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PHILIP II'S IMPERIAL AMBITIONS
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PHILIP II's IMPERIAL AMBITIONS TOWARD GREECE

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ABSTRACT

PHILIP II'S IMPERIAL AMBITIONS TOWARD GREECE

BY

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The purpose of this study is to examine the conventional view that Philip II of Macedon had imperial ambitions toward the Greeks. Philip's contemporaries and later historians have typically argued that his ambitions involved one or more of the following:

A. Philip's hatred of democracy, particularly that of Athens.

B. Philip's desire to seize the riches of Greece.

C. Philip's need to protect his southern border from attack by the Greeks while he invaded Persia.

D. Philip's interest in utilizing Greek troops and ships in an attack on Persia.

This study finds each of these alleged motives inaccurate or inadequate.

This study explores the hypothesis that Philip had no imperial ambitions toward Greece. Philip's involvement with Greece is traced to his alliance with Thessaly and his subsequent role on the Amphictyonic Council. It is further suggested that his role with the Amphictyonic League was animated and strengthened by his extraordinary religiosity.

DEDICATION

This thesis is dedicated to the memory of

Fanchon LaVerna Leath Cline

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ABBREVIATIONS

All abbreviations used in this thesis are those used in the Oxford Classical Dictionary, second edition.

CHAPTER 1

Sources

The literary sources for the life and activities of Philip II of Macedon may be conveniently put into three categories: 1) contemporary sources, 2) ancient, but not contemporary, sources, and 3) modern sources. The contemporary sources include Demosthenes, the Athenian orator; Aeschines, also an Athenian orator; Xenophon, an Athenian general and writer; Isocrates, an Athenian rhetorician; and Theopompus of Chios, a historian and pupil of Isocrates.

Of the contemporary sources it was Demosthenes who was most closely associated with Philip. The great orator is frequently cast as the voice in the wilderness trying desperately to warn his fellow citizens of the dangers of the indomitable warrior of Macedon. This is a much oversimplified picture. The extant speeches of Demosthenes involve much more than just his concerns about Philip, as might be expected of an orator and politician in a democracy such as Athens possessed in the fourth century.

For our purposes, however, it is Demosthenes' speeches on foreign affairs, and particularly Philip's activities, for which he frequently is the only source, that concern us here. Those speeches include: 1) four Philippics, the fourth of which is now considered to be spurious,[1] 2) three Olynthiacs, 3) On the Peace, which Libanius believed was written but never delivered,[2] 4) On the Chersonese, 5) On the Embassy to Philip in 346, 6) Philip's Letter, 7) On the Treaty with Alexander, and 8) On Halonnesus, a speech which Libanius identifies as having been written by one Hegesippus.[3]

Aeschines was an opponent of Demosthenes throughout his career, and his three extant speeches are in direct opposition to activities or accusations of Demosthenes; one is in direct response to Demosthenes' charge of official misconduct, a capital crime. The speeches of Demosthenes and Aeschines are invaluable to the reconstruction of events of the time. As T.T.B. Ryder says:

> It is then, largely from the speeches themselves that we have to build up our picture of the historical events they discuss and form judgements

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[1]Dem. Speeches. Translated by J.H. Vince (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1962), p. 268.

[2]Ibid., p. 103.

[3]Ibid., p. 148.

> of the merits of their arguments and of the policies and actions of those who delivered them; and this is a situation which a historian cannot find easy. It need hardly be said that political speeches present many hazards to anyone who seeks to construct the true record of events, especially if, as is usually the case in this period, only one side of the argument has come down to us. It is true that in the two trials with which this volume is concerned both sides can be heard, but often only to increase the general uncertainty; the two versions of some episodes in the not too distant past are so discordant that one or other speaker must be trying to escape with untruths which, though he presumably thought them plausible, should, one feels, have been too much for the gullibility of any audience. It is not always easy to tell which of the two is the culprit; moreover we are left wondering how often either speaker indulges in similar misrepresentations on occasions where the argument of the other is not available.[4]

Beyond the potentially misleading statements that either orator may have made, a historian must be concerned about what of the preserved speech was actually delivered. Athenian orators of that period always gave their speeches from memory and only later published them. This delayed publication allowed some opportunity for changes in the text in order, presumably, to address an unexpected argument from one's opponent. On the other hand, as Ryder points out, "it is arguable that such a published version needed to be more accurate than the spoken, for its

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[4]T.T.B. Ryder, Demosthenes and Aeschines (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1975), p. 13.

statements were open to more prolonged and careful scrutiny."[5]

In weighing the evidence provided by Demosthenes and Aeschines, we must give great consideration to the fact not only that both lived at the time of Philip but also that both were actively involved in the decisions relating to Athens' stance toward Philip and were involved in the implementation of those policies. Both had met Philip at least twice and so were in a position personally to judge his character. Nevertheless both were actively involved as politicians and orators, so that their works were composed to convince the assembly towards an action which they favored, and were not necessarily an even-handed attempt to find the truth of the issues at hand.

Isocrates' life spanned the largest part of the fourth century, and his works were written between 380 and 338 B.C. Although an orator as well as a rhetorician, Isocrates was never directly involved in political matters.[6] Of particular interest to students of Philip and

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[5]Ibid., p. 15.

[6]George Cawkwell, "Isocrates," Oxford Classical Dictionary. Edited by N.G.L. Hammond and H.H. Scullard (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1970), p. 554. Isocrates was not directly involved in the sense that he never deliverd speeches to the Athenian assembly or was engaged as an official in the day to day affairs of Athenian government.

Macedonia is Isocrates' letter to Philip, composed in 346, urging Philip to lead the united Greeks in a war against the Persians. Also of value for the social and economic background are his "Panegyricus," "Archidamus," and "Areopagiticus." Isocrates was a lifelong advocate of Panhellenism, and this view permeates all of his writings. On balance, then, Isocrates must be considered a reasonably good source, with allowances being made for the fact that he may, because of his panhellenic viewpoint, exaggerate the evils of non-cooperation among the Greek city-states.

From the philosophic Isocrates we turn to Xenophon, the man of action. Xenophon was born in the last quarter of the 5th century and died in 356, just after Philip's accession to the throne. Although a soldier and mercenary general, Xenophon, like Isocrates, knew and was influenced by, Socrates. Upon retiring from an active military life, Xenophon wrote several extant books, including a book of advice on improving the economy, and a history of his times, which are of great value for this study.

Anderson summarizes his value as a historian thus: "In his historical works Xenophon makes mistakes and omissions, and displays his prejudices, though his partiality for Sparta has been over-censured by his critics. But he is, at his best, an excellent story-teller, and, if he offers no profound general reflections

on human behavior, he gives us some good individual portraits. His histories contain many incidents illustrating his notions of honorable or dishonorable conduct, and the standards by which he judges are by no means despicable."[7] His comments on the state of the Athenian economy would, under this analysis, seem reliable enough.

The last of Philip's contemporaries upon whom this study is based is Theopompus of Chios, who was born around 378 B.C. Theopompus was a historian and pupil of Isocrates. Theopompus is of particular value to historians of Philip because he lived at the Macedonian court and therefore was close to some of the events about which he writes. His fame rests upon two works, the Hellenica and the Philippica, a fifty-eight volume tome beginning with Philip's accession. Unfortunately, we possess only fragments of these works, although enough remain of the Philippica to discern the outline of its structure.

The important ancient, but not contemporary, sources for Philip's life include Diodorus Siculus, Justin, and Plutarch. Of these three the most important is Diodorus, who write a universal history in forty books which covers

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[7]J.K. Anderson, Xenophon (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1974), p. 2.

from earliest times to 54 B.C. Most of Diodorus' works, written between 60 and 30 B.C., is based directly upon a variety of authorities. He seems to have relied upon Ephorus and Theopompus for his section on Philip of Macedon. If that is correct, then the reliability of these sections should be excellent, since both Ephorus and Theopompus were well-regarded as historians by the ancients. Fortunately, those portions of Diodorus' work relating to Philip and Alexander survived, since they provide a chronology (debated) of their reigns. It was Diodorus' attempt to write an annalistic history which may have contributed to many of his mistakes, since he had either to break off and restart his narrative every year or condense the events of many years into one. He also seems to have given, on occasion, two versions of the same story, but in different years.[8] The difficulties with Diodorus, then, are the chronology and the very sketchy nature of some of the information.

Justin (Marcus Junian Justinus) wrote an epitome of the Historiae Philippicae of Pompeius Trogus in the 3rd century A.D. The epitome is rather short and contains

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[8]Cf. Thomas R. Martin, "Diodorus on Philip II and Thessaly in the 350's B.C.," Classical Philology 76 (1981): 188-201 and N.G.L. Hammond, "Diodorus' Narrative of the Sacred War and the Chronological Problems of 357-352 B.C.," The Journal of Hellenic Studies 57 (1937): 44-77.

barely an outline of events during the period. Nonetheless, it has some value in that it gives some details not elsewhere available.

Plutarch of Chaeronea lived from c. 46 A.D. to 126 A.D. and wrote widely on a variety of topics, but the most well-known work is his Parallel Lives. As a biographer, Plutarch is most interested in events and actions that reveal men's characters and hence there are frequent omissions and distortions in his historical narrative.[9] Here again Plutarch is most helpful by filling in information otherwise unknown.

Because these three writers lived a considerable time after Philip's reign and had to rely on other (and perhaps unknown) sources, their reliability seems rarely the equal of contemporary accounts. Therefore the works of these authors should be given less weight than that of the contemporary authors unless very compelling reasons can be adduced which support their conclusions.

As a result of what R.M. Errington calls "academic anti-cyclical activity," there has been an outpouring of works on Philip II and Macedonia within the last decade.

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[9]D.A. Russell, "Plutarch," Oxford Classical Dictionary, p. 849. Cf. Alan Woodman, Plutarch's Lives (London: Paul Elek, 1974), pp. 2-9 for a more favorable review.

Among those, three stand out as being of exceptional value: 1) J.R. Ellis, Philip II and Macedonian Imperialism, 2) George Cawkwell, Philip of Macedon, and G.T. Griffith and N.G.L. Hammond, A History of Macedonia, Vol. 2. This last book was written in two sections so that we may credit Griffith alone for the section covering the era of Philip II. All three works seem extremely well researched and written. Cawkwell's, being the shortest (just over two hundred pages) has much less detail. All have taken advantage of a plethora of good monographs on many of the topics of interest, not a few of them written by the authors themselves.

Of the three, I have found Griffith's to be most useful because of the abundance of detail and the voluminous footnotes. On military issues, his arguments seem most compelling. Cawkwell and Ellis both seem superior to Griffith in elucidating the political and diplomatic issues. I fault all of them for seeming to bring to their studies an a priori belief that Philip really planned to conquer Greece. This bias necessarily surfaces in much of their narratives and on Philip's plans and purposes, with which views I find myself in disagreement.

TABLE 1

The Dates of Demosthenes' Speeches

Concerned with Philip

Speech	Date
On the Navy-Boards	354
For the Megapolitans	353
Against Timocrates	353
Against Aristocrates	352
First Philippic	351
For the Liberty of the Rhodians	351
First Olynthiac	349
Second Olynthiac	349
Third Olynthiac	349
Meidias (not delivered)	347
On the Peace	346
Second Philippic	344
On the False Embassy	343
On Halonnesus (Hegesippus?)	342
On the Chersonese	341
Third Philippic	341
Funeral Oration	338

In this Table I have followed the dating of J.H. Vince in Demosthenes Vol. I, Translated by J.H. Vince (Harvard: Cambridge University Press, 1962), pp. XV-XVIII.

CHAPTER 2

The Conventional Thesis

At the height of the celebration of his daughter's wedding, Philip II of Macedon was assassinated by Pausanias, a disaffected noble.[10] Revered as a god, Philip revealed his mortality.[11] Upon his death, his son Alexander quickly and efficiently seized power, consolidated his role in Macedonia and Thrace, and then demolished Thebes for attempting revolt.[12] These actions accomplished, young Alexander marched the Macedonian army into Western and Central Asia, conquering Egypt and parts of India as well.

After Alexander's death, his successors engaged in a futile struggle to consolidate Alexander's empire. The resulting fragmentation led to the establishment of many monarchical states which inherited the influence and organization of the Greek city-states. Many formal aspects of the city-state, such as the gymnasium, theater, and the Greek language, were thus imported into Asia and Africa.

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[10]Justin 9.6.

[11]Diod. 16.95.1 Philip may have considered himself a god as well.

[12]Arrian 1.8.

Thus, weak and almost helpless at Philip's accession in 359 B.C., the Macedonians first conquered, and then controlled, much of the ancient world by the time of Alexander's death in 323 B.C. The first steps along this path were taken by Philip, who united Macedonia into a political and military whole, secured her borders, and only then advanced into the larger arena of foreign affairs. Upon Philip's death, Alexander seized the falling torch and raced across the Hellespont to glorious success.

Even while he lived, Philip's actions towards the venerable Greek city-states were viewed in two diametrically opposed ways. The view of Demosthenes and those who followed him was that Philip was the ruthless destroyer of liberty in the Greek city-states. Philip, says Demosthenes, cannot abide democracy and freedom, and thus, "the chief object . . . of his arms and his diplomacy is our free constitution; on nothing in the world is he more bent than on its destruction."[13] Demosthenes' theme has been carried forward by historians, both ancient and modern.[14]

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[13]Dem. Fourth Philippic 11-12.

[14]Diod. 1.4; Justin 9.1; J.R. Ellis, Philip II and Macedonian Imperialism (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1986), pp. 233-234; George Cawkwell, Philip of Macedon (London: Faber and Faber, 1978), pp. 10-15.

The opposite view, espoused by the rhetor Isocrates, identified Philip as a unifier of the diverse and continually warring Greek city-states. In his discourse, To Philip, Isocrates states,

> I affirm that, without neglecting any of your own interests, you ought to make an effort to reconcile Argos and Lacedaemon and Thebes and Athens; for if you can bring these cities together, you will not find it hard to unite the others as well; for all the rest are under the protection of the aforesaid cities, and fly for refuge, when they are alarmed, to one or other of these powers, and they all draw upon them for succour. So that if you can persuade four cities only to take a sane view of things, you will deliver the others also from many evils."[15]

This view, too, has been adopted by many historians.[16]

While there is considerable disagreement over the effects of Philip's actions, there has been relatively little over his aims. From the beginning, historians have seen Philip's goal as the conquest of Greece. Justin states, "for Philip, King of Macedonia, looking as from a watch-tower, for an opportunity to attack their liberties, and fomenting their contentions by assisting the weaker,

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[15]Isocrates To Philip 30-31.

[16]J.R. Ellis believes that whether a historian adopts the view of Demosthenes or Isocrates is a reflection of the events during the period in which he is writing, Ellis, Philip II, pp. 6-7.

obliged victors and vanquished alike to submit to his regal yoke."[17] Modern historians have, for the most part agreed. Chester Starr states, "Although his [Philip's] ambitions soon extended to the mastery of all Greece and eventually envisaged the possibility of invading the Persian empire, few men were able to divine his aims before they were accomplished."[18]

Bury expands the notion, "He was ambitious to secure a recognized hegemony in Greece; to hold such a position as had been held by Athens, by Sparta, and by Thebes in the days of their greatness; to form, in fact, a confederation of allies, which should hold some such dependent relation towards him as the confederates of Delos had held towards Athens."[19]

In the late nineteenth century, Joy had asserted, "At the focus of Greece, where fortune had placed him [Philip], he saw his opportunity to succeed in a conquest which had baffled the hosts of Xerxes, and from the day of his accession to the Macedonian throne (?359 B.C.), in his

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[17] Justin 8.1.

[18] Chester A. Starr, A History of the Ancient World (New York: Oxford University Press, 1965), p. 367.

[19] J.B. Bury, A History of Greece (New York: The Modern Library, 1913), p. 688.

twenty-third year, he went on cautiously but steadily, by guile and by force, to the consummation at Chaeronea."[20]

As late as the 1960s, Jones can say, "Philip II was a man who well understood the Greeks and their politics. With a genius for organization and a great capacity for intrigue, he soon had the disunited and mutually jealous city-states of Greece at his mercy; step by step, he moved relentlessly towards his goal - the establishment of Macedonian supremacy in Greek lands."[21]

Of the most recent writers on Philip II, Cawkwell, too, sees Greece as Philip's primary target.[22] Ellis views the subjugation of Greece as an intermediate goal on the way to an attack on Persia.[23] Both in ancient times and from the mid-19th century to the 1980s, historians have been nearly unanimous in attributing to Philip the objective of conquering the Greek city-states.[24]

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[20]James Joy, Grecian History (New York: Chautauqua Press, 1892), p. 272.

[21]Tom B. Jones, Ancient Civilization (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1968), pp. 280-281.

[22]Cawkwell, Philip of Macedon, p. 68.

[23]Ellis, Philip II, pp. 233-234.

[24]Cf. Connop Thirlwall, A History of Greece, Vol. 2 (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1855); George Grote, History of Greece, Vol. 11 (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1859); Ellis, Philip II; and Cawkwell, Philip of Macedon.

