REFORMED SCHOLASTICISM IN MEDIEVAL PERSPECTIVE: THOMAS AQUINAS AND FRANCOIS TURRETTINI ON THE INCARNATION

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ABSTRACT

REFORMED SCHOLASTICISM IN MEDIEVAL PERSPECTIVE: THOMAS AQUINAS AND FRANCOIS TURRETTINI ON THE INCARNATION

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The sixteenth and seventeenth century successors of the Protestant Reformers are widely regarded as having defected from the distinctives of the Reformation by returning to the scholastic method. This study investigates the question of scholasticism in Reformed Protestantism by an inquiry into the medieval origin of scholasticism and its relationship to Renaissance humanism and the Protestant Reformers. It then selects a representative of medieval scholasticism (Thomas Aquinas) and of Reformed scholasticism (Francois Turrettini), analyzing their treatment of the Incarnation in the context of the major work of each man (Summa Theologiae and Institutio Theologiae Elencticae, respectively).

The study concludes that the consensus view of Reformed scholasticism inaccurately portrays the origin and nature of the scholastic method, which developed for pedagogical reasons. In addition, it too closely identifies scholasticism with Thomism.

Renaissance humanism, while often ardently opposed to scholasticism, also was capable of cooperation and coexistence with it. Individuals could exemplify traits from both. The Reformers cannot be characterized simply as humanistic opponents of scholasticism. Instead,

they selectively borrowed from both traditions and sometimes rejected both, depending upon the topic.

Though both Thomas and Turrettini clearly are scholastics, they write quite different versions of scholastic theology. Thomas is analytical, seeking a deeper understanding of an already established doctrine and doing little exegetical study. Turrettini, in contrast, is polemical, not analytical, but engaged in extensive exegetical argumentation. Neither fits the stereotype of scholasticism in that they set the Incarnation in a redemptive (not a metaphysical) context and caution against over-confidence in human reasoning.

The study concludes that discussions of Reformed scholasticism must place it more accurately in the perspective of medieval scholasticism, recognizing diversity among its representatives, before attempting the complex task of assessing the strengths and weaknesses of particular works in light of their specific purpose and method.

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I would like to thank the members of my committee, Dr. W. Fred Graham, Dr. Richard Sullivan, and Dr. Harold Walsh, for making my doctoral studies such a profitable and enjoyable experience. Their contribution in courses and their counsel has been of great value and is deeply appreciated. Dr. Thomas Ryba, as my external reader, carefully read the dissertation and contributed a number of helpful comments. James M. Grier, Victor M. Matthews, and Albert G. Crawford, my former professors and current colleagues, first introduced me to the history of ideas and have enriched me in a multitude of ways, both academically and personally. I am greatly in debt to them. As Academic Dean of the Grand Rapids Baptist Seminary, Jim graciously relieved me of some responsibilities at crucial periods of my studies. Philip West has encouraged and assisted me throughout more than a decade of fellowship in academia. His friendship is a precious treasure. My parents, James and Lorna Rae Spencer have endured the endless saga of a son who has been a professional student, with constant encouragement and support. Cyndie Walstra, besides sharing a common devotion to the Boston Celtics, has generously contributed her skills and patience in typing more pages of my handwriting than she cares to remember. I'm grateful for her willingness to meet impossible deadlines for my sake.

Those who finally complete graduate studies realize the genuineness of the thanks to the spouses whose endurance and sacrificial spirit is

so essential to such a task. Gaylynn's labor and support has been remarkable and has made all of this possible. I cherish her companionship in life.

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Chapter One

The Problem of Reformed Scholasticism

"Existe-t-il position plus incomfortable que celle des epigonés? D'une part les historiens déplorent leur absence d'originalité, d'autre part ils crient à la trahison à la moindre difference d'aves le modele!"[1] While Olivier Fatio may overstate the case, he nonetheless dramatizes the dilemma of the successors of intellectual pioneers. The successors of John Calvin have borne their share of this criticism. In particular the second criticism (the charge of unfaithfulness) has dominated for some time now, first appearing in the early seventeenth century.[2]

More recently, in the past three decades, numerous studies have argued the case for the discontinuity between later Reformed theology and John Calvin. The exact charges have varied somewhat. Most common has been the thesis that predestination assumed a central role in the developing Reformed tradition. Hans-Emil Weber, Otto Grunlder,

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[1]Olivier Fatio, Méthode et Théologie: Lambert Daneau et les débuts de la scolastique réformée (Geneve: Librairie Droz, 1976) ix.

[2]See Richard A. Muller, "Predestination and Christology in Sixteenth Century Reformed Theology" (Ph.D. dissertation, Duke University, 1976) pp. 20-42; idem, Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics, Vol. 1: Prolegomena (Grand Rapids: Baker Book House, 1987) pp. 13-40, 53-97; Timothy R. Phillips, "Francis Turretin's Idea of Theology and Its Bearing Upon His Doctrine of Scripture" (Ph.D. dissertation, Vanderbilt University, 1986) pp. 17-59. For a similar summary of the Lutheran debates, see Robert P. Scharlemann, Thomas Aquinas and John Gerhard (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964) pp. 14-18.

Ernst Bizer, Walter Kickel, Brian Armstrong, Johannes Dantine, and Basil Hall argue that the successors moved the discussion of the doctrine of predestination from the salvific effects of Christ's works in the believer to the nature and works of God, thus giving the doctrine a metaphysical cast.[3] This replaced the soteric-Christological emphasis which Calvin had given predestination, particularly in the final edition of his Institutes. Such a move is said to indicate the rationalistic, even deductive method employed by the later Calvinists.[4]

Others focus on this method itself and emphasize the stress upon reason and philosophy (particularly Aristotle) as a movement away from Calvin's humanistic, Biblically oriented theology.[5] In their judgment, the problem of discontinuity manifests itself most prominently at this point rather than in the doctrine of predestination. These two viewpoints are not antithetical, of course, but merely divergent evaluations of cause and effect. Both groups agree in describing Calvin's successors as "scholastic" because of this speculative,

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[3]Hans-Emil Weber, Reformation, Orthodoxie und Rationalismus (Gutersloh: C. Bertelsmann, 1951) pp. 98-99; Otto Grundler, "Thomism and Calvinism in the Theology of Girolamo Zanchi (1516-1590)" (Th.D. dissertation, Princeton Theological Seminary, 1961) pp. 22-23,122; Ernst Bizer, Fruhorthodoxie und Rationalismus (Zurich: EVZ-Verlag, 1963) pp. 6-15,60-63; Walter Kickel, Vernunft und Offenbarung bei Theodor Beza (Neukirchen: Neukirchener Verlag, 1967) pp. 280-283; Brian Armstrong, Calvinism and the Amyraut Heresy (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1969) pp. 136-137; Johannes Dantine, "Les Tabelles sur la doctrine de la prédestination par Théodore de Bèze," Revue de Théologie et de Philosophie 16(1976)375-377; Basil Hall, "Calvin Against the Calvinists" in John Calvin, ed. G.E. Duffield (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1966) pp. 25-30.

[4]See, e.g., Armstrong, Calvinism and the Amyraut Heresy, p. 136.

[5]Jack Rogers and Donald McKim, The Authority and the Interpretation of the Bible (New York: Harper and Row, 1979) pp. 185-187.

metaphysical interest in the nature of God and the eternal decree and because of the rationalistic, philosophical cast which dominates their theologies. The term indicates what these scholars perceive as the return, in method and content, to the theology of the medieval Roman Catholic scholastics (most notably Thomas Aquinas) by Peter Martyr Vermigli, Jerome Zanchi, and Theodore Beza.[6]

John Bray and John Patrick Donnally have suggested a more cautious, nuanced evaluation of the sixteenth century successors to Calvin. Rather than regarding them as full-fledged scholastics who have rather thoroughly revised Calvinism, Bray and Donnelly describe Vermigli and Beza as transitional figures. While maintaining substantial continuity with John Calvin, they nonetheless paved the way for the later, fully scholastic theologians of the seventeenth century.[7]

Jill Raitt also has suggested modifications in the prevailing conception of late sixteenth century Reformed theology, but seems to press the modifications more emphatically than Bray or Donnelly. Working with Beza's eucharistic doctrine, Raitt acknowledges, "Beza's method, it is true, became increasingly scholastic," "but in all of this the method suppported his doctrine more than subverted it."[8] By comparing him with

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[6]Robert M. Kingdon, review of Correspondance de Theodore de Beze, Vol 4 (1562-1653 [sic]) ed. Henri Meylan, Alain Dufour, and Arnaud Tripet. Bibliothèque d'Humanisme et Renaissance XXX (1968) pp. 386-387; Armstrong, Calvinism and the Amyraut Heresy, pp. 129-132.

[7]John S. Bray, Theodore Beza's Doctrine of Predestination (Nieuwkoop: B. DeGraaf, 1975) pp. 21, 119-143; John Patrick Donnelly, Calvinism and Scholasticism in Vermigli's Doctrine of Man and Grace (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1976) pp. 29,64,66-67,194-197,201-202. Elsewhere, Donnelly is less emphatic about the qualified use of "scholastic" for Vermigli and Zanchi; see "Italian Influences on the Development of Calvinist Scholasticism," Sixteenth Century Journal 7, 1(April 1976) 81-101.

[8]Jill Raitt, The Eucharistic Theology of Theodore Beza: Development of Reformed Doctrine (Chambersburg, PA: American Academy of Religion, 1872) p. 71.

contemporary Roman Catholic scholastics such as Cajetan, "one sees how far from the scholasticism of his own day Beza was."[9] Raitt concludes, "He may be responsible for a Reformed movement in the seventeenth century called today neo-scholasticism, but this may be fairly questioned."[10]

In this dissatisfaction with the prevailing viewpoint on Reformed scholasticism, Raitt joins the ranks of several scholars who demur from viewing the later Reformed movement as discontinuous with Calvin.[11] Olivier Fatio (on Lambert Daneau), Marvin Anderson and Joseph McLelland (on Vermigli), Norman Shepherd (on Zanchi), W. Robert Godfrey (on the Synod of Dort and on Scripture), Richard Muller (on Christology and predestination, revelation and reason), and Ian McPhee (on Beza) all claim that their examinations suggest a significant doctrinal continuity with Calvin and careful preservation of the key Reformation emphases.

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[9] Ibid.

[10] Ibid.

[11] Olivier Fatio, Méthode et Théologie, x-xii, pp. 192-193; Marvin Anderson, Peter Martyr: A Reformer in Exile (1542-1562): A Chronology of Biblical Writings in England and Europe (Nieuwkoop: B. DeGraaf, 1975), and "Peter Martyr Vermigli: Protestant Humanist" in Peter Martyr Vermigli and Italian Reform, ed. Joseph C. McLelland (Waterloo, Ontario: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 1980) pp. 65-84, McLelland, The Visible Words of God: An Exposition of the Sacramental Theology of Peter Martyr Vermigli, A.D. 1500-1562 (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1957) and "Peter Martyr Vermigli: Scholastic or Humanist?" in Peter Martyr Vermigli and Italian Reform, ed. Joseph C. McLelland, pp. 141-151; Shepherd, "Zanchius On Saving Faith," Westminster Theological Journal 26(1973) 31-47; Godfrey, "Tensions Within International Calvinism: The Debate on the Atonement at the Synod of Dort, 1618-1619" (Ph.D dissertation, Stanford University, 1974) pp. 265-269, and "Biblical Authority in the Sixteenth and Seventeeth Centuries: A Question of Transition" in Scripture and Truth, ed. D. A. Carson and John D. Woodbridge (Grand Rapids: Zondervan Publishing House, 1983) pp. 225-243; Muller, Christ and the Decree: Christology and Presdestination in Reformed Theology fromCalvin to Perkins (Studies in Historical Theology 2; Durham: Labyrinth Press, 1986) pp. 7-13, 175-182; and "Duplex cognitio dei in the Theology of Early Reformed Orthodoxy," Sixteenth Century Journal 10, 2(1979) 51-61, and "Perkins' A Golden

At the center of this dispute is the question of "scholasticism"--what it is, what its causes and effects are, and how we should evaluate it. The view of the critics of Protestant scholasticism is represented in Brian Armstrong's widely used[12] description:

> (1) Primarily it will have reference to that theological approach which asserts religious truth on the basis of deductive ratiocination from given assumptions or principles, thus producing a logically coherent and defensible system of belief. Generally this takes the form of syllogistic reasoning. It is an orientation, it seems, invariably based upon an Aristotelian philosophical commitment and so relates to medieval scholasticism. (2) The term will refer to the employment of reason in religious matters, so that reason assumes at least equal standing with faith in theology, thus jettisoning some of the authority of revelation. (3) It will comprehend the sentiment that the scriptural record contains a unified, rationally comprehensible account and thus may be used as a measuring stick to determine one's orthodoxy. (4) It will comprehend a pronounced interest in metaphysical matters, in abstract, speculative thought, particularly with reference to the doctrine of God. The distinctive scholastic Protestant position is made to rest on a speculative formulation of the will of God.[13]

In Armstrong's estimation, "this new outlook represents a profound divergence from the humanistically oriented religion of John Calvin and most of the early reformers."[14]

Chaine: Predestinarian System or Schematized **Ordo Salutis**?", Sixteenth Century Journal 9,1 (1978) 69-81, and "Vera Philosophia cum sacra Theologia nusquam pugnat: Keckermann on Philosophy, Theology, and the Problem of Double Truth," Sixteenth Century Journal 15,3 (1984) 341-354; McPhee, "Conserver or Transformer of Calvin's Theology? A Study of the Origins and Development of Theodore Beza's Thought, 1550-1570" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Cambridge, 1979) pp. 352-358; also see Phillips, Francis Turretin's Idea of Theology, pp. 796-809.

[12]See the use, sometimes with modifications, of Armstrong's list by, e.g., Bray, Theodore Beza's Doctrine of Predestination, pp. 12-17; Donnelly, Calvinism and Scholasticism pp. 199-201; Rogers and McKim, The Authority and Interpretation of the Bible, pp. 185-187.

[13]Armstrong, Calvinism and the Amyraut Heresy, 32.

[14]Ibid.

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Conversely, those who reject the discontinuity view find the fundamental problem precisely at this point. This position manifests itself in two ways. Some, while apparently granting that some Reformed theologians fit such a description, question its applicability to particular figures, groups, or documents. Alternatively, some scholars question the accuracy of the description itself. Raitt and Bray (concerning Beza) and Donnelly, Anderson, and McLelland (regarding Vermigli) are examples of the first response.[15]

The second manifestation is diverse. Marvin Anderson can be included here as well when he argues that some recent Vermigli studies have failed "to penetrate beneath the level of description to the fundamental religious and non-speculative roots of Martyr's thought." This failure results in the omission of "a crucial distinction which Martyr himself makes between the form of a discourse and its content."[16] Richard Muller seems to agree with the identification of this distinction between the form or method and the content of theology.[17] Muller also argues for the Christological orientation of Reformed theology's doctrine of predestination[18] and the knowledge of God[19] as

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[15]See Raitt, Eucharistic Theology, p. 71; Bray, Theodore Beza's Doctrine of Predestination, pp. 21, 141-143; Donnelly, Calvinism and Scholasticism, pp. 201-202 and "Calvinist Thomism," Victor 7 (1976) 452; Anderson, "Peter Martyr Vermigli: Protestant Humanist," pp. 67-68; McLelland, "Peter Martyr Vermigli: Scholastic or Humanist?", p. 150.

[16]"Peter Martyr Vermigli: Protestant Humanist," p. 67.

[17]Muller, "Predestination and Christology," pp. 39-41.

[18]Predestination and Christology," pp. 12-20; "Perkins" Golden Chaine," pp. 80-81.

[19]Muller, "Duplex cognitio dei, pp. 54-61.

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well as for its diversity.[20] In his judgment, later Calvinism is indeed concerned for piety and praxis.[21] Its modifications of the Reformers' thought are legitimate responses to changing circumstances.[22] "Far from pursuing a course toward arid intellectualism,"[23] these theologians could develop, e.g. a "rich conception" of the meanings of Biblical terms such as "the Word of God."[24]

Joseph McLelland notes "the fallacy of a simple distinction between humanism and scholasticism, assigning blame to the latter,"[25] a complaint with which Ian McPhee concurs.[26]

According to David Steinmetz, some of the recent disagreements about Reformed scholastism seem to be "traceable to the great ambiguity which characterizes the use of certain terms. Scholasticism, for example, is almost never defined."[27] Steinmetz seems to suggest that the use of the term as a self-evidently undesirable characteristic

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[20]Muller, "Predestination and Christology," pp. 30-31, 432-435.

[21]Muller, "Predestination and Christology," p. 435; and "Perkins' Golden Chaine, pp. 80-81; and "Vera Philosophia," p. 348.

[22]Muller, "Vera Philosophia," pp. 357-365; "Giving Direction to Theology: The Scholastic Dimension," Journal of the Evangelical Theological Society 28,2 (June 1985) 183-193 (See his list of "surprising" virtues of scholastic theology, 184-186).

[23]Muller, "Christ: The Revelation or the Revealer? Brunner and Reformed Orthodoxy on the Doctrine of the Word of God" (Journal of the Evangelical Theological Society 26, 3 (September 1983) 319.

[24]Ibid, 318.

[25]McLelland, "Peter Martyr Vermigli: Scholastic or Humanist?", p. 150; see also pp. 143-145.

[26]McPhee, "Conserver or Transformer?", xvii-xxv.

[27]Steinmetz, "The Theology of Calvin and Calvinism" in Reformation Europe: A Guide to Research, ed. Steven Ozment (St. Louis: Center for Reformation Research, 1982) p. 225.

is unwarranted. For instance, "one could argue that a scholastic is a teacher who treats theology by topic and who attempts to be as comprehensive as possible in the selection of the topics which he treats."[28] In fact, "stripped to its bare essentials, scholasticism is school theology. The problem which the scholastic faces and tries to solve is how knowledge can be transmitted from one generation to another, particularly in an environment in which competing visions . . . are vigorously advocated."[29] Such a task involves the realistic recognition that students are unable to master and synthesize all of the primary sources, but instead must use compendia and other textbooks. "In that sense, perhaps, even Calvin was a scholastic. He was interested in constructing a house of learning in the Church which was both Mother and School."[30]

In addition, Steinmetz states that "medieval scholasticism is not bound to any single philosophy, as the differences between Peter Lombard, Aquinas, Bonaventure, Scotus, and Ockham prove."[31] Therefore, the equation of scholastism and Aristotelianism (e.g. in Armstrong's description) is untenable. "While the return to Aristotle marks a difference between Calvin and the later Calvinists, it is certainly not the only difference and it remains to be proven that it is the crucial one."[32]

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[28] Ibid.

[29] Ibid., p. 226.

[30] Ibid.

[31] Ibid., p. 225.

[32] Ibid., p. 226.

This study intends to focus its contribution at this point of the discussion. It seeks to clarify the meaning of "scholastic" when used to describe Reformed theologians by examining the origin, scope, and character of the school theology of medieval Western Europe. A substantial body of scholarship analyzes the development of medieval scholasticism in philosophical, theological, and institutional dimensions, fed recently by the labors of G. R. Evans.[33] Unfortunately, the literature on Reformed Scholasticism evidences little interaction with the well-developed research on the earlier, Roman Catholic version. I hope to contribute to the correlation of these two fields of research.

The study of medieval scholasticism will also involve probing the significance of the "school theology." Others agree with Steinmetz on this basic, etymological meaning of scholasticism.[34] Yet, to say that the method was used in the medieval schools scarcely settles the question. In fact, it merely re-locates it, albeit in a more fundamental, and a more historical, context. There still remains the question as to the details of this method of studying and doing theology. Beyond that lies the crucial question of the legitimacy of the school method. Granted that the medieval masters of theology had pedagogical motives, was the method which they developed appropriate for

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[33] G. R. Evans, Anselm and Talking About God (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978), and Anselm and A New Generation (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980), and Old Arts and New Theology (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980), and The Language and Logic of the Bible Vol. 1, The Earlier Middle Ages; Vol. 2, The Road to Reformation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984, 1985).

[34] Muller, "Giving Direction to Theology," 187; John W. Baldwin, The Scholastic Culture of the Middle Ages, 1000-1300 (Lexington, MA: D. C. Heath and Company, 1971) preface; M.D. Chenu, Toward Understanding St. Thomas, trans. A.M. Landry and D. Hughes (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1964), p. 61.

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the subject of Christian theology? Are there inherent distortions in any Christian theological scholasticism? Critics of Reformed scholasticism are convinced that there are. This point warrants careful scrutiny.

I will then examine the relationship between scholasticism and Renaissance humanism and the relationship of both to Protestant theology, specifically Luther and Calvin. Here again, an ample body of literature exists upon which I can draw, literature which, in this case, has been correlated with the problem of Reformed scholasticism.[35]

In particular, I have selected two theologians to be studied in greater detail, one from each of the scholastic periods in question. The most original contribution will be the analysis of the scholasticism of Francois Turrettini[36] (1623-1687), a pastor and professor in Geneva. He was the grandson of an Italian religious émigré from Lucca where reforming ideas had been advocated by Peter Martyr Vermigli, among others. Both the grandfather (Francesco) and the father (Benedict) had rendered important civic service to Geneva. Benedict also served, with distinction, for many years as a pastor. Francois studied at many of the leading schools of his day (Geneva, Leyden, Utrecht, Paris, Saumur).

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[35]See, e.g., McPhee, "Conserver or Transformer?", xvii-xxv; McLelland, "Peter Martyr Vermigli: Scholastic or Humanist," pp. 143-145; Bray, Theodore Beza's Doctrine of Predestination, pp. 10-12.

[36]The last name has been variously Anglicized as Turrettine, Turrettin, and Turretin. The latter seems most frequent in recent scholarship. For full biographical information, see Eugene de Budé, Vie de Francois Turrettini, théologien genevois (1623-1687), (Lausanne: Georges Bridel, 1871); Gerrit Keizer, Francois Turrettini, sa Vie et ses Oeuvres et le Consensus (Lausanne: Georges Bridel, 1900); John W. Beardslee III, "Theological Development at Geneva under Francis and Jean-Alphonse Turretin (1648-1737)" (Ph.D. dissertation, Yale University, 1956) pp. 1-70; Phillips ("Francis Turretin's Idea of Theology," pp. 60-90) gives a brief summary treatment.

He became pastor of the Italian congregation in 1648 and in 1652 was appointed to teach in the Academy of Geneva. His three-volume Institutio Theologiae Elencticae appeared in 1679, 1682, and 1685, in the closing years of his life, as the mature summary of his teaching. It comprises three-quarters of his Opera, making it his principal literary legacy.[37] The Institutio has been described as representative of "standard" Reformed orthodoxy, coming as it does from the generation which saw the completion of the structure of that orthodoxy.[38] In 1848, The Biblical Reportory and Princeton Review could write that "it has long been admitted that Francis Turrettin was the best expounder of the doctrine of the Reformed Church, as matured into completeness of form in the period following the Synod of Dort."[39] Gerrit Keizer, explaining his choice of Turrettini for a dissertation topic at the turn of the century, stated,

> Turrettini est indubitablement un des plus éminents théologiens du dix-septième siècle, et, après Calvin, le plus grand dogmaticien que Genève ait produit. Ses origines remontent à la Reformation; sa vie coincide avec la periode de la scholastique réformée. Dans toute l'acception du term il est, pour ainsi dire, le produit de l'esprit des pères de Dordrect. Il est, lui-même, un des redacteurs du celebre Consensus. Par le rôle qui'il joue, dans cette circonstance et en sa qualité d'auteur de l' Institutio Theologica Elenctica, il termine une periode de l'histoire de la théologie réformée. En sa qualité de polemiste distingué, il est un type representatif des théologiens réformés du dix-septiéme-siècle...[40]

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[37]The 1847 ("corrected") Edinburgh edition is the basis for this study. The unpublished, handwritten translation of George Musgrave Giger of Princeton College, done between 1845 and 1860, also has been used.

[38]John W. Beardslee, III, "Theological Development at Geneva under Francis and Jean-Alphonse Turretin (1648-1737)" (Ph.D. dissertation, Yale University, 1956) p. 698.

[39]The Biblical Reportory and Princeton Review, 20 (1848) 452.

[40]Gerrit Keizer, Francois Turrettini, p. 11.

Francois Turrettini's significance has not diminished since Keizer wrote; in fact, he may loom even larger on the present theological horizon. Jack Rogers and Donald McKim consider Turrettini to be the "full development of Reformed scholasticism"[41] whose influence was far-reaching because of the wide use of his Institutio as a textbook for the training of ministers (e.g., at Princeton Theological Seminary in the nineteenth century under Archibald Alexander and Charles Hodge[42]). However, for years the only major study of Turrettini since Keizer's volume in 1900 was John W. Beardslee III's dissertation on the ebb and flow of orthodoxy at Geneva under Francois and his son Jean-Alphonse.[43]

Beardslee surveys the entirety of the Institutio to compare Francois Turrettini's theology with his son's. Such a scope obviously precludes intensive inquiry on the whole. He gives detailed analysis only of the content and interrelationship of the Turrettini's doctrines of revelation, reason, and philosophy. Keizer's study expands and corrects some of the biographical aspects of de Budé's earlier study. He concentrates on Turrettini's role in the origin and composition of the Helvetic Consensus Formula. In addition, he summarizes Turrettini's theology and the Institutio, selecting as examples his treatment of lapsarian and justification disputes for more extended discussion. Recently, the prolegomena of Turrettini have been treated by Muller and,

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[41] The Authority and Interpretation of the Bible, pp. 172-184.

[42] James W. Alexander, The Life of Archibald Alexander, D.D. (New York: Charles Scribner, 1854) pp. 367-369; Alexander A. Hodge, The Life of Charles Hodge (London: T. Nelson and Sons, 1881; reprint, New York: Arno Press and the New York Times, 1969) pp. 323, 324, 391.

[43] Beardslee, "Theological Development at Geneva."

in combination with his doctrine of Scripture, by Phillips.[44] These latest efforts follow calls for renewed study of Turrettini in the context of the discussions regarding continuity and discontinuity in the Reformed tradition.[45]

Francis Landey Patton, one of his admirers, lauded Turrettini as "the Thomas Aquinas of Protestantism."[46] Such a designation invites a comparison of the two theologians. Accordingly, this study will focus particularly upon Aquinas, representing the thirteenth century scholastics. The choice is not as obvious as it might seem for Thomas did not enjoy the pre-eminence in his day which we typically attribute to him.[47] His project of finding some middle ground between the radical Aristotelians' policy of a slavish following of the Philosopher, which

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[44]See also Leon McDill Allison, "The Doctrine of Scripture in the Theology of John Calvin and Francis Turretin" (Th.M. thesis, Princeton Theological Seminary, 1958), and Richard A. Muller, "Scholasticism Protestant and Catholic: Francis Turretin on the Object and Principles of Theology"; Church History 55,2(June 1986) 193-205; Earl William Kennedy includes significant comparative studies of Turrettini in "An Historical Analysis of Chrales Hodge's Doctrines of Sin and Particular Grace" (Th.D. dissertation, Princeton Theological Seminary, 1968).

[45]David Steinmetz, "The Theology of Calvin and Calvinism," p. 225; W. Robert Godfrey, "A Question of Transition," 236, 243; John D. Woodbridge, Biblical Authority: A Critique of the Rogers/McKim Proposal (Grand Rapids: Zondervan Publishing House, 1982) p. 117, 205 n.64.

[46]Patton, "Theological Encyclopedia" in Biblical and Theological Studies by the Members of the Faculty of Princeton Theological Seminary (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1912) p. 28.

[47]See Frederic Copleston, Aquinas (Hammondsworth, England: Penguin Books, 1955), p. 243; Anthony Kenny, Aquinas (New York: Hill and Wang, 1980), p. 27; Heiko A. Oberman, "Fourteenth Century Religious Thought: A Premature Profile," Speculum 53 (1978), pp. 80-93, esp. 82-84; Paul Vignaux, Philosophy in the Middle Ages: An Introduction (trans. E. C. Hall; New York: Meridian Books, 1959), pp. 91-92, 129-130, 145; James A. Weisheipl, Friar Thomas D'Aquino: His Life, Thought, and Works (Garden City: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1974), pp. 338-339. For an extended discussion of the use and influence of Thomas' Summa, see Leonard Boyle, The Setting of the Summa Theologiae of Saint Thomas (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1982), esp. 23-30.

imitated Averroes' example, and on the other hand, the steadfast refusal of the traditional Augustianians such as John Peckham to be open to the burgeoning body of knowledge of classical Greek thought, brought criticism from both sides. The Parisian episcopal condemnations of 1270 and 1277 showed the extent to which the traditionalists opposed any thorough re-modeling of the established intellectual framework.[48]

Nevertheless, through the years, his acceptance increased. He was canonized in 1326 and recognized as a Doctor of the Church in 1568. Pope Leo XIII's Aeterni Patris restored scholastic thought in general and that of Aquinas in particular. Beginning in Spain in the sixteenth century, Aquinas' Summa Theologiae gradually replaced Peter Lombard's Libri Quattuor Sententiarum as the standard textbook for Roman Catholic theologians. Thus, even if Patton's comment bespeaks some ignorance of the thirteenth-century, Thomas is eminently worthy of selection as one of the finest of the medieval scholastics, and, as such, very appropriate for comparison with Turrettini as a leading Reformed scholastic. Regardless of whether Patton's description is accurate and whether Turrettini consciously modeled his thought after the pattern of Aquinas, the comparison merits investigation. The degree of the similarity, if any, will be discussed at length later in the paper.

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[48]See Fernand Van Steenberghen, The Philosophical Movement in the Thirteenth Century (Edinburgh: Thomas Nelson and Sons, 1955) and Thomas Aquinas and Radical Aristotelianism (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1980); James A. Weisheipl, O.P., Friar Thomas D'Aquino: His Life, Thought and Works (Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Company, 1974) pp. 272-292; Étienne Gilson, History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages (New York: Random House, 1955) pp. 321-431; John F. Wippel, "The Condemnations of 1270 and 1277 at Paris," Journal of Medieval and Renaissance Studies 7, 2 (Fall 1977) 169-201.

Selecting two men out of the many who labored during the respective periods of scholasticism will give specificity and manageability to the study. Yet additional limitations must be added because of the length and scope of the Summa and the Institutio. Therefore, my comparison will limit itself to the doctrine of the Incarnation in Aquinas and Turrettini.

Prolegomena are rightly seen as fundamental in Turrettini (and all Reformed scholastics). This locus elaborates the explicit conceptions, intentions, and method for scholastic theology. An additional way to investigate the nature of scholastic theology is to examine the actual treatment which they give to a theological topic which is not one of the principia, whether cognoscendi (Scripture) or essendi (God).[49]

The incarnation is an apt selection for such a study for several reasons. Along with the Trinity, it is generally ranked among the mysteries of the Christian faith. As such, it is viewed as exceeding the rational capacity of human beings, and thus knowable only by the divine revelation in Scripture. Yet some Christian theologians have claimed to be able to provide rational demonstrations of these doctrines, perhaps most notably Anselm in De Processione Spiritus Sancti, De Incarnatione Verbi and Cur Deus Homo. Furthermore, these doctrines often evoke a pronounced metaphysical interest, following the precedent set by the fourth and fifth century controversies which gave rise to the Nicene, Constantipolitan, and Chalcedon creeds. Thus these topics present the intriguing and conflicting confessions of rational

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[49]For Turrettini's doctrine of Scripture, see Phillips, "Francis Turretin's Idea of Theology"; for Scripture and the doctrine of God, see Muller, Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics, Vols. 2 and 3 (Grand Rapids: Baker Book House, forthcoming).

inadequacy (on the part of many) and demonstrability (on the part of a prominent few) yet nearly always with significant metaphysical elements. As such, they seem to be fertile territory for an investigation of the nature, method and effects of scholastic theology. Because the Trinity is part of the doctrine of God and because Muller's study of this doctrine in the scholastic Reformed theolgians is forthcoming, I have chosen the incarnation.

Heinrich Heppe presents the representative statements on this doctrine (including Turrettini's) in his Reformed Dogmatics.[50] More recently, Muller has touched on the incarnation in his Christ and the Decree, although it is not a central concern of that study (which in any case limits itself to the period from Calvin to Perkins). Beardslee summarizes Turrettini's Institutio discussion in his survey.[51] The lack of research on Turrettini is particularly acute on the doctrine of Christology, particularly the incarnation. It seems appropriate to begin to fill that void as a means to the larger goal of studying the Reformed scholasticism against the background of medieval scholasticism in general and Thomas Aquinas in particular.

In summary, I hope to contribute toward a more satisfactory description of Reformed scholasticism, first by appropriating the contribution of the extant literature on medieval scholasticism. Then, after presenting the intellectual climate of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries in which the Reformed theologians wrote, I will

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[50]Heinrich Heppe, Reformed Dogmatics: Set Out and Illustrated From the Sources (Foreword by Karl Barth. Rev. and ed. Ernst Bizer. Trans. G. T. Thomson; London: George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1950; reprint, Grand Rapids: Baker Book House, 1978), pp. 410-447, 488-509.

[51]Beardslee, "Theological Development at Geneva," pp. 523-530.

compare the doctrine of the incarnation in Thomas Aquinas and Francois Turrettini. Treating Aquinas' thought as one of several versions of medieval scholasticism, I will seek to determine the nature and extent of Turrettini's Reformed scholasticism.

Chapter Two

Medieval Scholasticism

Whether or not the thirteenth century was in fact "the greatest of centuries" as James J. Walsh claimed,"[1] it certainly witnessed the flowering of medieval intellectual life. It was not the sudden dawning of a new day after the gloom of the "dark ages" nor was it a brief, evanescent glow before the lamentable interlude of the next two centuries, but the thirteenth century was a remarkably productive period of scholarship. The scene of most of the intellectual contributions was the university.[2] Though relatively recent, these institutions existed throughout Christendom. The most famous was located in Paris, but Oxford, Cambridge, Orleans, Bologne, and Padua also boasted major centers of learning.

The Growth of the Schools

These universities are the schools which are in view when scholaticism is defined as "school theology." However, the origins

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[1]James J. Walsh, Thirteenth: The Greatest of Centuries (1952; Reprint, New York: AMS Press, 1970).

[2]The classic work is Hasting Rashdall, The Universities of Europe in the Middle Ages, ed. F. M. Powicke and A. B. Emden, 3 vols. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1936). See also Charles Homer Haskins, The Rise of Universities (New York: H. Holt and Company, 1923); Lowrie J. Daly, The Medieval University, 1200-1400 (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1961); and Gordon Leff, Paris and Oxford Universities in the Thirteenth Century (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1968). For a concise summary, see Baldwin, The Scholastic Culture of the Middle Ages, 1000-1300.

of this theology were in earlier types of schools. The monastic and cathedral schools of the eleventh and especially the twelfth century provided the context for the development of the new approach to learning.[3] Monastic schools played the major role in the preservation of learning. In this, they fulfilled at least a portion of the role that Cassiodorus had envisioned for monks,[4] though many monks reflected the influence of St. Benedict of Nursia and Pope Gregory I on the role of learning in monastic life.[5]

The cathedral schools had been commissioned by Charlemagne and designed by Alcuin, but never existed in the abundance that those men intended.[6] Though not present in every episcopal see, as the edicts had mandated, these schools were the crucial link between the preservationist work of the Carolingian Renaissance and the creative

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[3]David Knowles, The Evolution of Medieval Thought (New York: Random House Vintage Books, 1962) pp. 76-77, 84-86. For a more detailed discussion of the twelfth-century schools, see Philippe Delhaye, "L'organization scolaire au XIIe siècle," Traditio 5(1947) 211-268. For the theological developments of the period, see Joseph de Ghellinck, Le mouvement théologique du XIIe siècle, 2nd ed. (Bruges: Editions "de Tempel," 1948). For the history of the development of the scholastic method, see Martin Grabmann, Die Geschicte der Scholastischen Methode, 2 vols. (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1909-1911. Reprint, 1956).

[4]See E. K. Rand, Founders of the Middle Ages (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1928; Reprint, Dover Publications, 1957) pp. 240-248; Beryl Smalley, The Study of the Bible in the Middle Ages (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1964) pp. 30-32; M. L. W. Laistner, Thought and Letters in Western Eupope, A.D. 500-900, rev. ed. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1957) pp. 95-103.

[5]Laistner, Thought and Letters in Western Europe, pp. 93-95; Baldwin describes St. Benedict and Pope Gregory I as "more equivocal" than Cassiodorus regarding monastic education (The Scholastic Culture of the Middle Ages, 36).

[6]Laistner, Thought and Letters in Western Europe, pp. 195-204, 207-211; Knowles, The Evolution of Medieval Thought, pp. 71-78.

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activity of the twelfth century Renaissance.[7]

Rediscovery of Classical Literature

Fundamental to the advances of the twelfth century was the rediscovery of a significant quantity of the writings of classical antiquity. Through the expansion of commercial activity, the contacts with both Syria and Constantinople provided by the Crusades to the Holy Land, and the sustained contact of neighboring settlements (principally in Spain), the Latin West received from the Arabs and the Greeks many documents of classical learning hitherto unknown or unavailable to Christian scholars since the late patristic era.[8]

In addition, much of the remainder of Artistotle's Organon, his collection of logical and methodological treatises, resurfaced within western Europe. In the logica novum were the Prior Analytics, the Sophistica Elenchi, and the Topics, translated by Boethius (sometimes from an earlier version by Marius Victorinus).[9] To this was added the Posterior Analytics, newly translated from Greek by James of Venice. Aristotle's metaphysical and scientific treatises also made their appearance in the area of study (as did several of Plato's dialogues) with far-reaching results. It would take until the next century for

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[7]Knowles describes the "gradual accumulation of clearly (and therefore correctly) written books" as being "of inestimable value when the more comprehensive revival came two centuries later" (The Evolution of Medieval Thought, 76).

[8]Knowles, The Evolution of Medieval Thought, pp. 186-188; Fernand van Steenberghen, Aristotle in the West: The Origin of Latin Aristotelianism, trans. L. Johnson (Louvain: E. Nauwelaerts, 1955) pp. 58-66. On the intellectual impact of the Aristotelian corpus, see also Steenberghen, The Philosophical Movement in the Thirteenth Century, pp. 19-55.

[9]See Henry Chadwick, Boethius: The Consolations of Music, Logic, Theology and Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981) pp. 133-141.

careful attention to be given to each of these works, but already the new documents spurred reflection and discussion and attracted new readers. The result was the remarkable creativity of the twelfth-century schools, seen most concretely in the development of the universities.

Of particular significance, especially for the subject of this paper, was the impact of Aristotle's Organon. The name indicates his own conception of the usefulness of the constituent writings. Logic and the scientific method and the other subjects covered served as instruments for the philosophical tasks. Particularly in light of the new availability of the treatises in which Aristotle applied these tools, the discussion of method stimulated the incorporation of his guidelines in all areas of study, including theology. It became a prime concern that the medieval departments of learning fulfill the philosopher's requirements for a science or discipline. As a result, theological scholarship changed irrevocably.[10]

Lectio

Previously, theological study primarily took the form of commentaries, whether oral or written.[11] Termed Lectio, it involved the the running exposition of a document (particularly Scripture).[12]

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[10]For extended analysis of the influence of the scientific method upon theology, see Evans, Old Arts and New Theology, pp. 27-37 and Yves M. J. Congar, A History of Theology, trans. Hunter Guthrie (Garden City, NY: Doubleday and Company, 1968) pp. 85-143, especially 89-91.

[11]For a thorough discussion, see Smalley, The Study of the Bible; also see Evans, The Language and Logic of the Bible: The Earlier Middle Ages and more briefly, Congar, A History of Theology, pp. 50-68.

[12]See Smalley, The Study of the Bible, pp. 26-36, 196-213; Evans, The Earlier Middle Ages, pp. 8-10, 51-122; Congar, A History of Theology, p. 55.

"Lectio is the reading of the text with a commentary, either written in the margin and between the lines for convenient reference or given by a master as he expounded the text to his pupils in a lecture."[13] Peculiaritites of grammar or style as well as difficulties of language or history were noted and points of significance were highlighted. Then the meaning of the passage was expounded and the reader passed on to the next portion. This comment was enhanced when possible by reference to the writings of the Fathers. These quotations would enrich the exposition by the quality of the comments themselves, but also by the weight which such auctoritas carried with the intended audience.

> The running commentary had many merits as a vehicle of teaching on the Bible. In its written form it allowed the individual reader to turn to the margin or the space between the lines of the book he was reading and find a difficult word or a grammatical construction explained, an extract from Gregory or Augustine to clarify a perplexing passage ready selected for him and conveniently placed to hand.[14]

Such commentaries or glosses were written by teachers of the Bible throughout Europe, in keeping with the characteristic practice of the other disciplines.[15] Each commentary had its own purpose and tone, "but running through this various and independent effort was steady work on the bread-and-butter task of compiling a complete gloss on the whole Bible."[16] Eventually termed the Glossa Ordinaria, it was known earlier simply as the Gloss.[17]

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[13]Evans, The Earlier Middle Ages, p. 8.

[14]Ibid., p. 37.

[15]Smalley, The Study of the Bible, p. 52; Congar, A History of Theology, p. 55.

[16]Evans, The Earlier Middle Ages, p. 37.

[17]Smalley, The Study of the Bible, p. 56.

> The biblical Glossa Ordinaria is a tremendous work. Each book begins with the prologue, or prologues, of St. Jerome together with other prefatory matter. The text is glossed, with varying degrees of thickness, in the margin and between the lines.[18]

Though Anselm of Laon was "a central figure in the process of bringing this work together and developing it,"[19] the Gloss Ordinaria is "a work of composite and uncertain authorship,"[20] with a long line of contributors before Anselm and his school.[21]

Disputatio

"One aspect of Lectio was "the discussion of the questions which arise in the exposition of difficult passages, and which prove to require fuller treatment than can be given in the course of the lecture."[22] Such disputatio, like lectio, had its heritage in the arts of grammar and rhetoric.[23] Consequently, the early emphasis was upon points of grammar and logic in the text of Scripture. The emphasis upon logic or dialectics came to be used in a more elaborative way as well. In addition to "tunneling underneath the text" (as Smalley puts it) in an attempt to reconstruct the mind of the author, "dialectic could also be used for building up a new theological structure with the text as a

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[18]Ibid.

[19]Evans, The Earlier Middle Ages, p. 41.

[20]Smalley, The Study of the Bible, 56. Evans refers to the "protracted collaborative labor" involved in its composition (The Earlier Middle Ages, 37).

[21]See Smalley, The Study of the Bible, pp. 46-66 and the summary of the pre-Anselmian contributors in Evans, The Earlier Middle Ages, p. 38.

[22]Evans, The Earlier Middle Ages, p. 8.

[23]Smalley, The Study of the Bible, pp. 69-72.

base."[24] Such disputing had a broader range and a greater concern for the conceptual content of a text than the other type. It was, in short, theological in character.

Nonetheless, it clearly had the Biblical text as its context. Though the precise details of the development are still unclear, the consensus among scholars is that disputatio was rooted in lectio. While prefacing her comments with the qualification that the relationship between the two activities is "difficult to disentangle," Smalley summarizes the process thusly:

> We are told that the disputation actually grew up within the framework of the lecture: the text and its glosses presented difficulties which master and pupils discussed at length;...[26]

M.-D. Chenu agrees, stating that the disputing of questions "grew spontaneously on the surface of the text, the natural result of the literal and doctrinal difficulties presented by the text."[27]

In time, however (particularly in the second quarter of the twelfth-century), "these quaestiones multiply in number, in relation to the size of the commentary, and the use of dialectic increases this length. Each pupil enlarges upon his master."[28] The result was that "the quaestio element in the commentary tended to grow at the expense of the simple exposition."[29] Chenu observes that "in the normal course of

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[24]Ibid., p. 72.

[25]Ibid., pp. 209-210.

[26]Ibid., p. 210.

[27]M.-D. Chenu, Nature, Man, and Society in the Twelfth Century: Essays on New Theological Perspectives in the Latin West, trans. Jerome Taylor and Lester L. Little (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968) p. 291.

[28]Smalley, The Study of the Bible, p. 73.

[29]Ibid.

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events the 'question' grew further and further away from the text which had produced it in the first place, eventually to become a form unto itself, independent of the lectio."[30] According to Smalley, "the next stage, logically, is a commentary composed altogether of quaestiones, with no explanatory notes at all."[31]

This increasing concentration upon the quaestiones did not limit itself to the commentary literature, whether with or without explanatory notes. A critical step was taken when the quaestiones were arranged, not according to the textual order, but rather in a logical or systematic pattern. This signaled a fundamental change in orientation in theology. It is true, as Smalley notes, that "when lectures were given on the Sentences, the disputation was organized separately in connection with this book,"[32] yet the essential element is that Lombard's Sentences were organized topically in contrast to the canonical pattern of the Biblical commentary. Thus, Chenu gives a more thorough account of the developments in the relationship between disputatio and lectio when he writes that

> in the twelfth century, this spontaneous development [of disputatio out of lectio] became systematic; i.e., because the curiosity of faith became so widespread and the use of dialectic gave such useful implements, the lector (reader commentator) began to pose questions technically, artificially on each proposition or at least on the important points of the text.[33]

Consequently,

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[30]Chenu, Nature, Man and Society, p. 295.

[31]Smalley, The Study of the Bible, pp. 74-75.

[32]Ibid., p. 209.

[33]Chenu, Nature, Man and Society, pp. 291-292.

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> no longer was the question a spontaneous inquiry raised by an obscure point met in the text or in some teaching; it had become a deliberately and methodically applied technique--even where no difficulty to speak of had been met.[34]

Yves Congar summarizes the course of events:

> So in the last third of the twelfth century an evolution has come about in the teaching and conception of theology. Instead of relying principally on textual commentary, theology now, like any other science, consists in research initiated by a "question."[35]

The growing importance of the disputation of key topics unavoidably altered the nature of theology and theological education. Controversial or fundamental issues constituted the agenda by the intention and design of the theologians. No longer did they wait until the issue arose in a Biblical passage to address it.

