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Utilizing the Voice of America
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THE UNITED STATES INFORMATION AGENCY: UTILIZING THE VOICE OF AMERICA AS A PUBLIC DIPLOMACY INITIATIVE IN BRAZIL

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ABSTRACT

THE UNITED STATES INFORMATION AGENCY:
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PUBLIC DIPLOMACY INITIATIVE IN BRAZIL

By

Michelle Denise Massey

The United States Information Agency (USIA) is a public diplomacy agency that utilizes the Voice of America (VOA) as a broadcasting arm to communicate the government's message to foreign publics. The author analyzes the relationship between the broadcasting of the VOA to Brazil and how it relates to public diplomacy. This thesis attempts to:
1. Provide some insight into what public diplomacy is considered to be and what it is designed to achieve.
2. Determine what motivates the USIA and VOA to operate in the manner that they do. 3. Emphasize that Brazil (as well as other countries) are worth having quality time and effort invested into them. The significance of these issues is discussed.

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INTRODUCTION

This thesis will investigate the particular pattern of the United States Information Agency (USIA) in Brazil. Brazil presents a unique case study. It has emerged from a blanket of colonialism and rapidly revealed in the light of a notion that may well be termed an information society. Historically, Brazil has had close economic and media ties to the United States. Therefore, it is no surprise that the USIA has a special interest in Brazil. The United States Information Agency considers itself a public diplomacy agency that utilizes the Voice of America (VOA) as a broadcasting arm to communicate the message of the government and the environment of the United States to foreign publics.

Using mass communication to influence the opinion of an international audience is believed to be a vital part of the international diplomatic process (Straubhaar & Boyd, 1989). Public diplomacy can consist of utilizing any form of communication that is publicly disseminated (exchange programs, films, books, etc. . .) by a governmental structure to a foreign audience. The United States Information Agency is a current example of the type of communication organization that is utilized to advance the

foreign goals of the United States government. The use of communication resources to sway public opinion, is for many, too closely related to propaganda. Propaganda, in its most basic sense, utilizes resources to manipulate the opinions of a foreign audience. "Propaganda is the deliberate and systematic attempt to shape perceptions, manipulate cognition, and direct behavior to achieve a response that furthers the desired intent of the propagandist" (Jowett & O'Donnell, 1986, p. 16). When looked at objectively, it appears that public diplomacy is trying to do primarily what propaganda does. "In a purely dictionary sense, public diplomacy embraces some of the aspects of propaganda--the spreading of ideas and information for the purpose of helping an institution or a cause" (Hansen, 1984, p. 7).

A first question for the thesis is to examine USIA and U.S. public diplomacy. Since World War II the actions of government influences communication agencies have been the topic of continuous debate. Each administration fosters a distinct perspective reflecting the philosophy of the President.

The issues that are debated often consist of the following: How should the USIA attempt to tell the story of the U.S. to the world? What should be the content of the VOA programs? What is public diplomacy (or propaganda) and how should it be implemented? These and a variety of

similar issues have been recurring in the evolution of the United States Information Agency.

Secondly, this thesis will review the path that public diplomacy has taken. Public diplomacy is professed to be a form of communication with its only goal being increased understanding. Public diplomacy is the device that when implemented, is supposed to bring the two entities (the USIA and the Brazilian public) together in mutual understanding about the policies and actions of the United States Government, as well as of America.

Through literature reviews and examples, the thesis will determine distinct differences between public diplomacy and propaganda. It will also ask: What is its relationship to policy.

Third, this thesis will look at the public diplomacy efforts taking place in Brazil. Besides fulfilling the mission as outlined in the Voa charter, the Brazilian Branch of the VOA currently created a new format in radio programming called Bandeirantes. The VOA has changed the public diplomacy format by developing this program because their audience was dwindling and they decided to take a different approach before their service was removed from the air, also, shortwave is becoming obsolete and mediumwave can reach a wider more diverse audience. By utilizing a Brazilian network to transmit its broadcasts, they are also functioning as public diplomats on a one-on-one basis.

This thesis follows the history of Brazil and the USIA to establish the past and present environments to better understand the current circumstances under which they both operate.

Other questions to be examined are: Is the government's was of thinking really a reflection of America? Is attempting to bring a public around to your way of thinking propaganda (or at least persuasion)? Are budgetary restraints and Radio Marti really hampering the initiatives of the VOA? Do relations and research efforts within the USIA need to be expanded?

The Voice of America is an important and reliable source in the communications arena. Though literature reviews, personal observations and interviews, the relationship between the United States Information Agency and Brazil will be examined. It is important to see where they have been, where they are going, and how a new form of information technology is effecting both societies. Hopefully the progress being made in Brazil can be used as an example for other ares on how to effectively communicate during an era of public diplomacy.

HISTORY OF BROADCASTING IN BRAZIL

Broadcasting entered Latin America as an import from developed or more developed nations. These countries brought not only the hardware but also the ways to implement it. In general, Britain, the United States, and France were the principle countries that brought their models to developing nations. For better or worse, it appears that when a broadcasting model from a developed country is incorporated into a developing country's infrastructure, "the norms, unwritten rules, styles of production, values, professional codes and expectations, beliefs, and attitudes . . . They are transferred directly through training, socialization, and expectation, and indirectly as functions of the importation of structures, technologies, and content of broadcasting that originate in the advanced industrial nations." (Katz and Wedell, 1977, pp. 67-68)

Although outsiders may determine the model that enters the country, the domestic government has the power to shape its national system and keep the model within its standards. The political climate, the media ownership patterns, and the methods of gaining access to the media are all issues that may affect the broadcasting system, and help determine who

has access to the national audience. These factors are extremely applicable to Brazil.

Since the first Brazilian radio transmissions generated across the airways in 1922, Brazil's media market has rapidly expanded. In 1985 Brazil ranked second in the world in number of radio stations. Its television network, Rede Globo, is said to be the fifth largest network in the world (Head, 1985). Radiobras, a government television network, has been established to provide broadcasting to those areas not served by the commercial stations.

There are several internal and external factors, some mentioned previously, which are crucial in molding the path the media system (radio in particular) did and will take. Others that also need to be analyzed more closely are: Revenue sources, advertising, and the origins of Brazilian broadcasting: when and how different players entered the game. These actors are primarily comprised of foreign countries, transnational corporations, the Brazilian elite, as well as the government. These entities have all played a part in Brazil's political, economic, and social arena, and they will continue to have an impact into the future.

HISTORY OF RADIO

Colonial Influence

Due to the lack of a powerful indigenous culture in Brazil, there has not been the foundation to deter the

penetration of European culture as there is in the Arab world, China, India, or even Peru and Mexico. As Lins da Silva points out, even during the first centuries of colonization, there was a lack of indigenous culture to mix with the culture of the colonizer, the need for a uniform society to provide the European market with certain products, and for Brazilian elites to be more responsive to the needs of the colonizers than to the demands of the population, did not permit the native culture to survive (Lins da Silva, 1986).

Most Latin American countries were greatly influenced by the colonial traditions of their colonizers--the British, Danish, Dutch, French, Spanish, and Portuguese. Even after these countries physically left, their influence still remains in the social structures and the language of the countries (Head, 1985). This colonial dependency paved the way; enabling foreign interest to penetrate the Brazilian system and reap the profits with minimal difficulties.

As Coutinho points out, it is not realistic to assume that European culture blanketed Brazil and left the people with no identity at all:

"The history of Brazilian culture . . . can be schematically defined as the history of the assimilation--mechanical or critical, passive or transformative--of the universal culture (which is certainly a highly differentiated culture) by the several classes and social strata of Brazil. In sum: when Brazilian thought 'imports'

a universal ideology, it is proof that a specific class or social stratum of our country found (or thought it found) in that ideology of the expression of its own Brazilian class interest. For example, when the Brazilian working class took shape, it did not look for adequate theoretical expression in Bororo myths or in African relations." (Lins da Silva, 1985, p.99)

Thus it is apparent that Brazilians did maintain some degree of cultural awareness, but as a result of colonialization, they were desensitized to foreign intervention when broadcasting and it foreign entourage entered Brazil.

The 20th Century

The first license for a commercial radio station in Brazil was issued by the national government on August 2, 1920 in Rio. On August 27 a similar licensing process transpired in Buenos Ares. The closeness in the licensing dates has created decades of arguments between Argentina and Brazil as to which nation was the founder of radio (Alisky, 1981).

The first official person to be heard over the air was President Epitacio Pessoa during the celebrations of Brazil's one hundredth year of independence on September 7, 1922 (Oliveira, 1988). There were only 80 receivers in operation at the time, thus, only the social elite of Rio de

Janeiro were able to hear the speech of the President in their homes. (Ortriwano, 1985). Westinghouse installed a radio transmitter which transmitted 500 watts, and was placed high on Corcovado. Many days after the first transmissions, there were operas transmitted live from the municipal theater of Rio de Janeiro. The demonstration caused an impact, but the transmissions were soon stopped due to the lack of a plan for its continuation (Ortriwano, 1985).

April 20, 1923 is the date that we are definitely able to consider as the date of the installation of broadcasting in Brazil. The first station, the Radio Sociedade do Rio de Janeiro (Radio Society of Rio de Janeiro), was established on this date and was funded by Roquette Pinto and Henry Morize (Frederico, 1982). The station had 2,000 watts of power and was installed by Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo Telephone Company, Westinghouse International, and Western Electric.

Radio was born for the well-to-do Brazilians and not the masses, due mainly to the fact that the only ones who were able to afford receivers were the very rich. During the 1920s the programming functions were: to take a little bit of education, culture and altruism (Ortriwano, 1985). These functions were born as an undertaking of the intellectuals and the scientists. Small elitist groups cultivated the technological innovation, contributing with money, helping to produce programs, playing their musical

instruments, singing, talking, and listening (Oliveira, 1988). In the beginning, the opera was listened to with records loaned by the listeners, poetry recitals, concerts, cultural talks, etc., and the programs were always very selective. But since the beginning, Roquette Pinto was convinced that broadcasting was a medium for the masses. Even so, the reality of the 1920s was that the popular culture did not have access to radio, because it was not characterized as an entertainment of the masses. The forms of radio were individualistically diverse through a small number of broadcasting installations which had little interest in the global society (Ortriwano, 1985).

In the first stages, radio was maintained through monthly payments of those who owned sets, public and private donations, and very rarely, paid advertisements, that strictly speaking, were prohibited through legislation of the time. At this time they were also making an appeal, to those interested, to adhere to a social broadcast and helping to maintain it. Renato Murce said that perseverance is not a very Brazilian virtue, after some months, no one had contributed much (Ortriwano, 1985). Thus, radio fought through the decade without a stable economic or financial structure that was able to benefit its growth.

The 1930s and '40s: The Vargas Rule

From the beginning of the 1930s radio suffered a radical transformation due to the fact that its survival was in danger. In 1932 a decree was issued that permitted the introduction of advertising and increased the accessibility of receivers. The introduction of commercial messages immediately transformed radio. What was once "scholarly", "educational", "cultural" became "popular" programming. In order to maintain a format that listeners were accustomed to and to insure that the public was reached, the advertisements were not able to interrupt concerts, but spots were permitted between performances of popular music, humorist orations, and other attractions that were emerging and eventually dominated the programming (Ortriwano, 1985).

With the advent of publicity, the question of how to organize this advertising undertaking became a dispute in the marketplace. When slots for commercials were taken under consideration three facets of the station were deliberated: technical development, status of emission and its popularity. The preoccupation with education was beginning to be set aside as a determining factor, and what would appeal to local merchants began to take over. Variety shows, music, and news entertained as well as informed the population, which was largely centered on the Atlantic coast. Radio was the primary instrument used to unify the

country and was effective due to the universal language: Portuguese.

During the 1930s President Getulio Vargas realized radios potential as a political tool. Vargas favored and encouraged the expansion of commercial broadcasting. He began to realize the promise of this medium when it became apparent that radio was much more efficient for spreading messages than was printed matter, due to the large amount of illiteracy in the country. To ensure his message was heard, the government was able to exercise strict control, including censorship of radio broadcasts. The functions of radio emerged as direct links to the political and economic development of the country. Vargas helped make radio an indispensable part of everyday life by placing it in the service of the national economy, utilizing it to the utmost, and creating a public vehicle with the multiple objectives of popular expression and national integration (Ortriwano, 1985). Even though Vargas and his government had their hands in much of the medium, some stations were still able to legitimately fulfil these objectives.

In 1935, there were two creations that marked the development of programming on the Brazilian broadcasts. Radio Kosmos, of Sao Paulo broke the traditional cycle of programming by including the participation of the audience in the shows. At the same time in Rio de Janeiro, Radio Journal of Brazil was established to provide a system of

programs primarily for information. Its manner was strict and it gained much notoriety.

As the decade marched on, Brazilian radio went along its way, defining its purpose and becoming an integral part in the political and economic life of the country. Gertulio Vargas was the first Brazilian leader to see the great political implication of radio and went on to use it within his regime (Ortriwano, 1985).

