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ABSTRACT

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The dissertation suggests a reconciliation between two apparently incompatible, even antithetic attempts by Brunner, on the one hand, and Kurtz, on the other, on the question of achieving a virtuously moral life.

In a pluralistic society and in a highly scientific and technological age, it is difficult to come up with a definitive and satisfactory approach to achieving a moral life for fear of indoctrination or irrationality. On the other hand, a line of neutrality tends towards moral relativity. The solution to this dilemma is attempted by Brunner and Kurtz.

At the outset, Kurtz's morality without intervention, such as appropriate exemplars, leaves us with attaining a virtuous life by mere intellectual exercise. Since he dissociates himself from the libertarian camp, implying that he renounces moral relativity, I reconsider his view along the line of interventionism at the level of exemplars. This approach is, however, unacceptable to him since it includes religious exemplars, such as those employed in Brunner's model.

Brunner believes that secular morality is tenable and acceptable but he argues that his notion of agape in exemplars supplements this morality in the sense that it makes a moral life better. He, however, faces two serious difficulties from Kurtz's view. First, morality is autonomous, implying that it cannot depend on divine sanctions. Second, for Kurtz, agape is irrational, implying that it cannot be brought to bear on a rational system such as morality.

According to a plausible view of moral autonomy, a moral agent is one who determines his own destiny through critical reflection. But, according to this view, he is not insulated from external influences such as religious beliefs, except that he determines whether these influences should have a bearing on his moral life. Thus, even though morality is autonomous, it can still depend on religion. On the question of agape being irrational, Brunner could argue that agape is immune from scientific inquiry and, whatever publicly observable effects it might have, these effects are themselves rational. This approach should achieve reconciliation.

God had given knowledge of right and wrong in all the ages that preceded Christianity. God has not changed and cannot change. Of what use to virtue are theological distinctions, dogmas based on these distinctions, persecutions based on these dogmas? Nature, frightened and aroused with horror against all these barbarous inventions, cries out to all men: 'Be just, and not sophistical persecutors'--

Voltaire

To Wambeti, Moraa, Muthoni, Mogusu

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CHAPTER 1

STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

Defining the Problem

Throughout history religion has been an area of dispute. Before the advent of the scientific revolution, religion was considered the solution to many problems, including the question of morals and technical skills such as architecture. Religion was still a separate and distinct discipline, but this was only in degree, not in kind; for all physical phenomena and intellectual explorations tended toward some transcendental deity. As Baumer points out, religion was queen of all the sciences.[1] After the scientific revolution, certain forms of technological rationality purportedly replaced religion in offering physical and intellectual security and comfort.

Presenting a skeptical position about religion in the eighteenth century, Baumer argues that religion was depicted as "originated in imposture and fear; because it encouraged 'sick men's dreams'..., superstition and fanaticism ...; because it preached a false, cruel and immoral God, revealed in the Bible ...."[2] Proponents of the new science advocated morality of nature as opposed to a religious morality.[3] The new science and technology, inseparable as it is from the

student of nature, seems to offer man, whatever his geographical location, almost anything he ever cleaved for.

This inference may be somewhat misleading, for there are millions of people in the world today who do not have access to the scientific revolution, and religion still holds a key place in their lives. Furthermore, despite the exposure to the myriads of fascinations that modern technology displays, many people, including those from industrialized nations, are still searching for answers to mysteries and puzzles which they believe this technology is incapable of solving.

The brief historical account I have so far presented forms groundwork, in my view, for current charges that religion is an irrational enterprise, furnishing a typical case of indoctrination.

For all its success in medicine and natural science, the new science and technology has done little to alleviate moral decay in society. As Kurtz puts it: there is permissiveness concerning drugs. The state's coercive action to punish drug users is increasingly questioned. "Today, marijuana is as common in some circles as soft drinks and beer, and, regretfully, so are cocaine and heroine."[4] There are also increases in violence, urban decay, political corruption, and professional malpractice. As a result of these problems, there is an increasing interest in finding moral solutions that would lead to a society of virtuous individuals.

A program that is committed to the realization of virtuous individuals in a pluralistic society faces a predicament. On the one hand, since individuals in such a society hold moral values about which there are disagreements, it is difficult to come up with a set of values acceptable to everyone. Neutrality, in this case, tends to lead to moral relativity, resulting in little progress. On the other hand, supposing universal or eternal values could be found, it is difficult to teach them without being involved in an indoctrination of some sort.[5] I have elected to conduct this comparative analysis at the level of exemplars as a possible way of evaluating the effectiveness of overcoming this dilemma in both Brunner and Kurtz.

The importance of exemplars in morality has long been recognized by Plato, who argues that virtue is not something that can be taught since there are neither teachers nor students of virtue. Whoever has it gets it by divine dispensation. Virtue is God-given and those who have it perform services that are complementary to the well-being of a moral community. Individuals in such a community find their fulfillment and the realization of their goals in cooperative action. For Plato virtue would be acquired by imitating that which is the supreme good, the pattern for those who strive for it.[6]

Aristotle criticizes Plato's theory of the Good as something that is not tenable: "it is clear, therefore, that

the good cannot be something universal, common to all cases, and single; for it were, it would not be applicable in all categories but only in one." For him, the good is not something that is entirely separate from particular objects, as Plato claims, for it has a real being within the particular itself as its formal cause. Accordingly, the good "which we are now seeking must be attainable."[7] In Aristotle's view, virtue is implanted in us by habits. We become virtuous by doing virtuous things. Parents, teachers, and those concerned with the morals of society have an obligation in inculcating the right habits in the young. But this approach does not have to resort to formal instructions on ethics, as it is taught in Philosophy departments. They could, for instance, impress virtuous habits by being role models of virtue.

Brunner believes that a good life could result from religious training. Kurtz, on the other, believes a good life is based on the satisfaction of human needs independent of supernatural sanctions. In the contemporary scene, Brunner is not ignorant of the impact that science and technology have made in transforming the world. Both Brunner and Kurtz have a claim to access to the miraculous power of modern technology and both have been direct beneficiaries of the fruits of this technology. What puts a wedge between them is their perception of whether science and technology,

as embodying a mechanism in the form of an authority by which a moral life, could be achieved.

For Brunner, God, who logically cannot command evil, commands that a person should render services that enhance survival and comfort when (1) believers, who have agape, do so spontaneously and (2) when unbelievers execute the principle of reciprocity on which agape is based. Believers are exemplars of this principle inasmuch as they have agape, and so are virtuous unbelievers.

For Kurtz, a good life consists in services that enhance survival and comfort of self as well as others, in this life, without reference to Brunner's God, in the form of obeying or disobeying the commands of that God, either for their own sake, or for the sake of anticipating rewards or punishment.

Broadly speaking, this study attempts to investigate an underlying dispute between theism and atheism on the question of a virtuously moral life. Since both of these categories are broad and complex (see appendix), specific reference should be made for a study of this kind. I have elected to consider Kurtz's version because of the bold claim he makes about his moral program being a viable alternative to that advocated by theism. Certainly, he is correct in as far as the claim is directed against conservative wings like the Fundamentalist Right. I have, therefore, decided to juxtapose Brunner's model alongside that of Kurtz's in order to reconcile the two views.

The Significance of the Inquiry

This study is significant in at least four ways:

1. It cautions us against overgeneralization. Secular humanism is not an immoral program as we might be led to think simply because it is secular. It is sensitive to the need to create a virtuous society in the face of moral decay. Likewise, not all theistic programs advocate immoral methods of changing the values of society. Theistic humanism is committed to service to humanity in contrast to non-humanist theism which could condone intolerant behavior.

2. The study will shed light in the mind of moral educators who are interested in the role of religion in moral growth but are at the same time perplexed by the seemingly irrational nature of religion. These educators will discover that religious beliefs and practices do embody a mode of rational thought that would enhance the success of a moral program.

3. The theses advanced by both Brunner and Kurtz compel a move towards refining and broadening categories of the principle of reciprocity as a way of seeing moral relationships and how they are best to be achieved. People often interact beyond kinship boundaries, even in primitive societies. Educational institutions have for instance, succeeded in breaking down kinship, racial and even religious boundaries.

4. The study helps moral educators to see the inadequacies of employing critical reflection alone in their programs. It shows that those programs that strictly employ critical reflection without an emotional element provided by institutions such as religion will make little progress. A bias-free moral program is untenable, and some kind of balance needs to be struck between indoctrination and moral relativism.

I will now devote the rest of this inquiry stating and evaluating Brunner's and Kurtz's approaches in an attempt to reconcile them.

CHAPTER 2

SETTING THE TONE

This section attempts to provide an empirical basis for the principle of reciprocity advocated by Brunner and Kurtz. There are disagreements concerning what constitutes a moral life. In spite of this, there seems to be one area of agreement: that the furtherance of the welfare of mankind is good. Brunner emphasizes service to community, following Christ's parable of the Good Samaritan; Kurtz, following Spinoza, and others, emphasizes preservation of self and others. In my view, anthropological studies provide one of the most illuminating empirical understandings of this area of moral life in the form of kinship reciprocity. It is here that the closest social ties are manifested on the basis of sharing and generosity accompanied by truth, honesty, kindness, friendship, and concern for others. Although based on simple societies, kinship reciprocity will illuminate the kind of moral life advocated by both Kurtz and Brunner.

Kinship Reciprocity

In anthropology, morality has always been one of the ambiguous areas. Committed to the understanding of diversity among human beings, anthropology has for many years in the

past equated morality with culture. Since, from the anthropologist's perspective, cultures differ from one ethnic group to another, it follows that morality is relative to culture. Ethical relativism seems to have emerged as a result of this kind of approach. Some anthropologists are now recognizing the universality of human nature[1] and it seems ethical relativism is losing the popularity it once had. Another confusion that lingers on in the anthropological study of ethics is the Victorian misconception of the primitive as irrational. Those who have always believed that religion is irrational have reduced ethics to religion among the primitives. Dawson, for example, views religion as "not reasoning and demonstration."[2] The fact that many primitive societies seem to be deficient in political organizations and definite legal institutions does not mean that they are lawless. "On the contrary, primitive society is hedged in by a complicated system of prohibitions and restrictions and finds security in strict adherence to the law of custom and the guidance of divination." Social control (morality) "is provided by religion and ritual and magic rather than by political and legal organizations."[3] Others, like Fortes and Block, have identified morality with kinship reciprocity.

Fortes and Block

Fortes formulates a theory of kinship morality that is based on the distinction between what he calls "kinship domain" and "non-kinship domain"[4] of a social universe. The kinship domain, according to Fortes, is a relationship of amity among cognates. Amity is a social behavior among the cognates in which injury and quarrel are minimized by promoting a kind of reciprocity characterized by tolerance, generosity, and sharing. The kinsfolk in this domain are in "security circle." They have irresistible claims on one another, but marriage among them is forbidden, forcing men to seek women for marriage relationships in the non-kinship domain. The non-kinship domain is alien, strange and opposed since the relationship between these domains is one of conflict, frequent fights take place between them, resulting in injury or death. If there is any kind of sharing between them at all, it is minimal, mostly confined to the exchange of women.[5] According to Fortes, non-kinsfolk who are within the circle of affinal relationships can be turned from enemies into affines through marriage relationships.[6] It would thus appear that marriage is a powerful tool that could be used by both sides to mold an atmosphere free from injury on either side. Fortes, however, points out that conflict does exist even after marriage, although it takes a different dimension. For instance, among the Gisu, the affines

(including the wife) and the kinship are alienated; husband and wife never eat together among the Tellensi and a man avoids his mother-in-law. In general, the affines are not entitled to the kind of sharing and generosity relationships that the kinsfolk enjoy. The main point which Fortes himself emphasizes in the kinship and non-kinship distinction is that there are inescapable moral claims and obligations among kinsmen as opposed to non-kinsmen. It is as if the "attitude toward a person" is exercised only to those who are kinsmen. It would appear that Fortes' "kinsfolk" are ethical egoists of sorts, since they express moral duties only to those who belong to their group. There are obvious difficulties of viewing kinship morality as egoism. Fortes would counter this criticism by pointing out that the kinsfolk have a certain world view in which they distinguish between persons and non-persons; persons in this case happen to fall in the kinship domain and non-persons in the non-kinship domain, but this distinction is not supported by Fortes himself, and even if it were, we could still want to know how marriage between persons and non-persons is conceivable. From my experience, as a member of the "primitive" world, the affines are regarded as much persons as Fortes' "kinsmen" and are, therefore, included in moral relationships with the "kinsmen." This suggests then that Fortes' notion of kinship should be extended to cover not only consanguines but also affines. But, this would run counter to the evidence which

Fortes himself produces, showing that it is in fact the case that Ego treats his consanguines differently from his affines. According to Fortes, he treats the former with tolerance and tends to minimize conflict, injury or quarrel with them in contrast with the latter. Thus, kinship morality could really be said to pervade consanguineous relationships, but this does not rule out moral relationships between "kinsmen" and the affines. The problem Fortes thus faces is to give an adequate account of "persons" in a community of kinsmen who have moral obligations for one another. Those who have defended Fortes' theory have argued that the essence of kinship morality is sharing without reckoning. Block holds this view.[7] On close examination, however, "sharing without reckoning" applies to the consanguines rather than the affines, indicating that the affines do not fall under moral relationships. Fortes' morality of kinship would need to be modified in order to be well-suited to the principle of reciprocity advanced by Brunner and Kurtz for two reasons: 1) Assuming that a distinction between persons and non-persons could be made on the basis of treating the farmer with tolerance in contrast with the latter, this does not explain instances whereby "kinsfolk feuds" do occur. 2) Fortes' morality lacks essential features that could be the basis for exploring the principle of reciprocity advocated by Brunner and Kurtz. On 2), Block has suggested that kinsmen are persons who are

conscious of their interdependence, and, therefore, they should regard one another as a chain in an objectifying process for the existence of their group. This means that each chain has a vital part to play in the self-existence of the group which is subject to threats and annihilation from non-kinsmen. The notion of interdependence is basic to the well-being of the group as a whole; it is by coming into existence that morality among kinsmen will only be realized. It is by working as a cooperative and supportive entity that the well-being of kinsfolk is assured. Non-kinsmen, on the other hand, should be alienated because they might destroy the kinsfolk entity if contact with them is maintained. So, any form of generosity or friendship with them should be avoided. They are enemies, as it were, who might destroy the kinsmen if engaged in moral relationships. But, it has not been empirically demonstrated that involving non-kinsmen in moral relationships leads to the destruction of the kinsmen. Perhaps, kinsmen lack actual knowledge of non-kinsmen, because of their social distance leading the former to perceive the latter as dangerous for their own existence. If this is true, the issue of "persons" becomes a pseudo-problem, for person or non-persons alike, who are dangerous to the existence of a group should be avoided and alienated. Contact with them should be completely avoided. Morality is based on contact between persons and, where contact is lacking, morality is inconceivable. This means that Fortes'

theory of kinship morality may be tenable. At any rate, Fortes asserts that there is one point of contact with non-kinship domain, that is, marriage. Marriage turns enemies into affines, but, even when this occurs, affines are still regarded as aliens, and, therefore, they are not included in moral relationships. There are, of course, instances whereby affines do in fact destroy the original kinship entity by realigning social relationship ties. A man X who has strong ties with consanguines Y, may discover later that his relationship has shifted from Y to resist Z in every way, but this is not a sufficient reason for not treating Z in moral relationships. It seems to me that kinship morality includes both consanguines and affines and that these two groups frequently come into moral relationships with one another. A case in point of this assertion comes from India where a woman who experiences ill treatment from affines is consoled and given courage by her mother-in-law. To console and encourage someone is to be involved in a moral action (for consolation and courage are moral virtues). According to Brunner and Kurtz, a moral duty is not for only the consanguines but also for the affines, and even for people who lack the same ethnic background.

The second point which Block makes is that there is a distinction between short-term and long-term reciprocity. He thinks that, for Fortes, short-term reciprocity is a relationship with debt payment within a specified time

whereas, in long-term reciprocity, balance is not sought "in the short term because the relationship is assumed to endure;" there is here delay between gift and counter gift. According to Block, long-term reciprocity is the realm of kinship morality; for morality is associated with tolerance and delayed reciprocity. Immediate "reciprocity is tantamount to the denial of any moral relationship between parties, while delay between gift and counter gift is indication of moral character of the relations."[8] I am going to confine my discussion to long-term reciprocity, since this is the area which seems to have a bearing on views held by Brunner and Kurtz. At the outset, Block's interpretation of Fortes' kinship morality in this sense removes certain difficulties we saw earlier associated with Fortes; it would seem to explain why affinal relationships cannot fall under moral action, since most of these relationships demand that immediate compensation be made in exchange for women (or a woman in the case of symmetrical cross-cousin marriages and intermoeity marriages). However, even if this might be true, we still face difficulties with Block's "long term reciprocity." Supposing that, in long-term reciprocity, a kinsman gives a gift to another kinsman, expecting a counter gift in the long run. There may be delay, but the giver expects the balance some day. This form of reciprocity tends to treat persons only as means and, therefore, an action that falls under this kind of relationship could not be said to be

moral. But, Kant argues that a moral action is one in which persons are treated, not as means only, but also as ends.[9] This means that, when a kinsman gives a gift, it should express unconditional commitment and may not build up expectations that the balance will be paid. A person is a means only when he is under obligation to give a counter gift, when he is an intermediary between the gift and counter gift. He is a means as well as an end when he is not under such an obligation, in which case, he may or may not give a counter gift. Should we construe Block then as saying that the giver of the gift does not expect the balance? If the giver does not have any said expectation, he would not conceive his relationship with the receiver as one of reciprocity. On the other hand, if the receiver has to fulfill his moral obligation through giving a gift to the original giver, this gift may not be in response to the original giver, since he has to treat the other person, not as a means only, but also as an end. In effect, there is no real difference between short-term and long-term reciprocity. One might argue in favor of Block's long-term reciprocity by pointing out that, in this sort of reciprocity, there is a removal of fear of immediate payment of the balance and any action that removes fear and replaces it with courage is a virtuous one. Thus, kinship reciprocity may be moral in this sense. Block points this out: "The fact that morality carries the inevitable corollary of 'long-term' means" that

we can estimate "the amount of morality in a relationship by observing its degree of tolerance of imbalance in the reciprocal aspects of the relationship."[10] In long-term reciprocity, members of a community recognize that they need each other for their own survival. By contrast, in short-term reciprocity, one uses the other person for egoistic ends, which may have harmful consequences. The distinction between these two forms of reciprocity is crucial to the view that Brunner and Kurtz maintain in this inquiry. For their principle of reciprocity is a kind of long-term reciprocity. It is true that a form of self-interest is embodied in this principle, but this self-interest is opposed to egoism.

Thus far, reciprocity in terms of exchange of gifts illustrates two aspects of morality. One aspect is elucidated by Block's shift to an important aspect of kinship reciprocity as a complex pattern of interpersonal relationships in which the community views itself as an entity whose whole existence depends on these. The other one views a person's relationship to others as benefitting that person exclusively, regardless of harmful consequences on the people involved in the reciprocal relation. This notion may be extended to include a community whose relationships to others is calculated to serve its own interests exclusively. The version of reciprocity I will be considering in subsequent inquiry treats the well-being and interests of everyone involved in it seriously. But it should be noted

that certain forms of interdependent relationships do not qualify. For instance, marriage is a social institution by which society perpetuates itself--so the kinsfolk do not become extinct in the course of death of old members of the kinsmen--but marriage itself is a domain characterized by quarrels, conflicts, fights, and even jealousy. Thus, it is only those reciprocal relationships as domains of virtue that are to be achieved and constantly nurtured in a virtuous society.

