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NO DEAL, NEW DEAL:
SOCIAL SECURITY AND THE EIGHTIETH CONGRESS

By

Susan Bernice Stawicki

A THESIS

Submitted to
Michigan State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

Department of History

1984

ABSTRACT

NO DEAL, NEW DEAL:
SOCIAL SECURITY AND THE EIGHTIETH CONGRESS

By

Susan Bernice Stawicki

This thesis examines the New Deal program of Old Age
and Survivors' Insurance as it applied to the elderly, the
attitudes of the Republican Eightieth Congress toward it,
and the legislation they prOposed and passed to alter it.

In this way I will prove that by the time of Roosevelt's
death the New Deal was not as firmly entrenched as some
historians would lead us to believe. Using the Congression-
al Record, Congressional Digest, Congressional Quarterly
Almanac, manuscript collections of Democratic and Republican
Congressmen, and autobiographies it was discovered that
under the Eightieth Congress the OASI program took two

steps backward for every half-step forward. The Republicans
attempted to dismantle OASI through, what they thought

would be, small unnoticeable changes in legislation. They
attempted to halt the coverage of new employees by the
system and even remove coverage from some groups that were

already protected by the prOgram.

To my parents,
Ralph and Marie
and my grandmother,
Bernice

ii

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

My thanks must go to my thesis advisor William B.
Hixson, Jr., for his patient, constructive criticism,
guidance and encouragement on this project, as well as to
James H. Soltow for graciously serving as my second reader.

I would also like to thank the numerous archivists at
the following libraries and archives for their help: the
Library of Congress, Manuscript Division; the Bentley
Historical Library, the Sam Rayburn Library, the Cushing-
Martin Library, the University of Kentucky Libraries, and
the Western Reserve Historical Society. A special thank
you also goes to John Doyle Elliott, lobbyist for the
Townsend Plan.

My deepest appreciation also goes to my family,
especially to my parents Ralph and Marie Stawicki for their
encouragement and support (both emotional and financial),
to my grandmother Bernice Stawicki whose prayers, company,
and encouragement always helped me to make it through just
one more re-write, and to my brothers, sister, nieces and
nephews for their kind tolerance of my seemingly endless
involvement with this project. I would also like to thank
my friends, especially Joanne Pfeil-Montasser, Bill McDaid,

Dick Harms, Debbie Allen and Pete Vrobel for their

iii

assistance in every way from procuring books I could not
find, to their empathy with the frustrations of graduate
study and for their endless supply of tasteless, but
funny, jokes about Master's candidates.

Finally, to all my relatives, friends, and complete
strangers.who ever asked me: "Aren't you done yet?!?"

The answer is finally--YES!

iv

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION 0 O O O O O O O O C O C 0

TO ERR IS TRUMAN, 1945-46. . . . . . . . . . . . . 26

CHARITY BEGINS AT HOME, 1947 . . . . . . . . . . . 44
ACTIONS SPEAK LOUDER THAN WORDS, 1948 . . . . . . .75
CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .119

BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .129

INTRODUCTION

It was once said that the moral test of government is

how that government treats those who are in the dawn

of life-—the children, those in the twilight of life--

the elderly, and those in the shadows of life-~the

sick, the needy, and handicapped.

Hubert H. Humphrey

The elderly in 1947 were a generation caught in
change. The estimated 11,185,000 who were 65 or older1
had been born in an era of rural life and self-sufficiency.
They had lived through“ some of the more dramatic changes
in national history. They had grown into maturity observing
and participating in the migration from rural to urban life.
They had experienced the Depression, the ultimate in eco—
nomic diSplacement, and had seen the experimental prOgrams
of Franlkin Roosevelt stem political anarchy until the pro-
duction demands of World War II corrected the economic
imbalance.2

They saw that with the pressures of war and foreign
concerns the domestic programs and goals of the New Deal
were, if not forgotten, realistically relegated to lesser
importance. This caused some concern, but most peOple
believed once the war had ended the liberal progression

would at least stabilize if not continue.3 With the death

of FDR, the succession of Harry S. Truman, and the end of

the war in 1945 the uncertainty increased. The retired

or soon-to-be-retired were eSpecially concerned.4 They
were one of the groups Specifically provided for in the
New Deal, under the old age pension provisions of the
Social Security prOgrams. But their concern heightened

in 1947 when most found themselves retired; without a job,
without FDR, and without a Democratic Congress for the
first time in 16 years.

The elderly‘s questioning now began in earnest: would
the Republicans carry through with the New Deal programs
they had sniped at while out of power?. Would Truman be
strong enough or willing enough to step them if they tried
to destroy the legacy of Roosevelt? The elderly waited
while the Eightieth Congress rolled into motion and at-
tempted to roll over Social Security.

This thesis will examine the New Deal program of
Social Security as it applied to the elderly, the attitudes
of the Republican Eightieth Congress toward it, and the
’ legislation they prOposed and passed to alter it. In this
way I will attempt to prove that by the time of Roosevelt's
death the New Deal was not as firmly entrenched as some
historians would lead us to believe. In fact, the continued
existence, let alone the expansion of various New Deal
programs, had become questionable. This thesis will follow

the argument of Alonzo Hamby in Beyond the New Deal:

 

Harry S. Truman and Liberalism. Hamby argues that without

the election of Harry S. Truman in 1948 much of the New
Deal would most likely have been disbanded by the Republicans
and conservatives.5

The selection of Social Security as the particular
New Deal prOgram to be studied is important. The ethics
of America, in fact of much of the world calls for symbolic
reverence for certain groups in society. For the initial
purpose of this thesis it matters little whether they are
in reality treated fairly.

Children were one such group. Young children were
usually held free from verbal attacks in Congress. Another
such group were the elderly, the aged parents of the nation.
Although America's love affair with youth began well before
the 19408, the elderly had never.been targets for Open
attacks.6 Few Congressmen, at that time, were daring
enough to stand forward and label the elderly as worthless
appendages to society, who free—loaded off the workers by
accepting inflated SoCial Security payments. Even fewer
were the Congressmen who made such a statement and survived
the next election.7 Respect for the elderly, accolades for
their unselfish sacrifices in building America, and calls
for their better treatment, were the benchmark of most
congressional statements on the elderly.

Because of this accepted level of public reSpect,8
the elderly were somewhat protected from obvious attacks

during the time period studied. If the Republicans were

determined to dismantle the New Deal, the Social Security
prOgrams which dealt specifically with the elderly would
be the most difficult to tear down. Therefore, if the
Republicans were successful in destroying Social Security,
they would have less trouble with other New Deal prOgrams
with a less pOpular or morally acceptable footing. The
Republicans would perhaps move quite swiftly with this
destruction under a congenial, party-loyal, Republican
president.

As mentioned above, only those Social Security pro-
grams dealing predominantly with the elderly will be
examined here. The Social Security system, as created in
1935 legislation, consisted of five basic parts: Aid to
the Blind, Aid to Dependent Children, Unemployment Insurance,
Old Age Assistance (public assiStanca, and Old Age and
Survivors} Insurance (OASI). The primary purpose of the
1935 Act was to provide for the United States a permanent,
national system by which workers! incomes would be assured
upon their retirement or dismissal from employment. Prior
to this time income replacement was primarily the function
of either the family, private charitable organizations, or
local and state governments. But the magnitude of the
Depression overwhelmed the traditional charitable organiza-
tions and their ability to cover the needs of the destitute.

DeSpite Republican arguments that the Old Age and Surviors'

Insurance aSpect centered too much power in the hands of
the Federal Government the Act was passed overwhelmingly
by the House and Senate.9

Although the other areas of income assurance are
important, this thesis will be concerned only with the

10 At times Old

Old Age and Survivors' Insurance aspect-
Age Assistance (0AA) will be included in the discussion of
OASI. Often times Congressmen, in the heat of an argument,
would confuse the two and begin ranting about one program
when actually they were referring to the other. This is
perhaps; related to the original purpose of the two. In
theory 0AA was meant to achieve the same end as OASI but
through different means.

Old Age Assistance was a prOgram whereby the Federal
Government and individual states combined to give pensions
to the indigent elderly 65 or older. Only those individu-
als who were not working, had no savings or other income,
no prOperty, and no relatives to fall back on for support,
were eligible. Unlike OASI, 0AA was not given as a right,
but as charity, with the elderly often having to submit to
degrading means tests.

The states were under no requirement to take part in
this prOgram. But as over half the states already had
such pension programs it was to their advantage to partic-
ipate in this Federal prOgram which left the direct admin-

istration to the individual states, with minimum Federal

interference. The only restriction was the amount of money
the Federal Government would reimburse the individual state
for participating in 0AA. The first years the reimbursement
was $15 per 0AA recipient, but in years after it did in-
crease, although not in large amounts and often as a
political ploy, aspects which will be illustrated in later
chapters. 0AA was meant to fade away as OASI matured and
only cover those not covered by OASI, and those whose
insurance payments were too low to sustain life. In fact,
Jerry R. Cates, a researcher in Social Security policy-
making, has found that the administrators in the Federal
Security Agency saw the 0AA as a threat to OASI and often
tried to hold it back so as not to rival OASI.11
Old Age and Survivors' Insurance, on the other hand,
was exactly what the title states, that is, insurance. If
working in one of the covered professions,12 the worker
made a contribution in a certain set percentage of his
gross wages to the fund. In 1947—48, as from its beginning,
the employee had a one percent tax for OASI removed from
his paycheck. The employer was also required to match this
amount for each of his covered employees. Requiring
employers to contribute to the fund caused some concern.
It was argued, however, that employers should provide for
depreciation and obsolescence of their workers just as
they did for their plant and machinery.13 After working a

set amount of years (after the 1939 amendments: a minimum

of six and a maximum of 40 quarters) and upon reaching the
age of 65 the worker was eligible for a monthly, life-long
payment. The amount of the monthly payments was set be-
tween upper and lower limits, as directed by Congress, but
most often two-thirds of the retiree's normal salary.14
To explore the actions and attitudes of Congress
toward OASI a number of primary sources were consulted.

Among the primary sources used were: the Congressional

Record, Congressional Quarterly, Social Security Bulletin,

 

 

and manuscript sources of various Congressmen.

Although it is well known that Congressmen are al-
lowed to alter, add to, or completely delete their remarks
before they are printed in the Congressional Record it is
still an important source. The Record gives an indication
of what Congressmen believe portrays themselves in the best
light to the press, to their constituents and to one
another. It may be considered, in a way, a reflection of
pOpular sentiment on any given subject at a given time.

The Congressional Quarterly, on the other hand, is a

 

nonpartisan publication which devotes its weekly issues

to the thorough investigation of different legislative
problems facing Congress. Its annual issue is a consolida-
tion of the weekly issues. Included in the annual issue
are comparisons of party voting in Congress with Official

positions taken by both major parties.

One of the most important features of both the

Congressional Record and Congressional Quarterly are the

 

roll-call votes. 'Once the vote had been recorded,
Congressmen cannot change it; they can only try to justify
it by their comments and remarks inserted into the Record.

The next major sources used were the Social Security

 

Bulletin and Harry S. Truman's Memoirs. The first was
used to investigate what the Federal Security Agency15
desired in terms of the program.- The Social Security
Bulletin also gave breakdowns of various Congressional
actions and how they changed the program and affected the
peOple involved. Truman's goals, as Stated in his Memoirs,
were used to contrast the administrative goals of the FSA.
Truman was concerned with his political future, and as
President was reSponsible for a number of policy areas
including Social Security and other prOgrams. The President
had to make decisions which would balance the strength of
all programs without playing favorites. The Federal -
Security Agency, on the other hand, was reSponsible for a
very definite range of programs and worked very hard for

the rec0gnition and advancement in these specific areas.
Therefore, the goals of the President and the FSA were

not always the same. The Bureau of the Budget even

admitted that at times agencies would revolt against too

much control from the White House.16 Both of these sources

gave some idea of what Opposition or.support Congress faced
and what they had to react for or react against.

Finally, the manuscript sources were used to see how
Congressmen explained their actions to their constituents
and to one another. The papers of Robert A. Taft, Arthur
Vandenberg, Joseph Martin, Sam Rayburn, Emanuel Geller,
Alben W. Barkley, John Sherman COOper, Wallace White,
Theodore F. Green, and Tom Connally were all examined.

Most of the collections contained letters to constituents
and to campaign.managers, along with speeches and policy
statements.

To supplement these primary sources I also used pub-
lished biographies and autobiographies of members of the
Eightieth Congress and Administration appointees. Although
there were no great or astonishing revelations found in the
manuscript sources that were not reflected, to an extent,
in the Congressional Record they did contain some attempts
at justification of what was done in the Eightieth Congress.

In the autobiographies and biographies I expected the
Republicans, who bore the brunt of Truman's accusations in
the 1948 campaign, to defend the actions of the Eightieth
Congress vehemently. In contrast I expected the Democrats
to accept what Truman said about the "do nothing" Eightieth
Congress and even add to the accusations against the

Republicans.

10

The autobiOgraphies and biOgraphies were not quite as
rigid as I had first believed. For instance, among the
participants' autobiographies only one spoke directly of
the Eightieth Congress: Texas' Democratic Senator
Tom Connally. Although a staunch southerner, Connally,
along with Representative Sam Rayburn, felt the South
should support Truman, the 1948 Democratic presidential
nominee, despite their dislike of him and his programs.
Connally shunned the Dixiecrat Party and feared that
division of the Democratic Party would lead to a Republican
victory. Connally was also rather hostile about losing
his position of power once the 1946 Republican Congress
came in. So although he was a member of Congress, Connally
agreed with Truman's attacks on the Eightieth. He agreed
that Truman's detailed complaints about the Eightieth
Congress were the real reason the President won in 1948.1,7

In his autobiOgraphy, Representative Jacob Javits of
New York also criticized the Republicans. Although Javits
was a Republican, he was elected from a traditional
Democratic stronghold, so often voted with the Democrats
against the Republicans. Javits felt that although much
was done in Congress what received the most attention was
reactionary, retaliatory legislation. He believed that
the Republicans were determined to make their mark on the

country, especially if that meant destroying the New Deal.18

11

Arthur Altmeyer was another participant, although in
the Administration, rather than the Legislature. He
accused the Republicans of deliberately attempting to
destroy the old age security feature of Social Security.
He also credits this blatant maliciousness for clinching
the 1948 election for Truman.19

Those writing biographies of legislators were very
open in their attacks, perhaps because not being members
themselves they felt they had no reSponsibility for the
actions of the Eightieth CongreSs. Or perhaps it is
because they relied on the campaign speeches used, where
some Congressmen jumped on the Truman bandwagon, accusing
the Congress of playing favorites with special interests.
This is evident in the biographies of Representatives
William Lemke and Sam Rayburn and Senators Olin Johnston,
Theodore Green and Harley Kilgore.2O

Most other autobiOgraphies and biOgraphies simply
mentioned prOgrams passed, or skipped over the entire
1947-48 period completely, unless they simply mentioned
the outcome of the election. Others mouthed the 1948
Truman campaign line of the "do nothing" Congress with no
attempt at justification, evaluation or explanation.21

Among the personal memoirs there are those who felt
the Eightieth really was much maligned by Truman. Many
believed that if the Eightieth was not much better than

past Congresses, it was in reality not any worse.

12

Representatives Joseph Martin of Massachusetts and Norris
Cotton of New Hampshire were the staunchest supporters of
the Eightieth Congress' record, and not surprisingly both
were Republicans. Both men showed respect for Truman, but
argued that he was wrong in leveling the charge of "do
nothing" in 1948.22

Martin did admit that previous Congresses had tried
to stOp the New Deal and failed. But the domestic prOgrams
in 1948, precursor to the full Fair Deal programs, he

23

claimed "...we stOpped in its tracks." This is not to
say that Martin thought this a bad thing. In fact, Martin
took pride in this action. He felt that the Congress had
stOpped the Fair Deal, and had substituted a record of
good, solid legislation. He also blamed.Dewey's lackluster

24

campaign for the losses in 1948. Martin sums up the
problem as such:

It.was a strong, independent Congress. In

Truman it was pitted against a strong, impulsive

President. The result, naturally, was almost

continual conflict, much of it going to funda-

mental differences Sgtween the Democratic and

Republican parties.

The remaining biOgraphies, all of Republican Party
members, reiterated the beliefs of their studies. Lending
credence to the prior argument that many biographers simply
took campaign speeches at face value without any analysis.

For instance, George Mayer gives glowing reports to the

Republicans in his work: The Republican Party, 1854-1964.

 

13

He supports Martin's argument that the Republicans in their
attempts to implement their party's prOgrams succeeded in
alienating many voters.26 The remaining biographies on
Representative Charlie Halleck and Senators Robert Taft and
Kenneth Wherry all illustrated the Republican's hostility
towards Truman and their belief that the Eightieth Congress
really made positive steps in running the country.27

There was also a large amount of secondary literature
consulted on this period. Most of these studies dealt with
Truman, very few investigated the problems facing Social
Security in 1947-48.

The early historical accounts of the Truman presidency
are positive, idealized versions of the President.28
Among the better known of these idealistic accounts are
Fonathan Daniels' The Man of Independence, Eric F. Goldman's
The Crucial Decade and After:. America 1945-1960, and
Cabell Phillips' The Truman Presidency: The History of
29

Triumphant Succession. Another such writer was Richard
E. Neustadt, who as.a staff member in the Bureau of the
Budget 1946-50 and Special assistant in the White House
Office 1950-53 presents a particularly sticky problem.
Neustadt, a political scientist, wrote numerous articles
and books in a very obvious pro-Truman style. When reading

one of Neustadt's works, it is important to keep in mind

his participant status when judging the merit of his

14

analysis. In fact, Neustadt has been faulted by revision-
ists for misleading the traditionalists with his biased
analysis in "Congress and the Fair Deal."30

Following this highly idealized pro-Truman literature
came the emergence of what was to form the core of the
traditionalists school of historical thought. Centered
around Richard S. Kirkendall, at the University of Missouri,
this group is also known as the Missouri School.

Most members of this group admit that Truman had
failures, but instead of zeroing in solely on those
failures the historians in the Missouri School also point
to successes. Perhaps the most common thread running
through the traditionalists' theory is their acceptance of
the existence of a conservative coalition which Truman was
forced to fight in trying to promote his Fair Deal prOgram.

Some of the best-known works from the traditionalist

school are Kirkendall's "Harry Truman" in America's Eleven

 

Greatest Presidents, as well as the introductory comments

in The Truman Period as a Research Field: A Reappraisal)

 

1972. Kirkendall's successors include Alonzo L. Hamby and

his early landmark book on the Truman era, Beyond the New

 

Deal: Harry S. Truman.and American Liberalism. Finally,
Susan M. Hartmann deals Specifically with Executive-

Legislative problems in her work: Truman and the 80th

31

Congress. Although these works do not take a hands-off

15

policy when it comes to criticizing Truman, they argue
that the prOgrams he advocated were timely.

Combining criticism with appreciation the Missouri
School studies of Truman appeared to halt the candy-coated
versions of his life. After Truman's death in 1972,
however, the Spate of 'Truman the Great' books returned.
This reappearance was lead by the publication of a very
loving biOgraphy of Truman by the "Boss's Boss" as Truman

called his daughter. Margaret Truman, in Harry S. Truman,

 

painted a warm picture of her father as a wonderful man,
a good President and a loving devoted family man. Merle
Miller's Plain Speaking:. An Oral Biography of Harry S.
Truman reinforced the view of Truman as a scrappy man,
fighting against the odds for the good of the peOple.32
Although this type of pOpular literature captured the
interest and admiration of the American public it only
increased the intensity of the feud between professional
Truman scholars.

While the Missouri School places Truman out in front
to absorb the criticism, they shield his programs behind
them in a protective stance. Meanwhile, behind the
traditionalists are the revisionists, sniping at the Fair
Deal and post war liberalism. The revisionists are
critical of both Truman and his prOgrams. They argue that

Truman's policies were not the liberal programs previous

historians have made them out to be. The revisionists'

16

literature states that Truman was an inept President, that
he was ill—prepared to deal with the conservative coalition
and that instead of solving the problems Truman stOpped
any chance of New Deal liberalism reasserting itself by
substituting his own limited program.

Revisionists began their attack by writing counter
assaults on traditionalists' works. Perhaps the best
known revisionists is Barton J. Bernstein. His essay in

Politics and Policies of the Truman Administration and

 

Towards a New Past:' Dissenting Essays in American History,

 

two books which he editied, best exemplify his revisionist

interpretation. Bert Cochran's Harry Truman and the Crisis

 

Presidency is also an example of revisionist' thought.
Allen Yarnell in Democrats and PrOggessives: The 1948
Presidential Election as a Test of Postwar Liberalism,
also attacks both Truman and his prOgram.33
For the study of Social Security under Truman and
the Eightieth Congress little literature, whether
revisionist or traditionalist, exists. Except for the
afore mentioned Gates study, and a study of the Social
Security Administration by Martha Derthicks, there is

nothing.34

There is a need for this type of study, dealing
specifically with Social Security. Hopefully, the
attention Social Security is receiving in present-day

politics will encourage more historians to delve into its

heritage.