After a while there was much concern about Vargas' methods and his intentions. In response to critics who attacked his methods of utilizing the media, Vargas started broadcasting political message nationwide (Rosen, 1988). He placed the Departamento Oficial de Propaganda (Official Department of Propaganda)--DOP in charge of a section of radio that was called "Hora do Brasil" ("Hour of Brazil"). This program was required to be retransmitted by all radio outlets in the nation, from seven to eight every evening. These broadcasts explaining the government and its actions were dotted with music and news of the entertainment world via interviews with Brazilian film, theater, radio and recording artists. (Alisky, 1981).

In order to maintain a strong hold on the reins, Vargas created and recreated many departments within his government. In 1934 the DOP was transformed into the Departamento de Propaganda e Difusao Cultural (Department of Propaganda and Cultural Diffusion) which then started "A Voz do Brasil" ("The Voice of Brazil"). President Vargas

created the Brazilian Radio Commission in 1936 (Ortriwano, 1985). This entity scrutinized all licensed station operators in detail. New regulations that were put into effect demanded that public service announcements from the government be placed on all stations. Later on December 27, 1939 a decree created the Departamento de Imprensa e Propaganda--DIP, which was directly tied to the President and which also replaced the Department of Propaganda and Cultural Diffusion. DIP's responsibility consisted of supervising and censoring not only the content of the radio programs, but also the cinema, theater and newspapers. Later "A Voz do Brasil" passed its responsibility to the National Agency, presently the Empresa Brasileira de Noticias--EBN (Brazilian News Firm) (Ortriwano, 1985).

It appears that the multitude of departmental transactions took place to maintain a watch dog function to flush out any loopholes and solidify the system. Perhaps this was done due to the fact that most of Brazilian broadcasting was (and still is) in private hands. Among the commercial stations, the most popular for quite a few years was the Radio Nacional (National Radio) of Rio de Janeiro. Its goal was to cover the entire nation with its mediumwave and shortwave bands, and its popularity was immense. In the 1950s the station received 19,125,056 letters during a national campaign (Oliveira, 1988, p. 36).

In 1940, the Vargas government decided that Radio Nacional had to become an affirmative instrument of the regime. The '40s also saw the emergence of the first radionovela (soap opera)--in 1942, it went on the air through Radio Nacional of Rio de Janeiro and was titled: "Em Busca da Felicidade" ("In Search of Happiness"). This type of programming caught on quickly making it a major part of the programming during this period of broadcasting. In 1945, Radio Nacional along transmitted 14 novelas daily (Ortriwano, 1985).

Freedom from censorship did not occur until Vargas was removed from the presidency, in 1945, and General Eurico Gasper Dutra took over. Ironically, the media that Vargas so loved to manipulate ended up contributing to his death. on August 24, 1954, four years after his reelection, Vargas felt that public opinion was against him too much permit his further effectiveness as president. He took his own life to put a halt to the weeks of assault from the newspapers and broadcasting stations (Alisky, 1981).

HISTORY OF TELEVISION

The 1950s: The Introduction

After the Vargas reign, the new civilian Government paid little attention to broadcasting. Brazilian editors and

commentators now had the opportunity to develop their skills and write their own thoughts.

Radio's heyday lasted throughout the 1950s, thus ignoring the introduction of television. One of the main reasons was due to the lack of receivers available to the public. The first television station, TV Tupi of Sao Paulo, went on the air in 1950. The station's owner imported 100 sets and distributed them to public places because the price of receivers was beyond the common income (Oliveira, 1988, p. 36). Therefore, TV did not have any adverse impact on radio.

As the '50s came to an end and the '60s began, more affordable television sets were made available outside of the realm of the elite. Live advertising with garotas-propaganda (advertising girls) became popular and domestic and international corporations began switching to television. In the presence of all these changes, radio felt pressured to change its format to mostly music and news, as well as reducing its budget in order to be able to compete with television (Oliveira, 1988).

1960 to the Present: General Overview

The 1960s consisted of a decade dominated by military rule which ended in 1985. But this did not stop the prosperous path of the broadcasting media.

During this time, two important commercial stations were set up: TV Globo and TV Bandeirantes. TV Globo captured the audience early on and they still enjoy the viewership of the majority of the audience in the '80s.

As a token attempt to fulfil the "educational" dream of the '20s and '30s, educational programs are required by law in both radio and television. The government's "Projecto Minerva" ("Minerva Project") is required to be broadcast over all AM radio outlets. It is transmitted from 8:00 to 8:30 in the evening (Oliveira, 1988). This program is targeted at the less educated portion of the nation in an attempt to lower the nation's 23 percent illiteracy rate (Sanders, 1988). Television usually uses such programs as Sesame Street or "Sitio do Pica Pau" (The Yellow Woodpecker Ranch) to satisfy the obligation (Oliveira, 1988).

Not only does radio have to worry about the competition it is receiving from television, but also from pirate stations. Piracy seems to be very popular in Sao Paulo. There are several popular FM radio stations that operate without a license. The primary reasons these stations are rising to the surface is in response to the lack of a variety of programming. Most commercial stations may be reluctant to adopt the pirate station's formats because they have budgets and advertisers to take into consideration. In addition, they do not have the freedom to experiment with alternative

programming. The pirate stations do not have to broadcast

for a profit and often use homemade equipment (Oliveira, 1988).

INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL INFLUENCES ON BROADCASTING IN BRAZIL

INTERNAL INFLUENCES

Brazilian Elites

Throughout the communication history of Brazil, the elite have had a hand in the content of programs, the ownership of the media, and the direction of the general economy. Historically the elite have owned and operated the television and radio networks, thus having a substantial role in the cultural and social atmosphere of the country. This is not to say that no local stations exist. As of 1982, 1130 medium wave or AM stations existed and 398 FM stations were on the air (Straubhaar). But these entrepreneurial stations usually only carry an impact in their local community and have no influence outside of their realm. On the other hand, once an elite owns one of the media networks they often have holdings in the newspaper and magazine industry. Roberto Marinho, a giant in the communications field, is a current example of the amount of power that can be welded by a media owning elite. TV Globo, the fourth largest network in the world, is the network that Marinho owns (De Lima, 1988). Millions of Brazilians watch TV Globo which airs and produces telenovelas (soap operas

with cultural themes) nightly. It is primarily these soap operas that give TV Globo its $500 million a year turn over (Economist, 1987).

As of 1982, the Rede Globo Television Network dominated 75% of Brazil's total audience (Howell, 1986). It does not broadcast more than one hour of foreign programming during prime time (from 6:00 p.m. to 12:00 p.m.). In addition to the novelas the network broadcasts humor programs, documentaries and musicals which are produced in Brazil. Even though the themes and content of the programs are obviously Brazilian, the style and format of them are influenced by North American models (Lins da Silva, 1986).

Marinho also controls the popular Jornal Nacional, TV Globo's 30-minute news program, which is nestled between the two prime-time telenovelas. Even though the soap operas bring in an ample amount of money, it is Jornal Nacional that makes Roberto Marinho an influential man in the Brazilian economy. His background as a journalist gives him the credentials to write editorials for the family newspaper, O Globo. Besides the internal interests previously mentioned, the Marinho group is also involved in other lines of domestic businesses such as radio, records, video sales, telecommunications and publishing, and also does business in mining, agriculture, real estate, and manufacturing. Abroad, Marinho purchased TV Monte Carlo in 1985 (Economist, 1987). In each of these endeavors the government supports and cooperates in every way it can.

This is not surprising due to TV Globo's and, in particular, Mr. Marinho's history with the government. One of TV Globo's main claims to fame with the government is that it has never confronted them. TV Globo was founded in 1965, just a year after the revolution and the military took control, and became an instrument of sophisticated propaganda to the next series of military regimes. Even though the end of formal censorship came in the mid-1970s Marinho controls the content of Jornal Nacional and O Globo so that it reflects his conservative views. As Roberto Marinho explains it: "We give all necessary information, but our opinions are in some way or other dependent on my character, my convictions and my patriotism" (Economist, 1987, p. 44).

Vencino A. De Lima does not see Marinho's intervention in political matters as a patriotic mission. De Lima claims that the Globo group has manipulated its television newscasts by "distorting, suppressing, and promoting information according to its own interests and those of the class fraction it represents" (De Lima, 1988, p. 108)

The "you scratch my back, I'll scratch yours' mentality is readily apparent in the government/Marinho relationship. In 1984, Marinho backed the civilian candidate Tancerdo Neves due to the fact that the retiring military president General Joao Figueiredo could not tolerate the ruling party's candidate. When Neves died before taking office,

Marinho threw his support behind the next civilian in line: President Jose Sarney.

It just so happens that the communications minister, Antonio Carlos, is Marinho's friend, ally and business partner. Conveniently Carlos was able to sign a profitable supply contract with a telecommunications firm that Marinho had just purchased. The government has also taken precautions to ensure that the new constitution being drafted by Congress excludes any reference to the regulation of broadcasting (Economist, 1987).

The final analysis is that TV Globo has made itself indispensable to the government due to its ability to legitimize the actions of the group power. One man, Roberto Marinho, has the ability to help determine what information is absorbed by the Brazilian population and the slant the opinions will take.

TV Globo is not the only commercial television station. There is also Rede Bandeirantes, Rede Manchete, and Sistema Brasileirs de Televisao (Brazilian System of Television). It is evident television has become an important part of Brazilian life. Despite these other stations, Globo is still the predominate influence. Although, it has been reported that the competition is rapidly appealing to a larger audience and television viewers are becoming more segmented (Interview, 1989).

Clothesline Literature

Not so surprisingly, literature has made its influence felt in the broadcasting world. Folhetos are small booklets, which have been produced since the end of the last century, as literatura de cordel or "clothesline literature". The subject matter of these folhetos range from accounts of political events to the visit of Pope John Paul II to Brazil or a trip to the moon. The theme they carry is often conventional: the established order is respected, good always triumphs and punishment is given out to wrong-doers.

Neither the poet (who writes the folhetos) nor the illustrators are rich people. They often make extra income by working with small radio stations. The folhetos are not only read but recited over the radio. In the early 1980s there were approximately 2,500 poets working for radio stations (Pisa, 1986).

The Brazilian authorities and the Roman Catholic Church were quick to latch on to the idea of using the folhetos as a popular dissemination channel for ideas, proposals and reforms. By the 1940s, government agencies were already using them to promote its interests--five titles were published on Getulio Vargas, the President of the Republic. When the Church or the government funds a folheto the communication generally consists of explanation of the key passages of a pastoral letter or a piece of legislation.

This form of entertainment not only eudcates the masses but also provides radio with a program that appeals to the public.

Illiteracy

At first glance illiteracy may not appear to carry much weight in the internal forces of the broadcasting media. In actuality, the level of education that a person has, and thus their ability to read, does play a role in media selection (Straubhaar, 1988).

Illiteracy is very common in Latin America, even though statistics state that it is only 23 percent of the population this only applies in a proportional sense (Sanders, 1988). The proportion of illiterates in Brazil may be falling but it is an illusion, while the actual number of illiterates increase due to rapid population growth (Tunstall, 1977).

One of the main factors that started Brazil's decent was that there was a delay in the arrival of the printing press in Brazil. Until the beginning of the 19th century, print shops were prohibited in Brazil by the colonizers. Therefore, there was no tradition of reading the printed word to pass down through the generations. This suppression of print continued after political independence in 1922 and throughout most of the monarchy.

Once the population was at a reading deficit, the need for censorship of the press was no longer needed but the control over the broadcasting mediums still was maintained. In the 1970s telenovelas were required to present 20 episodes at a time to the censors, and once approved a Censura Federal certificate had to be displayed on the screen before each episode. Programs were reviewed to ensure that no references to political, religious, sexual, racial or economic problems were aired (Head, 1985).

The rationale behind television censorship is, according to a Brazilian editor, that the government is already opposed by the ten% of the people who read the newspaper, therefore censorship would serve no purpose. But the majority of the population depends upon television for information rather than on newspapers, thus they could be persuaded either way; thus the government feels it has to censor television to protect itself (Head, 1985).

Censorship in theory may work as may maintaining an illiterate population through the media, but in reality the information is getting out to the population that the government is trying so hard to suppress. The masses can get the restricted programming as well as the information they desire through pirated VCR tapes, spillover services from neighboring countries, pirate stations and foreign external services. Elizabeth Mahan also came to the conclusion that censorship is not really effective in

suppressing opinion because eventually most banned information leaked out. Licensing, equipment importation restrictions, and reliance on government advertising were actually more effective at stifling all information censored or not (Mahan).

Even multinationals realize the lack of salesmanship to a non-paper reading audience. In 1977, 65% of their total advertising budget went into television and radio. The advertising executives realized that more Latin Americans were in daily contact with radio, television in the urban areas, than with daily newspapers (Alisky, 1981).

