDS in light of the philosophy of universalism and non-discrimination justified these actions. The WIDS did not meet the labor needs of Canada nor the Caribbean; the match between professed qualifications and comparable Canadian skills were weak and discouraging to both employers and workers. Canada was faced with an immigrant population of qualification extremes--most entries lacked marketable skills and did not wish to stay in domestic service. Others were clearly over qualified and used the WIDS as an entre into other employment opportunities.³⁷ Controversial issues of social adjustment, race and sex discrimination and skills arise most often when the mechanics of implementing policy are discussed.

The Reclamation of Power: Controlling the Mechanics of Dependent Immigration

Elements in the formal maintenance of Canadian dependent immigration center around the issues of: promotion, selection and placement of Caribbean immigrants. Control over the recruitment of domestics and other Caribbean entries surpassed all other considerations. Canada wished to maintain control over the source of domestics.

...the Canadian Immigration authorities prefer to draw domestics from Europe and the West Indies. They are able to give effect to this preference because the quota system enables them to admit West Indian domestics under less stringent requirements than are applicable to Asian and African applicants.³⁸

...any relaxation of the requirements could mean a flood of applications from Asian and African countries which would quickly satisfy the market and adversely effect the flow of domestics from the preferred sources particularly the West Indies.³⁹

The 1962 Regulations allowed Canada to regain control over the process of selection of new entrants.

The principle on which our Regulations are based is individual selection, based on merit, as determined by our visa officers; group movements are in many respects just the antithesis of this...as in the case of the West Indies domestic movement, training and selection of the girls is largely in the hands of the labour officials in the country of emigration, rather than in Canadian hands.⁴⁰

The intent of the new arrangement was to normalize the procedures for the movement of domestics, returning these procedures exclusively to Canadian authorities.

So important was this issue of control that it was proposed the flow of Jamaican domestics be increased or maintained at present levels for a few years in return for Jamaica relinquishing its practice of pre-selection of eligible emigres. In 1966 WIDS quotas from the Caribbean were actually doubled from 250 to 500 women and Assisted Passage Loans were extended to this region. This action proved not to be a concession, it simply allowed for greater control over the movement from the Caribbean. Caribbean governments continued to select and train 250 women and Canadian officials were responsible for selecting spontaneous and employer applications for the remaining 250 domestics.⁴¹ In addition, political agitation resulted in the opening of immigration offices in Kingston, Jamaica and Port of Spain, Trinidad by 1967. Signaling the insignificance of these actions, in the same year it was announced that the WIDS would be discontinued

effective January 1, 1968, removing island governments from the process of selection altogether.⁴² The Immigration Act of 1968 merely echoed the 1962 Regulations but conceded that domestics would continue to enter during this elite phase of immigration as a "skilled" category.

The mechanics of a dependent immigration recruitment policy bolstered this maintenance of control over Caribbean immigrants. Promotional activities signified Canada's ideological definition of desirable immigrants; the selection process embodied the political and economic interests between the two regions; and placement perpetuated the nature and structure of inequality in terms of access and power between the two regions.

A. Promotional activities involves structures such as active recruitment through advertising, the existence of offices in the source country, and facilitating the movement of people by extending Assisted Passage Loans. The arrangement of these structures varied according to the geographical source for immigrants. Both Europe and the Caribbean were preferred markets for domestics, but each served different purposes for Canada. Formal promotional campaigns were always directed at the European market, especially the United Kingdom. Canadian attractions included: economic (trade, travel), fraternal/cultural, and diplomatic/political advantages for European entries.⁴³ Canada competed with other Commonwealth countries of Australia, New Zealand, South Africa and Rhodesia, and the United States and lesser receiving nations for British citizens.⁴⁴

In 1963 Canadian promotion agents in Europe recognized that Canada was operating in a "sellers" market with many countries bidding for preference. Canada wished to be competitive for desirable migrants and

promoted itself using paid advertisements, films, speaking engagements, etc.⁴⁵ An important promotional item was Assisted Passage Loans.

Begun in 1951, the purpose of Assisted Passage loans was:

to assist, by means of an interest free loan part of the cost of transportation, those immigrants, both single and heads of families, whose services are urgently required in Canada and who are unable to pay their own transportation costs.⁴⁶

Although many of the Europeans could pay for their passage, they were able to keep a portion of their funds as a reserve to settle in Canada with the Assisted Passage loans. The underlying philosophy was that loans ensured that they would reestablish successfully in Canada with a minimum of difficulty. Assisted Passage loans were only publicized in countries where active promotion of immigration took place to insure a reasonable number of approvals.⁴⁷

Except in extremely rare instances, Assisted Passage Loans were granted only to immigrants coming forward from Europe, for unsponsored immigrants and to sponsored immigrants coming as dependent relatives of a permanent resident in Canada. Principally, non-white nations were excluded.⁴⁸ Immigrants coming from the Middle East, Africa, South America, or the Far East could not secure loans while living in their countries, nor obtain loans on behalf of their families living outside of Europe.⁴⁹ Approximately 168,282 had come to Canada using loans between 1951 and 1964. One third of Europeans reported that loans were decisive in coming to Canada. It is estimated that a loss of 15% of German immigrants would result if AP were withdrawn, 40% from France and 50% in the United Kingdom. Several changes were instituted since 1951 in the program: dependents were made eligible, any person from Europe qualified for selection (not skill-based), previous requirement

of \$30.00 contribution and demonstration of financial need were abolished.⁵⁰

By 1966 loans were extended on a universal basis to qualified unsponsored immigrants. Specific selection and skill criteria were established for unindustrialized or semi-industrialized countries where the mode of living and/or occupational standards differed from Canada.⁵¹ For instance in the Commonwealth Caribbean:

Loans are available to independent applicants who are in occupations which are in strong demand in Canada. This, along with loan terms and conditions (six percent interest, \$1,500 ceiling, \$50 deposit), is applied uniformly throughout the world. The number of Assisted passage loans granted has been on the decline for some time and this is also reflected in the figures for the Commonwealth Caribbean, where only 103 covering 275 persons have been granted up to February 1970. It is believed that the relatively low transportation costs to Canada from these countries (average \$140) accounts in some measure for the small number of loans granted in that area.⁵²

Proximity was not the only factor accounting for this situation. AP loans from the Caribbean were low largely because the Caribbean governments had always been responsible for the financial and transportation arrangements for its citizens. The most common form of travel assistance was made with employers who deducted transportation costs from the meagre wages paid domestics. Because of the perceived higher wages in Canada, families pooled their resources as a form of collective investment in a better life. Moreover, a tendency that migration literature reveals is that often the people who are most mobile in the search for work are people who are already working. In the case of domestics, it was illustrated in Chapter 4 that most women who entered Canada as domestics were engaged in other types of skilled

work before departing the Caribbean. While loans were perhaps the biggest promotional mechanism in Europe, for the Caribbean establishing immigration offices served a similar promotional purpose.

A number of Canadian immigration offices necessary for processing new recruits existed, but the greatest concentration was in the United Kingdom. The idea of opening an immigration office in the Caribbean had been bantered around for nearly a decade and a half. The sending of special immigration teams to the West Indies for the first time in 1962 and later in 1963 was an essential step forward in Canada's immigration practices. Yet, unlike Europe, the purpose was to screen, not attract, prospective immigrants in lieu of permanent immigration facilities.⁵³ Visiting teams were used in the Caribbean until 1967 and the reports of immigration officials in the field proved to be critical in the final selection of immigrants. Whether officials were stationed in the region or traveled briefly from island to island to process applications, the ethnocentrism of the team members was decisive in measuring the personal suitability of migrants. The power granted immigration officials in the final selection of candidates has been a persistent concern and source of criticism for advocates of Caribbean immigration. From the Canadian point of view, offices were opened to gain political mileage because emigration was extremely important in island politics:⁵⁴

The islands cling to concessions such as the Domestic Quota Agreement because they still feel that this is the only avenue by which West Indian may enter Canada. I doubt whether there is any other place in the world where the establishment of a Canadian Immigration office would be greeted so enthusiastically; not so much because it would solve their problems, but because it would represent to them an act of faith and goodwill on our part.⁵⁵

There were many reservations about establishing an office in the region. The limited number of good immigrants were decreasing as people migrated to Canada, the United States, United Kingdom and other West Indian islands. With office facilities, Canada would be expected to maintain a flow of immigrants which may not be justified and it would be difficult or impossible to close the office without creating considerable dissent among the people and the governments concerned. Theoretically, the advantage of opening an office enabled the selection of immigrants on a continuing basis, using the same yard stick for refusals and approvals. An office allowed selecting officers to become familiar with the educational standards, skills and mental attitudes of the people⁵⁶ and gave Canadian officials greater control over non-immigrant matters, (since the barometer of sentiments toward Canada were best gauged by on-site personnel--trade commissioners, immigration officers, etc.) Much has been written on the thirst for power among lower-level gatekeepers of the status quo, often discussed in terms of authoritarian personalities, such as police officers, prison guards, soldiers, and immigration officers (see Adorno, 1950). Structurally this is a decisive position in the immigration selection process.

B. Selection issues include controlling the volume of immigration through sponsorship categories, screening processes, using skills and personal suitability criteria--race, sex, geographical source. Under the 1962 Regulations four types of sponsorship existed: (1) sponsored by relatives, (2) sponsored by prospective employer, (3) unsponsored general (or spontaneous), (4) unsponsored government-preapproved special movements.⁵⁷ Sponsored applications from the Caribbean approximated unsponsored immigrants;⁵⁸ for European countries like

Italy, with a much larger representation in Canada, the sponsored group made up nearly 90% of the entries. Canadian officials screened candidates for the first three categories; Caribbean governments selected special movement participants until 1968. Women who worked as domestics in Canada could have entered under all four categories. Besides requirements of formal academic, educational or vocational training,

other factors also enter into the consideration, such as an applicant's knowledge of Canada's official languages, financial resources, personal adaptability and desire to succeed. In the end the question of whether an individual applicant has such qualifications as to justify approval becomes a matter of human judgment. [emphasis added]⁵⁹

Applications increased many fold by 1962, with quite a build-up of cases whose eligibility could be determined only by a personal interview. There were 2,798 applications processed in 1962.⁶⁰ The expectation was that the refusal rate would always be very high since the whole area was not a source for people with the type of skill⁶¹ and training required in the Canadian economy. This expectation was not borne out by the first visiting team in 1962:

...we thought if 40% of the candidates were accepted we would do quite well...the Team selected well over 60% of the persons who appeared for interviews and according to reports from the Head of the Team, the calibre of the perspective immigrants was surprisingly good...⁶²

At the beginning of 1963 the observations of the applicants from the Caribbean was that the calibre of the persons who had applied for admission to Canada was considerably higher than that of the average person living in these areas. Interviewers reported that immigrants seemed motivated by considerable determination, enthusiasm and

ambition, and their objective was Canada or some other country if need be, where they could work and create a better future for themselves and their family.⁶³

The fact that by the third rotation of the 1963 immigration team the evaluation of applicants drastically declined was not unrelated to Canada's new official position to decrease the volume of Caribbean admissions. Depending on the area visited, the team rejected between 65% and 75% of those screened. Their consensus was that more applications should be rejected on paper screening, less approved and most should be personally interviewed.⁶⁴ In British Guiana, 75% of the applications were rejected; and of the 25% accepted, many were in senior positions of government and industry.⁶⁵ In many areas educational qualifications listed were not considered reliable indicators. Other factors that were considered included: the friendliness of the political climate of the territory, the stability and quality of services, institutional arrangements and even physical appearance of the prospective migrants. Insightful for these subjective and racist evaluations were the team officials written comments about the territories which held tremendous weight in the selection process:

British Guiana - At present the U.S.S.R. and Cuba are very interested in this country and children are being sent to school in these countries; Montserrat - Residents of this island live a very primitive life and it is unlikely that any of them will be able to qualify under 31(a); Bermuda - The local people are clean and bright, but do not have much to offer in the way of skills; Surinam - crime and unemployment rate is high and the calibre of persons applying is low; Barbados - The personal suitability of the inhabitants is above average of the surrounding areas; Grenada - The only industry is spices. There is no central organized educational system...school principal or classroom teachers are missionaries or

other persons with a religious background. Therefore, most of the teaching is related to the Bible with little emphasis on the basic three R's. It is doubtful if any of the applicants could be successful in Canada...⁶⁶

Evaluations of the situation in Jamaica were so uncomplimentary until it was requested that "it might be preferable if the final decision on admissibility were to appear to remain with the Immigration Branch in Ottawa."⁶⁷ Stated categorically:

Jamaicans in general are reluctant to recognize the deficiencies which make them unacceptable as immigrants...Generally speaking, negro Jamaicans tend to attribute their inability to meet standards accepted in Canada and other countries to racial prejudice, and refuse to recognize that common Jamaican attributes, such as irresponsible parenthood and indolence, are not regarded with indifference elsewhere.⁶⁸

I feel that the average Jamaican does not fully comprehend the real meaning of the immigration scheme as laid down by the Department of Citizenship and Immigration at Ottawa. Their attitude seems to indicate that this is a transitory and temporary thing by which some benefits can be obtained; in some cases in order to do this the family unit is temporarily broken up when the wife feels that she can earn more in Canada whilst the husband remains in Jamaica and visits are made about once a year.⁶⁹

The benevolent guise of a purely political process had been uncovered by the general public in the islands. In the Caribbean the scheme was accepted for what it was, a "scheme" to be used to the advantage of the islanders when possible. This discovery prompted indignation among Canadian policy makers who quickly imposed greater restrictions of new entries--unless they were domestic workers. The new enforcement confined admission to people prepared to do menial labor which matched the racist perceptions of all non-whites. By 1966 a directive was given in the Regions to:

scrutinize all applicants of marginal qualifications with respect to skills or education and screen them out....The accent is to be increasingly on quality with an inevitable lessening of numbers... Obviously the domestics fall into the category of those possessing only marginal skills, if indeed they have any...we can control the numbers by simply applying an acceptable set of selection criteria. Domestics have been on the list of occupations to be selected for years. There has never been any excessive intake, simply because those girls with a suitable educational background do not wish to engage in this servile occupation.⁷⁰

By 1967 selection criteria for domestics included: (1) good health and character, (2) single, widowed or divorced, (3) without minor children (i.e. children under 21), (4) aged 21 to 35 although exceptions may be made for well qualified persons, (5) completion of elementary school, (6) experienced or trained in household service. Attached to these criteria were two sets of guidelines supplied by the Planning Branch--for "Career Domestics" and a separate provision for "Ostensible Domestics", i.e. those posing as domestics, but probably not likely to remain in this occupation. Personal suitability often depended on the applicant's adaptability and "willingness" to work as a domestic.⁷¹ Whatever the classification, women continued to enter as domestic workers from the Caribbean, a seemingly "preferred" classification for the group.

Entry into Canada as a domestic was not the ultimate goal; this was only a means to an end. Caribbean women entered Canada under the domestic service scheme as an expedient form of departure from limited options in their home territories. Employment in the less desirable jobs such as domestic service was perceived as a temporary state, necessary to endure as an admission criterion into a more lucrative wage labor zone. The social context and the perceived openness of the

economy as measured by the availability of long-term jobs, educational advancement and related opportunities for women and their families, which helped to determine their range of expectations within the domestic service sector and the economy in general. The possibility of the permanence of domestic work signified that Caribbean immigrants in Canada were socially losing ground compared to previous entrants. A sense of the range of options open to new immigrants was narrowed by immigration officials before they entered. Canada wished to limit unskilled entry to women for domestic work. Job placement quickly conditioned skilled and unskilled immigrants' perception of life in Canada.

C. Placement involves the issue of matching qualifications to the type of employment desired, social adjustment issues, and their agencies responsible for these activities. European countries from which large numbers of immigrants come were highly industrialized and presumably a higher proportion of their populations had trades and skills.⁷² However, most Europeans are sponsored by relatives and do not have to meet skills qualifications as a criteria for admission. Nevertheless, according to Canada discrimination is in favor of the Caribbean unskilled domestic workers admitted outside of the Regulations--during a period of skills preference. Actually Caribbean placement in Canada has been a factor of qualification extremes--the highly skilled or domestics. The ease of occupational placements for either end of the continuum led to the misinterpretation that Caribbean immigrants have easily been absorbed in the communities.⁷³ This is not the situation reported by placement officers.

In 1963 interviews were arranged in Toronto and Montreal with the Citizenship Liaison Officers, National Employment Service Officials and the University Placement Officers to assess the success of black immigrant adjustment. All agreed that there had been some difficulty, but in light of the fact that more blacks will enter, some solution would have to be found. University placement officers noted that many foreign students set their sights very high and have to be counseled on lowering their expectations and preparing to work up. More difficulty is encountered when placing a black college graduate because employers are inclined to accept white students over their black counterparts, despite their records. Most students are forced to do menial work as dish washer, car washer, caddying, etc.⁷⁴ It is predictable that underemployment would not elicit positive self-perceptions nor enamored views of the dominant society. However the Canadians explained the source of discontent on unrealistic expectations of individuals who had work experience in the Caribbean or who had received training in Canada:

One characteristic of the West Indian Negro, which is of interest and value when considering him for immigration is, that in order to get continued good results in his work output he has to be continually humoured, encouraged and complimented on his work. If he is reprimanded, or told to perform his work in a manner different from what he is accustomed to, he becomes sulky and unco-operative and a poor worker. He finds it very difficult to re-adjust and adapt himself to new and different approaches to a job.⁷⁵

Male office workers, sanitary engineers and health inspectors are among the categories of immigrants who could not be placed in their field. Tradesman who had served their apprenticeship in the U.K. or had experience there were easier to place than those who had only studied

and worked in the Caribbean. Few well-qualified craftsmen could readily establish themselves within their respective trades in Canada.⁷⁶

Unlike their urbanized European counterparts:

A large portion of the Canadian negro population live in the Maritimes, particularly in Nova Scotia, and the majority of these negroes are employed in menial jobs at basic minimum salaries. This situation adds to the difficulty of finding suitable employment for persons of the negro race unless they are fully qualified in a profession or trade.⁷⁷

In general the concentration of Caribbean blacks in Montreal and Toronto were noted as unhealthy developments by the Canadian authorities,⁷⁸ especially since:

Very few Caribbean immigrants are reporting to the Placement officers for assistance. It appears the majority are going to their relatives friends or ethnic organizations where they are being helped in finding employment and accommodation.⁷⁹

The importance of cultural networks were not given much credibility by Canadian authorities who wished to portray Canada in the most optimistic, non-discriminatory light. The occupational group most closely monitored by Placement officers were domestics. Historical irregularities of domestic work such as extended working hours, being paid subminimum wages and mistreatment were typical, but unlikely occurrences to be reported to the Immigration department. Therefore, few problems were listed for domestics. Most entered domestic employment and left soon after one year for similar work in hospitals or other institutions.⁸⁰ As such domestic women were the most unobtrusive interlopers, as staid and innocuous behind the scenes workers. Placing black females was not a problem. A major concern among black organizations was the difficulty in placing black males,⁸¹ who continued to enter, welcomed or not.

The preponderance of one sex in Canada resulted in pressure to admit males of the same social status as potential mates. Caribbean governments complained that Canadian requirements were too high and therefore discriminatory against males from the Caribbean.⁸² The major objection to the entry of domestics was that they tended to sponsor relatives with similar backgrounds:

The most serious aspect of special movements is the swelling of the unskilled labour force in Canada and not by the girls alone. By bringing in groups of single persons of one sex and of one social level an imbalance is created, which the girls immediately seek to remedy...In fact, the admission of these domestics has resulted in representations from coloured organizations in Canada to admit a comparable number of males to balance the sexes.⁸³

Canadian officials doubted that the problem of sex ratio imbalances were as serious as Caribbean people suggested and felt the argument was a gimmick to force Canada into taking more male immigrants rather than an indication of concern for the females.⁸⁴ The Canadian logic came from misconceptions of the importance of cultural background. For the policy makers the racial groups were homogenous:

Coloured males in the Canadian population had always outnumbered females. The figures from the 1961 census figures for Negro and East Indian males were 16,184 and 4,122, respectively. For females the figures were 15,943 and 2,652, respectively.⁸⁵

Canadian officials had engineered an immigration policy that was based on their experience with historical communities of blacks in the Maritime and assumed linkages between immigrant and indigenous black consciousness, which did not mesh with reality. Subsequent studies demonstrate there are greater social bonds based on nationality than on race among Caribbean immigrants.⁸⁶ Evidence presented in Part III

also suggest a distinctive pattern of interaction among the immigrant community.

Despite the structural mechanics which facilitated immigration from the Caribbean, Canada again tightened its policy. The explicit policy at this time was to neither recruit nor promote migration from any developing country. By the 1970's Canada's position was clear--no special movements, no active recruitment, no concessions to the Caribbean governments. Canada was not prepared to offer special training for Caribbean entries because they would have to do the same for other Commonwealth countries.⁸⁷ Ostensibly, Canada selfishly considered it unwise to take large numbers of unskilled and uneducated; and selflessly unethical to admit large numbers of professionals from regions desperately in need of skilled personnel. The number of entries from the Caribbean over this twenty year period had already changed the dynamics of Canadian internal social relations.

Social Consequences of Universalism: Internal Social Relation

In a relatively short span of time, this universalistic system opened Canada to many highly educated persons of the formerly least-favored nations and races.⁸⁸ This seam in the immigration codes of Canada in the 1950's opened up the floodgates of immigrants from the Caribbean by the 1960's and 1970's. Between 1946-1970 black immigrants had risen to a third place ranking among entering ethnic groups behind the British and Italians, from the seventh rank in 1966.⁸⁹

Before offices were opened in the Caribbean, Asia or South America, people from these regions came to Canada as tourists and then applied

for permanent residence from within Canada. This loophole in the process was so obvious that by 1972 more than one-third of immigrants applied from within Canada. Despite their small numbers, the effects of an increased black presence in Canada produced a series of local reactions.

Lobbying on a variety of fronts illustrates this transformation. The responsiveness of the Canadian policy makers to internal pressures is reflected in the gradual approach of enacting changes for enforcement of the 1962 immigration Regulations. On the one hand, Caribbean governments played an influential role in reminding Canada of integral structural relations between the two regions. Canadian officials often felt brow-beaten into untenable positions.⁹⁰ The Caribbean governments always had lobbying organizations inside Canada focusing attention on the mechanics of discriminatory immigration practices. Typically, the Caribbean lobbying process involved a two-pronged attack using domestic and foreign diplomatic channels:

Generally the West Indian Governments have a propensity to negotiate in respect of immigration on the basis of their own difficulties without any consideration of unemployment and other economic problems facing the countries which receive immigrants from their countries...Quite often the Canadian High Commissioners in the West Indian countries are approached regarding certain concessions in the field of immigration. If that approach is unsuccessful then the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration may expect similar representations from organizations such as the Jamaican-Canadian Association in Toronto or the Deputy Minister may be approached by the High Commissioner to Canada for the West Indian country concerned. When all these approaches have failed, the next step is for the Prime Minister of another West Indian country to arrange a meeting with the Secretary of State for External Affairs or the Prime Minister of Canada.⁹¹

Similarly, the divided Canadian public expressed real and perceived negative social consequences caused by the New Immigration. Canadian employers demanded access to labor, trade unions required protection, private citizens coveted existing local communities and their way of life whenever threatening policy issues were publicly aired. Their concerns were also brought to the attention of immigration officials.

...disgruntled immigrants, either through their own activities or through the press, or sometimes through the officials from the countries from whence they came, have a depressing effect on immigration to this country. The views of those disgruntled immigrants reach the small vocal minority of Canadians who are anti-immigration as well as well-meaning Canadians who have no racial prejudice but who are afraid that if the immigrant intake from certain countries is stepped up too quickly we will find ourselves in the position that developed in the United Kingdom and possibly even worse because our experience with different racial groups has not been so extensive. These Canadians, in turn, are not backward in making their fears and views known to Members of Parliament and more particularly to this Department...⁹²

Flooded by a barrage of correspondence from white citizens, the Immigration Department expressed the view that the multi-racial nature of Canadian immigrant movement could result in race riot situations similar to those in the United Kingdom and the United States. In light of their own Sir George Williams University student demonstrations led by Caribbean students articulating the hypocrisy of Canadian race relations, correspondence flooded the department. Broadly speaking letters were from British Columbia, Ontario and Quebec, with Toronto and Vancouver areas predominant, which baldly expressed seething racist attitudes about the non-white population of less than 5% of the total:

B.C. shows a preponderance of anti-East Indian feeling whereas Toronto and Montreal are less specific but basically anti-black... A Vancouver surgeon, for instance, writes that many of his

(Canadian) patients have taken seriously the need to control population growth, to the point that he is asked to perform sterilizing operations frequently. He mentions the dismay of people who have made this sacrifice and are then faced with seeming plans by the government to increase the population by importing highly fecund "Asiatics and Blacks."⁹³

The official sentiment was that racial discrimination of one type or another cannot be eradicated simply by enacting legislation. It must be solved by the people themselves through education in understanding and tolerance in human relations.⁹⁴ An interim strategy was to minimize public involvement in immigration practices. "The less adverse publicity we have the easier it will be for us to increase the immigrant intake from underdeveloped countries."⁹⁵

Pandering to an antagonistic social climate, in 1973 Canada implemented temporary worker programs to deter permanent immigrant applications. This non-immigrant category weighed social and humanitarian criteria for admission. Previously, a prospective temporary worker only needed to possess an offer of employment and have the required skills for the job; without any fanfare, applications for work could be sought abroad, at arrival or from within Canada.

"Non-immigrant" classifications acted basically as residuals of all categories of entrants not specifically given landed immigrant status. It is a makeshift arrangement that rationalizes exceptions, affords labor flexibility, and makes foreign workers easy prey for corrupt selection processes. Implemented as "temporary" programs, they have become long-term sources of labor supply.⁹⁶ The 1973 laws proved to be the most damaging legislation for immigrants who traditionally entered Canada under less stringent conditions. It affected not only who could enter, but dramatically stripped entering and existent

immigrants of both civil and labor rights, increasing the power of immigration officials to unilaterally decide the fate of already stigmatized newcomers.

With the adoption of this law foreign domestic workers were forbidden by law to change their status to permanent residents and visas must be obtained from abroad and renewed yearly. When this easy access to work visas was removed, people continued to come, hoping to find work, stay out of trouble, and somehow get permission to stay. They became the targets of border immigration officials. A former officer admitted:

Of course, we didn't talk to many travellers from Europe or the United States...They sent us everyone, except Canadian residents, from countries on a list that changed from time to time but generally included South America, the Caribbean, Asia and Africa. People from poor countries were considered more likely to want to sneak into Canada.⁹⁷

The 1973 Employment Visa Regulations had three objectives: (1) administrative control over the flow of temporary workers, (2) control over the labor market characteristics of temporary workers, and (3) temporarily legalizing for social or humanitarian reasons the presence of persons already in Canada.⁹⁸ One's availability, skills and presence in Canada are no longer sufficient criteria to be granted authorizations. Not a guestworker program in the European sense, the program is designed with the dual objectives of recruiting migrants to meet temporary labour needs and providing opportunity for migrants to work who are already in Canada or who will come to Canada for non-economic reasons.⁹⁹

Portes describes the search for new sources of low-cost labor as taking primarily two forms: (1) exporting the production process to

where such labor sources are found, and (2) importing low-cost labor to replace or supplement the national work force. The domestic service industry, like many urban services, cannot be "produced" except on the site where they are needed. Therefore, such service industries requires a readily available mobile labor force, which is lowly or unorganized by trade unions. Directly related to their legal status, the leverage of deportation over foreign workers has been the handmaiden of exploitation.¹⁰⁰

This shift proved to be particularly discriminatory against women seeking visas to enter as domestics because of the high rate of mobility out of domestic service, once they were landed immigrants. The notion of "temporary workers" as an international labor trend was gaining acceptance and legitimacy. A majority of temporary workers were "bonded" to their employers and their right of residence was tied to pre-arranged employment. Therefore, if they stopped working they were subject to deportation. Unofficially, when the government increased the number of foreign domestics entering on work permits under severe restrictions, it gave Canadian employers complete freedom regarding pay and work conditions. Domestics were never protected, but industrial workers in general were barred under the 1973 provisions from seeking redress for labor infractions under provincial minimum labor standards legislation or starting unions.

