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Young-Joo Moon

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Joseph Straubhaar CS
Major professor

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By

Young-Joo Moon

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ABSTRACT

NATIONAL FACTORS AND INDIGENOUS TELEVISION CULTURE : THE DEVELOPMENT OF KOREAN TELEVISION

by

Young-Joo Moon

This study examines the development of Korean television, focusing on the broadcasting structure and programming. The major purpose is to measure the degree of independence and autonomy in Korean television culture, in an attempt to contribute to a better understanding of the global communication flow and the media growth of individual countries. Based on the national case-historical design, archival research and simple categorical content analysis are employed to investigate the effects of foreign and domestic forces on the growth of Korean television. As an analytical tool, two competing theoretical perspectives, media imperialism and media diffusion, are put forward, seeking a balanced approach to the questions of this study. The research concludes that, in contrast to prevailing assumptions about the continuing inevitability of cultural dominance by American media in the world's television system, Korean television has achieved a relatively large measure of self-reliance and indigenous cultural autonomy in control of its television system and in the creation of programming. It also finds that this process has been significantly influenced by the national factors of indigenous cultural preference and the government cultural policies.

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Director of Thesis

To my mother and father,
with all my love and gratitude

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The media of mass communication have been a major subject of discussion among national media planners and communication researchers since the "dominant paradigm" came into prominence in the mid-1960s as a way to explore the role of communication in national development.

Through the late 1960s, mass communication was often considered to be a very powerful, positive, and direct force for national development, especially in the new, independent nations of the Third World. At that time, many national policy-makers in the Third World had high hopes that the new technologies of transistor radio and television could be harnessed to the overall development process.

However, the practical performance of the communication technologies in facilitating development did not seem to approach the announced goals of national integration, socioeconomic modernization, and authentic cultural self-expression in Latin America, Africa, and Asia. It was realized that the role of communication in development is complex and complementary to social change, but is not independently powerful (Schramm and Lerner, 1976; Rogers, 1978).

Consequently, the thinking on communication in development has shifted its major focus to inequitable and dysfunctional social structures existing in the Third World, and to the dependency

relationship between nations within the context of the entire world political-economic order (McAnany, 1983; Lee, 1980).

Schiller first argued in his influential book, "Mass Communication and American Empire" (1969), that the American military-industrial complex controls the world's communication system in order to maintain a political, economic, and cultural domination. Shortly after, Kaarle Nordenstreng and Tapio Varis (1974), in their UNESCO study of international television flow during 1972 and 1973, demonstrated that there was a "one-way flow" of television programs internationally, from a small number of industrialized Western countries to the rest of the world. The empirical evidence of this study has demanded an examination of the once taken-for-granted American principle of "free flow of information."

Along with this empirical documentation of the skewed global distribution of television programs, the changing milieu of international concerns and the corresponding Third World agenda added a great deal of momentum to the overall discussion of international communication and the eventual call for a "New World Information Order" (Straubhaar, 1983; Lee, 1980; McPhail, 1987, Smith, 1980). The first change of world context was the new adjustment of the power structure within major international organizations such as UNESCO (United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization) and ITU (International Telecommunications Union). As the Third World countries have come to play an important role in these international organizations where the traditional ideology of "free flow of information" had been dominated, complaints about the "one-way flow" of global communication became salient in the

international debate. Second, with the rise of nationalism in the Third World countries during the 1960s, a parallel concern for control of their economies, cultures, and media systems was strongly established (McPhail, 1987). Third, the media's cultural function has received unprecedented emphasis, for it has been perceived that cultural control has important implications for political and economic structures. Many Third World countries also seem to have shifted priorities from national integration and socioeconomic modernization to indigenous cultural expression, as they are concerned with the instrumental use of the themes of traditional culture as a more effective means of reaching people (Katz, 1977; Lee, 1980).

Subsequently, international communication researchers have attempted to analyze the unbalanced global flow of television programs and the impact of those imported programs on the indigenous cultures of the Third World countries. With an enormous growth in research on the international flow of imported programs, many communication researchers have concluded that the one-way flow of cultural content from a few Western centers, mainly the United States, to the rest of the world, and increasing dependence of Third World countries on Western media products, might result in the dominance of alien values, molding the minds of Third World individuals to ideals, opinions, and ways of life that are generated by the United States' capitalistic interests (Schiller, 1969, 1976, 1982; Nordenstreng and Varis, 1973; Tunstall, 1977; Beltran, 1978; Lee, 1980; Hamelink, 1983). This prevalent assumption has portrayed a vision of inevitable dominance by American media products, which has brought the Third World and even some Western European countries worries about the

long-term independent development of their indigenous cultures and media systems. Furthermore, from this perspective, the prospects for the future rest on the assumption that new television services like cable television will also be dominated by imported programs.

Nevertheless, recent studies of the available empirical evidence demonstrate major changes in the international flow of television programs and in Third World media development (Straubhaar, 1981; Mattos, 1984; Antola and Rogers, 1984; Lee, 1980; Tracey, 1988; Ogan, 1988). A number of Third World countries exhibit certain characteristics in media development which deviate from the prevailing orthodoxies. Hence, the generalization of prevalent conclusions--the continuing inevitability of cultural dominance by American television programs--about the present and the future of television in Third World countries is now being questioned by many critical writers.

It is in this context that my basic research inquiry is based. Has initial dependence by Korea on the foreign media products created a reinforced pattern of dependency, or has it allowed Korean television to accomplish a relative independence in terms of the broadcasting system and programming ?

The ultimate goal of this thesis is to analyze precisely the development of Korean television, within both a national and an international context, in an attempt to contribute to a better understanding of the global media flow and Third World media development.

First of all, this thesis will attempt to examine thoroughly the history of Korean television broadcasting, focusing on the ownership

pattern and organizational structure (Chapter III). The cause and effect of the foreign influences on Korean television industry will be investigated, using historical analysis. Furthermore, an attempt will be made to identify the role of foreign and domestic forces in shaping the present form of the Korean television system.

Secondly, it will explore the evolution of television programming in Korea via archival research and simple categorical content analysis (Chapter IV). In particular, television programming will be sampled for a two-week period once every three years, from 1964 to 1988, in order to measure the proportion of imported versus domestic television programming in terms of both number of broadcast hours and of prime-time hours. Using selected ideas of both the media imperialism and the media diffusion perspectives, the degree of independence and autonomy in Korean television programming will be gauged.

Finally, this thesis will try to identify some national factors and their role in the process of television development and apply those factors to evaluation of the future of cable television in Korea (Chapter V). The impact of the introduction of cable television on Korean television culture will be briefly examined by assessing the possibilities for indigenous cable programming in Korea.

As a research methodology, the present study uses both qualitative and quantitative analysis, although more emphasis is placed on the former. Based on the national case-historical design, archival research and simple categorical content analysis are employed in this study, utilizing documentary sources and interviews.

As an analytical tool, two competing theoretical perspectives,

media imperialism and media diffusion, will be put forward in this study. In brief, proponents of media imperialism tend to view the existing imbalance of global communication flow as the economic and ideological dominance of American imperialistic interests, and therefore a threat to indigenous culture (Schiller, 1969, 1976; Nordenstreng and Varis, 1973). Media diffusionists, on the other hand, tend to see the imbalance as only a temporary and positive process, followed by a relative growth of domestic cultural capabilities (Read, 1976; Pool, 1977). Both perspectives appear to have merits as well as demerits in analyzing the international flow of TV programs. The media imperialism perspective tends to explain the unbalanced media flow and Third World media development within a global and external framework, to the exclusion of internal forces and their potential role. In contrast, the media diffusion perspective is willing to put an emphasis on national factors to illuminate the same subject, but it is not concerned with international politico-economic relationships and their effect on domestic development. This thesis argues the respective importance of both perspectives, seeking a balanced approach to the questions of this study.

A single interpretation, without danger of bias, usually can not be applied to diverse cases. In this sense, national case studies may be a more useful research design for understanding mass media development in the Third World and the international flow of television programs than are more aggregate approaches that follow a only global perspective (Mattos, 1984). At the same time, two competing perspectives need to be compounded for a more balanced analysis.

Since it is felt that the growth of Korean television can be better appreciated by looking at national factors than at international factors, this study will be conducted mainly within a national context. It will, however, also consider the external influences imposed by the United States. This thesis will concentrate on the following three specific research questions :

1. Do the ownership and structure of Korean television still reflect initial foreign influence? What is the role of foreign and domestic forces in the development of a television broadcasting system in Korea? Is control of the Korean television industry in domestic or foreign hands?

2. How has the Korean television industry developed in terms of programming? Has Korean television, which relied heavily on imported programming in its early development, increased its dependence on foreign media products or has it achieved a relatively large measure of self-reliance and indigenous cultural autonomy in the creation of programming? If more programming is being created in Korea, is it truly "Korean" in nature and thus beneficial to indigenous television culture?

3. Have national factors played a much larger part in the development of Korean television than foreign forces? If so, what are the main contributing national factors identified to explain the relative independence of Korean television programming? Will these particular national factors contribute to future development of cable television in culturally specific ways?

Chapter II will examine the two theoretical perspectives for the global media flow and summarize some arguments which may have

significance to the concern of this study. It also argues for the importance of in-depth historical analysis for understanding mass media development.

CHAPTER II

THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES : MEDIA IMPERIALISM versus MEDIA DIFFUSION

This chapter will review the two overarching umbrella perspectives by contrasting their different explanations with respect to: (1) causal mechanisms of global imbalance in TV programming and (2) the effects of the one-way television flow. Then, a critique of both perspectives will be offered in an attempt to establish a more adequate analytical framework for this study.

2.1. Causal Mechanisms of Global Imbalance in Television Programming

2.1.1. The Imperialistic Interests of the United States

Originally the media imperialism perspective grew out of a *Marxist theory of political economy and dependency.*. The basic assumption is that the national and international power structures lend themselves to various levels of class conflict between the economically dominant "cores" and the poor "peripheries" (Wallerstein, 1979; Frank, 1972). Therefore, the economic dependency of the Third World on advanced capitalistic powers constitutes the central feature of international power relationships, and rich capitalistic centers exploit the Third World countries in order to maintain a political and economic superiority (Schiller, 1969;

Lee, 1980).

Relying on this assumption, proponents of media imperialism consider that emphasis should be laid on the imperialistic interests of the United States for understanding the global phenomenon of unbalanced TV program flow. They believe that American hegemony and domination are evident in the present pattern of the media flow, in the sense that the United States intentionally imposes its values, norms, and beliefs upon the other dependent countries through communication via the mass media. In particular, media imperialism advocates stress that American TV programs reflect the capitalistic interests of the senders and not the unanimous output of the receivers (Nordenstreng and Varis, 1974; Hamelink, 1983). This proposition is well presented by Boyd-Barrett's (1977: 117) definition of "media imperialism": "the process whereby the ownership, structure, distribution or content of the media in any one country are singly or together subject to substantial external pressures from the media interests of any other country or countries without proportionate reciprocation of influence by the country so affected." Thus, the one-way flow of TV products from the United States to the Third World, and the dependency relationship that could be established by the importation of foreign TV programs, can be interpreted as an intended effort by the United States to perpetuate political, economic, and cultural domination.

More detailed attention has been drawn to the role played by the American transnational corporations in determining the flow of TV programs. It is certain that the transnational media corporations contribute considerably to the present imbalance of global TV flows.

Proponents of media imperialism have pointed out that the American transnational corporations have great control over international finances, technology, and marketing by exerting their great economic power which is gained from the enormous size of their national market. Media imperialism advocates maintain that the control and concentration of resources and infrastructure by transnational corporations significantly affect the freedom and democratization of international communication by wielding decisive influence in the international marketplace (Tunstall, 1977; Schement et al., 1984). Moreover, in their opinion, such concentration and transnationalization tend to create international monopolies and standardization in media products, which may establish a worldwide uniformity in ideas, values, life-styles, and consumer behavior.

A more critical argument is that the American transnational corporations fully collaborate with American political, financial, and military circles and have a mutual interest with them (Schiller, 1969; Hamelink, 1983). The capitalistic self-interest of transnational corporations tallies with the imperialistic interests of the United States. Accordingly, in the view of the radical writers, the transnational corporations willingly strive to expand American foreign and defense policies, including international military control, electronic surveillance, and homogenized American commercial culture, to Third World countries on the behalf of the U.S. government.

Furthermore, analysts of media imperialism claim that the local ruling elites in the Third World play the role of the intermediaries for the global spreading of metropolitan cultures. If the interests of elites

in the Third World fit those of international capitalism, they will introduce the cultural system of the hegemonic centers, and impose metropolitan culture on the rest of the population (Salinas and Paldan, 1979). Thus, the imperialistic interests of the external capitalist powers are adopted and incorporated by internal ruling elites into Third World.

