This is to certify that the

thesis entitled

Ethnic and Tribal Identity Among the Saginaw Chippewa of Nineteenth Century Michigan

presented by

Margaret Mary Montfort

has been accepted towards fulfillment
of the requirements for

a Masters degree in Anthropology

Major professor

Date Feb. 23, 1990

ETHNIC AND TRIBAL IDENTITY AMONG THE SAGINAW CHIPPEWA OF NINETEENTH CENTURY MICHIGAN

By

Margaret Mary Montfort

A THESIS

Submitted to
Michigan State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

Department of Anthropology

1990

ABSTRACT

ETHNIC AND TRIBAL IDENTITY AMONG THE
SAGINAW CHIPPEWA OF NINETEENTH CENTURY MICHIGAN

by

Margaret Mary Montfort

This study examines the evolution of ethnic and tribal identity among the Saginaw Chippewa of Michigan's Lower Peninsula between 1800 and 1840. Referred to as the Treaty period, this time frame encompasses the majority of land cessions that involved the Saginaw Chippewa. These cessions and the settlement of the Michigan frontier by pioneers resulted in alterations to mobility patterns, subsistence orientation and sociopolitical organization, all of which contributed to changes in ethnic and tribal identities. The method used in this study was ethnohistorical reconstruction based primarily on government records and pioneer accounts. Two trends are evident in the data. 1) Consolidation took place as the U.S. government encouraged the development of a Saginaw Chippewa tribal identity and 2) fragmentation occurred as local level units of identification struggled to re-define themselves in the context of pioneer settlement and increasing dependence on government funds and services.

To Dave

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Many people deserve my thanks for their encouragement and contributions to this study. First and foremost, I would like to thank the members of my Master's Thesis Committee who provided guidance and support throughout this process: Dr. Charles E. Cleland, Chair; Dr. Kenneth E. Lewis; and Dr. William A. Lovis. I would also like to thank Dr. James M. McClurken, Barbara Mead and Scott Beld for their assistance. Numerous people on the staff of the Michigan Bureau of History provided friendship and advice throughout the various stages of research making the journey more rewarding. In particular, Kathryn Eckert and John Halsey made it possible for me to complete my research and writing.

Those deserving thanks for helping me to gather my data include LeRoy Barnett of the State Archives of Michigan, the staff of the Clarke Historical Library at Central Michigan University and Sue Liddell of Michigan State University's microform library.

I also wish to thank my father Donald Montfort, my grandmother, Hilda Hufnagel, and my second family, the Tony Hufnagel clan for their support. My mother deserves particular thanks for all her help and guidance. My sister,

Chris Montfort, produced the graphics for Figures 2 and 3. I thank her for her fine work and grace under pressure. My cousin Eric Hufnagel also provided much appreciated technical support.

Finally, I want to thank David Barondess who made it all worthwhile.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF FIGURES

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION:
ETHNIC AND TRIBAL IDENTITY

Many anthropological studies have pointed out the shortcomings and potential pitfalls of accepting modern tribal organizations and ethnic groups as representative of their respective pre-colonial or precontact forerunners. During the early years of anthropological inquiry, researchers were inclined to view the boundaries of the groups they observed as unchanging and static in nature. Only later did they begin to explore the changing relationships between groups of people or "cultures." As they did so, they came to view cultural boundaries as subject to change over time. The subjects of anthropological analysis were not necessarily static, circumscribed units nor were they necessarily analogous to the more familiar, well-bounded, stable nation-states of Europe. Both intra- and intergroup processes were at work shaping and changing them into new configurations, especially when they were subject to contact with European society.[1]

In the case of native North Americans, the arrival of

Europeans had repercussions for all areas of life, including group identity. With European contact, Native Americans experienced changes in demographic structure, mobility patterns, subsistence orientations, and sociopolitical organization, all of which contributed to and reinforced changes in group identity. The processes of change brought about by European contact did not cease after the early stages of European influence; indeed, they continue today as modern Native Americans interact with the rest of American society on an individual and tribal basis. Thus, the diachronic study of group identity contributes to our understanding of contemporary relationships between Native Americans and Americans, as well as to our understanding of how identities are created, maintained, and changed through time.

This study examines the evolution of ethnic and tribal identity among the Saginaw Chippewa between 1800 and 1840. This period is referred to as the Treaty Period because it encompasses the majority of treaties the Saginaw Chippewa participated in and, more specifically, those treaties pertaining to land cessions. It includes the beginnings of reservation life for the Saginaw Chippewa, a period during which the United States government came to play an increasingly dominant role in Native American affairs. The loss of traditional lands and economic autonomy presented the largest threat, up to this period, to Native American-determined identity and resulted in a new order in which

Americans became more instrumental in defining Native American identity. This study focuses on the incipient stages of this process.

Since a synthesis of Saginaw Chippewa history has not been produced, this study will provide a footing for future researchers wishing to explore the later development of tribal and ethnic identity for this group. As such, it serves as a starting point from which a complete reconstruction of Saginaw Chippewa tribal history can be undertaken. It also helps to explain their evolution as a tribe and the role that ethnic identification played in this process.

The people and geographic region on which this study is focused can be defined according to two sets of standards: those of the American government and those of Native Americans. The two are not necessarily mutually exclusive. Treaty records indicate that, as a unit created by the U.S. government, the Saginaw Chippewa consist of those people ceding territory along the northern borders of the 1807 Treaty and those people involved in the 1819 Treaty cession. (See Figure 1) The realities of these boundaries will be discussed in later chapters. The study area conforms roughly to the treaty boundaries and includes those groups inhabiting all of the tributaries of the Saginaw River drainage as well as the Maple, Looking Glass, and Red Cedar rivers associated with the upper Grand River drainage. Of the groups participating in the 1819 Treaty, those living to

Figure 1 **Land Cessions in Michigan's Lower Peninsula**


1836
1819
1807
1821
1795
Rifle River
Chippewa River
Pine River
Flat River
Maple River
Grand River
Looking Glass River
Red Cedar River
Thornapple River
Flint River
Cass River
Disputed Boundary 1807 Treaty
0
16
32
Miles

Figure 1

the north of the Saginaw River drainage are examined only peripherally here. Their social and geographic isolation from the Saginaw Chippewa was significant in itself and deserves attention in a study of larger proportions. Instead, particular attention is paid to the western boundary of the 1819 Treaty, which corresponds to the territorial range of Native Americans associated with the Grand River Ottawa, a group possessing a history and identity separate from that of the Saginaw Chippewa. This treaty boundary area was examined to assess the reality of an American determined boundary and its impact on Native American inter-group relationships.

The method used was ethnohistorical reconstruction, involving the examination of primary and secondary documents in archives and libraries. Historic documents pertaining to activities in the defined geographic region and to the people identified as residents of that region were examined in light of anthropological theories and concepts that provide insight into the cultural differences between the small-scale, egalitarian societies of Great Lakes Native Americans and the complex, highly stratified society of encroaching Euro-Americans. The majority of documents examined came from government records and pioneer accounts. Therefore, the data is primarily representative of the male segment of the population, namely, either those in positions of authority or those designated to speak for a particular group. The data is, thus, largely political and well-suited

to assessing the political aspects of identity among the Saginaw Chippewa.

The approach taken here involves more than merely examining the Saginaw Chippewa as a monolithic unit reacting to the activities of Euro-Americans. Rather, this study examines the life histories and behaviors of individuals as they made decisions and choices that reflect their beliefs and values. It is through the actions and words of these individuals that motivations and viewpoints are discerned.[2] Because of its nature, the data yields only glimpses of the Native American perspective on identity. Instead, markers of identity must be sought by assessing the character of the interaction between peoples and their decision making as it occurred on multiple levels, including those of the individual, the family, the village, and larger aggregates of politically associated villages. Toward this end, the data was examined for indications of cooperation, non-cooperation, and hostility as these types of interaction manifested themselves in group composition, the fusion and fission of peoples into units of varying sizes, and political actions.

Theoretical Overview

Largely due to the work of Frederik Barth, the concept of ethnic identity came to the forefront of anthropological thinking during the late 1960s. Barth argues that it is not appropriate to define groups of people by trait lists or

culture areas. Such an approach reifies and isolates cultural units, neglecting the dynamic interactions among groups and focusing on the unit rather than the social processes involved in creating and maintaining group distinctness. As Barth defines it, ethnic identity is self-ascribed, may or may not possess a territorial component, and can cross-cut overt cultural traits, persisting in a variety of physical and social settings. As such, the concept provides an analytical unit not necessarily tied to specific ecological or social circumstances. Ethnic identity is fluid, subject to change and not a static phenomenon.[3]

For Barth, ethnic boundaries manifest themselves in two ways. The first is through cultural diacritica or conspicuous signals to insiders and outsiders that differences exist. These may include distinctions in language, material cultural, and custom or lifestyle. The second is through differences in value orientation or the ideals of morality and excellence used by others to judge an individual's performance as a member of an ethnic group. Barth views membership in an ethnic group as an imperative status, containing both ascribed and achieved components yet taking precedence over most other statuses maintained by an individual.

Barth's version of ethnicity became known as "The New Ethnicity" and has been used to examine the way in which people defined their identity to gain access to resources

within the context of a multi-ethnic state society.[4] Disagreeing with Barth's primarily subjective approach to ethnicity, others began to view it as a competitive strategy. Despres, in particular, rejects Barth's assertion that performance alone motivates people to maintain an ethnic identity.[5] His work focuses on ethnicity as a competitive strategy employed in the context of resource scarcity. Moreover, ethnicity does not represent an imperative status, but one that takes precedence only under certain circumstances. Boundaries are maintained as long as they confer a competitive advantage, not as a result of individuals attempting to perform according to established values.

Despres distinguishes ethnic populations that maintain boundaries and certain cultural diacritica from ethnic groups that, in addition to maintaining boundaries and diacritica, are politically organized. "Internally, they reveal governmental processes; externally, they generally reveal a determinate set of political relationships."[6] Variations in the form of ethnicity and the manner in which it is used by a group thus become tied to changes in the political and economic contexts in which people interact.[7]

Despres recognizes that ethnic identity varies with level of sociopolitical organization. He categorizes two types of populations that possess very different needs in the maintenance of ethnic boundaries. The first includes hunting-gathering populations in which ethnic boundaries are

flexible. They lack rigid criteria for identification and typically refer to remote mythological and genealogical origins as a basis of identification. Individuals alter identities to react to cooperative or competitive relationships that arise as small populations encroach upon one another's territories. No one group is likely to have access to a particular technology conferring a competitive advantage and resources are not regionally scarce on a consistent basis.

In response to Despres's characterization, Burch argues that, in Alaska, ethnic boundaries existing prior to European contact were rigidly drawn among hunting-gathering peoples. It was only after contact, when the dispersal and fragmentation of cultural units occurred, that boundaries became more flexible. He further maintains that often what anthropologists and ethnohistorians observe are cases resulting from the fragmentation and large scale re-distribution of people over the landscape who may, therefore, appear to posses flexibly drawn boundaries.[8]

Despres's second population category includes people under colonial, post-colonial or imperial governments. These groups constitute complex poly-ethnic systems in which ethnic boundaries are more rigidly defined. In these situations, membership in an ethnic group takes on meanings carrying either positive or negative connotations that demarcate a system of inequality in which the distribution of resources may depend upon those meanings. Accordingly,

ethnic identity can be used to maintain access to key resources or as a strategy to gain access to resources.

Levine and Campbell also indicate that ethnic boundaries are not likely to be as distinct among stateless, egalitarian groups as they are in complex, state level societies. Boundaries between such peoples frequently have vaguely defined physical limits. In addition, these boundaries are permeable and lack high profile symbols and sharp loyalties with which people can identify. The absence of a well-developed corporate entity among egalitarian peoples makes it difficult for ethnicity to develop as a priority status. Ethnic identity, therefore, may operate on a different level for egalitarian peoples than it would in a highly stratified society.[9]

Thus, ethnicity assumes distinctive forms under different sociopolitical conditions. The dynamic interaction of internal and external forces serves to direct the strength and purpose of ethnic identity. A contextual approach to observing ethnic identity over time thus provides the best means of observing its use. Different levels of identification come into play under different circumstances. Likewise, ethnicity is not an imperative status structuring all interaction. At times, other statuses, such as race, class, sex, and political position, take precedence.

Without attention to the different ways in which ethnicity manifests itself, depending on the level of

sociopolitical organization, principles more appropriate to state-level societies can be inappropriately employed to study egalitarian or tribal peoples. Ethnic identity can assume more importance than warranted. Ethnic groups can be assigned inappropriate levels of status and power when defined incorrectly. Therefore, applying the principles that have been established for complex poly-ethnic systems may result in the creation of a structure that does not take into account the views of all component groups or does not play a priority role in the decision-making of such people.

The Case of the Saginaw Chippewa

In the case of the Saginaw Chippewa of Michigan's central Lower Peninsula in the nineteenth century, the context would be incomplete without the inclusion of the Euro-American presence. During the Treaty Period covered in this study, the Saginaw Chippewa do not fall into one category or another as outlined by Despres. They are in the process of being encapsulated by a state society, and yet they retain many of the characteristics of their precontact forms of organization.

The encapsulation process involves both the consolidation and the fragmentation of peoples. Numerous studies have predicted outcomes or responses to this process; some of these are: (1) the strengthening of ethnic boundaries in order to compete for resources;[10] (2) the emergence of a new ethnic group, based on access to

particular resources or markets;[11] and (3) the elimination of old boundaries and the amalgamation of peoples with the concordant loss of distinct cultural diacritica.[12] A combination of these responses may occur over time and at the same time, depending on conditions such as who is involved, the structure of sociopolitical and economic relations, and other mitigating factors.

Separating the multitude of identities existing among the Saginaw Chippewa presents an organizational problem. In addition to developing regional tribal identity during the Treaty Period, there are larger frameworks for identification, primarily that of Ottawa and Chippewa. The local identification of people with a particular village community or leader also plays a major role in structuring social interaction and daily life. The work of Stephen Cornell offers a means of studying changing identity, particularly in the case of native North Americans for whom, as already illustrated, ethnic identity has a different character than that found in complex, state-level societies.[13] This study takes Cornell's position that the development of ethnic and tribal identity can best be understood by examining two principles of organization: the political and the conceptual. The political dimension of organization refers to the locus and mechanism of political decision-making. Algonquin peoples of the Great Lakes do not possess a well-developed tribal government. They lack specialized governmental structures. A leader's ability to

lead is dependent on a consensus backing and often tied to a specific activity, such as hunting or warfare, rather than to a formal position within the group. It is thus important to determine on what level decision-making takes place, the extended family, the village, or the band. This level of decision-making has territorial, kinship, and possibly linguistic components (differences in dialect, for example), making it a type of social identity.

The conceptual level of identification is more extensive than the political. Conceptual identities extend beyond the politics of the band or village, connecting people through symbolism, a common lineage, language similarities, and a larger scale level of interaction. Conceptual identity separates a people from the rest of the world but may possess no formal political reality. For example, during the nineteenth century, the term Ojibwa included numerous autonomous political units, often exploiting very different environments and spread over a vast territory. The word defined a people possessing a similar history and language even though there was no politically organized Ojibwa tribe maintaining its own government.

The examination of the interaction of these two dimensions of organization in the context of European contact reveals two processes sometimes simultaneously at work: consolidation and fragmentation. In the consolidation process, the U.S. government came to play an increasingly

dominant role in the affairs of Native Americans. It manipulated Native American identity to serve its own purposes. Native Americans were categorized in order to meet administrative needs and to more easily handle people whose decision-making system was diffuse and who did not possess a single leader speaking for all. Such action on the part of the government is common to colonialism world-wide, as others have illustrated.[14]

Native Americans were not, however, passive recipients of Euro-American created identities and political organizations. In some instances, they adapted to the conditions placed on them and, in turn, used American efforts at categorization to their own ends. The process of change was, thus, a dynamic one involving the interaction of Native Americans and Euro-Americans.

Fragmentation occurred as Native Americans came under the influence of ever-increasing forces in Euro-American society struggling to convert them to new principles of organization and a different value system. Such forces include the trader, the missionary, the Indian agent, and the surrounding pioneers. As Native Americans strove to make decisions in this tug-of-war, they re-defined their identities on all levels, often with an increase in the amount of factionalism when disagreements arose.

Chapter Overviews

Chapter II provides historical background for the

seventeenth and eighteenth centuries necessary to understanding the events of the nineteenth century. It traces the impact of the fur trade, warfare, and changing settlement patterns on group composition and identity and illustrates how from the beginning of contact, Europeans attempted to impose identities upon Indians which did not necessarily reflect indigenous conceptual or political realities. Chapter II also outlines the emergence of the Saginaw River Valley as a homeland to the Saginaw Chippewa and the changing leadership roles that were encouraged by the interaction of Indians and Europeans.

Chapter III deals with the land cessions and events between 1795 and 1830 that served as a prelude to the arrival of American pioneers. It illustrates the pressures placed upon the Saginaw Chippewa by the U.S. government to consolidate politically into a tribal unit and explores the reality of American determined boundaries for the Saginaw Chippewa.

Chapter IV traces the persistence of indigenous political organizations between 1830 and 1840 as the pioneers and the government pressure the Saginaw Chippewa to consolidate. During this time, pioneers converged on former Indian territories, resulting in an outbreak of epidemic disease, in addition to increased internal dissension over facing the crises presented by dwindling economic autonomy and the threat of removal west.

Chapter V consists of a summary and concluding remaks

concerning changing political and conceptual identities. It emphasizes the dynamic interaction persisting indigenous forms of political organization and ethnic identification, and American efforts to encourage the tribalization of the Saginaw Chippewa.

CHAPTER II

SEVENTEENTH AND EIGHTEENTH CENTURY BACKGROUND

Introduction

The so-called Saginaw Chippewa of nineteenth century Michigan were actually people of mixed Ottawa and Chippewa heritage. The Saginaw River valley was not their original homeland. The majority of them settled in the area sometime in the eighteenth century. This chapter presents a brief account of the two groups as they first encountered Europeans, adjusted to the fur trade economy, and then moved into the Saginaw River basin.

Seventeenth-century records indicate that the region between the Georgian Bay and the eastern end of Lake Superior was inhabited by a number of autonomous, named bands that spoke mutually intelligible Algonquian dialects. The ancestors of the nineteenth century Ottawa lived in four localized groups: the Kiskakon, which translates as "Cut Tails" in reference to the tail of the bear; the Sinago, or "Black Squirrels"; the Sable, meaning "People of the Fine Sandy Beach;" and the Nassauaketon or "People of the Fork."[1] Their territorial ranges included Manitoulin Island, the Bruce Peninsula, the northern and eastern shores of Georgian

Bay, and possibly the eastern shores of Michigan's Lower Peninsula.[2]

Those people who became known as the Ojibwa or Chippewa (a corrupted form of Ojibwa) inhabited the north shore of Lake Huron and eastern Lake Superior. Named groups included the Amikwa or "Beaver" Nation, Nikokouet or "Otter" people, the Mississauga or "People of the River Mouth," and the Saulteurs or "People of the Rapids." It is evident that there were other named bands, such as the Achiligouiane, the Noquet, and the Marameg; however, there is little or no information about them.[3] The named bands were the local units composing what would become known as the Ojibwa tribe or nation. Where appropriate, the local name will be used here; however, the terms Ojibwa or Ottawa will be used to refer to the group as a whole.

Subsistence and Economic Systems

Both Ottawa and Ojibwa peoples practiced a hunting and gathering economy. There were, however, variations based on divergent ecological conditions. Differences in subsistence rounds had implications for social organization in that they resulted in variations in group size and composition. In the case of Ojibwa and Ottawa peoples, however, these differences were not so great as to inhibit interaction or intermarriage.

Bands of Ojibwa peoples varied in size seasonally from a cluster of extended families to as many as 200 people,

sustained by the abundant resources of the inland fishery. Corn played only a peripheral role in the Ojibwa economy because their territorial range within the Canadian biotic province did not afford the number of frost free days necessary to produce a reliable crop. The Ojibwa economy focused on hunting, fishing, and the collection of berries and other plant foods.

In contrast, the Ottawa inhabited the transition zone between the Carolinian and Canadian biotic provinces and were able to grow corn in the fashion of their Huron neighbors, while also relying upon fishing, hunting, and gathering to supplement their diet. It is likely that the Ottawa also produced storable surpluses, which allowed them to sustain larger villages and to remain in them for longer periods of time than their Ojibwa neighbors.

The subsistence and economic activities of the Ojibwa and Ottawa peoples often overlapped during the seventeenth century. Ottawa peoples served as liaisons -- first between the Huron, who had direct contact with the French, and the Ojibwa peoples inhabiting lands rich in fur-bearing animals and later directly between the French and western Indian groups. Early European explorers, such as Champlain, identified the Ottawa as traders. As part of their trade, they spent time among the Ojibwa, establishing trade partnerships, intermarrying, and participating in the seasonal round. Conducted in the idiom of kinship relations, trade between Indian groups involved the

extension of kin ties through intermarriage as well as the creation of trade partners expected to behave as kin. Thus, favorable trade relations involved cooperative subsistence efforts. For example, in 1662, some Ottawa joined the Saulteur, Amikwa, and Nippissing at the Sault for hunting and fishing forays.[4]

By 1670, the Sault had become a gathering place for numerous groups. Large numbers of people arrived on a seasonal basis to benefit from the superb fishing in the rapids. The Sault also became a trading center. Other refugee Algonquian peoples, such as a group of Potawatomi, arrived in 1641, and Cree peoples arrived in the 1660s at the invitation of the Saulteur and Ottawa.