The majority of female temporary workers are employed in the service occupations, accounting for 25% of all validated authorizations in 1979 and 1980. Non-immigrants target earn and in the case of agricultural workers are guaranteed a higher wage than local workers. A major disadvantage of temporary, non-immigrant status was that they

paid for social services from which they do not benefit.¹⁰¹ Live-in domestic work is now the preserve of third world women--a captive labour force which could be disposed of at will. They are visible minority women from the economically depressed Caribbean countries, and more recently from the Philippines.

Foreign domestics in Canada on employment visas account for between one-third and one-half of all domestics entering. Between 1973 and 1979 60,000 women entered Canada under these conditions.¹⁰² Table 5 shows that between 1973-1974 36% came from the Caribbean, increased to 39% in 1974 and rose again between 1975-76 to 49.7% of the total.¹⁰³ In 1982 more than 16,000 temporary work permits had been issued to foreign domestics.¹⁰⁴ Persons holding an employment visa issued in Canada had no right to appeal to the Immigration Appeal Board. The severity of the new law was camouflaged by an amnesty for anyone who had entered the country on or before November 30, 1972.¹⁰⁵

Before July 1973 the wide discretionary power of the Special Inquiry Officers (S.I.O.s) was not a matter of great interest to people concerned with civil liberties in Canada, since all persons who were subject to the Special Inquiry had the right to appeal all deportation orders made by S.I.O.s to the Immigration Appeal Board. In 1973 the Appeal Board had 18,000 backlogged cases, the equivalent of 15 years of work. Under the old regulations, the Special Inquiry Officer tried to persuade applicants to withdraw their request to enter, emphasizing that if they were deported they would be barred from returning. Since there was no provision for voluntarily withdrawing an application in the Immigration Act, those who knew their rights stayed.

Advocates acting as counsellors apprised potential immigrants of their rights. Immigration officers as the traditional gatekeepers could not stop the tide. The new law restricted the right of appeal to Canadian citizens, permanent residents, refugees or persons with valid visas issued outside Canada. Thus, in the vast majority of deportation hearings, the S.I.O. is the final arbiter. Almost all victims of the Special Inquiry are Asian, African, or Latin American people .

Simultaneously, government was forced to tighten up at all immigration points. A Central Enforcement Unit was also set up in 1973 in response to complaints from the Metropolitan Toronto Police that the immigration department was too soft on criminals and illegal immigrants.

Headed by a former RCMP intelligence officer, the unit was full of ex-cops who wore handcuffs on their belts and loved "scooping niggers," as they sometimes called it. My first day on the job I learned how to make an arrest, how to search "clients," handcuff them, and transport them by car, and how to arrest someone without a warrant and get away with it [while your colleague phones for the warrant.

In the Admissions Section...everyone was assumed to be trying to get away with everything, and the idea was to put as many obstacles in the way as possible. People were made to come back to the office again and again with different documents. Students were often required to report every couple of months just to show that they were still studying.

Middle management at the regional level also began exerting more muscle...sensing the direction of the wind, began to urge less use of favourable discretion, less giving of the benefit of the doubt. The unwritten rules and policies that govern the daily operation of any bureaucracy changed slowly in the direction of strictness.¹⁰⁶

TABLE 5

Non-immigrant Employment Visas
In-Home Domestic Service Occupations
By Worker's Citizenship

Country of Citizenship	United Kingdom	Scandi- navia	Western Europe	Eastern Europe	Africa	Asia	Austra- lia	U.S.A.	Mexico, C. Amer.	West Indies	South America	Other	TOTAL*
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	(n)
<u>July 1973-June 1974</u>													
Babysitters	27.6	7.1	19.9	.6	.6	3.7	.6	3.1	.9	31.6	3.7	.6	100.0 (326)
Maids-Domestic	27.6	3.8	18.2	.9	.9	1.9	.7	4.1	2.1	36.0	3.9	.2	100.0 (1,299)
Other**	19.6	1.0	15.5	1.0	---	6.2	1.0	21.7	3.1	28.9	2.1	---	100.0 (97)
Total	(467)	(73)	(317)	(14)	(13)	(43)	(12)	(84)	(33)	(598)	(64)	(4)	100.0 (1,722)
<u>July 1974-June 1975</u>													
Babysitters	36.5	3.0	19.5	.4	.3	1.1	.5	1.8	1.5	30.8	4.7	---	100.0 (738)
Maids-Domestic	24.9	1.4	18.3	1.1	.9	3.6	1.8	2.7	1.6	39.0	4.6	.3	100.0 (2,225)
Other**	25.7	2.1	20.0	2.1	1.4	2.1	2.1	5.0	1.4	32.9	4.3	.7	100.0 (140)
Total	(860)	(56)	(578)	(30)	(24)	(90)	(46)	(79)	(49)	(1140)	(144)	(7)	100.0 (3,103)
<u>July 1975-June 1976</u>													
Babysitters	32.7	2.5	19.3	.5	.5	1.8	.5	.3	.8	36.4	4.3	.4	100.0 (1,921)
Maids-Domestic	20.8	2.1	11.1	.4	1.0	3.7	1.1	1.6	2.6	49.7	5.5	.5	100.0 (3,556)
Other**	19.4	3.9	16.1	.6	1.7	5.0	3.3	7.2	1.7	35.0	5.6	.6	100.0 (180)
Total	(1404)	(127)	(794)	(25)	(46)	(177)	(55)	(74)	(110)	(2531)	(289)	(25)	100.0 (5,657)

*Totals may not sum to 100.0% due to rounding

**Other' includes cook, servant, foster-mother, butler, companion, farm housekeeper, handyman, and domestic couple.

Source: Sheila McLeod Arnopoulos, Problems of Immigrant Women in the Canadian Labour Force, (January, 1979), p. 61.

Under the new Act, domicile protections have been removed. Domicile was achieved after 5 years of permanent residence and gave persons more rights than the landed immigrant who was not domiciled. Now, those who choose not to apply have no more rights than any other landed immigrant. Previously only landed immigrants who did not have domicile could be deported typically for suspected subversive activities. All landed immigrants, no matter how long they had been in Canada, were subject to clauses of this kind.¹⁰⁷

By 1976 the Immigration Act (which took full force in 1978), officially voiding the 1952 Alien Labour Act and diminishing the power of accompanying enforcement and assistance agencies such as the Immigration Appeal Board. Individuals who had entered Canada under the Alien Labour Act of 1952 could no longer automatically apply for landed immigrant status. Moreover, immigrants living in the country continuously for five years, were now prohibited from applying for landing from within the country. Prospects for domestic workers was even more dismal.

For the Caribbean and its citizens abroad, a pattern that spanned more than twenty years had been disrupted. Consequently, between 1977 and 1981, when strategies to cushion the full-fledged force of the 1973 legislation in 1978, local campaigns to combat the restrictive conditions of immigrant labor emerged.

Public Policy As a Molder of Social Relations and Power Relations.

The evolution of the policy and programs since their onset in the 1950's has witnessed a fundamental shift in contemporary Canadian immigration policy. Pressed by both issues of labor supply shortages

and labor sector competition, the national government hoped to resolve this dilemma by setting goals of making the domestic service category attractive enough to keep new foreign entries in this category by up-grading the status and skill proficiency of the work. When not needed for certain jobs, they would return home.

Policies and programs geared to this area shifted from a two-pronged benefit of work and eventual landed citizenship in Canada for recruited labor at its inception, to a more singularly focused benefit of work with no guarantee of landed citizenship. The most notable change in foreign recruitment had been with the 1976 Immigration Act. This policy shift distanced manpower needs, on the one hand from citizenship privileges on the other. This contributed to the vulnerability of these immigrant women in both legal and occupational terms. A tenuous legal status not only resulted in personal feelings of insecurity; it also provided the concrete basis for the initiation of a series of deportation cases of these women from Canada. In response to these government actions, efforts to protect the women who had entered Canada expecting both work and landed status were mounted on several fronts. Who are these social actors?

Chapter Six investigates the emergence of vocal advocates and activities to protect immigrant domestics from whom the Canadian government relinquished its responsibility.

CHAPTER FIVE - NOTES

¹Letter. From: Robert N. Adams. To: Douglas Henderson, Assistant General Manager, Canadian Chamber of Commerce, Montreal. Re: Information respecting Canada's immigration policy as it applies to commonwealth countries in the Caribbean area. Ottawa, April 5, 1972. 75 pages. RG 76/Volume 135, 83-84/349, File 5850-3-533.

²"People anywhere in the world now have an opportunity to immigrate to Canada if they demonstrate their suitability for life in this country and are likely to become established without hardship to themselves or disruption to the communities in which they settle." Traditionally, Canada has sought to increase its population through immigration in order to expand domestic market, reduce per capita costs of administering a huge country, stimulate economic activity by providing new skills, ideas and enthusiasm, and support a higher level of cultural independence and creativity. Canadian experience indicates that a substantial volume of immigration is highly desirable. New population cannot be added haphazardly without regard to their means of subsistence, or their effect on Canadian life...new settlers must be economically competitive in terms of training, skills and personal qualities.

Brief. Canadian Immigration Policy. Immigration Branch, Department of Citizenship and Immigration. Ottawa, Ontario, September, 1964. 3 pages. RG 76/Volume 820, File 552-1-533.

B.W.I. domestics are admitted on the basis of their education, training, skills or other qualifications in accordance with new Regulation 31(a). Those who qualify on this basis will in addition have to show before they are admissible to Canada that:

- (a) they have sufficient means to look after themselves until they become successfully established in Canada; or
- (b) they are coming to Canada to take employment arranged or approved by the Director.

...the domestics will almost certainly come to Canada under the alternative shown as (b) since very few will have sufficient means to maintain themselves for an extended period (6 months or longer) and they will invariably be going into domestic service in homes selected by the N.E.S....or in homes pre-selected on an individual basis and approved by the Director.

Memorandum. From: George F. Davidson. To: Mr. W.R. Baskerville. Re: West Indies domestics under the new Regulations. Ottawa, January 22, 1962, 5 pages. RG 26/Volume 124, File 3-33-6, Part 3.

...under the new regulations and separate and apart from those domestics who may be admitted under the quota, we shall have to accept applications for bona fide qualified domestics where the sponsors in Canada are reputable and where wages and other working conditions are satisfactory.

Memorandum. From: Director of Immigration. To: Deputy Minister. Re: West Indies domestics under the new Regulations. January 30, 1962. 2 pages. RG 26/Volume 124, File 3-33-6, Part 3.

³N. Deakin, Colour, Citizenship and British Society. London: Panther Publishers, 1970, p. 50 cited in Miles and Phizacklea, 1984, p. 140.

⁴Ibid

⁵Robert Miles and Annie Phizacklea, White Man's Country. Racism in British Politics. (London: Pluto Press, 1984).

⁶Director of the Jamaica Government's central planning unit said a most unfortunate situation of persons with education, skills and means are leaving for Canada...everything possible would be done to promote the migration of unskilled people. The Jamaican Prime Minister has made the statement that Jamaica must "export" at least 15,000 persons yearly or the island will be in serious difficulty in the not too distant future.

Memorandum. From: A/Director of Immigration. To: Deputy Minister. Re: Opening of an office in The West Indies. Ottawa, October 2, 1962, 5 pages. RG 76/Volume 830, File 552-1-644, Part 4.

Apparently a fairly substantial number of Jamaican students come to Canada with financial assistance from their Government and are under an obligation to return after completion of their studies.

Brief. Immigration from the West Indies. April 1, 1963. 3 pages. RG 76/Volume 830, File 552-1-644, Part 4.

Minutes from a 1963 Commission in Canada for the Barbados-Windward-Leeward Islands and the British Honduras in Montreal in a summary of meeting with representatives reflect that the Islands are not concerned about landed immigrants. Many students who had completed their education in Canada preferred to remain here rather than return to the Islands. As you know, this is different from the attitude of Jamaica which has asked us to not land students who graduate in Canada without a clearance from Jamaican authorities as the Government of Jamaica and interested private agencies had in many cases financed the students' education and were anxious that they return to Jamaica to give the country benefit of their qualifications.

Memorandum. From: Chief, Policy and Liaison Division. To: Acting Director of Immigration. Re: Immigration from Barbados, British Honduras, et al. September 5, 1963. 3 pages. RG 76/Volume 830, File 552-1-644, Part 4.

⁷Earl Barrow, "A Role for Canada in the West Indies," International Journal of the Canadian Institute of International Affairs. Toronto, 19(2) (Spring, 1964): 184.

⁸Ibid

⁹Discrimination exists in Canada, not by law, but by the immigration officer on the spot who for years had been working under the old regulations and so interpreted the new ones in the light of his past experience.

Restricted Report on the October 25-27, 1963 Conference on "Commonwealth Partners in the West Indies" sponsored by The Canadian Institute of International Affairs (Fredericton Branch) and the University of New Brunswick. November 29, 1963. 5 pages. RG 76/Volume 830, File 552-1-644, Part 4.

¹⁰Confidential Memorandum to the Minister. From: C. M. Isbister, Deputy Minister. To: Minister. Re: Household Service Workers from the West Indies and British Guiana. Ottawa 4, November 20, 1963. 4 pages. RG 76/Volume 838, File 553-36-556.

¹¹Letter. From: Assistant Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, Ottawa. To: The Deputy Minister of Citizenship & Immigration, Ottawa. Ottawa, December 6, 1963. 3 pages. RG 76/Volume 830, File 552-1-644, Part 4.

¹²Locksley, G.E. Edmondson, "Canada and the West Indies: Trends and Prospects," International Journal of the Canadian Institute of International Affairs, Toronto, 19(2) (Spring, 1964): 199.

¹³Confidential Memorandum prepared by Dr. Alexander Brady of the University of Toronto: Canada and the West Indies, January 7, 1963 Professor Alexander Brady of the University of Toronto's Dept. of Political Economy spent 3 1/2 month in the Department reviewing material in our files on the West Indies. He has prepared the attached essay on Canada and the West Indies. It should not be regarded as official departmental opinion, it has been read in the Department with considerable agreement and satisfaction.

Numbered Letter. From: Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, Ottawa, Canada. To: The Office of the High Commissioner for Canada, London. Re: Canada and The West Indies. Ottawa, February 1, 1963, 21 pages. RG 76/Volume 830, File 552-1-644, Part 4.

¹⁴What is the use of having a 10 million dollar aid scheme, as the Canadian government instituted in 1958 for the 5-year period to 1963, if at the same time fiscal and economic measures are going to be introduced which are not in the best interests of the exporters in the West Indies?

Canadians must expect people in the West Indies who purchase perhaps 75% of their essential foodstuffs from Canada to look with a great deal of alarm, despair and even despondency at the fantastic amount of money which is thrown away in place in the Far East, when the only thing that we can point to with any sense of pride in the West Indies today is the gift of two ships. It is in the interest of the Canadian government to take a greater part of the sugar exports from the West Indies. Unless the Canadian government wakes up to the

realities of the situation, they may find that the U.S. government may be entering into commodity arrangements with the Caribbean in respect of commodities like wheat and flour to the complete exclusion and dereliction of your producers here in Canada...But we can't go on telling people like the Americans with large surpluses of wheat that we are not going to buy anything from them any more.

Barrow, "A Role for Canada in the West Indies," p. 179-83.

¹⁵Confidential Memorandum prepared by Dr. Alexander Brady of the University of Toronto: Canada and the West Indies, January 7, 1963 Numbered Letter. From: Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, Ottawa, Canada. To: The Office of the High Commissioner for Canada, London. Re: Canada and The West Indies. Ottawa, February 1, 1963. 21 pages. RG 76/Volume 830, File 552-1-644, Part 4. RG 76/Volume 830, File 552-1-644, Part 4.

¹⁶Ibid

¹⁷Ibid

¹⁸Ibid

¹⁹Edmondson, "Canada and the West Indies: Trends and Prospects" p. 190-194.

Canada entered the Caribbean market in a bigger way after the United States switched the bulk of its sugar imports to Cuba, Puerto Rico and the Philippines after 1903, by 1930. Today traffic is virtually in one direction only. Canada has been increasing her exports, both by volume and by value to the Eastern Caribbean, but there has been a decrease in Canadian imports from the Caribbean. In 1930 Canada took almost 13% of Caribbean exports; by the 1960's it took only 10% and this included bauxite and alumina from the area. This situation was contradictory to the 1958 \$10 million five-year Commonwealth Caribbean Assistance Programme, which when renewed in 1963 also included British Guiana and British Honduras. The Commonwealth Caribbean Aid Programme was inaugurated after the birth of The West Indies Federation, for improvements in communications, including ports and airfields, especially in the "Little Eight" island of Barbados, St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla, Dominica, Antigua, St. Vincent St. Lucia, Grenada, Montserrat, whose plight is serious because of physical and social handicaps making their own powers of initiative and self-help weak. If Canada were to maintain or slightly increase exports to the region, it could only be done by concentrating even more on the present basics, i.e. newsprint, salt cod and other fish products and flour, with attempts to develop local manufacture in the islands.

Confidential Memorandum prepared by Dr. Alexander Brady of the University of Toronto: Canada and the West Indies, January 7, 1963. Numbered Letter. From: Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, Ottawa, Canada. To: The Office of the High Commissioner for Canada, London. Re: Canada and The West Indies. Ottawa, February 1, 1963. 21 pages; Restricted Report on the October 25-27, 1963 Conference on "Commonwealth Partners in the West Indies" sponsored by The Canadian Institute of International

Affairs (Fredericton Branch) and the University of New Brunswick. November 29, 1963. 5 pages. RG 76/Volume 830, File 552-1-644, Part 4.

20 Jamaica and Trinidad in the coming years will be soliciting capital assistance and some technical aid. Between 1950 and 1957 the export trade in Jamaica increased by 180% and in Trinidad by 66%, whereas Barbados the increase was only 30%, the Leeward island was 7%, and the Windwards only 1%. For the last decade Jamaica and Trinidad have had special trading advantages which in view of the changing situation in the world cannot be guaranteed in the next decade. It is in the sphere of commerce that Canada in the future can contribute its major help to all the islands. Confidential Memorandum prepared by Dr. Alexander Brady of the University of Toronto: Canada and the West Indies, January 7, 1963

Numbered Letter. From: Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, Ottawa, Canada. To: The Office of the High Commissioner for Canada, London. Re: Canada and The West Indies. Ottawa, February 1, 1963. 21 pages. RG 76/Volume 830, File 552-1-644, Part 4.

21 Extractive industries. Bauxite from Jamaica and British Guiana and oil from Trinidad accounted for almost 50% of the trade of the entire Caribbean. Bauxite is the largest single industrial enterprise, alone represents a \$125 million dollar investments in two alumina and one fabricating plant in Jamaica. Bauxite and alumina accounted for more than 50% of Canadian imports from Jamaica in 1961 or \$27 million dollars of the import trade from the island of \$39 million dollars. In 1961, 46% of the bauxite needed to produce Alcan's total output of aluminum came from British Guiana. Estimates for 1962 and 1963 place this dependence at the increased figures of 51% and 54% respectively. Banking and Insurance Companies. This was the earliest form of direct Canadian enterprise and investment in the Caribbean, flourishing on the foundations established in trade. As early as 1889 the Bank of Nova Scotia had a branch in Jamaica. Eight insurance companies exist. With the exception of Barclays, four Canadian banks have 75 branches in the region and in many areas provide the sole available banking facilities. Industries. The Caribbean accounts for the fourth largest market for manufactures in Canada. Barrow noted that 75% of Caribbean essential foodstuffs are purchased from Canada--salt cod and other fish products and flour, etc. Small manufacturing initiated or sponsored by Canadian capital include commodities ranging from paint, food products, dentifrices, sports equipment, clothing, fiberglass, typewriters, transistor radios, woolen blankets, rum, packaging equipment and leather goods. Public Utilities. A Canadian company controls the principal source of electricity in Jamaica and British Guiana. Shipping. A subsidiary of Alcan provides the transport north of alumina and bauxite with other commodities that can be accommodated and picks and returns cargo for many of the islands and territories. Tourism. Since 1948, the Trans-Canada Air Lines extended services to the chief islands of the region. This movement complements European traffic because the seasonal peak is reached in Winter and early Spring when traffic to Europe is relatively light.

Confidential Memorandum prepared by Dr. Alexander Brady of the University of Toronto: Canada and the West Indies, January 7, 1963; Numbered Letter. From: Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, Ottawa, Canada. To: The Office of the High Commissioner for Canada, London. Re: Canada and The West Indies. Ottawa, February 1, 1963. 21 pages. RG 76/Volume 830, File 552-1-644, Part 4.

²²Emigration has long been a politically sensitive issue here, and has become even more so with the new British restrictions which, as you know, are being characterized here as a virtual mortal blow to the concept of a multi-racial Commonwealth. Our failure to respond in any way to the Jamaicans could cause increasing annoyance to the Government and have a negative effect on our relations with Jamaica. On the other hand a great deal of good will would be gained if some sort of modest but positive gesture on our part could be developed for offer to the Jamaican Government.

Confidential Memorandum. From: Office of the High commissioner for Canada, Kingston, Jamaica. To: Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, Ottawa, Canada. Re: Immigration of Domestic from Jamaica. August 10, 1965. 2 pages. RG 76/Volume 838, File 553-36-577.

²³Letter. From: A/Director of Immigration. To: Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, Ottawa, Ontario. Re: Special movement of household service workers from the West Indies and British Guiana. Ottawa, 4 February 27, 1963. 3 pages. RG 76/Volume 838, File 553-36-577.

²⁴Memorandum. From: C.M. Isbister, Deputy Minister. To: Minister. RE: Admission of Unskilled Workers under present Immigration Regulations, particularly Household Service Workers. Ottawa 4, December 10, 1964. 4 pages. RG 76/Volume 83-84/346, Box 18, File 58506-6-4-533, Part 1.

²⁵Confidential Memorandum prepared by Dr. Alexander Brady of the University of Toronto: Canada and the West Indies, January 7, 1963 From: Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, Ottawa, Canada. To: The Office of the High Commissioner for Canada, London. Re: Canada and The West Indies. Ottawa, February 1, 1963. 21 pages. RG 76/Volume 830, File 552-1-644, Part 4. Numbered Letter.

²⁶Confidential Numbered Letter. From: E. H. Gilmour, Office of the High Commissioner for Canada, Port of Spain. To: Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, Ottawa, Canada. Re: Immigration from the Caribbean. November 3, 1964. 4 pages. RG 76/Volume 831, File 552-1-649.

²⁷Memorandum. From: C.M. Isbister, Deputy Minister. To: Minister. RE: Admission of Unskilled Workers under present Immigration Regulations, particularly Household Service Workers. Ottawa 4, December 10, 1964. 4 pages. RG 76/Volume 83-84/346, Box 18, File 58506-6-4-533, Part 1.

²⁸Ibid

²⁹The discontinuance of the special movement of domestics was first seriously considered in 1962. The revised Regulations of 1962 had introduced a global concept of unsponsored immigration which obviated the need for special movements. There was no argument about the desirability of discontinuing the arrangements - rather it was a question of finding some way of cancelling or modifying the arrangements without alienating the Caribbean Governments.

In more recent times, the Canadian Government has sought to establish and maintain a special relationship with the Caribbean Governments. This relationship cannot be ignored when considering what steps may be taken to cancel or modify the special annual movement of domestics...But there is a possibility that we do over-stress the sensitivities of these people and under-rate the desirability of achieving genuine non-discrimination. In an attached hand-written note, dated Sept, '67, was the following response to the proposal:

I feel that the principles spelled out here are probably correct, but that the timing of the proposal is very bad. It was only recently that the Canada Caribbean Conference here featured a new and expanded agreement i.e. domestics. It was acclaimed by the island representatives. It would require explanations almost beyond our ability to put over to them to secure their agreement to a change based largely on our White Paper & Selection System of 1967. Why not wait until the new system has been used for a few months at least. Is the matter really one of the highest priority now? (initialed).

Memorandum. From: Director, Planning Branch. To: Assistant Deputy Minister, (Immigration). Re: Household Service Workers from the Caribbean. September 28, 1967. RG 76/Volume 83-84/346, Box 18, File 58506-6-4-533, Part 1.

³⁰Letter. From: Robert N. Adams. To: Douglas Henderson, Assistant General Manager, Canadian Chamber of Commerce, Montreal. Re: Information respecting Canada's immigration policy as it applies to commonwealth countries in the Caribbean area. Ottawa, April 5, 1972. 75 pages. RG 76/Volume 135, 83-84/349, File 5850-3-533.

³¹Ibid

³²Memorandum. From: Office of the High Commissioner for Canada, Port of Spain. To: Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, Ottawa. Re: Canadian Immigration Policy. May 25, 1965. 4 pages. RG 76/Volume 831, File 552-1-649.

Apparently President Johnson's 'war on poverty' crusade has caused the labour unions in the United States to request a tightening up on migrant labour, and one of the casualties appears likely to be the present Jamaican immigrant farm labour scheme...Apart from the dislocation which the enforced return of such a large group would create here, it also means the drying up of their remittances which are a not insignificant factor in Jamaica's balance of payments.

Confidential Memorandum. From: Office of the High Commissioner for Canada, Kingston, Jamaica. To: Under-Secretary of State for

External Affairs, Ottawa, Canada. Re: Immigration to Canada by Jamaicans. March 23, 1965. 3 pages. RG 76/Volume 838, File 553-36-577.

³³Article in New Nation, newspaper of the opposition People's National Congress, which draws its support from the African or Negro portion of the population...We suspect that the newspaper, which for political reasons wishes to embarrass the government here as much as possible, has presented the story in manner calculated to achieve that end.

Confidential Canadian Eyes Only Numbered Letter. From: Office of the Commissioner for Canada, Georgetown, B.G. To: Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, Ottawa, Canada. Re: Newspaper Comment on Domestic Scheme. June 6, 1964. 3 pages. RG 76/Volume 838, File 553-36-556.

³⁴Letter. From: Claude A. Merriman, Minister of Labour & Social Security, To: Milton F. Gregg, Commissioner for Canada. Re: British Guiana relinquishes quota. Georgetown, British Guiana, 3 May, 1965. 1 page. RG 76/Volume 838, File 553-36-556.

³⁵This move was forecast by Mr. Burham during an interview we had with him before the election last December. It can be attributed to a number of factors, the most important of which is probably the fact that most, if not all, the domestics who have been going to Canada are of African descent; i.e. persons who would be expected to support the present government. Most of the emigrants from British Guiana in recent years have been Africans and Portuguese, and their departure has significantly affected the racial balance vis-a-vis the East Indians. The proposal for a "scheme for the education of our women folk" as a substitute for the WIDS by implication would involve training in Canada, in some field or other, for the women who might have emigrated as domestics. In other words, the government would like to retain the political good-will generated by the domestics movement without having to accept the politically unfavorable aspects of it...The Minister's interest in assisting this potential emigrant from British Guiana was in complete contradiction to the stated policy of his government, but he did not seem to realize this.

Restricted Memorandum. From: Office of the Commissioner for Canada, Georgetown, B.G. To: Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, Ottawa. Re: Termination of Household Workers Scheme. May 7, 1965. 2 pages. RG 76/Volume 838, File 553-36-556.

A hand-written note in the margin stated: "Too bad this couldn't get lots of publicity in the W.I., especially Trinidad and Tobago as well as Jamaica. A.L.C. 27-5-65"

Confidential Correspondence. From: Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs. To: Assistant Deputy Minister (Immigration), Department of Citizenship & Immigration. Re: Relinquishing quota for British Guiana. Ottawa, May 21, 1965. 1 page. RG 76/Volume 838, File 553-36-556.

³⁶Practically all of the island governments have discriminatory immigration policies and in a somewhat subtle way are making a concerted effort to ease out white workers.

Memorandum to the Minister. From: Deputy Minister, Citizenship and Immigration. Re: Briefing for Prime Minister Eric Williams' visit. Ottawa, April 17, 1964. 5 pages. RG 76/Volume 831, File 552-1-649.

The Selectors here belong to a Political Party which at present is the ruling party of this country...Girls are selected only if they are supporters of this party. Most of the selectors ask these girls for money. The male government ministers demand sexual relationship or money.

Letter. From: EBT (anonymous) To: Officer-in-Charge, Central Selection Unit, Dept. of Immigration & Manpower. Re: Irregularities in Island Selection. Kingstown, St. Vincent, West Indies, February 7, 1967. 1 page. RG 76/Volume 83-84/346, Box 18, File 58506-6-4-533, Part 1.

