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This is to certify that the

thesis entitled

NATIONAL FACTORS AND
INDIGENOUS TELEVISION CULTURE:
THE DEVELOPMENT OF KOREAN TELEVISION

presented by

Young-J00 Moon

has been accepted towards fulﬁllment
of the requirements for

M.A. Telecommunication

degree in

 

 

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To AVOID FINES return on or betore date due.

     

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MSU Is An Affirmative Action/Equal Opportunity Institution

 

 

 

x

NATIONAL FACTORS AND
INDIGENOUS TELEVISION CULTURE :
THE DEVELOPIMENT OF KOREAN TELEVISION

BY

Young-Joo Moon

A THESIS

Submitted to
Michigan State University
in partial fulﬁllment Of the requirements
for the degree of

MAst OF ARTS

Department of Telecommunication
1989

4-1044

or:

I

ABSTRACT

NATIONAL FACTORS AND
INDIGENOUS TELEVISION CULTURE :
THE DEVELOPMENT OF KOREAN TELEVISION

by

Young-JOO Moon

This study examines the development of Korean television,
focusing on the broadcasting structure and programming. The major
purpose is to measure the degree of independence and autonomy in
Korean television culture, in an attempt to contribute to a better
understanding Of the global communication ﬂow and the media growth
of individual countries. Based on the national case-historical design.
archival research and simple categorical content analysis are employed
to investigate the effects Of foreign and domestic forces on the growth
of Korean television. As an analytical tool, two competing theoretical
perspectives, media imperialism and media diffusion, are put forward,
seeking a balanced approach to the questions Of this study. The
research concludes that. in contrast to prevailing assumptions about
the continuing inevitability Of cultural dominance by American media
in the world's television system, Korean television has achieved a
relatively large measure of self-reliance and indigenous cultural
autonomy in control Of its television system and in the creation Of
programming. It also finds that this process has been significantly
inﬂuenced by the national factors Of indigenous cultural preference
and the government cultural policies.

Copyright by
YOUNG-JOO MOON

1989

Accepted by the faculty Of the Department Of
Telecommunication, College Of Communication Arts and
Sciences, Michigan State University, in partial fulfillment
Of the requirements for the Master Of Arts degree.

M/ Zia/z...

Director ofI Thesis

‘3‘,

To my mother and father.
with all my love and gratitude

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I wish to thank Dr. Joseph D. Straubhaar. adviser and chairman
Of this thesis committee. for his support. understanding, and
friendship during my stay at Michigan State University. His wisdom
was essential in guiding this study.

Appreciation is due also to Dr. Charles Steinfield for his
invaluable time and assistance.

A personal thanks goes to Yun Ahn. my ardent friend, who
provided me with helpful comments and encouragement.

Finally, special recognition is given to my parents. Joon-Chule
and Hyang-Lim, for their steadfast love and faith in me.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

 

 

LIST OF TABLES ix
LIST OF FIGURES x
CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION 1

 

CHAPTER II. THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES:
MEDIA IMPERIALRISM versus MEDIA DIFFUSION --- 9

2.1. Causal Mechanisms of Global Imbalance
in Television Programming 9
2. 1 . l . The Imperialistic Interests
of the United States 9
2. 1.2. The Natural Market Force 12
2.2. The Effects Of the One-Way Flow 16
2.2. 1. AThreat to Indigenous Culture 16
2.2.2. The Growth Of Domestic Cultural Capabilities 21
2.3. Toward a More Adequate Analytical Framework 26

CHAPTER III. THE OWNERSHIP AND STRUCTURE
or KOREAN TELEVISION ------------------- 32

 

3. 1. History Of Korean Television 32
3.1.1. Introduction Of Television Broadcasting 32
3.1.2. Formation Of Three National TV Stations 34
3. 1.3. Expansion and Competition of
Commercial TV 37
3.1.4. Adoption Of the Public Broadcasting System 39
3.2. Political Inﬂuence on Korean Television 42

CHAPTER IV. PROGRAMMING ON KOREAN TELEVISION --------- 47

4.1. Program Patterns on Korean Television 47
4.2. Imported Television Programs 56
4.3. Entertainment-Oriented Programming

and Cultural Benefits 66

CHAPTER V. NATIONAL F ACTORSAND THE INTRODUCTION OF
CABLE TELEVISION INTO KOREA 69

 

5.1. Main Contributing Factors to Relative Independence
in Korean Television Programming 69
5. l. 1. Indigenous Cultural Preference 69
5. 1.2. Government Control Of Foreign Content 73
5.3. Cable Television: Concern and Hope 77

 

 

 

CHAPTER VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION —— 83
NOTES 87
REFERENCES — 9 1

LIST OF TABLES

TABLE 1 : PROLIFERATION OF TELEVISION

 

IN KOREA. 1965-1979

TABLE 2 : STANDARD FOR BROADCAST
PROGRAMNIING IN KOREA

 

TABLE 3 : TYPES OF PROGRAMS IMPORTED
BY KOREAN TELEVISION. 1984

 

38

48

61

FIGURE 1 :

FIGUREZ:

FIGURE 3 :

FIGURE4:

FIGURE 5 :

LIST OF FIGURES

THE TREND IN KOREAN TELEVISION

 

PROGRAMMING ———

PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL BROADCAST HOURS
FOR IMPORTED PROGRAMS

 

ON KOREAN TELEVISION

PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL PRIME-TIME HOURS
FOR IMPORTED PROGRAMS

 

ON KOREAN TELEVISION

SOURCES OF IMPORTED PROGRAMS
ON KOREAN TELEVISION

50

57

58

BY NUMBERS AND PERCENTAGES OF IMPORTS, 1984

 

SOURCES OF IMPORTED PROGRAMS

FOR TYPES OF PROGRAM ON KOREAN TELEVISION

64

BY NUMBERS AND PERCENTAGES OF IMPORTS. 1984

 

65

CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

The media Of mass communication have been a major subject of
discussion among national media planners and communication
researchers since the "dominant paradigm" came into prominence in
the mid-19603 as a way to explore the role of communication in
national development.

Through the late 19608, mass communication was Often
considered to be a very powerful. positive. and direct force for national
development. especially in the new, independent nations of the Third
World. At that time. many national policy-makers in the Third World
had high hopes that the new technologies of transistor radio and
television could be harnessed to the overall development process.

However, the practical performance of the communication
technologies in facilitating development did not seem to approach the
announced goals of national integration. socioeconomic modernization.
and authentic cultural self-expression in Latin America. Africa. and
Asia. It was realized that the role Of communication in development is
complex and complementary to social change. but is not
independently powerful (Schramm and Lerner. 1976; Rogers. 1978).

Consequently, the thinking on communication in development
has shifted its major focus to inequitable and dysfunctional social

structures existing in the Third World. and to the dependency
1

relationship between nations within the context of the entire world
political-economic order (McAnany. 1983; Lee. 1980).

Schiller first argued in his inﬂuential book. "Mass Communication
and American Empire" (1969). that the American military-industrial
complex controls the world's communication system in order to
maintain a political. economic, and cultural domination. Shortly after,
Kaarle Nordenstreng and Tapio Varis (1974), in their UNESCO study
Of international television ﬂow during 1972 and 1973, demonstrated
that there was a "one-way ﬂow" of television programs internationally.
from a small number of industrialized Western countries to the rest Of
the world. The empirical evidence of this study has demanded an
examination Of the once taken-for-granted American principle Of "free
ﬂow Of information."

AlOng with this empirical documentation Of the skewed global
distribution of television programs. the Changing milieu Of
international concerns and the corresponding Third World agenda
added a great deal of momentum to the overall discussion Of
international communication and the eventual call for a "New World
Information Order" (Straubhaar. 1983: Lee. 1980; McPhail, 1987.
Smith, 1980). The first change Of world context was the new
adjustment Of the power structure within major international
organizations such as UNESCO (United Nations Educational. Scientiﬁc.
and Cultural Organization) and ITU (International Telecommunications
Union). As the Third World countries .have come to play an important
role in these international organizations where the traditional ideology
of "free ﬂow of information" had been dominated, complaints about the

"one-way ﬂow" Of global communication became salient ‘in the

international debate. Second, with the rise of nationalism in the
Third World countries during the 19605. a parallel concern for control
of their economies, cultures, and media systems was strongly
established (McPhail, 1987). Third, the media's cultural function has
received unprecedented emphasis. for it has been perceived that
cultural control has important implications for political and economic
structures. Many Third World countries also seem to have shifted
priorities from national integration and socioeconomic modernization
to indigenous cultural expression, as they are concerned with the
instrumental use of the themes of traditional culture as a more
effective means Of reaching people (Katz, 1977; Lee. 1980).
Subsequently, international communication researchers have
attempted to analyze the unbalanced global ﬂow of television programs
and the impact Of those imported programs on the indigenous
cultures of the Third World countries. With an enormous growth in
research on the international ﬂow Of imported programs, many
communication researchers have concluded that the one-way ﬂow of
cultural content from a few Western centers, mainly the United States,
to the rest of the world, and increasing dependence Of Third World
countries on Western media products, might result in the dominance
Of alien values, molding the minds Of Third World individuals to ideals.
opinions. and ways of life that are generated by the United States'
capitalistic interests (Schiller, 1969. 1976, 1982; Nordenstreng and
Varis. 1973; Tunstall, 1977; Beltran, 1978; Lee, 1980: Hamelink,
1983). This prevalent assumption has portrayed a vision of inevitable
dominance by American media products, which has brought the Third

World and even some Western European countries worries about the

long-term independent development of their indigenous cultures and
media systems. Furthermore, from this perspective. the prospects for
the future rest on the assumption that new television services like
cable television will also be dominated by imported programs.

Nevertheless. recent studies of the available empirical evidence
demonstrate major changes in the international ﬂow Of television
programs and in Third World media development (Straubhaar. 1981;
Mattos. 1984; Antola and Rogers. 1984; Lee, 1980; Tracey, 1988;
Ogan, 1988). A number Of Third World countries exhibit certain
characteristics in media development which deviate from the
prevailing orthodoxies. Hence, the generalization of prevalent
conclusions--the continuing inevitability of cultural dominance by
American television programs--about the present and the future Of
television in Third World countries is now being questioned by many
critical writers.

It is in this context that my basic research inquiry is based. Has
initial dependence by Korea on the foreign media products created a
reinforced pattern Of dependency. or has it allowed Korean television
to accomplish a relative independence in terms of the broadcasting
system and programming ?

The ultimate goal of this thesis is to analyze precisely the
development of Korean television, within both a national and an
international context, in an attempt to contribute to a better
understanding of the global media ﬂow and Third World media
development.

First Of all, this thesis will attempt to examine thoroughly the

history of Korean television broadcasting, focusing on the ownership

pattern and organizational structure (Chapter III). The cause and
effect of the foreign inﬂuences on Korean television industry will be
investigated. using historical analysis. Furthermore, an attempt will be
made to identify the role of foreign and domestic forces in shaping the
present form Of the Korean television system.

Secondly, it will explore the evolution of television programming
in Korea via archival research and simple categorical content analysis
(Chapter IV). In particular. television programming will be sampled
for a two-week period once every three years. from 1964 to 1988. in
order to measure the proportion of imported versus domestic
television programming in terms Of both number Of broadcast hours
and of prime-time hours. Using selected ideas of both the media
imperialism and the media diffusion perspectives. the degree of
independence and autonomy in Korean television programming will be
gauged.

Finally. this thesis will try to identify some national factors and
their role in the process Of television development and apply those
factors to evaluation of the future of cable television in Korea (Chapter
V). The impact Of the introduction Of cable television on Korean
television culture will be brieﬂy examined by assessing the possibilities
for indigenous cable programming in Korea.

As a research methodology, the present study uses both
qualitative and quantitative analysis, although more emphasis is placed
on the former. Based on the national case-historical design, archival
research and simple categorical content analysis are employed in this
study, utilizing documentary sources and interviews.

As an analytical tool, two competing theoretical perspectives,

media imperialism and media diffusion, will be put forward in this
study. In brief, proponents of media imperialism tend to view the
existing imbalance Of global communication ﬂow as the economic and
ideological dominance of American imperialistic interests. and
therefore a threat to indigenous culture (Schiller, 1969, 1976:
Nordenstreng and Varis, 1973). Media diffusionists, on the other
hand, tend to see the imbalance as only a temporary and positive
process, followed by a relative growth of domestic cultural capabilities
(Read, 1976; Pool, 1977). Both perspectives appear to have merits as
well as demerits in analyzing the international ﬂow of TV programs.
The media imperialism perspective tends to explain the unbalanced
media ﬂow and Third World media development within a global and
external framework, to the exclusion Of internal forces and their
potential role. In contrast. the media diffusion perspective is willing
to put an emphasis on national factors to illuminate the same subject,
but it is not concerned with international politico-economic
relationships and their effect on domestic development. This thesis
argues the respective importance of both perspectives, seeking a
balanced approach to the questions Of this study.

A single interpretation, without danger Of bias, usually can not be
applied to diverse cases. In this sense, national case studies may be a
more useful research design for understanding mass media
development in the Third World and the international ﬂow of
television programs than are more aggregate approaches that follow a
only global perspective (Mattos. 1984). At the same time, two

competing perspectives need to be compounded for a more balanced

analysis.

Since it is felt that the growth of Korean television can be better
appreciated by looking at national factors than at international factors.
this study will be conducted mainly within a national context. It will,
however, also consider the external inﬂuences imposed by the United
States. This thesis will concentrate on the following three specific
research questions :

1. Do the ownership and structure of Korean television still
reﬂect initial foreign inﬂuence? What is the role Of foreign and
domestic forces in the development of a television broadcasting
system in Korea? Is control Of the Korean television industry in
domestic or foreign hands?

2. How has the Korean television industry developed in terms of
programming? Has Korean television, which relied heavily on
imported programming in its early development, increased its
dependence on foreign media products or has it achieved a relatively
large measure of self—reliance and indigenous cultural autonomy in the
creation Of programming? If more programming is being created in
Korea, is it truly "Korean" in nature and thus beneficial to indigenous
television culture?

3. Have national factors played a much larger part in the
development of Korean television than foreign forces? If so, what are
the main contributing national factors identified to explain the relative
independence Of Korean television programming? Will these
particular national factors contribute to future development Of cable
television in culturally Specific ways?

