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**A CHINESE AMERICAN COMMUNITY:
THE POLITICIZATION OF SOCIAL ORGANIZATIONS**

**By
Chuen-rong Yeh**

A DISSERTATION

**Submitted to
Michigan State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
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ABSTRACT

A CHINESE AMERICAN COMMUNITY:
THE POLITICIZATION OF SOCIAL ORGANIZATIONS

By

Chuen-rong Yeh

Much has been written about the Chinese communities in Malaysia, Indonesia, Philippines, Thailand, Cambodia, Canada, and the United States. Out of these studies have come generalizations about the principles by which these overseas communities create mutual aid societies, design professional and trade associations, and form social relationships. This study, which is based on a Chinese community located in a college town in the Midwest, raises some fundamental questions about the validity of generalizations about overseas Chinese communities made by earlier studies. For example how valid is the generalization that overseas communities are based on traditional clan and kinship structures found in China? This study argues that recent historical events--especially political events--have impacted on these overseas communities to such an extent that it is now necessary to examine their structure from a new perspective. Based on

Chuen-Rong Yeh

nearly ten years of participant observation work in the study area, this study attempts to spell out in specific terms the emerging basis of social organization. By reviewing the extensive literature of overseas communities in the United States and Southeast Asia, the author believes that the generalizations observed in my study area also applies to these other Chinese communities.

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For My Parents,
Yeh Ch'êng-ts'ai and Yang Yüeh-hsiang

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Chapter 1: Introduction

This study deals with the politicization of Chinese social organizations in an American Midwest college town, Springville. The Springville metropolitan area has a population of 200,000 of which its Chinese minority totals about 1300 people. Half of these Chinese are temporary residents, categorized as students or visiting scholars from Taiwan, China, and Southeast Asian countries. There are 95 Chinese families (624 persons) living in the Springville area permanently.

The household heads of 71 of these 95 families are professionals (professors, doctors, government employees, etc.), 17 are entrepreneurs-restaurateurs, and the remaining 7 are laborers. All of the professionals came from China and Taiwan as students after the 1940s and remained in the United States after graduating.

In the 1950s, the Chinese residents in Springville started to organize various social groups. As of 1988, there were ten formally organized social organizations. Among these are a stock club, a women's rotating credit association, a religious group, a professional association, three territorial associations, and three political organizations. These organizations are mainly composed of

students and professionals. Chinese businessmen and non-professionals rarely participate in the activities sponsored by these organizations. This study examines how these groups formed, what their organization is, and the historical forces leading to their particular structures.

When I began the study four years ago, I had decided to emphasize Chinese social organizations. The vast literature on Chinese migrants, both within China and overseas, includes a great deal of discussion on their formation of social organizations. Since the Springville Chinese community is relatively new and a different type of overseas Chinese community, I wanted to investigate how the Springville Chinese community compares with other Chinese communities in Southeast Asia and North America.

I. THE PROBLEM

Two striking characteristics of the Springville Chinese community became evident soon after I began the study. One is that the Chinese are divided into discordant and antagonistic political groups rather than along traditional locality or dialect boundaries. Chinese in this community have never demonstrated solidarity as an ethnic group. Some even deny that they are "Chinese," insisting, instead, that they are "Taiwanese." A Chinese who joins a social organization in Springville does not follow the traditional principles of kinship, territory, or

language, but joins according to political affiliation oriented toward the homeland.

Another characteristic that marks members of this community is ambivalence toward local American politics. Although some have lived in the United States for more than 20 years, they have shown little interest in its politics. Their political interests remain centered on developments in Taiwan or China, even though most of them are reluctant to discuss politics except in the company of close friends.

These observations of the Springville Chinese community raise several questions which form the central issues of this study. Why do these Chinese, most of whom are American citizens and have been in this country for many years, still live under the shadow of the politics of their homelands? Why are these Chinese suspicious of each other? Why are they divided along lines of political ideology only as it relates to China? Why don't traditional kinship, territorial, and language ties still dictate the parameters of the social group? How do we perceive these realities and ultimately provide an adequate interpretation? To begin answering these questions, I look first at the traditional interpretations offered by students of overseas Chinese societies.

II. THE STUDY OF OVERSEAS CHINESE SOCIAL ORGANIZATIONS

Chinese have been immigrating to Southeast Asia and North America for the past several centuries. In these

foreign countries, Chinese immigrants have always congregated together. Major Southeast Asian and North American cities all have their Chinatowns. The Chinese in these cities not only live in close proximity, but they also form many social organizations. Most studies of overseas Chinese communities include a section or chapter on Chinese social organizations, which are usually based on kinship, locality, or dialect.¹

Most scholars agree that overseas Chinese social organizations are based on the patterns of village and kinship organizations in the South Chinese homeland (Courant 1899:89; Fewsmith 1983:617; Ward 1954:360,362; Freedman 1979:74,79; Jackson 1970:46; Lyman 1974a:28). Several hypotheses have been proposed to explain the existence of these Chinese kinship and territorial organizations. These are briefly discussed below.

A. ADAPTATION INTERPRETATION

Many anthropologists have interpreted immigrants' social organizations as adaptive mechanisms that help new immigrants in the new environment (e.g., Mangin 1959;

¹For example, studies on Chinese social organizations are found in the works about Chinese communities in San Francisco (Conwell 1871:206-211; Speer 1877:554-571; Seward 1881:223-242,261-291; Dobie 1936:119-137; Hoy 1942; McLeod 1947:213-225,226-259; Glick and Hong 1947; Liu 1976:149-243; Zo 1978:131-145), in New York (Beck 1898), and overseas Chinese in general (Leong 1936; Kung 1962:216-224; Sung 1967:135-143; Tan 1973:205-229; Nee and Nee 1973; Lyman 1986:111-224).

Parkin 1966; Anderson 1971; Little 1973; Graves & Graves 1974; Kerri 1976; Hamilton 1979:347-49; Maeyama 1979:590-592).² Social organizations function to "adapt the social structure for modern requirements" and to "adapt individuals for modern participation" (Anderson 1971:218).

In a study of Chinese social organizations in America, Wong (1979) argues that the formation of Chinese social organizations arose

from pressure from the U.S. (host country) and internal needs of the community.... In a sense, [it] was an *adaptation* to a situation where necessary assistance could not be obtained either from the home country or the host country. (Wong 1979:51, emphasis original)

Kuo's (1977) study of social organizations in New York City's Chinatown distinguishes four types of social organizations in New York City's Chinatown: traditional; modern service; political pressure; and political action-oriented. Traditional organizations, including district, kinship and merchant associations, operate as the "inner

²In sociology, Giddens dislikes functionalism as much as he dislikes adaptive explanations--for the reason that "the idea of adaptation falls in the same category as the functional 'needs'" (Giddens 1981:21). In 1981, Giddens advocated "to erase the notion of 'adaptation' (or any synonyms) from the vocabulary of the social sciences" (Giddens 1981:21). Giddens argues that the notion of adaptation can be used in biology, but not in social sciences (Giddens 1984:233), because societies are not organisms and thus "have no need to 'adapt' to (master, conquer) their material environments" (Giddens 1981:21). Recently, however, he softened his tone by saying that adaptation "can perhaps be formulated in a cogent way in social sciences if ..." (Giddens 1984:233).

government" of Chinatown. Modern service associations, on the other hand, are those resulting from anti-poverty programs instituted by the state. Political pressure associations derived from United States' foreign policy toward China and Taiwan. Political action-oriented organizations were a result of nationwide political associations.

Kuo's major hypothesis is that voluntary associations "are adaptive mechanisms directly responsive to the needs of their members and to the demands of the encapsulating political system" (Kuo 1977:xx,149). In other words, the development of and changes in social organization resulted from external pressure such as the Asian-American movement, the student anti-war movement, and the unification of China movement as well as internal needs such as the maintenance of cultural values and ethnic group solidarity.

Still another example of the adaptation interpretation is Kwong's recent study of New York City's Chinatown (1987). Kwong argues that when Chinese immigrants came to the United States in the 1840s American authorities offered no protection (Kwong 1987:82). To survive, Chinese transplanted their traditional social organizations to overseas Chinatowns. Kwong says, "family, village associations, and secret societies were initially formed to defend immigrants against racial attacks from whites" (ibid.:6). Therefore,

The many associations existing in Chinatown were essential for survival; they formed a collective defense against the hostile larger society. They also provided order within the community. To this extent, the associations were functional; the members did join voluntarily. (Kwong 1987: 87)

In other words, the Chinese associations were needed as a collective mechanism for survival. Kwong also notes, however, that different interests within the Chinese community resulted in conflict among the various organizations.

Individuals joined associations for protection, and for the maintenance--and expansion--of their interests. By its nature, an association was exclusionary. Inevitably this led to conflicts with other associations. In times of conflict, members rallied around their own associations, creating more sectarian differences. That's why Chinatown has always been an extremely divided community--though the impression of outsiders is different. (Kwong 1987:89-90)

Kwong's assessment is insightful and complies with historical fact. He also discusses the intervention of the Kuomintang (KMT) regime in Chinatowns, which also caused division among Chinese. He does not, however, clearly point out the role of political ideology in creating major "conflicts of interest," thus leading Chinese into different political camps and to form social organizations with opposing political interests.

B. SOJOURNER MENTALITY

Other anthropologists explain the formation of social organizations in overseas Chinese communities from the "sojourner mentality" perspective (e.g., Plotnicov 1965, 1967; Lloyd 1969; Du Toit 1975). The sojourner's mind, they argue, is oriented towards homeland ties and ethnic group solidarity. Siu (1952), Barth (1964), and Lyman (1968) suggest that the sojourning orientation caused Chinese immigrants to transfer the loyalties and institutions of their native place to the overseas community. In Chinese society, native place was an essential component of a person's identity. A person's native county commonly appeared on doorplates, and invariably appeared on tombstones (Skinner 1977:539). While working in the host country, the sojourner lives among his native people, resisting assimilation in the host society and maintaining a strong relationship with his native land and family and lineage status (Skinner 1971:275; Watson 1975:207-208).

Thus, traditional Chinese social institutions, based on kinship, dialect, and native place, kept the sojourner isolated in an ethnic community. Kinship and native place ties were viewed as of the utmost importance among the many forms of cohesion and solidarity. According to Freedman, "the village, the county, the prefecture, and the dialect area provided overseas Chinese with lines along which to organize themselves" (Freedman 1979:78).

C. SEGMENTARY STRUCTURE

Crissman (1967) attempts to build a different analytical model to explain the development of Chinese social organizations.

[I]t is possible to discern a similar segmentary organization underlying the superficially different characteristics of various communities. The existence of this common structure makes it possible to describe urban Chinese society throughout South-east Asia and in North America in terms of the same generalised model. (Crissman 1967:185)

He explains that the social organizations that exist both in China and in overseas Chinese societies are based on the same organizational principle. According to Crissman, a Chinese community is divided into a hierarchical series of sub-communities or segments. Three identities are important to Chinese: speech group, native place, and surname. In other words, similarities in dialect, native place, and surname are the major bases on which social organizations are formed for the Chinese.

At the bottom tier of the hierarchy are the surname or clan associations. In some larger Chinese communities, such as Singapore, New York, or San Francisco, these are further subdivided into *fangs* (branches), where membership is based not only on surname but also on village of origin. The middle tier consists of associations based on residence in the same district (county) in China, each of which might encompass several surname and village groups.

In many larger Chinese communities, particularly in Southeast Asia, there was another tier consisting of dialect associations, segmenting the community along linguistic lines. In this instance, the most important segment is dialect group, which can further segment by locality or surname identity.

For example, among early immigrants to the U.S., Chinese from T'aishan, K'aip'ing, Hsinhui, and Enp'ing counties spoke the same dialect. In 1851, they formed *Szuyi huikuan* (four-county association) based on the principle of a common language. In 1853, the immigrants from T'aishan left *Szuyi huikuan* and formed their own county association. In 1862, the Yee clan from T'aishan organized their own, more exclusive, clan association (Nee and Nee 1973:272-273).

This division process demonstrates that language is the fundamental organizational principle in the early stage of immigration. When there were enough immigrants from the same hometown or with the same surname, these people would form their own territorial or clan associations.

Crissman's model is insightful and has been used for empirical studies of urban Chinese communities in Malaysia (Strauch 1981), in Valley City, California (Weiss 1974), in Singapore (Clammer 1983:269), in the Philippines (Omohundro 1983:65), in traditional China, and in Southeast Asia in general (Hamilton 1977). Crissman claims that his model is timeless. He says, "the segmentary model that the analysis

has produced is a-temporal: it has no time dimension"
(Crissman 1967:185).

III. THE NEED FOR A NEW INTERPRETATION

All three of these traditional interpretations of Chinese immigrant social organizations are useful in explaining the development of early Chinese social organizations. They are not, however, able to explain the politicized and antagonistic social organizations found in the Springville area Chinese community. To analyze these organizations we must look at their historical context. In other words, we shall study the Springville Chinese community from the perspective of the history of Chinese immigration and the context of the role of the social organizations in the community.

Chinese immigration, primarily to Southeast Asian countries and the United States of America, was initially precipitated by overpopulation, famine, and political instability. Although many early immigrants were sojourners, about a half of those who came to the U.S. ended up living there permanently (Lee 1960:72). These early migrants came seeking work, and they formed social organizations mainly for mutual help.

In contrast to earlier years, Chinese students-turned-immigrants have been one of the major components of Chinese immigration in recent decades. Chinese college students, mainly from Taiwan, have swarmed into the United States

because of the political instability at home. Most of these students have remained in the United States and college towns throughout the United States became new centers of Chinese settlement.³ Springville is one of these typical college towns with a large Chinese population. These new immigrants form social organizations, but they are quite different from the traditional ones found in Chinatowns.

Of the many studies of Chinatowns and overseas Chinese social organizations not one deals with college town Chinese communities. I believe the phenomena of politicized social organizations is not unique to the Springville area. Many studies on Chinatown social organizations touch upon the problem of politicization, but they are overshadowed by the traditional interpretations. A comprehensive model has yet to be formulated. The historical interpretation I propose here should provide some insights and be applicable to other Chinese communities as well.

³From 1960 to 1967, over 15,000 students went abroad [from Taiwan], and less than 5 percent of the overseas students had returned during the same years (Tien 1975:623). Another figure shows that during the period 1950-1983, a total of 74,000 students from Taiwan were enrolled in American colleges; of this number less than 13 percent returned to Taiwan (*Free China Journal* May 27, 1984:3; Gold 1986:141; Tsai 1986:180).

IV. RESEARCH METHODS

This study focuses primarily on 95 permanent Chinese families who are the major components of Springville's Chinese community. Much of the data and discussion will also concern Springville's Chinese students as well, although in less personal detail. Since the members of Springville's Chinese community--students as well as the permanent families--have so many points of mutual involvement in organizations, activities, and issues of concern, it is not possible to deal with either group in isolation.

My residence in this community and familiarity with most of the local Chinese since 1978 has been highly advantageous in conducting the field work. Although generally aware of my anthropological research project focusing on the nature of the local Chinese community, most community members treated me as an ordinary person when I participated in activities sponsored by Chinese organizations or in more personal matters. For example, during the study period, I spent a good deal of time and effort helping a Chinese laborer's family deal with a serious legal problem. Throughout my involvement with the case, neither the family nor other community members seemed concerned about the research I was doing. Although many times people felt it strange that I asked so many

questions, no one treated me as an intruder or outsider. I believe that my background gave me a great opportunity to do participant observation.

Since politics is the major focus of this study, I did encounter some particular difficulties, however. First, as mentioned above, this community is divided into different antagonistic political groups. Although an individual can have casual relations with every group, no one can maintain a close relationship with them all. If an individual participates in one group's activities regularly, he will be classified by other Chinese as a member of that group and automatically will be distrusted by other groups. That was a problem I encountered, and all I could do was to try, where possible, to compensate through other sources of information.

Second, many Chinese believe that both the People's Republic of China (PRC) and Republic of China (ROC) governments send spies to overseas Chinese communities to watch Chinese in the United States. There are numerous reports accusing the Chinese governments of spying activities (Lyman 1974a:179-183; Chen 1980:214-215; OSDMT 1981) and most Chinese in the Springville area also believe that there are surveillance webs. According to a local newspaper article, "Some Taiwanese students said that they had been asked by a former KMT party leader on campus to spy for KMT" (*The State News* Nov. 23, 1981. P.1). The surveillance activities may be an effective means of social

control, but one clear result of these activities is that the Chinese in the community tend to be suspicious of each other.

Because Chinese can not trust and are always suspicious of each other, it has been my experience in conducting field research that it is extremely difficult to ask questions directly related to political attitudes. Simply stated, interviewees often feel they can not trust any Chinese, whether an acquaintance or a stranger. A report published by *Newsweek* confirms my observation: "Because no one is certain who the spies are, meeting a colleague is a strain for Taiwanese students.... [They] are careful about what they say in front of each other" (*Newsweek* May 17, 1982. P.73).

Despite the difficulties mentioned above, I participated in every groups' activities as much as possible. In addition to participant observation, I often asked different people, including both Chinese and Americans, the same questions. Through such cross-referencing, I was able to reconstruct many details of Chinese social organizations. Although I did not tell most Chinese the exact details of my research, many were aware that I was collecting data for my dissertation. With assistance of close friends in the community, I gained a position as an elected officer in a highly politicized Taiwanese organization. My Taiwanese background helped me

in gaining the confidence of that organization's members and allowed me to collect details about that organization.

Finally, I must explain the great difficulty in securing accurate figures for the number of Chinese and Chinese families living in the Springville area because (1) there are Chinese families that move in and out every year; and (2) if a Chinese family does not participate in the community activities, their existence may not be known. The figures given in this study, then, are based on my field notes and the directories published by the various Chinese social organizations in the Springville area.

V. STRUCTURE OF THE STUDY

This study is organized into nine additional chapters following this introductory chapter. Chapter 2 concerns overseas Chinese and introduces the history of Chinese immigration into Southeast Asia and America. Although many Chinese immigrants arrived in Southeast Asia and America before the 19th century, most went abroad after the 1840s. Chinese immigrants in Southeast Asia and America were mainly from Fukien and Kuangtung provinces. The particular traditions in these provinces, i.e., agnatic villages and diverse local dialects, resulted in overseas Chinese organizing themselves according to their primordial ties. The historical background is necessary to help us understand the Chinese community in the Springville area.

After discussing this historical background, I will describe the development of overseas Chinese social organizations in general with a special emphasis on the Chinatowns in the United States. What roles do secret societies and territorial associations play? What kinds of leaders do they have? And, finally, how do politics penetrate into overseas Chinese communities?

Chapter 3 deals with the Chinese immigrants to Springville. Although some Chinese arrived in the Springville area as early as 1869, the Chinese population in Springville was relatively small until the 1950s. According to Census data, there were only five Chinese living in Springville in 1910 and nine in 1940. Most of these early immigrants were laundrymen or workers in the Chinese restaurants. After the 1950s, Chinese students started to come to the United States and about 90 percent of them stayed after graduation from college. Most of the permanent Chinese residents in the Springville area are, therefore, students or professionals, and work for university or the State government.

After introducing the above historical background, this chapter presents a general picture of the Chinese community in Springville. Who are they? What do they do? What kind of social organizations do they have? In what way do they differ from traditional Chinatowns as described in Chapter 2? This background information will supply

readers with a basic understanding of Springville's Chinese community.

Chapter 4 deals with the composition of the local Chinese population. From the previous chapter we know that the social organizations in the Springville area are organized and run by Chinese members of the professional class. Laborers and merchants are minorities in this Chinese community, and do not generally participate in activities sponsored by any Chinese social organizations. This chapter describes the professionals and these "invisible" minorities.

Chapter 5: Chinese Social Organizations in Springville (I). This chapter describes four more traditional, non-political organizations: (1) The Chinese-American Faculty Association; (2) the Chinese Bible Study group; (3) Stock Club; and (4) Rotating Credit Association: a social organization by a group of women. Although these groups claim to be purely social organizations, they cannot escape from the dark shadow of political ideology. For example, the Chinese-American Faculty Association is a professional organization that aims to help its members in an alien land and to promote Chinese faculty consolidation. Most Taiwanese faculty members, however, refuse to join the association.

Chapter 6: Chinese Social Organizations in Springville (II). This chapter deals with pro-KMT organizations. In this chapter, I demonstrate how the KMT government has

extended its rule to Chinese community in college towns, and how the KMT controls social organizations, engages in political activities, and utilizes spies to watch people. The findings of this section show that the same pattern and method of KMT operations in American Chinatowns also exists in the Chinese communities on college campuses in the U.S. The next chapter will examine the role of anti-KMT organizations.

Chapter 7: Chinese Social Organizations in Springville (III). In addition to those pro-KMT organizations described in the previous chapter, the Taiwanese Association was regarded by the KMT as a dissident organization. This chapter focuses on its leadership, recruiting, and internal structure. In addition to the Taiwanese Association, there are two pro-PRC groups, but they do not attract many participants. This chapter demonstrates that the composition of members of these anti-KMT organizations clearly indicates that political ideology, not ethnic ties, plays a decisive factor. For example, in traditional Chinese territorial organizations, no Cantonese would join a Hokkienese association. However, in the Springville area, both mainlanders and Hong Kong Chinese have joined the Taiwanese Association.

Chapter 8 depicts Chinese personal relationships. Previous chapters illustrate that kinship, territorial, and language ties always play an important role in the immigration settings, including the Springville area. In

addition to these relationships, however, other personal relationships within the Chinese community and between Chinese and Americans are also important to my study.

Chapter 9, after first defining my historical interpretation for explaining the operation and problems of overseas Chinese communities, I will then use an example to compare the historical interpretation with the traditional interpretations, i.e., adaptation theory, sojourner mentality, and segmentary structure, to show that the historical interpretation is a necessary explanatory means. In the second half of the chapter, I will also cite data from the Springville Chinese community utilizing historical interpretation to explain this material.

The concluding chapter (Chapter 10) summarizes the findings of the study, and uses the case of the Springville Chinese community as an example for comparison with other overseas Chinese communities. I will also show that the politicization of social organizations is not a phenomenon unique to the Springville area, and how the application of the historical approach can provide insights into the changing organization and operation of other overseas Chinese communities.

A Note on Proper Names

Chinese names have been transcribed according to the Wade-Giles system with the exception of some well-known proper names such as Sun Yat-sen.

Since politics is a very sensitive topic to Chinese, it is necessary to use pseudonyms in order to protect informants and other local Springville area Chinese.

Chapter 2: Overseas Chinese

The majority of earlier overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia and North America emigrated from China during the "high colonial" period, 1850-1940. They came primarily from villages of Southeast China, particularly the coastal provinces of Fukien and Kuangtung. There are two striking features about this area. First, most villages in these two provinces were "self-administered" (Weber 1978:1229), agnatic villages. Since the ideal of big families living together was a Confucian tradition, a village often consisted of people of a single surname. As Freedman says, "[T]he lineage and the village tended markedly to coincide, so that many villages consisted of single lineages" (Freedman 1958:1; see also Smith 1847:445; Lang 1946:173-180; Hu 1948:11,14; Hsiao 1960:326, 421-426). In this area, kinship ties are closely knit as are those of the family.

Second, these provinces are characterized by linguistic heterogeneity. People living only about thirty miles apart might speak mutually unintelligible languages (Tsai 1986:45-46). For example, in the Canton area, there are many local languages: Cantonese, Hakka, Ch'aochou (Teochew), T'aishan, Lungtu, Chungshan, just to name a few.

Some are distinct, being related in about the same degree as are Spanish and Portuguese (Crissman 1967:203).¹

Nurtured by strong kinship and dialect ties in these southern Chinese provinces, the Chinese immigrants in Southeast Asia and North America were able to maintain close ties among themselves.

I. CHINESE MIGRATION TO SOUTHEAST ASIA

Chinese historical records indicate that Chinese started to journey abroad as early as Han dynasty (Virphol 1972:3). In the 10th century, the *Sung Shih* (historical records for the Sung Dynasty [960-1279]) mentions visits made by traders from China and what is now the Philippines (Chen 1923:100; Chen 1963:1; 1968:1) long before the Spaniards came to the Philippines. Chinese ships were far bigger and better than those of any other Asian or European countries between the 12th and mid-15th centuries. By Sung dynasty, Chinese vessels had as many as 1,000 crew members. Both Ibn Battuta and Marco Polo had the same impression (Elvin 1973:137-145). These early contacts were sporadic but important. In the early Ming dynasty (A.D. 1368-1644), Cheng Ho's seven naval expeditions (1405-1433) to Southeast

¹As a linguist said, "Over much of the South the speech of each community--commonly a group of farming villages served by the same market--has tended to diverge from that of other, neighboring communities. The amount of divergence depends largely on the degree to which it is isolated from its neighbors" (Ramsey 1987:23).

Asia and far beyond opened the gate to Southeast Asian countries and stimulated emigration. In 1570, the Spanish conquerors found that about 150 Chinese lived in Manila. By 1603, the Chinese population in Manila was estimated at 20,000 (Wickberg 1965:4-6; Chen 1968:32,64,81, 48; Alip 1974:8).

Throughout Chinese history, the Chinese government held a negative attitude towards emigration (Viraphol 1972:6), and both the Ming and Manchu governments prohibited it. The Grand Law of Ch'ing stated that anyone going abroad would "be punished according to the law against communicating with rebels and enemies and consequently suffer death by being beheaded" (Purcell 1965:26). The reason for such severe punishment was that the "experience of the Manchu with Koxinga (Cheng Ch'eng-kung) had strengthened the feeling at Peking that emigrants from the disaffected South would almost certainly be anti-Ch'ing and plotting the overthrow of the dynasty" (Barth 1964:66; see also Viraphol 1972:6; Tsai 1986:2).

Despite the ban, however, poverty, population pressure,² and the turmoil of the Taiping Rebellion [1850-1864] were the internal driving forces that pushed the emigration from China (Coolidge 1909:17; Ling 1912; Chen

²The most widespread and lethal epidemics in Ming dynasty did not touch Kuangtung (Elvin 1973:310-311). The population of Kuangtung came close to doubling in a century between 1786 and 1882 (Chen 1923:5; Lee 1976:185; cf. Ho 1959:283).

1923:5-12; Heidhues 1974:6; Wolf 1982:375; Yen 1986:1-2).

In addition to the "push" from China, there was a "pull" from Southeast Asia. Because the European colonialists were few in number in Southeast Asia, they needed the Chinese as skilled labor in mines and plantations.

FitzGerald reports (1972:158):

there had been Chinese settlers ... in the earlier periods, the great influx only followed the development of international trade which in itself was a product of the colonial regimes then arising in the adjoining parts of South-East Asia.... The colonial empires were thus everywhere the incentive which brought the great Chinese migration of the nineteenth century into existence.

Chinese immigrants were peasants, outcasts, vagabonds, criminals, small businessmen and craftsmen, refugees from official displeasure,³ people banished from their local communities, and captives in "clan" wars sold to dealers (Purcell 1965:26; Freedman 1979:62). According to one study, only half of all Chinese immigrants to the Malay and Singapore in the 1880s were free immigrants. The other

³An American writer once asked a Chinese immigrant, "Were you driven out of the country?" The reply was, "In one sense we were. The police kept arresting us for nothing we had done, the tax collectors took our rice and clothes, the landlords reduced our wages, and we were afraid the government was going to take us for soldiers." (Conwell 1871:120-121)

half were coolies⁴ (Yen 1986:116).

Although Chinese immigrants were often poor and illiterate, the European colonialists created opportunities for Chinese to become middlemen between the Europeans and the native people. Many Chinese immigrants soon succeeded handsomely in the Southeast Asia. They are sometimes called the "Jews of the East" (Mitchison 1961:24) or "Economic Animal" (Viraphol 1972:9). By the end of the 19th century, there were prosperous Chinatowns in Singapore, Manila, Nagasaki, and other Southeast Asian cities. The Nationalist government estimated in 1969 that there was a total of 18,301,126 overseas Chinese, including the Chinese of Hong Kong and Macao, 96.02 per cent of whom were in Asia (FitzGerald 1972:3).

II. CHINESE MIGRATION TO NORTH AMERICA

Although some scholars believed that a Chinese Buddhist priest "discovered" America in the 5th century (Vining 1885; Leland 1973 [1875]; Speer 1877:446-454; Dobie 1936:10-21; Chapman 1939:25-30; Holmes 1963:145-147; Stevens 1970; Steiner 1979), historic records show that Chinese immigration to the America began with the Spanish conquest. Chinese merchants and tradesmen, known as the

⁴"Coolie" means "bitter strength" in Chinese (Barth 1964:3; Knoll 1982:9). Some scholars argue that "coolie" is derived from the Hindustani language (Conwell 1871:20; Speer 1877:473; Condit 1900:28), or Begali or Tamil word (Coolidge 1909:43; Dillon 1962:14-15; Lee 1960:436).

Spanish Chinos, crossed the Pacific Ocean on the Spanish galleons during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries (Hudson 1931:204-234; Schurz 1939; Dubs and Smith 1942; Steiner 1979:79-92). These early migrants were employed at shipbuilding or other labor in Lower California as early as 1571 (Bancroft 1890: VII:335).

Chinese arrived on the Northwest coast of America during the fur trade period. In 1788 Captain John Meares of the English East India Company recruited 50 Chinese carpenters and blacksmiths from Canton and sailed to Nootka Sound (Meares 1967 [1790]:3). Meares said, "The Chinese armourers were very ingenious, and worked with such a degree of facility that we preferred them to those Europe [sic]" (Meares 1967 [1790]:88). Since there is no record that Captain Meares carried Chinese back to Canton, they might have assimilated with the Northwest Coast Indians (Quimby 1948:249). In the following years, more Chinese came to this area (Scholefield 1914:I:143-144; Quimby 1948:248-250; Barth 1964:185) and were established there by the time of the Lewis and Clark expedition's arrival in November of 1805 (Brooks 1901:225).

Despite these early, documented arrivals, the United States Immigration Commission recorded that the first Chinese arrived in California in 1820 (Bromwell 1969 [1856]:24). In the following decade (1820-1830) only three

Chinese arrived (Coolidge 1909:498).⁵ The first massive immigration of Chinese laborers was after the discovery of gold in San Francisco by James Wilson Marshall in 1848. After 1850, a great many Chinese peasants, especially from T'aishan area,⁶ were drawn to America as miners or railroad workers. It was the first time in human history that large numbers of Orientals and Occidentals lived together in the same ecological niche. Unfortunately, it was a very unpleasant experience.

Since the incoming in the last century, Chinese laborers were perceived as peaceful, docile, placid, inoffensive, and law-abiding people.⁷ However, these early Chinese immigrants were subjected to prejudice, persecution, racial discrimination, popular tribunals and mob violence, notably by Irish immigrants (Gibson 1877:9;

⁵The figures quoted covered arrivals at the Atlantic and Gulf of Mexico ports only (Chinn 1969:9). California belonged to Spain between 1786 and 1822, belonged to Mexico between 1823 and 1846, became independent between 1846 and 1848, and became the 31th state of the U.S.A. in 1850.

⁶T'aishan (in Mandarin, Toishan in Cantonese) lies about 70 miles southwest of Canton. Prior to 1914, T'aishan district was called Sunning or Hsinning.

⁷See Nevius 1868:278; Mayo-Smith 1890:244; Hutcheson 1902:60; Coolidge 1909:12,14,455; Oberholtzer 1931:IV:254-255; Leong 1936:86; Crane and Larson 1940:54; McLeod 1947:39; Seager 1959:49; Carranco 1961:330; Dillon 1962:30; Griswold 1962:109; Barth 1964:144; Jacques 1974:236; Sowell 1983:169. A Detroit police officer, Lt. Donald Ruedisueli, executive officers of the 13th Precinct, told a reporter, "Never in 24 years on the force have I known a Chinese person as a perpetrator of crime in Detroit. If everyone was like that, we'd be in heaven" (Bunnell 1974:10).

Coolidge 1909:267,270; Oberholtzer 1931:IV:257; Wittke 1939:475; Black 1963:60-62). Especially in the 19th century, the anti-Chinese riots and assaults swept all over the West. A Chinese immigrant recalled what happened in 1870s:

We were simply terrified; we kept indoors after dark for fear of being shot in the back. Children spit upon us as we passed by and called us rats. (Huie 1932:27)

In those days, such headlines were often seen in the newspapers, "Chinese coal miners attacked at Seattle"; "Chinese expelled from Eureka"; "600 Chinese driven out of Tacoma"; "Chinese miners mobbed at Cheyenne" etc. (Condit 1900:83). In one particularly brutal case, 28 Chinese were massacred (11 were burned alive in their cabins), and 500 were driven out of the mines in Rock Springs, Wyoming in 1885 (Mayo-Smith 1890:257-259; Wilcox 1929:205; Crane and Larson 1940).

Although some Americans resented the presence of Chinese, their cheap labor was needed to develop natural resources and build railroads. As of 1880, the census counted more than 100,000 Chinese in the United States (Lyman 1970:66; Liu 1976:68; Tsai 1986:31); almost four-fifths of them resided in California. In 1882, however, the United States Congress passed the Chinese Exclusion Act, which suspended all further Chinese immigration to the United States for 10 years and declared that Chinese were

"forbidden" to be naturalized as U.S. citizens (Wu 1972:70-75; Tsai 1986:64-65). Shortly after the U.S. adopted the Act, Canada, Mexico, Guatemala, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Columbia, Ecuador, Peru, Australia, and New Zealand followed suit (Kennedy 1959:39).

The ten-year term of the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 was extended twice, and in 1904, the U.S. barred Chinese immigration permanently. The U.S. Congress also passed many amendments, acts, and treaties to limit the Chinese-American's civil rights. (For a detailed record of anti-Chinese laws, see Wu comp. & ed. 1972; Tung 1974:50-108.) For example, in 1888, the U.S. Congress passed the Scott Act which stated that "no Chinese laborer in the United States shall be permitted, after having left, to return ..." (Wu 1972:84). The direct victims of the Scott Act were over 20,000 Chinese laborers who had left the United States to visit their families in China with proper certificates entitling them to return. About 600 persons were on the ocean on their return to the United States but were denied landing (Coolidge 1909:203).

The Scott Act also gave the Immigration Bureau the authority to detain every Chinese until the immigration officers had time to examine his/her papers. They treated Chinese in the detention station worse than jailed prisoners (Tsai 1986:74). Prominent Chinese were not excepted: Dr. Sun Yat-sen was detained for twenty days in 1904 (Lick and Hong 1947:174-179; *China Times* Oct. 25, 1982)

and H. H. Kung, a descendant of Confucius and later Chinese Finance Minister, was detained for 13 months (Chen 1980: 171-172).

The exclusion laws lasted over 60 years and were not repealed until President Roosevelt signed the Magnuson Bill in December 1943. Even then, only 105 Chinese a year were permitted to immigrate to the United States. The law was "highly discriminatory when compared with European quotas" (Tsai 1986:116).⁸ The Chinese population in the U.S. decreased from the peak of more than 100,000 in 1880 to 60,000 in 1920. Since 1943, however, the Chinese population in the U.S. has increased each year. The quota for Chinese immigrants each year increased from 105 in 1943 to 20,000 in 1976 (Chen 1980:212); 1943 was the first time in American history that immigrants from Europe and other parts of the world have had the same quota (ibid.).

Even today, most early immigrants and their descendants still live in Chinatowns. American-born Chinese want to move out of Chinatown (Webster 1972:393), but not everyone can make it. According to one study, a high percentage of Chinese who live in New York's Chinatown live below the poverty level. (24.7 percent compared to 17.2 percent for New York City overall, Kwong 1987:58). In

⁸Three years later the U.S. Congress adopted the Public Law 483. There were still peoples from many Asian countries ineligible for U.S. citizenship, including those of Japan, Korea, Indonesia, Siam etc. (Kennedy 1959:42-43)

San Francisco's Chinatown, 41½ percent of the population lives below poverty level (Nee and Nee 1973:xxii).

A more recent group of Chinese immigrants to the U.S. consists of those who came as students. As early as 1645, Chinese students were sent by the Catholic Church to Rome to study (Fang 1970:II:190). They must be the earliest Chinese students to have studied abroad. Between 1650 and 1870, only about 133 students studied abroad, mostly Chinese Catholic (Clausen 1979:107). In the last century, due to anti-Chinese movements, few Chinese students came to the United States to study; they went to Japan instead. By 1907, two years after the traditional examination system was abolished, there were 15,000 Chinese students in Japan (Brown 1912:79-80), and only about 500 or 600 in western Europe and the United States (Scalapino and Yu 1985:269). After 1909, because the help of the Boxer Indemnity Fund,⁹ Chinese students began to come the United States. Although a small number of Chinese came as students in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, it was not until President Roosevelt signed the Magnuson bill in 1943 that

⁹After the Boxer Rebellion in 1900, China compensated 450 million taels, or 67,500,000 to fourteen countries as imdenity (Tan 1967:226). In 1909, the United States refunded the excess indemnity, a sum of \$27,920,000, for educational purposes (Tsai 1986:90) and the Chinese government sent one hundred students annually for four years and then fifty for twenty-nine years to American colleges. Chinese government also established a preparatory school, Ch'ing Hua Academy, to train young students before going to the United States (Brown 1912:81).

Chinese students began to come to the United States in large numbers.¹⁰

Prior to 1943, there was, however, one influx of students. This was the result of the Japanese invasion of China in 1937 and the Communist revolution which caused many rich Chinese families to send their children to America for education (Chen 1980:202). After the KMT government retreated to Taiwan in 1949, students from Taiwan kept coming to this country and 87% of them stayed after graduation (*Free China Journal* May 27, 1984:3; Gold 1986:141; Tsai 1986:180). In the 1986-87 academic year, there were 25,660 students from Taiwan in the United States (*The New York Times*, Dec. 23, 1987, p.12).

The 1980 census indicated 806,027 Chinese living in the U.S. (*The New York Times* July 30, 1981); this number had

¹⁰There were two famous students among early immigrant Cantonese laborers: Yung Wing (1828-1912) and Charles Jones Soong (1866-1918). Mr. Yung came to this country as a student in 1847. He graduated from Yale in 1854 and was the first Chinese to finish college degree in America. Mr. Yung married a white American woman, became a naturalized American citizen, died and was buried in this country. (For detail, see Yung 1909; La Fargue 1942.)