To sum up, kinship reciprocity is a domain of moral relationships, but it is also a domain of non-moral or even immoral relationships. But, it is those interdependent relationships that promote comfort and security for each member of the community and the community as a whole that constitute a moral life through sharing, generosity, and friendship. The assumption here is that in a primitive society their world view of persons is limited. The pluralistic societies, the principle of kinship reciprocity could be extended to cover members of the same fraternity, religious groups, family, political party or business organizations--settings that provide the formation of the closest social ties and interactions. It is also illustrative of interdependent relationships among members of the human community for the well-being of each member in that community. It is the latter notion of the moral life that Brunner and Kurtz basically defend.

Brunner and Kurtz

By now, it should be clear that reciprocity is not simply the exchange of gifts or women, as some anthropologists have suggested. Block has correctly observed that, among the Pal Eliya, reciprocity is complex. These villagers heavily rely on the system of tank irrigation for farming, and each farmer is totally at the mercy of the unselfish use of water by his neighbors. Since they are conscious of their interdependence, they ensure that everyone has enough water for his agricultural tasks without resorting to force. In drawing water from the system, one gets what is just enough for one's own use by considering the well-being and existence of others.[11] Whereas Block's notion of reciprocity is abstracted from primitive societies, whose world view may be limited, it illuminates Kurtz's and Brunner's models in two ways:

1) Reciprocal relationships are the basis of morality when each person involved in this relationship stands to gain or to lose. It is conceivable that in reciprocity some individuals may exploit others for the sake of egoistic ends. This is to be construed as viceous. The distinction between egoism, on one hand, and a form of self-interest that serves the well-being of each person, on the other, is overlooked by Fortes but emphasized by Brunner and Kurtz. This shows that it is only a certain form of reciprocity that is to be fostered and maintained in a successful moral program in the latter.

2) The distinction between short-term and long-term reciprocity seem to correspond to the execution of the principle of reciprocity in <u>this world</u> and Brunner's <u>supra</u>-empirical realm respectively.

Since both Brunner and Kurtz have lived in the post-enlightenment period of great scientific innovations and inventions their moral programs are at least entitled to a view of persons that transcends the confines of gender, religion, economic, cultural, racial, and national boundaries. This is reflected in their general commitment to services to humanity of whatever background. This will increasingly become clear in due course. I now undertake a detailed analysis of their approaches.

CHAPTER 3

BRUNNER AND THE MORAL LIFE

Emil Brunner comes from the city of Zurich, Switzerland. Before his death in 1966, he was professor of systematic and practical theology at the University of Zurich, where he taught for almost forty years, until his retirement and subsequent death. He also travelled and lectured at a number of universities in Europe, United States, and Japan. Brunner writes in a period where there is concern for finding solutions to crime, violence, corruption, and licentiousness in a pluralistic society. His own version of moral program begins with obedience to the will of God, which is the will to serve the community and those in need. His approach is inseparable from his theology.

God as Transcendent and Immanent

Brunner's approach to a moral life presupposes belief in a transcendental deity of the Judeo-Christian traditions. The Supreme Being is God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, and the Father of the Lord Jesus Christ. He is the Creator of all things and, therefore, Lord of even those who do not know and obey him. Following Luther, Calvin and other church fathers, Brunner emphasizes the doctrine of the Trinity,

according to which "God who in himself is Father, Son and Spirit," as "God, independent of the being of the creature, is in himself, the loving One, the self-communicating One, the One who speaks."[1] God has loved all human beings through all eternity and has elected them in his Son who is love. It is through Christ and the Holy Spirit that God approaches man, as historical revelation[2] and the enlightenment of the Holy Spirit taking place from moment to moment respectively. "The Spirit bear witness that the Father, who through the Son, has come out of his mystery and drawn near to us, is our Father."[3] The historical revelation is mainly compiled in the Bible, a document that bears testimony to the love of the Father through Christ. But the Bible alone is not sufficient for a well-rounded religious experience. For the "human heart must be opened in faith through the power of God's own spirit if that on which everything depends is to come to pass: the knowing of God."[4] For Brunner, the historical revelation and the presence of the Holy Spirit in a believer's life are mutually supportive in sustaining the essentials of a truly religious experience. One cannot exist without the other. "We are Christians because we are related to a historical fact, that fact of history which we all know, the person of Jesus Christ in whom God has revealed himself and by whom man's situation is changed from one of being lost to one of being redeemed."[5] In this unique event, God revealed Himself in the cross of His Son, reconciling the

world to Himself in Christ for good and forever.[6] But the historical revelation alone is uncertain, since we do not know whether what the Gospels tell us about Jesus Christ is true. Further, the event of God's redemptive work in his Son appears irrational to a critical inquirer. "Certainly, historical traditions are of merely relative certainty, they are open to historical criticism, even to historical skepticism." Nonetheless, "the Gospel traditions, considered as historical documents by the historian, carry with them not more than relative certainty" and irrationality for the believer. They "become to the believer through the divine Spirit the instrument of the Word of God, which in itself has absolute certainty."[7] Thus, Brunner leans toward the phenomenological tradition, which, as I will show later, grounds divine encounter within an experience encapsulated from a non-religious view. Like Otto, he believes that the historical revelation is a scandal or stumbling-block for the "natural man."[8]

Eternal Life

Closely tied to the notion of God as transcendent and as immanent, is the belief in eternal life. Accordingly, eternal life is God's gift through his Son. It is "the expectation of the good things to come."[9] Brunner's version of eternity is unlike that of Spinoza's. For Spinoza, eternity is achieved by the exercise of reason and intuition,

resulting in comprehending the world as consisting of causal chains that are governed by necessary laws of the universe. For Brunner, on the other hand, it is omniqualitative and is given to all those who will accept God's gift of grace. He rejects Plato's claim that the soul is immortal, asserting, instead, that God alone is immortal. Eternal life has, therefore, its origin, not in the soul, but in God, through his act of resurrection. It is not that which man has but that which God gives. "And this eternal life which God gives is personal, not impersonal."[10] The act of God through his Son as narrated by the Gospels is past. The enlightenment of that act by the Holy Spirit is an ever present experience for the believer. But eternal life, on the other hand, is a forward-looking event that has not yet been made concrete. Brunner will, however, not hesitate to point out that even eternal life is made present and actual in those who have faith. Certainly, it is impossible for the "natural man" to comprehend and appropriate eternal life as would a believer. Here, to the natural man, the claim that there is eternal life is something that resists investigations of the kind depicted in ordinary rational methods of scientific inquiry.[11] Thus, Brunner would once again escape the criticisms of those who would employ these methods to penetrate into the structures of religious beliefs. I would postpone a detailed treatment of this attempt for now.

Meanwhile, I would like to consider the central theme in Brunner's exposition of eternal life: parousia.

Parousia

The Parousia denotes the future coming of Christ in the consummation. It implies the overt realization of a present reality that is veiled. It is a coming in which God imparts his effectual presence of salvation and dwells among his people. It is the reign of the Messiah.[12] Following New Testament writers and traditions, Brunner believes that the single event that is decisive on the movement of Christianity in the historical revelation is the crucifixion of the Son of god followed by his resurrection and these two elements constitute victory, not tragedy. But faith in this past event "without the expectation of his Parousia is a voucher that is never redeemed, a promise that is not seriously meant." A Christian faith without this expectation is like a ladder which leads nowhere but ends in a void.[13] Parousia is one of those religious beliefs that could be appreciated by the unbeliever as having a function in human activities.

For the believer, Christ will come and establish his kingdom of love and peace. This will be accomplished by the resurrection of individuals and the realization of eternity by the believers. Brunner appears to lack clarity on the question of the fate of those people who have rejected God's gift of grace. Consequently, there could be two possible

interpretations. First, his theology of Parousia would tend to lead to universal salvation for everyone, regardless of whether God's gift is accepted or rejected. Second, it could mean that those who accept the gift will receive eternal life and those who do not will be punished, possibly condemned to die. His view of judgment might clear away this confusion, putting Parousia in the right perspective.

Judgment

Brunner generally speaks of judgment as if he were supporting the second view. Accordingly, the just are separated from the unjust after the resurrection. The "curse and punishment strikes down only the latter." God is a Judge, "ascertaining with precision the guilt of the individual and making judgment accordingly: this is especially the case in connection with the expectation of a dual resurrection, some to eternal life, others to eternal damnation."[14] Judgment is a disclosure in which man becomes exposed to searching. The expectation of the Parousia is linked to the expectation of the judgment. Just as the resurrection puts an end to death, "so judgment terminates the state of confusion and obscurity, of inconclusiveness,"[15] that the judgment discloses the secrets of a person's life, like "the internal parts of the body under X-rays"[16] is an experience that occasions fear, not only in a non-believer but also in the believer. Brunner also grants the first

interpretation a place in salvation theology. "Both aspects remain juxtaposed in their harsh incompatibility."[17] In this state of indecision, it is difficult to determine Brunner's real position. The first interpretation is inconsistent with his view of love--as will become clear shortly--which seems to run through his entire theological enterprise. For this reason, I would consider the second interpretation as his official position. This move is supported by various assertions he makes in other works. For instance:

> Therefore in His revelation God's will is expressed by His sanctions, by rewards and punishments. God alone gives life; to be with Him is life, to resist is ruin. It is impossible to exist apart from God; it is impossible to be neutral towards Him. He who is not for Him is against Him. God's command means eternal life and God means nothing else than this. He is love. But His will is utterly serious; it is the will of the Lord of Life and Death. Anyone who--finally--resists Him will only dash himself to pieces against the rock of His Being.[18]

The notion of rewards and punishments meted out after the divine judgment plays a crucial role in Brunner's approach to a moral life, which I will now encounter in the next section.

Love and Preservation of Order

Like Spinoza, Brunner believes that a person has an obligation to preserve the world in which that person lives in order to promote his own self-preservation by exercising the power of reason. He, however, goes further than Spinoza in claiming that the believer does more than just preserve orders for the sake of his own self-preservation. The

believer does this only by conducting his moral life in the realm of love. It would, therefore, be illuminating to appreciate Brunner's point by distinguishing between preservation and love.

Preservation of Orders

I have already pointed out that Brunner believes that God created everything. But this assertion as it stands out would face some difficulties. On the one hand, a Marcionite would maintain that this world as we know it is evil. God is perfect, implying that he cannot create something that is evil. Therefore, God, who is perfect, did not create this world. This means that it is false that God created everything. Therefore, Brunner is mistaken. On the other hand, one could assert, like a Marcionite, that this world as we know it is evil, but will grant that God does, in fact, create everything, including this world. He would then attribute sin to God since God is the creator of everything, including that which is evil--this world. This, however, would undermine Brunner's notion of freedom, which is a pre-condition for standing before the divine judgment, for to be judged is to be held responsible for violations committed. Responsibility presupposes that one has ability to make free choices, but if we are already determined to be evil, we have no choice. Brunner steers out of this dilemma by maintaining that sin is the human denial of the divine order of creation.

"Apart from the evil in men's hearts, and in their actions, everything in the world is in God's creation: the course of the starts, the changing seasons, the form and the life of plants and animals--even of wild animals--the human body in its relation to the soul, the series of human generations, birth and death--all this is, as it is, and takes place in this way, because, and as, God has appointed it, from the standpoint of His Creation."[19] For him, then, death is not an evil, as many people tend to think. Nevertheless, Brunner would add: "The bodily physical death is only the final and full revelation of the sinful character which inheres in this sinful life--of the fact that it is a prey to death, that it is oriented to the goal of destruction and bears in itself the marks of its own nothingness, because it has lost its ground in the One who is the source of life and is Himself life." Death is for the believer an ordinance of God "but it is not an original element of the divine order in creation; on the contrary, it has arisen from disorder."[20] After the Fall,[21] disorder exists alongside the order ordained at creation, but this disorder is the result of "a fallen humanity."[22] Brunner's rejection of "Original Sin,"[23] however, does not explain why death should be the fate of everyone who never participated in Adam's rebellion. Surely the death of an infant should not be the result of Adam's sin, but why should the infant be subjected to such a cruel act then? Brunner's failure to come into grips with this

issue is a general weakness that infects his subsequent approach to a moral life. Leaving this question aside, as if it raised no problem at all, Brunner proceeds to analyze human nature.

Human Nature

The basic elements in human nature, according to Brunner, are freedom, reason, and preservation of orders ordained in Creation. He argues that a correct view of justice ought to recognize equality and inequality among human beings. The human race has one essential feature: right to freedom, which has its origin in the structure of created order. It might thus be said that God bestowed freedom to man. Man has a right to his life, a right to his body, limbs and property.[24] Man has right to obtain his livelihood from the earth by the work of his hands. He is created to draw his sustenance from the earth.[25] No one, not even the state, should refuse anyone the right to his freedom. Freedom "belongs of necessity to the destiny of man." God can only have communication with a free being. "it is only in freedom that man can do God's will as a loving creature who obeys his own free will."[26] The community, of which the individual is a member, has freedom, too. It has a right to the existence of its organic collectivity.

Following Locke and Rousseau, Brunner asserts:

> Communities can be nothing but utilitarian organizations created by the free consent of

> individuals in order to give effect to a definite purpose to which the individual could give effect himself. Hence the original form of all communities is the contract, freely entered into and only dissolved by mutual consent. The community is therefore a mere expedient, a product of necessity. Since the individual is too weak, the individual must--unfortunately--cooperate.[27]

His commitment to a social contract theory of sorts here subjects him to a commonly raised criticism against the theory. What is the status of individuals who elect not to, or are not allowed to, enter the contract and whose right to freedom ought, nevertheless, to be protected? In early democratic process in the United States, for instance, a contract was made through the agreement of the majority, who happened to be whites. Blacks were not involved. Moreover, their rights to freedom were not included in the contract. It would appear, then, that, according to this theory, the civil rights movement of the early sixties, involving mostly blacks, were violating the contract which they were not permitted to take part in making. Brunner has no problem finding an answer to this sort of criticism. Since it is his conviction that the freedom of the individual comes first,[28] the claim of the civil rights activists ought to be taken seriously. A contract that does not integrate the right of individual freedoms of all individuals into itself is not better than a tyrannical rule, which Brunner believes is evil. In other words, the right to individual freedom has priority to the right to freedom of the collectivity to form a contract. In this state of affairs, neither the individual

nor the collectivity is sovereign over the other, for God alone is sovereign. Accordingly, anarchy is checked by recognizing that the collectivity is ordained by God. By the same token, the tyrannical hand of the collectivity over the individual is checked by recognizing his inalienable right to freedom ordained at Creation.[29]

The other element Brunner considers in a moral life is reason. Reason, like freedom, is the gift of God. It is what distinguishes man from animals. Reason is creative activity in which "the intellectual side of life is freely self-determined." Brunner contends that God is not the enemy of reason, "since indeed He has created it," but is the enemy of reason which becomes an end in itself. "Man, whom God has created as a rational being, can only fulfill the purpose of his being by the exercise of his reason,"[30] For Brunner, reason and freedom are inseparable. Freedom is the real substance of reason. Without freedom, one would not raise himself to the level of self-determination in creative thought. Man cannot believe without reason; he cannot make choices of what to believe without freedom. Reason presupposes making choices from among given alternatives but to be able to consider each alternative separately in order to choose presupposes freedom. Reason and freedom would thus become the basis for Brunner's conception of a morality conceived under preservation.

Brunner observes that human beings are just as much equal as they are unequal. Although he does not condone class distinction on the basis of economy, race or religion that would lead to exploitation or oppression, he however believes that "Creation has so disposed human beings that they must seek and have each other."[31] The individual needs the community in order to survive; the community cannot exist where there is no difference: "without difference, there is unity, but not community." "Community presupposes reciprocal giving and taking, community reciprocal exchange and completion." One has something in his being that the other lacks.[32] God preserves human life through existing orders in various communities. He gives us these orders by means of our reason, and He preserves them by means of our reason."[33] From the point of view of justice, preservation of orders basically results in rendering to each person his due. It is thus in the community that the right of the individual's life, limbs and property is to be protected. Each person owes the other protection of such a right. It is a moral obligation for everyone to render services that promote preservation of life and comfort of oneself and others. The question of suicide is not discussed by Brunner. Since one has a right to his own life, it is entirely up to him to decide whether to preserve it or destroy it. It is therefore not morally objectionable to take one's life. Brunner would probably counter this conclusion by reminding us that taking

one's life deprives others of the contribution one could make to promote the preservation of others, if one were living. A person is therefore obliged to protect his own life so that he will not deprive others of this contribution. As a whole, the principle of reciprocity Brunner uses in his view of a moral life could be stated simply as follows: we ought to render services to other persons in the human community and to the community itself that promote their preservation through reason, so that our self-preservation would also be promoted by their services rendered to us. This principle is really not different from that advanced and defended by Spinoza. It is a principle of ethical self-interest.[34] Brunner, however, goes further than Spinoza in asserting that agape sustains the principle of reciprocity in a way that the principle by itself could not.

Agape

Brunner is aware of the various ways the term "love" is used in ordinary language contexts. Thus, "love" may mean (eros) from the Greek roots, Ἔρομαι , ἐράω which means "intense desire for a particular individual as a sexual partner."[35] Brunner argues that this kind of love is based on a have/have-not relationship, in which each person involved has something which the other person does not have. The consummation of a sexual relationship is to harmonize the partners involved so each will receive what lacked before the

relationship occurred. A relationship of ἔρως type essentially operates on the same principle as that of Brunner's notion of reciprocity used in the preservation of individuals and orders. Brunner proceeds to consider another form of "love" that has been identified by some writers as φιλία (phila) from φίλος, which means friendship, or the art of making one's own.[36] Likewise, this kind of "love" is founded on the principle of reciprocity. The third kind of love is ἀγάπη (agape) from ἀγαπάω which, according to Brunner, is love not grounded in value. It is not attracted by the value of the object. It is "movement in just the opposite direction;" it is giving but not getting.

> If I love you because you are so and so, I love you with <u>eros</u>. But if I love you in spite of your being so and so, my love is <u>agape</u>. Most of us do not like to be loved in spite of what we are. But this is the very essence of <u>agape</u>, and particularly God's love. There is no apparent reason why I should love anyone in spite of his being what he is. Neither is it understandable why I should be intent upon giving rather than getting. But that is the character of <u>agape</u>; it is a love that does not seek to fill my soul, but to fill you; to replenish your emptiness and not my own.[37]

Following the example of Jesus, believers show <u>agape</u> in their moral lives, even to the degree of loving enemies. Agape does not simply replace the principle of reciprocity in the preservation of individuals and communities, but it is founded on it. Agape which neglects service to the community and fellow man is not agape but sheer sentimentality, and sentimentality, feeling for feeling's sake, is the poison, the solvent which destroys all orders. The principle of

reciprocity is the pre-condition of agape; it cannot be neglected by agape. Agape can only do more, it can never do less, than the principle requires. The parable of the good Samaritan, who rendered services of preserving life and restoring comfort to a wounded stranger from whom he expected nothing in return for the services, is an illustration of agape. Its origin is God alone, whose nature is to want to give but not to get. He "wants to share, to give of his own to those who lack, who have need of what he gives. His love is entirely unmotivated by any value outside himself." He loves for no other reason than that he wants to love.[38] God is agape. "Faith is nothing in itself but the openness of our heart for God's love" by "a relation to a fact of history, the cross of Christ"--the crucified Christ becoming the living Christ, present in the heart. Christ in the heart is the one who fills hearts with himself and with agape.[39] Agape is not rational but supra-rational.[40] It is inseparable from faith. For this reason, it is only believers who have it and no one who lacks it is a believer.[41] Brunner characterizes agape as spontaneous and unmotivated. It seems to me that a believer does not accept the gift of eternal life (which is an expression of God's love) simply, but in view of considerations of rewards or punishment after the judgment. Thus, the believer's agape may not be as unmotivated, as Brunner seems to argue.