17

Despite the lack of secondary material covering the
question of Social Security in 1947-48 the primary sources
painted a consistent view. Under the Eightieth Congress
the OASI program took two steps backward for every half-
step forward, all in the name of Republican progress. The
Republicans attempted to dismantle OASI through, what they
thought would be, small unnoticeable changes in legislation.
They attempted to halt the coverage of new employees by
the system and even remove coverage from some groups that

were already protected by the program.

18

1By 1948 the number of those estimated to be 65 or
older had risen to 11,538,000. U.S. Department of
Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Historical Statistics of
the United States: Colonial Times to 1970, pt. 1
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1975),
p. 10.

 

2The 1938 recession, for a time, lessened public
confidence in FDR's economic recovery plans.

3The 1944 Economic Bill of Rights FDR presented in
his State of the Union message indicated that the New Deal
was coming out of retirement once the necessity for ‘Dr.
Win-the-War' had faded.

4Many peOple came out of retirement to ease the labor
shortage during World War II. Most returned by choice to
retirement or were forced out of the market once the
servicemen began returning.

5AlonzoL. Hamby, Beyond the New Deal: Harry s.
Truman and American Liberalism (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1973). pp. 256-59, 267. Alonzo L.
Hamby, Imperial Years: The United States Since 1939 (New
York: Weybright and Talley, 1976), p. 146. Truman him-
self reflected this fear in his memoirs. Harry S. Truman,
Memoirs, vol. 2:' Years of Trial and HOpe (Garden City,
New York: Doubleday & 00., 1956), p. 172. Irwin Ross,
The Loneliest Campaign: (The Truman Victory of 1948 (New
York: New American Library, 1968), pp. 237-45. In fact,
some authors credit Truman's 1948 victory solely to the
electorate's perception of what the Republicans would do
to the New Deal should they win both Congress and the
Presidency. Hamby believes liberals eventually supported
Truman rather than Wallace not because of their great
confidence in Truman's ability or desire to carry on the
New Deal but rather to defeat the Republicans who they
believed would eliminate the prOgreSS made under the New
Deal. Others voted for Truman for narrower self-interests:
they were not concerned with the entire New Deal; instead
they feared the destruction of certain portions of the New
Deal which would effect them personally. This idea is
dealt with in more detail in the conclusion of this
thesis. Republicans did little to reduce this fear. For
instance, in "The Record of the First Five Months,"
Congressional Digest 27, #6-7 (1947): 178, a Digest writer
indicated that the Eightieth Congress began session "with

 

 

19

the intent Of putting the brakes on the remainder of the
New Deal prOgram and its own agenda formulated and under-
way." Allen Yarnell, Democrats and Progressives: The 1948
Presidential Election As A Test of Post War Liberalism
‘(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974), p. 144,
argues just the Opposite. Representing the revisionist
school of thought, Yarnell suggests that the 1948 victory
was not a victory of liberalism. It was just the Opposite.
Truman's victory insured that liberalism would be pushed
aside in favor of more mediocre reforms.

 

 

America's love affair with youth had begun almost
30 years earlier, stemming from.youth's disillusionment
with World War I., Still the cultural praise Of, and
fascination with the young was not as Open in 1947-48 as
it would become in the late 19503, 605 and 708.

7One of the only Congressmen to question the aged and
their right to support was Walter Horan, third term
Republican Representative from the state of Washington.
He inserted, into the Congressional Record, an article by
Howard Ordey.entitled: "Land of Milk and Honey--Relief
Cash Plentiful in State Of-Washington." The article
dealt with supposed Social Security abuses in Washington
State. But the article played it safe and instead of
criticizing the elderly as a group, asked: "Are All These
Our Senior Citizens?? Horan was re-elected in 1948. U.S.,
Congress, House, Article by Howard Ordey on Social Security
Abuses in Washington State,."Land of Milk and Honey:-
Relief Cash Plentiful in State of Washington," 80th Cong.,
1st sess., 20 March 1947, Congressional Record 93: 2338-
39. This was the most daring attack leveled against the
elderly in the Eightieth Congress. AS will be seen in
later chapters, the aged were usually praised in every
debate on SOOial Security, no matter what the Speaker was
arguing for. ~ ‘

 

8A strong influence on this sentiment may be traced
directly to World War II. AS mentioned earlier, retirees
went back into the work force to Shore up the lagging
number Of workers. There was also the strong sentimental
appeal of the waiting mothers and elderly parents who had
lost sons in the war.

20

9In the House the roll call vote on the 1935 Social
Security Act was 372 for passage and 33 against passage
(Democrats 297 for, 13 against; Republicans 68 for, 18
against; Independents seven for, two against). The Senate
passed the bill on a voice vote. Congress and the Nation:
A Review of Government and.POlitics in the Post-War Years,
1945-1961 (Washington,D.C.: Congressional Quarterly
Service, 1965), p. 1227. There was a very strong reluctance
to pass the bill by the Republcians. This reluctance was
evident when the House Ways and Means Committee originally
voted on whether to report the bill or not. At that time,
all Democrats, except one, voted for reporting out the
bill, and all Republicans voted against it. Arthur J.
Altmeyer, The Formative Years of Social Security (Madison:
University of Wisconsin Press, 1966), p. 37.

10Common usage has replaced Old Age and Survivors'
Insurance (the present day Old Age, Survivors' and
Disability Insurance) with the term Social Security.
Therefore, when I refer to Social Security in this thesis
I mean, in Specific terms, OASI as it refers to the elderly.

11Jerry R. Gates, Insuring Inegyality: Administrative
Leadership in Social Security4 1935-1954 (Ann Arbor:
University Of Michigan Press, 1983), pp. 20, 39.

12Covered employment was usually that which involved
manual labor, such as factory work, and some white collar
employees.. Among the uncovered employees were: farmers,
farm workers, domestic labor, state and local government
workers, and employees of non-profit organizations. Also
excluded were the self-employed such as: insurance agents,
doctors, lawyers, other professionals, those covered by
private pension plans and other small groups.

13Eveline Burns, Social Security and Public Policy
(New York: McGraw-Hill, 1956), p. 161.

 

14Pairtial benefits were available for those retiring
at age 62.

15In 1946 Congress Opposed but passed President
Truman's prOposal that the Old Social Security Board be
abolished and all its duties transferred to the FSA.

21

16The FSA, as a branch of the Executive, did not
always reflect the policy Of the President. Gates,
Insuring Inequality, pp. 23, 58. Robert J. Donovan also
reinforces this idea by arguing that governmental depart-
ments had a freer role in "initiating prOgrams and dealing
with Congress" than in later years when the White House
centralized control. Robert J. Donovan, Conflict and
Crisis: The Presidency of Harry S. Truman, 1945-1948
(New York: W. W. Norton & CO., 1977), p. 22. ROger W.
Jones, Assistant Director, Bureau of the Budget 1945-59
Spoke of agencies' independent streak in: Francis H.
Heller, ed., The Truman White House: The Administration
Of the Presidency, 1945-1953 (Lawrence: The Regents Press
of Kansas, 1980), pp. 227-28.

1'7Tom Connally, My Name is Tom Connally (New York:
Thomas Y. Crowell 00., 1954). pp. 330—32.

18Jacob J. Javits and Rafael Steinberg, Javits: The
Autobiography of a Public Man (Boston: Houghton Mifflin
Co., 198T), p. 134.

19Altmeyer, Formative Years, pp. 160, 163, 169.

20Edward C. Blackorby, Prarie Rebel: The Public Life
of William Lemke (Lincoln: University Of Nebraska Press,
1963). p. 774. John E. Huss, Senator for the South: A
Biography of Olin D. Johnston (Garden City, New York:
Doubleday & CO., 1961), p. 147. Erwin L. Levine, Theodore
Francis Green: The Washington Years, 1937-1960 (Providence:
Brown University Press, 1971), pp. 20-23, 109. Robert
Franklin Maddox, The Senatorial Career Of Harley Martin
Kilgore (New York: Garland Publishing Inc., 1981),
pp. 258-64, 267. Alfred Steinberg, Sam Rayburn: A
BiOgraphy (New York: Hawthorn Books, Inc., 1975). p. 244.
Dwight C. Dorough, Mr. Sam (New York: Random House, 1962),

p. 398.

21Helen Gahagan Douglas, A Full Life (Garden City,
New York: Doubleday & CO., 1982), p. 274 simply mentions
the 1948 election and tactics with no judgement on domestic
policies. Ralph E. Flanders, Senator From Vermont (Boston:
Little, Brown & Co., 1961), pp. 220-24. Flanders relates
actions of the Eightieth, but also praises Truman. Brooks
Hays, A Hotbed of Tranquillity: My Life In Five Worlds
(New York: MacMillan CO., 1968), pp. 103-05. Although

Hays pretty much ignores the Eightieth Congress, his

 

 

 

22

dislike Of Truman is very evident. F. Edward Hebert and
John McMillan, Last Of the Titans: The Life and Times Of
Congressman F. Edward HSbert Of LouisianaTLayfayette:
Center for Louisiana Studies, 1976)_7p. 321. Hebert deals
mostly with the Dixiecrats, and though there was some
animosity between Truman and Hebert after the election,
Hebert' 3 picture of Truman is fairly positive. Edward
Keating, The Gentleman From Colorado: A Memoir (Denver:
Sage Books, 1964). Keating totally ignores the Eightieth
Congress. Louis W. Koenig, ed., The Truman Administration:
Its Principles and Practice (Washington Square, New York.
New York University Press, 1956), p. 3, gives the usual
story Of the 1948 election and mistreatment of Truman by
the Eightieth Congress. However, Koenig also reminds the
reader that the Democratic Seventy-ninth and Eighty-first
Congresses did not treat Truman much better. F. Ross
Patterson, PrOphet_Without Honor: Glen H. Taylor and the
Fight for American Liberalism (Lexington: -University Press
Of Kentucky, 1974), p. 139. The author nonjudgementally
emphasizes the political astuteness of Truman in his 1948
campaign Of demanding liberal reforms and the failure of
Congress to pass them. Robert A. Smith, The Tiger in the
Senate: The Biography of Wayne Morse (Garden City, New
York: Doubleday & CO., 1962), pp.18, 132. Smith argues
that although Morse appeared anti-New Deal, he was really
an independent, if not-in actuality a liberal. Morse's
votes on some Social Security issues in the Eightieth
Congress supports this theory. Smith also states that
although .Morseawas not overly fond Of Truman he gave him
the necessary support.

 

 

 

 

 

22Norris Cotton, In the Senate: Amidst the Conflict
and Turmoil (New York: Dodd, Meade & CO., 1978), p. 127.

 

 

23Joe Martin, My First Fifty Years in Politics (New
York: McGraw-Hill Book 00., 1960), pp. 178-79.

 

24Ibid.. pp. 178-79, 195-98.
25Ibid., p. 190.

26George H. Mayer, The Republican Party, 1854-1964
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1964), pp. 469, 471.

27Henry Z. Scheele, Charlie Halleck: A Political
Biography (New York: Exposition Press, 1966)} pp. 115,
117, 124- 25. Halleck did not like Truman but he COOperated

 

 

23

with him. Therefore, he was especially angry when Truman
leveled the charges of inactivity against the Congress.
Marvin E. Stromer, The Making of A Political Leader:
Kenneth S. Wherry and the United States SenateTILincoln:
University of Nebraska Press, 1969), pp. 38-39. The

Wherry biography followed closely Scheele's argument in
Halleck's biography. Finally, Robert A. Taft's biOgraphies
also mirror the Obvious dislike between Taft and Truman
and the indignation Taft felt at Truman's congressional
jabs. James T. Patterson, Mr. Republican: A BiOgraphy

Of Robert A. Taft (Boston: Houghton Miffin CO., 1972),

p. 394. William S. White, The Taft Story (New York:

Harper & Brothers, 1954), pp. 62-63. This last book
reflects the candy-coated biOgraphy version of Taft's life,
but appears to argue the same type of description of the
Taft-Truman feud as is found in later more thoughtful
biOgraphies.

 

 

 

28The most Obvious exception to this statement is

Samuel Lubell, Futupe Of American Politics (New York:
Harper & Brothers, 1951). In comparison to other works of
the time, Lubell seems overly critical of Truman. But
closer analysis reveals that Lubell was not so much
critical of Truman, as he was realistic about Truman's
intentions and actions. Lubell paints Truman as the
conservative in 1948 rather than Dewey. Truman represented
safety and continuation to a public afraid Of losing
ground. (Ibid., p. 60.) Lubell illustrates thathruman was
not intent upon change, as others have stated, but wanted
to retain the status quO, (Ibid., pp. 10, 176-77, 196, 229,
230-31. 232. 254.)

29Jonathan Daniels, The Man Of Independence
(Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott CO., 1950). Eric F.
Goldman, The Crucial Decade and After: America 1945-1960
(New York: Vinatage Books, 1960). Cabell Phillips, Th3
Truman Presidency: The History of Triumphant Succession
(New York: MacMillan CO., 1966). See also, Morris L.
Ernst and David Loth, The PeOple Know Best: The Ballots
vs. The Polls (Washington, D.C.: The Public Affairs Press,
1949). This book is so highly biased and one-sided in
examining the Truman election Of 1948 and the error of the
Opinion polls in predicting the victory, that it is a
valuable source for comic relief. But it is also an
excellent example of the worst type Of laudatory literature
published on Truman at this time. Another example Of the
myth making books is Jules Abels, Out Of the Jaws of
Victory (New York: Henry Holt & CO., 1959). See also

 

 

 

 

 

24

Truman appointee, George E. Allen, Presidents Who Have
Known Me (New.York: Simon and Schuster, 1950). More
recent works in this tradition include: Alton Lee, "The
Turnip Session of the DO-Nothing Congress: Presidential
Campaign Strate y," Southwestern Social Science Quarterly
44 (December 1963): 256-67. Irwin Ross, The Loneliest
Campaign: The Truman Victory of 1948 (New York: New
American Library, Inc., 1968)} Alfred Steinberg, The Man
from Missouri: The Life and Times of Harry S. Truman (New
York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1962).

 

 

 

 

30Richard E. Neustadt, "Congress and the Fair Deal:
A Legislative Balance Sheet," Public Policy 5 (1954): 351-
81. Also Neustadt, "Presidency and Legislation: The
Growth of Central Clearance," American Political Science
Review 48, #3 (1954): 641-71, And Neustadt, Presidential
Power: The Politics of Leadership (New York: John Wiley
& Sons, 1960).

 

 

31Richard S. Kirkendall, "Harry Truman," in Morton
Borden, ed., America's Eleven Greatest Presidents (Chicago:
Rand McNally, 1971). Kirkendall, ed., The Truman Period
As A Research Field (Columbia: University Of Missouri
Press, 1967). Kirkendall, ed., The Truman Period As A
Research Field: A Reappraisal, 1972 (Columbia: University
of Missouri Press, 1974). Alonzo L. Hamby, Beyond the New
Deal: Harry S. Truman and American Liberalism (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1973). Hamby, The Imperial
Years: The United States Since 1939 (New York: Weybright
& Talley, 1976). Although more general and textbook in
style than his first works, The Imperial Years also re-
inforces the traditionalist school views on Truman both in
his domestic and foreign policies. -For an analysis of
legislative response 1944-46 to FDR's and Truman's attempts
to bring back the early enthusiasm of the New Deal and its
failure see Mary Hedge Hinchey, "The Frustration of the
New Deal Revival, 1944-46" Diss., University of Missouri,
1965. Robert J. Donovan, journalist turned historian,
should also be grouped with the traditionalists, perhaps
more by default than from any real, clear classification of
views. He presents a very readable narrative of Truman's
life, and a generally sympathetic view of the President.
He differs from the earlier biographies on Truman, in that
he also attempts to analyze Truman's actions and sometimes
false accusations against Republican inaction in the
Eightieth Congress. Robert J. Donovan, Conflict and Crisis:
The Presidency of Harry S. Truman, 1945-1948 (New York:
W. W. Norton & CO., 1977).

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

25

32Margaret Truman, Harry S. Truman (New York: William
Morrow & CO., 1973). As was to be expected this theme is
reinforced in editorial comments in Margaret Truman, ed.,
Letters From Father: The Truman Family's Personal Corre-
Spondence (New York: Arbor House, 1981). Merle Miller,
Plain Speaking; An Oral Biogpaphypof Harry S. Truman
(New York: Berkley Publishing Corp., 1973): Part of the
very positive image reflected by the public, and the
popular easy reading books on his Presidency may be traced
to Truman's quick wit and easy Speaking style. As evident
from the speeches in his whistle step campaign, Truman's
own books and the Miller biOgraphy, Truman had an earthy
sense of humor. When Truman made a pun or told a joke its
language and style made it easily understood by most. His
link to the average citizen was reinforced by his use of
expletives in Speeches and comments- Even the one-man
stage show on Truman in the early 19703 helped reinforce
this pOpular image of a President of the peOple.

 

 

 

33Barton J. Bernstein, ed., Politics and Policies of
the Truman Administration (Chicagof_ Quadrangel Books,
1970). Bernstein, ed., Towards a New Past: Dissenting
Essays In American.HistOpy (New York: Vintage Books, Inc.,
1967). Bert Cochran, Harry Truman and the Crisis
Presidency(New~York: Funk & Wagnalls, 1973). Allen
Yarnell, Democrats and Progressives: *The 1948 Election as
a Test of Postwar Liberalism (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1974).

 

 

34Martha Derthick, Policymaking for Social Security
(Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institute, 1979). Others
are business studies of coverage and the like, with little
or no historical study or analysis. This is not to say
that Arthur Altmeyer's book is of little use. But his
participant status in the events limits his Objectivity.

ONE

TO ERR IS TRUMAN, 1945-46

The initial session Of the Eightieth Congress began
calmly. There was present, to be sure, the self-
righteousness of a group of politicians who felt they had
just been given a mandate from the peOple. Surprisingly,
however, there was also a sort of benign compatibility
between the Republican-dominated Congress and Democratic
President Harry S. Truman.

In the mid-term election.of 1946 the Republicans had
run a campaign based on discrediting Truman and the New
Deal legacy. A campaign slogan such as the famous "TO err
is Truman" could hardly be counted on to set the stage for
good relations between Congress and the President. Yet,
for a time, relations were cordial, almost friendly,
between the legislative and administrative branches Of
government.1

Much of this cordiality had to do with the attitude
of Harry Truman. His tenure in the Senate had given him
some idea of what it was like to function on Capitol Hill
with all its freedoms and restraints. For ten years Truman

had served in Congresses which often blanched under what

26

27

they viewed as the unnecessary interfering, meddling
tactics Of the Roosevelt White House.2

Truman had begun congenial relations with Congress
almost as soon as he assumed the Presidency after FDR's
death. In fact, on his very first day in Office in 1945
he went to Capitol Hill for lunch with 17 Senators and
Representatives of both parties. Among the luncheon group
were Congressmen whose tenure would extend to the Eightieth
Congress. This initial, unusual act for a President, left
a positive effect on most Congressmen. Republican Senator
Arthur Vandenberg praised this initial informal meeting.

It was both wise and smart. It means that the

days of executive contempt for Congress are

ended. That we are returning to a government 3

in which Congress Will take its rightful place.

This statement by Vandenberg although made in 1945,
sums up the attitudes of many members of the Eightieth
Congress as well. AS will be seen in Chapter 3, Congress
was very concerned with its role in the nation as the
initiators Of legislation.' They felt much Of their power
had been usurped by Roosevelt. They were now like children
beginning to Show their independence against a domineering
parent. They were willing to go to almost any length to
re-establish their role. At times Congress would back

themselves out on a limb and then saw it off all in the

name of Congressional independence.

28

Truman's honeymoon with the Seventy-ninth soon ended,
just as, two years later, his relations with the Eightieth

4

Congress would quickly grow bitter. The Congressional
good will Truman had built up on his first few months in
office was shattered on September 6, 1945 when he submitted
his "Twenty-one Point Message" on domestic problems.5
Republicans and Southern Democrats believed Truman's
suggestions were too close to Roosevelt's 1944 Economic
Bill of Rights, and this attempted.resurrection of the New
Deal galvanized the conservatives in the Seventy-ninth
Congress. In his September 6 message Truman asked for a
modernized New Deal: full-employment legislation, public
housing, farm price supports, national health insurance,
expanded social security and a permanent Fair Employment
Practices Commission. Instead he received from Congress
either conservative measures or stony silence and total
inactivity.

For example, Truman's request for legislation to
assure full employment was met with the passage of the
Employment Act of 1946, which contained no implementation
provisions to assure full employment. Rather the 1946 Act
simply proclaimed full employment to be a desirable national
Objective and created a Council of Economic Advisors to
furnish the President with information on the economy and

recommendations for change. In addition, Congress also

passed a small aid program for veteran's housing, hardly

29

comparable to Truman's original prOgram, which had called
for over two million housing starts in a two-year period.
The rest of the prOposals in the Twenty-one Point message
were either killed or ignored, as was the case with the
Fair Employment Practices Commission which was allowed to
expire.

