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UMARIAN KARTA (MALI, WEST AFRICA)
DURING THE LATE NINETEENTH CENTURY:
DISSENT AND REVOLT AMONG THE FUTANKE
AFTER UMAR TAL’S HOLY WAR

By

John Henry Hanson

A DISSERTATION

Submitted to
Michigan State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
Department of History

1989

ABSTRACT
UMARIAN KARTA (MALI, WEST AFRICA)
DURING THE LATE NINETEENTH CENTURY:
DISSENT AND REVOLT AMONG THE FUTANKE
AFTER UMAR TAL’S HOLY WAR
By

John Henry Hanson

This dissertation examines the aftermath of Umar Tal’s holy war in Karta.
Umar’s armies conquered Karta in 1855 during the course of the more extensive
Umarian conquests in the Western Sudan (1852-64). Most of Umar’s followers
were Futanke, residents of Futa Tom, the Fulbe state in the middle Senegal
valley. As the main Umarian army marched to Segu in 1859, several thousand
Futanke soldiers remained behind in Karta. In the years following the Umarian
conquests, many Futanke men and women left the Senegal valley to reside in
the Western Sudan. Most migrants settled in Karta, the Umarian territory
closest to the Senegal valley. The process of Futanke colonization altered the
terms of Umarian domination in Karta, creating a powerful immigrant community
with diverse interests in the region. Until the French conquest of Karta in
1891, this state was the most viable Umarian successor state in the Western
Sudan. Drawing on Arabic documents produced by the Umarian elite, oral
accounts transmitted in western Mali and French materials produced by
travellers and officials stationed in French posts in the Senegal valley and
Western Sudan, this dissertation reconstructs the Futanke migration to Karta

and the social and political history of Umarian Karta during the late nineteenth
century.

Cepyright by
JOHN HENRY HANSON
1989

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The archival and field research for this dissertation was conducted in
Mali, Senegal and France in 1984-86 with the support of a Fulbright-Hays
Doctoral Dissertation Research Abroad Fellowship. I also am grateful to the
African Studies Center at Michigan State University, which awarded me a D
Department of Education Foreign Language and Area Studies Fellowship for four
years (1980-84) to study Arabic and lPulaar. The American Council of Learned
Societies and the Social Science Research Council’s Joint Committee on the
Comparative Study of Muslim Societies provided support for me to attend their
dissertation workshop in June, 1986. Kalamazoo College placed its computer
facilities at my disposal for printing the final copy of the dissertation. The
History Department at Michigan State University provided assistance to help
defray some of the costs associated with completing the dissertation.

I was assisted by the staffs at the following institutions: . the Archives
Nationales du Mali, Institut des Sciences Humaines, Division du Patrimoine
Culturelle and the Ecole Normale Supérieure in Bamako, the Archives Nationales
du Sénégal and Institut Cheikh Anta Diop in Dakar, and the Archives Nationales
de la France, Section Outre-Mer and Bibliotheque N ationale de Paris in Frame.

iv

The Operation pour la Developpement Integré du Kaarta in Nioro provided me
with transport from Bamako to Nioro, and opened their rest house to me in
Nioro on several occasions.

Many Malians and Senegalese generously provided me with hospitality and
insights into the Umarian past. I am especially grateful to Abdoul Aziz Diallo
of Bamako and Amadou Ba of Nioro, who spent countless hours speaking with
me about their research and offering valuable suggestions for my inquiries.
Baidy Touré and Bakary Diagouraga of Nioro, Mamadou Dia of Kayes and Bokar
Ba of Konyakary assisted me as I collected oral data in western Mali. Oudiary
Makan Dantioko, Abdoul Aziz Diallo and Mustapha Kane made either transcripts
or cassette tapes from their field research available to me.

I also am grateful for the support and advice provided by members of my
doctoral committee: Professors Alan Fisher, John Hinnant, Harold Marcus and
David Robinson. Professor David Campbell offered suggestions as I prepared my
research proposal and served as the college representative to my committee.
Professor Jay Spaulding of Kean College shared his insights into pro-colonial
African social formations. Professor Marcus helped shape my understanding of
African history and always offered insightful comments regarding my work.
Professor Robinson guided me through all phases of my graduate studies with
sound advice and instructive criticism, and generously opened his library of oral
materials and Arabic sources to me. His work on Umar Tal’s holy war provided
a standard for historical writing based on careful and responsible research, and

served to generate many of the questions which I pursued in this dissertation.

Introduction

Chapter One:

Chapter Two:

Chapter Three:

Chapter Four:

Chapter Five:

Chapter Six:

Chapter Seven:

Chapter Eight:

Chapter Nine:

Chapter Ten:

Conclusion:

Sources

TABLE OF CONTENTS

The "Tukulor Empire" and the Late Nineteenth Century
Western Sudan

Umar Tal’s Holy War and the Umarian Successor State in
Karta

The Fulbe Migration to Karta During the Late Nineteenth
Century

Regional Trade and the State in Umarian Karta
Umarian Karta and the Grain Trade at Medine

The Revolt of Habib and Moktar: the Politics of
the Evidence

The Revolt of Habib and Moktar

Umarian Karta in the Aftermath of the First Revolt
The Siege of Nioro

The End of the Umarian Era

Dissent, Revolt and the Umarian Era in Karta

39

72
103

124

149
170_
196
236
273
300

307

LIST OF TABLES

A: Volume of Iraitam Gum Purchases at Medine and Bakel, 1860-90
B: Volume of Traitam Grain Purchases at Medine, 1860-90

C: Grain Caravans Arriving at Medine, 1885

D: Grain Caravans Arriving at Medine, 1887-88

vii

113
130
131
132

 

LIST OF FIGURES

The Western Sudan in the Nineteenth Century
Umarian Karta in the Late Nineteenth Century
The Umarian Conquests, 1852-1864

The French Posts in the Western Sudan

The Fort at Nioro

The Main Building

viii

42

43

51

219

256

257

INTRODUCTION

Sham Umar Tal declared a holy war against the non-Muslim regimes of
the Western Sudan in 1852. Until his death in 1864, Umar led his followers in
a conquest of the upper Senegal valley, the Bambara states of Karta and Segu,
and the Fulbe regime in Masina, which he felt had betrayed the vision of its
Muslim founders. Most of his followers were Futanke, residents of Futa Toro,
the Fulbe state in the middle Senegal valley. As the main Umarian army
marched to Segu in 1859, many soldiers remained behind in garrisons which
they had established in Karta and in the upper Senegal valley region of Tarnba.
Shaykh Umar spent the remaining years of his life on the march in the east,
and never devoted much attention to creating an imperial Umarian state in the
conquered territories. After his death, the Futanke found themselves scattered
throughout the Western Sudan without a state structure nor even a common
agenda for the process of consolidation.

During the late nineteenth century, many Futanke men and women
continued to migrate to the Western Sudan. Most of the We (migrants in
Pulaar) settled in Karta, the conquered territory closest to the Senegal valley.

2

The process of Futanke colonization altered the terms of Umarian domination in
Karta, creating a powerful immigrant community with diverse interests in the
region. Karta straddled trade-routes connecting the Saharan desert-side to the
markets of the upper Senegal valley and Western Sudan. After the Umarian
conquest, some Futanke invested in economic activities associated with Karta’s
status as a commercial crossroads. As they withdrew from the military to
manage their economic affairs, subsequent ferganke assumed their positions in
the army in hopes of gaining wealth through wars and raids in the name of
Islam. Tensions mounted among the Futanke and political groupings eventually
emerged which were defined internally as "war" and "peace" factions.1 Futanke
factionalism greatly influenced the history of the Umarian era in Karta.

Previous historians have not perceived the emergence of factions among
the Umarian Futanke and argue that they formed a monolithic "warrior elite".2
The inability to discern these political cleavages distorts historical analyses of
the revolts which twice divided the Umarian community in the late nineteenth
century. Both revolts occurred in Karta and involved the sons of Umar Tal.
Amadu Sheku, Umar’s oldest son and successor as the Umarian Commander of
the Faithful, felt that his title gave him claims to rule the entire Western
Sudan. During the late 1860s, Amadu’s half-brothers Habib and Moktar rallied
communities of Futanke in Karta to join their challenge to Amadu’s authority.
In 1869, Amadu Sheku marched to Karta from his base in Segu, captured Habib
and Moktar, and imprisoned them in Segu upon his return in 1874. Although
Amadu Sheku tried to consolidate an imperial Umarian state from his Segovian
base, his hopes were dashed by Muntaga, another half-brother who organized a
second revolt in Karta in the mid-1880s. Amadu Sheku marched to Karta in

3
1884 to defeat the challenge, but never was able to unite the Futanke in the
Western Sudan under his leadership.

In the standard analyses of the revolts, historians emphasize the
succession dispute and focus merely on the actions and motives of the Tal
brothers. No one has examined the reasons why the revolts occurred in Karta
nor discussed the roles which the Futanke from Karta played in events. This
dissertation breaks from previous works and emphasizes the interests and
actions of the Futanke community in Karta. This focus reveals the broader
political dimensions of the revolts and shows how local Futanke influenced the
decisions of the main protagonists. Amadu Sheku’s brothers mounted their
succession challenges in Karta because the continuing influx of manic: allowed
them to recruit soldiers for their armies. Amadu responded to the challenges in
large part because he wanted to dislodge the Futanke settlers from Karta and
move them to Segu where he could exercise greater control over their actions.
The revolts themselves made the Futanke settlers choose between loyalty to
Amadu Sheku, Umar’s successor, and their interest in an autonomous state
which they had helped to establish. The revolts also forced the Futanke to
reassess their commitment to the ideals of Shaikh Umar’s holy war and the
mission which had brought them into the Western Sudan.

This dissertation also challenges the previous assumption that Sham
Umar created an imperial Umarian state or "Tukulor Empire" which declined
after the death of its founder.3 In the first chapter, I examine the
historiography of the rise and decline of the "Tukulor Empire" and show how
this thesis reflects the convergence of Amadu Sheku’s aspirations and French
imperial interests in the late nineteenth century Western Sudan. I also discuss

the data in written and oral sources which allows me to break from the

 

4
standard literature. In the second chapter, I examine the Massassi Bambara
regime in Karta and assess the political changes which occurred in the years
immediately following Umar’s conquest. I argue that the initial Futanke settlers
and Umar’s appointed leaders successfully established an Umarian successor to
the Massassi state in Karta. By the late 1860s, Umarian Karta’s emergence as a
strong and autonomous state made it the locus of political competition among
the Tal brothers. Rather than evidence of imperial "decline", the revolts reveal
the political vitality of the post-conquest era.

Chapters Three through Five provide additional perspectives on the vitality
of the Umarian state in Karta. Chapter Three examines the Futanke migration
to Karta after the Umarian conquest and analyzes its impact on the forms of
Futanke domination in Karta. I show how Senegal valley migrants responded
to both "push" and "pull" forces during the late nineteenth century. Chapter
Four discirsses regional trade in Umarian Karta, and describes Karta’s links to
the Saharan desert-side and the upper Senegal valley. Chapter Five focuses on
Futanke involvement in the Kartan economy, drawing on economic data from the
grain trade at the upper Senegal valley market of Medine to reconstruct the
consolidation of a slave-owning class in the province of Jomboxo.

The remaining chapters turn to a description and analysis of political
dissent and revolt in Umarian Karta. Chapter Six examines previous historical
reconstructions of the first revolt and exposes the politics associated with the
transmission of the extant oral traditions. Futanke political activity in Karta
and the narrative of the first revolt follows in Chapter Seven. In Chapter
Eight, the focus is Kartan political history of the late 1870s and early 1880s, an
era when divisions within the Futanke community in Karta deepened. I also

show how French moves into the Western Sudan influenced events in Karta.

5
Chapter Nine offers an analysis of the extant historical data for the second
revolt before moving to a narrative of the political drama. The Tenth chapter
describes the final years of Umarian rule in Karta and closes with a discussion
of the French conquest and the return of thousands of Futanke to the Senegal
valley. The conclusion reflects on the emergence of dissent and revolt among

the Futanke in Umarian Karta.

Notes

1. "War" and ""peace parties emerged elsewhere in pre- c-olonial West Africa.
See, for an analysis of political factions at the Asante court in nineteenth
century Kumase, I. Wilks, - N

(Edinburgh, 1970).

2. See, for example, Jacques Méniaud, Les Pignniers dd Saddad, av am, av ee e;
apr reg Arehingd, 1822-1894 ,2 volumes (Paris, 1931); AS Kanya- -,Forstner The
f h W trn (Cambridge, 1969); Yves Saint- Martin, L’ Empire

tdueqdleur (Paris, 1970); BO. Oloruhntitmehin, The Sega Takeldr Empire (London,
1972), R. Roberts, W

1thhe didle Niger Valley,l rAli/[1214 (Stanford, 1987).
3. "Tukulor" is a colloquial term for Futanke.

CHAPTER ONE

The "Tultulor Empire" and the Late Nineteenth Century Western Sudan

The rise and fall of the "Tukulor Empire" is an important thesis in the

West African historical literature.1

References to an imperial Umarian state or
"Tukulor Empire" first appeared in the official correspondence from the late
nineteenth century Senegal valley, where the French had established a foothold
in West Africa. French officials argued that Shaikh Umar Tal created a vast
empire in the Western Sudan which he bequeathed to Amadu Sheku, his son
and successor as the Umarian Commander of the Faithful. They added that
Amadu’s empire was in decline and could not stop the French advance into the
interior.2 Historians in recent decades have found the French usage
convenient. Narrating the rise and fall of the "Tukulor Empire" simplified the
task of summarizing the history of the Western Sudan. Researchers also were
able to focus on French-mediated materials at Paris and Dakar, and leave aside
Arabic documents and oral accounts produced by the Umarians. These sources
provide data and perspectives on the Umarian past which do not appear in the
French-mediated materials. Analysis of all the extant historical sources leads to

a revised understanding of the Umarian era in the Western Sudan.

8

References to the "Tukulor Empire" do not appear in the initial French
descriptions of the mid-nineteenth century Western Sudan. During the lifetime
of Umar Tal, the conquered territories were recognized as such: a vast region
which Umar had not organized into an imperial state. The initial agreement
negotiated between the French and the Futanke in Karta illustrates the mutual
recognition that the Western Sudan was a constellation of independent states:
the treaty marked the boundary between "the states of al-Hajj Umar" and the
"countries under French protection".3 Both the French and Futanke recognized
Umar’s authority over his "lieutenants" in Karta, but neither party stated that
it was an imperial relationship. Indeed, Umar probably did not direct the
Futanke of Karta to negotiate with the French, and the agreement was never
ratified.

The first French references to a "Tukulor Empire" appear after the death
of Umar Tal and during the period of direct contact with Amadu Sheku at Segu.
Amadu’s assertion that he was Umar’s successor as Commander of the Faithful
clearly influenced French perceptions. Equally as important, Amadu’s title
served French interests, since they could sign a treaty with the Umarian
Commander of the Faithful and claim the entire Western Sudan. as their
commercial sphere without having to negotiate with several Umarian political
leaders. In 1866, for example, Eugene Mage negotiated a treaty between the
French Governor of Senegal and Amadu Sheku which, without specific reference
to a "Tukulor Empire", implied that Amadu claimed to rule over the entire
Western Sudan.4 Thereafter, the French referred to the constellation of
Umarian states in the interior as a "Tukulor Empire" over which "Sultan

Amadu" ruled as "Commander of the Faith ".

9

During the late 18705 and throughout the 18805, the French advance into
the Western Sudan altered their perceptions of the Umarian territories. As the
French military established permanent posts along a line from the upper Senegal
to the middle Niger valley, they looked for potential weaknesses in the "Tukulor
Empire". Amadu Sheku’s inability to exercise control over Karta and Beledugu,
a region located between Karta and Segu, became salient facts. The French did
not abandon their references to the "Tukulor Empire", but spoke instead of its
"decline". They clung to the imperial idiom because international competition
for territories in Africa meant that French treaties with "Sultan Amadu" could
be used to bolster their claims to the Western Sudan as a French "sphere of
influence".5 French references to the "decline" in the "Tukulor Empire"
reflected an awareness of internal political developments which had escaped
their attention during the initial years of Franco-Umarian interaction.

‘ The' autonomy of Karta from Amadu Sheku’s control impressed almost every
French military official who visited the Western Sudan during the 18808. Given
the change in their interests gm Segu, they spoke of dismembering the
"Tukulor Empire" by luring the Futanke of Karta into an alliance. The first
attempt to bring Karta into the French camp occurred in 1882 when the leader
of the advance into the interior, WW Borgnis-Desbordes, tried
to send an envoy to meet secretly with Muntaga, the Futanke leader at Nioro.
Desbordes hoped that Muntaga would accept French recognition of his autonomy
from Segu in exchange for a commitment to trade with the French as they

6

moved against Amadu at Segu. This mission never made contact with

Muntaga, but Desbordes’ immediate successors never abandoned their hope that

Karta could be separated from Segu and drawn into the French camp.7

 

10

The French also tried to recruit the non-Futanke populations of the
Western Sudan into an anti-Umarian coalition. French military officials
actively pursued the Bambara of Beledugu, who resisted incorporation into
Amadu Sheku’s state, as well as Soninke, Malinke and other Bambara leaders in
the Western Sudan. The targeting of non-Futanke groups reinforced the French
tendency to speak of the "decadence" of Umarian rule. French officials
represented their actions as "liberating" the "oppressed" populations of region
from the yoke of Amadu Sheku. During the conquest of the Western Sudan,
they followed a policy designed to dismantle the "Tukulor Empire" by sending
twenty thousand Futanke settlers back to the Senegal valley and recognizing
non-Futanke elites as intermediaries in the new administration. They distrusted
the Futanke because they were "fanatic" Muslims who could not be trusted to
accept French rule. Additionally, Amadu Sheku fled from Karta and eluded
capture, causing some concern that the Futanke might revolt against the
French. With the expulsion of the Futanke, the French and their allies assumed
control over Karta.

After the French conquest, historians combined the image of Umar Tal’s
vast empire with subsequent judgments of the decadence of Amadu Sheku’s rule
into narrative accounts of the rise and fall of the "Tukulor Empire". French
colonial historians chronicled the defeat of the Umarians in order to celebrate
the French conquest, and accepted the late nineteenth statements regarding the
"Tukulor Empire" uncritically.8 A.S. Kanya-Forstner subsequently corrected
many of the overstatements of the early colonial writers in his analysis of the
French conquest, but he accepted the imperial thesis regarding the rise and
decline of the "Tukulor Empire".9 Similarly, the political histories of the
Umarian era by ED. Oloruntimehin and Yves Saint-Martin reify the "Tukulor

11
Empire" as a political entity. These works primarily are based on French-
mediated materials and fail to tap the perspectives in the oral data and Arabic
materials generated by the Umarians. As a result, they merely echo the initial
French statements regarding the "Tukulor Empire".

The imperial thesis also is embraced by many Malian historians, who argue
that the Umarian era brought about thirty years of raiding and exploitation by
an immigrant ruling elite.10 The Malian version of the imperial thesis accepts
French assessments of the oppression of Futanke rule but balks at representing
the colonial conquest as "liberation". They prefer to see the Umarian era as a
time of foreign occupation which weakened the military power of the indigenous

inhabitants and prepared the way for the French conquest.11

Consequently,
they embrace the "Tukulor Empire", fill out its history and accept the imperial
thesis created by the coincidence of Amadu’s aspirations and French interests
in the Western Sudan.

David Robinson’s recent analysis of Umar’s holy war challenges the
conventional wisdom. 12 Robinson drew on Umarian Arabic documents and West
African oral traditions as well as French-mediated materials to transcend the
perspectives of both the Umarian and French elites. The resulting synthesis
undermines several standard interpretations of the holy war. Robinson’s
analysis of Franco-Umarian relations in the late 1850s shows how the French
forced Umar from the Senegal valley but allowed him to recruit soldiers to
renew the conquests to the east. This suggests that the campaign against Segu
marked a new departure and signalled the end of Umar’s dream of establishing
an imperial state in the upper Senegal valley. Robinson also argues that
parallels drawn between the holy wars led by Uthman dan Fodio and Umar Tal

are inappropriate because Uthman’s movement was an internal revolution

 

12
whereas Umar’s holy war was a conquest. References to the "Tukulor Empire"
may equally reflect comparisons with the Sokoto Caliphate which obscure rather
than illuminate the Umarian past.

Despite Robinson’s work and its implications for the imperial thesis, the
"Tukulor Empire" continues to influence historical perceptions of the Umarian
era in the Western Sudan. Richard Roberts’ recent examination of the political
economy of the middle Niger valley is an extended thesis about the rise of the
economy and its decline under Umarian rule: "my research on the Middle Niger
valley had to confront the thirty-year period of economic decline that coincided
with the Umarian conquest and subsequent rule". 13 Although Roberts does not
refer to a "Tukulor Empire", his "Umarian State" includes the entire Western
Sudan as its domain. His work focuses primarily on the historical experience of
the Segu area, and he does not develop his ideas about the "Umarian State" at
great length. Nevertheless, he speaks of one Umarian state which was created
during Umar’s life and then divided after his death into "three or four
zones".14 Roberts thereby perpetuates the historiographical conventions
regarding the imperial Umarian state and its decline. '

The present study breaks cleanly from these conventions and examines the
Umarian period in the Western Sudan without the conceptual blinders which the
imperial thesis imposes on research and historical reconstruction. In the
following chapter, I argue that the Umarians who settled in Karta consolidated
an autonomous state in the years immediately following Umar Tal’s holy war.
Before moving to an analysis of the Umarian consolidation of power in Karta,
the last section of the present chapter surveys the nature and limits of the

historical somces for the Umarian era in Karta.

 

 

This reconstruction of Umarian Karta in the late nineteenth century draws
on Arabic documents produced by the Umarian elite, oral traditions in Pulaar
and other West African languages, and materials written by French travellers
and officials who served in the Senegal valley and Western Sudan. These
materials provide a variety of perspectives on the past, but each category of
data presents the historian with specific challenges. Arabic documents, for
example, often do not have a date or place of composition indicated in the text.
Careful analysis of the text and its content is required before these sources can
be used.15 Chronicles and other literary materials also reflect the perspectives
and interests of the author’s patron or social group: they are not neutral
statements about the past. 16 Finally, Arabic materials from the Umarian era do
not provide sufficient documentation upon which to construct a complete
chronology of the past.

Oral traditions and reminiscences are an important complement to the
Arabic documents. While oral materials certainly are not first-hand accounts of
historical events which are transmitted over time, they do represent coherent

17 The process of oral transmission introduces

reconstructions of the past.
changes in the content of the traditions, but the transformations occur in
predictable ways: oral historians work within historiographical traditions which
dictate much of the form of the oral account. 13 Admittedly, local political
issues influence the presentation of historical information in oral societies, and
expatriate historians alter the transmission of oral data by the questions they
ask. 19 An appreciation of the context in which oral historians recount their

traditions, however, provides clues to the introduction of bias or novelty in the

oral data.20 When the processes of oral transmission in western Mali are

14
understood, oral materials yield useful information and perspectives regarding
the Umarian past.

Travellers accounts and the official French correspondence of the late
nineteenth century also provide information about the Umarian era. These
materials also were shaped by political interests, and conditioned by the way in
which the information was collected and reported in the written form. The
testimony of African informants passed along in the French materials requires
careful examination to determine whether colonial officials transformed the
information to conform to their expectations or political interests. Even when
French officers passed along analyses based on personal observations, they
interpreted events in terms of their own understanding of the Umarian
situation. The reliability of individual officials varied according to personality
and length of tenure in the Western Sudan; in most cases, however, the quality

of data reflected changes in Franco-Umarian relations.21

European materials
offer the advantage of having been written contemporaneously with events, but
clearly are not authoritative sources for the Umarian past. The aim of this
section is to describe the categories of evidence and assess the processes

through which the extant source materials were created.

Arabic materials

Most of the Arabic materials concerning Umarian Karta come from the
personal archives of Amadu Sheku. He kept administrative records, official and
personal correspondence, and literary materials (chronicles and praise poetry)
describing his reign. Amadu collected these materials at his main palace at

Segu and at the palace at Nioro, where he resided at the time of the French

15

conquest. W Archinard, who directed the French conquest
of the Western Sudan, seized the Arabic materials from Segu and sent them to
Paris, where they can be found in the W (EN).22 Archinard
also emptied the palace at Nioro of its Arabic materials, now found in Dakar at
the Wm (ANS).23 Additional materials are available
in private collections in the Western Sudan and the Wm
(formerly the MW in Dakar.

Few historians have worked extensively with these Arabic materials, and
no one with an interest in Umarian Karta has examined this rich fund of source
materials. As a result of this neglect, my research focused initially on
sm'veying the collections and identifying relevant documents from the mass of
Arabic materials. I have examined most of the relevant files of Arabic
materials in the archives, and uncovered several runs of important historical
documents in the BN and ANS dossiers.24 The data that I have examined to
date allows the present thesis to break from the themes and perspectives of the
standard literature on the Umarian past and offer an alternate view of the
aspirations and actions of the principal political actors.

Many Umarians in Karta possessed skills in Arabic, but to the best of our
knowledge they produced few administrative records or other documentary
materials during their rule. The small number of written records does not imply
that the Umarians failed to establish a bureaucracy in Karta; ' tax collection
and judicial activities merely occurred without being documented in written
form.25 Umarian court proceedings made reference to written laws, but the
judgments were rendered orally. A few written tax records do exist, and date
from Amadu Sheku’s two residences in Karta, from 1870 to 1873, and from 1885

to 1891.26 Amadu’s initiative was not an attempt to reform the tax system per

16
se, but an assertion of imperial control over Karta. The records reflect the
struggle for power in Karta as well as provide evidence of the amount of the
taxes collected at the time.

Most of the Arabic historical materials for Umarian Karta consist of
official correspondence and literary materials. Perhaps ironically, given the
desire for (autonomy from Segu expressed by many Umarians in Karta, the major
work of historical writing produced in Karta was a chronicle of Amadu Sheku’s
reign?!7 Members of the Kaba Jakite family wrote a chronicle which located
Amadu Sheku’s reign within a long tradition of imperial control beginning with
the Soninke state of Wagadu.28 Several members of the Kaba Jakite family
probably compiled the chronicle at various times over the course of the late
nineteenth century.29 The chronicle provides very little information about the
consolidation of power in Umarian Karta, but it is valuable as a source because
it presents a non-Futanke perspective on the Umarian era.

The only comparable document written from a Futanke perspective is an
Arabic chronicle of the construction of the Umarian fort at Konyakary, written
by Cemo Yahya Tal sometime in the 19705.30 Cemo Yahya primarily relied on
the testimony of Demba Sadio Diallo, a local oral historian of the Xassonke and

31 The Umarians constructed the fort at the site of the old

Umarian past.
Xassonke capital in the late 18503, and several Umarian leaders made it their
base of power during the late nineteenth century. Cerno Yahya’s chronicle,
however, focuses only on the construction of the fort and the leadership of the
initial Umarian leader, Cemo Jibi Ban. While this document provides important
details about the period of conquest, it avoids reference to the conflicts of the

subsequent era. Indeed, it reflects the current desire among Futanke in

17

western Mali to emphasize the conquest and forget the subsequent years of
Umarian rule in the region.32

Amadu Sheku’s court produced or received most of the Arabic literary
materials and correspondence concerning Umarian Karta. As a result, I have
yet to find many Arabic materials concerning Umarian Karta prior to Amadu’s
first residence in Nioro. Indeed, Amadu produced very little about his own
reign in Segu in the early 18603, as the focus of description and commentary
within the Umarian community was directed toward Umar’s conquest of Masina.
Some documents concerning Umarian Karta in the 1860s survive, but none
provide important information on the process of consolidation.33 Oral traditions
from the Nioro area indicate that Mustafa, Umar’s appointee as the leader of
Karta, received an Arabic letter from Umar which granted Muntaga significant
autonomy in the conduct of his affairs, but I have not yet uncovered such a

letter.34

The longest run of correspondence from Karta concerns the
negotiations conducted between the French and Cemo Musa, a Futanke leader
from Konyakary.35 _

Amadu Sheku arrived at Nioro in 1870 in response to the revolt which his
brothers Habib and Moktar had organized in Karta. While the volume of Arabic
documentation increased during this period, Amadu’s actions and opinions
regarding the revolt are not specified in any written materials of the era.36
Given local Futanke outrage over the capture and imprisonment of Habib and
Moktar, Amadu probably forbade his court officials from writing about the
revolt. This instance of official neglect illustrates one way in which the

imperial court influenced the transmission of historical traditions during the late

nineteenth century.

 

18

The court also tried to create an historical tradition focused on Amadu
Sheku’s military victories against the Bambara. Prior to Amadu’s march to
Nioro, his forces defeated the Bambara of the middle Niger valley at Kejje.
While Amadu was in Karta, he led a military campaign against the Bambara of
Gemukura, a Massassi stronghold in the southern marches of Karta. Uthman
Kusa compiled a collection of materials concerning Amadu’s victories at Kejje
and Gemukura.37 Uthman Kusa’s collections celebrate Amadu’s military actions
in language which marks a return to the rhetoric of Shaykh Umar’s holy war.
Since Futanke at Segu and other locations were writing chronicles of the holy
war at this time, Uthman Kusa seems to have responded to the initiative by
linking Amadu’s reign to the emerging historical tradition of the holy war.38

Amadu Sheku returned to Segu in 1874, but he maintained correspondence
with Umarians in Karta during the 1870s and 1880s. The material includes
correspondence with Muntaga, Amadu’s half-brother, and the other political
leaders whom be appointed to rule in Karta. The official correspondence is
not very extensive, nor does it provide much information on the tensions
between the brothers which surfaced during the 18808. Much more revealing of
these tensions is Amadu’s correspondence with Futanke notables from Nioro.
This material includes correspondence with Cemo Mamadu Khayar, a religious
leader who challenged the policies of both Amadu and Muntaga.39 Other
notables wrote Segu to keep Amadu abreast of the activities of Muntaga and
Cemo Mamadu.40 These materials are perhaps the most important documents in
the archive, since they provide unedited insights into Amadu’s deteriorating
relationship with the Umarian community in Nioro.

In 1884, Amadu Sheku left his son Madani at the helm in Segu as he left

41

to confront Muntaga at Nioro. Amadu never returned to Segu, and resided at

19

Nioro until the beginning of 1891, when the French conquered Umarian Karta
and Amadu began his seven-year hijza to the east. The Arabic materials from
this era mostly are letters and records; the pace of events discouraged the
creation of chronicles and treatises. While no chronicle of the 1885 siege of
Nioro exists, Amadu received letters and reports from some of his agents in the
southern garrisons of Karta.42 Amadu’s official correspondence in the period
after Muntaga’s revolt includes correspondence with French officials as well as
with his political subordinates in Karta43 Amadu also received letters from
Fulbe who migrated to Nioro in large numbers during the late 18803.44 The
official correspondence for this era is most abundant, and provides insights into
the Umarian state in Karta as it confronted the French advance.45

Most of the Arabic materials from the late nineteenth century reflect the
interests of Commander of the Faithful Amadu Sheku, and present his imperial
perspective on the Umarian era. The perspectives of Amadu’s brothers and the
Futanke of Karta do not emerge directly in the extant materials. Besides these
Umarian perspectives, the views of the indigenous communities of the Western
Sudan do not appear in these Arabic materials. The search for the Umarian
past, therefore, must tap other perspectives as they are revealed in oral

traditions and French documents.

Oral materials

Once the French established control in Karta, they collected historical
traditions from the conquered populations. Several French officials gathered
oral materials about the Umarian era, and published their results in colonial
journals and monographs.46 In the 19508, as the French conducted a general

20
census of the region, officials gathered additional oral historical data.47 Most
of these colonial efforts at oral canvassing suffer from authoritative methods of
data collection, and were followed by discrete efforts by Malian and American
researchers in the post-independence period. Beginning in the mid-19705, David
Robinson and Oudiary Makan Dantioko focused on gathering oral data of Umar’s
holy war in western Mali.48 Abdoul Aziz Diallo subsequently began to collect

oral accounts of the W (migration to Nioro) among the Fulbe of the
Nioro area.49 During the early months of 1986, I joined this effort and

interviewed informants about the Umarian era.
Amadou Ba of Nioro also has conducted numerous oral interviews regarding
the Umarian past in Karta.50 He is a local historian who collected his data

over the course of the last three decades.51

He did not tape any of his
sessions with informants; his data consist of several volumes of notes taken
during his interviews. Amadou wrote a brief history of the Umarian era and
published it in mimeo form, and currently is working on a longer history of the
Umarian era based on his work with oral informants.52 He shared his insights
into and knowledge of the local traditions with me, and provided names of
informants to interview. I interviewed Amadou several times during the course
of my work in western Mali. He did not allow me to record the sessions, but I
took copious notes.

Most of my other informants were elders and heads of families in Nioro,
Konyakary and their surrounding villages. I selected informants who were
suggested to me by Amadou Ba and Abdoul Aziz Diallo as well as informants
who were reputed by their peers to be the custodians of historical traditions.

In many cases, the informants asked me not to tape the interviews, and I

honored their requests. I conducted many interviews in the presence of a

21

research assistant, and we compared notes at the conclusion of the session.
The sessions generally began with the main informant narrating the history of
Umar’s holy war. He would then add what he knew about the others aspects of
the Umarian past. If the interview included other informants, they would add
comments as well. After the main narrative, I probed the memory of the
informant with a set of questions which I had carefully prepared to elicit
comments regarding the holy war and its aftermath.

Frequently when I was collecting oral testimony, informants brought
documents and published materials to the session: an Arabic chronicle of
Umar’s holy war, Paul Marty’s examination of Islam in the region and Yves
Saint-Martin’s examination of Franco-Umarian relations were the most common
written materials in the libraries of western Mali.53 The informants often used
the published texts to show how the French had perpetuated myths about the
Umarian past, but always offered the Arabic chronicle as a primary source.
Some informants merely read the chronicle and claimed to know very little
about the jaamanu_al;djina (the period between Umar’s holy war and the French
conquest). Even informants who did not possess the Arabic chronicle knew the
content of the document: their narratives drew on the chronology and imagery
of the Arabic chronicle.

Oral and written forms of historical representation are not considered
separate genres in western Mali. The custodians of the Arabic chronicle told
me that they read it publicly at the great feast celebrating the end of Ramadan
(the month of fasting). Others have heard the chronicle, committed it to
memory and added fragments of their own family history to the main narrative.
While this process preserves family traditions associated with the holy war,

reminiscences of life in the period after Umar’s death are not celebrated

22
publicly. The result is that the history of the iaamann_al;diiaa is being
forgotten. The custodians of family traditions are dying as young men rrrigrate
to urban areas in Mali and the Ivory Coast without learning them from their
fathers and grand fathers. The influence of the Arabic chronicle on the oral
historiography will only increase over time.

The emphasis on the holy war equally reflects current ambiguity regarding
the jammLalfliina, a period during which Amadu Sheku twice marched to
Karta and defeated challenges to his authority organized by his brothers. The
existence of an Arabic chronicle of Umar’s conquests merely facilitates the shift
away from the fraternal conflict which plagued the Umarian movement in the
wake of Umar’s death. Persistent canvassing of oral informants by Malian and
American researchers has elicited important oral accounts of the W
diina, but the general ambiguity regarding the Umarian era still informs the
transmission of oral data. In Nioro, for example, public reference to the
suicide of Muntaga Tal is socially unacceptable, and many informants asked
that their sessions remain unrecorded and confidential. In the villages around
Nioro as well, informants asked me not to tape the session.

In addition to embarrassment, the reluctance to speak about the iaamadn
ahdiina involves respect for Cemo Hadi Tal, the leader of the Tijarriyya
community of western Mali. Cemo Hadi is the grandson of Muntaga who moved
to Nioro in the 19505. He welcomed my research, but stated that he personally
knew nothing about the past since he was occupied with religious issues.54
Cemo Hadi’s reputation clearly rests on his scholarship in the Islamic sciences,
but many informants stated that his descent from Muntaga also was a factor in
his rise to religious authority in Nioro. Cemo Hadi’s religious authority is
rooted in history, and he clearly has a vested interest in public memory of the

23
past. Although he did not initiate public readings of the Arabic chronicle of
the holy war, he encourages the practice. Cemo Hadi also discourages
references to Muntaga’s death, since suicide is not accepted in the Muslim
tradition.55 His interest in the past, therefore, is to divert attention from the
indiscretions of Muntaga and focus on the heritage of the holy war which
reinforces the leadership of the Tal family.

In addition to a narrow focus on the holy war, Cerno Hadi encourages the
consolidation of a dissident tradition regarding the last words uttered by
Shaykh Umar. The tradition, as transmitted in western Mali, states that Umar
appointed Muntaga, Bassiru and several other sons to governorships in Karta at
a gathering of the Tal family at Degembere in 1864.56 Degembere is a
settlement to the east of the inland Niger delta where Umar retreated and
eventually died after a major defeat in Masina. The tradition of Muntaga’s
appointment by Sham Umar circulated in Karta well before the arrival of
Cerno Hadi in Nioro; members of Muntaga’s court probably were among the
first to recount the tradition.57 Nevertheless, it presently is added as the final
episode in most public accounts of Umar’s holy war.58 The focus away from
the period of Umarian consolidation and the emphasis on the dissident
tradition of Umar’s appointments combine to create a revisionist history of the
jaamammL—diina in western Mali.

While Muntaga and his descendants have influenced the transmission of
oral data in western Mali, their efforts should not lead to the conclusion that
the oral traditions should be discarded as sources for historical reconstruction.
The politics of the oral evidence mirrors the efforts of Amadu Sheku, who tried
to create a written tradition of his reign and clearly dominated historical

discourse in the Arabic materials. In both instances, the historian must subject

24
the materials to careful analysis. For the oral materials, the existence of
various collections of oral data gathered over time facilitates the critical
analysis of the transmission of oral data in western Mali.59 In addition to
materials collected by early twentieth century officials and late twentieth
century researchers, nineteenth century French explorers and colonial officials
transmitted oral data in their accounts, providing a firm basis for the critical

analysis of the local oral historiography.

French materials

The French materials include official correspondence and reports contained
in the WWW (ANS). WW
(ANM) and WM (ANFSOM).
The. most. informative official materials were written by French officials who
served in the permanent posts of Medine and Bakel in the Senegal valley. The
post at Kita, after its establishment in 1881, also produced quite a bit of
material concerning Umarian Karta. The post at Medine bordered the Kartan
province of Jomboxo, and its officials were in contact with Umarians from
Konyakary throughout the late nineteenth century. Bakel was on one of the
major migration routes which linked the Senegal valley with Karta, and the
edmmandams saw caravans of Futanke who streamed out of the Senegal valley.
Kita lay some distance from Karta, but it was located on a trade route which
linked Nioro with the markets of the southern savanna. In addition to frling
official reports, French officials and explorers also published accounts of their

experiences in the Senegal valley and Western Sudan.

25

The French materials include eye-witness observations of the situation in
Umarian Karta. The first two French expeditions to Konyakary and N ioro
occurred during the mid-18605, and both missions produced written reports of
their experiences.60 These initial accounts of Umarian Karta are notable for a
direct style of communicating information: the official orthodoxy regarding the
"Tukulor Empire" had not yet influenced perceptions of Karta. While the
authors may have distrusted the intentions of their Umarian hosts, they
approached their task with an eye to gathering data on political elites whom
they considered as equals. These reports are much more valuable as historical
sources than the published account of Eugéne Mage, who provides few details of
his passage through the Kartan colonies.61

The next French mission to Umarian Karta occurred during the late 18705.
The explorer was Paul Soleillet, who visited Jomboxo and the southern
provinces of Karta on his way to Segu in 1878, and then passed through Nioro
and the Xoolimbinne valley on his return in 1879.62 His visit coincided with
increasing French interest in the commercial life of the Western Sudan, and his
perspectives reflected the heightened Franco-Umarian competition of the era.
Additionally, he did not write his own account of the mission, but left the
task to the French geographer Gabriel Gravier, who edited Soleillet’s notes and
published an account which would attract a broad audience in France. The
text of Soleillet’s account, therefore, requires careful scrutiny to discover the
degree to which Soleillet’s hostility toward the Umarians and Gravier’s editing
altered the data.63 Nevertheless, Soleillet was the last French explorer to
pass through Karta before the colonial conquest, and his account provides an

eye-witness account of Umarian Karta in the late 18705.64

26
In 1880, the French sent Joseph Gallieni to negotiate a treaty with Amadu
Sheku, and his mission resided at Nango for several months before returning
without completing the negotiations.65 Although his mission did not directly
observe the provinces of Karta, one of his officers, Camille Piétri, collected an
an oral account of the revolt of Habib and Moktar and published it in his

description of the mission.66

Piétri presents a version of the revolt which
contrasts sharply in essential details with Soleillet’s account. Since both
Soleillet and Piétri collected their versions after trips which almost overlapped
in time, the differences in their accounts point to the need to assess the data
in French sources as carefully as the oral data.67

In addition to sending missions into the interior, French officials directly
observed the activities of Umarians who visited their posts in the upper Senegal
valley. At Medine, Futanke caravans brought large amounts of grain to the
market which African merchants had established near the post. French
statistics of caravan size, composition and provenance provide a detailed glimpse
into this aspect of the economic life of the colonies. No one has worked with
these statistics with a view to reconstructing commerce and production in
Karta. Indeed, Sékéne-Mody Cissoko and Gerard Kisyeti argue that the Umarian
grain trade with Medine was insignificant.68 The present thesis uses the
economic data on the Futanke grain trade at Medine to reconstruct the variety
of activities in which the settlers engaged during the years after the conquest.

French officials also observed the movement of Futanke from the middle
Senegal valley to Karta. Their estimates of the numbers of migrants in the
caravans provide a sense of the total volume of the migration flow, but do not

form the basis for a definitive statement. The limitations relate to the fact

that many migrants did not pass near the posts of Bakel and Medine, a pattern

27
which increased during the 18805. French officials nonetheless made qualitative
statements regarding the social composition of the caravans (such as the
proportion of younger men to older men, etc.). Cemandant Soyer, who served
at Bakel for several years, provides an incisive analysis of the migration flow
based on his own observations as well as oral testimony provided by leaders of
the caravans.69

French officials at Bakel, Medine and Kita commonly passed along the
testimony from Africans who visited the posts. Their informants included
merchants, Umarian envoys and African agents whom the French sent to
Umarian Karta to gather political and economic information about the interior.
Since most French officials did not have command of any African languages,
they also employed Africans to serve as their interpreters. These employees
could exercise some control over the exchange of information at the post.
While in most cases interpreters did not consciously distort the testimony of
informants, they could influence the interpretation of the testimony.70 Since
the advancement of interpreters clearly depended upon French assessments of
their performance, the interpreters usually tried not to contradict the opinions
of. the madam. The result was that the French often left the sessions
with African informants without fully understanding the testimony. The French
correspondence from the posts to the Governor often passed along distorted
assessments of the situation in Umarian Karta.

Despite these problems, some French reports often provide glimpses into
the consolidation of power in Umarian Karta. Much of the insight came from
African merchants. Their commercial contacts gave them access to a wide
range of information, and their interests in trading in the upper Senegal valley

made them vulnerable to pressure from gammandams who forced them into

28
revealing information. The French at Bakel and Medine heard about events
from merchants who had recently passed through Karta on their way to the
Senegal valley. The edmmndams also cultivated informants from among the
merchants who resided in the upper Senegal valley. The resident merchants
served as conduits of information from itinerant traders, and funneled
information from others with whom they had contacts in the Western Sudan.

Momar J ak is an example of an African trader whom the French cultivated
for information. Jak was a gum and grain merchant at Medine who made a
fortune in the upper valley. His activities brought him into contact with
Umarian officials in Karta.71 Jak hosted the various Umarian envoys from
Karta and Segu who visited Medine or passed through the post on their way to
Saint Louis. He also had extensive contacts with Moorish gum merchants.
When the French needed information about the gum trade or political events in
Karta, they often turned to Jak. As the French expanded into the Western
Sudan, they turned to Jak and the other grain merchants at Medine for cereals.
The coincidence of interests with the French ultimately led Momar Jak to sever
his ties with the Umarians during the conquest of Karta in 1890, but not before
he had served many years as an important source of information about. economic
and political affairs in Karta.

Other sources for qualitative information about Umarian Karta were the
Umarian envoys who frequently visited the French posts during the 18605, 705
and early 805. These envoys were on diplomatic missions with specific goals,
and usually revealed only what their political superiors wanted the French to
know. During the first revolt in Karta, for example, the envoys revealed very
little about the struggle and the French remained uninformed about the conflict.
Some envoys came to establish rapport with specific eemmandanta, and their

29
conversations with the French reveal Umarian opinions of political struggles or
illuminate the attitudes of particular social groups. Since Futanke interests and
attitudes changed over time, written reports which can be dated are essential
for the reconstruction of the Umarian era.

The French also sent envoys to Karta with specific orders to obtain
information about Umarian affairs. The use of envoys increased over the
course of the late nineteenth century, as the French sought more and more
information about the "decline" of the "Tukulor Empire". In most cases, the
envoys received information which .the Umarians wanted them to report to the
French. Additionally, the envoys also felt pressure from the French to
communicate information which conformed to French expectations of the
Umarians. Nevertheless, some envoys provide valuable information about social
cleavages in Umarian Karta. These envoys often had relatives in Nioro or
Konyakary, and resided with them for an extended period. In 1883, as tensions
mounted in Umarian Karta, the envoys described the public statements and
activities of Cemo Mamadu Khayar, a leading Futanke political figure. Since
Cemo Mamadu did not leave many Arabic documents describing his political
positions, the accounts of the envoys are crucial to the reconstruction of his
activities at the time.

The testimony of African merchants, Umarian envoys and spies combine
with eye-witness observations of the French as the main sources of information
in the French materials. The analysis of the testimony and its transmission in
the late nineteenth century assists the historian in making judgments regarding
the bias and reliability of the data. Sensitivity to the interests of the
informants and the French officials serves to situate the genesis of written

documents within a context which does not differ very radically from the

30

contexts which influenced the creation of oral materials and Arabic documents.
French imperial interests emerge as clearly in the official correspondence and
travel literature as do Amadu Sheku’s imperial interests in the Arabic materials;
other interests clearly shape the transmission of oral data in western Mali. At
the same time, the French, Arabic and oral materials overlap, and comparisons
across the categories of evidence yield particularly revealing insights into the
Umarian era.

The source materials consulted in this study are not complete. Further
work in collecting oral data and in surveying the Arabic documents will yield
more data and perspectives on the past. Additionally, the distribution of data
is uneven: the 18605 are the least fully documented whereas the data increases
considerably for 18805. Nevertheless, this review of the data shows that
various perspectives are available for all periods of the Umarian past in Karta.
The ‘ historiographical emphasis on an imperial Umarian state does not describe
the Umarian experience as it is revealed in the oral and Arabic source

materials. The data clearly allow for a new synthesis of the Umarian era in

Karta.

31

Notes

1. Yves Saint-Mania W
W (Dakar 1967); AS. Kanya-Forsmcr. 1'11:
WW (Cambridge. 1969); Y. Saint-Martin. LLEnrnire
museum (Paris. 1970); B O Oloruntimehin Wake (London.
1972). References to the Tukulor Empire appear in most general surveys of
African history. See, for some recent examples, Paul Lovejoy, Immfmmatims
mjlam (Cambridge. 1983); and Mervyn Hiskett Wu

W Marion, 1984).

2. The French officer Joseph Gallieni wrote in 1880 that "the Tukulor Empire
is nothing more than the debris of [Umar’s] vast conquests with none of the
political and territorial unity which that brilliant Negro was able to achieve".
Other French military officials similarly described the decline of the "Tukulor
Empire". See, for Gallieni’ 5 statement, Kanya-Forstner, W
W, p. 76. See, for other descriptions of the "Tukulor Empire",
Camille Pién'i.1&s_Etancals_au_nget (Paris. 1885). pp: :‘98'101 Henri Frey.

.110- '41 1.1 ' v.1 -\ '-r - :30 (Paris, 1888),
p. 98.

3. The text of the agreement is reproduced in Saint-Martin, LZEmpjre
W, p. 102. The emphasis is mine.

4. Saint-Martin LIEmnirerQuconlenetlafrance. pp. 130-131.

5. Kenya-Former. WM.

6. ANS 1D68: Bamako, 11 and 14 February 1883, Ct. Sup. to the Governor; and
ANF.SOM SEN.IV 77a: "Rapport sur la campagne, 1882-83" (relevant discussion
appears in the section marked "instructions").

7. WW Boileve expressed hope for an alliance with Muntaga.
ANS 1D68: Kayes, 3 July 1883, Ct. Sup. to the Governor, ANF.SOM SEN.IV
79bis: Saint Louis, 8 August 1884, "Rapport du campagne, 1883- 84".

8. See, for example, Jacques Meniaud,
MW. 2 Volumes (Paris. 1931)

9- Kanytt-Forstner. W. pp. 47ff. 76ff.

10. On numerous occasions when I was in Bamako in 1986, Malian intellectuals
told me that Umar’s conquest and the period of the "Tukulor Empire" dissipated
the resistance forces which the Malians could have employed against the French
conquest. I also was informed that this opinion is shared by the Traore regime:
no one sings the praises of Shaykh Umar Tal on the occasions when the Malian
state celebrates its pre-colonial heritage.

32

11. Perhaps the most prominent example is Sékéne-Mody Cissoko, who wrote a
doctorat d’etat on the pre-colonial history of the upper Senegal state of Xasso.
He recently decided to publish the thesis in two parts. The first volume, and
the only one to appear to date, stops Xasso’s history at 1854, with Umar Tal’s
holy war. One hopes that the second part of his doctorat d’etat, in which he
discusses the Umarian conquest and its impact on Karta, will appear shortly.
The implication in his decision, however, is that the Umarian era signals a
break with the pre-colonial past and is a prelude to the French conquest. See
Cissoko, "Contribution a l’histoire politique des royaumes du Khasso dans le
Haut-Senegal des origines a la conquete francaise (XVIIe-1890)", Universite de
Paris, doctorat d’ état. 1979. with CissokO. LiHrstmmmhnquednfiamdmm
WM (Paris, 1986). A review of the final theses
presented at the Ecole Normale Supérieure in Bamako reveals that many Malians
end their historical analysis of the pre-colonial era with Shaykh Umar’ s holy
war. See, for example, the memoires de fin 'd’études of Mamadu Diawara and
Ibrahima Barry.

12. David Robinson,
Midltl'meteenthflenm (Oxford, 1985).

13. Richard Roberts, a, ' .
EmmaLtheMrddleNigerlalleLlllKl-JfllMStanford. 1987) P 2

14. Roberts wanictsLMerahantsandfilms. pp. 129-130.

15. See, for an example of the type of textual analysis that is required, John
Hanson, "Historical writing in nineteenth century Segu: a critical analysis of an
anonymous Arabic chronicle", W 12 (1985).

16. See, for an excellent analysis of the historical metaphors in an Arabic
chronicle, Murray Last, "Historical metaphors in the Kano Chronicle", Him
Africa 9 (1980)

17. Many historians in the 19605 and early 19705 made the error of assuming
that oral traditions were equivalent to first-hand accounts.

18. Joseph Miller, "The dynamics of Oral Tradition in Africa", in mm
ed. by B. Bemardi, C. Ponti and A. Triulzi (Milan, 1978). See also his

introduction 1n MW edited by J. Miller (Hamden, 1980).

19. Africanist anthropologists have argued that contemporaneous social and
political forces alter the representation of the past in oral societies, thereby
rendering much historical analysis difficult. See, for example, Ian Cunnison,
"History and genealogies in a conquest state" WW5;

(1959); T. O. Beidelman, "Myth, legend and oral history ,Amhmpga 65 (1970);
Roy Willis, "The literalist fallacy and the problem of oral tradition", Seeial

Amlysis no. 4 (1980).

20. David Henige offers some useful suggestions for managing the process of
data collection 1n W (London, 1982).

21. David Robinson examines this issue in W, pp. 35-42.

 

33

22. Many may be familiar with this extensive Arabic collection as the "Fonds
Archinard". Scholars of West African Islam already have tapped its holdings of
rehgious texts, and historians have worked with the correspondence and
chronicles related to Umar Tal’s holy war.

23. Most of these documents are in the 15G (Western Sudan) series, but an
important group of materials is filed in the 9G (Mauritania) series. David
Robinson brought the 9G materials to my attention.

24. More work remains to be done with the Arabic materials. The documents
concerning Karta are scattered throughout the BN and ANS dossiers. I worked
with two indices to selected dossiers in the two collections. A valuable index
to the Arabic materials from Segu in the BN was published recently.
Noureddine Ghali et_aL. WW (PariS.
1985). David Robinson allowed me to use his personal index to some of the
dossiers in the ANS ISG series. He has not published that index.

25. The Massassi and the Umarians generally collected the taxes in the field
at harvest, and did not record the assessment. The Umarians also retained the
Massassi tolls on commercial caravans. Both of them charged one-tenth the
value of the caravan traffic in the region, but the Umarians called their toll
115511111, a term derived from Luann; (Arabic for "one tenth").

26. Umarian agents also collected tolls annually on the passage of caravan
traffic through Karta, but records of these transactions do not appear in any
Arabic materials from the region. Tax records and lists of villages from
Umarian Karta during the early 18705 are scattered throughout BN.MO.FA. 5713.
Tax records for the late 18805 are in ANS 15678: pieces 49-51, 61, 79, 80.
Among the tax records are letters of introduction for Fudi Khalila, who was
one of Amadu’ 5 tax collectors in the early 18705. He also served as Amadu’ 5
agent at Medine, the Senegal valley post closest to the Umarian territories.
The French mention Fudi Khalila in ANS 156111: Medine, Mammal,
2815261877. See, for Khalila’ 5 letters of introduction, BN. MO. FA. 5713 fos. 1,11,

27. French translations of the Kaba Jakite chronicle have been published by
Mamice Delafosse and MG. Adam. My surveys in Nioro did not uncover a copy
of the document in Arabic. "Traditions historiques et legendaires du Soudan
occidental par Maurice Delafosse". Bulletin_du_Cnmit§_d1Afrinue_Erancaise.
Rensergnementsfiolonlaux nos 8-10 (1913); MG Adam. Mmdeshlstnnnuem
mmemcmrsahelr (Paris. 1904)

28. Arab travellers referred to the state of Wagadu as "Ghana". See, for an
analysis of the historical literature on Wagadu/Ghana and a brief discussion of
the Kaba Jakite chronicle, David Conrad and Humphrey Fisher, "The conquest
that never was: OGhSMSEi and the Almoravids, 1076.11: the local oral sources",
Histontr'nAftisal (1 )

The Kaba Jakite are a Soninke clerical family whose founder lived in
Bundu before joining Umar’s holy war. See, for an historical account of the
founder of the Kaba Jakite clerical family, Tiébile Dramé, "Alfa Umar Kaba
Jaxite, fondateur de Kabala, marabout et conseiller de Siixumaru Tal (al-Hajj
Umar)".1slam.et.$nci§tés_au$ud_dll_$ahmno 2 (1988)

34

29. El Hadj Sadiku Kaba Jakite, the current imam of the mosque at Nioro,
does not possess a copy of the document, although he remembered that his
grandfather and grandfather’s brethers produced the document over the course
of the late nineteenth century. It is possible that sections of the Kaba Jakite
chronicle were produced in Segu: Fode Buyagi Kaba Jakite, the imam of the
mosque at Nioro during the 18705 and Sadiku’s grandfather, resided with Amadu
Sheku at Segu for several years during the late nineteenth century.

30. Cemo Yahya did not want me to microfilm the chronicle, but he allowed
me to tape him as he read it. The taping session occurred at Cemo Yahya’s
compound at Konyakary on 9 February 1986.

31. Demba Sadio was gravely ill when I visited Konyakary in February, 1986,
and I was unable to interview him. He is acknowledged by everyone in the
region to be the most knowledgeable oral historian about the Umarian period in
Jomboxo. I have consulted David Robinson’s interview with Demba Sadio Diallo
on 12 September 1976. Robinson’s interview focused primarily on the period of
Umar’s conquest and not the aftermath in Jomboxo.

32. I develop this argument at length below in the section on oral materials.

33. I have yet to find any correspondence written by the Umarian leaders in
Karta, Mustafa, the leader at Nioro, and Samba Mody, the leader at Konyakary.
Mustafa received at least one letter from Amadu Sheku during this period; it
concerns a minor affair. ANS 15678: piece 5.

34. .Adam, IggendeLhistmjgues, p. 111. El Hadj Sadiku Kaba Jakite asked me
about Umar’s letters of instruction when I spoke with him in 1986. He said
that the French took all the Arabic materials from the palace at Nioro, and
wondered whether I had found the letters during the course of my work with
the Arabic materials in Dakar and Paris. El Hadj Sadiku was particularly
interested in a letter from Umar which nominated his great grandfather, Umar
Kaba Jakite, to serve as the first imam of the mosque. I have found only one
letter from Shaykh Umar to Mustafa. It is in Amadu Sheku’s Segovian archive
and concerns a minor political affair. BN.MO.FA., 5721, fo. 91.

35. The treaty which he negotiated never was ratified but served to define the
working relationship in the upper Senegal valley for a good portion of the late
nineteenth century. See, for these negotiations and Franco-Umarian relations

in the early 18608 Yves Saint-Martin. W PP 91-
110.

36. Amadu did receive a judicial ruling or {ma concerning his succession as
Commander of the Faithful, but this document probably was written in Segu
before he left to confront his brothers. BN.MO.FA. 5561 fos. 66-69.

37. Uthman Kusa is known in the Arabic documents as Uthman b. Muhammad
of Dara Labe in Futa Jalon Uthman Kusa’s collections include prayers offered
to God prior to the battle, descriptions of the victory and poems in praise of
Amadu Sheku. See, for the Kejje victory, BN.MO.FA. 5716, fos. 42-44. See, for
the Gemukura victory, BN.MO.FA. 5640, fos. 25-44. See also, for the Gemukura
campaign, BN.MO.FA. 5689, fos. 97-98; 5713, fos. 37-38, 124.

35

38. See, for an analysis of the historical materials related to Umar’s holy war,
Robinson. W81. PP- 946-

39. Muntaga’s correspondence is in BN.MO.FA. 5737, fo. 51; ANS
15668/Chemise spéciale: pieces a,b,i; 15678: pieces 4 and 5; 15680/2: piece 149;
15680/3: pieces 4 and 114; 15680/4: pieces 25 and 96. Cerno Mamadu’s
correspondence includes the documents in BN.MO.FA. 5737, fos. 57, 62.

40. Moorish notables complained to Amadu Sheku about Muntaga in BN.MO.FA.,
5713, fo. 186. Cemo Mamadu Khayar’s activities elicited quite a few letters to
Amadu. See BN.MO.FA. 5680, fos. 157 and 168; 5737, fos. 50 and 61. Cerno
Abu Bakr b. Alfa Sa‘id was a supporter of Amadu, and his correspondence with
Segu was voluminous. See ANS 15668/Chemise speciale: pieces c,d,e,f,g,k,l;
15679: piece 146; 15680/1: pieces 130, 131, 132, 133, 134, 135.

41. Some materials from Madani’s tenure at Segu are located in ANS 15676/4
and 15680/1.

42. ANS 15678: pieces 6, 69, 92, 95; 15679: piece 156.
43. The letters are scattered throughout ANS 9639, 15679 and 15680.

44. These letters include ANS 15670: pieces 28, 37, 40; 15678: pieces 91 and
110; 15680/2: pieces 83 and 139; 15680/3: piece 29; 15680/4: piece 122.

45. Colonel Archinard sent letters to Umarian notables in Nioro in hopes of
getting them to ally with the French. The originals can be found in ANS
15679: pieces 120-130. French translations appear in ANS 15676: piece 54.
None of the notables to whom Archinard wrote joined the French.

46. E. Blane, "Contribution a l’étude des populations et de l’ histoire de Sahel
soudanais",Bl 1. 1011.811" ,0..." .1119; I ‘

7 (1924); I include Adam in this category, since his
translation of the Kaba Jakite chronicle draws upon oral data from informants
in Nioro: M.6. Adam, Legendesfistmjgues; I also include the oral traditions
provided by Agibu Tal, who was the Umarian leader at Dingiray during the
18805: A. de Loppinot, "Souvenirs d’Aguibou", 311W

 

' .' 2 (1919).

47. ANM 1D51: "Etude sur le canton de Kaarta-Soninke par Luciani", "Etude
sur le canton de Foulankes-Kaartankes par J. Tisserant", "Etude sur le canton
des Diawaras par J. Tisserant", "Etude sur le canton des Peuls Rangabe par J.
Tisserant", "Etude sur le canton de Kingi-Oulof par J. Tisserant", "Etude sur le
canton des Toucouleurs de Boundou par J. Bertin". All these studies were
written in 1954.

48. The most relevant Robinson interviews are with Bougouboly Alfa Makki Tal
at Bandiagara on 19 and 20 August 1976, with Demba Sadio Diallo at Konyakary
on 12 September 1976, and with Lamine Bassirou Tal at Kayes on 13 September
1976. The relevant Dantioko interview is with Djammé Tounkara and Sadio
Sakhone at Balle in June 1980. Robinson and Dantioko allowed me to consult
their transcriptions of the interviews.

36

49. Diallo’s material includes the testimony of his father, Mamadou Alfa Diallo,
and his uncle, Bassirou Alfa Diallo, both of whom narrated very detailed
accounts of the Iggd and of the political conflicts in Karta. Mamadou and
Bassirou resided in Gavinane, the major Fulbe settlement of contemporary
western Mali. Their father, Alfa Idris Diallo, was a prominent 10113ij or
migration leader of the late nineteenth century. Alfa Idris was the dadi or
Muslim judge at Sambagoré, the major Fulbe settlement of the period. The
openness and clarity of Mamadou and Bassirou Diallo’s testimony contrasted
noticeably with the testimony of Abdoul Aziz Diallo’s other informants as well
as many of my own informants. Both Mamadou and Bassirou have since
deceased. Abdoul Aziz Diallo allowed me to consult his materials.

50. Amadou Ba is the great grandson of Woulibou Ba, an important Fulbe
leader who participated in Shaykh Umar’s conquest of Karta. Woulibou then
accompanied him to Segu in 1859.

51. Amadou served as a teacher in the secondary school in Nioro and then as
the mayor of Nioro.

52. Amadou Ba, "Connaissance de la Commune de Nioro-du-Sahel."

53 Marty. WWW. Volume 4 (PariS. 1921);
Saint-Martin,L1Em_pi_re_tdneQn_le_ur. The Arabic chronicle often was a copy of
an anonymous document which other researchers have found in private libraries
in Senegal and the inland Niger delta of Mali. The chronicle probably was
compiled in Segu sometime between 1874 and 1884. See, for an analysis of the
anonymous Arabic chronicle, Hanson, "Historical writing in nineteenth century Segu".

54. I had a letter of introduction for Cemo Hadi from Cemo Muntaga Tal, the
leader of the Tij aniyya community in Dakar. David Robinson, who has worked
with Cemo Muntaga, introduced me to him in Dakar. Cemo Hadi asked his
son, Amadou Cerno, to assist me. Amadou Cemo kindly provided me with
accounts of the holy war which he had recorded over the years.

55. Abdoul Aziz Diallo also noted the refusal to talk about the suicide of
Muntaga in Nioro.

56. Dantioko’s informants from Balle, a region farther east and influenced by
the historical traditions of Masina, state that it was Umar’s cousin, Amadu
Tijani, who turned to Amadu Sheku after Umar died and prophesied that his
brothers would hold power in Karta. Amadu Tijarri was the Umarian leader who
consolidated power at Bandiagara after Umar’s death at Degembere.

57. The first French emnmandam to reside at Konyakary, Lt. Valentin,
collected oral materials regarding the Umarian era in Karta. Hi5 report notes
that Muntaga was governor of Nioro at the time of Umar’s death. ANM 1D108:
Konyakary, 10 October 1890, Lt. Valentin, "Diombokho et itineraires a Nioro".

58. I did not notice the dissident tradition in the texts of any of the Arabic
chronicles in western Mali.

37

59. See Chapter Six for a critical analysis of the written and oral materials
related to the first revolt.

60. ANS 156109: Medine, 22 January 1865, Ct. Medine to Ct. Bakel. This
report was published as M. Andre, "Excursion a Koniakari", mm;
W nos. 465- 467 (1865); ANS 136169: Bakel, 4 March
1865, M. Perraud to Ct. Bakel. This report was published as "Rapport de M.
Perraud sur un voyage a Niom" . WWW nos.
488-489 (1865).

61. Mage’ 5 account provide invaluable details about the situation in Segu.

Eugene Mage.loyage_dansle_s_olldm_ocsrdental_(18_63_6)(Pans 1868)

62. Paul Soleillet,
WWW (Paris, 1.887)

63. See Chapter Six for an analysis of Gravier’s role as an editor.

64. Other missions went into the interior, but few actually travelled into
Karta. The only exception is the 1883 mission of Dr. Bayol. Both Soleillet and
Bayol were proponents of French expansion, and self-consciously described the
economic potential of the Western Sudan with a view towards convincing
reluctant officials of French interests in the region. Soleillet had more
sympathy for his Umarian informants than Bayol, but both viewed the Umarians
as obstacles to French expansion. See, for an example of Bayol’s attitudes,

"Une excursion au pays de Mourdia par M. Bayol", WM
Wnos. 1481-1486(1884).

65. Joseph Gallieni, ' H - 1
1312-31 (Paris, 1885).

66. Piétri. W
67. I subject the two accounts to careful data analysis in Chapter Six.

68. Sékéné-Mody Cissoko, "Contribution a l’histoire politique des royaumes du
Khasso", pp. 640-44; 6. Kisyeti, "Recherches sur le commerce dans l’empire
toucouleur," Université. de Dakar, memoire de mainise, 1980. They make their
assessment of the Umarian grain n‘ade based on a review of the sparse data in
ANS dossiers. The detailed statistical data from Medine, however, appears in
the ANM and ANF.SOM dossiers.

69. Governor Briere de l’Isle passed along Commandant Soyer’s reports to the
Minister of Colonies. ANF.SOM SEN.I 61c: Saint Louis, 22 March and 5 June
1878, Governor to the Minister.