Chapter II will examine the two theoretical perspectives for the

global media ﬂow and summarize some arguments which may have

significance to the concern Of this study. It also argues for the
importance Of in-depth historical analysis for understanding mass

media development.

CHAPTER II

THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES :
MEDIA MERIALISM versus MEDIA DIFFUSION

This chapter will review the two overarching umbrella
perspectives by contrasting their different explanations with respect
to: (1) causal mechanisms Of global imbalance in TV programming and
(2) the effects of the one-way television ﬂow. Then. a critique of both
perspectives will be Offered in an attempt to establish a more adequate

analytical framework for this study.

W
in Television Programming

2.1.1. The Imperialistic Interests Of the United States

Originally the media imperialism perspective grew out Of a
Marxist theory of political economy and dependency.. The basic
assumption is that the national and international power structures
lend themselves to various levels Of class conﬂict between the
economically dominant "cores" and the poor "peripheries"
(Wallerstein, 1979; Frank, 1972). Therefore, the economic
dependency Of the Third World on advanced capitalistic powers
constitutes the central feature Of international power relationships.
and rich capitalistic centers exploit the Third World countries in
order to maintain a political and economic superiority (Schiller, 1969:

10

Lee, 1980).

Relying on this assumption, proponents Of media imperialism
consider that emphasis should be laid on the imperialistic interests of
the United States for understanding the global phenomenon Of
unbalanced TV program ﬂow. They believe that American hegemony
and domination are evident in the present pattern Of the media ﬂow,
in the sense that the United States intentionally imposes its values.
norms, and beliefs upon the other dependent countries through
communication via the mass media. In particular, media imperialism
advocates stress that American TV programs reﬂect the capitalistic
interests Of the senders and not the unanimous output Of the receivers
(Nordenstreng and Varis, 1974: Hamelink, 1983). This proposition
is well presented by Boyd-Barrett's (1977: 117) definition Of "media
imperialism": "the process whereby the ownership. structure.
distribution or content of the media in any one country are singly or
together subject to substantial external pressures from the media
interests of any other country or countries without proportionate
reciprocation of inﬂuence by the country so affected." Thus. the
one-way ﬂow of TV products from the United States to the Third
World, and the dependency relationship that could be established by
the importation Of foreign TV programs, can be interpreted as an
intended effort by the United States to perpetuate political. economic.
and cultural domination.

More detailed attention has been drawn to the role played by the
American transnational corporations in determining the ﬂow Of TV
programs. It is certain that the transnational media corporations

contribute considerably to the present imbalance Of global TV ﬂows.

11

Proponents Of media imperialism have pointed out that the American
transnational corporations have great control over international
ﬁnances. technology. and marketing by exerting their great economic
power which is gained from the enormous size of their national
market. Media imperialism advocates maintain that the control and
concentration Of resources and infrastructure by transnational
corporations significantly affect the freedom and democratization of
international communication by wielding decisive inﬂuence in the
international marketplace (Tunstall, 1977; Schement et al., 1984).
Moreover, in their Opinion, such concentration and
transnationalization tend to create international monopolies and
standardization in media products, which may establish a worldwide
uniformity in ideas, values, life-styles, and consumer behavior.

A more critical argument is that the American transnational
corporations fully collaborate with American political. financial. and
military circles and have a mutual interest with them (Schiller, 1969;
Hamelink, 1983). The capitalistic self-interest of transnational
corporations tallies with the imperialistic interests of the United
States. Accordingly, in the view of the radical writers, the
transnational corporations willingly strive to expand American foreign
and defense policies. including international military control,
electronic surveillance, and homogenized American commercial
culture, to Third World countries on the behalf of the US.
government.

Furthermore, analysts of media imperialism claim that the local
ruling elites in the Third World play the role of the intermediaries for
the global spreading of metropolitan cultures. If the interests Of elites

12

in the Third World ﬂt those Of international capitalism, they will
introduce the cultural system Of the hegemonic centers, and impose
metropolitan culture on the rest Of the population (Salinas and Paldan.
1979). Thus, the imperialistic interests of the external capitalist
powers are adopted and incorporated by internal ruling elites into
Third World.

In summary. the present global media ﬂow of TV programs is
criticized as an explicit manifestation of the American hegemony and
will to dominate the Third World. As the agents of capitalist
expansion, the American transnational corporations aggravate the
international ﬂow of TV programs and perpetuate the dependency Of
the Third World. The proponents Of the media imperialism
perspective add that those media corporations seek to disseminate a
great deal of American TV programs which represent the
communication interests of the ruling classes, both external and
internal. The values and images contained in those alien programs are
seemingly Opposed to the interests Of the majority of the people in the
Third World, and therefore jeopardize cultural autonomy. What is
more. critical writers indicate that the local ruling class is the crucial
link between American imperialistic interests and exploited people in
the Third World.

2.1.2. The Natural Market Force
As an alternative to the media imperialism perspective, the
media diffusion perspective has a directly opposite implication for the
global media ﬂow (Lee. 1980). Basically, the media diffusion

perspective is evolved from the anthropological theory of cultural

13

diffusion. Anthropologists have analyzed the process Of cultural
diffusion to show that all cultures owe many of their elements to
borrowing from other cultures. They believe that internal processes
such as invention and discovery can account for only a part of the total
inventory Of any sociocultural system. and that the diffusing cultural
items provide the basis for much Of the culture (Malinowski, 1945:
Benedict, 1959: Schwartz and Ewald. 1968). The borrowing culture
reinterprets the diffusing item to ﬁt its existing patterns and makes it
quite different from its original state (Schwartz and Ewald. 1968:
Lauer, 1973; Pool, 1977). Media diffusionists hold this position.
They argue that sociocultural development accrues to a nation from an
open interaction with metropolitan culture. Mass media. for them,
play a leading role in the domestic cultural growth Of the Third World
because they provide greater opportunities to adopt a vast amount of
cultural information and knowledge from most of the world's major
cultural areas on a continuing basis (UNESCO, 1982). When members
Of a society are faced with diffusion Of a component Of culture, it is
argued. they will either modify the component to adapt it to their
culture or reject it in response to their cultural need.

Anchored in this theory, proponents of the media diffusion
perspective seem to understand the existing imbalance of global
television programs as the initial process of interaction with foreign
cultures. The present structure of production and distribution is in its
infancy. and will grow as the century proceeds and the television
market evolves (Tracey, 1988). 'In their Opinion, if the free ﬂow of
information is genuinely guaranteed, the present uneven ﬂow will be

self-correcting and eventually will result in the cultural growth Of the

14

Third World countries (Lee. 1980: Read. 1976; Pool, 1977).

This explanation seems to concur with the cultural implications
of the "product life cycle" theory. The business-organization model of
the product life cycle predicts that the early monopolistic situation of
American transnational corporation expansion will later reverse itself
as the foreign media companies begin to have the ability to produce
their own programs. It also predicts that local companies will have a
distinct advantage in the competition for an audience. due to the
relative appeal of the domestically produced programs to national
populations (Vernon, 1971; Read. 1976: Pool, 1977; Straubhaar.
1983: Mattos. 1984; Schement et al., 1984: Lee, 1980: Tracey.
1988).

Based on this line of thought, proponents Of the media diffusion
perspective explain the existing unbalanced ﬂow of TV programs
chieﬂy as the result Of natural market forces. Read (1976) is one Of
the key writers to have applied the product life cycle theory to the
global media ﬂow in order to account for global expansion Of
transnational corporations. He argues that the condition affecting the
global media ﬂow is the great ability and inclination Of American mass
media merchants to sell their media commodities in foreign markets.
where demands for their products are governed by political,
economic, social, and cultural factors. In fact, American multinational
corporations have entered the international marketplace with
abundant resources derived from a communication-intense native
society. Such a firm national base gives the United States a
comparative advantage, facilitating expansion into the international
market. Therefore, the global expansion Of American multinational

15

corporations is the consequence Of the technological capability and
the marketing ability Of the big American companies to provide a
product or service at the lowest price in the international
marketplace.

As regards the impact Of transnational corporations, Read (1976:
180-191) suggests that there are fair benefits to both American
transnational corporations and their consumers. The parties
separately expect rewards for their participation. This implies that
the Third World countries Offer access to transnational corporations in
return for their expectations being rewarded. Within their limited
economic situation, the Third World countries can purchase American
programs for less than the cost of producing local programs. and
thereby satisfy the local audience. He adds that the host government
and consumers in the Third World have a strong bargaining position.
Local consumers. according to his argument. adjust or terminate the
foreign program importation by all possible means, including quotas.
censorship, bans. and boycotts, when their expectations are
inadequately fulﬁlled.

Moreover, as soon as the Third World countries learn and adapt
the technology and culture from abroad, the domestic cultural industry
begins to produce its own product. in the native language and with
local relevance. and thereby wins the bulk Of the audience,
terminating the monopolies that the American enterprises enjoyed at
the outset (Pool, 1977; Read, 1976).

In the view Of media diffusionists, the activities of the
multinational media corporations are not necessarily collaborative with

the US. government. Rather, American transnational corporations act

16

mainly from the pure motive Of profit maximization (Lee. 1980).

In sum, the demands of the Third World countries for the
plentiful supply of inexpensive media products, together with the
ability of the United States to provide media content more cheaply
than its international competitors. contributes to the global expansion
of American transnational media corporations. This expansion results
in the one-way ﬂow Of TV programs. Media diffusionists, as
represented by Read (1976). believe that American transnational
corporations contribute to the decision-making processes affecting
sociocultural development in the Third World through the
marketplace system by which they make deals with foreign

consumers.

-W 1 1 w
2.2.1. AThreat to Indigenous Culture

Proponents of the media imperialism perspective Claim that the
one-way ﬂow Of television programs from a small number of Western
countries, mainly the United States, to the rest Of the World and the
increasing dependence Of Third World media system on the imported
foreign material jeopardizes a country’s national identity and
indigenous culture.

They stress that the United States strives to propagate
exogenous cultures using television programs in order to induce Third
World countries to accept capitalist values and behaviors. It seems
necessary to inﬂuence the attitudes. desires, beliefs, lifestyles. and
consumer patterns of those 1 who consume the imported media

products to maintain a global communication hegemony and cultural

17

domination (McPhail, 1987). Sarti (1981) contends that the task of.
the mass media as instruments Of the process Of ideological
domination is to disseminate values that are guided by the capitalistic
interests of hegemonic centers and that are opposed to the national
interests of Third World countries. The Third World countries are
incorporated into the market-oriented capitalist world economies by
the powerful U.S. transnational corporations. As mentioned
previously, these big American ﬁrms are held to be responsible for the
global spreading Of synchronized TV programs. Writers such as
Hamelink (1983: 6) note that : "Transnational firms consider national
boundaries politically. economically, and culturally Obsolete and unable
to define business requirements or consumer trends. The world is
one marketplace and the world consumer is essential for that market.
World market and world consumer demand an optimal
synchronization of cultural values so that authentic national
characteristics do not jeopardize the unity Of the transnational
system." Therefore. the transnational corporations have no regard for
national culture and content diversity, and force a global
synchronization of television culture to guarantee the imperialistic
interests of the United States.

Analysts Of media imperialism emphasize that the values
inherent in the homogenized TV content seriously affects a nation's
cultural autonomy. They maintain that US. TV programs reﬂect
American middle-class values and aspirations, which have nothing to
do with the genuine culture Of the Third World. Heavy doses Of these
foreign cultural values. many conclude, would threaten indigenous

cultural values and traditions.

18

Beltran (1978: 79-81), in his study touching on program content
of Latin America television, asserts that the intoxicating TV images
that assail the mind of Latin Americans are. to a large extent, "made in
the U.S.A.." These TV images that foster the cultural values Of an
advanced capitalist society contribute to selling both consumer goods
and a "way Of life" based on the norms of that capitalist society
(Williams, 1975).

Other writers such as Lee (1980: 100-108) note that the
imposition of alien cultural values may contribute to externally forced
changes in common thinking about society. human relations, and life.
For example, US. TV programs present an ideology of consumption
that may nourish aspirations and expectations that are difficult to
satisfy given the low income of the majority Of the population in the
Third World (O'Brien, 1974; Sarti, 1981: Beltran. 1977). According
to this argument. this "consumerism" introduced by foreign programs
may bring about mass frustration and disintegration of society, which
results in the continuing underdevelopment Of the Third World.

In addition, it is argued that the strong presence of cheap and
polished American media products may impede any effort toward
utilizing local resources and stimulating local talents in the
development of an indigenous cultural industry. Thus, such foreign
media products contribute to perpetuation of a long-term dependence
of Third World economies and cultures on the American media
industry.

On the other hand. Nordenstreng and Varis (1973) argue that
media programs which originate in the United States minimize the
portrayal of class conﬂict and serve to make illegitimate the concrete

19

social alternatives to capitalistic society. It is noteworthy that the
radical writers tend to suggest the so-called "socialist alternative" as
the way to achieve national identity and cultural autonomy.

In short, proponents Of the media imperialism viewpoint
consider the existing one-way ﬂow Of TV programs as the intended
cultural domination Of the United States. TO them, the consequences
of the present TV ﬂow are deemed undesirable because the
importation of a vast amount Of American TV programs results in
dominance Of alien values over the domestic culture. and therefore
contributes to furthering the present dependence Of the Third World
on the dominant culture.

Concurrently, analysts Of media imperialism claim that the
expansion of new communication technologies does not seem to
change the current global ﬂow Of television programs. Varis (1984:
152) argues: "The new communication technologies may offer some
alternatives for the future. But they may also serve only to widen the
gap between those who have access to information and the means Of
using it and inﬂuencing others. and those who do not have these
capabilities. If access to information is dependent solely on wealth
and income, no change in this current ﬂow Of information seems likely
in the future".

There is a widespread belief that the introduction of new
communication technologies--cable television, direct broadcasting
satellites. video cassette recorders--add a great number Of new
channels primarily ﬁlled with foreign material, thus increasing the
Third World's importation Of US. TV programs. It is Obvious that the

extension Of media infrastructure is only feasible if there is a

20

corresponding extension Of the media content. Grounded in this
belief, radical writers argue that the introduction of new media
systems may create not only one more means of control, whose sole
Objective is cultural domination, but also a reinforced pattern of
dependency (Nordenstreng and Varis, 1973: Schiller, 1976: Varis,
1984; Sarti, 1981: Hoffmann-Rein, 1987). At the same time. they
stress the adverse effects stemming from the current form of
technology transfer (Tunstall, 1977 : Hamelink, 1983). It is argued
that when a communication technology is imported, inevitably, its
supporting social structure is introduced. Hamelink (1983: 17)
claims: "many countries, in choosing to adapt U.S. radio and television
technology, have also introduced the United States model Of
commercial media. This structure was originally designed to suit
specific United States commercial interests." Hence. the introduction
Of new technologies often can not effectively represent the interest Of
the developing countries. In particular. advanced communication
technologies such as satellite broadcasting and cable television. by
their capital-intensive and technologically sophisticated nature, may
introduce a complex array of factors into the development process,
which may hamper rather than facilitate certain desired outcomes
(Clippinger, 1975).

