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
"The Socioeconomic Experiences of Families
of Migrant Workers in Jordan"

presented by

Husein Farhan Ismail

has been accepted towards fulfillment
of the requirements for

Ph.D. degree in Sociology


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**THE SOCIOECONOMIC EXPERIENCES OF FAMILIES OF MIGRANT WORKERS
IN JORDAN**

By

Husein Farhan Ismail

A DISSERTATION

**Submitted to
Michigan State University
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ABSTRACT

THE SOCIOECONOMIC EXPERIENCES OF FAMILIES OF MIGRANT WORKERS
IN JORDAN

By

Husien Farhan Ismail

Statement of the problem

This research seeks to determine the extent and nature of the socioeconomic experiences of the families of out migrant workers in Jordan.

The data were obtained through personal interviews with the migrants' families. The following experiences resulting from labor migration were measured: (1) economic change at the household level; (2) household management; (3) children's discipline; (4) and the unity of the family. These consequences of labor migration are examined within four social strata in Jordanian society: high, middle, and low urban areas, and the village.

Three principal factors that effect the experiences of migrants' families are (1) whether or not the family accompanied the household head abroad, (2) the mother's level of education and career, and (3) the area of residence (the social class).

Findings from this research indicate a high level of savings among most families who stayed home. They also

indicate better school achievement among children of families who accompanied their father.

Women from the higher urban stratum who remained in Jordan were much more likely than other women to manage their families. Women from this stratum who accompanied their husbands abroad were very likely to complain about the limited opportunities for a normal social life in the host country. Most of the women from the middle urban stratum who remained home were left under the management of in-laws, regardless of their level of education or career status. In the low income and village strata, almost half of the women who remained home were left under the management of in-laws or their eldest son.

The percentage of families who were prevented from accompanying their household-head abroad was greatest in the low income urban stratum. These families were also most likely to report school dropouts, bloody fighting, robbery, and drinking among their children. These problems were especially prevalent when the mother was very poorly educated and was not managing the household.

The findings of this research suggest that the social costs for migrants' families who remain home are greater than the economic benefits they derived from remittances. Labor migration contributes to family instability and behavior problems among children, especially in the high and low urban strata.

To: the memory of my mother,
Saa'deyya; my father Farhan;
my wife, Safa; and my sons,
Ahmad, Ebrahim, and
Mohammed Amin

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION
AND
CONCEPTUAL BACKGROUND
Background

Labor migration as a process is not a new phenomenon. In the past, migrants, individually or collectively, often sought better jobs and lives in other lands. Their families frequently accompanied them, and many became citizens of the new country. This movement of migrants used to be on individual bases and was not strictly controlled by the policies of either the sending or receiving country. However, the present labor migration is totally different. Today's labor migration is highly controlled by both labor importing and exporting countries for political, social, and economic reasons.

Jordan is one of the countries most affected by labor migration (Saa'd-El-Dean and Abd-Al-Fadeil, 1983), in part due to the sudden jump of its population after the 1948 and 1967 Wars, and in part to the immigration of more than one and half million Palestinians (the only country in the Middle East where more than half of its three million population are refugees) (Zaghal, 1984). This was accompanied by the increase dependence of world market on the Middle East oil and the need for more and more

technicians to work in the developmental projects in the Arab oil countries. This led to the migration of more than 342,000 Jordanian worker to other countries according to latest estimate of 1985, which was more than one third of the total labor force in Jordan (Ibrahim, 1986). Those Jordanian workers found themselves surrounded by thousands of other workers from all around the world. They also faced more and more restrictive policies by the Arab oil countries to control that huge migration of workers.

This study seeks to understand the socioeconomic consequences of labor migration on Jordanian families. Jordan's case can be used as an example to understand the socioeconomic experiences of families of out migrant workers in who work in the Arab oil countries given their similar social backgrounds.

On the national level in Jordan, several researchers have emphasized the economic aspects of out-labor migration. For example, Secombe (1980) and El-Saket (1983) concluded that on one hand, out-labor migration provides the national economy with a considerable amount of foreign exchange. On the other hand, however, the increase in expenditures on imported goods by migrants' families increases the need for foreign exchange to balance the national trade deficit (Secombe, 1980; El-Saket, 1983). Nevertheless, the social costs on the migrants' families are undoubtedly

considerable, especially in the long run, which has been largely ignored (Keely and El-Saket, 1984; Burki, 1984).

The out minrants' families socioeconomic experiences resulting from labor migration are the focus of this research. To understand the extent of the problem, a discussion of policies for labor exporting and labor importing countries regarding migration is necessary.

Policies in Labor Exporting Countries

Labor exportation is viewed as a profitable economic activity for the governments in labor exporting countries. Many writers, (El-Saket, 1983; Shah, 1985; Wilch, 1988; Shalaleidin, 1984; Fergany, 1982) have discussed how Jordanian, Pakistani, Egyptian, Sudanese and Yemeni governments consider the flow of remittances as a solution for unemployment and an element in balancing their foreign trade deficit. These governments usually seek to increase the number of training institutions to meet the local and foreign demands for skilled workers. More than 380.000 Jordanian worker (one-third of the Jordanian labor force) and 3.5 million Egyptian worker (seven percent of the Egyptian labor force) are presently working abroad, mainly in the Arab oil countries and the Gulf States. Remittances from Jordanian migrant workers in 1982 accounted for one-third of the national foreign exchange needed to balance the Jordanian foreign trade deficit. For example, in 1984 the amount of remittances through the banks in Jordan

totaled more than 966 million (US) dollars. It also amounted to 3.3 billion (US) dollars through the Egyptian banks in 1987, and 1,056 million (US) dollars through the Sudanese banks in that same year (Kifner, 1985).

These figures give a clear picture of the importance of labor migration for the labor-exporting countries and the reason why their policies encourage labor migration.

Policies in Labor Importing Countries

After the rise in oil prices during the early seventies, the Arab oil countries experienced increasing needs for foreign workers to construct roads, housing, and governmental facilities, all of which demanded a large number of professionals, engineers, and skilled and unskilled workers. They also needed a substantial number of teachers and university professors for their educational institutions. In addition, because governments in the Arab oil countries began to take a more active role in providing free public services to "their" people, they drained professionals from the labor exporting countries (Owen, 1982).

The Arab oil governments did not allow this movement of foreign workers to go uncontrolled. Governments in these countries enacted many laws against foreign workers. These laws can be summarized as follows:

- 1- migrants' contracts are limited in place of work and in time (five years at the maximum, but renewable). Only

those who earn above a certain salary, or are employed in particular technical or professional occupations (such as engineers, doctors and university professors) are allowed to bring their dependents.

- 2- Migrants have limited access to free education (especially in universities) and limited access to medical care, which forces them to pay for private schools and private health care. Their children usually find it difficult or impossible to be admitted to universities to study engineering or medicine. This forces those children to return to their home countries for higher education (Owen, 1982).

Consequences of Labor Migration Policies on the Social Life of Migrants' Families

From the above discussion, it seems reasonable to conclude that these policies work in favor of separation between migrant workers and their families which could lead to drastic effects on the socioeconomic life of those families. So far, most of the research on labor migration has focused on the economic aspects of this problem. Social impacts were studied as a minor side-effect. The previous studies did not emphasize the variables that could work for or against the welfare of the migrants' family. Keely and El-Saket (1984) argued more research be conducted on this topic, since their data indicated many problems between wives and in-laws. However, they did not control many

variables such as the wife's age, education or career status. Burki (1984), drawing on his observations in Pakistan, concluded that labor migration had a liberating effect on the women in labor exporting country. Ibrahim (1978) went further to suggest that labor migration would lead to a new social order, including feminization of the family, in labor exporting countries. In contrast, Saa'd-El-Dean and Abd-Al-Fadeil (1983) indicated that 40 percent of the divorce cases in the Northern District of the Sudan were caused by migration of the husband. In addition, drawing upon many interviews with school principles in Sudan, Saa'd El-Dean and Abd-Al-Fadeil suggested that the father's absence would lead to deterioration in their children's school achievement and many discipline problems. They drew similar conclusions from interviews with Yemenis social services researchers. The Yemenis children assumed the roles of adults at a younger age, began using drugs (al-qat), and started smoking. Azzam and Sharib (1980) found that, in contrast to their expectation that wives would welcome their husband's migration in order to obtain more freedom, many Lebanese women objected to the migration of their husbands because that increased their responsibilities.

Focus of the Research

Based on this discussion, it seems reasonable to expect that the laws and conditions surrounding migrant workers in the host countries have tremendous socioeconomic impacts on the labor exporting countries. In Jordan the previous research mainly focused on national economic concerns such as national economic development, national labor markets, national balance of payments, etc. The social experiences and problems of migrants' families have been seriously underestimated and have never been fully explained in evaluating the costs and benefits of labor migration. According to a recent research by Share' (1987), out-labor migration from Jordan may provide a net gain for the country only as long as the social costs are not considered in this evaluation.

Problem

Statement of the Problem

The problem of this research is to determine the extent and the nature of the socioeconomic experiences that out-labor migration seem to have among out migrant workers' families in Jordan. More specifically, this study addresses three major issues: 1) The scope and variety of changes taking place in family life, structure, and ties with the extended family among those who stayed at home and those who

accompanied their household head. 2) How and why the families of the migrants vary in terms of such changes, especially between families in different social classes. 3) How families cope with such changes. The specific questions addressed in this research are as follows.

1. Economic Change at the Household Level: The first set of questions examined in this study consider changes in saving and investment patterns among families of migrants. To examine this aspect of change, the topic has been divided into several sub-questions:

1A- What differences exist between the saving patterns of migrants' families who accompanied the household head and those who stayed home?

1B- What differences exist in saving and spending patterns among migrants' families in the various social strata in the Jordanian society?

1C- On what new areas of investment were the families of migrants spending their remittances?

2. Household Management: The second set of questions in this study examine changes in the wife's role after the husband's migration. To examine this aspect of change, the topic of household management has been divided into several sub-questions.

2A- Does the wife's education affect her role after the husband's migration?

2B- Does the career status of the wife affect the role she takes after her husband's migration?

2C- Does the wife's "social background" (being from a rural or urban area) affect the role she takes after her husband's migration?

3. Children's Discipline: The third set of questions in this study considers the effects of the father's migration on the educational achievement and behavior of children. To examine this aspect of change the topic of children's discipline has been divided into several sub-questions.

3A- How does the mother's level of education affect the behavior and the level of school achievement of the children of migrants?

3B- How do the responsibilities placed on children after their father's migration affect their level of school achievement and their behavior?

3C- How does the area of residence affect the level of school achievement and the behavioral problems of children after their father's migration?

4. Unity of the Family. The fourth set of questions in this study considers the effects of the husband's migration on the unity of their families. To examine this aspect of change, the topic of the unity of the family has been divided into two sub-questions.

4A- How well is the family unity maintained in families who do not accompany the head of the household?

4B- How does the area of residence of migrants affect the occurrence of problems between husbands and wives?

Expectations

1. Economic Change at the Household Level: As a result of the new policies of Arab oil countries (which resulted in decreases in the numbers and the wages of labor migrants to those countries which lead in turn to decreases in the amount of remittances and the level of inflation in Jordan), the proportions of savings by families of migrants would increase. However, this would depend on several factors:

1A- For three reasons, it was expected that families who accompanied the household head would be able to save more than those who did not; (a) the household head would remain in control of the household's financial affairs; (b) the family would not have the expenses of two houses, one at home and another abroad; and (c) inflation has been lower in the Arab oil countries than in Jordan.

1B- Professionals from the high urban stratum and villagers would be able to save more than others, since high professionals receive high income and villagers live with less expensive everyday life.

1C- Due to the recent decline in remittances, investments in small retail stores (which depends mostly on the presence of foreign exchange for importing goods) would decrease in profitability. More people, it was thought, would invest in agriculture and in stocks. Construction of buildings to be rented still expected to be the leading form of investment.

2. Household Management It was expected that wives would play a larger role in managing their household affairs after their husbands' migration (Burki, 1984). This would depend on:

2A- More educated wives would be more likely to manage their household affairs.

2B- Wives pursuing careers would be more likely to manage their household affairs.

2C- Women from urban backgrounds would be more likely to manage their household, while rural women would be more likely to be under the management of in-laws.

- 3- Children's Discipline: It was expected that the level of education and the behavior of children would deteriorate after their fathers' migration. Children who accompanied their fathers would be better educated (Saa'd El-Deen and Abd-Al-Fadeil, 1983). The school achievement for those who stayed home would depend on:
- 3A- Children who have better educated mothers would be more likely to do better in school.

3B. Children who had more responsibility for their family's affairs during their father's absence would have less time for higher achievement in school and may drop out of school.

3C- Children who accompanied their household head would have fewer problems in school achievement and dropping out than those who did not. For those who accompanied their father, no differences in school performance or dropout would be expected among the various strata in the sample. For those who stayed home, it was expected that the area of residence would affect the child's level of achievement after the father's migration, since their education would be regarded as less important in the low income stratum.

4. Unity of the Family: Problems between husbands and wives would increase as a result of the husbands' migration (Saa'd-El-Deen and Abd-Al-Fadeil, 1983). This would depend on:

4A- Families that accompanied the household head would have fewer problems, and hence greater family unity.

4B- Families from rural areas who stayed home would experience the most problems of interference by in-laws in the wives' personal affairs, and this interference would, in turn, affect the wives' relationships with their husbands.

Explanatory Factors

Three principal factors that appear to explain many of the major differences in the socioeconomic experiences of migrants' families are given particular attention in this research:

1. Whether or not the family accompanied the household head abroad. Although a majority of the migrant workers leave their families in Jordan, the families of some workers -- especially higher-status professional and technical workers -- may accompany the migrant worker. Families who accompanied the migrant worker abroad frequently experienced different conditions and problems than did the families who remained at home.
2. The area of residence of the family in Jordan Area of residence incorporates two distinct variables: (a) socioeconomic status, which is divided in this study into the three levels of high, medium, and low; and (b) urban versus rural residence. Both of these variables -- which are built into the sampling design of the study -- appear to produce numerous differences in experiences and problems among migrants' families.
3. The mother's level of education and occupational career. This factor also incorporates two variables pertaining to the wife of the migrant worker: (a) her amount of formal education, ranging from none to college graduate; (b) whether or not she has an

occupational career outside the home. These interrelated variables consistently influence the experiences and problems encountered by migrants' families.

Although a large portion of Jordan's population, especially in the urban centers, are descendants of migrants from other countries and hence do not reflect traditional Jordanian culture, ethnic background was not taken as an explanatory factor in this study. There were two reasons for this. First, most of those descents of migrants were born in Jordan, are fully integrated into Jordaian society, and consider themselves to be Jordanians rather than ethnic minorities. Second, the rural-urban distinction incorporatd in the study takes account indirectly of the cultural differences that still do exist between indigenous Jordaians and descendants of migrants.

Objective and Overview

The objective of this research was to examine labor migration as a process of change among the families of migrant workers. It seeks to provide a better understanding of the forgotten or underestimated socioeconomic experiences of labor migration for these families. This research may also benefit those parties involved in labor migration --including the migrant workers themselves, their families, and national policy makers in the labor exporting countries-- by emphasizing the social consequences which

must be considered in the evaluation of the costs and benefits of out-labor migration in general.

Jordan provides a good setting for such a research because of the fact that more than one third of its labor force is working abroad.

This dissertation is divided into four chapters. Chapter one includes general background information, a statement of the problem, expectations of the study, and conceptual background about labor migration as a process of change on the family, national and international levels.

Chapter two presents the methods used in the study. It gives a detailed description of the sample, the procedures used in collecting data, and the manner in which the data were analyzed.

Chapter three presents the findings of the study.

Chapter four is discussion and conclusion. The first part analyses the results of the study in regard to previous studies and discusses the major patterns observed in this research; the second part contains conclusion and policy implication from the study.

THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

Labor Migration from an Economic Perspective

Labor migration as a process is not new. One form of ancient labor migration was taking laborers by force from other nations, as slaves. This process was clearly evident during colonial times, when colonial powers used to take the manpower they needed (mainly as slaves) to work for their capitalist economies. Another ancient form of labor migration was voluntary-collective movement of workers with their families to another land of perceived opportunities where they settled permanently.

A new form of labor migration was initiated by the industrial revolution in Europe. The expansion of industrialism created a need for more labor. As a result, waves of migrant workers moved into cities from the surrounding rural areas. When that migration was not sufficient, waves of international temporary migrants came, especially to Germany. This latter migration provided the needed labor without the economic or political costs associated with a permanent work-force (Rhodes, 1978). Thus, in one sense, modern labor migration is a movement of workers from developing countries to core countries to satisfy their needs for a less expensive labor-force for their expanding industries. In another sense, modern labor

migration also functions as an "escape valve" in developing countries that prevents uprising among their labor forces caused by lack of opportunities.

World system theorists consider labor migration as a process in which rural manpower is incorporated into the capitalist production system on the national level. On the international level, labor migration represents one element among many in the growing structural linkage between regions that play differential and unequal roles in the world economy (Wallerstein, 1974).

Rempel (1976) has questioned the net value of benefits derived by poor countries from the money remitted by their citizens who have migrated to one of the rich countries for employment. The adverse effects of receiving such remittances included rural producers being turned into strictly consumers, consequent reductions in the production of food and exports crops, and inflation in rural areas caused by the interaction of increased purchasing power (of migrants' families) and inelastic supply condition.