Socio-Political Organization

Little is known of the socio-political organization of these peoples. Harold Hickerson argues that in the Ojibwa case, except for the Mississauga and possibly the Saulteur, the band names represented totemic clans. Such clans would have been corporate unilineal descent groups tracing ancestry to a fictitious animal ancestor. As such, they would have provided a framework for interaction among the proto-Ojibwa peoples, outlining marriage and hospitality rules as well as rules for larger group interactions. According to Hickerson, these clans merged in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries with the movement of Ojibwa peoples into northern Wisconsin and Minnesota, to

form the multi-clan villages observed during that time.[5] Remnants of the old system of totemic identification persisted among later Ojibwa peoples even into the nineteenth century but were not significant in structuring community relations. Despite Hickerson's argument, the evidence for the function of clans during the seventeenth century is scant.[6]

Ottawa social organization may have been adapted to the necessities of trade. Marriage provided the means of establishing trade routes and of cementing trade partnerships.[7] To intermarry with their trade partners, the matrilineal Huron and the patrilateral tending Ojibwa, the Ottawa developed a flexible socio-political organization. McClurken argues that the primary unit of organization in Ottawa society was the extended family, not the unilineal descent group. Extended families could pursue trade opportunities free of rigid rules restricting their movements.[8] At any rate, neither Ottawa nor Ojibwa peoples seems to have had a highly structured system of reckoning descent on which to base group formation and identity.

Seventeenth Century Warfare, Alliance, and Settlements

In the mid-seventeenth century, the Huron dispersed as a result of long conflict with the powerful Iroquois. The end came in 1649 when the Iroquois attacked a settlement there and massacred its residents. Panic ensued and the Huron fled in many directions, some to the French, others to

the Iroquois. The Petun or Tobacco Huron went west, hoping to escape further Iroquois raids. With them went their Ottawa allies.[9]

The Ottawa and Huron diaspora took them first to Mackinac Island. The Kiskakon and Sable then moved to Green Bay while the others remained in the Straits of Mackinac. During the 1650s, Ottawa and Huron moved even further west into the Mississippi River valley and the territory of the Sioux. By 1660, they had moved to Chequamegon on Lake Superior, having experienced difficulties with the Sioux. The Jesuits joined them there and the Indians resumed trading with the French. In the 1670s, with the attention of the Iroquois turned elsewhere and relations with the Sioux heating up, some Ottawa returned to Manitoulin Island while others went first to the Sault and then settled at St. Ignace with the Huron. By the end of the century, other Ottawa had settled at St. Ignace as well.[10]

During this time, Ojibwa peoples did not experience the extreme displacement of their Ottawa and Huron neighbors. The Saulteurs and Mississauga left their homes for a short while, fleeing to the north and west. The Saulteur were spotted hunting in the vicinity of Keeweenaw Bay in the 1660s and some may have decided to stay in the region, settling near Chequamegon. Others soon returned to their homeland. Skirmishes between Ojibwa peoples and the Iroquois were reported by Perrot, who claimed that Saulteur, Mississauga, and Nikikouet defeated an Iroquois raiding

party on one occasion while the Amikwa defeated them on another.[11]

Although hostilities with the Iroquois lessened in the 1670s, British and French competition for control of the Great Lakes rendered any peace unstable. The British desired control of the Straits trade, and they encouraged the Iroquois to turn their interests to the west.[12] Some Huron sought an Iroquois alliance, still fearing an attack, and conspired against their Ottawa allies.[13] Thus, while the threat of an Iroquois attack had decreased, the effect of their presence was still felt among the Ottawa and Ojibwa of the northern Great Lakes. This state of affairs prevailed until 1701, when a general peace was concluded at Montreal following a series of successful French raids against the Iroquois. This peace concluded nearly fifty years of Iroquois hostility directed at the Ottawa, Ojibwa, and their allies.

The duration and force of Iroquois warfare to the east and Siouan hostility in the west served to unify the people of the Great Lakes in specific instances and probably contributed to the creation of large multi-tribal communities such as that at St. Ignace. The fur trade is most frequently cited as the primary factor influencing the creation of such communities, and indeed, the Indians were drawn to such trading centers. Their motivation, however, was not purely economic. To understand their motivations, we must have some notion of what the French alliance meant

to the Indians. Alliance for the Indians was embedded in their political and social life. In a society in which the idiom of kinship provided the model for larger interactions, trading partners and allies were recognized as kin on both the individual and group level. As such, these relationships provided not only economic benefits, but also political and military support. Alliance therefore signified many levels of co-operation. It is also important to note that these alliances were not exclusive. Relations with outsiders were negotiated on a case-by-case basis and subject to change under differing circumstances. To the Indians, therefore, French alliance meant military support as well as economic opportunity. From the start, the French interjected themselves into the Indian decision-making process and the Indians sought to include these powerful allies. Each group urged its own agenda upon the other. Though he greatly exaggerated, Perrot tried to explain the position of the French among the Indians when he wrote,

> ...the savages often took them [the Frenchmen] for spirits and gods; if any tribe had some Frenchmen among them, that was sufficient to make them feel safe from any injuries by their neighbors; and the French became mediators in all their quarrels.[14]

As Bruce Trigger has argued in the case of the Huron, the French were at first perceived as the possessors of powerful magic. By controlling incomprehensible technology, such as fire-arms, the French were seen to possess mysterious powers. Yet, the Algonquians, like the Huron,

also viewed them as mortal men, equals in other ways, a fact over-looked or ignored by observers such as Perrot. What stands out in Perrot's statement is that French alliance provided an effective military defense as well as a source of advice and conflict mediation. There is no doubt that the Indians sought the French for the advantages of the fur trade, but it is also clear that the advantages they sought were more than economic.

The Algonquian fear of the Iroquois was very real. They felt especially vulnerable when bringing their furs to the St. Lawrence River valley to trade with the French. For protection, they traveled in canoe brigades. In 1670, Perrot accompanied a canoe brigade heading to Montreal that included Ottawa, Saulteur, Mississauga, and Cree participants.[15] There are other indications of military alliance. In 1683, a party of Ottawa traveling to Montreal told Perrot that they required arms to avenge the Saulteur, who had suffered a defeat from the Outagamis or Fox.[16] An Amikwa chief, friend to Perrot and ally of the French, informed the Ottawa living at the Straits of Mackinac that a group of Huron and Iroquois conspired against them in 1689.[17] Trouble occurred between the English-backed Miami and the Saulteur in 1696, when the former plundered Nicholas Perrot. In a speech to the French, a prominent Ottawa leader indicated that the Ottawa were ready to take the part of the Saulteur against the Miami. It is important to note that, during the late seventeenth and early eighteenth

centuries, Ottawa and Ojibwa peoples appear to have had no disputes with each other, although both had disputes with many of the other surrounding tribes.[18]

There are indications that in opposition to the Iroquois and other enemies, Ottawa and Ojibwa peoples were drawn closer together. There was honor in defeating the Iroquois, an honor recognized by other Algonquian groups in the case of Feast of the Dead, held in 1670, in which an Amikwa leader was honored because he had defeated an Iroquois war party.

> That was what made his memory Revered, and had drawn thither many chiefs of different Nations, in so great numbers that there were cabins in which as many as two or three hundred persons were gathered together.[19]

The seventeenth century was a time of much geographical movement for Great Lakes Indians as well as of changing inter-group dynamics. In addition to the desire to participate in the fur trade, warfare and the necessity for negotiation and diplomacy with enemy Indians and with Europeans resulted in changes in group identification. Some of the named groups appearing in the seventeenth century disappear by the eighteenth century; in these later records, only the Mississauga and the Saulteur survive as independent identities. The experience of the Ottawa was similar, although more delayed. References to the four named Ottawa groups originally noted in the seventeenth century continue well into the eighteenth century only to die out by the

nineteenth century.[20]

Between 1650 and 1700, much changed for the Ojibwa and Ottawa. The territorial component of group identification for many Great Lakes people was upset by the Iroquois wars. It remained unbalanced for the remainder of the seventeenth century as people moved about, seeking to participate in the fur trade and establishing new alliances and new territories. Direct contact with the French and resultant periods of famine and disease along with greater participation in the fur trade, greater mobility, and the emergence of large, multi-ethnic communities at Chequamegon, Green Bay, Sault Ste. Marie, and the Straits of Mackinac served to combine formerly autonomous peoples into larger units.

During the last thirty years of the seventeenth century, Iroquois hostilities faded and Huron, Ottawa and Ojibwa began to visit the Saginaw River valley for hunting and gathering. Having been abandoned during the Iroquois wars, the Saginaw area provided fresh hunting grounds for a people now enmeshed in the fur trade. Those hunting at Saginaw came from the Straits area where large congregations of people strained local resources and made it necessary for the Indians to travel great distances during the winter months to secure pelts for trade and acquire food. Jesuit accounts place some Amikwa, Huron, Nipissing and Mississauga either in or near the Saginaw River valley in the winter of 1676.[21] In 1688, Lahontan noted that the Ottawa and Huron

travelled to Saginaw every two to three years to hunt beaver.[22] In 1689, the Amikwa wintered there again.[23]

Eighteenth Century Warfare, Alliance, and Settlements

For the duration of the seventeenth century, there are no indications in the records that any seasonal visitors stayed on a permanent basis. Saginaw's geographic position placed it within easy reach of Iroquois war parties. When permanent settlement did begin in the eighteenth century, it was guarded and tentative. A 1718 French account of one such settlement noted that Ottawa

> ...are on the islands at the entrance of the bay of Saguinan, where they have their villages and cultivate their lands, on which they raise grain. When they are not at war with other nations they raise crops on the mainland, but they always till the land in both places for fear that their supply of food may fail.[24]

In this case, it was not necessarily the Iroquois producing anxiety but, most likely, unstable relations with other tribes drawn to Detroit to trade.

In 1701 Cadillac founded Detroit and began his campaign to shift the Indian trade from Mackinac to Detroit, having convinced his superiors that such an act would deter growing British influence in the Great Lakes. Not all Indians abandoned the Straits, but some Saulteur and Mississauga settled a village near Detroit. The Sinago and Kiskakon Ottawa also established a settlement there as did Potawatomi and Huron groups.[25]

Detroit also attracted Indians from the south and west, some of whom displayed hostility toward the French and their Indian allies. In 1708, a band of Miami killed three Frenchmen and took Ottawa prisoners. Cadillac sent an envoy to Saginaw to gather Ottawa and Saulteur forces wintering there. He had encouraged their use of Saginaw as a wintering area, apparently supplying provisions and a blacksmith for their stay. The envoy managed to return with nearly 450 warriors and their families who were encouraged by the French to avenge themselves on the Miami at Detroit.[26]

Relations between the allied Fox and Mascouten, who inhabited southwestern Michigan and also a settlement at Detroit, and their Ottawa and Potawatomi neighbors were also strained. In 1712, Ottawa and Potawatomi attacked a Mascouten camp on the St. Joseph River. Fox and Mascouten in Detroit retaliated against the Ottawa, and the French, who did not trust the Fox, encouraged the Ottawa and their allies to attack. They did so, driving the Fox and Mascouten out of Michigan's Lower Peninsula, subsequently opening it up to permanent settlement by the victorious parties.[27] Aroused by the Fox incident, however, the Indians of Saginaw, under the leadership of chief Saguina and others from Detroit, returned to Michilimackinac, some moving to Manitoulin Island with Le Pesant, a Straits leader known for his opposition to Cadillac.[28] Many shortly returned to Detroit and their old villages.

By 1715, nearly 320 Kiskakon and Sinago Ottawa were reported to have settled at Saginaw and were still living there by 1736.[29] In 1718 the French noted that 240 Ottawa inhabited settlements on an island in Saginaw Bay and on the mainland.[30] The Mississauga settled villages nearby in Ontario. Through contact at trade centers, intermarriage, and cooperative military efforts, the Ojibwa and Ottawa peoples of southeastern Michigan and Ontario came to resemble each other more and more. They no longer inhabited different ecological zones but instead lived in a relatively environmentally uniform area that did not have the climatic restraints on corn production familiar to the Ojibwa in their northern territories. There is very little eighteenth century evidence referring to the nature of their interaction and the how their customs may have merged. One French observer, however, noted,

> Twelve leagues from Fort Detroit, always going up river, you will find the Misisague Indians, who occupy a beautiful island where they raise their crops. They are about 60 or 80 men. Their language resembles that of the Outaouae; there is very little difference between them. Their customs are the same, and they are very Industrious.[31]

Coming from a European, who may have lacked a discerning eye for differences in Indian custom, this passage is perhaps suspect. The observation is, however, born out by later, more complete historical data and can be viewed as an indication of continued close and cooperative relationships

between Ojibwa and Ottawa peoples. As the observer notes, the languages were very similar throughout recorded history, merely representing differences in dialects.[32]

The French trade at Detroit proved difficult in that it placed the Indians closer to British influence. French officials were concerned that their Saginaw allies would succumb to British enticements and eventually overwhelm the Detroit post. Controlling the Indians at Saginaw was much more difficult than it had been when they lived near Michilimackinac. The Jesuit presence was strong at the Straits. Because of their resistance to Cadillac's plans and his attempts to limit their activities, the Jesuit mission at Detroit was relatively ineffectual. In addition, Indian discontent was on the rise. In 1717, an Indian envoy of representatives from Saginaw and Detroit arrived at Montreal to meet with the Marquis de Vaudreuil. They complained about the high prices of French goods and the poor treatment the French commandant at Detroit, Sabrevois, had given them. Vaudreuil urged the Saginaw to remain loyal to the French and encouraged them to return to Michilimackinac by arguing that they would thus be reunited with their brothers and better able to defend themselves in case of war. In his speech, he indicated that he regarded the people at Saginaw "...as wandering children who must have forgotten prayer altogether;" and urged them to "...return to the place where prayer is offered up, for you must not expect any missionary will go and live among you at

Saguinan."[33]

The Ottawa of Saginaw re-affirmed their allegiance to the French in 1742 when they visited the Marquis de Beauharnois, claiming that they would only trade with the French and receiving the promise of a blacksmith in return.[34] Yet, in 1746, Saginaw Ottawa killed three Frenchmen traveling from Detroit to Michilimackinac. This action took place in the context of general Indian discontent and was not limited to the Saginaw. Reports of a plot emerged in which the Saginaw and Detroit Ottawa, the Mississauga of northern Lake Huron, and the Saulteur planned to attack the Detroit garrison.[35] These hostilities were fueled by the British, who had constrained the French from providing expected supplies to the Indians via naval blockades and also encouraged Great Lakes Indians to drive out the French.[36]

In 1747 the Saginaw people made peaceful overtures to the French by turning over the man responsible for the earlier murders.[37] In November, thirty families visited Detroit at the invitation of a resident Ottawa chief. They brought wampum with them, pledging their loyalty to the French and asking for asylum in Detroit.[38] This is the first indication that British and French contests for Indian loyalty created factions among the Saginaw. By asking for asylum with the French and their Detroit-based Indian allies, these families may have been leaving a strong pro-British faction in Saginaw. Group fission was an

established mechanism of conflict resolution among Great Lakes Indians. Evidence for a pro-British faction in Saginaw can be found in the 1750 report of Le Pian, a member of a Miami band lead by the pro-English La Demoiselle. He told the commander at Miami that Ottawa and Chippewa from Saginaw requested the permission of La Demoiselle and of the English to relocate near them on the Miami River.[39] They were granted permission and plans were made for the move; it is not known whether these plans were carried out.

French officials continued to encourage Saginaw residents to move to the Straits of Mackinac or to Detroit where they could be more closely monitored. In 1751, Indians living at the Sault were forbidden by French officials to winter at Saginaw for fear of British influence.[40] The policy was successful to a limited extent when, in 1751, some Sinago Ottawa returned to Mackinac and pledged to persuade the Chippewa at Saginaw to return to their old village at the Straits. Other Ottawa also left Saginaw for Detroit.[41]

During this time, more frequent reference is made to the presence of Chippewa at Saginaw. By the end of the century they would out-number the Ottawa.[42] About mid-century printed maps began to demarcate the locations of Indian settlements in Saginaw. The Bellin map of 1744 places an Ottawa village near Saginaw Bay to the east of the Saginaw River.[43] The 1755 DeVaugondy map indicates the presence of two Ottawa villages located north and east of

the mouth of the Saginaw River,[44] and subsequent maps, such as the Carver map published in 1778, the Tour map published in 1784, the Faden map of 1793, and the Cary map of 1805, all show an Ottawa village located near the mouth of the Saginaw River. The exception is the Hutchins map of 1762, which shows both Ottawa and Chippewa villages near the Saginaw River.[45] Given the nature of these maps, evidently little was known about the interior Indian settlements. Settlements appear only at the mouth of the Saginaw River, one of the places most accessible to Europeans via Lake Huron, but it is likely that interior villages existed, given the population figures of the time. Hutchins 1762 map notes that the combined populations of the Chippewa and Ottawa villages in Saginaw equaled 200 warriors or a total population of nearly 800 people.[46] Each village would have housed 400 residents. A village of 200 people would have been a more likely possibility given records of the seventeenth and nineteenth centuries. There are also other indications that Saginaw peoples began to establish permanent villages in the interior sometime in the second half of the eighteenth century. A council hosted by the U.S. government at Detroit in 1778 included five civil chiefs and one war chief from Saginaw.[47] This indicates that there was probably more than one settlement in the region since it was not typical of one village to possess six prominent leaders.

Kinietz states that the Chippewa began to enter Saginaw

in 1723; however, this date is not born out upon examination of his source and in the face of other evidence indicating an earlier date of their arrival. It has already been noted that Saulteur were wintering in Saginaw with their Ottawa allies as early as 1708. After this, no mention of Chippewa at Saginaw is made until the 1750 request of La Demoiselle for permission to relocate along the Miami. It is probable, however, that the Chippewa did inhabit the Saginaw River valley during this time. People from the Sault apparently came to hunt in Saginaw; they may have done so because of the presence of kin in the region.

George Croghan indicated another point of origin for the Saginaw Chippewa in his journal written while visiting Detroit in 1767 to investigate rumors of an Indian uprising. A Saginaw Chippewa chief informed him that the previous summer he had received a wampum belt from "Our Nation from Toronto" asking for a meeting in Shawnee territory.[48] The Mississauga inhabited the Toronto area. The chief may have spoken in general terms; however, no international border existed, and even when one did, it did not preclude the interaction of Canadian and American Indians. His comments indicate the existence of political and probably kinship ties with the Mississauga in southern Ontario.

By this time, the British had succeeded in establishing a tenuous hold over the Great Lakes Indians who had resisted the end of French rule. They had put down Pontiac's uprising in which 250 Saginaw warriors had fought under the

leadership of the Chippewa chief, Wasson.[49] Little is known of the Saginaw Indians' role in the British and American conflicts that soon followed except that they participated in raids on American settlers in the Ohio territory.

Likewise, little is known of their subsistence, settlement, and group composition during the latter half of the eighteenth century. They provisioned the British garrison at Mackinac with 600 bushels of corn in 1779 and were expected to provide more corn in 1781.[50] The captivity narrative of John Tanner indicates that, in 1789, the residents of a village on the Saginaw River planted corn in the spring, cached it for winter, speared fish in the summer, and hunted along the riverbanks. During his two years with these Indians, Tanner saw only one Euro-American, indicating that traders had not taken up permanent residence in the valley.[51]

In April of 1790, Hugh Heward, a fur trader, traveled from Detroit to Illinois via the Grand River. He encountered two canoes of Indians ascending the Grand River on their way to Detroit; they indicated that many others were following them. The Grand River provided a likely trade route for both Saginaw area and Grand River area Indians who had passed the winter in central lower Michigan hunting and traveled to Detroit in the spring to trade. The fur trade had not yet reached its competitive zenith (when numerous traders located themselves in close proximity to the Indians) so many Indians still journeyed to Detroit to

trade. As he went further down the Grand, Heward came across a camp of Saginaw Indians at the junction of the Red Cedar and Grand rivers.[52] Therefore, at least for hunting purposes and probably on a permanent basis, the Saginaw Indians had established a territorial resource area as far west as the junction of these two rivers by the turn of the nineteenth century.

Oral Tradition and Emergent Identity

Oral tradition among the nineteenth century Saginaw Chippewa stated that they took the Saginaw River valley by force from its former inhabitants, the Sauk. The story varies as to exactly who massacred the Sauk. It always includes the Chippewa; however, various other groups including the Ottawa, Potawatomi, Menominee, and Iroquois of New York accompany them in different versions.[53] The latter two allies represent interesting additions to the tradition, given the enmity between Iroquois and Algonquin and the lack of historical references to a Menominee presence in Lower Michigan during the prior two centuries. This illustrates the need to use oral tradition with caution. As a historical record, it is unreliable since events and identities can become confused and time can become compressed or extended. However, oral tradition reflects the beliefs of a people and has value as such.

The story of the Sauk massacre defined the origin and identity of those who inhabited the Saginaw area during the

nineteenth century. The tradition likely had some basis in fact. The Sauk supposedly inhabited the Saginaw valley prior to the arrival of Ottawa, Huron, and Ojibwa hunting parties during the late 17th century. Thus, the massacre may have occurred or it may be another, similar event that took place with a different people, at a different time. However, a debate over the historical realities of the tradition is not the only topic of interest here.[54] Instead the focus, is upon the tradition as a symbol of identity.