Mr. Soong's uncle brought him to the United States in 1878. Helped by some American Methodists, he had studied at Trinity College at Durham, North Carolina (the forerunner of Duke University) and Vanderbilt University. He went back to China in 1886 as a minister and later became a successful businessman by selling bibles to his countrymen. His family was often regarded as the most powerful family in modern Chinese history. One of his daughters married Dr. Sun Yat-sen; another married Chiang Kai-shek; "others served as China's prime ministers, foreign ministers, financial ministers.... T.V. Soong may have been the richest man on earth" (Seagrave 1985:8).

increased to 1,079,400 by 1985 (Gardner 1985:5). The new immigrants, many of them students professionals, are quite different from the early labor migrants. The early labor migrants often left their wives and children at home in China, intending to return there after they had enough money. Many new immigrants in recent years leave their wives and children in the U.S. while they commute between there and Taiwan. Unlike Chinatown-centered early immigrants, they either have congregated in "new Chinatowns" such as Monterey Park in Los Angeles or Flushing in New York City (Tanzer 1985) or have moved to small towns all over the United States to run Chinese restaurants or engage in professional occupations. Therefore, they did not join early immigrants' social organizations (Hong 1976:511).

III. TRADITIONAL OVERSEAS CHINESE COMMUNITIES

Chinese communities in Southeast Asia and North America grew rapidly in the second half of the 19th century. These Chinese migrants primarily came from the countryside of Fukien and Kuangtung provinces. Very often, village people followed their kinsmen or fellow villagers emigrating abroad. Thus, generally, Fukienese from the Amoy area went to Penang, Malacca, Java, and the Philippines; Cantonese went to West Malaya and Cambodia; Hakka congregated in West Kalimantan and in Sabah; Ch'aochou (Teochew) immigrated from Swatow to Thailand,

Sumatra, and Cambodia, and there are today more Teochew in Bangkok than in Swatow (Heidhues 1974:5; Lebra 1980:3). In the United States, the majority of Chinese immigrants in the last century were from T'aishan. Today, about half of the American Chinese trace their origins to T'aishan (*The New York Times* Nov. 4, 1987. P.5).

In both the United States and Southeast Asia, most of earlier Chinese migrants were illiterate in Chinese (Sandmeyer 1939: 13; Barth 1964:7,223; Kung 1962:224; FitzGerald 1972:163; Tsai 1983:17; Lyman 1986:132; Yen 1986:9) and 95 percent of them were male peasants (Lyman 1970:79). At that time, there was a very strong sentiment in China against any decent woman leaving home even with her husband (Coolidge 1909:18-19; Tsai 1983:17). They left wives and children at home and went to Southeast Asia, North America, or Australia to seek their fortunes. They intended to save enough money to allow them to return to their towns and villages to enjoy an easy life. Barth vividly portrayed a typical Chinese immigrant:

His wife would remain in the native village and bring up his offspring with his family. Overseas he would maintain a very low living standard and save the larger part of his income for his family which depended on his remittances. The long years in the strange world would not break the emigrant's emotional ties with his family. The tablets of his ancestors in the clan hall and his children in the family home, the veneration of his parents, and the desire to live leisurely in China would sustain his loyalty during his adventurous years ahead until the sun of the Pearl River delta and the joy of his family again warmed his homesick heart. (Barth 1964:29-30)

Chinese migrants were both physically and culturally distinct from the native people in the host countries. They took no part and had no interest in the politics of the countries in which they lived but remained highly concerned with the politics of China. They did not want to adopt local Buddhism in Thailand and Vietnam, to become Muslim in Malaysia, or to convert to Christianity in the United States. They practiced their own religion and built their own temples or joss houses. Although most of them came from poor families, when they did prosper and brought their families to the U.S., they built Chinese schools and sent their children to learn Chinese when they managed to prosper. They lived together in Chinatowns and organized various *t'ung hsiang hui* (*huikuan*, territorial associations) and *tsung ch'in hui* (clan associations) to help each other. In other words, they did not "assimilate."

In the United States, after the gold mines were exhausted, some Chinese were hired to build railroads and cultivate fields and others started their own small restaurants, laundries, and grocery shops or engaged in various trades such as vegetable and fish peddling, tinkering, shoe making, fortune telling, barbering, etc. As of 1930s, there were about 3,550 Chinese laundries and 1,000 Chinese restaurants in New York City (Leong 1936:37). A famous Chinese writer, Lin Yutang, described a Chinatown laundryman in his novel, *Chinatown Family* (1948:27):

"But, Father, why did you choose laundry?" asked Tom.

"I did not choose, son. And it is not bad as you can see. I have made a living, and now we are all here. There was no other way. All you have is a pair of hands, and you do what the Americans do not want to do and allow you to do. When they built the railroads in the West, there were no women there. Those American men! They could not cook, and they could not wash. We Chinese cooked and washed better, so they allowed us to cook and wash. Now we wash America and cook America because we wash better and cook better. I would have opened a restaurant if I had the money ..."

Mary Roberts Coolidge, a Stanford University sociologist, wrote along similar lines:

Whatever the white man scorned to do the Chinaman took up; whatever white man did, the Chinese could learn to do; he was a gap-filler, doing what no one else would do, or what remained undone, adapting himself to the white man's tastes, and slipping away, unprotestingly, to other tasks when the white man wanted his job. (Coolidge 1909:22)

For many of these Chinese laborers, in strange countries without their families, gambling became a favorite pastime. As of 1930s, there were about fifty gambling houses in New York's Chinatown with weekly business estimated at \$100,000 (Leong 1936:210). The laundrymen and restaurant workers were the regular customers of the gambling houses. In Chicago, "Every Sunday afternoon laundrymen come from all parts of the metropolis to Chinatown, and all evening and night all the gambling houses are crowded with chance-taking fortune seekers, pursuing excitement" (Siu 1987:232). Because of

their Sunday gambling activities, the laundries were constantly changing hands; the restaurant workers often had no money to send home (Leong 1936:37). There is a story that a Chinese laborer, who had saved for fifteen years to go back to China, dropped into a gambling house on the eve of his departure and lost his whole savings in one night (Genthe 1908:129). Sung describes a laundryman:

In a few months, Man Fook Liu will be fifty-nine years old. Forty years of his life have been spent in the United States--twenty-five of them in the same laundry in Boston, Mass....

Before he left [China], however, the family made sure that he had married and had properly presented them with a male descendant. Man fook came to the United States in the early 1920's ...

When Man Fook had money, he sent some home, but the big pile never materialized. From Monday morning to Saturday night, Man Fook seldom left his laundry. He subscribed to the Chinese newspapers from New York and occasionally went to a movie. His main recreation was to go to Chinatown, where he first stocked up on the week's groceries and then headed for the fan-tan tables [for gambling]. If he won, he treated himself and others to a special dinner ... (1967:265-66)

Unlike the Indian government's sponsorship of and assistance to Indian laborers migrating to Malaya (Sandhu 1969:75-96), Chinese emigrants received no help at all from their government. Often the Chinese immigrants had to look to secret societies (secret only in their ritual of initiation)¹¹ for protection (FitzGerald 1972:170; Yen

¹¹Secret society was called *tong* [Cantonese, *t'ang* in Mandarin] in the United States. For a detailed account of Chinese secret societies in the United States, see Gong and Grant 1930, Leong 1936:66-84, Dillon 1962.

1986:114). Most Chinese secret societies in Southeast Asia and the U.S. stem from the Triad Society, which was begun in South China in the 17th century (Tsai 1986:51). Its slogan was "overthrow the Ch'ing and restore the Ming" (Comber 1957:21; Chesneaux 1971:61; Davis 1977:64).¹² In the 19th century, some members of the Triad Society in southeast China joined the emigration and they spread throughout the overseas Chinese communities. When anti-Manchu sentiment gradually lost its momentum in foreign lands, the secret societies became predominantly criminal organizations, controlling opium, alcohol, gambling, prostitution, and coolie trade.

In the British colonies of Southeast Asia, the British Civil Service and the Malay rulers left the control of the Chinese communities to the Chinese and their secret societies (Fitzgerald 1972:171-73). As a result, secret

¹²When the Manchurians, a Tungustic people, overthrew the Ming dynasty [1368-1644], some Han Chinese, the major stock of Chinese people, organized secret societies for the purpose of fighting against the Manchu regime of the Ch'ing dynasty. The Triad Society was founded in the Fuchou area by the Shaolin monks in the 17th century as anti-Manchu resistance organization (Ward and Stirling 1925:I:2; Comber 1957:2; Barth 1964:103; Davis 1977:62; see also Smith 1847:80-81). The anti-Manchu sentiment of these early secret societies can be seen from their refusal to adopt the reigning calendar of Manchu emperors (Yen 1986:110).

The name of the Triad Society in the United States is the *Chee Kung Tong*, commonly called the Chinese Free Masons. The *Chee Kung Tong* is also a legal party in the People's Republic of China (Lyman 1974a:27; Kuo 1977:29; Chen 1980:29; Day and Degenhardt 1984:73).

societies were in total dominance until they were banned in 1890 (Freedman 1979:68). In the United States, some members of the Triad Society established the first American branch in San Francisco in 1852. To help each other, those who did not join either clan associations or territorial associations organized their own underground seditious secret societies and very often fought over territory (Leong 1936:66-82). Today, some scholars believe that the secret societies have "disappeared" or are "almost totally inactive" (Hsu 1971: 71; Dillon 1962), while others say that secret societies still exist and operate like the Mafia (Yee 1970:58; Kuo 1977:29-31; Wong 1979:63), engaging in gambling, smuggling aliens, racketeering, and, recently, narcotics. Some observers say the traditional secret societies finance and support the youth gangs from Taiwan and Hong Kong (Nee and Nee 1973:226; Wong 1979:63). According to a recent report, Chinese gangs have taken over the dominant role in New York City's heroin trade (*The New York Times* August 9, 1987, p.1).

In addition to secret societies, Chinese formed various social organizations based on their kinship, locality, language ties, as noted in Chapter 1. Freedman described the early Chinese immigrants in Singapore:

When immigrants are thrown down in a strange setting where they must make their social life among themselves, they are likely to divide into units which express the solidarity of homeland ties. The village, the county, the prefecture, and the dialect area provided overseas Chinese

with lines along which to organize themselves.
(Freedman 1979:78)

In Singapore and Malaya, the first Chinese dialect organization, Chia Ying Association of Penang, was founded by Hakka speakers as early as 1801. By 1870, 33 dialect associations were organized in Penang, Malacca, and Singapore (Yen 1986:322-326). The first clan organizations were organized in 1819, and as of 1911, there were 38 clan associations in the Singapore and Malaya (ibid.:327-331). A leader of a dialect group, the "kapitan," was often appointed by the European colonialists. The Kapitan system was adopted by the Portuguese and Dutch colonialists in the Southeast Asia. The Kapitan was "a man of wealth, prestige and influence, recognized by both the ruling authorities and his own community, who negotiated between the two and was responsible for both internal law and order and the external good behaviour of his community" (Heidhues 1974: 45). The Kapitan system was abolished in Penang, Malacca, and Singapore after the formation of the Straits Settlements in 1826 (Yen 1986:50, 124), but it continued in the Malay states (ibid.:50).¹³

¹³Penang, the first British settlement in Southeast Asia, was leased from the Sultan of Kedah in 1785. In 1819 the British founded Singapore, and in 1824 they acquired Malacca from the Dutch. The three British East India Company territories of Penang, Singapore, and Malacca were given a unified administration in 1826 and called the Straits Settlements.

In the United States, the first Chinese territorial association was founded in 1849 in San Francisco, where nearly 791 Chinese lived (Liu 1976:150; Zo 1978:132; Chen 1980:28). Within a few years the immigrants from Sanyi, Szuyi, Chungshan, and other counties organized their associations respectively. The Hakka who were a minority among immigrants, formed their small association in 1852.

When enough migrants came from the same native place, they formed their own native place organization. One of their immediate goals was to build their own building (*huikuan*) as a meeting place. All members paid membership fees with the richer members donating larger sums to achieve the goal of building a meeting place more rapidly. Once they had their own building, members came together to sit and chat, exchange news, ask for help, welcome newcomers from their hometown, or have a game of *mahjong* or *fan-tan*. There were sleeping rooms for newcomers and for those who had no jobs. There were also cooking facilities for Chinese New Year parties, weddings, funerals, and other occasions. Some associations also bought graveyards for their members. "And if later the living want the bones of their dead, the Association will dig up the skeleton, and ship it by freight to China" (Leong 1936:50).

Members elected a chairman and the chairman appointed a treasurer. A chairman was usually a respected, wealthy, elderly, and learned gentleman. Very often the chairman had to settle disputes or conflicts between members and

negotiate with other associations. "There was no force behind [the] decisions, only moral persuasion, but the decisions were generally accepted and adhered to" (Sung 1967:135). In addition to a chairman and treasurer, every *huikuan* had English and Chinese secretaries to help illiterate members write letters home or deal with local businesses. The English secretary also served as an interpreter to help the members in hospitals, courts and other places.

In 1854, all of the associations in San Francisco formed a federation, *Chung Wah Kung Saw*, (the Chinese Consolidated Benevolent Association (CCBA), which Americans called "the Six Companies"). This organization represented all Chinese immigrants (Barth 1964:97; Chen 1980:27). Before the Manchu government established the Chinese legation in Washington, D.C. in 1878 (Liu 1978: 40), the Six Companies was the "unofficial" representative of the Chinese community in the United States.

The Chinese Benevolent Associations claim to be the supreme ruling bodies of the Chinese community in their respective cities. They presume to speak for the entire Chinese population of that city. In theory, all people of Chinese ancestry come under the jurisdiction of the Chinese Benevolent Association. (Sung 1967: 136)

Each Chinatown has its own CCBA to control the Chinese. To the Chinese, the social organizations that they formed in foreign countries were transplants from

China (Lyman 1974a:28). To westerners, however, Chinese CCBA were often seen as institutions that "supervised or oppressed their countrymen" (Barth 1964:80). For example, in the 19th century, no Chinese in San Francisco could purchase a ticket back to China unless he had paid all his debts in the United States and got the requisite certificate from the Six Companies (US Congress 1877:24; Gibson 1877:339-340; Condit 1900:35; Coolidge 1909:409-410; Dobie 1936:128; McLeod 1947:219). One critic claimed that "with the aid of district companies and clan associations, the merchant-creditors controlled the mass of indentured emigrants. Under manifold compulsions, forced into submission by their basic allegiances of district loyalty and filial piety, most sojourners readily accepted the confines and dictates of Chinese California" (Barth 1964:80).

In traditional China, the gentry¹⁴ and scholars in China were leaders in the local community. Their high social status kept them out of the stream of emigration (Barth 1964:81). The poor peasants at the bottom stratum

¹⁴The term "gentry" does not correspond to the English usage (Chang 1955:xviii-xix; Balazs 1964:19; Eberhard 1965:42). In the study of traditional Chinese society, there is no general agreement on the definition of gentry. Some scholars argue that the gentry were those who passed the examination and held offices (Chang 1955, 1962; Michael 1955; Ho 1962). Others maintain that gentry were local elite (Fei 1946, 1953; Eberhard 1960; Marsh 1961). Still others think that the gentry included both officials and local elites (Bielenstein 1953:93; Fried 1953:180; Ch'ü 1962).

of the social pyramid composed the major stock of emigrants. When they migrated to the U.S., some of them became successful merchants.¹⁵ The merchants' social status was low in the traditional Chinese value system. In the absence of the gentry and the scholars in the Chinese communities in America, however, the successful merchants assumed the role of leaders (Lyman 1974b:476; Chen 1980:27; Tsai 1986:49). The merchants in San Francisco Chinatown, realizing their low social status in the traditional realm of Chinese culture, promoted Confucian ideology, stressing the importance of clan/regional ties on the one hand (Tsai 1983:35; 1986:49), and denouncing Christianity on the other (Gibson 1877:341-342; Danton 1931:4-5). They "combined the prestige of mandarins, the wealth of gentry, the authority of family heads, the status of scholars, and the power of creditors in their unique position" (Barth 1964:81).

To legitimize their status and promote Confucian ideology, they even brought Chinese scholars to serve as company presidents. "Since scholars were rarity among the California Chinese, the district associations, in most instances, had to import scholars from their native hearths for their presidents" (Hoy 1942:11). In 1906, for example, there were four *chūjên* (holder of the provincial examination

¹⁵Jack London wrote a short novel about a Chinese immigrant, Chun Ah Chun, who came to Hawaii as a coolie. Later, when he became rich enough, he became a leader of Chinese community (London 1912:149-189).

degree) who were paid handsomely to come to the United States to serve as company presidents (Tsai 1986:49). Until today, Chinatown leaders appeal to Confucianism to enhance their authority (Kuo 1977:38). The leaders of the Six Companies complained that the Chinese street-corner hoodlums did not know of the Confucian value to obey superiors and elders. They urged the police to crack down on hoodlums, Communists, and highbinders in Chinatown (Light and Wong 1975:1360; Wong 1979:53).¹⁶ According to a recent study of New York City's Chinatown (Kwong 1987:95), the Six Companies "obtained money from the Taiwan government to erect a statue of Confucius as a Chinatown landmark, and each year the CCBA [i.e., the Six Companies] organizes an official celebration of Confucius's birthday."

Thus, the Chinese communities overseas mirrored to a great extent the hierarchical organization of the Chinese village except that the merchants were able to gain increased social status. As in traditional China, the leaders of the Chinese community used Confucian ideology to administer the community.

¹⁶Responding to these demands, police "broke up street-corner cliques, and cracked batons over Oriental skulls" (Light and Wong 1975:1360). In contrast, black community leaders vied with each other in decrying police use of force (Sowell 1983:171-172).

IV. POLITICAL CHANGE IN CHINESE COMMUNITIES

We have seen that traditional overseas Chinese communities acted in many ways like independent colonies. Various territorial and dialectical organizations helped immigrants with their economic and social needs, and secret societies and, later, the Six Companies acted as ruling powers. The situation has changed dramatically since the end of Ch'ing dynasty [1911]. While the Manchu regime was weak, both the Reformers (led by Liang Ch'i-ch'ao) and Dr. Sun Yat-sen's Revolutionaries tried to make use of traditional social organizations in the overseas Chinese communities. Politics thus gradually penetrated into the Chinese immigrants' daily lives.

In 1903, Liang Ch'i-ch'ao visited the Chinese communities in North America to preach his reform movement on the one hand and to raise funds on the other. He gave hundreds of speeches, created 103 branches of his Imperial Reform Party, and established newspapers in San Francisco, New York City, Honolulu, and Vancouver (Lo and Lai 1976:6). In the following years, the leader of the revolutionary party, Dr. Sun Yat-sen (1866-1925), came to America to compete with the reformers and did the same: gave speeches, raised funds, and established newspapers.

Especially the younger elements, students and workers alike, rallied around him and joined his secret revolutionary organization.... A fascinating and fluent speaker, well informed about world affairs and backed by his unselfish devotion to the national cause, undaunted courage

and romantic career, Dr. Sun could hold his audiences spellbound for hours at a time, whether they numbered by the hundreds and thousands or only a handful. He was at his best when in the quiet of the night, with a small group of followers gathered around the lamplight, as often happened in the back-rooms of the little laundries in the new York City, he spoke to them about the military reverses and diplomatic failures of China and expounded his programme for the liberation and self-rule of the Chinese people. (Huie 1932:70-71)

Dr. Sun knew that the central doctrine of the Triad Society was to overthrow the Manchu regime and restore the Ming, so he joined the Triad Society in Hawaii (Glick and Hong 1947:172-173; Yu 1966:28; Davis 1977:170; Tsai 1981:134; Scalapino and Yu 1985:214). When he preached his revolutionary ideas to Chinese in America, the leader of the Triad Society, Wong Sam Ark, traveled with him. For years Dr. Sun solicited help from Chinese communities abroad, particularly in Japan, Southeast Asia, and the United States. In 1911, he led the revolution that overthrew the Manchu regime.

In the following years, China had civil war between the Communists and the Nationalists (KMT). The KMT government needed support from overseas Chinese to display its legitimacy. The KMT also wanted to be sure that its overseas countrymen remained loyal and did not become enemy collaborators or engage in seditious activities. The KMT, therefore, established political organizations, party newspapers, Chinese language schools, and sent agents to overseas Chinese communities. The surveillance webs have

become institutionalized within Chinese communities and continue in the present.

The KMT also took advantage of the hierarchic structure of territorial associations by controlling their leaders. For example, the Six Companies, the most powerful organization in the Chinatowns, were under the KMT's direct control; indeed, it had been loyal to the Nationalist regime since the early 20th century (Lyman 1974a:34; Kuo 1977:38; Wong 1979:54; Chen 1980:214; Tsai 1986:134-135). The leaders of the Six Companies can obtain favorable export quotas of certain merchandise such as mushrooms from Taiwan (Wong 1979:138). Several leaders from the Six Companies were even appointed as Presidential National Policy Advisers or Congressmen in the Nationalist government in Taiwan (Nee 1972:23; Nee and Nee 1973:221; Wong 1979:54; Tsai 1986:136-137) despite the fact that it is illegal for an American citizen to serve in such position in the foreign country (Chen 1980:214). This political domination by the KMT continues to the present. Kwong, in a recent study, comments "Chinatown is still dominated by a traditional political elite which, despite change, rules with the acquiescence of outside authorities" (Kwong 1987:6).

During the Korean war and the McCarthy purge years, the Six Companies and the Nationalist government supporters took advantage of this atmosphere to organize a "lobbying and propaganda" (Tsai 1986:134-135) organization, the Anti-

Communist Committee for Free China. "[U]nder the prodding of Kuomintang diplomatic representatives and their agents within the Chinese communities, an anticommunist witch hunt was launched" (Chen 1980:214). Very often they accused their opponents of being communists and reported them to the FBI and INS (Immigration and Naturalization Service) (Nee and Nee 1973:212, 216, 224; Chen 1980:214). The leaders of the Six Companies further worked out a "Confession Program," under which some 8,000 Chinese confessed and many were prosecuted and deported (Lee 1960: 307-310; Chen 1980:215). Immigration authorities and FBI agents increased activity in the Chinese community. Shock waves permeated the Chinese community and sympathizers of the left and liberals suffered extensive political harassment.

The Chinese community was thus divided along the lines of political ideology. When China split into two contending factions, so did the overseas Chinese community. "In Chinatown the left and right struggled for control, often resorting to violence" (Leong 1936:142). Chinese civil war, therefore, was transplanted abroad: the contenders fought for power and political control in China and for political backing in overseas Chinese communities.

V. SUMMARY

This chapter provides a brief history of Chinese immigration to Southeast Asia and North America.

Social organizations have always played a major role in overseas Chinese communities. When early Chinese immigrants arrived in foreign countries, they created social organizations based on dialect, locality, and kinship ties. But, as we have seen, the overseas Chinese became increasingly attuned to political developments in China since the end of the Manchu dynasty. When China divided, overseas Chinese also divided along the lines of political ideology. As Lyman said, "Essentially interested in political loyalty and financial support from the Chinese abroad, the KMT from the beginning of its reign in China embarked upon a broad program of educational controls, patriotic campaigns, and community surveillance to ensure its place in the hearts and pocketbooks of expatriate Chinese" (Lyman 1974a:182). As a consequence, traditional kinship and locality ties were replaced by the political ideology.

In this chapter, I have described the development of overseas Chinese social organizations in general with a special emphasis on the Chinatowns in the United States. This historical background will help us understand the Chinese community in the Springville area to which I now turn.

Chapter 3: The Setting

The site for this study, Springville, is a medium-sized metropolitan area in the midwestern state (place name has been changed). The area contains the state capital, which is an industrial city, a college town, and a residential suburb. The population of the study area totals approximately 220,000 in 1988. In 1837, the first settler came to Springville and built the first permanent dwelling (Romig 1973: 318). When legislators selected Springville as the new state capital, it was a forest and had only a few timber families living here. Most of these pioneers came from the East, and named this new village after their home village, Springville, New York.

The new "capital of the woods" grew rapidly after the state government moved to the site in 1847. In 1855, the first agricultural college in the United States was established in the capital area. By 1859, the population numbered 4,000 and Springville was incorporated as a city.

By the end of last century, when the gasoline engine became available on the market, Springville became one of the major automobile producing centers. "An important factor in Springville's industrial development was the ability to finance the 'radical' proposals of automobile

inventors" (Writer's Program 1941:331). The continuous expansion of the automobile industry attracted people into the area. The population doubled in ten years, from 16,000 in 1900 to 32,000 in 1910.

Although the study area is a major automobile-producing city, most of the permanent Chinese residents work for either the university or the state government; some are self-employed. The non-permanent Chinese residents, mainly graduate students, come to the area to attend the university. We could roughly divide the history of Chinese immigrants in the Springville area into three stages: (1) early immigrants in the 19th century, (2) 20th century immigrants from China before 1949, and (3) student-immigrants after 1949, mainly from Taiwan.

I. EARLY CHINESE IMMIGRANTS

The literature about early Chinese immigrants in the study area is scarce. According to census records, there was only one Chinese inhabitant in the entire state in 1850; this number increased to 27 in 1880 and 240 in 1900 (Verway 1974:50).

The anti-Chinese movement on the West Coast during the 19th century was the major reason for Chinese migration to the Midwest (Anderson and Smith 1983:82). Many of the migrants came to the Midwest by illegally crossing the border from Canada. In the early 1900s, Chinese smugglers used ferries and rowboats to get Chinese across the Detroit

River into the United States. When the river froze in the winter, the migrants simply walked across at night. In 1910, a *Detroit Journal* article, under the headline "Over Bridge of Ice Wily Chinese Seek Forbidden U.S. Land," reported the story with strong racial overtones:

In the days of the "underground railway" runaway slaves made good use of ice on the Detroit river. Just now, with a natural bridge from Sandwich to this city, there is a return invasion--of Chinese, this time, running the blockade raised by the United States against the threatened Yellow Peril. Federal inspectors patrolling the docks declare few Chinese have attempted invasion--but no data is obtainable as to the number who have succeeded in escaping official cognisance. (*The Detroit Journal* January 18, 1910, p.1)

Moving to the Midwest, however, did not end the struggle against harassment and discrimination for the early Chinese immigrants. For example, in 1887, Governor Russell A. Alger of Michigan said,

There is, as you well know, on the western shores of this great country a horde of Chinese Pagans.... Their immigration to this country should be for ever stopped. They are not fit subjects to become citizens, they have no interest in this government, they send all their earnings back to their native land, and when they have accumulated a small sum they return there only to send out, to take their places, hordes of similar people.... I recommend that you urge upon our members of Congress the necessity of the enactment of a law that shall for ever forbid another one of that race from landing in this country. We have no use of them, and the sooner stringent laws are passed prohibiting them from coming here, the better it will be for the country. (Fuller 1927:559-560)

Various laws also made the Chinese "limited in the type of work or business they could perform" (Anderson and Smith 1983:82). For example, one of the articles of the second constitution of California, ratified in 1879, specified that no corporation was allowed to employ any Chinese. It was stipulated that "no Chinese shall be employed on any state, county, municipal, or other public work, except in punishment for crime" (Tsai 1986:57). Therefore, like their countrymen on the West Coast, most Chinese in the Midwest worked in Chinese-owned hand laundries and Chinese restaurants.

In the Springville area, as early as 1879, a Chinese put his laundry advertisement in the local newspaper:

Charlie Chingee, Laundry, does the best Laundry-work in the city. The great care given to the handling of all articles. Fine fabrics a specialty. Prices low. Michigan Avenue, opposite Chapman house. (*The Springville Republican* Nov. 14, 1879 p.4)

In 1901, a local newspaper reports the story of Lem Jim, another Chinese laundryman:

Lem Jim, the most popular citizen of the Chinese Empire who ever resided in Springville [place name has been changed], has gone to San Francisco, California. Lem will embark in the grocery business in the Chinese quarter, and will deal out to his patrons all kinds of eatables which appeal to the Celestial appetite. (*The Springville Journal*, Jan. 26, 1901, p.1)

One of the earliest Chinese living in Springville was Usa H. Forester (1849-1931). Unlike early Chinese laborer

immigrants, his father was one of the leaders of the Taiping Rebellion [1850-1864] during the Ch'ing Dynasty. He came to Springville in 1869 (Turner 1924:469) and, in 1880, married an Irish girl from Philadelphia (*Springville Republican* Feb. 3, 1880, p.4). Usa was a successful businessman, and at the time of his death, owned considerable real estate, several businesses and office blocks in downtown Springville and in Miami, Florida.

The earliest Chinese restaurant in the Springville area was the Foo Ying Cafe on downtown Washington Ave. The restaurant was started by the Lum family in 1913, and remained in business until it burned in 1969. After the restaurant was burned, Wing Dot, the son of the original owner, started a new restaurant in DeWitt, Michigan.

II. 20TH CENTURY IMMIGRANTS BEFORE 1949

As early as 1924, there was a Chinese student, Mr. T. M. Wang, from Shanghai who attended the university in Springville. Before his departure from Shanghai on September 15, 1924, one of his friends gave him a copy of the huge *Webster's Collegiate Dictionary with Chinese Translation*. His friend wrote the following message in the beginning of the dictionary:

Mr. Wang, one of my dearest friends will start for America on the 15th, September of 1924, with the sole purpose of acculting [sic] some advanced knowledge in the world of industry, which he may be able to put into actual display when he comes back to his own country. He is a well-to-do and

ambitious young man and his success of the future career is to be foretold. This book is presented to him as a token of remembrance to help him in any respect.

Upon Mr. Wang's graduation in 1928, he donated this dictionary to the university library, and today, sixty years later, Chinese students are still using it.

After WW II, the Nationalist government, mindful of postwar reconstruction needs, started to send students and professionals to study in the U.S. When the Communists took over China in 1949, however, the United States government refused to allow some 4,000 "stranded students" to leave because "they had acquired skills and knowledge in this country which could be employed against the United States in event of war" (Sung 1967:91).¹

Of these, four now teach at the local university. A fifth, Mr. Chien, was involved in business and in teaching in the state until 1975. (Excerpts from his memoir appear in Appendix A)

¹Among them including Nobel laureate in physics Chen Ning Yang and Tsung-dao Lee, architect I. M. Pei, and computer entrepreneur An Wang (Kwong 1987:59-60). Actually some prominent Chinese scientists did return to China several years later. The most famous case was Dr. Chien Shue-sen, a professor at the California Institute of Technology, and a pioneer in American rocket research in WW II. When he announced plans planned to return to China in 1950, the U.S. government put him under house arrest for five years. Dr. Chien eventually returned to China where he helped to develop China's own nuclear missile program. (*The New York Times* December 11, 1985. P.22)

III. STUDENT-IMMIGRANTS AFTER 1949

The year 1949 is, of course, an important historical turning point in modern Chinese history, the year the Chinese Communists defeated the Nationalists and the Nationalist government retreated to Taiwan. The People's Republic of China (PRC) did not allow emigration, particularly students, into the United States until 1979. The Nationalist government in Taiwan, however, permitted students to study abroad after they graduated from college in Taiwan. Thus the Chinese students who came to the U.S. to study in the early 1950s were from Taiwan. During the period of 1950-1983, a total of 74,000 graduate students from Taiwan enrolled in American colleges (Tsai 1986:180). More than 87% of them remained in the United States after graduation (*Free China Journal* May 27, 1984:3; Gold 1986:141; Tsai 1986:180). There are several reasons for the low rate of students returning to Taiwan.

First, the American standard of living is higher than that of Taiwan. If a student can find a job in the United States, he will stay to enjoy the better living conditions.

Second, research facilities at American colleges are better than those in Taiwan. In some fields, particularly the natural sciences, it is difficult to continue research without the more advanced research facilities that the United States has to offer.

Third, many Taiwanese fear a Chinese Communist takeover of Taiwan; thus, they choose to remain in the United States.

Fourth, some students have participated in anti-KMT activities in the United States, and consequently, the KMT government has prohibited their return. Recently, the KMT has admitted that there are 467 overseas Chinese who have not been allowed to return to Taiwan (*Central Daily News* Aug. 3, 1988, p.3), although many informants believe that this figure is underestimated.

Springville is a college town and also the seat of State Government. It is these conditions which attract Chinese students from Taiwan to pursue higher degrees, graduate, and find jobs at the local university, in the State government, or private companies. Thus, increasing numbers and rising percentages have been characteristic of Chinese population trends in Springville in recent decades.

A. CURRENT CHINESE POPULATION IN SPRINGVILLE

According to census data, the Chinese population of the Springville area increased dramatically after the 1960s. From a total of 37 in 1950, Chinese population increased to 168 in 1960, 573 in 1970, and 810 in 1980 (see Table 3-1 below).

Table 3-1: Chinese Population in Michigan and Springville

Year	State	Springville
1880	27*	
1890	120*	
1900	240**	
1910	241**	5+
1920	792**	24+
1930	1,081**	10++
1940	924**	9++
1950	1,619**	37#
1960	3,234**	168##
1970	5,221**	573###
1980	11,009***	810@

Sources: Census of Population: 1930 - 1980.

- *. Census of Population: 1950, Vol. II, Part 22, Table 14: Race by Sex, 1880 to 1940 (P.47).
- **.. Census of Population: 1970, Vol. 1, Part 24, Table 17: Race by Sex, 1900 to 1970 (P.63).
- ***.Census of Population: 1980, Vol. 1, Chapter B, Part 24, Table 15: Persons by Race (P. 25).
- +. Census of Population: 1930, Vol. 3, Table 17: Indians, Chinese, and Japanese, 1910 to 1930 (P.1152).
- ++. Census of Population: 1940, Vol. 2, Part 3, Table 25, Indians, Japanese, and Chinese (P.821).
- #. Census of Population: 1950, Vol. II, Part 22, Table 47: Indians, Japanese, and Chinese (P. 152).
- ##. Census of Population: 1960, Vol. 1, Part 24, Table 21: Characteristics of the Population (P. 76).
- ###. Census of Population: 1970, Vol. 1, Part 24, Table 23: Race by Sex (P.78).
- @. Census of Population: 1980, Vol. 1, Chapter B, Part 24, Table 30: General Characteristics (P. 137).

During the 1985-86 academic year, there were more than 1,300 Chinese living in Springville area. Half of these were students and their families. Of the approximately 600 Chinese students studying at the university, 244 were from the PRC, 245 were from Taiwan, and 98 were from Hong Kong, Singapore, and other Southeast Asian countries. Most

students from China and Taiwan were graduate students, while those from Hong Kong and Southeast Asian countries were mainly undergraduate students.

In addition to students, there were 95 Chinese families (624 persons) with permanent residence in the Springville area during the 1985-86 academic year. This study focuses primarily on these 95 families because they are the major components of Springville's Chinese community, but also includes much discussion concerning Chinese students' involvement in this community and their interaction with the permanent Chinese families.

B. EDUCATION AND OCCUPATION

Perhaps the most striking characteristic of the Chinese population in the study area is its high level of education. Among 95 family heads, 55 hold a doctorate degree, 17 have a master's degree, and 13 have a bachelor degree; only 10 have a high school education or less. Thus, these immigrants are quite unlike the poor, illiterate laborers who went to Southeast Asia and the United States in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Most of the Chinese now living in Springville area came to the United States as graduate students, and after earning their degrees, took jobs in the Springville area.

Given the high level of education among these migrants, it is not surprising that over two-thirds are in

professional² occupations: 38 are employed by the university; 23 work for the state government; 2 work at the community college; and 4 are physicians (see Table 3-2). The remaining one-third includes restaurateurs, entrepreneurs, laborers, and others.

Table 3-2: Family Head's Occupation

Occupation	Number of Families
University faculty	38
Community College faculty	2
State government	23
Physicians	4
Restaurateurs	12
Laborers	4
Entrepreneurs	5
Other*	7
Total	95

*Including retired, unemployed, and separated families.

The remaining latter 28 non-professional family heads did not arrive through the graduate student route but, instead, came through kinship ties, were hired as cooks, arrived as Vietnam refugees, or for various other reasons. For example, Mr. Chang has his own small import-export business in Taiwan but he purchased a Chinese restaurant in Springville in 1981. He says that he had no intention of

²Various terms have been applied to this group--"new middle class" (Mills 1951; Carchedi 1977), "professional-managerial class" (Ehrenreich and Ehrenreich 1977), or "new petty bourgeoisie" (Poulantzas 1975). For a recent review of the usage of these concepts, see Burris (1987).

living in the United States but came because he wanted his children to immigrate to the United states. A friend of his who lives in Springville told him that there was a Chinese restaurant for sale. Mr. Chang came with his daughter, age 15, and his son, age 13. His wife remained in Taiwan to manage the import-export business. Mr. Chang used "investment" as a reason to apply for a permanent residence. His application was denied by the INS (Immigration and Naturalization Services) several times. The INS finally deported Mr. Chang in September 1988, but both of Mr. Chang's children had already enrolled in a U.S. college, so they were allowed to remain as students. Mr. Chang says that he is happy to go home, but he still regrets that he was not able to obtain permanent residency status for his children.

The distinction between professionals and non-professionals is important to this study, because the two groups have different social relationships. Most professionals are active in the various Chinese social organizations. Most non-professionals, on the other hand, have never participated in the activities sponsored by the Chinese social organizations. Not only have non-professionals not participated in activities sponsored by the Chinese social organizations, neither have they formed their own guild. For example, most restaurateurs know each other, but they have no regular contact, either formal or informal.

• *Chlorophyll a* (Chl a) is the primary photosynthetic pigment in most plants and algae. It is responsible for capturing light energy and converting it into chemical energy through the process of photosynthesis.

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C. SOCIAL ORGANIZATIONS

There are ten formal Chinese social organizations in the Springville area: (1) Chinese Student Association, (2) Taiwanese Student Association, (3) Association of Chinese Scholars and Students, (4) Kuomintang (KMT), (5) The Three Principles Study Club, (6) Organization for the Support of Democratic Movement in Taiwan, (7) The Chinese-American Faculty Association, (8) The Chinese Bible Study, (9) Stock Club, and (10) Women's Rotating Credit Association.³ There is no single organization, such as the Six Companies in traditional Chinatowns, which acts as an umbrella organization. Although some organizations have "student" in their English names, it does not mean that they are entirely student organizations. In order to use university facilities, according to some informants, the groups had to

³The term "rotating credit association" was used by Geertz (1962). Other terms also used in English translation are: cooperative loan society (Smith 1970 [1899]: 112; Yang 1952:6,77), credit association (Weber 1951:278; Topley 1964:177-178; Myers 1970:95), credit group (Miyashita 1966:218), credit society (Fei and Chang 1945: 120; Yang 1959:69), financial aid society (Fei 1939:267), loan fund (Clark 1896:110; Siu 1987:92-96), loan society (Jacques 1931:225), money loan association (Ball 1925:596; Freedman 1958:93; Potter 1968:156; Freedman 1979:23,77; Hayes 1983:183), moneylending club (Doolittle 1865:II:147; Gray 1878:II:86; MacGowan 1912:189; Gallin 1966:74), mutual aid club (Kulp 1925:189), mutual loan society (Gorst 1899: 117; Garrett 1974:214; Sprenkel 1977: 625,628), mutual savings society (Gamble 1944; Lin 1948:249; Gamble 1954: 260), revolving loan fund (Watson 1975:90), savings society (Leong 1936:177).

register as student organizations at university, but their directories include non-students as well.