To sum up, proponents Of the media imperialism perspective
arguing from the radical viewpoint, conclude that the present
unbalanced TV ﬂow constitute an extreme threat to indigenous
culture. The expansion of new communication technologies, in their
Opinion, serves the capitalistic interests Of the hegemonic centers as

one more means Of cultural control.

21

2.2.2. The Growth Of Domestic Cultural Capabilities

Contrary to the media imperialism perspective, proponents Of
the media diffusion perspective argue that the outcome of the present
TV ﬂows is beneﬁcial to the recipient nations Of the Third World.

As discussed previously. the foreign inﬂux Of media products
Offers great Opportunities for contact with a wealth of cultural
information that is not available at home. Media diffusionists believe
that, in most cases. the diffusing items are modified to suit to the
recipient culture because the process of adaptation is selective and
accommodative. The new items are given meaning in the terms Of the
borrowing culture. In this way, the borrowing culture absorbs
elements from other cultures into a native organism to develop the
existing cultural heritage (Schwartz and Ewald. 1968: 433-458).

From this point of view, media diffusionists contend that an
open interaction with foreign culture is essential for sociocultural
development. The present unbalanced ﬂow, for them, is only a
temporary process and will Change soon to a more diverse ﬂow.

Pool says, in his inﬂuential article, "The Changing Flow Of
Television" (1977), that there is a cycle of initial dependence on
interaction with the source culture, but that that is followed by a
relative growth of domestic cultural capabilities. He also suggests that
this cultural growth is nurtured by the local cultural preferences. In
his opinion, if other things are equal. local consumers pick local
products, which have the great advantage of familiar common language
and cultural traits, and Of social support.

Read (1976) has a similar viewpoint. He points out two major
reasons for the Third World's importation Of US. TV programs. First,

22

the price of importing U.S.—made programs is much cheaper than that
of using domestically produced one. Second. the initial audience for
television in any society is usually composed Of a wealthy elite that can
afford to buy a TV set and whose tastes tend to be cosmopolitan.
Hence. a foreign broadcaster depends on the United States as the
most readily available source for TV programs at the early stage Of TV
development. However. according to Read (1976: 91), as the local

television industry grows. a new situation develops:

As foreign television systems matured, just as had the
American system, their audience base broadened. they
increased the number Of telecasting hours. and they
acquired more wherewithal to do their own productions
that had greater local appeal. This development did not
necessarily diminish the amount of imported
programming, but rather the kind. With more air time to
fill, the inexpensive import remained desirable, but the
type Of shows preferred changed. Whereas at ﬁrst any
film, almost irrespective of its political/cultural
dimensions. could be exported, the new situation reduced
the scope of the international telefilm market to
entertainment action- adventures. Foreign stations could
and would do their own musical comedies, soap Operas,
and political documentaries. What they still could not
afford to do was what Hollywood did so well: the western
with the great exterior scenes, the cops and robbers story
with a big chase. and the dramatic adventure with special
production effects.

The free ﬂow TV programs may impose initial constraints on
indigenous cultures in the Third World. but will bring about eventual
cultural enrichment. Given the labor-intensive nature of the TV
industry. the initial advantages of the US. programs can not last long.
Locally produced programs will gradually get ahead Of foreign
programs in the Third World due to the natural force Of local cultural
tastes. and thus contribute to indigenous cultural expression.

23

Analysts of media diffusion tend to place emphasis not only on
the development of new exporting centers within Latin America, Asia,
and Europe but also on the decreasing dependence of some Third
World countries on US. TV programs (Mattos. 1984; Antola and
Rogers, 1984: Tracey,1988). They point out the success Of new
production centers such as Brazil, Mexico, Egrpt. and Hong Kong as a
positive outcome of the free ﬂow of TV programs and media diffusion.
The reverse media ﬂow via the Spanish International Network (SIN) to
the United States is favorably cited to support media diffusionists'
arguments.

Furthermore. Pool (1977) claims that those new production
centers will originate from countries which encourage free ﬂow and
free development in the future. Those nationalist. authoritarian
governments that use the slogan of national integrity to resist change.
in his opinion, are chieﬂy responsible for cultural backwardness. That
is, cultural protectionism is usually self-defeating and pays the price Of
mediocrity and primitiveness. Preferably, the free inﬂow of foreign TV
programs permits the greatest amount of individual Choice and
improvement in domestic cultural capabilities.

Particularly, media diffusionists argue that the marketplace
system enhances the prospects for the free ﬂow Of information to be
genuinely free (Read, 1976). They claim that, in the marketplace
system, it is the producers who conform to the consumer's taste, and
that it has never been possible to impose a type of cultural product or
service on users against their will (UNESCO, 1982). Accordingly, in
their view, American programs abroad reﬂect world cultural tastes and

have international human appeal, given the ability of American

24

transnational corporations to make their products universally available.

However. American mass media do not seem to have the power
to bring about adoption Of values contrary to Third World audiences'
true beliefs (Read, 1976). Foreign television content can provide
alternative cultural values, but it can not effectively impel audiences to
change their cultural values against their will. Depending on the
audience's cultural needs, a diffusing item Of foreign culture can be
rejected, modified for adoption. or accepted as it is. Therefore,
according to this argument, the importation of foreign TV programs,
which has a strong economic rationale given their low cost, appears to
have little adverse cultural impact.

In brief, media diffusionists contend that Open interaction with
metropolitan culture, specifically foreign inﬂow Of US. TV programs,
results in long-term cultural growth in the Third World.

Viewed in the same light, proponents Of media diffusion assert
that new communication technologies increase the importation of a
wide variety Of foreign programs of specialized kinds which are not
available domestically. Pool (1977: 148) argues: "Specialized material
for diverse audiences may be produced in many places in many
countries. and may in time be distributed economically to local
redistribution channels by taking advantage Of the new technology of
satellites and cassettes." He believes that new communication
technologies will aid more the development of multiple cultural
centers than the concentration of world production centers in
relatively few places. In his opinion, the development Of cable
television or video cassettes creates a variety of specialized local

channels These local distribution channels are linked by the satellites.

25

The satellite transmission increases the importation of international
programs which Oﬂ'er diverse cultural information and knowledge. In
addition, thanks to the development of cheap TV cameras and
inexpensive editing equipment Of good quality. local producers in the
Third World can more economically produce their own materials.
Indeed. new technolog may promote local origination of TV programs
by reducing the economic burden Of production equipment.

In a similar vein. Ogan (1988) argues that substantial changes in
media delivery systems expand the range Of choice beyond the more
limited selection of broadcast administrators and theater owners.
Particularly, the availability and spread of the videocassette recorder in
developing countries, according to Ogan's study Of VCRs in Turkey.
encourage the production of more culturally authentic materials and
their distribution outside the centralized mass media system.

Moreover, the new channels, using a considerable amount Of US.
material, may increase the amount of viewing and advertising revenue.
Based on Bekkers'(1987) research, Tracey (1988) points out that the
extra viewing is going not to the new channels. but rather to the
traditional domestic channels, and that the potential growth in
advertising is national rather than transnational. He then suggests that
the strength Of national cultures. the power Of language and tradition,
and the force that ﬂows within national boundaries should be carefully
taken into consideration, in assessing the likely success Of new
communication technologies such as cable, DB8, and the VCR. This
implies that what makes the new technologies viable is a national
productive force that is attuned to local audience's tastes.

In sum, analysts of media diffusion claim that the free ﬂow Of

26

media eventually leads to indigenous cultural development. For them,
if the free ﬂow Of information is genuinely guaranteed. the present
one-way ﬂow of TV programs will change expeditiously to a more
adequate and balanced ﬂow. The introduction of new communication
technologies, in their view, would not only aid the development Of
diverse cultural centers but also contribute to the relative growth Of
cultural capabilities in the Third World.

w M l r w r

Both perspectives have been put forward by various writers. and
are considered to be a very important theoretical base for explaining
not only the imbalance of the international communication ﬂow but
also the development Of mass media in the Third World. However, it
is fair to say that the media imperialism perspective has attracted the
research interest of communication scholars more than has the media
diffusion perspective. though its preeminence has obviously
diminished in recent years.

Proponents Of the media imperialism viewpoint have tried to
place the analysis Of the media in the context Of the international
extension of capital, unmasking the liberal rhetoric of the "free ﬂow of
information" (Lee, 1980: Sarti, 1981). It is true that the media
imperialism perspective has made a valuable contribution to diagnosis
of the inequity and inadequacy in international communications.
However, this radical perspective seems to have at least three serious
ﬂaws.

First, the media imperialism perspective tends to put emphasis

on the world-system analysis to the neglect of the complex internal

27

dynamics Of individual recipient nations (Lee. 1980: Katz and Wedell,
1977; Tunstall, 1977; Mattos. 1984). Analysis Of media imperialism
appears to overlook the importance of national factors, such as
government policies and national cultural preference that a country
may have, in counteracting foreign inﬂuence. If this perspective does
not consider national variations, it is in danger Of being used to
understand everything in general about the media in the Third World
and hence nothing in particular (Ogan, 1988). While there are some
countries that are heavily dependent on foreign programs, there are
also some that are relatively self-reliant in TV programming.

Second, there appears to be unrealistic policy prescriptions in
their suggestions on how to redress the imbalance in global media
ﬂow. Proponents Of the media imperialism perspective have argued
for isolation from the world capitalist system and its dominant
cultures (Schiller, 1976: Read, 1976: Lee. 1980). Lee (1980)
contends that socialized central control does not necessarily present a
possible alternative to media imperialism, citing as an example China's
media policy and practices. Hence. media imperialism seems to fail to
provide viable policy solutions to the problem Of the existing
dependency relationship.

Third, proponents of the media imperialism viewpoint often
assume that US. television programs are popular, and that these U.S.
programs have an impact on the cultural orientation of Third World
viewers. However. there seems to be considerable evidence that local
viewers basically prefer national programming (Read, 1976: Pool,
1977; Straubhaar. 1983: Lee, 1980: Mattos. 1984; Tracey, 1988).
The radical writers tend to ignore the possibilities for viewers to avoid

28

foreign programs when local programs are available. Moreover,
although media may play an important role, it is not possible to impose
cultural values on viewers against their true beliefs (Read, 1976). Katz
(1984: 32) argues: "The reading Of a TV program is a process Of
negotiation between the story on the screen and the culture Of the
viewers themselves." Indeed. it seems that the potential cultural
impact Of media content may vary depending on the relationship
between the cultural values Of the imported programs and those Of the
domestic viewers. The importation Of foreign programs does not
necessarily establish a set Of foreign cultural values in the minds of
Third World viewers. In other words. foreign programs alone are not
so powerful as to affect the cultural values Of the Third World
audience. because television is only one small factor among many other
social factors that affect society and its culture.

On the other hand, the media diffusion perspective, which views
the unbalanced media ﬂow as a result of global market forces. also has
its critics. Lee (1980: 63) claims: "The more conservative element of
non-Marxist analysts appears to defend the established interests Of the
strong nations under an illusion Of a bright and rosy future. That time
and market will not automatically take care Of the present inequity in
media production and distribution if no actions are to be taken
resolutely by the nations involved does not deter them at all." The
ideological roots of the media diffusion perspective appear to be
closely related to the "free ﬂow" principle of the United Nations
Universal Declaration on Human Rights (1948). This principle
stresses the individual's right to information through any media,
regardless Of frontiers. Accordingly, the individual's right to

29

information is considered to be Of greater importance than the
nation's right to protect its borders. However, the development
process and strategies Of the Third World are considerably different
from those of advanced Western countries. Given the weak social,
political, and economic background Of the Third World, government
leading Of purposive and planned development may bring about more
fruitful results. Third World countries have the right to protect their
cultures from the inﬂow of what they deem undesirable. Under the
existing political and economic dependency structures Of international
relationships. the free ﬂow of media means consolidating the interests
Of the advanced Western centers in the international marketplace.
Underdeveloped countries may suffer from negative consequences
economically and culturally before positive benefits are in sight (Lee,
1980). Therefore, the media diffusion perspective can be criticized
for overemphasis on the positive function of open interaction and for
reluctance to recognize fundamental political and economic
dependency dynamics.

In conclusion, different theoretical lenses provide different
explanations for the global media ﬂow. Both perspectives, which
respectively contain valid points Of arguments, appear to function as
valuable theoretical frameworks for discussing the relative causes and
effects of the unbalanced global TV programming. However, problems
remain with both of the extreme perspectives. It seems that both
competing perspectives usually oversimplify their arguments, and lack
concrete empirical Observation. In particular, the media imperialism
perspective, and to some extent the media diffusion perspective. tend

to explain the global media ﬂow and Third World media development

30

within an international context. Even though the media diffusion
perspective inclines to assign more weight to internal conditions
existing in individual Third World countries, it still depends for its
explanation largely on international market forces. National factors
that inﬂuence the media ﬂows are disregarded by both perspectives.
Katz and Wedell (1977) are two Of the few scholars to demonstrate the
importance Of national variations. They recognize the varying degrees
Of media dependency relationships, which are inﬂuenced by the
interaction Of foreign and domestic forces. Autonomous domestic
forces may play an important role in the development Of media by
withstanding foreign inﬂuence on the indigenous culture.

What is needed at this point seems to be a concrete analysis of
speciﬁc national historical contexts, in which the global perspective Of
the nation is maintained. Straubhaar (1981, 1982, 1983. 1984,
1989a) is very instructive in this respect. His historical analysis Of
Brazilian TV studies the increasing power of the Brazilian forces
within its TV industry compared with foreign forces. His research
reveal the asymmetrical interdependence of Brazilian TV , focusing on
the inﬂuence Of the national government and the dynamics Of industry
actors, but considering the effects of foreign inﬂuences.

