‘ _' .. ., _ ; E ‘, I ~:- . A. . v:- .,. a: :- W (E. -\ ”A u .“I. A . ‘ , A SECTION FROM THE LONG OFAVICENNA'S I ~§ * I ‘ A DANISH NAMEII E ‘ALAI IExT WITH TRANSLATION _ . ‘ , " ANALYSIS AND NOTES A CONTRIBUTION TO THE ..... A , < . , HISTORY OF LOGIC ........ a; ' j , . DIssertahon foI thO Degree of Ph. D f -. ' . ‘ Q MIOIII‘OAN STATE UNIVERSITY ' ' f f : SAN'AIILLAIIIIIRMANI -‘ -I ‘. 'b.,'r'Il.v"~.-" " “ ,,. I'T‘VJNIRIJIu ‘).IK'I“"'I"",f 2. " - "I.“ I . 3,3712 . "I 1-,. 'I' that ARM“ I I $0 ‘9'? I23}; I: i"? ‘ . I RofiDEZVfi MICHIGAN srATE UNIVERSIT ' M I III II'IIIIYII'IIRAR'“ ' M L- fix I!HJIQQIIIIIIIAIIIIIAILIIIIIUI/II , I, f] f . A Y *3 __L:' 'ééi‘sr L This is to certify that the thesis entitled A SECTION FROM THE LOGIC OF AVICENNA'S DANISH NAMEH-E 'ALAI TEXT WITH TRANSLATION, ANALYSIS, AND NOTES: A CONTRIBUTION TO THE HISTORY OF LOGIC presented by Sanaullah Kirmani has been accepted towards fulfillment of the requirements for Ph . D . degree in Philosophy W quor professor Date Nov. 14, 1974 . I I l . ... I .I .. r. 2 ‘4 _. . .x .r .a z I» a. .. ‘| :191451 ‘3‘ kn '.‘ 4 the colic: ABSTRACT A SECTION FROM.TH.E LOGIC .OF AVICENNA'S DANISH NAMEH-E 'ALA'I TEXT WITH TRANSLATION, ANALYSIS, AND NOTES: - A CONTRIBUTION To THE HISTORY OF LOGIC By Sanaullah Kirmani In this paper we present the text and translation with notes of the logic section of Avicenna's Danish Nameh-e hlEi. The text, the entirety of which has been formulated but only a part included and studied here, is the result of collating two manuscripts that, to our knowledge, have never been collated before. The result of the collation of our two manuscripts was intercollated both with the Main and Mishkat edition of the logic of Danish Némeh and the manuscript variations quoted in that edition. It is a part of the text thus obtained that is presented in this study from page 2h to 92. Our two manuscripts, the Moin and Mishkat edition, some problems re— lating to the formulation of the text and its translation, as well as some general and selected specific problems are discussed in the Introduction to this study. The Introduction is followed by the text which has been divided into two sections and subdivided into chapters by the present author. The text is followed by the Apparatus. This is followed by the translation which we have tried to keep as literal as possible, in order to preserve the flavor, with its terseness, of the original. We have wherever necessary, however, expanded the translation by the use of square brackets. Sanaullah Kirmani The notes which follow the translation deal mainly with substan— tive issues that arise either directly from the process of translation or from the positions which Avicenna seems to hold in the text under study. We have, as far as possible, avoided making generalizations be- cause what our subject needs most are philosophically critical textual studies. A SECTION FROM THE LOGIC OF AVICENNA'S DANISH NAMEH-E ‘ALRI TEXT WITH TRANSLATION, ANALYSIS, AND NOTES: A CONTRIBUTION TO THE HISTORY OF LOGIC By Sanaullah Kirmani A DISSERTATION Submitted to Michigan State University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY Department of Philosophy 197h >36. 131;" ,_ by-.. Camisht 197A G +-~ DEDICATION With respect and fondness to the memory of my teachers the late Harry Austryn Wolfson and the late Henry S. Leonard ii ACKNOWLEDGMENTS I wish to record my gratitude to Mr. Ghufran Ahmad Faruqi whose concern and support for my well—being and education exceed by far the duties of an uncle. I also wish to thank him for helping me with the translation of the first twenty pages of the text. The members of my committee, Professors Harold T. Walsh (Chairman), William J. Callaghan, Herbert E. Hendry, and Charles J. McCracken, have all been very patient, understanding and helpful. Professors William J. Callaghan and Harold T. Walsh have been associated with the project from its very beginning and have throughout cheerfully addressed them— selves to the numerous unusual problems, administrative and otherwise, that arose during my graduate study and research. I thank my committee members for their help and advice during my research and writing. I wish to acknowledge my personal and intellectual debt to Profes- sor Henry S. Leonard who first introduced me to philosophy and later made it possible for me to pursue it further; many of his philosophical assumptions are now also mine. Michigan State University's International Programs awarded me a year's grant to continue my research at Harvard University where the Center for the Study of World Religions, then under the direction of Professor Wilfred C. Smith, accepted me in its membership and provided both material support and intellectual stimulation for three years. I would like to record my appreciation to the Center and the Harvard Divinity School for their help. iii Professor Harry A. Wolfson was kind enough, despite his retirement and preoccupation with The KalEm, to take me on as a student and super- vise my research. My debt to Professor Wolfson is too overwhelming to be expressed. I benefitted from his advice and criticism at every stage of my research. I also with to thank Professor Fathullah Mujtabai' for checking through the Persian text and helping me in the translation of some passages. I thank MaariJ and Humera Kirmani for their help with the collation and Raza Kirmani for proofreading the Persian. I also thank John and Sandra Carter for proofreading the rest of the text. Last but not least I wish to express my thanks, admiration and love for my wife Carla without whose help and faith this project would have been impossible to complete. iv TABLE OF CONTENTS SWLS IIIO'IIIOOIIIIIOODCICIICOIOIQOOOOOOIOIOIIIJIIIIICII. ...... I INTRODUCTION........... ..... ....................................... l Avicenna Danish Nameh—IfAlai Translations and Printed Editions The Present Edition PERSIANTEXT ....... .. ...... . ...... . . . ..................... 2h APPARATUS . ....... .. . . . . . . .. ......... ... . . ..... .. . 93 TRANSLATION [AYICENNA'S PREFACE]................................................ 130 [AYICENNA'S INTRODUCTION]: [WHEREIN] THE PURPOSES AND THE ADVANTAGES OF LOGIC ARE MADE CLEAR. ............. .... ..... 132 THE BEGINNING OF THE SCIENCE OF LOGIC [SECTION I] [CHAPTER] [I] THE EXPLANATION OF THAT WHICH IN TERMS AND IDEAS IS CALLED - SMIIEDO......0.!0I0.000...-OOIOO'OOIOOOOIODOIUO ..... III...- 138 [II] [WHEREIN ARE] DESCRIBED GENUS, SPECIES, DIFFERENTIA, PROPmTYANDACCIDENTn.IllI......I.00......OIIOIVOIOIOOOOIOD 11‘); [III] [WHEREIN ARE] To BE FOUND THE CONDITIONS OF DEFINITION AND DESCRIPTION.... ..... . ..... .............................. 1A9 [Iv] [WHEREIN ARE] MADE MANIFEST THE MEANING OF NOUN, VERB, AND PARTICI‘EOIDOI‘IOIODOIOIOII...U..........IOIIIOI'IQIOCODOO 152 TABLE OF CONTENTS SmoLS II...OI...lIO...OIOOOOIIOI.IC‘IOCII-IOIIOQID lllll 0|... ...... nwmmmnnmn.n.u.u.n.H.u.n.u.u.u.u.u.n.u.u ..... . 1 Avicenna Danish Nameh—IfAIEI Translations and Printed Editions The Present Edition Pmmnm'nnT ....... . ....... . ...... .. . .. u .u ... .. 2h APPARATUS .. .. ........ .. ...... .. ...... . ....... . . . ..... . .. ... 93 TRANSLATION [ANICENNA'S PREFACE]...................... ..... .. ...... ............. 13o [ANICENNA'S INTRODUCTION]: [WHEREIN] THE PURPOSES AND THE ADVANTAGES OF LOGIC ARE MADE CLEAR ..... 132 THE BEGINNING OF THE SCIENCE OF LOGIC [SECTION I] [CHAPTER] [I] THE EXPLANATION OF THAT wHICH IN TERMS AND IDEAS IS CALLED . SMLEQOOIQOOIOOIOIIO to. lllll O!.0O...IIGOIIIOIIOIOIIOIIOOOI.138 [II] [WHEREIN ARE] DESCRIBED GENUS, SPECIES, DIFFERENTIA, PROPERTY AND ACCIDENT....................................... Ihh [III] [WHEREIN ARE] TO BE FOUND THE CONDITIONS OF DEFINITION AND DESCRIPTION......................... ..... ............... 1h9 [Iv] [WHEREIN ARE] MADE MANIFEST THE MEANING OF NOUN, VERB, ANDPARTICIEIIIII...IOUIO.......CIIIOIODOOIOIIOIOOOOOCIOCCOOO 152 [SECTION II] CHAPTER] [v] [WHEREIN ONE IS] To FIND OUT WHAT [A] PROPOSITION Is........ 155 [Description of] the Various] Kindsof Propositions [VI] [WHEREIN ARE] MADE MANIFEST PREDICATIVE PROPOSITIONS AND THEIR AFFIRMATIVITY, NEGATIVITY, UNIVERSALITY, AND PARTICU— LARITYAND WHATEVER [ELSE] IS PERTINENT TO THESE............ 157 [VII] [WHEREIN ONE Is] TO FIND [A DESCRIPTION OF} THE STATE OF CONJUNCTIVE CONDITIONAL PROPOSITIONS AND DISJUNCTIVE CONDITIONAL PROPOSITIONS.................................... 16h [VIII] MAKING KNOWN THE CONDITIONS [PERTAINING To] CONTRADICTORY JUDGMENTS. ...... ................. . ......... .... ..... .... 17o [IX] CLARIFICATION OF THE CONDITIONS OF CONVERSION..... .......... 173 [x] IN THE DESCRIPTION OF SYLLOGISM...... ......... .............. 175 [XI] SYLLDGISMS OF LIASON ........ ................................ 177 Exposition of the Conditions of the Syllogisms of the First Figure Syllogisms of the Second Figure Syllogisms of the Third Figure [XII] [SILLOGISMS FROM CONDITIONAL PROPOSITIONS] ..... ............. 187 Detachmental Syllogisms of Hypotheticals Detachmental Syllogisms from Disjunctives [XIII] COMPOUND SYLLOGISMS............... ...... .................... 190 The Demonstration of This Reductio Ad Imgossibile Syllogism NOTES...................................... ....... ......... ..... .... 195 BIBLIOGRAPHY...................................... ..... . .......... .. 228 vi SYMBOLS Omission; that the lemma enclosed is omitted in the manuscript. Addition; that the lemma enclosed is added in the manuscript. Different reading; that the reading inside the half-bracket is different in the manuscript. Means the reading from the Moin and Mishkat manuscript named Within has been adopted. illegible. end of a lemma. end of a line. INTRODUCTION AYICENNA We are fortunate that Ibn-e Sina's autobiography, which he dicta- ted to his pupil and constant companion, JuzJEnI, as well as JuzJEnI's biographical continuation of it, has survived,1 affording scholars a glimpse into the diversified career of this famous Persian philo- sopher. Abfi 'Ali aI—Hossain bin 'Abdalfah ibn Easan ibn 'AII bin Sin; (known as Ibn-e SInE or Shaikh al-RaIs, and Latinized as Avicenna) was born in Karmathain, near Bokhara, in A.D. 980. After a stormy career as a philosopher, physician, and public administrator, he died in Ramadan in A.D. 1037 at the age of fifty-seven.2 It is very difficult to separate Avicenna as a physician and political man from Avicenna as a philosopher. This is not peculiar to Avicenna; it is, rather, the case with Muslim philosophers of this period in general, for although many a prince supported a philosopher, philosophy was not a teaching vocation.3 Having noted this general difficulty we shall, however, summarize Avicenna's development as a man of letters and a philosopherh without paying close attention to his other activities. Avicenna's education, characteristic of a Muslim youth, began (presumably at home) with the study of the Quran and literature5 2 (probably grammar6); and by the time he reached his tenth birthday, he had achieved such a mastery of these subjects that all were "struck full of amazement."7 He was next sent to a greengrocer8 from whom he learned Indian arithmetic. Meanwhile he was also taking lessons in Muslim Jurisprudence and methods of religious (Juridical) argumenta— tion with Ismael Zahed.9 It is at this time, he tells us in his autobiography, that Abu 'Abdallah NEtilI,lo proclaiming to be a philosopher arrived from Bokhara, was received by Ayicenna's father and Avicenna placed under his tutelage.ll With NEtilI he read the Eisagoge of Porphry,l2 and five or six figures from the Elements of Euclid, completing the rest by himself.13 From this he moved on to Ptolemy's Almagest; but NEtilI, we are told, was not well versed in it, so, after the Introduction, Avicenna finished the work by himself and helped NEtilI understand it as well.1h Having read the Eisggoge with NEtilI, Avicenna by himself commenced a study of logic books and commentaries upon them until he had gained expertise in that subject.15 Unfortunately, we are told neither what books nor what commentar— ies these were. It would be useful to have this information, if only to determine what initial influences might have shaped his thoughts in logic. We surmise, though, that the "books" were most likely those of Aristotle and the "commentaries? commentaries upon these. Our surmise is not without foundation, for commenting on the progress of his studies, Avicenna names a particular Aristotelian work when he says that, having mastered logic, physics, and mathematics, "I returned to the science of theology (i.e., metaphysics) and engaged myself in the study of the book Ta Meta ta.Physica."16 This means that he had 3 probably already mastered that part of the Aristotelian corpus which traditionally precedes the Metaphysica. But the final determination of the titles and the sequence in which he read the Aristotelian corpus lies beyond the scope of this paper. While Avicenna was in the midst of his study of the Almagest, NEtilI left for Gurgan. Hereafter, there is no mention of any other teacher under whom Avicenna studied.17 Avicenna continued his studies in texts and commentaries on the Physics and the Metaphysics but was soon attracted to medicine; he pursued that subject both in theory and practice and gained such a reputation in it that even accomplished physicians came to study with him. He was then, he reports, sixteen years old.18 Once again, at this age, he turned to logic and other parts of philosophy for another year and a half.19 It is during this period that he had begun the-study of Aristotle's Metaphysica. He despaired of ever understanding it, until perchance he came across Al-Farabi's commentary on it; which, finally, for him, proved to be the key to understanding this work.20 Finally, during this period, as a result of having participated in the cure of Nfih II bin Mansur (A.D. 976—977), the ruler of Bokhara, 21 There Avicenna was granted the use of the SamanId royal library. he perused "the list of the books of the ancients"22 and obtained those books that he desired. The library must have had rich holdings, for he says, "I obtained books whose very titles many have not heard of. '[Books] that I too had neither seen before nor have seen with anyone since."23 He completed his study of these by the time he reached his eighteenth birthday.2h h This is all that he tells us of his initial formative years in philosophy. Undoubtedly he visited other libraries during his travels,25 but no other libraries are mentioned either by him or by JuzJEnI. Historians have tried to establish intellectual connections between Avicenna and other philosophers.26 They have also, from other sources, supplied us with a partial list of books read by Avicenna at the very early stages of his development.27 However, such information is not supplied by the autobiography and its continuation by JuzJEnI. JuzJEnI in his continuation of the autobiography includes a bib- liography of Avicenna's works. He lists ninety-five works in all.28 It is noteworthy that in this list only three are in Persian, the rest being in Arabic. Of these three in Persian, one only, Kitab-i 'Alai ('AIE'I's Book), known also as Danish Nameh-i‘Alai (The Alai Book of Science) is on philosophical sciences. It is to Danish Nameh-i Alai that we now turn. DANISHANAMEH—I‘ALAI Danish NEmeh-i‘AIEI is also known by other titles. We have already mentioned Kitab-i'Alai. It is also known as Hikmst-i‘Alai (The Elsi Book of Philosophy), Danish Mayah elJAlai (The‘Alai Book of Principle Sciences), and Usool va Nikat-i‘Uloom-i Khamsah Hikmiyyah (The Essentials and Subtleties of Five Philosophical Sciences). But the title by which it is most well-known is Danish Nameh-i‘AlEi. Here- after we shall refer to this book simply as Danish Nfimeh. The book was written in Isfahan,29 and it is dedicated to‘Ald al-Dawlah Abfi thar Muhammad bin DushmanziyEr Kikuyiah (A.D. 1008- 1051), the ruler of Isfahan, and Avicenna's protector and master. 5 In fact, as Avicenna himself tells us, the work was undertaken at the specific command of the king 30 hence,the word'Al§i_in the title. The exact date of the composition of the work is not known. However, we do know31 that Avicenna, who had served Shams al-Dawlah as prime minister in HamadEn, left Ramadan for Isfahan shortly after the accession of Shams al-Dawlah's son, SamE' al-Dawlah, in A.D. 1021. How soon after the accession Avicenna left we do not know.32 We do know that Avicenna died in A.D. 1037, which means that the Danish Ngmgh_was composed ca. A.D. 1021-1037, which is ca. h12-h28 of the Is- 33 lamic era. This leaves a margin of sixteen years which must needs be narrowed. Unfortunately, we cannot attempt that task in this paper. The book is written in PErsi DarrI.3h The term Darrl, derived from the term darbir, signifies language used in the king's darbEr, or court. The custom of calling the court language DarrI apparently goes at least as far back as the Sassanians.35 Ibn al—Nadim (ca. A.D. 935- 990/991) says that the 2255i, as a proper language (and the court language), came "chiefly from the language of the people of KhurEsEn and the East, the speech of the people of Balkh."36 Avicenna's family also hailed from Balkh, but by Avicenna's time PErSI DarrI, while re- taining the significance of "court Persian," had also probably come to signify the common language of the populace, as opposed to PehlevI on the one hand and ngi (i.e., Arabic) on the other.37 So when Avicenna wrote the DEnish Nameh, he wrote a book in the spoken language of the Persian royal courts and the language understood by the general popu- lace, who nevertheless retained their local dialects. The literary situation in the Persian language in the Islamic fifth century is reflected by Browne, when he reports that we have t 6 scanty knowledge of Persian prose works before the middle of the fifth century A.H.38 He might well have added that except for DEnish Nameh we have no knowledge of a philosophical work in Persian belonging to this era. I The absence of philosophical literature in the Persian language does not, of course, mean the absence of philosophical literature or output in Persia. 