It is instructive to review the reasons attributed to Philip for this interest in Greece. Demosthenes states that Philip is motivated by ". . . ambition and the desire of universal dominion . . ."[25] Moreover, says Demosthenes,

> First, men of Athens, you must fix this firmly in your minds, that Philip is at war with us and has broken the peace, and that he is ill-disposed and hostile to the whole city and to the very soil on which the city stands, and, I will add, to the gods that dwell in it; and may those same gods complete his ruin! The chief object, however, of his arms and diplomacy is our free constitution, and on nothing in the world is he more bent than on its destruction. And it is in a way inevitable that he should now be acting thus. For observe! He wants to rule, and he has made up his mind that you, and you only, bar the way.[26]

More specifically, he continues,

> This, then, is the first thing needful, to recognize in Philip the inveterate enemy of constitutional government and democracy; and your second need is to convince yourself that all his activity and all his organization is preparing the way for an attack on our city. For none of you is so simple as to believe that though Philip covets these wretched objects in Thrace - for what else can one call Drongilus and Cabyle and Mastira and the other places he is said to be now holding? - and though he endures toil and winter storms and deadly peril for the privilege of taking them, yet he does not covet the Athenian harbours and dockyards and war-galleys and the place itself and the glory of it . . .[27]

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[25]Dem. Second Philippic 67.7.

[26]Dem. Fourth Philippic 11-12.

[27]Dem. Fourth Philippic 15-16.

Demosthenes' case may be summarized as follows:

1) Philip is a megalomaniac, desirous of power for its sake alone, and therefore insatiable.
2) Philip especially dislikes Athens because of its democratic constitution.
3) Moreover he fears that Athens may become the rallying point against his tyranny.
4) In addition, Philip values the Athenian port, fleet, and high reputation.

Therefore, by seizing Athens, Philip will have increased his power, removed a potential source of opposition to his rule, and acquired an important harbor and fleet for his further adventures.

Justin sets forth an entirely different reason for Philip's designs on Greece. "When Philip had once come into Greece, allured by the plunder of a few cities, and had formed an opinion, from the spoil of such towns as were of less note, how great must be the riches of all its cities put together, he resolved to make war upon the whole of Greece."[28] It is in the wealth of Greece, therefore, that Justin finds motivation for Philip's incursion to the south. Further, it seems clear that Justin is referring to

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[28]Justin 9.1.

the riches represented by precious metals and coinage as opposed to the riches inherent in such things as agricultural produce (e.g., olives and grapes).

Diodorus Siculus sees as Philip's motivation toward Greece the desire to lead a united Greek army against the Persians, much as Jason of Pherae had planned earlier. Diodorus says, "For he was ambitious to be designated general of Hellas in supreme command and as such to prosecute the war against the Persians."[29] What Diodorus does not state, but seems to intend, is that Philip wanted the military strength, both hoplites and triremes, of Greece to aid him in his incursion into Asia Minor.

Modern historians have adopted and expanded upon this list of motives. In 1899, Thirlwall wrote, "It was in and through Greece that he had to seek the highest objects of his ambition. He had to make Macedonia a Grecian state of the first magnitude, and then to try if it could not swallow up the rest."[30] Here Thirlwall echoes Demosthenes' assertion of Philip's unrestrained desire to conquer. Likewise Grote, who styles Philip the "great aggressor of the age."[31]

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[29]Diod., 60.5.

[30]Connop Thirlwall, A History of Greece, Vol. 2 (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1855), p. 75.

[31]George Grote, History of Greece, Vol. 2 (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1859), p. 443. Also pp. 520-521.

It was the view of Adolph Holm, in 1896, that Philip was attempting to become the hegemon over Greece, thereby uniting the city-states and securing their aid for his Persian enterprise.[32] This view is also echoed by Curtius in his History of Greece.[33]

In more recent times, Hammond has suggested that: "His [Philip's] plan to pacify the Greek states and provide scope for their surplus populations in Asia was conceived in the interest of Greece as well as of Macedon."[34] Of the most recent writers, Ellis states,

> From the Macedonian viewpoint, Greece was poor in all respects but one, that its soldiers were the best, outside their own, in the eastern Mediterranean world. Whether or not Philip wished to make very extensive use of the Greek soldier or sailor in a co-operative eastern venture, he was at the least compelled to protect his kingdom against their use in opposition to him. In military terms, that is, Greece was only incidental to Philip's longer-term aims. His ambitions lay in two directions, south and east. Towards the former he turned for security and coalition, but for a continuing source of military objectives and wealth he turned towards Asia.[35]

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[32]Adolf Holm, The History of Greece, Vol. 3 (New York: MacMillan, 1896), pp. 245-246.

[33]Ernst Curtius, The History of Greece, Vol. 5. Translated by Adolphus Ward (New York: Scribner, Armstrong, and Co.), pp. 66-67.

[34]N.G.L. Hammond, A History of Greece to 322 B.C. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1959), p. 575.

[35]Ellis, Philip II, p. 234.

Cawkwell also sees Philip's plan requiring the use of Athenian military strength to further his planned invasion of Persia. "Philip wanted alliance with Athens because he had already decided to attack Persia. For that the Athenian navy was indispensable."[36] This is a very strong statement on Cawkwell's part, as he is asserting not only that Philip judged that he needed the assistance of the Athenian flotilla, but also that his Persian expedition could not be successful without it. Interestingly, Cawkwell provides no argument at all for this statement.

Bringing together both contemporary views and those of ancient and modern historians, the plans of Philip, and the reasons for those plans, include the following:

1) Philip was a megalomaniac, eager to achieve power wherever he could and chose Greece because,
2) He especially disliked Athens' democratic constitution which he feared might become the rallying point for opposition,
3) He coveted the wealth and riches possessed by the Greek city-states,

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[36]George Cawkwell, Philip of Macedon, p. 111.

4) He also coveted the military might of the Greeks, particularly the hoplites and the Athenian fleet, which he desired for use against Persia, and

5) He needed to protect the Macedonian homeland from attack by the Greeks while he was off in Persia.

Each of these five factors deserves special attention, as do the relationships between them. Moreover, each requires expansion in order to see why it was espoused and to ascertain, if possible, the reasons that it was put forth. Those reasons can then be examined both for validity, truthfulness, and consistency. The examination of these assertions and their supporting reasons will help to uncover some assumptions, not necessarily stated, which are an essential part of the arguments presented both by Philip's contemporaries and historians. These unstated assumptions deserve our scrutiny as well, if the arguments are to be fairly evaluated.

CHAPTER 3

Philip's Personality and Character

The first factor to be considered is that Philip was power-hungry generally but had a particular interest in achieving control over Greece. This is a view held by Demosthenes and Theopompus in particular, and also by some modern historians; so we should review their statements on the matter with care.

Demosthenes argues that as Philip is a king, he is necessarily opposed to freedom and the rule of law, because every king is. Consequently, Demosthenes argues, "This, then, is the first thing needful, to recognize in Philip the inveterate enemy of constitutional government and democracy, for unless you are heartily persuaded of this, you will not consent to take your politics seriously."[37] But not only is Philip opposed to freedom and democracy, he also has a desire to gain great power. Demosthenes asserts that all of Philip's actions are guided by "ambition and the desire of universal dominion."[38]

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[37]Dem. On the Chersonese 43.

[38]Dem. Second Philippic 7-8.

In the view of Demosthenes, the existence of Athens is the main, if not sole, barrier to the ambitions of Philip, since "he rightly saw that to our city and our national character he could offer nothing, he could do nothing, that would tempt you from selfish motives to sacrifice to him any of the other Greek states. . . ."[39] Demosthenes makes it clear in this passage that Philip's desire to rule is the desire to rule over the Greeks. This is also confirmed in the following: "I only know this, that Philip was less interested in these towns than desirous to secure the pass [Thermopylae], to win for himself the credit of finishing off the Sacred War, and to preside at the Pythian games. That was the summit of his ambition."[40]

Not only does Philip desire to rule Greece, but, owing to his character, there are no means he will not use to accomplish this goal. Demosthenes finds in him, "the restless activity which is ingrained in Philip's nature, and which makes it impossible for him to ever rest on his laurels."[41] Presumably it is this characteristic which leads Philip to such unorthodox tactics as fighting during the winter season.

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[39]Dem. Second Philippic 7-8, Cf. also Dem. Second Philippic 17.

[40]Dem. On the Peace 22.

[41]Dem. First Olynthiac 14 and Cf. Herodotus description of the nature of Persian Kings, Herodotus 3.134.

Beyond this restless activity, Demosthenes, and especially Theopompus, find in Philip an evil and treacherous nature. Demosthenes believes him to be very jealous, particularly with regard to gaining glory. "[F]or those who have resided at his court agree that Philip is so jealous that he wants to take to himself all the credit of the chief successes, and is more annoyed with a general or an officer who achieves something praise worthy than with those who fail ignominiously. . . ."[42]

Both Theopompus and Demosthenes accuse Philip of leading an immoral and drunken life and associating only with those who share his debauchments.[43] The result of this, they both claim, was that Philip shunned the company of those who were upright and proper in their behavior. In his arguments before the assembly, Demosthenes used this assertion to point to the inherent weakness of Philip's rule and the likely effects of stern resistance by the Athenians. That is, if the Athenians would only resist, Philip and his companions, because of their dissolute ways, would readily be defeated.

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[42]Dem. Answer to Philip's Letter 12. Cf. also Dem. On Halonnesus 45. and Second Olynthiac 18.

[43]Dem. Second Olynthiac 18-19; Theopomp. quoted by Polybius 8.9. 6-13; Theopomp. quoted by Athenaeus (4. 166-167); Theopomp. quoted by Athenaeus (6. 259-260); and Theopomp. quoted by Athenaeus (6. 260).
Plutarch also comments upon Philip's drunken behavior, Plutarch Alexander 9.

An expected result of a character such as Philip was said to have possessed was that he easily stooped to bribery to accomplish his political ends, which bribery was also accompanied by treachery.[44] As Demosthenes phrases it, "In a word, he has hoodwinked everyone that has had any dealings with him; he has played upon the folly of each party in turn and exploited their ignorance of his own character. That is how he has gained his power."[45] Libanius refers back to Philip as the arch-briber when he says, "[S]o Philip's domination is due to Lasthenes, Euthycrates and all the rest who reduced their states to slavery while he fought with bribes, not arms."[46]

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[44]Cf. Perlman, "The number of cases in which charges were made against ambassadors because of bribe-taking is quite small. This clearly confirms the view that bribing ambassadors was not a very wide-spread custom. Moreover, charges of bribe-taking were restricted to embassies to Persia and Macedon. In these cases the prevailing custom of bestowing gifts as a sign of hospitality . . . made it possible to cast suspicion of bribery," S. Perlman, "On Bribing Athenian Ambassadors," Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies 17 (1976): 231-232.

[45]Dem. Second Olynthiac 7.

[46]Libanius Oration XLIX 26. Cf. also Diod. 16. 8.7 who asserts that Philip used coins minted at Philippoi to bribe the Greeks. It seems the height of folly to bribe someone with coins with your own picture on them, for how would they be spent without revealing the fact that a bribe had been accepted. According to Strauss, Philip's coins were most likely to circulate in Macedonia, Thessaly, and Thrace because these areas had adopted the Aeginetic weight standard, in order to inhibit the use of Athenian coins for local transactions. Barry Strauss, "Philip II of Macedon, Athens, and Silver Mining," Hermes 112 (1984): 425.

By these many assertions about Philip's character, Demosthenes cleverly built up a series of premises designed to lead to the inescapable conclusion that the Athenians ought both to fear and act against Philip. Moreover, he built up a careful parallel between Philip and Athens, the intent of which was to show that Philip possessed characteristics opposite to those of the Athenians. The following table briefly outlines the comparisons brought forward by Demosthenes in his speeches:

By these means Demosthenes hoped to persuade the Athenians to vigorously contend with Philip and to reverse what had become a rather conservative policy under Eubulus.[47]

Table II

Demosthenes' Comparison of Philip and Athens

Philip	Athens
King and tyrant	Constitutional democracy
Ambitious	Restrained
Immoral	Virtuous
Restless	Orderly
Treacherous (bribery)	Honest

[47]George Cawkwell, "Eubulus," JHS 83 (1963): 47-67.

The question that must be considered, however, is the veracity of Demosthenes' account. Was he rightly alerting the Athenians to the danger of Philip or was he creating a caricature of Philip to further his own policy preferences?

One cannot gainsay that Philip was a king, or that he came to the Macedonian throne by the more or less normal and accepted process.[48] Whether his kingship necessarily made him an opponent of constitutional democracy or of Athens in particular is hardly proven. Surely it is clear that Demosthenes exaggerates to make a point: that Philip, as a king, is not likely to be favorably disposed to the Athenians and their interests. In contradiction, Philip was, throughout his career, extraordinarily considerate of the Athenians, releasing their prisoners without ransom, carefully negotiating with them time and time again about points of disagreement, and even after having defeated their armies, treating them with unwanted gentleness.[49]

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[48]The argument rages over whether or not Philip was regent before he became king (Justin 7.5; Diodorus 16.2.4). If he was a regent, his accession would have to be considered somewhat irregular, since he would have set aside the claims of the former king's son. However, there was adequate precedent for such an action in Macedonian history to account it an acceptable practice.

[49]Cf. Polyb. 5.9. 10-10.2.

R.M. Errington, in a recent review,[50] points out that Philip seemed only to be seeking a way to neutralize the Athenian fleet when he concluded the Peace of 346. He further suggests that, though Demosthenes supported the treaty in 346: "In 343 however he [Demosthenes] chose to cover up his tracks by pretending that Philip had hoodwinked the Athenians by making vague promises.[51] The essential point of Errington's argument is that Philip's behavior towards Athens seems unexpected only in the light of the expectations created by Demosthenes' rhetoric. By abandoning Demosthenes' viewpoint we are able to see Philip's actions in a more objective and understandable way.

As to Philip's moral failings, Demosthenes seems to be using them as both a foil to the announced Athenian character as well as a way to incite the _demos_ to action against the king, portraying him as a villain against whom the righteous _polis_ must naturally take arms just as it had against the Persian despots.[52]

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[50] R.M. Errington, "Review-Discussion: Four Interpretations of Philip II," _American Journal of Ancient History_ 6 (1981): 76.

[51] Ibid.

[52] Pierre Leveque, "Philip's Personality," _Philip of Macedon_, Edited by M.B. Hatzopoulos and L.D. Loukopoulos (Athens: Ekdotike Athenon, 1980), p. 177: "As regards Philip's Barbarism, which was the theme underlying Demosthenes' orations, it is evident that this was only a polemical argument without real historical value."

The vitriolic attacks of Theopompus on Philip's character are not so easily dismissed as rhetorical devices. Ostensibly, Theopompus was trying to explain Philip's actions from the perspective of a historian and so assertions regarding Philip's character ought to be taken more seriously. Theopompus asserted that Philip: 1) showed no favor to good men, 2) surrounded himself with men who were drinkers, gamblers, and dissolutes, and 3) was himself wasteful of material goods.[53] The latter Theopompus said was caused by Philip's constant soldiering which left him no time "to count up revenues and expenses."

However, some contemporary evidence contradicts both Demosthenes or Theopompus. Aeschines, in describing the first embassy to Philip, pictures Philip as understanding, intelligent, and witty in his dealings with the ten envoys.[54] He also quotes Demosthenes as saying that Philip was "the most wonderful man under the sun."[55]

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[53] Theopomp. quoted by Polybius (VIII.9. 6-13) and Theopomp. quoted by Athenaeus (IV. 166-167).

[54] Aeschin. On the Embassy 33-39.

[55] Aeschin. On the Embassy 41. Interestingly, Aeschines also quotes Demosthenes as telling the Ecclesia that Philip was not an especially great drinker because, "our Philocrates could beat him." (Aeschines On the Embassy 52.)

Polybius saw Philip as being lenient and humane.[56] He also exonerates Philip's companions in the following: "But in speaking of Philip and his friends not only would one hesitate to accuse them of cowardice, effeminacy, and shamelessness to boot, but on the contrary if one set oneself the task of singing their praises one could scarcely find terms adequate to characterize the bravery, industry, and in general the virtue of these men who indisputably by their energy and daring raised Macedonia from the rank of a petty kingdom to that of the greatest and most glorious monarchy in the world."[57]

Diodorus Siculus also found praise for Philip's character. "For King Philip excelled in shrewdness in the act of war, courage, and brilliance of personality."[58] He describes Philip as courteous, loyal, and clever.[59] In addition, Diodorus cites Philip's calm and eloquence: "Yet even so, with such fears and dangers threatening them, Philip was not panic-stricken by the magnitude of the expected perils, but, bringing together the Macedonians in

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[56]Polyb. 5. 9. 10-1.2.

[57]Polyb. 8. 10. 5-6.

[58]Diod. 16. 1.6.