This is not to say that the text of Scripture and the task of commenting on it were abandoned. Commenting on Scripture (or at least the Gloss) remained an integral part of theological training. Of the six years which the aspiring theologian in the thirteenth century spent as a "simple auditor," four were taken up by Biblical commentary and the last two by lectures on Lombard's Sentences.[36] In addition, the initial responsibility of a bachelor in theology was to funciton as a cursor biblicus.[37] Nevertheless, the higher levels of theological education were increasingly devoted to disputations of various kinds. Even bachelors were responsible to take part in certain kinds of disputations.

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[34]Ibid., p. 294.

[35]Congar, A History of Theology, p. 84.

[36]Rashdall, The Universities of Europe in the Middle Ages, I, p. 474.

[37]Ibid., p. 475.

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Summae

The growing importance of disputatio and quaestio culminated in the Summae which appeared in increasing numbers in the thirteenth century. Like the sentence literature, particularly Lombard's, this was topical rather than canonical in format. Furthermore, the topics were carefully disputed by the authors, as Lombard had done. However, the Summae represented a development beyond the Sentences or the commentaries on them by giving greater organizational freedom to the author. Individuals who were dissatisfied with the four books of the Sentences could create their own pattern.[38] The "system" in the systematization of theology now was up to the theologian (within the limits of orthodox dogma). The corner had been turned, according to Chenu, when "problems and their solutions were no longer immediately associated with some text"[39] (Lombard). At that point, "the age of the summa had arrived."[40] The connection between the disputatio and the summae is obvious when we recognize that the articles of the latter are actually questions. The very structure of the summae incorporates the quaestio format.[41]

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[38]Chenu, Nature, Man and Society, pp. 298-299.

[39]Ibid., p. 295.

[40]Ibid., See also Marcia Colish, "Teaching and Learning Theology in Medieval Paris" in Schools of Thought in the Christian Tradition, ed. Patrick Henry (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1984) pp. 115-116. For a concise summary of the summae including their relationship to the Sentence literature, see the New Catholic Encyclopedia, s.v. "Sentences and Summae," by Palemon Glorieux.

[41]Congar, A History of Theology, p. 84; Baldwin, The Scholastic Culture of the Middle Ages, p. 84.

Quaestio

The quaestio was "the characteristic act as well as the literary form" of scholastic theology; consequently the growing dominance of the quaestio as the pattern of theology was "the crucial step in the making of scholasticism."[42] Therefore it is important for the purposes of this paper to determine its basic character as well as the rationale and expectations of its development.

Gilbert of Poitiers provides a careful definition of a question in his commentary on Boethius' De Trinitate:

> Ex affirmatione et eius contradictoria negatione questio constat. Non tamen omnis contradictio questio est. Cum enim altera contradictiones pars esse uera, altera uero nulla prorsus habere ueritatis argumenta uidetur...aut cum neutra pars ueritatis et falsitatis argumenta potest habere...tunc contradictio non est questio. Cuius uero utraque pars argumenta ueritutis habere videtur, questio est.[43]

Congar understands a question to involve "an opposition of propositions whereby the mind is placed in a state of doubt."[44] It is for this reason that Gilbert rejected the opposition of propositions in which one was obviously true or both obviously false. In those cases, there was no doubt and thus no spur to inquiry. Only when each proposition of a pair "seemed to be true" was there an actual question. In those cases, there is a quest for a resolution, and not only a resolution, but an explanation for the resolution. Quaestio seemed to involve not merely "which proposition is correct?", but also "why is

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[42]Chenu, Nature, Man, and Society, pp. 291-292.

[43]Gilbert of Poitiers, De Trinitate I, prologue, in The Commentaries on Boethius, ed., N.M. Haring (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 1966) p. 63.

[44]Congar, A History of Theology, p. 81. Later he gives another version: "A quaestio arises when two contradictory or contrary theses are both supported by arguments and a problem follows which the mind wishes to clarify" (ibid., p. 82).

there an apparently true proposition which in fact is not true?" or "why are there two apparently true propositions which also are apparently contradictory?" As Chenu states, quaestio involves "the search for causes and reasons."[45]

Questions thus were an attempt to give answers where there were none or to make an answer clear when it was ambiguous or to put to rest doubts or to refute error. They presupposed a dialogue, whether actual or possible, in which challenges or queries or confusions are present. At least two individuals were required and in fact the exchange might range throughout the intellectual world in its selection of conversation partners. In fact, it was not individuals who ultimately concerned the scholastics; rather it was the ideas which individuals espoused. It was the proposal of contradictory ideas which made the disputation significant. Accordingly, it soon did not matter whether an actual individual had proposed a contradictory proposition, only that such a proposition was possible. Similarly, it did not matter whether the theologian actually had met the individual proposing the contradictory thesis (e.g., a Muslim or Greek theologian or an Arab philosopher). The conflict of ideas (whether actual or possible, oral or written, with acquaintances or anonymous scholars) was the essence of the quaestio format and in turn, the essence of the scholastic method.

It seems clear that the quaestio did not have a medieval origin, having been used by patristic authors.[46] I have sketched the general pattern of development from a subordinate, occasional aspect of lectio

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[45]Chenu, Nature, Man, and Society, p. 303

[46]Smalley, The Study of the Bible, p. 72; Chenu, Nature, Man, and Society, p. 291.

to an independent, programmatic, sophisticated theological method. Yet, in view of the nature of quaestio (in its early form) as a spontaneous response to actual difficulties in the text, we should examine some of the key instances of this, particularly those which helped to give this procedure greater prominence.

Correcting John of Salisbury's designation of Alberic of Reims as the originator, M.-D. Chenu has concluded that "the masters of Chartres, readers of the auctores, of the Timaeus, of Boethius, of the Bible, were surely the ones who got the new method going."[47] Even granting that the school of Chartres existed in the form that Chenu implies, with a number of outstanding teachers (which points have been challenged by R. W. Southern[48]), there is reason to look elsewhere for the crucial stage or stages.

Anselm of Laon

One likely candidate is Anselm of Laon (c. 1050-1117) who with his brother Ralph directed a monastic school in the early twelfth century. Anselm, a student of Anselm of Canterbury and a teacher of Abelard, directed what surely must be classified as one of the most significant schools in the Middle Ages. Beryl Smalley states that "it is at Laon that we find the first concerted effort toward theological systematization. The Summa Theologica traces its formal pedigree back to Laon."[49] David Luscombe notes that, although "from the doctrinal

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[47]Chenu, Nature, Man and Society, pp. 292-293.

[48]R. W. Southern, "Humanism and the School of Chartres" in Medieval Humanism and Other Essays (New York: Harper and Row, 1970) pp. 61-85.

[49]Smalley, The Study of the Bible, p. 49.

viewpoint the school in general made little progress," yet "in relation to the organization of studies in the twelfth century the school was of very great importance."[50] The school's contributions to theological literature included not only fostering the production of the Gloss[51], but also systematic arrangement of theological sentences from the Church Fathers.[52] In fact, Congar regards the Sententiae of Anselm as "less a sort of Florilegium or a work constructed along the lines of the Sentences of Lombard, but a foreshadowing of the great Summae."[53] Congar's grounds for this conclusion underline Anselm's importance for this study. He identifies Anselm's works as "the beginnings of the quaestio procedure, that is of dialectical debate."[54] As James Weisheipl describes it,

> the scholastic quaestio disputata seems to have arisen at Laon in the early 12th century from conflicting patristic interpretations of Scripture. Authorities pro and contra were disputed, noted in the margin of the text, and a tentative solution proposed.[55]

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[50]David Luscombe, The School of Peter Abelard: The Influence of Abelard's Thought in the Early Scholastic Period (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969) p. 173. For a qualified estimate of the existence and character of Anselm's School, see Valerie I. J. Flint, "The School of Laon: A Reconsideration," Recherche de Théologie ancienne et médievale 48 (1976) 89-110.

[51]Evans, The Earlier Middle Ages, p. 41; Luscombe, The School of Peter Abelard, p. 174.

[52]Luscombe, The School of Peter Abelard, pp. 173-174; Congar, A History of Theology, p. 69; Maurice de Wulf, History of Medieval Philosophy, Vol 1: From the Beginnings to the End of the Twelfth Century, trans. Ernest C. Messenger (London: Thomas Nelson and Sons, Ltd., 1952) p. 242. Wulf identifies the outline as God in Himself; the Trinity; God as Creator; God as Redeemer.

[53]Congar, A History of Theology, p. 69.

[54]Ibid.

[55]New Catholic Encyclopedia, s.v. "Scholastic Method," by James A. Weisheipl.

Luscombe agrees, noting that "Anselm and his school were not averse to the introduction of the quaestio to biblical exegesis or to the reappraisal and the supplementation, when need arose, of patristic tradition."[56] Therefore, he concludes that "it is Anselm, not Abelard, who directed the first "scholastic" school of theology which enjoys a historical importance."[57] This is so despite the solutions being "brief, often incomplete, occasionally omitted."[58]

A pattern exists in the various contributions of Anselm and his school. The involvement with the Gloss indicates, at the least, a concern for the meaning of the text of Scripture, a concern to make the Bible clear to its students.[59] The elemental character of many of the comments supports, rather than undermines, this fact, for it then maximizes its audience and serves to introduce the reader to a new enterprise. The accumulation of patristic citations can be seen in the same light. The concern for meaning increases the attractiveness of additional assistance, especially from such an authoritative quarter.

The Sententiae and its successors, with the pro and contra arrangement, are an outgrowth of the careful and extensive knowledge of the Fathers' writings. Once the disparities are perceived, a reasonable response to the conflict of such authorities is the attempt at reconciliation. The topical compilation is an easily understood outgrowth of the patristic study. As the attention shifts more and more toward the study of the auctores, the topical grouping would present a

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[56]Luscombe, The School of Peter Abelard, p. 174.

[57]Ibid.

[58]Wulf, History of Medieval Philosophy, 1:242.

[59]Evans, The Earlier Middle Ages, pp. 42, 45-46.

more "internal" format than the Biblical order. Other than the authorial grouping (which had been the first form of Sentences[60]), the topical arrangement is perhaps the most obvious alternative. This is particularly the case since the conflicts were doctrinal, and thus topical.

While this reconstruction admittedly is hypothetical (and without arguing for an exact order of events), I am suggesting that the various activities do cohere conceptually. Each aspect seems to be a plausible undertaking, even practical, as it were. None seems intrusive or alien to the hermeneutical and theological task. Consequently, if Laon, under the leadership of Anselm and Ralph, does represent the first school characterized by the scholastic method of theology, then this reading of the evidence suggests that the new approach is at least plausible, even defensible. By no means is it obviously a distortion of, or an alien intrusion into, Christian theology.

Despite the fundamental place of Laon in the history of scholasticism, there is reason to look back even further. There are earlier individuals whose example was formative for the later developments.

Boethius

One such individual was Boethius (480-524). As previously mentioned, the writings of this Roman patrician were an important foundation for the twelfth-century developments. The Opuscala Sacra in

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[60] New Catholic Encyclopedia, s.v. "Sentences and Summae," by Palemon Glorieux.

particular were significant.[61] They were "established works, appropriate for classroom study and the source of an occasional proof-text."[62] Though Gibson makes this observation while explaining the perceived unsuitableness of these writings for the practice of theology by twelfth-century theologians, such a description makes clear their attractiveness for Anselm of Laon. The school has been characterized as more pedagogical than creative[63]; hence the popularity of Boethius' theological writings.

Of course, as Congar has indicated and Gibson has documented, Boethius' impact via his Opuscala Sacra extended beyond Laon.[64] Most notable in the twelfth-century were the lengthy commentaries of Thierry of Chartres and his school and those of Gilbert of Poitiers.[65] In the next century, Thomas Aquinas also wrote extensively on one treatise, De Trinitate.[66]

The logical translations and commentaries also exercised a

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[61]Margaret Gibson, "The Opuscala Sacra in the Middle Ages" in Boethius: His Life, Thought and Influence, ed. Margaret Gibson (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1981) p. 221; Grabmann, Die Geschicte der Scholastischen Methode, 1:163.

[62]Gibson, "The Opuscala Sacra", p. 221.

[63]Evans, The Earlier Middle Ages, p. 221.

[64]Congar, A History of Theology, p. 69; Gibson, "The Opuscala Sacra," pp. 214-234; See also Chadwick, Boethius, p. 242; Evans, Old Arts and New Theology, pp. 21, 24-25, 31, 91, 99-100, 123, 199, 204-206, 213.

[65]The Commentaries On Boethius by Gilbert of Poitiers; Commentaries on Boethius by Thierry of Chartres and His School, ed. Nikolaus M. Haring (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 1971).

[66]Sancti Thomae de Aquino Expositio super Librum Boetii de Trinitate, ed. Bruno Decker (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1959).

significant influence upon medieval theology.[67] Their discussion of the various facets of the meaning and use of words served to spark an interest in logic, both for its own sake and as an instrument for use with other subject-matter. Along with the other disciplines, the new interest in dialectics was applied to theology as well. Yet in his Opuscala Sacra, Boethius not merely describes a scholastic method suitable for theology, but actually uses it. This is particularly crucial, it seems, as a chapter in the development of scholasticism.

The theological tractates are five in number, apparently composed individually.[68] These writings sharply differ in style. Four them (1, 2,3,5) are topical and analytical. The other (De fide catholica) summarizes the Catholic faith by means of a review of the course of God's relationship to humanity, particularly the plan of redemption and the promise of the Messiah.[69] This heilsgeschicte approach to the Christian Faith (save for the opening identification and explanation of the true God) is noteworthy. First it vividly contrasts with the style of the remaining tractates. Second, it is so "unscholastic." It is historical, not topical. It is discursive, not analytical. Its central

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[67]See, e.g., Gibson, "The Opuscala Sacra," p. 221; H. Liebschutz, "Western Christian Thought from Boethius to Anselm" in The Cambridge History of Later Greek and Early Medieval Philosophy, ed. A. H. Armstrong (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967) pp. 600, 639; G. R. Evans, Anselm and a New Generation (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980) p. 77; Osmund Lewry, "Boethian Logic in the Medieval West" in Boethius, ed. Gibson, pp. 90-134.

[68]For discussion of the text and circumstances of these tractates, see Chadwick, Boethius, pp174-222; John Mair, "The Text of the Opuscala Scara" in Boethius, ed. Gibson, pp. 206-213.

[69]See Boethius, The Theological Tractates, ed., H. F. Stewart, E. K. Rand, and S. J. Tester in Boethius: The Theological Tractates and the Consolation of Philosophy, ed. H. F. Stewart, E. K. Rand, and S. J. Tester (Loeb Classical Library; Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1973) pp.2-129.

focus is redemptive and the conclusion describes the personal benefits of Christianity. Its style has been termed "free, at times rhapsodical."[70] De fide catholica's uniqueness in the Boethian corpus militated against its acceptance at various points of its history, but the current consensus favors its authenticity.[71]

The themes are a prime factor contrasting the fourth tractate with the others. As mentioned De fide catholica is an historical summary of God's activity in creation, fall and redemption. Its breadth of scope yet clarity of purpose provided a criterion which accounts for the selectivity of its contents.

> Probably De fide catholica is the earliest of the tractates and was written by Boethius to crystallize in his own mind what John has taught him in catechesis. It has about it the air of someone trying to get the main points clear in a course of instruction which he has recently assimilated and very much wants to imprint upon his own mind.[72]

Chadwick seems correct about the elementary character of the work. It is, as W. Bark has suggested, "a guide for bewildered laymen confused by theological intricacies."[73] At the least, it is suitable for such an audience. Chadwick is unduly hasty in dismissing such a description of a wider audience, stating in resonse to Bark, "if so, Boethius wrote it for himself."[74] That Boethius himself would have profited from such a solidifying, clarification of the chief points of Christianity as an

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[70]See Mair, "The Text of the Opuscala Sacra," p. 208 for a brief summary and Chadwick, Boethius, pp. 180-190 for a fuller discussion.

[71]See Chadwick's summary in n. 7 on p. 302 of his Boethius.

[72]Ibid., p. 180.

[73]William Bark, "Boethius' Fourth Tractate, the So-called De fide catholica," Harvard Theological Review 39(1946)68.

[74]Chadwick, Boethius, p. 180.

historical religion need not mean that this was the sole purpose of composition. There is nothing demeaning or unworthy in such a survey and it surely would have had widescale usefulness in the Church of that (or any) day. Its virtue, rather than its flaw, is the brevity, clarity, and simplicity of its summary. In short, whatever the particulars of the occasion of its writing, the basic character is non-technical historical summarization.

This contrasts with the origins of the other treatises, or at least the two which contain some indications of Boethius' reasons for writing them. The fifth treatise (Contra Eutychen et Nestorium) includes as part of its heading the notation that it was addressed to Boethius' "saintly master and reverend father, John the Deacon," perhaps later Pope John I.[75] The opening pages recount how both men were present when a letter from the Eastern bishops to Pope Symmachus was read to a gathering of notables in Rome.[76] The bishops were attempting to plot a course which avoided both the Eutychian and Nestorian heresies and also would be acceptable to the West. The point at issue is described by Boethius:

> Eutychianos ex duabus naturis Christum consistere confiteri, in duabus negare: catholicos vero utrique dicto fidem praebere, nam et ex duabus eum naturis consistere et in duabus apud verae fidei sectatores aequaliter credi.[77]

When Boethius inquired as to the differences between unions of two natures and those in two natures, the immediate response of the gathering was to insist tumultously that there was no difficulty in

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[75]Ibid., pp. 26-29.

[76]Chadwick, Boethius, pp. 180-190; Mair, "The Text of the Opuscala Sacra," p. 208.

[77]Boethius, The Theological Tractates, p. 72.

perceiving the obvious difference. Unable to discern the viewpoint of a certain respected member of the gathering, Boethius afterwards left without an answer to his question. However, he was convinced of the ignorance yet feigned learning of the speakers. Consequently, he continued his reflection until he found what he thought was an answer. This is now explained to John for his evaluation.

Similarly, the third tractate (Quomodo Substantiae) is in response to a request (from John?[78]) for a statement and explanation of "eius quaestiones obscuritatem," in a now lost treatise of Boethius', Hebdomadibus, "how substances are good in virtue of their existence without being substantial goods."

Both of these treatises treat single subjects in response to some confusion concerning them. As a result, the works are precise, analytical, detailed, with varying degrees of technicality. They are, in brief, "scholastic." The third tractate even follows the example of mathematics by setting forth a list of preliminary axioms from which the discussion will be developed.

Though the first two tractates (De Trinitate and Utrum Pater et Filius) give no indication of the circumstances behind their composition (other than being addressed, respectively, to Boethius' father-in-law Symmachus and John the Deacon), both indicate in their opening lines that they concern questions. The first opens with "investigatam diutissime quaestionem" while the second begins "Quaero." This clearly marks them out as being analytical investigations of precise topics. Each is involved in its argumentation and closely reasoned. They too are "scholastic."

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[78]Chadwick, Boethius, p. 203.

Boethius thus wrote in two different styles. He did so to accommodate divergent subject-matter and audiences. When appropriate, he could write simply and historically, almost devotionally. On the other hand, he could write intricate analyses of sophisticated topics. The first seem intended for the more general audience of the Church, or at least for the novices in the Church. The latter are for the learned leadership and are called forth by the existence of perplexing doctrinal issues in the Church or the Church's teaching. At least in Boethius' case, the investigations we possess are either elicited by pressing circumstances or requests from others or by a conceptual puzzle inherent in ecclesiastical dogma. Those in the latter category which Boethius addressed are by no means trivial or irrelevant. Rather, they are fundamental, even crucial. They were so important in his estimation that Boethius thought it essential to clarify them in the interest of orthodoxy. Later generations of Christians indeed profited from his terminological precision and conceptual clarity.[79] Thus Boethius' methodological innovations[80] had at least plausible bases and had beneficial effects. Here too the origins of scholasticism seem justifiable.

Anselm

A second individual whose example was formative upon theological developments in the twelfth-century was Anselm of Bec and Canterbury

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[79] Laistner, Thought and Letters in Western Europe, p. 87.

[80] Wulf, History of Medieval Philosophy, 1:112; Rand, Founders of the Middle Years, p. 151.

(1033-1109). However, his influence did not take the form which we might expect. That is, his writings were not used and copied by multitudes of teachers and students in the immediately succeeding generations. Anselm as an author was not in great demand, as surprising as that seems to us.[81] In fact, R. W. Southern suggests that a primary explanation for this neglect was the unsuitableness of Anselm's method for twelfth-century theology:

> He wrote for a monastic, and not for a sceptical or an academic audience, and his arguments cannot be taken from their context and quoted as definitive. In the Schools this was a hindrance to the growth of his influence; and even in the monasteries of the twelfth-century Anselm's influence was soon overtaken by the growing strength of School theology.
>
> Textual commentary, the compilation and arrangement of extracts, and the discussion of their points of difference made no appeal to him....Anselm did not inaugurate or advance a method of study suitable for the schools and capable of being developed methodically by those who came after him. He stood aside from the intellectual fashions of his time.[82]

This would suggest that perhaps Anselm was not in fact a formative exemplar for scholastism. However, Southern later clarifies the sense in which Anselm "stood aside from the intellectual fashions of his time."

> All his utterances, whether in Chapter or at table, in formal sermons or in remarks casually elicited, have a quality which reflects the meeting of the Benedictine and scholastic ages. They are a combination of old and new: of old, in the monastic setting and range of monastic topics; of new, in the penetrating analysis, the striking definitions and the unfamiliar illustrations."[83]

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[81] Evans, Anselm and a New Generation, p. 7.

[82] R. W. Southern, St. Anselm and His Biographer: A Study of Monastic Life and Thought 1059-c.1130 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1963) pp. 121, 204.

[83] Ibid., p. 217.

"The penetrating analysis": here Southern identifies Anselm's principle significance for the development of scholasticism, for this phrase encompasses both of the others. Evans observes that "he is happiest where he can show most plainly how one truth implies another; no techical skill available to him was so helpful in this connection as that of definition."[84] The careful definition of terms, however, is but one aspect of Anselm's primary activity of analysis. "His main aim" was "the task of understanding the ideas directly linked to religious doctrine."[85] He "unflaggingly" pursued "the rationale of revelation."[86] Of the many sources of Anselm's thought,[87] Boethius is most important for this analytical work, especially by his logical writings.[88]

G. R. Evans' Anselm and a New Generation is devoted to a discussion of this balancing act of Anselm's which Southern has noted. Anselm's combination of old and new accounted for both his influence and for his lack of influence upon subsequent theologians. Anselm's emphasis upon analysis, aided by a careful appropriation of dialectical skills, was new. It meant that his writings focused upon problems, often raised by

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[84]Evans, Anselm and Talking about God, p. 7. See also Lewry, "Boethian Logic in the Medieval West," p. 100: "Much of Anselm's writing in characterized by the conscious adoption of the technical language of the logician, to avoid the pitfalls of ordinary speech."

[85]H. Liebeschutz, "Western Christian Thought from Boethius to Anselm" in The Cambridge History of Later Greek and Early Medieval Philosophy, ed. A. H. Armstrong, p. 622.

[86]Jasper Hopkins, A Companion to the Study of St. Anselm (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1972) p. 54.

[87]See ibid., pp. 16-37 for a discussion of this.

[88]Lewry, "Boethian Logic in the Medieval West," p. 100; Evans, Anselm and Talking of God, 6; Hopkins, A Companion to the Study of St. Anselm, pp. 28-30.

others.[89] For instance, the Monologion and Proslogion were written in response to the entreaties of the monks at Bec. De Incarnatione Verbi was elicited by the heretical teaching of Roscellinus (c.1050-c.1122) and requested by fellow monks. De Conceptu Virginali is a response to the desires of his "brother and most beloved son Boso." De Processione Spiritus Sancti was called for by Pope Urban II as a result of Anselm's remarks to the council of Bari in 1098 and was a response to the Greeks' continued rejection of the filioque. Likewise De Sacramentis is a "defense of the true doctrine" against the Greek, which was requested of Anselm by Walram, Bishop of Naumberg.

This concentration upon controversies culminates in Anselm's use of the quaestio format.[90] De Concordia is overtly structured into three questions. De Incarnatione Verbi makes repeated references to quaestiones as a description of the present undertaking (e.g., at least six times in chapter one alone). It also carries on a running debate with an opponent (Roscellinus) as indicated by phrases such as "perhaps my opponent will say to me" (chapter 6) or "there are some who ask" (chapter 11) or "if my opponent objects" (chapter 13). This is the language of disputatio. Both traits are also present in De Conceptu Virginali. Finally, De Sacramentis addresses a series of questions as well, though not as overtly as De Concordia. All of this was formative upon the twelfth-century developments.

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[89]Evans, Anselm and Talking About God, pp. 196-199.

[90]See ibid., pp. 195-196. See also Hopkins, A Companion to the Study of St. Anselm, pp. 5-8, where he discusses the development in method between Anselm's earlier and later writings, so that the final ones foreshadow "in a primitive way" Aquinas' Summa Theologiae.

On the other hand, Anselm was outside the mainstream in his limited use of auctores, whether Scripture or the Fathers.[91] This contrasted sharply with the later penchant for Sentence collections. Perhaps the most fundamental difference was in the conception of theology. When Anselm embarked upon the quest for a solution to a problem, he confidently expected to find one, and indeed one which would be clear and certain and to which all other aspects of the question would be subordinate.[92] It was the attainment, more than the quest itself, which gave the most satisfaction to him and which was the value in the undertaking. Moreover, when Anselm encountered a person who held a mistaken opinion instead of this clear and certain answer, he assumed that persuading this person to change his views was relatively easy.

> Anselm took the optimistic view that if a man who held a mistaken opinion had his error reasonably explained to him, and if he listened to the explanation with a receptive mind, he would be cured of his error.[93]

In contrast, later thinkers tended to be less optimistic about the tidiness of the intellectual arena. Problems might resist resolution or yield only complex or tentative ones.[94] When answers were available, attempts to persuade opponents had no guarantee of success.[95] Where Anselm saw orderliness and thus could penetrate to the heart of an issue, subsequent scholars found a proliferation of problems, which

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[91]Hopkins, A Companion to the Study of St. Anselm, p. 8

[92]Evans, Anselm and a New Generation, p. 172.

[93]Ibid., viii.

[94]Ibid., p. 172.

[95]Ibid., p. 71.

could not be reduced to an orderly pattern.[96]

It seems that Anselm, by his attention to controversies and his careful analysis of them by the powers of dialectics, set a pattern for others. However, having started them on their way, he was unable to convince them of the brevity and simplicity of the journey. They started, as he had suggested, but found the way to be tough going, involved and lengthy, but immensely satisfying in its own right. Anselm was a formative influence in the inauguration of this analytical method for theological problems, but he clearly "stood apart" from his successors in the way they developed the method.

While Boethius and Anselm of Canterbury were two significant pioneers of the emergent scholasticism institutionally manifested at Laon, Peter Abelard and Peter Lombard were two of its most prominent twelfth-century successors. In them, and in Abelard particularly, we see represented the development of that mainstream from which St. Anselm stood apart.

Abelard

Abelard (1079 - 1142), though the subject of widely divergent evaluations by his contemporaries, clearly ranked as a figure of great significance. His conclusions on several important doctrinal issues partly explain his prominence, but perhaps the fundamental reason is his contribution to the development of theological method.

> Abelard's methods are generally agreed to have proved an inestimable stimulus upon twelfth-century thinking. The powerful advocacy of reason, the development of the quaestio in biblical exegesis, the propagation of techniques for

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[96] Ibid., vii-viii.

> harmonizing concepts, propositions and the documents of the faith by a dialectical hermeneutic, have assured for Abelard an exceptional place of honour in the history of the twelfth-century revival.[97]

Few would contest Abelard's right to a "place of honor" among twelfth-century theologians, but there is some question as to the degree of originality with which he can be credited. Just how much of a pioneer was he? Was he an inventor or was he a refiner and developer of others' innovations?

The debate focuses primarily upon his Sic et Non. It is clear by now that Abelard cannot be credited with beginning the practice of pro et contra collections of the teachings of the Fathers. Anselm of Laon, at least, preceded him in this. Moreover, the quaestio method, in addition to its patristic roots, was used by Boethius and both Anselms before Abelard wrote. Others also had gained competency in dialectics and then applied it to the study of theology. In none of these areas is Abelard an innovator.

In addition, Martin Grabmann has suggested some qualification of the credit for the growth of scholasticism which is given to Abelard's Sic et Non:

> Wir müssen vielmehr der Sic-et-non-Methode Abälards einen Koeffizienten beigeben, dessen Aktivität die Ausgestaltung der scholastischen Lehr-und Darstellungsmethode wesentlich beeinflusst hat. Dieser Koeffizient ist die logica nova.[98]

Yet, having denied to Abelard the claim to innovation or decisive influence in scholasticism's development, we still must grant him a unique contributory role.

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[97] Luscombe, The School of Peter Abelard, p. 113.

[98] Grabmann, Die Geschicte der Scholastischen Methode, 2:219-220.

> True, the method of collecting and arranging passages from the Fathers on specific topics had been used before, as in the Sentences of Anselm of Laon, but Abelard gave it a pungency and a wide popularity which associate it permanently with his name.[99]

Though others had addressed the doctrinal conflict of the authorities,

> Abélard, in his Sic et Non, introduces the problem of the agreement of authorities into the heart of the theological method and give [sic] it a technical form of great precision.[100]

It was no longer merely one of several aspects of theological activity, but the centerpiece, the means by which issues were presented, dialectical skills sharpened, and Christian truth communicated. Quaestio and disputatio thereby strengthened their grip upon theological education. This gives Abelard his place of honor—not the introduction of these methods nor the final, decisive push to ascendancy over alternative modes of theology, but rather a powerful demonstration of them which promoted their adoption by others.

Haskins summarizes Abelard's procedure in the Sic et Non:

> His method was to take significant topics of theology and ethics and to collect from the Fathers their opinions pro and con, sharpening perhaps the contrast and being careful not to solve the real or seeming contradiction.[101]

"Sharpening but not solving": Herein lay the cause for alarm for many church leaders when they read (or at least heard about) this work. Even though Abelard's intention seemed to be to make the task of reconciliation "the cornerstone of his work,"[102] Sic et Non was "not

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[99]Charles Homer Haskins, The Renaissance of the Twelfth Century (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1927) pp. 353-354.

[100]Congar, A History of Theology, p. 72.

[101]Haskins, The Renaissance of the Twelfth Century, p. 354.

[102]Luscombe, The School of Peter Abelard, p. 214.

well received."[103] The reconciliation, to be sure, was not included by Abelard; rather, because the book was intended for students, solutions were to be discerned by them through close analysis of the words and arguments of the citations. There is good reason to be confident of Abelard's orthodox affirmation of the truthfulness of the Church's writings, but he apparently regarded the inclusion of answers in the textbook as pedagogically inappropriate.

In the prologue, he explained the principles for handling the conflicting statements.[104] First, students must determine whether the statements which appear to contradict the truth come from authentic writings of the Fathers. Second, they should ask whether the statement was later retracted or was fragmentary or questionable or whether, on the other hand, it was presented as a definitive affirmation. Also, readers should ascertain the exact nature of the obligation involved in the statements, i.e., is one only temporary or limited to a particular group or subject to later modification? Again, identical terms may be used with different meanings. Finally, after careful comparison, if the contradiction still remains, the weightier and better established authority should be given priority.

In Abelard's estimation, the effort expended in such detailed study greatly profited the student. The clear realization of the conflict between authorities engaged the mind, raising the questions of which was correct and why. This questioning led to investigation which in turn led to the discovery of truth. "Dubitando quippe ad inquisitionem

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[103] Justo L. Gonzalez, A History of Christian Thought, 2:169.

[104] See Grabmann, Die Geschichte der Scholastischen Methode, 2:200-203 for an analysis of the prologue which provides the basis for the present summary.

venimus; inquirendo veritatem percipimus."[105] Despite the initial opposition, soon most students and teachers had to agree with this, even if they disagreed as to what the truth was which they had found.[106]

Peter Lombard

The last individual to be noted, Peter Lombard (1095-1160), apparently was quite opposite to Abelard in personal and professional character.

> The Lombard's temperament was conservative and harmonizing, eschewing the "garrulities of the dialecticians," and softening and reconciling the differences and disagreements to a degree that made the "Magister Sententiarum" the standard authority for many centuries to come.[107].

Luscombe describes him as "a cautious, sober and apparently dull expositor."[108]

Not surprisingly, in light of this, his Libri Quattuor Sententiarum was scarcely daringly creative. Most analyses agree on its borrowed, conservative character.

> He imitates and often copies Abelard, Hugh of St. Victor, the Sententiae divinitatis, Alcher of Liege, and many others; he takes his patristic and conciliar texts from Gratian; he makes use of the classifications and certain of the ideas of the De

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[105] Peter Abailard, Sic et Non: A Critical Edition, ed. Blanche B. Boyer and Richard McKeon (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977) p. 103.

[106] Gonzalez, A History of Christian Thought, 2:170.

[107] Haskins, The Renaissance of the Twelfth Century, p. 357.

[108] Luscombe, The School of Peter Abelard, p. 262. For more extensive studies of Lombard, see Philippe Delhaye, Pierre Lombard: sa wie, ses oeuvres, et sa morale (Montréal: Institut d'Études Médiévales, 1961) and Dictionaire de Théologie Catholique, s.v. "Pierre Lombard" by Joseph de Ghellinck.

> Fide Orthodoxa of St. John Damascene...; he is greatly influenced by St. Augustine.[109]
>
> He is always timid, always modest, and some of his conclusions are intentionally stated quite vaguely. His humility and modesty are summed up admirably in the rather discouraged words at the end of one distinction, "If anyone can explain this better, I am not envious."[110]

Nevertheless, "it is becoming increasingly recognized that Peter Lombard engaged fully in the disputes of his time, particularly concerning the teachings of Gilbert."[111] In this latter dispute as in others, Lombard aligned himself with Bernard of Clairvaux. So strong was the affinity between these two individuals that St. Bernard has been described as the one "who set Peter Lombard on his way as a theologian"; Lombard was "St. Bernard's positive contribution to the development of scholastic theology."[112]

Though Lombard taught at the School of Notre Dame and at the end of his life served as Bishop of Paris, his principal contribution to theology was the Sentences. Despite its borrowings (often at secondhand) and lack of novel treatments of doctrine, this work had real value as a textbook:

> ...his work forms an excellent systematization inspired by a division of the material into res and signa; it provides schemes and subjects for lectures, excludes all imprudent curiosity and deals with all the questions at issue without

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[109] Wulf, History of Medieval Philosophy, 1:246. For a discussion of his sources, see Magistri Petri Lombardi Sententiae in IV Libris Distinctae, 3rd ed. (Rome: Collegii S. Bonaventurae Ad Claras Aquas, 1971) Vol. 1, Pt. 1: Prolegomena, pp. 118-122.

[110] Elizabeth Frances Rogers, Peter Lombard and the Sacramental System (New York: n.p., 1917; Reprint, Merrick, NY: Richwood Publishing Company, 1976) p. 64.

[111] Luscombe, The School of Peter Abelard, p.262.

[112] R.W. Southern, The Making of the Middle Ages (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1953) p. 262.

> succeeding in harmonizing completely the divergent authorities. All this explains the astonishing celebrity of the work.[113]

Rogers' evaluation is similar:

> The Middle Ages needed a theological compendium and Peter Lombard gave the best in the period. He had a gift for compilation and system, and for conciseness and clearness. With the exception of a few statements he was rigorously orthodox and his orthodoxy secured the almost immediate success of his work. The impersonal treatment made it suitable for commentary by professor and student, and so made it invaluable as a textbook. The very fact that he had not drawn definite conclusions encouraged the study of the problems he presented.[114]

In particular, Yves Congar singles out Lombard's via media approach as the prime factor in its success.[115] There seems, though, to be a hint of criticism in Congar's comment when he there describes Lombard as "graciously conciliating the authorities." Lombard clearly intends to proffer at least tentative resolutions of the various conflicts and he is just as clearly a conservative on most theological issues, but the two are not equivalent nor even essentially related. After all, Abelard too intended reconciliation as the outcome of the analysis of the pro et contra lists of authorities. He certainly tended toward more radical solutions to these difficulties, but he was as committed to the fundamental unity of the doctrinal authorities as was Lombard. It must be admitted, however, that the more conservative cast of the Sentences and the inclusion of resolutions, however tentative, did much to spare

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[113] Wulf, History of Medieval Philosophy, 1:246. For a similar assessment, see New Catholic Encyclopedia, s.v. "Peter Lombard," by Ignatius C. Brady.

[114] Rogers, Peter Lombard and the Sacramental System, pp. 76-77.

[115] Congar, History of Theology, p. 57.

Lombard the degree of criticism which Abelard faced.[116]

The Sentences differ from Sic et Non in another way as well. Not only has Lombard collected the conflicting statements of the authorities, but he has organized them systematically. The sophistication and overtness of this system distinguishes the work from its predecessors.

The Sentences are divided into four books: The Trinity, the Creation, the Incarnation and Redemption, and the Sacraments and Eschatology. An even more basic division is its Augustinian distinction of res and signis.[117] According to that Father, all doctrine concerns either one or the other. Books one through three treat res while book four on the sacraments treat signs. The first three books of res are divided further into those which are loved for their own sake and those which are loved for another's sake. The Triune God occupies the first category and all other substances fall into the second classification.[118]

However, this structure is not carried out in the details of the work (the sacraments being the only signs). Consequently, the actual structure is somewhat different. Grabmann cites approvingly Aquinas' analysis of the Sentences as emphasizing God as the beginning from which all creation proceeds and the end toward which it tends.[119] The

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[116]See, though, the brief summary of the opposition which he did face, in New Catholic Encyclopedia, s.v. "Peter Lombard."

[117]Grabmann, Die Geschichte der Scholastischen Methode, 2:364. See Augustine, Christian Instruction, trans. John Gavigan in Saint Augustine, Christian Instruction: Admonition and Grace; Christian Combat; Enchiridion, 2nd ed.; Fathers of the Church Vol. 2 (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 1950) pp. 28-29.

[118]Grabmann, Die Geschichte der Scholastischen Methode, 2:364.

[119]Ibid.

significance of this structure is mitigated somewhat with the realization that any doctrinal treatment which begins with creation and ends with eschatology (including the Scriptures) can be similarly characterized. History itself goes from beginning to consummation. Nevertheless, such a scope is noticeably absent in Abelard's Sic et Non, for instance. Aquinas' description, then, is important because it, perhaps indirectly, underscores the conceptual completeness of the Sentences, one of the notable advances of this work.

By its thoroughness (more than nine hundred capitula on most of the aspects of Christian theology), the Sentences complete the preparation for the scholasticism of the next century issuing in the many Summae. It addresses disputes, it ranges the authorities on both sides, it attempts clarification and reconciliation, all within an inclusive, logically developed format. None of this seems objectionable. We need not endorse Lombard's particular selection of questions nor the relative space allowed to various parts to recognize the value of the arrangement and method of the Sentences as a whole.

Conclusion

Several observations can be made on the basis of this survey of medieval scholasticism. The distinguishing characteristic is the quaestio, with its emphasis upon disputation and distinction for the purpose of reconciliation. The origins are not medieval, for these practices existed in the patristic period as well. While the medieval theologians surely gave greater prominence to them, the practices themselves were not innovations on their part. The evaluative question regarding medieval scholasticism therefore concerns the propriety of the

increased emphasis upon these procedures, not the propriety of the creation of them.

The explanation for the development of the reconciliation of questions by disputation and distinction is a complex of several factors.[120] The first, and perhaps most surprising, is the practical nature of the scholastic developments. That is, the growth and expansion of the scholastic method was a response to felt needs within theology and theological education. Far from being a theoretically devised or abstractly conceived approach to theology, the increasingly elaborate scholastic procedures were an attempt to obviate certain pressing problems. These problems fall into two categories.

One pressing problem was the conflict of authorities on doctrinal matters.[121] In an age when the study of any discipline principally consisted of "reading" an authoritative text and providing commentary, authoritative conflict represented a fundamental problem. This was particularly the case in theology where the status of the authorities was enhanced by the conviction of divine sanction for their teachings. The prima facie discrepancies within or between Scripture, the Councils, and the Fathers only increased in number as the quantity of available documents and scholarly activity grew. Whether for scholar or student, such conflicts could not be ignored. Some account had to be given for them in order for theological activity to continue. To avoid the discrepancies would have been obsurantistic. To declare them only

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[120] Much of Evans, Anselm and a New Generation and especially idem., Old Arts and New Theology elaborates the factors accounting for the developing scholasticism.

[121] See Evans, The Earlier Middle Ages, pp. 133-139. Regarding Scriptural paradoxes, see R. W. Southern, "Medieval Humanism" in Medieval Humanism and Other Essays, pp. 47-48.

apparent but not actual required investigation and explanation, whether linguistically or conceptually. To opt for one side or the other was a serious step requiring careful deliberation and clear warrant. Each alternative involved close analysis of the texts. Several of these options involved distinctions. The texts themselves created the disputation, as it were.

It is difficult to find grounds for criticizing this development. The task of reconciliation forced itself upon the scholars by the nature of the conflicting material. Distinctions of various kinds are obvious means of dissipating the disputes. It seems that the failure to recognize or address the conflicts would be the culpable act, instead of the reverse. This is not to say that the medievals exercised an infallible judgment in the identification, much less the solution, of the particular disputes, but merely to grant the fundamental clarity and honesty of the overall project.

In addition to this "internal" problem of the conflict of the authoritative sources of orthodoxy, theologians also faced the "external" pressure created by the teachings of heterodox movements and non-Christian religions.[122] Groups such as the Catharii and the Waldensians within and the Jews and Moslems without fostered "the twelfth-century urge to sharpen and point the differences, to make it quite plain to ordinary people where dissidents from the orthodox view" were "in error."[123] Conversely, the challenge to the truth of Christianity on rational and ethical grounds by these groups forced the elaboration of the warrant for Christian dogma.

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[122]See Evans, Old Arts and New Theology, pp. 137-166, especially 141, 151, 166. See also Southern, "Medieval Humanism," pp. 11-12.

[123]Evans, Old Arts and New Theology, p. 137.

Such a task involved linguistic and conceptual distinctions similar to those used for the purpose of reconciliation. Blunting the accusations of irrationality and immorality required the analysis of the opposition's arguments in order to identify the flaws. It also required the analysis and elaboration of arguments supporting Christian theology.

Here too dispute was forced upon theological scholarship. The threat to faith by heresy and false religion demanded a response. To be effective, the response needed rigor and substance which could come only by sophisticated linguistic and conceptual analysis of the arguments pro et contra. Again, there seems to be no grounds for indicting medieval scholars in their development of the disputational academic format in light of this pressing pastoral and missionary situation. Even the conclusion that these other doctrinal systems did not in fact constitute threats to Christians or to Christian theology could only be reached by careful comparison of the teachings. The medieval Church showed no inclination toward such thinking, as many contemporary theologians do, but if it had, it would have required the conciliatory methods of scholastic disputation to substantiate it.

A second factor accounting for the growth of scholasticism was the growing maturity of the exegetical skills of the theologians. The twelfth century, in particular, saw a rapid growth in the trivium arts of grammar, rhetoric and dialectic. When this renewed knowledge of language was applied to theological texts, the range of hermeneutical options increased markedly.[124] Theologians well-versed in the artes now understood the variety of uses which a given grammatical construction could have. This inevitably lengthened the exegetical task as each

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[124]See ibid., pp. 57-90, especially 73, 78.

alternative was considered. It also brought more views of a passage to light, resulting from the choice and implementation of the various linguistic possibilites. This wealth of competing views to be evaluated and sorted made disputation a valuable method. The process of distinguishing and/or reconciling enabled the theologian to arrive at a conclusion regarding the meaning of the text. Even if a traditional interpretation retained its hold, it had to repel the objections of the many newer views.

The maturing process also included dialectics and philosophy. These skills led to increased speculatio, that is, "abstract thought, purposeful, investigative thought which is governed by consciously-held principles concerning appropriate methods and apposite modes of speech.'"[125] Though not utterly distinct from the study of the Bible,[126] such thought was gaining significance in its own right throughout the twelfth and thirteenth centuries.[127] Indebted to Boethius both for definition and model,[128] theologians found this method productive of possibilities to be explored and resolutions to be expounded. Such conceptual sophistication proved useful for disputation. It also placed more emphasis upon quaestiones as topics for conceptual analysis so that even non-disputed points of doctrine became the objects of theological study, perhaps as potentially disputed issues.[129]

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[125] Ibid., p. 99.

[126] Ibid., p. 92.

[127] Ibid., p. 99. See also Colish, "Teaching and Learning Theology in Medieval Paris," p. 109.

[128] Evans, Old Arts and New Theology, p. 92.

[129] Chenu, Nature, Man, and Society, p. 294.

These factors are summarized by G. R. Evans, who notes that "a complex of influences is at work" in the twelfth century.