0n the contrary, many of the major contributions to Islamic philosophical literature came from scholars and philosophers in Persia; but they wrote in Arabic, the common literary language of the Muslim world.39 Thua.Avicenna's writing a philosophical work in Persian in ca. A.H. h12—h28 is a major departure from the usual philosophical literary practice of his day. Avicenna seems to have been conscious of this. For example, instead of just enumerating the subjects he wishes to discuss, he is also attentive to the language; for he says that the king's order is "that it is necessary that I, one of the servants of his court, write in PErSi DarrI a book...."ho Such a remark, which calls attention to the language used in the book, is not found in any of his other works. Also, in the Danish Nameh, he seems to quite deliberately choose 3 Al Persian word where a more common Arabic word was available. Finally, Avicenna makes specialized use of Persian words to replace technical philosophical Arabic terms.h2 Such departures from the usual practice as we have just mentioned indicate that Danish Nameh is most probably the first such effort in post—Islamic Persian.)43 Thus Avicenna "can claim to be the actual originator of Persian philosophical language."hh h 7 At the present stage of our studies, it is not possible to deter- mine the extent of educational use, pOpularity, and reception of this book either in Iran or the Muslim world at large}5 The book may have been used in the palace school of Sultan Muhammad II (FEtih) "the Conqueror" (r. A.D. 1hhh-lhh6 and again A.D. thl-lh8l) in Istanbul}6 in which case perhaps its use for instructional purposes was fairly well established. However, the book seems already to have been rare in the 1700's and most likely even before."7 Evidently, the book was overshadowed by the voluminous Avicennian philosophical corpus in Arabian8 TRANSLATIONS AND PRINTED EDITIONS There is a French translation, by Mohammad Achena and Henri Masse, of the first two sections (logic and metaphysics) of Danish NEmeh. This translation was published in Paris in 1955 and is entitled, Avicenna: Le Livre de Science, Vol. I. The first printed edition that we know of was printed in Hyderabad (Deccan), India,h9 in A.H. 1309, that is, ca. A.D. 1891. This edition includes the Danish Nameh in its entirety. However, it reproduces only one manuscript which is neither identified nor discussed. Another editionso came out in Tehran, Iran, in A.H. 1315 (ca. A.D. 1936). This edition is confined to the metaphysics section of the Danish Nameh. Finally, the third edition was published from Tehran in A.H. 1371 (A.D. 1952) as part of the commemoration of the millenary of Avicenna's birth. This edition is complete in a series of books, one on each section of the Danish NEmeh, edited either collaboratively or by 8 different individual editors. This is by far the best edition avail- able so far. The printed edition of the-logic section of the Danish Nameh is a collaborative effort by Muhammad Moin and Syed Muhammad Mishkat. This, we have already said, is the best edition available to date. The editors compare ten manuscripts51 and quote the variants. Yet there are some very serious difficulties with this edition. The editors do not record variants for each word per line. There is a large number of places where it is nearly impossible, without a restructuring of manuscripts either in whole or in part, to determine where in the text the variation occurs, and whether it is merely a variant reading or an omission or, on the contrary, an addition. We 52 Part of the variation for cite a few representative examples. p. 21, L. 8, is actually noted as footnote h, belonging to p. 22, L. 3. The variation is not clearly brought out on p. h2, L. 9, n. 13. The variation for part of p. hT, L. 8, actually occurs on p. h9, n. 1. Variations for manuscripts ;> ($31) and “(J/(ks: bay) are recorded on p. 7h, n. 1, whereas they actually belong to p. 73, L. 8. This particular error, however, may be attributed to a printing error, where the last word " )J’, " (2203.) of p. 73, L. 8, is repeated as the first word on p. 7h, L. 1. On p. 51, nn. 5-9, and p. 52, nn. 8-11, it is impossible to say where the variations belong and what exactly they are, without a restructuring of the manuscript material. In short, we have had to restructure a large number of passages from various manu- scripts, particularly U , to determine exactly what a given vari- ation was and where exactly it belonged. In fact, an intercollation 9 with the Moin and Mishkat edition would have been impossible without such an undertaking. Other difficulties have to do with punctuation which could have affected the meaning of the author, for example, on p. 9, L. 3. Yet another set of difficulties centers on adoptions which seriously affect the intent of the author. For example, on p. 3h, LL. 7—8, the editors adopt chunin both for the antecedent and the consequent in Avicenna's example of a conjunctive conditional (or a hypotheti- cal) proposition. If we let 'p' stand for chunin, which itself stands for a proposition, we have Avicenna saying that an example of a conjunctive conditional proposition is 'if p then p'; there is, of course, logically nothing wrong with this example, but clearly this is a special case of 'if p then q',53 and it is this latter which Avicenna clearly intended as an example. Thus, instead of chunin, chunan should have been adopted. Such a reading was 5h available. THE PRESENT EDITION We have made a new edition of the logic section of Danish Nameh-i (Algi. Only approximately half of this is the subject of our study in this paper. The half which is studied here is enclosed from page 2h to 92. We were fortunate in being able to consult two manuscripts that have never been made use of in any previous edition of Danish Nameh. One of these manuscripts is preserved in the British Museum Library and the other in the India Office Library. These manuscripts are 10 fully described and discussed below. We do not include a list of manu- scripts used by Moin and Mishkat, as, other than having the Moin and Mishkat record of variations, the manuscripts were inaccessible to us. - Our manuscripts are: M§;A;: This manuscript is Ethé 218, 1.0. h78, preserved in the India Office Library, London. It measures 8 1/h inches by A 7/8 inches, has 168 folios with an average of 1h lines recto and the same verso. The section on logic begins on folio 2a and ends on hhb, and it is scribed in the Naskhi style.55 The year the transcription of the logic section was finished is dated by the scribe, as also noticed by Ethe, as A.H. 106k (A.D. 165%). However, if we read further down folio hhb we read on lines h and 5 the following,"fi al-Khamis Ghurra shahr Jamidi al-awwal" which, strange as the expression is, most likely means "the fifth day of Jamadi al-awwal." That is to say, the transcription finished the fifth Jamadi al—awwal A.H. 106h, that is March 2h, A.D. 165h. The writing is clear and easy to read except for those places that are faded. The main section headings are all in red ink. Be- cause of fading, various places from folios 1-7 are unreadable, but starting with folio 8 the section on logic is very clear. Folios 3-5 are out of order,56 but this does not seem to be a scribal error, since once the folios are placed in order there is no discontinuity in the material.57 We might also note that the last four lines of folio l6a are repeated as the first four lines of folio 16b. This indeed is a scribal error. 11 There is a consistent orthographical replacement of Jugwi'by jggLi and of giyasha by giyasha'i, and gawhar is replaced by Jawhar. These examples indicate that either the manuscript from which "A" was transcribed had these changes, or that the scribe (perhaps un- consciously) wrote the Arabic in place of the Persian terms. The other deviations are mostly scribal style58 and omission of dots which are of no philosophical interest. M§;§;: This-manuscript is Dr. 16,830, preserved in the British Museum Library. It measures 9 inches by h 3/h inches. This manu- script, consisting of Danish Nameh in its entirety, has 283 folios. The logic section consists of folios 3a to 66b.59 There is an average of eleven lines each recto and verso per folio. It is scribed in the Nastfi'lig style, which is the common Persian style. Unlike manuscript A, manuscript B has no date. The best we can do is refer to the note of the penultimate owner,60 who penned A.H. 1127, ca. A.D. 1715, as the date when he obtained the manuscript. Accord- ing to William Yule,61 the different parts of the manuscript are from the 17th and 18th centuries. The logic section would probably be from the 17th century, but we cannot be sure of the date at all. Manuscript B is entitled Danish Nameh. The manuscript is sur- prisingly well preserved and easy to read, the only serious fading being a short one on folio 39a. The main section headings have been underscored, most likely by the scribe himself. There are a large number of marginal corrections, seemingly in the scribe's handwriting; and repetitions are crossed out, for example, a part of the last line of folio 21b and a part of the first line of folio 22". 12 "B," as will be noticed from the collation, has many more explana- tory words and phrases. We are appreciative of the skill with which they have been blended in the text. These have been of some help to us in understanding the text. Like "A," "B also, in places, adopts Arabic orthography for Persian. There is a consistent orthographical replacement62 ofL/i"myciflh'(b0th pronounced sughra), and. [4!(uy Ckzgf1both pronounced kappa). Replace- ment of hamli by hamliah, munfasil by munfasilah can also be found. The 1952 printed edition was also used in the formulation of our best. This edition is designated by the letter P in the collation. When- ever necessary we also adopted readings from the manuscript variations quoted in the printed edition. Only those Moin and Mishkat manuscripts from which adoptions were made are collated by means of enclosing their names within corners (i.e., "<':’"). These manuscripts are described in the printed edition, and we have retained the sigla used therein. 1 The procedure followed as to compare and collate "A" and "B" with the printed edition. Variation for each word or phrase was recorded, one each on a separate line. Appropriate symbolism63 was used to indicate, without ambiguity, whether the word or phrase was an omission or an addition or simply a variant reading. The printed text was examined once again in the light of this collation, but, this time, also with respect to the manuscript vari- antséh quoted in the printed version. It was at this stage that questions of adoptions, omissions, and variations were considered, and our text started taking shape. At this stage also the printed variations and the adaptions of the manuscript variations quoted in the printed version were intercollated with "A" and "B". 13 Obviously, in such a task language is a consideration. As far as possible we have guarded-the text against modernisms, whether they be late expressions, sentence structures, or spellings.- We have also tried to guard the text against later interpolations. We have avoided as many Arabic words as possible, that is, if Persian equivalents were available in the manuscripts. Though in this work Avicenna formu— lates philosophical vocabulary in Persian, even he could not nor would have wanted to eschew all Arabic philosophical technical terms. Because of these considerations, and Avicenna's own style in this work, we have made no attempt to make the text smooth. We should also remember that Avicenna was not contributing to belles lettres but writing a book in philosophy. Thus philosophy, not language, has been our maJor consideration. We have chosen that language which makes the best philosophical sense, which does not make him commit errors he him— self would have avoided, and which clarifies his philosophical intent and meaning as far as possible even though the language be strained. This, in fact, has been our guiding principle both in formulating the text and attempting its translation. The text has been divided into "Avicenna's Preface," "Avicenna's Introduction" and thirteen chapters in order to facilitate its reading and discussion. The translation also reflects these divisions. A translator cannot completely detach himself from the role of an interpretor nor should he. His role as an interpreter is best when it is minimal. He should let the author speak. We have, therefore, tried to make the translation literal. Paraphrasing has been avoided, but we have expanded the translation by use of square brackets within the body of the translation. The square brackets in the margins and notes, 1h however, correspond to Persian page numbers. The unbracketed numbers in the margins refer to Persian line numbers for the Persian page number. Avicenna does not use logic symbols, but, in order to facilitate the discussion of certain points, we have used ' 3 ', 'V', and '8" as abbreviations for the English expressions, 'if...then', 'or', and 'and', respectively. We have also used parentheses as grouping indicators. Thus, '(p&q) 3 (er)' is to be read 'If p and q, then p or r'. The book Danish Nameh, in its entirety, consists of logic, physics, metaphysics, and mathematics.65 Avicenna himself completed the sections on logic, physics, and metaphysics and some parts of mathematics which were lost, and so his pupil, Juzjani, completed the whole section of mathematics relying on various Avicennian sources.66 Danish Nameh then is an encyclopedic work as are the Shifa' (The Book of Remedy) and the §§j§t_(The Book of Deliverence). As such the logic section considered in this study is a part of this larger work. The section on logic in Danish Nameh starts with a preface in which Avicenna declares his plan for the book. While enumerating the planned sections, he exhibits a classification of sciences which is Aristotelian.67 Yet, in a subsequent passage, he informs us that, contrary to the usage and custom, he is, after completing logic, going to begin his exposition with sciences "at the higher level [namely 68 metaphysics]" and move gradually to the sciences lower down. The "usage and custom,’ of course, refers to the presentation of the Aristotelian corpus in which the Meta sica follows the Physics. But with respect to the objects studied by each of the three theoreti- 69 cal sciences, and whether their objects are separable and immutable or not (i.e., from sensible matter), Aristotle leaves no doubt that 15 "the speculative sciences are to be preferred to the other sciences, and 'theology' to the other speculative sciences."70 Since the object of philosophy "can be only Being as such"71 and since metaphysics is the science which studies being qu§_being, Aristotle himself calls it "first Philosophy." Thus Avicenna's arrangement is contrary to custom and practice, but it is in keeping with Aristotle's own teachings about the relative positions of the theoretical sciences. We may perhaps say, with hesitation, that the Avicennian arrangement of the books of Danish Nameh is reflective more of the Aristotelian ontology than his epistemology. Avicenna in his preface does not attempt to classify logic in any one of the sciences but construes it as a necessary preliminary to any science. It is nevertheless termed an 'ilmf (science), which, in 7 this appellation and subsequent discussion, 2 suggests that logic is to be taken as a specific theoretic discipline. While logic in itself 73 has no loss or gain, which suggests its subject neutrality, logic is called a balance which can separate the certain from the uncertain, and thus knowledge from non-knowledge,7" a characterization which suggests both its instrumentality and pervasiveness. This view of logic is in keeping with the Parapatetic tradition. Aristotle himself does not explicitly state whether logic is an instru- ment of philosophy or part of philosophy. Andronicus' calling the collection of Aristotle's logical works the Organon, however, indicates that the later antiquity accepted logic as an instrument of science. The decision whether it is exclusively one or the other may reflect on the nature of logic, but the decision depends more on how one construes science and art and the relation between these.75 i’”~i‘s 16 ‘The main purpose of the development of logical theory for Avicenna seems to center on the process of tasdig (verification or justification) which, in the end, is an epistemological concern.76 This concern cannot be met without the theoretical development of logic, which in turn cannot be accomplished without considering logic, internally, as A a special intellectual discipline in its own right. Thus, for Avicenna logic is a special theoretical discipline which also serves as an instrument of the sciences. This we consider to be the view of the Danish Némeh, and it is corroborated by the §§i£§L-77 The logic book of the Danish Nameh is unlike the Shifa' and also the Organon in that the Danish Nameh does not divide logic material in separate books as do both the §hi§§ and the Organon. Rather the topical structure of Danish Nameh parallels that of the Egjét, But the presentation of topics, as in the Najég, reflects broadly the organization of the Organon. Internally, though, since Danish Nameh is not a commentary on Aristotle, Avicenna is selective of his material. From the point of view of logic the book may be divided into two sections between simple and compound tenms; from an epistemological point of view the division, which covers exactly the same material, is between tasawwar (simple comprehension) and tasdig (verification). The first section (Chapters I-IV) is a rapid and selective presen- tation of the materials basically from the Categories of Aristotle and Porphyry's Eisagoge. The Aristotelian categories are neither mentioned nor discussed,and the material presented seems to range over only chapters two and three of the Categories. As far as the 17 Eisgggge material is concerned, it too is presented swiftly and is confined to definitions and short discussions of the predicables.78 Besides acquainting the reader with basic distinctions and vocabulary, the important logical task of the section, as we see it, is to classify terms as simple (222221) and compound (murakkab) and as singular (125:1) and general (k311i). It also considers essential (zati) or accidental ('arzi) predication. This depends on whether the attribute referred to by the general term,79 which serves as the predicate, is an essential attribute of the subject or not. The issue of essential predication is, of course, central to the theory of definitions. For "the purpose in a definition is to know the true nature of a thing,"80 that is, a definition gives us the essence of a thing, that is, its essential attribute. In fact, it is this feature of a definition which separates it from a description.81 But in virtue of what is an attribute essential, and how is it known? It is in the light of the answer82 to this question that essential predication is to be understood. The answer would depend largely on the analysis of Avicennian metaphysics. But that task is beyond the scope of this paper. The first section ends with Chapter IV which begins the subject matter of Aristotle's De Interpyetatione. Avicenna once again is selective and interjects a chapter on conditional proposition. The De Integpretatione material ends with Chapter VIII, and the Ana ica gzigyg_material begins with Chapter IX. A chapter on conditional syllogism is added. The subject matter of Analytics Priora is followed by Analytics Posteriora; Avicenna skips the main part of the Topics, and the book ends with the appendix to the Topics, De Sophisticis 18 Elenchis, evidently thinking that the important parts of the Topics had already been covered in Chapter II. The Rhetorica and the Poetics which are included in the Shifa' are excluded here. Thus the bulk of the Danish Nameh book on logic is in the second section. . Our own text, translation, and notes for this study end with Avicenna's discussion of reductio ad impossibile. The main concern of the second section of the Danish Nameh book on logic is with compound expressions, that is to say, with various types of propositions and their combinations resulting in a syllogism. Avicenna defines a proposition as the result of the combination of simple terms, any one of which "is [such] that when you hear it you may [properly] say [of it that] it is true, or [else that] it is false."83 As in Aristotle,8" and in accordance with this definition, supplications and commands are exempted from.being propositions.85 We might remark here that Avicenna introduces three terms:86 gggiyg, khabar (report), sokhan-e jazim (judgmental discourse). The last is the Persian equivalent for ppkp_which means 'judgment." Of these, he almost exclusively uses gadiya to mean "proposition.” Propositions are divided into predicative (pgpli), and two types of conditionals, viz., conjunctive conditional (sharti muttasil) and disjunctive conditional (sharti munfasil). Following Aristotle, the subject-predicate proposition is classified both according to quality and quantity. Again following Aristotle,87 indefinite propositions, which Avicenna calls "indeter- minate prop csitions,‘ tions.88 But Avicenna does not offer the same argument as Aristotle are considered the same as particular proposi- for construing an indefinite proposition as a particular proposition. l9 Aristotle's reason for equating the two is that they both have the 89 Avicenna, however, explicitly bases his same inferential force. argument on the interpretation or the semantics of the quantifiers: "The indetenminate...judgment is [really] a particular judgment...for the reason that when you say 'man is such [and such]', [then in] your utterance [the term] 'man' may [mean] 'all men' or...'one man' in that 'all men' are men and 'one man' is also a man. Therefore, ['man' means 'some men' with certainty and 'all men' [only] with doubt."9° Evidently, Aristotle also had the semantics of the quantifiers as the basis of his assertion; if so, Avicenna explicates the argument. Another thing to be noticed about the Avicennian interpretation of predicative propositions is the interesting fact that he asserts that the propositicn that every many is an animal is the same as the 91 This raises proposition that whatever is a man is an animal. interesting prospects and questions. Does he, for example, translate other predicative propositions into sentences of first-order predicate logic? We have not found other such attempts in the Danish NEmeh; there may be clues in his other works on logic, but unfortunately they have not yet been studied. Aristotle introduced term variables for the first time in the Anglypica Priora.92 Avicenna also introduces letters of the alphabet as variables in the Danish Nameh and is aware of the fact that they may replace either simple terms or compound tenms;93 but, whereas Aristotle used the letters as term variables, Avicenna does not. Rather he uses words which are grammatically particles and which may indiscriminately be translated as 'such', ‘so', and 'that', etc., in contexts where we might use 'such and so', 'this and that', and 'thus and 30', etc. Avicenna turns these, by his use, into discrete symbols. 20 He makes them do double duty, however, in that he uses them as term variables in predicative propositions and as propositional variables in conditional propositions.9" Avicenna, as previously mentioned, considers two types of condi— tional propositions in Chapter VII of the Danish Nameh. These propo- sitions, Avicenna points out, are distinguished from the predicative propositions by the fact that whereas predicative propositions have terms as their constituent parts, the conditional propositions have propositions as their constituent parts.95 But whereas conjunctive conditionals are confined to having only two parts?6 the disjunctive conditionals are not.97 Conjunctive conditionals are propositions that result from join- ing two propositions by means of 'if...then'. He is careful to point out98 that the term 'if' and the term 'then' are not to be included in the antecedent (mugaddam) and the consequent (tali),respectively. These propositions pose some interesting problems in Avicenna's logic. For example, the semantics of the connective 'if...then' in the Danish Nameh is not clear. The solution will have to rest on two factors: first, the interpretation of sazgari and nESEngri,99 and second, the evidence from other sources analyzed and sorted out. This latter, as we have pointed out in several other places, is not at hand. _Disjunctive conditionals result by combining two or more proposi- tions by 'or.']'