A record will be kept in the Central Selection Unit of all complaints regarding the Household Service Workers scheme and copies will be furnished to your office. The allegation made is one that has concerned me from the beginning about the "Own Government Selected" approach for domestics. This system does indeed give a clear opportunity for abuse and malpractice. Even spontaneous applications initially received by us direct are referred to the respective Governments and become subject to the "Own Government pre-selection process".

Memorandum. From: Officer in Charge, Central Selection Unit. To: Director, Region "A". Re: Complaints Regarding Selection of Household Service Workers in St. Vincent. March 3, 1967. 3 pages. RG 76/Volume 83-84/346, Box 18, File 58506-6-4-533, Part 1.

...there may be a study underway which would assist in assessing the domestic movement to Canada. Mr. Paul Dobson who is apparently a Jamaican presently employed with the Immigration and Foreign Manpower Section of P.D.S. is presently preparing a sociological thesis which will have a particular tie in with immigration of household service workers. It is understood that he may seek to incorporate in his thesis a conclusion that girls in this domestic movement may be forced into prostitution in Canada....It should be useful to us in the absence of other more extensive studies which might be undertaken.

Memorandum. From: T.R. Burns. To: For File, Immigration - Planning. Re: Domestics. August 2, 1967. 1 page. RG 76/Volume 83-84/346, Box 18, File 58506-6-4-533, Part 1.

...unsubstantiated report that girls arriving in Canada from the Caribbean to work as domestics, are being forced into prostitution....Watching briefs were maintained for a period of one year only therefore, behavior patterns beyond this period were not necessarily made known to the Department.

Memorandum. From: Chief Intelligence Officer, Ottawa. From: Officers in Charge, Intelligence Units, Toronto - Montreal. Re: Prostitution - General. August 24, 1967. 2 pages. RG 76/Volume 83-84/346, Box 18, File 58506-6-4-533, Part 1.

Allegations that girls arriving in Canada from the Caribbean to work as domestics are force to become involved sexually prior to their departure from their native country and following their arrival here.

Memorandum. From: Director, Home Branch. To: Director, Foreign Branch. Re: Domestics from the West Indies. August 25, 1967. 2 pages. RG 76/Volume 83-84/346, Box 18, File 58506-6-4-533, Part 1.

I am satisfied the Department does not have a prostitution problem with Caribbean domestics employed in Canada...Our field Intelligence Units maintain a close interest in the activity of American pimps and prostitutes in Canada and it is significant to note that, up to now at least, there is no indication whatever that young domestics are being recruited for prostitution.

Memorandum. From: Director, Home Branch. To: Director, Planning Branch. Re: Domestics. October 12, 1967. 1 page. RG 76/Volume 83-84/346, Box 18, File 58506-6-4-533, Part 1.

³⁷With our new Regulations, of course, we are now in a much better position to completely do away with these small movements. I think it could be put to the Jamaicans in such a way that they might see the advantages of dealing with all spontaneous applications on the same basis rather than devoting so much of our attention to these small movements, possibly to the detriment of a larger group of more suitably qualified immigrants. You are aware, however, that the Jamaicans now appear to be having some second thoughts on the desirability of allowing their better qualified people to be drained away through the emigration process.

Memorandum. From: A/Director of Immigration. To: Deputy Minister. Re: Visit of Jamaican Government Officials. Ottawa, October 12, 1962. 2 pages. RG 76/Volume 838, File 553-36-577.

³⁸Confidential Memorandum. From: Office of the High Commissioner for Canada, Kingston, Jamaica. To: Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, Ottawa, Canada. Re: Immigration of Domestics from Jamaica. September 14, 1965. 2 pages. RG 76/Volume 838, File 553-36-577.

³⁹Confidential Memorandum. From: Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, Ottawa, Canada. To: Office of the High Commissioner for Canada, Kingston, Jamaica. Re: Immigration of Domestics from Jamaica. September 1, 1965. 1 page. RG 76/Volume 838, File 553-36-577.

⁴⁰Memorandum. From: George F. Davidson, Deputy Minister of Citizenship and Immigration. To: The Minister. Re: Meeting with the Jamaican Minister of Labour. Ottawa, October 16, 1962. 1 page. RG 76/Volume 838, File 553-36-577.

⁴¹Memorandum. From: C.F. Rogers. To: Director, Foreign Branch. Re: Domestic Quota Agreement. December 21, 1966. 1 page. RG 76/Volume 135, 83-84/349, File 5850-3-533. Letter. From: Robert N. Adams. To: Douglas Henderson, Assistant General Manager, Canadian Chamber of Commerce, Montreal. Re: Information respecting Canada's

immigration policy as it applies to commonwealth countries in the Caribbean area. Ottawa, April 5, 1972. 75 pages. RG 76/Volume 83-84/346, Box 18, File 58506-6-4-533. Part 1.

⁴²Canadian officials noted that in light of the policy change, some applicants who would qualify for admission under WIDS may not be selected under the new criteria of 1962. Nevertheless, it was likely that the number of women qualifying under the new Regulations would exceed the number selected under the quota agreement. In 1968 689 domestics were admitted and in 1969, 1,197 domestics out of 14,468 total entries from the Caribbean were admitted.

Letter. From: Robert N. Adams. To: Douglas Henderson, Assistant General Manager, Canadian Chamber of Commerce, Montreal. Re: Information respecting Canada's immigration policy as it applies to commonwealth countries in the Caribbean area. Ottawa, April 5, 1972. 75 pages. RG 76/Volume 135, 83-84/349, File 5850-3-533.

⁴³Proposal that A.P. should be extended to all needed qualified migrants whether they are sponsorable or not. Outright migrant subsidies if authorized could be used mainly to attract the urgently needed skilled and professional workers while the A.P. Loan would be used to attract semi-skilled, promising young people and people whose attainments would be considered advantageous to Canada. A universal basis to qualified unsponsored immigrants, with specific selection and skill criteria established for each individual country--more specifically for the unindustrialized or semi-industrialized countries--where the mode of living and/or the occupational standards differ considerably from ours.

Memorandum. From: J.G. Grant. To: A/Chief, Evaluation Division. Re: Assisted Passage Loan Scheme. March 23, 1966. 3 pages. RG 76/Volume 926, File 590-1, Part 12.

Preferred countries: direct advertising: U.K., U.S., Netherland, Italy, Belgium. Indirect Advertising: France, Germany, Austria, Denmark, Norway, Spain.

Brief. Immigration - Promotion and Advertising. December 20, 1966. 13 pages. RG 76/Volume 832, File 552-11, Part 2.

⁴⁴Memorandum. From: Director, C.G.I.S, U.K., London, England. To: Director of Immigration, Ottawa. Re: Promotional Programme - 1963-64. September 10, 1963. 15 pages. RG 76/Volume 832, File 552-11, Part 1.

⁴⁵Ibid and Memorandum. From: Director, C.G.I.S, U.K., London, England. To: Director of Immigration, Ottawa. RE: Promotional Programme - 1963-64. September 10, 1963. 15 pages. RG 76/Volume 832, File 552-11, Part 1.

⁴⁶Brief. Canada's Assisted Passage Loan Scheme. October 21, 1965/Revised January 6, 1966. 12 pages. RG 76/Volume 926, File 590-1, Part 12.

⁴⁷Ibid

⁴⁸Memorandum. From: Chief, Policy & Liaison Division. To: Assistant Deputy Minister - Immigration. Re: Extension of Assisted Passage Loan Scheme to non-European countries. September 2, 1964. 3 pages. RG 76/Volume 820, File 552-1-533.

⁴⁹Brief. Canada's Assisted Passage Loan Scheme. October 21, 1965/Revised January 6, 1966. 12 pages. RG 76/Volume 926, File 590-1, Part 12.

⁵⁰Ibid

⁵¹Memorandum. From: Director of Policy and Planning. To: Assistant Deputy Minister (Immigration). Re: Canada - West Indian Conference - Follow-up action. July 14, 1966. 2 pages. RG 76/Volume 926, File 590-1, Part 12.

⁵²Letter. From: Robert N. Adams. To: Douglas Henderson, Assistant General Manager, Canadian Chamber of Commerce, Montreal. Re: Information respecting Canada's immigration policy as it applies to commonwealth countries in the Caribbean area. Ottawa, April 5, 1972. 75 pages. RG 76/Volume 135, 83-84/349, File 5850-3-533.

⁵³Edmondson, "Canada and the West Indies: Trends and Prospects" p. 198.

⁵⁴Jamaica, Trinidad and Barbados were considered as possible locations for the office. Jamaica and Trinidad are 1,500 miles apart and were political rivals, so the establishment of an office in one would offend the other. Offices were established in each.

Memorandum. From: Director, Foreign Branch. To: Assistant Deputy Minister (Immigration). Re: A Proposal to open an Immigration Office in Bridgetown, Barbados. December 21, 1966. 5 pages. RG 76/Volume 832, File 552-11, Part 2.

⁵⁵Memorandum. From: Director, Foreign Branch. To: Assistant Deputy Minister (Immigration). Re: A Proposal to open an Immigration Office in Bridgetown, Barbados. December 21, 1966. 5 pages. RG 76/Volume 832, File 552-11, Part 2.

⁵⁶Memorandum. From: N. Green To: Acting Chief of Operations. Re: Opening an Immigration Office in the West Indies. April 17, 1963. 3 pages; RG 76/Volume 830, File 552-1-644, Part 4.

Memorandum. From: A.A. Ewen. To: A/Chief of Operations, Attn: Head, Technical Services. April 17, 1963. 2 pages. RG 76/Volume 830, File 552-1-644, Part 4.

⁵⁷An added incentive for opening a Caribbean office were the two French islands of Guadeloupe and Martinique, seen as untapped sources of French-speaking immigrants for Canada. As integral parts of France, they have a high standard of education and social services compared to their Caribbean neighbors. Limited numbers of opportunities on the island propels 6,000 to France annually.

Memorandum. From: Chief, Policy and Liaison Division. To: Acting Director of Immigration. Re: Selection Criteria - Household Service workers. July 8, 1963. 3 pages. RG 76/Volume 83-84/346, Box 18, File 58506-6-4-533, Part 1.

58 Background Paper. From: Planning Branch, Canadian Immigration Service. To: General Distribution. Re: Immigration to Canada From the Commonwealth Caribbean prepared by Canada for Commonwealth Caribbean-Canada Conference, Ottawa, July 6-8, 1966. Ottawa, June 1, 1966. 18 pages. RG 76/Volume 820, File 552-1-533.

Statistics on Black and East Indian immigration to Canada 1946-1963, e.g. 1,555 blacks vs. 116 East Indians. In 1956 and 1957 the unsponsored movements exceeded by a fair margin the sponsored movement, due largely to the domestic movement started in 1955. As these domestics became established they sponsored the admission of their relatives, fiances, and in some cases husbands and children, with the result the sponsored movement equalled in number the unsponsored movement and kept pace with it from 1958 to 1962 when due to the new Regulations, which permitted the admission of larger numbers of unsponsored immigrants, the gap was again widened between the two groups.

Confidential Brief. Re: Jamaican Immigration to Canada. no date. 3 pages. RG 76/Volume 824, File 824.

59 Extract of Regulation - Section 31 - landing requirements--see section (d).

Brief. Canadian Immigration Policy. Immigration Branch, Department of Citizenship and Immigration. Ottawa, Ontario, September, 1964. 3 pages. RG 76/Volume 820, File 552-1-533.

60 Brief. Immigration from the West Indies. April 1, 1963. 3 pages. RG 76/Volume 830, File 552-1-644, Part 4.

61 Oil in Trinidad and bauxite in Jamaica and British Guiana accounted for almost 50% of the trade of the entire region, and yet it benefited directly only the two most prosperous islands and the colony of British Guiana. Agriculture employs some 44% of the labour force in the region. Its importance in the total gross domestic product varies conspicuously in different islands, ranging from 18.5% in Trinidad and 20% in Jamaica to 42% in the Leewards and 44% in Jamaica to 42% in the Leewards and 44% in the Windwards. Industrial diversification is most pronounced in Trinidad and progressing in Jamaica, but is retarded in the Leewards and Windwards. There are many small farmers in the West Indies. Between 70 and 80% of the farms are from one to 5 acres, and usually their peasant cultivators are also part-time laborers, seeking some outside employment to supplement their income.

Confidential Memorandum prepared by Dr. Alexander Brady of the University of Toronto: Canada and the West Indies, January 7, 1963; Numbered Letter. From: Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, Ottawa, Canada. To: The Office of the High Commissioner for Canada, London. Re: Canada and The West Indies. Ottawa, February 1, 1963. 21 pages. RG 76/Volume 830, File 552-1-644, Part 4.

⁶²Memorandum. From: A/Director of Immigration. To: Deputy Minister. Re: Opening of an office in The West Indies. Ottawa, October 2, 1962, 5 pages. RG 76/Volume 830, File 552-1-644, Part 4.

⁶³Memorandum. From: A. C. A. Kaarsberg. To: A/Chief of Operations. Re: Visit of A.C.A. Kaarsberg to the Caribbean Island, Bahamas, Curacao, Trinidad, Grenada, Barbados, and St. Vincent. April 4, 1963. 9 pages. RG 76/Volume 831, File 552-1-649.

⁶⁴Circular Letter. From: Acting District Superintendent, WDHQ, Department of Citizenship and Immigration, Immigration Branch To: All Immigration Offices. RE: Background information on the Caribbean and South America regions. July 22, 1963. 6 pages. RG 76/Volume 820, File 552-1-533.

⁶⁵Ibid

⁶⁶Ibid and Circular Letter. From: Acting District Superintendent, WDHQ, Department of Citizenship and Immigration, Immigration Branch To: All Immigration Offices. Re: Background information on the Caribbean and South America regions. July 22, 1963. 6 pages. Volume 820, File 552-1-533.

⁶⁷Half of enquiries are from members of the poorer class who could ill afford to stay in Canada for 6 months...There is a strong possibility that those people are doing day work in Canada unknown to the authorities. ..Rather than go through the prescribed routine it is much easier for the Jamaican to "take a trip to Canada" for an indefinite length of time and be employed unofficially during that time....use of "church post letter", advertising in Canadian newspaper as a domestic. Persons being processed by the Jamaican Ministry of labour as "domestics" for Canada, are in actual fact, sometimes office workers and clerks. This complaint has been made by the domestic type of person who states that they don't get a chance. It has been a well known fact for the past eight years or so that many local girls who were stenographers, etc. proceeded to Canada under the domestic scheme at the time when there was no open emigration to Canada from the West Indies."

Numbered Letter. From: The Office of the High Commissioner for Canada, Kingston, Jamaica - Department of External Affairs. To: The Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, Ottawa, Canada. Re: Immigration Office in Jamaica. July 31, 1963. 3 pages. RG 76/Volume 830, File 552-1-644, Part 4.

⁶⁸Numbered Letter. Confidential. From: Office of the High Commissioner for Canada, Kingston, Jamaica. To: The Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, Ottawa, Canada. RE: Jamaican Immigration to Canada. August 2, 1963. 2 pages. RG 76/Volume 830, File 552-1-644, Part 4.

⁶⁹Numbered Letter. From: The Office of the High Commissioner for Canada, Kingston, Jamaica - Department of External Affairs. To: The Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, Ottawa, Canada.

Re: Immigration Office in Jamaica. July 31, 1963. 3 pages. RG 76/Volume 830, File 552-1-644, Part 4.

⁷⁰Memorandum. From: T.R. Burns. To: Director, Planning Branch. Re: Domestic. October 19, 1966. 5 pages. RG 76/Volume 83-84/346, Box 18, File 58506-6-5-633, Part 1.

⁷¹Memorandum. From: T.R. Burns. To: Director, Planning Branch. Re: Selection Criteria for Domestic. February 2, 1967. 4 pages. RG 76/Volume 83-84/346, Box 18, File 58506-6-4-533, Part 1.

⁷²Confidential Letter. From: C.M. Isbister, Deputy Minister. To: Arnold Smith, Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, Ottawa, Ontario. RE: Immigration from the Caribbean - Conference between various Caribbean countries and Canada. Ottawa 4, October 5, 1964. 11 pages. RG 76/Volume 820, File 552-1-533.

⁷³Memorandum. From: Administrator - Atlantic Region. To: Acting Chief of Operations. RE: Immigrants from the Caribbean Area. October 18, 1963. 3 pages. RG 76/Volume 820, File 552-1-533.

⁷⁴Memorandum. From: C.H. Hill and A.C.A. Kaarsberg. To: Deputy Chief, Policy and Liaison Division. Re: Caribbean Immigration Survey trips to Montreal and Toronto--May 21-24, 1963. May 31, 1963. 6 pages. RG 76/Volume 820, File 552-1-533.

⁷⁵Memorandum. From: A. C. A. Kaarsberg. To: A/Chief of Operations. Re: Visit of A.C.A. Kaarsberg to the Caribbean Island, Bahamas, Curacao, Trinidad, Grenada, Barbados, and St. Vincent. April 4, 1963. 9 pages. RG 76/Volume 831, File 552-1-649.

⁷⁶Memorandum. From: A. C. A. Kaarsberg. To: A/Chief of Operations. Re: Visit of A.C.A. Kaarsberg to the Caribbean Island, Bahamas, Curacao, Trinidad, Grenada, Barbados, and St. Vincent. April 4, 1963. 9 pages. RG 76/Volume 831, File 552-1-649.

In the health field, most of the complaints stemmed out of promotions. In all cases the Caribbean area immigrants receiving the promotion had been trained in the United Kingdom and had their S.R.N. as well as their S.R.M.N. (mental nurse) and were eminently better qualified for the positions than their Canadian counterparts.

Memorandum. From: A/Administrator - Pacific Region. To: A/Chief of Operations, Ottawa. Re: Immigrants from the Caribbean area. October 7, 1963. 1 page. RG 76/Volume 820, File 552-1-533.

⁷⁷Memorandum. From: Administrator - Atlantic Region. To: Acting Chief of Operations. Re: Immigrants from the Caribbean Area. October 18, 1963. 3 pages. RG 76/Volume 820, File 552-1-533.

⁷⁸Placement officers were not prepared to hire Negroes. In Montreal a number of firms were prepared to accept a token number, one or two, but were not willing to accept them in larger numbers. In a few specific cases where immigrants were placed and subsequently were let out, it appears the difficulty was that the individual was slow or lazy or irresponsible in his attitude toward his work. A few had been

place in jobs in classifications below their claimed qualifications and where the employment was accepted the individual was making satisfactory progress...tradesmen who had served their apprenticeship in the U.K. or had experience there were easier to place than those who had only studied and worked in the Caribbean area. In all cases when any difficulty was encountered it was in placing male Negroes, females did not present any problem.

Memorandum. From: C.H. Hill and A.C.A. Kaarsberg. To: Deputy Chief, Policy and Liaison Division. Re: Caribbean Immigration Survey trips to Montreal and Toronto--May 21-24, 1963. May 31, 1963. 6 pages. RG 76/Volume 820, File 552-1-533.

⁷⁹Memorandum. From: T.R. Burns. To: Director, Planning Branch. Re: Domestics. October 19, 1966. 5 pages. RG 76/Volume 83-84/346, Box 18, File 58506-6-4-533, Part 1.

A handwritten note in the margin of correspondence indicated the official's personal view of this situation, stating: "this suggests an unhealthy concentration in Montreal and Toronto." In comparison under the Greek Domestic Movement--a number of girls coming forward do not have a "working knowledge" of English and a number of private employers and hospitals are dissatisfied with them for this reason. A number have relatives in Canada who meet them and take them to their homes without referring them to NES. They then arrange for employment for them in a Greek restaurant where they remain until entitled to draw U.I.C. benefits and another "Greek Domestic" is then taken on at the restaurant...because of the job in the restaurant she is able to draw Unemployment Insurance.

Memorandum. From: C.H. Hill and A.C.A. Kaarsberg. To: Deputy Chief, Policy and Liaison Division. Re: Caribbean Immigration Survey trips to Montreal and Toronto--May 21-24, 1963. May 31, 1963. 6 pages. RG 76/Volume 820, File 552-1-533.

⁸⁰Memorandum. From: C.H. Hill and A.C.A. Kaarsberg. To: Deputy Chief, Policy and Liaison Division. Re: Caribbean Immigration Survey trips to Montreal and Toronto--May 21-24, 1963. May 31, 1963. 6 pages. RG 76/Volume 820, File 552-1-533.

⁸¹In Montreal visits were also made to the Travellers' Aid Welfare Society, Negro Community Services Centre, and Rev. Este, a Negro spiritual leader....view expressed that more male Negroes from the West Indies should be admitted, in order to balance out the larger female movement which Canada had had from that area over the past few years. A similar view has also been expressed by the Negro community of Toronto. Others supported a gradualist strategy of acceptance into Canadian society.

Mr. G. Howard, a West Indian Negro who has lived 15 years in Canada expressed the opinion that before any large scale movement should be considered from that area, Canada should admit as a vanguard persons selected on the basis of a good educational background, well skilled and trained in their occupation, with good personal suitability, to lay the foundation for respect, acceptance, and understanding between Canadians and West Indians....continued for a few years...prejudices and discrimination barriers be broken down, permitting at a later date

larger numbers to come forward whose qualifications were possibly lower but acceptable to Canadians.

Memorandum. From: C.H. Hill and A.C.A. Kaarsberg. To: Deputy Chief, Policy and Liaison Division. Re: Caribbean Immigration Survey trips to Montreal and Toronto--May 21-24, 1963. May 31, 1963. 6 pages. RG 76/Volume 820, File 552-1-533.

⁸²Memorandum. From: Acting Director of Immigration. To: Deputy Minister. Re: Interview with Mr. Rose, High Commissioner for Trinidad and Tobago. February 25, 1964. 3 pages. RG 76/Volume 831, File 552-1-649.

A Briefing Paper revealed that two years ago the Jamaicans asked for an increase in the female domestic quota, a quota of male domestic workers or house-men, and asked that we open our U.S.-Canada border to permit the temporary entry of Jamaican sugar-beet, potato and tobacco workers who are in the USA under temporary work permits (migrant labour on contract)...Basically, under our new Regulations, we should be seeking to get away from "group movement" as such...we are willing to consider any individual applications on their merits, without restriction as to numbers, but that we do not favour new quotas or group movements and would, in fact, prefer to do away with the one we have, respecting domestics.

Memorandum. From: George F. Davidson, Deputy Minister of Citizenship and Immigration. To: The Minister. Re: Meeting with the Jamaican Minister of Labour. Ottawa, October 16, 1962. 1 page. RG 76/Volume 838, File 553-36-577.

⁸³Confidential Memorandum to the Minister. From: C. M. Isbister, Deputy Minister. To: Minister. Re: Household Service Workers from the West Indies and British Guiana. Ottawa 4, November 20, 1963. 4 pages. RG 76/Volume 838, File 553-36-556.

⁸⁴Confidential Letter. From: C.M. Isbister, Deputy Minister. To: Arnold Smith, Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, Ottawa, Ontario. Re: Immigration from the Caribbean - Conference between various Caribbean countries and Canada. Ottawa 4, October 5, 1964. 11 pages. RG 76/Volume 820, File 552-1-533.

⁸⁵Ibid

⁸⁶See Dawn Marshall, "The ISER Eastern Caribbean Migration Project: A Longitudinal Study of Immigrants to Canada from the Eastern Caribbean." Paper presented at the 7th Annual Meeting Caribbean Studies Association, Kingston, Jamaica, May 25-29, 1982; and "Potential Migrants of the Eastern Caribbean: Data from the UNESCO/UNFPA/ISER, MAB Project Four Country Questionnaire Survey." Paper presented at Seminar at Center for Latin American and Caribbean Studies, New York University, March 17, 1981.

⁸⁷The Department has had some experience with special training facilities for migrants operated by the Inter-governmental Committee for European Migration (I.C.E.M). These training courses do not effectively convert an unskilled worker into a skilled one...The only

type of training which would be effective in fitting adult workers for migration to Canada would be extensive training over a period of years to upgrade each person's educational level and add a skill...Were Canada to embark on any training program for migrants from the Caribbean, we would be expected to do the same for other countries of the world with similar problems, particularly such Commonwealth countries as India, Pakistan, Malta, Hong Kong, to name but a few. The prospect is staggering and quite evidently is out of the question for Canada.

Letter. From: Robert N. Adams. To: Douglas Henderson, Assistant General Manager, Canadian Chamber of Commerce, Montreal. Re: Information respecting Canada's immigration policy as it applies to commonwealth countries in the Caribbean area. Ottawa, April 5, 1972. 75 pages. RG 76/Volume 135, 83-84/349, File 5850-3-533. Memorandum. From: C.M. Isbister, Deputy Minister. To: Minister. Re: Admission of Unskilled Workers under present Immigration Regulations, particularly Household Service Workers. Ottawa 4, December 10, 1964. 4 pages. RG 76/Volume 83-84/346, Box 18, File 58506-6-4-533, Part 1.

⁸⁸Anderson, "Immigration and Social Policy," p. 119.

⁸⁹Ibid, p. 115.

⁹⁰Confidential Letter. From: C.M. Isbister, Deputy Minister. To: Arnold Smith, Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, Ottawa, Ontario. Re: Immigration from the Caribbean - Conference between various Caribbean countries and Canada. Ottawa 4, October 5, 1964. 11 pages. RG 76/Volume 820, File 552-1-533.

⁹¹Confidential Letter. From: C.M. Isbister, Deputy Minister. To: Arnold Smith, Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, Ottawa, Ontario. RE: Immigration from the Caribbean - Conference between various Caribbean countries and Canada. Ottawa 4, October 5, 1964. 11 pages. RG 76/Volume 831, File 552-1-649. Letter. From: Robert N. Adams. To: Douglas Henderson, Assistant General Manager, Canadian Chamber of Commerce, Montreal. Re: Information respecting Canada's immigration policy as it applies to commonwealth countries in the Caribbean area. Ottawa, April 5, 1972. 75 pages. RG 76/Volume 135, 83-84/349, File 5850-3-533.

⁹²Ibid

⁹³Memorandum. From: Director, Programs and Procedures Branch. To: Assistant Deputy Minister (Immigration). Re: Coloured Immigration - Correspondence Pro and Con. September 20, 1973. 2 pages. RG 76/Volume 32, 83-84/349, File 5175-1-533.

⁹⁴With few exceptions the Canadian press supports coloured immigration. However, the correspondence we receive indicates that there is not support from the population as a whole to the same extent. It is our impression that there have always been more than a few Canadians who have prejudices in respect of race. More recently there have been persons...who are concerned that through rapid

increases in coloured immigration we could end up with situations similar to those in the United Kingdom and the U.S. It is considered of utmost importance that coloured immigrants be selected not only because of their special skills and qualifications but primarily because they are personally suited for the pioneer role of laying the foundation for a larger movement from the Caribbean area; people who will be accepted as equals in the Canadian community and inspire the confidence and understanding of others regardless of race.

Confidential Letter. From: C.M. Isbister, Deputy Minister. To: Arnold Smith, Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, Ottawa, Ontario. Re: Immigration from the Caribbean - Conference between various Caribbean countries and Canada. Ottawa 4, October 5, 1964. 11 pages. RG 76/Volume 831, File 552-1-649.

⁹⁵Ibid

⁹⁶Vernon M. Briggs, Jr., "Non-immigrant Labor Policy: Future Trend or Aberration?" in The Unavoidable Issue: U.S. Immigration Policy in the 1980's. Demetrious G. Papademetrious and Mark Millers (eds.): 93-122, (Philadelphia: Institute for the Study of Human Issues, 1983).

⁹⁷International Committee Against Racism, The Case Against the S.I.O., (Toronto: INCAR Pamphlet. September 1976).

⁹⁸Monica Boyd and Chris Taylor, "Temporary Workers in Canada: Expanding Research Horizons," Paper presented in the Labor Migration in Comparative Perspective Section at the annual meeting of the Population Association meeting, Boston, March, 1985.

⁹⁹Ibid p. 9.

¹⁰⁰Alejandro Portes, "Toward a Structural Analysis of Illegal (Undocumented) Immigration," International Migration Review 12(4) (Winter 1978), p. 473-474.

¹⁰¹Canada. Office of the Minister of Employment and Immigration, "Integration of Immigrant/Migrant Women into the Canadian Labour Market." National Report of Canada to the Working Party on Migration and the Working Party on the Role of Women in the Economy," Organization of Economic Co-Operation and Development, May 1981. pp. 1-4.