> Upon the foundation laid by the study of the Bible a great structure was going up, as scholars strove to build a solid edifice of academic theology from the mass of materials they had to hand. Into the building went the technical skills they were learning from their study of the liberal arts and ancient philosophy. And into the design went a number of features which, it was hoped, would serve to keep heretical doctrines out.[130]

When these factors combined in particular cases, they could yield very different results. In the midst of the commonality of the disputational procedures of scholastic theology, there was great variety of conclusions upon individual questions as well as of overall systems. Scholasticism was not monolithic.[131] In the twelfth-century, Anselm of Laon, Abelard, and Peter Lombard evidence this. Similarly, Alexander of Hales, Robert Grosseteste, Bonaventure, Thomas Aquinas, John Pecham, and John Duns Scotus in the next century demonstrate it. Though they shared many common concerns both of method and content, the scholastics found ample room for diversity. Creativity rather than predictability characterized the leading thinkers of this movement. They could address different topics, quote different authorities, and arrange the material in different configurations with different analyses of the fundamental nature of Christian theology. The results were remarkably pluriform. Summarizing the factors promoting scholastic development and the divergence of implementation, Marcia Colish observes,

> Apology thus joined with an expanded curriculum of secular arts and sciences and a deeper reading of the Church Fathers to promote a widespread interest in the twelfth century in defining and comparing different modes of knowledge and in situating theological knowledge and theological language in a

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[130] Evans, Old Arts and New Theology, p. 214.

broad philosophical context. While agreeing on the need, individual thinkers and groups disagreed on how best to meet it.[132]

Evaluation

I have suggested already that there is no compelling reason to regard these developments as regrettable. Scholastic methods in theology are not essentially deleterious. James Weisheipl's description of the disputation format highlights its virtues:

> The master's exposition was not simply an exegesis, but an intellectual grappling with real problems examined by the author. To understand a particular problem, words, ideas, and realities had to be clearly defined, distinguished, and examined from all sides. Recognition of a problem meant appreciation of all problems sic et non, i.e., for and against a specific questions. Such questions could arise from the text, conflicting interpretations, doubtful solutions, or new insights; these gave rise to the disputation.[133]

Such procedures strengthened theology's capacity for analysis and reconciliation. They yielded real profit in increased clarity and depth of understanding. As a result, "The strength of this period lay in its power to deal with discordant texts, to seize on distinctions of meaning, and to clarify confusions of thought."[134] The disputations over various questions advanced theological understanding, rather than distracting it. As Southern puts it, "friction is necessary for intellectual progress" in this period, and "theology provided the

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[131]Chenu, Nature, Man, and Society, pp. 289-291.

[132]Colish, "Teaching and Learning Theology in Medieval Paris," pp. 109-110.

[133]New Catholic Encyclopedia, s.v. "Scholastic Method," by James A. Weisheipl.

[134]Southern, "Medieval Humanism," p. 45.

friction necessary for the development of independent thought."[135] The quaestio format provided the vehicle for orderly and productive friction, marshalling the new information on theological topics from within and without the Church, and evaluating its relative merits and mutual relationships. The end product of such sorting, the conciliation of disparate sources, quieted doubts, silenced accusations, advanced understanding, and made the intellectual arena more orderly and thus more accessible, particularly to students, but also to scholars.

Though the method, and thus the movement associated with it, is commendable per se and could be greatly beneficial, in the hands of the small-minded or the unskilled, it yielded little profit. Petty, irrelevant issues could consume vast amounts of energy. Recognition of this possibility (and of its actualization, particularly in the later Middle Ages) is widespread among scholars. Chenu describes the quaestio as "a scholarly formality that risked taking technique as an end to itself, while losing sight of the real goals in studying the text."[136] Similarly, "Scholastics, preferring to dispute subtle questions rather than to comment on the Bible, made dialectics an end in itself, divorced even from patristic sources."[137] They engaged in "excessive, futile use of dialectics," leading to the decline of scholasticism.[138] They incurred the wrath of the humanists in the Renaissance because of "an

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[135]Ibid., pp. 45, 47.

[136]Chenu, Nature, Man, and Society, p. 294.

[137]New Catholic Encyclopedia, s.v. "Dialectics in the Middle Ages," by P. Michaeud-Quantin and James A. Weisheipl.

[138]Ibid.

extreme penchant for subtle questions, principally de sophismatibus."[139] Armand Maurer grants that "the scholastic style degenerated into dullness and pedantry at the end of the Middle Ages," even though it was "one of the most remarkable instruments" which philosophers and theologicans have ever had.[140] In an extended "evaluation of theology in the scholastic period," Yves Congar lists three problems with the application of the scholastic method to theology: "The excessive domination of a method too exclusively rational and logical," "the danger of useless subtlety," and "the danger of crystallization into petrified systems."[141]

Scholastic theology unquestionably presented numerous lamentable examples of the method. Yet these arguably were abuses of the method rather than manifestations of the essential character of the method itself. Moreover, even the most noteworthy practitioners fell short occasionally in the course of a particular work. The defense of scholastic theology in no way requires a canonization of each and every attempt nor of any individual work in its entirety. Nevertheless, when all such qualifications are made, the scholastic method with its emphasis upon the disputation of questions should be regarded as a positive development in the history of theology.

This analysis obviously contrasts to Brian Armstrong's widely used characterization of scholasticism in its Protestant form.[142]

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[139] New Catholic Encyclopedia, s.v. "Scholastic Method," by James A. Weisheipl.

[140] Étienne Gilson, ed. A History of Philosophy, 4 vols. (New York: Random House, 1962), vol. 2: Medieval Philosophy, by Armand Maurer, p. 90.

[141] Congar, A History of Theology, pp. 137-143.

[142] Armstrong, Calvinism and the Amyraut Heresy, p. 32.

Armstrong's list of "more-or-less identifiable tendencies," cited in chapter one, consisted of the following four points: (1) deductive ratiocination from given assumptions, as the basis for theological assertions which form a logically coherent and defensible system of belief, all of which is invariably based upon an Aristotelian orientation; (2) the use of reason on a par with faith, to the abandonment of revelation in some measure; (3) the sentiment that Scripture contains the materials for a definitive statement of orthodox doctrine; (4) a pronounced interest in metaphysical matters, in abstract, speculative thought, especially concerning God.

An examination of medieval scholasticism, of course, is not sufficient by itself to permit an evaluation of Armstrong's description. We must wait for that until we have included Calvin and the Protestant scholastics too. Yet it is appropriate to check the validty of the term "scholasticism" as a description of some forms of Protestant theology against the medieval forerunner.

Several points should be noted regarding Armstrong's first characteristic. The emphasis upon deduction as the means of developing the system was less prominent than he suggests. Obviously dialectics played a major role, but deduction is not equivalent to dialectics. Moreover deduction can refer to the attainment of a conclusion without also referring to the means of proposing a topic. That is, deductions can be made from certain premises without the premises themselves being obtained by deduction. Secondly, "logically coherent and defensible systems" do not need to depend upon deduction. Such a system can be obtained in other ways. There is no necessary connection between them.

This characteristic, the only one which Armstrong explicitly

connects with medieval scholasticism, is not prevalent in that movement. The scholastic works of the Middle Ages do not as a rule develop their content by deduction alone. Theology rather took its content from questions arising from the text of Scripture, whether directly or indirectly. Certainly some topics were deduced from others, but by no means did the entirety of the work of the medieval schoolmen come by deduction alone.

The reference to Aristotle is problematic. Though, to be sure, modern logicians have developed numerous systems of logic, earlier ages had less variety from which to select. Granted that sixteenth-century scholars had Ramist logic available and that patristic thinkers could study Stoic logic, neither was available for the medieval period. Even so, such a description assumes that those two forms were distinct from the methods of the Organon which in fact is only true of certain points (as will be shown later with regard to Ramus). On the content of philosophy, Neo-platonism seems at least as influential upon scholasticism as Peripateticism, even for Aquinas.[143] In short, the Aristotelian characterization is at best trivial and at worst inaccurate.

The second trait, that of an undue rationalism likewise is inaccurate. Medieval scholastics attempted to understand their faith, but did not as a rule abandon it. Chenu in fact describes the scholastic objective as intellectus fidei, reminiscent of Augustine and Anselm.[144] There may well be flaws in the medieval view of faith and

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[143]See David Burrell, Aquinas: God and Action (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1979) and idem., Knowing the Unknowable God (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1986).

[144]Chenu, Nature, Man, and Society, p. 303.

reason but the denigration of faith, whether in principle or in practice, does not seem to be among them. This is particularly true of Aquinas.[145]

Armstrong's third point is awkward. In some ways it reiterates the first point about a "logically coherent and defensible system of belief" which was noted earlier. The novelty of this third characteristic seems to be the reference a criterion for orthodoxy. This too is problematic. If Armstrong is referring to <u>any</u> such criterion, then the description does not single out medieval theology in any significant way. Several ecumenical creeds (which circumscribed the bounds of orthodoxy) antedated the rise of scholasticism, after all. If, on the contrary, he is referring to a complete statement (or even relatively complete) such as would foreclose investigation or creativity, then the charge is false. Medieval scholars enjoyed remarkable freedom of inquiry.[146] This was particularly the case before the end of the thirteenth century, but it held true for the later period to a significant degree. Even with the Fourth Lateran Council's determination of the identity of the sacraments and its proclamation of transubstantiation, the 1277 Parisian condemnations concerning certain points of Aristotelianism, and the several bulls specifying the nature of papal authority, to mention some examples, many doctrinal questions remained open for discussion in ways that sixteenth and twentieth century Catholic theologians, e.g., would not experience. The diversity of scholasticism also indicates this freedom. Here too, then, Armstrong misses the mark, if Protestant scholasticism is so designated in terms of the medieval version.

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[145]Vos, <u>Aquinas, Calvin, and Contemporary Protestant Thought</u>, pp. 66-122.

[146]See, e.g. Haskins, <u>The Renaissance of the Twelfth Century</u>, p. 362.

The final element of the description, the penchant for metaphysics, particularly regarding the doctrine of God, seems to be more defensible, though it is unclear whether Armstrong uses "speculative" in the medieval or modern sense. The latter perhaps is the intended meaning, but if so, then this weakens his point. Scholasticism indeed was based upon speculatio, but Evans' definition of this as "abstract thought, purposeful, investigative thought which is governed by consciously-held principles concerning 'appropriate methods and apposite modes of speech'"[147] implies something different, something more positive than Armstrong's meaning. Evans' depiction centers on investigative thought which is governed by certain principles. Armstrong seems to have in mind a style of theology which "creates" new content, perhaps by postulation or conjecture, rather than an analysis of extant matters. Even here, then, Armstrong does not capture the thrust of the medieval ancestry of Protestant scholasticism.

This contrast suggests that, whether or not the Protestant (for the present purposes, Reformed) scholastics were faithful to the early Reformers and, behind them, Scripture, the criticism of them as "scholastic" rests upon an ambiguous, even erroneous, view of the medieval schoolmen and their theological method.

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[147]Evans, Old Arts and New Theology, 99.

Chapter Three

Humanism, Scholasticism, and the Protestant Reformation

The investigation of the relationship between the Protestant Reformation and scholasticism must be conducted in light of the powerful force of Renaissance humanism. Though the on-going study of humanism by no means has settled all of the questions, some broad outlines have emerged.[1] Kristeller has advocated a narrow, technical definition for the movement:

> Thus Renaissance humanism was not as such a philosophical tendency or system, but rather a cultural and educational program which emphasized and developed an important but limited area of studies. This area had for its center a group of subjects that was concerned essentially neither with the classics nor with philosophy, but might be roughly described as literature.[2]

Elsewhere, he amplifies this:

> When historians speak of Renaissance humanism, they use the word in a sense that is different from our contemporary

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[1]A principal figure in research on Renaissance humanism is Paul Oskar Kristeller whose basic work is Renaissance Thought: The Classic, Scholastic, and Humanist Strains (New York: Harper and Row, Harper Torchbooks, 1961). See also his Renaissance Thought and the Arts (Princeton University Press, 1980; Originally published as Renaissance Thought II, New York: Harper and Row, Harper Torchbooks, 1965); Renaissance Thought and Its Sources (New York: Columbia University Press, 1979). For other basic sketches of the movement, see William J. Bouwsma, The Culture of Renaissance Humanism (Washington, DC: American Historical Association, 1973) and E. F. Jacobs, "Christian Humanism" in J. R. Hale, J. R. L. Highfield and B. Smalley, eds., Europe in the Late Middle Ages (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1965) pp. 437-465; See also Benjamin G. Kohl, Renaissance Humanism, 1300-1550: A Bibliography of Materials in English (New York: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1985).

[2]Renaissance Thought, p. 10; See pp. 8-23 for an extended discussion of the proper definition.

> meaning. They are referring to a broad class of Renaissance intellectuals who are traditionally called humanists and who were active as teachers and secretaries, writers, scholars and thinkers; who exercised a wide and deep influence on all aspects of Renaissance civilization; and who left to posterity, along with their records of their lives and activities, vast writings that may be roughly classified as literature, historical and philosophical scholarship, and moral thought, but which often deal with such diverse subjects as philosophy and the sciences, literary and art criticism, education, government, and religion.[3]

In particular, as the previous quotation indicates, Kristeller is concerned to limit the use of the "humanist" to two professions:

> The humanists represent the class of professional teachers of the humanistic disciplines, at the universities as well as in the secondary schools; they represent also the class of the professional chancellors and secretaries who knew how to compose the documents, letters, and orations required by their posts.[4]

While assenting to the accuracy of such a characterization, many scholars also want a "broader" definition.[5] In Linder's words,

> this is what might be called "general humanism" with its concern for the potentials and actions of men as men. According to this outlook, humanism had to do with the dignity of man and was expressed widely in Renaissance poetry, drama, music, painting, sculpture and philosophy.[6]

Similarly, William Bouwsma warns against using Kristeller's particularization as "a kind of lowest common denominator for humanism,"

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[3] Renaissance Thought and the Arts, p. 23.

[4] Ibid., p. 5.

[5] In addition to those cited below, see also Charles Trinkaus, In Our Image and Likeness: Humanity and Divinity in Italian Humanist Thought, 2 vols. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970) pp. XIV-XV; Brian Gerrish, Grace and Reason (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962; Midway Reprint, 1979) p. 153; and with reference to Christian humanism, E. F. Jacobs, "Christian Humanism," pp. 438-439; and Charles Partee, Calvin and Classical Philosophy. Studies in the History of Christian Thought, Vol. 14 (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1977), p. 9.

[6] Robert Linder, "Calvinism and Humanism: The First Generation," Church History 44 (1975) p. 169.

and suggests a characterization with more room for diversity.[7] So too Alain Dufour who uses the term "humanism" "au sens large" including all the intellectual activities which comprise philosophy and religious thought and not "au sens strict" which Kristeller uses.[8]

Steven Ozment warns that humanism in this more general sense defies "simple, solitary" definitions.[9] Nevertheless, it does have "definable, distinguishing characteristics."[10] The "most basic" is their view on the proper method and goal of education:

> Humanists read classical authors (orators, poets, historians, and moral philosophers) directly in their original tongue and urged that such study of primary sources be made the core of the Arts curriculum. This approach to education tended to make the individual scholar rather than an established tradition of interpretation the authority on a subject.[11]

Secondly, "humanists, as orators and rhetoricians, gave right living and good deeds--the active civic life--priority over right thinking and correct confession."[12]

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[7]William J. Bouwsma, "Two Faces of Humanism: Stoicism and Augustinianism in Renaissance Thought" in Heiko A. Oberman and Thomas A. Brady, Jr., eds., Itinerarium Italicum: The Profile of the Italian Renaissance in the Mirror of Its European Transformation. Studies in Medieval and Reformation Thought, Vol. 24 (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1975) pp. 3-4, 52.

[8]Alain Dufour, "Humanisme et Reformation: État de la question" in Histoire politique et psychologie historique (Genève: Librairie Droz, 1966) p. 38.

[9]Steven Ozment, "Humanism, Scholasticism, and the Intellectual Origins of the Reformation" in F. Forrester Church and Timothy George, eds., Continuity and Discontinuity in Church History (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1969) p. 137.

[10]Ibid., p. 138.

[11]Ibid., p. 139; On method in Renaissance humanism, see Neal W. Gilbert, Renaissance Concepts of Method (New York: Columbia University Press, 1960) and also Dufour, "Humanisme et Reformation," p. 60.

[12]Ozment, "Humanism, Scholasticism, and the Intellectual Origins of the Reformation," p. 139.

Humanism and Scholasticism

In contrast, as we saw in chapter two, scholasticism worked precisely by means of those intermediaries, the traditional authorities. Not the original sources, but the traditional interpretations, were paramount (though this did not lead to the exclusion of direct study of the original—note the interest in the newly available Aristotle in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries). Moreover, scholasticism reversed the priorities of humanism.

> Whereas humanists, alert to the ethical consequences of theological doctrines, insisted that good deeds should be a test of creedal truth, scholastics, sensitive to the necessity of an abiding body of truth, insisted that true creeds must be the fount of good deeds.[13]

Perhaps the underlying factor for these distinctions is that humanism and scholasticism each represented an ancient tradition, the rhetorical and dialectical, respectively.[14] Though each were ancient components of the academic curriculum, they were almost equally ancient rivals, reaching as far back as Socrates' clash with the Sophists.[15] With the dominance of scholasticism in the later Middle Ages, dialectic dwarfed rhetoric in prominence and influence. The rise of Renaissance humanism thus presented a challenge to the dominant form of thought and began a new chapter in the long-running educational/intellectual feud between dialectic and rhetoric.

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[13]Ibid., p. 141.

[14]For humanism and the rhetorical tradition, see Quirinus Breen, "The Subordination of Philosophy to Rhetoric in Melancthon," Archiv für Reformationgeschichte 43 (1952): 15-24; Kristeller, Renaissance Thought, pp. 11, 102-111.

[15]See Kristeller, Renaissance Thought and Its Sources (New York: Columbia University Press, 1979) pp. 211-259; Quirinus Breen, "John Calvin and the Rhetorical Tradition," Church History 26 (1957): 5-6.

It is important, however, that both movements are characterized primarily in terms of method and priorities rather than a certain ideological content. This puts them in a different category from Platonism or Stoicism, for example, both of which represent some doctrinal stance on fundamental issues. I have suggested in the previous chapter that there is significant diversity among medieval scholastics; the same is true of Renaissance humanists. According to Kristeller,

> I have been unable to discover in the humanist literature any common philosophical doctrine, except a belief in the value of man and the humanities and in the revival of ancient learning.[16]

Both movements were capable of variegated patterns of doctrine and practice. It is not surprising therefore that it was possible for a humanist and a scholastic to espouse the same idea or even for the same person to manifest distinctive traits of both movements.[17] In Kristeller's words, "all kinds of adjustments and combinations between humanism and scholasticism were possible and were successfully accomplished."[18]

Nevertheless, representatives of each tradition often clashed. Kristeller suggests that these incidents should be seen, not as the inevitable conflicts of two philosophical schools of thought, but rather as the "departmental rivalry"[19] of two competing academic disciplines:

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[16]Kristeller, Renaissance Thought, p. 22.

[17]Lewis W. Spitz, "The Course of German Humanism" in Oberman and Brady, eds. Itinerarium Italicum, pp. 375-376.

[18]Kristeller, Renaissance Thought, p. 116.

[19]Ibid., p. 113.

> Their controversy, much less persistent and violent than usually represented, is merely a phase in the battle of the arts, not a struggle for existence. We may compare it to the debates of the arts in medieval literature, to the rivaling claims of medicine and of law at the universities, or to the claims advanced by Leonardo in his Paragone for the superiority of painting over the other arts.[20]

James Overfield's observations support this when he notes that humanist accounts of the scholastic opposition which they faced in the schools were often somewhat exaggerated.[21] We should expect the accounts of conflict in such a setting to be subject to some loss of perspective and, especially, to the display of the rhetorical style which gave rise to the dispute in the first place. Kristeller concludes,

> I think there has been a tendency, in the light of later developments, and under the influence of a modern aversion to scholasticism, to exaggerate the opposition of the humanists to scholasticism....[22]

To be sure, he acknowledges the controversies between them, but argues,

> Such controversies, interesting as they are, were mere episodes in a long period of peaceful co-existence between humanism and scholasticism. Actually the humanists quarreled as much among each other as they did with the scholastics. Moreover, it would be quite wrong to consider these controversies as serious battles for basic principles whereas many of them were meant to be merely personal feuds, intellectual tournaments, or rhetorical exercises. Finally, any attempt to reduce these controversies to one issue must fail since the discussions were concerned with many diverse and overlapping issues.[23]

In short, humanism and scholasticism were not "mortal enemies."[24]

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[20]Ibid., p. 116.

[21]James Overfield, "Scholastic Opposition to Humanism in Pre-Reformation Germany," Viator 7 (1976):391-420.

[22]Kristeller, Renaissance Thought, p. 100.

[23]Ibid., pp. 113-114.

[24]Ozment, "Humanism, Scholasticism, and the Intellectual Origins of the Reformation," p. 137.

However, Charles Nauert has warned against an easy dismissal of these clashes between representatives of the two movements. In his words, the two traditions in fact were "fundamentally opposed" to one another.[25] The problem, according to Nauert, lies in Kristeller's narrow or "particular" definition of humanism and in the characterization of the disputes as "departmental feuds." Nauert points out that the humanists had a decided practical bent which led them to implement their views in concrete situations.[26] The effects of such real-life implementation of their departmental ideas could be far-reaching indeed--witness the consequences of Valla's study of the Donation of Constantine.[27] Many more people than just professors in certain disciplines, along with secretaries, imbibed something of the method and goals of humanism. These people took these traits--and the conclusions reached by the studies spurred on by them--into very many areas of life beyond the classroom. The conclusions and even the ideals themselves often conflicted with those of the scholastics.

Nauert's point is important, but qualifies rather than replaces Kristeller's interpretation. Though the disputes between humanists and scholastics could be innocuous personality clashes or struggles for faculty or curriculum "turf", they could also be much more significant. The different methods and goals could lead to widely divergent analysis of an issue or strategies for its resolution.

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[25]Charles G. Nauert, Jr., "The Clash of Humanists and Scholastics: An Approach to Pre-Reformation Controversies," Sixteenth Century Journal 4, No. 1 (April 1973):10.

[26]Ibid., p. 11.

[27]Ibid., p. 13.

We must avoid both the temptation to dismiss the confrontations as inconsequential or petty and also the error of setting the two movements in irreconciliable conflict. Moreover, we must also avoid the error of seeing scholasticism as merely the vestiges of the outmoded medieval cultural and conversely, humanism as the harbinger of a new and better day which was destined to prevail.

> ...Italian scholasticism originated toward the end of the thirteenth century, that is, about the same time as did Italian humanism, and both traditions developed side by side throughout the period of the Renaissance and even thereafter.[28]

In fact, there was a re-emergence of scholasticism in the later sixteenth century,[29] what has been termed a "notable revival."[30] Only in the next century would scholasticism be superseded and then because of the Cartesian philosophy, whose debt to scholasticism has been detailed by Etienne Gilson.[31]

Finally we should note that the distinction between humanism and scholasticism, however variegated, occasional, or intense is not equivalent to the distinction between Catholic and Protestant. Humanists and scholastics found themselves on both sides of the Reformation.[32]

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[28]Kristeller, Renaissance Thought, p. 113.

[29]Dufour, "Humanisme et Reformation", p. 60.

[30]John A Trentman, "Scholasticism in the Seventeenth Century" in Norman Kretzmann, Anthony Kenny, and Jan Pinborg, eds., The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982) p. 818.

[31]See his Études sur le rôle de la pensée médiévale dans la formation du système cartésien (Paris: J. Vrin, 1930).

[32]Kristeller, Renaissance Thought, p. 117.

Humanism and the Reformation

There is no way to deny the formative impact of humanism upon many of the leaders of Protestantism.[33] Several elements of humanism were widely appropriated by the Reformers. Most basic was the ad fontes orientation of humanism. Reformation preaching and theology was overtly Biblical. The text of Scripture, often in the original languages, was the immediate source of the content for both preacher and professor. In all the major centers of Protestantism, Biblical books were treated from beginning to end in a historical and grammatical exposition.

The Protestant leaders also shared the humanists' concern for morality. Linder describes this as "their common quest of 'true men.'"[34] Basil Hall terms it "moralistic humanism."[35] In Harbison's words,

> The Italian Humanists who soaked themselves in the classics absorbed the strong ethical interests of the Greek and Roman thinkers. Their chief quarrel with Scholasticism was that its fine-spun abstractions were useless for better living in this world.[36]

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[33]For surveys of the relationship between the two movements, see Quirinus Breen, "Humanism and the Reformation" in Jerald C. Brauer, ed., The Impact of the Church Upon Its Culture (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1968) pp. 145-171; Dufour, "Humanisme et Reformation"; Ozment, "Humanism, Scholasticism, and The Intellectual Origins of the Reformation"; and Lewis W. Spitz, "Humanism in the Reformation" in Anthony Molho and John A. Tedeschi, eds., Renaissance: Studies in Honor of Hans Baron (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 1971) pp. 643-662; For a recent study of the Reformation in the context of humanism and scholasticism, see Alister McGrath, The Intellectual Origins of the European Reformation (London: Basil Backwell, 1987); see especially pp. 32-68 for humanism and the Reformation.

[34]Linder, "Calvinism and Humanism," p.181.

[35]Basil Hall, John Calvin: Humanist and Theologian, rev. ed. (London: The Historical Association, 1967) p. 15.

[36]E. Harris Harbison, The Christian Scholar in the Age of the Reformation (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1956; reprint ed., Grand Rapids: Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1983) p. 161.

The Reformers strongly decried the prevailing--and as many thought, worsening--moral situation of contemporary society and found that their concern for practical moral zeal echoed those of the humanists. In particular, Stoic ethical writers were highly prized among both humanists and Protestants.[37]

This moral emphasis was closely related to another, the concern for utility as a virtue, and often, as a test for truth. To be useful for daily life, to make a difference in concrete situations, identified an idea as significant.[38] The classroom was oriented towards life. Morever, "imperceptively the test of truth with many Humanists became its utility, here, now, in this life."[39] Thus an axiological principle grew into an epistemological criterion. The Reformers often shared the humanists' scorn for learning which was of no consequence in life, particularly in theology.

The rhetorical orientation of the humanists frequently found exponents among Protestants. The quantity of popular writings which the Reformers used to spread their message displays their interest in the goals and ideals of the rhetorical tradition. Persuasion of the masses of church-members was the task set before the leaders and the rhetoricians served them well as models teaching the art of convincing audiences. These values played an equally obvious and perhaps more immediate role in the preaching of the Reformation. Nearly all of the important Reformation figures preached regularly. To no small degree,

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[37]Hall, John Calvin: Humanist and Theologian, p. 13.

[38]Joseph C. McLelland, "Calvin and Philosophy," Canadian Journal of Theology 11, no. 1 (1965):44.

[39]Harbison, The Christian Scholar, p. 161.

the success of the movement was due to the ability of these men to present the issues clearly and persuasively in public settings and in addresses to political authorities.[40]

Clearly, the humanists found a sympathetic ear among the Reformers for many of their ideals. To omit humanism from an analysis of the Protestant Reformation would seriously distort the picture. Yet it is incorrect to see the Reformers as unanimous supporters of the humanists. In addition to their sizeable debt to humanism, there were important points where the Reformers dissented from humanist teaching. The condition of human beings--the extent and severity of sin and the nature of the remedy needed--was a prime area of dispute. Luther's exchange with Erasmus regarding the freedom or bondage of the human will is perhaps the most famous example of this clash of humanist and Reformation teaching. The withdrawal of many humanists from the new movement after Luther's 1520 treatises is another example.[41] Spitz has rightly observed,

> A broad chasm did indeed separate evangelical theology from the religious assumptions of the classical world and from Christian humanism in the area of soteriology, in the sin/grace, law/gospel antinomies.[42]

Luther and Calvin provide illuminating examples of this relationship between humanism and the Reformation. In fact they each

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[40]For illustration of this, see Quirinus Breen, "Melancthon's Reply to G. Pico della Mirandola," Journal of the History of Ideas 13 (1952):413-426; and "The Subordination of Philosophy to Rhetoric in Melancthon," Archiv für Reformationsgeschichte 43 (1952):13-28.

[41]Bernd Moeller, "The German Humanists and the Reformation," in Imperial Cities and the Reformation (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1972) pp. 19-38.

[42]Spitz, "The Course of German Humanism," p. 414.

picture the Protestant response both to humanism and to scholasticism.

Luther, Humanism, and Scholasticism

It is appropriate to consider Luther on the topic of the Reformation view of the humanists' program for, despite his description of Ockham as "my dear master,"[43] he was no stranger to humanist learning and no foe either.[44] Though he received his schooling from representatives of the via moderna, Luther moved increasingly toward humanist values.

> What we find in the intellectual development of Luther is a man trained originally in the philosophy of the Nominalist Schoolmen, but turning more and more to the Biblical Humanists as his "new theology" was hammered out.[45]

Several examples indicate Luther's humanist learnings. Among the earliest is the increasing prominence of humanism at Wittenberg.[46] The courses offered and the textbooks used and the style of classroom

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[43]Martin Luther, "Exhortation to All Clergy," (Luther's Works, Vol. 34, ed., L.W. Spitz; Philadelphia: Muhlenberg Press, 1960) p. 27.

[44]See, e.g., Gerrish, Grace and Reason, pp. 141-167; Harbison, The Christian Scholar, pp. 132-134; Kristeller, Renaissance Thought, pp. 78-79, 86-87; Ozment, "Humanism, Scholasticism, and the Intellectual Origins of the Reformation," pp. 141-144; Partee, Calvin and Classical Philosophy, pp. 8-9; Charles Partee, "The Revitalization of the Concept of 'The Christian Philosophy' in Renaissance Humanism," Christian Scholars Review 3, no. 4 (1974);360-369; Lewis W. Spitz, The Protestant Reformation, 1517-1559 (New York: Harper and Row, 1985), pp. 82-83: Lewis W. Spitz, The Religious Renaissance of the German Humanists (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1963) pp. 237-266; Lewis W. Spitz, "Luther and Humanism" in Luther and Learning: The Whittenberg University Symposium, ed. Marilyn J. Harran (Selinsgrove: Susquehanna University Press, 1985) pp. 69-94; McGrath, Intellectual Origins, pp. 59-68.

[45]Gerrish, Grace and Reason, p. 141.

[46]See Ernest G. Schwiebert, Luther and His Times. The Reformation from a New Perspective (St. Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 1950) pp. 275-302; also see Marcia Grossman, Humanism in Wittenberg (Nieuwkoop: B. De Graaf, 1975).

instruction all fit humanist models. The philological interest and the concern for accurate original texts "read" straight through by the professor are typical of humanism. In particular, the presence of Philip Melancthon on the faculty (at Luther's request) displays the priority of first-rate humanist scholarship at the University.

It is the German Bible, translated by Luther while in hiding at the Wartburg Castle, which cements his identity as a humanist. The work clearly evidences how much Luther had learned from Melancthon. The polishing of his Greek proficiency and the bulk of his knowledge of Hebrew came from his younger colleague.

Furthermore, there were the theses of the Disputation Against Scholastic Theology with the typical humanist derision for the pre-eminence of Aristotle and logic in Schoolmen's debates.[47] Gerrish argues that the "humanism" of such criticisms must not be missed:

> ...it is not enough to see Luther's "assault on reason" against the background of his Scholastic education: one must also see it in the wider context of the Renaissance and the "revival of learning." For the revolt against Scholasticism was by no means peculiar to Luther: it was part and parcel of the Humanist programme.[48]

In short, Luther must be seen in the light of both Renaissance humanism and Scholastic thought (of the Ockhamist variety). Both currents of thought left their mark on him. Yet, as the previous quotation from Gerrish reminds us, Luther's protest against the prevailing Catholic theology included a rejection of key scholastic elements of that doctrine. The Disputation Against Scholastic Theology involved both factors. The break with the papacy also involved a break

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[47]Martin Luther, Disputation Against Scholastic Theology (Luther's Works, Vol 31; Philadelphia: Muhlenberg Press, 1957) pp. 12-13.

[48]Gerrish, Grace and Reason, p. 139.

with the Schoolmen. This anti-Scholastic attitude is not the party controversy of the *via antiqua* versus the *via moderna*, but a more radical break with the tenets which these two groups shared. Thus, while Luther may have been "of Ockham" in opposition to Thomas and Scotus, he came to renounce portions of his Ockhamist heritage as well. Paul Vignaux has shown Luther's rejection of the Ockhamist ethical optimism which was summarized in the phrase, *facere quod in se est*.[49]

This ethical or volitional confidence was coupled by Ockhamists with a distrust of human rationality. The latter trait was less objectionable to Luther. Thus,

> by a strange turn in the argument Luther finds himself attacking reason in characteristic Nominalist style precisely in order to destroy the other characteristic of Nominalist thought, its optimism concerning the powers of the human will. In short, Luther's attack on reason, even if it began as an inheritance from Nominalism, finally ended as an assault upon the Nominalists and all who shared with them a vain reliance upon man's natural capacities.[50]

Gerrish later observes that "the truth of the matter is that Luther's own distinctive contribution to the Nominalists' 'critique of reason' finally made the Nominalists themselves the chief objects of his attack."[51]

The explanation for Luther's complex relationship to the Nominalists' view of reason, both sharing and opposing it, sheds light on his stance toward the movement as a whole. In fact, it also

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[49]Paul Vignaux, "On Luther and Ockham," in Steven E. Ozment, ed., *The Reformation in Medieval Perspective* (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1971) pp. 107-118.

[50]Gerrish, *Grace and Reason*, p. 56.

[51]Ibid., p. 114.

clarifies the larger question of his relationship to both Humanism and Scholasticism.

Luther shared the Nominalists' pessimism toward the via antiqua's project of rationally resolving large portions of the contemporary intellectual disputes. Yet the basis for this pessimism was linked to a volitional optimism, as noted above. In contrast, Luther's rational pessimism was a part of his anthropological pessimism. Unwilling merely to argue about which human faculty was primary and thus dependable, Luther argued that no faculty was able to provide what in fact only divine mercy could do, that is, prove an adequate resource for religious life. Thus, he opposed Thomists and Scotists on human reason and Ockhamists on the human will.

However, this opposition to human rational self-reliance must not be misunderstood.

> For Luther is not simply "against" law and reason; he is against an unwarranted transferring of them from their proper place . . . . When Luther said that Reason was the "devil's whore," he meant that Reason may be prostituted for the ends of evil.[52]

Here is the key to understanding the complex of pro and con stances manifested in Luther. His verdict in each case depended upon the propriety of the use of the faculty in question. Luther was quite willing to allow rationality its proper place:

> In temporal affairs and those which have to do with men, the rational is self-sufficient: here he needs no other light than reason's. Therefore, God does not teach us in the Scriptures how to build houses, make clothing, marry, wage war, navigate, and the like. For here the light of nature is sufficient. But in godly affairs, that is, in those which have to do with God, where man must do what is acceptable with

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[52]Ibid., p. 137.

> God and be saved thereby--here, however, nature is absolutely stone-blind, so that it cannot even catch a glimpse of what those things are. It is presumptuous enough to bluster and plunge into them, like a blind horse, but all its conclusions are utterly false, as surely as God lives.[53]

"Reason does, then, have a legitimate sphere of competence, within which it is autonomous; it only begins to be called in question when it approaches the boundary-line of the Heavenly Kingdom."[54] This view of reason mirrors Luther's stance on the will. Against Erasmus, Luther vigorously asserted the bondage of the will--in religious matters, in the "Heavenly Kingdom." Yet he explicity asserts the liberty of the human will in mundane matters, in the "Earthly Kingdom."[55] His position on these two issues is consistent. In both disputes, his fundamental concern is the profound "self-insufficiency" of sinful humans before God. Human capacities and activities are divinely ordained and thus dependable in their proper sphere. When proudly arrogating unintended realms to themselves, however, they prove to be broken reeds.

Luther thus critically appropriated the contribution of Renaissance Humanism. He gratefully used their tools and espoused some of their values, while rejecting others.[56] Similarly, he rejected important

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[53]Martin Luther, "Epistel am Tage der Heiligen Drei Kőnige, Ies. 60:1-6" (D. Martin Luthers Werke, Weimarer Ausgabe 10. Band Erste Abteilung, Erste Halfte; Weimar: Hermann Bohlaus Nachfolger, 1966) p. 531; translation cited from Gerrish, Grace and Reason, p. 12.

[54]Gerrish, Grace and Reason, p. 15.

[55]e.g., Martin Luther, The Bondage of the Will (Luther's Works, Vol. 33, P. S. Watson; Philadelphia: Muhlenberg Press, 1972) p. 240.

[56]See Heiko A. Oberman, "facientibus Quod in se est Deus non Denegat Gratian: Robert Holcot, O. P. and the Beginnings of Luther's Theology" in Steven E. Ozment, ed., The Reformation in Medieval Perspective (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1971) pp. 119-141; Gerrish, Grace and Reason, pp. 161-166, for Luther's rejection of aspects of humanist teachings.

aspects of Nominalist Scholasticism, but retained others which did not threaten the Gospel. For instance, Pierre Fraenkel describes Luther's attitude toward the academic use of the scholastic disputatio as "favorable."[57] In short, as Gerrish concludes,

> it could perhaps be said that our inquiry into Luther's views on philology and Humanism present, in some respects, a parallel to his views on philosophy and Scholasticism. In each case his attitude is ambivalent. It is all a question of what you do with your philosophy or philology.[58]

Consequently, it is inaccurate simply to term Luther an Ockhamist or a Humanist. Neither should we designate him anti-Scholastic or anti-Humanist without qualification. In important ways, he is a loyal son of each movement, but in equally important ways, he is a fervent opponent of each.

Calvin, Humanism, and Scholasticism

John Calvin exhibits similar complexity. Although the popular stereotype of a rigidly deductive systematizer still endures, scholars long ago demonstrated the humanist roots and traits of Calvin's theology.[59] He received a first-rate humanist education. "Not even the

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[57]Pierre Fraenkel, L'Écriture à la dispute. Le cas de l'Académie de Genève sous Théodore de Bèze (Lausanne: Revue de Théologie et de Philosphie, 1977) p. 5 n. 3; For more on Luther's relationship to Scholasticism, see Leif Grane, "Luther and Scholasticism" in Luther and Learning, ed. Marilyn J. Harran (Selinsgrove: Susquehanna University Press, 1985) pp. 52-68.

[58]Gerrish, Grace and Rason, p. 166.

[59]Quirinus Breen, John Calvin: A Study in French Humanism (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1931) and "John Calvin and the Rhetorical Tradition," Church History 26 (1957):3-21; Roy W. Battenhouse, "The Doctrine of Man in Calvin and in Renaissance Platonism," Journal of the History of Ideas 9 (1948):447-471; Linder, "Calvinism and Humanism"; Charles

great Erasmus received such a thorough exposure to the New Learning in his youth."[60] His commentary on Seneca's De Clementia, the first of his literary ventures (and apparently the only pre-conversion work) "provides impressive illustration of the extent and thoroughness of his humanist studies."[61] Numerous scholars agree that Calvin never lost the impact of this early training in and orientation to humanism. A. M. Hunter observed, "Calvin began his career as a humanist and he never ceased to be one."[62] Breen claimed that Calvin "never got away from his humanistic inheritance."[63] According to W. Stanford Reid, Calvin emerged from his academic training "as a thoroughly convinced humanist. This humanism he never lost."[64] Along with other French Reformed leaders like Pierre Viret, Calvin retained his "affinity for humanism"

Trinkaus, "Renaissance Problems in Calvin's Theology," Studies in the Renaissance 1 (1954):59-80; Francois Wendel, Calvin et l'Humanisme. Cahiers de la revue d'histoire et de philosophie religieuses, 45 (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1976); and E. David Willis, "Rhetoric and Responsibility in Calvin's Theology" in Alexander J. McKelway and E. David Willis, eds., The Context of Contemporary Theology (Atlanta: John Knox Press, 1974) pp. 43-63; Alexander Ganoczy, The Young Calvin, trans. David Foxgrover and Wade Provo (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1987) pp. 178-181; William J. Bouwsma, John Calvin: A Sixteenth Century Portrait (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988) pp. 113-127; McGrath, Intellectual Origins, pp. 43-59

[60]Linder, "Calvinism and Humanism," p. 169.

[61]A. Mitchell Hunter, "The Erudition of John Calvin," Evangelical Quarterly 18 (1946):201; See also Breen, John Calvin: A Study in French Humanism, pp. 67-99; Calvin's Commentary on Seneca's "De Clementia," ed. and trans. Ford Lewis Battles and A. M. Hugo (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1964); Battles, "The Sources of Calvin's Seneca Commentary" in G. E. Duffield, ed., John Calvin (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1966) pp. 38-66.

[62]Hunter, "The Erudition of John Calvin," p. 200.

[63]Breen, John Calvin: A Study in French Humanism, p. 150.

[64]W. Stanford Reid, "Calvin and the Founding of the Academy of Geneva," Westminster Theological Journal 18 (1955):4.

throughout his life.[65] Consequently, Wendel can write of the continuing influence of humanism in Calvin's life after his conversion,[66] what Breen termed "the precipitate of humanism in Calvin the Reformer."[67]

This "precipitate" manifested itself in several ways. Among the most direct forms was Calvin's exegetical method. Pre-conversion Calvin commented on Seneca; post-conversion Calvin commented on Scripture. His first work, on De Clementia, is a careful analysis of the structure and meaning of the classical Greek text. The numerous Biblical commentaries, which began in 1539 with Paul's Epistle to the Romans, exhibit that same concern for the faithful exposition—and contemporary application—of the original text. Calvin's work as a commentator is more "theological" than "philological,"[68] but he clearly displays the characteristics of both types, the former being the culmination of the latter for him.

> Calvin's method of studying the Biblical text is typical of the humanist jurists among whom he had been trained, for the law school of Bourges had made it a first principle to ignore the gloss and to go to the earliest and best form of the test.[69]

Thus, "rather than making him 'legalist,' as so often is supposed, Calvin's legal training was one of the most important sources of the rhetorical humanism which helped shape the content of his theology."[70]

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[65]Linder, "Calvinism and Humanism," p. 173.

[66]Wendel, "Calvin et l'Humanisme," pp. 63-98.

[67]Breen, John Calvin: A Study in French Humanism, pp. 146-164.

[68]Harbison, The Christian Scholar, p. 153.

[69]Hall, John Calvin: Humanist and Theologian, p. 34.

[70]Willis, "Rhetoric and Responsibility in Calvin's Theology," p. 48; see also Bouwsma, John Calvin, p. 12.

Calvin's method of Biblical comment also was humanistic because of his concern for contemporary moral application for his readers. This activity wed the twin humanist concerns of philology and morality. The knowledge gained from a careful study of the classical sources ultimately must be applied to the practical matter of wise living. The truth, once understood, was to be obeyed. In other words, Calvin's concern was for the utility of the knowledge of the truth--and "the concern for utility is itself humanist."[71] The result of this concern was a theology with a "practical-utilitarian bent"[72] or what Émile Doumergue termed "une doctrine de pratique."[73] Such an orientation explains Calvin's frequently displayed "impatience with 'speculation.'"[74] Calvin, like many other humanists, criticized Scholasticism for "its fine-spun abstractions" which were "useless for better living in this world."[75] For this common humanist moral, utilitarian emphasis, Calvin had additional religious motives, but they do not erode his obvious linkage with the humanists.

It is not only in Calvin's exposition of Scripture that we see this practical concern; the Institutes also clearly evidence the humanist emphasis on morality or piety. In fact, the Institutes can be characterized as a Theologia Pietatis, finding their dominant focus here rather than a particular doctrine such as Christology or

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[71]McLelland, "Calvin and Philosophy," p. 44.

[72]Ibid., p. 51.

[73]Cited in ibid, p. 51.

[74]McLelland, "Calvin and Philosophy," p. 51.

[75]Harbison, The Christian Scholar, p. 161.

predestination.[76] Breen has delineated the rhetorical traits of the Institutes thus locating Calvin clearly in the tradition of the rhetorical humanists.[77] In particular, Breen notes Calvin's aversion to the syllogism, typical of the Renaissance due to the plainness of such a style of writing.[78] In its place, Calvin used enthymemes or incomplete syllogisms, a typical humanist stylistic trait because of its greater literary merit.[79] The arguments and proofs of the Institutes, then, are rhetorical rather than philosophical in character. Willis is correct in observing that Calvin's theology should not be termed "dialectical" in the sense of late medieval logic (especially what he terms "diastatic nominalism") because "Calvin's thought is not primarily characterized by dialectical diastasis but by rhetorical correlation."[80] Breen goes so far as to describe the Institutes as "homiletical" in character, oriented more to the preacher in the pulpit than to the professor in the classroom.[81]

An additional evidence of Calvin's humanist traits is the Academy which he established in Geneva. With the schools at Strasbourg and

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[76]Philip E. Holtrop, "A Strange Language: Toward a Biblical Conception of Truth and a New Mood for Doing Reformed Theology," The Reformed Journal 27 (February 1977):13.

[77]Breen, "John Calvin and the Rhetorical Tradition," pp. 8-18.

[78]Ibid., p. 6.

[79]Ibid., pp. 12-15, 18-19.

[80]Willis, "Rhetoric and Responsibility in Calvin's Theology," p. 44.

[81]Quirinus Breen, "The Terms 'Loci Communes' and 'Loci' in Melancthon," Church History 16 (1947):207-208.

Lausanne serving as models, the Genevan Academy opened in 1559.[82] Officially called "the College of Geneva," it consisted of two divisions, the schola privata "for children up to about sixteen years" and the schola publica for university education.[83] The fundamental document, The Order of the College of Geneva[84] spells out the purpose, structure, government, and curriculum of the new institution. The rhetorical emphasis, achieved by a nearly exclusive use of classical authors, bears out Reid's observation that the education offered "was in many ways typically humanistic."[85] Like Theodore Beza and Pierre Viret, Calvin's educational ideals "largely parallel those of Erasmus."[86] In addition to the plan of the College, the faculty who were sought and hired also bear out the humanist principles of Calvin and Beza. Beza and Viret at Lausanne and later both men along with Calvin at Geneva "used their influence to bring noted humanists who had become Protestants" to teach in the schools.[87]

In light of the size of this "precipitate of humanism" in Calvin's life, T. H. L. Parker's apparent refusal to describe Calvin as a member

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[82]See Reid, "Calvin and the Founding of the Academy of Geneva"; Breen, John Calvin: A Study in French Humanism, pp. 156-158; Jacques Courvoisier, "La haute école de Genève au XVIe siècle d' après le discours de Théodore de Bèze a l' inauguration de Collège et Académie de Genève," Theologische Zeitschrift 35 (1979):169-176: Henri Borgeaud, Histoire de l' Université de Genève, Vol I: L'Académie de Calvin 1559-1798 (Genève: Georg and Co, Libraires de l'Université 1900).

[83]Reid, "Calvin and the Founding of the Academy of Geneva," p. 11.

[84]Reid's translation of this appears as an appendix to his "Calvin and the Founding of the Academy of Geneva" (pp. 22-23).

[85]Reid, "Calvin and the Founding of the Academy of Geneva," p. 17.