Indeed, neither perspective appears to be able to explain
properly TV development in many Third world countries, since they
do not consider the internal dynamics Of individual nations in a
historical way. It seems to me that an appropriate synthesis of both
perspectives. as well as in-depth historical analysis of specific cases,
would provide more adequate explanations for both the media

development Of individual countries in particular and for the global

31

media ﬂow in general. It is within this analytical framework that the
development Of Korean television will be examined. National factors
contributing to media development in Korea, valid points Of each
perspective that may have significance in the case of Korea, can both
be analyzed in order to aid recognition Of points in common with
other countries.

The following chapter will analyze thoroughly the historical
development of Korean television, focusing on its ownership and
structure. An attempts will be made to analyze foreign and domestic

inﬂuences on the television system in Korea.

CHAPTER III

OWNERSHIP AND STRUCTURE OF KOREAN TELEVISION

As a basis for the evaluation of Korean television programming,
this chapter will investigate the television broadcasting history and
processes that led to the current situation in Korea with respect to
ownership and structure. The major focus will be to present the role
of foreign and domestic forces in the development Of the television

broadcasting system in Korea.

ammmmuamam

3.1.1. Introduction of Television Broadcasting:
1956-1960

Television broadcasting in Korea began on May 12, 1956.1 The
Radio Corporation Of America (RCA) first established a commercial
television station called "Korea-RCA Distributor" (KORCAD) to promote
the purchase of television receivers and transmitting equipment.
Since the American domestic market for television was almost
completely saturated by the late 19505. big American media
corporations sought new foreign markets for their finished products.
As a way to secure additional foreign markets, RCA was actively
engaged in activities that would assure them the ownership of foreign
television stations (Lee, 1980: 83-100). KORCAD can be seen as a
product Of such activities.

32

33

However, KORCAD did not work well in Korea. a small poor
country torn by the Korean War (1950-1953). Although "radio with
moving pictures" attracted many Korean's attention, most Koreans
could not afford the "luxurious" television receivers. Moreover, few
advertisers were willing to invest in television advertising. Given the
fact that KORCAD adopted the American model of commercial
broadcasting, which entirely depended on advertising revenue as a
financial base for broadcasting. those internal conditions seriously
threatened KORCAD'S ﬁnancial viability. At that time. the total number
of television receivers in Korea was less than 300 sets. and this
extremely small market never supported commercial television
broadcasting (Kim, 1983). In fact, RCA was not invited at the outset to
Offer technical assistance or consultancy work in Korea, where local
business capital was not available for initiation Of television
broadcasting. It invited itself, to guarantee additional foreign markets.
It did not achieve this goal due to the poor internal conditions Of
Korea.

This poor proﬂt picture made RCA hand over its television
business to Gi-Young Chang, the owner of Hankuk Ilbo (Korea Times).
in May, 1957.2 Gi-Young Chang Opened a commercial television
station by the name of "Dae-Han Broadcasting Corporation" (DBC).
which was set up using domestic private capital and former KORCAD
personnel. Since DBC embraced the US. commercial model Of
management, it continuously had financial difficulties in Operating its
station due to very limited advertising revenue. For example, DBC
itself sustained fifty percent Of its total programming while national
advertisers (30%) and the United States Information Service (USIS)

34

(20%) supported the rest of the programming (Choi. 1979: 69-71).

As for the programming pattern Of DBC, the American
commercial style emphasizing . entertainment was continued (Hwang,
1982: Choi. 1985). The programming of DBC can be characterized by:
(1) emphasis on entertainment programming, which accounted for
approximately half Of the total programming; (2) strengthening of
news programming with the assistance of Hankuk Ilbo, the DBC's
parent newspaper company: and (3) evidence Of a sincere endeavor to
produce its own programming, in contrast to KORCAD (Park, 1985:
342-345: Ma, 1985: 75-76).

Unfortunately, in spite Of steady efforts in programming and
station management. DBC was destroyed by ﬁre in 1959. After 1959.
until DBC drew down its curtain in 1961, it broadcast only twenty
minutes a day through "American Forces Korea Network" (AFKN)
which was established in 1957 for the purpose Of encouragement and
entertainment to the US. Armed Forces in Korea. Although DBC'S
audience was very small, about 8,000 TV sets in 1960. this limited
broadcasting through AFKN'S channel seems to have induced Koreans
to watch more US. programs (Park, 1985: 345-347).

3.1.2. Formation of Three National TV Stations:
1961-1969

In December 1961, Chung-Hee Park's revolutionary military
government, which took over power through a coup d'e- tat, launched
the state-owned "Korean Broadcasting System" (KBS) in Seoul. The
government recognized the importance of ‘mass media as an

instrument of the revolutionary tasks. High priority was given to the

35

expansion of mass media systems, in the sense that that not only did
the mass media effectively orchestrate government development plans
and messages but they also helped to create the necessary climate of
political support.

Accordingly. the government played an active role in promoting
the mass media system. particularly television. For example, despite
Korea's uncertain economic situation in late 1961, the government
contracted with RCA for the technical facilities Of KBS and approved
the importation Of 20,000 television sets from the United States and
Japan to ensure rapid diffusion Of television. One possible explanation
for the selection Of RCA was that the company was perhaps the only
one that could provide a complete television system by the speciﬁc
date (Annual Report Of KBS, 1963: 219: Boyd, 1982: 33-50).

When KBS started its regular broadcasting. the poverty Of the
national economy made it difficult to support the cost Of the
state-owned television service. Under the deficit operation of the
early stage, KBS accepted advertising as a way to finance its TV
broadcasting service. As another means Of ﬁnancial support,
subscription fees were also collected from the owners of television
sets. Thanks to the profit-making proposition of single-channel
commercial Operation. KBS gradually grew and expanded into a
national network by 1966.

The lucrative proﬁt picture Of KBS and promising future of the
television industry incited commercial interests to participate in the
formation of commercial television companies. It is also possible that
major business companies looked at the potential Of television in

gaining political weapons for the protection Of their commercial

36

interests.

"Tong-Yang Broadcasting Corporation" (TBC) was established in
1964 as a commercial station by Byung-Chule Lee. a private
entrepreneur of Samsung Industrial Group. TBC primarily relied on
the domestic electronics industry for its broadcasting equipment
because Korea's hard currency holdings in the mid-19603 discouraged
TBC from purchasing foreign equipment (Park, 1985: 360).

In 1969, the "Mun-Wha Broadcasting Corporation" (MBC), which
soon became the leading force in commercial television, followed TBC.
The 5.16 Foundation was a heavy stockholder, while business
enterprises such as Lucky, SSangyong, and Dong-A Group Shared the
remaining stocks.3 With improved economic conditions, MBC could
set up its system by importing advanced foreign broadcasting
equipment from the United States (Ampex) and the United Kingdom
(Pye TVT) (Hwang, 1982: 238).

Thus, by 1969, three television systems--KBS, TBC, and
MBC--were ﬁrmly erected and put into Operation in Korea. It is worth
noting here that two commercial TV stations, TBC and MBC, were
strongly linked not only to the high-ranking politicians but also to
other media outlets such as radio and newspaper (Won, 1984:
126-127). Although this close linkage Of political and business elites
might have contributed to rapid construction and expansion of both
commercial stations, it has impeded long-term independent

development of the media system.

37

3.1.3. Expansion and Competition of Commercial W:
1970-1979

Following the lead Of KBS, TBC and MBC threw their efforts into
creating a nationwide network organization. In the early 19703. both
commercial stations rapidly expanded into national networks, building
local affiliated stations in the major cities Of the country. Concomitant
with the expansion Of the television networks. the national TV
receiver industry was boosted and developed in response to the
increasing local demand for television sets. Further aided by
government policies of raising the living standard of the people
through a series of Five-year Economic Plans. television soon came
into wide use as a mass medium (see Table 1).

With the quantitative expansion of television broadcasting, many
scholars and experts have questioned its performance in terms of
quality. for two reasons. First. there was a lack of fairness in news
programs. The information function Of television was paralyzed due to
severe control Of news programs by the ruling regime. The watch dog
role of media took a back seat. while priority was given exclusively to
"national security" and "rapid economic development" (Nam. 1983b).
Second. two commercial broadcasters suffered from content
homogeneity in low quality programming. As KBS became proﬁtable
solely through the collection of license fees, it decided to withdraw
advertising from its broadcasting in 1969. From that time, there was
fierce head-on competition between the two commercial networks for
advertising revenue. The two commercial broadcasters pitted the
same kind of popular programs against each other in an attempt to

draw viewers from each other. Such a struggle resulted in an overload

38

of serial dramas which could build audience loyalty at a low cost, and

in turn drove the stations toward a majority of their programming

being low-quality.

TABLE 1
PROLIFERATION OF TELEVISION IN KOREA, 1965-1979

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Year Total # of Penetration
Registered per UrbanAreas RuralAreas
TV Sets Household
1% 31.701 0.6% 1000 % 0.0 0/6
1% W 0.8% 100096 0.0 0/6
1W 73.34 1.3% 100.0% 0.0%
1% 1 18.262 2.1 % 1m.0% 0.0%
1% 223% 3.9 % 1w.0% 0.0 0/6
1970 379.564 6.4 % 94.5 % 5.5 %
1W1 616.3% 10.2 % Q0 % 8.0 %
1972 $5.363 14.7 % a). 1 % 9.9 0/6
1973 1.282. 122 20.7 % 86.7 % 13.3 %
1974 1.618.617 26.0 % 82.5 % 17.5 %
1975 MID” 314 % 77.3 % 22.7 %
' 1% 239.131 41.1 % 71.7% 3.3%
1977 3M535 55.7 % $7 % 313 %
19,8 5. 135.4% 70.7 % 66.6 % $3.4 %
1979 5.696.256 78.5 % 63.7 % 363 %

 

SOURCE: Ministry of Culture and Information. Republic of Korea: W
Waiter: (1979: 215).

In response to the prevailing criticism about the low quality
programming, KBS was eventually converted to a public-managed
system under the Revised Broadcasting Act Of 1973, emphasizing a

39

more informative and educational role for KBS. Shortly\aftg/./the
government also provided certain guidelines on TV programming for
all three networks, which resulted in the reduction Of the number of
serial dramas (Kim, 1983: 39).

Despite such restrictions. commercial TV broadcasting with
entertainment programming continued to grow rapidly. As
mentioned. the two commercial stations. TBC and MBC. were built
around an alliance Of the high-ranking politicians and major business
companies. Along with remarkable economic development during the
1970s. the television industry was politically so powerful as tO be able
to ignore the critics' constant call for program reform or content
upgrading (Kang, 1987: Choi. 1985). The media elite did not worry
or offend the ruling regime. but rather avoided politically sensitive
subjects. In turn, the government was less concerned with censoring
low quality entertainment programs which came from the commercial
interests of the two private TV networks. Until 1980, when Korean
broadcasting made structural Changes, overheating Oligopolistic
competition and a pattern Of content homogeneity in low quality

programming continued.

3.1.4. Adoption Of the Public Broadcasting System:
1980-Present

When Doo-Hwan Chun seized power in 1980 after President
Park's assassination, Korean television broadcasting underwent three
major changes. First, the process called "Uniﬁcation Of Mass Media"
in 1980 resulted in a forced shift of Korean TV broadcasting structure
toward a quasi-public broadcasting system.4 The privately-owned TBC

40

was merged into KBS and 70% Of MBC's stocks passed into KBS.
Chun's military government, which was actively and deeply engaged in
this procedure. defended such mass media reformation on the
grounds that concentration of media ownership in a small number Of
commercial interests and production Of low quality mass culture
through unhealthy commercial competition must be corrected for the
sake of the public interest (In, 1986: Choi. 1985: 124-139).

However, the political intention behind such rhetoric was
ultimate control of the mass media system. The new military regime
found itself very unpopular with the Korean people because most
Koreans anticipated political modernization along with economic
achievement after the assassination of President Park. Moreover, the
government realized the limitations and inefficiency in political
manipulation of the TV medium, which was owned and operated by
rapidly-growing private media conglomerates (Kang, 1989: 643).
Thus. Chun's government saw the necessity Of assuming direct control
of the media‘ and decided to bring mass media under its authority
through the abolition Of private broadcasting. In fact, under Chun's
regime. Korean television actually functioned as an agent Of the
government by advancing the policy Objectives of the ruling regime
and by manipulating information received by the Korean peOple (Kang,
1989: 633-650).

Second, the government introduced color television in 1980.
using the National Television Systems Committee (NTSC) standard.
Some people believed the introduction of color television was another
ploy by Chun's government in its attempt to legitimate its control.
Despite the unsettled political conditions and the ensuing harsh

41

national economy in the early 19805, Chun's government urged the
spread of color television so as to disguise its self-interested
broadcasting policy (Kang, 1987).

Third. in 1980, one UHF channel was solely dedicated to
specialized education TV service (KBS-3) ranging from lectures for
high school students to foreign language Classes for adults. This
educational TV broadcasting was designed to support the
government's educational policy that any tutoring outside school was
prohibited (Choi. 1985: 83-89).5

Since 1980, consequently. Korean TV broadcasting has been run
as a quasi-public system which consists of two TV national
networks--KBS, with three Channels, and MBC, with one channel.
However, the public broadcasting model had not functioned well
because Korean broadcasting has been subject to censorship from the
authoritarian government. Furthermore, KBS heavily depends on
advertising revenue even though it collects receiver license fees and
receives government subsidies. This financial dependency on
advertising revenue has led Korean TV broadcasting toward
entertainment-oriented TV programming.

President Tae-WOO NOh, who ascended to power in 1988
through direct presidential elections, promised to "democratize"
Korean television. The government is relaxing control of mass media
and Korean broadcasting now appears to enjoy more freedom than
ever. In addition. the Ministry of Culture and Information has realized
the malfunction of the public broadcasting structure in the past, and
now is considering adoption Of a public-private, dual system more like

the Japanese broadcasting structure (Joong-Ang Daily, March 29,

42

1989).

MW

Television broadcasting in Korea had a strong commercial
orientation in its early development. after the American model Of
broadcasting. It has been argued that the ex-colonial powers have
been responsible for transferring their broadcasting model to many
Third World countries (Tunstall, 1977; Katz and Wedell, 1977; Lee.
1980). Yet. this generalization does not seem to apply to Korea. As in
the case of Latin America, the colonial ruler failed to make a strong
imprint on Korea's broadcasting system. During the colonial period
(1910-1945), Japan was not known for its broadcasting strength (Lee.
1980). Given the fact that "Nippon HOSO Kyokai's (NHK)" television
and the ﬁrst Japanese commercial television both began in 1953,
Japanese colonial rule had no signiﬁcant effect on the pattern of early
Korean television.6 Instead. RCA appears to be responsible for
transferring the American television broadcasting model to Korea.
RCA provided capital, technology, and technical advice for the birth Of
a TV station in Korea.