According to the story, battles were fought at villages on the Saginaw and Flint rivers by war parties originating from Detroit and the Straits of Mackinac. The allies succeeded in killing or driving away all of the Sauk, except for a few women. Ephraim Williams, a Saginaw area trader, noted that the nineteenth century resident's of Saginaw feared Sauk ghosts, whom they blamed for poor hunting and other misfortunes. According to Williams, the Saginaw Chippewa abandoned a camp when they suspected the presence of Sauk ghosts. Furthermore, non-Saginaw Indians took advantage of this fear by encouraging belief in a ghost's presence and later looting an abandoned hunting or fishing camp when its residents fled.

Williams' version confirms that the Saginaw Chippewa maintained a distinct identity reinforced by this origin story. He notes that non-Saginaw Indians used the tradition in order to take advantage of Saginaw peoples. The persistence of the oral tradition and its vitality indicate

the Saginaw Chippewa believed it was their ancestors who participated in the massacre and that, therefore, the unavenged spirits of the Sauk held them accountable. If the neighboring groups Williams claims took advantage of Saginaw superstitions felt that they too were held accountable by these ghosts, then they would also have feared them. Instead, they used the Chippewa belief in the spirits to achieve their own end. The tradition of the Sauk massacre thus serves to demarcate those who came to the Saginaw valley as a consequence of the Sauk massacre from those who did not.

Summary

Prior to settling the Saginaw River Valley during the eighteenth century, Ojibwa and Ottawa peoples were very mobile, moving about the Great Lakes with the tides of warfare and economic opportunity. Consequently, numerous local level identities that may have once had political reality, became subsumed under the guise of larger, conceptual identities such as that of Ojibwa or Ottawa. Such conceptual identities were used by both Indians and Europeans for diplomatic and military purposes. However, they failed to develop politically and decision-making mechanisms among the Indians remained with autonomous bands or villages, rather than the tribe.

As people settled the Saginaw River Valley on a permanent basis during the eighteenth century, they

established new territories and began to develop a regional identity. The Europeans recognized them as the Saginaw Chippewas, using this title as a reference point for dealing with the residents of the Saginaw River Valley. In addition to this, the story of the Sauk massacre illustrates how oral tradition served to reinforce the regional identity of the Saginaw Chippewas.

Toward the end of the 18th century the rapid changes in European sovereignty over the Great Lakes required the Indians to adjust to new policies and develop new relationships, yet they retained many old loyalties, which cause increased levels of internal friction as they struggled to re-define their position toward succeeding governments. Although the Americans defeated the British during the Revolutionary War, tensions between these two nations continued to be played out in the Great Lakes into the early nineteenth century. The Indians played an important role in both military and economic arenas. However, their position would soon change with the new century. The Treaty Period began with the Treaty of Greenville in 1795, and while the land cessions were small, the Americans soon demanded more cessions and the Saginaw Chippewas faced the prospect of losing their homeland.

CHAPTER III

THE TREATIES: 1795-1830

Introduction

The conflict between Britain and the U.S. government over sovereignty in the Great Lakes provided a backdrop for both internal and external relationships among the Ottawa and Chippewa of Michigan during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Americans and British competed for Indian loyalties, sometimes creating divisions among friends and kinsmen and, at other times, creating a rallying point to unify, for military purposes, peoples who would not ordinarily come into contact. At stake for the Ohio Indians were important issues involving their continued residence on traditionally inhabited lands, their participation in the market economy via the fur trade, and their ability to assert themselves militarily. Treaties between the United States government and the Indians were the offspring of both the conflict with Britain and the government's need to acquire land. The early treaties especially served as diplomatic peacekeeping missions whereby the U.S. attempted to gain and hold the loyalty of the Indians. In addition,

these treaties included land cessions.

The Treaty of Greenville

The Treaty of Greenville (1795) represented a turning point for the Americans with respect to their ability to negotiate with the Indians in the Midwest. Various other treaties had already been attempted with mixed results. The Treaty of 1785 at Fort McIntosh had been repudiated by its signers, and neither the 1786 Treaty at Fort Finney nor the 1789 Treaty at Fort Harmar carried much weight with the Indians, who were not adequately represented at these treaties and whose military might was primarily committed to the British cause in the Northwest.[1] There is no evidence that Michigan Chippewa or Ottawa participated in these first treaty attempts. The Saginaw Chippewa, however, did attend the Treaty at Greenville, held in 1795. As the first treaty to assemble large numbers of Great Lakes Indians, the Treaty of Greenville represented a turning point for the Americans, whose hold over the Northwest had thus far been tenuous. The government wisely commissioned General Anthony Wayne, who had recently defeated the Indians in the Battle at Fallen Timbers, to negotiate the treaty. His battle victories provided an inducement to the Indians to capitulate to the Americans. In addition, the British had shown little interest in supporting the Indians at the Battle of Fallen Timbers. Indeed, they had shut the gates of Fort Miami on them. At the Treaty, Wayne read to the

Indians Jay's Treaty to the Indians in which the British had agreed to withdraw from American territory. These actions produced a wake of disillusioned former supporters of the British who were ready to listen to the Americans.[2] Ninety-two men, including Wyandot, Shawnee, Ottawa, Ojibwa, Potawatomi, Wea, Miami, Kikapoo, Piankeshaw, and Kaskaskia, either placed their mark on the treaty or were represented by someone who did.[3] Many of those who attended did not cede lands within their own territories but attended in order to vie for a position of power with the Americans. The Wyandot and Potawatomi, who were generally more supportive of the Americans, were most generously represented. From the Indian perspective, participation in such a treaty enhanced a chief's status at home. Americans distributed gifts which a chief would re-distribute to his constituents, thereby adding to his prestige. By participating in treaties, Indian leaders could broaden their influence if they possessed oratory skills and an ability to manoeuvre the course of important events to the advantage of their own constituents.[4]

Participation by the Saginaw Chippewa and the Grand River Ottawa in this treaty was minimal. The name Manitogeezhic ("Meenedohgeesogh"), appears on the treaty under the tribal affiliation of Chippewa.[5] Yet Manitogeezhic and his son Kishkako, who followed him, built their power base upon popular support for the British presence in the Great Lakes. He remained a confirmed ally

of the British until well after the War of 1812. His presence at the treaty may indicate an attempt to enhance prestige rather than a capitulation to the Americans. No Grand River Ottawa can be identified on the treaty.[6] Unlike the Saginaw Chippewa, they had few kinship connections to the Indians of southeastern Michigan and northern Ohio. They had severed ties with the Ottawa in Ohio and, in general, involved themselves more in events surrounding the L'Arbre Croche Indians to the north, where kin relations were stronger.[7]

British Influence

Although the Treaty of Greenville was concluded successfully from the American standpoint, it did little to stem British influence in the Great Lakes. The period between 1795 and 1821 was a time of tribulation for the Americans as they struggled to assert control over those Indian tribes still subject to the influence of British Canada. British soldiers evacuated Detroit in 1796, in accordance with the terms of Jay's Treaty, but they merely crossed the Detroit River to the newly constructed Fort Malden.[8] From there they maintained contact with the Indians of southern Michigan, continuing to court them with yearly distributions of gifts and provisions which fueled war parties striking at American settlers throughout the Ohio River valley.[9]

This relationship served both British and Indian needs.

The Indians provided the British with a military buffer that protected their prosperous settlements in Upper Canada. Such an army was also useful should the British decide to attack the Americans. The British cultivation of Indian allies in American territory also maintained their open door to the Great Lakes' fur trade. Jay's Treaty contained little in the way of economic sanctions against British traders working in American territory. British traders were free to continue their business much as they had before the official withdrawal of the British from American territory.[10]

The Indians maintained their allegiance to the British for several reasons. They preferred British traders to the American factory system. Established by Congress in 1795, government run factories were seen as a means to compete with British traders, control the liquor trade and improve relations with the Indians via standardized trade practices. Detroit sustained a factory from 1802 to 1805. It could not compete with independent traders or the American Fur Company employees who could and did travel far afield. Factory goods were considered second rate to British materials and the prohibition against the sale of liquor rendered the factory system obsolete by 1822.[11]

Besides offering the Indians more desirable trade goods, the British supported efforts to regain traditional tribal lands in the Ohio River valley from American pioneers. The choice between American or British rule

became one of lifestyle. The Americans were reckoned as land hungry farmers, eager for the Indians to cede their homelands. The British represented the life lived under the fur trade regime, which allowed the Indians to keep their land and offered a continuation of traditional customary subsistence practices.[12]

For the most part, the Saginaw Indians supported the British cause during this time of conflict. Among the leaders there, Manitogeezhik and his son Kishkako stand out as critical of the Americans. In the summer, this influential leader resided on the Saginaw River, in the heart of the Saginaw territory. Manitogeezhik's tribal affiliation is somewhat of a mystery. John Tanner, the American captive who resided with Manitogeezhik for nearly two years, referred to him as an Ottawa. He had Ottawa kinsmen at Mackinac and other kin living in northwest Ohio, near Lake Erie.[13] His name appears on the Treaty of Greenville and on other, however, as a Chippewa and his son Kishkako is often identified as a Chippewa.[14] Manitogeezhik may have been of mixed descent, or he may have taken a Chippewa wife as there was much intermarriage between Ottawa and Chippewa at Saginaw.

Manitogeezhik's kin ties among the people living near Lake Erie probably gave him first hand knowledge of the effects of major land cessions. With most of Ohio ceded in the Treaty of Greenville, the Indians living there sorely felt the onslaught of the homesteaders who besieged the Ohio

territory. This knowledge, probably combined with encouragement from the British, led Manitogeezhik to conduct raids on Ohio River valley settlers in the 1790s. He traveled as far as Kentucky, where he captured John Tanner.[15] Manitogeezhik and his son Kishkako enhanced their status as warriors and leaders with these activities. Manitogeezhik was later to be a problem to the U.S. government in his opposition to the Treaty of 1807.

The Treaty of 1807

In January of 1807, Territorial Governor William Hull received a commission from the government to treat with certain Indian tribes of Michigan and Ohio for land cessions.[16] His instructions were to limit the attendance to under 100 chiefs and to negotiate for two large parcels of land for less than two cents an acre.[17] One of these parcels lay in northeastern Ohio. The other included the southern portion of the Saginaw Chippewa territory and impacted the upper reaches of the Shiawassee, Flint, and Cass rivers (See Figure 1). Summer villages within this territory included Kechewandagoning on the Shiawassee River and the Grand Traverse settlement on the Flint River (See Figure 2). Hull sent news of the impending negotiations far in advance to allow the Indians time to hold individual councils on the matter.[18] The Saginaw Chippewa sent a memorandum to Hull in June in which they asserted that "Almighty God gave us this land for us to serve, but not for

Figure 2 1819 Treaty Reserves and Associated Villages



KEY

1. *Little Forks reserve; Arbetohwachen Village*
2. *Blackbird's reserve and village*
3. *40,000 acre reserve*
4. *Kawkawlin reserve and village*
5. *Reserve; formerly Nabobask's village*
6. *John Riley reserve*
7. *1,000 acre reserve near the island in Saginaw River*
8. *Menitegow reserve-includes Crow Island and was set aside for Kishkako*
9. *Peter Riley reserve*
10. *Chesaning or Big Rock reserve and village*
11. *Kechewandagoning reserve and village*
12. *Grand Traverse reserves; eleven individual claims made by Neome and Jacob Smith for their relations*
13. *Reaum's (Neome's) reserve*
    - *a. Kishkawbawee village*
    - *b. Peonagowing village*
14. *8,000 reserve; Otusson's village*
15. *640 acre reserve*
16. *Menoquet's reserve and village*
17. *Island reserve*
18. *Rifle River reserve and village*
19. *Point Au Grais reserve and village*

Figure 2

us to sell. Think never to buy them for it is not of any use."[19] Under no terms would they agree to sell their land, and they advised Hull to stay away from Saginaw lest he make the Indians there angry. In addition, they warned Hull concerning an un-named Indian(s) who wished to sell land in the Saginaw territory, but had no right to do so, because he was not from the region[20].

The Saginaw were aware of the possibility that the U.S. government would treat with the wrong leader or only a few of the leaders necessary for the sale of land. From the Indian perspective, such an act violated political protocol. Decision-making was based on consensus, often achieved only after numerous councils and much discussion among influential leaders. Sometimes consensus was never achieved. When this method of decision-making came into contact with the United States system of negotiating treaties, there were cases in which men lacking a consensus backing agreed to cede lands. Such men gambled their status and even their lives for monetary rewards and the chance of improving their status through economic gain and the ability to influence the outcome of the treaty. The United States desired a speedy and economical settlement. The slow deliberation of tribal elders delayed negotiations and gave the Indians more time to debate the terms of the treaty. The United States was not to be stalled in its quest for land, and in the majority of formal negotiations, their demand for cessions was met, although not always in an

expected manner. Almost anyone who would cede land might be accepted as a representative of an entire territory or people, but of course the extent of this depended upon the individual in charge of the negotiations. William Henry Harrison was notorious for allowing unauthorized Indians to cede lands in Indiana.[21] In the case of the 1807 treaty, Hull was instructed to treat only if the most influential leaders were present.

The Saginaw Indians displayed their awareness of the consequences of land cessions by saying "...if you should come here against the Indians, the young men perhaps kill your cattle, you will put us in jail and that would trouble us..."[22] When Indian and farmer came into contact, the farmer's domesticated animals often became fair game to the Indians -- a practice frowned upon by the farmers, prompting them to exact retribution or have the Indian jailed. On the frontier, farm animals roamed the forest and fields unhampered by fences. With game often in short supply on the shrinking land base, the Indians sometimes slaughtered such animals for sustenance. Although the Saginaw Chippewa themselves had little, if any contact with farmers in 1807, they were obviously aware of the experiences of others to the south in Ohio territory.

Hull sent the trader Jacob Smith to Saginaw in July to deliver an invitation to the negotiations. Smith encountered more hostility toward the proposed land sales. The Saginaw Chippewa claimed that they had received only a

small portion of the annuities promised at the Treaty of Greenville because much of it had gone to pay Euro-American claims against the Indians. They again warned of other unauthorized Indians who would attempt to sell the lands. Some Indians went so far as to hold a war dance during Smith's visit.[23] Hull attributed their hostility to local jealousy of the Swan Creek Indian Machonce, who they believed received more annuity monies and who had murdered the brother of a Saginaw Chief.[24] While the Saginaw may have harbored antagonistic feelings toward Machonce, their resistance was in line with growing Indian sentiments. This was the time of Tecumseh's ascendancy to power. The influence of the Shawnee war chief and the teachings of his brother, The Prophet (Elkswatawa), were spreading among disaffected Indians throughout the Midwest. They urged a rejection of European customs and a return to the old way of life. In 1807, Tecumseh was in the process of building an Indian alliance that would expel Europeans from Indian territory. Undoubtedly, the Indians at Saginaw were influenced by the teachings of Tecumseh and his brother because they were already sympathetic to the plight of their Indian neighbors and relations in Ohio and also fully aware of their own position with respect to the American government. Tecumseh's movement added impetus to the Saginaw Chippewa resistance to land sales.[25]

It is clear, however, that the Saginaw Chippewa were not universally opposed to a treaty with the Americans. The

warnings to Hull against treating with certain Indians may be taken to mean that some among the Saginaw were willing to treat. By late August, Hull wrote to his superiors claiming that he had induced all of the Saginaw Indians to meet with him at Detroit. Manitogeezhik advised the other chiefs not to attend, but they came anyway. He followed them, perhaps realizing that the majority was not in his favor. Hull later wrote that Manitogeezhik decided to capitulate to the United States, offering his friendship.[26]

The treaty itself was held on November 17th. Sometimes referred to the Treaty of Brownstown or the Treaty of Detroit, it included an annuity of $800.00 per year to be paid to the Chippewa and the assurance of a resident blacksmith at Saginaw for ten years. The latter term was not of much significance from the United States' perspective since Hull had already made plans to send a blacksmith to Saginaw.[27] The only Saginaw chief to be positively identified as a signatory is Manitogeezhik.[28] In December, Manitogeezhik requested a pardon for Kishkako who had escaped from prison in 1800 after being incarcerated for murdering a Frenchman. Hull recommended that it be granted. He had succeeded in acquiring the friendship of the chief and did not want to jeopardize it.[29]

No reserves were specifically set aside for those Saginaw Chippewa who were affected by the land cessions; however, a provision was made for six unassigned sections to be set aside at a later date.[30] The land cessions included

the territory of the Flint and Shiawassee rivers, yet these leaders did not request reserves in the ceded area as others had done. This may have been because of a misunderstanding as to the actual location of the cession. Later surveyors found that the Indians understood the boundary line ran in a direct line from White Rock on Lake Huron to Defiance, Ohio, but the Treaty stated that the cession line ran southwest and then south to Defiance. As the Indians interpreted the boundary, they had not ceded the Shiawassee and Flint river lands.[31] This land cession had little impact on the Saginaw Chippewa. The cession boundaries were not surveyed until after the War of 1812 and reserves in the ceded territory were not set aside until the Treaty of 1819.[32]

The War of 1812 and the Treaty of 1815

The War of 1812 and the events preceding it brought Indians from different regions into greater contact with one another. When the war broke out, parties of both Saginaw Chippewa and the Grand River Ottawa joined the British against the Americans. Indians from all over the Lower Peninsula had continued to maintain their British ties by annual visits to Fort Malden in order to receive gifts. In the years between the British surrender of what would become Michigan and the War of 1812, the Indians had little contact with the Americans and were still heavily courted by their British allies who depended upon them to guard the border and provide an opening for future military inroads into the

Great Lakes.

For their part, the Indians fought because they believed the British would keep American settlers out of Indian territory. Indian efforts in the war were inspired by Tecumseh, and shades of old alliances from the last century were hinted at as a coalition of Indian troops joined forces to fight on the side of the British. Factionalism, however, rendered it impossible for any Indian army to stay together. When Tecumseh was killed and the war lost, this coalition disintegrated.[33] After the war, the United States returned to the peacekeeping format of 1795 with a treaty held at Springwells near Detroit in 1815 and negotiated by William Henry Harrison, a Major General in the recent war. A post-War of 1812 treaty, it called upon a diverse body of signers, who were largely sympathetic to the British during the late war, to swear their loyalty to the United States. On this treaty, for the first time, a representative from the Grand River ("Mechequez") is listed separately from other Ottawa chiefs. The Red Cedar River chief Okemos ("Okemas") and his cousin Manitocorbway ("Menitugawboway"), who considered themselves Saginaw Chippewa, appear on the treaty under a separate listing as Ottawa chiefs. Noaquageshick or Noonday, the Ottawa chief from the Grand River, appears under the Chippewa chiefs ("Nowgeschick"). Noticeably absent from this treaty are Kishkako and Neome, two important leaders who had supported the British during the war.[34]

Despite the seemingly random categorization of chiefs on the treaty, the presence of both Saginaw Chippewa and Grand River Ottawa demonstrates that they were probably in contact both during and after the War of 1812. Further indications of such contact can be inferred from some of the settlement adjustments that took place after the war's conclusion. Okemos claims this is when he moved to the Red Cedar River (See Figure 3).[35] Pokanamino, a Chippewa from Saginaw, settled in Southwest Kent County with his band, forming a pocket of Chippewa in the Thornapple River area. Makitoquet moved east from the Grand Rapids area to Coocoosh's village at the junction of the Grand and Maple rivers where he would become head chief after Coocoosh's death.[36] These movements followed from the interaction that took place during the war when new alliances were forged and new leaders emerged. It is likely that Okemos' leadership developed in this period. His move to the Red Cedar from the Shiawassee River probably resulted from his having achieved status during the war and splintering off from the Shiawassee River Indians to form his own band with his cousins Manitocorbway and Shingwauk.[37] These movements do not, however, indicate an overall merging of Grand River Ottawa with Saginaw Chippewa. The events of the War of 1812 did not destroy the autonomy of either the Grand River Ottawa or the Saginaw Chippewa. They remained as independent of each other as they had always been. Instead, these relocations reflect individuals' decisions to cross

Figure 3 Grand River Valley and Saginaw River Valley Villages

1. Fort Village
2. Mackatosha's Village
3. Bowting
4. Prairie Village
5. Nongee's Village
6. Chippewa's Village
7. Middle Village
8. Name unknown
9. Name unknown
10. Cobmoosa's Village
11. Cookoosh & Makitoquet's Village
12. Wabigake's Village
13. Meshimnekhaning
14. Wabwahnahseepee
15. Okemos' Village
16. South Branch Village
17. Looking Glass Village
18. Kechewandagoning
19. Sheshigemasking
20. Grand Traverse
21. Copenicorning
22. Chesaning
23. Indiantown
24. Kishkawbawee
25. Peonagowing
26. Menoquet's Village
27. Otusson's Village
28. Sawabun's Village
29. Green Point
30. Kishkako's Village
31. Sebewaing
32. Au Grais Village
33. Rifle River Village
34. Kawkawlin
35. Sigenok's Village
36. Blackbird's Village
37. Arbetohwachewan
38. Name unknown-probably Pamosega's Village
39. Shingwahkoosing


TUSCOLA CO.
LAPEER CO.
GENESSEE CO.
SAGINAW BAY
BAY CO.
GLADWIN CO.
MIDLAND CO.
SAGINAW CO.
SHIAWASSEE CO.
LIVINGSTON CO.
INGHAM CO.
ISABELLA CO.
GRATIOT CO.
CLINTON CO.
EATON CO.
MECOSTA CO.
MONTCALM CO.
KENT CO.
IONIA CO.
BARRY CO.
OTTOWA CO.
LAKE MICHIGAN
Cass (Titton) R.
Flint R.
South Branch (Shiawassee)
Shiawassee R.
Tittabawassee R.
Kawkawlin R.
Au Gres R.
Rifle R.
Chippewa R.
Pine R.
Bad R.
Maple R.
Stoney Creek
Looking Glass R.
Red Cedar R.
Grand R.
Rogue R.
Flat R.
Thornapple R.
SCALE
Miles
0 4 8 12 16

Figure 3

unit to another. For example, the Saginaw Chippewa who moved to the Grand River did so to exploit a variety of ties to kin or others with whom they had newly allied themselves. The moves of Okemos and Makitoquet reflect the normal political process that allowed ambitious young men or those with diverging viewpoints to attract followers and establish new communities.

