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IMAGES OF SELF, PEERS' PERCEPTIONS,
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IMAGES OF SELF, PEERS' PERCEPTIONS, AND REFLEXIVE SELF-IMAGES: NEW SUPPORT FOR THE SYMBOLIC INTERACTIONISTS

By

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ABSTRACT

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REFLEXIVE SELF-IMAGES:
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Following the symbolic interactionist viewpoint, it was hypothesized that others' actual perceptions relate to self-perceptions through individuals' beliefs about how others perceive them (reflected perceptions). Self-perceptions were also expected to be influenced by the individual's power and locus of control. Perceptions were assessed by ratings on the two central and orthogonal interpersonal dimensions of self- and other-acceptance in small groups on two occasions. Of four hierarchical regression analyses, three supported the main hypothesis strongly. Reflected perceptions, as compared to others' perceptions, accountd for about twice the variance in self-perceptions. Others' perceptions also related significantly to reflected perceptions. Power and locus of control effects were also often significant. Unexpectedly large differences were found when using measures of self- versus other-acceptance. Supplemental evidence suggested that individuals thought it was more important to be viewed as other-accepting than self-accepting, although their schemata for self-acceptance tended to be better defined.

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INTRODUCTION AND CONCEPT REVIEW

The present study investigates the use of locus of control and personal power in elucidating the nature of the relationship between perceptions by others, reflected perceptions, and self-perceptions. Following the symbolic interactionist perspective of Cooley (1902) and Mead (1934), it is argued that the impact of other's perceptions on self is mediated by an individual's reflected perceptions. In this work, an attempt is made to clarify the operationalization of this relationship, which seems to have been commonly misinterpreted in the past. The manner in which others differentially affect one's self-concept is also addressed. The influence of reflexive perceptions of others on the self-concept are thought to vary as the other is seen as more or less powerful and as one tends toward an internal versus an external conception of control over interpersonal events. In addition, where past research approaches have typically examined perceptions between two relatively unacquainted individuals at only one point in time, the present research investigates the relationship between other, reflected, and self-perceptions using several others within a small group context where time of acquaintance was varied.

The Symbolic Interactionist View of the Self-Concept

One of the first individuals to synthesize and systematically develop ideas involving the reflected self was George Herbert Mead. As the orientation and constructs of the present study are founded largely upon Mead's seminal ideas, his work will be reviewed in some detail. Later attempts to empirically verify Mead's ideas and the shortcomings of these efforts are next reviewed before turning to recent studies that purport to have corrected some of these difficulties. Limitations in the present state of understanding of the symbolic interactionist perspective will also be explored.

According to Mead (1934) communication is the fundamental process that makes society possible and that makes human beings really human. How one comes to communicate and Mead's view of the individual within this process is crucial to the understanding of his theory. Mead argued that persons initiate activity relating them to their environments. In this, it is the act which is the unit of existence. To Mead, individuals do not respond to stimuli as objects outside of a response they may make, but rather the stimuli and response are thought of as a unit, so interpenetrating that neither can be said to exist without the other. Objects become stimuli as they function in the context of acts and as they come to be defined in the acts' completion. It is through experience and activity that objects come to be viewed as separate from the self. To

Mead, it is the capacity to utilize and think about activity and to conceptualize the object as object which sets humans apart from other life forms. It is one's conceptualization of the object, rather than the object itself, which has meaning for an individual.

Through activity, then, one realizes the object, which may eventually include other individuals. Mead stated that communication emerges when an activity has shared meaning between persons. Thus, when two or more "selves" conceptualize an object similarly, the potential for communication exists. Mead referred to the sharing of meaning of activity as comprised of significant symbols. "The significant symbol emerges when the one who makes it is aware of its meaning to the other, i.e., when one can anticipate the response it will evoke in another" (Miller, in Mead, 1982, p. 10). When we communicate by significant symbols, we break out of the present. The communication is not one of activity, but of the meaning of that activity.

When one breaks out of the present and into conceptualization and significant symbols, one may also realize a sense of self. That is, one has the capacity to separate time and space and to see his or her self as an object with a past and a future. For Mead, all things are socially constructed, the self included. One comes to define one's self through communication with others. In this communication, attention is shifted from the present to the meaning of behaviors of both oneself and other(s). The

self-concept is said to arise as a result of one's idea of another's idea of oneself as an object or thing. We come to think of ourselves as we think others see us. The self develops and is emergent from symbolic interaction with others. It is a socially defined structure existing in the activity of viewing one's self reflexively. This idea has been termed the reflexive or reflected self.

In later work conducted within Mead's framework, the self-concept has been thought to have three primary components (Kinch, 1963; Rosenberg, 1981): [a] the self-perception--how the individual views one's self, [b] the reflected self--how the individual believes another views him or her, and [c] the accorded self--how others actually see the individual.

In an extensive review of the research on symbolic interactionist theory, Shrauger and Schoeneman (1979) found considerable evidence that people's self-perceptions agree with the way they think others perceive them. In another review, Rosenberg (1981) found similar support for this relationship. Evidence for the relationship between the accorded self and these constructs, however, has been mixed. Rosenberg (1981) stated that "there is a consistent, though imperfect, relationship between the social self (what others actually think of us) and the reflected self" (p. 597). He went on to state that "more often than not, people's views of what others think of them are accurate" but that "in many cases they also misread the attitude of the other toward

themselves" (p. 597). Shrauger and Schoeneman (1979) were pessimistic in their evaluation of the relationship between self- and accorded perception; "There is no clear indication that self-evaluations are influenced by the feedback received from others in naturally occurring situations" (p. 549). Thus the relationship between self-perception and the reflexive self appears to be solidly supported, whereas the evidence for a relationship between these constructs and the accorded self remains uncertain.

Schafer and Keith (1985), largely in rebuttal of Schrauger & Schoenemans' 1979 review, stated that researchers who expect to find a significant and parallel relationship between self-perceptions and reflected self, and between self-perceptions and others' actual perceptions may be making "a rather uncritical use of the symbolic interactionist model of the self-concept" (p. 964). They stated that the interactionist perspective does not necessarily imply that actual and perceived appraisals of others toward the self need to be treated similarly in explaining the construction and organization of the self-concept. Other authors were noted that made a similar distinction, stressing the importance of the individual's perception of other's appraisals over these others' actual appraisals in affecting self-concept. In Mead's original work, it was the reflexive aspect of an interaction which was the material for the idea of the self-concept. It is the meaning the individual makes of the other's behavior

that creates the significance of the symbol. Kinch (1963) addressed this issue by defining a causal chain where the actual responses of others have a direct effect on a person's reflected perceptions which then effects the self-concept. Schafer and Keith (1985) supported Kinch's view and cited earlier research showing that what we believe others think of us is more closely related to our self-concept than what the others actually think. In their own research, Schafer and Keith (1985) used a path analysis design which showed that others' actual appraisals did influence the self-concept, but that this influence took place via the reflexive self.

Rosenberg's (1981) review of this literature acknowledged that though Mead's theory is generally supported, it is imprecise and in need of refinement. He noted that though we tend to see ourselves as we think others see us, we have not identified which others influence us and which do not. Schafer and others (Schafer, Keith, & Lorenz 1984; Schafer & Keith, 1985) explored this issue by studying married couples. This had the advantage of insuring significance in the relationship between self and one other. Schafer and Keith (1985) stated that another limitation of their own (and much past) research was that measurement of the relationship between actual, reflected, and accorded selves were taken at only one point in time. "As with many naturalistic studies, there are no repeated assessments of self and other perceptions whereby the

effects of feedback over time from significant others on the self could be determined. Although in this analysis we have statistically examined effects, the influence of the independent variable on the self-concept can only be assumed" (p. 969).

The present study redresses both of the aforementioned limitations. The question of differential impact of others on the self-concept is addressed through the constructs of power and locus of control, while the limitation of number of measurements and the issue of importance of the other to the self is addressed through using repeated measures in small interpersonally oriented groups.

