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I.¢:‘:'I'I'I"I"-_ I I I, I; ( rIv/II-vt V3,:I:-I r rvp where rvp is the conclusion following the premises 1) and 2) and the truth value of r v p is dependent on r alone and not on p, but it is also true that r v p is an ethical conclusion on account of p alone and not on r. cuearly, q and r are factual statements, which, according to the absolutist view, cannot entail an ethical conclusion. In the above deduction 1) and 2) are non-ethical premises from which an ethical conclusion has been deduced, showing that ethical statements could sometimes depend on non-ethical statements.7 It might be argued that Brunner's argument exposes the weakness of the absolutist View, rather than the non- absolutist view. Is the non-absolutist View immune from this weakness? Throughout the discussion, I have been treating the absolutist and non-absolutist as if they were separate and 80 different views, but I have also pointed out that the non— absolutist View is a modified version of the absolutist view. Brunner would probably pursue this line of thought. When I say: "I ought to be courageous," I could arrive at making this judgment from the following considerations: 1) I would study a particular event, say, a thief breaks into my house and threatens the lives of my family. I would obstruct him by having courage in order to be able to act in self-defense; 2) Under ordinary circumstances ( no dilemmas involved) I know I ought to be courageous when an event such as 1) takes place. For the absolutist, l) and 2) comprise a rule that should guide my action, whereas, for the non-absolutist, 1) and 2) comprise a set of circumstances. "Do they really differ as much as we thought?" Brunner would ask. It is true that the non—absolutist tends to solve the Kantian dilemma, but is this not another way of saying we should make special rules to overcome such dilemmas? If this final form of Brunner's interpreting the non-absolutist View is correct, his earlier criticisms of the absolutist view will equally apply here. In effect, we cannot assume statement 6) above to justify 5) or to reject 3) and 4). In short, Brunner would claim that the views of moral autonomy assumed to destroy his argument for divine-based morality are not tenable. However, there is another view of morality autonomy that could be used to weaken Brunner's position. It is a view that is mostly supported by Kurtz and 81 many human nature ethicists. Accordingly, critical reflection plays a prominent role in this View. Moral Autonomy and Critical Reflection This is the view that, in ethics, the moral agent is the originator of a moral principle or action. This view is alluded to by Kant in his famous "categorical imperative" doctrine: "Act according to a maxim by which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law,"8 but the view finds the clearest expression in Spinoza. In Ethics, Spinoza is opposed to the Cartesian notion of freedom and instead maintains that a virtuous person is one who acts under the control of reason.‘9 This person is not impervious to external influences, but would decide whether or not those influences would enter into his moral life, since he exercises the power of reason. Further exploration of this notion might show Brunner's weakness. Kant's attempt to explicate it faced difficulties, however, as shown earlier. This could be due to his failure to appreciate Spinoza's position. According to the human nature view, autonomy is a process in human growth resulting in a developed sense of critical reflection at various stages. Whereas an autonomous person is one who is in charge of his life, hence lives according to the laws he gives himself, he is, however, not entirely detached from external influences, or his decisions are not immune to revision. He determines 82 whether these influences transmit new information that he believes would be relevant in his moral decisions. This is true for example, of someone who changes his moral decision on the issue of abortion as a result of acquiring scientific information about the status of the fetus. An autonomous person has innovative and creative ability so that he critically reflects on whether he should be guided by whatever standards or principles, whether his own or external, as seen through the end of his nature alone. Haworth reveals that critical reflection comes into play when a moral agent has to make decisions when confronted with an actual problem by invoking a problem space, consisting of background beliefs and knowledge that have a bearing on the problem in question--which involves a long history of decision-making process files of decision maps (an antecedently held view concerning an appropriate technique of dealing with the problem). An appropriate decision is reached by confirming or disconfirming that the map guided him adequately, invoking it when faced with the same problem. Gaps in it may lead to information search and may result in redrawing the map. The individual has acquired his own rules that guide information processing and direct information searches to ensure enlightened and procedural competence. Fred's case in the next chapter will illustrate this. It is noteworthy that a person who has critical reflection is not one who is completely insulated from external influences that 83 would have a bearing in executing an enlightened moral duty.10 But if this view of moral autonomy is to be accepted by Brunner's critics, then there are certain repercussions. For a person could be given religious teachings about a supernatural God, but the decision to appropriate religious beliefs in a moral duty rests solely on the autonomy moral agent. To insist that such teachings should not be given would be contrary to the notion of moral autonomy explicated here. In effect, this view does not weaken Brunner, but it instead shows that an autonomous moral agent could incorporate God into morality. That morality is autonomous is indisputable in Brunner's view: "The feeling for what is humane and inhumane, for that which furthers and that which destroys life, for that which is fair and that which is unfair, can (and should) always be presupposed in every 'fellow-citizen' without inquiring into the question of his religious faith." But he also claims that, in matters of morality, a believer sees better than a non—believer and is "more resolute ix: working for 'the introduction of the better order." "But can he only discover what this better order is, not as believer, but as a member of his nation, along with his fellow-countrymen, by the use of reason." Clearly, Brunner believes that morality is autonomous. He also claims that both the believer and the unbeliever could achieve virtue.ll At the same time, he 84 turns around and asserts that a believer has an advantage over the believer on matters of executing a moral duty. There is one possibility of elucidating this point. In Chapter 5, it was pointed out that a believer renders caring services, even when an appropriate emotion for that service is lacking. The unbeliever, on the other hand, is incapable of performing the same services when he does not have an appropriate emotion. Functionalists have, however, dismissed this explanation and have instead given their own versions. Let me explore briefly two of these alternatives. Has a Wider Scope Skinner has conducted a laboratory pigeon experiment in order to establish the relationship between a moral life and religion, basing his evidence on such an experiment. According to Skinner, a believer, like a non-believer, is basically one who has a concern for his survival, as well as that of others. He accordingly makes rules that prescribe toward this end and then carries them over into the religious sphere. Behaviors are classified as moral or immoral, virtuous or sinful, according to these rules. Skinner thinks that such terms as "heaven" and "hell" fall into this context. "Hell is made contingent upon sinful behavior, while virtuous behavior brings a promise of Heaven." A virtuous behavior is the result of a conditioning process the believer goes through in "ritualistic techniques."12 85 "Relevant environmental conditions are manipulated when the stimuli which elicit or set the occasion for sinful behavior are weakened or removed and when the stimuli which elicit or serve as the occasion for virtuous behavior are pointed up."13 In Skinner's View, this kind of control is likely to coincide with those of the group as a whole. "It works in concert with ethical control in suppressing selfishness primarily reinforced behavior and in strengthening behavior which works to the advantage of others."14 But he further points out that the religious agency maintains its practices according to more enduring criteria of virtuous and sinful behavior, implying that the religious conscious speaks louder than the ethical. Although this functionalist view of religion which Skinner presents here suffers from eliminating inner states, such as religious beliefs, from publicly observed behavior, his account nonetheless could illuminate how a moral life is dependent on religion. It is especially in the ritual that this takes place, Skinner points out. He would thus see Brunner's doctrine of eternal life as a case in point. Thus, a believer is one who envisions a divine judgment in which those who have accepted God's gift of grace achieve eternal life and those who do not are punished. It is in anticipation of a reward or punishment that the believer is motivated to be of service to those in need without necessarily having an appropriate emotion, for such services. Skinner's study shows that Brunner's notion of 86 agape is somewhat illusory. The believer does have certain emotional states which could be described as fear of future punishment, hope of eternal rewards. It is these states that lead to the execution of a virtuous action. But the study also shows that the unbeliever lacks these states. So, he cannot act virtuously unless he has another emotion such as compassion. At any rate, Skinner's study confirms Brunner's claim: the believer promotes the preservation of others even when he is lacking an appropriate emotional state (like compassion). He thus surpasses the unbeliever in this respect. The last section shows that, in a ritual process of a religious experience, beliefs in supernatural rules about moral behavior are not only reinforced but the tastes and attitudes towards these rules are conditioned in such a way that conformity to the rules is achieved, regardless of whether such beliefs are true or false. I would now like to discuss another aspect of the relationship between a moral life and religion. As will become clear later, Durkheim reduces the moral to religion, which he, in turn, reduces to society. In the opinion of many, he observes that people who have similar religious beliefs tend to be united through the commonalities of those beliefs. This may lead to the formation of a community of persons whose social bonds are the basis for moral expression. Morality is thus not only individual, but it is 87 also social—-a moral life is infiltrated by social interactions. People who happen to share the same beliefs could form a community that provides a setting for emotional states that lead to services of caring for others. It has already been pointed out that these states