¹⁰²Ramirez, "Good Enough to Stay," p. 16.

¹⁰³Canada. Office of the Minister of Employment and Immigration, "Domestic Workers on Employment Authorizations." Report of the Task Force on Immigration Practices and Procedures established by the Honourable Lloyd Axworthy, Minister of Employment and Immigration in September 1980. April 1981. p. 50.

¹⁰⁴Lloyd Axworthy, Minister of Employment and Immigration, Correspondence. From: Lloyd Axworthy To: Dear Madam/Sir. Re:

Recent Developments in the Foreign Domestic Program. June 10, 1983. 3 pages.

¹⁰⁵INCAR, The Case Against the S.I.O., p. 33.

¹⁰⁶Ibid, p. 3-6.

¹⁰⁷Arnopoulous, "Problems of Immigrant Women in the Canadian Labour Force." Prepared for Canadian Advisory Council on the Status of Women (January, 1979), pp. 27-42.

PART III

Social Movements

- Chapter 6 - Immigration-Related Struggles Among Caribbean Peoples in Canada: Historical Developments**
- Chapter 7 - Advocate Inter-Organizational Relations and Conflicts: Mass Campaigns for Domestic Workers**
- Chapter 8 - Evaluating the Outcomes of Two Mass Campaigns: Varying Visions of Success by Domestic Workers, Advocates and the State**
- Chapter 9 - Summary and Analysis of Findings**

CHAPTER SIX

Immigration-Related Struggles Among Caribbean Peoples in Canada: Historical Developments

Introduction. In this chapter advocacy¹ as a traditional feature of immigration policy development in industrial nations is discussed. Protest as a form of advocacy typically exists in response to restrictive government policy and is the focus of this chapter. Immigrants are compelled to most directly confront the state and are often disadvantaged without buffers between themselves and the system of consolidated power shared by government agencies and private employers. Immigration advocates serve as independent monitors of a regulatory system operating with only internal checks, that is, subject to review solely by cooperating divisions within the same system.

Typically, groups that act do so in their own interest. When groups act on behalf of others, what does this indicate about the universal nature of the issue, identification with the targeted population or the process of empowerment for emerging groups? This chapter highlights the early vanguard role played by black immigrants in community-based struggles against restrictive immigration laws in post-World War II Canada and lays the groundwork for discussing the dynamics of coalitions in contemporary social movements centered around foreign domestic workers.

Advocacy took the form of formal inquiries, the presentation of briefs and formal recommendations, legal adjudications, special

hearings and appeals, convening conferences, sending delegations for audiences with public officials, letter-writing campaigns, using the media to educate the public, and organizing mass demonstrations--all of which solicit formal responses by government. For purposes of this study, government legislative action or non-action in progressive, restrictive, or other forms, signal the provocative affect of social action. Various degrees of failure or success are ultimately defined by the evaluator. The degrees and types of negatives and/or positives which come from social action are discussed in Chapters 7 and 8, from the perspectives of: advocates, foreign domestics, and the state.

The harsh treatment of foreign domestic workers by government representatives and employers was revealed in the early 1970's. The structure of Canadian immigration policy had the twin affects of highlighting the devalued status of these women and persistently affecting their social and legal status in Canada. A series of actions were led by disperse segments of the Canadian community who evaluated the treatment of foreign domestic workers as a threat to all immigrants and visible minorities whose cosmology is shaped as much by their local community as their occupations. The actions resulted in concessions in the policy and simultaneously highlighted the need for conciliatory civil rights actions for all immigrant and visible minority peoples by the 1980's.

The incorporation of racial inequality into a national plan of action for social legislation affecting immigrant women is a very recent phenomenon in Canada. Many settlement services for immigrants fall under provincial mandates.² Beginning in 1981 the federal

government entered into immigration agreements with six provincial governments activating mechanisms for successful settlement and integration of newly arrived immigrants in the provinces. Only since 1983 has Canada adopted Affirmative Action as the state interventionist strategy in national public service. The Caribbean community, the largest segment of Canada's black population, was considered among their successful enough model minorities, not requiring government intervention through compensatory regulations. As it was conceived in 1983 Affirmative Action applied primarily to women, Native People, Handicappers and Nova Scotian blacks.³

In 1985 employment equity programs were established for crown corporations, federally regulated employers, and certain contractors. Also in 1985 the Department of Employment and Immigration took explicit responsibility for social issues such as discrimination, making the Caribbean subpopulation eligible for Affirmative Action legislation. Therefore, today, the status of race and immigration matters related to social legislation is in its infancy. This era of reform eventually incorporated a labor segment that had been quite low on the list of priorities for protective legislation affecting working people (farm workers in rural areas and domestic workers in urban areas). Although separate from other workers, as of 1983 foreign domestic workers have been extended some form of labor protection, including such things as higher wages, mandatory time off, a 44-hour week, overtime pay.

None of these protections were gifts from the Canadian government. Rather they are victories from struggles by various groups for an improved quality of life. According to one activist in reference to

the liberalization of legislation affecting domestics:

One thing is quite clear--the only reason we have a new, less exploitative policy in Canada today is because domestic workers and their allies banded together across national and racial lines, and fought like hell to get it.⁴

It is the contention of this study that the less documented experiences of affected groups and their advocates were instrumental in bringing about these changes. In the remainder of this chapter precursors to the 1977-1981 community mobilization waged in order to protect the rights of foreign domestic workers in Canada are discussed and the state response to these actions are reviewed.

Immigration and Advocacy. Knowing the historical grievances, the social context within which change occurs and the social actors involved helps in understanding the role of advocacy in shaping immigration policy. The causes of social movements noted in this study are rooted in Canadian social segmentation based on race, class and sex reinforced by stringent immigration laws. To redress immigrant community grievances reforms were required to allow more equitable access to desired resources, privileges and power for Canada's socially disenfranchised newcomers. The five years between 1974 to 1979 were filled with endless confrontations between the Caribbean community and agencies of the government.

The domestic worker issue was only one of a series of "brush fires" confronting the Toronto black community. However, the selection of this labor category as the point of departure for a discussion of community advocacy is not an arbitrary choice. The WIDS fueled the popular ideology of subservience associated with the Caribbean community in subsequent decades, despite the reality of a highly

skilled migration stream from the Caribbean. Concrete negotiated issues affecting all Caribbean immigrants are epitomized by domestic worker struggles revolving around admission, citizenship rights and labor protection.

These successive demands were reformist to the extent that such rights and privileges were not new and were already enjoyed by other segments of the Canadian society. However, from the point of view of the government, Caribbean demands requesting greater incorporation into the existing structure had ramifications which were potentially revolutionary in nature. These new social actors were unknown commodities, or "loose cannons on the deck," which could change the social fabric of the society.

Written accounts and personal interviews reveal a range of advocacy protests led by: earlier black immigrant groups persistently involved in immigration issues (Universal Negro Improvement Association, Canadian Association for the Advancement of Coloured People, Jamaica-Canadian Association); new immigrant-based parastatal units and existing government agencies (such as, Immigrant Women's Job Placement, Immigrant Women's Centre); and coalitions of diverse labor and civic groups whose interests (in women's issues, trade unions, civil rights, etc.) had always overlapped with immigration issues (YWCA, Civil Liberties Unions, Canadian Congress of Labour) and now coalesced in direct action with one of the most powerless targets of the immigration system--foreign domestics. While government initiatives are notable, the primary impetus for change is typically a result of advocacy using community-based strategies.

Early Advocacy. Available correspondence files indicate that advocacy which maintains the status quo had been an acknowledged part of the immigration process since the 19th century with the passage of the Immigration Aid Societies Act in 1886. Wishing to maintain ultimate control, but capitalize on existing social networks, the purpose of the Act was to encourage European immigrant communities to promote and assist the recruitment of workers to Canada from their respective countries of origin. While having no official standing or decision-making role, they could sponsor new immigrants.

The Act was not very successful in giving government access to the traditionally informal process of family and ethnic community networks of support in recruiting desired newcomers. When by 1921 only one application for incorporation was received in 1905 from Italians residents in Montreal, recommendations were made to repeal the Act.⁵ Another attempt to harness non-governmental participation in immigration was the state-sanctioned Canadian Council on Immigration of Women for Household Service organized in 1919 by the Women's Branch of the Immigration and Colonization Department. Thirteen voluntary social service and religious organizations on the Council assisted the immigration division in housing and social adjustment of women recruited from the British Isles as domestic workers.⁶

In post-World War II Canada, blacks from the Caribbean were decidedly in the vanguard of adverse struggles with the immigration department.⁷ It is reasonable that Caribbean blacks would play a leadership role, since they had been explicitly singled out for exclusion under the 1951 Immigration Act and restrictive Order-in-Council P.C. 2856. Directly affected, the minuscule community

of blacks from the Caribbean already in Canada lobbied for the entry of people from the British West Indies; as governments in the Caribbean approached the Canadians with proposals for a limited immigration scheme.

Immigration Department Interactions: Representations and Cooperation. The strong position voiced by the black immigrant community on the issue of legal entry to Canada in the 1950's was instrumental in the creation of the West Indies Domestic Scheme (WIDS). This seam in the restrictive immigration tradition led to the influx of a significant Caribbean mass to Canada by the 1970's. The rationale for early representations to the government were explained this way:

[In] response to the continual appeals of our brothers and sisters who were experiencing untold indignities and hardships occasioned by the wholesale rejection of their attempts to be legally admitted to Canada...our Association was born out of the heartaches, the pain and suffering of the Negro himself. If it is growing, it is growing because it is being watered by the tears of the suffering Negro, and it is being fed by the milk of human kindness of our white brethren, as evident here today.⁸

This explanation was given by the spokesperson for a 1954 delegation of twenty six black and white organizations during an audience with the Minister of Immigration.

The Presbytery of the Toronto Centre of the United Church of Canada is the first organization on record to send initial inquiries in 1952 about the exclusion on the basis color to the Citizenship and Immigration Department. In the same year a Negro Citizenship Committee, which later became the Negro Citizenship Association (NCA), sent a delegation of five people to introduce the organization and

discuss the detention and deportation of relatives of established West Indians in Canada and to offer their services in generally assisting Caribbean people. Four out of the five delegates had direct experience with their relatives being refused entry.

Sensing the persistence of the group, it was noted by the Chief of the Admissions Division in Toronto through an internal communique to the Director of Immigration in Ottawa that:

The main purpose of forwarding you this information is to forewarn you that undoubtedly there will be other Committees formed by this organization and they will no doubt seek audience with either the Director or Deputy Minister.⁹

Correctly perceived, follow-up letters, visits and briefs were presented by the NCA, with appeals to: amend the definition of "British subject" to include all citizens of the Commonwealth, allow the entry of West Indians with sufficient means to maintain him/herself until they secured employment; delete "orphan" from Regulation 21 which provides for entry of nephews and nieces; specify the terms "persons of exceptional merit"; and establish an Immigration office in the Caribbean.¹⁰

Advocate appeals in the 1950's were conventional in style and couched in the language of moral suasion. Citing atrocities in Europe under Hitler as compelling evidence in favor of their positions, advocates attempted to rebut climatic-, biological- and behavioral-based racist arguments for restrictive immigration from the Caribbean.¹¹ As a way of establishing their worthiness of equitable treatment, advocates representing disenfranchised groups often offered a litany of patriotic acts and track records of loyal service to the nation. Typical were letters of support by black mothers whose sons

had died in the Armed Services of the Crown. They were sent as proof of the type of demonstrated loyalty that could be expected of Caribbean immigrants. Other types of documentary evidence submitted were statistics showing the decline in black admissions between 1941 and 1951 because of blatant discrimination.¹²

A 1952 editorial, "Immigration by Discrimination" published in The Black Worker, the official organ of the Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters in the American Federation of Labor systematically responded to the racist illogic of adverse climatic conditions and the supposedly difficult social adaptation prohibiting black entries.

...Canada, in the main is not different in temperature from the northern, eastern and mid-western sections of the United States. In other words, it is as cold in New York, Boston and Chicago as it is in Canada...Yet, Negroes from the West Indies have been adapted and integrated into the community life of these metropolitan centers for over a half century...What about the largest single group of Negro workers in Canada, sleeping car porters on the Canadian Pacific, Canadian National and Northern Alberta Railways, most of whom come either from the West Indies or the southern part of the United States of America?¹³

The article also reminded officials that if adverse temperatures and topography were legitimate issues, then it would be difficult to explain the visible vitality in Canada of the 90 year old black explorer, Matt Henson, who accompanied the deceased, white Admiral Robert Perry to the North Pole.¹⁴

Resolutions in accordance with the NCA position were adopted and disseminated to various religious, trade union and community service organizations in small Caribbean communities in Ontario, Montreal, Vancouver and Manitoba.¹⁵ As a result, the department received a number of letters supporting the NCA resolution such as the Diocesan

Council for Social Service, Toronto and the Trades and Labor Council of the Canadian Pacific Railroad Division of the Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters.¹⁶ Support for the older Caribbean community position was not coincidental. It was directly related to the fact that the Caribbean community had active members in the churches, trade unions and service organizations in Canada who solicited the aid of these other affiliations.

Considered a highlight of the NCA was its delegation to Ottawa in 1954 to protest sections of the Immigration Act. With the support of prominent members of the community, church and labor groups, the delegation was made up of thirty-five black members of the Association and was supported by twenty-six organizations. A white labor representative from the Canadian Congress of Labour appeared with the group, the Canadian Pacific Railway provided sleeping car accommodations at no cost for the thirty-five members, and while in Ottawa, the YMCA and YWCA provided housing.¹⁷

With this type of internal pressure and the external demands of Caribbean governments the WIDS was launched in June 1955, permitting a very nominal amount of female immigrants from the Caribbean. Groups such as the NCA and the YWCA quickly volunteered to assist in the adaptation of these women to Canada.¹⁸ Immigration violations in the form of misinformation, misdirection and sexual harassment were common occurrences under conditions where unscrupulous immigration officers held much sway in final entry decisions. Instrumental in the social integration of new entrants, the NCA persistently requested more opportunities for detainees to consult with community organizations eager to assist in preparing newcomers for interviews with the

admitting officers and to ensure that proper information was conveyed. Eventually permission was granted for an NCA representative to be present when WIDS women were processed. The NCA monitored the treatment of Caribbean immigrants at the point of entry and advocated less power be given to immigration officers at the borders.

The work of the NCA is germane to this study because it was the official association welcoming women entering Canada under the WIDS in the 1950's. The NCA was sustained solely by membership fees (\$2.00), monthly dues (\$.50), occasional fund-raiser and later a building fund. The NCA's motto was "Dedicated to the promotion of a better Canadian Citizen." While several community-based organizations negotiated the legal channels for new immigrants, the NCA acted as employment placement agency and provided crucial social integration functions: locating churches, personal services, organizing supervised social gatherings, such as dinners and dances, for women working as domestics. This organization acted as their "extended family" in Canada and were involved in both professional and personal decision-making. So successful were these social attractions that the humble beginnings of the NCA in the back room of the dry cleaning establishment of its president necessitated the formal purchase of property by the NCA for activities related to the WIDS; accommodating the meeting and residential needs of women attempting to get a foothold in Canada.

Donavalon Centre, which operated from 1956 to 1962 at 20 Cecil Street, is a notable case in point. It was the site for informal gatherings, formal meetings, closely supervised residential living and weddings of women who began life in Canada under the WIDS, but remained

in touch after they moved outside of this work sector. This and other civic organizations in the black community greeted WIDS participants and the overwhelming majority of Caribbean entries who came outside of this specific quota arrangement. At this community center a newsletter was published and it acted as the site to receive formal government representations and members of the federal immigration department and Caribbean officials, university students, etc. Other established organizations where these women found comfort were the churches and the Home Services Centre, an organization catering to the needs of black armed services veterans.¹⁹

Despite the NCA's fairly smooth incorporation into the Canadian immigration system, officials were by no means "pushovers" for all groups making representations. Just as calculated risks were taken with the NCA services, the Immigration department remained cautious about outside intervention.

Immigration Department Reactions to Advocates: The Downside.

Offers of assistance from the advocate community of racial and religious organizations were received by the Canadian government, with caution. Even in response to an early NCA offer of assistance, the immigration department responded:

This branch of the Department of Labour together with the National Employment Service has had the responsibility for the reception and placement of some 25,000 immigrant domestics in the past eight years and it has been our experience that best results have been obtained by full responsibility for all matters relating to the employment and working conditions being left in the hands of the government department concerned.²⁰

The government established an early preference for non-interference from these protesting groups. Often interaction was unavoidable. In

matters that the government actors perceived they were less equipped to handle or did not wish to address such problems resulting from obvious racial differences, social contacts within specific cultural communities and climate, organizations were hand selected by the government. Typically, state-controlled agencies were tapped for these purposes.²¹

Although the NCA enjoyed a high profile with immigration officials, they did not represent the totality of advocacy for this early period. Groups displaying less working knowledge of current immigration regulations or representing different segments of the growing immigrant community also approached officials. Despite their constituency, ideology, structure or operating style, all organizations could cite specific infractions against recent black immigrants. However, the perceptions of the organization by the Immigration department dictated the kind of relationship that would develop. Therefore, the standard operating procedure for request for audiences regarding Caribbean immigration by the Canadian government was to hear cases, then scrutinize the background of individual advocates. For this purpose Immigration cooperated with other agencies and enlisted their own departmental representatives in Canada and the Caribbean for surveillance activities of identifiable individuals. The experience of the Canadian Association for the Advancement of Coloured People (CAACP), a black civic organization is instructive.

Formal interactions between Immigration and the CAACP were not as amicable as those with the NCA. The CAACP made an appeal on behalf of a woman who, while visiting Canada, sought admission under the sponsorable relatives category in order to care for an ailing aunt.

Refused as a non-admissible relative and on the grounds of lacking a desirable skill, this questionable case was used as an exemplary basis for exposing the inequitable application of the law for the Caribbean. A series of accusatory letters were exchanged between the two organizations. Despite the WIDS, in 1959 the CAACP challenged the still restrictive sponsorable relatives admissions from the Caribbean. Their Executive Secretary warned:

A wise government pays heed to the protests of its people, and a majority of the Canadian people appear to be supporting us with our contention that the Canadian Government is discriminating against people with dark skins.

Under these circumstances, this Association would like to know whether it is the intention of the Government to introduce a Bill of Rights, while denying equal opportunity to the Canadian Negro? Fully realizing that this Association must regard it as a mockery to our people (sic).²²

Judged as militant and unsavory by the Immigration department (based on the Executive Secretary's reputation as a philanderer with a generally questionable character and criminal background), the CAACP Executive Secretary was still invited to Ottawa for discussion with the Minister. The department had already dismissed the legitimacy of CAACP claims, evidenced by confidential internal correspondence on the organization's executive. The memo negatively states:

Our experience with Mr. _____ in immigration matters is that he is unpredictable and unreliable--making baseless charges against our officers and later withdrawn them with elaborate apologies and explanations. He has spoken in one way in the presence of news reporters and clients, and later in quite another way to departmental officials about the same matter.²³

With insights from other branches of the government, Immigration concluded:

Its about time someone put into the hands of the RCMP the various bits and pieces we have on _____, and they be asked to follow his activities from here on to see what they can put together.²⁴

The character of the leadership of the CAACP was not the only reason that surveillance was kept on such advocates. The Canadian government was quite sensitive to consultations between Caribbean people resident in Canada with officials from their country of origin, especially during the uncertain years of the West Indies Federation.²⁵ Anyone questioning the authority of the immigration officials were closely monitored by the government--including the NCA representatives.

When the Secretary of the NCA, Mr. _____, traveled to Barbados and Trinidad in 1959 and called on several Federal ministers, the Canadians arranged an ad hoc meeting with their Secretary of External Affairs in Port-of-Spain to uncover the basis for these meetings. In this instance, negative information about the West Indies Commissioner and the limited impact of Canada's official reception procedures were revealed. They found that, despite formal mechanisms for handling new immigrant problems, reliance on voluntary organizations for advising new immigrants of their rights in an unfavorable immigration situation was common. External Affairs reported to Ottawa:

[The] job of the Commissioner for the West Indies to make representation has fallen to Mr. _____, who has neither rank nor position to help him and must necessarily work for charity in these matters. He seems happy to be of service, but obviously one of the major points in his discussions with the Federal authorities will have been the excitement of a greater interest on the part of the Commissioner's office.²⁶

If community advocates did not volunteer their expertise many immigrant

needs would not be met. The state's reward to advocates for speaking out and unsolicited community service was blatant exposure of their private lives.

Although other community service organizations outside the Caribbean community, such as the YWCA were involved in the WIDS, most organizations did not question exploitative working conditions under which the women worked, nor the legal problems associated with institutional racism with a similar passion. Most of the energies for black or white, militant or conservative groups, were spent simply gaining access to the Canadian market during the early period. Therefore, cooperation between service organizations, religious groups, trade unions, etc. was an on-and-off affair; with no sustained trans-organizational activities. A vacuum in the efficacy of the immigrant community still seeking to get a foothold in the society would not be fulfilled until the 1970's when attempts were unsuccessfully made to defend, define and implement the newest immigration retrenchment for black immigrants--the guidelines of 1973.

From Advocacy to Social Movements. Activities in Canada in the 1970's and 1980's fit the classic conditions of social movements described in the social science literature. Canadian protests arose under identifiable objective conditions of increasing segmentation of the Canadian society publicly acknowledged by the 1971 declaration of Multiculturalism.²⁷ Social cleavages had been exacerbated since World War II with the increasing immigration of people from non-traditional geographical sources, marked by a predominance of women.

The social movements forged by protest advocates were reformist in nature to the extent that groups outside of the two charter groups (English and French) sought greater access to existing resources, privileges and power. Their objective was to replenish and enrich the society, not to reconstitute the nation from the ground up. Therefore, the objective conditions, the participants, their guiding ideology, strategies and mobilization are classic elements demarcating a reformist social movement.

By 1975 the WIDS was formally phased out. The termination of this 1955 agreement not only ended an era of government tolerance for admitting women suspected of having dependent children, it also permitted the prosecution of women discovered to have actually falsified their initial entry application. The announcement of the 1976 Immigration Act in 1975 forecast a series of repressions directed against all immigrants; systematic deportations began despite individual protestations. Although the law would take full effect in 1978, community organizations came together in the interest of domestic women workers being deported as a larger threat against the black community in 1977.

Deportation as the punishment for violating a code which had not been enforced by Canadian or Caribbean governments for twenty years of the program's operation was judged as severe and unusual punishment. These now disposable women had honored their commitment to domestic work, often beyond the one year requirement, become landed and were gainfully employed in other occupations. As a former immigration officer explained the pattern:

When times are good, we need immigrants. We may try to make them feel guilty or grateful, but we pack

them in, through loophole, amnesty, and "humanitarian measures." When times are bad, we suddenly become righteous and moralistic; we close the loopholes, stop more from coming and try to send back some of those who are here already.²⁸

This direct affront to the black community eventually led to challenging the racist and discriminatory authority of the Employment and Immigration Commission through both conventional means in the media and unconventional protests in two mass campaigns. What were the events that led up the 1981 policy on foreign domestic workers?

Active in the public debates over the new immigration bill, one editorial in the black community newspaper, Contrast summarized it this way:

There are thousands of people in Toronto today in whose hearts the mere mention of the world 'immigration' strikes a note of terror...Why do we have to tremble in fear and live in guilt and accept ourselves as less than human in order to avoid confrontation with a system that will always, no matter what our paper status, regard us as 'illegals', 'aliens', 'undesirables'?

Why do we immigrants, especially us "visible" ones, have to live with the uneasy feeling that we are guilty of some unnameable crime unless we can prove ourselves innocent by parading the most uncalled for and dehumanizing evidence before the Great and Good Canadian legal system? Why do we accept as generous gifts and privileges what others see as their rights and shower endless gratitude on those whom others see merely as people THEY elected to serve THEM?

Why do we continue to accept our position in this society as third class citizens and the abuses to which our people are subjected daily as unavoidable conditions of that once in a lifetime chance to live a better life as merely taking the bad with the good...²⁹.

Endorsing this criticism, The Toronto Caribbean Coalition Against the Immigration Bill was formed in May, 1977 with the expressed purpose of mobilizing the black community against this pending legislation.

Members of the coalition, spearheaded by the Black Education Project and the Caribbean Alliance Council and affiliated groups included individuals and groups from across the nation.³⁰

Events in Canada after 1976 suggest the responses of the state at different points in time also fit the classic literature on social movements. They ignored it, utilized repression and sought to coopt segments of the movement.³¹ The relevance of social movements literature is the subject of Chapters Seven and Eight. The next chapter focuses on the range of formally documented organized actions which emerged in response to new restrictions on the rights and privileges of foreign recruited labor in Canada after passage of the 1976 Immigration Act using organizations.

CHAPTER SIX - NOTES

¹Historically immigration advocacy has taken both conservative and critical forms. Advocacy which maintains the status quo was welcomed by the government if it encouraged "desirable" immigrants to come to Canada.

²Racial crises which struck Canada in the 1970's were initially treated as aberrations or the products of the proverbial "bad apples" (overzealous enforcement officials) spoiling the whole government "barrel"; not serious structural deficiencies. Under the British North America Act the provinces are given ultimate jurisdiction for education, municipal institutions, hospitals, charities, property and civil rights, administration of justice in the province and all matters of a local or private nature.

Canada, Office of the Minister of Employment and Immigration, "Integration of Immigrant/Migrant Women into the Canadian Labour Market." National Report of Canada to the Working Party on Migration and the Working Party on the Role of Women in the Economy, Organization of Economic Co-Operation and Development, May 1981. p. 36.

³field notes, November, 1985 during informational interviews with personnel at CEIC in Ottawa.

⁴Judith Ramirez, "Domestic Workers Organize," Canadian Women's Studies 4(2) (Winter 1982), p. 91.

⁵From time to time other Immigrant Societies have been formed under the Companies Act and registered with the Secretary of State. Correspondence. From: Department of Mines and Resources. To: Commissioner. Re: Immigration Aid Societies Act. Ottawa, October 28, 1948. 2 pages. RG 76/Volume 877, File 563-10.

⁶Council representatives included: Canadian Council of Agriculture, Canadian Council of Child Welfare, Canadian National Committee on Mental Hygiene, Canadian Red Cross Society, Canadian Legion of the British Empire Service League, Catholic Women's League, Federated Women's Institutes, I.O.D.E., National Council of Women, Social Service Council of Canada, Trades and Labour Congress of Canada, Women's Christian Temperance Union, Women's Missionary Society of the United Church, Women's Missionary Society of the Presbyterian Church and the Y.W.C.A.

Memorandum. From: Margaret Grier, Department of Labour. To: Mr. Arthur MacNamara. Re: Immigration of Women for Household Service. Ottawa, April 24, 1947. 5 pages. RG 27/Volume 278, File 1-26-3-1, Part 1.

⁷Women's advocacy groups were also formed at this time. Priority was given to workplace issues affecting women in the charter citizenship categories. The situation of immigrant women was seen as a moral issue because many entered as single, and therefore unprotected.

Problems facing this group were not analyzed as a defect in the laws governing their entry.

Two points of view exist on the role of immigrants in social reform and social policy enactment. Lynn Y. Weiner, From Working Girl to Working Mother: The Female Labor Force in the United States, 1820-1980, (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina, 1985). Weiner, in discussing the changing role of women in the workforce suggests that labor policy follows the dictates of native white women despite the fact that black, poor, and immigrant women have always worked and been in the workforce longer. Viviana A. Zelizer, Pricing the Priceless Child. The Changing Social Value of Children, (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1985). Zelizer, in writing about policies to protect children on the other hand suggests that social legislation affecting an entire population was initially implemented to protect immigrant children from the dangers of an expanding urban centers--also a moral issue. I am inclined to support Zelizer's position and would venture to say that immigrants were among the first to initiate adversarial relations with the government on the social impact of immigration policy in its brief history.

⁸Moore, Don Moore: An Autobiography, p. 108.

⁹Memo. From: Central District Superintendent, Toronto. Department of Citizenship and Immigration. To: Director of Immigration, Ottawa, Atten: Chief, Admissions Division. Re: Negro Citizenship Committee - Complaint re colour discrimination. June 21st, 1952. RG 76/Volume 830, File 552-1-644, Part 1.

