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thesis entitled

The United States Information Agency:
Utilizing the Voice of America
as a Public Diplomacy Initiative in Brazil

presented by

Michelle Denise Massey

has been accepted towards fulfillment
of the requirements for

Masters degree in Telecommunication

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MSU Is An Affirmative Action/Equal Opportunlty Institution

THE UNITED STATES INFORMATION AGENCY:
UTILIZING THE VOICE OF AMERICA AS A
PUBLIC DIPLOMACY INITIATIVE IN BRAZIL

BY

Michelle Denise Massey

A THESIS

Submitted to
Michigan State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

Department of Telecommunication

1989

C904 l " (0)4

ABSTRACT
THE UNITED STATES INFORMATION AGENCY:

UTILIZING THE VOICE OF AMERICA AS A
PUBLIC DIPLOMACY INITIATIVE IN BRAZIL

BY

Michelle Denise Massey

The United States Information Agency (USIA) is a public
diplomacy agency that utilizes the Voice of America (VOA) as
a broadcasting arm to communicate the government's message
to foreign publics. The author analyzes the relationship
between the broadcasting of the VOA to Brazil and how it
relates to public diplomacy. This thesis attempts to:

1. Provide some insight into what public diplomacy is
considered to be and what it is designed to achieve.

2. Determine what motivates the USIA and VOA to operate in
the manner that they do. 3. Emphasize that Brazil (as well
as other countries) are worth having quality time and effort

invested into them. The significance of these issues is

discussed.

Copyright by
MICHELLE DENISE MASSEY
1989

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to thank Joseph Straubhaar and Thomas Muth for
the assistance, time and dedication that they devoted to
this project.

iv

CHAPTER

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION

HISTORY OF BROADCASTING IN BRAZIL
History of Radio

Colonial Influence

The 20th Century

The 19305 and '403: The Vargas Rule
History of Television

The 19505: The Introduction

1960 to the Present: General Overview

INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL INFLUENCES ON
BROADCASTING
Internal Influences
Brazilian Elites
Clothesline Literature
Illiteracy
The Government
External Influences
The United States and Transnationals
Conclusions-Brazilian Broadcasting

USIA HISTORY
The Humble Beginnings
A Period of Governmental Rest
The First Small Step
On to Bigger and Better Things
The Administration and Policy Themes

PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

Propaganda or Public Diplomacy?
Other Views
Terminology Debated

Public Diplomacy in the USIA
A Closer Look

THE VOICE OF AMERICA
VOA Charter
A Closer Look at the Charter
A Public Diplomacy Branch
VOA in the Americas
Bandeirantes-Public Diplomacy in Action

V

PAGE

19
19
19
23
24
25
29
29
35

37
37
39
40
43
46

51
51
52
56
58
58

63
63
64
66
70
72

AUDIENCES 76

VOA Audiences 76
Audiences in Brazil 77
Budget/Modernization Analysis 83
RECOMMENDATIONS 89
CONCLUSION 99
BIBLIOGRAPHY 103

vi

LIST OF TABLES

TABLE PAGE
1 U.S. Understanding SS
2 U.S. and Brazilian Relations 82

vii

INTRODUCTION

This thesis will investigate the particular pattern of
the United States Information Agency (USIA) in Brazil.
Brazil presents a unique case study. It has emerged from a
blanket of colonialism and rapidly revealed in the light of
a notion that may well be termed an information society.
Historically, Brazil has had close economic and media ties
to the United States. Therefore, it is no surprise that the
USIA has a special interest in Brazil. The United States
Information Agency considers itself a public diplomacy
agency that utilizes the Voice of America (VOA) as a
broadcasting arm to communicate the message of the
government and the environment of the United States to
foreign publics.

Using mass communication to influence the opinion of an
international audience is believed to be a vital part of the
international diplomatic process (Straubhaar & Boyd, 1989).
Public diplomacy can consist of utilizing any form of
communication that is publicly disseminated (exchange
programs, films, books, etc. . .) by a governmental
structure to a foreign audience. The united States
Information Agency is a current example of the type of

communication organization that is utilized to advance the

2
foreign goals of the United States government. The use of
communication resources to sway public opinion, is for many,
too closely related to propaganda. Propaganda, in its most
basic sense, utilizes resources to manipulate the opinions
of a foreign audience. ”Propaganda is the deliberate and
systematic attempt to shape perceptions, manipulate
cognition, and direct behavior to achieve a response that
furthers the desired intent of the propagandist" (Jowett &
O’Donnell, 1986, p. 16). When looked at objectively, it
appears that public diplomacy is trying to do primarily what
propaganda does. ”In a purely dictionary sense, public
diplomacy embraces some of the aspects of
propaganda--the spreading of ideas and information for the
purpose of helping an institution or a cause” (Hansen, 1984,
p. 7).

A first question for the thesis is to examine USIA and
U.S. public diplomacy. Since World War II the actions of
government influences communication agencies have been the
topic of continuous debate. Each administration fosters a
distinct perspective reflecting the philosophy of the
President.

The issues that are debated often consist of the
following: How should the USIA attempt to tell the story of
the U.S. to the world? What should be the content of the
VOA programs? What is public diplomacy (or propaganda) and

how should it be implemented? These and a variety of

3
similar issues have been recurring in the evolution of the
United States Information Agency.

Secondly, this thesis will review the path that public
diplomacy has taken. Public diplomacy is professed to be a
form of communication with its only goal being increased
understanding. Public diplomacy is the device that when
implemented, is supposed to bring the two entities (the USIA
and the Brazilian public) together in mutual understanding
about the policies and actions of the United States
Government, as well as of America.

Through literature reviews and examples, the thesis
will determine distinct differences between public diplomacy
and propaganda. It will also ask: What is its relationship
to policy.

Third, this thesis will look at the public diplomacy
efforts taking place in Brazil. Besides fulfilling the
mission as outlined in the Voa charter, the Brazilian Branch
of the VOA currently created a new format in radio
programming called Bandeirantes. The VOA has changed the
public diplomacy format by developing this program because
their audience was dwindling and they decided to take a
different approach before their service was removed from the
air, also, shortwave is becoming obsolete and mediumwave can
reach a wider more diverse audience. By utilizing a
Brazilian network to transmit its broadcasts, they are also

functioning as public diplomats on a one-on-one basis.

4

This thesis follows the history of Brazil and the USIA
to establish the past and present environments to better
understand the current circumstances under which they both
operate.

Other questions to be examined are: Is the
government's was of thinking really a reflection of America?
Is attempting to bring a public around to your way of
thinking propaganda (or at least persuasion)? Are budgetary
restraints and Radio Marti really hampering the initiatives
of the VOA? Do relations and research efforts within the
USIA need to be expanded?

The Voice of America is an important and reliable
source in the communications arena. Though literature
reviews, personal observations and interviews, the
relationship between the United States Information Agency
and Brazil will be examined. It is important to see where
they have been, where they are going, and how a new form of
information technology is effecting both societies.
Hopefully the progress being made in Brazil can be used as
an example for other ares on how to effectively communicate

during an era of public diplomacy.

HISTORY OF BROADCASTING IN BRAZIL

Broadcasting entered Latin America as an import from
developed or more developed nations. These countries
brought not only the hardware but also the ways to implement
it. In general, Britain, the United States, and France were
the principle countries that brought their models to
developing nations. For better or worse, it appears that
when a broadcasting model from a developed country is
incorporated into a developing country's infrastructure,
”the norms, unwritten rules, styles of production, values,
professional codes and expectations, beliefs, and attitudes

They are transferred directly through training,
socialization, and expectation, and indirectly as functions
of the importation of structures, technologies, and content
of broadcasting that originate in the advanced industrial
nations." (Katz and Wedell, 1977, pp. 67-68) .

Although outsiders may determine the model that enters
the country, the domestic government has the power to shape
its national system and keep the model within its standards.
The political climate, the media ownership patterns, and the
methods of gaining access to the media are all issues that

may affect the broadcasting system, and help determine who

6
has access to the national audience. These factors are
extremely applicable to Brazil.

Since the first Brazilian radio transmissions generated
across the airways in 1922, Brazil’s media market has
rapidly expanded. In 1985 Brazil ranked second in the world
in number of radio stations. Its television network, Rede
Globo, is said to be the fifth largest network in the world
(Head, 1985). Radiobras, a government television network,
has been established to provide broadcasting to those areas
not served by the commercial stations.

There are several internal and external factors, some
mentioned previously, which are crucial in molding the path
the media system (radio in particular) did and will take.
Others that also need to be analyzed more closely are:
Revenue sources, advertising, and the origins of Brazilian
broadcasting: when and how different players entered the
game. These actors are primarily comprised of foreign
countries, transnational corporations, the Brazilian elite,
as well as the government. These entities have all played a
part in Brazil's political, economic, and social arena, and

they will continue to have an impact into the future.

HISTORY OF RADIO

Colonial Influence

Due to the lack of a powerful indigenous culture in

Brazil, there has not been the foundation to deter the

7
penetration of European culture as there is in the Arab
world, China, India, or even Peru and Mexico. As Lins da
Silva points out, even during the first centuries of
colonization, there was a lack of indigenous culture to mix
with the culture of the colonizer, the need for a uniform
society to provide the European market with certain
products, and for Brazilian elites to be more responsive to
the needs of the colonizers than to the demands of the
population, did not permit the native culture to survive
(Lins da Silva, 1986).

Most Latin American countries were greatly influenced
by the colonial traditions of their colonizers—-the British,
Danish, Dutch, French, Spanish, and Portuguese. Even after
these countries physically left, their influence still
remains in the social structures and the language of the
countries (Head, 1985). This colonial dependency paved the
way; enabling foreign interest to penetrate the Brazilian
system and reap the profits with minimal difficulties.

As Coutinho points out, it is not realistic to assume
that European culture blanketed Brazil and left the people
with no identity at all:

"The history of Brazilian culture . . . can be
schematically defined as the history of the assimilation--
mechanical or critical, passive or transformative--of the
universal culture (which is certainly a highly
differentiated culture) by the several classes and social

strata of Brazil. In sum: when Brazilian thought ‘imports'

8
a universal ideology, it is proof that a specific class or
social stratum of our country found (or thought it found) in
that ideology of the expression of its own Brazilian class
interest. For example, when the Brazilian working class
took shape, it did not look for adequate theoretical
expression in Bororo myths or in African relations.” (Lins
da Silva, 1985, p.99)

Thus it is apparent that Brazilians did maintain some
degree of cultural awareness, but as a result of
colonialization, they were desensitized to foreign
intervention when broadcasting and it foreign entourage

entered Brazil.
The 20th Century

The first license for a commercial radio station in
Brazil was issued by the national government on August 2,
1920 in Rio. On August 27 a similar licensing process
transpired in Buenos Ares. The closeness in the licensing
dates has created decades of arguments between Argentina and
Brazil as to which nation was the founder of radio (Alisky,
1981).

The first official person to be heard over the air was
President Epitacio Pessoa during the celebrations of
Brazil’s one hundredth year of independence on September 7,
1922 (Oliveira, 1988). There were only 80 receivers in

operation at the time, thus, only the social elite of Rio de

9
Janeiro were able to hear the speech of the President in
their homes. (Ortriwano, 1985). Westinghouse installed a
radio transmitter which transmitted 500 watts, and was
placed high on Corcovado. Many days after the first
transmissions, there were operas transmitted live from the
municipal theater of Rio de Janeiro. The demonstration
caused an impact, but the transmissions were soon stopped
due to the lack of a plan for its continuation (Ortriwano,
1985).

April 20, 1923 is the date that we are definitely able
to consider as the date of the installation of broadcasting
in Brazil. The first station, the Radio Sociedade do Rio de
Janeiro (Radio Society of Rio de Janeiro), was established
on this date and was funded by Roquette Pinto and Henry
Morize (Frederico, 1982). The station had 2,000 watts of
power and was installed by Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo
Telephone Company, Westinghouse International, and Western
Electric..

Radio was born for the well-to-do Brazilians and not
the masses, due mainly to the fact that the only ones who
were able to afford receivers were the very rich. During
the 19205 the programming functions were: to take a little
bit of education, culture and altruism (Ortriwano, 1985).
These functions were born as an undertaking of the
intellectuals and the scientists. Small elitist groups
cultivated the technological innovation, contributing with

money, helping to produce programs, playing their musical

10
instruments, singing, talking, and listening (Oliveira,
1988). In the beginning, the opera was listened to with
records loaned by the listeners, poetry recitals, concerts,
cultural talks, etc., and the programs were always very
selective. But since the beginning, Roquette Pinto was
convinced that broadcasting was a medium for the masses.
Even so, the reality of the 19205 was that the popular
culture did not have access to radio, because it was not
characterized as an entertainment of the masses. The forms
of radio were individualistically diverse through a small
number of broadcasting installations which had little
interest in the global society (Ortriwano, 1985).

In the first stages, radio was maintained through
monthly payments of those who owned sets, public and private
donations, and very rarely, paid advertisements, that
strictly speaking, were prohibited thrOugh legislation of
the time. At this time they were also making an appeal, to
those interested, to adhere to a social broadcast and
helping to maintain it. Renato Murce said that perseverance
is not a very Brazilian virtue, after some months, no one
had contributed much (Ortriwano, 1985). Thus, radio fought
through the decade without a stable economic or financial

structure that was able to benefit its growth.

11

The 19308 and ’405: The Vargas Rule

From the beginning of the 19303 radio suffered a
radical transformation due to the fact that its survival was
in danger. In 1932 a decree was issued that permitted the
introduction of advertising and increased the accessibility
of receivers. The introduction of commercial messages
immediately transformed radio. What was once ”scholarly",
”educational”, ”cultural” became "popular" programming. In
order to maintain a format that listeners were accustomed to
and to insure that the public was reached, the
advertisements were not able to interrupt concerts, but
spots were permitted between performances of popular music,
humorist orations, and other attractions that were emerging
and eventually dominated the programming (Ortriwano, 1985).

