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A Sociological Exercise

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of the requirements for

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ALIENATION AND IDEOLOGY:
A SOCIOLOGICAL EXERCISE

By

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ABSTRACT

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A SOCIOLOGICAL EXERCISE
By

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This thesis deals with a number of topics, essential in sociological thinking. Alienation, Anomie, Ideology, and the role of the sociologist are addressed in a way that interprets the concepts within a comprehensive and historical manner. Marx's alienation and Durkheim's anomie are interpreted in a way that reveals ideology as a common denominator. The same relation is employed when dealing with the contemporary conceptualizations, which leads our argumentation into a most sensitive and crucial area: The deterioration of sociological thinking.

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To the two Nicholas'

The one introduced me to life

The other introduced me to sociology.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. THE PROBLEM OF ALIENATION

> "Where everything is bad it must be
> good to know the worst" F. H. BRADLEY

A. THE CHARACTER OF ALIENATION

Alienation is one of the various sociological concepts that have evolved throughout social history. In contrast with the related concept of "anomie" it does not acquire a uniquely sociological meaning, it pre-existed to sociology, as defined by the chronology of science, and it has evolved under various conceptual frames through Greek mythology, early theology, Christianity, and modern philosophy.[1] Consequently, any attempt to define alienation, has been engraved by the experienced reality of each chronological era and has been locked in the luggage of social inheritance together with the sovereign ideology of each period.[2]

The purpose of the thesis is derived from the very character of the concept; it is too useful- it explains in a way too much: " If it means that our human feelings and responses have been in some way estranged from us, alienated

from us then it does seem to apply to many typical maladies at our time." (Gaylord C. LeRoy, The Concept of Alienation.). Furthermore alienation acquires diachronical characteristics: "The history of man could very well be written as a history of the alienation of man." (Erich Kahler, The Tower and the Abyss). The purpose of the thesis is dual:a. First I will attempt a diachronical classification of the concept of alienation within specific parameters of context. In this classification major volume is occupied by the classics, Marx's alienation and Durkheim's anomie. A discussion on ideology will serve as the common denominator for the dialectical comparison of the concepts. b. Secondly from a review of the contemporary interpretation of the concepts, I will argue about the necessity of recognition for the role of alienation in the very core of sociological context: The sociological thinking. Alienation has to be redefined as an internal affair of sociology. The reflection of the concept in social affairs is not photographic, is not one dimensional, it is rather holographic, multidimensional and complex. It influences both the institutional structure and the critical sociological enterprise, the view and the viewer, the subject of analysis and the analyst. It is exactly the explanatory nature of this relation that necessitates the intellectual to administer an endocritical approach to the concept, or what could we call, the psychoanalysis of sociological thinking.

B. ALIENATION AS A DIACHRONICAL CONCEPT

Certain notions travel through time as belonging in the nature of reality itself. They become thus part of history, and have to be viewed as historical aspects, as facts of a unified process. Alienation is one of the concepts that usually escapes a diachronical approach from the part of sociologists, it escapes the categorization of its own totality. However any totality does not reduce its various elements to an undifferentiated uniformity [3]. It is exactly this lack of identity between the various conceptualizations of alienation that the context itself opens up for the intellectual.

Alienation, is a liquid notion, suggesting by that a property of acquiring various shapes and an ability of transformation and continuous moving. It has to be viewed as a relational property within various theoretical schemes. Various modes of relating can lead to various modes of alienation. \In the first stages of humanity, it expresses fear and ignorance. In other words, the unknown and the fear of the unknown. The alienation of that era underlines the basic animalistic behavior of survival. A need to create a minimum, though self fulfilling, notion of group and environment awareness, is of a top priority. / If dinosaurs had the capability of developing a similar notion, as Italo

Calvino suggests in his own version of the Genesis, they have had to sense their dinosauric alienation when "their world" turned into an ice cube. [4]

The fear of the unknown, marks as well, the following alienated era, where the concept has assumed more definite metaphysical or religious forms. The notion of alienation, has taken by the ancient Greeks a positive connotation, since for the first time in history, life itself is seen and projected with optimism and happiness, in an absolute contrast with the civilizations of the Messopotamians, Egyptians, Babylonians, Assyrians, Phoenicians. The alienation of the latter cases, is their metaphysical alienation from their own gods, that reflects on the irrelevant state of existence for the individual. The ancient Greeks solved the problem, by creating their Gods as replicas of the human reality; gods that can love and hate, can help and save, can cheat and lie, can murder or commit adultery, can be frightened and often mistake. The Greeks have created as well, a very important myth, the one of Prometheus: He has stolen the fire from the gods and gave its secret to the humans. The internal truth belongs now to every individual. [5] No matter however of any metaphysical metaphor we can detect, we have to accept the dramatic effort of man to explain and solve his exteriority, his marginality from the powers of the unknown, the truth of the gods.The Greeks were the first that layed stress on the reasonable chains of causation. [6] The twelve gods, despite

certain moral weaknesses of the Greek democracies, appeared to be an ingenious way of thinking and doing, which allowed the creation of a miracle: the classical era. In this semi-mythological semi-historical era, reason and paganism constitute the context of what we could call "Promethean alienation". The estrangement from the reasoning of gods, that represents the culmination of the Absolute Nature -it is not accidental that heroes were considered lesser gods- is the alienating process for man. Reasoning and metaphysical causation, whenever reasoning was not self explanatory moves man closer to his gods, in an effort to fight against his estrangement. Hence the etymological meaning of the concepts accepts a contextual variation within this "divine-man" relation, within the minimization of the existential gap. That can offer an explanation as on why on a certain extent the term in Greek philosophy assimilates the classic Greek ideas for change and disturbance as mediated by ecstasy; an ecstatic elevation of man, not a denial of himself. [7]

The center of the Universe, though, moves away from the Aegean sea, and new historical conditions sign the rise of Christianity. Before that, however, we see alienation appearing as a defined concept in the Roman era. Nathan Rotenstreich suggests that "alienatio" in Latin has two meanings. First a denotative legal meaning, and second a series of metaphoric or psychological meanings, one of which indicates a loss of sanity, related probably with the Greek

idea of ecstasy and ecstatic elevation. [8]

In the Christian era we can trace the first modern use of the concept. The context is religious ,/the estrangement from the divine. Calvin saw man alienated through all time from God by his original sin; a spiritual death is nothing else than the alienation of the soul from God.) We can contrast the modern idea of alienation with earlier etymological forms. For us though the word etymological, has to be appreciated beyond its linguistic usefulness. It has to be interpreted as a imaginative bridge, as a conceptually evolving chain reaction expressing the historical subjectivity of any given era. Indeed it would not have made much sense for Calvin to refer to alienation as a psychosomatic condition of man, caused by labor relations. The importance lies not on the acceptability or not of any given definition, (for that reason no apparent definition has been used thus far), instead it lies on the mere fact that an interpretation can be found in any historical period. It is important to realize, that each and every one of the interpretations of alienation, has to be appreciated as illuminating maladies of unique and different social structures, ideologies and civilizations. Alienation receives contextual meanings and it is in each context that is given a specific identity.

Hegel adopted the concept from the pessimist protestant theology, and he regarded man's history as one of alienation. The critical difference in the last evolution of

the concept, is a radical turn from the metaphysical to the physical, to history and nature. Hegel recognizes that man actively constitutes himself in history. He noted such curious ideas as the fact that humans alone of all the creatures on earth can take the objective conditions around them and transform them into a medium of humanity's subjective development. The very need of philosophy itself springs from these all embracing conditions in which human existence has been plunged. The conflict of society (subject) against nature (object), of idea against reality, of consciousness against existence, Hegel generalizes into the conflict between subject and object [9]). The world has revealed its complexity, and metaphysics, although still important, yields its urgent anxiety to more obvious questions, that spring out of pure social relations. Labor relations become the spinal cord of social evolution and philosophers redefine alienation on a rejuvenated plateau. Hegel emphasizes labor as the central human activity, he identifies alienation as a fundamental human problem and he conceives dialectically the historical emergence and eventual transcendence of it.

For Hegel labor is inherently alienating since it creates objects external to man and his consciousness. Thus on the one hand alienation is inevitable in the human condition and cannot be superseded through institutional change. On the other hand, alienation can be superseded within the realm of consciousness by recognizing or

designating consciousness as real and objects produced by labor a mere manifestation of thought.