Personal Power

Personal power is broadly defined in terms of influence between related individuals. Kaplowitz (1978) sees power as operative through a "set of propositions" about the consequences of attributions an individual makes of another in an interpersonal situation. From the symbolic interactionist perspective, another's personal power might influence an individual through his or her reflected perceptions. Others seen as more powerful would influence an individual's self-concept to a greater extent because the reflected perceptions of more powerful individuals would likely be weighted more than the reflected perceptions of those others viewed as less powerful. Most treatments of power, however, have largely neglected empirical

verification and have concentrated on broad theoretical conceptualizations (Dahl, 1957; Nagel, 1968; Kaplowitz, 1978). Indeed, it is interesting that the power construct has received extensive and complex theoretical treatment while numerous investigators have stated that the field suffers from overly simplistic operational definitions and limitations in empirical measurement (Allen, 1984; Gray-Little & Burks, 1983; Olsen & Rabunsky, 1972; Safilios-Rothschild, 1970). Though many studies utilizing a power construct have been conducted, the instruments used often seem to measure different aspects of power and typically correlate quite poorly with one another (Gray-Little, 1982; Olsen & Rabunsky, 1972). In spite of these limitations, the literature on personal power may be roughly separated into two groups, those studies that focus on narrowly-defined personal attributes and those that focus on the power strategies utilized between individuals in an interaction.

The idea that specific attributes of individuals have variable impact in an interpersonal context has been widely researched. Tedeschi (1972) called this impact personal power and defined it as "...a relatively consistent attribute of the person across situations." (p. 104). Jacobson (1972) referred to "resources of the agent" which include status, authority, education, communication skills, and interpersonal abilities. Heider (1958) defined personal power as the ability to influence the social and physical

environment of another person, and noted that it is something deriving from what an individual possesses. Minton (in Maher, 1968), in summarizing the work of Heider (1958), identified ability, knowledge, intelligence, strength, status, and competence as personal power variables. Minton himself referred to a category of power characteristics that are "organismic". Elements of this category include skills, intelligence, knowledge, and education. Tedeschi, Schlenker, and Bonoma (1973) found that primary sources of personal power included expertise, attraction, status, and prestige. Other attributes found to influence interpersonal interaction include physical attractiveness (Barnes & Rosenthal, 1985; Benson, Karabenick, & Lerner, 1976; Cash, Begley, McCown, & Wise, 1975; Miller, 1970; Warner & Sugarman, 1986), speech ability and fluency (Bord, 1975; Erikson, Lind, Johnson, & O'Barr, 1978; O'Sullivan, Ekman, Friesen, & Scherer, 1985; Warner & Sugarman, 1986), assertive expression (Reicken, 1958), eye contact (Cherulnik, Neely, Flanagan, & Zachau, 1978; Dovido & Ellyson, 1982; Hurley & Marsh, 1986), attire (Schnieder, 1974), and body carriage (Fast, 1977; Schwartz, Tesser, & Powell, 1982).

The literature on marriage and the family is also concerned with personal power. It is within this research sector that a strategies approach has been most often utilized in attempting to understand power processes between family members. In a recent review of this literature,

Gray-Little and Burks (1983) reported that power strategies are usually investigated through decision-making. In past research, decision-making was often decided simply by asking each individual in the couple who made the decisions over a variety of areas such as vacationing, grocery shopping, and housing (see Safilios-Rothschild, 1970, for review). More recently, the approach has been to develop a number of strategies that are thought to represent the process of power in an interaction. Strategies commonly thought to be indicative of power in relationships include; number of interruptions (Farina, 1960; Gray-Little, 1982; Mischler & Waxler, 1968), frequency of concessions (Cromwell & Cromwell, 1978; Gray-Little, 1982; Scanzoni, 1971), and talking time (Gray-Little, 1982). Falbo (1977), Falbo and Peplau (1980), and Cowan, Drinkard, and Macgavin (1984) have developed lists of power strategies, each based largely upon the former's work, that purportedly account for a large portion of power strategies actually utilized in interaction. Falbo and Peplau (1980) developed a list of 13 strategies that accounted for 98% of the strategies that occurred among a total sample of essays on personal decision-making. The power strategies utilized in the most recent revision of this list (Cowan et al., 1984) include; asking, begging/pleading, telling/assertion, reasoning, demanding/arguing, stated importance, bargaining, persistence, negative affect, positive affect, verbal manipulation, eliciting reciprocity, using an advocate,

evasion, and lassez-faire.

As past research on personal power has been criticized for only partially operationalizing the power construct, the present study will include a measure of power called the Personal Power Scale (PPS). Developed by this author, the PPS involves rating others on a statistically supported subset of the attributes and strategies noted above (see Method section). It is hoped that the inclusion of both attributes and strategies in a single instrument will more fully represent the personal power construct.

Locus of Control

Rotter (1954, 1966) first introduced the internal-external locus of control construct. He considered it a generalized expectancy, operating over a large number of situations, which related to whether or not the individual perceives the self to possess or lack control over what happens to him or her. Lefcourt (1966) noted that, as a general principle, "internal control refers to the perception of positive and/or negative events as being a consequence of one's own actions and thereby under personal control; external control refers to the perception of positive and/or negative events as being unrelated to one's own behaviors in certain situations and therefore beyond personal control" (p. 207).

Of particular relevance to the present research is the idea that internal-external variance in attributing control

may be salient specifically in interpersonal contexts. Paulhus (1983) found that locus of control could be attributed by an individual in three distinct areas; personal efficacy, sociopolitical control, and interpersonal control. The interpersonal domain of control was said by Paulhus to pertain to individuals as they interact with others in dyads and group situations. An internal locus of control indicates the expectation that one can, through their <u>own</u> behavior, control outcomes of personal significance in interpersonal situations, whereas an external locus indicates the expectation that in an interpersonal situation one will feel a lack of personal control over significant processes or outcomes. Since one comes to define their self in part through their perceptions of what others think of them, one might assume that the locus of control construct acts as a mediating variable in determining the importance of one's reflected appraisal of others on the self-concept.

The present research investigates the relationship between locus of control and the influence of accorded perceptions on self-concept via the reflexive self by utilizing both Rotter's (1966) internal-external locus of control measure and the interpersonal control scale from Paulhus's (1983) work (see Method section). It is thought that as one has an increasingly external sense of interpersonal control, one's reflected appraisals of others toward them will have a greater influence on one's

self-concept.

Use of Interpersonally Oriented Groups

The use of the small group setting has many advantages over the frequently utilized single measurement schema. Within such small groups, individuals typically move from being strangers to becoming relatively well acquainted. At the close of these groups, individuals will have around 50 hours of direct interpersonally oriented contact (see Method section for detail). Thus, where much past research has looked for the presence of the reflexive self at only one point in time, the use of the small group enables control over the time of acquaintance, making it possible to investigate the salience of the reflexive-self construct at successive stages in the development of relationships. Another advantage to the small group format is that it allows measurement of how more than one "other" perceives each individual. The present groups have from six to seven members.

Individuals have also shown significant change over the course of the groups' development on the measure used to represent the self-concept (Hurley & Rosenberg, 1986). This is in part because these groups focus on developing interpersonal skills and the self-concept measures used in the present study pertain to interpersonal aspects of personality. Thus, the small group setting is one where the possible impact of others on the self-concept may be

measured because these aspects of the self-concept have been shown susceptible to change.

Self-Schemas, Self-Acceptance, and Other-Acceptance

The self-concept gains its meaning through interpersonal behavior. This has recently been conceptualized is in terms of self-schemas (Markus, 1977; Markus, Moreland, & Smith, 1985; Rogers, Kuiper, & Kirker, 1977). Markus, Crane, Bernstein, & Siladi (1982) state that "Self-schemas are assumed to be summaries and constructions of past behavior that enable individuals to understand their own social experience and to organize a wide range of information about themselves" (p. 38). Self-schemas are cognitive generalizations about the self, derived from experience, that organize and guide the processing of self-related information. The union of summaries and constructions across differing focal domains comprises the self-concept. One self-schema relevant to the present research concerns the domain of interpersonal experience. Surprisingly enough, it has been found that self and others' perceptions of interpersonal behavior can reasonably be classified under only two principle and orthogonal dimensions; acceptance versus rejection of self and acceptance versus rejection of others.