[59]Diod. 16. 3.3.

a series of assemblies and exhorting them with eloquent speeches to men, he built up their morale. . . ."[60]

Even if we allow that Demosthenes is essentially correct in his characterization of Philip's situation and personality, no necessary link is evident between them and the supposed interest of Philip in conquering Athens. Other kings, such as Bardylis the Illyrian and Cersobleptes the Thracian, were militarily and economically strong, yet neither seemed interested in attacking Athens. The northern kingdoms (e.g., Epirus, Illyria, Macedonia, Thrace) seemed always to be engaged in fighting with each other, not in attacking the Greeks. Moreover, it was not necessary for a king to be dissolute to oppose the policies and actions of the Athenians; there were perfectly rational grounds for such opposition.

Moreover, opinion is divided as to the personal qualities of Philip, although it is not impossible that in him resided both the good and bad qualities ascribed to him. In the end we must admit that we are insufficiently acquainted with what animated and motivated Philip in any of his actions.

An element of Philip's character not mentioned by Demosthenes and Aeschines was his piety. Plutarch records

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[60]Diod. 16. 3.1-2.

that: "Philip fell in love with Olympias, Alexander's mother, at the time when they were both initiated into the mysteries at Samothrace."[61] The mysteries at Samothrace involved earth-gods of fertility, and since Philip had no children by his two previous marriages, his attendance at such rituals may have been for the purpose of correcting that problem.

Olympias was a passionate devotee of the orgiastic cults, going so far as to introduce the celebration of "extravagant and superstitious ceremonies."[62] Plutarch states that she was seen by Philip to have a serpent sleeping beside her, which led him to believe that she was the consort of a higher being.[63] In order to achieve an explanation for this phenomenon, Philip sent an ambassador to Delphi to consult the oracle of Apollo, who told him to "sacrifice to Zeus Ammon and to revere him above all other deities."[64]

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[61]Plutarch Alexander 2.

[62]Plutarch Alexander 2.

[63]Plutarch Alexander 2.

[64]Plutarch Alexander 3. There was a long tradition of consulting Apollo which can be traced back to the foundation legends of Aigeai, G.T. Griffith and N.G.L. Hammond, A History of Macedonia Vol. 2. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979), pp. 7-9. Alexander I dedicated gold statues of himself to both Apollo and Zeus, G.T. Griffith and N.G.L. Hammond, A History of Macedonia, p. 103.

In 357, Philip delayed in signing an important treaty of alliance with Olynthus while the oracle at Delphi was consulted. Griffith points out that this was unusual in the fourth century, although he argues that if it had been Philip's normal practice, it would have been commented upon.[65] But an alternative argument may be given: that his normal approach was to consult the Delphic oracle and that it was only noted on this occasion because of the delay it caused. It is also well known that Philip dedicated the Battle of the Crocus Field to Apollo, even adorning his troops with laurel wreaths.[66] Though participating in religious rituals does not prove Philip's high moral character, the evidences for his piety cannot be ignored in an estimate of his life.

Given the over-all lack of essential information, the suggestion that Philip sought to conquer the Greek city-states, and especially Athens, as a consequence of his kingship or his character is unproven based on the evidence. Demosthenes' assertion that this was the case seems clearly to be a political and polemical stance to arouse the Athenians to action. For, in spite of all

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[65]G.T. Griffith and N.G.L. Hammond, A History of Macedonia, pp. 244-245.

[66]Justin 8.2.

Demosthenes' assertions about Philip's desire to attack and destroy Athens, Philip never attempted to do so. While Philip certainly attempted to advance his own interests in his frequent negotiations with Athens, he generally acted towards her with restraint. Had Philip been bent upon the destruction of Athens, it seems likely that he would have attacked her soon after the battle of Chaeronea in 338. Philip's restraint at that time surely indicates that, whatever his goals, the obliteration of Athens was not among them.[67]

The relationships between kings other than Philip and the Athenians seem to be characterized by the usual range of opposition and friendship, depending upon the political or military advantage to be gained by each side. The relationships did not seem to hinge upon the views of the kings toward democracy, but rather of advantage or disadvantage. So we find the Thracian kings Cotys and Cersobleptes ranged sometimes with the Athenians and sometimes against them, depending upon the situation of the moment.

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[67]Larsen points out that Philip carefully followed the League of Corinth's stipulations regarding such matters as the freedom and autonomy of the members, protection of existing constitutions, and the prevention of revolutions. Therefore, Philip's approach of restraint included not just Athens, but all of Greece, J.A.O. Larsen, "Representative Government in the Panhellenic Leagues," Classical Philology 20 (1925): 31.4

We should also keep in mind that not all of Philip's contemporaries found him the corrupt megalomaniac that Demosthenes describes. Aeschines relates that one Ctesiphon, an Athenian envoy, returned from a meeting with Philip and "told of marked kindness of his reception. . . ."[68] Later in the same speech Aeschines also notes that the ambassador Aristodemus, "reported Philip's great friendliness toward the city, and added this besides, that Philip even wished to become an ally of our state."[69] In both cases Aeschines is recalling to the jury reports to the Assembly, so the likelihood of their truth is great, since their falsehood would be easily detected by the jury.

Aeschines also describes a conversation among the embassy members on their way back to Athens during which Ctesiphon said that, "he had never looked upon so charming and lovable a man. . . ."[70] During this same conversation Demosthenes is reported to have declared, "that Philip was the most wonderful man under the sun." Aeschines supports this portion of his defense by the testimony of his

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[68]Aeschin. On the Embassy 13.

[69]Aeschin. On the Embassy 17.

[70]Aeschin. On the Embassy 42.

colleagues in the embassy. While such support could be less reliable than public reports to the assembly, it must be given some weight since the jury did acquit Aeschines of the charges against him.

On balance the evidence seems to suggest that Philip was neither the drunken megalomaniac described by Demosthenes nor opposed to Athens merely as the result of his kingship. If Philip sought to conquer Athens or other Greek city-states, other reasons must be adduced.

CHAPTER 4

The Relative Wealth of Macedonia and Greece

Whether or not Philip's greed was a motive for his interest in Greece is a complex issue. At the beginning we must recognize that we cannot know from the sources available to us what his attitudes were during his reign; therefore, there is no possibility of knowing directly if the desire for wealth was a motivating factor, either in a general way or specifically with regard to the Greek city-states. We have already observed that some did not see Philip as a particularly rational man, and this may indeed have been the case. Our analysis can show only whether or not a reasonable person would have viewed the conquest of Greece as an economically advantageous enterprise. The best we may hope for is to conclude that if Philip was reasonable, he would have determined that an attack on Greece for economic reasons either was or was not likely to prove advantageous.

Another complicating factor is that a reasonable man in ancient times did not possess the analytic and conceptual tools that a modern reasonable man would bring

to the issue. Such elementary modern concepts as return on investment and net present value were entirely lacking in that time, as was the mathematical framework in which to calculate them. The determination of gain, loss, and risk was a much cruder and more intuitive matter in Philip's age.

Moreover, accurate information upon which to base any judgement had to have been incomplete and inaccurate. As seen in the numerical figures given by ancient writers, the most common method used to derive them must have been estimation. While the Athenians appear to have been reasonably careful accountants, there is little evidence that this trait was wide-spread. Moreover, even in Athens, the accounting activities were narrowly focused and the information not widely available.

Philip also had to contend with the fact that he was frequently in the field with his army, and therefore most often involved with the day to day management of the military. Obtaining the opportunities for careful and calm reflection on complex economic issues must have been difficult. Philip also suffered from several wounds and at least one severe illness, neither of which lends itself to contemplation on the economy. Even in peace time Philip would necessarily been actively engaged in internal

policy,[71] directing his own government, and dealing with a large and difficult family.[72]

Given all these factors, Philip still made decisions, many of which were asserted to have been driven primarily by economic motives. Justin states: "Next, as if everything that he meditated was lawful for him to do, he seized upon the gold mines in Thessaly, and the silver ones in Thrace, and to leave no law or right unviolated, proceeded to engage in piracy."[73] Likewise Demosthenes, ". . . and that he [Philip] is all the time repeatedly seizing the property of the other Greeks and of the barbarians, and so equipping himself for an attack upon us."[74]

Justin leads us to believe that Philip's primary economic target was precious metals, to be found in various mines; Demosthenes, and Justin to a certain extent, view "property" as Philip's target. This differentiation

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[71]He apparently had an active resettlement program within Macedonia. (Arrian 7.9).

[72]See especially Carney, Elizabeth, "Olympias," Ancient Society 18 (1987): 35-62. and also Plutarch Alexander 9.3.

[73]Justin 8.3. Cf. also Justin 9.1 for similar assertions.

[74]Dem. On the Chersonese 6.

between mineral wealth and other valuables raises the issue of what should be taken into account in determining economic value.

Clearly, gold and silver, either in coins or bullion or yet in mines, constituted an economically advantageous acquisition. Coins or bullion could be immediately spent for necessary supplies, including troops, or could be saved against future needs. Mines constituted an even more valuable asset. Possession of a mine insured a steady and predictable stream of bullion. The disadvantages of mines are the costs of protecting them and extracting the ore.

Other metals, such as copper, tin, and iron, would also have had great intrinsic value as they provided the raw materials for both weapons and tools. Both copper and tin were usually obtained from outside the boundaries of Greece and Macedonia; however, control of the trade routes to such minerals or of areas with large stores of such materials could be both reasonable and practical.

Other natural resources overlooked in the sources which simplistically stress only bullion, also could have direct economic value. Among them are timber, agricultural products, and products from the sea. Timber, of course, is an essential building product, especially for ships, in which so much of ancient trade took place. Agricultural products feed the populace and are also of great value in

trade. Products from the sea, such as shrimp, fish, and murex shells, can be valuable both as food-stuffs and as manufacturing items. These products can be used in trade as well.

The range of economically advantageous materials is rather broad. The possible economic motives are, therefore, correspondingly complex. It is worth examining the relative status of Macedonia and the Greek city-states with regard to their resources dealing first with Macedonia and then the Greeks.

In precious metals, Macedonia was well provided with gold and silver. Strabo cites Mt. Vermion as a gold-producing center, although some doubt has been cast upon this assertion by modern scholars.[75] Three other areas of mineral exploitation were certainly in use by the sixth century B.C. The first area was the basin of the Echedoros river (now the Gallikos) which was a site for both working and smelting gold. Nearby was a silver mine cited by Herodotus as producing a talent a day in the time of Alexander I.[76]

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[75]Strabo Geography 14.680. Cf. E.N. Borza, "The Natural Resources of Early Macedonia," Philip II, Alexander the Great and the Macedonian Heritage. Edited by N.L. Adams and E.N. Borza (Washington, D.C.: University Press of America, 1982), p. 8 for the modern view.

[76]Herodotus The History 5.17.

The second area is that around Mt. Pangaion, including the region of Krenides, which Philip renamed Philippi after capturing it in 356 B.C. This area produced both silver and gold. Diodorus says that the output of this area was insignificant prior to its acquisition by Philip.[77] However, Borza has argued compellingly that Diodorus must have been referring only to the gold production since there is evidence of early and abundant silver production.[78] Diodorus put the production of this area under Philip at 1000 talents per year.[79]

The third major mining area extended from the Volvi-Koroneia lake corridor to the southern slope of the central Chalkidian ranges. Even though not worked before the middle of the fourth century, these ranges contain the most evidence of ancient mining in Macedonia. It is not certain whether the mines were opened by Philip or by the Olynthians.

According to Borza, "In antiquity the mines of eastern Macedonia produced enough gold and silver to support

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[77] Diod. 16.8.7. Cf. Arrian Anabasis 7.9.3.

[78] Borza, "The Natural Resources of Early Macedonia," p. 10.

[79] Diod. 16.8.7.

excellent local coinages, make the region attractive to foreigners, help support the ambitions of Macedonian kings from Alexander I to Perseus, and enable Macedonia to enjoy the reputation of being one of the most important precious-metal sources in the ancient Mediterranean world."[80]

Philip was the first Macedonian king to strike coins in gold.[81] Although it is widely agreed that he began minting silver coins early in his reign, there is serious disagreement over just when the gold issues were produced. Georges le Rider has argued for a date between 345-342 B.C., which means that little was struck during Philip's lifetime. Le Rider suggests that: "Thus we have to do with a very limited coinage bearing little relationship to the wealth claimed by Diodoros for the mines of Philippi, and not very likely to have brought the Macedonian king substantial means."[82]

Against this view, Martin has argued that the date of first minting gold coins should be placed in the

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[80]Borza, "The Natural Resources of Early Macedonia," p. 10.

[81]George Le Rider, "The Coinage of Philip and the Pangaian Mines," Philip of Macedon. Edited by M.B. Hatzopoulos and L.D. Loukopoulos (Athens: Ekdotike Athenon, 1980), p. 48.

[82]Ibid., p. 49.

mid-350s.[83] The crux of the argument is a hoard of coins found in Corinth. The dating of the coins hinges upon whether or not the hoard was an ordinary savings hoard or an emergency hoard. Martin's argument that it was a savings hoard seems compelling, and therefore his dating of the first struck gold coins to the mid-350s seems to be the correct one.

It is also to be remembered that coinage was not the only product of Pangaion metals. Many workshops have been discovered in the area which produced the highest quality jewelry, vessels, and other objects of great artistic value. Athenaeus provides the following story in corroboration: "As a matter of fact, gold was really very scarce in Greece in ancient times, and the silver to be found in the mines was not considerable. Duris of Samos therefore, says that Philip, the father of King Alexander the Great, always kept the small gold saucer which he owned lying under his pillow."[84]

As to timber resources, Theophrastus states, "The best timber which comes into Greece for the carpenter's use is

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[83]Thomas Martin, Sovereignty and Coinage in Classical Greece (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1985), p. 49.

[84]Ath. Deipnosophistae 6.231.

Macedonian. . . ."[85] Macedonia produced not only abundant timber, but that which was most useful, especially for the building of ships on which so much of Greek commerce depended. Greek ships were constructed of oak, fir, pine, and beech, all of which Macedonia grew in abundance.[86]

Macedonian timber was sufficiently important to the Greeks, especially to Sparta and Athens during the Peloponnesian War, that Macedonia became a far-flung theater of that war. It is arguable that the Spartan strategy of Brasidas was to interdict the supply of ship building woods to Athens at its source. If that were accomplished, it would have helped to reduce the dramatic superiority of Athens on the sea.

The agricultural resources of Macedonia were substantial. As Borza states: "The region possesses large alluvial plains, abundant rainfall throughout the year, and cultivable terrace lands on the lower slopes of mountains. Moreover, Macedonia's major rivers flow year-round, permitting both natural and artificial irrigation for crop and pasture land. The large mountain ranges also provide

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[85]Theophrastus History of Plants 5.2.1.

[86]Borza, "The Natural Resources of Early Macedonia," pp. 2-3.

well-watered summer pasture on their upper slopes and basins, a phenomenon that has sustained herdsmen for centuries."[87]

As to specific crops, Theopompus states: "in parts of Philip's domain, round about Bisaltia, Amphipolis, and Grastonia, in Macedonia, the fig-trees produce figs, the vines grapes, the olive-trees olives, in the middle of the spring, at the time when you would expect them to be just bursting forth, and that Philip was lucky in everything."[88]

There are other ancient literary fragments which bear upon Macedonian agriculture and products. Athenaeus quotes Archestratus as giving this advice: "If ever you go to Iasus, city of the Carians, you will get a good-sized shrimp. But it is rare in the market, whereas in Macedonia and Ambracia there are plenty."[89] Quoting Dorotheus, Athenaeus says: "Philip of Macedon and his son Alexander were apple-lovers . . ."[90] From these two fragments we may

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[87]Ibid., p. 12.

[88]Theopompus quoted in Athenaeus, 3.77.

[89]Ath. Deipnosophistae, 3. 105e.

[90]Ath. Deipnosophistae, 7. 276f.

conclude that the Macedonians harvested what they could from the sea and that the Macedonian climate favored the growth of at least some fruit trees.

A drawback to greater agricultural productivity was the swampy, marshy nature of the Eumathian plain, the core of ancient Macedonia. Farmers were forced to cultivate the surrounding slopes as well as whatever land they could recover from the marshes' edge. In addition to the hardship it caused to the farmers, this area was the breeding ground of two strains of Anopheles mosquito which made malaria endemic in ancient Macedonia.[91]

To sum up the natural resources of Macedonia, we may say that she was uncommonly blessed with both precious metals and timber, and relatively well-off with agricultural conditions and produce. As Borza says: "But we do come away with a vivid impression of a relatively rich land whose abundance was exploited to the extent that a primitive technology and frequent political instability permitted."[92]

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[91]Borza, "Natural Resources," pp. 16-19 and E. Borza, "Some Observations on Malaria and the Ecology of Central Macedonia in Antiquity," American Journal of Ancient History 4 (1979): 102-124.