Truman went on to criticize the Seventy-ninth Congress
for the same lack Of action for which he would criticize
the Eightieth.6 Unfortunately, this tactic suffered from
the fact that unlike the Republican Eightieth Congress the
Seventy-ninth was Democratic. Truman was thus put in the
peculiar position Of criticizing his own party. Critics
have since argued that Truman's criticism was one reason
the Democrats lost the Eightieth Congress to the
Republicans. But ironically the 1946 election results
would free Truman from this restriction, for he would now
be able to criticize Congress without jeOpardizing the
election chances of the Democrats.

Congress as an institution is a homogeneous mixture
Of politicians representing a heterogeneous group of
Americans. Individual Congressmen may be divided into
numerous categorieS--southern, northern; western, eastern,
midwestern; urban, rural; pro-labor, pro-business; and so
on. But no division is so Obvious as that Of political

party: eSpecially Democrats and Republicans. This is why

30

party divisions of the Eightieth Congress were of
Special interest.

As they entered the 1946 campaign the Republicans
had not held a majority in Congress for 16 years. The
last Republican-dominated Congress, elected in 1928, had
teen tied to the ill-fated career of Herbert Hoover.
Whether rightly or wrongly blamed for the Depression,
almost the entire Republican Party was swept from power in
1932 and replaced by the Democrats, or more precisely,
by Franklin Delano Roosevelt and his associates. At
various points during the ensuing years the Republicans
increased their strength and occasionally came close to
regaining control. It was, therefore, with considerable
interest that the peOple, media, and the Truman Administra-
tion viewed the new Republican-dominated Eightieth Congress.

The Republicans needed to do something dramatically
different from their Democratic predecessors. In fact,
they had run their political campaign on that promise.
Like other politicians, before and after, they felt they
had a mandate from the peOple, a demand for striking
political changes.8 On January 5, 1947 the night before
the new Eightieth Congress was to go into session, Senator
Robert A. Taft said in a radio broadcast:

The main issue of the election was the restora-

tion of freedom and the elimination or reduction

Of constantly increasing interference with family

life and with business by autocratic government
bureaus and autocratic labor leaders.

31

The Democrats, fearing the Republicans were right, were
more likely to go along with the new majority or at least
not to Openly antagonize them until they had reassessed
the mood Of the electorate. This attitude was eSpecially
prevalent in the two major areas of Republican-Democratic
conflict: government Spending and the power labor had
accrued under Roosevelt's tutelage.1O

After the 1946 election, Senate Republicans controlled
51 of the 96 seats: they had gained 13 seats in the

11

election. The South was joined in its united Deomocratic

front only by Arizona and New Mexico.12

The relative experience of the Senators, both
Republican and Democratic, is also important. The majority
of Senators were relatively new and inexperienced in
Congressional politics, thus leaving a few old-timers with
most of the power. New Senators, those elected to Congress
for the first time, are more likely to be close followers

13

Of the party line. Although they arrive with a certain

amount of arrOgance, most are quickly brought to the
realization that they are probably there because of backing
from their party, or because of voter association of the

14

candidate with the party. More important, if they have

any desire to advance through the ranks from less to more
desirable committees they had better follow the party
15

leaders.

32

Conversely, those Senators who have been in Office
for more than one term are the ones more likely to buck
party line.16 Although not so dependent on party favor as
the new Senators, most realize that the legislature runs
on a process of COOperation. The most likely place for
COOperation is within the party itself.

Finally, those Senators who are able to return after
two terms may be considered the party leadership.17
Unless an unusual circumstance should arise--a personal
scandal or dramatic change in their ideology--most Senators
in this final bracket will have advanced far enough up the
ladder of party authority that they would be less likely to
question party tenets, even though they probably have the
power and prestige to do so. In fact, one study shows
that Senators in this bracket are more likely to be neutral
as long as the item in question does not affect their
state in particular.18

There were 49 Senators who had completed less than
one complete six-year term. The next group, those who were
beginning or were in their second term of Office, tallied
in at 26 members. The final group, those who had over two
terms experience, numbered 21 members Of the Senate.

Examining the Republican Senators by this method
Shows there were 34 first-term Republican Senators. Those

Republican Senators beginning or in their second terms made

Up a grOUp of 14. But there were only three Republican

33

Senators with more than two terms behind them. As
illustrated by these figures most Republicans in the Senate
were in their first term and, according to the before
mentioned study, they could be expected to vote the party
line as set by leaders such as Taft and Vandenberg. AS

for the other categories, since the number of Republicans
with a long tenure in the Senate was small, the Republicans
had to delve into lower ranks to find committee chairmen
and therefore almost insured loyalty among what could have
become that middle maverick group.

Democratic tenure was structured a bit differently.
There were 15 first-term Democrats in the Senate. There
were 12 Democratic Senators in office for more than one
term but less than two terms. There were 18 Democratic
Senators who had been in office for more than two terms.
The Democrats were concentrated in this most senior group
of Senators. A third of this final most powerful group of
Senators came from the South. Southern Senators were
consistently re-elected to Office resulting in long tenures.
Republicans charged this is how they amassed so much
power.19 The seniority system bears out this claim. As
mentioned before, the desertion of some Southerners in
1948 casts doubts on their loyalty in 1947-48, so the
strength Of the Democratic Party in the Senate should not

be viewed as strong support for Truman.

34

The House Of Representative mirrored the Senate in
terms of Republican gains. After the 1946 election, House
Republicans controlled 246 seats of the 435 seats, they
had gained 56 seats. The Democrats held on to 188 seats
and the American Labor Party held on to one seat.20

The House provided a much more diverse group than the
Senate in terms Of the geographic distribution of the
parties. In comparison to the Senate, the Republicans
were able to capture very few states completely in the
House. The Democrats, on the other hand, retained their
hold over the South, just as they had in the Senate.

The pattern Of Office tenure in the House of
Representatives was similar to, though not as clear cut
as, that in the Senate. One difference, Obviously, was
in the term of Office. Representatives are up for
election every two years rather than every Six, so the
chance for turnover is greater. As the Founding Fathers
had predicted, House membership is more tied to current
issues.21 So if public opinion should shift drastically
on an issue, some once very pOpular Representatives could
find themselves out of a job after an election. For
clarity, however, the same numerical divisions of years
as used for the Senate will apply here.22

There were 215 Representatives who had served less
than six years. In fact, 91 of these were first-term

Representatives with no previous experience at the national

35

legislative level. This is quite a large amount of
incoming Representatives, comprising over one-fifth Of the
House membership. There were 130 Representatives who had
served more than six years but less than 12 years. There
were 89 Representatives who had served for six terms or
longer. Of these 89 members, 47 had served less than 18
years and 42 more than 18 years. There was also one
vacancy later filled by a first-term Republican.

Divided by party, the Republicans had 135 Of all their
members in the House less than three terms. In fact, their
members comprised 62 of the 91 first term members.. Those
Republicans who had.been in the House more than three
terms, but under six, numbered 70. Finally, there were
40 Republicans who had been in the House 12 years or
longer. Of these 40 Republicans, 23 had served less than‘
18 years and 17 had served 18 years or longer.

The Democrats tallied up a bit differently. There
were 80 Democratic Representatives who had been in the
House less than six years. There were 29 first time
Democratic Representatives in this group. Those Democratic
Representatives who had served Six years, yet under 12
years, numbered 59. This was considerably less than their
Republican counterparts. There were 49 Democrats who had
extended their tenure at least 12 years or beyond. Of
these 49, 24 served between 12 and 18 years. The addi-

tional 25 Democrats had been in Congress 18 years or longer.

36

If compared, it is Obvious that once again the
Democrats had their strength Spread through all levels of
experience. Although quite a few Democrats were in the
somewhat new category, they had predominantly more Of
their party represented in the older, more experienced
brackets, than the Republicans.23 The Republicans concen-
tration was among the newer arrivals.

Even with their majority, the Republicans were faced
with a large percentage of new or relatively new members
Of Congress. There was potential for some trouble as
studies have found that Republicans tend to stick closer
together in party ideOIOgy when they are out Of power.2
The Democrats, on the other hand, always seem to have
their problems holding their members to a strict party
line, simply because Of their greater diversity of party
membership. But in the Eightieth Congress the inexperience
Of most Republican members Offset the tendency and most
Republicans held to the party line.

Judging from the above figures, the Republicans in the
Eightieth Congress were primarily new and inexperienced.25
If the aforementioned studies apply here, the Republicans
would find themselves leading a large group of rather
pliable first-time Congressmen and therefore would present
a very unified party line along the Taft-Vandenberg
persuasion. The Democrats, on the other hand, had a

majority of experienced legislators, used to controlling

37

committees and embittered by their loss of power for

which they blamed Truman. Since they blamed Truman's
political ineptitude for the loss of Congress in 1946 they
were less likely to SUpport what appeared like more Of the
same Administration prOposals which had defeated the
Democrats in 1946, thus presenting the Republicans with
little organized Democratic resistance.

Surprisingly, in view of all this, after the 1946
election Truman believed that he might have a better
chance to get prOposals past a new Congress, Republican or
not, than he had had with the hard-headed Seventy-ninth
Democratic Congress. In reSponse to Eleanor Roosevelt's
letter that the new Congress might be easier to deal with
than the Old, Truman wrote:

I think we will be in a position to get more

things done for the welfare of the country, or

at least to make a record of things recommended

for the welfare Of the country, than we would

have been had we been responsible for a Demgcratic

Congress which was not loyal to the party.2
On November 14, 1946 Truman echoed this sentiment to an
Old friend.

I don't expect to knuckle under to the Republicans.

. . . Between you and me I don't expect this

Congress to be any worse than the pne I had to

deal with for the last two years.2

As the time drew near for the new Congress to go into
session, Truman continued his conciliatory remarks. On

New Year's Day 1947 Truman called up the new Republican

leaders Of the Senate and the House. Arthur H. Vandenberg

38

Of Michigan, the new Senate Majority Leader, only

suggested that the President wait until after his

January 6 State Of the Union message to meet with
Republican leaders. Joseph W. Martin, Jr. of Massachusetts,
the new Speaker of the House, gave an even more positive
and, most importantly tO Truman, believable reSponse.
Martin spoke of OOOperation for the "general welfare" of
the country, as well as a willingness to discuss these
things.28 Robert Taft, the de facto leader on domestic
issues for the Republicans, was not as conciliatory, nor is
there any indication that Truman tried to push a friendly

29

relationship with Taft. In fact, by November 1947

Truman was referring tO Taft in private letters as one Of

30 Taft took a harder

a group of "liars and demagogues."
line than either Vandenberg or Martin. As reflected in

his radio broadcast prior tO the Opening of the Eightieth
Congress, Taft thought the Republican Congress would come
out swinging, no matter what the White House wanted.

Still, the initial relations between Harry Truman and
the Eightieth Congress were considered good, mostly because
of good will and a desire tO OOOperate. With these
congenial relations it would seem that Congress and the
President would have been able to move to agreement on many
issues, foreign as well as domestic. But the honeymoon

would end on numerous issues, and eSpecially on Social

Security.

39

1The first cracks in Presidential-Congressional rela-
tions began to Show in February 1947 with the David E.
Lilienthal appointment as chairman of the CiVilian Atomic
Energy Commission. After Lilienthal was confirmed, with
Vandenberg's help, Truman did Show disgust with Congress.
In his typical style, Truman confided in his mother and
sister that "I am of the Opinion that the country has had
enough Of their pinhead antics." Margaret Truman, Harry S.
Truman, p. 349.

2Neustadt, Presidential Power, p. 173. For a state-
ment on Truman's belief in separation Of powers between
President and Congress see Daniels, Man of Independence,

pp. 294-95.

 

 

3Arthur H. Vandenberg, Jr. and Alex Morris, eds.,
The Private Papers of Senator Vandenberg (Boston: Houghton-
Mifflin CO., 1952), p. 167.

 

4Donovan, ConfliCt and Crisis, pp. 114, 118, claims
this chilly relationship between Truman and Congress re-
sulted because Truman followed to closely the policies Of
the former administration. 'Hamby, Beyond the New Deal,
pp. 53-54, 83-84 argues that at the time in question, it
seems Truman could do nothing right. The conservatives
thought he was too close to the liberals. The liberals
thought he catered to big business and the conservatives.
The South thought he mollycoddled labor. Labor felt he
ignored their needs. Most important, to the chagrin of
the liberals and delight Of the conservatives, Truman was
not Franklin D. Roosevelt.

 

 

5U.S., President, Public Papers of the President or
the United States (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Federal
Register, National Archives and Records Service, 1963 ,
1945, p. 263. Following references to this collection will
be listed as Presidential Papers.

6Ibid., p. 263. See also Donovan, Conflict and Crisis,
p. 260.

7Hamby, Beyond the New Deal, p. 183. Donovan,
Conflict and Crisis, pp. 163-64.

 

 

 

 

8The so called mandate might be better understood in
the context Of the disjointed 1946 Democratic campaign.
Two major problems plagued the administration in 194 .

40

First, Truman had fired Secretary of Commerce Henry Wallace
on September 20. Wallace was one of the last major New
Dealers left in the Cabinet. By this action Truman severely
damaged his image among liberals as the heir to FDR. TO a
part so dependent upon the image(and coattails at election
time) Of Roosevelt for SO long, this action gave the
impression they were cut free from the non-existent New
Deal ideology and presented an uncertain,'confusing’
political front.

Second, Truman ended meat controls on October 14. He
did this as a campaign ploy to give the Republicans one
less example of SUpposed government intervention in the
public's private life. Unfortunately, this action also
disillusioned labor, one of the strongest links of the New
Deal coalition.

The Republicans campaigned with such Slogans as "It's
time for a change" and "Had enough?" and appeared to still
be running against Roosevelt. The Democrats played right
into their hands. Rather than allowing Truman to campaign
for them the Democrats instead relied on Roosevelt's
recorded campaign addresses. This presented the confusing
image to the public of a party being run by a dead '
President, and as is common in Off year elections, the
Republicans made major gains from this confusion.

For an in-depth look at the 1946 election see James
Boylan, The New Deal Coalition and the Election of 1946
(New York: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1981).

9Robert A. Taft, quoted in Donovan, Conflict and
Crisis, p. 260. See also Congressional Digest 26, #2
(1947): 33, which claims that the victory was because
American voters wanted a reduction in Federal Government
expenditures, a reduction in taxes and an overhauling of
New Deal labor laws. This anger associated with Democratic
over indulgence with labor is also discussed by Lubell,
Future of American Politics, p. 2, 194-98, and Congressional
Digest 26, #6-7 (1947): T63.

10

 

 

 

Congressional Digest 26, #2 (1947): 33.

 

11The one seat discrepancy between the 12 seats the
Democrats lost and the 13 seats the Republicans gained was
due to the loss of PrOgressive Robert LaFollette to
Republican Joseph McCarthy.

12Considering what would happen in the 1948 election
with the Split Off of some Southern Democrats into the
Dixiecrat Party, perhaps the Democratic South was not so
Democratic after all. Perhaps it was best described as

41

simply anti-Republican. In retrOSpect even Truman saw the
South as a threat to the party. Chief Truman advisor
Clark Cliffor thought the South would remain Democratic

no matter what, as did many others. Truman, Years Of
Trial and HOpe, 2: 172.

13ROger H. Davidson, The Role of the Congressman
(New York: Pegasus, 1969), p. 152.

 

14Ibid., p. 146.

15Barbara Hinckley, The.Seniority System In Congress
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1971), pp. 3-4.
Hinckley describes the seniority system and the procedure
for deciding upon the leaders in Congress. The power
structure hinged upon years of service in a committee,
rather than the total.number Of years in Congress. So it
was important for a Congressman to be assigned to the
proper committee as soon after his entrance into Congress
as possible. This idea is reinforced also by Davidson,
Role Of Congressman, p. 153, Randall B. Ripley, Party
Leaders In The House of Representatives (Washington, D.C.:
Brookings Institution, 1967), p. 197, and Donald R.
Matthews, U.S. Senators and Their World (New York: Vintage
Books, 1960), p. 96.

 

 

 

 

16Hinckley proves this point in her 1947-66 study.
Although the study covers a longer time span than this
thesis it reinforces the idea that median tenure Congress-
men are more likely to be mavericks than their colleagues.
Hinckley, Seniority System, pp. 3-4, 40, 44, 66-67.

17According to the Hinckley study, the median number
Of years necessary to reach the chairmanship of a committee
or ranking minority member was as follows in the Senate:

Democrats needed 10 years (2 elections)

Republicans needed 7 years (2 elections)
The higher tenure required for Democrats is due to their
normally larger numbers and to southern tenacity. Ibid.,
p. 20.

18Since Congressmen with this length of tenure usually
come from a safe district they do not need the party to be
re-elected. This group is where the mavericks will be
found, provided they are not in the party leadership.
Davidson, Role of Congressman, pp. 146, 153-55.

 

42

19Cotton,'In The Senate, p. 7. Hinckley, Seniority
System, pp. 3-4.

20The American Labor Party gained an additional Seat
in a Special election, bringing their number to two.

 

 

21Cotton, In The Senate, pp. 50-51, argues it was the
House not the Senate which was conservative. Since House
members represented small and usually homogeneous areas
they were well aware how they were expected to vote. The
Senate, on the other hand, was the "radical and impulsive
body" because they represented a larger, more mixed group
and they had to try and please everyone.

 

22Hinckley, Seniority System, p. 20, lists the average
number of years needed to gain committee chairmanship or
ranking minority member in the House as:

Democrats needed 16 years (9 elections)

Republicans needed 12 years (7 elections).

 

23Much of this concentration was in the South and
there was no love between the northern and southern
Democrats. In fact, the two factions were arguing from the
beginning, trying to decide who would be House Minority
Leader. Northerners and Sam Rayburn wanted John McCormack
from Massachusetts. The South wanted Rayburn. Eugene Cox
of Georgia warned Rayburn that if McCormack won "the rift
within the ranks of the House Democrats will be wider than
that between the Democrats and Republicans." Eugene E.
Cox to Sam Rayburn, 30 December 1946, Miscellaneous Files
1946, Sam Rayburn Papers, Rayburn Library, Bonham Texas.

24But Ripley indicates that by time the Republicans
gained power, the party leadership had long experience at
Opposing a Democratic President and were able to use this
experience to hold the party together. Randall Ripley,
Majority Party Leadership in Congress (Boston: Little,
Brown & CO., 1969), p. 147. The "Party Unity Records"
compiled by the Congressional Quarterly support the conten-
tion that Republicans were more party cohesive at this
time than the Democrats, expecially in the House.

43

80th Congress K
Senate House
Voted with party GOP Dems GOP Dems
90 per cent or more 29 12 147 73
75 to 89 per cent 16 18 84 69
50 to 74 per cent 4 13 10 40

less than 50 per cent 2 2 1
Congressional Quarterly Almanac 4 (1948): 37.

25Senator Ralph E. Flanders, Republican from Vermont,
backed this idea. "It is a well-established maxim that
freshmen Senators should be seen and not heard. That
maxim was more honored in the breach than in Observance in
the 80th Congress. There were not enough elder statesmen
to goéaround." Ralph E. Flanders, Senator From Vermont,
p. 21 .

26

 

Donovan, Conflict and Crisis, p. 180.

27Harry S. Truman to Sherman Minton, 14 November 1946,
President's Secretary's File, Harry S. Truman Library,
Independence, Missouri, quoted in Donovan, Conflict and
Crisis, p. 239.

 

28Truman, Years of Trial and Hope, 2: 172. Truman
appeared to like or at least respect Vandenberg and to view
him as an ally rather than an enemy. Truman's diary entry
for January 1, 1947 quoted in Robert H. Ferrell, ed., Off
the Record: The Private Papers of Harry S. Truman (New
York: Harper & Row, 1980), p. 107. In his diary Truman
paraphrases Martin's response as: "He assured me that
COOperation was at the tOp of his consideration. And that
he wanted very much to help run the country for the general
welfare. He told me that he would be most happy to talk to
me at anytime on any subject. I am inclined to believe
that he meant what he said."

29Mayer, The Republican Party, pp. 454. 467-68, 470,
gives some examples of Taft's hostility toward the New Deal
and its adherents, especially Truman. According to the
diary of Eben A. Ayers, Truman had remarked once that even
Vandenberg was afraid of Taft. Truman had compared the two
to "roosters-squaring Off". Diary of Eben A. Ayers, 25
November 1948, quoted in Donovan, Conflict and Crisis, p. 258.

 

 

30Harry S. Truman to Mary Jane Truman, 14 November
1947 quoted in Ferrell, Off the Record, pp. 118-19.

 

TWO

CHARITY BEGINS AT HOME, 1947

Alf Landon, former Republican Presidential candidate,
warned after the 1946 Republican victory: "people will
expect more of us than we can probably deliver."1 Little
did anyone realize how true these words were, eSpecially in
relation to what Harry Truman would ask the Eightieth
Congress to change in the Social Security Act.