"The evidence that two principle dimensions encompass a broad variety of interpersonal behavior seems impressive but unfamiliar to many contemporary researchers in the

psychotherapeutic and T-group areas" (Hurley, 1976b, p. 88). Work presented by Foa (1961), Schaefer (1961), Adams (1964), Peterson (1965), Bierman (1969), Carson (1969), and Kiesler (1983), shows that one dimension plainly concerns ones responses to other persons. Both Symonds (1939) and Bierman (1969) labelled this dimension acceptance--rejection while others have quite similarly labelled it: affiliation--hostility (Freedmen, Leary, Ossorio, & Coffey, 1951); positive--negative (Chance, 1954); loving-rejection (Roe, 1957); love--hostility (Schaefer, 1959); love--hate (Carson, 1969); and affiliation (Wiggins, 1982).

As Hurley (1976b) noted, finding agreement in a label for the second dimension has been more difficult. Symonds (1939) called it dominance--submission as did Freedman et al. (1951) and Carson (1969), while Bierman (1969) and Chance (1954) both labelled it activity-passivity. Foa (1961) Identified acceptance-rejection as the primary content component in <u>both</u> dimensions and held that in the second dimension, this related to both social and emotional behaviors of the subject toward the self. Wiggin's (1982) overview of the literature in this area noted that theorists most commonly speak of the second dimension as dominance.

Allport (1961) observed that a two-dimensional structure has been utilized as a conceptual base of personality since the time of Hippocrates, as well in the works of Galen, Kant, Wundt, Herbart, and Pavlov, among others. Gibb (1964) stated that "a person learns to grow

through his increasing acceptance of self and others" (p. 279). Argyris (1962) depicted interpersonal competence as deriving from "a basic need of man to increase his sense of self-acceptance and acceptance of others" (p. 20). Hurley (1986b) noted that the concept of acceptance versus rejection of others and of the self were major features of H.S. Sullivan's (1953) interpersonal theory, and are independently seen in the works of Carl Rogers (1951) and Abraham Maslow (1970). This seems congruent with both Foa's perspective and Adams (1964) view that "an interpersonal act may be regarded as the Cartesian product of these two sets" [acceptance-rejection of self/others] (p. 195). Additionally, these concepts plainly formed the conceptual base for Eric Berne's (1966) four 'life positions' (p. 270): I'm OK,You're OK; I'm OK, You're not OK; I'm not OK, You're OK; and I'm not OK, You're not OK.

Operationally, many instruments have been constructed which directly utilize these orthogonal dimensions (Benjamin, 1979; Hurley, 1976a; Kiesler, 1983; LaForge & Suczek, 1955; Lorr & McNair, 1965). Though the instruments range from those relatively simple and easy to administer (Hurley, 1978) to those extremely complex and involved (Benjamin, 1979), they repeatedly find acceptance versus rejection of self and other(s) as primary and salient. Furthermore, this salience has been demonstrated across a wide variety of settings (Hurley, 1986b).

Interpersonal behavior, then, seems adequately

conceptualized as essentially undergirded by the dimensions of acceptance versus rejection of self (ARS) and acceptance versus rejection of others (ARO). Though a third dimension, task orientedness-expressivity, (Bales, 1970) has been identified as salient in some interpersonal contexts, Hurley (1986b) has noted that most agree that it plays a minor role. Conte and Plutchik (1981) stated that, "For interpersonal personality data, however, any factors beyond the first two account for very little of the total variance" (p. 707). In the present study, ARS and ARO, as self-schemata, represent important facets of the self-concept. Though it may be argued that one's self-concept will vary depending on subject and setting, or that many other self-schematas also exist which could be measured, it is thought that the dimensions of ARS and ARO not only represent significant aspects of most individuals' self-concept, but they also represent the interpersonal medium through which one gains information regarding other areas of oneself. In that these dimensions are the <u>primary means</u> by which an individual's interpersonal world is represented, and in that it is through interpersonal means that an individual comes to develop a sense of self, it is thought that the dimensions of acceptance versus rejection of self and acceptance versus rejection of other(s) appropriately represent pertinent features of the self-concept.

Concept Synthesis and Hypotheses

The present research is aimed at clarifying and extending recent work on the relationship between the reflexive-, accorded-, and self-concepts. The basic relationship as defined by the symbolic interactionist perspective is tested. Two other constructs, personal power and locus of control, are also investigated. It is thought that the influence of others on self-perceptions will vary as the individual perceives these others to be more or less powerful. In addition, as one has increasingly external expectations of control, the others' importance to oneself increases, and reflected appraisals in general are hypothesized to have a greater impact on one's self-concept. One might further expect that these constructs act complementarily, as personal power pertains to perceptions of another and locus of control pertains to the importance of those perceptions to one's self. Finally, the present research utilizes small interpersonally oriented groups to assess the status of the symbolic interactionist relationship both early (Time I) and late (Time II) in the groups' development.

1. (a) It is hypothesized that individual's impressions of how others perceive her or him (the reflexive self) will account for more of the variance in self-ratings than will these other's actual or accorded ratings. Self, reflexive, and accorded perceptions will be measured on ARS and ARO ratings from the Group Behavior Rating Scales. Individuals

will rate themselves (self-ratings), and also predict how they will be rated by others (reflexive ratings) on these measures. All will also be rated by each other group member (accorded ratings) as well.

(b) It is also hypothesized that accorded ratings on these same measures will account for a significant amount of the variance in reflected ratings.

2. It is hypothesized that the above-stated relationships will be significantly stronger after about 40 hours of small group interaction (Time II) than after only about 20 hours (Time I).

3. It is hypothesized that individuals perceived as less powerful by others (as rated by the Personal Power Scale) will have reflexive perceptions which account for more of the variance in self-ratings when compared to those individuals viewed as more powerful by others (note comments in Discussion, p. 41).

4. It is hypothesized that the relationship in hypothesis 3 will be supported to a significantly stronger degree at Time II than at Time I.

5. It is hypothesized that the reflexive perceptions of others will account for more of the variance in self-ratings with an increasingly external versus internal locus of control (as measured by Rotter's I-E Locus of Control Scale and the Interpersonal Scale from the Spheres of Control Battery (Paulhus, 1983)).

6. It is hypothesized that the relationship in hypothesis 5

will be supported to a significantly stronger degree at Time II than at Time I.

7. It is hypothesized that locus of control and personal power will jointly increase the self-ratings variance accounted for by reflected ratings and that this hypothesis will be significantly stronger at Time II than at Time I.

Method

Participants and Setting

Participants were 27 male and female students (three groups of 7 and one group of 6) enrolled in an upper level undergraduate psychology course (PSY 400) at Michigan State University. All class members consented to participate, though one person from the group of six dropped the course before any ratings were collected. The purpose of the course, as stated in a description was, "to build an atmosphere of concern and respect for each member's personhood while also attempting to respond both constructively and honestly to each participant's behavior within a here-and-now context". Small groups were formed during the initial meeting of the full class. While there were no formal placement criterion, members were strongly encouraged to enter a group in which they were unacquainted with the other members. Attempts were also made at gender balancing within each group, which consisted of three or four members and two facilitators. Groups were co-led by facilitators who had previously completed both this course

and at least one subsequent term of leadership training. Groups typically met a total of about 50 hours, including two 90-minute sessions weekly. Each group also held 12-hour uninterrupted "marathon" sessions near the third and seventh weekends.

Students were informed that their course grades would be based mainly on a detailed journal of their thoughts, feelings, and experiences about self and each other group member and secondarily on their course attendance and their successful completion of two quizzes on the textbook, Interpersonal Living (Egan, 1976). Journals were regularly reviewed and graded by the instructor. This separation of course grades from actual within-group behavior was intended to minimize artificial conformity or "good student" behavior within the small group sessions. Attendance at all class and group sessions was mandatory and absences were relatively rare, averaging less than one per student per term.

Instruments

The Group Behavior Rating Scales for ARS and ARO

The Group Behavior Rating Scales (GBRS), featuring measures of acceptance versus rejection of self (ARS) and acceptance versus rejection of others (ARO), consisted of nine subscales, four of which constitute ARS, four which constitute ARO, and one independent scale. All subscales were bipolar and in semantic differential (Snider & Osgood,

1969) format. ARS subscales included: Shows feelings--Hides feelings; Expressive--Guarded; Active--Passive; and Dominant--Submissive. ARO subscales included: Warm--Cold; Helps others--Harms others; Gentle--Harsh; and Accepts others--Rejects others. The independent Liked--Disliked scale was presented first as a buffer for the remaining measures (Smith, 1979).

