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This is to certify that the
thesis entitled

Alienation and Ideology:
A Sociological Exercise

presented by

Stefanos Tsekos

has been accepted towards fulfillment
of the requirements for

 

Master degree in Sociology

 

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ALIENATION AND IDEOLOGY:
A SOCIOLOGICAL EXERCISE

BY

Stefanos Tsekos

A THESIS
Submitted to
Michigan State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

Department of Sociology

1988

/ / (/7 .3731“) /

_/

ABSTRACT

ALIENATION AND IDEOLOGY:
A SOCIOLOGICAL EXERCISE

BY

Stefanos Tsekos

This thesis deals with a number of topics, essential
in sociological thinking. Alienation, Anomie, Ideology, and
the role of the sociologist are addressed in a way that
interprets the concepts within a comprehensive and
historical manner. Marx's alienation and Durkheim's anomie
are interpreted in a way that reveals ideology as a common
denominator. The same relation is employed when dealing
with the contemporary conceptualizations, which leads our
argumentation into a most sensitive and crucial area: The

deterioration of sociological thinking.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I wish to express my heartfelt gratitude to Dr. Peter
K. Manning for his inspiration, guidance and encouragement
in completing this thesis. If this work is of value Dr.
Manning owns a great percentage. Also, I would like to
thank Dr._ Marilyn Aronoff whose help has been sincerely
appreciated, and Dr. Vladimir Shlapentokh who assisted me as
part of my committee.
vMy appreciation is also extented to everyone that has
surrounded me during my graduate studies, Fotis, whose help
with the computer was enormous, Kostas, Yiannis, Betsy and
Filippos.

Special thanks go to my roomate Dimitri who during our
living together has elevated our friendship on a rare level
of understanding and respect, to Sofia whose help and
friendship was absolutely essential, and to Paolo who was
the main reason for me coming at M.S.U.. .

I am deeply grateful to my parents Nicholas and
Katerina, and to my aunt Eirene in helping me achieve this
goal.

Finally to Efi, who probably has payed the higher price
concerning my studies, I offer my deepest love and

gratitude.

iii

To the two Nicholas'
The one introduced me to life

The other introduced me to sociology.

iv

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER: PAGE

I. THE PROBLEM OF ALIENATION 1
A. The Character of Alienation 1
B. Alienation as a Diachronical Concept 3

II. THE CLASSICAL APPROACHES 10
A. Marx's Alienation 10
B. Critical Evaluation on Marx's 18

Conceptualizations

C. The Conceptual Transition from

Alienation to Anomie 29

D. Durkheim's Anomie 31

E. Alienation and Anomie as Ideology 35

III. CONTEMPORARY ALIENATION 41
A. Contemporary Conceptualizations 41

B.Typology of the Conceptualizations of

Alienation 44

C. A New Approach 48

D. Sociology and Alienation 49

IV. NOTES 59

BIBLIOGRAPHY 63

I. THE PROBLKH OF ALIENKTION

"Where everything is bad it must be

good to know the worst" F. H. BRADLEY

A. THE CHARACTER OF ALIENATION

Alienation is one of the various sociological concepts
that have evolved throughout social history. In contrast
with the related concept of"anomie' it does not acquire a
uniquely sociological meaning, it pre-existed to sociology,
as defined by the chronology of science, and it has evolved
under various conceptual frames through Greek mythology,
early theology, Christianity, and modern philosophy.[l]
Consequently, any attempt to define alienation, has been
engraved by the experienced reality of each chronological
era and has been locked in the luggage of social inheritance
together with the sovereign ideology of each period.[2]

The purpose of the thesis is derived from the very
character of the concept; it is too useful- it explains in a
way too much: ' If it means that our human feelings and
responses have been in some way estranged from us, alienated

1

2
from us then it does seem to apply to many typical maladies
at our time.” (Gaylord C. LeRoy, The Concept of
Alienation.). Furthermore alienation acquires diachronical
characteristics: ”The history of man could very well be
written as a history of the alienation of man." (Erich
Kahler, The Tower and the Abyss). The purpose of the thesis
is dua1:a. First I will attempt a diachronical
classification of the concept of alienation within specific
parameters of context. In this classification major volume
is occupied by the classics, Marx's alienation and
Durkheim’s anomie. A discussion on ideology will serve as
the common denominator for the dialectical comparison of the
concepts. b. Secondly from a review of the contemporary
interpretation of the concepts, I will argue about the
necessity of recognition for the role of alienation in the
very core of sociological context: The sociological
thinking. Alienation has to be redefined as an internal
affair of sociology. The reflection of the concept in social
affairs is not photographic, is not one dimensional, it is
rather holographic, multidimensional and complex. It
influences both the institutional structure and the critical
sociological enterprise, the view and the viewer, the
subject of analysis and the analyst. It is exactly the
explanatory nature of this relation that necessitates the
intellectual to administer an endocritical approach to the
concept, or what could we call, the psychoanalysis of

sociological thinking.

B. ALIENATION AS A DIACHRONICAL CONCEPT

Certain notions travel through time as belonging in the
nature of reality itself. They become thus part of history,
and have to be viewed as historical aspects, as facts of a
unified process. Alienation is one of the concepts that
usually escapes a diachronical approach from the part of
sociologists, it escapes the categorization of its own
totality. However any totality does not reduce its various
elements to an undifferentiated uniformity [3]. It is
exactly this lack of identity between the various
conceptualizations of alienation that the context itself
opens up for the intellectual.

Alienation, is a liquid notion, suggesting by that a
property of acquiring various shapes and an ability of
transformation and continuous moving. It has to be viewed as
a relational property within various theoretical schemes.
Various modes of relating can lead to various modes of
alienation. \In the first stages of humanity, it expresses
fear and ignorance. In other words, the unknown and the fear
of the unknown. The alienation of that era underlines the
basic animalistic behavior of survival. A need to create a
minimum, though self fulfilling, notion of group and
environment awareness, is of a top priority./ If dinosaurs

had the capability of developing a similar notion, as Italo

4
Calvino suggests in his own version of the Genesis, they
have had to sense their dinosauric alienation when "their
world” turned into an ice cube. [4]

The fear of the unknown, marks as well, the following
alienated era, where the concept has assumed more definite
metaphysical or religious forms. The notion of alienation,
has taken by the ancient Greeks a' positive connotation,
since for the first time in history, life itself is seen and
projected with optimism and happiness, in an absolute
contrast with the civilizations of the Messopotamians,
Egyptians, Babylonians, Assyrians, Phoenicians. The
alienation of the latter cases, is their metaphysical
alienation from their own gods, that reflects on the
irrelevant state of existence for the individual. The
ancient Greeks solved the problem, by creating their Gods as
replicas of the human reality: gods that can love and hate,
can help and save, can cheat and lie, can murder or commit
adultery, can be frightened and often mistake. The Greeks
have created as well, a very important myth, the one of
Prometheus: He has stolen the fire from the gods and gave
its secret to the humans. The internal truth belongs now to
every individual. [5] No matter however of any metaphysical
metaphor we can detect, we have to accept the dramatic
effort of man to explain and solve his exteriority, his
marginality from the powers of the unknown, the truth of the
gods.The Greeks were the first that layed stress on the

reasonable chains of causation. [6] The twelve gods, despite

5

certain moral weaknesses of the Greek democracies, appeared
to be an ingenious way of thinking and doing, which allowed
the creation of a miracle: the classical era. In this semi-
mythological semi-historical era, reason and paganism
constitute the context of what we could call "Promethean
alienation". The estrangement from the reasoning of gods,
that represents the culmination of the Absolute Nature -it
is not accidental that heroes were considered lesser gods-
is the alienating process for man. Reasoning and
metaphysical causation,' whenever reasoning was not self
explanatory moves man closer to his gods, in an effort to
fight against his estrangement. Hence the etymological
meaning of the concepts accepts a contextual variation
within this ”divine-man" relation, ‘within the minimization
of the existential gap. That can offer an explanation as on
why on a certain extent the term in Greek philosophy
assimilates the classic Greek ideas for change and
disturbance as mediated by ecstasy: an ecstatic elevation of
man, not a denial of himself. [7]

The center of the Universe, though, moves away from the
Aegean sea, and new historical conditions sign the rise of
Christianity. Before that, however, we see alienation
appearing as a defined concept in the Roman era. Nathan
Rotenstreich suggests that "alienatio" in Latin has two
meanings. First a denotative legal meaning, and second a
series of metaphoric or psychological meanings, one of which

indicates a loss of sanity,' related probably with the Greek

6
idea of ecstasy and ecstatic elevation. [8]

In the Christian era we can trace the first modern use
of the concept. The context is religious ,/the estrangement
from the divine. Calvin saw man alienated through all time
from God by his original sin: a spiritual death is nothing
else than the alienation of the soul from God;> We can
contrast the modern idea of alienation with earlier
etymological forms. For us though the word etymological, has
to be appreciated beyond its linguistic usefulness. It has
to be interpreted as a imaginative bridge, as a conceptually
evolving chain reaction expressing the historical
subjectivity of any given era. Indeed it would not have made
much sense for Calvin to refer to alienation as a
psychosomatic condition of man, caused by labor relations.
The importance lies not on the acceptability or not of any
given definition, (for that reason no apparent definition
has been used thus far), instead it lies on the mere fact
that an interpretation can be found in any historical
period. It is important to realize, that each and every one
of the interpretations of alienation, has to be appreciated
as illuminating maladies of unique and different social
structures, ideologies and civilizations. Alienation
receives contextual meanings and it is in each context that
is given a specific identity.