70. In some instances, African employees actively shaped the information to
serve their interests in career advancement. The example of the interpreter
Alfa Sega suggests the kind of interests which some personnel had in the flow
of information. He worked at Bakel and Medine during the 18705 and 18805,
both as a scribe and a translator for their Arabic correspondence. Alfa Sega’s
career took an upward rise with the French expansion into the Western Sudan:

 

38

be accompanied several French missions into the Western Sudan during the early
18808 and then served with W during the conquest of the
late 1880s. His anti-Futanke sentiments were widely reported, and reflect his
interest in gaining and retaining French confidence in his loyalty. His rise
through the service also shows how his interests mirrored French interests in
territorial expansion. His role as a translator placed him in a position to delete
passages from correspondence and shape French impressions of Umarian hostility
toward them. Africans who occupied similar positions may have reinforced the
Franco-Umarian rivalry to serve their careers.

71. Jak married a daughter of Amadu Sheku.

CHAPTER TWO

Umar Tal’s Holy War and the Umarian Successor State in Karta

As Paul Soleillet travelled through a sparsely inhabited region of the
Western Sudan in the late nineteenth century, one of his guides pointed to
several large stones which ran along the boundary between Karta and Segu.1
Prior to Umar Tal’s holy war, the Bambara regimes in Karta and Segu were
mortal enemies which had fought numerous battles and conducted countless raids
into the frontier zone where Soleillet was u'avelling.2 During the early
nineteenth century, one Segovian leader marched deep into Karta, won a
decisive victory over the armies of the Kartan regime and marked the
boundary between the two Bambara states with the stones which Soleillet’s
guide noted.3 The Umarian conquest did not alter the boundary, and the stones
remained in place to mark the frontier between the Umarian successor states in
Karta and Segu during the late nineteenth century.

Despite Umar’s vision of a united West African Miami, he failed to
consolidate the conquered territories into an imperial state, and his followers in
Karta and Segu resurrected the heated conflicts of the previous era shortly
after his death.4 Amadu Sheku of Segu, Umar’s successor as the Commander

39

40

of the Faithful, tried to force the Umarians in Karta to acknowledge his
authority over their affairs. When the Umarians in Karta resisted, Amadu led
his armies into Karta. Twice he marched into Karta, and in both instances his
status as the Commander of the Faithful divided the resistance and helped his
armies defeat the challenge. Military victories proved much easier to obtain
then political unity, and Amadu failed in his attempts to create an imperial
Umarian state in the Western Sudan.5

Nonetheless, most historians emphasize the imperial dimension of Umarian
history. They credit Umar Tal with the creation of a "Tukulor Empire" and
blame Amadu Sheku for its decline.6 This concern leads to an emphasis on
Amadu’s interests and actions, and consequently diverts attention from Umarian
moves to consolidate an autonomous state in Karta during the 1850s and 1860s.
Immediately after Umar’s conquest of the Massassi Bambara state in Karta, he
made Nioro, the former Massassi capital, a central place in a hierarchy of
Umarian garrisons in Karta. Mustafa Keita, Umar’s appointee as the leader of
Nioro during the 18603, consolidated Nioro’s position as a center of Umarian.
power in Karta, and extended his control over all the regions formerly within
the Massassi state. By the time Amadu Sheku turned from consolidating power
in Segu to establishing his authority over the Western Sudan, Mustafa and the
Futanke in Karta had succeeded in creating an autonomous state in Karta. The
post-conquest era in Umarian politics, therefore, was not a time of "imperial
decline", but an era of political competition among Umarian political leaders.
This chapter focuses on the emergence of an Umarian state in Karta, analyzing
the Massassi state, the Umarian conquest, and the actions of Mustafa and the

Futanke of Karta as they consolidated power in the 1860s.

41

I] ll .1 . K 7

During the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, Massassi
lineages fled from a civil war in Segu and settled among Soninke groups living
in the Sahelian area known as Karta. As the Massassi expanded their control
over other areas in the Western Sudan, the indigenous inhabitants began to
refer to them as the Bambara from Karta.8 Historians went one step further,
and commonly use Karta to refer to the entire region in which the Massassi
Bambara consolidated power. I will follow these conventions and use Karta to
refer to the large geographical entity in which the Massassi Bambara established
control. In order to avoid confusion, when I need to refer specifically to the
"original Karta" (1,9,, the traditional Soninke region), I will speak of "the
Massassi heartland" since this region initially received the Massassi and
remained an area of extensive Massassi settlement in the nineteenth century.

. At its apogee in mid-nineteenth century, the Massassi state in Karta
encompassed communities in a region bounded by the Saharan desert-side in the
north, the Senegal River in the west, the upper Senegal and its tributaries in
the south, and the buffer zones separating the Massassi state from the Bambara
state of Segu in the southeast and the Fulbe state of Masina in the west. The
region lay at the center of north-south trade routes which linked the desert-
side with the savanna, and east-west routes running between the markets of the
upper Senegal and middle Niger valleys. The climate was Sahelian, receiving
small amounts of rainfall which supported agricultural communities but favored
the production of livestock. The subject populations of the Massassi state were
heterogeneous, and spoke one or more of the following languages: Soninke,

Bambara, Mandinka and Pulaar (Fulfulde).

 

10

42

 

 

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1b., 4 .lloro
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FIGUREA

The Western Sudan in the Nineteenth Century

43

 

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m may—DOE

aununacox .

44

The Gidiyumme and Jomboxo hills ran through the heart of the Massassi
state, forming an axis which divided the northern regions of Karta into two
distinct environments: a well-watered region of marshes and river valleys in
the north-west and a dry plateau to the north-east.9 The Xoolimbinne River
flowed westward out of the hills and joined the Senegal River near Medine. Its
valley provided a corridor for trade with both the desert-side and the Niger
River. The valleys of the Xoolimbinne and its tributaries maintained high
moisture levels during the first months of the dry season, due to the magnitude
of the rainy season run-offs from the eastern hills. Consequently the farmers
of the valleys were able to plant and harvest a second crop in the flood plain,
ensuring grain surpluses even during years when the rainy season crop failed.
Soninke groups inhabited the provinces of the northern Xoolimbinne: Jafunu,
Gidiyumme and Kanyareme. 10 Soninke and Mandinka-speaking populations lived
in Jomboxo.11

In northeastern Karta, on the plateau, the climate and terrain favored
extensive livestock production. The J awara, Soninke agriculturalists who lived
in Kingi, raised the Barb horse, a species particularly favored by the cavalrymen
of West Africa.12 Fulbe groups specialized in raising cattle, which they herded
in well-defined north-south corridors running from the desert-side to the Baule
River. During the rainy season, the herders camped in semi-permanent camps in
the north of Karta where they exchanged milk and cattle for agricultural
products produced by local farmers. The Fulbe Jawaambe spent the rainy
seasons of the early nineteenth century at Karaharo, a village located in
southern Kingi.13 Fulbe Kartanke lineages also camped in southern Kingi, but
most lineages stopped in the Xoolimbinne valley or in the Massassi heartland.
The Wolaarbe, the last major group of Fulbe in Karta, camped in eastern Kingi

45
and Bakunu. While some Fulbe leaders looked to the Fulbe regime in Masina
for leadership, most Fulbe were integrated into the Massassi state. 14

The northern boundary of the Massassi state ran along the ecological
divide separating the Saharan desert-side from the Sahel. To the north, in the
region known as the Hodh, Moorish groups raised camels, horses, cattle and
small livestock. Most of the Moors were transhumant, following north-south
itineraries which brought them into the northern provinces of Bakunu. Kingi,
Kanyareme and Jafunu during the hot, dry seasons of the later pre-colonial era.
This contact allowed for annual inter-zonal economic activity, particularly
exchanges of Soninke millet and cloth for Moorish livestock, dairy products and
dates.15 Saharan salt also moved into the Sahel via these exchanges.16 These
dry season activities were mirrored during the rainy season by reciprocal
exchanges between the Fulbe and the Soninke, whereby they shared the fruits
of the rainy season, milk and millet.

The south was inhabited largely by Mandinka and Bambara groups. These
farmers lived in villages in which the authority of political leaders did not
extend much beyond the village itself. An exception were the Mandinka in the
southwest, who were organized into a large, eighteenth century state by the
Xassonke.17 At its height, the Xassonke state included the densely populated
Mandinka province of Tomora, the Soninke regions of Sorma, Tringa and
Jomboxo, and the multitude of small Mandinka communities albn g the upper
Senegal River. The northern regions of the Xassonke state fell under Massassi
domination in the early nineteenth century, and the populations along the upper
Senegal felt the ravages of Massassi raids. The Mandinka in the south and
southeast who had not been organized into a state suffered from constant

Bambara raiding throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The

46
southeast in particular was an arena of conflict between the Massassi and the
Bambara of Segu, who competed for influence in the region.

The Massassi heartland lay in the center of Karta. It did not possess the
Open plateau of Kingi and Bakunu, the river system of the northwestern
provinces nor the relatively abundant rainfalls of the southerly zones.
Nevertheless, the region served as the initial locus and continuing base of
power for the Massassi Bambara. It was here that the Massassi first settled
and formed alliances with Soninke lineages in the province. As the Massassi
knit the regions of the north and south into a social formation, members of the
Massassi clan settled outside of the province, in Jomboxo, Gidiyumme and Kingi,
but the Massassi heartland remained the largest single region of Massassi
settlement. The process of Bambara expansion, of which the Massassi
colonization of Karta is an example, began much earlier in the middle Niger
valley.

During the early eighteenth century, Bambara groups in Segu, led by
Mamari Kulibali, created the ton, a military unit modeled on the Bambara age
set.18 These units offered ambitious leaders a means by which to recruit and
organize warriors from the ranks of adventurous free men and war captives
(ton-jog or "slaves of the association"). Ionjgn recruits were particularly
attractive to military elites because their social dislocation through enslavement
made them more easily integrated into the army as loyal soldiers. 19 Their
desire for booty and enhanced status within the military also made them

ambitious warriors.20

The Kulibali rode the military successes of tom-jog
warriors to power in Segu, placing successful major} soldiers at the head of
their own battalions and in administrative positions throughout the state. The

power and influence of the ton-jog warriors grew with every military campaign,

47
however, and a ton-jog leader seized power in the vacuum created by a mid-
eighteenth century civil war among the Kulibali. The Massassi, members of the
Kulibali clan, fled the civil war and settled to the northwest of Segu, in the
Massassi heartland of Karta. The Massassi remained enemies of the new
regime in Segu throughout the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.

The Massassi used the major; military institution to acquire power in
their new home. They balanced raids and warfare with offers of alliances to
Soninke lineages willing to join their raiding parties.21 After gaining power in
the Massassi heartland, they were able to establish tributary relations over
Soninke and Fulbe groups in Bakunu, Kingi, Kanyareme. Jafunu and
Gidiyumme.22 To the south, in regions of Mandinka and Bambara settlement,
ton-jot) regiments attached a southern fringe to the state, but they rarely I
created formal relations with indigenous elites as in the north; the southern
communities surrendered whatever the armies requested during annual military
campaigns or risked being enslaved instead.23 To the west, during the early
nineteenth century, the Massassi invaded the Xassonke state and, through a
combination of military intervention and political alliance with one of the four
ruling Xassonke lineages, incorporated the northern provinces of Xasso into the
Massassi state.

Warfare played an important role in the structure of the state as well as
its geographic expansion. The need to reward military leaders and their
followers forced the Massassi to conduct wars or at least authorize raiding for
booty.24 Successive Massassi rulers supervised the expansion of the state in
fairly regular intervals, suggeSting a pattern whereby every new generation of
princes, war leaders and soldiers pushed for wars of expansion.25 Once local

groups agrwd to surrender a set amount of millet, cattle or cloth to a Massassi

48

prince or a Lon-jog leader, however, continued warfare in the region ran
counter to the interests of those who received the tribute. Consequently,
Massassi leaders directed the military campaigns of subordinate leaders and their
followers to the southern regions of the state where the communities never
entered into formal relations with the Kartan state. The pattern of political
arrangements and raiding led to a division of Karta into a northern region,
where the Massassi and their armies settled, taxed the local populations but did
not raid for slaves, and a region of predation in the south where ambitious war
leaders conducted raids to increase their wealth and military standing.

The Massassi preference for concluding political arrangements in the north
related to their need to establish alliances with commercial groups which
offered military hardware, luxury items and salt in exchange for the slaves
produced by the military apparatus. The major commercial groups of the
western Sahel were Soninke families with connections to the Muslim trading
diasporas of the Senegal and Niger River basins and the desert-side. These
commercial families lived among communities of Soninke farmers in the northern
and western regions of the Massassi state.26 The commercial elites willingly
entered into relations with the Massassi warriors, both to ensure a source of
slaves and to direct the raids of the state elsewhere. Consequently, the
interests of the Massassi and their Soninke commercial allies led to the creation
of a social formation in which northern commercial and military groups lived in
symbiotic relations with each other, and in parasitic relations with the
communities of the south.

The Massassi elite also exploited their strategic position at the center of a
network of trade-routes connecting the salt and gum producing centers of the

Saharan fringe with the markets along the Niger and Senegal Rivers. A major

49
salt axis ran from the Ijil salt mines through Tishit and on to the middle Niger
markets at Nyamina and Sinsani. A secondary commercial axis ran from Tishit
directly south to the upper Niger markets at Bamako and Kankan. The major
gum routes connected the Hodh, a major region of gum production, with the
upper Senegal males of Bakel and Makana via the northern provinces of the
Massassi state. The Massassi collected payments, in return for safe passage,
from both the caravan leaders and, in some cases, the commercial groups who

27

received the merchandise. In the early nineteenth century, the judgement

that the Massassi tolls were excessive discouraged extensive Saint Louisian
investment in the upper valley gum trade.28

The constituent populations within Karta also bristled at Massassi taxation
policies. Local traditions assert that the Massassi changed the terms of their
rule in the early nineteenth century, asking for a larger (proportional) amount
of harvests or herds instead of a fixed tribute. 29 The Jawara keenly felt the
decline in their revenues because the new taxes fell at a time when they joined
Massassi military campaigns less and less frequently. In the 1840’s, the Jawara
revolted against the Massassi, and then drew the fighting out over several
years. The Massassi ruler at the time, Mamadi Kanja, finally defeated the
Jawara and then moved his capital to Nioro in Kingi as a sign of Massassi
intent to keep the Jawara subdued. While Mamadi Kanja’s victory buoyed his
confidence, it also increased resentment of Bambara domination among the
Jawara and other groups in the Massassi state.

Umar Tal played upon these resentrnents as his armies moved through the
heart of the Massassi state and toppled Mamadi Kanja from his throne. By the
time Umar marched victoriously into Nioro, he counted in his camp most of the

leading Soninke, Fulbe and Xassonke groups of western and northern Karta

50
Umar also brought numerous followers from Senegambian societies, some of
whom eventually settled in Kingi and Jomboxo. The descendants of some of
these colonists still live in northwestern Mali today, and remember the holy war
as the most dramatic event of the immediate precolonial era. While the
conquest of Karta certainly altered the lives of Umar’s followers, the question
remains whether the holy war and the Senegambian colonization significantly
transformed the patterns of social domination which the Massassi had imposed

inKarta.

W

Umar Tal was a Muslim from Futa Toro in the middle Senegal valley. His
decision to lead his fellow Senegambians in a holy war against the societies and
states of the Western Sudan occurred after his pilgrimage (hajj) to Mecca and a
lengthy residence at Sokoto, the capital of the Muslim state created through
the holy war of Uthman dan Fodio, a Fulbe reformer of the early nineteenth
century. After Umar’s return to the Western Sudan, he established a residence
in Futa Jallon, a Fulbe state in the hills of today’s Guinea. After gaining a
following of Fulbe from this state as well as his former home of Futa Toro,
Sham Umar moved his growing community to Dingiray in Tamba, a Mandinka
kingdom which neighbored Futa Jallon. He continued to recruit Fulbe from the
two Futas, and strained relations with the King of Tamba who had welcomed
Umar initially. In 1852, Tamban-Umarian relations reached a point where Umar
declared a holy war against the "pagan" ruling elite of Tamba. For the next
two years, Umar led his followers in a conquest of the other small Mandinka
and Soninke politics of the upper Senegal valley, and then moved into the Fulbe

 

l0

 

51

 

FIGURE C
The Umarian Conquests, 1852-1864

52
state of Bundu. Shaykh Umar became dominant over the Fulbe elite of Bundu
and, by late 1854, demanded and received the submission of the Fulbe elite in
Futa Toro.

Umar’s position in the upper Senegal allowed him to recruit additional
Fulbe soldiers from Futa Toro and Bundu for the extension of his holy war into
Karta, which he initiated in January, 1855. His troops engaged their first
Bambara regiment at Xolu, near the mouth of the Xoolimbinne River, where
they defeated the Bambara decisively.30 Umar passed through the vacant
Massassi garrison at Segala, and camped at Konyakary, the former capital of
Xasso, which would become the new Umarian administrative center in the
region. As word of Umar’s victory at Xolu spread, Xassonke and Soninke
leaders in northwestern Karta submitted to Umar. Among Umar’s initial group
of supporters were the Xassonke of Sero (northern Jomboxo), the Soninke of
Gidiyumme and the Soninke of Jafunu. Some of the tonjon regiments who had
engaged the Umarians at Xolu also joined Umar’s armies as sofa.

The Soninke of Jafunu may have been involved in the planning of the
conquest, if the reminiscences of the Kaba J akite family are accurate. Umar
Kaba Jakite, a Soninke cleric from Bundu who played an important role as
advisor to Umar Tal during the holy war, was related by kinship to Soninke
lineages in Jafunu. The Kaba Jakite of Jafunu had extensive commercial
relations with their relatives in Kankan. a thriving nineteenth century trading
center in the southern savanna. The descendants of Umar Kaba Jakite
remember that, dtning Umar Tal’s brief visit to Kankan during his return from
Mecca, a distant relative met Umar Tal and told him to visit the Bundunke

31

cleric, who would give him important advice. Even informants without ties to

the Kaba Jakite family emphasize the importance of the "secret" meeting

53
between Umar Tal and Umar Kaba Jakite.32 The meeting may well have allowed
the transfer of information about Massassi strength and local discontent to
Umar Tal. Whether or not Umar Kaba Jakite played an intermediary role before
the holy war, he and his sons were an important link between the Umarian
community and Jafunu’s commercial families in the post-conquest period.33

With the assistance of the Soninke of Jafunu and Gidiyumme, the Umarian
armies followed their victory at Xolu with two dramatically successful sieges of
the Massassi garrisons in Gidiyumme in February, 1855. News of these victories
reverberated throughout Karta, and Umar obtained submissions from the Jawara,
the Fulbe Kartanke, the Fulbe Wolaarbe and the Jawaambe. As Umar gained
the support of most of the non-Massassi groups of northern Karta, Mamadi
Kanja, the Massassi ruler, had no choice but to submit peacefully to Umar. In
April, a short four months after Umar’s initial move into the Xoolimbinne
valley, Mamadi Kanja opened the gates of Nioro and invited the Umarian armies
to occupy his capital. Umar’s victorious march into Nioro was followed shortly
thereafter by a revolt of several Massassi lineages, who drew the Umarians into.
battle in the Massassi heartland south of Nioro. The Umarians suffered many
losses before finally putting down the challenge in late 1855. Another revolt by
some Jawara lineages broke out the following year, and the Umarian position in
Karta was not secure until the Jawara revolt was defeated at the end of 1856.

In the aftermath of the Massassi and Jawara revolts, Umar encouraged his
followers to occupy the settlements vacated by the rebels. The decision to
colonize Kingi meant that the Umarians wanted Nioro to remain the major
administrative center in Karta. Futanke and Bundunke (residents from Futa
Toro and Bundu, respectively) established a ring of villages around the capital

to serve as the first line of defense against attack. They put their war

54
captives to work cultivating millet for the large garrison of troops at Nioro. A
similar pattern of defensive settlement also emerged around the Umarian
garrison at Konyakary in Jomboxo. The colonization of Kingi and Jomboxo set
into motion the process whereby soldiers began to forsake active involvement in
the conquests and establish households in the conquered territories.

While the Umarians reinforced the garrisons at Nioro and Konyakary, Umar
marched through southern Karta in 1856-57, establishing a string of garrisons to
defend against attacks from the Bambara of Segu. As a result of Umar’s choice
to colonize the north but only to garrison the south, the Umarian occupation of
Karta resembled that of the Massassi. The addition of Karta to the earlier
Umarian acquisitions in the upper Senegal valley formed the potential basis for
an imperial Umarian state in the region. The Umarians controlled the upper
Senegal valley and its extension up the Xoolimbinne, as well as the network of
trade routes extending from the desert-side to the southern savanna, and from
Senegambia to the routes leading to the Niger River markets. Umar also
exercised influence as far west as the Fulbe regime in Futa Toro, a source of
recruits for his armies. In a sense, Umar had replaced the Massassi elite and
replicated the extent of their control at the height of their power in the early
nineteenth century.

French actions in the upper Senegal valley, however, prevented the
consolidation of an Umarian empire in the region.34 Up until 1854, the French
presence in the Senegal valley had consisted of a settlement in Saint Louis at
the mouth of the Senegal River and a few posts scattered along the river. The
French were content to dominate long-distance commerce on the river and let
Africans control their own affairs. Under the leadership of Governor

Faidherbe, however, the French expanded the scope and extent of their

55
activities in the Senegal valley, and exerted greater control over African
political affairs.

In 1855, Faidherbe established a new French post in the upper Senegal
valley at Medine, a location at the limit of high-water navigability near the
mouth of the Xoolimbinne. He hoped desert-side gum, Bambuk gold and middle
Niger trade goods would flow into Medine’s market and onto boats waiting to
move the merchandise through a French-dominated Senegal valley.35 Faidherbe
convinced many upper valley political leaders who had just submitted to Umar’s
armies to sign treaties with the French, and this reinforced his hold on Medine.
Even as Umar was conquering the Massassi Bambara in Karta, Faidherbe was
creating an anti-Umarian coalition under French patronage in the upper Senegal
valley.36 These activities set into motion a sequence of events which prevented
the consolidation of an imperial Umarian state in the region.

From- the Umarian perspective, Medine’s establishment was intolerable,
since an expanded French presence implied a political claim to the upper
Senegal valley. It also cut the Umarians from their source of recruits in Futa
Toro and put the French in position to control the commerce of the desert- side
and the Western Sudan. The Umarians met the French challenge with an attack
on Medine in April, 1857. The French repelled the attack, whereupon the
Umarian forces settled in for a lengthy siege. With the arrival of high-waters
in July, Faidherbe brought two gunboats up the Senegal and used their
firepower to disperse the Umarians. After breaking the siege, he conducted
military raids against Umarian positions throughout the upper valley, effectively
destroying the recruitment network linking Futa Toro with Umarian Karta and

thereby weakening the overall Umarian position.

56

The loss at Medine forced Umar to reassess his position in the region.
Any hope for an imperial Umarian state in the upper Senegal valley certainly
was over. Karta and Tamba remained firmly under Umarian control, but these
territories lay at some distance from one another, and did not have the
productive capabilities to support Umarian assertions M the French.
Umar’s options all pointed to continuing the holy war to the east against the
Bambara of Segu. He still retained the charisma needed to lead soldiers into
battle, and most of the troops favored the continuation of fighting. Indeed, the
recruits had joined the holy war with expectations of gaining booty and not
fighting the French, and the opening of a new front would more than
compensate for the loss at Medine. In the immediate aftermath of the battle at
Medine, Umar turned his attention away from competition with the French for
control of the upper Senegal and directed his energies toward the defeat of the
Bambara of Segu and an Umarian state based on the fertile Niger valley. Karta
no longer was the final piece in an upper Senegal valley imperial state but the
staging ground for Umar’s move on to the east.

Before launching the holy war against the Bambara of Segu, Umar passed
through the Senegal valley on one final recruitment effort. He succeeded in
forcing most of Bundu’s population to emigrate to Nioro in 1858. Umar then
travelled through Futa Toro, recruiting some twenty percent of Futa Toro’s
population for his army. By the time Umar arrived in Nioro in 'early 1859, he
had brought close to fifty thousand persons into Karta. Some of the recruits
from Bundu, whom Umar’s pressure tactics had forced to emigrate, took every
opportunity to return to the Senegal valley. Other Bundunke offered to join
the initial Umarian settlers in Kingi who wanted to remain in Karta. Given

these expressions of resistance and the need to defend against possible French

57
moves into Karta, Umar decided to leave a considerable Futanke community in
Kingi. Umar appointed Mustafa Keita, a Hausa slave who had fought heroically
in the Kartan campaigns, to serve as his leader in Karta. He gave Mustafa
control over the Umarian fort in Nioro and command over all the garrisons in
Karta.37 In mid-1859, Umar finally departed from Nioro with over thirty-five
thousand followers to launch the holy war against Segu.

In 1860 as he marched from Nioro to Segu, Shayla}; Umar appointed his
oldest son, Amadu Sheku, to succeed him as Commander of the Faithful and
head of the Tij aniyya order for the Western Sudan. The appointment came at
that time because Umar wanted to designate a clear line of succession in the
event that he died in the course of the holy war against Segu. The Umarians
went on to defeat the Bambara of Segu, and Shaykh Umar survived to lead his
armies against the Fulbe state of Masina in the inland Niger Delta. After 1862,
Umar’s involvement in the campaigns against Masina left Amadu Sheku alone to
consolidate Umarian control in Segu. The task was enormous, as the Bambara
reorganized themselves and fielded an impressive army. Amadu spent the entire
first decade of his reign as Commander of the Faithful in defeating this
challenge to Umarian hegemony in the middle Niger valley. Segu achieved great
fame in Muslim circles of the late nineteenth century as the Umarian capital
and the replacement of the Bambara capital which was the symbol of paganism
in West Africa.

As Amadu Sheku struggled to keep Segu under his control, the Umarian
armies defeated the Masinanke regime, but suffered a major reversal during
which most of them died, including Shaykh Umar himself in 1864. The
remaining Umarian soldiers reorganized under the leadership of Tijani, a nephew

of Umar, and regained a foothold in Masina at Bandiagara, in the hills to the

58
east of the delta. Neither Amadu Sheku nor Tijani offered assistance to one
another, and they consolidated power separately in Segu and Masina. This
development illustrates the process whereby two Umarian states emerged in the
Niger valley. Elsewhere in the Western Sudan, in Karta and at the initial
Umarian garrison at Dingiray, similar processes of consolidation in local
contexts occurred. In Karta, the emergence of the Umarian successor state had

its roots in developments beginning immediately after the conquest.

 

After the Umarian conquest of Karta and the suppression of the Massassi
and J awara revolts of 1856, Shaykh Umar encouraged Futanke to settle in
Karta. The largest Futanke colony was in Kingi, where their settlements
encircled the main Umarian garrison at Nioro. A considerable number of
Futanke also settled in Jomboxo, at the garrison at Konyakary and in nearby
villages. These two principal garrisons and their surrounding Futanke
settlements were central places in an Umarian network which mirrored the
Massassi occupation of Karta. The Umarians controlled the fertile Xoolimbinne
valley and the vast Kingi plateau in the heartland of the state, and their
garrisons in the south served as bases to continue the pattern of wars and
raids on the fringes of the state. After the battle at Medine, when the French
challenged the Umarian presence in the upper valley, the Massassi pattern
regained its value as a system of domination in the area where the Futanke
still retained control. The emergence of an Umarian successor state in Karta,
therefore, was a partially a result of Umarian losses in the upper valley and the

Futanke occupation of the former Massassi garrisons.

59

Several Umarian leaders at Nioro also took actions which reinforced the
emergence of an Umarian state in Karta. Alfa Umar Cerno Baila Wan, who was
the Umarian military leader at Nioro from 1857 to 1859, led Futanke armies in
Karta to several important victories at a time when the Umarian cause had lost
its momentum. Prior to his service at Nioro, Alfa Umar had fought in the
major battles of the holy war, recruited soldiers in Futa Toro and then assumed
the position as Shay_k_h Umar’s most successful military commander in Karta
during the Massassi and Jawara revolts of 1856.38 Alfa Umar was appointed to
serve as leader at Nioro when Umar left Kingi in 1857 to establish a network
of garrisons in the south of Karta, and he held the position as Shaykh Umar
retreated from Medine to Kunjan and then recruited in the Senegal valley for
the holy war against Segu. The Umarian position in Karta was challenged by
local groups in the wake of Shaykh Umar’s departure, and Alfa Umar won
several crucial battles.39 The most critical victory was in early 1859, when
anti-Umarian forces invaded Jomboxo from the Senegal valley and killed Cemo
Jibi, the commander of the Umarian forces of Konyakary. Alfa Umar led a
force from Nioro, dispersed the invaders and retained the Umarian hold over
Jomboxo.40 His actions reinforced Nioro’s status as the center of power in
Karta.

Mustafa Keita, Alfa Umar’s successor as the leader of Nioro, further
reinforced Nioro’s status as the Umarian capital of Karta. When Umar Tal
returned to Nioro in mid-1859, he asked Alfa Umar to join the Umarian army
which was heading to Segu and appointed Mustafa to serve as the military
commander at Nioro and the Umarian leader of Karta. Mustafa had gained
Umar’s trust as a member of the small group of Umarians which had been with
the Shaykh since his residence in Sokoto, and further distinguished himself as a

60
capable military leader during the holy war.41 While Umar probably did not
make the leaders of the other garrisons swear allegiance to Mustafa, he clearly
intended that Mustafa continue Alfa Umar’s consolidation of power from
Nioro.42 Mustafa used his position as the leader of the largest Umarian
ganison in Karta to seize the initiative militarily and to form a multi-ethnic
coalition of interest in the region.

Mustafa conducted military campaigns annually throughout the 1860s,
directing his efforts against those who challenged the Umarian presence in
Karta. During the early 1860s, he focused attention on the Awlad Mbark, the
dominant Moorish confederation in the desert-side north of Mom.” Mustafa
invited the leaders of the other garrisons to assist him in meeting the Awlad
Mbark challenge, but initially received little support.44 In response to this
unwillingness to assist him, Mustafa sent hundreds of Futanke women, children
and older - men to the other garrisons for "protection"; this move forced the
other leaders to share responsibility over the Futanke community in N ioro.45
'Ihen, Mustafa turned to the Senegal valley and recruited Futanke to help
defend Nioro.46 Futanke migrants from the Senegal valley arrived in 1865 and
helped Mustafa’s forces deliver a decisive blow to the Awlad Mbark.47 This
victory ensured Nioro’s emergence as the dominant center of Umarian influence
in Karta, and allowed Mustafa to take the lead in campaigns into Bakunu during
the late 18608. These campaigns launched annually from Nioro included
contingents from most of the other garrisons, and suggest that Mustafa had
consolidated his position as the military leader of Karta.48

Mustafa also built upon the oaths of alliance which Shaykh Umar had
obtained fi'om a variety of local Fulbe, Soninke and Moorish leaders to create a

multi-ethnic coalition of interest in Karta. This coalition included groups who

61

fought in the Umarian army during the conquest, as well as those who wished
Shaykh Umar well without actually fighting with him. With the defeat of the
Massassi, these groups expected Umarian rule to favor their interests in Karta.
Some groups continued to fight in the Umarian army and expected an equitable
division of booty. Other groups expected that their interests in regional trade
would be served by the Umarian administration in Karta. It was left to
Mustafa to weave these diverse interests and expectations into a workable
coalition. Mustafa had to convince these groups that Umarian rule served their
interests in the years after Shaykh Umar’s death when many groups reassessed
their commitment to the Umarian cause.

Mustafa focused his attention on reinforcing the position of the Kaba
Jakite family as the cornerstone of the Umarian coalition in Karta. During the
conquest, one of the Shaykh’s major supporters had been Umar Kaba Jakite, a
Soninke cleric from Bundu. Immediately after the conquest of Karta, Umar
Kaba Jakite settled with his family at Munia, a small Umarian garrison near
Jafunu.49 Not long after Shaykh Umar’s departure for Segu, Mustafa invited
the Kaba Jakite family to move to Kingi and asked Umar Kaba to serve as the
imam of Nioro’s mosque.50 In making Kaba Jakite the imam of Nioro, Mustafa
may have been following the instructions of Umar Tal; oral traditions from
Kingi mention an Arabic letter in which Umar designated Umar Kaba J akite as
the imam of Nioro.51 While no letter has yet been found to corroborate the
oral traditions, Mustafa’s choice of Kaba Jakite certainly represented a logical
extension of Umar’s policies if not the specific order of the Shaykh.

'Ihe Kaba Jakite family lived at Kamandape, a village on the outskirts of
Nioro. Umar Kaba died shortly after moving to Kingi, and his oldest son,
Buyagi, succeeded him as the imam of Nioro.52 Buyagi and Umar Kaba’s other

62

sons devoted themselves to the Islamic sciences, thereby building upon the
religious credentials of their father and creating a Kaba J akite tradition of
, Muslim scholarship. From their compound at Kamandape, they successfully
recruited students from among Soninke families throughout Karta, and converted
many local Soninke clerics to the Tijaniyya affiliation.53 The Kaba Jakite
family also hosted Soninke leaders and traders who travelled to N ioro on
official visits. By recruiting a Soninke family to serve such a role for the
state, Mustafa made Umarian rule more acceptable to indigenous Soninke groups
while simultaneously facilitating the communication between Mustafa and
Soninke families with whom the Kaba Jakite had kinship relations or had
established particularly strong ties.

Mustafa also strengthened the alliances which Umar had established with
other Soninke groups in the region. He recruited Jawara from Kingi into his
military and defeated a pocket of Jawara resistance in the mid-18605.54
Thereafter, Jawara fought alongside Futanke units in Mustafa’s armies, much as
Jawara groups had joined ton-Jon units during the Massassi era.55 Another
group of Soninke, those who had moved from southern Karta to Yuri after
Umar’s armies had defeated the Massassi, also served the state as merchants
who purchased the slaves generated by Mustafa’s campaigns.56 The Soninke of
Yuri included clerical families among them who recruited students from the

Soninke areas of Karta and acted as an ideological support for the Umarian
re gime.57

Mustafa also reinforced ties with the Fulbe of Bakunu. Samburu, the
leader of these Fulbe herders, had sworn allegiance to Sham Umar during the
holy war, but, in contrast to Wulibu, the leader of the Fulbe of Karta, had not

joined Shaykh Umar’s Segovian campaign in 1859. Samburu’s knowledge of the

63

desert-side and his aggressive Fulbe forces helped Mustafa defend the northern
boarder of Karta during the early 18608. The Fulbe Samburu also joined
Mustafa’s campaigns into Bakunu during the late 18608. Some Fulbe lineages
settled near Nioro during the 18608, cementing the ties between the Umarian
regime and the Fulbe of Samburu. These ties grew in intimacy throughout the
Umarian era. Muntaga, Mustafa’s successor as leader of Nioro, for example,
relied on the Fulbe Samburu as elite troops in his army.

Mustafa also brought desert-side groups into the coalition of interest
forming at Nioro. The Laghlal, a zawaya group involved in the Ijil salt trade,
were one of the first Moorish groups to join the Umarian camp. As Mustafa
quickly discovered, however, this alliance brought the Umarians into the ever
shifting and often confusing world of desert-side politics. In 1860, the
Mashduff delivered a crushing defeat to a group of Laghlal and Fulbe soldiers
operating in the northern Sahel.58 The Mashduff were not, however, hostile in
principle to the Umarian state. Indeed, Mustafa’s forces served the interests of
the Mashduff by defeating the Awlad Mbark in 1865. Thereafter, the Mashduff
seized the initiative against the Awlad Mbark and attacked them several times
during the late 18608.59 The Mashduff coalition won several decisive victories
and thereby became the dominant warrior group to the north of Karta.

The Mashduff eventually joined the Umarian coalition in order to gain
access to the commercial corridors leading to the market at Medine. In 1866,
negotiations between African gum traders and various Moorish groups led to the
opening a major gum market at Medine.6O This new market was closer to the
sources of gum harvested by the Mashduff. More importantly, it lay outside the
sphere of influence of the Idaw Aish, a warrior confederation which controlled

access to the other gum markets of the upper Senegal valley. By crossing the

64
Umarian territories and exchanging gum at Medine, the Mashduff avoided having
to acknowledge subordination to another Moorish confederation. Mustafa’s
efforts to bring and retain the Mashduff and the Laghlal in the Umarian
coalition ensured that gum and salt would pass through Karta on the way to the
markets of the Niger and Senegal valleys.

Under Mustafa’s leadership, Umarian rule encouraged the expansion of
commercial traffic within and across Karta. The security along the desert-side
facilitated exchanges between Moorish groups and Soninke communities which
cultivated along the northern boundary of Karta. Umarian rule also extended
order along the trade routes which linked the north with the markets of the
savanna and forest to the south. Eugene Mage, a French traveller who passed
through Karta on his way to Segu during the mid-18608, commented on the
social order and commercial vitality of Karta; his description of southern
Karta sharply contrasts with the images of disorder which dominate his
discussion of Amadu Sheku’s rule in Segu.61 The social order which Mage
observed in his travels reflected Mustafa’s success in creating a multi-ethnic
coalition of interest in Karta. It also reflected Mustafa’s ability to control the
Umarian network of military garrisons in Karta. Mustafa consolidated an
Umarian presence in Karta which contrasted with the state emerging under
Amadu Sheku’s leadership in Sega.62

As Mustafa’s power increased, the Futanke began to wonder whether
autonomy was desirable and whether it was appropriate for a former slave to
hold such a powerful position. The Futanke combined the issues because they
perceived Mustafa’s policies as favoring the interests of indigenous groups over
those of the Futanke. As more and more Futanke migrated into Karta, their
political voice grew in strength, and they pushed for changes at the top in

65
Karta. As their influence grew, however, they had to resolve two questions.
Who should they support as a successor to Mustafa? Would that successor
continue to consolidate an autonomous state in Karta, or would he emphasize
commitments to the Umarians in other regions of the Western Sudan?

These questions surfaced during the two revolts, and never received a
unified response from the Futanke of Karta Their interests were much too
diverse. This diversity was the result of the multi-ethnic coalition, which
brought economic wealth into Karta. Some Futanke participated in economic
enterprises directly linked to the regional economy. Others, often those who
migrated to Karta after Umar’s holy war, fought in the Umarian army and came
to much different conclusions about the most desirable form of Umarian rule.
The political leadership, such as Mustafa and his successors, had yet another
view. In the next three chapters, I turn to the Kartan economy and the

migration to Karta in order to amplify these diverse interests.

Notes
1. Paul Soleillet, Voyago a Ségon, 1828-22, rs‘xligo d’apros los notos o1; journaox
WWW (Paris, 1887). PP- 227-23-

2. Bambara oral traditions assert that Segovian generals mounted their
campaigns with armies of as many as twenty thousand soldiers. The Bambara of
Karta also fielded an awesome force, but they could not match the numbers
which the armies of Segu totaled. See Louis Tauxier, W
(Paris, 1942), p. 83.

3. Tauxier, Hisroiredealiamhara. p. 171.

4. The Bambara of Segu drove deep into Karta several times in the eighteenth
and nineteenth centuries, but they never were able to force the Massassi, the
Bambara rulers of Karta, to recognize Segovian suzerainty.

5. Amadu Sheku’s desire to create an imperial state emerges most clearly in
the account of Camile Piétri, a French military officer who collected oral
testimony from officials of Amadu’ s court during his service in a diplomatic
mission to Segu. See Chapter Six for a discussion of the Piétri’ s role in the

transmission of Amadu Sheku’ s perspectives. C. Piétri, W
(Paris, 1885).

6. See my discussion in Chapter One.

7. The Massassi state in Karta, in contrast to its neighbor in Segu, is not
blessed with an extensive historical literature. I base this discussion on an
examination of eighteenth and nineteenth century traveller’s accounts, the most
informative being Anne Raffenel’ s WW5:
(Pan'S. 1846) See also Charles Montcil WWW
(Paris, 1924). Sékéné-Mody Cissoko’ s overview of Massassi history also is
useful. Cissoko, ’h 1"

WM (Paris, 1986). I also draw on traditions of the
Massassi era recounted to me by Amadou Ba of Nioro.

8. Montcil. IasBamhara. W 4-5.

9. This discussion relies on the late nineteenth century description of northern
Karta by the French officer Valentin. ANM 1D108: Konyakary, 1 October 1890,
"Diombokho et itineraires sur Nioro". Lt. Lartigue relied on Valentin’ 8 account
and published "Notice géographique sur la regiggsfu Sahel", W
W (1

10. .During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, Soninke lineages in the
province of J afunu invested in slave labor and supervised the expansion of
millet and cloth production. Eric Pollet and Grace Winter, WM,
(Brussels, 1971).

67

11. The Xassonke, Mandinka- -speaking clans who claim Fulbe origins, colonized

Jomboxo during the eighteenth century. See Cissoko,L’_1_Iistoim_mhggao_do
Khasso PP 9811

12. Robin Law,1he_florse_inflestAmcan_Hlstom (Oxford. 1980). PP- 53-58-

13. According to Jawaambe traditions, rebellious J awaambe slaves were the
first groups to settle at Nioro. Jawara lineages later claimed Nioro for their
residence. In the nineteenth century, Mamadi Kanja made Nioro the capital of
the Massassi state. By this time, the Jawaambe had moved their major camp
southward to Karaharo.

14. Amadu Hampate Ba and Jacques Daget, W
1851), (Paris, 1962).

15. Pollet and Winter, Lamétisomnko.

16. E. Ann McDougall, "Camel caravans of the Saharan salt trade: traders and
transporters in the nineteenth century" in Catherine Coquery-Vidrovitch and
Paul LOVCJO)’. eds” MW (Beverly Hills 1985)

17. Charles Monteil, W (Paris, 1915).

18. Regarding the origins of the Bambara state of Segu, I adopt Richard
Roberts argument that the ton was based on the age-set and not the hunters’
organization. See Roberts, "Production and Reproduction of Warrior States:
the Segu Bambara and Segu Tukolor", a

W 13 (1980). Sources for Segu Bambara history include:
Maurice Delafosse, W, 3 vols. (Paris, 1912), Monteil, 1&5
Ba_ba;a; Tauxier, 111319113; Lilian Kesteloot, MW, 4 vols. (Paris,
1972); Jean Bazin, "Guerre et servitude a Segou" , in W911:
prosoloniale, ed. C. Meillassoux (Paris, 1975).

19. Military elites throughout West Africa and the Middle East have relied on
slaves for use in the military and bureaucracy due to their perceived virtues of
loyalty. See, for an example from the Middle East, Daniel Pipes, Slamjoldiors
mrdlslamathLGenesimtaMliianLstrem (New Haven. 1981)

20. Roberts makes this point for the soldiers of the Segu Bambara state, but
perhaps overstates the degree to which the warriors relied on warfare and
raiding. Roberts, "Production and Reproduction", pp. 406-08.

21. Charles Monteil argues that the intricate web of political ties which the
Massassi wove in the region was the feature which most distinguished the
Massassi state from the neighboring Bambara regime in Segu. Indeed, unlike
the Segovian traditions, which point to conflicts among Bambara and Marka
cohorts during the creation of Mamari Kulibali’s ton, the traditions of Massassi
origins emphasize the alliances between the Massassi and Soninke lineages. See
Monteil, W. pp. 103ff.

68

22. Cissoko argues that the Xassonke state established tributary rights over
Jafunu during the reign of Demba Sega (1757-96). It seems likely that ruling
groups among the Massassi, Xassonke and Moors all competed for control of
the Xoolimbinne valley. The Massassi held the upper hand and ultimately won
full control after the fall of the Xassonke state in the early nineteenth century.
Cissoko, W. The Massassi chronology of expansion
can be found in Monteil, LoLBambara, the Kaba Jakite chronicle translated by
Delafosse, and the oral traditions of the Massassi recounted by Amadou Ba.

23. The frequency of raids in the south led to a hierarchy of enslavement:
Bambara from commoner lineages were eligible for recruitment into the tonjon
regiments, but slaves of Bambara masters and all Mandinka men were best used
for exchanges (for weapons, salt or luxury goods). This anecdote was repeated
to me by Amadu Ba of Nioro.

24. My argument concerning warfare and the structure of the Massassi state
draws on insights into the Segovian state offered by Bazin, "Guerre et
servitude". Roberts, "Production and reproduction" also proved helpful in
formulating my ideas. My argument differs from these two works on the Segu
Bambara state on points of historical difference between the two Bambara
regimes and, in some instances, on theoretical grounds.

25. The pattern is apparent in the schematic chronology of Massassi rulers and
the history of their reigns by Monteil in W

26. See Philip Curtin’ 8 discussion of the Gajaaga commercial diaspora and its
western exten81 . ' A _ ' .. , .

Woo, (Madison, 1975), chapter Two. L

27. At Makana, up river from Bakel in the upper Senegal valley, the agents of
Saint Louis gum merchants paid a fee to the Massassi to ensure the arrival of
the gum caravans.

 

 

28. E. Ann McDougall discusses the question in her thesis, "The Ijil salt
industry: its role in the precolonial economy of the western Sudan",
Birmingham University, Centre of West African Studies, Ph.D. thesis, 1980.

29. The Kaba Jakite chronicle refers to the change, as well as the oral
traditions recounted to me by Amadu Ba. I date the change in taxes to the
reign of Bojan Moriba (c. 1818-32) from indirect evidence. He is known as the
most powerful Massassi ruler, and his reign is associated with establishment of
a new capital at Yelimane in Gidiyumme. His choice of residence may indicate
the desire to exploit more fully the resources of the northern Xoolimbinne
valley. Jawaambe from Kingi reportedly asked the Fulbe of Masina to help
liberate them from the Massassi yoke during Bojan Moriba’s reign, suggesting
changes in tax collection in Kingi as well. See, for Jawaambe oral traditions,

Ba and Daget, W, pp. 173ff.

30. David Robinson provides the details and sources in Wind:
Ial, (Oxford, 1985).

69

31. The contact may well have been made while Umar was in Dingiray from
1849 to 1852, given the proximity of Kankan to Dingiray.

32. Amadou Ba of Nioro is a notable example.

33. The Kaba Jakite family initially settled at Munia, a village on the
boundary of Jomboxo and Jafunu, before moving to Kamandape, a village on the
outskirts of Nioro; Umar Kaba and his sons served as spiritual guides and
hosts to Soninke families of Jafunu and other Soninke provinces in the west.

34. Robinson provides a balanced assessment of Franco-Umarian relations
during the holy war, one which contrasts with the polemic works of many

historians who write about this era. Robinson, 1th Holy War: of flora: filial,
Chapter Six.

35. French hopes of tapping into a lucrative source of gold proved futile. See

Philip Curtin, "The lure of Bambuk gold," MW 14 (1973).
Curtin discusses the importance of Medine within the context of the regional

economic system of Senegambia. Curtin, Eoonomioflhaogo, Chapter Two.

36. See, for the anti-Umarian coalition, Robinson, W,
pp. 167ff.

37. Umar’s last days in Nioro are not remembered as clearly as his triumphal
first entrance into the town. Umar’s charge to the inhabitants of Nioro is
usually reported as a prophetic statement made just before his death in Masina.
The Arabic chronicle written by Thierno Yahya Tal of Konyakary recounts some
of the details associated with Umar’s last visit there. See Chapter One for my
analysis of Yahya’s Arabic chronicle.

38. Robinson, W, pp. 148, 154, 161, 187, 190, 195.

39. ANS 156108: Medine, l3 and 27 October 1858 and 7 January 1859, Ct.
Medine to the Governor. .

40. ANS 156108: Medine, no date (piece 81) and 7 April 1859, Ct. Medine to
the Governor.

41. Robinson. W. p. 338.

42. The Kaba Jakite chronicle from Nioro indicate that Mustafa was to serve
as the leader of all the Umarian garrisons in Karta. "Traditions historiques et
légendes du Soudan occidental; traduites d’un manuscrit arabe inédit par
Maurice Delafossc" . W

(him no. 10 (1913). P. 362.
43. ANS 156108: Medine, 2 October 1860, Ct. Medine to the Governor.
44. ANS 136169: Bakel, 4 May 1865, Ct. Bakel to the Governor.

45. ANS 136210: Medine, 8 July 1864, Ct. Medine to Ct. Bakel; ANS 136169:
Bakel, 8 and 15 July 1864, Ct. Bakel to the Governor.

70

46. The only direct reference to Mustafa’s involvement in the recruitment of
Futanke soldiers in the Senegal valley is: ANS 136169: Bakel, 18 October
1865, Ct. Bakel to the Governor. References to recruiters from Nioro first
appear in 1864.

47. ANS 136169: Bakel, 4 March, 4 April, 4 May and 2 July 1865, Ct. Bakel
to the Governor.

48. Mustafa had no problems recruiting forces from the other garrisons for his
annual campaigns of the late 18608. ANS 136213: Medine, 25 February and 12
March 1868, Ct. Medine to Ct. Bakel.

49. ANM 2E61: Nioro, 1 January 1897, fiche de renseignement. See, for a
history of the founder of this clerical family, Tiébilé Dramé, "Alfa Umar Kaba
Jaxite, fondateur de Kabala, marabout et conseiller de Siixumaru Tal (al- -Hajj
Umar)" WM 2(1988)

50. Umar Kaba Jakite had moved to Kingi before mid-1865. Interviews in
Nioro with Amadou Ba and El Hadj Sadiku Kaba Jakite. He is described as
"Mustafa’s marabout" in ANS 136169: Bakel, 4 September 1865, Ct. Bakel to the
Governor.

51. Colonel Robert Adam. W (Paris,
1904). p. 111.

52. Paul Marty. EmdeLsrLLIslammmmmdan. Volume 4 (Paris.
1921), pp. 212-214.

53. Despite current ambiguity in Nioro regarding the question of Umar Kaba
Jakite’s affiliation with the Tijaniyya order, it seems very likely that Umar Tal
inducted Umar Kaba J akite into it. Kaba J akite’s sons without question were
Tijaniyya. Interviews in Nioro with El Hadj Hatta Oumar Kaba Jakite and El
Hadj Sadiku Kaba Jakite in February 1986.

54. ANS 156108: Medine, 1 February 1866, Ct. Medine to Ct. Bakel.
55. Interview with Amadou Ba, Nioro, 26 January 1986.
56. Interview with Amadou Ba, Nioro, 26 January 1986.

57. Emile Blane, "Contribution a .l’étude des populations et de l’histoire du
Sahel soudanais",

[Ainauemcidemalelirancaise (1924). p 273.

58. Paul Marty, "Les Chroniques de Oualata et de Néma (Soudan francais)",
WW1 (1927) P 363

59. Marty, "Les Chroniques de Oualata", p. 370.
60. I discuss the gum trade in greater detail in Chapter Four.

61. EugEne Mage. Enragedanslefinudanmcidrmal (Paris, 1868). p. 86.

71

62. Amadu Sheku never was able to weave the diverse groups of the middle
Niger valley into a coalition of interest. Overt use of force remained the
primary expression of state involvement.

CHAPTER THREE

The Fulbe Migration to Karta During the Late Nineteenth Century

During the course of the late nineteenth century, tens of thousands of
Fulbe from the Senegal valley migrated to the Western Sudan. Most migrants
(forganko in Pulaar) settled in the Kartan provinces of Jomboxo and Kingi, with
Nioro and its environs receiving the largest population influx. Oral traditions
from the Senegal valley refer to the migration as the W, expressing
Nioro’s status as the primary destination of the migrants. According to the
late nineteenth century French officer Joseph Gallieni, the forgo helped Nioro
emerge as "the most important center of Futanke influence" after Amadu
Sheku’s capital at Sega-Siiroro.1 Gallieni added that many Futanke whose
fathers had settled in Segu after the holy war also wanted to migrate to Nioro,
but Amadu prevented them from doing so. Amadu coveted Karta’s growing
Futanke population, and tried to attract them to Segu. Despite his efforts,
most Futanke preferred Karta to Segu, and their settlement in Karta made it a
powerful rival to Segu during the final years of Umarian domination in the

Western Sudan.

72

73

The migration strategies associated with the mm differed from the
dominant patterns of movement in the late nineteenth century Senegal valley.
Farmers and herders frequently moved to new settlements in response to several
years of poor rains or increasing raids from desert-side groups from the north.
When the cycles of rains returned or the threat of raids dissipated, migrants
often returned to the areas which they had abandoned. In contrast, the forgo
Nioro usually occurred after a good harvest, and reflected years of discussion
and planning with others thinking of making the migration. The forganko, too,
often were responding to a specific invitation to join their relatives or
neighbors who had migrated to Karta prior to them. The final decision to
migrate often hinged on the {organko’s confidence in the abilities of those who
were leading the forgo, since the journey to Karta was long, arduous and often
dangerous. Many migrants lost all their cattle to raids along the route to
Nioro, or had to sell them to acquire guns and grain for the long trip. The
risks associated with the trip were considerable, but migrants who decided to go
to Karta hoped to regain it all as booty when they fought in the Muslim
armies led by the disciples of Umar Tal.

The French presence in the late nineteenth century Senegal valley also
shaped the context in which the More occurred. Although the migration
began before the French established formal colonial control in the valley, the
French felt that the forgo of lower and middle valley Fulbe ran counter to
their political interests in the region. They tried to stop the migration from
time to time during the late nineteenth century, but their efforts proved to be
unsuccessful. As the French began their advance into the interior in the 18808,
the forgo acquired an anti-colonial tone: Futanke leaders argued that the

74
region was falling under the control of Christians, and they advocated migrating
to join Muslim armies in the "holy lands" of Umarian Karta.

The dynamics of the forgo_N_ioro challenge the historian to situate the
migration within a matrix in which the ffigarlko were both "pushed" from the
valley and "pulled" to the Futanke colonies in Karta. Neither the data nor
historical circumstances of the forgo lend themselves to economic models which

assume an economic order shaped by wage-employment.2

Neo-marxist analyses
which focus on the capricious penetration of foreign capital and the coercive
power of colonial policies are equally as inappropriate, since the French had not
established formal colonial control over the entire valley.3 The French
presence, nevertheless, was an important historical factor, and the migration of
lower valley Fulbe herders suggests that French efforts to create a new
economic order in which raiding was discomaged may have influenced the forgo
Nioro.

The present chapter examines the forgo within a diachronic framework in
which the importance of a range of forces operating at different periods can be
assessed. After providing an historical overview of the population flow, the
discussion moves to an analysis of the historical forces which "pulled" and
"push " the migrants to Karta. The data is not complete, but it does allow for
a general assessment of the forgo__Njom. The chapter concludes by discussing

the implications of the arrival of the forganko on Umarian Karta.

II . . K . .
Quantitative statements regarding the migration flow are diffith to make

with much certainty. Even estimates of the net outflow from the Senegal

75

valley over the course of the late nineteenth century require qualification.
These reservations are due to the nature of the extant data. Tax records from
the Umarian era are virtually non-existent. Most of the population figures in
Umarian Arabic documents focus almost exclusively on troop strength, and even
these materials document only a few periods and are not even complete for
those eras. While the French oommaodaots of the Senegal valley reported on
the movement of migrants making their way to Karta, their documents do not
provide sufficient data to estimate the total volume of the population flow into
Karta. The reports often describe only those migrants whose caravans passed
close to the posts; many forganko followed a northern route to avoid French
attempts to halt the migration flow. All quantitative statements, therefore, are
at best informed estimates based on incomplete data.

Early colonial census records are the best sources for an estimate of the
total, number of immigrants who arrived in Karta. These materials put the early
colonial population of the Senegambian immigrants at twenty thousand.4 This
figure is too low, since it does not include the twenty thousand Futanke whom
the French forced to return to the Senegal valley during the early 18908.5
Colonial officials, too, had trouble counting the number of Fulbe herders in
Karta, who used their mobility to evade contact with the French; colonial
census reports fluctuated widely over the course of the late nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries.6 Resistance to enumeration by colonial census takers
also was evident among sedentary groups, who knew that the French used the
figures to access taxes.7 Finally, the military losses suffered by the Futanke
community during the French conquest also need to be included.8 My estimate
of the size of the Futanke community on the eve of the French conquest is

50,000. If this figure is accurate, then the immigrant community constituted

76
close to a third of the total population in Jomboxo and well over half the
population of Kingi.

This estimate of the immigrant Futanke community indicates the total
during the last few years of Umarian domination in Karta. While the increases
associated with natural population growth cannot be discounted, the arrival of
forgaoko after Umar’s holy war accounted for most of the expansion during the
late nineteenth century. The initial settler population probably numbered less
than ten thousand Futanke. The largest concentration of immigrant settlement
was in Kingi, where Futanke and Bundunke settlers resided at Nioro and in
villages vacated by Bambara and Jawara communities in the aftermath of their
revolts against Umarian rule. Jomboxo also was a locus of Fulbe settlement:
Futanke and Bundunke settled at Konyakary and in nearby villages. When raids
by desert-side groups made life difficult in Nioro and its environs during the
early 18608, Jomboxo received an infusion of Futanke settlers from Kingi.
Smaller communities of Futanke had settled at other garrisons in Karta after
the holy war, but Kingi and Jomboxo were the largest settlements by a wide
margin.

Many Futanke soldiers who had participated in Umar’s campaigns in Segu
and Masina returned to Karta during the early 18608 to rejoin wives and

9 The crucial role

children who had been sent back during the movement east.
which the returning Futanke played in bolstering the colonies is reflected in
oral traditions associated with the construction of the main mosque in Nioro.
All variants stress that it was not built during Umar’s era but constructed with
the assistance of Futanke who had returned from the east.10 The stories of

Bambara resistance to Umarian rule in Segu which the returning soldiers

repeated certainly contributed to the colonists’ resolve to construct a large

77
mosque in the region. It also strengthened their growing conviction that they
had to expand their ranks with additional Senegal valley migrants in order to
ensure that Umar’s holy war had an enduring impact on Karta.

The Futanke colonists of Karta began to send recruiters to the Senegal
valley beginning in 1864. This effort produced results almost immediately: the
arrival of a group of for-garlic: in 1865, led by Samba Umahani Sal of Toro
province, helped break the siege of Nioro by the Awlad Mbark, a desert-side

warrior confederation.11

The forgo of Samba Umahani Sal demonstrated that
the Futanke colonies depended upon an influx of new settlers to strengthen
their position in Karta. Mganko continued to arrive in Karta over the course
of the 18608 at a rate of several hundred annually. 12 French officials in the
valley were alarmed by the numbers of Fulbe leaving the middle valley, who
often migrated just after the harvest and did not pay their taxes.13 Some
oomrnaodmfs tried to stem the tide by stopping migrants and sending them
back. Others encouraged their African clients to attack passing caravans, a
policy which led to severe injuries to the rrrigrants.14 In 1865, Cemo Musa, a
Futanke notable at Konyakary, protested these actions to the French, arguing
that anyone making the forgo was accompanied by envoys of the Umarian state
and deserved to be protected. 15 French migration policy was inconsistent
throughout the 18608, with the result that thousands were able to make the
forgo successfully.

Amadu Sheku’s arrival and residence in Nioro during the early 18708
altered the forgo. The Commander of the Faithful came to Karta to put down
a challenge to his authority led by his younger brothers, Habib and Moktar,
who had rallied some of the Futanke of Karta to their banner. Amadu sent

recruiters to the Senegal valley in advance of his arrival in Nioro, in hopes of

78

increasing his forces with fgganko who responded to the call.16 He continued
to recruit in the Senegal valley throughout the early 18708, to bolster his army
for campaigns against the Bambara of Gemukura. The numbers of forgan_k_o for
the years 1869 through 1872 increased, but the volume did not approach the
level of recruitment which Umar Tal had obtained over a decade earlier. I
estimate that the total did not surpass four thousand migrants. 17

French policy toward the increased population flow of this period was

ambiguous. 18

The French initially confused supporters of Amadu Sheku for
supporters of Amadu Mahdiyu, the Futanke cleric who preached holy war
against the French in the lower valley, and consequently prevented some
forgaolgo from going to Karta. Direct orders from the Governor at Saint Louis
clarified French policy toward the Commander of the Faithful: he advocated
tolerance for the forgaoko as long as Amadu Sheku did not make advances
toward the French position in the Senegal valley. The Governor hoped to
retain commercial ties with the Western Sudan, and Amadu’s insistence on
access to the Futanke of the valley was perceived as a compensation for the
ensuing commercial benefits. From the French perspective, too, four thousand
migrants was a much smaller number than the forty thousand followers whom
Umar recruited in the late-18508.

While thousands of Futanke migrated to Karta, some returned to the valley
during this period. The out-migration occurred in 1871 and 1872, and included
Futanke who had settled in Karta immediately after the holy war as well as
recent arrivals.19 The reverse flow partially reflected disagreement with Amadu
Sheku’s treatment of his dissident brothers, Habib and Moktar, whom Amadu

imprisoned. However, a similar return movement back to the valley occurred

after Umar Tal’s recruitment of the late-18508; at that time, it expressed the

79
reaction of those who had been forced to migrate. Some of the returnees of
the early 18708 may also have been migrants who had been swept up in the
forgo and became disenchanted with life in Karta.

In this context of recruitment and return, Amadu Sheku tried to convince
the remaining Futanke in Karta to join him and migrate to Segu in 1873.20 At
first Amadu threatened to force the Futanke into leaving, but his threats
precipitated active resistance among the Futanke of Karta. Cerno Mamadu
Khayar emerged as a leader of the Futanke resistance, and successfully argued
in defense of remaining in Karta and completing the task which Umar Tal had
given the initial Futanke colonists. While Amadu Sheku’s arrival had
accentuated the migration flow from the Senegal valley, it did not have the
result of shifting the locus of attraction from Nioro to Segu. By returning to
Segu without many Futanke migrants, Amadu virtually conceded that the
population influx associated with the forgo was outside his control and would
benefit Karta to the exclusion of Segu.

The return of Futanke dissidents and those dissatisfied with the forgo may
have dampened enthusiasm for migrating to Karta for a time, since the number
of migrants who made the forgo in the years immediately following the return
of these F utanke dropped off considerably. However, the coincidence of two
events in the mid-18708 served to launch the forgo into yet a new phase. In
early 1875, five forganko returned to their Fulbe herding communities in
western Futa Toro and began to recruit additional migrants to return with them

to Nioro.21

At the same time, one of the leading French-designated Fulbe
chefs in Dimar, Alfa Samba Coki of Botol, decided to join the ranks of those
making the forgo.22 Alfa Samba’s forgo not only added legitimacy to the

initiatives of the forganko recruiters, but his migration attracted many Fulbe

80

herders from the lower valley.23 The migration led by Alfa Samba launched the
migration of lower valley Fulbe herders which would gain considerable
momentum over the next decade.24

Migrations from Futa and the lower valley continued during the late 18708
and early 18808, when several thousand made the forgo. The movement then
took on dramatic proportions between 1885 and 1888, when thousands of Fulbe
migrants made the forgo annually. French estimates of the population loss from
the area near Saint Louis alone approach twenty thousand for the entire area;
well over half of these losses occurred after 1875.25 Thousands more joined
the forgo__Nioro from the western and central provinces of Futa Toro. Most of
the forganlro were herders, but the exodus included farmers as well.26 In the
1880s, farming communities from Toro and the Halaybe village cluster joined the
caravans as they passed through Futa Toro.27 Also, several prominent Futanke
leaders made the forgo independently from the mass movement.28

The military leaders of Karta actively encouraged the forgo. During the
late 18708, French officials at Bakel stopped Umarian recruiters heading for the
Senegal valley and learned that most were recent arrivals who were encouraged
to return to Senegal valley and ask relatives and friends to join them in
Karta.29 A pattern of recruitment emerged in the late 18708 whereby forganko
joined the armies of Umarian Karta and the most distinguished soldiers returned
to the Senegal valley to become leaders of subsequent migrations. Muntaga and
Bassiru Tal, who served as military leaders at Nioro and Konyakary,
respectively, rewarded the recruiters with booty and promotions within the
army. They accommodated the growing influx of forgamgo by establishing new
settlements on the outskirts of their capitals. The Tal brothers also prevented
any disenchanted forganko from returning to the Senegal valley by encouraging

81
their allies in the desert-side to raid any unauthorized groups trying to return.
Amadu Sheku continued these policies regarding the forgoflforo upon his second
return to Karta in 1885.

As the caravans of forgaoko grew in size and included migrants who had
not planned their participation in the forgo as carefully as the earlier
immigrants, the demand for grain along the migration route increased. Some
quantities of grain probably were obtained by exchanges with producers along
the migration route, but direct purchases from grain merchants at the major
Senegal valley markets also occurred. Records are not complete for the period,
but French documents from the mid-18808 indicate that grain prices at Bakel
increased as forgaoko caravans moved through the region.30 Quinfo cloth was
the currency accepted by the grain merchants, but they probably accepted cattle
and slaves in exchange for grain as well. The forgo, therefore, drew the
migrants into the markets of the Senegal valley as they made their journey to
Karta.

Given the uncertainties associated with the long migration up the valley,
some forgarrlgo chose to forgo caravan travel. The French steam ships which
moved up the Senegal River from Saint Louis to Medine after the annual rains
provided an alternative to caravan travel. Eorgarngo could board the ships at
one of the stops along the lower valley and then descend at Medine, which was
merely one day by foot from Konyakary. Several migrants traveled by ship in
the 18705, but the option grew in popularity during the 18808.31 In response to
the growing interest in travel by ship, Gaston Deves, a Saint Louisian merchant,
offered passage up the Senegal River on the French ships in exchange for the

32

cattle of lower valley herders. The grain merchants and butchers of the

82
Senegal valley provided crucial services in support of the mass migration of
{organise

The loss of Fulbe herders from the hinterland of Saint Louis attracted the
attention of the French as early as 1875, and the Governor of Senegal ordered
the oommandaofs of the valley to gather information about it beginning in the
late 18708.33 The French tried to stop the fggo through various strategies,
including the imprisonment of returning forgaoko recruiters, the surveillance of
and discussions with those groups which were planning to migrate and the
seizure of slaves, cattle and other goods from those Fulbe who made their way
to Karta. The French asked various Futanke leaders in the middle Senegal
valley to attack caravans, but these efforts only led the forgaoko to travel in
increasingly larger caravans to protect themselves as they moved up the valley.
Nevertheless, the migrants usually arrived in Karta without cattle, slaves and
material goods, and joined the Umarian armies without hesitation.

Four patterns emerge from the data regarding the forgo_b_l°rom. Firstly,
the western regions of Futa Toro consistently provided the largest number of
migrants. Toro province was the largest single contributor, but the Halaybe
village cluster (to the east of Toro) and communities in the lower valley
contributed a large number of migrants. Secondly, the participation of herders
increased over time, and came to dominate the numbers of forgarlloo. Thirdly,
forganko tended to be young males. While some caravans included women,
children and heads of household, many groups consisted almost entirely of men
between the ages of twenty and thirty. Not surprisingly, the French report
that the armies of Karta in the 1880s were composed almost entirely of young
men who had recently arrived. Young men were able to withstand the

hardship of the long forgo, and more willing to take risks than men who were

83
establishing households in the lower valley. Oral traditions of the forgo of
prominent notables often narrate the exploits of the notables’ sons, which
suggest that younger men were the most eager to join the forgo and best
suited for the demands of the migration trail.