do not have to be appropriate. For example, believers do not have to be compassionate in order to offer humanitarian services. All they need is to fear future punishment, or anticipate some eternal reward, in order to be caring. It is this kind of emotion that a social setting helps to form--first, by maintaining a system of beliefs about eternal life and judgment, followed by emotional states aroused in respect to these beliefs. Despite the tenability of Brunner's claim thus far, he faces the formidable problem of countering the charge that agape is irrational. His response will be considered in the next chapter. CHAPTER 7 AGAPE IS IRRATIONAL So far, it seems that arguments from moral autonomy do not seriously undermine Brunner's divine—based morality. This morality may still be jeopardized on other grounds. For instance, the claim that agape in his approach to moral life is irrational.1 Brunner would easily meet this charge by arguing that agape is exclusively accessible to those who have faith, implying that it is immune to scientific inquiry, implying that it cannot be determined whether it is rational or irrational. For the believer, however, it is super- rational,2 not irrational. To argue his point, he would present the phenomenological perspective of agape and then show how functionalist attempts to penetrate it fail. The key figures he could use from the phenomenological tradition are Eliade and Otto. Eliade and Otto Eliade, for instance, distinguishes between the sacred and the profane spaces inhabited by supernatural and ordinary beings respectively. The sacred space is non—homogenous and consists of interruptions. The sacred time is non- homogeneous and non—historical. It is "eternal present." On 88 89 the other hand, the profane space is homogeneous and neutral, whereas the profane time is historical. As Eliade points out, however, there is no pure profane experience.3 It is within the experience of the sacred that religion is conceptualized. Thus, the eruption of sickness, death, and extraordinary phenomena are all treated as non-homogenous and, therefore, belong to the sacred realm, in the sense that their causation and control are beyond the visible world (the profane realm). This invisible world is the holy and the superior, requiring specialized, supernatural methods of approaching it. It is the supernatural beings in the sacred space and time who are accounted for in the non-homogeneity, interruptions and breaks that are experienced in the profane life. For this reason, these beings come to occupy the core position in religion. Brunner would, however, find Eliade's neat description rather unsatisfactory for two reasons: first, Eliade admits that a religious person desires "to live in the sacred,"4 the realm of interruptions and breaks. On the contrary, no religious man desires to live in such an abode unless, by interruptions and breaks, he means peace and tranquility. Second, not every interruption or break is the result of the sacred. For instance, acts like tribal feuds originate in the profane realm, not in the sacred realm, yet they are interruptions and breaks of the social realm, yet they are interruptions and breaks of the social order. As a result of these difficulties, Brunner would need to be 9O cautious in adopting Eliade's insight in order to ward off his critics. Otto's exposition of the idea of the holy might prove resourceful in lending support to Brunner's position. For Otto, religion consists of rational and non-rational aspects of human experience of the holy. He calls the non- rational element the numinous. The numinous is non-rational, non-ordinary, standing beyond the sphere of the usual, intelligible and the familiar. It is both frightening and attractive, inspiring feelings of fascination, wonder, and dependency. This "creature feeling" does not indicate that numinous is merely a subjective experience, but it is something that "belongs to an absolutely different"5 scheme of reality from our own, that is to say, it is objective and outside self. A common criticism that has been levelled against the structure of Otto's religious view is that not all religions whose objects of worship are supernatural. The Australian Aborigines, for example, are said to express their religious experiences exclusively toward concrete objects. Otto is, however, conducting his study within Judeo-Christian traditions. So this criticism does not have weight. Following Kant, Otto thinks that the mind is a receptacle of the numinous influence, treating the latter as if it were the "things in themselves." However, whereas for Kant, the senses play a crucial role in his epistemological scheme, Otto tends to deal with mental states exclusively. Accordingly, the "wholly other"——that is the holy as the 91 objective reality--induces two types of mental states: the rational and the non—rational (the numinous) which interpenetrate one another, not by causal necessity, but by association. As an illustration, music induces natural feelings in our minds like homesickness, courage, or pleasure, which are "capable of being described in conceptual terms." We are also conscious of "a glimmering, billowy agitation" "without being able to explain in concepts what it is really that moves us so deeply."6 In religious experience, not only is the holy attested as the "inward voice of conscience and the religious consciousness, the 'still, small voice' of the Spirit in the heart, by feeling, presentiment, and longing, but also that which may be directly encountered in particular occurrences and events, self-revealed in persons and displayed in actions, in a word, that beside the inner revelation from the Spirit there is an outward revelation of the divine nature."7 Otto admits that not everyone experiences the holy; for the non-religious person is incapable of comprehending the things that pertain to the holy. He offers no proof for the existence of the holy. If a person is unable to see things in the same light as Otto sees them, that is the holy, it is because he is "natural" (non-religious), and his being in that state is his choice. In his natural state, he might protest that he does not see what Otto sees, but he would have proved nothing that Otto's presentation is mistaken, for any attempt to prove it 92 only shows inability to comprehend the non—rational in a "natural" way. From these considerations, Brunner could argue that agape, which is an element in the numenous, is immune to scientific inquiry. To prove his point, he would cite cases in functionalist attempts to understand religion. The Functionalist Attempts and Brunner's Objections Briefly stated, the functionalist approach is based on methodological commitments to science as involving publicly observable and recordable empirical phenomena, validation and testing of hypothesis and theories. Since religious beliefs, such as Brunner's agape, cannot be verified by observation, some functionalists reduce them to that which is observable. Other functionalists who react very strongly against introspective approaches to behavior, and, who are committed to reconstructing psychology and sociology along natural science methodology, would simply ignore agape. For Skinner, for instance, explanation and prediction of behavior is made only by means of public observation: "Adequate prediction of any science requires information about all relevant variables, and the control of a subject matter for practical purposes make the same demand," and inner states are irrelevant in functional analysis. In his famous pigeon experiment, he designed measurable and recordable observation from stimuli-response mechanism of the animal. For him, operational behavior consists in raising 93 the hand to a certain height, "H," rewarding the animal with food "F" at the same time, followed by the animal's response to "F" which has a low initial frequency. By repeating the experiment many times, the animal undergoes a conditioning process, that is, it comes to a point where it learns to associate "F" with "H." If "H" occurs, "F" follows, thus increasing the frequency of the response to "F." At the advanced stages of the experiment, Skinner fails to reward the animal with food after he raises his hand to a height "H," but it responds as if "F" were present by turning in the direction where the food is dropped.8 This study is supposed to illustrate human behavior in both psychology and‘ sociology. But, by eliminating beliefs from behavior, Skinner fails to account for the difference between a human being and, say, a Coke machine, Brunner might argue. In other words, what prevents psychology or sociology from becoming the study of diesel engines? In Brunner's view, the attempt to comprehend agape by eliminating religious beliefs, which are its basis, is not tenable. Next, Brunner might consider attempts by logical behaviorists, vnua would reduce beliefs about agape to behavioral dispositions. To say, for example: "Brunner believes that there is agape" may simply express the statement: "If there were a Bible available, Brunner would read it." The main difficulty with this kind of deduction is that the resulting subjunctive conditionals do not constitute 94 an observation language. Furthermore, Brunner's believing that there is agape does not guarantee that he would read the Bible, for he would believe that there is agape without ever reading the Bible. In this case, we would be required to list an infinite number of subjunctive conditionals to correspond to the fact that Brunner believes that there is agape, hoping that one of them squares with the inner state about agape. Practically, this is impossible. So Brunner would reject this attempt. But Durkheim would argue, "In fact, we can say that the believer is not deceived when he believes in the existence of a moral power upon which he depends and from which he receives all that is best in himself: this power exists, it is society."9 The individual exalts religion, and this exaltation is real "and is really the effect of forces outside of and superior to the individual." If Durkheim's insight is correct, then Brunner's controversial notion of agape here becomes a pseudo-problem. Durkheim gives an additional flavoring to his approach to religion: "By the mere fact that their apparent function is to strengthen the bonds attaching the believer to his god, they at the same time really strengthen the bonds attaching the individual to the society of which he is a member, since the god is only a figurative expression of the society."10 Durkheim may be said to advocate an identity relation of some sort. Supposing that a society "S" consists of social orders 01, 95 Oz, ... Oh each of which contributes unity among individuals in "S," and that Oa corresponds to beliefs in agape of "S," say that As, according to Durkheim, is nothing but society itself, then: Beliefs in agape As = Social Order Or. This could mean that As and Or have different meanings but the same reference; beliefs in agape talk is reducible without change in reference to social order talk, in a given entity S. The difficulty we immediately face is that of determining what constitutes the properties and objects for AS and Ch. For the sake of argument, let us make such an arbitrary determination, which, of course, fits Durkheim's model. Identity of Properties Objects Occurs in Unity of Social Order