Hegel adopted the concept from the pessimist protestant
theology, and he regarded man's history as one of
alienation. The critical difference in the last evolution of

7
the concept, is a radical turn from the metaphysical to the
physical, to history and nature. Hegel recognizes that man
actively constitutes himself in history. He noted such
curious ideas as the fact that humans alone of all the
creatures on earth can take the objective conditions around
them and transform them into a medium of humanity's
subjective development. The very need of philosophy itself
springs from these all embracing conditions in which human
existence has been plunged. The conflict of society
(subject) against nature (object), of idea against reality,
of consciousness against existence, Hegel generalizes into
the conflict between subject and object [9]). The world has
revealed its complexity, and metaphysics, although still
important, yields its urgent anxiety to more obvious
questions, that spring out of pure social relations. Labor
relations become the spinal cord of social evolution and
philosophers redefine alienation on a rejuvenated plateau.
Hegel emphasizes labor as the central human activity, he
identifies alienation as a fundamental human problem and he
conceives dialectically the historical emergence and
eventual transcendence of it. >

For Hegel labor is inherently alienating since it
creates objects external to man and his consciousness. Thus
on the one hand alienation is inevitable in the human
condition and cannot be superseded through institutional
change. On the other hand, alienation can be superseded

within the realm of consciousness by recognizing or

8
designating consciousness as real and objects produced by
labor a mere manifestation of thought.

For Hegel objectification was tautonomous with
alienation. In his "Phenomenology of Mind", the Absolute
Idea, the god of the mind, confronts the subjective
objectification of Nature. Nature itself, according to the
Hegelian dialectic is the antithesis to the Idea and it is
nothing in and for itself: It is merely a concealed and
mysterious embodiment of the Absolute Idea. [10] Feuerbach
adhered the idea, suggesting though that there has been a
miscalculation in the Hegelian Synthesis. Feuerbach pointed
out that this Absolute Idea, was itself nothing but "a thing
of thought", a generalized expression for the thinking
process of real individuals dependent on nature.

Marx pays tribute to Feuerbach for exposing the
religious essence of Hegel's system and thereby
reestablishing the materialistic truth that Nature instead
of being an expression of the Idea, is the real basis for
thought and the ultimate basis for all ideas.

Diderot and Rousseau in their own right had criticized
the alienating social relations in a modern state. Diderot
spelled out the sociopolitical riddle of a modern society by
emphasizing that once man succeeded in his critique of the
"majestry of Heaven", he will not shy away for long from an
assault on the other oppressor of mankind, the "worldly
sovereignty", for these two fall or stand together. Istvan

Meszaros, in "Marx's Theory of Alienation", suggests that

9

Diderot has grasped the problematics of alienation by
indicating as basic contradiction ”the distinction of yours
and mine", the opposition between ”one’s particular utility
and the general good”, and the subordination of the ”general
good to one’s own general goods". Rousseau in ”The Social
Contract" suggests: "Under bad government the equality (of
the people) is only apparent and illusory: it serves only to
keep the pauper in poverty and the rich man in the position
he has usurped. Laws are always of use to those who posses
and harmful to those who have nothing: from which it follows
that the social state is advantageous to men only when all
have something and none too much".

Alienation has retained contextual social meanings in
social history. It is nevertheless Marx's work that moves

the notion into a rigid social context: Labor relations.

II. THE CLASSICAL.APPROACHES TO ALIENATION

A. MARX’S ALIENATION

"It may be said that each person changes himself to the
extent that he changes and modifies the entire complex of
relationships which center in him. From this aspect the real
philosopher is the political person, the active man who
modified his environment, the sum total of his
relations."(A. Gramsi).

To be radical, according to Marx, is to go to the root
of the matter. For man the root is man himself. I would like
to clarify here that within Marx's philosophy we concentrate
on his dealing with alienation. We tried to separate ”the
tree from the forest”, in order to show the historical
nature of the conceptualization of the notion. Thus the vast
volume of Marx's theory bares only relative importance in
our context: if not so, the weight would be unbearable.

Marx inherited a concept of alienation that lacks the
theoretical assumption to follow the dynamic social
evolution as he himself was viewing it. The time for the
latest modification of the concept had arrived. It brought
with it all the ideological dowry of Marx's later major
works, besides the fact that for certain Marxists alienation

10

11
develops an idealistic frame of thought incomprehensible
within the materialism of social clarity.The moment Marx
chooses to criticize Hegel and thus bring "History upside
down", alienation finally fits in the puzzle of labor
theory.[ll]

It was the analysis of Hegel's philosophy of the State,
which led Marx to the conclusion that legal relations as
well as forms of state are to be grasped neither from
themselves not from the so-called general development of the
human mind (Geist-Idea), but rather are rooted in the
material conditions of life (Nature). (Marx, Selected
works,1958).

On a broader epistemological level, Marx criticizes
Hegel for having mistaken the nature of the connection
between objectification and alienation. Fundamental to
Hegel’s idealism is the premise that "thinghood' is the same
as alienated self consciousness and that objectification is
only made possible by human self alienation. The truth, for
Marx, is the other way around. The existence of alienation
presupposes objectification, and is consequent upon the
specific distorted form of objectification, characteristic
of capitalism. [12]]

The notion of a state that governs its members with
(alienating laws,// was already part of political philosophy.
LMarx had already occupied himself with the problems of
alienation, while analyzing the Epicurean philosophy in his

doctoral thesis, and viewing the whole matter as an

12

expression of a historical stage dominated by the
privatization of life, which lead to the notion of isolated
individuality. There is a basic variation between the role
of the individual in the "Polis-State", and the one in the
modern state. Whether the individual could function as a
center , as a social atom, in an ancient era, it is no
longer the case. The historical tendency is said to give
vise to the 'self— centered" modern state, whose center of
gravity was discovered within the state ‘itself and is thus
the natural condition of "isolated individuality". [13]

Marx, in his critique of the Hegelian Philosophy of
Right, discusses: ”The present condition of society
displays its difference from the earlier state of civil
society in that -in contrast to the past- it does not
intergrade the individual within its community. It depends
partly on change, partly on the individual's effort etc.
whether or not he holds on to his estate: to an estate
which, again determines the individual merely externally.
For his station is not inherent in the individual's labor,
nor does it relate itself to him as an objective community,
organized in accordance with constant laws and maintaining a
permanent relationship to him...KThe principle of the
bourgeois estate- or the bourgeois society- is enjoyment and
the ability to enjoy.) In a political sense the member of
bourgeois society detaches himself from his estate, his real
private position: It is only here that his characteristic of

being human assumes its significance, or that his

13

determination,...,as a communal being appears as his human
determination. For all his other determinations appear in
bourgeois society as inessential for man, for the
individual, as merely external determinations which may be
necessary for his existence in a whole, but they constitute
a lie which he can just as well cast away. The present
bourgeois society is the consistent realization of the
principle of individualism: individual existence is the
ultimate end: activity, labor, content etc. are only
means......The real man is the private individual of present
day political constitution.....Not only is the estate
founded on the division of society as its ruling law, it
also divorces man from his universal being: it turns him
into an animal that directly coincides with his
determination. The middle Ages constitute the animal history
of mankind, its Zoology. The modern Age, our civilization
commits the opposite error. It divorces man his objective
being as something merely external and material." (Marx,
1844). [14] ‘

It is useful to stress here that Marx believes in the
good nature of human beings, hence the explanation f or the
development of conflict and the destruction of harmony, has
to be found in external factors. Alienation is due to a
particular mode of production which turn all natural and
rational relations upside-down .CIt can be called therefore,
the unconscious condition of mankind. )Productive activity is

‘the mediator in the subject-object relation between man and

14

nature. Productive activity is hence the source of human
consciousness. Under a bourgeois state, productive activity
is mediated by the institutions of the self-centered state
and thus it cannot bring the fulfillment which is supposed
to bring to the individual. ”Alienated consciousness" is the
reflection of alienated activity or of the alienation of
activity. uman alienation was accomplished through turning
everything into alienable, saleable objects. Selling is the
practice of alienation. Just as man, so long as he is
engrossed in religion, can only objectify his essence by an
alien and fantastic being: So under the sway of egoistic
need, he can only affirm himself and produce objects in
practice by subordinating his products and his own activity
to the determination of an alien entity, and by attributing
to them the significance of an alien entity namely money.
Alienation is characterized by the universal extension of
"saleability”(the transformation of everything into
commodity). (Marx 1844).