Exemplars: Christ and Believers

Thus far, Brunner stresses a mystical union with the divine as the most effective means of achieving a moral life conceived as service to the community. There are two levels of religious experience that involve a moral life. First, there is the believer's private world in which the concept of agape shapes his attitudes towards others. There is also the believer's public life in which these attitudes are expressed in actions of service the community. It is the latter which is accessible to the unbeliever's inquiry. But, from the believer's view, the two levels are inseparable. For Brunner, Christ is an Exemplar or Role Model of virtuous living. To live virtuously is to be able to translate Christ's practical life of service to humanity into that of the service of a moral agent to others. The Gospels declare Christ, not only as truthful, sincere, honest and kind, but also as helpful in such works as healing and feeding the hungry. He is a model of agape. Brunner, however, maintains that Christ the Example presupposes "that Jesus, True Man, the Sinless One, could only be True Man because He was more than man; because he was also--God." But he admits that the connection between the Exemplar, on the one hand, and the virtuous living of individual moral agents, on the other, is not a necessary one since there are human possibilities of one becoming virtuous without an awareness of Christ, the Exemplar. Nonetheless, Brunner thinks that Jesus as the

Perfect Ideal could generate "impulses" that help in nurturing and directing virtuous living.

The other way that a moral life is related to exemplars is one in which a believer is an example in the community. His most important duty "always remains that of pouring the vitality of love into the necessarily rigid form of the order."[42] Love of our neighbor can transform "harsh orders."[43] Brunner draws attention to the principles of the Sermon on the Mount as central to a believer's moral life, according to which those who are filled with agape are the light of the world.[44] The importance of exemplar in moral training has been recognized by educators: "Outside the home, the teacher is probably the single most potent exemplar of morality in children's lives" but this approach should be coupled by logic and reason.[45] Brunner will not raise objection to this insight, but he would maintain that believers could be such exemplars. I will consider this point after the next chapter.

CHAPTER 4

KURTZ AND THE MORAL LIFE

Paul Kurtz is Professor of Philosophy at the State University of New York at Buffalo. He is former Editor-in-Chief of The Humanist and currently serves as Vice-President of The New Humanist. Kurtz has written extensively on a certain version of secular humanism, which he also defends. He believes that secular humanism is an alternative to the traditional methods of solving contemporary moral problems, and that moral education is the frontier for the realization of a virtuous society.

Kurtz's approach to the realization of a virtuous life is influenced by a line of philosophers from Aristotle down through Spinoza, Mill, Dewey, Hook, and others. In my view, Spinoza has given the clearest classical direction for Kurtz's position. Spinoza alleges that morality is based on the preservation of human nature, that is to say, on the maintenance of biological, sociological, and psychological features of human existence, through the use of rational powers that enable human beings to create symbols and manipulate nature in order to promote their own survival. According to him, human beings are capable of hindering the persistence in the being of others as well as promoting it.

Morality and Human Nature

In a Spinozist version, Kurtz argues that morality is rooted in sensitivity to the interests and needs of oneself and others, "a rational awareness that my good is tied up with the good of others and, a recognition that any happiness I desire presupposes some conditions of order and rules which would make it possible for other human beings beside myself to achieve their ends."[1] He concurs with McShea in recognizing that no man can live in total isolation. We are "consistent, coherent and continuing beings: and of common species membership."[2] Morality is an obligation to ourselves inasmuch as we regard human nature as connected with benefit and harm for human beings produced by human agency, thus behooving us to devise an artificial technique for handling physiological, psychological, and sociological needs through exhaustive efforts to human efforts to human rationality. Kurtz is, however, not sharp in making a distinction between physiological needs such as food, water, sleep and air, which are the most elementary, and other needs desirable for a satisfactory existence, such as physical comfort, sexual satisfaction, health, full use of limbs and organs, shelter, sense of common membership, and of continuing, self-identical entities. As McShea reveals, there are human goods that are primary and there are others which are secondary--for human existence--and these goods do

require a means to acquire them.[3] Frequently, the means used depends on human variables, such as culture, environmental influence, tastes, attitudes, and interests. Let us call the means so used instrumental goods. Granting that Kurtz accepts the distinction between instrumental goods, on the one hand, and primary and secondary goods, on the other, then an account of morality being situational and relative, according to Kurtz,[4] can be given as follows. According to McShea, the variable aspect of the instrumental goods is often the realm of moral disagreements (morality is thus, not simply an obligatio to acquire primary and secondary goods, but it constitutes particular ways by which these goods are acquired). One would possibly object that this move essentially endorses hypothetical ends and that morality is not objective. According to Griffin, this objection rests on a miscontrual that results from confusing desires that we happen to have and desires that are characteristic of human existence, things that we aim at as particular human beings and things we aim at "as normal human beings" ("ends that fill the last place of human existence").[5] Survival goods, especially primary goods, which are deeply rooted in our biological constitution, are invariable, and, therefore, universal and neutral, whereas instrumental goods, secondary goods, could be variable and, therefore, become subjective values. Food, a basic human survival good, is hedged about with social rules. The Gusii people of Kenya, for example,

receive plenty of rainfall and rarely experience a drought exceeding a month. As a result, they are able to grow maize, the subsistence crop, two or three times a year. Before the first fruits of the harvest are eaten, each family conducts their own ceremony in which the eldest son initiates the partaking of the maize meal. The occasion is supposed to endow the meal with properties that would sustain human survival beyond the biological needs. People of other cultures may disagree with the cultural underpinnings surrounding maize as food stuff, but they may have little difficulty agreeing that maize is a foodstuff that can sustain human survival. Human beings may disagree on instrumental goods or secondary goods, but they agree on primary goods. They may agree that showing hospitality to hungry strangers by giving them food is good, but they may disagree on the method of doing it. Situational morality is thus far made plausible.

The two faces of morality, as thus construed in Kurtz's morality, have been recognized by Hampshire as "the rational and articulate side and the less than rational, the historically conditioned, fiercely individual, imaginative and parochial, the less than articulate side." There is a "distinction between the abstract ideal, the good for man in a perfect life, and the relatively specific and limited way of life chosen by individuals at definite historical junctures." The abstract ethical ideal is objective in the

sense that "the validity and relevance of the supporting arguments do not vary with the varying circumstances in which they are invoked, but are universal and independent of any particular standpoint or assumed premises."[6] This view, however, tends to assign instrumental goods (particular ways of acquiring primary goods as well as certain secondary goods, which are universal and neutral) a nonobjective status. Griffin resists this move, arguing that many of our non-universal, non-neutral values are not "personal values as if they came from tastes or attitudes that we just happen to have, or from commitments that we blindly make."[7] On the contrary, they generally "choose us by being the sort of values that we have only to perceive clearly to adopt as goals."[8] This means that we could not limit moral objectivity to that which is neutral and universal, for moral autonomy (which presupposes individual ways of making choices) would be denied objectively. Griffin himself hardly offers an argument in support of this claim. I think the approach adopted thus far shows that Kurtz is able to defend himself against the charge that, if morality is situational and relative, we do not need to be concerned with the morals of society. Primary goods reflect general guides to conduct, but deny that they are "universal or absolute, since exceptions can be made to them on occasion."[9] Morality is situational and relative inasmuch as we are concerned with instrumental and secondary goods but it is objective inasmuch

as we are concerned with primary goods which human beings share. The latter is the purpose for moral education, which I will consider in the next section.

Moral Education

Kurtz believes that all education is "in a sense moral, thus we have an obligation to nourish moral character in the young. This includes an appreciation for temperance, prudence, excellence, and the development of sensitivity to the needs of others."[10] One might argue that education is moral; this, however, is inconsistent with Kurtz's recurring theme that the morals in society today are far from satisfactory. If all education is moral as such, it would be needless to be concerned with morality since education automatically remedies that would-be concern. Kurtz would appear not to be saying that once we have education, moral problems are automatically solved, but rather, that education is a process and a frontier for solving today's moral vices. Such an education needs not to be confined to that offered in the formal classroom setting, but it could also include parental training and other conditioning variables. But supposing that parents and society do not hold values that are satisfactory, then the onus is on educational institutions to become exclusive carriers of moral values. Kurtz believes that moral education should not lose sight of the essential element that:

> Man needs to be himself. He needs to affirm his manhood, to develop the courage to persist in spite of all the obstacles that would destroy him, indeed to exceed himself by creating a new life for himself. The challenge for the free man is to realize his possibilities, and to create new ones, not to cower in masochistic denial, not to withdraw in anxiety, fear, and trembling, not to look outside of himself for help that is there.[11]

Although Kurtz wants to emphasize the need for creativity and critical thinking, he is clearly critical of Brunner's God, as it will become clear in the next section. Brunner did defend a doctrine of divine judgment that could inspire fear on matters of ultimate concern for those who believe. For Kurtz, this defeats the purpose for moral education.

The second element Kurtz emphasizes is that moral education reflects commitment to the scientific method of inquiry, broadly conceived as the hypothetical-deductive method, "in which hypothesis are introduced, deductively elaborated, and experimentally tested, directly or indirectly, by evidence." In other words, morality should be scientifically informed, but this does not mean that scientific truth is eternal and immutable. "Knowledge claims are tentative; even verified hypothesis may be later modified in the light of new evidence or more comprehensive explanations."[12] We believe the scientific method, though imperfect, is still the most reliable way of understanding the world.[13] The view that scientific truth is subject to revision implies that morality, formulated in the light of

scientific evidence, is similarly subject to revision. At least this is true in a situational morality.

The final element in Kurtz's moral education program is a democratic ethic. "It recognizes that moral truth is often the product of give and take among conceptions of the good life." We should tolerate the rights of others--"so long as they do not harm others--though we may disapprove of their moral values." In this case, "we reserve the right to educate and modify their tastes and conceptions by persuasion."[14] Kurtz seems to relegate the determination of what constitutes the morally acceptable to the decision of the majority, but there is no basis here for justifying the rule of that majority; just because the majority holds a certain view does not guarantee that their view is morally right. I will pursue this point further in the next section.

Critical Reflection vs. Indoctrination

I mentioned that Kurtz might claim to differ from Brunner in emphasizing value clarification in a moral life through intellectual inquiry and critical reason. Specifically, he claims that "the good life is achieved when we realize the human potential," for the human values are cultivated only if we "overcome the blind forces (supernatural commandments) that threaten the quality of life."[15] "Some theists attempt to impose authoritarian

structures from without by establishing rules of conduct and instilling them in the young, offering no rhyme or reason other than God's commandments."[16] According to Kurtz, an individual who is leading a truly morally good life should be tolerant of others even though their actions may be repugnant to his own moral values. If this attack on theistic morality is directed against Brunner's view, then it is grossly mistaken since the latter emphasizes human freedom. Kurtz's motivation for moral education arises, however, out of his observation: "Moral libertarianism, as is apparent has made considerable progress in the democratic society." Thus, censorship in the arts, television, movies, theatres, magazine and book publishing has lessened. But this has led to pornography. Restrictions on sexual morality have been loosened. Adultery and divorce have become widespread as a result. Kurtz also blames libertarianism on permissive use of drugs, broken homes, rejection of the work ethic, narcisstic morality and self-indulgence. "Without virtue, the person freed from restraint may indeed by transformed into a moral monster."[17] Kurtz is thus aware of two extremes in a moral education in a democratic society today. On the one hand, there is libertarianism, which is a force in upholding the orders of a democratic system, but whose permissiveness leads to moral decay. On the other hand, there is Brunner's insistence on a divine-based morality. Kurtz wants to steer between these two extremes by

avoiding Brunner's God on the one hand, and licentiousness, on the other.

Extramarital sex is morally acceptable provided that the parties involved are guided by reason in the process of deriving pleasure. Kurtz condemns imposition of "external authoritarian rules upon human beings," for "the traditional supernaturalistic moral commandments are especially repressive of our human needs." According to Kurtz, basing moral rules solely on religious authority is a sufficient reason for rejecting those rules. "They are immoral in so far as they foster illusions about human destiny [immorality] and suppress vital inclinations [deny human beings pleasure or happiness]." For him, then, divine-based ethics and libertarianism are moral ills.

In his condemnation of moral libertarianism, Kurtz declares that though "these new freedoms" have liberated people from "stultifying customs," they have gone too far.[18] Libertarianism "in its full sense" is not possible unless "certain antecedent conditions are fulfilled: a program of moral education and growth is necessary to instill virtue in the young, not blind obedience to rules but the ability for conscience reflective choice."[19] It is a type of education that leads to control and self-mastery, training in responsibility-developing altruistic concern for other human beings, to help and be helped, to cooperate with others. Schools should focus on the most basic and shared moral

values such as truth, honesty, sincerity, trust, kindness, generosity, friendship, sharing, and concern for others.[20]

Critical Evaluation of Kurtz

Despite the interest Kurtz expresses in moral education as a necessary component in a successful libertarian program, he falls short in reconciling the problem of authority in education and toleration, for toleration presupposes neutrality in a learning process. A teacher is tolerant when he/she refrains from expressing his/her bias, that is to say, when he/she is neutral. The kind of moral education Kurtz countenances is difficult to achieve in practice without an element of background moral beliefs that the teacher brings to bear in the instructional process. This may be in the form of his/her own conduct in which he/she acts as a model for the youth, or this may be in the form of explicit remarks concerning the evils of certain practices without ever presenting the good side of those practices. A teacher who is known as a member of the Mafia ring and has acquired wealth through such a connection will not effectively instill truth, honesty, and sincerity in the youths, who know him to be a ruthless profiteer and could admire becoming like him someday. An educator who would be interested in leading the youth to become members of a crime-free society will tend to downplay fortune-making activities in drug-trafficking and a comfortable, happy and admirable life that follows. In

short, if we are interested in producing Kurtz's virtuous society, we would disclaim those elements that could undermine our moral program by seemingly emphasizing a concern for others as well as those benefits one would derive in doing so. But, there are also benefits in being a member of the Mafia ring which we do not want to dramatize in a way that could lead the youth to strive to become members of the ring. If an authority is to be thus presupposed in moral education, then Kurtz's program is not any different from that of Brunner in which a supernatural figure is assumed.

Kurtz would possible counter this criticism by reminding us that intellectual inquiry and rational reflection are the bases for moral education. As in Plato's Meno, he would maintain that virtue is not knowledge, in the sense that mastery of such knowledge would make one lead a good life. Instead, the moral educator presents the configurations of moral reasoning so that the youths could make intelligent moral decisions for themselves. Accordingly, indoctrination is avoided in three ways: the educator 1) adopts a meta-ethical perspective by subjecting the form and content of moral reasoning to critical examination; 2) is indifferent toward the normative ethical judgments and decisions of the youths, but guides them into creative and reasoning processes, for their own sake, that could aid them, not only in making ethical decisions, but that could also lead them to intelligently analyze complex non-ethical patterns of

everyday life. Philosophical logic is one such tool that an educator could want to employ; 3) presents human nature ethical theory to the youths, showing clearly the relationship between moral obligation and our need to survive as human beings. 1) and 2) are purely intellectual processes that could equally be employed to justify immoral behaviors such as becoming and participating in drug-related crimes, using utilitarian procedures, of course. Although 3) emphasizes moral obligation as an obligation toward ourselves, it nonetheless lacks a practical mechanism that gives positive guidance for Kurtz's moral society. Like 1) and 2), it operates at an intellectual level. This means we would need some kind of authority to steer the youth into the direction that prepares them into becoming, in our conceptions, good citizens, as will be argued later. Kurtz might argue that such an authority does exist, only not in the form of a supernatural being or moral educator, but within the human nature ethical system itself. To discern the import of this argument, let me use Claw's characterizations of moral agents.[21] First, there are those who do not believe immorally in Kurtz's sense. People in this class perceive themselves as part of the organic whole and realize their lives for their own advantages, as well as the advantage of others. If everyone belonged to this class, we would not have any need for moral education. Second, there are those who behave immorally in four ways: (a) there

are those who do not want to behave morally; (b) there are those who do not care one way or the other about behaving morally; (c) there are those who would like to behave morally, but they do not know how; (d) there are those who would like to behave morally, and know how, but cannot quite manage it. (a) - (d) represent those who have caused concern in Kurtz and Brunner (and possibly the theists). I would like to add that there are those who are possible candidates for (a) - (d) and who may be prevented from achieving this class by introducing a unique apparatus that turns them into those of the first class, that is, those who do not behave immorally. Supposing that this apparatus is human nature ethical theory, which tells us that we ought to realize the good of others for our own advantage, then we need a human instrument to translate it into practice. For a moral educator to do this, he will have to be guided by 1) an ethical standard of a perfect person, 2) a society of morally decayed individuals. Since he is dissatisfied with the latter, he has to teach the youth to develop thinking patterns to want to appropriate 1). But to do so is to have authority. Clearly, there is a dilemma here. On the one hand, if human nature ethical theory lacks authority, it becomes a purely intellectual device, lacking force in transforming an immoral society into that of virtuous individuals. On the other hand, if the theory has to be translated into practice, it has to have moral authority.

Sometimes, Kurtz argues as if he is defending the view that a moral authority is needed in moral education, thus the "best way of doing the latter is not by dictate, but by means of education and persuasion."[22] The problem is where does one draw the line between coercion and persuasion? If I want to have women stop having abortions, I will show them movies of a fetus undergoing an excruciating experience, and neglect the social and economic pleasures to be derived from aborting. Whether I am persuading these women to stop having abortions is a debatable matter. For me to withhold certain information that could help them decide differently than if I had not withheld it would not really be said to be persuasion. Thus far, I do not find Kurtz's argument very persuasive. In short, his approach to moral education of the youth will have to employ an authority, otherwise this kind of moral education becomes a mere intellectual mechanism that has no impact on the morals of society. For this reason, this approach to a moral life ought to be rejected.

Democratic Process

Kurtz's defense for his position may not be hopeless after all. He could, for instance, revive his notion of democratic process in morality into a program of moral education. He could, thus, argue that, in a democratic society, the values reflected in the opinions of the majority should guide the youth and others towards virtuous living.

He would grant that the means adopted to achieve the accepted end may be an area of much disagreement, requiring critical reflection at every stage of deliberation, however the majority view is not subject to debate. This means that parents and teachers, who are instrumental in clarifying the accepted values of the majority, are neutral since they instruct and practice only that which has been decided through a democratic process. But, by this admission, Kurtz would be permitting moral authorities of some sort into a moral program, authorities in the sense that these people are adept in the values of a democratic society and are therefore qualified to teach those who do not know to practice them. This shows that he has not really succeeded in avoiding indoctrination. It seems that, if neutrality is to be achieved at all, these instructors will present both the majority and the minority views, leaving the potential moral agents to determine the side they find more gratifying for themselves. This form of value-clarification approach to morality, for its own sake, is however inconsistent with Kurtz's own rejection of libertarianism. In spite of the difficulties he seems to be facing this far, a decisive effort will be made to formulate a view that reflects his own intention, after the development of moral exemplars in the next chapter.

CHAPTER 5

MORAL LIFE AND EXEMPLARS

In this chapter, I will conduct a comparative analysis of Brunner's versus Kurtz's approaches to achieving a virtuous life through exemplars. In the course of the inquiry, I will examine the source of and access to exemplars. I will also consider the consistency of use of exemplars with each main view.