¹⁰Correspondence. From: Donald W. Moore, Director, Negro Citizenship Association, Toronto. To: J. W. Pickersgill, Minister of Citizenship and Immigration. Re: Brief. July 10th, 1954. 5 pages. RG 76/Volume 830, File 552-1-644, Part 2.

¹¹As cited in Chapter 4, footnote 12, again, see Correspondence. From: C.E.S. Smith, Director. To: M.B. Palmer, Canadian Trade Commissioner, Kingston, Jamaica. Re: Reply to letter re immigrants from Jamaica. Ottawa, no date, 2 pages. RG 76/Volume 830, File 552-1-644, Part 1.

¹²Memo. From: Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, Private Secretary. To: The Deputy Minister. Re: Negro Citizenship Association of Toronto. Ottawa, April 27, 1954. 1 page. RG 26/Volume 123, File 3-32-24.

¹³Newsletter. "Immigration by Discrimination," The Black Worker. (Official Organ of the Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters). Affiliated with the American Federation of Labor. March 1952 4 pages. RG 26/Volume 123, File 3-32-24.

¹⁴Ibid

¹⁵Moore, Don Moore: An Autobiography, p. 105.

¹⁶Correspondence. From: Gordon G. Cushing, General Secretary-Treasurer. Trades and Labor Congress of Canada. To: E.S. Smith, Director of Immigration, Department of Citizenship and Immigration. Re: Resolution regarding coloured persons from Commonwealth countries. Ottawa, March 11, 1955, 2 pages. RG 76/Volume 830, File 552-1-644, Part 2.

Memo. From: M.C. Hoey, Private Secretary, Minister of Citizenship and Immigration. To: Deputy Minister. Re: Negro Citizenship Association. Ottawa, May 25, 1954. 1 page. RG 26/Volume 123, File 3-32-24.

¹⁷According to Don Moore the list of Toronto groups supporting the brief were the Toronto Universal Negro Improvement Association, Home Comfort Club, the Canadian Pacific Railway Division of the Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters, Road Roamers Division of the Canadian National Railways and the Toronto Negro Women's Club. The official delegation of 35 represented the Negro Citizenship Association, Toronto; Canadian Congress of Labour, Ottawa, Toronto and Lakeshore Labour Council; United Automobile, Aircraft, Agricultural Implement Workers of America, Local 439; Toronto United Negro Association; Negro Citizenship Association, Montreal, and Canadian Brotherhood of Railway Employees and other Transport Workers, Local 123. The list of supporters of the brief goes on. See Moore, Don Moore: An Autobiography, p. 105-108.

¹⁸Correspondence. From: Agnes Roy, Executive Director, Young Women's Christian Association to Canada. To: Mr. W. J. Pickersgill, Minister of Citizenship and Immigration. Re: BWI Domestics. Toronto, October 18, 1955. 1 page. RG 27/Volume 292, File 1-26-69-2, Part 1.

Correspondence. From: Donald W. Moore, Director, Negro Citizenship Association, Toronto. To: Milton F. Gregg, Minister of Labour. Re: Domestic Scheme. Toronto, September 26, 1955. 2 pages. RG 27/Volume 292, File 1-26-69-2, Part 1.

¹⁹Moore, Don Moore: An Autobiography, and Interviews: #6, #8, #14.

²⁰Correspondence. From: W.W. Dawson, Director, Department of Labour. To: Donald W. Moore, Negro Citizenship Association. Re: BWI Domestics. Ottawa, October 6, 1955. 3 pages. RG 27/Volume 292, File 1-26-69-2, Part 1.

²¹Such as Montreal's Negro Centre (officially affiliated with Welfare Federation). The Regional Coordinator of Women's Placement assessed black Caribbean entries this way:

West Indians, on their part, tend to hold aloof from the negro community, feeling rather superior to them...Social contacts tend therefore to be rather superficial and where rebuff occurs easily become ingrown. There are no negro churches in Montreal but coloured university students are welcomed at St. Georges' Church (Anglican) and coloured people in general at St. Judes (Anglican) and the Union United Church in the neighbourhood the Negro Community Centre. No information was available on other

denominations though an active pentecostal group (Holy Rollers) are known to exist.

Ibid.

²²Correspondence. From: Sydney A. Williams, Executive Secretary, Canadian Association for the Advancement of Coloured Peoples. To: Ellen L. Fairclough, M.P. Minister of Citizenship and Immigration. Re: Reply to letter of Sept. 30 Re: W.I. Immigration. October 26, 1959. 2 pages. RG 76/Volume 830, File 552-1-644, Part 3.

²³Confidential Correspondence. From: Ellen L. Fairclough. To: Howard C. Green, Q.C., P.C., M.P. Secretary of State for External Affairs. Re: Canadian Association for the Advancement of Coloured Peoples, Toronto, Ontario. Ottawa, October 10, 1961 2 pages. RG 26/Volume 124, File 3-33-6, Part 2.

²⁴Memorandum. From: George F. Davidson. To: Director of Immigration. Re: Sydney Williams. Ottawa, October 10, 1961. 1 page. RG 26/Volume 124, File 3-33-6, Part 2.

²⁵Restricted Numbered Letter. From: The Office of the Commissioner for Canada, Port of Spain, Trinidad, W.I. To: Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, Ottawa, Canada. Re: Policy-Immigration into Canada. January 9, 1959. 3 pages. RG 76/Volume 830, File 552-1-644, Part 3.

Confidential Correspondence. From: Laval Fortier. To: M.W. Sharp, Associate Deputy Minister, Department of Trade and Commerce. Re: Donald Moore, Director of the Negro Citizenship Association. Ottawa, August 23, 1956. 1 page. RG 26/Volume 124, File 33-6, Part 1.

²⁶Restricted Numbered Letter. From: The Office of the Commissioner for Canada, Port of Spain, Trinidad, W.I. To: Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, Ottawa, Canada. Re: Policy-Immigration into Canada. January 9, 1959. 3 pages. RG 76/Volume 830, File 552-1-644, Part 3.

²⁷The national policy of multiculturalism announced in 1971 was slow to trickle down to visible minorities. In immigration legislation is still unfolding in the process of negotiations. A Directorate of multiculturalism was placed under the Secretary of State in 1973 and handles social concerns of immigrant adjustment and adaptation.

²⁸Roy Blake, "Saying 'no' to the alien hordes," Saturday Night (July/August 1976), p. 47.

²⁹Contrast Newspaper, June 16, 1977: 9.

³⁰The International Committee Against Racism, Ad Hoc Committee Against Bill C-24, The Inter-Church Groups Working Committee on Immigration, The Coalition of Spanish-Speaking Groups, The Urban Alliance, The Toronto Labour Unions, CPL, Canadian Union of Postal Workers, East Indian Workers, Vancouver Status of Women, Jamaica Caribbean Association, Political Action Committee of the Steelworkers Local 1005 at Stelco (Hamilton), Committee to Stop the Deportation of

Black Mothers, Coalition to Save the Seven. See Contrast, June 16, 1977, p. 9-12.

³¹Piven and Cloward, Poor People's Movements.

CHAPTER SEVEN

Advocate Inter-organizational Relations and Conflicts: Mass Campaigns for Domestic Workers

Introduction. This chapter investigates events in the immigration policy transformation process between the 1950's and the 1980's, using instrumental immigrant community coalitions. The social implications of mass campaigns are apparent in community recognition, empowerment and self-determination of advocacy organizations. Advocate organizations act as one barometer by which societal impacts are measured because they are affected by their own work as much as the powerless group for whom they speak. Two groups, INCAR and INTERCEDE, are discussed in this chapter as cases in point of the affect of advocacy work on government policy and advocates themselves.

What makes alliances qualitatively different from organizations operating independently is reflected in the form and content of their division of labor, collective goals and objectives, and the use of political strategies. Relevant questions identifying the affects of the mass campaigns on advocacy organizations relate to the structure of the campaign, relationships within the coalition and inter-organizational conflicts.

Understanding the various types of community-based advocacy has implications for the empowerment of social change vanguards, general perspectives on alliances, self-efficacy and collective action. Two contemporary mass campaigns are discussed using three areas: (1)

dimensions of organizing: goals, objectives and strategies (Question 2); (2) how coalitions function in terms of the division of labor, communication networks and shared resources (Questions 7, 8, 17); and (3) resultant conflicts affecting coalition strategies, goals and agendas (Questions 16, 17).

In the 1950's the collective goal of immigrant advocacy organizations was gaining access to Canadian labor markets for more people from the Caribbean during a period where the prevailing atmosphere exuded a philosophy to "Keep Canada White." The standard operating procedures for addressing a social problem in the black immigrant community was to form an ad hoc committee.¹ Letter writing campaigns and sending delegations of community organizations to appeal to Immigration department officials were the collective strategies employed.

The Negro Citizenship Association (NCA) was the lead organization contacting other groups about irregular immigration department procedures. During the 1950's, churches were most influential in the community, although other groups active in the coalition included local trade unions and ethnic or cultural organizations. One community advocate who entered Canada under the WIDS in 1956 commented on the modest goal of the NCA. In describing the genesis of the WIDS she noted:

...trade and the presentation from [the NCA] lobbying...caused [women from the Caribbean] to go into, not computers, but to be domestic workers.² [emphasis added]

For nearly two decades hundreds of women entered Canada under the WIDS alone. Thousands were admitted from the Caribbean during what, in retrospect, is considered a less restrictive period of general immigration. Sudden immigration prohibitions precipitated the formation of ad hoc committees once again. By this time the Caribbean community had a number of immigrant organizations and sufficient memberships among organized segments of the labor force to form effective coalitions. By the mid-1970's, ad hoc coalitions were standard in this immigrant community. Two campaigns provide the background and social actors in a contemporary immigration-centered social movement in Canada.

Defining the Issues in Mass Campaigns

The 1970's represented a plethora of grassroots organizing within the New Immigrant³ community. Coalitions emerged representing a rapidly growing population working in a variety of occupations which extended beyond the traditional areas of service work. The confidence displayed by these newcomers in an era of rising expectations was suddenly jolted by changes in the immigration laws. The "Save the Seven" campaign reflected the convergence of political and legal battles and involved many civil rights organizations. Once admitted into Canada, New Immigrants sought to secure civil rights. Similarly, the "Good Enough to Work" movement sought to consolidate the victories of the previous campaigns.

Save the Seven. Withholding the right to landing, decline in civil safeguards for all immigrants and the increasing reliance on unprotected temporary workers were catalysts for protracted social

action, which culminated in the domestic-worker-centered mass campaign, "Save the Seven Mothers" between 1977-1979. The living and working conditions for foreign domestics became a public issue in 1977 when a number of women--both black and white--were ordered deported for falsification of entrance documents after an 18-month amnesty period to regularize the status of all immigrants was expired.

The 1977 campaign took concrete form when seven women, all of whom were from the Caribbean and landed citizens, collectively fought their deportation orders in unconventional public forums which garnered the attention of the mass media and public sentiment. While the "Save the Seven" campaign involved domestic workers to the extent that the targeted women entered Canada as domestic workers, none were employed as domestics at the time of deportation. All wished to stay in Canada and it was reported that the slogan "good enough to work, good enough to stay" began with these women.⁴ The "Save the Seven Mothers" campaign in 1977 galvanized wide community support for women who had entered Canada, performed domestic service, moved into other sectors of the economy and now wished to reunite their families by sending for their unlisted children left in the Caribbean.

Unlike early advocates who linked the right to enter to newly formed Canadian citizenship rights, the participants in the 1977 social movements were people most directly experiencing adverse conditions related to immigration, social differentiation and working conditions. A racialized ideology of the initial and subsequent social movements united this struggle. The ideology was borrowed from their recent colonial past sense of nationalism, understanding citizenship, etc. and awareness of what the Canadian creed entailed. Targets of the initial

attacks were the government and employers. The labor sector was quite secondary because discrimination was found throughout the system. Black women were the victims; the immigration department and private employers the culprits for racial and gender discrimination.

In addition to the specific cases of selected black foreign domestic workers whose plight was well publicized, coalesced groups made explicit the pervasiveness of the problem beyond this particular labor category and geographical regions:

We...hear of the sending back of whole planeloads of passengers especially those originating from Latin America and the Caribbean. It is common knowledge that many of the officers at the airport see the major part of their job as turning back or deporting Third World visitors...More than 90 per cent of black West Indians who visit Canada are sent back on the next available flight.⁵

A 1977 Toronto Star editorial brought a feminist perspective to the situation as it suggested that the new enforcement in the deportation of Caribbean women was discriminatory on the basis of sex as well as origin:

A man cannot be ordered deported for leaving behind children born out of wedlock. The immigration authorities picked up these women and each was ordered to be deported after an inquiry. They found themselves lawyers (and not under the tax-supported legal aid) and launched appeals to the Immigration Appeal Board. Deportation was upheld.

...the federal court would not treat women of different skins, men of the same color or single women the same...Clearly, the federal authorities have deliberately chosen to discriminate against them, on the grounds of color, sex, marital status, country of origin, and even motherhood.⁶

One prominent newspaper article questioned the suspicious nature of decisions to deport these women when it learned in 1979 that:

The Immigration Department ... ordered deported only 26 of 80 women who didn't list their children. On

what arbitrary basis did the department decide to deport these women? Unmarried men are never deported for not listing their children.

Immigrants were experiencing a decline in their social conditions through loss of long term rights within Canada and in the labor market. Advocates dispelled myths leading to guilt about the New Immigrant presence in Canada and educated the public on the 1976 Immigration Act, its ramifications and the rights of those in the immigrant community. Identification of themselves as victims and the Immigration Department and employers as the perpetrators was easy and mobilization was possible through appeals to their identification as Canadian citizens who are visible minorities, women, or workers.

By July 1979 all seven women involved were allowed to remain in Canada and their landed status was restored. After over two years of protests most of these women shunned the limelight and sought to recapture a modicum of privacy in their personal lives. Most did not pursue public life or leadership roles in domestic organizations. It is speculated that follow-up of these women is difficult mostly because they had enough public exposure in the protracted anti-deportation campaigns and, more importantly, they were no longer domestic workers. While some segments of the immigrant advocacy community turned their attention to other community concerns, others persisted in the struggle to secure the status of foreign domestic workers.

Like the black vanguard role in the 1950's, in the 1980's, domestic worker issues were kept alive primarily by women--both immigrant and charter citizens (English and French-Canadians), who sought to consolidate the victories of the protracted deportation cases. The advocates in the 1980's came from trade unions, feminist groups

organizing around the issue of housework and most importantly, cultural workers and immigrant services specialists, armed with various agendas, strategies and differing needs for formal recognition by the government.

Good Enough to Work. The "Good Enough to Work, Good Enough to Stay" campaign in 1979 was an outgrowth of the "Save the Seven" crusade. This was a preventive measure to avoid the perils of the deportation process while pressuring the government to modify the criteria for landing. It differed from the earlier anti-deportation campaign with the emphasis now focused on the nature of domestic service itself.

The interface of the structure of housework with immigration laws brought this social movement to the attention of the government. The campaign was characterized by discontinuous social action centered around issues of equity for all Caribbean immigrants. This campaign represented a classic social movement because it had identifiable leaders, members, goals, strategies and stages of activities.⁸ It was discontinuous to the extent that within the Toronto community activism around women threatened with deportation took place both within existing organizations and, more importantly, new organizations were formed because of the converging issues of immigration status, worker category and domestics' working conditions. Throughout the movement period the basic issues were crystallized, government and private employers were identified as targets and indicted as co-conspirators in the exploitation of domestic workers. Organizers and supporters changed several times and a classic movement became institutionalized.

The fact that this campaign was largely organized by women signified the difference in the two movements born in 1977 and 1979. The thrust of the landing campaign remained a legal one as attempts were made to mesh employment standards (domestic work) with immigration status (temporary immigrant). The Temporary Employment Authorization Program of 1973 was assessed as a "revolving door of exploitation" which met the hefty demand for live-in domestic work in Canada at the lowest possible cost to both employers and the government.⁹ Federal laws governing the entry and landing of women were critical to the conditions of work in private households. Therefore, federal legislation related to immigration were the initial targets of advocacy activity and provide continuity across historical periods. Although provincial legislation responsible for labor standards and the private employers of domestic workers later became targets of the social movement, the focus of this study is not on provincial standards. Local regulations obscure distinctions related to immigrant status in preference for occupational variations. Stressing the continuing need for advocacy groups and the necessity of organizing immigrant workers, Arnopoulos suggested in 1979:

Immigrants are more worried about their status in Canada than their labour rights and are not inclined to take any risks...Every newcomer knows someone who has had a knock at the door by an Immigration Officer and has eventually been deported. Many are plagued by the fear that they may inadvertently do something forbidden by Immigration and that they too will be whisked away.¹⁰

Between 1979 and 1981 various organizations were successful in getting concessions from the government for landing rights on the condition that temporary workers attempt to upgrade themselves during

the three years of mandatory employment as domestics.

Campaign Lead Organizations

Facilitating cooperation and setting allied groups agendas on behalf of domestic workers were ongoing activities since the 1950's in Canada. The 1977-1979 "Save the Seven" and the 1979-1981 "Good Enough to Work..." campaigns operated within this tradition, however, the leadership, cause celebre and organizational strategy shifted for each. Question 2 helps get at these distinguishing issues, because it asks about the: Organization of the Campaign? How did it start? Who were directly involved? Organization, leadership, members and the division of labor? Several participating organizations were active throughout the thirty year period.

Written and oral evaluations of the campaigns by participants indicate the extent of inter-organizational relations and conflicts. Who are these people and who do they represent?

Despite the fact that a range of individuals and organizations participated in these two mass campaigns, the available data indicates that there were identifiable "lead" organizations within coalitions¹¹ (see Table 6). Sometimes they were spontaneously created, such as the NCA; deliberately organized like INTERCEDE; or subsumed under an existing structure such as INCAR. All were bonafide organizations, except they functioned in tandem with other associations. By focusing on the lead organizations in mass campaigns, interactions are observable and the evolution and transformation of individual groups are noticeable. Two organizations, INCAR and INTERCEDE, allow behind-the-scenes inspections.

TABLE 6

**Mass Campaign Lead Organizations:
1950's to 1980's**

CAMPAIGN PERIOD	THEME	LEAD COALITION*
1950	Anti- "Keep Canada White" Anti-Immigration Restrictions	Negro Citizenship Association (NCA)
1977- 1979	"Save the Seven" Anti-Immigration Deportation Campaign	International Committee Against Racism (INCAR)
1979- 1981	"Good Enough to Work, Good Enough to Stay" Pro-Temporary Worker Landing	International Coalition to End Domestic Exploitation (INTERCEDE)

***List based on personal interviews conducted in Toronto
in 1986.**

INCAR. The leadership of the 1977-1979 activities expanded to include, not only the traditional seats of power in the black community found in the churches and fraternal organizations, more grassroots, community-based approaches. Organizations such as the International Committee Against Racism (INCAR) had been active in Canada since 1974 with the sole objective to struggle against racism and racist governmental policies and institutions. Immigration policies were viewed as the vehicle for perpetuating distrust against racial minorities. Interestingly enough, initially they were reluctant to take up the issue of deportation; leaving the burden for organizing the protest to black civic and community organizations. Once deportations were defined as a political issue plaguing the immigrant community, INCAR got involved.¹² It was one of the first umbrella groups to provide the infrastructure for these activities.

An issue-oriented group, INCAR's goal was to eradicate racial discrimination by raising public consciousness.

...issues of racism...not so much individual bigotry, but systematized institutional discrimination. ["Save the Seven"] certainly spoke to those concerns because it seemed to be a form of mistreatment which had government sanction.¹³

Using direct confrontation tactics, INCAR concentrated on informing minority communities and trade unions about the plight of the seven women, requesting their support in writing letters, passing resolutions, donating funds, sending messages to the government and participating in highly organized demonstrations. Even progressive provincial and federal politicians were tapped for support.¹⁴ The targets for organizing were deliberately selected:

We knew people who were concerned about issues such as racism...For example, Local 1005 of the Steelworkers has always taken an interest in these type of issues. Its a very progressive union local. The same union locals with progressive reputations, we were able to have more success with. So definitely we concentrated on those and...we also had a scattershot approach.¹⁵

Later, civil rights groups, the Canadian Civil Liberties Association, the Law Union, the Immigrant Lawyers Association, etc. coalesced around the issue, once victories had been all but guaranteed based on the work of grassroots community organizations.¹⁶ The campaign was broad-based and represented many organizations, had great media attention and grew from the ground up.

Court action became focal points around which organizations galvanized. One law firm's philosophy make it especially suited for this campaign. From their perspective, the law was to be used for the liberation of black people. They were prepared for this struggle because the firm constantly focused on three things:

One is getting immigrant people to get to live in this country; which includes making applications and coming into Canada to live and reunifying with their families, getting their families here and so forth...The next would be keeping the police and the authorities off their backs in one way or the other. And then the third would be trying to help people get upward mobility in their situations...¹⁷

Consistent with a grassroots approach, the victims of government policies played pivotal roles in the campaign; especially the presence of the seven women in the campaign. One immigration lawyer suggested that convincing the women that there was no need for shame and a public fight was necessary because the campaign could not succeed as a "faceless situation."¹⁸ Intensity and singleness of purpose

characterized the participation of advocates who held weekly and thrice weekly strategy meetings in the homes of women facing deportation. While making the women an integral part of the struggle was often done for legitimacy, one activist noted a deliberate philosophy was to avoid having the women appear as "victims." An important part of advocacy included the testimony of women confronted with harsh experiences of coming to Canada, cleaning floors, and facing deportation. One community activist stated:

Yes, we spearhead things, and we're there to coordinate, but you also in that advocacy give power and give room for people to speak.¹¹⁹

An integral part of encouraging women to speak involved having trusted members of their community involved in the campaign in addition to the traditional seats of political power in unions and churches. Government assistance programs often neglected Caribbean immigrants, making self-help agencies within the immigrant community the norm. The need for organizations to address domestic worker issues arose when it was realized by black mental health workers that:

people...call the black organizations when their social worker comes across a [black] girl who has a problem.²⁰

To qualify for government funding, it was important that local community services had to be open to the public. Just as facilities were organized for assisting people with adjustment problems, other services, such as tax assistance, citizenship classes were also organized. A long-term immigrant community advocate explained it this way:

It must not be perceived that you're only serving your own people...You use the underground railroad...Citizenship classes were open...I visited

quite a number of other community group to see what they were doing, how they were succeeding.²¹

Immigrant community services were a part of the network of agencies tapped when problems arose--Universal African Improvement Association, Home Services Organization, the Jamaican-Canadian Association, Black Resources and Information Center, Immigrant Women Center, Working Women, Jane and Finch Legal Counsel, Parkdale Legal Clinic, Jane Corridor Immigrant Service--were all a part of the network of referrals.

Some people wouldn't demonstrate, but they would do other things such as answering the telephone or socializing or make different programs for the domestics.²²

Some agencies offered drop-in centers to domestics at different points in time. They provided counseling services and opportunities for domestics to learn typing and sewing skills on their days off and mediated problems with employers.²³

The coalitions of the late 1970's were loose and people used existing organizations to facilitate the goal of the campaign to inform the community. Seminal work on interracial cooperation had begun during these years. Falling directly on the heels of these events were coalition activities, which prompted the creation of formal organizations specifically for foreign domestic workers.

The 1979-1981 "Good Enough to Work..." campaign differed from the previous campaign in its narrowed focus. The goal of this organization was to become a type of union or broker for foreign domestic workers with the government; and to get landed status for domestic workers. It capitalized on the theretofore silenced category²⁴ of domestic

workers whose presence and predicament was made obvious by the "Save the Seven" campaign.

INTERCEDE. By 1979 the plight of foreign domestic women in particular and the tenuous status of all immigrants was well known. At that time a number of domestic worker organizations and quasi unions were born, such as: International Coalition to End Domestic Exploitation (INTERCEDE), Labour Rights for Domestic Servants (LRDS) and others formed in the Toronto area and, because of the national attention given the deportation cases, had their counterparts in Montreal, Ottawa and Vancouver.²⁵

In an effort to take action, INTERCEDE organized.

Finally we had a workshop at Ryerson Polytechnical Institute...all about work and Third World women, both in Canada and the Third World. And we decided to set up an organization whose specific objective it would be to work on the issues of domestic workers rights, because there was no such thing at that time.²⁶

This umbrella organization attempted to bring together all people considered natural allies of domestic workers: feminists, social action groups, the YWCA, Home Mission Division of the United Church of Canada, churches, World Congress for Peace and Justice, all immigrant services groups, the Arab community, the Immigrant Women's Center and councils established by the government:

We...got a small grant from a coalition of churches to set up shop. For six months, we had a grant to knock on everybody's door in the community and say, 'Look, this is what we want to do, this is the way we propose to do it, would you like to endorse our work and be a member.' So, that's how we got all these groups to join. We went out and recruited everybody.²⁷

Since a critical component of advocacy work was informing the community in order to solicit support for their positions, activists in coalitions valued the broad appeal to otherwise isolated segments of the community. Moreover, broad-based activism had been a distinguishing feature of immigrant-oriented coalitions in contemporary Canada.²⁸ The lack of a consolidated, physically identifiable black community in Toronto necessitated networking within a wider context of New Immigration.

The lead organization of the "Good Enough to Work" campaign was INTERCEDE. Not created in a vacuum, INTERCEDE began as a community coalition in 1979 and continued its activities into the 1980's. It was the brainchild conceived out of two organizations, the Immigrant Women's Job Placement Centre, a front-line community service group, and the Committee to Advance the Status of Housework (CASH), a public education group. Although each organization worked with women, the Immigrant Women's Job Placement Centre had a track record of involvement with immigrant women and had participated in the "Save the Seven" campaign. Each organization pursued issues related to remuneration and working conditions for women involved in the wage and non-wage devalued reproduction tasks of housework.

At its zenith the INTERCEDE coalition boasted of an organizational membership of fifty.²⁹ The purpose of INTERCEDE was to combat immigration policy which prevented protection under the law and for the right of domestic workers to settle in Canada permanently.³⁰ Between 1979 to 1981, INTERCEDE changed from a coalition of community groups for domestic workers' rights to an organization of domestic workers with community support.³¹

INTERCEDE, formed by a core of strategically located women in immigrant service agencies and feminist organizations, had frequent interactions with immigrant women working as domestics.³² Through this interaction they came to understand the miserable working conditions and the unfair treatment leveled against these workers by Immigration officials and employers. Labor laws did not cover domestics and so both provincial and federal governments immigration and work policies were targeted. Initial meetings were with expert immigrant lawyers, then the Minister of Immigration. Initially their organizing strategy was to present academic briefs to government outlining abuses and recommendations for change.

Largely informed about the issue through other community workers in touch with domestic workers within the Caribbean and Filipino community, one community advocate admitted:

...it took us at least six months before domestic workers began to come to our meetings. We felt all along that unless some community people who were not in domestic work started to stand up...and build a public voice and a point of reference for domestic workers' rights, that the women probably wouldn't come forward. It was just too dangerous and too risky and they lived in constant fear...that if they stepped out of line their employers would just pick up the phone and tell Immigration they didn't want them there, and they'd be shipped back home.³³

Once domestic workers attended meetings, the grassroots side of the organizing began. They supplemented research and lobbying activities of the federal task force with petitions, letter-writing campaigns and demonstrations.³⁴ The strategy for informing the community was to use existing organizations and attend captive community audiences at local events:

That's where groups like the Ad Hoc Committee of the Filipino Domestic Workers came in. They went to

every conceivable event in the Filipino community, every picnic, every dance, every church, retreat with masses of petitions and get everybody to sign them. And their community newspapers would write about their efforts...

The West Indian community was less organized. But there was a lot of support for our work in the press...So that community was also well informed even though they didn't have a parallel structure like the Ad Hoc Committee... 35

As domestic workers came forward in significant large numbers, the character of the organization changed and an individual membership structure were added to accommodate domestics who did not belong to an organization among the alliance of organizations. The collective leadership was a more professional, many whom hold university degrees as lawyers, social works or showcased a long track record in social service agencies, group. Domestics on its "Board of Directors," were part and parcel of its corporate image. The structure of the steering committee reflected this change ensuring that domestics always held a majority of seats, purportedly making domestics and allies a partnership.³⁶ Professionalization continued with this group as items like contracts and procedures of due process were introduced.