In summary, the present global media flow of TV programs is criticized as an explicit manifestation of the American hegemony and will to dominate the Third World. As the agents of capitalist expansion, the American transnational corporations aggravate the international flow of TV programs and perpetuate the dependency of the Third World. The proponents of the media imperialism perspective add that those media corporations seek to disseminate a great deal of American TV programs which represent the communication interests of the ruling classes, both external and internal. The values and images contained in those alien programs are seemingly opposed to the interests of the majority of the people in the Third World, and therefore jeopardize cultural autonomy. What is more, critical writers indicate that the local ruling class is the crucial link between American imperialistic interests and exploited people in the Third World.

2.1.2. The Natural Market Force

As an alternative to the media imperialism perspective, the media diffusion perspective has a directly opposite implication for the global media flow (Lee, 1980). Basically, the media diffusion perspective is evolved from the *anthropological theory of cultural*

diffusion. Anthropologists have analyzed the process of cultural diffusion to show that all cultures owe many of their elements to borrowing from other cultures. They believe that internal processes such as invention and discovery can account for only a part of the total inventory of any sociocultural system, and that the diffusing cultural items provide the basis for much of the culture (Malinowski, 1945; Benedict, 1959; Schwartz and Ewald, 1968). The borrowing culture reinterprets the diffusing item to fit its existing patterns and makes it quite different from its original state (Schwartz and Ewald, 1968; Lauer, 1973; Pool, 1977). Media diffusionists hold this position. They argue that sociocultural development accrues to a nation from an open interaction with metropolitan culture. Mass media, for them, play a leading role in the domestic cultural growth of the Third World because they provide greater opportunities to adopt a vast amount of cultural information and knowledge from most of the world's major cultural areas on a continuing basis (UNESCO, 1982). When members of a society are faced with diffusion of a component of culture, it is argued, they will either modify the component to adapt it to their culture or reject it in response to their cultural need.

Anchored in this theory, proponents of the media diffusion perspective seem to understand the existing imbalance of global television programs as the initial process of interaction with foreign cultures. The present structure of production and distribution is in its infancy, and will grow as the century proceeds and the television market evolves (Tracey, 1988). In their opinion, if the free flow of information is genuinely guaranteed, the present uneven flow will be self-correcting and eventually will result in the cultural growth of the

Third World countries (Lee, 1980; Read, 1976; Pool, 1977).

This explanation seems to concur with the cultural implications of the "product life cycle" theory. The business-organization model of the product life cycle predicts that the early monopolistic situation of American transnational corporation expansion will later reverse itself as the foreign media companies begin to have the ability to produce their own programs. It also predicts that local companies will have a distinct advantage in the competition for an audience, due to the relative appeal of the domestically produced programs to national populations (Vernon, 1971; Read, 1976; Pool, 1977; Straubhaar, 1983; Mattos, 1984; Schement et al., 1984; Lee, 1980; Tracey, 1988).

Based on this line of thought, proponents of the media diffusion perspective explain the existing unbalanced flow of TV programs chiefly as the result of natural market forces. Read (1976) is one of the key writers to have applied the product life cycle theory to the global media flow in order to account for global expansion of transnational corporations. He argues that the condition affecting the global media flow is the great ability and inclination of American mass media merchants to sell their media commodities in foreign markets, where demands for their products are governed by political, economic, social, and cultural factors. In fact, American multinational corporations have entered the international marketplace with abundant resources derived from a communication-intense native society. Such a firm national base gives the United States a comparative advantage, facilitating expansion into the international market. Therefore, the global expansion of American multinational

corporations is the consequence of the technological capability and the marketing ability of the big American companies to provide a product or service at the lowest price in the international marketplace.

As regards the impact of transnational corporations, Read (1976: 180-191) suggests that there are fair benefits to both American transnational corporations and their consumers. The parties separately expect rewards for their participation. This implies that the Third World countries offer access to transnational corporations in return for their expectations being rewarded. Within their limited economic situation, the Third World countries can purchase American programs for less than the cost of producing local programs, and thereby satisfy the local audience. He adds that the host government and consumers in the Third World have a strong bargaining position. Local consumers, according to his argument, adjust or terminate the foreign program importation by all possible means, including quotas, censorship, bans, and boycotts, when their expectations are inadequately fulfilled.

Moreover, as soon as the Third World countries learn and adapt the technology and culture from abroad, the domestic cultural industry begins to produce its own product, in the native language and with local relevance, and thereby wins the bulk of the audience, terminating the monopolies that the American enterprises enjoyed at the outset (Pool, 1977; Read, 1976).

In the view of media diffusionists, the activities of the multinational media corporations are not necessarily collaborative with the U.S. government. Rather, American transnational corporations act

mainly from the pure motive of profit maximization (Lee, 1980).

In sum, the demands of the Third World countries for the plentiful supply of inexpensive media products, together with the ability of the United States to provide media content more cheaply than its international competitors, contributes to the global expansion of American transnational media corporations. This expansion results in the one-way flow of TV programs. Media diffusionists, as represented by Read (1976), believe that American transnational corporations contribute to the decision-making processes affecting sociocultural development in the Third World through the marketplace system by which they make deals with foreign consumers.

2.2. The Effects of the One-Way Television Flow

2.2.1. A Threat to Indigenous Culture

Proponents of the media imperialism perspective claim that the one-way flow of television programs from a small number of Western countries, mainly the United States, to the rest of the World and the increasing dependence of Third World media system on the imported foreign material jeopardizes a country's national identity and indigenous culture.

They stress that the United States strives to propagate exogenous cultures using television programs in order to induce Third World countries to accept capitalist values and behaviors. It seems necessary to influence the attitudes, desires, beliefs, lifestyles, and consumer patterns of those who consume the imported media products to maintain a global communication hegemony and cultural

domination (McPhail, 1987). Sarti (1981) contends that the task of the mass media as instruments of the process of ideological domination is to disseminate values that are guided by the capitalistic interests of hegemonic centers and that are opposed to the national interests of Third World countries. The Third World countries are incorporated into the market-oriented capitalist world economies by the powerful U.S. transnational corporations. As mentioned previously, these big American firms are held to be responsible for the global spreading of synchronized TV programs. Writers such as Hamelink (1983: 6) note that : "Transnational firms consider national boundaries politically, economically, and culturally obsolete and unable to define business requirements or consumer trends. The world is one marketplace and the world consumer is essential for that market. World market and world consumer demand an optimal synchronization of cultural values so that authentic national characteristics do not jeopardize the unity of the transnational system." Therefore, the transnational corporations have no regard for national culture and content diversity, and force a global synchronization of television culture to guarantee the imperialistic interests of the United States.

Analysts of media imperialism emphasize that the values inherent in the homogenized TV content seriously affects a nation's cultural autonomy. They maintain that U.S. TV programs reflect American middle-class values and aspirations, which have nothing to do with the genuine culture of the Third World. Heavy doses of these foreign cultural values, many conclude, would threaten indigenous cultural values and traditions.

Beltran (1978: 79-81), in his study touching on program content of Latin America television, asserts that the intoxicating TV images that assail the mind of Latin Americans are, to a large extent, "made in the U.S.A.." These TV images that foster the cultural values of an advanced capitalist society contribute to selling both consumer goods and a "way of life" based on the norms of that capitalist society (Williams, 1975).

Other writers such as Lee (1980: 100-108) note that the imposition of alien cultural values may contribute to externally forced changes in common thinking about society, human relations, and life. For example, U.S. TV programs present an ideology of consumption that may nourish aspirations and expectations that are difficult to satisfy given the low income of the majority of the population in the Third World (O'Brien, 1974; Sarti, 1981; Beltran, 1977). According to this argument, this "consumerism" introduced by foreign programs may bring about mass frustration and disintegration of society, which results in the continuing underdevelopment of the Third World.

In addition, it is argued that the strong presence of cheap and polished American media products may impede any effort toward utilizing local resources and stimulating local talents in the development of an indigenous cultural industry. Thus, such foreign media products contribute to perpetuation of a long-term dependence of Third World economies and cultures on the American media industry.

On the other hand, Nordenstreng and Varis (1973) argue that media programs which originate in the United States minimize the portrayal of class conflict and serve to make illegitimate the concrete

social alternatives to capitalistic society. It is noteworthy that the radical writers tend to suggest the so-called "socialist alternative" as the way to achieve national identity and cultural autonomy.

In short, proponents of the media imperialism viewpoint consider the existing one-way flow of TV programs as the intended cultural domination of the United States. To them, the consequences of the present TV flow are deemed undesirable because the importation of a vast amount of American TV programs results in dominance of alien values over the domestic culture, and therefore contributes to furthering the present dependence of the Third World on the dominant culture.

Concurrently, analysts of media imperialism claim that the expansion of new communication technologies does not seem to change the current global flow of television programs. Varis (1984: 152) argues: "The new communication technologies may offer some alternatives for the future. But they may also serve only to widen the gap between those who have access to information and the means of using it and influencing others, and those who do not have these capabilities. If access to information is dependent solely on wealth and income, no change in this current flow of information seems likely in the future".

There is a widespread belief that the introduction of new communication technologies--cable television, direct broadcasting satellites, video cassette recorders--add a great number of new channels primarily filled with foreign material, thus increasing the Third World's importation of U.S. TV programs. It is obvious that the extension of media infrastructure is only feasible if there is a

corresponding extension of the media content. Grounded in this belief, radical writers argue that the introduction of new media systems may create not only one more means of control, whose sole objective is cultural domination, but also a reinforced pattern of dependency (Nordenstreng and Varis, 1973; Schiller, 1976; Varis, 1984; Sarti, 1981; Hoffmann-Rein, 1987). At the same time, they stress the adverse effects stemming from the current form of technology transfer (Tunstall, 1977; Hamelink, 1983). It is argued that when a communication technology is imported, inevitably, its supporting social structure is introduced. Hamelink (1983: 17) claims: "many countries, in choosing to adapt U.S. radio and television technology, have also introduced the United States model of commercial media. This structure was originally designed to suit specific United States commercial interests." Hence, the introduction of new technologies often can not effectively represent the interest of the developing countries. In particular, advanced communication technologies such as satellite broadcasting and cable television, by their capital-intensive and technologically sophisticated nature, may introduce a complex array of factors into the development process, which may hamper rather than facilitate certain desired outcomes (Clippinger, 1975).

To sum up, proponents of the media imperialism perspective arguing from the radical viewpoint, conclude that the present unbalanced TV flow constitute an extreme threat to indigenous culture. The expansion of new communication technologies, in their opinion, serves the capitalistic interests of the hegemonic centers as one more means of cultural control.

2.2.2. The Growth of Domestic Cultural Capabilities

Contrary to the media imperialism perspective, proponents of the media diffusion perspective argue that the outcome of the present TV flows is beneficial to the recipient nations of the Third World.

As discussed previously, the foreign influx of media products offers great opportunities for contact with a wealth of cultural information that is not available at home. Media diffusionists believe that, in most cases, the diffusing items are modified to suit to the recipient culture because the process of adaptation is selective and accommodative. The new items are given meaning in the terms of the borrowing culture. In this way, the borrowing culture absorbs elements from other cultures into a native organism to develop the existing cultural heritage (Schwartz and Ewald, 1968: 433-458).

From this point of view, media diffusionists contend that an open interaction with foreign culture is essential for sociocultural development. The present unbalanced flow, for them, is only a temporary process and will change soon to a more diverse flow.

Pool says, in his influential article, "The Changing Flow of Television" (1977), that there is a cycle of initial dependence on interaction with the source culture, but that that is followed by a relative growth of domestic cultural capabilities. He also suggests that this cultural growth is nurtured by the local cultural preferences. In his opinion, if other things are equal, local consumers pick local products, which have the great advantage of familiar common language and cultural traits, and of social support.

Read (1976) has a similar viewpoint. He points out two major reasons for the Third World's importation of U.S. TV programs. First,

the price of importing U.S.-made programs is much cheaper than that of using domestically produced one. Second, the initial audience for television in any society is usually composed of a wealthy elite that can afford to buy a TV set and whose tastes tend to be cosmopolitan. Hence, a foreign broadcaster depends on the United States as the most readily available source for TV programs at the early stage of TV development. However, according to Read (1976: 91), as the local television industry grows, a new situation develops:

> As foreign television systems matured, just as had the American system, their audience base broadened, they increased the number of telecasting hours, and they acquired more wherewithal to do their own productions that had greater local appeal. This development did not necessarily diminish the amount of imported programming, but rather the kind. With more air time to fill, the inexpensive import remained desirable, but the type of shows preferred changed. Whereas at first any film, almost irrespective of its political/cultural dimensions, could be exported, the new situation reduced the scope of the international telefilm market to entertainment action- adventures. Foreign stations could and would do their own musical comedies, soap operas, and political documentaries. What they still could not afford to do was what Hollywood did so well: the western with the great exterior scenes, the cops and robbers story with a big chase, and the dramatic adventure with special production effects.