Three organizations--the Chinese Student Association, the Taiwanese Student Association, and the Association of Chinese Students and Scholars--I have called "territorial" although it should be recognized that they are also inherently political organizations since the "territories" upon which the organizations are based are Taiwan (the first two above) and the PRC (the third above). Both the Chinese Student Association and the Taiwanese Student Association were organized in the 1950s when the number of students from Taiwan became substantial.

Unlike traditional territorial organizations, which were organized for mutual help, both the Chinese Student Association and the Taiwanese Student Association had political overtones from the very beginning. Chinese students from Taiwan who came to the United States in the 1950s were split into two camps: those supporting the KMT regime and those against it. The Chinese Student Association strongly supports the Nationalist government. The Taiwanese Student Association, on the other hand, supports the Taiwanese Independence Movement and is therefore declared by the KMT to be seditious (Tsai 1986:179). The two organizations often attack each other and have never united to sponsor activities. These two ostensibly territorial social organizations in the Springville area have been politicized since their

inception in the 1950s. More importantly, they do not shun their political stances. Since the 1950s, Chinese in the Springville area have also organized three purely political organizations: the Kuomintang, the Three Principles Study Club, and the Organization for the Support of Democratic Movement in Taiwan.

In addition to these overtly political or politicized organizations, there are four other organizations which declare themselves to be "apolitical." These include the Chinese-American Faculty Association, the Chinese Bible Study, the Stock Club, and the Women's Rotating Credit Association. Even though the Faculty Association declares itself to be non-political, faculty who are anti-KMT refuse to join because of the number of pro-KMT faculty who are members.

The Stock Club and the Women's Rotating Credit Association seem to be based purely on friendship and not on political ties. The Stock Club is a group of 14 professionals whose members invest \$50 a month to buy stocks. The Women's Rotating Credit Association is identical to Chinese traditional savings associations, called *hui* or *piaohui*. Each member pays a certain amount at certain intervals. From this each will be paid a certain sum on a specified date. The Women's Rotating Credit Association in the Springville area consists of 18 women. They meet once a month each paying in \$50 a share. Of the

ten organizations, these two associations are most similar to the traditional Chinese mutual aid organizations.

D. RELIGION

Among the 95 families in the Springville area, 15 are Christian. Eight of these participate in the Chinese Bible Study regularly; the other seven go to other local churches. Most of the seven families who go to other churches cite denominational considerations as their reason for attending American churches. Two families, however, give political reasons for not joining the Chinese Bible Study. "Most people who join the Chinese Bible Study speak Mandarin Chinese so if we go there we have to speak Mandarin Chinese. If we can not pray in Taiwanese, we would rather pray in English." In the early 1980s, one of the Taiwanese Christian families organized a Taiwanese Christian fellowship where only Taiwanese was spoken during the weekly meeting. This group only lasted two years and dissolved for lack of participation.

Many of the Chinese families in the Springville area believe in Buddhism to a certain extent, but no one admits that he/she is a Buddhist. Most Taiwanese state that they practiced popular Taoism when they were in Taiwan, but only five families have ancestral shrines and burn joss sticks on parents' or grandparents' birthdays and death anniversaries. In fact, most Chinese living in the Springville area evince little interest in religion. I

have, for example, participated in funerals in which incidents occurred that would be acceptable neither for serious Christians nor for believers in popular Taoism. In one funeral ceremony, I saw a bereaved son, an American born Chinese in his early twenties, laughing during the funeral ceremony. In another ceremony, the bereaved son, an immigrant from Taiwan in his forties, asked everyone to sing a song together for his mother. Both of these actions would be inappropriate in the traditional Chinese funerals, but because these individuals do not have strong religious belief, they could do these things.

E. FAMILY STRUCTURE

In the study of Chinese family structure, it is always necessary to make a distinction between family and household, which also involves the endless debate about the criteria of family division. Since most Chinese immigrants in the Springville area are first generation and are members of conjugal families, family division is not an issue, and I have never heard the topic discussed among them. In this study, I use the term "family" (*chia*) to describe a unit "consisting of members related to each other by blood, marriage or adoption" (Lang 1946:13). I follow Fei Hsiao-t'ung in using locality as a sole criterion to determine a household (*hu*).

Fei Hsiao-t'ung defines household as "the basic territorial group" (Fei 1939:96), consisting of all who

live and eat together, including guests, servants and apprentices. In the Springville area, as long as family members live together, cook together, and eat together, although some of them consist of three generations, I count them as a family and at the same time a household. If they live separately, even if their relationship is that of parents and children, I count them as a family consisting two or more households. Using these definitions, the 95 Chinese families discussed here consist of 101 households.

The most prevalent form of Chinese family in Springville is the conjugal family. This family type consists of a man, wife, and their unmarried children. Among the 95 families in the study, 84 of them (89.47%) are conjugal families.

Table 3-3: Size and Types Chinese Families in Springville

Family Type	Number of Families	Number of Persons per family
Conjugal	84 (88.42%)	4.14
Stem	10 (10.52%)	5.96
Joint	1 (1.05%)	16
Total	95	4.45 ⁴

⁴1980 Census indicates that the Chinese family size in the Springville area is 3.34 persons per family (Census of Population: 1980. Vol. 1, Characteristics of the Population, Chapter B, General Population Characteristics, Part 24, Table 30: General Characteristics for Selected Racial Groups for Areas and Places, p.133). The reason my figure is much higher than the census data is that census data include students, married or single, while my field data include only Chinese permanent residents.


Among the conjugal families, there are six "dispersed" families in which the wife and children remain in the United States and the husband "commutes" between Taiwan and the U.S. Four of these commuters are professors in Taiwan. They came to the university in Springville as graduate students and, upon their graduation, left their families in Springville; they visit their families only once or twice a year. The other two commuters are businessmen. One of them lives in South Africa where he has an import/export business. Because of political situation in South Africa, he sent his family to live in the United States. The other is a restaurateur who came to the U.S. with a son and a daughter, leaving his wife and another son in Taiwan. The wife manages the family-owned import-export business in Taiwan.

There are only ten stem families and one joint family in the Springville area. In traditional Chinese society, a stem family is a family which "consists of the parents, their unmarried children, and *one* married son with wife and children" (Lang 1946:14, emphasis original).⁵ In other words, the stem family is a result of the family "developmental cycle" (Fortes 1949:63ff). Of the ten stem

⁵One unit that I have counted as a stem family is an unusual case in which grandparents have "adopted" the out-of-wedlock child of their daughter who resides in another city.

families in the study area only three are cases of married children continuing to live with their parents. The other seven cases result from conjugal families who brought their parents from Taiwan to live with them.

According to Lang's definition, a joint family is a family which "consists of parents, their unmarried children, their married sons (more than one) and sons' wives and children, and sometimes a fourth or fifth generation" (Lang 1946:14). The only joint family in the Springville area has recently immigrated from Taiwan and has 16 members (see Figure 3-1). The head of the family told me several times, "We are the largest Chinese family here." His words imply his pride.



Key: ♂: male; ♀: female

Figure 3-1: A Chinese Joint Family

This joint family is not yet divided, but the three brothers live in three houses, only a few blocks apart.

Their parents take turns living and eating with the three son's households. The arrangement is very similar to the "meal rotation" practice in Taiwan in which parents take turns eating, or/and living with their sons' families after the family has divided (Gallin 1966:144; Li 1967; Chuang 1982; Hsieh 1985). In this case, however, the family is not yet divided and the head of the family is still in control of family economy. The family head owns two apartment houses (60 units) and three brothers manage their father's business. I will discuss this family's economic activities in a later chapter.

IV. SUMMARY

This chapter introduces the historical background of Chinese immigrants into the Springville area. The first Chinese came to Springville as early as 1869. Until 1910, there were only five Chinese living in Springville; they were laundryman and restaurateurs. Beginning in the 1950s and 1960s, most Chinese who came to the Springville area came as students and they stayed after completing their degrees. Today, students and professionals compose the majority of the Chinese population in the Springville area. Furthermore, they play the main role in the local Chinese social organizations.

The second half of this chapter describes the social characteristics of the Chinese community in Springville.

This provides with a general picture of this Chinese community as background for the remainder of the study.

Chapter 4: Population Composition

This chapter looks in more detail at the four non-student subgroups of Chinese immigrants in the study area. These subgroups I have called: (1) professionals; (2) restaurateurs; (3) other business owners; and (4) laborers. A fifth section looks at the American-born children of these immigrants. As noted previously, the professionals are the major component of Chinese social organizations, while Chinese businessmen, laborers, and restaurateurs have never participated in social activities held by Chinese social organizations.

I. PROFESSIONALS

This group includes 38 persons employed by the local university, 23 who work for the state government, 2 who work for the community college, and 4 who are doctors. All of them came to the United States as students after the 1940s and settled in the Springville area after graduation. This is the very generation that experienced the historical events, such as the civil war between the KMT and the Communist, "2-28 Incident," Protecting Tiao Yü T'ai Movement, that have had a profound impact on overseas

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Chinese social organizations.¹ These professionals are also of the generation who initiated Chinese social organizations in college towns across the United States. Today, most of them still actively participate in these organizations.

Twelve of the professionals are strongly pro-KMT in their political identification. All of these are Mainlanders and many of them come from official families in Taiwan. For example, one is the grandson of Chiang Kai-shek's Secretary General. Another is the son of a lieutenant-general in the KMT Army (see Appendix B). These KMT participants do not hide their political stance; they often display the flag of the Republic of China on their houses and cars and celebrate political holidays such as the Double Ten (October 10th, the birthday of the Republic of China) and Chiang Kai-shek's birthday (October 31).

There are 15 professionals who can be classified as pro-PRC. They are from China, Hong Kong, or other

¹The "2-28 Incident" was a massacre of thousands of Taiwanese by the KMT forces on February 28, 1947. For detail, see Chapter 7.

Tiao Yü T'ai are small islands in the Ryukyu archipelago that historically belonged to China. In 1970, the Japanese government claimed them as Japanese territories. The Chinese students, mainly from Taiwan and Hong Kong, in the United States protested the decision. They asked the KMT government to take actions, but the Nationalist regime interpreted the students' movement as "pro-communist and subversive" (Tsai 1986:173). Disappointed at the weak and unresponsive attitude of the Nationalist government, many students shifted their nationalism toward the Communist regime in Peking. For detail, see Chapter 6.

countries. Many of them support the PRC because China is their home country. Professor Tang, for example, left China in 1948 and was unable to return to see his father until 1976. Since 1979, he has returned to China 11 times to train many poultry specialists. In 1987, Professor Tang was honored by China's Ministry of Agriculture for his contributions to China's poultry industry.

In addition, some support the PRC for political reasons, either ideological support for the Communist revolution or dislike for the KMT. One man, for example, was a Nationalist government military attache to the United States in the early 1950s and took the opportunity to attend graduate school. He was ordered to return to Taiwan but decided to stay in the United states to finish his doctoral degree. The KMT regime thus saw him as a defector and told the FBI and INS that he and his wife were communists. Thus, his dislike for the KMT has led to his support for the PRC.

The 25 professionals who support the Taiwanese Independence Movement are all from Taiwan. These people are all members of the Taiwanese Student Association and participate in its activities regularly. The group's activities create a base for contact, and its members seem to be closer than the members of the pro-PRC and pro-KMT groups. In addition to group activities, the group members often associate with each other for other social and

recreational activities. For example, they call each other on weekends for a game of golf or tennis or family potluck.

There are some Chinese professionals who do not associate with any of these three groups. Most of them do occasionally join activities held by different groups but they do not do so on a regular basis; thus, it is difficult to classify their political affiliations. One informant told me that he has never participated in any Chinese group activities because he dislikes both the PRC and the KMT regimes. He told his story:

My father and I left the mainland with the KMT regime when it went to Taiwan. We left my mother and brother behind in China in 1949. When we were in Taiwan, the KMT government arrested my father because they thought that he had connections in China, and he had not clearly reported his background. After I came to this country, I learned that my mother and my brother were tortured by the Communists in China for the reason that they have "overseas connections." Both KMT and the Communist governments do not know how to protect their people, they only know how to persecute the helpless common people. I dislike both regimes!

In summary the professionals were the people who formed the various social organizations ten or twenty years ago. They now associate only with those groups that share their political beliefs.

II. RESTAURATEURS

Most of Chinese business owners in the study area are operating Chinese restaurants, just as immigrants in the

last century did. Of the twelve Chinese restaurants in the Springville area five are owned by Cantonese immigrants, four are owned by Taiwanese immigrants, and the other three are owned by Chinese immigrants from Korea. All of the Cantonese restaurateurs are from traditional immigrant families; their fathers or grandfathers had been in the United States before. For example, one restaurateur, who was born in Hong Kong and lived there until he was eighteen, is actually a fourth generation Chinese immigrant. He says,

My great-grandfather came to the United States as a railroad worker in the last century. My grandfather served in the U.S. Navy in World War I. My father also served in the U.S. Navy in the World War II. I am a foreign-born U.S. citizen, and I served in the U.S. Army from 1957 to 1959.

In contrast to the Cantonese group, those that came from Korea and Taiwan to operate Chinese restaurants are first generation immigrants to the United States and came after 1949. Mr. Tien, whose father owns a Chinese restaurant in Korea, is a typical example. He was born in Shantung province in China in 1932 and moved as a youngster to Korea to join his father. He did not want to take over his father's restaurant, so he went to Taiwan to study political science at the National Taiwan University. He was unable to find a job in that field in Korea or Taiwan and became a chef to support his family. He and his wife immigrated to the United States in 1973, first to

California then to Springville in 1976. Mr. Tien has brought two families, that of his uncle and that of his brother, to the U.S. The uncle and his family have since opened their own restaurant. Mr. Tien himself opened a second restaurant to provide employment for his brother and his family (see Figure 4-1).




Figure 4-1: Three Korean Chinese Restaurateur Families

All of the Chinese restaurants are family operations in which almost all family members work. Very often, the father is chef and the mother or one of the other adults is cashier. Children work either part-time or full-time as waiters/waitresses or tea servers. Non-family members are hired as needed to fill positions as waiters/waitresses, busboys, dishwashers, etc. Most of these employees are

Chinese students and their spouses and, for reasons of visa restrictions, are from China rather than from Taiwan.²

When I asked the restaurateurs who are first generation immigrants why they gave up their jobs in their homelands and immigrated to the United States to work so hard in the restaurants, many simply said "to seek a fortune." Although some of them indicated that political instability was part of their reason, no one would say so directly. One man, who was an executive manager in a bank in Taiwan and a member of the wealthiest family in his home county, simply said that he came to the U.S. "for the children's future."

Some of the children of Chinese restaurant families are quite well-educated. One, for example, has a Ph.D. in electrical engineering, and two are in medical school. On the other hand, there are also many restaurateurs' children without college educations. For example, the owner of Shantung Restaurant has four children, the eldest son and daughter have only a high school education. The eldest son of the Hopei Restaurant also has only a high school education. His mother, Sue, said that he did not study hard when he was in high school. He wanted to be a chef.

²Foreigners who hold F1 or F2 visa (students and their spouses) cannot work off-campus; those who hold J2 visas (spouses of exchange officials) can work anywhere. Most students from Taiwan have student visas (F1), whereas most students from China have J1 visas, consequently their spouses (J2 visas) are legally able to work.

None of the restaurateurs have ever participated in any Chinese community activities, regardless of the activity or by which group it is sponsored. They all say that they are too busy to participate. One owner, however, stated quite frankly, "We know there are different political groups here and they strongly oppose each other. We are businessmen and if we take sides, we would lose business from the other side. We just want to be neutral."

III. OTHER BUSINESS OWNERS

Some Chinese entrepreneurs have invested in businesses other than restaurants. These include:

- (1) a computer store owned by a Singapore immigrant.
- (2) an import/export firm and a construction company owned by a Chinese immigrant from Taiwan.
- (3) a Chinese grocery store owned by a Chinese refugee from Vietnam.
- (4) a book store operated by two women from Taiwan.
- (5) a gift shop operated by immigrant from Hong Kong.
- (6) an apartment complex owned by an immigrant from Taiwan.

Aside from the gift shop, these enterprises are fairly prosperous. The individual who owns the student apartments, for example, says that in 1980 he invested \$900,000 to purchase two apartment houses (60 units total)

and now earns \$30,000 every month from rent. The grocery store owner estimates that he makes about \$7,000 a month. The computer store and book store owners are reluctant to discuss their financial situations in detail, but they both state that their business are doing extremely well.

One of the most successful entrepreneurs was the owner of the construction firm. He came to the United States as a student in 1961. He earned two masters degrees and then, as he told a reporter "at this point, I decided it was time to get rich." (*The State Journal* Dec.27, 1986, p.6B). He accomplished this goal and "modestly" admitted to the same reporter that he became a millionaire in 1976 (*ibid.*); local Chinese called him "Lin *paiwan*" (Millionaire Lin).

Mr. Lin never participated in any activities sponsored by any Chinese social organizations. He was, however, active in pursuing equal admission rights for Chinese students to American colleges and universities. A few months before he died in 1987, he established the Chinese-American Legal Defense Fund of the U.S.A. to fight unfair and illegal policies of universities.

The gift shop is the least successful of the Chinese-owned business. It sells inexpensive oriental souvenirs that do not provide much of a profit margin. A sideline passport and green card photograph service in the store provides almost one-third of the income. The gift shop owner was born in Hong Kong and immigrated to New York in 1962 when he was 34 years old. He worked in a Chinese

restaurant in New York City for 17 years. After both of his sons went to college, he decided to quit the restaurant job and moved to Springville in 1979 because his younger sister lives there.

This man is the only one of all Chinese immigrants in the Springville area who is planning to go back to his birthplace when he retires. He plans to close the shop in 1990, when he is 62 years old, and live on his social security pension. He says,

I pay \$4,000 in taxes a year. When I retire I could receive approximately \$600 a month. To live on \$600 a month is very difficult in the United States, but would be very easy in Hong Kong.

I don't have many friends here but I have lots of friends and relatives in Hong Kong. Besides, Hong Kong's weather is much much better than here.

When asked if he was afraid that Hong Kong would return to communist China in 1997, he answered,

No. I have special reasons. I was born as a British subject. When I came to the United States, I had a British passport. I have lived in the United States for 25 years and became an American citizen. I am a Chinese but all my life have never been a Chinese citizen. I am glad that when I die I will have the opportunity to become a real Chinese.

IV. LABORERS

There are few Chinese blue collar families in the Springville area, and those few are all recent immigrants

from China and Chinese refugees from Vietnam. None has more than a high school education and they speak little English. Most of them work in the kitchens of Chinese restaurants. They do not own their homes and some do not own cars. They do not join the Chinese social organizations in the Springville area, and most other Chinese living in Springville area have no contact with them.

Unlike Chinese immigrants of the last century, who left their families in China, the Chinese laborers in the Springville area have their families with them. They came to Springville either as sponsored refugees or through kinship ties. A Chinese refugee from Vietnam, for example, told me that he and his family did not know anyone in Springville before they immigrated. American churches sponsored them and helped them make arrangements to settle in Springville in 1980. Both he and his wife have worked in the kitchens of Chinese restaurants since then. This family is not listed in any Chinese social organization's directory. The father of the family says that, besides his fellow worker in the restaurant and other refugees from Vietnam, he does not know any Chinese in the Springville area. He has never participated in Chinese activities in the Springville area. He says, "I am a poor laborer and I have to work six days a week; how can I have leisure time to participate other activities?"

These laborers are all, as mentioned, recent immigrants. It may be that some of them will eventually move into other groups. We noted in the section on restaurateurs, for example, that one family who began their life in Springville working in the kitchen of a relative's restaurant now own their own restaurant. Thus, the laborer status may be, for some families anyway, temporary.

At this point, I would like to discuss at some length the case of one laborer family that immigrated to Springville through kinship ties. This case merits attention not only for its portrayal of the life of a recent immigrant family, but also because of the light it sheds on the Chinese community in general. I will present the data now and further discussion will appear in later chapters.

SANMAO' STORY: A CASE STUDY

Sanmao, aged 21, lives with his divorced father Puitsun and two sisters, one older and one younger, in a Springville suburb. This family, by virtue of its low income and internal problems has come to the attention of welfare agencies, the courts, and the police. The family originally came to the Springville area in 1985 under the sponsorship of a relative who owns a large restaurant.³

³The restaurant owner is the grandson of Puitsun's half-brother.

This relative paid the legal fees and airfare to allow both Puitsun and his family and Puitsun's brother Puilum and his family to come to the U.S. Puilum and his family have since moved to San Francisco.

When the family arrived, Puitsun went to work as a dishwasher six days a week at his relative's restaurant to pay back his debt for airfare and legal fees. He receives a minimum wage that amounts to less than \$900 a month. Since the family cannot afford a car, they must live in the relatively affluent suburb where the restaurant is located. Thus, their rent is more than half Puitsun's gross income. Both Sanmao (age 19 when he arrived) and his younger sister initially enrolled in public school, but Sanmao soon dropped out because his English was too poor to allow him to keep up. The family's first encounter with government agencies came through the school system. The younger sister's teacher, noticing the child's poor clothing--very evident in this affluent suburb--and other indications of a need for help, contacted social services. The social worker assigned to the family needed an interpreter, and I was called upon to assist her. At that point, I contacted several other Chinese families in the area in an attempt to get help for the family. None was willing to help on a consistent basis.

The family's real problems began in June 1986, soon after they had moved into a cheaper apartment. Sanmao and his father quarreled and the manager, hearing the noise,

called the police. When they arrived, Sanmao stood in the door holding a wooden stick, which was used to put in the sliding window track for security. Seeing him with the stick and because they could not understand Sanmao, the police called for other policemen, including a Chinese-American officer from an adjacent town. Sanmao says that he did not intend to provoke the police and was, indeed, surprised that they had been called for a family dispute. Thinking they had left, he went inside and into his room. When they returned and knocked on his door, he refused to open it because, according to him, he had done nothing wrong. The Chinese-American officer speaks no Cantonese, Sanmao's mother tongue, and very little of the T'aishan dialect, a second language for Sanmao. Sanmao says he did not understand what the officer said. After another encounter, with Sanmao still brandishing his stick, Sanmao again returned to the bedroom and locked the door. Eventually, the police broke into the room, handcuffed Sanmao, and transported him to the county jail. He was charged with two counts of felonious assault.

Sanmao was labeled "non-cooperative" in jail because he refused to shower, wear jail clothing, be fingerprinted, etc. He believed he should not have been treated as a prisoner because he had done nothing wrong. He said his use of the stick was not meant to challenge the police but only for emphasis to his point "It is none of your

business." He still cannot understand why a family quarrel can result in police intervention.

The arrest was followed by a preliminary hearing with bail set at \$2,000. Of course, Sanmao's father did not have money to pay it nor was any other help forthcoming until two weeks later when an American university professor found a bondsman to bail Sanmao out.

Meanwhile, the landlord of the apartment building where the family lived had filed eviction proceedings. On the day of the eviction hearing, the social worker went to the apartment and suggested that Sanmao's father bring the younger sister to court, presumably in the hope of arousing the judge's sympathy. Sanmao disagreed with this suggestion because he feared the sister would say something against him. He became very angry and quarreled with his father, the social worker, and me. The social worker called the police, Sanmao left the apartment, and the rest of us went to the court. In court, the judge received a message that Sanmao had been arrested and the police were bringing him into court. Because Sanmao's father and the social worker did not want him to see his younger sister in the courtroom, the father and young sister went into the judge's chambers. When Sanmao was brought in, the bondsman also came in and revoked the bond. Thus, Sanmao has to go back to jail. At the preliminary trial, he was released on his own recognizance; by this time, he had spent 78 days in jail. At the trial, Sanmao refused to plead guilty or no

contest and the jury found him guilty as charged. He was sentenced to 78 days, which he had already served.

Six months later, Sanmao was again arrested, this time for kicking his sister. He spent 3 days in jail but was released because she refused to press charges. In two months he was in trouble again when the police picked him up because he had been standing in the middle of a major highway for two hours. This time he was taken to the Mental Health Department of a local hospital where he stayed, by court order, for 17 days. Upon release, the doctor sent him to a Chinese-American doctor at the university for continued treatment. This doctor, however, had come to the U.S. at the age of six and speaks little Cantonese. Therefore, there was a communication problem. Also, Sanmao complained that the doctor asked too many questions about his personal background; he did not believe this was effective therapy.

Several months later, the doctor visited Sanmao's father and asked him about Sanmao's recent behavior. Puitsun reported that Sanmao had twice been accused of peeping on his neighbors. The doctor called the police to have Sanmao taken to the hospital again. He said he felt he had to do this or Sanmao would end up in jail again and he needed treatment, not jail. After three weeks of treatment, Sanmao's doctor was ready to release him, but when his father went to pick him up, they had a bitter argument with the university doctor over his suggestion

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that Sanmao be sent to a family therapy center. Sanmao was detained for two more weeks for a total of five weeks in the hospital.

As of this writing, Sanmao still has no job. His father still works in the kitchen of the relative's restaurant, and his older sister is a waitress at another Chinese restaurant. They still have no car and, until a Japanese-American helped them, no telephone. Indeed, it was through the assistance of this Japanese-American, whom I contacted through the Michigan Asian Pacific American Association [name has been changed], that the family was able to find a new apartment and move after their eviction. It is noteworthy to point out that during Sanmao's difficult times, there were few Chinese willing to provide help, even though many were aware of Sanmao's trouble. A fuller discussion of the "non-involvement" role of the Chinese community will be provided in a later chapter.

V. THE SECOND GENERATION

Chinese immigrants refer to their second generation as "ABC" (American-born Chinese), "ABT" (American-born Taiwanese), or simply "*ti erh tai*" (Second Generation). In the previous chapters, it has been demonstrated that one of the major differences among Chinese adults is political ideology. In this section, we will see that although the parents have different political stances, the children are

not so different from each other. In other words, although their parents make a distinction between "ABC" and "ABT" when they refer to second generation Chinese, these Chinese children are not really aware of the difference.

Therefore, when I talk about second generation, I will not differentiate among them in most situations.

There are about 200 second generation Chinese living in the study area. Like American youth, Chinese Second Generation youth move out of their parents' homes when they attend college. Even in the summer, they prefer to rent a apartment rather than to live with their parents although they visit. After graduation, most of them find jobs in other cities, which makes accurate population statistics difficult.

In the U.S., children of Chinese descent are reputed to do well in school, and this is also true in the study area. Sons or daughters of Chinese parents often graduate from high school with lists of awards, and gain admission to Ivy League schools or prestigious public universities. Generally, they are good students--maintain good grades, stay away from drugs and alcohol, and do not cause trouble.

Second generation Chinese have American friends and their relationships will be discussed in a later chapter. These American-born Chinese tend to have as friends children whose parents share the political affiliation of their own parents. In an interview, an ABT who is a university student says,

Because our parents participate in the same organizations, we followed our parents to participate in their activities together. We had the same piano or violin teachers. We went to the same Chinese school. We have known each other since we were children.

"Since you are aware that there is another Chinese group, how do you perceive them?" I asked.

We are not close friends but we are not enemies either. We know each other in the elementary schools or middle schools. We are not that close because we did not have much opportunity play together after school. We know each other and say 'Hi' when we meet.

An ABC, who is also an undergraduate student, says,

Actually I do not care that much about the division between Taiwan and China. I am an American and my root is here. I believe that I should fight for affirmative action in this country, not political conflict within Chinese circles.

Thus, their affiliations are not really overtly political ones but developed through their parents' association with people of like political beliefs.

The American-born Chinese are seldom participant in the Chinese Student Association's activities, except for dancing parties. Hsu notes, "American-born Chinese students rarely get together with those who came from Taiwan or Hong Kong. This is true in Ivy League schools no less than in others" (Hsu 1971:3). It is also true in the Springville area. Although American-born Taiwanese students may accompany their parents in participating in

the Taiwanese Association's activities, they have no personal contact with students from Taiwan. Language is a major barrier because the American-born Taiwanese speak only English and students from Taiwan speak Chinese or Taiwanese when they get together.

Most of the second generation Chinese speak only English. Often, the first child in the family, now in his/her mid-20s, knows Chinese or Taiwanese better than his/her younger siblings. Not many of younger children understand their parents conversation in Chinese, Taiwanese or other dialects. Most of them at most can barely answer the phone in Chinese or Taiwanese. Even those who can speak Chinese, Taiwanese or other dialects, usually cannot read and write Chinese fluently. However, most of Chinese children in the Springville area attend Chinese school.

In the Springville area, there are two Chinese language schools, one operated by the Chinese Student Association and another by the Taiwanese Student Association. The CSA Chinese language school began operation in 1970 with an attendance of only eight students. The school did not operate continuously during the first ten years and it was not until 1979 that the school became a "permanent" institution. During the academic year 1985-86, there were forty students in four levels.

The CSA school is operated by enthusiastic parents from the pro-KMT groups. Most of the students are in

elementary or middle school. Their parents all know each other as a result of their support for the KMT government. University classrooms are used to teach Chinese once a week for two and half hours. As with Chinese language schools in Chinatowns, textbooks are provided free by the Taiwan government. Tuition is thirty-five dollars per term (ten weeks). This to pay for the teaching staff.

According to the school president and other parents, the major problems facing the CSA Chinese language school are the qualifications and high turnover of the teaching staff. All of the teachers are pro-KMT university graduate students from Taiwan. They are not required to have educational or linguistic backgrounds, but they are required to have good relationships with the Chinese Student Association. Some teachers stay at the job for several years; others quit after a term or two.

"It is no harm to have some pocket money," a teacher says. However, another teacher complains:

They asked me to go back several times, but I refused. They did not take the study of Chinese seriously. They speak only English at home. How can you expect a child to learn a language like Chinese when they only study two hours a week? It seems to me they treat Chinese School as day care center, sending their children to school to have someone to watch them.

The Chinese school run by the TSA is ten years old. An average of ten students come to study every year. It is much smaller than the school runs by the Chinese Student Association.

The TSA school is also operated by parents and borrows a university classroom to teach. Students meet once a week for two hours. According to parents, the most serious problem for the school is the availability of textbooks. One told me,

All the textbooks, no matter where they are published, Taiwan, China, or Hong Kong, all carry strong political overtones. In addition to teaching Chinese, those Chinese textbooks also teach politics. It is impossible to find textbooks with a neutral political stance.

Because there are no appropriate textbooks available, the TSA school has to use the textbook provided by the KMT government in Taiwan. I once questioned the principal of the TSA-run Chinese school as follows:

Q: "In the Taiwanese Student Association every one speaks Taiwanese, not Chinese. Why do you decide to teach your children Chinese, not Taiwanese?"

A: "The most obvious reason is that there is no Taiwanese textbook available. In addition, we think that it is useful to teach them Chinese characters and writings which are applicable to Taiwanese."

Q: "Since both Chinese schools use the same textbooks and your size is much smaller, why don't you join the Chinese Student Association's Chinese school?"

A: "There are several reasons: First, we do not get along well. There has been problems and difficulty in exchanging opinions.

Second, children in this school have known each other for years, they may not get along with other children in other Chinese school.

Third, the most important problem is the interpretation of the textbooks. Although we use the same textbook, we do not accept everything

the textbook says. For example, in several places in the textbook, there are sentences like 'I am a Chinese.' or 'We are Chinese.' It seems that they are trying to impose the image or concept of 'Chinese' to the children. It contradicts what we teach our children, that 'We are Taiwanese.' In our school, we have the opportunity to clarify the issue. In their school, our children would have to accept everything that they teach in the school."

Discussions with parents, teachers, and children, indicate that the fundamental problem in both Chinese schools is that the children are reluctant to attend. Most children go to Chinese school only to obey their parents. They have no motivation or desire to learn Chinese. Fifty years ago, Leong described Chinese schools in Chinatown by saying, "very little is accomplished by these schools. It is not only the reluctance of the children to attend, but fatigue, which defeats the purpose of the school" (Leong 1936:117). It seems the problem persists until today.

In the previous chapter, we noted that the Chinese language schools in Chinatowns were established as early as 1908 (Tsai 1986:124). When the KMT's influence penetrated into these Chinatowns, the Chinese language schools were one of the institutions used by the KMT. It is clear that the separation of two Chinese schools in the Springville area is based on the different political ideologies. In order to maintain its principles and integrity, the Taiwanese Student Association Chinese school will not merge with the Chinese Student Association's Chinese school.

VI. SUMMARY

This chapter deals with professionals, restaurateurs, entrepreneurs, laborers, and the second generation.

The restaurateurs and other business owners and the laborers are only a small percentage of the Chinese community. Most of them have never participated in social activities held by Chinese social organizations. Although merchants had low social status in traditional Chinese society, this is not the case in overseas Chinese communities in Southeast Asia and the United States, as we indicated in the Chapter 2. The Chinese restaurateurs say that they are too busy to participate in other activities, which is partially true. However, another reason is, as one restaurateur points out, that they do not want to take sides with any political group. The laborers also do not have much free time for social activities, but there also social class issues at work here. The fifth group, the second generation, American-born children of all groups also do not participate except through their parents. In their case, language is a barrier.

Chapter 5:

Chinese Social Organizations in Springville (I)

This study has been to emphasize the importance of political ideology in guiding the organizational life of the Springville area Chinese. Certainly, every Chinese has his own political stance; in order to protect themselves, however, many of them have purposely avoided association with Chinese organizations. Among students from Taiwan at the university, about 40 of them participate in the Chinese Student Association's (CSA) activities regularly and 20 of them participate in the Taiwanese Student Association (TSA) regularly. Among the 95 Chinese families in the Springville area, 25 of them participate in the TSA's activities regularly; only about 15 of them participate in the CSA regularly. In other words, in those highly politicized organizations such as the TSA and the CSA, there are core members and marginal members. Core members are activists in these politicized organizations, while marginal members only come to activities occasionally.

In addition to the CSA and the TSA, which I will discuss in the following chapters, four Chinese organizations in the Springville area are actually social in the sense that they are based on factors other than

political affiliation. These are: (1) The Chinese-American Faculty Association (professional); (2) the Chinese Bible Study (religious); (3) Stock Club (economic); and (4) Rotating Credit Association: (a women's club). These four social organizations are composed primarily of marginal members of the CSA and TSA.

I. THE CHINESE-AMERICAN FACULTY ASSOCIATION

This association was organized in 1980 and now lists forty members. Membership requires annual fee of ten dollars. The group usually meets twice a year, at the beginning of the academic year in September and at the Chinese New Year's party. Gatherings are always dinner parties at restaurants. At the end of the academic year, there is occasionally a farewell party for retiring or departing faculty.

During the meeting in September, the group elects a president, a vice-president, a secretary-treasurer, and two officers at large. These officials meet irregularly during the school year to deal with current issues such as making reservations for the dinner parties, the buying of gifts for the retiring or departing faculty, etc.

Of these 40 members, 24 are from Taiwan (7 Taiwanese and 17 mainlanders), 5 are from China pre-1949, 8 are from Hong Kong, 1 is from Singapore, and 2 are American-born

Chinese. Among the seven Taiwanese, only one participates in the activities regularly.¹

When I asked the other six Taiwanese members why they do not participate in association activities, only one stated that it was for a purely personal reason: "I do not have a tenured position. Since it is only a temporary teaching job, I do not feel comfortable participating in the parties." The other five admitted that they did not participate for political reasons. Two of them state that they do not want to go to a "Chinese" association because they consider themselves "Taiwanese."

Most people there speak Mandarin but my Mandarin is not that good. It is awkward to speak English among Chinese in that meeting, so I decided not to go.

I know most of the people in that organization. Some of them lean to support for the KMT government, some of them have visited the PRC several times, but no one, except one professor, is sympathetic toward the Taiwanese Independence Movement. I do not think we would get along.

Since most of my Taiwanese friends are not going, I do not want to go alone.

Although those from Taiwan are the majority in this organization, they are the least active of the members. Six

¹Professor Hsu has a special personal background. He was born in Amoy, China in 1935, adopted by a Taiwanese and grew up in Taiwan. He has been a participant in the Taiwanese Association's activities regularly. In 1979, he had the opportunity to teach in China and went back to his birth place. Since Professor Hsu has ties with China and Taiwan, he does not restrict himself as being "Taiwanese," and is able to participate in various groups.

Taiwanese have never participated in activities, and the mainlanders are not enthusiastic either. The most enthusiastic members are those from Hong Kong and pre-1949 China. Every year at least one of the Hong Kong members is elected as an official, and from 1985 to 1987, the presidents of the organization were all from Hong Kong.

When asked about this seeming bias toward the election of people from a certain area, one member stated, "I think that those who are from pre-1949 China are the senior generation so that they are respected. Those who come from Hong Kong are less political than those from Taiwan, and therefore fit in the position better." One faculty member, who was president in 1981-1982, claims that the organization is a purely academic organization for Chinese faculty and its goal is to help each other in a foreign land. "Chinese have suffered too much internal conflict in the past, we want to unify everyone as much as we can." Despite this lofty ambition, it would seem that the organization has a long way to go before it can unify Chinese faculty.

II. THE CHINESE BIBLE STUDY

The name of the Chinese Bible Study, or the Class for the Bible Study, is a free translation from its Chinese name, *Ch'a Ching Pan* (study Bible class). This association was founded by ten Chinese Christians in 1968 and registered as a student association at the university.

This group does not have a clergyman but is run by a group of enthusiastic local Chinese Christian residents and students. A chairperson and eight officials are either volunteers or elected by the members to serve for a one-year term. In the academic year 1985-86, 96 Chinese participated in the Chinese Bible Study regularly. Among them, 46 are single students, 24 are married students, and 26 are local Chinese residents. Members are from different ethnic and denominational backgrounds. The majority are from Taiwan, but about thirty members are from Hong Kong, Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia; one student family is from mainland China.

The group meets once a week, on Friday nights, at a local church. Choir leaders take turns leading singing for about twenty minutes. After singing is witnessing. The leaders arrange for a member to testify his/her witness each week. After this, the group divides into Bible study groups by language: Mandarin (further divided into three subgroups), Cantonese, and English. The Mandarin group is obviously the largest, and Mandarin is the only language used when everyone gets together. The Cantonese group is for students from Hong Kong (15 to 20 people).² The

²The attendance fluctuates each week. More attend in the Fall than other terms and fewer attend during the midterm and final examination weeks.