[86]Linder, "Calvinism and Humanism," p. 178.

[87]Ibid., p. 175.

of that movement is clearly unacceptable.[88] There is no avoiding the Genevan's obvious linkage with that group. Yet there is another side to this relationship. For all of Calvin's espousal of many humanist traits, he was not at all reticent about criticizing the humanists. This deviation from humanist ideals can be seen in several ways. For instance, Calvin could criticize the humanist penchant for saving their finely-crafted orations for an appropriately sized and placed audience, sharply contrasting this with the Reformers' zeal to preach the Gospel to any who would listen. He asked

> Se peuvent-ils vanter d'avoir jamais dressé une église de dix personnes en un village, avec leur si grande discrétion et sagesse tant circonspecte, au lieu que toute de monde a été gagne par la simple prédication de l'Évangile?[89]

Reid suggests that Calvin's humanist designation must be qualified by his insistence upon the explicit acknowledgement of God's grace as the source of human capacities and achievements and of God's glory as their purpose.[90] Thus Calvin could oppose humanists with the same "moralistic humanism" which they were mistaking as an end in itself rather than merely a means to the end of God's glory.[91] Even though it was morality (and particularly Stoic morality) in which Calvin and the humanists shared an interest because of its value as a practical moral philosophy,[92] Calvin nonetheless departed from them regarding the means

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[88] T. H. L. Parker, John Calvin: A Biography (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1975) p. 22.

[89] Jean Calvin, L'excuse a M.M. les Nicodémites, ed. Albert Autin (Paris: Editions Bossard, 1921) pp. 232-233).

[90] Reid, "Calvin and the Founding of the Academy of Geneva," pp. 18-19.

[91] Hall, John Calvin: Humanist and Theologian, p. 15.

[92] Ibid., p. 13.

of the realization of this morality. Calvin differed from the humanists "in completely abandoning any hope for the spiritual or moral regeneration of mankind by its own efforts."[93]

H. A. Van Gelder notes Calvin's "apparent humanism" but argues that his general theological orthodoxy actually kept Calvin close to Catholicism and opposite to the "major Reformation," the Renaissance.[94]

In light of these points of disagreement, it is not surprising that Calvin qualified his "enthusiasm for the pagan classics with warnings not to forsake Scriptures for lesser and worldly pleasures."[95] The explanation lies in the obvious fact that though Calvin was a humanist, he was "above all" a theologian and practical reformer.[96]

It may be that Roy Battenhouse has identified the most concise summary of Calvin's break with humanism by stating that the departure is "a rejection more often of conclusions than of basic definitions and assumptions."[97]

In light of this complex relationship to humanism, it is not possible to label Calvin simply as either a humanist or a non-humanist (or anti-humanist). He exhibits elements of both positions, with a theological criterion for selectivity. Where humanist method and ideals could aid his theological work for the Church, Calvin gladly

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[93]Trinkaus, "Renaissance Problems in Calvin's Theology," p. 79.

[94]H. A. Enno Van Gelder, The Two Reformations of the Sixteenth Century (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1961) p. 268-273.

[95]Linder, "Calvinism and Humanism," p. 175.

[96]Ibid., p. 181.

[97]Battenhouse, "The Doctrine of Man in Calvin and in Renaissance Platonism," p. 469; See also Hall, John Calvin: Humanist and Theologian, p. 33; and Linder, "Calvinism and Humanism," p. 181.

appropriated them. However, he drew the line where the humanists fell short or transgressed the standards he found in Scripture.

This same complex relationship is seen in Calvin's relationship to Scholasticism. Here too he parallels Luther's selective affinity and rejection of contemporary intellectual currents. According to Harbison, the scholastic logic which Calvin "absorbed" at the University of Paris prior to 1528 was one of "the three disciplines that left their mark on Calvin's mind" (the others being "Roman law" and classical studies).[98]

> When he became a Humanist he ignored or despised Scholasticism as most good Humanists did, but many of the mental habits of the Schoolmen remained with him. As a result there is actually more continuity between Aquinas and Calvin than between Aquinas and either Erasmus or Luther.[99]

Harbison does not specify the grounds for these conclusions, but it is possible to identify several aspects of Calvin's work which indicate an adoption of some parts at least of Scholastic thought.

The Order of the College of Geneva, so notable for its humanist traits, provides one of the most interesting evidences of "Calvin's Scholasticism." In the section setting forth the regulations for "the Public Scholars" or university students, there is instruction for the regular conducting of theological disputations.

> These same students shall, in turn, prepare and write, each month, certain statements which are not merely curious nor sophistical nor containing false doctrine, and shall communicate them in good time to the Professor of Theology. Then they shall sustain them publicly against all those who would like to argue them. It shall be permissible at that time for everyone to speak. All sophistry, impudent and audacious curiosity which corrupts the Word of God, and

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[98]Harbison, The Christian Scholar, p. 144.

[99]Ibid., p. 145; see also Ganoczy, The Young Calvin, 168-178.

> likewise, all evil contention and opinionated pride shall be banned. Points of doctrine should be treated reverently and religiously by both sides of the dispute. The Professor of Theology who shall preside in the dispute shall conduct everything according to his prudence and shall give by the Word of God the solution to the difficulties which have been submitted.[100]

This Order (of whose authorship by Calvin there is "little doubt"[101]) here displays both hostility to certain (prevalent contemporary Roman Catholic?) forms of disputatio and also a fundamental commitment to a purified version of it as a basic instrument in theological education. Here too, it seems, Calvin distinguishes between certain uses (or abuses) of a method and the method itself.

Pierre Fraenkel has detailed the place of disputatio in the Reformation period.[102] In his words, disputatio was

> d'un type d'enseignement et d'exercice de la théologie qui a de toute évidence été des plus influents à l'époque de la Réforme et encore longtemps après, aussi bien dans la vie quotidienne des Églises que dans la view académique elle-meme.[103]

"The Order of the College of Geneva" bears out the following observation by Fraenkel:

> La Réforme n'avait quère changé ces pratiques de la vie académique. Les étudiants en théologie—et ceux des autres facultés—continuant à disputer non seulement pour obtenir leurs degrés, mais aussi de manière régulière en cours d'études.[104]

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[100] The Order of the College of Geneva (Appendix to Reid, "Calvin and the Founding of the Academy of Geneva") pp. 32-33.

[101] Reid, "Calvin and the Founding of the Academy of Geneva," p. 10.

[102] Fraenkel, L'Écriture à la dispute.

[103] Ibid., p.39.

[104] Ibid., p. 5.

There were some modifications, however, in these disputes which had been part of university training since the twelfth century. Fraenkel notes two innovations compared with the medieval model. "La première était représentée par les nouvelles manuels de logique, oeuvres d'humanistes," who joined dialectic together with rhetoric.[105] "L'autre innovation touchait plus particulièrement à l'enseignement de la théologie."[106] Whereas the medievals had used Lombard's Sentences as the basics of instruction, the Protestants substituted new texts. The Lutherans used Melancthon's Loci Communes (and later manuals by Leonhard Hutter and others). These volumes were structured by key themes drawn from Paul's Epistle to the Romans which was considered to contain the essence of Christian doctrine.[107]

In contrast to this, in Reformed circles, "les loci formaient d'ordinaire des digressions dans les commentaires bibliques eux-mêmes, de petites monographies dogmatiques qui se rattachent aux divers passages de l'Écriture."[108] Quirinus Breen has shown the classical and thus humanist character of the Loci Communes approach in Melancthon.[109] The Reformed habit of leaving these topical digressions within their textual commentary setting perhaps increases the humanist overtones of

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[105] Ibid.

[106] Ibid., p. 6.

[107] Ibid.

[108] Ibid., p. 7.

[109] Breen, "The Terms 'Loci Communes' and 'Loci' in Melancthon," pp. 197-209; See also Marvin W. Anderson, "Peter Martyr Vermigli: Protestant Humanist," p. 71; G. R. Evans, The Language and Logic of the Bible: The Road to Reformation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), pp. 142-143; Dufour, "Humanisme et Réformation," p. 41.

this teaching style. Yet these humanistic loci were the subject of scholastic disputatio in the Reformed schools! This seems to be graphic evidence of Kristeller's contention that humanist and scholastic traits were capable of combination and in fact often were combined in Renaissance era.[110]

In the disputationes at Geneva, two elements deserve notice. The first is the topics--or quaestiones--which were debated. Much importance was given to the "ancient" controversies of the Church. The traditional nature of these issues in Christian theology may be part of the reason for the retention of the (by now) traditional way of teaching them to a new generation of students, i.e. the disputatio.

> Les controverses auxquelles les étudiants s'exercent ici sont anciennes; . . . La controverses, sourtout si l'on s'y exerce a l'aide de l'Institution, devaient ainsi un important facteur de continuité théologique.[111]

Continuity of doctrine concerned the Reformers, particularly those of the "magisterial" wing. They were conscious of their significant deviations from the contemporary Roman Catholic Church and desired to emphasize continuity with the earlier generations of theologians whenever possible. This was particularly true of the early, "purer" Church.

The second noteworthy factor of these disputationes appears in the previous quotation, i.e. the role played by Calvin's Institues. As Fraenkel puts it, the Institutes

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[110]Kristeller, Renaissance Thought, p. 116.

[111]Fraenkel, L' Ecriture a la dispute, p. 36.

[112]Ibid., p. 39.

> pouvait servir non seulement d'arsenal où le jeune théologien trouvait les armes offensives et défensives au maniement desquelles il devait s'exercer, mais aussi de modèle pour la dispute elle-même.[112]

Fraenkel is speaking of the period after the death of Calvin,[113] but it is not illegitimate to see Calvin's own views in this. After all, it was he who wrote the Institutes in part for the training of theological students and who also established the disputatio as a basic element of Genevan theological education. The import of this is the necessity of seeing the Institutes as embodying both humanist and scholastic traits. Fraenkel indicates the coalescence of the humanist ad fontes education and the scholastic disputatio. Speaking of the topics on which the theological students must take "positions" (which became a designation for the activity itself), he notes

> Le rôle essentiel des "positions" était de combiner les resultats de l'exégèse d'un passage particulier avec la défense de la doctrine calviniste ou, comme nous l'avons dit auparavant, de montrer qu'une exégèse a la fois scientifique, c'est-à'dire philologique, et théologique aboutissait aux idées que Calvin avait formulées de manière normative dans son Institution.[114]

Humanist exegesis, Calvinist orthodoxy, and scholastic disputatio coexist together--peacefully, so it seems--in the Genevan Academy. Again we see parallels to the complex of factors involved in Luther's theological work.

A significant element in the scholastic scheme was dialectic. The Order of the College of Geneva indicates something of Calvin's stance on this issue as well. "The Laws of the Second Class" of the College, the next-to-highest class in the "preparatory" half of the school, directs

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[113] Ibid., pp. 3-4.

[114] Ibid., p. 24.

that "the elements of dialectic shall be explained, that is, the nature of propositions and the figures of arguments, without going too far."[115] In their final year, in the "first class," the students "shall have further additions made to the rudiments of dialectics by being taught that which the science has to say concerning predicaments, categories, topics and elenchs, and a well-made outline shall be used."[116] Interestingly, the next sentence states that "they shall also be shown the beginning of rhetoric and principally those things which appertain particularly to the ornamentation and to the embellishments of the language." Dialectic was an integral part of the education which Calvin envisioned for Genevan students--and so was rhetoric.

To be sure, the logic was apparently the recent humanist modification, but this was just that--a modification of the traditional dialectic, not a wholesale replacement or rejection of it.[117] This newer version was still recognizably Aristotelian. In fact, when Peter Ramus was invited to lecture at the Academy in 1570, Beza asked him to temper his attack on Aristotle's Organon which Calvin himself had made the foundation of all philosophical teaching in Geneva. Ramus consented, lecturing on Cicero, who of course was one of Calvin's favorites.[118] Even Ramus himself must be seen as merely attempting "to

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[115] The Order of the College of Geneva (Appendix to Reid, "Calvin and the Founding of the Academy of Geneva"), p. 28.

[116] Ibid.

[117] See Lisa Jardine, "Humanism and the teaching of logic," in Kretzmann, Kenny, and Pinborg, eds., The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy, pp. 797-807; Irena Backus, "l'enseignement de la logique à l'Académie de Genève entre 1559 et 1565," Revue de Théologie et de Philosophie 111 (1979):153-163.

[118] Borgeaud, Histoire de l'Université de Genève, I, p. 112.

reform Aristotelian logic,"[119] retaining Aristotelian elements,[120] rather than as representing some type of fundamentally non-Aristotelian logic. Ramus proposed alterations within the established (Aristotelian) system of logic, particularly as it related to education, not a completely new logic upon a wholly different foundation.[121]

While it is wrong to see Calvin as the supremely logical theologian, building his theology by elaborate deductions, it is also wrong to represent his theology as implying a thorough rejection of logic (or at least Aristotelian logic). Neither his humanist orientation nor his theological stance implied such a conclusion. He certainly was in favor of limiting the role of human reason (and thus logic) in theology, but he apparently did not reject it completely.

This position on the value and legitimacy of logic in education and in theology is part of Calvin's view on the larger issue of philosophy's relationship to theology. Kristeller's description of the Renaissance humanists as primarily rhetoricians whose philosophical interest was moral philosophy aptly fits Calvin. Yet the Institutes, for example, display important elements of philosophy, particularly as appropriated to theological purpose by patristic and medieval theologians. Calvin's discussion of the Trinity (the principal portion of the section on the person of God), providence, the anthropological discussion of the soul and the body, Christology, predestination, and the Lord's Supper contain

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[119] Kristeller, Renaissance Thought, p. 43.

[120] Charles B. Schmitt, "Towards a Reassessment of Renaissance Aristotelianism," History of Science 11 (1973):169, 174, 175.

[121] For more on Ramus, see Walter Ong, Ramus, Method, and the Decay of Dialogue (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1958).

key (and sometimes frequent) use of philosophical terms and concepts, particularly those from Aristotle's metaphysics and physics.[122]

The correct conclusion regarding Calvin and philosophy seems to follow the pattern we saw generally in Luther and also in Calvin's relationship to humanism. He does not reject philosophy out-of-hand nor does he slavishly adopt its teaching and strictures. Rather he makes critically selective use of it (some of which he clearly knows first-hand, others perhaps only through intermediaries). "Calvin uses philosophy, not as a source for the truth, but as a learned adjunct to the explanation of the Christian faith."[123] With reference to four particular figures, Partee concludes, "Calvin knows Plato and Aristotle, Seneca and Cicero too well to be entirely independent of them. Their views neither constitute nor determine Calvin's, but they contribute to it."[124]

Conclusion

We have seen Renaissance humanism, whether defined narrowly or broadly, to be a powerful critic of aspects of late medieval

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[122]See Appendix I for a list of some of these instances in the Institutes; For lists drawn from his commentaries, see Louis Goumaz, La Doctrine du Salut (Laussane: Librairie Payot, 1917) pp. 92-95; See also Irena Backus, "'Aristotelianism' in Some of Calvin's and Beza's Expository and Exegetical Writings on the Doctrine of the Trinity, With Particular Reference to the Terms 'Ousia' and "Hypotasis' in Histoire de l' exégèse au XVIe siècle. Olivier Fatio et Pierre Fraenkel, eds. (Genève: Librairie Droz, 1978), pp. 351-352, 357; Partee, Calvin and Classical Philosophy, p. 97; McLelland, "Calvin and Philosophy," p. 46.

[123]Partee, Calvin and Classical Philosophy, p. 91; For similar conclusions, see also Dewey J. Hoitenga, Jr., "Calvin and the Philosophers," The Reformed Journal 8 (Feb. 1958):11-12; McLelland, "Calvin and Philosophy," p. 52.

[124]Partee, Calvin and Classical Philosophy, p. 37.

intellectual life, but also capable of concrete cooperation with persons, institutions, or procedures of the long-established Scholastic tradition. Similarly, it served both as ally and as foe of the Protestant Reformation, giving crucial aid to its methods and ideals, but in turn receiving sharp rebuke in certain respects. This complex relationship of Humanism, Scholasticism, and Protestantism was illustrated both in Luther and in Calvin and could be shown equally well in such men as Melancthon and Beza also.

Here too then, the sharp bifurcation suggested by scholars such as Armstrong, Bangs, Rogers and McKim is faulty. It is incorrect to see the Reformation in general and Calvin in particular merely in terms of an alliance (even if a selective alliance) with Renaissance Humanism and in complete opposition to Scholasticism. Instead, we must understand them as selectively appropriating from both currents when either had something to contribute to the life and thought of the Reformation.

Chapter 4

Thomas on the Incarnation

"The mystery of the incarnation" opens the Tertia Pars of Thomas' Summa Theologiae. The earlier portions treated God and creation (both the divine act and the finite product). In particular, it treated humans and their activities (including the nature of sin and its effects upon humans and their activities). The Son of God has been studied in the doctrine of the Trinity, most notably, and referred to regularly, of course, but only now does Thomas address the incarnation of the eternal Word.

The Purpose of the Treatise on the Incarnation

The Tertia Pars is a crucial movement in the Summa.[1] In the prologue to the Prima Pars, 2, Thomas identifies the plan of the Summa. He states that he intends to treat first "of God," secondly, "of the journey of rational creatures to God," and thirdly, "of Christ, who, as man, is our way to God." These three-fold plans correspond to the three Pars of the Summa. The Prima Pars is the exitus portion in which Thomas investigates "the procession of creatures from [God]." The Secunda Pars

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[1]See "The Setting of the Treatise," Appendix 1 in Summa Theologiae, 60 vols. (Blackfriars ed.; New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1976) 48:175-177. For general treatments of the Summa Theologiae, see Martin Grabmann, Introduction to the Theological Summa of St. Thomas (trans. John Zybura; St. Louis: Herder Book Company, 1930); M.-D. Chenu, Toward Understanding St. Thomas, pp. 298-318; Leonard E. Boyle, The Setting of the Summa Theologiae of Saint Thomas (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 1982).

(in turn divided in two sections) begins the reditus portion of the work, in which the human activities that bring them back to God, the source and satisfaction of their existence, are set forth, in an adaptation of the Pseudo-Dionysian/Plotinian emanation—exaltation motif.[2]

This return to God is hindered by the radical breach between God and humanity that resulted from the sin of Adam. Neither humans nor their activities remain in pristine condition and consequently the way back to God is blocked. The previous section of the Summa discussed law and grace, the virtues and vices, which concern the overcoming the effects of sin. However, the basis for that has not yet been examined. Thomas now turns to that matter in the Tertia Pars. This portion investigates the grounds for the human return to God despite the presence of sin. In the person and work of the incarnate Son of God, the moral defects of humanity can be overcome and they are enabled to return to God for whom their hearts have been "restless," in Augustine's famous phrase. The Tertia Pars, then, is the means by which humans can successfully complete their journey back to God. It opens with an extended discussion of the incarnation, as an essential aspect of the provision of a way back to God.[3]

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[2]For a recent extended treatment of Thomas' indebtedness to this tradition, see W. J. Hankey, God in Himself: Aquinas' Doctrine of God as Expounded in the Summa Theologiae (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987). For examples of Thomas' own identification of the exitus - reditus motif (in which he terms God as "principium rerum et finis earum et specialiter rationalis creaturae") see 1a,2, prologue; also 1a,1,7, reply.

[3]See 3a, prologue.

Structure

According to Thomas' prologue to the Tertia Pars, the section on the incarnation is part of a much larger unit dealing with "the Savior himself" (1-59) which is followed by the uncompleted treatment of "his sacraments, through which we attain salvation" (60-90). The incarnation material is divided into "the mystery of the incarnation" (1-26) and "the things which the incarnate God did and suffered" (27-59). In turn, the first half is further divided into questions concerning its rightness (de convenientia incarnationis ipsius), the manner of union of the incarnate Word, and the consequent implications of the union (1, 2-15, and 16-26, respectively). The first two subsections are the focus of the present study.

The first question indicates a fundamental perspective of Thomas' treatment. The term convenientia occurs frequently, not only in the first question, but throughout the entire section. At several points along the way, Thomas will ask regarding the appropriateness, the suitability, of a particular state of affairs. He is concerned to understand the incarnation of God and what things are fitting for such an unparalleled situation.

The concern for propriety is coupled with the problem of the mode of union in the incarnate Word. In what way is God "infleshed?" How are the divine and the human brought together? Part of Thomas' criterion for arriving at the answers will be the propriety (or lack thereof) of a given alternative. The way in which "the Word became flesh" clearly must only be a way that is appropriate. This question of the proper mode of union has two sides for Thomas. He is concerned not

only for what type of union is fitting for God, but also for man. The authenticity of the incarnation demands not only "true God" but also "true man." The integrity of both components of the union must be protected.

Rationale

The rationale for this treatment of the incarnation is quite specific. The content of the treatment and the order and method of treatment both indicate a clear conception by Thomas of his purpose. The section is an exercise in fides quaerens intellectum. In one sense, of course, this comes as no surprise. Anselm's motto is not greatly dissimilar to Augustine's credo ut intelligam and Thomas is obviously and consciously in line with both men in a number of ways. All of the work of the schools of the later Middle Ages could be described with this phrase, the Summae classically so. Yet, in another sense, there is something significant in this label for this section on the incarnation. Thomas seems to apply some such criterion as a principle of exclusion. There seems to be almost nothing included except that which fits this standard.

Specifically, this section is notable for its non-apologetical and non-polemical orientation. It is not concerned to identify and refute false views of the appropriate mode of union in the incarnation. Neither does it attempt to prove that such an incarnation occurred. Instead, it seeks to understand the incarnation. Thus there is no formal treatment of the early Church debates on the subject nor a listing and refutation of the various heretical views. To be sure,

Thomas does mention these other views in the course of the discussion, but only to set them aside as unacceptable understandings for a particular problem which he is addressing. His choice of issues to address seems never to be dictated by the heretical positions, but only by the quest for greater understanding. The heresies indicate the limits of the range of alternatives, thus serving as boundary markers.[4]

In particular, Thomas is concerned primarily with understanding the meaning of the true humanity of the incarnate Son of God. Acknowledging from the start the truth of the creedal dogma that Jesus Christ is "truly God" as well as "truly human," he seeks to gain a fuller understanding of what the latter phrase means. We understand the meaning of "human" when used of those who are "merely human," but what does it mean when united to the person of the Son of God? Are there any alterations? If so, what are they and how extensive are they? If there are none, how is that possible? Questions such as these seem to be Thomas' interest.

All of this is noteworthy for what it indicates that Thomas does not do. He is not "debating" the truth of the incarnation with infidels or heretics.[5] He is not seeking to demonstrate the doctrine, on purely rational grounds, as Anselm did in De Incarnatione Verbi and in Cur Deus

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[4]See, e.g., 3a, 2, 6, reply where Thomas indicates that orthodoxy holds to "the mean between those extremes."

[5]Note the contrast between the treatment of the incarnation in the Summa Theologiae and that given in the Summa Contra Gentiles. In the latter work, chapters twenty-seven through forty-nine of Book Four cover this topic. Twenty-eight through thirty-eight are refutations of various heresies while forty and forty-nine deal with objections against the orthodox doctrine. Thus thirteen out of twenty-three chapters are explicitly polemical or apologetical. Chapters forty-one through forty-four mirror the topics covered in the Summa Theologiae.

Homo.[6] Thomas can address outsiders (e.g. Summa Contra Gentiles) and he can attempt purely rational demonstrations of matters already declared as dogma (e.g. the existence of God, the immortality of the human soul), but he does neither of these tasks here. Rather, in this portion of the Summa, Thomas seeks merely to understand the meaning of one item of dogma. He desires not to denigrate the humanity of Jesus Christ for the sake of his deity nor does he want to detract from his deity by careless assertions of his genuine humanity.

In all of this, it seems difficult to fault Thomas' intentions. In fact, at times he sounds strangely "modern" in his concern to insist upon the full and true humanity of Jesus. Such agendas typically are thought to be more recent, when Hellenism in general and Platonism in particular have been widely identified as intrusive and corrupting influences on Christian theology. Thomas thus challenges some of our preconceptions regarding medieval theology, though we should not necessarily assume that he is typical on this issue (his argument, at least at times, suggests the opposite).

This is not to say that the anti-docetic stance in Thomas always successfully manifests itself nor that he is always non-Hellenistic enough for modern tastes. Similarly his concern simply to understand the limits and range of Christ's truly human character will at times lead him to ask questions or give answers which we think exceed the proper boundaries of theologizing. He does seem willing to engage in "speculation," in its modern sense of conjecture or abstract

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[6]This suggests that intellectum in Anselm's famous motto means something different for him than for Thomas.

hypothesizing.[7] Nonetheless his agenda is defensible, even within the limits of Karl Barth's definition of theology as believing reflection upon the Word of God, that is, the attempt, as a responsive act of faith, to understand the disclosure from God which confronts us in Christ and the Scriptures.[8]

Content

Thomas focuses his attention upon several topics in questions one through fifteen, concentrating upon two in particular. He addresses the appropriateness, necessity, and timing of the incarnation in question one and the locus, mode, and value of the union in the incarnation (including the relationship of grace and merit to the union) in question two. Questions three through six concern the assumption by God of humanity, both from God's side (question three) and from humanity's (questions four through six). After examining the kind and measure of grace in Christ (question seven) and specifying Christ's headship (question eight), Thomas devotes a second extended section to a discussion of the capacities of the incarnate Word, concentrating upon his knowledge (questions nine through twelve) but also treating his power (question thirteen). The last two questions deal with his "bodily defects" and sin, ignorance, and emotions, respectively, i.e., the infirmities of the body and the soul.

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[7]See Summa Theologiae (Blackfriars ed.) 48:109, fn. a, 49:88, fn. a.

[8]See his Church Dogmatics 1, 1 (2nd ed.; trans.. G. W. Bromiley, Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1975) 11-24.

Thus, Thomas addresses the "why" and "when" of the incarnation (question one), the "where" and "how" of it (questions two through six), and the character (the "what") of the product of the incarnation (questions seven through fifteen). Within each portion, he thoroughly analyzes the range of possible alternatives.

It is interesting that so little space is spent on the divine aspect of the assumption in comparison with the human. Thomas gives twice as much space to the human as to the divine (sixteen articles to eight). In part, this may be due to the composite nature of humans versus the "simplicity" of God, for a significant portion of the treatment from the human perspective is concerned with the relationships of the various components of human beings to the incarnation.

The other major focus of this section of the Summa, Christ's knowledge, perhaps results from Thomas' conception of human beings. According to him, the distinctive capacity of humans is their rationality and thus this constitutes their essence. The union of divine and human, of the omniscient God and a finite human, obviously raises questions regarding the consequence for that uniquely human ability. As man, Christ must be rational, but it would seem that the divine assumption jeopardizes the humanity of that rationality by making it difficult to be finitely rational, not divinely so. This problem, applied to other areas more briefly, accounts for questions seven, thirteen, and perhaps also fourteen and fifteen.

Thomas does not discuss the problem of monotheletism in this section. He will raise it in question eighteen in connection with Christ's earthly life and ministry rather than in the present treatment

of the nature of the incarnation. He will affirm dyotheletism on the basis of the will's association with the nature and not with the person. A two-natured person must have two wills, not one. Thus, the presence of two wills does not imply two persons (Nestorianism), but only two natures.

Sources

Thomas is quite consistent in his use of sources in this section. In the four portions of each article (objections, sed contra, reply, and replies to objections), Scripture is easily the predominant source (nearly three hundred fifty times). Internal references to the Summa occur approximately two hundred eleven times. Augustine is referred to nearly one hundred times. Aristotle and John Damascene are introduced fifty-five and fifty-three times, respectively.

The relative prominence is fairly consistent throughout the four parts of the article, though not rigidly so. Scripture is used to object to the proposed statement more than twice as often as any other source (approximately one hundred twenty-six times to fifty-eight internal references to the Summa while John Damascene and Augustine occur twenty-two and twenty-one times). This indicates that Thomas most frequently found (or posed) apparent discrepancies between Scripture and a specific theological statement or between the statement and other theological conclusions in the Summa Theologiae itself. In other words, his quest for understanding of what he already believed most often concentrated on what may be termed "internal" difficulties. The most prominent issue for Thomas, thus, was the consistency of a proposed

statement with the teaching of the authoritative Scripture or with other theological statements he had already concluded.

Perhaps this concern could be termed "systematic." Thomas is sensitive to the "fit" of a statement with other statements in these principal sources. Incompatibility at this point, if demonstrated, precludes the affirmation of the proposed item. Yet, it is incorrect to identify this "systematic" concern as deductive. Thomas does not merely deduce the proposals from previous statements (although of course there is a logical progression to his discussion). Rather, as the prominence of Scripture indicates (as well as the spatial remoteness of a significant number of the Summa conclusions quoted), Thomas is inquiring regarding the compatibility between statements. This inquiry often concentrates upon how two statements can be compatible as opposed to whether they are compatible.[9] This highlights the use of these two sources (Scriputre and the Summa). The objections identify prima facie inconsistencies between these sources and the proposal. The objections, of course, usually serve as Thomas' foil in the response to the statement. Thus, he acknowledges (or suggests) an apparent conflict, intending to resolve it. The resolution is not strict deduction but rather the careful explanation of some degree of logical comportment (short of deductive necessity). Since the objections seldom can be said to be forced upon him, Thomas' choice of the objections (and their source) indicate his focus of interest regarding his theological assertions. His attention is dominated by these two sources.

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[9]See Armand Maurer, "Translator's Introduction" in St. Thomas Aquinas, Faith, Reason and Theology (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 1987), xii.

The next most frequently occurring figures are also significant. Augustine and Aristotle, of course, are his primary theological and philosophical authorities, especially in light of the controversy which occupied center stage in the middle of the thirteenth century. John Damascene, the noted eighth century theologian of the Eastern church, is perhaps more surprising for his prominence in Thomas' writing. Although he is generally the most frequently cited Eastern writer (except for "Dionysius" whom Thomas regarded as Western), his prominence here is probably explained also by the topic. The Eastern church had been the context for the Christological controversies of the fourth and fifth centuries and had continued to give central theological emphasis to the doctrine.[10] The Damascence was noted for his profound and yet, to Western eyes, relatively sober exposition of Christology, making him a source too important to ignore in such a discussion.

When the sed contra portions are isolated, the predominance of Scripture only increases. Seventy times Scripture serves as the source for the statement to be juxtaposed to the objections. The next most frequently cited authority is Augustine (sixteen times). Interestingly, Aristotle is never cited in this part of the article (within this treatise).[11] The explanation for these numbers seems to be Thomas's desire to show that the often Scriptural objections cannot be taken at face value as precluding or supporting the proposal under consideration. Instead, they can be countered by other Scriptural statements which,

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[10]Note Thomas's rejection of this emphasis in favor of God in 3a, prologue.

[11]The brevity of the sed contra in contrast to the objections also accounts for some of this numerical disparity.

prima facie, urge the opposite regarding the proposition. This then sets up Thomas' procedure of reconciling the statements, showing how (and to what extent) they are true.

In the reply portion of the article, the most frequently cited work is the Summa itself (approximately eighty-four times) three more than Scripture. This indicates Thomas' concern for coherence. Conclusions already reached (sometimes those which will be reached later) provide the basis for resolving the conflict between the earlier sets of statements. The Summa, only cited six times in the sed contra, seems more useful for resolution than for posing conflicts. The network of conclusions provides limits within which the resolution must be sought and often suggest useful distinctions. Augustine and Aristotle appear thirty and twenty-three times, respectively. John of Damascus occurs as frequently here as in the sed contra (ten times).

The replies to the objections usually are briefer and often respond without an additional citation. The Summa again occurs most frequently (sixty-three times), with Scripture cited six less times. Augustine (twenty-nine), Aristotle (nineteen), and John of Damascus (eleven) are still the next most frequently used authorities.

Thomas apparently finds Aristotle's philosophical work more useful than the Damascene's theology for the task of explaining the answers. Aristotle often presents prima facie objections to the proposition, but is more often useful for supporting Thomas' answer. John Damascene seems to serve the opposite function, occurring more often in the first half of the article than the second. Augustine and especially the Summa itself more often point the way to the answer than they do to the posing

of the problem.

The consistent dominance of these five sources is notable. Only the relative dominance varies from one position of the article to another (with the exception of Aristotle's absence from the sed contra portions). Numerous other authorities are cited, but none with great frequency. This supports the earlier observation regarding the nature of this treatise. Thomas' "opponents" (i.e. the source of the objections) are the same authorities who serve as his "supporters." The understanding task is clearly central while Thomas has little interest in identifying and refuting particular individuals.

Due to the size of Thomas' discussion of the incarnation, the present treatment cannot cover the entirety of it in detail. However, the purpose of this study (the comparison of medieval and Reformed scholasticism) suggests a way to reduce the scope to more manageable proportions. I will limit my more detailed analysis to those portions of 3a, 1-15 which have a counterpart in Turrettini's Institutio. This in itself will not suffice, for Thomas's discussion often is longer than Turrettini's. Nonetheless, it does provide an initial criterion of selection.

The Propriety and Rationale of the Incarnation

Most of the first question of the Tertia Pars concerns the rationale of the incarnation. Before Thomas addresses that, however, he asks regarding its fittingness (convenientia).[12] As he himself explains

[12]See the Blackfriars edition, vol. 1: appendix 2 (section 6); appendix 6 (sections 15 and 29); appendix 9 (section 32); Chenu, Toward Understanding St. Thomas, pp. 181-186; Summa Theologiae 1a, 32, 1 ad 2; 3a, 1, 1 ad 2; 3a, 4, 1 reply.

this form of argument, it is a weaker form, lacking the force of demonstration.[13] In contrast to the conclusiveness of arguments, e.g. in natural science, this other type merely shows that one thing is "congruent" with another. While not necessitating the other, it is not incompatible with it. More positively, it may be said to be "appropriate" to the other. The Trinity is one article of faith supported by such argumentation; Thomas now proposes that the incarnation is also susceptible of such reasoning. In the discussion of the mystery of the Trinity, Thomas refers to the goodness of God as the ground for the appropriateness of that article of faith. That is also the reason he offers for the incarnation, citing Dionysius. The sed contra of the first article quotes John of Damascus who argues that the incarnation serves to make visible the invisible things of God, including goodness, wisdom, justice and power. In the reply, however, Thomas seems to narrow the focus to goodness and shift the emphasis from what is disclosed by the incarnation to what motivated or precipitated it. Thus, although a broader argument was nearby, he had recourse to the same reason used in the earlier argument ex convenientia.

Thomas defends the appropriateness of the incarnation by insisting that it does not detract from God's immutability. He also denies that it implies natural congruency between God and human beings. The congruence is between God's goodness and his incarnation for the sake of humanity, not between God and humans per se. That is, the congruence is rooted in God's character, not the relationship between God and humanity. This is noteworthy in light of the common construal of

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[13] 1a, 32, 1 ad 2.

Thomas' concept of analogia entis, so fiercely criticized by Karl Barth among others.[14]

Thomas also rejects the assertion that the body, as evil, is incompatible with God's holiness, distinguishing between the creaturely characteristics as they were when made by God originally and the "evil of fault" brought on by human rebellion. Though not elaborated or identified by name, this seems to be a rejection of Gnosticism and its medieval relative Manicheanism.

Finally, he argues that there is nothing impossible in the infinite God becoming incarnate in the small body of an infant. Such an objection indicates that one is "incapable of thinking of anything beyond the corporeal," confusing God's greatness of power with massiveness of size.

Having shown that, far from being impossible or implausible, the incarnation is an appropriate divine action, Thomas now pursues its rationale. Having asked how it could be, he now asks why it should be. The answer has been hinted at already for, in basing the appropriateness of the incarnation on the goodness of God, Thomas had noted the object of that goodness—"man's salvation." The goodness of God which motivated the coming of Christ was teleological; it was oriented toward the achievement of a specific purpose, the redemption of humanity. Accordingly, he asks if this act was necessary for the restoration of the human race or whether the same goal could have been achieved by another means.

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[14]See, e.g. Church Dogmatics 1, 1, p. xiii.

The first objection which Thomas raises claims that God's power was such that anything which could be accomplished by the incarnation could be accomplished apart from it. The second complains that a necessary incarnation seems unjust in that it implies that God is requiring more than a mere man could do. The last objection argues that the incarnation diminishes reverence for God and thus could not be necessary, (which seems to revive the issue from article one though Thomas' response makes no mention of this).

Thomas grants in reply that, in the strict sense, the incarnation was not necessary for redemption. By God's "infinite power," he had "many other ways" to accomplish this end.[15] Yet, following Augustine, he asserts that there was no more fitting way. The necessity, then, is one of appropriateness, not of sufficiency. This extends the convenientia principle beyond the incarnation itself to its purpose.

Thomas lists a series of benefits resulting from the incarnational redemption, under two headings, man's furtherance in good and the effectiveness in delivering man from evil. These lists are intended to substantiate the appropriateness of this means of accomplishing redemption. Under the first heading, he notes the greater assurance of faith which comes from God himself speaking and the higher hopes aroused from such a clear sign of God's love for us. In addition, our love is "most greatly kindled" by this act of God which also sets before us a visible example of right living. Finally, Thomas quotes Augustine's use of the deification principle, i.e. "God became man in order that man

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[15]This is an intriguing anticipation of the potentia absoluta of later medieval thought.

might become God."[16]

The effectiveness of the incarnation in delivering men from evil is seen in the instructive display of the non-supremacy of the devil. The enabling union of humanity with divinity teaches the greatness of the dignity of human nature and inhibits our return to sinfulness. The unmerited grace of God shown in the man Christ does away with human presumption and the pride of man, which so powerfully prevents union with God, is cured by the humility of God.

The final point under this second heading seems not to fit the pattern as well as others. Thomas states that it was "to rescue man from thraldom" that God became man. He explains that the devil was overcome by the justice (or righteousness—justitia) of a man (Christ) who made satisfaction for the human race. This in turn is explained by the impossibility of either God or a man by himself making satisfaction, which made it necessary (oportebat) for Jesus Christ to be both God and man (not "fitting," as the Blackfriars edition renders it). The stronger rendering seems called for by the absoluteness of the preceding statement. Thomas seems to exceed mere "appropriateness" at this point. The only way to avoid such an observation is to see the necessity as limited to the making of satisfaction which itself is not an essential part of redemption (but this is implausible). While the previous four elements of effectiveness are results of the redemptive work of Christ, the fifth is more related to the possibility of the redemptive work (at least of this kind of redemptive work). Accordingly, the force of

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[16]Characteristic of Eastern theology, this notion goes back at least to Ireneaus' Adversus Haereses IV, 28.

"necessary" more closely approaches the first, stronger sense which Thomas rejected at the beginning of the reply. This is reinforced in the reply to the second objection where Thomas distinguishes between condign and "sufficient but incomplete" satisfaction. The second presupposes the first and the first requires (oportuit) infinite worth on the part of the one atoning which is only possible with a God-man. Here too is something more than "appropriateness."

Thomas apparently is somewhat ambivalent here. Anselm's argument in Cur Deus Homo certainly seems to be just under the surface of these statements and yet that work uses the strong sense of "necessity" which Thomas has rejected. The argument of Anselm's work does not mesh well with the ex convenientia motif which is intended to characterize the present treatise.

In the third article, Thomas asks a counter-factual question. "if man had not sinned, would God nevertheless have become incarnate?" The contemporary background for the query is indicated not in the objections (which in fact quote only two of Paul's statements and an Augustine statement already quoted in the previous article), but in the opening lines of the reply. Two groups are anonymously described. One group claims that the incarnation would have occurred even if there was no sin problem to be redressed. The calamity of the fall, thus, may have given additional significance to the incarnation but it did not precipitate it. The other group asserts the opposite, apparently (no reasons are given) finding the grounds of God's becoming man solely in the need created by the presence of sin in the human race in particular and creation in general. R. J. Hennessey, the editor of this volume of the

Blackfriars edition of the Summa, notes Albertus Magnus and Alexander of Hales as examples of the first position while Bonaventure and fellow Franciscan Odo Rigaldus (d. 1275) espoused the second. The recent nature of this question may be indicated by the dates of these writers and also by the absence of the question in Lombard's Sentences as well as Abelard's Sic et Non. Thomas aligns himself with the latter view.

The legitimacy of the question arises out of the attempt to understand the essential nature of the incarnation. Is it to be understood as a redemptive act in its primary intention or merely in its benefits? Are statements in Scripture regarding the redemptive focus of the incarnation describing an "accidental" or an "essential" property? Seen in the light, the issue is not merely "speculative," i.e., conjectural, but rather a profound search for further understanding.

The objections focus, variously, upon the diverse consequences of the incarnation (which suggests diverse causes), the omnipotence of God, the capacity of human nature for such a union (which capacity would be unfulfilled without the incarnation), and the problem of the posteriority of the Fall to the decree and the earliest revelations of the incarnation.

Thomas' reply moves along quite different lines. His basic principle is "those things that flow from the will of God alone beyond all that is due to creatures can come to be known by us only to the extent that they are handed down in sacred Scripture, which makes God's will known." Hennessey describes this as "a golden principle in theology, to be kept in mind throughout scholastic deductions and recommendatory arguments, argumenta ex convenientia."[17]

This appears to be an application of Thomas' more basic distinction between natural theology and revealed theology. Here he is describing a specific kind of revealed theology, i.e. "those things that flow from the will of God alone beyond all that is due to creatures." The converse ("those things that are due to creature") is not entirely clear. Perhaps it refers to the natural, environmental factors essential for the continuity of human life, i.e., climatic, atmospheric, and nutritional factors, the continuing divine gift of which can be inferred (perhaps) from the divine intention to create human life. Assuming that this identification is correct, there are still questions which should be put to Thomas, both regarding clarification and substantiation. Yet even with this unsettledness about the contrasting form, the principle as stated in the reply can be grasped adequately for our purposes. The incarnation, in Thomas' judgment, is contingent and gratuitous. It might have been the case that God had not decreed that the Word become flesh and even though he has so decreed, this fact could not be learned by humans by any reasoning which began with observation of the creation or of history nor by any analysis of the concepts of "humanity" or "creation" or "God." It was not necessary because its purpose was not necessary. That is, the goal in view in the incarnation did not need to be chosen by God. Hence, the means to that goal might also have been not decreed.

Those who argue that the incarnation would have occurred even if humanity had not sinned have identified a different goal, and thus a different motive, than Thomas' proposed goal (redemption) and motive

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[17] Summa Theologiae (Blackfriars ed.) Vol. 48:18, fn. c.

(mercy towards the human plight). Thomas thinks that the identification of such alternatives is impossible. This is underscored by the absence of any Biblical indications of such alternatives. "Everywhere in sacred Scripture, however, the sin of the first man is given as the reason for the incarnation."[18]

This is an argument from silence, but a valid one because Thomas has shown that we are concerned here with a topic about which we have no non-revelational knowledge. Limited to disclosed interpretations, we may know only what Scripture says. The absence of Biblical statements about a non-redemptive incarnation is thus a telling point. In this reply, Thomas appears singularly "non-speculative' (in the modern "conjectural" sense).

The remaining articles of question one concern the distinction between actual sins and original sin and their relative significance in the purpose of the incarnation (article four) and the timing of the incarnation (articles five and six). On the latter question, Aquinas opts for a reassertion of Galations 4:4 which identifies the date of the incarnation as "the fulness of times." Humans may not second-guess God's decision on such matters, as we have already seen. Moreover, there is something fitting in Christ coming after humans have been humbled by their need yet early enough in history to rescue humanity from its decline and to grant fulfillment, in a variety of ways, to individuals in history.

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[18] 3a,1,3, reply.

The Kind of Union in the Incarnation

Question two asks concerning the kind of union the incarnation is in itself. Of the twelve articles, at least four and perhaps seven cover matters discussed by Turrettini. Thomas begins by asking if the union was in one nature. The objections, which affirm that it is, come from Cyril of Alexandria, "Athanasius",[19] and Gregory of Nazianzus while the contrary view is cited from the Chalcedonian creed. Such an alignment is puzzling, even arresting, at first glance. Thomas' opening sentence in his reply clarifies the issue.

The controversy, he sees it, hinges upon the meaning of "nature". After briefly tracing the term through its etymology and associations, echoing Aristotle[20], he concludes with Boethius that "nature for each thing is what gives it form through the specific difference."[21] Here, therefore, we are discussing nature as meaning essence or the 'what-it-is' [quod quid est] or 'whatness' [quidditatem] of a species.

On the basis of this definition, Thomas rejects the proposition in question. He identifies three ways such a union might be formed, all of which are unacceptable for the incarnation. One type would be an accidental union formed by the juxtaposition of the components. Among other faults of this alternative, Thomas notes that juxtaposition scarcely results in "union." The second way involves the transformation of separate realities into something new, a tertium quid. This however

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[19] See Summa Theologiae (Blackfriars ed.) Vol. 48:36, fn. 4 for correction of Thomas' mis-attribution.

[20] Metaphysics V, 4, 1014b16-1015a19.

[21] 3a,2,1, reply, citing Boethius, De Duabis Naturis, 1.

is not possible in the incarnation because the divine nature is immutable and cannot be transmuted into something else. Moreover, the transformed mixture of Christ's nature would no longer resemble either God the Father or Mary.

Finally, another variety of natural union is exemplified in the union of body and soul. In such a case, two non-complete things are united (but not transmuted) into one complete entity. This however cannot describe the incarnation because each of the natures is already complete according to its own rationem. Nor can the union be construed as resembling the parts of the body (because the incorporeality of the divinity prevents it) or as a form to matter (inasmuch as "the divine nature cannot be the form of anything, least of all anything corporeal"). Lastly, this type of union would add a "difference" to both natures, altering them so that, properly speaking, Christ would exist neither in divine nor human nature and thus be neither God nor man.

The objections all are seen to presuppose some improper notion of nature. The quotation from Cyril overlooks the fluidity of this term in the early fathers. The Athanasius citation makes too simplistic an inference, unaware of the twofold unity resulting from body and soul, only one of which is analogous to the incarnation. The soul is the form of the body, a relationship which Thomas has already shown to be inapplicable to this doctrine. Consequently, the objector's use of this analogy is unacceptable. Thomas instead takes Athanasius' reference to be the unity of person resulting from the subsistence of body and soul. The incarnation resembles such a union in that it results in a unity of

person subsisting in two natures. Apparently it is the "unified person subsisting in two entities" which is the precise point of analogy, not the entire body-soul relationship in all other ways.