empirical indivi- Orfi ,gphenomena dual / Beliefs in Are Mental Unity of Agape As States Indivi- duals Figure 2 Accordingly, beliefs in agape are not merely reducible to Or but to each of the social orders: 01, 02, O2 ... O . This n is what, in fact, Durkheim appears to be saying. But this configuration of agape does not go deep enough to explain why members of a certain community consisting of believers and non-believers might unite for the sake of warding off external aggression, for, given his analysis, only the 96 believer's identity with the solidarity of the social order. This is true of war when the existence of a social entity, consisting of those who have agape and those who do note, is threatened. For this reason, Brunner would reject Durkheim's weakness, claiming that agape is a system of symbols that establish powerful and "long-lasting moods and motivations in men by formulating conceptions with such an aura of factuality that the moods and motivations seem uniquely realistic."11 Geertz purports to go further than Durkheim in giving specific characteristics of religious beliefs. For Brunner, Geertz's seeming substantive definition of agape will not do, for it simply expresses what agape does, not what it is. Moreover, we still need to know how agape symbols differ from others that may display similar effects. To this charge, Geertz might respond by revealing that it is just those symbols which shape society and whose source is society itself. Thus, among the Gusii people, a sacrificial meal consisting of animal flesh, shared with ancestral spirits, is symbolic of peace and reconciliation between humans and the ancestors. Reciprocal relationships among these people, usually characterized by the sharing of food in the empirical phenomenon (the pmofane world), lead to friendship and goodwill between the parties. consequently, any differences that might have existed before they partake the meal are eliminated, opening a way to forgiveness on the part of the offended party and to a relationship that is free 97 of retaliatory action. Thus, agape first exists in the mind, being abstracted from the profane world, and then takes publicly observable forms through sacrificial practices, and, finally, it reinforces meal sharing activities in the profane world. The diagram in Figure 3 illustrates the point Geertz makes. Reinforces or Legitimizes Food sharing Public in Reciprocal Sacrificial Meal Relationship in Empirical Phenomenon Agape symbols ‘///////% Creation of Friendship and Reconciliation, Peace Figure 3 It is not hard to see that this account suffers certain defects. First, like Durkheim, Geertz is committed to the view that agape attempts to explain its source and function, hardly makes progress toward elucidating its symbolic meanings. Second, granting that agape symbols do in fact exist, for example, shape reciprocal relationships, Geertz does not give a condition that ensures that these symbols are the only ones that have this function. Third, even if he could successfully give a substantive symbolic account of agape, he would not thereby have given a substantive account 98 of agape itself, for agape symbols are one thing and agape itself another. When I say that "two" is "2," I have not really said what "two" is. All that I have tried to do is to represent "two" by some symbol "2," raising an open question: "But what is two?" Geertz and Durkheim might readily point out the source of agape beliefs (i.e., beliefls in God that are abstracted from reciprocity). This explanation, however, leads tx> either infinite regress (n: the circularity indicated in the diagram in Figure 3. Some social scientists might skillfully argue that agape is a response to disruptions in ordinary life. Like science, religion attempts to explain some phenomenon that resists adaptations to everyday experience, or rather, it is a defense mechanism against threats to everyday life. This is the view which Berger seems to be advocating: "I would recommend that a scientific study of religion return to a perspective on the phenomenon 'from within' that is, to viewing it in terms of the meanings intended by the religious consciousness."12 Ordinary, safe reality of everyday experience contains other realities which appear as enclaves, islands, holes that "constitute an implicit threat to the take—for-granted security of the ordinary." Human experience is "an ongoing succession of resting securely within the reality of the ordinary, having that reality breached, and returning it to the ordinary after that breach in its defenses has been repaired."13 Berger goes to great lengths 99 to specify the empirical phenomena from which agape might be abstracted. 'It is those forms of experience that present counter-measures against maintenance and continuation of the profane world. Agape is thus a way of coming to terms with the disrupted ordinary reality, offering to explain it in a way that it should fit into the working scheme of ordinary life experience by hypothesizing a notion of "gods" in the other side of ordinary reality, just as a scientist hypothesizes electrons in explaining the flow and effect of electricity in a conductor. To this end, Berger's scientification of the phenomenological school has not really demonstrated Brunner's agape, for he faces the formidable challenge of empirically penetrating the human mind. If there is any success at all in his favor, he would possibly resort to the following epistemologically guided scientific methods of studying the relationship between sensory impacts and beliefs about the world. 1) Supposing that Berger is one of those rare, neutral observers, studying the believer in the "gods" as well as the believer's external world by investigating the bombardments from the natural phenomena on the believer's sensory surfaces, this would result in whatever would become his beliefs in agape made public by the believer's own report. a. He might know the believer's beliefs, but he would not thereby have explained how these beliefs are connected with the empirical phenomenon, for 100 beliefs may be held for reasons not connected with the phenomenon in question; he might establish a correlation but not a causal relationship. b. He does not have privileged access to that part of the believer's own world of beliefs. Thus, he will not, for example, be able to tell whether Brunner's claim is true or false. 2) Supposing a social scientist who is a believer experiments with himself, thus attempting to resolve these difficulties (since he has access to his own mental states including his agape beliefs), he would need an external observer to confirm or disconfirm his own beliefs, for these beliefs may be the result of hallucinations and are possible. There is one attractive recourse for this: the external observer will have to rely on the experimenter's own report about his agape beliefs, but this is not different from saying that he can establish a connection between another person's beliefs and that person's external world (public report), implying that the difficulties encountered in 1(a) and 1(b) are once again in the backyard. We could avoid these difficulties by regarding any scientific study of religion as a Hatter of subjective experience, a move which put Berger in an embarrassing position. Brunner would thus conclude that the functionalist attempts to penetrate the falsity or truth of agape failure. But this does not mean that functionalism is a total failure. 101 As Kurtz indicates: to the functionalist the main issue "is not what religion says but what it does."1" The functionalist approach is concerned with the effects of agape. This could be the functionalist rejoinder. Functionalist Rejoinder The functionalist could argue that agape is not exclusively for those who have faith, as Brunner claims. For agape does have effects accessible to scientific inquiry. It is these effects that have been found to be irrational. To illustrate this point, he would give an exposition of ritual process studied by scientific inquiry. The Ritual Process Earlier, it was pointed out that Eliade fails to give an adequate account of the distinction between the sacred and the profane. A functionalist could make a reconstruction of Eliade's distinction to pave his way. He could claim that there are three features in the life of a religious believer. First, there is a profane state, where the life of the believer is not any different form that of the secular person. The believer may not do exactly those things that the secular man does, but certain of his activities may have nothing to do with religion, though they may not conflict with religion. This will include activities like farming, taking a course in engineering, or attending a political 102 rally. Next, there is the sacred—profane zone where interruptions have both useful or harmful effects on the believer. It is here where the effect of agape can be publicly observed, especially the ritual process. Finally, there is the sacred zone, remote from the observer but nonetheless conceptualized. This is the area which is not accessible to scientific inquiry. The sacred-profane and the sacred zones respectively correspond to the immanent and the transcendent in Brunner's theological View. Worship, or ritual process, is a response to the sacred realm, but it takes place in the sacred-profane zone. A clear distinction between the sacred and profane in the latter cannot be drawn. The overlap is ambiguous involving in a way a paradox, because the very beings who have a transcendental experience of agape are also the very beings who have immanent experience in the principle of reciprocity--hence an appearance of irrationality. The other aspect of irrationality occurs when believers, in their peak experience, display emotional behavior that resists rational explanation. Brunner could respond to this rejoinder by turning to specific study in ritual process. Turner is one of those who has conducted such a study. Gennep coined rites of passage to distinguish rites of separation, transition, and incorporation. Thus, rites of separation are prominent in funeral ceremonies, rites of incorporation at marriages, and rites of transitions in 103 initiation.15 Turner has extended the term to cover three phases of a ritual process. Thus, when there is a large scale calamity or catastrophe among the Luo of Kenya, they traditionally respond to their supreme invisible being, Nyasaye, by offering him a bull at the top of a mountain as a sacrifice. Before such a sacrifice is made, they separate themselves from the profane experience and enter the sacred- profane region where sacrifice is offered. Turner calls it the "liminal period" or "communitas." It is betwixt and between and ambiguous, neither here nor there, stressing equality and comradeship.16 Liminality culminates in the incorporation of the group to the profane zone. In liminality, the communities emerge. Here there are no kings, chiefs, or princesses, since society "is pictured as a communitas of free and equal comrades--of total persons" and also since communitas "is essentially opposed to structure, as antimatter is hypothetically opposed to matter."17 Consequently, exaggerated differences emphasized in social structure (profane realm), including acquired and ascribed status, are diminished. In spite of its "purely spontaneous and self-generating