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31293 00543 6112

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This is to certify that the
thesis entitled

PHILIP II'S IMPERIAL AMBITIONS
TOWARD GREECE

presented by

RONALD LEE CLINE

has been accepted towards fulfillment
of the requirements for

M.A. HISTORY

 

 

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byway/4M

Major professor

Date 2 - 17 — 1989

 

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PHILIP II's IMPERIAL AMBITIONS TOWARD GREECE

By

Ronald Lee Cline

A THESIS

Submitted to
Michigan State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

Department of History

1989

ABSTRACT
PHILIP II'S IMPERIAL AMBITIONS TOWARD GREECE
BY

Ronald Lee Cline

The purpose of this study is to examine the
conventional view that Philip II of Macedon had imperial
ambitions toward the Greeks. Philip's contemporaries and
later historians have typically argued that his ambitions
involved one or more of the following:

A. Philip's hatred of democracy, particularly that of

Athens.

B. Philip's desire to seize the riches of Greece.

C. Philip's need to protect his southern border from

attack by the Greeks while he invaded Persia.

D. Philip's interest in utilizing Greek troops and

ships in an attack on Persia.

This study finds each of these alleged motives
inaccurate or inadequate.

This study explores the hypothesis that Philip had no
imperial ambitions toward Greece. Philip's involvement
with Greece is traced to his alliance with Thessaly and his
subsequent role on the Amphictyonic Council. It is further
suggested that his role with the Amphictyonic League was

animated and strengthened by his extraordinary religiosity.

DEDICATION

This thesis is dedicated to the memory of

Fanchon LaVerna Leath Cline

ii

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The author wishes to express his deepest appreciation
and sincere thanks to Dr. Eleanor Huzar, whose constant
encouragement, endless sound advice, and unfailingly high
standards have made her both a joy to work with and superb
teacher from whom to learn. If some small portion of her
great ability has spilled over into this work I will be
most pleased.

I would also like to thank my colleague and good
friend Mr. Craig Starnaman for both his perceptive comments
and criticisms as well as his steady fellowship; my dear
friend Toni Stevenson for her many helpful comments on the
economic issues and much more; and to Eugene Borza, whose
many helpful comments during a fortuitous visit to our
campus helped to shape this paper.

I would like to especially thank my wife Betsy for
encouraging me to begin this course of study, steadfastly
supporting it, and providing the environment in which it
could be carried out. And finally many thanks to my
children Jason and Alysia whose joyous companionship has

enlightened my life.

iii

List of
List of
Chapter
Chapter
Chapter

Chapter

Chapter

Chapter

Bibliography

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Tables 0 O O O O 0 O O O O O O O O O O

AbbreViations I O O O O O O O O O O O

l

6

Sources . . . . . . . . . . . . .
The Conventional Thesis . . . . .
Philip's Personality and Character

The Relative Wealth of Macedonia
and Greece . . . . . . . . . . . .

The Relative Military Strength
of Macedonia and Greece . . . . .

The Aims and Motivations of Philip

0 O O O O 0 O O O O O O O O O O 0

iv

Page

vi

11

22

37

75
104

129

 

LIST OF TABLES

Page

The Dates of Demosthenes' Speeches . . . . . . . 10

Demosthenes' Comparison of Philip
and Athens . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26

Possible Motives Associated with
Military Engagements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113

ABBREVIATIONS

All abbreviations used in this thesis are those used

in the Oxford Classical Dictionary, second edition.

 

vi

CHAPTER 1

Sources

The literary sources for the life and activities of
Philip II of Macedon may be conveniently put into three
categories: 1) contemporary sources, 2) ancient, but not
contemporary, sources, and 3) modern sources. The
contemporary sources include Demosthenes, the Athenian
orator; Aeschines, also an Athenian orator; Xenophon, an
Athenian general and writer; Isocrates, an Athenian
rhetorician; and Theopompus of Chios, a historian and pupil
of Isocrates.

Of the contemporary sources it was Demosthenes who was
most closely associated with Philip. The great orator is
frequently cast as the voice in the wilderness trying
desperately to warn his fellow citizens of the dangers of
the indomitable warrior of Macedon. This is a much
oversimplified picture. The extant speeches of Demosthenes
involve much more than just his concerns about Philip, as
might be expected of an orator and politician in a

democracy such as Athens possessed in the fourth century.

For our purposes, however, it is Demosthenes' speeches
on foreign affairs, and particularly Philip's activities,
for which he frequently is the only source, that concern us

here. Those speeches include: 1) four Philippics, the

 

fourth of which is now considered to be spurious,1 2) three
Olynthiacs, 3) On the Peace, which Libanius believed was

written but never delivered,2 4) On the Chersonese, 5)'Qg

 

the Embassy to Philip in 346, 6) Philip's Letter, 7) On the

Treaty with Alexander, and 8) On Halonnesus, a speech which

 

Libanius identifies as having been written by one
Hegesippus.3

Aeschines was an Opponent of Demosthenes throughout
his career, and his three extant speeches are in direct
opposition to activities or accusations of Demosthenes; one
is in direct response to Demosthenes' charge of official
misconduct, a capital crime. The speeches of Demosthenes
and Aeschines are invaluable to the reconstruction of
events of the time. As T.T.B. Ryder says:

It is then, largely from the speeches themselves

that we have to build up our picture of the
historical events they discuss and form judgements

 

1Dem. Speeches. Translated by J.H. Vince (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1962), p. 268.

21bid., p. 103.

31bid., p. 148.

 

of the merits of their arguments and of the
policies and actions of those who delivered
them; and this is a situation which a historian
cannot find easy. It need hardly be said that
political speeches present many hazards to
anyone who seeks to construct the true record

of events, especially if, as is usually the

case in this period, only one side of the argument
has come down to us. It is true that in the

two trials with which this volume is concerned
both sides can be heard, but often only to
increase the general uncertainty; the two
versions of some episodes in the not too distant
past are so discordant that one or other speaker
must be trying to escape with untruths which,
though he presumably thought them plausible,
should, one feels, have been too much for the
gullibility of any audience. It is not always
easy to tell which of the two is the culprit;
moreover we are left wondering how often either
speaker indulges in similar misrepresentations
on occasions where the argument of the other is
not available.

Beyond the potentially misleading statements that
either orator may have made, a historian must be concerned
about what of the preserved speech was actually delivered.
Athenian orators of that period always gave their speeches
from memory and only later published them. This delayed
publication allowed some opportunity for changes in the
text in order, presumably, to address an unexpected
argument from one's opponent. On the other hand, as Ryder
points out, "it is arguable that such a published version

needed to be more accurate than the spoken, for its

 

4T.T.B. Ryder, Demosthenes and Aeschines (Baltimore:
Penguin Books, 1975), p. 13.

 

statements were open to more prolonged and careful
scrutiny."5

In weighing the evidence provided by Demosthenes and
Aeschines, we must give great consideration to the fact not
only that both lived at the time of Philip but also that
both were actively involved in the decisions relating to
Athens' stance toward Philip and were involved in the
implementation of those policies. Both had met Philip at
least twice and so were in a position personally to judge
his character. Nevertheless both were actively involved as
politicians and orators, so that their works were composed
to convince the assembly towards an action which they
favored, and were not necessarily an even—handed attempt to
find the truth of the issues at hand.

Isocrates' life spanned the largest part of the fourth
century, and his works were written between 380 and 338
B.C. Although an orator as well as a rhetorician,
Isocrates was never directly involved in political
matters.6 Of particular interest to students of Philip and

51bid., p. 15.

6George Cawkwell, "Isocrates," Oxford Classical
Dictionary. Edited by N.G.L. Hammond and H.H. Scullard
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1970), p. 554. Isocrates was
not directly involved in the sense that he never deliverd

speeches to the Athenian assembly or was engaged as an
official in the day to day affairs of Athenian government.

 

 

Macedonia is Isocrates' letter to Philip, composed in 346,
urging Philip to lead the united Greeks in a war against
the Persians. Also of value for the social and economic
background are his "Panegyricus," "Archidamus," and
"Areopagiticus." Isocrates was a lifelong advocate of
Panhellenism, and this view permeates all of his writings.
On balance, then, Isocrates must be considered a reasonably
good source, with allowances being made for the fact that
he may, because of his panhellenic viewpoint, exaggerate
the evils of non—cooperation among the Greek city—states.

From the philosophic Isocrates we turn to Xenophon,
the man of action. Xenophon was born in the last quarter
of the 5th century and died in 356, just after Philip's
accession to the throne. Although a soldier and mercenary
general, Xenophon, like Isocrates, knew and was influenced
by, Socrates. Upon retiring from an active military life,
Xenophon wrote several extant books, including a book of
advice on improving the economy, and a history of his
times, which are of great value for this study.

Anderson summarizes his value as a historian thus:
"In his historical works Xenophon makes mistakes and
omissions, and displays his prejudices, though his
partiality for Sparta has been over—censured by his
critics. But he is, at his best, an excellent story-

teller, and, if he offers no profound general reflections

 

 

on human behavior, he gives us some good individual
portraits. His histories contain many incidents
illustrating his notions of honorable or dishonorable
conduct, and the standards by which he judges are by no

7 .
" His comments on the state of the

means despicable.
Athenian economy would, under this analysis, seem reliable
enough.

The last of Philip's contemporaries upon whom this
study is based is Theopompus of Chios, who was born around
378 B.C. Theopompus was a historian and pupil of
Isocrates. Theopompus is of particular value to historians
of Philip because he lived at the Macedonian court and

therefore was close to some of the events about which he

writes. His fame rests upon two works, the Hellenica and

 

the Philippica, a fifty-eight volume tome beginning with

 

Philip's accession. Unfortunately, we possess only
fragments of these works, although enough remain of the

Philippica to discern the outline of its structure.

 

The important ancient, but not contemporary, sources
for Philip's life include Diodorus Siculus, Justin, and
Plutarch. Of these three the most important is Diodorus,

who write a universal history in forty books which covers

 

7J.K. Anderson, Xenophon (New York: Charles
Scribner's Sons, 1974), p. 2.

from earliest times to 54 B.C. Most of Diodorus' works,

 

written between 60 and 30 B.C., is based directly upon a
variety of authorities. He seems to have relied upon
Ephorus and Theopompus for his section on Philip of
Macedon. If that is correct, then the reliability of these
sections should be excellent, since both Ephorus and

Theopompus were well—regarded as historians by the

 

ancients. Fortunately, those portions of Diodorus' work
relating to Philip and Alexander survived, since they
provide a chronology (debated) of their reigns. It was
Diodorus' attempt to write an annalistic history which may
have contributed to many of his mistakes, since he had
either to break off and restart his narrative every year or
condense the events of many years into one. He also seems
to have given, on occasion, two versions of the same story,
but in different years.8 The difficulties with Diodorus,
then, are the chronology and the very sketchy nature of
some of the information.

Justin (Marcus Junian Justinus) wrote an epitome of
the Historiae Philippicae of Pompeius Trogus in the 3rd

century A.D. The epitome is rather short and contains

 

8Cf. Thomas R. Martin, "Diodorus on Philip II and
Thessaly in the 350's B.C.," Classical Philology 76
(1981): 188-201 and N.G.L. Hammond, "Diodorus' Narrative
of the Sacred War and the Chronological Problems of 357—352
B.C.," The Journal of Hellenic Studies 57 (1937): 44—77.

 

barely an outline of events during the period.
Nonetheless, it has some value in that it gives some
details not elsewhere available.

Plutarch of Chaeronea lived from c. 46 A.D. to 126
A.D. and wrote widely on a variety of topics, but the most

well—known work is his Parallel Lives. As a biographer,

 

Plutarch is most interested in events and actions that
reveal men's characters and hence there are frequent
omissions and distortions in his historical narrative.
Here again Plutarch is most helpful by filling in
information otherwise unknown.

Because these three writers lived a considerable time
after Philip's reign and had to rely on other (and perhaps
unknown) sources, their reliability seems rarely the equal
of contemporary accounts. Therefore the works of these
authors should be given less weight than that of the
contemporary authors unless very compelling reasons can be
adduced which support their conclusions.

As a result of what R.M. Errington calls "academic

i

anti—cyclical activity,' there has been an outpouring of

works on Philip II and Macedonia within the last decade.

9D.A. Russell, "Plutarch," Oxford Classical
Dictionary, p. 849. Cf. Alan Woodman, Plutarch's Lives
(London: Paul Elek, 1974), pp. 2—9 for a more favorable
review.

 

 

Among those, three stand out as being of exceptional

value: 1) J.R. Ellis, Philip II and Macedonian

 

Imperialism, 2) George Cawkwell, Philip of Macedon, and

 

 

G.T. Griffith and N.G.L. Hammond, A History of Macedonia,

 

Vol. 2. This last book was written in two sections so that
we may credit Griffith alone for the section covering the
era of Philip II. All three works seem extremely well
researched and written. Cawkwell's, being the shortest
(just over two hundred pages) has much less detail. All
have taken advantage of a plethora of good monographs on
many of the topics of interest, not a few of them written
by the authors themselves.

Of the three, I have found Griffith's to be most
useful because of the abundance of detail and the
voluminous footnotes. On military issues, his arguments
seem most compelling. Cawkwell and Ellis both seem
superior to Griffith in elucidating the political and
diplomatic issues. I fault all of them for seeming to
bring to their studies an a priori belief that Philip
really planned to conquer Greece. This bias necessarily
surfaces in much of their narratives and on Philip's plans
and purposes, with which views I find myself in

disagreement.

TABLE 1
The Dates of Demosthenes' Speeches

Concerned with Philip

Speech Date
On the Navy—Boards 354
For the Megapolitans 353
Against Timocrates 353
Against Aristocrates 352
First Philippic 351
For the Liberty of the Rhodians 351
First Olynthiac 349
Second Olynthiac 349
Third Olynthiac 349
Meidias (not delivered) 347
On the Peace 346
Second Philippic 344
On the False Embassy 343
On Halonnesus (Hegesippus?) 342
On the Chersonese 341
Third Philippic 341
Funeral Oration 338

In this Table I have followed the dating of J.H. Vince
in Demosthenes Vol. I, Translated by J.H. Vince (Harvard:
Cambridge University Press, 1962), pp. XV—XVIII.

 

lO

CHAPTER 2

The Conventional Thesis

At the height of the celebration of his daughter's
wedding, Philip II of Macedon was assassinated by
Pausanias, a disaffected noble.10 Revered as a god, Philip
revealed his mortality.11 Upon his death, his son
Alexander quickly and efficiently seized power,
consolidated his role in Macedonia and Thrace, and then
demolished Thebes for attempting revolt.12 These actions
accomplished, young Alexander marched the Macedonian army
into Western and Central Asia, conquering Egypt and parts
of India as well.

After Alexander's death, his successors engaged in a
futile struggle to consolidate Alexander's empire. The
resulting fragmentation led to the establishment of many
monarchical states which inherited the influence and
organization of the Greek city-states. Many formal aspects
of the city-state, such as the gymnasium, theater, and the

Greek language, were thus imported into Asia and Africa.

 

10Justin 9.6.

11Diod. 16.95.l Philip may have considered himself a
god as well.

2Arrian 1.8.

11

12

Thus, weak and almost helpless at Philip's accession
in 359 B.C., the Macedonians first conquered, and then
controlled, much of the ancient world by the time of
Alexander's death in 323 B.C. The first steps along this
path were taken by Philip, who united Macedonia into a
political and military whole, secured her borders, and only
then advanced into the larger arena of foreign affairs.
Upon Philip's death, Alexander seized the falling torch and
raced across the Hellespont to glorious success.

Even while he lived, Philip's actions towards
the venerable Greek city—states were viewed in two
diametrically opposed ways. The view of Demosthenes and
those who followed him was that Philip was the ruthless
destroyer of liberty in the Greek city—states. Philip,
says Demosthenes, cannot abide democracy and freedom, and
thus, "the chief object . . . of his arms and his
diplomacy is our free constitution; on nothing in the world
is he more bent than on its destruction."13 Demosthenes'
theme has been carried forward by historians, both ancient

and modern.14

13Dem. Fourth Philippic 11—12.

14Diod. 1.4; Justin 9.1; J.R. Ellis, Philip II and

Macedonian Imperialism (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton
University Press, 1986), pp. 233—234; George Cawkwell,
Philip of Macedon (London: Faber and Faber, 1978), pp. 10—

 

13

The opposite view, espoused by the rhetor Isocrates,
identified Philip as a unifier of the diverse and
continually warring Greek city-states. In his discourse,

To Philip, Isocrates states,

 

I affirm that, without neglecting any of

your own interests, you ought to make an
effort to reconcile Argos and Lacedaemon and
Thebes and Athens; for if you can bring these
cities together, you will not find it hard to
unite the others as well; for all the rest are
under the protection of the aforesaid cities,
and fly for refuge, when they are alarmed, to
one or other of these powers, and they all
draw upon them for succour. So that if you
can persuade four cities only to take a sane
view of things, you will deliver the others
also from many evils."

16

This view, too, has been adopted by many historians.
While there is considerable disagreement over the
effects of Philip's actions, there has been relatively
little over his aims. From the beginning, historians have
seen Philip's goal as the conquest of Greece. Justin
states, "for Philip, King of Macedonia, looking as from a
watch—tower, for an opportunity to attack their liberties,

and fomenting their contentions by assisting the weaker,

 

5Isocrates To Philip 30—31.

16J.R. Ellis believes that whether a historian adopts
the view of Demosthenes or Isocrates is a reflection of the
events during the period in which he is writing, Ellis,

Philip II, pp. 6—7.