Conventional economic theorists view the international labor migration from poor to wealthy countries as a resource flow. Like the trade of commodities, labor migration yields benefits to the participation countries through numerous mechanisms that operate at both the individual and macro-structural levels (Griffin, 1976). Other theorists, like Friedman, have gone further by conceiving of labor

migration as an "equilibrium" process in which capital flows from the rich and productive regions in an exchange for labor from poor and cheap labor regions (Rhouds, 1978). This theory assumes that this "healthy" process will lead to the development of rural and periphery regions through the migrant workers who will carry back capital, new skills, attitudes, and thoughts that are needed in their regions. Thus labor migration presumably benefits both labor importing and exporting countries. Labor importing countries benefit from the needed cheap labor, while labor exporting countries benefit from the flow of foreign exchange and the reduction in unemployment. Migrant workers also benefit themselves and their country because they become agents of change in underdeveloped regions. Furthermore, the theory assumes that returned migrants also apply the new skills they acquired abroad to establish businesses, increase investments, and expand farming; this would in turn increase the local and national production of the labor exporting countries. In short, conventional economic theory views the international labor migration as a "manna" from heaven for the development of the underdeveloped and labor-rich regions.

However, many experts in this field have argued that modern history has proved that the theory of labor migration as an equilibrium process is only a myth (Burki, 1984, and Portes, 1978). According to Burki, it is not true that both

labor importing and exporting countries are benefiting equally from labor migration in terms of development. In fact, labor importing countries benefit much more through cheap wages for the demanded skills without providing fringe benefits that local labor force usually demand. On the other hand, while labor exporting countries financially benefit through the extra foreign cash, they may lose various skills needed for local small development projects. Also, inflation will increase as a result of the increasing purchasing power for the families of migrant workers.

For example, Wood and McCoy (1985) stated that sugar cane cutters from the Caribbean migrate to Southern Florida to gain the cash they needed to improve their farms as well as to improve their standard of living. However, there is no evidence of expanding agricultural output or productivity in those Caribbean nations. In fact, the remittances undermined the agricultural production, since the dependency on remittances has created "remittance societies" in which people with remittances remove land from production to purchase real estate for speculative rather than productive purposes. The land holdings purchased by people with remittances remain uncultivated or are worked below their capacity (Wood and McCoy, 1985). Thus small farm production has declined as a result of the remittances. Beside declining agricultural production, social relationship among village people deteriorated because of the lack of

cooperation and concern about village affairs. Social roles were also changed as women started to take over the activities of their absent men in farming and running the family affairs. In other cases, some returned migrant workers were inclined to accept wages offered for local farm work or even to work their own farms. These social changes that resulted from remittances have led to an increasing need for imported food stuffs to compensate for the shortage in local agricultural production.

Shah (1985) stated that the Pakistani labor migration to the Arab oil countries was managed through personal (private) or public contracts. Seventy percent of the Pakistani migrants are married. However, only 4 percent of them have been allowed to take their wives with them. Sixty percent of their remittances were spent on consumption of food and clothing, while 22 percent were spent on real estate, including housing. The dependency of both the government and the rural people on the remittances from workers abroad put the future of rural Pakistani people at the mercy of the fluctuation in oil prices over which they have no control.

Fergany (1982) reported that high wages in Saudi Arabia led to a vast out-migration from Yemen which increased the wages of unskilled Yemeni workers twelvefold in three years. To meet the resulting shortage in skilled and unskilled workers in Yemen, the government allowed children to work in

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public services. Nevertheless, 20 percent of all government service jobs remained vacant. The government also reduced the qualifications needed for specific jobs in order to fill shortage in public services. At the same time, changes in technology and the type of development occurring in Saudi Arabia have created needs for specific kinds of high-skilled workers that are not available in Yemen. This has reduced the need for unskilled Yemeni workers. Added to this is new competition caused by a flow of unskilled cheap labor from Somalia and Sudan. These changes have caused a large drop in the size of remittances to Yemen. The Yemen economy, (which had become dependent on remittances as a source of income for the nation) found it difficult to cope with the new situation, since agricultural production had declined because so many people were leaving their land to work abroad, and no alternative economic base based on remittances has been established. Furthermore, the remaining farmers have converted their lands from food production to cash crop production (which do not require large number of workers). As a result, the largest portion of imports to Yemen today is food stuffs and agricultural machines and equipment. Compounding this situation is the free market policy in Yemen which turned the country into an open market for foreign goods.

Labor migration is not an economic equilibrium process between labor importing and exporting countries since the

former countries receive most of the economic benefits while the latter countries receive few such benefits. In fact, recent studies have concluded that labor migration has created or exacerbated problems that inhibited development in labor exporting countries, including unemployment, dependency on remittances, inflation, increasing imports, and removing land from production. As a result, the equilibrium theory has been reinterpreted from considering labor migration to be of equal benefit to both labor importing and exporting countries (capital in exchange for labor) to a concern with how to make better use of remittances (Griffith, 1985).

Labor Migration in the Arab World

The Arab world represents a major region for international labor migration import and export. For example, in 1975, there were about 4.2 million international migrant Arab workers in the World. These migrants remitted more than \$2.3 million (U.S. dollars) to their families. The largest part of that earlier Arab labor migration was from North Africa to Europe. At that time, only 1.6 million Arab workers were working in the Arab oil countries and their accompanying families totaled another 1.5 million persons (Saa'd-El-Deen and Abd-El-Fadeil, 1983). By 1980, however, the number of Arab workers in the Arab oil countries has jumped to 2.3 million. About 83 percent of them were from three countries: Egypt, Yemen, and Jordan. Added to this

number were 1.1 million Asian workers located mainly in the Arab oil countries.

The rise in world oil prices in the mid-1970s led to more developmental projects in the Arab oil countries as a result of the increasing cash. Saudi Arabia, for example, in order to carry out its developmental plans, became highly dependent on foreign skilled labor, and of course, on the world prices of oil. As a result, even more migrant workers were needed. The same can be applied to the other Arab oil countries. Therefore, foreign workers now constituted about two thirds of the labor-force and half of the population in the Gulf states. Labor migration indeed created significant changes in the structure of the population, in the labor-force and employment, and in the general economy of both Arab labor importing and exporting countries. As a result, both sets of countries initiated new policies regarding this wave of workers.

Labor Migration Policies in Labor Exporting Countries

For these countries, labor exportation is viewed as a profitable economic activity. Many writers (El-Saket, 1983) Shah, 1985; Wilch, 1988; Shalaledin, 1984; and Fergany, 1982) have discussed how the Jordanian, Pakistani, Egyptian, Sudanese and Yemeni governments consider the flow of remittances from their migrant workers to be a solution for unemployment and an element in balancing their foreign trade deficit. These governments usually seek to increase the

number of training institutions to meet the local and foreign demands for skilled workers. As a result, as said before, more than one-third of the Jordanian and seven percent of the Egyptian labor-forces are presently working abroad, mainly in the Arab oil countries and the Gulf states. Remittances from Jordanian migrant workers to their families account for one-third of the national foreign exchange needed to balance the Jordanian foreign trade deficit. For example, in 1982 the amount of remittances through the banks in Jordan totaled more than \$966 million (U.S.) dollars. It also amounted to \$10 billion (U.S.) dollars through the Egyptian banks in 1987, and \$1,056 million (U.S.) dollars through the Sudanese banks in that same year.

In these labor exporting Arab countries, remittances from migrant workers have been a very important source of foreign exchange. In fact, these states have based their future development plans on the remittances they expect to receive, which are in turn tied to the stability of the world market price of oil (Ibrahim, 1978). Since 1978, international migrant workers are known to have remitted a total of \$24 billion to their home countries (Burki, 1984). According to many recent studies, the actual total of remittances is much higher because these reported figures are based only on statistics from the official banks in the

labor exporting countries. Most migrants use private agents and friends to send their remittances home (El-Saket, 1983).

These figures give a clear picture of the importance of labor migration for the labor-exporting countries and the reason for their policies which encourage workers to work abroad to generate needed foreign exchange.

Policies in the Labor Importing Countries

After the rise in oil prices during the early 1970s, the Arab oil countries began to need more and more foreign workers to construct roads, housing, and governmental facilities, all of which demanded a large number of professionals, engineers, and skilled and unskilled workers. They also needed a substantial number of teachers and university professors for their educational institutions. Governments in the Arab oil countries also began to take a more active role in providing free public health services. This resulted in draining professionals from the labor exporting countries (Owen, 1982).

Why have the Arab oil countries needed (and will continue to need for many years to come) to import labor? According to Ibrahim (1978), the following factors have contributed to this need:

1. These countries are underpopulated.
2. Their social norms bar women from working as employees.

3. Their population structure has (a) an inflated demographic base of underage children, and (b) a large number of nomads who are less deployed in the labor-force.

The Arab oil governments did not allow this movement of foreign workers to be uncontrolled. Citizens in the Arab oil countries realized that, in the long run, increasing the number of foreigners who have more education and more skills will undoubtedly change their demographic structures, especially if migrant workers and their families become citizens and began consuming the national wealth. If that trend continues, native Kuwaities, for example, will be less than 30 percent of the total population of that country in the year 2000 (Ibrahim, 1978). In the face of this large influx of Arab migrant workers, and due to recent events in some Arab oil countries, governments in these states have adopted specific policies as precaution against any possible "demographic" threat.

According to Burki (1984), Kuwait in 1986 took the following safety measures.

1. Since the Arab migrant workers pose more of a threat than other migrant workers, demand higher wages, and are often accompanied by their families who need more services, new migrant workers are to be imported from non-Arab countries.

2. The number of visiting visas was reduced by 93 percent from the previous year.
3. The number of working visas was reduced by 7 percent for the same period.

Governments in the other Gulf countries have also enacted many laws against foreign workers. These laws can be summarized as follows (Owen, 1982):

1. Migrant contracts are limited by place of work (to only the contracting business) and in time (five years at the maximum, but renewable). Only persons who earn above a certain salary or are employed in particular technical or professional occupations (such as engineers, doctors and university professors) are allowed to bring their families. No migrant is allowed to marry a native woman. Recently, native men have also been prohibited from marrying foreign women, since this practice was leaving many native women without marriage partners in societies in which all women are expected to be married.
2. Foreigners are prevented from owning property in the host country, and they are also not eligible for subsidized housing. As a result, 58 percent of the local expenditure by migrants working in Kuwait go for rent (Owen, 1982). Consequently, many migrant workers are forced to leave their families at home, even if they are permitted to bring them to the host country.

3. There are also problems connected with access to free medical care and education, which forces foreigners to pay for private health care and education. Foreigners usually find it difficult or impossible to be admitted to universities to study engineering, medicine or any other subject that would lead to professional jobs in the oil countries. This forces the children of migrant workers to return to their home countries for education (owen, 1982).

All of the Arab oil countries have started to take similar safety measures. For example, new projects have been largely given to Korean companies, who bring their own workers and put them in camps. When the project is over, the company leaves the country with all of its workers. Thus, while the Arab migrant workers were 65 percent of the total migrant workers in the Arab oil countries in 1975, they were only 48 percent in 1984 (Serageldin et al., 1984). Most of the restrictions on migrant workers are directed mainly against Arab workers. The reason for such actions, as Choucri (1983) outlined, is that "both politics and markets played a role in the new interregional flow of the Asian workers and the restrictions on Arabs. The Arab oil countries needed to tap new sources to meet the apparently unstable demand for labor. Asians would accept the working conditions that Arabs would refuse. They appeared better disciplined and more productive. In addition, Asians had a distinct political advantage. The Arab oil countries worried

less about Asian workers making claims for citizenship. They are alien and could remain disenfranchised. The Asians were regarded as more likely to be passive observers of political processes than potential activists or claimants on social services and other benefits. Added to all of this is the increasing threat of some Islamic fundamentalist movements. Some of these movements are responsible for many recent anti-government activities in some Arab oil countries. As a result, most Arab oil countries, especially Kuwait, sharply reduced the number of Arab migrant workers while, at the same time, the number of non-Arab workers increased rapidly.

From the above overview of policies in both labor exporting and labor importing countries, it seems reasonable to conclude that the policies which the Arab oil governments adopted against migrant workers have not been matched by suitable policies in the labor exporting countries that could protect workers (Owen, 1982). The only policy by those latter countries has been to export more and more people to the Arab oil countries. The impact of those policies on the migrants' families will be the subject of discussion in the next section.

Labor Migration in Social Perspective

Consequences of Labor Migration on Labor Importing Societies

Labor migration in the Arab world has had many profound social consequences for the labor importing countries. For

example, with more than one half of the population in the Gulf oil states being migrant workers with their families, a new privileged class has arisen among native citizens in most of these states (Saad-El-Deen and Abd-El-Fadeil, 1983). This new class is characterized by high income, many assets, and a luxurious lifestyle, while the imported migrants do the proletariat jobs that are characterized by far less income, very low status in terms of jobs and housing, and other forms of social isolation. This isolation has been built into every institution created to deal with migrant workers and their families (Kenfer and Miller, 1985). This treatment applies to Arab and non-Arab migrants alike. If a comparison is made between the treatment of Arab migrants in Europe and in the Arab oil countries, these workers have better living conditions in Europe (Saad-El-Deen and Abd-El-Fadeil, 1983). Thus, labor migration has created a new way of life and standard of living for both migrant workers and native citizens based entirely on the passport that one carries.

Owen (1982) and Sivanandan (1979) have observed that these policies are having a devastating effect on orientations toward work in the labor importing societies. For example, Kuwaitis, who for thousands of years have lived on fishing have lost this tradition. Fishing is no longer accessible to the people. Fishing rights are reserved for few elites who own fishing companies. Ninety percent of

the Kuwaities work in offices where they receive a full salary for working an average of four hours per week. All technical jobs are left for foreigners.

Consequences of Labor Migration on Labor Exporting Societies

Families of migrants usually have two options, either to separate from their household head, or to live in social isolation within the host country. Either of those options could undoubtedly affect the life of a migrant's family.

According to Burki (1984), it is possible to estimate the economic benefits and costs of labor migration with some precision and to come to the conclusion that the economic benefits have generally outweighed the economic costs. However, such a calculation is very difficult to make in regard to noneconomic costs and benefits. Burki (1984) said that to study the full socioeconomic impacts of labor migration at the micro level, reasonably firm information should be available on the number of people involved; their social, economic and cultural backgrounds; the amount of remittances sent by them to their families; and the use of the remittances by household heads. On the basis of such information, it should be possible to determine accurately not only the immediate impacts of migration, but also its long term social and economic consequences. At the present time however, such information is generally lacking. So far, most of the research on the impacts of labor migration on

the labor exporting countries has focused entirely on economic impacts.

While the economic impacts can be measured in monetary terms, the nature and extent of the social impacts of labor migration on migrants' families vary from one place to another and from one family to another, depending on such factors as education, the social structure of a given family, and the social norms in a given society. The variety of these social impacts are virtually unlimited. They include several changes in the social relations within families, among groups, between generations etc. Serageldin et al., (1984) indicated in his study that labor migration would produce a very different reaction from a Yemeni of rural origin for who in exposure to the lifestyle of Riyadh or Jidda is the initial contact with "a big city," as compared with a Lebanese, Egyptian, or Jordanian professional who would likely find the lifestyle in Saudi Arabia confining and dull in contrast to Beirut, Cairo, or Amman.

A complete analysis of the social impacts of labor migration should certainly include women. They are expected to carry out many duties that are very different from their husbands' responsibilities for farming, family decision making etc. The wives of migrant workers undoubtedly suffer the most from migration. Yet this subject has been

underestimated in most of the studies done on labor migration (Burki, 1984).

There is a disagreement among different researchers about the new role of women after migration. Ibrahim (1978) hypothesized that labor migration could lead ultimately to a new social order and to "feminizing" the families of migrant workers in the labor exporting countries and "masculinizing" the flow of migrant workers to the labor receiving countries. Labor migration consisting of mostly men could lead also to a serious imbalance in the sex ratios in both sets of countries, which could produce serious problems in Arab societies in which every adult is expected to be married.

Serageldin et al. (1984) agreed with Ibrahim on this point, pointing out that the wives of migrants must undertake much more work than traditionally done by women in Arab societies. These women have to assume many roles of the household head, including house keepers, protector, and disciplinarian of the children. As a result, these women's control over household resources has dramatically increased, which in turn alters many aspects of their family role. He also suspected that those role changes may not survive after the return of the husband, which would create further problems for women in Arab societies.

Burki (1984) based his comments on the experience of Pakistanians, saying that on one hand, the women have more

problems when they stay in the home country. They are left without a "protector" against interference by the extended family, who traditionally may act as protector for the family of a migrant household head. On the other hand, he also suggested that in some cases the women were able to make effective use of the remittances sent by their husbands to establish businesses and to buy vans to transport the surplus produce from village to market town. In addition, he suggested that migrants' children were deriving benefits from the significant increase in household income that has resulted from the flow of remittances. A part from being better clothed and better fed, they are also receiving much better education when compared with the children from non-migrant household. One interesting consequence of the decision to denationalize education in Pakistan is that private schools have been set up in large numbers in the areas with high concentrations of migrant families. These schools usually provide better education than government institutions, they have higher enrollment rates, and the quality of their teaching is superior. Burki concluded that if these speculations about the possible benefits for women in migrants families are true, then these should be an additional secondary impact on the education of female children. If remittances sent by migrant workers are turning some of their wives into economic entrepreneurs, then these liberated women should be able to provide better education

and better social opportunities for their female children than they had themselves. In a society that places a very low priority on female education, such a change should produce some very desirable results.

Many writers (such as Griffith, 1985) argue however, that such changes in women's control over household resources will not change their status in the bottom of the status hierarchy. According to Saad-El-Deen and Abd-El-Fadeil (1983), "in contrast to what had been believed in labor exporting countries that migration would lead to an improvement in wellbeing among migrants' families, there is a recent feeling that this is not at all for good. There are negative socioeconomic effects in addition to the positive effects that have been focused on previously. Moreover, it is doubtful if the social effects are beneficial, since they are difficult to evaluate. The principal negative effect is caused by the separation of the household head from his family. Most of the migrant males are between 24 and 40 years old, and they are often prevented from bringing their families with them. This means that a large number of families are separated for either a short or a long time, and that many women are forced to take on more responsibilities for managing their families.