Finally, an ethnic factor also emerges in the forgLNiom. While Soninke
from the upper valley and Wolof from the lower valley joined the forgo from
time to time during the late nineteenth century, the overwhelming majority of
forgaoko were Fulbe. The importance of ethnicity is magnified by the fact that
lower valley Fulbe herders, who comprised an important forgamso component in
the 18708 and 18808, left in large number while Wolof communities who farmed
in the same area did not join the forgo in the same proportions. Oral
traditions collected from descendants of lower valley Fulbe forgmko note the
desire to leave Wolof areas as one of the motivations for making the migration.
While French policies regarding the interests of Fulbe herding activities may in
part account for the lower valley Fulbe participation, the participation of many
Fulbe farmers from Futa Toro suggests that ethnicity was an important factor
in the W- Why did the Fulbe of the Senegal valley rrrigrate to Karta
in large numbers during the course of the late nineteenth century? Some

answers emerge from a careful analysis of the data.

W

The reasons that Senegal valley Fulbe participated in the forgo_liioro are
numerous. The efforts of agents who targeted the Fulbe for recruitment into
Umarian armies proved to be the most important factor. Beginning in the mid-

18608 and continuing throughout the next two decades, Umarian agents travelled

84

to the Senegal valley, rallied Fulbe under the Muslim banner, and led them to
Karta. Few forgaako would have made the long trip to Karta without the
active encouragement of the recruiters. Historical circumstances in the western
Senegal valley made certain groups more receptive than groups farther east to
recruitment into the fago. The French presence was closer, and in the case of
Dimar, the effects of French policies were quite evident. Farmers in Toro
province also felt both the demands of the toad}; elite and the French
presence in the Senegal valley. Herders in Toro and the lower valley resisted
French attempts to halt their raids against Moorish groups on the right bank
and the sedentary populations of the left bank. The result was significant
participation in the forgo at various junctures of the late nineteenth century.

Pull factors. The importance of recruiters, those who already had left the
Senegal valley and returned to encourage others to join the fggo, cannot be
overstated. During Umar Tal’s recruitment campaign in Futa Toro during the
late 18508, Eliman Seydu, a leading notable of Dimar, expressed the sentiments
of many Futanke when he reportedly said: "we prefer our country to one
which our fathers have not seen".34 This argument against migrating diminished
as the inhabitants of the valley heard about Karta from those who resided
there. Sons who had left Futa Toro ten years earlier returned as heads of
household who had several wives, children and slaves in Karta. The knowledge
that those who had followed Shaykh Umar were safe and calling for their
relatives to settle with them in the conquered territories altered how they
received the invitation: the Futanke realized that the holy war had succeeded
and the immigrants lived as a ruling elite in Karta. The Umarian armies were
no longer fighting on the march as invaders, but launching their wars from the
security of large Futanke settlements in Kingi and Jomboxo.

85

The forgo of Yero Balel, a prominent Fulbe notable, illustrates the role of
recruiters and how information about Karta encouraged participation in it. Oral
accounts from the Nioro area report that Yero decided to visit Karta prior to
leading his followers on the forgo because the wanted to make certain that the
region was suitable for settlement by herding communities. The informants note
that he was so impressed by the Kingi area that he returned to lead several
caravans of forgaoko there. French documents indicate that Yero Balel and a
companion made such an exploratory trip to Karta prior to the mass migrations
of the 18808, travelling by French steamship upriver in 1878.35 Since Yero
became an important military commander in Karta, it was less the pasturage of
Karta than the military opportunities which moved him to recruit so many Fulbe
to make the forgo. Yero’s emergence as a leading joro_forgo of the 18808
clearly shows how a recruiter with knowledge of conditions in Karta succeeded
in convincing Fulbe to make the final decision to migrate.

Oral accounts of Yero Balel’s leadership also emphasize his ability to
protect his forganko from attacks along the way due to his experience as a jool
forgo. Yero was not unique in that regard; most recruiters were Fulbe who
had already made the forgo and could reassure reluctant migrants that they
knew the migration route and how to avoid its many dangers.36 All residents
of the valley knew that attacks might occur as they passed through Toro, Law
and Bossea, since the Laamdolom, the Almamy of Law and Abdul Bokar Kan
often raided caravans. They also knew that the migration to Kingi involved a
lengthy passage through the Sahel east of Bakel, where knowledge of the
locations of wells was essential. Many communities waited several years to

make the forgo with an experienced recruiter who had made the trip often.37

86
Recruiters were a crucial human link between Karta and the Senegal valley
without whom the forgo Nioro would not have occurred.

Recruiters often carried letters from relatives who made specific requests
for relatives to join them in the conquered territories. An Arabic letter
confiscated in 1866 by a French oorrlrrraodam at Podor reveals the tone and
sentiments of the immigrant community in Karta.38 The author of the letter,
Moktar Soogi, was a leader of a Fulbe Wodaabe group which had participated in
Umar’s conquests in both Karta and Segu and returned to Karta to settle at
Sambagore, a village to the west of Nioro.39 He wrote on behalf of the Fulbe
Wodaabe who had fought in the holy war, and addressed the letter to the
Wodaabe who had remained in the Senegal valley. He mentioned several Fulbe

leaders by name, and informed them that:40

. . . we are well and wish the same for you. We want to
encourage the Muslims among you to respond to God’s will [and
emigrate]. Do not fear that those who have come to Nioro have
lost their possessions and their families. Know that God will
provide for those who follow His commands. . . .

Shayfll Umar told us . . . your relatives [who remain, in
the valley] prefer Christians [the French] to Muslims. . . .

It is much easier to extract water from dry soil than it is to

separate them from the Christians. . . . [Those who remain]
are infidels. . . . They are damned [to go to Hell].

Moktar’s letter illustrates another factor pulling the forgmlgo to Karta:
religious arguments in favor of leaving a region which was coming increasingly
under the domination of the French. The religious arguments exerted pressure
upon the populations of the valley to emigrate. Moktar’s letter was clearly
intended to provoke a response by suggesting that those who remained in the
valley would go to Hell. The reference to Umar Tal’s statement that the Fulbe

of the valley preferred Christians to Muslims served both to embarrass those

87
who had not joined the holy war and encourage them to make up for their
mistake. French reports from the nineteenth century Senegal valley often noted
that the forgo_Ni_oro was the result of the "fanaticism" of the Futanke;41
Moktar’s letter suggests that the migration was a response to specific religious
arguments made by relatives and other forgmko who wrote or returned to the
Senegal valley.

The religious arguments for making the forgo cannot be separated from an
invitation to join Muslim armies. Moktar’s letter mentioned that God would
provide for those who headed the call: the recruiters probably were more
direct in their references to the material rewards from participation in Muslim
armies in Karta. The recruiters often served as regimental commanders of the
forgmugo upon arrival in Karta. The jorn_f_orgo expected to lead their recruits
into war, and rise within the ranks of the army based on both their success in
enlarging the Muslim armies with forgaoko as well as in fighting in Karta. The
fggarrko were equally desirous of gaining booty, since they often lost or sold
most of their material possessions during the forgo. Thus, the "fanaticism"
noted by the French also reflected the ambition of those who migrated to Karta
in hopes of making a name and wealth for themselves through participation in
religiously sanction warfare.

Recruiters described the material wealth awaiting the forgaoko who joined
Umarian wars in Karta, reminded the Fulbe that emigration was incumbent upon
all Muslims and carried specific invitations from relatives who already had made
the forgo. Perhaps most importantly, they knew the migration route and
promised to lead the forgaolgo safely from the Senegal valley to Karta. The
recruiters embodied the "pull" of Karta for the populations of the Senegal
valley. Specific groups of Senegal valley Fulbe responded to this encouragement

88
at different historical moments in the late nineteenth century. French reports
indicate, for example, that sedentary groups from Dimar migrated in much larger
numbers than herders during the 18608;42 the pattern reversed during the
1880s, when herders migrated in considerably greater numbers than sedentary
populations. While the actions of specific recruiters may have played a role,
other factors also explain the changed pattern. The Mom involved
historical forces which pushed specific Senegal valley populations from their
regions of origin at certain times in the past.

Push factors. The push factors which encouraged specific groups to leave
the valley when they did are difficult to reconstruct. Impersonal forces such as
overpopulation and land scarcity may have been a factor, but none of the oral
informants or written records provide any direct references to these issues.
The complaints registered in the data concern resistance to the emancipation of
slaves at' French posts, excessive taxation and French attempts to halt the
practice of raiding in the Senegal valley. These complaints may have been the
manifest factors, whereas impersonal forces were latent. Given the difficulty in
determining population size and changes over time, it is impossible at this stage
of my research to relate the forgo_Nioro to such forces. The burden of the
present discussion is to evaluate the importance of several factors which the
emigrants themselves suggested were pushing them to Karta.

Resistance to taxation is cited frequently as a reason for making the forgo
Nioro. The first recruiters who arrived in the Senegal valley stressed the
advantages of living in Karta where the taxes were not burdensome. These
arguments seem to have struck a chord in Dimar, a province of Futa Toro
which had come under direct French supervision and paid taxes annually to

chefs appointed by the French. In the 18608, recruiters convinced several

89
Futanke communities not to pay their annual tax and make the forgo after the

harvest.43

Amadu Kadiata, a French-appointed chef, confirmed that excessive
taxation was the primary reason that most of the Fulbe threatened to migrate,
and added that the migrants would have to pay no taxes if they moved to
Karta44 Alfa Samba Cold, another chef in Dimar who led a migration in 1375,
also played on the themes of excessive taxation as a reason for making the
forgo.“ Elsewhere, rerganlto complained about the LaarodLToro’s efforts to
collect taxes as a factor pushing them to migrate at various times in the late
nineteenth century.

Another reason frequently cited for making the forgo is opposition to the
French policy of emancipating "trade slaves" at the French posts. Lower valley
momma often liberated any slave who showed up in their post and asked
for emancipation. As a result, disgruntled slaves increasingly left their masters
during the late nineteenth century. Fulbe complaints about this policy
increased over time, and the anger with the liberation of slaves became the
most frequently cited reason for making the forgo_ijo in the 18808. The
French published data on the number of slaves whom they liberated at their
posts, and that data correlates with the frequency of Fulbe complaints: the
number of slaves liberated in the late 18608 and early 18708 averaged less than
150 annually, but the yearly totals increased to some 400 liberations annually
during the late 18708 and then reached over one thousand slaves liberated
annually during the mid-18808.46 While the data does not allow one to show
whether those making the fqgo had lost slaves or merely feared losing them,
the data suggests that the French policy regarding slave emancipations was a

factor contributing to Fulbe migrations to Karta.

90

For Fulbe herders, another reason for making the forgo was resistance to
French efforts to halt the raids traditionally pursued by their bands in the
lower valley. French ooromaodaots inflicted heavy fines on Fulbe leaders who
were caught with possessions taken from others, and these leaders often made
threats about making the forgo.47 The data does not indicate how many
actually migrated, but many certainly made the forgo. Other leaders resisted
French attempts to keep them from going to the right bank to raid Moorish
bands, and then left for Karta, arguing that they could raid with impunity

there.48

This knowledge of the military opportunities reflects the ability of
recruiters to target potential forgaoko with precision.

While complaints against the emancipation of slaves were registered more
often then resistance to the French effort to stop Fulbe raids, it probably was
the French effort to halt raids that figured more prominently as a push factor.
Young men, those who depended upon raiding to generate wealth, joined the
forgo in larger numbers than older men, those who generally would have large
slave holdings. The greater frequency of complaints against emancipation may
reflect the quality of the relationship which older men would have had with the
French oomandarrrs. Additionally, Futanke who remained in the valley because
they did not want to risk losing their slaves on the long fugo were those who
had the most to gain from a reversal of the French policy, and probably argued
in favor of French tolerance for slavery by noting that their relatives and
neighbors made the forgo in protest of the policy. Their complaints added to
French perceptions that most migrants left because of the emancipation policy.

Flight from natural crises in the Senegal valley does not seem to be a
dominant pattern in the Moro. The data do not indicate any relationship

between low rainfall/poor harvests and the forgo.49 The reaction to poor rains

91

usually involved a movement to another region in the Senegal valley and not
the long migration to Karta.50 Several years of movement within the valley
may have encouraged some groups to make the forgo. Poor harvests in the
Senegal valley, however, usually encouraged Futanke to wait before making the
forgo: most forganko usually left immediately after the harvest so as to
provide adequate grain reserves for the long trek. Oral traditions of the
fago, too, do not even hint at migration as a response to changes in rainfall
patterns. The traditions and proverbs regarding rainfall reflect forgaolgo
consciousness that the patterns of precipitation in Karta were less reliable than
those in the Senegal valley. These statements illustrate the lack of familiarity
with the natural cycles of Karta which one would expect from immigrants.

The only natural crisis which seems to have influenced the patterns of
participation in the forgo_Nioro is the cholera epidemic of the late 18608 which
ravaged populations throughout the Senegal valley. Religious arguments
regarding eternal damnation for those who remained in the valley probably had
more force as Futanke saw thousands of their relatives die from cholera. The
province of Toro reportedly lost close to one-quarter of its population during

the epidemic.51

Perhaps not coincidentally, Toro also was the major region of
origin for forgmko caravans during the late 18608 and early 18708. The direct
impact of the epidemic on the forgo is difficult to calculate. The French noted
that a few Futanke left for Nioro at the height of the epidemic, but most of
them died before getting too far on the route heading east; the experience
dampened enthusiasm for the forgo.52 The era also was the moment when the
French began to move against Amadu Madiyu, a Muslim cleric from western

Futa Toro. The French destroyed several villages in Toro province, and the

Madiyanke’s forces responded with an escalation of the armed conflict in the

92
region. The period was a time of crisis and upheaval in Toro province, the
major region of origin of theera.

Toronke informants who made the forgo at this time state that the social
upheaval in Toro was the major consideration for leaving the region. These
informants made their statements to the French oommmdarrt at Bakel who
stopped their caravan as it passed through the upper valley in early 1870.53
They stated, upon direct questioning regarding their support for Amadu Madiyu,
that they were not Madiyanke but refugees who left Toro to escape the warfare
and raids associated with the Franco-Madiyanke conflict. Since these forganko
knew that the French might halt their forgo, they probably modified their
statements to ensure that they would be allowed to continue on to Karta.“ No
other internal evidence points to consciousness of the epidemic as a force
which encouraged migration from the region; no oral traditions, for example,
refer to the cholera epidemic as the basis for making the forgLNiom. The
impact of the cholera epidemic was indirect, reflected in social chaos, the
Madiyanke movement and increasing participation in the forgo.

The push and pull of the Moro worked in tandem to encourage
Futanke to migrate to Karta. Futanke paid no taxes in Karta, could. own as
many slaves as they could accumulate, and were encouraged to join the Futanke
armies of Karta. Recruiters played on these aspects of life in Karta to
encourage Futanke who were the most frustrated with excessive taxation, the
emancipation policy and the effort to halt raids. The push factors made the
populations receptive to recruiters, and the recruiters read letters and described
social conditions in Karta until Futanke yielded and joined the forgo. At times
of crisis, such as when the cholera epidemic spread through the Senegal valley,

the push factors may have been the most influential. However, over the course

93
of the late nineteenth century, it was the pull factors which most encouraged
the Futanke to migrate to Nioro: the forgo_&'mo would not have attracted as
many participants if not for the activities of recruiters. They were the human
link between the two regions. The recruiters were crucial to the dynamic of
the population flow as it unfolded in the historical context of the late
nineteenth century Senegal valley.

f f r

Besides the changes in the demographic character of the Futanke presence
in Karta, the forgo_Ni_or_o altered the terms of the consolidation of Umarian
power in the region. As additional Futanke arrived in Karta, tensions increased
between immigrant and indigenous communities in Karta. Tensions were evident
almost immediately after the conquest, as evidenced by the comments of
Futanke who were returning to the Senegal valley in 1866. They told the
French oomrrrarflaor at Bakel that they were returning to recruit additional
Futanke migrants because Karta still was a "Soninke country".55 Futanke
ethnic consciousness also drew upon the ideology that Fulbe were "better"
Muslims than the other ethnic populations of the Western Sudan. The
association of Muslim commitment among the Futanke preceded Umar Tal’s holy
war, due in large part to the eighteenth century holy war fought in Futa
Toro.56 This consciousness also reflected the broader participation of Fulbe in
holy wars throughout West Africa: the eighteenth century movement in Futa
Jallon and the early nineteenth century holy wars fought in Sokoto and
Masina;7 The large numbers of Senegal valley Fulbe who joined Umar Tal’s

94
holy war and then participated in the forgo_N_iom increased the Muslim
pretensions of the Fulbe immigrants in Karta.

The Futanke remember that Karta had few mosques in its settlements, and
that they had to build mosques as one of their first projects in colonizing the
region. The main mosque in N ioro can accommodate hundreds of Muslims, and
the vast majority of those who prayed at N ioro during the late nineteenth
century were Futanke. By the late 18608, Futanke notables began to push
Mustafa Keita, the Governor of Nioro, to replace the imam at the time, a
Soninke cleric named Fode Buyagi Kaba Jakite, with a cleric selected from the
Futanke community.58 The Kaba Jakite family also had migrated from the
Senegal valley, and claimed solidarity with the Futanke as initial followers of
Shaykh Umar. That the Futanke emphasized the ethnicity of the Kaba Jakite
family over and above the shared commitment to Shayla]: Umar reveals the
emergence of Fulbe consciousness in the Kingi area.

Paul Soleillet, a French traveller who passed through Konyakary and the
Futanke colonies in Jomboxo, noted the emergence of similar attitudes whereby
the Fulbe were considered to be "better" Muslims than the faithful among the
indigenous communities of the region.59 Soleillet also canvassed opinion among
some of the non-Futanke, and observed that they resented the pretension of the
Futanke. In Jomboxo as in Kingi, the physical hardships which the forganko
endured in. making the migration to Karta reinforced the attitude that, since the
Futanke had sacrificed the comforts of the Senegal valley to settle in a region
which had been conquered during a holy war, they deserved exalted status over
the indigenous groups who had submitted to Shaykh Umar. The Futanke,

therefore, saw themselves as exemplary Muslims who were establishing Islam

95
where paganism had previously reigned, and had the right to dominate Karta
and its inhabitants because of their divine mission.

For a large part, the religious pretensions of the forgamso cannot be
separated from the desire to gain booty through warfare. Recent migrants were
forceful advocates of a militant interpretation of the Muslim commitment to
holy war, and pushed for frequent campaigns in order to increase their material
possessions. These interests were expressed by one informant, who said that
those who made the forgo were unlearned Muslims who accomplished through
warfare what the learned clerics could not accomplish with their words.60 Not
surprisingly, the former heartland of Massassi settlement was a locus of
continued warfare and raiding, where the Futanke attacked the last remnants of
the Bambara ruling elite and their allies and left the region virtually
uninhabited by the turn of the century.61 Further south, Futanke raids
extended deep into the Baule River basin, against Malinke communities.

The pattern of raiding over time is difficult to determine, but if the
reputations of the succession of leaders in Kingi and J omboxo serve as a
general guide, then the raids seem to have subsided during the 18608 only to
increase in frequency and violence during the 18708 and 808. The military
commanders of the 18608, Mustafa and Samba Mody of Konyakary, led several
successful military campaigns but did not create a reputation as formidable
generals. In contrast, their replacements in Nioro and Konyakary, Muntaga and
Bassiru Tal, respectively, were known during their tenure as committed holy
warriors and still command that status in the oral u'aditions of the region.62
The greater emphasis on the credentials of Shaykh Umar’s sons as opposed to
those of Umar’s appointed is simultaneously the expression of the actual
differences in the frequency of combat and the ideology of Futanke superiority

96
in the conduct of Islam: Mustafa and Samba Mody were chastised by the
Futanke community for being former slaves and not Futanke.

The W, therefore, altered the nature of Umarian domination in
Karta by bringing thousands of young Futanke who successquy pressured the
military leaders to conduct more and more raids against non-Fulbe populations
in the region. The increasing number of military campaigns did not result in
general social chaos in Karta because the stimulus for military activity was not
the need to defend the state against internal challenges but the desire to
acquire wealth from raiding populations in southern Karta. These southern
communities usually did not organize themselves to resist the Futanke raids,
choosing instead to endure them or move out of the region. As one French
official commented about Muntaga’s army during the early 18808, it thrived on a
type of organized warfare which contrasted with the wars of the neighboring
African populations.63 What the French official did not realize was that the
Umarian pattern of warfare during the 18808 resembled the Massassi pattern of
raids half a decade earlier.

The Umarian state in Karta was a successor to the Massassi state. Umar
Tal’s settlement of Futanke after the conquest, Alfa Umar’s aggressive
leadership during the late 18508, and the continuing consolidation of power
under Mustafa Keita during the 18608 created the conditions for the emergence
of an autonomous Umarian state in Karta. The alliances in the north with
Moorish and Soninke groups provided a stable and secure area of Futanke
settlement from which to launch the raids into the south. The alliances also
brought Futanke in contact with merchant groups who willingly purchased the
slaves produced by their wars and raids. Without the arrival of so many
Futanke from the Senegal valley, however, the return to the Massassi pattern

97
of wars and raids as a major state activity would not have occurred as
completely and successfully as it did.

As the recent immigrants arrived and joined the Umarian armies during the
1870s and 18808, some of the initial Futanke settlers were moving into economic
activities, and became increasingly critical of the warfare pursued by the new
arrivals. This tension among the Futanke of Karta influenced the course of
Umarian political history. Before the diverity of activities and attitudes of the
Futanke can be appreciated, the regional economic history of Karta in the late
nineteenth century needs to be discussed. The next chapter focuses on Umarian
Karta and the regional economy. Chapter Five then turns to the activities of
F utanke who no longer fought in the military and became involved in economic

enterprises linked to the regional economy.

98

139195

1. Lt. Commandant Joseph Gallieni, W
W (Paris. 1835). P- 592-

2. See, for a good overview of the literature, Kenneth Swindell, "Labour
migration in underdeveloped countries: the case of subSaharan Africa", ngroos

1115998131211! 12 (1979).

3. See, for example, Samir Amin, "Introduction", in Modom_Mjgrari_oos_'m
Wosfornfifrioa, S. Amin, ed. (London, 1974).

4. Most of the relevant census reports are in ANM 1D51 (census reports for
1895 and 1899) and 5D29/5D36 (census reports for 1904). I also examined the
statistics on the yillagos_do_hoorto created in Karta. Most of the slaves owned
by Senegambians either were retained by those who remained in Karta or were
taken by neighboring Soninke villages. The initial French officials were
inundated with complaints about the latter practice.

5. Jacques Meniaud discuses the forced migration in LoLBjormiorLdnmoan,
WM 2 volumes (Paris, 1931). The sources for the
forced migration include the correspondence between various oommmrdams in
Nioro and Colonel Archinard (in ANM 2N36, 1E60 and 1E211), the reports of
French officials involved in the administrative action (Sensarric in ANM 5D15,
Mazillier in ANM 1D74, and Dodds in ANF.SOM SEN.IV 69), and the descriptions
of the arriving emigrants as reported by the French officials in middle Senegal
valley posts (ANS 136191 and 136231). Based on an analysis of these materials,
I put a conservative estimate on the numbers of forced migrants at 20,000.

6. The problem persisted well into the twentieth century. ANM 1D82:
"Rapport sur la necessite de donne aux Peuls Toronke du Kingi un état social",
1905.

7. The correspondence written at the time of the various census surveys is
filled with complaints of under-reporting by village leaders. See, for example,
the correspondence in ANM 5D29.

8. Oral traditions collected by Abdoul Aziz Diallo maintain that 5,000 Umarians
lost their life during the French conquest. Diallo discussed this issue with me,
and allowed me to work with his taped interviews which he conducted in 1979.

9. Although women and children had travelled with the main Umarian army in
1859, Umar ordered a large number of dependents to return to Karta or the
upper Senegal valley when supplies began to dwindle on route to Segu. David
Robinson. W (Oxford. 1985). pP- 256-57-

99

10. Interviews with Amadou Ba, 24 January 1986, Baedel Diallo, 17 February
1986, El Hadj Sadiku Kaba Jakite, 25 February 1986. See also Amadou Ba,
"Connaissance de la commune de Nioro-du-Sahel" (mimeo), n.d.

11. Samba Umahani responded to recruiters circulating in the valley in early
1864. See, for descriptions of Samba’s forgo, ANS 136102: Dagana, 14 July
1864, Ct. Dagana to the Governor; and ANS 136169: Bakel, 18 February and 2
July 1865, Ct. Bakel to the Governor.

12. References to migrations led by various Wodaabe ardo or chiefs abound in
the ANS Dagana and Bakel dossiers.

13. See, for example, ANS 136102: Dagana, 24 September 1866, Ct. Dagana to
the Governor.

14. See, for one description of the injuries by a mansion: who was appalled
by the violence inflicted on the forganko, ANS 136210: Medine, 4 February
1865, Ct. Medine to Ct Bakel.

15. ANS 136210: Medine, 22 May 1865, Ct. Medine to Ct. Bakel.
16. I discuss Amadu Sheku’s recruiters in Chapter Seven.

17. While French officials in the middle valley spread rumors of a "complete
abandonment" of Toro province in 1870, reports of migrants who actually left
for Karta and passed near the upper valley posts of Bakel and Medine suggest
that French fears were exaggerated. Babacar Coulibaly’s estimates of 12,500-
15,000 forgarrko are much too high; unfortunately, he provides no citations to
French archival materials nor Senegal valley oral traditions to substantiate his
claims. Alassane W616 shares my view that the migration increased but not
dramatically. See, for the rumors of a "complete abandonment" of Toro, ANS
136171: Bakel, 31 March 1870, Ct. Bakel to the Governor. See also, Coulibaly,
"L’Armée toucouleur du jihad omarien a la fin de l’empire", Université de Dakar,
memoire dc matirise, 1978; W616, "Le Fergo omarien et son prolongement",
Université de Dakar, memoire de maitrise, 1976.

18. Relevant French correspondence is scattered throughout the ANS dossiers
from Bakel dming 1867-72. See, for an overview of French policy during this
era, ANS 136172: Bakel, (c. 1873?), "Instructions generales laissées a mon
successeur".

19. ANS 136171: Bakel, 28 February and 30 May 1871, Ct. Bakel to the Governor.
20. I discuss this attempt in Chapter Eight.

21. ANS 136108: Dagana, Loumalfiomsto, March 1875.

22- ANS 130103: Dagana. Bulletrnagncolemmmmalemolmque March. 1875.

23. ANS 136108: Dagana, 29 March 1875, Ct. Dagana to the Governor;
Dagana. WW. March 1875.

100

24. Alassane W616 shares my view of the importance of the migrations
beginning in 1875. W616, "Le Fergo omarien", p. 247.

25. ANS 2875: Saint Louis, 7 February 1889, Governor to the Minister.

26. The proportions of herders and farmers who made the forgo is an open
topic among the descendants of the migrants. For the last years of the
migrations, however, the young, male herders dominated the ranks of

See Adboul Aziz Diallo’ 8 interviews with Mamadou Alfa and Bassirou Alfa Diallo
at Gavinané, Mali in September 1977 and 1979. See my interviews with Amadou
Ba of Nioro.

27 . Mustafa Kane collected oral traditions regarding the forgo of the Halaybe.

28. Leaders include the Eliman Rindiaw of Bossea in central Futa Toro, and
several members of the Sal family who used the forgo to enhance their claims
to the leadership of Toro in western Futa Toro.

29. ANF.SOM SEN.I 61c: Saint Louis, 22 March and 5 June 1878, Governor to
the Minister. These two letters provide details of the fugo and insights into
the recruitment policy of the Umarian state in Karta. Qrmmandam Soyer, who
served at Bakel during the late 18708, gathered the information which the
Governor of Senegal passed along to the Minister. Much of the discussion
which follows draws on these letters. Oral interviews collected by Abdoul Aziz
Diallo also inform the analysis which follows.

30. See, for example, ANS 136187: Bakel, WW
mfifigno, February, April, May, June 1887.

31. ANS 136113: Dagana. W
September, 1886.

32. See, for a discussion of Devés’ role, ANS 13641: Dagana, 20 June 1886,
Ct. Dagana to the Governor.

33. The information which the Governor accumulated can be found in ANS 13641.
34. ANS 136118: Dimar, 14 November 1859, Ct. Dimar to the Governor.
35. ANS 136127: Podor, 14 March 1878, Ct. Podor to Ct. Bakel.

36. The ANS files are filled with references to recruiters who led forganko to
Karta several times. See, for example, 136127: Podor, 18 March 1878, Ct. Podor
to the Governor; 136112: Dagana, 16 December 1884, Ct. Dagana to the Director
of Indigenous Affairs.

37. ANS 136131: Podor, 25 December 1882, Ct. Podor to the Director of

Political Affairs; ANS 130113 Dagana. WU
polig’qoo, September, 1886.

101

38. Only one such letter has surfaced to date from my work with the Arabic
materials of the era. 1 am persuaded that it reflects the general tone of the
numerous letters sent to the Senegal valley from Karta.

39. Alfa Samba Wa (Wane?), a recruiter from Nioro, carried Moktar’s letter to
the Senegal valley sometime in early 1866. ANS 136103: Podor, 17 February
1866, Ct. Podor to the Governor.

40. ANS 136103: piece 9. Piece 8 is a fairly accurate French translation of
the letter.

41. The mass migrations of Fulbe herders from the lower valley pressed the
French to explain the reasons for their participation, since they assumed that
the herders of the lower valley were less "fanatic" than the Fulbe farmers of
Futa Toro. While Fulbe herders did not have as many mosques nor notable
clerics as the farmers of Futa Toro, the religious differences which the French
assert are inappropriate. The oral traditions of forganko herders note
differences in Muslim practice among the transhumant and sedentary Fulbe
populations of the valley and argue that the herders came to dominate the
ranks of the forgarfio because they had more to prove than the settled Futanke.
One cannot project this sense of rivalry with much certainty into the past, but
the oral traditions contradict the French assertions of differences in Muslim
commitment between the two Fulbe occupational categories.

42. ANS 136102: Dagana, 4 March 1864, Ct. Dagana to the Governor.
43. ANS 136103: Dagana, 4 February 1866, Ct. Dagana to the Governor.

44. ANS 136103: Dagana, n.d. (c. 1866), French translation of a letter from
Amadou Kadiata, Chef de Fanaye.

45. ANS 136108: Dagana. Bulletinaancolesommercialetmlitique. Mamh. 1875.
46. The figures are reported in JournaLCXfioiol.

47. See, for example, ANS 136113: Dagana, 12 March 1869, Ct. Dagana to the
Governor; ANS 136111: Dagana, 1 August 1881, Ct. Dagana to the Governor.

48. ANS 136112: Dagana: 1 April 1883, Ct. Dagana to the Governor.

 

49. French reports of rainfall patterns at their posts and their assessments of
crop size are the only sources available for an analysis of the relationship
between rainfall and the forgo. Admittedly, these sources may not accurately
reflect the patterns throughout Futa Toro, since rainfall varies considerably
within the Senegal valley. Nevertheless, these do not indicate a correlation
between years of low rainfall and poor harvests and the ebbs and tides in the
migration flow to Karta.

50. ANS 136102: Dagana, 17 February 1864, Ct. Dagana to the Governor;
ANS 136112: Dagana, 1 February 1883, Ct. Dagana to the Governor.

51. ANS 136124: Podor, 13 January 1869, Ct. Podor to the Governor.

102

52. ANS 13G103: Dagana. Bulletin_agrieole._cemmereiaLet_pelitique. December.
1868.

53. ANS 136171: Bakel, 1 March 1870, testimony of Ali Aliou Senou and
Tafsir Alioune (French translation of the sessions with the Commandam of
Bakel, the informants and the interpreter).

54. Ali Aliou argues that "other" forganko were followers of Amadu Madiyu
who were fleeing to safety in Nioro, but that they were "loyalists" who fled the
warfare associated with the conflict.

55. ANS 136170: Bakel, 8 November 1866, Ct. Bakel to the Governor.

56. David Robinson, "Abdul Qadir and Shaykh Umar: a continuing tradition of
Islamic leadership 1n Futa Toro" huemaflenalloumalofAfneanl-Iisterieal

Studies 6 (1975)

57. See, for a discussion of Fulbe ethnic consciousness, Robinson, W
W. 1313-81-39-

58. MG. Adam, Mae-WWW (Paris 1904).
pp. 111-112.

59. 801611161; 0 a." '. "0. 3 - i ' kt" tern '. at" ' mt .
WWW. pp 16311 See also for another
reference to the Umarian view that those who lived in Karta before the holy

war were not "good Muslim" Paul Marty. Enrdes_sru_l_lslarn_et_les_trihus_du
Soudan, Volume4(Paris, 1921), pp. 211- 213.

60. Fonds Abdoul Aziz Diallo, interview with Aliou Sow on 4 February 1980 at
Leyya.

61. An early French colonial observer described the former heartland of
Massassi settlement as virtually uninhabited and overrun with bush and wild
animals. See Emile Blanc, "Contribution a l’6tude des populations et de
l’histoire du Sahel soudanais" ,

SeientifiquesdellAfrieuefleeidentaleEmeaise (1924).

62. See, for the oral traditions regarding Bassiru, my interviews with El Hadj
Maeyal Diako at Konyakary and Bassirou Lamine Tall at Kayes in February 1986.
See, for the oral u'aditions regarding Muntaga, my interviews with Amadou Ba
at Nioro in early 1986, and Abdoul Aziz Diallo’s interviews with Mamadou Alfa
Diallo and Bassirou Alfa Diallo at Gavinan6 in February 1980.

63. ANF.SOM SEN.I 610: Saint Louis, 22 March 1878, Governor to the
Minister. The source of information was the French official at Bakel,

Cemandam Soyer.

 

CHAPTER FOUR

Regional Trade and the State in Umarian Karta

Shaykh Umar Tal’s mid-nineteenth century holy war altered the economic
fortunes of the territories which his armies conquered in the Western Sudan.
After the fall of Segu and Masina, the depth of local resistance to Umarian
rule prevented the successor states in those regions from gaining a firm hold
over the economic resources of the Niger River valley. In the middle Niger
valley, the major commercial town of the region, Sinsani, revolted against the
Umarians, and added to the general social chaos which led to its decline as a
commercial center. In Masina, the Kunta, a commercial diaspora which
dominated regional exchanges, also revolted, and did not support. Umarian
attempts to create a successor state in the inland Niger delta. In both regions,
wars and raids disrupted the annual cycle of harvests in the countryside. As a
result, the previous centers of production and exchange along the Niger valley
no longer thrived as they had during the first half of the nineteenth century.1

The economic consequences of Umar’s holy war were not uniformly
disruptive. In Karta, the transition from Bambara to Futanke rule did not
disturb the patterns of the regional economy.2 During the 18608, the efforts of

103

104

the Umarian leader at Nioro, Mustafa Keita, helped build a multi-ethnic
coalition of interest which worked to ensure that regional exchanges continued
to occur as the Futanke moved to consolidate their position in the region.
Nioro and several other communities along the southern edge of the western
Sahara benefitted from the commercial orientation away from the middle Niger
valley: Nioro consolidated its status as a port of trade for the caravan traffic
coming from the desert- side. Additionally, the Umarian state in Karta
supported the emergence of Medine as a major upper Senegal valley gum
market. Medine’s rise as a gum market in the late nineteenth century led to a
local gum boom which encouraged harvesting of this product from the acacia
forests to the north of Karta, and contributed to the circulation of wealth
within the region.3

Medine’s rise as an upper Senegal valley gum entrepot has not commanded
the attention of many historians. Philip Curtin comments on the emergence of
Medine as a major commercial center, but he does not study it in great detail
because its efflorescence occurred after the period of his analysis of the
Senegambian economy.4 S6k6n6-Mody Cissoko discusses Medine’s economic role
in the upper valley in a chapter of his work on the history of Xasso, the
region where Medine was established.5 He points accurately to the gum u‘ade
as the reason for its growth, but fails to appreciate the complexity of Medine’s
commercial relations with Karta. In fact he asserts incorrectly that the
Umarians sold very little grain at Medine.6 Cissoko’s error stems in part from
an incomplete examination of the archives from Medine] Gerald Kisyeti, who
studied the commerce of the "Tukulor Empire" under Cissoko’s supervision, fills

in some of the lacuna in Cissoko’s pioneering study, but largely neglects the

, 105

grain trade, the most important dimension of Umarian commercial involvement
at Medine.8

The present chapter examines the political economy of regional exchanges
of gum and salt in the late nineteenth century.9 I analyze the ways in which
the Umarian state in Karta supported the expansion of regional commerce. 10
Since salt and gum were produced in the desert-side and largely exchanged at
markets outside of Karta, I begin the discussion by examining economic activity
in the Saharan desert-side and in the Senegal valley. I then turn to the
Umarian state in Karta and the general patterns of regional exchange which its
leaders encouraged during the period after the holy war and before the French

conquest.

 

North of Karta were two desert-side regions of great economic importance
in the late nineteenth century. Northwest of the Xoolimbinne valley lay the
Tagant, a region with extensive groves of date palms and gum-producing acacia

trees.11

It also supported an oasis settlement at Tishit which serviced caravans
carrying salt bars southward from the Ijil salt mines to the markets of the
Western Sudan. Tishit, too, was the source of uncrystallized deposits of ground
salt which pastoral groups used to feed their livestock. Northeast of Kingi was
another desert-side region, known as the Hodh. This region also was well
endowed with acacia trees and had an oasis, Walata, which sat at the nexus of
trade routes leading from the Ijil and Tawdenni salt mines of the Sahara. The
Hodh had fewer wells than the Tagant, and consequently supported fewer

inhabitants than its neighboring region.

, 106

The Tagant and the Hodh formed part of a belt of sparsely inhabited, arid
land which runs south of the Sahara desert from the Atlantic coast to the Red
Sea. Most of its inhabitants derived a living from pastoralism, despite the
presence of settled life in oases, agricultural activity in low-lying areas and salt
mining in scattered desert-side environments. While anthropologists and
historians initially considered southern Saharan societies to have been quite
distinct from agricultural societies to the south, recent work shows that
economic relations between desert-side herders and savanna farmers integrated

both groups into regional economic systems. 12

When pastoral groups moved into
southern areas during the course of their transhumant cycles, extensive small-
scale exchanges occurred, as herders and farmers traded livestock for grain and
other goods from the different productive regimes of contiguous ecological
zones. When rainfall was abundant, enterprising groups could invest in the
expansion of productive activities associated with these exchanges, further
encouraging economic integration across the ecological frontier.

The nineteenth century was such an era of abundant rainfall in the
Western Sudan. 13 Moorish groups expanded upon the exchange of livestock for
grain by investing in increased production of bar salt in the Saharan mines at
Ijil and Tawdenni. Much of this salt entered the commercial networks of West
Africa at the middle Niger valley, which was a southern terminus for many
Moorish groups, a crossroads for commercial traffic going further south and the
locus of a considerable population of its own- Commercial groups living in the
middle Niger valley invested in slave-based production of grain and cloth for
exchange with the Moors. The Bambara state of Segu also facilitated the long-

term patterns of regional economic integration by capturing slaves for sale to

107
both the plantation owners and Moorish investors who constantly needed
replacements for the slaves who died in the harsh conditions of the salt mines.
Elsewhere along the upper Niger and in the Xoolimbinne valley east of
Medine, local commercial groups established similar patterns of exchange with

Moorish groups. 14

The amount of investrrrent in slave labor in these regions did
not compare with that in the middle Niger valley, but increases in slave-use
were noticeable throughout the Western Sudan. 15 Considerable debate surrounds
the question of the historical factors contributing to the vitality of the

nineteenth century economy;16

the relevant point here is that the most
successful economic activities of the era involved production for and exchange
with inhabitants of the desert-side. Integration across ecological boundaries
served to bring social groups from diverse regions into commercial networks and
powerful communities of interest.

‘ Moorish social charters influenced which desert- side groups participated in
these economic activities in the Western Sudan. The charters were based on
the outcomes of late seventeenth century social conflicts in which warrior
groups received submissions from the other southern Saharan lineages. 17
Warrior groups lived by raiding and collecting tribute from subordinates, and
left the management of economic activity to the mayo, groups distinguished
by the scholarship in the Islamic sciences of an ancestor or a lineage fraction.
Zamaya lineages often traded on their clerical heritage to demand gifts and
labor from non-warrior groups. 18 They also used their credentials as Muslim
jurists to mediate disputes among warrior lineages. In return, enterprising
zayyaya lineages asked the warriors for access to transport corridors and regions
of productive potential, and directed their clients to engage in economic

activities which increased the wealth of the mayo. These clerical groups were

108
the Moorish actors who moved to integrate the desert-side with the Western
Sudan.

Zmyaya groups dominated the production, transport and sale of Ijil and
Tawdenni salt bars in the Western Sudan. 19 The Kunta zayraya confederation
exercised monopoly control over the production of Ijil salt, and dominated its
transport from the Sahara to Shinqit, a major oasis northwest of Tishit. Other
zayraya confederation of lineages, most notably the Laghlal, who controlled vast
camel herds, transported Ijil salt from Shinqit to the oases of Tishit and Walata
and on to the northern markets of the Western Sudan. Other mayo groups
with ties to these lineages involved themselves in wholesale marketing of Ijil
salt, and had resident agents in all the major markets of the Western Sudan.
Production and transport of Tawdenni salt similarly involved zayyaya groups.
The most notable was the Ahl Sidi al-Mukhtar, an eastern branch of the Kunta
confederation, who transported the salt overland through Walata or directly to
the Niger River via Timbuktu.

Zayyaya groups also managed the harvesting, transport and sale of gum
arabic. The dispersed nature of this resource prevented one lineage or group
from asserting the type of control that characterized the salt economy of the
desert-side.20 As a result, access to the routes leading to the gum markets of
the Senegal valley proved more important than control over gum forests. In
order to defend their gum caravans, many zayraya groups purchased guns, and
used them to protect their loads of gum against raids. Warrior/ma
competition over control of the gum trade resulted in several major military
confrontations, the results of which altered the political history of the southern

Sahara during the nineteenth century.

109

In the Tagant, the Idaw Aish, a group with ramaya background, became
the dominant "warrior" group in the eighteenth century in part through their
control over the transport corridors from southern Saharan gum fields to the
upper Senegal valley markets.21 With the opening of a gum market at Medine,
which was some distance from the Idaw Aish base of power, the Ahl Sidi
Mahmud, another mayo, lineage from the greater Tagant region, launched
themselves into gum harvesting and gained control over the routes leading to
Medine.22 This assertion of mya autonomy angered the Idaw Aish, who
challenged the Ahl Sidi Mahmud throughout the rest of the century and finally
defeated them in the early 18808.23

The outcome of these warrior/rawaya struggles ultimately depended upon
which group could recruit support among the mass of commoner lineages which
inhabited the southern Sahara. Since tributaries could transfer their allegiance
from one 'group to another, astute commoner lineages manipulated the conflicts
to gain advantageous positions. In the Hodh, a commoner confederation known
as the Mashduff followed this strategy to obtain a share of the profits from
their involvement with the gum trade.24 By the mid-nineteenth century, the
Mashduff had been able to purchase enough guns and to gain sufficient support
among other commoner and zayzaya groups to overthrow the Awlad Mbark, the
dominant warrior confederation in the region.25 As a result, rayraya groups
who supported the Mashduff gained access to large tracts of acacia forests of
the Hodh and increased the amount of gum arriving at the market at Medine.26

While the production, uansportation and exchange of salt integrated the
Hodh and the Tagant with Karta and the other regions of the Western Sudan,
the gum trade brought these desert- side regions into another commercial area,

the Senegal valley trading zone. Zamya merchants who invested in the gum

e 110
trade depended upon the markets in the Senegal valley to realize exchange
value for a resource that had no commercial value elsewhere. Indeed, raryaya
access to gum-producin g forests and trade corridors would have meant very
little if links to European markets had not been provided by commercial agents
in the upper Senegal valley. In the next section, I explore the Senegal valley
gum trade and the factors behind the rise of Medine as a gum entrepot during

the late nineteenth century.

v 1 ' 'n
Gum arabic is the exudate of the acacia tree which grows in abundance
along the arid Saharan desert-side.27 Inhabitants of this region used gum for
medicinal purposes, but Europeans found gum arabic’s bonding qualities made it
suitable for the sizing of cloth. As Western European firms industrialized
textile production in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, they obtained
most of the gum from the western Saharan region now known as Mauritania.
The West African commerce in gum arabic was managed by French merchants
who operated from the trading town of Saint Louis at the mouth of the Senegal
River. These merchants imported blue fabric from India (known as gninoo
cloth) and lent it to African intermediary traders, known as trairarmi, who
travelled by boat to mya gum markets which appeared along the Senegal
River during the months of January through July. At the end of the trading
season, the Irm'rams repaid the loans of guinoo in gum arabic, and the French

merchants sent the gum by ocean freighter to EurOpe.
The traifarrts obtained most of their gum in the lower Senegal valley, but
they also traded farther up the upper Senegal valley as well. The creation of a

111

French post at Bakel in the first decade of the nineteenth century ushered in a
new era in the upper valley trade. While transportation costs to Saint Louis
were high and the quality of the gum arabic generally was less satisfactory
than that available in the lower valley markets, Bakel’s market thrived during
the early nineteenth century. Increasing world demand for gum was responsible
for the interest in the upper valley, but political problems with Moorish groups
in the lower valley also encouraged the expansion of the trade. Additionally,
the French established amicable relations with the leader of the Idaw Aish, the
warrior group in the Tagant. The Idaw Aish leader was paid a fee proportional
to the amount of gum that arrived in the market to encourage the arrival of
gum arabic. Moorish caravans loaded with gum flowed into Bakel from the
forests of the Tagant and the Hodh, despite some zawaya resistance to Idaw
Aish control over the market.

In the 18508, several developments altered the nature of the gum trade in
the Senegal valley. The arrival of Governor Louis Faidherbe at Saint Louis
marked the assertion of imperialist interests in the valley. He consolidated
French control in the lower valley, and pushed the French presence up to
Medine in the upper valley. Faidherbe also passed an ordinance which allowed
French commercial houses to establish bases upriver where the trairams had

claimed exclusive access.28

Almost simultaneously with the passage of the
ordinance, however, world prices for gum arabic experienced a precipitous
decline, which discouraged French expansion far from Saint Louis.

Ira’nants moved into the upper valley markets because the absence of
Eln'opean firms enhanced their profit margins. Medine was the most attractive
market because its recent establishment meant that newcomers faced few if any

entrenched interests in the gum trade. The volume of gum purchased at Medine

. 112

increased considerably over the course of the 18608 and 18708 (see Table A).
While the rate of nairam gum purchases reflects several factors, such as
environmental conditions in the southern Sahara and price fluctuations related
to world demand, the meteoric increase at Medine can be attributed primarily to
graham initiative. Admittedly this initiative came at a time when the commerce
in Senegal valley gum was in decline and French interests directed themselves
increasingly to the peanut basin of western Senegal. The upper valley gum
boom, nevertheless, was an historical phenomenon of major economic importance
in the region.

Medine grew from a small village of less than five hundred inhabitants in
the late 18508 to a commercial town of close to four thousand residents in the
late 18808.29 This growth depended upon several factors, the most important
being mairam decisions beginning in the late 18608 to make Medine their
permanent residence.30 The French encouraged this trend by granting Medine’s
fraifam community a measure of political autonomy through the creation in 1876
of a town assembly which had jurisdiction over market disputes.31 Medine also
received an annual influx of Moors, who camped on the right bank of the
Senegal River directly across from the commercial center. Finally, Medine
attracted seasonal migrants from the Umarian colony in Jomboxo, who worked
in various capacities for the W32

The fraitams at Medine sold luxury goods such as silverware, china and
paper, guinoo cloth and European military hardware. Moorish caravan leaders
and Umarian officials bought large quantifies of the latter. Very little data
exists in the archives regarding the firearms trade; the only extant reference
to this commerce puts Umarian pm'chases at 1,500-1,800 guns in 1871.33 This
purchase occurred as Amadu Sheku prepared for a major campaign and may not

113

TABLE A:
VOLUME OF M GUM PURCHASES AT MEDINE AND BAKEL, 1860-9034

leer M in 3339]
1860 0 221,780k
1861 0 300,175k
1862 0 n.f.
1863 0 265,727k
1864 0 295.0001:
1865 0 306,8071t
1866 30,0001t 301,3871t
1867 42,000k 105,316k
1868 176,875k 121,4641t
1869 211,459k 511,8251t
1870 n.f. n.f.
1871 n.f. 362,611k
1872 483,300k 438,7551t
1873 85,000k 416,553k
1874 580,5451t 368,671k
1875 575,0001t 375,4831t
1876 363,672k 414,667k
1877 576,069k 405,962k
1878 360,758k 522,508k
1879 523,533k 471,176k
1880-1890 n.f. n.f.

, 114
reflect an annual rate of weapons purchases. That the fraitanrs were able and
willing to supply that amount suggests that the weapons trade was considerable.
Gumoo cloth was the other major item of exchange: it served as both a
currency and a consumptive item in the southern Sahara. Unfortunately, figures
on the amount of guinoo cloth exchanged at Medine are not reported in the
archives.

The Moors also wanted grain in exchange for their loads of gum. This
demand mirrored the pattern of regional exchanges throughout the Western
Sudan, as desert-side commercial groups continued to supply their dietary needs
from surplus production in the sahel. The frairams, in contrast to the
merchants in the commercial centers of the Niger valley, were not producers of
this commodity. The growth of Medine meant that they, too, needed to find
grain for their own consumption. The gamma obtained most of their grain
from Karta, and in particular, the Umarian colony of Jomboxo. The grain
commerce began in the 18608 and thrived throughout the 18708 and 808, only
disintegrating in the early 18908 as a result of the French conquest of Karta.
The French archives from Medine provide data on the grain trade during much
of its efflorescence. The next chapter examines the rise of Medine’s grain

market and the involvement of Futanke immigrants as grain producers. Before

the grain trade can be understood, however, the political economy of the
Umarian state needs further elaboration.

 

Simultaneously with the Umarian political consolidation in Karta, Nioro

emerged as a major commercial center and retained that status throughout the

115

remaining decades of the late nineteenth century and beyond. Prior to Umar
Tal’s holy war, gum and salt caravans passed only infrequently through Karta,
as most salt caravans travelled along trade corridors which ran east of Karta,
and most gum caravans moved north of Karta along trade routes in the desert-
side.3S Nioro was merely one of several Jawara settlements in Kingi when
Mamadi Kanja decided to make it the political capital of the Massassi state.
Nioro’s status changed after Umar Tal’s holy war. Shaylm Umar made it his
capital and a locus of Futanke settlement. Additionally, he altered the patterns
of commercial traffic in the region by forging alliances with various Moorish
groups and encouraging Tishiti salt merchants to settle at Nioro.36 These
initiatives helped Nioro begin to fulfill its potential as a commercial center on a
crossroads between the desert-side and the Western Sudan.

The economic fortunes of Tishiti salt merchants had risen with the
expansion of the Ijil salt nude in the Western Sudan over the come of the
nineteenth century, so Shaykh Umar’s initiatives merely reinforced the dominant
patterns of the era. Nioro was not the most attractive salt market from the
perspective of Moorish salt merchants interested in optimal rates of exchange,
since prices for salt bars increased the farther south the commodity was sold in
the Western Sudan. However, Nioro did offer the advantage of less travel time
in the Western Sudan, where increased humidity took its toll on camels and the
insecurity of trade routes could diminish profits due to losses. Also, the
opening of commercial houses in Nioro allowed Tishiti merchants to stockpile
salt bars and sell them when salt prices reached their hi ghest.37 Finally, the
Tishiti merchants could obtain grain and slaves for their salt at Nioro.

Shaykh Umar’s initial contact with Tishiti salt merchants involved the
exchange of slaves for salt, and the slave/salt exchange remained the primary

116

basis of the trade throughout the late nineteenth century.38 The wars and
raids which the Futanke conducted in the name of Islam provided some of the
slaves exchanged for salt in Nioro; the Futanke military, however, did not
meet the demand for slaves. Soninke merchants who travelled from Nioro to
the major slave markets of the southern savanna provided the bulk of slaves
which entered the desert-side from Nioro.39 The creation of a warrior state
south of Karta by Samori Ture made its commercial center of Wassulu the
largest slave market in the Western Sudan. Consequently, the Wassulu-Nioro
and Wassulu-Banamba-Nioro trade routes were quite active during the late
nineteenth century.40

Mustafa’s efforts to forge a multi-ethnic coalition in Karta reinforced
Umar Tal’s initiatives with the salt merchants, and brought gum-producing
groups into N ioro’s sphere. Mustafa’s encouragement of the gum trade stood in
contrast to Umar’s call for an embargo against the French during the holy
war.41 Too much wealth was involved for the embargo to endure, however, and
the Umarian army also desired weapons from the upper Senegal valley markets.‘
Mustafa thus pursued the opening of the gum market at Medine. He sent
several representatives from zaryaya groups to Medine, and instructed the
Umarians at Konyakary to assist in the negotiations for the Umarian claim to
tax revenues from the trade. As Medine’s status as a gum market rose, the
Nioro-Medine trade route became as frequently travelled as the Nioro-Wassulu
and Nioro-Banamba-Wassulu routes.

Karta in general and Nioro in particular lay between two major economic
zones. To the cast was the middle Niger valley with its large population
densities, its access to the major markets of the southern savanna and forest

zones, and the cowrie shell as its currency. To the west was the Senegal

117

valley and its access to world markets and the gomoo cloth as its currency.
Karta itself was a distinct economic region in which local cloth served as the
primary currency.42 During the late nineteenth century, Karta remained tied to
its local currency, but gui_noo cloth also expanded to rank as an acceptable item
of exchange. Cowrie Shells never penetrated the Kartan economy, indicating
that the middle Niger region did not pull Karta into its sphere.43 That Karta
did not come under the influence of the middle Niger economy reflected the
ability of Kartan groups to supply and obtain the major commodities which
drove regional economic exchanges without having to trade with the middle
Niger.

Karta’s economic autonomy from Segu and the middle Niger reinforced the
emergence of the Umarian successor state in Karta. The Umarian military elite
obtained guns from the upper Senegal valley and salt from the desert-side, and
did. not need to keep a line of commerce open between Nioro and Segu. When
revolts in the middle Niger valley and Beledugu closed the Nioro-Segu route at
various times during the late nineteenth century, the Umarian military leaders
had no interests in re-openin g the road, beyond the sense of obligation to the
wider Umarian community in the Western Sudan. As the sense of obligation to
the wider Umarian community dissipated among the military leaders and the
Futanke of Karta, the absence of economic ties to Segu gained greater
importance as a factor which shaped the autonomy and internal integrity of the
Umarian state in Karta.

From the perspective of Amadu Sheku, however, the Nioro-Segu route was
crucial to the emergence of Segu as a powerful Umarian successor state. The
trade corridor between Nioro and Segu funnelled guns from the Senegal valley

markets and salt from Tishit to the middle Niger valley. When the corridor was

118
closed at various points of the late nineteenth century, Ijil salt was scarce in
Segu.44 Difficulties in procuring weapons from the Senegal valley prompted
Amadu Sheku to pursue weapons from British sources. Nevertheless, the need
to keep the Nioro-Segu route open encouraged Amadu Sheku’s imperial ambitions
M the Umarian successor state in Karta.

Amadu Sheku’s interests in controlling the commercial traffic of Karta led
him to assert his control over this domain during his residence in Nioro during
the early 18708. He obtained recognition as the Commander of the Faithful
from Moorish groups in the desert-side north of Karta. Amadu also claimed
tolls on the gum trade at Medine which Umarian Officials in Karta had collected
up to that time. He designated an official to collect the tolls, and also sent
him on missions to Saint Louis to communicate Amadu’s interests in obtaining
French weapons. Amadu also established a commercial center at Guigne on the
Nioro-Segu route during his return to Segu in 1873-74. His agents at Guigne
asserted imperial control over the traffic which passed along the commercial
corridor.

The Nioro-Segu corridor did not remain an open very long. Rebel Bambara
groups attacked caravans moving along it almost immediately after Guigne’s
establishment, and the town itself fell to a Bambara attack in 1879, never to
regain its status as an imperial outpost. Amadu Sheku asked the Futanke army
in Karta to keep the route open, but they refused to assist. His commercial
official at Medine had more success in maintaining Amadu’s control over the
revenues associated with the gum trade, but the agent no longer collected the
tolls by the early 18808. The attempt at imperial control of the regional trade
of Karta proved unsuccessful. Despite the closure of the Nioro-Segu route,

Nioro retained its status as a major commercial center between the desert- side

_ 119
and the upper Niger and Senegal valleys. The vitality of the Kartan economy
did not depend on the maintenance of the Nioro-Segu route.

Members of the initial Futanke settler community in Karta benefitted from
the prosperity of the Kartan economy. Soldiers who captured slaves sold them
to Moorish merchants. Others invested in production, putting slaves to work in
the production of grain for exchange with Moorish merchants. This diversity of
economic activity among the Futanke of Karta contrasted with the situation
elsewhere in the conquered territories, where the Futanke lived in armed
garrisons and continued to depend on warfare and raiding for their livlihood.

The next chapter turns to the productive activities of the Futanke in Karta.

120

110.128

1. Richard Roberts, '
WWW (Stanford. 1987)

2. In the 18808, the French military official Camille Piétri noted that Nioro
was a wealthier commercial center than Segu,a areversal of the early nineteenth
century patterns. Since Pi6tri did not personally visit either Umarian capital,
his state-ment probably reflects the opinions of West African merchants, who
would be able to make such a comparison. Pi6tri, LoLEranoamNjgor (Paris,
1885). p 251.

3. Karta’s economic vitality impressed several French travellers, and seems to
have whet the appetite of French military officials for the conquest of Karta in
the early 18908. Nevertheless, the middle Niger valley remained the focus of
French attention throughout the late nineteenth century. See William Cohen,
"Imperial mirage: Western Sugar; in French action and thought", LoumaLoLtho
Histonealfiomlentoffliaeria 7 (l 7 )

4. Philip Curtin, '
eftheSlaeIradMMadison. 1975) DP 144ff-

5. S6k6n6-Mody Cissoko, "Contribution a l’histoire politique des royaumes du
Khasso dans le Haut S6n6gal des origines a la conquete franoaise (XVIIe-1890)",
Uni'versit6 de Paris, doctorat d’6tat, 1979, pp. 604-675. Unfortunately, the
recently published version of Cissoko’s thesis includes only material up to the
Umarian conquest (1854).

 

6. Cissoko, "Contribution a l’histoire politique", pp. 640-44.

7. Cissoko seems not to have consulted the ANM and ANS files which provide
detailed data about the grain trade.

8. G. Kisyeti, "Recherches sur le commerce dans l’empire toucouleur,"
Université de Dakar, memoire de maitrise, 1980.

9. Most of the conclusions regarding the gum trade reflect the findings of my
research on the topic. E. Ann McDougall’s work on the salt trade informs
much of my analysis of the salt trade, but I also add details based on my own
research. McDougall does not discuss the gum trade at great length in her
thesis. Franoois Manchuelle recently completed a dissertation which touches on
the gum trade of the upper Senegal valley. His work also notes the importance
of the gum trade in the late nineteenth century upper Senegal valley, but it
came to my attention only after I completed my dissertation. McDougall, "The
Ijil salt industry: its role in the precolonial economy of the Western Sudan",
University of Birmingham, Ph.D. dissertation, 1980; Manchuelle, "Origins of
Black African emigration to France: the labor migration of the Soninke, 1848-
1987", University of California, Santa Barbara, Ph.D. dissertation, 1987.

121

10. I do not raise, for the purposes of the present discussion, the question of
local trade which, from the point of view of most inhabitants in late nineteenth
century Karta, was equally as important as regional exchanges of gum and salt.

11. What I call Tagant might well be called "greater Tagant" because I mean it
to include the Affolle and the Assaba, two areas which local Moorish groups
might distinguish from the Tagant. The use of Tagant or "greater Tagant" to
refer to the entire region reflects the historical dynamics of the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries. The Idaw Aish, a Moorish group from the Tagant, came
to establish their hegemony over groups in the Affolle and Assaba. I will
interchange usage of Tagant and "greater Tagant" Since this overview of the
desert-side does not require detailed examination of the intricacies of Moorish
politics in the late precolonial era.

12. Frederik Barth, NomadLofJouflLEorsja (Oslo, 1961); F. Barth, editor,
Wand—Beummes (Bergen 1969); Stephen Baier and Paul Lovejoy.
"The desert-side economy of the Central Sudan", ImomationLlonmalJ
AfdemHisterieaLSmdies 8 (1975)

13. See, for an extended discussion of this point and much of what follows,
Roberts, Wamemlflerchantundfilaxes

14. See, for a brief discussion of this phenomenon for the Soninke
communities of J afunu in the upper Xoolimbinne valley, Eric Pollet and Grace
Winter, Lasoo’rotosoom (Brussels, 1972).

15. Martin Klein, "The demography of slavery in the Western Sudan in the late
19th 013nm" in Afrleani’opulaneaandflapuahsmafllstonealiersmxes. eds.

D. Cordell and J. Gregory (Beverly Hills, 1986). Claude Meillassoux first drew
attention to the increases in slavery. See his editor’s introduction in Esolayago

W (PariS. 1975)

16. See, for example, Richard Roberts, "Linkages and multiplier effects in the
ecologically specialized trade of precolonial West Africa" and the commentaries
which follow the article by Paul Lovejoy and Stephen Baier in Cahierulllimdes
Afrioainos 20 (1980-81).

17. Charles Stewart provides a concise analysis of the social charters of the
southern Sahara in "Southern Saharan scholarship and the bilad_a1;$_udan"
' 17 (1976) and "Emergent classes and the early state:
the southern Sahara" in u“ . .- . -
eds. D. Crummey and C. Stewart (Beverly Hills, 1981).

 

18. Stewart illuminates the economic power of one zaryaya lineage in mm
SeeinlflrderjnMamitania (Oxford. 1973)

19. See, for a full exploration of the Ijil salt trade, E. Ann McDougall, "The
Ijil salt industry".

122

20. Anthony Hopkins makes a similar argument regarding the differences in the
slave and palm oil trades along the West African coast. Historians have shown
that, in some cases, the palm and slave trades were controlled by the same
entrenched interests. These useful correctives need not detract from the point
that some productive regimes are more amenable to monopoly control than

others See A G Hopkins, WWW (London 1973)

21. See, for a classification of the Idaw Aish as warriors, Stewart, "Southern
Saharan scholarship", p. 77n. See, for the emergence of the Idaw Aish as the
dominant group in the Tagant, Pierre Amilhat, ed. and trans, "Petite chronique
des Id ou Aich, h61itiers guerriers des Almoravides sahariens", Rormojoojrmlos
Islanueues (1937).

22. The reports and correspondence of the French officers at Bakel in the 136
series of the ANS narrate the rise to power of the Ahl Sidi Mahmud. See also,
ANS 16224: "Notice sur les Maures", by Ct. de Lartigues, 1897.

23. ANS 136175: undated letter to Ct. Bakel (piece 76). This letter, found in
the dossier with materials from 1880, describes a major confrontation in the
Tagant between the Ahl Sidi Mahmud and Idaw Aish. Additionally, chronicles
from Tishit and Walata report the confrontation between these two groups in
the early 18808. Vincent Monteil, ed. and trans. ., "Chroniques de Tichit",
WW (1939) and Paul Many ed and
trans., "Les chroniques de Oualata et de N6ma (Soudan franoais)", Rmo_dos

WM 1 (1927).
24. ANS 16224: "Notice surles maures".

25. Once in power, the Mashduff acted as most emergent groups and sought to
legitimate their position by claiming haooani status. The majority of the
warrior groups of the region traced their ancestry back to Hassan, the leader
of the Arabs who migrated into the southwestern Sahara during the fifteenth
century P Many. EnrdeLsuLlIIslam_et_les_uibus_dll_Seudan. Volume 3 (Paris.

1921).
26. ANS 16224: "Notice surles maures".

27. This discussion draws on Philip Curtin, W, and James Webb,
Jr. "The trade 1n gum arabic: prelude to French conquest in Senegal", Journal

efAfrieanflisterx 26 (1985)
28. Webb, "The trade in gum arabic", pp. 167-68.

29. ANM 1D48: "Monographie de Medine", 1888-89.
30. Cissoko, "Contribution a l’histoire politique", p. 633.
31. Cissoko, "Contribution a l’histoire politique", p. 612.

32. ANS 156111: Medine,= ' . - . '
1879; ANS 1D62: Medine,2December 1881, CtMedrne to Ct. sup.

 

e 123
33. ANS 136171: Bakel, 28 February 1871, Ct.Bakel to the Governor.

34. Unfortunately, the French statistics on the gum trade stop with the late
18708. See the relevant reports in ANS Q23.

35. The French traveller Anne Raffenel, who visited Karta just prior to Umar
Tal’s holy war, notes that very little commerce passed through Karta, and
attributed it to excessive tolls. A. Raffenel, WW
Nogros, Volume 1 (Paris, 1856), pp. 386-7.

36. Paul Marty. Emdes_snr_LIslarn_et_les_uibus_du_Seudan. Volume 4 (Paris.
1921), pp. 215-216.

37. Interview with Yilé Sibey, Nioro, 6 February 1986.

38. MH. Vincent, a European traveller heard of Umar’s exchange of slaves for
Tishiti salt. Vincent, "Voyage d’exploration dans l’Adrar", Iotn'_dn_Mondo 3
(1861), p. 58. The Arabic chronicle of Walata also mentions the exchange of
slaves for salt: Marty, "Chroniques de Oualata et de N6ma", p. 367. During the
late nineteenth century, a French official noted that a caravan with close to
2,500 bars of salt was in the Western Sudan seeking to find a market with at
least 300 slaves available for exchange. ANM 1Q24: Nioro, 25 December 1895,
Ct. Nioro to the Lt. Governor at Kayes.

39. Interview with Yilé Sibey, Nioro, 6 February 1986.

40. Most -of the French travellers who passed through Karta during the late
nineteenth century noted the traffic on the "southern" route from Nioro, and
assumed that the terminus was Bure, the center of gold production. Once the
French established a post close to the Nioro-Wassulu route at Kita in 1882, they
could more accurately describe the economic activity along the route. See, for
example, ANM 1Q17: Kita, 18 February and 17 April 1882, Ct. Kita to the Ct. Sup.