English group is for American-born Chinese and some two or three Americans.³

Bible discussion is the major activity of the evening. Each week group leaders hand out the questions for study to each group member. Questions are from the same chapters of the Bible each time. They encourage group members to study questions during the week, so every one can express his/her opinion during the group discussion the next week. Group discussion usually takes about an hour. After the group discussion, there is a floor gathering. The chairman and officials announce news, activities, etc., and finally leads group prayer.

Formal activities end at 9:20 and the remaining 40 minutes is for social interaction. Each week, the married students and local residents take turns preparing refreshments for this social period and single students take turns cleaning. It is the only time during which one can chat about something other than the Bible. Many people said that it is the most enjoyable period of the night.

The Bible Study group makes many efforts to attract new members. Every summer, they obtain a copy of new

³These Americans include two ministers and one university professor. All of them have been to China, Hong Kong, or Taiwan and speak Chinese. They participate in the Chinese Bible Study for the purposes of promoting Christianity to Chinese on the one hand and for improving their Chinese language skills on the other. They often invite Chinese Christians to their homes for a party during the weekend.

students' addresses from the Chinese Student Association and mail welcome letters to them while they are still in Taiwan. When the fall term starts, they arrange a special welcome dinner party for new students. During the term, the Chinese Bible Study provides a baby sitting service on Friday nights and publishes a quarterly periodical, *Hsi Hsin* (The Glad Tidings), which is mailed to local Chinese. The Glad Tidings has been published since 1971. Most articles are cut from Bible magazines published in Taiwan with occasional articles written by local authors.

The Chinese Bible Study does not ask members for donations, and there is no offering plate passed during the meetings, but they do maintain a donation box at the entrance. During a ceremony in September 1986, the chairperson of the Chinese Bible Study announced that the group had more than \$3,000 in its account. He hopes that the group can accumulate enough money someday to build its own church.

The purpose of the Chinese Bible Study is to promote Christianity, and it welcomes non-Christians. The head of the group in 1986 said that about one third of the people in the Bible Study were non-Christian; he calls them "truth seekers." Since the Chinese Bible Study does not have a minister, if a "truth seeker" wants to become a Christian, they ask the minister in the Trinity Church to baptize him/her. They had an average of nine converts a year from 1985-1988.

In spite of this, it is my observation that few of the non-Christians are interested in learning Christianity. They join the group because they are lonely and they appreciate the social gathering that follows the formal meeting. For example:

I am not a Christian and I do not want to be. But, it is very lonely on the weekend, particularly Friday and Saturday evenings. Since I have nothing to do and have no place to go, I'd rather go to the Chinese Bible Study to listen to what they say." ---Female, graduate student

The problem is that on Friday night, we do not have many places to go. I can not stay at home every Friday night. It is not only lonely, but I also lose face. Because if I always stay at home every Friday night, everyone will know that not only I have no girlfriend but also have no invitations. It is the fundamental reason I come to the Bible study. ---male, graduate student

My parents want me to find a girlfriend, or wife, as soon as possible. I think that the Chinese Bible Study is a good place to start. To be very honest with you, I do not need the Bible, I just need a girlfriend. ---male, graduate student

Among Chinese social organizations, it is the only one which provides a regular basis for social gathering and it is a nice place to know people. I have never paid attention to the group discussion, but I do enjoy the social gathering time. ---Female, graduate student

The Chinese Bible Study is an apolitical group. Unlike the Chinese Student Association and the Taiwanese Student Association, which are responsive to the political developments in Taiwan, the Chinese Bible Study has never become involved in any political controversies. In more than a year of participation in the Chinese Bible Study I

never heard anyone mention political developments in Taiwan, China or the United States during the meetings, group prayer, or any public occasions. When I inquired about this, an official told me "Let Caesar's belong to Caesar and God's belong to God." Some of these Christians participate in the Taiwanese Student Association's or Chinese Student Association's activities, but none is a very active member of both the Chinese Bible Study and a political group. For these Christians, it seems spiritual persuasion and personal issues are more important than profane politics. The Bible Study is thus a spiritual hometown for the Christians and a good place to meet people for the non-Christians.

III. STOCK CLUB

The Stock Club is a joint venture organization with 14 male members. It has existed for fifteen years and is formally registered at a broker's office as a stock club. Every month each member invests \$50, and they divide the dividends at the end of the year. At the end of 1987, the capital of the Stock Club was around \$30,000 and the return was about 13%.

The group meets once a month to discuss investments on every third Sunday night. Members take turns hosting the meeting; usually it is a strictly business meeting. Sometimes the host family has a potluck and the wives of the members attend also, but more often the host family

provide drinks and refreshments only and only the members attend. During the meeting, the members take turns reporting their studies of particular stocks, and the group then decides what stocks to buy or sell. The members take turns calling the broker the next morning to execute the decisions.

Although the group seems to be a formal business club, most members say that the club is a social group rather than an investment alliance. "Everyone invest only \$50 and a total of \$650 a month. There is not much you can do in the stock market with such a small amount of money," says one member.

Another member says,

We live in a foreign country; friendship is more important than at home. In order to have friendship and *kanch'ing* [emotions], you have to have *laiwang* [social interactions]. The Stock Club basically is an institution to keep everyone together.

Of the fourteen members, eight are mainlanders and three are Taiwanese (see Table 5-1 below). All of the mainlanders are sympathetic to the KMT government, although they are not politically active and have never participated in the Taiwanese Student Association's activities. The three Taiwanese do participate in the Taiwanese Student Association's activities, but they are not particularly active in that organization.

Table 5-1: Stock Club Members

	Name	Occupation	Ethnic background
1.	A	Professor	Taiwanese
2.	B	State govt.	Mainlander
3.	C	GM engineer	Mainlander
4.	D	State govt.	Hong Kongese
5.	E	Professor	Mainlander
6.	F	State govt.	Indonesian Chinese
7.	G	Professor	Mainlander
8.	H	State govt.	Taiwanese
9.	I	State	Mainlander
10.	J	State govt.	Mainlander
11.	K	Doctor	Hong Kongese
12.	L	State govt.	Mainlander
13.	M	State govt.	Taiwanese
14.	N	Professor	Mainlander

IV. ROTATING CREDIT ASSOCIATION

The rotating credit association, or *hui* (association, club, or society), is a very old institution in Chinese society. There are three types of *hui*: *lun hui* (rotating *hui*), *yao hui* (dice-shaking *hui*), and *piao hui* (bidding *hui*) (Fei 1939:207; Yang 1952:77). The difference among these three types is that the method to determine the order of a member to draw from the fund: "*lun hui* is determined by prescribed contact, *yao hui* by lot, and *piao hui* by auction" (Wu 1974: 573). Every *hui* has a *hui-t'ou* (head of the *hui*), who initiates it and is responsible for collecting money. Most rotating credit clubs have contracts and regulations (Gamble 1944:50-51; Lin 1948:250; Wu 1974:574). Freedman

gives a succinct description of how rotating credit clubs work:

The money loan associations were small groups of people who paid regular (usually monthly) sums into a pool which was placed at the disposal of the individual members in turn.... The normal procedure was for a man or woman who wished to raise a sum of money to get together a number of people who paid the desired sum in equal shares and then recouped themselves in turn at fixed intervals....

Suppose that there were nine members and a promoter, the initial sum collected by the latter being \$90. At the first meeting each member paid the promoter \$10. At the second meeting tenders were submitted, the highest bid being \$2. The successful bidder then collected \$10 from the promoter and $\$10 - 2 = 8$ from the other members. Suppose that at the third meeting the successful bidder offered to forgo \$2.40; he then received \$10 each from the promoter and the previous successful bidder and $\$10 - 2.40 = 7.60$ from each of the remaining seven members. (Freedman 1979: 23-24)

Although traditionally men are responsible for economic life, for women to organize a rotating credit club is quite common. Gray describes a money-lending club formed by women in 1866 (Gray 1878:II:86) and Lin Yutang also writes about a women's rotating credit club in New York City (Lin 1948:249-50).

The rotating credit club in the Springville area is composed of eighteen Chinese women (see Table 5-2 below). The club started in 1985. One of its founders explains the origin of the club as follows:

The Rotating Credit Association was a byproduct of the Stock Club. Our husbands joined the Stock

Club, sometimes we wives joined their parties. When our husbands were talking stocks, we would chat about something else. In 1985, some of us initiated the idea to organize a more formal, more endurable club for the wives to belong to so we could have our own base for a regular gathering. I suggested the rotating credit association and everyone agreed. In 1985, we had only ten participants, and one share was twenty dollars. When the first round ended, our club continued the second round, with 14 participants each share rose to fifty dollars. In January of 1987, we started the third round. This time we have 18 participants and each share is still fifty dollars.

Of the 18 women in the group, all but one is married; the exception is divorced. Five of the women are Taiwanese, three are overseas Chinese (from South Africa, Indonesia, and Malaysia), and nine are Mainlander Chinese from Taiwan and one came from China before 1949. Politically, most of them are pro-KMT or lean to pro-KMT. Of the five Taiwanese, only two participate in the Taiwanese Student Association's activities, but are not active in that group. Economically, 14 of them have their own occupations: seven work in state government, five work in business companies, and two have their own business (one restaurant and the other a bookstore). The two full-time housewives are from wealthy families and two retired women have children who reside in this area. In other words, these women are economically secure.

In the previous chapter, I mentioned that Chinese social organizations in the Springville area are primarily organized by professionals and students, not business

people. However, I also mentioned that there are two women who own their own businesses (one restaurant and the other a bookstore) who joined the Rotating Credit Club. According to one informant, the two entrepreneur-restaurateur joined because two reasons. Their husbands are professionals and they thus were thought of as members of a professional family. Secondly, they live close to other members with whom they share social lives.

Table 5-2: The Rotating Credit Club Members

	Name	Member's Occupation	Husband's Occupation	Ethnic background
1.	A	State govt.	Businessman	S. African Chinese
2.	B	Realtor	Professor	Taiwanese
3.	C	Restaurateur	State govt.	Taiwanese
4.	D	State govt.	State govt.	Mainlander
5.	E	Retired	Retired	Mainlander
6.	F	Retired	Retired	Mainlander
7.	G	Housewife	G.M.	Mainlander
8.	H	Insurance Co.	State govt.	Mainlander
9.	I	Housewife	Professor	Mainlander
10.	J	Computer Co.	Sate govt.	Indonesian Chinese
11.	K	State govt.	(Divorced)	Mainlander
12.	L	State govt.	State govt.	Mainlander
13.	M	Insurance Co.	Professor	Taiwanese
14.	N	State govt.	State govt.	Taiwanese
15.	O	State govt.	State govt.	Mainlander
16.	P	State govt.	State govt.	Mainlander
17.	Q	Bookstore owner	Doctor	Malaysian Chinese
18.	R	Motor Wheel	State govt.	Taiwanese

Unlike traditional Chinese rotating credit clubs, the Springville group does not have rules or bylaws. They meet once a month and members take turns (chosen by lot) hosting the meeting. Everyone has to bring a dish to pass for the

potluck dinner. The hostess decides whether to include the husbands and children in the potluck. After dinner, the members bid for that month's money. It usually takes about five minutes to finish the bidding. The process of bidding is that described by Lin Yutang half a century ago:

At each meeting, each member would bring the pledged sum, and the one who bid the highest interest would get the whole amount for that month. The bids were written on slips of paper, folded, and turned in to be opened during the meeting. Those who did not need money that month did not bid. (Lin 1948:249)

Most of the members are not eager to bid if they do not have particular need for money. Only an individual who needs a lump sum of money for a special occasion or for some particular need, such as to buy home appliances or pay children's school needs, would bid. The average bid for the first ten times was \$3.23.⁴ One of the members subscribes to two shares, so the winner of the bid could collect about \$850.

Rotating credit associations are a widespread phenomena and have been documented throughout Asia and Africa as well as in immigrant communities in the U.S.⁵

⁴The bid was \$3.10, \$3.51, \$2.89, \$3.35, \$2.59, \$3.51, \$3.50, \$3.01, \$3.69, \$3.15 respectively.

⁵Among Chinese, Rotating Credit Associations are found in China (Doolittle 1865:II:147-51; Gray 1878:II:84-86; Gorst 1899:117; Smith 1970 [1899]:112; MacGowan 1912:189; Williams 1914:88; Ball 1925:596-605; Kulp 1925:189-196; Fei 1939:267-274; Fei and Chang 1945:120; Lang 1946:69, 73, 168; Latourette 1946:593; Weber 1951:99, 278; Yang 1952:77-78; Gamble 1944, 1954:260-271; Freedman 1958:93; Yang 1959: 69; Miyashita 1966:218-219; Myers 1970:95; Garrett 1974: 214;

Students of rotating credit associations tend to interpret them from an economic perspective. It has been argued that the rotating credit association works as an "intermediate" institution, growing up within peasant social structure, and helps in the transformation of peasants from traditional society to modern society and articulation with the world commercial economy (Geertz 1962:242; see also Ardener 1964:221; Firth 1964:32). It also has been analyzed as an adaptive response to a condition of poverty (Kurtz 1973; Wu 1974:566), or adaptation of traditional savings associations that facilitate the implementation of modern

Sprenkel 1977:625), in Taiwan (Gallin 1966:74-75; Diamond 1969:23; Pasternak 1972:35), in Hong Kong (Topley 1964:177-178; Potter 1968:156; Hayes 1983:183-186), in Papua New Guinea (Wu 1974), in Malaysia and Singapore (Freedman 1979:23,77), in Sarawak (Jacques 1931:225-226), in Great Britain (Broadly 1958:32), in San Francisco (Cather 1932:60-61, quoted in Light 1972:25), in Chicago (Siu 1987:92-96). in Washington, D.C. (Sung 1967:145), and in New York City (Clark 1896:110; Leong 1936:177; Lin 1948:249; Wong 1979:117, 1982:45).

The Rotating Credit Associations are also found in Japan (Embree 1939:138ff), in Korea (Sjoberg 1960:215), in Vietnam (Nguyen 1949), in India (Anderson 1966), in Nepal (Messerschmidt 1981), in Java (Geertz 1962), in Malaysia (Swift 1964:140), in Tonga (Morton 1978), in Belgian Congo (Baeck 1961:168), in Nigeria (Nadel 1942:371-73; Bascom 1952; Ardener 1953; Bohannan and Bohannan 1953:49; Ottenberg 1968; Hill 1972:203; Yusut 1975:170; Barness and Peil 1977:95), in Cameroon (Kaberry 1952:119-120; Warmington 1958:332-33; Ardener, Ardener and Warmington 1960:178; Soen and de Comarmond 1972; Bouman and Hartevelde 1976), in Sierra Leone (Banton 1957:187-88), in Jamaica (Katzin 1959:436-40), in Trinidad (Herskovits and Herskovits 1947:76-77, 292), in Mexico (Lewis 1959:63, 1961:453), and in the United States among Mexican-Americans (Kurtz 1973), Puerto Ricans (Lewis 1965:214-215), and Japanese (Miyamoto 1939:75).

cooperation (Soen and De Comarmond 1972:1178).

The rotating credit club is also often seen as the result of a lack of banking systems in the developing societies or the fear of banks by unsophisticated people (Leong 1936:178; Ardener 1964:217-218; Wu 1974:570-71; Barnes and Peil 1977:96; Siu 1987:96). Chinese credit associations in the United States have been attributed to the later:

The *hui* in effect served as a systematic savings method for the thrifty and as a source of credit for those who needed a lump sum in cash for business or other reasons. Few Chinese utilized the services of American banks....The last hui ...dissolved in 1951. The Chinese have learned how to go to the bank and makes deposits and borrow funds. (Sung 1967:141-142)

Rotating credit associations have also been described as savings institutions (Bascom 1952; Geertz 1962; Firth 1964). Obviously, none of these rationales holds true for the rotating credit association in the Springville area. One member says,

All of the members are from moderately successful families. Among the eighteen members, except the one divorced woman, in thirteen of them both husband and wife have jobs and only four of them are either retired or full time housewives. As I know, there are two families which have annual incomes over two hundred thousand dollars. We do not rely on the Club to make a profit.

In addition, the members of this club are certainly well-versed in how to use banks and other financial

institutions. They are too sophisticated to regard the association as a savings vehicle. As one member says,

If I won the bid at \$3.50 at the first month, I could collect eight hundred and thirty-seven dollars total ($\$46.50 \times 18$), which means I have to pay fifty dollars each month and a total of nine hundred dollars in the following eighteen months. However, even if I deposit \$837 at the lowest annual interest rate of 5.5% for eighteen month, I still have \$906.05 in return. It is a \$6.05 profit at the lowest banking rate.

Let us calculate it another way. Suppose everyone bids \$3.50 each time, the last bidder paid \$837 in the past eighteen month and collect \$900 in the last month. Her total interest is only sixty three dollars, which means the annual interest rate is 5%. It is lower than the bank rate.⁶

From an economic perspective, Springville's rotating credit club should be regarded as, at least, an unconventional example. As one member says, "I would call it a gourmet club rather than a rotating credit association."

V. SUMMARY

In his study of Toronto's Chinatown, Thompson makes the following observation (1979:11):

...the traditional Chinese social organization (composed of the kin-based associational nexus) which successfully structured the original,

⁶Siu reports on the existance of a rotating credit club among Chinese laundrymen in Chiacago in 1928. The Club has nineteen members and the monthly basic amount is also fifty dollars, but the bid goes as high as \$9.25 (Siu 1987:94).

homogeneous immigrant population, has not been able to organize the large and complex immigrant population now resident in Chinatowns. The new immigrants are a heterogeneous mass, exhibiting both intraethnic and subethnic variation, and the emerging social organization of contemporary Chinatowns reflects this diversity.

Even though the Springville community is unlike Thompson's example in that it is comparatively small and not particularly complex, it is also true that Chinese in the Springville area no longer use traditional means as a basis for social organization. In this chapter, we have seen now even the various non-political groups in the Springville area do not draw on traditional principles such as kinship, language, or territory. In addition, it is interesting to note that these groups do not cut across the range of the local Chinese population but are composed entirely of professionals in three cases⁷ and professionals and students in the fourth.

⁷There are a businesswoman and one restaurateur in the Rotating Credit Association but they are all married to professionals.

Chapter 6:

Chinese Social Organizations in Springville (II)

Chinese in the Springville area, as well as in the other college towns in the United States, after the 1950s, organized themselves into different "territorial" organizations. As I mentioned in Chapter 3, although they appeared as "territorial" organizations in name, they had many political overtones. During the 1950s, all Chinese students were from Taiwan. When they formed social organizations, they faced political issues such as the "2-28 Incident" and the civil war between the PRC and the KMT. As seen in the traditional Chinatowns on the East and West coasts of the United States, as described in Chapter 2, it was not unusual for different "territorial" organizations to have different political positions.

In that chapter, it was argued that the struggle between Dr. Sun Yat-sen's revolutionary campaign and Kang You-wei's reform movement resulted in overseas Chinese communities splitting into rival camps. Later, the defeat of the KMT by the Chinese Communists in 1949 resulted not only in two Chinese governments both claiming legitimacy, but also in an ideological split among overseas Chinese. As one historian says, "these changes divided the overseas

Chinese community into various political factions and intensified the identity crisis of Chinese Americans (Tsai 1981:121). Political allegiance became a predominant factor. For example, "on the eve of the Kuomintang defeat the approximately 77,500 Chinese in America (this figure does not include Hawaiian Chinese) were faced with very difficult decisions about their loyalties" (Tsai 1986:133). To compete for allegiance and legitimacy, the KMT government on Taiwan sought to extend its influence to overseas Chinese communities.

Most Chinese residents in the Springville area arrived after the 1950s. Compared to the Chinatowns of the East and West coasts, the Chinese community in the Springville area is relatively young and small; however, its recent development is not much different from that of the old Chinatowns. The KMT regime has played an active role in Springville's Chinese community affairs since the 1950s and, consequently, politics has become an inseparable part of daily life.

There are two major territorial/political organizations in the Springville area since the 1950s: the Chinese Student Association (CSA) and the Taiwanese Student Association (TSA). The CSA is well known for its strong support of the KMT regime in Taiwan. The KMT government also recognizes the CSA as one of its loyal organizations in the Springville area. On the other hand, the KMT sees

the TSA as a dissident organization (Tsai 1986:179) and denounces its anti-KMT activities.

This chapter focuses on the internal structure of the CSA and its collaborate organizations. Since the structure of the CSA was profoundly shaped by the Protecting Tiao Yü T'ai Movement in the 1970s, it is necessary to introduce the Movement first.

I. TIAO YÜ T'AI MOVEMENT

Tiao Yü T'ai--the name means "fishermen's platform" in Chinese--consists of eight small coral islands located 100 miles from Taiwan, 50 miles from the China mainland, and 240 miles from Okinawa (Tsai 1986:173). Historical documents show that Tiao Yü T'ai has belonged to China since 1403; it has been administered as part of Taiwan since the end of WW II. These islands are uninhabited and for decades have been used exclusively by Taiwanese fishermen as an operational base and overnight shelter during typhoons.

In 1968, geographical investigations sponsored by the United Nations Economic Commission for Asia and Far East reported that this area may have one of the largest petroleum deposits in the world. Japan then claimed that these islands were its territory.¹ Japan and Ryukyu

¹Some Japanese students and professors from Tokyo University disagreed with the Japanese government. They published articles to condemn the Japanese governments' militaristic expansionism. A group of some 95 Japanese scholars called a news conference to denounce the Japanese

governments forcible ejected Taiwanese fishermen from the islands, destroyed Chinese shrines, and mutilated the Nationalist Chinese flag on the islands (Lee 1971:5). In order to retain its seat in the United Nations and win the friendship of the Japanese government, the Nationalist government in Taiwan not only did not protest, but also prohibited student demonstrations in Taiwan. "The Nationalist government found the demonstrations embarrassing because they strained relations with Japan and the United States" (*The New York Times* April 12, 1972. P.9).

In the United States, Chinese protested against the Nationalist government for abandoning its territory. A group of students organized the Protecting Tiao Yü T'ai committee at Princeton University in December 1970, and the movement quickly spread to campuses in the United States with sizable Chinese student populations. A total of 58 committees were organized across the United States (Lee 1971:6).

On January 29-30, 1971, some 3,000 Chinese students demonstrated in Washington, Chicago, Seattle, San Francisco, Los Angeles, Honolulu, and at the United Nations and the Japanese Consulate General in New York City (*The*

governments' imperialism and militarism. (*Mainichi Shimbun* [The Every Day News] April 18, 1972). Several Japanese historians published articles to show that the Tiao Yü T'ai belongs to China, not Japan. (For details, see Huang et. al. 1972.)

New York Times January 30, 1971, P.8). Again, on April 10, 1971, 2,500 Chinese participated in protest marches in Washington, Los Angeles, Seattle, Chicago, and Houston simultaneously to protest against the Japanese, United States,² and Taiwan Nationalist governments. They felt that the Taiwan government did not respond effectively against a "United States-Japan conspiracy" (*The New York Times* April 12, 1971, p.9; May 23, 1971, p.IV:7; May 30, 1971, p.IV:12).

On September 3-5, 1971, more than 500 Chinese students and intellectuals met at Ann Arbor, Michigan, to discuss "urgent national issues." The meeting passed the motion to acknowledge the PRC as the sole legitimate Chinese government and strongly condemned the KMT government for its inability to protect its territories and to maintain dignity and justice in foreign relations. From this point forward, some formerly pro-KMT students in the major university campuses turned to the PRC and students divided into politically antagonistic groups.

The Tiao Yü T'ai movement was organized by highly educated students and intellectuals. While the students protested and demonstrated, 523 Chinese scholars and scientists sent a joint telegram to President Chiang Kai-

²The United States, based on the Nixon-Sato communique of November 21, 1969, recognized the Tiao Yü T'ai as part of the Ryukyu Islands, and planned to return the Ryukyu Islands to Japan in 1972 (Tsai 1986:173).

shek urging him take immediate action to oppose "new Japan aggression" (*The New York Times* April 12, 1971. P.9). From the very beginning, however, Chinese students had found it difficult to gain support for the movement from members of Chinatown communities. In the past, Chinatown Chinese had often been eager to support their motherland, but this time they did not participate. A reporter from the New York Times correctly points out that Chinatowns are "largely controlled by an older generation, many of whom have close ties with the Nationalist government" (*The New York Times* January 30, 1971. P.8).

The Movement could have been a great opportunity and an effective means to unify overseas Chinese of different political viewpoints. The Nationalist government did not take action and therefore failed to gain overseas Chinese support. The KMT interpreted the Tiao Yü T'ai Movement in the United States as "pro Communist and subversive" (Tsai 1986:173). Many students were disappointed by the Nationalist government's indifference and turned to the PRC for support.

II. THE TIAO YÜ T'AI MOVEMENT IN SPRINGVILLE

In the Springville area, some sixty Chinese students and faculty, most from Taiwan but largely Mainlanders, organized a Tiao Yü T'ai Action Committee in the early 1971. They published *China Newsletter* to encourage more participation, organized study groups to study modern

Chinese history, sponsored seminars and lectures to attract other Chinese students, contacted other groups on other campuses, and participated in demonstrations in Chicago.

At first, they demanded that the Nationalist government in Taiwan protest Japanese expansionism, but when the Nationalist government was not responsive, the movement widened its scope of protest against the Nationalist government itself. Pro-KMT students then withdrew from the movement and organized their own organization, the Three Principles Study Club, as opposition to the Protecting Tiao Yü T'ai Movement members.

Although the movement could have been an opportunity for the Chinese to become a consolidated ethnic group, its result was to divide the Chinese further. The opposition groups published newsletters attacking one another. Pro-KMT students were labeled as "spies," and "traitors," and pro-KMT followers attacked anti-KMT protesters as "*mao tsei*" (Maoist bandits), or "*mao ch'ung*" (Maoist worms). A pro-KMT student, who has worked for the state government since his graduation, describes his experiences:

We were a minority during the Protecting Tiao Yü T'ai movement period. Most Chinese kept silent as usual, but those anti-KMT people were very active. They thought that the KMT government was irresponsible and thus turned their hopes to the PRC. They published newsletters and printed countless pamphlets accusing us of being KMT lackeys and spies. They posted our names on the wall, called us at midnight, and went as far as verbally attacked my wife and children. We suffered all kinds of harassment and were often terrified.

A core member of the Protecting Tiao Yü T'ai Action Committee who also works for the state government, looks on the past:

I came from a military family. My father was a general in the Nationalist Army. Before the Protecting Tiao Yü T'ai Movement, most students, including myself, were supporters of the KMT regime. At the early stages of the movement, we only protested against Japanese expansionism, not trying to overthrow the KMT regime. When realization of the Nationalist government's irresponsiveness was made apparent, we turned against the KMT, and some members went as far as to appeal to the PRC.

I was a Ph.D. candidate when the movement started in 1971. I gave up the degree and was involved full time in the movement. I do not regret what I did during the movement, but I do feel sorry to my father and feel the price I paid was too high. Because of my involvement, the KMT forced my father to retire and canceled my passport, they wouldn't allow me to go back to Taiwan.

Another Movement supporter, an English professor in Taiwan, says,

In the past hundred years, China suffered imperialist oppression, humiliation, and exploitation. The Tiao Yü T'ai Movement indicates that we can no longer tolerate these injustice. In order to calm student protests, the KMT regime sent party officials to each of the major U.S. campuses to talk to students. They told us that we should concentrate on our studies, do not allow ourselves to be utilized by communist agents or be influenced by communist propaganda. They warned us not to fall into communist bandits' conspiracy. We felt this was a lot of baloney.

They sent more spies to watch us on campus. Finally, the KMT threatened our parents. Our parents, in turn, warned us to behave ourselves. My parents called me several times complaining that the secret police visited their home and

warned them that if I was involved in anti-government activities again, they would take action against me. At the same time, those KMT spies warned us that the government will take action against insurgents and their families in Taiwan. My father was not allowed to promote to a higher position in his office for a long period of time. Some of my friends' fathers had automobile accidents in that period. Although we have no evidence to prove there was malicious intent, it was still hard to believe what had occurred was just coincident.³

The Protecting Tiao Yü T'ai Movement was a historical landmark in the shaping of Chinese social organizations. Before the Protecting Tiao Yü T'ai Movement, there were only two political groups in college-town Chinese communities: the pro-KMT group and the Taiwan Independence Movement group. After the Protecting Tiao Yü T'ai Movement, the pro-KMT group split into pro-KMT and pro-PRC groups. Thus during the period between 1971 and 1981, the Chinese communities around major college towns supported three contending political groups: pro-KMT, pro-PRC, and the Taiwan Independence Movement. After 1979, when Chinese students from mainland China arrived in the United States to study, pro-PRC groups withered rapidly; the reasons for this will be explained in Chapter 7.

³Ten years later, in an article about mystery surrounding death of Dr. Chen Wen-Chen [see Appendix D], the president of Carnegie-Mellon University Dr. Richard M. Cyert said, "I have received reports of members of the families of Taiwanese students in the United States who have been maimed or killed in automobile accidents in Taiwan in retaliation for the students' political activities" (*The New York Times* Aug. 27, 1981. P.31).

III. PRO-KMT ORGANIZATIONS

There are four pro-KMT organizations in the Springville area: the Chinese Student Association, the Three Principles Study Club, the Kuomintang, and the Chinese Language School. The remainder of this chapter centers on these four groups.

A. CHINESE STUDENT ASSOCIATION (CSA)

The CSA is the largest and the oldest Chinese social organization in the Springville area. Its directory includes every Chinese in this area, except those who arrived from mainland China after 1979. The CSA is a strong supporter of the KMT government in Taiwan, and considers those Chinese who came from mainland China after 1979 as the enemy, referring to them as "*kung fei*" (communist bandits). The CSA directory for 1985-86 has 426 entries.⁴ This includes 362 Chinese from mainland China before 1949 and Taiwan after 1949, 46 from Hong Kong, and 38 from Singapore.

Each year the CSA elects 14 officials, 10 students and 4 local Chinese. On the surface, the CSA is controlled and operated by a small group of pro-KMT students. This is partially true because most of the routine activities are conducted by these students. The Chinese residents who

⁴The directory contains both family and individual entries.

support the CSA are seldom involved in student activities. The real leaders, however, are a small group of behind-the-scenes local activists. They experienced the Protecting Tiao Yü T'ai Movement in the 1970s and are still directly involved in community affairs. Most of them are Mainlanders and well known as having been strong supporters of the KMT government since their student years. When they were graduate students at the university in the early 70s they played major roles in the Protecting Tiao Yü T'ai Movement. When these pro-KMT students graduated, some of them remained in the Springville area and still play important roles in the CSA.

Although these local activists may not be elected as officials every year, they invite pro-KMT students to their homes to have dinner on certain occasions. When important political events occur, the CSA officials always call them for consultation. For example, when the President of Taiwan, Chiang Ching-kuo, died on January 13, 1988, these local leaders were unable to arrange a memorial service in Springville. Their solution was to take student officials to participate in President Chiang Ching-kuo's memorial service in a nearby city.

The officials of the CSA are responsible for executing business and routine activities. The routine activities sponsored by the CSA include: receiving new students from Taiwan; holding free welcome dinners for new students; publishing a directory; holding a Chinese New Year's dinner

party; showing Chinese movies from Taiwan; and sponsoring dances and parties.

At the beginning of the academic year, the Chinese Student Association arranges a welcome party for new students. The party provides a free dinner, elects members for the executive committee of the Chinese Student Association after dinner, and then has a dance party. Theoretically, every member can go to the free dinner. In fact, besides the new students, most participants are the most politically active students and the single students. The politically active students want to make sure the election is on the right track. For the single students, the dancing provides a great opportunity to find a girlfriend or boyfriend. The Chicago Office of the Coordination Council for North American Affairs (CCNAA)⁵ provides \$500 a year for this event.

The most important routine activity is the Chinese New Year party. It is a big event for every Chinese. It is "big" not only in the sense of its being a traditional holiday, but also in the sense of its political implications. Both the Communist regime in Peking and the

⁵When the United States established its official relationship with the PRC in 1979, the KMT government closed its Embassy in the United States and changed its name to the Coordination Council for North American Affairs (CCNAA), with a main office in Washington, D.C. and others in 11 cities (Atlanta, Chicago, Houston, Boston, Los Angeles, New York, San Francisco, Seattle, Honolulu, Kansas City, Miami) around the United States (*Central Daily News* July 23, 1988, p.1).

Nationalist regime in Taiwan declare legitimacy over the whole of China. The PRC sees the KMT regime in Taiwan as local government and Taiwan treats the PRC government as a rebel organization that cannot represent China and the Chinese people. The Association of Chinese Scholars and Students (ACSS)⁶ and Chinese Student Association in turn fight for legitimacy in the local area. Every year, on occasions such as China Week and Chinese New Year, the groups vie to attract larger audiences and more supporters.

Often the Chinese Student Association (CSA), the Taiwanese Student Association (TSA), and the Associations of Chinese Scholars and Students (ACSS) hold parties at the same time. To show the legitimacy of their respective governments, the CSA and the Associations of Chinese Scholars and Students always invite political figures to come to the party and speak. The more people attending the party indicates the more people supporting their government.

It is always a difficult situation for an individual to decide which party to attend. If he participates in the ACSS or the TSA party, he fears that secret informers might report his name to the KMT government. If he goes to the CSA's party, he might feel that he betrays his friends in the other groups. Most Chinese students go to the CSA

⁶An association organized by the students and visiting scholars from the People's Republic of China. For detail, see next chapter.

party, but some go to two or even three parties on the same night.

"Why don't you have the dinner party together?" I asked the president of the Chinese Student Association. He replied,

We did try to have a joint Chinese New Year party, but it did not succeed. I called the president of the Taiwanese Student Association once to discuss the possibility of having a joint party. He told me that if the CSA gave up the name "China" or "Chinese" in the joint party, then the TSA might be able to talk about having a party together. It was not acceptable for the CSA to relinquish the title and identity. It is why we have separate parties every year.

The Chinese Student Association is clearly the winner in the annual competition for New Year's party attendance. It attracts about 800 people each year (*The State News*, Feb. 25, 1985, p.3), compared to about 500 for the ACSS and about 150 for the TSA.⁷

In addition to Chinese New Year party, other events are also held in the Springville area. During the term, the CCNAA Chicago Office provides Chinese movies from Taiwan to show on each college campus. The Chinese Student Association is the local agency showing those movies. Each movie attracts approximately one hundred people, most of whom are from Taiwan with a few from PRC and a few who are

⁷An insider estimates that the CSA makes about \$2,000 revenue from the party each year, but no one knows detailed accounts and where the money goes. Since the CSA does not ask membership fees, no one feels qualified to ask.

overseas Chinese students from the Southeast Asia countries. I have never seen or heard of any "hard-line" Taiwanese Student Association members attending these movies.

B. THREE PRINCIPLES STUDY CLUB

The Three Principles Study Club was founded in 1972, during the period of the Protecting Tiao Yü T'ai Movement, by a group of pro-KMT Chinese. One of the founders explained why they had to organize a new association:

The Chinese Student Association (CSA) has been supporting the Nationalist government since its founding days. During the heyday of the Protecting Tiao Yü T'ai Movement in 1971, those anti-KMT traitors vowed to take over the Chinese Student Association. They recognized Communist China as their mother country and wanted to hang the Communist Chinese five-star national flag and sing the Communist national anthem before the meetings and parties.

They came to every election and wanted as many of their members to be elected as executive officers of the CSA as possible. They intended to take over the CSA. It had happened on some other U.S. campuses.

When Taiwan was replaced by Communist China as a regular member in the United Nations on September, 1971, we were afraid that the impact might accelerate those 'Maoist bandits' ability to take over the CSA. Due to this consideration, we organized the Three Principles Study Club as a "spare tire" of the Chinese Student Association. In case we lost the CSA, we still have the Three Principles Study Club.

The anti-KMT people did not take over the CSA, and the Three Principles Study Club remains as a "spare tire"

controlled by the pro-KMT people. Since pro-KMT people have direct control of both organizations, they modified the role of these two organizations: the CSA sponsors non-political, social activities and the Three Principles Study Club sponsors political activities. Thus, the CSA holds activities such as new-student welcoming parties, Chinese New Year's parties, movies, picnics, dances, etc. The Three Principles Study Club celebrates Nationalist holidays and invites pro-KMT political figures and scholars to lecture.

Since the Three Principles Study Club does not hold open elections and does not publish its own directory, most people do not know who belongs to the organization. In fact the Three Principles Study Club does not have a list of its members, the organization is simply operated by the KMT members. The KMT designates its officials each year to carry out activities.

C. KMT PARTY

The KMT is the most powerful group in the Springville area, as well as in other U.S. Chinese communities. As stated in the Chapter 2, the Kuomintang has maintained branches in the United States since the turn of the century (Lee 1960:176-177; Kung 1962:216-217; Nee 1972; Yee 1972: 37; Weiss 1974:202-203). In the Springville area, as well as in other Chinese communities, the KMT is not a registered organization, but its members meet once a month

to discuss Chinese community affairs. After the meeting, the leader writes a report to the Chicago Office of the Coordination Council for North American Affairs (CCNAA).

Since this group is not a registered group and is closed to non-members, it is very difficult to know exactly how many KMT members there are in the Springville area. Estimates are between twenty and thirty members who attend regularly. These KMT members are also core members of the Three Principles Study Club and the Chinese Student Association.

On the surface, the Chinese Student Association and the Three Principles Study Club are different associations. The former is open to all Chinese in the Springville area except students and scholars from the PRC. In recent years, the latter, on the other hand, has been restricted exclusively to Chinese university students from Taiwan. Actually they are twin organizations and are mutually cooperative. Both organizations are controlled by the same small group of KMT leaders. Just as the KMT is in total control in Taiwan, these two groups also conduct, control, and monitor Chinese activities here.

The connections between the pro-KMT groups and the KMT government can be traced to Taiwan. In Taiwan, if a college student wants to go abroad to study,⁸ he has to

⁸Before 1988, Taiwan permitted only college graduates to go abroad to study.

obtain permission from the Ministry of Education. One of the requirements for permission is participation in a two-day seminar course about study abroad held by the Ministry of Education. During the seminar, students are told that they should contact the Chinese associations before they leave home and that, when they arrive at their destinations, they should not participate in the Taiwanese associations. A new student told me that in seminar one speaker told them straightforwardly that, "Taiwanese Student Associations on every campuses in the United States are Taiwan Independence Movement organizations."⁹

In the seminar, there is a special afternoon session reserved exclusively for KMT members. When a KMT member arrives in the United States, he reports his arrival to the KMT overseas branch. Membership in the local organization is immediate. In addition to being able to attend the local KMT branch meetings, the party member who reports immediately receives, free of charge, the *Central Daily News*¹⁰ which is sent from Taiwan every day.