For Hegel objectification was tautonomous with alienation. In his "Phenomenology of Mind", the Absolute Idea, the god of the mind, confronts the subjective objectification of Nature. Nature itself, according to the Hegelian dialectic is the antithesis to the Idea and it is nothing in and for itself; It is merely a concealed and mysterious embodiment of the Absolute Idea. [10] Feuerbach adhered the idea, suggesting though that there has been a miscalculation in the Hegelian Synthesis. Feuerbach pointed out that this Absolute Idea, was itself nothing but "a thing of thought", a generalized expression for the thinking process of real individuals dependent on nature.

Marx pays tribute to Feuerbach for exposing the religious essence of Hegel's system and thereby reestablishing the materialistic truth that Nature instead of being an expression of the Idea, is the real basis for thought and the ultimate basis for all ideas.

Diderot and Rousseau in their own right had criticized the alienating social relations in a modern state. Diderot spelled out the sociopolitical riddle of a modern society by emphasizing that once man succeeded in his critique of the "majestry of Heaven", he will not shy away for long from an assault on the other oppressor of mankind, the "worldly sovereignty", for these two fall or stand together. Istvan Meszaros, in "Marx's Theory of Alienation", suggests that

Diderot has grasped the problematics of alienation by indicating as basic contradiction "the distinction of yours and mine", the opposition between "one's particular utility and the general good", and the subordination of the "general good to one's own general goods". Rousseau in "The Social Contract" suggests: "Under bad government the equality (of the people) is only apparent and illusory: it serves only to keep the pauper in poverty and the rich man in the position he has usurped. Laws are always of use to those who posses and harmful to those who have nothing; from which it follows that the social state is advantageous to men only when all have something and none too much".

Alienation has retained contextual social meanings in social history. It is nevertheless Marx's work that moves the notion into a rigid social context: Labor relations.

II. THE CLASSICAL APPROACHES TO ALIENATION

A. MARX'S ALIENATION

"It may be said that each person changes himself to the extent that he changes and modifies the entire complex   of relationships which center in him. From this aspect the real philosopher is the political person,   the   active   man   who modified   his   environment,   the   sum   total   of   his relations."(A. Gramsi).

To be radical, according to Marx, is to go to the root of the matter. For man the root is man himself. I would like to clarify here that within Marx's philosophy we concentrate on his dealing with alienation. We tried to separate "the tree   from   the   forest",   in order to show   the   historical nature of the conceptualization of the notion. Thus the vast volume of Marx's theory bares only relative importance in our context; if not so, the weight would be unbearable.

Marx inherited a concept of alienation that lacks the theoretical   assumption   to   follow   the   dynamic   social evolution as he himself was viewing it. The time for the latest modification of the concept had arrived. It brought with it all the ideological dowry of Marx's later major works, besides the fact that for certain Marxists alienation

develops an idealistic frame of thought incomprehensible within the materialism of social clarity.The moment Marx chooses to criticize Hegel and thus bring "History upside down", alienation finally fits in the puzzle of labor theory.[11]

It was the analysis of Hegel's philosophy of the State, which led Marx to the conclusion that legal relations as well as forms of state are to be grasped neither from themselves not from the so-called general development of the human mind (Geist-Idea), but rather are rooted in the material conditions of life (Nature). (Marx, Selected works,1958).

On a broader epistemological level, Marx criticizes Hegel for having mistaken the nature of the connection between objectification and alienation. Fundamental to Hegel's idealism is the premise that "thinghood" is the same as alienated self consciousness and that objectification is only made possible by human self alienation. The truth, for Marx, is the other way around. The existence of alienation presupposes objectification, and is consequent upon the specific distorted form of objectification, characteristic of capitalism. [12]]

The notion of a state that governs its members with alienating laws, was already part of political philosophy. Marx had already occupied himself with the problems of alienation, while analyzing the Epicurean philosophy in his doctoral thesis, and viewing the whole matter as an

expression of a historical stage dominated by the privatization of life, which lead to the notion of isolated individuality. There is a basic variation between the role of the individual in the "Polis-State", and the one in the modern state. Whether the individual could function as a center , as a social atom, in an ancient era, it is no longer the case. The historical tendency is said to give vise to the "self- centered" modern state, whose center of gravity was discovered within the state itself and is thus the natural condition of "isolated individuality". [13]

Marx, in his critique of the Hegelian Philosophy of Right, discusses: "The present condition of society displays its difference from the earlier state of civil society in that -in contrast to the past- it does not intergrade the individual within its community. It depends partly on change, partly on the individual's effort etc. whether or not he holds on to his estate; to an estate which, again determines the individual merely externally. For his station is not inherent in the individual's labor, nor does it relate itself to him as an objective community, organized in accordance with constant laws and maintaining a permanent relationship to him...(The principle of the bourgeois estate- or the bourgeois society- is enjoyment and the ability to enjoy.) In a political sense the member of bourgeois society detaches himself from his estate, his real private position; It is only here that his characteristic of being human assumes its significance, or that his

determination,...,as a communal being appears as his human determination. For all his other determinations appear in bourgeois society as inessential for man, for the individual, as merely external determinations which may be necessary for his existence in a whole, but they constitute a lie which he can just as well cast away. The present bourgeois society is the consistent realization of the principle of individualism; individual existence is the ultimate end; activity, labor, content etc. are only means......The real man is the private individual of present day political constitution.....Not only is the estate founded on the division of society as its ruling law, it also divorces man from his universal being; it turns him into an animal that directly coincides with his determination. The middle Ages constitute the animal history of mankind, its Zoology. The modern Age, our civilization commits the opposite error. It divorces man his objective being as something merely external and material." (Marx, 1844). [14]

It is useful to stress here that Marx believes in the good nature of human beings, hence the explanation f or the development of conflict and the destruction of harmony, has to be found in external factors. Alienation is due to a particular mode of production which turn all natural and rational relations upside-down.(It can be called therefore, the unconscious condition of mankind.)Productive activity is the mediator in the subject-object relation between man and

nature. Productive activity is hence the source of human consciousness. Under a bourgeois state, productive activity is mediated by the institutions of the self-centered state and thus it cannot bring the fulfillment which is supposed to bring to the individual. "Alienated consciousness" is the reflection of alienated activity or of the alienation of activity. Human alienation was accomplished through turning everything into alienable, saleable objects. Selling is the practice of alienation. Just as man, so long as he is engrossed in religion, can only objectify his essence by an alien and fantastic being; So under the sway of egoistic need, he can only affirm himself and produce objects in practice by subordinating his products and his own activity to the determination of an alien entity, and by attributing to them the significance of an alien entity namely money. Alienation is characterized by the universal extension of "saleability"(the transformation of everything into commodity). (Marx 1844).

In the "Economic and Philosophic manuscripts of 1844, Marx uses the terms "entrfemdung"(alienation or estrangement), and "entausserung" (externalization or alienation). Allen Wood suggests that the terms evoke images; they suggest the separation of things which naturally belong together, or the establishment of some relation, or indifference, or hostility between things that are properly in harmony. For Marx it is the socioeconomic circumstances and institutions under which labor occurs and

objects are produced, not the production of objects per se, which generate alienation. Institutional conditions created or intensified by capitalism, interpose themselves between man and nature, man and his productive activity, and among men, with alienating consequences, alienated man, alienated productive activity and alienated nature.

Writing about alienation in bourgeois society, Marx traces the condition to the nature of the work process, to the way, under the conditions of private ownership, work ceases to be the expression of the creative powers of the worker. Furthermore, Marx traces the condition to the way the objects man create acquire an independent power and rule over him. He shows how man is impoverished in a society where it does not belong to his essential being, where in his work man does not affirm himself but denies himself, does not feel content but unhappy, does not develop freely his physical and mental energy but mortifies his body and mins his mind. Labor is therefore not a satisfaction of a need; it is merely a means to satisfy needs external to it. Its alien character emerges clearly in the fact that as soon as no physical compulsion exists, labor is shunned under the plague.