The subscales were presented on separate pages of a minibooklet with ten spaces separating each pair of anchors. After the initial Liked--Disliked scale, each ARS subscale was followed by an ARO subscale with favorable and unfavorable anchors staggered to minimize response sets. Ratings on each scale were translated into scores ranging from zero to nine, yielding potential ARS and ARO scores from zero to thirty-six. The scales were self-administered and were preceded by standardized instructions. These instructions were specific and requested "your personal impression of each member's actual behavior within the group sessions up to now" (Hurley, 1986a). They also encouraged raters to use the full range of possible ratings.

Recent evidence these measures' stability was demonstrated by Hurley (1986b) using members of the American Group Psychotherapy Association (AGPA) who participated in two-day, 12-hour interpersonal groups. Members completed GBRS ratings both early (2 1/2-hours) and late (12-hours) in these groups. Though the difference between mean group correlations early and late revealed an increment of

approximately 10% in interpersonal competence, as assessed by multiplying mean ratings on ARS and ARO for each occasion, ARS and ARO composite scores still showed reasonable stability (ARS = .66, $p < .01$; ARO = .72, $p < .01$). Thus, even when confounded with individuals' behavioral changes, these measures showed appreciable interoccasion stability. Evidence that these ARS and ARO measures were distinct and homogeneous is also reported in this work. Among the four ARS subscales, it was found that members' mean ratings of their group's leader had median correlations of .75 early, .74 late, and .74 early-to-late. For ARO's four subscales, the parallel median correlations were .54 early, .62 late, and .42 early-to-late. In contrast, the interquartet median correlations were much weaker (early = .21, late = .21, and early vs. late = .20), establishing that intraquartet linkages markedly exceeded their interquartet counterparts, supporting these measures' independence.

Theoretical and conceptual evidence presented earlier showed that the ARS and ARO measures were well-grounded in the literature. Additionally, several other measures have shown the expected patterns of correlation with Hurley's ARS and ARO indicators. These measures are all longer and more comprehensive than Hurley's measures and require much more time to administer and score. In light of this, it is appropriate to use these as a criteria for Hurley's much shorter and quicker measures (Anastasi, 1982). Some of this

validational evidence (Hurley, 1986b) is briefly summarized below:

> "Very similar ARS and ARO measures had shown construct validity in a study of the components' autocorrelations (Hurley, 1976a). Strong evidence of both convergent and divergent validity of ARS and ARO indicators was also demonstrated by their correlational patterns with different prototypical measures (Wiggins, 1982) of the affiliation and dominance dimensions. Thus, Gerstenhaber (1975) reported that the Interpersonal Checklist's (LaForge & Suczek, 1955) LOV factor, commonly taken as an affiliation index, correlated .55 ($p < .001$) with ARO but .00 with ARS, while its DOM factor, widely used to assess dominance, correlated with ARS .70 but only .18 (ns) with ARO. In another study, 47 members of six small personal development groups described self and each other group member on Lorr and McNair's (1965) Interpersonal Behavior Inventory (IBI) after 50-hours of interaction. All had earlier completed ARS and ARO ratings after both 22- and 45-hours of group participation. Individual's mean ARS ratings were found (Hurley, 1983) positively correlated (.41 & .63) with their parallel ratings on the IBI's five-scale Dominance factor but inversely (-.39 & -.44) with IBI's four-scale Intropunitive factor. Similar ARO rating did not correlate significantly with these two IBI factors, although ARO did correlate strongly (.73 & .74) with IBI's six-scale Affiliation factor."

The Personal Power Scale

The Personal Power Scale (PPS) is a measure intended to assess a wide range of personal power attributes and strategies. Developed by this author, the PPS consisted of 15 subscales subsumed under the categories of: Global Power (amount of power, amount of influence, control of others); Power Strategies (telling/assertion, talking time, frequency of concessions, interruptions, demanding/arguing,

persistence); Social Attributes (physical attractiveness, attire, apparent socioeconomic status); and Interpersonal Attributes (speech fluency, expression of ideas, interpersonal expertise). The subscales were presented on separate pages of a minibooklet with ten spaces separating each pair of anchors. Positive and negative anchors were staggered to minimize response sets. Ratings on each scale were translated into scores ranging from zero to nine. The scales were self-administered and were preceded by a standard instruction, "Rate each person in your group on the following dimensions. Use your own perceptions of each other person and try to use the full range of possible ratings. Remember, the research will hold these ratings in complete confidence so rate as honestly and as accurately as you can."

The PPS was developed from a previously existing measure called the Personal Power Functions Profile (Reyher, in Gavrilides, 1980) and a number of power strategies found throughout the literature. Originally, the PPS consisted of 18 subscales. A pilot study was conducted with 14 students enrolled in Psychology 400 at Michigan State University in the spring of 1987 to assess the principles of homogeneity, internal consistency, and parallelism (Hunter, 1977). In this work, the subscales height, build, posture, and frequency of eye contact were deleted from the instrument and the subscale control of others was added. Cronbach alphas for individual subscales ranged from .67 to .97 with

a mean alpha of .90 for the revised group.

Rotter's I-E Locus of Control Scale

Rotter's (1966) Internal-External Locus of Control Scale consisted of 23 forced-choice items plus 6 filler items. Possible scores range from 0-23, on the basis of one point for each external choice. Rotter purported that this scale assesses a generalized expectancy of locus of control over a wide variety of situations.

Rotter (1966) reported split-half reliabilities in the .70s and test-retest reliabilities ranging from .56 to .83, averaging .63. Recent studies have reported Cronbach alphas of .77 and .72 for spouses (Sabatelli, Buck, & Dreyer, 1983) and .70 for college undergraduates (Paulhus, 1983). Additionally, the I-E scale has been generally found to correlate only weakly with social desirability. Most studies report this correlation as accounting for less than 1% of the total variance (Askanasy, 1985; Parkes, 1984), although Paulhus (1983) reported a correlation of .32 between the measures.

A recent confirmatory factor analysis study by Askanasy (1985) found that among four differing approaches to the factor analysis, only 20% of the variance could be accounted for. He stated (p. 1337) that "the high levels of obliqueness between factors seem to support [a] Rotter's (1966, 1975) stance that the measure is tapping a generalized construct and [b] Collin's (1974) observation

that "there is a common theme of internal-external control of reinforcement running through the 46 alternatives" (p. 387). Other empirical support for the measure's validity come from Joe's (1971) extensive review of earlier literature. He stated that "the data tend to support Rotter's contention that the internal-external control concept is a generalized expectancy operating across many situations" (p. 755). This was also supported by Strickland (1977).

Rotter's I-E scale also shows evidence of construct validity through it's significance as a mediating variable over a wide variety of contexts (See Askanasy, 1985; Joe, 1971, for review), and in light of its continued use (see Concept Review). Overall, Rotter's I-E Locus of Control Scale has been found to be a valid measure of a generalized expectancy of control over a wide variety of settings.

Spheres of Control Battery: Interpersonal Scale

The Interpersonal Scale (IS) from the Spheres of Control Battery developed by Paulhus (1983) is a 10-item scale purported to assess an individual's locus of control specifically with regard to interactions with others. Items are rated on a seven-point Likert scale, with half of the items reverse scored to minimize response sets.

Paulhus (1983) reported Cronbach alpha reliabilities of .75-.80 on cross-validation samples for the IS. Test-retest correlations over four weeks were above .90 and at six

months were above .70. Paulhus found that the Interpersonal Scale's correlation with social desirability as measured by the Marlowe-Crowne accounted for only 1.2% of the total variance of the scale. The Interpersonal Scale has also been found to have predictive validity across three separate studies utilizing samples of college varsity football players, tennis players, and nonathletes (Paulhus, Molin, & Schuchts, 1979).

Finally, the Spheres of Control Battery (SCB) as a whole was found to correlate .75 with Rotter's I-E scale, supporting the SCB's construct validity. As a separate scale within the battery, the Interpersonal Scale's correlation with the I-E scale accounted for only 8% of the variance of Rotter's scale, showing possible support for the notion that it measures a specific facet of the generalized expectancy assessed by Rotter's scale.