The free flow TV programs may impose initial constraints on indigenous cultures in the Third World, but will bring about eventual cultural enrichment. Given the labor-intensive nature of the TV industry, the initial advantages of the U.S. programs can not last long. Locally produced programs will gradually get ahead of foreign programs in the Third World due to the natural force of local cultural tastes, and thus contribute to indigenous cultural expression.

Analysts of media diffusion tend to place emphasis not only on the development of new exporting centers within Latin America, Asia, and Europe but also on the decreasing dependence of some Third World countries on U.S. TV programs (Mattos, 1984; Antola and Rogers, 1984; Tracey,1988). They point out the success of new production centers such as Brazil, Mexico, Egypt, and Hong Kong as a positive outcome of the free flow of TV programs and media diffusion. The reverse media flow via the Spanish International Network (SIN) to the United States is favorably cited to support media diffusionists' arguments.

Furthermore, Pool (1977) claims that those new production centers will originate from countries which encourage free flow and free development in the future. Those nationalist, authoritarian governments that use the slogan of national integrity to resist change, in his opinion, are chiefly responsible for cultural backwardness. That is, cultural protectionism is usually self-defeating and pays the price of mediocrity and primitiveness. Preferably, the free inflow of foreign TV programs permits the greatest amount of individual choice and improvement in domestic cultural capabilities.

Particularly, media diffusionists argue that the marketplace system enhances the prospects for the free flow of information to be genuinely free (Read, 1976). They claim that, in the marketplace system, it is the producers who conform to the consumer's taste, and that it has never been possible to impose a type of cultural product or service on users against their will (UNESCO, 1982). Accordingly, in their view, American programs abroad reflect world cultural tastes and have international human appeal, given the ability of American

transnational corporations to make their products universally available.

However, American mass media do not seem to have the power to bring about adoption of values contrary to Third World audiences' true beliefs (Read, 1976). Foreign television content can provide alternative cultural values, but it can not effectively impel audiences to change their cultural values against their will. Depending on the audience's cultural needs, a diffusing item of foreign culture can be rejected, modified for adoption, or accepted as it is. Therefore, according to this argument, the importation of foreign TV programs, which has a strong economic rationale given their low cost, appears to have little adverse cultural impact.

In brief, media diffusionists contend that open interaction with metropolitan culture, specifically foreign inflow of U.S. TV programs, results in long-term cultural growth in the Third World.

Viewed in the same light, proponents of media diffusion assert that new communication technologies increase the importation of a wide variety of foreign programs of specialized kinds which are not available domestically. Pool (1977: 148) argues: "Specialized material for diverse audiences may be produced in many places in many countries, and may in time be distributed economically to local redistribution channels by taking advantage of the new technology of satellites and cassettes." He believes that new communication technologies will aid more the development of multiple cultural centers than the concentration of world production centers in relatively few places. In his opinion, the development of cable television or video cassettes creates a variety of specialized local channels These local distribution channels are linked by the satellites.

The satellite transmission increases the importation of international programs which offer diverse cultural information and knowledge. In addition, thanks to the development of cheap TV cameras and inexpensive editing equipment of good quality, local producers in the Third World can more economically produce their own materials. Indeed, new technology may promote local origination of TV programs by reducing the economic burden of production equipment.

In a similar vein, Ogan (1988) argues that substantial changes in media delivery systems expand the range of choice beyond the more limited selection of broadcast administrators and theater owners. Particularly, the availability and spread of the videocassette recorder in developing countries, according to Ogan's study of VCRs in Turkey, encourage the production of more culturally authentic materials and their distribution outside the centralized mass media system.

Moreover, the new channels, using a considerable amount of U.S. material, may increase the amount of viewing and advertising revenue. Based on Bekkers'(1987) research, Tracey (1988) points out that the extra viewing is going not to the new channels, but rather to the traditional domestic channels, and that the potential growth in advertising is national rather than transnational. He then suggests that the strength of national cultures, the power of language and tradition, and the force that flows within national boundaries should be carefully taken into consideration, in assessing the likely success of new communication technologies such as cable, DBS, and the VCR. This implies that what makes the new technologies viable is a national productive force that is attuned to local audience's tastes.

In sum, analysts of media diffusion claim that the free flow of

media eventually leads to indigenous cultural development. For them, if the free flow of information is genuinely guaranteed, the present one-way flow of TV programs will change expeditiously to a more adequate and balanced flow. The introduction of new communication technologies, in their view, would not only aid the development of diverse cultural centers but also contribute to the relative growth of cultural capabilities in the Third World.

2.3. Toward a More Adequate Analytical Framework

Both perspectives have been put forward by various writers, and are considered to be a very important theoretical base for explaining not only the imbalance of the international communication flow but also the development of mass media in the Third World. However, it is fair to say that the media imperialism perspective has attracted the research interest of communication scholars more than has the media diffusion perspective, though its preeminence has obviously diminished in recent years.

Proponents of the media imperialism viewpoint have tried to place the analysis of the media in the context of the international extension of capital, unmasking the liberal rhetoric of the "free flow of information" (Lee, 1980; Sarti, 1981). It is true that the media imperialism perspective has made a valuable contribution to diagnosis of the inequity and inadequacy in international communications. However, this radical perspective seems to have at least three serious flaws.

First, the media imperialism perspective tends to put emphasis on the world-system analysis to the neglect of the complex internal

dynamics of individual recipient nations (Lee, 1980; Katz and Wedell, 1977; Tunstall, 1977; Mattos, 1984). Analysis of media imperialism appears to overlook the importance of national factors, such as government policies and national cultural preference that a country may have, in counteracting foreign influence. If this perspective does not consider national variations, it is in danger of being used to understand everything in general about the media in the Third World and hence nothing in particular (Ogan, 1988). While there are some countries that are heavily dependent on foreign programs, there are also some that are relatively self-reliant in TV programming.

Second, there appears to be unrealistic policy prescriptions in their suggestions on how to redress the imbalance in global media flow. Proponents of the media imperialism perspective have argued for isolation from the world capitalist system and its dominant cultures (Schiller, 1976; Read, 1976; Lee, 1980). Lee (1980) contends that socialized central control does not necessarily present a possible alternative to media imperialism, citing as an example China's media policy and practices. Hence, media imperialism seems to fail to provide viable policy solutions to the problem of the existing dependency relationship.

Third, proponents of the media imperialism viewpoint often assume that U.S. television programs are popular, and that these U.S. programs have an impact on the cultural orientation of Third World viewers. However, there seems to be considerable evidence that local viewers basically prefer national programming (Read, 1976; Pool, 1977; Straubhaar, 1983; Lee, 1980; Mattos, 1984; Tracey, 1988). The radical writers tend to ignore the possibilities for viewers to avoid

foreign programs when local programs are available. Moreover, although media may play an important role, it is not possible to impose cultural values on viewers against their true beliefs (Read, 1976). Katz (1984: 32) argues: "The reading of a TV program is a process of negotiation between the story on the screen and the culture of the viewers themselves." Indeed, it seems that the potential cultural impact of media content may vary depending on the relationship between the cultural values of the imported programs and those of the domestic viewers. The importation of foreign programs does not necessarily establish a set of foreign cultural values in the minds of Third World viewers. In other words, foreign programs alone are not so powerful as to affect the cultural values of the Third World audience, because television is only one small factor among many other social factors that affect society and its culture.

On the other hand, the media diffusion perspective, which views the unbalanced media flow as a result of global market forces, also has its critics. Lee (1980: 63) claims: "The more conservative element of non-Marxist analysts appears to defend the established interests of the strong nations under an illusion of a bright and rosy future. That time and market will not automatically take care of the present inequity in media production and distribution if no actions are to be taken resolutely by the nations involved does not deter them at all." The ideological roots of the media diffusion perspective appear to be closely related to the "free flow" principle of the United Nations Universal Declaration on Human Rights (1948). This principle stresses the individual's right to information through any media, regardless of frontiers. Accordingly, the individual's right to

information is considered to be of greater importance than the nation's right to protect its borders. However, the development process and strategies of the Third World are considerably different from those of advanced Western countries. Given the weak social, political, and economic background of the Third World, government leading of purposive and planned development may bring about more fruitful results. Third World countries have the right to protect their cultures from the inflow of what they deem undesirable. Under the existing political and economic dependency structures of international relationships, the free flow of media means consolidating the interests of the advanced Western centers in the international marketplace. Underdeveloped countries may suffer from negative consequences economically and culturally before positive benefits are in sight (Lee, 1980). Therefore, the media diffusion perspective can be criticized for overemphasis on the positive function of open interaction and for reluctance to recognize fundamental political and economic dependency dynamics.

In conclusion, different theoretical lenses provide different explanations for the global media flow. Both perspectives, which respectively contain valid points of arguments, appear to function as valuable theoretical frameworks for discussing the relative causes and effects of the unbalanced global TV programming. However, problems remain with both of the extreme perspectives. It seems that both competing perspectives usually oversimplify their arguments, and lack concrete empirical observation. In particular, the media imperialism perspective, and to some extent the media diffusion perspective, tend to explain the global media flow and Third World media development

within an international context. Even though the media diffusion perspective inclines to assign more weight to internal conditions existing in individual Third World countries, it still depends for its explanation largely on international market forces. National factors that influence the media flows are disregarded by both perspectives. Katz and Wedell (1977) are two of the few scholars to demonstrate the importance of national variations. They recognize the varying degrees of media dependency relationships, which are influenced by the interaction of foreign and domestic forces. Autonomous domestic forces may play an important role in the development of media by withstanding foreign influence on the indigenous culture.

What is needed at this point seems to be a concrete analysis of specific national historical contexts, in which the global perspective of the nation is maintained. Straubhaar (1981, 1982, 1983, 1984, 1989a) is very instructive in this respect. His historical analysis of Brazilian TV studies the increasing power of the Brazilian forces within its TV industry compared with foreign forces. His research reveal the asymmetrical interdependence of Brazilian TV, focusing on the influence of the national government and the dynamics of industry actors, but considering the effects of foreign influences.

Indeed, neither perspective appears to be able to explain properly TV development in many Third world countries, since they do not consider the internal dynamics of individual nations in a historical way. It seems to me that an appropriate synthesis of both perspectives, as well as in-depth historical analysis of specific cases, would provide more adequate explanations for both the media development of individual countries in particular and for the global

media flow in general. It is within this analytical framework that the development of Korean television will be examined. National factors contributing to media development in Korea, valid points of each perspective that may have significance in the case of Korea, can both be analyzed in order to aid recognition of points in common with other countries.

The following chapter will analyze thoroughly the historical development of Korean television, focusing on its ownership and structure. An attempts will be made to analyze foreign and domestic influences on the television system in Korea.

CHAPTER III

OWNERSHIP AND STRUCTURE OF KOREAN TELEVISION

As a basis for the evaluation of Korean television programming, this chapter will investigate the television broadcasting history and processes that led to the current situation in Korea with respect to ownership and structure. The major focus will be to present the role of foreign and domestic forces in the development of the television broadcasting system in Korea.

3.1. History of Korean Television

3.1.1. Introduction of Television Broadcasting: 1956-1960

Television broadcasting in Korea began on May 12, 1956.[1] The Radio Corporation of America (RCA) first established a commercial television station called "Korea-RCA Distributor" (KORCAD) to promote the purchase of television receivers and transmitting equipment. Since the American domestic market for television was almost completely saturated by the late 1950s, big American media corporations sought new foreign markets for their finished products. As a way to secure additional foreign markets, RCA was actively engaged in activities that would assure them the ownership of foreign television stations (Lee, 1980: 83-100). KORCAD can be seen as a product of such activities.

However, KORCAD did not work well in Korea, a small poor country torn by the Korean War (1950-1953). Although "radio with moving pictures" attracted many Korean's attention, most Koreans could not afford the "luxurious" television receivers. Moreover, few advertisers were willing to invest in television advertising. Given the fact that KORCAD adopted the American model of commercial broadcasting, which entirely depended on advertising revenue as a financial base for broadcasting, those internal conditions seriously threatened KORCAD's financial viability. At that time, the total number of television receivers in Korea was less than 300 sets, and this extremely small market never supported commercial television broadcasting (Kim, 1983). In fact, RCA was not invited at the outset to offer technical assistance or consultancy work in Korea, where local business capital was not available for initiation of television broadcasting. It invited itself, to guarantee additional foreign markets. It did not achieve this goal due to the poor internal conditions of Korea.