As we can see, Marx depicted alienation as the essence of the capitalist order. Private property is therefore the product, the necessary result, of alienated labor, of the external relation of the worker to nature and to himself. The roots of alienation, Marx suggests, lie not in

industrialism but in private ownership of the means of production. Private ownership brings about the condition of alienation, first because work under these conditions serves neither the interest of the worker (except as means of earning his wage), nor the interest of a society in which the worker feels that he has a stake; it serves merely the profit of the owner. Work under these conditions ceases to be a means through which the worker expresses his human or creative power; instead it becomes enslaved labor. Second, under these conditions, the worker falls victim to forces that he can neither control nor even understand. Objects that man produces become an independent power rulling over him, and they confront him as something alien, as a power independent of the producer. The more the worker spends himself the more powerful the alien objective world becomes, which he creates over against himself; the poorer he becomes the less he belongs to him as a own. We can depict the similarity with what Freuerbarch suggested about religion:"The more man puts into God the more he refrains himself". Alienation comes about because the objects man has created come to rule him in the development of the capitalistic market. He ceases to have the feeling of creating for use and is ignorant of the reasons for the rise and fall of demand for his products of labor. The laborer exists for the process of production and not the process of production for the laborer. Alienated man experiences himself not as an agent but as a patient, not as a creator

but creature , not as self determined but other determined.

The products of man's labor were transformed into an objective power above him, growing out of control, thwarting his expectations, bringing to naught his calculations. Because man was alienated from the product of his labor, man also became alienated from other men. This estrangement, from the human essence, leads to an "existential egotism", or as Marx states it, "man becomes alienated from his own body, external nature, mental life, and his human life. Under capitalism the wage worker is treated, not as a fellow human being, but as a mechanism useful for the production of surplus value. He is a prisoner with a life time sentence to hard labor". (Marx, 1844). [15]

Marx's alienation is considered to be a utopian concept of the left. It is formulated within a tradition of naturalistic and historical immanence, it represents an attempt to put the ideas of German Idealism and the Enlightenment within a tradition of scientific and historical research. [16]   Preoccupied with the nature of change Marx a. Denied the artificial dualism of man-society, b. he suggested that society as a product of man's labor is an extension of man's own nature c. Reification of man's objects leds to the alienation of man from his self activity, his products, nature, fellow humans and himself d. Alienation is viewed as a historical state which will be overcome as man reaches an autonomous and self-contained existence. Communism is the historical context where man can

ultimately discover his freedom.

B. A CRITICAL EVALUATION ON MARX'S CONCEPTUALIZATION

Apparently, Marx's thought has shaped the way of thinking in our century. Capitalism has been scrutinized, rationalized, valued, moralized and demoralized, contemned, justified, cursed, praised and survived. Socialism on the other hand has experienced almost incomprehensible difficulties in maturing, from a theoretical framework to an applicable system, in the countries that was, forcefully or not, adopted. That mere fact has driven modern social thinkers in an effort to conceive human nature in a more ordered fashion.

In that tradition of "Marxism after Marx" we should include a. the psychoanalytical approach of Fromm (The Sane Society) and Reich, b. the radical reformulation of concepts such as class struggle, the dictatorship of the proletariat, the function of the state by G. Lukacs, K. Korsch, A. Gramsci, c. the critical theory of the Frankfurt school interpreting the impact of psychoanalysis and fascism and the role of culture (aesthetics), with Adorno, Horkheimer, Marcuse, Habermas, d. the existentialism Marxism, Sartre, Garandy, Lefevre, Axelos, e. Structuralism Marxism,

Althusser, Balibar, Poulantzas, f. the "New Left" in the U.S., with the second face of the Frankfurt school, Marcuse, C.W.Mills and g.the third world marxism, Mao and Ho Chi Minh. [17]

Bertell Ollman, perhaps the leading modern interpretor of Marx,in " Alienation, Marx's Conception of Man in Capitalist Society", addresses a certain point that for us stands as a crusial element in the overall structure of Marx's thought. Ollman states: "Human nature was an important topic when he (Marx) wanted to put his own house in order, but he hesitated to give it the same prominence when his purpose was to explain his views and to convince others". Ollman believes thatthe cause for that can be found in Marx's effort to confront socialist thinkers as Feuerbach, Stirner, Krieg who favored expressions like "human nature", "humanity" and "man in general". One cannot avoid however, thinking that the essence of an ongoing "ubnormal" situation, -alienation-, has an enormous relationship with human nature.

Have we viewed alienation as rooted in socioeconomic institutions, rather than in the inevitable nature of human conditions, we can suggest that a process of disalienation is in principle possible, given an appropriate development of society's productive forces. For Marx, propertylessnes and powelessness, estrangement and alienation from product, from activity, from self, from species being and from nature, can be overcomed and in a more revolutionary sense,

have to be and will eventually overcomed. Since the reasons for the existence of the phenomenon are rooted in the capitalist state, the effacing of capitalism and Bourgeois society is the first step for humans to free themselves from the restrains. The proletariat by taking over the power, it will eventually liquidate any other class, and at the same time by creating a classless society, it will be able to erase the existing ideology of the state, to destroy the rotten structure of society, to create new values.

Since it is society that corrupts man, the dictatorship of proletariat will lead to the socialistic state that will socialize the people on a basis of equality, fairness and the right to happiness. It will moreover, free man from the necessity of the state, since the collective interest will be identified with the well being at the individual, and the state eventually will dissapear, creating thus a communist society on the basis of anarchy. (the term used here with its etymological sense from the Greek word anarchia meaning no-rule). It is however wrong to suggest that nationalization of the means of production and the abolition of the capitalist class would eliminate all forms of alienation. History suggests that this is not the case. Marcuse is correct (in reflecting socialist reality) in saying that as long as wealth is measured in terms of labor time, itself a function of the division of labor, alienation will exist. [18]

Marx's belief, that it is possible under a different

set of relationship in the superstructure, to develop a society where all present features of alienation should dissapear, in the first place does not answer the obvious question "what is the state of non-alienation?", and second implies "historical" predestination" in a religious sense. Marx has criticized Proudhon, in that by deciding to work with capitalist categories, cannot completely disassociate himself from the "truth" which these categories contain.

Marx himself has fallen in this trap by structuring socialism. In the "Critique of political economy" he writes: "In the study of economic categories, as in the case of every historical and social science, it must be borne in mind that as in reality so in our mind the subject is given and that the categories are therefore but forms of expression, manifestations of existence, and frequently but one-sided aspects of this subject, this definite society." Ollman suggests that "this distinction between subject and categories is simple recognition of the fact that our knowledge of the real world is mediated through the contstraction of consepts in which to think about it; our contact with reality, in so far as become aware of it, is contact with a conceptualized reality". (Ollman, 1976). [19]

The moment that Marx realizes the relation between concept and subject, a construction of a conceptual reality based on a structure hypothetical and religiously predetermined, becomes purely ideological. If Marx was correct, by readjusting the Hegelian relation of "Idea" and

"Nature", he was mistaken in designating once again, the "Idea" as a basis of a non-alienated society. Such a social development brings in mind the Calvinian relation of alienated man and the internal truth of God; man will find his lost Paradise, as a historical necessity. Consequently the conceptualization of the future objective reality, is based on the subjectification of thoughts and their interelation with nature, distilled under a particular ideological union.

Furthermore, the assumption of the good nature of man, cannot be, at least sociologicaly, proven. Marx attributes to man certain powers, which he divides into natural and species, and maintains that each of these powers is reflected in one's consciousness by a corresponding need. The individual feels needs for whatever is necessary to realize his powers. The objects of nature including other men, provide the matter through which these powers are realized and consequently for which needs are felt. It is historically apparent that an equilibrium between individual needs and social existence has not been fulfilled. Hence a future hypothesis is not based on evidence but rather on ideology.

Ollman however makes a clear distinction:"Evidence, actual or potential, can be used to help solve any problem except how this same evidence should be viewed" hence the difference between theory as interpretation and theory as hypothesis like all philosophy which concerns itself with

organizing reality, with interpetation, the value of these theories must be measured by utility rather than truth (unless of course, the two are equated). It is in this sense that " philosophical systems are never exploded, but instead, like styles of clothing, simply go out of fashion, usually because other interpetations are found more useful or because the group whose interest these ideas serve itself disappears" (Ollman, 1976). [20].