In the "Economic and Philosophic manuscripts of 1844,
Marx uses the terms "entrfemdung"(alienation or
estrangement), and ”entausserung' (externalization or
alienation). Allen Wood suggests that the terms evoke
images: they suggest the separation of things which
naturally belong together, or the establishment of some
relation, or indifference, or hostility between things that
are properly in harmony. For Marx it is the socioeconomic

circumstances and institutions under which labor occurs and

15
objects are produced, not the production of objects per se,
which generate alienation. Institutional conditions created
or intensified by capitalism, interpose themselves between
man and nature, man and his productive activity, and among
men, with alienating consequences, alienated man, alienated
productive activity and alienated nature.

writing about alienation in bourgeois society, Marx
traces the condition to the nature of the work process, to
the way, under the conditions of private ownership, work
ceases to be the expression of the creative powers of the
worker. Furthermore, Marx traces the condition to the way
the objects man create acquire an independent power and rule
over him. He shows how man is impoverished in a society
where it does not belong to his essential being, where in
his work man does not affirm himself but denies himself,
does not feel content but unhappy, does not develop freely
his physical and mental energy but mortifies his body and
mine his mind. Labor is therefore not a satisfaction of a
need: it is merely a means to satisfy needs external to it.
Its alien character emerges clearly in the fact that as soon
as no physical compulsion exists, labor is shunned under the
plague.

As we can see, Marx depicted alienation as the essence
of the capitalist order. Private property is therefore the
product, the necessary result, of alienated labor, of the
external relation of the worker to nature and to himself.

The roots of alienation, Marx suggests, lie not in

16
industrialism but in private ownership of the means of
production. Private ownership brings about the condition of
alienation, first because work under these conditions serves
neither the interest of the worker (except as means of
earning his wage), nor the interest of a society in which
the worker feels that he has a stake: it serves merely the
profit of the owner. Work under these conditions ceases to
be a means through which the worker expresses his human or
creative power: instead it becomes enslaved labor. Second,
under these conditions, the worker falls victim to forces
that he can neither control nor even understand. Objects
that man produces become an independent power rulling over
him, and they confront him as something alien, as a power
independent of the producer. The more the worker spends
himself the more powerful the alien objective world becomes,
which he creates over against himself: the poorer he becomes
the less he belongs to him as a own. We can depict the
similarity with what Freuerbarch suggested about
religion:"The more man puts into God the more he refrains
himself". Alienation comes about because the objects man has
created come to rule him in the development of the
capitalistic market. He ceases to have the feeling of
creating for use and is ignorant of the reasons for the rise
and fall of demand for his products of labor. The laborer
exists for the process of production and not the process of
production for the laborer. Alienated man experiences

himself not as an agent but as a patient, not as a creator

l7 \
but creature , not as self determined but other determined.)
The products of man's labor were transformed into an
objective power above him, growing out of control, thwarting
his expectations, bringing to naught his calculations.
Because man was alienated from the product of his labor,
man also became alienated from other men. This
estrangement, from the human essence, leads to an
"existential egotism", or as Marx states it, "man becomes
alienated from his own body, external nature, mental life,
and his human life. Under capitalism the wage worker is
treated, not as a fellow human being, but as a mechanism
useful for the production of surplus value. He is a prisoner
with a life time sentence to hard labor”. (Marx, 1844). [15]
Marx's alienation is considered to be a utopian concept
of the left. It is formulated within a tradition of
naturalistic and historical immanence, it represents an
attempt to put the ideas of German Idealism and the
Enlightenment within a tradition of scientific and
historical research. [16] Preoccupied with the nature of
change Marx a. Denied the artificial dualism of man-society,
b. he suggested that society as a product of man’s labor is
an extension of man's own nature c. Reification of man's
objects leds to the alienation of man from his self
activity, his products, nature, fellow humans and himself d.
Alienation is viewed as a historical state which will be
overcome as man reaches an autonomous and self-contained

existence. Communism is the historical context where man can

18

ultimately discover his freedom.

B. A CRITICAL EVALUATION ON HARX’S CONCEPTUALIZATION

Apparently, Marx's thought has shaped the way of
thinking in our century. Capitalism has been scrutinized,
rationalized, valued, moralized and demoralized, contemned,
justified, cursed, praised and survived. Socialism on the
other hand has experienCed almost incomprehensible
difficulties in maturing, from a theoretical framework to
an applicable system, in the countries that was, forcefully
or not, adopted. That mere fact has driven modern social
thinkers in an effort to conceive human nature in a more
ordered fashion.

In that tradition of "Marxism after Marx" we should
include a. the psychoanalytical approach of Fromm (The Sane
Society) and Reich, b. the radical reformulation of concepts
such as class struggle, the dictatorship of the proletariat,
the function of the state by G. Lukacs, K. Korsch, A.
Gramsci, c. the critical theory of the Frankfurt school
interpreting the impact of psychoanalysis and fascism and
the role of culture (aesthetics), with Adorno, Horkheimer,
Marcuse, Habermas, d. the existentialism Marxism, Sartre,

Garandy, ~ Lefevre, Axelos, e. Structuralism Marxism,

l9
Althusser, Balibar, Poulantzas, f. the ”New Left" in the
U.S., with the second face of the Frankfurt school, Marcuse,
C.W.Mills and g.the third world marxism, Mao and Ho Chi
Minh. [17]

Bertell Ollman, perhaps the leading modern interpretor
of Marx,in ” Alienation, Marx’s Conception of Man in
Capitalist Society”, addresses a certain point that for us
stands as a crusial element in the overall structure of
Marx's thought. Ollman states: "Human nature was an
important topic when he (Marx) wanted to put his own house
in order, but he hesitated to give it the same prominence
when his purpose was to explain his views and to convince
others". Ollman believes thatthe cause for that can be found
in Marx's effort to confront socialist thinkers as
Feuerbach, Stirner, Krieg who favored expressions like
"human nature", "humanity" and "man in general”. One cannot
avoid however, thinking that the essence of an ongoing
"ubnormal' situation, -alienation-, has an enormous
relationship with human nature.

Have we viewed alienation as rooted in socioeconomic
institutions, rather than in the inevitable nature of human
conditions, we can suggest that a process of disalienation
is in principle possible, given an appropriate development
of society's productive forces. For Marx, propertylessnes
and powelessness, estrangement and alienation from product,
from activity, from self, from species being and from

nature, can be overcomed and in a more revolutionary sense,

20

have to be and will eventually overcomed. Since the reasons
for the existence of the phenomenon are rooted in the
capitalist state, the effacing of capitalism and Bourgeois
society is the first step for humans to free themselves from
the restrains. The proletariat by taking over the power, it
will eventually liquidate any other class, and at the same
time by creating a classless society, it will be able to
erase the existing ideology of the state, to destroy the
rotten structure of society, to create new values.

Since it is society that corrupts man, the dictatorship
of proletariat will lead to the socialistic state that will
socialize the people on a basis of equality, fairness and
the right to happiness. It will moreover, free man from the
necessity of the state, since the collective interest will
be identified with the well being at the individual, and the
state eventually will dissapear, creating thus a communist
society on the basis of anarchy. (the term used here with
its etymological sense from the Greek word anarchia meaning
no-rule). It is however wrong to suggest that
nationalization of the means of production and the abolition
of the capitalist class would eliminate all forms of
alienation. History suggests that this is not the case.
Marcuse is correct (in reflecting socialist reality) in
saying that as long as wealth is measured in terms of labor
time, itself a function of the division of labor, alienation
will exist. [18]

Marx’s belief, that it is possible under a different

21

set of relationship in the superstructure, to develop a
society where all present features of alienation should
dissapear, in the first place does not answer the obvious
question "what is the state of non-alienation?", and second
implies "historical“ predestination” in a religious sense.
Marx has criticized Proudhon, in that by deciding to work
with capitalist categories, cannot completely disassociate
himself from the "truth" which these categories contain.

Marx himself has fallen in this trap by structuring
socialism. In the "Critique of political economy" he writes:
”In the study of economic categories, as in the case of
every historical and social science, it must be borne in
mind that as in reality so in our mind the subject is given
and that the categories are therefore but forms of
expression, manifestations of existence, and frequently but
one-sided aspects of this subject, this definite society."
Ollman suggests that "this distinction between subject and
categories is simple recognition of the fact that our
knowledge of the real world is mediated through the
contstraction of consepts in which to think about it: our
contact with reality, in so far as become aware of it, is
contact with a conceptualized reality". (Ollman, 1976). [19]

The moment that Marx realizes the relation between
concept and subject, a construction of a conceptual reality
based on a structure hypothetical and religiously
predetermined, becomes purely ideological. If Marx was

correct, by readjusting the Hegelian relation of "Idea" and

22

"Nature”, he was mistaken in designating once again, the
"Idea" as a basis of a non-alienated society. Such a social
development brings in mind the Calvinian relation of
alienated man and the internal truth of God: man will find
his lost Paradise, as a historical necessity. Consequently
the conceptualization of the future objective reality, is
based on the subjectification of thoughts and their
interelation with nature, distilled under a particular
ideological union.