Illiteracy in Brazil will continue to be a problem for those less fortunate, but due to the rapid influx of alternative media their ability to gain access, knowledge will not be as hard to attain.

The Government

After the 1964 military takeover television grew phenomenally because it was an important supportive instrument for the governments ideal of monopolistic capitalism. Even though the government had control of all electronic communications by law, the regulation of the aspects of broadcasting was more of a concern to the government in the early years than regulating the program content. This is important to remember because Brazilian

broadcasting has remained in private hands but the government always has the authority and the right to control it. In Brazil and Columbia, broadcasting systems have developed, in part, due to direct government support in direct and indirect ways: restriction on foreign ownership, credit incentives, and indirect investment through advertising and program production (Mahan).

Besides the visual impact that it has, television was an especially important supportive instrument for the government in the early years. The utilization of this medium was seen as necessary due to the desire of the population to own a television set. According to "O Pais de Televisao", the census figures in 1980 showed that many more homes had a television than refrigerators (42.2% of urban residences) or sewage services (37.8%). No significant difference was found between television and radio ownership in urban areas (there are 79.2% radios and 73.1% televisions). In rural areas 68.0% of all homes have radios, whereas only 14.7% have television (all figures from Lins da Silva, 1986). Since the elites held the majority of the economic and political power, the accessibility gap of television between the urban and rural areas was not an issue to the ruling government. It appears that in the eyes of the government, what is beneficial for the masses also makes money for the administration as well as giving them a vast amount of media control.

Due to the fact that many areas were underserved by commercial stations, in 1967 the government started to construct a national microwave system to relay programs to transmitters in the most distant settlements. Radiobras, a government television network, was started to supplement commercial station coverage, primarily in the Amazons. Recently, the Empresa Brasileira de Radio e Televisao Radiobras (Brazilian Corporation of Radio and Television) was created in order to coordinate government-owned stations. Its alternative programming is not intended to compete with privately owned facilities (Oliveira, 1988).

Just as many authors have pointed out that the U.S. is imposing North American culture on Brazil (Tracey, 1988; Lins da Silva, 1988; Nordenstreng & Varis, 1974), and thus helping create a type of dependency. Brazil is now dumping its programming on other countries. This practice is being seen as a refute to the argument that Brazil is a culturally dependent nation and that there is an inequitable flow of information (Schwarz & Jaramillo, 1986). The Brazilian soap opera or telenovela has been broadcast in more than 100 countries (Interview, 1989). These novelas are gaining as much notoriety as American programming did when it was introduced overseas. However, these soap operas are giving other countries a window into Brazil, aiding them in formulating opinions and ideas about Brazilian life. As in the American situation, this process may (and probably will)

project distorted images of the "real" Brazil. But inside Brazil, the images portrayed create problems as well. Brazilian intellectuals persist in their claims that novelas are not reality based and are too fantasy oriented. The intellectuals must begin to understand that the primary motive behind the government's decision to export programming is not on of nation image enhancement but one prompted by capitalistic profit-motivation (Antola & Rogers, 1984).

Rede Globo exports many of its programs to other countries located primarily in Latin America and Africa. As of 1979 Globo sold its programs to 71 countries including Europe and the United States. The exports are comprised mainly of children's programs, telenovelas, musical programs, and series. THese transactions provided Globo with $2 million in revenue in 1979 (Lins da Silva, 1986). Lins da Silva points out that were are seeing: **". . . the beginning of the process of internationalization of production in the are of culture, paralleling the process that took place in certain areas of industrial production." (Lins da Silva, 1986: p. 105)**

EXTERNAL INFLUENCES

The United States and Transnationals

It is often difficult to separate North American endeavors in foreign countries from the workings of all transnational corporations. This is primarily because transnationals usually operate within a capitalistic framework and promote many American ideals.

After gaining its independence from one colonial nation, Brazil gave away any potential control it may have had economically and culturally to the foreign influences. Brazil received its first loan from the United States in 1922, which began a reign of North American influence and dependence that continued throughout the decade and has increased every decade since then. In the 1920s the first U.S. industries were installed in Brazil.

When World War I forced many European film producers to discontinue producing films, many North American interests supplied the Latin American mass media with films. Due to a lack of competition, Hollywood dominated the Latin American screen. One estimate stated that in 1922, 95 percent of the films in Latin America were North American products (Fejes, 1986, p. 25). Fred Fejes also stated that few Latin American producers attempted to create films because the local tastes were partial to the technical excellence and pervasiveness of the North American product (Fejes, 1986).

After the initial success of the film industry, attention turned towards Latin America as a consumer of foreign goods. In 1919 and 1920, pamphlets were published that provided North American exporters with an overview of the advertising climate in various Latin American countries (Fejes, 1986).

As early as 1928 Brazil saw the arrival of international advertising agencies such as N.W. Ayer, J. Walter Thompson, Standard Advertising and McCann Erickson. These agencies designed commercials for General Electric, Kodak, Coca-Cola, Goodyear and Ford (Oliveira, 1988). The '30s saw increased influence when the growing industrial bourgeoisie gained control over the internal political hegemony, which had interests that were close to the United States. These ties were drawn more tightly together after WWII when other central nations were more concerned about their war torn countries than with Latin America.

It was also in the 1930s that the North American capital, style, and content began to dominate in the mediums of radio, film, and the music industry. In the cinema, the U.S. influence was almost absolute. Yet, it was also during this period that Brazilian playwrights staged their first productions, and the samba and other Brazilian music reached all classes and was consumed by society as a whole (Atwood, 1986). The transmitting stations were owned by Brazilian entrepreneurs, but radio was financially under the control of American advertising agencies and advertisers, thus there

was heavy U.S. musical influence through the records that were played (Atwood, 1986).

The introduction of television in the 1950s also brought more U.S. influence and control to Brazil. However, the amount of people culturally affected by this dominance remained fairly low since television was initially an entertainment medium for the elite, and the masses did not have access to it. Sodre notes that even after the communication media were capable of reaching the masses they did not have great impact on the working class. Except for radio, which can reach diverse audiences, the other communication mediums were beyond the interests of the land workers, laborers and semiproletarians. On the other hand, the high bourgeoisie displayed an interest in the arts of techniques of communication media thus these tastes were catered to and advertising support was gained (Lins da Silva, 1986).

Foreign presence in Brazilian television has been most apparent in the areas of program content and advertising control (Hamelink, 1983; Beltran, 1978; Mattos, 1982).

The United States has been charged with 'dumping' or intentionally selling syndicated programming at a lower cost to third world countries (TWCs) in order to exploit dependency. In 1982 a country such as Haiti could obtain a half hour television episode for $30, while the same program would cost $4,000 in Brazil and $9,000 in the United Kingdom

(Head, 1985). It has been argued that this pricing differential is nothing more than good business practice. The value of the country is based on the program/audience combination, not abstractly on the programs (Head, 1985).

Relatively no change has taken place in the area of advertising control, foreign interests still have major holdings in this department. Of the fifteen biggest television advertisers in 1980 only five were Brazilian. The primary advertisers were, and continue to be, transnational business with headquarters in the United States, Switzerland, England, Holland, and Liechtenstein (Atwood, 1986).

The transnational advertising industry is dominated by North American agencies because their best clients are global advertisers such as Procter & Gamble, General Foods, Bristol-Myers, American Home Products, General Motors, Unilever, Ford, Sears Roebuck, R.J. Reynolds Industries, and Colgate-Palmolive. These industries invest about 30 percent of their advertising budgets on the international market (Hamelink, 1978). The amount of money these corporations bring to the Latin American commercial television and radio market makes them hard to resist. The financing provided by these ads contributes to the upgrading of the production of the major newspapers, network television, and radio broadcasting (Alisky, 1981).

The expansion of foreign investment in the Brazilian market, multinational corporations become televisions's largest source of advertising revenue (Mattos, 1984). Even though there is a multitude of North American agencies in the market, Brazilian legislation is attempting to curtail their activities. For example: Of the ten largest advertising agencies in Brazil, seven of them are domestic. This is primarily due to a government policy of granting advertising accounts only to national agencies (Mattos, 1984).

As time goes on, the Brazilian state becomes more involved in advertising but since many of their interests are tied closely to those of the transnationals, the state does not differ that much from transnational advertisers.

In the early years when the elite owned just about all of the media, the presence of foreign capital was overt. However when the capital interests of the transnationals are better served by a national audience, the situation rapidly changes. For example, a Brazilian hero on Latin American television is more effective than a North American one. In many areas the United States is still seen as the "evil colonializer" and by using national heroes limits language and cultural barriers (Lins da Silva, 1986). Using familiar characters may also help gain quicker acceptance of American products.

Hamelink points to a few of his personal experiences to illustrate the point that foreign substance is replacing national techniques, symbols, and social patterns.

-For starving children in the Brazilian city of Recife, to have a Barbie doll seems more important than having food.

-For the poorest people of Latin America, advertising is an important source of information. North American agencies tell them that the good life is the life of the average consumer in the U.S. Venezuelan housewives are encouraged to identify their happiness with possessing a refrigerator or dishwasher. Advertisements advise the worker in Bogota to escape from the daily routine by means of a U.S.-made Ford or a U.S. airline (Hamelink, 1984).

-A study conducted in Sao Paulo, Brazil revealed that 67% of the consumer market that saw advertisements consisted of people with less than $500 annual per capita income. However, radio and television commercials prompted them to finance 85% of the appliances and television receivers through installment credit (Alisky, 1981).

Putting foreign goods in a national context is not only providing money for advertisers but also helping to keep the radio and TV stations on the air. In order to survive, this

is a situation in which radio must participate in; even at the expense of cultural deterioration.

CONCLUSIONS - BRAZILIAN BROADCASTING

After reviewing the facts, it is quite clear that broadcasting in Brazil is based on the U.S. commercial model. North American corporations have been directly and indirectly involved in the broadcasting process since the early 1920s making its influence hard to ignore. Even though there is a variety of competition, radio has continued to grow through the years. By the late 1970s FM's popularity was expanding due to the increasing market for FM receivers. The musical format contains current Brazilian musical hits as well as a variety of international tunes (Oliveira, 1988; Folha de S. Paulo, 1986). In 1979 eight out of the top fifteen songs played frequently in Rio de Janeiro were American (Artur da Tavola, 1979). There are also formatted FM stations like Radio Incofidencia of Belo Horizonte, which plays only popular Brazilian music (Oliveira, 1988). The American musical culture has become a daily part of Brazilian life just as foreign advertisements have become a staple in the Brazilian diet. As previously pointed out, the popular format is usually abided by in order to maintain an audience as well as attract foreign advertising. As a result of this trend, just as in North

America, audiences have become more segmented (Straubhaar, 1988) and more competitive.

Even though foreign influence has been readily apparent in the broadcasting system, its effect on the system may be second to that of the government (Oliveira, 1988; Schiller, 1981). But it has been this government/foreign influence that has controlled radio through the years and it appears these entities will determine its future. This may primarily be due to the fact that their goals are similar. They each want to influence the greatest audience and achieve a large profit (Schiller, 1981; Alisky, 1981; Straubhaar; 1988).

Since it does not seem likely that Brazil will soon become an elitist society and the literacy rate will rise, radio will continue to cater to the masses. Its function will continue to be one of news, political information, and entertainment with an emphasis on local awareness. As in the United STates, Brazilian radio is an integral part of national life. It has survived a history of manipulation and constant competition. There may be fluctuations in its popularity or changes in its format, but Brazilian radio is in no fear of complete deterioration.

Keeping this in mind, it is not surprising that the United States Information Agency (USIA) shows great interest in providing Brazil with a radio service from which the population can gain a greater understanding of the United States.

USIA HISTORY

The United States Information Agency (USIA) is the primary information source about the U.S. for many Brazilian citizens. They have many publications, exchange programs, mass media services and events that help explain the issues, policies and motives of the United States. The mass media is an important aspect of the organization. The media has the ability to help people extend their knowledge of distant societies beyond their own surroundings and experiences. In 1912, Walter Lippmann saw it this way: "The world that we have to deal with politically is out of reach, out of sight, out of mind. It has to be explored, reported, imagined." (Tan, 1986, p. 299)

The Humble Beginnings

World War I was the event that initiated the first U.S. Government supported international propaganda program. George Creel has assisted President Woodrow Wilson in his reelection campaign of 1916, and thus became the head of the Committee on Public Information from 1917--1918.

Creel's philosophy of public information was that "the government encourage free expression as a means of

fortifying the war effort, relying on voluntary restraint of the press to maintain the secrecy of vital military matters." (Henderson, 1969) The themes that the committee used were simple: America would not be beaten; America was the land of freedom and democracy and therefore could be trusted; thanks to President Wilson's vision, Allied victory would usher in a new era of peace and hope, in which armaments would be put aside, minorities released from oppression, and sovereignty returned to the people (Henderson, 1969). Despite Creel's good intentions, the Espionage Act of 1917 gave a different gave a different perspective of the Committee to the public. The Act stated that it was a crime to make false reports with intent to interfere with military operations or promote the success of America's enemies or cause insubordination, disloyalty, mutiny, or refusal of duty in the military forces, or obstruct recruiting or enlistment. Heavy penalties were provided for violation. Therefore, this "voluntary" censorship had a bit of added insurance to make sure the press knew when to voluntarily censor its material.