 

 

14

obliged victors and vanquished alike to submit to his regal
yoke."17 Modern historians have, for the most part
agreed. Chester Starr states, "Although his [Philip's]
ambitions soon extended to the mastery of all Greece and
eventually envisaged the possibility of invading the
Persian empire, few men were able to divine his aims before
they were accomplished."18
Bury expands the notion, "He was ambitious to secure a
recognized hegemony in Greece; to hold such a position as
had been held by Athens, by Sparta, and by Thebes in the
days of their greatness; to form, in fact, a confederation
of allies, which should hold some such dependent relation
towards him as the confederates of Delos had held towards
Athens."19
In the late nineteenth century, Joy had asserted, "At
the focus of Greece, where fortune had placed him [Philip],
he saw his opportunity to succeed in a conquest which had

baffled the hosts of Xerxes, and from the day of his

accession to the Macedonian throne (7359 B.C.), in his

 

7Justin 8.1.

18Chester A. Starr, A History of the Ancient World
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1965), p. 367.

19J.B. Bury, A History of Greece (New York: The
Modern Library, 1913), p. 688.

15

twenty-third year, he went on cautiously but steadily, by
guile and by force, to the consummation at Chaeronea."20
As late as the 1960s, Jones can say, "Philip II was a
man who well understood the Greeks and their politics.
With a genius for organization and a great capacity for
intrigue, he soon had the disunited and mutually jealous
city—states of Greece at his mercy; step by step, he moved
relentlessly towards his goal — the establishment of
Macedonian supremacy in Greek lands."21
Of the most recent writers on Philip II, Cawkwell,
too, sees Greece as Philip's primary target.22 Ellis views
the subjugation of Greece as an intermediate goal on the
way to an attack on Persia.23 Both in ancient times and
from the mid-19th century to the 1980s, historians
have been nearly unanimous in attributing to Philip the

objective of conquering the Greek city—states.24

 

OJames Joy, Grecian History (New York: Chautauqua
Press, 1892), p. 272.

21Tom B. Jones, Ancient Civilization (Chicago: Rand
McNally, 1968), pp. 280-281.

22Cawkwell, Philip of Macedon, p. 68.

 

 

 

23Ellis, Philip 11, pp. 233—234.

24Cf. Connop Thirlwall, A History of Greece, Vol. 2
(New York: Harper and Brothers, 1855); George Grote,
Elgggry of Greece, Vol. 11 (New York: Harper and Brothers,
1859); Ellis, Philip II; and Cawkwell, Philip of Macedon.

 

 

 

16

It is instructive to review the reasons attributed
to Philip for this interest in Greece. Demosthenes states

that Philip is motivated by ". . . ambition and the desire

of universal dominion . . ."25

Moreover, says Demosthenes,
First, men of Athens, you must fix this firmly

in your minds, that Philip is at war with us and
has broken the peace, and that he is ill—disposed
and hostile to the whole city and to the very soil
on which the city stands, and, I will add, to

the gods that dwell in it; and may those same

gods complete his ruin! The chief object,
however, of his arms and diplomacy is our free
constitution, and on nothing in the world is he
more bent than on its destruction. And it is in

a way inevitable that he should now be acting
thus. For observe! He wants to rule, and he has
madezgp his mind that you, and you only, bar the
way.

More specifically, he continues,

This, then, is the first thing needful, to
recognize in Philip the inveterate enemy of
constitutional government and democracy; and

your second need is to convince yourself that

all his activity and all his organization is
preparing the way for an attack on our city.

For none of you is so simple as to believe

that though Philip covets these wretched objects
in Thrace - for what else can one call Drongilus
and Cabyle and Mastira and the other places he

is said to be now holding? - and though he endures
toil and winter storms and deadly peril for the
privilege of taking them, yet he does not covet
the Athenian harbours and dockyards and war—gaileys
and the place itself and the glory of it . . .

25Dem. Second Philippic 67.7.

26Dem. Fourth Philippic 11—12.

27Dem. Fourth Philippic 15—16.

 

 

17

Demosthenes' case may be summarized as follows:
1) Philip is a megalomaniac, desirous of power
for its sake alone, and therefore insatiable.
2) Philip especially dislikes Athens because of
its democratic constitution.
3) Moreover he fears that Athens may become the
rallying point against his tyranny.
4) In addition, Philip values the Athenian port,
fleet, and high reputation.
Therefore, by seizing Athens, Philip will have increased
his power, removed a potential source of opposition to his
rule, and acquired an important harbor and fleet for his
further adventures.

Justin sets forth an entirely different reason for
Philip's designs on Greece. "When Philip had once come
into Greece, allured by the plunder of a few cities, and
had formed an opinion, from the spoil of such towns as were
of less note, how great must be the riches of all its
cities put together, he resolved to make war upon the whole

of Greece."28

It is in the wealth of Greece, therefore,
that Justin finds motivation for Philip's incursion to the

south. Further, it seems clear that Justin is referring to

 

28Justin 9.1.

18

the riches represented by precious metals and coinage as
opposed to the riches inherent in such things as
agricultural produce (e.g., olives and grapes).

Diodorus Siculus sees as Philip's motivation toward
Greece the desire to lead a united Greek army against the
Persians, much as Jason of Pherae had planned earlier.
Diodorus says, "For he was ambitious to be designated
general of Hellas in supreme command and as such to

29 What Diodorus

prosecute the war against the Persians."
does not state, but seems to intend, is that Philip wanted
the military strength, both hoplites and triremes, of
Greece to aid him in his incursion into Asia Minor.

Modern historians have adopted and expanded upon this
list of motives. In 1899, Thirlwall wrote, "It was in and
through Greece that he had to seek the highest objects of
his ambition. He had to make Macedonia a Grecian state of
the first magnitude, and then to try if it could not

"30

swallow up the rest. Here Thirlwall echoes Demosthenes'

assertion of Philip's unrestrained desire to conquer.
Likewise Grote, who styles Philip the "great aggressor of

the age."31

 

29Diod., 60.5.

30Connop Thirlwall, A History of Greece, Vol. 2 (New
York: Harper and Brothers, 1855), p. 75.

 

31George Grote, History of Greece, Vol. 2 (New York:
Harper and Brothers, 1859), p. 443. Also pp. 520-521.

19

It was the view of Adolph Holm, in 1896, that Philip
was attempting to become the hegemon over Greece, thereby
uniting the city—states and securing their aid for his
Persian enterprise.32 This view is also echoed by Curtius

in his History of Greece.33

 

In more recent times, Hammond has suggested that:
"His [Philip's] plan to pacify the Greek states and provide

scope for their surplus populations in Asia was conceived

"34

in the interest of Greece as well as of Macedon. Of the

most recent writers, Ellis states,

From the Macedonian viewpoint, Greece was poor

in all respects but one, that its soldiers were
the best, outside their own, in the eastern
Mediterranean world. Whether or not Philip

wished to make very extensive use of the Greek
soldier or sailor in a co—operative eastern
venture, he was at the least compelled to protect
his kingdom against their use in opposition to him.
In military terms, that is, Greece was only
incidental to Philip's longer—term aims. His
ambitions lay in two directions, south and east.
Towards the former he turned for security and
coalition, but for a continuing source of miligary
objectives and wealth he turned towards Asia.

 

32Adolf Holm, The History of Greece, Vol. 3 (New
York: MacMillan, 1896), pp. 245—246.

33Ernst Curtius, The History of Greece, Vol. 5.
Translated by Adolphus Ward (New York: Scribner,
Armstrong, and Co.), pp. 66—67.

34N.G.L. Hammond, A History of Greece to 322 B.C.
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1959), p. 575.

35

 

 

Ellis, Philip II, p. 234.

 

20

Cawkwell also sees Philip's plan requiring the use
of Athenian military strength to further his planned
invasion of Persia. "Philip wanted alliance with Athens
because he had already decided to attack Persia. For that

"36 This is a very

the Athenian navy was indispensable.
strong statement on Cawkwell's part, as he is asserting not
only that Philip judged that he needed the assistance of
the Athenian flotilla, but also that his Persian expedition
could not be successful without it. Interestingly,
Cawkwell provides no argument at all for this statement.

Bringing together both contemporary views and those of
ancient and modern historians, the plans of Philip, and the
reasons for those plans, include the following:

1) Philip was a megalomaniac, eager to achieve
power wherever he could and chose Greece
because,

2) He especially disliked Athens' democratic
constitution which he feared might become the
rallying point for opposition,

3) He coveted the wealth and riches possessed by

the Greek city-states,

 

6George Cawkwell, Philip of Macedon, p. 111.

 

21

4) He also coveted the military might of the
Greeks, particularly the hoplites and the
Athenian fleet, which he desired for use
against Persia, and
5) He needed to protect the Macedonian homeland
from attack by the Greeks while he was off in
Persia.
Each of these five factors deserves special
attention, as do the relationships between them. Moreover,
each requires expansion in order to see why it was
espoused and to ascertain, if possible, the reasons that
it was put forth. Those reasons can then be examined both
for validity, truthfulness, and consistency. The
examination of these assertions and their supporting
reasons will help to uncover some assumptions, not
necessarily stated, which are an essential part of the
arguments presented both by Philip's contemporaries and
historians. These unstated assumptions deserve our
scrutiny as well, if the arguments are to be fairly

evaluated.

 

CHAPTER 3

Philip's Personality and Character

The first factor to be considered is that Philip was
power—hungry generally but had a particular interest in
achieving control over Greece. This is a View held by
Demosthenes and Theopompus in particular, and also by some
modern historians; so we should review their statements on
the matter with care.

Demosthenes argues that as Philip is a king, he is
necessarily opposed to freedom and the rule of law,
because every king is. Consequently, Demosthenes argues,
"This, then, is the first thing needful, to recognize in
Philip the inveterate enemy of constitutional government
and democracy, for unless you are heartily persuaded of
this, you will not consent to take your politics

seriously. But not only is Philip opposed to freedom

and democracy, he also has a desire to gain great power.
Demosthenes asserts that all of Philip's actions are guided

by "ambition and the desire of universal dominion."38

 

37Dem. On the Chersonese 43.

38Dem. Second Philippic 7—8.

 

22

 

23

In the view of Demosthenes, the existence of Athens is
the main, if not sole, barrier to the ambitions of Philip,
since "he rightly saw that to our city and our national
character he could offer nothing, he could do nothing, that
would tempt you from selfish motives to sacrifice to him

."39 Demosthenes makes

any of the other Greek states. .
it clear in this passage that Philip's desire to rule is
the desire to rule over the Greeks. This is also confirmed
in the following: "I only know this, that Philip was less
interested in these towns than desirous to secure the pass
[Thermopylae], to win for himself the credit of finishing
off the Sacred War, and to preside at the Pythian games.
That was the summit of his ambition."40
Not only does Philip desire to rule Greece, but,
owing to his character, there are no means he will not use
to accomplish this goal. Demosthenes finds in him,
"the restless activity which is ingrained in Philip's
nature, and which makes it impossible for him to ever rest
on his laurels."l'1 Presumably it is this characteristic

which leads Philip to such unorthodox tactics as fighting

during the winter season.

39Dem. Second Philippic 7-8, Cf. also Dem. Second
Philippic 17.

40Dem. On the Peace 22.

41Dem. First Olynthiac l4 and Cf. Herodotus
description of the nature of Persian Kings, Herodotus
3.134.

24

Beyond this restless activity, Demosthenes, and
especially Theopompus, find in Philip an evil and
treacherous nature. Demosthenes believes him to be very
jealous, particularly with regard to gaining glory. "[F]or
those who have resided at his court agree that Philip
is so jealous that he wants to take to himself all the
credit of the chief successes, and is more annoyed with a
general or an officer who achieves something praise worthy
than with those who fail ignominiously. . . ."42

Both Theopompus and Demosthenes accuse Philip of
leading an immoral and drunken life and associating only
with those who share his debauchments.43 The result of
this, they both claim, was that Philip shunned the company
of those who were upright and proper in their behavior. In
his arguments before the assembly, Demosthenes used this
assertion to point to the inherent weakness of Philip's
rule and the likely effects of stern resistance by the
Athenians. That is, if the Athenians would only resist,

Philip and his companions, because of their dissolute ways,

would readily be defeated.

 

42Dem. Answer to Philip's Letter 12. Cf. also Dem.
On Halonnesus 45. and Second Olynthiac 18.

43Dem. Second Olynthiac 18—19; Theopomp. quoted by
Polybius 8.9. 6-13; Theopomp. quoted by Athenaeus (4. 166-
167); Theopomp. quoted by Athenaeus (6. 259—260); and
Theopomp. quoted by Athenaeus (6. 260).
Plutarch also comments upon Philip's drunken behavior,
Plutarch Alexander 9.

 

 

 

 

 

25

An expected result of a character such as Philip was
said to have possessed was that he easily stooped to
bribery to accomplish his political ends, which bribery was
also accompanied by treachery.44 As Demosthenes phrases
it, "In a word, he has hoodwinked everyone that has had any
dealings with him; he has played upon the folly of each
party in turn and exploited their ignorance of his own
character. That is how he has gained his power."45
Libanius refers back to Philip as the arch—briber when he
says, "[S]o Philip's domination is due to Lasthenes,
Euthycrates and all the rest who reduced their states to

slavery while he fought with bribes, not arms."l'6

 

44Cf. Perlman, "The number of cases in which charges
were made against ambassadors because of bribe-taking is
quite small. This clearly confirms the view that bribing
ambassadors was not a very wide—spread custom. Moreover,
charges of bribe—taking were restricted to embassies to
Persia and Macedon. In these cases the prevailing custom
of bestowing gifts as a sign of hospitality . . . made it
possible to cast suspicion of bribery," S. Perlman, "On
Bribing Athenian Ambassadors," GreekL Roman, and Byzantine
Studies 17 (1976): 231-232.

45Dem. Second Olynthiac 7.

46Libanius Oration XLIX 26. Cf. also Diod. 16. 8.7
who asserts that Philip used coins minted at Philippoi to
bribe the Greeks. It seems the height of folly to bribe
someone with coins with your own picture on them, for how
would they be spent without revealing the fact that a bribe
had been accepted. According to Strauss, Philip's coins
were most likely to circulate in Macedonia, Thessaly, and
Thrace because these areas had adopted the Aeginetic weight
standard, in order to inhibit the use of Athenian coins for
local transactions. Barry Strauss, "Philip II of Macedon,
Athens, and Silver Mining," Hermes 112 (1984): 425.

26

By these many assertions about Philip's character,
Demosthenes cleverly built up a series of premises designed
to lead to the inescapable conclusion that the Athenians
ought both to fear and act against Philip. Moreover, he
built up a careful parallel between Philip and Athens,
the intent of which was to show that Philip possessed
characteristics opposite to those of the Athenians.

The following table briefly outlines the comparisons
brought forward by Demosthenes in his speeches:

By these means Demosthenes hoped to persuade the
Athenians to vigorously contend with Philip and to reverse
what had become a rather conservative policy under

Eubulus.47

Table II

Demosthenes' Comparison of Philip and Athens

 

Philip Athens
King and tyrant Constitutional democracy
Ambitious Restrained
Immoral Virtuous
Restless Orderly
Treacherous (bribery) Honest

 

47George Cawkwell, "Eubulus," JHS 83 (1963): 47—67.

 

27

The question that must be considered, however,
is the veracity of Demosthenes' account. Was he
rightly alerting the Athenians to the danger of Philip or
was he creating a caricature of Philip to further his own
policy preferences?

One cannot gainsay that Philip was a king, or that he
came to the Macedonian throne by the more or less normal
and accepted process.48 Whether his kingship necessarily
made him an opponent of constitutional democracy or of
Athens in particular is hardly proven. Surely it is clear
that Demosthenes exaggerates to make a point: that Philip,
as a king, is not likely to be favorably disposed to the
Athenians and their interests. In contradiction,

Philip was, throughout his career, extraordinarily
considerate of the Athenians, releasing their prisoners
without ransom, carefully negotiating with them time and
time again about points of disagreement, and even after
having defeated their armies, treating them with unwanted

gentlenessf'9

 

48

The argument rages over whether or not Philip was
regent before he became king (Justin 7.5; Diodorus
16.2.4). If he was a regent, his accession would have to
be considered somewhat irregular, since he would have set
aside the claims of the former king's son. However, there
was adequate precedent for such an action in Macedonian
history to account it an acceptable practice.

4got. Polyb. 5.9. 10—10.2.

 

28

R.M. Errington, in a recent review,50 points out that
Philip seemed only to be seeking a way to neutralize the
Athenian fleet when he concluded the Peace of 346. He
further suggests that, though Demosthenes supported the
treaty in 346: "In 343 however he [Demosthenes] chose to
cover up his tracks by pretending that Philip had
hoodwinked the Athenians by making vague promises.51 The
essential point of Errington's argument is that Philip's
behavior towards Athens seems unexpected only in the light
of the expectations created by Demosthenes' rhetoric. By
abandoning Demosthenes' viewpoint we are able to see
Philip's actions in a more objective and understandable
way.

As to Philip's moral failings, Demosthenes seems to be
using them as both a foil to the announced Athenian
character as well as a way to incite the dgmgg to action
against the king, portraying him as a villain against whom
the righteous pplig must naturally take arms just as it had

against the Persian despots.52

50R.M. Errington, "Review-Discussion: Four
Interpretations of Philip II," American Journal of Ancient

M2251 6 (1981): 76.

51Ibid.

2Pierre Leveque, "Philip's Personality," Philip of
MEEEQQEJ EMited by M.B. Hatzopoulos and L.D. Loukopoulos
(AFhentsz Ekdotike Athenon, 1980), p. 177: "As regards
Philip':3 Barbarism, which was the theme underlying
Demostluenes' orations, it is evident that this was only a
polemicnil argument without real historical value."

29

The vitriolic attacks of Theopompus on Philip's
character are not so easily dismissed as rhetorical
devices. Ostensibly, Theopompus was trying to explain
Philip's actions from the perspective of a historian and
so assertions regarding Philip's character ought to be
taken more seriously. Theopompus asserted that Philip:

1) showed no favor to good men, 2) surrounded himself
with men who were drinkers, gamblers, and dissolutes, and
3) was himself wasteful of material goods.53 The latter
Theopompus said was caused by Philip's constant soldiering
which left him no time "to count up revenues and
expenses."