After the War of 1812, a mosaic of Ottawa, Chippewa, and a few Potawatomi inhabited permanent villages between the core of the Grand River Ottawa territory at the future site of Grand Rapids and the gathering place of the Saginaw Chippewa at Green Point (later the City of Saginaw). These villages were autonomous, but, loyalties coalesced around key men who represented the interests of the region at large or at least of a powerful faction within that region.[38]

The Treaty of 1819

In 1819, only four years after the 1815 Treaty, the Saginaw Chippewa were called upon to make their first major land cession. This land cession differed from later ones in that it was not a response to pressures from settlers for land but was part of Lewis Cass's plan to attract settlers to Michigan. At the time, American settlement had not yet begun in the Saginaw region, but Cass recognized that the Saginaw Indians were a major barrier to settlement, because of their yet-to-be-extinguished title to the land there and because of the danger they posed to settlers to the south.[39]

After the War of 1812, Kishkako had continued to raid American settlers. He followed his father, Manitogeezhik in his support for the British. He emerged from the War of 1812 a powerful leader and his raiding causing Governor Cass great concern. In January of 1819 Cass wrote to John Calhoun saying:

> Those Indians [the Saginaw Chippewas] have always been troublesome and discontented and even now commit almost daily depredations vexatious enough indeed, but not large enough in their amount nor daring enough in their character to call for any decisive measures.[40]

It was at this time that the Saginaw Indians developed a reputation for violence. The American public, familiar with the Indian raids on the Ohio territory, came to perceive the Saginaw Indians as a danger. Kishkako himself had participated in raids on Ohio settlers and continued to raid Michigan farms to deter further settlement, enhance his own position, and promote British interests over American. With the loss of the war and the American demand for land cessions in 1819, it became patently clear that the British would not support Indian hostilities against Americans. Kishkako's power began to erode. His militant approach to the demands presented by the American regime did not achieve results. In fact, his policies placed the Saginaw Indians in danger of American military reprisals. Concerned by their behavior, Cass pressed for an increased American military presence at Detroit and Saginaw and was prepared to

take action against the Saginaw Indians should it become necessary.[41] Kishkako attempted to make amends with Cass by giving him information about British and Indian activities at Fort Malden, however, he never managed to engender Cass's trust and therefore was unable to translate his position as Indian intermediary with the British to the American regime.[42] Cass saw the Treaty of 1819 as the first step towards pacifying the Saginaw Indians and opening Saginaw for further settlement.

It is interesting that no apparent distinction was made among chiefs on the basis of their tribal identification during the treaty negotiations. Although not divided along tribal lines, Saginaw Indians far from agreed on the cession of their lands and a divisive group faced Cass at the negotiating table. It took ten days of hard negotiations to conclude the 1819 Treaty, and even then, the trader, James Ryley observed, "I knew that not one out of fifty of the natives understood the meaning and after the treaty was signed there was contention among many."[43] In the beginning, the Indians opposed any cessions whatsoever and council negotiations yielded few results. Ogemakeketo from the Tittabawassee River and Menoquet from the Cass River spoke out against the treaty. Kishkako also advised against ceding any land, yet one night he attempted to sell land privately without the knowledge of the other Indians.[44] His influence over the negotiations was significant enough that he managed to have what may have been much of the territory

he used during his seasonal rounds set aside in reserves.[45]

Another source of conflict was in the presence of the trader Jacob Smith and the Flint River Indians, who held themselves apart from the rest of the Saginaw Indians. A year after the treaty, Jedidiah Morse, a New England minister commissioned by the president to visit the Indians of Michigan, interviewed Smith. Drawing on this interview, he referred to the Saginaw as the "...the refuse of other tribes. Of these there is less hope than of those on the Flint River, who are of a different and better character."[46] Kazheobeonnoqua, a woman of Kishkako's band who attended the treaty, claimed, that Jacob Smith was not well liked by the Indians.[47] Yet Smith had secured a relationship with the Flint River chief Neome, that some likened to that between brothers. Kazheobeonnoqua!s observation merely reflects the schism between the Flint River Indians and Kishkako's band on the Saginaw River.[48]

To overcome some of the hurdles presented by Indian factionalism at the 1819 Treaty, Cass relied on the traders to speak with the Indians. At stake were accumulated Indian debts to the traders that were to be settled during the treaty. Cass also came prepared with 662 gallons of liquor to help with the persuasion.[49] Kishkako spent much time away from the negotiations drinking.[50] Alcohol thus served to eliminate influential leaders or effective orators who would oppose the proceedings, from the negotiations. In order to agree on terms, twenty reserves were granted,

fifteen of which were associated with known summer villages of the most influential chiefs in the Saginaw area. The most notable exception was the Green Point Indians whose land, being close to Campau's trading house, was desired for a future town.[51] It is noteworthy that Okemos and his cousins were not on the list of those receiving reserves. Wasso, the leader of the Shiawassee River village from which Okemos came, received a reservation. Okemos's band, however, was on the periphery of Saginaw Indian politics as were those Indians living on the Looking Glass River who were also affected by the treaty. As Okemos's name (Little Chief) suggests, he and his cousins were minor leaders and not men of influence beyond their own village. They thus held little sway over the outcome of the treaty and were in no position to demand their own reserve.[52]

In addition to these reserves, the Indians insisted that certain of their trading partners be included in the benefits of the treaty. Neome, the powerful chief from Flint River who represented a mini-coalition of four leaders who one observer noted "moved as one,"[53] was allowed small land claims for his children, as was his friend, the trader Jacob Smith. The Riley brothers, Peter, James and John, the sons of a Chippewa woman and a trader received reservations out of consideration for their Indian ties.[54]

The Grand River Ottawa derived little benefit from the treaty. The treaty specifically addressed the Saginaw Chippewa, but as he later indicated, Cass included the Grand

River Ottawa because he realized that part of their territory was to be ceded in this treaty.[55] Cass admitted that the western boundary line of the cessions was not well known. He invited the Grand River Indians to the treaty in order to have legal recourse should they attempt to make monetary claims for the land in the future. Ottawa leaders who attended the treaty were upon Kewaygooshcum (Kawgeshequm) from the Flat River and Noaggugeshik or Noonday (Nowkeshuc) and Megisinini or "Shell Man" (Meckseonne) from Grand Rapids.[56]

Two Grand River affiliated villages were ceded in the treaty. These were the villages of Meshimnekhan[57] and Cookoosh.[58] Besides gifts given at the treaty itself, members of these villages received no annuity monies and no reserves, even though their villages and hunting grounds were ceded. Thus, the Grand River Ottawa were peripheral to the negotiations, having no significant voice within the realm of Saginaw politics.

Because this treaty was conducted prior to the arrival of the majority of settlers who would later pressure the Grand River Ottawa to the negotiation table at the 1836 Treaty, the Grand River Ottawa had no reason to be alarmed about the land cessions involved. Those among them who were affected by the cession, Cookoosh and the people of Meshimnekhan, may not have realized the impact of the treaty or they would have objected. Even so, they had little influence with the Saginaw bands.

As Indian politics became more and more merged with state politics, sorting out why certain Indian names and representatives of groups not directly involved appear on the 1819 Treaty presents somewhat of a problem. There were also people who altogether refused to participate in the treaty process and whose interests are largely obscure. In its quest for land cessions, the cash-poor government of the United States attempted to limit those who participated in a treaty to those who would be directly impacted. Ideally, this would limit gift-giving and expense, while at the same time paying heed to what was perceived as a legal responsibility to purchase Indian land. Some Indians signed because they were invited to do so by the United States and not because of kin or other local interests. Therefore, the treaties are a far from perfect record of alliances or shared interests. The Grand River Ottawa signed the treaty because of the American presence rather than from political or kin obligations to the Chippewa. The 1819 Treaty was the last that both Saginaw Chippewa and Grand River Ottawa signed. The Chippewa who moved to the Thornapple River after the War of 1812 were not included in future Ottawa treaties, while Ottawa-affiliated mixed bands at Meshimnekhan and Coocoosh's village, whose lands were ceded in the 1819 Treaty, did not participate in later Saginaw Chippewa treaties. These groups would receive annuities from the 1836 Ottawa cession. Neither group benefitted in terms of annuities from both treaties.[59] In this instance,

political affiliation appears to have over-ridden boundaries laid down by government-determined land cessions, especially for those living in the poorly known territory between the upper Grand and Saginaw Rivers.

The Treaty of 1821

The Treaty of 1821 was largely concerned with the cession of Potawatomi and Ottawa territory in the southwest portion of the state. The Grand River Ottawa were invited in the hopes that more territory would be ceded, but as Cass learned, he was unable to acquire any lands north of the Grand River because of the unwillingness of the southern Ottawa to cede the property of their northern neighbors.[60] The Grand River Indians generally opposed any cession at all and most refused to attend the treaty. They hunted to the south of the Grand River and did not want to cede this land. A few Ottawa leaders, however, attended and agreed to the cession without the support of those at home. The government accepted them as representative of all Grand River Indians, which they were not, and the cession was made in opposition to majority opinion among the Indians. Kewaycooshcum, one of the Grand River Ottawa who signed the treaty, lost his position of leadership among his people and eventually paid with his life for his unpopular action.[61]

Of the two Chippewa who signed the 1821 treaty, one named Mettaywaw also signed the 1819 treaty at Saginaw. If he was indeed from Saginaw, he was not a leader of

importance and did not represent the Saginaw Chippewa in any sanctioned capacity. The ceded territory overlapped with that ceded in the 1819 treaty. Little was known, however, about the interior regions of the state, and such an error would not have been realized by the Indians. The two Chippewa signing the treaty likely did so as individuals rather than as representatives of a discreet Indian community.[62]

The Saginaw Chippewa and the Grand River Ottawa reacted differently to these two major land cessions, partly because of the terms of the individual treaties, but also because of their different approaches to similar problems precipitated by the sale of their lands and the changing economic conditions of the times. Coinciding with the conclusion of these cessions, the government began making efforts to civilize the Indians through education and agricultural training. Their efforts were often feeble at best, but they brought outsiders into the Indian sphere, such as missionaries, who fulfilled the educational stipulations of the treaties, and government employees, who provided blacksmith services, agricultural instruction and aid. The 1820s also brought changes in the fur trade, which affected Indian economics.

Repercussions of the 1819 and 1821 Land Cessions

Governor Cass wrote that the Saginaw Chippewa rejected educational aid during the 1819 Treaty negotiations, yet he

was able to include a stipulation offering agricultural aid despite a number Indian objections.[63] In the years immediately after the treaty, the government sent cattle and plows to Saginaw Chippewa, which the Indians refused them at first as "too much trouble."[64] But, in 1822, a delegation of Chippewa arrived at Detroit worried about a lack of game and asking for agricultural aid and livestock.[65] This change of heart may have been prompted by difficulties encountered with the fur trade. The Saginaw sub-agent Whitmore Knaggs reported that the Indians were starving in the summer of 1822.[66] Indeed they may have reached a point at which over-hunting had diminished their game resources. The fur trade was achieving its high point as numerous traders competed for Indian-acquired furs and skins. During this time, traders proliferated on both the Grand River and in the Saginaw River drainage, and the Indians did not have to travel far to do business. Whitmore Knaggs traded near Wasso's village on the Shiawassee River.[67] Jacob Smith had a post at the present site of Flint.[68] Louis Campeau, an independent trader, had a post at the future site of the city of Saginaw before leaving for the Grand River in 1826. Competition between the American Fur Company and independent traders resulted in a highly charged environment. When the trader Ephraim Williams arrived at Saginaw around 1828 to take over trading for the American Fur Trade Company, he found his predecessor, Reaume, in conflict with Louis Campeau and the Company's post on the Tittabawassee River

closed as a consequence of the resulting violence.[69]

While no violent incidents are recorded on the Grand River, competition was equally fierce there. In 1827 American Fur Company agent Rix Robinson maintained twenty posts between Kalamazoo and Little Traverse Bay. After 1826 Louis Campeau had posts at Lowell, Hastings and Eaton Rapids and in 1832, George Campeau succeeded John Cushway who had traded at Maple Rapids in the 1820s. Genereau had a post at Cookoosh's village at the junction of the Grand and Maple rivers.[70] These men were the best known traders and the most influential within the Indian community, although there were other early settlers who attempted to trade with local Indians. The Grand River Ottawa and the Saginaw Chippewa had fairly equal access to the trade since the traders were evenly distributed across the landscape. No one group had a competitive advantage by means of superior access to the trade. Interestingly enough, no single trader worked with both the Grand River and Saginaw Indians. Members of the boundary bands tended to gravitate to traders associated with those Indians with whom they were politically affiliated. For example, Okemos brought his goods to the Williams brothers on the Shiawassee River and to Baptiste's post at Jackson, but there is no indication that he traded on the Maple or Grand rivers, despite the proximity of Genereau's post at Lyons-Muir.[71]

Besides the competition that encouraged over-hunting and the destruction of important food sources for the

Indians, outside events began to threaten the fur trade. The demand for beaver diminished as fashions changed, and the American agricultural frontier loomed on the horizon, ready to embrace the trade and with it the lifestyle to which the Indians had become accustomed. The trade reached its zenith shortly before its demise and while it continued to play a large role in the lives of the Saginaw Indians in the 1820s, alarm over game shortages and periodic starvation may have caused some to take note and seek alternatives.[72]

One alternative, offered by the traders themselves, was to provision American settlements. Provisioning military outposts through the trade had long been a custom among the Saginaw Indians. After the 1819 Treaty the traders remained a fixture in Indian life, many shifting their emphasis from the fur trade to American settlers. American settlement in Saginaw was slow, but the rivers did reach well into or adjacent to areas around Detroit that were being settled. The traders of Saginaw had access to Detroit and eastern markets via Lake Huron. As furs became more scarce during the late 1820s and into the 1830s, traders such as the Williams brothers turned to provisioning Detroit-based settlements with Indian gathered and produced goods. Ephraim Williams purchased cranberries, sturgeon, and other fish from the Indians at low prices and made a tidy profit shipping them to Detroit. He actively encouraged the Indians to gather these foods, which they did while following their yearly seasonal round.[73] Thus, the Indians

could participate in the market economy while remaining enmeshed in their customary subsistence activities. They could take advantage of opportunities offered by pre-existing ties to fur traders without making significant changes in their own lives to accommodate this new economic activity.

The Grand River Ottawa also provisioned American settlement, selling maple sugar and meat. The only difference between the Grand River Ottawa and the Saginaw Chippewa in this situation may have been the latter's proximity to Detroit via Saginaw Bay and Lake Huron which allowed them earlier input into the markets there than the Grand River Ottawa had. Fish also played a larger role in Saginaw market participation. Saginaw villages located on the Bay and near Lake Huron tended to procure more of their own subsistence from fishing, and their fish often found its way to Detroit markets.[74]

Such large-scale provisioning, along with continued hunting, had serious ecological consequences in the context of settler encroachments. Such activity tended to strain Indian food resources when settlers began pouring into the central part of Michigan in the late 1830s. Indian provisioning of settlers fed the movement of peoples, but it also contributed to the loss of habitat caused by settler activities and to the competition for game created by the settler's presence.

Documents indicate that before 1830 the Saginaw Indians

had already begun to experience competition with settlers. An 1833 survey of eighteen abandoned Indian fields on the Pine, Tittabawassee and Saginaw rivers totaling 184 acres, illustrates some of the results of such competition. At the time of the survey, all of the fields had been abandoned. The survey does not refer to villages but only to family heads as proprietors of these fields. According to the records, three fields had been abandoned shortly after the 1819 Treaty; three more were left in 1824 and 1828 upon the death of the family head; and three other field sites were abandoned when settlers purchased the land. Sawabun, leader of the Green Point Indians left his fields for the reserve because the government farmers would not plow his fields.[75]

This shows the rapid rate of change taking place following the cessions of 1819. Although the Indians undoubtedly abandoned some of these fields in the natural course of events, the fact that they left so many within five years and the reasons given by the observer for their leaving demonstrate that a re-adjustment was taking place after the 1819 Treaty. Some Indians left the Saginaw area for Canada, discontent with life under American rule. In 1822, many were still trekking to Fort Malden to receive British gifts[76] and sentiments favorable to the British were voiced by some chiefs well into the 1830s. The alternative of moving to Canada remained an option for discontent Saginaw Indians for many years to come. Other Indians dispersed after the death of a family leader. At least one

of these families spread out to other communities, completely losing its cohesiveness. This dispersal, combined with the disruption caused by land sales and interference from settlers' livestock with their crops, rendered life off of the reserves and on major rivers such as the Tittabawassee, unstable. These were prime lands and the first to be bought by settlers because of their proximity to water and because of the cleared fields located on them. They also happened to be lands that were important to Indian subsistence. With their loss and with the death of family leaders willing to remain on them as long as possible, dispersal and cultural dissolution progressed at a faster pace.

Sawabun's move to the reserve from Green Point illustrates another force that drew people to the reserves. Cass had responded to the Saginaw requests for agricultural aid by employing two men to plow fields on the reservations and teach the Indians to become self-sufficient agriculturalists. From the outset, the program had mixed results. The hired farmers were often corrupt and their work sporadic at best. Most never seriously attempted to instruct the Indians in agricultural methods. Instead, they plowed a few acres of previously cleared land on the reservations and left the Indians to plant what they could. In theory, the government farmers provided a free source of labor for the Indians, some of whom gravitated to the reservations in order to benefit from it. The work of these

men was, however, somewhat less than what the Indians had expected in that the farmers did not plow all the reserves and would not plow lands off the reserves.[77] Others, such as the Shiawassee River Indians refused to allow government farmers on their land, thus removing themselves from the government sponsored civilization efforts.[78]

In contrast, the Saginaw Indians inhabiting the border territory near the Grand River villages did not have these experience prior to the 1830s. Because they had no reserves, they did not benefit from the government plowing program, nor did they have to adjust to the sale of lands and the arrival of settlers at the same rate the others did. As the Saginaw Indians along the major rivers of the system adjusted to the loss of land, only a few chose to migrate to less-occupied territory and no major movement of people occurred. Instead, their pattern of adaptation was to move to the reserves which provided a certain degree of security. The alternative was dispersal, which resulted in a loss of group cohesiveness and the distribution of individuals throughout existing Indian and non-Indian communities.

Instrumental in the government's attempts to civilize the Indians were the missionaries who were willing to take up the task with zeal and at a relatively low cost. In 1821, a Methodist minister Reverend Yates visited Saginaw in hopes of establishing a mission there. He purchased land from Menoquet near the present City of Saginaw. After doing so, he was confronted by Kishkako who told him that the

Indians had decided not to sell the land. Yates describes his demeanor as threatening.[79] Kishkako claimed that Menoquet, who possessed a reserve on the Cass River, had no right to sell land that was not his.[80] In May of 1822, the same delegation that had asked for agricultural aid stated explicitly that they would not accept schools or missions.[81] Yates gave up his plans for a mission in August of that same year, stating that the Indians of Saginaw were not receptive to religious instruction.[82] Thus, Kishkako effectively thwarted a missionary presence at Saginaw. Not until 1843, over twenty years later, would the Methodists be able to establish a permanent mission station among the Saginaw Indians.

In contrast to the Saginaw Indians, the Grand River Ottawa, swayed by the influential chief Noaquageshik, invited the Baptist missionary Isaac McCoy to begin a mission there in 1824. Noaquageshik pushed for the intensification of agriculture and the education of Indians as a means of facing the problems brought on by the 1821 land cession. With McCoy's mission came the economic benefits associated with its acceptance, including a much desired blacksmith shop. The workers for the mission plowed Indian fields and erected cabins.[83]

The establishment of a protestant mission at Noaquageshik's village had implications for pre-existing factions. Jealousy over the placement of the blacksmith shop caused those Indians to the east to complain about its

location. Traders became uneasy about the missionaries, who would object to the sale of liquor and attempt to settle the Indians into farming communities. When Louis Campeau arrived in 1827, he actively set out to exploit the factions among the Grand River Ottawa in order to deter the missionaries. By the 1830s, it was apparent that the Ottawa were divided along factional lines, with some aligned with the French speaking, Catholic traders, such as Louis Campeau and others aligned with Leonard Slater and his Protestant mission located at Grand Rapids. The issue at stake was not religion per se, but the different lifestyles that accompanied religious conversion. It came down to a choice of Americanization with the Protestant missions or maintaining a traditional way of life with the Catholic mission, supported by the traders.[84] The Saginaw Indians did not have such a dilemma; they repelled attempts at missionization and, at this time, did not seek it as some of the Ottawa did as a means of adapting to the conditions resulting from land cessions. They rejected mission interference in their affairs, which would have encouraged acculturation, and consequently did not develop church allies that might have worked to their advantage. Not until the 1840s, when they were surrounded by American settlers, had sold their reserves, and needed a means of staying on their lands and adapting to the resultant changes, did the Saginaw Chippewa accept the presence of missionaries.