With the advent of publicity, the question of how to
organize this advertising undertaking became a dispute in
the marketplace. When slots for commercials were taken
under consideration three facets of the station were
deliberated: technical development, status of emission and
its popularity. The preoccupation with education was
beginning to be set aside as a determining factor, and what
would appeal to local merchants began to take over. Variety
shows, music, and news entertained as well as informed the
population, which was largely centered on the Atlantic

coast. Radio was the primary instrument used to unify the

12
country and was effective due to the universal language:
Portuguese.

During the 19303 President Getulio Vargas realized
radios potential as a political tool. Vargas favored and
encouraged the expansion of commercial broadcasting. He
began to realize the promise of this medium when it became
apparent that radio was much more efficient for spreading
messages than was printed matter, due to the large amount of
illiteracy in the country. To ensure his message was heard,
the government was able to exercise strict control,
including censorship of radio broadcasts. The functions of
radio emerged as direct links to the political and economic
development of the country. Vargas helped make radio an
indispensable part of everyday life by placing it in the
service of the national economy, utilizing it to the utmost,
and creating a public vehicle with the multiple objectives
of popular expression and national integration (Ortriwano,
1985). Even though Vargas and his government had their
hands in much of the medium, some stations were still able
to legitimately fulfil these objectives.

In 1935, there were two creations that marked the
development of programming on the Brazilian broadcasts.
Radio Kosmos, of Sao Paulo broke the traditional cycle of
programming by including the participation of the audience
in the shows. At the same time in Rio de Janeiro, Radio

Journal of Brazil was established to provide a system of

13
programs primarily for information. Its manner was strict
and it gained much notoriety.

As the decade marched on, Brazilian radio went along
its way, defining its purpose and becoming an integral part
in the political and economic life of the country. Gertulio
Vargas was the first Brazilian leader to see the great
political implication of radio and went on to use it within
his regime (Ortriwano, 1985).

After a while there was much concern about Vargas'
methods and his intentions. In response to critics who
attacked his methods of utilizing the media, Vargas started
broadcasting political message nationwide (Rosen, 1988). He
placed the Departamento Oficial de Propaganda (Official
Department of Propaganda)--DOP in charge of a section of
radio that was called ”Hora do Brasil” ("Hour of Brazil").
This program was required to be retransmitted by all radio
outlets in the nation, from seven to eight every evening.
These broadcasts explaining the government and its actions
were dotted with music and news of the entertainment world
via interviews with Brazilian film, theater, radio and
recording artists. (Alisky, 1981).

In order to maintain a strong hold on the reins, Vargas
created and recreated many departments within his
government. In 1934 the DOP was transformed into the
Departamento de Propaganda e Difusao Cultural (Department of
Propaganda and Cultural Diffusion) which then started "A Voz

do Brasil” (”The Voice of Brazil"). President Vargas

14
created the Brazilian Radio Commission in 1936 (Ortriwano,
1985). This entity scrutinized all licensed station
operators in detail. New regulations that were put into
effect demanded that public service announcements from the
government be placed on all stations. Later on December 27,
1939 a decree created the Departamento de Imprensa e
Propaganda--DIP, which was directly tied to the President
and which also replaced the Department of Propaganda and
Cultural Diffusion. DIP's responsibility consisted of
supervising and censoring not only the content of the radio
programs, but also the cinema, theater and newspapers.
Later “A Voz do Brasil” passed its responsibility
to the National Agency, presently the Empresa Brasileira de
Noticia3--EBN (Brazilian News Firm) (Ortriwano, 1985).

It appears that the multitude of departmental
transactions took place to maintain a watch dog function to
flush out any loopholes and solidify the system. Perhaps
this was done due to the fact that most of Brazilian
broadcasting was (and still is) in private hands. Among the
commercial stations, the most popular for quite a few years
was the Radio Nacional (National Radio) of Rio de Janeiro.
Its goal was to cover the entire nation with its mediumwave
and shortwave bands, and its popularity was immense. In the
19503 the station received 19,125,056 letters during a

national campaign (Oliveira, 1988, p. 36).

15

In 1940, the Vargas government decided that Radio
Nacional had to become an affirmative instrument of the
regime. The '403 also saw the emergence of the first
radionovela (soap opera)--in 1942, it went on the air
through Radio Nacional of Rio de Janeiro and was titled:

”Em Busca da Felicidade” (”In Search of Happiness"). This
type of programming caught on quickly making it a major part
of the programming during this period of broadcasting. In
1945, Radio Nacional along transmitted 14 novelas daily
(Ortriwano, 1985).

Freedom from censorship did not occur until Vargas was
removed from the presidency, in 1945, and General Eurico
Gasper Dutra took over. Ironically, the media that Vargas
so loved to manipulate ended up contributing to his death.
on August 24, 1954, four years after his reelection, Vargas
felt that public opinion was against him too much permit his
further effectiveness as president. He took his own life to
put a halt to the weeks of assault from the newspapers and

broadcasting stations (Alisky, 1981).

HISTORY OF TELEVISION

The 19503: The Introduction

After the Vargas reign, the new civilian Government

paid little attention to broadcasting. Brazilian editors and

16
commentators now had the opportunity to develop their skills
and write their own thoughts.

Radio's heyday lasted throughout the 19503, thus
ignoring the introduction of television. One of the main
reasons was due to the lack of receivers available to the
public. The first television station, TV Tupi of Sao Paulo,
went on the air in 1950. The station's owner imported 100
sets and distributed them to public places because the price
of receivers was beyond the common income (Oliveira, 1988,
p. 36). Therefore, TV did not have any adverse impact on
radio.

As the '503 came to an end and the ’603 began, more
affordable television sets were made available outside of
the realm of the elite. Live advertising with garotas-
propaganda (advertising girls) became popular and domestic
and international corporations began switching to
television. In the presence of all these changes, radio
felt pressured to change its format to mostly music and
news, as well as reducing its budget in order to be able to

compete with television (Oliveira, 1988).

1960 to the Present: General Overview

The 1960s consisted of a decade dominated by military

rule which ended in 1985. But this did not stop the

prosperous path of the broadcasting media.

17

During this time, two important commercial stations
were set up: TV Globo and TV Bandeirantes. TV Globo
captured the audience early on and they still enjoy the
viewership of the majority of the audience in the '803.

A3 a token attempt to fulfil the ”educational" dream of
the '203 and ’303, educational programs are required by law
in both radio and television. The government's ”Projecto
Minerva“ (”Minerva Project”) is required to be broadcast
over all AM radio outlets. It is transmitted from 8:00 to
8:30 in the evening (Oliveira, 1988). This program is
targeted at the less educated portion of the nation in an
attempt to lower the nation’s 23 percent illiteracy rate
(Sanders, 1988). Television usually uses such programs as
Sesame Street or ”Sitio do Pica Pau” (The Yellow Woodpecker
Ranch) to satisfy the obligation (Oliveira, 1988).

Not only does radio have to worry about the competition
it is receiving from television, but also from pirate
stations. Piracy seems to be very popular in Sao Paulo.
There are several popular FM radio stations that operate
without a license. The primary reasons these stations are
rising to the surface is in response to the lack of a
variety of programming. Mest commercial stations may be
reluctant to adopt the pirate station's formats because they
have budgets and advertisers to take into consideration. In
addition, they do not have the freedom to experiment with
alternative

programming. The pirate stations do not have to broadcast

18
for a profit and often use homemade equipment (Oliveira,

1988) .

INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL INFLUENCES ON BROADCASTING IN BRAZIL

INTERNAL INFLUENCES

Brazilian Elites

Throughout the communication history of Brazil, the
elite have had a hand in the content of programs, the
ownership of the media, and the direction of the general
economy. Historically the elite have owned and operated the
television and radio networks, thus having a substantial
role in the cultural and social atmosphere of the country.
This is not to say that no local stations exist. As of
1982, 1130 medium wave or AM stations existed and 398 FM
stations were on the air (Straubhaar). But these
entrepreneurial stations usually only carry an impact in
their local community and have no influence outside of their
realm. On the other hand, once an elite owns one of the
media networks they often have holdings in the newspaper and
magazine industry. Roberto Marinho, a giant in the
communications field, is a current example of the amount of
power that can be welded by a media owning elite. TV Globo,
the fourth largest network in the world, is the network that
Marinho owns (De Lima, 1988). Millions of Brazilians watch

TV Globo which airs and produces telenovelas (soap operas

19

20

with cultural themes) nightly. It is primarily these soap
operas that give TV Globo its $500 million a year turn over
(Economist, 1987).

As of 1982, the Rede Globo Television Network dominated
75% of Brazil's total audience (Howell, 1986). It does not
broadcast more than one hour of foreign programming during
prime time (from 6:00 p.m. to 12:00 p.m.). In addition to
the novelas the network broadcasts humor programs,
documentaries and musicals which are produced in Brazil.
Even though the themes and content of the programs are
obviously Brazilian, the style and format of them are
influenced by North American models (Lins da Silva, 1986).

Marinho also controls the popular Jornal Nacional, TV
Globo’s 30-minute news program, which is nestled between the
two prime-time telenovelas. Even though the soap operas
bring in an ample amount of money, it is Jornal Nacional
that makes Roberto Marinho an influential man in the
Brazilian economy. His background as a journalist gives him
the credentials to write editorials for the family
newspaper, O Globo. Besides the internal interests
previously mentioned, the Marinho group is also involved in
other lines of domestic businesses such as radio, records,
video sales, telecommunications and publishing, and also
does business in mining, agriculture, real estate, and
manufacturing. Abroad, Marinho purchased TV Monte Carlo in
1985 (Economist, 1987). In each of these endeavors the

government supports and cooperates in every way it can.

21
This is not surprising due to TV Globois and, in particular,
Mr. Marinho’s history with the government. One of TV
Globo’s main claims to fame with the government is that it
has never confronted them. TV Globo was founded in 1965,
just a year after the revolution and the military took
control, and became an instrument of sophisticated
propaganda to the next series of military regimes. Even
though the end of formal censorship came in the mid-19703
Marinho controls the content of Jornal Nacional and O Globo
so that it reflects his conservative views. As Roberto
Marinho explains it: ”We give all necessary information,
but our opinions are in some way or other dependent on my
character, my convictions and my patriotism" (Economist,
1987, p. 44).

Vencino A. De Lima does not see Marinho’s intervention
in political matters as a patriotic mission. De Lima claims
that the Globo group has manipulated its television
newscasts by ”distorting, suppressing, and promoting
information according to its own interests and those of the
class fraction it represents” (De Lima, 1988, p. 108)

The "you scratch my back, I’ll scratch yours' mentality
is readily apparent in the government/Marinho relationship.
In 1984, Marinho backed the civilian candidate Tancerdo
Neves due to the fact that the retiring military president
General Joao Figueiredo could not tolerate the ruling

party's candidate. When Neves died before taking office,

22
Marinho threw his support behind the next civilian in line:
President Jose Sarney.

It just so happens that the communications minister,
Antonio Carlos, is Marinho’s friend, ally and business
partner. Conveniently Carlos was able to sign a profitable
supply contract with a telecommunications firm that Marinho
had just purchased. The government has also taken
precautions to ensure that the new constitution being
drafted by Congress excludes any reference to the regulation
of broadcasting (Economist, 1987).

The final analysis is that TV Globo has made itself
indispensable to the government due to its ability to
legitimize the actions of the group power. One man, Roberto
Marinho, has the ability to help determine what information
is absorbed by the Brazilian population and the slant the
opinions will take.

TV Globo is not the only commercial television station.
There is also Rede Bandeirantes, Rede Manchete, and Sistema
Brasileirs de Televisao (Brazilian System of Television).

It is evident television has become an important part of
Brazilian life. Despite these other stations, Globo is
still the predominate influence. Although, it has been
reported that the competition is rapidly appealing to a
larger audience and television viewers are becoming more

segmented (Interview, 1989).

23

Clothesline Literature

Not so surprisingly, literature has made its influence
felt in the broadcasting world. Folhetos are small
booklets, which have been produced since the end of the last
century, as literature de cordel or "Clothesline
literature". The subject matter of these folhetos range
from accounts of political events to the visit of Pope John
Paul II to Brazil or a trip to the moon. The theme they
carry is often conventional: the established order is
respected, good always triumphs and punishment is given out
to wrong-doers.

Neither the poet (who writes the folhetos) nor the
illustrators are rich people. They often make extra income
by working with small radio stations. The folhetos are not
only read but recited over the radio. In the early 19803
there were approximately 2,500 poets working for radio
stations (Pisa, 1986).

The Brazilian authorities and the Roman Catholic Church
were quick to latch on to the idea of using the folhetos as
a popular dissemination channel for ideas, proposals and
reforms. By the 19403, government agencies were already
using them to promote its interests-~five titles were
published on Getulio Vargas, the President of the Republic.
When the Church or the government funds a folheto the
communication generally consists of explanation of the key

passages of a pastoral letter or a piece of legislation.

24
This form of entertainment not only eudcates the masses but

also provides radio with a program that appeals to the

public.
Illiteracy

At first glance illiteracy may not appear to carry much
weight in the internal forces of the broadcasting media. In
actuality, the level of education that a person has, and
thus their ability to read, does play a role in media
selection (Straubhaar, 1988).

Illiteracy is very common in Latin America, even though
statistics state that it is only 23 percent of the
population this only applies in a proportional sense
(Sanders, 1988). The proportion of illiterates in Brazil
may be falling but it is an illusion, while the actual
number of illiterates increase due to rapid population
growth (Tunstall, 1977).

One of the main factors that started Brazil's decent
was that there was a delay in the arrival of the printing
press in Brazil. Until the beginning of the 19th century,
print shops were prohibited in Brazil by the colonizers.
Therefore, there was no tradition of reading the printed
word to pass down through the generations. This suppression
of print continued after political independence in 1922 and

throughout most of the monarchy.

25

Once the population was at a reading deficit, the need
for censorship of the press was no longer needed but the
control over the broadcasting mediums still was maintained.
In the 19703 telenovelas were required to present 20
episodes at a time to the censors, and once approved a
Censura Federal certificate had to be displayed on the
screen before each episode. Programs were reviewed to
ensure that no references to political, religious, sexual,
racial or economic problems were aired (Head, 1985).