Source of Exemplars

I have already pointed out that the notion of agape plays a core role in Brunner's approach to a moral life. Agape is something that is bestowed upon persons who have faith and trust in God's saving power in the historical event of Christ--who becomes present in the believer through the Holy Spirit. Agape is the gift of God. God alone gives it to those who accept it. It is supposed to empower believers to render services of preservation to other people free of charge. Believers are exemplars in the world, according to the Sermon on the Mount. The believers are also supposed to learn from Christ whose life was spent in serving humanity. They may not heal the sick, as Christ did, but the spirit he manifested in giving what he did for those who were in need--

without expecting anything in return--should be the kind of spirit the believers should nurture and manifest towards others who are in need, without expecting a reward in this world.

But it is also true, according to Brunner, that God, the Father, is an exemplar: He gives eternal life freely. Thus far, the believer has two sources of exemplars: God the Father, and Christ, the Son. Having been empowered by agape, the believer is an exemplar to the unbelievers, not merely by living an exemplary life of service, but also by testifying in word that such services constitute the good life. But in his endeavor to lead the unbelievers to become virtuous individuals, the believers need not introduce them to agape. Certainly, Brunner denies that one can become virtuous only by receiving agape. All men, regardless of their religious beliefs, are capable of exercising reason. Reason says that, when a person gives to others in need what he already has, he will receive from them what they have when he will be in need. This is the principle of reciprocity. The believer is an exemplar of this principle, only to go farther in faith by not expecting anything in return in this world. This does not, however, preclude the believer from being paid for his services.

Brunner's vagueness regarding the extent the believer should practice reciprocity is evident here. Reciprocity expresses the will of God, so that when a believer appeals to

reason and declares that the realization of the principle is the virtuous life, the will of God is thereby fulfilled. Agape is simply a guarantee of the principle. For Brunner, the principle is just something that the majority of the people in a democratic society could countenance, but it is also an expression of the will of God.

For Kurtz, exemplars could be human beings whose moral values reflect the accepted opinions or beliefs of the majority in a democratic society. All talk about Brunner's supernatural being is rejected, for we exist in order to be moral and we become moral in order to exist. Accordingly, Kurtz defends the principle of reciprocity. Exemplars have an obligation to preserve the being of others so that they will also be preserved. Although Kurtz advocates altruism in addition to a morality of self-interest, he hardly offers an account of how this fits into his moral theory. Just as in Brunner's approach, exemplars exercise the power of critical reflection. But they are also guided by scientific method in order to make enlightened decisions based on scientific evidence. In Kurtz's view, four elements work in conjunction in a moral life--service, critical reflection, scientific method, and democratic practice. It is scientific evidence and critical reflection that exclude beliefs and practices of Brunner's God from a moral life. The validity of this claim remains to be demonstrated.

Access to Exemplars

I have already mentioned that, according to Brunner, the believer has access to God through faith, who, in effect, grants him agape. Brunner believes, as did William of Ockham, Luther, and Barth, that God cannot logically command evil. Therefore, services to those in need are good, not evil, since they has been commanded by God. Likewise, a believer has access to Christ, the exemplar, through faith. The believer is in turn the exemplar for the unbelievers who act contrary to the principle of reciprocity. These unbelievers can witness the services of the believer and hear him affirm that these services are the good life itself. Brunner would admit that insofar as the believer explicitly identifies the good, some measure of indoctrination is involved in the sense that the believer is not neutral, but he would deny that this kind of indoctrination entails tolerance, which, in his view, is an evil. Reciprocity respects the rights of others to choose what to believe in, and this freedom is divine-given. Freedom is a basis by which all people stand before the divine judgment. For Brunner, merely living as a role model is not sufficient in the development of good habits in others. The exemplar's life is, in addition, to be identified by these people as the good life itself. The believers are the salt of the earth. The principle of reciprocity is a divine imperative, but it can be carried out by believers and unbelievers alike.

Consequently, the unbelievers who recognize interdependency of persons in a given order, and who accordingly render services of survival and comfort to others, are also exemplars. Brunner would permit a form of indoctrination that does not violate the rights of persons, especially their freedom. The exemplar should not violate the rights of persons. The exemplar could therefore explicitly declare that the life he is leading is a model of virtue. Furthermore, he will not hesitate to give attention to the advantage of the practice of reciprocity at the exclusion of disadvantages in order to impress good habits.

For Kurtz, exemplars could be visible being whose services to the needy can be publicly observable and recordable in a scientific manner. They are intelligent, scientific and democratic. Accordingly, they are supposed to be neutral, refraining, in every way, from announcing that they reflect the moral values of a good life, lest they may be involved in indoctrination. The youth, and the immoral adults, would know and imitate them. But we are not told the source of this knowledge. Let us assume, for the sake of argument, that this knowledge is intuitive. The problem is that the expressed urgency for moral education becomes illusory, since everyone is already aware of what constitutes models of virtue. We do not need moral education where everybody is by nature so constituted that we are able to make similar moral judgment concerning our common good. But

we do need moral education when this judgment runs counter to moral practice. It is the deterioration of right moral practice that presses an urgent need for a moral education in society. According to Kurtz, then, exemplars, if we ever need them, are exemplars of moral practice. We do not need to be educated to be aware of their presence. Kurtz has thus gone further than Brunner in avoiding indoctrination. Where Brunner would find knowledge of the principle of reciprocity through exemplars as an indispensable toll in an effective moral program, Kurtz might see this knowledge as already existing. The role of exemplars in Kurtz's moral education, then is to merely impress upon the youth and others to develop habits that reflect the principle of reciprocity. The trouble is that there are other types of exemplars in society who are habitually vicious. These too will impress the youth to develop vicious habits, resulting in counter-productive measures. Thus, Kurtz's attempt to avoid indoctrination does not succeed in assigning moral education an effective role in society. But Kurtz's rejection of intuitionism in morals presses an urgent need to reconstruct his program.

Indoctrination

It has already been pointed out that Brunner's indoctrination consists in dissemination of the knowledge about the principle of reciprocity by acquaintance with

exemplars, who are explicitly identified as practitioners of this principle. Accordingly, exemplars are persons who practice what they preach. Another element in Brunner's indoctrination is the withholding of any information that might undermine the principle. This is not surprising since the principle is ordained by God. For one who has faith and trust in God, this principle is simply absolute and immutable. Nothing that violates it will stand before the judgment bar of virtue. The immediate problem that Brunner faces is one of reconciling the notion of freedom he advocates in many of his works, on the one hand, and the withholding of information that could make a difference in making choices, on the other. If a person X were told about the advantages and disadvantages of being a member of a gang that engages in drug trafficking and crime activities, he could choose to become a member of that group, despite the disadvantages. But the withholding of information about the advantages of being a member limits X's freedom of making calculated choices that would in the end work for his own favor. Of course, X's becoming a member of a group in which he will employ violent methods to acquire wealth is an immoral move in itself, but, despite this, his freedom of choice ought to be respected. Brunner's own solution to this sort of dilemma is colored with a utilitarian background. Granting that the freedom of X is violated by withholding information that could lead him to choose otherwise, Brunner

argues that such a violation is justified provided that doing so protects the freedom of others. In the same vein, coercion is justified "in so far as the individual has either violated the rights of others by his conduct, and hence forfeited his own, or insofar as a general good is at stake which each man must regard as more important than his own life."[1]

Whereas Brunner's exemplars might deliberately conceal facts that could lead moral agents to make choices that have harmful effects on others, many times they are themselves ignorant of such facts. In this case, they will not really be said to have limited the freedom of other people deliberately. The are disseminating the most accurate information to their knowledge, leaving the moral agents with the choice of accepting or rejecting it. So Brunner's indoctrination does not entail violation of other people's freedom in all cases, and, even when it does, such violation is justifiable on utilitarian grounds.

By now, Kurtz might consider modifying his view on the question of indoctrination in order to accommodate a viable moral program. He might, for instance, reject the general characterization I have been making by proposing a view, according to which, indoctrination is a conditioning process that exclusively appeals to emotions in achieving some end. Sargant has defended this view. Gathering evidence from physiology, he argues that indoctrination exerts intolerable

stress, creating breakdown of the minds of normal persons. In addition, it eradicates old ideas and behavioral patterns and plants new ones in the vacant soil. This sort of indoctrination is accompanied by loss of rational insight and normal judgment. Sargant proceeds to elucidate this view by reference to a case study. In the mid-fifties, there was a rebellion in Kenya known as Mau Mau, which was organized by a certain indigenous population against the British rule. The leader, Jomo Kenyatta, deliberately used an emotional religious technique to instill strength into the Mau Mau movement. "Mau Mau swearing-in ceremonies were designed deliberately to arouse emotional horror and excitement in the participants--so much so, that they could not even be reported in detail." For instance, Kamau Kichina, one of the participants, was flogged, kicked, handcuffed with his arms between his legs, and fastened behind his neck, denied food for a period. In spite of this treatment, he neither admitted his guilt nor revealed the secrets of the movement.[2] Thus far, Kurtz's view of indoctrination has three main features: (1) it appeals to emotions exclusively; (2) it lacks rational insight and judgment; (3) it sanctions intolerance. This is the kind of indoctrination that should be excluded from a moral program. A more acceptable view would be formulated as follows: (4) it encourages critical thinking and employment of scientific methods; (5) it excludes intolerance and appeal to emotions based on

illusions; (6) it affords provision for identifying the principle of reciprocity and the exemplars who put it into practice; (7) it allows a form of indoctrination in which parents, teachers, and others would explicitly express their biases against certain values that lead to the violation of the rights of other people. In fact, Kurtz may choose not to call (4), (5), and (6) indoctrination at all, given that he has already formulated it in (1), (2), and (3). For all that, the example Sargant has given undermines the justification of characterizing (1), (2), and (3) as indoctrination. First, there is no evidence that the participants of the Mau Mau rebellion lacked rational insight and judgment. But there is evidence to the contrary, both from their own account and literature,[3] that these people executed their combat and self-defense wisely. The reasoning pattern behind the resistance movement was to overcome oppressive rule that included taking away fertile land from the indigenous population and confining them to unproductive land instead. Nonetheless, there was intolerance against British informants, whom they often secretly executed for deterrent reasons. Kurtz could reject the example given above simply because it has nothing to do with his moral program. The Mau Mau movement is purely a politico-religious maneuver, he might argue. However, if we admit that the principle of reciprocity includes preservation of a community, this objection will be viewed as ill-founded.

The Mau Mau rebellion was organized out of a concern to maintain the self-existence of the community against external oppression.

Self-Interest vs. Altruism

Supposing that we ignore for a moment the difficulties which Kurtz's notion of indoctrination might face, his approach to achieving a specific set of values has considerable plausibility, since a moral exemplar(s) has a certain kind of influence via (4), (5), and (6). For this reason, moral education succeeds in training responsibility: "first, toward one's self, one's long-range self-interest in the world, learning how to cope with and solve problems that emerge in the environment; and second, toward others, developing altruistic concern for other human beings, an ability to share life's experiences, to help and be helped, to cooperate with others."[4] (emphasis supplied) Like Brunner, Kurtz argues that critical reflection should be balanced by emotions, "for we believe in the cultivation of feeling and love."[5] He, however, does not emphasize the need for nurturing the right emotions in virtue, for the mere exercise of reason does not guarantee virtuous emotions.[6] It seems that reason and the right emotions are interdependent, and this is the point that Kurtz would be assumed to be making. To be emotionally set for the execution of a virtuous action, one would need reason, but it also is true

that reason does not have a characteristic drive of its own. It needs emotions.

According to Kurtz, emotions of virtue may occur at two different levels. First, there are those emotions that lead to a reciprocal relationship in which one stands to gain. For example, emotions that are accompanied by friendship as well as emotions in maturity in sexual expression, are of this sort. There are also other exclusive kinds of emotions that lead to actions in which others will benefit. Emotions leading to humanitarian services are a case in point. The problem with this distinction is that we cannot separate out a clear case of altruism, for the principle of reciprocity implies that a virtuous action is executed with the expectation that it works for the benefit of both parties. Even in humanitarian service, a moral agent could still count on being happy when his action is completed. Kurtz mentions compassion and empathy as somewhat supporting altruistic action,[7] but these are based on considerations that the other person is like me, that what I would not have others do to me, I should not do to them. This is the principle of reciprocity. Furthermore, it could be argued that even compassion and empathy are human needs that are fulfilled when one goes out to perform an appropriate action for another person. When that action is completed, that need disappears--one no longer has a feeling of compassion or empathy. The difficulty, noted above, with singling out an

altruistic action from the principle of reciprocity is, however, not meant to lessen the significance of this principle in an admirable, exemplary life.

Brunner might claim that his agape-based morality gives a more plausible account of altruistic behavior than that of Kurtz. He would argue that, from the point of view of the principle of reciprocity alone, a believer could perform a virtuous action out of agape, which is power-generating, spontaneous activity for the well-being of the other person. In the Gospels, Jesus narrated a parable that seems to illustrate Brunner's moral altruism. On one occasion, a lawyer asked Jesus to explain how he could inherit eternal life. The lawyer had known for some time the command: "Love your neighbor as yourself," but he did not comprehend who his neighbor was. A man was going from Jerusalem to Jericho one day, Jesus said, when he suddenly fell into the hands of robbers, who beat him and left him half-dead. Two religious figures, one a priest and the other a Levite, saw the man lying on the wayside in need of help, but took no interest in helping him. But a Samaritan, a heathen, who saw the wounded man had <u>compassion</u> for him. Without hesitation, he bandaged his wounds, and gave him food and paid his lodging. According to Brunner, the Samaritan, though an unbeliever, was doing the will of God by taking care of someone whom he did not know and from whom he did not expect reimbursement. The religious people who passed by, on the other hand, defied

the will of God by their negligent behavior. They are not believers. Believers do the kind of duty the Samaritan did and more. They do not act merely out of compassion, but they further act out of agape. Brunner's altruism may be illustrated by Figure 1, seen below.

	EMOTION	MORAL DUTY
BELIEVER	has compassion	caring
	1. has compassion/ 2. has no compassion	caring
UNBELIEVER	has compassion	caring
	has no compassion	not caring

Figure 1

There are two feasible approaches to altruism here. First, it could be assumed that agape is a form of compassion that has a higher degree of drive than the compassion of the unbeliever. But this approach faces difficulties similar to Kurtz's efforts to account for altruism above. From previous discussion of Brunner's agape (see Chapter 4), it is likely that he would reject this approach. Agape is not a virtuous emotion. It is a form of power that results in an activity that presupposes the principle of reciprocity. The second approach assumes that the believer and the unbeliever have certain physiological, psychological, and sociological similarities. This means that the believer, like the unbeliever, is a person who could lack compassion towards his objects, but this lack is filled in by agape, resulting in services of caring. The second approach is consistent with

Brunner's own view of the relationship between services of agape and the principle of reciprocity. But strictly speaking, a believer is not truly altruistic, for there is the notion of attaining eternal life constantly in view. Nevertheless, it is clear from the table above that there is a sense in which Brunner's approach to a virtuous life surpasses that of Kurtz. This occurs when a person, lacking in compassion, renders his caring services to others.

It would appear that Brunner's success will be increased (assuming that he is already engaged in a program of exemplars at the level of the principle of reciprocity) by persuading unbelievers to become believers. This move, however, faces two serious difficulties: first, it has been argued that morality is autonomous, needing no religious sanction. Second, Brunner's notion of agape is irrational, suggesting that it would weaken morality, which is a rational system. This point is indicated in (2) of Kurtz's characterization of indoctrination. Specifically, agape lacks the sort of reasoning patterns displayed in scientific inquiry, seemingly explaining why divine-command morality of any sort should be replaced by Kurtz's alternative. I will now consider these two objections in the next two chapters.

CHAPTER 6

MORALITY IS AUTONOMOUS

I showed earlier that Brunner maintains that God ordained order at Creation and that human beings have a moral obligation to serve others in order to realize that order. I am now going to consider counter arguments against this view. The thesis is that morality is autonomous; it cannot depend on God.

In Plato's Euthyphro, an inquiry is raised: "Is what is holy holy because the gods approve it or do they approve it because it is holy?" Put in Judeo-Christian perspective, this question may be framed a little differently: "Is a conduct right because God approves it; or does He approves it because it is right?" Following Euthyphro's argument, many philosophers have contended that morality does not depend on religion, i.e. God approves right conduct because it is right. Others have, however, pointed out that criticism based on Euthyphro is not as devastating as we might be led to think, since, from the believer's viewpoint, God cannot logically command evil. Still others have pointed out that, although ethics is autonomous, it could, in some instances, motivationally or psychologically depend on religion. I would like to postpone this latter view until later. Some

critics of divine command have abandoned using the Euthyphro[1] argument altogether and have maintained instead that morality cannot be logically derived from religion.

Views of Moral Autonomy

Different conceptions of moral autonomy have featured prominently in philosophical literature. First, we speak of moral autonomy when we want to refer to a person as the originator of a moral principle or action. Moral autonomy also appears in our conceptual framework when we are considering the worthiness of an action. Let me begin by discussing the first view.

Kant believed that an action is morally right if it is performed by a rational agent who possesses a good will. The motive for acting is not that one is concerned with the desires, interest or well-being of self or others, but rather, that the action is recognized as a duty. Kant maintains that a rational being belongs to the realms of ends, that is, he is his own sovereign, legislating his own laws. A will that gives rise to such legislation is said to be autonomous. In a sense, he is talking about autonomy of a moral agent whose will is not subject to external influences, such as the will of God. To sum up, when one says that morality is autonomous, one would be saying that a rational agent, who possesses autonomous will, acts according to maxims which he recognizes by reason alone as universal: a)

an action that is compatible (or incompatible) with a person's own will falls under the realm of morality in respect to that person. That is to say, an action which is thus compatible is approved, and one which is incompatible, is prohibited; b) an action that is compatible (incompatible) with a will that is subject to external influences, such as the will of God, does not fall under the realm of morality.[2] The immediate problem for Kant is that an action that is categorically commanded in a), might be the same as the action hypothetically commanded in b), resulting in two possible courses. On the one hand, we could discard a) from the realm of morality on account of its being the same action commanded hypothetically in b). This means that certain categorically commanded actions may not be moral duties. On the other hand, we could accept b) as falling under the realm of morality on the grounds that it is the same action commanded categorically in a), implying that an action that is commanded hypothetically like b) could be a moral duty in some instances. In each case, Kant would maintain that an action that has been commanded categorically is a moral duty regardless of its being the same action that is commanded hypothetically. The undesirable consequences of accepting this interpretation are not difficult to fathom. If I command an action X categorically and then command other people to do X, it follows that X is a moral duty for me, but it is not a moral duty for them. For X to become a moral

duty for everyone, each person has to command it categorically. One possible exit from this dilemma is to regard morality as not being a kind of empirical science. In Kantian ethics we would face difficulties expressing a universal law in an observation language. Thus, morality consists of absolutely binding laws recognized by human reason. Thus, when an autonomous will commands a good action, it is because that action is good in itself and that every rational being everywhere would recognize it as good. Our commanding an action categorically does not make that action a duty, but it is already a duty and it will always be a duty. This leads to two conclusions: (a) the worthiness of a moral action does not depend on there being moral agents; (b) if something is good, no matter what it is, its goodness does not depend on anything external to itself. Brunner would probably accept (a), but would reject (b), for it excludes God who ordained the natural order. Kurtz would reject both (a) and (b), for ethics "is <u>autonomous</u> and <u>situational</u>, needing no theological or ideological sanction." As an alternative, he would assent that: (c) the worthiness of a moral action depends on circumstances under which the action is executed; (c) seems to be alluded by Ewing: "I consider to be involved in 'autonomy' of ethics that the goodness or badness, rightness or wrongness of anything that is really good or bad, right or wrong, follows from the inherent nature of what is pronounced good, etc., in its

context and is necessarily fixed by this."[3] In other words, "an act is justifiably condemned as wrong, that act could not possibly have been other than wrong under the circumstances."[4] In (c), one would thus possibly grant an instance when speaking lies would be morally acceptable, say, if we ought to save a life. In (b) one would condemn both lying and letting an innocent person's life be destroyed on the ground that each violates moral rules, but he would be unable to justify which one would be given priority over the other just in case they are both in conflict. In (c) one would tend to treat each particular event as unique, recounting the circumstances that determine the worthiness of an action.