While in this country, KMT members have a direct channel to the Chicago Office of the Coordination Council

⁹After the death of Dr. Chen Wen-cheng, a House foreign affairs subcommittee heard testimony that Taiwanese headed for the U.S. are warned not to speak out against the Chiang government. Most obey, aware of the ubiquitous informers (*Time* Aug. 10, 1981. P.19).

¹⁰The *Central Daily News* is a KMT-owned newspaper. The subscription price is \$10.50 per month.

for North American Affairs (CCNAA). The KMT local branch handles official application forms for such things as renewal of passports, changes in marital or residential status, and applications for parental visits. Their goal is to fulfill the needs of the local Chinese to demonstrate their close connection with KMT government.

One of the counselors in the Chicago branch of CCNAA is in charge of Chinese community affairs of Midwest area colleges and visits the Midwest campuses. When he arrives, he speaks with certain KMT leaders, gives them instructions, and discusses recent developments in the Chinese community, with special interest in anti-KMT activities. KMT leaders call him whenever necessary. For example, when the president of Taiwan, Chiang Ching-kuo, died in January 1988, the head of the Chinese Student Association called to ask what to do.

IV. POLITICAL ACTIVITIES

Pro-KMT groups coordinate political activities in the local community. The most widespread political activity in the Chinese communities across the United States is political surveillance, and the Springville area is no exception.

A. POLITICAL SURVEILLANCE

When questioned about political surveillance in the Springville area, 51 Chinese said they believe that the KMT

has placed informants in the area; 21 of them either deny it or are not aware of it. A former KMT leader admits that he did write reports to the Chicago Office of CCNAA. He was elected chief of the KMT branch in the Springville area in 1984 and was required to write reports at least one a month. He stated that he never included any student's name in his reports, but he did report some professors who were either pro-Taiwan Independence Movement or pro-PRC. He said,

I did not report any students because I knew that they might return to Taiwan someday. However, since I can not send in a blank report, I did report some professors, for they are already well known.

He says each report was worth \$50 in 1983.¹¹

Another leader denies that he writes any reports. He says,

As I know, different intelligence agencies in the government have different channels to do their work. I do not belong to any one of them. I was elected as a chief but I am not in charge. You might want to think that I am a puppet, but my point is to clarify that I am not a informer.

¹¹According to sources in the United States, some informants receive a monthly salary of \$600; others get \$50 or \$100 for each report they submit (*Newsweek* May 17, 1982. P.73). A spokesperson for Taiwan's diplomatic office in the United States, Stephen Chen, denied any spying activities on campuses. He labeled as groundless and slanderous charges that \$50 payments were being made for reports from students to the KMT (*The State News*, Nov. 23, 1981. P.1).

One well-known surveillance case in the Springville area occurred in 1979. A member of the Taiwan military had been sent by the government to study business administration at the university in 1977. Because of his military background and government sponsorship, other Chinese believed that he was a spy. A short time after his arrival, he became one of the leaders in the local KMT party. After he fell in love with a Chinese girl from Taiwan, he decided to marry her and live in the United States.

Eventually his intentions to stay became public and the government in Taiwan stopped his financial support. Several months later, in a public meeting, this student stood up and accused the KMT of spying on him. He said that he had not received his subsidy from the government for several months because the KMT spies had reported his activities to the government. He said that he knew who the spies were and asked them to pass a message along to the government. His message was an ultimatum: reinstate the financial aid otherwise action would be taken against the KMT government and spies.

This man was the first and the only person to openly denounce the KMT's spying activity in a Chinese public meeting. Shortly thereafter his problem was solved; his subsidy continued until his graduation. After he graduated, he married and found a job in Washington, D.C. When I called him there, he told this story:

I was not a spy but everybody believed that I was, so some KMT spies talked to me quite frankly. I did intend to stay in the United States, but the Taiwan government believed that I had an obligation to go back. I thus had to threaten them, if they would not have allowed me to stay in the United States, I would go to China and release all the secrets that I knew to the public. The Taiwan government sent a military attache, a lieutenant colonel, from its embassy in D.C. to discuss these matters with me. He accepted my demands, allowing me to stay, and I, in turn, agreed not to go to China.

B. CHICAGO DEMONSTRATION

When PRC President Li Xiannian visited Canada and United States in July 1985, hundreds of pro-KMT students protested with demonstrations in Vancouver, Toronto, Washington D.C., Chicago, and Los Angeles. President Li was scheduled to arrive in Chicago on July 25th for a two-day visit and to open a consulate-general office. The Chinese Consolidated Benevolent Association of Chicago issued a statement on July 21st announcing that "Chinese residents in the mid-America area have decided to stage a demonstration and parade in downtown Chicago to unleash the anger of our Chinese compatriots" (*Central Daily News* [International Edition] July 23, 1985).

None of the organizations in the Springville area openly organized people to participate in the demonstration in Chicago. Some KMT members, however, organized a group secretly. Knowing who would like to go and who would not, they called potential participants

privately and told them they could have a free trip to Chicago and free lunch and dinner with the only obligation being to protest President Li for about two hours.

With about sixty volunteers, the group rented a bus, departed from Springville in the morning and had lunch at Chicago Chinatown. After lunch, they were free until four o'clock when they had to go meet on Michigan Avenue to join the protest. By the time President Li arrived, there were about seven hundred Chinese from Taiwan, who came from various midwestern colleges, to protest his visit. The protesters sang militantly and shouted, "Down with the Communists!" Everyone carried Taiwan's national flag and signs which said, "Overthrow the Tyranny!" and "Long live the Republic of China!" (*Central Daily News* [International Edition] July 28, 1985).

The parade was staged for about two hours. After the parade, everyone was given a sack lunch to eat on the way back. Nobody knows who paid for the lunch, dinner, and travel expenses. It certainly was headline news in Taiwan's newspapers (*ibid.*).

C. POLITICAL LECTURE

Chinese organizations in U.S. college towns often have guest speakers to present political lectures. Every year different political groups invite different scholars or political figures come to be guest lecturers. In February

1986, the KMT party invited Dr. Bing-Zhang Wang to speak on campus.

Dr. Bing-Zhang Wang was born in China and educated in Peking Medical College. In 1978 he won a Chinese government scholarship to study in Canada and earned a doctorate degree from McGill University in September 1982. In November of 1982 he announced that he would abandon his medical career and dedicate his full energy to promoting the Chinese dissident movement for democracy (*The New York Times* November 18, 1982).

Based in New York City, Dr. Wang published a monthly magazine, *China Spring*, to spread his ideas of democracy. Since his defection from the Peoples Republic of China, he became a national hero in Taiwan's mass media (*Central Daily News*, Nov. 19, 1982) and also received financial support from KMT Overseas Division (*Central News*, January 6, 1986).

In one of his lectures here a student asked Dr. Wang whether he receives money from the KMT; Dr. Wang did not answer the question; he said something else, and other students interrupted with other questions.

It was unclear who initially invited Dr. Wang to come to the university, the CCNAA Chicago Office or the local KMT group. Initially, the KMT members argued about which organization, the Three Principles Study Club or the Chinese Student Association, should sponsor Dr. Wang's talks. Finally they decided to use a strange pseudonym, "Preparatory Committee of Symposium on Chinese Future" as

the sponsor because if either the Three Principles Study Club or Chinese Student Association claimed sponsorship, it would reveal that the Taiwan regime directly supports Dr. Wang's organization.

One of the KMT leaders, a graduate student in mathematics and well known for his anti-communism sentiment, was assigned to be in charge of the visit. Before Dr. Wang came, he sent hundreds of copies of *China Spring* to the KMT leader to be distributed. When I asked the KMT leader why Dr. Wang had been brought to the university, he told me that the talks were designed for students from PRC so they could hear different opinions. This was interesting reasoning since the majority of the approximately one hundred students who attended the lecture were from Taiwan and pro-KMT; only a few were from China. No one from the Taiwanese Student Association went to the lecture. Thus, KMT-conducted political activity on campus is largely attended by pro-KMT students.

D. FLYER WARS

In Chinatowns, Chinese newspapers have been used as a means of ideological control since the beginning of this century. In the college towns, it is impossible to publish local Chinese newspapers since the Chinese population is too small to support the costs. To remedy this situation, various Taiwan government offices send publications to

Chinese students and others. Following is a list of some of these free publications:

Central Daily News (Daily newspaper, Chinese, published by the Nationalist party)

The Free China Journal (Weekly newspaper, English, published by Government Information Office)

China Update (Monthly news digest, English, published by The Hannaford company, an agent of the ROC)

Sinorama (Monthly magazine, Chinese/English, published by Government Information Office)

Overseas Digest Semimonthly (Chinese, publisher unknown)

Overseas-Chinese Magazine (Monthly, Chinese, published by Overseas Chinese Affairs Commission)

Overseas Scholars (Monthly, Chinese, published by Ministry of Education)

RSEA Weekly (Chinese, published by Ret-Ser Engineering Agency)

The Chinese Ethos (Monthly, Chinese, published by the United Commission of Midwest Chinese Student Associations)

Taiwan Pictorial (Monthly, Chinese, publisher unknown)

Young China Morning Paper (Daily newspaper, Chinese, founded by Dr. Sun Yat-sen in San Francisco 1910)

In the Springville area, KMT groups also publish newsletters. These newsletters (or flyers) began in the Protecting Tiao Yü T'ai Movement years. Much of the

material in these newsletters is pro-KMT propaganda written locally or cut from newspapers. The flyers or newsletters are sent to local Chinese, especially those of anti-KMT sentiment. The anti-KMT groups also cut and paste negative news published in Hong Kong or the U.S. about the KMT regime and send it to local Chinese. This is intended not only as counter-propaganda, but also as a passive way of recruiting.

The frequency of flyer mailing reflects political changes in Taiwan. Whenever big news happens there, for example, the Kaoshiung incident in 1979, the sentence of Rita Yeh in 1980, and the violent deaths of Dr. Chen Wen-cheng in 1981 and Henry Liu in 1984,¹² there is an increase

¹²On the night of Dec. 10, 1979, the *tang wai* (outside the [KMT] party) group in Taiwan organized a public rally to observe United Nations Human Rights Day in Kaohsiung, Taiwan's second largest city. Police and military squads suddenly appeared to disperse the mass gathering. As a result of tempest, more than one hundred of the police and ralliers were injured. The KMT arrested over one hundred political opponents and brought eight of them to trial under the martial law (*The New York Times* Dec. 14, 1979. P.8).

Rita Yeh was a graduate student in sociology at the University of Minnesota. When she returned to Taiwan in 1980, she was arrested and charged with having associated with "Taiwan traitors" and being in contact with Chinese Communists spies. She was sentenced to 14 years of "thought reform" by a military court.

Chen Wen-Cheng taught statistics at Carnegie-Mellon University. He returned to Taiwan to visit his parents in 1981. His body was found on the campus of National Taiwanese University after he was interrogated by the Taiwan Garrison General Command for 14 hours. For detail, see Appendix D.

Henry Liu published a critical biography of Chiang Ching-kuo, Chiang Kai-shek's son and the president of Taiwan. He was shot to death in the garage of his own home in Daley City, California by two gangsters from Taiwan in 1984. Later, the Taiwan government admitted it was Vice Adm. Wang Hsi-ling, the head of Taiwan's military

in the flyer distribution in Springville. The pro-KMT side tries to cover for the government and the other side tries to show the dark side of the story. The most recent example of the flyer war was the election in Taiwan in 1986.

On November 30, 1986, about ten thousand demonstrators battled the police near the Chiang Kai-shek International Airport in Taiwan to welcome a leading dissident, Hsu Hsin-liang, who was trying to return to Taiwan after seven years of exile in the United States. He was charged with treason after he left for the United States in 1979. He was accused of campaigning to overthrow the government by violence and advocating the independence of Taiwan. Although he was officially wanted in Taiwan, he was not allowed to board a plane in Tokyo for the last leg of his flight home. The Taiwan government was trying to keep him out.

Although Mr. Hsu never appeared, thousands of Taiwanese streamed toward the airport in anticipation of his arrival. The crowd was turned back two miles away by roadblocks which were backed by layers of barbed wire and a few thousand military police in riot gear. During the day, the crowd hurled stones and demolished a line of 33 police

intelligence network, who conducted the murder. He was sentenced to a life term in prison.

cars. The military police used tear gas and water cannons to disperse the crowd (*The New York Times*, December 1, 1986).

Although the above violence in Taiwan was purely domestic, in the Springville area unsigned flyers (written in Chinese) were posted on the university campus and distributed to every Chinese person's mailbox on December 1, 1986. The flyer said that the violence was conducted by a newly-formed opposition group in Taiwan, the Democratic Progressive Party. The flyer added that "the member of the Democratic Progressive Party uses clubs and stones that they take along to attack the police ... We need democracy and are against violence!" "Long Live the Republic of China!" Although it was an anonymous flyer, everybody believes that it was distributed by the KMT group. First, the flyer attacked the new opposition party, and second, most Chinese did not know the news before they read the flyer because the Chinese newspaper takes several days to arrive here. Thus, only those with special channels knew the news in detail.

The local anti-KMT Chinese also adopted the flyer tactic to express their point of view. They accused the government of orchestrating the violence and said that the evidence showed that those who smashed the police cars and threw the stones were military prisoners and that the prisoners had been trained for months to do this (*Independent Evening News* Dec. 3, 1986). They cut the news and mailed it to KMT people. The KMT people replied that this was rumor.

V. SUMMARY

The political structure of the KMT's Chinese government, as well as that in the PRC, is based upon the Soviet model of party leadership. The Party controls the state apparatus, the media, and social organizations. When this system is transplanted overseas, the party maintains its influence in the Chinatowns. The KMT controls the newspapers, Chinese language schools, and the leaders of social organizations. In the Springville area, the KMT operates along the same pattern and plays a dominant role in community affairs just as it does in Taiwan.

On the local level, strong government support gives the CSA an upper hand in terms of recruiting. The Ministry of Education in Taiwan has information on every student and supplies this information to the Chinese organizations on North American campuses. The CSA therefore knows how many students are coming and who they are before the academic year begins. It arranges transportation to pick up new students at the airport and arranges introductions to other students.

In the Springville area, the competition from anti-KMT associations prompts pro-KMT people to arrange political lectures, free dances, free dinners once a year (new student welcoming parties), and free sports, and has no membership fee. The Taiwanese Student Association, on the

other hand, has a membership fee, and requires payment to participate in sports activities and other events.

Although the CSA directory lists more than 400 names, it is difficult to know exactly how many people actually support the CSA. Because the CSA is controlled by KMT supporters, we know that those who participate in the CSA's activities are usually also supporters of the KMT government in Taiwan. Research has indicated that about one-third of the Chinese in the Springville area are strong supporters of the CSA and KMT government, and another one-third lean to that support.

As stated above, one result of the struggle between the KMT and the PRC is the politicization of social organizations in overseas Chinese communities. With a few exceptions, every overseas Chinese social organization has adopted a political stance.

Chapter 7:

Chinese Social Organizations in Springville (III)

As mentioned in the last chapter, the division of the overseas Chinese social organizations was a result of Chinese historical developments, particularly the 1911 revolution and the Communist revolution. In early days, pre 1949, politics probably were a source for bridging segmentary-based differences or cleavages in overseas Chinese communities. In the Springville area, however, the first major influx of Chinese was from Taiwan in the 1950s. By then, the "2-28 Incident" (see next section)--a most important massacre of Taiwanese by mainlander Chinese in Taiwan had taken place. It was an historical event that, later, was to have profound impact on the Springville Chinese community. Years after the "2-28 Incident," many Taiwanese in this community began to deny being Chinese. In a college town community like Springville, the severity of this split between Taiwanese and mainlander Chinese from Taiwan was soon multiplied by an additional form of cleavage, that based on the KMT/PRC split, by which most Chinese in the Springville community and elsewhere seemed to find it necessary to take sides and give their allegiance to one of the several factions.

In this chapter, I will discuss two major anti-KMT organizations in the Springville area: China Newsletter and the Taiwanese Student Association. China Newsletter was a product of the Protecting Tiao Yü T'ai Movement. The genesis of the Taiwanese Student Association can be traced back to the "2-28 Incident," which occurred in Taiwan on February 28, 1947.

I. 2-28 INCIDENT

Taiwan was ceded to Japan in 1895, as a result of the Sino-Japanese war. After World War II, the Nationalist Chinese government sent troops and civil service officials to take back the island. After fifty years of separation, there were cultural differences between the Taiwanese and the Chinese Mainlanders.

On February 28, 1947, an incident between a Taiwanese cigarette vendor and a Chinese Mainlander inspector resulted in anti-Mainlander turmoil throughout the island. Officials used troops to intervene and put down the disturbances. This resulted in the slaughter of thousands of Taiwanese, including numerous doctors, intellectuals, teachers, and local leaders.

The 2-28 Incident "crystallised the development of Formosan nationalist feelings" (Meisner 1963:98; see also Li 1980:31). As these feelings developed, overseas Taiwanese living in Japan started the Taiwan Independence Movement in the early 1950s (Ong 1963:111; Mendel 1970:

147). In the United States, because Taiwanese students came to this country after the late 1950s, the Taiwanese Independence Movement blossomed in the early 1960s.¹ The establishment of the Taiwanese Student Association (TSA) in the Springville area is a reflection of the development of the Taiwan Independence Movement in the United States.

II. TAIWANESE STUDENT ASSOCIATION (TSA)

The Springville Taiwanese Student Association was founded in 1965 by a group of Taiwanese students and intellectuals. It was among the earliest Taiwanese associations in the United States. The founders were members of the generation which grew up under the shadow of the 2-28 Incident. Thus, since its inception the TSA has been an organization deeply embroiled in anti-KMT sentiment. As one writer says, the term *erh-erh pa* ("2-28," February 28) "is not only a slogan of the exiled Formosan independence groups but it is a symbol that recalls tragic personal experiences deeply etched upon the consciousness of most adult Formosans" (Meisner 1963:99).

One of the founders of the Springville Taiwanese Association, an eyewitness to the 2-28 Incident, stated:

¹For a more detail account about the development of Taiwan independence movement in Japan, U.S.A., and other countirs, see Douglas Mendel, *The Politics of Formosan Nationalism* (1970), especially chapter 7, The Politics of Formosans Abroad.

I was born in Taiwan, I consider myself Taiwanese, not Chinese. I have never been in China, and my father and grandfather have never been in China. I think that Taiwan belongs to the Taiwanese. The United States, the PRC, and the ROC cannot determine the future of Taiwan. Only the Taiwanese can determine their own future.

TSA is a voluntary organization with an annual members have to pay membership fee.² During the 1985-86 academic year, there were 38 non-student families and 34 single students and student families in the TSA. Among them, there was one family from Hong Kong, five Hakka families, seven Mainlander families, and six Mainlander single students. The predominant language is Taiwanese (Amoy, or Southern Fukien), but Mandarin Chinese and English are also used by various individuals.

The TSA has several names. Its members call it *T'ai Wan T'ung Hsiang Hui* (Taiwanese territorial association or Taiwanese Association). When contacting other organizations, the group uses the name Taiwanese Association of America--Springville Chapter. In order to use the university's facilities, the group is registered as a student association, the Taiwanese Student Association.

Since the organization is registered as a student association, it must report its officials' names to the International Center every year. Because the KMT regime

²During the past six years (1982-1988) the membership fee has been two dollars per student, three dollars per student family, and ten dollars per non-student family.

has declared TSA a seditious organization (Kaplan 1981:45; Tsai 1986:179), students from Taiwan are reluctant to be elected as officials and have their names reported to the university's International Center. Instead, local Taiwanese residents involved in the TSA--usually university faculty--report their American born children, who are students at the university, to the International Center as the TSA officials.

The Taiwanese Association thus has many faces: it is operated mainly by local residents, utilizes students' names, and registers their children as officials. Unlike the Chinese Student Association (CSA), the leadership of the TSA rests upon the shoulders of local residents rather than students.

Every year, the TSA elects 10 officials, 6 local residents and 4 students. The president of the TSA is always a local resident; a student has never held the position. The local Taiwanese residents always initiate and organize the activities and invite students to participate. In other words, the TSA is totally dominated by the local residents, not students.

In this organization, enthusiasm and devotion are the most important factors in determining leadership, and in the Taiwanese Association, there are two de facto leaders, both university professors. They have been in the community longer than other Taiwanese, have connections with other Taiwanese organizations, and most importantly,

have devoted more time and money to Taiwanese activities than any other member.

A. INTERNAL CLEAVAGE

Traditionally, the Taiwanese Association is closely related to the Taiwan Independence Movement. In recent years, however, a "gap" has been developing among members. They themselves use the term "Zionist" and "Gypsy" to distinguish the difference.

The major difference lies in political ideology. The "Gypsies" argue that the TSA should emphasize the future in the United States for this generation and the next. Thus, the TSA should become a social organization and minimize its political activities. The "Zionists" maintain that the TSA must be a politically-oriented social organization and that pursuing an independent Taiwan is the only meaningful goal for overseas Taiwanese, whether or not they expect to return to Taiwan after independence.

This division in the local organization illustrates the debate about Taiwanese nationalism that has prevailed in overseas Taiwanese communities since the late 1970s. On one side, some authors assert that the Taiwanese are a separate ethnic group, not to be confused with the Chinese. They maintain that the Taiwanese Independence Movement is based on the premise that the KMT government is not democratic. If the KMT gradually democratized, then the Taiwanese Independent Movement would lose its ground. They

argue that an Independence Movement should be based on both democratic principles and nationalistic revolution. They thus have to advocate Taiwanese nationalism and declare that Taiwanese and Chinese are two separate ethnic-nations.

On the other hand, other writers argue that it is not necessary to relinquish ones roots to pursue independence. They agree that Taiwan has been a separate entity from China for more than three hundred years but doubt this historical factor alone is enough to claim that Taiwanese and Chinese are different ethnic-nations.

In the Springville area, the "Zionists" and "Gypsies" differ on the above issues. The "Zionists" insist that they are Taiwanese, not Chinese. The Gypsy faction is more flexible on this issue. A prominent leader in the "Gypsy" camp says,

I have donated thousands of dollars to help the Taiwanese Independent Movement in the past thirty years. However, the KMT government is still in total control as before. The price I paid is that they have canceled my passport and do not allow me to return to my homeland.³ Now I am getting older. All my children have grown up in the United States. They speak only English and they are Americanized. Their future is in the United States, not Taiwan.

Frankly speaking, even if Taiwan becomes independent now or the KMT government allows me and my family to return to Taiwan, it is impossible for me and my family to live there. My only hope is that I could go back to see my parents, relatives, friends, and my hometown

³The KMT admits that there are 467 overseas Chinese not allowed to go back to Taiwan (*Central Daily News* Aug. 3, 1988, p.3).

someday. Since the Taiwanese-American's future is here, not in Taiwan, we have to be realistic. We and our children should pursue our future as Taiwanese-Americans in this country; the members in the Taiwanese Association should help each other to establish roots in this land.

The "Zionist" camp maintains that the TSA should be involved in politics as much as possible. They argue that the mission of the TSA is to establish an independent Taiwan. If Taiwanese do not have an independent country, then overseas Taiwanese in the United States are just like the Gypsies who live in Europe. One of the leaders of this faction states:

We have been fighting for an independent Taiwan for more than thirty years. The TSA is filled with the spirit of "Zionism" since its very beginning. I don't think that the TSA should function as a social organization now. Without the Zionistic ideal, the TSA is just like a Gypsy club.

I know that some Taiwanese have already given up the revolutionary thought. They think that by softening their attitude toward the KMT government, the KMT would allow them to return to Taiwan. It's pitiful surrenderism. We live comfortably in the United States so we have to accomplish some ideals. Without these ideals, life is meaningless.

The gap between the two camps has widened in recent years and is manifested in many events; I present here five examples. The third example indicates that, among the TSA members, the Gypsies and the Zionists each compose half the membership.

1: 1980 CENSUS

The difference between the two camps is directly reflected in the 1980 census. When asked their ethnic background in the census questionnaire, the Zionists refused to answer "Chinese," instead, they marked "Taiwanese" in the "other" column.⁴

2: DIRECTORY

Another example is the admission of a local pro-PRC family into the Taiwanese Association. When the pro-PRC group gradually became inactive in the early 1980s, this family wanted to participate in the Taiwanese Association. The "Zionists" rejected their participation, but the "Gypsy" faction favored their presence. In 1982, before the Taiwanese Association was ready to publish its directory, the question of including this family's name was a controversial issue during the meeting. After a long debate, the TSA finally added the name to the directory.

3: ELECTION

Another example of the division in the group was the election of the president of the Taiwanese Association of America in 1986. The TSA is a chapter of the Taiwanese Association of America (TAA) and has one vote to cast.

⁴From the 1980 census, despite help from the librarian, I was unable to discern how many Taiwanese in the United States and the Springville area, in particular, marked "Taiwanese" in the "other" column.

There were six candidates running for the office of president of the Taiwanese Association of America in 1986, but only two were considered as front-runners. These two candidates represented two opposite ideologies: one advocated that overseas Taiwanese should have a dialogue with the KMT government and the other was well known for its strong anti-KMT background.

The difference between these two candidates paralleled the two camps within the Springville TSA. When the president of the Springville TSA called a meeting to decide which candidate the TSA should vote for, the Gypsy group favored the pro-dialogue candidate and the Zionists backed the other candidate. They argued and attacked each other's candidates vigorously.

During the meeting, everyone could express his/her opinion, but only ten officials had a right to vote. The vote was tied three times at 5 to 5. Two years later, when the Taiwanese Association of American needed to elect a new president, the TAA changed the rule to allow all members to vote. Of two candidates, one represented the Gypsy group and one represented the Zionists. In the Springville area, 60 TSA members came to vote. The result was again tied, this time at 30 to 30. These two elections indicate that in the Springville area the Gypsies and the Zionists are of equal number.

4: POLITICAL LECTURES

Formerly, the TSA, by unanimous decision, invited anti-KMT political figures to lecture every year.

Recently, however, the Gypsy faction leaders have opposed the TSA's sponsorship of political lectures. They do not object to political activities but argue that political activities should be kept secret and not use the TSA's name and money.

5: LANGUAGE PROBLEM

The "Zionists" insist that Taiwanese be used on every occasion, while the "Gypsies" are willing to use Mandarin occasionally. In a series of seminars held in recent years, in order to attract more students, speakers have not been limited to Taiwanese. Most speakers use either Taiwanese or Mandarin, but one speaker chose English. When I asked him why, he explained:

I speak five languages, but I always have had language problems. I was born and grew up in Japan until high school. I spoke Japanese in school and speak Hakka at home. I went to college in Taiwan, I learned Mandarin and Taiwanese there. I came to United States as a graduate student and have lived in this country for more than twenty years. I have to speak English every day now. When I come to talk to students, I know that no matter what language I use, I could not avoid criticism. Although it is probably more appropriate to use Mandarin since the audience consists mainly of new students, I can imagine some people in the TSA expect me to use Taiwanese. In order to avoid the trouble, I choose to speak English.

This story disclosed that language has been a very sensitive issue in the Taiwanese Association.

B. CONNECTIONS

In the preceding chapter, we noted the Chinese Student Association's direct link to the Chicago office of the NNCAA. The Taiwanese Association also has national as well as regional connections. The Springville TSA is one of 56 chapters of the Taiwanese Association of America (TAA), which is a branch of Taiwanese Association of World (TAW). Each local TSA pays a \$50 annual membership fee to the Taiwanese Association of America. The membership fee guarantees the right to vote in the TAA meetings.

The Taiwanese Association of America was established in 1971 as an umbrella social organization. An insider estimates that the Taiwanese Association of America "has a membership of approximately 100,000 in the United States" (Li 1980:25). According to one writer, "Its members include those of virtually all the other political, social, and cultural groups revolving about Taiwan, plus a large number of individuals of Taiwanese extraction who have no other group affiliation" (Kaplan 1981:45).

The Taiwanese Association of America is divided into six regional associations: Northeast, Southeast, Midwest, Northwest, West, and Southwest. The associations in the region take turns sponsoring regional summer conferences or

summer camps.⁵ There are important events in the Taiwanese community, attracting one to two thousand people to each conference. The Springville TSA has about ten families that regularly participate in the conferences or summer camps held by TAA or TAW.

In addition to the Taiwanese Association of America, there are still various politically anti-KMT organizations in the United states: The Formosan Association for Human Rights, Formosan Association for Public Affairs, The North America Taiwanese Professors' Association, World United Formosans for Independence,⁶ etc. Every organization keeps in contact with 56 local Taiwanese Association members regularly. They send their publications, ask for

⁵The Midwest area includes Chicago, Purdue, Indianapolis, Cleveland, Columbus, Cincinnati, Ann Arbor, Detroit, and Lansing. They take turns to sponsoring the summer conference: 1971 in Chicago, 1972 in Ann Arbor, 1973 in Purdue University, 1974 in St. Louis, 1975 in University of Wisconsin (Madison), 1976 in Michigan State University, 1977 in Kankakee, Il, 1978 in University of Illinois (Champaign), 1979-1981 in Calvin College (Grand Rapids, Michigan), 1982 in Miami University (Oxford, Ohio), 1983 in Oberlin College, 1984 in Eastern Michigan University, 1985 in Northern Illinois University, 1986 in Columbus, 1987 in Cincinnati, and 1988 in Michigan State University.

⁶According to one author, "This semisecret organization constituted the violent wing of the movement for Taiwanese independence and claimed credit for a number of terrorist attacks upon the government in Taiwan. Though some members of this group are known, most of its membership, estimated at between one and four hundred, has remained secret, and of course members are outside of Taiwan, mostly in the United States and Japan" (Kaplan 1981:44).

donations, or send political figures to lecture at local Taiwanese Association meetings.

These anti-KMT Taiwanese organizations in the United States have close link with the anti-KMT group, *tang-wai*,⁷ in Taiwan (Kaplan 1981:44-46; *The New York Times*, March 18, 1980. P.7; *Central Daily News* Aug. 20, 1988, p.2). When members of the *tang-wai* (or Democratic Progressive Party) visited the United States, various anti-KMT organizations would make arrangements for them to visit different Taiwanese communities across the United States.

Often times, a member of the Springville Taiwanese Association will make arrangements for political figures to give lectures in the Springville area. These lectures, are open to the public, on campus and off, or at individuals' homes. However, some lectures are closed to the public, so that attendance can be monitored. The selection of the audience eliminates the possibility of attendance by the KMT "spies." After the lecture, those attending will make donations to help cover the lecturer's travel expenses. The practice is identical to Dr. Sun Yat-sen's

⁷Literally "outside the [KMT] party," means "non-KMT (personage)," as "the opposition" in English. Despite the ban on forming political parties under KMT's martial law, some 135 of them established the new Democratic Progressive Party on September 28, 1986 (*Springville State Journal* Sept. 29, 1986, p. 5A). It is the first opposition political party organized in Taiwan since 1949 when the KMT retreated from China.

revolutionary campaign in the United States eighty years ago.

In addition to the national network, geographic proximity have made for particularly close ties between the Springville Taiwanese Association with that of the Taiwanese Association of Harbor and Melson [place names have been changed]. The leaders in these three areas frequently visit each other and jointly sponsor political or social activities. For example, the Springville Taiwanese Association is responsible for sponsoring the 1988 Midwest area regional summer camp. Since September 1987, the preparatory committee for summer camp in Springville has called meetings once a month. The representatives from Harbor and Melson have participated in the preparatory meetings on every occasion.

C. RECRUITMENT

Students from Taiwan are the major subjects of the Taiwanese Association's recruitment program. The competition for recruitment between the TSA and the Chinese Student Association starts as soon as a new student arrives. Since most new students arrive at the local airport, both organizations post phone numbers at the airport public phones for the new students to call for rides. During the peak of new students arrivals, the week before the fall term, both organizations also send people

to the airport to display their friendship and hospitality by welcoming new students personally.

In recent years, the CSA has had direct channels with the Ministry of Education of the KMT government in Taiwan. As noted previously, this gives the CSA the ability to contact new students before they arrive in the U.S.A. The TSA is unable to compete in this area.

At the beginning of the fall term, the TSA sponsors a welcome dinner party for new students. Although every year there are about 80 new students from Taiwan and the dinner is free for new students, only about 25 attend the party since many of the Taiwanese students apparently dare not participate in the Taiwanese Association's activities for fear of retaliation by the KMT.

After the dinner, usually, a TSA member who is a university professor tries to establish rapport with the new students by telling them that the TSA is a social, not political, organization and by introducing the TSA members who teach at the university.

In 1978, the TSA organized a chorus not for the love of music itself, but in an attempt to design a program that would attract students. The chorus met once a week and the Taiwanese Association supplied the music and necessary facilities. The chorus drew more than 20 people, including both Mainlanders and Taiwanese. This was the first Chinese chorus in the Springville area. It lasted only four years, however, and fell victim to politics. When the members of

the chorus started to sing Chinese songs, the leaders of the Taiwanese Association objected. They argued that a Taiwanese organization should not promote Chinese culture. Some chorus members argued that they were not interested in politics, but had joined the chorus just for enjoyment. They felt that joining the Taiwanese Association chorus was problematic enough and could cause KMT spies to report their names. They wanted to sing freely and not become instruments for particular political ends. The language issue became an irreconcilable problem until the chorus finally disbanded in 1982.

After this, the TSA started a sports program in its attempt to attract students. During the fall and winter terms, the TSA sponsors sports activities every Saturday night. After the games, long-term students would take turns inviting new students to their apartments for parties. The friendships established through the games and parties gradually induced new students to participate in the other TSA's activities. This recruiting strategy has been quite effective. About 40 people participate each Saturday even though the organization must charge \$1 each to pay the rent on the facility. Half of the attendance is local residents and the other half students.

In 1984, the Chinese Student Association (CSA) also began sponsorship of sports activities. Its sports activities are on Friday nights and are free. The CSA's sports night attracts more than 30 participants every week,

but has little effect on the Taiwanese Association's sports night.

To attract more students, the TSA has also sponsored a series of nonpolitical seminars on campus since 1986. Topics are designed mainly to attract and assist new students and cover such issues as tax reports, student insurance, financial investments, football, personal computers, Buddhism and Christianity, and automobile purchases and repairs. Even though most seminars are held in a graduate student dormitory, where most new graduate students reside they often draw fewer than ten students. When those who did attend were asked why most others did not come, they said that the KMT leaders either warned them not to attend or that the CSA was sponsoring another activity at the same time. To avoid conflict, most students attended the CSA's activities.

D. PROPAGANDA WARS

In the previous chapter, it was pointed out that in Taiwan as well as in overseas Chinatowns, the KMT government "has kept the media under close rein" (Lum 1985: 304) and used it effectively as means of ideological control. According to a study by the University of Missouri School of Journalism, Taiwan was ranked 51 among 91 countries in the press freedom index (Kurian 1979:362). One of the tactics that the KMT utilizes for ideological

control in the Chinese student communities is propagandistic flyers mailed to every Chinese resident.

On the national level, anti-KMT groups realized that they needed a newspaper urgently, but financially it was very difficult to support a daily newspaper.⁸ Instead they published two weekly newspapers in the United States to promote the Taiwanese Independence Movement: *The Taiwan Tribune* and the *Pacific Times*. *The Taiwan Tribune* is the larger of the two but still has a circulation of only 3,500 (Lum 1985:305).

In the Springville area, two steps were taken to challenge the KMT's dominance of the mass media: mailing flyers and operating a telephone news line, Voice of Taiwan.

The TSA supporters believe that students have not had the opportunity to hear other opinions before arriving in the United States. Some TSA members believe that the most fundamental task is to provide an alternative voice so that students can judge for themselves the credibility of KMT propaganda. Thus, they donate time and money, and engage in a "secret" operations of mailing propaganda material. According to one informant, a graduate student, they copy "more accurate or more neutral" news articles in both

⁸Among the Chinese newspapers published in north America, only the largest one, the World Journal, with a circulation of 100,000, is profitable (*The New York Times* Sep. 15, 1985. P.42).

Chinese and English from books, magazines and newspapers, paste them together, photocopy hundreds of copies, and mail them to local Chinese, especially those who are strong supporters of the KMT regime. Their hope is that when the readers discover the "facts," they will reconsider their loyalty to the KMT regime.

The Voice of Taiwan is a special telephone answering machine with recorded news on it. When a dialer calls the "Voice of Taiwan" phone number, the answering machine reads the news for about five minutes. The "Voice of Taiwan" started in New York City in 1978, and within a few months there were some twenty stations operating in North America and several others in Japan and Europe (Kaplan 1981:44). The Springville area "Voice of Taiwan" is located in a TSA member's basement. The TSA member, a university professor, applied for the new telephone number and purchased the equipment. Most of the news is provided by other "Voice of Taiwan" stations on the East and West Coast. The local "Voice of Taiwan" also provides local news, mainly TSA activity announcements. The "operator" estimates that the "Voice of Taiwan" attracted more than 60 calls everyday. However, due to internal conflict, which will be elaborated later, the "Voice of Taiwan" terminated after four years of operation.

E. "RETALIATION ACTION"

This study argues that, to control the college-town Chinese community, the KMT applied the same maneuvers that they used in the Chinatowns. One of the most controversial of these strategies is the development of informants on campuses. Although the KMT government constantly denies the charge, there are always accusations, particularly from students from Taiwan, regarding spying activities (e.g., Chen 1980:214).

Because of the alleged surveillance, Chinese from Taiwan are intimidated and shy away from political activities. An American friend once complained to me that Chinese are always late. He told me that several times he has gone to see films from China shown on campus. There are always some people who rush in after the movie starts and walk out before the movie ends, causing a disturbance. I explained to him that some of these are people who are afraid of spies. They do not want to expose themselves in the light, so they come in after the movie starts and hurry out before the movie ends.

In 1981, the mysterious death in Taiwan of Dr. Chen Wen-cheng provoked waves of protest in college-town Chinese communities across the United States. Chen taught statistics at Carnegie-Mellon University. In 1981, he went to Taiwan to visit his parents. One day before his scheduled return to the U.S., he was interrogated by military officials in Taiwan. The military officials

claimed that they released him after 13 hours of interrogation about his political activities in the United states. However, Chen had never returned home and his body was found behind the library at the National Taiwan University, his alma mater. (For detail, see appendix D.) Chen's death also provoked anger from the Taiwanese Association members about the clandestine surveillance of Chinese from Taiwan in the local area. In the summer 1981, the Taiwanese Association took "retaliation actions" to protest political oppression from Taiwan.