However, some contemporary evidence contradicts both
Demosthenes or Theopompus. Aeschines, in describing the
first embassy to Philip, pictures Philip as understanding,
intelligent, and witty in his dealings with the ten

54

envoys. He also quotes Demosthenes as saying that Philip

55
was "the most wonderful man under the sun."

53Theopomp. quoted by Polybius (VIII.9. 6—13) and
IDEODomp. quoted by Athenaeus (IV. 166—167).

54Aeschin. On the Embassy 33-39.

'SSAeschin. On the Embassy 41. Interestingly,
Aeschines also quotes Demosthenes as telling the Ecclesia
Ehat Philip was not an especially great drinker because,

our l"hilocrates could beat him." (Aeschines On the

Max 52.)

30

Polybius saw Philip as being lenient and
humane.56 He also exonerates Philip's companions in the
following: "But in speaking of Philip and his friends not
only would one hesitate to accuse them of cowardice,
effeminacy, and shamelessness to boot, but on the contrary
if one set oneself the task of singing their praises one
could scarcely find terms adequate to characterize the
bravery, industry, and in general the virtue of these men
who indisputably by their energy and daring raised
Macedonia from the rank of a petty kingdom to that of the
d."57

greatest and most glorious monarchy in the worl

Diodorus Siculus also found praise for Philip's

character. "For King Philip excelled in shrewdness in the
act of war, courage, and brilliance of personality."58 He
describes Philip as courteous, loyal, and clever.59 In

addition, Diodorus cites Philip's calm and eloquence: "Yet

even so, with such fears and dangers threatening them,
Philip was not panic-stricken by the magnitude of the

expected perils, but, bringing together the Macedonians in

 

56Polyb. 5. 9. 10—1.2.

57Polyb. 8. 10. 5—6.

58Diod. 16. 1.6.

59Diod. 16. 3.3.

31

a series of assemblies and exhorting them with eloquent
speeches to men, he built up their morale. . . ."60
Even if we allow that Demosthenes is essentially

correct in his characterization of Philip's situation and
personality, no necessary link is evident between them

and the supposed interest of Philip in conquering Athens.
Other kings, such as Bardylis the Illyrian and Cersobleptes
the Thracian, were militarily and economically strong, yet
neither seemed interested in attacking Athens. The
northern kingdoms (e.g., Epirus, Illyria, Macedonia,
Thrace) seemed always to be engaged in fighting with each
other, not in attacking the Greeks. Moreover, it was not
necessary for a king to be dissolute to oppose the policies
and actions of the Athenians; there were perfectly rational
grounds for such opposition.

Moreover, opinion is divided as to the personal
qualities of Philip, although it is not impossible that in
him resided both the good and bad qualities ascribed to
him. In the end we must admit that we are insufficiently
acquainted with what animated and motivated Philip in any
of his actions.

An element of Philip's character not mentioned by

Demosthenes and Aeschines was his piety. Plutarch records

 

6ODiod. 16. 3.1—2.

32

that: "Philip fell in love with Olympias, Alexander's
mother, at the time when they were both initiated into the

61 The mysteries at Samothrace

mysteries at Samothrace."
involved earth-gods of fertility, and since Philip had no
children by his two previous marriages, his attendance at
such rituals may have been for the purpose of correcting
that problem.

Olympias was a passionate devotee of the orgiastic
cults, going so far as to introduce the celebration of
"extravagant and superstitious ceremonies."62 Plutarch
states that she was seen by Philip to have a serpent
sleeping beside her, which led him to believe that she was
the consort of a higher being.63 In order to achieve an
explanation for this phenomenon, Philip sent an ambassador
to Delphi to consult the oracle of Apollo, who told him to

"sacrifice to Zeus Ammon and to revere him above all other

deities."6"

 

61Plutarch Alexander 2.

62Plutarch Alexander 2.

 

63Plutarch Alexander 2.

 

64Plutarch Alexander 3. There was a long tradition of
consulting Apollo which can be traced back to the
foundation legends of Aigeai, G.T. Griffith and N.G.L.
Hammond, A History of Macedonia Vol. 2. (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1979), pp. 7-9. Alexander I dedicated gold statues
0f himself to both Apollo and Zeus, G.T. Griffith and
N.G.L. Hammond, A History of Macedonia, p. 103.

 

 

 

 

33

In 357, Philip delayed in signing an important treaty
of alliance with Olynthus while the oracle at Delphi was
consulted. Griffith points out that this was unusual in
the fourth century, although he argues that if it had been
Philip's normal practice, it would have been commented
upon.65 But an alternative argument may be given: that
his normal approach was to consult the Delphic oracle and
that it was only noted on this occasion because of the
delay it caused. It is also well known that Philip
dedicated the Battle of the Crocus Field to Apollo, even
adorning his troops with laurel wreaths.66 Though
participating in religious rituals does not prove Philip's
high moral character, the evidences for his piety cannot be
ignored in an estimate of his life.

Given the over—all lack of essential information, the
suggestion that Philip sought to conquer the Greek city—
states, and especially Athens, as a consequence of his
kingship or his character is unproven based on the
evidence. Demosthenes' assertion that this was the case
seems clearly to be a political and polemical stance to

arouse the Athenians to action. For, in spite of all

65G.T. Griffith and N.G.L. Hammond, A History of
Macedonia, pp. 244—245.

66Justin 8.2.

 

34

Demosthenes' assertions about Philip's desire to attack and
destroy Athens, Philip never attempted to do so. While
Philip certainly attempted to advance his own interests in
his frequent negotiations with Athens, he generally acted
towards her with restraint. Had Philip been bent upon the
destruction of Athens, it seems likely that he would have
attacked her soon after the battle of Chaeronea in 338.
Philip's restraint at that time surely indicates that,
whatever his goals, the obliteration of Athens was not

67

among them.

The relationships between kings other than Philip and
the Athenians seem to be characterized by the usual range
of opposition and friendship, depending upon the political
or military advantage to be gained by each side. The
relationships did not seem to hinge upon the views of the
kiJIgS toward democracy, but rather of advantage or
(Elsadvantage. So we find the Thracian kings Cotys and
Cersobleptes ranged sometimes with the Athenians and
Efinnetimes against them, depending upon the situation of the

mOment.

7Larsen points out that Philip carefully followed the
League of Corinth's stipulations regarding such matters as
tbs? freedom and autonomy of the members, protection of
existing constitutions, and the prevention of revolutions.
herefore, Philip's approach of restraint included not just
Athens, but all of Greece, J.A.O. Larsen, "Representative
Overnment in the Panhellenic Leagues," Classical Philology

20 (1925): 31.4

35

We should also keep in mind that not all of Philip's
contemporaries found him the corrupt megalomaniac that
Demosthenes describes. Aeschines relates that one
Ctesiphon, an Athenian envoy, returned from a meeting
with Philip and "told of marked kindness of his
reception. . . ."68 Later in the same speech Aeschines
also notes that the ambassador Aristodemus, "reported
Philip's great friendliness toward the city, and added this
besides, that Philip even wished to become an ally of our

69

state." In both cases Aeschines is recalling to the jury
reports to the Assembly, so the likelihood of their truth
is great, since their falsehood would be easily detected by
the jury.

Aeschines also describes a conversation among the
mnbassy members on their way back to Athens during which
(H:esiphon said that, "he had never looked upon so charming

7O . . .
." During this same conversation

anti lovable a man.
Denuosthenes is reported to have declared, "that Philip was

thfii most wonderful man under the sun." Aeschines supports

tinis portion of his defense by the testimony of his

 

 

68Aeschin. On the Embassy 13.

 

69Aeschin. On the Embassy 17.

7OAeschin. On the Embassy 42.

36

colleagues in the embassy. While such support could be
less reliable than public reports to the assembly, it must
be given some weight since the jury did acquit Aeschines of
the charges against him.

On balance the evidence seems to suggest that Philip
was neither the drunken megalomaniac described by
Demosthenes nor opposed to Athens merely as the result of
his kingship. If Philip sought to conquer Athens or other

Greek city—states, other reasons must be adduced.

CHAPTER 4

The Relative Wealth of Macedonia and Greece

Whether or not Philip's greed was a motive for his
interest in Greece is a complex issue. At the beginning we
must recognize that we cannot know from the sources
available to us what his attitudes were during his reign;
therefore, there is no possibility of knowing directly if
the desire for wealth was a motivating factor, either in a
general way or specifically with regard to the Greek city-
states. We have already observed that some did not see
Philip as a particularly rational man, and this may indeed
have been the case. Our analysis can show only whether or
not a reasonable person would have viewed the conquest of
Greece as an economically advantageous enterprise. The
best we may hope for is to conclude that if Philip was
reasonable, he would have determined that an attack on
Greece for economic reasons either was or was not likely to
prove advantageous.

Another complicating factor is that a reasonable
man in ancient times did not possess the analytic and

conceptual tools that a modern reasonable man would bring

37

 

38

to the issue. Such elementary modern concepts as return
on investment and net present value were entirely lacking
in that time, as was the mathematical framework in which
to calculate them. The determination of gain, loss, and
risk was a much cruder and more intuitive matter in
Philip's age.

Moreover, accurate information upon which to base
any judgement had to have been incomplete and inaccurate.
As seen in the numerical figures given by ancient
writers, the most common method used to derive them must
have been estimation. While the Athenians appear to have
been reasonably careful accountants, there is little
evidence that this trait was wide—spread. Moreover, even
in Athens, the accounting activities were narrowly focused
and the information not widely available.

Philip also had to contend with the fact that he was
frequently in the field with his army, and therefore most
often involved with the day to day management of the
military. Obtaining the opportunities for careful and calm
reflection on complex economic issues must have been
difficult. Philip also suffered from several wounds and at
least one severe illness, neither of which lends itself
to contemplation on the economy. Even in peace time Philip

would necessarily been actively engaged in internal

39

policy,71 directing his own government, and dealing with a
large and difficult family.72

Given all these factors, Philip still made decisions,
many of which were asserted to have been driven primarily
by economic motives. Justin states: "Next, as if
everything that he meditated was lawful for him to do, he
seized upon the gold mines in Thessaly, and the silver ones
in Thrace, and to leave no law or right unviolated,

73 Likewise Demosthenes,

proceeded to engage in piracy."
". . . and that he [Philip] is all the time repeatedly
seizing the property of the other Greeks and of the
barbarians, and so equipping himself for an attack upon
us."74
Justin leads us to believe that Philip's primary
economic target was precious metals, to be found in various

mines; Demosthenes, and Justin to a certain extent, view

"property" as Philip's target. This differentiation

 

1He apparently had an active resettlement program
within Macedonia. (Arrian 7.9).

2See especially Carney, Elizabeth, "Olympias,"
Ancient Society 18 (1987): 35-62. and also Plutarch
Alexander 9.3.

3Justin 8.3. Cf. also Justin 9.1 for similar
assertions.

74Dem. On the Chersonese 6.

 

40

between mineral wealth and other valuables raises the issue
of what should be taken into account in determining
economic value.

Clearly, gold and silver, either in coins or bullion
or yet in mines, constituted an economically advantageous
acquisition. Coins or bullion could be immediately spent
for necessary supplies, including troops, or could be saved
against future needs. Mines constituted an even more
valuable asset. Possession of a mine insured a steady and
predictable stream of bullion. The disadvantages of mines
are the costs of protecting them and extracting the ore.

Other metals, such as copper, tin, and iron, would
also have had great intrinsic value as they provided
the raw materials for both weapons and tools. Both copper
and tin were usually obtained from outside the boundaries
of Greece and Macedonia; however, control of the trade
routes to such minerals or of areas with large stores of
such materials could be both reasonable and practical.

Other natural resources overlooked in the sources
which simplistically stress only bullion, also could have
direct economic value. Among them are timber, agricultural
products, and products from the sea. Timber, of course,
is an essential building product, especially for ships, in
which so much of ancient trade took place. Agricultural

products feed the populace and are also of great value in

41

trade. Products from the sea, such as shrimp, fish, and
murex shells, can be valuable both as food-stuffs and as
manufacturing items. These products can be used in trade
as well.

The range of economically advantageous materials is
rather broad. The possible economic motives are,
therefore, correspondingly complex. It is worth examining
the relative status of Macedonia and the Greek city—states
with regard to their resources dealing first with Macedonia
and then the Greeks.

In precious metals, Macedonia was well provided with
gold and silver. Strabo cites Mt. Vermion as a gold-
producing center, although some doubt has been cast upon
this assertion by modern scholars.75 Three other areas of
mineral exploitation were certainly in use by the sixth
century B.C. The first area was the basin of the Echedoros
river (now the Gallikos) which was a site for both working
and smelting gold. Nearby was a silver mine cited by
Herodotus as producing a talent a day in the time

of Alexander 1.76

75Strabo Geography 14.680. Cf. E.N. Borza, "The
Natural Resources of Early Macedonia," Philip II, Alexander
£39 Great and the Macedonian Heritage. Edited by N.L.
Adams and E.N. Borza (Washington, D.C.: University Press
of America, 1982), p. 8 for the modern view.

76Herodotus The History 5.17.

 

 

 

42

The second area is that around Mt. Pangaion, including
the region of Krenides, which Philip renamed Philippi after
capturing it in 356 B.C. This area produced both silver
and gold. Diodorus says that the output of this area was
insignificant prior to its acquisition by Philip.77
However, Borza has argued compellingly that Diodorus must
have been referring only to the gold production since there
is evidence of early and abundant silver production.78
Diodorus put the production of this area under Philip at
1000 talents per year.79

The third major mining area extended from the Volvi—
Koroneia lake corridor to the southern slope of the central
Chalkidian ranges. Even though not worked before the
middle of the fourth century, these ranges contain the most
evidence of ancient mining in Macedonia. It is not certain
whether the mines were opened by Philip or by the
Olynthians.

According to Borza, "In antiquity the mines of eastern

Macedonia produced enough gold and silver to support

 

77Qipd; 16.8.7. Cf. Arrian Anabasis 7.9.3.

Borza, "The Natural Resources of Early Macedonia,"
p010.

79Diod. 16.8.7.

43

excellent local coinages, make the region attractive to
foreigners, help support the ambitions of Macedonian kings
from Alexander I to Perseus, and enable Macedonia to enjoy
the reputation of being one of the most important precious—
metal sources in the ancient Mediterranean world."80
Philip was the first Macedonian king to strike coins
in gold.81 Although it is widely agreed that he began
minting silver coins early in his reign, there is serious
disagreement over just when the gold issues were produced.
Georges le Rider has argued for a date between 345—342
B.C., which means that little was struck during Philip's
lifetime. Le Rider suggests that: "Thus we have to do
with a very limited coinage bearing little relationship to
the wealth claimed by Diodoros for the mines of Philippi,
and not very likely to have brought the Macedonian king
substantial means."82

Against this view, Martin has argued that the date of

first minting gold coins should be placed in the

 

80
P. 10.

Borza, "The Natural Resources of Early Macedonia,"

81George Le Rider, "The Coinage of Philip and the
Pangaian Mines," Philip of Macedon. Edited by M.B.
HatZOpoulos and L.D. Loukopoulos (Athens: Ekdotike

Athenon, 1980), p. 48.

82Ibid., p. 49.

44
mid—3505.83 The crux of the argument is a hoard of coins
found in Corinth. The dating of the coins hinges upon
whether or not the hoard was an ordinary savings hoard or
an emergency hoard. Martin's argument that it was a
savings hoard seems compelling, and therefore his dating of
the first struck gold coins to the mid—3508 seems to be the
correct one.

It is also to be remembered that coinage was not the
only product of Pangaion metals. Many workshops have been
discovered in the area which produced the highest quality
jewelry, vessels, and other objects of great artistic
value. Athenaeus provides the following story in
corroboration: "As a matter of fact, gold was really very
scarce in Greece in ancient times, and the silver to be
found in the mines was not considerable. Duris of Samos
therefore, says that Philip, the father of King Alexander
the Great, always kept the small gold saucer which he owned
lying under his pillow."84

As to timber resources, Theophrastus states, "The best

timber which comes into Greece for the carpenter's use is

 

83Thomas Martin, Sovereignty and Coinage in Classical

Greece (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press,
1985), p. 49.

84Ath. Deipnosophistae 6.231.

45

."85 Macedonia produced not only abundant

Macedonian. . .
timber, but that which was most useful, especially for the
building of ships on which so much of Greek commerce
depended. Greek ships were constructed of oak, fir, pine,
and beech, all of which Macedonia grew in abundance.86

Macedonian timber was sufficiently important to the
Greeks, especially to Sparta and Athens during the
Peloponnesian War, that Macedonia became a far—flung
theater of that war. It is arguable that the Spartan
strategy of Brasidas was to interdict the supply of
ship building woods to Athens at its source. If that were
accomplished, it would have helped to reduce the dramatic
superiority of Athens on the sea.

The agricultural resources of Macedonia were
substantial. As Borza states: "The region possesses large
alluvial plains, abundant rainfall throughout the year, and
cultivable terrace lands on the lower slopes of mountains.
Moreover, Macedonia's major rivers flow year-round,

permitting both natural and artificial irrigation for crop

and pasture land. The large mountain ranges also provide

 

85Theophrastus History of Plants 5.2.1.

 

86Borza, "The Natural Resources of Early Macedonia,"
pp. 2'30

46

well-watered summer pasture on their upper slopes and
basins, a phenomenon that has sustained herdsmen for
centuries."87
As to specific crops, Theopompus states: "in parts of
Philip's domain, round about Bisaltia, Amphipolis, and
Grastonia, in Macedonia, the fig—trees produce figs, the
vines grapes, the olive-trees olives, in the middle of the
spring, at the time when you would expect them to be just
bursting forth, and that Philip was lucky in
everything."88
There are other ancient literary fragments which bear
upon Macedonian agriculture and products. Athenaeus quotes
Archestratus as giving this advice: "If ever you go to

Iasus, city of the Carians, you will get a good—sized

shrimp. But it is rare in the market, whereas in Macedonia

 

 

and Ambracia there are plenty."89 Quoting Dorotheus,
Athenaeus says: "Philip of Macedon and his son Alexander
were apple—lovers . . ."90 From these two fragments we may
87Ibid., p. 12.
88 .
Theopompus quoted in Athenaeus, 3.77.
89

Ath. Deipnosophistae, 3. 105e.