Let me call (b) and (c), for the sake of argument, absolutist and non-absolutist views respectively. I will now consider how these views of moral autonomy would affect Brunner's claim. I have already pointed out that an absolutist believes that what determines the rightness or wrongness of an action is a moral rule regardless of circumstances under which that action is executed (Brunner is not an absolutist). Such things as happiness, desires, incentives, and well-being, either of self or others, do not count in morality. In effect, this morality is some kind of external, immutable and eternal entity which is independent of persons and God. In the Euthyphro argument, if an action's rightness depends on its being approved by God, then

he could, in certain instances, command evil, say, torture of persons, and this action would thereby become morally right. On absolutist grounds, this is simply absurd, for torture of persons is immoral under any circumstance. A non-absolutist may be willing to grant that there are circumstances under which torture may be permitted. On the other hand, in case God approves an action because it is right, this might suggest that he is an omniscient being, knowing good and evil, and, therefore, when we lack this knowledge, we should be commanded by Him to act right. Both the absolutist and non-absolutist would not see any problem with this interpretation for a believer, but they would nonetheless contend that this confirms that morality is autonomous. Let us consider the two parts that form the groundwork for the Euthyphro argument. 1) An action is morally right because it has been approved by God, and 2) God approves an action because it is morally right. A person who believes that 1) entails absurdity (since God could command evil) is here assuming that there is an independent standard of moral judgment by which we would determine that certain actions which are commanded by God are evil and such actions would not possibly be morally right. In effect, he has not really demonstrated that 1) is not plausible until his assumption is justifiable. At most, 2) confirms this assumption, but it does not justify it. An absolutist view of moral autonomy is assumed here. On the other hand, if he does not use 1) to

show that morality is independent of God's commands (since absurdity may occur), he would nonetheless assume that morality is autonomous to maintain that 2) is true. A non-absolutist view of moral autonomy is assumed here. Supposing that he dispenses with 2), then he would be making a shift from using Euthyphro's argument. Brunner would block the charge of absurdity by pointing out that God cannot logically command evil so the use of autonomy in Euthyphro's argument does not work.

Brunner's critics are not yet done with him, for others, like Frankena,[5] would argue that ethical judgments and principles cannot be logically derived from religious or theological beliefs, since, for every ethical principle to depend on an appeal to a premise of a theistic kind is question-begging. It would be elucidating to formulate his versions of logical dependence of morality on religion: 3) religious or theological premises are logically necessary for the justification of all ethical judgments. He rejects 3) on the grounds that there are premises that do not contain theological terms for the justification of ethical judgments. To insist, as many divine command theorists do, that 3) is true, one would require to produce ethical definitions of theological terms, but it would be impossible to justify these definitions. So 3), is not true. He would, however, accept 4) in the sense that morality may causally or historically be dependent on religion, or that it may

motivationally or psychologically be dependent on religion. To reject both 3) and 4), one would have to presuppose: 5) religious or theological premises are not logically necessary for the justification of any ethical judgment. 5) is a strong thesis in this logical dependency argument, but to reject 3) and 4) because of 5) is question-begging, one would have to refer to a higher level of justification such as 6). No non-ethical premise is logically necessary for the justification of any ethical judgment; which indicates that ethical judgments are autonomous of any non-ethical ones. Since 6) entails 5), one would assume 6) to say 5) is true, hence, to reject 3) and 4). But is this not to say that morality is autonomous in order to defend the strong thesis?

I would now like to consider how Brunner would handle the criticisms raised in the sort of moral autonomy in logical dependency argument. As it turns out, this argument leans toward analytical tradition.

Brunner opponents should possibly consider the problem analogous to the traditional controversy of "is" and "ought" relationship.[6] According to the received view, we cannot deduce a valuative conclusion from a descriptive premise. In the language of moral autonomy which we have examined, ethical statements cannot be entailed by religious or theological statements, since the latter are nonethical.

There are two ways Brunner might respond to his critics. First, he could test the adequacy of the characterization of

ethical judgments. Second, he could find out if there are counter-examples to the nondeductibility of ethical statements from non-ethical ones. Granting that the view endures this scrutiny he may, all things considered, use it axiomatically in moral arguments, including those which purport to disclaim divine ordained ethics. Nevertheless, the fact that this view survives his critical examination alone does not entitle it to be presupposed in these arguments, unless a viable justification for it has also been constructed. In case his criticisms will be fatal, it is doubtful if it is worth the effort to try to justify an already inadequate view.

Moral language is often said to be colored by terms like "good," "right," "obligatory," "ought," "courage," "justice," "temperance," etc. Statements that contain these terms are characterized as ethical and those that do not are non-ethical. Thus, when I say, "I ought to be courageous," I am asserting an ethical statement. On the other hand, when I say "I am wincing," I am not asserting an ethical statement. The latter is a factual statement, one that could be readily demonstrable, verifiable and scientifically explainable, thus yielding prediction based on the general laws of nature. Supposing that a statement is ethical by virtue of the term "ought" appearing in it, then a statement such as, "I ought to ride a bus" is normative ethical. But is this true? If I wince and point out the source of pain just in case I

experience pain in my knee when I walk to class, I would draw the ethical status of the statement: "I ought to ride a bus" from the following contexts: 1) I am concerned with my own pleasure and realize that my walking to class does not promote my own pleasure. 2) From the fact that I have a pain, I might utter supporting statements like: "My knee is hurting." If I say, "I ought to ride a bus" with 1) in mind, I would be uttering an ethical statement. Strictly speaking, the statements in 2) are factual, but they may have ethical meaning if there is an implied concern for my "pain." Brunner would thus argue that a sharp distinction between ethical and non-ethical "ought" is blurred. If "I ought to ride a bus" is an ethical statement under every interpretation, then we would be saying that statements like in 2) from which "I ought to ride a bus" may be deduced are ethical. But, we would have to explain why a factual statement such as "my knee is hurting" should be treated as if it were an ethical statement. On the other hand, if "I ought to ride a bus" is a factual statement, under certain interpretations such as deducing it from factual statements in 2), we would be admitting that not all "ought" statements are ethical. In other words, this familiar linguistic to give necessary and sufficient conditions for distinguishing ethical statements from non-ethical ones fails.

The second level of testing the viability of absolutist view of moral autonomy is one of providing a counter-example

against the non-deducibility of ethical statements from non-ethical ones. In the last paragraph, I gave examples Brunner could use to illustrate how ethical statements are characterized. Although he might find them inadequate, he could still use them to show the weakness of his critics. Let us denote p: "I ought to be courageous"; q: "I am wincing"; and r: "I am hurting." Supposing that when I say "If I am wincing, then I am also hurting" is a logical truth, then the following deduction is also true,

1) q

2) $\dfrac{q \quad --> \quad r}{rvp}$

where rvp is the conclusion following the premises 1) and 2) and the truth value of r v p is dependent on r alone and not on p, but it is also true that r v p is an ethical conclusion on account of p alone and not on r. Clearly, q and r are factual statements, which, according to the absolutist view, cannot entail an ethical conclusion. In the above deduction 1) and 2) are non-ethical premises from which an ethical conclusion has been deduced, showing that ethical statements could sometimes depend on non-ethical statements.[7] It might be argued that Brunner's argument exposes the weakness of the absolutist view, rather than the non-absolutist view.

Is the non-absolutist view immune from this weakness? Throughout the discussion, I have been treating the absolutist and non-absolutist as if they were separate and

different views, but I have also pointed out that the non-absolutist view is a modified version of the absolutist view. Brunner would probably pursue this line of thought. When I say: "I ought to be courageous," I could arrive at making this judgment from the following considerations: 1) I would study a particular event, say, a thief breaks into my house and threatens the lives of my family. I would obstruct him by having courage in order to be able to act in self-defense; 2) Under ordinary circumstances (no dilemmas involved) I know I ought to be courageous when an event such as 1) takes place. For the absolutist, 1) and 2) comprise a rule that should guide my action, whereas, for the non-absolutist, 1) and 2) comprise a set of circumstances. "Do they really differ as much as we thought?" Brunner would ask. It is true that the non-absolutist tends to solve the Kantian dilemma, but is this not another way of saying we should make special rules to overcome such dilemmas? If this final form of Brunner's interpreting the non-absolutist view is correct, his earlier criticisms of the absolutist view will equally apply here. In effect, we cannot assume statement 6) above to justify 5) or to reject 3) and 4).

In short, Brunner would claim that the views of moral autonomy assumed to destroy his argument for divine-based morality are not tenable. However, there is another view of morality autonomy that could be used to weaken Brunner's position. It is a view that is mostly supported by Kurtz and

many human nature ethicists. Accordingly, critical reflection plays a prominent role in this view.

Moral Autonomy and Critical Reflection

This is the view that, in ethics, the moral agent is the originator of a moral principle or action. This view is alluded to by Kant in his famous "categorical imperative" doctrine: "Act according to a maxim by which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law,"[8] but the view finds the clearest expression in Spinoza.

In Ethics, Spinoza is opposed to the Cartesian notion of freedom and instead maintains that a virtuous person is one who acts under the control of reason.[9] This person is not impervious to external influences, but would decide whether or not those influences would enter into his moral life, since he exercises the power of reason. Further exploration of this notion might show Brunner's weakness. Kant's attempt to explicate it faced difficulties, however, as shown earlier. This could be due to his failure to appreciate Spinoza's position. According to the human nature view, autonomy is a process in human growth resulting in a developed sense of critical reflection at various stages. Whereas an autonomous person is one who is in charge of his life, hence lives according to the laws he gives himself, he is, however, not entirely detached from external influences, or his decisions are not immune to revision. He determines

whether these influences transmit new information that he believes would be relevant in his moral decisions. This is true for example, of someone who changes his moral decision on the issue of abortion as a result of acquiring scientific information about the status of the fetus. An autonomous person has innovative and creative ability so that he critically reflects on whether he should be guided by whatever standards or principles, whether his own or external, as seen through the end of his nature alone. Haworth reveals that critical reflection comes into play when a moral agent has to make decisions when confronted with an actual problem by invoking a problem space, consisting of background beliefs and knowledge that have a bearing on the problem in question--which involves a long history of decision-making process files of decision maps (an antecedently held view concerning an appropriate technique of dealing with the problem). An appropriate decision is reached by confirming or disconfirming that the map guided him adequately, invoking it when faced with the same problem. Gaps in it may lead to information search and may result in redrawing the map. The individual has acquired his own rules that guide information processing and direct information searches to ensure enlightened and procedural competence. Fred's case in the next chapter will illustrate this. It is noteworthy that a person who has critical reflection is not one who is completely insulated from external influences that

would have a bearing in executing an enlightened moral duty.[10]

But if this view of moral autonomy is to be accepted by Brunner's critics, then there are certain repercussions. For a person could be given religious teachings about a supernatural God, but the decision to appropriate religious beliefs in a moral duty rests solely on the autonomy moral agent. To insist that such teachings should not be given would be contrary to the notion of moral autonomy explicated here. In effect, this view does not weaken Brunner, but it instead shows that an autonomous moral agent could incorporate God into morality.

That morality is autonomous is indisputable in Brunner's view: "The feeling for what is humane and inhumane, for that which furthers and that which destroys life, for that which is fair and that which is unfair, can (and should) always be presupposed in every 'fellow-citizen' without inquiring into the question of his religious faith." But he also claims that, in matters of morality, a believer sees better than a non-believer and is "more resolute in working for the introduction of the better order." "But can he only discover what this better order is, not as believer, but as a member of his nation, along with his fellow-countrymen, by the use of reason." Clearly, Brunner believes that morality is autonomous. He also claims that both the believer and the unbeliever could achieve virtue.[11] At the same time, he

turns around and asserts that a believer has an advantage over the believer on matters of executing a moral duty. There is one possibility of elucidating this point. In Chapter 5, it was pointed out that a believer renders caring services, even when an appropriate emotion for that service is lacking. The unbeliever, on the other hand, is incapable of performing the same services when he does not have an appropriate emotion. Functionalists have, however, dismissed this explanation and have instead given their own versions. Let me explore briefly two of these alternatives.

Has a Wider Scope

Skinner has conducted a laboratory pigeon experiment in order to establish the relationship between a moral life and religion, basing his evidence on such an experiment. According to Skinner, a believer, like a non-believer, is basically one who has a concern for his survival, as well as that of others. He accordingly makes rules that prescribe toward this end and then carries them over into the religious sphere. Behaviors are classified as moral or immoral, virtuous or sinful, according to these rules. Skinner thinks that such terms as "heaven" and "hell" fall into this context. "Hell is made contingent upon sinful behavior, while virtuous behavior brings a promise of Heaven." A virtuous behavior is the result of a conditioning process the believer goes through in "ritualistic techniques."[12]

"Relevant environmental conditions are manipulated when the stimuli which elicit or set the occasion for sinful behavior are weakened or removed and when the stimuli which elicit or serve as the occasion for virtuous behavior are pointed up."[13] In Skinner's view, this kind of control is likely to coincide with those of the group as a whole. "It works in concert with ethical control in suppressing selfishness primarily reinforced behavior and in strengthening behavior which works to the advantage of others."[14] But he further points out that the religious agency maintains its practices according to more enduring criteria of virtuous and sinful behavior, implying that the religious conscious speaks louder than the ethical. Although this functionalist view of religion which Skinner presents here suffers from eliminating inner states, such as religious beliefs, from publicly observed behavior, his account nonetheless could illuminate how a moral life is dependent on religion. It is especially in the ritual that this takes place, Skinner points out. He would thus see Brunner's doctrine of eternal life as a case in point. Thus, a believer is one who envisions a divine judgment in which those who have accepted God's gift of grace achieve eternal life and those who do not are punished. It is in anticipation of a reward or punishment that the believer is motivated to be of service to those in need without necessarily having an appropriate emotion, for such services. Skinner's study shows that Brunner's notion of

agape is somewhat illusory. The believer does have certain emotional states which could be described as fear of future punishment, hope of eternal rewards. It is these states that lead to the execution of a virtuous action. But the study also shows that the unbeliever lacks these states. So, he cannot act virtuously unless he has another emotion such as compassion. At any rate, Skinner's study confirms Brunner's claim: the believer promotes the preservation of others even when he is lacking an appropriate emotional state (like compassion). He thus surpasses the unbeliever in this respect.

The last section shows that, in a ritual process of a religious experience, beliefs in supernatural rules about moral behavior are not only reinforced but the tastes and attitudes towards these rules are conditioned in such a way that conformity to the rules is achieved, regardless of whether such beliefs are true or false.

I would now like to discuss another aspect of the relationship between a moral life and religion. As will become clear later, Durkheim reduces the moral to religion, which he, in turn, reduces to society. In the opinion of many, he observes that people who have similar religious beliefs tend to be united through the commonalities of those beliefs. This may lead to the formation of a community of persons whose social bonds are the basis for moral expression. Morality is thus not only individual, but it is

also social--a moral life is infiltrated by social interactions. People who happen to share the same beliefs could form a community that provides a setting for emotional states that lead to services of caring for others. It has already been pointed out that these states do not have to be appropriate. For example, believers do not have to be compassionate in order to offer humanitarian services. All they need is to fear future punishment, or anticipate some eternal reward, in order to be caring. It is this kind of emotion that a social setting helps to form--first, by maintaining a system of beliefs about eternal life and judgment, followed by emotional states aroused in respect to these beliefs. Despite the tenability of Brunner's claim thus far, he faces the formidable problem of countering the charge that agape is irrational. His response will be considered in the next chapter.

CHAPTER 7

AGAPE IS IRRATIONAL

So far, it seems that arguments from moral autonomy do not seriously undermine Brunner's divine-based morality. This morality may still be jeopardized on other grounds. For instance, the claim that agape in his approach to moral life is irrational.[1] Brunner would easily meet this charge by arguing that agape is exclusively accessible to those who have faith, implying that it is immune to scientific inquiry, implying that it cannot be determined whether it is rational or irrational. For the believer, however, it is super-rational,[2] not irrational. To argue his point, he would present the phenomenological perspective of agape and then show how functionalist attempts to penetrate it fail. The key figures he could use from the phenomenological tradition are Eliade and Otto.

Eliade and Otto

Eliade, for instance, distinguishes between the sacred and the profane spaces inhabited by supernatural and ordinary beings respectively. The sacred space is non-homogenous and consists of interruptions. The sacred time is non-homogeneous and non-historical. It is "eternal present." On

the other hand, the profane space is homogeneous and neutral, whereas the profane time is historical. As Eliade points out, however, there is no pure profane experience.[3] It is within the experience of the sacred that religion is conceptualized. Thus, the eruption of sickness, death, and extraordinary phenomena are all treated as non-homogenous and, therefore, belong to the sacred realm, in the sense that their causation and control are beyond the visible world (the profane realm). This invisible world is the holy and the superior, requiring specialized, supernatural methods of approaching it. It is the supernatural beings in the sacred space and time who are accounted for in the non-homogeneity, interruptions and breaks that are experienced in the profane life. For this reason, these beings come to occupy the core position in religion. Brunner would, however, find Eliade's neat description rather unsatisfactory for two reasons: first, Eliade admits that a religious person desires "to live in the sacred,"[4] the realm of interruptions and breaks. On the contrary, no religious man desires to live in such an abode unless, by interruptions and breaks, he means peace and tranquility. Second, not every interruption or break is the result of the sacred. For instance, acts like tribal feuds originate in the profane realm, not in the sacred realm, yet they are interruptions and breaks of the social realm, yet they are interruptions and breaks of the social order. As a result of these difficulties, Brunner would need to be

cautious in adopting Eliade's insight in order to ward off his critics. Otto's exposition of the idea of the holy might prove resourceful in lending support to Brunner's position.

For Otto, religion consists of rational and non-rational aspects of human experience of the holy. He calls the non-rational element the numinous. The numinous is non-rational, non-ordinary, standing beyond the sphere of the usual, intelligible and the familiar. It is both frightening and attractive, inspiring feelings of fascination, wonder, and dependency. This "creature feeling" does not indicate that numinous is merely a subjective experience, but it is something that "belongs to an absolutely different"[5] scheme of reality from our own, that is to say, it is objective and outside self. A common criticism that has been levelled against the structure of Otto's religious view is that not all religions whose objects of worship are supernatural. The Australian Aborigines, for example, are said to express their religious experiences exclusively toward concrete objects. Otto is, however, conducting his study within Judeo-Christian traditions. So this criticism does not have weight.

Following Kant, Otto thinks that the mind is a receptacle of the numinous influence, treating the latter as if it were the "things in themselves." However, whereas for Kant, the senses play a crucial role in his epistemological scheme, Otto tends to deal with mental states exclusively. Accordingly, the "wholly other"--that is the holy as the

objective reality--induces two types of mental states: the rational and the non-rational (the numinous) which interpenetrate one another, not by causal necessity, but by association. As an illustration, music induces natural feelings in our minds like homesickness, courage, or pleasure, which are "capable of being described in conceptual terms." We are also conscious of "a glimmering, billowy agitation" "without being able to explain in concepts what it is really that moves us so deeply."[6] In religious experience, not only is the holy attested as the "inward voice of conscience and the religious consciousness, the 'still, small voice' of the Spirit in the heart, by feeling, presentiment, and longing, but also that which may be directly encountered in particular occurrences and events, self-revealed in persons and displayed in actions, in a word, that beside the inner revelation from the Spirit there is an outward revelation of the divine nature."[7] Otto admits that not everyone experiences the holy; for the non-religious person is incapable of comprehending the things that pertain to the holy. He offers no proof for the existence of the holy. If a person is unable to see things in the same light as Otto sees them, that is the holy, it is because he is "natural" (non-religious), and his being in that state is his choice. In his natural state, he might protest that he does not see what Otto sees, but he would have proved nothing that Otto's presentation is mistaken, for any attempt to prove it

only shows inability to comprehend the non-rational in a "natural" way. From these considerations, Brunner could argue that agape, which is an element in the numenous, is immune to scientific inquiry. To prove his point, he would cite cases in functionalist attempts to understand religion.