Furthermore, the assumption of the good nature of man,
cannot be, at least sociologicaly, proven. Marx attributes
to man certain powers, which he divides into natural and
species, and maintains that each of these powers is
reflected in one's consciousness by a corresponding need.
The individual feels needs for whatever is necessary to
‘ realize his powers. The objects of nature including other
men, provide the matter through which these powers are
realized and consequently for which needs are feltht is
historically apparent that an equilibrium between individual
needs and social existence has not been fulfilled. Hence a
future hypothesis is not based on evidence but rather on
ideology.

Ollman however makes a clear distinction:"Evidence,
actual or potential, can be used to help solve any problem
except how this same evidence should be viewed" hence the
difference between theory as interpretation and theory as
hypothesis like all philosophy which concerns itself with

 

23

organizing reality, with interpetation, the value of these
theories must be measured by utility rather than truth
(unless of course, the two are equated). It is in this sense
that ' philosophical systems are never exploded, but
instead, like styles of clothing, simply go out of fashion,
usually because other interpetations are found more useful
or because the group whose interest these ideas serve itself
disappears" (Ollman, 1976). [20].

Our purpose, as stated, is to acclaim a critical
review of Marx's thought. Marx himself believed that with
the development and/or discovery of each new social reality,
our view of what is humanly possible had to be extended,
revised and altered. Ideology and, through ideology, the
diachronical transformation of concepts, serve exactly that
direction. Concepts like good and bad. moral and immoral,
freedom and enslavement, reshape their meanings in
accordance with existing reality, or, if you prefer, with
the conceptualization of reality into meaningful and useful
relations. The meaning assigned in every relation produces
the notion of subjective reality, which in turn, through the
transcendence of ideology, and mass consensus, becomes
objective reality for the individual and battleground for
the philosopher and their social thinker. Understanding
society, means primarily to uncover its sacred ideological
shield, which in the final analysis is the one that creates
the enormous human rosary of values, norms and beliefs.[21]

Alienation, acquires the same characterstics as any

24

other concept: usefulness and explanatory power. It is
essential to realize, that it is not a matter of true or
false, right or wrong, accuracy or misconceptions when we
compare conceptual interpetations. Alienation has the same
validity, viewed in either the Calvinian tradition in it’s
respective era, or in the Marxist one today. Our seemingly
stronger interest in Marx, is due to the contemporary
essence of his ideas and to the comprehensive, historically,
character of his concepts. We do not pretent that our aim is
to discover the real meaning of the concept redefining Marx.
It is time however, to introduce the concept to a new state
of affairs. Such an introduction coincides with the
dialectic view that what is humanly possible has to be
extented, revised and altered.

The first idea has to do with the relativity of
happiness. From Plato to Judaism and from Christianity to
Marxism, ideologies are promising Heaven.(rIn other terms
they are promising a state of affairs within which humans
will discover the real meaning of life, hence they will
discover happiness. The problem with that idea is that
happiness is attributed an absolute value, a quality that
exists in a natural way, and humanity under given conditions
can reach out and grab it.2 The structure of human happiness
is a link in the chain of eing, predefined, predetermined
and assumed within the state of a social or metaphysical
environment. The exact idea of the heavenly kingdom espoused

by the Christians, as the concept of absolute happiness, is

25
the metaphysical image of the earthly heaven of communism,
adopted by the Marxists. The overcoming of the ubnormal
condition of alienation has to lead humanity, according to
Marx, to the happiness capsule, to the ideal society.

Happiness, however, cannot acquire absolute values. It
is as relative as truth, freedom or love. J.P. Sartre
excluded in his apartment, under German occupation, being
stripped off the basic elements of human freedom, has
suggested that he had never felt that free in his whole
life. What he ment was, that by unleashing the power of his
imagination, the power of the Idea (Hegel), (he was able to
create his own world where no oppression could border his
freedom.)Although this idea parts company with common sense,
it still indicates that vague concepts like freedom are
indeed relative.[22]

In our world, organic solidarity has determined the
interconnecting links of the social ”things" not within
universal measures, but rather through redefinitions of
manifestations within separate realities.§@he manifestation
of happiness is defined through the characteristics of
natural and social variables.) The happiness that is derived
from the_ existence of nucl ar family for a middle class
westerner, does not exist for an arab seikh, or a homosexual
teenager. Even under the same cultural background, age
barriers redefine happiness. Old people, in any given
society, should be miserable if they were supposed to derive

happiness within a system of activities that are no longer

26

able to cope with. Happiness has to be redefined for them.

Since men are compelled to impose a meaningful order
upon reality, as long as reality changes, modifications of
this order have to follow. Whenever the order reaches a
point that can accept no modifications, as history has
shown, society has to switch towards a fundamental change of
practicing life. Even if though, a social change reaches the
margin of the absolute, it cannot be, despite its
pretentions, the ultimate one, since society cannot survive
on a static level. Who can prove that the ideal happiness of
today, would still represent the same value-in satisfaction
and fulfillment- for the individual in a future state of
affairs? Happiness is like the Chimaera the ancient monster
that was so valuable because no one could ever posses it. No
ideology can promise happiness because no ideology can
escape happiness's relative existence: no ideology can
succesfully submit humanity under an artificial paradise.

Even the most severe and extreme socialization process
cannot ultimately suppress human individuality, or at least
it cannot practice it and expect a sane citizen. Berger and
Luckman suggest that social order transforms a biologically
given world openess (to humans by birth) into a socially
given world closedness. Thus the process of transformation
from a plastic to a formed nature is simoultaneously a
process of ordering. Even though, however, an ordering is
useful for the functioning of the individual in society, we

cannot be thrilled with the idea of a confrontation of our

 

27
social existence with our human nature. Ideologies are
deriving their absolute values for individual life through
their interpretation of social reality. Alienation theory,
besides its materialistic base cannot escape its utopian
character, since it prophesizes a social state where human
relativity is irrelevant.

A second point that develops a number of thoughts, is
the unconsciencious process that creates the alienated man.
(The concept of alienation suggest a step by step development
~of the state of alienation: a human being alienated from
nature, from fellow men, Hfrom himself.) In a historical
perspective of the capitalist evolution the process, indeed,
makes much sense. It is questionable though, if the same
procedure can be accounted for every individual of today. A
new born individual is not introduced in his societal
environment experiencing freely his habitat. The knowledge
(s)he is deriving, aims to his or her adaptation to the
given environment, and the socialization process is imposed
on him or her by a surrounding that conscienciously accepts
values, norms, beliefs, the whole ideological spectrum, the
whole construction of objective reality that exists in any
given state of relations:\
Consequently the socialized individual does not go
through the steps suggested by Marx.jf(S)He experiences a
knowledge of a world prearranged for hi , external to him,

and persistent in its reality. It is socialization that

creates the alienated individual, hence it is socialization

 

 

28
that is alienation, and humans, each and every one despite
their unique experience, are alienated long before they are
able to comprehent labor relations.)

If however, the objective reality of the individual is
alienated, as long as it remains a reality there is no way
of identifying its alienated nature, since there is nothing
external suggesting ”ubnormality". (For the societal member
the alienating ‘values do not represent an ubnormal force
.that (s)he has to negate. On the contrary is (the only
reality that can offer him the feeling of belonging and a
relative happiness. When you consciously believe that object
x and/or relation y is "good”, it is highly unlikely that
your unconscious ness would experience it as "bad”. In that
sense the unconscious process of alienation cannot be
applied to present capitalist (or socialist) reality.
Alienation is not any longer an unconscious, ubnormal state
of affairs: it is actually a conscious normal objective
reality. ("Norma1" is used not as representing a positive
state of affairs, it is rather used in opposing metaphysical
agonies and excuses). W

Herbert Read in his own area, Art, discussing art and
alienation, (although, unfortunately, Aesthetics and
Sociology rarely overlap), emphasizes a structural_
difference between the alienated artist of the nineteenth
century and the modern artist. Never before, he suggests, in
the history of our Western world has the divorce between man

and nature, man and his fellow man, between individual man

29

and his "self-hood" been so complete. We now recognize that
not Capitalism alone, but the whole character and scope of a
technological civilization is involved. To change the world,
meaning the prevailing economic system, is not enough. The
fragmented psyche ‘must be reconstituted, and only the
creative therapy we call art offers that possibility. (H.
Read, 1967, Art and Alienation, the Role of the Artist in
Society).

As sociologists ,we cannot be thrilled with Read's
proposed solution, however the problem in a final solution
is stated in an accurate way: Our fragmented psyche has to

be reconstructed.

C. THE CONCEPTUAL TRANSITION FROM ALIENATION TO ANOHIE

The fact that Marx's alienation castrates capitalism,
if universally accepted, leads us to search for another
transformation of the same old idea, that could exist
without threatening the status quo, however satisfying the
human need for critisism and explanation. Interestingly
enough, Marx uses, while discussing alienation, another
term: " What is left of the individual after all these
cleavages have occured is a mere rump, a lowest common
denominatior attained by looping off all those qualities on
which is based his claim to recognition as a man. Thus

denuded, the alienated person has become an abstraction".