aspect, when communitas becomes normative its religious expressions become closely hedged about by rules and interdictions--which act like the lead container of a dangerous radioactive isotope."18 Turner stresses the harmonious aspect of the sacred—profane zone, but there are also disruptions or episodes having a rational dimension and 104 leading to communitas itself. Accordingly, these people put efforts to eliminate these disruptions by making use of all available tools so they could live in an environment that is safe from harm or danger. They could, for instance, regulate themselves by instituting moral rules, but even if all these rules were strictly observed by everyone, they will not come into complete terms with certain aspects of reality that threaten their existence, which could include death or disease. Given the limitation in their knowledge of the world, they would tend to create religious symbols that give meaning to a reality that resists ordinary methods of explanation. Members of a religious community that accept those symbols may often have similar ways of perceiving reality, implying that their acceptance of these symbols is spontaneous activity. Brunner could accept this account thus far but he would nonetheless maintain that, insofar as communitas in ritual process is isolated from an underlying reality, it would appear irrational. But the believer refuses that communitas, the effect of belief in agape, be so isolated. Brunner could argue that the believer's underlying reality of the communitas employs rational patterns analogous to scientific explanation. To prove his point, he will need to establish this analogous relationship. Accordingly, he could consider areas like scientific observation and explanation. 105 Observation and Practice Although Brunner admits that science is one of the sources of the knowledge about the world, there is one view of science with which he is not in agreement--the positivist tradition. He himself, however, does not advance an argument for this disagreement, except that he thinks it to be untenable.19 A consideration of some of the criticisms raised against this tradition might help to reconstruct his position. For example, early formulations of the tradition viewed an empirically significant sentence S as one derived from an empirically significant set of finite observation sentences. Accordingly, conditions of adequacy for cognitive significance were formulated thus: 1) if a sentence S is significant, so is its negation; 2) if N is a non-significant sentence, then a compound sentence that has N is also non- significant.20 The immediate problem that this formulation faces is that it violates these conditions of adequacy as follows: First, it suggests that universal statements like (X) (RX --> BX): "All ravens are black," is not significant, since it does not consist of an empirically significant set of finite observation sentences. Consider an essential statement ( X) BX, which is significant. According to (l) ”( X) BX is also significant. But ~( X) BX = (X) ~BX. (X)~ BX is not significant since it is a universal statement. This is a contradiction. 106 Noting that universal statements in science (e.g.: scientific laws) could not be dispensed with, Carnap proposed a modification of cognitive significance as follows: a statement is significant if, and only if, it is derivable from infinite sets of observation statements and it has a degree of confirmability.21 Thus a statement like (X)(RX --> BX) qualifies as an infinite set of observation statements. Originally (a) (Ra —-> Ba), (b) (Rb --> Rb), ...., (c) (Rc -—> Bc), could be accepted as an empirically significant set of finite observation statements, but we have already seen the difficulties faced by this approach. So, Carnap's move was designed to overcome these difficulties, but at a great sacrifice, for to settle for a mere degree of confirmability weakens the original intent of positivist commitment to decidability. (It is noteworthy that the positivists wanted an effective method of reaching consensus by means of deductive procedures.) Next, Ayer proposed that a statement S is significant if, and only if, the conjunction of S and 8' yield observation statement 0 and that 8' alone does not yield 0.22 Stated simply, this formulation faces certain difficulties. For instance, let N be a non—significant statement, and N --> 0 be another statement, such that the conjunction of N and N --> 0 yields 0. This is possible since: 107 l. N --> O Premise 2. N Premise 0 Conclusion but, 0 cannot be derived from N --> 0 alone. It would follow that N is significant, but this is a contradiction. It is difficulties of this sort that could convince Brunner of the implausibility of the positivist View of science. The empiricist tradition, which is :3 departure from the positivist strict decidability, recognized the importance of theoretical terms snxfll as "electron," "fragile," etc. in scientific observation, and made reconstruction accordingly. Along this line, Hempel proposed a condition of adequacy for a criterion of empirical significance based on definability, as follows: "It would demand that any term with empirical significance must be explicitly definable by means of observation terms."23 According to this criterion, a statement F(X) --> (t) (SXt <--> BXt), which stands for: "An object X is fragile, if and only if, at any time when the object is sharply struck, it breaks at that time." As Hempel himself admits, this formulation has difficulties. For example, it is not true that fragile objects break any time they are struck, unless "sharply struck" is interpreted as "breaks." Furthermore, supposing that a is a non-fragile object (rubber) which happens not to be sharply struck at any 108 time throughout its existence, then Sat is false, implying that Sat --> Bat is true, since Fa is true. If Sat --> Bat is true, then Bat is true, which means that a non—fragile object breaks. This is a contradiction.24 Carnap has suggested an ingenious procedure to derive empirical laws, consisting of observation terms from abstract theories consisting of theoretical terms, by means of correspondence rules. Such a rule may, for instance, connect the theoretical term "mass" with the observable predicate "heavier than" as follows: "If U is heavier than V, then mass of U' (i.e., the mass of the coordinate region U' corresponding to U) is greater than the mass of V'."25 The main difficulty with correspondence rules, however, is that they do not account for change of meaning in theory change (e.g., Newtonian "mass" vs. Einstein's "mass"). Supposing that such an account could be given, it does not block introducing metaphysical entities such as "God" into observation language. This means we could have observation consequences of Brunner's "God" "agape" by devising correspondence rules. The empiricist would resist this move by maintaining that there is a distinction between scientific observation and Brunner's observation claims in that the latter is tainted by background beliefs whereas the former is theory-neutral. The empiricist's position thus shows commitment to consensus-based scientific inquiry. 109 The basic assumption in empiricism is that, in observation language, entities have directly observable attributes. Hempel elaborates this notion by making a distinction between two senses of observation, the narrow and the broader versions. Inn the narrow sense, observation is directly observable when auxiliary devices such as telescopes, microscopes, etc., are not used, whereas in the broader sense such instruments may be used. In Hempel's view, any of these types of observations could be employed in science, provided that, "certain techniques of observation have been agreed upon."26 Implicit in the commitment to direct observability in science is that observation language is theory-neutral. By this, they mean that those who make assertions in the language see the same things when looking at the same things. In the physics of the human eye, for example, light rays travel from an object outside the eye through the convex-like lens, resulting in the formation of an image on the retina. The optic nerves transmit the image 'UD the brain where the information is recorded that agrees with that of the object. Since all human eyes function similarly, it follows that two observers see the same thing when looking at the same object. The view that observation is theory-neutral is contradicted by Wittgenstein's analysis of "duck—rabbit" pictured below.27 110 Figure 4 Supposing that this picture is introduced to someone for the first time, and if asked: "What's that?" or "What do you see here?," Ina should reply: WA picture duck." If, however, another person is introduced to the same picture, but is given certain features of what he sees, such as "it is a small animal with long ears A and mouth B, looking in the direction X," he should reply that it is a rabbit. Thus, two observers looking at the same picture see two different things, depending on their background knowledge. In short, observation language is not theory-neutral. Following Wittgenstein, a number of philosophers and historians of science have sharply criticized the empiricist claim, arguing that observation is theory-laden. Among them are Quine, Hanson and Kuhn.28 Kuhn, for example, states this View: Nevertheless, paradigm [theory] changes do cause scientists to see the world of their research-engagement differently. In so far as their only recourse to that world is through what they see and do, we may want to say that after a revolution scientists are responding to a different lll world. It is as elementary prototypes for these transformations of the scientist's world that the familiar demonstrations of a switch in visual gestalt prove so suggestive. What were ducks in the scientist's world before the revolution are rabbits afterwards.29 Kuhn provides evidence for this assertion from the history of science. Thus, in the seventeenth century electricians saw chaff particles rebound from, or fall off, the electrified bodies that had attracted them. Modern observers would see electrostatic repulsion, rather than mechanical or gravitational rebounding. But, electrostatic repulsion was not seen until Hanksbee's large scale apparatus had greatly magnified its effects.30 Kuhn concludes that sensory experience is not fixed and neutral. "The duck— rabbit shows that two men with the same retinal impressions can see different things."31 There is no "pure-observation- language, perhaps one will yet be devised." According to Kuhn, the gestalt switch corresponds to theory change, (which is "a conversion experience," implying that it is an irrational transformation).32 It is only someone who sees through the theoretical framework of the scientific community who is capable of making relevant observation, one who operates out of this framework cannot make similar observation, neither refute it or confirm it.33 Brunner could therefore argue that scientific observation, like religious observation, is theory-laden. This conclusion is not without critics. 