 

90Ath. Deipnosophistae, 7. 276f.

 

47

conclude that the Macedonians harvested what they could
from the sea and that the Macedonian climate favored the
growth of at least some fruit trees.

A drawback to greater agricultural productivity
was the swampy, marshy nature of the Eumathian plain, the
core of ancient Macedonia. Farmers were forced to
cultivate the surrounding slopes as well as whatever land
they could recover from the marshes' edge. In addition to
the hardship it caused to the farmers, this area was the
breeding ground of two strains of Anopheles mosquito which
made malaria endemic in ancient Macedonia.91

To sum up the natural resources of Macedonia, we may
say that she was uncommonly blessed with both precious
metals and timber, and relatively well—off with
agricultural conditions and produce. As Borza says: "But
we do come away with a vivid impression of a relatively
rich land whose abundance was exploited to the extent that
a primitive technology and frequent political instability

permitted."92

 

91Borza, "Natural Resources," pp. 16—19 and E. Borza,
"Some Observations on Malaria and the Ecology of Central
Macedonia in Antiquity," American Journal of Ancient
History 4 (1979): 102-124.

92Borza, "The Natural Resources of Early Macedonia,"
pp. 19—20. Griffith argues, however, that Macedonia was
relatively poor just prior to Philip's accession due to an
underdeveloped economy and the strain of paying tribute to
the Illyrians, G.T. Griffith and N.G.L. Hammond, A History
of Macedon, p. 192.

 

 

 

48

A comprehensive review of the natural resources for
all of Greece in the fourth century, B.C. is beyond the
scope of this paper, though necessary for a definitive
analysis of an economic motive for attacking Greece. I
will review in some detail the resources of Athens, since
she was said by Demosthenes to be a prime target of
Philip's efforts and because there is considerable
information available on the Athenian economy in the fourth
century. I will also review the wealth associated with the
Delphic oracle, since it had been the site of Apollo's
oracle for several centuries and the recipient of many
donations.

As for the economy of the remainder of Greece, a
briefer, more general review will be undertaken in
deference to the relative paucity of sources and in the
interest of brevity. The primary sources for contemporary
economic conditions are Isocrates and Xenophon, both of
whom centered their comments on Athens, but whose insights
allow us a broader view of the Greek economy of the
PEriod. The first step will be to review the picture
Isocrates gives us of economic conditions in the middle of

the fourth century (his writings cover the period 380 to

49

339 B.C.).93 That Isocrates believes that the Greek
economic situation is desperate throughout this period is
shown by Fuks: "This signalling and evocation of

the terrible situation in Greece is not specifically
connected with any particular event, or set of events, of
his time, nor with any particular oration, or group of
orations, in the political writings of Isocrates. It
starts with Isokrates' first Hellenic discourse, the

Panegyrikos, written in 380 B.C., and goes all the way

 

through to the Panathenaikos, composed in the late forties
or early thirties of the fourth century. Thus, the
situation signalled and reacted to by Isokrates is that of
the roughly fifty years between the king's peace and

. . y . "94

Philip 8 Victory at Chaeronea.

Isocrates' description of the economic life during

this period is: "pirates command the seas and mercenaries

occupy our cities, where citizens, instead of waging war in

defense of their territories against strangers are fighting

 

93Both A. Fuks ["Isokrates and the Social—Economic
situation in Greece," Ancient Society 3 (1972): 17-44] and
P.G. Van Soesbergen ["Colonisation as a Solution to Social—
Economic Problems in Fourth-Century Greece," Ancient
Society 13/14 (1982/83): 131—145] offer excellent analyses
of Isocrates' View of the social and economic situation in
fourth century Greece.

94A. Fuks, "Isokrates and the Social—Economic
Situation in Greece," Ancient Society 3 (1972): 18.

 

50

within their own walls against each other; where more
cities have been captured in war than before we made the
peace; and where revolutions follow so thickly upon each
other that those who are at home in their own countries are
more dejected than those who have been punished with

exile."95

In describing the condition of the
Peloponnesians after the battle of Leuctra in 371,
Isocrates says: "they have been so levelled by the
misfortunes that no man can discern who among themselves
are the most wretched; not one of their states is unscathed
- their fields have been laid waste, their cities sacked,
their homes everted; their constitutions have been
overturned and their laws abolished; they feel such
distrust and such hatred of each other that they fear their
fellow-citizens more than the enemy."96
The result of these pervasive political and economic
calamities is a class of wandering poor, forced to become
mercenaries to live: "we have engendered wars and internal
strife among ourselves; and, in consequence, some of us are
being put to death against the law in our own countries,

others are wandering with their women and children in

strange lands and many, compelled by the lack of

 

95Isocrates Panegyrikos 114—116.

96Isocrates Archidamus 64—67.

 

 

51

necessities of life, become mercenaries and are being slain
fighting for their foes against their friends."97 Even so
great a city as Athens cannot escape the problem: "[the
poor] draw lots in front of the law—courts to determine
whether they . . . shall have the necessities of life. . .
They appear in the public choruses in garments spangled
with gold, yet live through the winter in clothing which

"98

one refuses to describe. Fuks argues that this

characterization applies not only to refugees driven to
Athens but to Athenian citizens as well.99

The overall economic status of Greece is considered by
Isocrates to be desperate, resulting in the significant
unemployment and dislocation of its citizens and in the
increase in stasis within the cities, further exacerbating
an already grim economic situation. In addition, many men
are driven to the life of the mercenary in order to live,
thus helping perpetrate the internecine warfare.

As we have seen, Athens was not exempt from the

economic problems besetting all of Greece. However, since

 

97Isocrates Panegyrikos 167. As Fuks points out,
Isocrates may be exaggerating the picture for rhetorical
effect, but it must contain a good measure of truth to be
effective at all.

98Isocrates Areopagiticus 54.

 

99A. Fuks, "Isokrates," pp. 24 & 26.

52

Demosthenes repeatedly asserted that Athens was the special
target of Philip's hostility, a more detailed review of her
economic status is in order. Garland characterizes Athens'
financial status as, "at no time . . . more than the ghost,

"100 He

financially speaking, of her former Periklean self.
finds that Athens is especially troubled at the end of the
Social War (354): "When it ended in 354 all that remained
in Athens' possession was, in Aischines' memorable phrase
(2.71) "a few wretched islanders'", from whom a mere 60
talents were exacted annually in tribute. The Athenian
state was in effect bankrupt, her entire revenue comprising
only 130 talents (Dem. 37). A revealing indication of the
level of anxiety regarding the state of Athens' finances at
this time is provided by Xenophon's poroi (3.13) which
contains recommendations for the improvement of trading
facilities in the Piraeus based on the observation that a
substantial proportion of the metic population had left
Athens."101
A review of individual products of Attica at the time

of Philip shows a number of items. With respect to

precious metals, Athens was in the fortunate position of

 

100Robert Garland, The Piraeus (Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 1987), p. 45.

101

 

Ibid., p. 43.

53

owning the silver mines at Laurium.102 These mines had
provided Athens with a steady income from the sixth century
until the Spartans occupied Decelea in 413. This
occupation effectively shut down the mining operations and
20,000 slaves who worked there fled to Decelea to escape
the treacherous working conditions.103 Mining operations
appear to have begun again at Laurium in the 390's. The
Athenian registers which record the number of mines leased
each year are extant for several years.104 The oldest
inscription is from 367/66 and lists seventeen mines. The
largest is from 342/41 and lists the leasing of 140 mines.

Based upon the above lists and the operational costs
of operating the mines, Isager and Hansen have suggested
that in the peak years of 340—330, the annual silver
production must have been about 1,000 talents. It is to be
noted that seven of the ten peak years fall after the
battle of Chaeronia. Also noteworthy is the fact that
in the 350's the revenues of Athens were of sufficient

concern that Xenophon argued that the state should purchase

10,000 slaves and even take over the running of the mines

 

 

 

102Cf. Xen. Ways and Means 1. 5.
103Thucydides The Peloppnnesian War 8. 27.5.
104

This information as well as that immediately
fOJJAJwing is from Isager and Hansen Aspects of Athenian

Mi. p. 43.

 

54

instead of leasing them.105 Xenophon also states: "Then
why, it may be asked, are fewer new cuttings made nowadays
than formerly? Simply because those interested in the
mines are poorer. For operations have only lately been
resumed and a man who makes a new cutting incurs a serious
risk."106

Strauss considers the interesting assertion that
Philip intentionally tried to bring down the price of
silver in order to damage Athens' economy.107 In this
article Strauss demonstrates that Philip neither minted
sufficient silver nor circulated it widely enough to affect
Athens' silver industry. He also concludes that not only
were Laurium's mining investors, as a group, not hostile to
Philip, but that they may have been pro-Macedonian, because
of their fear of nearby Thebes.108

With respect to gold, Athens was less fortunate, for
no gold in any significant amount is to be found in

Attica. Apparently it was also deficient in iron and

copper, for Pseudo-Xenophon states: "However, it is for

 

105Xen. Ways and Means 4. 6—32.

106Xen. Ways and Means 4. 28.

l
O7Strauss, Philip II, p. 419.

1
OSlbid., p. 426.

55

these very things that I have my ships: timber from one

place, iron from another, copper from another, flax from

"109

another, wax from another. Tin was not available in

any nearby area and was probably obtained indirectly from

the west.110

The Attic peninsula was sparsely forested in classical
times, although Aristophanes includes charcoal—burners in

his play Acharnians.111 To make up this shortage the

 

Athenians imported wood, some for the smelting operations
at Laurium, but most for the building of ships. The
favored source for this import was Macedonia, which, as we
have seen, had a plentiful supply of all the required

timbers.112 Some timber was possibly imported from Syria

also.113
The biggest shortfall of Athenian agricultural produce

was in grain. Nor was Athens able to import this item

from her neighbors who were also no better than subsistence

 

 

 

 

 

109Pseudo—Xenophon The Constitution of the Athenians
II. 11.

110Isager and Hansen, Aspects of Athenian Society,
p. 31.

111 . -

Aristophanes Acharnians 211 ff.

112Isager and Hansen, Aspects of Athenian Society,
p. 30.

113

lbid., p. 30.

56

producers.114 Consequently, Athens developed a very
lengthy supply line for this vital commodity, whose major
source was the Bosporus area of the Black Sea. However,
Athens also sought grain from Egypt, Sicily, and the P0

115 Isager and Hansen estimate the annual amount of

valley.
grain imported into Athens at 2—2.75 million medimni out
of a total consumption of 2.5-3.25 million medimni. On
these figures, Athens was dependent on imports for 80% or
more of her annual grain requirements.

Of other produce, we know that the olive flourished in
Attica to the extent that it was a constant item of
export. Grapes were also abundant, but probably not in
sufficient numbers to meet the demand of the Athenians. At
least there is little evidence of export.

Outside of olives, the Laurium silver mines, which
were not operating at anywhere near capacity, marble,
and good clay,the Athenians could not be said to enjoy a
particular advantage in natural resources. Did the
Athenians, then, possess other forms of wealth, such as
large reserves of bullion or coins? At first one might

think so given the statement of Demosthenes that: "With

-regard.to the supply of money, you have money, men of

 

 

114lbid., p. 20.

1151bid., pp. 23—24.

57

Athens; you have more than any other nation has for
military purposes. But you appropriate it yourselves, to
suit your own pleasure. Now if you will spend it on the
campaign, you have no need of further supply."116
Demosthenes also said: "For war—galleys, men in abundance,
money and material without stint, everything by which one
might gauge the strength of our cities, these we as a body
possess today in number and quantity far beyond the Greeks
of former times."117

The essence of Demosthenes' contention is that money
which might have been used for military purposes went
instead, by law, to the Theoric Fund out of which admission
to the theatre and other civic functions was paid.
Moreover, no one could move the repeal of this law except
he stand trial for his life. So Demosthenes indirectly
encourages the assembly to reconsider the utility of the
law promulgating the Theoric Fund.

His assertions about having more money than other

nations and more than former times must be received

sceptically. However true it may be that Athens was

 

116Dem. First Olynthiac 19.

117Dem. Third Philippic 40. See also First Philippic

4() for‘ similar sentiments.

 

 

58

wealthier than other Greek city—states, it surely could not
stand comparison with the Great King or Macedonia. Nor
does the comparison with previous times stand—up, since the
annual Athenian income was 130 talents in 355 and 400
talents in 346 as compared to 1000 talents during the
height of the empire.118 Demosthenes himself seems at
times to acknowledge the truth. In the Fourth Philippic he
says: "Nothing in the world does Athens need so much as

.119

money for approaching exigencies.' Moreover, some other

incidents also point to a shortage of funds. Diodorus

reports that in 356: "Chares, now that he had succeeded to
the command of the whole fleet and was eager to relieve the

Athenians of its expense, undertook a hazardous

operation."120

Another strategos, Iphicrates, worried about being
able to feed his troops (in 347): was tarrying near
Corcyra with a naval force and [since] Dionysius the
tyrant of Syracuse had shipped to Olympia and to Delphi
statues cunningly wrought in gold and ivory, Iphicrates,

Chancing to fall in with the ships that were conveying

'

118Figures cited by Cawkwell in his article "EubulUS,'
JHS 83 (1963): 61—62.

119Dem. Fourth Philippic 31.

120Diod. 16. 22.1.

59

these statues, seized them and sent word to the Athenian
people inquiring what he should do with them; whereat the
Athenians instructed him not to raise questions about what
concerned the gods but to give his attention to seeing that
his soldiers were well fed. Now Iphicrates, obeying the
decision of his country, sold as booty the work of art

belonging to the gods."121

Apparently commanders in the field were expected to
support themselves as much as possible from the resources
of their theatres of operations. That a strategos, distant
from the Athenian ecclesia, might find some novel ways to
raise funds is at least understandable. But for the
Athenian assembly to command the theft of sacred offerings
to defray campaign expenses argues a level of
impoverishment and need that may by classified as
desperate.

In summary we find that Athens was not particularly
well endowed with natural resources though the olive was
Plentiful and the Laurium silver mines occasionally
Provided respectable revenues. In spite of Demosthenes'
Protestations to the contrary, Athens' conservative

financial policies122 and inability to support her armies

 

121Diod. 16. 57. 1-3.

122Cf. George Cawkwell, "Eubulus," p. 61.

60

in the field suggest a rather serious shortage of currency.
Nor is this particularly surprising, with mine leases being
very few and grain imports at a high level, there would
have been a need to utilize manufactured goods, olives, or
silver to offset the trade imbalance. Likely all three
were utilized, but even they were just sufficient to
provide the vital grain supply and maintain the Theoric
Fund. Precious little seems to have been available for
military adventures.123

The discussion to this point has involved only state
revenues and expenditures. Individual Athenians may have
possessed substantial personal wealth, but were unwilling
to yield it up for state purposes. 0n the other hand, the
struggle to fund the liturgiesle and the well-attested
willingness of the assembly to tax the wealthy suggest that
the amount of private wealth was not great during this
period either.

Outside of Athens the most likely source of wealth
would normally have been the oracle of Apollo at Delphi.

For many centuries offerings had been made to the Pythian

 

123Demosthenes frequently argues indirectly that money
Should be diverted from the Theoric Fund. This would not
seem to have been necessary if monies could have been
raised easily in other ways.

124Dem. 0n the Symmories.

 

61

god by states and individuals, both Greek and non—Greek.
As examples, we have already noted the statues from Dion of
Syracuse destined for Apollo which Iphicrates intercepted
en route and sold to feed his troops. Livy records an
embassy no doubt bearing gifts to Apollo from Rome in the
8th century B.C.125 Perhaps the most notable offerings
were presented by Croesus the Lydian as recorded by
Herodotus.126

However, this traditional source of revenue had become
unavailable. When the Amphictyonic Council levied
substantial penalties against the Phocians in 358, they
rebelled under the leadership of Philomelos and seized the
city of Delphi and the holy shrine.127 Thus began the
Second Sacred War which was to rack Greece for the next ten
years. Philomelus was able to finance the initial seizure
of the city and shrine through his own funds as well as a
contribution of fifteen talents from Archidamos, the
Spartan king.128

Upon seizing the oracle Philomelus not only eradicated

the pronouncements of the Amphictyons, but also announced

 

125Livy 1.56—57.

126Herodotus 1.50-51.

127Diod. 16. 23—25.

128Diod. 16. 24.2.

62

his intention not to "plunder the oracle" nor to commit

129 n . . .
other unlawful acts, explaining that he had seized
Delphi, not with any designs upon its sacred properties but
to assert a claim to the guardianship of the

."130 Moreover, he told the other Greeks

sanctuary . .
that: ". . . he would render due account of the property
to all the Greeks and expressed himself as ready to report
the weight and number of the dedications to all who wished
an examination.131 At the beginning of the Sacred War, in
357, it appears as though the temple treasury remained
intact, although even at this early date Diodorus refers to
the Phocians as "temple—robbers".132
Facing attack by a large Boeotian army, Philomelus was
pressured into hiring mercenaries to assist in the
defense. For this purpose, ". . . he was compelled to lay
his hands on the sacred dedications and to plunder the

oracle."133

While successful in gathering a large
mercenary force, Philomelus lost his battle against the

Boeotian forces, and his life.

 

129Diod. 16. 24.5.

130Diod. 16. 27.3.
131Diod. 16. 27.4.
132Diod. 16. 28.4.
133

Diod. 16. 30.2.