Despite Creel's positive image of the Committee on Public Information, it was a target of continual criticism from the press, which resented voluntary censorship and feared the threat of even greater measures of suppression. Congress was also watching the process and many worried, particularly the Republican minority, that this propaganda mechanism might be used for partisan political advantage.

In addition, rumors had it that the Creel organization had been penetrated by spies and saboteurs. As a result, on June 30, 1919, Congress disassembled the Committee on Public Information. This is the humble beginnings of the first American information agency and how it was created and destroyed.

A Period of Governmental Rest

Between World War I and II the general atmosphere surrounding the idea of propaganda, especially in the 1920s, was that the U.S. had been tricked by foreign propagandists into entering World War I. Once it had infiltrated America, the only ideas and news that were disseminated were mostly fictitious. Thus, propaganda gained the connotation of being deceitful and tricky. And that only foreigners used this method that was below those of honest, moral Americans.

While the U.S. was engulfed with feelings of morality, the Soviet Union, the Germans and the Japanese began broadcasting international short-wave propaganda in 1926 and during the 1930s. Even England entered the field in the early 1930s.

During this era, America permitted foreign propagandists and domestic agents of foreign principals to broadcast to the U.S. public just as long as they were registered. But no effort was ever made to combat the attacks. Even so, many broadcasting institutions, including

Columbia Broadcasting System and National Broadcasting Company, established international broadcasting systems.

The First Small Step

In May of 1938 the U.S. Government took the first small steps towards psychological warfare. In an effort to accommodate a presidential decree to promote Western Hemisphere solidarity and to ward off Nazi infiltration, the Interdepartmental Committee on Cooperation with the American Republics (later called the Interdepartmental Committee for Scientific and Cultural Cooperation) was created.

After the Nazi victories in Europe in 1940 and concerns about the effects of German propaganda in Latin America grew, the American Government gently entered the field of international broadcasting. In August 1940, President Franklin D. Roosevelt, by Executive Order, established the Office of Coordination of Commercial and Cultural Relations (later renamed Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs [CIAA]) to communicate between the American Republics. This agency's duty was to disseminate information through government and private radio broadcasting and other methods throughout the Americas.

In 1941, President Franklin D. Roosevelt felt the imminence of war and established the Coordinator of Information (COI) and named Colonel William J. Donovan ("Wild Bill") as chief. Officially it was stated that the

objective of the organization was to gather intelligence material. This surface appearance of neutrality in the early years of WWII was maintained to deter public outcry. Behind closed doors, Robert Sherwood, the Presidential speech-writer, convinced Donovan and Roosevelt that the only way to counteract Nazi propaganda was an American international broadcasting service (Henderson, 1969; Roth, 1981).

Donovan named playwright Robert Sherwood to direct the Foreign Information Service, which was responsible for mainly foreign broadcasting. Even though the U.S. was trying to maintain a surface appearance of neutrality, Donovan convinced Sherwood and the President to utilize his agency to counteract Nazi propaganda.

In the beginning, the organization restricted its services to broadcasting to Europe and organized a news service abroad. Their policy was to stick to the facts. Sherwood was entirely opposed to using the falsehood or terror techniques used by the Nazis. As the war progressed there were new demands for a major psychological offensive. Even so, Sherwood said the main focus for America would be "Information": "The truth coming from American sincerity is by far the most effective means of propaganda." (Tyson, 1983, p. 5) On February 24, 1942 this new plan of service went on the air in German and was directed at Western Europe. The service was (and still is) known as the "Voice of America". The first official VOA broadcast has set the

aura surrounding the VOA for the last 47 years: "The news may be good or bad, we shall tell you the truth." (Henderson, 1969, p. 31)

As time went on, confusion developed as to which agency held jurisdiction to present information overseas. There were four entities which had been created to disseminate information on behalf of the government: The Coordinator of Information, the CIAA, the Office of Facts and Figures, and the Office of Government Reports. In order to establish some form of unity, in June 1942, the Roosevelt administration combined all of the above groups (except the Rockefeller program [CIAA]) to form the Office of War Information (OWI). Elmer Davis, a prominent journalist, was appointed director. Overseas information activities outside Latin America were overseen by a branch of the OWI, the U.S. Information Service (USIS). Latin America remained under the jurisdiction of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs. The other functions of Donovan's COI office which did not fall under the Foreign Information Service which was under Sherwood, were transferred into the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) which was also formed in June 1942. The OSS was responsible for foreign intelligence outside of Latin America as well as for psychological warfare in connection with military campaigns. These activities were carried on without much coordination with OWI's overseas operation (Henderson, 1969).

On to Bigger and Better Things

The end of World War II brought with it the disbandment of the OWI and the activities of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs. But the United States still felt the need to inform people overseas about the U.S. aims, culture and history. This was primarily because the Cold War was looming on the horizon and there was an unclear distinction between war and peace (Roth, 1981). Therefore, in 1946, an Office of International Information and Cultural Affairs was set up in the State Department, in the fall of 1947 it was renamed the Office of International Information and Educational Exchange.

In 1946 William Benton, President Truman's Undersecretary for Public and Cultural Affairs, began an ambitious plan for long-term peacetime operation. In January of the same year, he revealed his plan and called it "a dignified information program", as distinguished from propaganda, and added that President Truman felt some type of program was necessary in order to, "continue to endeavor to see to it that other peoples receive a full and fair picture of American life and of the aims and policies of the U.S. Government." (Roth, 1981, p. 3) Thus began the first peacetime program that was aimed at the public instead of governments.

President Truman, on January 27, 1948, signed into law the first peacetime propaganda program in American history.

The purpose of the program was "to promote a better understanding of the United States in other countries, and to increase mutual understanding between the people of the United States and the people of other countries." (Bogart, 1976, p. xi)

In order to support the program, President Truman began to push his new initiative: "Campaign Truth". He explained its purpose this way:

> The cause of freedom is being challenged throughout the world today by the forces of imperialistic Communism. This is a struggle, above all else, for the minds of men. Propaganda is one of the most powerful weapons the Communists have in this struggle. Deceit, distortions and lies are systematically used by them as a matter of deliberate policy.
>
> This propaganda can be overcome by truth--plain, simple unvarnished truth--presented by newspapers, radio and other sources that people trust.
>
> We know how false these communist promises are. But it is not enough for us to know this. Unless we get the real story across to people in other countries, we will lose the battle for men's minds by default.
>
> We must make ourselves known as we really are--not as Communist propaganda picutres us. We must pool our efforts with those of the other free peoples in a sustained, intensified program to promote the cause of freedom against the propaganda of slavery. We must make ourselves heard 'round the world in a great campaign of truth.
>
> (Henderson, 1956, p. 44)

In 1953, the Hoover Commission suggested that the information program be separated from the State Department. This reorganization plan was approved by Congress and on August 1, 1953, the United States Information Agency (USIA) came into being as an independent agency reporting directly to the President, but taking policy guidance from the Department of State.

Today, the United States Information Agency is still an independent organization within the executive branch responsible for the U.S. Government's overseas information and cultural programs including the VOA and the Fulbright Scholarship programs.

The following brief outline shows how the VOA and the USIA have risen and fallen and the policy themes broadcasted since the VOA's beginning.

--World War II. First American International Broadcasting: VOA Founded.

--1946. Holding Operation: Most wartime agencies are disbanded; VOA barely survives due to the efforts of a few backers. American foreign policy is based on the premise that the Soviets may be mellowing and are sincerely interested in the "peaceful coexistence" that they advocate.

--1947-52. Cold War, Hot War, and a Strong Voice: Hopes for political cooperation with the Soviet Union dwindle. America launches policy of "containment", with some hopes for "liberation" or "rollback." VOA is revived and other broadcasting organs initiated (Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberation).

--1953-60. Retrenchment and Revision of Mission: Broadcasting remains anti-communist but becomes more constrained, "calm and persuasive". Liberation idea abandoned in both foreign policy community and broadcasting policy.

--1961-63. Height of Material Support for Broadcasting: Kennedy and Murrow establish broadcasting policy that is anti-communist but not "strident".

--1964-80. Detente and Growing Controversies: Down grading of U.S. international broadcasting; increasing policy and personnel conflict under the Johnson, Nixon, Ford, and Carter administrations.

--1981-1988. Detente in Doubt--Search for New Guidelines: Reagan administration attempts to revive broadcasting as an arm of American foreign policy. (Tyson, 1983, p. 4)

THE ADMINISTRATION AND POLICY THEMES

From its origins to the present, the Voice of America has varied its broadcasting activities, depending on the availability of facilities, the size of its appropriations from Congress, the international situation and the administration in office. These issues are of current concern when determining what to broadcast, how to broadcast, to whom to broadcast and how U.S. policy (internal and external) mixes with the current profile of the United States.

Since broadcasting to developing countries is usually done shortwave, the VOA as well as any international broadcasting institution or administration must remember that how we broadcast and present policies overseas is not taken lightly. Take for example this conversation:

> The director of a large state-run Western shortwave broadcasting agency recalls asking the minister of communications of an African nation:
>
> "Could I start a newspaper in your country if I wanted to?"
>
> "Yes," said the African.
>
> "How about a radio station?" asked the broadcaster.
>
> "No," the African said. "All the stations in my country are state-owned. How would we know what you would say? The newspaper would be OK because not a lot of our people read, so you couldn't do much. But people believe what they hear on the radio."
>
> (Insight, 1989, p. 8)

In developing countries it's highly likely that the local media are at the same stage of development as other

aspects of the local society. This means there are not a lot of alternative news sources. USIA programming is usually welcomed, although the quality of the programs has to be high especially if there is local interest or a local angle.

In developed countries things are a bit different. In developed countries USIA officers must be able to quickly provide accurate information about U.S. policies, actions, and intentions. The sea of U.S. sources sometimes results in an overload of often times conflicting messages which leaves the foreign audience wondering which source is the official speaker for the United States.

So there are two different perspectives that the administration coming into office must consider when preparing policy to be disseminated to a foreign audience.

The last two administrations have had drastically different views of foreign policy and how the VOA would contribute the accomplishment of their goals.

During the Carter administration (as well as Ford's) the policy themes concentrated more on human rights than communist aggression. Economic objectives and democracy were also disseminated as was the promotion of U.S. products (Interview, 1989). The Carter administration's interest in human rights and the periods of detente, lead to more emphasis on that issue by the Voice. The administration tried to focus more on responding to the needs of an over populated word by attempting to create two-way communication

between Americans and those of other societies. The President was of the opinion that it was just as important for Americans to know about other countries as it was for them to know about us. This conception did not survive the general world view of the next more conservative administration (Fisher, 1987).

President Carter described his view of the mission of the International Communication Agency (later to be renamed the United States Information Agency by Ronald Reagan) to be that, "the principle function of the Agency should be to reduce the degree to which mispreceptions and misunderstandings complicate relations between the United States and other nations." (Hansen, 1984, pp. 21-22).

Some critics at this time felt that the VOA was not living up to its ability. One critic complained: "It is clear that the directors of the Voice of America are constantly trying not to arouse the anger of the Soviet leadership. In their zeal to serve detente, they remove from their programs everything that might irritate the communists in power." (Browne, 1982, p. 110)

When the Reagan administration took office in January 1981 the emphasis was once again placed on the Soviet Union. The "Great Communicator" considered combating "the evil empire" as the USIA's primary goal. The theme of maintaining or achieving democracy was seen as an outcome of crushing communism. The idea was first brought forth in the President's June 8, 1982 speech to the British Parliament.

He stated that the United States should make a major effort to help "foster the infrastructure of democracy which allow a people to choose their own way, to develop their own culture, to reconcile their own differences through peaceful means." (Tyson, 1983, p. 76) He also stated that the U.S. should engage more vigorously in a peaceful "competition of ideas and values" with the Soviet Union (Hansen, 1984). To achieve this goal the Reagan administration proposed a $65 million budget for Fiscal Year 1984. The focus of the program would be on: 1. leadership training, 2. education, 3. strengthening the institutions of democracy, 4. conveying ideas and information and 5. development of personal and institutional ties (Hansen, 1984).

John Nichols feels that Reagan's approach to international propaganda was all wrong. He says that the administration's method of referring to their efforts in military terms and assuming that the message would automatically be absorbed, indicated that they really did not understand how international communication works. It is known that international media campaigns have little impact on an audience and that personal attitudes, values and cultural norms have a greater impact (Nichols, 1983).