The Functionalist Attempts and Brunner's Objections

Briefly stated, the functionalist approach is based on methodological commitments to science as involving publicly observable and recordable empirical phenomena, validation and testing of hypothesis and theories. Since religious beliefs, such as Brunner's agape, cannot be verified by observation, some functionalists reduce them to that which is observable. Other functionalists who react very strongly against introspective approaches to behavior, and, who are committed to reconstructing psychology and sociology along natural science methodology, would simply ignore agape.

For Skinner, for instance, explanation and prediction of behavior is made only by means of public observation: "Adequate prediction of any science requires information about all relevant variables, and the control of a subject matter for practical purposes make the same demand," and inner states are irrelevant in functional analysis. In his famous pigeon experiment, he designed measurable and recordable observation from stimuli-response mechanism of the animal. For him, operational behavior consists in raising

the hand to a certain height, "H," rewarding the animal with food "F" at the same time, followed by the animal's response to "F" which has a low initial frequency. By repeating the experiment many times, the animal undergoes a conditioning process, that is, it comes to a point where it learns to associate "F" with "H." If "H" occurs, "F" follows, thus increasing the frequency of the response to "F." At the advanced stages of the experiment, Skinner fails to reward the animal with food after he raises his hand to a height "H," but it responds as if "F" were present by turning in the direction where the food is dropped.[8] This study is supposed to illustrate human behavior in both psychology and sociology. But, by eliminating beliefs from behavior, Skinner fails to account for the difference between a human being and, say, a Coke machine, Brunner might argue. In other words, what prevents psychology or sociology from becoming the study of diesel engines? In Brunner's view, the attempt to comprehend agape by eliminating religious beliefs, which are its basis, is not tenable.

Next, Brunner might consider attempts by logical behaviorists, who would reduce beliefs about agape to behavioral dispositions. To say, for example: "Brunner believes that there is agape" may simply express the statement: "If there were a Bible available, Brunner would read it." The main difficulty with this kind of deduction is that the resulting subjunctive conditionals do not constitute

an observation language. Furthermore, Brunner's believing that there is agape does not guarantee that he would read the Bible, for he would believe that there is agape without ever reading the Bible. In this case, we would be required to list an infinite number of subjunctive conditionals to correspond to the fact that Brunner believes that there is agape, hoping that one of them squares with the inner state about agape. Practically, this is impossible. So Brunner would reject this attempt.

But Durkheim would argue, "In fact, we can say that the believer is not deceived when he believes in the existence of a moral power upon which he depends and from which he receives all that is best in himself: this power exists, it is society."[9] The individual exalts religion, and this exaltation is real "and is really the effect of forces outside of and superior to the individual." If Durkheim's insight is correct, then Brunner's controversial notion of agape here becomes a pseudo-problem. Durkheim gives an additional flavoring to his approach to religion: "By the mere fact that their apparent function is to strengthen the bonds attaching the believer to his god, they at the same time really strengthen the bonds attaching the individual to the society of which he is a member, since the god is only a figurative expression of the society."[10] Durkheim may be said to advocate an identity relation of some sort. Supposing that a society "S" consists of social orders O_1,

O_2, ... O_h each of which contributes unity among individuals in "S," and that O_a corresponds to beliefs in agape of "S," say that A_s, according to Durkheim, is nothing but society itself, then: Beliefs in agape A_s = Social Order O_r. This could mean that A_s and O_r have different meanings but the same reference; beliefs in agape talk is reducible without change in reference to social order talk, in a given entity S. The difficulty we immediately face is that of determining what constitutes the properties and objects for A_s and O_r. For the sake of argument, let us make such an arbitrary determination, which, of course, fits Durkheim's model.

Identity of	Properties	Objects
Social Order O_r	Occurs in empirical phenomena	Unity of individual
Beliefs in Agape A_s	Are Mental States	Unity of Individuals

Figure 2

Accordingly, beliefs in agape are not merely reducible to O_r but to each of the social orders: O_1, O_2, O_2 ... O_n. This is what, in fact, Durkheim appears to be saying. But this configuration of agape does not go deep enough to explain why members of a certain community consisting of believers and non-believers might unite for the sake of warding off external aggression, for, given his analysis, only the

believer's identity with the solidarity of the social order. This is true of war when the existence of a social entity, consisting of those who have agape and those who do note, is threatened. For this reason, Brunner would reject Durkheim's weakness, claiming that agape is a system of symbols that establish powerful and "long-lasting moods and motivations in men by formulating conceptions with such an aura of factuality that the moods and motivations seem uniquely realistic."[11] Geertz purports to go further than Durkheim in giving specific characteristics of religious beliefs. For Brunner, Geertz's seeming substantive definition of agape will not do, for it simply expresses what agape does, not what it is. Moreover, we still need to know how agape symbols differ from others that may display similar effects. To this charge, Geertz might respond by revealing that it is just those symbols which shape society and whose source is society itself. Thus, among the Gusii people, a sacrificial meal consisting of animal flesh, shared with ancestral spirits, is symbolic of peace and reconciliation between humans and the ancestors. Reciprocal relationships among these people, usually characterized by the sharing of food in the empirical phenomenon (the profane world), lead to friendship and goodwill between the parties. Consequently, any differences that might have existed before they partake the meal are eliminated, opening a way to forgiveness on the part of the offended party and to a relationship that is free

of retaliatory action. Thus, agape first exists in the mind, being abstracted from the profane world, and then takes publicly observable forms through sacrificial practices, and, finally, it reinforces meal sharing activities in the profane world. The diagram in Figure 3 illustrates the point Geertz makes.



Figure 3

It is not hard to see that this account suffers certain defects. First, like Durkheim, Geertz is committed to the view that agape attempts to explain its source and function, hardly makes progress toward elucidating its symbolic meanings. Second, granting that agape symbols do in fact exist, for example, shape reciprocal relationships, Geertz does not give a condition that ensures that these symbols are the only ones that have this function. Third, even if he could successfully give a substantive symbolic account of agape, he would not thereby have given a substantive account

of agape itself, for agape symbols are one thing and agape itself another. When I say that "two" is "2," I have not really said what "two" is. All that I have tried to do is to represent "two" by some symbol "2," raising an open question: "But what is two?" Geertz and Durkheim might readily point out the source of agape beliefs (i.e., beliefs in God that are abstracted from reciprocity). This explanation, however, leads to either infinite regress or the circularity indicated in the diagram in Figure 3.

Some social scientists might skillfully argue that agape is a response to disruptions in ordinary life. Like science, religion attempts to explain some phenomenon that resists adaptations to everyday experience, or rather, it is a defense mechanism against threats to everyday life. This is the view which Berger seems to be advocating: "I would recommend that a scientific study of religion return to a perspective on the phenomenon 'from within' that is, to viewing it in terms of the meanings intended by the religious consciousness."[12] Ordinary, safe reality of everyday experience contains other realities which appear as enclaves, islands, holes that "constitute an implicit threat to the take-for-granted security of the ordinary." Human experience is "an ongoing succession of resting securely within the reality of the ordinary, having that reality breached, and returning it to the ordinary after that breach in its defenses has been repaired."[13] Berger goes to great lengths

to specify the empirical phenomena from which agape might be abstracted. It is those forms of experience that present counter-measures against maintenance and continuation of the profane world. Agape is thus a way of coming to terms with the disrupted ordinary reality, offering to explain it in a way that it should fit into the working scheme of ordinary life experience by hypothesizing a notion of "gods" in the other side of ordinary reality, just as a scientist hypothesizes electrons in explaining the flow and effect of electricity in a conductor. To this end, Berger's scientification of the phenomenological school has not really demonstrated Brunner's agape, for he faces the formidable challenge of empirically penetrating the human mind. If there is any success at all in his favor, he would possibly resort to the following epistemologically guided scientific methods of studying the relationship between sensory impacts and beliefs about the world.

1) Supposing that Berger is one of those rare, neutral observers, studying the believer in the "gods" as well as the believer's external world by investigating the bombardments from the natural phenomena on the believer's sensory surfaces, this would result in whatever would become his beliefs in agape made public by the believer's own report.

a. He might know the believer's beliefs, but he would not thereby have explained how these beliefs are connected with the empirical phenomenon, for

beliefs may be held for reasons not connected with the phenomenon in question; he might establish a correlation but not a causal relationship.

b. He does not have privileged access to that part of the believer's own world of beliefs. Thus, he will not, for example, be able to tell whether Brunner's claim is true or false.

2) Supposing a social scientist who is a believer experiments with himself, thus attempting to resolve these difficulties (since he has access to his own mental states including his agape beliefs), he would need an external observer to confirm or disconfirm his own beliefs, for these beliefs may be the result of hallucinations and are possible. There is one attractive recourse for this: the external observer will have to rely on the experimenter's own report about his agape beliefs, but this is not different from saying that he can establish a connection between another person's beliefs and that person's external world (public report), implying that the difficulties encountered in 1(a) and 1(b) are once again in the backyard. We could avoid these difficulties by regarding any scientific study of religion as a matter of subjective experience, a move which put Berger in an embarrassing position.

Brunner would thus conclude that the functionalist attempts to penetrate the falsity or truth of agape failure. But this does not mean that functionalism is a total failure.

As Kurtz indicates: to the functionalist the main issue "is not what religion says but what it does."[14] The functionalist approach is concerned with the effects of agape. This could be the functionalist rejoinder.

Functionalist Rejoinder

The functionalist could argue that agape is not exclusively for those who have faith, as Brunner claims. For agape does have effects accessible to scientific inquiry. It is these effects that have been found to be irrational. To illustrate this point, he would give an exposition of ritual process studied by scientific inquiry.

The Ritual Process

Earlier, it was pointed out that Eliade fails to give an adequate account of the distinction between the sacred and the profane. A functionalist could make a reconstruction of Eliade's distinction to pave his way. He could claim that there are three features in the life of a religious believer. First, there is a profane state, where the life of the believer is not any different form that of the secular person. The believer may not do exactly those things that the secular man does, but certain of his activities may have nothing to do with religion, though they may not conflict with religion. This will include activities like farming, taking a course in engineering, or attending a political

rally. Next, there is the sacred-profane zone where interruptions have both useful or harmful effects on the believer. It is here where the effect of agape can be publicly observed, especially the ritual process. Finally, there is the sacred zone, remote from the observer but nonetheless conceptualized. This is the area which is not accessible to scientific inquiry. The sacred-profane and the sacred zones respectively correspond to the immanent and the transcendent in Brunner's theological view.

Worship, or ritual process, is a response to the sacred realm, but it takes place in the sacred-profane zone. A clear distinction between the sacred and profane in the latter cannot be drawn. The overlap is ambiguous involving in a way a paradox, because the very beings who have a transcendental experience of agape are also the very beings who have immanent experience in the principle of reciprocity--hence an appearance of irrationality. The other aspect of irrationality occurs when believers, in their peak experience, display emotional behavior that resists rational explanation. Brunner could respond to this rejoinder by turning to specific study in ritual process. Turner is one of those who has conducted such a study.

Gennep coined rites of passage to distinguish rites of separation, transition, and incorporation. Thus, rites of separation are prominent in funeral ceremonies, rites of incorporation at marriages, and rites of transitions in

initiation.[15] Turner has extended the term to cover three phases of a ritual process. Thus, when there is a large scale calamity or catastrophe among the Luo of Kenya, they traditionally respond to their supreme invisible being, Nyasaye, by offering him a bull at the top of a mountain as a sacrifice. Before such a sacrifice is made, they separate themselves from the profane experience and enter the sacred-profane region where sacrifice is offered. Turner calls it the "liminal period" or "communitas." It is betwixt and between and ambiguous, neither here nor there, stressing equality and comradeship.[16] Liminality culminates in the incorporation of the group to the profane zone. In liminality, the communities emerge. Here there are no kings, chiefs, or princesses, since society "is pictured as a communitas of free and equal comrades--of total persons" and also since communitas "is essentially opposed to structure, as antimatter is hypothetically opposed to matter."[17] Consequently, exaggerated differences emphasized in social structure (profane realm), including acquired and ascribed status, are diminished. In spite of its "purely spontaneous and self-generating aspect, when communitas becomes normative its religious expressions become closely hedged about by rules and interdictions--which act like the lead container of a dangerous radioactive isotope."[18] Turner stresses the harmonious aspect of the sacred-profane zone, but there are also disruptions or episodes having a rational dimension and

leading to communitas itself. Accordingly, these people put efforts to eliminate these disruptions by making use of all available tools so they could live in an environment that is safe from harm or danger. They could, for instance, regulate themselves by instituting moral rules, but even if all these rules were strictly observed by everyone, they will not come into complete terms with certain aspects of reality that threaten their existence, which could include death or disease. Given the limitation in their knowledge of the world, they would tend to create religious symbols that give meaning to a reality that resists ordinary methods of explanation. Members of a religious community that accept those symbols may often have similar ways of perceiving reality, implying that their acceptance of these symbols is spontaneous activity. Brunner could accept this account thus far but he would nonetheless maintain that, insofar as communitas in ritual process is isolated from an underlying reality, it would appear irrational. But the believer refuses that communitas, the effect of belief in agape, be so isolated. Brunner could argue that the believer's underlying reality of the communitas employs rational patterns analogous to scientific explanation. To prove his point, he will need to establish this analogous relationship. Accordingly, he could consider areas like scientific observation and explanation.

Observation and Practice

Although Brunner admits that science is one of the sources of the knowledge about the world, there is one view of science with which he is not in agreement--the positivist tradition. He himself, however, does not advance an argument for this disagreement, except that he thinks it to be untenable.[19] A consideration of some of the criticisms raised against this tradition might help to reconstruct his position. For example, early formulations of the tradition viewed an empirically significant sentence S as one derived from an empirically significant set of finite observation sentences. Accordingly, conditions of adequacy for cognitive significance were formulated thus: 1) if a sentence S is significant, so is its negation; 2) if N is a non-significant sentence, then a compound sentence that has N is also non-significant.[20] The immediate problem that this formulation faces is that it violates these conditions of adequacy as follows: First, it suggests that universal statements like (X) (RX --> BX): "All ravens are black," is not significant, since it does not consist of an empirically significant set of finite observation sentences. Consider an essential statement (X) BX, which is significant. According to (1) ~(X) BX is also significant. But ~(X) BX = (X) ~BX. (X)~ BX is not significant since it is a universal statement. This is a contradiction.

Noting that universal statements in science (e.g.: scientific laws) could not be dispensed with, Carnap proposed a modification of cognitive significance as follows: a statement is significant if, and only if, it is derivable from infinite sets of observation statements and it has a degree of confirmability.[21] Thus a statement like (X)(RX --> BX) qualifies as an infinite set of observation statements. Originally (a) (Ra --> Ba), (b) (Rb --> Rb), ..., (c) (Rc --> Bc), could be accepted as an empirically significant set of finite observation statements, but we have already seen the difficulties faced by this approach. So, Carnap's move was designed to overcome these difficulties, but at a great sacrifice, for to settle for a mere degree of confirmability weakens the original intent of positivist commitment to decidability. (It is noteworthy that the positivists wanted an effective method of reaching consensus by means of deductive procedures.)

Next, Ayer proposed that a statement S is significant if, and only if, the conjunction of S and S' yield observation statement O and that S' alone does not yield O.[22] Stated simply, this formulation faces certain difficulties. For instance, let N be a non-significant statement, and N --> O be another statement, such that the conjunction of N and N --> O yields O. This is possible since:

1.	N --> O	Premise
2.	N	Premise
	———	
	O	Conclusion

but, O cannot be derived from N --> O alone. It would follow that N is significant, but this is a contradiction. It is difficulties of this sort that could convince Brunner of the implausibility of the positivist view of science. The empiricist tradition, which is a departure from the positivist strict decidability, recognized the importance of theoretical terms such as "electron," "fragile," etc. in scientific observation, and made reconstruction accordingly.

Along this line, Hempel proposed a condition of adequacy for a criterion of empirical significance based on definability, as follows: "It would demand that any term with empirical significance must be explicitly definable by means of observation terms."[23] According to this criterion, a statement F(X) --> (t) (SXt <--> BXt), which stands for: "An object X is fragile, if and only if, at any time when the object is sharply struck, it breaks at that time." As Hempel himself admits, this formulation has difficulties. For example, it is not true that fragile objects break any time they are struck, unless "sharply struck" is interpreted as "breaks." Furthermore, supposing that a is a non-fragile object (rubber) which happens not to be sharply struck at any

time throughout its existence, then Sat is false, implying that Sat --> Bat is true, since Fa is true. If Sat --> Bat is true, then Bat is true, which means that a non-fragile object breaks. This is a contradiction.[24]

Carnap has suggested an ingenious procedure to derive empirical laws, consisting of observation terms from abstract theories consisting of theoretical terms, by means of correspondence rules. Such a rule may, for instance, connect the theoretical term "mass" with the observable predicate "heavier than" as follows: "If U is heavier than V, then mass of U' (i.e., the mass of the coordinate region U' corresponding to U) is greater than the mass of V'."[25] The main difficulty with correspondence rules, however, is that they do not account for change of meaning in theory change (e.g., Newtonian "mass" vs. Einstein's "mass"). Supposing that such an account could be given, it does not block introducing metaphysical entities such as "God" into observation language. This means we could have observation consequences of Brunner's "God" "agape" by devising correspondence rules. The empiricist would resist this move by maintaining that there is a distinction between scientific observation and Brunner's observation claims in that the latter is tainted by background beliefs whereas the former is theory-neutral. The empiricist's position thus shows commitment to consensus-based scientific inquiry.

The basic assumption in empiricism is that, in observation language, entities have directly observable attributes. Hempel elaborates this notion by making a distinction between two senses of observation, the narrow and the broader versions. In the narrow sense, observation is directly observable when auxiliary devices such as telescopes, microscopes, etc., are not used, whereas in the broader sense such instruments may be used. In Hempel's view, any of these types of observations could be employed in science, provided that, "certain techniques of observation have been agreed upon."[26] Implicit in the commitment to direct observability in science is that observation language is theory-neutral. By this, they mean that those who make assertions in the language see the same things when looking at the same things. In the physics of the human eye, for example, light rays travel from an object outside the eye through the convex-like lens, resulting in the formation of an image on the retina. The optic nerves transmit the image to the brain where the information is recorded that agrees with that of the object. Since all human eyes function similarly, it follows that two observers see the same thing when looking at the same object.

The view that observation is theory-neutral is contradicted by Wittgenstein's analysis of "duck-rabbit" pictured below.[27]



Figure 4

Supposing that this picture is introduced to someone for the first time, and if asked: "What's that?" or "What do you see here?," he should reply: "A picture duck." If, however, another person is introduced to the same picture, but is given certain features of what he sees, such as "it is a small animal with long ears A and mouth B, looking in the direction X," he should reply that it is a rabbit. Thus, two observers looking at the same picture see two different things, depending on their background knowledge. In short, observation language is not theory-neutral.