The next major cession came in 1836 for the peoples of

Grand River and in 1837 for the Saginaw Chippewa. The 1830s were to bring economic hardship and changes that would create additional stress as the Indians on the Grand River frontier attempted various methods of adapting to the events around them. For the period up to 1830, there is little evidence for significant movements of people within the governmentally defined territory of the Saginaw Chippewa and between the Saginaw Chippewa and Grand River Ottawa. Individuals may have and did change communities. In general, the relationship between the Saginaw Chippewa and the Grand River Ottawa was characterized by indifference.

CHAPTER IV

THE ARRIVAL OF THE PIONEERS: 1830-1840

Introduction

The major land cessions of 1819 and 1821 opened the way for the settlement of southern Michigan, bringing to bear a new set of circumstances that would make the 1830s a time of tribulation for the Indians. Even though the Grand River Ottawa possessed the land north of the Grand River until 1836, they faced many of the same problems as the Saginaw Indians as settlers streamed into the territory to the south. The major problems for the Indians between 1830 and 1840 included competition for resources and destruction of animal habitats by settlers, the waning of the fur trade as a means of participating in the market economy, the threat of removal to Western lands, increasing dependence upon government aid, and population losses and cultural dissolution due to European disease. Outside forces and internal dissension resulted in different approaches to overcoming these difficulties.

Factionalism and the Treaty of 1837

The egalitarian structure of Indian politics on the

Grand River and the rivers of the Saginaw drainage meant that there was no single leader who could unite the various factions in either area. Grand River divisions continued to run along religious lines. The Catholic bands were supported by the fur traders and tended to be more conservative, attempting to maintain traditional economic activities. Those Indians associated with the Protestant missions tried to adapt to the new state of affairs by settling on mission stations and rejecting the lifestyle associated with fur traders. The goal of the Protestant missionaries was to turn the Indians into productive farmers. Between these groups lay the bands who rejected any sort of missionary efforts or had relatively little contact with the missions. They tended to be allied to those with Catholic affiliations since this faction required the least amount of change in lifestyle. As the situation of all Grand River Indians became more untenable, firmer lines were drawn between the factions, and unity in the face of American demands became more difficult.

In the Saginaw River area, such factionalism along religious lines did not take place until after 1845, when heavy missionization began. On the whole, the Saginaw groups remained reluctant to alter their lifestyle significantly. The factionalism hinted at during the 1819 treaty negotiations would be a constant theme in the Indians' approach to the problems of the 1830s. Indeed, as the groups became more politically and physically dispersed

by American settlement and its attendant pressures, fewer leaders emerged during this decade who could unite a cadre of bands in political action. Those villages that lay on reservations became focal points of activity, creating an even more disjointed atmosphere among the Saginaw bands. Jacob Smith expressed the opinion that dividing the Indians into numerous small reserves demoralized them and destroyed their sense of unity.[1]

By fall of 1836, Henry Schoolcraft wrote to W. Harris, the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, to say that the situation of the Saginaw Indians had worsened and to suggest that it was time for them to cede their reserves and remove to the west.[2] The treaty of January 14, 1837, followed. The Saginaw bands ceded all but two reserves, one at Au Grais and the other at Rifle River, which were to be ceded after five years in anticipation of removal west. Provisions were made for a school fund and the continuation of both blacksmith and farming services. Through an oversight, the reserve at Big Rock or Chesaning was confused with that at Kechewandagoning or Big Lick, resulting in the latter being left out of the cessions. Wasso is listed on the treaty as a principle chief who was to receive $500.00. Manitocorbway ("Monetogaubwee") from the Red Cedar bands attended but did not receive money for a personal claim and was not considered a principle chief. One stipulation of the treaty set aside money to settle Indian debts and Okemos was in debt. Manitocorbway attended to represent the

interests of these families.

Epidemic Disease

Prior to the 1830s the Saginaw area had been relatively untouched by widespread epidemic disease.[3] This situation changed as increasing numbers of settlers arrived and exposed the vulnerable Indians to a variety of diseases. Outbreaks of Asiatic cholera occurred in Detroit in 1832 and 1834. Although the first epidemic failed to reach the Saginaw Indians, the second spread along the Shiawassee and other rivers "...producing convulsions and cramps with death after a few hours."[4] According to B.O. Williams, this epidemic triggered a shift in settlement pattern, causing the Indians to congregate at villages located on reserves.[5] Epidemic disease thus functioned as a catalyst, hastening the retreat of the Indians to their reserves, a retreat already begun in response to the arrival of settlers. Asiatic cholera and its effects were merely a preamble to the next epidemic, which brought momentous change to the lives of many Saginaw Indians.

The summer after the signing of the 1837 removal treaty, smallpox spread throughout the Saginaw River valley. The Indians had already attempted to protect themselves from such an epidemic. In 1833, led by Ogemakeketo, they petitioned Governor Porter to send a doctor to inoculate them.[6] The government did not send a doctor to Saginaw until the 1837 epidemic was well underway. Even then, he

managed to vaccinate only fifty-eight Indians. The government's tardy response hindered the effectiveness of any vaccination program, and in addition, the Indians did not universally accept the technique. Those living at the Big Rock reserve on the Shiawassee River believed the epidemic had begun with the inoculation of a Saginaw River Indian.[7]

The disease was widespread throughout the Saginaw River valley. It infected people on the Cass, Tittabawasee, Saginaw, Shiawassee, Flint, Pine, Chippewa, and Muskego rivers.[8] Those Saginaw-affiliated Indians living on the Lookinglass and Red Cedar rivers also fell victim to the epidemic, but the contagion did not extend far beyond the territories of these latter people. The Ottawa and mixed Chippewa-Ottawa communities of the Grand River escaped this course of the disease.[9]

The widespread epidemic killed overwhelming numbers of people. Jeremiah Riggs, who had replaced Thomas Simpson as supervisor of the government farming program, estimated that half of those who contracted smallpox died.[10] Sub-agent Henry Conner reported that 354 out of 1,241, or nearly one-third, of the Saginaw Indians perished during the epidemic. Bands on the Tittabawassee and Shiawassee rivers were particularly devastated.[11]

There is no one reason to explain the devastation. The nature of the disease itself was compounded by the behavior of the Indians in its wake and by other circumstances out of

the Indians' control. In the year prior to the epidemic, the Indians had had difficulty procuring enough food to avoid starvation. Sub-agent Conner reported that the Indians had planted little corn that spring because they had not saved enough from the winter for seed.[12] Thus, there was little in the way of provision by late summer and the epidemic. Settlers gave what they could to help, but reports arrived at the Office of Indian Affairs saying that some Indians were being forced to eat grass to stay alive.[13] By October, starvation was common. The tending of crops and their harvest was disrupted by the disorder created by the epidemic.

With the outbreak of the disease, the immediate reaction of the Indians was flight. They remained scattered through August and into September and October. In September, the geologist Bela Hubbard, noted uninhabited villages as he traveled down the Shiawassee and up Tittabawassee rivers.[14] One settler wrote to Schoolcraft saying, "They [the Indians] fled panic stricken to their reservations where they are dying daily."[15] Others ran to the woods, the healthy leaving the sick and in turn spreading the disease.[16]

Smallpox is an unusual infectious disease in that it strikes down a disproportionate number of adults between the ages of fifteen and forty, the people who ordinarily see to food procurement and preparation for other members of the group. Thus, ordinary tasks necessary to the survival of

the young and the old are not carried out. Another characteristic of smallpox is its virulence, which renders large numbers of people simultaneously sick. Thus, the nursing of those who are ill is impaired by a lack of healthy care-takers. These factors combine to break down the social order that normally sees to everyday survival needs and the care of the sick.[17]

The smallpox epidemic of 1837 clearly destroyed normal social relations among the Saginaw Indians. One settler wrote to Henry Schoolcraft about the Shiawassee Indians with the warning, "...on the authority of two of the chiefs the alarm is so great, they fear it will not be in their power to collect their few remaining people together this fall, for the purpose of receiving their annuities."[18] Settlers discovered Indian children wandering in the woods, deserted by their parents who had either fled or fallen victim to disease.[19] Of those who died, sixty percent were adults, leaving a large number of children orphaned.[20] The necessity of feeding and caring for this generation of children fell to those who survived, creating additional hardships on top of those already at hand.

The Removal Threat

Important leaders died as well, leaving bands without leadership when it was most needed,[21] not only for guidance of individual families during the epidemic but for facing the prospect of removal, a process moving forward at the

same time. In the midst of the epidemic, a delegation of Saginaw, Black River and Swan Creek Indians left to tour western lands in anticipation of removal. Planned the previous spring, when the Saginaw requested that they be allowed to accompany the Black River leader, Maconse, to view western lands, the delegation was supposed to consist of the Chief Speaker, Ogemakeketo from Arbetowachewan on the Tittabawassee River, Southbird or Shawanepenasee also from the Tittabawassee River, Tondaganne, Neome's successor on the Flint River, and Warewasum, an unidentified Indian.[22] The absence of representatives from the Shiawassee and upper Grand rivers in this delegation bespeaks their continued exclusion and possibly reluctance to participate in the activities of those Indians at Saginaw who had accepted government efforts at civilization. Wasso had attended the first 1837 treaty, which laid the groundwork for removal, but there is no evidence that he supported government-sponsored efforts to proceed with removal. The chosen delegates themselves were not unanimously in favor of moving their people west. Southbird sent a representative with little authority in his stead because he was skeptical of government promises in the recent treaty to pay for his reservation lands. The smallpox epidemic took its toll on the delegation. Tondagonne contracted smallpox and sent the young Massenaus in his place. Southbird's representative also got the disease and was unable to leave. Thus, the only men of authority to attend were Ogemakeketo and

Moksauba from Cass River. Moksauba died of smallpox shortly after his return, leaving Ogemakeketo the only member of the delegation in a position of power who could comment on the lands designated for removal. Isaac McCoy, Baptist missionary and proponent of removal, had escorted the party west. In September, he wrote to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs saying that the Saginaw Chippewa, "...would eagerly embrace the opportunity of coming to this country and coming soon."[23] As it was, Ogemakeketo and the other surviving member of the delegation, Massenaus, returned to a people scattered and severely reduced in number. Any decisions about removal would have to wait until the people were restored to their villages.

The Glass Murders

Less than a year after the smallpox epidemic, the Saginaw Indians found themselves embroiled in an incident that endangered their continued residency in Michigan. On March 28, 1838, a pioneer family was found murdered on the Maple River in Ottawa territory. Upon calling at Aensel Glass's homestead, a neighbor discovered the bodies of Mrs. Glass and her two children in the remains of their burned house. Mr. Glass was missing as were two barrels of flour, a gun, and two axes. The brutal nature of the murders and the missing supplies seemed to indicate that the Indians were involved. Investigators brought local Grand River Ottawa to the murder site and questioned them about the crime.[24]

Although not mentioned specifically, the Indians visiting the site probably came from Makitoquet's village at the junction of the Maple and Grand rivers and Cobmoosa's village at the junction of the Grand and Flat rivers. Members of both villages hunted, trapped, and sugared on or near the Maple River during the winter and spring.[25] Their physical proximity to the Glass homestead made them likely suspects. The Ottawa searched the area around the Glass homestead and determined that tracks made by Indians led in the direction of Saginaw. Investigators began shifting their attention to the east and a delegation of three Ottawa and a "half-breed" went to Saginaw to gather information.[26]

The Ottawa reaction to the Glass murders was tempered by a number of factors, the most important of which was fear of removal as a near-panicked frontier population of American settlers envisioned an Indian uprising. Settlers at Grand Rapids knew that the Indians were dissatisfied with their last annuity payments, part of which were paid in goods. Americans of the 1830s had, at best, mixed perceptions of their Indian neighbors. They romanticized the proud Indian and his fierce and stoic disposition and wondered at his strange customs and wandering lifestyle. They marveled at the Indians while fearing them at the same time. Many settlers appreciated the goods traded by the Indians and some even befriended them; however, the Indians treated the settlers as they would any neighbor and came to depend upon them in times of trouble and to expect

hospitality from them. Every county history and pioneer account of local Indians tells the story of an Indian wordlessly appearing inside the home of a pioneer, frightening women and children and expecting food and shelter. Most of these accounts also mention that pioneer generosity was returned at a later date in the form of venison or some other gift wordlessly left. What the settlers perceived as alarming violations of protocol, the Indians viewed in terms of expected courtesies.

The Indians on the Grand River frontier were frightening to the American settlers for another reason. Many of their villages were still intact in the late 1830s even after the Treaty of 1836 and the creation of reserves to the north. Annuity payroll figures from 1838 refer to eight villages with an average size of 117 people, ranging from 38 at Prairie Village north of Grand Rapids at the mouth of the Rogue River to 225 at the Maple River village.[27] In other words, the Indian presence on the Grand River frontier was composed of established communities, not of a few scattered remnants of people. These communities reminded settlers that the Indians were numerous enough to be capable of inflicting a great deal of harm should they be inclined to do so.

Government officials had taken note of the unhappiness of the Grand River Indians over annuity payments, and when news of the Glass murder reached the Office of Indian Affairs, Henry Schoolcraft's responses carried a sense of

urgency with them. He desired a speedy resolution to the investigation into the murders and wrote to General Brady, suggesting that troops be posted at the mouth of the Grand River as a visible reminder to the Indians of American military superiority and as an encouragement to respond quickly to American demands for justice.[28] Schoolcraft made it known that he held the entire tribe responsible for finding the murderers, stating that the guilty would undoubtedly flee according to Indian custom.[29] The Indians thus faced a delicate situation in which both the government and their imaginative frontier neighbors turned an anxious eye to them and were prepared to act with immediate military reprisals and/or expulsion from the state.

Shortly after the Ottawa sent their investigators to Saginaw, Antoine Campeau, brother of Louis Campeau and a sometime government interpreter, wrote to Schoolcraft bolstering the Ottawa claim that the Saginaw Chippewas were responsible for the Glass murders. He stated that an unnamed Ottawa chief claimed that the Saginaw Chippewas had been agitating for an attack on Michigan settlers.[30] Campeau was sympathetic to the Ottawa cause, having participated in the Indian trade himself and being of a family that had long associated with the Indians in both a social and business capacity. One account goes so far as to claim he was the father of Cobmoosa, the young chief who had taken over the leadership of Keweegooschcum's village at Flat River. As a trader, and as someone who was personally

involved with the Grand River Indians, Campeau did not want the Indians to be removed. Undoubtedly, he and other traders played a role in advising Cobmoosa and other leaders as they tried to transfer suspicion to the Saginaw Indians.

In May, the government began an investigation of the Saginaw Indians, and the sub-agent, Henry Connor, was instructed by Schoolcraft to gather the chiefs together to deliver a speech concerning the crime. Connor made a special trip to the camp of Pamosega, a chief who wintered up the Pine River and was within close range of the Glass homestead. Upon his arrival, Connor was informed that Pamosega had already been called to a council on the Grand River by Lucious Lyons and the Ottawa Indians.[31] Knowing that Pamosega trapped on the Maple River, the Ottawa invited him to meet to assess his position on the murder. Lucious Lyons, as a land speculator and promoter of settlement on the Grand River, had a vested interest in the outcome of the investigations.[32] Pamosega's wife assured Connor that her husband would return soon since the spring had been difficult and the family was in need of fresh game.

Upon Connor's return to Saginaw, Pamosega's sister gave him information that led to the arrest of two local Indians.[33] At Saginaw, rumors that the Grand River Indians were holding Pamosega prisoner had already spread. His sister's testimony appears to have been an attempt to exonerate him. After the arrest of the two men, however, the Saginaw leader Ogemakeketo and many others came forward,

saying they were "good, quiet" Indians and Conner planned to set them free.

Suspicion again fell on Pamosega, and Connor sent men to bring the chief, his son, his son-in-law, and his nephew to Saginaw. A neighbor of Pamosega testified against him. She claimed that an Indian traveler had stopped at Pamosega's camp and been refused food, an unusual and inhospitable act according to Indian custom. The traveler moved on to the neighboring camp and complained. The neighbor told Connor that she found Pamosega's behavior strange since she was sure he had plenty of provisions. She believed that the provisions came from the Glass home and that Pamosega's camp had failed to feed the traveler out of fear of incrimination.[34] Pamosega vigorously denied the charges, but his overly anxious appearance did not help his cause. As was traditional among the Indians in the case of a murder committed, he offered recompense for the crime. He also denied knowing the Glass family after his son had testified that they had sold venison to Glass and helped him round up his horses. Yet, the case against Pamosega was not clear-cut. There were many other interests at work behind the accusations against him. To understand how he came to be the primary suspect in the Glass murders it is necessary to examine his position among his fellow Saginaw Indians and his neighbors on the Grand River.

At the time of the Glass murders, Pamosega was in the prime of his leadership. He resided at Arbetowachewan

(present-day Midland) during the summer months. A number of other powerful leaders came from this area, known as the Forks of the Tittabawassee; one of these was Ogemakeketo. In the Grand River situation no one chief had emerged or been appointed government liaison; in the Saginaw area, in contrast, Ogemakeketo consistently represented the Saginaw Indians in the sphere of government relations. As a young man, Ogemakeketo had distinguished himself as an orator at the Treaty of 1819 negotiations. He signed almost every Indian petition and treaty pertaining to Saginaw affairs between 1830 and his death in 1849.[35] Referred to as the business chief of the tribe, Ogemakeketo provided the link between the United State government and the Saginaw Indians.[36] The government supported Ogemakeketo in his role, adding to his status since he undoubtedly derived special considerations from possessing the ear of the government.

While this chief did serve as a semi-government appointed leader, he did not represent the interests of all the Saginaw Indians. His influence primarily extended to those bands whose villages were to the north and east of the Shiawassee River. There were tensions between those Indians represented by Ogemakeketo and a faction centered upon the Shiawassee River. In June of 1838, a coalition of chiefs, including Wasso from Kechewandagoning and Mayketchewouk from Chesaning, both on the Shiawassee River, wrote to Schoolcraft asking to receive their annuities somewhere

other than at Saginaw:

> Besides we have never had much intercourse with the Saginaw Indians and do not wish to meet at the same place with them. We wish the Flint, Shiawassee, Lookinglass, and Red Cedar River Indians to meet at the place known as the Big Rock Reserve.[37]

These same Indians shunned other government services as well. Blacksmith Benjamin Cushway's (stationed at Saginaw) records indicate that only five Shiawassee Indians and none from the Red Cedar or Lookinglass rivers used his services in the spring of 1837[38]. The Saginaw Indians were far from a united group and the dissension among them became more obvious during the Glass murder investigations.

Pamosega himself was a conservative, representing a different voice from that of Ogemakeketo, who saw the necessity of co-operating with the government. Pamosega refused to sign the recent treaty, and his name rarely appears on petitions and letters sent to the Office of Indian Affairs. He remained friendly to the British in Canada while actively opposing the sale of Indian lands and the settlement of Americans on or near his own reserve at Arbetowachewan. He threatened to kill a settler for every one of his relatives lost to smallpox and, in general, was regarded by the prominent settlers of the Saginaw area as threatening and blackhearted. The young men of his band likewise had a reputation of hostility toward newcomers.

Pamosega thus received little sympathy from settlers and other Indians who had chosen a less confrontational approach to dealing with the Americans. As an editorial in the Saginaw Journal noted, Pamosega's character weighted public opinion in favor of his guilt more than any factual evidence.