The rationale behind television censorship is,
according to a Brazilian editor, that the government is
already opposed by the ten% of the people who read the
newspaper, therefore censorship would serve no purpose. But
the majority of the population depends upon television for
information rather than on newspapers, thus they could be
persuaded either way; thus the government feels it has to
censor television to protect itself (Head, 1985).

Censorship in theory may work as may maintaining an
illiterate population through the media, but in reality the
information is getting out to the population that the
government is trying so hard to suppress. The masses can
get the restricted programming as well as the information
they desire through pirated VCR tapes, spillover services
from neighboring countries, pirate stations and foreign
external services. Elizabeth Mahan also came to the

conclusion that censorship is not really effective in

253

suppressing opinion because eventually most banned
information leaked out. Licensing, equipment importation
restrictions, and reliance on government advertising were
actually more effective at stifling all information censored
or not (Mahan).

Even multinationals realize the lack of salesmanship to
a non—paper reading audience. In 1977, 65% of their total
advertising budget went into television and radio. The
advertising executives realized that more Latin Americans
were in daily contact with radio, television in the urban
areas, than with daily newspapers (Alisky, 1981).

Illiteracy in Brazil will continue to be a problem for
those less fortunate, but due to the rapid influx of
alternative media their ability to gain access, knowledge

will not be as hard to attain.

The Government

After the 1964 military takeover television grew
phenomenally because it was an important supportive
instrument for the governments ideal of monopolistic
capitalism. Even though the government had control of all
electronic communications by law, the regulation of the
aspects of broadcasting was more of a concern to the
government in the early years than regulating the program

content. This is important to remember because Brazilian

26
broadcasting has remained in private hands but the
government always has the authority and the right to control
it. In Brazil and Columbia, broadcasting systems have
developed, in part, due to direct government support in
direct and indirect ways: restriction on foreign ownership,
credit incentives, and indirect investment through
advertising and program production (Mahan).

Besides the visual impact that it has, television was
an especially important supportive instrument for the
government in the early years. The utilization of this
medium was seen as necessary due to the desire of the
population to own a television set. According to ”O Pais de
Televisao”, the census figures in 1980 showed that many more
homes had a television than refrigerators (42.2% of urban
residences) or sewage services (37.8%). No significant
difference was found between television and radio ownership
in urban areas (there are 79.2% radios and 73.1%
televisions). In rural areas 68.0% of all homes have
radios, whereas only 14.7% have television (all figures from
Lins da Silva, 1986). Since the elites held the majority of
the economic and political power, the accessibility gap of
television between the urban and rural areas was not an
issue to the ruling government. It appears that in the eyes
of the government, what is beneficial for the masses also
makes money for the administration as well as giving them a

vast amount of media control.

27

Due to the fact that many areas were underserved by
commercial stations, in 1967 the government started to
construct a national microwave system to relay programs to
transmitters in the most distant settlements. Radiobras, a
government television network, was started to supplement
commercial station coverage, primarily in the Amazons.
Recently, the Empresa Brasileira de Radio e Televisao
Radiobras (Brazilian Corporation of Radio and Television)
was created in order to coordinate government-owned
stations. Its alternative programming is not intended to
compete with privately owned facilities (Oliveira, 1988).

Just as many authors have pointed out that the U.S. is
imposing North American culture on Brazil (Tracey, 1988;
Lins da Silva, 1988; Nordenstreng & Varis, 1974), and thus
helping create a type of dependency. Brazil is now dumping
its programming on other countries. This practice is being
seen as a refute to the argument that Brazil is a culturally
dependent nation and that there is an inequitable flow of
information (Schwarz & Jaramillo, 1986). The Brazilian soap
opera or telenovela has been broadcast in more than 100
countries (Interview, 1989). These novelas are gaining as
much notoriety as American programming did when it was
introduced overseas. However, these soap operas are giving
other countries a window into Brazil, aiding them in
formulating opinions and ideas about Brazilian life. As in

the American situation, this process may (and probably will)

28
project distorted images of the ”real” Brazil. But inside
Brazil, the images portrayed create problems as well.
Brazilian intellectuals persist in their claims that novelas
are not reality based and are too fantasy oriented. The
intellectuals must begin to understand that the primary
motive behind the government’s decision to export
programming is not on of nation image enhancement but one
prompted by capitalistic profit—motivation (Antola & Rogers,
1984).

Rede Globo exports many of its programs to other
countries located primarily in Latin America and Africa. As
of 1979 Globo sold its programs to 71 countries including
Europe and the United States. The exports are comprised
mainly of children’s programs, telenovelas, musical
programs, and series. THese transactions provided Globo
with $2 million in revenue in 1979 (Lins da Silva, 1986).
Lins da Silva points out that were are seeing: ". . . the
beginning of the process of internationalization of
production in the are of culture, paralleling the process
that took place in certain areas of industrial production."

(Lins da Silva, 1986: p. 105)

29
EXTERNAL INFLUENCES

The United States and Transnationals

It is often difficult to separate North American
endeavors in foreign countries from the workings of all
transnational corporations. This is primarily because
transnationals usually operate within a capitalistic
framework and promote many American ideals.

After gaining its independence from one colonial
nation, Brazil gave away any potential control it may have
had economically and culturally to the foreign influences.
Brazil received its first loan from the United States in
1922, which began a reign of North American influence and
dependence that continued throughout the decade and has
increased every decade since then. In the 19203 the first
U.S. industries were installed in Brazil.,

When World War I forced manvauropean film producers to
discontinue producing films, many North American interests
supplied the Latin American mass media with films. Due to a
lack of competition, Hollywood dominated the Latin American
screen. One estimate stated that in 1922, 95 percent of the
films in Latin America were North American products (Fejes,
1986, p. 25). Fred Fejes also stated that few Latin
American producers attempted to create films because the
local tastes were partial to the technical excellence and

pervasiveness of the North American product (Fejes, 1986).

30
After the initial success of the film industry, attention
turned towards Latin America as a consumer of foreign goods.
In 1919 and 1920, pamphlets were published that provided
North American exporters with an overview of the advertising
climate in various Latin American countries (Fejes, 1986).

As early as 1928 Brazil saw the arrival of
international advertising agencies such as N.W. Ayer, J.
Walter Thompson, Standard Advertising and McCann Erickson.
These agencies designed commercials for General Electric,
Kodak, Coca-Cola, Goodyear and Ford (Oliveira, 1988). The
’303 saw increased influence when the growing industrial
bourgeoisie gained control over the internal political
hegemony, which had interests that were close to the United
States. These ties were drawn more tightly together after
WWII when other central nations were more concerned about
their war torn countries than with Latin America.

It was also in the 19303 that the North American
capital, style, and content began to dominate in the mediums
of radio, film, and the music industry. In the cinema, the
U.S. influence was almost absolute. Yet, it was also during
this period that Brazilian playwrights staged their first
productions, and the samba and other Brazilian music reached
all classes and was consumed by society as a whole (Atwood,
1986). The transmitting stations were owned by Brazilian
entrepreneurs, but radio was financially under the control

of American advertising agencies and advertisers, thus there

31
was heavy U.S. musical influence through the records that
were played (Atwood, 1986).

The introduction of television in the 19503 also
brought more U.S. influence and control to Brazil. However,
the amount of people culturally affected by this dominance
remained fairly low since television was initially an
entertainment medium for the elite, and the masses did not
have access to it. Sodre notes that even after the
communication media were capable of reaching the masses they
did not have great impact on the working class. Except for
radio, which can reach diverse audiences, the other
communication mediums were beyond the interests of the land
workers, laborers and semiproletarians. On the other hand,
the high bourgeoisie displayed an interest in the arts of
techniques of communication media thus these tastes were
catered to and advertising support was gained (Lins da

Silva, 1986).

Foreign presence in Brazilian television has been most
apparent in the areas of program content and advertising
control (Hamelink, 1983; Beltran, 1978; Mattos, 1982).

The United States has been charged with ‘dumping' or
intentionally selling syndicated programming at a lower cost
to third world countries (TWCs) in order to exploit
dependency. In 1982 a country such as Haiti could obtain a
half hour television episode for $30, while the same program

would cost $4,000 in Brazil and $9,000 in the United Kingdom

32
(Head, 1985). It has been argued that this pricing
differential is nothing more than good business practice.
The value of the country is based on the program/audience
combination, not abstractly on the programs (Head, 1985).

Relatively no change has taken place in the area of
advertising control, foreign interests still have major
holdings in this department. Of the fifteen biggest
television advertisers in 1980 only five were Brazilian.

The primary advertisers were, and continue to be;
transnational business with headquarters in the United
States, Switzerland, England, Holland, and Liechtenstein
(Atwood, 1986).

The transnational advertising industry is dominated by
North American agencies because their best clients are
global advertisers such as Procter & Gamble, General Foods,
Bristol-Myers, American Home Products, General Motors,
Unilever, Ford, Sears Roebuck, R.J. Reynolds Industries, and
Colgate-Palmolive. These industries invest about 30 percent
of their advertising budgets on the international market
(Hamelink, 1978). The amount of money these corporations
bring to the Latin American commercial television and radio
' market makes them hard to resist. The financing provided by
these ads contributes to the upgrading of the production of
the major newspapers, network television, and radio

broadcasting (Alisky, 1981).

33

The expansion of foreign investment in the Brazilian
market, multinational corporations become televisions’s
largest source of advertising revenue (Mattos, 1984). Even
though there is a multitude of North American agencies in
the market, Brazilian legislation is attempting to curtail
their activities. For example: Of the ten largest
advertising agencies in Brazil, seven of them are domestic.
This is primarily due to a government policy of granting
advertising accounts only to national agencies (Mattos,
1984).

As time goes on, the Brazilian state becomes more
involved in advertising but since many of their interests
are tied closely to those of the transnationals, the state
does not differ that much from transnational advertisers.

In the early years when the elite owned just about all
of the media, the presence of foreign capital was overt.
However when the capital interests of the transnationals are
better served by a national audience, the situation rapidly
changes. For example, a Brazilian hero on Latin American
television is more effective than a North American one. In
many areas the United States is still seen as the "evil
colonializer" and by using national heroes limits language
and cultural barriers (Lins da Silva, 1986). Using familiar
characters may also help gain quicker acceptance of American

products.

34
Hamelink points to a few of his personal experiences to
illustrate the point that foreign substance is replacing
national techniques, symbols, and social patterns.

—For starving children in the Brazilian city of Recife,
to have a Barbie doll seems more important than having
food.

-For the poorest people of Latin America, advertising is
an important source of information. North American
agencies tell them that the good life is the life of
the average consumer in the U.S. Venezuelan housewives
are encouraged to identify their happiness with
possessing a refrigerator or dishwasher.

Advertisements advise the worker in Bogota to escape
from the daily routine by means of a U.S.-made Ford or
a U.S. airline (Hamelink, 1984).

-A study conducted in Sao Paulo, Brazil revealed that
67% of the consumer market that saw advertisements
consisted of people with less than $500 annual per
capita income. However, radio and television
commercials prompted them to finance 85% of the
appliances and television receivers through installment
credit (Alisky, 1981).

Putting foreign goods in a national context is not only
providing money for advertisers but also helping to keep the

radio and TV stations on the air. In order to survive, this

35
is a situation in which radio must participate in; even at

the expense of cultural deterioration.

CONCLUSIONS — BRAZILIAN BROADCASTING

After reviewing the facts, it is quite clear that
broadcasting in Brazil is based on the U.S. commercial
model. North American corporations have been directly and
indirectly involved in the broadcasting process since the
early 19203 making its influence hard to ignore. Even
though there is a variety of competition, radio has
continued to grow through the years. By the late 19703 FM's
popularity was expanding due to the increasing market for FM
receivers. The musical format contains current Brazilian
musical hits as well as a variety of international tunes
(Oliveira, 1988; Folha de 5. Paulo, 1986). In 1979 eight
out of the top fifteen songs played frequently in Rio de
Janeiro were American (Artur da Tavola, 1979). There are
also formatted FM stations like Radio Incofidencia of Belo
Horizonte, which plays only popular Brazilian music
(Oliveira, 1988). The American musical culture has become a
daily part of Brazilian life just as foreign advertisements
have become a staple in the Brazilian diet. As previously
pointed out, the popular format is usually abided by in
order to maintain an audience as well as attract foreign

advertising. As a result of this trend, just as in North

36
America, audiences have become more segmented (Straubhaar,
1988) and more competitive.

Even though foreign influence has been readily apparent
in the broadcasting system, its effect on the system may be
second to that of the government (Oliveira, 1988; Schiller,
1981). But it has been this government/foreign influence
that has controlled radio through the years and it appears
these entities will determine its future. This may
primarily be due to the fact that their goals are similar.
They each want to influence the greatest audience and
achieve a large profit (Schiller, 1981; Alisky, 1981;
Straubhaar; 1988).

Since it does not seem likely that Brazil will soon
become an elitist society and the literacy rate will rise,
radio will continue to cater to the masses. Its function
will continue to be one of news, political information, and
entertainment with an emphasis on local awareness. As in
the United STates, Brazilian radio is an integral part of
national life. It has survived a history of manipulation
and constant competition. There may be fluctuations in its
popularity or changes in its format, but Brazilian radio is
in no fear of complete deterioration.

Keeping this in mind, it is not surprising that the
United States Information Agency (USIA) shows great interest
in providing Brazil with a radio service from which the pop-

ulation can gain a greater understanding of the United States.

USIA HISTORY

The United States Information Agency (USIA) is the
primary information source about the U.S. for many Brazilian
citizens. They have many publications, exchange programs,
mass media services and events that help explain the issues,
policies and motives of the United States. The mass media
is an important aspect of the organization. The media has
the ability to help people extend their knowledge of distant
societies beyond their own surroundings and experiences. In
1912, Walter Lippmann saw it this way: “The world that we
have to deal with politically is out of reach, out of sight,
out of mind. It has to be explored, reported, imagined.”