[92]Borza, "The Natural Resources of Early Macedonia," pp. 19-20. Griffith argues, however, that Macedonia was relatively poor just prior to Philip's accession due to an underdeveloped economy and the strain of paying tribute to the Illyrians, G.T. Griffith and N.G.L. Hammond, A History of Macedon, p. 192.

A comprehensive review of the natural resources for all of Greece in the fourth century, B.C. is beyond the scope of this paper, though necessary for a definitive analysis of an economic motive for attacking Greece. I will review in some detail the resources of Athens, since she was said by Demosthenes to be a prime target of Philip's efforts and because there is considerable information available on the Athenian economy in the fourth century. I will also review the wealth associated with the Delphic oracle, since it had been the site of Apollo's oracle for several centuries and the recipient of many donations.

As for the economy of the remainder of Greece, a briefer, more general review will be undertaken in deference to the relative paucity of sources and in the interest of brevity. The primary sources for contemporary economic conditions are Isocrates and Xenophon, both of whom centered their comments on Athens, but whose insights allow us a broader view of the Greek economy of the period. The first step will be to review the picture Isocrates gives us of economic conditions in the middle of the fourth century (his writings cover the period 380 to

339 B.C.).[93] That Isocrates believes that the Greek economic situation is desperate throughout this period is shown by Fuks: "This signalling and evocation of the terrible situation in Greece is not specifically connected with any particular event, or set of events, of his time, nor with any particular oration, or group of orations, in the political writings of Isocrates. It starts with Isokrates' first Hellenic discourse, the Panegyrikos, written in 380 B.C., and goes all the way through to the Panathenaikos, composed in the late forties or early thirties of the fourth century. Thus, the situation signalled and reacted to by Isokrates is that of the roughly fifty years between the king's peace and Philip's victory at Chaeronea."[94]

Isocrates' description of the economic life during this period is: "pirates command the seas and mercenaries occupy our cities, where citizens, instead of waging war in defense of their territories against strangers are fighting

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[93]Both A. Fuks ["Isokrates and the Social-Economic situation in Greece," Ancient Society 3 (1972): 17-44] and P.G. Van Soesbergen ["Colonisation as a Solution to Social-Economic Problems in Fourth-Century Greece," Ancient Society 13/14 (1982/83): 131-145] offer excellent analyses of Isocrates' view of the social and economic situation in fourth century Greece.

[94]A. Fuks, "Isokrates and the Social-Economic Situation in Greece," Ancient Society 3 (1972): 18.

within their own walls against each other; where more cities have been captured in war than before we made the peace; and where revolutions follow so thickly upon each other that those who are at home in their own countries are more dejected than those who have been punished with exile."[95] In describing the condition of the Peloponnesians after the battle of Leuctra in 371, Isocrates says: "they have been so levelled by the misfortunes that no man can discern who among themselves are the most wretched; not one of their states is unscathed - their fields have been laid waste, their cities sacked, their homes everted; their constitutions have been overturned and their laws abolished; they feel such distrust and such hatred of each other that they fear their fellow-citizens more than the enemy."[96]

The result of these pervasive political and economic calamities is a class of wandering poor, forced to become mercenaries to live: "we have engendered wars and internal strife among ourselves; and, in consequence, some of us are being put to death against the law in our own countries, others are wandering with their women and children in strange lands and many, compelled by the lack of

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[95]Isocrates Panegyrikos 114-116.

[96]Isocrates Archidamus 64-67.

necessities of life, become mercenaries and are being slain fighting for their foes against their friends."[97] Even so great a city as Athens cannot escape the problem: "[the poor] draw lots in front of the law-courts to determine whether they . . . shall have the necessities of life. . . They appear in the public choruses in garments spangled with gold, yet live through the winter in clothing which one refuses to describe."[98] Fuks argues that this characterization applies not only to refugees driven to Athens but to Athenian citizens as well.[99]

The overall economic status of Greece is considered by Isocrates to be desperate, resulting in the significant unemployment and dislocation of its citizens and in the increase in stasis within the cities, further exacerbating an already grim economic situation. In addition, many men are driven to the life of the mercenary in order to live, thus helping perpetrate the internecine warfare.

As we have seen, Athens was not exempt from the economic problems besetting all of Greece. However, since

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[97]Isocrates Panegyrikos 167. As Fuks points out, Isocrates may be exaggerating the picture for rhetorical effect, but it must contain a good measure of truth to be effective at all.

[98]Isocrates Areopagiticus 54.

[99]A. Fuks, "Isokrates," pp. 24 & 26.

Demosthenes repeatedly asserted that Athens was the special target of Philip's hostility, a more detailed review of her economic status is in order. Garland characterizes Athens' financial status as, "at no time . . . more than the ghost, financially speaking, of her former Periklean self."[100] He finds that Athens is especially troubled at the end of the Social War (354): "When it ended in 354 all that remained in Athens' possession was, in Aischines' memorable phrase (2.71) "a few wretched islanders'", from whom a mere 60 talents were exacted annually in tribute. The Athenian state was in effect bankrupt, her entire revenue comprising only 130 talents (Dem. 37). A revealing indication of the level of anxiety regarding the state of Athens' finances at this time is provided by Xenophon's poroi (3.13) which contains recommendations for the improvement of trading facilities in the Piraeus based on the observation that a substantial proportion of the metic population had left Athens."[101]

A review of individual products of Attica at the time of Philip shows a number of items. With respect to precious metals, Athens was in the fortunate position of

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[100]Robert Garland, The Piraeus (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987), p. 45.

[101]Ibid., p. 43.

owning the silver mines at Laurium.[102] These mines had provided Athens with a steady income from the sixth century until the Spartans occupied Decelea in 413. This occupation effectively shut down the mining operations and 20,000 slaves who worked there fled to Decelea to escape the treacherous working conditions.[103] Mining operations appear to have begun again at Laurium in the 390's. The Athenian registers which record the number of mines leased each year are extant for several years.[104] The oldest inscription is from 367/66 and lists seventeen mines. The largest is from 342/41 and lists the leasing of 140 mines.

Based upon the above lists and the operational costs of operating the mines, Isager and Hansen have suggested that in the peak years of 340-330, the annual silver production must have been about 1,000 talents. It is to be noted that seven of the ten peak years fall after the battle of Chaeronia. Also noteworthy is the fact that in the 350's the revenues of Athens were of sufficient concern that Xenophon argued that the state should purchase 10,000 slaves and even take over the running of the mines

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[102]Cf. Xen. Ways and Means 1. 5.

[103]Thucydides The Peloponnesian War 8. 27.5.

[104]This information as well as that immediately following is from Isager and Hansen Aspects of Athenian Society, p. 43.

instead of leasing them.[105] Xenophon also states: "Then why, it may be asked, are fewer new cuttings made nowadays than formerly? Simply because those interested in the mines are poorer. For operations have only lately been resumed and a man who makes a new cutting incurs a serious risk."[106]

Strauss considers the interesting assertion that Philip intentionally tried to bring down the price of silver in order to damage Athens' economy.[107] In this article Strauss demonstrates that Philip neither minted sufficient silver nor circulated it widely enough to affect Athens' silver industry. He also concludes that not only were Laurium's mining investors, as a group, not hostile to Philip, but that they may have been pro-Macedonian, because of their fear of nearby Thebes.[108]

With respect to gold, Athens was less fortunate, for no gold in any significant amount is to be found in Attica. Apparently it was also deficient in iron and copper, for Pseudo-Xenophon states: "However, it is for

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[105]Xen. Ways and Means 4. 6-32.

[106]Xen. Ways and Means 4. 28.

[107]Strauss, Philip II, p. 419.

[108]Ibid., p. 426.

these very things that I have my ships: timber from one place, iron from another, copper from another, flax from another, wax from another."[109] Tin was not available in any nearby area and was probably obtained indirectly from the west.[110]

The Attic peninsula was sparsely forested in classical times, although Aristophanes includes charcoal-burners in his play Acharnians.[111] To make up this shortage the Athenians imported wood, some for the smelting operations at Laurium, but most for the building of ships. The favored source for this import was Macedonia, which, as we have seen, had a plentiful supply of all the required timbers.[112] Some timber was possibly imported from Syria also.[113]

The biggest shortfall of Athenian agricultural produce was in grain. Nor was Athens able to import this item from her neighbors who were also no better than subsistence

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[109]Pseudo-Xenophon The Constitution of the Athenians II. 11.

[110]Isager and Hansen, Aspects of Athenian Society, p. 31.

[111]Aristophanes Acharnians 211 ff.

[112]Isager and Hansen, Aspects of Athenian Society, p. 30.

[113]Ibid., p. 30.

producers.[114] Consequently, Athens developed a very lengthy supply line for this vital commodity, whose major source was the Bosporus area of the Black Sea. However, Athens also sought grain from Egypt, Sicily, and the Po valley.[115] Isager and Hansen estimate the annual amount of grain imported into Athens at 2-2.75 million medimni out of a total consumption of 2.5-3.25 million medimni. On these figures, Athens was dependent on imports for 80% or more of her annual grain requirements.

Of other produce, we know that the olive flourished in Attica to the extent that it was a constant item of export. Grapes were also abundant, but probably not in sufficient numbers to meet the demand of the Athenians. At least there is little evidence of export.

Outside of olives, the Laurium silver mines, which were not operating at anywhere near capacity, marble, and good clay,the Athenians could not be said to enjoy a particular advantage in natural resources. Did the Athenians, then, possess other forms of wealth, such as large reserves of bullion or coins? At first one might think so given the statement of Demosthenes that: "With regard to the supply of money, you have money, men of

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[114]Ibid., p. 20.

[115]Ibid., pp. 23-24.

Athens; you have more than any other nation has for military purposes. But you appropriate it yourselves, to suit your own pleasure. Now if you will spend it on the campaign, you have no need of further supply."[116] Demosthenes also said: "For war-galleys, men in abundance, money and material without stint, everything by which one might gauge the strength of our cities, these we as a body possess today in number and quantity far beyond the Greeks of former times."[117]

The essence of Demosthenes' contention is that money which might have been used for military purposes went instead, by law, to the Theoric Fund out of which admission to the theatre and other civic functions was paid. Moreover, no one could move the repeal of this law except he stand trial for his life. So Demosthenes indirectly encourages the assembly to reconsider the utility of the law promulgating the Theoric Fund.

His assertions about having more money than other nations and more than former times must be received sceptically. However true it may be that Athens was

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[116] Dem. First Olynthiac 19.

[117] Dem. Third Philippic 40. See also First Philippic 40 for similar sentiments.

wealthier than other Greek city-states, it surely could not stand comparison with the Great King or Macedonia. Nor does the comparison with previous times stand-up, since the annual Athenian income was 130 talents in 355 and 400 talents in 346 as compared to 1000 talents during the height of the empire.[118] Demosthenes himself seems at times to acknowledge the truth. In the Fourth Philippic he says: "Nothing in the world does Athens need so much as money for approaching exigencies."[119] Moreover, some other incidents also point to a shortage of funds. Diodorus reports that in 356: "Chares, now that he had succeeded to the command of the whole fleet and was eager to relieve the Athenians of its expense, undertook a hazardous operation."[120]

Another strategos, Iphicrates, worried about being able to feed his troops (in 347): was tarrying near Corcyra with a naval force and [since] Dionysius the tyrant of Syracuse had shipped to Olympia and to Delphi statues cunningly wrought in gold and ivory, Iphicrates, chancing to fall in with the ships that were conveying

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[118]Figures cited by Cawkwell in his article "Eubulus," JHS 83 (1963): 61-62.

[119]Dem. Fourth Philippic 31.

[120]Diod. 16. 22.1.

these statues, seized them and sent word to the Athenian people inquiring what he should do with them; whereat the Athenians instructed him not to raise questions about what concerned the gods but to give his attention to seeing that his soldiers were well fed. Now Iphicrates, obeying the decision of his country, sold as booty the work of art belonging to the gods."[121]

Apparently commanders in the field were expected to support themselves as much as possible from the resources of their theatres of operations. That a strategos, distant from the Athenian ecclesia, might find some novel ways to raise funds is at least understandable. But for the Athenian assembly to command the theft of sacred offerings to defray campaign expenses argues a level of impoverishment and need that may by classified as desperate.

In summary we find that Athens was not particularly well endowed with natural resources though the olive was plentiful and the Laurium silver mines occasionally provided respectable revenues. In spite of Demosthenes' protestations to the contrary, Athens' conservative financial policies[122] and inability to support her armies

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[121] Diod. 16. 57. 1-3.

[122] Cf. George Cawkwell, "Eubulus," p. 61.

in the field suggest a rather serious shortage of currency. Nor is this particularly surprising, with mine leases being very few and grain imports at a high level, there would have been a need to utilize manufactured goods, olives, or silver to offset the trade imbalance. Likely all three were utilized, but even they were just sufficient to provide the vital grain supply and maintain the Theoric Fund. Precious little seems to have been available for military adventures.[123]

The discussion to this point has involved only state revenues and expenditures. Individual Athenians may have possessed substantial personal wealth, but were unwilling to yield it up for state purposes. On the other hand, the struggle to fund the liturgies[124] and the well-attested willingness of the assembly to tax the wealthy suggest that the amount of private wealth was not great during this period either.

Outside of Athens the most likely source of wealth would normally have been the oracle of Apollo at Delphi. For many centuries offerings had been made to the Pythian

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[123]Demosthenes frequently argues indirectly that money should be diverted from the Theoric Fund. This would not seem to have been necessary if monies could have been raised easily in other ways.

[124]Dem. On the Symmories.

god by states and individuals, both Greek and non-Greek. As examples, we have already noted the statues from Dion of Syracuse destined for Apollo which Iphicrates intercepted en route and sold to feed his troops. Livy records an embassy no doubt bearing gifts to Apollo from Rome in the 8th century B.C.[125] Perhaps the most notable offerings were presented by Croesus the Lydian as recorded by Herodotus.[126]

However, this traditional source of revenue had become unavailable. When the Amphictyonic Council levied substantial penalties against the Phocians in 358, they rebelled under the leadership of Philomelos and seized the city of Delphi and the holy shrine.[127] Thus began the Second Sacred War which was to rack Greece for the next ten years. Philomelus was able to finance the initial seizure of the city and shrine through his own funds as well as a contribution of fifteen talents from Archidamos, the Spartan king.[128]

Upon seizing the oracle Philomelus not only eradicated the pronouncements of the Amphictyons, but also announced

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[125]Livy 1.56-57.

[126]Herodotus 1.50-51.

[127]Diod. 16. 23-25.

[128]Diod. 16. 24.2.

his intention not to "plunder the oracle" nor to commit other unlawful acts,[129] "explaining that he had seized Delphi, not with any designs upon its sacred properties but to assert a claim to the guardianship of the sanctuary . . ."[130] Moreover, he told the other Greeks that: ". . . he would render due account of the property to all the Greeks and expressed himself as ready to report the weight and number of the dedications to all who wished an examination.[131] At the beginning of the Sacred War, in 357, it appears as though the temple treasury remained intact, although even at this early date Diodorus refers to the Phocians as "temple-robbers".[132]

Facing attack by a large Boeotian army, Philomelus was pressured into hiring mercenaries to assist in the defense. For this purpose, ". . . he was compelled to lay his hands on the sacred dedications and to plunder the oracle."[133] While successful in gathering a large mercenary force, Philomelus lost his battle against the Boeotian forces, and his life.

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[129]Diod. 16. 24.5.

[130]Diod. 16. 27.3.

[131]Diod. 16. 27.4.

[132]Diod. 16. 28.4.

[133]Diod. 16. 30.2.

Onomarchus, then rallied the defeated forces, returned them safely to Delphi, and persuaded the Phocians to continue the war.[134] Diodorus reports that Onomarchus had no qualms in using the temple dedications: "Onomarchus, when he had been chosen general in supreme command, prepared a great supply of weapons from the bronze and iron, and having struck coinage from the silver and gold distributed it among the allied cities and chiefly gave it as bribes to the leaders of those cities."[135]

During the following year at Volo, Philip soundly defeated the Phocians and killed Onomarchus. The routed forces of the Phocians were withdrawn by Phayllus, the brother of Onomarchus. In order to strengthen his position, he hired more mercenaries at double the normal rate of pay. Additionally: "He got ready also a large supply of arms and coined gold and silver money."[136] Later in his history Diodorus reiterates this point: "For since he [Phayllus] had an inexhaustible supply of money he gathered a large body of mercenaries, and persuaded not a few allies to co-operate in renewing the war. In fact, by making lavish use of his abundance of money he not only

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[134]Diod. 16. 32.

[135]Diod. 16. 33.2.

[136]Diod. 16. 36.1.

procured many individuals as enthusiastic helpers, but also lured the most renowned cities into joining his enterprise."[137]

This theme of bribery by the Phocians permeates the account of Diodorus, for he returns to it again in the same chapter: "Not a few of the lesser cities as well actively supported the Phocians because of the abundance of money that had been distributed; for gold that incites man's covetousness compelled them to desert to the side which would enable them to profit from their gains."[138]

Despite his mercenaries and bribery, Phayllus suffered defeat at the hands of the Boeotian forces after a brief success in Locris.[139] After rebounding to defeat the Boeotians in a surprise attack at Narycaea, Phayllus fell sick and died. The leadership of the Phocians then fell to Phalaecus, son of Phayllus.[140] Phalaecus was even less successful in battle than was Phayllus, for the Boeotians not only were able to seize some of their cities formerly

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[137]Diod. 16. 37.2.