112 Some scientists might challenge Brunner, arguing, as Fodor does, that there is a class of beliefs that is typically fixed by sensory/perceptual processes, and that the fixation of such beliefs is theory—neutral of observation. Fodor's discussion attempts to show that the empiricist view is not as mistaken as Kuhn and others have tried to argue and that there is a sense in which the empiricist view is correct. Thus, "given the same stimulations, two organisms with the same sensory/perceptual psychology will quite generally observe the same things, and hence arrive at the same observational beliefs, however, must of their theoretical commitments may differ."34 {Hue basis for this argument is as follows: first, perception is modular (inferential, but encapsulated). It follows that bodies of theory that are inaccessible to the modules do not affect the way the perceiver sees the world. "Scientists with quite different axes to grind, for example, might nevertheless, see the world in exactly the same way, so long as the bodies of theory that they disagree about is inaccessible to their mechanisms."35 Thus, something can be made of the notion of theory-neutral observation. Fodor's attempt to reconstruct a notion of theory- neutral observation in science, is, in my opinion, mistaken. For Brunner might argue that, in relevant scientific observation, scientists are trained to be able to make such observation. In other words, they will not only see what a 113 lay person (non-scientist) will see, but they will, in addition, need to interpret it in order that it may have relevancy in the scientific community. It is true that there is something fixed in the perceptual process, but it is something that is shared by both the layman and the scientist. The kind of perception having informational relevancy to the scientist and his community is not fixed, as Fodor contends. A radiologist, for example, is one who has been trained to read an X—ray photograph according to certain scientific criteria, which may later change depending on new findings. But, there is something that is fixed in the radiologist's perception that is shared by a non- radiologist--seeing an X-ray photograph as a mere photograph. This shows that, if there is such a thing as theory—neutral observation language, then it is that kind of perceptual mechanism that is shared by all human beings who have normal sensory surfaces and are able to respond to similar stimuli in the same way--given this mechanism. There is thus something that a scientist and a religious believer similarly sees, but what the scientist sees in addition is not theory- neutral. Reasoning Patterns The skepticism raised in the last section does not really help to sustain Brunner's position about the rationality of an underlying reality, since one could argue 114 that both the believer and the scientist are penetrated by background beliefs of their respective practices, but then the religious believer's background is irrational, infecting the fixed perceptual mechanism he shares with the scientist, thus making the whole religious practice just as irrational. Since the scientific cognition is rational, whatever perceptual process (the fixed mechanism) it penetrates becomes rational. For Brunner to counter this charge, he will have to demonstrate that the underlying reality in communitas is rational--hence, when it penetrates the fixed perceptual mechanism, it makes the religious practice rational. There are two levels of science being rational that could be used to undermine Brunner's claim. First, science could be said to be rational when it results in the growth of knowledge about the world in the sense that the application of this knowledge improves the human situation. The last hundred years run“; witnessed improved systems of communication and breakthroughs in conquering many diseases (that religion was unable to account for) an increase in the life-span of human beings, etc., attributed to the scientific revolution. In this respect, religion is no competitor. If science is rational and religion irrational, it is because the former is progressive, and the latter is not. The concept of rationality construed this way is not without difficulties; for science has also created threats to human 115 life. Clear cases abound, ranging from pollution to nuclear weapons, indicating that science is at least irrational. Thus attempts to construe rationality in terms of progress do not succeed in weakening Brunner's position. The second level of rationality in science is of the kind in which science reasons about its subject matter--the reasoning patterns employed by scientists in actual scientific practice. The scientific domain that could best reveal this feature is scientific explanation. The prominent figures that could illuminate the argument of Brunner's critics are Hempel and Salmon. A brief discussion of Hempel and Salmon will illuminate the basis of the critics' argument. Hempel presents two main types of scientific explanation: deductive nomological anui statistical models. In both models, explanation is an argument, consisting of explanans as premises and explanandum as conclusion. The deductive nomological model is a deductive argument in which the explanans must have empirical data; i.e., Wit must be capable, at least in principle, of test by experiment or observation and explanandum must be a logical consequence of the explanans. The explanans consist of particular fact and general laws while explanandum contain a particular event to be explained."36 In Hempel's schema, the deductive nomological model may be summarized: 116 C1, C2 ... Ck particular fact Logical deduction L1, L2 ... L general laws E Description of the empirical phenomenon Explandunum to be explained The notion of rationality implicit in this model is that an argument which is valid and whose premises have empirical content is rational. Since religion lacks the latter feature and may not employ the same technique, agape is, therefore, irrational. The general weakness of the deductive nomological model is that laws may be true at one time and false at another time, implying that what used to be an explanation at one time ceases to be one at another time. The second weakness is that this model does not distinguish between genuine law and accidental laws. Thus, Brunner could easily dismiss this kind of scientific rationality as untenable. Hempel next discusses statistical models, of which the inductive statistical model is a representative. According to this model, an explanation is an inductive argument in which one of the premises must be a statistical law. Hempel imposes the following conditions to this model: 1) the premises must be true, 2) the explanation must satisfy the requirement for maximal specifity, 3) the premises must lend high inductive probability to the conclusion. Condition 2) was formulated as a result of ambiguity of inductive 117 statistical explanation. Thus, for a given statistical argument with true premises and a high associated probability, there may exist a rival statistical argument with equally true premises and with a high associated probability whose conclusion contradicts the first. For example: Sx = definition: x has streptococus Rx = definition: x recovers P(Rx/Sx & PX) = 0.95 Px = definition: Jones 0.95 Rj Sf — definition x has penicillin resistant streptococus p(~Rx/s; & Px) = 0.95 0.95 Rj Hempel's own solution is that a concept of statistical explanation for particular events, is essentially relative to a given knowledge situation as represented by a class K of accepted statement, which he calls epistemic relativity.37 Salmon has sharply criticized both Hempel's deductive nomological and statistical models.38 His four main theses in this move are as follows: 1) People who have colds, but use vitamin C, recover within a fortnight, but, the use of vitamin C may not explain the recovery, since almost all colds clear up within two weeks regardless. In other words, causal connections between vitamin C and recovery is lacking. This shows that Hempel's models lack a requirement 118 that ensures that only relevant facts will be included. 2) Inability to account for explanations in which the explanadum has new probability relative to the explanans. Paresis occurs only in peOple who have had syphilis un-treated. Less than 1/2 percent of these people who have untreated syphilis develop paresis. Yet, it is an explanation to say that one develops paresis as a result of having untreated syphilis. 3) The epistemic relativization of I-S explanation implies that all I-S models are incomplete D-N models; their inadequacy can be measured by the degree to which they approximate a D-N model. Hempel developed I-S models, because he found D—N models inadequate in certain cases. In effect, this attempt hardly improves his scheme, since the weakness of D—N models would equally affect I-S models. 4) An explanation does not depend on the knowledge situation as Hempel argues. Epistemic relativity does not depend on their being intelligent beings. Since Salmon's criticisms are convincing, Hempel's models of scientific explanation are defective to do the job of demonstrating scientific rationality. Salmon's own alternative version might require considerable attention. Reacting against Hempel's epistemic relativity of statistical explanation, Salmon proposes objective homogeneity as the basis for his own version of scientific explanation, for objective homogeneity avoids making reference to background knowledge (explanation in Salmon's view is independent of their being intelligent beings). Accordingly, to explain an event is to show it as occupying a 119 place in the discernible patterns of the world. Explanation is fathoming the causal structure of the world which relates to individual events, and this structure does not depend on background knowledge. According to the objective homogeneity principle, an objectively homogeneous reference class cannot be partitioned into sub-classes, that are statistically relevant to the occurrence of the attribute in question. In fact, there is no way to identify a relevant partition. Explanation consists of identifying the causal relations, which in turn relate to individual events. We explain general regularities by identifying the causal mechanisms that produce the events they cover. The argument which Salmon offers in support of thesis 4) presupposes 3). He cites again the example of paresis mentioned in thesis 2) as a cause that does not satisfy the high probability requirement. According to Hempel's I-S explanations, this case is a partial explanation, since we do not have enough medical knowledge to provide anything like adequate explanation of paresis. Supposing that medical science uncovers an additional factor F at some point in the future "such that those victims of latent untreated syphilis in which F is present will probably (high probability) develop paresis," thus, satisfying Hempel's high-probability requirement of the I-S explanation. But, since not all the class of people with latent untreated syphilis (S) who possess the factor F develOp paresis, there must be a further 120 factor G that helps to determine which members of S.F. will develop paresis P and which will not. "If all the members of S.F.G. develop paresis, then we have an objectively homogeneous reference class on account of the universal generalization (X) [SX.FX.GX)PX], but this is a case of trivial objective homogeneity." Moreover, this kind of explanation "is no longer I—S explanation, but rather D-N, for we replaced our statistical law with a universal law" Salmon concludes: ...if