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C- LIBRARY Michigan State University This is to certify that the thesis entitled FREE PRESS - RIGHT TO PRIVACY: EXTENDED MEDIA COVERAGE OF TRIAL WITNESSES presented by Michele Eileen McCauley has been accepted towards fulfillment of the requirements for MA Telecommunications degree in #2,,4/2495/ [20% Major professor 0-7639 MS U is an Affirmative Action/Equal Opportunity Institution ‘4 llllllll l999199999199 3 1293 00647 5911 IV‘ESI.) RETURNING MATERIALS: Place in book drop to LJBRARJES remove this checkout from -_‘—. your record. F__I___NES W1” be charged if book is returned after the date stamped below. \0 FP “£31993???- 53:3 9391993: I ifii'a 0C) 0U 21 909 I — “W.“ __ _ / '/' é,';' 4' 1.) FREE PRESS - RIGHT TO PRIVACY: EXTENDED MEDIA COVERAGE OF TRIAL WITNESSES By Hichele Eileen McCauley A THESIS Submitted to Michigan State University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of 1HASTER.OF ARTS 'Department of Telecommunications 1988 ABSTRACT FREE PRESS - RIGHT TO PRIVACY: EXTENDED MEDIA COVERAGE OF TRIAL WITNESSES By Michele Eileen HCCauley The landmark case, Qhagfil§r_xL_Elggid§. 449 0.8. 560 (1981) announced that the presence of extended media during a trial did not deny defendants a fair trial. However, no serious consideration had been given to the privacy concerns of sensitive witnesses, especially victims of crime. A historical study revealed individuals considered newsworthy lose much of their right to privacy. During extended media coverage of trials, witnesses must rely on state guidelines and media ethics to insure some form of privacy protection. Extended media coverage of trials can be educational to the public. However, the media must not revictimize a witness/victim merely to provide a titillating story on the evening news. The courts must also consider the effects of the publicity, and enforce protective measures to shield the witnesses from unwarranted coverage. Copyright by MICHELE EILEEN MCCAULEY 1988 To my parents, Gene and Shirley McCauley The love, encouragement, and support you shower me with daily has helped me reach this goal, and not be afraid to go on to another. Though I don’t always show it, I love you both very much. iv ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ‘ Sincere thanks to Dr. Thomas Muth, who has encouraged and supported me from the very start of my graduate studies. His criticisms were balanced by compliments, making my thesis project a desirable challenge, not a dreaded chore. Special thanks also to Dr. Gerald Miller, whose interest in my thesis topic encouraged me to produce the best work I am capable of. Thank you to Sheila Skutar, a great typist, but an even greater friend. We shared some rough times, yet we always seemed to end up laughing. To my brother Tim, his wife Sharin, Gabe, and Dani, who helped me relax and enjoy myself, and forget about school for awhile, when I was home for a visit. Thanks to my brother Dan, and my sister Tracey. The letters and phone calls (and few extra dollars!) always seemed to come when I needed them most. When we’re together I’m still treated like the baby sister, but I don’t mind since it shows that we can still be close even though we live so far away from each other. Special thanks to Vivian and Frank Albert, my "adoptive parents", who helped me out so much while I’ve been at MSU. A simple thank you is hardly enough. It’s easy to see why my parents treasure their friendship so highly -- you’re very special people. vi Chapter TABLE OF CONTENTS Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . Research Question . . . . . . . Subsidiary Questions . . . . . . . . Review of Literature . Research Method Endnotes . . The Constitution: An Historical Sketch of Relevant Sections The First Amendment . The Fourth Amendment . The Sixth Amendment . . . The Fourteenth Amendment . Endnotes . . . . . . Privacy Rights . Endnotes . Aural and Visual Media and the Courts: Relevant Court Decisions . . . Endnotes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Extended Media in the Courtroom: Opinions and Research . . . . . . The Media . . . . . . . . . . . . The Judicial System . . . . . . . Victim/Witness Advocates . Research . . . . . . . . . . . : : Endnotes . vii UbVC‘O‘ Hg... 44 59 62 62 71 80 84 96 6 Aural and Visual Coverage in the Courtrooms. . 107 Court Proceedings Covered by the Extended Media . . . . . . . . . . 112 Future Extended Media Coverage 120 of Court Proceedings . . . . . . . . . . . . . ‘ Endnotes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127 7 Witnesses On Trial . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133 Rape Victims and the Second Assault. . . . . 137 Protecting the Privacy Interests of Sexual Assault Victims. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155 Endnotes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..... 160 8 Findings, Implications, and Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 166 Findings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 166 Implications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - . 180 Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 188 Endnotes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - . 203 .9 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . .l. . . . . 209 Endnotes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 212 Sources Consulted . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 213 viii CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION The 0.8. Constitution was designed to assure citizens basic rights. For instance, freedom of the press is guaranteed by the first amendment of the Constitution. The right to a public trial is insured through the sixth amendment; and citizens are guaranteed a right to privacy under the fourth amendment. However, the framers of the Constitution could not have imagined the social and technological changes that were to occur over the years that would generate conflicts between these amendments. The innovation of the extended media is one such example. When the guarantee of a free press was incorporated into the first amendment by the framers of the Constitution, the idea of radio and television, let alone cable, microwave, and satellite transmission, was inconceivable. Two hundred years later the press has evolved into the [media -- every type of publishing which disseminates information, ideas, and opinions through a channel of communication. The media publicizes events and information deemed newsworthy to the general public. Today’s press believes the first amendment’s free press clause encompasses the extended media when public court proceedings are covered by the press. Since newspaper reporters are allowed into courtrooms with their tool of the trade, a pen and notebook, it is reasoned, then a newspaper photographer and television crew should be permitted into the courtroom with their tools -- visual and audio equipment. The purpose of a free press is to allow the media to act as a watchdog for the general public; aural/visual coverage of court proceedings is the most advanced and ideal way to communicate news to the citizens. There are many arguments that support extended media access to courtroomslt 1. The public has a right to know what goes on in court proceedings. 2. There is a constitutional guarantee of a free press. 3. Visual and audio recorders are merely an extension of the courtroom walls. Until 1981, cameras had been barred from most courtrooms. The Supreme Court’s landmark decision in Chandler v. Florida, 449 0.8. 560 (1981) ruled that the presence of the extended media during court proceedings does not deny a defendant due process of law.2 However, access by the extended media is not an absolute; each individual state must determine if, and to what extent, the aural/visual media will be permitted in courtrooms. The Chandler decision only demonstrated that the presence of the extended media is not unconstitutional. The Chandler decision addressed and outlined the rights of both the media and the defendants when broadcast coverage of trial proceedings is desired. However, the rights of some trial participants must now be examined by the courts, media, and society. Because the general policies and laws of the United States are based on the Constitution, the main concern during a judicial examination is that of the defendant’s right to a fair trial. The rights of the media are even guaranteed by the first amendment. But trial participants, specifically witnesses, have no constitutional rights when participating in the judicial process, and must rely on the state to protect their interests. Witnesses —- especially when covered by the extended media -~ become public figures, and thus newsworthy, unwillingly. Opponents of. extended media coverage of victims and witnesses have many justifiable arguments=3 1. Cameras may have a subconscious effect on the witness. 2. There is a temptation by the media to sensationalize. 3. Extended media coverage of some types of trials may discourage other victims, who may be required to be a witness, from reporting crimes. Witnesses are often forced to testify when persuaded by an attorney or served a supeona. Although the testimony the witness supplies may not be damaging to either party, it will still be the job of the opposing attorney to discredit the witness in any (acceptable) way possible. A witness to a.mugging may be questioned about his/her vision, memory, or past tendencies to fabricate stories to receive attention. A victim of sexual assault may be questioned about the clothing worn, the amount of physical resistance she used, or her sexual history. In both instances, though extremely different in the seriousness of the alleged crime, the witnesses may be ridiculed, embarrassed, and their character assassinated, feeling that they themselves are on trial for committing a crime. The presence of the extended media during the testimony may be unnerving and unwelcome to any witness in any type of court proceeding; the fear of publicity and public ridicule may be of equal concern to a witness asked only three questions about seeing a car stolen as to a rape victim who must endure endless hours of testimony. The delicate balance between a free press and right to personal privacy needs to be examined and clarified as more states open their courts to the aural/visual media. The value the press places on responsible and ethical reporting of court proceedings must also be studied. Even though a state