Differences between what the administration outlined and the policy assumptions of some of the managers, led to some controversies over policy in 1981 and 1982. According to Carolyn Weaver, the most pervasive change in the VOA

during the Reagan administration was the drifting towards reporting primarily the nicest things about America (Weaver, 1988). Soft, self-congratulatory features were abundant. When taking breathers from its pitch on the ills of communism, the VOA broadcasted features on such topics as Americans' delight in "cuddly" pets ("Fifi loves to wear clothes"), there was even one on the VOA's in-house programming awards. The narrative lauded winning programs variously as "electrifying," "brilliant and revealing," "masterful," and "enchanting and delightful." Early in 1988, the VOA's New York bureau was asked to cover a banquet at which USIA director Charles Wicks was honored as "p.r. professional of the year" by PR News. Thirteen language services thought the news was noteworthy enough to place in their broadcasts (Weaver, 1988).

The whole idea surrounding the Reagan era and the VOA is summed up best in his own words: "For the ultimate determinant in the struggle now going on for the world, will not be bombs or rockets, but a test of wills, a trial of spiritual resolve, the values we have, the beliefs we cherish, the ideas to which we are dedicated." (Panel Discussion, 1982, p. 22) The idea is valid but if the above examples are samples of how the objectives were attained, the validity remains questionable.

PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

PROPAGANDA OR PUBLIC DIPLOMACY?

When the words "arms control", Star Wars", "Human Rights", "Glastnost", are mentioned, more often than not, people have definitive feelings or comments about the terms. Most of these responses would be primarily based on personal experiences, whether they be through the print, media or word of mouth. It's highly likely that these terms held no meaning until an experience, be it positive or negative, could be associated with the word (B.F. Skinner, 1938; Kurt Lewin and Fritz Heider, 1935). The intentional message of the term by the originator is of no practical use, it's the connotation that the public determines which is of vital importance.

This idea holds true in the "propaganda" vs. "public diplomacy" debate in the international broadcasting arena. The word propaganda is assumed to be synonymous with disinformation, lies and manipulation. The term public diplomacy is intended to be seen as accurate, in the public interest and to develop mutual understanding between countries. Here are just a few of the definitions attributed to public diplomacy:

> Public diplomacy (is) international communication, cultural and educational activities in which 'the public' is involved.
>
> Elmer Staats (Hansen, 1984, p. 2)

> As contrasted with traditional diplomacy, which develops relation between governments, public diplomacy establishes between societies a dialogue on issues of mutual concern. Its goal is to improve perceptions and understanding between the people of the United States and the people of other countries.
>
> Daniel Yankelovich (Hansen, 1984, p. 2)

> Public diplomacy is a new label for an old concept. It supplements and reinforces traditional intergovernmental diplomacy, seeking to strengthen mutual understanding between peoples through a wide variety of international communication and educational and cultural exchange programs.
>
> 1980 Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy

> The cause and effect of public attitudes and opinions which influence the formulation and execution of foreign policies.
>
> Edward R. Murrow (Fisher, 1972, p. 7)

When you look at it objectively, public diplomacy is trying to do primarily what propaganda does. "In a purely dictionary sense, public diplomacy embraces some of the aspects of propaganda--the spreading of ideas and information for the purpose of helping an institution or a cause." (Hansen, 1984, p. 7)

Other Views

Yesterday's "propaganda" and "psychological warfare" are today's "communication" and "public diplomacy". As international telecommunication has evolved, so have the terms that are used to explain a source's objectives. In a time where Glastnost and arms reduction reign, our

communication terminology is evolving to reflect a more understanding and informational nature, rather than the hostile and manipulative atmosphere that propaganda is presumed to create. The backers of the term public diplomacy are attempting to create a positive association with the word. Incorporating cultural and educational exchange programs into the process and placing an emphasis on mutual understanding is intended to project a less threatening air on international broadcasting attempts. But even the best laid plans go astray and our most industrious efforts can appear tainted by the brush of propaganda.

When the 1984 Olympics in Los Angeles, California were taking place, many countries complained that the American announcers were biased in their coverage of the events. It seemed as if the foreign athletes were getting less coverage and the American reporters were pushing American patriotism. They were probably also sending a message to the Soviet Union, telling them, "We do not need you at the Games." (Jowett & O'Donnell, 1986, p. 17)

Another issue along these lines to consider is that even if the content of an American press release or a broadcast is pure, is it not still propaganda or a form of manipulation when one news story or interview is actively selected over another? Is there no such thing as guilt by deletion? By not relaying all of the events, neglecting to present a holistic view of an event, of American society or even of policies, are we not endorsing a form of censorship

by telling countries only what we think they should know or what we think they will want to hear? Our motives may be pure but the results or appearances may be skewed. Take for example a survey done by The Commission on Critical Choices for American. The Commission was established by Nelson A. Rockefeller. It was brought together to develop information and insights which would bring about a better understanding of the problems confronting America. A survey of elite and popular opinion in Western Europe, the Americas and Japan comprised the survey population. In every country two samples, each consisting of about six hundred cases, were interviewed.

When presented with the question: To what extent do you think the United States really tries to understand and take into account (respondent's country's) best interests--a great deal, a fair amount, not very much, or not at all?

TABLE 1 U.S. Understanding (in percents)

	Elites			Publics		
	Western Europe	The Americas	Japan	Western Europe	The Americas	Japan
Great Deal	8	12	2	8	16	1
Fair Amount	37	22	29	43	23	19
Not Very Much	38	49	47	28	44	44
Not at All	14	12	5	11	10	6
Don't Know	3	5	17	10	7	30

Lloyd A. Free, 1976.

It appears that the motivations, objectives and goals of the United States are not seen by the public and the elites to even be fairly reasonable for all those involved. Even though the data is a bit dated, it is safe to assume that this is not the image that a peaceful nation would want to project.

International radio provides one of the primary avenues through which people in developing countries learn new ways of thinking and behaving as well as solidifying what they already believe. Garth Jowett and Victoria O'Donnell state that our most pervasive and penetrating form of propaganda is advertising. While scholars debate over which term to associate with our international broadcasting efforts, the U.S. advertising agencies have been largely responsible for the creation of a massive consumer culture in the 20th

century. U.S. advertising is slowly but surely creeping into the lifestyles of many Third World nations (as seen previously, this consumer trend is being repeated in many Third World countries) (Jowett & O'Donnell, 1986). How ironic it would be that if while the government agencies are bickering over word phrases and connotations, the images, messages and sense of reality that are ingrained into the minds of our receivers unwittingly comes from advertisers who are only trying to sell a product rather than those who are trying to sell our country.

The point is not which term we will use to describe our activities but the results we desire to get and how we proceed to achieve these goals. Terms to a certain degree are purely academic and provide no assistance in creating a structure that will be accepted by a foreign audience.

Terminology Debated

If there must be a term to describe the actions of the USIA and the VOA, Jowett and O'Donnell says it should be subpropaganda. This dimension of propaganda consists of spreading a doctrine which the audience is not familiar with. A considerable period of time is needed to promote a way of thinking which is conducive towards the acceptance of the doctrine. Attention maintaining stimuli are used to gain the target audience's favor.

L. John Martin, a former USIA research administrator, refers to the U.S.'s actions as "facilitative communication". This is a process that is created to keep lines open and to maintain contacts against the day when they will be needed for propaganda purposes. He says that facilitative communication is not necessarily propaganda. It is considered communication that is designed to create a positive attitude towards a potential propagandist (Jowett & O'Donnell, 1986).

Within certain sections of the VOA the responses are varied, from those who oppose the use of the word propaganda and manipulation to those who accept the words and add their own interpretations (Interviews, 1989).

Some say we have reached a potential turning point in international communication policies in the U.S., other say we have turned the corner and we are rid of those negative manipulations of years past, thus arriving into the era of true "public diplomacy". Which accounting of our present reality is actually valid will only come to light in the future. For now it is safe to say that there is controversy over the terms and neither term is completely a pure form of describing international telecommunication. Public diplomacy, when broken down into its integral parts seems to be the equivalent of white propaganda, which is what might be called "legitimate propaganda", can be described as "the spreading of true or accurate information for what one considers a worthy cause." Many USIA officials would say

that the only way the agency could be considered a propaganda agency would be in this context (Hansen, 1984, p. 6).

For the purposes of this paper all of the previously mentioned terms will be used void of any connotations or personal biases which may be associated with the word(s). Unless otherwise noted, they will all be seen as synonyms for international broadcasting.

PUBLIC DIPLOMACY IN THE USIA

A Closer Look

Since it is definitely an international broadcasting entity the USIA must figure prominently in the workings of public diplomacy. According to the 1989 U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy Report, the USIA is a large cog in the wheel of public diplomacy activities. In their eyes the USIA has "the primary responsibility for the conduct of American public diplomacy and for advising the government on the policy implications of foreign attitudes and perceptions." (U.S. Advisory Commission Report, 1989) The methods that the USIA utilizes to accomplish this mission are as follows:

Personal Contact	International Visitors
VOA	Press & Publications
Educational Exchanges	Libraries & Books
Television	Cultural Programs

Some examples of public diplomacy are:

--When President Bush speaks to students at Moscow State University. (U.S. Advisory Commission report 1989)

--USIA's American Participant Speakers Program brought many U.S. officials and private experts to foreign audiences through travel and international telephone conference calls. (U.S. Advisory Commission Report 1986)

--When Columbian students learn English at a Binational Center in Bogota. (U.S. Advisory Commission Report 1980)

In September 1987 the Commission hosted a privately funded conference on "Public Diplomacy in the Information Age." About 200 experts in the fields of foreign policy, legislature, media, business, labor, and academia met at the Department of State "to exchange views on the impact of the information revolution on foreign relations and to consider the future course of American public diplomacy." (U.S. Advisory Commission report, 1989)

How important is public diplomacy? This is what some of the top leaders in the United States had to say:

PRESIDENT REAGAN:

In this information age, this age of the mass media and the micro-chip, of telecommunications satellites above the planet and fiber optic cables underground, in this new age traditional diplomacy alone is not enough. The United States must speak not just to foreign governments, but to their people, engaging in public diplomacy with all the skill and resources we can muster.

SECRETARY OF STATE GEORGE SHULTZ:

Now is certainly not the time to be short-sighted about the importance of public diplomacy. In a world where no one country can dictate economic, political or military events, the need for international cooperation, for coalition forging and confidence building becomes ever more apparent. It is just as

> important for us to understand and to shape public attitudes--abroad and at home--as it is to receive and interpret the latest computer-generated statistics or esoteric intelligence reports. People-to-people programs are more important than ever.
>
> SENATOR CLAIRBORNE PELL (D-RI), CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS:
>
> Public diplomacy as debated on Capital Hill and elsewhere has come to describe two separate but related phenomena. Narrowly, public diplomacy is understood to describe the American government's international information and exchange programs. These are primarily the programs that are administered by USIA. More broadly, though, public diplomacy encompasses all of the problems and actions of a government which influence public opinion abroad.
>
> (U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy, 1989, pp 8-9)

It seems as if public diplomacy is utilized to humanize the political process. Incorporating the once excluded publics of a country into the exchange and communication process of our domestic affairs, may have more long range benefits than dealing solely with heads of state (Fisher, 1972).

The ability to gain maximum benefits from our public diplomacy initiatives has not yet been pin-pointed to a science. Just as the international communication process has evolved from a one way "propaganda" type of transmission to an interactive "public diplomacy" one, after its time has passed, it too one day will (more than likely) manifest itself in a different form.

According to Glen H. Fisher, understanding the public psychological dimension is the key. Foreign affairs specialists, diplomats, policy makers and scholars not only

have to understand a given policy initiative or overseas program but also how both publics (at home and abroad) perceive them. The way these perceptions are received depend partly on the way the communications media depicts the event. But of even greater importance is the knowledge, attitudes and prejudices of the audience.

While many are quick to point out that what the USIA is participating in is public diplomacy, it is important to remember that this form of communication is still in the pioneering stages. There are still too many varied views concerning it, experimentation to determine public diplomacy objectives, and disagreement about what public diplomacy is or should be to call it an evolved form of communication (Hansen, 1984).

When it all boils down, is public diplomacy an art that only a few will ever be proficient at? Or is it a science and with the right ingredients anyone can replicate the results? Until more time has passed so that effects can be determined and a general consensus is made about what public diplomacy is, there is no clear cut answer.

Fisher suggests that it is "more art than science when dealing with the emotional and attitudinal factors which os often appear irrational in their cross-cultural conflict of meaning, and which, while popular in scope, tend to be diffuse and intangible in assessment." (Fisher, 1972, p. 6)

Even though the 1989 United States Advisor Commission on Public Diplomacy is dedicated to the role that public

diplomacy is playing as a strategic component of U.S. foreign policy, they state that to help avoid misunderstanding and semantic confusion, the Department of State should not use the word public diplomacy and just characterize public affairs programs in the U.S.

THE VOICE OF AMERICA

VOA CHARTER

The long-range interests of the United States are served by communicating directly with the peoples of the world by radio. To be effective, the Voice of America must win the attention and respect of listeners. These principles will govern VOA broadcasts:

1. VOA will establish itself as a consistently reliable and authoritative source of news. VOA will be accurate, objective, and comprehensive.