the world is actually indeterministic, we seem to need the concept of objective homogeneity to describe that very indeterminacy. In a sample of radioactive substance composed of atoms of a single isotope, for example, some atoms undergo spontaneous radioactive decay within a certain time interval and others do not. If the indeterministic interpretation of quantum mechanics is correct, then there is no further characteristic of these atoms that is relevant to their decay within that time period. To formulate the thesis of indeterminism—-whether it turns out ultimately to be true or false—-we seem to need the concept of a homogeneous reference class, and this homogeneity must represent an objective feature of the real world.39 In a nutshell, Salmon's objective homogeneity of scientific explanation states: "A reference class A is homogeneous with respect to an attribute B provided there is no set of properties Ci (1 g i i k; k 3 2) in terms of which A can be relevantly partioned." A partition of A is a set of "mutually exclusive subclasses of A which, taken together, contain all members of A." "A portion of A by means of C1 is relevant with respect to B if, for some values of i, (B/A. Ci # (B/A)."4° 121 Despite Salmon's attempts to overcome Hempel's failure, his version of scientific explanation has certain weaknesses, too. As Hanna points out, supposing that the universe is deterministic, then objective homogeneity is trivialized because the only objective homogeneous reference classes will be those associated with universal generalizations. On the other hand, supposing that the universe is irreducibly stochastic, tinny for practical purposes, objective homogeneity must be temporarily relativized. Objective probabilities of particular events evolve and so must temporarily be relativized, since there is no objectivity in choosing a point in time. The upshot of this is that our choice will depend on pragmatic purpose and background beliefs, culture, values, etc.41 This opens possibilities of constructing religiously intentioned explanations. In both Hempel and Salmon's models of scientific explanation, observation plays a crucial role. Hempel's conception of observation suffers from regarding observation as occurring in theory-neutral observation language. For Salmon, whether observation is theory-neutral or theory-laden is not a big issue. If the conclusion reached in the last section, then Hanna's criticisms are in order. It also means that a scientist, as well as a religious believer, is capable of making certain kinds of observations. In other words, a religious person has access to the external world, through his sensory mechanism. Could a religious believer construct 122 an explanation of the observed phenomena that displays reasoning patterns analogous to science? To answer this question, Salmon gives insightful elucidation. Salmon contends that scientific explanations frequently appeal to unobserved or unobservable objects. A typical example is the electromagnetic theory developed by Faraday and Maxwell, who postulated the existence of electric and magnetic fields, as well as the existence of electromagnetic radiation, which are imperceptible to human sense organs. A person may have trouble with the reception on a television receiver, sometimes a picture breaking up into a herringbone pattern. He later discovers that the picture is highly correlated with a broadcast made from a nearby police station. To explain this correlation one would involve electromagnetic radiation CHE frequencies (which are unobservable to the senses).42 Following Salmon, Schoen has argued that religious explanations are common among believers. Like many scientific explanations, they appeal to non-observable entities or beings, and they usually attempt to account for patterns of phenomena that resist a naturalistic account. To illustrate his point, he recounts Fred, the theologian,43 who introduces God as an explanatory entity to account for regular patterns he had noticed in his own life. Suppose Fred badly needed money for rent at one point. At the eleventh hour, he receives the exact amount he needed by mail. The check he receives was exactly the right 123 amount and it came at the right time. Furthermore, Fred had revealed his financial problems to no one of his friends. Fred discovers that there was no way the donor could have known of this need and that the donor had a thoroughly inexplicable and uncharacteristic urge to send along a check, that happened to be of just the right amount, made out to just the right person and delivered at just the right time. Explanatory resources to natural phenomena would fail. He, therefore, deems this event a miracle and seeks to explain it by taking recourse to God. Of course, Fred might be mistaken if it were discovered later that, with expanded human knowledge, this event fits in the neural patterns. But, at this point in time, no such knowledge is available. Schoen's insight here has already been hinted by Eliade and Burger (who, however, have not developed explanations to the same degree as Schoen has done). In a religious explanation, a religious person, like a scientific theorist, chooses an explanatory range, a relevantly analogous range of phenomena for which the governing mechanism already is understood and needs to be found. He then carries over explanatorily efficacious features of that known mechanism into "the religious sphere and attribute it to god without undue epistemic or religious sacrifice."44 Schoen's religious explanations, patterned as they are after scientific ones, ignore many religious features such as ritual process that could appear irrational 124 to unbelievers. This is true of baptism as a sacrament in which a Catholic priest incorporates an infant in the Church through holy water and baptismal formula. Brunner would, however, view all religious experience as coherent and founded on certain realities whose explanations can be patterned along scientific ones. For this reason, ritual process is rational since it is founded on underlying reality whose rationality is embodied in its explanation. Human rationality includes the capacity to abstract symbols from ordinary activities (activities that may not distinguish human beings from non-humans) in order to survive. Language consists of audible sounds or noises that have been manipulated to form a communication system. This does not mean that human beings would be incapable of acquiring food, air and sleep if they did not have language. But, they would acquire these goods more efficiently with than without their own system of language. As McShea indicates: "The relatively sudden evolution of his enlarged brain [man's brain], some hundreds of thousands of years ago, made man the only animal which can (and in the absence of instincts) cope with the world that includes the tangible evidences of the powers thus contributed to the complication and satisfaction of his desires."45 Whereas symbols could be put into the well—being of human species, it is also true that they could be used to create suffering for others. This is true of episodes of colonization in the history of the 125 species, whereby the imposition of colonial rule required that the masters were first able to communicate effectively among themselves through usage of common language in order to jointLy crush native resistance, often resulting in bloodshed. (I have pointed out that the humanist recognizes the possibilities of harm among human beings that create the need for the formation of moral obligation.) Brunner could thus conclude that rituals are symbols that stand for beliefs in a reality for which explanations can be constructed. These symbols, though appearing irrational in themselves, are expressions of a rational underlying structure. The effects of agape are therefore rational, not irrational as it might be claimed.46 126 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION Brunner's and Kurtz's approaches to a moral life have similarities. Both stress that a virtuous life consists of services that bring comfort and preservation to those in need. Both believe that a moral agent is one who executes an action through critical reflection and self-determination. But, there are also differences. Brunner embodies an element of a supernatural being into a moral life and argues that a believer is one who has received agape, the gift of this being, by which he renders services to those in need spontaneously. Accordingly, a believer does not expect to be rewarded or served, if in need, in this world, although this may occur. Agape does not displace the principle of reciprocity, according to which human beings view themselves as interdependent beings. Their existence rests on mutual support in time of need. A person promotes the preservation of others so that he would preserve himself immediately or at some point in the distant future. The principle was ordained by God in Creation and has to be presupposed by agape. The believers, however, expect to be rewarded by eternal life for living a virtuous life. For Kurtz, a virtuous life consists in services that enhance survival and comfort to others in need in this life, without any reference to Brunner's God. Morality is rooted in human nature alone and it is 127 situational and relative. In the course of comparing Brunner and Kurtz, the use of exemplars in achieving a moral life is suggested to overcome the dilemma faced when inculcating virtues in a moral program. Kurtz is totally opposed to indoctrination. Exemplars could play a role in his moral program, but he is immediately faced with identifying the right exemplars without resorting to some sort of indoctrination. A rapist, for example, is not the right exemplar. At the outset, Kurtz's moral program is a mere intellectual mechanism that has little impact in transforming society into virtuous individuals. His rejection of libertarian morality and intuitionism demands that his moral program be reinvested with new meaning. Accordingly, a redefinition of his own notion of "indoctrination" is formulated. Exemplars in this new approach, though easily identified, are interventionists. In spite of Kurtz's claim to some altruistic morality, the principle of reciprocity, on which his moral program is based, is self-interest. Consequently, this program is incapable of leading a person who lacks certain emotions, such as compassion, to be engaged in humanitarian services. For Brunner, a loving Father, Christ and believers are exemplars because they have agape. Unbelievers who preach and practice the principle of reciprocity are also exemplars. Brunner does not reject possibilities of indoctrination in his approach, on condition that the rights of the other person are not violated. He 128 overcomes Kurtz's weakness by maintaining that a person who has agape will promote the well-being of others in spite of his emotional state insofar as there is already a divine command for it. Moral autonomy as self-determination through critical reflection does not undermine Brunner's claim. Furthermore, agape is not irrational insofar as its effects are not isolated from the underlying reality, which is rational. In effect, Kurtz should concede to Brunner's approach. In general, both Brunner and Kurtz have adopted an interventionist approach to resolving the dilemma that was pointed out at the beginning of this inquiry. Since they are both concerned with the deteriorating of morals in pluralistic societies, this approach has possibilities of working SUI their favor. They also stress critical reflection. The use of exemplars will greatly enhance their programs. NOTES CHAPTER 1 1. Baumer refers to a famous painting by Paul Rubens in which Religion is seated in a triumphal chair, occupying a central place, and behind her stand three figures who by their attitudes clearly show their subservience to her. Science is depicted as young in years; Philosophy, a bearded old man leaning on a staff; and Nature, of ample Rubenesque bosom. Behind these still are two figures, one an American Indian and a Negro. See Franklin L. Baumer, Religion and Rise of Skepticism, (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Company, 1960), p. 113. 