(Tan, 1986, p. 299)

The Humble Beginnings

World War I was the event that initiated the first U.S.
Government supported international propaganda program.
George Creel has assisted President Woodrow Wilson in his
reelection campaign of 1916, and thus became the head of the
Committee on Public Information from 1917--1918.

Creel's philosophy of public information was that "the

government encourage free expression as a means of

37

38
fortifying the war effort, relying on voluntary restraint of
the press to maintain the secrecy of vital military
matters.” (Henderson, 1969) The themes that the committee
used were simple: America would not be beaten; America was
the land of freedom and democracy and therefore could be
trusted; thanks to President Wilson's vision, Allied victory
would usher in a new era of peace and hope, in which
armaments would be put aside, minorities released from
oppression, and sovereignty returned to the people
(Henderson, 1969). Despite Creel's good intentions, the
Espionage Act of 1917 gave a different gave a different
perspective of the Committee to the public. The Act stated
that it was a crime to make false reports with intent to
interfere with military operations or promote the success of
America's enemies or cause insubordination, disloyalty,
mutiny, or refusal of duty in the military forces, or
obstruct recruiting or enlistment. Heavy penalties were
provided for violation. Therefore, this "voluntary"
censorship had a bit of added insurance to make sure the
press knew when to voluntarily censor its material.

Despite Creel’s positive image of the Committee on
Public Information, it was a target of continual criticism
from the press, which resented voluntary censorship and
feared the threat of even greater measures of suppression.
Congress was also watching the process and many worried,
particularly the Republican minority, that this propaganda

mechanism might be used for partisan political advantage.

39
In addition, rumors had it that the Creel organization had
been penetrated by spies and saboteurs. As a result, on
June 30, 1919, Congress disassembled the Committee on Public
Information. This is the humble beginnings of the first
American information agency and how it was created and

destroyed.

A Period of Governmental Rest

Between World War I and II the general atmosphere
surrounding the idea of propaganda, especially in the 19203,
was that the U.S. had been tricked by foreign propagandists
into entering World War I. Once it had infiltrated America,
the only ideas and news that were disseminated were mostly
fictitious. Thus, propaganda gained the connotation of
being deceitful and tricky. And that only foreigners used
this method that was below those of honest, moral Americans.

While the U.S. was engulfed with feelings of morality,
the Soviet Union, the Germans and the Japanese began
broadcasting international short-wave propaganda in 1926 and
during the 19303. Even England entered the field in the
early 19303.

During this era, America permitted foreign
propagandists and domestic agents of foreign principals to
broadcast to the U.S. public just as long as they were
registered. But no effort was ever made to combat the

attacks. Even so, many broadcasting institutions, including

40
Columbia Broadcasting System and National Broadcasting

Company, established international broadcasting systems.

The First Small Step

In May of 1938 the U.S. Government took the first small
steps towards psychological warfare. In an effort to
accommodate a presidential decree to promote Western
Hemisphere solidarity and to ward off Nazi infiltration, the
Interdepartmental Committee on Cooperation with the American
Republics (later called the Interdepartmental Committee for
Scientific and Cultural Cooperation) was created.

After the Nazi victories in Europe in 1940 and concerns
about the effects of German propaganda in Latin America
grew, the American Government gently entered the field of
international broadcasting. In August 1940, President
Franklin D. Roosevelt, by Executive Order, established the
Office of Coordination of Commercial and Cultural Relations
(later renamed Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American
Affairs [CIAA]) to communicate between the American
Republics. This agency's duty was to disseminate
information through government and private radio
broadcasting and other methods throughout the Americas.

In 1941, President Franklin D. Roosevelt felt the
imminence of war and established the Coordinator of
Information (COI) and named Colonel William J. Donovan

(”Wild Bill") as chief. Officially it was stated that the

41
objective of the organization was to gather intelligence
material. This surface appearance of neutrality in the
early years of WWII was maintained to deter public outcry.
Behind closed doors, Robert Sherwood, the Presidential
speech-writer, convinced Donovan and Roosevelt that the only
way to counteract Nazi propaganda was an American
international broadcasting service (Henderson, 1969; Roth,
1981 ) .

Donovan named playwright Robert Sherwood to direct the
Foreign Information Service, which was responsible for
mainly foreign broadcasting. Even though the U.S. was
trying to maintain a surface appearance of neutrality,
Donovan convinced Sherwood and the President to utilize his
agency to counteract Nazi propaganda.

In the beginning, the organization restricted its
services to broadcasting to Europe and organized a news
service abroad. Their policy was to stick to the facts.
Sherwood was entirely opposed to using the falsehood or
terror techniques used by the Nazis. As the war progressed
there were new demands for a major psychological offensive.
Even so, Sherwood said the main focus for America would be
”Information": "The truth coming from American sincerity is

by far the most effective means of propaganda. (Tyson,
1983, p. 5) On February 24, 1942 this new plan of service
went on the air in German and was directed at Western
Europe. The service was (and still is) known as the "Voice

of America”. The first official VOA broadcast has set the

42
aura surrounding the VOA for the last 47 years: ”The news
may be good or bad, we shall tell you the truth.“
(Henderson, 1969, p. 31)

As time went on, confusion developed as to which agency
held jurisdiction to present information overseas. There
were four entities which had been created to disseminate
information on behalf of the government: The Coordinator of
Information, the CIAA, the Office of Facts and Figures, and
the Office of Government Reports. In order to establish
some form of unity, in June 1942, the Roosevelt
administration combined all of the above groups (except the
Rockefeller program [CIAA]) to form the Office of War
Information (OWI). Elmer Davis, a prominent journalist, was
appointed director. Overseas information activities outside
Latin America were overseen by a branch of the OWI, the U.S.
Information Service (USIS). Latin America remained under
the jurisdiction of the Coordinator of Inter-American
Affairs. The other functions of Donovan’s COI office which
did not fall under the Foreign Information Service which was
under Sherwood, were transferred into the Office of
Strategic Services (085) which was also formed in June 1942.
The 088 was responsible for foreign intelligence outside of
Latin America as well as for psychological warfare in
connection with military campaigns. These activities were
carried en without much coordination with OWI's overseas

operation (Henderson, 1969).

43

On to Bigger and Better Things

The end of World War II brought with it the disbandment
of the OWI and the activities of the Coordinator of Inter—
American Affairs. But the United States still felt the need
to inform people overseas about the U.S. aims, culture and
history. This was primarily because the Cold War was
looming on the horizon and there was an unclear distinction
between war and peace (Roth, 1981). Therefore, in 1946, an
Office of International Information and Cultural Affairs was
set up in the State Department, in the fall of 1947 it was
renamed the Office of International Information and
Educational Exchange.

In 1946 William Benton, President Truman’s
Undersecretary for Public and Cultural Affairs, began an
ambitious plan for long-term peacetime operation. In
January of the same year, he revealed his plan and called it
”a dignified information program", as distinguished from
propaganda, and added that President Truman felt some type
of program was necessary in order to, ”continue to endeavor
to see to it that other peoples receive a full and fair
picture of American life and of the aims and policies of the
U.S. Government." (Roth, 1981, p. 3) Thus began the first
peacetime program that was aimed at the public instead of
governments.

President Truman, on January 27, 1948, signed into law

the first peacetime propaganda program in American history.

44
The purpose of the program was “to promote a better
understanding of the United States in other countries, and

to increase mutual understanding between the people of the

United States and the people of other countries.’ (Bogart,

1976, p. xi)

In order to support the program, President Truman began
to push his new initiative: "Campaign Truth“. He explained
its purpose this way:

The cause of freedom is being challenged
throughout the world today by the forces of
imperialistic Communism. This is a struggle, above all
else, for the minds of men. Propaganda is one of the
most powerful weapons the Communists have in this
struggle. Deceit, distortions and lies are
systematically used by them as a matter of deliberate
policy.

This propaganda can be overcome by truth--plain,
simple unvarnished truth--presented by newspapers,
radio and other sources that people trust.

We know how false these communist promises are.
But it is not enough for us to know this. Unless we
get the real story across to people in other countries,
we will lose the battle for men’s minds by default.

We must make ourselves known as we really are-—not
as Communist propaganda picutres us. We must pool our
efforts with those of the other free peoples in a
sustained, intensified program to promote the cause of
freedom against the propaganda of slavery. We must
make ourselves heard 'round the world in a great
campaign of truth.

(Henderson, 1956, p. 44)

In 1953, the Hoover Commission suggested that the
information program be separated from the State Department.
This reorganization plan was approved by Congress and on
August 1, 1953, the United States Information Agency (USIA)
came into being as an independent agency reporting directly
to the President, but taking policy guidance from the

Department of State.

45

Today, the United States Information Agency is still an
independent organization within the executive branch
responsible for the U.S. Government's overseas information
and cultural programs including the VOA and the Fulbright
Scholarship programs.

The following brief outline shows how the VOA and the
USIA have risen and fallen and the policy themes broadcasted
since the VOA's beginning.

--World War II. First American International
Broadcasting: VOA Founded.

--1946. Holding Operation: Most wartime agencies are
disbanded; VOA barely survives due to the efforts of a
few backers. American foreign policy is based on the
premise that the Soviets may be mellowing and are
sincerely interested in the ”peaceful coexistence” that
they advocate.

—-1947-52. Cold War, Hot War, and a Strong Voice: Hopes
for political cooperation with the Soviet Union
dwindle. America launches policy of ”containment",
with some hopes for "liberation" or “rollback.” VOA is
revived and other broadcasting organs initiated (Radio
Free Europe and Radio Liberation).

--1953-60. Retrenchment and Revision of Mission:
Broadcasting remains anti-communist but becomes more
constrained, ”calm and persuasive". Liberation idea
abandoned in both foreign policy community and
broadcasting policy.

-—1961-63. Height of Material Support for Broadcasting:
Kennedy and Murrow establish broadcasting policy that
is anti-communist but not "strident".

--1964-80. Detente and Growing Controversies: Down
grading of U.S. international broadcasting; increasing
policy and personnel conflict under the Johnson, Nixon,
Ford, and Carter administrations.

--1981-1988. Detente in Doubt--Search for New
Guidelines: Reagan administration attempts to revive
broadcasting as an arm of American foreign policy.

(Tyson, 1983, p. 4)

46

THE ADMINISTRATION AND POLICY THEMES

From its origins to the present, the Voice of America
has varied its broadcasting activities, depending on the
availability of facilities, the size of its appropriations
from Congress, the international situation and the
administration in office. These issues are of current
concern when determining what to broadcast, how to
broadcast, to whom to broadcast and how U.S. policy
(internal and external) mixes with the current profile of
the United States.

Since broadcasting to developing countries is usually
done shortwave, the VOA as well as any international
broadcasting institution or administration must remember
that how we broadcast and present policies overseas is not
taken lightly. Take for example this conversation:

The director of a large state-run Western shortwave

broadcasting agency recalls asking the minister of

communications of an African nation:

”Could I start a newspaper in your country if I wanted
t0?”

”Yes," said the African.
"How about a radio station?" asked the broadcaster.
”No," the African said. "All the stations in my
country are state-owned. How would we know what you
would say? The newspaper would be OK because not a lot
of our people read, so you couldn’t do much. But
people believe what they hear on the radio.“

' (Insight, 1989, p. 8)
In developing countries it's highly likely that the

local media are at the same stage of development as other

47
aspects of the local society. This means there are not a
lot of alternative news sources. USIA programming is
usually welcomed, although the quality of the programs has
to be high especially if there is local interest or a local
angle.

In developed countries things are a bit different. In
developed countries USIA officers must be able to quickly
provide accurate information about U.S. policies, actions,
and intentions. The sea of U.S. sources sometimes results
in an overload of often times conflicting messages which
leaves the foreign audience wondering which source is the
official speaker for the United States.

So there are two different perspectives that the
administration coming into office must consider when
preparing policy to be disseminated to a foreign audience.

The last two administrations have had drastically
different views of foreign policy and how the VOA would
contribute the accomplishment of their goals.

During the Carter administration (as well as Ford's)
the policy themes concentrated more on human rights than
communist aggression. Economic objectives and democracy
were also disseminated as was the promotion of U.S. products
(Interview, 1989). The Carter administration's interest in
human rights and the periods of detente, lead to more
emphasis on that issue by the Voice. The administration
tried to focus more on responding to the needs of an over

populated word by attempting to create two-way communication

48
between Americans and those of other societies. The
President was of the opinion that it was just as important
for Americans to know about other countries as it was for
them to know about us. This conception did not survive the
general world view of the next more conservative
administration (Fisher, 1987).

President Carter described his view of the mission of
the International Communication Agency (later to be renamed
the United States Information Agency by Ronald Reagan) to be
that, ”the principle function of the Agency should be to
reduce the degree to which mispreceptions and
misunderstandings complicate relations between the United

States and other nations.‘ (Hansen, 1984, pp. 21-22).
Some critics at this time felt that the VOA was not
living up to its ability. One critic complained: "It is
clear that the directors of the Voice of America are
constantly trying not to arouse the anger of the Soviet
leadership. In their zeal to serve detente, they remove
from their programs everything that might irritate the
communists in power.” (Browne, 1982, p. 110) .
When the Reagan administration took office in January
1981 the emphasis was once again placed on the Soviet Union.
The "Great Communicator" considered combating "the evil
empire" as the USIA’s primary goal. The theme of
maintaining or achieving democracy was seen as an outcome of

crushing communism. The idea was first brought forth in the

President's June 8, 1982 speech to the British Parliament.

49
He stated that the United States should make a major effort
to help ”foster the infrastructure of democracy which allow
a people to choose their own way, to develop their own
culture, to reconcile their own differences through peaceful
means.” (Tyson, 1983, p. 76) He also stated that the U.S.
should engage more vigorously in a peaceful "competition of
ideas and values" with the Soviet Union (Hansen, 1984). To
achieve this goal the Reagan administration proposed a $65
million budget for Fiscal Year 1984. The focus of the
program would be on: 1. leadership training,
2. education, 3. strengthening the institutions of
democracy, 4. conveying ideas and information and
5. development of personal and institutional ties
(Hansen, 1984).