41. Robinson discusses the gum embargo in W, pp. 165ff.

42. Paul Soleillet provides the best description of the local currency in Karta
based on his observation in 1878. See Paul Soleillet, Voyagoisogon, p. 168.

43. After Soleillet passed from Karta to Segu, he began to notice that the
cowrie shell was the currency in use. See, for the currency of Karta and Segu,

Soleillet. W. 99- 168.

44. See, for example, the testimony of Aly Oumar, a Futanke from Segu whom
the French Governor at Saint Louis interviewed in 1874. ANF.SOM SEN.I 58a:
St. Louis, 21 July 1874, Governor to the Minister of Colonies.

CHAPTER FIVE
Umarian Karta and the Grain Trade at Medine

The army’s elite - the falioo from Futa and Bundu -

. . . had become bourgeois. Settled in provincial

capitals, Futanke soldiers were especially numerous

around Nioro in Karta. They had received land and

slaves, and married local women. They no longer went

on campaigns, and many among them - the old men - no

longer could pursue their brutal exploits of old. 1
- Yves Saint-Martin

Saint-Martin makes this statement regarding the embourgeoisment of the
Futanke old guard of Nioro in his study of Franco-Umarian relations. He
offers it as a general assessment of the Futanke community in Nioro, but does
not present any evidence to support his claims. French travellers do not refer
to the embourgeoisment of the Futanke of Nioro, nor does the correspondence
from the French posts at Medine and Bakel provide much data on the economic
and social history of Nioro. Additionally, oral interviews with informants in
western Mali today do not support Saint-Martin’s statement: most informants
emphasize the glories of the holy war and the fight against the French, and
assert without qualification that the Futanke of Karta were either soldiers or
military commanders in the army. Must we accept Saint-Martin’s judgement,

therefore, as unsupported speculation?

124

125

During the late nineteenth century, Commandanmfiafirfom Combes also
argued that the Futanke of Karta had become settled in their ways.2 He
based his conclusions on what he observed at Medine where he served in the
early 18808 as oommandarlr of the French post. Hundreds of Futanke arrived at
Medine with caravans filled with grain from Konyakary and its neighboring
villages in Jomboxo. The Futanke sold the grain to African gum traders or
trairanfs, who in turn sold it to the French and to desert-side merchants who
travelled to exchange gum at Medine. Combes submitted a description of the
commercial traffic at Medine in 1884, and a skeptical Governor of Senegal
commissioned a study to determine whether Combes had exaggerated the wealth
of Karta. The Governor’s study showed that Combes had not overstated his
case.3

Within less than two decades after Umar Tal’s holy war, Medine had
emerged as one of the largest gum and grain markets in the entire Senegal
River valley. It rose to prominence due to the efforts of southern Saharan
commercial groups, Senegal valley merchants and Futanke plantation owners
from Jomboxo, the Kartan province closest to Medine. Ironically, surplus grain
produced in Jomboxo and exchanged at Medine fed the troops which the French
used in the initial campaigns of their military advance on the Umarians. After
the French conquest, most of the Futanke plantation owners left Karta and
returned to Futa Toro. The fortunes of most of Medine’s merchants also
suffered, as French firms and other merchants eventually made Kayes the new
commercial center of the upper valley. The French conquest not only destroyed
the production complex: it removed social groups who would have remembered

4

the grain trade in oral traditions and reminiscences. Fortunately, archives

from the post at Medine provide ample evidence for the reconstruction of the

126
Futanke grain trade at Medine. While this chapter rests primarily on written
evidence produced by French officials at Medine, I also use oral data and the

European travel literature whenever relevant.

I] f . l 11 1.

Surplus grain had been exchanged in the upper Senegal valley long before
the establishment of a grain market at Medine. Whenever harvests produced
abundant surpluses, farmers exchanged grain with the camel and cattle herders
of the region for milk, hides and cattle. During the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries, these exchanges expanded greatly as Soninke groups living along the
northern sahel integrated their economic activities more fully with Moorish

commercial families who ran the economy of the southern Sahara.5

European
and: African merchants also bought surplus grain as an outgrowth of their
involvement in the slave and gum trades in the upper Senegal valley. In the
early eighteenth century, grain purchases in the region rose dramatically as
slave traders bought foodstuffs to feed the slaves waiting transport to the

coast.6

With the rise of the gum trade in the late eighteenth century, the
growing urban population at Saint Louis depended on Senegal valley harvests.
Bakel, the major upper valley market of the early nineteenth century, regularly
sent large quantities of grain to Saint Louis. The establishment of a market at
Medine added to the number of commercial outlets for upper valley grain and
competed with entrenched interests at Bakel and the southern Sahara.

Jomboxo’s position as the major supplier of grain to Medine reflected the

favorable conditions for production in the region as well as its proximity to

Medine. Annual rains created a flood plain along the Xoolimbinne and Kirgu

127

valleys where dry season cultivation produced a second harvest. Mungo Park,
who passed through Jomboxo in the late eighteenth century, noted that the
extent and productivity of the cultivated region around Konyakary "surpassed
everything that I had yet seen in Africa."7 The economics of transport also
explain Jomboxo’s dominance of the Medine trade: gain received such a low
price relative to its weight and volume that transportation costs had to be kept
low in order to ensure a reasonable profit from its exchange. The communities
of Jomboxo were between one to two days travel time by donkey from Medine.8

Medine’s gain trade began as an outgrowth of improved relations between
the French and the Umarians in Karta. In 1863, Cemo Musa, an Umarian
leader from Konyakary, proposed the opening of Franco-Umarian commercial
relations at the post of Medine.9 The acquisition of foodstuffs was high on the
French agenda, and Cemo Musa responded by sending a gain caravan to
Medine to demonstrate his ability to supply what the French requested. 10
Grain exchanges continued at Medine throughout the mid-18608, with Umarian
agents exchanging gain for gninoo cloth, European luxury goods and weapons.11
The French bought as much gain as the Umarians transported to Medine. One
French official boasted that he could provision all the posts of the ' Senegal
valley with Umarian gain.12 The Franco-Umarian gain exchanges at Medine
led the way toward the relaxed relations which characterized the next fifteen
years of the relationship. 13

In the late 18608, nairanjs began to involve themselves in the gain trade
at Medine. They initially made gain purchases merely to obtain foodstuffs for
themselves, but Moorish demand for gain encouraged some traifanrs to expand

14

their involvement in the commodity. Soon graham who could offer their

clients gain as well as gnjrroo cloth had an advantage over their rivals. While

128
individual maya caravans may only have wanted small quantities to meet the
needs of their return trip into the southern Sahara, the cumulative impact of
their demand geatly exceeded the supply of gain at Medine in the early 18708.
As a result, enterprising granams sought dependable quantities of gain and
integated the gain and gum trades.

Unfortunately, the extant data does not provide much information on the
gain trade in the 18708, when the frairanrs expanded their gain purchases and
diverted large quantities of Jomboxo gain into Medine.15 Those who pioneered
the gain trade were gum merchants tied to the Umarian elite.16 The trairama
seem not to have acted as brokers; they bought wholesale and assumed all
risks and profits for themselves. 17 By the 18708, the gain market operated
throughout the year.18 The leading gain merchant, Momar Jak, purchased the
former Xassonke fort so that he could store the large quantities of gain and
gum which-he was purchasing. 19

French demand for upper valley gain increased with the expansion of
their military presence into the West African interior. After renewing the push
into the interior with the establishment of several new posts in the early 18808,
the French conducted annual campaigns until the Western Sudan fell under their
control in the 18908.20 The French planned initially to supply their African
troops with gain obtained through taxation and purchase at the posts in the
interior, but their inability to tap these local sources nearly forced them to

halt the initiative.21

The solution was to buy gain in the region around
Kayes, their new administrative center, and then transport the supplies overland
to the army. Grain shortfalls frequently threatened the French position in the

interior, and officials at Kayes turned increasingly to the market at Medine,

. 129
which was less than 15 kilometers away.22 Grain prices at Medine predictably
rose each time the French needed to supply the interior.23

How much gain passed through Medine’s market during the era of graham
control? French archival materials provide several indicators of the volume.
Quantitative measures include graham estimates of annual gain purchases (see
Table B). Unfortunately, the data are far from complete. Gaps in the
reporting are quite apparent. Also, the figures often represent only a portion
of the total: the estimates for 1877-78, 1881-82, 1882-83 and 1884-85 were
made prior to the end of the trading season.24 The reliability of any figure,
too, is open to question, given that the merchants would be reluctant to reveal
the full extent of their economic activity to the French. Nevertheless, the data
provide a general indication of changes in the volume of the gain trade.

During the 18708, the volume increased throughout the period. The actual
rate. of change is difficult to calculate with very much certainty. The total for
1871-72, for example, reflects the impact of Amadu Sheku’s embargo on trade
with Medine that year and is not representative of purchases during the early
1870s.25 The figure for 1877-78 almost certainly is too low, since it does not
include purchases after April, 1878; May and June were usually the most active
months of the trading year, and gain sales continued even during the planting
season. Accepting the estimate for 1873—74 as a representative annual total for
the early 1870s,26 and assuming that 400 metric tons is a low eStimate for the
late 18708, I calculate a fourfold increase in gain purchases at Medine during
the decade.

The data from the early 18808 allow for a fairly confident assertion that
gain purchases maintained an average of 500 metric tons annually. The lowest

reported estimate, 335,282 kilogams, is the total as of the end of April, 1882.

TABLE B:

VOLUME OF TRAITANT GRAIN PURCHASES AT MEDINE, 1860-9027

Purchasing year28

1860-1871
1871-72
1872-73
1873-74

1874-1877
1877-78

1878-1881
1881-82
1882-83
1883-84
1884-85

1884-1890

Kilogams of gain

n.f. = no figures reported

29

n.f.
65,000
n.f.
127,000
n.f.

*
400.000
n.f.
355,282"
500,000"
n.f.
*
500.000
n.f.

*total does not reflect purchases for the entire marketing year

TABLE C: GRAIN CARAVAN S ARRIVING AT MEDINE, 1885

Moor];
Jam-Mar.
April
May
June
July
August
September
October
November

December

131

Caravans arriving from:

1911109189 Nioro
n.f. n.f.
18 3
21 1

6 0
8 0
6 0
12 O
18 4
6 0
0 0

n.f. = no figures reported

30

LII

12

ocoooo

132

TABLE D: GRAIN CARAVANS ARRIVING AT MEDINE, 1887-88 31

Caravans arriving from:

Month Jomboxo Elem Ember:
October 3 4 0
November n.f. n.f. n.f.
December 10 4 1
January 26 0 2
February 20 0 2
March n.f. n.f. n.f.
April n.f. n.f. n.f.
May 43 0 5
June 26 0 3'
July n.f. n.f. n.f.
August n.f. n.f. n.f.
September 25 O 0

n.f. = no figures reported

. 133

Since an Umarian embargo on trade with Medine had been in effect earlier in
the marketing year, an additional 200 metric tons could easily have arrived in
the five remaining months of the 1881-82 trading year.32 Two of the following
three years resulted in annual gain imports in excess of 500,000 kilogams.
The gain trade in 1883-84 probably attained that level, since an early report
indicates that gain purchases were geater than the previous year.33 Clearly,
then, Medine had become a very active gain market. It had surpassed Bakel in
total volume of gain purchases by at least 100 metric tons annually.34

Jomboxo remained the major source of gain for the market at Medine
even as traifaot purchases increased fourfold and reached 500 metric tons
annually. The French described the caravan traffic at Medine in 1872 as
follows: "the millet [is] brought almost exclusively by the Futanite.°'3S
Additionally, French descriptions of Medine’s population begin to refer to a
large seasonal influx of Futanke in the 18708 as the numbers of gain caravans
increased.36 Monthly reports on the number of caravans arriving in Medine
from 1885 to 1888 indicate additionally that most of the Futanke came from
Jomboxo (see Tables C and D).37 The market at Medine funCtioned as an

entrepot for Jomboxo gain.

6 . . I II . nn .

French documents never mention who produced the gain brought to
Medine, only commenting on the role of Futanke as the primary caravaneers of
the gain trade. The fact that the Futanke monopolized the caravan traffic
between Jomboxo and Medine is not surprising, given the tight control exercised

over the movement of caravans in all the Umarian territories of the Western

134

Sudan.38 Restricted participation in the commercial life reflected the Umarian
ideology which divided society into two classes: the followers of Umar Tal (the
"true Muslims") and the subordinate goups of the state.39 In the context of
the gain trade at Medine, limited access to the market ensured that only those
with privileged social positions were allowed to reap exchange values from the
gain surpluses of the region. Umarian officials and notables were the two
main beneficiaries of restricted access to Medine. Through time, however, these
two social goups came into conflict over the gain trade at Medine.

From the state perspective, the gain trade was merely one among many
economic activities which required state supervision and regulation. Umarian
officials charged mayo caravaneers for the privilege of crossing Karta on
their trip to Medine, and in turn collected a fee from the traifanfs at Medine
for ensuring the arrival of the gum caravans.40 The initial gain exchanges
were clearly in the domain of inter-state relations: Cerno Musa sent a gain
caravan filled from the state treasury to open the way for more relaxed
Franco-Umarian relations.41 Subsequent leaders at Konyakary continued Cemo
Musa’s practice of exchanging state gain surpluses at Medine.42 The
willingness of trajranrs to exchange weapons for gain only served to increase
official interest in the gain trade.43

The Umarian state obtained the gain for exchange at Medine from direct
taxation of Jomboxo’s agicultural output. Umar Tal initially instituted a tax on
the harvests of Jomboxo at a time when widespread gain confiscation by the
conquering army threatened to erode local support for Umarian rule.44 The tax
became known as the jaklra, in conscious reference to the zakar (the tax levied
on Muslims in the Islamic heartland). Authority for its assessment and

collection fell on the military leaders of Konyakary, including Cemo Jibi, Cemo

135
Musa, Samba Mody and Bassiru Tal. Most of the gain collected as jakka was
stored at Konyakary, where the leaders used it to provision the standing army
residing at the capital and to celebrate the major Muslim holidays. When the
surpluses were high, state officials freely traded a portion at Medine. State
exchanges stopped, however, when military campaigns or official visitors placed
demands on the use of surplus gain in the treasury.45 Thus, while the state
treasury was a reliable source of gain, Umarian leaders at Konyakary were not
the most dependable suppliers to the traifanfs.

Umarian leaders frequently assigned important lieutenants the task of
collecting the tax in outlying areas, and these agents also participated in the
gain trade at Medine.46 Agents traditionally retained a portion of the tax for
their own support, sometimes keeping up to one-half of the jakka for
themselves."’7 The emergence Of the gain market at Medine encouraged agents
to take their full Share of the taxes, since gain now had both exchange and
consumptive value. As a result, tax collectors in Jomboxo usually met or
exceeded the recommended tenth of the harvest, while in other Kartan
provinces, agents rarely collected a tenth of the harvest.48 The ability of
Jomboxo’s agents to exchange gain at Medine was circumscribed, however, by
the fact that the military leader at Konyakary could revoke the right to collect
taxes if he thought that the agent was abusing the privilege.

In addition to Umarian officials, Futanke notables also participated in the
gain trade at Medine. Suleyman Eliman, a Futanke who fought in the holy war
and settled at Konyakary, described his involvement in the gain trade to Paul
Soleillet, whom be accompanied on his trip to Segu in the late 18708.49
Suleyman told Soleillet how, during a diplomatic mission to Bakel, he exchanged

136

several donkey loads of gain for some going cIOth.SO Once back in
Konyakary, Suleyman traded the gninoo cloth for Ijil salt bars from the Moors
who resided in Jomboxo. Suleyman completed his transactions by exchanging the
salt bars for gold at Bur6, a gold-producing region southeast of Karta. These
exchanges Show that surplus gain could be converted into gold at Bur6 as well
as European firearms or luxury goods in the upper Senegal valley.

Although Suleyman’s testimony is the only extant reference to private
involvement in the gain trade, his description of the transactions suggests that

Futanke participation in it was extensive.51

His travels, for example, reflect a
desire to maximize a return on each exchange: gain fetched a higher price at
the upper valley markets than in Konyakary, the value of salt bars increased as
one moved farther from the desert-side, and gold prices were lowest near the
source of production. From Suleyman’s actions, one can reasonably conclude
that he was not an occasional participant in commercial dealings, but an
experienced trader. Moreover, he probably recounted the series of exchanges to
inform Soleillet of the commercial strategies of his social strata. Soleillet was
imbued with the idea that French commercial expansion would geatly benefit
the inhabitants of the Western Sudan, and Suleyman wanted him to see that
restricted access to markets worked in favor of the Umarian elite.52
The Futanke population of Jomboxo in the late 18708 included notables,
such as Suleyman Eliman, who had been important soldiers during the conquest
of Jomboxo and received numerous slaves as booty from the campaigns.53
Their slaves lived on the outskirts of Konyakary in agicultural settlements
along the Kirgu and Xoolimbinne vaneys.54 Many of these initial settlers had
been state agents who collected taxes in the 18608 and subsequently retired

from state service. Their initial involvement in the gain trade gave them

_ 137

connections with the fraitanrs and knowledge of the economic potential of
increasing gain production. As prominent members of the Umarian community,
they also had the social standing to ensure continued access to the market at
Medine. Their movement into gain production reflected generational change
within the Umarian community: the gain trade provided an aging elite with
the means to consolidate their social and economic position in Umarian society.

Konyakary’s slave market flourished during the 18808, suggesting
additionally that Futanke settlers were investing in slave labor to expand
production in Jomboxo. Slave prices were so high in Jomboxo in the 18808 that
migants who arrived at that time often sold their slaves as a means to finance
the migation of additional family members.55 Among the goups purchasing
slaves in Jomboxo were Futanke plantation owners whose involvement in gain
production was sufficiently profitable to merit investment in additional labor
inputs. These settlers were the kind of suppliers upon whom the nairanfs could
depend to provide large amounts of surplus gain annually.56

The emergence of a slave-owning goup of Futanke settlers with interests
in the gain trade at Medine had political implications for Umarian rule in
Jomboxo. As the settlers turned to production as the primary basis of livlihood,
they acted in ways which drew them into conflict with the state. Some used
their influence to throw off the obligation to pay jaklrafi‘7 Others refused to
join Bassiru’s military campaigns as gain production was expanding in the
18708. They expressed their resistance in terms of their more pressing
involvement in agricultural production.58 These settlers did not share Bassiru’s
enthusiasm for military conquests because their material life had come to
depend upon the production and exchange of surplus gain. Bassiru’s campaigns
diverted labor and managerial talents from production, and often caused a halt

. 138
in the caravan traffic from Jomboxo to Medine.59 The resistance of the
settlers proved so successful that Bassiru began sending recruiters to Futa Toro
in order to find enough soldiers to field an army.60

Invitations to migate to Umarian Karta were well received among the
Fulbe communities of the lower valley, who began to migate eastward in large
numbers beginning in the late 18708. Many of these Fulbe were young men who
left their families back in the Senegal valley with promises to send for their
relatives when they had accumulated sufficient wealth to establish a household.
These migants saw the army as the best vehicle for such accumulation, and
joined it without hesitation. Not surprisingly, the French noted that the armies
under the command of Bassiru and Muntaga consisted largely of young men.61
Many of these young men were recent Fulbe recruits from the Senegal valley.

Bassiru settled his recruits at Segala, the former Massassi garrison at the
convergence of the Kirgu and Xoolimbinne Rivers. Soleillet passed through
Segala in the late 18708 and observed that it actually was two settlements.62
One village, which was surrounded by well-attended fields, was the residence of
Bundunke settlers who occupied the village immediately after the conquest.63
The other village was a garrison for the Fulbe migrants of the late 18708; it
continued to receive Fulbe migrants well into the 1880s.64 The two settlements
of Segala reflected the larger conflicts emerging within the Umarian community
in Jomboxo: the initial goup of settlers controlled the productive land whereas
subsequent migants lived in garrisons and looked to military service for their
material support.

Each goup had differing perspectives on the role of the Umarian state.
The initial settlers, as the first Umarian disciples whose military conquests had
brought Karta under Umarian control, claimed that the holy war was over and

. 139

felt that Bassiru’s campaigns were unnecessary.65 They probably added that the
state should support their efforts at exploiting the agicultural potential of the
Xoolimbinne valley.66 Neither Bassiru nor the recent arrivals dared challenge
these views directly because state ideology glorified Umar’s life and the period
of the holy war. At the same time, however, the young recruits probably
responded with the suggestion that the obligation of jihad fell upon all Muslims
regardless of their past accomplishmentsfi‘7 They saw warfare as the primary
occupation of the Umarian state. This disageement over the role of the
state came to be expressed openly during the mid-1880s.68

Futanke settlers continued to exchange surplus gain at Medine up until
the eve of the French conquest. Although no data presently exists to document
the extent of the commerce in the late 18808, the reports of French officials
indicate that the gain trade remained active until 1889, when a poor harvest
brought it to a halt.69 Amadu Sheku tried to stop it in 1887, but he seems not
to have had the support to enforce his edict.70 Thus, even though the French
had prohibited the sale of weapons and powder to the Umarian army, Kartan
gain Still flowed into Medine.

As the French advanced on the Umarians, the Futanke plantation owners
were caught in an ambiguous position. Their economic interests did not
coincide with those of the Umarian army, but they were not in a position to
ally with the French. Some probably hoped that some accommodation with the
French could be obtained, but others resisted the idea of French control. Many
Futanke were executed upon capture, and most settlers were forced to leave
Jomboxo. Their involvement in the gain trade conuibuted to the efflorescence
of Medine and enhanced their material position at the time, but the arrival of

the French ended their era.

140
Censlusiea

The rise of Medine as a commercial center involved the coincidence of
economic interests in the upper Senegal valley. The zaiyaya goups of the
southern Sahara willingly directed their caravans of gum to the new Senegal
valley market because the commodity had little exchange value in the Western
Sudan. The frairanto saw Medine as a safe haven against the expansion of
French interests in the gum trade, and brought their expertise, connections to
Saint Louis and enthusiasm up the Senegal. Umarians officials, too, worked to
ensure that Medine’s establishment enhanced their interests. They obtained
European weapons in exchange for surplus gain, which both the mayo and
the traitanrs desired.

The involvement of Futanke notables ensured Medine’s commercial success.
They expanded production and provided the market with dependable supplies of
gain. As the notables increased production, however, their interests began to
diverge from those of Umarian officials. The notables found that they much
preferred the role of agarian landlords over that of the warlord. Had State
officials not recruited successfully in Futa Toro, the initial colonists may have
been able to wrestle control of state policy from the hands of Bassiru. As it
occurred, Senegal valley recruits replenished the Umarian armies and
strengthened the position of the military. The unsuccessful attempt on the part
of the notables to remove Bassiru as leader of Konyakary was merely an overt
expression of the contradictions which lurked within the Umarian community.
The following chapters focus on the two revolts in Umarian Karta and locate
the conflicts within the historical context which these initial chapters have

provided.

141

110.193

1. Y. Saint-Martin, ’ ' - '-'
WW (Dakar. 1967). pp. 183-184.

2. See Commandanffiumijom Combes’ reports in ANF.SOM SEN.IV 81c.

3. ANF.SOM SEN.IV 810: Kayes, 1 November, 1884, Ct. Sup. to the Governor.
Combes sent a lengthy letter arguing for continued French expansion into the
Western Sudan. To Strengthen his argument regarding the necessity of French
action, he attached several charts which described the commercial activity at
Medine and several other French forts in the interior (Bafoulabe, Kita and
Bamako). Medine’s figures so impressed the Governor that he ordered a more
intensive investigation of the commercial life of Medine. Summaries of the
quantitative and qualitative data gathered during this investigation are
invaluable for the reconstruction of the history of Medine. These summaries
appear in ANS 2B75 (the Governor’s correspondence with the Minister of the
Colonies in France). Some of the original reports can be found in ANM 1Q70.
Also see, for an informative account of the commercial life of Medine, Dr.

Colin, "Le Soudan occidental", W 78 (1883).

4. I tried to find descendants of the traitants and the Futanke plantation
owners in western Mali, but found few who could remember much about the
commerce in gain trade during the Umarian era. Informants remembered the
gum trade and the arrival of the French.

5. The Kartan provinces of Gidimaxa, Jafunu, Gidiyumme, Kanyareme, Kingi
and Bakunu participated in the expansion of exchanges across the ecological

boundary.

6- Abdoulaye Bathily, "La traite atlantique des esclaves et ses effets
6conomiques et sociaux en Afrique: la cas du Galam," '

Elston: 27 (1986).

7. Mango Park. W (New York. 1907). p. 73.
Major Gray made a similar remark about the middle Xoolimbinne valley during
his trip through the region in the early nineteenth century. Gray and Staff
Surgeon Dochard, Irayois_in__Wostorn_Afijoa (London, 1925), p. 299. French
officials also remarked on the agicultural abundance of the region when they
marched through Jomboxo during the conquest of Jomboxo in 1890. ANS 1D117:
n.p., n.d., "Lignes d’6tapes de Konyakary a Dionkolan6."

8. Donkeys were primary beasts of burden used to transport the gain to
market at Medine. They were slow and carried less than camels or pack oxen,
but they maneuvered well in the difficult terrain. Occasionally pack oxen and
human porters were used.

142

9. Cerno Musa and Governor Faidherbe were the major figures behind the
initial Franco-Umarian treaty of 1860. Faidherbe pursued commercial
negotiations with the Umarians upon his return to Senegambia in 1863.

10. The French at Medine constantly complained about the lack of agicultural
output on the territory under their control. Grain shortfalls in 1863 forced the
French oorn_rrrandanr to appeal for assistance from the Umarians at Konyakary.
ANS 136210: Medine, 7 March 1864, Ct. Medine to Ct. Bakel. Cemo Musa
responded almost immediately with a caravan loaded with gain. ANS 156108:
Medine, 23 April 1864, Ct. Medine to Ct. Bakel. Cerno Musa had sent a
caravan to Medine half a year earlier: ANS 136168: Medine, 7 October 1863,
Ct. Medine to Ct. Bakel.

ll. ANS 136210: Medine, 16 October 1865, Ct. Medine to Ct. Bakel; ANS
150108: Medine, 27 March 1866, Ct. Medine to Ct. Bakel.

12. ANS 136210: Medine, 27 July 1864, Ct. Medine to Ct. Bakel.

13. See, for Franco-Umarian relations, Saint-Martin, W
France.

14. ANS 156109: Medine, 1 August 1872, Ct. Medine to the Governor.

15. I could not find any descendants of the iraitants of Medine who
remembered much about the grain trade at any time of its operation.

16. Momar Jak, the wealthiest iraitant at Medine and a leading figure in both
the ' gum and gain trades, hosted Umarian envoys who visited Medine. He also
was the frairmn responsible for the delivery of 1500 firearms to Amadu Sheku
in 1871. Amet Samba Pullo, another gain trader, may have used shared Fulbe
ethnicity with the Umarians as a means to forge contacts in Jomboxo. See
Momar J ak’s Arabic correspondence with the Umarian elite in ANS 15668: #84;
ANS 15676: #51-53; 15678: #65,96,99,100. See, for a description of Momar Jak’s
gain trading activities, ANS 3B98: St. Louis, 3 August 1883, Governor to Ct.
Sup. See, for Amet Samba Pullo, ANM 1E207: Medine, 18 January 1886, Ct.
Medine to Ct. Kayes.

17. In the absence of complete pricing information, I base this judgement on
numerous French reports that the traitants bought gain at "favorable" prices.

18. The normal pattern was for the traitann to leave Medine timing the rainy
season and return for the opening of the new gum season in late December.
See Sék6n6-Mody Cissoko, "Contribution a l’histoire politique des royaumes du
Khasso", Université de Paris, doctorat d’6tat, 1979, p. 633. Cissoko does not
make the connection between the iraitant move to establish residences at
Medine and the expansion of the gain trade.

19. Momar J ak bought the royal Xassonke fort in 1880. Cissoko, "Contribution
a l’histoire politique", p. 656.

20. See, for a description of the French conquest, A.S. Kanya-Forstner, Ilro
Congaestofdeflestemfiudan (Cambridge. 1969).

143

21. The question of supply haunted all the W of the
18808. Bamako ultimately became a major gain market, but this development
awaited the consolidation of French control in the region during the early
18908. See, for a brief discussion of the problem of supply, Riehard Roberts,
"The emergence of a gain market in Bamako, 1883- 1908, "

Amoairfimdios 14 (1980). See, on the question of closing forts and halting
expansion in the interior, ANS 1D62: Kayes, 4 December 1881, Ct. Sup. to the
Governor; ANF.SOM SEN. XX 5° Kayes, 4 May 1884, Ct. Kayes to the Governor,

and Kanya-Forstner. TheQenquestoftheWesthlrdan. p. 96.

22. The only other major gain market in the upper valley was Bakel, which
was almost 150 kilometers downriver from Kayes. Bakel’s gain supplied the
urban population of Saint Louis, and the French probably were reluctant to
divert it. Momar J ak who regularly supplied the post at Medine with gain,
received a glowing recommendation from the oommandant at Medine. Others
may have sold gain to the French, but the evidence is lacking. J ak ultimately
became an ally of the French, supplying CommandanLSnporionr Archinard with
information about the Umarians. See, for J ak’s recommendation as a reliable
source, ANS 1D62: Kita, 14 February 1881, Ct. Sup. to Governor; and ANS
3B98: Saint Louis, 3 August 1883, Governor to Ct. Sup.

23. See, for an example of a price increase, ANM 1E207: Medine, 18 January
1886, Ct. Medine to Ct. Kayes.

24. The French often changed oomrnandanfs before the onset of the rainy
season so the departing official made inquiries about the gain trade in April or
May. -

25. ANS 156109: Medine, 6 January, 28 May and 1 August 1972, Ct. Medine to
the Governor.

26. One could argue that 127 metric tons for 1873-74 is a low estimate since
it is only double the amount purchased during the embargo year of 187 1-7 2.
More probable, however, is the case for the ineffectiveness of Amadu’s embargo,
which could only cut the volume of gain exports in half.

27. The French officials never distinguished between millet (potit_mfl) and
sorghum (groLmil). The quantitative estimates appear in: ANF.SOM SENT 56b:
St. Louis, 14 September, 1872, Governor to the Minister; ANS 156109: Medine,
1" ,July, 1874 and April, 1878; ANS
150111: Medine. WW April. 1882: ANM
11354: Medine. WW. May. 1883; ANS 2B75:
St. Louis, 12 September and 12 November, 1885, Governor to the Minister. Very
useful descriptions of the gain u°ade during this era also can be found in the
correspondence of the oommandant of Medine with his superiors in ANM 1Q70.

28. The "purchasing year” began in October with the harvest of gains and ran
until the end of the subsequent rainy season. Most of the gain trade occurred
between January and June.

144

29. The traitanrs estimated the gain trade in terms of haniouos, the largest
unit of measurement used in the Senegal valley. During the 1880’s, when the
French took an active interest in the gain trade, they determined that the
harriqno held approximately 200 kilogams of millet. I have used the 200:1 ratio
in my calculations for this table. Cissoko states that the oairiqno held only 100
kilogams of millet, but he provides no evidence in support of this ratio. See,
for his discussion of the baniquo, Cissoko, "Contribution a l’histoire politique",
pp. 631-32. See, for the French estimates, ANM 1Q70: Medine, 1 April 1886,
"Rapport commercial"; ANM 1E207: Medine, 13 May 1886, Ct. Medine to the Ct.
des Cercles; ANS 2B75: St. Louis, 12 August 1885, Governor to the Minister.

30. The data comes from the monthly reports of caravan traffic at Medine
held in ANM1Q70.

31. The data comes from the monthly reports on caravan traffic at Medine
held in ANM1Q70.

32. Bassiru Tal imposed an embargo on trade with Medine between‘ November,
1881 and January, 1882. See ANS 1D62: Kayes, 23 November 1881, Ct. Sup. to
the Governor; Medine, 2 December 1881, Ct. Medine to Ct. Sup.° ., ANS 156113:

Medine. Brrfletinagricelesemmercialetpehtique. January 1882.

33. ANM 1Q70: Medine, 26 July, 1884, "Rapport commerciaL" This report only
discusses the gain trade for the first three months of 1884, and does not
provide a quantitative estimate of the volume.

34. The volume of Bakel’s gain trade in 1883-84 was 400 metric tons annually.
See" ANS 136184: Bakel, 1 October 1884, "Rapport trimestriel. " The traifanrs
of Medine supplied the French post at Bakel with gain several times in the
18808. See, for example, ANS 136187: Bakel, Bollotin_agrioolo,_mmmoroia1_ot

politique. May 1887

35. ANS 156109. Medine, 6 January, 1872, Ct. Medine to the Governor. See
alsothereferencestodregainfiadehtheWmsrLdo
Modino from the late 18708 which suggest that it remained firmly in "Tukulor"
hands at that time. In 1884, the oommandant at Medine noted that "the millet
[is] brought in abundance by Tukulors," and his successor added that "the
millet . . . is brought principally from Jomboxo." ANS 156111: Rogionjo
malJLmstLJLMfline. June, 1877, and February, March, April, and
November, 1879; ANM lQ70: Medine, 26 July 1884, "Rapport commercial"; ANM
1Q70: Medine, 18 October, 1885, "Rapport surl’accroissement du commerce."

36. 156113: "Recensement de la population de Medine-1882".

37. The French collected the data in their wider attempt to calculate the
economic wealth of the Western Sudan. Worn Combes’
estimate of Umarian commercial involvement at Medine precipitated the specific
interest in their upper valley post. The mmmandanrs at Medine organized the
data in monme reports of economic activity and sent the information to the
Governor. He in turn summarized the data and relayed it to the Minister of
Colonies in France. See, for the monthly reports, ANM 1Q70. The
correspondence from the Governor is in ANS 2B75.

145

38. The French travellers Eugene Mage and Paul Soleillet commented on the
role of Fulbe in either guarding or running the caravan traffic of the Western
Sudan.

39. Paul Marty notes that Soninke goups in early twentieth century Karta
still reflected the Umarian social order: the immigant Soninke who arrived
after the holy war were "leamed" Muslims and a second tier of "unschool
Soninke goups who claimed long residence in Karta. P. Marty, Emdom
[IslametlestribrlsdeSeudan Volume4(PaIiS. 1921). PP 237 33

40. See, for the extended negotiations leading to the collection of fees or
"coutume" in the language of the nineteenth century, the correspondence in the
Medine archives from the mid-18608: ANS 136211, 156108 and 156109. Gerard
Kisyeti provides an adequate summary of the outcome of the negotiations in his
thesis, "Recherches sur le commerce dans l’empire toucouleur", Universit6 de
Dakar, memoire de maitrise, 1980. The French ageed to the collection of a
fee, but required that the exchange be called a "gift" and not a customs tax,
and that the traitanta paid the fee directly to the Umarian agent. In practice,
the French oommanm often played an intermediary role.

41. ANS 156108: Medine, 27 March 1866, Ct. Medine to Ct. Bakel.

42. Umarian Governors from Nioro, Farabugu and Jalla similarly sent gain
caravans to Bakel. The Konyakary-Medine connection had by far the most
traffic of the official caravan routes.

43. ' ANM 1E207: Medine, 27 and 28 February 1885, Ct. Medine to Ct. Kayes.

44. Cemo Yahya Tal’s Arabic chronicle of the conquest of Jomboxo includes a
discussion of Umarian raiding of Xassonke fields and Umar’s severe reaction to
the practice. My comments about the passages prompted Yahya to explain that
Umar imposed Muslim taxes (the zakat) to stop his "unschooled" soldiers from
raiding the Xassonke. Cerno Yahya’s source for the raiding is Demba Sadio
Diallo, who probably obtained the information from one of several interviews
among the oral historians of the Xassonke. Much of the following discussion of
Umarian taxes in Jomboxo comes from Cemo Yahya’s Arabic chronicle and
several interviews with him, and S.-M. Cissoko’s overview of Umarian taxation
of the Xassonke communities of Jomboxo in "Contribution a l’histoire politique".

45. See, for examples of the cessation of the official gain trade, ANS
156109: Medine, 6 January 1872 and ANM 1E54: Medine, June 1887, "Rapport

politique".
46. A few Xassonke elites obtained the authorization to collect iakka, but
most agents were Fulbe military leaders.

47. ANM 1D51: "Notice historique sur la region du Sahel," by de Lartigues.
This report was published under same title in

EranoaisommLQoloniaio (1898); ANS 16310: "Renseignements historiques,
géogaphiques et 6conomiques sur le Cercle de Kayes," by Adminisrratom Roux,
Kayes, 30 March 1904.

146

48. Compare, for example, the comments in ANM 1D51: "Notice historique"
and ANS 16310: "Renseigrements historiques," the former drawn from
information from the Nioro region and the latter drawn from informants from

the Konyakary region.

49. Suleyman was a leading notable of Ko.nyakary Some of his correspondence
in Arabic with French officials, the rrairanf community at Medine, and Amadu
Sheku is contained in the ANS WM; dossiers: 15677 #98,
15666 #17, and 15678 #97, respectively. In the late 18808, Suleyman served as
Amadu Sheku’s agent for the collection of gum duties from the traifanrs of
Medine. Suleyman died in 1889.

50. Paul Soleillet, - ° ’
jeunlallxdeSeleilletpaLQabrielflraxier (Paris. 1887), pp. 222-23.

51. As I noted earlier, I did not find many Futanke informants in western Mali
who could remember the gain trade. I attribute the absence of memory in
large part because the participants returned to Futa Toro after the French
conquest.

52. In the pages immediately preceding Suleyman’s testimony, Soleillet raved
about the agicultural production of the Bambara and Mandinka of Karta. He
speculated that these goups would become wealthy if only the French could
establish markets in the interior. While this comment may have been added for
the French audience, it conceivable that Soleillet expressed these ideas directly
to Suleyman.

53. ’ Interview with El Hadj Maeyel Diako, Konyakary, 8 February 1986.

54. Futanke notables held extremely negative stereotypes of their slaves; one
notable compared his slave unfavorably to his horse in a conversation with Paul
Soleillet. These attitudes reflect the temperament of plantation owners whose
involvement in the supervision of agicultlnal slaves was intimate. See, for the
negative stereotypes of slaves, Soleillet, VoyagLLsogou, pp. 162ff. El Hadj
Maeyel Diako of Konyakary admitted that beatings of slaves were common in
late nineteenth century Jomboxo. Interview of 8 February 1986.

55. ANS 136187: Bakel, 23 February 1887, Ct. Bakel to Ct. Kayes. The price
for slaves was twice as high in Jomboxo as in Futa Toro.

56. The number of Futanke gain caravans arriving at Medine in the mid-18808
(Tables C and D) reflects widespread participation in the gain trade at that
time. In the absence of data, one may also speculate that the increase in gain
purchases in the 18708 (Table B) expressed the increasing involvement of
notables beginning at that time and continuing into the 18808.

57. Although Umar Tal imposed the iakka on all Muslims in Jomboxo,
indigenous and immigant alike, the Umarian state stopped collecting taxes from
selected Futanke communities in the late nineteenth century. This
administrative change quite probably reflects the success of some notables in
freeing themselves from taxation in order to pursue the gain trade. This
reading of events places the change during the mid-18708, with the arrival of a

147

new governor, Bassiru Tal, and the increased demand for gain at Medine. See,
for the change in taxation, ANS 16310: "Renseignements historiques".

58. Throughout the 18708, French oommandanfs at Medine report the failure of
Bassiru Tal to recruit an army among the Futanke of Jomboxo because no one
will fight in preference to planting, weeding or harvesting. Futanke notables
occasionally are noted as the leaders of the resistance. ANS 156109: Medine,

1 May 1874,Rogi_s_tro_jo_nrna1; 156110: Medine, 7 September 1876, Ct. Medine to
the Governor; 156111: Medine, 30 June 1877,Rogian°o_jo_nrna1; Medine, Balloon

ameeleeemmereialetmhu'que. June. 1877. and March andAPril 1879

59. Such an instance was the prolonged conflict between Bassiru and Moriba
Safere of Sero. The Commandant of Bakel reports the complaints of one
Futanke notable from Konyakary who suffered from the halt in caravan traffic.
ANS 136173: Bakel, 21 February 1876, Ct. Bakel to the Governor.

60. Commandant Soyer from Bakel filed an informative report on Umarian
Karta in 1878, sections of which the Governor of Senegal sent along in his
monthly report to the Minister of the Colonies in France. Soyer notes that
Bassiru and Muntaga were sending recruiters into Futa Toro at the time.
ANF.SOM SEN.I 61c: Saint Louis, 5 June 1878, Governor to the Minister.

61. ANS 1D73: Kayes, 31 October 1883, Ct.Sup. to the Governor; 156126:
Kita, 29 April 1884, Ct. Kita to Ct. Sup.

62. Soleillet, Moyagoasogon, pp. 158-161.

63. ‘Monsieur Perraud, who travelled through Jomboxo in 1865, noted that
Segala was a Bundunke settlement. "Rapport de M. Perraud sur un voyage a
Mom. WWW no. 488 (1 August 1865).
Soleillet made the observation regarding the crops.

64. During the French conquest of Jomboxo, the French military gathered data
on the Umarian settlements of Jomboxo. They noted that "Segala Peulh" or the
Fulbe settlement had received migants in the late 18808. ANS 1D105: "Rapport
militaire, 1889-90", p. 63.

65. Cemo Amadu Abdul, a notable from Konyakary, told the French
oonmiandam at Medine that he disapproved of Bassiru’s campaigns, and added
that Bassiru did not have the approval of the "Commander of the Faithful".
ANS 156110: Medine, 7 September 1876, Ct. Medine to the Governor.

Oral traditions of Umar Tal’s holy war from western Mali uniformly end
with the statement that the holy war ended with Umar’s "disappearance" in
1864. One informant, El Hadj Maeyel Diako, conceded that Umar’s sons
continued the holy war despite the legal cessation of jihad. Given the
influential role which the initial settlers would have played in the creation of
these oral traditions, I argue that the traditions enshrine their arguments
regflafsding the differences between Umar’s "holy war" and the military campaigns
0 sons.

148

66. The son of a Konyakary notable tried to convince a French official in the
early 18908 that he should allow the Umarians to return to their fields in
Jomboxo. In the course of the discussion, the son boasted that his father had
expanded agicultural production quite considerably over the late nineteenth
century. See ANM 1D74: "Rapport du Cpt. Mazillier sur le Jomboko, 1e S6ro et
les Maures d’Askeur".

67. Both Abdoul Aziz Diallo and I found that descendants of lower valley and
Toronke herders who arrived in the Nioro area during the 18708 and 808
indicate that the new arrivals resented the Muslim pretensions of the Futanke
notables "who prayed in mosques but did not fight with the mm
(Commander of the Faithful) Amadu Sheku". While I could not find descendants
of lower valley Fulbe herders to interview in the Konyakary area, I suspect
that they would have shared that perspective on the Futanke notables of
Jomboxo. See, for the most eloquent statement of Kingi’s "young men", Abdoul
Aziz Diallo’s interview with Mamadou Alpha Diallo, 6avinann6, 25 September 1977.

68. The notables of Jomboxo took the initiative in 1884 and asked Amadu
Sheku, who had just arrived in Nioro, to settle the dispute by replacing Bassiru
with a new leader. I discuss these events in Chapter Nine.

69. ANM 1Q70: Medine, 31 July 1889, Ct. Medine to Ct. Sup.; ANS 15676/3:
Kayes, 1 November 1889, transcript of an interview with a spy who visited
Karta in late October, 1889.

70. ANM.1E54: Medine, June, 1887, "Rapport politique".

Nioro, as an unwilling participant:

CHAPTER SIX

The Revolt of Habib and Moktar: the Politics of the Evidence

Amadu Sheku, at the head of a small army, crossed the Niger

at Nyamina and arrived in the vicinity of Nioro 15 days later.

One evening at seven, Mustafa was in the compound with Moktar

and a voice whispered to him from the door: "Mustafa, your

master sends you geetin gs and awaits you. He is already at

Tugunne!" Mustafa got up immediately and, without informing

the prince [Moktar], left quickly by horse for Nioro . . . .

The next day Moktar arrived at Nioro. He was desperate because

he knew that the arrival of Amadu signaled the end of his revolt

. . . . He went to Nomo to meet the army of the Commander [of

the Faithful] and spent that evening with his brother. 1
-recounted to Soleillet in 1878 at Segu.

[Amadu Sheku] sent a message to Muntaga to inform him of . . .

the impending arrival of his army at Nioro. The courier did

not find Muntaga, who had left to meet with Moktar .....

[Upon hearing of Amadu’s impending arrival, Muntaga] abandoned

the rebel cause after making an initial step toward supporting it.

. . . . Moktar decided to retreat. Slowly and reluctantly he

followed the route to Niogomera, where Habib was going to arrive.

Muntaga arrived at Nioro almost at the same time as Amadu’s avant-

garde. To demonstrate his new commitment to the latter, he quickly

sent a cavalry force to pursue Moktar. 2
-recounted to Pi6tri in 1880 at Nango.

These two accounts provide contrasting narratives of the revolt led by

Habib and Moktar. Paul Soleillet’s version depicts Mustafa Keita, the leader of

he arrived with his army at Nioro, but secretly sent a letter informing Amadu

Sheku of Moktar’s actions.

149

Mustafa met the demands of Moktar when

Amadu quickly marched to Karta and confronted

150
Moktar, who retreated from Nioro after spending a few days with Amadu. In
Camille Pi6tri’s account, the leader of Nioro at the time of the revolt is
Amadu’s half-brother Muntaga, and not Mustafa Keita. Muntaga, too, initially
plotted against Amadu but then betrayed the rebel cause upon Amadu’s arrival
in Nioro. Piétri also notes that Moktar withdrew from the Nioro area before
Amadu Sheku could meet with him.

Paul Soleillet and Camille Piétri transmitted these accounts less than one
decade after the revolt occurred, and may have consulted some of the same
informants. Since they are the only major historical sources for the revolt,
historians must address the questions of historical perspective and the
transmission of oral data in the late nineteenth century Western Sudan. The
major discussions of the revolt, by BC. Oloruntimehin and Yves Saint-Martin,

however, fail to gapple with these issues.3

Not surprisingly, these works
contain numerous errors. Saint-Martin prefers Soleillet’s account, and uses it
to narrate a drama which concludes with Amadu Sheku’s return to Segu in 1876.
Oloruntimehin accepts both accounts as narratives of two separate encounters.
He argues that Amadu Sheku captured Moktar and appointed Muntaga leader of
Nioro in 1871, released Moktar and returned to Segu, and then returned to
Nioro to put down another round of revolts. Amadu Sheku in fact made only
one trip to Nioro during the early 18708, and he was back in Segu by 1874.4

Other errors appear in the works of Saint-Martin and Oloruntimehin. The
French reports which were written contemporaneously with the revolt indicate
that Amadu captured Habib and Moktar in early 1871, but these two historians

5 Their error stems from

narrate a conflict lasting several years longer.
acceptance of the chronologies offered by Soleillet and Pi6tri, who added dates

to their accounts to satisfy their editors. Saint-Martin uses the French

151
materials from the Senegal valley rather extensively, and Oloruntimehin makes
specific reference to the documents which report the capture of Habib and
Moktar in 1871, but both fail to notice the discrepancies in the data.6 The
result is that their narratives offer inaccurate chronologies of the revolt.

The present chapter analyzes the source materials for the revolt led by
Habib and Moktar. Through an appreciation of the transmission of oral data
and the motives of African informants and French editors, some of the
discrepancies among the accounts can be resolved. While data analysis does
not rectify all the problems, it provides a basis for making evaluations of the
accounts based on the perspectives and motives of the original informants and

the interests of the listeners.

Theflidence

Not one oral account of the revolt of Habib and Moktar, generated within
the Umarian community and refined over the course of several generations, has
been collected in the Western Sudan.7 Most informants fail to recall anything
about Habib and Moktar, and those that do simply remember that they
challenged Amadu Sheku and lost.8 A combination of historical circumstances
pushed the revolt out of the public memory of the Umarian community. The
imprisonment of the two brothers precipitated expressions of outcry against
Amadu Sheku, thus discouraging public celebration of Amadu’s victory over his
brothers. Also, a dissident tradition never emerged in western Mali. The
dispersal of Habib and Moktar’s followers in the aftermath of their capture may
partially explain the absence of such a tradition.9 Additionally, the subsequent
rebellion of Muntaga tapped the sirnmerin g discontent of the Futanke of Karta,

152
and became the historical event through which discord in the current Umarian
community is expressed. 10 An inquiry into the initial revolt, therefore, must
turn to contemporaneous written materials and French collections of oral
reminiscences from the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and use
them to re-examine the competing versions in the Soleillet and Pi6t1i accounts.

Contemporaneous written materials include French reports and political
correspondence from the upper Senegal valley posts at Medine and Bakel.
French officials primarily relied on the testimony of non-Umarian political elites
who lived near the posts and desert-side traders who passed through Umarian
settlements on their way to the gum markets of the Senegal valley. Both
goups of informants rarely passed along information about internal political
conflict among the Umarians.11 In 1870, at the height of the revolt, the
French oommarrdm at Bakel and Medine received envoys from Amadu Sheku,
Habib and Moktar. The envoys obtained weapons from the market to support
their military activities, but were unable to lure the French into choosing sides
in the dispute.12 Despite these contacts, the French remained confused about
the revolt and its political ramifications.

According to the initial French reports, Moktar remained neutral in a
conflict between Habib and Amadu. This understanding flows logically from the
earlier French perception that Moktar’s arrival in Konyakary during mid-1869
indicated his appointment as the new leader at Konyakary.13 Only in May,
1870, when Habib arrived in Jomboxo, did the French first realize that a
political challenge to Amadu’s authority had emerged in Karta.14 Thereafter,
French archival materials provide information regarding the manuevers of the
Tal brothers and conclusive evidence for dating the capture of Habib and

Moktar by January or February of 1871. On the whole, however, they do not

153
provide sufficient data for the creation of an independent chronology of the
revolt. Nor do they offer insight into the origins of the conflict.

Arabic documents are even less helpful than the French archival materials
for the historical reconstruction of the revolt. A chronicle of the revolt does
not exist in Arabic nor in Pulaar in Arabic script; the existence of several
Arabic chronicles of Amadu’s other major political victory during his residence
in Kingi, the defeat of the Bambara at Gemukura in 1872, suggest that Amadu
decided to emphasize his conquest of the Bambara in preference to his earlier

victory. 15

Additionally, Amadu’s court did not generate many documents
concerning the revolt. A few commercial papers related to the purchase of
weapons exist, as do scattered estimates of troop strength and a partial list of
taxable villages. 16 Not one piece of correspondence between Amadu and his
brothers has yet been found in the Arabic materials from Nioro and Segu.

French travellers and colonial officials collected Umarian reminiscences of
the revolt of Habib and Moktar, and their published accounts are the primary
materials upon which a historical reconstruction of the political drama must be
based. The most detailed information appears in the late nineteenth century
accounts of Soleillet and Piétli. Two early twentieth century collections, based
on the testimony of influential Umarians, supplement the nineteenth century
accounts. 17 Several distinct and often contradictory perspectives emerge from
these materials. The failure of Saint-Martin and Oloruntimehin to gapple with
the competing perspectives within the published accounts led to their factual
and interpretive errors. These shortcomings can be avoided through careful

consideration of the specific historical circumstances under which each text was

created.

g 154

Paul Soleillet was the first European to gather oral reminiscences of the
revolt. He travelled to Segu in 1878-79, passing through Konyakary and Nioro
during an era when Franco-Umarian commercial collaboration was giving way to
competition between the two regional powers. Soleillet left his notes and
journals with Gabriel Gravier, a French geographer, who published the account
several years after the trip occurred. Gravier compiled the text, freely adding
his own observations and frequently referring the reader to other traveller’s
accounts. Unfortunately, Gravier does not describe the process whereby he
transformed Soleillet’s notes into the published account. Since the history of
the political challenge appears as a narrative in the text, one wonders about its
original form: did an oral account exist in Segu at the time of Soleillet’s visit,
or did Gravier compile the narrative from Soleillet’s notes?

The Soleillet/Gravier account includes material which strongly suggests
that. he collected an oral account of the revolt which members of Amadu’s inner
circle narrated for him. References to the itinerary of Amadu’s travels, the
size and composition of his army at various points in the struggle, and the
interactions between Amadu and his dissident brothers reflect the testimony of
informants with access to Amadu’s court. Additionally, the text follows
immediately with a narrative of Amadu’s victory over the Bambara at Gemukura
and an account of his installation as Commander of the Faithful during his
return to Segu. This movement in the narrative, flowing from the revolts to
Amadu’s accomplishments, reflects a concern for Amadu’s role as leader of the
Umarian community. Since neither Soleillet nor Gravier were sympathetic
towards Amadu, they are unlikely sources for such a perspective. Saydu Jeliya,

an advisor to Amadu at the time of Soleillet’s visit and the author of an Arabic

V 155

chronicle of Amadu’s victory at Gemukura, may have been the informant who
recounted a history of Amadu’s reign for Soleillet.18

It is clear, however, that Soleillet questioned the completeness of the
official narrative and sought information and perspectives from outside the
Umarian inner circle. Soleillet collected testimony from the interpreter Alfa
Sega, who worked on the staff at Medine and had toured Jomboxo at the time
of the revolt. More importantly, Soleillet sought dissident perspectives from
within the Umarian community. He frequently mentions two former leaders of
Karta, Mustafa Keita of Nioro and Samba Mody of Konyakary, who lived in
Segu at the time. 19 He may have gathered their reminiscences of the revolt,
given his overt sympathy for them as deposed administrators in Karta.
Informants from Konyakary also may have provided Soleillet with oral testimony
which diverged from the official Segovian perspective. In his description of his
trip from Konyakary to Segu, Soleillet noted how tensions erupted within his
travelling party when a resident from Konyakary spoke negatively about the
reign of Amadu Sheku.20 Scattered details in the Soleillet/Gravier account of
the revolt suggests that he may have gathered information from this informant,
or others from Konyakary, in private sessions.21

Textual evidence indicates, additionally, that either Gravier or Soleillet
drew upon written source materials as they compiled the narrative. The dates
which appear throughout the text indicate that Soleillet or Gravier tried to
locate the events in a chronology established from dated source materials.
Among the written sources were archival reports from Medine. Most of the
dates are inaccurate, suggesting that the written data did not correspond well

with oral testimony, or that Gravier misread the notes. In either case, the

attempt to reconcile oral and written data points to a process whereby someone

156
outside the Umarian camp worked with materials from various sources and made
the final decisions regarding what would and would not appear in the published
account of the revolt.

The editorial decisions of Gravier, therefore, mark Soleillet’s text as a
composite account of the political challenge. While Soleillet’s efforts to collect
data from a variety of informants potentially increases the value of his work to
the historian, the intrusive role of the editor and the absence of clear
references to sources of information creates problems for its use as a basic
source. The text mentions, for example, that Moktar’s move into western Karta
was a reaction to the prior initiative of Muntaga, another son of Umar, who
reportedly led a contingent of soldiers into southern Karta. Yet, Soleillet’s
narrative never again refers to Muntaga’s activities, although Camille Piétri’s
account suggests that Muntaga was a principal actor in the capture of Moktar.
How does one interpret Soleillet’s silence regarding Muntaga’s role? Did
Soleillet not collect any information on the topic, or did Gravier decide not to
include subsequent references to Muntaga’s role? Or did Muntaga actually play
an insignificant role in the political drama?

A careful analysis of Piétri’s account might propose a resolution of the
issue. Captain Camille Piétri published his account of the revolt based on oral
testimony gathered less than two years after Paul Soleillet’s travels. He
collected his material while serving in Lieutenant Joseph Gallieni’s diplomatic
mission to Segu in 1880-81. The Gallieni mission occurred just as France
renewed its military advance into the Western Sudan; Amadu took the
opportunity to express his reaction to the French military initiatives by
detaining Gallieni’s mission for 10 months at Nango, a village near Segu.22

Piétri described the entire experience, and included a chapter devoted to the

157

history of the revolt. He wrote the text himself, which appeared in print two
years before Soleillet’s account. Piétri, therefore, probably did not have the
chance to compare his materials with those collected by Soleillet.23 His work
also does not show signs of the wide canvassing of opinion and the synthetic
treatment of oral and written material which mark Soleillet’s text. The
extended residence at Nango nonetheless provided Piétri with the opportunity to
collect oral material and reflect on Umarian history.

Piétri’s captivity at Nango and his military service in the Western Sudan,
where the French were poised to overthrow Amadu Sheku, influenced his views.
He judged Amadu as one who "was never distinguished by his bravery nor by
any splendid achievements. He was, and still remains, . . . faint-hearted."24
Piétri also detested the Muslim rhetoric which Amadu used to consolidate his
support among his Futanke followers, reflecting a more general animosity of the
French military towards the Tukulor 13111! and their zealous leader. Piétri
recounted the history of the revolts to show how divided and weak the Umarian
state had become after Umar’s death.25 His emphasis on the divisions within
the Tal family served the interests of those in the military who wanted the
French advance to continue unfettered by the diplomatic concerns of the
French Ministry of the Colonies.”

Since Amadu controlled the flow of information which the Gallieni mission
received at Nango, one wonders why Amadu would have allowed his enemies to
hear an account as politically damaging as the history of the revolt. That
Amadu allowed and in fact encouraged his envoys to recount the history of the
revolt to the French mission is evident in the detail of Piétri’s account, which
is as comprehensive as Soleillet’s composite account. Piétri seems to have been

an unwitting accomplice in the transmission of a version of the revolt which

158
Amadu instructed his envoys to reveal at Nango. Although Piétri’s own political
opinions color his writing, careful textual analysis shows that Amadu’s envoys
influenced Piétri and led him to draw conclusions about the revolt which served
Amadu’s political purposes.

Piétri reflects an official Segovian perspective through his emphasis on the
political concessions granted by Amadu before the outbreak of the revolt.
Piétri’s account is the only narrative to assert that Amadu Sheku appointed
Moktar to a leadership position at Konyakary. He adds that Amadu also put
Muntaga in place as the leader in Nioro shortly afterward. Soleillet’s account
in contrast emphasizes the initiative of Moktar in seizing power and rallying
the Futanke to his side, testimony which may reflect the perspective of
Mustafa Keita, Samba Mody or a Futanke informant from Konyakary. Piétri’s
focus on Amadu’s appointments reflects an official perspective by putting Amadu
in a favorable light as a brother who had granted his younger siblings political
power before the revolt. Indeed, Piétri’s account contains no references to the
pervasive criticisms of Amadu’s lack of generosity, comments which abound in
Soleillet’s narrative. Despite his own opinions of Amadu, Piétri’s account
portrays Amadu in terms which, from an internal perspective, were flattering.

Piétri continues with the official Segovian line by arguing that Moktar and
Habib forced Amadu’s hand by refusing to send him the requisite share of the
taxes amassed at Konyakary and Dingiray, respectively. Piétri notes that, just
prior to Amadu’s departure for Nioro, the Commander of the Faithful told his
Segovian supporters that his only goal was to keep intact what Umar had
created with the blood of Muslims. Although Piétri distances himself from
Amadu’s perspective, he fails to invoke dissenting opinions regarding Amadu’s

intentions. Piétri is unable to step outside the received account because he did

_ 159
not collect data from informants other than Amadu’s envoys. As a result, Piétri
concludes his narrative by repeating what he has heard at Nango, which is a
celebration of Amadu’s efforts to defeat the rebels. Piétri’s reference to
Habib’s attack on Amadu’s army while they were performing the mid-day prayer
is merely one of many examples of how the Segovian view of Amadu’s righteous
victory over his two brothers crept into Piétri’s account.

Amadu had an additional purpose in providing the French with his history
of the revolt: he wanted his enemies to draw negative conclusions about the
value of forging an alliance with Muntaga, the Umarian leader at Nioro in the
early 1880s. Muntaga already had begun to assert his independence from Amadu
Sheku by 1879, and the French military initiative gave him further room for
manoeuver. Amadu accurately perceived that the French hoped to exploit the
conflict to their own advantage: Gustave Borgnis—DesBordes, W
W in the Western Sudan during the early 1880s, in fact attempted to
draw Muntaga into an alliance with the French.27 Amadu’s decision to hold the
Gallieni mission at Nango allowed him to send the French a message regarding
the wisdom of intervening in Umarian affairs. Not surprisingly, Piétri’s account
portrays Muntaga as an unreliable ally to those who conspired with him in an
effort to defeat Amadu.

Muntaga’s role in the revolt is a dominant sub—plot in Piétri’s account.
Piétri notes that Muntaga, before his appointment as leader in Nioro, joined
Moktar’s rebel camp, only to beu'ay the dissident brothers once Amadu arrived
in Nioro. The frequent references to Muntaga’s betrayal of Moktar in Piétri’s
narrative suggest that his informants stressed Muntaga’s actions. These
unflattering references have the dual effect of absolving Amadu of blame for

the capture of Moktar and of depicting Muntaga as an unreliable ally. The

160
emphasis on Muntaga’s role also shows how rapidly Muntaga’s ambition
dissipated with the arrival of Amadu’s superior military forces. Both images of
Muntaga, as an unreliable political ally and a cowering subordinate, are
examples of Amadu’s attempt to use the past to serve contemporary political
interests m the French.

Piétri’s account, therefore, is based on an initial oral transmission at
Nango which Piétri subsequently published upon his return to France. Amadu
Sheku’s envoys provided the Gallieni mission with a narrative history of the
revolt which Amadu hoped would dissuade the French from intervening in
Umarian political squabbles. Piétri retold Amadu’s story to influence debate on
the value of the French conquest of the Western Sudan. Except for a few
errors, such as confusing the names of Amadu’s and Habib’s mothers, most of
what appears seems to be a fairly accurate account of what Amadu’s envoys
passed to Piétri at Nango. While the account must be evaluated carefully and
placed within the context of heightened political tensions in the Western Sudan
during the early 1880s, it stands as a complete and coherent narrative account
of the revolt as perceived by Amadu Sheku in the early 1880s. It is perhaps
more valuable as an historical source than the Soleillet/Gravier account because
Amadu’s bias and Piétri’s interests are clear and the distortions are obvious and
predictable.

That Piétri collected a narrative influenced by the political events of the
1880s becomes even more evident when compared with the information gathered
by A. de Loppinot, a French colonial official of the early twentieth century.28
De Loppinot served in Bandiagara, where be supervised Agibu Tal, another son
of Umar. Agibu acted as Amadu’s replacement in Segu when Amadu resided in
Nioro in the early 1870s, and then replaced Habib as leader at Dingiray in the

161
late 1870s. A decade later, as the French expansion gained momentum, Agibu
was the only Tal to enter into an alliance with the French; he joined the
conquest of the Western Sudan and eventually obtained the former Umarian
territories of Masina as his personal fiefdom, which he controlled from
Bandiagara. In 1908 Agibu recounted some of his reminiscences of the past for
de Loppinot, who edited and published the account some ten years later.

Agibu’s memory of the revolt is similar to Soleillet’s account in its basic
narrative structure. Agibu follows Soleillet’s core chronology beginning with
Moktar’s activities in Nioro and continuing through to the capture of Moktar
and Habib. This similarity in narrative structure suggests that a standard
chronology of the revolt existed at some point in the nineteenth century. The
basic narrative probably was developed in Amadu’s court, since it takes as its
focus the actions of Amadu in defeating the political challenge. While Agibu
uses a Segovian core to order his reminiscences, he distances himself from it by
adding details of Futanke disenchantment with Amadu. In particular, he notes
that the Futanke of Kingi wanted Amadu to put Agibu in power at Nioro. As
Soleillet before him, Agibu stepped outside the received narrative and freely
added alternate traditions and perspectives on the sequence of events. '

Since Agibu does not mention a role for Muntaga, one must reflect on the
question of whether Amadu’s envoys at Nango fabricated Muntaga’s role in the
revolt, or at least overstated his importance for the benefit of dissuading the
French from intervening in Umarian political conflicts. The Soleillet/Gravier
account makes one reference to an early initiative on Muntaga’s part, but then
remains silent, suggesting that Muntaga played at least some role in the revolts.

Contemporaneous French sources also are silent, but one letter refers to a

162
"third brother" who was in Nioro at the time when Moktar was in Konyakary
and Amadu was in Nioro.29 Was the third brother Muntaga?

Perhaps oral data from early twentieth century Nioro, the only other
extant collection of Umarian reminiscences, will help resolve the question.
Colonel Adam collected oral reminiscences and traditions in the Nioro area
during the course of his service in the colonial administration there.30 He
published an annotated translation of a local Arabic chronicle in which he
interjected his own observations as well as the oral testimony of his informants.
The Arabic chronicle and much of the oral testimony came from the Kaba Jakite
family of Nioro, many of whom worked for the French as interpreters and
chiefs. This family had moved to Karta from Bundu at the time of the holy
war. Umar Kaba Jakite, who founded the Nioranke branch of the family, was
an influential Soninke cleric who, as I have outlined in Chapter Two, joined
Umar’s cause and became one of his close advisors during the Kartan
campaign.31 Umar Kaba Jakite and his sons served as the imams of the mosque
in Nioro, and were leading figures in local politics. That the family worked for
the French administration suggests that they had been able to disassociate
themselves from the Futanke Umarian community which the French so despised.
Their perspectives on the past are not, therefore, representative of a Futanke
view, but certainly reflect one local perspective on the events.

The Kaba Jakite chronicle includes a section on the reign of Amadu Sheku.
The chronicle narrates Amadu’s campaigns against armies of the Bambara of
Segu, who regrouped after the conquest and fielded a serious challenge to
Amadu’s administration. The chronicle mentions Amadu’s residence in Nioro, but
does not refer to the revolt of Habib and Moktar, emphasizing instead the

defeat of the Bambara at Gemukura and the appointment of his six brothers as

163
leaders of garrisons in Karta.32 The chronicle, therefore, presents a Segovian
perspective on Amadu’s reign, avoiding the topic of the challenge to his
authority in favor of a celebration of his battlefield exploits. Buyagi Kaba
Jakite, one of Umar’s sons, was a loyal supporter of Amadu Sheku, and
eventually moved to Segu in the late nineteenth century.33 His access to the
court makes him a possible author of this section of the chronicle.