More simply, Thomas clarifies the sense of the Damascene reference by indicating that the naming of one nature from the other (the "enfleshing" of the divine nature; the "deification" of the human nature) is based upon the union of the two, not from the conversion, because each keeps its own properties, a point Damascene himself goes on to make in the original context.

In this article, Thomas obviously draws upon the metaphysical technicalities of scholasticism to a greater degree than previously in this section. He makes greater use of Aristotelian definitions and distinctions. Yet, in part at least, he is only repeating the established pattern of the Christological controversies in which the terms and distinctions of the Greek philosophical tradition were adapted for use in clarifying the Church's affirmation of the Christ. There is nothing novel about Thomas' discussion, save perhaps some additional clarity.

The second article asks whether the union of the incarnate Word was in a person. That Thomas affirms this has already been disclosed by his response to the second objection in question one ("one Christ subsisting in divine and human natures"). The objections focus upon two themes. The first argument challenges the distinction between "person" and "nature" with regard to God which this question requires. It refers back to the Prima Pars conclusion that God's person is not other than

his nature.[22] The second and third objections reason from the inseparability (but not identity) of nature and personality in humans. Thus the identity of nature and person in God plus their inseparability in humans seems to preclude the union of two natures in a single person. A divine being cannot have a nature separate from its person while the human nature already has a personality. There seems to be no way to avoid the duplication of persons corresponding to the duplication of natures. Over against the objections, in the sed contra, Thomas very simply sets the Chalcedonian dogma of two natures in one person, not two. This is a particularly stark conflict (at least prima facie) between philosophical reasoning and dogmatic deliverances and thus a particularly clear case of the need for fides to seek intellectum.

The reply explores the relationship between nature and person. It begins by asserting that "person" means something other than "nature." Three lines of argument support this. First, the recognized distinction between a nature and a supposit in that nature would be unnecessary if the essential qualities of a species exhaust the characteristics of an existing thing. This is especially true in beings composed of form and matter. "For example, we do not say that this man is his humanity" because there are accidents and individuating principles which are not included in the essence or nature of a human but do exist in particular humans.[23]

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[22] 1a,3,3.

[23] Later, in article six, Thomas will clarify that he does not espouse an accidental union nor an essential or natural union, but a union which is a mean between those extremes, i.e. a hypostatic or personal union.

Moreover, even in God, whose nature is identified with his essence or nature, we can distinguish nature and supposit. In such a case, of course, the distinction is not secundum rem but rather according to our mode of understanding and speech.

Finally, Thomas argues for a personal union by identifying the untenability of the alternative. "All that is in any person, whether belonging to his nature or not, is united to him in person." Thus, to deny a personal union is to deny any kind of presence of humanity in Christ. That is, it is possible, as a Christian, to dispute a particular type of personal union, but not the personal union per se. Such a denial would "totally destroy faith in the incarnation" and "undermine the entire Christian faith." Thomas has shown that "unions in a nature" are a subset of "unions in a person" and not a mutually exclusive alternative. The more specific mode has been rejected and the more general mode is affirmed as requisite for Christianity.

The reply to the first objection further clarifies the second line of support. According to our mode of understanding, the union of the divine and human in Christ is not a change in the essential character of the Word but a change in his subsistence. That is, in our categories (which do not correspond to "real" distinctions in God) the union is classified as personal, not natural.

This reply addresses the most problematic aspect of Thomas' exposition thus far. It is not entirely clear that his explanation is adequate. The denials of a "union in a nature" in the previous article seemed quite metaphysical, i.e., they seemed to concern God per se. Here however Thomas seems to speak on a different "level," the level of

human knowledge and speech.

For example, the argument against a natural union which was based upon the immutability of God fits awkwardly with the merely human linguistic/epistemic distinction between God's nature and God's person or supposit. The first is de re and the second is de dicto. The conclusion "we may not speak of the incarnation as essential, but only as personal" seems considerably less forceful than "the incarnation is not essential but is personal."

Moreover, it is not evident that the distinction between the "simple" God de re and the "complex" God de dicto succeeds in permitting an acceptable exposition of the incarnation. It is difficult to see how the drastic change in the subsistence of the eternal Word could be said merely to be a change de dicto and not a real change de re. If this difficulty is authentic, then either God's nature has changed somewhat or else his nature and his person are not identical.[24] Of course, at this point in the argument Thomas is building upon his Prima Pars treatment of the nature of God and he is not concerned to re-argue those points. The limits of our study preclude a pursual of this question at any length. Nonetheless, it perhaps is legitimate to identify the difficulty and to note that the incarnation is a particularly significant "test-case" of the doctrine of divine simplicity and of what I have been calling the de re/de dicto distinction regarding God's nature and human language about it. Accordingly, Thomas may not unfairly be charged with giving a crucial aspect considerably less

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[24]See, e.g. Alvin Plantinga, Does God Have a Nature? (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1980).

attention than it needs. At best, it is unclear how these difficulties would be answered; at worst, several significant pieces of his theology are flawed, with significant and far-reaching consequences for Thomas' thought.

The next article establishes that this person in which the union takes place is also rightly called "supposit" or "hypostasis." The objections arise from those who take these terms as similar to "nature" and thus as dually represented in the incarnate Word. Thomas in response argues that they should rather be taken with "person," giving three supporting arguments. First, only one characteristic is included in "person" while absent from hypostasis, i.e., rationality, in keeping with Boethius' definition of "person." Thus, "person" and "hypostasis" are nearly equivalent and in this case equally heretical if dually attributed to the incarnate Christ. Second, that which may be conceded as a distinction between person and hypostasis is a certain property relating to dignity. Yet such a distinction is inadequate to posit two hypostases and one person in the incarnation and was consequently condemned by Cyril of Alexandria in his twelve anathemas.[25] Dignity or moral excellence is too limited a foundation for the union of divinity and humanity in Christ.

The last argument which Thomas offers concerns the role of the hypostasis. In the concrete individual, the properties and operations of the nature are predicated of the hypostasis so that this or that human being (not nature) is said to act or feel or think. Consequently,

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[25]And also, Thomas erroneously thought, by the Council of Ephesus which supposedly approved them.

if there was a human hypostasis as well as a divine one in Christ, then the human activities and experiences would be predicated of the human supposit and not the Word. This, of course, jeopardizes the redemptive work of Christ and accordingly was condemned by the Council of Ephesus.

It is notable that all three arguments rest on citation of conciliar decisions (or at least, in the second argument, what Thomas thought was a conciliar decision). While there is no shortage of analysis and reasoning in this reply, Thomas ultimately has recourse to the dogmatic declaration of the gathered representatives of ecclesiastical leadership. If this article is combined with the preceding one, with which it closely corresponds (article three being viewable as a clarification of the second), then the sed contra of article two, quoting the Council of Chalcedon over against the reasoning of the objections, is echoed by the conciliar-based reply to article three. The discrepancy between reasoning and faith is clearly decided in favor of the latter.

The fourth article in some ways returns to an issue raised in article two, the simplicity of God. It asks whether the person of Christ is composite. The first objection raises the most telling problem. In the eternal Word of God, person is not distinct from nature, according to Thomas' conclusion in la, 39, 1. Moreover, he has just shown (in article two) that the person of Christ is not something different from the person of the Word. Consequently, the simplicity which characterizes the pre-incarnate Word (see la, 3, 1) must also characterize the incarnate Word.

Thomas' reply is brief. In se, the person of Christ is omnino

simplex, but secundum rationem personae vel hypostasis, Christ subsists in two natures. He himself is a single subsisting reality but he subsists under two principles, the human and the divine. Thomas concludes that Christ is called a composite person because one reality subsists in two. Thomas considers this reply to be also a response to the first objection.

Quite obviously, the value of this reply rests in turn on the value of the earlier conclusions drawn by Aquinas. However, there is also a problem with clarity. Is Thomas distinguishing between two ways of understanding the incarnate Word (as subsisting being and as to the mode of subsisting) or between Christ in se and Christ as we understand him? The opening line of the reply suggests the former (dupliciter considerari potest). Yet this would make the in se simplicity of Christ (only?) a mode of human understanding and Thomas would seem to want more than this. The first way perhaps resembles (in a reverse way) the orthodox doctrine of the Trinity which affirms that, in one way, God is one and in another way he is three. That doctrine is a description of God de re, however, and not merely de dicto. If the second interpretation is chosen, then the same difficulties occur which presented themselves in the second article. That is, the duality of Christ's nature is made a facon de parler which does not affect the immutable simplicity of the Word.

This theme occurs again in the reply to article seven. In responding to the question whether the union of the divine and human nature is something created, Thomas reminds us that the Prima Pars (13, 7) concluded that "every relation between God and a creature exists

really in the creature." It does not exist realiter in God, "but only secundum rationem. This too seems to jeopardize the full force of the incarnation dogma.[26] Without suggesting that the Word ceased to be divine, it seems inadequate to deny that the incarnate subsistence of the Word is an altered subsistence; there is, in other words, at least an altered circumstance for the existence of the Word, even if no alteration in his nature.

Article five concerns the existence of body and soul in Christ. The objections all deny this, conceiving of an affirmation as jeopardizing his divinity. Thomas in contrast, argues that the denial denigrates the true humanity of Christ. His replies to the objections equally firmly protect the true divinity of Christ, thus supporting the intention of the objections but disputing their reasoning.

The Incarnation on the Part of the Person Assuming

Question two is Thomas' fundamental exploration of the incarnation. The remainder of the treatise pursues particular aspects of the union in light of the just completed reaffirmation of the classical orthodox doctrine. In questions three through six, Thomas seeks to understand what the personal union meant for the two parties, the divine person assuming and the human nature assumed.

The former aspect is the subject of question three. Of the eight articles, five pertain to the present investigation. In the first two,

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[26]For a defense of the position of Thomas (and of classical orthodoxy in general), see Richard A. Muller, "Incarnation, Immutability, and the Case for Classical Theism," Westminster Theological Journal 45 (1983) 22-40.

Thomas again raises the question of appropriateness, this time concerning the incarnational assumption. Respectively, they treat the appropriateness of the assumption for a divine person and then for the divine nature. These articles thus follow up the more general discussion of appropriateness in question one, article one.

Somewhat surprisingly, neither reply addresses the appropriateness issue. The first article reply explains what assumption involves and shows that such things pertain to persons, not natures. This is based upon previously established conclusions and thus seems stronger than the typical ex convenientia argument. "Appropriate" seems to understate the force of the reasoning. The second article reply builds upon the first, pointing out that, because nature is an element in a person, the incarnation may be said, in a secondary way, to involve the divine nature assuming a human nature to its person. Here, too, the strength of the establishment of the premises makes ex convenientia language seem out of place. The objections most resemble the usual "propriety" concern of such arguments, but the replies to them emphasize more the possibility/impossibility of assumption or the correctness/incorrectness of certain descriptions of it.

Articles five, six, and eight address matters which are also covered in Turrettini. "Does each person have the power to assume?" is the title of article five. The objections concern themselves with the improper, even erroneous language which would be entailed by the assumption of a human nature by either the Father or the Holy Spirit. "Sonship" or "sonship by adoption" or "sent" or "born" are inapplicable to any divine person save the Word.

The sed contra introduces the tack that Thomas will take in his reply, asserting the equal power of each person of the Godhead. In the reply, Thomas reiterates the analysis made in question two, article six, noting that assumption involves an act (and a corresponding principle) and a term. The principle is the divine power and the term is a person. Each member of the Godhead has sufficient power, for they all are equally God, fully possessing the divine nature. Each is also equally a person; the distinctions between them are not germane at this point. It is therefore incorrect to deny the possibility of the incarnation of the Father or the Spirit. While the replies to the objections admit the awkwardness of the language which would result from such assumptions, Thomas shows that there is no incorrectness in such language. In some cases, terms would have different senses than their other uses; in other cases, an alternative incarnation would have precluded certain language for the Word, who, in such a case, would not have assumed human nature.

The next article is of interest because the third objection and the corresponding reply raise the issue of the communicatio idiomatum, albeit briefly. Turrettini will devote a separate question to this, in light of the greater prominence which the Lutheran/Reformed disputes would give to it. The actual topic of the sixth article is whether several persons can assume a nature one and the same numerically. According to the initial objection, such an act would lead to absurd results, there being no plausible answer to the question of how many men would result form such a union (or at least no way of making a case for an answer). The second objection insists that because the term of an assumption is the unity of a person, the trinity of persons cannot

assume a single human nature.

The reply concentrates on the issues involved in these two objections. Not the production of a new person, but rather the assumption of a nature to an already extant divine supposit is the present topic; this clarification is intended to turn aside certain confused refutations of the thesis. As is clear from the Trinity itself, divine persons can share the same nature, but they cannot be the same person. It is the former, not the latter which is the state of affairs under discussion. Moreover, the determination of possibilities in such a matter rests upon the capacity of the assumer, not on that of the assumed. Thus, the limitations of human nature are not relevant here. Thomas grants, however, on the authority of Anselm, that the assumption must be of one human nature and not of one human person or hypostasis. In that, the objectors are correct. They err in mistaking that for the proposition in question.

The third objection cites John Damascene and Augustine in support of the interchangeability of predicates of "the Son of God," i.e. the divine nature of Christ. It then contends that, in light of that communicatio idiomatum, the assumption of a single human nature by three (divine) persons would lead to the exchange of descriptions between any of them and this man and in turn to an exchange between this man and another of the divine persons. The specific reductio ad absurdum cited is a property of the Father, e.g. the eternal generation of the Son being predicated of this human and in turn being predicated of the Son of God, who would then be eternal begetter of himself. The communicatio idiomatum being incontestable, the problem must lie with the multiple

assumers. Therefore that notion must be rejected.

In reply to this, Thomas clarifies that the cummunicatio is between a nature and the person subsisting in that nature. Or, more properly for the present discussion, it is between the two natures and the person. The properties of either nature may be predicated of the single person of the incarnate Word (on the actual assumption by only the second person of the Godhead). The interchange is not on the level of person or hypostasis. Consequently, on the basis of the hypothetical situation of this article, the absurd results could not occur because they involve the exchange of personal distinctives. Therefore, the hypothesis in the title of this article is possible, albeit counterfactual.

Thomas' notion of the communicatio idiomatum pertains to predication, i.e. to speech. This is an accordance with the citations from Damascene and Augustine which concern what is said (quod dicitur) of the Son of God and the Son of Man. He is not describing an ontological interchange between the natures themselves but rather only a linguistic interchange between the natures and the person. We may speak of the person in terms of either nature, but each nature maintains its distinctions and separateness, in keeping with the Chalcedon affirmation of the unconfused, unmixed hypostatic union.[27] Thomas will return to this issue in question sixteen where he will examine statements which exemplify the principle. There he consistently applies the distinction between natures and person, protecting the integrity of the former and

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[27]In terms of the sixteenth-century Reformation debate, Thomas seems "Reformed" (or "Calvinistic") not "Lutheran."

insisting upon the dual subsistence of the latter, which thus permits it to be described in terms originating from either of the natures.

In article five, Thomas had asked whether each divine person had the power to assume human nature and had answered affirmatively; it was possible for any (and, on the basis of article six, for all) to so assume. Now, in article eight, Thomas shifts the focus. Granted the capability of each divine person, in fact only the second person, the Word, assumed a human nature. Since it was not a matter of ability, perhaps the explanation is to be sought in the appropriateness of the Word's action.

Each of the objections suggest that the assumption by someone other than the eternal Son would have been more appropriate. The heresies which subordinate the Son to the Father in some ontic (as opposed to economic) sense could have been avoided by the Father's assumption; "no one would think of the Father as less than the Son." Secondly, in light of the descriptions of redemption as a new creation, it would have been more fitting for the Father to be the agent of it by his assumption of human nature. Finally, the Spirit, described in Scripture as the source of forgiveness, might better have become incarnate because the purpose of that act is forgiveness. Over against these is placed the sed contra which cites John of Damascus' observation that the wisdom which discerned the appropriate means of redemption and the power which successfully conquered death and hell call for the Son to be incarnated inasmuch as Paul terms him "the power of God and the wisdom of God."[28]

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[28] 1 Corinthians 1:24.

Three arguments constitute Thomas' reply. Because the Word was the exemplar for all creation (as Thomas has already shown[29]), it was appropriate that he was the one to be united to a human nature. Likewise, since the creatures were originally made to share in the likeness of the exemplar, it is fitting that their restoration be the result of that exemplar's union with a human nature. An additional aspect of this argument notes that the Word is particularly apt to be united to God's rational creature and thus to lead him to perfection.

Thomas then reasons that, because the purpose of the incarnation was the fulfillment of the predestination of those selected for a heavenly inheritance, the Son was most fitting for the task. After all, inheritance is a right belonging only to sons. Thus, by the incarnation of God's Son by nature, his sons by adoption gain their inheritance. Note that, in contrast to 3a, 3, 5 (second objection), Thomas is not arguing that the eternal sonship of the Word necessitates his incarnation nor that it precludes that of the other divine persons. Here he merely argues that sonship by eternal generation provides an aptness for becoming the source of adoptive sonship and its correlative inheritance.

The third reason offered in support of the Word's fitness for incarnation concerns the correspondence between "the sin of our first parents" and the remedy supplied by the incarnation. It was a desire for knowledge which led to the rebellion against God initially. Therefore, it is fitting that the incarnate "Word of true wisdom" should

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[29]la 3, 8 ad 2; la 34, 3 reply and ad 4.

restore humans to God. Thus "the disordered craving for knowledge" is exchanged for the rightness of submission to the one who is the truth.

The Incarnation on the Part of the Nature Assumed

The next unit of analysis, based upon a comparison to Turrettini, is the human aspect of the incarnation (questions four through six in the Summa). Question six, on the ordo of the assumption of the parts of human nature, does not correspond to any portion in Turrettini's Institutio and therefore will be omitted from this analysis. It reflects the detail to which Thomas is willing to extend his search for an understanding of the God-man. Questions four and five, as usual, contain a more extensive discussion than Turrettini's and include some matters not examined by him. Yet the focus does reflect a common concern.

According to Thomas' own outline, question four explored the realities assumed by the Word of God with regard to the human nature itself while the next question studies those assumed realities with regard to the parts of that nature.

Characteristic of this section of the Summa, Thomas again begins by asking regarding the "assumability" of human nature. Apparently taking the term to refer to a "natural passive power," the objections insist that other creatures were also capable of being the object of assumption. Divine power is infinite, thus rendering nothing non-assumable, there is a likeness to God (of varying degrees) in all creatures, and angels seem both more like God and equally needy due to sin compared to humanity. Indeed, the universe as a whole is more

perfect than its parts and hence is more assumptibile than human nature.

The reply commences with the clarification that the question actually concerns some sort of appropriateness for such a union, that is, it is an argument ex convenientia. The alternative, that a natural passive power is meant, is impossible in the context. Such a power does not exceed "the limits of the nature" and yet the incarnation surely transcends those limits. Consequently, only appropriateness can be the intent of the present question.

Two items mark such a fittingness, dignity and need. Thomas notes human rationality and intelligence as sources of dignity. Those qualities enable humans to reach, in some way, the Word himself, by knowing and loving him. By this, Thomas apparently means the human response to the effects of the incarnation, not some previous effort in which humans meet the grace of God halfway.[30] In other words, human nature is such that the effects of the divine restorative grace upon it bring about particularly valuable responses. The need of human nature, of course, is its burden of original sin from which it requires deliverance.

No other creature is characterized by these two marks of appropriateness. While angels possess a similar dignity, they do not need redemption. More precisely, as Thomas notes in his reply to the third objection, the holy angels do not need redemption and the fallen angels' sinfulness is irremediable as he already showed.[31] The remainder of the creation, the non-rational beings, does endure a cursed

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[30]See his discussion of prevenient grace, la2ae, 111, 3.

[31]la, 64, 2.

condition which it bears for humanity's sin and thus has the appropriate need, yet the requisite dignity is lacking.

The next two questions recall earlier portions of this treatise. They ask, respectively, whether what was assumed was a person and whether it was a man. In the main, the objections, which affirm these questions, arise from authoritative sources such as John Damascene, Innocent III, Boethius, and Augustine, although two are based upon logical analysis of the meaning of terms and phrases. In the case of the citations from the authorities, the problem is their use of language which seems to indicate the assumption of a person or a man (i.e. human being) despite Thomas' earlier discussion[32] that reaffirmed the Chalcedonian dogma of two natures and one person. If correct as the objections interpret them, the quotations would jeopardize either the orthodox doctrine or, more likely, the reliability of these men at this point. In fact, however, Thomas challenges the proposed interpretation of these quotations, showing that there are alternative explanations which better comport with orthodoxy.

When responding to an objection based upon one of Augustine's statements, Thomas reiterates a principle which he had proposed earlier in the Summa.[33] "Expressions of this type are not to be extended (extendendae) as though proper, but are piously expounded (exponendae) whenever proposed by the holy Doctors."[34] Such a policy is evident

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[32] 3a, 2, 2 and 3.

[33] 1a, 39, 5 ad 1.

[34] 3a, 4, 3 ad 1. The earlier reference is briefer and more stylish: "Unde huiusmodi locutiones non sunt extendendae, sed exponendae."

throughout his corpus and indeed is not unique to him.[35] What sometimes looks like inaccurate handling of sources in Thomas is not accidental. Instead, it is his conscious, programmatic attempt to put the best possible interpretation upon a revered author or work in order to bring it into line with the truth.

In his replies, Thomas distinguishes between the term of an assumption and the presupposition (praeintelligere) of an assumption. The former is a person, in this case a divine person. The latter is what is assumed, thus requiring to be understood as the precondition for the act of assumption. In short, a nature is assumed to a person.

In the reply in article three, Thomas points out that "man" signifies not a human nature itself but a human nature as it is in a supposit. Consequently, it is not proper to say that the Son of God assumed a man because this would entail the heretical proposition that Christ had two supposits and two persons. It is the proximity to unorthodox positions which provides Thomas' warrant for this linguistic decision, at least in part, as the closing lines of this reply indicate.

Articles four and five reflect the medieval interest in the problem of universals, particulars, and individuals. The first asks: whether the Son of God should have assumed a human nature abstracted from all individuals. This is reversed in the subsequent article which asks whether the Son of God should have assumed human nature in all individuals. Thomas rejects both propositions, arguing instead for a single individual human nature, that is, a single human nature assumed in order to be an individual when united to the supposit of the Word.

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[35]See Chenu, Toward Understanding St. Thomas, pp. 144-149.

In each case, the objections find something more appropriate in the universality of the proposed assumption, whether abstract universality or distributive universality.

Against the first type, Thomas points out that human nature has sensible matter as part of its specific nature and thus it cannot subsist *per se*. Granting hypothetically the truth of the counterfactual, he shows that even then a series of problems would prevent such an incarnation. Likewise, it is not possible to assume an abstract universal existing in either the divine or human mind, for both would undermine the authenticity of the incarnation as orthodoxly understood.

His reply to article five is more typical of the *ex convenientia* style. There he shows that a distributively universal incarnation would not in fact be more appropriate because of its limitation of the human race to one person, because of its detraction from the unique dignity of Christ, and because it violates the proportionality of one divine supposit and one human nature.

In article six, Thomas affirms, following Augustine, that it was better for the incarnation to have taken place by the assumption of a human nature from the Adamic line. Here too he is asserting the true humanity of the incarnate Word. While he apparently regards it as possible that God could have taken up another humanity, nonetheless it is fitting that the one who committed the sin should make satisfaction, that the conqueror of the devil should be from the conquered race, and that God display his power by exalting one from a corrupted and infirm nature. The objections had regarded it as unfitting to the holiness and

dignity of Christ that he be a member of the Adamic race. Thomas shows those fears to be misplaced.

Having addressed the issue of the assumption of the nature itself, Aquinas now narrows the focus to the parts of human nature. The parts which he has in mind are the body and the soul. Each is addressed in an article. An aspect of each is also treated more specifically in a follow-up article.

The first two articles investigate the body which Christ had. They ask, in turn, whether he had a true body (as opposed to an imaginary one) and whether he had a carnal or earthly body (as opposed to a heavenly one). To both, Thomas answers affirmatively and for the same reasons. In the first article, objections are made from certain scriptural language describing Christ's incarnate state ("the likeness of men," Philippians 2:7) and from a prophecy-fulfillment motif, claiming that the visionary prophecies should have visionary or imaginary fulfillment. The more significant objection, it seems, finds support in Pope Leo I's declaration that the incarnation did not diminish the divine eminence. Noting that one aspect of God's eminence is his complete separation from a body, the objection concludes that a true body assumed in the incarnation would violate that principle of undiminished eminence.

Thomas' reply proffers three reasons. The first is founded upon the already-established conclusion of the appropriateness of the assumption of a human nature. In light of this, nothing short of a true body for the Christ is acceptable. An imaginary body is not a proper element of an authentic human nature; if Christ had only an imaginary

body (or something else which was not a truly human body), then the incarnation was not genuine. Secondly, and related to this, an imaginary body would prevent the authentic experience of death which in turn would prevent the provision of salvation for humanity.

Finally, an imaginary body would detract from the dignity of Christ. The apparently real (but actually imaginary) body, which Christ is said to have had would be deceptive. All who saw him seem to have regarded him as genuinely human and genuinely corporeal, just as they themselves were. The objection does not mean to suggest otherwise. Such a state of affairs, however, would be tantamount to misrepresentation on the part of Christ. Moreover, Christ himself excluded this view by inviting others to touch his body and assure themselves of its genuineness.

Thomas' reply to the second objection (the one based upon Pope Leo's statement) is not entirely transparent. Citing Augustine[36] he insists that the incarnation, though a self-emptying according to the famous kenosis passage in Philippians 2:5-11, did not in any way detract from Christ's dignity. This much of Thomas' reply is clear, if not elaborately argued. The remainder of the response, however, is less obvious. Taking his lead from the term "form" in both Philippians 2:7 and "Augustine's" comment upon it, Thomas then clarifies that "assuming a true body" does not equal "becoming the form of a body." The latter would involve the already rejected notion of the assumption unto a nature (as the term of the assumption) rather than unto a person. It is

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[36]Or so he thought; it was actually Fulgentius' (468-533) De Fide ad Petrum.

not clear why this discussion arises at this point nor how it reinforces Thomas' claim of the undiminished eminence of the incarnate Word. The objection does not seem to imply that "becoming the form of a body" was the corollary of a true body for Christ; the former is a metaphysical notion a good deal more sophisticated, it seems, than the reluctance to affirm true corporeality which the objection betrays. Thomas seems to have passed up an opportunity to elaborate on the rationale for the immutable eminence of the Word even in a state of incarnation. Though clearly insisting upon the authentic bodily character of Christ and thus emphatically anti-docetic, he does not identify the warrant for such a high view of the body, except for the citation of authorities and the Christian necessity of such a position. Here he is notably dogmatic, and not at all philosophical or rational, in his arguments.

The arguments which favor the attribution of a "heavenly body" to Christ, according to the objections in article two, arise in part from the language of heavenly/earthly contrasts in Scripture, but also from a more general axiological principle exalting heavenly (and perhaps concomitantly non-material) realities over against things earthly. This appears to be a fusion of cosmological, metaphysical, and ethical elements, reminiscent of Greek philosophy generally and Platonism particularly. The sed contra is a statement of Jesus in a post-resurrection appearance which insists upon his flesh and bones constitution.

The reply resorts to the same three arguments which were used in the previous article, now expounded as excluding a real, but heavenly body. The replies to the objections offer some distinctions to clarify

the notions of the "descent from heaven" and "fleshly" or "flesh and blood." Regarding the first, Thomas distinguishes the descent of the Son as divine (which means that, without departing from heaven, he became present on earth in a new way) and the descent of the body of Christ (which refers to its formation by heavenly power). "Heavenly," thus, can refer to a locale of presence or to a source of powers or causal agency.

The second distinction is particularly notable. Thomas explains that "flesh and blood" can bear two different meanings. The first refers to a substantial referent, and is an ontic or metaphysical sense. The second indicates the corruption in flesh and blood, i.e. sin. This is an ethical sense. Such a distinction is significant because it keeps Thomas from what seems to be a fundamental Platonic affirmation merging cosmic, anthropological, and ethical dualisms. It is a clear indication of the dominance of Christian (i.e. Scriptural) rubrics over philosophical in his thought. The Gnostic and Manichaean heresies seemed to have functioned as a benchmark of the limits of what may be called the Platonic denigration of corporeal and terrestrial values. This is not to pass judgment here on whether the ramifications of this were always clearly and consistently extrapolated by the Church as a whole or by Thomas in particular. It does indicate a fundamental intention not to despise the corporeality with which humans were created and in which Christ became incarnate.

The soul and intellect of the incarnate Christ are the subject of articles three and four. In parallel with the first two articles, Thomas uses the same three reasons in both replies, again in support of

the questions. He identifies the rejection of the questions with Arianism and Apollinarianism, on the authority of Augustine. If granted, such a denial would mean that Christ has only one nature, not two. He could not be said to have a human nature because it is constituted of both body and soul.

His reasons for rejecting such a position are, first, that it contradicts authoritative statements of Scripture. He has in mind both explicit mentions of the word "soul" by Christ and also, following Augustine, the Gospel accounts of his emotional life (wonder, anger, sadness, desires for food). He dismisses Apollinarius' response that these should have been taken metaphorically, for such a view impugns the reliability of the Evangelists.

Moreover, a denial of a human soul in Christ detracts from the purpose of the incarnation, the liberation of man. He then includes an extensive quotation which he thought was from Augustine.[37] The passage identifies four alternatives which would explain why the incarnation included the assumption of a body but not a soul. Two of them are labelled blasphemous: his inability to heal the soul and his consideration of the soul as alien to him (and thus not created by him, apparently), leading him to withhold redemption from it. The other two are ignorance of the plight of the soul (by regarding it as blameless, not knowing its actual sinfulness) and of the value of the soul (by regarding it as worthless and unfit for redemption). None of these are acceptable to orthodoxy, of course. The wisdom and prudence of Christ

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[37]It was actually from Vigilius, a sixth-century North African bishop.

are seen in his refusal to cast aside the soul, leaving it unredeemed, and in his own assumption of that which had been greatly wounded (knowing that only this course of action could accomplish his purposes).

Thomas' last reason applies Aristotle's explanation of the relationship of soul to flesh and bone.[38] According to the Philosopher, the soul is the form or actuality of the body. Hence, a body without a soul is not flesh or bone "except equivocally," Thomas concludes.

The more significant of the objections had argued from the superfluity of the soul as the agent of life because Christ as the divine Word was "the fountain of life," living _a se_ and the source of life for others. To this Thomas replies that while the Word is the first effective cause of life (and thus the source of life _per se_), the soul is the form of the body (and thus the source of its life _qua_ body). This application of the Aristotelian analysis of causality thus distinguishes an eternal life in the Word and also a new, historically oriented life in the incarnate Word.

The objections to article four suggest that a human mind or intellect in Christ would be superfluous because its character as the image of God and its function as the light of reason to man are already accounted for by qualities of the Word. The last objection finds it superfluous to the fleshly orientation of incarnation. The reply notes the three reasons from article three, again insisting that the absence of human mind or intellect conflicts with the Gospel accounts, defeats the effectiveness of the incarnation, and undermines the truth of the incarnation. It also repeats Augustine's identification of this view as

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[38] _De Anima_ II, 1, 412b 20-22.

originally Apollinarian and thus officially heterodox.

The Grace of the Incarnate Christ

Thomas and Turrettini both treat the topic of grace in relationship to the humanity of Christ. Of Thomas' twelve articles, five find some complement in Turrettini's discussion. Article two already established that from the grace which was present in Christ as human would proceed virtues which perfected each of the faculties of his soul. Now, in successive articles, the Summa seeks to understand whether these graciously produced virtues included faith, hope, and the gifts of the Spirit.

The objections to article three all aver that Christ must have had faith in light of its virtuous character. The third objection, in anticipation of claims that faith involves some imperfection, cites the Glossa Ordinaria which distinguishes between a "faith of words and longings" and a "faith of realities and possession," i.e. an imperfect faith and a perfect faith.

The sed contra quotes Hebrews 11:1 which defines faith as "the conviction of things not seen," which obviously ill-befits the incarnate Word who was omniscient. In his reply, Thomas also uses that passage to identify "the field of faith." Recalling the conclusion of the earlier inquiry on faith,[39] he states that faith is concerned with invisible divine reality. This field of action gives faith, as a virtuous habit, its character. There is no rationale for faith if nothing is unseen and Thomas affirms that Christ had the full visio Dei from the moment of

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[39] 2a2ae, 4, 1.

conception. Hence faith is excluded from Christ's humanity.

In reply to the objections, he grants that faith ranks high among the virtues, greater even than the moral virtues which he already has acknowledged to be possessed by Christ. He identifies the reason for this ranking as the greater importance of the matters with which it deals. Yet, to take that superior ranking as warrant for attribution to Christ overlooks "certain limitations" in relationship to these matters. It is these limitations (and not the undeniable value of faith) which prevents its possession by the incarnate Word.

The Gloss uses a broader sense of "faith" when it describes a "seeing faith" or a "perfected faith." In the present context, however, Thomas is using a stricter sense which excludes such scope. Therefore, to cite the Gloss against Thomas is equivocation.

The sed contra of article four links hope to faith in that both pertain to things which are not seen, as Romans 8:24 observes. It therefore denies the question of Christ's possession of hope. Thomas again adopts the sed contra's reasoning, although this time he somewhat modifies the definition used. Whereas "faith" is described in vision terms (seen/unseen), "hope" is defined in posssession terms (have/have not). Thus "hope" is waiting for that which one does not yet have or, more specifically for the present discussion, waiting for the enjoyment of God himself. If someone already possessed full enjoyment of God in the present, that person could not be characterized by hope in its strictest sense.

Unlike the faith article, Thomas now makes a qualification. "Hope" can also refer to divine matters other than God himself. Although

Christ enjoyed the perfection of knowledge and fellowship with God, yet there were certain things which he did not yet possess, such as the immortality and glorification of his body. For these things, though not for God himself, the incarnate Son could hope. The complete absence of faith thus contrasts with the partial presence of the virtue of hope in Christ.

Without attempting to develop an entire investigation of the character of "faith," which would require treatment of several other works by Thomas,[40] perhaps it can be observed that a qualified sense of faith might have been given, corresponding to the second sense of "hope." For surely Christ "depended" or "trusted" in the Father to provide for him during his earthly life, even if he knew perfectly and directly that the Father would do just that. The confidence in another person which grows with the increase in our knowledge of the character of that person seems to be something quite like theological faith. The cognitive (or propositional) character of faith may have been absent from Christ, yet, even so, the "trustful" or fiduciary aspect seems quite compatible, even requisite, to the Scriptural account. In addition, this dependence has a future orientation, much as Thomas' secondary sense of "hope." The legitimacy of the latter argues for the former as well.

When Thomas replies to the objections, which had supported the attribution of hope to Christ, he observes that the objectors had taken hope in its primary theological sense of fulfillment sought in the

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[40] 2a2ae, 107; Faith and Reason and Theology; Summa Contra Gentiles; I, 4-8; On Truth, 14.

enjoyment of God. Each of the supporting arguments given for that attribution, however, would only bear the weight of the weaker, secondary meaning.

Thomas next (article seven) asks regarding the gifts of the spirit in Christ. The objections point out that the gifts, intended to aid the virtues, would be superfluous in Christ whose virtues were fully developed and thus self-sufficient. Second, they note a certain awkwardness involved in the notion that Christ was both the giver and the receiver of the spiritual gifts. Finally, at least four of the gifts apparently pertain to the life of contemplation practiced on earth, an interpretation which is supported by Aristotle's identification of these as intellectual virtues. However, Christ, while on earth, had a heavenly contemplation, making these gifts incompatible.

The reply draws upon an earlier discussion of the gifts of the Spirit.[41] As a certain perfection (or completion) of the the powers of the soul which makes them sensitive to the movement of the Spirit, they are appropriate for Christ. Throughout his earthly life, as Scripture indicates, he was perfectly moved by the Spirit, manifesting his superlative endowment with the gifts.

In the reply to the first objection, Thomas elaborates on the problem of the gifts as _perfectiones_ in a man who was _perfectus_, the difficulty which led the first objection to deny their presence in Christ. The key is the distinction between a perfect humanity _secundum ordinem suae naturae_ and the perfection which pertains to a higher order of life. Even a perfect human needs divine aid for spiritual matters.

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[41] 1a2ae, 68, 1.

Therefore Christ required the gifts to develop his human soul for the activities of the Spirit.

The awkwardness of Christ's roles as both giver and receiver of the gifts is alleviated by Thomas' distinction between Christ's two natures. He gives the gifts according to his divine status and receives them according to his humanity. Thus he does not give and receive in the same capacity. Similarly, the objection based upon the terrestrial character of the contemplation involved in some of the gifts false assumes the incompatibility of heavenly knowledge and earthly knowledge. The incarnate Christ, though, had both kinds, in keeping with his two natures. Christ's authentically divine knowledge is not jeopardized by his genuinely human knowledge.

Articles seven and eight pose questions similar to articles five and six. The earlier articles asked concerning the gifts of the Spirit, which "perfect" or complete the capacities of the soul. The latter articles discuss the "charisms" (gratiae gratis datae) whose purpose is the presentation of "the faith and spiritual doctrine." That is, the gifts are ordered toward the (spiritual and moral) character of a person (which of course will be displayed in actions) while the "charisms" are ordered toward the (spiritual) function in the ministry of Christian teaching.

Inasmuch as Christ is the primus et principalis doctor, he must have had the charisms. Though they ordinarily seem to be shared graces when present in humans, in Christ they were fully present, apparently because of his pre-eminent position (i.e. his divinity). Nonetheless his true humanity makes it fitting (competit) that he receive them even though

this again creates the awkward situation of the same person being both giver and receiver. Thomas again insists on the integrity of both natures, the divine (which makes Christ pre-eminent) and the human (which makes him an appropriate recipient of divine grace).

In particular, Thomas asks whether Christ was a prophet (i.e. had the charism of prophecy). The objections deny that he was, most notably because of his full and perfect knowledge (which contrasts with the obscure and imperfect knowledge which seems characteristic of the prophetic visions and dreams) and because of the future orientation of prophecy (because of which prophecy resembles faith and hope, both of which Thomas denied to Christ).

At several points in his reply and in the answers to the objections, Thomas reasons from the true humanity of Christ to the presence of (the charism of) prophecy in him. Prior to the passion, Christ authentically shared our state. Not only did He enjoy the beatific vision, but he was also a pilgrim. And it was as a pilgrim that he prophesied. Although he had the full knowledge that comes with the vision, he also had the images that reflect the things of God, just as other pilgrims. Again, faith and hope are essentially incompatible with Christ's divine nature and thus were not present despite his humanity. In contrast, prophecy concerns that which exceeds the common experience of humans, thus allowing for exceptional experiences by divine grace. Thus, prophecy is not incompatible with Christ's divinity and is possible for him as a genuinely human pilgrim. As usual, Thomas predicates every authentically human characteristic of Christ which is compatible with his undiminished divinity.

Knowledge in the Incarnate Christ

Questions nine through twelve examine the incarnate Christ's knowledge. In the eighteen articles, Thomas discusses beatific, endowed, and acquired knowledge to determine what types of human knowledge were possessed by Christ. This inquiry perhaps can be seen as an enlargement of the faith, hope, and prophecy questions (on which Thomas rendered a split decision). The present section will add considerable precision to the answers already given.

Question nine sets the stage for the three subsequent questions. The first of the four articles simply asks whether Christ had any knowledge other than divine knowledge. The second asks whether he possessed beatific knowledge, the third asks regarding endowed or infused knowledge, and the fourth, about acquired knowledge. The subject of each of the last three articles will be investigated further in a separate question (ten, eleven, and twelve, respectively).

In 9, 1, Thomas cites three objections against the proposition that Christ had any non-divine knowledge. Once something is known, it cannot "come to be known"; thus the non-divine knowledge is superfluous because redundant. Moreover, there is not a superior quality to non-divine knowledge which would surpass or improve the divine knowledge. Lastly, the personal character of knowledge implies that only divine knowledge existed in Christ. The duality of natures is not the basis for determining the number of kinds of knowledge; rather, the unity of his person is the criterion.

The reply begins by reiterating the integrity of the human nature which Christ assumed. This involves both a soul and a body and the soul

was not only sensitive but also rational. If Christ had no created knowledge, his soul would merely be in potency to understanding, a state which brings imperfection to the Son of God and, in fact, would make him inferior to other humans who had actualized their potential for understanding. Further, it would have been purposeless to assume an intellectual capacity and then not use it. Finally, there is some created knowledge which is essential to human souls. Had Christ not had such knowledge, e.g. of the first principles, he would not be completely human. Thomas thus concludes that the Fathers had rightly condemned all denials of human knowledge in Christ.

The replies to the objections underscore these points with specific applications of them. Besides Thomas' change of the metaphor in the second objection (from two lights to a light and a reflector), the principal novelty in these replies is the contradiction of the premise that knowledge is to be aligned with "person," not with "nature." This premise is true only by means of the communicatio idiomatum; properly speaking, "knowledge is not appropraite for a person except by reason of his nature."

The remaining articles of question nine establish the facticity of the various kinds of knowledge in Christ. In each case, the fundamental argument by Thomas is that the perfect humanity of Christ entitles us to affirm the presence of the particular type of knowledge in question. His replies to the objections often fall short of decisive refutation because he is content to show that affirmation is required by Christ's perfect humanity; the force of any objection is less than the force of the necessary affirmation of the orthodox doctrine. The various

arguments he presents in favor of the three types of knowledge are (generally) merely variations on this.

At the end of article four, Thomas aligns each of the three forms of knowledge to a certain level of being. Acquired knowledge is distinctively human knowledge, not only in the way it is received in a subject, but also by the way it is caused. Infused knowledge is proportioned to angelic nature. Finally, beatific is "proper and connatural" only to God because by it the divine essence itself is seen. Nevertheless, although distinctively characteristic of different beings, these three kinds of knowledge are all possible for humans. For instance, Thomas states that humans are in potentia to beatific knowledge, consisting in the visio Dei. Indeed, this knowledge (and this vision) is the end toward which humans have been ordered.[42] Inasmuch as Christ is the means to the achievement of this objective by Christ (according to Hebrews 2:10) he himself as "the pioneer and consummator of the Faith" must have it in a supreme degree.

Similarly, Aristotle's De Anima discussion of the passive intellect is recalled to make the point that the capacity of man is in potentia to all intelligible objects.[43] However, because being in potentia is imperfect unless brought to actuality, it is necessary to posit infused knowledge in Christ. This is in keeping with the principle that the human nature assumed by the Word of God should not be imperfect in any way. This infused knowledge, in which the intelligible species of all things have been imprinted on the soul of Christ which is united to the

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[42] 3a, 9, 2 reply.

[43] 3a, 9, 3 reply.

Word of God, parallels that possessed by the angels since the beginning of creation.

Thus, not only knowledge which is distinctively human (acquired knowlege), but all types of knowledge which are possible for humans must be possessed by the incarnate Word in order that his perfection might be protected. These forms of knowledge, of course, are in addition to Christ's divine, uncreated knowledge present from all eternity. The beatific, infused, and acquired forms of knowledge all arise from the event of the incarnation.

The parallel section in Turrettini deals primarily with Christ's fulness of knowledge in relation to ignorance and learning. This is treated by Thomas in question twelve. As noted above, the presence of acquired knowledge in Christ has already been affirmed by Thomas.[44] His reasoning was based upon Aristotle's observation that "God and nature make nothing futile."[45] This general principle is particularly true in the case of Christ. The inevitable conclusion is that Christ's active intellect must have functioned to abstract intellectual species from the images given by the senses.

Building upon this prior conclusion, Thomas is concerned now to determine more precisely the character of this acquired knowledge. In particular, he is interested in ascertaining the relationship between it and the cognitive state resulting from the other types of knowledge which Christ had. The first and second articles of question twelve raise the most significant problems.

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[44] 3a, 9, 4.

[45] De Caelo et Mundo 1, 4, 271a33.

Article one asks whether Christ knew everything by means of acquired or experimental knowledge. The objections deny that he did. First, because Christ obviously had limited experiences--limited temporally to thirty years, approximately, in a particular historical time-period; limited geographically to Palestine. If he did not experience everything, it follows that he could not have omniscience via this mode of knowledge. The second objection applies this more specifically to the bodily senses which were not presented with all the objects of sensation, even all of those extant at that time. Accordingly, his acquired knowledge must have been limited.

The third objection suggests that there is something unfitting (inconveniens) about the assertion that Christ's acquired knowledge equalled (quantitatively) his infused and beatific knowledge. Therefore, the number of things known by Christ experimentally must be less than the sum total of available knowledge. He did not have exhaustive acquired knowledge.

The sed contra reintroduces the issue of perfection in its affirmation of Christ's complete acquired knowledge. It recalls that there was nothing imperfect in the soul of Christ. Yet, the attribution to Christ of anything less than complete experimental knowledge would constitute imperfection. The incompleteness of this knowledge is equivalent to imperfection. "Therefore, according to this knowledge, Christ knew all things."

In his reply, Thomas sets up an analogy between infused and acquired knowledge. Each of these types corresponds to a capacity of the human intellect. Infused knowledge "perfects" the passive

intellect; acquired knowledge is suited to the active intellect. The completeness of Christ's infused knowledge is to be paralleled by the completeness of his acquired knowledge. By each of these, the passive and active intellects of Christ, respectively, knew all that it was possible to know by such a mode. This avoids any "waste" in the Word's assumption of a human nature, including an agent intellect.

The body of Thomas' reply has anticipated the central element in his response to the third objection. The "all things" which Christ knew by means of experimental knowledge is not to be taken absolutely. Some things cannot be known experimentally and of these things, accordingly, the soul of Christ had no acquired knowledge. Thomas thus grants that the quantity of Christ's acquired knowledge is less than that of his infused or beatific knowledge.