Procedure

At PSY 400's first session of the term, potential participants were advised of the nature of this study and invited to participate. They were told that this work would explore individual's perceptual accuracy in an interpersonal context which entailed making ratings of self and others in their group on a variety of dimensions. Also, they were advised that their participation would hopefully assist future group members by making perception within the group better understood. They were further informed that all

responses would be confidential and that no identifying information would be available to others. They were told that for their participation they would receive confidential feedback on aspects of their interpersonal style and, toward the end of the term, on their perceptual accuracy in the group itself. They were further advised that this author would be available toward the end of the term to discuss more specifically what the research involved and to assist them in understanding their individualized feedback. Finally, they were informed that participation was voluntary and that there would be no penalty should they choose not to participate.

Those choosing to participate were then asked to fill out the I-E Locus of Control Scale and the Interpersonal Scale from the Spheres of Control Battery. The GBRS and the PPS were administered several weeks later, after approximately 22 (Time I) and 45 (Time II) hours of group interaction. Two GBRS versions were administered on both occasions. One version asked each member to simply rate both their self and each other member on the behavior they have observed in the group up to that point in time. These data yielded both the self-concept ratings and others' actual ratings (accorded selves) of the individual. The second GBRS version differed from the first in that each person was asked to rate how you think each member rates your behavior within the group up to now. This provided a measure of the reflexive self for each individual. Order of

presentation of the four measures at each administration was randomly determined to minimize order effects.

After returning the final set of such ratings, participants were given the option of receiving individualized feedback on their personal perceptual accuracy. This feedback was in the form of a graph showing the proximity of reflected appraisals on the GBRS from those ratings which were made by others. Participants were also given the opportunity for debriefing at this time.

Results

Reliability

For the present sample, the Personal Power Scale (PPS) items had a full-scale Cronbach alpha reliability of .97 at both Times I and II. Individual item alphas ranged from .52 to .87 at Time I, and from .41 to .89 at Time II. Mean internal consistency for individual items was .77 for Time I and .76 for Time II. The PPS was also highly stable over time as shown by an interoccasion Pearson r = .95.

Rotter's Locus of Control (LOC) Scale had a Cronbach alpha of .85 as contrasted with the parallel value of only .55 for Paulhus's Spheres of Control (SOC) scale. These measures correlated significantly (r = .53), and alpha for the combined measures was .77. Rotter's LOC measure was also correlated highly with the combined measure (r = .96) and did not correlate significantly with the Personal Power Scale at either Times I or II. Paulhus's SOC, on the other

hand, was less well correlated with the combined measure (r = .73) but correlated significantly with PPS (r =.50) at Time II. Since Rotter's LOC measure had greater internal stability than both the SOC and the combined measure and accounted for 92% of the latter's variance, but was found unrelated to the PPS, it was used in subsequent analysis, rather than SOC or their combination.

The Group Behavior Rating Scales (GBRS) reliabilities reflected the orthogonal nature of the two acceptance dimensions. Within both ARS and ARO, internal consistency was high regardless of source or occasion of ratings. Thus Cronbach alphas ranged from .84 to .93 for the ARS items and from .77 to .93 for the ARO subscales. In contrast, the correlations between measures of ARS and ARO were not significant on either occasion as shown in Table 1.

Insert Table 1 about here

Evaluation of Hypotheses

Multiple hierarchical regression analyses were utilized to assess the tenability of the hypotheses. Since four separate groups provided data, mean ratings were computed and standardized by group. Measures were then pooled across groups utilizing the group's standardized scores. Group means and variances were equated to minimize treating

Table 1

Internal consistency and interset correlations for measures of acceptance versus rejection of self (ARS) and other (ARO) as rated by self, others, and reflected self at Times I and II.

		ARS[a]	ARO[a]	ARS & ARO[b]
Self Ratings	Time I	.93	.92	.28 (ns)
	Time II	.93	.93	.13 (ns)
Reflected Ratings	Time I	.92	.92	.03 (ns)
	Time II	.91	.89	-.26 (ns)
Ratings by Others	Time I	.84	.85	.02 (ns)
	Time II	.89	.77	-.36 (ns)

[a] Internal consistency as measured by Cronbach's alpha.

[b] Pearson r between ARS & ARO.

between-group variance as within-group variance due to the tendency of different groups to use different parts of the scale for their ratings (i.e., some groups tended to rate all members high, others tended to rate all members low, etc.). Because of the orthogonal character of the two acceptance dimensions, all analysis were independently performed for each dimension.

Hypothesis 1a stated that the reflexive ratings would relate more strongly to self-ratings than would the individual's ratings by others. This was well confirmed by the ARS data. Reflected ratings accounted for at least 62% (r = .78) of the variance in self-ratings at Time I and 72% (r = .85) at Time II. In contrast, others ratings of individuals only accounted for about 35% (r's of .58 and .60) of the self-ratings variance on each occasion (for n = 27, $p < .01$ when $r = \pm.57$). For the ARS dimension, then, reflected ratings accounted for about twice as much of the variance in self-ratings as did the parallel ratings by others. The comparable ARO findings were mixed. Reflected ratings accounted for only about 22% (r's of .42 and .49) of the variance in self-ratings. Ratings from others accounted for 25% (r = .50) and 11% (r = .33) of the same variance at Times I and II. Hypothesis 1a was supported by the ARO data at Time II, but not at Time I when ratings of individuals by others accounted for 7% more of the variance in self-ratings than did reflected ratings.

Hypothesis 1b stated that reflected ratings would

mediate the relationship between ratings by others and self-ratings. This relationship was confirmed on each occasion by ARS data. Ratings by others accounted for significant amounts of the outcome variance of both self and reflected ratings. More specifically, ratings by others accounted for an average of 35% of the variance in self-ratings and an average of 33% of the variance in reflected ratings. When reflected ratings were the first independent variable in the regression, however, ratings by others did not significantly contribute to the predictability of self-ratings. If averaged for Times I and II, reflected ratings accounted for 31.5% more of the variance of self-ratings than did ratings by others. It is important to note that this finding satisfies Kinch's (1963) criterion of the relationship between self, other, and reflected ratings from the symbolic interactionist perspective. Ratings by others did correlate significantly with reflected ratings, but reflected ratings accounted for nearly twice as much of the variance in self-ratings than did ratings by others. In addition, the variance accounted for by others' ratings was reduced to zero when reflected ratings were the first independent variable entered in the regression equation.

Insert Table 2 about here

Table 2

Hierarchical regression equations with self-, other-, and reflected-ratings regressed on measures of acceptance versus rejection of self (ARS) and other (ARO) at Times I and II.

	Self Ratings	Reflected Ratings[a]	Ratings by Others[a]	Full Equation
ARS1	dep	.62**	.63	F = 20.66**
ARS2	dep	.72**	.71	F = 32.19**
ARO1	dep	.18	.29*	F = 5.75*
ARO2	dep	.24*	.24	F = 4.69*
ARS1	dep	---	.34**	F = 12.76**
ARS2	dep	---	.36**	F = 14.93**
ARO1	dep	---	.25**	F = 8.45*
ARO2	dep	---	.11*	F = 4.26[b]
ARS1	---	dep	.31**	F = 11.34**
ARS2	---	dep	.35**	F = 16.25**
ARO1	---	dep	.13*	F = 4.45*
ARO2	---	dep	.12*	F = 6.74*

[a] Entries show cumulative adjusted R^2.

[b] $p < .06$.

* $p < .05$.

** $p < .01$.

Similar to the findings for hypothesis 1a, ARO again accounted for less variance than ARS and provided only mixed support for hypothesis 1b. Ratings of individuals by others did account for significant portions of the variance in both self and reflected ratings, though the Time II value for the full equation for ratings by others regressed on self-ratings closely ($p < .06$) approached significance. At Time II, the same relationship between self, reflected, and other ratings was found as was described for the ARS dimension, supporting the stated hypothesis. Again, however, the variance accounted for was much below that found for ARS. Also, the Time I ARO data did not support hypothesis 1b, as reflected ratings did not account for a significant portion of the self-ratings variance, while ratings by others did.

Hypothesis 2 stated that the association between self, other, and reflected ratings described in hypothesis 1b would be significantly stronger at Time II than at Time I. For ARS, reflected ratings accounted for an additional 10% of the variance over Time I. When regressed on both self and reflected ratings, ratings by others showed a slight tendency to account for more variance at Time II (an additional 2% and 4% on self and reflected ratings, respectively). For ARO, support was again mixed. Although reflected ratings accounted for an additional 6% of the variance at Time II, ratings by others accounted for less variance at Time II when regressed on both self and

reflected ratings.