[138]Diod. 16. 37.4.

[139]Diod. 16. 38.3.

[140]Paus. 10.2.6. Diodorus says that Phalaecus was the son of Onomarchus, which seems possible by the chronology. (Diodorus 16. 38.5).

captured by the Phocians, but also: ". . . with a large army invaded Phocis, sacked the greater portion of it and plundered the farms throughout the countryside; and having taken also some of the small towns and gathered an abundance of booty, they returned to Boeotia."[141] Interestingly, Phalaecus was removed from command shortly thereafter on charges of having stolen sacred properties for his own use.[142]

Diodorus gives a summary and estimate of the value of the treasures at Delphi utilized by the successive Phocian commanders during the Sacred War: "For he [Phayllus] coined for currency one hundred twenty gold bricks which had been dedicated by Croesus King of the Lydians weighing two talents each, and three hundred sixty golden goblets weighing two minae each, and golden statues of a lion and of a woman, weighing in all thirty talents of gold, so that the sum total of gold that was coined into money, referred to the standard of silver, is found to be four thousand talents, while of the silver offerings, these dedicated by Croesus and all the others, all three generals had spent more than six thousand talents' worth, and if to these were

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[141]Diod. 16. 39. 7-8.

[142]Diod. 16. 56.3 and Pausanias 10.2.7.

added the gold dedications, the sum surpassed ten thousand talents."[143]

The massive fortune of the oracle proved only to delay, not deter, the punishment of the Phocians; for when they had come to the end of it, they could no longer resist the forces of the Amphictyons, especially after the Thebans asked Philip to join.[144] Aeschines gives us a clear summary of the Phocian situation: "For the same thing that built up the power of the tyrants in Phocis, destroyed it also: they established themselves in power by daring to lay hands on the treasures of the shrine, and by the use of mercenaries they put down the free governments; and it was lack of funds that caused their overthrow, when they had spent all their resources on these mercenaries. The third cause of their ruin was mutiny, such as usually attends armies which are poorly supplied with funds."[145] Phalaecus, reinstated as leader of the Phocian troops, or at least the mercenaries, stationed himself at Thermopylae to oppose the entrance of Philip into Greece. However, Phalaecus chose

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[143]Diod. 16. 56.6.

[144]Diod. 16. 59.

[145]Aeschin. On the Embassy 131-132. Cf. also A.W. Packard-Cambridge, "The Rise of Macedonia," Cambridge Ancient History, Vol. 3, edited by J.B. Bury, S.A. Cook, and F.E. Adcock (New York: MacMillan, 1927), p. 240.

the wiser course when faced with Philip's seasoned army: "But Phalaecus, who was tarrying in Nicaea and saw that he was no match for Philip, sent ambassadors to the king to treat for an armistice."[146]

There must also have been much spent on supplies for the suddenly enlarged Phocian army, either directly by the Phocians or by the soldiers with the pay given them. The main items purchased were probably armor, weapons, and food. Given the ravished state of both Phocis and Boeotia, food must have been rather scarce, and so there must have been a brisk trade in those commodities. One might also expect that much of the weaponry would have to be imported, even though the bronze treasures were apparently converted into weapons.

If the aforementioned hypotheses are correct, the wealth of Phocis' allies should have increased since they would be the only local source of such supplies. To demonstrate this occurrence one would first look for hoards of Phocian coinage of the period in Athens, Sparta, and Achaea, the most likely allied sources of supply. There are, however, no such hoards known to exist.[147] Upon reflection, this is not surprising, since the source was so

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[146]Diod. 16. 59.2.

[147]Thomas Martin, Coinage in Classical Greece, p. 287.

tainted they were probably melted down immediately and traded for local specie.

We find some support for this view in Athenaeus; "Anaximenes of Lampsacus, in the work entitled First Inquiries says that the necklace of Eriphyle became famous merely because gold was at that time rare among the Greeks; indeed, it was even unusual to see a silver drinking cup in those days. But after the seizure of Delphi by the Phocians, all such things as that took on abundance. Even those who were reputed to be very rich used to drink from bronze cups, and they called the receptacles for these 'bronze-boxes.' And so Herodotus says that the priests of the Egyptians drank from bronze cups, and that once, when their kings were offering sacrifices together, not enough silver cups to be given to all could be found; at any rate, Psammethicus, being younger than all the other kings, poured his libation from a bronze cup. Be that as it may, when the Pythian shrine was looted by the Phocian usurpers, gold flamed up everywhere among the Greeks, and silver also came romping in."[148]

Some of the treasure was in the form of jewelry and was conscripted by the leading women of Phocis. Ephorus

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[148]Ath. Deipnosophistae 6. 231c - 231d.

(quoted by Athenaeus) relates that: "Not only did Onomarchus, Phayllus, and Phalaecus convey away all the possessions of the god, but to cap all this, their wives took the jewelry of Eriphyle, which Alcmaeon had dedicated in Delphi at the god's command, and also the necklace of Helen which Menelaus had dedicated."[149]

After the surrender of Phalaecus and his mercenaries to Philip at Nicaea, the general and his troops were allowed to go. Phalaecus led his troops, either 8,000 or 11,000 strong,[150] first to the Peloponnese, where they apparently lived from their accumulated savings, either of pay or booty.[151] They later hired themselves out as mercenaries to attack Lyctus in Crete, which they successfully captured. They were shortly thereafter defeated by the Spartans, who were called in as allies by the Lyctians.[152]

From the above account it is clear that Delphi possessed impressive wealth in precious metals received as dedications to Apollo. Equally clear is the fact that this

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[149]Ath. Deipnosophistae 6. 232e.

[150]Diodorus gives 8,000 (16. 59.3) and Demosthenes 10,000 foot and 1,000 horse (19.230).

[151]Diod. 16. 61.3.

[152]Diod. 16. 61.4.

treasure began being depleted early in the Sacred War and was used up steadily throughout its course. By the end of the Sacred War the treasures had been entirely depleted. Indeed, this loss seems to have been instrumental in bringing the War to an end when it did.

Further, the wealth seems to have been distributed widely throughout Greece and much of it beyond the shores of Greece either to buy food or with the departing mercenaries of Phalaecus. At any rate, no single city in Greece seems to have been the primary recipient of the gold and silver once adorning Delphi.

After Athens and Delphi, the most likely sources of Greek wealth were the other two most prominent cities, Thebes and Sparta. Neither Lacedaemonia nor Boeotia is known for abundant natural resources, especially of precious metals. Nor is either area especially fertile, although each area seemed to manage a subsistence agriculture. The diminishing number of Spartiates relied upon their helots to provide them with sufficient agricultural goods. Thebes apparently relied upon its citizenry to provide enough produce.

The Thebans seemed to be perpetually short of money during this period. Even at the very beginning of the Second Sacred War, shortage of funds may have slowed their response to the surprise takeover of Delphi by

Philomelus.[153] That the Thebans might be in financial difficulty is understandable given their recent struggles under the leadership of the brilliant Epaminondas against first Sparta and then Athens. Such continuing struggle cannot but have diminished the resources of a none too wealthy city-state.

The financial fortunes of Thebes seemed to go down hill in 353, for Diodorus reports: "At first when Chares the Athenian general was fighting with him, Artabazus resisted the satraps courageously, but when Chares had gone and he was left alone he induced the Thebans to send him an auxiliary force. Choosing Pammenes as general and giving him five thousand soldiers, they dispatched him to Asia. Now it seemed an amazing thing that the Boeotians, after the Thessalians had left them in the lurch, and when the war with the Phocians was threatening them with serious dangers, should be sending armies across the sea into Asia and for the most part proving successful in the battles."[154]

One explanation of this "amazing" event is that Thebes was utilizing its forces in the service of Artabazus as

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[153]A.W. Pickard - Cambridge, "The Rise of Macedonia," p. 215.

[154]Diod. 16. 34. 1-2.

mercenaries to raise much-needed money for the city.[155] Parke suggests that the Thebans also felt that the Phocian cause would collapse momentarily following the death of Philomelus at Neon.[156] In his analysis, Parke argues that the 5,000 soldiers sent to Asia by the Thebans were mercenaries. His basis is a statement in Pausanias[157] which has to be stretched very much indeed to support such a contention, because Pausanias seems clearly to be referring to Phocian mercenaries.

Later in the Sacred War Thebes, even though having supported the revolting satrap Artabazus, was desperate enough to ask the Great King for money: ". . . the Thebans growing weary of the war against the Phocians and finding themselves short of funds, sent ambassadors to the King of the Persians urging him to furnish the city with a large sum of money. Artaxerxes, readily acceding to the request, made a gift to them of three hundred talents of silver."[158]

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[155]Cf. H.W. Parke, Greek Mercenary Soldiers. (Chicago: Ares Publishers, 1981), p. 135.

[156]Ibid., p. 135.

[157]Pausanias 10.2.2.

[158]Diod. 16. 40.1. Cf. also Kennedy's view that the Byzantines had aided the Thebans with money during the Sacred War (Kennedy, Demosthenes, Third Philippic, footnote p. 242). It seems to have been the policy of the Persian kings to foment unrest among the Greeks, to keep them from uniting against him and to assure their assistance in putting down revolts in the Persian kingdom.

Even this large infusion of cash proved insufficient, as the Thebans, as much as the Phocians, had been drained by the constant warfare.

Pickard-Cambridge reports that: "Evidently, however, Phalaecus retained the support of a large body of mercenaries; he appears to have made his headquarters not far from Thermopylae: and the Thebans, suffering severely from loss of men and lack of funds, applied to Philip for aid."[159] Throughout this entire period, then, Thebes was chronically short of funds.

Sparta was noted for its determination to prevent greed from tempting its leaders. Lacedaemonian currency was made of iron, and the importation of gold and silver was strictly forbidden. Nonetheless, it appears that some gold and silver was secreted in Arcadia.[160] It was probably from this fund that Archidamus advanced Philomelus fifteen talents to assist in his takeover of Delphi.

This rather lengthy review of the relative economic situations of Macedonia and the Greeks shows that in virtually every respect the Macedonians were superior to the Greeks. Philip possessed several mines with which to supply himself with a steady and predictable income

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[159]Pickard-Cambridge, "The Rise of Macedonia, p. 234.

[160]Ath. Deinosophistae 6.233f.

stream. His country produced almost every requirement save olives, and so little of his wealth need be directed at importing vital supplies.

The Greeks presented the reverse. Not blessed with an abundance of agricultural resources, they did not possess the mineral deposits with which to secure them. The Laurium silver mines of Attica were operated at relatively low levels, especially during Philip's reign, so that what mineral wealth was still available was untapped. Nor was an abundance of currency available, since the Phocian tyrants had seized and used the Delphic dedications, and the other city-states were forced into very conservative fiscal policies, including sending their troops to fight as mercenaries to raise money, or borrowing money from the Great King.

Given this situation, it would hardly seem prudent for Philip to attack Greece in the hope of acquiring great wealth. Moreover, in the event it does not seem that Philip, when he was in a position to do so after the battle of Chaeronia, confiscated any of the supposed Greek wealth or exacted tribute. This restraint reflected the little wealth available to exact, and Philip's awareness of the lack.

CHAPTER 5

Relative Military Strength of Macedonia and Greece

In assessing the desirability of a Macedonian takeover of Greek military resources or the need for Philip to protect himself from attack by the Greeks, we are on somewhat firmer ground than in evaluating the relative economic advantage of a Greek conquest. Philip had both an adequate knowledge of warfare and an abundance of practical experience. Moreover, Philip's military activities, however sketchy, are much more thoroughly attested in the ancient literature than his economic situation.

The military reasons asserted for Philip's interest in conquering Greece may be summarized as follows:

1) To assure that the Greeks would not attack Macedonia, either by land or sea, while Philip was off attacking someone else, such as the Persians,[161]

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[161] Ellis, Philip II, p. 126. Ellis claims that Philip's greatest fear was a combined attack by Athens and Thebes on Macedonia.

2) To incorporate Greek hoplites into Macedonian infantry,

3) To have the use of the Greek, especially the Athenian fleet to aid him in attacking Persia.

On Griffith's view that Philip was interested in the conquest of Greece to protect his southern flank, the following assumptions seem to be implicit:[162]

1) That all, or at least a significant portion of the Greek city-states, would be interested and capable of joining together a force large enough to threaten Macedonia.

2) That such a force, if gathered, would have a reasonable chance of defeating a combined Macedonian and Thessalian defensive contingent.

3) That Philip would not be able to return from his primary theater of operations in time to aid in the defense of Macedonia and that no one else in Macedon could do it.

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[162]G.T. Griffith and N.G.L. Hammond, A History of Macedonia, p. 462.

In the following sections I will attempt to show that none of the underlying assumptions was likely to prove correct and that the notion of Philip's having to conquer Greece to neutralize a potential threat from the south is illusory. Outside of a certain hesitant and desultory interest by the Athenians, the Greeks seemed little interested in affairs Macedonian.[163] Even if they had been interested, they were unlikely to have been able to join forces effectively to attack Macedonia.[164] Such an unlikely Greek force would then be unable to sustain a lengthy campaign in Macedonia.[165]

Should such a force be gathered and move north towards Macedonia, it would then face a formidable task in overcoming whatever home guard Philip would have deployed prior to his departure with the main army. Undoubtedly the home guard would include a defensive force designed to stop a northern thrust through the pass at Thermopylae and at other passes leading into Macedonia. Having been

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[163] A. Fuks, "Isocrates and the Social Economic Situation in Greece," Ancient Society 3 (1972): 19-20.

[164] See review of Isocrates outline of Greek affairs on pp. 33-36.

[165] D.J. Mosley, "Athens' Alliance with Thebes 339 B.C.," Historia 20 (1971): 509. Mosley discusses the notorious difficulties the Greeks had with joint or multiple commands and financing.

successful in forcing the passes, the invaders would then have to defeat the main home guard.

The third factor necessary for success would be the timeliness of the incursion. To be successful it would have to be accomplished before Philip could return to the home land with the main army. Griffith gives strong arguments for supposing that the Greeks were incapable of meeting any of the three criteria above mentioned.

The first criterion involves both a joint interest and a capability on the part of the Greeks. In analyzing the situation of the Greeks Griffith states: "Philip attempted to assert himself as the leading power in the Greek world at a time when, of the three states that had formerly held this position, Sparta had retired from the arena; Thebes no longer played a leading role and Athens was desperately trying to arrest her decline. Sparta had been crushed by the Boiotians twelve years before Philip's accession to the throne, had lost roughly half her territory, was suffering a decline in manpower, and was no longer protected by a ring of dependent allies. The conditions that had favored the rise of Thebes and the Boiotian League, of which she was leader, were ephemeral. The signs that the city was incapable of maintaining itself in the position which it

had reached, manifested themselves a mere three years before the beginning of Philip's reign in Macedonia."[166]

That the Greeks would be able to maintain an army in the field even if they could gather a force is doubtful on economic grounds alone. Philip could routinely field armies of 30,000 infantry and 2,000 cavalry and had the potential to raise three or four times as many men in an emergency.[167] In order for the Greeks to combat Philip successfully in an attack on Macedonia, they would have to have a force at least as large as Philip's and probably much larger. We know that the Athenian expedition to Thermopylae in 352, which consisted of 5,000 infantry and 400 cavalry, cost 200 talents.[168] It would require a force six times the size of the Athenian expeditionary force to equal Philip's normal force of 30,000; therefore, the cost of a campaign of just a few weeks with those forces would cost 1,200 talents. As it happens, we know the annual revenue of Athens for both 355 and 339 - which was 130 and and 400 talents respectively, Even using the larger

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[166]G.T. Griffith, "Philip and the Southern Greeks: Strengths and Weaknesses," in Philip of Macedon. Edited by M.B. Hatzopoulos and L.D. Loukopoulos. (Athens: Ekdotike Athenon, 1980), pp. 112-113.

[167]Ibid., pp. 121-122.

[168]Ibid., p. 121.

figure, the cost of the proposed invasion force is three times Athens' annual income, an impossibly high figure.

Even if the Greeks could successfully mount such a force, could they defeat Philip? Griffith states: "Philip's army was superior to that of any of the other Greeks in terms not only of numbers but also of quality. Moreover it was commanded by Philip himself, one of the greatest organizers and army leaders the world has ever seen. Parmenion, the second-in-command, was also a general of exceptional capabilities. Under them served first rate senior and junior officers. Philip had introduced a number of innovations in the organization, equipment and tactics of the army which had improved its efficiency. The soldiers were imbued with fighting spirit and were connected by strong ties of loyalty to Philip; they were trained to carry out swift forced marches and to execute battle plans with great precision. None of the Greek powers with whom Philip clashed were in a position to inflict any damage on Macedonia."[169]

Beyond the above requirements and assumptions, there is the further assumption that Philip could not accomplish the neutralization of Greek arms by other than military means. Were Philip only fractionally as adroit in bribery

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[169]Ibid., p. 122.

and diplomatic deceit as Demosthenes portrays him to be, could he not achieve his goal by those means? All of these issues will be discussed in detail later in the chapter.