This poor profit picture made RCA hand over its television business to Gi-Young Chang, the owner of Hankuk Ilbo (Korea Times), in May, 1957.[2] Gi-Young Chang opened a commercial television station by the name of "Dae-Han Broadcasting Corporation" (DBC), which was set up using domestic private capital and former KORCAD personnel. Since DBC embraced the U.S. commercial model of management, it continuously had financial difficulties in operating its station due to very limited advertising revenue. For example, DBC itself sustained fifty percent of its total programming while national advertisers (30%) and the United States Information Service (USIS)

(20%) supported the rest of the programming (Choi, 1979: 69-71).

As for the programming pattern of DBC, the American commercial style emphasizing entertainment was continued (Hwang, 1982; Choi, 1985). The programming of DBC can be characterized by: (1) emphasis on entertainment programming, which accounted for approximately half of the total programming; (2) strengthening of news programming with the assistance of Hankuk Ilbo, the DBC's parent newspaper company; and (3) evidence of a sincere endeavor to produce its own programming, in contrast to KORCAD (Park, 1985: 342-345; Ma, 1985: 75-76).

Unfortunately, in spite of steady efforts in programming and station management, DBC was destroyed by fire in 1959. After 1959, until DBC drew down its curtain in 1961, it broadcast only twenty minutes a day through "American Forces Korea Network" (AFKN) which was established in 1957 for the purpose of encouragement and entertainment to the U.S. Armed Forces in Korea. Although DBC's audience was very small, about 8,000 TV sets in 1960, this limited broadcasting through AFKN's channel seems to have induced Koreans to watch more U.S. programs (Park, 1985: 345-347).

3.1.2. Formation of Three National TV Stations: 1961-1969

In December 1961, Chung-Hee Park's revolutionary military government, which took over power through a *coup d'e·tat*, launched the state-owned "Korean Broadcasting System" (KBS) in Seoul. The government recognized the importance of mass media as an instrument of the revolutionary tasks. High priority was given to the

expansion of mass media systems, in the sense that that not only did the mass media effectively orchestrate government development plans and messages but they also helped to create the necessary climate of political support.

Accordingly, the government played an active role in promoting the mass media system, particularly television. For example, despite Korea's uncertain economic situation in late 1961, the government contracted with RCA for the technical facilities of KBS and approved the importation of 20,000 television sets from the United States and Japan to ensure rapid diffusion of television. One possible explanation for the selection of RCA was that the company was perhaps the only one that could provide a complete television system by the specific date (Annual Report of KBS, 1963: 219; Boyd, 1982: 33-50).

When KBS started its regular broadcasting, the poverty of the national economy made it difficult to support the cost of the state-owned television service. Under the deficit operation of the early stage, KBS accepted advertising as a way to finance its TV broadcasting service. As another means of financial support, subscription fees were also collected from the owners of television sets. Thanks to the profit-making proposition of single-channel commercial operation, KBS gradually grew and expanded into a national network by 1966.

The lucrative profit picture of KBS and promising future of the television industry incited commercial interests to participate in the formation of commercial television companies. It is also possible that major business companies looked at the potential of television in gaining political weapons for the protection of their commercial

interests.

"Tong-Yang Broadcasting Corporation" (TBC) was established in 1964 as a commercial station by Byung-Chule Lee, a private entrepreneur of Samsung Industrial Group. TBC primarily relied on the domestic electronics industry for its broadcasting equipment because Korea's hard currency holdings in the mid-1960s discouraged TBC from purchasing foreign equipment (Park, 1985: 360).

In 1969, the "Mun-Wha Broadcasting Corporation" (MBC), which soon became the leading force in commercial television, followed TBC. The 5.16 Foundation was a heavy stockholder, while business enterprises such as Lucky, SSangyong, and Dong-A Group shared the remaining stocks.[3] With improved economic conditions, MBC could set up its system by importing advanced foreign broadcasting equipment from the United States (Ampex) and the United Kingdom (Pye TVT) (Hwang, 1982: 238).

Thus, by 1969, three television systems--KBS, TBC, and MBC--were firmly erected and put into operation in Korea. It is worth noting here that two commercial TV stations, TBC and MBC, were strongly linked not only to the high-ranking politicians but also to other media outlets such as radio and newspaper (Won, 1984: 126-127). Although this close linkage of political and business elites might have contributed to rapid construction and expansion of both commercial stations, it has impeded long-term independent development of the media system.

3.1.3. Expansion and Competition of Commercial TV: 1970-1979

Following the lead of KBS, TBC and MBC threw their efforts into creating a nationwide network organization. In the early 1970s, both commercial stations rapidly expanded into national networks, building local affiliated stations in the major cities of the country. Concomitant with the expansion of the television networks, the national TV receiver industry was boosted and developed in response to the increasing local demand for television sets. Further aided by government policies of raising the living standard of the people through a series of Five-year Economic Plans, television soon came into wide use as a mass medium (see Table 1).

With the quantitative expansion of television broadcasting, many scholars and experts have questioned its performance in terms of quality, for two reasons. First, there was a lack of fairness in news programs. The information function of television was paralyzed due to severe control of news programs by the ruling regime. The watch dog role of media took a back seat, while priority was given exclusively to "national security" and "rapid economic development" (Nam, 1983b). Second, two commercial broadcasters suffered from content homogeneity in low quality programming. As KBS became profitable solely through the collection of license fees, it decided to withdraw advertising from its broadcasting in 1969. From that time, there was fierce head-on competition between the two commercial networks for advertising revenue. The two commercial broadcasters pitted the same kind of popular programs against each other in an attempt to draw viewers from each other. Such a struggle resulted in an overload

of serial dramas which could build audience loyalty at a low cost, and in turn drove the stations toward a majority of their programming being low-quality.

TABLE 1
PROLIFERATION OF TELEVISION IN KOREA, 1965-1979

Year	Diffusion		Distribution	
	Total # of Registered TV Sets	Penetration per Household	Urban Areas	Rural Areas
1965	31,701	0.6%	100.0%	0.0%
1966	43,634	0.8%	100.0%	0.0%
1967	73,224	1.3%	100.0%	0.0%
1968	118,262	2.1%	100.0%	0.0%
1969	223,695	3.9%	100.0%	0.0%
1970	379,564	6.4%	94.5%	5.5%
1971	616,392	10.2%	92.0%	8.0%
1972	905,363	14.7%	90.1%	9.9%
1973	1,282,122	20.7%	86.7%	13.3%
1974	1,618,617	26.0%	82.5%	17.5%
1975	2,061,072	30.4%	77.3%	22.7%
1976	2,809,131	41.1%	71.7%	28.3%
1977	3,804,535	55.7%	69.7%	30.3%
1978	5,135,496	70.7%	66.6%	33.4%
1979	5,696,256	78.5%	63.7%	36.3%

SOURCE: Ministry of Culture and Information, Republic of Korea; The 30-year History of Culture and Information (1979: 215).

In response to the prevailing criticism about the low quality programming, KBS was eventually converted to a public-managed system under the Revised Broadcasting Act of 1973, emphasizing a

more informative and educational role for KBS. Shortly after, the government also provided certain guidelines on TV programming for all three networks, which resulted in the reduction of the number of serial dramas (Kim, 1983: 39).

Despite such restrictions, commercial TV broadcasting with entertainment programming continued to grow rapidly. As mentioned, the two commercial stations, TBC and MBC, were built around an alliance of the high-ranking politicians and major business companies. Along with remarkable economic development during the 1970s, the television industry was politically so powerful as to be able to ignore the critics' constant call for program reform or content upgrading (Kang, 1987; Choi, 1985). The media elite did not worry or offend the ruling regime, but rather avoided politically sensitive subjects. In turn, the government was less concerned with censoring low quality entertainment programs which came from the commercial interests of the two private TV networks. Until 1980, when Korean broadcasting made structural changes, overheating oligopolistic competition and a pattern of content homogeneity in low quality programming continued.

3.1.4. Adoption of the Public Broadcasting System: 1980-Present

When Doo-Hwan Chun seized power in 1980 after President Park's assassination, Korean television broadcasting underwent three major changes. First, the process called "Unification of Mass Media" in 1980 resulted in a forced shift of Korean TV broadcasting structure toward a quasi-public broadcasting system.[4] The privately-owned TBC

was merged into KBS and 70% of MBC's stocks passed into KBS. Chun's military government, which was actively and deeply engaged in this procedure, defended such mass media reformation on the grounds that concentration of media ownership in a small number of commercial interests and production of low quality mass culture through unhealthy commercial competition must be corrected for the sake of the public interest (In, 1986; Choi, 1985: 124-139).

However, the political intention behind such rhetoric was ultimate control of the mass media system. The new military regime found itself very unpopular with the Korean people because most Koreans anticipated political modernization along with economic achievement after the assassination of President Park. Moreover, the government realized the limitations and inefficiency in political manipulation of the TV medium, which was owned and operated by rapidly-growing private media conglomerates (Kang, 1989: 643). Thus, Chun's government saw the necessity of assuming direct control of the media' and decided to bring mass media under its authority through the abolition of private broadcasting. In fact, under Chun's regime, Korean television actually functioned as an agent of the government by advancing the policy objectives of the ruling regime and by manipulating information received by the Korean people (Kang, 1989: 633-650).

Second, the government introduced color television in 1980, using the National Television Systems Committee (NTSC) standard. Some people believed the introduction of color television was another ploy by Chun's government in its attempt to legitimate its control. Despite the unsettled political conditions and the ensuing harsh

national economy in the early 1980s, Chun's government urged the spread of color television so as to disguise its self-interested broadcasting policy (Kang, 1987).

Third, in 1980, one UHF channel was solely dedicated to specialized education TV service (KBS-3) ranging from lectures for high school students to foreign language classes for adults. This educational TV broadcasting was designed to support the government's educational policy that any tutoring outside school was prohibited (Choi, 1985: 83-89).[5]

Since 1980, consequently, Korean TV broadcasting has been run as a quasi-public system which consists of two TV national networks--KBS, with three channels, and MBC, with one channel. However, the public broadcasting model had not functioned well because Korean broadcasting has been subject to censorship from the authoritarian government. Furthermore, KBS heavily depends on advertising revenue even though it collects receiver license fees and receives government subsidies. This financial dependency on advertising revenue has led Korean TV broadcasting toward entertainment-oriented TV programming.

President Tae-Woo Noh, who ascended to power in 1988 through direct presidential elections, promised to "democratize" Korean television. The government is relaxing control of mass media and Korean broadcasting now appears to enjoy more freedom than ever. In addition, the Ministry of Culture and Information has realized the malfunction of the public broadcasting structure in the past, and now is considering adoption of a public-private, dual system more like the Japanese broadcasting structure (Joong-Ang Daily, March 29,

1989).

3.2. Political Influence on Korean Television

Television broadcasting in Korea had a strong commercial orientation in its early development, after the American model of broadcasting. It has been argued that the ex-colonial powers have been responsible for transferring their broadcasting model to many Third World countries (Tunstall, 1977; Katz and Wedell, 1977; Lee, 1980). Yet, this generalization does not seem to apply to Korea. As in the case of Latin America, the colonial ruler failed to make a strong imprint on Korea's broadcasting system. During the colonial period (1910-1945), Japan was not known for its broadcasting strength (Lee, 1980). Given the fact that "Nippon Hoso Kyokai's (NHK)" television and the first Japanese commercial television both began in 1953, Japanese colonial rule had no significant effect on the pattern of early Korean television.[6] Instead, RCA appears to be responsible for transferring the American television broadcasting model to Korea. RCA provided capital, technology, and technical advice for the birth of a TV station in Korea.

This RCA investment in Korea proved to be unprofitable and was disposed of, mainly due to poor economic conditions in the late 1950s. Thereafter, mounting nationalism and increasing government control of media have never allowed foreign investment in Korean television. Moreover, American multinational media corporations were gradually convinced of the effectiveness of foreign media ownership and came to reduce or phase out their foreign investment (Read, 1976; Lee, 1980).

Even after RCA's departure, significant American influence continued. The American commercial model of management and programming was clearly transferred to DBC-TV, the first indigenously-owned TV station. The main elements which came from the American model include private ownership, finance by advertising, predominance of entertainment, and minimal government regulation.

However, this initial model was overhauled and modified following historic changes in Korea's political order. Two authoritarian regimes--Chung-Hee Park's (1961-1979) and Doo-Hwan Chun's (1980-1987)--have determined the structure and function of the mass media system according to perceived social needs and national political persuasions.

Park's government not only established a state-owned TV system but also approved commercial TV stations. It is obvious that the development of a commercial TV system had nothing to do with the external forces. Instead, it seems to have grown out of the internal conditions of Korea. Two reasons for the commercialization of TV come to mind. One, commercial television, through which national industries could advertise their consumer goods, was seen as suitable, or at least not objectionable, to the government economic development policies centering on rapid industrialization; and two, the expediency of a bureaucratic-commercial alliance consolidated the commercial basis for television.