30

(Marx, 1844). As we saw this is a broader term Marx uses to
refer to any factor which appears isolated from the social
whole. At it’s simplest, "abstraction" refers to the type of
purity that is achieved in emptiness. Its opposite is a set
of meaningful particulars by which people know something to
be one of a kind. Given that these particulars involve
internal relations with other factors, any factor is
recognized as one of kind to the degree that the social
whole finds expression in it. It is because we do not grasp
the ways in which the social whole is present in any factor
(which is to say, the full range of its particular qualities
in their internal relation) that this factor seems to be
independent of the social whole, that it becomes an
abstraction. [24]

A second interesting point is derived by Engels, while
justifying Marx's inconsistent terminology, in the preface
of ”Capital". We are not expect to find "fixed, cut-to-
measure, once and for all aplicable definitions in Marx's
works. It is self-evident that mere things and their
interrelations are conceived, not as fixed, but as changing,
their mental images, the ideas, are likewise subject to
change and transforamtion, and they are not encapsulated in
rigid definitions, but are developed in their historical or
logical process of formulation”. Marx examines things and
their interrelations. Both abstraction and the
conceptualization of social facts as things, are important

not only for their role in the theory of alienation, but

31
also because they are part of another significant
intellectual (see ideological) framework of social thinking.

The one of Durkheim and his concept of "anomie".

D. DURKHEIH’S ANOHIE

Anomie lies in the ideological antipodes of alienation.
For as is a sign of our times. As an intelectual product we
consider it to be the twin brother (or sister if you may) of
alienation. Whereas Marx was interested in problems of power
and change Durkheim was interested in problems of the
maintenance of order. Consequently the concept of alienation
finds in the Durkheimian formulation a new identity : the
one of anomie. Durkheim has probably adopted the term from
Guyau when reviewing ”L' irreligion de l'avenir'. Guyau uses
the term "religious anomie” in a sense close to Durkheim’s
"the cult of the individual". [25] For Durkheim the cult
of the individual is the moral counterpart to the growth of
the division of labor, and it is possible because of the
secularisation of most sectors of social life. Durkheim uses
the term "anomie" in a broader sense. He does not assign to
anomie a simple operational definition on either a purely
psychological or sociological level. In simple terms social
problems result from and promote anomie. Anomie means system
imbalance of social disorganization - a lack of or a break

down in social organization reflected in weakened social

 

 

32
control, inadequate institutionalization of goals,
inadequate means to achieve system goals, inadequate
socialization, etc. At a social psychological level of
analysis, anomie results in the failure of individuals to
meet the maintenance needs of the social system.

k Society is viewed by Durkheim as controlling
individuals primarily through the ”moral power" of the
social environment. Such moral power is invested in the
“moral consciousness of societies”, their "moral structure"
their "moral constitution" or more concretely, the common
ideas, beliefs, customs and tendencies of societies.x}
Externalized in part in legal codes embodying swift
sunctions for his behavior, outnumbering him in the form of
public opinion and preceding him as traditions in which he
himself is socialized this moral power bears down on the
individual who is seen as a ”spark" in the "collective
current". Certain states of this moral constitution or moral
structure approximate pure types which in the extreme,
constitute social conditions predisposing individuals to
suicide. [26] Anomic suicide derives from the lack of moral
regulation, a particular characteristic of major sectors of
modern industry. [27].

Anomie is a pathological phenomenon. It is endemic in
modern economic life. The economy traditionally restrained
by the moral codes of church, state or guild, now dominates
as the realm of unrestrained self-interest, or even class-

interest. Formerly a means to, and a means limited by other

33

ends, economic activity had became an end in itself. In
other words, anomie has become institutionalized. These
dispositions (self interested striving toward indefinite
goals) are so inbred that society has grown to accept them
and think of them as normal. It is 'everlastingly repeated
that it is man's nature to be eternally dissatisfied,
constantly to advance, without relief or rest, toward an
indefinite goal. The longing for infinity is daily
represented as a mark of moral distinction, whereas it can
only appear within unregulated consciences which elevate to
a rule the lack of rule from which they suffer.(E.Durkheim,
1952, Suicide). I

Marx himself, had a little interest in questions of
philosophy and tended to repress questions of the grounds of
moral decisions. His analysis of society is not an analysis
of "moral life". In contrast Durkheim views sociology in an
opposite direction. For him the sience of society was the
science of its moral life. Two key terms describe
Durkheimian thought. ”Exteriority and constraint”. Members
of a society view social facts as "things". The individual
faces an objective society that existed before and will
continue to exist after him, and more important, Durkheim
attributes to society a moral quality that controls each and
every member. \As Mannheim suggests individuals do not think
alone they rather participate in thinking, and that very
thinking is determined by the moral constraint of society.

This moral constraint of society is almost unconsciously

34

accepted by its members.)In a final analysis a confrontation
with moral reality is a confrontation with society. Social
changes are not due to the inexistence of moral reality,
they are rather products of formation of new moral
realities. (For example the. transformation of mechanical
experience of a new collective morality, with principles as
rationality, and moral individualism). "As the division of
labor advances so also did the gradual replacement of
mechanical solidarity with organic solidarity.
Individualism, then was a morality collectively arrived,
collectively shared and collectively enforced". (Durkheim,
1933).

Moral constraint is the spinal chord of collective
reality. The exteriority of the individual objectifies and
legitimizes reality. Consequently exteriority and constraint
are the essence of moral life. However "abrupt social
changes, can limit a society's regulation power, as can
rapid evolutionary changes can outstrip the development of
appropriate regulative morality (Durkheim 1951).

Anomie's most essential referent is a situation that
runs roughly opposite to that of a healthy social organism.
It's limit, or total anomie, would be precisely the absence
of any sort of society whatsoever :a dead social organism,

to push Comte’s analogy a bit. [28]

35
E. ALIENATION AND ANOHIE AS IDEOLOGY

In actual terms anomie for Durkheim is what alienation
is for Marx: Metaphor for a radical attack on the dominant
institutions and values of industrial society. Durkheim
assumed a transcendental conception of the relationship
between man and society, and the value of moral constraint,
whereas Marx assumed an immanent conception and the value of
freedom from constraint. Marx was interested in problems of
power and change, Durkheim in the problem of the maintenance
of order. The fact remains however that both have utilized
alienation from a different perspective to illuminate their
theories. Even under two different ideological approaches
the radicalism of common elements is striking: KThe anomic
person is an estranged person. He cannot relate to the
objective reality of "moral life”, according to Durkheim.
The isolation of the social whole can lead to suicide. On
. the other hand Marx's alienated person becomes an
"abstraction" which is again, any social factor (man
included) that appears isolated from the social whole. The
dead social organism of total anomie, can also viewed as the
total social emptiness, that results from the lack of
meaningful particulars by which people experience reality]
When the social whole cannot interrelate with social
particulars we can except a total abstraction, a non

society.

 

 

36

Moreover, both Marx , as we saw, and Durkheim notably
recommend to view society of social facts as "things". It is
indeed inconceivable to construct an idea, unless you reify
its consisting characteristics. How you can explain love,
for example, unless you break it up in certain expectations
that produce the evidence, necessary for a communicating
definition. In a final analysis this is the problem of any
ideology. The non-admittance of the fact that the
reification of a social fact is based on the ideological
podium that we stand on. Sometimes the differences of
interpretations can be enormous, sometimes they can be
minor, however they are always judged in accordance not with
their designated pretention to reflect reality, but rather
with their chronological usefullness. There is no ideology
(although willing) able to comprehend and justify society,
otherwise social facts would and could remain static.[29]

Social change is apparent whenever social order (and
it's reigning ideology) lose their legitimacy of reflecting
objective reality. (As a philosophical extremety one might
argue that objective reality is nothing more and nothing
less, at least within the framework of sociology, of an
extreme massive unquestionable (production and ) acceptance
of definitions. The anemic person, the marginal, the
alienated, the crazy, the succesful, the sick, the in love
the rebel does not exist before the existence of the
definition). [30]

In actual terms, this very ability of an ideology to

 

37
express objective reality, distinguishes a state of mind
that functions in a meaningful plus useful way, and a state
of mind that has no potential of such functions.[31]

As Mannheim suggests a state of mind is utopian when it
is incogruous with the state of reality within which it
occurs. Consequently a change in the state of reality has
immediate connotations for the respective state of mind. The
"passage” of society from religion to logos and science, has
devaluated the validity and legitimation of religious
concepts which lost in the process their authority in
explaining and guiding human life. In a sense it is a set of
ideas that have lost their powers, it is ideology per se.
Historically an ideological concept despite how rigid it
seems or pretents to be, is bound to fall as the state of
reality within which it occurs becomes simply ”the past".
Adorno has suggested that there is nothing untrue about
ideologies themselves: The untruth exists in their
pretention to reflect reality.

On the pretention of ideology to correspond and reflect
reality, rest the weaknesses of the concepts used to explain
this reality. Social theories cross the path of social
knowledge, similar to a caravan of camels that cross the
Sahara. Each one of the camels can see and criticize the
hump of the one infront, but is unable to realize its own
hump. The recognition of ideological biases in a theory x
that social thinkers examine, is, unfortunately, not related

with the recognition of the biases of theory y, under which

38
theory x is viewed by.