Hypothesis 3 stated that individuals will attend more to the reflected ratings of those persons they perceive as more powerful as compared to those of individuals they view as less powerful. Operationally, individuals rated as less powerful by others should attend to the reflected ratings of those rated as more powerful when compared to those powerful others (see Discussion). Thus we would expect that the amount of variance in self-ratings accounted for would increase as individuals decreased in power. For ARO items, power accounted for an additional 13% of the outcome variance at Time II, raising the total variance in self-ratings accounted for to 37% (r = .61). Power was not significant, however, at Time I. Interestingly, for ARS items this relationship was highly significant, but contrary to the direction predicted. Whereas <u>decreasing</u> power led to additional ARO variance accounted for, <u>increasing</u> power led to additional ARS variance accounted for. For ARS, power significantly (p < .01) accounted for an additional 13.5% and 7.5% of the variance in self-ratings at Times I and II, respectively. This raised the total variance accounted for to 74% (r = .86) for Time I and 78% (r = .88) for Time II.

Insert Table 3 about here

Table 3

Hierarchical regression equations for measures of acceptance versus rejection of self (ARS) and others (ARO) with self-ratings as the dependent variable and locus of control (LOC), personal power (PPS), reflected ratings, and ratings by others as the independent variables.

	Self Ratings	Reflected Ratings*	LOC*	PPS*	Other Ratings*	Full Equation
ARS1	dep	.62**	.73**	.81**	.80	F = 24.49**
ARS2	dep	.72**	.73	.79**	.79	F = 25.11**
ARO1	dep	.18	.28	.27	.32	F = 3.83*
ARO2	dep	.24*	.25	.41*	.40	F = 5.03*
ARS1	dep	.62**	---	.74**	.73	F = 21.69**
ARS2	dep	.72**	---	.78**	.76	F = 28.66**
ARO1	dep	.18	---	.15	.30*	F = 4.35*
ARO2	dep	.24	---	.37*	.39	F = 6.15*
ARS1	dep	.62**	.73*	---	.72	F = 20.51**
ARS2	dep	.72**	.73	---	.72	F = 22.54**
ARO1	dep	.18	.28	---	.30	F = 4.29*
ARO2	dep	.24*	.25	---	.22	F = 3.30

* Entries show cumulative adjusted R^2.

* $P < .05$.

** $p < .01$.

Hypothesis 4 stated that self-ratings would change toward reflected perceptions of those viewed as more powerful as compared to those who are less powerful. If this were the case, the variance in self-ratings accounted for by the power variable at Time II should significantly exceed that at Time I. This hypothesis was not supported for ARS. For ARO at Time II, however, a trend toward support was found, with power accounting for an additional 22% of the variance of self-ratings.

Hypothesis 5 stated that individuals having a more external locus of control will have reflected perceptions more closely linked to their self-perceptions than will persons having a more internal locus of control. No support was found for this hypothesis. Though a significant ($p < .01$) relationship was found at Time I for ARS, this was opposite to the predicted direction. It was found that those with a greater internal locus of control had reflected perceptions which more closely paralleled self-perceptions. In this case, locus of control accounted for an additional 11.5% of the variance in self-ratings with reflected ratings first in the regression equation.

Hypothesis 6 stated that the relationship in hypothesis 5 would be significantly stronger at Time II than at Time I. This hypothesis was not supported.

Hypothesis 7 stated that locus of control and power would jointly increase the predictive ability of the reflexive relationship, and that this would be more apparent

at Time II than at Time I. The first part of this hypothesis was supported for ARS at Time I, with partial support at Time II. At Time I, the four independent variables accounted for 80% (r = .89) of the variance in self-ratings, with significant contributions by each variable except ratings by others. One drawback to this finding was that the contributions of locus of control and personal power were significant, but contrary to the direction predicted. At Time II on ARS, the full equation accounted for 79% (r = .88) of the variance of self-ratings, but the LOC measure failed to contribute significantly (p = .10). The hypothesis was not supported for ARO. Furthermore, neither the ARS or ARO data supported the hypothesis that significantly more variance would be accounted for at time II than at Time I when all variables were present in the regression equation.

DISCUSSION

The symbolic interactionist perspective asserts that we come to view ourselves as we <u>think</u> others see us. Stated another way, others' views of us influence self-perceptions through reflected perceptions. An empirical test of this formulation must show that reflected perceptions are related to self-perceptions. It must further be shown that perceptions by others are related to reflected perceptions as well. This implies an important difference in the strength of these relationships which has been largely

neglected and misunderstood (Kinch, 1963; Rosenberg, 1981; Schafer & Keith, 1985). Reflected and self-perceptions should be linked more strongly than accorded and self-perceptions. Indeed, accorded and self-perceptions need not be directly related at all. Rather, accorded perceptions must correlate significantly with reflected perceptions if the other's actual views are to have any influence upon the individual's concept of self.

The present findings amply support these aspects of the symbolic interactionist viewpoint. For ARS and ARO (only Time II ARO), the correlations between reflected perceptions and self-perceptions were about twice as strong as those between accorded perceptions and self-perceptions. It was also found that others' actual ratings of individuals correlated significantly with reflected perceptions. Especially convincing was the finding that others' actual ratings failed to account for <u>any</u> of the variance in self-ratings when reflected ratings were the first independent variable in the regression equation and ratings by others was second.

This study also investigated the use of personal power ratings. Initially it had been hypothesized that individuals would be more influenced by the reflected perceptions of those whom they viewed as more powerful as compared to those seen as less powerful. Due to an unforeseen statistical complication this hypothesis was not directly testable because it required that the data be

organized by raters, since it is the perceived power of each other group member that was hypothesized to influence which reflected perceptions the individual would give higher priority. The problem arose from the organization of data by raters rather than by ratees. Unless the data are evaluated by individual case, the power ratings will lack internal consistency. If individuals ratings of peers' personal power agree, however, the data may be organized by ratee and the hypothesis can be rewritten. High interrater agreement about PPS ratings permitted this reformulation and it was hypothesized that individuals rated as less powerful by others will link their perceptions of self more closely to their reflected perceptions than will individuals rated as more powerful. This is because less powerful individuals will tend to look more to others whom they regard as powerful for their self-definition than to those others whom they view as less powerful.

This hypothesis was supported for the ARO items at Time II, but interestingly, was directionally contrary to that predicted for ARS items. On the self-acceptance dimension, persons viewed as more powerful by others tended to have self-definitions that corelated more strongly with the reflected perceptions of others than did those viewed as less powerful. Apparently, highly self-accepting persons tended to more readily accept their own views of how others see them, while less self-accepting persons were more hesitant about accepting their own views of how others

regard them. This finding seems congruent with Sullivan's (1953) interpersonal theory and also fits related findings from recent studies by Hurley (1986a) and Hurley & Myers (1987).

Sullivan (1953) stated that people become anxious when they perceive external threats to their self-system. These individuals then utilize a variety of interpersonal security operations to maintain or reestablish a feeling of safety and to ward-off anxieties aroused by these adverse messages. The present findings suggest that persons low in self-acceptance tend to experience more interpersonal anxiety than those higher in self-acceptance and consequently shift more quickly into security operations than do more self-accepting persons. These quick shifts are thought to lessen the impact of adverse or threatening reflected perceptions as these persons likely either discount or distort reflected information. Hurley & Myers (1987) provided indirect support for this notion. They found that individuals' ranges of ratings of peers and self correlated inversely with defensiveness when it was known that all ratings would be fully disclosed. Restricted range seemed an index of personal security in this context, with narrower ranges, indicating a reduced set of discriminations, accompanying a greater need for self-protection. Hurley (1986a) earlier reported that users of restricted ranges also tended to inflate their self-ratings as compared to others' ratings of them. He

stated, "Considering that such persons [low range users] commonly show personal adjustment problems, this observation suggests that very narrow range users tend to manifest an exaggeratedly self-protective stance" (p. 226). In terms of security operations, Hurley suggested that very narrow range raters seek to avoid interpersonal tensions through a nonassertive and overly-deferential stance. This contrasted with their rating themselves as much more assertive and self-accepting than they were rated by their group peers'. Taken together, these findings provide generalized support for the notion that individuals regarded as relatively low in power by others tend to more readily resort to security operations to distort or discount their reflected perceptions than do persons regarded as more powerful.