Indeed, Henry Connor complained that he could not get any Indian informants to repeat their testimony against Pamosega.[39] Either these informants were intimidated by the chief or their testimony was motivated by other factors, such as fear of American reprisals and efforts at intra-tribal political manipulation. It is unclear whether or not Pamosega himself was arrested by Henry Connor; however, he and his son were detained at Saginaw for some time and Connor may have arrested a relative of Pamosega, along with another man, on June 5, 1837. Connor took these two men to prison at Detroit to be prosecuted for the crime. He wrote to Schoolcraft saying that one was a member of Pamosega's band and the other a member of Shwawnasagut's band, which also trapped on the Maple River.[40] Connor himself did not sound convinced of their guilt. The impression is that he made the arrests under strong pressure from Schoolcraft to accuse someone of the crime. Connor noted that the two men were not known to trap or socialize with each other and that they were very submissive. He also spoke of a piece of paper taken from Pamosega that stated that the chief would be given economic support while his young men looked for the

murderer. Pamosega had acquired the pledge during his meeting with Lucious Lyons and the Grand River Indians. Henry Connor found it very strange that the Grand River Indians initially gave Pamosega their support and later retracted it.[41] In fact, led by Cobmoosa and supported by men such as Antoine Campau and Rix Robinson, the Grand River Ottawa continued to campaign for the arrest of a Saginaw Indian for the crime. In a May address to Solomon Sibley, a speaker for the Grand River Indians referred to the murderers as "stragglers" from Saginaw.[42] The language used in this address places distance between themselves and those they held responsible, who as "stragglers" were not associated with the Grand River Indians but were men who somehow made their way into Ottawa territory to commit the crime. Ottawa efforts to convince Henry Schoolcraft that no Grand River Indians were involved in the crime proved a success. Schoolcraft requested legal council for the two men held at Detroit and also wrote a letter published in the Grand Rapids Times vindicating the Grand River Indians and condemning the Saginaw Indians for their part in the crime.[43]

Lacking both informants and evidence to convict his prisoners, Henry Connor eventually released them. Schoolcraft accepted Connor's explanation for his actions and the incident began to fade with summer's end. No more Indians were charged in the Glass murder case, but the unsolved case stayed on the minds of both the Grand River

and Saginaw area Indians. In September, Cobmoosa and others wrote to Schoolcraft with news that they had received wampum from friends at Saginaw who named Shawenosdegay and Shewahtinakun[44] as the murderers. The Saginaw also charged that Ogemakeketo, Henry Connor, and one of the Trombles had accepted bribes to conceal the murderers. As a result, they called for the removal of Ogemakeketo as principal leader, claiming that the majority of the tribe desired this. Henry Conner had already written in June to Schoolcraft mentioning this accusation and denying its validity. He noted that Ogemakeketo had been very helpful in trying to uncover the identities of the murderers.[45]

Cobmoosa's letter reveals continuing Indian alarm over the negative effect of the Glass murders on both settlers and the United States Government. It also points to the dissension among the Saginaw Indians who, like the Grand River Indians, feared removal but remained divided over how to satisfy the Americans' requests and calm their fears. Some were displeased with the response of Ogemakeketo. They felt he was not representing their best interests and took the opportunity to discredit his leadership. The letter also illustrates the different approaches taken by the Saginaw and the Grand River Indians in facing the dilemma before them of producing a palatable murder suspect. As it turned out, Aensel Glass probably murdered his own family, taking provisions and his gun with him as he fled. He was later seen and questioned somewhere in Wisconsin. The

popular understanding among the settlers at Saginaw was that he was guilty, and even Schoolcraft admitted in his memoirs that Glass was likely the murderer.[46]

To place what occurred with the Glass murder investigation in perspective, both Saginaw Chippewa and Grand River Ottawa Indians feared the reprisals they would face if the murderer proved to be a member of their group. Both had recently experienced hardship in the form of epidemic disease, cultural dissolution, and starvation attributable to the ever-increasing number of settlers. Both groups had recently ceded their lands and were awaiting removal West with foreboding. Complaints from settlers that Indian crimes went unpunished had already been received by the Office of Indian Affairs[47], and the more bothersome the Indians became, the more likely they would be forced to leave their homeland. The Glass murders came at a delicate moment when Indians in Michigan were feverishly trying to hold onto their land. That the Ottawa chose to shift blame to the Saginaw Chippewa during this crisis period is significant. Hidden within their actions are clues to the priorities of the actors in reference to ethnic, tribal, and political identities. It is significant that they chose to place blame upon another Indian group. By doing this, they catered to American assumptions that the crime was an Indian one, and they successfully shifted attention from themselves to another group whose destiny was not tied directly to theirs through alliance or legal participation in treaties.

As Henry Schoolcraft himself wrote in his memoirs, the Ottawa, in choosing who to blame for the murders[48], took advantage of the Saginaw reputation for plundering American citizens after the War of 1812.

The selection of Pamosega and his band as the likely murderers sheds further light on why the Ottawa campaigned so heavily in favor of Saginaw Chippewa guilt. Pamosega was chief at Arbechtowachewan, a village located on the Tittabawasse River near present day Midland. Rather than stay amid the settlers, Pamosega favored a strategy of moving away from them. As game grew scarce, he extended his hunting territory farther and farther up the Pine River. In the 1840s, he moved his village up the Pine River, eventually settling in what would become the town of St. Louis. In doing so, he began to hunt and trap within the territorial range of the eastern Grand River Ottawa villages at Flat River and at Lyons-Muir. Thus, he competed directly with members of Makitoquet's band of mixed Ottawa and Chippewa who headquartered at the junction of the Grand and Maple rivers. Makitoquet had succeeded Cookoosh as chief after the latter's death around 1836. He is listed on the 1836 treaty as a first class chief ("Mukutay Oquot or Black Cloud") and appears as the first name on the 1838 and 1839 annuity payroll lists. Around the time of the Glass murders, this band was in a state of flux. Population figures taken from the above mentioned payrolls indicate that 71 people left the Maple River village between 1838 and

1839. Coincidentally, in January of 1837, prominent members of the band had begun to systematically purchase land near the present site of Maple Rapids, upriver from the village near Lyons-Muir on their hunting grounds and in close proximity to Pamosega. Land sale records indicate that on January 10, 1837, "Makitoquit" and "Lemorandiere" [a French merchant] from Ionia County together purchased 143 acres in Essex Township, Clinton County. On January 11, "Wintogowish," who was Makitoquet's second in command, purchased 40 acres in the same section, and on January 31, 1837, "Battice Makatoquet," and three other Indians also purchased land in Essex Township.[49] By the time Makitoquet died in 1846 or 1847, the entire band had removed to this property.

In 1837, the region around Lyons-Muir was being settled, and Makitoquet's band moved up the Maple River to seek out more isolated territory. Within the larger framework of Ottawa politics, this band was affiliated with the Catholic, fur trade oriented faction. Indeed Makitoquet made the first land purchase with the help of the Frenchman Lemorandiere. Makitoquet himself was rumored to be part French, a notion supported by the first name of Battice listed on the land sale records.[50] Congruent with their association with French fur traders, this band contained several Catholic converts.[51] They were also closely associated with the conservative chief Cobmoosa on the Flat River. In 1850, the Methodist missionary Manahassah Hickey

visited the village near Maple Rapids and spoke to Makitoquet's son Wabigake, who had become head chief. Hickey attempted to take a census count of the people there, but Wabigake would not allow him to do so, asking if Cobmoosa had allowed such a count to be taken. Wabigake's question implies deference to Cobmoosa's opinion and hints at the scope of Cobmoosa's influence.

Indeed, Cobmoosa was largely responsible for shifting the blame for the Glass murders away from the Maple River band to the Saginaw Chippewa. His actions gained prestige for him because he shifted attention away from the Grand River Ottawa at a time when they feared removal.[52] Further, it may not have been coincidental that, in shifting attention from the Ottawa, Cobmoosa insisted that members of Pamosega's band had committed the murders. Pamosega was encroaching on the hunting territory of Cobmoosa and his associates. Cobmoosa's insistence that members of Pamosega's band were guilty achieved two goals. It shifted settler focus away from the Ottawa and, had it proved effective, would have eliminated a competitor for already scarce game. But their were other potential competitors in the area. Why then did Cobmoosa focus on Pamosega's band?

Maketoquet's village, potentially hunting in the same area, consisted of mixed Chippewa and Ottawa inhabitants as did the village at Meshimnekhan. Some of the Indian communities to the south of the Grand River, near the Thornapple River, contained primarily Chippewa inhabitants

who were forced to hunt north of the Grand River in the late 1830s. These people, however, were all too closely associated with the Ottawa of Grand River. Their permanent villages were nearby compared to that of Pamosega and blaming them would not have shifted attention away from the Grand River Ottawa. Besides, Pamosega was associated with the Saginaw Chippewa, who were well known for their attacks on settlers after the War of 1812.

CHAPTER V

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

During the seventeenth century, disease, warfare, and the fur trade contributed to increased mobility and consolidation of peoples as they attempted to reform their communities to adapt to new crises and challenges presented by contact with Europeans. Economic and military needs resulted in the creation of large, multi-ethnic settlements and the loss of numerous local-level identities as people were uprooted from customary territories. Conceptual identities, such as that of Ojibwa or Ottawa, became more commonly used, but distinct political organizations paralleling these conceptual identities did not develop.

Political authority remained in the hands of local leaders who led by virtue of their persuasiveness and ability to influence others through the distribution of gifts and goods. Leadership did not indicate absolute authority but authority granted by a consensus backing of the band or village. Leadership was therefore flexible. Different circumstances might bring different leaders to the fore. For example, leaders who represented the group in warfare might be different from those who handled civil

affairs. There was no formal post held by a single individual who could make decisions for the group without its consent. Nor was it customary for one leader to lead under any and all circumstances in which leadership was necessary.

This caused problems for the Europeans who wanted to identify a single person through whom they could deal with a particular group. Consequently, the Europeans looked for and urged the creation of political structures similar to their own. Thus, the Ojibwa and Ottawa were referred to as nations in European records because these were the familiar terms in which the Europeans perceived groups sharing a language and cultural tradition. The Indians themselves used these terms when dealing with the Europeans, probably recognizing that band or village association meant little to the Europeans while one's nationality bore more clout. Thus, the conceptual identity of Ojibwa or Ottawa began to develop new meanings in the context of European interaction. The problem was that, for the Europeans, nationhood carried a political message. Neither the Ojibwa nor the Ottawa, however, developed formal political structures congruent with their expanded conceptual identities. The political reality of the Ojibwa and Ottawa lay with the village and band and not with the tribe or "nation." Even so, leadership roles within these smaller units did change as leaders were increasingly required to perform according to both European and Indian standards. Leaders became

middlemen between the two systems, managing a balancing act where the danger lay in assuming too much of the authority Europeans urged on them, and thus risking the rejection of those in the band or village who supported them.

The European pressures to consolidate politically, were one force that helped to shape the conceptual dimension of Ottawa and Ojibwa identity. Another was warfare, the Iroquois wars in the seventeenth century and the Fox wars in the eighteenth century. These conflicts created the need for peoples to band together in opposition to an enemy force, reinforcing their mutual identity as victims of the Iroquois or allies of the French. Some alliances made under these conditions were more lasting than others, yet it must be emphasized, that in general, they were forged between individual bands and not between Ojibwa or Ottawa peoples as a whole, even though at times they were expressed in these terms. There were instances, such as concerted military actions, that united many members of the tribes; however, these were most often led by charismatic individuals rather than tribal governments.[1]

During the eighteenth century, the people moving into the Saginaw River valley came from various, closely allied groups, including Saulteur and Mississauga Ojibwa and Kiskakon and Sinago Ottawa with the Ojibwa outnumbering the Ottawa by the end of the century. Because of their geographic location, the residents of the Saginaw River Valley found themselves in the middle of French and British

contests for control of the Great Lakes. They used their position to acquire desired benefits from the Europeans. It is, however, possible that pro-French and pro-British factions emerged, resulting in the division of peoples and their relocation to other areas. The attempt of one group of Chippewa and Ottawa to move to the Miami River area in the 1750s and the abandonment of the Saginaw River Valley by the Sinago Ottawa for the Straits of Mackinac indicate that there were factions that led people to ally themselves with other pro-British or pro-French groups.

Despite the movement of peoples in and out of the Saginaw River valley during the eighteenth century, an oral tradition developed identifying a common origin and, thus justifying a common identity for those who inhabited the region. The story of the Sauk massacre indicates that the Chippewa and their allies who settled the Saginaw valley did so by force. The oral tradition served to demarcate those whose ancestors participated in the massacre from others' who did not.

With the passing of European control of the Great Lakes from the French to the British and from the British to the Americans, the Saginaw Chippewa played an important role as military allies of first the French and then the British. Throughout these conflicts, leaders who were capable of balancing Indian and European interests rose to power. Such leaders gained status among their own people through the distribution of gifts given to them by Europeans seeking

their alliance and through their ability to negotiate desired concessions such as blacksmith services. The pro-British Saginaw Chippewa leader Manitogeezhik acquired status during the conflicts between Britain and America through the economic rewards he received from the British for his support and by opposing the sale of lands. His son Kishkako also achieved a position of leadership through his exploits in the War of 1812. He unwisely chose, however, to continue to support the British after the war's conclusion, placing all Saginaw Chippewa in danger of military reprisal from the Americans. Consequently, he lost his middleman status when the new American administration took control of Indian relations. Governor Cass did not view Kishkako as trustworthy and Ogemakeketo, a popular leader from the Tittabawassee River, became the Indian liaison to the American government. Even so, Kishkako, because he was considered a military threat, was able to negotiate favorable terms for himself at the 1819 Treaty.

The imposition of Euro-American group categories and political organizations on the Saginaw Chippewa became formalized during the treaty process. To acquire Indian lands, the Americans needed to identify the appropriate owners. Additionally, the U.S. government required some sort of organization to take responsibility for ceding these lands, so it targeted a block of people to do so, often regardless of indigenous political and conceptual realities.

In the case of the Saginaw Chippewa, the borders of the

1819 Treaty cessions reflect a government definition of what peoples made up the Saginaw Chippewa and what lands they used. The root of a tribal identity may have existed among the Saginaw Chippewa, but it did not have geographical boundaries comparable to those the U.S. government imposed. In the political realm, only individual bands and villages had boundaries, and these were more or less territorial resource use areas, loosely defined. On a more conceptual level, the Saginaw Chippewa consisted of those people who possessed a common history embodied in the Sauk massacre oral tradition.

Because the real power among the Saginaw Chippewa rested with band and village leaders, the 1819 Treaty negotiations included a great deal of dissension as leaders competed for influence. The 1819 Treaty illustrates the fragmentation that could occur over the issue of land cessions. The Saginaw Chippewa had no institutional means for dealing with this situation. Aside from the 1807 Treaty, in which they claimed they did not cede their lands, they had never had to deal with the crisis presented by the prospect of land sales. Traditional means of dealing with disagreement over land sales were inadequate and intense conflicts resulted. To gain consensus among so many interest groups concerning such a vital topic was a formidable task. Nevertheless, treaty negotiations proceeded regardless of Indian dissent. In the case of the 1819 Treaty, the U.S. government could not force a tribal

decision on the Saginaw Chippewa, so it settled with individual leaders instead, creating numerous, small reserves instead of one large reserve for the entire tribe. Each reserve thus represents a portion of the territory used by individual leaders and those bands or villages under their influence.

The Saginaw Chippewa were thus divided into numerous small reserves, which served to funnel economic benefits only to those on the reserves (with the exception of annuities). For example, the government-paid farmers would only plow Indian lands located on reserves. Those inhabiting the reserves became formal members of the tribe in the eyes of the government. Living on the reserves did not necessarily meet group subsistence and social needs. Choices became limited as surrounding American settlers began to limit Indian subsistence activities to the reserves. The U.S. government supplied insufficient services to the Indians and did not provide the necessary support to compensate for the Indians' loss of land. Additionally, these services were focused on the tribe, as defined by the government, rather than on the people.

In the face of such pressures to converge on local reservations, local political blocs persisted into the 1830s and 1840s that stunted the development of a true tribal organization. The Shiawassee River Indians, for example refused to participate in the government farming program and also expressed their unwillingness to mingle with other

Saginaw Indians. They represented a healthy autonomous group of allied village leaders who strove to maintain local decision-making and resisted incorporation into a Saginaw Chippewa tribe. The responses of numerous other leaders such as Pamosega, to the pressures of American settlement indicate that local level decision-making continued.

Finally, the Glass murders illustrate the political nature of developing tribal identity as it was shaped by interaction with the U.S. government. The threat of removal added a new dimension to inter-group interaction and tribal identity gained new importance in the eyes of the Indians as a means of determining who would be removed to Western lands. Conceptual identities such as that of Chippewa and Ottawa played little, if any, role here since removal was directed at those "tribes" who had already ceded lands in earlier treaties.

To conclude, the development of tribal identity as a political form of organization began first as an Indian response to contact with the Europeans who expected to deal with nations rather than bands. Secondly, the tribe became a means for the U.S. government to treat officially with the Indians. With the cession of their lands and the creation of reserves, the tribe became even more of an administrative category used to funnel goods and services to the correct people who had ceded their lands. As Stephen Cornell notes, it is at this point that the indigenous political organization of Indians came under direct attack.

Membership in the tribe became a legal matter no longer tied to indigenous conceptual notions of identity.[2] Although still active in the 1840s, the multiple autonomous units making up the Saginaw Chippewa or its indigenous political organization were being subsumed under the political unit of the Saginaw Chippewa tribe. Although still in use, Ottawa and Ojibwa conceptual identities represented remnants of the old concept of tribe, yet they were cross-cut by the new, political tribe which took over its function as a mediator between Indian and Euro-American.

LIST OF REFERENCES

LIST OF REFERENCES

CHAPTER I

1. Robert A. Levine and Donald T. Campbell trace the history of anthropological assumptions concerning ethnic boundaries in their book, Ethnocentrism: Theories of Conflict, Ethnic Attitudes, and Group Behavior (New York: Wiley, 1972), 81-113. Particular attention has been paid to Africa, where it has been pointed out that present day tribes may reflect colonial constructs rather than pre-contact reality. See also Jay O'Brien's "Toward a Reconstitution of Ethnicity: Capitalist Expansion and Cultural Dynamics in Sudan," in American Anthropologist 88:898-907.

2. William N. Fenton discusses the methods of ethnohistory in his review article, "Huronia: An Essay in Proper Ethnohistory," in American Anthropologist, (Washington D.C., 1978), 80:923-935. In particular see pp. 927-928 concerning the importance of studying the actions of individuals. James Clifton also emphasizes this point in his review article, "The Tribal History- An Obsolete Paradigm," in American Indian Culture and Research Journal, (1979), 3(4):81-100.

3. Frederik Barth, ed., Ethnic Groups and Boundaries: The Social Organization of Culture Difference. (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1969), 10-15.

4. John W. Bennett, "A Guide to the Collection," in The New Ethnicity: Perspectives from Ethnology (St. Paul: West Publishing Co., 1975), 3-4.

5. Leo A. Despres, "Toward a Theory of Ethnic Phenomena," in Ethnicity and Resource Competition in Plural Societies, (The Hague: Mouton Publishers, 1975), 191-193.

6. Despres, "Toward a Theory of Ethnic Phenomena," 196.

7. Charles F. Keyes, Ethnic Change (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1981), 27.

8. Ernest S. Burch, Jr., "Indians and Eskimos in North Alaska, 1816-1977: A Study in Changing Ethnic Relations," in Arctic Anthropology, 16(2): 123-151.

9. Levine and Campbell, Ethnocentrism: Theories of Conflict, Ethnic Attitudes and Group Behavior, (New York: Wiley Press, 1972), 99.

10. Despres, "Toward a Theory of Ethnic Phenomena."

11. Jay O'Brien, "Toward a Reconstitution of Ethnicity: Capitalist Expansion and Cultural Dynamics in Sudan," in American Anthropologist, 1986, 88:898-907.

12. Burch, "Indians and Eskimos in North Alaska, 1816-1977."

13. Stephen Cornell, "The Transformation of tribe: organization and self-concept in Native American ethnicities," in Ethnic and Racial Studies, 1988, 11(1):27-47.

14. O'Brien, "Toward a Reconstitution of Ethnicity: Capitalist Expansion and Cultural Dynamics in Sudan;" Levine and Campbell, Ethnocentrism: Theories of Conflict, Ethnic Attitudes and Group Behavior.

CHAPTER II

1. Emma Blair, The Indian Tribes of the Upper Mississippi Valley and the Region of the Great Lakes, 2 vols. (Cleveland: A.H. Clark, Co.,) 1911, 1:282, W. Vernon Kinietz, Indians of the Western Great Lakes, 1615-1760 (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1940, 246-247.

2. Blair, Indian Tribes, 1: 148, Kinietz, Indians of the Western Great Lakes, 227.

3. Reuben G. Thwaites, ed., The Jesuit Relations and Allied Documents, 73 vols. (Cleveland: The Burrows Brothers Company, 1896-1901) [Hereafter JR], 18:231; 10:322; 54:133.

4. Blair, Indian Tribes, 1: 179.

5. Harold Hickerson, The Chippewa and Their Neighbors: A Study in Ethnohistory, (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston) 1970, 44-50.

6. Edward S. Rogers, "Southeastern Ojibwa," in Handbook of North American Indians, Northeast, (Washington: Smithsonian Institution) [Hereafter Handbook], 1978, 15: 763.

7. Gary A. Wright, "Some Aspects of Early and Mid-Seventeenth Century Exchange Networks in the Western Great Lakes," in Michigan Archaeologist, 1967, 13 (4): 181-197.

8. James M. McClurken, We Wish to Be Civilized: Ottawa-American Political Contests on the Michigan Frontier, PhD Dissertation, Michigan State University, 1988, 22.

9. Bruce Trigger, Children of Aataentsic, 2 vols.(Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1976); Blair, Indian Tribes, 148.

10. Kinietz, Indians of the Western Great Lakes, 227-229; Feest and Feest, "Ottawa," in Handbook, 772-786.

11. Blair, Indian Tribes, 85, 153, 173, 181.

12. Elizabeth Tooker, "Wyandot," in Handbook, 399.

13. Blair, Indian Tribes, 253.

14. Ibid, I: 307-308.

15. Ibid, I: 210.

16. Ibid, I: 357.

17. Ibid, I: 254.

18. Kinietz, Indians of the Western Great Lakes, 262.

19. JR 55:137.

20. References to the Nassauaketon are rare. Little is known about the territory they inhabited and they seem to disappear early in the 18th century as a distinct group. They appear to be the most detached of the four Ottawa groups. Kinietz, Indians of the Western Great Lakes, 246.