Following Wittgenstein, a number of philosophers and historians of science have sharply criticized the empiricist claim, arguing that observation is theory-laden. Among them are Quine, Hanson and Kuhn.[28] Kuhn, for example, states this view:

> Nevertheless, paradigm [theory] changes do cause scientists to see the world of their research-engagement differently. In so far as their only recourse to that world is through what they see and do, we may want to say that after a revolution scientists are responding to a different

> world. It is as elementary prototypes for these transformations of the scientist's world that the familiar demonstrations of a switch in visual gestalt prove so suggestive. What were ducks in the scientist's world before the revolution are rabbits afterwards.[29]

Kuhn provides evidence for this assertion from the history of science. Thus, in the seventeenth century electricians saw chaff particles rebound from, or fall off, the electrified bodies that had attracted them. Modern observers would see electrostatic repulsion, rather than mechanical or gravitational rebounding. But, electrostatic repulsion was not seen until Hanksbee's large scale apparatus had greatly magnified its effects.[30] Kuhn concludes that sensory experience is not fixed and neutral. "The duck-rabbit shows that two men with the same retinal impressions can see different things."[31] There is no "pure-observation-language, perhaps one will yet be devised." According to Kuhn, the gestalt switch corresponds to theory change, (which is "a conversion experience," implying that it is an irrational transformation).[32] It is only someone who sees through the theoretical framework of the scientific community who is capable of making relevant observation, one who operates out of this framework cannot make similar observation, neither refute it or confirm it.[33] Brunner could therefore argue that scientific observation, like religious observation, is theory-laden. This conclusion is not without critics.

Some scientists might challenge Brunner, arguing, as Fodor does, that there is a class of beliefs that is typically fixed by sensory/perceptual processes, and that the fixation of such beliefs is theory-neutral of observation. Fodor's discussion attempts to show that the empiricist view is not as mistaken as Kuhn and others have tried to argue and that there is a sense in which the empiricist view is correct. Thus, "given the same stimulations, two organisms with the same sensory/perceptual psychology will quite generally observe the same things, and hence arrive at the same observational beliefs, however, must of their theoretical commitments may differ."[34] The basis for this argument is as follows: first, perception is modular (inferential, but encapsulated). It follows that bodies of theory that are inaccessible to the modules do not affect the way the perceiver sees the world. "Scientists with quite different axes to grind, for example, might nevertheless, see the world in exactly the same way, so long as the bodies of theory that they disagree about is inaccessible to their mechanisms."[35] Thus, something can be made of the notion of theory-neutral observation.

Fodor's attempt to reconstruct a notion of theory-neutral observation in science, is, in my opinion, mistaken. For Brunner might argue that, in relevant scientific observation, scientists are trained to be able to make such observation. In other words, they will not only see what a

lay person (non-scientist) will see, but they will, in addition, need to interpret it in order that it may have relevancy in the scientific community. It is true that there is something fixed in the perceptual process, but it is something that is shared by both the layman and the scientist. The kind of perception having informational relevancy to the scientist and his community is not fixed, as Fodor contends. A radiologist, for example, is one who has been trained to read an X-ray photograph according to certain scientific criteria, which may later change depending on new findings. But, there is something that is fixed in the radiologist's perception that is shared by a non-radiologist--seeing an X-ray photograph as a mere photograph. This shows that, if there is such a thing as theory-neutral observation language, then it is that kind of perceptual mechanism that is shared by all human beings who have normal sensory surfaces and are able to respond to similar stimuli in the same way--given this mechanism. There is thus something that a scientist and a religious believer similarly sees, but what the scientist sees in addition is not theory-neutral.

Reasoning Patterns

The skepticism raised in the last section does not really help to sustain Brunner's position about the rationality of an underlying reality, since one could argue

that both the believer and the scientist are penetrated by background beliefs of their respective practices, but then the religious believer's background is irrational, infecting the fixed perceptual mechanism he shares with the scientist, thus making the whole religious practice just as irrational. Since the scientific cognition is rational, whatever perceptual process (the fixed mechanism) it penetrates becomes rational. For Brunner to counter this charge, he will have to demonstrate that the underlying reality in communitas is rational--hence, when it penetrates the fixed perceptual mechanism, it makes the religious practice rational.

There are two levels of science being rational that could be used to undermine Brunner's claim. First, science could be said to be rational when it results in the growth of knowledge about the world in the sense that the application of this knowledge improves the human situation. The last hundred years have witnessed improved systems of communication and breakthroughs in conquering many diseases (that religion was unable to account for) an increase in the life-span of human beings, etc., attributed to the scientific revolution. In this respect, religion is no competitor. If science is rational and religion irrational, it is because the former is progressive, and the latter is not. The concept of rationality construed this way is not without difficulties; for science has also created threats to human

life. Clear cases abound, ranging from pollution to nuclear weapons, indicating that science is at least irrational. Thus attempts to construe rationality in terms of progress do not succeed in weakening Brunner's position.

The second level of rationality in science is of the kind in which science reasons about its subject matter--the reasoning patterns employed by scientists in actual scientific practice. The scientific domain that could best reveal this feature is scientific explanation.

The prominent figures that could illuminate the argument of Brunner's critics are Hempel and Salmon. A brief discussion of Hempel and Salmon will illuminate the basis of the critics' argument.

Hempel presents two main types of scientific explanation: deductive nomological and statistical models. In both models, explanation is an argument, consisting of explanans as premises and explanandum as conclusion. The deductive nomological model is a deductive argument in which the explanans must have empirical data; i.e., "it must be capable, at least in principle, of test by experiment or observation and explanandum must be a logical consequence of the explanans. The explanans consist of particular fact and general laws while explanandum contain a particular event to be explained."[36] In Hempel's schema, the deductive nomological model may be summarized:

	$C_1, C_2 \ldots C_k$	particular fact
Logical deduction	$L_1, L_2 \ldots L_r$	general laws
	E	Description of the empirical phenomenon Explandunum to be explained

The notion of rationality implicit in this model is that an argument which is valid and whose premises have empirical content is rational. Since religion lacks the latter feature and may not employ the same technique, agape is, therefore, irrational. The general weakness of the deductive nomological model is that laws may be true at one time and false at another time, implying that what used to be an explanation at one time ceases to be one at another time. The second weakness is that this model does not distinguish between genuine law and accidental laws. Thus, Brunner could easily dismiss this kind of scientific rationality as untenable.

Hempel next discusses statistical models, of which the inductive statistical model is a representative. According to this model, an explanation is an inductive argument in which one of the premises must be a statistical law. Hempel imposes the following conditions to this model: 1) the premises must be true, 2) the explanation must satisfy the requirement for maximal specifity, 3) the premises must lend high inductive probability to the conclusion. Condition 2) was formulated as a result of ambiguity of inductive

statistical explanation. Thus, for a given statistical argument with true premises and a high associated probability, there may exist a rival statistical argument with equally true premises and with a high associated probability whose conclusion contradicts the first. For example:

S_x = definition: x has streptococus

R_x = definition: x recovers $P(R_x/S_x \ \& \ P_x) = 0.95$

P_x = definition: Jones $\dfrac{\qquad\qquad}{R_j}$ 0.95

S_x^* - definition x has penicillin resistant streptococus

$P(\sim R_x/S_x^* \ \& \ P_x) = 0.95$

$\dfrac{S_j \ \& \ P_j}{\sim R_j}$ 0.95

Hempel's own solution is that a concept of statistical explanation for particular events, is essentially relative to a given knowledge situation as represented by a class K of accepted statement, which he calls epistemic relativity.[37]

Salmon has sharply criticized both Hempel's deductive nomological and statistical models.[38] His four main theses in this move are as follows:

1) People who have colds, but use vitamin C, recover within a fortnight, but, the use of vitamin C may not explain the recovery, since almost all colds clear up within two weeks regardless. In other words, causal connections between vitamin C and recovery is lacking. This shows that Hempel's models lack a requirement

that ensures that only relevant facts will be included.

2) Inability to account for explanations in which the explanadum has new probability relative to the explanans. Paresis occurs only in people who have had syphilis un-treated. Less than 1/2 percent of these people who have untreated syphilis develop paresis. Yet, it is an explanation to say that one develops paresis as a result of having untreated syphilis.

3) The epistemic relativization of I-S explanation implies that all I-S models are incomplete D-N models; their inadequacy can be measured by the degree to which they approximate a D-N model. Hempel developed I-S models, because he found D-N models inadequate in certain cases. In effect, this attempt hardly improves his scheme, since the weakness of D-N models would equally affect I-S models.

4) An explanation does not depend on the knowledge situation as Hempel argues. Epistemic relativity does not depend on their being intelligent beings.

Since Salmon's criticisms are convincing, Hempel's models of scientific explanation are defective to do the job of demonstrating scientific rationality. Salmon's own alternative version might require considerable attention.

Reacting against Hempel's epistemic relativity of statistical explanation, Salmon proposes objective homogeneity as the basis for his own version of scientific explanation, for objective homogeneity avoids making reference to background knowledge (explanation in Salmon's view is independent of their being intelligent beings). Accordingly, to explain an event is to show it as occupying a

place in the discernible patterns of the world. Explanation is fathoming the causal structure of the world which relates to individual events, and this structure does not depend on background knowledge. According to the objective homogeneity principle, an objectively homogeneous reference class cannot be partitioned into sub-classes, that are statistically relevant to the occurrence of the attribute in question. In fact, there is no way to identify a relevant partition. Explanation consists of identifying the causal relations, which in turn relate to individual events. We explain general regularities by identifying the causal mechanisms that produce the events they cover.

The argument which Salmon offers in support of thesis 4) presupposes 3). He cites again the example of paresis mentioned in thesis 2) as a cause that does not satisfy the high probability requirement. According to Hempel's I-S explanations, this case is a partial explanation, since we do not have enough medical knowledge to provide anything like adequate explanation of paresis. Supposing that medical science uncovers an additional factor F at some point in the future "such that those victims of latent untreated syphilis in which F is present will probably (high probability) develop paresis," thus, satisfying Hempel's high-probability requirement of the I-S explanation. But, since not all the class of people with latent untreated syphilis (S) who possess the factor F develop paresis, there must be a further

factor G that helps to determine which members of S.F. will develop paresis P and which will not. "If all the members of S.F.G. develop paresis, then we have an objectively homogeneous reference class on account of the universal generalization (X) [SX.FX.GX)PX], but this is a case of trivial objective homogeneity." Moreover, this kind of explanation "is no longer I-S explanation, but rather D-N, for we replaced our statistical law with a universal law" Salmon concludes:

> ...if the world is actually indeterministic, we seem to need the concept of objective homogeneity to describe that very indeterminacy. In a sample of radioactive substance composed of atoms of a single isotope, for example, some atoms undergo spontaneous radioactive decay within a certain time interval and others do not. If the indeterministic interpretation of quantum mechanics is correct, then there is no further characteristic of these atoms that is relevant to their decay within that time period. To formulate the thesis of indeterminism--whether it turns out ultimately to be true or false--we seem to need the concept of a homogeneous reference class, and this homogeneity must represent an objective feature of the real world.[39]

In a nutshell, Salmon's objective homogeneity of scientific explanation states: "A reference class A is homogeneous with respect to an attribute B provided there is no set of properties C_i $(1 \leq i \leq k; k \geq 2)$ in terms of which A can be relevantly partioned." A partition of A is a set of "mutually exclusive subclasses of A which, taken together, contain all members of A." "A portion of A by means of C_i is relevant with respect to B if, for some values of i, $(B/A.\ C_i \neq (B/A)$."[40]

Despite Salmon's attempts to overcome Hempel's failure, his version of scientific explanation has certain weaknesses, too. As Hanna points out, supposing that the universe is deterministic, then objective homogeneity is trivialized because the only objective homogeneous reference classes will be those associated with universal generalizations. On the other hand, supposing that the universe is irreducibly stochastic, then, for practical purposes, objective homogeneity must be temporarily relativized. Objective probabilities of particular events evolve and so must temporarily be relativized, since there is no objectivity in choosing a point in time. The upshot of this is that our choice will depend on pragmatic purpose and background beliefs, culture, values, etc.[41] This opens possibilities of constructing religiously intentioned explanations.

In both Hempel and Salmon's models of scientific explanation, observation plays a crucial role. Hempel's conception of observation suffers from regarding observation as occurring in theory-neutral observation language. For Salmon, whether observation is theory-neutral or theory-laden is not a big issue. If the conclusion reached in the last section, then Hanna's criticisms are in order. It also means that a scientist, as well as a religious believer, is capable of making certain kinds of observations. In other words, a religious person has access to the external world, through his sensory mechanism. Could a religious believer construct

an explanation of the observed phenomena that displays reasoning patterns analogous to science? To answer this question, Salmon gives insightful elucidation.

Salmon contends that scientific explanations frequently appeal to unobserved or unobservable objects. A typical example is the electromagnetic theory developed by Faraday and Maxwell, who postulated the existence of electric and magnetic fields, as well as the existence of electromagnetic radiation, which are imperceptible to human sense organs. A person may have trouble with the reception on a television receiver, sometimes a picture breaking up into a herringbone pattern. He later discovers that the picture is highly correlated with a broadcast made from a nearby police station. To explain this correlation one would involve electromagnetic radiation of frequencies (which are unobservable to the senses).[42] Following Salmon, Schoen has argued that religious explanations are common among believers. Like many scientific explanations, they appeal to non-observable entities or beings, and they usually attempt to account for patterns of phenomena that resist a naturalistic account. To illustrate his point, he recounts Fred, the theologian,[43] who introduces God as an explanatory entity to account for regular patterns he had noticed in his own life. Suppose Fred badly needed money for rent at one point. At the eleventh hour, he receives the exact amount he needed by mail. The check he receives was exactly the right

amount and it came at the right time. Furthermore, Fred had revealed his financial problems to no one of his friends. Fred discovers that there was no way the donor could have known of this need and that the donor had a thoroughly inexplicable and uncharacteristic urge to send along a check, that happened to be of just the right amount, made out to just the right person and delivered at just the right time. Explanatory resources to natural phenomena would fail. He, therefore, deems this event a miracle and seeks to explain it by taking recourse to God. Of course, Fred might be mistaken if it were discovered later that, with expanded human knowledge, this event fits in the neural patterns. But, at this point in time, no such knowledge is available. Schoen's insight here has already been hinted by Eliade and Burger (who, however, have not developed explanations to the same degree as Schoen has done).

In a religious explanation, a religious person, like a scientific theorist, chooses an explanatory range, a relevantly analogous range of phenomena for which the governing mechanism already is understood and needs to be found. He then carries over explanatorily efficacious features of that known mechanism into "the religious sphere and attribute it to god without undue epistemic or religious sacrifice."[44] Schoen's religious explanations, patterned as they are after scientific ones, ignore many religious features such as ritual process that could appear irrational

to unbelievers. This is true of baptism as a sacrament in which a Catholic priest incorporates an infant in the Church through holy water and baptismal formula. Brunner would, however, view all religious experience as coherent and founded on certain realities whose explanations can be patterned along scientific ones. For this reason, ritual process is rational since it is founded on underlying reality whose rationality is embodied in its explanation.

Human rationality includes the capacity to abstract symbols from ordinary activities (activities that may not distinguish human beings from non-humans) in order to survive. Language consists of audible sounds or noises that have been manipulated to form a communication system. This does not mean that human beings would be incapable of acquiring food, air and sleep if they did not have language. But, they would acquire these goods more efficiently with than without their own system of language. As McShea indicates: "The relatively sudden evolution of his enlarged brain [man's brain], some hundreds of thousands of years ago, made man the only animal which can (and in the absence of instincts) cope with the world that includes the tangible evidences of the powers thus contributed to the complication and satisfaction of his desires."[45] Whereas symbols could be put into the well-being of human species, it is also true that they could be used to create suffering for others. This is true of episodes of colonization in the history of the

species, whereby the imposition of colonial rule required that the masters were first able to communicate effectively among themselves through usage of common language in order to jointly crush native resistance, often resulting in bloodshed. (I have pointed out that the humanist recognizes the possibilities of harm among human beings that create the need for the formation of moral obligation.) Brunner could thus conclude that rituals are symbols that stand for beliefs in a reality for which explanations can be constructed. These symbols, though appearing irrational in themselves, are expressions of a rational underlying structure. The effects of agape are therefore rational, not irrational as it might be claimed.[46]

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

Brunner's and Kurtz's approaches to a moral life have similarities. Both stress that a virtuous life consists of services that bring comfort and preservation to those in need. Both believe that a moral agent is one who executes an action through critical reflection and self-determination. But, there are also differences. Brunner embodies an element of a supernatural being into a moral life and argues that a believer is one who has received agape, the gift of this being, by which he renders services to those in need spontaneously. Accordingly, a believer does not expect to be rewarded or served, if in need, in this world, although this may occur. Agape does not displace the principle of reciprocity, according to which human beings view themselves as interdependent beings. Their existence rests on mutual support in time of need. A person promotes the preservation of others so that he would preserve himself immediately or at some point in the distant future. The principle was ordained by God in Creation and has to be presupposed by agape. The believers, however, expect to be rewarded by eternal life for living a virtuous life. For Kurtz, a virtuous life consists in services that enhance survival and comfort to others in need in this life, without any reference to Brunner's God. Morality is rooted in human nature alone and it is

situational and relative. In the course of comparing Brunner and Kurtz, the use of exemplars in achieving a moral life is suggested to overcome the dilemma faced when inculcating virtues in a moral program. Kurtz is totally opposed to indoctrination. Exemplars could play a role in his moral program, but he is immediately faced with identifying the right exemplars without resorting to some sort of indoctrination. A rapist, for example, is not the right exemplar. At the outset, Kurtz's moral program is a mere intellectual mechanism that has little impact in transforming society into virtuous individuals. His rejection of libertarian morality and intuitionism demands that his moral program be reinvested with new meaning. Accordingly, a redefinition of his own notion of "indoctrination" is formulated. Exemplars in this new approach, though easily identified, are interventionists. In spite of Kurtz's claim to some altruistic morality, the principle of reciprocity, on which his moral program is based, is self-interest. Consequently, this program is incapable of leading a person who lacks certain emotions, such as compassion, to be engaged in humanitarian services. For Brunner, a loving Father, Christ and believers are exemplars because they have agape. Unbelievers who preach and practice the principle of reciprocity are also exemplars. Brunner does not reject possibilities of indoctrination in his approach, on condition that the rights of the other person are not violated. He

overcomes Kurtz's weakness by maintaining that a person who has agape will promote the well-being of others in spite of his emotional state insofar as there is already a divine command for it. Moral autonomy as self-determination through critical reflection does not undermine Brunner's claim. Furthermore, agape is not irrational insofar as its effects are not isolated from the underlying reality, which is rational. In effect, Kurtz should concede to Brunner's approach. In general, both Brunner and Kurtz have adopted an interventionist approach to resolving the dilemma that was pointed out at the beginning of this inquiry. Since they are both concerned with the deteriorating of morals in pluralistic societies, this approach has possibilities of working in their favor. They also stress critical reflection. The use of exemplars will greatly enhance their programs.

NOTES

CHAPTER 1

1. Baumer refers to a famous painting by Paul Rubens in which Religion is seated in a triumphal chair, occupying a central place, and behind her stand three figures who by their attitudes clearly show their subservience to her. Science is depicted as young in years; Philosophy, a bearded old man leaning on a staff; and Nature, of ample Rubenesque bosom. Behind these still are two figures, one an American Indian and a Negro. See Franklin L. Baumer, Religion and Rise of Skepticism, (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Company, 1960), p. 113.

2. Baumer, Modern European Thought (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc., 1977), p. 197.

3. Voltaire Philosophical Dictionary: Edited and translated by Theodore Besterman S.V. "Superstition" and "Theiste: Theist."