Our purpose, as stated, is to acclaim a critical review of Marx's thought. Marx himself believed that with the development and/or discovery of each new social reality, our view of what is humanly possible had to be extended, revised and altered. Ideology and, through ideology, the diachronical transformation of concepts, serve exactly that direction. Concepts like good and bad. moral and immoral, freedom and enslavement, reshape their meanings in accordance with existing reality, or, if you prefer, with the conceptualization of reality into meaningful and useful relations. The meaning assigned in every relation produces the notion of subjective reality, which in turn, through the transcendence of ideology, and mass consensus, becomes objective reality for the individual and battleground for the philosopher and their social thinker. Understanding society, means primarily to uncover its sacred ideological shield, which in the final analysis is the one that creates the enormous human rosary of values, norms and beliefs. [21]

Alienation, acquires the same characterstics as any

other concept: usefulness and explanatory power. It is essential to realize, that it is not a matter of true or false, right or wrong, accuracy or misconceptions when we compare conceptual interpetations. Alienation has the same validity, viewed in either the Calvinian tradition in it's respective era, or in the Marxist one today. Our seemingly stronger interest in Marx, is due to the contemporary essence of his ideas and to the comprehensive, historically, character of his concepts. We do not pretent that our aim is to discover the real meaning of the concept redefining Marx. It is time however, to introduce the concept to a new state of affairs. Such an introduction coincides with the dialectic view that what is humanly possible has to be extented, revised and altered.

The first idea has to do with the relativity of happiness. From Plato to Judaism and from Christianity to Marxism, ideologies are promising Heaven. (In other terms they are promising a state of affairs within which humans will discover the real meaning of life, hence they will discover happiness. The problem with that idea is that happiness is attributed an absolute value, a quality that exists in a natural way, and humanity under given conditions can reach out and grab it.) The structure of human happiness is a link in the chain of being, predefined, predetermined and assumed within the state of a social or metaphysical environment. The exact idea of the heavenly kingdom espoused by the Christians, as the concept of absolute happiness, is

the metaphysical image of the earthly heaven of communism, adopted by the Marxists. The overcoming of the ubnormal condition of alienation has to lead humanity, according to Marx,   to the happiness capsule, to the ideal society.

Happiness, however, cannot acquire absolute values. It is as relative as truth, freedom or love.   J.P.   Sartre excluded in his apartment, under German occupation, being stripped off the basic elements of human freedom,   has suggested that he had never felt that free in his whole life. What he ment was, that by unleashing the power of his imagination, the power of the Idea (Hegel), (he was able to create his own world where no oppression could border his freedom.)Although this idea parts company with common sense, it still indicates that vague concepts like freedom are indeed relative.[22]

In our world, organic solidarity has determined the interconnecting links of the social "things"   not   within universal measures,   but rather through redefinitions of manifestations within separate realities. The manifestation of happiness is defined through the characteristics of natural and social variables.) The happiness that is derived from the existence of nuclear family for a middle class westerner, does not exist for an arab seikh, or a homosexual teenager.   Even under the same cultural background,   age barriers redefine happiness. Old people,   in any given society, should be miserable if they were supposed to derive happiness within a system of activities that are no longer

able to cope with. Happiness has to be redefined for them.

Since men are compelled to impose a meaningful order upon reality, as long as reality changes, modifications of this order have to follow. Whenever the order reaches a point that can accept no modifications, as history has shown, society has to switch towards a fundamental change of practicing life. Even if though, a social change reaches the margin of the absolute, it cannot be, despite its pretentions, the ultimate one, since society cannot survive on a static level. Who can prove that the ideal happiness of today, would still represent the same value-in satisfaction and fulfillment- for the individual in a future state of affairs? Happiness is like the Chimaera the ancient monster that was so valuable because no one could ever posses it. No ideology can promise happiness because no ideology can escape happiness's relative existence; no ideology can succesfully submit humanity under an artificial paradise.

Even the most severe and extreme socialization process cannot ultimately suppress human individuality, or at least it cannot practice it and expect a sane citizen. Berger and Luckman suggest that social order transforms a biologically given world openess (to humans by birth) into a socially given world closedness. Thus the process of transformation from a plastic to a formed nature is simoultaneously a process of ordering. Even though, however, an ordering is useful for the functioning of the individual in society, we cannot be thrilled with the idea of a confrontation of our

social existence with our human nature. Ideologies are deriving their absolute values for individual life through their interpretation of social reality. Alienation theory, besides its materialistic base cannot escape its utopian character, since it prophesizes a social state where human relativity is irrelevant.

A second point that develops a number of thoughts, is the unconsciencious process that creates the alienated man. The concept of alienation suggest a step by step development of the state of alienation; a human being alienated from nature, from fellow men, from himself. In a historical perspective of the capitalist evolution the process, indeed, makes much sense. It is questionable though, if the same procedure can be accounted for every individual of today. A new born individual is not introduced in his societal environment experiencing freely his habitat. The knowledge (s)he is deriving, aims to his or her adaptation to the given environment, and the socialization process is imposed on him or her by a surrounding that conscienciously accepts values, norms, beliefs, the whole ideological spectrum, the whole construction of objective reality that exists in any given state of relations.

Consequently the socialized individual does not go through the steps suggested by Marx. (S)He experiences a knowledge of a world prearranged for him, external to him, and persistent in its reality. It is socialization that creates the alienated individual, hence it is socialization

that is alienation, and humans, each and every one despite their unique experience, are alienated long before they are able to comprehent labor relations.)

If however, the objective reality of the individual is alienated, as long as it remains a reality there is no way of identifying its alienated nature, since there is nothing external suggesting "ubnormality". (For the societal member the alienating ´values do not represent an ubnormal force that (s)he has to negate. On the contrary is the only reality that can offer him the feeling of belonging and a relative happiness. When you consciously believe that object x and/or relation y is "good", it is highly unlikely that your unconscious ness would experience it as "bad". In that sense the unconscious process of alienation cannot be applied to present capitalist (or socialist) reality. Alienation is not any longer an unconscious, ubnormal state of affairs; it is actually a conscious normal objective reality. ("Normal" is used not as representing a positive state of affairs, it is rather used in opposing metaphysical agonies and excuses).)

Herbert Read in his own area, Art, discussing art and alienation, (although, unfortunately, Aesthetics and Sociology rarely overlap), emphasizes a structural difference between the alienated artist of the nineteenth century and the modern artist. Never before, he suggests, in the history of our Western world has the divorce between man and nature, man and his fellow man, between individual man

and his "self-hood" been so complete. We now recognize that not Capitalism alone, but the whole character and scope of a technological civilization is involved. To change the world, meaning the prevailing economic system, is not enough. The fragmented psyche must be reconstituted, and only the creative therapy we call art offers that possibility. (H. Read, 1967, Art and Alienation, the Role of the Artist in Society).

As sociologists we cannot be thrilled with Read's proposed solution, however the problem in a final solution is stated in an accurate way: Our fragmented psyche has to be reconstructed.

C. THE CONCEPTUAL TRANSITION FROM ALIENATION TO ANOMIE

The fact that Marx's alienation castrates capitalism, if universally accepted, leads us to search for another transformation of the same old idea, that could exist without threatening the status quo, however satisfying the human need for critisism and explanation. Interestingly enough, Marx uses, while discussing alienation, another term: " What is left of the individual after all these cleavages have occured is a mere rump, a lowest common denominatior attained by looping off all those qualities on which is based his claim to recognition as a man. Thus denuded, the alienated person has become an abstraction".

(Marx, 1844). As we saw this is a broader term Marx uses to refer to any factor which appears isolated from the social whole. At it's simplest, "abstraction" refers to the type of purity that is achieved in emptiness. Its opposite is a set of meaningful particulars by which people know something to be one of a kind. Given that these particulars involve internal relations with other factors, any factor is recognized as one of kind to the degree that the social whole finds expression in it. It is because we do not grasp the ways in which the social whole is present in any factor (which is to say, the full range of its particular qualities in their internal relation) that this factor seems to be independent of the social whole, that it becomes an abstraction. [24]

A second interesting point is derived by Engels, while justifying Marx's inconsistent terminology, in the preface of "Capital". We are not expect to find "fixed, cut-to-measure, once and for all aplicable definitions in Marx's works. It is self-evident that mere things and their interrelations are conceived, not as fixed, but as changing, their mental images, the ideas, are likewise subject to change and transforamtion, and they are not encapsulated in rigid definitions, but are developed in their historical or logical process of formulation". Marx examines things and their interrelations. Both abstraction and the conceptualization of social facts as things, are important not only for their role in the theory of alienation, but

also because they are part of another significant
intellectual (see ideological) framework of social thinking.
The one of Durkheim and his concept of "anomie".