No support was found for the hypothesis that the reflexive self would correlate more highly with the self-concept as individuals adopted an increasingly external locus of control. Instead, an increasingly internal locus of control was found significantly associated with the variance in self-ratings. Thus, increased confidence that one has more control over the outcome of interpersonal events apparently enhanced one's ability to accept their reflected perceptions of others for the ARS items. This finding seems congruent with the argument cited for personal power on the self-acceptance measure. That is, feeling more in control of one's experiences was associated with a lesser need to distort or discount the reflected perceptions of

others, whereas the perception of external control apparently enhanced interpersonal anxiety because others appear to have greater control in determining one's self-definition.

One aspect of this study that reaches beyond prior works was the attempt to measure changes in the self-concept as a function of reflected perceptions of others. Specifically it was thought that all variables would account for more of the variance in self-ratings at Time II than at Time I. Of eight relevant trends in the data, five supported and two opposed this hypothesis, although none reached generally accepted standards of statistical significance.

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insert Table 4 about here

There seem at least three plausible reasons for this outcome. First, the small number of study participants (27) may have made it difficult for the between-group differences to exceed the within-group variance. Real differences between the measures at Times I and II may have been overshadowed by instabilities inherent in this research design. Second, the first assessment was taken after 22 hours of rather intense interpersonal interaction within these groups. This measurement may have occurred after the

Table 4

Shifts in the variance of self-ratings accounted for from Time I to II on measures of acceptance versus rejection of self (ARS) and others (ARO) with reflected ratings, locus of control, personal power, and ratings by others as independent variables.

		Time I[a]	Time II[a]	Shift
Reflected Ratings	ARS	.62	.72	+.10
	ARO	.18	.24	+.06
Locus of Control[b]	ARS	.73	.73	.00
	ARO	.28	.25	-.03
Personal Power[b]	ARS	.74	.78	+.04
	ARO	.15	.37	+.22
Ratings by Others	ARS	.34	.36	+.02
	ARO	.25	.11	-.14

[a] Entries show cumulative adjusted R^2.

[b] These variables were second in the regression equation after reflected ratings.

reflexive relationship had already developed. Third, there may not have been any real changes.

In the present context, the first two alternatives seem more plausible. That five of eight possible shifts were in the predicted direction (reflected ratings on ARS & ARO, personal power on ARS & ARO, accorded ratings on ARO) versus only two contrary shifts (LOC on ARO and accorded ratings on ARO), suggests that the differences were real but suppressed for the above-mentioned reasons (see Table 4). Obviously, a larger study is needed to clarify this issue.

Possibly the most interesting and unexpected finding was the differential patterns of correlation yielded by the self-acceptance and other-acceptance scales. While the basic interactionist relationship held as predicted for ARS items at Times I and II, and for ARO items at Time II, an appreciable difference ($p < .01$) existed between the two kinds of acceptance. Reflected self-acceptance ratings accounted for nearly twice the variance in self-ratings as did the other-acceptance relected ratings. While this difference was unexpected, a perusal of pertinant literature concerning these measures suggested that individuals commonly respond quite differently to these self- and other-acceptance measures. The Hurley & Marsh (1986) study of the mutual eye contact (MEC) correlates of self- and other-acceptance found that early and late peer-based ratings of self-acceptance and total MEC both correlated .55 although MEC correlated only .34 early and .38 late with

other-acceptance ratings. MEC also correlated somewhat more firmly with self-rated self-acceptance and peer-rated self-acceptance (.76 early and .83 late), than with other-acceptance ratings by self and peers (.74 early and .48 late). Agreement between peer and self-based ratings on other-acceptance items also showed a puzzling decline as members became more familiar and had more experience with one another.

There is also indirect evidence that individuals' regard being perceived as quite accepting of others as more important than being seen as quite self-accepting. A study by Hurley and Rosenberg (1986) found that member-based ratings of leaders on the ARO items warm--cold and gentle--harsh were the best predictors of their group's members' net gains on both self-acceptance (respective r's = .61 & .62) and other-acceptance (respective r's = .71 & .63). An earlier study of two-day psychodynamic groups of mental health professionals (Hurley, 1986b), yielded strikingly similar results as member-based ratings of leaders on the warm--cold ARO subscale also generated the strongest significant correlations with members' net gains on both self-acceptance (r = .46) and other-acceptance (r = .67).

Furthermore, it appears that members of small groups are significantly less accurate in predicting how their group peers view them on items assessing other-acceptance (r's = .36 early & .35 late) than on self-acceptance items

(*r*'s = .56 early & .59 late). Yet, the behavior of their group leaders on items assessing other-acceptance have been found to be consistently linked more strongly to group members' interpersonal gains than are leader behaviors linked to self-acceptance. Two possible reasons for this discrepancy come to mind. One is that because it is more important to individuals to be perceived by others as other-accepting than as self-accepting, group members may have a greater need to distort their ideas of how others see them for other-acceptance than for self-acceptance. Various ego-involvement effects, reviewed by Greenwald and Pratkanis (1984), such as beneffectance are illustrative of individuals' general bias to protect their self-esteem. In the interpersonal context, it may be more important for individuals' to be seen as warm, gentle, helping, and accepting of others than as showing of their own feelings, active, expressive, or dominant.

Another possible explanation for the lesser correlations between self, other, and predicted ratings for other-acceptance (as compared to the relationships for self-acceptance) is that people may have vaguer notions of what comprises other-accepting behaviors. One way of stating this is to say that people may not possess very clear schemata for the ARO scale items. Interestingly, Markus's primary evidence for self-schemata across various publications (Markus, 1977; Markus, Crane, Bernstien, & Siladi, 1982; Markus, Smith, & Moreland, 1985) include

schematization of independence--dependence and masculinity, traits (especially independence) which appear highly congruent with ARS, but irrelevant to ARO. Markus's work has also focused on differences among individuals on a single self-schema. No research addressing the possibility that various classes of evaluative traits may vary in their ability to be schematically integrated is known to this author. One possible reason for the presently noted differential relationships for self- and other-acceptance, then, is that individuals may be more cognitively vague or less well schematized for other-acceptance variables than for self-acceptance variables.

Markus (1977) stated that if a person has a developed self-schema, she or he should be able to: (1) process information about the self in a given domain with relative ease, (2) retrieve behavioral evidence from that domain, (3) predict future behavior in the domain, and (4) resist counter-schematic evidence about himself. The present findings indicate that individuals process information about self-acceptance more accurately than they process information about other-acceptance. This indirectly satisfies the first of Markus's criteria. Obviously, if you cannot predict how others see you, you cannot do it easily. To see if persons satisfy the remainder of these criteria differentially for ARS and ARO, and to see if the other-acceptance dimension is more important to people in their interactions with others than is the self-acceptance

dimension, the following exploratory study was conducted.

17 students enrolled in Psychology 400 at Michigan State University (Spring term, 1988) were simply asked to rate how important it would be to them that their close friends perceive them positively on each item of the ARS and ARO scales. These eight bipolar items were intermixed and presented on the blackboard in class. It was found that students rated the other-acceptance items as significantly more important ($p < .05$) than the self-acceptance items. Two weeks later, without intervening discussions of this topic, the same group of students were asked to record three of their own behaviors in the last two weeks that represented each of the eight ARS and ARO items. They were then asked to rank-order these eight items for how easy it was to supply a behavioral example for each item (these data were gathered the following week due to time constraints). Two members' responses were unscorable. For the remaining 15 students a trend was found ($p < .06$) favoring the ease of identifying the self-acceptance items.

This simple study provides some support for both the hypothesis that it is more important for individuals to be seen positively on other-acceptance than on self-acceptance and that it is more difficult for them to define what behaviors actually constitute the other-acceptance dimension. Though these findings are preliminary, they do suggest an explanation for the large discrepancy between the variance in self-ratings accounted for by ARS and ARO in the

initial study. Certainly a more comprehensive test of these hypotheses is warranted.