INTERCEDE further narrowed its focus to domestic workers who were in Canada as temporary workers. Their first agenda item was to secure landing rights for temporary workers who were disproportionately from the Caribbean and the Philippines. INTERCEDE followed up the landing issue by pressing for counselling services to improve the chances of women passing the landing examination by showing applicants the ropes on securing landing. Women were encouraged to join voluntary organizations, and donate their spare time to charities and hospitals. This could be used as evidence of their integration into the local

community and as an employability advantage when experience for paid work was required. Advocates also encouraged women to take classes to upgrade their skills and open savings accounts. The women were also counselled to include in their record of savings any remittances sent back to the Caribbean.

Finally, the need for contracts for both employers and domestic workers was demanded by advocates. Reluctant to make this concession, the Immigration Department claimed that in clear cases of violation of employment agreements, it did not have the authority to require employers to live up to contracts, making their enforcement in private homes virtually impossible ³⁷. No semblance of a monitoring system existed before the mass campaign in the public or private sector regarding domestics' working conditions, wages or abuses, leaving most domestics unaware of their rights.³⁸ INTERCEDE assessed this void in this way:

We suspect the truth of this argument to be that the government would rather not "interfere" in a private household...Our belief is that while the "sanctity of the household" is the ideal, the sanctioning of exploitation is the reality.³⁹

Various advocacy organizations endorsed the work of INTERCEDE because it represented a systematized action for domestics and allied segments of the immigrant community. One old guard activist stated:

When you see a white person take an interest in the lowly domestic, its worthwhile..its very gratifying to know that at least you have a white person helping to better your condition. I appreciate that.⁴⁰

How was this success in gaining such a foothold in the black Caribbean community possible?

Organizing Through Community Networks. The resources shared by members of the coalitions existed in the form finances, professional expertise, and access to services through advocates strategically located in existing agencies. In response to Question 17 - Were there services and resources contributed to the campaign by your organization? What type and were fees assessed? - one advocate in the "Good Enough to Work..." campaign said about the participants:

All contributed people, money and services. For example, if we had to run off a flyer, one of the groups would either have to do it in their office, or somebody had to run to the local xerox shop on their lunch hour...we would at the next meeting say, 'All right we have to take a collection because we have a \$50 dollar xeroxing bill that so-and-so ran up.' Or somebody would just spend \$100 dollars on telephone calls...and we would ask groups to make a donation or if need be, those of us on the Steering Committee would just put the money in the hat.

...We got to be very good at it...soliciting all kinds of help from groups. Because we had no budget...we had to do⁴¹ it without funding. You become very creative.

Immigration lawyers offered the most obvious expertise, and typically donated their services. One lawyer active in the "Save the Seven" campaign answered Question 17 on fees this way:

Yeah, I charged the women a fee. I think I charged them \$5,000 dollars among them; or \$6,000 dollars, a thousand dollars each. But they didn't have any money⁴² So I sent out the bill, but I never got paid.

A symbiotic relationship existed between members of the immigrant community informed about internal networks and experienced organizers. This was reflected in the responses to Question 7 on communications and Question 8 on internal relationships of the campaigns. Advocates sought the expertise of community organization networks to spread the

word about issues in the campaigns. One way of spreading the word was by targeting immigrant communities and individuals for support. An artist donated his talent by designing a popular poster for this purpose:

It was designed rather effectively with black and white and had a larger number 7 across it. It said: "Save the" at the top. It was difficult to get away from the poster. People had plastered them up along St. Clair, which is essentially an immigrant neighborhood. Its a Portuguese, West Indian and Italian immigrant neighborhood. So you see a long line of 7s. It was quite eye-catching.⁴³

Most formal advocate organizations had boards of directors and there was overlapping members from these coalitions. A significant group of domestic worker advocates were linked into a loose network by the end of the 1970's. Coalitions benefited from these types of networks, but such coordination did not always run smoothly. Funding often limited the type of assistance that agencies could offer. In those cases, referrals were or assistance given "unofficially" by people strategically placed in agencies serving the immigrant community.⁴⁴

Advocacy often lacked an observable plan of action. Normally as the volume of domestics visiting a community organization increased, the more effectively organized became services for domestic workers. Community agencies juggled their desire for professionalism and credentials with indispensable direct knowledge of the community and organizing skills. One immigrant community advocate noted:

I got the job because I had contributed a lot to the organization. I was doing a lot of community work; I had the experience. But there were people who were saying that they wanted people with a degree.⁴⁵

Another immigrant community advocate who had worked as an immigration officer and was a latecomer to the "Good Enough to Work..." campaign, was convinced of his superior qualifications over the women organizing the campaign. Neither the degree nor community experience matched his trade union organizing:

I'm a professional. I've been a union person...I was national vice-president of the Public Service Life, Canada, which is the public servants union. I've always been involved...So, I'm well qualified with my knowledge of government services, my knowledge of the attitudes of government people; how they think and act. I'm a negotiator with experience. I've represented for 20 years in the union.⁴⁶

Another community activist spoke about members' reactions to their organization offering a range of social activities and training services to domestics. Immigrants well established in Canada disparagingly asked: "Well, what are we getting out of it?" While not a majority opinion nor successful in preventing these activities, this attitude tarnished the spirit of such service projects.⁴⁷

When questioned about being prepared for the issues in the campaign (Question 18), one immigrant lawyer responded:

We had been thinking all kinds of ways...well these women cannot go, we have to find places for them, we have to hide them. All these kinds of things, just trying to figure out just what's to be done. So eventually what happened was we said...'Over our dead bodies, would these women go.'⁴⁸

Analyzing the same question on the organization's preparedness for the "Save the Seven" campaign, an immigrant community advocate revealed:

I don't think it was a matter of being prepared. I think the issues present themselves. My experience within the black community, both here and I lived in England as well, they are issues that organizations do not prepare themselves for, but you wake up one morning and the problem is there!...There was no organized effort at the initial stage of the

program, but people just came in the organization and had a need which the organization tried to accommodate and fulfill.⁴⁹

Just as cooperation was exceptionally good in the "Save the Seven" campaign, there was noticeable competition evidenced within the "Good Enough to Work..." campaign. Both cooperation and competition held implications for how the campaigns ultimately affected individual organizations.

Impact on Community Organizations: Conflicts and Contradictions of INTERCEDE. By 1983-84 when INTERCEDE wrote its first annual report the objectives of the organization were much more ambitious and concrete than during its formative years. Their activities switched from straight lobbying to delivering services to its membership and conducting research for briefs to the government. These activities are not unrelated to the recommendations made to the government to improve the situation for foreign domestics. The posture that INTERCEDE adopted meshed perfectly with recommendations likely to be accepted by the government as forecast in government briefs.

Evidence of conflicts among advocates was most apparent in the 1979-1981 "Good Enough to Work..." campaign. That action experienced the rise and decline of a specific movement which culminated in differential rewards for certain organizers. By the 1980's, INTERCEDE displayed at least two incompatible purposes as a lobbying organization challenging governmental practices and as a new government financed service agency filling the special needs of new immigrants as sanctioned by the government. Conflicts were evident as confrontations between INTERCEDE also challenged the appropriateness of certain

aspects of the laws governing women entering under this work arrangement.

Conformity, was the dominant tradition as women rallied to form organizations of domestic workers to improve conditions of the work and also educate women on how to meet criteria for eventual landing in Canada. This was a calculated and deliberate political decision as INTERCEDE fought to dodge objectives that were too narrow and simultaneously avoid obsolescence.

The government sought the least conciliatory positions, therefore, agencies such as INTERCEDE worked to gain legitimacy and power by adapting itself to quickly changing interpretations of the policy. INTERCEDE readily accommodated itself to the government's plan of action--it formulated the major recommendations which the government subsequently adopted. Therefore, INTERCEDE was successful to the extent that it could get a hearing with government representatives when other advocacy groups could not.⁵⁰ However, the price for this decision was loss of credibility in the immigrant community, despite active recruitment efforts and accolades by the government and the media.

A waning cooperative spirit was evinced by a immigrant community advocate instrumental in starting INTERCEDE:

I've seen organizations whose work or whose objectives were good come to grief because of problems internally, along racial lines or along sexual lines. In our case, we're 99 percent female, so there wasn't that issue. But there have been issues that are either racial or along class line. Women who are from middle class backgrounds who take certain skills for granted and women who are from a more working-class background...

I remember one woman, a domestic worker, heard me make a speech once and she came up to me and said 'I

would like to speak exactly like that.' She expressed such admiration for it and then, about a month or two later she had turned completely against me...What I think happened there was she really felt that she had been cheated. That I had certain advantages and had been able to develop certain skills; I have a university degree. I agree with her.⁵¹

Apparently segments of the black community supported the coalitions in principal, while simultaneously working through its own agencies operative prior to the inception of INTERCEDE. What are the factors that lead to this situation?

On the downside of cooperation members invariably had turf fights, tactical differences, and suspicions about hidden political agendas and personal ambitions. Most conflicts had internal and external consequences and surfaced among advocates when asked about being prepared for issues (Question 18).

By and large INTERCEDE accepted the fact that black women would enter Canada as domestics, to the extent that it provided a form of viable incorporation into a more lucrative labor market decidedly discriminatory against the unskilled. The fact that women often remained in these servile roles were tolerated as hazards accompanying an optimal number of work options. Domestic worker advocates spoke on behalf of these women and when possible promoted the empowerment of these women, using their voices to reveal the hardships of domestic work and the cruelty of the legal system. So there was high visibility of domestic workers in this social movement; although no formal mechanisms existed to bring these domestics into the organization in a self-sustaining way.⁵²

It was clear that the balance of power for monitoring foreign domestic worker programs lie with community agencies which deal with the women all the time.⁵³ Perceived ambitions among the leadership of INTERCEDE eventually led to attempts to maneuver control of one government-funded agency. When members of this organization fought against this merger, clear battle lines were drawn.⁵⁴ A major point of contention were the questionable tactics used by INTERCEDE:

Some of the Canadians go down to the Caribbean, tape the women, brought the tapes back and wanted to use it. So that was the beginning of a breakdown of many of the groups that had originally been involved...its ironic, they did help the women, but at the same time they were using the women.⁵⁵

So when accusations that INTERCEDE members used Caribbean women as cannon fodder on the frontline of the domestic worker struggle for self-aggrandizement, the organization was forced to defend itself. Organized opposition in the black community attempted to shed light on INTERCEDE's unusual tactics. Two grievances were that INTERCEDE-sponsored demonstrations did not have a wide enough base in the community and black domestic workers were in particular jeopardy by publicly protesting because the laws were disproportionately stacked against them.

By its own admission, INTERCEDE's major constituency were domestics from the Caribbean and United Kingdom nannies.⁵⁶ Eventually immigrant community advocates became more and more leery of hidden agendas and the personal ambitions of some advocates. This negative reality ignited contempt in advocates whose lives were bound up with these issues:

I guess in that way I've become extremely cynical. That I want to know more about why you're organizing. What is the basis of your organizing

when you say you want to help domestic workers or you want to help immigrants or help women, like where are you coming from and what's the basis for that?⁵⁷

INTERCEDE, with the support of the Filipino community responded:

If its true that the black women are more vulnerable than everybody because of racism, its also true that we have to fight that. The appeal for the rally is not going only to the black community, its going to everybody.

We had invited groups from every conceivable nook and cranny of the immigrant service sector, the feminist community, the trade unions, the churches. We simply explained because they were either misinformed or malicious.⁵⁸

This situation raises the persistent question of factionalism and the tenuousness of alliances between exploited foreign domestics from the Caribbean and the Philippines. While no open conflict was described between these two racial minorities within INTERCEDE a predictable undercurrent based on competition and perceived differences in treatment between Caribbean and Filipino domestics existed. Neither of the participating groups were homogeneous in their thinking nor actions, but on balance INTERCEDE held the support of the Filipino community despite some members overzealous posture and actions toward Caribbean members. It is important to note that the bulk of the domestics from the Philippines arrived under the universal immigration admission criteria where landing was not automatically considered.

Perhaps the best insight into the reality of fragile alliances was when one of the newest immigrant community advocates, who emerged when INTERCEDE once again split into competing fragments by 1985 for government funding, suggested:

...this is a burn out situation...you get people who get involved, _____ is one who stayed with it because she's being paid of course, but usually

you'll find that they get involved for a year or two, then somebody else takes over. There's that natural turnover. Like me, I came into it over the last year.⁵⁹

Once suspicions and accusations surrounded the lead organization in the "Good Enough to Work..." campaign, various paths were pursued by different segments. Officially, INTERCEDE moved ahead, soliciting government funding and starting a service unit; domestics waffled between this agency and other domestic worker service units.

About the disintegration of the coalition, one community advocate described it this way:

I think the people from the black community undertook an advocacy role individually...Because we're all so burnt out, we just couldn't do it in a group. So many of us have taken on individual cases.⁶⁰

Social Inequality: Integrative and Divisive Effects. New Immigrants to Canada were instrumental in defining problems facing the community; advocates contributed logistical skills for resolving these issues. Two community-based campaigns reflect the conflicts and consequences to the immigrant community. The impact on organizations and communities are observed through organizational features, such as the division of labor, collective goals and political strategies.

The ideology that initially bound the group together was their race-consciousness, their devalued status as immigrants, and knowledge of Canadian ideals. This was later extended to incorporate issues of inequality based on sex and gender. Issues of race and gender were compounded further by economic disparities between regions and nations; all of which occurred on the heels of debates about citizenship, self-government and political independence in the Caribbean. The new

social actors in Canada and island governments in the Caribbean formed alliances and engineered campaigns with slogans against racism, sexism, imperialism and occupational exploitation. These delicate issues were also the fine thread that eventually unraveled these tenuous unions.

A major finding of this chapter is recognizing the wide range of social actors formally involved in campaigns centered around restrictive immigration policy. Each mass campaign had lead organizations, INCAR and INTERCEDE. The first was a racially based direct confrontation coalition; the second was organized chiefly by women and used coalition-based political lobbying as a major technique. Existing sequentially, both understood and combatted the government's complicity in the exploitation of domestic workers. Each used traditional and non-traditional seats of community power found in churches, fraternal organizations, cultural societies and trade unions.

The impact of the campaigns on various immigration policies were as significant as their social effects on segments of the immigrant community. Differential rewards accrued to advocates from legitimating units in the government. The greatest advantages of coalitions lie in effective community education on an issue and sharing a range of resources.

Perhaps the most obvious, but least discussed analytically are advocates strategically located in voluntary and occupational positions used to service the immigrant community. Like newly emerging nations within the Caribbean had done decades before, strategically located individuals in Canada sought the most mileage from their access to power and resources for the larger community. Chapter Eight details

several dimensions of coalition work which have implications for understanding hidden advocacy.

CHAPTER SEVEN - NOTES

¹With the exception of Marcus Garvey's organization, creating ongoing organizations in Canada that dealt with problems of racial discrimination, immigration matters, or blocked mobility was rare.

²Interview #8.

³See Chapter 1, footnote 9 for explanation of "New Immigrant." Roy S. Bryce-Laporte and Delores M. Mortimer, Caribbean Immigration to the United States, Washington, D.C.: Research Institute on Immigration and Ethnic Studies, Smithsonian Institute, 1976.

⁴Interview #1.

⁵Contrast, June 16, 1977 p. 10.

⁶The Toronto Star, March 12, 1978: A13

⁷"Nationwide Struggle against racist deportation", Contrast, September 6, 1979.

⁸Lauer, Social Movements and Social Change.

⁹Ramirez, "Good Enough to Stay."

¹⁰Arnopoulous, "Problems of Immigrant Women in the Canadian Labour Force."

¹¹Table 6 outlines broad generalizations about specific immigration-related mass campaigns. There are lots of groups that were not "officially" listed as participants who none the less played supporting roles in these campaigns. This distinction between participants and supporters proved to be a prickly point of contention in the "Good Enough to Work Campaign..." Organizations such as INTERCEDE were accused of using names of organizations who supported specific actions as constituting its organizational memberships. Individuals strategically located, rather than general organizational memberships were pivotal to the success of hidden advocacy discussed in Chapter 8.

¹²Interview #1; INCAR, The Case Against the S.I.O., p. 7.

¹³Interview #10.

¹⁴Interview #10.

¹⁵Interview #10.

¹⁶Interview #1.

¹⁷Interview #1.

¹⁸Interview #1.

¹⁹Interview #4.

²⁰Interview 12.

²¹Interview #12.

²²Interview #9.

²³Interview #9.

²⁴See Silvera's Silenced pp. 18-19 which addresses the process of being silenced. "...their silence is the result of a society which uses power and powerlessness as weapons to include non-white poor people from any real decision-making and participation.

²⁵The Canadian women in trade union literature is the best source of this information.

²⁶Interview #2.

²⁷Interview #2.

²⁸INTERCEDE and Ottawa-Carleton Immigrant Services Organization. "The Status of Domestic Workers in Ontario: An Update of the Recommendations Presented to the Government of Ontario in December 1980." May 1981.

³⁰INTERCEDE Speech. INTERCEDE Rally, Sunday, November 22, 1981.

³¹Ramirez, "Good Enough to Stay," p. 16.

³²Ibid

³³According to a community advocate active in the "Good Enough to Work..." campaign:
it drew people that were highly motivated; either feminist who felt strongly about the exploitation of women who were in the domestic field, or Third World women who felt strongly about the exploitation of other Third World women, or social action groups...People were very motivated and very focused. It made everything relatively smooth (Interview #2).

³⁴Interview #2.

³⁵Interview #2.

³⁶Interview #2.

³⁷Interview #2.

³⁸INTERCEDE, Association of Filipino Patriots, Labour Advocacy and Research Association, Montreal Household Workers' Association. "The Status of Domestic Workers on Temporary Employment Authorization: Recommendations for Change." A Brief to the Immigration Task Force on Practices and Procedures. January 1981; Immigrant and Visible Minority Women. Brief. For Minister, Employment and Immigration. June 3, 1985, 21 pages.

³⁹Legally binding employment contracts signed by both employers and domestics specifying the terms of employment (wages, hours of work, benefits, length of employment) were victories for domestics only in 1983.

⁴⁰Interview #5.

⁴¹The precedent for broad-based immigration coalitions had been set since the 1960's with the question of Canadian pluralism as a bicultural model, representing Anglican and French Canadian origins. What has been referred to as the "Third Force" in Canada is a reference to non-charter groups who desire recognition and enfranchisement in the political life of Canada. Largely eastern and southern European ethnics entering in the early twentieth century, they are distinct from Third World immigrants, prevalent after World War II (Hawkins, Canada and Immigration.)

⁴²Interview #2.

⁴³Interview #1; There is evidence from the lawyer's records that one woman hired a lawyer in order to avoid paying the initial lawyer's fee. It was assumed that there would be no charge since the client was encouraged to pursue the case, for political reasons. (Fieldnotes, June, 1985.)

⁴⁴Interview #10.

⁴⁵Interview #3; Interview 9.

⁴⁶Interview #3.

⁴⁷Interview #7.

⁴⁸Interview #9.

⁴⁹Interview #1.

⁵⁰Interview #9.

⁵¹Other advocate community briefs such as Equality Now!, which stressed the need for rapidly implementing policies which accommodate a multicultural and multiracial society where community advocates would play an influential role were tabled in the House of Commons March 28, 1984 and implementation of the recommendations has been piecemeal and dilatory (see Canada. House of Commons. "Response of the Government to

'Equality Now!'" March 28, 1984. As a good faith effort a pilot project for improving the immigrant's situation was proposed. It had two phases:

(i) to educate local ethnic communities about the exploitation which has occurred in the past and about which potential immigrants should be warned; and (ii) to develop expertise within such communities by providing actual instruction in immigration law, procedures and practices, which would, in turn, be made available to immigrants on a volunteer basis (INTERCEDE, Annual Report, 1983/84 lists five major objectives that parrot the stated priorities of the government.

⁵²Interview #2.

⁵³Briskin and Yanz, Union Sisters.

⁵⁴Interview #3.

⁵⁵Interview #3.

⁵⁶Interview #3.

⁵⁷Interview #2.

⁵⁸Interview #4.

⁵⁹Interview #2.

⁶⁰Interview #7.

⁶¹Interview #3.

CHAPTER EIGHT

Evaluating the Outcomes of Two Mass Campaigns: Varying Visions of Success by Domestic Workers, Advocates and the State

Introduction. In this chapter the reactions of advocates participating in the mass campaigns for foreign domestic workers are discussed and the conflicts and contradictions of coalitions are highlighted. Immigration-based community struggles throughout the 1970's and 1980's sent legal and social tremors throughout the Canadian social structure. Federal and provincial governments redressed immigrant grievances through formal legislation. Social reverberations from both legal machinations and repressive immigration practices were evident in the formation of alliances across racial, gender and occupational lines. Most activists recall deportation cases and landing demonstrations with passion, revealing a layer in the dynamic of social change seldom highlighted in the policy process. The campaigns touched people not only at the national and local levels, but quite personally as well.

Activists speak about the toll of the campaigns on various organizations that they represent and on their political and private lives. All concede the fundamental political, economic and social problems of domestic workers are not yet solved. Most continue their involvement in general "brush fires" affecting segments of the immigrant community; and some complain that a "burn-out" syndrome is rampant in this effective but small advocate community. Others have

become cynical about socially divergent alliances, but more common are philosophical reflections about advocacy in general.

Having reviewed the nature of coalition-based campaigns in the previous chapter, it is important to reflect on the real and perceived outcomes of these actions for their significance in the development of the New Immigrant communities in Canada. Participants in the campaigns evaluate the movement based on knowledge of the intended and unintended consequences of their fights. Measuring the "success" of community-based collective action is difficult because there are competing definitions of success.

The category of advocacy is important in accounting for the variation in evaluations of the mass campaigns. This research reveals that the typical profile of advocates interviewed generally fall into four basic categories:

(1) Old Guard/Garveyites - reputational leaders comprised of people resident in Canada before 1950's who were in the front line of black immigration battles in the 1950's over entry and initial civil rights inclusion; (2) Immigration Lawyers - these were formally trained, legal representatives for immigrants faced with deportation, problems of landing, reuniting families, etc.; (3) Immigrant Community Workers - includes both paid and voluntary service sector workers located in parastatal community agencies serving immigrant communities. Such agencies were often the first point of contact when immigrants attempted to formally negotiate problems or integrate themselves into the larger society; and (4) Politicized Domestic Workers - these women worked as domestic servants and were also involved in domestic worker

organizations.¹ They were informed about domestic worker issues, the laws that constricted their activities and agencies tailored to their needs and foreign workers in Canada.

The variation in responses by advocate category (Old Guard, Immigrant Lawyers, Immigrant Community Services Workers, Activists Domestics) is most apparent when evaluations of the impact of collective action on four dimensions of their outcomes are outlined: (1) gauging success: the legal and social measures; (2) empowerment of immigrant domestic workers, (3) hidden advocacy: the impact of advocacy work on activists themselves; and (4) the role of the state in immigration policy change. An approach to gauging the success of coalition-based collective action introduces the discussion of these dimensions.

Evaluation of the Mass Campaigns.

This section explores both the general perceptions of the impact of collective action and its effects on specific segments of the movements as two distinct elements of Proposition B. Most advocates viewed the domestic workers issue as a recurring problem.² Questions and answers based on the interview guide are linked with each analytical section.

Gauging the Success of the Campaign. Success in transforming public policy exists in varying degrees and may be viewed as a continuum of activists' evaluations. In assessing the responses to "What did the campaign accomplish?" (Question 3) several factors are considered concerning the source, definition and measurement of "success." Placement on the success continuum was a function of the

convergence of these three definitions.

The success of a movement depends on the category of actors questioned. Although all participants acknowledged a coalescence of protest cutting across many organizations, each was rather parochial in the recollection of events, vis-a-vis their own organizational affiliation. So, even an organization like INTERCEDE, which received much publicity throughout Toronto and across Canada and often singularly credited with organizing the "Good Enough to Work..." campaign, was viewed as just one more participating organization by other groups in the coalition. The usefulness of using a continuum of success is further substantiated when definitions of success are discussed.

In judging the success of the campaign legal, policy and social objectives were considered. For most respondents both the specific political objectives of the movement (halting deportations or demanding a more liberal landing policy) and the social impact of the campaign on the larger society beyond the category of domestic work, were crucial dimensions for measuring success above and beyond changes in the law. Typically, the legal and policy changes which resulted from the campaigns were touted as concrete victories. Blocking the deportations in the 1977-1979 "Save the Seven" campaign was a concrete victory:

...[I]t was the first win that we ever had when the judge said, "I'm going to reserve this judgment and deliberate it at a later time." If he reserves his judgment, he hasn't given his judgment. We know at least that the expulsions will be postponed. So that was the first indication of any, any success. Just that reserving the thing was a big victory. We went out and we had a celebration, really.³

Similarly a community worker in the "Good Enough to Work..." campaign of 1981 listed several clear measures of success: the chance to become landed, implementing contracts, the right to change employers, the right to use services of Canada Employment Centers, educational upgrading, etc:

...[T]he problem has been before they've landed, you know, they didn't used to have access to anything. Since the 1981 policy change, these things...have finally become part of what they're entitled to while working in Canada on a temporary basis.⁴

Even perceptions of more indirect measures of success in the campaign for the community in general included boosting the community's self-efficacy:

I think one of the important gains for immigrant and visible minority women generally all over Canada was the message that you can take on the government on a policy which is widely disliked by the people who it affects and actually win something...And when the policy change came about in '81, I think it gave a lot of other groups the sense that you could fight and win, rather than just wish you had something and wish things would change.⁵

Similar sentiments were reinforced by an immigrant lawyer who spoke about it in terms of raising consciousness:

I think that the campaigns like have an affect on the community of making people think about racism and think about the position of immigrants. My recollection of the campaign is that we had nothing more than steady support...People felt that there was a basic unfairness.⁶

The lawyer continues his global praise of the action in suggesting the movement was:

helpful in bringing minority communities [together] and having them understand each others problems...at least East Indian community was given a better understanding of immigration problems faced by West Indians because they face similar problems themselves.⁷

The lawyer discussed only one dimension of success; and only in terms of the campaign versus the government. Internal discord was missing.

Not all community activists agreed on this general sense of empowerment of the people. In describing the leadership of the "Good Enough to Work..." campaign one immigrant service worker speaks about the limitations of victories:

...[T]hose same people just sort of give you just enough, you know? Just a nibble; they seem to have the ability to give you just a nibble and to make you think you've gained the world. And its not so.⁸

Placing some responsibility on members of the immigrant community, there is a tendency for people to distance themselves from this targeted population, one community worker stated:

...for the black population I would say that they realized there was a tremendous struggle...Even the landed people, who were permanent residents...felt they had a hard time, but when they read the story of these foreign domestics, they realized...the struggle was even worse than they thought. And some of them, not too many of them became volunteers. Not too many.⁹

The pattern of quiet incorporation of Caribbean immigrants had been set from the early days of the WIDS when landing was automatic after one year's service as a domestic worker. One immigrant community advocate who entered as a domestic worker talked about the innocuous route to early entry into the Canadian market using the WIDS:

...after the year you did not have any struggle or any fight or anything...Some people went to university...Many went on to school, many went on as the struggle started..[professional women entering as domestic workers were] not going to do no fighting.¹⁰

So community-consciousness about domestic workers was raised to varying degrees, with a notable and significant amount of internal resistance

to aiding devalued immigrants slandered by the stigma of the falsification of documents.

Of the four categories of advocates, the immigrant lawyers and old guard appear to be the most unequivocal in their evaluation of the success of the movement for policy change. Despite varied strategies, they depict the struggles as legal battles for which there were some measurable resolution. Whereby the old guard worked on attitudinal issues, the lawyers used legal, not moral suasion in affecting change. The objectives of the social movement were different for the two groups. Lawyers focused on legal victories; the old guard emphasized issues of social adjustment and integration.