This RCA investment in Korea proved to be unprofitable and was
disposed of, mainly due to poor economic conditions in the late
19503. Thereafter, mounting nationalism and increasing government
control Of media have never allowed foreign investment in Korean
television. Moreover, American multinational media corporations
were gradually convinced of the effectiveness of foreign media
ownership and came to reduce or phase out their foreign investment

(Read, 1976; Lee, 1980).

43

Even after RCA'S departure, signiﬁcant American inﬂuence
continued. The American commercial model of management and
programming was clearly transferred to DBC-TV, the first
' indigenously—owned TV station. The main elements which came from
the American model include private ownership, ﬁnance by advertising,
predominance Of entertainment, and minimal government regulation.

However, this initial model was overhauled and modified
following historic changes in Korea's political order. Two
authoritarian regimes-~Chung-Hee Park's (1961-1979) and Doo-Hwan
Chun's (1980-1987)--have determined the structure and function Of
the mass media system according to perceived social needs and
national political persuasions.

Park's government not only established a state-owned TV system
but also approved commercial, TV stations. It is Obvious that the
development of a commercial TV system had nothing to do with the
external forces. Instead, it seems to have grown out Of the internal
conditions of Korea. Two reasons for the commercialization Of TV
come to mind. One, commercial television, through which national
industries could advertise their consumer goods, was seen as suitable,
or at least not objectionable, to the government economic
development policies centering on rapid industrialization: and two.
the expediency of a bureaucratic-commercial alliance consolidated the
commercial basis for television.

Regardless of media ownership, however, Park's government
had a dominant voice in determining what did and did not appear in
mass media. Although there was a genuine need to guide mass media

toward supporting positive government goals that could integrate all

44

people and make them participate in national development schemes,
President Park abused his power by manipulating the media for
perpetuation of his prolonged dictatorship.

Chun's government redesigned its broadcasting structure by
adopting a quasi-public broadcasting system. The government
objective of "social stability" appears to have been used for legitimizing
the abolition Of commercial television because of unhealthy
commercial competition and its harmful effects on the public good.
Still, this forced modiﬁcation Of the broadcasting structure has not
well served the public interest due to the Oligopolistic commercial
competition between KBS and MBC. Rather, structural change allowed
closer government supervision. In practice. public broadcasting in
Korea was a state-controlled monopoly under Chun's administration.

Thus. the authoritarian governments seem to be the most
important driving force behind the development of Korean television.
In spite of Korea's history as a strong political and economic liaison
with the United States, intemal forces have had more inﬂuence on the
development of Korean television than have external forces.

It is also true that the present model Of Korean TV broadcasting,
although functioning under a quasi-public broadcasting system with
the ultimate Objective of contributing to the public interest, borrowed
two important elements from the US. commercial model Of TV
broadcasting: dependence on advertising support and emphasis on
entertainment. However, the process Of adapting the commercial
model to the internal conditions Of Korea resulted in the modiﬁcation
of the original elements. For example, even though Korean television

broadcasting has been mainly financed by advertising revenue,

45

commercial inﬂuences seem tO be much weaker than in the United
States. To minimize advertiser inﬂuence on TV programming, a
public corporation called "Korean Broadcasting Advertising
Corporation" (KOBACO) was established in 1980 (Choi. 1985: 99).
This public corporation has mediated advertising contracts between
advertiser and TV networks in an attempt to protect TV content from
direct inﬂuences and pressures from advertisers. Furthermore, the
television advertising market in Korea has favored the seller (TV
networks), mainly because Of KBS's monopolistic position in the
marketplace (Kum, 1987: 24-25: Lee, 1987: 16-19). As for the
entertainment programs. Korean TV networks must Observe a
standard of balanced TV programming, unlike American commercial
television. According to the Enforcement Ordinance Broadcasting Law
revised in 1981 (Article 29). each TV network must carry at least 40%
cultural and 10% informative programs out of total weekly
broadcasting hours.

In sum, the 33-year history of television broadcasting in Korea
has produced a unique form of broadcasting system through the
process Of adaptation. It is clear that the American commercial model
Of broadcasting had great inﬂuence on the inauguration Of Korean
television. However, this initial commercial model has been modiﬁed
and mixed with other models to adapt to the particular internal
conditions Of Korea. In this process. the authoritarian regimes since
1961 have played an important part in generating the present distinct
TV broadcasting structure. The broadcasting structure of Korean
television has reﬂected not only the policy Objectives Of the

governments in power but also the political interests Of the ruling

46

regimes. Of course, the existing Korean TV broadcasting system also
reﬂects commercialism. but to blame it primarily on US. inﬂuences is.
to borrow Straubhaar's (1989a) phrase, to let powerful national

governments Off the hook.

CHAPTER IV
PROGRALIMING ON KOREAN TELEVISION

This chapter will explore the evolution Of television
programming in Korea. Special emphasis will be placed on the trends
and patterns Of imported programming on Korean television. Using
selected ideas Of both the media imperialism and media diffusion
perspectives, an attempt will be made to measure the degree Of

independence and autonomy in Korean television programming.

WWW

Perhaps the most accurate description of the media philosophy
of Korea would be "developmental" in the sense that the underlying
purpose of media use is more positive and constructive than merely
serving the power interests Of authoritarian regimes (Howell, 1986:
3-24). This philosophy acknowledges broadcasting as a vital resource
best managed by the government for socioeconomic development
(Sussman, 1978: Lent, 1978). Thus, broadcasting in Korea is
regarded as an Ofﬁcial instrument for social unity, cultural projection,
economic growth, and education rather than as a source of individual
gratiﬁcation or entertainment. In tune with this media concept, the
Korean government has required all broadcasters to play a socially
constructive rOle (even if commercially supported) by enforcing

program content regulation aimed at preserving the indigenous
47

48'

cultural values and traditions. For example. the government has
enacted a changing set of programming standards with an increasing

emphasis on cultural programming (Table 2).

TABLE 2
STANDARD FOR BROADCAST PROGRAMMING IN KOREA

 

 

 

Category 1964- 1974 1974— 198 1 198 1 -Present
Information 10% or more 10% or more 10% or more
Culture 20% or more 30% or more 40% or more
Entertainment 20% or more 20% or more 20% or more

 

SOURCE: WM (1985: 35): WW
Wlmw 437): Ann (1986: 6364)-

By increasing the minimum proportion Of cultural programming,
the government seems to have expected the broadcast media to serve
more explicitly the sociocultural purpose. Yet, the actual patterns Of
programming on Korean Television have widely deviated from the
culturally-oriented programming direction mentioned above. To show
this, television programming was sampled from two major daily
newspapers (Cho-Sun Daily and Dong-A Daily) for the ﬁrst week Of
April and October, biannual rescheduling months, from 1964 to 1988
(1964, 1967, 1970, 1973, 1976, 1979, 1982, 1985, 1988). Every
program was divided into three categories-- entertainment. culture.
and information. Due to the absence of a legal deﬁnition for each

category. the ﬁgures may deviate from the government's programming

49

standard (see Table 2). The ﬁgure was drawn on the basis that the TV
broadcast hours of each category were divided by the total TV
broadcast hours of all available TV networks except KBS-3. the
educational TV network, and then multiplied by one hundred for the
percentage. Since the program log does not indicate commercial or
other advertisements separately, TV advertising hours could not be
extracted from TV program hours. Thus. TV hours from each category
are rounded up to one hundred percent. Each category includes the
following speciﬁc TV program genres:

1. Entertainment. These included variety shows, music shows.
talk shows. quiz shows. daily soap Operas, weekly series, made-for-TV
movies, mini-series. domestic feature ﬁlms, imported feature ﬁlms,
imported series, imported mini-series, children's programs. cartoons,
comedy shows, and sports programs.

2. Culture. These included documentaries. classical music
shows. adult education programs. children's educational programs.
cultural ﬁlms, art programs. foreign language lessons, and cooking
lessons.

3. Information. These included news shows, documentaries
concerning current affairs, public information, sports news, and
campaign coverage.

The results of this content analysis indicated that entertainment
programming has always dominated the entire Korean system over
cultural and informative programming, although there has been

ﬂuctuation in its proportion due to government policy (see Figure 1).

50

FIGURE 1
THE TREND IN KOREAN TV PROGRAMMING
% of Total
TV Time
70

 

8138816688188
2'; I

 

 

 

 

 

l "limit":
15 uummumnummlmumm millllmllmuwm I||llllIll Illlllll "mm" "In.“ I"lllllmumlmumlmmml
tttllllmmlmil

10 _

5 _

o L l I l I l l

1%4 1%7 1970 1973 1976 1979 1982 1985 1988

Year
— IlllllllHllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll
Entertainment Information

 

The proportion Of entertainment programs steadily went up
from 57 percent of total broadcast hours for all TV networks in 1964
to 60 percent in 1970 (Figure 1). In accordance with the economic

51

logic of advertising-supported television. it was only natural that
Korean TV networks in the 19605 increasingly carried a substantial
quantity of entertainment programming to appeal tO the lowest
common denominator of the "middle market" (Deﬂeur and
Ball-Rokeach, 1975: 162-181). Furthermore, although the government
paid lip service to the cultural significance Of broadcasting, the
political and economic value Of media virtually took primacy during
this period.

Throughout the 1960s, Korean television ﬂoundered about,
trying to sustain about five-hours of daily programming for each
network. The most available source of programming was domestic
ﬁlms, most of them produced some years before for cinema exhibition.
A number of domestic feature ﬁlms appeared on TV until the domestic
ﬁlm-makers decided in 1962 not to give aid to a competitor, the
emerging TV medium (Park, 1985: 354-375). Consequently, TV
networks began to import U.S. programs which would be
commercially successful at a low cost. Indeed, the most popular
shows in the 19608 were the imported feature ﬁlms and series (In,
1986: 36-39: Ma. 1985: 77). Most imported ﬁlms were either
American Westerns like "Sunset 77" and "Bonanza," or action/war
dramas like "Combat" and "The Fugitive." Another major genre Of this
period was the talk program designed to propagate the government
economic development policies. In addition, KBS-TV introduced a
weekly TV drama series that dealt with anti-communism and family
occasions, while TBC-TV aired a Korean soap opera for the ﬁrst time.
Even though this attempt failedito attract an audience at this time, the
serial drama became the most popular genre in the 19708 (In, 1986:

52

36-42).

The development of a mass market and a TV mass audience in
the early 19708 led to a major shift in TV programming. The search
for cheap programming to build mass audience loyalty arrived at the
formula of a serial drama with a tiny cast and minimal studio sets
(Choi. 1985: 76-80: Tunstall, 1977: 174-184). All three networks
were eager to produce broadly appealing Korean soap Operas by hiring
away well-known actors, directors, and script writers from theater
and cinema (Lee, 1987: Irn, 1987). Korean soap Operas were aired
daily in prime viewing time and were based largely on melodramatic
themes which usually reﬂected the patience and Obedience Of
traditional Korean woman (Nam. 1984). A key turning point was a
1972 soap Opera, "Journey," which depicted a self-sacriﬁcing wife and
her mentally-deﬁcient husband. This serial drama was very popular
with all age groups and the heroine became the idealistic image Of a
"good" wife.

With the growing popularity Of Korean soap Operas during the
early 19708. the three TV networks tried to Offer as many serial
dramas as the audience cared for, in an attempt to pull the audience
away from their competitors. Producers and script writers were so
tired with the day-to-day pressure Of work that they could not create
new and interesting material (Kim, 1987). A8 a result. the public
complained loudly about the quantity and quality Of serial dramas and
invited government interference. The government became involved in
the control of programming patterns through a legal base (Table 2).
Although such involvement brought about the reduction Of the number

of entertainment programs, particularly serial dramas and imported

53

series in the mid-19708, it increased political intervention rather than
upgrading TV content (In, 1986: 41). For instance, all TV networks
were forced to air campaign programs at 8 o'clock every evening to
support government policies. The proportion Of entertainment
programs, however. began to increase again from 53 percent in 1976
to 64 percent in 1979 (Figure 1). This increase seems to be basically
attributable to the aforementioned expediency Of a
bureaucratic-commercial alliance. Insofar as powerfully- grown private
TV industry did not cause political problems with the ruling regime,
the government relaxed restrictions on the quality and quantity of
entertainment programs.

The subsequent decline in the proportion Of entertainment
programs to a low of 49 percent by 1982 seems to be due to the
structural changes in Korean broadcasting, which were made by
Chun's government in 1980 (Figure 1). Since the rationale for such
government action was the imposition Of a public broadcasting system
that could contribute to public interests and enhancement of national
culture, the government increased the emphasis on cultural
programming, restricting entertainment (Table 2). Evidence that the
political interests Of the government rather than genuine need for a
public broadcasting system led to structural modiﬁcation Of Korean
broadcasting can be observed in the restoration Of an overtly
entertainment-oriented tone in TV programming since 1982 (Figure
1). Indeed. one can not see any rigid distinction between former
commercial broadcasting and present public broadcasting on the
grounds that both rely primarily on advertising for their support and

put an emphasis on entertainment.

54

The 19808 have seen remarkable progress in Korean TV
programming in the sense that various genres of locally-produced
programs that were developed are sophisticated and relatively
high-quality, and have won the bulk of the audience. The imported
programs. which dominated domestic TV channels in the 19608 and
remained an important source in the 19708, have gradually been
replaced by popular indigenous programs in this period, as we shall
discuss in next section.