4. Paul Kurtz, In Defense of Secular Humanism (New York: Prometheus Book, 1983), p. 50.

5. There are disagreements about what constitutes indoctrination. Barrow has summarized such disagreements in Chapter 14. See Robin Barrow, Moral Philosophy for Education (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1975). I am considering indoctrination in broad terms as influencing others.

6. Plato's Meno in The Collected Dialogues of Plato, edited by Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982).

7. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, translated by Martin Ostwald (Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Menll Company, Inc.), 2096a:25; 1106b: 20, 1144a:5, 1139a:24, 1103a:25.

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CHAPTER 2

1. Robert E. Murphy, An Overture to Social Anthropology (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1979), who points out that "our preoccupation with cultural differences has led us to neglect the similarities of our experiences," p. 22.

2. Christopher Dawson, Religion and Culture (New York: Sheed & Ward, 1948), p. 11.

3. Ibid., p. 157.

4. Meyer Fortes, Kinship and the Social Order (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Company, 1948), p. 11.

5. The notion of exchange of women is emphasized by Levi-Strauss, and so is reciprocity, an underlying principle in his study of his theory of kinship. This point is especially discussed in relation to the Kachine people. See Claude Levi-Strauss, The Elementary Structure of Kinship, translated by James Harte Bell (London: Eyre and Spottiswood, 1969), pp. 233-254.

6. Leach, in his study of Trobriad clans, affirms that affines are potentially hostile aliens whose relationship is modified into a kind of treaty by the fact that marriage and gift-giving. See E.R. Leach, "Concerning Trobriad Clans and the Kinship Category 'Tabu'" in Developmental Cycle in Domestic Group, edited by Jack Goody (Cambridge: At the University Press, 1958), pp. 120-145.

7. Block, p. 77.

8. Arnold van Gennep, The Rites of Passage (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1960), pp. 10-11.

9. Victor Witter Turner, Dramas, Fields and Metaphors (New York: Cornell University Press, 1974), p. 232.

10. Block, pp. 81-82.

11. Block, pp. 81-82.

NOTES

CHAPTER 3

1. Emil Brunner, Truth as Encounter (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1964), pp. 141, 142.

2. Ibid., p. 75.

3. Ibid., p. 124.

4. Brunner, The Divine-Human Encounter, translated by Amandus W. Loos (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1943), p. 24.

5. Brunner, Faith, Hope, and Love (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1956), pp. 17-18.

6. Ibid., p. 22.

7. Brunner, The Scandal of Christianity (Philadelphia: the Westminster Press, 1952), pp. 24-5.

8. Ibid., p. 22.

9. Brunner, Faith, Hope and Love, p. 37.

10. Ibid., p. 51.

11. A reconciliation between Brunner and Kurtz on religious beliefs is conceivable at the level of constructing epistemically analogous relationship in the realm of natural science. It could be argued that a color-blind person is unable to see exactly the same things--the non-color-blind person sees. Yet there is something that exists for the latter--distinguishing different color shades. Likewise, a believer with a certain background (environment, experience) see things which a person without this background does not see.

12. Brunner, Eternal hope, translated by Harold Knight (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1954), p. 136.

13. Ibid., p. 139-140.

14. Ibid., p. 171.

15. Ibid., p. 175.

16. Ibid., p. 176.

17. Ibid., p. 183.

18. Brunner, The Divine Imperative, p. 120.

19. Brunner, The Christian Doctrine of Creation and Redemption, translated by Olive Wyon (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1952), p. 18.

20. Brunner, Eternal Hope, pp. 102-103.

21. "Fall" is a term generally used by Brunner to denote man's rebellion against the divine order established in Creation, and that this rebellion is "sin." It is straying away from God's original plan. See Brunner, The Christian Doctrine of Creation and Redemption, 90-101.

22. Ibid., p. 90.

23. According to Brunner, "Adam," in the meaning of Christian theology, is the unity of humanity, not in the zoological sense, but in the sense of humanitas, that in which something personal, something which transcends a form of existence which achieves no personal acts at all, but merely acts of self-preservation and the preservation of the species. By this, he seems to mean that the unity of humanity with Adam is based of man's ability to exercise the power of reason, a feature which distinguishes human beings from animals. This interpretation is supported by Brunner's view of "justice" as something that is involved only in human relationships. "Things or animals can of themselves be neither just or unjust." See Brunner, Justice and the Social Order, translated by Mary Hottinger (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1945), p. 13. On the question of the unity of humanity with Adam, see Brunner, The Christian Doctrine of Creation and Redemption, pp. 81-82.

24. Brunner, Justice and the Social Order, pp. 58-59.

25. Ibid., p. 61.

26. Ibid., p. 55.

27. Ibid., pp. 77-78.

28. Ibid., p. 80.

29. Ibid., pp. 74, 75, 197, 198.

30. Brunner, The Divine Imperative, p. 484.

31. Brunner, Justice and the Social Order, p. 42.

32. Ibid., p. 41.

33. Brunner, The Divine Imperative, p. 223.

34. Benedict de Spinoza, Ethics, translated by R.H.M. Elwes, IV, Prop XXXV. Proof, IV. Prop XXV.

35. Kenneth Dover, ed., Plato: Symposium (London: Cambridge University Press, 1980), p. 1.

36. Edward Ross Wharton, Etyma Graeca: Etymological Lexicon of Classical Greek (n.d.), s.v. (philos).

37. Brunner, Faith, Hope and Love, p. 64.

38. Brunner, Justice and the Social Order, pp. 129-130; Faith, Hope and Love, p. 65.

39. Brunner, Faith, Hope and Love, pp. 75-76.

40. Supra-rational is a term which Brunner employs for we generally conceive as non-rational in contrast with irrational.

41. Brunner, Justice and the Social Order, p. 127.

42. Brunner, The Christian Doctrine of Creation and Redemption, p. 331.

43. Brunner, The Divine Imperative, p. 233.

44. Ibid., p. 227.

45. Richard H. Harsh, John P. Miller, Glen D. Fielding, Models of Moral Education (New York: Longman Inc., 1980), pp. 183-4.

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CHAPTER 4

1. Paul Kurtz, "What is Happening?" in Moral Problems in Contemporary Society, ed. Paul Kurtz (New York: Prometheus Books, 1973), p. 10.

2. Robert McShea, "Human Nature Ethical Theory," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 39(2), (March, 1979), p. 399.

3. Ibid., p. 399.

4. Paul Kurtz, "What is Humanism?", pp. 3-4.

5. James Griffin, Well-Being: Its Meaning, Measurement and Moral Importance (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), p. 54.

6. Stuart Hampshire, Morality and Conflict (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1983), p. 40.

7. Ibid.

8.Griffin, p. 54.

9. Kurtz, In Defense of Secular Humanism, p. 55.

10. Kurtz, "The Ethics of Secular Humanism," in Sidney Hook, ed. Paul Kurtz (New York: Prometheus Books, 1983), p. 163.

11. Kurtz, "What is Humanism?" p. 5.

12. Kurtz, "The Ethics of Secular Humanism," p. 160.

13. Kurtz, In Defense of Secular Humanism (New York: Prometheus Books, 1983), p. 19.

14. Kurtz, "The Ethics of secular Humanism," p. 160.

15. Kurtz, In Defense of Secular Humanism, p. 34.

16. Ibid., p. 52.

17. Ibid., p. 54.

18.Ibid., p. 54.

19. Ibid., p. 50.

20. Ibid., p. 96.

21. Peter Claws, "On the Teaching of Ethics," Hastings Center Report, (October 1978), p. 32.

22. Kurtz, In Defense of Secular Humanism, p. 53.

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CHAPTER 5

1. Brunner, The Divine Judgment, p. 232.

2. William Sargant, Battle for the Mind (London: Heinemann, 1957), p. 214.

3. Waruhiu Itote, "Mau Mau" General (Nairobi: East African Publishing House, 1967), p. 283.

4. Kurtz, In Defense of Secular Humanism, p. 53.

5.Ibid., p. 42.

6. Kurtz has argued that, even in vicious emotions there may be a "measure of deliberation and planning." See Joseph Katz, "Desiring Reason," The Journal of Philosophy 53(26) (December, 1956), p. 838.

7. Kurtz, In Defense of Secular Humanism, p. 42.

NOTES

CHAPTER 6

1. Frankena, for instance, is skeptical about using Euthyphro's argument to disclaim the divine theory ethics. See William Frankena, "Is Morality Logically Dependent on Religion?" in Religion and Morality, ed. Gene Outka and John P. Keeler (New York: Anchor Press, Doubleday, 1973), pp. 302-3. He does not, however, give reasons for thinking so.

2. Immanuel Kant, Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Educational Publishing, 1981), pp. 64-5.

3. A.C. Ewing, "The Autonomy of Ethics" in Prospect for Metaphysics, ed. Ian Ramsey (London: George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1961), pp. 37-8.

4. Ibid., p. 38.

5. Frankena, "Is Morality Logically Dependent on Religion?", Outka.

6. See George Edward Moore, Principle Ethics (Cambridge: At the University, 1956).

7. I have been influenced by Prior to construct this kind of argument. See A.N. Prior, "The Autonomy of Ethics" The Australian Journal of Philosophy 38(3) (December, 1960): 199-206.

8.Kant, p. 39.

9. Spinoza, E IV.

10. Lawrence Haworth, Autonomy: An Essay in Philosophical Psychology and Ethics (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986), pp. 83-106.

11. Brunner, The Divine Imperative, p. 232.

12. B.F. Skinner, Science and Human Behavior (New York: Macmillan, 1953), p. 353.

13. Ibid., p. 354.

14. Ibid., p. 356.

NOTES

CHAPTER 7

1. Claims that religion is irrational have been made philosophers such as Kurtz. See Kurtz, "The Ethics of Secular Humanism," pp. 162-3.

2. Brunner, Justice and Social Order, p. 127

3. Mircea Eliade, The Sacred and the Profane, translated by Willard R. Tusk (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc., 1959), Chapters 1 and 2.

4. Ibid., p. 48.

5. Rudolf Otto, The Idea of the Holy: An Inquiry into the Non-Rational Factor in the Idea of the Divine and Its Relation to the Rational, translated by John W. Harvey (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970), p. 29.

6. Ibid., p. 48.

7. Ibid., p. 5.

8. B.F. Skinner, Science and Human Behavior (New York: Macmillan, 1953), pp. 65-81.

9. Emile Durkheim, Elementary Forms of the Religious Life, translated by Joseph Ward Swain (London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1976), p. 225.

10. Ibid., p. 225.

11. Clifford Geertz, "Religion as a Cultural System," An Anthropological Approach to the Study of Religion, edited by Michael Banton (London: Tavistock Publications Limited, 1968), p. 4.

12. Peter L. Berger, "Some Second Thoughts on Substantive v. Functional Definition of Religion," Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 13(2) (June 1974), pp. 129-130.

13. Ibid.

14. Kurtz, In Defense of Secular Humanism, p. 97.

15. Arnold van Gennep, The Rites of Passage (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1960), pp. 10-11.

16. Victor Witter Turner, Dramas, Fields and Metaphors (New York: Cornell University Press, 1974), p. 232.

17. Ibid., p. 243.

18. Ibid.

19. Brunner, Truth as Encounter, p. 15.

20. Carl G. Hempel, Aspects of Scientific Explanation (New York: The Free Press, 1965), p. 102.

21. R. Carnap, "Testability and Meaning," Philosophy of Science, 3(4) (October, 1936), p. 425. Dilworth makes the Empiricist replaced the positivist conceptions of verifiability with that of confirmability. See Craig Dilworth, Scientific Progress (Boston: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1986), p. 33.

22. A.J. Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic (New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1952).

23. Hempel, p. 109.

24. Ibid.

25. R. Carnap, "The Methodical Character of Theoretical Concepts," in Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. 1, edited by Herbert Feigl and Michael Scriven (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1964), p. 49.

26. Hempel, pp. 22-23.

27. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, translated by G.E.M. Anscombe (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc., 1968), p. 194.

28. See N.R. Hanson, Patterns of Discovery (Cambridge: At the University Press, 1961), Chapter 1 and W.V.O. Quine "Two Dogmas of Empiricism" in W.V.O. Quine, From a Logical Point of View (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980).

29. Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1970), p. 111.

30. Ibid., p. 117.

31. Ibid., p. 118.

32. Ibid., p. 151.

33. Ibid., p. 176.

34. Jerry Fodor, "Observation Reconsidered," Philosophy of Science 51 (1984), pp. 24-5.

35. Ibid., p. 38.

36. Hempel, pp. 248-9.

37. Ibid., p. 394.

38. Wesley C. Salmon, Scientific Explanation and the Casual Structure of the World (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), Chapters 2, 3, 4.

39. Ibid., p. 54.

40. Ibid, p. 56.

41. Hanna has illustrated the weakness of Salmon's objective homogeneity of scientific explanation by considering the disastrous explosion of the space shuttle "Challenger" which occurred on January 28, 1986. In the early hours of the morning, the objective homogeneity was close to zero, yet seventy seconds into the flight, it was evidentally close to (if not equal to) one. It would follow, according to Salmon's theory, that the S-R basis for an explanation of that event would be essentially trivial (involving, perhaps, a reference class of events in which plumes of fire were issuing from the booster rocket only moments before its explosion). There do not appear to be "any objective grounds for isolating one moment rather than another in the evolution of the event as the focus of the explanation." See Joseph F. Hanna, "Objective Homogeneity Relativized," Philosophy of Science Association (1986), p. 430.

42. See Salmon, pp. 208-09.

43. Edward L. Schoen, Religious Explanations: A Model From the Sciences (Durham: Duke University Press, 1985), p. 84.

44. Ibid., p. 149.

45. McShea, pp. 288-300.

46. I have thus far given an analogy between reasoning patterns in science and religion without ever showing if the latter demonstrated rationality in other ways. Even though

science is rational, as presented in this work, a rational property does not belong to science alone. Legal procedures, for instance, embody criteria for rationally distinguishing the criminally insane from the sane on the basis of witnesses, consistency or corroboration from history. It is, therefore, not difficult for a person, neutral to Brunner and Kurtz, to employ a similar procedure to determine whether agape is rational. Kurtz would probably reject this approach since it is not based on the scientific method, but it may nonetheless be acceptable to some third party.

APPENDIX

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I have devised the following categorizations in order to clarify and locate Brunner's and Kurtz's positions on morality. The tension between these two seems to boil down to atheism versus theism.

Theism includes such world religions as Christianity, Islam, and Judaism, each of which comprises diverse movements. Christianity, for example, is that body of believers of Catholics, on the one hand, and Protestants, on the other, but it goes further to include subdivisions such as Fundamentalist Right in the United States and Christian Humanism. Both these groups represent a fundamentalist wing and theistic humanism respectively. Whereas theistic humanism fuses elements of other-worldly, on the one hand, and human-central concern, on the other, into morality, the fundamentalist wing often stresses the element of other worldly even at the risk of human well-being. Let me refer to this wing as non-humanistic theism for clarity's sake. Accordingly this kind of humanism basis morality exclusively on other-worldly. Considerations of human needs may be present but they do not take precedent. It is for this reason that non-humanist theism has often tended to be intolerant of the feelings and needs of other people who

happen to differ from them in beliefs about God or gods. This is clearly true of the Islamic fundamentalist movement in Iran today.

From the perspective of morality, I group atheism into two main camps: non-humanistic atheism and atheistic humanism, for clarity's sake. Non-humanistic atheism is indifferent to the well-being of other persons as long as its primary concern is not in immediate danger. It may be committed to a particular discipline, political or economic ideology at the neglect of the basic needs for human existence. Morality is often given an inferior rating, and beliefs in God or gods are excluded from its mission. In short, the non-humanistic atheism is immune to human sensitivities and may lead to intolerance, persecution, oppression or torture of other people. It might be contended that certain experimentations of human subjects in medical science are of this sort. Scientific research, for its sake, is conducted regardless of the consequences of human suffering. By contrast, atheistic humanism is committed to considerations of human values, especially of moral dimension and it may take various forms. Let me briefly present five of the main strands of this kind of humanism, which I would refer to as existentialism atheistic humanism, Marxist atheistic humanism, positivist atheistic humanism, rationalistic atheistic humanism, and neo-Kantian atheistic humanism.

Existentialist Atheistic Humanism

This form of humanism views human existence as prior to its essence. Accordingly, a human being exists before he can be defined by any concept. For Sartre, man is at first nothing because he is indefinable; he is afterwards something because he is definable. The existentialist finds it very distressing that God does not exist. Since there is no God, there is no determinism. If God does not exist, then man is the starting point. Human existence is comprehensible through such categories as alienation, despair and forlornness. Sartre's account of morality is based on a notion of freedom, according to which all actions are freely willed. Consciousness does not belong to the realm of material substances, and hence it is not governed by the laws of nature. Even emotions such as fear manifest one's freedom. A person who fears puts his freedom in his fear, and thus chooses to be fearful in the given circumstances. Freedom is the ability of the human consciousness to be guided by what does not exist.[1] This position, which may be termed hard indeterminism, fails to discriminate voluntary from involuntary action. Thus, a person who involuntarily causes injury to another deserves the same punishment as one who willfully causes a similar injury. This is counter-intuitive.

Marxist Atheistic Humanism

This humanism envisions a classless society achieved through the conquest of the capitalist forces of oppression. Beliefs in God are only illusions that serve to advance the capitalist interests.[2] Although this form of humanism purports to promote the well-being of human beings, the means it employs to achieve a classless society would possibly result in bloodshed. Besides, it fails to do justice to the capitalist who, though he may have been oppressive, has invested his time and effort in organizing the mode of production. It is not true that all the profits are solely the product of the worker.

Positivist Atheistic Humanism

Here emphasis is placed on observation language as well as consensus of the scientific community. Accordingly, a sentence is meaningful if, and only if, it is verifiable by empirical observation. This humanism regards morality and theism as excluded from the realm of meaningful entities, since they do not meet this requirement. Some positivists of this orientation have, however, conceded to morality having an emotive meaning rather than a cognitive one.[3] This emotive approach lacks commitment to a moral program to be undertaken here, since it tends to treat morals as a form of propaganda, lacking rationality. This indifference is not surprising, given its skepticism towards morality.

Rationalistic Atheistic Humanism

Before I discuss this type of humanism, I would like to make a distinction between two sense of "reason." First, there is "reason" as speculative thought that is detached from experience. Kant was critical of this kind of reason, arguing that where observation is lacking, no knowledge is possible and where reason is lacking, no knowledge is possible. Both reason and observation must be present for knowledge, and none is a substitute for the other. The second type of "reason" is one that is employed in checking, testing, guiding, or judging thought. Scientific thought is of this kind. It is a kind of empirical reason. Throughout the inquiry I will use "critical reflection" in this second sense. The rationalistic atheistic humanism I am examining here employs reason in the first sense. Accordingly, reason is an instrument for comprehending human nature and for achieving human fulfillment. This view of reason is, to me, out of balance.

Neo-Kantian Humanism

Neo-Kantian humanism is a reaction against the rationalistic atheistic humanism, employing critical reflection instead of speculative reason. Among proponents of this kind of humanism is Kurtz, whose approach I will consider in detail later, and whose humanism I will refer to as "secular humanism."

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1. Jean-Paul Sartre, Essays in Existentialism, edited by Wade Baskin (Secaucus: The Citadel Press, 1965), pp. 31-59.

_____, Being and Nothingness, translated by Hazel E. Barnes (Secaucus: The Citadel Press, 1974), pp. 409, 529-532.

2. The Marx-Engels Reader, edited by Robert C. Tucker (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1978), pp. 147-200, 203-291, 295-361.

3. C.L. Stevenson, Ethics and Language (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1944), pp. 81-110.

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