John Nichols feels that Reagan's approach to
international propaganda was all wrong. He says that the
administration’s method of referring to their efforts in
military terms and assuming that the message would
automatically be absorbed, indicated that they really did
not understand how international communication works. It is
known that international media campaigns have little impact
on an audience and that personal attitudes, values and
cultural norms have a greater impact (Nichols, 1983).

Differences between what the administration outlined
and the policy assumptions of some of the managers, led to
some controversies over policy in 1981 and 1982. According

to Carolyn Weaver, the most pervasive change in the VOA

50
during the Reagan administration was the drifting towards
reporting primarily the nicest things about America (Weaver,
1988). Soft, self—congratulatory features were abundant.
When taking breathers from its pitch on the ills of
communism, the VOA broadcasted features on such topics as
Americans' delight in "cuddly” pets ("Fifi loves to wear
clothes”), there was even one on the VOA's in-house
programming awards. The narrative lauded winning programs

variously as “electrifying,' "brilliant and revealing,”

"masterful,' and "enchanting and delightful.” Early in
1988, the VOA’s New York bureau was asked to cover a banquet
at which USIA director Charles Wicks was honored as "p.r.
professional of the year” by PR News. Thirteen language
services thought the news was noteworthy enough to place in
their broadcasts (Weaver, 1988).

The whole idea surrounding the Reagan era and the VOA
is summed up best in his own words: "For the ultimate
determinant in the struggle now going on for the world, will
not be bombs or rockets, but a test of wills, a trial of
spiritual resolve, the values we have, the beliefs we
cherish, the ideas to which we are dedicated." (Panel
Discussion, 1982, p. 22) The idea is valid but if the above

examples are samples of how the objectives were attained,

the validity remains questionable.

PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

PROPAGANDA OR PUBLIC DIPLOMACY?

When the words “arms control”, Star Wars”, ”Human
Rights”, ”Glastnost”, are mentioned, more often than not,
people have definitive feelings or comments about the terms.
Most of these responses would be primarily based on personal
experiences, whether they be through the print, media or
word of mouth. It’s highly likely that these terms held no
meaning until an experience, be it positive or negative,
could be associated with the word (B.F. Skinner, 1938; Kurt
Lewin and Fritz Heider, 1935). The intentional message of
the term by the originator is of no practical use, it's the
connotation that the public determines which is of vital
importance.

This idea holds true in the “propaganda" vs. "public
diplomacy" debate in the international broadcasting arena.
The word propaganda is assumed to be synonymous with
disinformation, lies and manipulation. The term public
diplomacy is intended to be seen as accurate, in the public
interest and to develop mutual understanding between
countries. Here are just a few of the definitions

attributed to public diplomacy:

51

52

Public diplomacy (is) international communication,
cultural and educational activities in which ‘the
public’ is involved.

Elmer Staats (Hansen, 1984, p.

As contrasted with traditional diplomacy, which

2)

develops relation between governments, public diplomacy

establishes between societies a dialogue on issues of

mutual concern. Its goal is to improve perceptions and

understanding between the people of the United States

and the people of other countries.
Daniel Yankelovich (Hansen, 1984,

Public diplomacy is a new label for an old concept
supplements and reinforces traditional
intergovernmental diplomacy, seeking to strengthen

p.

mutual understanding between peoples through a wide
variety of international communication and educational

and cultural exchange programs.

2)

It

1980 Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy

The cause and effect of public attitudes and opinions

which influence the formulation and execution of
foreign policies.

Edward R. Murrow (Fisher, 1972, p. 7)
When you look at it objectively, public diplomacy is
trying to do primarily what propaganda does. "In a purely

dictionary sense, public diplomacy embraces some of the

aspects of propaganda--the spreading of ideas and

information for the purpose of helping an institution or a

cause.‘ (Hansen, 1984, p. 7)

Other Views

Yesterday's ”propaganda" and "psychological warfare"

are today's "communication" and ”public diplomacy“. As

international telecommunication has evolved, so have the

terms that are used to explain a source's objectives.

time where Glastnost and arms reduction reign, our

In

53
communication terminology is evolving to reflect a more
understanding and informational nature, rather than the
hostile and manipulative atmosphere that propaganda is
presumed to create. The backers of the term public
diplomacy are attempting to create a positive association
with the word. Incorporating cultural and educational
exchange programs into the process and placing an emphasis
on mutual understanding is intended to project a less
threatening air on international broadcasting attempts. But
even the best laid plans go astray and our most industrious
efforts can appear tainted by the brush of propaganda.

When the 1984 Olympics in Los Angeles, California were
taking place, many countries complained that the American
announcers were biased in their coverage of the events. It
seemed as if the foreign athletes were getting less coverage
and the American reporters were pushing American patriotism.
They were probably also sending a message'to the Soviet
Union, telling them, "We do not need you at the Games."
(Jowett & O’Donnell, 1986, p. 17)

Another issue along these lines to consider is that
even if the content of an American press release or a
broadcast is pure, is it not still propaganda or a form of
manipulation when one news story or interview is actively
selected over another? Is there no such thing as guilt by
deletion? By not relaying all of the events, neglecting to
present a holistic view of an event, of American society or

even of policies, are we not endorsing a form of censorship

54

by telling countries only what we think they should know or
what we think they will want to hear? Our motives may be
pure but the results or appearances may be skewed. Take for
example a survey done by The Commission on Critical Choices
for American. The Commission was established by Nelson A.
Rockefeller. It was brought together to develop information
and insights which would bring about a better understanding
of the problems confronting America. A survey of elite and
popular opinion in Western Europe, the Americas and Japan
comprised the survey population. In every country two
samples, each consisting of about six hundred cases, were
interviewed.

When presented with the question: To what extent do
you think the United States really tries to understand and
take into account (respondent's country's) best interests—~a

great deal, a fair amount, not very much, or not at all?

55

TABLE 1 U.S. Understanding
(in percents)
Elites Publics

Western The Western The

Europe Americas Japan Europe Americas Japan
Great
Deal 8 12 2 8 16 1
Fair
Amount 37 22 29 43 23 19
Not Very
Much 38 49 47 28 44 44
Not at
All 14 12 5 11 10 6
Don't
Know 3 5 17 10 7 30

Lloyd A. Free, 1976.
It appears that the motivations, objectives and goals of the
United States are not seen by the public and the elites to
even be fairly reasonable for all those involved. Even
though the data is a bit dated, it is safe to assume that
this is not the image that a peaceful nation would want to
project.

International radio provides one of the primary avenues
through which people in developing countries learn new ways
of thinking and behaving as well as solidifying what they
already believe. Garth Jowett and Victoria O’Donnell state
that our most pervasive and penetrating form of propaganda
is advertising. While scholars debate over which term to
associate with our international broadcasting efforts, the
U.S. advertising agencies have been largely responsible for

the creation of a massive consumer culture in the 20th

56
century. U.S. advertising is slowly but surely creeping
into the lifestyles of many Third World nations (as seen
previously, this consumer trend is being repeated in many
Third World countries) (Jowett & O'Donnell, 1986). How
ironic it would be that if while the government agencies are
bickering over word phrases and connotations, the images,
messages and sense of reality that are ingrained into the
minds of our receivers unwittingly comes from advertisers
who are only trying to sell a product rather than those who
are trying to sell our country.

The point is not which term we will use to describe our
activities but the results we desire to get and how we
proceed to achieve these goals. Terms to a certain degree
are purely academic and provide no assistance in creating a

structure that will be accepted by a foreign audience.
Terminology Debated

If there must be a term to describe the actions of the
USIA and the VOA, Jowett and O'Donnell says it should be
subpropaganda. This dimension of propaganda consists of
spreading a doctrine which the audience is not familiar
with. A considerable period of time is needed to promote a
way of thinking which is conducive towards the acceptance of
the doctrine. Attention maintaining stimuli are used to

gain the target audience’s favor.

57

L. John Martin, a former USIA research administrator,
refers to the U.S.‘s actions as ”facilitative
communication". This is a process that is created to keep
lines open and to maintain contacts against the day when
they will be needed for propaganda purposes. He says that
facilitative communication is not necessarily propaganda.

It is considered communication that is designed to create a
positive attitude towards a potential propagandist (Jowett &
O’Donnell, 1986).

Within certain sections of the VOA the responses are
varied, from those who oppose the use of the word propaganda
and manipulation to those who accept the words and add their
own interpretations (Interviews, 1989).

Some say we have reached a potential turning point in
international communication policies in the U.S., other say
we have turned the corner and we are rid of those negative
manipulations of years past, thus arriving into the era of
true ”public diplomacy". Which accounting of our present
reality is actually valid will only come to light in the
future. For now it is safe to say that there is controversy
over the terms and neither term is completely a pure form of
describing international telecommunication. Public
diplomacy, when broken down into its integral parts seems to
be the equivalent of white propaganda, which is what might
be called "legitimate propaganda", can be described as “the
spreading of true or accurate information for what one

considers a worthy cause." Many USIA officials would say

58
that the only way the agency could be considered a
propaganda agency would be in this context (Hansen, 1984,
p. 6).

For the purposes of this paper all of the previously
mentioned terms will be used void of any connotations or
personal biases which may be associated with the word(s).
Unless otherwise noted, they will all be seen as synonyms

for international broadcasting.

PUBLIC DIPLOMACY IN THE USIA

A Closer Look

Since it is definitely an international broadcasting
entity the USIA must figure prominently in the workings of
public diplomacy. According to the 1989 U.S. Advisory
Commission on Public Diplomacy Report, the USIA is a large
cog in the wheel of public diplomacy activities. In their
eyes the USIA has "the primary responsibility for the
conduct of American public diplomacy and for advising the
government on the policy implications of foreign attitudes
and perceptions." (U.S. Advisory Commission Report, 1989)
The methods that the USIA utilizes to accomplish this

mission are as follows:

Personal Contact International Visitors
VOA Press 6 Publications
Educational Exchanges Libraries 8 Books

Television Cultural Programs

59
Some examples of public diplomacy are:

--When President Bush speaks to students at Mescow State
University. (U.S. Advisory Commission report 1989)

--USIA'3 American Participant Speakers Program brought
many U.S. officials and private experts to foreign
audiences through travel and international telephone
conference calls. (U.S. Advisory Commission Report
1986)

--When Columbian students learn English at a Binational
Center in Bogota. (U.S. Advisory Commission Report
1980)

In September 1987 the Commission hosted a privately funded
conference on "Public Diplomacy in the Information Age."
About 200 experts in the fields of foreign policy,
legislature, media, business, labor, and academia met at the
Department of State “to exchange views on the impact of the
information revolution on foreign relations and to consider
the future course of American public diplomacy.” (U.S..
Advisory Commission report, 1989)
How important is public diplomacy? This is what some
of the top leaders in the United States had to say:
PRESIDENT REAGAN:
In this information age, this age of the mass media and
the micro-chip, of telecommunications satellites above
the planet and fiber optic cables underground, in this
new age traditional diplomacy alone is not enough. The
United States must speak not just to foreign
governments, but to their people, engaging in public
diplomacy with all the skill and resources we can
muster.
SECRETARY OF STATE GEORGE SHULTZ:
Now is certainly not the time to be short-sighted about
the importance of public diplomacy. In a world where
no one country can dictate economic, political or
military events, the need for international

cooperation, for coalition forging,and confidence
building becomes ever more apparent. It is just as

60
important for us to understand and to shape public
attitudes—-abroad and at home--as it is to receive and
interpret the latest computer—generated statistics or
esoteric intelligence reports. People-to-people
programs are more important than ever.

SENATOR CLAIRBORNE PELL (D-RI), CHAIRMAN, COMVIITTEE ON
FOREIGN RELATIONS:

Public diplomacy as debated on Capital Hill and

elsewhere has come to describe two separate but related

phenomena. Narrowly, public diplomacy is understood to
describe the American government's international
information and exchange programs. These are primarily
the programs that are administered by USIA. Mere
broadly, though, public diplomacy encompasses all of
the problems and actions of a government which
influence public opinion abroad.

(U.S. Advisory Commission on Public

Diplomacy, 1989, pp 8-9)

It seems as if public diplomacy is utilized to humanize
the political process. Incorporating the once excluded
publics of a country into the exchange and communication
process of our domestic affairs, may have more long range
benefits than dealing solely with heads of state (Fisher,
1972).

The ability to gain maximum benefits from our public
diplomacy initiatives has not yet been pin-pointed to a
science. Just as the international communication process
has evolved from a one way "propaganda" type of transmission

to an interactive "public diplomacy" one, after its time has

passed, it too one day will (more than likely) manifest
itself in a different form.

According to Glen H. Fisher, understanding the public
psychological dimension is the key. Foreign affairs

specialists, diplomats, policy makers and scholars not only

61
have to understand a given policy initiative or overseas
program but also how both publics (at home and abroad)
perceive them. The way these perceptions are received
depend‘partly on the way the communications media depicts
the event. But of even greater importance is the knowledge,
attitudes and prejudices of the audience.

While many are quick to point out that what the USIA is
participating in is public diplomacy, it is important to
remember that this form of communication is still in the
pioneering stages. There are still too many varied views
concerning it, experimentation to determine public diplomacy
objectives, and disagreement about what public diplomacy is
or should be to call it an evolved form of communication
(Hansen, 1984).

When it all boils down, is public diplomacy an art that
only a few will ever be proficient at? Or is it a science
and with the right ingredients anyone can replicate the
results? Until more time has passed so that effects can be
determined and a general consensus is made about what public
diplomacy is, there is no clear cut answer.

Fisher suggests that it is "more art than science when
dealing with the emotional and attitudinal factors which 03
often appear irrational in their cross-cultural conflict of
meaning, and which, while popular in scope, tend to be
diffuse and intangible in assessment." (Fisher, 1972, p. 6)

Even though the 1989 United States Advisor Commission

on Public Diplomacy is dedicated to the role that public

62
diplomacy is playing as a strategic component of U.S.
foreign policy, they state that to help avoid
misunderstanding and semantic confusion, the Department of
State should not use the word public diplomacy and just

characterize public affairs programs in the U.S.