The fact that social reality is complex, confusing and
lacking the ”hard evidence" of the physical world, is partly
responsible for the confusion, 'complexity and lack of
paradigm for the science that is concerned with the analysis
of social reality.

Symptomatic of this, are the confusions surrounding the
term ideology. Shils in defining the concept suggests:'
Ideologies are characterized by a high ' degree of
explicitness of formulation over a very wide range of the
subjects with wich they deal": in addition "They
passionately oppose the production of the cultural
institutions of the central institutional system." (E.
Shils, 1960, The Concept and Function of Ideology).
Abercrombie suggests that ideology exists partly through its
opposition to central values, either seeking a total
transformation of these values or a total withdrawal from
them: "This oppositional character invests all ideologies
with a necessary political quality: however remote their
direct concerns may seem to be from government, the fact
that they have to strike an attitude towards the central
value system politicizes them." (Nicholas Abercrombie:
Class, Structure and Knowledge). If that is true, only the
non admittance of sociological thought to the Pantheon of
Ideologies, deters sociological concepts of being in essense
the derivation of a sociopolitical reality.

Similar to the formation of the alienated man or the

 

39

anomic suicider due to their existense in society,-which is
the unique framework in which they could exist in the first
place-, is the formation of the ideas underlying these
concepts. Not only problems are social products: their
definition and explanation acquire the same features as
well. Marx exists in the nineteenth century because that is
the only era he could exist. The same is true from Plato and
Aristotle to Durkheim, weber, Freud, Sartre or Poulantzas.
All of them are social products and indispensable part of
their theories.

The above thoughts are in no way a systematized
critique concerned with the analysis of the social
construction of ideologies. The point we derive at is the
picturing of a certain state of mind under which the
diachronical concept of alienation (even as anomie), is
conceived in a parallel dimension with social evolution, and
the ongoing exchange between Nature and Idea. They can be
interpreted as an example to demonstrate the relative
usefulness of concepts when dealing with the objectification
of reality: the need for a realization of their relativity.

When you ride a moving vehicle, the continuously
changing sites minimize your descriptive potential of the
environment. The non-static character of social reality and
the vehicle-passenger relation of it with the sociological
mind (or imagination), produces the same difficulties for
the construction of any social theory.

A historical relation or in that matter, any relation

40
between concepts, can serve as a means to keep in touch with
the pieces of the societal puzzle. Since we don't know were
we are going is useful to know were are we coming from.

As part of‘ the discipline we call Sociology of
Knowledge, one must compare similarities between doctrines
that at first sight will be dissimilar. Lovejoy suggests
that the history of ideas can be constructed around the
concept of the unit idea. (Lovejoy, 1950, The Great Chain of
Being). The history of ideas like the sociology of Knowledge
is, to some extent, an exercise in "unmasking", looking
behind the very diverse things people say to the common
elements of which the people themselves may be unaware.
(N.Abercrombie, 1980, Class, Structure and Knowledge).

Following the conventional argument of the Marx-
Mannheim position, (the Mannheim approach towards Sociology
of Knowledge drew heavily on a particular interpretation of
Marx), we want to emphasize the point that, not only a
certain set of beliefs is associated with certain social
classes but moreover, there is a reason why one particular
set of beliefs, instead of any other, goes together with a
particular social class.

A combined look at the two ideas, namely the common
elements of diversified concepts, and the particular linkage
of these concepts to certain social classes, could provide
the framework for an elaborate future analysis interrelating

alienation and anomie.

 

III. CONTEMPORARY ALIENATION

A. CONTEMPORARY CONCEPTUALIZATIONS

In the Durkheimian tradition, or what would Horton call
transendent sociology, we can identify three contemporary
schools of thought that consist the contemporary order
theory. 1. The middle range approach of R.K.Merton, 2. The
psychological approach exemplified by some of the works of
Melvin Seeman and 3.The ideology of objectivity represented
by Karl Popper.

Merton as a major representative of order theory, has
given to anomie its broad contemporary sociological
identity. Anomie is conceived as a breakdown in the cultural
structure, occuring particularly when there is an acute
disjunction between the cultural norms and goals and the
socially structured capacities of members of the group to
act in accord with them. In this conception cultural values
may help to produce behavior which is at odds with the
mandates of the values themselves. (R.Merton, Social
Structure and Anomie). Merton’s interpretation of Durkheim

41

 

 

42
place empasis upon, a. moral order as norms, b. anomie as
normlessness and c. anomic suicide as deviance. Merton
categorized modes of social adaptation in his famous
typology contrasting cultural goals and institutional means,
aiming to the understanding of a strong cultural value: The

goal of monetary success.

MODES OP ADAPTATION CULTURAL GOALS INSTITUTIONAL MEANS

1.Conformity + +
2.Innovation + -
3.Ritualism - +
4.Retreatism - -
5.Rebellion +/- +/-

(plus and minus represent acceptance and non-acceptance

respectively)

According to this typology society is anomic in so far
as there are socially structured barriers to the achievement
of the culturally legitimate goal of success and status. If
however by legitimate goals we refer to the values of the
social system, is like accepting the constant legitimacy of
the values of the dominant groups. Middle-range theorizing
assumes its value-free predispositions on a notion that
proves exactly the opposite: Its identification with the
existing social conditions.

The second approach is social psychological one. Melvin

43

Seeman categorizes six types of alienation.[32]. In his work
there is a clear effort to contain into a tautonomous
context both alienation and anomie. Although this
conceptualization reinforces the natural relation of the
concepts, is another historical opportunity for an even
slight alteration of their meanings. Seeman talks about(1.
Powerlessness, originated in the Marxist view, meaning the
expectancy or probability held by the individual that his
own behavior cannot determine the occurance of the outcomes
or reinforcements he seeks. 2. Meaningless, a notion that
Seeman derives from Adorno and Mannheim, suggesting that the
individual is unclear on what to believe. Minimal standards
of clarity for decision making are not met. 3. Normlessness,
from the Mertonian tradition, meaning high expectancy that
socially unapproved behaviors are required to achieve given
goals. 4. Isolation, again derived from Merton, meaning to
assign low reward value to goals or beliefs that are
typically highly valued in the given society 5. Rebellion,
pressuposes alienation from reigning goals and standards,
and 6. Self-Estrangement, originated in the works of Fromm,
Mills, Hoffer, Riesman, suggesting the degree of dependence
of the given behavior upon anticipated future rewards. The
social psychological approach employs alienation and anomie
as operationalized models for survey research.)

The third approach is the approach of the professional
ideologist. It is a part of both middle-range approach and

survey research. It suggests that sociological findings,

 

 

44
including the disciplinary treatment of alienation, can be
objective if they meet the standards of the sociological
community. The consensual standard becomes thus the spring
of objectivity.[33]

The core of the contemporary formulations is their
pretention to being able to avoid the ideological
idiosyngracies of the classical concepts of alienation. [34]
The debate and the criticism on such approach is still very
much alive. [35]

Although intellectual argumentations are always a
positive and welcomed phenomenon, one should not avoid the
recognition of his historically situational position in the
theory of thought. What I have attempted to obtain through a
historical review, is the capturing on a sociological lense
static moments of the liquid notion of alienation, its

various contextual realities.

B. TYPOLOGY OF THE CONCEPTUALIZATIONS OF ALIENATION

A historical cartography of alienation consists of a.
its context, b. its content perspective, c. the respective
view or definition, d. the ideological perspective, and e.

the characteristic representatives.

1. Promethean.

CONTEXT: Metaphysical.

45
CONTENT PERSPECTIVE: Man v.s the unknown.
VIEW OF ALIENATION: Alienation from the natural environment,
due to the fear of the "unknown", and lack of understanding
natural relations. In a later face of Greek civilization it
has been transformed in the inability of man to realize the
moral justification of his existence.
IDEOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE: Ranges from primitive and archaic
religionism to the idealism of Greek philosophy.
REPRESENTATIVES:In a liberal sense we can include Hesiod,

Lycourgos, Plato.

2. Christian
CONTEXT: Religious.
CONTENT PERSPECTIVE: Man v.s God.
VIEW OF ALIENATION: Alienation from God. Internal damnation.
IDEOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE: Religious determinism.
REPRESENTATIVES: Pessimistic Christian Theology, Calvin.

3. Hegelian.
CONTEXT: Philosophical.
CONTENT PERSPECTIVE: Man v.s the environment, Idea v.s
Nature.
VIEW OF ALIENATION: Alienation inherent in the
objectification of reality.Estrangement of man due to his
environmental relations.
IDEOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE: Idealism.

REPRESENTATIVES: German Idealists, Hegel.

 

46

4. Classical.

4a. Marx's alienation.
CONTEXT: Social, Economic.
CONTENT PERSPECTIVE: Man v.s Society (Immanent relation).
VIEW OF ALIENATION: Alienation from Nature, other men, man's
own self. Saleability, objectification of man, exteriority
of his own humanity. Need for radical social change.
IDEOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE: Radical historical immanence.
Historical materialism.
REPRESENTATIVES: K.Marx.