Along with daily soap Operas, the weekly TV drama series
became very popular in the 19808. These programs are diverse in
theme. covering urban, rural. and historical settings. TV channels are
placing large-scale traditional costume dramas. considerably polished
Korean soap operas. and self-contained one-hour weekly dramas with a
continuing cast and weekly different themes at prime time. Currently,
"Three Families in One House," a program mirroring urban
middle-class daily life, and "Rural Diary," portraying farmers' daily
events are the highest-ranking two weekly dramas (Dong-A Daily,
February 5, 1988: Kyung-Hyang Daily. March 17, 1988). Since
President Noh came to power in 1988. those serial dramas have begun
treating serious social and political themes, which was strictly
prohibited before. In additiOn, Korean TV networks started to
produce a kind of made-for-TV movie in the mid-19808. and
mini-series in the late 19808. These are frequently based on popular
and classic novels as well as on original material. Both made-for-TV
movies and mini-series. using popular TV talents and exterior scenes,
tend to be quite expensive but have generated considerable audience

support. The recent mini-series "Sand Castle," based on a popular

55

novel about a middle-aged housewife who ﬁnds out her seemingly
trustworthy husband has a mistress. captured some 60 percent Of the
television audience during the show (Joong-Ang Daily. October 11.
1988).

Another major genre Of the 19808 is the music-oriented variety
show. These are usually live shows in front of a studio audience and
are extremely popular with the teenaged fans of popular singers.
Although this format emerged as early as 1964 and has been the major
target of public criticism because Of the lavishness, suggestiveness,
and vulgarity contained in these shows, they have been glamorized and
sophisticated to consolidate their great popularity (Chung, 1983).
Very recently, MBC-TV created a distinct format of the weekly music
show, "Housewife Singing Contest," featuring amateur performances by
ordinary housewives. This Show strongly appeals to a great number of
married couples and is thought to be of higher quality than other
music-oriented shows (Sweet Home Monthly, April 1989).

Comedy, sports. and news all capture a good deal of space and
audience on Korean television. Comedy has always gained high ratings,
changing itself from slapstick comedy in the 19708, to youth-oriented
gag comedy in the 19808. and currently to satirical comedy on present
political and social events (Park, 1988). Sports on Korean TV has
been dominated by professional baseball teams, but amateur sports
stole the spotlight with the 1986 Seoul Asian Games and 1988 Seoul
Olympics.

The evening news programs have been very popular. even
though they could not play a "gatekeeper" role. A 1984 study Of better

educated audiences in four major Korean cities by the United States

56

Information Agency (USIA, 1984) found that the 9 O'clock TV news
was the most common news source of Korean people.

In sum, entertainment-oriented programming is the most
prominent feature Of Korean TV programming. Legal and Official
rhetoric about the cultural mission Of broadcasting notwithstanding,
Korean TV programming has primarily catered to the entertainment
interests Of individuals. The cultural programming took a back seat in
the face of the government interests and media economics. Instead,
Korean television has developed a number of entertainment formats
that are economically profitable and very popular. Imported
entertainment programs, which contributed to development of Korean
television for a decade. decreased slowly as these national genres
began to dominate most TV time slots. The next section will deal with
these imported TV programs in' detail.

4,2, Imported Television Programs

The development of Korean television programming shows a
course from heavy reliance on imported programs in the beginning to
a relatively large measure of independence in creation of indigenous
programs in recent years.

The importation of foreign television programs in Korea
originated from the demand for materials to fill up airtime
inexpensively. While the Korean government was active in promoting
television in the early 19608, limited funds and inexperience kept
indigenous production very low. The lack Of available domestic
programs, in turn, created the need for imported television programs.

Imported television programs were far less expensive than creating

57

local productions. Moreover. the television audience at that time was
conﬁned to the upper middle class who tended to prefer "superior"
metropolitan culture. The slickness of Hollywood was well attuned to
such an audience's tastes.

During the 19608. therefore, the imported television programs
occupied a good deal Of television Slots, due to their low cost and
relative appeal to the wealthy, elite audience. However, as the Korean
television industry developed and the audience expanded into the
middle Class. the amount of imported television programming was

signiﬁcantly diminished (see Figure 2).

FIGURE 2
PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL BROADCAST HOURS
FOR IMPORTED PROGRAMS ON KOREAN TELEVISION7

% of Total
TV Time

 

 

 

 

o l l l l l l J
1%4 1967 1970 1973 1976 1979 1982 1985 1%8
Year

 

58

For a brief period in the mid-19608. the proportion Of imported
programs reached a peak of 36 percent. Although the relative
proportion of imported programs' broadcast hours was sharply
reduced in the early 19708. it stayed at a fairly high level throughout
the 19708. In the 19808. the proportion Of imported programs has
dropped more and stayed around 10 percent Of total broadcast hours
across the three major television channels (see Figure 2).

The decline of imported programming seems to be more

evident in the prime-time scheduling,8 as shown in Figure Three.

FIGURE 3
PRCENTAGE OF TOTAL PRIME-TIME HOURS
FOR IMPORTED PROGRAMS ON KOREAN TELEVISION9

%OfTbtal
Prime Time Hours

 

 

 

 

 

1964 1967 1970 1973 1976 1979 1982 1985 1933
Year

59

In the 19608. substantial quantities Of imported television
programs were aired during prime-time hours to attract a large
audience. According to the audience ratings in September 1966. the
top three programs on TBC-TV were the prime-time imported series:
"The Fugitive," "0011 Napoleon Solo." and "Combat" (The 10-year
History of Joong—Ang Ilbo and TBC, 1975: 232). In addition, major
imported programs on MBC-TV, such as "Barron" and "Ironside." were
very popular and placed within the prime-time hours in 1969 (History
Of MBC, 1982: 174). This strong appeal of imported television
programs seems to have stemmed from the relatively inferior quality
of locally-produced programs. the fairly high entertainment value
contained in imported materials. and maybe a yearning for the "rich"
American society (Park, 1985: 345-347; Kang, 1986: 50-66). Indeed.
imported television programs were one of the most promising genres
to ensure a good deal Of audience during this period.

Since the early 19708. however, major imported programs have
been removed from the prime-time viewing hours and assigned tO the
late-night or weekend afternoon time Slots. Audience preference
began to shift from imported programs to domestic ones in the early
19708, as indigenous production increased in quality and quantity.
Gradually, imported television programs have been replaced by
domestic productions that have greater local appeal. The results Of an
analysis of ratings data for 1978-1987 showed that most Of the top
three TV programs in each year were locally-produced programs,
mainly Korean soap Operas and weekly series. Only 4 Of the 30 top
programs (ten years times the top three programs in each) were

imports (Korea Marketing Research & Public Opinion Poll Center,

60

February 1988). Furthermore. as the Korean government sponsored a
nationalistic reform movement in the early 19708, the television
networks were reminded continually of their responsibilities to
preservation Of indigenous values and culture. The government
expressed strong disapproval Of TV's portrayals of violence and sex,
which offended Korea's conservative cultural ethos. The almost
complete removal of imported programs from the prime-time
scheduling in the latter half Of the 19708 can be seen in part as a
result of this government inﬂuence (see Figure 3). However, the total
amount of imported programming remained at a considerably high
level during the 19708, not only to ﬁll expanded broadcast schedules
in which local production is not profitable, but also to attract
additional audiences who tended to prefer imported culture.

With much more improved sophistication of the Korean
indigenous television industry and the general trend toward mass
audience preference for homemade programs, locally-produced
programs have deﬁnitely dominated imported TV series in the 19808,
both in terms of broadcast hours and prime-time hours. Imported
television programs average roughly one-tenth Of total broadcast hours
and one-twentieth Of total prime-time hours in this period (see Figure
2, 3). This relative independence of Korean television programming
was also proved in the 1983 follow-up study on the worldwide
trafﬁcking of TV programs by Tapio Varis (1984: 146-147). According
to his data. MBC-TV, a semi-commercial channel which has tended to
include the highest proportion Of imported programming among
Korean TV networks in the 19808, imported 16 percent Of its

programs from foreign sources for a two-week period in early 1983.

61

This proportion was very low, given the Varis' conclusion that
imported programs accounted for approximately one-third or more of
the world's total TV airtime during the period Of his study. Noticeably.
Varis's data also showed that MBC-TV was the only broadcasting
institution which did not schedule any imported programs within the
prime-time hours, among those analyzed in seven continental regions
of the globe. Certainly, this evidence indicates that Korean television
is only slightly dependent on foreign programming.

It is worth nothing here, that, although most programming is
now locally produced. there are several types of programs which
continue to be imported into Korea. As shown in Table Three;

imported programs on Korean television consist mainly of four major

types of programs.

TABLE 3
TYPES OF PROGRAMS IMPORTED BY KOREAN TV. 1984

 

 

 

 

 

13'9”“ mm W WW
Series 539 37.7 %
Cartoons 446 31.2 %
Documentaries 235 16.5 %
Feature Films 183 12.8 %
other 26 1.8 %
Total 1429 100.0 %

 

SOURCE: Ministry of Culture and Information. Republic of Korea: W
W (1985).

62

Series are the most conspicuous type Of imported programs. and
the large portion of them is action/ adventure programs such as "The
A-Team." "MacGyver," "Airwolf." and "Knight Rider" (Joong-Ang Daily,
February 6, 1987). According to ratings data, these imported series
are largely watched by a younger. male audience (Lee's PR 8: Research
LTD., March 1989). Since action/ adventure series are quite expensive
to produce and their major themes (violence and sex) are basically in
discord with Korea’s values and culture. Korean television networks
have produced few Of them. Although two locally-produced cop shows
are currently aired once a week in prime-time hours on both KBS-2
and MBC. they tend to focus on the depiction of police Ofﬁcers' toils
rather than on the portrayals Of crimes and violence. The second type
of imported program is cartoons which have acquired a stable
audience among children and adolescents. Cartoon programming has
depended heavily on foreign material for a long time, because Korean
television networks can purchase foreign cartoons far cheaper than it
would cost to create them. For example, the price of imported
cartoons per 30-minute episode was $1,000 in 1987, whereas the
cost of local production Of identical duration was about $5,800
(Dong-A Daily. July 28, 1987). The third type Of imported program is
documentaries. They are mainly educational/cultural programs,
usually aired through KBS-3, an educational TV network. Most of
them are imported from the United States and the United Kingdom,
given the cost Of creating documentaries versus buying them, but
Korean television networks haVe occasionally produced a number of
high-quality documentaries for an upscale audience. Lastly, Korean

television networks still use relatively Old feature ﬁlms to compete

63

with each other for the weekend night audience. Due to the numerous
reruns of these feature ﬁlms, however, the Korean audience now tends
to be disinclined to watch this type of imported program, according to
ratings data (Lee's PR & Research LTD., March 1989).

It is rational from an economic standpoint for Korean television
networks to continue to import the above-mentioned program types.
As indicated earlier, Korean television broadcasters are obliged tO
ﬁnance themselves via the advertising market. They must. when
possible, try to keep program costs lower than revenues. In fact. the
cost of importing such types of programs is still much less than that of
originating them. In addition, these program types have a certain
audience that cannot be ignored by the proﬁt-motivated broadcasters,
despite the overwhelming demand for locally-produced programs.
Thus, they import. Since these types Of imports are generally less
popular than a number Of national genres. they are scheduled out Of
prime-time Slots where the value Of the advertising is less. In those
time slots, however, imported programs can generate advertising
revenues well ahead of their costs. thus acting as profit-makers.
Undoubtedly. most Of these imported programs. particularly series
and feature ﬁlms, come from the United States. which has the ability
to provide expensively—made programs at low prices (see Figure 4, 5).

In sum, during the last three decades. Korean television has
evolved from heavy dependency on imported materials to a relatively
high degree Of self-reliance in indigenous program production. In
contrast to what the media imperialism supporters might have
expected, initial dependence by Korean television on the dominant

culture in terms of programming has never led to a continuing

64

dependence. Although Korean television networks still include
foreign programs. the proportion Of such programs seems never to be
large enough to cause serious cultural concerns. In addition, that
Korean television networks continue to import several types of
programs is undoubtedly more a matter Of broadcast economics than
anything else (e.g., permanency Of initial dependence or inevitable
presence Of popular metropolitan culture). In the next section, the
critical question of whether nationally-produced programs are
authentically "Korean" in nature or still reﬂect foreign inﬂuences will

be investigated.

FIGURE 4
SOURCES OF IMPORTED PROGRAMS ON KOREAN TV
BY NUMBERS AND PERCENTAGES OF IMPORTS. 1984

 

United States

 

 

SOURCE: Ministry of Culture and Information, Republic Of Korea:
WWWUQBS).

65

FIGURE 5
SOURCES OF IMPORTED PROGRAMS FOR TYPES OF PROGRAMS
ON KOREAN TELEVISION
BY NUMBERS AND PERCENTAGES OF IMPORTS, 1984

 

 

 
 
 
     

 

 

m FEATURE FILMS
West Germany Italy
46 1 8
8.5% 54 Other 9.9 o . Other
10.0 %
439 141
539 183
81.5 % 77.0 %
United States United States
W W
West Germany
5 1
1 1.5 % Hong Kong
3 l 0
7.8 % United
446
69 5 % ﬂ Other States

United States

SOURCE: Ministry of Culture and Information. Republic of Korea: Recommended
WW (1985).

66

n - n
andﬁultumlﬂcncﬁts
The Korean cultural ideology dictates, in principle, that

television broadcasting should enhance traditional culture and adopt
foreign cultures on a selective basis for the creating of an identiﬁed
national culture. This has led to two regulatory strategies for Korean
television programming. One is to minimize what the government
considers undesirable foreign inﬂuences, while the other is to upgrade
the cultural/educational programming. The former has been quite
successful. but the latter has failed due to the commercial
characteristics of Korean broadcasting, as indicated earlier.

However, entertainment-oriented Korean television does not
seem to necessarily deteriorate the country's cultural values and
traditions. Since entertainment is not simply neutral but value-laden,
local entertainment programming which incorporates indigenous
culture can be a useful force for authentic cultural expression. Katz
(1977: 117) addressed the subject Of understanding the importance Of
entertainment in promoting cultural authenticity and continuity:

If broadcasting is to be harnessed to the goal of promoting
indigenous values. it is important to understand how
entertainment works. That means understanding what
message is implicit in "Hawaii 5-0," what people perceive
in it, what they enjoy, what it "gives" them, and then, by
contrast. analyzing the experience with home-made
broadcast entertainment and with entertainment in
traditional culture.

In Korea, serial dramas seem to-be the most popular
entertainment form Of television culture. This type Of imported

program has outperformed most imported materials in audience

67

ratings since the early 19708. The critical question is whether this
kind of programming has any lingering effect as a format borrowed
from abroad. AS discussed before, Korean serial dramas have definitely
reﬂected indigenous values. traditions. and folklore and have ﬁt better
to Korean audience's tastes. Their themes are very diverse: daily life of
both the middle and lower class, historical and regional themes,
contemporary social issues, and youth-oriented themes. In addition,
Korean serial dramas use more exterior scenes, are generally
broadcast in the prime-time hours, and target various segments Of
audience. In this respect. Korean drama formats seem to deviate
widely from their foreign counterparts, which are usually
characterized by the day-time soap Opera aimed at housewives.
treating love affairs or a Cinderella theme.