.00 The problem is to decide whether the term ya, that is 'orfl is to be taken as being synonymous with the Latin 'vel' or the Latin 'aut'. The task of interpreting sazgar and casazgar is some- what easier here. There seems to be a good case for taking 'or' as exclusive.101 Yet when, what seem to be paradigmatic examples of 21 inferences in the Isharat are examined, it turns out that they exhibit forms that are validating in either case. In fact, it would seem that Avicenna has both and is aware of the distinction.102 But corrobora- tive evidence and further analysis is required. He also says that there is a form of syllogism which pertains to conditional proposi- tions. This he calls the istethn‘é'I syllogism.]‘o3 Paradigmatic examples clearly indicate that what he intends by istethna'i syllogism is to cover the rules of.modus ponens, modus tolens and the disjunc- tive syllogism. There have been some problems in translating the term istethnE' from which the adjective istethna'i is derived. In the literature istethna' is taken to indicate exception,and the istethna'i syllogisms are called exceptive syllogisms in contrast to categorical syllogisms which are called igtirani (conjunctive) syllogisms. One may adduce two obvious reasons for calling istethna'i syllo— gisms exceptive syllogisms. First, the term istethna' means exception, taking out, or setting aside. Second, Avicenna's practice, in his "discussion of arguments patterned after modus ponens, is to introduce the second premiss by the word laikin (but)}0" which is an istethnE'i (exceptive) particle in Persian. Thus, in view of the meaning of the term istethna' and Avicenna's use of the word laikin, there would seem to be a prima facie case for calling istethna'i syllogisms exceptive syllogisms. However, the inferential process indicates otherwise; for an examination of the fonm reveals that we have a proposition 'if p then q' which is a compound of two propositions; to this com- pound we Edd another proposition 'p', and, by virtue of this addition, we draw the conclusion 'q'. A recent study of the term istethnE' 22 discloses that the term in question was used in Arabic to also trans- late the Greek terms prosthesis and prosdiorismos which imply addition.105 Still, we notice with respect to the first premiss, that although the antecedent is added (istethna'), the consequent is excepted or detached (istethnfi'); both of these processes belong to the same inferential movement, so it seans that the term istethna' is used here ambiguously to indicate both the processes: i.e., one of structuring the inference and the other of inferring. Avicenna's discussion of conditional propositions, and, for example, modus ponens, poses a historical question also, namely, what are Avicenna's historical sources? Although Aristotle presents his syllogistic figures in conditional form,106 his known writings do not contain a special treatise devoted to the logic of conditional propositions. He uses modus ponens, for example, but does not explicitly state it as a validating fonm or a rule of inference. It is plain, from Avicenna's discussion of condi- tional propositions, that Avicennian sources cannot be directly located in the Aristotelian corpus. His discussion, rather, reflects his reliance on Stoic sources; but we have no evidence of any Stoic or Megaric logicians being translated into Arabic.107 Evidently Avicenna's sources must be found in Aristotle's later Greek commentators. Turning to conjunctive syllogisms, that is, categorical syllogisms, the Avicennian presentation follows Aristotle. In all three figures, Avicenna states the various combinations of A, E, I, O propositions, taken as pairs, which yield valid conclusions 108 in the figure in question. Yet, as we have noticed, he is not able to rule out by this process certain invalid combinations. 23 In regard to many problems of interpretation that have been raised in this study, we may add here that their solution may well lie in the study of Aristotle's Greek_commentators. We have, however, confined our references to Aristotle. No doubt Aristotelian doctrines, as commented upon by his Greek commentators, reached Avicenna, and he should also be studied in the light of these commentaries; but this is not done here because it is a much wider problem, appropriate for a more encompassing study than the present one. 2h reflux/lime: u] / § v )b’d/S} I:)//J/ Gabe—cry: I) 9“ka- // , ‘Usw/ a: by / 92.x , (I: ow: J “dbl/J .. , /, , // . 4y ()ka Lela/J LQJX (JV/J jvléc: ‘33)ng) qu/xusufllfi-n,av ULrb/LzJL’ (Jr/fiteffij ’JLJIJJ 0291?») rlMJLJ/ “Jain/J) fol): 'o’Mnyl QJJ/‘J‘l/i 0’91: (ff/1’ (ff—97 UMK/UJ WAFJJJI a. / - / /. J’J‘erd was“ 19:5” em ./ . 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[1] All praises and thanks are due to God, the creator, and the giver of wisdom. And blessings on His prophet, Muhammad Mustafa, and on his family members and companions. 5 [There came to me] the order of my exalted master, the victorious and Just king, Adhuddin‘Ala-al Dawlah, who is aided by God and who is the pride of the faithful and the crown of the religious leaders, Abu Jafar Muhammad bin Doshmanziar, the master and the leader of the faithful. May his life be long and destiny victorious, and may his kingdom be increased [from day 10 to day]. [His order] came to me, his slave and servant of his court, [I] who have found in his service all the fulfillment of my objectives by way of security, greatness, dignity, sufficiency, pursuit of knowledge, and [the very] nearness [of the king hbnself]. [His order is] that it is necessary that I, one of the servants of his court, write in Pars} Barri a book in which I bring together the principles and fine points of five sciences from the sciences of wisdom of the ancients in a 15 simple and condensed form. First, logic, [as] that science is the measure [of all other sciences]. 130 131 Second, natural science, which is the science concerning those things which can be touched, seen, or moved and changed.109 [2] Third, the science of astronomy which deals with the origin of the world, and the conditions and the manner of the movement of the heavens and stars; as [both] are open to observation, and so it is befitting to know their [true] nature. Fourth, the science of music which discloses the causes 5 of harmony and disharmony in voices and [also discloses] the origin of tones. Fifth, the science of those things that are beyond the science of natural things. And [this] has been decided [by me], that when logic has been completed, then [the following] strategy [as conducive to the better presentation of the sciences under consideration] has been brought about: [namely,] that a beginning has been made with those sciences which are at the higher level,110 [proceeding] 10 whereafter gradually to those sciences which are lower down, contrary to that which is the usage and the custom. Therefore, if there was no guidance [available] as to the assignment of a science [to] a place [in this scheme], then [it is] taken as one of the lower sciences. Thus I, a servant [of the king], even though I did not consider myself worthy of these sciences and [moreover] viewed 15 [them to be] above my capacity and ability, thought [neverthe- less] that when I obey my benefactor and carry out his order, then by [some] good fortune [my] obedience might result in [3] success. And [so], relying on my creator, I occupied.myself with carrying out the order [of the king]. [AVI CENNA ' 5 INTRODUCTION] [WHEREIN] THE PURPOSES AND THE ADVANTAGES OF LOGIC [h] ARE MADE CLEAR Knowing is of two kinds: The first is through concepts, a [process] which is called tasawwur in Arabic. For instance, if somebody says, "man," ' or "angel," or anything similar to this, you under- "fairy,' stand and you can conceive and realize what he intends by 5 those words. The second is knowing by Judging [or verifying]. For example, you Judge [and verify whether or not] this is a fairy, or that some man is under the orders [of somebody], or anything similar to this. This brocess] is known as tasd1glll in Arabic. Both of these [ways of knowing occur] in two manners: One is that [a thing] may be conceived by thought and for 10 the conception of which there is no other way except reasoning; for example, to comprehend what the soul is and form a concep- tion of it and to Judge the immortality of the soul and to verify it. The other is that we conceive a thing about which we Judge: not through argumentative thinking and summoning it from the intellect, but by way of a priori knowledge. Thus, we know 15 that whatever things are equal to one [and the same] thing, 132 133 then however many they may be, each One of them will also be equal to one another. Or [we may know things] through the senses: for instance, that the sun is bright. Or we may accept things from the great and wise people, [5] such as experts on Islamic law [and those who are] religious leaders. Or it may be something on which [all]_people agree and we may have been brought up [believing in those things], 1hr example, [when] we say, "Lying is bad," or "One should not be 5 cruel." Or [it may rest] on those other similar things that come latest to the memory. And before any [unknown] thing is conceived or verified by reasoning, it is necessary that we know something else, so that we [may] know the unknown through the known. An example of this in the area of concepts is that if it 10 is not known to us what man is.and somebody [by way of] disclos- ing [this] to us says, "A man is an animal who speaks,"lthen] I it is necessary that we should first have known the meaning of "animal" and the meaning of "speaker" and have conceived of these, and [it is only] afterwards then that we might [come to] ' 15 know that which was not known to us about the meaning of man. And an example of this in the area of reasoning and verifi- cation is that, if it is not known to us that the world is originatedljizand somebody [by way of] disclosing [this] to us [6] says, "The world is formed and whatever is formed is originated," 13h [then] it is necessary that we should have [accepted it as] verified and [hence] known113 that the world is formed, and also [accepted it as] verified and [hence] known that whatever is formed is originated, [it is only] afterwards then that we come to know that which we did not know, [which in the present example is] about the 5 world's originated.mode. Thus, whatever we do not know but want to know by means of some [other] thing, [then] we know [now] that [that other thing] should be known to us first. And [so] whatever was not known to us becomes known by [means of] the known. But it is not the case that every known leads us to the knowledge of every unknown. [A known can lead us to the knowl- lO edge of an unknown only when] the unknown is commensurate [with the known] so that it [might be] possible to know [the unknown] through it; and[also when] there is a method such that by that method it is possible to get from the known to the unknown till it [too] becomes known. The science of logic is that science in which the conditions of knowing the unknown through the known are made explicit: [namely,] what it is which is true and what it is which is [only] 15 near the truth and what it is which is false. Each of these [three] is of several kinds. The science of logic is a balanced science while the other sciences are sciences [which have] either gain or loss. Man's salvation is [concomitant] with the purity of his [7] soul. And the purity of the soul [depends] on the accomplish- ment of worths in its existence and keeping away from the 135 corrupting of [one's] nature. And the way to both [the accom- plishment of worths and the prevention of corruption] is through knowledge. And any [purported] knowledge which has not been weighed in the balance [of logic] has no certitude, hence, in 5 reality is not knowledge [at all]. Therefore, there is no escape from learning logic. This science of the ancients has one [peculiar] character- istic, [which is,] that the student of this [science] in the beginning of [his] work does not know what the advantage is in that which he is learning, until suddenly in the end he comes to know and understand [both] its advantage and its purpose. 10 It is therefore necessary that the reader of this book not become disheartened by hearing things which do not manifest their usefulness immediately. THE BEGINNING OF THE SCIENCE OF LOGIC [8] 136 [SECTION I] 137 [CHAPTER I] THE EXPLANATION OF THAT WHICH IN TERMS AND IDEAS IS [9] CALLED SIMPLE Simple and compound terms: It is necessary that it be known that terms11h are of two kinds. One is called simple; for instance, you say, "Zayd" or "Muhammad," or, for instance, you say, "man" or "wise." The 5 other is called compound or compiled; for instance, you say, "The man is learned" or "the wise man." And ncm until the nature of simple words becomes known can the nature of com- pound words become known. Clarification of [the classification of] terms as general and singular: Every simple term is either general or singular. 10 A general term is that which in the same sense is equally applicable to many things. For example, you [might] say, "man," in that [the term] man in one and the same sense is applicable [equally] to [persons named] Zayd, 'Amar, and Bakr. If it is that [in a given case] the term was applied only to one thing, then you may be able to imagine such that you apply it to many 15 things. That [is] by imagination you are able to think [of] many [10] things belonging to that concept. 138 139 Thus, you are able to think of many suns and.many moons [to which the term.sun and the term moon will respectively apply; although as a.matter of common practice these terms are in fact applied each to one thing respectively]. A singular term is that [of which] it is impossible that it apply to [any] except [exactly] one thing in one [and the same] meaning. [That is,] you cannot in the same meaning apply 5 [that word] to other things. For example, when you say [the proper name] Zayd,[then] the meaning of "Zayd" is not [anything else] except [that particular person called] Zayd. Thus, if you call some other thing Zayd [also], then you call it [that] with a different meaning, not with the same meaning [as in the first case]. The learned are not occupied with the nature of singular terms and singular concepts, rather their occupation is with general concepts. And there is no doubt that every general 10 [term or concept] subsumes [some] singular [terms and concepts]. Exposition of general-essential and general-accidental: [A] general in relation to its singulars is either essential or accidental. The [general-lgessential [term] is such that when you know its meaning and [also] the meaning of the singular [it subsumes], 15 [then] you would necessarily know three cases: First, you would know that that [general] is the meaning of that singular. For instance, when you know what "animal" is [11] and what "man" is, or you know what "number" is and what "four" is, [then] it is impossible that you not know that man is [an] lho animal, and similarly it is also impossible that you not know that four is a number. But if, as substitutions for "animal" and "number," you posit "exist" and "white," [then] it is 5 possible that you not know that man exists or four exists, or man is white, or [man] is not [white]. The second is that you should know that it is necessary [that a thing] be first [subsumable under] that concept which is [general-] essential before [the thing can] be [subsumed under] that concept which is singular. For example, it is 10 necessary that a thing first be an animal before it [can] be a.man, and it is necessary that [a thing] first be a number before it [can] be four, and it is necessary that [a thing first] be a man before it [can] be Zayd. Third is that you should know that no [external] thing has given that particular that [essential] meaning, rather it is that in itself. For example, you know with correctness 15 that no thing renders a man an animal, and [no thing] renders four a number [in that man in himself is an animal, and four in itself is a number]. And if this were not [the case], then a man could be a non-animal, and similarly four could be a [12] non-number, which is impossible. The meaning of our saying that something renders [another] thing thus and so is, that the thing [in question] by and in itself was not thus and so, but something else has externally rendered it thus and so. But if it is not possible that a 5 thing [in] itself be [anything] except thus and so, then no thing has rendered it so. lhl Certainly that thing which renders [a thing] a man also renders [that thing] an animal, but it does not render man an animal, in that man [in] himself is an animal and four [in] itself is a number, and blackness [in] itself is a color. This [however] is not so [for example with] man's whiteness, in that there is something [not pertaining to man as man] which renders a man white, [whether it be] in his [physical or physiological] nature or external to his nature. Nor is it so [with] man's existence, in that something [else] is necessary to give man existence. Thus, every concept which has [met] these three conditions is essential, and anything which has not [met] even one of these three conditions is accidental. The accidental is that [of which] it is not possible that it ever [occurs] separated, even in the imagination, from the thing [to which it belongs]. For example, evenness [is not separable] from a thousand. Or, for example, [a geometrical figure's] three angles being [equal] only to two right angles from[its] being a triangle. A triangle's three angles together equaling only two right 115 [Also] the ability to laugh angles will be explained later. by nature, for example, [is not separable] from.man. But these [and others like them] are characteristics which are anterior to the reality [or essence] of the thing. It is necessary that [in order] to explain [the foregoing] we also say this: Man has two characteristics, one [of which 10 15 [13] lhz he has] more intimately than the other. The first is essential and the second is accidental. [The first is] rationality. The explication of this is that he has a rational soul, the soul from which come [his ability] to speak, [his power of] discernment, and [other] 10 characteristics peculiar to humans. The second is risibility. The explication of this is that in his nature [he is] such that when he sees or hears a surpris- ing [or a] strange thing he is surprised. And if [the thing] is not contrary to [his] nature he may [possibly] laugh. But I prior to these two characteristics, it is necessary that first 15 there exist a soul in order that there be a,man. When this soul has become coupled with the body and man has [really] become man, then risibility and the ability to be astonished come. Thus, the posterior characteristic comes [only] after [1h] man has [really] become man. [While] of [the characteristic] previous to this, [namely, of rationality,] it may be said that it is necessary first that a.man have [the] human soul so that he becomes [in the real sense] a man in order that he may laugh by nature. But it is not possible to say that it is necessary first that he become [capable of] laughing by nature in order to have [the] human 5 soul and become [truly] a man. Thus, the former characteristic, [namely, rationality,] is truly essential, and the second characteristic, notwithstand- ing [the fact] it is never apart from man, is not essential [but] accidental. 1143 But [when] you say that Zayd is sitting, or is sleeping, or is old, or is young, [then] there is no doubt that [these are all] accidental; notwithstanding that one [of these may] quickly disappear, and one long endure. 