The replies to the first two objections elaborate a clarification of the notion of "acquired knowledge." The objections imply that only immediately experienced knowledge qualifies under this category. Thomas points out that this is too restrictive. "Acquisition" includes not only experience of things themselves, but also experience of other things. By means of various types of reasoning (e.g., involving causes and effects, similarities, or distinctions), we may "acquire" knowledge of many more things than are themselves experienced. It is in this way that Christ was able to know all things. Because of the "excellence of his mental powers," he was able, from the objects that were present to his senses, to know other things as well, even if they were not present to his senses.

This first article has defended the perfection of Christ's acquired knowledge, in keeping with his divine perfection. The second article, conversely, defends the genuine humanity of this mode of his knowledge. Here the issue is the integrity of the "acquisition" of knowledge with its apparent corollaries of prior ignorance and the concomitant increase in knowledge.

This article is particularly noteworthy because of the personal dimension involved. Thomas has already mentioned his changed views upon this crucial aspect of the subject of the acquired knowledge of the incarnated.[46] In his Commentary on the Sentences, he concurred with Peter Lombard in his denial of any real increase in the acquired knowlege of Christ,[47] typical of most scholastics. He agreed with Lombard's endorsement of the Gloss quotation rejecting any increase in wisdom in Christ.[48] Conversely, they all rejected Ambrose's view, also cited by Lombard, that Luke's description of Christ as "increasing in wisdom and age" (Luke 2:52) must be given its full weight of meaning. According to these men, the "increase" in Christ's knowledge was only that of the conversion of infused intelligible species into images. Such an increase is "by experience" (i.e. the images being experienced) as Christ related the infused intelligible species to that which was newly received by the senses.

Though Thomas had earlier espoused this position, he now regards it as "inconveniens" that "Christ should lack what is a natural activity of

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[46] 3a, 9, 4

[47] Sentences III, 13, 1; 14, 1.

[48] Sentences III, 13,1 .

intelligence."[49] The agent intellect is intended to abstract intelligible species from images and does so as a natural activity of human beings. If this activity is absent from Christ, the genuineness of his humanity is jeopardized, whether because the agent intellect is absent or simply because its activity is absent. In the latter case, the additional problem of a "wasted" endowment also arises. Therefore, it seems "conveniens" to posit this abstracting activity to Christ. This means that we must affirm a habitus of knowledge which could increase by this abstraction of intelligible species, an activity which occurred successively throughout his life.

The objections to this article argued that, because the other two forms of knowledge were complete and did not increase, this third form likewise must have been complete (as was just concluded in article one) and therefore without increase. Moreover, growth implies prior imperfection "because what is perfect cannot receive additions." Such imperfection is improperly attributed to Christ and, thus, so is growth. Finally, John of Damascus is quoted as linking an affirmation of Christ's increase in knowledge with disrespect for the union of the divine and human incarnate Word. It is impious, therefore, to claim that Christ grew in knowledge.

Thomas signalled his changed views by citing in the sed contra the same Ambrose interpretation of Luke 2:52 which Lombard had rejected. He then distinguished two types of progress in knowledge. The first is secundum essentiam and involves the increase of the habitus of knowledge itself. The second is secundum effectum. In this, the habitus remains

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[49] 3a, 12, 2 reply.

unchanged while the knowledge is processively demonstrated to others, moving from simpler to more subtle matters. The second way Thomas regarded as obviously true because Christ's works increased as he grew to maturity. It is the first type of progress which is disputed.

The key to the difference between Thomas' earlier and later views is the attribution or denial of a habitus of acquired knowledge in the soul of Christ. That is, if some distinction is not made, then an essential increase in knowledge would have to affect the infused knowledge of Christ, an unacceptable eventuality in light of the conclusions reached earlier about the perfection of that knowledge.[50] Those who reject an increase in acquired knowledge also reject a distinct habitus of that knowledge. They thus limit the experimental knowledge of Christ to the conversion of infused intelligible species into images, as noted earlier.

Thomas' affirmation of this proposition thus involves two prior affirmations, both hinging upon his intent to preserve the integrity of the humanity of Christ. He affirms the presence of a habitus of acquired knowledge as a normal endowment of human beings and he affirms the natural activity of this habitus as a characteristic element in human intellectual life. Thus, while desirous of preserving unsullied the divine perfection of the incarnate Word, he is equally--and, among his contemporaries, notably--desirous of preserving the genuineness of Christ's humanity. Whether or not we are inclined to endorse the precise way in which he prosecuted those two tasks, we must commend Thomas' intent.

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[50] 3a, 11, 1.

This balancing act continues in articles three and four where Thomas on one hand denies that Christ learned from other men (because it is inconveniens that one of his dignity, the head of the Church and the source of grace, should be taught by any man) and on the other hand denies that Christ received knowledge from angels (because it would be out of keeping with the normal human sources of knowledge).

Thomas next investigates the power of Christ's soul.[51] As God, Christ was omnipotent and this question does not challenge that. Rather it asks whether this unlimited power of Christ's divine nature was communicated to the human nature. This parallels, of course, the just completed inquiry into Christ's human knowledge. In that case, such communication did occur. Regarding the power of Christ, however, Thomas gives the contrary verdict. Whether in the full sense (article one) or in more limited senses (articles two, three, and four), omnipotence is denied to the human nature of Christ. In this area of the incarnation, communicatio idiomatum does not occur. Thomas is concerned here, as generally, to preserve the true humanity of Christ and he finds no way to do so while attributing omnipotence to Christ's soul. In this, he does not appear to be exceptional. Although considerably briefer and not as clear, Lombard's discussion reaches a similar conclusion.[52]

The Infirmities of Christ

The last section of Thomas' treatise on the incarnation to be examined consists of questions fourteen and fifteen on the disabilities

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[51] 3a, 13.

[52] Sentences III, 14, 2.

of body and soul, respectively, assumed by Christ in his human nature. The four articles of question fourteen explore, respectively, the fittingness (convenientia) of the assumption of bodily defects, whether it was by inheritance, and why it was a selective assumption.

The objections to the assumption of bodily defects are based upon the perfection of Christ, the glorification of the body which results from the soul's beatific vision, and the absence of sin or guilt which could have brought the disabilities as punishment. The final objection contends that "it does not seem fitting" (conveniens) for Christ to assume the disabilities because they impeded the aim of the incarnation in several ways, relating principally to the impaired recognition of Christ and to the predominance of weakness instead of strength in Christ's person. According to the objector, "no sensible person" (sapiens) would jeopardize his ends by such disabilities.

Against these, Thomas in the sed contra sets Biblical passages which indicate that this resemblance by disability is integral to the help which the Son of God came to give. His reply identifies three reasons why indeed it was fitting (conveniens) for the Christ to be subject to human infirmities. Inasmuch as the incarnation was for the purpose of redemption, not only should Christ suffer death for humanity, he should also bear these other physical consequences of the sin of the human race. If the ultimate punishment is assumed, it surely is not unfitting to assume the penultimate punishments as well.

Secondly, because the only humanity known to us is one burdened by such infirmities, their presence in Christ underscores the reality of the incarnation. Finally, Christ models for us the patient endurance

which we are called to exemplify.

Thomas, in his replies to the objections, observes that Christ's beatitude, by an act of his divine will, was prevented from extending to his body. Christ thus chose to expose himself to disability and suffering which emphasizes the loving character of the incarnation when he forsook so many privileges, which were naturally his, for the purpose of redemption. To the charge that the affirmities hid Christ's identity, thus impeding the purpose of the incarnation, Thomas insists that, though his divinity may have been veiled, the infirmities made his humanity manifest "in the best possible way." Because Christ's humanity opened the way to God, such a clear manifestation is an aid to salvation, not an impediment.

The second and third articles discuss the basis for the assumption of the disabilities. While the objections to article two simply reject the proposition that the assumption was ex necessitate, the sed contra affirms such necessity as an essential element of Christ's "likeness to sinful flesh." Thomas replies, characteristically, by distinguishing two kinds of necessity. One kind is the necessity which involves external coercion contrary to the nature and the will of the subject. The other is a natural necessity which follows from the form or matter of a subject. Thomas affirms the second kind of Christ, because the assumption of corporeality post-fall necessarily involves the presence of disabilities and death.

He then makes an additional distinction regarding the first type of necessity. Christ was subject to the necessity of an external coercive force contrary to nature when the body of Christ submitted to the

necessity of the nails and whip. That is, they inflicted their damage upon the body in violation of its natural condition. However, Christ was not subject to the necessity of an external coercion contrary to his will because he voluntarily assumed humanity and the concomitant corporeality and infirmities. An act of the will transforms necessity into freedom.[53]

The third article inquires regarding a particular aspect of necessity, the notion of inheritance. The bodily disabilities are "natural" to post-lapsarian humans and what comes with our nature and from our origins (from parents likewise infirm) is described as inherited. Moreover, other men clearly inherit these infirmities and Christ is made like other men by the presence of these infirmities which presumably were assumed in an analogous fashion.

It is the cause-effect relationship which Thomas finds etymologically in "inherit" (contrahendi) which makes this proposition unacceptable to him. Had the cause of these infirmities (i.e. sin) been present in Christ, he could be said to have inherited them. He would have been legally liable for the punishment on the basis of the presence of the grounds of that punishment. However, because he did not deserve the infirmities but rather assumed them voluntarily in order to redeem humanity, the notion of inheritance (or contractual justice) must be rejected. After all, it was possible for him to assume a human nature without these infirmities. The "necessity" involved in Christ's assumption of infirmities arises from the redemptive end of the incarnation and not from the incarnation itself. In effect, the third

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[53] Summa Theologiae (Blackfriars ed.) Vol. 49:179, fn. g.

article is a further qualification of Thomas' acknowledgement of the ex necessitate character of Christ's assumption of bodily infirmities.

The final article in question fourteen further qualifies the assumption of infirmities, asking whether its authenticity required an inclusive assumption of all bodily disabilities. The inclusiveness of Christ's redemption, the fulness of his grace, and his endurance of the supreme infirmity of death are urged in favor of the question by the objections. The sed contra, however, points out the impossibility of the proposition inasmuch as some human weaknesses are contrary to each other.

Thomas' reply omits this strong logical notion of impossibility because of mutual exclusivity, emphasizing instead the inconveniens of the proposition. He distinguishes three categories of disabilities. Some arise from original sin but are incompatible with perfect knowledge and grace and hence should not be assumed by Christ. Others are not common to all humanity because not arising from original sin, resulting instead from special causes such as one's own fault or from defects of the formative powers of the individual. These too are inconveniens for Christ. It is the third category which he assumed, those disabilities which arise from the first sin, yet are, in Damascene's words, "natural and unshameful afflictions".[54] This is a particularly clear case of Thomas' policy of protecting the genuiness of Christ's divinity and humanity, insisting on the fullest scope possible to his humanity without detracting from his divine perfection.

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[54] On the Orthodox Faith 1, 11.

Moving from the bodily disabilities to those of the soul, Thomas begins question fifteen with two articles regarding the presence of sin in Christ. Five objections affirm the first inquiry, "was sin in Christ?", each of them arising from a passage of Scripture. Several focus on the relationship between Christ and other human beings, arguing that his solidarity with sinful humans or his example for the redeemed imply the presence of sin in Christ. The sed contra simply cites Christ's profession of sinlessness.

Three principles from the opening of the present section on disabilities are recalled by Thomas to explain why Christ ought not to have assumed sin.[55] These principles identified the purpose for this assumption. In each case, the assumption of the disability of sin would not have contributed to the achievement of the purpose. Sin would have impaired the sacrificial work of Christ by sullying his atonement. It would not have authenticated his humanity for it is not part of human nature, being from the devil, not from God. Furthermore, sin would have corrupted Christ's example of virtue. In short, the assumption of sin would have been counter-productive to the divine design for the incarnation and thus did not occur. This answer, it should be noted, is "economic," not metaphysical.

If actual or original sin was not in Christ, perhaps at least the spark (fomes) of sin was, article two proposes. The objections agree, arguing from the close link between corporeality and the vulnerability to sin and from the necessity for the presence of the opponent if the personal spiritual conquest of Christ is to be possible.

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[55]See 3a, 14, 1.

While the sed contra rejects the question because of Christ's conception by the Holy Spirit, Thomas' reply concentrates upon the fulness of grace and virtue in Christ. The perfection of virtue is measured by the degree of subjection to reason. Consequently, in Christ, who had the highest possible degree of virtue, the degree of conformity to reason would also be maximal. Accordingly, there was no moral defect in him, not even the defect of fomes.

Thomas notes in passing at the end of the reply that, in terms of the teleological principles discussed in the previous article, the presence of fomes must be rejected. The spark of sin would not have aided Christ's redemptive work, but only contravened it. Thomas' use of economic arguments for Christ's sinfulness is made more noteworthy by the absence of any reasoning based upon Christ's impeccability. Such reasoning had occupied him in his commentary on Lombard's Sentences, as it did most other scholastics. Here, however, it is noticeably absent. While it would be unsound to infer any hesitency about such reasoning on Thomas' part at this stage in his life, it is contextually "fitting" that the present discussion argues from the purpose of the incarnation.

Thomas returns to the subject of Christ's ignorance in article three, treated now as a disability of soul rather than under the heading of Christ's knowledge. The objections cite patristic and scriptural statements which seem to attribute ignorance of Christ. Thomas, however, rejects the proposal, arguing that, just as the fulness of grace and virtue in Christ excluded sin (and even the fomes), so also does the fulness of knowledge exclude ignornace.

This seems, prima facie, to conflict with Thomas' earlier

insistence upon the genuine humanity and consequent growth in acquired knowledge. In his reply to the first objection, he explains that we must distinguish between the state of Christ's human nature *per se* and its condition in light of the union with the Word and the consequent *communicatio idiomatum*. By itself, the human nature was lacking in knowledge, but by virtue of the union with the Son of God, it had the fulness of knowledge. The decisive factor regarding this issue seems to be the unqualified nature of the ignorance in question. Thomas' earlier statements concerned only acquired knowledge;[56] the present proposal has no such specific focus. Thomas will not permit an unqualified attribution of ignorance to Christ, insisting instead upon a carefully nuanced affirmation. In terms of what seems to be his programmatic agenda, the question in this article attempts to recognize Christ's true humanity, yet it fails to correspondingly guard his divinity. Such a sacrifice of Christ's divine perfection is unacceptable to Thomas.

It is interesting that Thomas makes no mention of his earlier distinction between ignorance and nescience.[57] In his discussion of the causes of sin, he had contrasted a mere (innocent) absence of knowledge (nescience) with a culpable failure to know that for which we have a natural aptitude and which we have an obligation to know. Here, some of the cited objections seem to involve nescience and not ignorance. Furthermore, such a distinction would be of use in affirming the genuine humanity of Christ without detracting from his divine perfection.

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[56] 3a, 12.

[57] 1a2ae, 76, 2.

Articles four through nine investigate a series of passiones, asking regarding their presence in the soul of Christ. Article four treats the topic generally while the subsequent articles are more specific. The objections reject the passiones on the grounds that they are associated with the fomes or illness and also because they would indicate inferiority to some creature which caused them. Following a Scriptural gloss, the sed contra simply notes the Biblical affirmation of Christ's passibility.

Thomas proceeds to distinguish several ways in which the soul can be moved. The first distinction is between physical and emotional causes. Physical causes involve bodily hurts which indirectly move the soul, the form of the body. The physical vulnerability of Christ meant he was also passible in this way.

Emotional passiones include those actions which are either peculiar to the soul or else predominantly psychical. Thomas subdivides such movements into those of the intelligence and those of the feelings (of the sense appetite). The latter are most properly called emotions, as earlier discussions in the Summa had concluded.[58] Thomas affirms these of Christ as well, because "he also had whatever else pertained to human nature."

The presence of emotions in Christ is distinguished from their presence in us in three ways. Their objects were always lawful, their origin was always under the rule of reason, and their effect was always confined to the sense appetite and did not prevent reason from doing what was proper. Christ has full and genuine human emotions, but they

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[58] 1a2ae, 22, 3; 41, 1.

were completely proper in every way, never excessive or uncontrolled.

This conclusion is then applied to pain, sadness, fear, a sense of wonder, and anger in articles five through nine. Each of these emotions is affirmed to have been present in Christ's soul within the limits of the general policy of doing justice to both the divinity and humanity in the incarnation and also within the bounds of the three-fold qualification elaborated in article four. Pain is affirmed quite straightforwardly while sadness, fear, and wonder are more carefully nuanced. In particular, the latter is limited to one aspect of his human nature, his experimental knowledge. Anger is distinguished into unrighteous and righteous, a classification which likewise applies to the rest of the human race.

Later in the Tertia Pars, in the treatment of the passion and death of Christ, Thomas elaborates on the nature of Christ's suffering. Question forty-six asks first concerning the necessity, superiority, and propriety of Christ's suffering. While rejecting a necessity of compulsion, Thomas does affirm a necessitate finis for the Messianic passion (articles one and two). He enumerates five advantages which accrue to us because of the redemptive suffering of Christ, making this an unsurpassed means of salvation (article three). Seven reasons are given to support the fittingness of the crucifixion (article four). Though of course he could not experience specifically every human way of suffering, Christ did endure every type of human suffering (article five) and these in the maximum degree (article six).

Article seven of question fifteen investigates an aspect of the topic of Christ's passion which Turrettini specifically addresses. The

objections deny that Christ's suffering extended to the entirety of his soul. They claim that the suffering should not and could not involve the intellect. The reply distinguishes between two meanings of "suffering in the whole soul": suffering in essence of the soul and suffering in all of the parts (or powers) of the soul. It also distinguishes between suffering from the object to which a faculty is directed and suffering in the subject in which the faculty is founded. The first kind is called passione propria, apparently because the faculty itself experiences sufferings inflicted by an object to which it is naturally oriented. The second kind is perhaps more indirect suffering, by participation in some more basic entity.

In light of these distinctions, Thomas insists that the soul of Christ suffered in its essence because of its intimate relationship to the body which suffered. However, Christ did not suffer in all of soul's powers, at least not in the "proper" sense. Christ's lower powers did suffer from their objects (temporal things). On the other hand, his superior reason suffered only with its subject, i.e. the essence of the soul. The object of the higher power is God, from whom Christ could not experience suffering, but only delight and joy. Thus, while refusing to assert unqualifiedly that Christ suffered in the entirety of his soul, Thomas evidently is concerned that protection of the perfection of Christ's soul would not erode the clear Biblical affirmations of Christ's psychical suffering. Accordingly, he seeks to involve the soul more extensively in the passion of Christ, while scrupulously protecting the superior reason's focus upon God. This apparently is intended to preserve unbroken the beatific knowledge which

Christ had throughout his earthly life. Article eight explains that this unmarred fellowship with God continued throughout the suffering and death of Christ, giving Christ joy and perfect bliss despite that which he endured in his body and lower parts of the soul.

Article twelve makes clear that Christ suffered only in his human nature, his divine nature remaining impassible. The person of Christ can be said to suffer only from its human nature, a communicatio idiomatum.

Thomas concludes this question with a summary topic. He asks whether Christ was simultaneously a pilgrim (viator) and a beholder (comprehensor). This aptly poses the fundamental issue in much of the preceding discussion in this section of the Summa. Granted that Christ is simultaneously true God and true man, is his humanity simultaneously in the beatitude of one beholding God and also in the wayfaring limitations of one who lives in the present world of suffering and death? The contrast is bluntly stated by Thomas in the opening line of his reply: a pilgrim is one proceeding towards beatitude; a beholder has already obtained it.

The answer given is that at the same time, Christ is both of these, but not in the same way. Christ indeed had beatitude in all that belongs properly to the soul, but he lacked beatitude in other ways, pertaining both to the body and to the soul. The lack of beatitude in the soul seems to be Christ's liability to the passiones. Thomas earlier had explained that Christ chose to limit the effects of his beatitude to the soul.[59] This necessarily had involved also limitations

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[59] 3a, 14, 1 ad 2.

within the soul to the extent that it was the form of the body. The presence of emotions in Christ's soul also was attributed to his choice.[60] The choice, it will be remembered, was rooted in the economy of redemption, made for the purpose of accomplishing salvation for humanity. Here too, then, Thomas remains consistent in his "balancing act." The perfection of Christ (including his beatitude), necessary because of the hypostatic union itself and also for the effective work of the Messiah, is affirmed, yet so is the humanity of Christ, likewise necessary for the union and for redemption. The agency for this carefully nuanced duality is the will of Christ, choosing to maintain the genuine simultaneity of viator and comprehensor, for the benefit of the human race.

Conclusion

We must wait until the comparison with Turrettini is completed before determining the significance of the Summa's treatment of "the mystery of the incarnation," but already at this point some observations may be made regarding this example of medieval scholasticism. Several characteristics are notable, particularly in light of Brian Armstrong's description of scholasticism.[61] Some of the elements in his portrayal do not fit Thomas in general terms, quite apart from the present study. However, specifically in light of this investigation, it should be noted that Thomas does not "assert religious truth on the basis of deductive ratiocination from given assumptions or principles." While there surely

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[60] 3a, 14, 4 ad 1.

[61] See above, p. 5.

is an abundance of syllogistic reasoning and a clear reliance upon Aristotle, it is not deductive in any embracing or programmatic sense (note the contrast with Anselm's treatment of similar topics). In fact, quite the contrary is true about the sources and authoritative presentation of many of Thomas' premises and about his ex convenientia arguments in particular.

Consequently, Armstrong's second point is also inapplicable. Thomas quite clearly does not employ reason in such a way that it "assumes at least equal standing with faith in theology, thus jettisoning some of the authority of revelation." Rather, he frequently countered philosophical arguments with Scriptural and creedal statements, indicating the limits of such reasoning. This is not surprising in light of Thomas' explicit demarcation of the boundary between natural and revealed theology (with the incarnation in the latter realm).[62] Philosophical reasoning was limited to a supporting role in revealed theology, refuting hostile arguments and elucidating the meaning of that which was revealed.[63]

The fourth characteristic fits awkwardly at best. Thomas obviously raises metaphysical matters at numerous points (where he seems to be in line with the early Christological councils), but at crucial junctures he insisted upon the limitations of our knowledge of God's essence. The degree of accuracy of my criticisms of his de dicto orientation is the degree to which Armstrong's description misses the mark. The presence

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[62]For the definitions and distinctions, see, e.g. 1a, 1, 1; Summa Contra Gentiles 1, 4-5; Faith, Reason and Theology 1, 2 and 4; 2, 1-3; 3, 1-2.

[63]Faith, Reason and Theology 2, 3.

of "speculative" elements (in Armstrong's sense of the term) was previously acknowledged.[64] However, these seem to be the exception rather than the rule. Thomas is primarily pursuing an understanding of the meaning of the incarnation for the person of Christ. His detailed investigation is a continual search into the myriad aspects of the complex being of the God-man. The inquiry surely is concrete in its focus upon the actual individual in question. Even the counterfactual questions are for the purpose of gaining understanding of the actual. We need not endorse the whole of the inquiry nor its conclusions to be able to acknowledge the legitimacy of the fundamental orientation.

We should also notice that Thomas is an atypical scholastic at several points of the present subject, such as the possibility of a non-redemptive incarnation and the presence of acquired knowledge in Christ. His postulation of the existence of alternative, non-incarnational ways of redemption is at least non-Anselmian and perhaps also unusual among his contemporaries, apparently anticipating in some ways the potentia absoluta of fourteenth-century thought.

All of this, combined with the non-polemical, non-apologetical perspective, makes Thomas' treatise on the incarnation a poor match for some standard views of scholastic theology, and perhaps somewhat surprising even for more experienced students of medieval scholasticism. It remains to be seen how he compares with Francois Turrettini.

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[64]See fn. 7 of this chapter.

Chapter Five

Turrettini on the Incarnation

Turrettini treats the incarnation in locus thirteen of the Institutio Theologiae Elencticae. Written in the closing years of his life, as noted earlier, this work not only gives his mature positions on theological issues, it also displays his pedagogical perspective for the training of ecclesiastical leadership.[1]

The Nature of the Institutio

The title itself is revealing. The first two words indicate Turrettini's intention to provide basic or foundational instruction in theology. He thus follows Calvin's usage and, behind him, numerous classical works in various disciplines.[2] However, the third term differs from Calvin, who had specified Religionis as the focus of his fundamental instruction in Christianity. Others, of course, had not added any third term to qualify their aim. Nevertheless, Turrettini informed the reader that he intended an "elenctic" theological education

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[1]For introductory material on Turrettini's Institutio, see de Budé, Vie de Francois Turrettini, pp. 169-171; Keizer, Francois Turrettini, pp. 231-237, Phillips, "Francis Turretin's Idea of Theology," pp. 104-110.

[2]See Calvin: Institutes of the Christian Religion, 2 vols. (ed. John T. McNeill and trans. Ford Lewis Battles; Library of Christian Classics 20-21; Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1960) xxxi, n.3; Muller, Dictionary of Latin and Greek Theological Terms: Drawn Principally from Protestant Scholastic Theology (Grand Rapids: Baker Book House, 1985) p. 155-156.

to result from his writing.

Originally a Greek term, this word had a long and varied history with great range of usage from the classical to Koiné periods.[3] The New Testament continues the development begun in the Septuagint, focusing increasingly upon ideological, moral, or judicial exposure of errors. The Latin term, which originally denoted a jewelled pendant (which was "exposed"), later, perhaps under the influence of the Greek New Testament, was used by the Protestant scholastics to designate an ideological refutation.[4] De Budé renders it polémique,[5] and Keizer even suggests that polemica would have been a more accurate choice.[6] Muller suggests that the term was broader than "polemics" because it also implied a positive statement in the wake of the negative (i.e. the refutation of an opposing view).[7] Turrettini obviously included an elaboration of his position, setting the stage by discussing the present state of controversy.

Muller's explanation of the sense of elencticus as generally used by Protestant orthodoxy corresponds well to the two-fold purpose of Turrettini's work. The combination of institutio and elencticae suggests "teaching beginners by means of the controversies." This observation is explicitly confirmed in the Praefatio ad Lectorem. Like

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[3]See Theological Dictionary of the New Testament 10 vols. (ed. G. Kittel and G. Friedrich; trans. G. W. Bromiley; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1964-74) 2:473-476.

[4]Muller, Dictionary, p. 101.

[5]de Budé, Vie de Francois Turrettini, p. 169.

[6]Keizer, Francois Turrettini, pp. 231-232.

[7]Muller, Dictionary, p. 101.

Thomas (and countless other teachers), Turrettini wrote this textbook out of a conviction that students were ill-served by existing alternatives. In this case, the prevalent tome was Samuel Maresius' Decades, a part of his Collegium Theologicum.[8] Each of the twenty chapters on a theological topic was divided into ten statements. By use in classroom disputation, Maresius intended these propositions to give students an understanding of Christian doctrine.

Turrettini regarded the Decades as inadequate for several reasons.[9] It failed to set the propositions in a sufficient historical and ideological context for the student to grasp the origin and significance of the relevant dispute. He also observed that "some distinctions and observations" were lacking, which could guide the novice in assessing the issues. In addition, the major errors should be identified and the principal objections against orthodoxy should be answered. In short, the Decades gave too little help to students in their attempt to understand and assess the various aspects of theology.

Turrettini intended to maintain the "controversial" element in Maresius' work, but to alter its thrust. In the Institutio, there is less emphasis on providing topics for classroom disputation, and a greater focus upon providing the reader with the identification and explanation of the actual controversies past and present. This occurs in two ways. First, the content of the work is chosen for its controversial significance. Second, the explanation of each topic

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[8]For brief sketches of Maresius (1599-1673), see Phillips, "Francis Turretin's Idea of Theology," p. 104 n. 58; Muller, Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics, I:48.

[9]Institutio, I:xxiii-xxiv.

chosen is placed in its historical context, with the principle persons and parties and their respective arguments carefully marshalled. Thus, both the criterion for inclusion and also the method of treatment are "controversial." Turrettini's is explicitly a polemical instruction in theology (or, an instruction in polemical theology). Clearly, he thinks that the disputes, both ancient and modern, are an apt means to gain a "basic instruction" in Christianity.[10]

Yet he just as clearly recognizes some limitations to this approach. Both the criterion for selection and the treatment of topics circumscribe the scope of the Institutio. Turrettini warns the readers not to expect a "full and accurate system of theology"[11]; instead they will find a guide to the principal controversies. Not all of theology can be treated by focusing upon disputes. Even those which can be included may not receive a full exposition. Turrettini apparently is distinguishing what we might call "systematic theology" from "polemical theology." In Phillips' words, "he is not developing a didactic theology, but a polemics."[12] This suggests that some critics who have faulted the character of Turrettini's theology err by applying inappropriate standards. The divergent intentions of Calvin's Institutiones and Turrettini's Institutio are striking. Though there is an apologetic thrust to Calvin's work, increasingly prominent in the later editions, he increasingly emphasized his goal "to prepare and

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[10]See de Budé, Vie de Francois Turrettini, 170; see also Abelard's similar observations in his preface to Sic et Non, p. 103.

[11]Institutio, I:xxiv; see also Keizer, Francois Turrettini, p. 237.

[12]Phillips, "Francis Turretin's Idea of Theology," p. 114.

instruct candidates in sacred theology for the reading of the divine Word, in order that they may be able both to have easy access to it and to advance in it without stumbling."[13] On the other hand, Turrettini intends "a guide to the debates" more than "a guide to the Bible." Whether rightly or wrongly, he apparently judged that the theological students most needed a guide through the myriad of disputes which dominated that period of religious history.

In support of such an emphasis, Gerrit Keizer notes that seventeenth century theology in general was polemically oriented—dogmatic not exegetical and more polemical than historical.[14] In his judgment, the Institutio admirably succeeds in its intention of introducing students to the controversies of theology; in fact,

> est-elle, entre toutes, l'oeuvre dogmatique qui nous renseigne le plus clairement, le plus rapidement et le plus facilement sur l' opinion de la théologie protestante du dix-septiéme siècle, sur l'orthodoxie ou l'hétérodoxie de tel ou tel point controversé.[15]

If it provides this for modern readers, we may assume that it functioned similarly for Turrettini's students.

Of course, he was not satisfied merely to present the facts of the controversies from the perspective of a dispassionate observer. He selected the controversies because of their significance as threats to orthodoxy and felt compelled to provide the students with guidance, not only for the nature of the dispute but also for its correct solution.

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[13]"John Calvin to the Reader" in Calvin: Institutes of the Christian Religion, p. 4.

[14]Keizer, Francois Turrettini, p. 271.

[15]Ibid., p. 236.

According to de Budé, Turrettini identified Pelagianism, Socinianism, and Arianism as principal threats to infiltrate and corrupt orthodoxy.[16] He presumably included Catholicism under these forms (perhaps under the first). It was the struggle for conversions against Catholicism that made polemics a high priority and created a need for literature suited for this pastoral task, in de Budé's judgment.[17]

Polemics, then, clearly dominates the purpose of this work. However, it does not exclude the other goals which Turrettini had established. Identify, explain, and adjudicate the ancient and modern controversies, but in so doing, also teach theology to young students (within the limitations of the method). Moreover, he desired to lead the students to growth in piety as well,[18] part of which involved the humility and wisdom to restrain vain curiosity from unseemly investigations, seeking to know more than humans should or engaging in futile debates.

The Structure of the Institutio

The Institutio is composed of twenty loci. The first two deal, respectively, with the object, nature and method of theology and with the Sacred Scriptures. According to Keizer, these loci constitute the formal part of the work while the remainder are the material part.[19] The other headings are God as one and triune, the divine decrees in

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[16] de Budé, Vie de Francois Turrettini, p. 185.

[17] Ibid.

[18] Institutio, I:xxv.

[19] Keizer, Francois Turrettini, p. 235.

general and predestination in particular, creation, providence, angels, pre-fall human beings and the covenant of nature, sin, human free will, the law of God, the covenant of grace, the person and states of Christ, the mediatorial office of Christ, calling and faith, justification, sanctification, the Church, the sacraments and the last things.

Though there are significantly different emphases and some notable additions and omissions, the order of topics is not dissimilar to Cavin's in his Institutes. Calvin does not talk explicitly of "a covenant of nature," he gives his extended treatment of predestination following his soteriological discussion, and his order for the sections on justification and sanctificaiton is the reverse of Turrettini's. Beyond these, relatively minor points, the order of topics is similar.

Keizer states that "en partant de Dieu, Turrettini retourne a Dieu."[20] Interestingly, he observes that this arrangement exemplifies the truth of a maxim of St. Bonaventure that God is not only "rerum primum principium et exemplar effectivum in creatione, sed etiam refectivum in redemptione et perfectivum in retributione."[21] Moreover, Keizer says that it has the additional merit of following the order which God indicated in his revelation.

We previously encountered this rationale for the structure of theology in Thomas and, before him, in Peter Lombard. Behind both of them (and perhaps especially Thomas) was the Neo-Platonic tradition in Christian theology. Notably, this resemblance to a medieval scholastic principle is not Aristotelian, but Neo-Platonic. As mentioned

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[20] Ibid.

[21] Ibid.

previously[22] and also suggested by Keizer, the basic Biblical (and historical) pattern from creation to consummation perhaps mitigates the ideological uniqueness of this "Neo-Platonic" scheme. Yet the consistency of the outworking of this schema on the intermediate topics may legitimate such an identification.

Keizer describes this pattern as "une synthese tres juste."[23] The use of the term "synthese" must not be taken to mean some sort of an abstract or deductive system. As noted, this arrangement is an attempt to identify the inter-relationships which the Biblical history of redemption suggests to us. Perhaps it can be described as an attempt to find in the flow of redemptive history an indication of the ontological relationships of God, his actions and his creatures. History and metaphysics unite, as that which came from God's hand, but was corrupted, is restored to harmonious submission again. Beardslee notes that "we must remember that it is his [Turrettini's] intention to understand all theology in terms of the relationship of God to his creation. This knowledge of God as saviour of men, not as 'God-in-Himself' is what makes theology 'practical.'"[24]

The length of the loci vary significantly, reflecting diversity in the breadth of coverage and also the detail of the analysis. They range from the twenty-two page locus on the state of pre-fall human beings and the covenant of nature to the two hundred eighty-four page discussion of Church. Nearly all of the loci are subdivided further by Turrettini,

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[22]See pp. 51-52.

[23]Keizer, Francois Turrettini, p. 235.

[24]Beardslee, "Theological Development at Geneva," p. 377.

grouping the component questiones around various aspects of the locus.[25] Some of the subsections come from an analysis of the topic of the locus while others are selected merely because they are (or were) points of controversy. As an example of this last type, the last section of locus four, on the decrees and predestination, consists of question eighteen, on the order of the divine decree. Turrettini introduces the question by noting that "quamvis Christiana pietas ista Quaestione facile carere potuisset, being "soberly" content with what had been revealed, yet the "pertinacity of the opponents" requires an inquiry which will delineate the truth and refute the falsehoods in order to protect the grace of God against the free will of human beings.[26] Save for its controverial significance, this subject would not be included.

The basic components of the loci are the quaestiones. The larger subsections of the loci are simply one or more quaestiones with a topical heading. The indicative phrasing of the loci and the subsections contrasts with the interrogative form of these fundamental units. This of course places him in a long tradition of academic theology, extending back into the twelfth and thirteenth century. The comment by Gerrit Keizer[27] that the use of questions to present theological content in a textbook had originated with Thomas in his Summa Theologiae is inaccurate, of course, giving too much credit to him at too late a date in the scholastic developments. Moreover, as

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[25]The exception is the five question locus ten on the free will of sinful humans; the equally brief locus seventeen on sanctification and good works has five subsections.

[26]Institutio locus 4, quaestio 18, paragraph 1.

[27]Keizer, Francois Turrettini, p. 235.

Phillips points out, the use of quaestiones need not be seen as a conscious or novel return to Catholic scholasticism for "Turretin's formal method is very similar to that proposed by [Antoine] Sadeel in the late fifteen hundreds."[28]

> In fact, Turretin's systematics is representative of the historical line issuing from Sadeel's methodological innovation in Protestant theology. There is no need to trace it back to Aquinas, as is commonly done; it is firmly rooted in the history of Protestant dogmatics.[29]

If the question concerns the immediate source of Turrettini's method, i.e. where he acquired this approach to theology, then Phillips is correct. Moreover, Thomas is not distinctive or original among medieval scholastic users of the quaestio method. Yet, as suggested in chapters two and three, there is no reason to be squeamish about the medieval Catholic roots of this approach when used by Protestants. It does not represent a "retrograde" movement by the later Protestants. Throughout the Renaissance and Reformation, the quaestio/disputatio method had remained basic to theological education. It would be more surprising if Turrettini had failed to use it in his teaching. As seen earlier, it was the fundamental structure of the work he was attempting to improve, Maresius' Decades, and not one of the features which he had found pedogogically ineffective.

Often, Turrettini follows the statement of the question with an indication of whether his answer is affirmative or negative. Some of these cite the opponent whose teachings have aroused the controversy behind the question, e.g. the Catholics, the Socinians, the

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[28]Phillips, "Francis Turrettin's Idea of Theology," p. 110 n. 67.

[29]Ibid.

Remonstrants, the Lutherans.

These features vary somewhat and so do the three parts which structure the questions. Although several paragraphs of general introduction may open the question, the first major unit is usually the status quaestionis. Here Turrettini clarifies the point at issue, delineating what is agreed upon by the parties to the disputes and bracketing what is irrelevant in the immediate context. This portion of a quaestio often contains several distinctions which enable the readers to focus their thinking more precisely.

Following this sketch of the controversy (including the historical background of persons, movements, and events), Turrettini proceeds to set forth what he regards as the orthodox (i.e. Biblical and Reformed) answer. Here he positively states the position which addresses the questions most satisfactorily. Distinctions and qualifications are a common feature of this section as well. Imprecision and lack of subtlety are frequent sources of error, according to Turrettini, though overly-subtle distinctions and an inordinate curiosity are equally harmful.[30]

Typical of his approach is the identification of the orthodox position as the via media between two extremes. Phillips states that it is "his usual pedagogical device." "Turretin carefully delineates his position by rejecting those who 'sin in excess' and 'in defect'" (in this case with regard to reason).[31] He was well aware that error often

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[30]For such warnings, see Institutio I:xxv; also see the rejection of "speculation," e.g. 13, 3, 11; also 13, 3, 2 and 4.

[31]Phillips, "Francis Turretin's Idea of Theology," p. 336; also see Muller, "Scholasticism Protestant and Catholic," p. 201.

comes in the complementary varieties of opposite extremes. Truth thus cannot be found by moving as far as possible from a particular error, lest one back into the other, usually equally untrue extreme.

Turrettini is "primarily occupied with the specific attacks upon the Reformed stance."[32] What Phillips notes concerning the first locus as a whole, Beardslee finds to be typical of many quaestiones, e.g. the series on the decalogue. "Following his custom," he "restricts himself to the letter, and gives much space to the rejection of particular 'errors' of rival schools of theology."[33] This breaks up Turrettini's treatment, preventing it from being either full or smooth flowing. He clearly gives the reader the essential statement of the orthodox position, carefully defined and distinguished and thoroughly defended, but we are frequently left desiring more exposition of it. As Phillips rightly observes, this "fragmentation" is "a reflection of the theological genre he employs."[34]

Following his positive statement, Turrettini sets forth his proofs for it.

> Turretin's proofs almost entirely are based upon Scriptural texts or the implications from other doctrines. If the question is within the realm of natural theology, Turretin may corroborate it on extra-Biblical grounds, but only after the doctrine has been established from Scripture. Turretin's Biblical proofs can be divided into two types. On some occasions these texts are explicated with great care, using the exegetical resources then available....In other places, however, Biblical references are listed with little or no commentary....Since this is a polemics, Turretin must focus his remarks upon the essential points in question; but on the other hand, since he intends for this work to be beneficial

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[32]Phillips, "Francis Turretin's Idea of Theology," p. 115.

[33]Beardslee, "Theological Development at Geneva," p. 626.

[34]Phillips, "Francis Turretin's Idea of Theology," p. 115.

> to the uninitiated, he must provide the elementary Biblical supports for his position.[35]

If Phillips is correct, then what often looks like "proof-texting" systematics, reflecting Turrettini's view of the method of dogmatics, may only be the limitations imposed by his determination to write a polemical theology. In support of Phillips is the surprising range of the citations of Biblical scholarship in the Institutio, both ancient and modern, textual and lexical, Reformed, Catholic, and often Jewish.

The final section of most quaestiones, following the status quaestionis and the statement of the orthodox position, is the fontes solutionum. Here Turrettini notes the spectrum of criticisms of the view which he proposes, giving the "source" or basis for a satisfactory reply to the objections. In this portion, Turrettini's breadth and analytic acumen are clearly displayed. Whether or not his explanations are satisfying in every case,[36] he seems alert to the principal challenges.

Locus Thirteen: De Persona et Statu Christi

Like Thomas, Turrettini reserves the examination of the incarnate Christ until creation, humanity, sin and law have been discussed. Locus three, the unity and triunity of God, argued for the deity, personal distinctiveness, and eternal procession of the Son. The incarnation of that Son was left until the stage was set for a discussion of the work

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[35] Ibid., pp. 108-109.

[36] Samuel Alexander ("Turrettin," Biblical Reportory and Princeton Review 20 [1848] 462) says that they "often furnish examples of as pithy and discriminating replies as are any where [sic] to be found."

of the Messiah on behalf of a creation and humanity fallen in sin. This marks the treatment as redemptively oriented, the person of Christ being treated in the context of his ministry.[37]

The contents of this locus range quite widely. The following locus will treat the mediatorial office of Christ, especially the triple office of prophet, priest, and King (and including his sacrificial atonement as part of his priestly work). The present locus will include such historical questions as the date of Christ's birth as well as fundamental inter-religious issues as whether the Messiah has come yet and, if so, whether Jesus of Nazareth was the Messiah. The entire scope of his life is treated, from the virgin birth up to his present heavenly session, including his suffering, death, and resurrection. In short, it treats the necessary personal background to an understanding of the Son of God's "official" work of redemptive mediacy.

The locus begins with the advent and identity of the Messiah (questions one and two), asks next regarding the necessity of the incarnation (question three), and then sets forth the nature and mode of the incarnational union in the God-man and its effects (questions four through eight). The remainder of the locus treats the two states of Christ, first his humiliation and then his exaltation (questions nine through nineteen). Thus, within a redemptive context (see questions one through three), the person of Christ and his life are discussed. This in turn provides the setting for the elaboration of Christ's mediatorial

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[37]See Muller, Christ and the Decree: Predestination and Christology in Reformed Theology From Calvin to Perkins for this as a typical motif in Reformed theology, p. 147.

office in locus fourteen.[38]

The prominence of the "states of Christ" motif means that Turrettini will discuss certain topics at a different stage of the treatment of this doctrine than Thomas did. For instance, the question of the grace and the gifts in Christ, the knowledge of the soul of Christ, and the capacity for suffering of Christ are placed by Turrettini in the historical progression through Christ's state of humiliation. On the other hand, Thomas treated those topics in his analysis of the nature and effects of the hypostatic union, not in his subsequent treatment of the life of Christ. In an interesting reversal of this pattern, Thomas waits until the later section to discuss more fully the communicatio idiomatum[39] while Turrettini places it in the section on the incarnation.[40]

The "states of Christ" approach means that Turrettini will raise his metaphysical questions within an historical context. While a good deal of space is occupied with a defense of the facticity of certain events, Turrettini is at least equally concerned to defend the orthodox position on the doctrinal, and particularly redemptive, significance of those realities. In his handling of these matters, Turrettini only infrequently poses counterfactual questions as a means to gain greater understanding of an event, circumstance, or relationship. That is, he

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[38]See Turrettini's own introductory orientation to these two loci in Institutio, 13, 1, 1; cf. Muller, Christ and the Decree, pp. 59, 140-141 for claims that such a structure was replaced or transformed in Reformed theology.

[39]Summa Theologiae, 3a, 16, 4 and 5.

[40]Institutio, locus 13, quaestio 8.

devotes more attention to the establishment, definition, and defence of the orthodox view than he does to the investigation of its further meaning and significance. This of course is not surprising in light of his identification of his work as a polemical theology, not a full and complete systematic theology. He groups the nineteen questions under fifteen headings, thus indicating that the locus is geared to breadth of coverage, not depth. The longest questions of the locus are thirteen and ten pages (on the coming and identity of the Messiah). Several are two or three pages long. We must characterize him as thorough in identifying the disputes but concise in his treatment of them.

All but three of the quaestiones indicate Turrettini's own stance of affirmation or denial in their titles. The majority are affirmed, though several quaestiones are composite and in some cases draw a split judgment. Only eleven mention the opponent by name (two mention a couplet of opponents). The Lutherans and Catholics each are cited three times, the Socinians and Jews twice, and the Nestorians, Eutychians, Anabaptists, and Remonstrants once. Even those questions which do not indicate a specific opponent in their title engage in citation and debate in the course of their discussion. For example, question twelve, on the graces and gifts bestowed on Christ, does not name anyone in the title, but in the fontes solutionum, Turrettini takes issue with certain Catholic writers who criticize the Reformed position.

The Advent and Identity of the Messiah

Turrettini identifies the first two quaestiones of this locus as treating the advent and the person of the Messiah.[41] Directed against

[41] Locus 13, quaestio 1, paragraph 2.

the Jews, they establish that the long promised and expected Messiah has already come and that he was Jesus of Nazareth. Passages such as Genesis 49:10 (referring to the coming of "Shiloh") and Daniel 9:24-27 (seventy "weeks") are expounded at some length[42] to support the first century appearance of the Messiah. More briefly, Turrettini argues that the glory of the Second Temple[43] and various signs associated with the Jews, the world, and the Church[44] identify the Messianic advent as having already occurred.

The second question covers the marks which identify Jesus as the Messiah: his birth, his three-fold offices and two states, his works, and finally certain absurdities which would follow from the (counterfactual) denial of Jesus as the Christ. One-third of the question (eleven of thirty-two paragraphs) is devoted to the first mark including its time, the forerunner, its place, and its mode.[45] Christ's offices and states will receive separate attention later (locus fourteen for the offices; questions nine through nineteen of the present locus for the states).