A study done on the wives of Lebanese migrants (Azzam and Sharib, 1980) showed that many women do not share the attitude expected by most writers of welcoming migration

because it gives more freedom. More than 75 percent of women in that study preferred to stay home even if the family income would be 25 percent less. That study also showed that 15 percent of interviewees acknowledged that the marriage bonds had been weakened by migration. They complained about the increase in their responsibilities for children's discipline and fewer opportunities for social interaction after their husband's migration. There was a clear indication that in most cases (63 percent) the decision to migrate was initiated by the husband, despite objections by their wives in 34 percent of the cases. In only 4 percent of the cases, the desire for migration originated from the wife. Saad-El-Deen and Abd-El-Fadeil (1983) also showed that in Sudan a large percentage of divorces (40 percent) were due to the migration of husbands.

Regarding Burki's hypothesis that migration would lead to more educational opportunities for migrants' children, Saad-El-Deen and Abd-El-Fadeil (1983) showed that the opposite was true. Based on interviews with principals of elementary and Junior-middle schools in Sudan, this study found large differences in levels of school achievements as well as disciplinary problems between the children of migrants and those whose father stayed home. Saad-El-Deen and Abd-El-Fadeil also showed that social service researchers in Yemen began to pay more attention to the increase in the number of children in rural areas whose

fathers were abroad. There was often no way for the mothers of these children to discipline them. Children began to take the father's role at a young age, and also begin smoking and taking drugs (alqat).

The following section presents background information relevant to the socioeconomic impacts of labor migration on migrants' families in Jordan.

Jordanian Migrant Worker, Socioeconomic Perspective

Government's Economic Policy

Jordan is a Middle Eastern country with a population of about three million. Agriculture used to be the main economic base before the Israeli occupation of the West Bank in 1967 War. After that, exporting skilled labor became the major export.

Jordan's recent history has been shaped by the Palestinian problem. After the 1948 and 1967 wars, its population increased ten times, from about 300,000 in 1947 to 2.75 million by the mid-1970s. It is the only country in the Middle East in which more than half the population consists of refugees (Zaghal 1984). With its limited resources, however, Jordan has not been able to absorb all the potential Palestinian refugees. Consequently, since the late 1940, Palestinians have been migrating to the Arab oil

countries to work as professionals and technicians. For a long time, the number of these workers needed by these countries was quite limited. As world oil prices increased rapidly during and after the 1973 war, however, there was more need for construction workers and engineers to meet the sudden boom in construction in the Arab oil countries.

The Jordanian government came to appreciate the importance of remittances as a solution for unemployment and as a means of balancing its foreign trade deficit. The Jordanian government therefore decided to increase the number of training institutions in the country to meet the growing foreign (as well as domestic) demand for skilled workers. The number of professional institutions was increased more than three times between the late 1960s and 1982 (Simantee, 1985). This Jordanian labor migration to the Arab oil countries has had many similarities to the labor migration from some Asian and many other Middle Eastern countries (for which labor migration also became an important source of income and was enhanced by the governmental policies to train workers and establish annual contracts with the labor importing countries). Jordanian workers were in especially high demand, however, because of their relatively high levels of education which qualified them for highly skilled white and blue collar jobs.

The Jordanian labor force in the Gulf is characterized by quite high levels of education with 40 percent being

college graduates and 25 percent being secondary-school graduates. If we compare those figures to the total labor force in Jordan -- of which 57 percent have less than a secondary education, 24 percent have secondary education, and only 18 percent are college graduates -- we find that that out migrant workers have a higher level of education (Ibrahim, 1986).

It is estimated that approximately 10,000 workers have migrated from Jordan every year since 1974. This trend continued until the mid 1980s (Abdal-Jabbar, 1982). By 1982, more than 40 percent of the Jordanian work-force was abroad, working mainly in the Gulf area. More than 30 percent of the Jordanian national income comes from remittances. For example, the amount of remittances through the banks of Jordan totaled more than 966 million (U.S. dollars) in 1982 (Ibrahim, 1986).

While Jordan is one of the major Arab labor exporting countries, it is the only Arab state beside Yemen that exports and imports workers at the same time. It exports its highly educated and skilled workers, who are highly demanded in the Arab oil countries, and imports sbstitute cheaper labor, maaainly from Egypt. This is a very clear example of dealing with labor migration as "human capital" which is a very widespread phenomenon in many Third World countries. The basic reason for this policy is the need for foreign exchange and the high rate of unemployment among highly

skilled persons. Thus, the number of Jordanian workers abroad increased from 1973 to 1985 as follows. (Compiled from estimation by Serageldin et al. 1984; Ibrahim, 1986; Saa'd-El-Deen and Abd-El-Fadeil, 1983; and population Report, 1983):

<u>Year</u>	<u>Total</u>
1973	125,000
1975	139,000
1976	170,000
1980	261,500
1982	350,000
1985	382,500

On the average, these numbers equaled one-fourth of the total Jordanian labor force until 1976, and represent 40 percent of the total since 1980. This large migration opened up many jobs in Jordanian cities and provoked considerable rural-to-urban migration to fill them. In addition, workers from outside the country came to fill the vacant rural jobs created by the rural-urban migration and the new jobs in service sectors created by the remittances flowing into the country (Population Report, 1983). A good example of this is the increase in the estimated number of work permits for foreign workers issued by the Jordanian Ministry of Labor between 1973 and 1986. (Compiled from Ibrahim (1986) and Saa'd-El-Deen and Abd-El-Fadeil, 1983):

<u>Year</u>	<u># Permit</u>
1973	376
1975	5,000
1980	80,700
1984	135,000
1985	155,000
1986	149,000

These data show that the number of migrant workers coming into Jordan increased dramatically as a result of the severe shortage in the national labor-force.

However, the recent Iran-Iraq war and the continual decline in world oil prices has resulted in a severe drop in the number of the Jordanian workers abroad and the amount of remittances they send home. At the same time, the number of applicants for jobs in Jordan increased greatly, rising by 95 percent between 1973 and 1983.

In 1985, the steady growth in remittances began to decline for the first time (Ibrahim, 1986). Returning migrant workers who face the depression and unemployment in Jordan may end up joining the growing radical movement that exists here as well as all other labor-exporting countries (Kinfer, 1985). According to CBS News, the civil riot in the West Bank erupted at the peak of unemployment among college graduates as a result of the growing shortage of migration opportunities to the Arab oil countries (CBS Jan. 7, 1988).

The Jordanian government therefore worked out with the Arab oil countries an agreement to limit the number of returning migrants. In addition, in 1986 the government imposed new fees on foreign in-migrating workers. While this research was taking place in Jordan, the government increased those fees more than three times, especially on non-Arab migrants. This fee is largely a response to the lack of foreign exchange flowing out of the country as wages for foreign workers. Foreign workers in Jordan prefer to be paid in U.S. dollars. Therefore, the government decided to:

1. Impose an annual fee of about \$350 on each imported Arab worker and about \$800 on each imported non-Arab worker, to be paid by employers
2. Cancel most imports, especially those of durable goods.
3. Temporary close all money exchange offices except banks.

As this overview indicates, migrants became a convenient source of income both for the government and the migrants' families.

The Economical Consequences of Labor Migration on Jordanian Society

Secombe (1980) argued that Jordan had put itself at the mercy of oil prices fluctuations over which it has no control. In his study, Secombe showed that remittances increased between 1971-1979 from 22.8 million to 156.4 million Jordanian Dinars. But this had led to drastic

effects on the economy, since its trade deficit increased from 95 million Jordanian Dinar to 450 million Jordanian Dinars during the same period. This reflects a 443.6 percent increase in the value of domestic imports compared to a growth in total exports of only 62 percent. Consumer goods are currently the fastest growing component of the import bill. Secombe concluded that "while remittances have covered an otherwise large trade deficit, it is these very remittances which have exaggerated the trade deficit by facilitating the imports boom. The migration of professional and skilled workers has assumed new dimensions at a time when Jordan's own need for technicians and skilled personnel has intensified owing to the growing requirements of the variance in economic sectors (Secombe, 1980).

Secombe also noted that the labor migration movement out of Jordan has negatively affected the rural areas, where agricultural production has declined due to the shortage in labor force, and because returned migrant workers prefer to live in cities and not to expand their farms or buy new ones.

El-Saket (1983) and Al-Fanik (1988), however, hold the position that remittances supply the country with foreign exchange and eliminate the unemployment problem. Al-Fanik said that "there was always an extra labor force (about 25 percent). And this extra labor force was caused by the

continuing migration from the West Bank. For this reason, Jordan Cannot live without labor migration."

El-Saket was interested in discovering how these remittances had been spent, by whom, and on what. His 1983 study reported these major results:

1. While most returned migrant reported that some of their wages went for savings and investments abroad, the proportion saved was not great.
2. The only investment of remittances reported with any notable level was for residential land and buildings.
3. Although migrants' families earned extra money as the result of remittances, this was accompanied by another serious problem. The migrants' families became totally dependent on remittances. El-Saket wrote that "the outstanding sour note from the perspective of Jordanian development is the discouraging picture of direct investments or saving of remittances reported by respondents."
4. While the migrants' families have considerably improved their standard of living, it seems that their economic development (expanding farms or investments) did not improve. Thus for rural and urban migrants' families, remittances have made very limited contributions to their economic development.

El-Saket concluded that a crucial underlying fact was that the majority of returned migrants at all socioeconomic

levels held the opinion that migration led to neither new skills nor better jobs. He also concluded that investments compete with many other things on families' lists of priorities because of their limited financial resources. When investments take place, it is reportedly more likely to be tangible assets or small businesses rather than shares or bonds for larger enterprises. El-Saket showed that "villagers were the only sector who invested a high percentage of their earning inside the country with 50 percent of their income going into investments. But these investments were still mostly in real estate.

The high percentage of investments by villagers can be explained by the findings of Castells (1982) in Latin America cities, in which he found that people living as squatters in cities were able to save money despite their very low income. Those people were able to manage their lives primarily through the informal sector by raising animals and some food in their own gardens. In Jordan, villagers are the most likely to manage their lives through the informal sector, so they are the most able to save even though they have very small earnings in comparison with urban professionals. Nevertheless, their investments were not used productively. Secombe (1980) showed that the Jordan valley lost 60 percent of its people between 1970 and 1980. These people used their remittances to buy land and to build houses in urban areas, which inflamed residential costs,

enhanced the over-urbanization problem, deteriorated the economy, and pressured city services. (This was a typical case of the urbanization problems that Castells [1982] had observed in Latin America).

These findings show that Jordanian labor migration has created many serious changes at all levels of life in the society. It is understandable that these changes would affect the social structure of migrants' families, and in turn the society as a whole. The last section of this literature review discusses the social impacts of labor migration on migrants' families in Jordan.

Social Perspective

Jordan is part of the Arab world, where people are strongly influenced by Islam and traditional tribal customs. In Jordan and other Arab states, large internal migrations from rural to urban areas have brought rural norms to cities, where the norms tend to prevail within the largely unassimilated urban fringe areas. No clear differences are found between urban, semi-rural or rural areas in women's status, as has occurred with Western urbanization (Abu Lughod, 1962). The fertility rate is one of the highest in the world at 3.3 (Zaghal, 1984; Al-Fanik, 1988). The number of people living in villages is continuously decreasing due to the active rural to urban migration (Zaghal, 1984). According to the 1979 census 59 percent of the population lived in cities at that time (Khamees, 1988).

At the beginning of this century, the city of Amman was just a very small village of about one thousand migrants from Southern Russia. Those people had settled Amman and other small villages around it such as Wadi El-Sear, Sweillieh, and Zarga. The Ottoman government chose this land in the Balqa mountains to settle those who left their land after the Turks were defeated by the Russians. In the 1980s, all of those villages became part of the big metropolitan area of Amman, with population of well over a million people, which is about half of the population who live in the entire East Bank.

The growth of Amman has been a result of the deterioration of other older cities in Jordan. At the time of Ottoman Empire, Jerusalem and Nablus were seats of government in the west Bank. Both of these cities, together with the villages around them were considered to be independent economic units. In the east Bank, Sult (about twenty miles northwest of Amman), and Karag (about eighty miles south of Amman) were also seats of government. They and their surrounding villages were also viewed as were having independent economies.

After the defeat of the Turks by the British in World War I, King Abdalla (grandfather of King Hussein) chose Amman as a capital for the new East Jordanian state. This caused thousands of people to move from Sult and Karag (then

the largest cities in the East Bank) to Amman, since opportunities for acquiring wealth were better there.

After the 1948 Arab-Israeli war, roughly two million people left what is now called Israel and went to Arab states. One million of them settled in the remaining part of Palestine in which came to be known as the West Bank. Many others went to the East Bank to settle in Amman and surrounding areas. The population of Amman grew from 40 thousand in the 1940s to 300,000 in the 1950s. Zarqa, a community located within the metropolitan area of Amman, grew from a few thousand to 100,000 during that same period.

After the 1967 War, another migration occurred. The loss of the West Bank to Israel led most of those who had migrated first into the West Bank to make another migration into the East Bank, and most of them settled in the metropolitan area of Amman. Also, people living in the West Bank's old cities (Jerusalem, Nablus, and Hebron) and their surrounding villages began to experience a lack of economic opportunities under the Israeli rule. Many of them chose to migrate to the East Bank and many chose Amman as a place to settle. By the 1980s, the number of people living in Amman and its metropolitan area reached one and a quarter million. Because the largest proportion of those who live in large cities like Amman and Zarqa are from Palestine --rural and urban origin --, these cities often are called refugee cities (Khamees, 1988). The only city in the east Bank of

Jordan that remained largely a homogeneous unit with its surrounding villages around was Irbid. Irbid and its villages had followed the Damascus government at the time of Turkish rule. However, there was no major migration from Irbid to Amman after the establishment of East Bank Jordan as a state at the beginning of this century (Khamees, 1988; Zaghal, 1984)

The social norms that are observed in the city of Amman differ according to the area of origin (being from Palestinian or East Jordanian rural origin). The fact that most of Amman population are refugees, means that the Palestinian social norms are the ones that are prevalent there.

The social norms that are observed in the Palestinian rural areas are generally not the same as those observed in the East Jordanian ones. The rural Palestinians depend mostly on agriculture. Their social norms regarding women's status and their relations with in-laws are similar to the ones observed in many peasant societies around the world. In the East-Jordanian rural areas, the prevailing social norms have many similarities to the ones observed among the Bedouin in Arabia.

Palestinian village norms assign a great deal of power to the grandfather in the family. He has the ultimate power over all affairs of his extended family. The land was traditionally under the control of the grandfather, and the

whole family worked in the field without hired laborers. The grandfather, together with the grandmother, thus occupied a very strong position.

However, among rural East Jordanian, the eldest son has higher status than among Palestinian villagers. In the old days when raiding was a common phenomenon between East Jordanian tribes, the older people were dependent on their youth for protection. The older generation asked for the respect from the younger generation, more than ultimate obedience. In recent years most of the villagers in the east Bank work in military services as their primary source of income (Zaghal, 1984).

Compared with other countries with approximately the same per capita income, Jordan's 1975 level of female participation in the labor force was the lowest, at 10.5 percent; in comparison, the rate in Tunis was 19.35 percent and in Turkey it was 17 percent. Local customs and Islam do not encourage the mixing of male and female in job environment, especially in factories. As a result, the most "socially" desirable jobs for women are teaching, sewing, or other jobs where women are majority. Also, most of the women work is in the nonagricultural sector (United Nations, ILO Year Book of Labor Statistics, 1984). There is also a low level of labor force participation among men over forty. It is often the case that workers in the defense forces retire

around forty years of age. Some of these retired men seek employment in Arab oil producing countries (Zaghal, 1984).

Manufacturing, which accounted for 35 percent of the female work force in 1961, dropped to 10.2 percent in 1976. It would seem that women are becoming increasingly disenchanted with productive work and are turning to services, such as secretaries, tailors, and saleswomen. The low level of Jordanian female labor force participation is highly associated with a spectrum of variables, the most important of which are the cultural values, marital status, level of education, high fertility, husbands's education, and degree of urbanization (Mujahed, 1982).

However, with modern education (students are one-third of the population) and with the strong urbanization movement in the country, this once traditional society is becoming more modern. Educational development in Jordan is equalizing opportunities between sexes. In 1952, 25 percent of all students were female. By 1981, that percentage had increased to 46.3 percent. As enrollment has increased, there has been a marked decrease in student dropout in all educational cycles and in all social classes for both sexes. The percentage of dropouts among students had declined to about 11 percent by 1980 (Zaghal, 1984). Families are determined to put their children through a university. Education has become the major route to a higher social status as well as

the door leading to the skills that are highly demanded both locally and abroad (Day, 1986).

Although these, and many other changes, are taking place in Jordan, traditional social norms are still observed in rural as well as urban areas. The family is still overwhelmingly important in the social organization of local communities in the Middle East (Davis, 1977). Men are the defenders of property and honour. Women should not act on their own as defenders. Therefore, women are still dependent on the men of their families for protection and external-family relationships.

The family is headed by the husband. He is the decision maker in all internal affairs. Wives usually participate in most of the family's external affairs, but they may not participate in all of the family's external affairs and relations even if the husband is abroad or dead. Eldest sons or the husband's father or brother may take over responsibilities of the family's external affairs in that case.

The Social Impact of Labor Migration on Jordanian Families

The question that remains to be asked is "what effects might labor migration have on the social norms in Jordan described above, especially those relating to women. Davis (1977) observed that:

One of the most interesting consequences of labor migration, and also one of the least studied, is what happens to the members of the family who remain. It is

not unreasonable to suppose that the suffering of the migrant is matched by his family's. Moreover, the accommodation which women make to the absence of their men should be of particular interest in communities which emphasize the protection of women and their customary dependence of men (Davis, 1977).