10 [CHAPTER II] [WHEREIN ARE] DESCRIBED GENUS, SPECIES, DIFFERENTIA, [15] PROPERTY AND ACCIDENT There are five [kinds] of general terms: three [general-] essential and two [general-] accidental. The [general-] essentials [themselves] are of two types: One is this: when with respect to things, you ask, "What 5 are they?" then by that question you want [to find out] the reality of the concept of those [things], [and] the answerfto this question] is given [by] a[general—] essential term. For example, when you ask, "What are man, cow, and horse?" then the answer is given that they are animals. And if you ask, "What is blackness [or] whiteness [or] redness?" the answer is 10 given that they are colors. [Again,] if you ask, "What are ten, and five, and three?" the answer is given that they are numbers. Similarly, if it is asked, "What are Zayd, and 'Amar, and Khalid?" the answer is given that they are men. Thus, "animal," "color, number,‘ and "man" [are] in reply 15 to the question, [as to] what [concept] do these things [viz., man, cow, and horse; blackness, whiteness, and redness; ten, five, and three; Zayd, 'Amar, and Khalid respectively] fall under. In Arabic ["animal," "color," "number," and "man"] are [each] called the answer to mE-huwaull6 [And whatever term is [16] lhh lhs general-essential and is the answer to the question "what things?" is genus]. The other is this: when you inquire as to [what] kind [of thing] anyone [of the above things] is in itself [or in its essence, then] the answer [to that query] is this other general- essential term. For example, [suppose] you ask, "What kind of animal is man?" [and] they say "rational;" then "a rational" is the answer to [the question] "What kind is it?" [as applied] to [the animal] man. In Arabic [this is] called the answer to ayyu shayy'in.117 Again, for example, we [may] ask, "What kind of number is 5 four?" and [in answer] they [will say] that [it is such that] by being halved twice it reduces to one. And whatever is a general-essential term.and is the answer to "What kind of thing is it?" is known as differentia. [Note,] however, that general-essential term which is in answer to the question "What is it?" [may be] more general 10 [compared to one general-essential term] and more particular [compared to another general- essential term]. For instance, "body" is more general than "animal" but more particular than "substance." And "animal" is more general than "man" but more particular than "body." Similarly, for example, number is more particular than "quantity" but more general than "even number." While "even number" is more particular than "number" and more general than "four," but "four" is more particular 15 than "even number," however, it is more general than this par- ticular or that particular [instance of] four. So, whichever 1&6 [of two] general [-essential terms] is more general is the genus [of that which is] more particular [than it]. And which- ever general [-essential term] is more particular [of the two] is the species of [that which is] more general. Also there are things which are both genus and species. [17] And there are things that are genus only without being a species under anything [at all]; for instance, "substance" and "quantity" in the examples [we have given]. Also there are things that are species only and genus of no species at all. [This is] for the reason that under these 5 there are no general-essential terms answering to [the question] "What is it?"; instead, under these [terms] there are particulars only, for example, "man" and "four." [Or] for example, "black— ness," in that [one instance of] blackness does not, in [its own] nature, have that separateness from another [instance of] blackness which one color [has] from [a different] color. [This 10 is] for the reason that color from color has that separateness which blackness [has] from whiteness; [that is to say that] they have opposition in terms of essential properties. An [instance of] blackness does not have separation from another [instance of] blackness in [terms of] substance or property, but [the separateness is rather] due to external circumstances. [80,] for example, one [instance of blackness might] be the blackness of a crow, and the other,the blackness of an ink. But the crow and ink are things [that are] external to the nature of blackness [itself]. And [while] the presence of blackness in the crow is the condition of [the crow's being] 15 1&7 black, [it is still] not essential [to the crow]; even though at present, [in a given case, the blackness] is not possible [in fact] to be separated from the crow; nevertheless, in imagination, it is possible [to see] that that blackness [may] be in something else and not be in the crow at all. In fine, all those particulars which are under one [and [18] the same] species have separation one from.the other in [virtue of] accidental things. [Thus] Zayd is different from 'Amar in that Zayd is taller or fairer or older [than 'Amar], or is someone else's son, or from another town. And all [of] these 5 characteristics are accidental. Thus it is [now] manifest that there is a species which cannot become a genus; and this is called the species of species,118 meaning the species of all species that are above it. It is therefore clear that a general-essential [term] is either genus or species or differentia. But a general- 10 accidental [term] either [belongs].to [only] one universal [or class], as, for example, "risibility" to man--[in which case] it is called proEerty--Or the universals [or classes to which it belongs] are more than one, as, for example, "ability to move"--which [belongs] both to man as well as to other things-- and "blackness"--which [belongs] to crows as well as to other 15 things. [In these latter cases the general-accidental terms] are known as common accidents. Thus, every general term is either a genus, such as "animal," or it is species, such as "man," [a species] of animal, or it is lh8 a differentia, such as "rational," or it is a property, such as [19] "risible,' or it is a common accident, such as "moving [thing]" or "white" or "black." [CHAPTER III] [WHEREIN ARE] TO BE FOUND THE CONDITIONS OF DEFINITION [20] AND DESCRIPTION The purpose in a definition is to know the true nature of a thing, and [when this is done] the thing's differentiation [from others] naturally follows [by] itself [so that one need not enumerate these]. The purpose in a description is to give a note of a thing, 5 even though its essence is not truly known, and giving notes [of a thing] is itself to differentiate it [from other things]. Thus, definition is composed of essential characteristics of a thing. To define is this: you take the proximate genus of the thing, for example, "animal" of man. After that, you bring the 10 essential difference [of that thing], thus "rational" [for the present example, and] so you say, "Man is a rational animal." This then is the definition of'man. Similarly [in the defini— tion of four] you say, "Four is a number which, by being halved twice, reduces to one." And a description is [formed] like this: you say that "Man is a smiling, weeping, [and] wide-nailed animal." Or, 15 "Four is a number such that when it is multiplied by itself, 1A9 150 sixteen results." Or, "[Four] is a number which results when [21] two is multiplied by itself." It is imperative that four kinds of mistakes not be com- mitted in definition and description. All four [of these] happen to fall [under this] one [general] notion; [namely,] it is necessary [with regard to] anything which is not known and [which] you«wish [to] know, that you [attempt to] know 5 it by means of a thing which is better known than that [which you wish to know], otherwise there will be no gain at all in your seeking knowledge of it. The four circumstances which explicate [the aforementioned general] notion [are these]: The [first] is [when] we [attempt to] make [something] known [by means of a definition, which is given] in terms of [the thing] itself. For instance, in the definition of time, 10 we [might] say that "Time is the period of movement." [Now,] period and time are the same things; [thus, for] the person to whom the definition of time is a problem, the definition of period is also a problem. And to ask him "What is time?" is to ask him "What is period?" The [second] is [when] we [try to] make one thing known 15 [by means of a definition] in terms of another thing which [itself] also is like [the thing being defined] in obscurity or in obviousness. For example, we say that "Blackness is that color which is the opposite of whiteness." But this is [22] no better than saying that "Whiteness is that color which is Opposite of blackness," in that [both] blackness and whiteness 151 occupy the same position in [respect of their] obscurity or obviousness. The third is [when] we [try to] make a thing known [by means of a definition] in terms of a thing [even] more obscure 5 than that thing [being defined]. For example, we [might] in the definition of fire say that "It is that body which resembles the soul." But soul is much more obscure than fire.119 The fourth is [when] we [try to] make a thing known by [defining it in terms of] that thing which is [itself] known through it. For example, we [might] in the definition of sun 10 say that "The sun is that star which comes out in the day." So we [are trying to] make the sun known in terms of day. However, it is impossible that someone know [what a] day [is] except through the sun, for the reason that in reality day is that time in which the sun is risen. Thus, if it is a problem [for some- one to know what] the sun [is], it is [also] a problem [for him 15 to know what] a day [is]; indeed, even more 80.120 [It is] extremely important [to observe] these four condi- tions in formulating definitions and descriptions so that they do not fall into error. [CHAPTER Iv] [WHEREIN ARE] MADE MANIFEST THE MEANING OF NOUN, VERB, [23] AND PARTICLE Every uncombined word is either a noun or a verb or a particle. In Arabic noun is known as ism, The verb is called fill_ by the grammarians while the logicians call it kalima. 5 121 of both nouns and verbs [by themselves] is The sense complete. For example, if somebody asks, "Whom did you see?" And you say, "Zayd," then, this is a complete answer. [Again] if somebody asks, "What did Zayd do?" and you say, "He left," then, this is a complete answer. But a particle [in itself] does not have a complete sense. 10 For example, if [somebody] asks, "Where is Zayd?" and you say, "by" or "on," or you say, "in," then it is not a complete answer ' or "in the mosque," or "on the unless you say, "by the house,’ roof." The difference between noun and verb is that the noun is 123 a token122 of a thing but not an indication of the whenness 15 of that thing, for instance, "man" or "correctness" or "light." A verb on the other hand indicates a sense [as well as] the [2A] whenness of that sense. For example, [when] you say, "He struck," [then this] indicates [both the act of] beating, and that it 152 153 was [done] in the time passed. Similarly, when you say, "He may strike," then [this] always indicates someone [or something] such that the sense, [namely, the act of beating,] is [in refer— ence to] it, for instance, a striker or a reptile. But that person or that thing is not determined [by the phrase itself] that you know who or what it is. And if somebody asks [whether] "yester-" [day, year, etc.] and "past," "last," and "old" are nouns or verbs, then the answer is that they are nouns. After [this] if he says that all these three are indicationslgh of temporality and therefbre it is necessary that they be verbs, [then] we say that not every- thing which [is an] indication of temporality is a verb, in that it is necessary, first [of all,] that it indicate an 125 and then afterwards indicate a time [with respect to] idea, that idea. For example, when you say, "He struck" you indicate [first the idea of] striking and then you indicate the time of that striking. And [so] our saying that the sense of "yester-" is essentially temporal is not [the same as saying] that [first] there is an indication of an idea and afterwards an indication of its time. And this much that has been said [in Section I] in [regard to] simple words [and terms] was choice. Now it is necessary to discourse in [the subject] of compound terms. 10 [SECTION II] 15h [CHAPTER v] [WHEREIN ONE Is] TO FIND WHAT [A] PROPOSITION IS. [25] Various [kinds of] combinations result from simple terms. For us at present, one kind from these [various kinds of combina- tions] is of continuous necessity. And this is the kind which 5 is called a proposition or a report or a Judgmental discourse. And this [kind] is [such] that when you hear it, you may [properly] say [of it that] it is true, or [else that] it is false. [Some] examples [that clarify this point]: If someone says, "For man there is [divine] reward as well as [divine] punishment," then it is possible to say, "It is so." 10 And if he says, "Man is a winged animal," then it is possible to say, "It is not so." If someone says, "Whenever the sun comes out it is day," then it is possible to say, "It is so." And if he says, "When- ever the sun comes out the stars become visible," then it is possible to say, "It is not so." If [someone] says, "Numbers are either odd or even," then 15 it is possible to say, "It is so." And if he says, "Numbers are either black or white," then it is possible to say, "It [26] is not so." However, if someone says, "Instruct me [in] something or some problem," then in no way will it be [an] answer to him 155 156 [if] you say, "It is so" or [else] "It is not so." And if he says, "Come with me to the mosque," the answer to him is 5 is neither "It is so and you are telling the truth" nor "It is not so and you are telling a falsehood." [DESCRIPTION OF] THE [VARIOUS] KINDS OF PROPOSITIONS There are three kinds of prepositions: One [kind of proposition] is called predicative [proposi- tion]. For example, you say, "Man is an animal" or [you say,] 10 "Man is not an animal." Another [kind] is called conjunctive conditional [propo- sition]. For example, you say, "Since this is so, that is 503' or [you say,] "If this is so, then that is sof'or [you say,] "It is not the case that since this is so then this or that is so." [Still] another [kind] is called disjunctive conditional 15 [proposition]. For example, you say, "Either this is so or that is so," or you say, "It is not the case that either this is so or that is so." [A fuller discussion of the different kinds of propositions mentioned above is in the next two chapters.] [CHAPTER VI] [WHEREIN ARE] MADE MANIFEST PREDICATIVE PROPOSITIONS [27] AND THEIR AFFIRMATIVITY, NEGATIVITY, UNIVERSALITY, AND PARTICULARITY AND WHATEVER [ELSE] Is PERTINENT TO THESE The [distinguishing] characteristic of predicative propo- sitions is that in these [propositions] we have Judged either 5 that a thing is a something or [we have Judged that] a thing is not a something. For example, we say, "Man is an animal," or we say, "Man is not an animal." That proposition in which we say, "is" is called affirmative, and that in which we say, "is not" is called negative. And that part of [the proposition] about which the Judgment [is made],fbr instance, "man" in the above examples, is called the subJect [of the predicative pro- 10 position]. And that part of [the proposition] which is Judged as either "is" or "is not" [of the subJect], for instance, "animal" in the above examples, is called the predicate [of the predicative prOposition]. Each one of these two, [namely, the subject and the predicate,] may sometimes be a simple term. For example, "Man is an animal" [where both "man" and "animal" are simple terms]. 157 158 Sometimes [each of the subject and predicate] may be com- pound terms. For example, "Whosoever does not digest his food, his stomach will be disturbed." Here our entire utterance, "whosoever does not digest his food," is the subJect, and our entire utterance, "His stomach will be disturbed! is the pre- dicate; [in this case both the subject and predicate are com- pound terms]. However, you may put [two different] simple [or single] words126 [each as] a substitute for each of these two phrases. That is, you may designate as A the person who does not digest his food and designate as B the person whose stomach will be disturbed. So, then you sam."A is B." This has the same meaning [as the original proposition]. It may [also] be [the case in a proposition] that of [its two] parts one be [a] simple [term] and the other [a] compound [term]. If someone asks whether our utterance, "Zayd is non-seeing," is affirmative or negative, [then] we reply that it is affirma- tive. [This is] because "non-seeing" as a whole is one [single] predicate. If you affirm it [of a subJect] then the [resulting] proposition is affirmative, but if you deny it [of a subJect] then the [resulting] proposition is negative. Therefore, since we said "is non-seeing," we affirmed it by [virtue of] the word "is," hence, the proposition ["Zayd is non-seeing"] becomes affirmative. [A proposition such as] this is called a distorted 127 affirmative proposition. If we want the proposition to be negative, we say, "Zayd is not capable of seeing." The difference between these two, [namely, "Zayd is non—seeing" and "Zayd is not Capable of seeing"] 15 [28] 10 15 159 is that if Zayd does not exist in the world, then you may [quite properly] say, "Zayd is not capable of seeing," for the reason that anyone who is not alive is [certainly] not [29] capable of seeing. But you may not say that [Zayd] is non— seeing except until Zayd exists. And if asked whether our utterance "Zayd is not non-seeing" is affirmative or negative, we answer that it is negative, for the reason that "non-seeing" is the predicate and the words "is not" have negated it. This 5 [type of a proposition, namely, "Zayd is not non-seeing"] is called a distorted nggativeproposition}?8 Seeing that this has become known, it is necessary that it become known that the subJect [of a proposition] is either a general term or a singular term. The example of a singular term [used as a] subJect is that you say, "Zayd is a writen" or "Zayd is not a writer.". This 10 [type of a proposition] is called a singular prOposition or a personal proposition. The first proposition [of the two given above] is affirmative and the second is negative. But when the subJect is a general term, the proposition is not outside the [following] two [classifications]: Either it is not declared upon how many the Judgment [is, that is] whether it is upon all [of the subJect] or some [of the subJect]. For example, you say, "Man is mobile," but you do not say "every man" or "some man." This [type of proposition which is 15 affirmative but without any indication as to how many it applies to] is called an affirmative indeterminate [or affirmative 160 unquantifiedpproposition]. Again, you say, "Man is not mobile" and this [type of proposition] is called a negative indeterminate [or negative unquantified proposition]. Or [30] the quantity of the Judgment is declared. And this [type of proposition] is called a determinate [or quantified proposition]. And the word which manifests the quantity is called the quanti- _f_i_e_1_'_. Quantified prOpositions are of four kinds: One is that which makes the Judgment on all [of the sub- Ject] by affirmation. For example, you say, "Whatever is a.man 5 is an animal? or "Every man is an animal;" this [type of pro- position] is called a universal affirmative [proposition] and its quantifiers are the words "whatever," ["all that," "any- thing that,"] and "every." The second is that which makes the Judgment on all [of the subJect] by denial or negation. For example, you say, "No man is immortal." This [type of proposition] is called a universal 10 negative [proposition]. And its quantifier is the word "no." The third is that which makes the Judgment on a part [of the subJect] by affirmation or [the assertion of] existence. For example, you say, "Some men are writers." This [type of proposition] is called a particular affirmative [proposition]. And its quantifier is the word "some." The fourth is that which makes the Judgment on a part [of the subJect] by negation and [the assertion of] non-existence. .15 For example, you say, "Some men are not writers." This[type 161 of proposition] is called a particular negative [proposition], and its quantifier is the word "some" [also]. It has other quantifiers [too], these words are "not-all," "not-everything," [31] and "not-every." [This is] for the reason that when you say, ! "Not-all men are writers,’ or you say,"Not-everything that is ' or you say, "Not-every man is a writer," a man is a writer,’ you have Judged [as to something] not being [something else], hence, these Judgments are negative. You have also not Judged about all [of the SubJect], for the reason that when you say, 5 "not-all" [you do not exclude the possibility] that there may be some [that are such and so]. Therefore, these utterances of ours that we have made [using the quantifiers "not—all," etc.] are particular negative. The indeterminate [or unquantified] Judgment is [really] a particular Judgment. [This is] for the reason that when you say, "Man is such [and such]," [then in] your utterance [the ' or it may [mean] "one man" term] "man" may [mean] "all men,‘ in that all men are men, and one man is also a man. Therefore, 10 ["man" means] "some men" with certainty and "all men" [only] with doubt. Thus, if someone says, "Some men are such [and such]," it is [then] not necessary from [here] that the other part is opposite of that, for the reason that if all are [such and such] then some are also [such and such]. Thus, a Judgment about some 15 does not [necessarily] exclude the Judgment about the rest being likewise. But [we repeat that the Judgment] is with certainty about some and [only] with doubt about all. Thus, 162 it is clear that the indeterminate [or unquantified] Judgment is even as the particular Judgment. [Now] it is manifest that there are eight kinds of predica- [32] tive propositions: singular affirmative, singular negative; indeterminate affirmative, indeterminate negative; and the four quantified [propositions, namely,] universal affirmative and universal negative, and particular affirmative and particu- lar negative. Of these eight the singular [proposition] is 5 not useful in the sciences, and the indeterminate [proposition] is Judgmentally [the same as] the particular [proposition]. [Thus,] there remain, [as] propositions being useful in science, [only] the four quantified [ones]. [It should be noted that] wherever [in a discourse] an indeterminate [proposition] is used in place of a universal [proposition], it throws [the discourse] into error and con- fusion, as we will exhibit elsewhere.129 Hence, it is necessary to abstain from [using] it. It is [also] necessary that it be known that the Judgment 10 of every proposition is: Either infallible and certain as, for example, you say, "Man is corpo- real." [A proposition such as] this is called necessapy. Or ’ [the prOposition] may be [true] or [may] be [untrue] as, for example, you say, "Man is a writer." [A proposition such as] this is called a possible [proposition]. 