D. DURKHEIM'S ANOMIE

Anomie lies in the ideological antipodes of alienation.
For as is a sign of our times. As an intelectual product we
consider it to be the twin brother (or sister if you may) of
alienation. Whereas Marx was interested in problems of power
and change Durkheim was interested in problems of the
maintenance of order. Consequently the concept of alienation
finds in the Durkheimian formulation a new identity : the
one of anomie. Durkheim has probably adopted the term from
Guyau when reviewing "L' irreligion de l'avenir". Guyau uses
the term "religious anomie" in a sense close to Durkheim's
"the cult of the individual". [25] For Durkheim the cult
of the individual is the moral counterpart to the growth of
the division of labor, and it is possible because of the
secularisation of most sectors of social life. Durkheim uses
the term "anomie" in a broader sense. He does not assign to
anomie a simple operational definition on either a purely
psychological or sociological level. In simple terms social
problems result from and promote anomie. Anomie means system
imbalance of social disorganization - a lack of or a break
down in social organization reflected in weakened social

control, inadequate institutionalization of goals, inadequate means to achieve system goals, inadequate socialization, etc. At a social psychological level of analysis, anomie results in the failure of individuals to meet the maintenance needs of the social system.

Society is viewed by Durkheim as controlling individuals primarily through the "moral power" of the social environment. Such moral power is invested in the "moral consciousness of societies", their "moral structure" their "moral constitution" or more concretely, the common ideas, beliefs, customs and tendencies of societies. Externalized in part in legal codes embodying swift sunctions for his behavior, outnumbering him in the form of public opinion and preceding him as traditions in which he himself is socialized this moral power bears down on the individual who is seen as a "spark" in the "collective current". Certain states of this moral constitution or moral structure approximate pure types which in the extreme, constitute social conditions predisposing individuals to suicide. [26] Anomic suicide derives from the lack of moral regulation, a particular characteristic of major sectors of modern industry. [27].

Anomie is a pathological phenomenon. It is endemic in modern economic life. The economy traditionally restrained by the moral codes of church, state or guild, now dominates as the realm of unrestrained self-interest, or even class-interest. Formerly a means to, and a means limited by other

ends, economic activity had became an end in itself. In other words, anomie has become institutionalized. These dispositions (self interested striving toward indefinite goals) are so inbred that society has grown to accept them and think of them as normal. It is everlastingly repeated that it is man's nature to be eternally dissatisfied, constantly to advance, without relief or rest, toward an indefinite goal. The longing for infinity is daily represented as a mark of moral distinction, whereas it can only appear within unregulated consciences which elevate to a rule the lack of rule from which they suffer.(E.Durkheim, 1952, Suicide).

Marx himself, had a little interest in questions of philosophy and tended to repress questions of the grounds of moral decisions. His analysis of society is not an analysis of "moral life". In contrast Durkheim views sociology in an opposite direction. For him the sience of society was the science of its moral life. Two key terms describe Durkheimian thought. "Exteriority and constraint". Members of a society view social facts as "things". The individual faces an objective society that existed before and will continue to exist after him, and more important, Durkheim attributes to society a moral quality that controls each and every member. As Mannheim suggests individuals do not think alone they rather participate in thinking, and that very thinking is determined by the moral constraint of society. This moral constraint of society is almost unconsciously

accepted by its members.)In a final analysis a confrontation with moral reality is a confrontation with society. Social changes are not due to the inexistence of moral reality, they are rather products of formation of new moral realities. (For example the transformation of mechanical experience of a new collective morality, with principles as rationality, and moral individualism). "As the division of labor advances so also did the gradual replacement of mechanical solidarity with organic solidarity. Individualism, then was a morality collectively arrived, collectively shared and collectively enforced". (Durkheim, 1933).

Moral constraint is the spinal chord of collective reality. The exteriority of the individual objectifies and legitimizes reality. Consequently exteriority and constraint are the essence of moral life. However "abrupt social changes, can limit a society's regulation power, as can rapid evolutionary changes can outstrip the development of appropriate regulative morality (Durkheim 1951).

Anomie's most essential referent is a situation that runs roughly opposite to that of a healthy social organism. It's limit, or total anomie, would be precisely the absence of any sort of society whatsoever :a dead social organism, to push Comte's analogy a bit. [28]

E. ALIENATION AND ANOMIE AS IDEOLOGY

In actual terms anomie for Durkheim is what alienation is for Marx: Metaphor for a radical attack on the dominant institutions and values of industrial society. Durkheim assumed a transcendental conception of the relationship between man and society, and the value of moral constraint, whereas Marx assumed an immanent conception and the value of freedom from constraint. Marx was interested in problems of power and change, Durkheim in the problem of the maintenance of order. The fact remains however that both have utilized alienation from a different perspective to illuminate their theories. Even under two different ideological approaches the radicalism of common elements is striking: (The anomic person is an estranged person. He cannot relate to the objective reality of "moral life", according to Durkheim. The isolation of the social whole can lead to suicide. On the other hand Marx's alienated person becomes an "abstraction" which is again, any social factor (man included) that appears isolated from the social whole. The dead social organism of total anomie, can also viewed as the total social emptiness, that results from the lack of meaningful particulars by which people experience reality. When the social whole cannot interrelate with social particulars we can except a total abstraction, a non society.

Moreover, both Marx , as we saw, and Durkheim notably recommend to view society of social facts as "things". It is indeed inconceivable to construct an idea, unless you reify its consisting characteristics. How you can explain love, for example, unless you break it up in certain expectations that produce the evidence, necessary for a communicating definition. In a final analysis this is the problem of any ideology. The non-admittance of the fact that the reification of a social fact is based on the ideological podium that we stand on. Sometimes the differences of interpretations can be enormous, sometimes they can be minor, however they are always judged in accordance not with their designated pretention to reflect reality, but rather with their chronological usefullness. There is no ideology (although willing) able to comprehend and justify society, otherwise social facts would and could remain static.[29]

Social change is apparent whenever social order (and it's reigning ideology) lose their legitimacy of reflecting objective reality. (As a philosophical extremety one might argue that objective reality is nothing more and nothing less, at least within the framework of sociology, of an extreme massive unquestionable (production and) acceptance of definitions. The anomic person, the marginal, the alienated, the crazy, the succesful, the sick, the in love the rebel does not exist before the existence of the definition). [30]

In actual terms, this very ability of an ideology to

express objective reality, distinguishes a state of mind that functions in a meaningful plus useful way, and a state of mind that has no potential of such functions.[31]

As Mannheim suggests a state of mind is utopian when it is incogruous with the state of reality within which it occurs. Consequently a change in the state of reality has immediate connotations for the respective state of mind. The "passage" of society from religion to logos and science, has devaluated the validity and legitimation of religious concepts which lost in the process their authority in explaining and guiding human life. In a sense it is a set of ideas that have lost their powers, it is ideology per se. Historically an ideological concept despite how rigid it seems or pretents to be, is bound to fall as the state of reality within which it occurs becomes simply "the past". Adorno has suggested that there is nothing untrue about ideologies themselves; The untruth exists in their pretention to reflect reality.

On the pretention of ideology to correspond and reflect reality, rest the weaknesses of the concepts used to explain this reality. Social theories cross the path of social knowledge, similar to a caravan of camels that cross the Sahara. Each one of the camels can see and criticize the hump of the one infront, but is unable to realize its own hump. The recognition of ideological biases in a theory x that social thinkers examine, is, unfortunately, not related with the recognition of the biases of theory y, under which

theory x is viewed by.

The fact that social reality is complex, confusing and lacking the "hard evidence" of the physical world, is partly responsible for the confusion, complexity and lack of paradigm for the science that is concerned with the analysis of social reality.