Regardless of media ownership, however, Park's government had a dominant voice in determining what did and did not appear in mass media. Although there was a genuine need to guide mass media toward supporting positive government goals that could integrate all

people and make them participate in national development schemes, President Park abused his power by manipulating the media for perpetuation of his prolonged dictatorship.

Chun's government redesigned its broadcasting structure by adopting a quasi-public broadcasting system. The government objective of "social stability" appears to have been used for legitimizing the abolition of commercial television because of unhealthy commercial competition and its harmful effects on the public good. Still, this forced modification of the broadcasting structure has not well served the public interest due to the oligopolistic commercial competition between KBS and MBC. Rather, structural change allowed closer government supervision. In practice, public broadcasting in Korea was a state-controlled monopoly under Chun's administration.

Thus, the authoritarian governments seem to be the most important driving force behind the development of Korean television. In spite of Korea's history as a strong political and economic liaison with the United States, internal forces have had more influence on the development of Korean television than have external forces.

It is also true that the present model of Korean TV broadcasting, although functioning under a quasi-public broadcasting system with the ultimate objective of contributing to the public interest, borrowed two important elements from the U.S. commercial model of TV broadcasting: dependence on advertising support and emphasis on entertainment. However, the process of adapting the commercial model to the internal conditions of Korea resulted in the modification of the original elements. For example, even though Korean television broadcasting has been mainly financed by advertising revenue,

commercial influences seem to be much weaker than in the United States. To minimize advertiser influence on TV programming, a public corporation called "Korean Broadcasting Advertising Corporation" (KOBACO) was established in 1980 (Choi, 1985: 99). This public corporation has mediated advertising contracts between advertiser and TV networks in an attempt to protect TV content from direct influences and pressures from advertisers. Furthermore, the television advertising market in Korea has favored the seller (TV networks), mainly because of KBS's monopolistic position in the marketplace (Kum, 1987: 24-25; Lee, 1987: 16-19). As for the entertainment programs, Korean TV networks must observe a standard of balanced TV programming, unlike American commercial television. According to the Enforcement Ordinance Broadcasting Law revised in 1981 (Article 29), each TV network must carry at least 40% cultural and 10% informative programs out of total weekly broadcasting hours.

In sum, the 33-year history of television broadcasting in Korea has produced a unique form of broadcasting system through the process of adaptation. It is clear that the American commercial model of broadcasting had great influence on the inauguration of Korean television. However, this initial commercial model has been modified and mixed with other models to adapt to the particular internal conditions of Korea. In this process, the authoritarian regimes since 1961 have played an important part in generating the present distinct TV broadcasting structure. The broadcasting structure of Korean television has reflected not only the policy objectives of the governments in power but also the political interests of the ruling

regimes. Of course, the existing Korean TV broadcasting system also reflects commercialism, but to blame it primarily on U.S. influences is, to borrow Straubhaar's (1989a) phrase, to let powerful national governments off the hook.

CHAPTER IV

PROGRAMMING ON KOREAN TELEVISION

This chapter will explore the evolution of television programming in Korea. Special emphasis will be placed on the trends and patterns of imported programming on Korean television. Using selected ideas of both the media imperialism and media diffusion perspectives, an attempt will be made to measure the degree of independence and autonomy in Korean television programming.

4.1. Program Patterns on Korean Television

Perhaps the most accurate description of the media philosophy of Korea would be "developmental" in the sense that the underlying purpose of media use is more positive and constructive than merely serving the power interests of authoritarian regimes (Howell, 1986: 3-24). This philosophy acknowledges broadcasting as a vital resource best managed by the government for socioeconomic development (Sussman, 1978; Lent, 1978). Thus, broadcasting in Korea is regarded as an official instrument for social unity, cultural projection, economic growth, and education rather than as a source of individual gratification or entertainment. In tune with this media concept, the Korean government has required all broadcasters to play a socially constructive role (even if commercially supported) by enforcing program content regulation aimed at preserving the indigenous

cultural values and traditions. For example, the government has enacted a changing set of programming standards with an increasing emphasis on cultural programming (Table 2).

TABLE 2
STANDARD FOR BROADCAST PROGRAMMING IN KOREA

Category	1964-1974	1974-1981	1981-Present
Information	10% or more	10% or more	10% or more
Culture	20% or more	30% or more	40% or more
Entertainment	20% or more	20% or more	20% or more

SOURCE: The Korean Broadcasting handbook (1985: 35); The Annual Report of Korean Newspaper & Broadcasting (1988: 437); Ann (1986: 63-64).

By increasing the minimum proportion of cultural programming, the government seems to have expected the broadcast media to serve more explicitly the sociocultural purpose. Yet, the actual patterns of programming on Korean Television have widely deviated from the culturally-oriented programming direction mentioned above. To show this, television programming was sampled from two major daily newspapers (Cho-Sun Daily and Dong-A Daily) for the first week of April and October, biannual rescheduling months, from 1964 to 1988 (1964, 1967, 1970, 1973, 1976, 1979, 1982, 1985, 1988). Every program was divided into three categories-- entertainment, culture, and information. Due to the absence of a legal definition for each category, the figures may deviate from the government's programming

standard (see Table 2). The figure was drawn on the basis that the TV broadcast hours of each category were divided by the total TV broadcast hours of all available TV networks except KBS-3, the educational TV network, and then multiplied by one hundred for the percentage. Since the program log does not indicate commercial or other advertisements separately, TV advertising hours could not be extracted from TV program hours. Thus, TV hours from each category are rounded up to one hundred percent. Each category includes the following specific TV program genres:

1. *Entertainment.* These included variety shows, music shows, talk shows, quiz shows, daily soap operas, weekly series, made-for-TV movies, mini-series, domestic feature films, imported feature films, imported series, imported mini-series, children's programs, cartoons, comedy shows, and sports programs.

2. *Culture.* These included documentaries, classical music shows, adult education programs, children's educational programs, cultural films, art programs, foreign language lessons, and cooking lessons.

3. *Information.* These included news shows, documentaries concerning current affairs, public information, sports news, and campaign coverage.

The results of this content analysis indicated that entertainment programming has always dominated the entire Korean system over cultural and informative programming, although there has been fluctuation in its proportion due to government policy (see Figure 1).

FIGURE 1

THE TREND IN KOREAN TV PROGRAMMING



The proportion of entertainment programs steadily went up from 57 percent of total broadcast hours for all TV networks in 1964 to 60 percent in 1970 (Figure 1). In accordance with the economic

logic of advertising-supported television, it was only natural that Korean TV networks in the 1960s increasingly carried a substantial quantity of entertainment programming to appeal to the lowest common denominator of the "middle market" (Defleur and Ball-Rokeach, 1975: 162-181). Furthermore, although the government paid lip service to the cultural significance of broadcasting, the political and economic value of media virtually took primacy during this period.

Throughout the 1960s, Korean television floundered about, trying to sustain about five-hours of daily programming for each network. The most available source of programming was domestic films, most of them produced some years before for cinema exhibition. A number of domestic feature films appeared on TV until the domestic film-makers decided in 1962 not to give aid to a competitor, the emerging TV medium (Park, 1985: 354-375). Consequently, TV networks began to import U.S. programs which would be commercially successful at a low cost. Indeed, the most popular shows in the 1960s were the imported feature films and series (In, 1986: 36-39; Ma, 1985: 77). Most imported films were either American Westerns like "Sunset 77" and "Bonanza," or action/war dramas like "Combat" and "The Fugitive." Another major genre of this period was the talk program designed to propagate the government economic development policies. In addition, KBS-TV introduced a weekly TV drama series that dealt with anti-communism and family occasions, while TBC-TV aired a Korean soap opera for the first time. Even though this attempt failed to attract an audience at this time, the serial drama became the most popular genre in the 1970s (In, 1986:

36-42).

The development of a mass market and a TV mass audience in the early 1970s led to a major shift in TV programming. The search for cheap programming to build mass audience loyalty arrived at the formula of a serial drama with a tiny cast and minimal studio sets (Choi, 1985: 76-80; Tunstall, 1977: 174-184). All three networks were eager to produce broadly appealing Korean soap operas by hiring away well-known actors, directors, and script writers from theater and cinema (Lee, 1987; Im, 1987). Korean soap operas were aired daily in prime viewing time and were based largely on melodramatic themes which usually reflected the patience and obedience of traditional Korean woman (Nam, 1984). A key turning point was a 1972 soap opera, "Journey," which depicted a self-sacrificing wife and her mentally-deficient husband. This serial drama was very popular with all age groups and the heroine became the idealistic image of a "good" wife.

With the growing popularity of Korean soap operas during the early 1970s, the three TV networks tried to offer as many serial dramas as the audience cared for, in an attempt to pull the audience away from their competitors. Producers and script writers were so tired with the day-to-day pressure of work that they could not create new and interesting material (Kim, 1987). As a result, the public complained loudly about the quantity and quality of serial dramas and invited government interference. The government became involved in the control of programming patterns through a legal base (Table 2). Although such involvement brought about the reduction of the number of entertainment programs, particularly serial dramas and imported

series in the mid-1970s, it increased political intervention rather than upgrading TV content (In, 1986: 41). For instance, all TV networks were forced to air campaign programs at 8 o'clock every evening to support government policies. The proportion of entertainment programs, however, began to increase again from 53 percent in 1976 to 64 percent in 1979 (Figure 1). This increase seems to be basically attributable to the aforementioned expediency of a bureaucratic-commercial alliance. Insofar as powerfully-grown private TV industry did not cause political problems with the ruling regime, the government relaxed restrictions on the quality and quantity of entertainment programs.

The subsequent decline in the proportion of entertainment programs to a low of 49 percent by 1982 seems to be due to the structural changes in Korean broadcasting, which were made by Chun's government in 1980 (Figure 1). Since the rationale for such government action was the imposition of a public broadcasting system that could contribute to public interests and enhancement of national culture, the government increased the emphasis on cultural programming, restricting entertainment (Table 2). Evidence that the political interests of the government rather than genuine need for a public broadcasting system led to structural modification of Korean broadcasting can be observed in the restoration of an overtly entertainment-oriented tone in TV programming since 1982 (Figure 1). Indeed, one can not see any rigid distinction between former commercial broadcasting and present public broadcasting on the grounds that both rely primarily on advertising for their support and put an emphasis on entertainment.

The 1980s have seen remarkable progress in Korean TV programming in the sense that various genres of locally-produced programs that were developed are sophisticated and relatively high-quality, and have won the bulk of the audience. The imported programs, which dominated domestic TV channels in the 1960s and remained an important source in the 1970s, have gradually been replaced by popular indigenous programs in this period, as we shall discuss in next section.

Along with daily soap operas, the weekly TV drama series became very popular in the 1980s. These programs are diverse in theme, covering urban, rural, and historical settings. TV channels are placing large-scale traditional costume dramas, considerably polished Korean soap operas, and self-contained one-hour weekly dramas with a continuing cast and weekly different themes at prime time. Currently, "Three Families in One House," a program mirroring urban middle-class daily life, and "Rural Diary," portraying farmers' daily events are the highest-ranking two weekly dramas (Dong-A Daily, February 5, 1988; Kyung-Hyang Daily, March 17, 1988). Since President Noh came to power in 1988, those serial dramas have begun treating serious social and political themes, which was strictly prohibited before. In addition, Korean TV networks started to produce a kind of made-for-TV movie in the mid-1980s, and mini-series in the late 1980s. These are frequently based on popular and classic novels as well as on original material. Both made-for-TV movies and mini-series, using popular TV talents and exterior scenes, tend to be quite expensive but have generated considerable audience support. The recent mini-series "Sand Castle," based on a popular

novel about a middle-aged housewife who finds out her seemingly trustworthy husband has a mistress, captured some 60 percent of the television audience during the show (Joong-Ang Daily, October 11, 1988).

Another major genre of the 1980s is the music-oriented variety show. These are usually live shows in front of a studio audience and are extremely popular with the teenaged fans of popular singers. Although this format emerged as early as 1964 and has been the major target of public criticism because of the lavishness, suggestiveness, and vulgarity contained in these shows, they have been glamorized and sophisticated to consolidate their great popularity (Chung, 1983). Very recently, MBC-TV created a distinct format of the weekly music show, "Housewife Singing Contest," featuring amateur performances by ordinary housewives. This show strongly appeals to a great number of married couples and is thought to be of higher quality than other music-oriented shows (Sweet Home Monthly, April 1989).