determines gha; trials will be taped or photographed, bag the information is used is left up to the media. Quotes out of context, small bites of video and audio, and stories solely intended to attract a larger audience may result in news reports which focus on only the most interesting, not the most important parts of a trial. Journalists, judges, attorneys, victim/witness advocates, and members of the general public are split on whether the right to privacy outweighs the right of a free press. The contrasting viewpoints of these individuals who are involved with the judicial process must be analyzed. Each group is interested in court proceedings for different reasons: the media wants to report newsworthy information; lawyers want to defend or prosecute individuals; judges want to administer justice; victim/witness advocates want to assure that witnesses testify properly and willingly; and the general public wants to see how the court system works to bring justice to society. The issue of extended media coverage and victim/witness right to privacy is important, as it involves constitutional rights and ethics. The media believe open courtrooms are only fair -- that the advanced technology which allows a trial to be broadcast across the entire country is simply a way of opening courtrooms to citizens who have a right to see and hear a trial, but may not be able to attend. At the same time, however, others believe this coverage will prevent some individuals from testifying or even from pressing charges for fear of embarrassment or personal harm. The media respond that a judge will deny extended media coverage if it could be harmful to any trial participant; but opponents point out that not all judges and lawyers act in the best interest of the trial participants, and thus some trials that should allow victim/witness privacy do not. A balance between the conflicts needs to be found; and if not, then it must be decided whose right will be favored when conflicts of interest do arise. RESEARCH QUESTION Should trial witnesses have a right to privacy under the fourth amendment? SUBSIDIARY QUESTIONS 1. In what classes should privacy interests be considered? 2. When should the media’s right to free press outweigh the right to privacy during court testimony? 3. If extended media coverage of a witness results in a physical or emotional injury, who is held responsible? 4. Is the public educated as to how the court system works by viewing a thirty or sixty second news report? REVIEW OF LITERATURE The issue of right to privacy was first discussed in 1890. Since that time, court decisions, writings, and research have offered many opinions, ideas, and findings regarding freedom of the press and right to privacy. Court decisions are the most important information to be considered when debating conflicts of interest between the press and the private citizen. When the broadcast medium was just developing, the first cases concerning extended coverage of trials focused on the defendant’s right to a fair trial. Bidaaa v. Louiaiana, 373 0.3. 723 (1963), 353;: v. Taxaa, 331 0.5. 532 (1965), and Shappard v. [flaggall, 384 0.8. 333 (1966) were heard by the Supreme Court, which ruled that in its present state aural and visual coverage of trials denied the defendant due process of law; the Court concluded that when the first and fourteenth amendment conflict, the latter takes precedence over the former. However, as technology made major advancements in the broadcast industry, the opinions of the judicial system began to change. The landmark case, Chaadlar__xa_filgrida, 449 0.8. 580 (1981) ruled that the previous Supreme Court decisions did not announce a constitutional ban on all audio/visual equipment. The Court went on to say each state had the right to permit or deny extended media access; this was reenphasized in WM 672 F.2d 818 (1982). The 19705 saw concern moving away from defendants’ rights to the rights of trial participants, especially witnesses. Numerous cases have been heard regarding the privacy right that witnesses are allowed when the press -- traditional or extended -- are present during the proceedings. A significant case was ng_Bzgagaa§Liag_ga Saba, 420 0.8. 469 (1975), which ruled that privacy rights fade if information (name, address, identifying information) is part of the court’s public record. A Florida court ruled in 1983 ( v. -- n o ' Telev' 'o , 436 802d 328 (Fla. App.2 Dist. 1983)), that unless the court takes necessary precautions to protect the privacy of a witness when the extended media has access to trials, the witness cannot sue for invasion of privacy. Other pertinent cases concerning privacy interests of trial participants include. W. 457 0.8. 596 (1982) andfiishngaummw v. Virginia. 448 U.S. 555 (1880). First amendment expert Thomas Emerson, offers an indepth analysis of freedom of the press in his book, Iguana -__; other relevant books by Emerson include W W and WW. Yale Kamisar, et. a1, discusses landmark Supreme Court decisions and their impact on the interpretation of freedom of the press. Alexander Meiklejohn and Alfred Kelly also provide insightful discussions about the history and impact of the U.S. Constitution on the citizens it protects. Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis were the first to argue that individuals should have a right to privacy. In the flazxazg_Lag__Baziag, Warren and Brandeis stated that privacy should be treated much like slander and libel. William Prosser wrote an article in the C if 'a w Baxiag suggesting four types of invasion of privacy: misappropriation, intrusion, public disclosure, and false light in the public eye. Prosser’s article is considered a significant contribution to tort law. Two additional texts offer a philosophical perspective to personal privacy: WM and WW 10 Madia Ethigs: Qaaaa aad Moral Baasonigg discusses the development, enforcement, and importance of ethical standards in the print and broadcast media. Bruce Swain, Bepgzta11§_Ethig§, looks at the modern-day reporter and the obstacles that may hinder the reporting of news. F. Lee Bailey and Henry Roghblatt explain the procedures and tactics of court proceeding in W We: detailed and enlightening information about questioning different types of witnesses is included. Cross-examination techniques of witnesses are also explained in WW1 Pzggadaga and flaw 19 Ba A Wigaaaa. Judith Rowland, a former prosecuting attorney, discusses the crime of rape, and the problems faced by rape victims in Iha Ultigate Violation. Actual cases are examined, while the testimony of victims ‘ and expert witnesses help illustrate the injustices faced by many sexual assault victims. The National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice provide two publications for the public to help deal with the crime of rape: ‘Bapa 59' -_ 7-1.1' i {.2531 _-_ '1::2- -:=_ t I Q . . J I !' E 'l'l° and B : g .1 1' E Cglnuaitz__fla§pgn§§. "Section B“ of the Sunny Von Bulow National Victim Advocacy Center Curricula offers suggestions 11 to the media on how to handle sensitive issues, particularly sexual assault, responsibly and morally. Steps that state legislatures can take to protect victims and witnesses from unnecessary publicity are outlined .in Egliciaa 9f the Considering forty-five states allow extended media coverage of court proceedings, very few studies have been done to allow an indepth examination of the effects coverage may have on trial participants. The most significant study, , 1; ': ' ., ., foat- ew,wesk ,— ‘.. _- To: , , 370 'So.2d 764 (Fla.1979), was considered by the Supreme Court when deciding the ghaagla; case. The surveys found that the presence of extended media had little effect on trial participants or the decorum of the courtroom. Susanna Barber examined nineteen studies, thirteen of which were conducted before 1980. The general finding was that aural and/or visual coverage of trials did not adversely effect trial participants. A study of two similar trials, one of which was covered by the extended media, was done by Dalton Lanscaster of Indiana University. Empirical research was included in the study; however, the study was not able to be controlled since each trial had different defendants, attorneys, and jurors. A simulated courtroom setting provided James Hoyt with the opportunity to analyze the 12 pressures felt by witnesses under three different circumstances: answering questions in front of a camera; answering questions with the knowledge that a hidden camera was present; answering questions when no camera was present. Hoyt found no significant difference in the verbal responses of the subjects in the three different settings._ In 1984, two U.S. Senate subcommittees dealt with the issue of victims testifying during court proceedings, and the effects publicity may have on the witness. Inpagt H.- 01111. :v‘ 91 Cim'a H o 1:. 9w! _== f -18 Judigiarx provided testimony from rape victims, victim/witness advocates, and members of the media. The. benefits and negative effects that extended coverage may have on rape victims was discussed. The Subcommittee on Juvenile Justice dealt with WWII! tha_§ga;t. Though emphasizing the overall impact that participating in a trial may have on a child, the testimony did touch on the subject of extended media coverage of proceedings. Correspondence and personal interviews with.members of the press, judicial system, and victim/witness advocates offer personal viewpoints that are not found in textbooks. Representatives of the media, such as Timothy Dyk, counsel 13 for CBS, Inc., Ernie Schultz, acting president of the Radio- Television News Directors Association, and Charles McCorkle Hauser, executive editor of the Providence Journal-Bulletin, suggest reasons why the extended media should be permitted to cover all court proceedings. Legal professionals, including Judge Carolyn Stell and Judge Michael Harrison, 30 Jud Circuit, Lansing, Michigan, Donald Martin, Ingham County (Michigan) Prosecuting Attorney, and Raymond Buffmyer, defense attorney, Charlotte, Michigan, discuss the positive and negative effects of aural/visual coverage of trials. Lastly, Anne Seymour, public affairs director of the Sunny Von Bulow National Victim Advocacy Center discusses the free press - right to privacy conflict from the perspective of the victim. Transcripts from the ABC news programs Nightline, Ihia flaak with Dav'd Brinkle , and Viengint provide testimony that ‘was aired by the extended media during the infamous New Bedford rape case in 1984. A variety of viewpoints, regarding the coverage of the trial, from a number of individuals are included. 