First, they set up an information table in the university's International Center, distributed flyers to American students, and had volunteers there to explain why they were protesting the KMT government. They urged Chinese and Americans to write to their congressmen to protest the KMT government's brutal murder of Dr. Chen.

While the Taiwanese Student Association attempted to appeal to the American public, the Chinese Student Association used similar tactics to express its point of view. They also established a stand in the International Center, distributed flyers, and sent students there to clarify that the KMT government was innocent of charges linking it with the death of Dr. Chen. American students were puzzled because both stands were manned by students from Taiwan but one claiming that KMT government killed Dr. Chen and the other denying it.

Second, TSA members expressed their anger to the press. Several times the campus newspaper carried front page news about Taiwanese students' fears of spying on campuses. For example,

A ... professor originally from Taiwan, who asked to remain anonymous, said he is sure of the existence of KMT spies here. He said that while he was in class one day, he had joked about being arrested for anti-Kuomintang activities if he returned to Taiwan.

Not long after the jocular statement, the professor received a call from the Taiwanese Coordination Council for North American Affairs--Taiwan's equivalent to an embassy since formal diplomatic relations were curtailed a few years ago--and was told that he would not be arrested if he returned to Taiwan, but that he would be welcome there.

The professor maintains that this is proof of the existence of KMT spies on campus, because there is no other way that the Taiwan CCNAA would know about his classroom banter. (*The State News* Nov. 3, 1981. P.1)

Here is another example:

A number of Taiwanese students have complained to ... the Asian Studies Center director [the director] said that this sort of harassment has been going on since last spring....

Two *State News* staff members received telephone calls after an article on the subject appeared earlier his term. The calls warned that if any similar stories appeared, 'you'll be sorry.' (*The State News* Nov. 11, 1981. P.1)

Still another example:

One of the students said that the Taiwan government knew of his activities and plans, and admitted knowing about it by confiscating some of

his personal letters to his family in Taiwan.
(*The State News* Nov. 23, 1981. P.1)

In addition, *The State News* wrote an editorial condemning the KMT's spying activities:

Given the magnitude of the problem some Taiwanese students maintain they face, it behooves the University to act now with a little foresight to avert a possible tragedy.... A simple statement from [university] President ... which reassures the University's commitment to enforce academic freedom bylaws would ease some tension. (*The State News* Nov. 17, 1981. P.4)

Third, the Taiwan Student Association also carried out further "retaliatory actions" directed against "spies" in the Springville area. At night, members painted "KMT SPY" on the walls and windows of their houses and on their cars. Another tactic was the damaging of "spy's" cars. They put salt, sugar, or other foreign substances into gas tanks and damaged the bodies of the automobiles.

A primary object of the "retaliatory action" was a former head of the Chinese Student Association, the Three Principles Study Club, and the KMT Springville branch. Most people interviewed named him as one of the most powerful KMT members in the Springville area. According to one graduate student,

We went to the same college, Chung Hsing University in Taichung. He was an active KMT member and notable for his accusation of some of his professors for their supposed disloyalty to the KMT government. One professor subsequently lost his job.

When he arrived here in 1978, we felt very uncomfortable. Some of our alumni warned everyone to shy away from him.

In 1980, this individual published an article in a local newsletter naming a university professor and a graduate student as leaders in an anti-KMT organizations, the United Front for Taiwan Nationalhood. Because this organization was seen as a seditious group by the KMT regime (Kaplan 1981:45), the article caused a great disturbance.

The two were angered by the article and prepared to sue, but their parents called from Taiwan warning them not to. So they had no alternative but to drop the charges. Thus, the writer of the article went without punishment, which accelerated the TSA members' hostility toward him. He became the first victim of the "retaliation action." After his car was damaged, his wife went to the campus police to file a complaint and ask for protection. The DPS released the news to newspaper:

One Taiwanese student said that she was accused of being a spy, her car tires were deflated, a sugar-water mixture was dumped into her gas tank and the slogan, 'KMT SPY' was painted all over her car and apartment windows.

'Now I am really scared for my life ... I can't sleep, I can't do anything,' She said.

The same Taiwanese student said, 'It's not just that Taiwanese are scared to being spied on-- they're scared of being accused of being spies. Now I have no friends because they're all scared that if other see them with me, they too might be accused.' She said she had requested protection

from the DPS, but said she was told by [Detective Jim] Douglas, 'We don't have enough people to do that.' (*The State News* Nov. 11, 1981. P.1)

Commenting on the incident, an active TSA member said,

We did claim her husband was a spy, but we have never blamed her of being a spy. Furthermore, for such a big harassment happened to a family, it is hard to believe that it was wife went to DPS alone. It proves that he was a spy and felt guilty thus dared not go to [campus police].

In recent years, although there are still Chinese who complain about political surveillance, without the stimulation of any particular political events, it now seems much more peaceful than before.

III. CHINA NEWSLETTER

As mentioned in previous chapters, during the Protecting Tiao Yü T'ai Movement, some sixty Chinese in the Springville area organized a Tiao Yü T'ai Action Committee and published the *China Newsletter*. When the Tiao Yü T'ai Action Committee registered as a student organization at the university, it registered under the name China Newsletter. Although the organization survived from 1971 to 1981, its heyday was only over one year, from January 1971 until the United States returned the Ryukyu Islands to Japan in May 1972.

In 1975, a new family, surnamed Chan moved into the Springville area; their presence gave the China Newsletter group new life. The Chans were originally from Hong Kong

and both husband and wife had doctoral degrees from an American University. They were enthusiastic supporters of the Protecting Tiao Yü T'ai Movement while in Pittsburgh. When they moved into Springville, their first responsibility was to continue to publish the *China Newsletter*.

At the beginning of the Protecting Tiao Yü T'ai Movement, most of the *China Newsletter* was handwritten in Chinese. Because of the ease with which the KMT could identify authors through handwriting, the newsletter gradually became a cut and paste publication. The publication was normally eight pages in length and was published once a month. Three hundred copies were circulated. The newsletter required time, labor, and financial support, most of which was provided by one family from the mid-70s to the last issue in November of 1981.

The cessation of the *China Newsletter* symbolized the end of Tiao Yü T'ai Movement in the Springville area. Protecting Tiao Yü T'ai Movement supporters were classified by other Chinese as *t'ungp'ai* (unification faction) or *tso p'ai* (leftists), because of their political support of the PRC. In the beginning of the Protecting Tiao Yü T'ai Movement, they believed that the purges of the Cultural Revolution were the only hope for a new China, but when the Gang of Four were arrested, they were shocked and disappointed. The disasters of the Cultural Revolution were now apparent and former supporters of the Great Proletariat Cultural Revolution were left to rationalize their beliefs.

1. 1

2. 2

3. 3

Although some still supported the PRC, some of them gradually changed their direction of support to the democratic movement in Taiwan.

In 1978, a small group of Protecting Tiao Yü T'ai Movement supporters in Chicago formed the Organization for the Support of Democratic Movement in Taiwan (OSDMA). When the *China Newsletter* was discontinued, the family who had supported it so strongly began to publish another newsletter, the *Democratic News*. Officially the *Democratic News* was published by the OSDMA--Springville Branch. The first issue was published on April 15, 1981. This publication was much shorter lived than the *China Newsletter*; only ten issues were published. The last was June 16, 1982.

In addition to publishing the *China Newsletter*, and later the *Democratic News*, the family subscribed to many Chinese newspapers and periodicals published in New York, Taiwan, China, and Hong Kong. Many Chinese would go to their house to read these publications on weekends. They often invited students to their house for dinner, and once or twice a year, they sponsored open-house dinner parties. Scores of Chinese residents and Chinese students were invited.

After dinner, some would read newspapers and periodicals, some would play volley ball, and some might play Chinese musical instruments. Thus, this family served as a activity center for the pro-PRC group for almost ten years, from 1975 to 1984. Through the establishment of personal friendship, there were about 25 "leftists" always

getting together in the early 1980s. Most of them were graduate students from Taiwan, including both Taiwanese and Mainlanders, and only four were from Hong Kong.

In 1979, when the PRC began sending its students to the United States, two students from China arrived in Springville. The family treated these Chinese students with great hospitality. Students from Taiwan were hesitant to initiate contact with students from the PRC because they were afraid the KMT informers might report their association with the "Communist bandits." This family, however, is from Hong Kong and was not concerned by the KMT's spying activities.

As more and more Chinese students and scholars arrived from the PRC, the family gradually lost their attraction. Students from Taiwan or Hong Kong who wanted to learn more about China could do so directly from Chinese from the PRC. The family therefore began to concentrate efforts on a new organization, the Springville Chinese Music Ensemble.

The Ensemble was started as an informal music group in 1975 by several Chinese residents in the Springville area--all of whom were active in the Protecting Tiao Yü T'ai Movement. According to one informant, the initial idea was to have a weekly gathering in which members can learn to play and entertain themselves with music from their Chinese heritage. During the academic year of 1985-1986, the Ensemble consisted of 18 members (3 from China, 4 from Hong Kong, 9 from Taiwan, and 2 Americans). Although those

members from Hong Kong, China, and 4 members from Taiwan were pro-PRC, the other 5 members from Taiwan were politically neutral. "I know that some members have strong political overtone, I came here just enjoy the music," stated one of the politically neutral members, a graduate student from Taiwan.

The Ensemble has performed frequently in the Springville area and cities within and outside of the state. Since 1985, the Ensemble has gained financial support from the state council for the Arts and the National Endowment for the Arts.

IV. THE ASSOCIATION OF CHINESE SCHOLARS AND STUDENTS

This organization was founded in 1980 for scholars and students from the PRC exclusively. In the academic year of 1985-86, this organization had 244 members, all from China. Although new immigrants from China have come to the area in recent years, they do not belong to this organization.

During the period of the Sanmao's lawsuit case (described in Chapter 4), I asked the chairperson and several members of the organization for help. One of the members told me that, "This is an organization for Chinese scholars and students only; since he is not a student here, it is beyond our responsibility." And another member told me, "If he is an immigrant as you said, then he is an American, although at the same time he is an overseas Chinese. However, our association serves for Chinese only,

not for American or overseas Chinese." From their responses we clearly know that the Association of Chinese Scholars and Students (ACSS) is for Chinese students and scholars from the PRC only.

The head of the ACSS states that the organization has direct contacts to the Chinese embassy in Chicago. He says, "They give us instructions whenever it is necessary and provide movies from China for us to show on campus. It is necessary to keep in contact with them." He continues, "We operate student affairs just as your Chinese Student Association does." Some students disagree with him. They accuse the ACSS of being oppressive rather than providing necessary services. One student said "Last year, we signed an open letter to protest the PRC's removal of the communist party chairman Hu Yaobang.⁹ Although we thought

⁹In December 1986, thousands of students marched the streets of Shanghai, Beijing, Nanjing and other cities demanding democracy and freedom of the press (*The New York Times* Dec. 14, 1986. P.13; Dec. 21, P.6; Dec. 22, P.14; Dec. 23, P.12). After the student demonstration, the Communist Party leader Mr. Hu Yaobang was forced to resign (*The New York Times* Jan. 17, 1981. P.1). As many as one thousand Chinese students from 51 colleges in the United States signed an open letter to the leadership in China voicing their support for Hu Yaobang (*The New York Times* Jan. 20 1987. P.3).

Among the students who signed the open letter, 480 of them allowed their names to be used. When interviewed by the *New York Times*, some of them declined to be quoted by name. They said that "to be quoted in the Western press could be more dangerous for them and their families in China than to sign an open letter" (ibid.).

our protest was justified, the ACSS officials strongly discouraged our action." He explains,

It happened in January 1987. After students had protested in December 1986, Chinese conservative leaders removed Hu Yaobang as party chairman. They considered Hu Yaobang as too liberal. He was also thought to be responsible for the student's march. In the United States, an open letter was circulated among colleges to protest the Chinese leader's decision. In the Springville area, we collected twenty eight signatures, but no one would allow their names to be used. We were afraid of retaliation when we returned to China.

Recently, the announcement of China's acting Prime Minister Li Peng¹⁰ that China's new policy was to reduce the number of its students abroad, especially in the United States, provoked another protest in the United States.

A total of 40,000 Chinese students are now studying abroad, 27,000 (68 percent) of them in the United States. According to China's new policy, they would reduce the number of students studying abroad to 3,000 a year with only 20 percent being allowed to study in the United States. In other words, only 600 students could come to the United States, compared to the current figure of 8,000 who have arrived in the United States since 1985 (*The New York Times* March 24, 1988. P.1).

¹⁰Li Peng was confirmed as Prime Minister by the National People's Congress on April 9, 1988 (*The New York Times* April 10, 1988. P.3). He was trained in the Soviet Union and considered as conservative.

Prime Minister Li's new policy provoked a protest letter circulated on various U.S. campuses. In the Springville area, Chinese students posted several copies of the protest letters on campus and asked Chinese students to sign their names. The organizers of the protest letter were planning to send the letter to the Communist Party leadership. But the head of the ACSS questioned the sincerity of some of the protesters, saying to me,

Do not believe what they said. According to new policy, no student would be permitted to study abroad more than five years. They protest because they want to stay as long as possible. And yet, some students sign protesting letter have special purpose. They know once they sign the letter, when they go home they might face prosecution for their hostile action against government. They want to use this as a reason to apply for political asylum in the United states. Thus, if a student does not want to return to the PRC, very often the student will utilize every opportunity to expose himself as a dissident in hopes that his anti-government actions will allow him to apply for political asylum in the U.S.

V. SUMMARY

As mentioned in previous chapters, political changes in China and Taiwan shaped overseas Chinese into various politically rival factions---divided between those who support and those who criticize their homeland's government. In most Chinese communities in America, there exists three major rival groups: the pro-Nationalist group, the pro-Communist group, and the pro-Taiwan Independence group. This chapter discussed the various anti-KMT groups

in the Springville area. The Taiwanese Student Association is a territorial organization with political overtones. The China Newsletter was a product of the Protecting Tiao Yü T'ai Movement. When Chinese students from the PRC arrived to study in the U.S., the China Newsletter gave way to them.

Chapter 8: Personal Relationships

I. KINSHIP TIES

Even though there are no formal kinship organizations in the study area, kinship still plays an important role in organizing people's lives. We have seen that most Chinese living in the Springville area are first generation immigrants. They came to the United States as students and remained after their graduation. They had, of course, left their parents and other kinsmen behind. After they had settled in the local area, they started to send for their kinsmen. Among kinsmen, parents are always on the top of the priority list. To send for the parents from their home country is, according to Chinese culture, a demonstration of filial piety. Some Chinese also have siblings or other kinsmen who have joined them here. In other words, although Chinese immigrants live in this country, they keep close contact with their kinsmen in their hometowns.

A. PARENTS

Many of the Chinese immigrants' parents do not want to live in the United States. For those who have joined their children, however, the relationships between parents and children and grandchildren are generally good. About

... ..

fifteen years ago, there were not many elderly Chinese living in Springville. The parents came to visit their children in the Springville area but did not want to stay permanently for several reasons. First, many of them were not yet retired. Second, most elderly Chinese did not understand English and did not know how to drive. They felt totally incompetent and alienated in the United States. An informant told me that he became a "deaf, dumb, and lame" person in the United States. Third, many Chinese believe in a life after death. Traditional Chinese thinking is that, if they died and were buried in the United States, they would "live" with Americans in the afterworld; this would be lonely for them.

In recent years, however, many more retired parents have come to stay with their children. Most of them have had adjustment problems but have chosen to stay either because all of their children are in the United States or because their children can not go back for political reasons. Among seven stem families resulting from international immigration, five of them have three generations living together, and the other two have the grandparents living independently. The grandparents who do not know English and do not know how to drive, live with their children. Those who know English and know how to drive, live separately from their children.

An example of a parent who came here to live with a son who cannot go back to Taiwan for political reasons is

the father of a local university professor. This professor has been active in the Taiwanese Student Association. Because of his political activism, the Nationalist government in Taiwan refused to renew his passport and forbade his returning (see Figure 8-1).




Figure 8-1: A Chinese Stem Family

Since he could not go back, his father came here to join him and his family and is now, at 86, the oldest Chinese in the community. At first he lived here half the year and spent the other half with another son in New York City. He also visited Taiwan almost every year. In recent years, because he is too old to travel, he lives in the study area most of time.

This same professor also invited his mother-in-law from Taiwan to live with his family. After her arrival in Springville, she asked her other daughter and son-in-law, a pediatrician, to join them.

Neither the professor's father nor his mother-in-law speak English or Mandarin Chinese, so they can not

communicate with their grandchildren. According to the professor, however, his four American-born children get along well with their grandparents. He says,

In a traditional Chinese family, children always have to obey their parents and grandparents. However, for my children, my parents are newcomers. They have no common language with which to communicate. I can only demand them to respect my parents as much as they can.

To my generation, language is a tragic issue. My parents had Japanese education and when they write me, they use Japanese. However, my Japanese is not good enough, I always have to guess at what they mean to say. When I write them in Chinese, they have to ask someone to translate for them. Now we are in the United States. When I write a note or a letter in English to my children, sometimes they have to guess what I am trying to say.

The elderly father and mother-in-law stay home most of the time. Besides occasionally coming to dinner parties held by the Taiwanese Student Association, they seldom participate in any social activities. They say that they are too old and social activities belong to young people.

The second type of stem family is that in which the grandparents know English, know how to drive, and would like to live separately. The parents of both Bob Pei and his wife, Sue, are examples of this type of arrangement (see Figure 8-2).




Figure 8-2: Two Retired Parents

Sue's mother was sent from China by American missionaries in the 1920s to attend high school and nursing school in Illinois. She returned to China and worked in various hospitals. When her husband retired in 1977, they came to Springville to join their daughter. They purchased a house and did not stay with their daughter's family. In 1978, they operated a Chinese grocery store, the only one in the area at that time. They sold the grocery store to another Chinese in 1980.

Bob's father had been a professor at the local university but returned to Taiwan in 1976. Bob was a college student then and did not go back with his parents. When Bob was in graduate school, he met his wife, Sue, a graduate student from Taiwan. After their graduation, both of them found jobs in State Government and settled down in Springville.

When Bob's parents retired in Taiwan in 1985, they moved back to Springville. Since both Bob's parents had lived in the United States before, they had no adjustment

problems. They purchased a small house and live by themselves. Bob's mother joined the Women's Rotating Credit Association for social reasons, she says. Bob's father and Sue's parents, on the other hand, have never participated in any activities held by Chinese social organizations.

Another example of independent grandparents is Mr. Ning and his wife. Mr. Ning was born in China in 1906. He attended Ch'ing Hua Academy, which was established by the Boxer Indemnity Fund, and later studied at West Point (United States Military Academy). He was the seventh Chinese to graduate from West Point. After his graduation, he returned to China to join the army. He retired from the Chinese army a lieutenant general in 1965. Because his son teaches at the local university, Mr. and Mrs. Ning came to join him. They purchased a small house and live on their own. (For a detailed description of Mr. Ning, see appendix B.)

According to many informants, the relationships between Chinese parents and their children and grandchildren are generally good. Although there is language barrier between grandparents and grandchildren, I heard no complaints about family harmony.

B. OTHER KINSMEN

In addition to parents, Chinese also receive other kinsmen in the United States. The use of kinship ties as a

means of immigration occurs not only in the traditional Chinatowns, but also in this college town. The Korean Chinese restaurateurs described in Chapter 4 are a typical example of immigration through kinship ties. Several examples will depict the kinship relationships among Chinese immigrants.

Professor Chiang was one of the "stranded" students who had come from China before 1949. In 1980, he and his wife sponsored one of his wife's sister's daughters from the PRC to attend college in the Springville area. They treated her as their daughter and paid all of her expenses. They tried to help her gain permanent residency in the United States but did not succeed before Professor Chiang's wife died in 1986. Professor Chiang then decided to bring his deceased wife's sister to the U.S. She could then gain permanent resident status and file for her daughter under second preference.¹

¹According to the U.S. immigration laws, immigrants are admitted according to six preference categories (Sung 1987: 17):

1st preference: Unmarried children of U.S. citizens.

2nd Preference: Spouses and unmarried children of aliens lawfully admitted for permanent residence.

3rd Preference: Members of the professions or persons of exceptional ability in the sciences and arts.

4th Preference: Married children of U.S. citizens.

5th Preference: Siblings of U.S. citizens over 21 years of age.

6th Preference: Skilled and unskilled workers in short supply.

When Professor Chiang went back to China in 1987, his brother also asked Professor Chiang to sponsor one of his sons to study in the United States. Professor Chiang agreed to his brother's request because he felt that he should help not only his wife's kinsmen, but also his own. Since Professor Chiang's wife is dead and his only son is married and lives in another city, he now lives in Springville with three of his kinsmen: his wife's sister, his wife's sister's daughter, and his brother's son.

Mr. Hsieh has worked for the State Government since 1975. In 1979, Mr. Hsieh and his wife sponsored one of his wife's brothers to come to Springville. Mr. Hsieh and his wife's brother then opened a Chinese grocery store in the same year. Later they did not get along; Mr. Hsieh withdrew his share of the investment and his wife's brother sold the grocery store to another Chinese and moved to another city.

Mr. Hsieh's siblings in Taiwan are not interested in emigration to the United States, but he and his wife sponsored his wife's two sisters. One of them married a graduate student and moved to another city. The other sister is in her 40s and unmarried. She lives with Mr. Hsieh's family about six months of the year and with her siblings in other cities for the other six months. Mr. Hsieh states that because she is in her 40s and unmarried,

it is difficult to live in Taiwan where the social pressure is greater.² They therefore take turns providing for her.

Thus, we can see that, in the Springville area, kinship ties still play a vital role for Chinese immigration as they did for Chinese immigrants in the last century. In addition, kinship relations among professional groups in the Springville area are generally good. For members of non-professional groups, on the other hand, kinship relations are often stressful. For example, we mentioned in Chapter 4 the split between a restaurant owner and his uncle that resulted in the uncle opening his own restaurant. In the case study about Sanmao, also described in the Chapter 4, although a relative helped Mr. Wan and his family immigrate into the United States in 1985, when the family had problems, his kinsmen did not help at all.

II. INTERPERSONAL RELATIONSHIPS

In the study of Chinese society, we have seen scholars discuss the importance of *kuanhsi* and *kanch'ing* (Fried 1953; Gallin 1966; Jacobs 1980; Gallin and Gallin 1982:228). *Kuanhsi* refers to connections between people often deriving from kin or friendship or other long term relationships. *Kanch'ing* is sentiments, emotions, and feelings between

²There is a social stigma attached to being an older, single woman in Chinese culture. Her parents, relatives, and friends will always try to persuade her to get married.

persons.³ In Chinese society, *kuanhsi* and *kanch'ing* indeed are two very important aspects of the Chinese social web. In contrast to Chinese society, I believe that alienation is the best word to describe interpersonal relationships among Chinese in the Springville area. There are various reasons for this alienation. To present a clearer picture, I will divide my discussion into two categories: entrepreneurs-restaurateurs and students-professionals.

A. ENTREPRENEURS-RESTAURATEURS

In traditional Chinese society, businessmen's social status was low. One of the reasons was that businessmen pursue profit, which contradicts the Confucian doctrine of *ren* (kindness). But, in Chapter 2, we saw that in reality successful merchants often assumed the leadership of the overseas communities in the last century. In the Springville area, however, although Chinese no longer hold businessmen in low regard, entrepreneurs-restaurateurs do not participate in the social activities sponsored by the various Chinese social organizations. Nor are they included in less formal activities. For example, the professionals often play tennis or golf on the weekends and

³In his classic study, Morton Fried defines *kanch'ing* as "quality of a relationship" (Fried 1953:103), and refers to the people who have no kinship ties. However, in recent studies scholars found that *kanch'ing* also refers to kin relationships as well (Gallin 1966:171; De Glopper 1972: 318; Jacobs 1980:54). I accept the latter usage.

invite friends and Chinese students together to have dinner, watch television, chat and share gossip. I have not witnessed the non-professional class participate on these occasions.

Not only do the entrepreneur-restaurateurs not interact with the student-professional group, they also have little contact with each other. One interviewee, a restaurateur, says that he knows the name of almost every Chinese restaurant owner in the Springville area, but he has not met many of them and has no contact with them. When asked why they have no contact, he simply says "There is no need."

The class relations between restaurateurs and their employees can be seen from the Sanmao story, as described in Chapter 4. Sanmao's father is the restaurant owner's grandfather's brother. The restaurateur should call Sanmao's father "uncle" according to Chinese lineage structure. But Sanmao's father works as a dishwasher in the restaurant and earns minimum wage. When Sanmao was in jail and in the hospital, no one from the restaurant went to see him. I once asked Sanmao's father why his kinsmen did not help Sanmao. He told me that "money is more important than kinship."

I saw another example when I was called to the local hospital emergency room to translate for a Chinese. The patient was Mr. Lin's little boy. Both Mr. Lin and his wife are Chinese refugees from Vietnam and work in the

kitchens of Chinese restaurants. Because Mr. Lin and his wife had to work, they called a Vietnamese friend to come to the hospital to keep the boy company. Mr. Lin and I had the following conversation:

"Why do you call a Vietnamese rather than a Chinese friend to accompany your boy?"

"Because all of my Chinese friends are working right now and some of my Vietnamese friends have governmental financial assistance,⁴ they do not have to work."

"You have been in Springville for seven years. Don't you have friends that can translate for you?"

"No."

"How about your friends at the restaurant?"

"All of my friends are kitchen workers. Their English is as poor as mine."

"Why don't you call the restaurant owner to send someone to help you?"

"You must be kidding. If I do not go to work, I do not get paid. I cannot even ask my boss to help me, how can I ask him to help my son? All he knows is money."

"All he knows is money," represents a Chinese kitchen worker's observation regarding the restaurant owner. It confirms Sanmao's father's complaints that money is more important than kinship. The story also indicates that

⁴The U.S. government gave monetary stipends to Vietnamese refugees.

Chinese laborers can not help each other. Their lack of ability in English and long working hours prohibit them from doing much for each other. When Sanmao had trouble no member of the laboring class was able to assist him in any situation.

Chinese entrepreneurs generally have no contact with other Chinese (except the Chinese grocery store) and most Chinese do not know them personally. Indeed, one student characterized a computer store owner as "stingy and greedy."

The computer store is owned by a Chinese from Singapore. A Chinese student also from Singapore told me that he wanted to buy a computer from this store because he knows the owner and he believes that the owner would give him a good discount. I later discovered that the student did not buy computer from that computer store. The store owner said,

That student asked me to give him a discount. I asked him why. The student's reasoning was that because we are all Chinese and also all from Singapore he was entitled to a discount. I asked the student, "When you attend a Chinese restaurant, can you ask for discount because you are a Chinese?" The student could not answer me. However, I did offer him fifty dollars discount as a token, but he refused.

The student had a different interpretation:

[The computer store owner] Mr. Chan is stingy and greedy. He knows only money and does not care about the friendship and *t'ung hsiang* [the same hometown] relationships. I know that a computer

store makes about 33% profit when they sell a computer. For example, if they sell a computer at \$1,500, the computer store earns about \$500. Mr. Chan offered me only fifty dollars discount, but the price of a computer is still much more expensive than the mail order price. He asked me if I could ask for a discount in a Chinese restaurant. I certainly cannot. However, if I know the owner of the restaurant, the owner very often offers me a discount or gives me extra dishes to show the friendship and hospitality.

B. STUDENTS-PROFESSIONALS

While I was conducting field work, very often an informant, if from the PRC, would remind me, "Do not repeat what I have said to another Chinese from the PRC." An informant from Taiwan would say, "Do not tell anyone from Taiwan." This indicates that Chinese distrust others from their home country. Why? I believe that it is politics causes Chinese to be so suspicious of each other.

An informant named Hsieh, a State Government employee, told me his story. His wife has a home business selling ginseng and sometimes he solicits business for her. On one occasion, he was having dinner at a local Chinese restaurant and had the opportunity to talk with the restaurant owner. They had never met before, and after exchanging polite remarks, he told the restaurant owner that his wife was in the ginseng business. The restaurant owner said that he would like to buy some for himself and to send to his parents in Taiwan. They made an appointment. The restaurant owner, however, did not keep the appointment and called to reschedule. After several

cancellations, the restaurant owner never did come to buy ginseng. My informant says, "Must be that he found out who I was after the first time I met him. I was the chairman of Taiwanese Association at that time was always active in the Taiwanese Association."

From the previous chapters we know that Chinese restaurateurs do not involve themselves in any Chinese social organizations, while professionals are divided into various political groups. Thus, when the restaurant owner discovered Mr. Hsieh's political attitude, he kept himself distant although both of them are Taiwanese.

Most Chinese professionals living in Springville know each other, but they have contact with other Chinese professionals only within their own political group. I have never seen Chinese who belong to different political groups get together for social occasions. A State Government employee told me during an interview how he deals with other Chinese who are in a different political camps:

If I meet a Chinese who has a different political stance, most of time I do not talk to him. For example, if we meet in the mall, grocery store, parking lot, or street, we generally pretend that we did not see each other. If we meet in the office, we may have to nod to each other or exchange polite greetings. We do not phone each other and simply do not form a friendship.

In the spring of 1988, an American university professor organized and the university's Asian Studies

Center sponsored a seminar about the future of Taiwan. Professor Loo, who is well known for his pro-KMT stance, was one of the speakers. One of the leaders of the Taiwanese Association was among the audience. After the seminar this leader argued with Professor Loo about political developments in Taiwan. Interestingly enough, they spoke English, not Mandarin Chinese. The TSA leader explained to me, "He [Professor Loo] cannot speak Taiwanese and I refuse to speak Mandarin Chinese. We thus have to speak in English." These several examples are indicative of the fact that Chinese from different political groups generally do not talk to each other. If they do, they may use English.

Among students, there is even more suspicion than there is among professionals. Professionals have clear political stances. They have nothing to hide from each other. For the students, one never knows who the secret informer is and who is watching you. In a campus newspaper article, a Chinese student from Taiwan says, "There is more freedom in Taiwan for the Taiwanese--all of the freedoms except political freedom. But here, you don't even have the freedom of making friends and joining groups" (*The State News* Nov. 23, 1981. P.1).

In 1979, when the first student, from the PRC arrived at the university, students from Taiwan were curious and wanted to see him. This was the first opportunity for these students from Taiwan to see a real "communist

bandit." Even though most students were curious, no one dared to show friendship towards the new student for fear of being labelled as "leftist" or friend of a communist.

In the past several years, more and more students from the PRC have arrived in the United States to study. Students from Taiwan and China have had more opportunities to talk to each other. In May 1984, when President Reagan made a trip to China, a student newspaper reporter asked the head of the Chinese Student Association, a graduate student from Taiwan, about the relations between Chinese from Taiwan and from China. He replied,

Different ideologies makes it difficult to be close friends.... The mainland Chinese will never give up the liberalization of Taiwan. For myself, when I meet with a PRC student I might evade or not talk about this issue. We try not to embarrass each other." (*The State News* May 3, 1984. P.1)

The personal relationships between students from Taiwan and China are uneasy. For example, when my wife and I considered having a woman from China, the wife of a graduate student, as a babysitter, several of our friends warned us not to hire her because if a KMT spy discovered we had a babysitter from China, he might report us as associating with a communist. Thus, for many students from Taiwan, the fear of being labelled a "leftist" is still strong.

Since Chinese are so suspicious of each other, when two Chinese strangers meet each other on the street, there

is no exchange of greetings. If two strangers meet at a party, they will exchange polite, superficial niceties, but no one would touch upon the subject of politics.

Certainly, no one would speak out against the Chinese governments for fear that someone listening may be a spy. Likewise, if someone strongly supports the Chinese government, he would not speak out because others might suspect that he is a spy.

The atmosphere of distrust between Chinese also manifests itself in non-political events. For example, many Chinese students, both from China and Taiwan, want to stay in the United States after graduation. They do not want their countrymen to know that they are applying for or already have a Green Card. To have a Green Card implies their intention to live in the United States and further implies that they are not "loyal" to their home countries. Therefore, many people applying for a Green Card do so secretly. Their actions may be disclosed only to their closest friends. Since most students and scholars from the PRC came to the United States with a J1 visa,⁵ it is more difficult for them to get permission from the INS to remain in the United States. Many of them attempt every means possible to remain in the United States, including applying for political asylum.

⁵The J1 visa means "exchange scholars;" thus, everyone with a J1 visa must go back to his/her home country after graduation.

III. RELATIONSHIPS WITH THE HOST SOCIETY

Chinese have been in the United States of America for two hundred years, but most Chinese still feel themselves to be Chinese, not Americans. They keep their Chinese way of life here and pay attention to their homeland--to which they may or may not plan to return--rather than to the host country. This observation is true for Chinatown Chinese and is also true for Chinese living in the Springville area. In this section, I will describe the relationships between Chinese and the host society in three areas: (1) Chinese/American friendship; (2) Chinese and the host society; and (3) racial prejudice.

A. CHINESE/AMERICAN FRIENDSHIP

Most Chinese living in the Springville area say that have American friends, but few would say that they have close friendships with Americans. Most Chinese agree that Americans are very easy to get along with, but strong friendships are not easy to make. Language and cultural differences are the main barriers.

Weddings and funerals are good occasions for understanding social interaction. I have participated in Chinese funerals three times and weddings twice in the past three years. A few American guests attend the funerals and weddings, but not many. The daughter of a university professor, one of the leaders in the Taiwanese Association,

married an American. There were twelve Americans guests, all of the American guests were relatives and friends of the bridegroom. When I asked the professor why his family had no Americans guests, he responded only that a couple of American friends had been invited.

In addition to these special occasions, Chinese often call each other to play golf or tennis on the weekends, but seldom do Chinese invite American friends to play golf or tennis. On other occasions, such as the Super Bowl, Rose Bowl, Thanksgiving, and Christmas, Chinese invite friends to get together and watch television or have a celebration, but Americans are very rarely included. This is true not only among first generation Chinese, but is also a trend among the second generation Chinese.

Although second generation Chinese grew up in this country, speak only English, and do have American friends, they most often congregate with other American-born Chinese. They share dormitory rooms, play softball and basketball together, go to movies together, and study together in the library. In other words, most of their friends are American-born Chinese.

B. CHINESE AND THE HOST SOCIETY

After the beating death of Vincent Chin in 1982,⁶ some

⁶Vincent Chin was born in China in 1955. When he was four years old, he was adopted by Lily Chin and her husband, who had lived in the Detroit area since the 1950s. Mr. Chin died in November 1981. On June 12, 1982, a week before his wedding, Vincent celebrated with three friends

Asian-Americans in the Springville area organized a social organization called Asian Pacific American Association (APAA, name has been changed). According to one informant, Filipino-Americans and Japanese-Americans are the most active participants in the APAA. Although there are more Chinese than Filipino or Japanese living in the Springville area,⁷ participation by Chinese is low.

Most Chinese faculty at the university say that they maintain good relationships with American faculty, but they are not generally active in departmental social activities and other social gatherings with American colleagues. One Chinese professor told me that he has not participated in

in a bar in Detroit. That night, an argument ensued with Ronald Ebens, a former Chrysler worker, in the bar. Ebens and his stepson tracked him down and beaten him to death with a baseball bat. After pleading guilty, the murderers were only fined \$3,780 each and never served a day in jail. The sentencing judge, Charles Kaufman, states his reasons as: "These men are not going to go out and harm somebody else. I just didn't think that putting them in prison would do any good for them or for society" (*The New York Times* April 26, 1983). Kaufman was imprisoned by the Japanese during World War II, and the protesters claimed that the experience left him with an anti-Oriental sentiment (*The State Journal* May 12, 1983 p.8B).

Vincent's mother, deeply disappointed by American justice, plans to go back to live in China. She says, "I want to say very, very, sorry to my son. If it wasn't for me to bringing him to America, he wouldn't die so young." She continues, "He was my only child. Take him away and I am bare. I have no seeds. I have nothing." (*Detroit Free Press*, Sept. 9, 1987. P.1C)

⁷According to 1980 Census data, there were 868 Chinese, 635 Asian Indians, 581 Koreans, 461 Japanese, and 267 Filipinos living in the Laning area.

departmental parties in the past fifteen years. This is not an unusual case.

I believe that Chinese avoid social activities with Americans for the same reasons they avoid local politics. It has been a long tradition among the Chinese in Southeast Asia that they deliberately avoided political activity and concentrated on making money (Mills 1964:110; FitzGerald 1972:159,173); this has also been true in the United States (Light 1972:174; Sowell 1983). As early as 1909, Mary Coolidge, a sociologist, studied early Chinese labor immigrants in the United States:

The early Chinese were, indeed, very like the Irish in that economic rather than political and religious forces drove them hither.... One marked difference is distinguished: the stronger family ties at home and the entire absence of political motive, made it inevitable that the Chinaman should return when he had paid his debts and gained a competence.... (Coolidge 1909:21)

This apolitical attitude toward the host country is also found among the Chinese in the Springville area. For example, of 44 Chinese who are naturalized citizens of the United States, only 6 of them say that they vote regularly, 14 of them report that they have voted at least once, and 24 of them admitted that they have never voted since they became U.S. citizens.

They pay more attention political changes in Taiwan and the PRC than to American political development. When a Chinese political figure comes to give a public speech, he

may attract an audience of scores or even hundreds. On the other hand, when an American political figure comes to give a speech, its rare to see Chinese in the audience. When a leader of Taiwan Independence Movement, for example, gave a lecture in a nearby university, he drew an audience of about one thousand, with more than one hundred coming from the Springville area. Two months later, when Noam Chomsky came to the university to lecture on American foreign policy (*State Journal* May 22, 1980), only two Chinese students attended.

One journalist observed:

For more than 20 years, Chinese students have been visible on nearly every college campus in this country, but they have not usually participated in other than social and academic functions. (Lee 1971: 5)

This lack of interest in local politics and social life is not confined to the students-professionals. The entrepreneur-restaurateurs also do not participate in the host society activities. For example, the Springville Regional Chamber of Commerce had more than 1,300 members in 1988 but only two Chinese businessmen were among them. And neither of these two businessmen participate in the activities sponsored by the Chamber of Commerce. He sends his general manager (an American) in his place. The other simply says that he is too busy to participate in the Chamber's activities. I interviewed several officials in the Chamber of Commerce, including the director of Minority

Business Enterprise Council, and no one knew the Chinese members.

One might wonder why most Chinese merchants do not join the Chamber of Commerce. Some Chinese businessmen said that they are too busy; some said that they had no need to join the Chamber. Only one, a restaurateur, said that it is the language barrier that prevents him from joining. He told me, "I do not mind paying the \$180 basic annual membership fees, but my English is not good enough to socialize with Americans."