Comedy, sports, and news all capture a good deal of space and audience on Korean television. Comedy has always gained high ratings, changing itself from slapstick comedy in the 1970s, to youth-oriented gag comedy in the 1980s, and currently to satirical comedy on present political and social events (Park, 1988). Sports on Korean TV has been dominated by professional baseball teams, but amateur sports stole the spotlight with the 1986 Seoul Asian Games and 1988 Seoul Olympics.

The evening news programs have been very popular, even though they could not play a "gatekeeper" role. A 1984 study of better educated audiences in four major Korean cities by the United States

Information Agency (USIA, 1984) found that the 9 o'clock TV news was the most common news source of Korean people.

In sum, entertainment-oriented programming is the most prominent feature of Korean TV programming. Legal and official rhetoric about the cultural mission of broadcasting notwithstanding, Korean TV programming has primarily catered to the entertainment interests of individuals. The cultural programming took a back seat in the face of the government interests and media economics. Instead, Korean television has developed a number of entertainment formats that are economically profitable and very popular. Imported entertainment programs, which contributed to development of Korean television for a decade, decreased slowly as these national genres began to dominate most TV time slots. The next section will deal with these imported TV programs in detail.

4.2. Imported Television Programs

The development of Korean television programming shows a course from heavy reliance on imported programs in the beginning to a relatively large measure of independence in creation of indigenous programs in recent years.

The importation of foreign television programs in Korea originated from the demand for materials to fill up airtime inexpensively. While the Korean government was active in promoting television in the early 1960s, limited funds and inexperience kept indigenous production very low. The lack of available domestic programs, in turn, created the need for imported television programs. Imported television programs were far less expensive than creating

local productions. Moreover, the television audience at that time was confined to the upper middle class who tended to prefer "superior" metropolitan culture. The slickness of Hollywood was well attuned to such an audience's tastes.

During the 1960s, therefore, the imported television programs occupied a good deal of television slots, due to their low cost and relative appeal to the wealthy, elite audience. However, as the Korean television industry developed and the audience expanded into the middle class, the amount of imported television programming was significantly diminished (see Figure 2).

FIGURE 2
PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL BROADCAST HOURS
FOR IMPORTED PROGRAMS ON KOREAN TELEVISION[7]

For a brief period in the mid-1960s, the proportion of imported programs reached a peak of 36 percent. Although the relative proportion of imported programs' broadcast hours was sharply reduced in the early 1970s, it stayed at a fairly high level throughout the 1970s. In the 1980s, the proportion of imported programs has dropped more and stayed around 10 percent of total broadcast hours across the three major television channels (see Figure 2).

The decline of imported programming seems to be more evident in the prime-time scheduling,[8] as shown in Figure Three.

FIGURE 3
PRCENTAGE OF TOTAL PRIME-TIME HOURS
FOR IMPORTED PROGRAMS ON KOREAN TELEVISION[9]



In the 1960s, substantial quantities of imported television programs were aired during prime-time hours to attract a large audience. According to the audience ratings in September 1966, the top three programs on TBC-TV were the prime-time imported series: "The Fugitive," "0011 Napoleon Solo," and "Combat" (The 10-year History of Joong-Ang Ilbo and TBC, 1975: 232). In addition, major imported programs on MBC-TV, such as "Barron" and "Ironside," were very popular and placed within the prime-time hours in 1969 (History of MBC, 1982: 174). This strong appeal of imported television programs seems to have stemmed from the relatively inferior quality of locally-produced programs, the fairly high entertainment value contained in imported materials, and maybe a yearning for the "rich" American society (Park, 1985: 345-347; Kang, 1986: 50-66). Indeed, imported television programs were one of the most promising genres to ensure a good deal of audience during this period.

Since the early 1970s, however, major imported programs have been removed from the prime-time viewing hours and assigned to the late-night or weekend afternoon time slots. Audience preference began to shift from imported programs to domestic ones in the early 1970s, as indigenous production increased in quality and quantity. Gradually, imported television programs have been replaced by domestic productions that have greater local appeal. The results of an analysis of ratings data for 1978-1987 showed that most of the top three TV programs in each year were locally-produced programs, mainly Korean soap operas and weekly series. Only 4 of the 30 top programs (ten years times the top three programs in each) were imports (Korea Marketing Research & Public Opinion Poll Center,

February 1988). Furthermore, as the Korean government sponsored a nationalistic reform movement in the early 1970s, the television networks were reminded continually of their responsibilities to preservation of indigenous values and culture. The government expressed strong disapproval of TV's portrayals of violence and sex, which offended Korea's conservative cultural ethos. The almost complete removal of imported programs from the prime-time scheduling in the latter half of the 1970s can be seen in part as a result of this government influence (see Figure 3). However, the total amount of imported programming remained at a considerably high level during the 1970s, not only to fill expanded broadcast schedules in which local production is not profitable, but also to attract additional audiences who tended to prefer imported culture.

With much more improved sophistication of the Korean indigenous television industry and the general trend toward mass audience preference for homemade programs, locally-produced programs have definitely dominated imported TV series in the 1980s, both in terms of broadcast hours and prime-time hours. Imported television programs average roughly one-tenth of total broadcast hours and one-twentieth of total prime-time hours in this period (see Figure 2, 3). This relative independence of Korean television programming was also proved in the 1983 follow-up study on the worldwide trafficking of TV programs by Tapio Varis (1984: 146-147). According to his data, MBC-TV, a semi-commercial channel which has tended to include the highest proportion of imported programming among Korean TV networks in the 1980s, imported 16 percent of its programs from foreign sources for a two-week period in early 1983.

This proportion was very low, given the Varis' conclusion that imported programs accounted for approximately one-third or more of the world's total TV airtime during the period of his study. Noticeably, Varis's data also showed that MBC-TV was the only broadcasting institution which did not schedule any imported programs within the prime-time hours, among those analyzed in seven continental regions of the globe. Certainly, this evidence indicates that Korean television is only slightly dependent on foreign programming.

It is worth nothing here that, although most programming is now locally produced, there are several types of programs which continue to be imported into Korea. As shown in Table Three, imported programs on Korean television consist mainly of four major types of programs.

TABLE 3

TYPES OF PROGRAMS IMPORTED BY KOREAN TV, 1984

Types of Programs	Number of Imported Programs	Percentage of Total Number of Imported Programs
Series	539	37.7 %
Cartoons	446	31.2 %
Documentaries	235	16.5 %
Feature Films	183	12.8 %
other	26	1.8 %
Total	1429	100.0 %

SOURCE: Ministry of Culture and Information, Republic of Korea; Recommended Imported Television Programs in 1984 (1985).

Series are the most conspicuous type of imported programs, and the large portion of them is action/adventure programs such as "The A-Team," "MacGyver," "Airwolf," and "Knight Rider" (Joong-Ang Daily, February 6, 1987). According to ratings data, these imported series are largely watched by a younger, male audience (Lee's PR & Research LTD., March 1989). Since action/adventure series are quite expensive to produce and their major themes (violence and sex) are basically in discord with Korea's values and culture, Korean television networks have produced few of them. Although two locally-produced cop shows are currently aired once a week in prime-time hours on both KBS-2 and MBC, they tend to focus on the depiction of police officers' toils rather than on the portrayals of crimes and violence. The second type of imported program is cartoons which have acquired a stable audience among children and adolescents. Cartoon programming has depended heavily on foreign material for a long time, because Korean television networks can purchase foreign cartoons far cheaper than it would cost to create them. For example, the price of imported cartoons per 30-minute episode was $1,000 in 1987, whereas the cost of local production of identical duration was about $5,800 (Dong-A Daily, July 28, 1987). The third type of imported program is documentaries. They are mainly educational/cultural programs, usually aired through KBS-3, an educational TV network. Most of them are imported from the United States and the United Kingdom, given the cost of creating documentaries versus buying them, but Korean television networks have occasionally produced a number of high-quality documentaries for an upscale audience. Lastly, Korean television networks still use relatively old feature films to compete

with each other for the weekend night audience. Due to the numerous reruns of these feature films, however, the Korean audience now tends to be disinclined to watch this type of imported program, according to ratings data (Lee's PR & Research LTD., March 1989).

It is rational from an economic standpoint for Korean television networks to continue to import the above-mentioned program types. As indicated earlier, Korean television broadcasters are obliged to finance themselves via the advertising market. They must, when possible, try to keep program costs lower than revenues. In fact, the cost of importing such types of programs is still much less than that of originating them. In addition, these program types have a certain audience that cannot be ignored by the profit-motivated broadcasters, despite the overwhelming demand for locally-produced programs. Thus, they import. Since these types of imports are generally less popular than a number of national genres, they are scheduled out of prime-time slots where the value of the advertising is less. In those time slots, however, imported programs can generate advertising revenues well ahead of their costs, thus acting as profit-makers. Undoubtedly, most of these imported programs, particularly series and feature films, come from the United States, which has the ability to provide expensively-made programs at low prices (see Figure 4, 5).

In sum, during the last three decades, Korean television has evolved from heavy dependency on imported materials to a relatively high degree of self-reliance in indigenous program production. In contrast to what the media imperialism supporters might have expected, initial dependence by Korean television on the dominant culture in terms of programming has never led to a continuing

dependence. Although Korean television networks still include foreign programs, the proportion of such programs seems never to be large enough to cause serious cultural concerns. In addition, that Korean television networks continue to import several types of programs is undoubtedly more a matter of broadcast economics than anything else (e.g., permanency of initial dependence or inevitable presence of popular metropolitan culture). In the next section, the critical question of whether nationally-produced programs are authentically "Korean" in nature or still reflect foreign influences will be investigated.

FIGURE 4
SOURCES OF IMPORTED PROGRAMS ON KOREAN TV
BY NUMBERS AND PERCENTAGES OF IMPORTS, 1984



SOURCE: Ministry of Culture and Information, Republic of Korea; Recommended Imported Television Programs in 1984 (1985).

FIGURE 5

SOURCES OF IMPORTED PROGRAMS FOR TYPES OF PROGRAMS ON KOREAN TELEVISION BY NUMBERS AND PERCENTAGES OF IMPORTS, 1984



SOURCE: Ministry of Culture and Information, Republic of Korea; Recommended Imported Television Programs in 1984 (1985).

4.3. Entertainment-Oriented Programming and Cultural Benefits

The Korean cultural ideology dictates, in principle, that television broadcasting should enhance traditional culture and adopt foreign cultures on a selective basis for the creating of an identified national culture. This has led to two regulatory strategies for Korean television programming. One is to minimize what the government considers undesirable foreign influences, while the other is to upgrade the cultural/educational programming. The former has been quite successful, but the latter has failed due to the commercial characteristics of Korean broadcasting, as indicated earlier.

However, entertainment-oriented Korean television does not seem to necessarily deteriorate the country's cultural values and traditions. Since entertainment is not simply neutral but value-laden, local entertainment programming which incorporates indigenous culture can be a useful force for authentic cultural expression. Katz (1977: 117) addressed the subject of understanding the importance of entertainment in promoting cultural authenticity and continuity:

> If broadcasting is to be harnessed to the goal of promoting indigenous values, it is important to understand how entertainment works. That means understanding what message is implicit in "Hawaii 5-0," what people perceive in it, what they enjoy, what it "gives" them, and then, by contrast, analyzing the experience with home-made broadcast entertainment and with entertainment in traditional culture.

In Korea, serial dramas seem to be the most popular entertainment form of television culture. This type of imported program has outperformed most imported materials in audience

ratings since the early 1970s. The critical question is whether this kind of programming has any lingering effect as a format borrowed from abroad. As discussed before, Korean serial dramas have definitely reflected indigenous values, traditions, and folklore and have fit better to Korean audience's tastes. Their themes are very diverse: daily life of both the middle and lower class, historical and regional themes, contemporary social issues, and youth-oriented themes. In addition, Korean serial dramas use more exterior scenes, are generally broadcast in the prime-time hours, and target various segments of audience. In this respect, Korean drama formats seem to deviate widely from their foreign counterparts, which are usually characterized by the day-time soap opera aimed at housewives, treating love affairs or a Cinderella theme.

Some of music-oriented variety shows, game/quiz shows, and comedy programs on Korean television also have a foreign style, but with highly localized content. Generally, foreign formats of game/quiz shows tend to attract audiences for advertisers and provide a forum for product exposure (of prizes) within the show itself (Straubhaar, 1989a: 19). This never happens on Korean television, although Korean broadcasters owe some ideas, such as the method of a specific game, to foreign formats.

In short, Korean television broadcasting has evolved from dependency on foreign materials to independent programming based on nationally-produced programs. In contradiction to the government directives on culturally-oriented programming, an emphasis on entertainment has emerged in nationalizing television content. However, Korean entertainment programming is often quite distinct

from its foreign roots and tends to be well adapted to the indigenous culture. It reflects the national heritage and interests. Entertainment programming, the largest quantitative component of Korean broadcasting, is in this sense truly "Korean" in nature. Since entertainment is an active force in the communication of cultural values, Korean programming seems to be relatively beneficial to indigenous cultural autonomy.