Symptomatic of this, are the confusions surrounding the term ideology. Shils in defining the concept suggests:" Ideologies are characterized by a high degree of explicitness of formulation over a very wide range of the subjects with wich they deal"; in addition "They passionately oppose the production of the cultural institutions of the central institutional system." (E. Shils, 1960, The Concept and Function of Ideology). Abercrombie suggests that ideology exists partly through its opposition to central values, either seeking a total transformation of these values or a total withdrawal from them: "This oppositional character invests all ideologies with a necessary political quality; however remote their direct concerns may seem to be from government, the fact that they have to strike an attitude towards the central value system politicizes them." (Nicholas Abercrombie: Class, Structure and Knowledge). If that is true, only the non admittance of sociological thought to the Pantheon of Ideologies, deters sociological concepts of being in essense the derivation of a sociopolitical reality.

Similar to the formation of the alienated man or the

anomic suicider due to their existense in society,-which is the unique framework in which they could exist in the first place-, is the formation of the ideas underlying these concepts. Not only problems are social products; their definition and explanation acquire the same features as well. Marx exists in the nineteenth century because that is the only era he could exist. The same is true from Plato and Aristotle to Durkheim, Weber, Freud, Sartre or Poulantzas. All of them are social products and indispensable part of their theories.

The above thoughts are in no way a systematized critique concerned with the analysis of the social construction of ideologies. The point we derive at is the picturing of a certain state of mind under which the diachronical concept of alienation (even as anomie), is conceived in a parallel dimension with social evolution, and the ongoing exchange between Nature and Idea. They can be interpreted as an example to demonstrate the relative usefulness of concepts when dealing with the objectification of reality; the need for a realization of their relativity.

When you ride a moving vehicle, the continuously changing sites minimize your descriptive potential of the environment. The non-static character of social reality and the vehicle-passenger relation of it with the sociological mind (or imagination), produces the same difficulties for the construction of any social theory.

A historical relation or in that matter, any relation

between concepts, can serve as a means to keep in touch with the pieces of the societal puzzle. Since we don't know were we are going is useful to know were are we coming from.

As part of the discipline we call Sociology of Knowledge, one must compare similarities between doctrines that at first sight will be dissimilar. Lovejoy suggests that the history of ideas can be constructed around the concept of the unit idea. (Lovejoy, 1950, The Great Chain of Being). The history of ideas like the sociology of Knowledge is, to some extent, an exercise in "unmasking", looking behind the very diverse things people say to the common elements of which the people themselves may be unaware. (N.Abercrombie, 1980, Class, Structure and Knowledge).

Following the conventional argument of the Marx-Mannheim position, (the Mannheim approach towards Sociology of Knowledge drew heavily on a particular interpretation of Marx), we want to emphasize the point that, not only a certain set of beliefs is associated with certain social classes but moreover, there is a reason why one particular set of beliefs, instead of any other, goes together with a particular social class.

A combined look at the two ideas, namely the common elements of diversified concepts, and the particular linkage of these concepts to certain social classes, could provide the framework for an elaborate future analysis interrelating alienation and anomie.

III. CONTEMPORARY ALIENATION

A. CONTEMPORARY CONCEPTUALIZATIONS

In the Durkheimian tradition, or what would Horton call transendent sociology, we can identify three contemporary schools of thought that consist the contemporary order theory. 1. The middle range approach of R.K.Merton, 2. The psychological approach exemplified by some of the works of Melvin Seeman and 3.The ideology of objectivity represented by Karl Popper.

Merton as a major representative of order theory, has given to anomie its broad contemporary sociological identity. Anomie is conceived as a breakdown in the cultural structure, occuring particularly when there is an acute disjunction between the cultural norms and goals and the socially structured capacities of members of the group to act in accord with them. In this conception cultural values may help to produce behavior which is at odds with the mandates of the values themselves. (R.Merton, Social Structure and Anomie). Merton's interpretation of Durkheim

place empasis upon, a. moral order as norms, b. anomie as normlessness and c. anomic suicide as deviance. Merton categorized modes of social adaptation in his famous typology contrasting cultural goals and institutional means, aiming to the understanding of a strong cultural value: The goal of monetary success.

MODES OF ADAPTATION	CULTURAL GOALS	INSTITUTIONAL MEANS
1.Conformity	+	+
2.Innovation	+	-
3.Ritualism	-	+
4.Retreatism	-	-
5.Rebellion	+/-	+/-

(plus and minus represent acceptance and non-acceptance respectively)

According to this typology society is anomic in so far as there are socially structured barriers to the achievement of the culturally legitimate goal of success and status. If however by legitimate goals we refer to the values of the social system, is like accepting the constant legitimacy of the values of the dominant groups. Middle-range theorizing assumes its value-free predispositions on a notion that proves exactly the opposite: Its identification with the existing social conditions.

The second approach is social psychological one. Melvin

Seeman categorizes six types of alienation.[32]. In his work there is a clear effort to contain into a tautonomous context both alienation and anomie. Although this conceptualization reinforces the natural relation of the concepts, is another historical opportunity for an even slight alteration of their meanings. Seeman talks about(1. Powerlessness, originated in the Marxist view, meaning the expectancy or probability held by the individual that his own behavior cannot determine the occurance of the outcomes or reinforcements he seeks. 2. Meaningless, a notion that Seeman derives from Adorno and Mannheim, suggesting that the individual is unclear on what to believe. Minimal standards of clarity for decision making are not met. 3. Normlessness, from the Mertonian tradition, meaning high expectancy that socially unapproved behaviors are required to achieve given goals. 4. Isolation, again derived from Merton, meaning to assign low reward value to goals or beliefs that are typically highly valued in the given society 5. Rebellion, pressuposes alienation from reigning goals and standards, and 6. Self-Estrangement, originated in the works of Fromm, Mills, Hoffer, Riesman, suggesting the degree of dependence of the given behavior upon anticipated future rewards. The social psychological approach employs alienation and anomie as operationalized models for survey research.)

The third approach is the approach of the professional ideologist. It is a part of both middle-range approach and survey research. It suggests that sociological findings,

including the disciplinary treatment of alienation, can be objective if they meet the standards of the sociological community. The consensual standard becomes thus the spring of objectivity.[33]

The core of the contemporary formulations is their pretention to being able to avoid the ideological idiosyngracies of the classical concepts of alienation. [34] The debate and the criticism on such approach is still very much alive. [35]

Although intellectual argumentations are always a positive and welcomed phenomenon, one should not avoid the recognition of his historically situational position in the theory of thought. What I have attempted to obtain through a historical review, is the capturing on a sociological lense static moments of the liquid notion of alienation, its various contextual realities.

B. TYPOLOGY OF THE CONCEPTUALIZATIONS OF ALIENATION

A historical cartography of alienation consists of a. its context, b. its content perspective, c. the respective view or definition, d. the ideological perspective, and e. the characteristic representatives.

1. Promethean.

CONTEXT: Metaphysical.

CONTENT PERSPECTIVE: Man v.s the unknown.

VIEW OF ALIENATION: Alienation from the natural environment, due to the fear of the "unknown", and lack of understanding natural relations. In a later face of Greek civilization it has been transformed in the inability of man to realize the moral justification of his existence.

IDEOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE: Ranges from primitive and archaic religionism to the idealism of Greek philosophy.

REPRESENTATIVES:In a liberal sense we can include Hesiod, Lycourgos, Plato.

2. Christian

CONTEXT: Religious.

CONTENT PERSPECTIVE: Man v.s God.

VIEW OF ALIENATION: Alienation from God. Internal damnation.

IDEOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE: Religious determinism.

REPRESENTATIVES: Pessimistic Christian Theology, Calvin.

3. Hegelian.

CONTEXT: Philosophical.

CONTENT PERSPECTIVE: Man v.s the environment, Idea v.s Nature.

VIEW OF ALIENATION: Alienation inherent in the objectification of reality.Estrangement of man due to his environmental relations.

IDEOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE: Idealism.

REPRESENTATIVES: German Idealists, Hegel.

4. Classical.

4a. Marx's alienation.

CONTEXT: Social, Economic.

CONTENT PERSPECTIVE: Man v.s Society (Immanent relation).

VIEW OF ALIENATION: Alienation from Nature, other men, man's own self. Saleability, objectification of man, exteriority of his own humanity. Need for radical social change.

IDEOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE: Radical historical immanence. Historical materialism.

REPRESENTATIVES: K.Marx.

4b. Durkheim's anomie.

CONTEXT: Social, Cultural.

CONTENT PERSPECTIVE: Man v.s Society (Transcendental relation).

VIEW OF ALIENATION: Alienation as anomie due to the lack of moral constraints. Weakness of the regulatory power of society. Need for social order.

IDEOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE: Naturalistic transcendentalism. Positivism.

REPRESENTATIVES: E. Durkheim.

5. Contemporary conceptualizations.

5a. Conflict theory

CONTEXT: Social- Psychological.

CONTENT PERSPECTIVE: Man v.s Society. Society as a contested struggle between groups with opposed aims and perspectives.

Men are society, society is the extension of man. Positive attitude towards change. Man is viewed as the active creator of himself and society. Underlying values: Freedom as autonomy, change action, qualitative growth.

VIEW OF ALIENATION: Self-alienation, being thwarted in the realization of individual and group goals. A problem of illegitimate social control and exploitation.

IDEOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE: Radicalism. (Need for a radical transformation of existing patterns of institution. Revolutionary change of the social system).

REPRESENTATIVES: Marxists, Fromm, Adorno, Mannheim, New Left, C.W.Mills, etc.

5b. Order theory.

CONTEXT: Social- Psychological.

CONTENT PERSPECTIVE: Man v.s society. Society as a natural boundary maintaining system of action. Man half egoistic (nature), half altruistic (society), or completely equated with the socialization process.

VIEW OF ALIENATION: As a problem of anomia in inadequate control over competing groups in the social system. Disequilibrium in the existing society.

IDEOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE: Conservativism. (Positive attitude towards the maintenance of social institutions. Extension of social control.

REPRESENTATIVES: Functionalists, Parsons, Merton, Strole, Seeman.

The typology we are suggesting is clearly a historical one. Our thematic link is the concept of alienation through the eons. It does not strive towards a judgemental evaluation, it simply shows a continuum of contextual reevaluations, from mythology to meta-capitalism. What is for the Greeks existential metaphysics, becomes religion for Kant, idealism for Hegel, materialism for Marx, cultural moralism for Durkheim, etc.. From that perspective I address the issue of a sixth category that compliments our typology: The alienation of sociology.

C. A NEW APPROACH

There is a sixth category that has to be included in our chart. The reason that is missing is really simple: It does not exist. The reason for that is that it can be considered an internal affair of sociology, which still remains a taboo topic: The alienation of sociology, or the alienation of the sociologist, or the alienation in the sociological context. If, however we want to include this category in our chart it should look something like the following.

6. The alienation of Sociology

CONTEXT   Sociological, Social Psychological

CONTENT PERSPECTIVE   Sociologist vs. sociology

VIEW OF ALIENATION   Alienation of the Discipline due to:

    a. The notion of value-free sociology,

    b. The institutionalization of sociology,

    c. The occupational character of the sociologist,

    d. The relation between sociology and society.

IDEOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE   Existential Sociologism [36]

REPRESENTATIVES   J.Horton, C.W.Mills, R.Merton, T.Adorno [37]

D. SOCIOLOGY AND ALIENATION

Theodor Adorno on the Freedom of Thought:

" We are presented on the couch with a relaxed performance of what was one enacted, with the utmost exertion of thought, by Schelling and Hegel on the lecturer's podium: the deciphering of the phenomenon. But this drop of tension affects the quality of the thought: the difference is hardly less than that between the philosophy of revelation and the random gossip of a mother-in-law. The same movement of mind which was once to elevate its "material" to a concept, is itself reduced to mere material for conceptual ordering. ·The ideas one has are just enough to allow experts to decide whether their originator is a compulsive character, an oral type, or a hysteric. Thanks to the diminished responsibility that lies in its severance from reflection, from rational control, speculation is itself handed over as an object to science, whose subjectivity is extinguished with it. Thought, in allowing itself to be reminder of its unconscious origins by the administrative structure of analysis, forgets to be thought. From true judgement it becomes neutral stuff. Instead of mastering itself by performing the task of

conceptualization, it entrusts itself impotently to processing by the doctor, who in any case knows everything beforehand. Thus speculation is definitively crushed, becoming itself a fact to be included in one of the departments of classification as proof that nothing changes." (Theodor Adorno, 1960, Minima Moralia).

The lack of comparative and historical material in viewing alienation, cause to sociology a certain narrowness in its depth of field. A latent effect of that is targeted towards the "viewing point" of the intellectual, that is his/her own historical position, within the context that he/she considers as his/her subject matter. As a result he/she is limiting his/her potential for interpretation and understanding.

A second point that needs future elaboration is the role of the sociologist (as intellectual) in the broader society. Intellectuals more and more are acquiring an ornamental position in social reality. Their immediate socio-economic influence is minimum and their acceptability does not rest on their usefulness towards economy or polity; it rather rests on the premice or pretention of society to be culturally advanced, intellectually progressive, open, free, and diverse. Intellectuals are becoming the social ornaments. This in itself can be the context of the alienation of the sociologist as an intellectual.

It is true, and we have to give credit to intellectuals of various ideological podiums, that questions on the deterioration of sociological thinking have been raised. Unfortunately though they have been received by the

sociological community as a by right eccentricity of some great sociological minds. The paradox in what we shall call the alienation of sociology, rests on its acceptability as a normal phenomenon. The deterioration of sociological thinking is not really apparent in either a qualitative or a quantitative approach. One reason for that is that the standards of measuring content quality have become a. extremely specialized within the so called schools of thought, and b. given by sociologists themselves. Objectivity has been identified with a collective consensus. A second reason is that quantitative sociology due to its occupational and societal usefulness has become an axiom of its own. Alienation in sociology, however, can be detected in how contemporary sociologists attack the concept of alienation. J.Horton makes a distinction between the approaches of the classics (meaning Marx and Durkheim) and the contemporary social thinkers."In the works of Marx and Durkheim alienation and anomie critically and negatively describe states of social disorder from utopian standards of societal or human health. Today dehumanization has set in, the concepts have been transmogrified into things instead of evaluations about thins, and is no longer clear what alienated men are alienated from." (J. Horton, 1974, Dehumanization of anomie and alienation).

This purely sociological transformation of alienation and anomie can very well start what we can call the sociology of sociology. I have tried to show that the

concept of alienation in social history is a history of different ideologies, different socially conditioned approaches to the question of individual dissatisfaction and social discontent. Ideology continues its march into contemporary sociology and affects sociological thought and praxis. If we accept that sociology is a reflexive discipline, I believe it should reflect of its own practices. I will argue on three main points: 1. The wide acceptance of the idea of value-free sociology is an ideology on its own. 2. The institutionalization of sociology and the occupational character of the sociologist have deprived in a certain extent the intellectual of his most valuable tool: His "Sociological Imagination".[38] 3. The relation between sociology and society is in itself alienating for the sociologist.

I have to start here by defining the use of the term "ideology" in the specific context. Ideology is employed here in a broader sense as any socially determined perspective.[39]

There is a certain historical connection between sociology and ideology, as it has been a connection, or rather a distinction between ideology and science. Starting from Comte's impact on modern thought, reason was to replace prejudice. Science was to repeat, in our understanding of human society, the demystifications it had seemingly accomplished in respect of the world of nature.[40]. Prejudism is linked with ideology and reason with science.

If science is reason ideology than is unreason; from that on the link between ideology and non-science has been radicalized.[41]. In that sense any contemporary sociologist will agree that Promethean alienation and Christian alienation having no scientific basis do have- and have indeed- ideological origins. The socially determined perspective of the concept is either metaphysical or religious, thus non-scientific, thus ideological. In the works of Marx and Durkheim, alienation and anomie critically and negatively describe states of social disorder from utopian standards of societal or human health. Again, besides the fact that the tremendous impact of the two prohibits the characterization of non-science, contemporary sociologists agree that the classical definitions of alienation contain different ideologies. Contemporary change and order approaches towards alienation and anomie share a common characteristic. They have been formulated within a specific sociological context that is known as objective sociology, or value- free sociology. In that sense sociology parts company with ideology, parts company with no reason, and finally becomes reason and science. This can be interpreted as an effort on behalf of sociologists to realize the position of the discipline in the realm of sciences, (even as a "soft" science, in distinction with the "hard" natural sciences), and it has a mighty relation with the institutionalization of sociology. In order to return to the specific argument of value-free sociology I would like

to raise a question. What do we consider sociology?
Naturalism? Structuralism? Functionalism? or Conflict
theories? In actuality sociology can be defined in Giddens'
way: The study of the institutions of the industrialized
society. There is no single way, single paradigm, single
methodology for doing this. There are various interrelated
approaches to social problems and on such diversity a value
free sociology has not be proven to exist yet. "Such a
position [values have been done away] is the epitomy of
alienated and unsociological thinking".(J.Horton,
Dehumanization of Anomie and Alienation). In other words the
fact that the ostrich hides its head in a hole so it cannot
see the danger does not mean that the danger is non-
existent. Furthermore the acceptance of value-free sociology
is an ideological position per se since a priori negation of
the "value" is based on an assumption of scientific
determinism, that it can obscure the demystification of
social relations. In a final sense sociology by its own
nature cannot avoid not to be diverse and imaginative.[42]

The second question I have raised deals with the
institutionalization of sociology and the occupational
character of the sociologist. It is true that sociology as a
discipline could not have survived unless it became, as it
did, a part of the Academia, part of the educational
institution. In order to accomplish that it had to adjust in
its maximum potential to the standards of natural sciences.
The basic model of natural sciences is to reveal or

demistify common sense beliefs about the physical world. The view was transferred en bloc to sociology: Revelation or demystification of the social world. The early sociologists, most notably Durkheim, argued that social objects must be approached and studied as one would study natural or physical phenomena.