Since the old guard's major contribution was assisting in the settlement and social adjustment of new comers, by this standard, they would not readily characterize the activities of 1977-1981 as domestic-oriented service organizations. The old guard activists deemed their activities successful because previously excluded groups entered, fulfilling labor needs and awakening the moral conscious of the nation. The old guard was not enthusiastic about subsequent activities centered around domestic workers, who in their estimation had little appreciation for current origins of earlier struggles to bring domestics and nurses to Canada. Relevant is the statement of one old guard activist:

They don't know that was through the instrumentality of that little group that laid the foundation...Mr. _____ he often tells me, he goes into the hospital and he sees a black nurse, and he asks her, "You know _____? She says, "Who's _____?" "How did you get here?" "Well, I just applied and I came in as a nurse." It just happened.¹¹

The social dimension of the domestic worker problem was evaluated with much more variation in the degree of success. Community workers and activist domestics were prone to qualify their evaluation of "success" of the campaign.¹² Conceding improvements in the legal status of foreign domestics, they were also quick to point out that social conditions and gaining a sense of belonging in Canadian society had not occurred. As suggested by one community worker, the first order of business was to help the women effectively live with, not change, the policy.

Consequences which arise from the intersection of race, gender, occupation and legal status are epitomized by foreign domestics in Canada. One of the most convincing measures of the efficacy of the campaigns between 1977-1981 was their direct impact on the lives of these women. Answers to questions about this targeted group constitutes the next section.

The points of contention for both campaigns centered around foreign domestics' tenuous legal and social status in Canada. Advocates attempted to secure the legal status of foreign domestic workers and empower this group to act on its own behalf. Although most viewed the issues confronting foreign domestics as illustrative of larger social problems endemic in the Canadian society, success was usually measured in relationship to the specifics of the campaigns.

Campaigns' Empowerment of Domestic Workers. The "Save the Seven" and "Good Enough to Work..." campaigns had two separate and distinct impacts on the lives of foreign domestics. The affects of the 1977-79 "Save the Seven" campaign was the most indirect in that the women around whom the coalition defensively formed were not domestic workers

at the time of the campaign. All seven women had entered Canada as domestic workers and subsequently moved out of this occupation. So, the category of domestic work became relevant only to the extent that all seven in the campaign and many others already deported from Canada had entered under special domestic quotas.

Therefore, the concrete victory of stopping the deportations were not victories for domestic workers in general. One respondent answered the question "Were there issues left unsettled?" in this way:

...women at the time who did not have lawyers, who probably couldn't afford a lawyer, who were affected by this new [policy]...but did not come forward. So they were not included in this victory. ¹³

What the action did highlight for all members of the immigrant community was the need for changes in the law, for protective domestic worker organizations during the legal transition, a new level of consciousness about the plight of domestic workers (vis-a-vis legal status and working conditions) and a genuine sense of empowerment by community people organized to aid and abet vulnerable members. Many of these issues were taken up by the "Good Enough To Work..." campaign.

In contrast to the "Save the Seven" campaign, the "Good Enough to Work..." campaign (1979-1981) was more narrowly focused on domestic workers coming from the Third World who disproportionately experienced difficulty meeting the official criteria for landing. Growing out of the general concerns raised by the "Save the Seven" campaign, participants overlapped. However, the igniting force for the "Good Enough to Work..." campaign came from within the loose coalition of immigrant community activists; not action initiated by domestics in response to the long arm of the government as in the "Save the Seven"

campaign. Moreover, it existed as a project led primarily by women, most of whom were not domestics and as a continuation of protracted and persistent immigration battles which focused on specific policies.

Their mandate came from observing the significance of foreign women to Canada's domestic worker supply. Assessed as an ongoing labor need, the objective of the "Good Enough to Work..." campaign was to acquire rights for these new workers. The social needs of foreign domestic workers were subordinated to legal efforts; complicating the range of opinions about the campaigns' success.

In response to "What did the campaign accomplish in the lives of foreign domestics?" (Question 3), the social impact of the movements are emphasized. Three additional questions help gauge the success of campaign objectives: Were there negative outcomes for domestics? Were there issues left unsettled? (Question 4); If you could list specific needs of domestics today, what would you include? (Question 5); and Besides domestic work itself, what other factors contribute to problems of immigrant domestics? (Question 6).

Where advocate support for these women was evident a sense of empowerment and demonstrable leadership skills existed. Though some advocates were skeptical about the viability of independent domestic worker organizations or unions, women were active in existing community organizations.¹⁴ Seeking not to build on a foundation of domestic servants as "victims", advocates encouraged the women to speak for themselves. One lawyer recalled that when possible, the threatened women were integrated into the advocate organizational structure:

We would always try to make them chairpeople of the meeting in order to develop them...We used to go to their homes and take them around with us all the time on speaking engagements.¹⁵

They spoke about their own experiences and reclaimed power they probably had not exercised before. One immigrant community activist stated:

Yes, we spearheaded things, and we're there to coordinate, but you also in that advocacy give power and give room for people to speak.¹⁶

This sense of empowerment carried over into the "Good Enough to Work..." campaign where empowerment was a vital element of organizing. One advocate noted:

We spent an awful lot of time in what we call the community meetings, where domestic workers and community advocates would together try to hammer out what we stood for.¹⁷

An example of this was the 1981 announcement of the change in policy affecting temporary foreign domestic workers, and groups involved in the coalition wished to generate a formal response. During this collaboration the fleshing out of issues was a protracted process, with advocates actually formulating the representative statements:

...repeatedly issues would come up from the floor. And domestic workers would say, well we want this and that and the other. And then the lawyers would say, but you can't ask for that because the government will never go for it. And then one of us would stand up and say, 'Well, we can't base our position only on what we think the government is going to go for. If the women want this, then we'd better figure out some way that we can incorporate it in our position.'¹⁸

Domestic workers wanted options. The ability to ask for options--to stay in the country or in domestic work or upgrade and leave it--were empowering victories which emerged from the "Good Enough to Work..." campaign. It was in this instance that the government openly acknowledged two types of domestics--career domestic workers and

temporary domestic workers seeking access to the Canadian labor market--providing distinct career choices related to upgrading and assessment criteria.¹⁹

Unavoidable were some negative consequences for domestics who had participated in the campaigns (Question 4). Domestics who were directly involved suffered emotionally from the toll of the campaign. Once concrete legal triumphs were achieved, the women left the glare of the media's spotlight and often the sponsoring organization. One community worker explained the loss of contact after the "Save the Seven" campaign:

I think a number of them were just tired of it, burnt out and just wanted to rest. So I didn't after the campaign have any kind of continuing contact. People just wanted to [take a break].²⁰

Other negative consequences of the campaigns were that some issues were left unsettled--illegals were not helped by either campaign; areas of discretion in interpreting the policy were not clarified; and real and perceived benefits accrued as much to advocates as they did to domestics. The next section discusses the interface of individual biographies with collective action on behalf of domestic workers.

Hidden Advocacy: Impact on Public and Private Lives of Advocates.

People who identify with the plight of domestic workers and act to eradicate it are real people with private lives, jobs, commitments to human service and visions of an improved quality of life for newcomers to Canada. These actors should be understood both in terms of their individual identities and their collective, organizational profiles.²¹ Organizational or agency-based action is a key feature of advocacy traditionally hidden from observers of classical collective

action and social change analyst alike. Hidden advocacy involves assisting individuals negotiating the system by going above and beyond responsibilities listed in a position description. More often than not such agility on the job also usually results in a liberal use of organizational or agency resources.

Some advocates learned about the problems of foreign domestics and got involved because of their community networks and track records of experience in voluntary advocacy capacities. Others became involved as a function of their paid occupations in human service work.

Three issues are isolated for attention: (1) How the individual became involved in the campaign? (Question 1); (2) Reactions to their participation from both inside and outside of the movement (Question 9) This was reflected generally in their professional roles, advocacy capacity or personal lives; and (3) Real and perceived benefits and consequences associated with advocacy work (Question 12 and Question 13).

Predictable economic, social and political community service agencies geared to immigrants were fertile ground for producing advocates for foreign domestic workers. One old guard activist born in Barbados and having entered Canada in 1913 was instrumental in the 1950's in getting women from the Caribbean accepted as domestic workers in Canada. He was a founding member of Canada's Marcus Garvey inspired Universal Negro Improvement Association (UNIA) and owner of a cleaning and pressing business which served as a gathering place for ad hoc discussions of social issues. Word soon spread of the inequitable treatment of black people at the borders seeking to enter Canada. This old guard advocate described his initiation into this issue in this

way:

See we had black cabs at the airport. They would come in and shoot their mouths about 'Someone come up last night and wouldn't let you through.' I became interested in that respect...If they were held, I would go and interview them and see what could be done.²²

As a result he established an ongoing relationship with the Immigration department which spanned three decades. He stated in 1986:

I just wrote a letter to the Minister of Immigration thanking him for the decisions he made in problems that I've had to put before him. I am happy that those [WIDS] girls turned out wonderful.²³

Employment-related exposure to the problem of foreign domestic workers is particularly relevant for understanding the notion of hidden advocacy. A small number of advocates also approached advocacy work for domestics quite indirectly, as fortuitous converts to an existing movement. Of the fourteen interviews, only eight had direct recall of the 1977-1981 campaigns. People from the Caribbean had been an expected part of the domestic service workers throughout the 1960's and 1970's. As such several Caribbean immigrant organizations set up services to meet the needs of this group. A community advocate from Guyana who entered Canada in 1965 described the services of several Caribbean organizations:

We had what we called a drop-in center for domestics at 355 College Street, where the domestics would come on their day off...We would have typewriters there, they'd learn to type. We had several sewing machines that some girls would occupy their time. And we also went on trips with them. And if they had any problems with the employers, we would get into the act of mediating between the employer or even finding new employment.²⁴

Similarly a lawyer of Guyanese parentage born in Trinidad, came to Canada in 1955 and practiced law since the 1960's:

I got involved because professionally I do immigration law and I do other kinds of law too, like police repression--anything having to do with black people's lives. One of the biggest struggles we've had is just to come and live in this country.²⁵

When the immigration policy changed in 1976, a simple legal procedure to adjust individual cases of women wishing to bring children not listed on initial entry documents to Canada became a political one. Analyzed as a deliberate and blatant attack on the black immigrant community, some of these cases were fought through the Immigration Appeal Board and then through the federal court.²⁶ A second lawyer got his advocacy experience as a student, political organizer and paralegal training in the same law firm during the 1977-1979 period. There this second lawyer, who was white, formed and developed his legal interest in human rights issues and racism.

The domestic worker struggle was only one of many fought involving black, East Indian and other minority communities.²⁷ Two immigrant services community advocates were instrumental in setting up an interracial domestic worker organization aimed at the federal government and focused on the conditions and policies governing domestic work active in the 1979-1981 "Good Enough to Work..." campaign. One community activist from Bermuda had been in Canada since the 1950's and had work experience in Vancouver, Hamilton and Toronto. She worked as a counselor during the 1977-1981 campaigns in a federally funded immigrant service unit, which paralleled services in the black immigrant community:

When we were first organized we were funded to serve the Chinese, West Indian, Spanish and Italian communities. Now we serve just about anyone...We have an Armenian counselor and an East Indian counselor and some of the counselors speak other

languages and will serve anyone...We try not to turn anyone away.²⁸

Immigrant service organizations, community development specialist and feminist organizations converged to combat issues. In the course of their work they were constantly informed about the domestic worker issue. Many of these advocates were white ethnics from Eastern Europe. Relatedly, one immigrant community services interviewee was of Italian descent.

There were also people who did not have a history of this kind of community work. Based on personal circumstances and a deep compassion for the women, they joined a movement already in progress. Notable was the budding journalist turned immigrant community advocate by the 1977-1979 "Save the Seven" campaign. She was swayed by the power of testimony given by the women facing imminent deportations at rallies and demonstrations. Attempting to explain away the accusation that she was too biased in her reporting, she talked about her roots in Jamaica and offered this about the women's testimony:

It seemed to have brought back a lot of memories to me. In fact you know my grandmother and her friends were domestic workers. And just coming to my grandmother's house and talking about doing domestic work and the kind of problems they went through...came back to me during that.²⁹

Forced to take a stand on the domestic worker issue:

...at one point I decided, to hell with what these people are saying, what my editor is saying, like I going to go and get involved [sic], if they don't want me to do the stories, well I won't do the stories, but I'm going to become actively involved in this struggle and demonstrate and I will abstain from writing articles.³⁰

Likewise a retired, white immigration officer became involved in the 1979-1981 "Good Enough to Work..." campaign because his new wife from

the Philippines who entered as a domestic and had become a politicized domestic active in a domestic worker organization predominated by women from the Philippines:

I've talked with the ladies, I've gotten to know them, I talk to them at their meetings, all the things I'm telling you about, about their feelings and that, I've learned from this very close contact with them, with them expressing their feelings.³¹

Reactions to advocates' participation from both inside and outside of the movement signal areas of greatest latitude for observing behavior.

In general the trends were relevant to the notion of hidden advocacy, most people got involved because the agency or business for whom they worked was approached about the problem. Having already attracted media attention, the campaign was usually covered by women on staff of various newspapers. The two lawyers became active in the 1977-1979 campaign because the law firm for which they worked was approached by several of the women seeking legal counsel. Two immigrant community activists became involved as part of their active role in counseling and in the women's movement in the immigrant community. Others were approached because of their track records of leadership in progressive causes affecting the black and immigrant community.

The views of people outside the movement ranged from tacit approval, to suspicion, to confusion and open indignation about the activities of advocates on behalf of devalued foreign domestics. One immigrant community advocate suggested that the reaction to his advocacy work in general is that:

My involvement, as seen by the community, I think is a necessary involvement by most people...You have to understand that everybody does not like this militancy and this approach of opposing anything

that is wrong. So, there's always pressure from these black people who work within the system to say, "Well look, you're not doing it the right way..." But I think the broad sector of the black community is supportive of any positive action, such as saying what is wrong when it is wrong³²

Some of the old guard activists even got the stamp of approval from the opposition, the Immigration department. The Minister of Immigration eventually told one advocate active since the 1950's:

"...When you come here I know that you have this matter in your heart. When some two cent lawyer comes in here to represent some people and telling me and directing me what I have to do and that I shouldn't do with and the other, it doesn't go very easy."³³

A similar example is evidenced by an advocate instrumental in spearheading the "Good Enough to Work..." campaign:

...people in government and in decision-making positions...Their orientation is much more to track record. They look back over the last ten years of work and they've seen or they know about the organizations that I helped to develop and the battles that have been fought...that gives my work some strength...The fact that they know me or know of me in connection with various other initiatives, means its not coming from nowhere.³³

On the downside, the influential old guard advocate hinted at the suspicion from within the community surrounding the work:

Some people might think, oh he just sat there. Some people who come to me to assist with direction seem to think that I knew somebody in the Immigration Department and I was slipping them something under the table.³⁵

Suspicion as a debilitating reaction was discussed at length by a white immigrant community advocate:

...When you have a public role, you almost automatically come up at certain points with resentment and jealousy. I experienced it and some of the domestic workers who emerged as spokespeople experienced it.

You have to learn to discriminate between a critic who wants to help you advance your work and between one who wants to destroy it. If you come up against somebody who really wants to only tear down the work you've done, you have to be very careful not to fall for provocation and not get involved in battles that are going to go nowhere; that are being generated just for the sake of conflict.

I've come to view that as an occupational hazard...you have to learn to deal with people who wish you ill. Because they will always be there and the more successful you become, the more people will emerge who either want to take over what you're doing or just cut you down to size.³⁶

Another immigrant services community activist who participated in both the "Save the Seven" and the "Good Enough to Work..." campaigns explained that when opposition to the work comes from within your natural support system, the rigors of advocacy work becomes even more taxing:

...generally people who weren't involved just saw you as a raving crazy person...I remember my own mother saying, "Why do you always have to choose these issues, right? Why all these depressing things?" She said that, but it was the opinion also of a lot of people, they just saw you generally...as a crazy person, radical and that the government must have had...a good reason for wanting to deport women. Because, after all, this is the government.³⁷

It is one thing for people to question your motives and bases for legitimacy, but quite another to have your job or professional credentials threatened. Because the nature of advocacy in the 1950's was a very oblique and understated endeavor, hidden advocacy, the use of your place of employment or the protection of trade unions to shield advocacy activity was a hallmark of the 1950's.³⁸ Employers who objected to the goals of the social movements would attempt to use the

leverage of controlling advocates' economic livelihood to temper this behavior.

Returning from a precedent setting audience with the Immigration Minister in Ottawa in 1951, working overtime in order to accompany this black delegation, one old guard activist who hailed from Jamaica and had resided in Canada since 1911 was sent for by his superior. The supervisor commented, "I see you went to Ottawa to change the government policy, you can't do that." The old guard gave this scathing reply:

Let me tell you something...I respect you very highly...but I wish you didn't mentor...Anytime it affects my people, black people, I'll be there; anytime, [even] if you cut my neck off. And you had no right to say that.

He['s] getting out of bounds...I told him that. I said, "I didn't take anything. I worked Sunday all day and I told the platform agent, who was my boss, while you were away that I'd be doing this."³⁹

During the 1977-1979 "Save the Seven" campaign, one lawyer whose strategy it was to take each deportation case to the federal courts was threatened by a federal court judge:

"...you keep bringing these cases, they're all similar, you know our position on it, and you keep bringing them back here. I'm going to impose cost on you, the cost of the case on you personally."⁴⁰

Faced with the possibility of extra fees, these immigrant lawyers also fought to keep their most effective weapons, their law credentials:

[B]ecause of the kind of work we do, we've always been looked at through slant eyes from those people in the Law Society. In fact in 1978, even before the campaign was completed, we were facing disbarment. They said we were unfairly trying to get clients by popularizing ourselves. In fact the women rallied around us very well.

They call it touting...But you see, the kind of work that we do, we necessarily have to be high profile. Because we try...we lose in court, and we take impossible cases that we know are just and right, so we use our legal skills as persons who are pamphlet writers and agitators in the community do...So people know who we are and for that reason, some people don't like us.⁴¹

Despite the range of negative reactions to advocate's work, most agreed that the personal benefits of the work far exceed the negative consequences. One old guard advocate corrected a reporter for a local paper as she interviewed him she observed, "You've done a lot for your people." The old guard's rejoinder was: "No, no, no, you've got it wrong, I've done a lot for Canada."⁴² No matter how long the track records in advocacy work, most learned something new each time about the issue and the contradictions within the process of organizing. Benefits from and negative consequences from organizing were discussed in terms of ideological or moral lessons. One activist speaks with irritation about accusations made by others about motives:

I've gotten very tired...running from one meeting with the Minister to this conference, trying to convince people to back you and to give them a vivid sense of the urgency; and then you're running off to a press conference, and you go home and you drop dead and you don't even have time to make love. If at a moment like that you also start hearing the people who are criticizing you and saying that, "Oh, you're always trying to grab headlines, and this and that," its a little bit demoralizing.⁴³

Lawyers readily admit that the campaigns gave them greater insights into the law and the interconnection between legal and political advocacy.⁴⁴ Likewise, for the journalist turned activist:

After this experience, I had a purpose for writing...I knew this was a political tool...a way of bringing information to people. This was a way of making a certain position known...So when I realized that I got more excited about writing...I didn't want to write in isolation in a cottage or

somewhere, this was what it was all about, this lived experience and making the public know about it.⁴⁵

For activists for whom the 1977-1981 period was just one of many struggles, the benefits of these specific campaigns were less apparent.⁴⁶

Analysis of the affects of the campaign on the lives of individual advocates readily documents the conflicts inherent in advocacy coalitions. Differential rewards accruing to advocates from the state are most apparent when organizations are the units of analysis. The next section details several examples of the state's role in the outcome of coalition-based mass campaigns. What is the status of the legal and social position of foreign domestic-workers, vis-a-vis the state?

The Role of the State on Mass Campaigns. The federal government has demonstrated contradictory positions concerning foreign domestic workers from the Caribbean since the 1950's. Viewed as vital to the labor market, the concessions to domestic workers has been minimal.

The state first attempted in the early 1970's to obstruct the avenues of social mobility for Caribbean immigrants legislatively by restricting admissions. This resulted in a protracted phase of legal challenges for several deportation cases. Publicity from the deportations caused considerable embarrassment to the immigration authorities who falsely claimed ignorance of Caribbean social customs when they set up the program barring adult women with children.⁴⁷

Interestingly enough, this domestic-centered issue was the first case heard by the federal Human Rights Commission in March, 1978.

Unsuccessful in the courts, several months later the government chose violence to control the growing militant immigrant population. Between 1978-1979 police were involved in eleven shootings resulting in death and woundings. In particular the murders by police of two black men, Buddy Evans a Nova Scotian in 1978 and Albert Johnson a Jamaican national in 1979 led to more mass demonstrations, protests and even representations from the Jamaican High Commission.⁴⁸ When force became too reprehensible the tactic of cooptation and dividing the social movement was adopted by the government.

The government stepped up the use of "salt and pepper" (racially mixed, white and black) community patrols and reactivated Community Relations Boards, in an attempt to stay on top of rising discontent. It attempted to hand-pick community agencies towards which to steer shy immigrants. Fueling the divisions and playing on the vulnerability felt by immigrant domestics, the government warned immigrants against:

...placing trust in an adviser simply because of a shared language or cultural background; perception that to succeed in an application takes more than mere compliance; general distrust of government officials or belief that bribing is the ordinary manner of transacting business; tendency not to report victimization.⁴⁹

Contracts were reluctantly introduced, but social services for immigrant domestic workers were much slower to take form. They challenged in a fundamental way the integrity of Canadian society.

For instance, foreign domestic workers on work permits contributed to Canada but lacked structural mechanisms or opportunities to move up in the social structure. Recommendations to substantially rectify this situation included improving minimum labor standards legislation and adopting more permissive labor codes allowing union organizing for

temporary foreign domestic workers. Moreover, more generous government financial investments in immigrant community activities would demonstrate national commitment to this vital segment of the workforce.⁵⁰ The government used Multiculturalism funding as a sanctioning system of rewards and punishments for immigration advocacy movements. Government funding of minority ethnic organizations had a two-fold purpose: bestowing legitimacy on ethnic groups before the government and as a major management technique of minority ethnic demands.⁵¹ Such state intervention effectively contained protests, distracted groups from their organizational objectives and fueled divisiveness among fragile inter-ethnic factions.

INTERCEDE readily accommodated itself to the government's plan of action, thereby getting hearings with government representatives when other advocacy groups could not,⁵² eventually becoming a government-funded service unit. However, the price for this decision was loss of credibility in the immigrant community, despite active recruitment efforts and accolades by the government and the media. Fragmenting a rather fragile alliance with immigrant and visible minority women was INTERCEDE'S decision to stay within the narrow proscriptions laid down by the federal government and not advocate for improved social services for immigrants not yet landed. Disagreement on the timeliness and sequence of these demands, proved to be divisive issues for women directly affected by the policy and those advocating on behalf of disenfranchised groups.⁵³

This situation worked to the disadvantage of the immigrant domestic workers who suffered from the lack of delivery of social services. A 1985 study of major social service organizations in Toronto revealed:

... 82% of the respondents had no recruitment policies related to ethnicity and that 72% referred "ethnic" clients to "ethnic" agencies. However, the "ethnic" agencies, where they exist, are so understaffed and underfunded that they do not even begin to make a difference.⁵⁴

This situation suggests the need for on-going advocacy work that is culturally diverse, and employing a variety of organizations and ideologies.

The extent to which government agencies differentially reward and recognize various groups is directly related to the degree of legitimate authority that the government is willing to concede to a specific group. The transformation caused by funding changed domestic worker-sensitive issues of the 1950's into struggles over individual personality conflicts within the non-domestic worker leadership of these new "domestic worker" organizations.

Although there was a perception that domestic worker organizations had been created,⁵⁵ there is competing evidence to the contrary. The downside of the ostensible victories were that the spinoffs of the changes in policy did not go directly to domestic workers. Advocates, not domestics, cultivated effective channels of communication and established ongoing dialogues with the government about the temporary foreign domestic issue, an innocuous segment of the labor force. The structure of the policy of upgrading for landing neatly lends itself to a "super-spinoff": the creation of an infrastructure servicing people in this process over a three year period. As one advocate active in the 1981 victory stated:

Some domestic workers have been very unhappy with certain feature of the policy and we ourselves were not thrilled...

But we took the view that because it did allow women to become landed, that we would work with it and then ask the government for the money to set up the [Counselling and Domestic Worker Advocacy] unit, which we now have of course. We've had it since 1983.⁵⁶

Having legitimated and created advocate jobs to service the needs of foreign domestics, how successful has the government been at gutting the advocacy movement? One measure of success of the unit was that domestic workers continued to work with the organization after receiving their landing and directed other women to the unit.⁵⁷

What the service unit did not fill was the void in the social situation of foreign domestic workers, leaving an organic catalyst to organize once again.

In the 1950's it was the women who had come as domestics and then moved to different work who helped form groups or organizations that would deal with new women coming up. With the assistance of established immigrants from their place in origin in Canada, they provided space in churches or community organizations for meeting, cooking, playing music and sharing friendship. Missing in current organizations were interpersonal links, bonding the women together.⁵⁸ Questioning the motives of contemporary domestic organizations, a community worker suggests:

Domestic workers are not organizing the group and spokespeople are speaking on behalf of the government where there's a whole different kind of language. Sometimes you wonder if this is in the interest of the women...in some ways it even alienates domestic workers themselves from going to this group or organization...where we're going to sit in these chairs, sit down and a speaker's going to come in and talk to us about...when what you want is to be a person, you know, [not] an object, "domestic worker."⁵⁹

Fortunately for the government as the volume of immigrants from the Caribbean increased, so did the options for immigrants regarding adjustment and settlement activities. Established immigrant organizations were supplanted by individual networks of family and friends assisting new comers.⁶⁰

Summary. Varying opinions of the 1977-1981 campaigns exist, depending upon the source, the yardstick by which it is measured and the placement on the continuum of definitions of success. Advocates with long track records of service to domestics speak about the evolution of domestic worker organizations between the 1950's and the 1980's. Immigrant lawyers and old guard activists are most unequivocal about the success of several campaigns, citing both legal and attitudinal changes. Comparatively speaking, immigrant services community workers and domestics were the most tentative about the breadth and endurance of mass campaign impacts. The scale of their services are basically judged as stop-gap measures to fundamental inequities in the system. For community advocates and domestics cynicism and lack of trust of other advocates were critical fallouts of collective action.

The real and perceived rewards of advocacy work vary by criteria other than observable organizational structure and stated objectives. The goals of the collective action often appeared somewhat contradictory, as organizers waffled between improving domestic workers' social adaptation to the existing immigration policy while insisting on fundamental changes. Most advocates concede that they accomplished legal victories for domestic workers and enhanced the political clout of advocates for the immigrant community.

However, legal empowerment did not inevitably translate into increased power with employers or improved social relations. Moreover, gaining legal protection at the expense of strong social networks of support that existed in the smaller immigrant community decades before are trade-offs whose merits are difficult to assess. The institutionalization of advocate-based social movements resulted in virtually ignoring the significance of organizations providing a basic sense of belonging. Most advocates conclude that future work lies in meeting the social and interpersonal needs of these women.

The transformation of social movements to formal movement organizations as described by Piven and Cloward was quite evident in the evolution of INTERCEDE. Unlike earlier campaigns which galvanized around images of super-exploitation raised by the connotation of "maid", the "Good Enough to Work..." campaign was an authentic domestic-centered movement requesting options for women. While the assessment of these organizations criticize the failure to propel domestic women into leadership positions of these new organizations. What it does not address is the role of these women in non-domestic organizations.

Central advocates are often hidden from easy observation. They occupy strategic positions in immigrant service agencies or as volunteers within the immigrant community. Unless these actors are disentangled from the networks of possible community-based coalitions, a vital source of entry into the growing immigrant community will be overlooked.

Chapter Nine summarizes the findings and returns to the basic research questions guiding this study.

CHAPTER EIGHT - NOTES

¹The distinctions made at the outset between "advocates" and "women working as foreign domestics" is a somewhat false distinction. In many instances women working as foreign domestics were not only the catalyst for action, but were actors in their own interest as well. Their status as domestics was usually temporary, while their commitment to eradicating inequities were long-lasting. Important to note is that most women entering as foreign domestics were not politically active. In this regard it should be noted that the women (no longer domestics) who were active in the deportation cases in the "Save the Seven" Campaign virtually dropped out of the public spotlight after their deportation orders were overturned (Fieldnotes, 1986; Interview #1). The researcher was not able to get access to women who were not politically active. Of the three domestics interviewed, one entered under the WIDS in 1955, another entered under the universal recruitment program in 1977 and the third entered Canada after the 1981 policy in 1982.

²Few advocates had continuous involvement in domestic workers recruitment and treatment or even linked the genesis and developmental stages of the program which spanned four decades.