When discussing Shiloh, Daniel's weeks, and the birth of the Messiah, Turrettini gives close attention to the text of Scripture. He treats the translation of the Hebrew text including the morphology and etymology of terms, the various ancient Greek translations of the passages, and cites numerous commentators, both Jew and Christian,

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[42] 13, 1, 7-16; 13, 1, 17-25, respectively.

[43] 13, 1, 26-29.

[44] 13, 1, 30-31.

[45] 13, 2, 3-13.

ancient and modern. In some cases, he indicates a secondary-source knowledge of an authority, but generally he seems to have had first-hand acquaintance with them. Particularly notable are the copious references to rabbinic writings. He can cite a spectrum of interpretations within that category, using them against one another to make his case. Perhaps this knowledge is a result of his personal interest in matters Jewish (his mother's maternal grandfather was a converted Spanish Jew[46]).

In the course of the first question, Turrettini argues that there was good reason for the delay of the coming of the Messiah, though not a delay until the end of history.[47] Here he sounds reminiscent of Thomas[48] though the Summa discussion contains nearly twice as many supporting arguments.

At some points, Turrettini appends lengthy lists of Biblical references without further comment.[49] These are intended to support some generalization for which Turrettini regards detailed argumentation as unnecessary. Some of his lists are not topical but verbal (concordance-type listings of word occurences[50]) or hermeneutical (parallel construction arguments, e.g. in prophecies[51]).

These two questions display Turrettini's grasp of linguistics, textual matters and the history of interpretation, all focused upon the

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[46]Keizer, Francois Turrettini, p. 45.

[47]Institutio, 13, 1, 3 and 4.

[48]Summa Theologiae, 3a, 1, 5 and 6.

[49]e.g. Institutio, 13, 2, 21.

[50]See 13, 2, 12.

[51]See 13, 2, 10.

controversy over the advent of the Messiah. His arguments range widely over the Scriptures, now close to the text, now treating them more generally. Although not all of his exegesis is persuasive (e.g., the Gen. 49:10 "Shiloh" discussion has a number of problematic aspects), it handles the textual data soberly, aware of problems and showing discretion in the selection of solutions. Though there is no shortage of reasoning in this section, it is scarcely deductive and clearly is more "Biblical" than "philosophical."

The Necessity of the Incarnation

Quaestio three asks whether the incarnation of the Son of God was necessary. The heading indicates that Turrettini affirms this question, but specifies no opponent. This question begins the discussion of the incarnation proper, questions one and two having dealt with the more general topic of the Messiah. After an introductory paragraph noting the diversity of terminology designating the incarnation in Scripture and in Fathers, he asserts that the incarnation is a mystery unascertainable by reason and known only by revelation.[52] The variae quaestiones which regularly arise concerning this doctrine originate in that mysteriousness. The "imperviousness" of this doctrine to rationality and the limited content of revelation apparently are seen as precipitating the many disputes. While probably not meaning to deny that the question would receive treatment even in an irenic context, Turrettini clearly is placing his discussion in a polemical setting. The topics selected for discussion are included in these "various questions."

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[52] 13, 3, 2.

The present question on the necessity of the incarnation is said to be the first of these. It in turn "can be distributed" into three heads.[53] These make up the structure of this quaestio when cast into the form of propositions. The first states that, except for sin, the incarnation was not necessary.[54] Turrettini notes that this proposition places him in opposition to the "old Schoolmen" including, among others, Alexander of Hales, William of Ockham, and Bonaventure. More recently, the Lutheran, Osiander, and the Socinians revived this view. Their claim was that, although the incarnation had particular significance for the problem of a fallen humanity, it would have occurred even if the creation had continued in its original unfallen state. Such a claim Turrettini characterizes as rash and "without Scriptural authority."[55] In the case of Osiander and the Socinians, he claims ulterior motives arising from their heretical view of redemption.

Four lines of proof support the asserted proposition. Scripture nowhere speaks of the advent of Christ as having any other goal than redemption from sin.[56] Second, Christ's office as prophet, priest, King, and mediator, is directed only to sinners.[57] Third, the causa impulsiva of the sending of Christ into the world was the love and mercy of God for fallen humanity.[58] Finally, Fathers such as Irenaeus,

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[53] Ibid.

[54] 13, 3, 3.

[55] Ibid.

[56] 13, 3, 4.

[57] 13, 3, 5.

[58] 13, 3, 6.

Augustine, and Gregory taught this view.[59]

He appends a fontes solutionum to this proposition.[60] It addresses several alleged supports for a non-redemptive rationale for the incarnation. Included are Christ's designation as the first-born of all creation, the (pre-fall) marriage of Adam and Eve as a sign of the marriage of Christ and the Church, Christ's headship of the Church, the Son's love for humanity, and the goodness of God, among others.

Notable in these responses is Turrettini's remark "nec fas est longius inquirere, tacente Scriptura."[61] When we add his earlier rejection of a non-redemptive incarnation, because Scripture nowhere speaks of it,[62] the result is a striking assertion of the limits of human ("ectypal"[63]) theologizing. This is not to pass judgment on whether or not Turrettini draws this boundary line in the correct place or always observes this principle in his practice. Nonetheless, his recognition that theology is confined within the bounds of revelation should not be dismissed lightly. Here is an at least principial rejection of "speculation" (i.e. conjecture) in theology. Such a policy is reminiscent of Calvin, of course, who had offered "one rule of modesty and sobriety: not to speak, or guess, or even to seek to know, concerning obscure matters anything except what has been imparted to us by God's Word."[64] Here, at least, Turrettini faithfully echoes his

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[59] 13, 3, 7.

[60] 13, 3, 8-13.

[61] 13, 3, 11.

[62] 13, 3, 4.

[63] See 1, 2, 6.

[64] Institutes, I. xiv. 4.

predecessor.

The second proposition in this quaestio asserts that, on the supposition of the fall into sin and God's decree to save human beings, it was necessary that the Son of God become incarnate.[65] Turrettini specifies that he means by "necessity" something which surpasses "appropriateness" (conveniens).[66] This of course he grants, but he means to make a stronger claim.

He immediately inserts a section on the status quaestionis to clarify his assertion.[67] He does not mean a "necessitate simplici et absoluta" but hypothetica, i.e. only upon the basis of prior realities. Second, he does not refer to the necessity of the divine decree (i.e. that the incarnation was necessary because it was decreed); no one denies this, in his judgment. Rather, he refers to a "natural necessity" such that, apart from the decree, the incarnation must still be regarded as necessary for redemption. Third, he does not refer to a "congruent necessity" (necessitate congruentiae) which indicates the appropriateness to the divine majesty, but instead to a "necessity of justice": that the justice of God could not possibly be satisfied in any other way than the incarnation of the Son of God. This hypothetical, natural "necessity of justice" is what is being asserted.

Turrettini again acknowledges his deviation from "some of the Ancients" who stated that alternative ways of redemption were possible.[68] He cites Augustine (as representative of other Fathers,

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[65] Institutio, 13, 3, 14.

[66] Ibid.

[67] Ibid.

[68] 13, 3, 15.

apparently), then lists some of the Schoolmen who concurred with him: Thomas, Lombard, Bonaventure. He also concedes that some Reformed theologians taught this view, including Peter Martyr Vermigli and the Puritan Samuel Twisse. Nevertheless, in support of his own view, he can mention Athanasius, Anselm, and Ambrose, "plerique ex Nostris, maxime post exortium Socinum."[69] In light of the presence of those opponents, Turrettini regards this opinion as "veriorem et tutiorem," an interesting combination of criteria.

Two reasons support the asserted proposition. The first states that God cannot deny his own justice and thus was not able to free men unless satisfaction of that justice was made.[70] The principal requirement of this satisfaction of God's infinite justice was an infinite ransom, which could only be found in the Son of God. Thus the incarnation was necessary for the accomplishment of redemption. Turrettini then refers back to his earlier establishment of the necessity of divine justice (as opposed to its free or arbitrary character) in support of this first reason.[71] It is striking to see this Reformed scholastic taking a less voluntaristic stance than Thomas, which seems to run counter to most depictions of each man.[72]

The second reason offered concerns the wisdom and the goodness of

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[69]See Muller (Christ and the Decree, p. 90) who states that this view was "typical of Reformed theology after Calvin"; for Calvin's statement of this view, see Institutes II. xii. 1-3.

[70]Institutio, 13, 3, 16.

[71]See 3, 19.

[72]e.g. Muller represents Thomas as advocating a necessitarian view (Christ and the Decree, p. 61).

God.[73] Turrettini regards it as "non credibile" that God would have undertaken such a plan of redemption if alternatives were available. The divine "labour" and sacrifice and suffering (of the incarnate Word) involved seem unwise and unkind if they were not necessary for redemption.

Turrettini explicitly rejects the suggestion that by placing an "ineluctable necessity" upon God[74] he is attempting to limit the divine omnipotence or "define" his supreme right toward his creatures. He claims to be only delineating the Scriptural account of what God can or cannot do. Two criteria are mentioned; God's potentia ordinata and jus virtutibus temperatum. The first recalls the late medieval disputes on the relationship of potentia ordinata and potentia absoluta. Turrettini claims not to be imposing limits upon the latter, but only stating the divinely ordained uses of that omnipotence. Yet he had earlier bracketed the necessity which arises from the divine decree as not being in view in this question. He must mean by "ordained" something related to the character of God rather than the decrees of God. It is not clear that this is the standard meaning of potentia ordinata. The limitations of the divine character (particularly the moral attributes) and non-compossibility are usually cited as the sole exceptions to potentia absoluta.[75] Turrettini seems to be merging the two categories or perhaps denying that there are two distinct categories, which surely is noteworthy.

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[73] 13, 3, 17.

[74] Ibid.

[75] See, e.g. Muller, Dictionary, p. 231.

His second criterion involves the harmonious display of the divine attributes. The sovereign rights over creation never function apart from the moral attributes. Thus the virtue of divine justice acts in consort (so to speak) with divine sovereignty. The implication is that the demands of absolute justice must be satisfied by any plan of redemption sovereignly decreed--and only a redemptive incarnation does so.

The third proposition of this question asserts that the work of salvation required a God-man.[76] Here Turrettini more precisely specifies the character of this redemptive incarnation. In apparent opposition to docetic or assumptive versions, he states that only an incarnation in which the human nature is joined with the divine nature by an "indissoluble bond" would suffice.

Such a union is required by the nature of salvation. Turrettini appends a lengthy series of couplets describing this duality, e.g. "Our mediator ought to be God-man in order to accomplish these things, Man to suffer, God to overcome...Man who, dying, acquired salvation for us, God who, overcoming, applied it to us...." He concludes, "this neither a mere man, nor God alone was able to do."[77] Therefore, the two natures ought to be conjoined in order that the capacities of each may contribute to the work of redemption.

Turrettini adds three supporting arguments for this necessary two-nature incarnation.[78] The justice of God requires that the

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[76] 13, 3, 19.

[77] Ibid.

[78] 13, 3, 20-21.

punishment for human sin be borne by a human, yet the bearer must also be God in order that there be infinite value to the suffering. The office of Christ requires that he mediate between God and man in his role as prophet, priest, and king. Each of these mediatorial offices require both divine and human capacities. Finally, in respect of us, he ought to be man to have the jure proximitatis to function as our brother and go'el or "kinsman-redeemer." Yet he ought also to be God in order that by jure proprietatis et dominii he would be able to redeem us and to claim us for himself.

The final paragraph of the question observes that the Scripture fere semper speaks of Christ by joining the two natures, attributing characteristics and actions to him which indicate that he was truly God-man. Another lengthy series of couplets follows, pairing Biblical affirmations signifying the reality of the dual nature of Christ.

This question is an intriguing combination of the marshalling and analyzing of the Biblical text on one hand, and philosophical theology argumentation regarding the a priori relationship of sin, justice, and redemption, on the other hand. Even the latter is supported from Scripture, making it difficult to regard it as merely conjectural, whether we find it persuasive or not. Though Anselm is mentioned only in passing, his Cur Deus Homo seems to be the obvious source, ultimately, for the Turrettini's reasoning.

The Nature and Mode of the Incarnational Union and Its Effects

Whereas the first two questions of locus thirteen are substantially without a parallel in Thomas' treatise on the incarnation, Turrettini's

question three corresponds to Thomas' first question. The order of the next several questions differs in the two works, though the content is generally similar.[79] Thomas examined the kind of union which the incarnation was, the mode of union on the part of the person assuming, then the union on the part of the nature assumed, and finally the effects of the union. On the other hand, Turrettini will discuss the person assuming, the nature assumed, and then the mode of assumption by hypostatic union, concluding with the effects of the union. What Thomas treats first, Turrettini leaves until third in the order. Accordingly the present discussion will not precisely parallel the study of Thomas' treatise in its order of topics. In addition, the communicatio idiomatum is treated by Thomas as an aspect of the mode of union on the part of the Son of God but Turrettini, perhaps because of the greater prominence of this issue in Reformation debates, devotes an entire (and later) question to it. Thus not only the order, but also the association of certain topics varies in the two works.

Quaestio four of the Institutio asks if the second Person of the Trinity was alone incarnate, and why. The first of the four topics just noted, this concerns the Person who was assuming a human nature.

He begins by clarifying that he is not asking whether the entire Trinity was active in the incarnation. It is an "axiomate receptio" among theologians that all divine opera ad extra are undivided, so this is not at issue.[80] Rather, the controversy concerns whether the

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[79] cf. Muller's repeated contrast of the "classic, Chalcedonian" order versus the Reformed order (i.e. a metaphysical vs. historical/economic/redemptive), e.g. Christ and the Decree, p. 33 (but also see pp. 91-92 on Beza's combination of the two models).

[80] 13, 4, 2.

incarnation terminated in or was appropriated by the entire Trinity. Although as to "efficiency," the incarnation was the work of the entire Trinity, were they all the "subject" of it? This Turrettini denies, affirming it only of the Son.

In the second place, the dispute is not about the necessity of the incarnation nor about the possibility of the entire Trinity being incarnated.[81] The first has been proved already; the second is impossible because of the need for a unity of person in the God-man. Here Turrettini differs with Thomas who had said that an entire Trinitarian incarnation was possible (the unity of the incarnate humanity being maintained) but that it was "fitting" that only the Son be incarnate.[82] He had argued that if three persons can subsist in the one divine nature, they could also subsist in one human nature. Thomas does not seem as concerned to protect the unity of the incarnate person as Turrettini is. His argument is to the effect that multiple persons are possible metaphysically and apparently also redemptively. Turrettini's criterion is the kind of incarnation required for the Mediator of redemption. Here the earlier differences regarding the necessity of the incarnation surface again, this time relative to the nature of the incarnation.

The precise point at issue is which one of the three divine persons became incarnate. Turrettini states that only the second person did so and, in fact, only the second person could have. Three reasons are proffered.

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[81] 13, 4, 3.

[82] Summa Theologiae 3a, 3, 6.

The first is that Scripture attributes this only to the Son.[83] Though an argument from silence, it is a significant one in light of his theological principle limiting us to what is revealed in Scripture. This descriptive reason is followed by one that is more prescriptive.[84] According to Turrettini, the Father could not be incarnate for it would ill-comport with his primacy in the ordering of the Godhead to be sent by anyone or to act as the mediator. Likewise the Spirit could not be the Mediator and also be sent by the Mediator to the Church nor could he become a son by incarnation, thus making a second member of the Trinity a son.

The point of this second reason is the incongruity and incompatibility of incarnation with the roles played in the divine economy by the other members of the Godhead. Turrettini finds this proposal so un-fitting (nec conveniebat) as to make it an impossibility. Thomas, it will be recalled, had regarded alternative incarnations as possible because of the difference between intra-Trinitarian roles and historical/incarnational roles. Thus he distinguished sonship by eternal generation from sonship by incarnation, which Turrettini is unwilling to do. Thomas found nothing inconveniens or impossible in the eternal Father by procession becoming a son by incarnation. The different senses due to different contexts made it possible, though counterfactual.

Turrettini does not explain why an alternative incarnation could not have been accompanied by alternative actions in the plan of

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[83] 13, 4, 4.

[84] 13, 4, 5.

redemption. Is the role which the Son in fact played the only possible role which he could play? Turrettini's arguments assume that everything else must be the same and that thus an alternative incarnation was unfitting and impossible. His argument is unpersuasive both on this count as well as in light of Thomas' distinctions in the meaning of terms and relationships.

The third reason, itself composite, correlates with the previous one, showing that only the Son could properly fulfill this role.[85] The Son being in between (medius) the Father and the Spirit should be the mediator between God and man. The Son of God by nature is the fitting (conveniens) agent to make us sons by the grace of adoption. Third, recreation should be done by the original creator. Finally, the beloved Son is the most fitting (aptior) person to reconcile us to the Father.

The second and third of these arguments parallel Thomas' support for the appropriateness of the Son's incarnation, but they do not prove more than that. The fourth has a similar force, falling short of Turrettini's objective. The first support is the least adequate, correlating medius and mediator. In any case, it is not clear that "Father-Son-Spirit" is a normative Trinitarian order or that there is any such standard order in Scripture, at least in regard to their "essential" relations.[86]

In the fontes solutionum portion of this question, Turrettini clarifies the difference between saying that the entire divine nature is

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[85] 13, 4, 6.

[86] See B. B. Warfield, "The Biblical Doctrine of the Trinity" in The Works of Benjamin B. Warfield, vol. 2: Biblical Doctrines (10 vols; New York: Oxford University Press, 1927-1932) p. 162; but see also p. 165.

incarnate and saying that all the divine persons are incarnate.[87] The first he regards as acceptable though dangerous in light of certain Lutheran doctrines. The second is incorrect, as he has attempted to show. When Scripture says that "God' became incarnate, we are to take it as referring to the divine nature or to one hypostasis of the divine nature, but not to all the persons or hypostases. He quotes approvingly the Father's phrases that the divine nature is incarnate "in one of the hypostases" or "in the hypostasis of the Word."[88]

He also defends a single hypostatic incarnation as compatible with divine simplicity (distinct modes of subsistence do not divide the essence)[89] and asserts that the visio dei by the blessed terminates upon the entire divine essence, both in its unity and trinity yet nonetheless the incarnation only involves one hypostasis of the divine essence.[90] The force of this last challenge to his position is not clear (nor is his solution to it).

Turrettini's accomplishment in this question is more modest than his intention. He has shown the appropriateness of the Son's incarnation but, except for a relatively brief reference to Scriptural exclusiveness in its depiction of this event, he has not shown persuasively that only the Son could be incarnate or that he must become incarnate. His claims significantly exceed those of Thomas, but his achievement is scarcely greater.

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[87] 13, 4, 7.

[88] 13, 4, 8.

[89] 13, 4, 9.

[90] 13, 4, 10.

The fifth question complements the fourth, asking concerning the nature assumed in the incarnation, as the previous question asked regarding the person assuming. Various errors (of the Manichaeans, the Valentinians, the Apollinarians and the Anabaptists) are identified in the opening paragraphs[91] before Turrettini specifies the status quaestionis. The controversy does not concern whether Christ had flesh and was properly called human. Instead, at issue is the complete integrity of that humanity so that, except for the absence of sinfulness, he was identical with all other humans.[92] In particular, in light of teachings by certain Anabaptists, debate focused upon the flesh of Christ. Was it normal human flesh and blood, etc., such that it came from his human mother Mary, or did he have 'heavenly flesh' of some sort, distinguishing him from other humans?

Turrettini's answer is related to the larger issue of Christ's true humanity.[93] He has just finished stating that Christ's true humanity is not the question, but now he implies that it is the answer. That is, though these opponents may not explicitly or intentionally question the genuine humanity of Christ, yet their denial of the genuineness of his body erodes, by implication, that humanity. Thus, the proper means of rebuttal is a delineation of the impossibility of denying Christ's humanity, even by implication.

Six reasons are given to prove that Christ is truly human. First, he is consistently called "man" and "Son of man" which signifies the

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[91] 13, 5, 1-2.

[92] 13, 5, 3.

[93] 13, 5, 4.

commonality of his nature.[94] The latter term is particularly significant because while angels are often called "men" due to their appearance, they are never called "sons of men." Furthermore, the more explicit phrases such as "made flesh" or "partakers of flesh and blood" are never used of them. In short, Christ's names and descriptions indicate that he has both the appearance and the nature of humanity while angels can at most be said to have the appearance of humans on certain occasions.

Turrettini's second reason is the designation of Christ as "the seed of the woman" and "the seed of Abraham" and "the fruit of the womb" and other similar phrases.[95] These seem impossible to interpret as descriptive of anything less than full humanity. He appends several attempts to take them in other ways, which imply or at least permit some qualifications to Christ's humanity. He shows them all to be inadequate handlings of the Biblical text. Though not stated, the opponents who are the sources of these interpretations are perhaps the Anabaptists, who seem primarily in view throughout the question.

The third reason focuses on the Christological significance of Hebrews 2:10,14,16.[96] There Christ is said to be made a partaker of flesh and blood and as a result is called our brother. The reference in that passage to Psalm eight reinforces the genuiness of the filial relationships by assuring a true commonality of nature with the humanity who is represented by this high priest. Turrettini strongly presses the

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[94] Ibid.

[95] 13, 5, 5.

[96] 13, 5, 6.

assertion of the prerequisite common nature for priestly representation, rejecting attempts to undercut its force.

The fourth reason concentrates more narrowly upon the significance of ἐπιλάμβανεσθαι, used in Hebrews 2:16 to describe Christ's action of taking on himself the seed of Abraham.[97] Both the phrase and the verse with its context have been used in previous reasons, but here Turrettini is concerned only with this word. According to him, the meaning is "proprie apprehendere et assumere, seu suscipere significat, et recte ad assumptionem naturae ad unitatem Personae refertur."[98] The word indicates authentic reception and possession and cannot be taken to mean a momentary or merely superficial relationship, as the Socinians suggest,[99] or interpreted as describing auxilium et patrocinium simplex, a meaning it never has elsewhere.[100] Finally, the context clearly refers this assumption to Christ's earthly life, not his later heavenly existence, as some argue.[101]

In the fifth reason, Turrettini argues that the genealogies of Christ amply prove the genuineness of his humanity.[102] His final reason asserts that redemption requires authentic humanity because sin ought to be punished in the same nature in which it was committed.[103]

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[97] 13, 5, 7.

[98] Ibid.

[99] Ibid.

[100] 13, 5, 8.

[101] Ibid.

[102] 13, 5, 9.

[103] 13, 5, 10.

The lengthy fontes solutionum section[104] analyzes the phrase "Lord from heaven" (1 Corinthians 15:47), the notion of likeness or similitude, Christ's consubstantiality with us, Christ's descent from and ascent to heaven (Ephesians 4:9), the active role of a woman in generation (thus contributing to the nature of the offspring), Christ's apparent denial that Mary was his mother (Matthew 12:47,48), the role of the Spirit in Christ's conception, and, finally, the contrast between "born of flesh" and "born of Spirit" in John 3. Turrettini specifies the proper sense of each of these, carefully nuanced and protected from misinterpretation. He shows each phrase or passage to be fully compatible with the orthodox position. They cannot legitimately be taken as supporting an heretical erosion of Christ's true humanity.

Several points are noteworthy about this question. First, it seems less tightly organized than usual. Turrettini wanders somewhat, repeating old points on several occasions. Second, as noted earlier, the status quaestionis and the fundamental presupposition of the argument of the question could be more clearly interrelated. The clarity would also contribute to the force of the argument by showing the clearly unacceptable conclusions which an undermined humanity of Christ would entail for the work of redemption. Only in the discussion of Christ's high priesthood (the fourth reason) and in the last, brief reason (on the necessary continuity of sinful and of punished human nature) does this point become explicit. Thomas had made this the principal emphasis of his parallel discussion,[105] but it plays a more

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[104] 13, 5, 11-19.

[105] Summa Theologiae 3a, 5, 1-2.

minor role for Turrettini.[106] It must be granted that he gives prominence to the Biblical statements and not to elaborate philosophical proofs. Yet, Turrettini seems not to make enough of the implications of the Biblical Christological designations in the larger scheme of redemption.

Perhaps most noteworthy is the absence of any sustained attempt to pursue the meaning the orthodox affirmations about Christ's assumption of a genuine human nature. This is a striking instance of the polemical orientation of the Institutio. After the defense and refutation is complete, the reader is prepared for a careful investigation of the affirmed view, but is disappointed. The contrast with Thomas' Summa Theologiae (and, conversely, the similarity to the Summa Contra Gentiles) is obvious.

One of the two most difficult questions in Christian theology (in Turrettini's judgment) is addressed in question six, the union of two natures in one Person in the incarnate Christ. The other question is the Trinity of one essence and three persons. Turrettini notes a similarity about them in that both involve an exception from the usual one to one relationship of nature or essence and person. Thus the questions shed light on each other. In the Trinity, the persons are not mixed or confused nor the essence multiplied while in the incarnation the natures are not confused nor the person multiplied.

Turrettini takes paragraphs two through ten to establish the state of the question. His clarifications are extensive. Among the more important are his assertions that the authenticity of the human nature

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[106]This seems to be a reversal of Muller's point because here the "classic, Chalcedonian" treatment is more economic/redemptive oriented than Turrettini's discussion.

and of the nature or hypostasis of the Son of God are not at issue. The former is acknowledged by both sides while the latter has been established already.[107] The point being debated is the truth or authenticity of the incarnation, an Filius Dei naturam humanam assumpserit in unitatem Personae , ita ut idem qui Filius Dei erat, factus sit per unionem hypostaticam Filius hominis?[108] Turrettini's opponents, denying this proposition, are the Socinians.

The union which Turrettini asserts in "Unio personalis" but "non Personarum": "Unio naturam" but "non naturalis,"[109] a hypostatic union. Thus he rejects as not part of the question a physical or essential union, a union of souls and consent of wills, a union of association or "adjacentness," or a union of sustenance and action. These assert either too little or too much to be acceptable descriptions of the incarnation. The union is "intima et perpetua conjunctio in unitatem Personae."[110] The human nature which was assumed "destituta est propria personalitate et ἀνυπόστατος fuit"[111] and is rightly said to be substantial with the Logos, though Turrettini regards it less accurate to say that it "subsistere subsistentia λογου"[112] because this latter phrase implies that the human nature is a divine person.

Recalling a point granted in question four,[113] Turrettini

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[107] 3, 2, 8.

[108] 13, 6, 2.

[109] 13, 6, 3.

[110] 13, 6, 5.

[111] Ibid.

[112] Ibid.

[113] 13, 4, 2.

acknowledges that the entire Trinity is involved in the incarnation as the principii or the power (virtute) by which the union is made, but insists that only the Word is the terminus of the incarnation quia in eo terminatur.

It is proper to conceive of the human nature as the "adjunct" of the God-man and, in a certain sense, as a "part" of the incarnate person.[114] Yet it is incorrect to call the God-man "compound" if that is intended to signify that the Word and the human nature were constitutive elements, incomplete in themselves, and designed to be united together. This would be "composition properly so-called," according to Turrettini, and does not describe the incarnation, which is an "extraordinary" compound.[115]

Turrettini proves his affirmation of the question with four reasons, in each case a particular passage or passages in the New Testament: John 1:14 "distinctly mentions" both "the Word" and "flesh," the former a divine person, as the context indicates, the latter a synecdoche for human nature. The use of the verb εγενετο, translated as factus est by Turrettini, is taken as a "distinct mention" of the assumptive union of the human nature by the divine Word. He defends this rendering of the word against Socinus at some length, surveying the other occurrences of the word in the New Testament. While acknowledging its variety of senses, he argues from the context and the fundamental meaning of the word to establish the traditional, orthodox interpretation. He again displays a notable grasp of the Scripture and the

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[114] 13, 6, 6.

[115] 13, 6, 8.

lexical issues involved in this passage.

Turrettini next turns to Philippians 2:6,7.[116] Here too he finds reference to both the pre-existent divinity of Christ and to his human nature as well as the act of assumption which joined them in one person. He gives particular attention to the crux interpretum, the verb εκένωσεν ("emptied"). The word must be taken "ratione status et comparate" not "simpliciter et absolute."[117] The latter is impossible because of the immutability of the divine characters. He appends an extended response to two criticisms of the orthodox interpretation of this passage. Both deal with the word μορφή (form) which occurs twice in the passage, in combination with "of God" and with "of a servant." Turrettini refuses to permit weakened interpretations of the phrases which would undermine the authenticity of the divine and human in the incarnation. He takes both as describing the full and true possession of divine and human characteristics by the Christ.

Turrettini then refers to 1 Timothy 3:16 which states that "God was manifested in the flesh."[118] He takes "flesh" as a synecdoche for "human nature." "Manifested in the flesh" he contrasts with the several transitory appearances of God to humans in Scripture, arguing that a hypostatic (but not essential) manifestation is meant.

The last reason combines several passages in which two natures in one person "clare proponuntur."[119] These differ from the previous

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[116] 13, 6, 13.

[117] Ibid.

[118] 13, 6, 15.

[119] 13, 6, 16.

passages in the absence of verbal reference to the act of assumption. The passages in view here indicate the state of incarnation but not the act of incarnation. With each of these, Turrettini defends the true humanity and true deity of the incarnate Word, carefully warding off attempts to assert one to the exclusion or erosion of the other. Thus, for example, when Christ is said to be "made of the seed of David according to the flesh" in Romans 1:3,4, this use of κατα σαρχον is carefully distinguished from the other uses in the New Testament, whether those with a connotation of moral defect (e.g. Romans 8:1) or of mere externalism (e.g. John 8:15).

He concludes the question with a consideration of several conceptual matters (some of which have been touched upon in passing earlier in this locus).[120] While the human nature is a "first substance," in Aristotelian terms, this need not entail that it is a subsistence.[121] In other words, it is philosophically possible to be a nature but not a person. Turrettini also clarifies that the Son of God assumed a human nature, "hominem specifice sic dictum," but not a man, an individual subsistence.[122] He distinguishes the proper and improper uses of phrases such as "God and man" and "divinity and humanity" when speaking of Christ[123] as well as the acceptability of "God is man" from the improper "man is God."[124] Likewise, he distinguishes the action

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[120] 13, 6, 18-26.

[121] 13, 6, 18.

[122] 13, 6, 19.

[123] 13, 6, 20.

[124] 13, 6, 21.

of the hypostasis of the Word in assuming a human nature from heretical alternatives which have been proposed.[125] He briefly asserts the logical permissability of the presence of contradictories qualifies (e.g. infinite and finite, immortal and mortal) in the person of Christ inasmuch as they belong to him in different respects, i.e. in his two natures.[126] Finally, he insists that the assumption of a human nature does not add to or change the nature of the Son, both of which are impossible for the eminently perfect and eternally immutable God. Instead, "mutatio, ergo, si qua hic detur, est in natura humana."[127] Even this seems to be a strikingly hesitant concession. He stands with Thomas in asserting that the assumption of a human nature into a hypostatic union does not constitute a change in the Son of God.[128]

Turrettini has no formal fontes solutionum section in this question. Three of the four passages offered as reasons supporting his position have separate paragraphs appended which respond to criticisms of Turrettini's interpretation. The last reason offers rebuttals in the course of its discussion. The final secion, although not labeled as such, seems to function as a fontes solutionum to conceptual (i.e. philosophical and theological) problems, in contrast to the earlier textual discussions.

The length and care of Turrettini's attention to the exegetical

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[125] 13, 6, 22.

[126] 13, 6, 23,24.

[127] Ibid.

[128] For his defence of divine immutability, see 3, 11.

warrant for his position is notable. While not above reproach in a number of respects, his treatment deserves commendation for its sensitivity to context in determining the significance of words and phrases. This approach is absent from Thomas' treatise, though the variance is partially explained by the different types of theology being done. Quite obviously, though, Turrettini found no incongruity in handling philosophical or logical objections on their own terms, as at the end of the question. That is, we would be mistaken to draw any principial "Biblical theology" vs. "philosophical theology" contrasts from the heavy exegetical emphasis of the earlier portions of the question.

As in the previous question, Turrettini's intention is to establish the facticity of the Son of God's assumption of a human nature into a unity of person, not to penetrate to greater depths of understanding of that fact. When the reality of that assumption is proven, Turrettini's task is accomplished and he turns to the next question. His students learned what orthodox (Reformed) theology affirmed, clearly and fully distinguished from unacceptable alternatives. They were not led on from that affirmed faith in search of a deeper understanding.

The seventh question forms a couplet with the sixth, both of them setting forth the mode of the union in the incarnation. The second in the pair asks regarding the relationship between the two natures, clarifying the assertions defended in the previous question. In particular, it intends to set forth the _via media_ between Nestorianism and Eutychianism so that the person of Christ is not divided nor are the natures confused. The treatment is an explicit articulation and defense

of the Chalcedon Christological statement, especially of the four adverbs which are used to qualify the affirmation of the hypostatic union.

Turrettini's opening statement in this question is an acknowledgement that the hypostatic union is "positively unspeakable" ("ἄρρητος positive").[129] That is, its character cannot be set forth in a formal definition which captures its essence. He had made similar comments about the Trinity exceeding the human capacity for understanding and speech.[130] Yet, despite this limitation, theology may make assertions by proceeding via negativa. The incarnation non male designatur by such negative speech.[131] Such an approach of course is that which was taken by the Council of Chalcedon. The four adverbs, mentioned earlier, are all negative: ἀδιαιπέτως, ἀχωρίστως, ἀτρεπτως, ἀσυγχύτως. Without specifying the precise nature of the incarnation, they preclude certain interpretations deemed heretical, thereby marking out a limited area of orthodox affirmation. The via negativa must not be taken as a denial of the possibility of theological affirmation, but only as a denial of a certain kind of theological affirmation.

The question is a doublet of sorts. For both Nestorianism and Eutychianism, Turrettini will state their views, refute them, and add a fontes solutionum. The treatment is unequal in length, the former occupying paragraphs three through twelve, the latter thirteen through seventeen.

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[129] 13, 7, 1.

[130] 3, 14, 4; 3, 15, 4-6.

[131] 13, 7, 1.

Turrettini links Nestorius' error, "duas fingebat personas," to the consequent refusal to endorse the title theotokos, "God-bearer," for Mary the mother of Jesus.[132] Nestorius would go no further than the designation Christotokos. He would call Mary "Mother of Christ," but not "Mother of God." His "division" of the person of the incarnation resulted in two Christs, one which was crucifed, the other which was not crucified. According to Turrettini, Nestorius' conception of the union of the two natures was only "accidental": amounting to "παραστασιν et simplicem habitationem," " κατα χαριν et ευδοκιαν," "κατ' ενεργειαν per operationem," "κατα ταυτοβουλίαν et affectum," "κατ' ἀξίαν et ἰσοτιμίαν."[133] Several of these phrases, it will be recalled, were specifically rejected by Turrettini earlier.[134]

Despite the claims of some (apparently in the Reformed Churches), Turrettini refuses to reverse the evaluative labels of Nestorius and his opponent, Cyril of Alexandria, charging Cyril with Eutychianism and approving of Nestorius for distinguishing yet not separating the two natures.[135] He offers three arguments against such a reinterpretation: the "unanimous consent" of the three ecumenical councils and the ecclesiastical historians that Nestorius' views were heretical, the approval by the Council of Ephesus of Cyril's charges in his twelve anathemas,[136] and the refusal of Nestorius to call Mary "the Mother of

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[132] 13, 7, 3.

[133] Ibid.

[134] 13, 6, 3.

[135] 13, 7, 4.

[136] Note the endurance of this factual error made earlier by Thomas (Summa Theologiae, 3a, 2, 3).

God." While granting that Nestorius "ambiguis et flexiloquis usus est phrasibus," he charges that the intention was "ad errorem suum tegendum." Therefore, even if it is possible to give the language sanum sensum, it does not follow that Nestorious was orthodox. Turrettini finds it wholly implausible that the fathers, "qui penituis ejus mentum noverant," imposed an erroneous interpretation upon his words.[137] In short, Turrettini's rebuttal to the reconstructed view of this chapter of the Christological controversy is principally an appeal to the weight of tradition. If there were an error here, it would have been discovered before now. The other criterion is the title theotokos for the rejection of which he apparently finds no legitimate basis. Any refusal to use the term must arise from theological error. The prominent role given to this term is remarkable considering its heritage as the focus of controversy. Later in this question, Turrettini will defend his endorsement of the title.[138] He does concede that Cyril sometimes used phrases duriores which resembled Eutychian affirmations, but attributes this to the intensity of Cyril's rejection of Nestorianism which led him to appear to back into the opposite error. Turrettini seems to regard this as an endemic danger of polemics. Perhaps we should make use of this principle when interpreting his Institutio as well.

In concluding this statement of Nestorianism, Turrettini observes that the historical or factual question of what Nestorius actually affirmed should not be confused with the conceptual or "juris" inquiry as to the orthodoxy of the views which have been traditionally

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[137] 13, 7, 4.

[138] 13, 7, 11-12.

attributed to him. That is, whether or not Nestorius actually taught a two-person incarnation, this view must be condemned as heretical. Turrettini will not let the historical issues distract from his polemical task.

He briefly states three reasons for rejecting such a Christology.[139] The passages which indicate a virgin birth oppose Nestorianism because the implied origin involved in a birth cannot be true of God yet divine names and phrases are used to describe the person born of Mary. In the second place, many passages describe one person consisting of two natures. Turrettini here cites the passages studied in question six. The last reason argues from the passages which attribute diverse properties and operations to a single Christ.

In the fontes solutionum, Turrettini contends that Christ may be truly human and yet not dually personal. He clarifies this by distinguishing a human nature which is complete in its substantial and subsistential being and is incommunicable (as is the case with the rest of humanity) and one which is complete in substance but not in subsistence and is not incommunicable.[140] He distinguishes the relationship of actions and passions to natures and to individual subsistences.[141] Similarly he distinguishes between acceptable and unacceptable uses of the phrase "the temple of God" to describe the humanity of Christ.[142]

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[139] 13, 7, 5-7.

[140] 13, 7, 8; the substance/subsistence distinction had been made earlier (13, 6, 18).

[141] 13, 7, 9.

[142] 13, 7, 10.

He then turns to a defense of "theotokos" and "Mother of God" as appellations of Mary.[143] Despite the later abuses associated with these terms, Turrettini supports the Church's use of them and insists that they are important indicators of the orthodox Christology. The terms indicate the intimate and enduring hypostatic union in the eternal Son of God who became enfleshed.

Turning to Eutychianism, Turrettini notes Eutyches' ardent opposition to Nestorious but also his confusion of Christ's two natures into one. Eutyches thus constitutes the opposite extreme for orthodoxy, so emphasizing the unity of the incarnate Christ that the duality of natures is undermined. Against this error, the Council of Chalcedon insisted upon the integrity of the two natures, without change or confusion.

Turrettini offers three reasons for the orthodox position in opposition to this error. He cites, without specific comment, several Scripture references which indicate the "duarum naturarum in Christo oppositio." Second, he refers to the two wills which are attributed to Christ. Last, the contraries attributed to Christ require the affirmation of two diverse natures, divine and human.

The fontes solutionum respond to problems raised in regard to the number of principles of causality in Christ[144] and the similarity and dissimilarity between the union of two natures in Christ and the union of body and soul in Christ.[145]

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[143] 13, 7, 11-12.

[144] 13, 7, 15.

[145] 13, 7, 16.

This question contains more material also discussed in other portions of the locus than is typical for Turrettini. He follows faithfully the traditional arguments of orthodoxy, giving scant attention to the original sources of this aspect of the controvery and deferring to long-established conclusions on the debate. Turrettini's staunch defense of the significance of theotokos as a mark of orthodoxy is notable in light of the apparent absence of any reference to it in Calvin's Institutes. This question gives no sustained exegesis of any Scripture passages and in general restricts itself to the citation of reasons, not the elaboration of arguments for them.

Question eight concerns the communicatio idiomatum in Christ. Handled in passing by Thomas as a subordinate part of his discussion of the mode of the hypostatic union and later as part of the effects of the incarnation,[146] the topic had become a dominant issue by Turrettini's day.[147] A key to the Lutheran-Reformed Lord's Supper dispute, it was arguably the most divisive issue among Protestants, at least in the early decades of the Reformation. It is not surprising that, in this locus, Turrettini devotes more space to this question than any besides the two on the advent and identity of the Messiah, that is, more than any other dispute among Christians.

Though the specific interest of the question is only the communicatio idiomatum, Turrettini sketches the larger context of which this subject is a part. With this question, the locus moves into its

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[146] Summa Theologiae, 3a, 3, 6; 3a, 16, 4 and 5.

[147] See his account of the origin of the controversy (13, 8, 7).

next section. The opening paragraph of quaestio four had delineated four areas of the mystery of the incarnation. Having now discussed the Person assuming, the nature assumed, and the mode of assumption, Turrettini now completes the examination by inquiring regarding the effects of the assumption.

He divides the effects of the hypostatic union into two categories.[148] Some pertain to the human nature of Christ while others concern the person. Each of these categories is itself composite. The effects for the human nature include both the gratia eminentiae (the dignity which surpassed all other creatures because of the union with the Son) and the gratiae habituales (the gifts which exceeded all merely human capacities, though not attaining fully divine levels).

Three effects relate to the person of Christ.[149] The first is the communicatio idiomatum, which Turrettini defines as the communication of attributes and properties from each nature to the person. The second is communio officii et apotelesmatum according to which Christ's actions as mediator are attributed to him regardless of the nature from which they are derived. The last is communio honoris et cultus by which the person of the God-man (including his human nature) is the object of worship. It is only the first of these which interests Turrettini in the present context. Here we again can see clearly the significance of the elencticae in the title of this theology. Turrettini sets forth the fuller theological context (which presumably would be treated in a dogmatic theology) but then selects only one part for examination, the

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[148] 13, 8, 1.

[149] 13, 8, 2.

others being relatively non-controversial. Turrettini obviously cannot be faulted for ignorance of a more straight-forward dogmatic theology agenda; he does not mistake his polemics for dogmatics. Nevertheless, we can still lament the resulting lacunae in the students' education.

Before addressing the status quaestionis, Turrettini makes some preliminary clarifications.[150] The communication of properties from the two natures to the person can be either directly or indirectly accomplished. Direct communication occurs when what pertains to a particular nature is predicated of the person which is being considered or named from that nature, i.e. human nature/human denomination; divine nature/divine denomination. Indirect communication involves the predication arising from one of the natures to the person being spoken of from the other nature (e.g. the reference to "God's blood" in Acts 20:28).

Turrettini emphasizes that such communicatio is not merely verbal, but real.[151] It does not take place from nature to nature, but from the nature to the toti Supposito. Evidently Turrettini is responding to Lutheran charges that the Reformed view amounts to a merely verbal communication and that only the Lutherans affirm a real communication. He insists that the distinction is not between verbal and real, but between two versions of real communication.[152]

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[150] 13, 8, 3-5.

[151] For similar assertions, see Heinrich Heppe, ed. Reformed Dogmatics, pp. 439-447.

[152] Cf. Muller, Dictionary, p. 74.

He offers a second clarification, this time concerning the words "abstract" and "concrete."[153] In keeping with the "communi usi Philosophorum" and "ex usu in Scholis recepto," these words must refer to the name of a nature or form ("abstract") and a person or subject having that form or nature ("concrete"). Thus "deity" and "humanity" are abstract terms while "God" and "man" are concrete. The "sense abusivo" of the Lutherans must be rejected. They claim that "abstract" refers to the human nature separated from the Son of God and that "concrete" refers to that nature united to the Son. Such usage is too narrowly incarnational and, more importantly, involves an impossibility because the human nature of Christ could never be separated from the Word.

In paragraphs six through eight, Turrettini specifies the status quaestionis. The question does not concern communication in the concrete because both parties acknowledge this.[154] It does not concern the communication of the properties of the human nature to the divine nature; this both sides reject as impossible.[155] Neither does the question involve the communication of all of the properties of the divine nature to the human nature because neither party asserts this. On the other hand, the question does ask whether certain divine properties (i.e. omnipotence, omniscience, omnipresence, and the power to give life) were communicated in the abstract, from the divine nature to the human nature, as an effect of the hypostatic union. Against the

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[153] 13, 8, 5.

[154] 13, 8, 6.

[155] 13, 8, 8.

Lutheran's support of this proposition, Turrettini denies it, giving ten reasons for his rejection.

With the exception of a portion of the seventh reason (which is by far the longest, occupying well over a page by itself), Turrettini's reasons make little explicit reference to Scripture. Even the exception (paragraph fifteen) does not examine in detail any of the quoted passages. This suggests that the dispute with the Lutherans hinges much more upon a theological schema than upon exegetical data. Or, perhaps more accurately, they differ on which passages are decisive, providing the interpretive pattern for other passages. Accordingly, when Turrettini defends the Reformed interpretation of a number of Biblical passages (in the fontes solutionum section), it is apparent that the Lutherans exhibit no uneasiness about the compatibility of their doctrines with these passages. The debate thus focuses upon a conception of the effects of the hypostatic union and is thus "supra-textual" in a certain sense. Turrettini adapts his polemic accordingly.

Turrettini rejects the Lutheran communicatio in abstracto, first, because the divine essence cannot be communicated to creatures.[156] This would change the creature into the creator and make it God. Second, such communication would involve making the "proper" or distinctive qualities of one nature common to both natures, destroying their character.[157] Third, the selectivity of the Lutheran position is

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[156] 13, 8, 9.

[157] 13, 8, 10.

objectionable.[158] Either all the divine qualities are communicated or none are. Both the Lutherans and the Reformed reject the first alternative and the second is the Reformed position. The Lutheran view is an impossible attempt at a half-way position. In the course of this reason, Turrettini addresses the standard communicable/incommunicable distinction of the attributes of God and shows its relationship to the present dispute.

The fourth reason is that properties of the human nature are not communicated to the Word, but such reciprocality would be the expected concomitant of the Lutheran assertions.[159] Fifth, this proposal would amount to a confusion of the natures, the already rejected Eutychianism.[160] Only the Reformed view embodies the Chalcedonian principle of unchanged and unmixed natures, maintaining with integrity their distinct identity. The sixth reason charges the Lutherans with inconsistency, intending to be orthodox and yet espousing a view whose implications are illogical and heretical. The substance of these charges echoes the second and fifth reasons.