2. VOA will represent America, not any single segment of American society. It will therefore present a balanced and comprehensive projection of significant American thought and institutions.

3. As an official radio, VOA will present the policies of the United States clearly and effectively. VOA will also present responsible discussion and opinion of these policies.

The Voice of America, which is the radio division of the USIA, helps the USIA achieve its basic mission of supporting U.S. foreign policy. The VOA employs about 1,971 people in the U.S. and more than 2,786 people worldwide (Voice of America, 1989). Perhaps the best way to visualize the VOA is a collection of about 40 radio stations, located in the VOA building in Washington D.C., each of which broadcasts in a different language or to a different part of the world. In 1989 the agency estimated listenership over

the age of 15 worldwide totaled 127 million, most of whom lived in Eastern Europe, USSR, South Asia, and China (Voice of America, 1989).

According to a VOA source, there has not been a meeting in many years that specifies the VOA's objectives in a certain country, although there is a public diplomacy stance for every country in the world. In general, each official or previous official, the author spoke with saw the long range goals as being to improve the image of the United States through the arts, science and technology. In the short term, the goals seem to be to bring an understanding of U.S. policy to each country.

A Closer Look at the Charter

In order to attain its goals in public diplomacy, the Voice of America adheres to the guidelines established by the charter in a variety of ways. It accomplishes the first objective: to ensure accurate, objective and comprehensive reporting of news; by making sure that at least two of the nine wire services coming into the newsroom have corroborating information. This allows for greater reliability than services that run with a story verified by only one source, but may also mean that the story is a bit slower being broadcasted. This is not necessarily a detriment, Sherwood Demitz related that BBC's service is acclaimed for being credible but in their eagerness they

have often been proven wrong. VOA's credibility is highly regarded, it is quite often cited as a source by newspapers in Brazil, Indonesia, and South Asia. (U.S. Advisory Committee, 1989).

The second requirement of the charter is that: VOA will represent America, not any single segment of American society. This is built-in protection so that the Administration in power can't take over the radio station and turn it into their mouthpiece. All events have to be reported regardless of whether they shine a positive or negative light on America.

Last, VOA will present the policies of the United States clearly and effectively. VOA will also present responsible discussion and opinion on these policies. This requirement is usually fulfilled by providing editorials or commentaries. These editorials will not just be written to reflect the Bush Administration's thoughts on a topic; if there is dissent, it too, must be reflected in the piece. All of this is kept as separate from the news as possible. This is done by placing these items on the backhalf of a program which will contain correspondent reports from overseas (these are only one reporter's news story on a situation or topic). Even so, one former USIA official says that even with this separation, the audience is not often clear as to what is news and what is an editorial opinion (Weaver, 1988). Commentaries or features are also heard here. They consist of anything outside of the newscast

which may be opinion or a news item not covered by the two source rule. These three types of broadcasts are considered to amply cover the requirements that the charter sets forth.

A Public Diplomacy Branch

One steadfast rule that is adhered to precisely is that the news is purely news. There are slots in programming for editorials and commentaries. News is the primary reason audiences listen to the VOA and in order to maintain it, they make sure it is as objective as possible. Anything after the news, as one VOA Branch Head put it, "is just one big commercial for this country" (Interview, 1989).

Since there are not any concrete guidelines to follow in the area of public diplomacy, it is sometimes difficult to categorize events as being publically diplomatic. Hansen gives two examples of this.

U.S. popular music used to comprise a majority of the programming time. As time went on, budget cuts and the development of more sophisticated programming, nearly entirely erased music from formats. Many public diplomats felt if there were no returns, why use it. Others felt that using music is needed to make everything else more palatable. Still others thought that music was needed to provide an accurate reflection of American society, and there were those who felt that U.S. music is so popular in most countries, why waste time and effort in this area when

it can be utilized elsewhere. This last view is the prevailing thought today.

The second example took place when a USIA information officer who was in charge of the post's Latin American programming, realized that the target audience rarely listened to local radio stations except for music and the morning newscasts. He then eliminated all USIA radio placement that he had control over which could not be placed on the morning news show. After he left, under new supervision, the post eventually returned to its old methods. The replacement officer did not know or share the first officer's thoughts on how to run a radio station.

Donald R. Browne points out that even in the VOA newsroom there may be conflicts of interest with other staff members. Since much of the newstaff was previously working for U.S. newspapers and broadcast stations, and the staff in the language divisions are usually natives to that country, there is always the likelihood of some disagreement about which stories are important and for what reasons.

Without firm rules on how to conduct public diplomacy, the people who may get hurt are the people we are supposed to help and the country we are trying to reflect.

Laurien Alexandre does not view the VOA charter as an advancement of public diplomacy. Instead, she sees the charter's separation of political programming (editorials) from cultural programming (Americana) from information programming (news) as a mask, hiding the fact that the

entire development of broadcasting--news, features, editorials, music--is just covering the one common goal, "the legitimization of U.S. policies in the public opinions of foreign audiences" (Alexandre, 1988, p. 87).

The VOA can be divided into two sections: the News and the Current Affairs divisions. These produce the primary elements of programs heard in a variety of languages all over the world. Currently, about 30 Current Affairs writers distribute news/issue and feature programs for translation by the foreign-language services. The language services, which prepare much of their own programming, are free to use the material presented by Current Affairs or not. For example, in the Brazilian Branch, they have the freedom to set their own approaches to the Brazil's debt problem, informatics, the environment and the problem in the Amazon rain forests, and as to whether a topic is hot or not. On the other hand, the language services must depend on the stories produced by the News division for their newscasts. The previous requirement of using the top four stories as determined by the agency is no longer active. The editors have the liberty of determining if the news stories are appropriate for the country in question and modifying the story if a direct translation is not accurate. This appears fine on the surface. The drawback lies within the fact that the VOA is such a large agency that it is impossible to tell, even with the two source rule, with any form of accuracy, the extent to which news and feature programs have

been tampered with. According to Carolyn Weaver, a staff writer for the VOA, the Current Affairs department is considered by many as having been intensely politicized. While newswriters, editors, and reporters in the English news and features sections say they have, by and large, been left alone to do their work as they see fit, many editors admit to having to contend with oftentimes intense political pressure (Weaver, 1988).

It appears that a system of checks and balances needs to be implemented to maintain the high standards the VOA professes to have as well as to hold up the VOA charter, which is referred to so often.

In addition to the VOA's duty, supporting to the USIA, it must also at the same time (according to the charter), establish itself as a "reliable and authoritative source of news." The pursuit of these two separate goals by the VOA has been the cause of some confusion. First of all, since the above statements are true, is the VOA an objective news service or is it the official voice of the U.S. Government? (Weaver, 1988). A second conflict comes into view when looking at another portion of the VOA charter. If the VOA's task is in fact to represent the American people, first, how is it determined what the American people think? Second, if this is true, why should the VOA not be held accountable for the foreign policy of the existing administration, which was popularly elected by the American people? Answers to these

questions are not easy to come by, but without questions, solutions will never be found.

VOA IN THE AMERICAS

Even before the official verification of the VOA, which took place on February 24, 1942, the Coordinator for Inter-American Affairs (CIAA) had already begun to organize, produce and transmit programs in English, Portuguese and Spanish to the Americas in 1941. The CIAA and the VOA were separate until 1945 when they were both placed under the Department of State. Between 1946-1961 there was a dilemma as to whom would be granted production rights to the Americas. Initially, production rights were granted to the VOA, then to private broadcast organizations, then by VOA, and one more time to a private station. By the late 1950s, VOA-managed transcription services took the place of direct broadcasts. No matter which system was employed, controversy ensued. After a scandal where a commercial network writer produced a script for broadcast to Latin America and described Texas as having been "born in sin", the VOA was issued sole responsibility for the information of the U.S. Government's international broadcasts in the Americas (Voice of America, 1989).

Just as in many other areas, Congressional and/or Executive Branch support tends to appear when a political crisis is at hand. In the elections of 1960, John F.

Kennedy incorporated the absence of direct VOA broadcast to Latin America into his platform. After Kennedy was elected, the crisis in Cuba overshadowed the need for a direct broadcast program to the Americas. Although, before the year 1960 ended, Spanish broadcasts were re-introduced and by the end of 1961 a Portuguese service to Brazil went on the air. Since this time, the Spanish and Portuguese services have been on the air every day. In 1987, a broadcast service in Creole was started for listeners in Haiti and elsewhere in the Caribbean. VOA's English programs are also broadcasted. In addition, VOA also continues to provide programming to Latin America stations.

In the area of transmission sites and the quality of signals, there lies much fluctuation. VOA utilizes shortwave transmitters in California, Ohio, and North Carolina to deliver broadcasts to Latin America. Although powerful (175 kw to 500 kw), they range from 3-45 years old. In addition, the position in which they are situated is just too far to transmit a reliable and accurate signal. The modernization program established in 1984 to construct a station in Puerto Rico or at least lease shortwave transmitters in Brazil, were both scrapped due to budget cuts in 1985 (Voice of America, 1989). It would seem logical to use mediumwave stations to reach a wider variety of people, but because of regulations enforced by the International Telecommunications Union (ITU) which restrict construction of transmitters over 100 kw during the day, and

50 kw at night, it is not possible in many countries.

Despite the difficulties they have encountered, the VOA is still very effective. In 1989, approximately 4.8 million Latin Americans listened to VOA's broadcasts (Voice of America, 1989, p. 33).

BANDEIRANTES-PUBLIC DIPLOMACY IN ACTION

VOA has two primary ways of reaching an audience: 1. By beaming broadcasts directly to them; and/or 2. Having its programs transmitted on domestic stations in the particular country--a process called "networking".

Networking is gradually becoming the primary form utilized for reaching a mass audience in Latin America. VOA declares that: "While political and technical realities p[illegible]ide the possibility that networking can ever become a t[illegible] substitute for direct broadcasts on VOA's own transmitters, networking is a major supplementary or alternate channel to reach millions of radio listeners who may never tune in a foreign station." (Voice of America, 1989, p. 1)

Because the VOA cannot force a domestic station to broadcast its programming, they rely on their reputation for providing credible and quality programs with a local flair to encourage stations to use the material. Many countries have the same problem that Brazil often has, a VOA source said that it is impossible to monitor all of the stations

that request material from the VOA, so verification of use is done by the telephone. Due to the scarcity of tape in the countries, of course all of the stations report that they utilize the material so that they can receive more tapes. Therefore, it is very important to provide stations with material that appeals to their audience.

In order to maintain a sense of continuity, much of the programming via networking and direct broadcasting is produced by the same VOA staff members (in times past, much of the programming that was placed on Latin American stations consisted primarily of timeless radio series which were often produced by outside sources). In an attempt to create more relevant and effective programming for direct broadcast listeners, the regular VOA affiliates are increasing their interaction with their listeners. A prime example of this form of networking at work is the Brazilian Branch's partnership with the Bandeirantes Network of Sao Paulo. A partnership broadcast consists of a major broadcast organization's satellite delivering live programs for broadcast by the affiliates in another country. This form of international broadcasting is still fairly new and improvements are being made every day. VOA introduced partnership broadcasting to Brazil in April 1988 (Voice of America, 1989). In conjunction with the Bandeirantes Network of Brazil, VOA's Brazilian Branch began live two-hour program each Saturday called USA. They sought out a network with an outstanding audience figure and had an

excellent tradition for objective news reporting. VOA's satellite transmits this program to Sao Paulo for Bandeirantes to broadcast which captures about 4.5 million listeners--this is approximately three times the amount of listeners that regular shortwave VOA reach (VOA in the Americas, 1989, p. 5). This endeavor was so successful that on May 8, 1989, weekday programs were started (Interview, May 25, 1989). USA host Darcio Arruda, a popular Brazilian DJ, hosts all six broadcasts. As of May 25, 1989 the show was highly popular and according to Chief Nils Linquist they have had one show out of 16 shows that is an ideal example of what they are looking for.

This endeavor was not rushed into. Bandeirantes was formulated over a ten year period. During the ten years the Brazilian Branch worked very closely on the journalistic line and they provide them with everything, even space launches. As the Brazilian Branch Chief saw their shortwave audience dwindle, they decided that a media-rich society such as Brazil had no need to listen to scratchy shortwave. They began to formulate Bandeirantes when a 1988 survey showed that their audience went down to between five and 800 thousand on a weekly basis in the rural area. So they decided to take a different approach, keeping in mind all the time that they still had their mission although one person related that their "mission in this democracy can be turned off tomorrow, there's nothing that gives us a ten or five year lease on life. We are not going to wait for them

to come to us and say budget restraints being the way they are, you'll be off the air in three months. We decided to take some calculated risks and hope they work." (Interview, 1989)

Bandeirantes provides the American Government with immediate access to a good portion of Brazil which it has not had. Worldnet does not reach the masses; neither does the wireless file because Brazilians as a whole do not read the newspaper.