Some of music-oriented variety shows, game/quiz shows, and
comedy programs on Korean television also have a foreign style, but
with highly localized content. Generally, foreign formats of game/ quiz
shows tend tO attract audiences for advertisers and provide a forum for
product exposure (Of prizes) within the Show itself (Straubhaar, 1989a:
19). This never happens on Korean television, although Korean
broadcasters owe some ideas. such as the method Of a speciﬁc game.
to foreign formats.

In Short, Korean television broadcasting has evolved from
dependency on foreign materials to independent programming based
on nationally-produced programs. In contradiction to the government
directives on culturally-oriented programming, an emphasis on
entertainment has emerged in nationalizing television content.

However, Korean entertainment programming is Often quite distinct

68

from its foreign roots and tends to be well adapted to the indigenous
culture. It reﬂects the national heritage and interests.
Entertainment programming, the largest quantitative component of
Korean broadcasting, is in this sense truly "Korean" in nature. Since
entertainment is an active force in the communication of cultural
values, Korean programming seems to be relatively beneficial to

indigenous cultural autonomy.

CHAPTER V

NATIONAL FACTORS AND THE INTRODUCTION OF
CABLE TELEVISION INTO KOREA

This chapter will first present the main contributing factors that
can be identiﬁed to explain the relative independence of Korean
television programming. Then, in connection with these national
factors, it will brieﬂy evaluate and predict the impact Of introduction

Of cable television on Korean television culture.

Rivnnn

in Koreao Telﬂeion Programming
5.1.1. Indigenous Cultural Preference

One Of the most crucial factors in the relative success of Korean
television programming seems to be the strong appeal of the
indigenous culture. Pool (1977) is one Of relatively few who expected
that, other things being equal, local audiences would prefer
domestically-made cultural products which have the distinct
advantages Of cultural familiarity and local relevance. Korea's
experience of television programming perfectly comes up to his
expectation.

Contrary to what many used to believe, one consequence of the
Korean television development has been to refine an audience

preference for indigenous programming. The prevalent assumption of

69

70

the inherent appeal of imported, "superior" metropolitan culture
proved to be a temporary phenomenon in Korea. Because Of the initial
novelty Of the television products from culturally different places with
advanced technology, Korean audiences sat together in front of
television receivers to watch "Combat" in the 19608. However, as
reasonably well-produced domestic programs became available, the
audience has decisively shifted its preference and its viewing to
indigenous programming that has better conformed to the cultural
tastes of the Korean people.

Specifically, there seems to be two critical cultural elements
that play a leading part in determining what Korean audiences actually
choose to watch: (1) the existence of vivid traditional values: and (2)
local relevance. First Of all, traditional Korean culture has developed
and ﬂourished under the strong inﬂuence of Confucianism. With a
massive inﬂux of Western culture, the cultural system Of Korean
society has suffered conﬂict between traditional and modern Western
values. The value system and social structure have changed. and
various mechanisms of adjustment have created provisional value
systems and ways of behavior. However, traditional Korean culture still
seems to have a mighty inﬂuence on the consciousness and behavior of
the Korean people, as the Korean Overseas Information Service (1981:
158) points out:

Korea is a country blending change and tradition. In both
the city and countryside, the appearance of Korea is
changing with great speed but beneath this transformation
of society is a stability born of centuries—Old traditions and
customs which while modiﬁed to fit a new society still
have great meaning and powerful inﬂuence.

71

The most salient feature of traditional Korean culture is an
emphasis on the harmonious unity Of the collectivity. such as the
family unit. respect for the aged. and sacriﬁce of self for the good Of a
larger unit in life (Nam, 1983a). Notably, the Korean television
audience has deﬁnitely favored those programs that have reﬂected
these kinds Of traditional. but still dominant, cultural values. For
example, the Korean professor Nam (1984) found, in her content
analysis of the eleven most popular Korean soap Operas aired between
1970 and 1984, that the central images fostered by those dramas
were largely patience. Obedience, and self-sacrifice. As another
example. the longstanding traditional costume dramas. such as "The
500-year History of the Lee Dynasty," have portrayed the spirit and
wisdom Of Korean's ancestors. stressing loyalty, ﬁlial piety, sincerity
and constancy. This type Of drama has been consistently popular and
is always included in the top-ten ratings list in the 19808 (Korea
Gallop Survey Polls CO..Ltd.. July. 1988). In contrast. some imported
programs do not ﬁt the basic values Of the Korean culture. For
example, the suspense in "Dallas." a drama series that was imported
from the United States, derived from greed. self-interest, lying, and
manipulation-behavior (Tracey, 1988). This program never attracted
larger audiences than popular domestic dramas. Thus, the traditional
cultural values put into indigenous programming seem to be strongly
accepted by the Korean audience.

Local relevance might be another cultural element that has
placed indigenous programs in a better position than imported ones in
the competitiOn for an audience. Historically, Korean audiences have

preferred the kind Of programs in which the themes are relevant to

72

the their own daily life. or are something that could actually happen to
them. For instance. "Ordinary People". a locally-produced 25 minute
daily serial drama, was highly popular with most segments of the
audience in 1982-1984, once recording the highest rating ever in the
history of Korean television. at 63 percent (Korea Marketing Research
8: Public Opinion Poll Center, February 1988). This drama described
the common daily affairs Of one middle-class family that consisted of
three generations. Similarly, "Rural Diary," a weekly serial drama Of a
modern farmers' everyday life, has been very popular and captured
between 40 percent and 50 percent Of the audience in 1987-1988
(Han-Kuk Daily, November 20. 1987; Dong-A Daily, February 5, 1988:
Kyung-Hyang Daily, March 17, 1988). In particular, this drama tends
to make use of picturesque scenes Of the Korean rural area. which
might provoke a feeling Of afﬁnity. even Of belonging, among the
Korean audience. No imported programs have come close to
competing in popularity with these kinds of drama series.10 The
Observation appears to be quite consistent with POOl's (1977: 143)
contention that local products are protected by barriers Of culture:

Domestic products portray characters eating the foods the
people eat, wearing the clothes they wear, celebrating the
events they celebrate, and gossiping about the celebrities
they follow. Allusion is a large part Of what art is about.
Foreign works of art have jokes that are harder tO get.
stereotypes that do not ring a bell, situations that do not
come from daily life.

Indeed, the Korean audience appears to be more interested in
the joys and sorrows of their people. which are depicted by their own

artistic talent and within a familiar environment, than with

73

Western-style action and adventure. It is also possible that they
prefera television program made in their own language than one that
is dubbed into Korean. Therefore, local relevance seems to be another
reason for a audience preference for domestically-produced programs.

In brief, indigenous cultural preference is probably one of the
most crucial determinants of how Korean television has become
increasingly self—sufﬁcient in terms of domestic programming. It
seems Clear that the Korean audience basically favors
nationally-produced programs over imported materials. They have
preferred programs that are resonant with their particular cultural
values and tastes. Moreover, they have liked programs that evoke a
feeling of familiarity and relevance. Consequently, imported television
programs, from the United States and other metropolitan countries.
have retreated before the strong presence Of distinct cultural values
and traditions in Korea. This can be contrasted with the Canadian
media dependence which stems in large measure from a lack of
cultural identity. A great degree Of cultural homogeneity between
Canada and the United States has really been both a cause and an
effect of the dominant presence of American media products within
the Canadian culture.

5.1.2. Government Control Of Foreign Content
Another important factor in the rise of Korean television
programming and in the decline Of imported programs seems to be
the government cultural policies aimed at protecting indigenous
culture.

The Korean government has striven to protect its own cultural

74

and moral heritage from foreign media inﬂuences. From the
beginning Of television broadcasting, the government has rigorously
controlled the inﬂow Of Japanese television programs due to historical
hostility and a fear Of negative impact on Korean traditional culture. 1 1
A8 a result, there has been Officially no importation Of Japanese
programs except a limited number of documentaries and cartoons,
despite Korea's heavy reliance on Japanese broadcasting equipment.12

While the Japanese product has been fended Off of the domestic
television screen, an inﬂux of Western television programs, mainly
from the United States. has taken place. During the 19608, the
government tolerated the massive inﬂow Of inexpensive Western
entertainment programming which was necessary to ﬁll the broadcast
hours of the rudimentary Korean television systems. However. as
Park's regime employed a deliberate policy to promote indigenous
initiatives and values in the early 1970. the use of these imported
programs began to be subject to government restrictions.

In 1973, the government revised the 1963 Broadcasting Act to
establish the "Korean Broadcasting Ethics Committee (KBEC)" which
was responsible for enforcing program regulation aimed at protecting
the cultural values and morality of the Korean people (Article 4-9).
This government regulatory agency was authorized to review all the
television programs, indigenous or imported. prior to their exhibition.
In the mid-19708, some imported series such as "Kojak" "Columbo,"
and "The FBI" were discontinued by the KBEC because they were
judged to be too violent and therefore harmful to youth culture (In,
1986: 42). However, the KBEC did not Object to science ﬁction type
Of programs such as "The Six Million Dollar Man" and "Bionic Woman."

75

Moreover, the government required all television networks to
carry a minimum of 30 percent cultural programs in 1974, with a view
to reducing the proportion Of entertainment programs, including
foreign imports. At the same time. the government announced that all
television advertising should be aired between the programs, instead
of being aired within a program (Ma, 1985: 80). Consequently,
imported feature ﬁlms and 60 minutes-long imported series were
either shifted from prime-time hours to late night slots or went Off the
air due to economic proﬁtability concerns. Coincident with these
government regulations. the proportion Of imported programs
dropped signiﬁcantly in the 19708.

Here. one can not discount the political motivations behind such
government regulations of foreign television content, as Nam (1983a:

217) pointed out:

For the ruling elite of any Third World country
experiencing challenges to its legitimacy due to its being
new in the power game or its failure to deliver the
promised good life to its people fast enough, the strain
upon the political system created by excessive demands Of
people exposed to Western (entertainment) media content
can not be ignored. Hence, as soon as a country is
reasonably well Off by modest successes in industrialization
and modernization, its government assumes a more active
role in its cultural policies including its entertainment
policies.

Yet, a sincere desire to preserve Korea's cultural values and
traditions has been also reﬂected in the government cultural policies.
Concerning cultural protectionism, President Chung-Hee Park said,
"Good inﬂuences we must retain, but bad ones we must reject, and

reject at their very inception" (New York Times. December 5, 1975).

76

Indeed. Korea should be "selective" in absorbing foreign inﬂuences,
and the government has legitimate reasons to protect its own culture
from the negative and undesirable elements Of foreign media products.
such as violence, sexuality. and immorality.

In the early 19808. along with the restructuring Of Korean
broadcasting, Chun's regime increased restrictions on imported
programming. First Of all. the government imposed restraints on the
quantity Of foreign materials in 1980. It forced all broadcasters to set
self-regulatory limits on the proportion Of imported programs to no
more than 15 percent of total broadcast time (Park, 1983: 70-71).

Furthermore. the government created the "Telefilm Censorship
Deliberation Council (TCDC)" in 1981 for more specialized and
efﬁcient regulation of foreign content.13 The TCDC has the right to
deny the exhibition Of certain scenes or programs that are considered
not to be proper for the Korean people. As an indirect means, a new
standard of television programming was also enacted in 1981,
increasing the minimum proportion Of cultural programs to 40
percent.

All these government efforts to minimize undesirable alien
media inﬂuences seem to have been fairly successful. Even though the
government imposed a very tough ceiling Of 15 percent on the quota
of imported programs, the Korean broadcasters have well conformed
themselves to this rule.

In sum, the Korean government has been actively involved in
limiting the inﬂow Of foreign television programs. Pool (1977), a
strong advocate of the media diffusion perspective, argues that

protectionist measures are self—defeating in culture. However,

77

government restrictions on imported programming appears to have
had a beneﬁcial effect on indigenous culture in Korea. Together with
the increase in production capacity and the evolution Of the Korean
audience's tastes, government regulation of imported programs has
contributed to the decline Of foreign programming and the rise Of
indigenous programming. A8 Lee (1980) points out, the indigenous
culture may need protection because an Open interaction with
metropolitan cultures, in the free and unrestrained world market. may
put the economically weak nations at an unwarranted disadvantage.
The next section will discuss the recent development of cable
television in Korea in order to evaluate how new communication

technology will affect the indigenous television culture.

5.2. Cable Television: Concern and Hope

Recently. the Korean government has made frequent mention Of
the new communication technologies, especially cable television. The
government passed the Cable Communication Policy Act. dealing with
the implementation of cable service. in 1987. Even though the Act
stipulated that cable systems are forbidden to originate or broadcast
material other than that previously broadcast from the existing four
television channels, it is certain that the Act paved the way for the
development of cable television in Korea. Signiﬁcantly, in 1988, a
Korean government official announced that the government was
planning to modify the Cable Communication Policy Act of 1987 to
allow a private cable television system to originate programs such as
news, entertainment, sports, movies, and cultural programs

(Joong-Ang Daily, April 20, 1988). Therefore, it is likely that an

78

expanded entertainment cable service will be introduced in the near
future.

The Korean government seems to have three major reasons for
its cable expansion policy. First. it is the conviction of the government
that the main international market in the future will be that of
information technology. With China becoming an important
competitor in labor—intensive sectors such as textiles, household
electrical appliances. and shipbuilding, Korea's economic growth and
survival depend on an immediate shift into high-technologr products
such as computers, ﬁber Optics, cable and satellite decoders, and
videotext (South, September, 1988). The government appears to
hope to build cable communication networks as the basic
infrastructure for industrial development of information technology.
Moreover. creating a cable industry will not only provide new
employment but also encourage the growth Of other cultural industries
such as the ﬁlm production and home video industries.

Second. both the uniform standard for programming and
quasi-commercial Oligopolistic structure of Korean television have
contributed to a content homogeneity, and have reduced audience
choice. The Korean government, which has historically exercised a
great deal of control over Korean television, seems to regard cable as a
medium which will meet public demand for more diversity and
choice, yet still be under its regulation. Cable is more controllable,
even if privately owned and Operated, than VCRs, DBS, or other
alternative video distribution vehicles.