Adam’s text, however, includes local perspectives on Amadu’s residence in
Nioro that he collected from oral testimony. Adam discusses at some length
Amadu’s resolution of a conflict between the Futanke of Kingi and two Umarian
leaders, Mustafa Keita and his advisor, Buyagi Kaba Jakite. In Adam’s
account, the Futanke of Kingi accuse Mustafa of depleting the state treasury
and distributing it to his associates, but Amadu Sheku determines that the
accusation was false. A member of the Kaba Jakite family certainly was the
source of information for this discussion. Adam also adds a few details
concerning the revolts of Habib and Moktar. The information is scanty, and
does not mention anything about support for Habib and Moktar in Kingi. The
lack of specific information regarding the revolt may either indicate a poor
memory of the events or a decision not to tell Adam much about the political
problems of Amadu.

The silence regarding this issue continues in Kingi up until today. My
inquiries in Nioro and its environs uncovered even less than Ada‘m collected at
the turn of the . century. Most informants could not remember that Amadu
Sheku had lived in Nioro prior to his second residence in the late 1880s. Only
a few could remember the names of Habib and Moktar, and fewer still knew
that they led a challenge to Amadu. All questions about Muntaga elicited a
universal assertion: Shaykh Umar, and not Amadu, appointed Muntaga and five

_ 164
other brothers as military leaders in Karta at a ceremony in Masina, set over
ten years earlier in 1862.34 Events which would contradict the alleged
appointment of Muntaga by Umar, such as the revolt of Habib and Moktar,
details of Mustafa’s career as leader at Nioro and Amadu’s first residence in
Karta, have been pushed out of the oral memory and replaced by the acceptance
of Muntaga’s appointment by his father, Shaykh Umar.

Muntaga’s lengthy tenure as leader at Nioro gave him the opportunity to
rewrite the Umarian past. His advisors may have created the tradition that
Muntaga was appointed by Umar in an effort to reinforce his claims for
autonomy from Segu. They found a willing audience for this version of the
past among the Futanke who had grown antagonistic towards Amadu Sheku for
his capture and imprisonment of Habib and Moktar. Given that Shaykh Umar
had appointed Amadu Sheku as his successor in 1860, the assertion that Umar
subsequently diminished Amadu’s position by appointing his younger brothers to
the garrisons in Karta was a slap at Amadu which probably captm'ed the
imagination of an angry group of Futanke.35 As the tradition gained
acceptance, the Futanke inserted it at the end of the saga of the holy war.36

As Muntaga rewrote the past, he also had to eliminate reminiscences which
would contradict the received tradition. Public recounting of the revolt would
contradict the tradition of Muntaga’s appointment by Umar, since the political
challenge was based on the fact that Amadu Sheku had not shared power with
the other brothers. Additionally, if Muntaga had betrayed Moktar, then his
reputation would suffer from continual repetition of the fact. Indirect evidence
of Muntaga’s suppression of the history of the revolt is contained in the
Soleillet/Gravier account: Soleillet, who passed through Nioro on his return

from Segu, does not seem to have collected any data about the revolt from

165

Nioranke informants. The current amnesia among informants in western Mali
also suggests that Muntaga discouraged public recounting of the revolts. The
creation of a new tradition regarding Muntaga’s appointment and the
suppression of public discussion of the revolts suggest that Muntaga felt
considerable embarrassment at the means by which he obtained power in Nioro.
One would guess that Muntaga betrayed Moktar, helped in his capture and
received the appointment from Amadu Sheku as a reward for his service at
Amadu’s time of need.

The published materials illustrate how the outcome of the revolt helped to
influence the transmission of information regarding the political drama. The
Piétri account provides a clear statement from the victor, Amadu Sheku, as he
reacted to the French advance of the early 18803 and bristled at Muntaga’s
growing assertions of autonomy from Segu. Muntaga, a political beneficiary of
Amadu’s victory, created a tradition regarding his accession to power which
obscured his role in the revolt. Amadu and Muntaga, as leaders in Segu and
Nioro, respectively, were able to discourage public recollection of the events
which challenged their official versions. While neither Amadu Sheku nor
Muntaga were completely successful in preventing alternate perspectives from
gaining currency, their efforts limit the quantity and quality of historical data
presently available for reconstruction of the revolt.

The published materials do include some dissenting perspectives on the
revolt. The twentieth century collections provide testimony from subordinate
actors in the drama, the Kaba J akite family of Nioro and Agibu Tal, whose
recollections help resolve some of the contradictions in the nineteenth century
data. The Soleillet/Gravier account also includes various perspectives on the

revolt, but the composite nature of the text limits its utility unless a much

166
more extensive analysis of the narrative yields additional insights into the
sources and social bases of the dissident perspectives. Nevertheless, this
analysis has provided the basis for an informed inquiry into the political drama

based on the extant source materials.

167

Notes
1. vPaul Soleillet WW
1 ill 1 r vi (Paris, 1887), p. 368.
2. Camille Piétri, Les Frangais an Niger (Paris, 1885). pp. 117-118.
3. 8.0. Oloruntimehin, W (London, 1972) and Yves
Saint-Martin. Limpiretoucmrleur (Paris, 1970).

4. Conclusive evidence for Amadu Sheku’s return are the Arabic materials
produced by Amadu Sheku’s entourage as they made their way from Nioro to
Segu. See the documents in BN.MO.FA. 5713, fos. 38, 97-98, 143, 146, 153.
Another document (BN.MO.FA. 5713, fos. 15-16) puts Amadu Sheku in Segu to
celebrate the Ramadan of 1874.

5. ANS 15G109: Medine, 25 January 1871 and 12 March 1871, Ct. Medine to
the Governor of Senegal.

6. Oloruntimehin states correctly that by "the end of January 1871 Ahmadu
had defeated his rivals" (p. 184), but then argues that Amadu had only captured
Moktar and not Habib. Oloruntimehin subsequently cites the Medine letter of
12 March 1871 (in ANS 15G109), which refers to the capture of Habib and
Moktar as the reason for growing Futanke dissent, but uses it merely to argue
that' Amadu was losing support among his followers in Kingi (p. 185nl).
Oloruntimehin also refers to letter of 21 November 1871 (in the ANS 15G109)
from Medine which refers to Amadu’s capture of Habib; indeed, he even
translates the relevant passage in his note: "L’emprisonnement de deux de ses
fréres depuis huit mois . . ." (p. 185n3). Additionally, an examination of the
archival documents which Oloruntimehin uses to narrate Habib’s actions after
January 1871 reveals that not one corroborates Olorunitrnehin’s argument: the
letter from 6 January 1872 mentions a challenge from Seydu Tal and not Habib;
the 26 March 1872 letter refers to Amadu’s campaign against the Bambara of
Gemukura and not "rebellions" against Amadu Sheku. Oloruntimehin clearly has
misread and misquoted many of the relevant archival materials from Medine.

7. The sole known exception to this statement is the interview granted David
Robinson by Bougouboly Makki Tall on 19 August 1976 at Bandiagara, Mali. In
it subsequently interview with Robinson, he tried to retract his statements.
Even his memory of the revolt is not very extensive, and contrasts with the
depth of detail in his account of other political events during the reign of
Amadu Sheku.

8. See, for example, Abdoul Aziz Diallo’s interview with Bassirou Alpha Diallo
in September, 1977 at Gavinané, Mali.

9. ANS 13Gl71: Bakel, 28 February, 14 March, 31 March and 30 May 1871,
Ct. Bakel to the Governor of Senegal.

168

10. Abdoul Aziz Diallo published an account of Muntaga’ s rebellion based on
his collection of oral data regarding the affair. Diallo, "Le siege de Nyoro et

la mort de Muntaga Tall", Emdemaljennes (1979).

11. The initial phases of the revolt, too, occurred at a time when an outbreak
of cholera in the Senegal valley commanded the attention of the French.

12. Amadu’s envoys purchased weapons at Bakel, while Moktar’s and Habib’s
envoys secured their firearms at Medine. The French Governor Valiere seems
to have adopted a posture of strict neutrality with regard to the revolts. No
specific document directly attests to such a policy decision, but Valiere did
issue a policy statement regarding French neutrality y_i_s;a-_\_ris Amadu’s struggle
with the Bambara at the sametime. See ANF.SOM SEN.1 56a#99

13. 13G214: Medine, 21 January 1870, Ct. Medine to Ct. Bakel.

l4. ANS 150109: Medine, 11 June 1870, Ct. Medine to the Governor.

15. BN.MO.FA. 5640, fos. 36b-38a; 5713, fos. 37a-38a.

16. BN.MO.FA. 5713, fos 4, 122a, 126a, 53a-53b, 196-197.

17- M G Adam W (Paris, 1904);
A. de Loppinot, "Souvenirs d’ Aguibou", ' ' ' - -
’A

(1919).
18. Saydu Jeliya was the author of the two Arabic chronicles cited above.
19. Soleillet, Wm (hereafter, Soleillet/Gravier), pp. 365, 366.

20. While this scene simply may have reflected a desire not to air dirty
political linen in front of a guest, it also may suggest that the Umarian
community had resolved not to discuss the revolts publicly as early as the late
18705. Today’s lack of detailed oral knowledge about the revolts adds strength
to the view that the Umarians did not consider the revolts a topic for open
discussion. Soleillet/Gravier, p. 206.

21. Soleillet/Gravier, p. 367, for example, notes how Moktar distributed booty
to his Konyakary supporters.

22. Saint-Martin describes the Gallieni mission in W
Emma (Paris, 1967). PP. 225ff.

23. He may have seen the materials which Soleillet submitted to the French
Governor at Saint Louis. These materials are preserved in ANS 1G46.

24. Piéui.l.&s_Etamais.P- 101-
25. Piém'.l.&s_Etancais.p.101.
26. A.S. Kanya-Forsmcr.1he_Conquest_Qf_theflestm_Sudan(Cambfidgc. 1969).

169

27. ANS 1D68: Bamako, 11 February and 14 February 1883, Ct. Sup. to the
Governor; and ANF.SOM SEN.IV 77a: "Rapport sur la campagne, 1882-83", (the
relevant discussion appears in the section marked "instructions").

28. de Loppinot, "Souvenirs d’Aguibou".
29. ANS 13G214: Medine, 21 January 1870, Ct. Medine to Ct. Bakel.

30. Adam, W

31. The family initially settled at Munia, a village in southern Jafunu, but
Mustafa Keita called upon the services of the Kaba Jakite frequently, and the
family moved close to Nioro in the early 1860s. The Kaba Jakite acted as
hosts to Soninke chiefs, notables and traders who visited the Umarian
governors at Nioro. They were able to collect oral traditions and
reminiscences from many Kartan oral historians and elders. Their Arabic
chronicle contains important versions of the history of many kingdoms of the
Western Sudan, including that of Wagadu. See Chapter Two for a discussion of
Umar Kaba Jakite’s role in the conquest of Karta.

32. Adam. W PP- 1063.

33 Paul Marty WNW Volume 4 (Paris
1921), pp 212 14; Adam. W pp 110112.

34. All my Futanke informants recounted the tradition regarding Muntaga’s
appointment by Umar. Soninke informants from western Mali also recount this
tradition. See the Oudiary Makan Dantioko’s interview with Djammé Tounkara
et Sadio Sakhone at Balle, Mali in June 1980.

35. The tradition also transformed Amadu’s political concessions to his younger
brothers into a belated recognition by Amadu that all the brothers, including
Habib and Moktar, had a right to hold power.

36. Most of my informants recounted the tradition of Muntaga’s appointment
at the end of their narrative of Umar Tal’s holy war. See, for example, my
interview with Bakary Diagouraga on 25 January, 1986.

CHAPTER SEVEN

The Revolt Led by Habib and Moktar

The revolt led by Habib and Moktar, two brothers of Amadu Sheku,
severely damaged the Umarian body politic. Shaykh Umar had installed Amadu
Sheku as the Commander of the Faithful in an attempt to put the succession
question to rest in 1860. The fraternal competition that pitted Umar’s sons
against one another as they grew up at Dingiray, however, expanded into an
open revolt in the late 18603. Habib, very close in age to his half-brother
Amadu, used his status as leader at Dingiray to make that fortress the first
foyer. From there, he and his brothers .moved to bring Karta under the rebel
banner, encouraged by Karta’s autonomy from Amadu Sheku. Habib and Moktar,
Habib’s younger brother, rallied the Futanke of Jomboxo to the rebel camp.
Amadu brought a large Segovian army to Karta, captured his two brothers, and
transferred them in chains to Segu, where they died a few years later in
captivity. Amadu’s reign was tainted by his imprisonment of his two brothers,
and the image of Amadu as an uncharitable older brother lingered in the minds

of most Umarians in the late nineteenth century.

170

171

The major discussions of the revolt, by B. O. Oloruntimehin and Yves
Saint-Martin,1 fail to locate the revolts within the context of the Umarian
colonies of Jomboxo and Kingi. They animate their narratives by emphasizing
the interests and aims of Amadu, Habib and Moktar, despite the fact that none
of these sons of Shaykh Umar had a strong and secure base of power in Karta.
Habib and Moktar were able to rally support for themselves because of Futanke
grievances against the leadership of non-Futanke in the administration of
Jomboxo and Kingi. These grievances did not diminish with the battlefield
losses of Habib and Moktar, and Amadu addressed the Futanke demands in 1874
when he replaced Umar’s former slave administrators in Karta with his younger
brothers. The revolt expressed local Futanke demands for new leadership in
Karta as well as the desire of Habib and Moktar to embarrass Amadu and obtain
control over Umarian Karta.

My analysis of the revolt led by Habib and Moktar begins by describing
Futanke political activity during the period of Mustafa’s consolidation of power
in the 1860s. I then examine Amadu Sheku’s relations with Karta, and follow
with an overview of the succession dispute among Shaykh Umar’s sons. The
chapter concludes with a tentative historical reconstruction of the. political
drama in which the emergence of political demands among the Futanke settlers
in Jomboxo and Kingi takes an appropriate place in the analysis of events.

Ell°'l"'11850
Although Futanke political action prior to the revolt is overshadowed in

the oral historical record by a focus on the succession dispute, sources from

the Senegal valley document some fascinating political developments in Umarian

172
Karta in the era preceding the revolt. The written data are neither abundant
nor complete, but they illuminate local political processes and help to explain
local support for the dissident Tal brothers. Kartan autonomy and Futanke rule
within that independent state were the two main goals of the Futanke political
agenda of the 18605.

Two French envoys visited Umarian Karta and recorded their observations
of political activity at Konyakary and Nioro in 1865 during the initial years of
Franco-Umarian commercial cooperation in the Western Sudan.2 One envoy
noted an administrative duality which existed at these two Umarian centers: in
Nioro, Mustafa served as the military commander while two brothers of Shaykh
Umar acted as religious leaders, whereas in Konyakary, the civil and military
leaders were Samba Mody and Cemo Musa, respectively.3 The French envoy
reversed the two roles in Konyakary, since internal accounts and all
subsequent French reports from Medine suggest that Samba Mody was Umar
Tal’s appointee as the military leader of Konyakary.4 Cemo Jibi, the brother
of Cemo Musa, had been the garrison leader until his death in 1859, but Umar
chose to replace him with Samba Mody, an appointment made contemporaneously
with that of Mustafa at N ioro. Shaykh Umar clearly decided to leave control
over the Kartan provinces with large immigrant populations in the hands of
former slaves instead of members of the Futanke community.

No subsequent written document nor oral tradition refers to such an
administrative duality, so it is reasonable to conclude that the "religious
leaders" were men who occuped informal leadership positions at the garrisons.
That the brothers of Umar and an important Futanke leader such as Cemo
Musa would fill these positions of moral leadership is consistent with the kind

of support that they would have had within the immigrant community. Indeed,

173

the emergence of religious leaders seems to have been a response to the fact
that Umar had not designated a member of the Futanke community to serve as
commander of the garrisons. In N ioro, for example, the Futanke demanded that
Mustafa reveal the contents of official correspondence to Umar’s brothers.5
Their lobbying in support of the brothers’ rights suggests an effort to force
Mustafa into recognizing the Tal leaders as representatives of the immigrant
community in Kingi. Thus, well before the revolt of Habib and Moktar, the
Futanke of Kingi actively were promoting Tal family members as potential
leaders in an effort to influence state policy in Karta.

The conflict between the Futanke of Kingi and Mustafa Keita remained
unresolved throughout the 1860s. The immigrants subsequently protested
Mustafa’s choice of Buyagi Kaba Jakite to replace his father as Nioro’s imam.
They questioned Mustafa’s relationship to the Kaba Jaldte family, suggesting
that they received lavish gifts from the state treasury.6 Beyond the specific
question of Kaba Jakite influence, the Futanke resented the fact that no one
from their community had assumed political office and that the Umarian state
seemed to advance the interests of Soninke and Moorish communities over the
interests of the Futanke. That the imam of Nioro was a member of the Kaba
J akite family only contributed to their perceptions that Mustafa’s multi-ethnic
policies were disadvantageous to their community.

The Senegambian immigrants in Jomboxo equally resented the leadership of
Samba Mody as garrison commander. The French commandant}, at Medine
reported Futanke discontent with Samba Mody, expressed in part against his

slave origins.7

The prominent role which Cemo Musa played in Franco-
Umarian negotiations helped satisfy Futanke concern over Samba Mody’s role,

but the departure of Cemo Musa for Segu in 1867 left a political vacuum in

174
which the Futanke grew increasingly discontent. Indeed, their enthusiatic
support for Moktar when he assumed command at Konyakary in 1869 suggests
that the Futanke of Jomboxo felt, as did their fellow Futanke in Kingi, that a
Tal would better represent their interests than a former slave. Although the
Futanke may not have anticipated Amadu Sheku’s response to the initiative of
Moktar, their support for the dissident brother expressed the culmination of

their political grievances against the policies of Umar’s appointees - Samba
Mody and Mustafa.

 

Another reason that the Futanke of Jomboxo rallied around Moktar in 1869
was their changing attitude toward Amadu Sheku. Most Futanke probably had
accepted Umar’s appointment of Amadu as the Commander of the Faithful in
1860, although the majority had not been present at the installation ceromony
nor had they sworn allegiance to him. This appointment did not influence their
lives, since Segu was hundreds of miles away and Amadu Sheku’s demands for
taxes were infrequent.8 Futanke concerns focused on recruiting additional
fezganke to settle in Karta, thereby adding to their numbers and increasing
their influence over Mustafa and Samba Mody. In as much as Amadu Sheku
recognized Umar’s appointees and engaged them in correspondence, he was
tainted by his implicit support for their policies. However, as the oldest son
and appointed successor to Umar, Amadu still commanded the respect of the
Futanke. This goodwill toward Amadu Sheku quickly dissipated as he began to
make demands on the human resources of Kartainthemid-1860s.

g 175

Amadu’s difficulties in Segu forced him to call for troop reinforcements
from Karta in 1866. When Shaykh Umar and tens of thousands of Umarian
soldiers embarked on the conquest of Masina in 1862, they left Amadu with an
army of approximately four thousand Futanke and even fewer ton-ion to defend
Segu.9 Shortly thereafter Kege Mari Jarra, the last surviving son of Monzon,
the former ruler of Segu, launched an offensive against Amadu’s forces.
Umarian chroniclers report that, after several rebel victories, Kege Mari had
recruited close to 12,000 soldiers into his army.10 In contrast, most of the
Umarian army in Masina had been killed by 1864, and Amadu had to defend his
position without any support from that direction. The lengthy account of
Eugene Mage’s visit to Segu during the mid-18608 describes Amadu Sheku’s
difficulties in rallying the forces to meet the challenge, and leaves the
impression that his position was quite precarious in the years after Umar’s
death. 11

Amadu Sheku took the opportunity of Mage’s return to Saint Louis in
early 1866 to send scores of recruiters back with him to the Senegal valley in
hopes of increasing the flow of femanke and siphoning off a major portion of
the Futanke settlers from Karta.12 Amadu also sent an envoy with orders to
remain in Karta and ensure that the ferganke did not stop there but continued
on to Segu. 13 For six months, the envoy, Mamadu Habib, a cousin of Amadu
Sheku, resided at Munia, a garrison on the migration route through the
Xoolimbinne valley. During his residence, he assembled the Futanke leaders of
Karta to ask them to join in a mass fergo to Segu.” He must have reminded
the Futanke of their obligation to support the activities of the Commander of
the Faithful, and asked them to join in Amadu’s effort to defend the Segovian

conquests and create a new Muslim society on the banks of the Niger. Most

176
Futanke leaders refused, and Mamadu Habib moved his base to the garrison at
Kolomina in early 1867 in an effort to appeal directly to the Futanke settlers in
Kingi.15 This effort largely failed to produce many recruits from Kingi despite
three months of invocation, so Amadu’s envoy returned to Segu in mid-1867
with a small contingent of mange who had only recently arrived in Karta.l6

Amadu’s recruitment effort offended the Futanke settlers of Karta. Not
only did the envoy try to lure them into leaving Karta, but he asserted his
authority over the fergo which the Umarian state in Karta had used for its own
benefit. Amadu’s implicit support for Umar’s appointees could be forgiven, but
his usurpation of control over the {ergo could not, since it was a direct
assertion of imperial rule which disrupted their local political agenda. Many
Futanke had not sworn their allegiance to Amadu. Perhaps more importantly,
most settlers had chosen to live in Karta in preference to joining Umar’s
campaign in 1859 or residence in Segu. They did not share Amadu Sheku’s
concerns for Segu, and feared that their loss of control over the fergg would
weaken their influence in Karta. As Mamadu Habib’s entourage passed from
Karta to Segu, a Bambara group attacked it and took over two hundred Futanke
prisoners. 17 This event only served to reinforce the local Futanke perspective
that Amadu’s authority as the Commander of the Faithful did not necessarily
serve Kartan interests; the imperial mission was proving to be too costly.

Umar’s appointees did not support Amadu Sheku’s imperial plans for Karta.
Mamadu Habib, for example, seems not to have been invited to reside at either
Nioro nor Konyakary during his nine month visit to Karta. While the envoy’s
decision to use Munia as a recruitment center may have been a strategic choice
given its location on a major migration route, his subsequent residence at

Kolomina instead of Nioro suggests that Mamadu was not offered hospitality at

A 177

Mustafa’s palace. In contrast, Mustafa had hosted an envoy of Habib Tal at
Nioro just over a year earlier.18 By the mid-1860s, therefore, Mustafa was
beginning to cast a wider net within the Umarian sea of successor states.19
While Mustafa’s political interests did not always coincide with those of the
Futanke, they did share the same agenda with regard to Amadu’s imperial
assertions over Karta. Local autonomy was an issue which united Mustafa and
the Futanke of Kingi.

While Amadu Sheku undoubtedly was angry about Mamadu Habib’s report of
Mustafa’s waivering commitment and the depth of Futanke resistance to Amadu’s
demands for soldiers, he had more pressing concerns in the form of a military
challenge mounted by Kege Mari. He integrated ferganke into his army and
mounted his own offensive against the rebels in early 1868.20 Kege Mari and
the main rebel force retreated into their well-fortified camp at Kejje, a village
southeast of Segu. Amadu and his forces surrounded Kejje and held them there
for three months.21 When the rebels finally tried to break the siege, Amadu’s
forces met the challenge and defeated the rebel forces quite decisively in a
lengthy battle.22 Although Kege Mari escaped the battle, he died in flight
shortly thereafter. Amadu’s victory at Kejje quieted the Bambara challenge
from the southeast for the moment, and put the Umarian presence in Segu on
the firmest ground it had occupied since the initial victories eight years earlier
in 1860.

Amadu Sheku could not savor his victory. The cholera epidemic which had
moved up the Senegal valley in 1868 eventually reached Segu in 1869 and killed
many members of the Futanke community.23 These deaths, and the recognition
that the Umarian victory at Kejje had been secured in part due to the arrival
of ferganke troops, turned Amadu’s attention once again to Karta, its Futanke

178

community and its access to the Senegal valley. The arrival of new recruits
had become essential to Amadu’s hopes for maintaining power in the middle
Niger valley. He asked one of his court historians, Uthman Kusa, to write an
open letter to the Futanke community imploring them to migrate to Segu and
reside at the capital of the Commander of the Faithfnl.24 Amadu Sheku also
had Uthman compose an Arabic account of the battle at Kejje which placed his
victory within the tradition of Umar’s holy war.25

Conscious of his weakness and stung by the earlier refusal of the Futanke
of Karta to join his campaigns, Amadu now mounted an ideological offensive
which he hoped would win them over to his side. This effort was overtaken by
the succession challenge led by Moktar, who began recruiting in Karta in 1869.
Before turning to a narrative of Amadu’s response to Moktar and Habib’s

challenge, the wider context in which the succession conflict emerged needs

examination.

II . l' S] 1111 3.55:”

The question of who was to succeed Umar Tal gripped the Umarian
community in the years immediately following his death in 1864. Umar’s
followers joined the holy war at various times and from many Senegambian
societies, and loyalty to Umar had been the only unifying bond. The
circumstances of the conquest left them dispersed from Tamba in the west to
Masina in the east, and these distances as well as local challenges to Umarian
rule helped to reinforce the tendency among Umar’s followers to consolidate
control autonomously from other areas of Umarian domination. The Umarians

who survived their Shaykh’s death and the revolts in Masina, for example,

179
numbered in the hundreds, regrouped under the leadership of Umar’s nephew,
Tijani, and drew heavily upon local support in consolidating an Umarian
successor state based at Bandiagara. In as much as Amadu did not attempt to
assert his authority in Masina, they did not join the conflict over the extent of
Amadu Sheku’s authority that raged in the other areas of Umarian settlement
during the late 1860s.

At Dingiray, the Umarian garrison in Tamba in the upper Senegal valley,
however, the succession question was a major concern; it had, in fact, first
been raised during Umar’s lifetime. Umar selected Dingiray as a permanent
settlement for his growing community in 1849, and used it as a base to launch
his holy war against Tamba in 1852. As Umar led his forces up the Senegal
valley and then eastward into Karta in the mid-18503, his wives and their sons
remained at Dingiray and began to manoever over the question of who was to
succwd Umar in the event of his death. Several factions emerged among the
Tal in Dingiray, and the intensity of the conflict forced Umar to call the two
major competitors, Amadu Sheku and Makki, to join his armies on the route.
from Nioro to Segu in 1860. Umar installed his oldest son, Amadu, as the
Commander of the Faithful, and left his next oldest son, Makki, with no title
but an ambiguous commendation as a leading figure in the religious sphere.26

Umar’s installation of Amadu in 1860 only momentarily resolved a
simmering conflict among his sons at Dingiray. Amadu’s mother, Aisha Jallo,
had rallied support for her son’s claims based on his position as the oldest son

of Umar.27

Amadu’s base of support, however, was quite limited outside the
circle of supporters his mother had created for him. In contrast, Makki had
personal charm and leadership qualifies which endeared him to many Umarians

at Dingiray, and also had a reputation for religious learning. In addition,

180

Makki’s mother, Mariatu, had given birth to him only a few months after
Amadu, obscuring the question of birth-order. Makki’s supporters could also
point to Mariatu’s status as the daughter of a noble in Bomu, and suggest that
Aisha was a lowly daughter of a female slave, in their arguments on behalf of
his candidacy.28 The support for Makki in Dingiray was quite strong, and Umar
himself was the only possible arbiter of the conflict between these two factions.
Had Makki not died with Umar in 1864, he might well have led a challenge to
Amadu’s position.

Makki’s death did not prevent other brothers from challenging Amadu
Sheku. Habib, who emerged as the leader at Dingiray in the mid-18608, hoped to
create a large Umarian successor state in the remaining areas of Umarian
domination in the upper Senegal valley - Tamba and Karta.29 He apparently
produced an Arabic letter, putatively written by Umar himself, which gave him
control over these Umarian territories.30 Habib backed that letter with a
strong army of supporters from Futa Jallon, who made up the largest group of
Umarians at l)ingiray.3l He also had credentials which played well before a
larger Umarian audience: he was the third oldest son of Umar, and his mother,
Mariam Dem, was the daughter of Muhammad Bello, the son of Uthman dan
Fodio. Other ambitious brothers at Dingiray rallied behind Habib and his
promises to find places for them in his upper Senegal valley empire. These
brothers included Seydu and Daha, Makki’s younger brothers, Daye and Muniru,
sons of a Bomu Fulbe woman, and Bassiru, the youngest of Umar’s sons, who
was born to a Bambara women captured during the conquest of Karta. Habib’s
most intimate supporter, however, was his own younger brother Moktar.

Muntaga also aspired to political leadership, drawing support from among
those at Dingiray who respected his reputation as a Muslim of deep conviction

. 181

and learning.32 He was five years younger than Habib, but may have tapped
support from the faction which had backed Makki and was looking for a brother
with similar religious credentials. Muntaga’s mother was not from nobility, so
Muntaga lacked the social credentials of Habib, Moktar and Makki. Muntaga’s
ability to attract support illuminates the complexity of the situation at Din giray:
the community which had produced the first two candidates for the succession
to Umar, Amadu Sheku and Makki, remained the primary residence for the Tal
family and continued as the nurturing community for ambitious sons of Shaykh
Umar. While Habib used Dingiray as a base to challenge Amadu Sheku, he had
to share power or face similar challenges to his own position. Indeed, Habib
dared not turn his back completely on a potential challenge from Muntaga.

Karta seemed to present Habib and his brothers with an Umarian territory
in which they could assume control quite easily. Nioro was equaldistant from
Segu and Dingiray, and the Umarian colonies in Jomboxo were even closer.
Additionally, Amadu’s potential administrative reach into Karta was quite
limited, and his control would hinge on the degree to which Umar’s appointees
remained loyal to Umar’s successor. Most importantly, the Futanke community
in Karta had become discontent with Amadu Sheku’s demands upon them. In
1866-67, they refused Mamadu Habib’s attempt to recruit them for a campaign
against the Segovian Bambara, even though he remained in Karta for over half
a year trying to secure an army. The envoy’s failure to recruit troops must
have encouraged the Tal brothers at Dingiray, since it revealed Amadu’s
inability to inspire confidence in his leadership among the Umarians in Karta.
Additionally, Futanke in both Jomboxo and Kingi had begun to question the
authority of the administrators who ruled Karta. While they may not have
formulated any specific plans regarding their replacement, they certainly were

182
looking for leaders who shared their identity and would serve the interests of
the Futanke community ids-£3115 other local interests as well as those of Amadu
Sheku. Some Futanke may have encouraged the brothers at Dingiray to assume
power in Karta.

Amadu Sheku was quite unwilling, however, to accept any diminution of his
authority over Karta.33 The proximity of Karta to new recruits and to weapons
at the French posts in the Senegal valley was a sufficient reason for Amadu to
act against challenges to his authority in the west. Additionally, Amadu had
just defeated the Segovian resistance, and was in a position to leave Segu and
meet military challenges in Karta precisely at the time Habib and Moktar chose
to act. Indeed, Amadu’s sense of accomplishment over defeating the Bambara as
well as the need to purchase weapons and recruit soldiers to replace those lost
in that effort pushed Amadu to take a more forceful approach toward his half-
brothers at Dingiray. On the eve of the revolts, therefore, Amadu was able and
willing to meet the political challenges to his authority arising in the west.

W

Habib most certainly was the instigator of the revolt. He had the age,
the position and the political support at Dingiray to consider a challenge to the
authority of Amadu Sheku. His use of an Arabic letter from Shaykh Umar,
giving him authority in the west, provides additional evidence of his desire to
extend his control from Dingiray to Nioro. Well before making an overt move
into Karta, Habib sent envoys to Konyakary and Nioro to test receptivity to his
plans; Samba Mody responded enthusiastically, while Mustafa reacted with some
reserve. 34 In the late 1860s, Habib decided to send Moktar to Jomboxo to

183
consolidate a base at Konyakary as a first step towards gaining control over all
of Karta.3S Moktar and several other brothers arrived in Konyakary after the
rains ended in late 1869 to mobilize the Futanke of Jomboxo for a march on
Nioro.36

The Tal brothers received an overwhelming welcome from the Futanke at
Konyakary.37 Moktar quickly consolidated support among the Futanke of
Jomboxo, promising to lead them on a new round of campaigns against the
Bambara of southern Karta. It is unclear whether many Futanke fully
understood that recruitment into Moktar’s armies would result in a political
challenge to Amadu’s authority. The Commander of the Faithful lived far away
in Segu, and Moktar’s promises of a campaign against the Bambara were much
more immediate. Additionally, Moktar’s recruitment efforts benefitted from the
arrival of Futanke migrants who were leaving a cholera epidemic in the Senegal
valley and hoped to start a new life in the Senegambian colonies of Karta.38
As a son of Umar Tal with plans to attack the Bambara, Moktar could not help
but rekindle the spirit of the holy war and the memory of material rewards
which loyal followers received from participation in it.

Both French archival sources and Pietri assert that Moktar had been
appointed to serve in Jomboxo by Amadu Shelru.39 According to Piétri’s
account, Amadu held Moktar captive at Segu and appointed him leader at
Konyakary in order to secure the release of Aisha, Amadu’s mother, whom
Habib held at Dingiray. This exchange reportedly culminated seven years of
negotiations between Habib and Amadu. Amadu may have released Moktar in
exchange for Aisha, but the tradition concerning Amadu’s appointment of
Moktar at Konyakary is probably a Segovian attempt to absolve Amadu for
detaining his younger brother at Segu.40 The French confusion regarding

184
Moktar’s position as the leader of Jomboxo reflects the depth of support that
the rebel received among the Futanke of Jomboxo.

Piétli’s traditions regarding Amadu’s release of Moktar, however, invite
speculation that Cemo Musa played a supportive role in the revolt. Cemo
Musa was the leading Futanke notable at Konyakary, and he accompanied
Amadu’s envoy to Segu in 1867. At the time, Amadu’s inability to recruit an
army in Jomboxo weighed on his mind, and Cemo Musa’s advice on what Amadu
could do to win over the F utanke of Jomboxo would have had great impact.
Cemo Musa may well have expressed the desire to have the fraternal conflict
resolved. If this reading of events is accurate, then Cerno Musa may well have
accompanied Moktar to Dingiray in 1868, heard of Habib’s plans regarding
Karta, and then returned to Konyakary and encouraged Samba Mody to support
Moktar when he arrived in late 1869. While the evidence for Cerno Musa’s role
in these events is slim, his involvement certainly would help explain the
widespread acceptance accorded Moktar by the Futanke community.411

Not all Jomboxo’s Futanke, however, joined Moktar’s armies. During his
preparations for the campaigns against the Bambara, Moktar prevented Amadu’s
agents from claiming the Commander of the Faithful’s share of the harvest.42
Some Futanke in Jomboxo wanted no part in a political challenge, and refused
to contribute soldiers to Moktar’s army. These loyalists eventually had to flee

to avoid reprisals from the rebel armies.43

This example aside, most of
Jomboxo’s Futanke were in the rebel camp. By the end of the rains in 1869,
Moktar and his brothers had successfully assembled a sizable force at the
Umarian garrison at Konyakary.

Moktar led these troops in a campaign against the Bambara in southern

Karta, producing material rewards for his followers and renewing the spirit of

. 185

the holy war."4 Riding this wave of success, he then directed his column
northward toward Nioro, where Mustafa and the Futanke of Kingi had yet to
commit themselves openly to the rebel cause. Mustafa met Moktar’s entourage
at Madina, a village a few miles south of Nioro, and declared his allegiance.
He also offered to escort Moktar and the other Tal brothers to Kolomina, an
Umarian garrison in southern Kingi, where a considerable amount of weapons
and munitions were stored.45 Moktar agreed, and as Mustafa led the rebels to
Kolomina, news of the rapid approach of Amadu Sheku’s forces reached their
column.

Amadu Sheku’s arrival had an immediate impact on the revolt. Under the
cover of darkness, Mustafa left Moktar and returned to Nioro. He tried to
cover his tracks by sending a punitive raid against Moktar, but the rebels easily
defeated it.46 Moktar did lose quite a few supporters, who abandoned him and
rushed back to Jomboxo. The rebel forces were severely diminished.47 Most
importantly, the arrival of Amadu prevented Moktar from gaining the support of
the Futanke community in Kingi. No Futanke leader had openly declared
himself on the rebel question prior to Amadu’s arrival, and none joined the
rebels afterward":8 Without a base of support in Kingi, Moktar and his troops
retreated to the west. They passed into the Xoolimbinne valley and stopped in
Gidiyumme, where they camped at Niogomera during the rainy season of 1870.49
Niogomera provided the rebels with a secure base in the Gidiyumme hills where
they could observe Amadu’s movements and tap the grain reserves of the fertile
Xoolimbinne valley.

Amadu Sheku had marched from Segu to Nioro in two weeks instead of the
usual month of travel.50 He arrived at Nioro with at least eight thousand

troops and several canon.51 Amadu’s troop strength indicates that he had

186

gained the full support of the Umarian community at Segu; he reportedly had
redistributed much of Segu’s treasury to the leading Futanke generals, and
promised them several profitable raids against Bambara communities during the
course of their western campaign.52 Amadu’s troops, as Moktar’s before him,
were not, however, committed to a campaign against the rebels. Their
ambiguity toward fighting fellow Umarians explains Amadu’s decision not to
follow Moktar’s forces into Gidiyumme and engage the rebels immediately.
Instead, Amadu spent the first months of his residence at Nioro in discussions
with the Futanke of Kingi, whose support or neutrality Amadu needed to ensure
his victory.53

Amadu’s arrival in Kingi prompted a response from Habib at Dingiray. The
revolt was failing and Moktar faced possible capture by Amadu’s forces. Two
contingents set out for Karta from Dingiray. One was commanded by Habib,
who, convinced many Tal brothers to join a large contingent of Futa J allonke
troops in a march to Konyakary, where he hoped to recruit additional Futanke
supporters.54 Muntaga did not join Habib’s army, but marched with his own
group of supporters to Murgula on the eastern front, an Umarian garrison
south of Karta. It is unclear whether Habib divided his Dingiray forces to
threaten Amadu on two fronts, or whether Muntaga marched to Murgula on his
own initiative, leaving Habib uncertain as to his intentions.55 The two Dingiray
contingents arrived at Konyakary and Murgula just as the rains of 1870 began
to fall.

During the rainy season, all the brothers tried to consolidate their
positions. At Niogomera, Moktar and his brothers enticed some Soninke troops
to join their army. Habib tried to rally the Futanke of Jomboxo to his side,

but without much success.56 Muntaga led the campaign at and around Murgula

187
to entice Futanke to join his contingent, and seems to have increased his
forces considerably.” Amadu Sheku recruited additional soldiers from among
Futanke migrants who continued to arrive in large numbers, but he feared what
might happen if he had to divide his forces and fight simultaneously on three
fronts.58 In an attempt to negotiate a settlement to the political crisis, Amadu
sent envoys to Habib at Konyakary in July, 1870. Since Amadu had only
recently released Moktar from captivity in Segu, his ability to gain the trust of
Habib was seriously compromised. Habib dispersed Amadu’s envoys, and
demanded that Amadu concede control of Karta to the rebels in exchange for
their recognition of Amadu as the Commander of the Faithful59 These demands
made Amadu Sheku all the more determined to assert his supreme authority over
the Umarian community as Umar’s successor.

Although direct evidence is lacking, it seems likely that Amadu also sent
an envoy to Muntaga while his troops were advancing on Nioro from Murgula.
Amadu may have reminded his brother of the pretensions of Habib and Moktar
and the lowly social status of Muntaga’s mother, and then warned that Habib
and Moktar would leave Muntaga out of any power-sharing in Karta. Amadu
also may have offered Muntaga the command of Nioro in exchange for his
betrayal of the rebel cause. These or similar arguments eventually convinced
Muntaga to switch his allegiance. The negotiations would have occurred at
some distance fi'om western Karta, so Habib and Moktar would not have known
of Muntaga’s change of loyalties.

As the rains stopped in October, Habib moved his forces from Konyakary
toward Missira, a village on the Konyakary-Niogomera route.6o At Missira,
Habib, Moktar and the other brothers met for a strategy session. They
probably discussed Muntaga’s march on Nioro from Murgula, and decided that

188

Moktar could convince Muntaga to attack Amadu’s position. They also decided
that, while Moktar met with Muntaga, Habib and the other brothers would take
most of the forces, move up the Xoolimbinne valley, and approach Nioro from
the west. The rebels would then have Amadu pinned down and could force him
to accept their demands. Unfortunately for Habib and the other brothers, their
forces were attacked by Soninke troops as they tried to cross Kanyareme.61
Amadu’s loyalist Soninke not only turned the rebels back, but wounded two of
Habib’s half-brothers.62

The rebels still had a fighting chance if Moktar could convince Muntaga to
stay with the other brothers. The details surrounding Moktar’s activities are
unclear, but Muntaga seems to have feined receptivity to Moktar’s initiative and
arranged a meeting at Gajaba-Jalla, a village to the south of Nioro, sometime
during December.63 Moktar did not have a large contingent with him, and
Muntaga’s troops easily surrounded the rebel brother. Moktar’s forces battled
heroically, but most were killed and the confrontation ended with Moktar’s
capture. Without having to engage either brother directly himself, Amadu
inflicted two major reversals on the rebel cause during the last few months of
1870.

Habib regrouped his forces for a final attempt at defeating Amadu Sheku.
How Habib marched into Kingi is unknown, but an encounter occurred at Biru, a
village to the southwest of Nioro.64 Habib’s forces apparently caught Amadu’s
army by smprise, as they were performing the afternoon prayer.65 Habib’s
initial battlefield advantage could not outweigh Amadu’s strength in numbers;
Habib’s troops eventually retreated and he was forced to surrender himself to
one of Amadu’s generals.66 Habib’s and Moktar’s supporters dispersed in the

aftermath of their capture. Some returned to Futa Toro, frustrated with the

189
turn of events and unwilling to submit to Amadu’s authority.67 Some of their
Futa J allonke supporters returned to Din giray, and encouraged yet another
brother, Seydu, a brother of Maltlti, to raise an army to fight Amadu.68 Seydu
decided not to lead a challenge, and thus the revolt ended effectively with the
capture of Habib and Moktar.

293$}:an

The source materials for the revolt led my Habib and Moktar are neither
abundant nor without limitations. Soleillet/Graver emphasizes the initiative of
Moktar, Amadu’s response, and Habib’s reaction to the escalating political
drama. The Piétri account focuses on the conflict between Habib and Amadu,
and adds Muntaga’s betrayal of Moktar as a dominant sub-plot to the story.
The, errors in the historical reconstructions based on these accounts, by Saint—
Martin and Oloruntimehin, reflect the difficulties they had in resolving the
contradictions. My source analysis reveals some of the social bases for the
differing perspectives; even with extensive analysis and reflection, however,
many of the contradictions in the source materials defy resolution.

Based on the insights generated by my source analysis, I offer the
narrative which appears in this chapter as the best available reconstruction of
the revolt. My sequence of events differs in significant ways from the
nineteenth century accounts and the historical reconstructions of Saint-Martin
and Oloruntimehin, and takes into account the political contexts in which the
revolt occurred. My narrative emphasizes the way in which a plot, formulated
at Dingiray by Habib and the other Tal br0thers, gained support among the
Futanke of Jomboxo but ultimately failed because the rebels were not able to

190

win the Futanke of Kingi into the rebel camp. Moktar’s ability to recruit a
large army of Jomboxo Futanke may have been possible only because of the
supportive role played by Cemo Musa, the leading Futanke notable of
Konyakary. When Moktar arrived in Kingi, he did not win over a similar
notable from the Futanke community there, and relied on the support of
Mustafa. Moktar’s recruitment of Mustafa may have worked against the rebels,
given Futanke resentment against Mustafa. The revolt was probably doomed to
failure after Amadu’s arrival pushed Moktar into the Xoolimbinne valley and
away from the Futanke in Kingi.

Amadu’s ability to lure Muntaga away from the other brothers was the
other major development which turned the tide against the rebels. If the
dissident brothers had presented a united front against Amadu, they might have
had sufficient moral and military strength to force concessions from Amadu.
Instead, Muntaga’s own ambitions led him to betray his rebel brothers. Amadu
asked Muntaga to capture Moktar, which then prompted Habib’s fateful attack
on Amadu’s superior forces. In a matter of a few months, Amadu defeated the
rebel challenge to his authority in Karta. Amadu Sheku returned to Segu,
Muntaga received his appointment as Amadu’s Governor of Nioro, and these two
brothers spent the following years trying to put the best possible gloss on the

entire affair.

191

E915”:

1. B. O. Oloruntimehin, W (London, 1972) and Yves
Saint-Martin LErnpimpllmuleur (Paris. 1970)

2. Their mission was to gather information about the mission led by Eugene
Mage, who was at Segu at the time. See M. Perraud, "Rapport sur un voyage a
Nioro", W. nos 488 489 (1 and 8 August
1865) and M. Andre, "Excursion a Koniakari",1&__Momto|n'_do_S_inogal_ot
W, nos. 465, 466 467 (21 and 28 February, and 7 March 1865). Andre
submitted his report to the French commandant at Medine. ANS 15G108: Medine,
27 December 1865, Andre to Ct. Medine.

3. ANS 15G108: Medine, 27 December 1865, Andre to Ct. Medine.

4. The clearest internal statement is in Maurice Delafosse’s translation of the
Kaba Jakite chronicle from Nioro: [Umar] made his servant Assamadi (Samba
Mody) Keita commander over the province of Jomboxo". "Traditions historiques
et légendaires du Soudan occidental; traduites d’un manuscrit arabe inédit par
Maurice Delafosse", - 9- _ - z. ' .- -

M3115. no. 10(1913), p. 362. "
5. ANS 13G169: Bakel, 4 September 1865, Ct. Bakel to the Governor. The

oommandant received his information from an African envoy, Sidi Amadu, whom
he had sent to Nioro on official business.

6. Colonel MG. Adam, Well (Paris,
1904). Pp. 110112.

7. ANS 136212: Medine, 13 and 28 March 1867, Ct. Medine to Ct. Bakel.

 

8. I have not found much evidence of a major transfer of tax revenues from
Karta to Segu during the 18608. Amadu Sheku’s claim for a share of the tax
revenues associated with the gum trade may well date to the period of his
first residence in Nioro in the early 1870s. Equally, evidence of Amadu’s
collection of a portion of the annual harvests begins in the 1870s.

9. David Robinson, W (Oxford, 1985), pp. 272-273,
279-280.

10. BN. MO. FA. 5716 fos. 42-433; "Traditions historiques", p. 365; Adam,

W, p. 109; A. de Loppinot, "Souvenirs d’Aguibou", W
IlI' I’ 19 u, IuI ‘ 9119 I5. I .III‘ OrreI'H' rat
(1919)rPo 35.

11. Eugene Mage. WW (Paris, 1868).
12m

192

12. ANS 13Gl70: Bakel, 8 November 1866 and 1 January 1867, Ct. Bakel to the

Governor; Adam, WES. pp. 108-109; de Loppinot, "Souvenirs
d’Aguibou", pp. 34—35.

13. ANS 13G211: Medine, 30 June and 24 November 1866, Ct. Medine to CL
Bakel; 13G170: Bakel, 1 January 1867, Ct. Bakel to the Governor; and 13G212:
Medine, 23 February 1867, Ct. Medine to Ct. Bakel. See also the French
sources cited in the preceding note.

14. ANS 130211: Medine, 24 November 1866, Ct. Medine to Ct. Bakel.
15. ANS 136212: Medine, 23 February 1867, Ct. Medine to Ct. Bakel.
16. ANS 13G212: Medine, 11 May 1867, Ct. Medine to Ct. Bakel.

l7. ANS 13G212: Medine, 13 March 1867, Ct. Medine to Ct. Bakel.

18. ANS 13G169: Bakel, 4 September 1865, Ct. Bakel to the Governor. The
commandant received his information from an African envoy, Sidi Amadu, whom
he had sent to Nioro on official business.

19. No additional evidence has yet been found to provide details of the
Nioro-Dingiray association.

20. BN.MO.FA. 5716 fo. 44b; Adam, Wigs, p. 108; de Loppinot,
"Souvenirs d’Aguibou", pp. 34—35.

21. Delafosse’s translation of the Kaba Jakite chronicle erroneously puts the
length of this siege at 13 months instead of 3 months. "Traditions
historiques", p. 365. All the other oral traditions and Arabic accounts agree on
three months.

22. BN. MO. FA. 5716 fos. 42-43; Adam, W,” 108-109;
de Loppinot, "Souvenirs d’Aguibou", pp. 34-36; "Traditions historiques",
p.365.

23. Adam, W p.109; de Loppinot, "Souvenirs d’Aguibou",
p.37; "Traditions historiques", p. 365.

24. BN.MO.FA. 5716 fo. 44a.

25. BN.MO.FA. 5716 fos. 42-43, 44.

26. "Chronicle of Succession", BN.MO.FA. 5683, fo. 151. Makki eventually died
with Umar in Masina in 1864. See, for Umar’s appointment of Amadu Sheku as
his successor. David Robinson. MW (Oxford. 1985). pp-
255-56.

27. Aisha also may have been Umar’s first wife. Bakary Diagouraga,
interview of 25 January 1986.

193

28. Agibu, one of Makki’s younger brothers, recounted the tradition of
Aisha’s slave background to the French administrator de Loppinot. See de
Loppinot, "Souvenirs d’Aguibou", p. 38. Aisha’s actual backgron and social
status is ambiguous.

29. See Chapter Two for a discussion of the question of an upper Senegal
valley state under Umarian control.

30. The Arabic original has not yet been found. See, for French references
to the Arabic letter, ANS 15G109: Medine, 8 November 1870, Ct. Medine to
the Governor.

31. Umar’s initial followers had come from Futa Jallon, but the expansion of
the holy war forced Umar to recruit more and more frequently in Futa Toro.
As a result, the Futa Jallonke talioe grew disenchanted with the holy war. A
major challenge occurred during the course of the campaign against .Segu.

See Robinson’s discussion of Futa Jallonke/Futanke conflicts in W
pp. 252-53, 339.

32. Paul Soleillet, - ' ’

1 ll ' ’ (Paris, 1887), (hereafter
Soleillet/Gravier), pp. 364, 385. Camille Piétri, WM (Paris,
1885), p.106. Amadu Ba of Nioro also argued that Muntaga was a fervent Muslim.

33. While Amadu had confirmed Habib as the leader of Dingiray during the
mid-1860s, he certainly had not granted control over Karta to his younger
brother.

34. Piétri, W, p. 106; Soleillet/Gravier. PP. 366-68.

35. All the internal narratives agree that control over Kingi and its populous
Futanke community was the ultimate goal of the rebels.

36. The Commandant at Medine states that Moktar arrived in November, 1869.
ANS 13G214: Medine, 21 January 1870, Ct. Medine to Ct. Bakel.

37 . Soleillet/Gravier, p. 365; Piétri, W. p. 109.

38. ANS 13G17l: Bakel, 15 January and 1 April 1869; 30 January and 31
March 1970, Ct. Bakel to the Governor.

39. ANS 13G214: Medine, 21 January 1870, Ct. Medine to Ct. Bakel. See also
15G109: Medine, 8 November 1870, Ct. Medine to the Governor. Piétli
elaborates on the appointment in W, pp. 104ff.

40. Piétri’s account also states that Amadu appointed Muntaga at Nioro prior
to the revolt, but Muntaga was not appointed until 1874. Interestingly. French
archival materials almost certainly suggest that Habib never released Amadu’s
mother. Amadu reportedly sent Moriba Safere of Sero to bring his mother to
Nioro from Dingiray. See ANS 13G215: Medine, 24 June 1871, Ct. Medine to
Ct. Bakel. According to the French reprots, Moriba’s mission failed to reach
Dingiray. ANS 15G109: Medine, 20 July 1871, Ct. Medine to the Governor.

194

41. Neither oral nor written data mentions how long Cemo Musa remained at
Segu nor when he returned to Konyakary from Segu.

42. Piétri. Meals. PP. 110-111. Moktar probably used all the state
revenues to purchase military supplies at Medine.

43. Piétri. W. p. 111-112.
44. Soleillet/Gravier, p. 365.

45. Soleillet/Gravier, pp. 366-368, and de Loppinot, "Souvenirs", p. 37. Piétri
argues that it was Muntaga and not Mustafa who met Moktar at Madina.

He also argues that Muntaga went on to betray Moktar twice: once when
Amadu first arrived from Segu, and later when Muntaga entrapped and captured
Moktar. Pietri probably confused the names of Muntaga and Mustafa when he
wrote about the first betrayal. See Pietri, LogEmnoais, pp. 117-118, 120-121.

46. Piétri is the source for the raid, but he argues that Muntaga sent it.
Piétri. mm. pp. 117-118.

47 . Moktar’s force was reduced to 5-600 cavaliers, according to Pietri, Les
Emmett. P-113-

48. They preferred using the threat of joining to force concessions from
Amadu. The best source for the negotiations is Adam, W5. pp.
110-112. See also Soleillet/Gravier, pp. 368- 370. None of the accounts
direCtly acknowledge the force of the exchanges nor the political threats.

49. Pietri, Loam, p. 119; Soleillet/Gravier, p. 369, ANS 15G109:
Medine, 14 July 1870, Ct. Medine to the Governor.

Moktar’ s activities after Amadu’ s arrival in Nioro are the source of
major contradictions in the narrative accounts. Soleillet/Gravier and Agibu Tal
narrate face-to-face interactions between Amadu and Moktar at Nioro, in
which Moktar refuses to submit to his older brother. Since these stories
depict the rigidity of Moktar and the eagerness of Amadu to settle the dispute
without conflict, they reflect an attempt to rewrite the past so as to absolve
Amadu for capturing and then imprisoning Moktar. Soleillet] Gravier, pp. 368-
369 and de Loppinot, "Souvenirs", pp. 37-38. By emphasizing Amadu’s
appointment of Moktar and then Muntaga’s betrayal, the Piétri version of
events, equally representing a Segovian perspective, eliminates the need to
create an encounter between Amadu and Moktar to absolve Amadu Sheku. Thus,
his account narrates the more probable sequence of Moktar’s retreat from
Kingi upon the arrival of Amadu Sheku.

50. Piétri. W8. PP. 114—115; Soleillet/Gravier, p. 368.
51. The French put Amadu’s troop strength at 16,000, but the narrative
accounts put the estimate at 8-10,000. See ANS 15G109: Medine, 8 November

1870, Ct. Medine to the Governor of Senegal; Piétli, W, pp. 114-
115; Soleillet/Gravier, p. 368.

52. Pietn'. Mammals. pp. 113-114.

195
53. Soleillet/Gravier, p. 368; de Loppinot, "Souvenirs", pp. 37-38.

54. The sources disagree as to the size of Habib’s forces, varying from 1500
to 3000 strong. See Piétri, W. p. 115; Soleillet/Gravier, p. 369; de
Loppinot, "Souvenirs", p. 38.

55. Soleillet/Gravier (p. 364) mentions Muntaga’s decision to go to Murgula,
but puts the activity prior to Moktar’s arrival in Jomboxo. Muntaga’s move on
Murgula is mentioned in ANS 15G109: Medine, 14 July 1870, Ct. Medine to the
Governor.

56. ANS 15G109: Medine, 11 June and 14 July 1870, Ct. Medine to the
Governor.

57. Soleillet/Gravier, p. 364; ANS 15G109: Medine, 14 July 1870, Ct. Medine
to the Governor.

58. See, for the reports of continuing Futanke migration to Karta, ANS
13G171: Bakel, 13 May and 30 June 1870, Ct. Bakel to the Governor; and
15G109: Medine, 8 November 1870, Ct. Medine to the Governor.

59. ANS 15G109: Medine, 14 July 1870, Ct. Medine to the Governor.
60. Soleillet/Gravier, p. 370.

61. ANS 15G109: Medine, 29 November, 1870, Ct. Medine to the Governor of
Senegal, Soleillet/Gravier, pp. 371- 372, de Loppinot, "Souvenirs", p. 38;

Adam.l.§gerrdeabislpriques p112

62. Soleillet met one of the two injured brothers, Daye, who was the leader
of the Umarian garrison at Jalla in the late 18703. Soleillet collected
testimony from an informant regarding Daye’s injury. Soleillet/Gravier, p. 205.

63. Soleillet/Gravier, pp. 372-373; de Loppinot, "Souvenirs", p. 39;- Adam,
Legendsshiston'ques. p 112

64. Pietri, Bram. PP. 121ff; de Loppinot, "Souvenirs", p. 39.

65. Piétri,l.&s_Etancais.Pp. 121-122.

66. de Loppinot, "Souvenirs", p. 39.

67. ANS 13G171: Bakel, 28 February, 14 and 31 March, and 30 May 1871, Ct.
gfgo‘t’oemtl; Governor; 15G109: Medine, 12 and 29 March 1871, Ct. Medine to

68. ANS 15G109: Medine, 6 January 1872, Ct. Medine to the Governor.

CHAPTER EIGHT

Umarian Karta in the Aftermath of the First Revolt

Amadu Sheku’s march to Karta in response to the revolt of Habib and
Moktar was merely the first step in his effort to create an imperial Umarian
state in the Western Sudan. He hoped to lure the Futanke of Karta to Segu,
both to reinforce his military strength in the middle Niger valley and to weaken
a powerful community whose interests in local affairs would certainly put them
at odds with Amadu’s imperial agenda. Most Futanke rejected his invitation to
move to Segu, and forced Amadu instead to appoint his younger brothers to
serve as leaders of the major Umarian garrisons in Karta. After Amadu Sheku
returned to Segu in 1874, these brothers and the Futanke of Karta consolidated
their positions. Their interests in local economic and political affairs led them
to subvert Amadu’s attempt to create an imperial state in the Western Sudan.
This chapter examines the political history in Umarian Karta during the 18703,
focusing on the actions and interests of Futanke political actors. Their efforts
influenced events and shaped the decisions of Amadu Sheku and the other Tal
brothers as they tried to rule in Karta.

196

197

The source materials for this period of Umarian history are relatively
abundant. Amadu Sheku’s court produced quite a few Arabic documents during
his stay, and Amadu himself commissioned several chronicles of his military
exploits against the Bambara. Amadu’s correspondence with Futanke officials
and notables in Karta also survives from the late 18703 and throughout the
18803. Additional internal perspectives exist in the oral reminiscences of Agibu
Tal, recorded at the turn of the century, and oral traditions currently
transmitted in western Mali. The French also kept abreast of developments in
Karta, and the correspondence from their posts at Bakel and Medine is filled
with data regarding events in Karta. During the 18803 in particular, they sent
several envoys to Nioro to gather information. Careful use of these sources
provides important glimpses into the Umarian political context. The quality of
the data allows for a detailed historical reconstruction of this era of Umarian

Karta.

Amadu h k ’ attem t t con li at wrin m 'a K

After the capture and imprisonment of Habib and Moktar, Amadu Sheku
attempted to consolidate his position as the leader of the Umarian community.
He called upon the Futanke of Karta to join him in a campaign against the
Massassi who had established a stronghold at Gemukura, a settlement south of
Karta. He later asked the Futanke to move to Segu and join the holy war
against the Bambara of the middle Niger valley. Many Futanke refused to join
him in fighting the Bambara and most did not leave Karta with Amadu and his
supporters. These requests not only provoked opposition, but resurrected the

divisions which had surfaced during the revolt and seriously compromised

198
Amadu’s attempts to consolidate imperial rule in the region. The present
section examines Amadu’s residence in Karta in the critical years immediately
after the revolt of Habib and Moktar.

Prior to the outbreak of the revolt, Amadu Sheku had planned to travel to
Nioro, lead a campaign against the Bambara of Gemukura and thereby rekindle
enthusiasm for the holy war among the Futanke of Karta.1 Habib and Moktar
launched their revolt before Amadu left Segu, and forced him to alter his
political agenda for the trip to Karta. Amadu’s preparations for a military
campaign against the Bambara allowed him to field a large army and march to
Karta quickly, and his promises to attack the Bambara of Gemukura helped rally
the Segovian forces for the march.2 During the revolt, too, Amadu’s vision of
a holy war against the Bambara served to reinforce his position as the
Commander of the Faithful.3 In early 1871, with the brothers captured and
imprisoned, Amadu began preparations in earnest for an attack on Gemukura.
Securing weapons and Umarian unity were Amadu’s two main concerns.

One of Amadu Sheku’s first acts after the conclusion of the revolt was to
re-establish his relations with the mums at Medine. During the revolt, the
naitants had distributed revenues from the gum trade to Habib and sold
weapons to Moktar; in response, Amadu closed the gum trade with Medine and
turned to the migants at Bakel for supplies.4 In January, 1871, Amadu opened
the trade routes to Medine and sent Samba Tambo, a close advisor, to meet
with the migants} Tambo and the gm'tants agreed that Amadu Sheku’s agents
and not the Umarian officials from Konyakary should receive customs revenues
which the MI: paid to ensure the safe passage of gum caravans through
Karta.6 Tambo also reminded the traitants of Amadu’s need for French weapons
to conduct the campaign against Gemukura. The traitant Momar J ak responded

199
by delivering 1500 guns and a large amount of powder to Amadu’s envoys at
Medine in April.7 Obtaining weapons and smoothing over relations with the
want; however, proved far easier for Amadu Sheku than uniting the Futanke
of Karta under his leadership.

Shortly after Amadu Sheku imprisoned Habib and Moktar, Cemo Bokar Tal,
one of Shaykh Umar’s brothers and a leading member of the Futanke community
of Nioro, demanded that Amadu release the two brothers from captivity.8
Amadu refused, and his intransigence provoked a reaction. In the months which
followed, Futanke settlers streamed out of Kingi and returned to the Senegal
valley. The migrants included colonists who had settled near Nioro during the
18503 as well as recent arrivals who had no roots in Karta.9 Some of the
migrants may have feared retribution from Amadu for their role in the revolt,
but most probably migrated out of dissatisfaction with Amadu’s imprisonment of
his . brothers.10 The departure of the original colonists was a particularly
powerful statement of discontent, since it meant facing an uncertain future in
the Senegal valley. Their movement took the political initiative from Amadu
and shook the Umarian community to its foundations. ’

The number of Futanke who left Karta in 1871 is impossible to calculate;
oral informants do not remember the population movement and French officials
at Bakel and Medine did not make numerical estimates of the out-flow.11 While
the absence of local oral memory might suggest that the figure was low, the
lack of memory might equally reflect the general silence regarding the revolt
itself: the movement’s implicit criticism of Umar’s sons did not serve the
political agenda of the Tal who consolidated power in Karta during the 18703.
Additionally, the out-migration may have taken entire families of settlers,

leaving no one behind to recount the loss of relatives. But, it is clear that the

200
number of Futanke migrants was sufficiently large to create a political crisis of
major proportions for the Amadu Sheku. Amadu had to reverse the movement
or risk giving up his attack on the Bambara of Gemukura.

Amadu Sheku did not force anyone to stay in Karta, and moved instead to
replace the Futanke with new recruits from the Senegal valley. Unbeknownst
to Amadu, the French commandants began to monitor and restrict the movement
of Futanke within the valley in 1871.12 The oommandants stopped Amadu’s
recruiters on their way to the valley and prevented {organko caravans from

leaving the lower valley.13

They also enlisted their African allies, such as
Bokar Saada, to assist them in stopping the forgo.14 French actions against the
forgo not only limited Amadu’s initial efforts to recruit in the valley, but also
gave those who returned to the valley an opportunity to discourage migration to
Karta. Although Amadu eventually succeeded in ensuring the free passage of
his, envoys in late 1871, the recruitment effort did not produce a mass
movement from the Senegal valley and consequently forced Amadu Sheku to
concentrate on uniting his forces in Karta.15

Amadu Sheku’s persistence in calling for holy war against the Bambara
succeeded in turning the tide against the out-migration. In May -of 1871,
Amadu’s propaganda about an imminent Massassi attack created rumors of a
Bambara contingent advancing on Nioro which were repeated by some merchants
in Medine.16 At the end of the month, Futanke emigration from Karta came to
a halt, due to fear of Bambara attacks and the fact that the planting season
was soon to arrive.17 As the rains began to fall, Amadu must have hoped that

his forces would mount a campaign soon after the harvest was in. Resistance

to the renewal of the holy war among the Futanke of Karta, however,

201
prevented Amadu from leaving for Gemukura immediately after the harvest and
he waited until well into the following year to launch his attack.

Futanke opposition to the renewal of holy war was as enduring as Amadu
Sheku’s calls to holy war. An Arabic chronicle of the Gemukura campaign
notes that Amadu had to preach about the obligation to wage holy war for an
extended period prior to the march on Gemukura.18 The reference to Amadu’s
preaching clearly is an allusion to Futanke resistance to joining the campaign.19
In addition, a French commandant at Medine reports that, in November 1871,
Amadu Sheku threatened to execute some Futanke from Kingi who remained
loyal to Habib and Moktar.20 The continuing support for the dissident brothers
certainly must have been expressed as opposition to the Gemukura campaign.
Additionally, it is conceivable that Amadu, angered by the resistance movement,
imprisoned its leaders and argued that their actions amounted to an act of

treason on a par with support for the rebel brothers.21

Despite the ambiguous
circumstances of November, the evidence suggests that Futanke resistance to
the campaign prevented Amadu from mounting an offensive in 1871.

In addition to opposing the renewal of the holy war, some Futanke were
disturbed by Amadu Sheku’s disregard for their interests. Despite Futanke
complaints that the Kaba Jakite family had too much influence over Kartan
affairs, Amadu retained Fode Buyagi Kaba Jakite as the imam of Nioro. After
investigating Futanke allegations that Mustafa had given this clerical family
lavish gifts, he also exonerated Mustafa of any misappropriation of funds.22
Additionally, Amadu appointed officials to collect taxes in Nioro’s market and
planned to encourage the flow of salt to Segu by creating a state-supervised

commercial route from Nioro to Segu. He supported the emergence of a multi-

ethnic coalition of interest as long as it funnelled wealth to Segu and away

202
from the Futanke community of Karta. Futanke resistance to the Gemukura
campaign probably reflected in part their grievances with Amadu’s imperial
policies.

Despite this resistance, Amadu Sheku eventually was able to lead a large
Umarian force against the Massassi. His Segovian forces were strong; some
estimates put its strength at over ten thousand soldiers.23 Additionally, Amadu
must have asked Muntaga, Daye and the orher Tal brothers to join his army.
While the data provides very little information regarding Amadu’s relations with
his brothers at this time, the fact that a dissident brother such as Daye24
received Amadu’s appointment as governor of Jalla shortly after the revolt
strongly suggests that Daye had proved his loyalty by joining Amadu’s march on
Gemukura. Daye and the other brothers probably swallowed their resentment of
Amadu and helped counter the resistance of the Futanke to fighting under
Amadu’s leadership. Indeed, Futanke resistance to the holy war may have been
a factor which forced Amadu to allow his brothers to play a prominent role in
the campaign.