14 RESEARCH METHOD A historical research method will be used to analyze the conflict of free press - right to privacy. An examination of relevant constitutional' amendments, as well as significant court decisions, will assist in determining the rights of the media and of trial ‘witnesses. Current state guidelines, along with the opinions of the media, attorneys, and victim/witness advocates will be analyzed to determine the attitudes and concerns held today as more states allow extended media access to courtrooms. This approach in research will enable a conclusion .to be drawn about the balance between a free press and a right to privacy. A thorough examination of the resources available will also assist in formulating recommendations for the media and states to consider when granting access to aural/visual media. ENDNOTES 1. Interview with Timothy Dyk, attorney, Wilmer, Cutler, and Pickering, Washington, D.C. (May 19, 1987); letter from Charles McCorkle Hauser, vice president and executive editor, The Providence Journal-Bulletin Rhode Island, to the author (November 6, 1986) (discussing free press v. right to privacy); Kenneth. Dovel, ed., .M§§§_M§di§ 6 (New York: Hasting House Publications, 1982), 419. 2. Wanda. 449 0.5. 530 (1981)- 3. Interview with Anne Seymour, director of public relations, Sunny Von Bulow National Victim Advocacy Center, Fort Worth, Texas, in Lansing, Michigan, (June 6, 1987); letter from Raymond Buffmyer, attorney, Charlotte, Michigan, to the author (October 6, 1987) (discussing free press v. right to privacy); interview with Donald Martin, Ingham County Prosecuting Attorney, Lansing, Michigan (October 14, 1987). 15 CHAPTER 2 THE CONSTITUTION: AN HISTORICAL SKETCH OF RELEVANT SECTIONS During the formation of the United States the founding fathers were determined to establish a nation of sovereign states, free from authoritarian control.1 It was believed that the people of the nation should be the source of the government’s power. While fighting the War of Independence (1775-1783) the Articles of Confederation (1781-1789) were ratified to establish the United States of America. The Articles contained three major provisions:2 *each state would be sovereign, free, and independent; the records, acts, and judicial proceedings of the courts and magistrates of each state would be honored; and the residents of each state would be allowed the privileges and immunities of the citizens in the other free states. However, at the close of the American Revolution economic problems and political agitation were growing -- it appeared that the Articles of Confederation were not working.3 Alexander Hamilton, in writing about the defects of the Articles,‘ said, The . . . most palpable defect of the subsisting Confederation, is the total want of a SANCTION to its laws. The United States, as now composed, have no powers to exact obedience, or punish disobedience to their resolutions, either by any other constitutional mode.5 16 17 A convention was held by Representatives from.twelve of the thirteen states in 1787. Numerous alternatives to the Articles of Confederation were drawn up by Representatives,6 and the final docwment was a culmination of the original Articles and the many proposed plans.7 The individual states would have the primary responsibility of governing the citizens, while the federal government would oversee foreign relations, establish a monetary system, and ensure the flow of commerce between the states and other countries. The body of the Constitution did not mention the rights of citizens. This caused some states to wonder whether the people would accept the new government if a bill of rights was not included in the Constitution.8 The Constitution was finally ratified in 1787, after promises to propose a series of amendments swayed many states in favor of ratification.9 James Madison initiated steps to formulate amend- ments to the Constitution during the first Congress in 1789. The majority of proposed changes concerned article I, section 9, prohibiting bills of attainer1° and became the first five amendments, and the eighth and ninth amend- ments.11 The sixth and seventh amendments resulted from proposed changes in art. III, sec. 2, guaranteeing citizens a fair trial by jury, and the benefits of common 18 law.12 The amendments, which reflected injustices the Americans experienced during British colonialism, were ratified in 1791.13 When; Congress Shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibit- ing the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people to peaceably assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances. The first amendment is the most important con- stitutional guarantee for the print, aural, and visual media.14 A major purpose of the first amendment is to protect the right of individuals to write and speak freely, without fearing restraints or punishment by the federal government. However, state and local government restric- tions often denied citizens some forms of free speech and press. The ratification of the fourteenth amendment in 1868 did little to secure the first amendment as a basic fun- damental right.15 It was not