But the stage was set, the actors present, and as the
curtain rose the audience across the country settled back
to watch the play unfold. Truman entered Congress and
began his State of the Union message and the sides began
to choose up.

"It looks like a good many of you have moved over to
the left since I was here last!"2 Truman's Opening quip to
Congress was most certainly an ironic indication of the
traditional physical placements of the parties as Opposed
to their political preference for liberal and conservative
beliefs. Truman went on to speak Of the need for under-
standing and COOperation between the Legislative and

Administrative branches. He suggested five major economic

44

45

3

policies which he wanted Congress to help him attain.
They were:
1) Better labor-management relations.

2) Tightened controls on monOpOly and encouragement
of private enterprise.

3) More home construction.

4) A balancedbudget and reduction of the public
debt.

5) The stabilization Of prices for agricultural
products.

It was under the first policy area that Truman slyly
included Social Security. Truman reminded Congress that
the best way to achieve better relations between labor and
management was not through the passage Of legislation
dealing only with labor relations and directed against
labor unions. Instead,.he maintained, the nation must
remove the anxieties a worker faces in an industrial
society. One Of the anxieties was the laborers' insecurity
Of being separated from the tools of production and having
his livelihood depend upon the good will of another.
Increased Social Security, among other things, would help
lessen this fear and put some trust back into the relation-
ship between labor and management.4

In keeping with his conciliatory style Of early 1947
Truman did not really demand as much as he would in 1948.
Instead Truman simply described the changes he would like

Congress to legislate into Social Security. Just in case

46

Congress had missed the point, Truman reiterated in more
detail in his "Special Message to Congress: The President's
First Economic Report" of January 8, 1947 and once again in
his "Annual Budget Message to Congress: Fiscal Year 1948"
of January 10, 1947.5

In terms Of Social Security Truman wanted specifically:

1) TO expand Social Security to cover those groups
not covered.

2) To increase Social Security benefits.
He also made other suggestions:

1) Alteration in the financing for Social Security
so there would not be so much reliance on Simple
employee/employer taxes, but on supplementation
from the general budget.7

2) The creation of a Department of Health, Education
and Security to organize Social Security and all
other welfare programs.. This would replace the
FSA and other agencies which welfare programs
were placed under.

3) The requirement that the states be uniform in
their public assistance that is supplemented by
the government, and the passage Of perma ent
legislation to continue this assistance.

Congress listened, but how well they heard what Truman
was saying is questionable. In 1947 Truman delivered only
those three policy statements to Congress dealing with
Social Security (aside from the veto message dealt with
later in this chapter). Congress did very little with the
suggestions in its first session. In fact, they did very
little with Social Security at all in 1947. What they

did mostly was talk.9

47

For a time it was not clear if Congressmen were
arguing about Social Security specifically or using Social
Security as a weapon to attack other legislation before
them. As mentioned in the Introduction, when speaking of
the prOgram most Congressmen called for increased aid.
There were three specific arguments given for this. The
first was used as a basis for the next two. First, if the
country could provide aid for EurOpe it could provide
adequate aid at home. Second, increased aid would fight
Communism at home by keeping the elderly and soon-tO-be
elderly content. Finally, it was the earned right of the
aged to be provided with a respectable standard of living
by the nation they had helped to build.

The actions Of the Eightieth Congress in foreign
policy went smoother than their actions in domestic issues.
This was due mostly to the great persuasive power Senator
Vandenberg held over foreign policy action and his COOp-
eration with Truman. Yet it was not as though all foreign
policy changes went through Congress without a hitch,
despite the power Senator Vandenberg wielded. One aSpect
of foreign policy was the major battleground on which
Social Security was fought on, the question of financial
aid to foreign countries, specifically under the Marshall
Plan and the Truman Doctrine. This is not to say that

calls for increased OASI and 0AA would not have arisen,

48

but just that the demands were linked in their attack to
these foreign aid prOgramS.

Portraying the situation in Greece and Turkey as
one of unchecked expansion of the_forces of Communism
against those Of democracy, President Truman proclaimed to
Congress the Truman Doctrine on March 12, 1947. His
Specific request was for 350 million dollars in military

aid to Greece and 50 million for Turkey.10

The military
aid package was passed in April by the Senate and May by
the House. June 5, Of the same year, General George
Marshall, Secretary Of State, set forth in his address at
Harvard the blue print of what would become the Marshall
Plan. Although the rhetoric Of crisis and the actions of
the Soviet Union and its satellites helped to bring success
to both these plans, it also laid the groundwork for
attacks by Congress on what they viewed as a faulty Social
Security system.

The major argument centered around the fact that the
United States was sending massive amounts Of aid to foreign
countries while seemingly ignoring the calls for better
living conditions Of her own citizens, Specifically the
elderly. This argument did not occur in floor debate but
rather as an insertion into the Record of prepared state-
ments. Most statements of this type centered around the
time that the considerations for foreign aid were in the

forefront of Congress, April through July and December
1947.11

49

The House was more adamant in using Social Security
in its attacks on foreign aid. The only Senator to attack
foreign aid using Social Security as the basis was William
Langer, second-term Republican Senator from North Dakota.
He claimed that:

the aged peOple are still in want, and misery,

and despair--in many cases comparable to the

plight of diSplaced persons in EurOpe who in

concentration camps are being fed better, and

clothed better, and housed better at our expense2

than these pioneer citizens in our own country.

This relative imbalance of attacks between the House
and the Senate could be explained in two ways. First, the
control Of Senator Vandenberg over foreign policy in the
Senate would lessen these roundabout attacks. Since the
Republicans were in such a small majority they had more Of
a tendency to stick tOgether.13 Second, Social Security
was introduced in 1935 as a tax. Although it was argued

14

that it was wrongfully represented as such, its status
as a tax limited initial action on the program to the

House of Representatives where all tax bills must initiate.
Until Specific legislation was Offered by the House, the
Senate was confined to merely commenting on inadequacies.
Since Very little ever reached the Senate in way of House
approved legislation, Senators were limited in their
criticisms.

The House, on the other hand, saw no reason to

restrict itself, and let loose with a vengeful attack on

50

foreign aid, using Social Security as the battering ram.

15 The first

Most attacks came from Republican Congressmen.
attack began in January, Representative Gerald W. Landis,
fifth-term Republican from Indiana's Seventh District
accused the Administration of "loaning" money (loans which
would never be repaid) to foreign governments to raise
their standard Of living while they failed to prOpose
adequate programs for the elderly.16 Ironically, in the
second session of the Eightieth Congress, its leaders would
accuse the Administration Of prOposing too much and there-
fore hampering Congressional initiative in constructing
Social Security legislation.

As other issues crowded into the forefront, Repre-
sentatives abandoned this line of attack until the Greek-
Turkish Aid Bill was nearing a vote. Five days before the
Senate approved the bill, and three weeks prior to the
House approval, the attacks began again and followed in
close succession and increasing ferocity. California
Republican Gordon L. McDonough was not as vehement as
later attackers, due perhaps to his relative newness to
Congress; he was beginning only his second term in Office.
In fact, he praised American generosity but gently repri-
manded the government for failing "to provide adequate

17

measures Of security for our senior citizens." Charles

R. Clason, a Massachusetts Republican, followed McDonough's

lead on April 30.18

51

These relatively mild attacks ceased the day after the
House passed the Greek-Turkish Aid Bill. Republican Homer
Angell of Oregon, beginning his fifth term and an outspoken
advocate Of the Townsend National Recovery Plan, led the
attack.

We are now considering Opening the Public Treasury
to send $400,000,000 overseas . . . for the relief
of the peOples of foreign lands,.some of whom did
not join with us in the recent war . . . . Would
it not be good judgement while considering this
huge expenditure of the Congress to grant some 19
relief to the Old folks here in America as well?

Michigan Republican John Bennett, not to be outdone,
stated:

Within the last week Congress voted an additional
$400,000,000 to bail out bankrupt and decadent
governments of foreign countries . . . . I do

not favor this kind of policy which is made without
regard to our own financial security. Nevertheless,
if we can afford to Spend millions on peOple and
governments Of foreign lands, we can certainly
afford 8 be a little more liberal with our own
people.

On the very same day, one Of the four Democrats to
advocate extended Social Security while attacking foreign
aid spoke up. Massachusetts Democrat Thomas J. Lane argued:

In addition to the billions we have spent abroad

for relief, we have hurried through legislation

to provide other billions in loans more prOperly
called gifts to foreign governments. But when our own
diSpossessed citizens ask for the relief they are

met with a stony silence . . . . We are withholding
assistance from the peOple who helped to build

our Nation and giving it to strangers who may,

at some future time, be our enemies.

Clason Spoke up again: "As we vote help for victims of

52

the war all over the world, let us give due condiseration
to our aged peOple at home. They also need our help."22
At the end of June the Townsend National Recovery
Plan Association held its annual convention in Washington.
The Townsend Plan Association had been following the same
basic theory Since 1933 when it was founded by Dr. Francis
Townsend. Under the Townsend Plan both OASI and 0AA would
be abolished. Instead the Government would pay to every
citized over 60 a flat pension, as long as that person was
not working, was a citizen and had never been incarcerated
for committing a crime. The pensioner would then be:
required to Spend the entire amount within the month,
thereby pumping money back into the economy. The problems
with the plan--the requirement that the entire amount was
Spent each month, and how the money would be raised-~were
glaring and had been pointed out many times by economists
and administrators. But ridicule had not prevented the
growth Of this extremely pOpular Association. In the
1930s the Townsendites wielded enormous political power
in certain areas. In fact, at one point they were able to
demand a recall election and were successful in replacing
a Congressman who did not vote for the Townsend Plan as
promised. In the 1940s, even with the large membership
they boasted, the Townsendites had lost much of their

political sway. Still they were a force with which to

53

reckon eSpecially by Congressmen with an unusually large
number of elderly constituents in their districts.
Therefore, once the Townsend conventioners began tOO
invade Washington, D.C. the rhetoric, provided by Oregon
Republican Homer Angell, began to flow.. Angell continued
his accusations that the U.S. was ignoring its own citizens
to help foreign countries who did not even help in the war
and that "our Old folks must move to foreign countries to
share in Old age benefits from Uncle Sam'Si treasury."23
Democrat John E. Rankin of Mississippi also decided
to cash in on the Townsend votes, by criticizing those who
"voted to send money abroad to give to people who will not
work, never have worked, and never will work," while
ignoring the aged. He was followed by Minnesota Republican
Harold C. Hagen on the same issue and Ohio Republican J.
Harry McGregor. McGregor went the farthest of all in his
attacks. He did not accuse the foreign aid recipients of
being lazy, or of not being allied with the U.S. in the
war. Instead he claimed that aid was going to certain
persons, "some of whom not many months ago were killing
our American boys and girls."24
There existed only a Single attack in July by
Republican Merlin Hull Of Wisconsin. Then in December,
when Truman called Congress back into special session to

work on inflation and foreign aid, the Marshall Plan

re-emerged into the Spotlight and the attacks began again.

54

Only California Democrat Helen Gahagan Douglas would
admit that foreign aid and payments to the elderly were
not mutually exclusive.25
Closely linked to the above line of attack was the
second major argument used when fighting for Social
Security. If want and deSpair abroad Openethhose nations
to Communist take over, then how could the United States
itself be immune from this type Of political upheaval?
TO fight Communism and ensure national security at home
the government must make sure that all citizens share in
the benefits and wealth of the democratic society. At
times it appeared that the Congressmen were afraid Com-
munist cells would Spring Up in the senior citizens groups
and that a revolution Of golden agers would have the nation
burning. But rather than dwelling upon the threat Of the
aged, Congressmen argued more in fear of, and for the
rights of, those still in the work force.
Most arguments for changes in the Social Security
program, as mentioned in the Introduction, dealt with
those free-loaders currently in the work force. These
were supposedly young, healthy adults who should have
enough sense to save for their retirement rather than
squander it on luxuries and expect the government to keep
them in style when they were older. Therefore, prOppsed;
cutbacks were meant to be a reprimand to those still in

the working years of their life. But in this second

55

argument, that Of fighting Communism at home through
ensuring a strong national economy, promises Of better
treatment upon retirement were meant to placate any
feelings Of resentment this group might have had. If they
saw retired persons being treated fairly, they could rest
assured that they tOO would be cared for and therefore
would have no reason to look for an alternate form Of
government.

Like the first argument, most Of the examples came
from the House rather than the Senate, and were related to
current events. The argument for Social Security centering
around foreign aid prOposals intensified about the time
Of the Greek-Turkish Aid Bill and the Marshall Plan. The
argument for increased Social Security to fight Communism
at home and ensure national security intensified during
the time of consideration of the federal loyalty prOgram.

Begun as a campaign strategy in 1946 the government
loyalty prOgram gained strength and notoriety. On March
21, 1947 just two weeks after requesting the Greek-Turkish
Aid Bill from Congress, President Truman signed an
executive order bringing the overzealous loyalty prOgram
into existence. This loyalty program, suggesting that
there might be Communist sympathizers within the government,
helped turn the debates on the need for better Social
Security from an emphasis on foreign aid to an emphasis on

Communism and national security.

56

There were no direct comments by the Senate arguing
for the need for adequate Social Security to deter
Communism. Only Senator Alexander Wiley, a Wisconsin
Republican, mentioned the need for security in an "insecure
world."26

In the House both Democrats and Republicans tried to
tie the need for Social Security to national security,
although Democrats were more likely than Republicans to
use this method Of attack. This specific method was used
five times by the Democrats and three times by the
Republicans. Only one Democrat named Communism as the
enemy to be fought, the other Democrats tried to link
inadequate Social Security to another economic upheaval
with governmental changes the possible outcome. The
Republicans, on the other hand, did try to link a shoddy
Social Security system tO Communist take over. They could
hardly use the economic upheaval argument as it might
conjure up the ghost of the Depression and refreshen in
the public's mind their link to it.27

Democrats made statements such as: "Social Security

28..

for all will strengthen our national security." In

reference to extending the programs, Oklahoma Democrat
Toby Morris said:
Talk about building a bulwark against Communism
. . .there is no better way in the world to

do it. . . .Because the psychology Of it is such
that it will make the young folk, as well as the

57

Old folk, love the Old red, white, and blue
more, and love our way of life all the morg9
It will give a feeling Of Security to all.

Adressing a Townsend audience Representative George P.
Miller, a California Democrat, warned:

For the first time in history, the old folks
(senior citizens) are organized, militant and
demanding . . . . All of us who believe in the
free-enterprise system know that it cannot stand
up under a cycle Of boom and bust--Of feast and
famine . . . . What we need above all, is an
adequate insurance in the form of a national Old
age pension system, not for humanitarian reasons
alone, but because it is necessary to avoid
economic anarchy.3O

Finally, Florida Democrat George S. Smathers stated:

I think that the problem of assistance for old
peOple is not alone sentimental, but practical
and realistic. The problem is basically an
economic one which is virtually inextricably
bound up with our whole economic structure and
one which, if not met now, will in the fuapre
plague and weigh down our entire economy.

Republicans pursued more closely the possibility Of a
Communist take over. Representative Gordon L. McDonough
stated:

In a post-war period technOlOgical unemployment

is likely to continue; indeed it appears to be

accelerating. Increased security on the part

of the peOple in the lower income brackets will

make for national stability, less labor unrest,

less demand for extreme economic measures. This
will safeguard free enterprise.
Edwin Hall Of New York stated more bluntly: "We can
successfully fight off Communism by making our American

system work. The most natural desire Of everyone is to

have security in his declining years."33 Ohio Republican

58

Homer A. Ramey echoed this idea in calling for better
Social Security because

Now we know that insecurity breeds fear and

distrust. We know fear and distrust are among

the most important factors involved in social

unrest and wars between nations. If we are to

do our utmost to avoid war and revolution in

this time of change and uncertainty throughout

the world, we must look for causes and find

cures.34

The final argument used to promote Social Security
permeated almost every Speech or statement made upon any
issue even remotely connected with the elderly. This final
argument was the powerful argument Of the right Of the
aged to be provided with a decent standard of living by the
nation they helped to build. The elderly, whether
receiving federally subsidized Old Age Assistance or Old
Age Insurance payments were to be reassured they were the
beneficiaries not because of charity, but because they
deserved this compensation. They deServed this aid, and
so much more, for what they had unselfishly given to the
country. These statements were not clustered around any
particular event, although they did appear around the
events mentioned previously which set off other attacks.
These calls for fair treatment were also more prevalent
among Republicans. This is ironic considering their later

actions which would weaken OASI. While Republicans called

for better treatment of the elderly they voted in ways

59

which undermined the very prOgram designed to help the
aged. These actions cast doubt upon their initial
laudatory statements concerning Social Security.35

The statements of the rights Of the aged tO be
provided for stressed the fact that shoddy treatment Of
the elderly "is not American." "By our neglect and abuse
Of the aged do we make (their life) a tragedy." "There
. . . should be old age security as a matter of right .
pay benefits as a matter of right to every aged citizen."
"Congress has a sacred obligation to our Old folks . . .
surely we can afford funds to provide economic security to
the fathers and mothers in America." Sacred as well as
secular justifications were included, as in: "Congress
has failed in its Christian duty by refusing to act. The
consideration and reSpect that a peOple give the aged
reflects their level of civilization." The vision of the
aged working in war production plants was also involved:

Millions Of Old peOple well beyond their ordinary

retirement age labored assiduously in the common

cause of our Nation. Now that peace has come

again, they ask that their own cause shall be

heard and that‘there shall be action thereon.-‘

The Senate produced only two statements. One was by
Republican William Langer calling on the elderly

. . . to join tOgether politically to get justice,

to get equality, to get fair play, to get a part

even a small part of the vast wealth which they

helped create and which today is being kept from
them by the unscrupulous, selfish monOpolists

60

who no longer need them in their scheme Of living

and who are perfectly willing to see them slowly

:fizgvg7to death on the pittance handed out to
Senator James E. Murray, of Montana, linked this earned
right to strong economic conditions by stating: "True
social security because it consists of rights which are
earned rights, reinforces the human values of independence
and individual enterprise."38

With all the calls for expanded coverage, better
treatment, and a revised Social Security system, it is
somewhat surprising to find out exactly what resulted in
legislation from this first session of the Eightieth
Congress. There were 65 bills prOposed dealing with some
aSpect of the legislation prOposed under the initial

39 Almost two-thirds Of the bills,

Social Security Act.
39 to be exact, dealt with either OASI alone or combined
action on 0AA and OASI. Of these 39 bill, 27 were
concerned with OASI alone. The rest Of the bills dealt
with Unemployment Insurance, Railroad Retirement Insurance,
or Old Age Assistance. Most of these bills called for

some sort of liberalization Of OASI. For example some
called for prOgram extension of coverage, as there were
approximately 32 million workers not covered.£0 (HR 20,

HR 2046, HR 1992, HR 2448, HR 3460, HR 1892, HR 2022,

HR 3457. HR 4359. HR 4303. HR 4573. S 1679. S1768).

61

Of the 13 bills calling for extension of coverage,
seven called for voluntary coverage and six for mandatory
coverage. In keeping with party ideOlOgy, five of the
seven bills calling for voluntary coverage, (that is,
coverage which could be extended depending upon the wishes
Of the employee and employer) were backed by the -
Republicans. This was keeping with their 1946 campaign
promise to keep government from interferring with private
life. The two Democratic-backed bills came from Maryland
Representative Harold D. Donohue, and from William M.
Colmer of Mississippi. The six remaining bills called for
expansion Of required coverage into such areas as the
Self-employed, educational religious, and scientific
institutions and there would be no voluntary clause.

Once workers were voted coverage by Congress they would be
included. All six Of these bills were Democratic-backed.
With the exception of HR 20, prOposed by Lindley Beckworth,
from Texas's Third District, all other House bills in this
category were Sponsored by Representatives from urban
areas, such as Herman P. Eberharter from the Thirty-second
District of Pennsylvania (encompassing Pittsburgh);

Walter A. Lynch from the Twenty-third District of New

York; Emanuel Geller from the Forty-fifth District of New
York (these last two coming from the New York City area);

and finally, John D. Dingell from the Fifteenth District

62

of Michigan (the Detroit area). The final bill was
prOposed in the Senate by James E. Murray of Montana,
Robert F. Wagner of New York and J. Howard McGrath Of
Rhode Island.

A second major area Of concern was the age at which
a person could collect benefits. Most felt the 65-year
age limit was too stringent and favored lowering it. Some
suggested an age as low as 55 (HR 3339. James H. Morrison
a Louisiana Democrat and HR 1568, James D. Scoblick a
Pennsylvania Republican). Scoblick thought that overseas
veterans should receive payments beginning at 55 and other
veterans should be eligible anywhere from 55 to 59.
Finally, Emanuel Celler advocated the age of 55 for women
(HR 3459). The most other pOpUlar ages suggeSted were 60
(HR 1568, HR 3458 for men only) and 62 (HR 3097, HR 3133).