As mentioned earlier, there has been very little research on this aspect of labor migration and what has been written is mostly a speculation based on what has been observed in a few societies (Pakistan, Burki, 1984; Sudan and Yemen, Saa'd-El-Deen and Abd-El-Fadeil, 1983). Some writers believed that labor migration would lead to the liberation of women and to increases in their levels of education (Burki, 1984; and Ibrahim, 1978). Others believed that this would lead to an increase in the rate of divorce and lower levels of school achievement among children (Saa'd-El-Deen and Abd-El-Fadeil, 1983; and Azzam, 1980)

Keely and El-Saket (1984) tend to agree with Ibrahim and Burki that migration has liberated women and increased the level of school achievement among migrants' children. In their sample, migrants were better educated than the average East-Banker. Among migrant workers 33 percent were university graduates compared to 18 percent of the total population, and only 11 percent were illiterate compared to 13 percent of the total East Bank population and 30 percent of rural East-Bank people as reported in the 1979 census.

Keely and El-Saket asked respondents about decision making in specific spheres of family life. Returned migrants

(mostly males) reported a modest increase in the role of their wives as the main decision makers during their absence. This increase was more notable in matters related to care of family consumption and education, rather than investment and savings.

Keely and El-Saket noted that "these data do not point to a precipitous change in roles and relationships within the family system. Nevertheless, the change is potentially a tidal change in its implications, and accompanies other changes such as higher participation of women in education and the labor force. In the male respondents' eyes, this is a process of two steps forward and one step back on the migrant's return. Although responsibility, power and status in a family cannot be put on and taken off like an overcoat, the changes in women's roles are not necessarily going to proceed on a smooth path."

Keely and El-Saket reported modest levels of problems regarding children during the migrant's absence, with 19 percent of their respondents saying that there were problems with both children's studies and behaviors. A significant proportion of returned migrants (60 percent) reported problems related to the separation of the husband, as well as problems of a young wife with in-laws or relationships with outsiders of relatives who is temporarily heading a household. They reported that these rates varied among socioeconomic strata, but did not show how. Keely and

El-Saket said that the price paid by the children whose health, clothing and education were provided by their father's absence is not clear.

El-Saket (1983) suggested that future research on the micro-level should give particular attention to household structures. In addition, he also hypothesized that the age of the wife might have both direct and indirect effects on her behavior when her husband becomes a migrant worker. Indirectly, young wives may be more likely to decide that she and her children should live in the household of her husband's parents. Directly, older wives should have more control over resources and decision-making regardless of whether they were living with in-laws or temporarily heading their own household. In-depth anthropological research, he said, could shed light on the effects of household structure on attitudes and behaviors related to migration, and on the impacts of migration on Jordanian households.

Although these previous studies have shed some light on the consequences of labor migration at the micro-level, no comprehensive research has been done to investigate these social problems in depth. Nor have the previous studies made clear what variables affect problems such as poor school achievement and conflict between spouses and with in-laws. The previous research has generally relied on a statistical analysis at a general level, without in-depth analysis of the contexts of these problems.

CHAPTER II

METHODOLOGY

Study Areas

The sample for this study was drawn from four social strata in the Jordanian society: high income urban areas, middle income urban areas, low income urban areas, and villages. The reason for this division in the sample is the fact that people in different strata have different concerns and experiences, and, as a result, will act differently to a given aspect of change such as labor migration.

The criteria used to define these areas were based on the classifications established by the local government that usually issues building construction permits. The shape, size, distance between buildings, and even the materials for new construction are defined in the permit, based mainly on the area of the proposed new buildings.

For example, West Amman, including West Jabal Al-Hussein, Al-Shmeasani and Jabal Amman, are considered class First-A areas. Government official buildings and foreign embassies are located on the main streets of these areas. For new buildings, much greater space must be left between neighbors than in other areas. They must also be set back farther from main streets, to allow for gardens. No one

can buy less than 500 square meters. And new buildings must be constructed of white stones.

The high urban strata in the study is located in West Amman. Every residence there is surrounded by a garden and a wall. The population density is fairly low (Zaghal, 1984). The average income of the residents is about \$1500 a month (El-Saket, 1983). The monthly rent for a small apartment is around \$300. It is expected that anyone who chooses to live there should have a large enough income to provide a standard of living identical to others in the neighborhood. As a place of origin, people who live in the area are mixed from the old cities of the West and East Bank, including Nablus, Jerusalem, Hebron, Sult, and Karag.

The middle urban stratum includes sections of Amman classified as Second-B or C areas. These areas are located in the main downtown of Amman and in the East residential areas of the city. The main streets in these areas are classified as business and merchandise sectors. No space is required between business buildings on main streets. Houses are permitted to have much less space between buildings. Streets in these areas are narrow and congested with cars due to the absence of private garages. Only the side of the house that faces the main streets is required to be built from white stones, while the other sides may be built with concrete. These main streets stretch to narrower streets in which the houses are built mostly with concrete. The rent of

an apartment in these areas is about \$150 a month. Those who live here earn around \$600 a month. They are mostly Palestinians from rural origins who earn enough to enable them to live a reasonably comfortable life in Amman.

The low urban stratum consists of unclassified U.N. camps as well as the areas surrounding them. The land for these camps was given by the government to the United Nations which built thousands of small huts, one beside other. The walls of the huts are built with cheap construction blocks consisting of a large proportion of sand and small stones and a little concrete. The roofs are made from zinc sheets. Every refugee family was given one of those huts free. No one is permitted to expand or build over his residence, since the cheap material that the huts are built from does not stand any additional construction.

The areas surrounding the camps have been illegally built up, mostly by refugees. Because they are entirely illegal, there are no standards to determine where streets begin and end, or how much space should be left between houses. Most of those houses contain only one or two rooms. The average income for people living in these areas is around \$240 a month. Zaghal (1984) reported that the fertility rate in these places is high, and El-Saket (1983) discovered that number of children per family in these places is also high.

The final stratum in the study consists of rural Jordanian villages. The primary sources of income in such villages are from farm production and military service (Zaghal, 1984, Keely and El-Saket 1984). The Jordanian army comes mostly from East Jordanian villages, since these people are the most loyal to the regime. People in the Jordanian military service usually retire early (around forty years of age, Zaghal 1984), and after retirement are highly demanded as military trainers in the Arab Gulf countries (Zaghal,1984).

One East Jordanian village was selected for this study. Most of the families own their houses, which are surrounded by their farms. The land that the house stands on is usually inherited from the grandfather. The Islamic law says that the land must be divided between all the children upon the father's death with 1/8 of the land is supposed to be given to the mother if she is still alive. However, the tribal practice differs from the law. Females have been obliged to write a statement at the time of their marriage that their portion of the farm will be given to their brothers. This practice is followed (against Islamic law) to prevent the land from going out of the family through daughters' marriages.

As a result of this practice, most of the villagers (on the male side of families) own their land. This also implies that most people hold about the same status position and

income, since the division of land is equal among all the males of the family. However, after several generations of such division, most plots of land become so small that the family can no longer depend on it for their entire income (Seconmbe, 1980). The result is that most literate villagers who can find a career in the city leave the village. Those who stay in the village use military service or driving a taxi cab or truck as a second source of income. Those villagers who have remained have usually built on their plots of land. This is usually a one-big story structure built with concrete.

Jordan, as a country, has a unique population structure. With more than half of its population are Palestantan, there is no social distinction between native Jordanian and Palestinian. Both carry Jordanian passports and can work in any official or unoffical jobs. They can live in any residential area except the refugee camps where the United Nation, who is in charge of housing, allows Palestinian only to live in its camps. On the other hand, Jordanian villages are not desirable places to live in for Plaestanian due to the lack of employment opportunities. Living together for more than fourty years, all forms of interaction, especially marriage, business, and other socioecnomic interests, it is relatively hard (and socially undesirable for both people) to ask if someone is a Palestinian or not. Added to all of this is the fact that

for the purpose of this study, such a distinction thought to be relatively not important.

Sampling

This study investigated the families of Jordanian men who were working abroad or had returned from such work during the past three years. One hundred migrants' families were interviewed; twenty five from each strata. Twenty respondents were subsequently eliminated from the study. During analysis, it was found that some respondents gave contradictory data that were inconsistent from one question to another concerning criticaal points in this research.

Seven cases from the village were eliminated when inconsistencies appeared in responses to questions about children school achievement and the management of the family. Five of them said that their children had high achievements in school, but three of them said later that their school age daughter had married early and the other two said that their school-age teenage son is intending to marry, and that the women do not have enough experience to face the responsibilities of the wedding parties in the absence of the father. It is usually understood in Jordan that those who marry early are usually those who may not succeed in school, but there is no way to know the truth from the interviewee's answers. Two other respondents said that they accompanied their household head abroad but

responded to other questions later that their oldest son was managing the family's financial affairs.

Three cases were eliminated from the low urban stratum. They kept saying that they pray for the good life of the king, even though none of the questions was asked about the king. Frequently, they claimed that they had nothing to save because of fears that their responses would be used for tax collection. These inconsistent answers were revealed in the analysis when the large remittances that such families reported receiving were not associated with a reasonable amount of saving or investment.

Five cases were eliminated from middle urban stratum. Respondents first reported accompanying their husbands, but later said that their in-laws were managing the financial affairs of the family.

Five cases were eliminated from high urban stratum because there was no way to determine the changes that occurred as a result of migration. They first said that they accompanied their husbands, and then they said that they returned after spending a year or so in the host country. However, there were no details in their answers to indicate if changes in their children's school achievements, their relationship with their husband, or their career status happened during their stay with their husband or after they returned home. Since there was considerable emphasis in the study on differences between those who accompanied their

husbands and those who did not, the data collected from them was considered invalid.

The final sample therefore consisted of twenty cases from each high and middle urban strata, twenty-two cases from the low urban stratum, and eighteen cases from the village, for a total of 80.

The initial plan to select a random sample proved to be totally not feasible because of recently initiated government policies concerning the conduct of all field studies. These new policies require that any researcher doing a study that deals with people, especially families, must present his proposal and any other related materials to the government in order to obtain written approval. A long set of procedures must be followed to obtain approval from various government agencies, which can take many months without any assurance that the permit will be granted. If approval is obtained, the researcher is then required to display a special identification card which says that he is authorized by the government to collect specific data on a given subject.

If this study had followed those new policies, a severe bias would have been introduced into the data given by families. Many families would be afraid to participate, or would be hesitated to give accurate information, especially about their financial condition. They would have thought

that this information would be used by the government for tax collections.

Consequently, the interviews were conducted without government permission to avoid any possible bias in the data, as well as frequent refusals by families to participate in the research. Specific steps were taken to avoid any circumstances that might have resulted in police interference. The first step in this process was to select local community leaders, mainly shop owners, who could identify (and sometimes guide the researcher to) families in which the household head was married, had children and was either currently working abroad or had returned from working abroad during the past three years. Families who met those criteria were contacted and asked to participate in the study. Participation was entirely voluntary, and anyone who refused was dropped from the sample. Within each stratum, this selection process was followed until 25 interviewees had been obtained in each stratum.

One major limitation in this research was that when a family refused to participate, the researcher did not return and insist on the interview, in order to avoid a possible call for police. This may have created some bias in the sample. Thus, the final data represent respondents who were spontaneous in giving the needed information.

This sample cannot be considered random, and thus is not representative of Jordanian society. This is a

purposeful sample that was specifically chosen to focus on the families of migrant Jordanian workers. In addition to being restricted to married workers with children, the sample also excluded workers who left Jordan in the fifties or sixties and did not return until the seventies or early eighties, since they were not subject to the new migration policies in the Arab oil countries against migrant workers that were established in the mid-eighties. The purpose of this sample is to provide insights concerning significant socioeconomic consequences of labor migration among different classes in the Jordanian society.

Data Collection Procedure

Data for this study were gathered through face-to-face interviews with families in the four selected strata.

These interviews were open-ended questions. Nevertheless, the questions asked during the course of the interviews were specific enough to allow judgements about various consequences of labor migration. Those questions covered the four broad topics mentioned in chapter I:

- a. Sources of income, rate of spending and areas of investment.
- b. Household management.
- c. Children's discipline.
- d. Intra-family relationships.

The selected families were informed that they had been selected for a "university" study on the consequences of labor migration on migrants' families. These families were assured that their participation was essential for the success of the research. They were also told that the results of this research would be shared with them, so as to reduce their suspicions about the purposes of the research.

The interviews were conducted with the migrants' wives for those families whose head are in the host country, and with the husbands and wives for those families who returned from migration. They were first asked to describe any significant social changes in the family life that occurred after the migration of their husbands. This broad question gave the researcher numerous insights into specific changes that migrants' families felt were important to them, without any intervention from the researcher. The researcher then asked some specific questions on particular issues that were not covered in the wife's initial talk. The kinds of questions that were asked in the interviews are given in appendix A.

A female accompanied the researcher and asked the questions whenever a wife was interviewed alone. (Local customs do not permit a male to have personal contact with a female alone unless she is a close relative.)

The original plan to tape-record the interviews could not be used, since most respondents were very suspicious of

the tape recorder and refused to be interviewed on tape. Hence, the interviews were all recorded by hand.

Documents and published materials were also used as sources of information and support materials for the data obtained from the interviews. Government documents and statistics were used to show specific social trends in the Jordanian population that are related to the migrants' families, including average family income, school attendance, standard of living, etc. They were also used to check the validity of data obtained in the field survey concerning labor migration, such as levels of education and kinds of occupation of migrants.

Data Analysis Procedure

The unit of analysis in this research is the family of out migrant worker. The method of analysis was cross examination of family experiences for all the sample cases. For example, the present socioeconomic conditions of each family were compared to their conditions before the migration of the household head (as recalled by the respondents themselves) to see what changes were perceived by them and that were attributed to the migration. Also, the socioeconomic changes (as perceived by migrants) were compared between families who accompanied their household heads and those who did not.

The purpose of these comparisons was to examine the impacts of the new migration policies, especially in the Arab oil countries. These new policies determine which migrant workers can or cannot bring their families into the host country. All the variables that could affect the social life of migrants' families were asked about during the interview.

There were also "intra-case" analysis, which examined how different factors within each case affected each other and lead to a specific outcome. For example, when the respondent said that one of the children dropped out of school, another analysis of the data was made to see if this family had accompanied the household head or not; whether the mother was educated or not; whether financial management was by the father, mother, son, or in-laws. Merely making a descriptive analysis which concluded that the percentage of those who live in the low-urban stratum had more dropout children than others would not have been sufficient to explain a given change, especially on the family level. The analyses were intended to explain the context of a specific outcome to discover all the factors that led one child to drop out while others had high achievement in school. This holistic method of analysis is advocated by Castells (1974) to understand an urban community.

After this "intra-case" analysis for every interviewee, tables were constructed for every factor that was assumed to

have an effect on the family according to the expectations of the study. As mentioned in the data collection section, this is a purposeful sample, so that it is inappropriate to use statistical tests to measure the significance of the findings. Because of that, and since the sample size is very small, the rule was followed of requiring a percentage difference of at least 10 percent to be considered substantively important.

CHAPTER III

RESEARCH FINDINGS

This chapter examines the most significant experiences and problems reported by Jordanian families in conjunction with labor migration. As mentioned previously, the principal factors are examined to explain differences in experiences among migrants' families: (1) whether or not the family accompanied the migrant worker; (2) the residential location (and hence socioeconomic status and rural-urban background) of the family; and (3) the wife's level of education and occupational career. Four sets of questions were examined, dealing with the most important aspects of change as perceived by those families: household economy, family leadership, children discipline, and family unity. As mentioned in Chapter 3, since the study uses a purposeful rather than a random sample, it is inappropriate to use statistical tests of significance with these findings. Because of that and because the sample is very small, the procedure followed throughout this analysis is to consider only differences of 10 percent or larger as substantially important.

Economic Changes at the Household Level

The first set of questions examined in this study considers changes in saving patterns and investments by families of migrants.

El-Saket (1983) showed that the percentage saved by the migrants' families was usually not great; about 70 percent of the families in his study saved less than 30 percent of their remittances. Only village families were able to make substantial savings; more than half of them saved more than 30 percent of their income. He also found that migrants' families typically used the money obtained from remittances to invest in real estate and merchandise, with very little being invested in stocks.

Political, social and economic conditions have changed since El-Saket's study was conducted, however, especially in the Arab oil countries. Those countries have established new policies which resulted in a sharp decline in the number of in-migrant workers as well as a decline in the wages of the remaining workers. On the other hand, as a result of decreased amount of remittances, the rate of inflation has also decreased in Jordan (Al-Fanik, 1988).

Presumably, those recent policy changes in Arab oil countries and the decreased inflation in Jordan should have led to higher levels of savings and new areas of investment among migrants' families. The uncertainty of the future

should have encouraged migrants' families to save more. In addition, decreased inflation should allow people to save more. Uncertainty about the future should also have encouraged people to invest in productive sectors of the Jordan economy such as agriculture and stocks.

To examine these expectations concerning the effects of the Arab oil countries' policies and the impact of reduced inflation in Jordan, the topic of economic change has been divided into several sub-questions. These effects are examined by providing detailed information about savings patterns in families that did and did not accompany the household head, savings patterns in the different social strata in the Jordanian society, and the ways in which savings were invested.

Sub-question 1A

What differences exist between the saving patterns of migrants' families who accompanied the household head and those who stayed home? For three reasons, it was expected that families who accompanied the household head would be able to save more than those who did not: (a) the household head would remain as the manager of the household's financial affairs; (b) the family would not have the expenses of two houses, one at home and another abroad; (c) inflation has been lower in the Arab oil countries than in Jordan.

Table 1 shows the percentage of the families in this study who accompanied the head of the household and those who did not, within each of the four strata of the sample. Overall, in 38 percent of the cases the family accompanied the household head, while 62 percent did not. The proportions of accompanying families were considerably higher in both the high urban (55 percent) and the middle urban (50 percent) strata. In contrast, only a small proportion of families from the low urban stratum (20 percent) accompanied the household head. The proportion of accompanying families from the village (40 percent) was about average.

To determine the amounts and patterns of savings among dependent families, the interviewees were asked to estimate roughly the proportion of their remittances they saved. (See Appendix A for the precise wording of the open-ended questions). Table 2 shows the percent of families who reported saving various proportions of their remittances, for the total sample and among accompanying and non-accompanying families.