C. RACIAL PREJUDICE

As mentioned in Chapter 2, earlier emigrants from China suffered tremendous racial discrimination. With the help of the civil rights movement of the 1960s, federal and state legislatures gradually removed racial discrimination laws, but racial oppression still persists in many areas.

In the Springville area, however, it seems to be minimal. The university professor who attended West Point fifty years ago said that racial problems now are less serious than when he was a student at West Point. He does not feel any racial prejudice now, but fifty years ago it was a totally different situation:

I was the seventh Chinese to study at West Point. When I entered West Point in 1928, American students always gave me trouble. They wouldn't talk to me, wouldn't share a table or bench with me. I was once stopped by three American students in a classroom and they asked me to sing

the Chinese national anthem. When I sang the song, those American students laughed at me haughtily. I told them that when I sang the national anthem they had to stand up and shouldn't laugh, but they refused to stand up. I was mad and fought with one of them. He beat me badly, but I got some respect from then on.

I suffered racial discrimination to some extent, but not as badly as one of my classmates, General Benjamin Oliver, Jr. He was the fourth black student to study at West Point. For an entire year, nobody would talk to him. He always sat alone in the last row of the classroom.

The local residents and those who work for the state government had more complaints of racial prejudice than did students and those working on campus. A recent study showed that Chinese (about half of whom were foreign-born) and Japanese (most of whom are native-born) faculty members throughout the U.S. receive thousands of dollars less than others with the same qualifications (Sowell 1983:197; National Research Council 1981:26-29; United States Commission of Civil Rights 1980:13), and qualified Chinese are often bypassed for management-level promotions (Wu 1980:54). At the local university, however, I have never heard any complaint about racial discrimination on the salary issue.

In interviews with 49 Chinese students and 23 Chinese residents in the Springville area, most of them could cite some unpleasant racial experiences, but none of them had sufficient evidence to prove racial discrimination. The most common complaint from students is difficulty in renting a place to live with American students. In

addition to the housing problem, there are various other complains:

I have been at Springville for three years. I have encountered minor offenses three times. One occurrence in the library, someone threw chewing gum at me. Another occurred while I was walking past an undergraduate dorm, someone threw a balloon filled with water at me. Still another time I was walking along the street, some one threw a cigarette butt at me from a car. I know that if this happened to an American, they would simply interpret it as "nuisance behavior." Since it happened to me, sometimes I think that it is a racial problem. ---Male, student

I had an accident once, someone hit my car from behind while I braked before a yield sign. He was a white student. When the police came, that young student admitted that it was his fault. The police officer, a woman, looked at my rear bumper, told me that it was only minor damage, and that it did not cost more than one hundred dollars to repair it, thus it was not reportable. I asked her what was 'not reportable,' she was unhappy about my question and did not want to explain. Not only did the police officer not give that student a ticket, she contradictorily warned me to drive carefully. It was that American student's fault, why then the police officer treats him kindly and take a harsh tone with me? Is it racial prejudice? I don't know. I do know that it cost more than five hundred dollars to repair the bumper, not less than one hundred dollars as that police officer had said. ---Female, Student

I worked at the cafeteria in a student dormitory for a long time. Since hourly wage is the same, every student worker wants to be assigned as cashier or food servers, not dish washers. However, most cashiers and food servers are Americans and most dishwashers are foreigners. ---Female, student

Studies of other Chinese communities, show that housing is a common problem for Chinese (Webster 1972:392-393). A Chinese sociologist, Siu, noted that he had the

same problem in Chicago, Boston, and throughout the Midwest. He says that a telephone inquiry would assure him that an apartment or house was available, but a face-to-face visit would tell him it had just been rented (Siu 1987:xxxiv).

In the Springville area, housing does not appear to be a major problem for Chinese. I have heard only one such complaint from a non-student:

Once in the early 1970s, my wife and I went to see a new model house, because we were planning to buy one. When we walked in, we saw some salespersons busy talking to other shoppers and still some other salespersons just standing there. No one came to talk to us. We were there for about thirty minutes and felt that we did not belong there. We left with a very unhappy mood.
---Male, State Government Employee

A more common complaint from local Chinese residents is that they are ignored on some occasions. For example,

We know that most stores do not have a clear waiting line, like most banks do. Several times I have been among customers standing at the service counter, the salesperson tends to take care of other customers first, regardless of the fact that I had been waiting longer. I have no evidence to say that this was result of racial prejudice, but I was neglected." ---Male, professor

The issue of racial problems is relevant here primarily because, in the Chinatowns of the last century, racial discrimination was one of the factors leading to unity within the Chinese community. This is clearly not the case in the Springville area where the Chinese

population is divided by the political lines as well as by occupation.

IV. SUMMARY

From the material in this chapter, it is clear that kinship ties are still important among the Chinese, especially for immigration. Chinese residents in the Springville area regard their parents as top priority for immigration. In addition to parents, they also help other kinsmen (e.g., siblings, nieces and nephews, etc.) to immigrate to the United States. Among the professional group, the relationship with kinsmen is generally good. On the other hand, the relationships among kinsmen are not necessarily harmonious among the non-professional groups.

In discussing the personal relationships among Chinese, I have classified two groups as: entrepreneurs-restaurateurs and students-professionals. Chinese laborers complain that the former group only knows money. Among the latter group, their social ties are based upon political ideology. Also, there is an atmosphere of distrust which especially permeates the student group.

The relationship between the Chinese and the host society is a distant one. Chinese participate neither socially nor politically in American society. On most social occasions, Chinese get together among themselves. Few Chinese have close American friends and Chinese are not active participants in local affairs.

Chapter 9: Interpretation And Analysis

In the study of Chinese social organizations in the Springville area, I found not the traditional Chinatown social organizations based on kinship, territory, or language, but organizations that are political rivals. Models that were developed to understand these traditional organizations, i.e., the adaptation interpretation, the sojourner mentality, and the segmentary model (discussed earlier in Chapter 1), provide solid insights into the genesis of Chinese social organizations. These models, however, are not able to explain why political ideology rather than ethnic ties became a dominant organizational principle in the overseas Chinese communities in recent decades.

Only an historical perspective can supply a more meaningful interpretation. The politicization of Chinese social institutions is not unique to the Springville area. It has been a common phenomena in Chinese communities all over the United States and Southeast Asia since the fall of the Manchu dynasty. In this chapter, I will first present my own interpretation of why and how the political aspect of overseas Chinese social organizations became increasingly dominant and, thus, the basis for antagonism

1. The first part of the document is a list of names and addresses of the members of the committee.

between groups. I will then cite examples used in this study to support my interpretation.

I. HISTORICAL APPROACH: A NEW INTERPRETATION

I believe that the politicization of overseas Chinese social organizations is an inevitable historical result of historical processes. Among the key historical developments and related social patterns were:

(1) Forming social organizations according to their ethnic ties is a long-standing Chinese cultural tradition.¹ This was, however, reinforced by the Manchu government's inability to protect Chinese overseas and by anti-Chinese discrimination.

(2) Contemporary Chinese governments inherited two thousand years of authoritarian tradition in ruling. The structure of the overseas Chinese community was essentially parallel to the structure of traditional Chinese society. This resemblance provided an excellent framework for KMT intrusion since the 1940s.

(3) For a number of years, Since the time that Dr. Sun Yat-sen solicited help from the overseas Chinese community,

¹As an early writer phrases it:

"One characteristic feature of Chinese society cannot be omitted in this connection, namely, its tendency to associate.... The people crystallize into associations; in the town and in the country, in buying and in selling, in studies, in fights, and in politics, everybody must cooperate with somebody else--women as well as men." (Williams 1914:II:87; see also Beck 1898:134)

overseas Chinese were relatively unified in their concern to "help-the-motherland" movements. Overseas Chinese are still very aware of and interested in what happens in their homeland.

(4) However, the more recent internal power struggle between the Communists and the Nationalists divided overseas Chinese communities into various groups. The Nationalist regime penetrated into overseas communities by establishing branches in those communities to control major social organizations and newspapers.

(5) In addition, the KMT in Taiwan and the alienation of many Taiwanese from KMT government authority caused a further cleavage of Taiwanese and KMT supporting groups in Taiwan and abroad.

In the following sections, I will present these historical processes in detail.

A.EARLY SOCIAL ORGANIZATIONS

The existence of Chinese social organizations is well documented in Southeast Asia and America. Their most obvious purpose has been that to organize Chinese who find themselves in an alien place. Similar organizations are found in urban areas in China. Two additional factors reinforced the need for these organizations. First, the Manchu government, as did the Ming, prohibited Chinese

migration abroad,² so that early Chinese emigrants went to Southeast Asia and the United States without their government's permission and protection. The massacre of the Chinese in Philippines in 1603 and 1639, and in Java in 1740, caused no great concern to the Manchu Emperors (Purcell 1965:27). When the massive immigration of Chinese into the United States from the southeastern coast of China occurred at the end of the Manchu dynasty, China was weak and poor. The United States Congress passed the Chinese Exclusion Act in 1882, but the Manchu government did not have bargaining power to prevent, protest or challenge it.

Second, when Chinese immigrants came to the United States, they suffered "double discrimination," racial discrimination and legal oppression. Crimes against Chinese were seldom avenged or punished (Mayo-Smith 1890:237-239). For example, in November 1885, the city of Tacoma, Washington, expelled six hundred Chinese from the city. For decades after, no Chinese were allowed to live in that city (Chen 1980:152).

In addition to racial discrimination, there were laws passed by federal and state legislatures to curtail Chinese rights. Chinese at various times and places were forbidden further immigration, could not file lawsuits against whites, could not own a horse and wagon, were not eligible for citizenship, could not vote, could not marry whites,

²The imperial ban was removed in 1860 (Sung 1987:14).

could not send their children to public schools, etc. (For a detailed record of anti-Chinese laws, see Wu comp. & ed. 1972; Tung 1974:50-108.)

Generally speaking, throughout this period, the Manchu government was too weak to protect or to control overseas Chinese. If the Chinese immigrants had had a strong motherland government with effective diplomatic bargaining power, the racial prejudice might still exist, but the legal oppression would have been greatly reduced.³ To protect themselves, the American Chinese "organized their own benevolent, protective, government bodies" (Lyman 1974b:476). The Chinese Consolidated Benevolent Association (CCBA, the Six Companies) "acted as an unofficial government inside the Chinatown and was the most important voice of the Chinese immigrants speaking to American officials" (ibid.:480). Several times the Six Companies raised money, as much as \$200,000 once, and hired prominent American attorneys to help their countrymen sue

³For example, former Japanese prime minister Yasuhiro Nakasone once said that the US "intellectual" level is lower than that of Japan because of the presence of blacks, Puerto Ricans and Mexicans (*The New York Times* Sep. 24, 1986. P. 12). In the United States, Black and Hispanic leaders responded angrily and demanded an apology from Nakasone. Nakasone did apology for his derogatory racial remarks (*The New York Times* Sep. 27, 1986. P.3). In 1988, Mr. Michio Watanabe, a leader of the Japanese ruling Liberal Democratic Party said that American blacks often go bankrupt to avoid paying debts. "Japanese might commit suicide rather than enter bankruptcy." He said. Japan's Prime Minister Noboru Takeshita apologized again. (*The New York Times* Aug. 16, 1988, p.7)

against the anti-Chinese Acts, but they never won a case. They "did not stand a Chinaman's chance!"

B. CHINESE AUTHORITARIAN TRADITION

Most scholars agree that traditional China, at least after the feudal Chou dynasty, was a highly centralized despotic state (Eberhard 1957:36; Wittfogel 1957:361-364; Ch'ü 1962:4, 193; Balazs 1964:10). Both the KMT and the Communist regime inherited this authoritarian tradition to control their people. In one study of political executions, human rights watchers investigated the execution of political prisoners and the problem of missing persons in 88 countries during the period of 1948-77; in this study the PRC had the worst record and Taiwan ranked 17th (Kurian 1984:68). In a similar study (Gastil 1985:14-15, 300-302), which rated the level of freedom based on a scale of 1-7, with 1 representing the highest level of political or civil rights and 7 the lowest, the PRC placed at 6 and Taiwan at 5 in categories of political and civil rights.

In the traditional Chinese political system, the bureaucracy stopped at the county level; villages and towns were "self-administered" (Weber 1978:1229). Gentry therefore were leaders of local self-administration. They were in charge of local public affairs, such as irrigation, self-defense, mediation in disputes, mutual aid, recreation, and religious activities (Fei 1953:81; Weber

1951:91-95). Since the state "again and again ignored the village as a unit" (Weber 1951:93), the gentry, therefore, served as a bridge between the bureaucratic system and the commoners. As Ch'ü has pointed out, the gentry "was the only group that could legitimately represent the local affairs with the officials and in participating in the governing process" (1962:168).

The structure of contemporary Chinese political systems is inherited from the traditional past and, likewise, the various social organizations developed by overseas Chinese had a strong resemblance to the traditional social pyramid.⁴ During the 19th century, the Chinatowns in Southeast Asia and North America behaved as though they were independent colonies. Since there was no traditional gentry, the merchants assumed the leadership over the laborers, peasants, artisans, and other commoners. While bureaucrats of the Kuomintang and Communists party cadres parallel the mandarins of the traditional empire, the leaders of the overseas Chinese communities are the

⁴Collins argues that it is misleading to envisage social stratification as a pyramid, a ladder, or a hierarchy of geological layers, since "this is not what human society looks like. What it looks like ... is nothing more than people in houses, buildings, automobiles, streets.... No one has ever seen anything human that looks like a ladder or a pyramid.... These images, I believe, have been misleading ... " (Collins 1975:51-52). I do not agree with him. No one has ever seen ideology, paradigm, function, consciousness, deep structure, IQ, DNA, or atoms either, but we can not deny the usefulness of these concepts.

parallel of the traditional gentry. In summary, my argument is that the structure of overseas Chinese social organizations is essentially parallel to the traditional Chinese social structure. It thus provided an excellent framework for KMT intrusion.

C. THE PENETRATION OF THE NATIONALISTS

Because the Manchu government was unable to protect overseas Chinese, gradually, the overseas Chinese realized that only a modernized, strong China could do so. To escape from racial oppression, they had a strong desire to help their weak homeland strengthen herself. In the late Manchu period, the political arena in China was divided into two rival camps: those who supported K'ang Yu-wei and Liang Ch'i-ch'ao's reform movement and those who supported Dr. Sun Yat-sen's revolution. Chinese society in America and Southeast Asia also divided into two vying groups along the line of their ideological affiliation: reform or revolution.

In the 1940s, the fight between Chiang Kai-shek and Mao Tse-tung also resulted in overseas Chinese communities dividing along political lines. Since the KMT was the incumbent regime, it had greater opportunity to stretch its power to overseas Chinese communities. In order to have better control of overseas Chinese communities, the KMT established overseas party branches, published newspapers, won control over community leaders, and established a

surveillance web.

The Kuomintang is, perhaps, the only political party that has overseas branches all over the world. It has maintained branches in the United States and other countries since the turn of the century (Purcell 1948:210; Lee 1960:176-177; Kung 1962: 216-217; Nee 1972; Yee 1972:37; Weiss 1974:202-203). In New York City, "two Kuomintang offices are located in Chinatowns. Both the Chinese Consulate (from Taiwan) and the Taiwan government have intimate associations with the CCBA (Chinese Consolidated Benevolent Association, the Six Companies)" (Wong 1979:54). According to Lee, the KMT branches in the overseas Chinese communities

held periodic meetings to stimulate interest in the home government by entertaining Party visitors from China, holding political discussions and showing Chinese films. They co-operated with the Department of Overseas Affairs in publishing the propaganda kinds of materials used by language schools in the U.S.A. They encouraged the operation of special schools in China for the education of young Chinese, born elsewhere, whose parents sent them to China to study. (Lee 1960:176)

In fact, the KMT controls social organizations and utilizes them as a tool to execute the policies dictated by the Party. For example, the Six Companies, the most powerful organization in the Chinatowns, is under the KMT's direct control. According to Wong,

The CCBA adopted an anti-Communist stance and is strong supporter of Nationalist China.... When

high-ranking [Taiwan] government officials visit Chinatown, New York, the CCBA always has advance notice and is able to organize receptions for them. Leaders of the CCBA are frequently invited to Taiwan for visits ... When Chinese businessmen want to import merchandise from Taiwan, they are required to produce recommendation letters from the CCBA...." (Wong 1979:54, see also Weiss 1974: 202)

Whenever the Nationalist Party Congress in China (in Taiwan after 1949) convened, the overseas Chinese leaders returned for the meeting (Kuo 1977:38). The leaders "do not hesitate to use symbols to demonstrate their pro-Kuomintang ideology. Pictures of Chiang Kai-shek and Sun Yet [Yat] Sen are displayed in offices" (Wong 1979:139-40). In a recent study, Kwong says, "Chinatown is still dominated by a traditional political elite which, despite change, rules with the acquiescence of outside authorities" (1987:6).

In the overseas Chinese communities, since the time of Dr. Sun Yat-sen's revolutionary years, the KMT has taken advantage of newspapers to deliver its political message. Since there is no press censorship in the United States, Chinese newspapers in the United States should, theoretically, enjoy tremendous press freedom. In fact, every Chinese newspaper, depending on its affiliation, has its own political stance. Very few are objective, because both Taiwan and the PRC subsidize the overseas newspapers. An insider said as early as 1936, "Because of that it has an influence so great that political factions in China

subsidize individual newspapers in New York, Chicago, and San Francisco" (Leong 1936:150).

Its very easy to tell the political affiliation of a newspaper because Pro-KMT papers insist on using the Chinese Republic year while non-KMT papers adopt the Gregorian calendar.⁵ There were 11 Chinese daily newspapers published in New York City in 1986; four were pro-KMT, six were pro-PRC and only one was independent (*The New York Times*, Sep. 15, 1986, p.42).⁶ Two leading Chinese newspapers are *World Journal*, owned by the publishers of *The United Daily News* in Taiwan, and *The Centre Daily News*, supported by the Peking regime.⁷ They are not shy about trumpeting their political views in the news columns--which range from the former's strong pro-Taiwan position to the latter's pro-Peking stance (*The New York Times*, Feb. 22, 1986). The

⁵This practice is slightly different from fifty years ago: "... after reading the contents, all the papers explicitly state their political affiliations. The Kuomintang papers, right and left, ironically enough print the will of Dr. Sun Yat-sen below their masterheads. For lack of live issues, the royalist and masonic organs date their numbers from the birth of Confucius" (Leong 1936: 155).

⁶After six years of publishing, the only independent paper ceased publication in November 1986. The most obvious reason for its closure was its lack of financial support from either Taiwan or the PRC. A small independent newspaper thus had no chance to compete.

⁷According to the *New York Times*, among Chinese newspapers, the only profitable one is the *World Journal*. It is also the largest with a circulation of 100,000 copies daily. The second largest newspaper, *The Centre Daily News*, has a circulation of 65,000. The latter publication is not profitable (*The New York Times* Sep. 15, 1985. P.42).

news in these newspapers is extremely biased. Only those items favorable to the paper's political stance will be emphasized, while unfavorable items will simply be ignored or minimized as news.

For example, when Chinese leader Deng Xiao-peng visited the United States on Jan 29, 1979, President Carter gave him a welcoming ceremony in the White House. The following day one Chinese newspaper showed thousands of demonstrators outside the White House to protest Deng Xiao-peng, while another newspaper showed thousands of people outside the White House to welcome him.⁸ As has been typical in the Chinese homeland, Chinese newspapers in overseas communities always serve as an organ of political propaganda, as an instrument for the authorities to teach people rather than to represent the voice of the people. As one critic said, "For the Chinese, a newspaper is mainly a political instrument, a way of gaining influence and power" (*The New York Times* Sep. 15, 1985. P.42).

⁸While Chinese newspapers are strongly biased, it is also true of Chinese television broadcasting. In China, TV viewers did not see the demonstrations outside of the White House, they saw the limousine roll up the driveway, Deng Xiao-peng getting out, and shaking the hands of President and Mrs. Carter. "The leaders walk slowly to the lectern. Nothing seems to have been left out." Oppositely, "In Taiwan, television coverage of Mr. Teng's visit is receiving yet another kind of editing. Reached by phone in Taipei, a journalist reported that last night's news programs showed only the demonstrations against Mr. Teng but not the welcoming ceremony for him and not, even for an instant, Mr. Teng himself" (*The New York Times* January 31, 1979. P.A6).

In addition to winning over the leaders and establishing newspapers, the KMT also sent its people to overseas Chinese communities. Sung describes an early agent, Raymond Eng,

A graduate of Sun Yat Sen University in Kwangtung, China, Raymond was sent to this country in 1937 to work on the *Young China* newspaper [in San Francisco], an official organ of the Kuomintang. His job was to sustain the loyalty of the Chinese in the United States to the Kuomintang or Nationalist Party of China....

Both husband and wife have become American citizens. Yet, on Double-Ten, [Republic of] China's Independence Day, Raymond can deliver an emotion-laden speech about driving the Communists out of "our beloved Motherland." (The habit is hard to break.) (Sung 1967:264-265)

In recent decades, the surveillance activities by the Nationalist government have been well documented (Lyman 1974a:179-183; Chen 1980:214-215; OSDMT 1981). However, it was not until the sentence of Rita Yeh in 1980, the mysterious death of Professor Chen Wen-ch'eng in 1981, and the murder of Henry Liu in 1984, that the KMT's spying activity become apparent to the American public.

The above materials show how Chinese political power penetrated into traditional overseas Chinese communities in recent decades. This penetration has not, however, been limited to traditional Chinatowns. In college towns across the United States, where the Chinese communities consist mainly of students and students-turned-immigrants,

political influence from overseas is also apparent. College-town Chinese are mainly from Taiwan, and the KMT utilizes the same tactics that it used in traditional Chinatowns to maintain its dominance. The Nationalist regime was totally dominant over the college-town Chinese community until the Protecting Tiao Yü T'ai Movement in 1971 and President Nixon's visit to China in 1972.⁹ From then on, the Chinese communities across America were divided into a pro-Nationalist regime group, a pro-Communist regime group, and a smaller, perhaps as small as 20 percent, pro-Taiwan independence group (Lyman 1974a: 179). Very often we hear of them fighting each other on campus, during parades, or in the newspapers.

Because the politicization of college-town Chinese communities is parallel to the division of Chinatowns in recent decades, I argue that the historical background is crucial for a meaningful interpretation of these developments. Without full consideration of the historical background, we have no way of understanding why and how the Springville Chinese community has been divided. In the following section, I give some examples to demonstrate my argument.

⁹Generally speaking, there is a fundamental difference between Taiwan and the PRC in terms of their attitude toward overseas Chinese. Taiwan is more aggressive and watches overseas Chinese closely. On the other hand, the PRC only started to send students to America in 1979.

II. WHY DO CHINESE AVOID LOCAL POLITICS?

In the study of overseas Chinese society, one of the often mentioned questions is why do Chinese avoid participating in local political activities and concern themselves only with home country politics (Clammer 1983: 280; Purcell 1965:94; Sung 1967:278). As FitzGerald observed,

The Chinese abroad took as yet no part and had no interest in politics ... of the colonies in which they lived: but they did take an increasingly active interest in the politics of their motherland. (FitzGerald 1972:159)

Scholars who adopt the "sojourner mentality" theory (Siu 1952, 1987:294-301; Lee 1960:69-85, 326-327; Barth 1964:183-213; Woon 1983) simply argue that Chinese immigrants saw themselves as sojourners. Chinese resist assimilation in a foreign country and remain mentally oriented towards the home country over time. Therefore, they neither expect nor do they desire to become involved in the host country.

On the other hand, according to the adaptation theory, Chinese avoided host country politics because they were maladapted. For example, Lee blames Chinese social organizations, such as family and clan associations, district and benevolent associations, tongs, secret societies, and merchants associations, "hindering the acculturation, assimilation and integration of the Chinese into American society" (Lee 1960:134). Chinatown leaders

are interested in maintaining a segregated Chinese community. These internal undemocratic "governments" caused slow, incomplete acculturation, and maladaptation to the host society.

The historical interpretation provides a different view. From this perspective, there are two reasons for the Chinese to avoid local politics. First, in the previous century, most Chinese emigrants to Southeast Asia and North American countries were illiterate laborers. Second, in this century, political intervention from Chinese governments has severely hampered the unification of the overseas Chinese community. The direct result of this political intervention in the overseas Chinese community is division according to political ideology. As a minority ethnic group in the United States, the Chinese have never been united, although there have been occasions and particular issues that have warranted it.

For example, when Mr. S. B. Woo ran as a candidate for lieutenant governor in Delaware in 1984, he was the first Chinese American in the United States to seek such a high elective position. He toured the Chinese communities in the United States for financial help. The Fukienese Association in New York City endorsed his campaign, since Mr. Woo is Fukienese by descent. However, since the Fukienese Association is well known for its pro-PRC stance, the KMT classified Mr. Woo as a leftist and urged others not to support him (Kwong 1987:113-114). This case

indicates that the Chinese state apparatus, through its use of political ideology, undermines ethnic ties.

The sojourner mentality may be a good model to help explain why Chinese avoided local politics in the previous century, but Chinese immigrants in recent decades are not sojourners. Adaptation theory, on the other hand seems to be only an exercise in Monday-morning quarterbacking. When the adaptation theorists found that Chinese were maladapted, they supplied reasons to explain this. If they saw that Chinese were adapted here, again, they then found a posteriori reasons to explain that phenomenon.¹⁰

III. INTERPRETATIONS

Based on the historical viewpoint, we can begin to review some events mentioned in this study. Why are Chinese so distrustful of each other? Why are students-professionals divided into various politicized groups? Why do different social organizations attack each other? Why do the students-professionals align themselves along lines

¹⁰There are also other interpretations. For example, some authors argue that the lack of interest in local politics was due to the incompatibility between political activism and economic achievement (Purcell 1965:94; Sowell 1983). Sowell elaborated upon this point by saying that for those with less entrepreneurial orientation or experience, civil service or military careers are more attractive. Chinese, however, are a more entrepreneurial oriented group and, therefore, have better options elsewhere and so have no need or desire to go into political, civil service or military careers (Sowell 1983:169).

of political ideology? I think it is now clear that these phenomena are the result of political intervention from the Chinese governments. Three examples will illustrate my interpretations.

1) Flyer wars: in chapters 6 and 7, we saw that the Chinese Student Association and the Taiwanese Association in the Springville area often use newsletters, anonymous letters, and flyers to attack each other. This is very similar to the way in which newspapers are used in Chinatowns. As noted, both Chinese governments treat newspapers as means of ideological control. Chinese newspapers always take sides and attack each other. Since the Springville Chinese population is relatively small and cannot support a newspaper or periodical, Chinese who belong to different political camps use newsletters or flyers to attack each other.

2) Alienation: In the previous chapter, we noted that alienation is the best word to describe the interpersonal relationships among the Chinese in the Springville area. Why are they so distrustful of one another? I believe the primary reason is the existence of the surveillance web. Both Chinese governments send secret informers to this country to watch every Chinese's activities. When a Chinese student comes to this country to study, he or she does not escape from the surveillance network. In order to avoid personal problems, many Chinese students avoid overt political activities. For non-students, unless they still

1. The first part of the document is a list of names and addresses of the members of the committee.

have close relatives in the home country, the risk is less, and these people generally form the core of the political groups.

For most Chinese, politics is full of "dirty tricks." The authoritarian nature of Chinese political rulers has often resulted in brutality against dissidents. Most parents advise their children to stay away from politics. "Do not get involved in politics!" is a very common axiom. As Gold observes, "Taiwan's students were generally apolitical and apathetic, concerned primarily with getting good enough grades to go abroad...." (1986:90). Although the homeland's political development is always an intriguing topic in social gatherings, most Chinese are afraid to speak out. They especially avoid criticizing the Chinese governments. The most obvious reason is the fear that someone is a spy. A Chinese will talk politics only with close friends, never to another Chinese who is a stranger or an ordinary acquaintance.

Alienation is also manifested in the sense of insecurity. In order to reduce their insecurity, the students-professionals need a strong web of friendships to support each other. In a politicized community such as Springville, friendship is thus based on sharing the same political ideologies. Political ideology has also resulted in the students-professionals being alienated from other Chinese as well as being suspicious of one another.

On the other hand, although the economic success of the entrepreneurs-restaurateurs group reduces their insecurity, their pursuit of economic achievement results in entrepreneurs-restaurateurs class becoming alienated from other classes of people. The computer store owner is a good example. Before he started his computer business in 1985, he was the leader of the China Newsletter group, a pro-PRC organization. After he opened the computer store, he stayed away from politics completely and concentrated on increasing profits. In other words, businessmen do not want to be seen allied with a particular group for fear it will hurt their business.

3) Sanmao: Let us return now to the case of the boy Sanmao. The question is why Sanmao did not get help from other Chinese. First, as I stated above, Chinese feel insecure in a foreign land. The side effect of this sense of insecurity is the development of selfishness. Most Chinese, as a result, tend to concentrate on caring only for themselves and their own families. Involvement in Sanmao's case could undermine that concern.

Secondly, the politicization of the Chinese community divides it into various political groups. There is no umbrella organization representing Chinese and, therefore, no single individual to act as the leader of the Chinese community. As laborers, Sanmao's family does not belong to any Chinese social organization. Those who support the Nationalist regime in Taiwan know that Sanmao's family is

from the PRC; therefore, they do not consider them members of their group. Those who claim they are Taiwanese and support the pro-Taiwan Independence Movement, say that Sanmao is Chinese and not a Taiwanese, which automatically excludes him from their group. (As mentioned in Chapter 7, some officials in the Association of Chinese Scholars and Students claim their organization is only for students and scholars. They therefore felt no obligation to help Sanmao.)

Thirdly, traditional Chinese class relationships are operating in the Sanmao case. In the traditional Chinese social structure, scholars were on the top of the social pyramid and they looked down upon other classes of people. In the Springville Chinese community, most residents are professionals (including scholars) and have no contact with laborers. Since Sanmao is from a poor family, they simply have no interest in helping him. Had Sanmao been from a higher class family, it is likely that at least some members of the community would have come to his aid.

Fourth, we know that kinship ties are still used for immigration among Chinese in Springville. Sanmao's family came to Springville through kinship ties. In a Chinese lineage, generation is more important than age; an older man may call a younger person "Uncle" because the generational status is primary. Moreover, one can not address his uncle by name; the proper way to address him is "Uncle." In Sanmao's case, both Sanmao and his father are

one generation older than their restaurateur relatives who sponsored them, and yet nobody respects them, no one calls them "Uncle." When Sanmao had no job, they did not want to hire him. When another Chinese restaurant called to check on Sanmao's references, his kinsmen did not give a positive recommendation. When Sanmao had trouble with the police, neither his kinsmen nor other members of the Chinese communities provided help, nor did they visit him in jail.

Sanmao's case clearly indicates that in a foreign land the lineage tie alone is no longer enough to bring help. Perhaps, this is especially true in this foreign environment when there are few other kinsmen or fellow countrymen to observe such a lack of kin support and apply social pressure. Sanmao's father certainly is not happy about this situation. When Sanmao's father was asked why his eldest brother had filed a petition to have them immigrate to this country, he said, "To sponsor one's kinsmen to immigrate is part of our [T'aisan people] custom. My eldest brother thinks that it is his responsibility to sponsor our immigration. If he did not do it, he might feel he would loose face."

"Then, why don't your kinsmen in the restaurant help you in the Sanmao's case?" I asked. He replied,

Money is more important than kinship relationships in this country. They are too busy making money to help us. On the other hand, we are from the same family, but have had no contact for more than thirty years. We can not expect too much.

Sanmao's kinsmen at the restaurant, of course have different interpretations. After Sanmao and his family moved into a new apartment in the summer of 1987, I called the restaurant to talk to Sanmao's father. A woman answered the phone telling me that Mr. Wan had already left for home. There was an interesting conversation between us:

"I lost Mr. Wan's phone number;" I asked,
 "Can you tell me his number?"
 "I don't know," she said.
 "Can you ask someone who may know in your restaurant?"
 "Nobody here knows his phone number."
 "I heard that you are related to each other but you don't even know his phone number?"
 "It depends how do you look at it. If you look at it from Chinese relationships, we were related to each other. If you look at it from the American angle, we are not."
 "That is a very interesting interpretation. May I ask, are you the manager's wife or sister?"
 "It seems that you know my family pretty well. If you know my family that well you should have a good idea [who I am]."

She refused to tell me who she was, but the most important point here is that she also refused to admit that they are relatives. All of this helps to explain why kinship ties in this case had little bearing on the issue of helping Sanmao in his time of trouble. First, Sanmao's more distant kinsmen who actually operated the restaurant had no interest in helping Sanmao's family immigrate from China to the United States. It was Sanmao's uncle who initiated the idea. Second and more importantly, Sanmao's kinsmen in the restaurant are business people. They

consider Sanmao's family to be just another laboring family, their social inferiors. For example, they have never invited Sanmao's family to have dinner on any holiday. In a previous chapter I mentioned that a Chinese laborer, who works at the same restaurant, sent his child to the hospital and called a Vietnamese friend to keep his child company because if he did not go to work he did not get paid. Although the restaurant owners are Sanmao's kinsmen, they treat Sanmao's family the same way they treat the other kitchen workers.

When Sanmao was arrested in 1986, I went to a university professor for help. This professor is a Cantonese and his son is a Harvard-educated lawyer who practices in Springville. When I asked the professor to ask his son to give Sanmao some advice, he refused. One of the doctors who treated Sanmao, another Cantonese, was the one who sent Sanmao to a mental hospital when he heard neighbors complain that Sanmao was peeping in their windows. Three Cantonese in the area acted as interpreters for Sanmao in court and on other occasions, but later they refused to help him any more because they believed him a hopeless trouble-maker.

Why did native-place relations not supply help despite the fact that many considered much of Sanmao's trouble to be based on harassment by non-Chinese neighbors and the police? As I have presented in this study, the territorial ties have been replaced by ties of political ideology in

this Chinese community. The professionals, in order to reduce their insecurity in the United States, have associated with other Chinese who have the same political ideology. The territorial ties are no longer important to them. In addition, becoming involved in Sanmao's case was not convenient. But I believe that the more fundamental problem is that the Chinese community is divided into various politicized groups. Had the Chinese community in Springville not been divided, the leaders of the community certainly would have taken action to help Sanmao with his legal problems.

IV. SUMMARY

This chapter shows that the politicization of Chinese social institutions in the overseas Chinese communities is a historical legacy. China's weakness caused massive labor immigration in the last century. Mistreatment of the immigrants made them eager to help modernize their motherland so it could be more supportive of its overseas countrymen. However, they were in turn "greeted with suspicion and apprehension by homeland governments which felt compelled to keep their overseas nationals under close surveillance and strict control" (Wang 1987:12). The authoritarian Chinese governments have attempted to achieve such control over their overseas countrymen through the use of newspapers as means of influencing ideology and by sending agents to watch them closely.

In the second half of the chapter, I used three examples to illustrate my historical approach. From these examples, we see that the political intervention from Chinese governments not only results in the overseas Chinese community in Springville becoming divided into various politicized groups, but also causes individual Chinese to be alienated from one another.

Chapter 10: Summary and Conclusions

The overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia and North America have formed territorial associations and clan associations since the last century. This study has emphasized a newer development--highly politicized social organizations. In the Springville area the cleavage between different social organizations is not along ethnic ties but political ones. This study has further stressed that traditional interpretations are not applicable to the Springville Chinese community. I thus proposed my own historical interpretation to better comprehend the origin and persistence of these organizations. This chapter summarizes the findings of this study and compares the study area with other Chinese communities.

I. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

A. POLITICIZED SOCIAL ORGANIZATIONS

In the Springville area, as we saw in earlier chapters, the Chinese are organized into various social organizations. Among them, the Stock Club and Women's Rotating Credit Association are apolitical social organizations. Of the eight other Chinese social organizations in the Springville area, all have at least

1. The first part of the document is a list of the names of the persons who were present at the meeting.

2. The second part of the document is a list of the names of the persons who were absent from the meeting.

3. The third part of the document is a list of the names of the persons who were present at the meeting.

some political concerns, some direct and others only indirect, as follows: (1) Association of Chinese Scholars and Students (ACSS): an organization only for Chinese from the PRC; (2) Chinese Student Association (CSA): KMT's official agency; (3) Three Principles Study Club: the "spare tire" for the CSA; (4) Kuomintang: KMT's Springville branch; (5) Taiwanese Student Association (TSA): pro-Taiwanese Independence Movement, anti-KMT, anti-PRC; (6) China Newsletter and Organization for the Support of Democratic Movement in Taiwan--Springville Branch: anti-KMT, pro-PRC; (7) Chinese Bible Study: "apolitical" organization, leans toward pro-KMT and anti-Taiwanese Independence Movement; (8) Chinese-American Faculty Association (CAFA): "apolitical" organization, anti-Taiwanese Independence Movement.

B. THE DECLINE OF ETHNIC TIES

In both traditional Chinese society and overseas Chinese communities, traditional Chinese territorial organizations were based on ethnic ties. But in the Springville area, among the ten social organizations discussed in this study, not one is based on purely ethnic relationships. Every group, political or apolitical, contains Chinese with different ethnic backgrounds. This study has demonstrated that in the Springville Chinese community ethnic ties no longer serve as an organizational principle.

For example, as we have shown in Chapter 6, although Taiwanese are a majority in the Taiwanese Student Association (TSA) in the Springville area, more Taiwanese students join the relatively larger Chinese Student Association (CSA), an organization primarily composed of mainlander Chinese. If ethnicity or language is a decisive organizational principle as Crissman suggests, most Taiwanese students should join the TSA, not the CSA. However, only a small percentage of Taiwanese students join the TSA in the Springville area.

C. TAIWANESE/CHINESE DICHOTOMY

As we have seen in the previous chapters, politics have always played an important role in the operation of overseas Chinese communities. Splits in the Chinese communities along political lines started with the 1911 revolutionary period, and were followed by further division as a result of the communist revolution. This kind of political cleavage was in addition to and actually intertwined with the traditional cleavages along segmentary kinship lines and territorial-linguistic lines that always existed in overseas Chinese communities (as well as within Chinese cities).