Another area Of concern was the amount of money a
person could earn and still receive the insurance payments.
With average monthly payments only $24.90, many senior
citizens needed to supplement their income with additional
work when they could find it.41 Since the government
limited outside earnings to $14.99 per month, many elderly
peOple were being forced into poverty, malnutrition, under
inadequate living and medical conditions. There were two
figures prOposed, delineating the amount of income a person

could earn and still receive OASI: $25.00 (S 1403,

63

Alexander Wiley a Wisconsin Republican) and $75.00
(HR 4532, Ellsworth B. Buck a New York Republican).

The final major area of concern centered around the
Townsend Plan. Dr. Francis Townsend had advocated the
same basic theory Since 1933, although changing pension
amounts. Legislation introduced by his advocates in
Congress called for the abolishment of both OASI and 0AA,
and replacing them with the Townsend National Recovery
Plan. The unworkability of a flat pension had been
discussed and discarded many times before. However, this
did not stOp a veritable landslide of 16 bills advocating
exactly this. Six of the'bills came from Republicans and
the remaining ten from Democrats. The limiting factor
was that most bills came from states with particularly
strong Townsend followings and/or a large percentage Of
the elderly such as Oregon, Florida, California, Indiana,
Washington, and Oklahoma.

All in all, of the 27 bills concerning OASI alone,
12 were prOposed by Democrats and 15 by Republicans. The
Democratic-backed bills dealt mostly with liberalizing
OASI, either having compulsory extension of coverage or
lowering the age for benefits to begin. In this way they
were following Roosevelt's plan Of universal OASI coverage
and the eventual destruction of OAA.

The Republicans, on the other hand, called for

changes which would move control of the program out of the

64

government's hands. Traditionally, Republicans believed
that the individual was reSponsible for his own economic
welfare. This personal responsibility included making
provisions for retirement or relying on family or state

and local governments for relief rather than the Federal
Government. The Republicans acknowledged that Old age
insurance was an intelligent investment for the individual.
But many Republicans, beginning as early as 1935, felt

that the insurance business would be better left to

private enterprise.142

The two Republican-backed bills, the only ones to
pass Congress in 1947 dealing with OASI, reflected the
Republican point Of View. The first bill froze the Old
Age and Survivors' Insurance tax rate on employers and
employees. The second bill excluded newspaper and magazine
vendors employed by publishers from OASI coverage.

In more detail, the first amendment passed was really
not Shocking or out Of step with previous policy. The
original 1935 Social Security Act had set up a tax rate of
one percent on both employers and employees. This rate
was to be valid from 1935 to 1939. Beginning in 1940
there were to be set rate increases at certain intervals.
Specifically this would have amounted to two and one-half
percent in 1940 and three percent in 1949. In August 1939
Congress amended the Act to keep the tax rate at one

percent through 1942, when graduated rate increases would

65

begin again. However, 1942 being an election year,
Congress once again managed to hold the rate at one
percent in a pre-Election Day decision October 21, 1942.
This pattern Of postponing contribution rate hikes was
followed again in 1943. 1944, 1945, and 1946.

When the question arose in 1947 a precedent had
already been set by previous Congresses postponing
contribution rate hikes. The Republicans had also
promised in the 1946 campaign to cut taxes. To allow an
increase in OASI taxes to go into effect would have made
the Republicans seem weak and their campaign promises mere
lies. The $8.7 billion surplus in the fund soothed any
qualms members Of Congress might have had.43 The Adminis-
tration and FSA argued that this surplus was needed to Off-
set higher claim rates in the late 19508. But the
Republicans countered that the Administration was already
using the huge surplus and replacing the actual money with
promissory notes to the fund. SO when the notes came due
the government would have to meet them by increasing the
income tax on citizens.

On this basis Republicans began their argument for the
pay-as-you-go plan supported by Senator Taft and others.44
The government would collect the taxes and divide up the
revenue each month between OASI recipients. In that way
there would be no surplus accruing and the government would

not be paying interest to itself. NO debts would be

66

accruing since the government could only pay out what they
had taken in annually. The next step would be to turn
over control to the private insurance industry.45

Still unable to make such a major change in the Act
the House amendment called for the one percent rate to be
in effect through 1949. The rate would increase to one and
one-half percent from 1950 to 1956 and two percent in 1957.
New York Republican Daniel Reed presented HR 3818, and by
couching the explanation in the above terms managed the
bill through the House with a voice vote and no debate,

June 18, 1947.

The Senate had different ideas about the rate
increases, although along the same lines. On July 24, the
Senate amended the bill to keep the one percent tax rate,
but in 1950 the rate would be allowed to rise to three
percent as originally planned in the 1935 Act. A compromise
was eventually agreed Upon which kept the one percent rate
until 1949, raised it to one and one-half percent from
1950 to 1956 and finally to two percent in 1957.

The same day as the Senate approved the conference
report compromise, July 24; the House did the same. Both
used voice votes without discussion or debate. The only
dissenting vote came from Republican Representative Robert
F. Rich of Pennsylvania, who saw no reason for the rates to
be increased in 1957, if the current surplus was SO large.

He questioned Daniel Reed in this method: "If the rates

67

are all right today and will protect the fund for several
years how does the gentleman know they are not going to be
all right in 1957?"46
President Truman signed HR 3818 with no comment.

Considering the actions Of previous Congresses he could
hardly accuse the Eightieth Congress of taking unprecedented
action. It was the Second attempted Social Security amend-
ment in 1947 which really gave an indication of where
Social Security legislation would be headed in 1948--down
a path of destruction.

In July 1947, HR 3997 passed both the House and the
t.47

Senate with little commen PrOposed by California
Republican Bertrand W. Gearhart, this legislation excluded
newspaper and magazine vendors, employed by publishers,
from OASI coverage. The argument, more fully discussed in
Chapter 3, centered around the idea of whether the vendors
were truly employees Of the publishing companies or

48

independent businessmen. News vendors who sold more than
one publisher's products were already excluded. But those
working for one publisher only were considered employees
and covered. HR 3997 would change their status to inde-
pendent businessmen thereby making them ineligible for
coverage.

Truman vetoed the bill immediately. He sent back a

message which illustrated what the Administration (and very

soon the public) would fear the Republican Party was

68

planning: the weakening and eventual destruction of OASI.
He stated in his veto message that the acceptance of this
exclusion ". . . proceeds in a direction which is exactly
Opposed to the one our Nation should pursue." The bill
would "Open our social security system to piece-meal attack
and to slow undermining."49

Congress accepted the veto at this time, but things
were fast changing in the Presidential-Congressional rela-
tionship. A campaign mentality would soon dominate both
sides and close communications. This, combined with some
Of the Administration's actions in 1948, would bring Open
hostility to the forefront on both sides.

In retrospect, there was little action taken in
terms of 1947 Social Security legislation. Although much
as prOposed, little was done. As illustrated in the
beginning of this chapter, Social Security was often used
as a weapon to attack other issues rather than as the issue
itself. This was the case for Democrats as well as
Republicans, only in 1948 did Republican beliefs that
Social Security should undergo drastic, and in the Opinion
of Truman and others, undesirable changes come out into

the Open.

69

1Alf Landon to Harold Johnson, 12 November 1946,

Landon Papers, Kansas State Historical Society, TOpeka,
quoted in Mayer, Republican Party, p. 467.

2Presidential Papers, "Annual Message to the Congress
on the State of the Union," 6 January 1947, p. 1.

31bid.. pp. 3-8.

4Ibid., p. 5.

5Ibid., "Special Message to the Congress: The
President's First Economic Report," 8 January 1947, pp. 29,
36-37, and "Annual Budget Message to the Congress: Fiscal
Year 1948," Dated 3 January 1947, Released 10 January 1947,
pp. 58, 71-73.

6Ibid., pp. 36-37, 71.

7Ibid., p. 37.

8Ibid., p. 71.

9Not that just talking its first session was so
unusual. Most of the time Congress deveIOps legislation
and discusses its merits and drawbacks the first session.
After Obtaining feedback from their constituencies between
sessions Congress will then act on the prOposed legislation
the second session. Congressional Digest 26, #6-7 (1947):
163. This is not to say that the country did not expect
immediate action from the Eightieth Congress in 1947 as
suggested below in the Vandenberg correSpondence.

"I just want to tell you that I do not agree with the
Opinion of certain newSpapers and some of the news commenta-
tors who severely criticized Congress for what they say is
a lack of accomplishments since the Republicans have taken
over."

John M. Bush to Arthur H. Vandenberg, 2 April 1947,
Arthur H. Vandenberg Collection, Michigan Historical
Collections, Bentley Historical Library, University of
Michigan, Ann Arbor.

To which letter Vandenberg replied:

"In order to avoid the mistakes of pell-mell legisla-
tion which has cursed the country for 15 years we had to

7O

proceed with some degree of prudent inquiry before our
committees could produce net results....0ur impatient
Republicans have a right to hold us to strict accountabil-
ity at the end of the session. But in my Opinion they have
no right to start sniping Egg."

Ibid., Vandenberg to John Bush, 23 April 1947.

Even Taft had to deal with problems of Congressional
inactivity, except he blamed it on a faulty budget, for
which the Democrats were reSponsible.

Robert A. Taft Speech, 26 September 1947, "Public
Welfare and the Federal Government," Jack Martin CorreSpon-
dence, Robert A. Taft Collection, Library of Congress,
Manuscript Division, Washington, D.C.

 

 

1OHamby, Imperial Years, p. 125. Donovan, Conflict
and Crisis, p. 285 quotes the figures at $300 million for
Greece and $100 million for Turkey.

 

11The April and June activity may be accounted for,
in part,by the voting on Greek and Turkish aid and the
introduction of the Marshall Plan. Much of the action
around the end of June, beginning of July can be traced
directly to the National Convention of the Townsend
National Recovery Organization which was meeting in Washing-
ton at the time. The Townsendites were very thorough in
their mail campaigns, flooding the offices Of Congressmen
with letters to bring attention to their problems, during
the convention.

12U.S., Congress, Senate, Senator William Langer,
80 Cong., 1st sess., 26 July 1947, Congressional Record
93: 10334. Succeeding references to the Congressional
Record will consist of the Speaker's name, date of comment,
OR, the volume and page number.

 

13Studies have shown that the party in the minority
tends to be more cohesive than the majority party. N. L.
Gage and Ben Shemberg, "Measuring Senatorial Progressivism"
Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology 44 (January 1949):
112-17, quoted in Duncan MacRae, Jr., and Fred H. Goldner,
Dimensions of Congressional Voting:. A Statistical Study
Of the House of Representatives in the Eighty-first Congress
(Berkely: University of California Press, 1958), p. 307.
This did not necessarily apply to the Eightieth Congress.
As discussed in Chapter 2, the high number Of first time
Congressmen on the Republican side, plus the long years of
exclusion from the majority would lead them to a more
cohesive voting pattern. The Democrats, on the other hand,

71

were already dividing up into various groups, such as the
Southern Democrats.

14Senator James E. Murray, 26 July 1947, CR 93: 10413.
Murray argued that OASI taxes were in fact "premiums for
insurance protection--not general taxes for paying the
expenses of the government."‘ Therefore, the prerOgative
for action should not be restricted to the House only.

15There were 14 Republican Congressional attacks as
compared to 4 Democratic attacks.

16Representative Gerald W. Landis, 20 January 1947,

QB 93: A185.

17Representative Gordon L. McDonough, 17 April 1947,
CR 93: A1750.

8Representative Charles R. Clason, 30 April 1947, CR
93: A2030-31.

19
4908.

Representative Homer D. Angell, 9 May 1947, CR 93:

20Representative John B. Bennett, 14 May 1947, CR 93:
A2306.

21Representative Thomas J. Lane, 14 May 1947, CR 93:
5277-78.

22Representative Charles R. Clason, 6 June 1947, CR

93: A270.
23Representative Homer D. Angell, 20 June 1947, CR
93: A3001; 24 June 1947. 93 93: 7608 and 26 June 194

ER 93: A3168-69.

24Representative John E. Rankin, 27 June 1947, CR 93:
7822. Representative Harold C. Hagen, 30 June 1947, CR
93: 3244. Representative J. Harry McGregor, 8 July 1 47,
93 93: A3389.

25Representative Merlin Hull, 25 July 1947, CR 93.
A4044. Representative Glen D. Johnson, 2 December 1947,
CR 93: A4444. Representative Noble J. Johnson, 2 December

72

1947. 93 93: A4442-43. Representative Helen Gahagan
Douglas, 4 December 1947, CR 93: A4581. Representative
Homer D. Angell inserts article by Francis E. Townsend,

5 December 1947, pp 93: A4525.

26Senator Alexander Wiley 2 April 1947, CR 93: 3005.

7Truman points out this reluctance clearly in a
campaign Speech. "Republicans don't like to talk about
depressions. You can hardly blame them for that. You
remember the old saying, 'Don't talk about rOpe in the
house where somebody has been hanged.'" Presidential
Papers, Address in Indianapolis at the Indiana World War
Memorial, 15 October 1948, p. 802.

 

28Representative Thomas J. Lane, 11 March 1947, CR
93: 1908; 11 July 1947, CR 93: A3490.

29
6796.

30Representative George P. Miller, 7 July 1947. Q3
93: 43332-33.

31Representative George A. Smathers, 22 July 1947, CR
93: A3703.

32Representative Gordon L. McDonough, 10 April 1947,
QB 93: A1612.

Representative Toby Morris, 11 June 1947, CR 93:

33Representative Edwin Arthur Hull, 3 June 1947, CR
93: 6265. ~

34
A3183.

Representative Homer A. Ramey, 27 June 1947, CR 93:

35Republicans were more apt to call for charity as the
mainstay of the program. But they were just as vehement as
Democrats when using this line of argument. Altmeyer,
Formative Years, p. 259. argues that Taft really wanted
universal pensions (pensions not related to wages) although
he earlier contends that the Republicans wanted exactly the
Opposite, Ibid., p. 232.

 

73

36Representative Toby Morris, 11 March 1947, QR 93:
1909. Representative Thomas J. Lane inserts article by
Edith M. Stearn, 6 June 1947, CR 93: A2703. Representa-
tive Alvin F. Weichel, 27 June 1947, CR 93: A3200.
Representative John A. Blatnik, 18 July 1947, ER 93:
A3613, A3612. Representative Merlin Hull, 25 July 1947,
QR 93: A4044.

37Senator William Langer, 26 July 1947, 93 93: 10334.
38Senator James E. Murray, 26 July 1947, CR 93: 10414.

39The prOposed bills were researched using the
Congressional Quarterly Almanac 3 (1947) and the Congres-
sional Record, 80th Cong., 1st sess., vol. 93.

AoCongressional Quarterly Almanac 3 (1947): 588.

 

41Couples received $39.60.

42Senator Robert Taft was among the more vocal. In a
September 26, 1947 Speech he referred to local charity and
how the New Deal appealed to this self help, then destroyed
it. Robert A. Taft, "Welfare and the Government," Jack
Martin CorreSpondence, 26 September 1947, Robert A. Taft
Collection, Library of Congress, Manuscritp Division,
Washington, D.C.

In a December 29, 1947 letter Robert Taft to George E.
Martin, Taft writes that "The present old age insurance
feature of the Social Security law is contrary to all of
the principles in which I believe. It is unfortunate it
was even adOpted but I do not quite see how we can repeal
it at this time with all the vested rights which have
occurred." Ibid.

43Congressional Quarterly_Almanac 3 (1947): 238.

 

44Altmeyer, Formative Years, pp. 34. 37, 259. AS
mentioned in footnote 35, Republicans believed that Old
age security should consist of charity rather than _
insurance. This was because they believed that it would
interfere with the private insurance companies. See also:

Cotton, In the Senate, p. 189.

 

 

74

45Altmeyer, Formative Years, p. 37. Besides inter-
ferring with private insurance companies, Republicans
argued that OASI would destroy pension systems set up by
private industry.

46 Representative Robert F. Rich, 24 July 1947, CR
93: 10045.

47Aime D. Forand, a Rhode Island Democrat, was one of
the few Congressmen to Openly question the bill. Represen-
tative Aime D. Forand, 16 July 1947, CR 93: 9058.

48As early as 1936 the Hearst press was attacking the
concept of the entire Social Security system. Altmeyer,
Formative Years, pp. 68-69.

49Presidential Papers, "Memorandum Of Disapproval of
Bill to Exclude NewSpaper and Magazine Vendors from the
Social Security System," 6 August 1947, pp. 371-72.

 

THREE

ACTIONS SPEAK LOUDER THAN WORDS, 1948

As the election year of 1948 rolled around it became
Obvious that Harry Truman had decided that he was going to
become President in his own right. The conciliatory,
compromising Truman of 1947 was gone. The insecure,
vacillating Truman of 1945 had faded from sight.1 In 1948
the Eightieth Congress found itself faced with a headstrong,
demanding Truman, a Truman that hOped to delineate his
stand as a liberal by bringing to light his obvious dif-
ference with the conservative Congress.2 SO different was
the 1948 Truman from the 1947 Truman that Congress might
have believed a double was standing in for him.

Congress knew things had changed as soon as Truman
gave the 1948 State Of the Union message. The Congressional
Digest described it this way:

Democratic Truman talking to a Republican-

controlled Congress, pulled out almost all the

New Deal stOps sounding the Roosevelt social

aims, and added a few new twists of his own

. . . .Republican leaders on 'The Hill' sat still

for the address literally--in fact the President

was generally heard in frigid silence--but

figuratively they did not sit still for it at

all . . . . "The President out-Wallaced Wallace"

was an average G.O.P. comment "He might as well
have said, 'Henry come home'"

75

76

The 1948 State of the Union message certainly was an
abrupt change from the 1947 message, in style as well as
content. Even Truman realized that Congress was in for
a shock.4 Truman called for:

1) The advancement of human rights of U.S. citizens.

2) The protection and develOpment of human resources.

3) The conservation and wise use of natural resources.

4) The raising of the standard of living by revital-
izing the national economic system.

5) The achievement Of world peace based on the
principles of democracy.

Specifically Truman wanted Congress to deal with such
problems as racial discrimination, health insurance,
Social Security, education, housing, expansion of the TVA,
soil conservation, crOp insurance, a tax cut and a raise
in the minimum wage from 40 cents to 75 cents per hour,
more government involvement in labor-management relations,
expanded foreign aid programs and universal military
training.

The major problem Truman wanted tackled was
inflation. He had already called Congress back into a
special session in December 1947. Specifically he had
wanted Congress to deal with the problems of inflation,
along with foreign aid. This emphasis on inflation goes
back to the 1946 campaign when Truman's apparent inability
to deal with rising inflation helped swing the election for

the Republicans. In November 1947, he had presented a

77

ten-part program to Congress, most Of which was ignored.
Congress had been promising tax reduction in 1947 and
Truman, in his 1948 State of the Union message, attacked
Congress in such a way that the political implications
were Obvious. TO stem inflation Truman said that govern-
ment revenues must be kept at their current level. However,
there was no reason that the individual should bear the
burden of this. Instead, he argued, the additional $4.5
billion in profits which corporations had amassed from
1946 to 1947 ($12.5 billion in 1946 and $17 billion in
1947, after taxes) would indicate that they were well
placed enough to carry more of the tax burden Truman
suggested that Congress grant, effective January 1, 1948,
a tax credit of $40 to each taxpayer and $40 for each
dependent. He estimated that the resulting $3.2 billion
reduction in revenue would be made up by corporations,
particularly large corporations.6 This was not at all
what Congress wanted and they realized that Truman had
already begun his re-election campaign.

In the area of Social Security Truman echoed his
suggestions from 1947. The basic premise remained the
same, but the Openness and terms in which they were couched
changed drastically. There was no doubt as to what Truman
wanted from Congress. "Our system has gaps and inconsis-
tencies; it is only half-finished. We Should now extend

unemployment compensation, Old age benefits, and survivors'

78

benefits to millions who are not now protected. We should
also raise the level of benefits."7

As in 1947, Truman restated this message in his
Annual Budget message to Congress and his Annual Economic
Report to Congress. Old Age and Survivor' Insurance
must be extended to cover "all gainful workers, including
agricultural and domestic employees, farmers and other
self-employed persons." To finance this expansion, the
present pay-roll tax would apply to the newly insured and
their employers.8 Truman repeated the same message again
two days later. "Social Security . . . Should be increased
and its coverage Should be made more general."9 His use
of specifics highlighted the problem and cinched his major
line of attack on Congress.

There are now more than ten million peOple in

the United States, about eight percent of the

total pOpulation, who have reached the age of

65 . . . . Our systems of protection against the

economic hazards of old age and dependency are

inadequate. There are now some 17 million jobs

in which workers cannot build up wage credits

for old age retirement. The coverage of Old

age and survivors' insurance should be extended,

and benefits should be adjusted upward with a

higher limit upon earnings which may be received

after retirement without loss of benefits.10

Truman's messages to Congress on Social Security for
both 1947 and 1948 seem quite similar except in their

tone, 1948 being more demanding than suggestive. Yet the

differences between the two years, and the develOping

campaign strategy becomes obvious with closer examination.