Third. the business community's active desire for a private

commercial broadcasting system and more television advertising

79

outlets has been Obvious. Private interests that have been shut out Of
television broadcasting by the government see a new opportunity in
cable television. Several buSiness enterprises such as Samsung,
Hyundai, and Lucky-Goldstar are now preparing for the cable business.
to become not only producers Of cable communication hardware but
also program makers and transmitters. The government seems to
have concluded that private cable television can satisfy the business
community.

While the Korean government is attempting immediate
construction of cable television system for these political and
economic reasons, the cable expansion plan has raised much concern
about the potential impact Of cable television on indigenous culture.
After the introduction Of cable television in Korea, the most
fundamental difﬁculty might be lack Of available programs. Indeed,
programming is a crucial factor in determining the success Of cable
television in Korea. There are two sources of cable programming:
domestic production and imported material. At present, Korea will
probably have problems ﬁlling cable Channels with locally-produced
programs. due to the relative underdevelopment of the domestic ﬁlm
industry and the absence of an independent production system except
for the television network's in—house work. Accordingly, imported
programming would be the only alternative for initial cable television
programming.

This prospect of ﬁlling new channels primarily with imported
programs has caused serious concern about media imperialism. Many
have concluded that the increasing dependence Of Third World media

systems on Western programs for a large portion Of their content

80

would result in the dominance of alien values over the indigenous
culture.

However, if we consider national factors that have contributed to
the development of television programming. there is a good deal of
hope that the introduction of cable television might have a beneﬁcial
effect on the indigenous television culture.

For one thing, the commercial Characteristics of cable
programming for proﬁt-making and advertising would probably force
the cable system to carry more locally-produced programs, because
the experience of broadcasting television indicates that indigenous
programs appeal most to Koreans. other things being equal. This
might stimulate the development of a domestic production industry.
Since Korean television networks have been the sole producers Of
almost all domestic television programs, independent production and
motion picture companies have not been able to participate in
television programming. In fact, they have no market in which to sell
their products beyond a limited number Of theater outlets, even
though they wish to produce television programs to make proﬁts in a
lucrative television market. The limited number Of program outlets
has discouraged many passionate and creative people employed in the
ﬁlm production studios. The introduction of cable television might
solve this problem, increasing the quantity and quality of specialized
indigenous programs. Furthermore, the existence of private cable
television can prevent Korea's public broadcasting system from
becoming entertainment-oriented. whereas the presence of the public
broadcasting system may help maintain an enhanced level Of quality in
Korean television programming (Ito, 1986).

81

For another, Article 1 Of the 1987 Cable Communication Policy
Act stipulates that cable television should be utilized for the purpose Of
public interests, making an effort to establish a sound cable television
business. This article is in line with the media philosophy Of Korean
broadcasting and thereby justifies the regulatory role of the
government in pursuing public interest. Government regulation aimed
at protecting indigenous culture from foreign media inﬂuences,
therefore, would be extended to cable television programming.
However, no concrete plan has yet been announced about the Korean
cable television service, although the government promulgated the
Cable Communication Policy Act in 1987 for the implementation Of
cable television. What is necessary seems to be formulation Of a clear
cable policy that reﬂect active cultural responsibility. The government
should take positive measures to encourage indigenous cultural growth
as well as economic development (Lee, 1980: 195).

In sum, according to the media imperialism perspective.
anticipation Of the future rests on the assumption that new television
services like cable television will also be dominated by imported
programs. The concern about the cross-cultural impact of such
television imports has been a major policy issue of Third World
countries. Consequently, a number Of Third World countries are
hesitant to introduce new communication technologies, even though
they realize their potential beneﬁt in the future. However, as the
MacBride commission suggested, countries which delay the
introduction and development of new technologies risk widening the
technological gap between themselves and developed countries, and

will be left behind in this rapidly developing sector Of many economies

82

in the First World (UNESCO, 1980).

The introduction of cable television into Korea has raised similar
concerns about preserving national culture, which stems from the
increased importation Of programs for cable channels. Yet, ubiquitous
imported programs on cable television would be merely the ﬁrst phase
Of the process in Korea. National forces such as indigenous cultural
preference and active government regulation might strongly resist
foreign media inﬂuences on domestic cable television, just as
witnessed in the process of Korean television development. The
coming Of cable television is more likely to Offer a good chance for the
development of indigenous programming Of specialized kinds rather
than wither local programming. Therefore. it seems that. with
well-planned government policy, cable television can be used tO

enhance the indigenous television culture.

CHAPTER VI

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION '

Using in-depth historical analysis. this study attempted to
investigate the development Of Korean television with respect to the
broadcasting structure and programming. Two competing intellectual
perspectives, media imperialism and media diffusion, were put
forward. seeking a balanced approach to the questions Of this study.

Media imperialism as a theoretical base does not seem to explain
properly what has occurred in Korean television, in relation to the
indigenous control Of ownership, structure. and programming.
National factors contributing to the development of Korean television
tend to be overlooked by this perspective.

First, RCA played an important role in the birth Of a television
station in Korea by providing capital, technology. and consultancy
services. However, this RCA investment in Korea proved unproﬁtable
and was withdrawn, due to Korea's poor internal conditions in the late
19508. Since that time, increasing government control has never
permitted foreign investment in Korean television.

Second. although the American commercial model of
broadcasting had great inﬂuence on the inauguration of Korean
television, its original form has been modiﬁed and blended with other
broadcasting models, such as the public broadcasting system, to adapt

to the particular internal conditions Of Korea. The main elements that
8 3

84

make the adaptation distinct seem to be the mechanism for
minimizing advertiser inﬂuence and the categorical standard for a
balanced programming Of information, culture. and entertainment.
The political and economic policies adopted by the authoritarian
governments since 1961 have played an leading part in generating the
present distinct TV broadcasting structure.

Third. during the last three decades, Korean television has
shifted from a heavy reliance on imported programs in the beginning
to relative independence in indigenous programming in recent years.
Today each Korean television network imports about 10 percent of
their total programming from foreign sources, compared with some
30 percent for a period in the 19608. In addition, although these
national programs tend to be based on foreign program formats to
some degree, the specific content seems to reﬂect clearly indigenous
culture and interests. This relative independence and autonomy in
television programming has been accomplished by the national forces
of indigenous cultural preference and government protective policies.
The rise Of local productions encourages hope that the introduction of
cable television into Korea might have a beneficial effect on the
indigenous television culture.

Thus, contrary to what media imperialism supporters might
have expected about Third World media development, Korea has
undergone the development of self-reliance in television broadcasting
after the initial dependency on the dominant cultures. Still, inherent
technological dependency in terms Of broadcasting equipment and
entertainment-oriented programming can be viewed as a major

implication of the media imperialism perspective.

85

Increasing self-sufficiency in domestic production in Korea,
which has been nurtured by the sheer force Of local cultural
preference. appears to be quite consistent with the "product life
cycle" implications of the media diffusion viewpoint. However, given
that the government is the most important driving force behind the
growth of the Korean television industry, the media diffusion
perspective, which views cultural protectionism as self-defeating,
lacks explanatory power for Korea's experience of television
development. As Lee (1980: 55) point out, "the indigenous culture
may need protection not just because it is unsatisfying or decaying, but
because it is devoid Of a strong metropolitan economy for support."

In sum, "cultural autonomy," as defined by Cees Hamelink (1983:
6), means a society's capacity to decide on the allocation Of its own
communication resources for adequate adaptation to its unique
historical environment. Having examined the development Of Korean
television, Korea's cultural decisions seem to be made by internal
forces like indigenous cultural preference and the national
government, rather than by external forces such as foreign media and
transnational corporations. Certainly, control Of the media system is
in domestic hands, most programming on Korean television is being
produced locally, its content reﬂects Korean culture and interests, and
the national population prefers this indigenous programming. In this
sense, Korea has achieved a relatively large measure Of indigenous
cultural autonomy in the contrOl Of its television system and content.
This process has been signiﬁcantly inﬂuenced by national factors that
have the potential to withstand external foreign media inﬂuence on

domestic cultirre.

86

The present study has focused on the development of Korean
television with respect to the broadcasting system and programming,
revealing its distinct features which contrast with the prevalent
assumptions about the continuing inevitability Of cultural dominance by
the cultural and economic cores in the world communication ﬂow.
This study has emphasized an appropriate synthesis of both
perspectives. as well as a historical analysis Of speciﬁc cases, for more
adequate explanations for both the media development of individual
countries and for the global media ﬂow. It is hoped that this study will
generate more research interests in the unique features of Korean

television development.

NOTES

1. Radio broadcasting was introduced into Korea during the
colonial period. The ﬁrst radio broadcasting service (JODK) started on
February 12, 1927 under tight control by the Japanese colonial
government. This radio broadcasting system was primarily used to
reinforce Japanese militarism in Korea.

2. The close relationship between RCA and Hankuk Ilbo dated
back to the time of the foundation Of KORCAD. For KORCAD, Hankuk
Ilbo was the only source Of TV news programs concerning domestic
events.

3. The 5.16 Foundation was closely related to military interests
as its name refers tO the date Of military coup d'e-tat (May 16, 1961).
This linkage may explain the rapid growth of MBC, which caught up
with TBC within a brief period of time in spite of its later start.

4. Concerning the modiﬁcation Of TV broadcasting structure into
a quasi-public system. Chun's government Claimed that the process
was strictly voluntary, instituted by the mass media themselves.
However, there is sufﬁcient evidence to disprove this. Nam (1983b:
317) Offered two decisive points: "First was the speed with which this
media reformation was achieved. The whole process took place within
a matter of two to three weeks. Second, such a major deprivation Of
property rights-~the Samsung Industrial Group had to give up its TBC
TV-Radio network-does not happen spontaneously."

5. In Korea, because Of historical and cultural traditions, almost
every parent tends to want highly educated Children, and parents
believe that they are under an Obligation tO educate their children as
much as possible. Accordingly, most parents are willing to pay for any

87

88

extracurricular lessons beyond the regular school education for their
children until their children pass the entrance examination to a
competitive university. The expense Of extracurricular lessons was a
serious burden to most Korean families and widened the gap between
"the haves" and "the have-nots" up until 1980.

6. Even in the case Of radio. Japanese colonialism seems to have
failed to transplant a Japanese broadcasting model to Korea. Of
course, the Japanese colonial government played important role in the
birth Of Korean radio. However, the US. military administration
(1945-1948) had much greater inﬂuence on the system and
programming Of recipient Korean radio than had Japanese colonial
government.

Generally the Japanese colonial rulers restricted radio
broadcasting in such a way that it could be used to propagate colonial
policy for an extended period Of time. Together with extreme
hostility to Japanese control. the uncertain broadcasting norm and
style Obstructed the transfer of a Japanese broadcasting model to
Korea. In contrast, the US. military administration’s policy in Korea
was to work through the existing broadcasting system, encouraging
the American model Of broadcasting norm and style. Korean
broadcasters soon learned the American-style commercial format Of
radio programming (Yun, 1986). Moreover, the US. military
administration laid down broadcasting guidelines for the Korean radio
broadcasting system, which emphasized the American concept of the
public -- public interest, convenience, and necessity (Choi. 1985:
50-51). Thus, American military occupation presence in Korea left a
strong imprint on the Korean radio broadcasting system.

The general inﬂuence Of Japanese broadcasting on Korean radio
and television can perhaps be found after the colonial period, not
because Of colonialism but because of the economic relationship and
geopolitical conditions.

7. These results are based on the author's analysis of
every-three-year program guides Of two major daily newspapers
(Cho-Sun Daily and Dong-A Daily) for the ﬁrst week Of April and

89

October. biannual rescheduling months. from 1964 to 1988. The total
broadcast hours for imported programs refer to the total amount Of
time devoted by major Korean TV networks--KBS-l, KBS-2, and
MBC--to broadcasting the programs which are originated from foreign
countries in the sample weeks. For the ﬁgure Of each year, the
number of TV broadcast hours of imported programs during the
sample weeks is divided by the number of total broadcast hours of
those two weeks, and then multiplied by one hundred for the

percentage.

8. A Korean TV network goes on the air around 6:00 A.M. and Off
at about 1:00 A.M. the next morning with no broadcasting between
11:00 A.M. and 5:30 P.M.. According to KBS (1982), Koreans watch
television most from 7:00 RM. to 11:00 P.M.. This time period is also
rated highest for Television commercial fees (Ann, 1986: 61-62).
Therefore. the prime time of Korean television can be deﬁned as the
most highly—viewed time period, between 7:00 PM. and 11:00 P.M..

9. These results are based on the author's analysis of
every-three-year program guides of two major daily newspapers
(ChO-Sun Daily and Dong-A Daily) for the ﬁrst week Of April and
October, biannual rescheduling months, from 1964 to 1988. The total
prime-time hours for imported programs refer to the total amount Of
prime-time viewing hours devoted by major Korean TV
network8--KBS-1, KBS—2, and MBC-~to broadcasting the programs
which are originated from foreign countries in the sample weeks. For
the ﬁgure of each year, the number of TV broadcast hours Of imported
programs which are aired in prime time during the sample weeks is
divided by the number Of total prime-time hours of those two weeks,
and then multiplied by one hundred for the percentage.

10. An alternative explanation is possible for the difference in
audience ratings for imported and domestic programs, mentioned in
this study. The explanation is based on their different time schedules.
Imported programs have been placed out of prime time and
indigenous programs have occupied prime-time hours, due not only to

90

audience preference but also tO government inﬂuences.

11. Japanese culture is rooted in the spirit Of "Samurai" which
means a warrior, while Korean culture is based on that Of "Scholar"
steeped in Confucianism. This distinction makes a crucial cultural
difference between Japan and Korea.

12. Since the late 19608. Japanese broadcasting hardware has
gradually displaced U.S. equipment out of the Korean television
industry, as Japanese equipment makers have become very
competitive with United States suppliers, and KBS and NHK created
the "KBS-NHK Expert Committee" in 1968, for the purpose of
technological cooperation between them (Ministry of Culture and
Information. 1969: Korean Broadcasting System, 1976)

13. In 1981, the "Korean Broadcasting Ethics Committee
(KBEC)" was renamed the "Korean Broadcasting Deliberations
Committee (KBDC)." The "Teleﬁlm Censorship Deliberate Council
(TCDC)" is a subordinate device of the KBDC.

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