THE VOICE OF AMERICA

VOA CHARTER

The long-range interests of the United States are
served by communicating directly with the peoples of the
world by radio. To be effective, the Voice of America must
win the attention and respect of listeners. These
principles will govern VOA broadcasts:

1. VOA will establish itself as a consistently reliable
and authoritative source of news. VOA will be
accurate, objective, and comprehensive.

2. VOA will represent America, not any single segment of
American society. It will therefore present a balanced
and comprehensive projection of significant American
thought and institutions.

3. As an official radio, VOA will present the policies of
the United States clearly and effectively. VOA will
also present responsible discussion and opinion of
these policies.

The Voice of America, which is the radio division of
the USIA, helps the USIA achieve its basic mission of
supporting U.S. foreign policy. The VOA employs about 1,971
people in the U.S. and more than 2,786 people worldwide
(Voice of America, 1989). Perhaps the best way to visualize
the VOA is a collection of about 40 radio stations, located
in the VOA building in Washington D.C., each of which
broadcasts in a different language or to a different part of

the world. In 1989 the agency estimated listenership over

63

64
the age of 15 worldwide totaled 127 million, most of whom
lived in Eastern Europe, USSR, South Asia, and China (Voice
of America, 1989).

According to a VOA source, there has not been a
meeting in many years that specifies the VOA’s objectives in
a certain country, although there is a public diplomacy
stance for every country in the world. In general, each
official or previous official, the author spoke with saw the
long range goals as being to improve the image of the United
States through the arts, science and technology. In the
short term, the goals seem to be to bring an understanding

of U.S. policy to each country.
A Closer Look at the Charter

In order to attain its goals in public diplomacy, the
Voice of America adheres to the guidelines established by
the charter in a variety of ways. It accomplishes the first
objective: to ensure accurate, objective and comprehensive.
reporting of news; by making sure that at least two of the
nine wire services coming into the newsroom have
corroborating information. This allows for greater
reliability than services that run with a story verified by
only one source, but may also mean that the story is a bit
slower being broadcasted. This is not necessarily a
detriment, Sherwood Demitz related that BBC's service is

acclaimed for being credible but in their eagerness they

65
have often been proven wrong. VOA's credibility is highly
regarded, it is quite often cited as a source by newspapers
in Brazil, Indonesia, and South Asia. (U.S. Advisory
Committee, 1989).

The second requirement of the charter is that: VOA
will represent America, not any single segment of American
society. This is built-in protection so that the
Administration in power can't take over the radio station
and turn it into their mouthpiece. All events have to be
reported regardless of whether they shine a positive or
negative light on America.

Last, VOA will present the policies of the United
States clearly and effectively. VOA will also present
responsible discussion and opinion on these policies. This
requirement is usually fulfilled by providing editorials or
commentaries. These editorials will not just be written to
reflect the Bush Administration’s thoughts on a topic; if
there is dissent, it too, must be reflected in the piece.
All of this is kept as separate from the news as possible.
This is done by placing these items on the backhalf of a
program which will contain correspondent reports from
overseas (these are only one reporter's news story on a
situation or topic).' Even so, one former USIA official says
that even with this separation, the audience is not often
clear as to what is news and what is an editorial opinion

(Weaver, 1988). Commentaries or features are also heard

here. They consist of anything outside of the newscast

66
which may be opinion or a news item not covered by the two
source rule. These three types of broadcasts are considered

to amply cover the requirements that the charter sets forth.

A Public Diplomacy Branch

One steadfast rule that is adhered to precisely is that
the news is purely news. There are slots in programming for
editorials and commentaries. News is the primary reason
audiences listen to the VOA and in order to maintain it,
they make sure it is as objective as possible. Anything
after the news, as one VOA Branch Head put it, "is just one
big commercial for this country” (Interview, 1989).

Since there are not any concrete guidelines to follow
in the area of public diplomacy, it is sometimes difficult
to categorize events as being publically diplomatic. Hansen
gives two examples of this.

U.S. popular music used to comprise a majority of the
programming time. As time went on, budget cuts and the
development of more sophisticated programming, nearly
entirely erased music from formats. Many public diplomats
felt if there were no returns, why use it. Others felt that
using music is needed to make everything else more
palatable. Still others thought that music was needed to
provide an accurate reflection of American society, and
there were those who felt that U.S. music is so popular in

most countries, why waste time and effort in this area when

67
it can be utilized elsewhere. This last view is the
prevailing thought today.

The second example took place when a USIA information
officer who was in charge of the post’s Latin American
programming, realized that the target audience rarely
listened to local radio stations except for music and the
morning newscasts. He then eliminated all USIA radio
placement that he had control over which could not be placed
on the morning news show. After he left, under new
supervision, the post eventually returned to its old
methods. The replacement officer did not know or share the
first officer's thoughts on how to run a radio station.

Donald R. Browne points out that even in the VOA
newsroom there may be conflicts of interest with other staff
members. Since much of the newstaff was previously working
for U.S. newspapers and broadcast stations, and the staff in
the language divisions are usually natives to that country,
there is always the likelihood of some disagreement about
which stories are important and for what reasons.

Without firm rules on how to conduct public diplomacy,
the people who may get hurt are the people we are supposed
to help and the country we are trying to reflect.

Laurien Alexandre does not view the VOA charter as an
advancement of public diplomacy. Instead, she sees the
charter’s separation of political programming (editorials)
from cultural programming (Americana) from information

programming (news) as a mask, hiding the fact that the

68
entire development of broadcasting—-news, features,
editorials, music—~is just covering the one common goal,
“the legitimization of U.S. policies in the public opinions
of foreign audiences" (Alexandre, 1988, p. 87).

The VOA can be divided into two sections: the News and
the Current Affairs divisions. These produce the primary
elements of programs heard in a variety of languages all
over the world. Currently, about 30 Current Affairs writers
distribute news/issue and feature programs for translation
by the foreign-language services. The language services,
which prepare much of their own programming, are free to use
the material presented by Current Affairs or not. For
example, in the Brazilian Branch, they have the freedom to
set their own approaches to the Brazil's debt problem,
informatics, the environment and the problem in the Amazon
rain forests, and as to whether a topic is hot or not. On
the other hand, the language services must depend on the
stories produced by the News division for their newscasts.
The previous requirement of using the top four stories as
determined by the agency is no longer active. The editors
have the liberty of determining if the news stories are
appropriate for the country in question and modifying the
story if a direct translation is not accurate. This appears
fine on the surface. The drawback lies within the fact that
the VOA is such a large agency that it is impossible to
tell, even with the two source rule, with any form of

accuracy, the extent to which news and feature programs have

69
been tampered with. According to Carolyn Weaver, a staff
writer for the VOA, the Current Affairs department is
considered by many as having been intensely politicized.
While newswriters, editors, and reporters in the English
news and features sections say they have, by and large, been
left alone to do their work as they see fit, many editors
admit to having to contend with oftentimes intense political
pressure (Weaver, 1988).

It appears that a system of checks and balances needs
to be implemented to maintain the high standards the VOA
professes to have as well as to hold up the VOA charter,
which is referred to so often.

In addition to the VOA's duty, supporting to the USIA,
it must also at the same time (according to the charter),
establish itself as a "reliable and authoritative source of
news.” The pursuit of these two separate goals by the VOA
has been the cause of some confusion. First of all, since
the above statements are true, is the VOA an objective news
service or is it the official voice of the U.S. Government?'
(Weaver, 1988). A second conflict comes into view when
looking at another portion of the VOA charter. If the VOA's
task is in fact to represent the American people, first, how
is it determined what the American people think? Second, if
this is true, why should the VOA not be held accountable for
the foreign policy of the existing administration, which was

popularly elected by the American people? Answers to these

70
questions are not easy to come by, but without questions,

solutions will never be found.
VOA IN THE AMERICAS

Even before the official verification of the VOA, which
took place on February 24, 1942, the Coordinator for Inter-
American Affairs (CIAA) had already begun to organize,
produce and transmit programs in English, Portuguese and
Spanish to the Americas in 1941. The CIAA and the VOA were
separate until 1945 when they were both placed under the
Department of State. Between 1946-1961 there was a dilemma
as to whom would be granted production rights to the
Americas. Initially, production rights were granted to the
VOA, then to private broadcast organizations, then by VOA,
and one more time to a private station. By the late 19503,
VOA-managed transcription services took the place of direct
broadcasts. No matter which system was employed,
controversy ensued. After a scandal where a commercial
network writer produced a script for broadcast to Latin
America and described Texas as having been "born in sin",
the VOA was issued sole responsibility for the information
of the U.S. Government's international broadcasts in the
Americas (Voice of America, 1989).

Just as in many other areas, Congressional and/or
Executive Branch support tends to appear when a political

crisis is at hand. In the elections of 1960, John F.

71

Kennedy incorporated the absence of direct VOA broadcast to
Latin America into his platform. After Kennedy was elected,
the crisis in Cuba overshadowed the need for a direct
broadcast program to the Americas. Although, before the
year 1960 ended, Spanish broadcasts were re-introduced and
by the end of 1961 a Portuguese service to Brazil went on
the air. Since this time, the Spanish and Portuguese
services have been on the air every day. In 1987, a
broadcast service in Creole was started for listeners in
Haiti and elsewhere in the Caribbean. VOA's English
programs are also broadcasted. In addition, VOA also
continues to provide programming to Latin America stations.

In the area of transmission sites and the quality of
signals, there lies much fluctuation. VOA utilizes
shortwave transmitters in California, Ohio, and North
Carolina to deliver broadcasts to Latin America. Although
powerful (175 kw to 500 kw), they range from 3-45 years old.
In addition, the position in which they are situated is just
too far to transmit a reliable and accurate signal. The
modernization program established in 1984 to construct a
station in Puerto Rico or at least lease shortwave
transmitters in Brazil, were both scrapped due to budget
cuts in 1985 (Voice of America, 1989). It would seem
logical to use mediumwave stations to reach a wider variety
of people, but because of regulations enforced by the
International Telecommunications Union (ITU) which restrict

construction of transmitters over 100 kw during the day, and

72
50 kw at night, it is not possible in many countries.
Despite the difficulties they have encountered, the VOA
is still very effective. In 1989, approximately 4.8 million
Latin Americans listened to VOA's broadcasts (Voice of

America, 1989, p. 33).
BANDEIRANTES-PUBLIC DIPLOMACY IN ACTION

VOA has two primary ways of reaching an audience:

1. By beaming broadcasts directly to them; and/or 2. Having
its programs transmitted on domestic stations in the
particular country-—a process called ”networking".

Networking is gradually becoming the primary form
utilized for reaching a mass audience in Latin America. VOA
declares that: ”While political and technical realities
p" ' :de the possibility that networking can ever become a
tc-sl substitute for direct broadcasts on VOA's own
transmitters, networking is a major supplementary or
alternate channel to reach millions of radio listeners who
may never tune in a foreign station." (Voice of America,
1989, p. 1)

Because the VOA cannot force a domestic station to
broadcast its programming, they rely on their reputation for
providing credible and quality programs with a local flair
to encourage stations to use the material. Many countries
have the same problem that Brazil often has, a VOA source

said that it is impossible to monitor all of the stations

 

73
that request material from the VOA, so verification of use
is done by the telephone. Due to the scarcity of tape in
the countries, of course all of the stations report that
they utilize the material so that they can receive more
tapes. Therefore, it is very important to provide stations
with material that appeals to their audience.

In order to maintain a sense of continuity, much of the
programming via networking and direct broadcasting is
produced by the same VOA staff members (in times past, much
of the programming that was placed on Latin American
stations consisted primarily of timeless radio series which
were often produced by outside sources). In an attempt to
create more relevant and effective programming for direct
broadcast listeners, the regular VOA affiliates are
increasing their interaction with their listeners. A prime
example of this form of networking at work is the Brazilian
Branch's partnership with the Bandeirantes Network of Sao
Paulo. A partnership broadcast consists of a major
broadcast organization's satellite delivering live programs
for broadcast by the affiliates in another country. This
form of international broadcasting is still fairly new and
improvements are being made every day. VOA introduced
partnership broadcasting to Brazil in April 1988 (Voice of
America, 1989). In conjunction with the Bandeirantes
Network of Brazil, VOA's Brazilian Branch began live two-
hour program each Saturday called USA. They sought out a

network with an outstanding audience figure and had an

74
excellent tradition for objective news reporting. VOA's
satellite transmits this program to Sao Paulo for
Bandeirantes to broadcast which captures about 4.5 million
listeners-~this is approximately three times the amount of
listeners that regular shortwave VOA reach (VOA in the
Americas, 1989, p. 5). This endeavor was so successful that
on May 8, 1989, weekday programs were started (Interview,
May 25, 1989). USA host Darcio Arruda, a popular Brazilian
DJ, hosts all six broadcasts. As of May 25, 1989 the show
was highly popular and according to Chief Nils Linquist they
have had one show out of 16 shows that is an ideal example
of what they are looking for.

This endeavor was not rushed into. Bandeirantes was
formulated over a ten year period. During the ten years the
Brazilian Branch worked very closely on the journalistic
line and they provide them with everything, even space
launches. As the Brazilian Branch Chief saw their shortwave
audience dwindle, they decided that a media-rich society
such as Brazil had no need to listen to scratchy shortwave.
They began to formulate Bandeirantes when a 1988 survey
showed that their audience went down to between five and 800
thousand on a weekly basis in the rural area. So they
decided to take a different approach, keeping in mind all
the time that they still had their mission although one
person related that their "mission in this democracy can be
turned off tomorrow, there's nothing that gives us a ten or

five year lease on life. We are not going to wait for them

75
to come to us and say budget restraints being the way they
are, you'll be off the air in three months. We decided to

take some calculated risks and hope they work.‘ (Interview,

1989) .

Bandeirantes provides the American Government with
immediate access to a good portion of Brazil which it has
not had. Worldnet does not reach the masses; neither does
the wireless file because Brazilians as a whole do not read
the newspaper.