As the bases for the assertion that Philip wanted to incorporate Greek troops into or as an auxiliary part of the Macedonian army,[170] the following further assumptions obtain:

1) Philip required additional troops for his army.
2) The troops possessed by the Greeks were the very kind that Philip required and in the number required.
3) Such troops could be successfully incorporated into the Macedonian system.

These assumptions are false or extremely doubtful. Philip possessed a highly trained, seasoned, and efficient army which was based in the political and cultural milieu of the Macedonians.[171] To suggest that Philip now wished to attempt to integrate the diverse elements of the Greek forces into the Macedonian system seems highly questionable. The more likely role to be played by such

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[170] Ellis, Philip II, p. 234.

[171] G.T. Griffith and N.G.L. Hammond, A History of Macedonia, pp. 407-426.

troops would be to maintain garrisons, defensive positions and key fortified cities. These were just the tasks performed by the mercenaries; and it must therefore be shown that conquered Greek troops could accomplish such tasks in a way more advantageous than the mercenaries could.[172]

The third main reason put forward for Philip's desire to conquer Greece is that he required the Greek, more particularly the Athenian fleet, to assist him in conquering Persia.[173] As with the other main contentions, this too has some implicit assumptions:

1) That Philip intended to attack Persia.
2) That Philip's fleet was not capable by itself of providing the necessary support.
3) That the Athenian fleet was the best available alternative.

Again, I contend that this entire set of assumptions is false and therefore the objective asserted is untenable. Setting aside for the moment the question of Philip's interest in attacking Persia, I will show that Philip had a sufficiently strong fleet of his own and that

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[172]G.T. Griffith and N.G.L. Hammond, A History of Macedonia, pp. 439-440.

[173]Ibid., p. 461.

if another fleet were required, there was a better alternative than the Greek one.

A brief review of the military position of both Macedonia and the Greek city-states will be helpful. The Macedonian army was in existence as a national army before Philip's accession. His brother Perdiccas had unsuccessfully led it to battle with the Illyrians, a struggle in which Perdiccas was slain and the army decimated and routed.[174] Philip was able to regroup the remainder of the troops and re-organize them into an effective force. He accomplished this, according to Diodorus account, as follows:

> Philip was not panic-stricken by the magnitude of the expected perils, but, bringing together the Macedonians in a series of assemblies and exhorting them with eloquent speeches to be men, he built up their morale, and, having improved the organization of his forces and equipped the men suitably with weapons of war, he held constant maneuvers of the men under arms and competitive drills. Indeed he devised the compact order and the equipment of the phalanx, imitating the close order fighting with overlapping shields of the warriors at Troy, and was the first to organize the Macedonian phalanx."[175]

It is important to note that Philip both reorganized and reequipped the Macedonian army. The reorganization

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[174] Diod. 16. 2. 4-5.

[175] Diod. 16. 3. 1-2.

involved the utilization of the light-armed, spear-throwing hypaspists in conjunction with the hoplite phalanx, both used as the anvil to the heavy cavalry's deadly hammer.[176] The rearming involved replacing the hoplite shield with a smaller, lighter version and lengthening the spear.[177]

The second point to notice is the increased discipline instilled under Philip's direction. He apparently drilled his troops with summer camps and forced marches.[178] He also instilled severe discipline in his pages and officers.[179] As Parke says: "Philip as king produced in the Macedonian soldier a discipline which no Greek citizen army could ever acquire."[180]

Finally, Philip's armies generally suffered nothing due to lack of money. As we have seen in the previous chapter, Philip's financial resources were considerable and because he probably did not have to pay his soldiers directly since it was their duty to serve in his army, his

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[176]George Cawkwell, Philip of Macedon, p. 158 and G.T. Griffith and N.G.L. Hammond, A History of Macedonia, pp. 405-449.

[177]See H.W. Parke, Greek Mercenary Soldiers, p. 156 n 1 for a more complete discussion of the sarissa.

[178]Frontinus Strategems 4. 1.6 and Polyaenus 4. 2.10.

[179]Aelian 14. 48 and Polyaenus 4. 2.1.

[180]H.W. Parke, Greek Mercenary Soldiers, p. 157.

expenditures would be mostly for subsistence and whatever few mercenary troops he required.[181]

Philip developed a standing army, well-equipped and organized, well-trained, and well-provided for. As Parke summarizes: "In fact, Philip, like Jason or the Phocian tyrants, had organized every side of his army, and by the employment of mercenaries had guaranteed that he might have a military force always at his disposal for instant action.[182] Demosthenes insightfully identified the strengths of the Macedonian army:

> On the other hand you hear of Philip marching unchecked, not because he leads a phalanx, but because he is accompanied by skirmishes, cavalry, archers, mercenaries, and similar troops. When, relying on this force, he attacks some people that is at variance with itself, and when through distrust no one goes forth

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[181]Cf. H.W. Parke, Greek Mercenary Soldiers, pp. 158 and 159. Parke says that no contemporary authority ever represents Philip as hindered in his plans by a shortage of money. However Diodorus, (16. 53.3) and Justin (9. 1) strongly imply such a situation. Anson suggests that Philip suffered shortages of money early in his reign, but that after the capture of the Pangaean mines he had sufficient resources. Edward M. Anson, "The Hypaspists: Macedonia's Professional Citizen-Soldiers," Historia 34 (1985): 246.

[182]H.W. Parke, Greek Mercenary Soldiers, p. 160. Diodorus (16. 8.7) says that Philip "organized a large force of mercenaries," however I think Parke is correct in suggesting that the mercenary force was rather small in comparison with the armies total strength. The navy may have been an entirely different situation.

> to fight for his country, then he brings up his artillery and lays siege. I need hardly tell you that he makes no difference between summer and winter and has no season set apart for inaction."[183]

The Athenian army and navy were not as well armed as Philip's soldiery. The Athenian army may have been reasonably equipped with the basic arms and armor, but the soldiers were not equipped with the innovative new weapons of the Macedonian phalanx. Nor were they as well-trained. Demosthenes admits in his Third Philippic that: "but for a pitched battle he [Philip] is in better training than we are."[184] In part, this deficiency in training must be laid to the reliance on citizen-soldiers who had sufficient control of the political system to resist the formation of a standing army or year-round service.[185] Moreover, the mercenaries so often used were not generally well trained, either. Exacerbating this condition was the uncertain leadership provided by their generals become mercenaries. As Parke states: "The Athenian strategos had become a roving condottiere over whose movements his city had little control."[186]

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[183] Dem. Third Philippic 50-51.

[184] Dem. Third Philippic 52.

[185] This, of course, can be attributed in large part to economic considerations.

[186] H.W. Parke, Greek Mercenary Soldiers, p. 144. It got so bad that Aeschines put a motion before the assembly. ". . . to sail with all speed and look for the general put in command of the force." (Aeschines 11.73).

The Athenian use of citizen hoplites during Philip's reign is notable for its rarity.[187] On only three occasions during that period are the use of Athenian land forces recorded; at the occasion of Philip's conquest of Onomarchus, when the Athenians sent 5,000 hoplites and 400 horse to hold Thermopylae[188] (353 B.C.); when 2,000 citizens set sail with 6,000 mercenaries to defend Olynthus (349 B.C.),[189] and at the battle of Chaeronea (338 B.C.).[190] For the most part such conflicts as occurred were fought with mercenary soldiers under mercenary generals, most of them not Athenian.

The Athenian army was neither seasoned nor well-led. This coupled with questionable financial support made it no match for the experienced and resourceful Macedonian combined arms. More importantly, it was, therefore, not a desirable acquisition for Philip's troops. Philip could

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[187] Isocrates viewed the increasing use of mercenaries by Athens as a symptom of degeneration, A. Fuks, Isocrates, p. 29 & 46.

[188] H.W. Parke, Greek Mercenary Soldiers, p. 146. Cf. G.T. Griffith, Mercenaries of the Hellenistic World,, p. 6 on the career of Charidemus.

[189] Ibid., p. 148.

[190] Ibid., p. 154.

afford to buy whatever mercenaries he needed for auxiliary duty, and he certainly possessed better commanders than any utilized by the Athenians.

Nor were any other Greek forces notably better than the Athenians. The once powerful Thebans, led by their Sacred Band, were no longer able to contend successfully even with the hastily formed mercenary forces of the Phocians. As Demosthenes points out: "The Thebans, for instance, were powerless to prevent Philip from pressing on and seizing the passes, or from coming in at the finish and usurping the credit of their previous exertions."[191]

The Phocians had, indeed, raised a sizable mercenary force shortly after Delphi was seized. Onomarchus was able to field an army of 20,000 foot and 500 horse for the Battle of the Crocus field during which Philip crushed the Phocian army.[192] As Parke summarizes: "The general conclusion to be drawn is that the power of Phocis rested largely on the fact that money in abundant quantities could secure professional soldiers and temporary victory."[193]

The remaining potentially important military force in Greece was Sparta. The Lacedaemonians, however, were in a

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[191] Dem. On the Peace 21.

[192] Diod. 16. 35.4.

[193] H.W. Parke, Greek Mercenary Soldiers, p. 140.

period of rapid decline. Having been defeated at Leuctra in 371 and invaded by the Thebans in 362, the Spartiates had been severely diminished both in numbers and wealth. Forrest summarizes the Spartan condition in the mid-fourth century: "Finally, decisively, Greece was impoverished by almost continuous war and Sparta, without Messenia, with her own outdated economy, was poorer than most - she simply could not afford to play at aggressive international politics."[194]

In view of the strength, cohesion, and training of the carefully combined elements of the Macedonian army and the loosely organized and carelessly led Athenian troops as well as the weakness of the other Greek land contingents, there can have been little for Philip to have either feared or coveted among Greek arms. While the Persian satraps and even the great King found utility in a Greek phalanx in waging their internecine wars, Philip had created a superior force, both from operation and resources stand points. That Philip might wish to employ Greek troops in his finely tuned army seems very unlikely.[195]

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[194]W.G. Forrest, A History of Sparta, (New York: W.W. Norton and Co., 1968), p. 139.

[195]Alexander apparently took 5,000 Greek mercenaries into Asia with his army (Diodorus 17.17.2), but they were used for garrison duty at Mytilene, Sidon, and Caria (G.T. Griffith, Mercenaries of the Hellenistic World, p. 27.

A force that Philip did covet was additional cavalry. From his Thessalian allies he was able to obtain some of the finest horses available. In order to integrate the Thessalians into his military organization Philip apparently ennobled some of them and elevated them to members of his Companion Cavalry.[196] Philip appears as an ally of Thessaly early in his reign when he is found assisting the Larissans against the tyrants of Pherae.[197] Griffith summarizes this continuing alliance nicely:

> In his early years of expansion Philip never entered Thessaly except by invitation, the Thessalian League being split by the defection of tyrants of Pherai with their satellite cities and perioikoi. By his skill in war and the allied arts, by his winning personality which carried him even into a Thessalian marriage (with Philinna of Larissa), and by his parties which were memorable even by Thessalian standards, he made more and more friends in Thessaly year by year, and when the 'crisis' came and his friends needed him, he did not fail them."[198]

We may conclude, then, that Philip had acquired what he needed by way of support for his cavalry from the Thessalians. This addition to his troops was accomplished

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[196]Ellis, Philip II, p. 54.

[197]Diod. 16. 14.2.

[198]G.T. Griffith, "Philip as a General and the Macedonian Army," Philip of Macedon. Edited by M.B. Hatzopoulos and L.D. Loukopoulos (Athens: Edkotike Athenon, 1980) p. 73.

through steady friendship and alliance, not by conquest and the impressing of defeated troops into the Macedonian army. In this Philip was consistent with his development of a national, standing army. As Griffith states it: "Philip was creating, what no Greek city could ever begin to create, a large army which should combine a trained and specialized efficiency with the fire of national spirit and racial patriotism, at once the seasoned professional and the enthusiastic amateur of war."[199]

There is another element of military strength that must be considered. Athens had risen to power on the strength of her fleet, both military and commercial. Was it possible that she still maintained such a decisive advantage in this area that it overcame her manifest weakness in land forces? Cawkwell argues that, despite reforms in the financing in 357/56 and again in 339, the Athenian navy remained as strong as it ever was.[200] However, in his discussion Cawkwell equates strength with number of ships available, rightly pointing out that about 300 triremes appear to be outfitted. From this he

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[199]G.T. Griffith, The Mercenaries of the Hellenistic World (Cambridge: University Press, 1933), p. 9.

[200]George Cawkwell, "Athenian Naval Power in the Fourth Century," Classical Quarterly 34 (1984): 334.

concludes that: "From the restoration of the Athenian navy in 378 down to the disaster of the battle of Amorgos in 322, the Athenians kept control of the sea."[201]

This last seems a wrong conclusion on three grounds. First, the Athenian navy was unable to prevent the defection of Rhodes, Cos, Chios, and Byzantium from its second confederacy. The decisive battle was the sea-battle at Chios in 355.[202] Cawkwell urges that this was "hardly a major engagement," and that if the Athenians had considered the defectors' fleet a real challenge they would have adopted different tactics.[203] Whether a major engagement or not, the Athenians lost it and were unable to defeat the defectors.[204]

Secondly, the Athenians were unable to cope with the Macedonian fleet in the north Aegean. Demosthenes clearly recognized the threat when he said: "And yet some people say that he has no use for the sea! Why, this man who has no use for the sea is laying down war-ships and building docks, and is ready to send out fleets and incur

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[201] Ibid., p. 345.

[202] Diod. 16. 21.3.

[203] George Cawkwell, "Athenian Naval Power," p. 345 n 33.

[204] Cawkwell rightly points out that part of Athens' reason for withdrawing was fear of intervention by the Great King, but the fact remains that from 357-355 the Athenians were unable to defeat the rebel flotilla.

considerable expense in facing risks at sea . . ."[205] Again: "Since Philip has a fleet, we must have fast vessels if our force is to sail in safety."[206] With this fleet and its mercenary commanders[207] Philip was able to trouble Athenian commerce when he wanted to and to transport his troops, even in the face of Athenian opposition.[208]

The third reason that the Athenians were unable to control the sea is that they could not afford to turn their paper strength into combat strength. In the time of Pericles a substantial part of the fleet was in training constantly, providing for a superbly able and well-paid naval contingent.[209] In commenting on a plan of Demosthenes, Cawkwell states: "If a force of fifty ships manned by citizens were to be constantly ready, 8,500 citizens would have had to be constantly on call to row the ships and a further 500 as marines, as well as the citizens

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[205]Dem. On Halonnesus 16.

[206]Dem. First Philippic 22.

[207]G.T. Griffith and N.G.L. Hammond, A History of Macedonia, p. 310. Griffith suggests that Philip hired mercenaries for his fleet because the Macedonians were unlikely to become good sailors in less than a year or two.

[208]Diod. 16.76.3.

[209]Thucydides 2.13.

in the hyperesiai. If they were to be paid, even at the rate of a half a drachma a day, and for only eight months of the year, the city would have taken on a large item of expenditure it was in no position to afford."[210]

If Athens could not afford to keep even 50 of its ships constantly up to combat strength, it is hard to envision her maintaining control of the seas. Moreover, the use of mercenary commanders who frequently had their own ends in view and were virtually outside the control of the Athenians on occasion lends no credence to a claim of complete control. It may be pointed out, on the other hand, that the Athenians were able to maintain their supply of grain from the Black Sea throughout this period, a trade which must imply that they had control of the waterway. Another interpretation is that Philip refrained from cutting off that supply because he was not particularly interested in doing so.

Let us now return to the three main military reasons, and the underlying assumptions, generally given for Philip's conquering Greece. The first involved the possible desire on Philip's part to protect his southern flank from Greek attack. During the period of

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[210]George Cawkwell, "Athenian Naval Power," p. 344.

Philip's reign, the Greek city-states were not only not moved by a spirit of co-operative resistance to Philip, but were actively engaged against each other, virtually ignoring Philip until 347 when Thebes requested his aid in the Sacred War.[211] Moreover, even at the last instant (338), with Philip already in Greece, only Athens and Thebes combined forces to face the Macedonians. It must be taken, therefore, as extremely unlikely that Philip feared an attack by a combined Greek force.[212]

Could such a combined force successfully have defeated Philip if it were put together? Given the crushing defeat that Philip inflicted on Onomarchus in 353 and on the Greeks at Chaeronea in 338, it seems unlikely that the Greeks would have done well against him. It is true that Onomarchus defeated Philip twice in 354, but one suspects that Philip was present with only a moderate force of Macedonians and was working against Pherae with primarily

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[211] G.T. Griffith and N.G.L. Hammond, A History of Macedonia, pp. 218 & 330-331. Philip is often stated to have fomented unrest among the various city-states, to divert their attention from his growing power and to keep them from uniting against him. It is also possible that he was involved at the request of already quarreling parties and was not the instigator.