Conclusion

Between self, other, and reflected perceptions, the present findings supported the symbolic interactionist perspective. It was found that individuals' self-representations can apparently be explained largely by how they think others see them. How individuals' think they are seen can be partially (and significantly) explained by how others actually say they see them. It was also found that the concepts of personal power and, to a lesser extent, locus of control clarified these relationships. Less powerful individuals apparently look to more powerful persons to confirm their other-accepting view of themselves. In contrast, for the self-acceptance dimension as an individual is more powerful he or she is more able to accurately utilize reflected perceptions of others. In this case the powerful individual may not feel as anxious in accepting reflected feedback from others and subsequently has less need to distort or discount this information. Locus of control seemed to function similarly for self-acceptance. A more internal locus of control seems to allow the individual to feel less anxious about accepting reflected perceptions as valid and contributory.

A striking and unexpected difference was found between the measures of self-acceptance (ARS) and other-acceptance

(ARO). The personal power variable yielded opposite patterns of correlation with these measures. There was also a large difference between the variance in self-ratings accounted for by items of the self-acceptance and other-acceptance measures. On both occasions the full regression on self-acceptance accounted for about 80% of the variance in self-ratings, while the parallel other-acceptances regressions accounted for only 32% and 40% of the variance. In an exploratory follow-up study, two possible explanations for this discrepancy were investigated. It was found that individuals thought it was more important to be seen positively by others on other-accepting qualities, while at the same time there was a tendency for them to have more difficulty in defining other-accepting behaviors than self-accepting qualities. Thus, individuals may have vaguer and less schematic perceptions of the behaviors undergirding other-acceptance items. Perhaps because this dimension is more important to individuals, it is less well defined. Anxiety and security operations may disrupt accurate feedback. Certainly this is a question future research should decide.

The present study had several advantages over previous research in this area as well as some limitations. Utilizing small, interpersonally-oriented groups allowed data to be gathered representing the perceptions of individuals by and toward several others. This created a great deal of stability when perceptions were combined and

this agreement among individuals in their perceptions of others supported the reliability and validity of the constructs used. This research also benefitted from prior studies which identified correctable errors in operationalizing the symbolic interactionist construct. Using the additional variables of personal power and locus of control also clarified of our understanding of factors which might facilitate a more accurate use of the symbolic interactionist paradigm by individuals. Probably the biggest drawback in the present study was the small number of participants from which data were gathered. It would also have been more useful to gather the first set of ratings earlier in the development of these groups, when reflected perceptions were still in a very early stage of development.

APPENDICES

Appendix A

The SOC's Interpersonal Scale

Instructions: In the space next to each statement, indicate the extent to which the sentence applies to you using the following key:

STRONGLY DISAGREE			NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE			STRONGLY AGREE
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

___ 1. Even when I'm feeling self-confident about most things, I still seem to lack the ability to control social situations.

___ 2. I have no trouble making and keeping friends.

___ 3. I'm not good at guiding the course of a conversation with several others.

___ 4. I can usually establish a close personal relationship with someone I find attractive.

___ 5. When being interviewed I can usually steer the interviewer toward the topics I wish to talk about and away from those I wish to avoid.

___ 6. If I need help carrying off a plan of mine, it's usually difficult to get others to help.

___ 7. If there's someone I want to meet I can usually arrange it.

___ 8. I often find it hard to get my point of view across to others.

___ 9. In attempting to smooth over a disagreement I usually make it worse.

___ 10. I find it easy to play an important part in most group situations.

Appendix B

The Personal Power Scale

Instructions: Rate each person in your group on each of the following dimensions. Use your own perceptions of each other person and try to use the full range of possible ratings. Remember, the research will hold these ratings in complete confidence so rate as honestly and as accurately as you can.

Amount of Power

POWERFUL — POWERLESS

a a a a a a a a a a a
b b b b b b b b b b b
c c c c c c c c c c c
d d d d d d d d d d d
e e e e e e e e e e e
f f f f f f f f f f f
g g g g g g g g g g g
h h h h h h h h h h h
i i i i i i i i i i i
j j j j j j j j j j j

Amount of Influence

NOT INFLUENTIAL — VERY INFLUENTIAL

a a a a a a a a a a a
b b b b b b b b b b b
c c c c c c c c c c c
d d d d d d d d d d d
e e e e e e e e e e e
f f f f f f f f f f f
g g g g g g g g g g g
h h h h h h h h h h h
i i i i i i i i i i i
j j j j j j j j j j j

Control of Others

CONTROLLED BY OTHERS — CONTROLS OTHERS

a a a a a a a a a a a
b b b b b b b b b b b
c c c c c c c c c c c
d d d d d d d d d d d
e e e e e e e e e e e
f f f f f f f f f f f
g g g g g g g g g g g
h h h h h h h h h h h
i i i i i i i i i i i
j j j j j j j j j j j

Telling/Assertion

ASSERTIVE — UNASSERTIVE

a a a a a a a a a a a
b b b b b b b b b b b
c c c c c c c c c c c
d d d d d d d d d d d
e e e e e e e e e e e
f f f f f f f f f f f
g g g g g g g g g g g
h h h h h h h h h h h
i i i i i i i i i i i
j j j j j j j j j j j

Talking Time



Frequency of Concessions

(gives in to others)



Demanding/Arguing



Interruptions

Physical Attractiveness



Attire



Socioeconomic Status
(Apparent)



Speech Fluency



Expression of Ideas



Interpersonal Expertise



Persistence



Encircle your name:

(a) _____
(b) _____
(c) _____
(d) _____
(e) _____
(f) _____
(g) _____
(h) _____
(i) _____
(j) _____

Appendix C

Group Behavior Rating Scales for ARS and ARO

Instructions[a]: On this minibooklet's last page note that all group members' names have been listed. Encircle your own name. Starting with the following page, encircle the letter that best represents your personal impression of each members' actual behavior within all group sessions up to now. These ratings will be most useful if you use the full range of possible ratings for each scale.

Rate all group members, including self and leader(s). Complete all ratings on each page before turning ahead to the next. Unlike other scales which address behaviors, the Liked versus Disliked scale solicits your personal responses.

Instructions[b]: Starting with the folowing page, encircle the letter between the extremes that best represents how you think each member rates your behavior within the group up to now. Please use the full range of possible ratings for each scale. Do not rate yourself. All ratings will be kept confidential. Complete all ratings on each page before turning ahead to the next.

	a	a	a	a	a	a	a	a	a	a		H	a	a	a	a	a	a	a	a	a	a	S
	b	b	b	b	b	b	b	b	b	b	D	I	b	b	b	b	b	b	b	b	b	b	H
L											I	D											O
I	c	c	c	c	c	c	c	c	c	c	S	E	c	c	c	c	c	c	c	c	c	c	W
K	d	d	d	d	d	d	d	d	d	d	L	S	d	d	d	d	d	d	d	d	d	d	S
E	e	e	e	e	e	e	e	e	e	e	I		e	e	e	e	e	e	e	e	e	e	
D											K	F											F
	f	f	f	f	f	f	f	f	f	f	E	E	f	f	f	f	f	f	f	f	f	f	E
	g	g	g	g	g	g	g	g	g	g	D	E	g	g	g	g	g	g	g	g	g	g	E
												L											L
	h	h	h	h	h	h	h	h	h	h		I	h	h	h	h	h	h	h	h	h	h	I
	i	i	i	i	i	i	i	i	i	i		N	i	i	i	i	i	i	i	i	i	i	N
	j	j	j	j	j	j	j	j	j	j		G	j	j	j	j	j	j	j	j	j	j	G
												S											S


WARM
COLD
GUARDED
EXPRESSIVE


HELPS OTHERS
HARMS OTHERS
ACTIVE
PASSIVE


HARSH
GENTLE
SUBMISSIVE
DOMINANT

											Encircle your name:	
A	a	a	a	a	a	a	a	a	a	R	_____	(a)
C	b	b	b	b	b	b	b	b	b	E	_____	(b)
C										J		
E	c	c	c	c	c	c	c	c	c	E	_____	(c)
P	d	d	d	d	d	d	d	d	d	C	_____	(d)
T	e	e	e	e	e	e	e	e	e	T	_____	(e)
S										S		
	f	f	f	f	f	f	f	f	f		_____	(f)
O	g	g	g	g	g	g	g	g	g	O	_____	(g)
T										T		
H	h	h	h	h	h	h	h	h	h	H	_____	(h)
E	i	i	i	i	i	i	i	i	i	E	_____	(i)
R	j	j	j	j	j	j	j	j	j	R	_____	(j)
S										S		

[a] Instructions for self and accorded ratings.
[b] Instructions for reflected ratings.

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