Sociology, although often characterized as pseudo-science, was accepted as a legitimate discipline. In actual terms, in a sociological vocabulary, it was not sociology per se, an objectified reality, that became part of the academic institution. It was rather a group of intellectuals, with a diversity of ideas, prospects and outlooks, concerned with the same broad subject matter: The social world. By becoming part of an institution they found themselves within the exact same normative order, within the exact same institutional relations that they were supposed to reveal. It is this transformation from independent to institutionalized, from marginal to status quo, from imagination to tradition, that has carried along a movement from radical to conformist values, from anti-middle class to middle class values, what Horton defines as "Value Relativism".[43] It is useful to keep in mind that the begining of sociology was in a certain extent a social movement, and the classics never hide the fact that they wanted to reshape social reality. Once sociologists became part of social reality they received their share of legitimated power, they acquired an administrative

hierarchy, they developed a bureaucratic ethos.[44]. I believe that within the Academia it has been proven that Sociologists are not immune to the system. Merton recognizes that fact, and expresses a serious epistemological concern. Merton has delt with the role of the intellectual in public bureaucracy in his Social Theory and Social Structure. However his questioning is towards the revelation of the exact position that the intellectual assumes within social order. He assumes that the sociologist can be objective in recognizing the variations that exist between his/her own values and the values of the bureaucracy. However the real problem starts when the values of the later dillute the values of the former, and thence an objective distinction between them becomes impossible. The Sociological mission has been absorbed in the occupational character of the sociologist. The vast number of sociology graduates (and in recent years statistics show that it is not that vast), are employed by wealthy institutions, corporations, army, goverment, in order to use their craftmanship of applied sociology towards the interest of the employer. (C. W. Mills, 1967, The bureaucratic Ethos). I am not questioning here the undisputed value and necessity of applied sociology. This, however, does not mean that we do not have to be concerned about the uses of the discipline and the transformation of its values.

The occupational character of the sociologist leads us to the third argument: The relation between society and the

sociologist is in itself alienating. There has been no empirical study about the social discontent of the sociologist. I believe it should be done. Sociologists rarely view themselves as participants in social reality, when employing the aura of the disciplinary characteristics. The acceptance of their participation immediately assumes subjectivity and relativism (which is not scientific). The sociological socialization of the sociologist automaticaly switches off this possibility. The fact, however, that a sociologist can define and explain what for any other social member is "common-sense", cannot be used as a shield towards personal or social maladies. [45]. From a conflict perspective, the sociologist can be alienated by the capitalist structure. From an order perspective he can be anomic due to institutional misfunctions. From a socio-psychological perspective he can be anything from isolated to schizophrenic. In any case the sociologist-person was not a sociologist for the first twenty years of his life. He was a baby and a child and a teenager and during these stages his social environment was not making exceptions about his socialization. The sociologist must reinforce in his/her sociological thinking his role as a participant in the social game. He/she has a.to realize the ideological margins of his/her sociology and b. to take into account not only the situational and problematic nature of meaning, but also the situational and problematic character of his/her interpretations, taking into account his/her dualism as the

participant and the trained spectator.[46]

I am arguing that the concept of alienation has to be recognized as a lively variable within the practice of sociology. With this statement which can and should be systematically verified, I suggest the need for the appreciation of sociology as an institution through a sociology of sociology. I believe that sociological thinking has a lot to be benefited from, if it opens a new direction towards an internal criticism of its own structure. Alienation and ideology in sociological thinking can virtually serve as basic concepts for inquiry.

NOTES

NOTES

1. See, Trent Schroyer, 1973, The Critique of Domination.

2. Contemporary definitions of alienation and anomie have been offered by both order and change theories in both social and psychological levels.

3. See, G. Lukacs, 1968, History and Class Consciousness.

4. See, Italo Calvino, 1980, Le Cosmicomiche.

5. See, Hesiod's Theogonia.

6. For an elaboration on that see, Gilbert Murray 1925, Five Stages of Greek Religions.

7-8. See, T. Schroyer, The Critique of Domination.

9. See, George Novack, 1970, The Marxist theory of Alienation.

10. See, Ernest Mandel 1970, The Marxist Theory of Alienation.

11. See, G. Lukacs,1960, Ideology and class consciousness, in History and Class Consciousness.

12-13. See, T.B.Bottomore, 1964, Karl Marx: Early writings.

14. See, Istvan Meszaros, 1970, Marx's Theory of Alienation.

15. See, Karl Marx: The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1884.

16. The term "utopia", is used here not in a Mannheimian aproach; it is closer to its etymological Greek meaning.

17. See, David McLellan, 1979, Marxism after Marx.

18. See, A. Giddens, 1971, Capitalism and modern Social

Theory.

19-20.   See, B. Ollman, 1976, Alienation.

21.   For a discussion on Contemporary Theory and Ideology, refer to J. Horton, Order and conflict theories of social problems.

22.   Relativism   in   Social   Theory   contradicts   the Objectiveness in social inquiry.

24. See, K. Marx: The Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844.

25. See, Giddens' analysis of Durkheim in, Capitalism and Modern Social Theory.

26-27.   See, E. Durkheim, Suicide, The Free Press, 1951.

28.   See, R. Hilbert, Anomie and the Moral Regulation of Reality, Soc. Theory, Spring '86.

29.   This view is shared by Existential Sociologists.   See, P.K.Manning, Existential Sociologists, The Soc. Quarterly, Spring 1973.

30.   The idea is basic in Labelling theory.

31. See, K. Mannheim,1936, Ideology and Utopia.

32.   See,   M.   Seeman,1959,   On   the   Meanings   of Alienation,A.S.R.

33.   See, K. Popper,1956, The Open Society and its Enemies.

34. See, J. Horton, 1964, Dehumanization of Anomie and Alienation, British Journal of Sociology.

35. See,   R. Hilbert, Anomie and the Moral Regulation of Reality.

36.   The term "existential" is used in accordance with the

definition of P.K.Manning in his discussion on Existential Sociologists. The term "Sociologism" suggests an inner aproach on the subject matter.

37. The names are not chosen as actually representing such an approach. Instead they are employed because besides their different ideological perspectives, each one has raised concern about the impact of the social system on the sociologist. Mills and Horton have loudly suggested the existence of the "alienated sociologist".

38. The term is borrowed and used as in C.W.Mills, The Sociological Imagination.

39. See, A. Giddens, 1979, Ideology and Consciousness, in, Central Problems in Social Theory.

40. See, Paul Ricoeur, 1974, Structure and Hermeneutics.

41. Althusser and Popper have produced in recent years the most articulated defenses of the view that science can be separated from other types of symbol systems.

42. See, C.W.Mills' discussion on the philosophies of Science,in, The Social Imagination.

43. See, Horton's discussion on immanent and transcendent sociology, in, Dehumanization of Anomie and Alienation.

44. C.W.Mills, Bureaucratic ethos (The Sociological Imagination).

45. See, Giddens' discussion on the "lay critique of sociology", in Central Problems in Social Theory.

46. See, T. Adorno, 1974, On the Freedom of Thought, in, Minima Moralia.

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