Amadu’s army left Kingi in February, 1872 and engaged the Bambara in
early March.25 They attacked and defeated the Bambara forces at Gemukura in
one battle, and followed that victory with a second attack on a neighboring
settlement the next day, dispersing the Massassi from the region. The Umarian
chronicles of the battle do not provide many details of the fighting, suggesting
that their victory was obtained without much struggle.26 After spending a few
days in the region, the Umarians headed back to Nioro. The campaign was not
lengthy nor particularly dramatic, but it produced a victory over the Bambara
which Amadu hoped to use in his attempt to bring the Futanke of Karta under
his leadership.

203
Amadu Sheku made Nioro his residence throughout most of 1872. He sent
his agents to the provinces of Karta to announce the defeat of the Bambara
and collect tribute in the name of the Commander of the Faithful.27 In the
northern Soninke provinces, his agents demanded large quantities of guns and
horses, leading to several months of discussions as the Soninke tried to reduce

28

the level of tribute through negotiations. In the Mandinka provinces of the

upper Senegal valley, Amadu’s agents collected cloth and agricultural products.29
When inhabitants resisted payment, his agents reminded them that Amadu had
renewed the holy war in the Western Sudan, and would not hesitate to attack
them.30

As the tribute flowed into Nioro and Amadu made plans for his return to
Segu, he asked the Futanke of Kingi to join him and move to the middle Niger

valley.31

The initial Futanke response was united in its opposition to the idea.
Amadu persisted, offering material incentives to win over the Futanke. While a
few leaders accepted his gifts, most Futanke remained opposed even after
learning that Amadu Sheku planned to empty the treasury of Nioro of all its
wealth.32 As Amadu preached about the obligation to wage holy war and made
various threats, the Futanke turned for inspiration and leadership to Cerno
Mamadu Khayar, a learned Muslim cleric, and several elders who had fought in

33

the conquest of Karta. These leaders defended the decision to remain in

Karta, and their arguments see to have convinced some of Amadu’s own Futanke
soldiers to forsake Segu and stay in Karta.34

The defense offered by Cemo Mamadu and the Umarian old guard drew on
the words and deeds of Shaykh Umar.35 They argued that the decentralized

Umarian presence was the design of Umar, who had established the garrisons

and provided each with its own treasury. The system worked well, they noted,

204

because the Futanke settled throughout the Western Sudan, shared equally in
the fruits of the conquest and defended the regions under their supervision.
Amadu’s. plan to concentrate wealth and political authority in Segu not only
disrupted the system, but was inspired by his greed. They suggested that he
examine his heart to determine whether he had strayed from the dictates of
Muslim law. Underlying these arguments was a strong desire to remain in
Karta, where the Futanke had lived since the initial conquest, and where
proximity to the Senegal valley allowed them to remain in contact with their
relatives.

The opposition openly criticized Amadu’s imprisonment of Habib and
Moktar. They offered sympathy for the two brothers who only fought to obtain
their proper share of Umar’s inheritance from a greedy older brother. They
asked rhetorically how he would explain the situation to his father when he
returned. Their representation of the revolt emphasized their own grievances
with Amadu; the criticisms seem to have communicated a threat of possible
rebellion if Amadu pressed too forcefully. Whether or not the spokesmen were
calling for Amadu to appoint Moktar and Habib to political office in Karta is
not clear. Their desire to remain in Karta and retain some autonomy over their
affairs was unmistakable.

The Futanke response to Amadu Sheku’s request that they move to Segu
dramatically illustrates the limits of Amadu’s authority. Although Amadu had
defeated the dissident brothers and led his army to victory over the Bambara at
Gemukura, the majority of Futanke in Karta not only resisted his request to
move but expressed a vision of Umarian society which contrasted with Amadu’s
imperial order. They unequivocally rejected his renewal of the holy war and

implicitly challenged the authority of Amadu as Commander of the Faithful.

205
Amadu could not force the Futanke to leave Karta against their will: he had to
accommodate some of their demands or face continuing dissent and the
possibility of open rebellion. Far from being an imperial ruler, Amadu saw his
political initiative fail and had to find a compromise solution which both
satisfied F utanke demands and allowed him some control over the affairs of
Karta.

In a bold move, Amadu Sheku decided to appoint six of his younger
brothers as leaders of several major garrisons in Karta.36 In return, Amadu
demanded that each brother submit to him as the Commander of the Faithful
and agree to visit Segu every year on one of the two major Muslim holidays.37
With these appointments Amadu answered Futanke criticisms that he did not
share power with his brothers and responded to their demands for political
leaders who would serve Futanke interests in Karta. At the same time, his
appointments expressed a divide-and-rule strategy: by placing several Tal
brothers in garrisons throughout Karta, he hoped to diminish Nioro’s status as
the central place within Karta and emphasize the shared subordination of each
ganison to the Commander of the Faithful at Segu. The appointment of
Amadu’s brothers was intended to satisfy F utanke demands while simultaneously
consolidating Amadu’s power as an imperial ruler.

The appointments reflected careful consideration on Amadu’s behalf. No
appointee was an obvious rival to Amadu: Habib and Moktar remained in
captivity, and Muntaga, who received the most crucial appointment as leader at
Nioro, had fought on Amadu’s side during the revolt. Muntaga also could not
claim that his mother’s family background was more prestigious than that of
Amadu’s mother, as Habib and Moktar had done during the revolt. The other

major post went to Bassiru, who also had shown loyalty to Amadu during the

206

revolt. The other brothers received appointments to smaller garrisons, where
their ambition would have an opportunity to grow at the expense of Muntaga
and Bassiru. Amadu’s appointments were his attempt to reassert control over
Karta in the face of Futanke resistance. Given the depth of Futanke opposition
to Amadu’s leadership, the appointments may seem inevitable, but his selection
of so many brothers probably was not expected by the Futanke community of
Karta.

Amadu Sheku also hoped that the appointment of his brothers would help
him draw the Futanke of Karta into closer relations with Segu. By demanding
that his brothers visit Segu annually as a condition of their appointment, Amadu
expected his brothers to arrive in Segu with a sizable army of Futanke and
provide him with annual infusions of military support for his campaigns against
the Bambara of the middle Niger valley. Amadu thereby continued to assert
control over the Futanke of Karta, but deferred direct responsibility for its
organization to his brothers. He also hoped that the annual visits would ensure
that the Nioro-Segu road remained open to commerce. Amadu’s appointments of
his brothers expressed his imperial agenda, despite the concessions to the
Futanke community in Karta.

Amadu Sheku did not appoint his brothers in a ceremony in Karta, but
asked them to return with him to Segu. Various considerations led him to his
decision. Amadu planned his re-installation as Commander of the Faithful for a
ceremony at Guigne, a town on the Nioro-Segu road, and he wanted his
brothers to submit to him there prior to receiving their appointments to rule
Karta.38 Additionally, Amadu wanted to appoint his br0thers in Segu instead of
Nioro, so as to diminish the prominence of the Kartan capital. Finally, he

wanted his brothers to spend their first Ramadan as officials in Segu, so as to

207
reinforce their obligation to visit Segu annually. Amadu and his brothers left
Nioro in early 1873, with most of the treasury and the few Futanke families
who had decided to move to Segu. They headed along the main route between
Nioro and Segu. During the interim, Almamy and Samba Mody held the reins of
power as Amadu’s agents in Nioro and Konyakary, respectively.

Amadu Sheku had hoped to lay the basis for an imperial state in the
Western Sudan during his residence in Karta, but his inability to entice the
Futanke community to leave Karta compromised his efforts. Admittedly, Amadu
established the core of an imperial state in Karta: customs officials at Medine
and Nioro, a state supervised trade and communications route between Segu and
Nioro and political appointees at the major garrisons who publicly acknowledged
him as their Commander of the Faithful and promised to visit him in Segu
annually. Nonetheless, the Futanke decision to remain in Karta was an
affirrnation of their intent to maintain their claim the wealth of Karta as a
share of the Umarian conquests. The initial settlers had no interest in further
conquests, and the new arrivals preferred campaigns closer to Karta. Therefore,
Amadu’s imperial plans for Karta hinged on the quality of his relationship with
his brothers and their ability to convince the Futanke to subordinate their

interests to Amadu’s imperial goals.

i h l 1
In the years following the appointment of his brothers, Amadu’s control
over Karta diminished. Many historians emphasize the personal ambition of
Amadu’s brothers as the primary cause for his inability to maintain an imperial

39

state in the Western Sudan. The erosion of relations with his brothers,

208

however, was merely a symptom of Amadu’s inability to command the Futanke
of Karta, who did not share Amadu’s imperial vision and took actions to subvert
his plans. The Tal appointees initially tried to honor their obligations to the
Commander of the Faithful, but found themselves torn between local interests,
Amadu’s imperial demands and their own aspirations for wealth and power. It
was this context of competing interests in Umarian Karta which encouraged
some brothers to seize the initiative from Amadu. The present section analyzes
the initial years of the Tal brothers tenure in Umarian Karta, focusing
particularly on the political arena in Nioro.

While the focus on the Futanke is appropriate, given their influential
position in Karta, the voices of other members of the multi-ethnic coalition
shaped the context in which the Futanke operated. Indeed, the arrival of the
Tal brothers initially caused a rupture in the coalition. The demands of so
many new Tal brothers increased the pressure on Karta’s populations to
contribute economically to the maintenance of the Umarian state while
simultaneously reducing the political voice of non-Futanke communities. Within
months of the arrival of Amadu’s brothers in May, 1874, the first complaints
against the Tal brothers were uttered in the region.40 The next two years
found Umar’s sons fighting against local groups who resisted their rule. The
participants in overt opposition to Umarian rule were the Xassonke of Sero and
the Soninke of Jafunu, groups which had assisted Shukh Umar during the

conquest of Karta.41

Their dissatisfaction with Umar’s sons challenged the
basis of Umarian rule in Karta, and shaped the political agenda of the era.

The Soninke of Jafunu reluctantly paid tribute to Futanke agents from the
inception of Umarian rule. Shaykh Umar’s Futanke agents met with some

opposition, and Mustafa relied on the Kaba Jakite family to help bring the

209

Jafununke into the Umarian coalition.42 Their opposition to Nuru, Amadu’s
appointee as the Governor of J afunu, expressed their desire for autonomy from
overt Futanke control over their affairs.43 They escorted Nuru out of Jafunu
within months of his arrival, complaining that his demands were excessive.44
Moriba Safere, the leader of Sero, assisted the Jafununke in expelling Nuru
from the province, probably because he resented the selection of Bassiru as
Governor of Jomboxo and may have hoped to trigger a political crisis."5 Nuru
turned for assistance to Bassiru, who sent a military force into Jafunu.46
Muntaga argued for a peaceful settlement, and eventually negotiated a
resolution to the conflict.47 The conflict thrust Muntaga into a position where,
as in the past, the leader of Nioro assumed the role of arbitrator for political
conflicts in Karta.

The cracks in the multi-ethnic coalition were not resolved completely, and
conflict in the northwest surfaced again during 1876-1877. The underlying
factor was Moriba Safere’s anger with Bassiru for accepting the submission of
his rival Xassonke leader, Niamody of Logo.48 Moriba felt that Bassiru’s action
signalled a change in his status as an Umarian ally, and he may have thought
of leaving the Umarian coalition at the time of Niamody’s submission sometime
in 1874. Moriba’s anger came to the surface in 1876 when Bassiru demanded
that Moriba collect a fine from some Moors who camped on the right bank of
the Xoolimbinne river near Sero. The Moors, known as the Assykiris, had
raided a settlement in Jomboxo in 1876, and Bassiru demanded retribution.49
Since Moriba Safere felt that Bassiru favored Niamody, he decided not to risk
alienating his Moorish allies.

In response to Moriba’s defiance, Bassiru recruited some Logonke and

attacked Sero.50 Bassiru lost the battle with Moriba, and the defeat forced

210
Muntaga to come to the defense of his younger brother. In response to the
increased Futanke presence in Sero, Moriba’s forces sought refuge in Jafunu,
where the J afununke enthusiastically joined the challenge to the Umarian
leadership.51 The growth of the rebellion raised the political stakes. Muntaga
combined the Umarian forces and led an assault on the dissident forces in two
encounters, at Tambacara and Gori, during the first months of 1877.52 The
Futanke forces emerged victorious from both battles, and inflicted heavy

casualties on the Jafununke and Seronke army.53

Muntaga again assumed a
leadership position, and earned considerable respect through military victories in
defense of his brothers in the Xoolimbinne valley.

The fighting in the Xoolimbinne valley also altered Futanke perceptions of
their presence in the region. The Futanke settlers realized that their position
was not as secure as it had been prior to the appointment of the brothers.
Among some Futanke, the challenge of the Seronke and Jafununke reinforced
their consciousness of their Fulbe identity and commitment to holy war.54
They were resolved to exercise vigilance and keep Karta’s non-Futanke and
non-Muslim populations under strict control. This group included military
leaders and recent migrants who came to Karta to fight in Futanke armies and
obtain booty in wars. The Tal brothers assumed leadership roles for this
faction: Amadu had emptied the treasuries of the garrisons before he left for
Segu and his brothers conducted wars to accumulate wealth and followers in
their efforts to establish a name for themselves.

Another group of Futanke cautioned against disrupting the multi-ethnic
coalition and argued for fewer military campaigns. This group had grown tired
of the brothers’ demands for troops: as early as September 1876, a French
commandant at Medine reported that "the Futanke [are] tired of war and call

211

for Bassiru’s replacement [as Governor of Konyakary] by Samba Mody".55 A
similar group opposed to continued warfare would eventually emerge in Kingi as
well. Those opposed to warfare included the growing group of Futanke
slaveowners who were investing in production and participating in commercial
exchanges, as discussed in Chapter Five. They felt that negotiation was the
best solution for every activity, whether it be commercial or political. These
two Futanke factions expressed their views in political discussions at Konyakary
and Nioro in the years which followed.

One issue which united the two factions was the question of Karta’s
obligations to Amadu Sheku. The Tal brothers had agreed to make annual visits
to Segu and provide military assistance against the Bambara, but the problems
with Sero and Jafunu between 1874 and 1877 kept them from fulfilling that
obligation, and French military activities in the Senegal valley kept them in the
west, in 1878.56 Amadu pressed his brothers to make the trip, and reminded
them that he was due one-fifth of the booty which they had seemed in their
military actions.57 Bambara raids along the Nioro-Segu road also had slowed
the flow of commerce to Segu, and he asked specifically in late 1878 for a
large Futanke army to open the route.58 The evidence suggests that the Tal
brothers made an effort to comply with Amadu’s request in 1879, but most
Futanke insisted that they did not want to join such a campaign.59

Amadu’s envoys communicated to his brothers b0th his dissatisfaction with
their absence from Segu and their preoccupation with military campaigns. In
early 1880, Bassiru responded to Amadu’s pressure and led a small force of
Futanke cavaliers toward Segu, only to return because of insecurity between
Karta and Segu5° Although a faction of the Futanke of Kingi was wining to
provide assistance to Amadu, Muntaga sided with those who resisted making the

212
trip. Muntaga, Nuru and Daye instead led a military campaign in the southern
marches of Karta, attacking communities near the Umarian garrison at

61

Murgula. Amadu Sheku interpreted Muntaga’s actions as a direct defiance of

his request. Amadu’s anger never abated, and the rupture of 1880 marked a
decisive turn in Kartan-Segovian relations.62

An appreciation of the context in which Muntaga made his decision shows
that he was caught within a complex web of competing local interests. While
some Futanke wanted to fulfill Amadu’s request, Cerno Mamadu Khayar

convinced most Futanke not to join the trip.63

Only a few years earlier, Cemo
Mamadu had led the Futanke in their opposition to moving to Segu with Amadu.
If Muntaga had challenged Cemo Mamadu, then he risked eroding Futanke
support which he had nurtured during his initial years in Nioro. At the same
time, the soldiers which Muntaga had assembled at Nioro included a large
number of recent migrants who wanted to obtain booty through warfare. They
rejected a trip to Segu because of its distance from Nioro and the dangers
which they would face on the Nioro-Segu road, not because they opposed
warfare 1m $412.64 The gathering of soldiers may have been so large that
Muntaga feared that they would conduct raids on communities in Kingi. The
southern campaign was his response to the soldiers’ desire for booty, and
expressed his enduring commitment to the soldiers upon whom he relied as the
leader of Karta. As during the earlier conflicts in the Xoolirnbinne valley,
Muntaga seized the opportunity to emerge as the leader of Karta.

Muntaga clearly was an ambitious man, and his willingness to challenge
Amadu’s order expressed his personal desire for greater wealth and power as
the leader of an autonomous Umarian state in Karta.65 Muntaga certainly

realized that his absence from Segu would cause a rupture in his relations with

213
Amadu Sheku. He also knew that his attempt to comply with Amadu’s order
would compromise his relations with the Futanke of Kingi. Muntaga chose to
take his chances as the champion of Futanke demands for local autonomy. His
desire for greater power converged with the interests of most Futanke in Kin gi.
His campaign into southern Karta was an affirmation that he was ready to
assume the mantle as the leader of Umarian Karta.

Muntaga’s decision to disregard Amadu’s orders also reflected the growing
rivalry among Umar’s sons. During the late 18703, several rumors regarding a
growing discontent among the Tal brothers circulated at the French post at
Medine. One rumor involved Amadu’s frustrations with the political ambitions

of his younger brothers.66

Another rumor concerned the displeasure of
Amadu’s younger brothers with his plan to designate Madani, Amadu’s oldest
son, as the next Commander of the Faithful.67 Underlying this increase in
fraternal suspicions may have been reports of the death of Habib and Moktar.
These two sons of Umar died in captivity in Segu, and their deaths reminded
the others of Amadu’s uncharitable treatment of his adversaries. Growing
suspicions and distrust, it would seem, informed Muntaga’s decision to break
with Amadu.

Agibu Tal provides the only detailed internal account of the events which
immediately followed Muntaga’s decision not to go to Segu. He notes that
Amadu Sheku ordered residents of a town in southern Karta to ambush and kill
Muntaga as he passed through on the way back to Nioro.68 Given the
communications difficulties in the Western Sudan at the time, it is unlikely that
Amadu actually ordered Muntaga’s assassination. Whether or not he ever sent

such a message, rumors of Amadu’s evil intentions toward Muntaga circulated in

Karta at the time.69 The rumors suggest that Futanke doubts about Amadu’s

214
intentions influenced events, and may have preceded their decision not to
comply with Amadu’s request for troops. Rumors of an assassination plot also
added to the rivalry.

Agibu adds that Amadu Sheku later tried to remove Muntaga from power
by writing to the slave soldiers of Nioro and asking them to depose Muntaga.7O
The envoy betrayed the plot, and revealed the contents of the letter to
Muntaga. Cemo Mamadu Khayar, whom Agibu states was the leader of the
slave soldiers, wrote to Amadu Sheku and reaffirmed his loyalty to the
Commander of the Faithful. While Cemo Mamadu was not the leader of the
slave soldiers, he did correspond with Amadu; fortunately, Amadu saved some

of the letters in his palace library at Segu.71

In a letter probably written in
the context Agibu evokes, Cemo Mamadu affirms his loyalty to Amadu, and
excuses himself for not going to Segu, offering his age as the primary reason
for remaining in Nioro. That Cemo Mamadu would send such a letter to Amadu
after leading the opposition to Amadu’s request suggests that Cemo Mamadu
was offering himself as a mediator between Muntaga and Amadu. If Amadu
responded to Cemo Mamadu’s letter, it has not yet surfaced; his subsequent
actions suggest, however, that he was not interested in a mediated resolution to
the conflict.

By 1880, Futanke opposition to Amadu Sheku’s demands for military
assistance forced a major political crisis, and fraternal rivalry once again
assumed prominence in Kartan-Segovian relations. Local rebellions in the
Xoolimbinne valley initially thrust the mantle of leadership on Muntaga, but
Futanke resistance to Amadu’s demands in the late 18703 forced Muntaga to

chose between the Futanke and Amadu. Once he chose not to honor Amadu’s

request and the break occurred, the political crisis grew in seriousness, and

215
Futanke such as Cemo Mamadu Khayar sought ways to mediate the conflict that
they had helped to create. The memory of the earlier fraternal rivalry was on
everyone’s mind, and shaped their fears and suspicions. Unfortunately, the
early 18803 ushered in a new era in Franco-Umarian relations, and the French
advance into the Western Sudan polarized factions in the Futanke community of

Karta and the divisions between the Tal brothers.

WW

Our march in the [Western] Sudan favors quite remarkably
the position of Muntaga. That is why I am convinced that
. . . [Muntaga] will renounce his ties to Amadu Sheku and
ally with us. . . . [Muntaga has interests] in allowing us
march . . . towards the Niger [and his rival Amadu Sheku].

{klnmlandanlillnetisllr Boliévc72

Louis-Alexandre Briere de l’Isle, the Governor of Senegal during the late
18703 and early 18803, sent Joseph Gallieni to Segu to negotiate an accord with
Amadu Sheku. Gallieni returned with a treaty in hand, but argued that the
internal weakness of the "Tukulor Empire" made it open to attaclr.73 Shortly
after Gallieni’s return, Gustave Borgnis-Desbordes, Briere’s appointee as the
initial Wye, began the French military moves
into the Western Sudan. By 1883, Desbordes had established a line of French
posts in the Western Sudan, and tried to draw Muntaga, the leader of Umarian
Karta, into an alliance with the French. Desbordes’ successors, C.E. Boileve,
A.V. Combes and H.N. Frey, also hoped to encourage the demise of the "Tukulor
Empire" through alliance with Karta, but Muntaga refused to agree despite his
knowledge of Amadu’s plans to march on Karta. Boileve’s assessment that the

216
French advance favored Muntaga’s position vista-1i; Amadu Sheku was accurate,
but he failed to appreciate the internal politics of the "Tukulor Empire".

Most historians argue that the combination of French cunning and Amadu
Sheku’s political weakness made the French advance possible. They emphasize
Amadu’s inability to unite the Umarians under the banner of holy war without
considering the internal dialogue within the Umarian community. Amadu was
not an imperial ruler, so he could not command the loyalty of the Umarians in
Karta, whose proximity to the French position made them crucial political
actors in the unfolding drama. Muntaga’s decisions also reflected the views of
the Futanke community of the region. This section views the French advance
of the early 18803 without the conceptual blinders associated with the myth of
imperial decline, and locates Franco-Umarian relations within a context of
Futanke political activity in Karta.

, Briere de l’Isle used his appointment as the Governor of Senegal to revive
French imperial ambitions in the Western Sudan. Briere adopted an aggressive
stance toward the Umarians almost immediately upon his arrival at Saint Louis
in 1876. He was pleased to hear of Moriba Safere’s revolt against Bassiru in
1877, and contemplated supporting the Seronke leader.74 Brier'e seized the next
opportunity to intervene in Umarian affairs: after encouraging Juka Sambala,
the Xassonke client at Medine, to challenge N iamody of Logo, a rival Xassonke
leader under the patronage of Bassiru, Briere ordered a military expedition
against Logo in 1878..75 The Logonke forces suffered a major loss, and Niamody
himself died during the attack. That same year, a large number of Fulbe from
the Senegal valley decided to migrate to Karta and directed Briere’s attention
to the activities of Umarian recruiters. The forgo of 1878 convinced Briere

that the growing strength of the "Tukulor Empire" was a threat to the French

217
position in the Senegal valley and he called for military action in defense of
their interests.76

Briere sent two missions into the Western Sudan to gather information on
the "Tukulor Empire". Paul Soleillet travelled through the Umarian territories
in Karta on his way to Segu, where he resided for several months in 1879. His
reports whetted Briere’s appetite for expansion, and the Governor sent Joseph
Gallieni to Segu in 1880 to negotiate a treaty with Amadu creating a French
sphere of influence in the Western Sudan. On his way to the middle Niger,
Gallieni explored a route which avoided Umarian territories: he passed south of
the upper Senegal valley regions which paid tribute to Bassiru at Konyakary and
Daye at J alla, and north of the regions claimed by the independent Umarian
garrison at Murgula in the middle Bakhoy valley.77 Although the treaty which
Gallieni negotiated never was ratified by either side, Briere’s desire for French
expansion into the Western Sudan did not diminish.

Briere’s views on French expansion in the Western Sudan eventually won
over the French Colonial Ministry. Jean J aureguiberry, a former Governor of
Senegal, obtained the colonial portfolio in 1879 and actively lobbied for French
action in the Western Sudan. In 1880, Jauréguiberry gained French
parliamentary approval for the "Niger Plan": the creation of a railroad line
from the French position in the upper Senegal valley to the banks of the Niger.
Jauréguiberry used passage of the measure to establish a Wye
as a separate department within the Ministry, thereby ensuring that his policies
would be served even after his departure from government service. Although
subsequent Ministers did not authorize specific military activities, they

supervised the French conquest of the Western Sudan through the Bureau_dn
Haukflsllxe.

218

Jauréguiberry authorized the creation of an Upper River Command in 1880,
and provided the WW3: with a large battalion
of African forces recruited in the Senegal valley (the famed finaiuonm
sendgalajs). The post attracted ambitious officers because the mmdant
Mom was responsible for all aspects of French activity in the Western
Sudan. Although the Commandant was subordinate to the Governor of Senegal,
he retained considerable autonomy over Sudanese policy. Borgnis-Desbordes, the
first appointee, and many of his successors used military successes in the
Western Sudan to gain promotions within the army. While the desire for glory
and career advancement contributed to the aggressiveness with which many
Commandants pursued military activity in the Western Sudan, their actions were
consistent with Briere’s vision and the hidden agenda of the Niger Plan of 1880.

MW Borgnis-Desbordes established a string of French
posts in the Western Sudan. Desbordes followed Gallieni’s strategy of avoiding
territories claimed by the Umarians in Karta. During his first year in the field
in 1881, he established a French post at Kita, where Gallieni had obtained local
permission to build a fort during his trip in 1880.78 Desbordes eventually
pushed beyond Kita and established a post at Bamako on the middle Niger River.
The French did not move beyond these posts until Commandantjmfin’om Louis
Archinard began the military conquests in earnest in 1890. Nevertheless, the
French position significantly altered the political geography of the Western
Sudan. The post at Bamako was less than two hundred kilometers from Amadu
Sheku’s fort at Segu, and gave the French access to the Niger River, which
flowed through the heart of Umarian Segu. Throughout the late 18803, the
French put boats into the Niger to threaten Umarian Segu. Additionally, the
oommandam at Kita and Bamako encouraged Bambara leaders in Beledugu to

 

10

219

 

   
 

 

Timbuktu
.lloro
K A R T A
HA 818A
Medine
8 8 G U
Kita Bamako \
FIGURE D

The French Posts in the Western Sudan

0'
’b\

 

220

attack the Nioro—Segu route, effectively severing communications and trade.
These actions isolated Segu from the other areas of Umarian domination in the
Western Sudan. Amadu Sheku clearly perceived the French advance as hostile
to his position. Conversely, the French avoided challenging the Umarian state
in Karta, so the French threat was less pressing to Muntaga and the Futanke
of Karta. Nevertheless, the French initiative altered the mo which had
been established after Umar’s holy war and forced the Futanke of Karta to
reassess their position.

The initial Umarian response to the French advance was ambiguous. The
French encountered no military resistance from the armies of either Karta or
Segu. Bassiru did seize the initiative and halted commercial caravans from
passing through Karta to Medine in late 1881.79 His decision immediately
prompted the French to impose an embargo on the sale of guns and powder to

80 The Franco-Umarian commercial conflict ended when the

the . Umarians.
Umarians lifted their embargo in February, 1882.81 Bassiru did not end the
embargo willingly: Amadu Sheku ordered the Umarians at Konyakary to lift the
embargo and called Bassiru to Segu.82 Amadu Moktar, a Futanke notable from
Konyakary, replaced Bassiru as the leader of Jomboxo. Amadu acted decisively
to avoid escalating conflict with the French, and expressed the widespread
Umarian ambiguity toward confronting the French militarily.

Amadu Sheku’s action divided the Futanke community of Jomboxo. The
Futanke faction which had already grown tired of Bassiru’s wars and raids
supported the move. They probably shared Amadu’s fears that Bassiru’s stance
toward the French had been too aggressive. They felt that a long embargo
would cut into revenues which they received from the grain trade at Medine,

and saw a member of their faction receive the reigns of power. On the other

221
hand, the soldiers who supported Bassiru probably felt that Amadu Sheku had
overreached his authority as Commander of the Faithful. Ironically, many of
these soldiers probably had accompanied Bassiru when he tried to fulfill Amadu’s
request for military assistance in 1880.

Amadu Sheku also moved against Daye, the leader at Jalla in southern
Karta. In November, 1881, as Bassiru implemented his embargo against the
French, Amadu’s supporters organized a palace coup in Jalla: Daye fled to
Nioro and Demba Ibrahim replaced him as the leader of J alla.83 The reasons
for Amadu’s actions are not clear. For months prior to Daye’s removal from
power, Amadu’s envoys moved between Segu and the Umarian garrisons at
Murgula and Jalla.34 Amadu probably feared that the Umarians at Murgula and
J alla planned to attack the French at Kita, and he ordered their leaders not to
take action without direct orders from Segu.85 Daye may have been removed,
therefore, because he favored an aggressive policy toward the French or
because he had refused to support Amadu Sheku in his requests for assistance
in Segu.

The French advance continued with the conquest of Murgula in late 1882
and the creation of a French post at Bamako in early 1883. Abdullay, another
servant from northern Nigeria who commanded at Murgula, and a small group of
Futa J alonke had established the garrison as an autonomous Umarian settlement

with links to Dingiray, Nioro and Segu.86

When the French initially arrived at
Kita, Borgnis-Desbordes reassured Abdullay that they would not usurp power
from the Umarians. Abdullay, because of his good faith in the French and
because of Amadu’s pressures, did not seek confrontation with the French. The
French sent two companies of solders to Murgula in December, 1882, and forced

Abdullay to leave the region. Abdullay and his supporters fled to Nioro with

222
accounts of the French and their deceptive ways. The French advance to the
Niger River led directly to the removal of the Umarian presence at Murgula and
indirectly to a change in leadership at J alla.
Commandant Superienr Borgnis-Desbordes hoped that these changes would
not draw Muntaga into war with the French, and wrote a letter after the
Murgula affair to inform him that the French had no intentions of encroaching

on Karta.87

Muntaga responded ambiguously to Borgnis-Desbordes’ letter,
stating that the Futanke of Nioro were divided on the question of Murgula:
some called for war and others counseled for peace.88 Borgnis-Desbordes took
the ambiguity as a sign of Muntaga’s interest in better relations with the
French, and sent Dr. Bayol to Nioro in hopes of negotiating a treaty with
Muntaga.89 While on route to Nioro, Dr. Bayol felt that the hostility toward
him was so great that it made travel dangerous, and he returned without
completing the mission. Borgnis-Desbordes continued to hope for a working
relationship with Muntaga, but Muntaga made it clear that he did not want
formal ties to the French.90

Muntaga’s reference to the "war" and "peace" camps in Nioro reflected real

divisions among the Futanke during the early 18803.91

Once again, the leader
of the faction arguing against warfare was Cemo Mamadu Khayar.92 His
position on the appropriate response to the French mirrored his own conviction
that Muntaga and the "war" faction embarked on wars and raids all too
frequently. He specifically argued that the wars were fought for the benefit of
Muntaga and the military commanders at the expense of the young men who
died in battle.93 With regard to the French, Cemo Mamadu Khayar felt that

their interest was in establishing a line of commerce to the middle Niger and

posed no threat to Karta. He argued that the Futanke brought beneficial

223

commercial services to the region, and pointed to the Muslims of Tishit as an
example of appropriate response to the opportunities offered by the French.94
Cemo Mamadu represented a broad spectrum of Futanke society, including older
and younger Futanke as well as Moorish commercial groups who had settled in
Nioro.95

The "war" camp was a diverse group, and included many Futanke from
Nioro and its surrounding villages as well as the communities Jawaambe and
Fulbe Samburu who fought in Muntaga’s army.96 On the question of military
actions against the French, the group included a few youthful leaders who
sought an engagement with the French.” Most Futanke, however, felt that the
French would defeat the Futanke in any encounter; they argued that they
would fight to the death if and only if the French attacked Karta93 On

Franco-Umarian relations, then, the 'war" and "peace" factions disagreed on the
question of French intentions but agreed that direct confrontation should be
avoided if possible.

Muntaga, too, did not want an engagement with the French because his
attention focused on Amadu Sheku. Amadu’s replacement of Daye at Jalla and
Bassiru at Konyakary marked another turn in the saga of fraternal conflict, and
Muntaga reflected on the appropriate response. Muntaga did not fear an attack
from the new leaders: Amadu Moktar represented the interests of the Futanke
faction which did not seek military confrontations, and the garrison at Jalla was
some distance from N ioro. Nevertheless, Amadu’s ability to appoint new leaders
at these garrisons was a challenge to Muntaga’s claims to authority over Karta,
and indicated that Muntaga could not count on all the Futanke of Karta for

support against Amadu. Muntaga decided that he wanted to return Daye to

power in Jalla and replace Amadu Moktar of Farabugu, Amadu Sheku’s

. 224
appointee.99 Amadu Moktar opposed Muntaga’s frequent campaigns into the
southern marches of Karta, and thereby earned Muntaga’s wrath.

Muntaga’s plans for escalating the fraternal conflict were not supported by
the Futanke of Karta. The Futanke at Nioro refused to provide men to fight
against Demba Ibrahim, and Amadu Moktar at Konyakary rejected Muntaga’s
request for a contingent from Jomboxo.100 Muntaga nonetheless mobilized a
small force to demonstrate his desire to attack Jalla. In July of 1883, the
tensions in Karta were heightened by the arrival of a caravan from Bundu with
600 cavaliers led Malik Samba Sy.101 Malik Samba was a member of the ruling
lineage of Bundu and, given the political crisis in southern Karta, decided to
claim the leadership of Jalla for himself. Malik Samba engaged the forces of
Demba Ibrahim twice, and neither side could claim victory. Demba’s letters to
Amadu Sheku, however, conveyed his fears that Muntaga would join the
conflict.102 Muntaga in fact sent a contingent to assist Malik Samba, but
Futanke protests over Muntaga’s involvement in Jalla’s affairs forced him to
order it back to Nioro without attacking Demba Ibrahim. 103 Malik Samba’s
troops eventually settled at Farabugu.

The events in southern Karta further divided Amadu Sheku and Muntaga.
Amadu decided that he no longer could dismiss the pleas for assistance from
supporters such as Demba Ibrahim, and he began to prepare for a march on
Nioro in late 1883. Conscious of Amadu’s activities in Segu, Muntaga decided
to rally the Futanke behind his leadership, and distributed a large amount of
gold to entice as many Futanke leaders to join him as possible. 104 Cemo
Mamadu refused Muntaga’s gifts, and repeated his opposition to warfare. 105

Some ten years after Amadu Sheku’s request that the Futanke of Karta

move to Segu, Cemo Mamadu again assumed a prominent role in the political

225
arena in Nioro. He had opposed Amadu’s request in 187 3, and influenced debate
on the major political issues of the late 1870s and early 1880s: Kartan-
Segovian relations, the French advance and Muntaga’s wars in the south. On
these questions, Cemo Mamadu was the leader of the "peace" faction which was
emerging among the Futanke of Kingi. A similar faction also gained influence
in Jomboxo, and was poised to benefit from Amadu’s replacement of Bassiru in
1881. Not all Futanke in Karta, however, were members of the "peace" faction.
As the fraternal conflict intensified, the "war" faction divided between
supporters of Amadu and supporters of Muntaga The next chapter explores

this development.

226

Notes

1. Throughout the 1860s, the Futanke consistently had refused Amadu Sheku’s
requests for military assistance in Segu. See Chapter Seven for details.

Internal accounts agree that one of Amadu’s primary reasons for marching to
Karta was to fight the Bambara of Gemukura. French reports note Amadu’s
calls for a campaign against the Bambara as early as mid-1870. ANS 15G109:
Medine, 14 July 1870, Ct. Medine to the Governor.

2. Amadu made the trip in. 15 days. Paul Soleillet, Voyage a Sfiggu, 1813-12,
. vo - o _-

r;gié’ q’.or' 1‘ no ' ' o rn - 1' -" Q _"l‘ 0a 101' 1
(Paris, 1887). P. 368.

3. His call for a major campaign against the Bambara also may have been an
attempt to lure his dissident brothers to Nioro during the revolt.

4. See, for the rocky relations between Amadu Sheku and the gamma at
Medine, ANS 13G171: Bakel, 30 January, 15 May and 14 June 1870, Ct. Bakel to
the Governor. See, for Amadu Sheku’s relations with the naitams at Bakel,
BN.MO.FA. 5713, fos. 61-63.

5. Samba Tambo accompanied the first gum caravan of the year. ANS 15G109:
Medine, 25 January and 12 March 1871, Ct. Medine to the Governor.

6. Cemo Musa and Samba Mody initially established the customs on the gum
caravans which crossed through Umarian territory on the way to Medine. See
Chapter Four for a discussion of the Opening of the gum trade. Samba Tambo
collected revenues for Amadu Sheku at Medine throughout the 18705 and early
18805.

7. Momar J ak travelled to Nioro in July to receive payment for the weapons
and work out the final details of the new relationship between Amadu Sheku
and the 1131131115 at Medine. ANS 15G109: Medine, 12 April and 20 July 1871,
Ct. Medine to the Governor.

8. Cemo Bokar was one of two Futanke "religious leaders" in Nioro mentioned
by the Frenchmen who visited Karta in 1865. See, for a discussion of Cemo
Bokar’s position as "religious leader" in the 1860s, Chapter Seven above. See,
for Cemo Bokar’s demands, ANS 13G17l: Bakel, 28 February 1871, Ct. Bakel to
the Governor.

9. French reports note that the migrants included Futanke "who had joined
Umar Tal" and "recent" migrants. See, for example, ANS 13G171: Bakel, 28
February and 30 May 1871, Ct. Bakel to the Governor.

10. I base this conclusion on the fact that most Futanke in Kingi had not
participated directly in the revolt.

227

11. Not one of my oral informants in western Mali remembered the out-
migration of 1871. Neither Amadou Ba nor Abdoul Aziz Diallo have collected
traditions regarding it. See, for French descriptions of the movement, ANS
13Gl71: Bakel, 28 February, 14 and 31 March, 30 May 1871, Ct. Bakel to the
Governor; 15G109: Medine, 12 and 29 March 1871, Ct. Medine to the Governor.

12. They wanted to stop the movement of Futanke who supported Amadu
Madiyu, a middle valley Muslim reformer who was causing the French problems
in the lower valley.

13. Commandants actually imprisoned recruiters who insisted on trying to
make the trip. See, for example, ANS 13Gl71: Bakel, 13 June and 20 October
1871, Ct. Bakel to the Governor.

14. ANS 15G109: Medine, 1 August 1871, Ct. Medine to the Governor.

15. See, for Amadu Sheku’s letter demanding free passage for his envoys, ANS
15G109: 23 September 1871, Ct. Medine to the Governor.

l6. ANS 15G109: Medine, 11 May 1871, Ct. Medine to the Governor.
17. ANS 13Gl71: Bakel, 30 May 1871, Ct. Bakel to the Governor.
18. BN.MO.FA. 5640 fos. 36-37.

19. The need to remind Umarians about their obligation to holy war suggests
that many soldiers expressed a reluctance to join the campaign against the
Bambara

20. ANS 156109: Medine, 21 November 1871, Ct. Medine to the Governor.

21. Another interpretation is that a group of Futanke demanded the release
of Habib and Moktar, or planned to assist their escape from Amadu’s prison.
Since many of Habib and Moktar’s most loyal supporters probably fled Karta in
early 1871, I favor the interpretations offered in the text.

22 MG Adam, WNW (Paris. 1904).
pp. 110-112; and my interviews with Amadou Ba and E1 Hadj Sadiku Kaba Jakite
in Nioro.

23. Initial French reports put Amadu’s Segovian force at 15,000 soldiers and
12,000 cavaliers. Amadu’s own record of troop strength immediately before the
battle of Gemukura puts his military force at 10,000 cavaliers and 12,000
soldiers. See ANS 13G214: Medine, 21 January 1870; and BN.MO.FA. 5713 fo. 143.

24. Daye had supported Habib and Moktar to the very end of the revolt, as
did Muniru and Daha. In contrast, Bassiru and Muntaga submitted to Amadu
well before the conclusion of the revolt.

228

25. Amadu received a shipment of weapons from the Senegal valley in early
February 1872 (28 Dhu al-Qa‘ da 1288). The battle of Gemukura occurred on the
22nd and 23rd of Dhu al- -Hijja 1288. BN. MO. FA. 5713 fo. 4 and 5713 fo.143.
The French first reported the victory in late March. ANS 15G109: Medine,

26 March 1872, Ct. Medine to the Governor", and ANS 13Gl71: Bakel, 30 March
1972, Ct. Bakel to the Governor.

26. BN.MO.FA. 5640 fos. 29-30, 35, 36-38; 5713 fos. 41, 124.

27. French reports of Amadu’s agents in Gidimaxa first appeared in early
April, 1872. ANS 13Gl71: Bakel, 6 April 1872, Ct. Bakel to the Governor.

28. The negotiations continued until late September, 1872. See ANS 13Gl71:
Bakel, 23 September 1872, Ct. Bakel to the Governor.

29. See, for the letters of introduction and a list of demands sent with Fudi
Khalila, one of Amadu’ s agents, BN. MO. FA. 5713 fos. 1, 11,25. This agent
remained in Karta, and assisted Samba Tambo in collecting the gum customs at
Medine. See, for example, ANS 15G111: Medine,

18151:, July 1877.

30. Sékéné- -Mody Cissoko discusses the aura surrounding Amadu Sheku and the
uncertainty of his intentions from a Xassonke perspective in 1111131211!

MW (Paris, 1986).

31. See, for the first French reference to Amadu’s request that Futanke move
to Segu, ANS 15G109: Medine, 1 September 1872, Ct. Medine to the Governor.

32. The name of only one Futanke leader who renounced his opposition to
Amadu Sheku is noted in the internal accounts: Cemo Amadu Aly Jeliya Ture.
His initial opposition to the request is noted 1n Soleillet, Mia—5.689.“,

p. 376. Agibu notes his change of position in his account transmitted by the
colonial official A. de .Loppinot, "Souvenirs d’Aguibou",B_u11egn_de_C_Qmite

c Q' 1°C.-" 111051’ .QUJCI 12W.-.

(1919). p 39.

33. Soleillet, Xeyagejfiegen, pp. 376-378.
34. Soleillet, W, p. 378.

35. The only extant account of their arguments is reported by Soleillet in

We pp. 376-378.

36. Amadu appointed the following brothers: Muntaga at Nioro, Bassiru at
Konyakary, Nuru in Jafunu, Daye at Jalla, Seydu at Kanyareme. Daha also was
sent west, and resided at Nioro with Muntaga. Some accounts note Murtada’s
appointment: Soleillet puts him at Kanyareme, and A gibu notes that Murtada
resided at Konyakary with Bassiru. Soleillet, mam, pp. 380, 384ff;
Adam, We, pp. 112-113; de Loppinot, "Souvenirsd’ Aguibou",
p. 42; ANS 15G109: Medine, 1 July 1874,

June, 1874.

9

229

37. Soleillet, Veyage a segee, pp. 380, 384- 385; de Loppinot, "Souvenirs
d’ Aguibou", p. 42, Emile Blane, "Conitribution a lo’étude des populations et de
l’histoire du Sahel soudanais", B1 1

W7 (1924), p. 302.

38. Amadu Sheku probably chose Guigne because he wanted to re-construct the
circumstances of his initial installation by Shaykh Umar, which had occurred
during the march between Karta and Segu. He also wanted to designate Guigne
as a major Umarian administrative center and commercial crossroads. Among
the visitors to the ceremony was a delegation from Walata. Arabic documents
associated with their visit appear in BN.MO.FA. 5713 fos. 46, 50.

39. Yves Saint-Martin,L_’_Empy:e_tQueen1em (Paris, 1970); 3.0. Oloruntimehin,
Segn 11mm; Empire (London, 1972).

40. According to French reports, the brothers arrived at Nioro in May and
Bassiru and Murtada arrived at Konyakary in June. Samba Tambo accompanied
the brothers to Konyakary, and made the announcement of their arrival to the
martian; at Medine. ANS 15G109: Medine, 1 July 1874, W
jenrnal de peste: June 1874. The first references to discontent among "the
people of J omboxo (presumably the non-Futanke populations) appear in the
French reports later that year. See, for example, 15G109: Medine,

regimnalitigue: (n. d. - late December, 1874?).

41. David Robinson, The Hely Wm: ef Umar In] (Oxford, 1985), pp. 180-181.
42. Paul Marty, Etudes sur l’Islgm et les tribes de 5911:1311. Volume 4 (Paris,

1921), p. 242; my interviews with Amadou Ba and El Hadj Sadiku Kaba Jakite in
Nioro.

43. Few historians comment on the causes of the rebellion. Sékené-Mody
Cissoko, who has worked extensively with the oral traditions of the Seronke
and also interviewed some Jafununke informants, is at a loss to explain the
actions of the Jafununke and the Seronke. Cissoko, "Contribution a -l’histoire
politique des royaumes du Khasso", Université de Paris, doctorat d’etat, 1979,
Part VI, Chapter 4.

44. Soleillet, loyagefijegen, p. 385.
45. Charles Monteil, mm (Paris, 1915), p. 371.
46. Soleillet, W, p. 356.

47. Soleillet, Wm, pp. 385-386.

48. See, for the origins of the rebellion in Sero: Monteil, MW,

pp. 370-371; and ANM 1D108: Konyakary, 10 October 1890, "Complement sur le
Séro et les maures de Séro", a report by Ct. Valentin, the first French official
to reside at Konyakary.

49. The Assykiris are known as the "Askeurs" in the French sources.

230

50. Soleillet, W, p. 387-388.

51. Erie Pollet and Grace Winter, Lew (Brussels, 1971), p. 70;
Soleillet W p 388

52. Pollet and Winter, W, p. 70.

53. Soleillet, W, p. 388; Pollet and Winter, La smiete seninke,
p. 70.

54. Interview with El Hadj Maeyel Diako at Konyakary on 8 February, 1986.
55. ANS 15G110: Medine, 7 September 1876, Ct. Medine to the Governor.

56. The French actively intervened in upper Senegal valley political affairs
beginning in 1877, and moved against Niamody, the Xassonke leader who joined
the Umarian alliance in 1874. Oloruntimehin mentions a French report which
states that Bassiru did not make the trip to Segu because he was too occupied
with the problems in Logo to make the visit. Oloruntimehin, W
Empire, p. l99n2 (ANS 15G111: Medine, 30 October 1877, Ct. Medine to the
Governor). See, for an analysis of the "Logo affair", Saint-Martin, LjEmpiee
W (Dakar, 1967), pp. 201-214; and Cissoko, "Contribution a
l’histoire politique des royaumes du Khasso", Part 4, Chapter Four.

57. ANS 15G111: Medine, ll ' ' l m ' l " , October
and December 1878; de Loppinot, "Souvenirs d’Aguibou", p. 42.

58. 'ANS 150111: Medine, B 11 ' ' 1 r' " , November
1878.

59 ANS 150111: Medine Mammy; November
1878 and April 1879. Karamakho Tal also argues that it was the Futanke of
Karta who resisted Amadu Sheku’s requests for military assistance. Interview
on 6 March 1986 in Bamako, Mali. See also my argument in note 63 below.

60. ANS 1D57: Medine 23 May, 8 June and 23 June 1880, Ct. Medine to the
Governor. Bambara armies had closed the route to safe passage.

61. ANS 1D57: Medine, 8 June 1880, Ct. Medine to the Governor; ANS 1G52:
Bakel, 12 June 1880, Dr. Bayol to the Commandant Superieur. Agibu states that
Muntaga feigned making a trip to Segu, but then turned back at Dina. I offer
an interpretation of that passage which emphasizes its metaphorical value in
note 63 below. With such a reading of Agibu, I reconcile the external and
internal perspectives. See, for Agibu’s testimony, de Loppinot, "Souvenirs
d’Aguibou", p. 42.

62. Internal accounts assert that Muntaga’s failure to visit Segu was the event
which prompted Amadu to march on Nioro and confront his younger brOther in
1885.

231

63. Amadu Sheku’s supporters often wrote to Segu describing Cemo Mamadu
Khayar’s activities in Nioro. Although none of the letters are dated, I argue
from internal evidence that two of the letters were written in 1880: they focus
singularly on his resistance to fulfilling Amadu’s requests for military assistance.
Subsequent letters describe both Muntaga’s and Cemo Mamadu’s resistance to
Amadu. If the two letters were written after the open break between Muntaga
and Amadu Sheku, then Muntaga’s disobedience would have figured in the
complaints as well. See, for the letters from 1880, BN.MO.FA. 5680 fo. 157;
5737 fo. 50.

Agibu Tal recounts a tradition in which Muntaga leaves Nioro for Segu
only to return after stopping at Dina (a town on the Nioro—Segu route). This
tradition captures in a symbolic form the internal conflict in Nioro in 1880:
Muntaga was pushed and pulled from all sides, and finally decided not to make
the trip after initially deciding to march. If this reading of the tradition is
accurate, then it reinforces the role of Cemo Mamadu Khayar in rallying the
Futanke against the trip. Agibu later refers to Cemo Mamadu, revealing his
knowledge of Cemo Mamadu’s prominence in Nioro. de Loppinot, "Souvenirs
d’Aguibou", p. 42.

64. Well over a thousand Fulbe from the lower Senegal valley arrived in Nioro
between 1878 and 1880. The migration in 1878 was so large that the Governor
of Senegal ordered a study of the migration flow. The French concluded that
most migrants were young men who migrated to fight in the holy wars of
Umar’s sons. See ANF.SOM SEN.I 61c: Saint Louis, 22 March and 5 June 1878,
Governor to the Minister; ANS lD73: Kayes, 31 October 1883, Ct. Sup. to the
Governor", ANS 15G126: Kita, 29 April 1884, Ct. Kita to Ct. Sup.

65. 'Agibu Tal notes the brothers objections to Amadu’s excessive demands for
taxes and tribute. de Loppinot, "Souvenirs d’Aguibou", p. 42.

66. ANS 15G110: Medine, 7 September 1876, Ct. Medine to the Governor.

67. ANF.SOM SEN.I 61c: Saint Louis, 22 August 1877, Governor to the
Minister. Soleillet argues that Amadu Sheku designated Madani as his successor
in 1874, during the residence of the other Tal brothers.

68. Agibu’s account has Muntaga at Dina, a stop on the route to Segu, when
Amadu hears of Muntaga’s decision and orders the residents of Dina to kill
Muntaga before he left the town. de Loppinot, "Souvenirs d’Aguibou", p. 42.
Since Muntaga probably never made a move toward Segu, and led a campaign
into the southern marches of Karta instead, then the assassination attempt must
have occurred elsewhere. French reports of Amadu’ s intent to assassinate
Muntaga upon his arrival in Segu circulated in Medine in 1880. See, for the
rumors, Oloruntimehin, W, p. 260nl (reference to ANS 15G112:
Medine, 1 July 1880, W, June, 1880). See, for
the internal account of Amadu’ s assassination attempt, de Loppinot, "Souvenirs
d’Aguibou", p. 42.

69. See reference to French reports cited by Oloruntimehin in note 68 above.

232

70. de Loppinot, "Souvenirs d’Aguibou", pp. 42-43. Unfortunately, Amadu’s
letter has not yet surfaced in my investigation of the Arabic materials from
Nioro.

71. Agibu refers specifically to the letter in his account. A letter from Cemo
Mamadu Khayar to Amadu Sheku appears in BN.MO.FA. 5737 fo. 57.

Cemo Mamadu Khayar wrote another letter to Segu which describes his
view of the growing conflict between Amadu Sheku and Muntaga. Neither this
letter nor the previously described letter is dated, preventing definitive
statements regarding the dates of composition. Cemo Mamadu addressed the
second letter to a friend in Segu, and implied that Muntaga had forbidden
direct correspondence with Amadu Sheku. This reference, as well as his open
discussion of the conflict between the brothers, suggests that this letter was
written some time after the first letter. BN.MO.FA. 5737 fo. 62.

Cemo Mamadu situates his obligation to Amadu Sheku within a hierarchy
of commitments ascending from Muntaga through Amadu Sheku to Umar Tal,
who in turn is Ahmad al-Tijani’s representative. Cemo Mamadu traces the link
to a religious movement and ultimately to the Prophet Muhammad.

72. ANF.SOM SEN.IV 79bis: Saint Louis, 8 August 1884, "Rapport du
Campagne, 1883-84".

73- Kanya-Forstner. W. p- 80-
74. Kanya-Forstner, W. p. 58n5.

75. See, for the Logo affair, Kanya-Forstner, The an nquest ef the Western
Sudau; Saint-Martin LLEanirLtQueeuleiu: Oloruntimehin IhLSeguJukuler
Empire.

76. ANF.SOM SEN I.6lc: Saint Louis, 5 June 1878, Governor to the Minister.

77. Murgula was constructed in 1858 after the conquest of the region. Alfa
Uthman So, the first leader of Murgula, was a recruit from Futa Jallon, and
many residents of Murgula hailed from Futa Jallon. Alfa Uthman later joined
Umar’s conquest of Segu and Masina, and Abdullay, a former slave of Umar Tal,
assumed control of Murgula. See, for Alfa Uthman So’s career as an Umarian

general, Robinson, W, pp. 251-255, 307-308.

78. See, for Borgnis-Desbordes’ statement of his accomplishments, ANS 1D64:
"Rapport sur la campagne, 1881—82". He established provision stores, several
resthouses and began construction of a telegraph line.

79. ANS 1D62: Medine, 2 December 1881, Ct. Medine to Ct. Superieur; and
Kayes, 4 December 1881, Ct. Superieur to the Governor.

80. ANS 1D62: Kayes, 23 November 1881, Ct. Superieur to the Governor. The
French advance into the interior stalled in 1881-82, and Borgnis-Desbordes
placed much of the blame on Bassiru’s embargo. ANS 1D62: Kayes, 4 December
1881, Ct. Superieur to the Governor; and ANS 1D68:

81. 156113: Medine. Coniederegistreioumaldmste February 1882.

233

82. ANS 156113: Medine. Wire March
1882.

83. ANS 1D62: Kita, 18 November and 6 December 1881, Ct. Kita to the Ct.
Superieur.

84. ANS 1D62: Kita, 17 September and 6 December 1881, Ct. Kita to the Ct.
Superieur.

85. The only reference to the content of Amadu Sheku’s orders regarding the
French advance comes from 1883. A Futanke envoy whom the French sent to
live with relatives in Nioro reported that he was present for a public reading of
a letter from Amadu Sheku to Muntaga. According to the Futanke envoy,
Amadu Sheku’ 5 letter prohibited any attacks on the French without his specific
instructions, and repeated his annual call for troops to fight the Bambara
along the Nioro-Segu road. ANS lD73: Kayes, 4 October 1883, "Renseignements
donnés par le nommé Abdoul Lamine envoyé en mission 11 Nioro".

86. See, for a French description of Murgula in 1879, Joseph Gallieni, Voyage
an Soudan franeeis. Haut-Niger e1 pays de segep, 1822-1880 (Paris, 1885), p.
287.

87. ANS 1D69: "Rapport sur la campagne, 1882-83". Borgnis-Desbordes sent
the letter on 23 February 1883. He was aware of the fraternal conflict. See
ANS 1D62: Kita, 6 December 1881, Ct. Kita to the Ct. Superieur.

88. ,I have not yet found Muntaga’s original Arabic letter in the French
materials. Nor does the initial French translation of the original appear in the
W’s register of correspondence (ANS 150141: piece 650 is
the "Sommaire de correspondence"). Thus, I draw on Borgnis-Desbordes’ own
description of the content of the letter in his annual report on the military
campaign in the Western Sudan. ANS 1D69: "Rapport sur la campagne, 1882-83".
Muntaga’s letter arrived by envoy at Kita on 4 April 1883.

89. See Chapter One, pp. 3-4 and notes 7 and 8 for details.

90. Muntaga’s letter to the Ct. Superieur arrived at Kita in April, 1884. ANS
15Gl41: piece 110. See, for the initial French reaction to Muntaga’s letter,
ANS 15G126: Kita, 10 April, 1884, Ct. Kita to the Ct. Superieur.

91. Muntaga was not the only contemporaneous actor or observer to note the
division of Futanke political groups into "peace" and "war" factions: Amadu
Sheku and Abdul Lamine, a Futanke from Kayes whom the French sent to Nioro
in 1883 to stay with his relatives and gather information on Umarian political
activity, also make the same observations. See, for Amadu’s assessment, ANS
15G68 (Chemise spéciale): piece h. Internal evidence in this undated letter
suggests that Amadu wrote it at Nyamina in mid-1884. Amadu’s description of
the divisions are based on information from his supporters in Nioro. Abdul
Lamine’s assessment appears in a French report in ANS 1D73: Kayes, 4 October
1883, "Renseignements donnés par le nommé Abdoul Lamine envoyé en mission a
Nioro".

234

92. Amadu, a Futanke smith from Kayes whom the French sent to gather
information in Nioro in September 1883, states that it was Cemo Mamadu
Khayar’s influence that prevented Muntaga from attacking the French after the
Murgula affair. ANS 1D73: Kayes, 13 October 1883, Ct. Superieur to the
Governor. Most of the information regarding Cemo Mamadu’s political positions
which appears in the text comes from 1883; I assume that his opinions did not
change radically from 1882 to 1883.

93. A J awaando from Kingi whom the French stopped in Kayes as he passed to
the Senegal valley provides this assessment of Cemo Mamadu’s objections to
Muntaga’s campaigns. He adds that Cemo Mamadu long has been against the
military activities of Muntaga, and that many notables and young men listen to
his counsel. ANS 1D73: Kayes, 31 October 1883, Ct. Superieur to the
Governor.

94. This statement was made in October, 1883, according to Abdoul Lamine’s
testimony. ANS 1D73: Kayes, 4 October 1883, "Renseignements donnes par le
nommé Abdoul Lamine envoyé en mission a Nioro".

95. This assessment of the social groups supporting a "peace" perspective in
Nioro is offered by Abdul Lamine, the Futanke spy from Kayes whom I discuss
in note 89 above. ANS 1D7 3: Kayes, 4 October 1883, "Renseignements donnés
par le nommé Abdoul Lamine envoyé en mission a Nioro".

96. ANS 1D73: Kayes, 4 October 1883, "Renseignements donnés par le nommé
Abdoul Lamine envoyé en mission at Nioro".

97. 'The Cemmendant at Kita noted a group of "young Futanke" who came very
close to the French position and seemed to want to provoke a confrontation.
ANS 15G126: Kita, 29 April 1884, Ct. Kita to the Ct. Superieur.

98. ANS 1D73: Kayes, 4 October 1883, "Renseignements donnés par le nommé
Abdoul Lamine envoyé en mission a Nioro".

99. ANS 1D68: Kayes, 3 July 1883: Ct. Superieur to the Governor. This
French report also notes Muntaga’s desire to replace Amadu Moktar with Daha

in Konyakary.

100. ANS 1D73: Kayes, 4 October 1883, "Renseignements donnés par le nommé
Abdoul Lamine envoyé en mission a Nioro".

101. Amadu Moktar of Konyakary wrote the French to ensure the safe passage
of this caravan. His Arabic letter is filed in ANS 1D68: piece 662. A rough
French translation of the letter appears in the same dossier: Kayes, 2 July
1883, Ct. Superieur to the Governor.

102. Several informants provided the French with information on the Malik
Samba-Demba Ibrahim conflict. ANS 1D73: Badumbe, 12 September 1883, Ct.
Badumbe to the Acting Ct. Superieur; Kayes, 4 October 1883, "Renseignements
donnés par le nommé Abdoul Lamine envoyé en mission a Nioro". Demba wrote
several letters to Amadu. The letter describing Malik Samba’s challenge and
Demba’s fears is ANS 15G78: piece 92.

235

103. ANS 1D73: Kayes, 4 October 1883, "Renseignements donnés par le nomme
Abdoul Lamine envoyé en mission a Nioro"; and Badumbe, 12 September 1883,
Ct. Badumbe to the Acting Ct. Superieur.

104. Amadu’s plans were not secret, as the following account repeated in
Nioro during September 1883 attests: when Amadu asked the Futanke of Segu
to march with him to Nioro, they responded enthusiastically, saying, "We will
march to Gidimaxa if it pleases God". This account is from the testimony of
Amadu, a Futanke smith whom the French sent to Nioro to gather information.
ANS 1D73: Kayes, 13 October 1883, Ct. Superieur to the Governor.

105. The testimony of Amadu, the Futanke smith, who was in Nioro at the
time of Cemo Mamadu’s refusal to accept the gifts. ANS 1D73: Kayes, 13
October 1883, Ct. Superieur to the Governor.

CHAPTERNINE

The Siege of Nioro

Amadu Sheku told his supporters, "Do not blame me for what
has occurred [here in Nioro]. I came here so that my brother
could join me in attacking [the Bambara of] Beledugu and then

in going on against the French. Instead, my brother Muntaga

has been found to be an enemy who prevents me from pursuing
these projects. He forces me to stay in Nioro where I must

either vanquish him or join him. [Have patience, my loyal
followers], one never knows exactly when a pregnant woman will
deliver her child, but one knows that the day approaches soon.

Muntaga loudly proclaimed: "it will take either a great Mus
leader or a great Christian general to make me leave this fort."

For close to nine months during 1885, Amadu Sheku put Muntaga under
siege in the fort at Nioro. Amadu wanted his younger brother to leave the fort
and submit to his authority without a struggle. Muntaga suspected that his
older brother was going to imprison him for not fulfilling requests for tribute
and military service, and decided to test Amadu’s resolve by remaining in the
fort. As Amadu waited, he came into conflict with Cerno Mamadu Khayar, and
eventually ordered his execution. Falel, the leader of the Fulbe Wolaarbe, also
died in a confrontation with Amadu’s troops. The siege ended when Muntaga
and a few supporters closed themselves in a room of the fort and ignited a
large amount of gunpowder, killing themselves before Amadu’s soldiers could

236

237
take them captive. As with the conclusion to the revolt of Habib and Moktar,
Amadu’s victory eroded support for Amadu among the Futanke of Karta.

Oral historians in western Mali celebrate the siege of Nioro as a central
event of the late nineteenth century. They narrate lengthy accounts of the
siege in which the death of Muntaga is the heroic culmination of a dramatic
fraternal struggle. In striking contrast, literate historians working with
French-mediated materials largely neglect the political drama, viewing the siege
as a minor event which further weakened the imperial Umarian state on the eve
of the French conquest of the Western Sudan. The failure to appreciate the
importance of the siege reflects the historiographical emphasis on Franco-
Umarian relations and the lack of interest in internal political developments in
Karta. The siege reveals the central tensions within the Umarian community,
and provides an opportunity to analyze the diversity of perspectives, goals and
interests associated with the Umarian consolidation of power in Karta.

Historians can make an important contribution to the historiographical
tradition pioneered by local historians. Written materials in Arabic and French
were produced contemporaneously with the revolt. The written and oral
materials complement one another quite well, and provide a firm basis for a
comprehensive reconstruction of the revolt. The abundance and quality of these
materials contrasts, for example, with the sources for the earlier revolt of
Habib and Moktar. The difference relates both to the altered nature of the
French presence in the late nineteenth century and the historical experience of
the Futanke community after the revolt. During the 1880s, the French were
very interested in political challenges to Amadu Sheku and collected information
from a range of informants about Muntaga’s revolt. After the French conquest,

the removal of the Tal family from political office created conditions whereby

238
the Futanke community could discuss the revolt without directly challenging the
position of any Tal brother. Additionally, the process of examining the past
produced an Arabic chronicle of the revolt, a development which did not occur
for the earlier revolt. Many perspectives, therefore, are available in both oral
and written materials. The goals of this chapter are to review the data and

then reconstruct and analyze the revolt.

Soumaterials

The source materials for the reconstruction of Muntaga’s revolt include
detailed reports generated by French officials in the Western Sudan. The
W at Medine obtained information from envoys whom they sent to
Nioro and Konyakary, from merchants who traded at Medine, and from their
Xassonke clients who passed along data gathered by their informants. The
W at Kita obtained most of their information from merchants who
stopped at the post on their trips between Nioro and the markets of the.
southern savanna. At Kita, too, the c_or_nmandam corresponded with Daha,
another brother of Amadu Sheku who supported Muntaga’s revolt, and several
Soninke leaders who eventually joined Daha in his battle with Amadu’s forces at
Larnbidu in 1886.3 Also, WW Combes and Frey gathered and
analyzed oral data about events in Karta during their tenures at the helm of
the French campaign in the Western Sudan.4

The quality of information in the reports of the French W at
Medine and Kita varies considerably, linked to such factors as the experience
and interests of both the informant and the French official. Many informants

passed along second-hand testimony which they adeptly shaped to conform to

239

their own interests or to reinforce the opinions of the French. Valuable first-
hand accounts, however, were provided by Moorish gum merchants who had
st0pped at Nioro on their way to Medine. Several envoys who had relatives at
Nioro and resided with them for several weeks also supplied informed accounts
of events in Nioro, and passed along the opinions of their relatives and local
notables. The French often noted the name of the informant in their reports,
so the historian can assess the information on its own terms.

ggemmandant Superieprs Combes and Frey provide valuable assessments of
the political conflict. They consciously used data about the revolt to lobby for
their policy views, but their bias is overt and predictable. Both Combes and
Frey perceived Amadu Sheku as their main rival, and presented information
which portrayed him an unfavorable light.5 In Combes’ favor was his
sensitivity to the internal tensions within the Futanke community; he had
served several years at Medine prior to his promotion and his reports were
written in the field during the first months of 1885. Frey wrote his account a
few years after the conclusion of the revolt, and offers a coherent narrative of
the siege. He relied on contemporaneous oral information, but he does not
reveal the sources of information nor his methods of data collection. Frey’s
account is the first external narrative of the revolt, and its detail and
chronology must be set into a context in which the motivations and goals of
the political actors inform the analysis.