until the 19205 and 19305 that courts began to incorporate the first amendment’s civil liberties in the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. In fiitlgu__xa__flau__xg;k, 268 U.S. 653 (1925), Justice Sanford said, 19 For present purposes we may and do assume that freedom of speech and of the press--which are protected by the first amendment from abridgement by Congress--are among the fundamental personal rights and ’liberties’ protected by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment from impairment by the States.16 In 1931, the Supreme Court formally included freedom of the press as a fundamental right; in Naa;_xa_flinna§gta, 283 U.S. 697 (1931) the Court found unconstitutional a Minnesota statute which required the suppression of malicious, scandalous, and defamatory newspapers.17 Chief Justice Hughes, who wrote the Court’s opinion, stated, "It is no longer open to doubt that the liberty of the press and of speech, is within the liberty safeguarded by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment from invasion by state action.“19 The Naa; ruling was important to a field that was growing and expanding quickly. Freedom of the press soon encompassed newspapers, periodicals and magazines, radio, and television. Thomas Emerson, in his book .Igaazd_A Wheat. says freedom of expression is necessary to assure individual self-fulfill- ment, attain the truth, secure participation by citizens in social and political decision making, and maintain a balance in society between stability and change.19 It is evident that freedom of expression is one of our most important 20 civil liberties, however how far one can go when expressing themselves through free speech or press is still being debated. John Stevens has said that the free speech and press clause in the first amendment should favor the speaker or press when a question of balance arises: What it states is a commitment to giving the benefit of the doubt to issues of free expression when weighing them against other societal interests. It is not a perception; it is not even a yardstick. It is an ideal20 First Amendment experts Thomas Emerson and Alexander Meiklejohn, however, believe a balance is necessary when freedom of expression and societal interests conflict. Emerson has written, the overall standard under the first amendment should be one that would preserve the right of communications so far as possible but allow the court to protect the rights of the individual in situations demanding it.21 Meiklejohn believes: The first amendment was not written primarily for the protection of those intellectual aristocrats who pursue knowledge solely for the fun of the game, whose search for truth expresses nothing more than a private intellectual curiosity or an equally private delight and pride in mental achievement. It was written to clear the way for thinking which serves the general welfare.22 21 The Eourth Amendment The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. The fourth amendment was originally intended to protect the property of citizens from unjust actions by the general government. Its purpose was not to safeguard personal privacy. Common law rights of privacy were practically nonexistent until the 18905 when some courts began to relate personal privacy to the law of libel.23 A Harvard Law ‘Baxiafl article by Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis shaped the laws of privacy by asserting that rights "could be pieced together from strands of property law and awards for mental anguish."34 Although the right of privacy has been without formal constitutional foundation, the fourth amendment has recognized personal privacy rights. By 1961, the Supreme Court had applied the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment to the fourth amendment.35 The Mapp_!‘_ghig, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), decision ruled that, with regard to search and seizures, the Constitution does recognize a right to 22 privacy.26 Four years later in another privacy case (figiaggld ‘1a_§gnaagtiggi, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)) Justice Douglas stated that ”specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give them life and substance.”37 The Court went on to say that the penumbraszl create zones of individual privacy and are protected by the guarantees of the first, fourth, and fifth amendments.29 However, the Court cautioned that the fourth amendment cannot be defined as a general con- stitutional right of privacy, an undertaking which is the responsibility of the individual states.30 W In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the Crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the 'witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense. The sixth amendment assures an accused criminal a fair trial. In 1963 this amendment was subsumed in the fourteenth amendment.u Justice Black, in writing the 23 Court’s opinion for Gidaon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), stated, We accept Bette v, Bragz’a assumption, based as it was on our prior cases, that a provision of the Bill of Rights which is “fundamental and essential to a fair trial” is made obligatory upon the States by the Fourteenth Amendment. We think the