For ease of analysis, the proportions saved are also grouped into two main categories: 30 percent or more of remittances, and less than 30 percent. The basis for this distinction is the observation -- derived from detailed case-by-case analysis -- that most families who saved more than 30 percent were actually making productive investments

TABLE 1

DIFFERENCES IN THE PERCENTAGE OF FAMILIES WHO ACCOMPANIED THE HOUSEHOLD HEAD AND THOSE WHO DID NOT, FOR THE TOTAL SAMPLE AND BY STRATA

strata	Accompanying Families	Non-Accompanying Families	N
All Respondents	38%	62%	80
High Urban	55%	45%	20
Middle Urban	50%	50%	20
Low Urban	20%	80%	22
Village	40%	60%	18

TABLE 2

PERCENTAGES OF FAMILIES REPORTING SAVING VARIOUS PROPORTIONS OF THEIR REMITTANCES, FOR THE TOTAL SAMPLE AND FOR ACCOMPANYING AND NON-ACCOMPANYING FAMILIES

Savings	Total Sample		Accompanying Families		Non-Accompanying Families	
0-9%	19%	50%	13%	54%	22%	48%
10-19%	12%		17%		11%	
20-29%	19%		24%		15%	
30-39%	16%	50%	23%	46%	13%	52%
40-49%	12%		10%		13%	
50-59%	13%		10%		14%	
60-69%	5%		3%		6%	
70 or more%	4%		0%		6%	
Total	100%		100%		100%	
N	80		30		50	

(that generate extra monthly income) such as buying a taxi cab that can be rented to a driver, a house for rent, or land for future sale with a higher price. Most families who saved less than that percentage were merely using their money to expand their homes or just save it.

The data in Table 2 show that 50 percent of the total sample reported saving 30 percent or more of their remittances and 50 percent saved less than that amount. This percentage is higher than in El-Saket's (1983) study, in which only 30 percent of the sample said they saved 30 percent or more of their remittances. The finding of higher ratio of savings at the present time supports one of the principal expectations of this study.

Table 2 also shows that slightly fewer accompanying families (46 percent) saved at least 30 percent of their remittances than did non-accompanying families (52 percent). Although this is less than a 10-percent difference, it is nevertheless very important because it is in the opposite direction from the expectation of the study. Whereas it was expected that accompanying families would be able to save more than non-accompanying families, this clearly was not the case.

A possible explanation for this unpredicted finding may be that families who accompanied their household head had to spend more in the host country for education and health care than they would have in Jordan. Free public services are not

available for them in the host countries. This may have been particularly critical for the village families, since in the host countries they had to pay money for all daily living expenses, whereas in Jordan they have many opportunities to raise food and animals in their gardens.

Sub-question 1B

What differences do exist in saving and spending patterns among migrants' families in the various strata of Jordanian society? It was expected that professionals from the high urban stratum and villagers would be able to save more than others, since professionals receive a high income and villagers can draw upon the informal sector for everyday expenses, while low urban people have to pay for everything.

The data in Table 3 show that the opposite of what was expected happened for professionals in the high urban stratum. Sixty percent of migrants' families from that stratum were unable to save at least 30 percent of their remittances. However, migrants' families from the village and middle urban stratum were found to save more than those from other strata, just as El-Saket (1983) found.

Table 4 compares the percentage of remittances saved by those families that accompanied their household head with those that did not by strata. These findings indicate that the failure of families from the high urban stratum to save much money occurred only among those who remained in their home country. All accompanying migrants' families, except

TABLE 3

PERCENTAGE OF SAVINGS ACCORDING TO STRATA

Percentage of Savings	High Urban		Middle Urban		Low Urban		Village	
0-9%	25%		20%		18%		6%	
10-19%	25%	60%	5%	45%	20%	58%	6%	39%
20-29%	10%		20%		20%		27%	
30-39%	15%		15%		4%		27%	
40-49%	5%		20%		15%		6%	
50-59%	15%	40%	15%	55%	5%	42%	17%	61%
60-69%	5%		5%		9%		0%	
70-79%	0%		0%		9%		11%	
Total	100%		100%		100%		100%	

TABLE 4

THE PERCENTAGE OF FAMILIES WITH SAVINGS GREATER OF 30 PERCENT OR MORE OF REMITTANCES BY STRATA

strata	Accompanying Families	Non-Accompanying Families	All Families
High Urban	50%	30%	40%
Middle Urban	50%	60%	55%
Low Urban	50%	40%	42%
Village	34%	73%	61%

the villagers, saved a comparable proportion of their remittances. Fifty percent of all those families except the villagers saved 30 percent or more of their remittances. However, among families from high urban stratum who did not accompany the household head, only 30 percent saved that much, which was considerably lower than any other stratum. The apparent explanation of this finding is that high urban families who stayed home had to maintain high standards of living appropriate to their area of residence.

Because non-accompanying families from the high urban stratum kept their high style of living in their home country (quality health care and education for children, cloth, etc.), they apparently had no extra money for savings or investments. One of the interviewees in the high urban stratum reported that she became bored with the social life in the host country and returned to live in an apartment that her husband had built in a high urban residential area of Amman. While living there, she was too embarrassed to do the laundry herself. Such jobs are usually carried out by Sri Lankian servants in the surrounding area. As she spent more and more of her remittances on such small things, she found that the family could not save anything. She therefore decided to return to live abroad with her husband.

Migrants' families from the high urban stratum also suffered severe declines in their remittances after the recent drop in oil prices compared to the 1970s' oil prices. As a result, wages, especially for professionals, were

sharply reduced. Some professionals returned to Jordan where many of them worked in such low status jobs as taxi driver. Many others remained abroad with a decreased salary because of the lack of opportunities and the high level of unemployment in Jordan. They preferred the decreased wages in the host country than the low status jobs or unemployment in Jordan.

Migrants' families from the middle urban stratum were able to save far more than families from the high and low urban areas. The apparent reason is that they had a greater percentage of professional and highly literate household heads than families from low urban stratum. Although migrants from high urban stratum were nearly equal in literacy to those from the middle urban stratum, their standard of living was much higher. Migrants' families from the middle urban stratum did not attempt to maintain such a high standard of living, which allowed them to save more.

As was shown in Table 4, village migrants saved much more when they left their families in the village. This was probably because part of their food could be supplied by the informal sector -- farms, gardens and domestic animals, and because life expenses in the host country are much higher.. Case-by-case analyses also showed that many villagers and low urban stratum women reported sewing their own clothes and performing other domestic needs.

TABLE 5

AREAS OF INVESTMENTS FOR MIGRANTS' FAMILIES

Area of Investments	The Proportion of Families who Invested
Real Estate	64%
Banks	30%
Small retail stores	15%
Taxi cabs for rent	13%
Agriculture	4%
Stocks	0%

Note: The total number is more than 100%, since many families reported more than one kind of investment.

Sub-question 1C

On what new areas of investment were the families of migrants spending their remittances? It was expected that, due to the recent decline in remittances, investments in small retail stores (which depend mostly on the presence of foreign exchange for imported goods) would decrease in profitability. More people, it was thought, would invest in agriculture and in stocks. Construction of buildings to be rented was still expected to be the leading investment.

To measure patterns of investment, both open and specific questions were asked. The respondents were first asked to state in general terms how they used the remittances. They were then asked specific questions as to whether they invested in rental housing, rental taxi cab, land for future sale, small retail stores, bank accounts with interest, stocks, or agriculture. Appendix A describes those questions.

Table 5 shows that, as was expected, the percentage of people who invested in small retail stores was not great (15 percent). As also anticipated, it shows that most people still consider real estate a good investment (64 percent). However, while investment in small retail stores decreased (from 52 percent of the families in El-Saket's study to 15 percent in this study), agriculture and stocks did not replace them. Contrary to expectations, bank accounts with

interest (30 percent) and taxi cabs (13 percent) apparently replaced the small retail stores that were formerly considered suitable investments. .

Only 4 percent of the families reported investments in agriculture. Even among villagers, only 12 percent of the families reported investments on farm improvements. Investments in stocks were not reported at all by migrants.

Case-by-case analyses showed that there were no differences between strata regarding types of investment, except for agriculture. Twelve percent of those living in the village invested in agriculture, while only 0.7 percent from the other strata did so. Gold was a form of saving, but certainly not of investment for some wives in the low urban stratum (9 percent) and the village (6 percent). Real estate, banks, and taxi cabs were common investments among families from all strata.

As many interviewees explained, migrants' families chose to invest in buildings rather than in agriculture, industry, or stocks because the public may lack the knowledge on such opportunities. This perception contains much of the truth. Jordan has a relatively small population with very limited resources. New industries need a big market which is not available in Jordan. To succeed, export industries must be competitive with lower-priced industries from South East Asia (Al-Fanik, 1988). Thus, on the family or individual level, it has been more secure (and

potentially more profitable) to invest in rental buildings than to invest in agriculture or stocks. Lebanese refugees from the strife there, and Iraqi refugees from the Iran-Iraq war, have increased the demand for rental housing in Jordan, driven up rents, and so increased the profits from rental housing. Moreover, ownership of a house represents social status for the migrant, and marks him as successful.

However, the situation has recently changed. The initial increase in the demand for rental housing, especially during the prosperous period of labor migration of the early eighties, lead many professionals and businessmen to invest in huge housing projects. In the long run, the number of apartments that had been built exceeds the demand. Adding to that, the Iran-Iraq war has ended and construction costs have increased, particularly because of the recent drop in the value of the Jordanian currency. In consequence, these types of investments have become unprofitable, and metropolitan Amman is pocked up with uncompleted building projects. It is a very common sight in Amman and its metropolitan areas to find huge, fancy houses and buildings containing twenty or more apartments standing uncompleted or vacant. With Jordan's economy in such a critical stage, it remains to be seen where people will decide to invest next.

Household Management

The second set of questions in this study examines changes in the wife's role after the husband's migration.

It was expected that wives would play a larger role in managing their household affairs after their husbands' migration. Burki (1984), Ibrahim (1978) and Serageldin et al. (1984), all emphasized that labor migration would change the role that women play in managing the household affairs. Although they recognized that in-laws could also play some role (Burki, 1984; Keely and El-Saket, 1984), they did not consider the role of eldest sons.

Open-ended questions asked wives about the way the house was managed during the absence of the husband. Other questions asked about the role that in-laws played during the head's absence (Appendix A). Through inter-case analysis, the consistency of the answers given during the interview was examined.

The findings given in Table 6 show that for those families who did not accompany the head of the household (forty-eight cases), half the households were managed by wives, while nearly a fourth of the households were managed by eldest sons or in-laws. Youthfulness of the wife explained why in-laws managed some households (as El-Saket has hypothesized). Fifty percent of those wives who lived in households managed by in-laws had young, preschool children.

TABLE 6

HOUSEHOLD MANAGERS AMONG NON-ACCOMPANYING FAMILIES

House manager	Proportion
Wives	50%
Eldest Sons	27%
In-laws	23%
Total	100%

However, the wives who lived under the management of eldest sons were obviously old enough to manage their household affairs, yet they chose (or were obliged) not to do so. The following sub-questions consider those factors other than age that influenced women's ability to manage their households or to yield this role to others.

Sub-question 2A

Does the wife's education affect her role after the husband's migration? It was expected that more educated wives would be more likely to manage their households.

Table 7 shows that 71 percent of the non-accompanying wives did not have high school diploma, while 29 percent had at least that amount of education.

More women who held at least a high school diploma were in management of their households (71 percent) than those women who completed no more than preparatory school (41 percent). Case-by-case analyses shows that in all of the households managed by the eldest son, the mother had no more than a preparatory school education. For such households, the initial expectation was confirmed.

Yet there were many wives with university (34 percent), middle collage (25 percent), or high school education (29 percent) who were not in management of their households. Case-by-case analysis showed that in-laws managed the household in all these cases. While lack of education by the

TABLE 7

THE RELATION OF WIVES' EDUCATIONAL LEVEL TO HOUSEHOLD MANAGEMENT IN
FAMILIES WHO DID NOT ACCOMPANY THEIR HOUSEHOLD HEAD

Level of Education	Proportion OF the Total		Proportion of Wives who Managed Their Household	
University	6%	29%	66%	71%
Middle Collage	8%		75%	
High school	15%		71%	
Preparatory	42%	71%	35%	41%
Elementary	21%		50%	
None	8%		50%	
Total/ 48 Cases	100%			

wife is sufficient to explain management by the oldest son, it is not sufficient to explain management by in-laws.

Moreover, half of the women (50 percent) with elementary or no education were in management of their household affairs. Indeed, more women with elementary or no education were in management of their household than women who had a preparatory education (35 percent). Factors underlying these results are considered below.

Sub-question 2B

Does the career status of the wife affect the role she takes after her husband's migration? It was expected that wives pursuing careers would be more likely to be in management of their household affairs.

In the interviews, the women were asked if they had a career and, if so, to explain the nature of this career. Table 8 shows the percentage of women who had careers as government employees, teachers or secretaries, and the proportion of those women who managed their household.

The data in Table 8 confirm the expectation. While only 50 percent of all non-accompanying wives managed their household, 63 percent of those wives with careers were in management of their household. However, to have such careers as teacher, principal or secretary, one must have at least a high school diploma.

For wives without a high school diploma, there are other sources of economic independence such as sewing.

Information about such source of income was obtained from questions concerning domestic work that the women did. This analysis shows that all women who reported having sewing machines - conventionally used as a source of income for women with low income - were also found to be in management of their household. This explain why many illiterate women were nevertheless in management of their household.

However, not all wives with careers managed their households. While 63 percent did, 37 percent did not (Table 9), those who did not live in households managed by their in-laws. Advanced education, combined with pursuit of a career, did not suffice to guarantee that the wife, rather than her in-laws, would manage the household. Sub-question 2C addresses this explanatory gap.

Sub-question 2C

Does the wife's "social background" (being from rural or urban areas) affect the role she takes after her husbands' migration? It was expected that women from urban backgrounds would be more likely to manage their household, while rural women would be more likely to be under the management of in-laws.

Table 1 (in the previous section) shows that the percentage of families who did not accompany their household heads differed from one stratum to another. This number is greatest in the low income stratum (18), and least in the high income stratum (9). The percentages of wives who

TABLE 8

PROPORTION OF NON-ACCOMPANYING WIVES WITH SERVICE SECTOR CAREERS WHO
MANAGED THEIR HOUSEHOLDS

Percentage of Wives who Managed their Household	50%
Percentage of Wives with a Career	20%
Percentage of Wives with Career who Managed their Households	63%

TABLE 9

HOUSEHOLD MANAGERS AMONG NON-ACCOMPANYING FAMILIES BY STRATA

stratum	Household Managed by In-laws	Household Managed by Son	Household Managed by Wife
High Urban	10%	10%	80%
Middle Urban	50%	20%	30%
Low Urban	20%	25%	55%
Village	7%	45%	48%

managed their household, by the area of residence, are shown in Table 9.

The data in Table 9 do not permit of a clear conclusion about the effect of urbanization on the management of the households. Comparing the percentage of wives who managed their households in high urban stratum (80 percent) to those in the villages (48 percent) seems to confirm the expected result. It appears that women from the high urban stratum had managed their household affairs than those in the village.

However, wives from the middle urban stratum were very unlikely (30 percent) to manage their own household. In a majority of those cases (50 percent), management was held by in-laws. In contrast, roughly the same proportion of wives in the low urban stratum (55 percent) maintained management of their household as in the village. When wives from the low urban stratum were not in management, the management of the household was equally likely to be by in-laws (20 percent) or by the son (25 percent). In the village, in contrast, when the wife was not in management, the management was almost always (45 percent) in the hands of the eldest son.

The wives in the villages seemed to have far more freedom in managing their household affairs than the women in middle urban stratum.

TABLE 10

NON-ACCOMPANYING WIVES' EDUCATION ACCORDING TO THE AREA OF RESIDENCE

stratum	University	Mid-collage	H. school	Preparatory	Elementary	None	Total
High Urban	20%	10%	50%	20%	0%	0%	100%
Middle Urban	10%	20%	20%	50%	0%	0%	100%
Low Urban	0%	0%	4%	50%	37%	9%	100%
Village	0%	8%	0%	30%	36%	26%	100%

The results are even less certain if one tries to combine the urban and rural results with other factors such as level of education or career. The level of education does not help in understanding why middle urban women were not in charge of their household affairs. Table 10 shows that wives in high urban stratum were generally better educated than women in other strata, and that half of all women in the middle urban stratum had at least a high school education. In contrast, wives from the low urban urban stratum and villages were very poorly educated. Nevertheless, wives in the latter two strata were more often managing their households than middle urban women (as shown in Table 9). Case-by-case analyses revealed that many of those who were living under in-law management in the middle urban stratum had a high school diploma. Indeed, some had middle collage and even university education.

Case-by-case analysis of women from the low urban stratum and the village showed that none of those with any degree of economic independence (whether teachers or women with private sources of income from sewing) lived under the management of in-laws or eldest son. On the contrary, many women from the middle urban stratum lived under the management of in-laws in spite of having job careers. Further analysis were carried out to understand why this tendency toward in-law management (which is a rural

convention) appears mostly in the middle urban stratum and, to a lesser degree, in the low urban stratum.

Case-by-case analysis revealed that none of the women in the high urban stratum had married a man with less than her level of education. In the low urban and village strata, however, some women with a high school education married less-educated men. In the middle urban stratum, meanwhile, there were many cases in which a woman with a preparatory education was married to a highly educated professional man. This pattern suggests that education has social value for both men and women in high urban stratum, while in other strata, the bride or groom is often chosen according to traditional norms through an arranged marriage. It seems that traditional rural norms are practiced more in middle and low urban strata. This may explain the high percentage of cases where wives, in spite of having good jobs or careers, were still under the management of in-laws in the middle urban stratum.