Commercial radio is still a major form of information

for many Brazilians and now the VOA has a portion of that

audience getting their information from the United States.

AUDIENCES

VOA AUDIENCES

Robert Burns once wrote that, to see ourselves as
others see us would be one of the greatest of all gifts
(Rubin, 1979). This holds true not only because it would be
politically advantageous to be able to know how our policies
are received, but also because it would be the building
blocks for a sound international environment.

In many open societies where there is freedom of the
media, public audiences as well as the government will
derive many of their perceptions of America based on their
own media. In these countries, and especially in restricted
societies, the VOA becomes an important source of
information and a powerful spokesman for the policies and
environment of the United States. Even so, according to
USIA researcher Dave Gibson, there is no change in
credibility in VOA broadcasts between developed and
developing countries. And that the general profile of
people listening are better educated males.

In societies that have had the opportunity to have the
American experience, many negative opinions have been
formed. The VOA is attempting to correct some of the
negative images from the past and the present and create

76

77
some positive ones for the future by explaining the
policies, actions and reactions of the United States. In
other words they are doing what they define as being public
diplomacy. Despite its best efforts, Americans are still
often referred to as the "Ugly Americans” (U.S. News and
World Report, 1985). Don Kendall, a Washington, D.C.
political consultant, says: "Partly, the envy and dislike
go with the territory when you have power and influence.

What's disturbing to me is that I can’t remember any

Russians being taken as hostages." (U.S. News & World
Report, 1985, p. 33). Ambassador Walters of the United
Nations states it this way: ”If one seeks only to be loved,

one cannot do the difficult things that must be done to
pursue human freedom. I think, on balance, I would prefer
that the world respect more than merely like us. If we
could have both, it would be even better.“ (U.S. News &

‘4

World Report, July 15, 1985, p. 33).

AUDIENCES IN BRAZIL

As seen in the history of Brazil, long before the VOA
made its appearance on the international scene in many
countries, the U.S. was starting to brand itself with a
negative image overseas. Therefore, when attempting to
present the ideas and policies of the U.S. today, the VOA is
also confirming or dispelling beliefs many audience members

bring with them.

78

Contrary to what many believe, the VOA & USIA Directors
don't sell policies. They go to the Hill and plead for
money. Brazilian Branch Chief Nils Linquist says that: ”If
they (the directors) do a good job which allows me to do a
great job which allows me to receive thousands of letters
from Brazil, which allows me to hear listeners call in to a
program and say we like the show but we would like to hear
more news. . . . They like it when we pick a city and talk
about it, be it. . . . Washington or Topeka, Kansas, they
love it. We are providing that audience with the kind of
information they want as long as I have the funds to that, I
can do a good job.”

No matter how much effort the VOA puts into the budget,
programming and organization, if the audience is not
satisfied and therefore does not tune in, the whole process
is for nothing. Research and conscientious dedication are
two things that can help monitor audience reactions and
provide a more sensitive environment to societal changes in
Brazil.

Brazil’s male elite are the primary audience that the
VOA currently reaches. But those in the Brazilian Branch
target the entire population. They get "more bank for their
buck” if they can pull in an A or B audience, but they aim
at everyone. A and B audiences are their primary target
because they need to attract that type of commercial
audience due to the fact that that is how the commercial

station and networks pay their bills. There are stations

79
that attract larger audiences, but they are comprised mostly
of C and D audiences. Besides, these stations don't give
the type of stability and credibility that Bandeirantes does
(Interview, May 27, 1989).

Bandeirantes seems to be reaching a more diverse
audience which should provide for some interesting research
in the future. One survey has been done so far and it
indicated that 36% of the audience is class A‘& B, 40% C &
D, and 20% E. They also know from personal observation that
the call-in audience ranges from nine year olds to 83 year
old grandmothers. And the composition varies from state
legislators, farmers, students, shop keepers, lawyers to
dentists (Interview, May 27, 1989). So, how effective is
the VOA on Brazil’s general audience? What are the opinions
that the Brazilian public harbor in their minds?

It does without saying that these questions must be
investigated in order to place, the Brazilian Bandeirantes
(or any Branch) on a solid foundation to build upon when
planning programming initiatives. This is not to say that
any of the charter's requirements need to be compromised.

After all the energy that is put into the entire VOA
program, it is only logical to want to determine if the
government is having any effect on public opinion.

In general, 1989 statistics state that there are 127
million adults -- aged 15 and older -- who regularly listen

to VOA direct broadcasts (Voice of America, 1989, p. 3).

80

A 1982 research publication by the United States
Information Agency showed that better educated Brazilians
identify newspapers and television as their preferred media
for information on international news. But since the media
uses a vast amount of information from the major wire
services, these Brazilians have exposure to the workings in
America. In the four major cities in Brazil (Rio de
Janeiro, Sao Paulo, Brasilia and Salvador) that were
surveyed, the listening rates for foreign radio (VOA & BBC)
were low. Whereas they listened to domestic radio at a
higher rate. In the smaller towns and remote areas, it was
found that there were higher rates of listening to the VOA.
In general, it appeared that Portuguese language broadcasts
were preferred. But within the better educated group,
English and Portuguese programs were listened to about
equally. They also declared that the reason they primarily
listen to the VOA is for the news. They claim that the VOA
is for the news. They claim that the VOA as well as the BBC
are timely, and relatively high on credibility. BBC is seen
as being less under the constraints of their government than
the VOA. In order to disspell any accusations of being
deceptive it must be revealed that the survey revealed that
only 0.9% of the adults in the urban area adults even listen
to the VOA (USIA Research Report, 1982, p. 76).

In a 1981 survey of 15 capitals the total jumped to

1.1% (USIA Research Report, 1982, p. 76). These numbers are

81
pretty consistent and may vary a percentage point or two
from survey to survey.

In 1984 BBC Research findings stated that both the BBC
and the VOA broadcasting in Portuguese have regular urban
audiences of 0.8% and total urban audiences of 3.9%. But in
1981, the VOA's regular audience was three times as large as
in 1983 (International Broadcasting and Audience Research,
1984).

For each year that the VOA surveys were completed the
statistics were accurate, but in between, one project head
left the USIA and another one took over. Therefore, there
is a high probability that different methods, due to
individual differences, produced different results.
Although, it seems ridiculous to squabble over a few
percentage points when the numbers are so low to begin with.
The main objective, whether the numbers are 1.1% of 3.9%,
should be to attempt to increase listenership.

It is not only necessary to understand the composition
and habits of the audience, it is also desirable to get an
idea of the opinions of the population in general so that
the VOA will know how to formulate techniques
(entertainment, news, music) to attract their attention.

A survey of the elite and popular opinion in Western
Europe, the Americas, and Japan was undertaken by the
Institute for International Social Research on behalf of the
Commission on Critical Choices for Americans. A summary of

the results of the survey follows.

82

When the question, “Do you feel that relations between
the U.S. and Brazil at present are too close, not close
enough or about Right?” was presented, the ”too close”
proportions were decisively greater than the "not close
enough” in the case of the elite 40% said it was "too close"
and 11% said ”not close enough". In the case of the public
31% said it was ”too close” and 17% said ”not close enough”
(Free, 1976, p. 34).

”Do you think that over the next five years relations
between the U.S. and Brazil will become closer, less close,

or stay about the same as they are now?”

TABLE 2 U.S. AND BRAZILIAN RELATIONS
Elite Public
Closer 33% 42%
Less close 13 11
Same 49 . 38
Don’t Know 5 t J 9

(Free, 1986, p. 35)

On a scale from 0-100 the U.S. ranks a 47 by Brazilian
elites and publics when they had to determine to what extent
they thought the U.S. really tries to understand and take
into account Brazil’s best interests (Free, 1976, p._50).

On a scale of 0-100 the Brazilian confidence in the
ability of the U.S. to provide wise leadership in dealing
with world problems ranked a 46 (Free, 1976, p. 50).

When questioned about who they would like to see more

powerful in the next ten years, 37% of the elites said the

83
U.S., while 54% said they wanted to see them equal in power.
42% of the Brazilian public wanted the U.S. to have the
majority of the power and 45% wanted to see them about equal
(Free, 1976, p. 69).

On a basis ranging from 100 for a great deal to 0 for
none at all, the respondents were asked to determine how
much danger they felt there is in a full-scale nuclear war
breaking out between the U.S. and the Soviet Union within
the next 10 years. The elites said 49 and the publics
responded 70 (Free, 1976, p. 76).

The results for the last two questions probably turned
out the way they did because Brazil felt almost no mutuality
of interests with the USSR (Free, 1976, p. 57) and they have
no real concern about improving relations with the USSR
(Free, 1976, p. 92).

The survey seems to reveal that the United States is a
more trusted ally than the USSR and the Brazilians seem to
have no interests in common with them. But on a scale of 1-
100 we are not even on the positive side of the scale.
Apparently the Brazilians did not trust the judgment of the
United States because they did not want them in power nor

did they trust our ability to prevent a nuclear war.
BUDGET/MODERNIZATION ANALYSIS

One of the areas of concern during the Reagan

administration was the lack of up to date equipment. In

84
order to achieve his goals in the most efficient manner,
Reagan proposed a 1.3 million dollar modernization program
for the VOA (Wick, 1986, p. 17).

The VOA equipment is antique. About a third of VOA’s
transmitters date to the Korean War. The result is the
transmission of weak signals which are more susceptible to
jamming. Mechanical failures are constant; spare parts
frequently must be salvaged from one transmitter to be used
on another (Salerno, 1987).

As more countries continually become more developed and
start adopting Western or more modern modes of
communication, AM and FM usage tends to increase. In many
countries it is being discovered that shortwave is not the
best way to reach a foreign audience (e.e. Brazil). Is this
money being spent to modernize the shortwave facilities
really justified? One previous producer says, ”The
proportion of glop to substantive features has really
increased. It's clear that people don't know who they’re
broadcasting to. Many of the features seem designed to
please someone in the front office" (Weaver, 1988, p. 42).

A source related this: If you walk into a store you
can buy a $200 color television set or a $1000 TV set. They
both will give you a very good picture, but the $1000 set
has more gadgets. In order to serve your purpose, the $200
set would be just fine. That's the problem with the
modernization program. Instead of going in with good basic

reliable technology that gives you 99% reliability, they

85
double or quadruple the price to get something with 99.9%
reliability.

Taking this into consideration, it is feasible to
assume that if they were spending less on reasonably
reliable equipment, perhaps they would have had enough to
give the Marti project, instead of taking the money away and
then VOA projects never get started.

Perhaps analysts and policymakers need to use some
forethought or create some scenarios for the future to
determine the countries that are switching over, those which
will use shortwave, and those who will listen for a while to
come.

The need for appropriations was justified primarily by
referring to the Soviet threat and how massive their
informational budget was (this argument is used frequently
when trying to acquire or create some elusive policy). In
the 1984—85 appropriations hearing for the VOA, it was
stated that we are engaged in a fierce competition of ideas.
”Our adversary is the Soviet Union . . .The Soviets are well
equipped to wage a war of ideas, and have increased their
efforts even more. . . . The Soviet Union far outdistances
us in resources--not merely in money, but in personnel and
level of activity as well. . . . In many areas we are behind
in the competition of ideas. Unless we reinforce our
efforts, we will continue to lose a round and our national
interest will suffer.” (Appropriations Hearing 1984-85 pp.

112-113). Nils Linquist, Chief of the Brazilian Branch,

 

86
says that justifying appropriations by using Russia as a
"scare tactic” will continue, “with the new openness and the
end of jamming it will cost us more money. People in Russia
are calling into VOA stations to talk live. Also we used to
rebroadcast programs frequently during the period of jamming
so that everyone could fit the pieces together. Thus more
money is going to be needed for more programs.”

This eternal comparison between the U.S. and the USSR
may bring about an untimely death to the information
program, due to the inability of being able to keep up with
the Jones’. This perception of not having enough money may
cause feelings of inadequacy among staff members who may
quit striving for perfection because they know they will
never be allocated as much money as the Soviet Union. It is
not the amount of money that is poured into a program that
determines its efficiency, it is what is done with the
appropriations that counts for the most. In addition, what
is good and appropriate for the Soviet Union does not
necessarily mean it is desirable for the U.S. There is no
guarantee that without proper research and investigation, if
the VOA was allocated equivalent Radio Moscow funds, that
the VOA aims would be better served. We need to become more
efficient and aggressive initiators, not unreliable and
passive reactors.

Since September 13, 1983 when the Senate approved the
establishment of Radio Marti under the VOA, money set aside

for modernization has slowly been slipping out of the VOA's

87
pocket. On October 4, 1983, President Reagan noted that
this facility would help “to break Fidel Castro's monopoly
on news and information within Cuba.” But of course this
will happen ”while maintaining the historic high standards
of the Voice of America for accuracy and reliability.”
(Hansen, 1984, p. 106) A chief within the VOA doubts very
seriously that Radio Marti will have any great effect. We
have had a long and troubled relationship with Cuba, he says
that as long as people have food, shelter, and clothing, why
should they believe any different than they already do just
because we tell them to?

Glen Fisher also tends to agree with this way of
thinking. He says that the potential effectiveness of Radio
Marti is very limited. "For every listener inclined to
appreciate the broadcasts, probably because of pro—U.S. view
already held, there would be a host of others who would
either have been programmed by existing outlooks to
discredit the source, or would be irritated by the heavy
handed and obvious attempt to manipulate and control."
(Fisher, 1987, p. 141).

Radio Marti is just another link on a long chain of
problems that plague the organization. The money allocated
for modernization was supposed to get VOA up and running; by
siphoning its funds they are being crippled before they get
their feet off the ground.

Congress approved $7.5 million for TV Marti in USIA's

FY (Fiscal Year) 1989 appropriation. The funds that were

88
previously earmarked for the VOA modernization account were
appropriated for "the purchase, rent, construction,
improvement and equipping of facilities . . . and startup
operations including a test of television broadcasting to
Cuba.” (United States Advisory Commission on Public
Diplomacy, 1989, p. 47). All of these actions were taken
without authorizing legislation or hearings by the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee and House Foreign Affairs
Committee. The 1989 Commission on Public Diplomacy
suggested that any additional funding for TV Marti should be
appropriately done so and not taken from the VOA
modernization or other public diplomacy accounts.