21. JR 60:215, E.F. Greenman, "Wintering in the Lower Peninsula, 1675-1676," in The Michigan Archaeologist, (1957), 3(3):5-12.

22. Baron de Lahontan, New Voyages to North America, 2 vols., R.G. Thwaites, ed., (Chicago: A.C. McClurg & Co., 1905), 210, 319.

23. Blair, Indian Tribes, I:254.

24. "Memoir on the Indians between Lake Erie and the River Mississippi with remarks on their manners and trade," in Documents Relative to the Colonial History of the State of New York, E.B. O'Callaghan, ed., (Albany: Weed, Parsons and Co., 1855), 9:888-889, [hereafter referred to as NYCD].

25. Michigan Pioneer and Historic Collections, 40 vols. (Lansing, 1877-1929) [hereafter MPHC], 33:162 on Saulteurs and Mississauga and MPHC 33:552-3, "List of Indian Tribes in the West."

26. Father Marest to Marquis de Vaudreuil, June 4, 1708, MPHC 33: 384 and Sr. D'Aigremeont to de Vaudreuil, November 14, 1708, MPHC 33: 424, 436.

27. Charles Callender, "Fox," in Handbook, 643-644; Ives Goddard, "Mascouten," in Handbook, 669-670.

28. MPHC 33:556.

29. MPHC 33:552-553; See R. G. Thwaites, ed., Collections of the State Historical Society of Wisconsin, (Madison, 1855-1931) [hereafter WHC] 17:251 for 1736 Pierre Celeron census.

30. "Memoir on the Indians between Lake Erie and the River Mississippi with remarks on their manners and trade," in NYCD, 9:888.

31. Ibid.

32. Ives Goddard, "Central Algonquian Languages," in Handbook, 583.

33. MPHC 33:431.

34. WHC 17:373.

35. NYCD 10: 119, 128.

36. This was the beginning of the end for French control of the Great Lakes, largely because of the Seven Years Wars at home from which the British would emerge victorious. The Indians would support the French cause in the Great Lakes for the most part, however, the British were successful in creating discontent and divisiveness over which group should be backed. Archaeological evidence from the excavation of the Fletcher site, a burial ground located near the mouth of the Saginaw River, indicates that between 1750 and 1765, when the cemetery was being utilized, very few British trade goods were available at Saginaw. See Robert C. Mainfort, Indian Social Dynamics in the Period of European Contact, (E. Lansing, Mich.: Michigan State University, 1979), 557-558. The British probably influenced the Saginaw Indians more indirectly through contacts among pro-British relatives and allies to the south than directly through trade incursions into French territory.

37. NYCD, 10: 162.

38. NYCD 10: 141.

39. Le Pian to Raymond, May 1750, in Illinois on the Eve of the Seven Years' War 1747-1755, T.C. Pease, ed. (Springfield: Illinois State Historical Library, 1940), 29:199.

40. WHC 18:101.

41. La Jonquiere to Rouille, Sept. 17, 1751, in Illinois on the Eve of the Seven Years' War, 1747-1755, 352.

42. Kinietz, Indians of the Western Great Lakes, 231, claims the Ottawa began leaving Saginaw for L'Arbre Croche during the 1750s. Indeed, the Sinago Ottawa and others did leave Saginaw, however not all Ottawa left the area. Feest and Feest, "Ottawa," in Handbook, claim they left during the 1780s due to resource competition with the Chippewa, yet the references they provide do not concern people originating from Saginaw. Instead they refer to those Ottawa from L'Arbre Croche and the Straits of Mackinac who visited more abundant hunting grounds in Minnesota and the Red River country, sometimes staying there for a number of years before returning. See MPHC 11:544, 553; MPHC 12, 262; Andrew J. Blackbird, History of the Ottawa and Chippewa Indians of Michigan (Ypsilanti: The Ypsilantian Job Printing House, 1887); James Edwin, ed. A Narrative of the Captivity and Adventures of John Tanner during Thirty Years Residence Among the Indians in the Interior of North America (Minneapolis: Ross and Haines, Inc., 1956). This may also be a case where migrating Chippewa eventually outnumbered resident Ottawa. The presence of the Ottawa in Saginaw during the 19th century should not be underestimated. Despite intermarriage 19th century Saginaw residents still identified themselves as Ottawa or Chippewa or both.

43. Detroit Public Library, Maps of Michigan and the Great Lakes 1545-1845, Catalogue of an Exhibition, (Detroit: Burton Historical Collection and Detroit Public Library, 1967), 21-22.

44. Mainfort, Indian Social Dynamics in the Period of European Contact, 287.

45. David B. Stout, "Ethnohistorical Report on Royce Area 111 (Michigan)," in Chippewa Indians V (New York: Garland Publishing Co., 1974), 12. The continual presence of an Ottawa village in approximately the same location from the 1740s to the 1800s does not necessarily reflect reality. Map-makers of the time were known to utilize prior maps for their information, even though they may have been out-dated and often incorrect. Thus, maps cannot be relied upon alone to determine the location of settlements in the case of the Saginaw Indians.

46. Ibid.

47. MPHC 9:442-3.

48. George Croghan's Journal of his Trip to Detroit in 1767 with his Correspondence Relating Thereto (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1939), 40.

49. Howard H. Peckham, Pontiac and the Indian Uprising, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1947), 182.

50. WHC 11: 129,162.

51. Edwin James, ed. A Narrative. Being a white captive, Tanner could have been hidden from Euro-American visitors frequenting the area. However, there are no other indications that visiting traders established themselves on anything more than a seasonal basis.

52. Milo M. Quaife, ed., The John Askin Papers (Detroit: The Detroit Library Commission, 1928), 339-352.

53. The two most comprehensive sources referring to this tradition are: Ephraim Williams, "Personal Reminiscences," in MPHC, 8:248 and William R. McCormick, in History of Kent County (Chicago: Charles C. Chapman & Co., 1881), 139-141. As one of the first settlers of Saginaw and a trader for the American Fur Co., Williams had much contact with the Saginaw. McCormick grew up on the Flint River in the 1830s and resided near and in Bay City in his later years. His interest in the Saginaw lead him to question them about their history. He was also an avid archaeologist, exploring prehistoric mounds and seeking to explain the skeletons found in them as a consequence of the Sauk massacre. See James Cooke Mills, History of Saginaw County (Saginaw: Seeman & Peters), 180-192; W. R. McCormick, "Mounds and Mound-Builders of the Saginaw Valley," MPHC 4: 379-383.

54. For a discussion of the historical realities of the Sauk massacre tradition, see James E. Fitting, "Scheduling in a Shared Environment: Late Period Land Use Patterns in the Saginaw Valley of Michigan," in Ontario Archaeology, 1970, 16: 36-41.

CHAPTER III

1. William A. Hunter, "History of the Ohio Valley," in Handbook of North American Indians, Bruce G. Trigger, ed. (Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian, 1978), 593.

2. James A. Clifton, The Prairie People: Continuity and Change in Potawatomi Indian Culture, 1665-1965 (Lawrence: The Regents Press of Kansas, 1977), 147-149.

3. Six Potawatomi signed for themselves and for a brother, Clifton, Prairie People, 153. See Charles J. Kappler, comp., Indian Affairs: Laws and Treaties, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1904), 2:44, for a list of Indian participants in the Treaty of Greenville.

4. Clifton, Prairie People, 151-152.

5. Kappler, Laws and Treaties, 2:44.

6. Ibid.

7. Erminie Wheeler-Voeglin, Anthropological Report on the Indian Occupancy of Royce Area 117 in Michigan and Indiana ceded by the "Ottawa, Chippewa, and Pottawatomie Nations" under the Treaty held at Chicago on August 29, 1821 (New York: Clearwater Publishing Co., 1973), 171.

8. Willis F. Dunbar, Michigan: A History of the Wolverine State (Grand Rapids: William B. Erdmans Publishing Company, 1965), 122.

9. Robert S. Allen, "His Majesty's Indian Allies: Native Peoples, the British Crown and the War of 1812," in The Michigan Historical Review, 14 (2):9; Helen Hornbeck Tanner, "The Location of Indian Tribes in Southeastern Michigan and Northern Ohio," in Indians of Northern Ohio and Southeastern Michigan (New York: Garland Publishing Co., 1974), 357.

10. Dunbar, Michigan, 122.

11. Ibid, 141-142.

12. Allen, "His Majesty's Indian Allies," 4-10; Tanner, "The Location of Indian Tribes in Southeastern Michigan and Northern Ohio," 354.

13. Edwin James, A Narrative of the Captivity and Adventures of John Tanner During Thirty Year Residence Among the Indians of the Interior of North America (Minneapolis: Ross & Haines, Inc., 1956), 4, 9.

14. Kappler, Laws and Treaties, 44, 186. Territorial Governor Hull referred to Kishkako as a Chippewa, Hull to Dearborn, December 28, 1807, "Documents Relating to Detroit and Vicinity, 1805-1813," MPHC 40: 240. Henry Whiting, the physician at Fort Saginaw in the 1820s claimed Kishkako's parents were Sacs. He is alone in this assertion. See "Saginaw County Pioneer Sketch Relative to the Military

Occupation of the Saginaw Valley, and other Reminiscences," in MPHC 2:460.

15. James, Narrative, 4-5.

16. Hull to Dearborn, Feb. 20, 1807, MPHC 40:100.

17. Alec R. Gilpin, The Territory of Michigan, 1805-1807 (East Lansing, Michigan State University Press, 1970), 40.

18. Hull to Dearborn, December 28, 1807, MPHC 40:100.

19. Indians at Saginaw to William Hull, June 5, 1807, MPHC 40:145.

20. Ibid.

21. Dunbar, Michigan, 144.

22. Indians at Saginaw to W. Hull, 5 June 1807, MPHC 40: 145.

23. W. Hull to H. Dearborn, 4 July 1807, MPHC 40:152.

24. Ibid.

25. Hull mentioned that the influence of the Prophet and the meddling of British agents and French residents made negotiations difficult. W. Hull to H. Dearborn, Nov. 8, 1807, MPHC 40:212-14.

26. W. Hull to H. Dearborn, December 28, 1807, MPHC 40:240. Whether or not a blacksmith was sent is unclear. The agent and interpreter, Jacob Visgar selected David Henderson for the job and budgeted his expenses in the Treaty budget. W. Hull to H. Dearborn, 26 November 1807, An Estimate of the Expenses Incurred by the Treaty of Detroit, MPHC 40:232.

27. Hull to Dearborn 20th Feb. 1807, MPHC 40:96.

28. Kappler, Laws and Treaties, 2: 94.

29. W. Hull to H. Dearborn, 20 February 1807, MPHC 40: 96.

30. Kappler, Laws and Treaties, 2:94.

31. Benjamin Hough to E. Tiffin, 20 May 1815, Territorial Papers of the United States, Clarence Carter, ed. (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1942) 10:540-541.

32. Tanner, "The Chippewa of Eastern Lower Michigan," 358.

33. Allen, "His Majesty's Indian Allies," 13-14.

34. Kappler, Laws and Treaties, 2:118-119.

35. William L. Webber, "Indian Cession of 1819 Made by the Treaty of Saginaw," in MPHC, 26:523.

36. History of Kent County, Michigan (Chicago: Charles C. Chapman and Co., 1881), 148.

37. B.O. Williams traded on the Shiawassee River and was familiar with the area's inhabitants, including Okemos. He noted that the Red cedar Indians came from the Shiawassee River. See Franklin Ellis, History of Shiawassee and Clinton Counties (Philadelphia: D.W. Ensign & Co., 1880), 13.

38. Okemos claimed he lead the Chippewa contingent of an Ottawa band indicating that the Red Cedar Indians were of both Ottawa and Ojibwa descent. He also noted that the band he came from on the Shiawassee River consisted for mixed Ojibwa and Ottawa. See Webber, "Indian Cession of 1819," 523. A pioneer observer noted that the residents of Meshimnekhan (Apple Place) on the Grand River near present day Portland consisted of Ojibwa and Potawatomi peoples. Residents of this village traveled to Grand Rapids in 1839 and 1841 for the annuity payments due the Grand River Ottawa after the 1836 Treaty cessions, indicating that they had ties to the Grand River Ottawa. Sebewa Recollector, March 1966, 1(4). Other Potawatomi bands lived in Eaton and Barry Counties, probably mingling with the people of Meshimnekhan. See The Past and Present of Eaton County (Lansing: Michigan Historical Publishing Association, N.D.), 13-19. B.O. Williams stated that Coocoosh's village at the forks of the Grand and Maple Rivers near present day Lyons-Muir also consisted of mixed Ottawa and Chippewa. See Ellis, History of Shiawassee and Clinton Counties, 13. Later references to Pewamo as the son of a Chippewa leader strengthen this observation. Pewamo was associated with Makitoquet, Coocoosh's successor. See Henry Gannett, American Names (Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1947), 244. Another group of mixed Chippewa and Ottawa lived on the Thornapple River near Cascade and Caledonia in Kent County. See Franklin Everett, Memorials of the Grand River Valley, (Chicago: The Chicago Legal New Company, 1878). Chief Chippewa who resided in the vicinity of Middle Village and later purchased land there, also lead a band of Ojibwas. See Charles A. Weissert, "The Indians of Barry County and the Work of Leonard Slater, the Missionary," in Michigan History Magazine, 16: 326.

39. L. Cass to J. Calhoun, May 27, 1819, NAM M1 4:78-84.

40. L. Cass to J. C. Calhoun, 6 January 1819, NAM M1 4:60.

41. L. Cass to J. Calhoun, May 27, 1819, NAM M1 4:78-84; Francis Paul Prucha, Lewis Cass and American Indian Policy (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1967), 2-4.

42. L. Cass to J. Calhoun, November 22, 1819, NAM M1 4:161.

43. J. Ryley to L. Cass, May 1, 1820, NAM M1 7:164.

44. Webber, "Indian Cessions of 1819," 522.

45. Kishkako received a 640 acre tract at a place called Menitegow, on the east side of the Saginaw River between present-day Bay and Saginaw cities that included Crow Island. See Kappler, Indian Laws and Treaties, 2:186. It is unclear what role this area played in his seasonal round. He also maintained a settlement at the mouth of the Saginaw River, both sides of which had reserves set aside, one of which was the largest of all, being 40,000 acres. See Whiting, "Saginaw County Pioneer Sketch," 462. It is not known where his hunting territory lay. John Tanner noted that during his stay with Kishkako's family in the 1790s they hunted along the Saginaw River. See James, A Narrative, 11.

46. Jedidiah Morse, A Report to the Secretary of War of the United States on Indian Affairs (New York: Augustus M. Kelley Publishers, 1970), 21.

47. Webber, "Indian Cessions of 1819," 526.

48. Williams, "The Treaty of Saginaw," 266.

49. L. Cass to A. E. Sacock, Aug. 31, 1819, NAM M1 4:110.

50. Judge S.B. Daboll, Past and Present of Clinton County Michigan (Chicago: The S.J. Clarke Publishing Co., 1906), 451.

51. Dunbar, Michigan, 172.

52. Kappler, Laws and Treaties, 2:186-187.

53. Webber, MPHC

54. Kappler, Laws and Treaties, 2:185-186.

55. NAM M1 4:114.

56. Kappler, Laws and Treaties, 186-187; McClurken, We Wish to be Civilized, 83, 369 (endnote #36.).

57. No 1819 Treaty signers from this village could be positively identified. McClurken, We Wish to Be Civilized, 369, identifies Moksauba (Submerged Beaver) as a Meshimnekhan chief, however this was also the name of a Cass River chief.

There was a Moksauba associated with the Grand River Ottawa, however no later references to Meshimnekhan mention him. It is most likely that the Moksauba signing the 1819 treaty was the one from Cass River. For references to the Cass River leader see, Benjamin Cushway's blacksmith records for 1837, NAM M1 43:47, J. Riggs to H. Schoolcraft, 25 August 1838, NAM M1 45:147.

58. McClurken, identifies Wawubegequak on the 1819 Treaty as a resident of the Maple River village in We Wish to Be Civilized, 369. It is doubtful that the Wabigake who lived on the Maple River would have signed the 1819 Treaty. In 1838 and 1839 Wabigake is listed on annuity payroll records as a resident of the Maple River village under the leadership of Makitoquet, HRSP 66: 41878 and 8:2853. By 1847 he is the band's leader according to Reverend M. Hickey, "A Missionary Among the Indians: Reminiscences of Reverend M. Hickey as a Minister and Missionary of the Michigan Annual Conference of the Methodist Episcopal Church," in MPHC, 4:544-566 and "Reminisces of Reverend M. Hickey, Clergyman of the Methodist Episcopal Church, Residing at Detroit, Michigan," in MPHC, 4:23-33. He is also a signatory of the 1855 Treaty with the Ottawa and Chippewa, Kappler, Laws and Treaties, 2:730. It seems likely that Wabigake assumed the leadership of the Maple River band after the death of Makitoquet around 1847. At this time Wabigake's name begins to appear on petitions to the Americans, NAM M1, 61: 337. Makitoquet was reported to be a feeble old man in 1846, History of Kent County, 158 and his name does not appear on any documents after 1847. Wabigake was probably too young to have signed the 1819 Treaty. Neither Wabigake's or Makitoquet's names appear on the 1836 Treaty as signatories, however, Makitoquet is provided for in the treaty as a chief of the first class, Kappler, Indian Laws and Treaties, 455.

59. Erminie Wheeler-Voeglin, "An Anthropological Report on Indian Use and Occupancy of the Area of Overlap of Royce Area 205 and Royce Area 111," in Chippewa Indians V (New York: Garland Publishing Co., 1974), 44-48.

60. L. Cass to J. Calhoun, Feb. 1, 1822, NAM M1 4:378.

61. McClurken, We Wish to Be Civilized, 104-109.

62. Kappler, Laws and Treaties, 2: 198-201.

63. L. Cass to J. Calhoun, Sept. 31, 1819, NAM M1 4:115.

64. L. Cass to J. Wampler, Feb. 24, 1821, NAM M1 10:223.

65. L. Cass to Reverend Yates, May 31, 1822, NAM M1 5:6.

66. W. Knaggs to L. Cass, July 1 1822, NAM M1 10:368.

67. Lucious E. Gould, "The Early History of Shiawassee County, in MPHC, 32: 275, 282.

68. Williams, "The Treaty of Saginaw in the Year 1819," 269.

69. Ibid; Ephraim Williams, "Personal Reminiscences," in MPHC 8: 244.

70. Ida Amanda Johnson, The Michigan Fur Trade (Grand Rapids: The Black Letter Press, 1971), 129; See John S. Schenck, History of Ionia and Montcalm Counties Michigan (Philadelphia: D.W. Ensign & Co., 1881), 28, for information on Genereau's post.

71. For references to Okemos trading at Jackson and with the Williams' brothers see Ellis, History of Shiawassee and Clinton Counties, 16.

72. The trade shifted westward to St. Louis in the 1830s in addition to the decline in the market due to changing fashions. Dunbar, Michigan, 172.

73. Williams, "Personal Reminiscences."

74. E. Meissler worked as a Lutheran missionary at the Bethany Mission near present day St. Louis in Gratiot County between 1851 and 1859. He remarked that the Indians at Sebewaing on Saginaw Bay depended much more on fish than the inland Indians did. See H.C. Miessler, ed., "Pioneer Lutheran Missionary to the Chippewas: Autobiography of E.G.H. Miessler 1826-1916 in Concordia Historical Institute Quarterly 52 (4):161. See Williams, "Personal Reminiscences" concerning the shipment of fish to Detroit.

75. Oct. 7, 1833, NAM M1 33:409-417.

76. W. Knaggs to L. Cass, 18 June 1822, NAM M1 10:368.

77. Saginaw Indians to Governor Mason, Dec. 23, 1834, NAM M1 35:519; G.B. Porter to Benedict Tremble, Jan 25, 1834, MPHC 37: 288.

78. B. Tremble to Governor Porter, May 21, 1833, MPHC, 37: 262.

79. L. Hudson to L. Cass, Sept. 11, 1821, NAM M1 19:147.

80. This is an instance where autonomous band territories were used to define rights to land, indicating that the Saginaw Chippewa did not possess a unified political body laying claim to all those lands ceded in the 1819 Treaty.

81. L. Cass to J. Calhoun, Sept. 31, 1819, NAM M1 4:115.

82. W. Yates to L. Cass, Aug 13, 1822, NAM M1 11:269.

83. McClurken, We Wish to Be Civilized, 104-127.

84. Ibid.

CHAPTER IV

1. Jedidiah Morse, A Report to the Segcretary of War of the United States on Indian Affairs.

2. H. Schoolcraft to W. Harris, Sept. 13, 1836, NAM M1 37:29.

3. There are no records indicating that any major epidemics occurred in the Saginaw River valley during the first three decades of the 19th century. Indian participation in the War of 1812 probably exposed them to European disease. In the fall and winter of 1813, hundreds of soldiers died of infectious disease at Detroit. The arrival of settlers during the 1830s exposed the Indians to those diseases common on the frontier such as scarlet fever, diphtheria, measles, and mumps Dunbar, Michigan, 205.