[212] To the extent that a combined Greek force utilized mercenaries, it seems likely that Philip could seriously disrupt it merely by offering more pay. Philip could also afford to hire a large mercenary force as a home-guard in his absence.

Thessalian troops, else it is difficult to see how Onomarchus could have defeated him.[213] Elsewhere, Philip's difficulties occurred mostly with sieges, notably at Perinthus and Byzantium.

The third issue was whether or not Philip would be able to return from his primary theater of operations in time to assist in the defense of Macedonia. According to Engels: "The consequence of Philip's reforms was to make the Macedonian army the fastest, lightest, and most mobile force in existence, capable of making lightning strikes against opponents 'before anyone had time to fear the event.'"[214] With his extremely rapid movement, Philip could fairly easily traverse the distance from the Hellespont to Macedonia, against no opposition, before a combined Greek force could march north against the stiff opposition of his Thessalian allies.[215]

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[213]G.T. Griffith and N.G.L. Hammond, A History of Macedonia, p. 219. Griffith suggests that Philip did not always call out the full levy of troops. Since he was operating so close to home in Thessaly he may not have felt that he needed all of his available manpower.

[214]Donald Engels, Alexander the Great and the Logistics of the Macedonian Army (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), p. 23. Engels presents a detailed and nicely argued account of the organization and logistics of the Macedonian army under Philip and Alexander.

[215]Any attack beyond the Hellespont would have required that a substantial force be left to guard Macedonia from attack from any direction. In the event, Alexander left Antipater with 15,000 troops when he attacked Persia.

Moreover, Philip did operate quite far from Macedon throughout his reign without any apparent fear of Greek attack. Demosthenes states: "He [Philip] is now established in Thrace with a large force, and is sending for considerable reinforcements from Macedonia and Thessaly, according to the statements of those on the spot."[216] Philip also undertook difficult and lengthy sieges of Perinthus and Byzantium with a large force with no apparent fear of leaving his southern flank unguarded.[217]

The second main reason given was Philip's interest in incorporating Greek troops into his army for further campaigns, presumably against Persia. The first assumption involved in this reason is that he needed additional forces. Assuming that his ultimate objective was to attack Persia,[218] we may get an idea of the force that he might have thought sufficient by observing how many troops Alexander took with him. According to Arrian: "At the

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[216]Dem. On the Chersonese 14.

[217]G.T. Griffith and N.G.L. Hammond, A History of Macedonia, pp. 571-574. A large force was required because of the well-fortified and strongly defended cities. Cf. Diodorus 16. 74-75.

[218]Knapp suggests that Parmenion's incursion into Asia was just a retaliatory measure in reaction to the satrap's sending mercenaries to fight against Philip at Perinthus. A. Bernard Kapp, The History and Culture of Ancient Western Asia and Egypt (Chicago: Dorsey Press, 1988), p. 265.

start of the next campaigning season Alexander left Antipater in charge of affairs in Macedonia and Greece, and made for the Hellespont with a force composed of not much more than 30,000 infantry, including light troops and archers, and over 5,000 cavalry."[219]

According to Diodorus, Philip fielded an army of more than 30,000 infantry and no less than 2,000 cavalry at the battle of Chaeronea.[220] This is about the size of the infantry force which Alexander took with him to Asia, while Antipater's cavalry force was much smaller. As a good commander Philip undoubtedly left a large reserve force in Macedonia, especially as his main objective was the reduction of the Amphissians. It therefore seems unlikely that Philip would have required the addition of any Greek troops for whatever campaign he had planned.

The second assumption involves the kind of troops that Philip might wish to add to his army. We have already seen that Philip had added Thessalian cavalry to his army by means of his alliance with the Larissans. The Greek city-states could not make an equal contribution in that

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[219]Arrian 1.11. Diodorus (17.17) gives 32,000 infantry and 5,100 cavalry. Antipater was left with 12,000 infantry and 1,500 cavalry.

[220]Diodorus 16. 85.5.

regard. For the hoplites, so valued by other forces,[221] Philip had little need. His primary infantry arm was the sarissa-bearing, light-armed phalanx, an infantry force not possessed by the Greeks. Philip also had a significant number of skirmishers, peltasts, and other auxiliary troops, including a formidable siege train. In none of these areas were the Greeks particularly numerous nor as effective as the troops Philip already employed.

The last assumption involves the incorporation of foreign troops into the Macedonian system. As we have seen, one of the reasons for the success of the Macedonian army was the training and discipline it received as a full-time national army. That Philip could successfully manage a standing army as a spirited national force was one of his major accomplishments. To integrate a part-time, citizen force from various Greek city-states seems virtually impossible, since not only would they have to be rearmed and retrained, but would have to become accustomed to fighting full-time and that away from their homes.

One might argue that Philip could use the Greek forces for garrison duty or other auxiliary tasks. These chores, which required little training, were performed for Philip

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[221]G.T. Griffith and N.G.L. Hammond, A History of Macedonia, p. 484.

by mercenaries, and it seems more likely that he would simply hire more if he required them. In conclusion, we may return to the observation of Diodorus that: ". . . he [Philip] left armies so numerous and powerful that his son Alexander had no need to apply for allies in his attempt to overthrow the Persian supremacy."[222]

The third main reason given for Philip's interest in conquering Greece was that he could utilize the Athenian navy.[223] That reason involved Philip's intention to attack Persia, the assertion that Philip's fleet was unable to support such an effort, and that the Athenian fleet was the best alternative. Leaving aside until the next chapter the validity of the assertion that Philip's ultimate aim was to attack Persia, and merely assuming it for the sake of analysis, we must turn to a review of Philip's fleet.

The initial phase of that analysis is to determine the role of a support fleet for such an operation. The Persians, in their two attacks upon the Greek mainland

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[222]Diod. 16. 1. 5-6.

[223]Errington argues that Philip did not covet the Athenian navy because he did not use the Athenian navy in the exploratory attack on Persia in 336, even though Athens was a member of the league of Corinth, and that Alexander managed without the support of the Athenian fleet, R.M. Errington, "Review-Discussion: Four Interpretations of Philip II," American Journal of Ancient History 6 (1981): 74.

in 490 and 481, used supporting fleets in very different roles. Darius used his fleet to ferry his troops from Asia Minor to the coast of Attica, attempting a direct attack on Athens. Darius also used his fleet to subdue the islands, such as Thasos,[224] along his route.

Xerxes used his impressive fleet[225] to ferry troops, to guard the bridge across the Hellespont, and to provide advance scouts. Upon arriving at their destination, the ships were also intended to engage the Athenian fleet. This fleet seems to have performed reasonably well until it encountered Greek opposition.

We have two specific instances to examine for the use of a support fleet by Philip. First, he sent Parmenion with 10,000 foot and horse into Asia Minor early in 336 B.C. These troops were apparently ferried across the Hellespont to Abydos.[226] There is no other mention of a supporting fleet in this incidence.

The second instance involves Alexander's entry into and subsequent campaigns in Asia Minor. Alexander, too, ferried his troops across the Hellespont, but later used

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[224]Herodotus 6.44.

[225]There were 1207 triremes according to Herodotus (7.89).

[226]Diod. 16. 91.2 and 16. 24.1.

his fleet for transporting food and assisting in sieges. Hauben suggests that there were four naval formations during this early period, one of which, the fleet of the Hellenic League, had as its purpose the support of operations on land.[227] This fleet of the Hellenic League was comprised of 160 triremes, only 20 of which were Athenian.[228]

The two examples reveal that the primary purpose of such a support fleet was to transport troops across the Hellespont and then to assist land operations as required. Since Alexander required only little aid from the Greek fleets, it is hard to see why Philip would have gone to all the cost, trouble, and casualties of conquest for the benefit of using 20 Athenian triremes.

The final assumption is that the Athenian fleet was the most desirable alternative for providing the Macedonians a fleet. Philip did have another option, the ships of the defectors in the Social War of 357-355 with

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[227] H. Hauben, "The Command Structure in Alexander's Mediterranean Fleets," Ancient Society 3 (1972): 55.

[228] Arrian 1. 11.6 and Justin 11. 6.2 who mentions 182 ships. For a more complete discussion see H. Hauben, "The Expansion of Macedonian Sea-Power Under Alexander the Great," Ancient Society 7 (1976): 79-105. Hauben believes (p. 80 n 10) that most of the ships were Macedonian or from the northern coastal cities.

Athens. After all, they had defeated the Athenians during that conflict and may have been considered the superior force. As it happened, the island of Chios quickly came over to the Macedonian side after Parmenion invaded Asia Minor.[229] Surely the Chians could have provided the same number of triremes that Athens did.

Upon examining the military arguments for Philip's interest in conquering Greece, all are found wanting. Philip demonstrably behaved as if he had no fear of an attack from Greece, his army wanted no addition, and he did not require the aid of the Athenian fleet to invade Persia, if that was his aim.

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[229]Ellis, Philip II, p. 221.

CHAPTER 6

The Aims and Motivations of Philip

Having reviewed in some detail the three reasons conventionally stated for Philip's interest in conquering Greece and having found each of them suspect, we must again examine Philip's plans. He did, after all, end up with a sort of control over Greece after the battle of Chaeronea and the founding of the League of Corinth. If, as I contend, it was no part of Philip's plan to conquer Greece, how did he end up in control? What, in fact, were his aims?

Ellis considers the question of Philip's aims at length in his excellent book, Philip II and Macedonian Imperialism. In trying to assess Philip's aims, Ellis turns away from Philip's character, which is unknowable at this late date even if it might have been during his lifetime. As Ellis puts it: "For if it is naive to speak of the causes of fourth-century Macedonian imperialism in terms of Philip's personal outlook (whether his supposed restless belligerence or, alternatively, some farsighted zeal for Hellenic unity), it must be the height of folly to

do so on the basis of the sort of pseudo-evidence for it that survives."[230]

Ellis emphasizes the important role that the unification of Macedonia under Philip played in setting the stage for later expansion. The essential element of that unification Ellis finds to be the army: "But if the army was at once the instrument and the expression of the new unity, it was all the more essential that military objectives were constantly in mind and, more important, that military successes were won, lest it turn the newly found energies upon itself and the state."[231] For Ellis the military was not only the crucial element of unification, but also the driving force of expansion, since, if it had no foreign enemy to feed on, it must feed upon itself.

As to Philip's direction of this unleashed tiger, Ellis sees three crucial decision points.[232] First, the need to find a protective alliance to allow him safety while he secured his borders and consolidated his rule in Macedonia. According to Ellis, Athens served this role during the early years. The second decision involved

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[230]Ellis, Philip II, pp. 7-8.

[231]Ibid., p. 9.

[232]Ibid., pp. 9-11.

cutting loose from this Athenian alliance. Here the decision was to free himself from the Athenian alliance and to join with the Olynthians and Chalkidean League so as to continue strengthening himself. The third decision was whether to end his advance into Greece and proceed to Persia. His choice was to abandon Greece.

According to Ellis, the reason that Philip turned toward Persia was to keep the military appropriately engaged: "When it came to the search for longer-term and profitable military objectives it was to the barbarians of Asia Minor that he turned."[233] Furthermore, Ellis believes that Philip foresaw this outcome as early as 346, and incorporated it in the Peace of Philocrates: "It was this purpose - to make Greece safe for his own withdrawal for the greener pastures of Anatolia - that he must have determined upon at the end of the 350's or very early in the 340's."[234]

The subsidiary strategy which Ellis sees being employed by Philip is that of negating the strength of the Theban hoplites and co-opting the power of the Athenian navy. The tactics used to blunt Thebes and Athens were to

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[233] Ibid., p. 11.

[234] Ibid., p. 11. Griffith dates Philip's interest in Persia from 344, G.T. Griffith and N.G.L. Hammond, A History of Macedonia, p. 487.

keep them enemies until he could conquer both. The instruments of this strategy were primarily diplomatic, with military incursion used only for the coup de grace.

While admitting that Ellis's analysis is both thoughtful and insightful, the very orderliness of it makes it suspect. Events tend to unfold chaotically and unexpectedly whereas in retrospect they seem clearly defined and sometimes inevitable. The tendency is to read backwards from an event or occurrence a simple causal series of events which then necessarily produce the actual outcome. The series of events then are called the "plan" of the main actor in the sequence of events.

Having said this, I must admit that leaders do plan and do set goals, and perhaps develop detailed operational guidelines with which to implement their plans. Unless we have sound documentation of such plans, we can only infer the motivation of actions from those actions themselves. It would seem more appropriate to identify sequences of action which are consistent and to group them together under the heading of "principles," rather than directly to seek a "plan" of action.

An excellent example of this approach to historical analysis appears in William Harris's, War and Imperialism in Republican Rome.

I have been stimulated and persuaded by Harris's arguments regarding the imperialism of Rome and have found them partially valid for Macedonia as well. The one difficulty that I have with his categorization is that in some instances Philip's motives do not fit neatly into it, as will become apparent in reviewing Table II. In his introduction Harris states: "Roman behavior requires explanation, 'No sane man,' wrote Polybius, 'goes to war for the sake of defeating his opponent, just as no sane man goes to sea merely to get to the other side, or even takes up a technical skill simply for the sake of knowledge. All actions are undertaken for the sake of the consequent pleasure, good, or advantage.'"[235] And as Harris further points out, such actions must be weighed against their costs: "In real international policies it is seldom that a state simply chooses to extend its power by effortless fiat. It must exert itself to establish its claim to power, it must pay costs and make sacrifices."[236]

Harris then goes on to identify four "motives" or principles that may have driven Roman expansion. The case of Roman expansion is sufficiently similar to Macedonian

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[235]Harris, Imperialism, p. 1.

[236]Ibid., pp. 1-2.

expansion under Philip, as Harris himself acknowledges,[237] to utilize the same principles in analyzing the behavior of Philip II. The four motives identified by Harris were: economic prosperity, expansion, annexation, and self-defense. We have seen previously that various writers have asserted economic, self-defense, and expansion motives to Philip with respect to Greece.[238]

The economic motive is succinctly stated by Harris: "Economic gain was to the Romans (and generally in the ancient world) an integral part of successful warfare and of the expansion of power. Land, plunder, slaves, revenues were regular and natural results of success; they were the assumed results of victory and power."[239] We have shown that Philip's interest in Greece was not likely motivated by economic concerns, for the land of Greece was poor, its plunder negligible, and neither slaves nor revenues were exacted in the event.

Generally speaking, Philip did not seem to be motivated by economic factors. The one instance where it

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[237]Ibid., p. 2.

[238]Even though Philip was tagos in Thessaly and hegemon of the League of Corinth, neither the territory of Thessaly nor of any Greek city-state was annexed to the territory of Macedonia. Therefore annexation does not seem to have been a motive.

[239]Ibid., p. 56.

seems obvious that he was motivated by economic gain, his seizure of Amphipolis and the mines around Krenides, stands out as his only clearly economically motivated activity. However, some writers, such as Ellis, do attribute economic gain as one of Philip's motives in attacking Persia.

Expansion as a motive for imperialism is defined by Harris as the increase of political power over other areas which did not involve annexation of those territories.[240] The view that Philip wished to conquer Greece to incorporate aspects of its military into the Macedonian army may be viewed as an expansionist motive. Previous arguments have shown this motive to be untrue with respect to Philip's interest in Greece. It does seem true, however, that Philip exercised some political power over both the Thracians, for whom he appointed a Macedonian governor, and over the Greeks through the League of Corinth.

By annexation Harris means the incorporation of territory into the political and economic system of the conqueror.[241] It is quite clear that this did not occur in Greece as a result of Philip's activity. The Greek city-states were left with substantial political and economic

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[240]Ibid., p. 105.

[241]Ibid., p. 131.

autonomy, such that the League of Corinth may be best described as merely a military alliance.

In his other spheres of activity Philip seems also not to have been much given to annexing territories. A notable though rather minor exception was the annexation of such cities as Methone and Pydna along the Macedonian sea-coast. One may also view the closer relations between Upper and Lower Macedonia as a lesser form of annexation.

According to Harris, motives of self-defense may be described as follows: "When they made their war-decisions, so it is often assumed and sometimes argued, they felt themselves to be more the subjects of pressure from others than the source of an expansionist drive."[245] Those who assert that Philip's interest in Greece was motivated by his desire to secure himself from attack from that quarter are appealing to the motive of self-defense. Here again we have shown both that Philip had little reason to fear such an attack and that he behaved as though he had no such fear.

There do seem to be many occasions when Philip acted from the motive of self-defense. Cases that come quickly to mind are his attacks on the Illyrians and Paeonians, especially during the first two years of his reign, his attack on Olynthus which he saw as posing a threat by

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[245]Ibid., p. 163.

harboring potential usurpers, and his attack on Onomarchus in Thessaly, although this seems a more complex case.