CHAPTER V

NATIONAL FACTORS AND THE INTRODUCTION OF CABLE TELEVISION INTO KOREA

This chapter will first present the main contributing factors that can be identified to explain the relative independence of Korean television programming. Then, in connection with these national factors, it will briefly evaluate and predict the impact of introduction of cable television on Korean television culture.

5.1. Main Contributing Factors to Relative Independence in Korean Television Programming

5.1.1. Indigenous Cultural Preference

One of the most crucial factors in the relative success of Korean television programming seems to be the strong appeal of the indigenous culture. Pool (1977) is one of relatively few who expected that, other things being equal, local audiences would prefer domestically-made cultural products which have the distinct advantages of cultural familiarity and local relevance. Korea's experience of television programming perfectly comes up to his expectation.

Contrary to what many used to believe, one consequence of the Korean television development has been to refine an audience preference for indigenous programming. The prevalent assumption of

the inherent appeal of imported, "superior" metropolitan culture proved to be a temporary phenomenon in Korea. Because of the initial novelty of the television products from culturally different places with advanced technology, Korean audiences sat together in front of television receivers to watch "Combat" in the 1960s. However, as reasonably well-produced domestic programs became available, the audience has decisively shifted its preference and its viewing to indigenous programming that has better conformed to the cultural tastes of the Korean people.

Specifically, there seems to be two critical cultural elements that play a leading part in determining what Korean audiences actually choose to watch: (1) the existence of vivid traditional values; and (2) local relevance. First of all, traditional Korean culture has developed and flourished under the strong influence of Confucianism. With a massive influx of Western culture, the cultural system of Korean society has suffered conflict between traditional and modern Western values. The value system and social structure have changed, and various mechanisms of adjustment have created provisional value systems and ways of behavior. However, traditional Korean culture still seems to have a mighty influence on the consciousness and behavior of the Korean people, as the Korean Overseas Information Service (1981: 158) points out:

> Korea is a country blending change and tradition. In both the city and countryside, the appearance of Korea is changing with great speed but beneath this transformation of society is a stability born of centuries-old traditions and customs which while modified to fit a new society still have great meaning and powerful influence.

The most salient feature of traditional Korean culture is an emphasis on the harmonious unity of the collectivity, such as the family unit, respect for the aged, and sacrifice of self for the good of a larger unit in life (Nam, 1983a). Notably, the Korean television audience has definitely favored those programs that have reflected these kinds of traditional, but still dominant, cultural values. For example, the Korean professor Nam (1984) found, in her content analysis of the eleven most popular Korean soap operas aired between 1970 and 1984, that the central images fostered by those dramas were largely patience, obedience, and self-sacrifice. As another example, the longstanding traditional costume dramas, such as "The 500-year History of the Lee Dynasty," have portrayed the spirit and wisdom of Korean's ancestors, stressing loyalty, filial piety, sincerity and constancy. This type of drama has been consistently popular and is always included in the top-ten ratings list in the 1980s (Korea Gallop Survey Polls Co.,Ltd., July, 1988). In contrast, some imported programs do not fit the basic values of the Korean culture. For example, the suspense in "Dallas," a drama series that was imported from the United States, derived from greed, self-interest, lying, and manipulation-behavior (Tracey, 1988). This program never attracted larger audiences than popular domestic dramas. Thus, the traditional cultural values put into indigenous programming seem to be strongly accepted by the Korean audience.

Local relevance might be another cultural element that has placed indigenous programs in a better position than imported ones in the competition for an audience. Historically, Korean audiences have preferred the kind of programs in which the themes are relevant to

the their own daily life, or are something that could actually happen to them. For instance, "Ordinary People", a locally-produced 25 minute daily serial drama, was highly popular with most segments of the audience in 1982-1984, once recording the highest rating ever in the history of Korean television, at 63 percent (Korea Marketing Research & Public Opinion Poll Center, February 1988). This drama described the common daily affairs of one middle-class family that consisted of three generations. Similarly, "Rural Diary," a weekly serial drama of a modern farmers' everyday life, has been very popular and captured between 40 percent and 50 percent of the audience in 1987-1988 (Han-Kuk Daily, November 20, 1987; Dong-A Daily, February 5, 1988; Kyung-Hyang Daily, March 17, 1988). In particular, this drama tends to make use of picturesque scenes of the Korean rural area, which might provoke a feeling of affinity, even of belonging, among the Korean audience. No imported programs have come close to competing in popularity with these kinds of drama series.[10] The observation appears to be quite consistent with Pool's (1977: 143) contention that local products are protected by barriers of culture:

> Domestic products portray characters eating the foods the people eat, wearing the clothes they wear, celebrating the events they celebrate, and gossiping about the celebrities they follow. Allusion is a large part of what art is about. Foreign works of art have jokes that are harder to get, stereotypes that do not ring a bell, situations that do not come from daily life.

Indeed, the Korean audience appears to be more interested in the joys and sorrows of their people, which are depicted by their own artistic talent and within a familiar environment, than with

Western-style action and adventure. It is also possible that they prefera television program made in their own language than one that is dubbed into Korean. Therefore, local relevance seems to be another reason for a audience preference for domestically-produced programs.

In brief, indigenous cultural preference is probably one of the most crucial determinants of how Korean television has become increasingly self-sufficient in terms of domestic programming. It seems clear that the Korean audience basically favors nationally-produced programs over imported materials. They have preferred programs that are resonant with their particular cultural values and tastes. Moreover, they have liked programs that evoke a feeling of familiarity and relevance. Consequently, imported television programs, from the United States and other metropolitan countries, have retreated before the strong presence of distinct cultural values and traditions in Korea. This can be contrasted with the Canadian media dependence which stems in large measure from a lack of cultural identity. A great degree of cultural homogeneity between Canada and the United States has really been both a cause and an effect of the dominant presence of American media products within the Canadian culture.

5.1.2. Government Control of Foreign Content

Another important factor in the rise of Korean television programming and in the decline of imported programs seems to be the government cultural policies aimed at protecting indigenous culture.

The Korean government has striven to protect its own cultural

and moral heritage from foreign media influences. From the beginning of television broadcasting, the government has rigorously controlled the inflow of Japanese television programs due to historical hostility and a fear of negative impact on Korean traditional culture.[11] As a result, there has been officially no importation of Japanese programs except a limited number of documentaries and cartoons, despite Korea's heavy reliance on Japanese broadcasting equipment.[12]

While the Japanese product has been fended off of the domestic television screen, an influx of Western television programs, mainly from the United States, has taken place. During the 1960s, the government tolerated the massive inflow of inexpensive Western entertainment programming which was necessary to fill the broadcast hours of the rudimentary Korean television systems. However, as Park's regime employed a deliberate policy to promote indigenous initiatives and values in the early 1970, the use of these imported programs began to be subject to government restrictions.

In 1973, the government revised the 1963 Broadcasting Act to establish the "Korean Broadcasting Ethics Committee (KBEC)" which was responsible for enforcing program regulation aimed at protecting the cultural values and morality of the Korean people (Article 4-9). This government regulatory agency was authorized to review all the television programs, indigenous or imported, prior to their exhibition. In the mid-1970s, some imported series such as "Kojak," "Columbo," and "The FBI" were discontinued by the KBEC because they were judged to be too violent and therefore harmful to youth culture (In, 1986: 42). However, the KBEC did not object to science fiction type of programs such as "The Six Million Dollar Man" and "Bionic Woman."

Moreover, the government required all television networks to carry a minimum of 30 percent cultural programs in 1974, with a view to reducing the proportion of entertainment programs, including foreign imports. At the same time, the government announced that all television advertising should be aired between the programs, instead of being aired within a program (Ma, 1985: 80). Consequently, imported feature films and 60 minutes-long imported series were either shifted from prime-time hours to late night slots or went off the air due to economic profitability concerns. Coincident with these government regulations, the proportion of imported programs dropped significantly in the 1970s.

Here, one can not discount the political motivations behind such government regulations of foreign television content, as Nam (1983a: 217) pointed out:

> For the ruling elite of any Third World country experiencing challenges to its legitimacy due to its being new in the power game or its failure to deliver the promised good life to its people fast enough, the strain upon the political system created by excessive demands of people exposed to Western (entertainment) media content can not be ignored. Hence, as soon as a country is reasonably well off by modest successes in industrialization and modernization, its government assumes a more active role in its cultural policies including its entertainment policies.

Yet, a sincere desire to preserve Korea's cultural values and traditions has been also reflected in the government cultural policies. Concerning cultural protectionism, President Chung-Hee Park said, "Good influences we must retain, but bad ones we must reject, and reject at their very inception" (New York Times, December 5, 1975).

Indeed, Korea should be "selective" in absorbing foreign influences, and the government has legitimate reasons to protect its own culture from the negative and undesirable elements of foreign media products, such as violence, sexuality, and immorality.

In the early 1980s, along with the restructuring of Korean broadcasting, Chun's regime increased restrictions on imported programming. First of all, the government imposed restraints on the quantity of foreign materials in 1980. It forced all broadcasters to set self-regulatory limits on the proportion of imported programs to no more than 15 percent of total broadcast time (Park, 1983: 70-71).

Furthermore, the government created the "Telefilm Censorship Deliberation Council (TCDC)" in 1981 for more specialized and efficient regulation of foreign content.[13] The TCDC has the right to deny the exhibition of certain scenes or programs that are considered not to be proper for the Korean people. As an indirect means, a new standard of television programming was also enacted in 1981, increasing the minimum proportion of cultural programs to 40 percent.

All these government efforts to minimize undesirable alien media influences seem to have been fairly successful. Even though the government imposed a very tough ceiling of 15 percent on the quota of imported programs, the Korean broadcasters have well conformed themselves to this rule.

In sum, the Korean government has been actively involved in limiting the inflow of foreign television programs. Pool (1977), a strong advocate of the media diffusion perspective, argues that protectionist measures are self-defeating in culture. However,

government restrictions on imported programming appears to have had a beneficial effect on indigenous culture in Korea. Together with the increase in production capacity and the evolution of the Korean audience's tastes, government regulation of imported programs has contributed to the decline of foreign programming and the rise of indigenous programming. As Lee (1980) points out, the indigenous culture may need protection because an open interaction with metropolitan cultures, in the free and unrestrained world market, may put the economically weak nations at an unwarranted disadvantage. The next section will discuss the recent development of cable television in Korea in order to evaluate how new communication technology will affect the indigenous television culture.

5.2. Cable Television: Concern and Hope

Recently, the Korean government has made frequent mention of the new communication technologies, especially cable television. The government passed the Cable Communication Policy Act, dealing with the implementation of cable service, in 1987. Even though the Act stipulated that cable systems are forbidden to originate or broadcast material other than that previously broadcast from the existing four television channels, it is certain that the Act paved the way for the development of cable television in Korea. Significantly, in 1988, a Korean government official announced that the government was planning to modify the Cable Communication Policy Act of 1987 to allow a private cable television system to originate programs such as news, entertainment, sports, movies, and cultural programs (Joong-Ang Daily, April 20, 1988). Therefore, it is likely that an

expanded entertainment cable service will be introduced in the near future.

The Korean government seems to have three major reasons for its cable expansion policy. First, it is the conviction of the government that the main international market in the future will be that of information technology. With China becoming an important competitor in labor-intensive sectors such as textiles, household electrical appliances, and shipbuilding, Korea's economic growth and survival depend on an immediate shift into high-technology products such as computers, fiber optics, cable and satellite decoders, and videotext (South, September, 1988). The government appears to hope to build cable communication networks as the basic infrastructure for industrial development of information technology. Moreover, creating a cable industry will not only provide new employment but also encourage the growth of other cultural industries such as the film production and home video industries.

Second, both the uniform standard for programming and quasi-commercial oligopolistic structure of Korean television have contributed to a content homogeneity, and have reduced audience choice. The Korean government, which has historically exercised a great deal of control over Korean television, seems to regard cable as a medium which will meet public demand for more diversity and choice, yet still be under its regulation. Cable is more controllable, even if privately owned and operated, than VCRs, DBS, or other alternative video distribution vehicles.

Third, the business community's active desire for a private commercial broadcasting system and more television advertising

outlets has been obvious. Private interests that have been shut out of television broadcasting by the government see a new opportunity in cable television. Several business enterprises such as Samsung, Hyundai, and Lucky-Goldstar are now preparing for the cable business, to become not only producers of cable communication hardware but also program makers and transmitters. The government seems to have concluded that private cable television can satisfy the business community.