2. Baumer, Modern European Thought (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc., 1977), p. 197. 3. Voltaire Philosophical Dictionary: Edited and translated by Theodore Besterman S.V. "Superstition" and "Theiste: Theist." 4. Paul Kurtz, In Defense of Secular Humanism (New York: Prometheus Book, 1983), p. 50. 5. There are disagreements about what constitutes indoctrination. Barrow has summarized such disagreements in Chapter 14. See Robin Barrow, Moral Philosophy for Education (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1975). I am considering indoctrination in broad terms as influencing others. 6. Plato's Meno in The Collected Dialogues of Plato, edited by Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982). 7. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, translated tug Martin Ostwald (Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Menll Company, Inc.), 2096a:25; 1106b: 20, ll44a:5, 1139a:24, 1103a:25. 129 NOTES CHAPTER 2 1. Robert E. Murphy, An Overture to Social Anthropology (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1979), who points out that "our preoccupation with cultural differences has led us to neglect the similarities of our experiences," p. 22. 2. Christopher Dawson, Religion and Culture (New York: Sheed & Ward, 1948), p. 11. 3. Ibid., p. 157. 4. Meyer Fortes, Kinship and the Social Order (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Company, 1948), p. 11. 5. The notion of exchange of women is emphasized by Levi- Strauss, and so is reciprocity, an underlying principle in his study of his theory of kinship. This point is especially discussed in relation to the Kachine people. See Claude Levi-Strauss, The Elementary Structure of Kinship, translated by James Harte Bell (London: Eyre and Spottiswood, 1969), pp. 233-254. 6. Leach, in his study of Trobriad clans, affirms that affines are potentially hostile aliens whose relationship is modified into a kind of treaty by the fact that marriage and gift-giving. See E.R. Leach, "Concerning Trobriad Clans and the Kinship Category 'Tabu'" in Developmental Cycle in Domestic Group, edited by Jack Goody (Cambridge: At the University Press, 1958), pp. 120-145. 7. Block, p. 77. 8. Arnold van Gennep, The Rites of Passage (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1960), pp. 10—11. 9. Victor Witter Turner, Dramas, Fields and Metaphors (New York: Cornell University Press, 1974), p. 232. 10. Block, pp. 81-82. 11. Block, pp. 81-82. 130 NOTES CHAPTER 3 1. Emil Brunner, Truth as Encounter (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1964), pp. 141, 142. 2. Ibid., p. 75. 3. Ibid., p. 124. 4. Brunner, in“; Divine-Human Encounter, translated by Amandus W. Loos (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1943), p. 24. 5. Brunner, Faith, Hope, anui Love (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1956), pp. 17-18. 6. Ibid., p. 22. 7. Brunner, The Scandal of Christianity (Philadelphia: the Westminster Press, 1952), pp. 24—5. 8. Ibid., p. 22. 9. Brunner, Faith, Hope and Love, p. 37. 10. Ibid., p. 51. 11. A reconciliation between Brunner and Kurtz on religious beliefs is conceivable at the level of constructing epistemically analogous relationship in the realm of natural science. It could be argued that a color-blind person is unable to see exactly the same things-—the non—color-blind person sees. Yet there is something that exists for the latter—-distinguishing different color shades. Likewise, a believer with a certain background (environment, experience) see things which a person without this background does not see. 12. Brunner, Eternal hope, translated by Harold Knight (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1954), p. 136. 13. Ibid., p. 139-140. 131 14. Ibid., . 171. . 176. p 15. Ibid., p. 175. 16. Ibid., p p 17. Ibid., . 183. 18. Brunner, The Divine Imperative, p. 120. l9. Brunner, The Christian Doctrine of Creation and Redemption, translated by Olive Wyon (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1952), p. 18. 20. Brunner, Eternal Hope, pp. 102-103. 21. "Fall" is a term generally used by Brunner to denote man's rebellion against the divine order established in Creation, and that this rebellion is "sin." It is straying away from God's original plan. See Brunner, The Christian Doctrine of Creation and Redemption, 90-101. 22. Ibid., p. 90. 23. According to Brunner, "Adam," in the meaning of Christian theology, is the unity of humanity, not in the zoological sense, but in the sense of humanitas, that in which something personal, something which transcends a form of existence which achieves no personal acts at all, but merely acts of self—preservation and the preservation of the species. By this, he seems to mean that the unity of humanity with Adam is based of man's ability to exercise the power of reason, a feature which distinguishes human beings from animals. This interpretation is supported by Brunner's view of "justice" as something that is involved only in human relationships. "Things or animals can of themselves be neither just or unjust." See Brunner, Justice and the Social Order, translated by Mary Hottinger (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1945), p. 13. On the question of the unity of humanity with Adam, see Brunner, The Christian Doctrine of Creation and Redemption, pp. 81-82. 24. Brunner, Justice and the Social Order, pp. 58-59. 25. Ibid., p. 61. 26. Ibid., p. 55. 27. Ibid., pp. 77-78. 28. Ibid., p. 80. 132 29. Ibid., pp. 74, 75, 197, 198. 30. Brunner, The Divine Imperative, p. 484. 31. Brunner, Justice and the Social Order, p. 42. 32. Ibid., p. 41. 33. Brunner, The Divine Imperative, p. 223. 34. Benedict de Spinoza, Ethics, translated by R.H.M. Elwes, IV, Prop xxxv. Proof, IV. Prop xxv. 35. Kenneth Dover, ed., Plato: Symposium (London: Cambridge University Press, 1980), p. 1. 36. Edward Ross Wharton, Etyma Graeca: Etymological Lexicon of Classical Greek (n.d.), s.v. (philos). 37. Brunner, Faith, Hope and Love, p. 64. 38. Brunner, Justice and the Social Order, pp. 129-130; Faith, Hope and Love, p. 65. 39. Brunner, Faith, Hope and Love, pp. 75-76. 40. Supra-rational is a term which Brunner employs for we generally conceive as non-rational in contrast with irrational. 41. Brunner, Justice and the Social Order, p. 127. 42. Brunner, The Christian Doctrine of Creation and Redemption, p. 331. 43. Brunner, The Divine Imperative, p. 233. 44. Ibid., p. 227. 45. Richard H. Harsh, John P. Miller, Glen D. Fielding, Models of Moral Education (New York: Longman Inc., 1980), pp. 183-4. 133 NOTES CHAPTER 4 1. Paul Kurtz, "What is Happening?" in Moral Problems in Contemporary Society, ed. Paul Kurtz (New York: Prometheus Books, 1973), p. 10. 2. Robert McShea, "Human Nature Ethical Theory,‘ Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 39(2), (March, 1979), p. 399. 3. Ibid., p. 399. 4. Paul Kurtz, "What is Humanism?", pp. 3-4. 5. James Griffin, Well-Being: Its Meaning, Measurement and Moral Importance (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), p. 54. 6. Stuart Hampshire, Morality and Conflict (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1983), p. 40. 7. Ibid. 8.Griffin, p. 54. 9. Kurtz, In Defense of Secular Humanism, p. 55. 10. Kurtz, "The Ethics of Secular Humanism," in Sidney Hook, ed. Paul Kurtz (New York: Prometheus Books, 1983), p. 163. 11. Kurtz, "What is Humanism?" p. 5. 12. Kurtz, "The Ethics of Secular Humanism," p. 160. 13. Kurtz, In Defense of Secular Humanism (New York: Prometheus Books, 1983), p. 19. 14. Kurtz, "The Ethics of secular Humanism," p. 160. 15. Kurtz, In Defense of Secular Humanism, p. 34. 16. Ibid., p. 52. 17. Ibid., p. 54. 134 18.Ibid., p. 54. 19. Ibid., p. 50. 20. Ibid., p. 96. 21. Peter Claws, "On the Teaching of Ethics," Hastings Center Report, (October 1978), p. 32. 22. Kurtz, In Defense of Secular Humanism, p. 53. 135 NOTES CHAPTER 5 1. Brunner, The Divine Judgment, p. 232. 2. William Sargant, Battle for the Mind (London: Heinemann, 1957), p. 214. 3. Waruhiu Itote, "Mau Mau" General (Nairobi: East African Publishing House, 1967), p. 283. 4. Kurtz, In Defense of Secular Humanism, p. 53. 5.Ibid., p. 42. 6. Kurtz has argued that, even in vicious emotions there may be a "measure of deliberation and planning." See Joseph Katz, "Desiring Reason," The Journal of Philosophy 53(26) (December, 1956), p. 838. 7. Kurtz, In Defense of Secular Humanism, p. 42. 136 NOTES CHAPTER 6 1. Frankena, for instance, is skeptical about using Euthyphro's argument to disclaim the divine theory ethics. See William Frankena, "Is Morality Logically Dependent on Religion?" in Religion and Morality, ed. Gene Outka and John P. Keeler (New York: Anchor Press, Doubleday, 1973), pp. 302—3. He does not, however, give reasons for thinking so. 2. Immanuel Kant, Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Educational Publishing, 1981), pp. 64-5. 3. A.C. Ewing, "The Autonomy of Ethics" in Prospect for Metaphysics, ed. Ian Ramsey (London: George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1961), pp. 37-8. 4. Ibid., p. 38. 5. Frankena, "Is Morality Logically Dependent on Religion?", Outka. 6. See George Edward Moore, Principle Ethics (Cambridge: At the University, 1956). 7. I have been influenced by Prior to construct this kind of argument. See A.N. Prior, "The Autonomy of Ethics" The Australian Journal of Philosophy 38(3) (December, 1960): 199—206. 8.Kant, p. 39. 9. Spinoza, E IV. 10. Lawrence Haworth, Autonomy: An Essay in Philosophical Psychology and Ethics (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986), pp. 83—106. 11. Brunner, The Divine Imperative, p. 232. 12. B.F. Skinner, Science and Human Behavior (New York: Macmillan, 1953), p. 353. 137 13. Ibid., p. 354. 14. Ibid., p. 356. 138 NOTES CHAPTER 7 1. Claims that religion is irrational have been made philosophers such as Kurtz. See Kurtz, "The Ethics of Secular Humanism," pp. 162—3. 2. Brunner, Justice and Social Order, p. 127 3. Mircea Eliade, The Sacred and the Profane, translated by Willard R. Tusk (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc., 1959), Chapters 1 and 2. 4. Ibid., p. 48. 5. Rudolf Otto, The Idea of the Holy: An Inquiry into the Non—Rational Factor in the Idea of the Divine and Its Relation to the Rational, translated by John W. Harvey (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970), p. 29. 6. Ibid., p. 48. 7. Ibid., p. 5. 8. B.F. Skinner, Science and Human Behavior (New York: Macmillan, 1953), pp. 65-81. 