In order to view more clearly Philip's possible motives over his entire career, the following table has been constructed to show his military engagements and their likely motivation where one can reasonably be identified. I have included the initial actions by Parmenion in Asia Minor and the postulated invasion of Persia as well.

Table III

Possible Motives Associated with Military Engagements

Engagement	Date*	Motive
Battle with Argaeus the Pretender	359	Self-defense
Battle with Paionians	359	Self-defense
Battle with Illyrians	358	Self-defense
Capture of Amphipolis	357	Economic
Capture of Pydna	356	Annexation
Battle with Northern Coalition	356	Self-defense
Capture of Poteidaia	356	Treaty obligation
Capture of Apollonia, Galepsos, & Oisyme	356	Unknown
First battle with Pherai	355	Alliance obligation
Capture of Methone	354	Annexation
Capture of Pagai	354	Alliance obligation
Capture of Abdera & Maroneia	354	Self-defense
Battle with Phocians under Phayllus	353	Self-defense
Battle with Phocians under Onomarchus	353	Self-defense
Re-capture of Pagasai	352	Alliance Obligation
Battle of Crocus Field	352	Self-defense

* For this table I have adopted the chronology and dating of Ellis as given in his Philip II and Macedonian Imperialism, pp. 14-20.

Engagement	Date	Motive
Thracian Campaign	351	Self-defense
Paionian and Illyrian Campaign	350	Self-defense
Invasion of Chalcidice	349	Self-defense
Attack on Pherai	349	Alliance obligation
Capture of Olynthus	348	Self-defense
Capture of Cersobleptes	346	Self-defense
Attack on Illyrian Pleuratos	345	Self-defense
Capture of Pherai	344	Alliance obligation
Final Thracian Campaign	342	Self-defense
Capture of Teres and Cersobleptes	341	Self-defense
Black Sea Campaign	341	Self-defense
Siege of Perinthos	340	Self-defense
Siege of Byzantion	340	Self-defense
Capture of Athenian corn-fleet	340	Self-defense
Scythian Campaign	339	Self-defense
Capture of Amphissans	338	Alliance obligation
Battle of Chaeronea	338	Self-defense
Parmenion attack on Persia	336	Retaliation
Postulated attack by Philip on Persia	?	Economic

From this table two major issues evolve: First several of the military actions of Philip cannot be clearly put into Harris's schema, which is not surprising given either the uncertainty or paucity of information we have about them. The second issue is that many of Philip's military activities were driven by treaty or alliance obligations. In particular, Philip's activities in Thessaly and Central Greece tended to be solely the result of alliance or treaty obligations, while the military activities in Illyria and Paconia tended to be for self-defense. I have also listed the Battle of Chaeronea as occurring out of the immediate motive of self-defense, though Philip's army was there only because of his obligation as a member of the Amphictyonic League.

I have also included in the table the element of retaliation as a motive for some of Philip's actions, including Parmenion's initial advance into Asia. It is also to be noted that in some cases the motives appear to be mixed, which points to a concern about forcing all of Philip's actions into a pre-determined scheme. We must allow that any action can spring from a number of motives. In this Table I have tried to identify the most important motives.

It may be argued that alliances or treaties are negotiated out of one of Harris's four motivating factors,

and it certainly seems possible that either self-defense or expansion may be a motive for such an alliance or treaty. However, in the case both of the alliance with Thessaly and Philip's participation in the Amphictyonic League neither self-defense, (for he had no reason to fear attack), nor expansion, (since he thereby acquired only little political power), was a motive for these alliances.

If Harris's categorization of the motives of imperialism is accepted as exhaustive, then it follows that Philip's interest in Greece is not primarily an imperialistic undertaking. In that case we must look for other motives, a conclusion toward which we have already been led by our examination of Table III. I believe that those motives are revealed in Philip's relations with Thessaly, or more particularly with the segment of Thessalian society opposed to the tyrants of Pherae, and in Philip's role on the Amphictyonic Council.

The relationship between Macedonia and Thessaly was one of long standing, particularly that between the Larissans and Macedonian kings. Thucydides identifies one Niconidas of Larissa as a particular friend of Perdiccas.[246]

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[246]Thucydides 4.78.2. Perdiccas is also identified as being on good terms with the leading men of Thessaly (Thucydides 4.132.2).

It is no surprise, therefore, that Philip was called on by the Aleuds, the leading family of Larissa, to help overthrow the Pheraean tyrants in both the early and late 350s.[247] Martin correctly states the impact of his victory over the Pheraeans: "With his glorious victory, Philip put an end to nearly twenty years of tyranny in Pherae and, therefore, to the claim of the successors of Jason to head the confederacy. He saved traditional government in Thessaly."[248]

As a reward for his outstanding services the Thessalians elected Philip as the leader of the confederacy. As the leader of the confederacy Philip received revenues both from market and harbor taxes as well as tributes from perioikic areas.[249] It was these funds which Demosthenes accused Philip of misappropriating for his own uses.[250] However, as Martin shows: "But even if the rumor about revenues was true, there is no indication

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[247]See T. Martin, "Diodorus on Philip II and Thessaly in the 350's B.C.," Classical Philology 76 (1981): 188-201 and "A Phantom Fragment of Theopompus and Philip II's First Campaign in Thessaly, "Harvard Studies in Classical Philology 86 (1982): 55-78.

[248]Martin, Sovereignty and Coinage in Classical Greece, p. 90.

[249]Ibid., p. 93.

[250]Dem. Olynthiac 1. 22 and Olynthiac 2. 11.

elsewhere in Demosthenes or any other source that the Thessalians ever ceased to turn over these revenues to Philip. The granting of these same revenues to Alexander when he succeeded to his father's position as leader of the confederacy supports the assumption that the threat to cut off funds, if it was ever made, was never carried out."[251] Martin suspects that Demosthenes reported the complaints of the now disaffected Pheraians to discredit Philip.[252]

Martin goes on to demonstrate that Demosthenes' further charges of Philip's imposing a tyranny upon the Thessalians was also false on all accounts.[253] He also demonstrates that Philip's establishment of the tetrarchies was merely a return to previous constitutional forms which had been disrupted by the tyrants of Pherae. The relationship of Philip to Thessaly is summed up pointedly by Martin: "In Thessaly, nomos remained king of all. With the election of Philip as their leader, the Thessalians had found a solution to their current problems which could be reconciled with tradition of long standing. In a time of severe factional strife, they had settled on a third party

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[251]Martin, Sovereignty and Coinage in Classical Greece, p. 96.

[252]Ibid., p. 97.

[253]Ibid., pp. 102-106.

to serve in a sense as 'mediating magistrate' at the head of an army strong enough to quell any rebellion or tyranny."[254]

Philip's role as tagos in Thessaly would have been a strong motive for his interest in Greece, the prosecution of the Sacred War and the return to Thessaly of its rightful place in the Amphictyonic Council. Historians have generally seen Philip's activities on the Council of the Amphictyons as a mere front for whatever goals he was said to be really pursuing. This interpretation is unnecessarily cynical and only confuses the interpretation of Philip's actions, whereas acceptance of his role on the Council as serious clarifies his activities.

In summing up Philip's career Diodorus tells us: "Having subdued in war the men who had been plundering the shrine at Delphi and having brought aid to the oracle, he won a seat on the Amphictyonic Council, and because of his reverence for the gods received as his prize in the contest, after the defeat of the Phocians, the votes which had been theirs."[255] Upon reviewing Philip's career we will find several instances of Philip's reverence for the

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[254]Ibid., p. 111.

[255]Diod. 16. 1. 4-5.

gods, particularly Apollo, and that he acted consistently in his role as leader of the Amphictyons, even when that might have conflicted with his role as King of Macedon.

The battle in which Philip defeated Onomarchus was apparently widely hailed as the vengeance of Apollo against the temple-robbing Phocians. Justin records that: "Philip, as if he were the avenger of the sacrilege, not the defender of the Thebans, ordered all his soldiers to assume crowns of laurel, and proceeded to battle as if under the leadership of the god."[256] The results of his victory Justin describes as follows: "This affair brought incredibly great glory to Philip in the opinion of all people, who called him 'the avenger of the god, and the defender of religion,' and said that 'he alone had arisen to require satisfaction for what ought to have been punished by the combined force of the world, and was consequently worthy to be ranked next to the gods, as by him the majesty of the gods had been vindicated."[257]

After Philip's return from Thessaly Diodorus records that: "he returned to Macedonia, having enlarged his kingdom not only by his achievements but also by his

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[256]Justin 8. 2.

[257]Justin 8. 2.

reverence toward the god."[258] It is important to note that even after inflicting a crushing defeat on the Phocian army and slaying its commander Philip did not follow his victory up by striking through the unprotected passes into Central Greece, which would have seemed the natural thing to do if his objective was the conquest of Greece.

According to Diodorus the Athenians prevented him from penetrating into Greece by way of Thermopylae."[259] Justin gives a little more detail: "The Athenians, hearing the result of the conflict, and fearing that Philip would march into Greece, took possession of the straits of Thermopylae, as they had done on the invasion of the Persians . . ."[260] Despite these two assertions it is highly unlikely that the Athenians could have beaten Philip to the pass or that he could not have forced it if they had. Griffith agrees in saying:

> Thermopylai was held by the Phokians, doubtless with a relatively small force of their mercenaries, and perhaps it was reinforced immediately now by another relatively small force of Athenian hoplites from the fleet, but there is no question that if the victorious army of the Crocus plain had marched on it without delay, it would have been able to

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[258] Diod. 16. 38.2.

[259] Diod. 16. 38.1

[260] Justin 8.2.

> force the pass by a combination of circumvention and frontal assault as Xerxes had done. But for weeks Philip never even marched."[261]

By 347 both sides in the Sacred War were exhausted with the fighting, which led the Boeotians to ask Philip, as a fellow Amphictyon, to assist in the struggle. Philip's response, according to Diodorus, was measured: "The king, pleased to see their discomfiture and disposed to humble the Boeotians' pride over Leuctra, dispatched few men, being on his guard against one thing only - lest he be thought to be indifferent to the pillaging of the oracle."[262]

The appearance of Philip's army at Thermopylae was sufficient to cause the surrender of Phalaecus and his 8,000 mercenaries. The capitulation of the Phocians quickly followed. With victory achieved, Philip moved to institute the peace: "As a result he decided to call a meeting of the Amphictyonic Council and leave to it the final decision on all the issues at stake."[263] Here again Philip followed strictly the protocol of the Council rather than using his overwhelming force to further Macedonian interests.

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[261]G.T. Griffith, "Philip as General and the Macedonian Army," p. 73.

[262]Diod. 16. 58.3.

[263]Diod. 16. 59.4.

Philip not only did not further Macedonian interests in the conquest of Greece, he helped impose a just yet moderate settlement after the Sacred War. And when that was complete: "Thereafter, when Philip had helped the Amphictyons give effect to their decrees and had dealt courteously with all, he returned to Macedonia, having not merely won for himself a reputation for piety and excellent generalship, but having made important preparations for the aggrandizement that was destined to be his."[264] In the last clause of Diodorus' account we see the evident scepticism which prevailed even in antiquity, but Philip's actions here are again completely consistent with his role as an Amphictyon and inconsistent with the role of a Macedonian conqueror.

Philip's special interest in supporting the oracle at Delphi and his ties with Thessaly may very well have been interrelated. Plutarch records that one Aleuas the Red, descendant of Heracles, just as Philip supposed himself to be, was unexpectedly chosen as the King of Thessaly.[265] He was chosen in a lottery at Delphi by the god Apollo when the Thessalians were unable to make the selection themselves. Martin concludes that the parallel is

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[264]Diod. 16. 60.4

[265]Plutarch Moralia 492 A-B.

suggestive: "Since Philip had led the Thessalian army to victory in the Sacred War under Apollo's banner and, it was alleged, in the interests of the proper management of the shrine, it was possible to imagine that Apollo had had a hand in the happy coincidence of interests between Philip and the confederacy."[266]

Beyond having his soldiers wear laurel wreaths into battle against the sacrilegious Phocians, Philip also made another substantial, public commitment to Apollo: he minted coins with the laureate head of Apollo on one face. As Martin points out:

> Philip was very conscious of the benefits to be hoped for in a visible commitment to Apollo. He had his soldiers wear laurel crowns into battle to prove that they were avengers of sacrilege committed against Apollo at Delphi and not just the defenders of Thessalian pride. Le Rider points out that the laureate head of Apollo on Philip's gold coins very likely has something to do with the king's public and ostentatious devotion to the god's banner in the Sacred War. But his chronology for these issues requires him to believe that the Apollo type commemorates Philip's success in the Sacred War when the coins were issued at some point after the war's end in 346, perhaps even well after the end. It makes better sense to think that Philip's gold coinage with its garlanded

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[266] T. Martin, Sovereignty and Coinage in Classical Greece, p. 107.

> head of Apollo represents a useful rival to the Phocian coinage stolen from Apollo of Delphi."[267]

A final element which may relate Philip's interest in the defense of Apollo's shrine to his own special interests involves the divine honors granted to Philip. In his summary of Philip, Diodorus states: "Such was the end of Philip, who had made himself the greatest of the kings in Europe in his time, and because of the extent of his kingdom had made himself a throned companion of the twelve gods."[268] Not only did Philip consider himself to be one of or equal to the gods, but he was apparently worshipped as one at Cynosarges. Fredricksmeyer quotes Clement of Alexandria as saying: "For indeed even whole nations and cities, with all their people, assuming the mask of flattery, disparage the stories about the gods, mere men, transforming men like themselves into the equals of the gods, blown up with vainglory, and voting them extravagant honors; at one time they enact by law at Cynosarges the worship of Philip the son of Amyntas, the Macedonian from

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[267] T. Martin, Sovereignty and Coinage in Classical Greece, pp. 288-289. Against this view it must be noted that coinage featuring the head of Apollo was not rare in this area. Griffith points out that Damastium minted tetradrachms in the early 4th century which featured the head of Apollo, G.T. Griffith and N.G.L. Hammond, A History of Macedonia, p. 189.

[268] Diod. 16. 95.1.

Pella, with his broken collar-bone and maimed leg, with one eye knocked out. . . ."[269]

This worship was held publicly at Cynosarges, a famous sanctuary of Heracles located just outside the city of Athens.[270] This was an entirely appropriate setting for Philip's worship, since he claimed descent from Heracles. Fredricksmeyer indicates that the fact that the cult was held outside the wall makes it a less drastic innovation.[271]

Fredricksmeyer also gives evidence that Philip was worshipped as a god as early as 359 B.C. in Amphipolis, and perhaps at Leshos in 343 B.C.[272] He suggests that: "There is evidence that after the battle of Chaeronea Philip not only received divine honors at Athens, but also planned to found a dynastic cult, of himself and his family at Olympia."[273] Remains of his temple, the Philippeum, have been found at Olympia.

If Philip took all this seriously, and it appears that he did, it is not surprising that he would be especially

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[269]E.A. Fredricksmeyer, "Divine Honors for Philip II," Transactions of the American Philological Association 109 (1979): 40.

[270]Ibid., p. 49.

[271]Ibid., p. 50.

[272]Ibid., p. 51.

[273]Ibid., p. 52.

interested in avenging the Pythian Apollo and trying to assure both the stability and effectiveness of the Council of the Amphictyons. And this would also be a sufficiently powerful motive both to involve him in the affairs of Central Greece when his main interests lay elsewhere and to allow him to separate his role as ruler of Macedon from his role as Amphictyon.

Philip appears to have been a complex and brilliant man, and therefore one likely to have many reasons for whatever actions he undertook. His interactions with the Greeks were precipitated by their actions in Thessaly and the northern Aegean until he was elected to be the military leader of Thessaly and, thereby, a member of the Amphictyonic Council. From that time onwards his actions toward the southern Greeks appear to have been driven solely by his dual roles in Thessaly and on the Council.

None of this is to deny altogether that Philip, somewhere along the way, contemplated the role of Greece vis-a-vis Macedonia. Especially as the Greek and Macedonian spheres of interaction grew ever closer must he have asked himself about the value of Greece to an ambitious northern king. What I am questioning is that Philip's driving motive was the conquest of Greece. Once we have stepped aside from Demosthenes' view of Athens as Philip's central focus, some mysteries seem much clearer.

For example, Philip's relatively gentle and generous treatment of Athens has always puzzled historians. But they have adopted Demosthenes' perspective. If neither Athens nor Greece was Philip's central focus, then Philip's actions towards the Athenians were not unexpected. He was merely doing the least possible to deal with them while he was engaged in meeting his primary objective.

The question of what his primary objective was, if not Greece, naturally occurs. While it is not the purpose of this study to answer that question, I believe that there are several possible responses: 1) the unification and consolidation of Macedonia proper, 2) the establishment of a ring of buffer states around Macedonia, and 3) a possible incursion into Asia Minor. I believe that any of these would have been more important to Philip than any value to be found in conquering Greece.

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