63

Onomarchus, then rallied the defeated forces, returned
them safely to Delphi, and persuaded the Phocians to
continue the war.134 Diodorus reports that Onomarchus had
no qualms in using the temple dedications: "Onomarchus,
when he had been chosen general in supreme command,
prepared a great supply of weapons from the bronze and
iron, and having struck coinage from the silver and gold
distributed it among the allied cities and chiefly gave it
as bribes to the leaders of those cities."135

During the following year at Volo, Philip soundly
defeated the Phocians and killed Onomarchus. The routed
forces of the Phocians were withdrawn by Phayllus, the
brother of Onomarchus. In order to strengthen his
position, he hired more mercenaries at double the normal
rate of pay. Additionally: "He got ready also a large

"136 Later

supply of arms and coined gold and silver money.
in his history Diodorus reiterates this point: "For since
he [Phayllus] had an inexhaustible supply of money he

gathered a large body of mercenaries, and persuaded not a

few allies to co—operate in renewing the war. In fact, by

making lavish use of his abundance of money he not only

 

134Diod. 16. 32.

135Diod. 16. 33.2.

136Diod. 16. 36.1.

64

procured many individuals as enthusiastic helpers, but also
lured the most renowned cities into joining his
enterprise."137
This theme of bribery by the Phocians permeates the
account of Diodorus, for he returns to it again in the same
chapter: "Not a few of the lesser cities as well actively
supported the Phocians because of the abundance of money
that had been distributed; for gold that incites man's
covetousness compelled them to desert to the side which
would enable them to profit from their gains."138
Despite his mercenaries and bribery, Phayllus suffered
defeat at the hands of the Boeotian forces after a brief
success in Locris.139 After rebounding to defeat the
Boeotians in a surprise attack at Narycaea, Phayllus fell
sick and died. The leadership of the Phocians then fell to
Phalaecus, son of Phayllus.140 Phalaecus was even less

successful in battle than was Phayllus, for the Boeotians

not only were able to seize some of their cities formerly

 

137Diod. 16. 37.2.

138Diod. 16. 37.4.

139Diod. 16. 38.3.

140Paus. 10.2.6. Diodorus says that Phalaecus was the

son of Onomarchus, which seems possible by the chronology.
(Diodorus 16. 38.5).

65

captured by the Phocians, but also: ". . . with a large
army invaded Phocis, sacked the greater portion of it and
plundered the farms throughout the countryside; and having
taken also some of the small towns and gathered an
abundance of booty, they returned to Boeotia."141
Interestingly, Phalaecus was removed from command shortly
thereafter on charges of having stolen sacred properties
for his own use.142

Diodorus gives a summary and estimate of the value of
the treasures at Delphi utilized by the successive Phocian
commanders during the Sacred War: "For he [Phayllus]
coined for currency one hundred twenty gold bricks which
had been dedicated by Croesus King of the Lydians weighing
two talents each, and three hundred sixty golden goblets
weighing two minae each, and golden statues of a lion and
of a woman, weighing in all thirty talents of gold, so that
the sum total of gold that was coined into money, referred
to the standard of silver, is found to be four thousand
talents, while of the silver offerings, these dedicated by

Croesus and all the others, all three generals had spent

more than six thousand talents' worth, and if to these were

 

141Diod. 16. 39. 7—8.

142Diod. 16. 56.3 and Pausanias 10.2.7.

66

added the gold dedications, the sum surpassed ten thousand
talents."143
The massive fortune of the oracle proved only to
delay, not deter, the punishment of the Phocians; for when
they had come to the end of it, they could no longer resist
the forces of the Amphictyons, especially after the Thebans
asked Philip to join.144 Aeschines gives us a clear
summary of the Phocian situation: "For the same thing that
built up the power of the tyrants in Phocis, destroyed it
also: they established themselves in power by daring to
lay hands on the treasures of the shrine, and by the use of
mercenaries they put down the free governments; and it was
lack of funds that caused their overthrow, when they had
spent all their resources on these mercenaries. The third
cause of their ruin was mutiny, such as usually attends

"145

armies which are poorly supplied with funds. Phalaecus,

reinstated as leader of the Phocian troops, or at least the
mercenaries, stationed himself at Thermopylae to oppose the

entrance of Philip into Greece. However, Phalaecus chose

143Diod. 16. 56.6.

144Diod. 16. 59.

145Aeschin. On the Embassy 131—132. Cf. also A.W.
Packxird—Cambridge, "The Rise of Macedonia," Cambridge
flEEJfiggt History, Vol. 3, edited by J.B. Bury, S.A. Cook,
and IP.E. Adcock (New York: MacMillan, 1927), p. 240.

 

 

67

the wiser course when faced with Philip's seasoned army:
"But Phalaecus, who was tarrying in Nicaea and saw that he
was no match for Philip, sent ambassadors to the king to
treat for an armistice."146

There must also have been much spent on supplies for
the suddenly enlarged Phocian army, either directly by the
Phocians or by the soldiers with the pay given them. The
main items purchased were probably armor, weapons, and
food. Given the ravished state of both Phocis and Boeotia,
food must have been rather scarce, and so there must have
been a brisk trade in those commodities. One might also
expect that much of the weaponry would have to be imported,
even though the bronze treasures were apparently converted
into weapons.

If the aforementioned hypotheses are correct, the
wealth of Phocis' allies should have increased since they
would be the only local source of such supplies. To
demonstrate this occurrence one would first look for hoards
of Phocian coinage of the period in Athens, Sparta, and
Achaea, the most likely allied sources of supply. There

47

. 1
are, however, no such hoards known to eXist. Upon

reflection, this is not surprising, since the source was so

 

146Diod. 16. 59.2.

147Thomas Martin, Coinage in Classical Greece, p. 287.

 

68

tainted they were probably melted down immediately and
traded for local specie.

We find some support for this view in Athenaeus;
"Anaximenes of Lampsacus, in the work entitled First

Inquiries says that the necklace of Eriphyle became famous

 

merely because gold was at that time rare among the Greeks;
indeed, it was even unusual to see a silver drinking cup in
those days. But after the seizure of Delphi by the
Phocians, all such things as that took on abundance. Even
those who were reputed to be very rich used to drink from
bronze cups, and they called the receptacles for these
'bronze—boxes.' And so Herodotus says that the priests of
the Egyptians drank from bronze cups, and that once, when
their kings were offering sacrifices together, not enough
silver cups to be given to all could be found; at any rate,
Psammethicus, being younger than all the other kings,
poured his libation from a bronze cup. Be that as it may,
when the Pythian shrine was looted by the Phocian usurpers,
gold flamed up everywhere among the Greeks, and silver also
came romping in."148
Some of the treasure was in the form of jewelry and

was conscripted by the leading women of Phocis. Ephorus

 

148Ath. Deipnosophistae 6. 231C — 231d.

 

69

(quoted by Athenaeus) relates that: "Not only did
Onomarchus, Phayllus, and Phalaecus convey away all the
possessions of the god, but to cap all this, their wives
took the jewelry of Eriphyle, which Alcmaeon had dedicated
in Delphi at the god's command, and also the necklace of
Helen which Menelaus had dedicated."149

After the surrender of Phalaecus and his mercenaries
to Philip at Nicaea, the general and his troops were
allowed to go. Phalaecus led his troops, either 8,000 or
11,000 strong,150 first to the Peloponnese, where they
apparently lived from their accumulated savings, either of
pay or booty.151 They later hired themselves out as
mercenaries to attack Lyctus in Crete, which they
successfully captured. They were shortly thereafter
defeated by the Spartans, who were called in as allies by
the Lyctians.152

From the above account it is clear that Delphi

possessed impressive wealth in precious metals received as

dedications to Apollo. Equally clear is the fact that this

 

149Ath. Deipnosophistae 6. 232e.

 

150Diodorus gives 8,000 (16. 59.3) and Demosthenes
10,000 foot and 1,000 horse (19.230).

151Diod. 16. 61.3.

152Diod. 16. 61.4.

7O

treasure began being depleted early in the Sacred War and
was used up steadily throughout its course. By the end of
the Sacred War the treasures had been entirely depleted.
Indeed, this loss seems to have been instrumental in
bringing the War to an end when it did.

Further, the wealth seems to have been distributed
widely throughout Greece and much of it beyond the shores
of Greece either to buy food or with the departing
mercenaries of Phalaecus. At any rate, no single city in
Greece seems to have been the primary recipient of the gold
and silver once adorning Delphi.

After Athens and Delphi, the most likely sources of
Greek wealth were the other two most prominent cities,
Thebes and Sparta. Neither Lacedaemonia nor Boeotia is
known for abundant natural resources, especially of
precious metals. Nor is either area especially fertile,
although each area seemed to manage a subsistence
agriculture. The diminishing number of Spartiates relied
upon their helots to provide them with sufficient
agricultural goods. Thebes apparently relied upon its
citizenry to provide enough produce.

The Thebans seemed to be perpetually short of money
during this period. Even at the very beginning of the
Second Sacred War, shortage of funds may have slowed their

response to the surprise takeover of Delphi by

71
Philomelus.153 That the Thebans might be in financial
difficulty is understandable given their recent struggles
under the leadership of the brilliant Epaminondas against
first Sparta and then Athens. Such continuing struggle
cannot but have diminished the resources of a none too
wealthy city—state.

The financial fortunes of Thebes seemed to go down
hill in 353, for Diodorus reports: "At first when Chares
the Athenian general was fighting with him, Artabazus
resisted the satraps courageously, but when Chares had gone
and he was left alone he induced the Thebans to send him an
auxiliary force. Choosing Pammenes as general and giving
him five thousand soldiers, they dispatched him to Asia.
Now it seemed an amazing thing that the Boeotians, after
the Thessalians had left them in the lurch, and when the
war with the Phocians was threatening them with serious
dangers, should be sending armies across the sea into Asia
and for the most part proving successful in the
battles."154

One explanation of this "amazing" event is that Thebes

was utilizing its forces in the service of Artabazus as

 

153
p. 215.

154Diod. 16. 34. 1—2.

A.W. Pickard — Cambridge, "The Rise of Macedonia,"

72

. . . 1 5
mercenaries to raise much—needed money for the City. 5

Parke suggests that the Thebans also felt that the Phocian
cause would collapse momentarily following the death of
Philomelus at Neon.156 In his analysis, Parke argues that
the 5,000 soldiers sent to Asia by the Thebans were
mercenaries. His basis is a statement in Pausanias 57
which has to be stretched very much indeed to support such
a contention, because Pausanias seems clearly to be
referring to Phocian mercenaries.

Later in the Sacred War Thebes, even though having
supported the revolting satrap Artabazus, was desperate
enough to ask the Great King for money: ". . . the Thebans
growing weary of the war against the Phocians and finding
themselves short of funds, sent ambassadors to the King of
the Persians urging him to furnish the city with a large
sum of money. Artaxerxes, readily acceding to the request,

made a gift to them of three hundred talents of silver."158

 

155Cf. H.W. Parke, Greek Mercenary Soldiers.
(Chicago: Ares Publishers, 1981), p. 135.

156lbid., p. 135.

157Pausanias 10.2.2.

158Diod. 16. 40.1. Cf. also Kennedy's view that the
Byzantines had aided the Thebans with money during the
Sacred War (Kennedy, Demosthenes, Third Philippic, footnote
P. 242). It seems to have been the policy of the Persian
kings to foment unrest among the Greeks, to keep them from
UHiting against him and to assure their assistance in
PUtting down revolts in the Persian kingdom.

73

Even this large infusion of cash proved insufficient, as
the Thebans, as much as the Phocians, had been drained by
the constant warfare.

Pickard-Cambridge reports that: "Evidently, however,
Phalaecus retained the support of a large body of
mercenaries; he appears to have made his headquarters not
far from Thermopylae: and the Thebans, suffering severely
from loss of men and lack of funds, applied to Philip for
aid."159 Throughout this entire period, then, Thebes was
chronically short of funds.

Sparta was noted for its determination to prevent
greed from tempting its leaders. Lacedaemonian currency
was made of iron, and the importation of gold and silver
was strictly forbidden. Nonetheless, it appears that some
gold and silver was secreted in Arcadia.160 It was
probably from this fund that Archidamus advanced Philomelus
fifteen talents to assist in his takeover of Delphi.

This rather lengthy review of the relative economic
situations of Macedonia and the Greeks shows that in
virtually every respect the Macedonians were superior to
the Greeks. Philip possessed several mines with which to
supply himself with a steady and predictable income

159Pickard-Cambridge, "The Rise of Macedonia, p. 234.

160Ath. Deinosophistae 6.233f.

 

74

stream. His country produced almost every requirement save
olives, and so little of his wealth need be directed at
importing vital supplies.

The Greeks presented the reverse. Not blessed with an
abundance of agricultural resources, they did not possess
the mineral deposits with which to secure them. The
Laurium silver mines of Attica were operated at relatively
low levels, especially during Philip's reign, so that what
mineral wealth was still available was untapped. Nor was
an abundance of currency available, since the Phocian
tyrants had seized and used the Delphic dedications,
and the other city—states were forced into very
conservative fiscal policies, including sending their
troops to fight as mercenaries to raise money, or borrowing
money from the Great King.

Given this situation, it would hardly seem prudent for
Philip to attack Greece in the hope of acquiring great
wealth. Moreover, in the event it does not seem that
Philip, when he was in a position to do so after the battle
of Chaeronia, confiscated any of the supposed Greek wealth
or exacted tribute. This restraint reflected the little
wealth available to exact, and Philip's awareness of the

lack.

CHAPTER 5

Relative Military Strength of Macedonia and Greece

In assessing the desirability of a Macedonian takeover
of Greek military resources or the need for Philip to
protect himself from attack by the Greeks, we are on
somewhat firmer ground than in evaluating the relative
economic advantage of a Greek conquest. Philip had both an
adequate knowledge of warfare and an abundance of practical
experience. Moreover, Philip's military activities,
however sketchy, are much more thoroughly attested in the
ancient literature than his economic situation.

The military reasons asserted for Philip's interest in
conquering Greece may be summarized as follows:

1) To assure that the Greeks would not attack
Macedonia, either by land or sea, while
Philip was off attacking someone else, such

as the Persians,161

 

161Ellis, Philip 11, p. 126. Ellis claims that

Philip's greatest fear was a combined attack by Athens and
Thebes on Macedonia.

 

75

76

2) To incorporate Greek hoplites into Macedonian
infantry,

3) To have the use of the Greek, especially the
Athenian fleet to aid him in attacking
Persia.

On Griffith's view that Philip was interested in the
conquest of Greece to protect his southern flank, the
following assumptions seem to be implicit:162

1) That all, or at least a significant portion
of the Greek city—states, would be
interested and capable of joining
together a force large enough to
threaten Macedonia.

2) That such a force, if gathered, would have a
reasonable chance of defeating a combined
Macedonian and Thessalian defensive
contingent.

3) That Philip would not be able to return from
his primary theater of operations in time to

aid in the defense of Macedonia and that no

one else in Macedon could do it.

162G.T. Griffith and N.G.L. Hammond. A History Of

Macedonia, p. 462.

 

77

In the following sections I will attempt to show that
none of the underlying assumptions was likely to prove
correct and that the notion of Philip's having to conquer
Greece to neutralize a potential threat from the south is
illusory. Outside of a certain hesitant and desultory
interest by the Athenians, the Greeks seemed little
interested in affairs Macedonian.163 Even if they had been
interested, they were unlikely to have been able to join
forces effectively to attack Macedonia.164 Such an
unlikely Greek force would then be unable to sustain a
lengthy campaign in Macedonia.165

Should such a force be gathered and move north towards
Macedonia, it would then face a formidable task in
overcoming whatever home guard Philip would have deployed
prior to his departure with the main army. Undoubtedly the
home guard would include a defensive force designed to stop

a northern thrust through the pass at Thermopylae and at

other passes leading into Macedonia. Having been

 

163A. Fuks, "Isocrates and the Social Economic
Situation in Greece," Ancient Society 3 (1972): 19—20.
164

See review of Isocrates outline of Greek affairs on
pp. 33—360

165D.J. Mosley, "Athens' Alliance with Thebes 339
B.C.," Historia 20 (1971): 509. Mosley discusses the
notorious difficulties the Greeks had with joint or
multiple commands and financing.

 

78

successful in forcing the passes, the invaders would
then have to defeat the main home guard.

The third factor necessary for success would be the
timeliness of the incursion. To be successful it would
have to be accomplished before Philip could return to the
home land with the main army. Griffith gives strong
arguments for supposing that the Greeks were incapable of
meeting any of the three criteria above mentioned.

The first criterion involves both a joint interest and
a capability on the part of the Greeks. In analyzing the
situation of the Greeks Griffith states: "Philip attempted
to assert himself as the leading power in the Greek world
at a time when, of the three states that had formerly held
this position, Sparta had retired from the arena; Thebes no
longer played a leading role and Athens was desperately
trying to arrest her decline. Sparta had been crushed by
the Boiotians twelve years before Philip's accession to the
throne, had lost roughly half her territory, was suffering
a decline in manpower, and was no longer protected by a
ring of dependent allies. The conditions that had favored
the rise of Thebes and the Boiotian League, of which she
was leader, were ephemeral. The signs that the city was

incapable of maintaining itself in the position which it

79

had reached, manifested themselves a mere three years
before the beginning of Philip's reign in Macedonia."166
That the Greeks would be able to maintain an army in
the field even if they could gather a force is doubtful
on economic grounds alone. Philip could routinely field
armies of 30,000 infantry and 2,000 cavalry and had the
potential to raise three or four times as many men in an
emergency.167 In order for the Greeks to combat Philip
successfully in an attack on Macedonia, they would have to
have a force at least as large as Philip's and probably
much larger. We know that the Athenian expedition to
Thermopylae in 352, which consisted of 5,000 infantry and

400 cavalry, cost 200 talents.168

It would require a force
six times the size of the Athenian expeditionary force to
equal Philip's normal force of 30,000; therefore, the cost
of a campaign of just a few weeks with those forces would
cost 1,200 talents. As it happens, we know the annual

revenue of Athens for both 355 and 339 - which was 130 and

and 400 talents respectively, Even using the larger

 

166G.T. Griffith, "Philip and the Southern Greeks:
Strengths and Weaknesses," in Philip of Macedon. Edited by
M.B. Hatzopoulos and L.D. Loukopoulos. (Athens: Ekdotike
Athenon, 1980), pp. 112-113.