9. Emile Durkheim, Elementary Forms of the Religious Life, translated by Joseph Ward Swain (London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1976), p. 225. 10. Ibid., p. 225. 11. Clifford Geertz, "Religion as a Cultural System," A_n Anthropological Approach to the Study of Religion, edited by Michael Banton (London: Tavistock Publications Limited, 1968), p. 4. 12. Peter L. Berger, "Some Second Thoughts on Substantive v. Functional Definition of Religion," Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 13(2) (June 1974), pp. 129-130. 13. Ibid. 139 l4. Kurtz, In Defense of Secular Humanism, p. 97. 15. Arnold van Gennep, The Rites of Passage (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1960), pp. 10-11. 16. Victor Witter Turner, Dramas, Fields and Metaphors (New York: Cornell University Press, 1974), p. 232. 17. Ibid., p. 243. 18. Ibid. 19. Brunner, Truth as Encounter, p. 15. 20. Carl G. Hempel, Aspects of Scientific Explanation (New York: The Free Press, 1965), p. 102. 21. R. Carnap, "Testability and Meaning," PhilOSOphy of Science, 3(4) (October, 1936), p. 425. Eulworth makes the Empiricist replaced in“; positivist conceptions of verifiability with that of confirmability. See Craig Dilworth, Scientific Progress (Boston: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1986), p. 33. 22. A.J. Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic (New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1952). 23. Hempel, p. 109. 24. Ibid. 25. R. Carnap, "The Methodical Character of Theoretical Concepts," in Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. 1, edited by Herbert Feigl and Michael Scriven (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1964), p. 49. 26. Hempel, pp. 22-23. 27. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, translated by G.E.M. Anscombe (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc., 1968), p. 194. 28. See N.R. Hanson, Patterns of Discovery (Cambridge: At the University Press, 1961), Chapter 1 and W.V.O. Quine "Two Dogmas of Empiricism" in W.V.O. Quine, From a Logical Point of View (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980). 29. Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1970), p. 111. 30. Ibid., p. 117. 140 31. Ibid., p. 118. 32. Ibid., p. 151. 33. Ibid., p. 176. 34. Jerry Fodor, "Observation Reconsidered," Philosophy of Science 51 (1984), pp. 24-5. 35. Ibid., p. 38. 36. Hempel, pp. 248-9. 37. Ibid., p. 394. 38. Wesley C. Salmon, Scientific Explanation and the Casual Structure of the World (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), Chapters 2, 3, 4. 39. Ibid., p. 54. 40. Ibid, p. 56. 41. Hanna has illustrated the weakness of Salmon's objective homogeneity of scientific explanation by considering the disastrous explosion of the space shuttle "Challenger" which occurred on January 28, 1986. In the early hours of the morning, the objective homogeneity was close to zero, yet seventy seconds into the flight, it was evidentally close to (if not equal to) one. It would follow, according to Salmon's theory, that the S-R basis for an explanation of that event would be essentially trivial (involving, perhaps, a reference class of events in which plumes of fire were issuing from the booster rocket only moments before its explosion). There do not appear to be "any objective grounds for isolating one moment rather than another in the evolution of the event as the focus of the explanation." See Joseph It. Hanna, "Objective Hemogeneity Relativized," Philosophy of Science Association (1986), p. 430. 42. See Salmon, pp. 208-09. 43. Edward L. Schoen, Religious Explanations: A Model From the Sciences (Durham: Duke University Press, 1985), p. 84. 44. Ibid., p. 149. 45. McShea, pp. 288—300. 46. I have thus far given an analogy between reasoning patterns in science and religion without ever showing if the latter demonstrated rationality in other ways. Even though 141 science is rational, as presented in this work, a rational property does not belong to science alone. Legal procedures, for instance, embody criteria for rationally distinguishing the criminally insane from the sane on the basis of witnesses, consistency or corroboration from history. It is, therefore, not difficult for a person, neutral to Brunner and Kurtz, to employ a similar procedure to determine whether agape is rational. Kurtz would probably reject this approach since it is not based on the scientific method, but it may nonetheless be acceptable to some third party. 142 APPENDIX APPENDIX I have devised the following categorizations in order to clarify and locate Brunner's and Kurtz's positions on morality. The tension between these two seems to boil down to atheism versus theism. Theism includes such world religions as Christianity, Islam, and Judaism, each of which comprises diverse movements. Christianity, for example, is that body of believers of Catholics, on the one hand, and Protestants, on the other, but it goes further to include subdivisions such as Fundamentalist Right in the United States and Christian Humanism. Both these groups represent a fundamentalist wing and theistic humanism respectively. Whereas theistic humanism fuses elements of other-worldly, on the one hand, and human-central concern, on the other, into morality, the fundamentalist wing often stresses the element of other worldly even at the risk of human well-being. Let me refer to this wing as non-humanistic theism for clarity's sake. Accordingly this kind of humanism basis morality exclusively on other-worldly. Considerations of human needs may be present but they do not take precedent. It is for this reason that non-humanist theism has often tended to be intolerant of the feelings and needs of other people who 143 144 happen to differ from them in beliefs about God or gods. This is clearly true of the Islamic fundamentalist movement in Iran today. From the perspective of morality, I group atheism into two main camps: non-humanistic atheism and atheistic humanism, for clarity's sake. Non-humanistic atheism is indifferent to the well-being of other persons as long as its primary concern is not in immediate danger. It may be committed to a particular discipline, political or economic ideology at the neglect of the basic needs for human existence. Morality is often given an inferior rating, and beliefs in God or gods are excluded from its mission. In short, the non-humanistic atheism is immune to human sensitivities and may lead to intolerance, persecution, oppression or torture of other people. It might be contended that certain experimentations of human subjects in medical science are of this sort. Scientific research, for its sake, is conducted regardless of the consequences of human suffering. By contrast, atheistic humanism is committed to considerations of human values, especially of moral dimension and it may take various forms. Let me briefly present five of the main strands of this kind of humanism, which I would refer to as existentialism atheistic humanism, Marxist atheistic humanism, positivist atheistic humanism, rationalistic atheistic humanism, and neo-Kantian atheistic humanism. 145 Existentialist Atheistic Humanism This form of humanism views human existence as prior to its essence. Accordingly, a human being exists before he can be defined by any concept. For Sartre, man is at first nothing because he is indefinable; he is afterwards something because he is definable. The existentialist finds it very distressing that God does not exist. Since there is no God, there is no determinism. If God does not exist, then man is the starting point. Human existence is comprehensible through such categories as alienation, despair and forlornness. Sartre's account of morality is based on a notion of freedom, according to which all actions are freely willed. Consciousness does not belong to the realm of material substances, and hence it is not governed by the laws of nature. Even emotions such as fear manifest one's freedom. A person who fears puts his freedom in his fear, and thus chooses to be fearful in the given circumstances. Freedom is the ability of the human consciousness to be guided by what does not exist.1 This position, which may be termed hard indeterminism, fails to discriminate voluntary from involuntary action. Thus, a person who involuntarily causes injury to another deserves the same punishment as one who willfully causes a similar injury. This is counter- intuitive. 146 Marxist Atheistic Humanism This humanism envisions a classless society achieved through the conquest of the capitalist forces of oppression. Beliefs in God are only illusions that serve to advance the capitalist interests.2 Although this form of humanism purports to promote the well-being of human beings, the means it employs to achieve a classless society would possibly result in bloodshed. Besides, it fails to do justice to the capitalist who, though he may have been oppressive, has invested his time and effort in organizing the mode of production. It is not true that all the profits are solely the product of the worker. Positivist Atheistic Humanism Here emphasis is placed on observation language as well as consensus of the scientific community. Accordingly, a sentence is meaningful if, and only if, it is verifiable by empirical observation. This humanism regards morality and theism as excluded from the realm of meaningful entities, since they do not meet this requirement. Some positivists of this orientation have, however, conceded to morality having an emotive meaning rather than a cognitive one.3 This emotive approach lacks commitment to a moral program to be undertaken here, since it tends to treat morals as a form of propaganda, lacking rationality. This indifference is not surprising, given its skepticism towards morality. 147 Rationalistic Atheistic Humanism Before I discuss this type of humanism, I would like to make a distinction between two sense of "reason." First, there is "reason" as speculative thought that is detached from experience. Kant was critical of this kind of reason, arguing that where observation is lacking, no knowledge is possible and where reason is lacking, no knowledge is possible. Both reason and observation must be present for knowledge, and none is a substitute for the other. The second type of "reason" is one that is employed in checking, testing, guiding, or judging thought. Scientific thought is of this kind. It is a kind of empirical reason. Throughout the inquiry I will use "critical reflection" in this second sense. The rationalistic atheistic humanism I am examining here employs reason in the first sense. Accordingly, reason is an instrument for comprehending human nature and for achieving human fulfillment. This view of reason is, to me, out of balance. Neo-Kantian Humanism Neo-Kantian humanism is a reaction against the rationalistic atheistic humanism, employing critical reflection instead of speculative reason. Among proponents of this kind of humanism is Kurtz, whose approach I will consider in detail later, and whose humanism I will refer to as "secular humanism." NOTES APPENDIX 1. Jean-Paul Sartre, Essays in Existentialism, edited by Wade Baskin (Secaucus: The Citadel Press, 1965), pp. 31-59. , Being and Nothingness, translated by Hazel E. Barnes (Secaucus: The Citadel Press, 1974), pp. 409, 529- 532. 2. The Marx-Engels Reader, edited by Robert C. Tucker (New York: W.W. 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