4b. Durkheim's anomie.
CONTEXT: Social, Cultural.
CONTENT PERSPECTIVE: Man v.s Society (Transcendental
relation).
VIEW OF ALIENATION: Alienation as anomie due to the lack of
moral constraints. Weakness of the regulatory power of
society. Need for social order.
IDEOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE: Naturalistic transcendentalism.
Positivism.

REPRESENTATIVES: E. Durkheim.

5. Contemporary conceptualizations.
5a. Conflict theory
CONTEXT: Social- Psychological.
CONTENT PERSPECTIVE: Man v.s Society. Society as a contested

struggle between groups with opposed aims and perspectives.

 

'fi' . mum

 

47
Men are society, society is the extension of man. Positive
attitude towards change. Man is viewed as the active
creator of himself and society. Underlying values:
Freedom as autonomy, change action, qualitative growth.
VIEW OF ALIENATION: Self-alienation, being thwarted in the
realization of individual and group goals. A problem of
illegitimate social control and exploitation.
IDEOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE: Radicalism. (Need for a radical
transformation of existing patterns of institution.
Revolutionary change of the social system).
REPRESENTATIVES: Marxists,Fromm, Adorno, Mannheim, New Left,
C.W.Mills, etc.

5b. Order theory.

CONTEXT: Social- Psychological.
CONTENT PERSPECTIVE: Man v.s society. Society as a natural
boundary maintaining system of action. Man half egoistic
(nature), half altruistic (society), or completely equated
with the socialization process.
VIEW OF ALIENATION: As a problem of anomie in inadequate
control over competing groups in the social system.
Disequilibrium in the existing society.
IDEOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE: Conservativism.(Positive attitude
towards the maintenance of social institutions. Extension of
social control.
REPRESENTATIVES: Functionalists, Parsons, Merton, Strole,

SEWER e

| ‘-b

 

 

 

48

The typology we are suggesting is clearly a historical
one. Our thematic link is the concept of alienation through
the eons. It does not strive towards a judgemental
evaluation, it simply shows a continuum of contextual
reevaluations, from mythology to meta-capitalism. What is
for the Greeks existential metaphysics, becomes religion for
Kant, idealism for Hegel, materialism for Marx, cultural
moralism for Durkheim, etc.. From that perspective I
address the issue of a sixth category that compliments our
typology: The alienation of sociology.

C. A NEW APPROACH

There is a sixth category that has to be included in
our chart. The reason that is missing is really simple: It
does not exist. The reason for that is that it can be
considered an internal affair of sociology, which still
remains a taboo topic: The alienation of sociology, or the
alienation of the sociologist, or the alienation in the
sociological context. If, however we want to include this
category in our chart it should look something like the
following.

6. The alienation of Sociology
CONTEXT Sociological, Social Psychological

CONTENT PERSPECTIVE Sociologist vs. sociology

 

 

49
VIEW OF ALIENATION Alienation of the Discipline due to:
a. The notion of value-free sociology,
b. The institutionalization of sociology,
c. The occupational character of the
sociologist,
d. The relation between sociology and
society.
IDEOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE Existential Sociologism [36]
REPRESENTATIVES J.HortOn, C.W.Mills, R.Merton,

T.Adorno [37]

D. SOCIOLOGY AND ALIENATION

Theodor Adorno on the Freedom of Thought:

' We are presented on the couch with a relaxed
performance of what was one enacted, with the utmost
exertion of thought, by Schelling and Hegel on the
lecturer’s podium: the deciphering of the phenomenon. But
this drop of tension affects the quality of the thought: the
difference is hardly less than that between the philosophy
of revelation and the random gossip of a mother-in-law. The
same movement of mind which was once to elevate its
"material" to a concept, is itself reduced to mere material
for conceptual ordering. .The ideas one has are just enough
to allow experts to decide whether their originator is a
compulsive character, an oral type, or a hysteric. Thanks to
the diminished responsibility that lies in its severance
from reflection, from rational control, speculation is
itself handed over as an object to science, whose
subjectivity is extinquished with it. Thought, in allowing
itself to be reminder of its unconscious origins by the
administrative structure of analysis, forgets to be thought.
From true judgement it becomes neutral stuff. Instead of
mastering itself by performing the task of

 

I‘VE. an- A}

 

 

50
conceptualization, it entrusts itself impotently to
processing by the doctor, who in any case knows everything
beforehand. Thus speculation is definitively crushed,
becoming itself a fact to be included in one of the
departments of classification as proof that nothing
changes." (Theodor Adorno, 1960, Minima Moralia).

The lack of comparative and historical material in
viewing alienation, cause to sociology a certain narrowness
in its depth of field. A latent effect of that is targeted
towards the "viewing point" of the intellectual, that is
his/her own historical position, within the context that
he/she considers as his/her subject matter. As a result
he/she is limiting his/her potential for interpretation and
understanding. .

A second point that needs future elaboration is the
role of the sociologist (as intellectual) in the broader
society. Intellectuals more and more are acquiring an
ornamental position in social reality. Their immediate
socio-economic influence is minimum and their acceptability
does not rest on their usefulness towards economy or polity:
it rather rests on the premice or pretention of society to
be culturally advanced, intellectually progressive, open,
free, and diverse. Intellectuals are becoming the social
ornaments. This in itself can be the context of the
alienation of the sociologist as an intellectual.

It is true, and we have to give credit to intellectuals
of various ideological podiums, that questions on the
deterioration of sociological thinking have been raised.

Unfortunately though they have been received by the

 

51

sociological community as a by right eccentricity of some
great sociological minds. The paradox in what we shall call
the alienation of sociology, rests on its acceptability as a
normal phenomenon. The deterioration of sociological
thinking is not really apparent in either a qualitative or a
quantitative approach. One reason for that is that the
standards of measuring content quality have become a.
extremely specialized within the so called schools of
thought, and b. given by sociologists themselves.
Objectivity has been identified with a collective consensus.
A second reason is that quantitative sociology due to its
occupational and societal usefulness has become an axiom of
its own. Alienation in sociology, however, can be detected
in how contemporary sociologists attack the concept of
alienation. J.Horton makes a distinction between the
approaches of the classics (meaning Marx and Durkheim) and
the contemporary social thinkers.”In the works of Marx and
Durkheim alienation and anomie critically and negatively
describe states of social disorder from utopian standards of
societal or human health. Today dehumanization has set in,
the concepts have been transmogrified into things instead of
evaluations about thins, and is no longer clear what
alienated men are alienated from." (J. Horton, 1974,
Dehumanization of anomie and alienation).

This purely sociological transformation of alienation
and anomie can very well start what we can call the

sociology of sociology. I have tried to show that the

 

52
concept of alienation in social history is a history of
different ideologies, different socially conditioned
approaches to the question of individual dissatisfaction and
social discontent. Ideology continues its march into
contemporary sociology and affects sociological thought and
praxis. If we accept that sociology is a reflexive
discipline, I believe it should reflect of its own
practices. I will argue on three main points: 1. The wide
acceptance of the idea of value-free sociology is an
ideology on its own. 2. The institutionalization of
sociology and the occupational character of the sociologist
have deprived in a certain extent the intellectual of his
most valuable tool: His ”Sociological Imagination”.[38] 3.
The relation between sociology and society is in itself
alienating for the sociologist.

I have to start here by defining the use of the term
"ideology" in the specific context. Ideology is employed
here in a broader sense as any socially determined
perspective.[39]

There is a certain historical connection between
sociology and ideology, as it has been a connection, or
rather a distinction between ideology and science. Starting
from Comte's impact on modern thought, reason was to replace
prejudice. Science was to repeat, in our understanding of
human society, the demystifications it had seemingly
accomplished in respect of the world of nature.[40].

Prejudism is linked with ideology and reason with science.