163 Or it cannot be [true] as, for example, you say, "Man is an angel." 15 [A proposition such as] this is called an impossible [proposition]. The word "possible" happens to be [applied in] two senses: One [sense] is [that] of "can be [or able to be]"130 only. In short, [it is the sense] of whatever is not impossible. Necessary [prOpositions] fall under this [sense of] possible [33] for the reason that it is possible that a necessary [proposition] be, but it is impossible that a necessary [proposition] not be. The second [sense] is [that] of "It may or may not be." This is [the sense of] "essential possible." A necessary [proposition] does not fall under this [sense of] "possible." In this sense [of possible, it is the case that of] whatever it is possible that it be, it is [also equally] possible that 5 it not be. In the previous sense [of possible], however, it is not the case that [of] whatever is possible that it be, it is [also equally] possible that it not be. And this much [as has been said in this chapter] is sufficient in the exhibiting of the state of affairs [with respect to] predicative propositions. [CHAPTER VII] [WHEREIN ONE Is] TO FIND [A DESCRIPTION OF] THE STATE [3h] OF CONJUNCTIVE CONDITIONAL PROPOSITIONS AND DISJUNCTIVE CONDITIONAL PROPOSITIONS [This description is] in the same manner that was used [for] the predicative propositions. Just as the predicative propositions have two parts, [namely,] a subJect and a predicate, the conditionals also have 5 two parts. ConJunctive conditionals have only two parts, an antecedent and a consequent. The antecedent is that in which the condition 131 is expressed. And the consequent is that in which the result of the condition is expressed.132 An example of this is when we say, "If the sun is risen, [then] it is day." Our saying, 10 "The sun is risenl33 is the antecedent, and our saying, "It is day" is the consequent. In the disJunctive [conditionals], however, one antecedent may have one consequent or many consequents. An example of the first [case] is when you say, "Either this number is even, or it is odd." The first [part, namely, 15 "This number is even"] is the antecedent, and the second [part, namely, "This number is odd"] is the consequent. Here, there is no more than one [consequent to the antecedent]. 16h 165 An example of the second [case] is when you say, "This number is either equal to, or less than, or greater than that [35] number." Here, one antecedent has two consequents. But it may have more than two or [even] an unlimitedl3" [number Of consequents]. For example, you say, "A number is either two, or three, or four...&35 and so ad infinitum. The difference between the antecedent and the consequent 5 [on the one hand], and the subJect and the predicate [on the other], is this, that a simple terml'36 can stand in place of the subJect or the predicate but not in place of the antecedent or the consequent, because the antecedent and the consequent are each in themselves propositions}37b For example, [when] you say, "If the sun is risen, it is day," then your saying, "The sun is risen" is a proposition, and.your saying, "It is 10 day" is [also] a proposition. However, the word ["if" taken together with the antecedent has the effect of] preventing the antecedent from[beingla proposition.138 The reason for [this is] that when you say, "if the sun is risen" by the in- clusion of the word "if" this clause ceased from.[being a] proposition in as much as it is neither true nor false. [Similarly] the word ["then," which introduces the consequent, taken together with the consequent, has the effect of] prevent- ing the conSequent from being a proposition.l39 The reason 15 for [this is] that when you say, "then it is day" [this clause,] again, is neither true nor false. And [the case of] disJunctive propositions is similar. That is, when you say, "either this number is odd," then if the word "either" were not there, this [36] 166 [purported] antecedent would be a proposition. [Again when you say,] "or it is even," then if the word "or" were not there, this [purported] consequent would be a proposition. This, then, is one difference between the antedecent and the consequent [on the one hand] and the subJect and the pre- dicate [on the other]. The other difference is that wherever there is subject and 5 predicate, you [may] say that the [predicate is affirmed] or [else that] it is denied [of the subJect].lho For example, you [may] say, "Zayd is alive" or [you may say] "[Zayd] is not [alive]." But wherever there is an antecedent and a consequent, you do not say that the consequent is affirmed of the antece- dent or denied [of it]. Between [the relationship of] the antecedent and the consequent of conjunctive conditionals [on the one hand] and [the relationship of] the antecedent and the conSequent of disJunctives [on the other], there are two differences: 10 One is that it is not possible'el":l that the antecedent of a conJunctive conditional be the consequent and the consequent be the antecedent and [still] the meaning remains [the same]. For example, you say, "If the sun is risen, it is day." [Here] it is impossible that the [resulting] Judgmentth be the same as [the above, if] the antecedent became the consequent and the consequent the antecedent. In disjunctive [propositions], how— 15 ever, you [may] make any [of its component propositions] that you wish, the antecedent and the meaning [will] remain [the same]. For example, you [may], if you wish, say, "Either the number 167 is even or it is odd," or if you wish, you [may equally] say, "Either the number is odd or it is even." The other difference [37] is that the consequent of the conjunctive [conditional] is com- lh3'with the antecedent and is a Sequellhh or it; as, patible for example, [the relationship of its] being day with the rising [of the] sun. But the consequent of the disjunctive 1115 with the ante- [conditional] is opposed to and incompatible cedent [Just] as being even is to being odd. 5 From [the discussion] prior [to] this it is true that a conJunctive [conditional proposition's] being an affirmation and affirmative is that you Judge this compatibility [referred to earlier] to exist. [So] for example, you say, "If the sun is risen, it is day." And a conJunctive [conditional proposi- tion's] being a denial and negative is that you judge this compatibility as not existing. [So] for example, you say, "It 10 is not [the case] that if the sun is risen, it is night." And it may be that the antecedent and the consequent be [both] negative [while] the proposition in itself be affirmative, since [in such a case] you have [in the proposition as a whole] made an affirmation of [the presence] of this compatibility. For example, you say, "If the sun has not risen, it is not day." This [proposition] compared to the foregoing [namely, "It is not the case that if the sun is risen, it is night] is affirma- tive in that the existence and dependence of it not being day 15 . has [already] been Judged upon the sun not having risen. The unquantified and quantified hypothetical [propositions] are: whenever you say, "I£_or when the sun comes out it is day? [38] 168 and.you do not add always, everytime, or sometime, [then] this [would be an] unquantified conditional [proposition]. However, if you say, "Everytime the sun comes out it is day," [then this would be a] universal affirmative hypothetical [proposition]; when you say, "Sometimes [when] the sun is out it is cloudy," 5 [then this would be a] particular affirmative [hypothetiCal proposition]; and when you say, "It is never [the case] that when the sun is out it is night," [then this would be a] universal negative [hypothetical proposition]. And when you say, "Not everytime the sun is out it is cloudy," [this would be a] particular negative [hypothetical proposition]. It is possible that the hypothetical proposition be universal while each of its two parts be particular: for example, [suppose] you say, "Always [if] some men are writers, 10 [then] some animals are writers," [then] this is a universal [hypothetical proposition] because you said alway . The affirmativeness [of] a disJunctive [proposition consists in] that you assent to the noncompatibility [between its com- ponents]; for example, you say, "Either it is thus, or it is so [and not both]." Whereas [their] negativity [consists in] that you negate this noncompatibility; for example, you say, "It is not [the case that] a number is either even or white; 15 rather it is either even or odd." And [their being] universal [consists in] this noncompatibility [being] permanent. Thus yOu say, "Always it is either thus or it is so." The particular [disjunctive proposition] is that [in [39] which] this noncompatibility is [present only] some of the time. 169 For example, you say, "It sometimes happens that a.man is either in the boat or drowning." This happens sometimes only, that is, when he is in the ocean [and not in the boat]. The disjunction is actually the very same as this noncompatibility [namely, the alternatives mentioned in either or,] so that the decision [as to what the case actually is] cannot be outside its disJuncts [namely, outside the alternatives mentioned in the disjunctive propositiOn]. Thus, you say, "This number is either equal to, or less than, or greater than that number." 'C‘! [CHAPTER VIII] MAKING KNOWN THE CONDITIONS [PERTAINING TO] CONTRA- [ho] DICTORY JUDGMENTS The contradictory of a [given] proposition is a proposi- tion which is opposed to [that proposition] either as an affirmation or a negation. [Thus] if [the given proposition] is affirmative, [the other] is negative, and if [the given] 5 is negative, this [i.e., the other] is affirmative. The manner of their Opposition necessitates in every case that one be true and the other false; hence, one is contradictory of the other. The conditions required for this manner of Opposition are these: it is necessary that the meaning of the subject and predicate, antecedent and consequent [occurring in the two propositions] be the same, otherwise [the two propositions] 10 will not be contradictory of each other.116 For example, a person says, "The ram has a parent," and another says, "The ram does not have a parent." [If] by one [use of the word] "ram" they intend a sheep and by the other the Zodiac sign [Aries, then] their assertions are not contradictory of each other. This [is a case where] the difference [of meaning] is on the part of the subject. 170 171 [Again if] it is said: ["Man is borne" and "Man is not borne" using the word "borne" in one case to mean carried and in the other case being in the womb,]lh7 then both [utterances] are true and not contradictory of each other. This [is a case where] the difference [of meaning] is on the part of the pre- dicate. [The violation of] these conditions is [clearly] revealed here. [This matter] is, however, concealed in many places in [the literature] of the sciences, and they are [thereby] thrown into error. Another condition is that it is necessary that the oppo- sition not be [asserted] between part and whole [of the same subject]; for example, [when] someone says "A person's eyes are black" and [that "The person's] eyes are white, not black," intending by "black" the blackness of the pupil and intending the denial of blackness to apply to the white portions [of the eye]. The other condition is that the judgments be both either potential or actual. Not, for example, that someone says,"This fire burns" meaning potentially [as having the capacity to burn something] and another says,"It does not burn? meaning that it is actually not burning anything. Both of these utterances are true and not contradictory one of the other. And the other [condition] is that in both propositions the [standard of] comparisonlha be the same. Not, for example, that someone says,"Ten is large," that is, [compared] to nine, and another says,"Ten is not large," that is, [compared] to 15 [141] lO 15 172 eleven. Each of these two is true and they are not contra- dictory. And other [conditions] are that the temporal [refer- [A2] ence] be the same, not two [different] temporal [references]; and the [reference to] location be the same, not [to] two [different] locations. And to sum up, it is necessary that the two propositionslhg be [of] identical modality;150 also it is necessary [that they have] the same predicate and the same subject. Finally, if the subject is universal, then it is neces- sary that one proposition be universal and the other particular, 5 in that it is possible for both the universal [propositions] to be false. For example, you might say, "Every man is wise" and "No man is wise;" [now] it is possible that the particular [propositions resulting from each of these] are both true, so that you might say, "Some man is wise" and "Some man is not wise." Therefore, the contradictory of "every" is "not every" and the 10 contradictory of "none" is "some." When [all] the conditions [stated above] are [properly] complied with, then, in every case one [of a pair of proposi- tions] is true and one, [i.e., the other,] false. Know also, that the above reasoning [applies, as well] to the case of conditional propositions. [CHAPTER Ix] CLARIFICATION OF THE CONDITIONS OF CONVERSION [A3] The method of converting is: [in predicative propositions] make the subject into predicate and the predicate into subJect; or [in disjunctive conditionals] make the antecedent [into] the consequent, and the consequent [into] the antecedent, and keep 5 the affirmativity and negativity [of the disJuncts constant], and the truth will be preserved.151 A universal negative [proposition] admits of conversion and yields universal negative again. For, whenever it is true that "No such is so," it is true that "No so is such;" or else its contradictory "Some [part] of so is such" is true. Let this 10 part in every case be "that some." Thus, that some is that §p_ which is gugh, and it [i.e., that some] is precisely [that which is] at once both eppp_and.§p, Therefbre, there is a ppgp, which is p95 but we had said [earlier] that it is true that no ‘ppppDis p93 and thus this [latter] is impossible. It is there- 15 fore evident that, since no such is so, no so is such:152 As to a universal affirmative [proposition], it does not [hh] necessarily come about that in every case its converse be universal affirmative [also]. [Thus] it is possible to say, "Every man is animal," and not-possible to say, "Every animal is man." It necessarily comes about, however, that it converts 173 17h to particular affirmative, because whenever all _slch are pg, 5 [then] necessarily some pg are _s_u_c_h, or else no 39 is .5321}.- But [if no pg is _sll_c_:_1_d_, then] it necessarily follows as was shown, [namely] that no slip}; is _s_o_, but [this is impossible since] we have already said that every supp is _s_o_. [As to] a particular affirmative [proposition], the 10 converse of it is [also] a particular affirmative. [Suppose], for example, you say, "Some such are _s_q_," necessarily then some _s<_>_ are Lug}; by [virtue of] the same sort of argument as we have already stated. However, [in case of a] particular negative [proposition] it is not necessary that it have a converse, for it is possible to say, "Not all animals are men," but not pos'sible to say, 15 "Not all men are animals." [CHAPTER x] IN THE DESCRIPTION OF SYLLOGISM [hSJ For every unknown there is a way that [one may become] knowledgeable of it. Moreover, let us recall the two methods for the [formulation of a] concept}53 [namely] definition and description.15h The method of verification is reasoning. Reasoning is 5 of three kinds: syllogism, induction, and analogy. Moreover, to conduct an argument from [that which is] present to [that which is] absent is also a part of analogical reasoning. Among these three, the syllogism is [the most] reliable, and among syllogisms,the demonstrative syllogism. However, until we know what, in general, a syllogism is, it is not possible to know 10 what a demonstrative syllogism 13.155 In general, a syllogism.is a discourse in which something is said, [such] that if that which is said in it is assented to, then from it another discourse is necessitated in every case. An example of this is that if someone says, "Every body156 is formed and every formed [thing] is originated," [then] this 15 discourse is a syllogism for the reason that every'time that both these propositions are assented to and accepted, [then] [NS] from this another discourse is necessitated: [namely] that "EVery body is originated." 175 176 Similarly, if someone says, "If the world is formed, then the world is originated. But the world is formed," then this too 5 is a syllogism. [This is so] because this discourse is com- posed of two propositions, [such] that every time that both [the prOpositions] are assented to, a third discourse, which is a part of the two [propositions] and, what is more, a com- ponent of one of them, comes about necessarily. This discourse is: "The world is originated." There are two types of syllogisms: One is calledlsyllogism] 10 of liason157 and the other detachmentaI158 [syllogism]. [CHAPTER XI] SYLLOGISMS OF LIASON [hTJ [In] syllogisms of liason two propositions are linked [by each one's] containing a component 159that is common to both, but [they are] separate with respect to [their] other components. Thus, from these [two propositions] another pro- 5 position follows necessarily, such that it has two components which were not common to the [two original propositions]. An example of this is [one] which we have [already given, namely,] that every time it is accepted that "Every body is formed and every formed thing is originated," [then] from this it ensues necessarily that "Every body is originated." Thus, there are two 10 propositions here: one is that "Every body is formed," and the other is that "Every fermed thing is originated." One component of the first proposition160 is "body" and the other component is "formed," while of the second premiss, one component is "formed" and the other is "originated." Thus, "formed"‘is in both, 15 but one alone has "body," while only the other [has] "originated." And of this proposition, which came of necessity, one component [h8] is "body," and the other component is "originated." The above discussion has revolved around three components, [namely,] "body," "formed," and "originated;" [each of] these is 177 178 called a.pepp, Now [the term] "formed" and anything [positionally] 5 resembling it is called the middle term. "Body," that is the subject in the necessitated [proposition], is called the 233g; 153311;, and "crigjngbai" that is the predicate in the necessitated [proposition], is called the majpr term. [Each of] the two [original] propositions that are in the syllogism is called a premiss, and the proposition that is neces- 10 sitated is called the conclusion. That [premiss] which has the subject of the conclusion in it is called the minor premiss, and that which has the predicate of the conclusion in it is called the major premiss.161 The linking of these two propositions is called liason, and the form of their linking is called figppe.l62 These figures are [of] three kinds: 15 The middle term is predicate in one premiss and the subJect in the other. This is called the first figure. [The middle term] is the predicate in both [premisses]. [A9] This is called the second figure. [The middle term] is the subject in both [premisses]. This is called the third figure.163 The rulel6" [with respect to] the antecedent and consequent of a hypothetical [proposition] is similar to the rule [regard- ing] the subject and predicate of a categorical [proposition]. .A syllogism issues [neither] from.two negative [premisses], 5 [nor does one] issue from two particular [premisses]. [Further- :more,] every time that the minor [premiss] is negative while 179 the major [premiss] is particular, no syllogism issues.165 Thus, every figure has peculiar properties. EXPOSITION OF THE CONDITIONS OF THE SYLLOGISMS OF THE FIRST FIGURE [Syllogisms in] the first figure have two merits. One 10 is that no [further] reasoning is necessary at all to certify [the fact] that its syllogisms166 are [indeed] syllogisms. Such is, however, not the case with the other two figures. The other [merit] is that each of the four quantified [propositions], that is,universal affirmative, universal negative, particular affirmative, and particular negative can occur as conclusions in it.167 In the second figure [however] the conclusion is 15 never an affirmative [proposition], [while] in the third figure the conclusion is never a universal [proposition], as will be Shown. There are two conditions [that must be satisfied] for [50] syllogisms to be syllogisms of liason of the first figure: one is that it is necessary that the minor premiss be affirmative, and the other is that it is necessary that the major premiss be universal. If [these conditions were not met], then it would be possible that the premisses be [both] true and the conclusion false, and whatever [is a purported deductive argu- 5 ment] whose conclusion is not true when its premisses are at any rate true, is not a syllogism. Since the conditions [pertaining to this figure] are the two conditions [mentioned above], there are therefore four syllogisms [in] this figure. 