1671bid., pp. 121—122.

1681hid., p. 121.

 

8O

figure, the cost of the proposed invasion force is three
times Athens' annual income, an impossibly high figure.
Even if the Greeks could successfully mount such a
force, could they defeat Philip? Griffith states:
"Philip's army was superior to that of any of the other
Greeks in terms not only of numbers but also of quality.
Moreover it was commanded by Philip himself, one of the
greatest organizers and army leaders the world has ever
seen. Parmenion, the second—in—command, was also a general
of exceptional capabilities. Under them served first rate
senior and junior officers. Philip had introduced a number
of innovations in the organization, equipment and tactics
of the army which had improved its efficiency. The
soldiers were imbued with fighting spirit and were
connected by strong ties of loyalty to Philip; they were
trained to carry out swift forced marches and to execute
battle plans with great precision. None of the Greek
powers with whom Philip clashed were in a position to
inflict any damage on Macedonia."169
Beyond the above requirements and assumptions, there
is the further assumption that Philip could not accomplish

the neutralization of Greek arms by other than military

means. Were Philip only fractionally as adroit in bribery

 

16916id., p. 122.

81

and diplomatic deceit as Demosthenes portrays him to be,
could he not achieve his goal by those means? All of these
issues will be discussed in detail later in the chapter.

As the bases for the assertion that Philip wanted to
incorporate Greek troops into or as an auxiliary part of

70

the Macedonian army,1 the following further assumptions
obtain:

1) Philip required additional troops for his
army.

2) The troops possessed by the Greeks were the
very kind that Philip required and in the
number required.

3) Such troops could be successfully
incorporated into the Macedonian system.

These assumptions are false or extremely doubtful.
Philip possessed a highly trained, seasoned, and efficient
army which was based in the political and cultural milieu
of the Macedonians.171 To suggest that Philip now wished
to attempt to integrate the diverse elements of the Greek
forces into the Macedonian system seems highly

questionable. The more likely role to be played by such

 

170Ellis, Philip II, p. 234.

 

171G.T. Griffith and N.G.L. Hammond, A History of
Macedonia, pp. 407—426.

 

82

troops would be to maintain garrisons, defensive positions
and key fortified cities. These were just the tasks
performed by the mercenaries; and it must therefore be
shown that conquered Greek troops could accomplish such
tasks in a way more advantageous than the mercenaries
could.172
The third main reason put forward for Philip's desire
to conquer Greece is that he required the Greek, more
particularly the Athenian fleet, to assist him in
conquering Persia.173 As with the other main contentions,
this too has some implicit assumptions:
1) That Philip intended to attack Persia.
2) That Philip's fleet was not capable by itself
of providing the necessary support.
3) That the Athenian fleet was the best
available alternative.
Again, I contend that this entire set of assumptions
is false and therefore the objective asserted is
untenable. Setting aside for the moment the question of

Philip's interest in attacking Persia, I will show that

Philip had a sufficiently strong fleet of his own and that

172G.T. Griffith and N.G.L. Hammond. A History Of
Macedonia, pp. 439—440.

1731bid., p. 461.

83

if another fleet were required, there was a better
alternative than the Greek one.

A brief review of the military position of both
Macedonia and the Greek city—states will be helpful. The
Macedonian army was in existence as a national army before
Philip's accession. His brother Perdiccas had
unsuccessfully led it to battle with the Illyrians, a

struggle in which Perdiccas was slain and the army

decimated and routed.174 Philip was able to regroup the

remainder of the troops and re—organize them into an
effective force. He accomplished this, according to
Diodorus account, as follows:

Philip was not panic-stricken by the magnitude
of the expected perils, but, bringing together
the Macedonians in a series of assemblies

and exhorting them with eloquent speeches to
be men, he built up their morale, and, having
improved the organization of his forces and
equipped the men suitably with weapons of war,
he held constant maneuvers of the men under
arms and competitive drills. Indeed he devised
the compact order and the equipment of the
phalanx, imitating the close order fighting
with overlapping shields of the warriors at
Troy, and was the fif7§ to organize the
Macedonian phalanx."

It is important to note that Philip both reorganized

and reequipped the Macedonian army. The reorganization

x

174Diod. 16. 2. 4—5.

175Diod. 16. 3. 1—2.

84

involved the utilization of the light—armed, spear—throwing
hypaspists in conjunction with the hoplite phalanx, both
used as the anvil to the heavy cavalry's deadly hammer.176
The rearming involved replacing the hoplite shield with a
smaller, lighter version and lengthening the spear.177
The second point to notice is the increased discipline
instilled under Philip's direction. He apparently drilled
his troops with summer camps and forced marches.178 He
also instilled severe discipline in his pages and
officers.179 As Parke says: "Philip as king produced in
the Macedonian soldier a discipline which no Greek citizen
army could ever acquire."180
Finally, Philip's armies generally suffered nothing
due to lack of money. As we have seen in the previous
chapter, Philip's financial resources were considerable and

because he probably did not have to pay his soldiers

directly since it was their duty to serve in his army, his

 

176George Cawkwell, Philip of Macedon, p. 158 and G.T.

Griffith and N.G.L. Hammond, A History of Macedonia, pp.
405—449.

177See H.W. Parke, Greek Mercenary Soldiers, p. 156 n
l for a more complete discussion of the sarissa.

178Frontinus Strategems 4. 1.6 and Polyaenus

4. 2.10.
179

 

 

 

 

 

Aelian 14. 48 and Polyaenus 4. 2.1.

 

180H.W. Parke, Greek Mercenary Soldiers, p. 157.

 

85

expenditures would be mostly for subsistence and whatever

few mercenary troops he required.181

Philip developed a standing army, well—equipped and
organized, well—trained, and well—provided for. As Parke
summarizes: "In fact, Philip, like Jason or the Phocian
tyrants, had organized every side of his army, and by the
employment of mercenaries had guaranteed that he might have
a military force always at his disposal for instant
action.182 Demosthenes insightfully identified the

strengths of the Macedonian army:

0n the other hand you hear of Philip marching
unchecked, not because he leads a phalanx,

but because he is accompanied by skirmishes,
cavalry, archers, mercenaries, and similar
troops. When, relying on this force, he attacks
some people that is at variance with itself,

and when through distrust no one goes forth

 

181Cf. H.W. Parke, Greek Mercenary Soldiers, pp. 158
and 159. Parke says that no contemporary authority ever
represents Philip as hindered in his plans by a shortage of
money. However Diodorus, (16. 53.3) and Justin (9. 1)
strongly imply such a situation. Anson suggests that
Philip suffered shortages of money early in his reign, but
that after the capture of the Pangaean mines he had
sufficient resources. Edward M. Anson, "The Hypaspists:
Macedonia's Professional Citizen-Soldiers," Historia 34

(1985): 246.

182H.W. Parke, Greek Mercenary Soldiers, p. 160.
Diodorus (16. 8.7) says that Philip "organized a large
force of mercenaries," however I think Parke is correct in
Sugqgesting that the mercenary force was rather small in
(Xmlparison with the armies total strength. The navy may
haves been an entirely different situation.

86

to fight for his country, then he brings up his

artillery and lays siege. I need hardly tell you

that he makes no difference between summer and

. . "183

Winter and has no season set apart for inaction.

The Athenian army and navy were not as well armed as
Philip's soldiery. The Athenian army may have been
reasonably equipped with the basic arms and armor, but the
soldiers were not equipped with the innovative new weapons
of the Macedonian phalanx. Nor were they as well—trained.
Demosthenes admits in his Third Philippic that: "but
for a pitched battle he [Philip] is in better training than
we are."184 In part, this deficiency in training must be
laid to the reliance on citizen—soldiers who had sufficient
control of the political system to resist the formation of

. . 185
a standing army or year—round serVice. Moreover, the
mercenaries so often used were not generally well trained,
either. Exacerbating this condition was the uncertain
leadership provided by their generals become mercenaries.
As Parke states: "The Athenian strategos had become a
roving condottiere over whose movements his city had little

control."186

183Dem. Third Philippic 50-51.

Dem. Third Philippic 52.

185This, of course, can be attributed in large part to
economic considerations.

186H.W. Parke, Greek Mercenary Soldiers, p. 144. It
got; so bad that Aeschines put a motion before the
aSSembly. 'H . . to sail with all speed and look for the
general put in command of the force." (Aeschines 11.73).

184

 

87

The Athenian use of citizen hoplites during Philip's

reign is notable for its rarity.187 On only three

occasions during that period are the use of Athenian land
forces recorded; at the occasion of Philip's conquest of

Onomarchus, when the Athenians sent 5,000 hoplites and 400

horse to hold Thermopylae188 (353 B.C.); when 2,000

citizens set sail with 6,000 mercenaries to defend Olynthus

(349 B.C.),189

190

and at the battle of Chaeronea (338
B.C.). For the most part such conflicts as occurred
were fought with mercenary soldiers under mercenary
generals, most of them not Athenian.

The Athenian army was neither seasoned nor well—led.
This coupled with questionable financial support made it no
match for the experienced and resourceful Macedonian

combined arms. More importantly, it was, therefore, not a

desirable acquisition for Philip's troops. Philip could

 

187 . . . .
Isocrates Viewed the increaSlng use of mercenaries
by Athens as a symptom of degeneration, A. Fuks, Isocrates,
p. 29 & 46.

188H.W. Parke, Greek Mercenary Soldiers, p. 146. Cf.
G.T. Griffith, Mercenaries of the Hellenistic World,, p. 6
on the career of Charidemus.

189Ibid., p. 148.

 

19016id., p. 154.

88

afford to buy whatever mercenaries he needed for auxiliary
duty, and he certainly possessed better commanders than any
utilized by the Athenians.

Nor were any other Greek forces notably better than
the Athenians. The once powerful Thebans, led by their
Sacred Band, were no longer able to contend successfully
even with the hastily formed mercenary forces of the
Phocians. As Demosthenes points out: "The Thebans, for
instance, were powerless to prevent Philip from pressing on
and seizing the passes, or from coming in at the finish and
usurping the credit of their previous exertions."191

The Phocians had, indeed, raised a sizable mercenary
force shortly after Delphi was seized. Onomarchus was able
to field an army of 20,000 foot and 500 horse for the
Battle of the Crocus field during which Philip crushed the
Phocian army.192 As Parke summarizes: "The general
conclusion to be drawn is that the power of Phocis rested
largely on the fact that money in abundant quantities could
secure professional soldiers and temporary victory."193

The remaining potentially important military force in

Greece was Sparta. The Lacedaemonians, however, were in a

 

191Dem. 0n the Peace 21.

192Diod. 16. 35.4.

19
3H.W. Parke, Greek Mercenary Soldiers, p. 140.

 

 

89

period of rapid decline. Having been defeated at Leuctra
in 371 and invaded by the Thebans in 362, the Spartiates
had been severely diminished both in numbers and wealth.
Forrest summarizes the Spartan condition in the mid-fourth
century: "Finally, decisively, Greece was impoverished by
almost continuous war and Sparta, without Messenia, with
her own outdated economy, was poorer than most - she simply
could not afford to play at aggressive international

politics."194

In view of the strength, cohesion, and training of the
carefully combined elements of the Macedonian army and the
loosely organized and carelessly led Athenian troops as
well as the weakness of the other Greek land contingents,
there can have been little for Philip to have either feared
or coveted among Greek arms. While the Persian satraps and
even the great King found utility in a Greek phalanx in
waging their internecine wars, Philip had created a
superior force, both from operation and resources stand
points. That Philip might wish to employ Greek troops in

his finely tuned army seems very unlikely.195

 

194W.G. Forrest, A History of Sparta, (New York: W.W.
Norton and Co., 1968), p. 139.

195Alexander apparently took 5,000 Greek mercenaries
into Asuia with his army (Diodorus 17.17.2), but they were
used fcyr garrison duty at Mytilene, Sidon, and Caria (G.T.
Griffitli, Mercenaries of the Hellenistic World, p. 27.

90

A force that Philip did covet was additional cavalry.
From his Thessalian allies he was able to obtain some of
the finest horses available. In order to integrate the
Thessalians into his military organization Philip

apparently ennobled some of them and elevated them to

196

members of his Companion Cavalry. Philip appears as an

ally of Thessaly early in his reign when he is found

. . . . l 7
aSSisting the Larissans against the tyrants of Pherae. 9

Griffith summarizes this continuing alliance nicely:

In his early years of expansion Philip never
entered Thessaly except by invitation, the
Thessalian League being split by the defection
of tyrants of Pherai with their satellite
cities and perioikoi. By his skill in war

and the allied arts, by his winning personality
which carried him even into a Thessalian
marriage (with Philinna of Larissa), and

by his parties which were memorable even by
Thessalian standards, he made more and more
friends in Thessaly year by year, and when the
'crisis' came and hingriends needed him, he
did not fail them."

We may conclude, then, that Philip had acquired what
he needed by way of support for his cavalry from the

Thessalians. This addition to his troops was accomplished

 

196Ellis, Philip 11, p. 54.

 

197Diod. 16. 14.2.

198G.T. Griffith, "Philip as a General and the
Macedonian Army," Philip of Macedon. Edited by M.B.
Hatzopoulos and L.D. Loukopoulos (Athens: Edkotike
Athenon, 1980) p. 73.

 

91

through steady friendship and alliance, not by conquest and
the impressing of defeated troops into the Macedonian
army. In this Philip was consistent with his development
of a national, standing army. As Griffith states it:
"Philip was creating, what no Greek city could ever begin
to create, a large army which should combine a trained and
specialized efficiency with the fire of national spirit and
racial patriotism, at once the seasoned professional and
the enthusiastic amateur of war."199
There is another element of military strength that
must be considered. Athens had risen to power on the
strength of her fleet, both military and commercial. Was
it possible that she still maintained such a decisive
advantage in this area that it overcame her manifest
weakness in land forces? Cawkwell argues that, despite
reforms in the financing in 357/56 and again in 339, the
Athenian navy remained as strong as it ever was.200
However, in his discussion Cawkwell equates strength with
number of ships available, rightly pointing out that about

300 triremes appear to be outfitted. From this he

199G.T. Griffith, The Mercenaries of the Hellenistic
World (Cambridge: University Press, 1933), p. 9.

200George Cawkwell, "Athenian Naval Power in the
Fourth Century," Classical Quarterly 34 (1984): 334.

 

 

 

92

concludes that: "From the restoration of the Athenian navy
in 378 down to the disaster of the battle of Amorgos in
322, the Athenians kept control of the sea."201
This last seems a wrong conclusion on three grounds.
First, the Athenian navy was unable to prevent the
defection of Rhodes, Cos, Chios, and Byzantium from its
second confederacy. The decisive battle was the sea-battle

202 Cawkwell urges that this was "hardly a

at Chios in 355.
major engagement," and that if the Athenians had considered
the defectors' fleet a real challenge they would have

adopted different tactics.203 Whether a major engagement

or not, the Athenians lost it and were unable to defeat the

defectors.204

Secondly, the Athenians were unable to cope with the
Macedonian fleet in the north Aegean. Demosthenes
clearly recognized the threat when he said: "And yet some
people say that he has no use for the sea! Why, this man

who has no use for the sea is laying down war-ships and

building docks, and is ready to send out fleets and incur

 

201lbid., p. 345.

202Diod. 16. 21.3.

203George Cawkwell, "Athenian Naval Power," p. 345 n
33.

204Cawkwell rightly points out that part of Athens'
reason for withdrawing was fear of intervention by the
Great King, but the fact remains that from 357-355 the
Athenians were unable to defeat the rebel flotilla.

93

considerable expense in facing risks at sea . . ."205
Again: "Since Philip has a fleet, we must have fast
vessels if our force is to sail in safety."206 With this

fleet and its mercenary commanders207 Philip was able to
trouble Athenian commerce when he wanted to and to
transport his troops, even in the face of Athenian
opposition.208

The third reason that the Athenians were unable to
control the sea is that they could not afford to turn their
paper strength into combat strength. In the time of
Pericles a substantial part of the fleet was in training
constantly, providing for a superbly able and well—paid
naval contingent.209 In commenting on a plan of
Demosthenes, Cawkwell states: "If a force of fifty ships
manned by citizens were to be constantly ready, 8,500

citizens would have had to be constantly on call to row the

ships and a further 500 as marines, as well as the citizens

 

 

 

205Dem. 0n Halonnesus 16.
206Dem. First Philippic 22.
207

G.T. Griffith and N.G.L. Hammond, A History of
Macedonia, p. 310. Griffith suggests that Philip hired
mercenaries for his fleet because the Macedonians were
unlikely to become good sailors in less than a year or two.

208Diod. 16.76.3.

209Thucydides 2.13.

 

 

94

in the hyperesiai. If they were to be paid, even at the
rate of a half a drachma a day, and for only eight months
of the year, the city would have taken on a large item of
expenditure it was in no position to afford."210

If Athens could not afford to keep even 50 of its
ships constantly up to combat strength, it is hard to
envision her maintaining control of the seas. Moreover,
the use of mercenary commanders who frequently had their
own ends in View and were virtually outside the control of
the Athenians on occasion lends no credence to a claim of
complete control. It may be pointed out, on the other
hand, that the Athenians were able to maintain their supply
of grain from the Black Sea throughout this period, a trade
which must imply that they had control of the waterway.
Another interpretation is that Philip refrained from
cutting off that supply because he was not particularly
interested in doing so.

Let us now return to the three main military reasons,
and the underlying assumptions, generally given for
Philip's conquering Greece. The first involved the
possible desire on Philip's part to protect his southern

flank from Greek attack. During the period of

 

210George Cawkwell, "Athenian Naval Power," p. 344.