Despite the budget cuts and decreases due to Gramm-
Rudman, VOA is still making admirable advances in many
areas. In November 1989, VOA began installing and using the
world's largest multi-lingual computer system. This system
is called System for News and Programming (SNAP); it
currently provides word processing capability in 26

languages (U.S. Advisory Commission, 1989).

RECOIMENDATION S

There are a variety of ideas on how to improve, change,
or reorganize the USIA (VOA). Following is a list of
suggestions on how problems might be solved or questions
answered. No one solution is considered better than
another, but a comprehensive list of recommendations needs

to be generated to stimulate creative thinking in others.

1. Public diplomacy can never be better than policy. "You
cannot have a good information program if you don't have a
policy that is good. If policy is good, they will love us;
if policy is bad, nothing that we write is going to change
their opinion but it might mitigate it.” (Bogart, 1986, p.
35) Taking this into consideration it is conceivable that a
Director or Chief of Information needs to be appointed to a
cabinet post. This way, more insight can be given to the
psychological aspects of the people that the policies will
affect and how they will react.

Successful public diplomacy requires a comprehensive
view of the political, policy, and informational goals and
acts of the U.S. as well as the target country. If an
accurate view of all of the elements can be attained, then

the U.S. informational services can be effective in present

89

90
policy and having it received accurately by a foreign
audience. Perhaps the only way this can be achieved is by
appointing a person to oversee these items on an executive
level. Realistically this may not come to pass quickly
because there seems to be no real belief in the importance
of ideological or psychological factors in non war periods.
”The government pays only lip service to the need for a
civilian information program. . . . Government and its
satellites are convinced that America’s strength in
international relations consists of its material strength,
industrial apparatus, wealth of raw materials, and technical
know how. Therefore, only such parts of the information
program have found almost universal acceptance that are
pretty close to the more material aspect of thinking,
particularly the library and exchange programs.” (Bogart,

1976, p. 35)

2. There are two schools of thought when considering
USIA/VOA approaches to policy.

The directive Approach to Policy: This school of thought
maintains that the direction of output cannot be left to the
day—to-day moves either of an individual operator or even of
the whole desk: It must implement the policy line set by
Washington. The media must carry out instruction, and
policy directives should carry the same weight as military

orders.

91

The other way of thinking is the Non Directive Approach
to Policy: This school of thought contends that guidance
should give background, not direction. The function of
policy is to keep operators abreast of current government
thinking and to suggest how this might best be conveyed to
foreign audiences. (In this formulation, national policy
rather than the problem of communication is the starting
point.) The guidance will be given on the psychological
handling of issues, but not technical instructions as to how
news should be handled. This guidance must put the operator
in the proper frame of mind.

According to this thought, the best way to run an
information program is to select the right media people and
to give them maximum leeway, confining policy guidance only
to major problems (Bogart, 1976).

It appears that presently each of these directives is
at work. In order to solidify the USIA, for better or
worse, one or the other (preferably the last one) should be
implemented. This way there is at least concrete guidelines

for employees to follow.

3. Some critics say that the VOA needs to be released from
governmental influence. As long as the VOA is part of the
USIA, it will be subject to compromise, political pressures
and outright subversion of its charter. Senator Pell
suggested the VOA should be set up as an independent

corporation similar to the Corporation for Public

92
Broadcasting or the British Broadcasting Corporation
(Weaver, 1988). Nils Linquist, Chief of the Brazilian
Branch, also has the same suggestion. He says: "VOA should
be the international arm of National Public Radio. National
Public Radio is criticized as being too liberal sometimes,
but you’ve got both sides. Yes there's government money,
but there's also a lot of yours and mine" (Interview, May
27, 1989).

Independence for the VOA would be a symbol of American
commitment to free flow of information and ideas. The VOA
should exemplify those values, not merely urge them upon the
rest of the world. Take for example a story related by
Bernard Kamenske, former Chief of the VOA News Division:

“There is no doubt that some of the new people in
leadership roles at the Voice have extensive and impressive
credentials as journalists.. And so it makes it all the more
surpriSing how, for instance, the Falkland Island story was
handled. In a period when the BBC’s Spanish broadcasts were
jammed by Argentina, when it was crucial that the people of
the River Plate countries (and for that matter, all of South
America) have the broadest news coverage, the Voice of
America did not expand its broadcast hours to that area in
any way that I can find out. It did send an additional
correspondent to the area. What a crucial time it was for
the people of Argentina to know what really was transpiring,
and what American leaders were actually saying. Lack of

technical facilities could not have been the reason. This

93
is a policy decision made at the highest levels. This
failure to expand broadcasting is another example of why the
Voice of America should come out from under control of
people who view the VOA mission only as government-to-
government communications. There were many such
circumstances in the past when the audience’s needs were
subordinated to the perceived diplomatic view of nation
interest. We at the VOA did not seek to make policy, but to
report it and to report the news. Silence, you know, is a
policy, but it is a policy inconsistent with out system and
a free society” (Panel Discussion, 1982).

The thought that the VOA should be decentralized is an
argument that has been stated in a previous section on
public diplomacy. To be effective, a precise knowledge
about the culture, the attitudes and the prejudices of the
audience must be understood. It would be extremely
difficult to get a composite picture of the United States
without doing indepth research. Often times professionals
in the field of communications (journalists, broadcasters
etc . . .) have been chastised by groups for not presenting
what they felt to be accurate information.

Therefore, how can a few people in the State Department
and those in the news section of the VOA determine which
select policies and news events, should be heard by every
country. It is true that the Branch Chief has editorial
liberty when he/she believes a word or line is in conflict

with their country's interests (lower priority stories may

94
be substituted for higher ones at the Chief's discretion).
But the bottom line is that ultimately the stories dealing
with American interests or policies -- domestic or foreign—-
are written and edited by someone that has no professional

association with the country in question.

4. Audience relations and research efforts need to be
expanded along with the increased professional and technical
monitoring of VOA’s signal receptions overseas to insure
that our programming is tailored and targeted to our
listeners in the most effective manner.

One country that this most recently applied to is
Russia. Now that signals are no longer jammed we will have
to change our approach to programming. Nils Linquist puts
it this way: “If we continue with the old hard line
approach, ’we're the good guys', ’you're the bad guys’,
you're not going to maintain an audience, you're going to
lose. So (we) will have to be come competitive within the
internal market. . . . They have local stations and FM
stations, they have comedy shows and soap operas. We will
have to try to come a little bit closer to that" (Interview,
May 27, 1989).

In the research realm, it is as much the fault of
budgetary constraints as it is lack of branch interest that
permits the VOA research department to falter. Apparently,
branches rarely request research be conducted in their

country. This may be due to the fact, states one

95
researcher, that they do not want to know for fear of low
audience ratings. According to VOA researcher, Kim Elliot,
the two items that have the greatest effect on research are
governmental restrictions and economic deficiencies. John
Nichols also agrees that USIA research is so under funded
that they cannot determine which agency programs are
effective. ”If the agency is going to spend hundreds of
millions of tax dollars on information programs, the least
it can do is try to gauge their effectiveness.” (Nichols,
1983, p. 138).

In conjunction with this, if we spend so much time with
the foreign audience, the audience in America must also be
considered.

It is important to note that by Congressional decree,
the USIA is prohibited from directing its transmissions upon
the American people. This is one of the most important
reasons why most Americans exist almost totally blinded as
to their own government's primary propaganda institution.

It is conceivable that audiences overseas get a more
comprehensive view of American policy than the average
American does. Many VOA officials do not think that
anything that the VOA does should be a secret (without
shortwave you cannot listen to the VOA in the United States,
therefore only special interest groups will invest the money
to purchase a set and tune in). One VOA employee said, “We
live in the most open society in the world, yet the average

American can not get a script or a piece of a newscast.

96
(It) protects from government propaganda, but we have a
right to see what our government is sending about us."

(Interview, 1989)

5. According to a VOA source, the availability of
qualified American personnel is slim. There are not many
American citizens who are fluent in less popular languages
and thoroughly knowledgeable about other cultures.
Therefore, many language branches utilize the services of
people who are natives of a particular country. The problem
here is that it is true the VOA and USIA needs staff who are
well versed and have an indepth understanding of a foreign
culture, but they also need personnel who are committed to
the United States and the goals they are trying to attain.
The Brazilian Branch recently hired two people who speak
very little English. This is fine for-proofreading texts in
Portuguese and checking for grammatical errors. But if we
took time to train or recruit Americans we would have a
better staff member with more potential. The USIA needs to
recruit and train qualified Americans who have an interest
in the program. But since the majority of Americans do not
even listen to VOA or know what it is, it's highly unlikely
that they will seek the VOA out. Whereas many foreign
people are brought up listening to the VOA and desire to
have a job.

The solution is not easy, but we need to incorporate

more Americans into the system if for no other reason, just

97
because we do have Americans in the job force looking for

employment.

6. It is difficult to be technically critical about many
aspects of a program that does not have an operating budget
that will allow them to perform in the most effective and
expedient manner possible. In order for the USIA and VOA to
evolve into the type of organization it can be, more money
is going to have to be invested. Cutting their funds
through Gramm-Rudman then taking a portion for Radio Marti
not only sets back development, it also lowers the moral of
the staff. In constant dollars since 1967, the USIA's
operating expenses have dropped 8.8 million dollars (US
Advisory Commission, 1989, p. 24). It seems logical to
assume that investing a little more and getting the maximum
benefits from the programs is more economically sound than
to spend money and having them operate below par due to
outdated equipment or poor working conditions. Nichols
states that U.S. ”propaganda“ programs should invest more
time and effort into the quality instead of the quantity.
During the Reagan administration requests had been made for
more broadcasting time each day and more powerful
transmitters. But no requests had been made for increased
staff professionalism, quality control of content, and
audience research.

It is also ironic that in this time of 'peace’ the

government appears unable to extend the budget for a

98
peaceful means of diplomatic communication. Yet, they can
sink billions into a plane that has only left the ground
once and then they want to invest billions more in a fleet

of these planes.

CONCLUSION

Public Diplomacy, the USIA, and Brazil. . . . How are
they working?

The VOA and international broadcasting in general can
be a very powerful tool when implemented correctly. The
Brazilian Branch is an excellent example of what can evolve
if the system is revised to fit into the local environment.
Although it is too soon to determine how effective
Bandierantes and the public diplomacy aims will be in the
future, the initial endeavor has been a success.

This paper has highlighted many of the weak links in
public diplomacy and the USIA. One main critique throughout
has been that the United States Information Agency needs to
devote a little more time to the preparation, evaluation,
and clarification of issues, ideas and policies. This
consideration needs to be given to all situations regardless
of whether they directly or indirectly effect public
diplomacy, the USIA or a particular country. A bit more
forethought in this area would eliminate much of the time,
energy, and money that is wasted in rectifying problems that
were needlessly created. For example, it should have been
obvious that deferring money from VOA to the Marti account

would present not only difficulties in completing proposed

99

100
modernization, but also delaying new public diplomacy
projects that relied on the modernization as well as
lowering the moral of the staff.

While being critical at times, this thesis has also
attempted to:

1. Provide some insight into what public diplomacy is
considered to be and what it is designed to achieve.

Public diplomacy is intended to be seen as a non-
manipulative, information pure form of communication which
can manifest itself in the form of books, film or radio (to
name a few). It is heralded to be better and more effective
than traditional propaganda because it is void of
disinformation, lies and manipulation. The only intention
of government initiated public diplomacy is to provide an
informative and accurate view of American society, policy
and ideals.

2. Determine what motivates the USIA and the VOA to
operate in the manner that they do.

Until recently the USIA's main priority was just to
survive and to be considered a valuable asset to the united
States Government. After a period of reorganization,
renaming, and varying views from administration to
administration, it is not surprising that the USIA and VOA
have had some difficulties in the administrative and policy
departments. It is also understandable that a large
department is going to have problems, but a little more

perception could, at times, help alleviate problems.

101
3. Emphasize that Brazil (as well as other countries) are
worth having quality time and effort invested into them.

We operate in a society where events across the globe
affect us here at home. Reliable and accurate flows of
information between countries enables governments to make
progress in other areas by erasing the doubt that
accompanies uncertainty. Establishing a solid foundation in
Brazil, will not only help educate a population but will
also create a more hospitable environment for governments to
operate in.

In order to ensure that these three entities work
together in the most advantageous manner, it is important to
remember that we operate in a global society and no incident
takes place in isolation. For every action there is a
reaction and in the world of international broadcasting the
potential effects can be numerous and far reaching. Policy
guidelines, research, and analysis should never be
overlooked’in the fast paced world of communication, for
this could surely lead to the swift demise of what has been
created.

Whether in policy analysis or technological
applications, as quickly as society is currently moving with
no apparent plan to slow down, the need to stay one step
ahead is vital. The ability to predict and anticipate the
future is one of our most valuable assets. As one man from
the VOA said, what we do is like a blind person. We can't

see the people but we can touch them (Interview, May 27,

102
1989). This is an ability that when utilized to its fullest
potential can develop the potential for better international

relations in a world that is filled with misunderstanding.

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INTERVIEWS

Interview with Joseph Straubhaar, Professor at Michigan
State University, East Lansing, Michigan, 22 May 1989.

Interview with Sherwood Demit, USIA Research, Washington
D.C., 25 May 1989.

Interview with David Gibson, USIA Research, Washington D.C.,
25 May 1989.

Interview and Tour with Margaret Jaffie, VOA Tours,
Washington D.C., 25 May 1989.

Interview with Nils Linquist, Director of the Brazilian
Branch, Washington D.C., 25 May 1989.

Interview with Kim Elliot, VOA Research, Washington D.C., 26
May 1989.

Meeting with Martin Manning, USIA Library, Washington D.C.,
26 May 1989.