The extensive seventh reason begins Turrettini's specific investigation of the four divine properties which are alleged to be communicated _in abstracto_, in this case omnipresence, crucial to the controversy.[161] He argues that Christ was not omnipresent in either of his states, humiliation or exaltation, the claim that he was conflicts with several articles of faith such as his birth, his death, and his

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[158] 13, 8, 11.

[159] 13, 8, 12.

[160] 13, 8, 13.

resurrection, and such a property would be repugnant to the nature of a body. He quotes a number of Biblical passages in support of the first argument and in conjunction with each argument he considers the Lutheran responses.

The eighth reason anticipates question thirteen (on the knowledge of the soul of Christ), addressing the property of omniscience.[162] Turrettini contents himself with briefly mentioning Biblical references indicating Christ's cognitive limitations or growth. The attribution of omnipotence to Christ's human nature is rejected by the ninth reason on the grounds that that property is incompatible with the passibility and mortality which Christ's humanity obviously had.[162] Finally, the power to make alive is rejected because this is an essential property of God; anyone who has this power is God and is immortal,[164] qualities incongruous with a human nature which suffered and died.

Turrettini devotes fully half of the question to the _fontes solutionum_ section. He responds to Lutheran conceptual and Scriptural criticisms of the Reformed doctrine as well as singling out additional Lutheran supporting arguments for his analysis and refutation. In general, Turrettini defends Reformed theology as asserting a true hypostatic union and true _communicatio idiomatum in concreto_. Repeatedly he insists that non-Lutheran teachings on this issue must not automatically be seen as weakening the genuineness of the incarnation or denying all _communicatio_. Likewise, he frequently underscores the point

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[162] 13, 8, 19.

[163] 13, 8, 20.

[164] 13, 8, 21.

made earlier in the question, that, far from being the exclusive orthodox position on incarnation and communication, the Lutheran teaching cannot be inferred from the orthodox doctrine and arguably undermines the Chalcedonian Christology, having heretical and illogical implications. It is in this portion of the question that Turrettini gives more sustained attention to individual Biblical passages, though largely limited to a rebuttal to accusations of implausible interpretation.

The Reformed doctrine which Turrettini advocates in this question largely coincides with that espoused by Thomas.[165] The argument in the Summa, though of course briefer and more general in focus, was a defense of the communication of the properties of each nature to the single person of the Christ. Thomas expressly rejected the communicatio idiomatum in abstracto.[166]

The States of Christ

Question eight completes the first half of locus thirteen. Turrettini explains that thus far he has handled the person of Christ, but now will speak of the state in which he ought to fulfill the office which the Father committed to him.[167] The office itself, it will be recalled, will be the subject of locus fourteen. Following what had become a standard pattern in Protestant orthodoxy, Turrettini divides the life of the incarnate Christ into two states: "alter exinanitionis

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[165]See Summa Theologiae, 3a, 3, 6; 3a, 16, 4-5.

[166]Ibid., 3a, 16, 5.

[167]13, 9, 1.

et humilitatis, alter Exaltationis et Majestatis; Passionum, et Gloriae; Certaminis, et Triumphi; Viae, et Metae; Mortis et Vitae."[168] The remainder of this question will examine the various events and activities of Christ, grouped into these two successive stages.

Turrettini establishes the truth of this schema by citing the Old Testament passages which predicted the ministry of the Messiah and then the New Testament passages which set forth the fulfillment of those predictions.[169] In both cases, the two states are repeatedly mentioned. He holds that the two states are not only predicted but in fact are necessary on the part of God, of Christ, of us, and of salvation.[170] These states, he is careful to point out, are properly said of the person of Christ and thus of both natures (though not in entirely the same way).[171]

Before he begins his discussion of the state of humiliation, he asks about the beginning of the Christian era. He notes that a two-fold question is asked here, concerning both the year and the month and day of Christ's birth.[172] After surveying the spectrum of opinions, he remarks, "non anxie de eo laborandum esse credimus" because the answers would not contribute significantly to the establishment of our faith.[173] Consequently, he suggests that quaestionibus variis intricatissimis can

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[168] Ibid.

[169] 13, 9, 2.

[170] 13, 9, 3-5.

[171] 13, 9, 7.

[172] 13, 10.

[173] 13, 10, 5.

be dismissed. To the first part of the question, he contents himself with specifying the three marks of the year of Christ's birth in Scripture: it was in the period of Herod's Kingdom, at the time of the taxing instituted by Cyrenius, governor of Syria, such that Christ's thirtieth year coincided with Tiberius' fifteenth year.[174] About the specific month and day of Christ's birth, the second part of the question, Turrettini sides with those who advocate the suspension of judgment "cum Scriptura de iis sileat."[175] This question apparently was included merely because of the controversy it had provoked rather than because of Turrettini's intention to protect the truth (unless we take his cautious conclusions as admonitions to his students not to attempt the impossible and unprofitable resolution of such debates).

Turrettini identifies the conception and birth of Christ as "primus gradus" of his humiliation and emptying.[176] The relatively long treatment (six pages) which he gives to this topic perhaps results from his opposition to the Socinians' challenge to the traditional orthodox doctrine of the virgin birth and to the recent (Protestant?) challenges to the perpetual virginity of Mary (though he denies the Roman Catholic advocacy of her vow of perpetual virginity). A principal interest in this question is the protection of Christ's true humanity. Turrettini insists upon the miraculous, Holy Spirit effected conception of Christ in the womb of the virginal Mary (defending the deity of Christ), but refuses to make the entire birth sequence miraculous (e.g.

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[174] 13, 10, 6.

[175] 13, 10, 17.

[176] 13, 11, 1.

instantaneous, rather than successive) lest Christ's solidarity with us be eroded.[177] His treatment thus again exemplifies his *via media* approach, balancing both the ordinary or natural and the extraordinary or supernatural dimensions of Christ's entrance into his incarnate period of humiliation. Though perhaps not all will agree that he has observed his own policy, on this topic too Turrettini warns against excessive curiosity into the mode of the accomplishment of this mystery.[178]

Thomas does not use the "two states" schema in his treatment of the incarnation (nor does Calvin) and he handles the life of Christ in an extensive section which follows the treatise on the incarnation proper. Thus these discussions in Turrettini's *Institutio* do not have parallels in the portion of the *Summa* examined in the previous chapter. The next three questions in the *Institutio*, however, do correspond to matters raised by Thomas in the opening section of the *Tertia Pars*.

Question twelve asks what graces and gifts were bestowed on Christ. In particular, it asks whether Christ had faith and hope, two of the three theological virtues. Turrettini divides the question into two parts to address these topics. The *status quaestionis* portion clarifies that it is not eternal grace nor the grace of union which is the subject of this controversy. Instead, the dispute concerns the "*Gratis habitualibus, seu donis et perfectionibus*" which resulted from the hypostatic union.[179]

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[177] 13, 11, 12-18.

[178] 13, 11, 9.

[179] 13, 12, 1; see also 13, 8, 1.

Turrettini states that many Scripture passages teach the bestowal of these gifts and in "fulness" or "without measure."[180] He is careful to qualify this plenitude, lest it be mistaken for infinity. Such strictly unlimited gifts are impossible for the Christ, however, because of the finitude of the human nature which accordingly "nec potest esse infiniti capax" and also because the grace itself is a created thing.[181] Therefore, the plenitude must be understood "secundum quid."[182] This too seems an attempt to protect the genuine humanity and thus creaturely finitude of the incarnate Word.

The general question of the presence and measure of the gifts of Christ thus settled, Turrettini turns to a particular (and more controversial) aspect of this topic. Among all "the gifts and perfections" which Christ possessed, were faith and hope included? The question is raised by "the Schoolmen," according to Turrettini, some of the sixteenth-century representatives having criticized Calvin for his attribution of faith to Christ.[183] In response, Turrettini observes that Scripture describes Christ as "faithful" and having hope and faith in God. These citations suffice to thwart the attempt to deny flatly these virtues to Christ, yet Turrettini adds a qualifying note regarding faith: "Sed non potest competere illi sub omni illo formali, quo hominibus competit, cum eo modo imperfectionem involvat."[184] Thus while

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[180] 13, 12, 2.

[181] 13, 12, 3.

[182] Ibid.

[183] 13, 12, 5.

[184] Ibid.

a flat denial of faith's presence is erroneous, so is an unqualified assertion of its bestowal.

The clarification of this problem is another *via media* in Turrettini's theology. Paragraph six explains "*quomodo*" faith is in Christ. He does not ascribe to Christ faith as an "*apprehensio fiducialis misericordiae Dei*" because this is appropriate only to sinners. Likewise he does not attribute faith as a "*modi cognitionis*" because this presupposes some obsurity or enigmatic element in a person's knowledge which Christ could not have had, of course. However, faith was present in Christ as to "*cognitionis substantiam*" or "*assensum in rem cognitam*" and as *fiduciam* in the goodness of God which provides that which is needed. Such types of faith Turrettini finds necessary because of Christ's humanity and yet compatible with his divinity.

The case is similar for hope:

> Quicquid in ea perfectionis est quoad certitudinem, per quam firmiter innitimur promissioni divinae de re futura, recte Christo tribuitur: sed quod involvit defectum et imperfectionem, quatenus est expectatio adhuc obscura rei quae nondum habetur,...non debet illi adscribi.[185]

Thus, in that Christ's soul did not have the fulness of the enjoyment of God during his humiliation (because of the suffering which was a corrollary of that state), he still lived in the hope of that bliss in the future when he would cease to be a *viator* and become a *comprehensor*, glorified in body and soul.

Turrettini's attribution of faith and hope to Christ while on earth is carefully nuanced. His opposition to the *Scholastici* is only partial. His precise qualifications, however, do not prevent a

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[185] 13, 12, 7.

disagreement with Thomas. The Dominican, as noted earlier, taught that Christ in fact did enjoy the perfection of knowledge and fellowship during his life on earth, and thus would demur even from Turrettini's qualified attribution of hope to Christ.[186] Thomas' limitations on the kind of hope possessed by Christ were even more stringent. Moreover, because he denied all types of faith to Christ, he would not agree with Turrettini on that point either.

Despite this disparity of conclusions, however, there is important concurrence in their views. Both insist that here, as elsewhere, only that which comports with Christ's deity may be attributed to him and, within those limits, all that which is requisite for his full and genuine humanity must be affirmed. This principle, embodied in the quotation from the Institutio regarding hope, is the maxim by which both men worked, as loyal sons of the Chalcedonian rejection of both Nestorius and Eutyches. Thomas apparently goes further in the implementation of this policy than many of his contemporaries. Turrettini is probably less remarkable among his Reformed colleagues for his espousal of such a maxim, but his similarity, in principle, to Thomas is noteworthy. They agree on the policy; they differ only on the implementation of it. Thomas would regard Turrettini as guilty of concessions which detract from the vere Deus character of Christ. For his part, Turrettini would charge Thomas with too little recognition of the significant effects of Christ's state of humiliation, leveling the sharp contrast contained in passages such as Philippians 2:6-11. The doctrine of the two states perhaps is a key criterion for Turrettini's

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[186] Summa Theologiae 3a, 7, 3-4.

decisions regarding the implementation of this via media Christology.

In question thirteen, Turrettini for the first time in this locus specifies the Roman Catholics (or "Pontificios") as the opponents in view, though he has differed from some or all of them on several points already. In the context of the effects of the incarnation[187] as qualified by the state of emptying and humiliation,[188] he asks about the knowledge which the soul of Christ possessed. Though he does not group this with the "donis et perfectionibus Christo," it clearly will be addressed in the light of the answer to that question. At this point, Turrettini's arrangement is the same as Thomas'.

He begins by identifying the three types of knowledge as they occur in Scholastic thought: "Beatam, Infusam, et Acquisitam."[189] He defines them as the heavenly (or glorious) vision of the essence of God, the gracious supernatural habit of the knowledge of heavenly realities, and the natural or rational understanding of experience. Anticipating the discussion in the latter portion of this question,[190] he denies that Christ's human nature possessed the beatific vision of God because, as a viator, he could not at the same time have the experience of one who was in glory, already having achieved the goal. Thus he affirms only two species of knowledge for the human nature on earth, infused (resulting from the sanctifying grace of the Holy Spirit) and acquired (gained both by ratiocination and by experience).[191]

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[187]See 13, 4, 1.

[188]See 13, 9; 13, 11, 1.

[189]13, 13, 1.

[190]13, 13, 12-16.

[191]13, 13, 1.

Turrettini carefully insists that he is not debating the present state of Christ's knowledge in glory, but the earlier state during his humiliation. Likewise, he repudiates any suggestion that Christ's human nature labored under a gross and sinful ignorance of many things. The ignorance which he means to assert is an innocent lack of knowledge which was compatible with Christ's purity. Finally, he reminds the reader that he has already disproved the proposition that the grace of union gave Christ's human nature omniscience.[192]

Thus, the quaestio which remains is whether, from the beginning of his life, because of the hypostatic union, Christ's soul was ignorant of nothing and could learn nothing de novo. Turrettini opposes the Roman Catholics, and denies that the plenitude of knowledge in Christ was infinite. Thus it was possible for him to add knowledge (which in fact he did, by thinking and by sense experience).

The three reasons used to prove Turrettini's position are each specific Biblical passages.[193] Two of them attribute either some growth in knowledge or some lack of knowledge to Christ (Luke 2:52; Mark 13:32). The third describes Christ as made like other human beings in all ways except sinfulness (Heb. 2:17; 4:15). For each passage, he defends his exegesis, charging the Roman Catholics with inconsistency or artificial and unpersuasive interpretations. The growth in knowledge may not be limited to other humans' perception of a growth in knowledge on Christ's part. Similarly, Christ's ignorance of the day of judgment cannot merely be a refusal to tell what he knows.

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[192]See 13, 8, 19.

[193]13, 13, 4-6.

The Hebrews passages are crucial, though not as decisive as Turrettini suggests. The principle that Christ shared the condition of humanity except for its sinfulness surely would not have been disputed by the Catholics. The precise point at issue was whether ignorance was innocent (at least some forms of it) and thus able to be shared by Christ or whether it was essentially tainted by moral impurity and thus alien to him.

In his discussion of Mark 13:32, Turrettini had defended the philosophical possibility of one nature being ignorant of what the other nature knew on the grounds that a distinctione reali existed between the natures, not merely formali. The fontes solutionum section contains several other responses to charges from the opponents, some arising from passages which attribute "all knowledge" or the "treasures of knowledge" to Christ. Others are more conceptual. Turrettini makes fundamental use of the two states of Christ schema, though referring here to "economies" or "administrations." Clearly, this pattern is integral to his Christology.

This is brought to the fore in the second part of this question, where he asks whether Christ was simultaeously "viator et Comprehensor."[194] This again addresses the Roman Catholics who taught that in the divine nature, Christ was comprehensor while in his human nature, he was viator. Such a conception is both incongruous and unbiblical. The two states are so diverse as to be incompatible in the same person at the same time. Turrettini's answer expounds the significance of the emptying and humiliation which characterizes

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[194]13, 13, 12.

Christ's life of earth. Though by right, Christ from eternity had enjoyed the blessings of glory, yet for the purpose of the accomplishment of the work of redemption, he gave up the enjoyment (though not the possession) of the happiness of the presence of God.[195] This was necessary in order that he genuinely experience suffering and death as the Mediator. Turrettini here advocates an emptying and humiliation characterizing the person of Christ, not just his human nature.[196] Thus the divine nature must veil some of its rights and privileges, genuinely enduring an unnatural state as part of the program of redemption. In contrast, the Catholic doctrine has no such framework of two states and thus insists on the continuity of the blessings of glory for the divinity of Christ.

As we have seen, Thomas does not fit neatly into the Catholic position which Turrettini opposes, but does not fully concur with him either. Unlike most of his medieval contemporaries, he regarded acquired knowledge as a necessary component of Christ's genuine humanity. This made some ignorance essential to the incarnation.[197] Yet, because he kept the species of knowledge so distinct, he was also able to attribute certain forms of omniscience to Christ.[198] In short, Thomas acknowledged the point about acquired knowledge which Turrettini would later make, but he also ascribed beatific knowledge to Christ

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[195] 13, 13, 14.

[196] See 13, 9, 7; Muller describes this as characteristic of Reformed theology, e.g. in Calvin (Christ and the Decree, p. 37).

[197] Summa Theologiae, 3a, 9, 4; 3a, 12, 1-2.

[198] Ibid., 3a, 10.

while on earth. Thomas' application of the via media on this issue is particularly embracing, perhaps the result of his earnest intention to affirm the authentic humanity of Christ while also granting him the simultaneous identity of viator and comprehensor.[199]

Question fourteen continues the inquiry about the import of the state of humiliation for the human nature of the incarnate Son. It asks regarding his suffering, particularly in his death by crucifixion. The question is complex, even in the heading, but more so when Turrettini clarifies the status quaestiones.

The significance of this controversy in Turrettini's understanding is underscored in the opening paragraph where he speaks of the centrality of suffering to the redemptive work of Christ. This suffering is "praecipuum fiduciae et consolationis nostrae fundamentum." Therefore it ought to be "primarium...fidei nostrae objectum." Any doctrine which threatens such a crucial element of Christianity must be resisted with particular firmness.

Though there were in the past some who denied to Christ all genuine suffering, regarding as only apparent that described in Scripture (the so-called Aphthartodocetae), these no longer require refutation and are not in view in the present controversy.[200] Granted then that Christ actually did suffer, what was the nature and subject of those sufferings? "An in Corpore tantum, An etiam in Anima? Et si in Anima, An in inferiori tantum ejus parte, quae sensitiva dicitur, An vero in superiore etiam et rationali?"[201] Turrettini is explicit about the

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[199]Ibid., 3a, 15, 10.

[200]13, 14, 2.

[201]Ibid.

decisive factor in this dispute with the Pontificios. It is their doctrine of the "perfecta beatitudine Animae Christi in toto Exinanitionis statu" which leads them to limit improperly the sufferings of Christ. He makes it clear that anything less than the affirmation of the fully extensive and authentic sufferings of Christ's soul erodes the foundation of Christianity.

Consequently, he is not satisfied with any--or many--concessions, if the resulting affirmations fall short of the full measure. He delineates the stages in the concessions beginning with the initial claim that Christ suffered only in body, but not in soul. "Et si urgentur," the Catholics distinguish between the lower (sensitive) part of the soul and the higher (rational) soul, granting suffering only in the former. Next, some will acknowledge passiones in the rational powers, but only by sympathy, not proprie et in se from an awareness of God's wrath. Each of these distinctions and qualified affirmations is inadequate. Though the difference between the first and last assertion may seem noteworthy, Turrettini is as opposed to the one as to the other.

He states that the "Orthodox" (the Reformed) refer Christ's sufferings

> tam ad animam quam ad corpus, tam ad partem superiorem quam inferiorem; Et corpore quidem dolores et cruciatus corporeos, et mortem prae caeteris crudelissimam temporalem tulisse; Anima vero spirituales et internos, gravissimum scil. [sic] illud, et summe horrendum irae divinae pondus, et κατραραν nobis debitam.[202]

Both the locus of the passiones and their nature contrasts with the more modest assertions of the opponents.

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[202] 13, 14, 3.

Turrettini offers four reasons in support of his affirmation. He finds Biblical statements which describe Christ's suffering, particularly in his soul. Distinctions which intend to limit the extent of that pschological passion are illegitimate because the soul is "ἀμεριστος et indivisibilis."[203] Particularly with reference to the trauma of the events culminating in the crucifixion, Turrettini finds profoundly disturbing ramifications from the denial of their full psychological experience and their "infernal" nature. Specifically, if Christ underwent such torments as the Evangelists describe when faced with merely physical suffering, then we must regard him as inferior to innumerable martyrs who displayed joy and exultation in the face of death. In his judgment, apparently, the passion of Christ must not only include the rational powers of the soul, they must be pre-eminently there. Only this concentration of suffering (accounted for by the wrath of God) can explain the marked contrast with later Christian (not to mention non-Christian) martyrdoms.

The second reason argues from the psychological suffering resulting from sin and its judgment to the necessity of the inclusion of psychological suffering in redemption.[204]

The third reason is perhaps the most notable. It deals with the cry of dereliction in Matthew 27:46.[205] Turrettini insists that this pssage must not be explained away. It clearly displays the remarkable uniqueness of Christ's suffering and death. No merely physical cause

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[203] 13, 14, 4.

[204] 13, 14, 5.

[205] 13, 14, 6.

could induce such an anguished cry.

Surprisingly, he proceeds to make numerous distinctions which qualify the nature and extent of the desertion.[206] It was not "absolute, total, and eternal" but only temporal. It did not involve the desertion of the human nature by the divine nature, dissolving the hypostatic union. It did not abrogate "unionis gratiae et sanctitatis." It must not even be seen as affecting the "communion and protection" which Christ experienced with God (Turrettini here cites Christ's claim in John 16:32 that the Father never left him alone).

The desertion did involve the loss of a "participationem gaudii et felicitatis" as God temporarily suspended praesentiam favorabilem gratiae et influxum solatii et beatitis.[207] In Turrettini's judgment, this desertion made possible Christ's suffering of all the punishment due for humanity's sin. Even this, however, is qualified. The suspension of grace and consolation was a withdrawal of the "vision" of divine love, an absence of the sensus of this love, a loss of the affectionem commodi. It was not a "dissolution of the union" (of love?) between the Father and the Son, not a real privation or extinction of divine love and not a loss of the affectionem justitiae which would have led to "desperation, impatience and blasphemy against God."

At least some of these qualifications seem to undermine Turrettini's earlier bold assertions, sounding strongly reminiscent of his opponents' position. The fourth reason, that Christ was made a

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[206] Ibid.; see Beardslee ("Theological Development at Geneva," p. 622) for a reference to an unqualified assertion that "God suffered."

[207] 13, 14, 6.

curse for us,[208] does not entirely remove that impression for it is brief and is followed, in the succeeding fontes solutionum, by a denial that despair should be ascribed to Christ, which seems to be at least the prima facie meaning of the cry of dereliction. Turrettini rejects several arguments for merely physical suffering and even insists that those sufferings should be called "infernales" because of their diritatem et intensionem,"[209] corresponding to one of the senses of that term in Scripture. Yet he refuses to permit despair to be attributed to Christ because this is not of the essence of punishment as imposed upon someone, but rather is a vice of the person who endures punishment. Christ experienced the dreadfulness of his afflictions, "certus erat tamen de felici exitu et fine ipsorum."[210] He emphatically rejects the accusations of certain Catholic writers against Calvin for allegedly attributing such an emotion to Christ, correcting their interpretation of Calvin's remarks.

It seems possible to charge Turrettini with some unwillingness to follow through with his intention to recognize the authenticity of Christ's sufferings despite his sincere inclusion of the rational part of the soul as a subject of them. At the least, he seems inconsistent, drawing back from a full acknowledgment of Christ's dereliction under the wrath of God. If this is the case, the difference between him and the Catholics, and especially between him and Thomas, is relativized. It again is the difference in the implemention of a principle, not in

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[208]See his qualification of this in 13, 14, 15.

[209]13, 14, 12.

[210]13, 14, 14.

the principle itself. Moreover, the degree of difference which does exist even between Turrettini and Thomas is rooted in the former's commitment to a personal humiliation and emptying, not merely one involving the human nature.

In the remainder of locus thirteen, Turrettini introduces material which Thomas treats considerably later in the Tertia Pars and thus is not paralleled in the section which we discussed in the previous chapter. Turrettini defends Calvin's controversial interpretation of the creedal affirmation of Christ's descent into hell.[211] Against the Roman Catholics and Lutherans, he rejects a local and bodily descent to hell or to limbus and Purgatory, whether in humiliation or in victory.[212] Against some of the Reformed, he argues that the phrase does not refer to the burial in the grave, but rather to the sufferings and the extremity of Christ's humiliation.[213]

He defends the deity of Christ against the attacks of the Socinians, insisting that, as God, Christ's power was causally involved in the resurrection as with all other divine opera ad extra.[214] Returning to the debate with the Lutherans raised in quaestio eight, he affirms a local and bodily ascension of Christ and not merely a metaphysical one.[215] The final quaestio clarifies the meaning of Christ's present high priestly session at the right hand of the

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[211] 13, 15-16.

[212] 13, 15, 4.

[213] 13, 16, 8.

[214] 13, 17, 2.

[215] 13, 18.

Father,[216] in part against the charges of the Lutherans that the Reformed are too corporeal in their hermeneutic.

Conclusion

Turrettini's locus on the person and states of Christ clearly corresponds to the format which his title announces. Consistent with his polemical orientation, he selected topics for their controversial significance and discussed them only so far as controversy required. The irenic investigation of a topic, characteristic of a didactic or systematic theology, is consistently omitted. In this, his treatment of the incarnation is sharply distinguished from Thomas' in the Summa Theologiae. "Fides quaerens intellectum" does not describe Turrettini's study.

At least at selected points of the locus, the thoroughness and competence of his exegetical work is noteworthy. When he regards it as appropriate, he is willing to spend considerable time defending his position at the textual level. He gives evidence of linguistic and historical skills and breadth of knowledge of the secondary literature, past and present.

On the other hand, he does not feel required to always give explicit attention to the Scriptural support for his views. When the dispute does not demand exegetical support, Turrettini is content to conduct the argumentation in terms of recognized theological or, more basically, logical principles. Yet specific philosophical elements are surprisingly scarce. Besides the concepts and terminology which

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[216] 13, 19.

were standard fare for theological work, there is little advanced or technical philosophy in this locus.[217] Turrettini does not give any reason for us to regard him as being as competent (or as interested, for that matter) in philosophy as Thomas. He much more closely resembles Calvin at this point.

Muller's claim that Reformed theologians, following Calvin's example among others, largely abandoned the traditional person-work distinction in Christology, replacing it with (or at least subordinating it to) a more historical/economic orientation with a redemptive focus, does not seem to fit Turrettini. He identifies his own structure as person-office with roughly the first half of the person discussion being in the "classic, Chalcedonian" pattern. The states of Christ complete that locus with the succeeding locus treating the office. The transformation which Muller speaks of does not seem as thoroughgoing in Turrettini's case. Moreover, its undeniable redemptive focus largely parallels that of Thomas' treatise on the incarnation. On both sides of the comparison, the contrast seems somewhat overdrawn, at least in terms of the two men under consideration here.

This is not to deny the significance of Turrettini's use of the states of Christ schema. It is clearly decisive in several respects, primarily by giving more weight to the humiliation and emptying of the person (not just the human nature) of Christ and thus leading Turrettini to conclusions on the knowledge and suffering of Christ which differ from Thomas' in crucial respects.

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[217]See E. W. Kennedy, "An Historical Analysis of Charles Hodge's Doctrines of Sin and Particular Grace," p. 130, n. 2.

How does Armstrong's description fit Turrettini?[218] As just noted, Turrettini is not hesitant about engaging in ratiocination. Yet the extent of the deduction "from given assumptions and principles" clearly is limited by Scripture, usually explicitly (if summarily in some cases) and sometimes extensively. Even when arguing that the incarnation was necessary for redemption, Turrettini identified the Biblical rootage of his reasoning. Instances such as this as well as his several admonitions to avoid curiosity or speculation, to be silent where Scripture is silent, and descriptions of certain doctrines as mysteries all indicate the (Biblical) restrictions which Turrettini places upon theologizing. Moreover, the redemptive orientation, focusing upon the person of the Mediator, undermines the characterization of Turrettini's theology as abstract, though in keeping with the Fathers and the Councils, he is willing to address metaphysical issues which he regards as implicit in these redemptive matters. Beardslee rightly observes:

> But we must remember that it is his intention to understand all theology in terms of the relationship of God to his creation. This knowledge of God as saviour of men, not as "God-in-Himself" is what makes theology "practical".[219]

Finally, it should be noted that Armstrong's description does not differentiate dogmatic theology from polemics, though this seems highly significant for both method and content in Turrettini's case.[220]

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[218] See above, p. 5.

[219] Beardslee, "Theological Development at Geneva," p. 377.

[220] It seems likewise crucial for Calvin, e.g. in his discussion of predestination (compare Institutes, III, 21-24 with On the Eternal Predestination of God).

Chapter Six

Conclusion

The intent of this study has been to contribute to the clarification of the nature of Protestant (and particularly Reformed) scholasticism by examining the origin and character of medieval scholasticism, then tracing the interrelationship of scholasticism, Renaissance humanism, and theology in the Protestant Reformation, and, finally, studying in a detailed comparison the content and method of the theologies of representatives of medieval and Reformed scholasticism. Several conclusions can be made on the basis of this study.

The initial and fundamental conclusion is that the criticisms of later sixteenth and seventeenth century Reformed theology as "scholastic" have generally used a seriously inadequate conception of medieval scholasticism as the standard for comparison. Typically, the medieval version is viewed far too monolithically, implying substantive agreement on philosophical and theological issues. In contrast, we found a wide spectrum of views, often hotly debated and never finally resolved in consensus.

Second, the characterizations as a rule give far too much prominence to Thomas Aquinas whether as the culmination of the constructive development of scholasticism or as the dominant figure in (at least thirteenth-century) scholasticism or at least as a typical representative of scholasticism. In fact, he was none of these. The

view of fourteenth and fifteenth century theology and philosophy as simply a decline from the apex of the thirteenth appears seriously problematic in light of recent research.[1] Only within the Dominican order can Thomas be termed dominant in his lifetime (or shortly thereafter).[2] Finally, the independence and creativity of his attempts to resolve the contemporary intellectual controversies make him anything but representative.

Third, the investigation into the origins of the scholastic method indicates that legitimate pedagogical concerns precipitated the search for new procedures and that the answer was found in the adaptation of the classical locus method, expanded and refined until it became the primary focus of a teaching process which sought to identify, clarify and resolve the panorama of viewpoints represented in the contemporary intellectual arena. Quaestio and disputatio served to foster rigorous and precise thinking and personal resolution of the controversies (both inside and outside the Church) within accepted boundaries. That the method could be and was abused cannot be denied, but that it was fertile for the development of the intellectual life of Christianity seems equally undeniable.

Then, examining the Renaissance and Protestant Reformation, it became apparent that the opposition between humanism and scholasticism has been frequently overdrawn, because the two movements came in various versions and could be espoused or rejected in any number of degrees.

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[1]See, e.g. Heiko Oberman, "Fourteenth-Century Religious Thought: A Premature Profile" Speculum 53 (Jan. 1978) 80-93, and the literature cited there.

[2]Boyle, The Setting of the Summa Theologiae of Saint Thomas, p. 23.

While by no means an inconsequential dispute, the items at issue did not preclude agreement or collaboration on many other matters. Particularly among Protestant theologians, complete endorsement of either alternative was rare, Luther and Calvin (as well as Melancthon and Beza, it seems), being consciously selective in their appropriation of the values and procedures of both. Therefore it will not do to label the first generation of Lutheran and Reformed theologians as humanists while reserving the scholastic label for later generations. Neither Luther nor Calvin was particularly inclined toward philosophy, but both made selective use of it and Calvin especially made provision for the scholastic element in education. Consequently, it is inappropriate to talk of the "introduction" of scholasticism into Reformed theology, suggesting that at one time it was absent. While early Reformed theology was sometimes only minimally scholastic in its orientation (e.g. Calvins's Institutes, Beza's Confession de Foi du Chrétien) early academic Reformed theology possessed significant scholastic characteristics (e.g. the academies of Lausanne and Geneva; Zanchi's Summa, Ursinus' Commentary on the Heidelberg Catechism).

Thomas and Turrettini on the Incarnation

Thomas' treatise on the incarnation is distinguished by his consistent implementation of a fides quaerens intellectum approach. His intent is to gain a greater understanding of the mystery which he already in faith confessed. Consequently, he omits any formal treatment of Christological heresies ancient or modern. The question is not the truth of the orthodox dogma, but its meaning. Similarly there is no

attempt to establish this doctrine via rational demonstration. Thomas and his audience of clerical students do not require surveys of heresies or proofs of the dogma. The latter task, in fact, is impossible for the incarnation which can only be known via divine revelation. Thomas uses the quaestio format (breaking down each one into several component articles) and intends the students/readers to follow the pros and cons (the sic et non) of the disputatio for each question as their means of learning, but it is clear that the questions serve Thomas and not vice-versa. He selects which questions will be addressed in terms of his program, omitting others (e.g. the Christological heresies; the controversies with Jews). Often, he seems to pose a question himself, including it even though it is not an actual point of controversy. Thomas thus does not merely collect the extant disputes (past and present), serving a reportorial or descriptive function. Instead he selects and even creates topics for dispute. The task of leading students into a deeper understanding of this aspect of their faith sets his agenda for them, determining the inclusions and exclusions. Controversy serves the needs of theological study, not the reverse.

The treatise on the incarnation has a definite redemptive orientation, evidenced in Thomas' prologue to the Tertia Pars as well as in his actual handling of the issues and arguments of the articles. The incarnation is not abstracted from the redemptive plan of God and Christianity's message of salvation. The incarnate person is the "Saviour" and the requirements of redemption set limits for reasoning and point towards answers for questions.

The rationalism so prominent in many descriptions of scholasticism

is noticeably absent from this portion of the Summa Theologiae. As noted, Thomas characterizes the incarnation as a mystery and includes it within the category of revealed theology. He consistently submits his reasoning to Scripture and the early Creeds and Councils. He argues ex convenientia, eschewing stronger forms. In some cases, he expressly rejects proposed arguments which claim rationally necessary force, at times resembling late medieval voluntarism in his recourse to the multiple possibilities available to God. In fact, he sometimes seems more "Ockhamist" than "Thomist."

Thomas shows himself willing to conjecture (or "speculate") regarding aspects of the incarnation, but even those occasions have as their intent the expansion of Christianity's comprehension of revealed theology. In particular, Thomas often poses counterfactual questions to illuminate the actual state of affairs. Though some of these seem to exceed proper limits, in many cases they are plausible inquiries into the meaning of the dogma. He appears quite unspeculative when he occasionally describes theological propositions about the hypostatic union as indicative of "what is said" about God, but not to be taken as indicative of what God really is. This de re/de dicto distinction perhaps manifests the Pseudo-Dionysian strain in his theology.

Despite his limitation of much of the theology of the incarnation to the content of revelation, Thomas is consistently non-exegetical. Though constant reference is made to Biblical passages, none receive detailed analysis of a linguistic, historical, or contextual sort. Though his handling of Scripture can be reliable, it is never justified in detail.

The opening portion of the Tertia Pars displays a commitment to the full and authentic humanity of Christ to a degree which may be surprising in a medieval scholastic. Of course, after Chalcedon, orthodoxy never called into question the verus homo status of Christ, but they often gave far more attention to his verus deus character, appearing chiefly concerned to protect the true divinity of Christ, perhaps at the expense of the genuine humanity. Thomas' Christology cannot be charged with any lack of respect for the divinity of Christ, but he consistently sought to protect Christ's humanity, denying him nothing required for authentic human life. Only those qualities and activities which involved moral corruption or were otherwise incompatible with divine perfection were rejected. This is Thomas' rationale for asserting genuine experimental knowledge in Christ and for extending the suffering of Christ to include, by sympathy, the higher powers of the soul. It is not the general affirmation of Christ's authentic humanity, but the specific application of that affirmation which is noteworthy in Thomas.

Francois Turrettini accurately labels his Institutio as elenctic or polemical. The individual loci are structured by quaestiones in standard scholastic fashion. However, it is quickly apparent that his claims not to offer a full system of doctrine are more than pro forma authorial modesty. In this case, the quaestiones control the author, so to speak. That is, Turrettini intends to offer his students/readers a summary, analysis, and refutation of the chief controversies concerning the Christian faith, both ancient and contemporary. His agenda is largely descriptive. Topics which would not in themselves merit study are included due to the disputes which have arisen around them (e.g. the

order of the divine decrees or the time of Christ's birth). Conversely, other topics which perhaps are more central to Christian theology will receive treatment only so far as they are controversial. Granted, Turrettini is not content merely to refute erroneous views, but goes on to set forth and to vindicate the orthodox, Reformed position, extending his task beyond polemics in its narrowest meaning. However, his effort in this regard clearly is circumscribed by the elenctic orientation. His is primarily a descriptive "guided tour" to theological controversies; the territory determines the map. It is not an investigation of theology in which Turrettini himself selects the topics to be studied within an orthodox framework (i.e. an irenic systematic theology).

Turrettini displays exegetical competency in both the text of Scripture and much of the secondary literature. At times, he gives extensive attention to the exegetical support for certain theological assertions; on other occasions, however, he is content merely to cite one or more Scriptural references. The criterion seems to be the nature of the dispute. When it concerned whether or not certain propositions were asserted in Scripture, detailed exegetical argumentation was in order. However, if the meaning of certain Biblical assertions or the realtionship between them was controverted, then Turrettini readily dispensed with an extended consideration of Biblical passages. Elenctic theology had a variable method, determined by the controversy at hand. Exegetical work was not always an appropriate response to a dispute.

The willingness to provide exegetical warrant (in extenso, if need be) and the frequent citation of references said to support a particular

assertion, combined with the polemical purpose (in which the opponents establish the agenda) suggest that Turrettini's elenctic theology should not be considered an exercise in deductive ratiocination. The disputes determine the topics to be considered and Turrettini regards Scripture as the basis for his theological positions, at least ultimately even if not immediately. Within this context, he is confident of the usefulness of redeemed human rationality in theology, but even the regenerate individual must recognize certain limitations upon his reasoning.[3]

Accordingly, Turrettini repeatedly warns against curiosity about Biblical mysteries and conjecture where Scripture is silent. Theology should be content with what God has chosen to reveal; there is labor enough required for the comprehension of that. The impropriety of such intrusive inquiries in turn often leads to erroneous conclusions, such as the claim that Christ would have become incarnate even without the Fall.[4]

The _via media_ approach to reason is illustrated in the question of the necessity of an incarnational redemption. Turrettini insists that it was necessary that the Son of God (and only the Son of God) become incarnate to accomplish redemption for humanity. He provides what he regards as a rationally necessary demonstration of this assertion. Yet he also provides Scriptural warrant for it. In his judgment, the content of Scripture is merely re-packaged in the proof of the necessity of the incarnation. Even here, then, theological reasoning is undergirded by revelation.

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[3]See _Institutio_ 1, 8-10 and 12-13.

[4]_Institutio_ 13, 3, 4 and 11.

Turrettini's discussion of the incarnation is set in a redemptive orientation, perhaps as part of the mixed nature of theology, partially theoretical and partially practical.[5] The locus opens with two questions about the "Messiah" and question three insists that sin is the presupposition for the incarnation in which God became man and was named Jesus because "he would save his people from their sin." Although there are times when Turrettini does not make full use of the significance of this redemptive orientation for his argumentation, yet it clearly is the overall context for this locus.

The "two states of Christ" schema, characteristic of Lutheran and Reformed Christology, occupies more than half of this locus. It provides the framework for the discussion of the life of Christ from birth to ascension and heavenly session. It is within this section that Turrettini raises the questions regarding the capacities and experiences of Christ (rather than in the section on the nature, mode, and effects of the incarnation). The framework enables Turrettini to combine historical, redemptive, and metaphysical elements.

The status duplex Christi is particularly significant for Turrettini because it leads him to strive for a via media which gives due emphasis to both Christ's humanity and his divinity. The two states refer to the person of Christ and not merely to his human nature. Consequently the person of Christ experiences emptying and humiliation and the person of Christ experiences exaltation. This is the rationale for Turrettini's assertion of the sequential (and not simultaneous) condition of the person of the incarnate Son of God as viator and

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[5]See Institutio 1, 7.

comprehensor, in opposition to the Catholics. Accordingly, the questions of Christ's gifts and knowledge and suffering should be answered according to a viator state without the need to protect a corresponding comprehensor state of the divine nature. The insistence upon Christ's genuine humanity thus has a primarily historical, rather than metaphysical, basis. Here, as in the communicatio idiomatum and the office of the mediator, Turrettini emphasizes the unity of the person as the proper focus of these doctrines, not the duality of the natures.

Similarities

There is both similarity and dissimilarity between Thomas and Turrettini on the incarnation. Both use the quaestio format, of course. Both men place their discussion in a redemptive context. Both give notable emphasis to the authentic humanity of Christ, particuarly in regard to his graces, knowledge, and passiones. Both men assert a communicatio idiomatum from the natures to the person of Christ, but not between the natures themselves. Both exemplify a via media approach to portions of this doctrine. Both regard the incarnation as a mystery which, in certain respects at least, surpasses the rational capacity of human beings. Each has confidence in the usefulness of human reasoning in theology, but insists upon its limitations. Accordingly each warns against ignoring the dependence of theology upon revelation for this doctrine, attempting to speak where Scripture is silent.

Contrasts

Over against this list are a number of differences. Thomas is primarily concerned to investigate the "mystery of the incarnation" while Turrettini intends to defend the doctrine. Thomas' audience is expected mainly to grow in their understanding of the Truth while Turrettini's audience is expected primarily to be enabled to identify and refute the opponents by a clear and accurate statement of the content of and warrant for the Truth. Thomas brings greater competency in philosophy whose literature and arguments he uses more extensively than Turrettini. On the other hand, Turrettini devotes greater attention to the exegetical support for the doctrine, which support Thomas apparently presupposes as already established, making possible an investigation into its significance. Thomas is more voluntaristic, distinguishing between potentia absoluta and potentia ordinata (though not in those terms), while Turrettini emphasizes the necessity of certain aspects of the incarnation, apparently denying the distinctions in divine power.

Turrettini's use of the "two states of Christ" doctrine leads him to make viator and comprehensor sequential in Christ's incarnate experience while Thomas makes them simultaneous. The crucial difference is that Thomas predicates them of the natures of Christ in contrast to Turrettini's attribution of them to the person of Christ. Consequently, Turrettini is provided with warrant for even greater emphasis upon Christ's humanity than Thomas. This format also places the discussion of the graces, knowledge, and passiones of Christ into a more historical (though not necessarily more redemptive) context. In short, it seems

problematic to name Turrettini "The Thomas Aquinas of Protestantism."

Scholasticism

Finally, it remains to make some observations about scholasticism (particularly Reformed scholasticism) on the basis of this study of writings of two representatives. It is immediately clear that, for all the similarities which I noted above, Thomas and Turrettini have distinct purposes and distinct methods. While both can be identified as scholastics, any definition of that phenomenon must have considerable flexibility in order to include both men. The quaestio/disputatio format, present in both the Summa and the Institutio, has significantly different characters and exercised diverse functions in those works. Studies of scholasticism need to penetrate beyond the surface similarity of theology done by quaestiones in order to grasp the actual nature and role of that pattern in a particular work. Disputatio is a means to another end for Thomas, but it is Turrettini's primary purpose.

Second, neither Thomas nor Turrettini does theology by "deductive ratiocination" yet their actual procedures are quite different. That is, neither fit one of the leading conceptions of the scholastic method, yet it is not possible to construct a new generalization either. Thomas is more analytical, drawing upon both Scripture and tradition, but without giving sustained attention to the original texts of either. He means rather to appropriate their value for his task of investigating the Faith. Conversely, Turrettini is polemical, not analytical, concerned to vindicate the Truth, not investigate it, yet he often gives careful and extended exegesis of words, phrases, or passages by a study

of the philological, historical, and literary context. Such activity might be thought to fit better with Thomas' investigation, but it is found instead in Turrettini's polemics.

While both men include metaphysical matters prominently in their treatment of the incarnation, they do so along with admonitions to limit (at least some portions of) theology to what God chose to reveal. In addition, there is a significant difference in the prominence of philosophy in the two works, being less extensively used by Turrettini. This suggests that these men regarded metaphysical concerns as included in divine revelation (at least to some extent) and not necessarily related to conjecture and undue curiosity nor part of a full scale philosophical orientation. Whether or not they are correct in this, analyses and evaluations of their works should address their understanding of the relationship. Concerns about "speculation" and unseemly inquiry into divine mysteries did not originate in the nineteenth century post-Kantian intellectual climate. Yet the earlier voices warning against these abuses nonetheless found what they considered to be a legitimate, even Biblically-based, role for metaphysics in theology. Indicative of his sensitivity to this issue, Thomas in fact seems at times to be hesitant about making theological statements regarding God *per se* or *de re*, limiting himself to a *de dicto* theology. This surely conflicts with standard representations of scholasticism in general and Thomas in particular.

Both men place their treatment of the incarnation in a redemptive context. Both assert that Biblical revelation shuts us up to but one purpose in the incarnation, the redemption of a fallen world.

Accordingly, the person being studied is identified as the mediator of salvation, the savior of the world. The hypostatic union is not treated abstractly, but redemptively. Each man (to some extent at least) bases his Christological argumentation upon what is necessary or appropriate for the redemptive work of the incarnate Son of God. In Turrettini's case, the non-abstract, redemptive cast is emphasized by his historical emphasis derived from the status duplex framework.

This study of Thomas Aquinas and Francois Turrettini suggests that while both are correctly described as scholastics, they are scholastics of quite different varieties, neither of which is accurately depicted in the standard literature (which is often critical of scholasticism). There are ample grounds for challenging their methods and conclusions at a number of points, but generally these do not correspond to the commonplace criticisms of them. There is much to learn from both medieval and Reformed scholasticism, whether for the emulation of their virtues or the avoidance of their vices, but a more accurate representation, with room for individualized features, must come first.

APPENDIX

APPENDIX

Scholastic Terms and Concepts in Institutes

philosophical (Aristotelian) terms for "person" & "substance'	I, xiii
philosophical views on faculties of soul endorsed	I, 1-6
"accidental" properties of covenant	II, xi, 5
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kinds of causality (highest, proximate, formal)	II, xvii, 2
material causality	III, xi, 7
4-fold causal analysis of salvation	III, xiv, 17
4-fold causal analysis of salvation	III, xiv, 21
"inferior cause"	III, xiv, 21
cause	III, xiv, 5
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cause	7
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