³Interview #1.

⁴Interview #2.

⁵Interview #2.

⁶Interview #10.

⁷Interview #10

⁸Interview #3.

⁹Interview #3.

¹⁰Interview 8.

¹¹Interview #6.

¹²Although two of the persons interviewed entered Canada in the 1950's under the West Indian Domestic Scheme. Comparatively speaking, the "victories" of the 1977-1981 campaigns were in fact more restrictive than the original conditions under which they entered. (Interviews #8; #14).

¹³Interview #4.

¹⁴This is most apparent when questions about the working relationship between domestic workers and advocates (Question 8) and the division of labor (Question 2) are raised.

¹⁵Interview #1.

¹⁶Interview #4.

¹⁷Interview #2.

¹⁸Interview #2.

¹⁹Interview #2.

²⁰Interview #4.

²¹Although no question on the interview guide asked advocates about their ethnic origins all, with the exception of 2 white males, volunteered their ethnic origins as a significant defining feature of their advocacy history in Canada.

²²Interview #6.

²³Interview #6.

²⁴Interview #9.

²⁵Interview #1.

²⁶Interview #1.

²⁷Interview #10.

²⁸ ²⁷Interview #3.

²⁹Interview #4.

³⁰Interview #4.

³¹Interview #7.

³²Interview #9.

³³Interview #6.

³⁴Interview #2.

³⁵Interview #6.

³⁶Interview #2.

³⁷Interview #4.

³⁸By the 1980's the government had accepted the legitimacy of advocacy groups whose services went beyond social adjustment for the new immigrant. The model for implementation of new government social

policies such as Affirmative Action was through existing immigrant services agencies.

³⁹Interview #5.

⁴⁰Interview #1.

⁴¹Interview #1.

⁴²Interview #6.

⁴³Interview #2.

⁴⁴Interview #10.

⁴⁵Interview #4.

⁴⁶Interview #1.

⁴⁷Arnopoulos, "Problems of Immigrant Women." pp. 26-28.

⁴⁸Contrast, September 6, 1979.

⁴⁹see Government of Canada. Office of the Minister, Employment and Immigration, "The Exploitation of Potential Immigrants by Unscrupulous Consultants," Discussion Paper issued by the Honourable Lloyd Axworthy, Minister of Employment and Immigration, April, 1981. 19 pages.

⁵⁰Arnopoulos, "Problems of Immigrant Women," p. 32.

⁵¹Evelyn Kallen, "Multiculturalism: Ideology, Policy and Reality," Journal of Canadian Studies 17(1) (Spring 1982), p. 59.

⁵²Other advocate community briefs such as Equality Now!, which stressed the need for rapidly implementing policies which accommodate a multicultural and multiracial society where community advocates would play an influential role were tabled in the House of Commons March 28, 1984 and implementation of the recommendations has been piecemeal and dilatory.

⁵³It is important to note that analysts observe: "Non-white women in Canada are defining themselves, their goals and their struggles as they work individually, collectively and in coalition to defeat racism, sexism and other forms of oppression." (Reeves, "Editorial").

⁵⁴Immigrant and Visible Minority Women, Brief, June 3, 1985, p. 15.

⁵⁵Interviews #9; #5; #2; #3.

⁵⁶Interview #2.

⁵⁷Interview #2.

⁵⁸Interviews #4; #6.

⁵⁹Interview #4.

⁶⁰Interview #6.

CHAPTER NINE

Summary and Analysis of Findings

The general research questions undergirding this project were: How do we measure social change? Of the advocates, who benefits and who is disadvantaged during the policy transformation process? Concretely this study measured changes by obvious transformations in formal policy and the legal structure. In addition, social change is evinced by noticeable shifts in the distribution of power--both between advocates and the government and within the advocate community itself. Two propositions capture these dynamics:

- A. If changes in immigration policy affect selected subpopulations in substantial and adverse ways (real or perceived), then political activism to modify the policy is a likely outcome.
- B. If benefits accrue to participants in policy transformation, only formally organized subpopulations will reap direct benefits from the state (i.e. credit, status, material rewards, recognition, etc.).

Proposition A, which focuses on the reality of the public's political activism, is reinforced because the collective perception of advocates was that a direct relationship between changes in immigration policy and activism in the immigrant community exists. All advocates interviewed had a recollection or direct involvement in advocacy work around the foreign domestic issue, although the actual point in time and capacity varied. This proposition established the importance of clearly identifiable targets against which to organize. Attempts to implement formal policy established a central focus for these

spontaneous movements. Generally, advocates enter a movement already in process and contribute to an array of tasks confronting targeted victims. Advocates experience varying degrees of unity, cohesiveness and strain.

When autonomous groups converge at specific points in time to collectively work on the domestic issue, in that union a decided division of labor was evident. Carving out their own niche based on their resources and organizational strengths, many immigrant-based groups sought to provide a cultural-centered experience for these women by providing a friendly and informal meeting place, information on personal needs, such as the Universal African Improvement Association (UAIA) and Jamaican-Canadian Association. Other actors fulfilled specific legal roles as lawyers, although most advocates had no legal training. In a very experiential and pragmatic fashion, community advocates were issue-sensitive, handling the situations confronting the community in a fairly ad hoc fashion. Some lobbied the government for specific policy changes, like INTERCEDE; while others, strategically located in state service agencies, taught newcomers how to negotiate the existing system.

Confirmed by this study was the importance of both horizontal and vertical patterns of communications to the survival of these communities. While some organizations may have originally formed as professional, religious, occupational, cultural, etc. groups, the blurring of political and economic issues confronting the immigrant community generally overrode such distinctions for purposes of defining

injustices. Status differences of an ascribed or achieved nature typically surfaced during strategy sessions.

Not only did activists assume that advocacy played some role in policy change, most were convinced that their actions were in fact the primary motivation for policy shifts in the 1970's and the 1980's. This is most evident in interview comments correcting the researcher's characterization of the campaign as a "1980" event. Through oral recollections of the struggle for domestic workers in Canada the paramountcy of advocate actions are evident for each advocacy category.

An old guard advocate involved in the WIDS acknowledged the relationship between activism and public policy:

In '51 I could walk down Yonge Street all day and not find two black faces. We worked with the labor union, we worked with the housing problem--accommodation in '51 or '52...

...I think there were 27,000 Negroes in all of Canada. Today, Toronto is talking about hundreds of thousands of Negroes. So we have fought the battles, but we have not formed marches and protests and demanding that this be done. We appealed to the people, they listened to our appeal and this is the result.¹

Even though the activists of the 1950's in retrospect appeared less militant to government officials, the early strategies were as confrontational as those utilized thirty years later. An immigration lawyer recounted events organized in Toronto and Ottawa on behalf of women facing deportation in 1977, suggesting that after exhausting legal channels, less conventional approaches were employed:

We'd done everything in a nice orderly way and later on we found that being a nice orderly way was not

going to save our skins. So then we started doing these various kinds of things.²

Describing the community's mood after the group disrupted the Prime Minister's speech announcing a change in policy in 1976, the lawyer further explained:

[P]eople became interested in what we were doing...although they didn't like our tactics...they felt that we were going too far...But then I mean what can you do after you've exhausted all your remedies? And you're still faced with injustice?

...[L]arge numbers of groups, including civil rights groups and so on eventually coalesced together. They caused so much pressure to be brought on Ottawa that Ottawa decided to change its policy.³

Other factors promoting the policy change notwithstanding, this sentiment is echoed by a community worker active during the same 1977-1979 campaign:

What I learned during that whole struggle was just how really important the power of the people is. Because even though it was a legal case, the struggle and the battle was not in the court room, but outside on the streets. That is where the victory came from. I mean sure there was all this legal stuff that one had to get through, and that was where the lawyers were really valuable. But the people, the mass movements on the streets really played a really important role in terms of the press coverage and just these thousands of people out on the street.⁴

Similar lobbying of the Parliament in 1981 is attested to by another community worker, also demonstrating the relationship between collective action and policy transformation:

Right before the Minister announced the policy in November of '81, we had a very large demonstration in front of the Immigration offices here in Toronto; which was attended by many, many domestic workers and a lot of community people. And simultaneously there was also...

[a] large demonstration held in Vancouver also by domestics and their allies in the community. And we

spoke to the press simultaneously and linked the two events. And naturally, when the new policy finally came out the following week, there was a great sense of achievement and sense our work had really paid off and amounted to something. Mind you, the policy we got was not the policy we asked for.⁵

So success in this instance was not that the objective demands of the campaign were fulfilled, success was gauged by the level of visibility and/or recognition from government officials because of the collective action. All groups within the coalition were not visible nor viewed as equally important by agencies representing the state. This perception affected the system of rewards to advocates, but not exactly as anticipated by assumptions underlying Proposition B.

Proposition B goes beyond the discussion that collective action exists, suggesting that measures of legitimacy and rewards are functions of whether or not groups are visibly organized and interact with government agencies. While these two conditions were notable advantages in the disbursement of state-sanctioned rewards, they were not the sole criteria by which advocates or domestics determined the success or failure of their actions. Non-monetary rewards and recognition accrued to campaign participants from a variety of sources. It was tremendously important that confirmation of legitimacy come both from the women served by advocacy organizations and the traditional seats of power in the immigrant community, such as churches, trade unions, home countries and cultural/fraternal organizations. Coalition work depended upon a positive rapport with targeted victims and good community relations.

Hidden advocacy existed not as a reward, but as a consequence of unequal power relations where the disenfranchised intermittently seized

opportunities and resources from the state. Both correspondence and interviews reflected activists' opinions and feelings about their work. The effects of the campaigns on participating organizations and individuals provided a way to analyze the differential rewards of advocacy work, the central feature of Proposition B.

One indicator of the relevance of advocacy work was improvement in the quality of life of domestic workers. Interestingly enough, when advocates were asked to discuss the existing needs of foreign domestics, there was never a hesitation. The litany of responses typically included loopholes in the new policy or issues not readily legislated, such as arbitrariness in discretion by immigration officers holding the leverage of deportations, thus cowering foreign domestic workers. Another community worker listed more psychosocial or interpersonal needs of domestic workers summarized by three items:

...the need for their children to come to Canada...I've met women in Canada who are five or six years as a domestic and they have not seen their children...The need to settle in Canada...Domestics need to live outside that environment of housekeeper, a constant, permanent housekeeper...Somebody living within the household 24 hours a day and you're working 24 hours a day. You can be called upon at any time to perform a duty. Thirdly, the social issue...the domestic hardly has that kind of opportunity to socialize with the rest of the community...she has no private life...⁶ [emphasis added]

Therefore, the primary objective of immigration advocates between 1977-1981 was to remove:

This threat of deportation or the threat that you might not stay...When some unscrupulous people know that, it changes a relationship even in a romantic relationship...it happens..puts a big cloud over it. All the more so a relationship such as a master and servant relationship...We've seen the fact that

one is illegal in the country or not documented has been used by the other for exploitative purposes.⁷

This leverage over women working with unsecured legal status is related to the vulnerability and devalued social status of domestic service work generally. Thus, in response to "Besides domestic work itself, what other factors contributed to the problems of immigrant domestics?" (Question 6), several categories of advocates have done wholistic analyses of the plight of foreign domestic workers. One immigrant community advocate suggests the campaigns represent a quagmire of power relations:

...the fact they're women and the fact that the majority of them are members of visible minorities...what you have is...a really nasty convergence of sexism and racism.

...Many [foreign domestics] are sole support heads of families. They have children who they have to feed and look after, and Canada is exploiting that fact by bringing them here and making them work under conditions that nobody would dream of imposing on somebody that wasn't female and black and from the Third World.⁸

Echoing this sentiment is another immigrant community worker who sees the need for more grassroots organizing:

something that would help foreign domestics at this point to deal with the alienation of being in this country...where you can go and just cook, you know, just sit around, just play some music...

For a kind of relaxation, an informal exchange, where they are people and not victims, not 'domestic workers were at this meeting to again discuss how the government is shitting on us and how our employers are shitting on us and what are we going to do?'⁹

Without an appropriate social setting, there exists the perception that non-adaptative behavior has become common. According to one old guard advocate:

Now here in the last some years [immigrants] have given up everything and smoke dope and take pills and all that stuff. Some of them have come in and carried on like that.¹⁰

Varying opinions of the 1977-1981 campaigns exist. Most concede that it accomplished legal victories for domestic workers and enhanced the political clout of advocates for the immigrant community. The actual rewards of this advocacy work varies by observable organizational structure and stated objectives. Generally domestic workers experienced legal changes during the 1977-1981 period; some of which were actual losses when compared to earlier periods of immigration. Political empowerment based on the action was most evident among domestics' new assertiveness of their rights of due process; or if they moved into a community organization as an active member. If they remained domestic workers, their political affects were quite inconspicuous.

Clearly, actions over these years did not lead to the formation of domestic worker organizations. In social terms, the campaigns did not affect the low status of these laborers, nor insulate these women against the disadvantages of the atomized, super-exploitative mental and physical work of domestic servants. What did occur were advocates felt more empowerment of their community, but individually exploited by other participants in the campaigns who were perceived as unscrupulous and opportunistic.

The future of advocacy work in countries like Canada lies in the New Immigrant communities. The greatest potential for growth is hidden advocacy work by immigrant community service workers, who fill a significant void when the advocacy is not actively organized around an

issue. Advocates rely on these workers to inform them of problems affecting the community, so in that sense they constitute the contemporary vanguard for immigrant community advocacy concerns.

CHAPTER NINE - NOTES

¹Interview #6.

²Interview #1.

³Another immigrant lawyer was also convinced that it was the breadth of community support from immigrant community groups, trade unions and local politicians that persuaded the government to reverse their policy. See Interview #10 and Interview #1.

⁴Interview #4.

⁵Interview #2.

⁶Interview #9.

⁷Interview #1.

⁸Interview #3.

⁹Interview #4.

¹⁰Interview #6.

PART IV

Conclusions and Recommendations

Chapter 10 - Conclusions and Recommendations

CHAPTER TEN

Conclusion and Recommendations

This study investigated the role of immigrant-based collective action in the process of immigration policy formation and change. Over three decades Caribbean immigrant community demands, coupled with changing interactive relations with Canadian government agencies, were significant in influencing the rate and direction of change in immigration policy. Changing immigrant appeals targeted reforms in the enforcement of laws over several decades.

In the first half of the 20th century Canada was not too segmented a society. Everyone was immigrant and racial distinctions between whites and blacks were few because the latter community was small and isolated. Prior to 1948 all individuals in Canada were British subjects, so there was an assumed equality attributed to formal membership in the British empire. In reality, however members of the British Commonwealth were stratified on a number of criteria, not the least of which were the level of economic development and the racial composition of the geographical area. Canada's early immigration policy reflected these differences as distinctive labor recruitment programs were set up for specific geographical regions, such as the West Indies Domestic Scheme (WIDS).

Immigration recruitment programs reflected dependent economic relations between the Caribbean and Canada. These international arrangements shaped subsequent internal social relations in Canada. As

blacks came to Canada they were physically integrated but socially and occupational ghettoized. Conflict emerged from the contact between groups among whom power was unevenly distributed, based on racial, sexual, occupational and geographical differences. Remedies to the conflicts were often the result of community initiated actions or inquiries. Social inequality within Canada exacerbated the pace, volume and strategies of immigration-based social movements. From the immigrant community perspective, improvements in social relations should be immediate and emanate from the state as the concrete symbol of the social structure.

This study isolated several instances of immigration-based confrontations between political activists and the state. In the 1950's and 1960's the focus of immigrant-based social movements was expanding the tightly circumscribed admission criteria and occupational mobility of Caribbean entrants. By the 1970's the rallying point was the extension of Canadian civil rights and freedoms to the growing immigrant community. Broadening uniform labor protection legislation for all occupations disproportionately filled by immigrant labor was the cause celebre in the 1980's. Monitoring the implementation of this newest legislation constitutes the current state of affairs for Canadian immigrant advocates.

A racialized ideology of the initial and subsequent social movements united these struggles. The ideology was borrowed from their recent colonial past, a new sense of nationalism, understanding the rights of citizenship espoused in the constitutions of the West Indies Federation and the awareness of what the Canadian creed allegedly

entailed about democracy and equality. Targets of initial attacks were the government and employers. The labor sector was quite secondary because discrimination was found throughout the system. Black women were the victims; the immigration department and private employers the culprits for racial and gender discrimination. Although clear distinctions were made between immigration department officials and community-based immigrant service unit workers, eventually targets of organized discontent were identified even among the advocacy community.

Strategists behind Caribbean based social movements acquired support and "credibility" by forming coalitions with members of the white community. Initially those most active in organizing were those who were directly affected, i.e., established members of the black immigrant community. Over three decades immigrants lost legal rights; however, power was gained when immigrants organized on the basis of collective cultural and community interests and identity and not merely for personal social mobility. Through organized efforts the range of advocate contributions was quite broad and included: voluntary time, donated resources and use of informal networks. Unintended and unanticipated consequences of deportation, temporary immigrant status and bitterness from a differentially rewarded advocate coalition, were outcomes of the movements.

The fragmentation of the social movements was caused by a variety of predictable internal factors such as: conflicting goals and objectives, strategies and tactics, and the formalization of social movements into less dynamic organizations. For instance, the switch in momentum of the movement from an immigrant-centered movement to a

women-centered movement was a significant change, because the persistent problems facing visible minority women became apparent. In any case, the concerns of visible female immigrants continued to be subsumed under the problems of female immigrants--language and job training. For women performing unskilled work and entering from English-speaking regions, these issues were not as relevant as issues of race or working conditions.

This study uncovered the vast range of social actors in the policy process, which would not have been evident without talking to actual participants in the struggles, nor comprehensible without the benefit of the historical record of relationships between Canada and the Caribbean related to immigration. Limited perceptions about social action dominate the literature on social movements and social change. The reconstruction of campaign events in Canada based on oral recollections helped address the void in thinking. Advocacy in the immigrant community has a level of sophistication often undetected by policy-makers and dismissed as a lack of organization and unnecessary duplication of efforts by casual observers. Particularly insightful is understanding that political activity by relatively powerless groups is typically silent, invisible work.

Another conclusion of this research relates to the multidimensional strategies used by the social actors. The commonality found in each of the campaigns was their continual reliance on coalition-based community action, which repeatedly rose to the occasion in solidarity with lead organizations. How better can one know the nature and dynamics of community than by seeing people acting collectively because of some unifying theme or issue? The study revealed a deliberate and diligent

layer of hidden advocacy, especially by individuals located in strategic occupations within immigrant service agencies. In these actions lie the most potential for the future directions of immigrant community development.

In conclusion, these basic insights discerned from this research assist in making sense of the facts that concrete changes occurred, cooperation among organizations existed alongside persistent, subterranean conflicts for individuals and organizations involved in advocacy.

Limitations of the Study. While referrals for interviews were reliable and randomly yielded an array of people with a variety of demographic characteristics, this study provided just a glimpse of immigrant community networks. The advocates interviewed were merely representative of a larger, but amorphous advocacy community--many of whom are hidden. Therefore, limitations of the study exist in interpreting and generalizing about the composition of advocates interviewed. Greater distinctions within the immigrant community are necessary to uncover the various forms advocacy takes and require a demographic and social problem disaggregation of these immigrant communities.

The lack of clarity between "immigrant community" and "Caribbean community" are functions of the quality of available data on New Immigrant communities. This shortcoming places limits on the generalizability of the findings to groups outside of the Caribbean immigrant community, the primary referrant group for this study. Without base line information on the specific internal structure and mechanics of post-World War II immigrant communities, a yardstick for

measuring social change is difficult to construct. We know that Caribbean, South Asian, Chinese, Greek, Portuguese, Filipino, Italian, etc. immigrants interact because of the information provided in the documents and in interviews. Therefore, there is a need for basic demographic profiles of New Immigrants because it is not clear whether such interaction represents normative or exceptional behavior. In either case it raises significant questions about subsequent relations between the groups and from the viewpoint of the state.

A logical starting point to redress these issues is in the demographic profiles of the New Immigrant community, since information already exists on the old immigrant communities in Canada. While the behavioral aspect of advocacy work connects the group analytically, demographic profiles address the issue of scale between old and new immigrants in terms of variation in size, longevity and mobility of the communities. Immigrant age and sex structures provide insight into functional benchmark needs of the community. Immigrant communities are demographically younger than the charter groups and there are significant differences between immigrants from eastern Europe, who exist in far greater number than Third World immigrants.

How groups define themselves and their problems also vary by time period and function in the division of labor. While both old and new immigrants are initially disenfranchised, by the mid-1960's advocacy by eastern Europeans is for greater inclusion in political affairs. Caribbean people have fought desperately to simply enter the country and for basic citizenship rights once they were landed. Asian groups have dealt with the reality of direct and violent confrontations against their members as immediate concerns. The best testimony for

disaggregated information is recent government policy initiatives geared to "immigrant and visible minority" women, which is geared primarily to the needs (language and job training) of immigrant women only. How can government address the needs of visible minority women if they are unaware of these details?

Directions for Future Research. In addition to the demographic profiles described in the preceding sections, several areas are opened up by this exploratory study. Immigrants seek economic, political and social integration into the larger Canadian society, while at the same time drawing comfort from images and services offered by the immigrant community. One way to improve the study of both of these realities is to conduct research using a global framework, drawing upon the experiences of the Caribbean diaspora at home and in Canada, Great Britain and the United States. Dependency relations between Canada and the Caribbean also come out of this framework. International migration is a concrete manifestation of these relations and includes issues concerning political, economic and social development.

Comparative demographic characteristics of the immigrant community generally, with special attention to both specific racial and ethnic groups and genuine multiracial/multiethnic organizations will add to the understanding of survival strategies used by the Caribbean diaspora within advanced industrial nations. The need for greater collaboration and comparative work between these areas will advance the area tremendously. Immigrant community studies are worth pursuing in order to understand the parallels and convergence of uniquely different struggles. To what extent does the interest of the state require the use of divide and rule tactics among new immigrant communities?

More work on social movements and resurgence of community studies is necessary. Community-based struggles for decency exist wherever immigrants find themselves. Groups respond to outside antagonisms in predictable and subtle ways. Community transformation and development occurs when new immigrant communities enter urban core cities. Women have been a significant part of this migratory stream, entering as workers and organizing within or because of their jobs.

APPENDIX AND REFERENCES

APPENDIX A

NAME: _____

DATE: _____

LOCATION: _____

APPT.
TIME: _____ BEGINNING _____ ENDING _____

INTERVIEW GUIDE

The purpose of this interview is to explore your experiences as an advocate. An advocate is simply one who speaks or acts on behalf of others. The development of the 1980 mass campaign with the slogan, "Good Enough to Work, Good Enough to Stay" is a good example of advocacy activity. I am especially interested in talking with people about their experiences in the 1980 campaign.

ABOUT THE 1980 CAMPAIGN...

1. How did you get involved in the 1980 campaign? Could you tell me about it?

- a. How long were you involved? (LENGTH)
- b. When did you first learn about the foreign domestic issue? (INITIAL KNOW.)
- c. Were you acting on behalf of an organization, for a group of people or as an individual? (CAPACITY)
- d. Do you have copies of old newspaper clippings, letters, minutes, files, pictures, or other documents related to the 1980 mass campaign for foreign domestics that I might see later? ☐ YES ☐ NO ☐ MAYBE (DOCUMENTS)

2. Now that we've talked about your involvement in the campaign, I'd like to know about the organization of the campaign. Could you tell me...

- a. How did the campaign start? (START)
- b. What individuals or organizations were directly involved? (PARTICIPANTS)
- c. Had you worked with any of them before the 1980 campaign? (OLD ALLIES)
- d. Who were the leaders? (LEADERS)
- e. Who handled the day to day operation and flow of information? (FT SOLDIER)
- f. Were there specific spokespersons for the media or government? If yes, who? (SPOKESPERSON)

3. What did the 1980 campaign accomplish?
 - a. Specifically, in the life of foreign domestics?
 - b. Generally for any group of people or individuals in Toronto?
4. Were there any negative outcomes for domestics based on the campaign?
 - a. Were there issues left unsettled?
If yes, what were they?
If no, how did the campaign solve these issues?
5. If you could list specific needs of immigrant domestics today what would you include?
 - a. Could you give me examples of this?
 - b. How do you know this?
6. Besides domestic work itself, what other factors contribute to the problems of immigrant domestics?

PEOPLE INVOLVED IN THE CAMPAIGN...

**NOW I'D LIKE TO TALK ABOUT THE PEOPLE INVOLVED IN THE CAMPAIGN.
THINKING OF THE EVENTS THAT LED UP TO THE 1980 CAMPAIGN...**

7. In your opinion, if more information was needed about foreign domestics, which organization or individual would most likely be contacted?
 - a. Can you give me a specific example of why you say this?
8. Could you generally describe the relationship between activists in the campaign?
 - a. Between advocates?
 - b. Between domestics and advocates?
9. Specifically, could you talk about some of the reactions toward you because of your involvement in the 1980 campaign?

- a. What were the initial reactions to you by DOMESTICS?
 - b. What were the initial reactions to you by PEOPLE INSIDE THE CAMPAIGN?
 - c. What were the initial reactions to you by PEOPLE OUTSIDE THE CAMPAIGN?
 - d. Were there examples of STRAIN, RESERVATION, JEALOUSY, OR HOSTILITY toward you by others involved in or affected by the campaign?
10. Do you maintain contact with people that you worked with for the first time in the 1980 campaign?
- a. Who?
 - b. Why..what's the basis for the contact?
[social, crisis-oriented, political, cultural?]

LOOKING BACK ON THE 1980 CAMPAIGN TODAY...

11. In your opinion, have these relationships changed over time..since 1980?
12. Are there examples of positive benefits TO YOU based on your involvement in the campaign?
- a. Why do you consider these positive benefits?
13. Are there any negative consequences TO YOU based on your involvement in the campaign?
- a. Why do you consider these negative consequences?

ADVOCATES ONLY...(Questions 14-18)

NOW I'D LIKE TO TALK ABOUT YOUR ROLE AS AN ADVOCATE IN THE 1980 CAMPAIGN.

14. How long has the organization existed [or] How long have you been in this line of work?
15. Who are your members? Could you describe the composition of your organization in terms of age, sex, race, occupational characteristics.

16. Did the campaign affect your goals and objectives? How?
17. Were there services and resources contributed to the campaign by you or your organization?
- a. Were fees assessed for the services or resources?
18. Were you prepared to deal with issues raised by the campaign?
- a. How or Why?
 - b. Have you done advocacy work around other issues?

QUESTIONS FOR DOMESTICS ONLY...(Questions 19-27)

NOW I'D LIKE TO TALK ABOUT YOUR OPINION OF THE 1980 CAMPAIGN AS A FOREIGN DOMESTIC FOR WHOM THE CAMPAIGN WAS ORGANIZED. FIRST I'D LIKE TO KNOW A LITTLE BACKGROUND INFORMATION ON YOU.

19. Were you in contact with any advocacy groups before 1980?
- a. Why? [social, crisis-oriented, political, cultural, etc.]
20. How long have you been in Toronto? Canada?
- a. Where were you born?
21. How long have you worked as a domestic in Canada?
22. How did you choose this line of work?
- a. Were you recruited to do domestic work in Canada? By Whom?
23. Could you tell me your impressions of the West Indies Domestic Scheme [1955-1968]
- a. Who participated?
 - b. What happened to these women once in Canada?
 - c. Why was the program started?
 - d. In your opinion, why did the program end?

NOW I'D LIKE YOUR OPINION OF THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE 1980 CAMPAIGN.

- 24. Would you give me a few examples of positive benefits to domestics because of the 1980 campaign?**
- 25. Could you name a few examples of positive benefits to people who are not domestics?**
- 26. Would you give me a few examples of negative consequences to domestics because of the 1980 campaign?**
- 27. Could you name a few instances of negative consequences to people who are not domestics?**

CLOSING THE INTERVIEW...

- 28. Is there anything else about the 1980 campaign which I should know but didn't ask?**
- 29. Are there other people who you think I should talk to? Do you know how I might contact them?**

THAT'S ALL THE QUESTIONS I HAVE...I'D LIKE TO THANK YOU FOR YOUR TIME...

- 30. Do you have any additional comments or questions you'd like to ask me?**
- 31. May I now look at your collection of documents on the 1980 campaign?**

THUMBNAIL...

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