79

In 1947 Truman presented the need for increased OASI
benefits as most important, with extension of coverage
suggested but not demanded. In 1948, as demonstrated
above, the extension of coverage became the main issue.
Calls for more liberal benefits were still present to be
sure, but they were mentioned more as a side or second
thought to the extension message.

The changes in the messages between 1947 and 1948
may seem small and inconsequential but they really touched
a nerve in theiRepublican Congress. As mentioned pre-
viously (see Chapter 2), the Republicans had very Specific
ideas of what Old age security should consist. Charity
should be the major cornerstone of the project--with family
and community charity ideally taking full responsibility
for the upkeep of the aged. If any insurance programs
were to be implemented to take the place of this charity,
they Should be on private initiative and by private insur-
ance companies. According to the Republicans, the govern-
ment should play a very small part in the entire system if,
in fact, it should play any part at all. When President
Truman called for increased coverage, what he did was to
bring to the forefront the differences between the Republi-
cans and the New Deal legislation. Republicans were faced
with a choice: they could accept the idea that Social
Security in its present form was here to stay and therefore

Should be expanded, or instead they could continue the

8O

piecemeal attacks on it that Truman had accused them Of in
his 1947 veto message of the News Vendors Exclusion Act.

The remainder of this chapter will illustrate that
the Republican Congress chose the second Option. After
promising to get the Federal Government out of peOple's
homes they could hardly vote to increase its interference.
Even if Congress had decided to compromise with Truman it
would have been next to impossible. Truman was determined
to place the Eightieth Congress as far to the right of
himself on all the issues he could, the earlier-mentioned
tax reduction and minimum-wage fights being the best
examples. Not only did he want the Republicans to appear
reactionary, he wanted them to appear reactionary and
wrong on all issues.

From January on, Truman increased the frequency and the
ferocity of his attacks. In 1947 Truman gave few messages
to Congress. But as Charles Murphy, assistant to Truman,
recalls part of Truman's strategy, "We did not have an
iron-clad rule, but our general Operating rule that Spring
was that we were to have a Special message ready to go to
Congress every Monday morning."11 NO matter what Congress
gave him, within a week Truman wanted more, and he wanted
it faster. This culminated in the President's July call
for a special session and his well-known charge of;the
"do nothing" Eightieth Congress. It is little wonder why

Truman had to ask Senator Vandenberg at all: "Wish you'd

81

tell me why the Senate no longer loves me."12 His vehement

attacks on both houses Of Congress would ensure that
neither would be even remotely fond of him by November 1948.

The cooling relationship between Truman and Congress
was evident from a January 6, 1948 Truman diary exerpt.

The day before the first day of the second session of the
Eightieth Congress, Truman wrote:

Congress meets--Too bad too.

They'll do nothing but wrangle, pull phoney

investigations, and generally upset the

affairs of the Nation.

The tone of Truman's diary entry clearly illustrates
his feelings about the Congress. But perhaps he did not
realize at that point exactly how far to the brink he would
be able to push Congress. In the area of Social Security
legislation Congress provided him with actions that would
demonstrate to the electorate the probable fate of the
prOgram if it was left unprotected in the hands of a
Republican President and Congress.14

The second session of Congress began and progressed,
for a time, in much the same way as the first session.

When dealing with OASI Congress Spent much of its time
talking, mostly along the lines of the first session.
Present were the three major arguments for changes in OASI,
centering around foreign aid, national security and the

right of the elderly to Social Security. Some things had

changed in the way the arguments were presented. The tone

82

was more accusatory, the upcoming elections had made major
issues out of what had, the previous year, been minor
irritants.

The argument revolving around foreign aid was again
the major one, as it had been in 1947. In 1948, spanning
January through August, twenty-two separate attacks were
made on the lavishness of foreign aid versus the Sparsity
of Social Security benefits. All attacks issued from the

15 Their

House. Only four of the involved were Democrats.
party affiliation did soften the blow of their words a bit.
They avoided placing the blame on the Truman Administration,
which had prOposed the programs, and instead pointed an
accusing finger at Congress for passing them.

The Republicans seemed determined to use this foreign
aid argument as an election year issue. Surprisingly they
did not finger Truman as the culprit, as one who would
deny benefits to the aged citizens while lavishing funds
on foreign nations, until Truman had launched one of his
more bitter attacks in August.16 In fact, from February to
mid-June with one exception, most statements had a double
purpose.17 They first praised the concern of the U.S. and
the foresightedness of Congress for providing aid pro-
grams.18 But they then went on to ask why the U.S. Should

have been so generous as to leave so little for its own

peOple. What they suggested was not a complete abandonment

83

of foreign problems, but a limitation on the financial
aid used to solve the problems.

Once the heat of the election was turned on, and
Truman began barraging the nation with horror stories of
Congress's inactivity, while the Republicans prepared for
their National Convention, the mood of the attacks changed.
Just prior to their June 21-25 convention, Republicans
referred to Administration-prOposed foreign aid prOgrams
as "squandering billions abroad, including many millions
to kings and their corrupt courts and agencies," or as
"money . . . considered having been poured down a rat
hole."‘19

But it was not until after Truman's scathing accusa-
tions in late July and August that Congress really started
to swing wildly. The limited amount of time left to the
session before Congress recessed for election campaigning
was short. Therefore, the attacks were direct and
administered by Republicans high up in party leadership.
Representative William Lemke, North Dakota Republican and
a veteran of 13 years in the House, launched the attack
August 7, 1948. He made it clear who the Republicans felt
should be blamed for the inequality between foreign aid and
the lack of prOper living conditions for the elderly.
"While the Truman Administration is making loans and gifts
to inefficient, and in some cases, grafting foreign

governments, it has woefully neglected the Old peOple.

84

They are among the forgotten peOple. While the Administra-
tion is feeding some able-bodied foreigners, too lazy to
work, it has permitted the aged to go hungry, and in some
cases ill-clad and ill-housed. It has been, and is,
'foreigners preferred, Americans;forgotten£' It is time
that our peOple realized that our old peOple created the
wealth that the President is SO lavishly giving away to
other nations . . . . The truth is that we require more
proof of the inability of our aged to support themselves
than we do of foreigners." Although Lemke did mention
Congress in his tirade he placed only the blame of forget-
fulness on them and let Truman alone Shoulder the entire
reSponsibility for the inadequacies of the economic
standards of the elderly vis-a-vis the foreign aid program.
Lemke followed the Republican line until later in his
remarks when he stated: "It (Congress) knows that the

case Of the aged is a Federal responsibility." He eventu-
ally tried to soften the statement by once again bringing
in familial reSponsibility in the care of the aged.

The two arguments Of fighting Communism and the earned
right Of the aged to good living conditions were seldom
made in 1948, as compared to the first session. Rather
than playing upon the possible New Deal-Communist link the
Republicans in Congressional statements simply ignored it.
Only Walter Brehm, an Ohio Republican, warned the House

that Communism was closer than they imagined, "the threat

85

to our Government by Communism Operating within the borders
of our country is no idle dream." The remaining Congress-
men commenting on the issue in 1948, simply echoed the
sentiments of the first session.

Had the Congress restricted itself to talk, as it did
in its first session, it might have been able to Slip by
the electorate with only the notice of inactivity that
Truman would be able to draw to it. Unfortunately
Congress did act, passing two major Social Security bills,
both restricting the Act and both over Truman's veto.

The Republicans were still on record for supporting
an extension of coverage of OASI, although their actions
and the Administration's charges would prove differently.22
One of the more surprising actions, yet indicative of the
frigid relationship between Congress and the President,
was prOposed early in 1948. HR 5052, prOposed by California
Republican Bertrand W. Gearhart, was designed to decrease
Social Security coverage. Under this bill, newspaper and
periodical vendors were to be excluded from coverage.

HR 3997, which was passed quickly by the House and Senate
in July 1947 (see Chapter 2) was also Sponsored by

Gearhart and, not surprisingly, HR 3997 and the 1948

HR 5052 were very similar. The 1947 version was vetoed by
the President. The 1948 version would suffer the same fate

but would be saved by Congress.

86

The actions taken in regard to the bill were common-
place at first. It was reported out of the House Ways and
Means Committee February 3, 1948. Little was said about
the bill between this time and March 4, when the House

23 The bill went to the

passed the bill on voice vote.
Senate Finance Committee and was reported out with no
amendment on March 13. Things appeared smooth for the bill
deSpite vigorous Opposition by the Federal Security Agency
and Truman's position that he would tolerate no reduction
of coverage in the Social Security Act.

One lone Senator questioned the bill and its validity.
On March 15 Florida Democrat Claude Pepper asked that the
bill be held on to until the Senate could review it more
thoroughly. (The bill was prOposed under the five-minute
debate rule.) Pepper brought up what should have been
obvious from the start ". . . it is my information that the
bill is substantially the same as the bill which the

"24 On March 23, Pepper with-

President vetoed last year.
drew his Opposition and the Senate passed the bill.

If any Congressman doubted what Senator Pepper had
questioned earlier, Harry Truman quickly reminded them in
his April 5 veto message. "This bill is identical with
HR 3997, which I declined to approve in August, 1947."
Truman went on to accuse the Congress of trying to

undermine " . . . the integrity of our social security

system." He also accused Congress of favoring employers

87

who "desiring to avoid the payment of taxes which would
be the basis for social security benefits for their
employees could do SO by the establishment of artificial
legal arrangements governing their relationships with

25

their employees." And why, if vendors would be covered
as independent contractors before this session of Congress
was out as Representative Gearhart had promised,26 could
they simply not remain covered until.the switch took place?
Finally, Truman charged that his warning of Opening ’
"Social Security to piecemeal attack" in vetoing the 1947
bill had been well founded.27 This was exemplified by
Congress' attempt to push through a similar bill in their
second session and more importantly by the upcoming fight
on House Joint Resolution 296, discussed later in this
chapter.

President Truman might have believed that his veto
would end discussion of the question as it had in 1947.
He may have also hOped that it would not and that Congress
would continue to haggle over the issue and eventually
override his veto. It was this second avenue which
Congress chose.

Pennsylvania Democrat Herman P. Eberharter expanded
upon the implications Truman had made in reference to the
Republican Congress. He charged that "the Republicans who

originally Opposed the enactment of Social Security

88

legislation have never really gotten over their hostility
and that they now plan systematically to undermine the
foundation of this all-important security legislation."
He also charged that the obvious benefactors of this entire
legislation would be the huge publishing companies, in
particular Hearst Publications, Inc.28

Gearhart countered the attack on April 14. He pre-
sented a contradictory, but obviously convincing argument.
Should the bill not pass there would result a confusing
state of affairs. First there would be the problem of
trying to collect taxes from these vendors. If they had
differing rates of profits, the paperwork involved in
determining how much each employer and employee paid would
be staggering. Besides it would effect perhaps only a
thousand persons (a number he changed to thousands and
thousands and back again at his whim) throughout the
country. And even the vendors involved wanted the bill
passed. For instance, the Newspaper and Periodical Vendors
and Distributors Union, Local 468 (AFL, San Francisco)
wired their support of HR 5052. (Eberharter would later
argue this union represented the Hearst Corporation and had
given their support in fear of retaliation.) Others
supporting HR 5052 were News Vendors Union Local 460 and
29

C.A. Newspaper Distributors, Chicago, Illinois. Gearhart

failed to mention also that one of the biggest lobbies for

89

the bill was the American Newspaper Publishers Association,
who would gain the most from not having to pay employer
contributions to the Social Security fund.30

Eberharter countered once more with a description of
what the real problem was. Local Union 496 supposedly
supported the bill since they were independent contractors
and not employees of the Hearst Corporation. But Eberharter
described their working conditions so as to leave little
doubt as to their status. The union and Hearst Corporation
fixed terms and conditions of employment, fixed minimum
wages, minimum commissions, fixed hours of employment, and
conditions under which they must work. The Hearst Corpora-
tion even had supervisors to go around and check that these
conditions were being met. If these vendors were in
reality independent businessmen why did they allow Hearst
Corporation to set their prices, days and hours of service
and places in which they were to work? Finally why, if
they were indeed independent contractors or businessmen,
did they feel they had to belong to a union in the APL?31
This last condition was questionable. After all a union is
meant to be a gO-between for employee to employer, a
businessman or independent contractor would have belonged
to a professional organiZation instead.

Eberharter argued in vain for on April 14 the House

overrode Truman's veto 308-28. This represented the

largest amount by which a veto had ever been overridden

9O

32

up to that time. The Senate also overrode the veto
April 20, 77-7. In the House two Republicans (Merlin Hull
of Wisconsin and Jacob Javits of New York) along with both
American Labor Party Representatives (Leo Isacson nad Vito
Marcantonio) and 24 Democrats voted against overriding the

33

veto. The seven nay votes in the Senate were all

Democratic.34

Congress handed Truman a stinging rebuff. The
Republicans had, as expected, voted with their party. But
the large percentage of Democrats also siding with the
Republicans should have indicated to Truman that he was
losing any control he might have had over the legislature.
If Truman had doubts of this, the next major piece of
Social Security legislation passed wiped away any possibil-
ity of Congressional-Executive COOperation. Each side was
out to prove something; it also appears that only one side
was truly aware of the consequences their actions might
have upon the electorate.

The second major piece of Social Security legislation
to be passed in 1948 hinged upon a court decision. But the
consequence of this action by Congress gave Truman exactly
the issue that he needed to boost his nomination and re-
election campaign.

Since the inception of the Social Security Act in
1935 one of the gray areas had always been the interpreta-

tion of the term "employee" versus "independent contrator"

91

or "self employed," in determining who should be covered
under the Act. Finally, in 1947 the Supreme Court in two

decisions, United States v. Silk and Bartels et al v.

35

 

 

Birmingham et al, clarified the term. These decisions

 

alone would probably have caused little controversy.
However, the Treasury Department immediately announced that,
under the definition set by the Supreme Court, they would
begin collecting OASI and Unemployment taxes for approxi-
mately 500,000 to 750,000 workers who had previously been
considered independent contractors and ineligible for
coverage.36 The new tax would begin January 1, 1948.
Some persons coming under coverage would be door-to-door
salesmen, life insurance agents, and piece workers, to
name a few.37
Congress reacted immediately. Again, it was Repre-
sentative Gearhart who took the initiative. On January 15,
1948 he prOposed a resolution to the House Ways and Means
Committee which would "maintain the status quo" of the
Social Security Program. The major issue involved, argued
Gearhart, was whether the judicial and administrative
branches could bring in additional persons under the Act
when Congress had never intended them to be covered? TO
a Congress whose leading members remembered all too well
the overbearing, pushy methods of FDR, the accusations

struck home. The fight became not one Of merely granting

or prohibiting extended coverage, but of maintaining the

92

legislative prerOgative of Congress. The result of a
weakened Federal Social Security program was an added plus
for the Republicans. A weakened Social Security program
would aid in the eventual destruction of the federally run
OASI and replacement with programs Offered by private
insurance companies. By February 3, House Joint Resolution
296 was reported out of committee. Outside observers saw
little chance of the bill succeeding. One newsletter
stated: "Passage is unlikely, Republicans are far from
united on question, and Administration Democrats think
Commissioner Schoeneman's pending regulation 'good

"38 But outside Observers Often underestimate

politios'.
or misinterpret the events that effect Congress.

On February 27, two hours of debate took place in the
House on the prOposed resolution. Gearhart began the
assault, once again insisting that the resolution was meant
to preserve the right of Congress and Congress alone to
make laws. The intent Of Congress in 1935, he maintained,
had been to use the ancient common-law definition of "master"
and "servant” or "employer“ and "employee", and that the
inclusion of the additional "625,000" would go against that
original decision. Instead, Gearhart suggested that
Congress return to that original definition, "one that

simply says in so many words that an employee is a person

who is engaged for hire, one who, in his emplOyment submits

93

himself to the control of his employer in respect to how
and why and when his service shall be performed."39
If this first argument failed to convince wavering
legislators of the correctness of the resolution, Gearhart
offered two more. First, if the Administration was allowed
to get away with this action they would be bringing in
625,000 free-loaders. These newly defined employees would
be receiving benefits for which they contributed nothing;
at a cost of $12 million to the government over the next
ten years. Second, and in almost complete contradiction
with the first argument, Gearhart along with Republican
Representative Carl T. Curtis and Richard M. Simpson
suggested that these free-loaders must also be protected.
He insisted that the IRS would collect back-contributory
taxes for the time these peOple considered themselves not
covered. This would produce a reign of terror for these
persons rather than any comfort at being covered.40
(Representative Eberharter, the Democrat's chief Spokesman
in the House on Social Security, later pointed out that
Par. 8, SE 379 of the prOposed Treasury regulations pro-
hibited retroactive tax collection prior to January 1, 1948
when the new coverage began.41)
The other Republicans who Spoke up that day echoed

Gearhart's sentiments. Forest A. Harness, Republican from

Indiana, reiterated the Congressional prerOgative to

94

legislate. He pointed out that

the question involved here is not whether the

sc0pe of social security coverage should be

broadened--the question here is whether it

should be done by the Congress of the United

States, or by Administrative orders from ap-

pointed bureau heads . . . whether the Congress

will continue to make the laws for the United

States or whether we will loseghis function

by default to the bureaucrats.4
Indiana Republican Robert A. Grant also supported the
argument that these new peOple brought under coverage
without having made previous contributions would "drain the
fund."43 Considering the previous term's argument that the
fund surplus was too large anyway, the persons following
this line of lOgic had to be very careful in their choice
of words. They had to rely primarily on the use of the
funds as unfair, rather than as a dangerous depletion.
The remaining Republicans to Speak up that day included
Daniel A. Reed Of New York, who argued with Eberharter that
the Ways and Means Committee had considered the report
from the Federal Security Agency when examining the bill.44
Clare E. Hoffman, a Michigan Republican, argued with
Democrat Adolph J. Sabath, forty-year veteran from Illinois,
about Congress's concern for peOple. He took a pot-shot
at the Democratic Administration by asking if they had
neglected the EurOpeans with all the aid requested. TO
which Sabath replied, "I regret very much that the

Democratic Party permitted itself to be used by the

95

present Republican majority. I think it is unfortunate
because it is not in the best interest of our country and

the peOple.45

Finally, there was a very timid comment
from Connecticut Republican Ellsworth B. Foote, who issued
an indecisive statement in favor of H. J. Res. 296 but
also in favor of liberalizing Social Security coverage and
benefits.46
Not surprisingly, with the exception of first-term
Representative Foote, all other Republicans arguing on this
day had been members of Congress while FDR was President:
Daniel Reed for 28 years, Gearhart and Clare E. Hoffman
for 13 years, Richard M. Simpson 11 years; Carl T. Curtis,
Forest A. Harness and Robert A. Grant nine years. The
membership of Reed, Gearhart, Simpson, Curtis and Grant on
the Ways and Means Committee SUggested their involvement
might be more than simple retaliation. Yet the resentment
of Congress against the tight hold FDR held over them is
not to be underestimated, especially among the Republicans.
It is quite lOgical to believe that the Republicans in this
case were not out to deliberately undermine Social Security
as a means to harm the elderly.but were, in fact, trying
tO retaliate for the years of restriction and constraint
they suffered under Roosevelt. As already explained,

Congress was quite aware of the power they had lost during

the New Deal years and they were extremely anxious to

96

regain it. This resolution appeared to Offer them this
Opportunity as well as an Opportunity for the Republicans
to shape Social Security to conform closer to their beliefs.

The Democrats made it quite clear that they were
Opposed to H. J. Res. 296 since in their view its major
purpose was not to keep intact the power of Congress, but
instead to damage the Social Security program in an effort
to destroy the entire New Deal legacy. The only Democrat
to verbally support the resolution was Brooks Hays of
Arkansas. Although he supported the resolution, he
demanded that Congress take the prerogative and extend
coverage through legislation as soon as possible.47

Eberharter, who was one of the most vocal Democrats
on all issues of Social Security, pointed to one of the
Obvious misinterpretations of the resolution-~its title.

I have had many Members come to me and say "this

bill states it is to keep the status quo." But

it does nothing of the sort. It changes the

status quo. When did you ever need legislation

to keep the status quo? "Status quo" means "as

is". Did you ever pass any measures to keep

things as is? You pass laws when you want to

change things.48
He also attempted, as did many other Democrats who followed,
to make the connection between the Republicans and big
business. "The purpose of the resolution before us today
is to do only one thing, and that is absolve a certain
group of employers from the payment of social security

taxes. That is the only purpose of this bill."49

97

Eberharter also claimed, and was supported in his claim
by New York Democrat Walter A. Lynch, that the resolution

would bring back the confusion the Supreme Court decision

50

had cleared up on who was an employee.
Illinois Democrat Sabath put the accusation in
clearer terms.

Of course, I am not the least suprised at what
you are seeking to do again because all that

the peOple can expect from the Republican party
now in power is legislation against the best
interests of those that need aid and protection
from Congress . . . . You are set to do what the
National Association of Manufacturers and certain
great interests demand of ypu. They seem to have
complete control over you.