4. B.O. Williams, "Shiawassee County," in MPHC 2:488.

5. Ibid.

6. H. Schoolcraft to W. Harris, Sept. 13, 1836, NAM M1 37:29.

7. Williams, "Shiawassee County," 2:488.

8. NAM M1 45:127, Report of Indians Died within my Sub-Agency in 1837 by the Smallpox, by Henry Connor.

9. Ellis, History of Clinton and Shiawassee Counties, 1880, 17; B.O. Williams stated that the Maple River people were unaffected by the epidemic. The people of Meshimnekhan also seem to have escaped infection. They experienced an outbreak of smallpox in 1841. See Hall J. Ingalls' pioneer recollections in the Sebewa Recollector, Vol. 1, No.4, March 1966. "History of Old Indian Settlement in Danby." The Grand River people were not strangers to smallpox. Charles Trowbridge noted to his travel companion, John Gordon, that the empty wigwams they passed between the present towns of Ada and Lowell were probably abandoned due to a smallpox epidemic in 1835. Gordon Douglas and George May, eds., 1959, "Michigan Journal" in Michigan History, 43: 474. Smallpox was feared by the Grand River Ottawa. They experienced localized outbreaks, yet they did not have an epidemic comparable to that at Saginaw in 1837.

10. J. Riggs to H. Schoolcraft, Aug 17, 1837, NAM M1 43:45.

11. NAM M1 45:127, Report of Indians Died within my Sub-Agency in 1837 by the Smallpox, by Henry Connor.

12. H. Conner to H. Schoolcraft, August 16, 1837, NAM M1 43:37.

13. J. Riggs to H. Schoolcraft, August 17, 1837, NAM M1 43:45.

14. Bela Hubbard, Memorials of a Half Century in Michigan and the Lake Region (New York: Clearwater Publishing Co., 1888), 70, 80.

15. P. Morgan to H. Schoolcraft, August 12, 1837, NAM M1 43:29.

16. W. Lee to H. Schoolcraft, Oct. 26, 1837, NAM M1 43:399.

17. Henry F. Dobyns, Their Numbers Become Thinned: Native American Population Dynamics in Eastern North America (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1983).

18. W. Lee to H. Schoolcraft, Oct. 26, 1837, NAM M1 43:399.

19. Ibid.

20. NAM M1 45:127, Henry Connor's "Report of Indians Died within my Sub-Agency in 1837 by the Smallpox."

21. Moksauba, the Cass River chief died after returning from his trip West to view lands for removal, J. Riggs to H. Schoolcraft, 25 August 1838, NAM M1 45: 147.

22. J. Riggs to H. Schoolcraft, May 18, 1837, NAM M1 41:409.

23. Isaac McCoy to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, September 6, 1837, NAM M1 43:249.

24. A. Campeau to H. Schoolcraft, April 9, 1838, NAM M1 44:217.

25. In 1833, Cobmoosa had a spring occupation near Ionia City, less than ten miles from the Maple River where the Indians hunted, fished and sugared, see Schenck, History of Ionia and Montcalm Counties, 29. Since it is known that Cobmoosa later took an authoritative role in the investigations, he probably participated from the start. Makitoquet succeeded Kookoosh, who died around 1835, as the leader of the Maple River band. In the late 1830s the band was in the process of moving its summer residence up the Maple River to the Maple Rapids area (more on this later in text).

George Campeau established a trade post here in 1826, so there must have been activity in the area, see Daboll's Clinton County History. The village of Meshimnekhan was also fairly close to the Maple River, however, its inhabitants seem to have no involvement in the Glass murder investigations whatsoever. They probably did not winter on the Maple River. Early pioneer accounts report that one Meshimnekhan resident, Squagon, maintained a spring encampment at the mouth of the Lookinglass River. See Rice, Early History of Portland (Portland Review Print, 1908). Since this village contained a Pottawatomi contingent, many of its members probably wintered to the south of the Grand River.

26. A. Campeau to H. Schoolcraft, April 9, 1838, NAM M1 44:217.

27. HRSP 8:2849.

28. H. Schoolcraft to General Hugh Brady, April 6, 1838, NAM M1 7:43.

29. H. Schoolcraft to L. Lyons, April 6, 1838, NAM M1 37:452.

30. A. Campeau to H. Schoolcraft, April 9, 1838, NAM M1 44:217.

31. H. Conner to H. Schoolcraft, May 5, 1838, NAM M1 44:287.

32. John D. Haeger, The Investment Frontier: New York Businessmen and the Economic Development of the Old Northwest (Albany: State University of New York Press).

33. H. Conner to H. Schoolcraft, May 15, 1838, NAM M1 44:401.

34. Judge Alber Miller, MPHC 7:244.

35. See W. Lee to H. Schoolcraft, June 2, 1839, NAM M1 46:609 for notice of his death.

36. Williams, "The Treaty of Saginaw in the Year 1819."

37. Wasso and Maywayketchewoulk to Schoolcraft, June 9, 1838, NAM M1 44:387.

38. NAM M1 41:393, May 1, 1837.

39. H. Conner to H. Schoolcraft, May 15, 1838, NAM M1 44:401.

40. No references to this band could be found. The name does not appear in any Saginaw related documents.

41. NAM M234 475:291, H. Conner to H. Schoolcraft, June 5, 1838. "Shawannasagut" cannot be identified and the whereabouts of his band are unkown.

42. Sibley to C. Harris, May 29, 1838, NAM M234 475:282.

43. Schoolcraft to C. A. Harris, June 12, 1838, NAM M1 37:494, on Ottawa innocence; Schoolcraft to C. A. Harris, June 15, 1838, NAM M234 475:287; Schoolcraft to Henry Conner, June 15, 1838, NAM M1 46:111. See NAM M1 45:41 editorial from the Saginaw Journal dated July 14, 1838 for reference to Schoolcraft's letter in the Grand River Times.

44. These men could not be identified. It is assumed that they were the men taken to Detroit by Schoolcraft. They were not leaders of note.

45. H. Conner to H. Schoolcraft, June 30, 1838, NAM M1 44:458.

46. H. R. Schoolcraft Personal Memoirs (Philadelphis: Lippincott, Grambo), 591 (footnote) and in Miller, MPHC 7:244.

47. Schoolcraft Memoirs, 589.

48. Schoolcraft Memoirs, 591.

49. The three other Indians purchasing land were "Peeaumoo" or Pewamo, "Tawwasomie" and Kawwyossawmie". The latter two could not be identified anywhere else. Pewamo was supposedly the son of a Chippewa chief. J. C. Blanchard suggested that the town in Western Clinton county be named after him in 1859, saying that it was the name of a chief who hunted on the Grand River with him, Walter Romig, Michigan Place Names (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1986). Also see Henry Gannet, "American Names" In WHC 12:390-398 and Virgil Vogel Indian Place Names in Michigan (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1986). Pewamo's name also appears on the 1838 and 1839 annuity payrolls as a member of the Maple River village, HRSP 8:2849.

50. Beth Dean, The Old Lamplighter: A History of Maple Rapids Michigan, 1826-1976 (Maple Rapids Villge Council, 1976).

51. Schoenfuhs, Walter P. "Edward Raimund Baierlein: Lutheran Missionary to the Indians in America and Asia," in Concordia Historical Quarterly, (1955), 27 (4): 145-162. Baierlein was a missionary at Pamosega's village on the Pine River from 1848 to 1853. His memoirs were written in German. This article is based upon those memoirs and contains a reference indicating that Baierlein was not able to preach on the Maple River because half of the Indians there were Roman Catholic.

52. McClurken, We Wish to Be Civilized.

CHAPTER V

1. Pontiac's war is a good example as is Tecumseh's role in the War of 1812.

2. Cornell, "The Transformations of Tribe," 40-42.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Allen, Robert S.
1988 "His Majesty's Indian Allies: Native Peoples, The British Crown and the War of 1812." In The Michigan Historical Review, 14(2):1-24.

Barth, Frederik, ed.
1969 "Introduction." In Ethnic Groups and Boundaries: The Social Organization of Culture Difference. Boston: Little, Brown and Company.

Bennett, John W., ed.
1975 The New Ethnicity: Perspectives from Ethnology-1973 Proceedings of the American Ethnological Society. St. Paul: West Publishing Co.

Biggar, H. P., ed.
1932 The Works of Samuel de Champlain. Volume IV 1608-1620. Toronto: The Champlain Society.

Blackbird, Andrew J.
1887 History of the Ottawa and Chippewa Indians of Michigan. Yipsilanti: Ypsilantian Job Printing House.

Blair, Emma Helen
1911 The Indian Tribes of the Upper Mississippi Valley and Regions of the Great Lakes. Vols. 1 and 2. Cleveland: The Arthur H. Clark, Co.

Burch, Ernest S., Jr.
1979 "Indians and Eskimos in North Alaska, 1816-1977: A Study in Changing Ethnic Relations." In Arctic Anthropology 16(2):123-151.

Callendar, Charles
1978 "Fox." In Handbook of North American Indians, Bruce G. Trigger, ed. Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian.

Carter, Clarence Edwin, ed.
1942 Territorial Papers of the United States. Vol. 10 & Vol. 12. Michigan Territory. Washington: United States Government Printing Office.

Clifton, James A.
1977 The Prairie People: Continuity and Change in Potawatomi Indian Culture 1665-1965. Lawrence: The Regents Press of Kansas.

1979 "The Tribal History - An Obsolete Paradigm. In American Indian Culture and Research Journal, 3(4): 81-100.

Cornell, Stephen
1988 "The Transformation of Tribe: Organization and Self-Concept in Nayive American Ethnicities." In Ethnic and Racial Studies 11(1):27-47.

Croghan, George
1939 George Coghan's Journal of his Trip to Detroit in 1767 with his Correspondence Relating Thereto. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press.

Daboll, Judge S. B.
1906 Past and Present of Clinton County Michigan Together with Biographical Sketches of Many of its Prominent and Leading Citizens and Illustrious Dead. Chicago: The S. J. Clarke Publishing Co.

Dean, Beth
1976 The Old Lamplighter: A History of Maple Rapids, Michigan, 1826-1976. Sponsored by Maple Rapids Village Council.

Despres, Leo A.
1975 "Toward a Theory of Ethnic Phenomena." In Ethnicity and Resource Competition in Plural Societies. Leo A. Despres, editor, pp. 187-207. The Hague: Mouton & Company.

Detroit Public Library and Burton Historical Collection
1967 Maps of Michigan and the Great Lakes 1545-1845. From the private collection of Renville Wheat with additions from the Burton Historical Collection. Exhibition catalogue.

Dobyns, Henry F.
1983 Their Numbers Become Thinned: Native American Population Dynamics in Eastern North America. Knoxville: The University of Tennessee Press.

1929 "Documents Relating to Detroit and Vicinity, 1805-1813". In MPHC vol. 40. Lansing: Michigan Historical Commission.

Dunbar, Willis Frederick
1965 Michigan: A History of the Wolverine State. Grand Rapids: William B. Erdmans Publishing Company.

Ellis, Franklin
1880 History of Shiawassee and Clinton Counties, Michigan, with Illustrations and Biographical Sketches of Their Prominent Pioneers. Philadelphia: D. W. Ensign & Co.

Everett, Franklin
1878 Memorials of the Grand River Valley. Chicago. The Chicago Legal New Company.

Feest, Johanna E. and C. Feest
1978 "Ottawa." In Handbook of North American Indians, Vol.15, Northeast. Bruce Trigger, editor. Washington D.C.: The Smithsonian Institution.

Fenton, William
1978 "Huronia: An Essay in Proper Ethnohistory." In American Anthropologist. 80:923-935.

Fitting, James E.
1971 "Scheduling in a Shared Environment: Late Period Land Use Patterns in the Saginaw Valley of Michigan." In Ontario Archaeology, 16:36-31.

Fitting, James E. and Charles E. Cleland
1969 "Late Prehistoric Settlement Patterns in the Upper Great Lakes." In Ethnohistory, 16(4):289-302.

Gilpin, Alec R.
1970 The Territory of Michigan, 1805-1837. East Lansing: Michigan State University Press.

Gordon, Douglas and George May
1959 "Michigan Journal 1836." In Michigan History, 43:1-42, 450-478.

Goddard, Ives
1978 "Mascouten." In Handbook of North American Indians, Bruce Trigger, ed. vol. 15, Northeast. Washington D.C.: The Smithsonian Institution.

Gould, Lucious E.
1903 "The Early History of Shiawassee County." In MPHC, 32:271-293. Lansing: Robert Smith Printing Co.

Greenman, Emerson F.
1957 "Wintering in the Lower Peninsula, 1675-1676." In The Michigan Archaeologist, 3(3):5-12.

Haeger, John D.
1981 The Investment Frontier: New York Businessmen and the Economic Development of the Old Northwest. Albany: State University of New York Press.

Hickerson, Harold
1960 "The Feast of the Dead Among the Seventeenth Century Algonkians of the Upper Great Lakes." In American Anthropologist, 62(1):81-107.

1962 "The Southwestern Chippewa: An Ethnohistorical Study." In American Anthropologist, Memoir 92, 64(3):1-110.

1970 The Chippewa and Their Neighbors: A Study in Ethnohistory. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston.

Hickey, Reverend M.
1883 "A Missionary Among the Indians: Reminiscences of Reverend M. Hickey as a Minister and Missionary of the Michigan Annual Conference of the Methodist Episcopal Church." In MPHC, 4:544-566.

1883 "Reminisces of Reverend M. Hickey, Clergyman of the Methodist Episcopal Church, Residing at Detroit, Michigan." In MPHC, 4:23-33.

(no author)
1881 History of Kent County, Michigan. Chicago: Charles C. Chapman & Co.

Hubbard, Bella
1888 Memorials of a Half-Century in Michigan and the Lake Region. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, The Knickerbocker Press.

Hunter, William A.
1978 "History of the Ohio Valley," in Handbook of North American Indians.

James, Edwin
1956 A Narrative of the Captivity and Adventures of John Tanner During Thirty Years Residence Among the Indians in the Interior of North America. Minneapolis: Ross & Haines, Inc.

Johnson, Ida A.
1971. The Michigan Fur Trade. Grand Rapids: The Black Letter Press.

Kappler, Charles J., ed. and compiler
1904 Indian Affairs: Laws and Treaties. vol. II. Washington: Government Printing Office.

Keyes, Charles F.
1981 Ethnic Change. Seattle: University of Washington Press.

Kinietz, W. Vernon
1965 The Indians of the Western Great Lakes: 1615-1760. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press.

Lahontan, Baron de
1905 New Voyages to North America. 2 vols. R. G. Thwaites, ed. Chicago: A. C. McClurg & Co.

Levine, Robert A. and Donald T. Campbell
1972 Ethnocentrism: Theories of Conflict, Ethnic Attitudes, and Group Behavior. New York: Wiley Press.

Mainfort, Robert C., Jr.
1979 Indian Social Dynamics in the Period of European Contact. East Lansing: Michigan State University.

McClurken, James
1987 We Wish to be Civilized: Ottawa-American Political Contests on the Michigan Frontier. Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, Michigan State University.

McCormick, W. R.
1883 "A Pioneer Incident." In MPHC, 4:376-379. Lansing: W. S. George & Co. Printers and Binders.

"Mounds and Mound-Builders of the Saginaws Valley". In MPHC, 4:379-383.

Miessler, H. C., ed.
1979 "Pioneer Lutheran Missionary to the Chippewas: Autobiography of E. G. H. Miessler 1826-1916." In Concordia Historical Institute Quarterly, 52(4):146-174.

Miller, Judge Albert
1886 In MPHC, 7:228-262.

Mills, James Cooke
1891 History of Saginaw County, Michigan. Saginaw:

Seemann & Peters.

Morse, Jedediah
1970 A Report to the Secretary of War of the United States on Indian Affairs. New York: Augustus M. Kelley Publishers.

MPHC
Michigan Pioneer and Historical Society
1877-1912 Historical Collections. 40 vols. Lansing.

NAM M1
National Archives Microcopy, M1
Records of the Bureau of Indian Affairs: Michigan Superintendency. Washington, D.C.

National Archives Microform Publications
Microcopy no. 432. Population Schedules of the Seventh Census of the United States. Poll 349 Michigan Cass, Chippewa, Clinton and Eaton Counties.

NAM M234
National Archives Microcopy, M234
Records of the Bureau of Indian Affairs: Letters Received from the Mackinac Superintendency. Washington, D.C.

O'Brien, Jay
1986 "Toward a Reconstruction of Ethnicity: Capitalist Expansion and Cultural Dynamics in Sudan. In American Anthropologist. 88:898-907.

NYCD
O'Callaghan, E. B., ed.
1855 Documents Relative to the Colonial History of the State of New York; Procurred in Holland, England, and France, vol. IX. Albany: Weed, Parsons & Co., Printers.

(no author)
n.d. The Past and Present of Eaton County Historically Together with Biographical Sketches and Illustrious Dead. Lansing: Michigan Historical Publishing Association.

Pease, Theodore Calvin, ed. and Ernestine Jenison, ed.
1940 Illinois on the Eve of the Seven Years' War 1747-1755, vol. XXIX, French Series, vol. III. Springfield: Illinois State Historical Library.

Peckham, Howard H.
1947 Pontiac and the Indian Uprising. Princeton:

Princeton University Press.

Prucha, Francis Paul
1967 Lewis Cass and American Indian Policy. Detroit: Wayne State University Press.

Quaife, Milo M., ed.
1928 The John Askin Papers, vol. 1, 1747-1795. Detroit: The Detroit Library Commission.

Rice, Mrs. N. B.
1908 Early History of Portland. Portland Review Print.

Rogers, Edward S.
1978 "Southeastern Ojibwa." In Handbook of North American Indians. Bruce Trigger, ed. Washington: The Smithsonian Institution.

Romig, Walter
1986 Michigan Place Names. Detroit: Wayne State University Press.

Schenk, Jon S.
1881 History of Ionia and Montcamlm Counties Michgan with Illustrations and Biographical Sketches of Their Prominent Men and Pioneers. Philadelphia: D.W. Ensign & Co.

Schoenfuhs, Walter D.
1955 Edward Raimund Baierlein: Lutheran Missionary to the Indians in America and Asia. Concordia Historical Institute Quarterly. vol. 27(4):145-162.

HRSP
Schoolcraft, Henry R.
Papers, 1806-1875. Microfilm. Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress.

1851 Personal Memoirs of a Residence of Theirty Years with the Indian Tribes on the American Frontiers: With Brief Notices of Passing events, Facts, and Opinions, A.D. 1812 to A.D. 1842. Philadelphia: Lippincott, Grambo.

1851-1857 Historical and Statistical Information Respecting the History, Conditions, and Prospects of the Indian Tribes of the United States. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott.

Sebewa Recollector
1965-1967 Bulletin of the Sebewa Center Association, volumes 1:1,4 and 2: 5.

Stout, David B.
1974 "Ethnohistorical Report on the Saginaw Chippewa," In Chippewa Indians V. David A. Horr, ed. New York: Garland Publishing Co. 87-132.

Tanner, Helen Hornbeck
1974 "The Chippewa of Eastern Lower Michigan." In Chippewa Indians V. David A. Horr, ed. New York: Garland Publishing Co. 347-377.

1974 "The Location of Indian Tribes in Southeastern Michigan and Northern Ohio." In Indians of Northern Ohio and Southeastern Michigan. New York: Garland Publishing Co. 317-375.

WHC
Thwaites, Ruben G. ed.
1855-1931 Collections of the State Historical Society of Wisconsin. Madison.

JR
1896-1901 The Jesuit Relations and Allied Documents. 73 vols. Cleveland: The Burrows Brothers.

Tooker, Elizabeth
1978 "Wyandot," In Handbook of North American Indians, vol. 15, Northeast. Bruce Trigger, ed. Washington: The Smithsonian Institution.

Trigger, Bruce G.
1976 The Children of Aataentsic. 2 vols. Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press.

1978 Handbook of North American Indians, (editor) vol. 15. Washington: The Smithsonian Institution.

Vogel, Virgil
1986 Indian Names in Michigan. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press.

Webber, William L.
1894-95 "Indian Cession of 1819 Made by the Treaty of Saginaw." In MPHC, 26:517-534.

Weissert, Charles A.
1932 "The Indians of Barry County and the Work of Leonard Slater, the Missionary." In Michigan History Magazine, 16:321-333.

Wheeler-Voeglin, Ermine
1973 Anthropological Report on the Indian Occupancy of Royce Area 117 in Michigan and Indiana ceded by the "Ottawa, Chippewa, and Pottawatomie Nations" under the treaty held at Chicago on August 29, 1821. Indians Claims Commission. Microfiche. 222 pp. New York: Clearwater Publishing Co.

1974 "An Anthropological Report on Indian Use and Occupancy of the Area of Overlap of Royce Area 205 and Royce Area 111," In Chippewa Indians V. New York: Garland Publishing Co. 9-86.

Whiting, J. L.
1877-78 "Saginaw County Pioneer Sketch Relative to the Military Occupation of the Saginaw Valley, and other Reminiscences." In MPHC, 2:460-62.

Williams, B. O.
1880 "Shiawassee County." In MPHC, 2:475-488.

Williams, Ephraim S.
1886 "Personal Reminiscences." In MPHC, 8:233-259.

1886 "The Treaty of Saginaw in the Year 1819." In MPHC, 7:262-270.

Wright, Gary A.
1967 "Some Aspects of Early and Mid-Seventeenth Century Exchange Networks in the Western Great Lakes." Michigan Archaeologist. 13(4):181-198.