180 First Syllogipm From two universal affirmative [premisses]: 10 An example of it is if someone says, "Every such is so, and every so is thus," from this conclusion ensues that "Every such is thus." For instance, you say, "Every corporeal sub- stance is formed, and every formed [thing] is originated," from which the conclusion follows that "Every corporeal substance 15 is originated." 1'68 This conclusion is a universal affirmative [proposition]. Second Syllogism [51] From two universal [propositions], but the major [premiss] negative: A For example, someone says, "Every such is so, and no so is thus;" the conclusion follows that "No such. is thus." For in- 5 stance, you say, "Every corporeal substance is formed, and no formed [thing] is eternal," it is necessitated from this that "No corporeal substance is eternal." This conclusion is a universal negative [proposition]. Third Syllogism From [a] minor [premiss] particular affirmative and [a] major [premiss] universal affirmative: For example, somebody says, "Some substances are alive, 10 and every live thing admits of a form of knowledge; therefore, some substances admit of a form of knowledge." This conclusion is a particular affirmative [proposition]. 181 Fourth Syllogism From [a] minor [premiss] particular affirmative and [a] major [premiss] universal negative: For example, someone says, "Some substances are souls, and 15 no soul is corporeal; therefore, some substances are not cor- [52] poreal." [The conclusion is a particular negative prOposition.] The [case] of hypothetical syllogisms is similar [with respect to the foregoing]: SYLLOGISMS OF THE SECOND FIGURE The conditions of the validity of syllogisms of the second figure are that one premiss be affirmative and one negative, and 5 [that of these] the major premiss in every case be universal. Thus, [the number of] its syllogisms is four. First [Syllogism] From two universal [premisses with] the major [premiss] negative: AS, for example, you say, "Every such is so and no thus is so," from thisthe conclusion follows that "No such is thus." 10 The demonstration of [the correctness of this conclusion] is that since my assertion that "No thus is so" is true ;l69 there- fore, its converse that "No so is thus" is [also] true, as has [already] been said in the chapter on conversion. Thus, since 'we have said that "Every such is so, and no so is thus," the 15 170 conclusion [arrived at] was correct, that is that "No such [53] istmmfl 182 Second [Syllogism] From two universal [premisses with] the minor [premiss] negative: For example, you say, "No such is so, and every thus is so." The conclusion follows that "No such is thus," for 5 the reason that if you convert the minor [premiss] and, [positionally as to their occurrence,] exchange the premisses, [thus obtaining] that "Every thus is so, and, no so is such," then [from this] the conclusion follows that "No thus is such." This [latter] conclusion is convertible, [whereupon] it becomes the former conclusion, [namely,] "No such is thus." 10 Third [Syllogi smi From the minor [premiss] particular affirmative and the major [premiss] universal negative: For example, you say, "Some such are so, and no thus is so," the conclusion follows that "Some such are not thus," 15 for the reason that the major [premiss] admits of conversion and then [the syllogism in question] reduces to the fourth syllogism [in] the first figure, [whence] also this [same] con- [5’4] clusion follows. Fourth [Syllogism] From [a] minor [premiss] particular negative and [a] major [premiss] universal affirmative: As, for example, you say, "Some such is not so, and every thus is so," the conclusion follows that "Not every such is 5 thus,"171 [that is, "Some such is not thus"]. 183 It is not possible [to Show] the correctness of the deri- vation of this conclusion by way of conversion, for the reason that the minor [premiss] is particular negative and [so] is not convertible, while the major [premiss] is universal affirma- tive and [so] its converse is a particular [affirmative propo- sition]. [Now] if you can conjoin the converse [of the major premiss] with the minor [premiss], there will be two particulars, and [we know that] a syllogism does not issue from two particu- lar propositions. [However,] there are two [other] methods [available] to 10 show the derivation of the conclusion [of the syllogism in question]. One [method] is called ecthesis and the other reductio ad impossibile. [Now] the [derivation] by way of ecthesis is this that since you said that "Some such is not so," [then] obviously that "some" is a thing [which is not so]; let that thing be gpep, Hence, we [may] say that "No gppp_is 15 so, and every thus is so," [and] the conclusion.follows that "No Tpgp_is thus." Since this is valid, [so] we [may now] [55] say that "Some such is 2222: and no Tpep_is thus," [and] from this assertion it is correctly [inferable], therefore, that "Not every such is thus," [that is, "Some such is not thus"]. [The derivation] by the method of reductio ad impossibile is that you say if our assertion that "Some such is not thus" 5 ' and [since] is false, then necessarily "Every such is thus,‘ we have [already] said that "Every thus is so," therefore, [from their conjunction] it is necessary that "Every such is so." But we had said [originally] that "Not every such is so," 18h [however] this is impossible. Therefore, our conclusion ["Not every such is thus"] is correct. SYLLOGISMS OF THE THIRD FIGURE 10 The condition for this figure is that the minor [premiss] in every case be affirmative and one premiss, [irrespective of] whichever [of the two] it is, be universal. Thus, the syllogisms of this figure are six. First [Syllogism] From two universal affirmative [premisses]: 15 For example, you say, "Every so is such, and every so is [56] thus" [from which] the conclusion follows that "Some such is thus." The reason is that if you convert the minor [premiss, the whole thing] comes out thus: "Some such is so, and every so is thus," and [now] it reduces to the third syllogism of the 5 first figure, and the [above] conclusion follows. Second [Syllogism] From two universal [premisses], but the major [premiss] negative: For example, you say, "Every so is such, and no so is thus," 10 [from which] the conclusion follows that "Not every such is thus," for the reason that if you convert the minor [premiss, this syllogism reduces to] the fourth syllogism of the firSt figure. Third [Syllogi smj From two affirmative [premisses], but the minor [premiss] particular: For example, you say, "Some so is such, and every 15 so is thus," [from which] the conclusion follows that "Some [57] 185 such is thus," for the reason that if you convert the minor [premiss, this syllogism reduces] to the third [syllogism] of the first figure. Fourth [Syllogism] From two affirmative [premisses], but the major [premiss] 5 particular: For example, you say, "Every so is such, and some so is thus," [from which] the conclusion follows that "Some such is thus," for the reason that if you convert the major [premiss], and so [now] we say, "Some thus is so, and every so is such," the conclusion follows that "Some thus is such," and then its 10 converse correctly ensues that "Some such is thus." Fifth [Syllogism] The minor [premiss] universal affirmative and the major [premiss] particular negative: For example, you say, "Every so is such, and not every so 15 is thus," [from which] the conclusion follows that "Not every [58] such is thus." It is not possible to derive [this conclusion] by conversion by the same token as we said of that other one.172 It is, however, possible [to derive it] by ecthesis as well as by reductio ad impossibile. [Derivation by] ecthesis [proceeds] thus: Let that "so" which is not "thus" be Tpepg so that, no 2232.13 thus.“ Hence, 5 ‘we [may now] say that "Every so is such, and some so is 3223," [from which] the conclusion follows that "Some such is 2223:" Afterward we [conjoin the conclusion just obtained with what we had supposed, namely,] that "No That is thus," [from which, 186 therefore,] the conclusion follows that "Some such is not thus." And [the derivation by] the reductio ad.impossibile 10 method is this: If our statement that "Not every such is thus" is false, then, [necessarily,] "Every such is thus." So we may [now] say that "Every so is such, and every such is thus," [from which] the conclusion follows that "Every so is thus." But we had said [originally] that "Not every so is thus," but this is impossible, therefore the conclusion 15 that ensued [to begin with, namely, that "Not every such is thus"] is correct. Sixth [Syllogism] ['59] From [a] minor [premiss] particular affirmative, and [a] major [premiss] universal negative: For example, you say, "Some so is such, and no so is thus," [from which] the conclusion follows that "Not every such is 5 thus," for the reason that if you convert the minor [premiss, the syllogism reduces] to the fourth [syllogism] of the first figure. Besides [these], there are two other separate figures pertaining to hypotheticals such that you replace 'subject' and 'predicate' by 'antecedent' and 'consequent'. [CHAPTER XII] [SYLLOGISMS FROM CONDITIONAL PROPOSITIONS] [6o] DETACHMENTAL SYLLOGISMS OF HYPOTHETICALS Detachmental syllogisms from hypotheticals issue from a hypothetical [conditional proposition] and a [proposition] of detachment. For example, you say, "If such and such a person has a fever, then his pulse is fast"--this is the hypothetical 5 [conditional]; and you repeat, "But the person has a fever"-- this is [the proposition of] detachment. From these the con- clusion follows that "The person's pulse is fast." These syllogisms are of two types: One is that the antecedent itself is the [proposition] of detachment, and the conclusion it produces is the very lO consequent itself, as [already] illustrated.173 The other is that the contradictory of the consequent is the [proposition] of detachment. Thus, you say, with reference to this[same] example, "But his pulse is not fast." The conclusion it produces is the contradictory of the antecedent, that is, therefore, that "The person does not have a fever." However, if you make the contradictory of the antecedent the [proposition] of detachment, that is, you say, "The person does not have a fever," then a conclusion as to whether the 15 187 188 person's pulse is fast or not does not follow. Similarly, if you make the consequent itself the [proposition of] detachment, that is, you say, "But his pulse is fast," then a conclusion [61] as to whether he has or does not have a fever does not follow. DETACHMENTAL SYLLOGISMS FROM DISJUNCTIVES [62] If the disjunctive [proposition] is composed of two parts, and [if] you make a [proposition] of detachment out of any one [but] exactly one [of the two parts], [then] it yields the contradictory of the other as the conclusion. For example, you 5 say, "This number is either even or odd, but it is even," therefore, you say, "It is not odd." [If you say] "But it is odd," you [would] then say, "It is not even." However, if you make the contradictory of any one [of the parts into the pro- position of] detachment, [then] it yields exactly the other [part] as the conclusion. For example, you say, "But it is not odd. Therefore, it is even." [On the other hand, you might say], "But it is not even. Therefore, it is odd." 10 The [foregoing] rules are [applicable] within essential disjunctive [propositions]. Within the non-essential dis- Junctive [propositions, however,] there may be rules that are not of this sort. If the disjunctive [proposition] has more than two [con- stituent] parts, [and if] you make [the proposition of] detach- ment exactly [the same as] any one [of the parts], then [it will] detach the [negation of the] entire remainder [as the conclusion]. For example, you say, "This number is either greater than or less than or equal to [another], but this 15 189 number is greater than [the other number]," the conclusion follows that, therefore, "[This number] is neither equal [to] nor less than [the other number]." [If] you make the contradictory of any one [of the parts of the proposition of] detachment, [then] the remainder will be the conclusion; and [proceeding] similarly till [only] one [63] [of the parts] remains. For example, you say, "but it is not greater," the conclusion follows that "It is either equal [to] or less [than the number]." [CHAPTER XIII] COMPOUND SYLLOGISMS [ 6h] It is not the case that all conclusions are derivable from Just one syllogistic process, nor that two premisses are [always] sufficient; on the contrary, it is the case that [some] points can be validly made [only] by means of several [successive] syllogi-s. Thus, a conclusion is drawn from two premisses, [and] that conclusion in turn becomes a premiss of another 5 syllogism, and [the process] continues in the same manner till the last conclusion [arrived at] is the point [in question]. People do not [always] present every [compound] syllogism arranged according to [the above] order. Indeed, there are many who cast some premisses out either for the sake of brevity or for [the sake of some other] strategem. Also, there are many who transpose [the order of occurrence] of the premisses. 10 However, in reality, the [type] of syllogism [which] we have described eventually results. We present an illustration of this discussion [by an example] from geometry. The example is [of] what is known as the first figure from the book of Euclid: 190 191 We have a [straight] line, say AB, and [using] this line 15 as a side, we want to construct for the sake of demonstration a three-sided figure, which is called a triangle, and [which] we claim is such that each side of it is equal one to the other. We say that if we take the point A as the center of a [65] compass, open [the compass] to point B and trace a circle around [point A]; and again if we take the point B as the center and with the distance of.A [from B] draw a circle around B; then the [two circles] inevitably intersect each other. We designate the point at the top of the lune as C, 5 and from that point we draw a straight line to,A and [another] straight line to B. We say, thus, that this figure which is in the interior of the points BAC is a triangle [with] all three sides equal. THE DEMONSTRATION OF THIS The two lines AB and AC are equal for the reason that 10 ‘they come from the center to the circumference, similarly, the “two lines BA and BC are equal. And the two lines AC and BC are equal for the reason that each [of them] is equal to [the same line] AB. Therefore, on line AB [as base], we have con— structed a triangle [such] that all three sides of it are equal [to each other]. [The foregoing] is how syllogistic reasoning is used in 'the literature. But [the situation] actually is as I wish to 15 state, [namely,] that there are four syllogisms here—-all [of them] from the first figure. 192 The first [syllogism] is this: "The two lines AB and AC are two straight lines that extend from the center [of the circle] to [its] circumference, and any two straight lines that extend from the center [of a circle to its] circumference [66] are equal." The conclusion follows that "The two lines AB and AC are equal." The second [sylloLism]: [This is] similar [to the first] about the two lines BA and BC. The third [syllogism]: "The two lines AC and BC are two lines that are equal to one line AB, and any two lines that are 5 equal to one [and the same] line are equal to each other." The conclusion follows that "The two lines AC and BC are equal." The fourth [syllogism]: "The figure ABC which is on the base AB is bounded by three equal lines, and any [figure] bounded by three equal lines is a triangle all three sides of which are 10 equal." The conclusion follows that "The figure ABC which is on the base ‘AB is a triangle all" three sides of which are equal." Other [such] problems must [also] be worked out [according to] the above syllogistic [procedure for compound syllogisms]. REDUCTIO AD IMPOSSIBILE SYLLOGISM In the group of compound syllogisms is a [type] syllogism 15 known as reductio ad impossibile syllogism. The difference between reductio ad impossibile [syllogism] [67] and the previous ones that are called straight or direct syllo— gisms is that the reductio ad impossibile syllogism proves the clam [in question] by showing its contradictory to be false. It falsifies the contradictory [of the claim in question] in 193 this way, that it derives, by necessity, an impossibility from it, and whatever is, by necessity, derived as impossible from 5 it is [truly] impossible. [This is] for the reason that if it is not [truly] impossible, [then] it will never definitely be the case that its impossibility cannot be avoided. The reductio ad impossibile syllogism is composed of two syllogisms: One syllogism is from the group of liason syllogisms, which I have described elsewhere, [the other] one is a detachmental 10 syllogism. [For example, suppose] someone wants to prove that "Every such is so." He says, "If 'not every such is so' and let us say that we know without doubt [that] every thus is so, from which it necessarily follows that not every such is thus; but this, that the adversary be acknowledged, is impossible. As this is 15 impossible, hence, our claim that every such is ‘so is true." People in [attempting] to reduce this discourse to syllo- gisms which are complete are faced with and are applying them- [68] selves to an arduous task. Aristotle has referred to what I want to say. However, he has said [only] this much that reductio ad impossibile [syllo- gism] is composed of conditional [syllogisms]. And so this is 5 what I want to say [in order] to explicate [Aristotle's assertion], that reductio ad impossibile [syllogism] is composed of conditional [syllogisms]. The first syllogism is [a syllogism of] liason [and is] composed of hypothetical and predicative propositions in the following manner: 1914 If my statement that "Every such is so" is false, then "Not every such is so" is true, and [let us say that] by unanimous agreement "Every thus is so," [from these] a conditional [proposition] follows as a conclusion, [namely,] "If 'every such is so' is false, then not-every such is thus;"lT" [in the 10 second syllogism] this conclusion [obtained above] is made a premiss again, and we say, "If 'every such is so' is false, then not every such is thus, but, by unanimous agreement, every such "175 is thus. This [proposition, namely, that every such is thus] is thelproposition of] detachment. The conclusion follows that "'Every such is so' is not false," therefore, it is true. [On the other hand,] [if one takes the contradictory of the 15 selfsame unanimously agreed to valid conclusion”6 of the [very] first syllogism and combines it with the premiss of whose 1 truth there is [already] unanimous agreement,77 [then] the correct cOnclusion itself follows without reductio ad impossibile. Thus, one says, "'Every such is thus, and every thus is so' [69] 'therefore, 'every such is so'." But there are many occasions in [a] discourse where :reductio ad impossibile is very appropriate, and the discussion [is thereby] greatly shortened. NOTES NOTES lThe autobiography (dictated to Juzjani) and Juzjani's biography of Avicenna is to be found in: al-Qifti, TErIkh al-HukamE', pp. 1413- h26, and the Persian translation of this work (with the same title but the translator unknown), pp. SSA-570; al-Bayhan, Tatimmat Sivan al-Hikmah, I, 38-59; II, 3h-h6; Usaybi'ah, 'thn'in sl-Anba', II, 2-9; also in the introduction to Avicenna's Mantiq al-Mashriqiyfin. Modern edi— tions of the autobiography and Juzjani's biography are to be found in Nafisi, Sarguzasht-e Ibn-e SIna, which has the Arabic from pp. l-l9 and the Persian translation following the Arabic from pp. 1-21]. Nafisi, Pfir-e Sina, pp. 63-70; Gauhareen, Hujjat al-Hanbl'i 'Ali Sina, pp. 356- 370. The autobiographical part takes the reader up to the time when Avicenna meets Juzjani; after this Juzjani begins his biographical narrative . All quotations from the autobiography-biography are either from Nafisi, Sarguzasht, or from the Persian translation of al-Qifti, T'arIkh al-HukamE' - the English translations are by the present author. 