 

95

Philip's reign, the Greek city—states were not only not
moved by a spirit of co—operative resistance to Philip, but
were actively engaged against each other, virtually
ignoring Philip until 347 when Thebes requested his aid in
the Sacred War.211 Moreover, even at the last instant
(338), with Philip already in Greece, only Athens and
Thebes combined forces to face the Macedonians. It must be
taken, therefore, as extremely unlikely that Philip feared
an attack by a combined Greek force.212

Could such a combined force successfully have defeated
Philip if it were put together? Given the crushing defeat
that Philip inflicted on Onomarchus in 353 and on the
Greeks at Chaeronea in 338, it seems unlikely that the
Greeks would have done well against him. It is true that
Onomarchus defeated Philip twice in 354, but one suspects

that Philip was present with only a moderate force of

Macedonians and was working against Pherae with primarily

 

211G.T. Griffith and N.G.L. Hammond, A History of

Macedonia, pp. 218 & 330—331. Philip is often stated to
have fomented unrest among the various city-states, to
divert their attention from his growing power and to keep
them from uniting against him. It is also possible that he
was involved at the request of already quarreling parties
and was not the instigator.

212To the extent that a combined Greek force utilized
mercenaries, it seems likely that Philip could seriously
disrupt it merely by offering more pay. Philip could also
afford to hire a large mercenary force as a home—guard in
his absence.

 

96

Thessalian troops, else it is difficult to see how

Onomarchus could have defeated him.213

Elsewhere, Philip's
difficulties occurred mostly with sieges, notably at
Perinthus and Byzantium.

The third issue was whether or not Philip would be
able to return from his primary theater of operations in
time to assist in the defense of Macedonia. According to
Engels: "The consequence of Philip's reforms was to make
the Macedonian army the fastest, lightest, and most mobile
force in existence, capable of making lightning strikes
against opponents 'before anyone had time to fear the
event.'"214 With his extremely rapid movement, Philip
could fairly easily traverse the distance from the
Hellespont to Macedonia, against no opposition, before a
combined Greek force could march north against the stiff

OPPOSition of his Thessalian allies.215

 

213G.T. Griffith and N.G.L. Hammond, A History of
Macedonia, p. 219. Griffith suggests that Philip did not
always call out the full levy of troops. Since he was
operating so close to home in Thessaly he may not have felt
that he needed all of his available manpower.

214Donald Engels, Alexander the Great and the
Logistics of the Macedonian Army (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1978), p. 23. Engels presents a detailed
and nicely argued account of the organization and logistics
of the Macedonian army under Philip and Alexander.

215Any attack beyond the Hellespont would have
required that a substantial force be left to guard
Macedonia from attack from any direction. In the event,
Alexander left Antipater with 15,000 troops when he
attacked Persia.

 

 

 

 

 

97

Moreover, Philip did operate quite far from Macedon
throughout his reign without any apparent fear of Greek
attack. Demosthenes states: "He [Philip] is now
established in Thrace with a large force, and is sending
for considerable reinforcements from Macedonia and
Thessaly, according to the statements of those on the
spot."216 Philip also undertook difficult and lengthy
sieges of Perinthus and Byzantium with a large force with
no apparent fear of leaving his southern flank
unguarded.217

The second main reason given was Philip's interest in
incorporating Greek troops into his army for further
campaigns, presumably against Persia. The first assumption
involved in this reason is that he needed additional
forces. Assuming that his ultimate objective was to attack
Persia,218 we may get an idea of the force that he might

have thought sufficient by observing how many troops

Alexander took with him. According to Arrian: "At the

 

216Dem. 0n the Chersonese 14.

217G.T. Griffith and N.G.L. Hammond, A History of
Macedonia, pp. 571—574. A large force was required because
of the well-fortified and strongly defended cities. Cf.
Diodorus 16. 74—75.

218Knapp suggests that Parmenion's incursion into Asia
was just a retaliatory measure in reaction to the satrap's
sending mercenaries to fight against Philip at Perinthus.
A. Bernard Kapp, The History and Culture of Ancient Western
Asia and Egypt (Chicago: Dorsey Press, 1988), p. 265.

 

98

start of the next campaigning season Alexander left
Antipater in charge of affairs in Macedonia and Greece, and
made for the Hellespont with a force composed of not much
more than 30,000 infantry, including light troops and
archers, and over 5,000 cavalry."219

According to Diodorus, Philip fielded an army of more
than 30,000 infantry and no less than 2,000 cavalry at the
battle of Chaeronea.220 This is about the size of the
infantry force which Alexander took with him to
Asia, while Antipater's cavalry force was much smaller. As
a good commander Philip undoubtedly left a large reserve
force in Macedonia, especially as his main objective was
the reduction of the Amphissians. It therefore seems
unlikely that Philip would have required the addition of
any Greek troops for whatever campaign he had planned.

The second assumption involves the kind of troops that
Philip might wish to add to his army. We have already seen
that Philip had added Thessalian cavalry to his army by

means of his alliance with the Larissans. The Greek city—

states could not make an equal contribution in that

 

219Arrian 1.11. Diodorus (17.17) gives 32,000
infantry and 5,100 cavalry. Antipater was left with 12,000
infantry and 1,500 cavalry.

220Diodorus 16. 85.5.

99

regard. For the hoplites, so valued by other forces,221

Philip had little need. His primary infantry arm was the
sarissa—bearing, light-armed phalanx, an infantry force not
possessed by the Greeks. Philip also had a significant
number of skirmishers, peltasts, and other auxiliary
troops, including a formidable siege train. In none of
these areas were the Greeks particularly numerous nor as
effective as the troops Philip already employed.

The last assumption involves the incorporation of
foreign troops into the Macedonian system. As we have
seen, one of the reasons for the success of the Macedonian
army was the training and discipline it received as a full—
time national army. That Philip could successfully manage
a standing army as a spirited national force was one of
his major accomplishments. To integrate a part—time,
citizen force from various Greek city—states seems
virtually impossible, since not only would they have to be
rearmed and retrained, but would have to become
accustomed to fighting full—time and that away from their
homes.

One might argue that Philip could use the Greek forces
for garrison duty or other auxiliary tasks. These chores,

which required little training, were performed for Philip

 

221G.T. Griffith and N.G.L. Hammond, A History of

Macedonia, p. 484.

100

by mercenaries, and it seems more likely that he would
simply hire more if he required them. In conclusion, we
may return to the observation of Diodorus that: ". . . he
[Philip] left armies so numerous and powerful that his son
Alexander had no need to apply for allies in his attempt to
. "222

overthrow the PerSian supremacy.

The third main reason given for Philip's interest in

conquering Greece was that he could utilize the Athenian

 

navy.223 That reason involved Philip's intention to attack
Persia, the assertion that Philip's fleet was unable to
support such an effort, and that the Athenian fleet was the
best alternative. Leaving aside until the next chapter the
validity of the assertion that Philip's ultimate aim was to
attack Persia, and merely assuming it for the sake of
analysis, we must turn to a review of Philip's fleet.

The initial phase of that analysis is to determine the
role of a support fleet for such an operation. The

Persians, in their two attacks upon the Greek mainland

 

222Diod. 16. 1. 5—6.

223Errington argues that Philip did not covet the
Athenian navy because he did not use the Athenian navy in
the exploratory attack on Persia in 336, even though Athens
was a member of the league of Corinth, and that Alexander
managed without the support of the Athenian fleet, R.M.
Errington, "Review-Discussion: Four Interpretations of

Philip II," American Journal of Ancient History 6 (1981):
74.

 

101

in 490 and 481, used supporting fleets in very different
roles. Darius used his fleet to ferry his troops from Asia
Minor to the coast of Attica, attempting a direct attack on
Athens. Darius also used his fleet to subdue the islands,
such as Thasos,224 along his route.

Xerxes used his impressive fleet225 to ferry troops,

to guard the bridge across the Hellespont, and to provide

advance scouts. Upon arriving at their destination, the

 

ships were also intended to engage the Athenian fleet.
This fleet seems to have performed reasonably well until it
encountered Greek opposition.

We have two specific instances to examine for the
use of a support fleet by Philip. First, he sent Parmenion
with 10,000 foot and horse into Asia Minor early in 336
B.C. These troops were apparently ferried across the
Hellespont to Abydos.226 There is no other mention of a
supporting fleet in this incidence.

The second instance involves Alexander's entry into

and subsequent campaigns in Asia Minor. Alexander, too,

ferried his troops across the Hellespont, but later used

 

224Herodotus 6.44.

225There were 1207 triremes according to Herodotus
(7.89).

226

Diod. 16. 91.2 and 16. 24.1.

102

his fleet for transporting food and assisting in sieges.
Hauben suggests that there were four naval formations
during this early period, one of which, the fleet of the
Hellenic League, had as its purpose the support of
operations on land.227 This fleet of the Hellenic League
was comprised of 160 triremes, only 20 of which were
Athenian.228

The two examples reveal that the primary purpose of
such a support fleet was to transport troops across the
Hellespont and then to assist land operations as required.
Since Alexander required only little aid from the Greek
fleets, it is hard to see why Philip would have gone to all
the cost, trouble, and casualties of conquest for the
benefit of using 20 Athenian triremes.

The final assumption is that the Athenian fleet was
the most desirable alternative for providing the

Macedonians a fleet. Philip did have another option, the

ships of the defectors in the Social War of 357—355 with

 

227H. Hauben, "The Command Structure in Alexander's
Mediterranean Fleets," Ancient Society 3 (1972): 55.

228Arrian 1. 11.6 and Justin 11. 6.2 who mentions 182
ships. For a more complete discussion see H. Hauben, "The
EXpansion of Macedonian Sea-Power Under Alexander the
Great," Ancient Society 7 (1976): 79—105. Hauben believes
(p. 80 n 10) that most of the ships were Macedonian or from
the northern coastal cities.

 

 

103

Athens. After all, they had defeated the Athenians during
that conflict and may have been considered the superior
force. As it happened, the island of Chios quickly came
over to the Macedonian side after Parmenion invaded Asia
Minor.229 Surely the Chians could have provided the same
number of triremes that Athens did.

Upon examining the military arguments for Philip's
interest in conquering Greece, all are found wanting.
Philip demonstrably behaved as if he had no fear of an
attack from Greece, his army wanted no addition, and he did
not require the aid of the Athenian fleet to invade Persia,

if that was his aim.

229Ellis, Philip II, p. 221.

 

 

CHAPTER 6

The Aims and Motivations of Philip

Having reviewed in some detail the three reasons
conventionally stated for Philip's interest in conquering
Greece and having found each of them suspect, we must again
examine Philip's plans. He did, after all, end up with a
sort of control over Greece after the battle of Chaeronea
and the founding of the League of Corinth. If, as I
contend, it was no part of Philip's plan to conquer Greece,
how did he end up in control? What, in fact, were his
aims?

Ellis considers the question of Philip's aims at

length in his excellent book, Philip II and Macedonian

 

Imperialism. In trying to assess Philip's aims, Ellis
turns away from Philip's character, which is unknowable at
this late date even if it might have been during his
lifetime. As Ellis puts it: "For if it is naive to speak
of the causes of fourth—century Macedonian imperialism in
terms of Philip's personal outlook (whether his supposed
restless belligerence or, alternatively, some farsighted

zeal for Hellenic unity), it must be the height of folly to

104

 

105

do so on the basis of the sort of pseudo—evidence for it
that survives."230
Ellis emphasizes the important role that the
unification of Macedonia under Philip played in setting the
stage for later expansion. The essential element of that

unification Ellis finds to be the army: "But if the army

was at once the instrument and the expression of the new

 

unity, it was all the more essential that military
objectives were constantly in mind and, more important,
that military successes were won, lest it turn the newly

"231 For Ellis

found energies upon itself and the state.
the military was not only the crucial element of
unification, but also the driving force of expansion,
since, if it had no foreign enemy to feed on, it must feed
upon itself.

As to Philip's direction of this unleashed tiger,
Ellis sees three crucial decision points.232 First, the
need to find a protective alliance to allow him safety
while he secured his borders and consolidated his rule in

Macedonia. According to Ellis, Athens served this role

during the early years. The second decision involved

 

 

230Ellis, Philip II, pp. 7—8.
231lbid., p. 9.
232

lbid., pp. 9—110

106

cutting loose from this Athenian alliance. Here the
decision was to free himself from the Athenian alliance and
to join with the Olynthians and Chalkidean League so as to
continue strengthening himself. The third decision was
whether to end his advance into Greece and proceed to
Persia. His choice was to abandon Greece.

According to Ellis, the reason that Philip turned

 

toward Persia was to keep the military appropriately
engaged: "When it came to the search for longer—term and
profitable military objectives it was to the barbarians of

"233

Asia Minor that he turned. Furthermore, Ellis believes

that Philip foresaw this outcome as early as 346, and

incorporated it in the Peace of Philocrates: "It was this
purpose - to make Greece safe for his own withdrawal for
the greener pastures of Anatolia — that he must have

determined upon at the end of the 350's or very early in
the 340's."234
The subsidiary strategy which Ellis sees being
employed by Philip is that of negating the strength of the
Theban hoplites and co-opting the power of the Athenian

navy. The tactics used to blunt Thebes and Athens were to

 

233lbid., p. 11.

234lbid., p. 11. Griffith dates Philip's interest in
Persia from 344, G.T. Griffith and N.G.L. Hammond, A
History of Macedonia, p. 487.

107

keep them enemies until he could conquer both. The
instruments of this strategy were primarily diplomatic,
with military incursion used only for the coup de grace.

While admitting that Ellis's analysis is both
thoughtful and insightful, the very orderliness of it makes
it suspect. Events tend to unfold chaotically and

unexpectedly whereas in retrospect they seem clearly

 

defined and sometimes inevitable. The tendency is to read
backwards from an event or occurrence a simple causal
series of events which then necessarily produce the actual
outcome. The series of events then are called the "plan"
of the main actor in the sequence of events.

Having said this, I must admit that leaders do
plan and do set goals, and perhaps develop detailed
operational guidelines with which to implement their
plans. Unless we have sound documentation of such plans,
we can only infer the motivation of actions from those
actions themselves. It would seem more appropriate to
identify sequences of action which are consistent and to
group them together under the heading of "principles,"
rather than directly to seek a "plan" of action.

An excellent example of this approach to historical
analysis appears in William Harris's, War and Imperialism

in Republican Rome.

 

108

I have been stimulated and persuaded by Harris's
arguments regarding the imperialism of Rome and have found
them partially valid for Macedonia as well. The one
difficulty that I have with his categorization is that in
some instances Philip's motives do not fit neatly into it,
as will become apparent in reviewing Table II. In his

introduction Harris states: "Roman behavior requires

 

explanation, 'No sane man,' wrote Polybius, 'goes to war
for the sake of defeating his opponent, just as no sane man
goes to sea merely to get to the other side, or even takes
up a technical skill simply for the sake of knowledge. All
actions are undertaken for the sake of the consequent

'"235 And as Harris further

pleasure, good, or advantage.

points out, such actions must be weighed against their

costs: "In real international policies it is seldom that a

state simply chooses to extend its power by effortless

fiat. It must exert itself to establish its claim to

. . . "236

power, it must pay costs and make sacrifices.
Harris then goes on to identify four "motives" or

principles that may have driven Roman expansion. The case

of Roman expansion is sufficiently similar to Macedonian

 

235Harris, Imperialism, p. 1.

236lbid., pp. 1—2.

 

109
expansion under Philip, as Harris himself acknowledges,237
to utilize the same principles in analyzing the behavior of
Philip II. The four motives identified by Harris were:
economic prosperity, expansion, annexation, and self-
defense. We have seen previously that various writers
have asserted economic, self-defense, and expansion motives
to Philip with respect to Greece.238
The economic motive is succinctly stated by Harris:
"Economic gain was to the Romans (and generally in the
ancient world) an integral part of successful warfare and
of the expansion of power. Land, plunder, slaves, revenues
were regular and natural results of success; they were the

239 We have shown

assumed results of victory and power."
that Philip's interest in Greece was not likely motivated
by economic concerns, for the land of Greece was poor, its
plunder negligible, and neither slaves nor revenues were
exacted in the event.

Generally speaking, Philip did not seem to be

motivated by economic factors. The one instance where it

 

237ibid., p. 2.

238Even though Philip was tagos in Thessaly and
hegemon of the League of Corinth, neither the territory of
Thessaly nor of any Greek city—state was annexed to the
territory of Macedonia. Therefore annexation does not seem
to have been a motive.

239Ibid., p. 56.

 

110

seems obvious that he was motivated by economic gain, his
seizure of Amphipolis and the mines around Krenides, stands
out as his only clearly economically motivated activity.
However, some writers, such as Ellis, do attribute economic
gain as one of Philip's motives in attacking Persia.

Expansion as a motive for imperialism is defined by
Harris as the increase of political power over other areas
which did not involve annexation of those territories.240
The view that Philip wished to conquer Greece to
incorporate aspects of its military into the Macedonian
army may be viewed as an expansionist motive. Previous
arguments have shown this motive to be untrue with respect
to Philip's interest in Greece. It does seem true,
however, that Philip exercised some political power over
both the Thracians, for whom he appointed a Macedonian
governor, and over the Greeks through the League of
Corinth.

By annexation Harris means the incorporation of
territory into the political and economic system of the
conqueror.241 It is quite clear that this did not occur in

Greece as a result of Philip's activity. The Greek city—

states were left with substantial political and economic

 

240lbid., p. 105.

241lbid., p. 131.

111

autonomy, such that the League of Corinth may be best
described as merely a military alliance.

In his other spheres of activity Philip seems also not
to have been much given to annexing territories. A notable
though rather minor exception was the annexation of such
cities as Methone and Pydna along the Macedonian sea—
coast. One may also view the closer relations between
Upper and Lower Macedonia as a lesser form of annexation.

According to Harris, motives of self-defense may be
described as follows: "When they made their war—decisions,
so it is often assumed and sometimes argued, they felt
themselves to be more the subjects of pressure from others

"245 Those who

than the source of an expansionist drive.
assert that Philip's interest in Greece was motivated by
his desire to secure himself from attack from that quarter
are appealing to the motive of self—defense. Here again we
have shown both that Philip had little reason to fear such
an attack and that he behaved as though he had no such
fear.