Arabic materials are less extensive than the French materials, but add
important internal perspectives and evidence which are not contained in other
sources. Perhaps most importantly, the Arabic materials include letters written
by Cemo Mamadu Khayar. In many oral and written accounts of the siege of

Nioro, Cemo Mamadu emerges as a loyal supporter of Muntaga; critical analysis

240
of his correspondence and other source materials adds complexity to his
character, and situates his actions within a larger historical context of
resistance to the military policies of both Amadu Sheku and Muntaga.6 Also
included in the Arabic materials are some of the letters exchanged between
Amadu and his supporters on the eve of the siege.7

The Arabic materials include a chronicle of Amadu Sheku’s reign which
contains a brief account of the siege of Nioro. The chronicle was completed by
a member of the Kaba J akite family of Nioro sometime prior to the end of the
nineteenth century. Maurice Delafosse and Colonel M.G. Adam each published
translations of the chronicle in the early colonial period. Neither Delafosse nor
Adam included the original text in the publication, nor has an Arabic copy
surfaced in the archives or in private libraries of western Mali. Delafosse’s
translation is more faithful to the original than Adam’s account; the latter
consistently inserted oral reminiscences and editorial comments into the Kaba
Jakite narrative. Close textual analysis of the two translations reveals that
Adam may have dropped passages of the chronicle in order to include detailed
reminiscences of events not described in the Kaba Jakite text. As a result, and
in the absence of the original, I will treat the Delafosse translation as a
reliable version of the Kaba J akite chronicle, and analyze Adam’s work as a
composite account of the revolt.

The Kaba Jakite chronicle recounts the siege quite briefly, and locates it
between Amadu Sheku’s military campaigns in Segu and his subsequent actions
against the followers of Mamadu Lamine in Jafunu and Gidimaxa. In the brevity
of the treatment as well as in the narrative itself, the chronicle adOpts a
sympathetic posture toward Amadu Sheku’s handling of the conflict. The Kaba

Jakite account never mentions Muntaga’s grievances against Amadu, and focuses

241
instead on his refusals to meet with his older brother. In essence, the
chronicle narrates a story of Muntaga’s intransigence which culminates in his
decision to kill himself instead of submitting to Amadu’s authority. The section
on the siege ends by noting that Amadu took great care in giving his dissident
brother a proper burial.

Despite an overt sympathy for the Amadu Sheku’s dilemma, the Kaba
Jakite chronicle was not necessarily composed under Amadu’s direct supervision
at Nioro. Rather, it is more likely that the Kaba Jakite chronicler completed
the sections on Muntaga’s revolt after Amadu had left Nioro on his hijra.
Evidence for such a view is that the Kaba Jakite text ends with an account of
the French advance on Nioro, an episode which certainly was added after the
conquest. While the earlier sections of the Kaba Jakite chronicle may have
been written under the patronage of Amadu, it is reasonable to conclude that
Amadu did not commission a narrative of the revolt. Thus, Kaba Jakite
sympathy for Amadu points to a tradition of active support for him in the post-
conquest period. Since such expressions of complete sympathy are uncommon in
the oral historiography of the Nioro area, the Kaba Jakite text is important
both as a source and as a reference to what groups had joined Amadu’s
coalition during and after the revolt.

Colonel Adam’s text also adds oral reminiscences from the Nioro area in
the late nineteenth century. Adam served in Nioro during the. early colonial
period, and probably gathered the oral data during the course of his duties.
Unfortunately, Adam does not note the process of data collection, the names of
his informants nor his procedure for selecting which oral reminiscences would
be inserted in the core narrative of the chronicle. He clearly included the

views of Muntaga’s supporters; the account is filled with vignettes which

242

emphasize Muntaga’s desire to compromise in the face of Amadu’s insistence
that Muntaga be removed from power. It also concludes with an emphasis on
Muntaga’s "heroic" death. Finally, Adam’s account mentions the role assumed
by the Futanke notable Cemo Mamadu Khayar, whom Amadu executed for
treason. This story as well as many others which focus on Futanke resistance
to Amadu Sheku suggest that Adam spoke with Futanke informants who overtly
supported the revolt against Amadu Sheku.

While Adam may have consulted informants who supported Muntaga’s
revolt, one cannot conclude that his account represents a coherent oral
tradition which was articulated in the region at the time. It is Adam who
juxtaposes the oral testimony and the narrative in the Arabic chronicle for a
literate audience in France; he seems to have emphasized the contrasting
perspectives to accentuate the fraternal conflict.8 The absence of information
about Adam’s methods of data collection cautions against making conclusions
about the state of the oral historiography in Nioro at that time. Thus, while
his account presents some of the views expressed in the internal dialogue, it
remains his personal synthesis of selected reminiscences.

Emile Blane, another French colonial official, subsequently collected oral
reminiscences about the revolt in the Nioro area during the early twentieth
century. Blane gathered traditions about the precolonial era from various
groups in Karta, and his work includes an account of Muntaga’s revolt outside
the framework of a complete history of the Umarian era, as the Kaba Jakite
chronicle attempted to provide. While he occasionally mentions the names of
some of his informants in the text, Blane fails to provide an adequate basis for
assessing the social bases of information. Given his broad canvassing of

opinion, Blane may include the views of Soninke communities in southern Karta

243
as well as the perspectives of the Futanke community in Kingi. As with Adam
before him, Blane edited and summarized his material. His account leaves some
traces of the internal debate but remains primarily an external synthesis of the
data.

Blanc’s account nevertheless provides clues to the process of historical
reconstruction and debate in the Nioro area. He notes, for example, that Samba
Altine Ba of Koriga was an informant who argued against the views of those
who doubted the sincerity of Amadu Sheku’s motivations 231-11s Muntaga.
While he does not state who provided the other perspective, one is forced to
conclude that Samba Ba represented a minority opinion on the revolt, given that
a sympathetic portrait of Muntaga informs most of Blanc’s account of the
revolt. Blanc’s sense of the major emphases of the Futanke community and
Adam’s earlier inclusion of testimony from Muntaga’s supporters suggest quite
strongly that the Futanke community in the Nioro area had begun to create an
historical narrative which made Muntaga and not Commander of the Faithful
Amadu Sheku the historical figure who symbolized the Umarian community’s
former position of dominance in the region. 7

In the early twentieth century, A. de Loppinot, a French official who
served in Masina, collected and translated the reminiscences of Agibu Tal, a son
of Shaykh Umar who was the leader at Dingiray at the time of the siege and
whom the French placed in command at Bandiagara. In contrast to the works
of Adam and Blane, de Loppinot’s account is a transmission of the oral
reminiscences of one informant, and de Loppinot seems to have been faithful to
that task. While Agibu’s testimony certainly expressed his own feelings about

the revolt, the references to so many episodes in his account and the diversity

244
of views implicit in the episodes suggests that Agibu was informed and
influenced by the reminiscences of many others.

Agibu’s testimony probably reflects the emerging internal assessment of the
revolt as it was being created at Bandiagara. There the remnants of the Tal
family gathered under the protection of Agibu and tried to make sense of the
events of the last years of Amadu’s reign. Agibu reveals sympathy for and
intimate details of Muntaga’s complaints against Amadu Sheku; he also recounts
the exploits of Amadu’s army as it travelled from Segu to Nioro, and as they
put the fort of Nioro under siege. Neither Amadu nor Muntaga escaped
criticism in Agibu’s account. Although most of the blame fell on Amadu, the
actions of Muntaga are not portrayed as heroic. A gibu’s account incorporates a
wide spectrum of opinion.

By the early colonial period, then, the collective assessment of Muntaga’s
revolt had begun, and the internal dialogue had not produced a single narrative
tradition of the political drama. At Bandiagara, far removed from the scene of
the revolt, an account had emerged which included a range of perspectives, and
criticized the actions of both Amadu Sheku and Muntaga. In Nioro, the
internal debate seems to have been more heated, and a general consensus had
not emerged. On the one hand, supporters of Amadu Sheku, such as the Kaba
Jakite family and Samba Altine Ba, felt that the tragic conclusion to the siege
was the result of Muntaga’s intransigence. On the other hand, Muntaga’s
supporters saw their former leader as a martyr for the cause of local autonomy,
and celebrated the actions of other Futanke who had joined in the resistance to
Amadu Sheku. Even though the latter group may have been in the majority,
the process was open to public discussion and neither group seemed capable of

imposing their opinions on the other.

245

As I embarked on field research in the Nioro area in 1986, I was quite
interested to discover whether a consensus of opinion had emerged, or whether
two strands of opinion still divided the community some one hundred years after
the revolt. I was initially discouraged to find that many informants expressed a
reluctance to speak openly about any aspect of Muntaga’s reign. Those who
eventually agreed to talk usually refused to have the session taped.9 In most
cases in which informants refused to discuss the history of Muntaga’s reign,
they would refer me to Cemo Hadi Tal of Nioro, the religious leader of the
Umarian Tijaniyya community in westem Mali. Cemo Hadi is Muntaga’s
grandson, and his reputation for Islamic learning combine with his descent from
Muntaga to create, in the minds and hearts of most Futanke, the ideal
expression of religious leadership for their community. An historical tradition
repeated widely in western Mali captures the current sentiments accurately:
Shaykh Umar appointed Muntaga as the first governor of Nioro, and Cemo
Hadi’s return to Nioro in the 19503 was the fulfillment of the Shaykh Umar’s
dreams for the region.

Oral traditions concerning Muntaga’s revolt collected in contemporary
western Mali, therefore, must be assessed with an eye to the influence of Cemo
Hadi’s reputation. Since Cemo Hadi’s arrival to Nioro from Futa Toro, he has
consolidated support among the Futanke of western Mali. Annually, members of
Cemo Hadi’s family visit his followers to collect a tenth of their harvests or
commercial profits. They willingly contribute because Cemo Hadi’s emergence
as a religious leader fills the void created by Muntaga’s death and the French
conquest. 10 While history enhances Cerno Hadi’s credentials, his status as their
current leader in turn alters Futanke perceptions of his grandfather’s era.
Indeed, the religious ideals of the current Futanke community, as articulated by

246
Cerno Hadi, inform the process of creating a standard tradition of Muntaga’s
revolt.

For example, even those informants who talk about the revolt are
reluctant to discuss the details of Muntaga’s death.11 Those who do talk about
Muntaga’s death usually emphasize the role of Farangelli, Muntaga’s griot, who
reportedly first suggested suicide as a means of ending the drama and then

ignited the gunpowder on the fateful day. 12

This transfer of responsibility
from Muntaga to his griot contrasts with the emphasis on Muntaga’s purposeful
and decisive action which dominates the narrative in earlier traditions. This
change of emphasis probably reflects current concern for the stigma associated
with suicide in the Muslim faith. Another informant added that Muntaga’s
body, after being thrown and landing hundreds of meters from the fort, was
found to have no blemishes - a sign that Muntaga had ascended into heaven as
a Muslim saint. This interest in Muntaga’s religious status, and the general
ambiguity regarding Muntaga’s decision to take his own life, suggests that
current sensibilities regarding Muslim beliefs have influenced the traditions of
Muntaga’s revolt. His decision to take his own life, an act which previously
was celebrated as a heroic expression of his resistance to Amadu, has less
significance than Muntaga’s status as a devout Muslim leader.

Despite such alterations in the oral record, and the reluctance among
informants to recount the history of the revolt, persistent fieldwork has added
oral traditions to the historical record. Several researchers besides myself
have collected oral information in western Mali. During the mid- 1970s, David
Robinson sought oral traditions of Umar’s holy war, and collected some

reminiscences of the siege of Nioro from members of the Tal family at Kayes

and at Bandiagara. Abdoul Aziz Diallo, a great grandson of an important

247

fer-gapke leader, collected oral traditions among the immigrant Fulbe in the
Nioro area during 1979 and again in the early 19805. Oudiary Makan Dantioko
gathered some oral traditions on the siege from oral historians in Balle.
Robinson, Diallo and Dantioko allowed me to consult their oral materials.

These recently-collected oral accounts show signs of the process whereby
a standard historical tradition emerges from numerous oral reminiscences.13 For
example, informants often telescope the siege of Nioro into a confrontation
which lasted four days instead of nine months.14 "One day" clearly marks the
passage of an episode in the nine month drama, and is a device which helps the
informant remember the past. The use of "days" instead of "weeks" or "months"
to mark time, however, excludes many epidoses from the oral account because it
enshrines only four among many possible sub-plots for commitment to memory.
When I asked informants about the length of the siege, most acknowledged that
the ordeal lasted much longer than four days. Although these informants did
not mention episodes which they chose not to include, it is clear that some
reminiscences are being excluded from the standard account of the revolt.15

The shortened chronology narrates Amadu Sheku’s arrival from Segu, the
execution of Cerno Mamadu Khayar, the death of Falel (a Fulbe Wodaabe leader
and one of Muntaga’s closest allies who died while fighting Amadu’s forces
during the siege of Nioro) and Muntaga’s suicide. This narrative structure is
not evident in the earlier accounts, but had its origins in the late nineteenth
century. According to a French envoy who visited Nioro in May, 1885, a
Futanke notable stood up at a gathering of Nioranke and chastised Amadu
Sheku for his siege of Muntaga, his execution of Cemo Mamadu and his
proposed military action against Falel. The Futanke reportedly argued that
Amadu Sheku’s herd included only three bulls, Muntaga, Mamadu and Falel, and

248
that his actions had begun to decimate the herd. 16 While current oral accounts
do not adopt the analogy of the herd to describe the local leadership of Nioro
at the time of the revolt, they focus on the same three leaders and implicitly
express the late nineteenth century criticism of Amadu’s actions.

Despite the implicit criticism of Amadu Sheku in the narrative structure of
these oral accounts of the revolt, the informants themselves did not draw such
judgments or conclusions from the story. Most notably, those who narrated the
history of the revolt for Diallo identified their ancestors as supporters of
Amadu Sheku who joined his expedition against Falel. While the informants of
the 1980’s no longer view themselves in terms of the political divisions of the
late nineteenth century, their historical traditions reflect a pro-Muntaga
position on the revolt. Sometime between the early twentieth century inquiries
of Adam and Blanc, and the field investigations of Diallo and myself, the two
strands of opinion merged and the perspectives of Muntaga’s supporters won
over the views of Amadu’s supporters. Whether Cemo Hadi’s arrival played a
role in the process is unclear; his presence may further encourage a
consolidation of the account to minimize Muntaga’s suicide. I

This overview of the oral accounts from the Nioro area does not diminish
their importance for the historian of the siege of Nioro. The identification of
the social and political bases of the oral data serves to facilitate its use for
the reconstruction of the past. As a result of such an analysis, additions to
the oral record may be more easily recognized, and interpretive traditions
within the oral historiography can be separated and assessed. An understanding
of the emergence of current historical perspectives in the Nioro area helps to
locate the present attempt to reconstruct the siege within an on- going and vital

tradition of inquiry and analysis. My findings will diverge from those of

249
previous historians, both oral and literate, but my work clearly builds upon the

firm historiographical tradition established by local historians.

Am h k ’ m ht Ni r

The events which immediately preceded Amadu Sheku’s siege of the fort at
N ioro are not reported very completely in the extant sources. Most oral
accounts condense the years prior to Amadu’s arrival in Kingi into a short
narrative: Muntaga defied Amadu Sheku by not visiting him at Segu and Amadu
responded by marching to confront him at Nioro.17 Some Arabic letters written
in 1884 survive, but they do not shed much light on the activities of the

principal actors. 18

French reports also add very little information: the
Medine materials for 1884 largely have been lost or misfiled in the archives,
and, other materials do not compensate adequately for the loss. 19 Nonetheless,
the major events of 1884 - Amadu’s march to Nioro, Muntaga’s preparations for
his brother’s arrival, and their meeting at Bassaga, a village in Bakunu - have
left traces in the data, and the outline of the year emerges fairly clearly.

Amadu Sheku left Segu for Nioro in early 1884. The route to Nioro was
not free from Bambara raids, and the French position on the Niger River at
Bamako exposed the western flank of the Segovian state to attack. The
movement of Samori Ture’s army into the savanna south of Segu also posed a
potential threat to Segu. In addition to these developments, Amadu was in the
unenviable position of having to return to Karta and confront his younger
brothers after the embarrassing conclusion to the revolt of Habib and Moktar.

Amadu felt, however, that he needed to unite the Umarian community under his

leadership if they were to have any chance against their external enemies. His

250

closest advisors also pushed him to make the trip, and Amadu redistributed a
large quantity of gold from the state treasury to recruit them for the
campaign.20 Given the threats posed by the Bambara, the French and Samori’s
troops, Amadu had to leave a sizable army in Segu, and entrusted its command
to Madani, his oldest son. After handing the reigns of power to Madani, Amadu
marched to the west with a force which probably numbered about ten thousand
men.21

Amadu and his forces travelled from Segu to Nyanrina, the last Futanke
garrison of the middle Niger valley. They remained at this garrison for much
of 1884 because of insecurity along the Nioro-Segu route. While Amadu waited
at Nyamina, his army clashed with some Bambara forces which operated in the
western marches of Segu, and Amadu lost several generals and a considerable

number of men.22

Despite these losses, Amadu remained committed to the
march to ‘Nioro and planned an alternate route to Nioro so as to avoid the
Bambara general N ’To, whose troops assembled near Nyamina for a major

offensive against the Umarians.23

Since the Bambara threat had grown in
seriousness in part because Segovian requests for assistance from the Futanke
of Karta had been refused, Amadu’s anger with Muntaga and his Futanke
supporters must have increased. Nevertheless, Amadu wrote to some of his
supporters in Kingi during this period and expressed his hope that his arrival in
Karta would lead to an amicable solution to the political disagreement with
Muntaga and the Futanke of Karta.24 He reminded his followers that all
Umarians were Muslims, and that the Christian French were the enemies of
Islam.

While Amadu Sheku resided at Nyarrrina, Muntaga countered Amadu’s earlier
moves at Jalla and Konyakary by removing Amadu Moktar Njay as the leader of

- 251

Farabugu.25 Muntaga feared that, if Amadu Sheku attacked him from the east,
Demba Ibrahim of Jalla and Amadu Moktar of Farabugu would join the assault
from the south. Muntaga also knew that Amadu Moktar of Konyakary would
not come to his assistance because he represented the "peace" faction of Nioro
and because Amadu had appointed him leader at Konyakary in 1882. Muntaga
decided to move against Amadu Moktar of Farabugu since he did not command
many Futanke and was open to attack. His taxation polices also had
engendered considerable local animosity toward his leadership.26 Daha,
Muntaga’s half-brother who resided at Nioro, was eager to lead the attack,
recruited a force of Futanke and Soninke soldiers and easily defeated Amadu
Moktar sometime in 1884.27 Daha then consolidated his position in southwest
Karta as a first step toward moving against Demba Ibrahim at Jalla.

The Futanke community of Kingi largely supported Muntaga’s actions. His
most fervent supporters used reports of Amadu Sheku’s impending march to
Nioro to stir memories of Amadu’s earlier residence in Nioro and his harsh
treatment of Habib and Moktar. Amadu’s arrival also was a direct challenge to
their desire for autonomy, for the Futanke knew that he would demand that
they fight against the Bambara and move to Segu with him. Cemo Mamadu
Khayar remained a spokesman for Kartan autonomy, and was joined by a leading
member of the "war" faction, Cemo Bokar Sammolde.28 While Cemo Mamadu
had opposed Muntaga’s actions against Demba Ibrahim in 1883,. he now knew
that Amadu’s march to Nioro would force a confrontation in Karta. The desire
for autonomy from Amadu’s imperial demands swung most of the Futanke of
Karta behind Muntaga as he faced the challenge of Amadu’s arrival from the

east.

252

Amadu Sheku responded to Muntaga’s initiative at Farabugu by sending
Bassiru back to Konyakary to recruit an army of Futanke in Jomboxo and join
him when he arrived in Karta.29 Bassiru probably accompanied Amadu Sheku to
Nyamina and then made his way to Konyakary in a small caravan along a
southern route which avoided the main Bambara forces.30 Bassiru’s return to
J omboxo angered Amadu Moktar and his supporters.31 Futanke who had
arrived recently in Jomboxo, however, rallied around Bassiru’s leadership in
hopes of a return to the wars and raids of the past. Amadu Sheku’s decision
to send Bassiru to Konyakary, therefore, heightened the divisions within the
Futanke community of Jomboxo on the eve of Amadu’s return.

Amadu Sheku and his Segovian army made their way from Nyamina to
Karta in late 1884.32 They camped at Bassaga, a village in Bakunu, well to the
east of Nioro. From Bassaga, Amadu sent word to Nioro that he expected his
brothers to come with troops to mount a campaign against the Bambara. Most
oral accounts present Amadu’s motivations in sinister terms: he wanted to lure
Muntaga from Nioro either to assassinate or imprison him.33 An assassination
of Muntaga made no sense from Amadu’s perspective, since he wanted to forge
a united front against the Bambara and the French. The letter that he wrote
at Nyamina in 1884 suggests that he had adopted a conciliatory approach toward
Muntaga, and Bassiru’s return to Konyakary suggests that Amadu planned to
include his brothers in the campaign. Amadu’s call for the renewal of the holy
war from Bassaga, therefore, probably was a genuine attempt to try and resolve
the conflict by allowing Muntaga and the Futanke of Kingi one last chance to
honor his requests for assistance.

Muntaga assembled the leaders of the Futanke and Soninke communities of
Kingi to inform them of Amadu Sheku’s request. Amadu’s supporters seized

253
upon his arrival to argue that Muntaga should honor the Commander of the
Faithful’s order.34 Most Futanke did not want to join Amadu’s army, but they
feared the outcome of a direct refusal to participate with Amadu’s forces so
close to Nioro. They counseled Muntaga to meet with his brother at Bassaga.
Muntaga agreed to travel to Bassaga, but decided to order his agents to move
military supplies and surplus grain into the fort in case he needed to withdraw

from Bassaga.35

Some Futanke notables preceded him to Bassaga to stall
Amadu and secure additional time for Muntaga to complete his preparations.36
Muntaga made his way to Bassaga with an entourage which included his armed
guard and several of his brothers.37

At Bassaga, Muntaga and Amadu Sheku did very little to resolve the
conflict and quite a bit to increase their distrust and anger toward one

another.38

They met at least once, but failed to address the issues which
divided them; the final interaction ended with Muntaga refusing to meet again
with his older brether.39 Most accounts also emphasize Amadu’s insistence that
he meet with Muntaga alone. Muntaga’s suspicions eventually reached the point
where he organized his escape from Bassaga. He fled at night and marched to
Kingi with a small force. Some of Amadu’s men caught up with Muntaga, but
he successfully avoided capture with the assistance of a local village chief.40
He made his way to Nioro and withdrew into the fort in anticipation of
Amadu’s march to Nioro.

Most oral accounts of the siege of Nioro locate subsequent events within
the context set at Bassaga: Amadu Sheku’s sinister motives forced Muntaga to
flee Bassaga, withdraw into the fort and take his own life after Amadu pursued
him to Nioro. This emphasis on the motives of Amadu not only reflects the

bias of the tradition, but diverts attention from Futanke resistance to joining

254
Amadu’s campaigns. Clearly the Futanke of Kingi were responsible for the turn
of events at Bassaga. Their opposition to fighting the Bambara prevented
Muntaga from offering to join Amadu’s forces as a sign of compromise, and
they did not discourage him from fleeing from Bassaga to the fort at Nioro.
The failure to reach a solution to the political crisis at Bassaga relates directly
to the continuing desire for autonomy on the part of the Futanke of Kingi.

Bassaga clearly was a turning point in the political drama. Rumors of
Amadu Sheku’s plan to kill or capture his younger brother influenced Muntaga’s
actions: his flight from Bassaga marked the end of his interest in dialogue
with Amadu. The Futanke of Karta also sided with Muntaga, further isolating
the Commander of the Faithful and forcing a confrontation. Amadu marched
toward Nioro and stOpped at Yerere, a major J awara settlement, where he sent
several envoys to Muntaga over the course of January, 1885.41 Later that
month, Amadu’s forces arrived at Nioro, occupied the city and surrounded the
fort. As Amadu’s men approached the front gate, Muntaga’s supporters fired
and drove them back. The first exchange of fire opened a new chapter in the

political drama.

W

Muntaga’s position in the fort was strong but not invincible. He probably
had over two hundred soldiers in the fort, enough to keep a sizable force at
bay but certainly not sufficient to hold back the thousands of soldiers under
Amadu’s command. Amadu’s decision not to take the fort by force reflected his
hope that Muntaga would end the drama of his own volition and submit to his

authority as the Commander of the Faithful. Throughout the siege, Amadu

255

Sheku stressed the campaign against the Bambara and a united front against the
French as the major goals of the Umarian community. Muntaga and most of
the Futanke of Kingi felt that Amadu’s insistence that he lead the Umarian
community was overreaching the social contract of the holy war. Futanke
desires for autonomy and Muntaga’s claim for his own share of political power
had converged in 1884 and survived through the long months of the siege.
Muntaga’s refusal to end the drama came to symbolize Futanke desires for
autonomy from Segu.

The fort at Nioro was quite large and had only one entrance which could
be closed and defended by artillery positions along the walls.42 Constructed
with a wooden sub-structure and a thick mud covering, the walls of the fort
measured over twelve feet high and six hundred feet long.43 The walls formed
a square which enclosed a military supply house, the state treasury and living
quarters for Muntaga’s personal guard (see Figure D). The main building
inside the fortress served as his official residence and private chambers for
meetings with advisors and notables (see Figure B). At the center of the fort
was a platform where edicts and degrees were announced to the public. The
fort had several wells and granaries, where Muntaga had stored enough food to
feed all his supporters for over a year. His supporters in the fort included
most of his family, his half-brother Daye and several praise-singers.

Outside the fort, the next largest structtue in Nioro was the mosque,
which stood less than a thousand feet from the southern walls of the fort.
Amadu Sheku controlled the mosque, and occupied residences to the south and
west of the mosque. These residences ran along the course of a rainy season
stream which curved around the fort and emptied its waters to the west. The

market of Nioro was to the north of the fort, and Moorish groups occupied the

256

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

FIGURE E : The Fort at Nioro

Entrance
Main building

Public square

Open Space

Hospital (added in French era)

Amory (added in Amadu Sheku’s era)

Storehouses

. Wells

10. Barracks

ll. Barracks adapted from: ANS 1D117: piece 38

OPSQMPPPF

257

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

FIGURE F: The Main Building
(#2 in Figure D)

1. Court
2-7. Private Rooms
8. Ruins (where Muntaga lit the explosives).

adapted from: ANS 1D117: piece 39

258

residential quarter contiguous with the market. In January, when Amadu’s
forces occupied the town, many of the men camped on the outskirts of Nioro
because the physical structures could not accommodate all the troops. Amadu
supported his men by demanding taxes from all the villages of Kingi. As the
siege wore on, the weight of the demands grew burdensome of the populations
of the region.44

Most of the residents of Kingi supported Muntaga from the inception of
the political drama. These supporters included the Futanke who lived in Nioro
and in settlements encircling the capital. He also counted supporters among the
indigenous populations of the region. Muntaga’s army drew soldiers from the
Soninke of Kanyareme to the west and the Jawara of eastern Kingi. He also
drew an elite guard from the Fulbe Wodaabe group known as the Samburu.
Falel, the leader of the Samburu, and his followers lived near Nioro in villages

to the southeast.45

The Jawaambe, another Pulaar-speaking group, lived in
villages to the south. The leaders of each of these communities had sworn to
obey Muntaga and were sympathetic to Muntaga’s plight. These leaders offered
support to Muntaga throughout the siege of Nioro. Thus, while Amadu’s men
formed an organized fighting force, they were surrounded by a large population
which resented their demands for grain and their occupation of the region.

During the first months of the siege, Cemo Mamadu Khayar tried to work
for a peaceful resolution to the conflict.46 He used his status as a learned
Muslim and an elderly man who had joined the holy war during Umar’s life to
try and mediate between the Tal brothers. As a major advocate of Kartan
autonomy over the years, however, Cemo Mamadu could not convince Amadu to

alter his position math-.155 Muntaga: Amadu Sheku demanded that Muntaga

submit to his authority as Commander of the Faithful without any conditions

259
attached. By late March, Cerno Mamadu’s frustrations grew and he became
involved in a plot to erode support from Amadu’s own ranks. Cemo Mamadu
tried to purchase the loyalty of some of Amadu’s Futanke generals with gold
bars, and probably spoke to local Soninke, Fulbe Samburu and Jawaambe
leaders.47 Amadu Moktar of Konyakary, who was in Nioro in response to
Amadu’s request for a meeting, heard of the plot and exposed it during a
private session with Amadu Sheku.“8

Amadu Sheku put Cemo Mamadu on trial before all the Futanke notables
of Kingi. He asked several Futanke notables to serve as judges for the trial,
but no one agreed. Amadu turned instead to some Walati merchants who were
passing through the region, and they attended the proceedings. During the
trial, Cerno Mamadu confessed to the charges, but argued that Amadu Sheku’s
behavior toward his brothers was an assault on the ideals of the holy war.
With the confession, Cemo Mamadu received a sentence of death from the
Walati judges. Amadu ordered a member of Cemo Mamadu’s family to behead
the cleric. The execution occurred on Friday of that week at the public square
near the entrance to the fort. Amadu had the execution in the early afternoon,
so that everyone would observe the execution before meeting for the mid-day
prayer.

Amadu’s handling of the Cemo Mamadu affair deeply offended many
Futanke. Most felt that the sentence was too severe, and withdrew their
support for the siege of the fort. These Futanke included those who had
accompanied Amadu from Segu as well as former supporters from Karta.49 As a
result of the Futanke response to the execution, Amadu assigned responsibility
to watching the fort to non-Futanke generals in his army. Rumors also

circulated that the leaders of the J awara, Fulbe Samburu and Jawaambe were

260
planning to attack. Amadu Sheku probably knew that Cemo Mamadu’s
execution would erode support among the Futanke of Kingi and anger Muntaga’s
supporters in the region, but he nonetheless acted to silence the most eloquent
spokesman for Kartan autonomy. Months after the execution, a Futanke from
Nioro who passed through the French post at Kita admitted that Cemo
Mamadu’s death had worked to destroy the "peace" faction as an active force in
Nioro.50

Within a month after the execution of Cemo Mamadu Khayar, Amadu
Sheku moved to eliminate the challenge to his authority raised by Bassiru. By
early April, Bassiru had not yet made his way from Konyakary to meet with
Arnadu.51 Bassiru had returned to Konyakary with the implicit understanding
that he would rally the Futanke to fight against the Bambara, but he did not
move from Jomboxo, even after Amadu made specific requests that he march to
Kingi. Bassiru complained that his long absence required that he resolve some
disputes before leaving Konyakary. In contrast to Bassiru’s equivocation, Amadu
Moktar of Konyakary led a large Futanke contingent to meet with the
Commander of the Faithful at Yerere in early January, making Bassiru’s absence
all the more obvious. In mid-April, Amadu Sheku sent an armed guard to force
Bassiru to Nioro. Upon his arrival at Nioro, Amadu immediately put Bassiru
under house arrest. On the question of his continuing as leader of Jomboxo,
Amadu deferred a decision until the end of the Muntaga affair.

Amadu Sheku had again shown his ability to act decisively when pushed by
the opposition. Cemo Mamadu clearly was the spokesman of the movement for
autonomy and against the holy war, and the loss of his dissident voice made
Amadu’s arguments seem much more persuasive. Amadu’s action against Bassiru

also drew Amadu Moktar and the ”peace" faction of Jomboxo into Amadu’s

261

camp, and eliminated potential attacks from that faction. Amadu’s other half-
brothers such as Murtada and Bassiru, who were not safely protected within the
walls of the fort at Nioro, eventually submitted to him. With these submissions,
Amadu gathered momentum in his waiting game with Muntaga. His calls for
unity in the face of external enemies to Islam rallied supporters from among
Futanke who arrived in Nioro from the Senegal valley in March and April.52

In the months of April and May, however, Amadu Sheku’s lost some ground
because of events in southern Karta. In late April, Demba Ibrahim of Jalla lost
a major battle to Musa Fatuma, a Soninke leader from Lambidu who acted in
concert with Daha of Farabugu.53 Amadu responded to the news of Demba’s
defeat by ordering Abdulay Jeliya, a close advisor who accompanied him from
Segu, to recruit five cavaliers and seven soldiers from each Futanke village in

the Nioro region.54

Resistance to this attempt forced Abdulay to imprison
twelve village chiefs until their villages provided men.55 In late May, Abdulay
still was trying to recruit an army while Demba Ibrahim lost another battle to
Daha’s forces.56 Abdulay finally left for the south in early June, but Demba
Ibrahim’s forces could not avert a third defeat at the hands of Daha.5‘7 Daha
seemed poised to mount an offensive against Nioro and Demba Ibrahim could
offer very little assistance.

The momentum shifted more firmly against Amadu Sheku in May and early
June. While the execution of Cemo Mamadu Khayar had silenced his voice,
most Futanke still had not forgiven Amadu for his handling of the affair.58
Amadu’s imprisonment of Bassiru also reinforced his reputation as an
unforgiving and greedy brother. As the siege dragged on, the leaders of the
Fulbe Samburu, the Jawara and the Jawaambe of the region edged closer to

breaking their neutrality and joining an attack on Amadu’s position. Daha’s

262
victories in the south made that possibility much more likely than in the initial
months of the siege. In May, Muntaga made plans to marry off one of his
daughters, and boldly announced that he would remain in the fort indefinitely.
He taunted Amadu Sheku by stating publicly that it would take a great Muslim
leader or a French general to force him to leave the fort.59

Amadu Sheku’s position strengthened considerably in mid-June with the
arrival of a major caravan of fergapke from the lower and middle valley. His
call for holy war against the Bambara and the French resonated with many
migrants who wanted booty and were fleeing from regions controlled by the
French. Samba Ngumma, the leader of the caravan which arrived in June, had
been a French-designated chief in the lower Senegal before renouncing his ties
to the French and leading well over a thousand men to Nioro in June.60
Amadu successfully recruited most of the ferganke in Ngumma’s caravan to fight
in his armies. Amadu’s success in recruiting ferganke led supporters of
Muntaga to try and halt the population flow by circulating negative rumors
about Amadu Sheku in Futa Toro. Despite these attempt to halt the flow,
Amadu Sheku probably added at least a thousand ferganke soldiers to his forces
over the course of 1885. These new recruits added momentum to Amadu’s siege
at a time when Muntaga’s position seemed strong.

With these new forces, Amadu Sheku turned against Falel, the leader of
the Fulbe Samburu. Falel and the Fulbe Samburu he commanded were Muntaga’s
elite guard, and led the army into battle during its annual campaigns. Falel had
not joined Muntaga in the fort, but withdrew from Nioro and observed events
with an eye to breaking the siege militarily. Daha’s successes in southern
Karta were encouraging, and Falel tried to organize an attack on the fort in

July.61 Amadu moved against Falel before he could join forces with Daha. He

263
sent a large force of fesganke along with some trusted spin to confront Falel.
After some discussions ostensibly aimed at a mediation of the conflict, Amadu’s
forces attacked the vastly outnumbered Fulbe the next day at dawn.62 After a
battle which raged until dust, the forces of Amadu defeated the Fulbe and Falel
died in battle. Amadu’s men decapitated him and carried his head to Amadu.

Falel’s defeat occurred just as the rainy season began in 1885. The
victory took the momentum from Muntaga’s only hope to break the siege by
force, while the rains took their toll on Muntaga’s forces inside the fort.
Malaria and other illnesses associated with the rainy season grew into an
epidemic which claimed the lives of many men, women and children.63 The
supply of wood for cooking also began to give out, and hunger furthered
weakened the troops, although the actual grain reserves remained abundant.64
In mid-September, Musa Ndi, one of the leaders of Muntaga’s military force,
pressed Muntaga to bring the drama to an end. Muntaga declared that he
would never submit to Amadu, but allowed everyone to leave the fort if they
desired. Musa and some forty soldiers left the fort, leaving Muntaga, his family
and a few loyal supporters behind.

The end of the siege receives considerable attention in the sources. Some
accounts portray a moving end in which Muntaga turns to his sons and tells
them to accept Amadu Sheku as their father, and then retires into his palace
and ignites the explosives. Other accounts emphasize the continuing resistance
to Amadu’s authority and note that he told his followers that he had kept his
word and not surrendered to his older brother. Yet another variant emphasizes
Amadu’s suspicions, and notes that Amadu’s men searched the fort room by
room and failed to capture Muntaga before he lit the explosives. Recent

narratives emphasize the role of Muntaga’s praise—singer Farangelli in

264
convincing Muntaga to commit suicide. All accounts agree that Muntaga, his
brother Daye and his praise-singer Farangelli died in a massive explosion which
destroyed several rooms in the main building within the fort.

The conclusion of the siege of Nioro was tragic, the result of Muntaga’s
determination to deprive Amadu Sheku from claiming victory in the struggle.
Throughout the long siege, the Segovian army held the upper hand militarily,
but Amadu’s reluctance to force Muntaga out of the fort reflected his ulterior
motive. He wanted to win the allegiance of the Futanke of Kingi, whom he
hoped would join him as he engaged the Bambara and the French. The Futanke
supported Muntaga’s preparations in anticipation of Amadu’s arrival and refused
to honor Amadu’s request that they join his campaign against the Bambara of
Beledugu. Although they lost a major leader with the execution of Cemo
Mamadu Khayar, they still refused to acknowledge Amadu’s authority. Daha’s
victories ‘in the south encouraged them, and their resistance delayed the
departure of Abdulay Jeliya, whom Amadu sent to assist Demba Ibrahim. Even
during the last months of the siege, as Amadu recruited ferganke into his army,
they did not rally under the banner of holy war. Muntaga’s decision to commit
suicide rather than submit to Amadu Sheku expressed the attitudes of most
Futanke of Kin gi, whose descendants still celebrate his decision to defy the

Commander of the Faithful.

265

limes

1. ANM 1E207: Medine, 18 May 1885, "Notice politique sur les demiers
événements du Kaarta rapportée par l’émissaire Mamadou Doucr ". Doucré was
sent by the French at Medine to gather information on the siege of Nioro.

2. ANM 1E207: Medine, 18 May 1885, "Notice politique sur les demiers
événements du Kaarta rapportée par l’émissaire Mamadou Doucré".

3. To my knowledge, no one has worked through all the materials produced by
the eemmandepts at Medine and Kita. The most detailed account of the revolt
in the extant secondary literature, by Oloruntimehin, relies primarily on monthly
correspondence between the Governors at Saint Louis and the Colonial Ministry
in France. Abdoul Aziz Diallo’ s reconstruction of the revolt relies primarily
on oral data that he collected in the Nioro area. See Diallo, "Le siege de
Nyoro et la mort de Muntaga T all", Emdesmeliemles, no. 3 (1979).

4. Combes’s assessments are offered in reports and correspondence presently
found in the Senegalese and French national archives. Frey, on the other hand,
published an account of his campaign in the Western Sudan in which he devoted
an entire section on Muntaga’s revolt. Colonel Henri Nicolas Frey,

MW (Paris, 1888). PP- 93406-

5. Frey is overtly sympathetic to Muntaga’s plight, and concludes that he died
"heroically". He also refers to Cemo Mamadu Khayar "the preacher of Karta’s

emancipation". Frey, Campagnedapsjeflautsenegal, pp. 99, 103.

6. The analysis of Cemo Mamadu Khayar’s activities in the 1870s and early
18808 offered in Chapter Eight contrasts with the orthodox view of his role.

7. Unfortunately, the relevant documents do not have dates of composition and
several even do not have an author clearly indicated in the text. Careful
textual analysis, combined with data from other sources, points to 1884 as the
date of composition.

8. Adam’s account alone focuses on many details of an initial meeting between
Muntaga and Amadu which other accounts note with less concern. ~

9. Some of the reluctance to speak with me was related to memories of the
colonial experience. In the 1950s, the French collected oral data from many
villages in the Nioro area. Their intent was to obtain an accurate census of
the population, but they also asked questions about the past. The testimonies
were made in general sessions in which all the notables of the various villages
participated. During my residence and research in the Nioro area, some of the
older men remembered the French effort of the 1950s, and identified close
relatives or their fathers as informants. These older men stated that their
fathers greeted the French attempt to collect oral traditions with suspicion;
only the implicit threat of force led them to participate.

266

10. Other members of the Tal family lived in Nioro prior to Cerno Hadi’s
tenure as the religious leader of the Tijaniyya community of Karta. Murtada
lived in Nioro during the early twentieth century, for example, and occupied
the role as religious leader of the Umarian community.

11. Abdoul Aziz Diallo also experienced a reluctance to talk about Muntaga’s
death on the part of informants in the Nioro region, whom he interviewed in
1979 and again in 1980. Only his relatives at Gavinane spoke freely with him
about the siege. One of Diallo’s relatives explained the reluctance to speak
about the siege: Cemo Hadi had forbade discussion of Muntaga’ s death because
he had committed suicide. Diallo refers to these problems in his article, "Le
siége de Nyoro et la mort de Muntaga Tall", Emmnepges, no. 3 (1979).
During the course of my residences in Bamako, Mali in the mid-1980s, I spoke
with him several times and at length about the problems of collecting oral data
on the Umarian era. His insights proved helpful.

12. David Robinson interviewed Bougouboly Alfa Makki Tal at Bandiagara in
August, 1976; Bougouboly also argued that it was Muntaga’s griot who caused
the conflict. Not all members of the Tal family share that sentiment. In my
interview with Karamokho Tal in Bamako in March, 1986, he placed the blame
on the Futanke of Kin gi.

13. The process whereby oral traditions are created from oral reminiscences is
most clearly discussed by Joseph Miller. See his introduction to W
m, edited by J. Miller (Hamden, U. K., 1980).

14. . Both Futanke and Soninke traditions telescope the lengthy siege into a few
days of confrontation. In the Futanke traditions, each day corresponds to an
episode in the political drama. Dantioko’s informants provide considerable
detail about a confrontation between Amadu Sheku and Muntaga at Bassaga
before the siege of Nioro, but very little detail regarding the siege in Nioro
itself. Nevertheless, they also state that Muntaga committed suicide m days
after Amadu’s arrival in Nioro. See Dantioko’s interview with Djammé Tounkara
and Sadio Sakhoné of Balle, Mall in June, 1980.

15. Bassiru Tal’s involvement in the revolt, for example, is not included as an
episode in any oral narrative. The French-mediated materials provide quite a
bit of evidence regarding Bassiru’s reluctance to go to Nioro during the siege,
and note that Amadu Sheku eventually had to send an armed guard to force
him to go to Nioro. No Umarian informants ever mention this episode,
including his descendants who currently live at Konyakary and Kayes. The
exclusion of an episode regarding Bassiru seems to be a concession to Bassiru’s
family, who may find the episode embarrassing.

l6. ANM 1E207: Medine, 14 July 1885, "Nouvelles politiques apportees du
Kaarta par l’émissaire Souaye Guibril".

17. The internal traditions which add details from this era do not attach much
importance to events in 1884 until Amadu Sheku arrived at Bassaga in Bakunu.
The only exception is the account by Agibu Tal.

267

18. Internal evidence points to 1884 as the date of composition for some of
the Arabic letters in ANS 15G68 Chemise spéciale and 15G80 dossier 1.

19. The ANM Medine dossiers for 1885 (1E54 and 1E207) document the events
in Kingi after Amadu’s arrival in considerable detail. The ANS Medine dossiers
for the period 1883 to 1888 are virtually non-existent. The ANM materials
begin in 1883, but the 1883 to 1884 period is not covered very extensively.

20. A. de Loppinot, "Souvenirs d’ Aguibou", Bulleu’u du Comite d’fitudes
Hi i fi ’Afri Fr ' Vol.2(1919),

pp. 42- 43; interview with Amadou Ba of Nioro.

21. I have found no estimate of Amadu’s forces for early 1884, but
' Frey put Amadu’s forces at 15 thousand in late 1885. I
estimate that Amadu gained over five thousand soldiers in Karta.

22. Jacques Méniaud, ni v v
1829-1894, Vol. 2 (Paris, l93l)i, p. 357.

23. de L0ppinot, "Souvenirs d’Aguibou", p. 43.
24. ANS 15G68 Chemise spéciale, piéce h.

25. Amadu Moktar was a Futanke soldier who had assisted Amadu during the
first revolt and received the command of Farabugu as a reward. Amadu Moktar
also was outspoken in his criticism of Muntaga’s raids into the south of Karta.
He also offered shelter to Amadu Sheku’s most vocal supporters whom Muntaga
drove out of Nioro in 1884. See, for Amadu Moktar’ s role in the first revolt
and his appointment as Governor of Farabugu, Paul Soleillet, _ange_a_S_egeu,
111-‘ r'lIi c’oar l I I‘VI -.:' I.‘ Ilill It- to
Gravier (Paris, 1887), pp. 372,380. See,for his criticisms of Muntaga’ s raids,
ANS 1D73: Kayes, 4 October 1883, "Renseignements donnés par Abdoul Lamine
envoye en mission 21 Nioro".

26. See, for Soninke resistance to Amadu Moktar’s taxes, Blane, "Contribution
a l’étude", p. 262.

27. Daha had not received an appointment from Amadu Sheku in 1874. He had
joined Habib and Moktar’s revolt, accompanied the brothers to Segu, and then
returned to Nioro with Muntaga in 1874. Soleillet, W, pp. 380,
384.

Malik Samba Sy’s involvement in Daha’s action is unclear. Malik Samba
had tried to depose Demba Ibrahim in 1883, and took refuge at Farabugu after
the attempt. Daha eventually expelled Malik Samba and his Bundunke followers
from Farabugu in 1886. Blane, "Contribution a l’étude", pp. 304-305.

 

28. An Arabic letter from the era identifies Cemo Mamadu and Cerno Bokar
as the leading advocates of Kartan autonomy at this time. Lamine Bassiru Tal
also remembers two Futanke notables as leading the challenge against Amadu
Sheku when he arrived in Karta. See David Robinson’s interview with him at
Kayes on 13 September 1976.

268

29. I interviewed members of the Tal family in Konyakary and Kayes, and no
one remembered any interruption in the reign of Bassiru. David Robinson did
not explore this topic with Lamine Bassiru in 1976 (he has since died, and I
spoke with his son in 1986). Since local accounts of Bassiru’s reign do not
note his departure from Konyakary, this reconstruction relies on external
evidence to establish the events of the period.

The French referred to Amadu Moktar as the leader of Konyakary when he
wrote the French regarding Malik Samba Sy’s fetge from Bundu in mid-1883.
He also was identified as the leader of Konyakary in October 1883, when the
French sent several envoys to Konyakary and Nioro. In early 1885, the French
first noted Bassiru’s return to Konyakary. ANS 1D68: Kayes, 2 July 1883, Ct.
Sup to the Governor; ANS 1D73: Kayes, 4 October 1883, "Renseignements
donnés par Abdoul Lamine envoyé en mission .1 Nioro"; ANS 1D73: Kayes, 13
October 1883, Ct. Sup. to the Governor; ANM 1E207: Medine, 19 January 1885,
Ct. Medine to Ct. Cercles.

I have no direct evidence for my argument that Bassiru accompanied
Amadu Sheku to Nyamina and then headed to Konyakary in a separate caravan.
It is possible, therefore, that Bassiru may have never made the trip to Segu
because of insecurity along the route, and merely returned to Konyakary in late
1884 after residing elsewhere for the period between 1882 and 1884. This
reading of events is unlikely, since it assumes, firstly, that Bassiru escaped
from Amadu Sheku’s soldiers on route from Konyakary to Segu and secondly,
that this escape was never reported in contemporaneous materials nor
remembered in the oral traditions of western Mali. Bassiru’s ancestors
presumably forget his departure from the helm and his trip to Segu because it
implicates him in the fraternal conflict. They probably could not neglect a
dramatic story of his escape from Amadu’s soldiers if it had occurred.

30. My work in the Kita dossiers, however, has not uncovered a reference to
Bassiru’s movement. Nevertheless, Bassiru probably travelled to Konyakary via
J alla, and may have been escorted in part by Demba Ibrahim’s troops.

31. Amadu Moktar of Konyakary clearly represented the interests of the initial
Futanke settlers who participated in the grain trade with the gum merchants at
Medine. They opposed Bassiru’s wars and raids, as well as his trade embargo
against the French. While Amadu Moktar and his supporters were not pro-
French, they advocated an amicable relationship with the French at Medine’s
post and tolerated the French advance south of Karta as long as they did not
move into Kartan territory. See Chapters Five and Eight for a lengthy
treatment of the "peace" camp in Jomboxo.

32. Amadu’s forces avoided N ’To and his Bambara troops who pursued them on
the route to Nioro. de Loppinot, "Souvenirs d’ Aguibou", p.43. Saint-Martin
cites a French report which places Amadu Sheku in Karta by November 1884.
His source is ANS 15683 piece 35 (Saint-Martin,

Emnee, p. 321). Icould not find the document when I worked with this file.

33. See, for the most extensive account of the assassination plot, Blane,
"Contribution a l’étude", pp. 302-303. Variations appear in the accounts of
Adam and de Loppinot. Dantioko’s account implies that Amadu wanted to kill
Muntaga, but the accusation is not made overtly by 11118 informants.

 

269

34. Adam’ s Kaba Jakite informants emphasizes the perspectives of those who
counseled Muntaga to go to Bassaga. Adam, Legepdeshhsteliques, p. 113.

35. Most oral accounts argue that Muntaga moved supplies into the fort after
his meeting with Amadu Sheku. The task of moving grain into the fort,
however, required considerable planning. Muntaga probably instructed his
agents to bring the state share of the harvest of 1884 directly to the fort at
Nlioro. They normally collected the tax at harvest time, which coincided with
Amadu’s arrival at Bassaga in late 1884. While Muntaga may have continued
moving grain into the fort after his meeting with Amadu, the process certainly
had begun much earlier. Indeed, Muntaga may have started to store additional
grain in the fort after the 1883 harvest.

 

36. This tradition was mentioned in passing by Amadou Ba of Nioro. Agibu’s
account notes that a group of Nioranke notables arrived before Muntaga arrived
at Bassaga. de Loppinot, "Souvenirs d’Aguibou", p. 44.

37. Blanc is the only account to provide the names of the Tal brothers who
accompanied Muntaga to Bassaga. He states that it was Daha, Muniru, Amidu
and Daye. Daha probably was not a member of the entourage, since he was in
the process of consolidating power at Farabugu. Blane, "Contribution a l’étude,

p. 303. Nuru also was not in the entourage, since he only met with Amadu
when he marched to Yerere. ANM 1E207: Medine, 19 January 1885, Ct. Medine
to the Ct. Cercles.

38. See, for accounts of the Bassaga encounter, Adam, MgeudeLhistetjques,
pp.' 113-115; Blane, "Contribution a l’étude, pp. 302-303; de Loppinot,
"Souvenirs d’Aguibou", pp. 43-44; Oudiary Makan Dantioko’s interview with
Djammé Tounkara and Sadio Sakhoné at Balle in June 1980. I also spoke with
Amadou Ba of Nioro regarding the Bassaga encounter.

39. Most accounts narrate several meetings between Muntaga and Amadu, but
Dantioko’s informants mention only one encounter. The difference may be
based on the fact that Dantioko’s informants narrate several interactions
between Amadu Sheku and Farangelli, Muntaga’s praise singer. One images that
Muntaga was present during some of the interactions. All versions agree that
the Tal brothers never met privately and that their final discussion ended in a
dispute over the question of Amadu’s authority.

40. Adam and Blanc note that Muntaga was overtaken at Tourougoumbe,
whereas

de Loppinot states that it was Yerere. Adam, Iggeudesjstefiques, p. 115;
Blane, "Contribution al’ etude, p. 303; de Loppinot, "Souvenirs d’Aguibou",

p. 44. In Adam’ s and Blanc’ 3 accounts, Muntaga convinced the leader of
Amadu’ s troops to let him go to Nioro. Adam, Lfigeudethstmiqnes. p. 115;
Blane, "Contribution h l’etude", p. 303. Agibu asserts that Muntaga received
help from the leader of the Jawara. dc Loppinot, "Souvenirs d’Aguibou", p. 44.
Dantioko’s account does not discuss the details of Muntaga’s movements after
he leaves Bassaga.

270

41. Adam, Legendes histerigues, pp. 115-116; Blane, "Contribution h l’étude",
p. 303; "Traditions historiques", p. 365; ANM 1E207: Medine, 19 January 1885,
Ct. Medine to Ct. Cercles.

42. The following discussion of the fort at Nioro draws on French descriptions
of the early 18903, after they had defeated the Umarians. Amadu had occupied
the fort for over five years, and partially altered the interior to meet his
needs and tastes, but the main features of the fort survived Amadu’s residence
and the French conquest.

43. See, for a discussion of the military architecture of the Western Sudan,
Thierno Mouctar Bah, ‘ hi '. lmi' 11., -._1' !!’-..'!'1 ' IlI °I ‘lI .‘ It!
0.1-.1k I‘ltlI.a‘. -. ._ lI. a-1 ‘. (Yaounde,1985).

44. Amadu’s agents travelled as far as Gidimaxa to collect grain, cattle and
guns as tribute for Amadu Sheku. ANS 13G185: Bakel, 23 April 1885, Ct. Bakel
to Ct. Cercles.

45. According to Aliou Sow, the Fulbe Samburu lived at Jakamodi, Bemma,
Damma and Carinke. See his interview with Abdoul Aziz Diallo at Yelimane.

46. Cemo Mamadu Khayar’s activities in Nioro during the initial months of
1885 were the topic of several contemporaneous French reports: ANM 1E207:
Medine 13 April 1885, Ct. Medine to Ct. Superieur; ANM 1E54: Medine 15
April 1885, "Rapport politique". I also draw on the oral accounts discussed in
the first section of the chapter.

47.’ Accounts of the plot vary, and oral traditions state that Cemo Mamadu
tried to recruit from among the following groups: the Bambara of Beledugu, the
Jawara of Kingi, the Fulbe Samburu of Bakunu, Daha and his forces at
Farabugu, and Futanke from Karta and Segu. All these groups resisted Amadu
Sheku at one point during the siege of Nioro. The association of Cemo
Mamadu’s plot with these groups reflects Cemo Mamadu’s stature as a leader of
Kartan resistance. The French reports from Medine state that Cemo Mamadu
tried to recruit some Futanke, Jawaambe and Fulbe Samburu leaders. All the
reports and oral accounts agree that Cemo Mamadu tried to recruit Futanke
leaders from Amadu’s army.

48. The French reports are the only accounts to identify who exposed Cemo
Mamadu’s activities. Cerno Mamadu probably was trying to include the "peace"
faction of Jomboxo in his coalition. ANM 1E207: Medine, 13 April 1885, Ct.
Medine to Ct. Sup.

49. ANM 1E207: Medine, 13 April 1885, Ct. Medine to Ct. Sup.; ANM 1E54:
Medine, 15 April 1885, "Rapport politique".

50. ANS 15G127: Kita, 17 May 1885, Ct. Kita to Ct. Sup.

51. Bassiru’s activities during the siege of Nioro are not mentioned in any
oral accounts. I draw the data exclusively from French reports. ANM 1E207:
Medine, 19 January, 5 and 13 April, 8 and 18 May 1885, Ct. Medine to Ct. Sup;
ANM 1E54: Medine, 15 April 1885, "Rapport politique"; ANS 15G127: Kita,

271
15 May 1885, Ct. Kita to Ct. Sup.
52. ANM 1E207: Medine, 6 March and 28 April 1885, Ct. Medine to Ct. Sup.

53. The French actively encouraged Daha’s efforts without directly supplying
military supplies or troops. In late March, the eemmuduut at Kita received
letters from Daha of Farabugu and Musa Fatuma, a Soninke leader from
Lambidu, another settlement in southern Karta. Both Daha and Musa asked for
French assistance against Demba Ibrahim. The eemmaudaut responded by
stating that the French would remain neutral in the affair of the Umarians, but
suggested that they act in concert against Demba Ibrahim. ANS 15G127: Kita,
l, 3 and 18 April and 17 May 1885, Ct. Kita to Ct. Sup.

The references to Musa Fatuma’s battle with Demba Ibrahim are ANM
1E207: Medine, 28 April and 18 May 1885, Ct. Medine to Ct. Sup; ANS 15G127:
Kita,

15 May 1885, Ct. Kita to Ct. Sup.

54. ANM 1E207: Medine, 8 May 1885, Ct. Medine to Ct. Sup.

55. ANS 1E207: 18 and 27 May 1885, Ct. Medine to Ct. Sup. ANM 1E54:
Medine, 1 June 1885, "Rapport politique".

56. ANM 1E54: Medine, 10 June 1885, "Notice politique".
57. ANM 1E54: Medine, 17 July 1885, "Notice politique".

58. Amadu Sheku reportedly had the support of less than 20 Futanke notables.
ANS 15G127: Kita, 17 May 1885, Ct. Kita to Ct. Sup.

59. ANM 1E207: Medine, 18 May 1885, "Notice politique sur les demiers
événements du Kaarta rapportée par l’émissaire Mamadou Doucr ". ,

60. Samba Ngumma left the lower valley in April and passed by Bakel in late
May. See, for a description of his caravan by the eemtuaudaut at Bakel, ANS
13Gl85: Bakel,C_the_du_11gisu;e_j9_ut:ua1_de_pg_ste,May, 1885. Abdoul Aziz
Diastllo’ s informants also provide information and perspectives on the ferge of
18 5.

61. Adam, mermmstedgues, p. 117; de Loppinot, "Souvenirsd’ Aguibou",
p. 45; ANM 1E207: Medine, 14 July 1885, "Nouvelles politiques".

62. I collected a lengthy tradition of the battle, recounted by Baedel Diallo
in Nioro on 17 February 1986. Abdoul Aziz Diallo also collected some accounts
of the battle. See his interviews with Mamadou Alfa and Bassiru Alfa Diallo.

See also, for a published account of the battle, Frey, Campagne_dans_le_H_aut;
aeaégal p 102.

63. All the oral accounts refer to an epidemic in the fort. Contemporaneous
French reports also mention the death toll inside the fort. ANM 1E207:
Medine, 16 September 1885, Ct. Medine to Ct. Sup.

272

64. Most of the oral accounts refer to famine in the fort, but only the French
report notes that it was the lack of firewood to cook meals and not the lack of
grain and meat which caused the famine. ANM 1E207: Medine, 16 September
1885, Ct. Medine to Ct. Sup.

CHAPTER TEN

The End of the Umarian Era in Karta

The sense of mission which prompted many Senegambians to join Umar
Tal’s holy war or to migrate to Karta during the late nineteenth century
remains a point of pride among Futanke men and women in contemporary Mali.
They recount the history of the holy war to reaffirm their commitment to Islam
and remind one another that Shaykh Umar will return one day in the future.1
They also celebrate Amadu Sheku’s flight from Karta (hijta) in reaction to the
French conquest of the Western Sudan.2 An Arabic account of Amadu’s last
years focuses on his 11413 as the event which closes the Umarian era with
dignity and purpose.3 The celebration of the hijsa as the final act of the
Umarian drama indicates that, in the memory of the Futanke community of
western Mali, Amadu gained the respect which had eluded him during his thirty
year reign as Commander of the Faithful in Segu and Nioro.

The solidarity expressed in the hijra chronicle contrasts with the
circumstances of Amadu Sheku’s residence in Karta for the half-decade between
Muntaga’s death and the French conquest. Amadu failed to maintain the

Umarian coalition intact as the French advanced on the Umarian territories.

273

274

Futanke resistance, Soninke initiative and political fragmentation in the desert-
side north of Karta contributed to the collapse. French actions also influenced
the course of Umarian history in this era, as they moved more deeply into the
Western Sudan, sought political allies and then launched a direct attack on the
Umarians at Segu and Karta. After the French captured Nioro in 1891, the
French victory and WW Louis Archinard’s direct orders led to
the return of some twenty thousand Futanke to the Senegal valley.

This chapter reviews the history of the final years of Umarian rule in
Karta. The extant historical literature covers this period in considerable detail,

4 The source materials from the late

but largely from a French perspective.
18803 and early 1890s allow for a broader assessment of the collapse of the
Umarian coalition and the Futanke departure from Karta. The French military
collected data about Umarian Karta in preparation for their conquest, and then
produced first-hand accounts of the region during and after their campaigns.
The Kaba J akite Arabic chronicle provides a narrative of the major military
battles of the era, and some of Amadu Sheku’s correspondence from the period
still survives. Oral traditions collected at various points in the twentieth
century also fill in details of the last years of Umarian rule.5 The narrative of
the present chapter highlights the major political events of the WM
hunt; (the era of Amadu Sheku’s residence in Karta) and how the Umarians
came to celebrate Amadu’s hijra from the Western Sudan.

 

At the conclusion of the siege of Nioro, Amadu Sheku could not direct his
attention to fighting the Bambara as he. initially had planned. Local challenges

275

to his authority forced Amadu to consolidate his position before contemplating
an offensive outside of Kartan territory. The most immediate threat to Amadu
Sheku was led by Daha, Amadu’s half-brother who seized control at Farabugu in
1884 and attacked Demba Ibrahim of Jalla during Amadu’s siege of the fort.
Daha’s position in the southern provinces of Karta allowed him to forge an a
powerful coalition among the non-Futanke populations of the region. Another
threat was the Muslim movement led by Mamadu Lamine, a Soninke cleric who
called for the creation of a new Muslim state in the upper Senegal valley.
Lamine attracted Soninke followers from the western regions of Karta and
asserted control over several provinces of Karta in early 1886. Finally, to the
north, succession disputes among desert- side groups led to their withdrawal
from the Umarian coalition in Karta.

After Muntaga’s death, Amadu Sheku did not occupy the fort at Nioro, and
resided instead at Madina, a Futanke settlement south of Nioro.6 During his
residence at Madina, Amadu tried to recruit a Futanke army to fight against
Daha. Despite the threats which accompanied Amadu’s request for recruits,
local Futanke leaders refused to provide many soldiers for his campaign and
forced Amadu to move his residence to Yerere in November 1885.7 Amadu
remained at Yerere, a major Jawara settlement, for several months trying to

8 Most J awara leaders

convince local leaders to join his campaign against Daha.
rejected Amadu’s invitation to join his army out of respect for Muntaga, who
had incorporated Jawara contingents into his armies during the annual military
campaigns of the early 1880s.9 As a result, Amadu Sheku relied on the
Futanke and sefa contingents which had accompanied him from Segu. He also
recruited ferganke from the Senegal valley throughout the late 1880s, and these

migrants formed an important part of his army.10

276

Amadu Sheku received support from the Futanke of J omboxo during this
period. In early 1885, Amadu Moktar and Suleyman Eliman had responded to
Amadu’s initial call for troops, and remained in Nioro during the siege. Amadu
Moktar had played an important role in the drama by exposing Cemo Mamadu
Khayar’s plot to Amadu Sheku. In contrast to Amadu Moktar’s service, Bassiru
had remained in Konyakary and only anived in Nioro under armed guard.
Amadu Sheku rewarded Amadu Moktar for his loyalty by retaining him as the
leader of J omboxo. The Commander of the Faithful sent Amadu Moktar to
Konyakary to recruit a large force of Futanke and join his campaign against
Daha.

Amadu Sheku’s relations with his brothers were strained during this
period. He kept most of them under surveillance in Nioro and allowed them to
leave only under the supervision of a loyal supporter. In contrast to Amadu’s
ability to attract half-brothers such as Muntaga and Bassiru to his side during
the revolt of Habib and Moktar in 1870, the Commander of the Faithful could
not count on the support of any brother as he moved against Daha. Amadu
could not afford to delay in responding to Daha’s challenge, however, because
he needed to counter Mamadu Lamine’s movement in the west, the French move
into the Western Sudan and Bambara actions in Segu and Beledugu. While the
Futanke and Jawara did not provide many men for his army, Amadu did not

wait for a break in relations.11

He set out from Yerere in late February in
expectation that Amadu Moktar and his Futanke recruiters would join him with
additional troops as he marched into southern Karta.12

Daha consolidated his position in the southern provinces of Karta as
Amadu Sheku organized his forces at Yerere.13 Daha led an attack on Jalla

which killed Demba Ibrahim in early 1886 and then inStalled himself at Lambidu,

277
where he deposed a local chief who had remained loyal to Amadu Sheku. Daha
drew most of his supporters from the Soninke communities of the region. He
also tried to recruit the Bambara leader N’To into his coalition. In the process,
Daha lost the support of Malik Samba Sy, the Bundunke leader who resided at
Farabugu, but added the forces of the Fulbe Samburu, whose leader had been
killed by Amadu’s army during the siege of Nioro.14 Hostility to Amadu united
the disparate forces under Daha’s command. Daha emphasized his opposition to
Amadu in an attempt to secure French support for his effort, but they refused
to involve themselves in the struggle. 15

Daha’s actions were less an expression of Futanke desires for autonomy
than an embodiment of Soninke rebellion against Umarian authority. He tapped
the anger over excessive Umarian taxes among the Soninke groups of southern
Karta and organized a movement which challenged the basis of Umarian rule in
the region. Daha’s effort certainly was tied to Muntaga’s suicide: he tried to
avenge his brother’s death and prevent Amadu from claiming victory in Karta,
but Daha’s movement differed from Muntaga’s challenge due to his reliance of
Soninke recruits. Not surprisingly, Daha’s revolt is not enshrined in the
internal traditions of the Futanke. Nor did Amadu’s actions against. his half-
brother Daha inspire the wrath of the Futanke. Amadu responded to Daha’s
challenge as the leader of Umarian Karta instead of the Tal brother who hoped
to create an imperial state. While not all Futanke supported Amadu’s action,
they reserved their criticisms for his treatment of Muntaga.

Amadu Sheku left Yerere with a force of around nine thousand men, and
camped at several points along the way both to give Daha an opportunity to
submit and to wait for additional recruits.16 Daha refused all of Amadu’s
offers and withdrew into the fort at Lambidu. Amadu waited until late April,

278
when he learned that Amadu Moktar of Konyakary had died on his way to meet
him at the head a large force of Futanke from Jomboxo. l7 Amadu delayed no
longer and made preparations for an attack on Lambidu.18 He launched an
offensive against Daha in mid-May and a bloody encounter ensued. Both sides
lost several hundred soldiers in a battle which lasted until the evening. 19 When
the forces stopped for the day, many of Daha’s men deserted him because of

the depletion of military supplies in the fort.20
The next day, Daha and those who remained with him lit what explosives
remained in the fort and committed suicide before Amadu Sheku’s forces could
capture them. Amadu moved into the fort and remained at Lambidu to obtain
the submissions of Soninke from the region before continuing with his forces to

Farabugu.21

He used the ganison to launch raids into the region and receive
delegations of Soninke leaders who submitted to him. Amadu then led a slow
march back to Nioro during which his army raided the communities along the
route. Amadu’s harsh treatment of the populations of the region was meant to
show his power, but it had the effect of reinforcing his image as a brutal
leader and further eroded his position among the Soninke of the south.