While the Korean government is attempting immediate construction of cable television system for these political and economic reasons, the cable expansion plan has raised much concern about the potential impact of cable television on indigenous culture. After the introduction of cable television in Korea, the most fundamental difficulty might be lack of available programs. Indeed, programming is a crucial factor in determining the success of cable television in Korea. There are two sources of cable programming: domestic production and imported material. At present, Korea will probably have problems filling cable channels with locally-produced programs, due to the relative underdevelopment of the domestic film industry and the absence of an independent production system except for the television network's in-house work. Accordingly, imported programming would be the only alternative for initial cable television programming.

This prospect of filling new channels primarily with imported programs has caused serious concern about media imperialism. Many have concluded that the increasing dependence of Third World media systems on Western programs for a large portion of their content

would result in the dominance of alien values over the indigenous culture.

However, if we consider national factors that have contributed to the development of television programming, there is a good deal of hope that the introduction of cable television might have a beneficial effect on the indigenous television culture.

For one thing, the commercial characteristics of cable programming for profit-making and advertising would probably force the cable system to carry more locally-produced programs, because the experience of broadcasting television indicates that indigenous programs appeal most to Koreans, other things being equal. This might stimulate the development of a domestic production industry. Since Korean television networks have been the sole producers of almost all domestic television programs, independent production and motion picture companies have not been able to participate in television programming. In fact, they have no market in which to sell their products beyond a limited number of theater outlets, even though they wish to produce television programs to make profits in a lucrative television market. The limited number of program outlets has discouraged many passionate and creative people employed in the film production studios. The introduction of cable television might solve this problem, increasing the quantity and quality of specialized indigenous programs. Furthermore, the existence of private cable television can prevent Korea's public broadcasting system from becoming entertainment-oriented, whereas the presence of the public broadcasting system may help maintain an enhanced level of quality in Korean television programming (Ito, 1986).

For another, Article 1 of the 1987 Cable Communication Policy Act stipulates that cable television should be utilized for the purpose of public interests, making an effort to establish a sound cable television business. This article is in line with the media philosophy of Korean broadcasting and thereby justifies the regulatory role of the government in pursuing public interest. Government regulation aimed at protecting indigenous culture from foreign media influences, therefore, would be extended to cable television programming. However, no concrete plan has yet been announced about the Korean cable television service, although the government promulgated the Cable Communication Policy Act in 1987 for the implementation of cable television. What is necessary seems to be formulation of a clear cable policy that reflect active cultural responsibility. The government should take positive measures to encourage indigenous cultural growth as well as economic development (Lee, 1980: 195).

In sum, according to the media imperialism perspective, anticipation of the future rests on the assumption that new television services like cable television will also be dominated by imported programs. The concern about the cross-cultural impact of such television imports has been a major policy issue of Third World countries. Consequently, a number of Third World countries are hesitant to introduce new communication technologies, even though they realize their potential benefit in the future. However, as the MacBride commission suggested, countries which delay the introduction and development of new technologies risk widening the technological gap between themselves and developed countries, and will be left behind in this rapidly developing sector of many economies

in the First World (UNESCO, 1980).

The introduction of cable television into Korea has raised similar concerns about preserving national culture, which stems from the increased importation of programs for cable channels. Yet, ubiquitous imported programs on cable television would be merely the first phase of the process in Korea. National forces such as indigenous cultural preference and active government regulation might strongly resist foreign media influences on domestic cable television, just as witnessed in the process of Korean television development. The coming of cable television is more likely to offer a good chance for the development of indigenous programming of specialized kinds rather than wither local programming. Therefore, it seems that, with well-planned government policy, cable television can be used to enhance the indigenous television culture.

CHAPTER VI

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

Using in-depth historical analysis, this study attempted to investigate the development of Korean television with respect to the broadcasting structure and programming. Two competing intellectual perspectives, media imperialism and media diffusion, were put forward, seeking a balanced approach to the questions of this study.

Media imperialism as a theoretical base does not seem to explain properly what has occurred in Korean television, in relation to the indigenous control of ownership, structure, and programming. National factors contributing to the development of Korean television tend to be overlooked by this perspective.

First, RCA played an important role in the birth of a television station in Korea by providing capital, technology, and consultancy services. However, this RCA investment in Korea proved unprofitable and was withdrawn, due to Korea's poor internal conditions in the late 1950s. Since that time, increasing government control has never permitted foreign investment in Korean television.

Second, although the American commercial model of broadcasting had great influence on the inauguration of Korean television, its original form has been modified and blended with other broadcasting models, such as the public broadcasting system, to adapt to the particular internal conditions of Korea. The main elements that

make the adaptation distinct seem to be the mechanism for minimizing advertiser influence and the categorical standard for a balanced programming of information, culture, and entertainment. The political and economic policies adopted by the authoritarian governments since 1961 have played an leading part in generating the present distinct TV broadcasting structure.

Third, during the last three decades, Korean television has shifted from a heavy reliance on imported programs in the beginning to relative independence in indigenous programming in recent years. Today each Korean television network imports about 10 percent of their total programming from foreign sources, compared with some 30 percent for a period in the 1960s. In addition, although these national programs tend to be based on foreign program formats to some degree, the specific content seems to reflect clearly indigenous culture and interests. This relative independence and autonomy in television programming has been accomplished by the national forces of indigenous cultural preference and government protective policies. The rise of local productions encourages hope that the introduction of cable television into Korea might have a beneficial effect on the indigenous television culture.

Thus, contrary to what media imperialism supporters might have expected about Third World media development, Korea has undergone the development of self-reliance in television broadcasting after the initial dependency on the dominant cultures. Still, inherent technological dependency in terms of broadcasting equipment and entertainment-oriented programming can be viewed as a major implication of the media imperialism perspective.

Increasing self-sufficiency in domestic production in Korea, which has been nurtured by the sheer force of local cultural preference, appears to be quite consistent with the "product life cycle" implications of the media diffusion viewpoint. However, given that the government is the most important driving force behind the growth of the Korean television industry, the media diffusion perspective, which views cultural protectionism as self-defeating, lacks explanatory power for Korea's experience of television development. As Lee (1980: 55) point out, "the indigenous culture may need protection not just because it is unsatisfying or decaying, but because it is devoid of a strong metropolitan economy for support."

In sum, "cultural autonomy," as defined by Cees Hamelink (1983: 6), means a society's capacity to decide on the allocation of its own communication resources for adequate adaptation to its unique historical environment. Having examined the development of Korean television, Korea's cultural decisions seem to be made by internal forces like indigenous cultural preference and the national government, rather than by external forces such as foreign media and transnational corporations. Certainly, control of the media system is in domestic hands, most programming on Korean television is being produced locally, its content reflects Korean culture and interests, and the national population prefers this indigenous programming. In this sense, Korea has achieved a relatively large measure of indigenous cultural autonomy in the control of its television system and content. This process has been significantly influenced by national factors that have the potential to withstand external foreign media influence on domestic culture.

The present study has focused on the development of Korean television with respect to the broadcasting system and programming, revealing its distinct features which contrast with the prevalent assumptions about the continuing inevitability of cultural dominance by the cultural and economic cores in the world communication flow. This study has emphasized an appropriate synthesis of both perspectives, as well as a historical analysis of specific cases, for more adequate explanations for both the media development of individual countries and for the global media flow. It is hoped that this study will generate more research interests in the unique features of Korean television development.

NOTES

1. Radio broadcasting was introduced into Korea during the colonial period. The first radio broadcasting service (JODK) started on February 12, 1927 under tight control by the Japanese colonial government. This radio broadcasting system was primarily used to reinforce Japanese militarism in Korea.

2. The close relationship between RCA and Hankuk Ilbo dated back to the time of the foundation of KORCAD. For KORCAD, Hankuk Ilbo was the only source of TV news programs concerning domestic events.

3. The 5.16 Foundation was closely related to military interests as its name refers to the date of military coup d'e·tat (May 16, 1961). This linkage may explain the rapid growth of MBC, which caught up with TBC within a brief period of time in spite of its later start.

4. Concerning the modification of TV broadcasting structure into a quasi-public system, Chun's government claimed that the process was strictly voluntary, instituted by the mass media themselves. However, there is sufficient evidence to disprove this. Nam (1983b: 317) offered two decisive points: "First was the speed with which this media reformation was achieved. The whole process took place within a matter of two to three weeks. Second, such a major deprivation of property rights--the Samsung Industrial Group had to give up its TBC TV-Radio network--does not happen spontaneously."

5. In Korea, because of historical and cultural traditions, almost every parent tends to want highly educated children, and parents believe that they are under an obligation to educate their children as much as possible. Accordingly, most parents are willing to pay for any

extracurricular lessons beyond the regular school education for their children until their children pass the entrance examination to a competitive university. The expense of extracurricular lessons was a serious burden to most Korean families and widened the gap between "the haves" and "the have-nots" up until 1980.

6. Even in the case of radio, Japanese colonialism seems to have failed to transplant a Japanese broadcasting model to Korea. Of course, the Japanese colonial government played important role in the birth of Korean radio. However, the U.S. military administration (1945-1948) had much greater influence on the system and programming of recipient Korean radio than had Japanese colonial government.

Generally the Japanese colonial rulers restricted radio broadcasting in such a way that it could be used to propagate colonial policy for an extended period of time. Together with extreme hostility to Japanese control, the uncertain broadcasting norm and style obstructed the transfer of a Japanese broadcasting model to Korea. In contrast, the U.S. military administration's policy in Korea was to work through the existing broadcasting system, encouraging the American model of broadcasting norm and style. Korean broadcasters soon learned the American-style commercial format of radio programming (Yun, 1986). Moreover, the U.S. military administration laid down broadcasting guidelines for the Korean radio broadcasting system, which emphasized the American concept of *the public* -- public interest, convenience, and necessity (Choi, 1985: 50-51). Thus, American military occupation presence in Korea left a strong imprint on the Korean radio broadcasting system.

The general influence of Japanese broadcasting on Korean radio and television can perhaps be found after the colonial period, not because of colonialism but because of the economic relationship and geopolitical conditions.

7. These results are based on the author's analysis of every-three-year program guides of two major daily newspapers (Cho-Sun Daily and Dong-A Daily) for the first week of April and

October, biannual rescheduling months, from 1964 to 1988. The total broadcast hours for imported programs refer to the total amount of time devoted by major Korean TV networks--KBS-1, KBS-2, and MBC--to broadcasting the programs which are originated from foreign countries in the sample weeks. For the figure of each year, the number of TV broadcast hours of imported programs during the sample weeks is divided by the number of total broadcast hours of those two weeks, and then multiplied by one hundred for the percentage.

8. A Korean TV network goes on the air around 6:00 A.M. and off at about 1:00 A.M. the next morning with no broadcasting between 11:00 A.M. and 5:30 P.M.. According to KBS (1982), Koreans watch television most from 7:00 P.M. to 11:00 P.M.. This time period is also rated highest for Television commercial fees (Ann, 1986: 61-62). Therefore, the prime time of Korean television can be defined as the most highly-viewed time period, between 7:00 P.M. and 11:00 P.M..

9. These results are based on the author's analysis of every-three-year program guides of two major daily newspapers (Cho-Sun Daily and Dong-A Daily) for the first week of April and October, biannual rescheduling months, from 1964 to 1988. The total prime-time hours for imported programs refer to the total amount of prime-time viewing hours devoted by major Korean TV networks--KBS-1, KBS-2, and MBC--to broadcasting the programs which are originated from foreign countries in the sample weeks. For the figure of each year, the number of TV broadcast hours of imported programs which are aired in prime time during the sample weeks is divided by the number of total prime-time hours of those two weeks, and then multiplied by one hundred for the percentage.

10. An alternative explanation is possible for the difference in audience ratings for imported and domestic programs, mentioned in this study. The explanation is based on their different time schedules. Imported programs have been placed out of prime time and indigenous programs have occupied prime-time hours, due not only to

audience preference but also to government influences.

11. Japanese culture is rooted in the spirit of "Samurai" which means a warrior, while Korean culture is based on that of "Scholar" steeped in Confucianism. This distinction makes a crucial cultural difference between Japan and Korea.

12. Since the late 1960s, Japanese broadcasting hardware has gradually displaced U.S. equipment out of the Korean television industry, as Japanese equipment makers have become very competitive with United States suppliers, and KBS and NHK created the "KBS-NHK Expert Committee" in 1968, for the purpose of technological cooperation between them (Ministry of Culture and Information, 1969; Korean Broadcasting System, 1976)

13. In 1981, the "Korean Broadcasting Ethics Committee (KBEC)" was renamed the "Korean Broadcasting Deliberations Committee (KBDC)." The "Telefilm Censorship Deliberate Council (TCDC)" is a subordinate device of the KBDC.

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