There do seem to be many occasions when Philip acted
from the motive of self—defense. Cases that come quickly
to mind are his attacks on the Illyrians and Paeonians,

especially during the first two years of his reign, his

attack on Olynthus which he saw as posing a threat by

 

2451mm, p. 163.

112

harboring potential usurpers, and his attack on Onomarchus
in Thessaly, although this seems a more complex case.

In order to view more clearly Philip's possible
motives over his entire career, the following table has
been constructed to show his military engagements
and their likely motivation where one can reasonably be
identified. I have included the initial actions by
Parmenion in Asia Minor and the postulated invasion of

Persia as well.

113

Table III

Possible Motives Associated with Military Engagements

 

 

Engagement .Qgpgf ,Mpgiyg
Battle with Argaeus the Pretender 359 Self—defense
Battle with Paionians 359 Self-defense
Battle with Illyrians 358 Self-defense
Capture of Amphipolis 357 Economic
Capture of Pydna 356 Annexation
Battle with Northern Coalition 356 Self-defense
Capture of Poteidaia 356 Treaty obligation
Capture of Apollonia, Galepsos, & Oisyme 356 Unknown
First battle with Pherai 355 Alliance obligation
Capture of Methane 354 Annexation
Capture of Pagai 354 Alliance obligation
Capture of Abdera & Maroneia 354 Self-defense
Battle with Phocians under Phayllus 353 Self—defense
Battle with Phocians under Onomarchus 353 Self-defense
Re-capture of Pagasai 352 Alliance Obligation
Battle of Crocus Field 352 Self-defense

* For this table I have adopted the chronology and dating of Ellis as given in
his_Philip II and Macedonian Imperialism, pp. 14-20.

114

Engagement

Thracian Campaign

Paionian and Illyrian Campaign
Invasion of Chalcidice

Attack on Pherai

Capture of Olynthus

Capture of Cersobleptes

Attack on Illyrian Pleuratos
Capture of Pherai

Final Thracian Campaign
Capture of Teres and Cersobleptes
Black Sea Campaign

Siege of Perinthos

Siege of Byzantion

Capture of Athenian corn—fleet
Scythian Campaign

Capture of Amphissans

Battle of Chaeronea

Parmenion attack on Persia

Postulated attack by Philip on Persia

Date

351
350
349
349
348
346
345
344
342
341
341
340
340
340
339
338
338

336

Motive

Self—defense
Self-defense
Self—defense
Alliance obligation
Self—defense

Self—defense

 

Self—defense
Alliance obligation
Self—defense
Self-defense
Self—defense
Self—defense
Self—defense
Self—defense
Self—defense
Alliance obligation
Self—defense
Retaliation

Economic

115

From this table two major issues evolve: First
several of the military actions of Philip cannot be clearly
put into Harris's schema, which is not surprising given
either the uncertainty or paucity of information we have
about them. The second issue is that many of Philip's
military activities were driven by treaty or alliance
obligations. In particular, Philip's activities in
Thessaly and Central Greece tended to be solely the result

of alliance or treaty obligations, while the military

 

activities in Illyria and Paconia tended to be for self-
defense. I have also listed the Battle of Chaeronea as
occurring out of the immediate motive of self-defense,
though Philip's army was there only because of his
obligation as a member of the Amphictyonic League.

I have also included in the table the element of
retaliation as a motive for some of Philip's actions,
including Parmenion's initial advance into Asia. It is
also to be noted that in some cases the motives appear to
be mixed, which points to a concern about forcing all of
Philip's actions into a pre—determined scheme. We must
allow that any action can spring from a number of motives.
In this Table I have tried to identify the most important
motives.

It may be argued that alliances or treaties are

negotiated out of one of Harris's four motivating factors,

116

and it certainly seems possible that either self—defense or
expansion may be a motive for such an alliance or treaty.
However, in the case both of the alliance with Thessaly and
Philip's participation in the Amphictyonic League neither
self—defense, (for he had no reason to fear attack), nor
expansion, (since he thereby acquired only little political
power), was a motive for these alliances.

If Harris's categorization of the motives of
imperialism is accepted as exhaustive, then it follows that
Philip's interest in Greece is not primarily an
imperialistic undertaking. In that case we must look for
other motives, a conclusion toward which we have already
been led by our examination of Table III. I believe that
those motives are revealed in Philip's relations with
Thessaly, or more particularly with the segment of
Thessalian society opposed to the tyrants of Pherae, and in
Philip's role on the Amphictyonic Council.

The relationship between Macedonia and Thessaly was
one of long standing, particularly that between the
Larissans and Macedonian kings. Thucydides identifies one
Niconidas of Larissa as a particular friend of

246

Perdiccas.

 

246Thucydides 4.78.2. Perdiccas is also identified as

being on good terms with the leading men of Thessaly
(Thucydides 4.132.2).

 

117

It is no surprise, therefore, that Philip was called on by
the Aleuds, the leading family of Larissa, to help
overthrow the Pheraean tyrants in both the early and late

350s.247

Martin correctly states the impact of his victory
over the Pheraeans: "With his glorious victory, Philip put
an end to nearly twenty years of tyranny in Pherae and,

therefore, to the claim of the successors of Jason to head

the confederacy. He saved traditional government in
"248

 

Thessaly.
As a reward for his outstanding services the

Thessalians elected Philip as the leader of the

confederacy. As the leader of the confederacy Philip

received revenues both from market and harbor taxes as well

as tributes from perioikic areas.249 It was these funds

which Demosthenes accused Philip of misappropriating for

250

his own uses. However, as Martin shows: "But even if

the rumor about revenues was true, there is no indication

 

247See T. Martin, "Diodorus on Philip II and Thessaly
in the 350's B.C.," Classical Philology 76 (1981): 188—201
and "A Phantom Fragment of Theopompus and Philip II's First
Campaign in Thessaly, "Harvard Studies in Classical
Philology 86 (1982): 55-78.

248 . . . . .

Martin, Sovereignty and COlnage in ClaSSical

Greece, p. 90.

249lbid., p. 93.

250Dem. Olynthiac 1. 22 and Olynthiac 2. ll.

 

 

 

 

 

118

elsewhere in Demosthenes or any other source that the
Thessalians ever ceased to turn over these revenues to
Philip. The granting of these same revenues to Alexander
when he succeeded to his father's position as leader of the
confederacy supports the assumption that the threat to cut
. . . "251
off funds, if it was ever made, was never carried out.
Martin suspects that Demosthenes reported the complaints of

the now disaffected Pheraians to discredit Philip.252

 

 

Martin goes on to demonstrate that Demosthenes'
further charges of Philip's imposing a tyranny upon the
Thessalians was also false on all accounts.253 He also
demonstrates that Philip's establishment of the tetrarchies
was merely a return to previous constitutional forms which
had been disrupted by the tyrants of Pherae. The
relationship of Philip to Thessaly is summed up pointedly
by Martin: "In Thessaly, nomos remained king of all. With
the election of Philip as their leader, the Thessalians had
found a solution to their current problems which could be

reconciled with tradition of long standing. In a time of

severe factional strife, they had settled on a third party

 

251Martin, Sovereignty and Coinage in Classical

Greece, p. 96.

252lbid., p. 97.

253lbid., pp. 102~106.

 

119

to serve in a sense as 'mediating magistrate' at the head
of an army strong enough to quell any rebellion or
tyranny."254

Philip's role as pgggg in Thessaly would have been a
strong motive for his interest in Greece, the prosecution
of the Sacred War and the return to Thessaly of its
rightful place in the Amphictyonic Council. Historians
have generally seen Philip's activities on the Council of
the Amphictyons as a mere front for whatever goals he was
said to be really pursuing. This interpretation is
unnecessarily cynical and only confuses the interpretation
of Philip's actions, whereas acceptance of his role on the
Council as serious clarifies his activities.

In summing up Philip's career Diodorus tells us:
"Having subdued in war the men who had been plundering the
shrine at Delphi and having brought aid to the oracle, he
won a seat on the Amphictyonic Council, and because of his
reverence for the gods received as his prize in the
contest, after the defeat of the Phocians, the votes which

"255

had been theirs. Upon reviewing Philip's career we

will find several instances of Philip's reverence for the

 

254lbid., p. 111.

255Diod. 16. 1. 4—5.

 

120

gods, particularly Apollo, and that he acted consistently
in his role as leader of the Amphictyons, even when that
might have conflicted with his role as King of Macedon.

The battle in which Philip defeated Onomarchus was
apparently widely hailed as the vengeance of Apollo against
the temple—robbing Phocians. Justin records that:

"Philip, as if he were the avenger of the sacrilege, not

 

the defender of the Thebans, ordered all his soldiers to
assume crowns of laurel, and proceeded to battle as if

"256 The results of his

under the leadership of the god.
victory Justin describes as follows: "This affair brought
incredibly great glory to Philip in the opinion of all
people, who called him 'the avenger of the god, and the
defender of religion,' and said that 'he alone had arisen
to require satisfaction for what ought to have been
punished by the combined force of the world, and was
consequently worthy to be ranked next to the gods, as by
him the majesty of the gods had been vindicated."257
After Philip's return from Thessaly Diodorus records

that: "he returned to Macedonia, having enlarged his

kingdom not only by his achievements but also by his

 

256Justin 8. 2.

257Justin 8. 2.

121

reverence toward the god."258 It is important to note that
even after inflicting a crushing defeat on the Phocian army
and slaying its commander Philip did not follow his victory
up by striking through the unprotected passes into Central
Greece, which would have seemed the natural thing to do if
his objective was the conquest of Greece.

According to Diodorus the Athenians prevented him from

"259

penetrating into Greece by way of Thermopylae. Justin

gives a little more detail: "The Athenians, hearing the
result of the conflict, and fearing that Philip would march
into Greece, took possession of the straits of Thermopylae,
as they had done on the invasion of the Persians . . ."260
Despite these two assertions it is highly unlikely that the
Athenians could have beaten Philip to the pass or that he
could not have forced it if they had. Griffith agrees in
saying:

Thermopylai was held by the Phokians, doubtless

with a relatively small force of their mercenaries,

and perhaps it was reinforced immediately now by

another relatively small force of Athenian hoplites

from the fleet, but there is no question that if

the victorious army of the Crocus plain had marched
on it without delay, it would have been able to

 

258Diod. 16. 38.2.

259Diod. 16. 38.1

260Justin 8.2.

 

122

force the pass by a combination of circumvention

and frontal assault as Xerxes had dong61 But

for weeks Philip never even marched."

By 347 both sides in the Sacred War were exhausted
with the fighting, which led the Boeotians to ask Philip,
as a fellow Amphictyon, to assist in the struggle.
Philip's response, according to Diodorus, was measured:

"The king, pleased to see their discomfiture and disposed

to humble the Boeotians' pride over Leuctra, dispatched few

 

men, being on his guard against one thing only — lest he be

thought to be indifferent to the pillaging of the

oracle."262

The appearance of Philip's army at Thermopylae was
sufficient to cause the surrender of Phalaecus and his
8,000 mercenaries. The capitulation of the Phocians
quickly followed. With victory achieved, Philip moved to
institute the peace: "As a result he decided to call a

meeting of the Amphictyonic Council and leave to it the

"263

final decision on all the issues at stake. Here again

iPhilip followed strictly the protocol of the Council rather

‘than using his overwhelming force to further Macedonian

:interests.

261G.T. Griffith, "Philip as General and the
bdacedonian Army," p. 73.

262Diod. 16. 58.3.

263Diod. 16. 59.4.

123

Philip not only did not further Macedonian interests
in the conquest of Greece, he helped impose a just yet
moderate settlement after the Sacred War. And when that
was complete: "Thereafter, when Philip had helped the
Amphictyons give effect to their decrees and had dealt
courteously with all, he returned to Macedonia, having not
merely won for himself a reputation for piety and excellent

generalship, but having made important preparations for the
"264

 

aggrandizement that was destined to be his. In the
last clause of Diodorus' account we see the evident
scepticism which prevailed even in antiquity, but

Philip's actions here are again completely consistent with
his role as an Amphictyon and inconsistent with the role of
a Macedonian conqueror.

Philip's special interest in supporting the oracle at
Delphi and his ties with Thessaly may very well have been
interrelated. Plutarch records that one Aleuas the Red,
descendant of Heracles, just as Philip supposed himself to
be, was unexpectedly chosen as the King of Thessaly.265 He
was chosen in a lottery at Delphi by the god Apollo when

the Thessalians were unable to make the selection

themselves. Martin concludes that the parallel is

 

264Diod. 16. 60.4

265Plutarch Moralia 492 A—B.

124

suggestive: "Since Philip had led the Thessalian army to
victory in the Sacred War under Apollo's banner and, it was
alleged, in the interests of the proper management of the
shrine, it was possible to imagine that Apollo had had a

hand in the happy coincidence of interests between Philip

"266

and the confederacy.

Beyond having his soldiers wear laurel wreaths into
battle against the sacrilegious Phocians, Philip also made
another substantial, public commitment to Apollo: he
minted coins with the laureate head of Apollo on one face.
As Martin points out:

Philip was very conscious of the benefits to

be hoped for in a visible commitment to Apollo.
He had his soldiers wear laurel crowns into
battle to prove that they were avengers of
sacrilege committed against Apollo at Delphi
and not just the defenders of Thessalian pride.
Le Rider points out that the laureate head of
Apollo on Philip's gold coins very likely has
something to do with the king's public and
ostentatious devotion to the god's banner in
the Sacred War. But his chronology for these
issues requires him to believe that the Apollo
type commemorates Philip's success in the Sacred
War when the coins were issued at some point
after the war's end in 346, perhaps even well
after the end. It makes better sense to think
that Philip's gold coinage with its garlanded

 

266T. Martin, Sovereignty and Coinage in Classical
Greece, p. 107.

 

125

head of Apollo represents a useful rival to

the Phocign coinage stolen from Apollo of

Delphi."

A final element which may relate Philip's interest in
the defense of Apollo's shrine to his own special interests
involves the divine honors granted to Philip. In his
summary of Philip, Diodorus states: "Such was the end of
Philip, who had made himself the greatest of the kings in
Europe in his time, and because of the extent of his
kingdom had made himself a throned companion of the twelve

"268 Not only did Philip consider himself to be one

gods.
of or equal to the gods, but he was apparently worshipped
as one at Cynosarges. Fredricksmeyer quotes Clement of
Alexandria as saying: "For indeed even whole nations and
cities, with all their people, assuming the mask of
flattery, disparage the stories about the gods, mere men,
transforming men like themselves into the equals of the
gods, blown up with vainglory, and voting them extravagant

honors; at one time they enact by law at Cynosarges the

worship of Philip the son of Amyntas, the Macedonian from

 

267T. Martin, Sovereignty and Coinage in Classical
Greece, pp. 288—289. Against this view it must be noted
that coinage featuring the head of Apollo was not rare in
this area. Griffith points out that Damastium minted
tetradrachms in the early 4th century which featured the
head of Apollo, G.T. Griffith and N.G.L. Hammond, A History
of Macedonia, p. 189.

268Diod. 16. 95.1.

 

126

Pella, with his broken collar—bone and maimed leg, with one

eye knocked out. . . ."269
This worship was held publicly at Cynosarges, a famous

sanctuary of Heracles located just outside the city of

Athens.270

This was an entirely appropriate setting for
Philip's worship, since he claimed descent from Heracles.
Fredricksmeyer indicates that the fact that the cult was
held outside the wall makes it a less drastic
innovation.271

Fredricksmeyer also gives evidence that Philip was
worshipped as a god as early as 359 B.C. in Amphipolis, and
perhaps at Leshos in 343 B.C.272 He suggests that:
"There is evidence that after the battle of Chaeronea
Philip not only received divine honors at Athens, but also
planned to found a dynastic cult, of himself and his family

at Olympia."27

Remains of his temple, the Philippeum,
have been found at Olympia.
If Philip took all this seriously, and it appears that

he did, it is not surprising that he would be especially

 

269E.A. Fredricksmeyer, "Divine Honors for Philip II,"
Transactions of the American Philological Association 109
(1979): 40.

270lbid., p. 49.

271Ibid., p. 50.

2721bid., p. 51.

273Ibid., p. 52.

127

interested in avenging the Pythian Apollo and trying to

 

assure both the stability and effectiveness of the Council
of the Amphictyons. And this would also be a

sufficiently powerful motive both to involve him in the
affairs of Central Greece when his main interests lay
elsewhere and to allow him to separate his role as ruler of

Macedon from his role as Amphictyon.

 

Philip appears to have been a complex and brilliant
man, and therefore one likely to have many reasons for
whatever actions he undertook. His interactions with the
Greeks were precipitated by their actions in Thessaly and
the northern Aegean until he was elected to be the military
leader of Thessaly and, thereby, a member of the
Amphictyonic Council. From that time onwards his actions
toward the southern Greeks appear to have been driven
solely by his dual roles in Thessaly and on the Council.

None of this is to deny altogether that Philip,
somewhere along the way, contemplated the role of Greece
vis—a—vis Macedonia. Especially as the Greek and
Macedonian spheres of interaction grew ever closer must he
have asked himself about the value of Greece to an
ambitious northern king. What I am questioning is that
Philip's driving motive was the conquest of Greece. Once
we have stepped aside from Demosthenes' view of Athens as

Philip's central focus, some mysteries seem much clearer.

128

For example, Philip's relatively gentle and generous
treatment of Athens has always puzzled historians. But
they have adopted Demosthenes' perspective. If neither
Athens nor Greece was Philip's central focus, then Philip's
actions towards the Athenians were not unexpected. He was
merely doing the least possible to deal with them while he

was engaged in meeting his primary objective.

 

The question of what his primary objective was, if not
Greece, naturally occurs. While it is not the purpose of
this study to answer that question, I believe that there
are several possible responses: 1) the unification and
consolidation of Macedonia proper, 2) the establishment of
a ring of buffer states around Macedonia, and 3) a possible
incursion into Asia Minor. I believe that any of these
would have been more important to Philip than any value to

be found in conquering Greece.

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