0 2We have accepted the usual and oft adopted dates of Avicenna. These dates are, however, not without dispute. See, for example, Gauhareen, Hujjat, pp. 371ff; Rizwani, Abfi'Ali Sina, pp. 7-10, who 0 shares the view of Hairi Mazenderani in Hikmat-e bfi'Ali Sing, p. 1, that Avicenna died in A.H. l[27 or 1[28, which would make him either fifty-seven or fifty-eight rather than definitely fifty-seven, if we 195 196 accept his date of birth established as A.H. 370, i.e., A.D. 980. One of the reasons for accepting A.H. 370-h28, i.e. , A.D. 980-1037, is the fact that this is the date which occurs in Juzjani (see Sarguzasht-- Persian, p. 18). 3Although Avicenna was not a preacher and Philo was, the spirit of Wolstn's remarks about Philo and philosophy may well, mutatis mutandis, be applied to AVicenna. See Wolfson, Religious PhiIOSOphy: A Group of Essays, p. 1. "For an informative and readable summary of life and politics in tenth century Iran and Avicenna's place in it, see Afnan, Avicenna: His Life and Works, pp. 39—82. I 5Nafisi, Sarguzasht (Persian), p. l. 6Nasr, Three Muslim Sages, p. 20. 7Nafisi, Sarguzasht (Persian), p. l. 8Rizwani, Abfi 'Ali Sina, p. 12, identifies this man as Mahmood Massah. 9In Nafisi, Sarguzasht (Arabic), p. 1, 'Zahed' seems to be included as part of the name. lOAbfi 'Abdallah Ibrahim bin Hosain Tabri Namli. See Rizwani, Abl'i'Ali Siné, p. 13, n. l and n. 2, and Gauhareen, Hpjjat, p. 357, n. h. Dahkhoda calls him "one of the mathematicians," see Dahkhoda, Lughat m, II, 615-616, and Brown says that Natili was a physician, see Browne,A Literarj History of Persia, II, 106. llal-Qifti, Tarikh (Persian), p. 556. 1222;93' 13%. 1"Ibid. l97 152229: 161219;. PP- 559-560. 17A possible exception is Abfi Sahl al-MasIhI with whom Avicenna might have studied medicine, see Nasr, Three Muslim Sages, p. 20. The autobiography is silent on this point; however, see Rizwani, Abu 'Ali Sins, p. 16. 18al-Qifti, Tarikh (Persian), p. 557. 192221. 29;p;g,, p. 558. 21Ibid. 22Ibid 233219.. pp. 558-559. 2";p;g,, p. 558. 25According to Weisweiler (see Weisweiler, Avicenna...Seiner Zeit, p. 62) there were libraries in Gurganj, Rai, Ramadan, and Isfahan. In fact, according to Padover, "every important city in Persia had its library." (See Padover, "Muslim Libraries" in The Medieval Library, p. 353.)' There is much need for research in the history of Persian libraries, especially as to their contents. 26See Rescher, Development of Arabic Logic, p. A9, Table V. 27See Nafisi, Pfir-e Sina,_ pp. 18A-l85, who quotes from Muhammad .Baqar Khwansari, Rfizat al-Jannat, (3rd printing; Tehran: n.d.), pp. 2AO—2A1. 28This is the number in Nafisi, Sarguzasht (Persian), pp. 18-2A. {there is, however, disagreement as to the number of his works, see, for example, al-Qifti, Tarikh (Persian), pp. 560-561. 29Nafisi, Sarguzasht (Persian), p. 13. 198 30Ibn Sina, Danish Nameh—e'Alai (English), [1]. 31Nafisi, Sarguzasht (Persian), p. 10ff. 321t was certainly after more than four months into the reign of Sama' al-Dawla. Even after 'Ala al-Dawla Kakfiyah's first campaign against Hamadan in A.D. 1021, Avicenna was still in HamadEn and did ‘some writing. He finally left Hamadan incognito, arriving in Isfahan after many hardships (see Nafisi, Sarguzasht (Persian), pp. lO-ll). All this may easily bring us to A.D. 1022 or 1023 as the year of Avicenna's arrival in Isfahan. 33A.D. 1021-1037 seems to be a date with wide acceptance. See Ibn Sina, Elahiyat Danish Nameh-e‘Alai, ed. by Muhammad Moin, p.:> , and Peters, Aristotle and the Arabs, p. 107. 3"Ibn Sina, Danish Nameh (English), [1]. 353afa, Tarikh-e Adabiyat dar Iran, p. 158. 36Nadim, Kitab al-Fihrist, I, 2h. 37Safa, Tarikh, p. 161. 38Browne, A Literary Histopy, II, 115. 39The situation with respect to the use of Arabic was the same with learned Muslims and Jews in Spain, for example, Maimonides' Guide to the Pepplexed and Treatise on Logic are in Hebrew script, but the language is Arabic. "OIbn Sina, Danish Nameh (English), [1], LL. lOff. The mention of the king's orders may also have served as an apologia. "lFor-example, the Persian pepep_for the Arabic uz, see Persian 'text p.[A71,LL, Aff. He is not consistent in this practice, though; and, of course, he could not have replaced every Arabic word by a Persian word. There is, however, a general decline in the use of Arabic 199 words compared to what one might normally expect. This last state of affairs, though not the specific example, is noticed by Rypka in Iranische Literaturgeschichte, p. 151. "2For example, the Persian garweedan for the Arabic pggdig. See Persian text, p. [A], LL. 6-7., "3Afnan, Avicenna, p. 81. my; "sBrockelmann, Geschichte der arabischen Lfiteratur(2nd edition), I, 590, only mentions the book but does not list any Commentaries. More importantly, for the Turkish case, the book is also listed without commentators by Haji Khalifa in Kashf al-Zunfin, III, 185. Rypka, Iranische, also does not list any commentaries. "6Mi11er, The Palace School of Muhammad the Conqueror, p. 110. "7A note, penned in A.H. 1127 by the former owner Muhammad Naseeruddin, to the British.Museum, Ms. 0r. 16,830, fol. lb (which is part of our Ms. B.), says in part "... God be praised that after years of search his [Naseeruddin's] wishes to be [the owner of] this great Grace~have at length been fulfilled." It is noteworthy that the book *was rare in India where one would suspect Persian as having wider use ‘than.Arabic even in philosophical circles. "8We have fOund no Latin translations of DEnish.N§meh. It does not arppear in Domingo Gundisalvi, Avicennae Opera, first printed in Venice, ILJD. 1A95, and it is not one of the works considered by Prantl in Geschichte der Logik, II, 325-367. "9The date of publication and the name Syed Asad Ullah, the Ixarson who arranged for its publication, will be found on the added 1: it le page . 200 50Under the editorship of Ahmad Khurasani. 51They name and describe only ten but also use others described in Moin, Elahiyat Danish Nameh. 52All references are in this case to Moin and Mishkat, Risala MantiquEnish Nameh-e 'Alai. 53Where 'p' and 'q' have the same substituends; or the expression may be derived from 'if p then q' by the rule of uniform substitution. 5"Moin and Mishkat, Risala Mantiq, p. 3A, n. 5. 55Ethe’, Catalogue of Persian Manuscripts in the India Office Librapy, I, 1209. 56The continuation of folio 3a is on Ab rather than on A8' where it should be. The material on folio 5a instead of continuing on folio 5b is continued on 3b, and the new section starting 3b and continuing through Aa continues on 5b instead of Ab. 57Perhaps the manuscript was bound once, then pages started falling off, and it was rebound with the present result. 58For example,Ju§;E for jugpi. 59Rieu, Catalogue of Persian Manuscripts in the British Museum, II, A33-A3A. 0See note A7 above. 61Rieu, Catalogpe, II, A33. 62See B folio 29b ff. 633cc p. vii-. hWe have indicated special problems with respect to these variants on pp.8-9. 65Ibn Sina, Danish Nameh (English), [1] and [2]. 66See British.Museum, Persian Ms., Add. 16,659, folio 306". 67Avicenna's classification of sciences follows that of Aristotle. 201 68Ibn Sina, Danish (English), [2], LL. 5—15. 69That is, metaphysics, mathematics and physics. 191026a2O-25. For further evidence seevflO26a25-32. 71Zeller, Aristotle and the Earlier Peripatetics, I, 163. 72Ibn Sina, Danish (English), [6], L. l3ff. 73333., [6], L. 17. 753219,, [7], LL. 3-5. 75Essentially this is also Hamilton's view. Hamilton, Lectures on Logic, p. 7. 761th Sina, Danish (English), [5], L. 16 - [7], L. 5ff.,and [A5], LL. A—5. 77A passage from the Spigefshowing this is quoted in Madkour, L'Organonsay that the tall is the jawEb al-shart, i.e., the apodosis. 133 All manuscripts and the printed text have, "If the sun is risen," but Avicenna's subsequent discussion precludes the inclusion of "if;" it therefore seems to be a consistent scribal error and hence has been edited out here. A . 13 Literally: "without count." 1 t 35This reflects the standard that an indefinitely characterized number is either 1, 2, .... l 6 3 See note 11A above. 137What he means is that in 'S is P' one may replace '8' and 'P' by simple terms, but that in 'if p then q' one cannot replace 'p' and 'q' by simple terms. 138Amore literal translation would be, "However, the word of con- dition withdraws the antecedent from [being] a proposition." 139Amore literal translation would be, "And the word Of answer withdraws the consequent from [being] a proposition." lhoThe literal translation would be "And the other difference is that where there is a subject and predicate you say that the subject is predicate or is not." 1A1 Nashdyad also means "improper." 206 l"2The text has gadiya, but the sense is preserved better with "Judgment." 11:3 muafig. This term is not used again; it is replaced by its synonym, SEZEErI. 1"".0‘) (lug). We read this term as g_upi_, not deg, hence the point- ing is important. Literally gpp means "tail," and "end," etc.; hence, derivatively, in this passage. we have taken it to mean "sequel." l"SLogical incompatibility is meant here. ll‘6il‘he requirements that the subjects and predicates be the same, and that "the terms [be] used without ambiguity" are given by Aristotle in De Interp.v:17a30ff. We have not been able to locate the Avicennian requirement on the antecedents and the consequents in Aristotle. 3‘“In order to make the point, the example in Persian, given by Avicenna, depends on the ambiguity of the predicate term, as does the English substitute given here. In Avicenna's example the predicate term shirIn, which means both "milky" and "sweet," makes the point in Persian, but its English translation does not. ll‘8Iz5fat (cJUI ), a grammatical term, seems to have been borrowed for the logical (philosophical) notion of relation. In this passage it probably means the relatum. ll[ghukm . .5...— 1591). [A2], L. 3. There seem to be some problans with the inter- pretation of the requirement of the contradictories that they be Lugg- j_i_h_§_t_, .. ; i.e., identical pope; "identical" because Avicenna uses y_a_k_ instead of M (.J (40 (same); "mode" is where the problem is. "Mode" in what sense--should they have identical modality? (This is what I think he means.) 207 Assuming he could not use "mode" ambiguously, since, if "mode" is taken to indicate, for example, potential and actual requirement (p. [A1], LL. 9-10), the use of ihat, on p. [A2], LL. 2-3, would not Constitute a new requirement. Also the requirement of identical modality would then be missing from requirements of two prOpositions' being contradictory one of the other. Hence, my interpretation of jgppp, here indicating modality, means that propositions of non- identical modalities (modes) cannot be opposed as contradictories. It could be that the use of "mode" here means to differentiate those propositions of which truth or falsity can be predicated as against those (e.g., modal propositions) of which, perhaps, it cannot be predicated. This latter will depend, of course, on whether or not AviCenna thinks we can predicate truth or falsity of modal proposi- tions, which will perhaps provide the answer for the interpretation of Jippp_as used here. The problem of modal propositions is not a part of this study. However, future and extensive research of modal propositions in Avicenna needs to be undertaken. 151P. [A3], LL. A-5. The interpretation is clear; he is author- izing'(p3q)50uqq~p)'. What he means when he says, "and keep the affirmativity..." is clearly that after conversion of conditional propositions, the constituent propositions in the resultant complex proposition should be denials of the original constituant prOposi- tions, and then he adds that the truth will be preserved. lsefh [A3], LL. 7-16. This is a cumbersome way of stating the argument, although it is pgp_cumbersome in Persian, since the words fulEn and bastar have the philological characteristics of substantives as well as variables, almost names in sound and in writing, but they 208 are not substantives. In English they are translated as 'such' and 'so', and when they are so used,the argument becomes unnecessarily cumbersome. Obviously, Avicenna;used these terms to keep the argu- ment perfectly general, since any substantive (or name or even a pro- position) may be substituted unifomly for 3115;; and bastar. He could, of course,have used letters from the alphabet (a practice not unknown to him, p. [28], L. A-7). Indeed, manuscript Uuses the name of the first letter of the alphabet (see Moin and Mishkat, Danish, p. 57, nn. 8-9),-which gives greater perspecuity. Unfor- tunately, though, manuscript (oj also uses particular examples which tarnish the generality of the argument somewhat, and Just a part of it cannot be adopted without making the adoption artificial and strained. 153See p. [A], L. 3. 15"See p. [20], L. 2 - p. [21]. L- 6- 155we have consistently interpreted (p. [A5], LL. A-10] tasdig and garweeda : U 4’ J! (2,0; as "verification" with the possible exCeption of p. [A], L. 2, where garweedan is most likely not used in its technical sense. Since henceforth Avicenna expounds on reason- ing, largely leaving aside epistemological considerations, this is perhaps a suitable occasion to consider the epistemological status of tasdIg and garweedan as one of the two ways of knowing and see how this way of knowing comes about. Although these questions have a bearing on the translationof tasdIg and garweedan, they go far beyond the translation itself. No specific method of verification is stated on p. [A], L. 7. The present passage characterizes this method as argument or reasoning. 209 Avicenna states that, of the three types of reasoning, syllogistic reasoning (_qiyég ' 0’1»; ) is the most reliable. Since induc- tion and analogy are not our concern in the present study, we will concentrate on syllogistic reasoning (ggyép). Lest the term ggyég be construed to mean only the categorical syllogism, we hasten to add that here the term.q$y§§.is to be taken in its broader sense of deductive argument. A broad construal of the term 9215.3. will in effect include conditional arguments as acceptable procedures for verification, since there is neither internal nor external evidence that they ought to be excluded as methods of verification. Thus, it is clear that as methods of verification, Avicenna intends both conditional syllogisms and categorical syllogism. . With respect to categorical syllogism we know that: a) the first figure is superior to all others (p. [A9], L. 10); b) Compound syllogisms are analyzable into several distinct arguments, some of which are categorical syllogisms in various figures (see p. [6A]ff) and presumably some conditional arguments; c) all the various figures are reduceable to the first figure. On p. [A5], LL. 7+9, Avicenna remarks that for the purpose at hand "the syllogism is the [most] reliable, and among syllogisms the de- monstrative syllogism." Although "demonstrative syllogism" as such falls outside the concerns of this study, we might nevertheless remark that since we have already argued for a broad interpretation of the term.giy§§, the term "demonstrative syllogism" will on this interpretation not be confined to the formal structure of categorical syllogisms but will include conditional arguments as well; while the 210 requirements on the epistemicstatus of the premiss of a "demonstra- tive syllogism" will apply equally to both kinds of arguments. -We are now ready to turn to the specific issue of deductive reason- ing as a method for verification. We begin this discussion by quoting two passages that illustrate verification. l) "... to comprehend what the scul is and form a conception of [it and to judge the immortality of the soul and to verify it" (p. [A], LL. 9-11). 2) "... an example of this in the area of reasoning and verifica- tion is that if it is not known to us that the world is originated and somebody [by way of] disclosing [this] to us says, 'The world is formed and whatever is formed is originated'..., we come to know that which we did not know..." (p. [5], L. 16 - p. [6], L. 5). The second passage has already formulated a proposition, namely, "The world is originated," and we do not know whether it is the case or not. The first passage does not have an already formulated propo- sition, but we easily could fOrmulate one, viz., "The soul is immortal." In either case we have a proposition which "we do not know" and.which we need to verify so that we may know. The second passage accomplishes this task explicitly; for here we. are presented with the conjunction of two prOpositions which serve as premisses for a syllogistic argument whose conclusion is the proposition in question, thus: The world is formed, Whatever is ggpmgg jg grjgjnajgd. .x The world is originated. 211 Keeping in mind that "verification" is here used in the sense of "to make it true," we may, in view of the discussion thus far, state the Avicennian idea of verification thus: a proposition is verified if it is either deductively deriVed from or deductively derivable from premisses whose truth is accepted: this is the weakest interpretation of garweedan and ma danistam, that is to say,if the proposition in question is the conclusion of a deductive argument (ggggg). In other words, in order to verify apropOsition we must construct a deductiVe argument whose conclusion is the proposition in question: if we are successful in doing so the proposition is verified. Three considerations or questions arise with respect to this prOcedure: 1) From where do we obtain premisses to construct the desired argument? 2) What about the validity of the argument thus constructed? 3) Isn't the truth of the premisses more critical than merely being "accepted as true?" These questions are interrelated, but we will take them separately to facilitate our exposition. We shall also see that these questions will lead us to modify our statement of the Avicennian idea of verification. Avicenna answers the first question by giving us a list of possible sources of premisses. These are: a) a priori knowledge (awwal khirad - .3/5' (,4, ), p. [A], LL. 1A-15. b) senses (EEEE - <:;;£7), p. [A], L. 17. c) reliance on authority (pg buzurgEn w_s_. dEnEyEn -914”, , [98975]). p. [5], LL. 1-2. 212 d) consensus of Opinion (ittifELmrdm - ry‘jw')’ p. [5], LL. 3—A. e) those other propositions that have been assimilated in the corpus of our knowledge by previous processes of verification (see p. [6], LL. 1-8 and p. [A], LL. 9-12). The second question is in effect answered by the Avicennian view of the syllogism, according to which no argument is termed a "syllogism" unless it is valid. See p. [50], LL. 5-6. (Whether or not Avicenna ' specifically recognizes "validity" is problematic. It is nevertheless the case that most likely for him, any argwment which is not valid—-as we understand the term-- would not be called a syllogism. See note 165.) . The third question needs further discussion since all that a - valid deductive argument (including the Avicennian view of syllogism] guarantees is that if the premisses are true, the conclusion must be true. we might say that if the premisses of a deductive argument are accepted as true and the argument is valid, then there is no escape from accepting the conclusion as true. But the validity of a deduc- tive argument is no guarantee of the truth of the individual propo- sitions that go to make up the deductive argument. That is, not only can we have a valid deductive argument with true premisses but also false premisses or at least one false premiss. In the latter case, that is in the case of a deductively valid argument all or one of whose premisses are false, it does not matter whether the conclusion is true or false; the argument remains valid in either case as the truthdvalue of the corresponding conditional, having the premisses as the antecedent and the conclusion as the consequent, is true in either case. 213 But the burden of the Avicennian idea of verification (tasdIg and garweedan), as we have indicated, is that we be able to testify with certainty as to the truth of the proposition which has been verified. Obviously this view of verification cannot countenance a situation where one or all of the premisses of the argument which is supposed to verify a given prOposition are false. we therefore must have a deductive argument the truth of all of those premisses is not Just merely accepted but guaranteed. There seem only two sources of such premisses: a) they are themselves verified propositions, and we know them (i.e., they are knowledge). As he says in connection with 2), on page 210, that before we know that the world is accidental "... it is neces- sary that we should have [accepted it as] verified and hence known..." (p. [6], LL. 1-5). These verified propositions themselves rest on other verified propositions and so on till eventuallvae are led to b) the first principles or primary premisses. ‘Eventually, then, verification rests on syllogisms whose premisses are true and primary, and, being primary or first principles, their prior intelligibility is guaranteed. In short, then, the syllogism by means of which a preposition is verified has for its premisses either propositions that are true and primary or the conclusions of demonstrative syllo- gisms; which is what he hints at when he says that among the three kinds of reasoning, "the syllogism is [the most] reliable, and among syllogisms the demonstrative syllogism" (p. [A5], LL. 8-9). We may now restate the Avicennian idea of verification thus: A proposition R is verified if and only if there exists proposition P and proposition Q such that 21A P is true and Q is true and such that R is de- rivable from the conjunction of P and Q. Whatever is thus verified is no longer a matter Of Opinion but gains entry into the corpus of knowledge. We may parenthetically remark that knowledge thus conSists only of truths. Induction and analogy are Of course not to be neglected, in that they Often lead to useful and valuable propositions; but these are only opinions-- they are not verified and one cannot testify to their truth. Epistemic certainty Obtains only with verification. 