Upon his return to Nioro, Amadu Sheku turned immediately to the
challenge presented by Mamadu Lamine. The Soninke cleric was born at
Gunjuru in the upper Senegal valley dming the late 18303, made the hajj to
Mecca in the early 18603, and returned to the Western Sudan in the late
1870s.22 Although Shaykh Umar’s holy war had been an inspiration to him, he
presented a challenge to Umar’s sons. In 1885 Mamadu Lamine returned to the
upper Senegal valley and began to call upon the Soninke of the region to join
him in creating a new Muslim state. He sent Suaybu, his son, to the Umarian

province of Jafunu in early 1886 to rally support in the region.23

279

Mamadu Lamine’s actions threatened both the French and Umarian
positions in the upper Senegal valley. Lamine’s attack of the French post at
Bakel led W Frey to move against the Muslim cleric’s
forces and his supporters in Gidimaxa. Lamine and his men retreated south
toward the Gambia River, but Suaybu remained in J afunu at his base at Gori.
Frey wanted to attack Suaybu, but hesitated from moving further into Umarian
territory because it might disturb relations between the French and Amadu
Sheku. Frey instead obtained an understanding that Amadu would force Suaybu
out of Jafunu while the French moved against Lamine in the south.“ The

following year, the French honored their commitment to fighting Lamine’s

forces, and Cemeudautjupefieur Joseph Gallieni spent most of his campaign in
1887 in pursuit of the Soninke cleric.25

Amadu Sheku tried to obtain a peaceful resolution to the conflict by
asking the Soninke of Jafunu to expel Suaybu from Jafunu. He sent envoys to
Jafunu in mid-June, 1886, asking that the Soninke village chiefs visit Nioro and
reaffirm their submission to the Commander of the Faithful; most refused to
visit Nioro.26 In August, Amadu demanded that the village chiefs of Jafunu
expel Suaybu or send him to Nioro.27 When the chiefs refused this second
request, Amadu decided to march to Gori after the rainy season ended in late
1886. He had not occupied the fort at Nioro for more than a few months
before being forced to meet another challenge to his authorityf Amadu called
for Futanke troops to fight Suaybu, they once again refused and Amadu had to
rely primarily on his Segovian forces and ferganke who continued to anive
from the Senegal valley.28

Before Amadu Sheku mounted his campaign against Suaybu, he appointed

Bassiru the Umarian leader in Konyakary. Amadu was forced by the need for

280

military reinforcements to swallow his anger and ask Bassiru for assistance.
Bassiru received Amadu’s appointment as Amadu Moktar’s replacement in
exchange for his promise that he would recruit an army of Futanke from
Jomboxo for the Jafunu campaign. Bassiru left Nioro in June of 1886 and
arrived in Jafunu with a large force in December.29 Bassiru fought loyally at
Amadu’s side for the remaining years of Umarian control, rewarding his
brother’s decision to trust him despite his behavior during the siege of Nioro.
Amadu’s reappointment of Bassiru as the leader of Jomboxo merely was the first
in a series of decisions to include his brothers in the activities of the Umarian
state despite the fact that they had not supported him during the siege of
Nioro.3O These decisions reflected Amadu’s growing recognition that he alone
did not inspire the Futanke of the region.

In late 1886, Suaybu consolidated his position in Jafunu. He built a
fortress with high walls around his capital at Gori and proclaimed himself the
Almamy of J afunu. Suaybu successfully recruited many supporters from the
communities of Jafunu. One account notes that Suaybu had assembled all the
strong Jafununke men at Gori.31 Amadu Sheku left Nioro in early December
and put Suaybu’s fort under siege at the end of the month.32 His anger with
the challenge was muted by his concern that a direct attack on another Muslim
reformer in an important region would erode solidarity within the Umarian
community. Amadu had attacked Daha because he organized a rebellion among
Soninke communities which did not figure very prominently in the Umarian
coalition. The Soninke provinces of the Xoolimbinne valley, however, were
central to the state, and Amadu moved as cautiously against the Soninke of

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Amadu Sheku surrounded the fort at Gori for several months. Suaybu’s
men kept Amadu’s forces at bay with gunfire and evening attacks during the
months of January and February.33 Amadu did not attack the fort and made
constant appeals for Suaybu to surrender and submit to his authority. game
who arrived in Karta during the siege grew impatient with the siege and raided
some Soninke villages in Jomboxo.34 Some of Amadu’s principal generals also
found the wait to be tiring. When Amadu received word from Nioro of a
possible attack from the Bambara in the south, several of Amadu’s lieutenants
volunteered to go back and defend Nioro. Despite these movements within the
ranks of his soldiers, Amadu bided his time in anticipation that the grain
reserves in the fort would give out and force Suaybu to submit peacefully.

While Amadu followed the strategy which he adopted against Muntaga,
Suaybu took the initiative and attacked Amadu’s forces in late March. The
Soninke killed over 350 Futanke and wounded another seventy.3S Suaybu’s
attack caused many Futanke from Jomboxo who had questioned the wisdom of
Amadu’s siege to make their doubts public. The attack was Suaybu’s effort to
break the siege before his supplies ran out. Shortly thereafter Suaybu and the
Jafununke chiefs in the fort agreed to submit to Amadu. Lamine’s son used the
cover of the Soninke exodus from the fort, however, to escape from Gori. He
marched to a neighboring village and organized a second rebellion against
Amadu’s forces.

Suaybu’s deception angered Amadu Sheku, and he ordered his army to level
the villages of Jafunu. Hundreds of Soninke were killed or taken prisoner,
Suaybu was captured and Amadu eventually ordered the execution of close to
one hundred fifty men. The siege of Gori ended with as meager results for
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great cost to his reputation as a Muslim leader. The Futanke of Kingi and the
Soninke of Jafunu challenged Amadu’s authority, lost on the battlefield but did
not respect the Commander of the Faithful. Additionally, his credibility as a
military leader dissipated since he gained his victories at the cost of several
hundred followers.

Amadu Sheku realized that he governed an uneasy coalition in mid-1887.
He decided to leave Karta and march to Segu, where he planned to reinforce
his position in the middle Niger. He hoped that the We who had provided
support during his recent campaigns would accompany him to Segu. He also
clung to the dream that the Futanke of Karta would join him in Segu. At a
public meeting in Nioro just before the rains fell in June, Amadu Sheku
announced his plans to return to Segu after the harvest.36 Amadu’s rhetoric
called for a united front against the French, and he argued that Segu was the
best location for a stand. 37 The Futanke of Karta again refused to honor
Amadu’s request. Additionally, the recently arrived fergauke also prefen'ed to
remain in Karta. Since Amadu Sheku’s force of Segovians was not sufficiently
strong to make the march by themselves, Amadu needed to recruit an army in
Karta if he wanted to get to Segu. Amadu therefore turned his attention to
consolidating control over Karta in hopes of forcing the Futanke to accept him
as their leader.

Amadu Sheku reorganized the system of command in Kingi by placing loyal
followers in ganisons throughout the Futanke villages which encircled Nioro.38
He required that his soldiers march to Nioro everyday to greet him in the
morning and receive his instructions regarding their duties for the day.39
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qudis at the garrisons were fetgauke or Futanke who had come with Amadu
from Segu: the Futanke of Kingi largely lost access to the institutions of the
Umarian state. Amadu’s plan was to create a rigid framework in which public
dissent with Amadu Sheku’s orders was no longer tolerated. Public beatings
became commonplace outside the gates of the fort at Nioro as a means of
reinforcing Amadu’s rule.

Amadu Sheku’s inner circle in Nioro included counsellors and friends from

41 His most intimate advisors were the two Jeliya brothers, Saydu and

Segu.
Abdulay, who composed praise poetry and led military campaigns for the
Commander of the Faithful.42 Samba Njay was also a long-time friend who
served as Amadu’s host for visiting dignitaries. Baba Wulibu also was a
confidant, whom Amadu entrusted with the responsibility of watching over
Jafunu after the siege of Gori. Finally, Amadu relied on the advice of his sefa
generals, whom he sent on military missions throughout Karta. He had a sofa
general in residence at Konyakary to watch over Bassiru.43 Thus, while Amadu
remained in Karta, he did not seek to integrate local notables into his inner
circle. He even kept distance between himself and the migration leaders who
contributed so valiantly to his military campaigns. Samba Ngumma and Yero
Balel both felt that Amadu Sheku did not take their advice as seriously as he
took the counsel of the Segovian clique.44

In late 1888, Amadu Sheku reiterated his request that the fergapke and
resident Futanke of Karta join him and march to Segu. All groups balked at
the request. The Futanke of Kingi, who had grown tired of the favoritism to
Amadu’s Segovian clique of advisors, responded to his request by asking Amadu

not to join them in prayer at the main mosque at Nioro.45 This action further

chilled relations between Amadu and the Futanke community. Twelve Futanke

 

 

 

- 284
notables from Kingi subsequently approached Amadu with a plan: they would
march to Segu with Amadu if he would withdraw all claims to Karta and agree
to the creation of an autonomous state in the western regions of the conquered
territories.46 In exchange, they proposed that Amadu recognize Agibu as the
leader of the western regions of the Umarian territories. The Futanke who
accompanied Amadu to Segu also expected to return to Karta.

The Futanke proposal expressed an enduring commitment to residence in
Karta and reiterated their desire for autonomy from Amadu Sheku. The
proposal also rekindled the flames of earlier revolts against the Commander of
the Faithful. Additionally, the designation of Agibu as the leader of the state
may have been a statement of their preference for the accommodationist
approach which he adopted toward the French}:7 Less than a year after this
proposal, several of the oldest Futanke residents of Nioro reminded Amadu
Sheku that Umar had specifically instructed them not to attack the French.“8
The Futanke of Kin gi wanted to preserve and protect their new residences in
Karta and feared that Amadu’s approach was too provocative. They may have
felt that Amadu had little of his own to lose in Karta.

Many Futanke from Jomboxo also expressed an accommodationist approach
to the French. The Futanke slave-owners who invested in surplus grain
production continued to sell millet at Medine. Grain statistics do not survive
from this era, so Futanke involvement in the grain trade cannot be quantified.
Amadu Sheku, nevertheless, was aware of their continuing involvement. In mid-
1889, he responded with anger to Futanke protests that they did not have
sufficient grain reserves to support Amadu’s demands by retorting that they
should not have sold it at the market at Medine.49 Amadu’s fears that the
Futanke of Jomboxo were not prepared to fight the French led him to send his

 

 

  
  
  
  
  
   
 
 
  
   
  
   
  
   
  
  
 
  

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- 285
supporters to live in Jomboxo.SO Amadu’s men occupied the villages in the
western areas of the province where they would be in the line of attack if the
French moved out of their Senegal valley headquarters at Kayes.

As the Futanke of Karta distanced themselves from Amadu Sheku’s
leadership, political rivalries in the desert-side north of Karta further
unravelled the Umarian coalition. The death of Ahmad Mahmud, who led the
Mashduff confederation ever since the 1860s, precipitated a bitter succession
dispute among his relatives. In 1884, the year of Ahmad’s death, his son
Muhammad Mahmud succeeded his father as the leader of the Masltduff.51
Ahmad Aly Mahmud, Muhammad’s uncle, however, recruited a sizable following
and challenged the succession.52 Amadu Sheku called on Muhammad for
support during the siege of Nioro and thereby involved himself in the
dispute.53 The dissident faction attacked caravans which passed through the
north of Karta and raided groups which supported his rival. Muhammad was
assassinated during the late 1880s, and the fraction led by Ahmad Aly Mahmud
gained the initiative for the moment. Muhammad Mahmud’s successor, his
brother Moktar Shaykh, decided to turn to the French for support and left the
Umarian coalition as the French moved into Karta in 1890.54

The interests of other African groups in Karta similarly led them to pull
out of the Umarian coalition and accept the French as replacements for their
Futanke overlords. French preparations for the conquest of Karta resembled
Umar’s strategy of the 1850s in that they exploited cleavages in Kartan society
to ensure the neutrality if not the active support of former allies of the ruling
elite. Soninke and Xassonke leaders throughout Karta sent signals to the
French that they would not resist their advance on Karta.55 When the French
eventually marched into Karta in the early 1890s, several local Soninke and

 

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286
Xassonke leaders joined the conquering army as it engaged the Umarian armies
at several battles in Karta.

WW Louis Archinard directed the French conquest of
Karta.56 He launched his conquest from Kayes, the upper Senegal valley post
established by the French in the early 18808. Archinard’s army consisted of
African soldiers (the Walati) who were recruited in Senegambia
and led by French officers. Archinard also recruited Africans from the upper
Senegal valley who would know the terrain and tactics of the Umarians. Among
the upper Senegal valley recruits were Usman Gassi Sy, the Fulbe leader whom
the French recognized as the Almamy of Bundu, and Demba Yamadu Diallo, the
Xassonke leader from the upper Senegal valley;7 Archinard attacked Umarian
Segu before moving against Amadu Sheku in Karta, and claimed a victory in the
middle Niger valley in April, 1890.

w The French victory over Segu reinforced solidarity among the Futanke of
Karta. Reports of Archinard’s treatment of the Futanke of Segu - the
executions, the forced march back to the Senegal valley, the distribution of
wives and children - angered the Futanke of Karta greatly and instilled a will
to fight the French to the death.58 Archinard was unaware of the change in
attitudes among the Futanke of Karta and sent letters to several Nioranke
leaders in May, telling them that he was willing to negotiate with them
separately from Amadu.59 All recipients of the letters refused to respond, and
told the envoy who delivered the letters to address all correspondence to
Amadu Sheku.60 The conflict between Amadu and the Futanke of Karta was
put aside as they prepared for a last stand against the French.

MW Archinard drove his forces against Konyakary in

61

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_ 287

installed Demba Yamadu as the indigenous ruler of the region.62 Many Futanke
fled into the Gidiyumme hills and others moved to Kingi, but a thousand men
remained in the surrounding villages to harass the French at Konyakary.63
Amadu Sheku rallied a large force of Futanke from Kingi to join the forces in
Jomboxo, and led nine thousand men into the province in August.64 The
combined forces of Jomboxo and Kingi mounted an attack on the fort at
Konyakary on September 8th. Although the Futanke fought valiantly, the
initiative did not dislodge the French and cost their forces dearly in lives,
supplies and horses.65 After the attack, the Futanke withdrew from Jomboxo
and reinforced the Umarian garrisons in the upper Xoolimbinne valley.66 In the
wake of this defeat, the Futanke realized that the French advance could not be
stopped, but decided nonetheless to fight to the end.67

Archinard resumed the French advance toward Nioro in early December.
The. Futanke fought valiantly at several battles in the upper Xoolimbinne valley,
where several thousand died trying to slow Archinard’s march to Nioro.68 As
Futanke losses mounted, Amadu Sheku assembled the Futanke army on the Kingi
plateau and communicated his decision to embark on a min to the east.69 He
welcomed all who wanted to join him, but most Futanke chose to remain
behind70 The Futanke allowed Archinard’s forces to occupy the fort at Nioro
without a struggle on the first of January, 1891, as Amadu retreated to the
southeast of N ioro. The main Futanke army camped to the southwest of Nioro,
and attracted Archinard’s forces, which moved against them on January 4th.
Amadu escaped to begin hishfimto the east.

After the battle and Amadu’s departure from Karta, the Futanke army
disbanded. Many soldiers did not want to suffer the humiliation of submitting
to the French and decided to return to the Senegal valley. Among the initial

 

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288

Futanke migrants were several hundred Halaybe who had made the f r i r
some five years earlier. They retreated into the Gidiyumme hills and returned
to Futa Toro by way of the desert-side north of the Senegal valley.71 While
others similarly made their way to the middle valley without submitting to the
French, most remained in Karta because Archinard’s troops closed the routes
between Karta and the Senegal valley.72 Archinard’s move was prompted by his
fear that Futanke from the Senegal valley would migrate to Karta and organize
a revolt against the French. As a result, most Futanke who wanted to return
to the Senegal valley had to submit to Archinard and ask for French approval
to leave Karta.

During the initial weeks of January, the Futanke sent envoys to Nioro to
offer Archinard their submission73 As Archinard received the submissions, he
told his superiors that his first inclination was to order the execution of all
Futanke in Karta, but added that humanitarian and practical concerns stopped
him.74 He decided instead to send the Futanke back ‘to the Senegal valley.
Archinard was unable to issue a general order of expulsion in January, 1891
because it would have jeopardized the French campaign against Abdoul Bokar
Kane in eastern Futa.75 Given the desire to leave Karta among many Futanke,
Archinard merely approved the requests of those who wanted to return and
thereby reduced the number of Futanke in Karta without having to use force.76

Most Futanke who left Karta after the French conquest were migrants who
had arrived in Karta in the 18808 and had not established a large household,
but some of those who left Karta were long-time residents of Jomboxo whom
Archinard prevented from returning to the province. After the conquest of
Jomboxo, most Futanke had fled the province and taken refuge in Kingi or the
Gidiyumme hills. Once Archinard captured the fort at Nioro, he ordered his

 

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289
troops to prevent these emigrants from returning to Jomboxo for fear that the
return of the Futanke would disrupt Demba Yamadu’s attempt to consolidate
power.77 Since these Futanke distrusted Archinard and did not know what he
planned to do with them, many left Karta in early 1891.78 Those who remained
with relatives in Kingi returned to Jomboxo after the relaxation of Archinard’s
policy beginning in 1894.79

In addition to recent migrants and residents of Jomboxo who "volunteered"
to leave in 1891, Archinard expelled nine thousand Futanke from Kingi in 1893.
His decision reflected his policy to send the Futanke back to Futa Toro, but it
also was a response to developments in Kingi. Many Futanke who had decided
to remain in Kingi in 1891 planned to return to the valley once they had
accumulated enough foodstuffs to make the trip to Futa. Their strategy
resembled the actions of fezganlge from the Senegal valley, who often waited
until after a good harvest to make the journey.80 While they resided in Kingi,
however, they came into conflict with Futanke leaders appointed by the French.
These problems led Archinard to expel all the residents living in several
villages in western Kingi.

Before leaving Karta to continue the French conquests in January, 1891,
mm Archinard organized the Futanke who decided to stay in
Kin gi into two administrative districts and designated a leader to collect taxes
and recruit forced labor for the French. He appointed the former Eliman of
Rindiaw to lead the Futanke living in villages to the west of Nioro and Malik
Samba Sy, a member of the ruling house of Bundu, to supervise the Futanke
living in villages to the south of Nioro.81 Many Futanke in Eliman’s district
planned to leave Karta for the Senegal valley if the harvest of 1891 was
abundant.82 Since the primary reason for remaining in Kingi had been to

 

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290

produce grain for the return to Futa, many refused to pay the colonial tax in
grains and complained of Eliman’s abuses.83 Futanke resistance to Eliman’s
authority led the French to depose him in March, 1892.34 Even after the move,
the Futanke still resisted paying taxes and supplying forced labor to the
French.85

W Archinard monitored the situation in Kingi, and
decided to punish the Futanke of western Kingi. When he passed through Nioro
on his way to the Niger River in early February, 1893, Archinard prepared a
list of villages whose leaders he felt were hostile to the French and ordered
them to return to the Senegal valley.86 The residents of the villages had one
week to pack and left under a military escort. Circumstances forced them to
leave many possessions and a considerable quantity of grain behind. The order
also separated many families, and thousands of Futanke applied to move to the
Senegal valley in the months following the expulsion.87 French officials at
Nioro estimated that the region lost close to nine thousand Futanke between
February and June, 1893.88

After 1893, the Futanke community in Karta did not experience any
further populations losses. The French officers whom Archinard left in
command at Nioro after 1893 did not order any additional expulsions because
they felt that the loss of Futanke from Karta to the Senegal valley would
disrupt the economy of the region.89 Additionally, Futanke requests for passes
to move to the Senegal valley declined in frequency until the turn of the
century. Subsequent changes in the population of the region, therefore, fall
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291

Conclusion

The disruption of the French conquest and its aftermath changed the
character of the Futanke presence in Karta. If French estimates of the number
of Futanke who left Karta between the French conquest and 1893 are correct,
then Karta lost close to twenty thousand Futanke settlers. The dislocation
also altered Futanke perceptions of the Umarian era. Instead of emphasizing
the conflicts and revolts, the Futanke chose to celebrate the solidarity which
characterized the movement at its inception and during Amadu Sheku’s last days
in Karta. The history of Shaykh Umar’s holy war and Amadu’s hiiza became
enshrined as the major events of the Umarian era. While this dissertation
draws on oral data regarding other topics and eras, the jihad and mm are the
primary experiences by which Futanke in western Mali define their identity
today.

   

 

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292

Notes

1. The most devout Futanke believe that Shaykh Umar merely disappeared and
did not die at Degembere.

2. Amadu never completed the trip to Mecca, but died on route in northern
Nigeria. See, for the hjjra, David Robinson, "The Umarian emigration of the

late nineteenth century" WM 20
(1987).

3. See, for an English translation of the chronicle, Robinson, "The Umarian
emigration", appendix.

4 Yves Saint-Martin WW (Dakar. 1967); A-S-
Kanya'Forsmcr WWW (Cambfidgc 1969); and

B. O. Oloruntimehin, Wm (London, 1972).

5. Amadu Sheku tried to institute a rigidly reformist Muslim regime in Karta
during the late 18803. Further work with the Arabic and oral materials will
allow for a detailed examination of the era. The present chapter focuses
narrowly on the political collapse and the French expulsion.

6. Amadu Sheku avoided occupying the fort at Nioro to deflect criticism from
himfor the tragic conclusion to the siege. Interview with Amadou Ba of Nioro.

7. ANM 1E207: Medine, 28 January 1886, Ct. Medine to Ct. Sup.

8. According to Blanc’s informants, Amadu stayed at Nioro-Madina one month
and resided at Yerere for over four months. Emile Blane, "Contribution a
l’etude des populations et de l’histoire du Sahel soudanais", W

to out; ‘ l!!" o' 'u" 0i 0'12; -. -.-l_ 7

(1924), p.263.
9. Interview with Amadou Ba of Nioro.

10. Among the recruiters who left for the Senegal valley in late 1885 was the
Eliman Rindiaw, who returned to Futa Toro in December, 1885. The Eliman had
traveled to Segu in 1882 and accompanied Amadu to Nioro in 1884. ANM 1E207:
Medine, 7 December 1885, Ct. Medine to Ct. Sup. See, for reports of Amadu’s
inability to recruit and army in Kingi, ANM 1E207: Medine, 28 February 1886,
Ct. Medine to Ct. Sup.

The migration from the lower and middle valley continued in large numbers
in 1886 and 1887, but began to diminish in volume in 1888 and 1889. See, for
French descriptions of the {ergo of this era, ANS 1D84: Dagana, 6 and 10 June
1886, Ct. Dagana to Director of Internal Affairs; ANF.SOM SEN.I 80b: Saint
Louis, 6 February 1889, Governor to the Minister; and ANS 13641.

11. Amadu Sheku spent over a year at the end of Habib and Moktar’s revolt
in preparation for his campaign against the Bambara at Gemukura.

 

 

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12. ANM 1E207: Medine, 28 February 1886, Ct. Medine to Ct. Cercles.

13. Historical accounts of Daha’s revolt include: E. Blane, "Contribution a

l’étudel". pp 262-266;C010ncl Henri Frey WW
dans le Haut-Niger (Paris, 1888); A. de Loppinot, "Souvenirs d’ Aguibou",
B11 n 0. mi 0' 9.- 0115 ‘ i'I'tjnfi 0.“ lAffi!‘

W 2 (1919); and French correspondence and reports from
Kita and Medine 1n ANS 156126.15G127,1D79 and ANM 1E54 and 115207.

14. See, for Malik Samba Sy’s activities, Blane, "Contribution a l’étude",
p. 262. See, for the Fulbe Samburu, ANM 1E207: Medine, 28 January and 8
February 1886, Ct. Medine to Ct. Sup.

15. The Commandant at Kita encouraged Daha in 1885, but in 1886 the French
concentrated on the activities of Mamadu Lamine and needed Amadu Sheku’s
support in this effort.

16. Blane, "Contribution a l’étude, pp. 263-264.
17. ANM 1E207: Medine, 8 May 1886, Ct. Medine to Ct. Cercles.
18. ANM 113207 : Medine, 11 May 1886, Ct. Medine to Ct. Cercles.

19. Bassirou Alfa Diallo, one of Abdoul Aziz Diallo’ s informants, argued that
the battle at Lambidu was as bloody as the battles fought against the French in
defense of Konyakary and Nioro.

20. This argument appears in the account of Bassirou Alfa Diallo, during his
interview with Abdoul Aziz Diallo.

21. Blane, "Contribution a1’étude", p. 264.

22. See, for Mamadu Lamine’ s activities, Ivan Hrbek, "The early period of
Mahmadu Lamin’ s activitieS".m ' mmmmmmmmmrv. Vol. I.
edited by John Ralph Willis (London, 1979); Humphrey Fisher, "The early life
and pilgrimage of al- -Hajj Muhammad al- Amin the Soninke",,[gnma1_gf_Afijgan
1115th 11 (1970); Daniel Nyambarza, "Le marabout El Hadj Mamadou Lamine
d’apres les archives franeaise", WW 9 (1969) and B. O.
Oloruntimehin, "Muhammad Lamine in Franco-Tukulor relations, 1885-1887",

mmmmmsmotm 4 (1968)

23. Samba Ngumma, whom Amadu had asked to supervise Jafunu during his
campaign against Daha, tried to prevent Suaybu from moving into Gori. ANM
1E207: Medine, 1 May 1886, Ct. Medine to Ct. Cercles.

24. Jacques Méniaud, .- '
Volume 2 (Paris, 1931), p. 349.

25. Joseph Gallieni, .
26. ANM 1E54: Medine, 18 June 1886, "Notice politique".

 

 

 

 

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27. ANM 1E207: Medine, 3 August 1886, Ct. Medine to Ct. Sup.

28. Many ferganke joined Amadu’s armies as he marched to Gori in late 1886
and put Suaybu under siege. See Abdoul Aziz Diallo’s interview with Bassirou
Alfa Diallo at Gavinané. See also Blane, "Contribution a l’étude", p. 298.

29. ANS 1E207: Medine, 15 June 1886, Ct. Medine to Ct. Cercles.

30. Amadu Sheku turned to Murtada in the months that followed to recruit
in the Senegal valley. See, for Murtada’s recruitment activities in
Futa Toro in 1888, David Robinson, We: (Oxford, 1975). p. 150.

31. ANM 1E54: Medine, no date, "Rapport sur la situation politique pendant 1e
mois du fevrier [1887]".

32. ANM 1E207: Medine, 3 December 1886, Ct. Medine to Ct. Cercles.

33. ANM 1E54: Medine, no date, "Rapport sur la situation politique pendant 1e
mois du fevrier [1887]".

34. ANM 1E54: Medine, ,3 _ 5 '
1887.

35. ANM 1E54: Medine. WWW March.
1887.

36. AW 1E54: Medine, "Rapport politique", June, 1887 and Mugged;
eemmneialetpehnqne June. 1887.

37. I do not have contemporaneous evidence for such a statement during this
era, but Amadou Ba of Nioro argued that Amadu Sheku felt this way during the
end of his stay in Nioro (ie, the late 18805).

38. Amadu Sheku authorized mm; to settle in villages vacated by
Muntaga’s supporters in the Nioro region. In some instances, Amadu’s
supporters forced the Futanke to vacate the village. See, for example, the
settlement history of Fosse, as reported in ANM 1D51: Nioro, 22 February
1954, "Etude sur le canton des Peuls Ranga ", compiled by Jacques Tisserant.
In most cases, the fergan_ke and other supporters of Amadu settled in villages
which had been abandoned by Muntaga’s supporters, such as the ,Fulbe Samburu.
See, for example, ANM 1D51: Nioro, 29 September 1954, "Rapport sur les
cantons Foutankés et Kaartankés", compiled by Tisserant. See also, Blane,
"Contribution a l’etude, pp. 297-298.

39. Abdoul Aziz Diallo’s interviews with Mamadou Alfa Diallo of Gavinané.

40. Abdoul Aziz Diallo’s interviews with Bassirou Alfa Diallo and Mamadou
Alfa Diallo at Gavinané; my interviews with Amadou Ba of Nioro; ANM 1D51:
"Notice historique sur la region du Sahel", compiled in 1896 by W de

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41. See, for a description of Amadu Sheku’s inner circle, ANS 15676, Chemise
trois: Kayes, 7 August 1889, "Compte rendu du voyage de Demba Samba"; and
Kayes, 27 December 1889, "Renseignements d’Abdoulaye Sow".

42. Abdulay led the campaign which Amadu sent to assist Demba Ibrahim in

1885. Saydu composed an Arabic chronicle of the Gemukura campaign and

recounted an oral account of the siege of Gori in the early colonial period.

gge, 3ft: the account of the siege of Gori, Blane, "Contribution a l’étude", pp.
5- 1 .

43. ANM 1D108: Konyakary, 1 October 1890, "Diombokho", complied by Ct.
Valentin.

44. ANS 15676, Chemise trois: Kayes, 27 December 1889, "Renseignements
d’Abdoulaye Sow".

45. ANM 1E54: Medine, 22 October 1888, "Rapport sur la situation politique".
46. ANM 1E54: Medine, 22 October 1888, "Rapport sur la situation politique".

47 . Agibu eventually would become the only Tal brother to come to terms with
the French; he received an appointment in the colonial political order and
offered shelter to the members of the Tal family who were dispersed during the
conquest. While the content of Aguibu’s negotiations with the French may not
have been commonly known in late 1888, Agibu’s willingness to deal with the
French stood in contrast to Amadu’s aggressive posture by that time.

48. 'ANS 15676, Chemise trois: Bakel, 23 September 1889, Ct. Bakel to Ct.
Sup. This report was based on the testimony of an informant from Gidimaxa,
who heard the story from a Futanke tax collector.

49. See, for Amadu Sheku’s retort, ANS 15676, Chemise trois: Kita, 2 April
1889, Ct. Kita to Ct. Sup. This report was based on testimony from an African
informant who had been in Nioro. See also ANS 15676, Chemise trois: Kayes,
27 December 1889, "Renseignements d’Abdoulaye Sow".

The grain trade came to a halt in late 1889, not due to Futanke decisions
not to trade but because poor rains kept the harvest below normal.

50. ANS 15676, Chemise trois, Kayes, 4 June 1889, "Renseignements foumis par
Sharif Abdoulrahman a son retour de Nioro."

51. Paul Marty. EndeLsuLUslamJLJeLmhuLdLSeudan Volume 4 (Paris,
1921), pp. 131-134.

52. ANM 1D84: Nema, July 1922, "Les Meschdoufs et leur constitution",
compiled by W Pierret.

53. Frey. WW, pp. 100101.

54. ANM 1D20: Kayes, 7 June 1900, "Introduction a l’étude de la politique
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296

55. The Xassonke leader from Sero, Sega Moriba, communicated the message to
the French. ANS 15678: Sega Moriba to Ct. Sup.

56. See, for an overview of We}: Archinard’s military actions
in the Western Sudan A S Kanya-Forstner. WWW
(Cambridge, 1969), pp. 174ff.

57. Saada Amadu, Usman Gassi’s cousin, received French recognition as the
leader of Bundu in 1886 when Bokar Saada died. Saada Amadu did not meet
French expectations, however, and lost the title to Usman Gassi in 1888.
Usman Gassi first came to the attention of WW Gallieni, who
awarded Gassi the French medal of honor for his military activities during the
French campaign against Mamadu Lamine in 1886-87. Gassi’s rise to power was
due in part to his promises to fight with Archinard. See Gallieni, my;

1 (Paris, 1891),pp 5.5, 130, 324, 357ff;
ANS 1D86: Bakel, 6 November 1886, Lt. Bonaccorsi to Ct. Sup.; ANS 136243:
French translation of Arabic letter from Usman Gassi to Ct. Sup. Archinard
received at Senedubu on 30 October 1888; ANS 136243: French translation of
Arabic letter from Saada Amadu to Ct. Sup. Archinard; ANS lD95: "Rapport de
la campagne, 1888-89".

Demba Yamadu received French recognition as "King of Xasso" in exchange
for his participation in the conquest. The Medine traitam, Momar Jak,
recommended Demba Yamadu to the French official at Medine, who passed the
information to Archinard. ANS lDllO: Medine, n.d., Ct. Medine to Ct. Sup.
Demba Yamadu initially fought on Mamadu Lamine’s side against the French, but
subsequently established a relationship with the W at Medine. ANS
15682: Kayes, 14 November 1888, Chief of Political Affairs to Ct. Sup.

58. Amadou Ba of Nioro argues that the French treatment of the Segovian
Umarian community convinced many Futanke in Karta to fight to the death
against the French.

59. Copies of the Arabic originals can be found in ANS 15679: pieces 120-130.
A French translation of the letter appears in 15676, Chemise deux: piece 54.

60. The Futanke response to the letters is described in a note on the margins
of a copy of one of the letters. ANS 15676: piece 54.

61 . An important but often neglected source for the French conquest of Karta
is W Archinard’s was They provide data
on Archinard’s decisions which the formal reports on the military actions do
not mention. See ANS 1D104, 1D114, 1D115 and 1D143. See also the letters
and telegrams in 1D112, 1D116 and 1D117. See, for Archinard’s reports, 1D105
and 1D119.

62. ANS 1D112: Konyakary, 17 June 1890, "Convention passe avec Yamadou".

63. See, for the withdrawal of the Futanke community from Jomboxo, ANS 104:
Konyakary, 15 and 22 June 1890, entries in Archinard’s W and
ANS 1D112: Konyakary, 19 June 1890, Ct. Konyakary to Ct. Sup. See, for the
military actions of the Futanke who remained in Jomboxo, the weekly reports of
Lieutenant Valentin, the French commandant at Konyakary, in ANS 1D112. Lt.

 

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Valentin served at Konyakary from June to October, 1890.

Archinard tried to win the Futanke of Jomboxo to the French side, but his
attempt failed. See, for a French translation of Archinard’s letter to the
Futanke of Jomboxo, ANS 15681: translation #47 (15 July 1890).

 

64. ANS 1D112: Konyakary, n.d., "Mouvements des troupes d’Ahmadou du 24
Juin au 8 Septembre".

65. ANS 1D112: Konyakary, 11 September 1890, Ct. Konyakary to Ct. Sup.

66. ANM 1D108: Konyakary, 1 October 1890, "Diombokho et itineraires sur
Nioro".

67. Many informants argue that the Futanke knew that the effort against the
French would not succeed, but note with pride that the Futanke wanted to
fight so that they could die as martyrs. Their effort is celebrated in numerous
oral accounts of the battles.

68. The French did not count the numbers of Futanke killed during the
conquest, but their reports often noted that several hundred of soldiers were
left on the each battlefield. Abdoul Aziz Diallo has worked extensively with
Futanke oral traditions regarding the conquest, and suggests that perhaps as
many as five thousand Futanke died in the defense of Karta. Corroborating
evidence of the massive loss of life is the report of a French official which
notes that most of the residents in the Futanke villages in Kingi were women,
gttflcslren and older men. ANM 11360: Nioro, ? January 1893, Cpt. Sensarric to
. up.

69. The exact date of the assembly is difficult to reconstruct from the oral
data. Nevertheless, the decisions made during the meeting are repeated widely
and quite consistently by Futanke informants in contemporary western Mali.

70. Amadu may have discussed with those who remained behind the merits of
remaining in Karta or returning to the Senegal valley. Informants in western
Mali argue that the assembly concluded with Amadu’s approval for the Futanke
attempt to create an enduring presence in Karta. In the Senegal valley,
however, some informants state the Amadu did not approve of the decision to
remaininKarta,andaskedtheFutankeeithertomakethehijmorreturnto
the Senegal valley (personal communication, Mustapha Kane).

71. ANS 1D117: Tambacara, 15 January 1891, Ct. Ruault to Ct. Sup. Archinard.
Mustapha Kane collected a tradition regarding the Halaybe return during his
field research in the Senegal valley in 1985. See, for his discussion of the
return and the "Kartanke problem" in the middle Senegal valley during the early
colonial period, M. Kane, "A History of Fuuta Tooro, 1890-1920: Senegal under
Colonial Rule. The Protectorate", Michigan State University, Ph.D. dissertation,
2 volumes, 1987.

72. ANS 1D114: Nioro, 9 January 1891, entry in Archinard’s '

marches. Some Futanke caravans still were able to pass tluough the French
barrier by moving through Sero. ANS 15678: n.p. (Kayes?), n.d.(4 June 1891?),
Ct. Sup. Archinard to Sega Moriba of Sero.

 

   
  
  
  
     
   
   
  
 
   
   
 
  
 
   
    
   
   
 
 
 
 
   

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73. Some groups sent written submissions to Archinard. See ANS 1D121 and
ANS 15670.

74. ANM 2N36: Nioro, 9 January 1891, Ct. Sup. to the Under-secretary of
State for the Colonies. While Archinard’s dream of exterminating the Futanke
of Karta never came to pass, his officers executed hundreds of Futanke leaders
in the initial months of 1891. In April, 1891, Goannes Barbier witnessed the
execution of several Futanke in Bakel and sent drawings to his sister who lived
in France. Barbier’s drawings and a condemnation of the executions eventually
appeared in several journals in Paris and Bourdeaux. The Barbier drawings are
discussed in several letters in ANF.SOM SOUDAN.II.2.

75. ANM 2N36: Nioro, 9 January 1891, Ct. Sup. to the Under-secretary of
State for the Colonies.

76. Archinard gave any Futanke who wanted to leave Karta a pass to allow
free passage to the Senegal valley. He did not allow anyone to head to the
east. ANS 1D114: Nioro, 18 January 1891, entry in Archinard’s 19mm
marches

77. ANM 2N36: Nioro, 9 January 1891, Ct. Sup. to the Under-secretary of
State of the Colonies. Archinard did approve the return of some Fulbe
herders who had submitted to him prior to the conquest of Kingi. Despite
Archinard’s orders, many Futanke tried to return to Jomboxo, and came into
conflict with Demba Yamadu of Konyakary. The Futanke attempts to return are
described in the W from Nioro for May-July, 1891, in ANM
11360. See, for Archinard’ 3 concern about Demba Yamadu’ s ability to consolidate
power, ANS 15688: summaries of Archinard’s discussions with Demba Yamadu in
Konyakary on 8, 10 and 11 June 1891. ANS 15089: summaries of Archinard’s
discussions with Demba Yamadu in Konyakary on 27 October 1892.

78. ANS 1D114: Nioro, 15 and 19 January 1891, entries in Archinard’s
W. Many also left Kingi in early 1893. ANS 1D143: Nioro, 11
January, 13 and 14 February 1893, entries in Archinard’s Wes.

79. ANS 15092: Nioro, 1 August 1894, Ct. Nioro to Ct. Sup.

80. See my discussion in Chapter Three.

81. The French assumed that all of Malik Samba’s subjects were "Bundunke",
or former residents of Bundu. While a few villages in Malik Samba’s area had
been established by former residents of Bundu in the late 1850s, most subjects
in the region south of Nioro were not originally from Bundu. The French
distinction between the "Futanke" of the west and the "Bundunke" of the south
was a "working misunderstanding" which persisted throughout the colonial era.

82. ANM 1E60: Nioro, 1 October 1891, "Rapport politique".

83. ANM 1E60: Nioro, 1 January 1892, "Rapport politique".

84. ANM 11560: Nioro, 1 April 1892, "Rapport politique".

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299
85. ANM 1E60: Nioro, 1 June and 30 August 1892, "Rapport politique".

86. ANS 1D143: Nioro, 13 and 14 February 1893, entries in Archinard’s
MW; ANM 1E109: Nioro, 15 April 1893, "Renseignements
politiques".

87. Many of the applicants may have been herders who were not in their
villages at the time of the expulsion. ANM 1E60: Nioro, 1 March, 1 April and
1 May 1893, "Rapport politique".

88. ANM 5D15: Nioro, 8 April 1893, Cpt. Sensarric to Ct. Sup.; ANM 113109:
Nioro, 23 September 1893, Ct. Nioro to Ct. Sup.

89. ANM 1E211: Nioro, 4 November 1893, Ct. Nioro to the Acting Ct Sup.

 

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CONCLUSION

Dissent, Revolt and the Umarian Era in Karta

According to the standard historical literature, the French conquest of
Karta in 1891 ended over thirty years of imperial Umarian control as the
"Tukulor Empire" crumbled in the face of the French advance. The rise and
decline of the "Tukulor Empire" is convenient way to summarize the events of
the _late nineteenth century while simultaneously equating the imperial nature of
both the Umarian and French regimes. In this study, however, I make the case
for the autonomy of Umarian Karta within a constellation of Umarian successor
states in the Western Sudan. The continuities which link the Massassi and
Umarian regimes - the Futanke occupation of Karta, the alliances made with
local groups and the military policies of the state - suggest that the Umarian
leadership in Nioro established a successor to the Massassi state in Karta.
Economically, Karta remained outside the cowrie zone which defined the
economies of Segu and Masina. Most importantly, the dissent and revolt which
dominated the political history of the Umarian era in Karta shows that the
Futanke settlers resisted Amadu Sheku’s attempts to assert his imperial

authority over their affairs.

300

 

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301

Late nineteenth century descriptions of a "Tukulor Empire" express the
coincidence of interest among the French in the Senegal valley and Amadu
Sheku. The French aspired to add the riches of the Western Sudan to their
sphere of influence and negotiated several treaties with Amadu Sheku, whom
they described as the imperial ruler of the region. Amadu wanted access to
Saharan salt and European weapons which passed through Karta. and hoped to
recruit the Futanke of the region into his army. Beginning in the late 18603,
Amadu tried to assert control over the leaders of Karta. Historians of the
Umarian past embrace French assessment of Amadu’s imperial status instead of
an internal view of the political struggle because they rely solely on French-
mediated materials. This study breaks from this limited data base by examining
Arabic documents and oral traditions as well as French sources.

The picture of Umarian rule in Karta which emerges from this broad
canvassing of data is one of economic vitality and political competition. In the
first regard, the Umarian era in Karta did not lead to the disruption of
exchanges of goods across the ecological zones of the region as occurred in
Umarian Segu and Masina. The Umarian state in Karta also encouraged the
expansion of the gum trade and other exchanges at the Senegal valley post of
Medine. These economic dimensions of Umarian rule reinforced the multi—ethnic
character of the Umarian coalition in the 1860s. Soninke and Moorish
merchants saw the Umarian successor to the Massassi state as one which shared
their goal of greater integration with the commercial networks of the Senegal
valley and the Western Sudan. While the Massassi tried to promote regional
exchanges during the early nineteenth century, the actions of the Umarian,
Soninke and Moorish groups linked Karta more intimately to regional commercial

networks during the late nineteenth century.

 

 

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302

The economic vitality of Karta encouraged some Futanke groups to invest
in productive activities in Karta. The Futanke who led the conquest of Karta
and remained behind as Umar’s forces headed to Segu in 1859 were poised to
involve themselves in grain production for the market since their booty included
large slave-holdings. Many moved into the economy and supervised plantations
around several Umarian centers. Commercial grain production in the hands of
Futanke landlords emerged most clearly in the area near Konyakary, but a
similar process of embourgeoisement occurred in the region near Nioro. As the
gum and grain trades continued to expand in the late nineteenth century, these
activities became more and more lucrative. In time, Futanke landlords came to
oppose frequent demands for soldiers from the Umarian state.

As these Futanke withdrew from the military, others migrated from the
Senegal valley and took their places in the army. The population influx from
the, Senegal valley reflected both push and pull forces. In the lower Senegal
valley, where the French presence was strongest during the late nineteenth
century, most migrants left because of French policies such as the liberation of
captives and the halting of raids by the Fulbe herders of the region. In the
middle valley, the migrants often left because of resistance to taxes imposed by
the regime in Futa Toro. In both regions, the actions of Umarian recruiters
who arrived with letters from relatives and promises of booty in the "holy
lands" of Karta convinced those who were considering migration to join their
caravans. The arrival of Futanke recruits with desires for material booty filled
the ranks of the Umarian army in Karta. The arrival of large numbers of
Futanke migrants also influenced the course of political events in Karta.

As the Umarian state in Karta emerged as a multi-ethnic coalition under

the leadership of Mustafa Keita, Umar’s appointee as the leader of Umarian

 

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303

Karta, the Futanke community in Karta pressed for representation in the offices
of the state and greater influence over policy. The arrival of migrants added
additional voices to the initial Futanke settlers, and strengthened the resolve of
the Futanke community in Karta. This political activity coincided with the
initiative of Shaykh Umar’s sons - Amadu Sheku, Habib, Moktar and others-
who yearned for greater political power in the conquered territories. Habib and
Moktar’s leadership was attractive to some Futanke, and many rallied behind
them when they arrived in Karta. Amadu Sheku responded to the challenge by
marching to Nioro, and he defeated his brothers. Amadu’s political success was
due to the incorporation of new Senegal valley recruits into his army and the
support of Muntaga, who joined Amadu at a crucial moment in the revolt.

After defeating Moktar and Habib, Amadu Sheku hoped to seize the
political initiative and establish the basis for an imperial Umarian state in
Karta. He appointed agents to collect taxes on the gum and salt trades, and
ordered the Futanke of Karta to accompany him back to Segu. Amadu wanted
to weaken the influence of the Futanke community in the west and to increase
his capital’s attraction to Senegal valley migrants, who usually settled in
Konyakary or Nioro. The local interests of the Futanke in Karta, however, led
them to reject Amadu’s invitation and chastise the Commander of the Faithful
for his imperial ambitions. Most Senegal valley migrants also refused to obey
Amadu’s order. His treatment of Habib and Moktar became a reason for and a
symbol of their resistance to Amadu. In response, Amadu Sheku appointed six
brothers to rule Karta in hopes that their oaths of allegiance to him would lead
eventually to Futanke acceptance of Amadu’s authority over Karta.

In the years after the first revolt and Amadu’s return to Segu in 1873,

further divisions emerged within the Futanke community in Karta. Differences

 

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304

in material interests among those who invested in production and those who
fought in the military became quite pronounced. Resistance to military
recruitment among the former group forced Muntaga, Bassiru and the other Tal
brothers to recruit in the Senegal valley. The arrival of recruits exacerbated
political tensions within the Futanke community, and two factions emerged,
identified internally as the "war" and "peace" camps. The Futanke factions
disagreed on the military policies of the Umarian state and on the appropriate
response to the French, but they agreed on the issue of autonomy from Segu
and Amadu Sheku. Most Futanke in Kingi encouraged Muntaga to resist Amadu
Sheku’s demands and thereby forced Amadu either to concede Karta’s autonomy
or to force them into submission.

Amadu Sheku decided that he needed to meet Muntaga’s challenge and
rally the Futanke under the banner of the Commander of the Faithful. This
decision expressed his desire for Umarian solidarity xii-33d: the French
advance into the interior. Nevertheless, the events surrounding the lengthy
siege of Nioro suggest that, in the minds of most Futanke in Karta, the
external threat was subordinate to the question of Kartan autonomy from Segu.
As the political drama unfolded, Futanke resistance stiffened and Amadu lost
any chance of emerging as an imperial ruler. Amadu was able once again to
bolster his army with recent Senegal valley migrants, and he stayed the tide of
resistance in Karta. His inability to orchestrate a peaceful conclusion to the
political drama, however, left him to deal with other internal challenges without
a firm base of support in Karta. Amadu never returned to Segu, and the
Umarian era concluded without Amadu’s army mounting an offensive against
the French. His resistance to the French was expressed in the hfim to the
east after the fall of Nioro in 1891.

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305

The two revolts reveal interconnections among social, economic, political
and ideological processes. Amadu Sheku’s brothers mounted their succession
challenges in Karta because the continuing influx of Senegal valley migrants
allowed them to recruit soldiers for their armies. Amadu Sheku responded to
the challenges because the Futanke community had created a successful economy
in the west, but their success equally made them rebuff Amadu’s requests that
they move to Segu. The history of the political dissent and revolt shows that
most Futanke in Karta chose to defend their interests in an autonomous state
over their loyalty to Umar’s designated successor. While they did not dispute
Amadu’s claim to the title of Commander of the Faithful, they disagreed as to
the responsibilities associated with it.

Differing understandings of the proper Umarian mission defined the major
political differences which divided the followers of Shaykh Umar after their
leader’s death. Amadu Sheku represented the perspective that Segu was the
focus of Umar’s holy war and that the obligation to wage jihad had never
ended. He spent his life calling for campaigns against the Bambara and the
French, and sought to weave the conquered territories into one imperial Muslim
domain under his leadership as Commander of the Faithful. He rallied the
migrants who continued to leave the Senegal valley for military exploits in
Karta, but never was able to convince these Futanke to move to Segu. Karta
remained the focus of interest for the migrants. Most Futanke who had settled
in Karta during the 18503, too, felt that Karta was their home. They had no
sense of obligation to wage holy war with Amadu Sheku, and resisted his
demands for assistance as they tried to consolidate power in Karta. They
understood their mission as the colonization of a "holy land" where their sons,

daughters and grandchildren could live as Pulaar-speaking Muslims. They

 

 

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306
divided into factions on questions of local military policy, but remained united
on the question of autonomy from Segu and moving residences to the middle
Niger valley.

Karta was the first major Umarian victory and the conquered territory
closest to the Senegal valley. These historical circumstances combined with
Umar’s initial policy of encouraging Futanke settlement in Karta to make this
successor state the most attractive Umarian territory to Futanke migrants and
may have been the most viable successor state of the late nineteenth century.
It clearly was not a province of an imperial state. The accomplishments of
the late nineteenth century are not forgotten by the descendants of the initial
colonists and subsequent migrants. The dissident traditions of Muntaga’s heroic
actions during the siege of Nioro remain an important historical account in the
region.

. Through the tradition of Muntaga’s revolt, the cmrent Futanke community
recognizes the stubborn resolve of their ancestors to remain in Karta against all
challenges. Cemo Hadi, Muntaga’s grandson and religious leader of the Futanke
in western Mali, influences current understandings of past events so that
Muntaga’s death has been transformed into an act which, according to current
understandings of the Muslim tradition, does not deny him a place in paradise.
As events recede further into the past, Muntaga’s actions may undergo further
transformations. The number of days of the siege may be reduced further, and
Muntaga’s death may merge with that of Cemo Mamadu Khayar’s defiance. My
point is not to criticize the transmission of oral traditions but to assert that
dissent and revolt forever will be enshrined in the history of the Umarian
community of the Western Sudan.

    

 

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SOURCES

UNPUBLISHED MATERIALS

DOCUMENTATION IN ARABIC. This section lists the collections of Arabic source
materials consulted for this study. I discuss individual documents in
the text and notes of the dissertation.

Arhiv N'n n

Ancienne Série.
156 62 Correspondance indigene, El Hadji et ses partisans, 1860.
156 63 Correspondance indigene, Kaarta, 1840—83.
156 64 Correspondance indigene, Khasso, 1860-83.
156 68 Correspondance indigene, 1887-90.
156 69 Correspondance indigéne, maures et peulhs, 1888-91.
156 70 Correspondance indigene, cercle de Nioro, 1890-91.
150 71 Correspondance indigéne, 1890-91.
150 76 Correspondance avec les chefs indigenes, 188094.
156 77 Correspondance avec les chefs indigenes, 1880-96.
15G 78 Correspondance avec les chefs indigenes, 1880-96.
156 79 Lettres des chefs indigénes, 1880-96.
156 80 Lettres arabes, 1880-96.
150 81 Correspondance indigéne, 1888-90.
156 82 Correspondance indigene, 1888-90.

Bibliothegue National; de Pan's. The relevant Arabic documents are located

throughout this collection. I have noted in this section only those
dossiers in which lengthy runs of documents occur.

hhnnuwmhlefienunnn andsrknflxa
5484
5559
5561
5640
5680
5689
5713
5716
5717
5721
5737
5740

In ' n ’A ° ' iv i D
Fonds Brevié, Section Futa Toro.

Cahier 10: Tarikh d’El Hadj Omar. Arabic text and French translation.
Cahier 11: Recit sur El Hadj Omar. Arabic text and French translation.

307

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308

COLLECTIONS OF ORAL MATERIALS. This section is organized by collector, and
subsequently by name of informant or location of group interview.

Fonds Oudiary Makan Dantioko of Bamako, Mali. Collected in June 1980.
Djammé Tounkara and Sadio Sakhone at Balle, Mali.

Fonds Abdoul Aziz Diallo of Bamako, Mali. Collected in September 1977.
Oumar Aly Ba at Koriga, Mali.
Amadou Dethié at Mayel, Mali.
Bassirou Alfa Diallo at Gavinané, Mali.
Mamadou Alfa Diallo at Gavinané, Mali.
Demba Sow at Mayel, Mali.
El Hadj Isma Sow at Gavinané, Mali.

Fonds Abdoul Aziz Diallo of Bamako, Mali. Collected in May and June 1979.
Hadja Mandou Dia at Nioro, Mali.
Amadou Boubou Koyel Diallo at Gumbayel, Mali.
Mamadou Alfa Diallo at Gavinané, Mali.
Mamadou Ngaye at Nioro Tougouné, Mali.
Aliou Sow dit Tamake at Leyya, Mali.
El Hadj Isma Sow at Gavinané, Mali.
Mamadou Sow at Gavinané, Mali.
Mamadou Lamine Sy at Gavinané, Mali.
Group interview with village elders at Birou, Mali.
Group interview with village elders at Kolomina, Mali.
Group interview of village elders at Nioro Madina, Mali.

Fonds John Hanson. Collected from January to April 1986.
Amadou Ba at Nioro, Mali.
Bakary Diagouraga at Nioro, Mali.
El Hadj Maeyel Diako at Konyakary, Mali.
Baedel Diallo at Diamveli, Mali.
Thierno Ibrahim Diallo at Nioro, Mali.
El Hadj Amadou Djigué at Gadiaba Kadiel, Mali.
El Hadj Omar Hatta Kaba Jakite at Nioro, Mali.
El Hadj Sadiku Kaba Jakite at Nioro, Mali.
El Hadj Ahmadou Kane at Gadiaba Kadiel, Mali.
Hady Seck at Nioro, Mali.
Yile Sibey at Nioro, Mali.
Abdoul Sy at Nioro Madina, Mali.
Amadou Thierno Hadi Tall at Nioro, Mali.
Bassirou Lamine Tall at Kayes, Mali.
Cheikh Mamadou Tall at Konyakary, Mali.
El Hadj Omar dit Karamokho Tall at Bamako, Mali.
Thierno Hadi Tall at Nioro, Mali.
Thierno Yahya Tall at Konyakary, Mali.

 

 

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309

Group interview with village elders at Batama, Mali.
Group interview with village elders at Gadiaba Diala, Mali.
Group interview with village elders at Korkodjo, Mali.
Group interview with village elders at Nioro Madina, Mali.
Group interview with village elders at Segala, Mali.

Group interview with village elders at Youri, Mali.

Fonds David Robinson. Collected in August and September 1976
Demba Sadio Diallo at Konyakary, Mali.
Bougouboly Alfa Makki Tall at Bandiagara, Mali.
Lamine Bassirou Tall at Kayes, Mali.

DOCUMENTATION IN EUROPEAN LANGUAGES.

Arhiv

'An' ' B Mi.

Sous-serie 1D: Etudes générales, missions, notices et monographies.

1D
1D

4
13

234

Notices sur les Maures du Sénégal et du Soudan, 1895-99.
Notice sur les ordres religieux musulmans et l’islamism au
Soudan.

Notices sur la justice, 1897.

Notice generale sur le Soudan, 1897.

Introduction 1 l’étude de la politique maure au Sahel, 1898-99.
Note sur l’organization du Hodh-Sahel, 1908.

Monographies du cercle de Bafoulabe.

Monographies du cercle de Bamako.

Monographies du cercle de Goumbou.

Monographies du cercle de Kayes.

Monographies du cercle de Kita.

Monographies du cercle dc Medine.

Monographies du cercle de Nioro.

Rapport du Cpt. Mazillier sur le Jomboxo, 1e Sero et les Maures
d’Askeur.

Rapport sur la necessité de donné aux Peuls Toronke du Kingi un
Etat Social, 1905.

Les Meschdoufs et leur constitution, 1922.

Etude sur la marche de Nioro, 1902.

Notice historique sur le Jomboxo-Koniakary, 1890.

Notices geographique, historiques, topographiques et
statistiques du cercle de Nioro, 1902-04.

Mission Baillaud, 1897

Oussourou, droits de passage, 1906-11.

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310

Sous— serie 5D: Recensement.
5D 15 Mouvements de la population, cercle de Nioro, 1893.
5D 18 Recensement de la population du Soudan, 1899.
5D 29 Recensement de la population, cercle de Kayes, 1887-1904.
5D 34 Recensement de la population, cercle de Medine, 1899-1904.
5D 36 Recensement de la population, cercle de Nioro, 1904.
5D 51 Statistiques de la population, Haut-Sénégal-Niger, 1905-13.

Sous-série 1E: Politiques generales.
1E 44 Rapports politiques, Kayes, 1891-1920.
IE 54 Rapports politiques, Medine, 1883-1900.
1E 60 Rapports politiques, Nioro, 1891-1920.
1B 109 Renseignements politiques, Nioro.
1B 140 Etats numeriques des villages de liberté, Medine, 1894-1905.
113 143 Etats numeriques des villages de liberté, Nioro, 1894—1911.
1E 163 Demandes et envois des certificates de liberté, Medine, 1894.
IR 164 Demandes et envois des certificates de liberté, Nioro, 1894-96.
11?. 174 Rapports sur les villages des captifs liberés, Medine.
1E 175 Rapports sur les villages des captifs liberés, Nioro.
1B 201 Affairs politiques, Kayes, 1882-1921.
113 207 Affairs politiques, Medine, 1882-1906.
IR 211 Affairs politiques, Nioro, 1891-1901.

Sous-serie 2E: Politique indigéne.
2E 12 Reclamations pour retourner au Sénégal, 1901-07.
215 61 Notes et fiches de renseignements sur les chefs et notables de
Nioro, 1897-1910.

Sous-série 4E: Politique musulmane.
4E 12 Surveillance, Kayes, 1895-1913.
4E 16 Surveillance, Medine, 1890-1905.
4E 19 Surveillance, Nioro, 1897-1910.

Sous-série 2M: Justice indigéne.
2M 27 Justice indigene, correspondance, Nioro, 1891-1919.
2M 84 Rapport sur le fonctionnement de la justice indigene, Nioro,
1894-1920.

Sous-série 1Q: Affairs economiques.
1Q 4 Commerce, correspondance, Bamako, 1887-1912.
1Q 15 Commerce, correspondance, Kayes, 1890—1912.
1Q 17 Commerce, correspondance, Kita, 1882-1907.
1Q 22 Commerce, correspondance, Medine, 1887-1907.
1Q 24 Commerce, correspondance, Nioro, 1892-1910.
1Q 70 Rapports commerciaux, Medine, 1884-1912.
1Q 74 Rapports commerciaux, Nioro, 1892-1919.

 

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Sous-series 23 et 33: Con'espondances diverses du Gouverneur du Sénégal.

2B
23

3B
3B

35 Affaires politiques generales, 1870-72.
73-78 Rapports de situation politique au Ministére de la Marine et
des Colonies, 1874-91.

75 Instructions de Gouvemeur Faidherbe a Mage.

82 Correspondance avec les arrondissements de Saint Louis et
Bakel, 1861-64.

87 Lettres a divers, 1863-67.

89 Régistre contenant les lettres importantes, 1865-70.

98 Correspondance avec le Commandant Superieur du Haut-Fleuve,
1882-85.

Sous-serie 1D: Affaires militaires.

13 Camps d’observations, 1858-59.

14 Expedition de Guémou contre le prophete El Hadj Omar, 1859.
51 Operations at Bakel, 1886.

55 Colonne Dodds dans le Fouta, 1890-91.

57 Penetration dans le Haut-Fleuve, correspondance.

58 Campagne du Soudan, 1880-81, correspondance.

59 Campagne du Soudan, 1880-81, rapport.

60 Campagne du Soudan, 1880-81, rapport.

62 Campagne du Soudan, 1881-82, correspondance.

64 Campagne du Soudan, 1881-82, rapport.

68 Campagne du Soudan, 1882-83, correspondance.

69 Campagne du Soudan, 1882-83, rapport.

73 Campagne du Soudan, hivernage, 1883, correspondance.

75 Campagne du Soudan, 1883-84, rapport.

79 Campagne du Soudan, hivernage, 1884, correspondance.

8O Campagne du Soudan, 1884-85, colonne contre Amadou Cheikou.
81 Campagne du Soudan, 1884-85, colonne Frey.

87 Historique de la colonne contre Mamadou Lamine, 1886-87.

100 Campagnes du Soudan, 1888-89 et 1889-90, correspondance.

101 Campagne du Soudan, 1889-90, combat de Ouossébougou.

103 Campagne du Soudan, 1889-90, journal de renseignements.

105 Campagne du Soudan, 1889-90, rapport militaire.

112 Campagnes du Soudan, 1889-90 et 1890-91, contre Ahmadou.
113 Campagne du Soudan, 1890-91, colonne Marchand dans le Bakounou.
117 Campagne du Soudan, 1890-91, colonne du Kaarta.

119 Campagne du Soudan, 1890-91, rapport.

121 Campagnes du Soudan, 1890—91 et 1891-92, lettres indigenes.
143 Campagne du Soudan, 1892-93, journal des marches.

158 Colonne du Gidimakha, 1894.

159 Operations divers, 1894.

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312

Sous-série lG: Etudes generales, missions, notices et monographies.

32
45
50
63
224
229
248

289
292
294
298
310
31 1
315

Voyages dc Mage et Quentin a Segou et ailleurs, 1860-70.
Mission Soleillet.

Mission du Haut-Niger.

Notice sur El Hadj Omar.

Notice sur les Maures, 1897.

Coutumiers juridiques, 1897.

Généralites sur les regions du Haut-Sénégal et du Moyen-Niger,
1889-90.

Monographie du Cercle de Dagana.

Monographie du Cercle de Matam.

Monographie du Cercle dc Podor.

Notice sur le Cercle de Bafoulabe.

Monographie sur le Cercle de Kayes.

Monographie sur le Cercle de Kita.

Monographie sur le Cercle de Medine.

Sous-serie 9G: Affaires politiques du Mauretanie.

9G

5

Correspondance des Maures Dowiches, 1853-80.

96 9 Traités avec divers tribus Maures, 1829-1897.
96 39 Lettres arabes sans traductions.

Sous-série 13G: Affaires politiques du Sénégal et Dépendances.
23-26 Situation généraIe du Sénégal, 1848-89.

136
13G
136

130

33
41

Situation politique du fleuve, 1847-85.
Emigration des Peulhs du Fleuve dans le Nioro, 1878, 1885-89.

42-43 Chefferies indigenes, 1861-72, 1881-99.

69

Fiches dc renseignements sur les marabouts, 1912-13.

100-13 Commandant de Dagana, correspondance, 1854-87.

118 Correspondance avec les chefs indigenes du Dimar, 1848-80.
120-35 Commandant de Podor, correspondance 1854-91.

145-46 Commandant d’Aéré, correspondance, 1866-86.

165-75 Commandant de Bakel, correspondance, 1848-80.

181-91 Commandant de Bakel, correspondance, 1881-91.

208-231 Correspondance recu par le Commandant de Bakel, 1860-91.

Sous-série 156: Affaires politiques du Haut-Fleuve et du Soudan.

156

Situation politique du Soudan, 1888-93.
Instruction provisoire, 1891.

Palabres et renseignements politiques, 1891.
Palabres, 1892-93.

Resume des rapports politiques, 1894-96.
Affairs administratives divers, 1893-94.

108-116 Commandant de Medine, correspondance, 1853-1900.
126-8,130-1,141,146 Commandant de Kita, correspondance, 1883-89.
165 Commandant de Nioro (Sahel), correspondance, 1892-98.

 

 

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313

Sous- série K: Esclavage.
K 12 Esclavage et captivité, 1881-92.
K 13 Captivité au Sénégal, 1893-94.
K 14 Captivité au Soudan, 1894.
K 19 Enquete sur la captivité au Soudan, 1904.

Sous-serie Q: Commerce.
Q 23 Traite de la gomme, 1855-81.
Q 25 Commerce, 1881-94.

 

Sous-série SENEGAL ET DEPENDANCES I: Correspondance générale.
SEN I 56 Correspondance de Valiére, 1869-73.
SEN I 58 Correspondance de Valiere, 1873—75.
SEN I 61 Correspondance de Briere de l’Isle, 1876-78.
SEN I 63 Correspondance de Briere dc l’Isle, 1878-81.
SEN I 68-70 Correspondance dc Canard, 1882-84.
SEN I 71-73 Correspondance dc Seignac, 1884~86.

Sous-série SENEGAL ET DEPENDANCES IV: Expansion territoriale.
SEN IV 61 Postes de Fleuve, 1879-95.
SEN IV 64 Dimar, correspondance, 1879-95.
SEN IV 69 Fouta sénégalaise, 1890-93.
SEN IV 70 Boundou, 1888-95.
SEN IV 77-85, 87-91, 93, 95 Soudan, 1882-90.

Sous-série SENEGAL ET DEPENDANCES XIII: Agriculture, commerce et industrie.
SEN XIII 31 Gomme, correspondances divers, 1855-80.
SEN XIII 32 Gomme, correspondances divers, 1881-95.
SEN XIII 40 Commerce du mil.

UNPUBLISHED DISSERTATIONS, THESES AND MANUSCRIPT S.

Ba, Amadou. "Connaissance de la Commune dc Nioro-du-Sahel", (mimeo).

Brown, William. "The Caliphate of Hamdullahi, c.1818-1864", University of
Wisconsin, Madison, Ph.D. dissertation, 1869.

Cissé, Modibo. "Hamdallahi", Ecole Normale Superieur de Bamako, memoire de
maitrise, 1982.

Cissoko, Sékéné-Mody. "Contribution a l’histoire politique des royaumes du
Khasso dans le Haut-Sénégal des origines a la conquete francaise (XVIIe-
1890)", Université de Paris, doctorat d’état, 1979.

Coulibaly, Babacar. "L’Armée toucouleur du jihad omarien a la fin de
l’empire", Université de Dakar, memoire de maitrise, 1978.

 

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nos. 465-467 (1865).
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W Paris 1888
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Curtin, Philip. "The Abolition of the Slave Trade from Senegambia", .in me

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_W, 2 volumes. Madison, 1975.

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12mm, edited by D. Cordell and J. Gregory. Beverly Hills, 1987.

_. "Women in Slavery in the Western Sudan", in W
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"Social and Economic Factors in the Muslim Revolutions in Sene-

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