Commercial radio is still a major form of information for many Brazilians and now the VOA has a portion of that audience getting their information from the United States.

AUDIENCES

VOA AUDIENCES

Robert Burns once wrote that, to see ourselves as others see us would be one of the greatest of all gifts (Rubin, 1979). This holds true not only because it would be politically advantageous to be able to know how our policies are received, but also because it would be the building blocks for a sound international environment.

In many open societies where there is freedom of the media, public audiences as well as the government will derive many of their perceptions of America based on their own media. In these countries, and especially in restricted societies, the VOA becomes an important source of information and a powerful spokesman for the policies and environment of the United States. Even so, according to USIA researcher Dave Gibson, there is no change in credibility in VOA broadcasts between developed and developing countries. And that the general profile of people listening are better educated males.

In societies that have had the opportunity to have the American experience, many negative opinions have been formed. The VOA is attempting to correct some of the negative images from the past and the present and create

some positive ones for the future by explaining the policies, actions and reactions of the United States. In other words they are doing what they define as being public diplomacy. Despite its best efforts, Americans are still often referred to as the "Ugly Americans" (U.S. News and World Report, 1985). Don Kendall, a Washington, D.C. political consultant, says: "Partly, the envy and dislike go with the territory when you have power and influence. What's disturbing to me is that I can't remember any Russians being taken as hostages." (U.S. News & World Report, 1985, p. 33). Ambassador Walters of the United Nations states it this way: "If one seeks only to be loved, one cannot do the difficult things that must be done to pursue human freedom. I think, on balance, I would prefer that the world respect more than merely like us. If we could have both, it would be even better." (U.S. News & World Report, July 15, 1985, p. 33).

AUDIENCES IN BRAZIL

As seen in the history of Brazil, long before the VOA made its appearance on the international scene in many countries, the U.S. was starting to brand itself with a negative image overseas. Therefore, when attempting to present the ideas and policies of the U.S. today, the VOA is also confirming or dispelling beliefs many audience members bring with them.

Contrary to what many believe, the VOA & USIA Directors don't sell policies. They go to the Hill and plead for money. Brazilian Branch Chief Nils Linquist says that: "If they (the directors) do a good job which allows me to do a great job which allows me to receive thousands of letters from Brazil, which allows me to hear listeners call in to a program and say we like the show but we would like to hear more news. . . . They like it when we pick a city and talk about it, be it. . . . Washington or Topeka, Kansas, they love it. We are providing that audience with the kind of information they want as long as I have the funds to that, I can do a good job."

No matter how much effort the VOA puts into the budget, programming and organization, if the audience is not satisfied and therefore does not tune in, the whole process is for nothing. Research and conscientious dedication are two things that can help monitor audience reactions and provide a more sensitive environment to societal changes in Brazil.

Brazil's male elite are the primary audience that the VOA currently reaches. But those in the Brazilian Branch target the entire population. They get "more bank for their buck" if they can pull in an A or B audience, but they aim at everyone. A and B audiences are their primary target because they need to attract that type of commercial audience due to the fact that that is how the commercial station and networks pay their bills. There are stations

that attract larger audiences, but they are comprised mostly of C and D audiences. Besides, these stations don't give the type of stability and credibility that Bandeirantes does (Interview, May 27, 1989).

Bandeirantes seems to be reaching a more diverse audience which should provide for some interesting research in the future. One survey has been done so far and it indicated that 36% of the audience is class A & B, 40% C & D, and 20% E. They also know from personal observation that the call-in audience ranges from nine year olds to 83 year old grandmothers. And the composition varies from state legislators, farmers, students, shop keepers, lawyers to dentists (Interview, May 27, 1989). So, how effective is the VOA on Brazil's general audience? What are the opinions that the Brazilian public harbor in their minds?

It does without saying that these questions must be investigated in order to place, the Brazilian Bandeirantes (or any Branch) on a solid foundation to build upon when planning programming initiatives. This is not to say that any of the charter's requirements need to be compromised.

After all the energy that is put into the entire VOA program, it is only logical to want to determine if the government is having any effect on public opinion.

In general, 1989 statistics state that there are 127 million adults -- aged 15 and older -- who regularly listen to VOA direct broadcasts (Voice of America, 1989, p. 3).

A 1982 research publication by the United States Information Agency showed that better educated Brazilians identify newspapers and television as their preferred media for information on international news. But since the media uses a vast amount of information from the major wire services, these Brazilians have exposure to the workings in America. In the four major cities in Brazil (Rio de Janeiro, Sao Paulo, Brasilia and Salvador) that were surveyed, the listening rates for foreign radio (VOA & BBC) were low. Whereas they listened to domestic radio at a higher rate. In the smaller towns and remote areas, it was found that there were higher rates of listening to the VOA. In general, it appeared that Portuguese language broadcasts were preferred. But within the better educated group, English and Portuguese programs were listened to about equally. They also declared that the reason they primarily listen to the VOA is for the news. They claim that the VOA is for the news. They claim that the VOA as well as the BBC are timely, and relatively high on credibility. BBC is seen as being less under the constraints of their government than the VOA. In order to disspell any accusations of being deceptive it must be revealed that the survey revealed that only 0.9% of the adults in the urban area adults even listen to the VOA (USIA Research Report, 1982, p. 76).

In a 1981 survey of 15 capitals the total jumped to 1.1% (USIA Research Report, 1982, p. 76). These numbers are

pretty consistent and may vary a percentage point or two from survey to survey.

In 1984 BBC Research findings stated that both the BBC and the VOA broadcasting in Portuguese have regular urban audiences of 0.8% and total urban audiences of 3.9%. But in 1981, the VOA's regular audience was three times as large as in 1983 (International Broadcasting and Audience Research, 1984).

For each year that the VOA surveys were completed the statistics were accurate, but in between, one project head left the USIA and another one took over. Therefore, there is a high probability that different methods, due to individual differences, produced different results. Although, it seems ridiculous to squabble over a few percentage points when the numbers are so low to begin with. The main objective, whether the numbers are 1.1% of 3.9%, should be to attempt to increase listenership.

It is not only necessary to understand the composition and habits of the audience, it is also desirable to get an idea of the opinions of the population in general so that the VOA will know how to formulate techniques (entertainment, news, music) to attract their attention.

A survey of the elite and popular opinion in Western Europe, the Americas, and Japan was undertaken by the Institute for International Social Research on behalf of the Commission on Critical Choices for Americans. A summary of the results of the survey follows.

When the question, "Do you feel that relations between the U.S. and Brazil at present are too close, not close enough or about Right?" was presented, the "too close" proportions were decisively greater than the "not close enough" in the case of the elite 40% said it was "too close" and 11% said "not close enough". In the case of the public 31% said it was "too close" and 17% said "not close enough" (Free, 1976, p. 34).

"Do you think that over the next five years relations between the U.S. and Brazil will become closer, less close, or stay about the same as they are now?"

TABLE 2 U.S. AND BRAZILIAN RELATIONS

	Elite	Public
Closer	33%	42%
Less close	13	11
Same	49	38
Don't Know	5	9

(Free, 1986, p. 35)

On a scale from 0-100 the U.S. ranks a 47 by Brazilian elites and publics when they had to determine to what extent they thought the U.S. really tries to understand and take into account Brazil's best interests (Free, 1976, p. 50).

On a scale of 0-100 the Brazilian confidence in the ability of the U.S. to provide wise leadership in dealing with world problems ranked a 46 (Free, 1976, p. 50).

When questioned about who they would like to see more powerful in the next ten years, 37% of the elites said the

U.S., while 54% said they wanted to see them equal in power. 42% of the Brazilian public wanted the U.S. to have the majority of the power and 45% wanted to see them about equal (Free, 1976, p. 69).

On a basis ranging from 100 for a great deal to 0 for none at all, the respondents were asked to determine how much danger they felt there is in a full-scale nuclear war breaking out between the U.S. and the Soviet Union within the next 10 years. The elites said 49 and the publics responded 70 (Free, 1976, p. 76).

The results for the last two questions probably turned out the way they did because Brazil felt almost no mutuality of interests with the USSR (Free, 1976, p. 57) and they have no real concern about improving relations with the USSR (Free, 1976, p. 92).

The survey seems to reveal that the United States is a more trusted ally than the USSR and the Brazilians seem to have no interests in common with them. But on a scale of 1-100 we are not even on the positive side of the scale. Apparently the Brazilians did not trust the judgment of the United States because they did not want them in power nor did they trust our ability to prevent a nuclear war.

BUDGET/MODERNIZATION ANALYSIS

One of the areas of concern during the Reagan administration was the lack of up to date equipment. In

order to achieve his goals in the most efficient manner, Reagan proposed a 1.3 million dollar modernization program for the VOA (Wick, 1986, p. 17).

The VOA equipment is antique. About a third of VOA's transmitters date to the Korean War. The result is the transmission of weak signals which are more susceptible to jamming. Mechanical failures are constant; spare parts frequently must be salvaged from one transmitter to be used on another (Salerno, 1987).

As more countries continually become more developed and start adopting Western or more modern modes of communication, AM and FM usage tends to increase. In many countries it is being discovered that shortwave is not the best way to reach a foreign audience (e.e. Brazil). Is this money being spent to modernize the shortwave facilities really justified? One previous producer says, "The proportion of glop to substantive features has really increased. It's clear that people don't know who they're broadcasting to. Many of the features seem designed to please someone in the front office" (Weaver, 1988, p. 42).

A source related this: If you walk into a store you can buy a $200 color television set or a $1000 TV set. They both will give you a very good picture, but the $1000 set has more gadgets. In order to serve your purpose, the $200 set would be just fine. That's the problem with the modernization program. Instead of going in with good basic reliable technology that gives you 99% reliability, they

double or quadruple the price to get something with 99.9% reliability.

Taking this into consideration, it is feasible to assume that if they were spending less on reasonably reliable equipment, perhaps they would have had enough to give the Marti project, instead of taking the money away and then VOA projects never get started.

Perhaps analysts and policymakers need to use some forethought or create some scenarios for the future to determine the countries that are switching over, those which will use shortwave, and those who will listen for a while to come.

The need for appropriations was justified primarily by referring to the Soviet threat and how massive their informational budget was (this argument is used frequently when trying to acquire or create some elusive policy). In the 1984-85 appropriations hearing for the VOA, it was stated that we are engaged in a fierce competition of ideas. **"Our adversary is the Soviet Union . . .The Soviets are well equipped to wage a war of ideas, and have increased their efforts even more. . . . The Soviet Union far outdistances us in resources--not merely in money, but in personnel and level of activity as well. . . . In many areas we are behind in the competition of ideas. Unless we reinforce our efforts, we will continue to lose a round and our national interest will suffer." (Appropriations Hearing 1984-85 pp. 112-113). Nils Linquist, Chief of the Brazilian Branch,**

says that justifying appropriations by using Russia as a "scare tactic" will continue, "with the new openness and the end of jamming it will cost us more money. People in Russia are calling into VOA stations to talk live. Also we used to rebroadcast programs frequently during the period of jamming so that everyone could fit the pieces together. Thus more money is going to be needed for more programs."

This eternal comparison between the U.S. and the USSR may bring about an untimely death to the information program, due to the inability of being able to keep up with the Jones'. This perception of not having enough money may cause feelings of inadequacy among staff members who may quit striving for perfection because they know they will never be allocated as much money as the Soviet Union. It is not the amount of money that is poured into a program that determines its efficiency, it is what is done with the appropriations that counts for the most. In addition, what is good and appropriate for the Soviet Union does not necessarily mean it is desirable for the U.S. There is no guarantee that without proper research and investigation, if the VOA was allocated equivalent Radio Moscow funds, that the VOA aims would be better served. We need to become more efficient and aggressive initiators, not unreliable and passive reactors.

Since September 13, 1983 when the Senate approved the establishment of Radio Marti under the VOA, money set aside for modernization has slowly been slipping out of the VOA's

pocket. On October 4, 1983, President Reagan noted that this facility would help "to break Fidel Castro's monopoly on news and information within Cuba." But of course this will happen "while maintaining the historic high standards of the Voice of America for accuracy and reliability." (Hansen, 1984, p. 106) A chief within the VOA doubts very seriously that Radio Marti will have any great effect. We have had a long and troubled relationship with Cuba, he says that as long as people have food, shelter, and clothing, why should they believe any different than they already do just because we tell them to?

Glen Fisher also tends to agree with this way of thinking. He says that the potential effectiveness of Radio Marti is very limited. "For every listener inclined to appreciate the broadcasts, probably because of pro-U.S. view already held, there would be a host of others who would either have been programmed by existing outlooks to discredit the source, or would be irritated by the heavy handed and obvious attempt to manipulate and control." (Fisher, 1987, p. 141).

Radio Marti is just another link on a long chain of problems that plague the organization. The money allocated for modernization was supposed to get VOA up and running; by siphoning its funds they are being crippled before they get their feet off the ground.