However, the "2-28 Incident" introduced a new political element into the nature of overseas Chinese communities. Now many Taiwanese support the Taiwanese Independence Movement and deny that they are "Chinese,"

insisting they are "Taiwanese." This idea, of not considering themselves as Chinese, is commonly found among Taiwanese in all overseas Chinese communities in Southeast Asia and North America. In other words, the Taiwanese/Chinese dichotomy developed in overseas Chinese communities after the "2-28 Incident." The development of this new distinction, however, depends upon such factors as where and when the community was founded and the size of the community. Therefore, in a college town community such as Springville, this new split of Taiwanese/Chinese becomes a most important additional source of cleavage along with the KMT/PRC split in the community. It becomes particularly significant because the Springville Chinese community is relatively small and the Taiwanese who do not consider themselves to be Chinese comprise a large and important portion of the overall community.

D. A DIVIDED COMMUNITY

As we have seen, the Chinese in the Springville area have never been a unified ethnic group and some of them have gone so far as to deny that they are Chinese. Although from an outsider's point view, members of the Chinese community are all Chinese. The two major antagonistic groups, the Chinese Student Association and the Taiwanese Student Association, operate two Chinese language schools, sponsor different sports nights, publish flyers attacking the other, and host Chinese New Year

parties separately. Never, in any situation, have these politically rival groups sponsored activities together or united to fight against any outside oppression.

To a great extent, the largest single factor that prevents such unity is political ideology. Differences in political ideology have resulted in cleavages and antagonistic social groups. However, in addition to political reasons, there are many people (e.g., entrepreneurs, restaurateurs, laborers, etc.) who have never participated in Chinese social activities. The second generation Chinese also seldom participate in these activities. Many of them disconnect themselves from the Chinese "community" completely. For example, in Sanmao's case, I mentioned a Harvard-educated lawyer who practices in Springville. He has never participated in any Chinese activities, Chinese New Year parties, weddings, funerals, or any other social occasions. Does he belong to this Chinese "community"?

Moreover, there is no one who can be identified as a leader. As mentioned in Chapter 2, in North America's Chinatowns, the president of the Chinese Consolidated Benevolent Association (CCBA, the Six Companies) is often recognized as the unofficial mayor of the Chinatown (Kwong 1987:109; see also Beck 1898:13-14; Nee 1972:228; Kuo 1977:36). This association acts as an umbrella over other groups. In the Springville Chinese community, there is no single individual, or group of individuals, who can be

identified as the leaders of the Chinese community. The *de facto* leaders in the pro-KMT camp are in their 50s. They experienced the Protect Tiao Yü T'ai Movement in the 1970s and are still directly involved in community affairs. In the Taiwanese Association, the leaders are in their 50s and 60s, and they are university professors.¹

Is this, then, an ethnic community? According to *The Social Science Encyclopedia* (Kuper and Kuper 1985:267), an ethnic group is a segment of a population that shares

the combination of (a) common descent (real or supposed), (b) a socially relevant cultural or physical characteristic, and (c) a set of attitudes and behaviours.

On the surface it would appear that the Springville Chinese community, just as other overseas Chinese communities, is an ethnic community. What I have tried to demonstrate in this study is that, despite the surface appearance of being unified ethnic communities, overseas Chinese communities are ridden with cleavages based on their more recently developed politicization. The above observations convey a situation of deep political division in the Springville Chinese community, so deep in fact that I hesitate to call it a Chinese "community."

¹Unlike in traditional Chinese society, age, wealth, and social status are not factors in determining leadership. Rather, it has been the individuals who are willing to devote time and donate money who became leaders.

II. COMPARISONS

Is the politicization of social organizations unique to the Springville Chinese community? Is this historical interpretation only applicable to the Springville college-town Chinese community, or is it also applicable to traditional Chinatowns in Vancouver, Manila, and Kuala Lumpur? In order to answer these questions, I first would like to look beyond Springville to other college-town Chinese communities. Then I will further compare them with the traditional Chinatowns in Southeast Asia and North America.

As mentioned in previous chapters, most Chinese social organizations in the Springville area are not isolated voluntary organizations or interest groups. Many of them have national, or even international, connections. The Chinese Student Association, the Three Principles Study Club, and the KMT are directly linked to the Chicago office of the CCNAA (Coordination Council for North American Affairs). The Association of Chinese Scholars and Students (ACSS) contacts the Chicago consulate of the PRC occasionally. The Taiwanese Association is a local chapter of the Taiwanese Association of America, which consists of 56 local chapters throughout the United States. The headquarters of the Organization for the Support of Democratic Movement in Taiwan (OSDMT) is in Chicago and also has its own national connections. The national connections indicate that the ideological cleavage is not

only a local phenomenon, but prevails throughout the Chinese college-town communities across the United States.

In Chapter 7, it was mentioned that each Taiwanese Association takes turns sponsoring the regional Summer Conference. In the summer of 1988, when the Midwest Taiwanese Summer Conference was held at the local university, I had the opportunity to interview many people from other college towns. I found that the phenomena of politicized social organizations in the Springville Chinese community is common to other American college towns. A professor from Columbus, Ohio, told me about a recent dispute between the Chinese Student Association and the Taiwanese Student Association:

When [the President of Taiwan] Chiang Ching-kuo died in January, 1988, the Chinese Student Association decorated a memorial hall for those who supported the KMT regime in demonstration of their respect. Many of us from the Taiwanese Association went there to protest the memorial ceremony.

Furthermore, I mentioned the KMT's spying activity in the Springville area. This is certainly not a unique problem among Springville Chinese. On all campuses, Chinese students complained about these spying activities. A Congressional testimony revealed that the KMT maintained a spy network across major U.S. colleges (*Time* Aug. 10, 1981. P.19). Some KMT informants admitted that they receive a monthly salary of \$600; others get \$50 or \$100 for each report they submit (*Newsweek* May 17, 1982. P.73).

The above observations suggest that cleavages between different political groups have not only occurred in Springville, but also in other college towns as well. I now shall look beyond the college towns and compare them with the Chinese communities in Southeast Asia and Chinatowns in the United States. In this section, I will use Skinner's *Leadership and Power in the Chinese Community of Thailand* (1958) to show that the politicization of Chinese communities in Bangkok parallels the situation in Springville.

A. BANGKOK CHINESE COMMUNITY

In 1910, the Chinese population in Bangkok was between 200,000 and 300,000. According to Skinner,

By the end of the First World War, Chinese society in Bangkok could legitimately be called a community. It had its own newspapers, read by all regardless of speech group and devoted to the same revolutionary cause.... Above all, it had reputable community leaders who could speak for the Chinese as a whole. (Skinner 1958:13)

In the interwar period, the leadership corps "became increasingly involved in national Chinese politics and increasingly motivated by loyalty to the Chinese government" (ibid.:13-14).

The civil war between the KMT and the Communists in China "was reflected in Thailand during the 1926-28 period, and, with the victory of the Nationalists, the chief community leaders became increasingly identified with the

Kuomintang" (ibid.:14). Since 1948, the continued successes of the Chinese Communist armies in China resulted in the great majority of politically conscious Chinese in Bangkok becoming favorably inclined toward the Chinese communist regime (ibid.:132). "While few of the most influential Chinese leaders were Communist, most could be described as being expectantly pro-Peking and in any case thoroughly disillusioned with the Kuomintang"(ibid.:133).

In 1950, there were seven Chinese language-group associations (Hakka, Hokkien, Cantonese, Hainanese, Chiang-che, Teochiu, Taiwanese) and one registered Chinese political association, Chung-hua Hui-kuan, a front for the Kuomintang in Bangkok (ibid.:23-25). In addition, there were benevolent societies, business associations, and religious societies in the Bangkok Chinese community. Among language-groups, Teochiu and Hakka leaders tended to be "neutralists," while Hainanese and Cantonese leaders tended to be pro-KMT (ibid.:145). However, in 1950, the Thai government consummated an effective alliance with the United States and took a strong stand supporting the KMT regime in Taiwan. These developments made possible a Kuomintang revival in Bangkok.

... openly backed by the Chinese Embassy, favored by several American agencies in the city, and encouraged by Thai government policies, the Kuomintang was able to attract the support of many local Chinese disillusioned with the Communists or unimpressed by their effective power in Thailand. (ibid.:134)

In 1951, the Kuomintang established a newspaper, *Min-chu Jih-pao*. "Its newsprint was supplied by U.S.I.S., and subsidies came from various Chinese Nationalist and American sources" (ibid.:136). On the other hand, two pro-PRC newspapers were increasingly subjected to the government harassment and censorship. By 1953, these two-pro-PRC newspapers were ordered to cease publication (ibid.:135, 287).

The Thai police launched an all-out anti-Communist campaign in 1952. "Between November 10, 1952, and January 24, 1953, some 150 Chinese business firms were raided and over 250 Chinese arrested. A score or more of Chinese community organizations were also subjected to police raids" (ibid.:285). According to Skinner (ibid.:287),

In its campaign the Thai police showed every willingness to co-operate with Kuomintang Chinese. In January 1953 a systematic inquiry was begun among "local Chinese residents loyal to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek" to obtain information about the movements of Chinese Communists.... There was serious official talk of an anti-Communist volunteer corps under police command consisting of ethnic Chinese ... the Thai Minister of Interior did not oppose the participation of local Chinese in a proposed overseas Chinese infantry division in Taiwan.

Such developments occurred not only in Bangkok, but also in other Chinese communities. In Manila, after Japan surrendered [in 1945], "the Chinese in the Philippines were subjected to violent stress and strain as a result of the political struggle of the local Kuomintang and the

communist parties for leadership of the Chinese community" (Tan 1981:102). In Papua New Guinea, the Chinese community divided into pro-KMT and pro-NGCA (New Guinea Chinese Association) groups (Wu 1982:124-125). In Indonesia, Chinese schools divided into pro-Peking schools and pro-Taipei schools (Suryadinata 1978:23). In Semarang, Chinese divided into three groups (Willmont 1960:133):

The partisans of the Nationalist Party of Chiang Kai-shek maintain an active branch of the Kuomintang. The pro-Peking group has organized the Sin You She. Many of the Chinese who profess no tie to either Chinese government, but consider Indonesia as their country, are members of BAPERKI (*Badan Permusjawaratan Kewarganegaraan Indonesia*).

These data suggest, therefore, that the politicization of the Chinese community in Bangkok is parallel to the politicization of the Springville Chinese community.

B. LOS ANGELES CHINATOWN

In this section I present a more recent situation in Los Angeles's Chinatown. This description is based on a newspaper article which appeared in the *Los Angeles Times* July 21, 1985, p.1.

Los Angeles' Chinatown was originally settled by Cantonese. It has absorbed a new influx of immigrants from Taiwan in the last decade--many inspired by fear of an ultimate communist takeover of the island. So many settled in Monterey Park that the city is also called "Little Taipei."

As in Springville, there are Chinese schools in Los Angeles. One, which is run by the Chinese Consolidated Benevolent Association (CCBA, or the Six Companies), the leading pro-KMT organization in Los Angeles' Chinatown, was given a detailed description by the reporter:

Portraits of the Chinese sage ... hung scattered through the building. The textbooks were gifts of the Taiwan government, and flags of that government ... festooned the temple's main hall. ... But books for its roughly 1,000 students are from Taiwan, so it can't be avoided that they have a bit of political content.... They introduce more about things on Taiwan and less about the mainland.... And the lessons taught there represent a small part of the struggle among the Communist government in Peking, the Nationalist government in Taipei and the Taiwanese independence movement for the support of ethnic Chinese in America.

As in Springville, Los Angeles' Chinese churches are places to socialize:

Churches are also centers of Taiwanese life ... The Evangelical Formosan Church ... sticks strictly to religion in the pulpit but is still identified with politics in the minds of many ...

Many people are afraid to come to the Taiwanese church because many members are also active in Taiwanese political organizations....

The situation in the above description parallels that in the Springville area. This Taiwanese church in Los Angeles is leaning toward support of the Taiwanese Independence Movement while the Bible Study group in Springville is leaning toward pro-KMT. Both of these churches have strong political overtones.

It is noteworthy that in Los Angeles "many Taiwanese are afraid to come to the Taiwanese church," a situation again resembling the one I described in the Springville area. As noted in Chapter 1, "these Springville overseas Chinese, although most ... are American citizens and have been in this country for many years, still live under the shadow of the politics of their homelands."

As in Springville, the Chinese community in Los Angeles is divided along political lines.

Immigrants from Taiwan are themselves deeply divided by a split between the native Taiwanese ... and the Mandarin speakers who fled the 1949 Communist victory on the Mainland. Since its retreat from the mainland, the Kuomintang, or KMT, has ruled Taiwan under martial law ... It is illegal in Taiwan to support either communism or Taiwanese Independence.

Against this back ground, ethnic Taiwanese organizations in the United states are centers of support for increased rights for the Taiwanese people, ranging from a greater voice in the current government to outright independence.

The staunchly pro-Nationalist Chinese Consolidated Benevolent Assn., an umbrella group linking 28 family or clan associations, continues to be the leading political institution in Los Angeles' Chinatown. In addition to running the Confucius Temple School, it plays a key role in organizing community activities such as Chinese New Year celebrations.... [the] benevolent association hall displaying flags of the United States and the Republic of China on Taiwan.

On the other hand, pro-PRC associations emerged strongly after President Richard Nixon's historic trip to Peking in 1972.

The greatest show of strength by supporters of Peking so far in Southern California came last August when a banquet held ... to welcome China's Olympic team drew about 1,800 people, the great majority of them ethnic Chinese.

Some Chinese-American organizations--especially those set up to deal with domestic issues such as civil rights, immigration policy or American politics--manage to avoid entanglement in this contest. But it is not always easy. According to the *Los Angeles Times* reporter, "the majority of Chinese would prefer that they not get involved in all these problems ... unfortunately, sometimes they couldn't help it." As a result,

This conflict permeates Chinese community life in Los Angeles, in California and throughout the United States. Many newspapers, bookstores, political associations, language schools, churches, business, television networks, social clubs--even some restaurants--can be classified by where they stand.

"This struggle goes on everyday, in this restaurant, this community, this state, this nation," said Dennis Wong, a pro-Nationalist clan association leader.... "Taiwan wants to keep the loyalty of the overseas Chinese, and the mainland wants to take it away.

According to the news article, the conflict is rooted in the history of the Chinese revolution and in provincial and linguistic distinctions among ethnic Chinese:

Cantonese speakers from South China, for example, have no ancestral roots in Taiwan and little reason to support the Taiwanese independence movement. If they or their relatives have suffered under Communism, they may support the Nationalists in Taipei. But if they visit their

native villages and feel pride in China's accomplishments, they may lean the other way.

Both governments view overseas Chinese as potential sources of investment capital and technical expertise, as well as having some influence over U.S. government policy. Taipei would like to have students and scholars from China now temporarily in the United States return again communism, while Peking seeks support for reunification of Taiwan with the mainland.

The above discussions suggest that overseas Chinese communities such as that in Bangkok and Los Angeles also were affected by the political developments described in this study. Since the KMT is most often established in countries which are adamantly anti-communist, the fear of being labeled pro-communist is often all that is required to keep anti-KMT sentiment very low. In Chapter 4, I mentioned a Chinese professor who had been accused by the KMT of being a communist. This also occurs in the other Chinese communities. For example, during the Korean war and the McCarthy "purge" years, pro-KMT leaders accused anti-KMT Chinese of being communists and informed the FBI and the INS (Nee and Nee 1973:212,216,224; Chen 1980:214).² In New York City, one of the targets was the publisher and editor of the *China Daily News*, Eugene Moy. He was indicted on 53 charges, including accepting advertisements for the Bank of China. After many years of litigation, the U.S. Supreme Court finally sentenced him to one year and fined

²In the 1950s and still today, the INS refuses to grant permanent residency to a communist.

him \$25,000. He publicly declared that the charges were made by the joint force of both the Nationalist regime in Taiwan and the U.S. Government. (For detail, see Lai 1972:16; Tsai 1986:131-132)

The KMT penetration into overseas communities suggests that Chinese communities have divided into various politicized groups. The division of the Chinese community along political lines often results in violence. I described the Chicago Demonstration in Chapter 6 and "Retaliation Action" among Chinese in Springville in Chapter 7. Similar events have taken place in other Chinese communities.³ Pro-KMT and pro-PRC Chinese continue

³For example, in Manila in 1945, the Kuomintang and the Communists each set up headquarters and "assassinated one another" (Tan 1981:102). In San Francisco's Chinatown in 1949, the Chinese Workers Mutual Aid Association held a celebration of its own 12th anniversary and of the establishment of the People's Republic of China. The meeting was interrupted by the pro-KMT secret society hoodlums (Nee and Nee 1973:210-211; see also Lai 1972:15-16). According to a participant:

That night, October 9, the celebration drew a full house.... But during the second speech we heard a shout from the door, then all of a sudden two lines of men ran through the aisles to the speakers' platform, tore down the red [PRC's] flag, knocked over the vases of flowers, and began throwing some kind of blue dye around the audience.... You see, the Kuomintang had had the upper hand in Chinatown since the Second World War. (Nee and Nee 1973:214-215)

On the next day, a pro-KMT group posted a black list which cited ten names on it and "offered a five thousand dollar reward for the death of anyone on the list" (Nee and Nee 1973:211). After they saw the "death list," the pro-PRC Chinese simply moved out of Chinatown quietly. Pro-KMT groups seem to have authority to teach "dissidents" a

to attack each other. In New York City's Chinatown (*The New York Times* January 2, 1979):

Two parades, one celebrating and the other denouncing the Carter administration's switch of diplomatic relations from Taiwan to Peking, twisted through [New York] Chinatown yesterday, separated by two hours, 600 police officers....

About 1,500 supporters of the Peking Government started through the streets at 1:30 P.M.... Five thousand supporters of the Taiwan Government [gathered] in front of the Chinese Consolidated Benevolent Association--the unofficial City Hall, which was flying a Taiwanese Government flag....

In the last week, the police had prepared for trouble, assigning helicopters, the mounted unit and 600 officers to the line of march. Organizers for both sides, represented by young Taiwanese students and conservative Chinatown businessmen, accused the others of hiring the fanatical pupils of kung-fu academy masters to intimidate the other parade....

These scattered reports from various settings suggest that the politicization of overseas Chinese communities is neither new nor unique to the Chinese community in Springville, Los Angeles, or Bangkok.

III. CONCLUSION OF THE STUDY

The focus of this study has been politicization and its effects on a Chinese college-town community and its

lesson without legal accusation and punishment. Also, surprisingly, the victims of political oppression did not complain.

social organization. Unlike older, much larger overseas Chinese communities in Southeast Asia and North America, the college-town community study area was formed only in recent decades by an extremely small Chinese population composed, primarily, of professionals, students, and business people.

From its beginnings in the 1950s, its population never developed any truly effective segmentary organizations based on territorial, language, or kinship lines. Again, this is very unlike what existed in the larger and older overseas Chinese communities. In one sense, however, given that most of the early members of the community were initially from the province of Taiwan, the study area did have some basis for segmentary organizational development, i.e., the features of common territory and language. As we have seen, however, those from Taiwan were either Taiwanese or Mainlanders and, thus, unable to form a single organization because of earlier and continuing political differences such as the "2-28 Incident." Even the two distinctive groups, Taiwanese and Mainlanders, have found it difficult to organize truly effective independent segmentary organizations, again, because of the highly divisive political issues such as differences concerning Taiwanese independence and a growing interest in the PRC vs. the KMT government by many of the community's members. In addition, as we have seen throughout the study, the community's members' constant fears of secret surveillance

by fellow community members frequently held activities of segmentary-type organizations to a minimum.

As a consequence of political developments in the Chinese homeland, I have shown how the Chinese living in the study area community have been so politicized or, in many cases, politically immobilized, that not even the most pressing ethnic issues can produce a unified response from the entire community. This is despite the community's appearance to outsiders of being a unified ethnic and even "clannish" community.

If we consider the differences between this small study area community and most large overseas Chinese communities, we might ask how this micro study can be of any general value toward bettering our understanding of the dynamics of overseas Chinese communities.

As we have already seen in the literature cited earlier in this study, traditional overseas Chinese communities were highly organized into segmentary groups along the lines of territory and language. Nevertheless, when necessary, they generally were able to coalesce and produce some kind of unified Chinese ethnic response to the outside world. This was normally accomplished through the accepted and/or imposed leadership, such as that of the "Kapitans" of Southeast Asian Chinese communities or "Six Companies" leaders of North American Chinatown communities. It appears, then, that in the earlier days, at least before the early 1950s, politics had not yet taken its more recent

toll on the ethnic unity of such overseas Chinese communities.

But as also cited in this study, particularly earlier in this chapter, we have seen that, since the early to mid-1900s, most large and important overseas Chinese communities were being affected by political developments in the Chinese homeland, including the civil war between the KMT and Communists, the demands for loyalty by the two Chinese governments created by the Nationalist-PRC split in 1949, and the many political problems between Mainlander Chinese and Taiwanese, both within and outside Taiwan since the 1950s. Nevertheless, only minor attention has been paid to just how important those political developments have been in politicizing large overseas Chinese populations and the effects on the very nature of their communities.

On the basis of my findings and insights from this study, I therefore suggest the need for additional research on the larger overseas Chinese communities, but with a new emphasis. As demonstrated in the previous chapter, adaptation theory, sojourner mentality, and segmentation structure all have merits in explaining the genesis of overseas Chinese social organizations. These theories, however, offer no help in explaining social and political changes. Having here examined and presented the extreme effects of politicization in a college town Chinese community, I believe there is a need for a more thorough

examination of the effects of politicization in North America's Chinatowns. But that examination should, I believe, use a more historically-oriented approach to analysis the nature and significance of politicization in overseas Chinese communities, particularly over the past four or so decades since the PRC-Taiwan split. Such studies will surely provide a valuable method for determining whether such politically-based cleavages as I have found in this study area are also to be found in Chinatowns such as those in New York or San Francisco.

More specifically, on the basis of insights from my own research on the effects of politicization in the study community, I suggest the need for detailed studies that focus on the effects of politicization in large overseas Chinese communities to consider some of the following questions. Under what conditions and to what extent does politicization become a decisive force? Does it cause cleavages in traditional language and territorial segmentary organizations? Under what conditions does it interfere with the community's ability to unify and respond to the needs and challenges faced by minority ethnic communities. This is a problem which faces the community in this study. I believe such a research focus can better our understanding of the dynamics of overseas Chinese communities and, by doing so, better our understanding of ethnicity in general.

GLOSSARY

ABC		American-born Chinese
ABT		American-born Taiwanese
<i>chia</i>	家	Family
<i>huikuan</i>	會館	Association-halls. It was called "company" during the 19th century in North America.
<i>chüjên</i>	舉人	Holder of the provincial examination degree
<i>hu</i>	戶	Household
<i>kanch'ing</i>	感情	Affect, sentiment
<i>kuanhsi</i>	關係	Particularistic connections
KMT		Kuomintang, the Nationalist Party.
<i>kung fei</i>	共匪	Communist bandits
<i>mao ch'ung</i>	毛蟲	Maoist worms; Leftists.
<i>mao tsei</i>	毛賊	Maoist bandits; Leftists.
<i>piaohui</i>	搖會	Rotating credit association
<i>tang-wai</i>	堂外	Outside the [KMT] party, non-KMT
<i>ti erh tai</i>	第二代	Second Generation
<i>tso p'ai</i>	左派	Leftists
<i>t'ung hsiang</i>	同鄉	From same native place or speak same language. <i>t'ung hsiang</i> ties are pretty flexible, ranging from subcounty townships-cum-marketing communities up to conventional groupings of provinces (cf. Skinner 1977:541-542).
<i>t'ung hsiang hui</i>	同鄉會	Territorial associations

<i>t'ung p'ai</i>	統一派	Unification faction
<i>tsung ch'in hui</i>	宗親會	Clan associations

APPENDICES

APPENDIX A: Mr. Chien: A "Stranded Student"

Mr. Chien was born in a wealthy banker family in Shanghai, China in 1928. He and his wife came to the United States in 1948. After receiving his master degree in finance, from University of Detroit, he entered MSU to study economics.

In 1949, when the Communists took over control of China, he became a "stranded student." In his unpublished memoirs, he states that his father wrote him saying that, "We are not able to send you any more financial assistance. You will have to be on your own" (Chien 1964:11). Being from a rich family, and never having to provide for himself, he found for the first time in his life, a need to find work to support his family. He says, "This type of feeling is very unusual. Maybe my dependence on my family was more than ordinary according to the American students. For an individual of twenty-one years I had never earned a dime or even a penny on my own. Now suddenly I have the responsibility of supporting my wife and son in a foreign country without adequate knowledge and skill" (ibid.).

In December 1950, Mr. Chien's one-year-old son died because of illness. Mr. Chien was too poor to send him to a hospital. He says, "I was only making \$120.00 a month

1. The first part of the document is a letter from the President of the United States to the Congress, dated January 3, 1862. It is a very important document, as it contains the President's message to the Congress, and is one of the most important documents in the history of the United States. It is a very long letter, and it contains a great deal of information about the state of the Union at that time. It is a very important document, and it is one of the most important documents in the history of the United States.

2. The second part of the document is a letter from the President of the United States to the Congress, dated January 3, 1862. It is a very important document, as it contains the President's message to the Congress, and is one of the most important documents in the history of the United States. It is a very long letter, and it contains a great deal of information about the state of the Union at that time. It is a very important document, and it is one of the most important documents in the history of the United States.

and had \$35.00 in the bank" (ibid.:14). He was not even able to afford a grave marker for the child until two years later. "Finally we saved enough money in 1952 to purchase a marker and engraved his name on it. My wife and I still visit there every couple of weeks. This is all I can do to pay for a memory I am never able to escape" (ibid.:16).

In 1954, Mr. Chien took a job with the J. A. Dart Construction Company of Mason as an accountant. The owner of the company, James A. Dart, was also the director of Dart National Bank in Mason, which was owned by his family (*The State Journal* Mar. 23, 1961. p.18). After a couple of years, the inability to keep up with continuous expansion and other problems, the construction company had difficulty balancing the books, but because of the family connection, the Dart National Bank was always able to cover his overdrafts.

In 1958, Chien started his own accounting company called American Management. He wanted to resign from the construction firm, but he was promoted to Mr. Dart's Construction's financial consultant. When the construction company's check-kiting resulted in an overdraft of about \$500,000, Mr. Chien was worried about the future and considered quitting the job. He says, "However, my employer always said you can not leave me now. We need only one or two good jobs to pull us out to a good start and I will never forget all you have done for me. I also had bad dreams in my mind about starvation and the loss of

my child due to poverty and the difficulties of securing a position by a minority group and a sense of decency to stay with the employer who needs you so badly" (Chien 1964:27-28). He thus stayed with the job.

Mr. Dart's check-kiting problem also involved the Bank of Springville and Michigan National Bank. An officer of the Michigan National Bank noticed the overdraft and reported it to the FBI. According to the FBI, at one point checks had been fraudulently drawn on the firm's account for more than \$1.5 million. After five months of an FBI probe, on March 1, 1961, Mr. Chien and Mr. Dart were arrested and immediately taken to the United States Commissioner (*Detroit Free Press & The State Journal* March 2, 1961. p.1). Mr. Chen was charged on six counts of misapplying bank funds and 11 counts of conspiracy to misapply the funds in an alleged check-kiting scheme (*The State Journal* Sept. 6, 1961 p.1). Had he been found guilty he would have served up to 5 years in prison and fined \$5,000 for each count.

Mr. Chien refused to plead guilty, and he wrote to the Indian embassy in Washington to arrange to have his wife and children sent back to China to stay with his father. He said, "I would not let my family live on welfare here and there was no one here could have cared for them" (*The*

State Journal Sept.15, 1961 p.1).¹

The trial opened on Sept. 6, 1961 and lasted for nine days. The jurors found him not guilty for the reason that he did everything under Mr. Dart's instruction and that he did not benefit from the check-kiting conspiracy. As a result of this court case, however, Mr. Chien said that it was becoming difficult to continue his own accounting company (*The State Journal* Aug. 17, 1961,p.1). In addition, the Immigration Office delayed his application for naturalization, but he did gain U.S. citizenship in 1962.

After he gained U.S. citizenship, he immediately ran for the Republican nomination for State Senate, a nomination which he lost. Mr. Chien moved to Midland and taught finance at the Northwood Institute beginning in 1965. He also started a local newspaper, *Valley Journal*;

¹This confirms the general impression that Chinese are "too proud to ask for help" (Bunnell 1974:10). "Few are on welfare rolls--exceptions being mainly some recent refugees. They [Chinese] tend to aid each other rather than rely on social services." (Knoll 1982:38) In Detroit Chinatown, some poor old Chinese live in ghettos and refused Federal government's help. A social worker says,

"The Chinese people think it's charity and won't take it. I can't even convince the old-timers around here to collect Social Security for for the same reason. This is a bad problem in Chinatown. Many of the old people live alone and sometimes die in their apartments without anyone knowing. They'd rather try and get by on their own" (Bunnell 1974: 10).

however, his name disappears from the *Midland City Directory* as of 1975.²

²On Oct. 26, 1987, I received a mystery call from a stranger, who identified himself by saying "Mr. Chien is my uncle." The caller asked why Mr. Chien was sought, and after my explanation, he revealed that Mr. Chien was now "traveling in the East" but was reluctant to specify his exact location.

APPENDIX B: Professor Ning, A Life Story

I was born in 1906 in Hunan [province], China. My great-grandfather died young; when he died, my grandfather only eight years old. Unable to support himself, my grandfather roamed around as a beggar for two years until he became a guide for a blind fortuneteller. After a couple years, my grandfather himself became an itinerant fortuneteller. After a while, he opened a small shop in a small village near Ch'angsha, the capital of Hunan Province.

My father was a *hsiuts'ai* (holder of the county-level examination degree). When he studied at Liang-hu Shuyuan [Academy of Hunan and Hupei], he became a close friend of Huang Hsing [1847-1916], co-founder of the Republic of China. They advocated revolutionary thought in the Hunan area. I remember when I was five or six years old, my father brought me with him; we stood on the stage and listened to Mr. Huang speak to the public. After the speech, someone brought in a chicken, cut off its head, drew blood into a bowl, and everybody had a sip of chicken blood. It is a common practice swearing brotherhood and secrecy.

In 1918, I passed the entrance examination to study at Ch'ing Hua Academy, which was established by the Boxer Indemnity Fund. In the following year, we joined the famous May Fourth Movement. Actually I was only thirteen, I just joined my classmates to participate in the demonstrations and did not know much about the Movement and its implications.

I spent eight years at Ch'ing Hua Academy. In the summer of 1924, my classmates and I went to Yent'ai [a seaport in Shantung province] for a vacation. One evening when I came back from the beach by myself, three Japanese naval sailors stopped me, beat me, and threw me into a ditch. I could not climb out and stayed in the ditch overnight. From then on I hated Japanese and swore to learn military affairs to fight the Japanese.

When I graduated from Ch'ing Hua Academy in 1926, I wanted to go to the U.S. Military Academy at West Point. However, for some diplomatic reasons, they assigned me to study history at the University of Wisconsin. I transferred to Norwich University in Vermont in 1927 and graduated in 1928. When I was ready to go home, the Chinese government informed me that I could study at West Point. I spent four years there, from 1928 to 1932. After graduation, I went back to China and served in the Army as a first lieutenant. In 1945, when the Japanese were defeated, I was a brigadier general and was one of the Chinese delegates who participated in the formal ceremonies

of the Japanese surrender aboard the USS Missouri in Tokyo Bay.


I was discharged from the Army in 1965, and served as Dean of General Affairs at Soochou [Tung Wu] University in Taipei. I retired in 1975, and immigrated to this country in 1976. Why did I come to Springville? Because my son is here; he teaches Mathematics. It is an ironic family migration. In 1949, I led my family from China to Taiwan. Now I am old and my son grew up and settled down in this country; he led my wife and me in a move to this country.

My wife and I did not have any adjustment problems. We know English and we know how to drive so we purchased a small house and did not need to live with our son. I am writing my memoirs now and my wife teaches Chinese painting at home. We have enjoyed living in Springville very much.

Appendix C: Sanmao's Family History

Sanmao came from a typical Cantonese immigration family. His grandfather, Gumsam Wan was born in T'aisan in 1874. After he married and had three children, Gumsam came to the United States in his early twenties. He worked in Chinese restaurants for about fifteen years, his wife died in 1915, he went back to China, stayed for a brief period time, and brought his eldest son, Ahim, back to this country with him. The father and the son worked together in a Chinese restaurant in Chicago Chinatown until Gumsam went back again in 1920. This time he purchased land, built new houses, married another woman, and settled permanently in Canton. His second marriage produced two boys, Puilam was born in 1924 and Puitsun in 1926 (see Figure A-1).

When Ahim came to this country with his father in 1915, he had already married, leaving his wife and little boy, Shiman, at home. Ahim is now 93 years old and lives with his second wife and two unmarried granddaughters in Chicago today. Shiman married and had 6 children. They came to United States in 1951 and lived in Chicago's Chinatown with Ahim. Shiman's eldest son, Robert, graduated from the local university's Electric Engineering department with a doctoral degree in 1973. He could not find a satisfactory



In the early 1980s, Ahim filed a petition to the US Immigration Office to gain permission for his two stepbrothers, Puilam and Puitsun, and their family's to immigrate to the United States. Legally, Ahim is the only one legitimately able to file for the petition, but he was too old to perform the task by himself. Consequently, Ahim asked his child and grandchildren at Oriental House for assistance to sponsor the immigration. They paid air fare and the lawyer's fee first. Both Puilum's and Puitsun's family came to Springville in 1985. Puilum and his family moved to San Francisco Chinatown in 1987.

APPENDIX D: The Death of Dr. Chen

Dr. Chen was born in Taiwan in 1950 and received his B.S. degree in mathematics from the National Taiwan University in 1972. He received his doctoral degree in statistics from University of Michigan in 1978. His adviser, Professor Bruce Hill at University of Michigan, said, "He was an outstanding student--the best that I have seen in statistics in 21 years." When Dr. Chen was a graduate student at the University of Michigan, he was a very active participant in the Ann Arbor Taiwanese Student Association. After graduation, he joined the faculty of Carnegie-Mellon University.

On May 20, 1981, Dr. Chen, with his wife and son, returned to Taiwan to visit his parents and celebrate his son's first birthday. The trip was his first to Taiwan since he had come to the United States six years before. They planned to return to the United States on July 1. However, they were not granted permission to leave the country. On July 2, the Taiwan Garrison General Command picked up Dr. Chen at 8:30 in the morning for interrogation regarding his political activities in the United States.

He never returned home. The next morning, his body was found on the campus of National Taiwan University.

The KMT authority claimed that they released Dr. Chen after 13 hours of interrogation at 9:30 p.m. and that Dr. Chen probably committed suicide. The President of Carnegie-Mellon University, Richard M. Cyert, theorized that Dr. Chen may have been killed because his political view (For details, see *The New York Times*, July 21, Aug. 27, 1981; *Pittsburgh Post-Gazette* July 8,9,10, 1981; *Newsweek* Aug 3, 1981,p.45). In an article published in the *New York Times*, the President of Carnegie-Mellon University speaks against the KMT agents activities:

Dr. Chen's death is unusual enough to suggest that there may be agents of Taiwan in the United States watching Taiwanese here and reporting to the Kuomintang.... As an example, after the memorial service for Dr. Chen, a student, identified as a Kuomintang supporter, took pictures of the mourners. These mourners were hooded because of their fear of Government retribution against them or relatives in Taiwan.

We have evidence that at social and political gatherings of Taiwanese students in Pittsburgh, there are two or three people who act as informants (*The New York Times* Aug. 27, 1981. P.31).

APPENDIX E: Taiwanese Benevolent Association of America

Taiwanese students started to come to the United States in the 1950s. In the early 1960s, Taiwanese students on various campuses across the United States started to organize *Taiwan t'ung hsiang hui* (Taiwanese Associations). As of 1988, there are 56 Taiwanese Associations across the United States.

The 56 Taiwanese Associations in the United States lean towards the pro-Taiwanese Independence Movement. Those Taiwanese who do support the KMT government do not feel comfortable participating in these organizations. In 1976, pro-KMT Taiwanese started to organize their own territorial association--*T'ai wan t'ung hsiang lien yi hui* (The Taiwanese Benevolent Association of America). As of 1988, there are 12 branches in the United States and 11 branches in other countries (*Central Daily News* Aug. 12, 1988, p. 8).

The Taiwanese Benevolent Association of America is an organization sympathetic to the KMT government (Tsai 1986: 177). Its activities always appear in the *Central Daily News*, a Kuomintang-owned newspaper. When the Taiwanese Benevolent Association of America held its 11th annual meeting in Houston on August 12, 1988, several KMT officials came from Taiwan to attend the meeting, and

President Lee of Taiwan sent a congratulatory telegram (*Central Daily News*, Aug. 12, 1988, p.8).

One of the founders of the Taiwanese Benevolent Association, Dr. Tzu-min Kao, is a Taiwanese but well known for his strong support of the KMT regime among overseas Chinese. In 1985, he sued the *Taiwan Tribune*,³ a pro-Taiwanese Independence Movement newspaper, charging that the newspaper called him "four legs." He demanded \$4.15 million for defamation of character.

The *Taiwan Tribune* argued that "four legs" was a colloquialism used by Taiwanese since the Japanese period [1895-1945] to refer to a collaborator or supporter of the foreign ruler. Although Dr. Kao denied that he has any connection with the KMT government, the *Taiwan Tribune* pointed out that Dr. Kao is a member of the Overseas Chinese Affairs Commission of the KMT government, one of the founders of the Taiwan Benevolent Association of America, and the chief editorial writer for the U.S.-based, pro-KMT magazine, *China Times Weekly*.

The *Taiwan Tribune's* lawyer, former Attorney General Ramsey Clark, says that the Kao case "was clearly an effort to silence a voice, an exile voice in the United States

³Of the more than fifty Chinese language publications published in America, only the *Taiwan Tribune* and the Los Angeles-based *Formosa Weekly* support the Taiwan Independent Movement, which calls for majority rule. The other publications favor either the PRC or the KMT (Lum 1985: 305).

that is speaking out against the government in its homeland" (Lum 1985:305). On April 19, 1985, a federal jury rejected Dr. Kao's claim that *Taiwan Tribune* had libeled him (*The Washington Post* April 20, 1985. P.A10).

Professor Ho once said, "It is generally recognized that next to family and kinship common geographic origin provided a most important basis for voluntary association in traditional China" (Ho 1966:1). This is apparently not the case now. The above story clearly indicates that, among Taiwanese territorial organizations, political ideology overrides ethnic ties. The reporter of the *Washington Post* correctly points out, "The lawsuit ... highlights the struggle between factions in the Taiwanese-speaking communities of this country--divided between those who support and those who criticize their homeland's government" (*The Washington Post* April 18, 1985. P.A14).

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1. The first part of the document is a list of the names of the persons who have been appointed to the various offices of the city of New York.

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