The lack of middle urban women's ability to manage their households can be best explained by one of the traditional, especially Marxist, sociological theories which says that middle class people are more conservative than low or high social classes (Bottmore, 1956). They are attached to religious, cultural, and traditional norms than other social classes in societies where the system of social classes exists.

Abu Lughuod (1962) and Zaghal (1984) found that, for large rural-urban migration in the Arab world, the migrants preserved the rural norms in the city, where the norms tended to linger in largely unassimilated urban fringe areas. Abu Lughuod (1962) found no clear differences among urban, semi-rural or rural areas with respect to women's status in Arab countries, despite what one might expect from the Western urbanization experience.

Still, if one takes the Jordanian village as a baseline example of traditional norms, then it is incongruous that wives in the middle urban stratum should exercise less household management than those in the village. A possible explanation for this finding is that the social norms that originally prevailed in the middle urban (and perhaps also the low urban) areas are different from the social norms of Jordanian villages.

Most of Amman's population originally came from Palestinian towns and villages (Khamees, 1988). In the Palestinian village, the husband's father used to have ultimate power over family members, including sons and daughters-in-law. Sons worked and lived on their fathers' farms, and were not wage earners. Even when the land was lost in war and the people became refugees in other countries, traditional norms still dominated the family way of life and family relationships.

These norms continue to be observed more in the middle urban than in the low urban areas of Amman (Table 9). This could be due to the fact that in the middle urban areas, the grandfather had frequently migrated in with enough capital to continue to command respect, and hence continued enforcing some of his old rules in his extended family. In the U.N. camps and lower urban areas, however, people live in houses they have built themselves with U.N. assistance. The grandfather is no longer able to enforce his old rules.

In contrast, the norms in Jordanian villages are originally nomadic (Bedouin). Sheep and camels used to be the symbol of wealth. Sons grew up to be fighters. The son's status was determined by his power to support and to protect his family. Village sons still practice these norms, especially in managing the family during the father's absence. Palestinian sons, on the contrary, live under the leadership of the grandfather.

Wives in the high urban stratum seemed to have fewer in-law problems than those living in the low and middle urban strata. The people living in high urban areas are mostly from the old urban centers of the East and West Banks. Wives in these areas have a higher status and more freedom in the management of their own families.

The degree of change in the role of wives in the middle and low urban strata and in villages depends on the amount of power or management wife had before the husband's

migration. That in turn depended upon the social norms that conditioned her actions in the family. If she was accustomed to caring for more than a small household, she usually continued to do that. If old social norms were still a controlling factor, then neither her education nor her career were a sufficient counterweight, and in-laws would be in management of the household. This in turn implies that such women were in a weak position in society, since women find more protection when living with their husbands than with their extended family, in a male-dominated society.

These cases illustrate that it is the original culture or background of the husband and wife (and not only labor migration) that largely controls the status of women during the husband's migration. Women's conditions could become worse if the old rural norms were still dominant.

Children's Discipline

The third set of questions in this study considers the effects of the father's migration on the educational achievement and the behavior of his children.

A particular concern of this section is to investigate the effects of the father's migration on children who did not accompany him. Saa'd-El-Deen and Abd-El-Fadeil (1983) hypothesized that the separation of the household head from

TABLE 11

CHILD'S SCHOOL PERFORMANCE AND DROPOUT RATES

	Accompanying Children (38%)	Non-Accompanying Children (62%)
Increased performance	72%	24%
Level of Dropout	4%	26%

the family, especially when the migration separates fathers from children at a crucial time of child development, would have a drastic effect on the children's discipline -- as case studies in Sudan and Yemen have shown.

To understand the effect of a father's migration on the children's discipline in Jordan, one needs information about the level of achievement of both children who migrated and of those who stayed home. The interviewees were asked several separate questions. These included whether their children's level of school achievement increased or decreased with migration, if any children had dropped out of school, if there were any incidents of fighting between the children in the neighborhood or at school, and if there were any disciplinary problems (see Appendix A). Table 11 shows the proportion of children whose school performance increased, and the proportion who dropped out of school, among accompanying and non-accompanying families.

Table 11 shows that the children who accompanied their households head were much more likely to have an improved level of achievement (72 percent) and were far less likely to drop out of school (4 percent) than those who stayed behind (24 percent with an excellent level of achievement and 26 percent dropouts). In other words there is a strong association between low achievement among school children

TABLE 12

**MOTHERS' EDUCATION AND CHILDREN'S SCHOOL ACHIEVEMENT AMONG
NON-ACCOMPANYING FAMILIES**

Mother's Level of Education	Children school Achievement				Total
	Increased	Remained The Same	Decreased	Dropped out	
University	33%	34%	33%	0%	100%
Middle collage	50%	25%	25%	0%	100%
High school	80%	20%	0%	0%	100%
Preparatory	12%	41%	6%	41%	100%
Elementary or Less	8%	33%	27%	33%	100%

and absence of the father. Boys from father-absent homes may be immature and do poorly in school (Biehler, 1976). This is very applicable to the Arab father where Islam and social norms gave the father the high degree of power over his wife and children (Defleur, 1976). Low achievement in school among children who stayed home is certainly related to many factors, which are considered under the following questions.

Sub-question 3A

How does the level of the mothers' education affect the behavior and level of school achievement of the children of migrants? It was expected that children who have better educated parents, especially mothers, would be more likely to do better in school.

To answer this question, the interviewees in non-accompanying families were asked about the level of the mother's education (Appendix A). A comparison then was done between the level of mother's education and the achievement of the children.

Table 12 shows that among non-accompanying families, children whose mothers had high school or middle-collapse education were more likely to improve their achievement in school than were children whose mothers were university graduates or had only preparatory or lesser levels of education. This increase in school achievement was most marked among children whose mothers had high school diplomas (80 percent). Case-by-case analyses showed that the mothers

with high school diplomas stayed home without any career. This enabled them to give more attention to the children's education. Mothers with university or middle collage degrees had jobs outside the home. In many cases, these mothers reported that they paid for private teachers because the father's absence and their increased responsibility did not give them enough time to attend to the children's education. Merely receiving a private education apparently did not guarantee that the child would excel educationally. Without the mother's attention, the level of achievement stayed the same and sometimes became worse than before the father left.

Table 12 shows also that only children of mothers whose education was preparatory or less dropped out of school. Not only did the absence of the father lead to less achievement, but the mothers' level of education was also an important influence on this behavior. This can also be explained by the fact that aside from the income of parents, the family influences the individual's chances of becoming educated (Defluer, 1976). It is the societal structure and unequal distribution of wealth and educational opportunities that enables high class families to pay for quality education for their children while others cannot.

Nevertheless, Table 12 also reveals that some of mothers with elementary, preparatory or no education had children with steady levels of educational achievement, and in some cases the level of achievement increased. This means

that the level of the mother's education was not the only factor affecting the dropout rate from school. The other reasons for this are the subjects of the second and the third sub-questions.

Sub-question 3B

How do the responsibilities placed on children after their father's migration affect their level of school achievement and their behavior? It was expected that children who had more responsibility for their family's affairs during their father's absence would have less time to concentrate on their education. In other words, children carrying responsibility as a result of their fathers' absence would interrupt their education (Defleur, 1973).

To answer this question, the interviewees were asked to describe the range of responsibilities that their children took on after their father's migration. They were not asked directly if these responsibilities affected their education. Through inter-case analyses, the relationships between the children's discipline, their level of achievement, the rate at which they dropped out of school, and the responsibilities children took on after their father's migration were established.

Table 13 shows that in 70 percent of the cases in which the children took responsibilities for household affairs upon their father's migration, the children dropped out of school. In some cases, the dropout rate was associated with

TABLE 13

CHANGES IN LEVEL OF ACHIEVEMENT FOR THOSE CHILDREN WHO TOOK HOUSEHOLD RESPONSIBILITIES AMONG NON-ACCOMPANYING FAMILIES AND THOSE WHO DID NOT

Assumed	Level of Achievement				Total
	Increased	Same	Decreased	Dropped out	
Increased Responsibilities	0%	15%	15%	70%	100%
Few Responsibilities	46%	36%	9%	9%	100%
No Responsibilities	47%	53%	0%	0%	100%

serious fighting with other children. None of these interviewees reported that the achievement of their children increased after taking on increased household responsibilities. In contrast, among children who assumed a few responsibilities (such as bringing households goods from a near by store) and the children who did not assume any responsibilities at all, about half of them showed an increase in level of achievement. For children who assumed no responsibilities, there were no reported cases of dropout or decreased level of school achievement. For those who assumed a few responsibilities, the percentage of dropout or lower achievement was 18 percent.

In all cases in which the child assumed increased household responsibilities, the mother's education was no higher than preparatory, was often only elementary, and was sometimes totally lacking. Those sons were put in charge without anyone to discipline them, and, at the same time, they had to discipline their younger brothers and sisters.

Still, case-by-case analysis showed that in many cases eldest sons were managing the families' affairs but did not drop out of school. The child's responsibilities at home are not sufficient to explain low achievement and/or dropping out. That topic is the subject of the third sub-question of the study.

Sub-question 3C

How does area of residence affect the level of school achievement and the behavioral problems of children after their father's migration? We have already seen that children who accompanied their father would have fewer problems with school achievement and be less likely to drop out of school than those who remained home. For those who accompanied their father, no differences in school performance or dropouts were expected among the various strata in the sample. For those who stayed home, it was expected the area of residence would affect the child's level of achievement after the father's migration, since their education would be regarded as less important in the poor areas.

To answer this question, the rate of improved school achievement and of school dropouts were related to the area of residence, as shown in Tables 14 and 15.

Table 14 shows that in all four strata children who accompanied their fathers showed higher levels of school achievement than those who stayed home. This advantage could be due not only to the lower burden of responsibility for the children who accompanied their fathers, but also to the likelihood that more money was spent on private education in the host countries, since free high education was not open to migrants' families.

Among high urban families, case by case analysis showed that many women with university degrees did not find

TABLE 14

THE PERCENTAGE OF CHILDREN WITH IMPROVED SCHOOL ACHIEVEMENT AMONG THOSE WHO ACCOMPANIED THEIR FATHERS AND THOSE WHO DID NOT

Strata	Percentage of Improved Achievement in Accompanying Children	Percentage of Improved Achievement in Non-Accompanying Children
High Urban	75%	38%
Middle Urban	57%	33%
Low Urban	75%	22%
Village	71%	20%

TABLE 15

THE PERCENTAGE OF DROPOUT AMONG MIGRANTS' CHILDREN WHO ACCOMPANIED THEIR FATHERS AND THOSE WHO DID NOT

Strata	Percentage of Dropout in Accompanying Children	Percentage of Dropout in Non-Accompanying Children
High Urban	0%	0%
Middle Urban	0%	10%
Low Urban	0%	60%
Village	15%	9%

suitable jobs in the host country, and since they did not work, they were more likely to give their attention to their children's education. However, the data reported in the first section (Table 1) shows that those children who were permitted to accompany their fathers were mostly from high and middle income urban strata. A large proportion of these strata are well-paid, highly educated professionals who are permitted and could afford to bring their families with them (as was seen in Table 16). Consequently, it is likely that migration has widened the education and income gaps between the rich and the poor for generations to come.

It should also be noted, however, that among middle-level urban families children who accompanied their fathers did not do as well in school as these from other strata. There are no apparent reasons for this difference. Case-by-case analysis showed that in these cases, only one mother was employed, most of the mothers had high school education, the fathers in most cases had university degrees, the level of informal interaction with neighbors was low and there were no apparent problems between father and mother.

Table 14 shows that, among non-accompanying children, the rates of improvement in school achievement were greater among children from the high and middle urban strata (38 and 33 percent, respectively) than among children from low urban stratum and the village (22 and 20 percent, respectively).

TABLE 16

HOUSEHOLD HEAD'S EDUCATION

Strata	University	Mid. collage	H. School	Preparatory	Elementary	None
High Urban	50%	10%	35%	5%	0%	0%
Middle Urban	65%	5%	25%	5%	0%	0%
Low Urban	4%	4%	23%	46%	23%	0%
Village	6%	11%	17%	60%	6%	0%

The reason for this is probably that (as seen in Table 10), the percentage of women who have at least a high school education is much greater in the high and middle urban strata than in the low urban stratum and the village. In all four strata, nevertheless, the percentage of children who improved their school performance was not high as among those who accompanied their fathers. The primary reason for this is likely the increase in mother's responsibilities after the father's migration.

Table 15 shows that among accompanying families, the only children who dropped out of school were from the village (15 percent). The fathers in these cases had preparatory education and mothers were illiterate. Among non-accompanying families, the dropout rate for children is extremely high in the low-income stratum (60 percent), but was rather low or zero in the other three strata. This dropout rate among low urban children is much higher than the national level (about 11 percent according to the 1979 census and Zaghal, 1984). Of great significance is the implication of this finding that the literacy level of migrants' children from low urban stratum is undoubtedly lower than other children in the area.

In many cases, children who dropped out of school engaged in such negative behaviors as bloody fighting with other children in the neighborhood, robbery, and drinking.

Those problem behaviors further increased the isolation of those families from their neighbors.

Case-by-case analysis showed high rate of bloody crimes, robbery and problem drinking among children who dropped out in the low-urban stratum, but not in the village. Even though in 45 percent of the village cases, the eldest son managed the household, this phenomenon was not interrelated in any way with such negative behavior as robbery, drinking, or fighting.

The economic condition of the family in the low urban stratum is closely related to children taking on household responsibilities. Children usually dropped out to take an early job. Without adequate family control, and in an urban atmosphere, they were more likely to engage in fighting, drinking, robbery and other behavior problems. Case-by-case analyses of those families in the low urban stratum in which children dropped out of school showed that the family's savings rose to more than 50 percent of their income because of the extra jobs the dropout children took.

However, the need to accumulate money was not the major reason why sons often took charge of the household in the village. In these cases, son took on this responsibility simply because of the social norms requiring them to do so. In the village, the family savings were less than 25 percent of their income when the sons took responsibility for the

household, but they reported no disciplinary and drinking problems.

Case-by-case analysis showed that in all school dropout cases, no money had been put aside for the children's education. Instead, children in the low urban stratum became a source of income after dropping out of school. Children of the rich have access to advanced education while children of the poor often drop out of school to take on premature economic responsibility. The differential patterns of spending remittances that occur among migrants' families will likely increase the educational disparity among the children of migrants' families for years to come.

From the above data, there is no doubt that the absence of migrant fathers caused a disruption in children's education, especially in low urban areas. However, the same data also approve the validity of the fact that the social status of the family is inversely related to the probability of dropping out of school. That is, the lower the socioeconomic level of the family, the higher the probability the education will be terminated early (Defleur, 1973).

Unity of the Family

The fourth set of questions in this study consider the effects of the husband migration on the unity of the family.

Saa'd-El-Deen and Abd-El-Fadeil (1983), in their study on Sudanese labor migration, suggested that problems between husbands and wives arise as a result of the husband's migration. Keely and El-Saket (1984) said that leaving the wife under the control of in-laws leads to problems that affect the unity of the family. Azzam and El-Sharib (1980) showed a rise in problems between Lebanese husbands and wives when the husbands migrated and the wives stayed at home. To understand more about such problems, several sub-questions were addressed.

Sub-question 4A

How well is family unity maintained in families that do not accompany the head of the household? It was expected that families that accompanied the household head would have fewer problems, and hence greater family unity.

To answer this question, several open-ended questions were asked during the interviews. An inter-case analysis was then conducted to uncover these aspects of family histories that resulted in problems arising between husbands and wives or between wives and in-laws that affected the unity of the family. One of these questions asked about changes in the relationship between the husband and the wife after migration (as perceived by the interviewee). Other questions asked about the relationship between the wife and the in-laws after the husband's migration (see Appendix A).

TABLE 17

FAMILY PROBLEMS IN COMPARISON TO SOCIAL-INTERACTION PROBLEMS

	Accompanying Families	Non-Accompanying Families
Problem between Husband and Wife	20%	32%
Wife's Social-Interaction Problems	58%	32%

Table 17 shows that, as expected, families who stayed home had a greater percentage of reported problems between husbands and wives (32 percent) than those who accompanied the household head (20 percent).

The analyses showed that problems were caused by three major factors. These can be summarized according to their importance.

The first major factor was husbands' envy of their wives' leisurely lives and their resentment about being deserted in a foreign country, especially if the wife chose to stay home in spite of being allowed to accompany her husband.

Those wives preferred the social-interaction atmosphere in their home country to the stress of being alone in the host country. In one case, a couple divorced because the wife refused to go to Saudi Arabia.

The second major factor that caused problems between husbands and wives was children dropping out of school and resulting disciplinary problems. Husbands often became resentful of their wives' attention to the children, and this increased problems in their relationship.

The third factor that caused problems between husbands and wives was wives being under the management of in-laws. Twenty-seven percent of wives who lived under in-law management reported having problems with their husbands. This does not mean that those wives were not having problems

with their in-laws. Case-by-case analysis showed that 71 percent of wives who stayed under in-law management were having serious problems with them as well. The most serious problems were reported in families where the brother in-law was managing the family. In one case, the brother in-law asked the wife to seek a divorce from his brother and marry him. When that happened, the wife was obliged to give her ten-year-old son the responsibility that the brother in-law had previously assumed. This resulted in a declining the son's school performance because less time was left for him to care for his education.

Table 17 shows that 20 percent of the wives who accompanied their husbands also reported marital problems. To investigate the source of these problems, wives were asked about social-interaction difficulties they encountered. Frequently mentioned by wives who accompanied their husbands were stresses from being away from their home country and from lack of opportunities for social interaction. Table 17 shows that wives who accompanied their husbands reported more social-interaction problems (58 percent) than those who stayed home (32 percent). Many wives who accompanied their husbands complained of the restricted social-interaction atmosphere in the Arab oil countries. For example, they reported that they were unable to drive their private cars in Saudi Arabia, and that they could not find the same type of people they had as friends in Jordan.