'u 11:1 ‘.‘Q&m'el.._'. I‘

 

 

53
If science is reason ideology than is unreason: from that on
the link between ideology and non-science has been
radicalized.[41]. In that sense any contemporary sociologist
will agree that Promethean alienation and Christian
alienation having no scientific basis do have- and have
indeed- ideological origins. The socially determined
perspective of the concept is either metaphysical or
religious, thus non-scientific, thus ideological. In the
works of Marx and Durkheim, alienation and anomie critically
and negatively describe states of social disorder from
utopian standards of societal or human health. Again,
besides the fact that the tremendous impact of the two
prohibits the characterization of non-science, contemporary
sociologists agree that the classical definitions of
alienation contain different ideologies. Contemporary change
and order approaches towards alienation and anomie share a
common characteristic. They have been formulated within a
specific sociological context that is known as objective
sociology, or value- free sociology. In that sense sociology
parts company with ideology, parts company with no reason,
and finally becomes reason and science. This can be
interpreted as an effort on behalf of sociologists to
realize the position of the discipline in the realm of
sciences, (even as a "soft" science, in distinction with the
"hard" natural sciences), and it has a mighty relation with
the institutionalization of sociology. In order to return to
the specific argument of value-free sociology I would like

 

 

4i

54

to raise a question. What do we consider sociology?
Naturalism? Structuralism?' Functionalism? or Conflict
theories? In actuality sociology can be defined in Giddens'
way: The study of the institutions of the industrialized
society. There is no single way, single paradigm, single
methodology for doing this. There are various interrelated
approaches to social problems and on such diversity a value
free sociology has not be proven to exist yet. "Such a
position [values have been done away] is the epitomy of
alienated and unsociological thinking".(J.Horton,
Dehumanization of Anomie and Alienation). In other words the
fact that the ostrich hides its head in a hole so it cannot
see the danger does not mean that the danger is non-
existent. Furthermore the acceptance of value-free sociology
is an ideological position per se since a priori negation of
the "value" is based on an assumption of scientific
determinism, that it can obscure the demystification of
social relations. In a final sense sociology by its own
nature cannot avoid not to be diverse and imaginative.[42]

The second question I have raised deals with the
institutionalization of sociology and the occupational
character of the sociologist. It is true that sociology as a
discipline could not have survived unless it became, as it
did, a part of the Academia, part of the educational
institution. In order to accomplish that it had to adjust in
its maximum potential to the standards of natural sciences.

The basic model of natural sciences is to reveal or

 

55
demistify common sense beliefs about the physical world. The
view was transferred en bloc to sociology: Revelation or
demystification of the social world. The early sociologists,
most notably Durkheim, argued that social objects must be
approached and studied as one would study natural or
physical phenomena.

Sociology, although often characterized as pseudo-
science, was accepted as a legitimate discipline. In actual
terms, in a sociological vocabulary, it was not sociology
per se, an objectified reality, that became part of the
academic institution. It was rather a group of
intellectuals, with a diversity of ideas, prospects and
outlooks, concerned with the same broad subject matter: The
social world. By becoming part of an institution they found
themselves within the exact same normative order, within the
exact same institutional relations that they were supposed
to reveal. It is this transformation from independent to
institutionalized, from marginal to status quo, from
imagination to tradition, that has carried along a movement
from radical to conformist values, from anti-middle class to
middle class values, what Horton defines as "Value
Relativism".[43] It is useful to keep in mind that the
begining of sociology was in a certain extent a social
movement, and the classics never hide the fact that they
wanted to reshape social reality. Once sociologists became
part of social reality they received their share of
legitimated power, they acquired an administrative

0‘. 'PI7

;-. s . I-".. V. Flflhflm' 4". ._L ‘A:- A!

56

hierarchy, they developed a bureaucratic ethos.[44]. I
believe that within the Academia it has been proven that
Sociologists are not immune to the system. Merton recognizes
that fact, and expresses a serious epistemological concern.
Merton has delt with the role of the intellectual in public
bureaucracy in his Social Theory and Social Structure.
However his questioning is towards the revelation of the
exact position that the intellectual assumes within social
order. He assumes that the sociologist can be objective in
recognizing the variations that exist between his/her own
values and the values of the bureaucracy. However the real
problem starts when the values of the later dillute the
values of the former, and thence an objective distinction
between them becomes impossible. The Sociological mission
has been absorbed in the occupational character of the
sociologist. The vast number of sociology graduates (and in
recent years statistics show that it is not that vast), are
employed by wealthy institutions, corporations, army,
goverment, in order to use their craftmanship of applied
sociology towards the interest of the employer. (C. W.
Mills, 1967, The bureaucratic Ethos). I am not questioning
here the undisputed value and necessity of applied
sociology. This, however, does not mean that we do not have
to be concerned about the uses of the discipline and the
transformation of its values.

The occupational character of the sociologist leads us

to the third argument: The relation between society and the

 

57
sociologist is in itself alienating. There has been no
empirical study about the social discontent of the
sociologist. I believe it should be done. Sociologists
rarely view themselves as participants in social reality,
when employing the aura of the disciplinary characteristics.
The acceptance of their participation immediately assumes
subjectivity and relativism (which is not scientific). The
sociological socialization of the sociologist automaticaly
switches off this possibility. The fact, however, that a
sociologist can define and explain what for any other social
member is ”common-sense", cannot be used as a shield towards
personal or social maladies. [45]. From a conflict
perspective, the sociologist can be alienated by the
capitalist structure. From an order perspective he can be
anomic due to institutional misfunctions. From a socio-
psychological perspective he can be anything from isolated
to schizophrenic. In any case the sociologist-person was not
a sociologist for the first twenty years of his life. He was
a baby and a child and a teenager and during these stages
his social environment was not making exceptions about his
socialization. The sociologist must reinforce in his/her
sociological thinking his role as a participant in the
social game. He/she has a.to realize the ideological margins
of his/her sociology and b. to take into account not only
the situational and problematic nature of meaning, but also
the situational and problematic character of his/her

interpretations, taking into account his/her dualism as the

 

58
participant and the trained spectator.[46]

I am arguing that the concept of alienation has to be
recognized as a lively variable within the practice of,
sociology. With this statement which can and should be
systematically verified, I suggest the need for the
appreciation of sociology as an institution through a
sociology of sociology. I believe that sociological thinking
has a lot to be benefited from, if it opens a new direction
towards an internal criticism of its own structure.
Alienation and ideology in sociological thinking can
virtually serve as basic concepts for inquiry.

 

NOTES

 

59

NOTES

1. See, Trent Schroyer, 1973, The Critique of Domination.

2. Contemporary definitions of alienation and anomie have
been offered by both order and change theories in both
social and psychological levels.

3. See, G. Lukacs, 1968, History and Class Consciousness.

4. See, Italo Calvino, 1980, Le Cosmicomiche.

5. See, Hesiod's Theogonia.

6. For an elaboration on that see, Gilbert Murray 1925, Five
Stages of Greek Religions.

7-8. See, T. Schroyer, The Critique of Domination.

9. See, George Novack, 1970, The Marxist theory of
Alienation.

10. See, Ernest Mandel 1970, The Marxist Theory of
Alienation.

11. See, G. Lukacs,1960, Ideology and class consciousness,
in History and Class Consciousness.

12-13. See, T.B.Bottomore, 1964, Karl Marx: Early writings.
14. See, Istvan Meszaros, 1970, Marx's Theory of Alienation.
15. See, Karl Marx: The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts
Of 1884.

16. The term "utopia", is used here not in a Mannheimian
aproach: it is closer to its etymological Greek meaning.

17. See, David McLellan, 1979, Marxism after Marx.

18. See, A. Giddens, 1971, Capitalism and modern Social

60
Theory.
19-20. See, B. Ollman, 1976, Alienation.
21. For a discussion on Contemporary Theory and Ideology,
refer to J. Horton, Order and conflict theories of social
problems.
22. Relativism in Social Theory contradicts the
Objectiveness in social inquiry.
24. See, K. Marx: The Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts
Of 1844.
25. See, Giddens' analysis of Durkheim in, Capitalism and
Modern Social Theory.
26-27. See, E. Durkheim, Suicide, The Free Press, 1951.
28. See, R. Hilbert, Anomie and the Moral Regulation of
Reality, Soc. Theory, Spring '86.
29. This view is shared by Existential Sociologists. See,
P.K.Manning, Existential Sociologists, The Soc. Quarterly,
Spring 1973.
30. The idea is basic in Labelling theory.
31. See, K. Mannheim,1936, Ideology and Utopia.
32. See, M. Seeman,1959, On the Meanings of
Alienation,A.S.R.
33. See, K. Popper,1956, The Open Society and its Enemies.
34. See, J. Horton, 1964, Dehumanization of Anomie and
Alienation, British Journal of Sociology.
35. See, R. Hilbert, Anomie and the Moral Regulation of
Reality.

36. The term ”existential" is used in accordance with the

 

 

61
definition of P.K.Manning in his discussion on Existential
Sociologists. The term "Sociologism" suggests an inner
aproach on the subject matter.
37. The names are not chosen as actually representing such
an approach. Instead they are employed because besides their
different ideological perspectives, each one has raised
concern about the impact of the social system on the
sociologist. Mills and Horton have loudly suggested the
existence of the "alienated sociologist".
38. The term is borrowed and used as in C.W.Mills, The
Sociological Imagination.
39. See, A. Giddens, 1979, Ideology and Consciousness, in,
Central Problems in Social Theory.
40. See, Paul Ricoeur, 1974, Structure and Hermeneutics.
41. Althusser and Popper have produced in recent years the
most articulated defenses of the view that science can be
separated from other types of symbol systems.
42. See, C.W.Mills' discussion on the philosophies of
Science,in, The Social Imagination.
43. See, Horton's discussion on immanent and transcendent
sociology, in, Dehumanization of Anomie and Alienation.
_44. C.W.Mills, Bureaucratic ethos (The Sociological
Imagination).
45. See, Giddens' discussion on the "lay critique of
sociology", in Central Problems in Social Theory.
46. See, T. Adorno, 1974, On the Freedom of Thought, in,

Minima Moralia.

 

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