Congress approved $7.5 million for TV Marti in USIA's FY (Fiscal Year) 1989 appropriation. The funds that were

previously earmarked for the VOA modernization account were appropriated for "the purchase, rent, construction, improvement and equipping of facilities . . . and startup operations including a test of television broadcasting to Cuba." (United States Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy, 1989, p. 47). All of these actions were taken without authorizing legislation or hearings by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and House Foreign Affairs Committee. The 1989 Commission on Public Diplomacy suggested that any additional funding for TV Marti should be appropriately done so and not taken from the VOA modernization or other public diplomacy accounts.

Despite the budget cuts and decreases due to Gramm-Rudman, VOA is still making admirable advances in many areas. In November 1989, VOA began installing and using the world's largest multi-lingual computer system. This system is called System for News and Programming (SNAP); it currently provides word processing capability in 26 languages (U.S. Advisory Commission, 1989).

RECOMMENDATIONS

There are a variety of ideas on how to improve, change, or reorganize the USIA (VOA). Following is a list of suggestions on how problems might be solved or questions answered. No one solution is considered better than another, but a comprehensive list of recommendations needs to be generated to stimulate creative thinking in others.

1. Public diplomacy can never be better than policy. "You cannot have a good information program if you don't have a policy that is good. If policy is good, they will love us; if policy is bad, nothing that we write is going to change their opinion but it might mitigate it." (Bogart, 1986, p. 35) Taking this into consideration it is conceivable that a Director or Chief of Information needs to be appointed to a cabinet post. This way, more insight can be given to the psychological aspects of the people that the policies will affect and how they will react.

Successful public diplomacy requires a comprehensive view of the political, policy, and informational goals and acts of the U.S. as well as the target country. If an accurate view of all of the elements can be attained, then the U.S. informational services can be effective in present

policy and having it received accurately by a foreign audience. Perhaps the only way this can be achieved is by appointing a person to oversee these items on an executive level. Realistically this may not come to pass quickly because there seems to be no real belief in the importance of ideological or psychological factors in non war periods. "The government pays only lip service to the need for a civilian information program. . . . Government and its satellites are convinced that America's strength in international relations consists of its material strength, industrial apparatus, wealth of raw materials, and technical know how. Therefore, only such parts of the information program have found almost universal acceptance that are pretty close to the more material aspect of thinking, particularly the library and exchange programs." (Bogart, 1976, p. 36)

2. There are two schools of thought when considering USIA/VOA approaches to policy.

The directive Approach to Policy: This school of thought maintains that the direction of output cannot be left to the day-to-day moves either of an individual operator or even of the whole desk: It must implement the policy line set by Washington. The media must carry out instruction, and policy directives should carry the same weight as military orders.

The other way of thinking is the Non Directive Approach to Policy: This school of thought contends that guidance should give background, not direction. The function of policy is to keep operators abreast of current government thinking and to suggest how this might best be conveyed to foreign audiences. (In this formulation, national policy rather than the problem of communication is the starting point.) The guidance will be given on the psychological handling of issues, but not technical instructions as to how news should be handled. This guidance must put the operator in the proper frame of mind.

According to this thought, the best way to run an information program is to select the right media people and to give them maximum leeway, confining policy guidance only to major problems (Bogart, 1976).

It appears that presently each of these directives is at work. In order to solidify the USIA, for better or worse, one or the other (preferably the last one) should be implemented. This way there is at least concrete guidelines for employees to follow.

3. Some critics say that the VOA needs to be released from governmental influence. As long as the VOA is part of the USIA, it will be subject to compromise, political pressures and outright subversion of its charter. Senator Pell suggested the VOA should be set up as an independent corporation similar to the Corporation for Public

Broadcasting or the British Broadcasting Corporation (Weaver, 1988). Nils Linquist, Chief of the Brazilian Branch, also has the same suggestion. He says: "VOA should be the international arm of National Public Radio. National Public Radio is criticized as being too liberal sometimes, but you've got both sides. Yes there's government money, but there's also a lot of yours and mine" (Interview, May 27, 1989).

Independence for the VOA would be a symbol of American commitment to free flow of information and ideas. The VOA should exemplify those values, not merely urge them upon the rest of the world. Take for example a story related by Bernard Kamenske, former Chief of the VOA News Division:

"There is no doubt that some of the new people in leadership roles at the Voice have extensive and impressive credentials as journalists. And so it makes it all the more surprising how, for instance, the Falkland Island story was handled. In a period when the BBC's Spanish broadcasts were jammed by Argentina, when it was crucial that the people of the River Plate countries (and for that matter, all of South America) have the broadest news coverage, the Voice of America did not expand its broadcast hours to that area in any way that I can find out. It did send an additional correspondent to the area. What a crucial time it was for the people of Argentina to know what really was transpiring, and what American leaders were actually saying. Lack of technical facilities could not have been the reason. This

is a policy decision made at the highest levels. This failure to expand broadcasting is another example of why the Voice of America should come out from under control of people who view the VOA mission only as government-to-government communications. There were many such circumstances in the past when the audience's needs were subordinated to the perceived diplomatic view of nation interest. We at the VOA did not seek to make policy, but to report it and to report the news. Silence, you know, is a policy, but it is a policy inconsistent with out system and a free society" (Panel Discussion, 1982).

The thought that the VOA should be decentralized is an argument that has been stated in a previous section on public diplomacy. To be effective, a precise knowledge about the culture, the attitudes and the prejudices of the audience must be understood. It would be extremely difficult to get a composite picture of the United States without doing indepth research. Often times professionals in the field of communications (journalists, broadcasters etc . . .) have been chastised by groups for not presenting what they felt to be accurate information.

Therefore, how can a few people in the State Department and those in the news section of the VOA determine which select policies and news events, should be heard by every country. It is true that the Branch Chief has editorial liberty when he/she believes a word or line is in conflict with their country's interests (lower priority stories may

be substituted for higher ones at the Chief's discretion). But the bottom line is that ultimately the stories dealing with American interests or policies -- domestic or foreign-- are written and edited by someone that has no professional association with the country in question.

4. Audience relations and research efforts need to be expanded along with the increased professional and technical monitoring of VOA's signal receptions overseas to insure that our programming is tailored and targeted to our listeners in the most effective manner.

One country that this most recently applied to is Russia. Now that signals are no longer jammed we will have to change our approach to programming. Nils Linquist puts it this way: "If we continue with the old hard line approach, 'we're the good guys', 'you're the bad guys', you're not going to maintain an audience, you're going to lose. So (we) will have to be come competitive within the internal market. . . . They have local stations and FM stations, they have comedy shows and soap operas. We will have to try to come a little bit closer to that" (Interview, May 27, 1989).

In the research realm, it is as much the fault of budgetary constraints as it is lack of branch interest that permits the VOA research department to falter. Apparently, branches rarely request research be conducted in their country. This may be due to the fact, states one

researcher, that they do not want to know for fear of low audience ratings. According to VOA researcher, Kim Elliot, the two items that have the greatest effect on research are governmental restrictions and economic deficiencies. John Nichols also agrees that USIA research is so under funded that they cannot determine which agency programs are effective. "If the agency is going to spend hundreds of millions of tax dollars on information programs, the least it can do is try to gauge their effectiveness." (Nichols, 1983, p. 138).

In conjunction with this, if we spend so much time with the foreign audience, the audience in America must also be considered.

It is important to note that by Congressional decree, the USIA is prohibited from directing its transmissions upon the American people. This is one of the most important reasons why most Americans exist almost totally blinded as to their own government's primary propaganda institution. It is conceivable that audiences overseas get a more comprehensive view of American policy than the average American does. Many VOA officials do not think that anything that the VOA does should be a secret (without shortwave you cannot listen to the VOA in the United States, therefore only special interest groups will invest the money to purchase a set and tune in). One VOA employee said, "We live in the most open society in the world, yet the average American can not get a script or a piece of a newscast.

(It) protects from government propaganda, but we have a right to see what our government is sending about us." (Interview, 1989)

5. According to a VOA source, the availability of qualified American personnel is slim. There are not many American citizens who are fluent in less popular languages and thoroughly knowledgeable about other cultures. Therefore, many language branches utilize the services of people who are natives of a particular country. The problem here is that it is true the VOA and USIA needs staff who are well versed and have an indepth understanding of a foreign culture, but they also need personnel who are committed to the United States and the goals they are trying to attain. The Brazilian Branch recently hired two people who speak very little English. This is fine for proofreading texts in Portuguese and checking for grammatical errors. But if we took time to train or recruit Americans we would have a better staff member with more potential. The USIA needs to recruit and train qualified Americans who have an interest in the program. But since the majority of Americans do not even listen to VOA or know what it is, it's highly unlikely that they will seek the VOA out. Whereas many foreign people are brought up listening to the VOA and desire to have a job.

The solution is not easy, but we need to incorporate more Americans into the system if for no other reason, just

because we do have Americans in the job force looking for employment.

6. It is difficult to be technically critical about many aspects of a program that does not have an operating budget that will allow them to perform in the most effective and expedient manner possible. In order for the USIA and VOA to evolve into the type of organization it can be, more money is going to have to be invested. Cutting their funds through Gramm-Rudman then taking a portion for Radio Marti not only sets back development, it also lowers the moral of the staff. In constant dollars since 1967, the USIA's operating expenses have dropped 8.8 million dollars (US Advisory Commission, 1989, p. 24). It seems logical to assume that investing a little more and getting the maximum benefits from the programs is more economically sound than to spend money and having them operate below par due to outdated equipment or poor working conditions. Nichols states that U.S. "propaganda" programs should invest more time and effort into the quality instead of the quantity. During the Reagan administration requests had been made for more broadcasting time each day and more powerful transmitters. But no requests had been made for increased staff professionalism, quality control of content, and audience research.

It is also ironic that in this time of 'peace' the government appears unable to extend the budget for a

peaceful means of diplomatic communication. Yet, they can sink billions into a plane that has only left the ground once and then they want to invest billions more in a fleet of these planes.

CONCLUSION

Public Diplomacy, the USIA, and Brazil. . . . How are they working?

The VOA and international broadcasting in general can be a very powerful tool when implemented correctly. The Brazilian Branch is an excellent example of what can evolve if the system is revised to fit into the local environment. Although it is too soon to determine how effective Bandierantes and the public diplomacy aims will be in the future, the initial endeavor has been a success.

This paper has highlighted many of the weak links in public diplomacy and the USIA. One main critique throughout has been that the United States Information Agency needs to devote a little more time to the preparation, evaluation, and clarification of issues, ideas and policies. This consideration needs to be given to all situations regardless of whether they directly or indirectly effect public diplomacy, the USIA or a particular country. A bit more forethought in this area would eliminate much of the time, energy, and money that is wasted in rectifying problems that were needlessly created. For example, it should have been obvious that deferring money from VOA to the Marti account would present not only difficulties in completing proposed

modernization, but also delaying new public diplomacy projects that relied on the modernization as well as lowering the moral of the staff.

While being critical at times, this thesis has also attempted to:

1. Provide some insight into what public diplomacy is considered to be and what it is designed to achieve.

Public diplomacy is intended to be seen as a non-manipulative, information pure form of communication which can manifest itself in the form of books, film or radio (to name a few). It is heralded to be better and more effective than traditional propaganda because it is void of disinformation, lies and manipulation. The only intention of government initiated public diplomacy is to provide an informative and accurate view of American society, policy and ideals.

2. Determine what motivates the USIA and the VOA to operate in the manner that they do.

Until recently the USIA's main priority was just to survive and to be considered a valuable asset to the United States Government. After a period of reorganization, renaming, and varying views from administration to administration, it is not surprising that the USIA and VOA have had some difficulties in the administrative and policy departments. It is also understandable that a large department is going to have problems, but a little more perception could, at times, help alleviate problems.

3. Emphasize that Brazil (as well as other countries) are worth having quality time and effort invested into them.

We operate in a society where events across the globe affect us here at home. Reliable and accurate flows of information between countries enables governments to make progress in other areas by erasing the doubt that accompanies uncertainty. Establishing a solid foundation in Brazil, will not only help educate a population but will also create a more hospitable environment for governments to operate in.

In order to ensure that these three entities work together in the most advantageous manner, it is important to remember that we operate in a global society and no incident takes place in isolation. For every action there is a reaction and in the world of international broadcasting the potential effects can be numerous and far reaching. Policy guidelines, research, and analysis should never be overlooked in the fast paced world of communication, for this could surely lead to the swift demise of what has been created.

Whether in policy analysis or technological applications, as quickly as society is currently moving with no apparent plan to slow down, the need to stay one step ahead is vital. The ability to predict and anticipate the future is one of our most valuable assets. As one man from the VOA said, what we do is like a blind person. We can't see the people but we can touch them (Interview, May 27,

1989). This is an ability that when utilized to its fullest potential can develop the potential for better international relations in a world that is filled with misunderstanding.

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