156 That is, corporeal substance. ISTIgtir'énI : . U by"! 158IstethnE'I : (j W. 159B. [A7], L. A. Avicenna has consistently used uz or pareh from p. [A7], LE to p. [’48], L. A to speak of the words that form the subJect and predicate of a proposition. He could have used "subject" and "predicate," but he wanted a more general term.that could be used indiscriminately to refer to either the subJect or the predicate of a proposition and at the same time indicate that the word thus referred to is a part of a proposition (excluding the copula - although it is not necessary to exclude it since g§p_is also a Jpp_or a pppep Of a given proposition). Only on p. [A8], In A does he give an ostensive definition of "term." The fact that that,which in literature is known as "term," is defined so late in the work, and then only in connection with syllogisms (whereas he could have done so much earlier in the discussion of propositions) would seem to indicate that he intends to reserve the word peg_for terms Of a proposition in context of a syllogism. Otherwise, the various parts Of a proposition would be 215 indiscriminately referred to as uz, which I have translated as I! 1 "component, rather than as "term,' in order to preserve the techni- cality Of pig and the everyday generality of J_u_z (or in Persianpa_._r_e_h_ in several manuscripts). We may, of Course, speak of "terms Ofsa proposition" whether the proposition is in a syllogism.or not, but we must remember that for Avicenna £133 is a technical term and J_1_1_z_ is not (although Jpg3i_is a technical term in the classification of propositions). Thus in 'S is P', 'S' is a 123; 'is' is a J22; and 'P' is a jpg_of the proposition; but only '8' is a p§g_and 'P' is a ped_of the proposition. (Thus to translate uz as 'termi would be to offend the development of the subject, that is, development as Avicenna seems to want.) 160This is a non-syllogistic use of the term mugaddima. 161P. [A8], L. A-lA. On this page Avicenna has defined various technical syllogistic terms; all these terms are defined with reference to AAA, first figure, i.e., "Barbara." The following example will show the location of various terms as well as illustrate the Avicennian paradigm for the order of premisses in "Barbara:" (1) All S is M (2) All M is P (3) A11 s is P where prOpositions numbered (1) and (2) are the premisses, and the proposition numbered (3) is the conclusion. Middle term: the term M which is common to both (1) and (2). Minor term: the term S, the subject of the conclusion. Major term: the term P, the predicate of the conclusion. 216 Minor Premiss: The premiss which contains the subject (here S) Of the conclusion. The minor premiss in this example is premiss (1). Major Premiss: The premiss which contains the predicate (here P) of the conclusion. In this example the major premiss is premiss (2). 16213. [A8], LL. 13—1A. "M'I/Jf/‘vpuwl "2/‘3” llul/e/ u my): ’U”’)/'/J” There are several difficulties in this passage: 1) Why is it so important to define igtiran which from this passage seems to be synonymous with gird amadan; but it is not clear from the passage whether the process of combining or bringing together is called igtiran or the product is called igtiran. " n 2) Igtiran and gird amadan both mean "bringing together, combining," and igtiran has in the literature usually been translated as "conJunc- tion." Intrinsically this translation is unobJectionable, and the concept would seem to be valuable and an important one (from.the point of view Of truth functions) as well as useful in distinguishing giyés igtirani (syllogisms Of liason) from detachmental syllogisms or giyds istethnaf. However, the following are to be noticed: a) Why does he introduce the word here and not when he talks about simple and compound prOpositions, or when he talks about disjunctive propositions? (P. [3A]ff) Since the conjunction of the two premisses results in a compound proposition, each Of whose components is itself a proposition, so the process of conjoining two prOpositions would not seem to be granted only in the case of categorical syllogisms. This 217 is also borne out by the fact that he considers 'qu} and 'paqf as Justified combinations Of propositions irrespective of their occurrence in syllogisms. However, it may be argued that, given the textual placement of the definition of igtiran, igtiran is usable and.weaningful, only with respect to an Offered syllogism, as a distinguishing feature Of one type of syllogism from another (i.e., syllogisms of liason from detachmental syllogisms). But on this basis it is easily seen that this device, although descriptive of what happens with respect to the premisses of categorical syllogisms, is equally descriptive Of what happens with respect to the premisses of detachmental syllogisms and hence fails to distinguish one from the other. For, presumably, what is meant here is that a conjunction Of premisses of a categori- cal syllogism leads necessarily to the conclusion, i.e., All S is P All P is K :.All 8 is K which may also be written'P.Q/;3R' to Show the structure. But egually P39 __£L_. .flq may be written '(poq).p/:.q'. In the latter case, also, there is igtiran Of two premisses as it was in the former case and as it will be in any argument-type. ' with respect b) The other puzzling thing is that he defines "figure,' to the manner Of this combination, which is very strange, since the figure Of a syllogism depends on the position Of the middle term per the conclusion as he himself says on p. [A8], LL. 16-17. 218 Thus, if igtiran is taken to mean "conjoining" or "conjunction," then it is difficult to see what the "manner (or mode) Of conjunction" has to do with figures. Indeed, it is difficult to interpret the ' what does "manner" mean here? There phrase "manner of conjunction;' is only one way Of conjoining premisses, i.e., with an "and." (Note: igtiran is v. n. 8 of QaRaN . Goichon in Vocabulaires, p. 26, gives one translation as "liason" and also says that igtiran is synonymous with Shakal, but this latter synonymity is not implied by the Danish.) If, on the other hand, igtiran is translated as "liason," a simple solution to these problems and a solution that is consistent with the rest of the discussion on igtirani syllogisms emerges, for now the lines in question read: "and the bringing together Of these two premisses is called liason (or alternatively, establishing a liason), and the way this bringing together is done is called figure...? What this liason is, is now clearly seen: it is a connection between two propositions (premiss in case of a syllogism) by virtue of their Sharing a term (there being a jpg common to both, p. [A7], L. 15); it is not a connection by'virtue of a conjunction, e.g., "and," "but," etc. This liason.,then, is established by means of a common term, which is always the middle term (p. [A8], L. 5). SO now "ppe_ EEQLthis bringing together occurs" (p. [A8], L. 13-1A) is a function entirely of the relative position in the two premisses that the middle term occupies. This in turn means that "figure," which is defined as "the way this bringing together occurs" (p. [A8], L. 1A), depends on the position (relative positions in the two premisses) Of the middle term as it should and as implied by Avicenna himself on p. [A8], LL. 16-17, and p. [A9], LL. 1-2. Hence, interpreting igtiran, V219 not as a conjunction Of two propositions, but rather as a liason estab- lished between the two premisses by means of a common term, avoids the problems raised in both a) and b) above. At the same time this inter- pretation distinguishes syllogisms of liason, in which no conclusion can be drawn without considering this liason between the two premisses, from detachmental syllogisms, where a conclusion is drawn independently of the presence or absence Of any shared pegpp, (See p. [A6], LL. 3-9, where in LL. 7-8 the common J35 is not a term but a proposition.) 1639. [A8], L. 16 - p. [A9], L. 2. Recalling the arrangement of premisses in a syllogism from note 161 above, we have: .Minor premiss: All S is M Major premiss: All M is P Conclusion: All S is P . Since it is clear from p. [A8], LL. 13-1A that the syllogistic figures are defined without regard to the quantity and quality Of the prOpositions involved and only with respect to the position of the middle term (p. [A8], L. 16 - p. [A9], L. 2), we may achieve greater_ perspecuity in the recognition Of the figures if we let a stand for the major term, 3 stand for the minor term, and u stand for the middle term. Then the following diagrams will show the position of the terms in each of the figures: First Figure Second Figure Third Figure Bu Bu NE U“ 23_ 22' Ba Bo Bo Where a = major term = minor term H = middle term 220 It will be noticed that Avicenna recognizes three figures only. 161[This passage presents great. difficulties in that we do not know which rule Avicenna has in.mind since he does not tell us. 165 We might tabulate Avicenna's rules for syllogisms of liason thus: Rule 1 (R1): Two Negative propositions do not yield a syllogism. Rule 2 (R2): Two Particular propositions do not yield a syllogism. Rule 3 (R3): Purported major premiss being a Particular proposition and the purported minor premiss being a Negative proposition do not yield a syllogism. This seems to be a partial list of rules for syllogisms of liason, as there is no mention of distribution rules, nor have we found later in the text any specific mention of them. Following the usual formulation of these rules in the literature, the first rule given by Avicenna should read: NO conclusion can be drawn from two negative premisses. It will be noticed that Avicenna's formulation of the three rules is without reference to conclusion. This is not an omission, since Avicenna's definition of a syllogism, which is Offered in two different places (p. [A5], LL. 1-13 and p. [A7],IL. 3-6) and according to which a syllogism must have three propositions (two of which necessitate the third), makes the mention of the conclusion in these rules superfluous. For, ascording to his definition, to say that two given propositions do not yield a syllogism is tantamount to saying that no conclusion from the two propositions is forthcoming. Granting that the statement "the syllogism is a form Of deductive argument in which granting the truth 221 Of two propositions (called the premisses), the truth of a third pro- position (the conclusion) necessarily follows" (Brennan, A Handbook Of Logic, p. A9.), is fairly representative Of the traditional defi- nition of a syllogistic argument, it is easily seen that the tradi- tional formulation of the two rules introduces an ambiguity as to what is to count as a syllogism. For they imply that two negative premisses do constitute a syllogism, except that "no conclusion can be drawn from them," and similarly for two particular premisses. Where- as, according to Avicenna's formulation Of these rules, it would seem that two negative propositions taken together and two particular pro- positions taken together cannot even serve as premisses, since he doesn't speak in terms of’mugaddima (premissL.on p. [A9], LL. 5-6, but says only "two negative(s)" and "two particular(s)." If it is objected that since he uses neither the term "propositions" nor the term."premisses" and so cannot be interpreted as using the term."pre- positions," then on the same grounds he cannot be interpreted as using the term "premisses" either. Internal evidence, p. [A8], LL. 9-10, indicates that a proposition may be called a premiss only in relation to an argument. This is not denying that any proposition may serve as a syllogistic premiss, but this is claiming that whether a propo- sitbn is actually a premiss will depend on whether there actually is a syllogistic argument whose premiss a given proposition is. But in the present case he says, in no uncertain terms, that there is no syllogistic argument at all (p.[50],LL.5-6). Thus, it is impossible that he could have used "premisses." Therefore, he must be interpreted as using "propositions." Since we have shown that, according to Avi- cenna, neither two negative propositions taken together nor two 222 particular propositions taken together can be premisses, and since he himself states that neither of these two combinations yieldsa syllogistic argument, it is obviously superfluous to talk in terms Of a conclusion. Hence, his fOrmulation of the rules is not only accurate but also avoids any contraverting his definition of the syllOgism, In the third rule we meet for the first time the traditionally ac— cepted Arabic terms spghra ( (3939) and £11113 ( J”. ), meaning "minor" and "major" respectively.. The switch to Arabic terminOlogy is hard to explain in light of the fact that he has available the Persian termin- ology on p. [A8], LL. 11-13. This switch cannot even be explained by appealing to variant readings in manuscripts, since none Of the manu- scripts consulted are at variance with regard to the terminology in the lines under discussion. The third rule taken as a whole prohibits the formulation of a syllogism, whose purported minor premiss would be a negative proposition and whose purported major premiss a proposition which is particular. In other words, the following combinations as leading to a syllogism are ruled out (in each case the major is written first): 1. I O 2. I E 3. O E A. O 0 It is to be noticed that: I 0 is also ruled out by R2. 0 E is also ruled out by R1. 0 0 is also ruled out by R1. 223 Thus, the third rule is necessary only for disallowing the IE comp bination. The third rule is impossible to justify without appeal tO distribution rules, and, as stated above, Avicenna does not specifi- cally mention them. The next question we must ask is are these rules sufficient for the forming of syllogisms of liason as well as for judging their validity. Avicenna, however, has not claimed the latter. Leaving the consideration of figures aside there are sixty-four possible moods Of the categorical syllogism:- AAI AAO In the above lists, AEI AEO AIA . AIE AII AIO R1 R1 R3 R2 AOA EAA EEA* EIA EOA* IAA IEA* IIA" AOE EAE EEE“ EIE EOE* IAE IEE* IIE" 'AOI EAI EEI" EII EOI’ IAI IEI“ III* AOO EAO EEO" EIO EOO* IAO IEO* IIO" R2 R1 R2 R1 8: R2 IOA" 0AA 'OEA? OIA? 00A" IOE* OAE OEE* OIE* OOE* IOI* OAI OEI" OII“ OOI* 100* OAO OEO’ OIO* 000* the asterisked combinations are those that are ruled out by the rule, All All All All All All All All 00's EE'S II's 10's OE's EO'S OI's IE's may may may may may may may may or rules, that head that column. be dismissed by R1, also by R2, and also by R3. be dismissed by R1. be dismissed by R2. be dismissed by R2 and also by R3. be dismissed by R1 and also by R3. be dismissed by R1. be dismissed by R2. be dismissed by R3. 22% It is to be noticed that the Avicennian rules eliminate Just exactly those combinations of purported premisses from which, by his definition of a syllogism, a syllogism cannot even be formed (in tra- ditional and usual terms, those combinations of premisses from which no conclusion can be drawn, that is to say, syllogistically impossible combinations). The remaining list contains combinations that are invalid, but it should be recalled here that Avicenna did not offer these rules in order to distinguish valid forms from invalid forms but only to discriminate, in light of his definition of a syllogism of liason, between possible and impossible syllogistic forms, and this latter task, as we have shown, his rules do accomplish. l66Meaning [syllogistic moods]. 1 67What is meant here is that arguments in the first figure exhibit all the four types of propositions in their conclusions. That is, the type of proposition that may occur as a conclusion in the first figure is not restricted to any particular type of proposition. That is to say the following combinations are possible: AAA' EAE AII EIO E223} These two have weakened conclu- sions (they could Just as well have been AAA and EAE; this fact, how- ever, does not detract from what Avicenna notices about the first figure). 168This seemingly cumbersome way of giving the skeleton of the argu- ment has been encountered before on p. [h3],.LL.74Ri It is quite obvious that the syllogistic fonm intended here is AAA (in the first figure). 225 Every B is C Every_A is B Every. A is C As against the example given in C, below, we have, above, put the example in standard form. Indeed, the manuscript c) gives this form by utilizing term variables: *9” 2.7”) A» .1“ new we x0 and the cumbersome expression could be avoided by adopting this read- ’1' ing; however, in subsequent pages, it will be seen that not even manuscript U returns to the use of ID (C...) (’Iv or any other letters to indicate various syllogistic forms, thus for the sake of consistency it was thought better to retain the cumbersome expressions throughout. 169p. [52], L. 11. 1) He should nct say that "No thus is so" is true. What he should have said is that "No thus is so" is assumed to be true and this, of course, given his definition of a syllogism, is what he means. 2) It should be noticed that "No thus is so;'etc., is not really a prOposition but only a propositional function. It can, of course, be made into a proposition by replacing the place holdefh 'thus' and 'so' by genuine terms; the resulting prOposition may then be Judged to be true or false. His discussion of propositions (P. [2S]ff) syllogisms (P.[h5]ff) indicates that he is aware, although he does not say so explicitly, that he is dealing with dummy propositions. In this particular case, and in previous and subsequent cases, however, there is very little or no chance of any confusion arising from the 226 , fact that he terms "No thus is so" and other such dmnmy propositions as true or alternatively as false. .ITQP. [52] , L. 15. Here it. would seem proper to translate "cg-VJ)” as "valid," and such a translation would certainly be acceptable under current practice in logic. I have, however, preferred "correct" to "valid," because the internal textual evidence indicates that Avicenna does not entertain the dual concepts of "validity" and "invalidity." As has been discussed in note 165 (P. [1+9], LL. 5—8), for Avicenna those syllogisms that we would call invalid would simply not be syl- logisms at all; for him a syllogism always necessarily yields its conclusion or it is not a syllogism at all. 171?. [5h], L. 5. To be consistent with the rest of the paragraph, the Persian should be " M U “0&6? ," but there is no support for such a reading in any of the manuscripts. Only the manuscript B comes close to such reading, but in this manu— script, although " 0w 6/ " is present, it is followed by " L9” I U Lt " rather than by " W (.9 W ", which is ample reason to reject it. For the above reasons‘fir! U My {Li/o a} is retained. Avicenna uses this form to express particular negative (0) propositions often. But this poses no real problem, since the English "Not every A is B" (which is a translation of "W! UWUW/a ’5 ") is equivalent to "Some A is not B" which fact the English translation reflects. It is also to be noted tha " curl uu’. U111)»; " is itself equivalent to " MU “(gulf/2’3" the latter form is impor- tantly and centrally employed on p. [55] , L. 5. l7'ESee p. [51:], LL. 6-10. 227 173See p. [60], LL. h-7. l h 7 An alternative reading would be, "If it is not the case that every such is so, then not—every. such is thus." 175This is the 'uuq' of'[(p3~q)-~uq]/.'.~p.' 176N .. . , , ot every such is thus: J! U Valli/00’ 177 Every thus is so: WIJU'L UV)"; BIBLIOGRAPHY BIBLICGRAPHY Afnan, S. M., Avicenna: His Life and WOrks. London: George Allen and Unwin, 1953. Aristotle, The Categtries (The Loeb Classical Library). Edited and trans- lated by Harold P. Cook, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1938. Aristotle, The Metaphysics (The Loeb Classical Library). Translated by Hugh Tredennick, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, I' 1933, II' 1935. ' Aristotle, On Interpretation [De Interpretatione] (The Loeb Classical Library). Edited and translated by Harold P. Cook, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1938. Aristotle. Posterior Analytics (The Loeb Classical Library). Translated by Hugh Tredennick, Cambridge:. Harvard University Press, 1960. Aristotle. 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