As a result, many of them decided to leave their husbands and return to Jordan alone.

Among wives who did not accompany their husbands, social interaction problems in the home typically resulted from three conditions. First, the isolation of the wives in the village. These wives reported not having enough time for social interaction because of increased home and farm responsibilities and also because the farms are far apart from each other. Second, isolation of wives in the urban strata as a consequence of a hostile atmosphere with the neighbors resulting from behaviour problems of children whose father was absent. Third, interaction problems occurred as a result of wives living with in-laws. Sixty percent of the wives who lived with in-laws experienced restrictions on their social interaction atmosphere.

The specific kinds of problems that arose between husbands and wives (whether springing from the social atmosphere in the host country or the three factors mentioned above for those who stayed home) are closely related to the family's area of residence. Investigation of such relationships led to the second sub-question.

Sub-question 4B

How does the area of residence of migrants affect the occurrence of problems between husbands and wives? It was expected that families from rural areas who stayed home would experience the most problems of interference by

TABLE 18

WIVES' PROBLEMS WITH HUSBANDS BY STRATA

Strata	Problems with Husbands for Accompanying Families	Problems with Husbands for Non-Accompanied Families
High Urban	36%	44%
Middle Urban	10%	30%
Low Urban	0%	39%
Village	15%	0%

in-laws in the wives' personal affairs, and this interference would in turn affect the wives' relationships with their husbands.

Table 18 shows that, contrary to expectations, problems between husbands and wives were most frequent in families from the high income urban stratum, regardless of whether or not the wife accompanied her husband. These wives, as said before, are more independent and managing their own households. Also, they can accompany their professional husbands but they chose not to due to the lack of socialized life in the host country. The rates of reported marital problems among families from the high urban stratum were 36 percent among wives who accompanied their household, and 46 percent among those who stayed home. Among wives from the middle and low urban strata, problems were more common among those who stayed home (30 percent and 39 percent respectively). Wives from the village reported relatively few marital problems regardless of whether they accompanied their husbands or remained home.

The occurrence of marital problems in the high income urban stratum depend on whether or not, the wife accompanied her husband. Among wives who accompanied their husband, a major cause of marital problems appeared to be problems in social interaction with others in the host country. Table 19 shows that wives from high income stratum complained of social-interaction problems in the host country far more

than any other stratum (73 percent). As noted previously, these wives encountered a very restricted social atmosphere in the host country, they were unable to drive their own car in Saudi Arabia, they were often not able to find jobs there, and they lacked the same kinds of friends they had at home.

In contrast, high income urban wives who stayed home generally remained in charge of their family's personal affairs. And many found jobs in the service sector which gave them opportunities for social interaction. None of those wives who stayed home reported any social-interaction problems. However, their decision to stay in their home country often made husbands envious of their leisurely lives and resentful of being deserted in a foreign country which apparently led to a high rate of marital problems.

In one high urban case, the husband first migrated with his family. The wife then returned alone because of a lack of job opportunities in the host country and in order to provide her children with a professional education in Jordanian universities. She had a good career in Jordan with a car to drive, sophisticated friends, and full charge of her family. In the host country, the husband became accustomed to the company of Arab friends from the Gulf countries, and he came to admire their social norms and lifestyle. He returned to Jordan with jewelry, expensive clothes and some land in the name of his wife. He asked his

TABLE 19

WIVES' SOCIAL INTERACTION PROBLEMS BY STRATA

Strata	Social-Interaction Problems for Accompanying Families	Social-Interaction Problems for Non-Accompanying Families
High Urban	73%	0%
Middle Urban	60%	30%
Low Urban	0%	39%
Village	29%	45%

wife to give up working and stay at home. She refused, and they eventually divorced after twenty years of marriage.

Women from the middle urban stratum were also more likely to experience social-interaction problems if they accompanied their husbands (60 percent) than if they stayed home (30 percent). A possible explanation is that those wives had nearly the same educational levels as those from the high income stratum, and faced essentially the same kinds of social interaction problems (not finding a suitable job or friends with equal levels of education. However, these social interaction problems did not lead to any of the middle urban stratum wives leaving their husband and returning alone into the home country. Consequently, most of them did not experience marital problems.

Among these wives who remained home, the main source of social-interaction problems was the management by in-laws, who often tried to restrict the wife's contacts with others. Although in most cases in which in-laws were in management, there were no problems between husbands and wives in the middle urban stratum. When there were such problems, their major source was in-law management. Women from the middle urban stratum were more likely to complain of in-law problems when they stayed home and did not migrate. During the interviews for this research, many wives from the middle income stratum reported problems with in-laws in regard to money management. The money from remittances was spent on

the extended family, with little left for the wife and children. In many cases the father found that the best solution to these problems was to return to Jordan.

Women from the low urban stratum and the villages had fewer social-interaction problems in the host countries (zero percent and 29 percent respectively). This is probably because they found it easier to interact with people in the host country. They shared with those people the same level of literacy and many Arabic social norms and traditions, unlike women from high and middle urban strata who did not find much in-common with women in the host country.

Among women in the low urban and village strata who stayed home, social interaction problems were fairly common (39 and 45 percent, respectively). These problems arose for a variety of reasons. For women in the low urban stratum, social interaction problems were related to abandonment by the neighborhood community when their children engaged in such hostile acts as robbery and fighting.

In the village, the women reported not having enough time for social interaction because of increased responsibilities for both the farm and the home, beside the fact that the farmhouses are located far away from each other. Nevertheless, none of those wives reported having any marital problems.

Problems between husbands and wives in the low income urban stratum appeared to be the cause of children's

behavioral problems. Many children dropped out of school, had marginal jobs, drank, and committed various kinds of crimes. In one case, the head of the family abandoned his family completely. In Jordan, dancing and singing careers are thought to be beneath everyone but Gypsies, who are regarded with contempt. The mother had encouraged her teenage children, who were talented singers and dancers, to pursue these careers. This family was shunned by the surrounding neighborhood. The head of the family in the host country, outraged by the career his wife had favored and his children had chosen, abandoned his family completely.

Conclusion

It appears that while labor migration had many economic benefits for many families, it also created many social problems for wives and children. Children in poor areas were forced to drop out of school and face the burdens of adulthood prematurely. Women from high income stratum had problems with their husbands as a result of living independently in the home country. In-law management created many problems for wives which in turn affected their relationships with their husbands. From a social perspective, it is far safer for both children and wives to accompany the household head than for the family to remain behind. However, restrictive policies in Arab oil countries that prevent families of low skilled laborers from

accompanying their household head may have drastic effects on these households.

Validity of Findings

The data collected in this study did not show any substantial statistical differences between the studied sample and national figures about the Jordanian migrant workers in terms of the educational level of men, the occupational status of the migrants' wives, and the occupations of village men.

Household Head Education

If we compare data from the Jordanian Labor Ministry about household head education with the data obtained in this study, the difference is relatively small. According to the latter, about 40 percent of the migrant workers held undergraduate degrees, 25 percent held high school degrees, and none were illiterate. The Ministry of Labor found the same levels of education for Jordanians working in the Gulf (Ibrahim, E, 1986). This indicates that the household heads in this study were typical of the larger population of migrants with respect to education.

Wive's Occupational Status

The data obtained in this study show that 14 percent of the women in migrants' families are employed. This is not substantially different from the level of 10.5

percent for all Jordanian families (United Nation, ILO Year book of labor Statistic, 1984). This small difference is probably due to the fact that, as already noted, migrant laborers are more educated than the population at large.

The data also show that none of the wives in the families studied were working in the industrial sector. Many women in the low urban stratum and villages reported that they sewed at home to earn money. All of the employed women in the subject families worked as teachers, secretaries, or in government. This reflects the low level of the Jordanian female participation in the production sector. As Mujahed (1982) observed, manufacturing, which accounted for 35 percent of the female work force in 1961, dropped to 10.2 percent in 1976. It would seem that women are increasingly disenchanted with industrial production work and are turning to the service sector. The low level of the Jordanian female labor force participation is closely related to a whole spectrum of factors. The most important ones are cultural values, Islam, martial status, level of education, fertility rate, husband's education and the degree of urbanization.

Village Men's Occupation

In this research, it was found that all village migrants had served in the military before migration, although this factor was not involved in the selection

of subjects. This finding suggests that village families were typical of all village families, since both Zaghal (1984) and Keely and El-Saket (1984) found that most villagers tend to migrate to the Arab oil countries after leaving the military service.

CHAPTER IV

DISCUSSION, CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATION

This final chapter summarizes and discusses the major findings of this study concerning the impact of labor migration on the socioeconomic experiences of out migrants' families in Jordan. In this research, efforts were made to take into account four important aspects of family life that could affect or be affected by labor migration in order to reach a more comprehensive understanding of the domestic consequences of migration. The four sets of impacts were: family's economic condition, household management, children's discipline, and unity of the family. In addition, policy implications of the findings are also examined.

The Economic Change at the Household Level

Those who have written about the economic consequences of labor migration and remittances differ in their judgment about its negative and positive impacts for labor exporting countries. Yet, they talk little or nothing about such an impact on the migrants' families to whom workers migrated in the first place. Therefore, very little has been written about the effects of labor migration on the economic conditions of families. El-Saket (1983) found that the village migrants were the most likely to save at a

substantial rate, where forty-eight percent of them were saving 30 percent or more of their remittances. Only 27 percent of the migrants from other areas tended to save at the same rate.

The results obtained by this study agree with El-Saket that villagers still save more than other strata (61 percent saved more than 30 percent of their remittances). At the same time, however, this study found much higher levels of savings in all other strata more than reported by El-Saket (50 percent saved 30 percent or more of their income).

The differences between the results of El-Saket's (1983) study and this study are likely due to two factors:

The first factor is the changes that have occurred in the economic conditions since El-Saket did his study. The effects of the decline in oil prices on labor migration were not as apparent then as they are now. More people now feel that they have to save more because of the uncertainty of the future of oil prices. Moreover, the rate of inflation has decreased since the early nineteen eighties (Al-Fanik, 1988). Decreased inflation should enable more people from low income areas to increase their savings.

The second factor is that El-Saket's study failed to control several major factors that can affect the level of savings. He did not show how many of the migrants' families he studied had accompanied their household-head to the host country. The present study shows that this factor has great

impact on savings of these families. The results show that those who accompanied their families were not able to save much because of the high expenses of living in the host countries. In most cases, migrants had to pay for health insurance, private education, and other services for their children. Nor is it surprising that villagers were not able to save when they accompanied their families. Village migrants saved more when they left their families in the village where they could take advantage of informal food production. Part of the food they need can be supplied by their farms, gardens, and domestic animals. Also, life expenses in villages are generally less than those in big cities. Many village and some low urban women who remained in Jordan reported sewing their clothes and performing other domestic services for themselves.

The findings from this study show that families from the high urban stratum who remained in Jordan were not able to save very much because they felt it was necessary to maintain the relatively high standard of living expected in their area of residence. Those people have also been the most affected by the deterioration in oil prices, which led many Arab oil countries to sharply reduce wages for many professional migrants, sometimes as much as 80 percent for some professions. Also, the restrictive policies of some Arab oil countries required most professional migrants to share their income with the local business owner, who, in

most cases, provided no services in return. Consequently a majority of these migrants expressed doubts and uncertainty about the security of their future careers in the Arab oil countries.

These findings suggest that, in contrast to what El-Saket (1983) had concluded, the lower savings reported by migrant families in the early 1980's were not caused merely by the spending behavior of families. It appears, rather, that market prices also influenced the level of saving. The greater amount of savings reported by migrants' families in this research was partially due to the lower inflation that Jordan experienced since the mid-eighties.

Another difference between the findings of El-Saket's and this study lies in the areas of investment. El-Saket (1983) reported that small retail stores were the dominant forms of investment where 52 percent of all migrants claimed this as a major area of investment. In contrast, this study found that such investment dropped to only 15 percent of the total. That decline probably reflects the facts that smaller remittances have recently been sent back to Jordan, so that less foreign exchange was available to purchase imports and luxuries. Adding to these factors is the recent drop in the value of the Jordanian Dinar against the U.S. Dollar. Major forms of investment at the present time are bank accounts with interest (30 percent) and taxi cabs for rent (13 percent). Taxi cabs for rent became an attractive source of

income for many returning migrant workers because of the lack of other employment opportunities in Jordan in recent years. Sometimes, the returned migrant drives the taxi or mostly rent it to a driver who takes a salary or a share of profit while the taxi owner take the rest of money.

This study concurs with the findings of El-Saket that most migrants prefer real estate as a secure type of investment. It also concurs with his finding that most returned migrants believe that migration led neither new skills nor to better jobs. It concurs also with El-Saket's finding that productive investments (that generate extra monthly income) were preferred. Although El-Saket found that a very small percentage of families (4 percent) in the high urban area invested in stocks, such investments were not reported by any one in the present study. Moreover, only 12 percent of the villagers and 7 percent of migrants from other strata reported investing in improving their farms.

The latter finding is in keeping with Fergany's (1982) claim that labor migration in Yemen had a destructive effect on Yemen's agriculture, since most of the remittances were used to buy durable goods while farms were neglected. This result is also in keeping with McCoy and Wood's (1985) description of the devastating effect of labor migration on the Caribbean agriculture.

The lack of investment in large projects in Jordan, as Al-Fanik (1988) has noted, is a consequence of Jordan's

relatively small population and its limited resources. New industries need a large-scale market which is not available in Jordan. To export, these industries have to be competitive with the low cost-production industries of South East Asia. Also, families found that it was more secure and probably more profitable to invest in rental buildings than to invest in industries, agriculture, or stocks. Also, the Iran-Iraq war and the civil war in Lebanon spurred a tremendous increase in the demand for housing, often driving prices up. The increase in housing profits reflected the willingness of the war refugees to pay high rent.

However, with more and more people investing in apartment construction, with the end of the Iran-Iraq war, and with the increase in the cost of construction (especially after the recent drop in the Jordanian currency), these forms of investment became unprofitable (many apartments now stand vacant or unfinished in metropolitan Amman). This has left unsettled the problem of future areas of investment.

Household Management

Household management is the other realm in which labor migration has had a major impact on families of out migrant workers. It is understandable that the absence of the household head would create a vacuum in family leadership that someone else has to fill, following some local

traditions. Much controversy has arisen concerning the impact on wives and family leadership. Ibrahim (1978) hypothesized that "labor migration could lead ultimately to a new social order and to the feminization of the Arab families of migrant workers in the home countries." Serageldin et al., 1984, wrote that "there is an increase in the amount of work by the migrant's wife compared to what women in the Arab society traditionally do. As a result, women's management over resources will dramatically increase, and this in turn may transform the role of Arab women. Such change in roles may survive the return of the male migrant; a fact which will change the role of women in the these Arab societies." Burki (1984) hypothesized that labor migration would lead to situations in which women would have more management over family resources, although he recognized that many of those who live under in-law management would lose some of the protection of their husbands. El-Saket (1983) suspected that the age of the wife may affect the degree to which she can manage her family (the older she is, the more power she will have). He suggested further research regarding this point.

In this study it was found that age, educational level, career status and area of origin are all critical factors affecting the wife's ability to manage the household. It was found that in 50 percent of the cases in which the wives were under in-law management, the women did not have

school-age children. This confirms El-Saket expectations. However in many other cases, the woman was old enough to live under her eldest son's management. In these cases, it was found that both women's educational level and the prevailing social norms affect her ability to manage her family. If the woman was not well educated, and the norms did not permit her to manage the family, the eldest son was likely to be the manager.

Wives from the high urban stratum had far fewer problems with in-laws than those living in the middle urban stratum, and some what fewer problems than wives from the low urban stratum. These high urban wives were better educated, and some had careers. The people living there were mostly from the old urban centers of the East and West Banks of Jordan. Wives in these areas have high social status with more freedom to take care of their business without being under others' management. Consequently, 80 percent of these wives managed their own homes.

In the low urban stratum and the village, management of the family by in-laws or the eldest son was related to wives' education and economic independence. The woman was in charge in about 55 percent in low urban areas. This is a high ratio, given the large percentage of those women have low level of education. Women's extra jobs (such as sewing) seem to allow them greater role and responsibilities even though fewer opportunities were available to them (as is the

case with Pakistani women, as Burki (1984) reported. In the Jordanian village, the in-laws have less management power on their daughter in-law's affairs than in the middle and low urban areas of Amman. In the East Jordanian village, the woman or her eldest son (if she does not have sufficient education or training to take responsibility) would be the manager in her husbands' absence. (In 45 percent of these cases the son was the manager.)

In the middle urban stratum, most of the migrants' families were managed either by in-laws (50 percent) or by the eldest son (20 percent) after the departure of the husband. This is a surprising finding, given the high educational level and strong employment opportunities for these women in comparison with the village and low urban stratum women. Abu Lughuod (1962) and Zaghal (1984) argued that large rural-urban migration in the Arab world results in bringing the rural norms to the city, where the norms tend to linger in largely unassimilated urban fringes areas. They found no clear differences between urban, semi-rural and rural areas regarding women's status; contrary to the Western urbanization experience. While Abu Lughuod's conclusion may explain part of the above finding, one must not forget that, as mentioned before, where a social class system exists, middle class people will be the most conservative in their attachment to religion and tradition.

In Jordan, however, more than one set of "traditional" social norms are at work. In the middle urban stratum, only 30 percent of migrants' wives managed their households, while in the village 48 percent of migrants' wives managed their households.

A possible explanation of this finding is that the "received" social norms prevalent in the middle urban and low urban strata are different from those prevalent in Jordanian villages. And indeed most of the population in Amman came originally from Palestinian towns and villages where the father in-law used to have the ultimate power over family members, including sons and daughters-in-law. The sons work and live on the farm that belongs to their father. Even though these people have subsequently lost their land and become refugees in other places, the original norms still control the family's way of life and family relationships.