Helen Gahagan Douglas, a California Democrat com-
pleting her second term in office and therefore a relatively
new member Of Congress, was just as brutal in her attacks.

In view of the spotty initial record of the
Republican Party on social security . . . my
fear is that this is just the beginning. There
will be other holes in the dike against economic
distress from old age . . . you are either for
social security or against. This bill is the
first attack on the social security prOgram by
those who never really believed in it. A vote
for this bill is a vote to begin the destruction
of the greatest social prOgram in the history of
the country.

And if the Supreme Court was being criticized for misinter-
preting the will of Congress in 1935, Mrs. Douglas argued,
how can Gearhart in all good conscience say he is able to
do the same thing? No, instead Congress is "turning back

the clock--crippling where they do not dare repeal, or

98

boring away like termites in an effort tO undermine the
progress of the proceeding 14 years."52
The final three Democrats to Speak that day repeated
the above sentiments. Pennsylvania Democrat Augustine B.
Kelley called for a broader not narrower program. Illinois
Democrat Melvin Price stated that employers were eager to
have an amorphous, confusing wording of the employee
definition so that they would be able to escape payment
for Social Security contributions. Aime Forand, a Rhode
Island Democrat, attacked the shortsightedness of Congress
for trying to remove from coverage a half million or more
peOple who were just as much in need of it as those already
covered. Forand was disgusted, as was Eberharter, with the
inadequate working as well as the faulty language of the
bill and attacked it and its arguments. Forand pointed out
that Congress was claiming that the Supreme Court was not
aware of a 1939 amendment to the Act which had clarified
the definition of employee. However, four consecutive
pages of the Government brief indicated that they had
dealt specifically with the 1939 amendment. Forand also
pointed out, much to the embarrassment of Congress, that
the amendment upon which they were basing their argument
was not passed in 1939 and in fact had never passed.53
Unlike the Republicans the Democrats who argued

against the resolution were somewhat more diverse in their

Congressional terms of service. In fact, only three

99

Democrats who Spoke up were members Of the Ways and Means
Committee: Lynch, Forand and Eberharter. Unlike the
Republicans whose terms of service concentrated in the 13
to 9 years of service, the Democrats covered a somewhat
wider range. Sabath served 41 years, Eberharter 11, Forand
nine, Lynch eight, Kelley seven, Hays five, Douglas and
Price three. Unlike the Republicans, who were arguing

for the legislative powers of Congress, the Democrats
seemed less concerned with the Congressional power argument.
At least those who might have agreed with the Republicans'
argument were less likely to vocalize it. Instead the
Democrats appeared more concerned about the New Deal, the
survival of one of its prOgrams, and the need to protect

it from Republican onslaughts.

DeSpite what the vocal Democrats believed, their
arguments fell on deaf ears, of the Republicans and of
members of their own party. The House passed the resolution
274 to 53. The Republicans voted 197 for, 4 against the
resolution. The Democrats voted 77 for, 48 against. One
American Labor Party member voted against it also.54

The resolution went on to the Senate Finance Committee
which reported it out May 6 with one amendment. The
Committee decided that persons already receiving benefits
should not be effected by the resolution, if passed.55
Eugene Millikin of Colorado, was the only Republican to

Speak in defense of the resolution; all other Republicans

100

remained silent. Millikin reiterated the House Republican
arguments and even went beyond the usual Republican position
in calling for eventual coverage for all employees.56
However, the Republican platform for 1948, already shaping
up, did call for support for Social Security and its
eventual broadened coverage. SO perhaps he was not as far
from the public Republican line as it first appears},7
The Democrats fought back rather weakly. Senator
James E. Murray was the most vocal. He relied upon the
details of who would be refused coverage, as well as letters
from the organizations calling for coverage to be retained.
He also pointed out, though not as vehemently as some in
the House, that H. J. Res. 296 was another move designed to
undermine the entire Social Security system.58
New Mexico Democrat Carl A. Hatch joined with Murray
to denounce the resolution. He argued that the experience
and knowledge of the Supreme Court would prevent them from
making such a terrible mistake as the Republicans had
accused them. He also attacked employers, giving examples
of testimony to the Finance Committee where employers had
written contracts which under the common-law an employee
would be defined as an independent contractor. Under the
Supreme Court Decision, on the other hand, the written
contract would be disregarded if it was in Opposition to

59

the true situation of the worker.

101

Things progressed pretty much as they had in the
House until Ernest W. McFarland, an Arizona Democrat,
Spoke up. In one action he assured the success of H. J.
Res. 296, surprising and embarrassing the Republicans for
not having thought of the solution earlier. McFarland also
brought upon himself the chagrin and anger of some of his
own party members for proposing such an action. McFarland
prOposed an amendment which would increase old age assis-
tance. Under the amendment Federal contributions would be
raised $5 for the aged and the blind and $3 for dependent
children.60 In this way the usual attacks of the Congress
were eliminated. The attacks were on those still working,
who would be excluded. The praise came in increased
benefits for the aged, who would receive larger pensions,
while others were barred from the OASI system.61 The
House, in conference, agreed to the amendment. Now those
voting for the resolution could escape criticism by stating
they were personally Opposed to the resolution and removing
persons from coverage, but they did support increased aid.

A final statement came from Indiana Republican Homer
Capehart, who nervously asked the Congress to hurry and
adjorn on June 19 to save the taxpayers' money. But the
underlying theme behind his statements clearly was prepara-
tion for the eagerly awaited, upcoming Republican National
Convention. Maryland Democrat Millard E. Tydings prOphet-

ically and bitterly suggested that the "Republican Party

102

. . . call Off its national convention and leave the
country in good Democratic hands."62 Had the Republicans
realized the far-reaching effect H. J. Res. 296 would have
on their campaign they might have called for adjournment
before the resolution had even come up.

June 4 the resolution passed the Senate 74 to 6,
though not without some last minute comments.63 Millikin,
in an attempt to once again justify excluding persons from
coverage even though the fund was large enough to cover
them, said: "that surplus is not a grab-bag which is
available for irreSponsible deposition, the surplus has
been built up by 30,000,000 wage earners, who have created
it in order to assure the protection of benefits which they
will ultimately receive. . ." in later years as the load
becomes heavier on the fund. Considering the line of
attack the Republicans had used to discredit the surplus in
the previous session this statement was out of line with
the reasoning. In fact, one is led to believe that the
Republicans did not Oppose the surplus fund as simply un-
necessary. Instead the Republicans feared the excess as a
means by which more peOple could be added to the prOgram,
thereby increasing its SCOpe and power, making it more
difficult for the Republicans to eliminate. Alexander
Smith of New Jersey was the only other Senate Republican
to speak up that day on the issue. He gave the same type

of reSponse as had Foote in previous debate. He simply

103

stated that the resolution was necessary but that the
program should be expanded.64

The Democrats also limited their discussion. The
Democratic argument was confined to comments by Claude
Pepper, who stated that the prOposed amendment for a $5
increase in aid payments was woefully inadequate and that

65 But

members should feel no remorse voting against it.
it was Alben Barkley of Kentucky, who really placed the
Republicans on the Spot. He confronted them with the
simple question of what qualified them to second guess the
Supreme Court. He was joined by Senator Pepper in the
assault. Speaking to Pepper, but jabbing at the Republi-
cans, Barkley asked: "Does not the Senator regret the
seeming tendency on the part of Congress, every time the
Supreme Court renders a decision which some member of
Congress does not think it ought to have rendered, to
prOpose to reverse that decision by an Act Of Congress?"
Pepper quickly reSponded: "I heartily share that sentiment.
In case after case Congress has considered itself the final
court Of appeal to review decisions of the highest court
in the land interpreting acts of Congress. . ."66
The Republicans were caught in a embarrassing predic-
ament. When Roosevelt had attempted the Court packing
fiasco in 1937, the Republicans and some Democrats had

Spoken long and hard about the injustice of the attempt.

The Supreme Court should be above reproach on such issues,

104

they charged; simply because a politician did not agree
with the decision he did not have the right to change the
Court or the decision. Now the Republicans were prOposing
much the same thing.

The Republicans remained embarrassedly silent about
the whole issue. Finally, a quick-thinking Daniel Reed,
in the House, countered the attacks and once again pointed
the finger not at the Supreme Court but at the bureaucracy:

Actually they (Treasury Department) do not rely

upon the decisions of the Court at all, but

upon purely incidental, prefatory language in

the Court's Opinion which confer no authority

whatever upon the Treasury Department or the

Federal Security Agency to decide for itself

the matter of coverage under the Social Security

Act. Rather than giving the Government a broader

license than it now has, these decisions actually

held in effect that the Government had overextended
the power it already had under the existing Treasury
regulation . . . . Rather than implementing the

Supreme Court decision the prOposed Treasury

regulation attgmpts to surmount, supersede, and

negative them. 7
Congress breathed a collective sigh of relief and hOped
that the issue would be gone. In any case, the Senate
passed the resolution June 4, 74 to 6.68 Congress must
have suspected how Truman would react, but once again the
Republicans banking on their mandate from the electorate
and Truman's own low standing, gave his displeasure little
thought.

It is next to impossible to gauge exactly how Truman

reacted when handed H. J. Res. 296 for his signature. He

certainly had given Congress every indication that

105

coverage should be extended, both in his beginning of the
year statements and in a May 24 statement dealing specif-

69 But he

ically with Social Security and its extension.
might have shown some pleasure in being handed such a
neatly packaged campaign issue, and so close to convention
time.

In any case, on June 14 Truman attacked H. J. Res. 296
and Congress with the relish of a crusading messiah. He
presented all the arguments the Democrats had used while
debating against the bill and he did it without the con-
strained civility Congress usually showed in debate. He
questioned Congress's ability to second guess the Supreme
Court. He questioned why the convenience of employers
should be placed over that of workers and their families.
He even questioned the increased aid amendment. Truman
admitted that he had considered signing the resolution into
law only because of the increased aid section. But he did
not because

Speedy action on public assistance legislation

is clearly possible. I note that section 3 (the

assistance section) of this resolution was adOpted

as an amendment on the floor of the Senate, and

passed by both houses in a single afternoon.

Accordingly, I am placing this matter before the

Congress in adequate time so that the public

assistance prOgram will not suffgr because of my

disapproval of this resolution.

Congress reSponded quickly. The Democrats who Spoke

up to sustain the veto echoed Truman's arguments. Democrats

Lynch and COOper continued the argument of the resulting

106

confusion if the veto was overridden. Dingell accused the
Republicans of being so deSperate to please the National
Association of Manufacturers that they included the same
restrictions in HR 6777 (a bill which would extend some
voluntary coverage but excluded the same persons as H. J.
Res. 296) which had recently passed through the House.
Finally, Eberharter, in a last attempt to sustain the veto,
explained that the members could uphold the veto and still
get the aid increase by voting for HR 6838.,71

But the Republicans needed only the scathing attack
of Gearhart to discredit the President. Gearhart stated
that Truman had used the very same arguments the year
before and they had been rejected by Congress as simple
hysterics.

In each instance those arguments were rejected

as fear arguments, arguments unworthy of the

attention of a legislative body. In View of the

Chief Executive's poverty Of argument, his utter

inability to advance anything worthy of our atten-

tion, I ask that the resolution be passed the 2

Objections of the President not withstanding.

The House responded to the Republican plea and voted
to override the veto, 298 to 75.73 Of the 75 Representa-
tives voting no, 69 were Democrats, four were Republicans
(Fulton, Javits, Keating and Welch), both American Labor
Party members also voted no. With the exception of Javits,
the same Republicans who had voted against the original

74

resolution also voted for sustaining the veto.

107

The Senate followed the House's lead. McFarland
warned that if the veto was allowed to stand the aid bill
would be lost, while Senators Millikin and Pepper once
again resumed the argument of the Supreme Court's right to

75

clarify issues and terms such as "employee". Pepper's
arguments accomplished little as the Senate voted to over-
ride the veto 65 to 12. Two Republicans, Langer and
Morse, voted with the 10 Democrats to sustain the Presi-
dent.76
With the resolution passed, vetoed, and overridden the
Congress had given Truman precisely the type of campaign
issue he was after. The representation of Congress as an
uncaring group-Of Republicans interested only in the welfare
of big business became Truman's major campaign theme. He
brought it up in his acceptance speech at the Democratic
National Convention and his call for a Special session;
he brought it up whenever possible in his campaign Speeches.
In fact, Truman so conditioned the electorate that his
mention of the "do nothing" or "good-for-nothing" Eightieth
Congress brought back images of persons removed from
Social Security coverage as well as a host of other attacks
against the New Deal liberalism. If many were not
concerned with expansion and continuation of the New Deal
they were certainly concerned with holding their own

ground. An indication that Congress might be taking away

some of their gains aroused hostile feelings toward the

108

legislature at election time. In fact, commentators often
noted that Truman was not so much running against the
Republican candidate Dewey, as against the record of the
Republican Eightieth Congress.77
The campaign strategy worked. In the November election
Truman won the Presidency and in Congress the Republicans
were once again pushed from power. In the House, Democrats
won 75 seats giving them a 263-171 advantage. (The
American Labor Party held on to one seat.) The Senate
showed a Democratic gain of nine seats, giving the Democrats
54 members and the Republicans 42. Even the states once
again shifted governorships in favor of the Democrats,
3048.78
From the results it appears that even though the
Republicans attempted to shift some of the blame for the
record of the Eightieth Congress onto Congressional
Democrats, this line of attack did little to influence the
79

electorate. Under Truman's insistence, the electorate
could hardly disassociate the "do nothing" Congress from

the Republican Party.

109

1Alben W. Barkley, That Reminds Me (Garden City.
New York: Doubleday, 1954). p. 197. When Truman first
took up the Presidency after FDR's death, he was so self-
deprecating that Barkley had to take him aside and tell
him to stOp the humility act or peOple would lose confi-
dence in him.

 

2Hamby, Beyond the New Deal, p. 183.

 

3Congressionaloigest27, #2 (1948): 33.

ATruman's diary entry for 6 January 1948 quoted in
Robert H. Ferrell, ed., Off the Record, p. 122. Truman
wrote "I'm to address them (Congress) soon. They won't
like the address either."

5Presidential Papers, "Annual Message to Congress on
the State of the Union," 7 January 1948, pp. 1-10.

 

6Ibid., pp. 9-10. Truman had vetoed Republican tax
cut bills twice in 1947. This request for a tax cut by
the President was a blatant political move to gain a
political advantage for the Democrats. Donovan, Conflict
and Crisis, p. 352. Susan M. Hartmann, Truman and the 80th
Congress, p. 149 gives another example of Truman's one-
up-manship. Truman asked for a minimum wage of 65 cents,
the Republicans complied. Truman upped his request to
75 cents tO appear different from the Republicans.

 

7Presidential Papers, "Annual Message to Congress on
the State of the Union," p. 3.

 

8Presidential Papers, "Annual Budget Message to
Congress, Fiscal Year 1949." Dated 6 January 1948,
Released 12 January 1948; pp. 34, 37.

9Presidential Papers, "President's Economic Report to
the Congress," 14 January 1948, p. 68.

 

 

10Ibid., p. 87.

11Heller, Truman White House, pp. 89-90.

 

12Hand written note from President Harry S. Truman to
Arthur H. Vandenberg, 8 February 1948, Correspondence
February 1948, Arthur H. Vandenberg Collection, Michigan
Historical Collections, Bentley Historical Library,
University of Michigan, Ann Arbor.

13Truman's diary entry for 6 January 1948 as quoted in
Ferrell, Off the Record, p. 122. '

1['The actions Of the Eighty-third Republican Congress
under Republican President Dwight D. Eisenhower does not
bear out this conclusion. This may be credited to the
reluctant Republican acceptance of the program. This
acceptance was reinforced by the public's reaction in 1948
to the possible destruction of Social Security as described
by Truman. The acceptance was also due, in part, to the
uniquely Democratic view Eisenhower took of the program.
In fact, some of the more liberal changes in OASI were made
under the Republicans in the Eighty-third Congress at the
insistence of Eisenhower. Also of importance was the
absence of some of the more conservative and powerful
Congressional Republicans, who had served in the Eightieth
Congress.

15Representative George G. Sadowski, 27 January 1948,
ER 94: 601. Representative Emory H. Price, 28 May 1948,
QB 94: 6737. Representative John A. Blatnik, 7 June 1948,
CR 94:. A3602. Representative Chet Holifield, 19 June

T948. 93 94: A4347.

16Presidential Papers, "Statement of the President on

the Record of the Special Session of Congress," 12 August
1948, pp. 431-32. This statement gave a summary of the
action taken by Congress on the President's recommendations
to the Special Session of Congress.

 

7Representative James E. Van Zandt, 1 March 1948, CR
94: A1250. Van Zandt referred to the aid as "international
handouts without any hOpe of a dollar ever being repaid."
Van Zandt did make a milder statement in June, see following
note.

8Representative Homer D. Angell, 2 February 1948, CR
94: 912-14. Representative Leon H. Gavin, 23 February
1948, CR 94: 1551. Representative Gerald W. Landis, 24
February 1948, ER 94: 1656. Representative John C. Butler,

111

22 March 1948, CR 94:1804. Representative Kenneth B.
Keating, 6 April 1948, LR 94: A2167. Representative Millet
Hand, 13 May p1948, LR 94: A3010. Representative Dewey
Short, 14 May 1948, LR 94: 5831-32. Representative John

B. Bennett, 26 May 1948, LR 94: A3340. Representative
Homer D. Angell, 7 June 1948, LR 94: A3604-O5. Representa-
tive James E. Van Zandt, 8 June —1948, CR 94: A3636.
Petition by Members of Congress to Committee on Ways and
Means, 15 June 1948, 93 94: A39-0. Representative

William H. Stevenson, 29 July 1948, LR 94: 9543. Repre-
sentative John 0. Butler, 6 August 1948, LR 94: A4948.

19Representative Merlin Hull, 16 June 1948, CR 94:
A4257. Representative Fred E. Busbey, 19 June 1948, CR
94: 9175.

20Representative William Lemke, 7 August 1948, CR 94:
45242-43.

21
4191.

Using the argument of discouraging Communism in the
U.S., promoting national security, and a strong economy
were the following: Senator Carl A. Hatch inserting a
Speech by Rev. Edmund A. Walsh, 3 June 1948, CR 94: 7027.
Representative Homer D. Angell, 7 June 1948, LR 94: A3604.
Representative George P. Miller, 19 June 1948, —LR 94:

A4310. Hatch and Miller were the only Democrats using this
argument.

Marjorie Shearon, one of the more reactionary Republi-
cans to advise Taft, tried to make a direct connection
between Social Security and state socialism. Taft, to his
credit, did not use the charges. Specifically Shearon ac-
cused Arthur Altmeyer, Commissioner of the Social Security
Administration, of following plans of the International
Labor Organization. The plans, which he received at a
Social Security Administration meeting attended by 22 other
countries in May 1948, would expand Social Security until
state socialism resulted. Marjorie Shearon to Robert A.
Taft, 15 June 1948, Legislative File, Soical Security
Miscellaneous, 1948-49. Robert Taft Collection, Library
of Congress, Manuscript Division, Washington, D.C.

Using the argument of an earned right were: Repre-
sentative Homer D. Angell, 7 June 1948, CR 94: A3604.
Representative Chet Holifield, 19 June 1948, LR 94: A4342.
Representative William Lemke, 7 August 1948, LR 94: A5247.
Representative Homer D. Angell, 2 February 1948, LR 94:
914. Representative William H. Stevenson, 29 July 1948,

Representative Walter E. Brehm, 7 April 1948, Cfl_94:

112

CR 94: 9544. Representative John B. Bennett, 26 May 1948,
CR 94: A3340. With the exception Of Holifield, all others
using this argument were Republicans.

22"Congressional Quarterly's Box Score: Recommenda-
tions vs. Congressional Action," Congressional Quarterly
Almanac 4 (1948): 50.

23There was only one comment on the bill and it came
from Representative Lyndon B. Johnson, 16 February 1948,
CR 94: A851. Bertrand W. Gearhart spoke of the bill the
day it was passed by the House. Referring also to H. J.
Res. 296, which will be discussed later in this chapter,
Gearhart painted a picture of the vendors forced against
their will to participate in the Social Security prOgram,
under false pretenses. Representatvie Bertrand W. Gearhart,
4 March 1948, CR 94: 2143.

24Senator Claude Pepper, 15 March 1948, pg 94: 2809.
Pepper later withdrew his Opposition, Senator Claude Pepper,
23 March 1948, CR 94: 3267.

25Presidential Papers, "Veto of Bill to Exclude Vendors
of Newspapers and Magazines From Social Security Coverage,"
5 April 1948, p. 205.

 

26Representative Bertrand W. Gearhart, 4 March 1948,
93 94: 2143.

27Presidential Papers, "Veto Message," p. 206.

28Representative Herman P. Eberharter, 12 April 1948,

QB 94: 4360. 4359. Truman's great dislike of the large
publishing companies might have played a part in this.
Beginning with the attempts to discredit Truman in his
early Senate races, to the Vice Presidential nomination,
Truman had built'up a great distaste for the media. At
times it seemed as though he used the term "Newspaper
publisher" more as an expletive than a description of a
profession. See also Hamby, Beyond the New Deal, p. 49
and Truman, Years of Trial and HOpe, 2: 175-76.