These norms are more evident in middle urban than in low urban strata of Amman. This is likely due to the fact that those who live in the U.N. camps and surrounding lower urban areas have built themselves up from nothing except for United Nations assistance. The power of in-laws is more common in the middle urban areas where the grandfather had migrated with some capital that would give him the economic power and moral authority to continue his rule over his extended family.

On the contrary, the norms in the Jordanian villages are of nomadic origin (Bedouin). Sheep and camels were the symbol of wealth. Sons grew up to be fighters. The son's status is determined by his ability to support and protect his family. Village sons still practice these norms, usually taking charge of the family during the absence of their fathers. The norms they follow are thus quite different from those in the middle urban stratum, where Palestinian sons still generally live under the management of their grandfather.

As Keely and El-Saket (1984) wrote about the effects of migration on family life:

"For some migrant male workers, this is a process of two steps forward, and one step back on the migrant's return. Although responsibility, power and status in a family cannot be put on and taken off like an overcoat, the changes in women's roles are not necessarily going to proceed on a smooth path."

This observation holds true for many wives in this study. In some cases, the problems of the wife appeared or intensified after the return of the husband, since he was unwilling to share authority or change certain old norms. His wife could no longer accept her pre-migration status, while the husband felt he was humiliated if his wife appeared as the manager in front of his family and male friends.

The impact of labor migration on the social order, and particularly on the status of women, has been far less rosy than Ibrahim and Serageldin et al., 1984, anticipated. Jordan provides an excellent test of their hypotheses (that out labor migration would bring a new social order to the Arab labor-exporting societies). This study clearly demonstrates that the expectation of labor migration creating a new social order is far from being true in the case of Jordan. Out labor migration just exacerbated the differences in women status already existing in the society. This supports Griffith's (1985) argument that labor migration will not change women status at the bottom of the social ladder.

Children's Discipline

Another aspect of change is children school achievement. Burki (1984) claimed that migrants' children would draw benefits from the significant increase in household income that results from the flow of remittances. Aside from being better clothed and better fed, he argued that children would also receive much better education when compared with children from non-migrant households.

Saa'd- El-Dean and Abd-El-Fadeil (1983), during their interviews with school principal in Sudan, found large differences in the level of achievement between children who had fathers working abroad and those whose fathers stayed

home. Saa'd-El-Dean and Abd-Al-Fadeil also found that social science researchers in Yemen had begun to pay more attention to the number of children in rural areas whose fathers were abroad, where the mothers had great difficulty with disciplining them. Children began to take their father's role at younger ages, as well as to begin smoking and taking drugs (al-qat).

The data obtained in this study are in accord with Saa'd-El-Deen and Abd-El-Fadeil's findings. The data shows that improvements in school achievement among children who accompanied their father were far higher than among those who stayed in Jordan. The most disadvantaged were the children from the low urban stratum. Their fathers held low status jobs in the host countries and a large percentage of them were not allowed to accompany their families with them. Also, the study shows that families who stayed home did not spend adequate amounts from the remittances on their children's education. Consequently, although school performance deteriorated among most children who did not accompany their father, this was most pronounced among children from the low income urban stratum.

Children from the low income urban stratum also had a very high rate of school dropout (60 percent). This percentage is much higher than the national average (about 11 percent according to the 1979 census and Zaghal, 1984).

In contrast, children from the high income stratum had better records of school achievements than those from all other strata; both accompanied and non-accompanied. High urban families reported the highest rate of spending on private education for their children in their home country.

In short, labor migration, as a process, has widened the educational gap between the rich and the poor for generations to come. Many children of the well-to-do professional families were allowed to join their fathers in the host country. These families also spent more money on their children and had access to quality education in the home country, while children of the poor often dropped out of school to take on family responsibilities, just as Saa'd-El-Deen and Abd-El-Fadeil found for Yemeni children. Burki's expectation (that higher income from remittances would enable migrants' families to pay more for their children's education and, then, the children's school achievement would increase) is not true except for the children from high strata; both accompanied and non-accompanied. The money that was spent on children's education in the home country was used largely to replace the time that the mother herself had previously spent on educating the children. As mothers in the home country assumed increasing responsibilities, they had to pay more for private teachers. In those strata in which this tendency was most apparent (the high and middle urban strata),

children's school achievement did not increase; it merely remained the same.

Thus, labor migration actually preserved the traditional social class order where the high class (privileged class) can monopolize the opportunities to accumulate capital by saving and investment, even education, so far these involve expenditures (Weber, 1956). Thus, although some low urban people had access to more capital through labor migration, such access was not enough to encounter the spending power of the high urban families on children's education.

Moreover, the results showed a high rate of bloody crimes, robbery and drinking problems among children who dropped out of school in the low urban stratum. This also supports the results obtained by Saa'd-El-Dean and Abd-Al-Fadeil regarding migrants' children in Sudan and Yemen, where they started smoking and using drugs at early ages. It should be noted in the present study that a higher percentage of children are taking on family responsibilities in the village than in the low income urban stratum. However, the school dropout rate and these crimes by children were observed more frequently in the city rather in the village. Children in the village were taking responsibilities mostly in accordance with prevailing social norms. The economic condition of families in the low urban stratum has a direct effect on children's assumptions of

responsibility. Many of these children were dropping out of school to take an early job. They became an important source of family income. The level of saving in most of these cases was more than 60 percent of the remittances. Accumulation of money became the major goal for these families, while other social values were ignored or undervalued. Without enough discipline, and in an urban atmosphere, these children engaged in fighting, drinking, robbery and other behavioral problems. This finding largely supports Beeghley's (1989) statement that the lower the social class, the higher rate of alcoholism and personal problems.

Overall, these cases show that labor migration did not improve school achievement among most migrants' children by increasing the family income, contrary to Burki's (1984) suggestion. It was found in this research that the patterns of spending of remittances among migrant families of different strata increased the gap between the children of professionals, who were permitted to accompany their fathers and for whom more was spent on their education, and the low income urban children. The latter children take on adult responsibilities and life styles before receiving a proper education.

Unity of the Family

In this study, it was shown that the sources of problems between husband and wife varied according to the

area of residence. In the high urban stratum, problems arose because of the factors that were described by Azzam and El-Sharib (1980). The wives seemed less willing to leave their home countries since the desirable social-life atmosphere that was available at home would not be available in the host country. Many wives experienced stress from living in isolation in the Arab oil countries. This study shows that mental problems became more intense when the wife did not accompany her husband or refused to remain in the host country. In those cases, the husband often became envious of his wife's leisurely life and resentful at being deserted in a foreign country.

Azzam and El-Sharib (1980) reported the same kind of problems with Lebanese women. They presented data showing that more than 70 percent of migrants' wives in Lebanon preferred to have their husband stay home even if the family income would be 25 percent less than if he migrated. Fifteen percent of their sample acknowledged that the marriage-bond was weakened by migration. Many wives in their study also complained about their increased responsibilities for disciplining the children and other duties of daily life. Sixty-three percent of the decisions to migrate were made by the husband, despite objections from their wives in 34 percent of the cases. Only in 4 percent of the migration cases did the wish to migrate originate with the wife (Azzam and Sharib, 1980).

The finding of this study is that only women from the high urban stratum had the same rate of family problems as Lebanese women. This may be attributed to the more cosmopolitan lives of high urban women in Jordan as compared to women in other strata. As Serageldin et al., 1984, explained: "labor migration would evoke a reaction from a Yemeni migrant of rural origin, whose exposure to the lifestyle of Riyadh or Jidda city in Saudi Arabia gives him the experience of a European big city, very different from that of a professional Lebanese, Egyptian, or Jordanian migrants' family who may find the lifestyle in Saudi Arabia confining and dull in contrast to Beirut, Cairo or Amman."

The differences in attitudes toward migration among different strata of Jordanian women is most likely comparable to the differences found by women who came from a Yemeni town and the one who came from Beirut. Woman from high urban areas in Jordan, as said before, may find that, in the host country, she is prevented from work or even driving her own car. For her, this would seem like a prison atmosphere. A woman from a middle urban area, on the other hand, may likely be under the management of in-laws if she stays home. In that case, the restricted atmosphere in the host country may not differ much from the restrictions imposed by the social norms if she stays in Jordan. She would find that the social norms which dominate the Arab oil countries do not differ much from those that control her

movement at home; unlike the woman from a high urban area. Therefore, it is far more comfortable for middle urban women to migrate and stay with their husband than to stay behind under the management of in-laws.

The problem of the in-law interference that Keely and El-Saket (1984) noted was most apparent in the middle urban stratum. Keely and El-Saket especially noted the relationship that could appear between the brother-in-law and the wife who was left under his management. A significant proportion of returned migrants (60 percent) reported problems related to the separation of the husband and problems of young wives with in-laws or problems with relatives who are temporarily heading the household. The data obtained in this study support Keely and El-Saket's findings. In all cases in which the wife reported problems between her and her husband in the middle urban stratum, in-laws were managing the family.

In the low urban stratum, the main source of problems between husbands and wives was the discipline of children. The household head often became outraged by a decline in his children's educational achievement and the increasing disciplinary problems among his children in the home country. Besides being angry at his children's behavior, he often put much of the blame on his wife. These kinds of problems were not accounted for in the previous literature, but in this study it was found that disciplinary problems

among the children of migrants deeply affected the relationship between the husband and wives.

Conclusions

According to the findings of this research, it is not the spending behavior alone that prevents the families of migrants from retaining large amounts of the relatively high remittances received during the early eighties, as El-Saket (1983) had assumed. Instead, market prices and investment opportunities largely controlled their spending and investment behavior. When the rate of inflation in Jordan declined in the middle eighties, migrants' families were often able to save more, although the market still did not encourage large types of investment in agriculture or industries.

While labor migration provided economic benefits for many families, it also created many social problems for wives and children. Children in poor areas were forced to drop out of school and to face the burdens of adulthood prematurely. Women from high income areas had problems with their husbands as a result of living independently in the home country. In-laws management of the family created many problems for wives which in turn affected the relationships with their husbands. From a social perspective, it is far better for both children and wife to accompany the household head than to remain behind. However, restrictive policies in

the Arab-oil countries that prevent families of low skilled laborers from accompanying their household head may cause severe social damage in their household.

The findings of this study support Saa'd-El-Deen and Abd-Al-Fadeil (1983) hypotheses that "in contrast to what was formerly believed in the labor exporting countries, that migration will improve the welfare of migrant families, there is now the feeling that this is not at all for the good. There are many negative socioeconomic effects, in addition to the positive ones that were focused on in many previous studies. Labor migration leads to the separation of the household head from his family, since most migrants are 24-40 years old males who are not allowed to bring their wives and children with them. Moreover, the data obtained in this study show that migration often involves families who still have school-age children. Many of the wives who were left behind came under the management of their in-laws or eldest sons. This caused problems for the wives with their in-laws, for sons with school achievement, and between wives and husbands who blamed each other for the adverse consequences of labor migration, especially on children.

Most migrant families have not benefited socially, as some theorists have asserted (Ibrahim, 1978, Burki, 1984). Far from creating a new social order in the labor exporting countries, labor migration has created some unexpected and hidden social problems and exacerbated others. On the one

hand, all migrant families reported that they had benefited financially from such migration. On the other hand, they all complained about the increased level of uncertainty and expressed fear for the security of their jobs in the future. Many families reported problems between the husband and wife and with their children's education. This varied from one social stratum to another, based on attachment to social traditions and norms.

Questions to be Asked in Future Research

This study suggests two critical questions for further research. The first question concerns a new form of labor migration where highly educated wives and female teachers migrate to teach in female schools and universities in many Arab oil countries where mixing male and female in schools is prohibited. In such a migration, the opposite is true for all aspects of normal labor migration. The husband of the migrant women must accompany her or otherwise cannot get into the host country as part of the Islamic teachings to avoid adultery. Under the influence of high wages for these highly demanded skills, the husband may leave his low paid job in Jordan and accompany his wife. As a result, the whole social order, relationships, and traditional sexual division of labor in such a family reversed. It would be very important to examine the social consequences of such migration on the family level, as was done in this research.

The second question concerns the change in investment patterns of remittances after the recent drop in the value of the Jordanian Dinar and the end of the Iran-Iraq war (which caused a sharp drop in the demand for rental apartments). When the research for this study was completed, these changes were still in progress. Migrants were still depending on construction as a form of investment. However, the above recent changes are likely to make migrant families increasingly hesitant to invest in rental housing. The cost of construction has also increased because of the decreasing value of the Jordanian Dinar as well as the profit from rental houses. The decrease in the value of the Jordanian Dinar has also reduced the profit of most import and export businesses. It will be useful to carry a follow up research to see how investors are adjusting to these new circumstances, especially in the light of the recent economic unity agreement between Iraq, Yemen, Jordan, and Egypt in 1989, needs further research.

Policy Implications

This study has some important implications for sociologists and social service specialists at both the micro and macro levels. The study shows that the area of investment made by families is related to larger problems on the social level. On the national level, the opening of a

big regional market for commodities could make investment in the production sector worthwhile for small investors and draw investment from other areas like real estate and building construction. The recent economic unity agreement between Jordan, Egypt, Iraq and Yemen (signed in February, 1989) may turn out to be a major step in this regard. It promises to create a large market for Jordan's exports and industries.

The study shows that people living in low and middle urban areas are not having problems with saving (contrary to El-Saket's conclusion). This is probably because of the different economic opportunities prevailing at the time of each study. However, the economic problems seem minor compared to the social problems that labor migration has intensified. Seventy-three percent of the wives in the high income urban stratum who accompanied their husbands complained about the stress of being isolated in a foreign country without opportunities for a normal social life. Problems frequently arose between wives and husbands when wives preferred to return home alone. The fact that half of the wives in the middle urban stratum lived under the management of in-laws created many problems in their marriages due to the interference by in-laws. Further, well over half of the low urban stratum families who stayed home saw their children drop out of school. Dropping out of

school was accompanied by bloody fighting, drinking, and robbery among these children.

If the economic benefits of higher income for out migrants' families are compared with the social problems they have experienced, the social problems clearly outweigh those economic benefits. For families with school-age children, it might be better for the household-head to stay home if he cannot be sure that his wife can take on responsibility for the family. Leaving the wife and children at the management of in-laws, or letting children drop out of school makes no sense in spite of the extra money earned abroad. The same kinds of jobs that workers from low urban areas are migrating to fill in the Arab oil countries are, to certain limit, available in Jordan with decent salary, especially after the rise in wages as a result of the large out labor migration in Jordan. In fact, Jordan is importing workers to fill low-status positions that out migrant workers have vacated. There should be a public awareness for low skilled workers to reconsider the unexpected social costs of their migration, especially for their children. Professionals are a special case, however, since they are forced to migrate for two reasons. First, Jordan is still producing many more professionals than it can employ. Second, in Jordan, unemployment among professionals is higher than among any low-skilled workers (Al-Fanik, 1988).

Therefore, out labor migration for professionals is needed as long as they have little job opportunities in Jordan.

Most of the social problems that migrants' families live require a regional cooperation, especially between Jordan and the Arab oil countries. Labor migration policies in the Arab oil countries seem to contribute to the various social problems that migrants' families face. Changing such policies should reduce the size of the negative consequences of out labor migration on the migrants' families.

Finally, the social interaction problem between migrants and natives in host countries, especially for wives, needs to be solved. Unfortunately, less can be done in this regard. International women's clubs in host countries might make the lives of migrants' wives less boring and more tolerable. Yet the problem of different social norms in the host country and in the country of origin remain serious obstacles for resolving this problem.

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APPENDIX

APPENDIX

The Questions that had been Asked during the Interviews

The specific questions asked during the interview

- 1- Can the family accompany the household head?
- 2- Did the family accompany him?
- 3- What is the Educational level for the Father?
- 4- What was the husband's career before and after migration?
- 6- Who's responsible for the family after migration?
- 7- Do the relative take more responsibility toward the family during their father's absence?

The Wife

- 1-What is the educational level for the wife?
- 2- What was the wife's career before and after migration?
- 3- Does the wife drive a car?
- 4- Did the responsibility of the mother towards the children' education change?
- 5- What kind of social responsibility does the wife have?
- 6- How is the relationship between the wife and the husband now?
- 7- How is the relationship between the mother and the children now?
- 8- How is relationship between the wife and the neighbors now?
- 9- What is the level of education for the wife?
- 10- Did the wife engage in any domestic work (tailor etc.)?
- 11- Are there any divorce cases between the family members?
- 12- Did the wife become interested in the socialized parties in her community.

The Children

- 1- What percentage of money did you spend on your children' education now and on what?
- 2- What the level of achievement for your children at school now?
- 3- Do any of the children engage in fighting at school?
- 4- Does any of the children engage in neighborhood fighting?
- 5- Do you know how the children spend their money?
- 6- What change had happened in your children' responsibilities?
- 7- Are the boys interested in higher education now?
- 8- Are the girls interesting in studying and higher education now?
- 9- Did any of the boys/girls who drop out of school?
- 10- How do the children spend their free time:?
- 11- Did the sons play any of the father's roles after migration?
- 12- What is the role of the older son during his father's absence?

Household economy

- 1- Has the level of spending on eating and clothes have increased?
- 2- What is the percentage of total spending compared to the total income?
- 3- What is the percentage of investment from income.
- 4- Specify whether you invest in:

a- House	b- Taxi cab for rent
c- Farm	d- Small retail stores
e- Land	f- Bank account benefit/n
g- Gold	h- Marriage
i- Stocks	

5-What kind of residence do you have?

a- Before migration

- Rent/own
- Rocks/Cement
- Number of rooms
- space between neighbors

b- After migration:

- Rent/own
- Rocks/Cement
- Number of rooms
- space between neighbors

6- What are the source of income for the family before and after migration:

7- Do you care for the economic situation in Jordan after migration and how?

8- Do you care for the economic situation in the host country and how?

9- Do you care for the economic global situation after migration and how

General questions in interview

- What are the most positive consequences of migration.
- What are the most deteriorating effect of migration.
- What are the problems you face after migration.
- Generally, how is the family unity now?

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