29Representative Bertrand W. Gearhart, 14 April 1948,
CR 94: 4428-29.

 

113

30
145.

31Representative Herman P. Eberharter, 14 April 1948,
93 94: 4430.

32

"Lobbies," Congressional Quarterly Almanac 4 (1948):

Congressional Quarterly Almanac 4 (1948): 145.

33House Vote on Overriding the Veto, 20 April 1948,
93 94: 4432—33.

34senate Vote on Overriding the Veto, 20 April 1948,
93 94: 4594.

35United States v. Silk. 331 U.S. 704—72, 321 Sup.
Ct. 91 L. Ed. 1757-1772 (1947). 'Bartels et al v. Birmingham
,et al, 332 U.S. 126-133, 126 Sup. Ct. 91 L. Ed. 1947-1955
(1947)..

36Congress and the Nation, p. 1241. See also Social
Security Bulletin 11 #7)(1948): 3. 5.

 

37Senator James E. Murray, 3 June 1948, ER 94: 7034,
gives a more detailed list, including:
30,000 salesmen
200,000 journey men, subcontractors and contract
filling station Operators
40,000 industrial home workers
70,000 house to house salesmen
10,000 mine leasees
36,000 entertainers
17,000 contract lOggers

38"What's Happening in Washington?" 2 February 1948,
See. 2, as found in the Legislative File-~Social Security
Miscellaneous, 1944-1947. Robert Taft Collection. Library
OprongreSS, Manuscript Division, Washington, D.C.

39Representative Bertrand W. Gearhart, 27 February
1948, CR 94: 1893-95.

401bid., p. 1894.

41Re resentative Herman P. Eberharter, 27 February
1948, CR_ 4: 1894.

114

42Representative Forest A. Harness, 27 February 1948,
CR 94: 1888.

43Representative Robert A. Grant, 27 February 1948,
.93 94: 1905-06.

44Representative Herman P. Eberharter and Daniel A.
Reed, 27 February 1948, CR 94: 8198, 8190. Eberharter
claimed that the report was never before the Committee and
therefore the bill was considered without all the pertinent
information present. Eberharter claimed that the clerk
was asked if the reports from the FSA and Treasury Depart-
ment were at hand. He replied that they were not, he had
received them and left them in his office. Without going
for the reports, both of which recommended voting against
the resolution, a vote was taken to report the resolution
out of committee.

45Representative Clare E. Hoffman and Adolph J.
Sabath, 27 February 1948, CR 94: 1889.

46Representative Ellsworth B. Foote, 27 February 1948,
CR 94: 1899.

47
1908.

Representative Brooks Hays, 27 February 1948, CR 94:

8Representative Herman P. Eberharter, 27 February
1948. QB 94: 1891.

49Representative Herman P. Eberharter, 27 February
1948. 23 94: 1890.

50Representative Walter A. Lynch, 27 February 1948,
QR 94: 1890-91, 1893. Lynch accused Gearhart of overkill
because H. J. Res. 296 would also cut coverage of Newspaper
and Magazine Vendors. Lynch suggested that instead Of
taking such a broad attack that Gearhart restrict his
ambition to have the vendors cut from coverage to HR 5052
which did this specifically. (See previous argument in
this chapter covering HR 5052.)

51Representative Adolph J. Sabath, 27 February 1948,
pg 94: 1889-90.

115

52Representative Helen Gahagan Douglas, 27 February
1948, CR 94: 1908, 1906.

53Representative Augustine B. Kelley, 27 February
1948, CR 94: 1893. Representative Melvin Price, 27
February 1948, QR 94: 1906. Representative Aimé Forand,
27 February 1948, CR 94: 1892.

54Vote on House Joint Resolution 296, 27 February 1948,
CR 94: 1908-09. The four Republicans to vote against the
bill were James G. Fulton of Pennsylvania, former PrOgres-
sive (1935-1947) Merlin Hull of Wisconsin, Kenneth B.
Keating of New York and Richard J. Welch of California.
All, with the exception of Hull, were from urban areas.

55Explanation Of the amendment may be found in "Senate
,Remarks Relative to Removal of Salesmen from Coverage by
Social Security," 3 June 1948, CR 94: 7033.

56Senator Eugene Millikin, 3 June 1948, CR 94: 7024.

57"Platform vs. Performance in Congress,"
Congressional Quarterly Almanac 4 (1948): 31.

58Senator James E. Murray, 3 June 1948, pg 94: 7033-34.
59senator Carl A. Hatch, 3 June 1948, 93 94: 7027-29.

60Senator Ernest W. McFarland, 3 June 1948, CR 94:
7035, 7039. Congressional Quarterly Almanac 4 (1948): 144.
Unfortunately the increased aid was only a temporary action
and the limits of the bill would expire in 1949.

61

 

The amendment passed 77-2, with Democrat Byrd and
Republican Knowland against it. "Senate Vote on McFarland
Amendment," 3 June 1948, CR 94: 7133.

62

Senators Homer Capehart and Millard E. Tydings,
3 June 1948, ER 94: 7039.

63"Senate Voting on H. J. Res. 296," 4 June 1948, CR
94: 7134. Voting against the resolution were Democrats
Barkley, McMahon, Pepper and Taylor. Republicans Ives and
Morse also voted against it.

116

64Senator Eugene Millikin, 4 June 1948, CR 94: 7129.
Senator Alexander Smith, 4 June 1948, CR 94: 7128.

65Senator Claude Pepper illustrated the inadequacy of
the $5 increase in aid payments. Using the Social Security
Board estimated cost of living for an aged person in June
1948, as Opposed to what they received from 0AA the
difference between the numbers was quite glaring.

, Couple Single
Cost of living $1,250.00 $800.00
The average monthly benefit of $40.00 equaled to only
$480.00 annually, much under the standard of living set by
the FSA. Even with the additional.$60.00 per year under
the McFarland amendment the aid would be too low. Pepper's
argument was supported.by Senator John C. Stennis, 4 June
1948, CR 94: 7125 and Senator Alben Barkley, 4 June 1948,
ER 94: 7123 who also argued that the assistance raise was
too small to be considered even adequate.

66

Some examples of Congressional tampering with
Supreme Court decisions were given.

1) Southern Underwriters--Supreme Court said they
were subject to prosecution under the anti-trust laws;
legislation was passed granting them immunity.

2) Fixing of rail rates--Supreme Court said this was
subject to prosecution under the anti-trust laws, Congres-
sional legislation allowed those involved to override the
liability. '

3) Mount Clemens Pottery Case--Supreme Court said
workers must be paid for all work they do (e.g. preparation
time for work). Congress prOposed portal to portal pay.

Senators Alben Barkley and Claude Pepper, 4 June 1948,
QB 94: 7125.

67Ironically Truman had backed FDR's court packing'
scheme, because "the Court had assumed legislative powers

 

which in no sense it constitutionally possesses."‘ Truman,
Years of Trial and HOpe, 2: 151.
68

"Senate Vote on H. J. Res. 296," 4 June 1948, CR 94:
7134. Voting nay were Barkley, Ives, McMahon, Pepper, Morse
and Taylor.

69Presidential_Papers, "Special Message to the Congress
on Social Security," 24 May 1948, pp. 272-76.

 

117

7OPresidential Papers, "Veto Of Resolution Excluding
Certain Groups From Social Security Coverage," 14 June

1948, pp. 344-46.

71Representative Walter A. Lynch, 14 June 1948, pg 94:
8190. Representative Jere COOper, 14 June 1948, CR 94:
8189. Representative John Dingell, 14 June 1948, ER 94:
8189. Representative Herman P. Eberharter, 14 June 1948,
CR 94: 8190.

 

72Representative Bertrand W. Gearhart, 14 June 1948,
CR 94: 8189.

73"House Voting to Override Veto Of H. J. Res. 296,"
14 June 1948, pg 94: 8191.

74Javits, in his autobiography, claims he was a
Republican representing a long-time Democratic district,
so he often voted Democratic out of fear of retaliation
at the next election. Javits, The Autobiography of a
Public Man, p. 134.

 

75Senator Ernest W. McFarland, 14 June 1948, pg 94:
8088. Senators Eugene Millikin andelaude Pepper, 14 June
1948, CR 94: 8092.

76"Senate Vote to Override Veto Of H. J. Res. 296,"
14 June 1948, CR 94: 8093.

77Most Republicans recognized Truman's ploy and wanted
to refocus the attention back on Truman and Dewey and away
from the Eightieth Congress. Story of the 80th Congress,
p. 107, as found in the Joseph W. Martin Papers, Cushing-
Martin Library, Stonehill College, North Easton, Mass.
Also see letter from John Foster Dulles to Arthur H.
Vandenberg, 17 August 1948, Correspondence August, in
Arthur H. Vandenberg Collection. Dulles warned that
"Truman is attempting to make the campaign issue one Of
Truman versus Congress and while that is not an issue to
be ignored, particularly in the face of your magnificient
record, also it is well to keep to the fore the issue of
Truman vs. Dewey, which apparently, Truman is trying to
duck."

78Congress and the Nation, p. 5.

118

79Some Congressional Republicans Spoke up and tried to
discredit Truman and the Congressional Democrats. For
example, Thomas Jenkins, 6 August 1948, CR 94: A4969-70,
10104. Representative Hubert S. Ellis, 7 August 1948, CR
94: A5165-66. Representative Daniel Reed, 19 June 1948,
CR 94: A4550, who argued that without Democratic support
H. J. Res. 296 never would have passed the first time and
certainly the Republicans would never have been able to
override the veto.

Surprisingly, although some Republican Congressmen
appeared to be fighting against the New Deal Specter, 1948
was the first time in 16 years there was no attack on the
New Deal specifically in either the Republican platform or
acceptance speeches of Dewey or Warren. Hartmann, Truman
and the 80th Congress, pp. 191-92. See also Mayer,
Republican Party, p. 470.

FOUR

CONCLUSION

Were the Republicans really bent upon destroying the
New Deal legacy as some historians would have us believe?
Few but the actual participants can answer this question
decisively. But from the evidence presented in this thesis
it is certainly evident that they were intent upon redefin-
ing the direction in which the Federal Government moved.
They wanted the Federal Government to stOp interfering in
the private life of the public. This unnecessary interfer-
ence, the Republicans believed, had been legislated by the
New Deal. Therefore, the interference could be stOpped only
by eliminating the New Deal.

It is not as though one can refer to the "Republicans"
as if they were a Single thinking entity. The diversity of
its members would belie any such all-encompassing statement.
So to say that the Republicans had one unified thought about
Social Security or any other prOgram would be misleading.
But the Republicans did represent a type Of unified
strategy and way Of thinking, just as the Democrats did in
their own scattered way. The Republicans believed, and the
1946 election results appeared to support the belief, that

they were offering a prOgram which was acceptable and even

119

120

desired by the nation. Their program of government non-
involvement, their preference for private business activity,
their Opposition to what they saw as "big labor" demands,
was the touchstone from which they launched their Congres-
sional programs. It was this philOSOphy which would bring
about changes in government that would reverberate through
to such New Deal programs as Social Security. It was almost
by chance that Social Security happened to be forced to the
forefront during the highly emotionalized 1948 campaign.

But it was precisely their actions on Social Security which
give the conclusion that the Republicans would have moved
to undermine the strength of the New Deal, specifically
OASI, unless restrained by a New Deal advocate such as
Truman.

Like any large group, the Congress of the United
States most often moves at a lumbering, slow pace. Despite
partisan accusations and periodic cries to the contrary
this is how most Americans prefer that it move, unless of
course they are concerned about a particular issue. Except
in time of extreme crisis, the American public is most at
ease with this change by degrees in American politics.

This is how the Republicans, at least their leaders,

wanted the changes to take place also. The political
shrewdness of Harry S. Truman prevented the Slow methodical
changes from occurring and instead forced the Republicans

to take immediate action to forestall the New Deal.

121

expansion Truman was promoting. The abrupt and seemingly
destructive changes instituted by Republican legislation
frightened the electorate.

However, some historians may argue that had Thomas E.
Dewey, as representative Of the more liberal wing of the
Republican Party, won the election he would have forestalled
conservative Republican action in Congress. This theory
is in direct Opposition to Hamby's argument that a Republi-
can President and Congress would have destroyed the New
Deal. But even though Dewey appeared to have accepted OASI
and some of the other New Deal social prOgrams, as reflected
in the Dewey-sponsored 1944 and 1948 Republican platforms
calling for the preservation of Social Security, he never
quite accepted the methods used to achieve the New Deal
goals. This dislike of the methods necessary to Operate
OASI, in particular, was common to the Republican Party.

Even had Dewey accepted the Democratic theory for
running OASI, he would have suffered from the same type of
personality and ideology conflicts with Congress as Truman
had. Dewey was relatively young for a presidential
candidate, he had never served in Congress, he appeared to
lack personal warmth when dealing with peOple and he
believed that unquestioning loyalty and party unity were
necessary for victory. As District Attorney and Governor
Of New York Dewey was successful in keeping the state

Republican Party in line. He achieved this by replacing

122

malcontents with Republicans loyal to his way of thinking.
Had Dewey attempted this type of discipline with Congress
it is unlikely that he would have been any more successful
than FDR was in his 1938 purge Of anti-New Deal Senators.

Dewey's demand that Congressional Republicans follow
his lead unquestioningly would have put Congressional
leaders such as Taft on the defensive. Congress had
fought against Truman to regain the powers they felt they
had lost to Roosevelt. It is doubtful that they would have
buckled so soon to Dewey's demands for their unquestioning
approval. This is especially true as Dewey's personality
and attitude toward the legislative branch, exemplified
by his New York governorship, has been described as
"dictatorial, Off-handed indifference, bordering almost
upon contempt." Dewey's leadership was that of an omnip-
otent commander in chief who expected unquestioning loyalty
from his followers. Although Dewey would listen to diver-
gent ideas, as long as he had requested discussion, he
viewed himself as the decision-maker and tolerated no
insubordination from party members. Republican Congres-
sional leaders viewed themselves as equal partners with
the President, however, and expected compromise and respect
from the Executive. This would not have been the case
with Dewey had he been elected President.1

The Southern conservative Democrats must also be

considered. They had not COOperated with a Democratic

123

President's plea for liberalism. There is no reason to
believe they would have reSponded to a Republican
President's request either. This loss of Southern votes
in Congress would have been a sticky problem to overcome.
It would have resulted in almost the same type of problem
Truman faced in 1947 and 1948; a liberal-to-moderate
President confronted with a conservative Congress.

Therefore, despite the 1944 and 1948 Republican
platforms calling for a strengthening and extension of
Social Security, Congressional Republicans did not intend
that it follow along the original liberal New Deal line
of universal coverage guaranteed by the Federal Government
with liberal benefits. Instead, under their program Social
Security would probably have ceased to be solely a govern-
ment function. There would have been a slow change,
stealthily channeling the reSponsibility for old age
insurance into private companies. Dismantling the system
bit by bit until it was either so small as to draw little
or no interest or completely in the hands of private busi-
ness. This is evident by the movement to have such groups
as news vendors removed from coverage, despite a congres-
sionally-appointed committee which suggested reduction of
coverage in any aspect was wrong.

The move to hold contribution rate increases, although~
as mentioned previously was hardly an unusual occurrence,

was a follow-up on the Republican belief that Social

124

Security should be under a pay-as-you-go method. This was
keeping with their philOSOphy of curbing government
spending. For if there was no surplus accruing annually

in the fund, the government would have less money available
to funnel into other areas.3 Future insurance recipients
would also realize that they would have to make other
arrangements to supplement their income, through private
investments, savings plans or reliance on private charity.4
This would return to the Republican theory of self-
sufficiency and old age insurance administrated through
the private insurance companies. Therefore, this seemingly
harmless action Of holding back OASI contribution rates

was really the first step in Republican destruction of
Social Security.

However, the slow methodical, almost unnoticeable
changes advocated by the Republicans were not to prevail.
The change in relationship between Truman and Congress
brought antagonization and hostility to Executive-
Legislative relations. The Administration by approving
extension of coverage, relying upon the 1947 Supreme Court
decisions; pushed the Republican plans into the limelight.
Now Congress acted, and acted as much out of anger with
Truman's disregard for their Sphere of power, as out of
maliciousness for the New Deal. They established their
supremacy as initators of legiSIation bUt they also

embarrassingly exposed some more unacceptable Republican

125

designs on the now pOpular and accepted Social Security
prOgrams. According to Republican plans OASI should be
decreased and the system weakened and eventually eliminated
not expanded and strengthened as it was by the Administra-
tion's actions.

House Joint Resolution 296, in essence, gave the
employer the right to decide if those persons involved
economically with him were employees or not. The chance to
rewrite contracts and redefine the financial connections
between them would give enormous power to business.

Through legal lOOphOles they could technically and legally
define persons economically attached to them as independent
contractors. DeSpite the legal language, the reality of
the situation would still Show business exerting control
and pUtting limiting restrictions upon their underlings,
as if they were employees. The same old argument of
business shackled by unnecessary taxes, in this case OASI
contributions, arose. If businesses were free from the
constraints, they would produce a strong economy, capable
of supporting all. The workers would benefit enough to

be able to contract their own insurance agreements with
private companies. In short, the entire system would work
faster, more efficiently, and more economically than with
government interference, or so the Republicans claimed.

This would have been the future of Old Age and

Survivors' Insurance in Republican hands. To say that

126

they were maliciously intent upon destroying it is perhaps
too harsh a statement. Destruction implies sudden and
wrenching change, more in line with an ideOlOgical,
political coup. A better interpretation would be to say
that the Republicans were intent upon redefining the role
of government according to their own plan. The results
may have been the same, loss of security for the aged and
the dependent, but the time span necessary to extract
change would have been longer and the public attention it
attracted much less noticeable. Had the Republicans won
the 1948 election, placing a Republican President with a
Republican Congress, they would have been reassured of the
public's acceptance of their programs. They would have
been foolish to proceed in any direction other than a
decrease in Federal interference as promised the public in
1948, and demonstrated to them under the Eightieth Congress.
But the stunning losses Republicans suffered revealed to
them that perhaps they had misjudged public attachment to
certain New Deal programs.5 This change is illustrated by
Eisenhower's election in 1952. Although Eisenhower and
the Republicans were still anti-big government and anti-
big Spending they realized that the OASI prOgram was so
widely accepted by the public that destruction would have
been impossible. But even in 1954 it took Eisenhower's

insistance that expansion of OASI would decrease the

127

government's role in other areas such as welfare, before
the Republican Eighty-third Congress would pass the
prOgram.

The 1948 reaffirmation of the public's belief in the
New Deal, specifically Social Security, would be strong
enough to carry the prOgram through additional growth and
expansion in the ensuing years. The Republicans were
forced to admit that they had erred in underestimating the

attraction the liberal legacy held for America.

128

1Barry K. Beyer, Thomas E. Dewey, 1937-1947: A Study
In Political Leadership (New York: Garland Publishing,
Inc., 1279), pp. 63-68, 98-99. 135. 229. 243. 251-52. 259.
272, 27 .

 

 

2The prOposals of the Advisory Council on Social
Security to the Senate Finance Committee were almost exactly
the same as the recommendations the previous year. For
text of FSA recommendations see Social Security Bulletin
10, #12 (1947): 3-5. For brief text of Advisory Council
on Social Security see: Social Security Bulletin 11, #5
(1948): 21, 24. For full text see Senate, "Questions
and Answers in Report of Advisory Council of Social Security,"

21 April 1948, CR 94: 4664-65.

 

3Again, it was not as though the government was stealing
money from the fund.. The intricacies of government finance
indicate that the fund was there, but only on paper. When
the OASI revenues arrived at the FSA, the government took
the money and left behind bonds. When benefits came due
the government would simply transfer money from its other
accounts to pay out benefits and pay interest into the
fund. This led to the Republican charge that the government
was borrowing money form itself and paying itself interest.

4Only wages were linked to Social Security payments,
not profits or dividends. Therefore, an OASI recipient
was restricted to a limited amount of money he could
receive in wages each month and still receive a Social
Security check. But the amount of money he could receive
from investments such as stocks, bonds, savings, and rental
prOperty, was unlimited.

5Altmeyer claims that the loss in 1948 was due ex-
clusively to Social Security. This claim is a bit over-
zealous. But the public reaction to Truman's claim of
Republican destruction of Social Security should not be
taken lightly. The reaction illustrated that the public
had formulated an ideal in their mind which represented
the New Deal. Any attempts to destroy this ideal would
be met with public dissatisfaction, as in the 1948
election. Altmeyer, Formative Years, pp. 163, 169.

 

Gary W. Reichard, The Reaffirmation of Rppublicanism:
Eisenhower and the Eighty-third Congress (Knoxville:
University of Tennesse Press, 1975). pp. 84, 146, 174,
184. 193. 198. 218-19. 230-31. 234. 236.

 

 

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