Court in Batta was wrong, however, in concluding that the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of counsel is not one of these fundamental rights.33 The media began to read the fundamental right of a fair and public trial as the right to cover all trial proceedings. However, the Supreme Court said that although the media had a right to attend most trials, as did ordinary citizens, the press did not have any special privileges over the general public, such as using audio and visual equipment in court- rooms.33 It has been stressed that the sixth amendment concept of "public trial“ is intended for the accused, and this right may be met as long as family members and legal counsel are present.3‘ MW All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any 24 person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. [Section 1 of 5.] The fourteenth amendment may be considered one of the most significant and important ratifications to the U.S. Constitution. Adopted in 1868, the amendment grew out of the Freedmen’s Bureau Bill and the Civil Rights Act of 1866.35 The amendment’s purpose was to incorporate a citizenship clause3B into the Constitution, and to insure that no person’s rights would be denied on the basis of race or color.37 The "due process" phrase was adapted from English law, dating back as far as 1354, when the term originally referred to common law writ.38 However, by the seventeenth century the phrase came to mean "law of the land", and had been a part of many of the original colonial charters.39 The phrase in the fourteenth amendment protects an in— dividual’s right to life, liberty, and property from state interference.4° For nearly fifty years after the ratification of the fourteenth amendment very few states or courts incorporated the Bill of Rights in the due process clause.‘1 It was not until the 19405, when Justices were appointed by President Franklin Roosevelt, that philosophies began to change in favor of economic democracy, political liberalism, and individual liberty.43 Justice Black announced that the 25 entire Bill of Rights should be incorporated into the fourteenth amendment as the framers had originally in- tended.43 However, it was not until the 19605 that the Bill of Rights was subsumed in the fourteenth amendment. The 19605 saw four liberal Justices on the Supreme Court: Warren, Black, Douglas, and Brennan. The Warren Court wanted to reform state criminal procedures by requiring them to conduct criminal proceedings with guarantees of fair procedures, as the federal courts did.44 This was accomplished by incorporating the fourth, fifth, and sixth amendments into the due process of the fourteenth amendment.45 Though it took one hundred years after its ratification, the intentions of the fourteenth amendment, at the close of the Warren Court, had finally been fulfilled.43 ENDNOTES 1. Samuel Eliot Morison, Henry Steele Commager, and William F. Leuchtenberg, A ancise Hiatory of theaAaerigaa Bapablig, 2nd ed. (New York-Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983), 108. 2. Alfred H. Kelly and Winfred A. Harbison, Th9 er“ Cons t‘ n: t Or' ins and v 10 (apt, 5th ed., (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1976), 97-98. 3. The Eederaliat, Bicentennial Edition, (Washington~ New York: Robert B. Luce, Inc., 1976), vii. 4. The Eedar alist is a collection of articles that appeared in the New York Press between October 178'? and May 1788. The articles, authored by “Publius" (Alexander Hamilton, John Jay, and James Madison), campaigned for the ratification of the Constitution. 5. The Federalist No. 21, at 125 (Alexander Hamilton) _..._.-—_-,‘.._ —— (Bicentennial Edition 1976). 6. Kelly and Harbison, supra note 2 at 114-119. (The Virginia Plan suggested that the problem of federalism could be solved by allowing Congress to define the authority of the states and itself; the New Jersey Plan modified the Articles of Confederation, and included a clause that made treaties and acts of Congress the supreme law of the states and enforced by the state courts). 7. 1a. at 98-99 (The three provisions from the Articles of Confederation were retained while a provision was added (Article VI) to specify that enforcement of the Constitution would be done through the courts). 8. Alfred H. Kelly, Winfred A. Harbison, and Herman Belz, eric t t t' : ts rl ' d Develop- .aat, 6th ed., (New York: W.W. Norton and Company Inc., 1983), 121. 9. Kelly, and Harbison, agpga note 2 at 164. 10. Winders are special acts passed by a legislature which brings about punishment without a judicial trial. Sag Black’s Law Dictionary (Abridged 5th ed. 1983); ace alga Words and Phrases, “Bill of Attainder". 11. Kelly, and Harbison, aapga note 2 at 164. 12. 1g. 25a 26 13. Ralph L. Holsinger, Media Lap (New York: Random House, 1987), 12; National Archives and Records Administra- tion, ome Fapts .About The National Archives, General Leaflet no. 18 (Washington, D.C.: National Archives and Records Administration, 1985). 14. The paint media include 'newspapers, magazines, journals, news services, and other printed sources; appal refers to the sense of hearing. Visual is used in order to include all things that are made visible or can be seen. "Video", "camera“, and "electronic media” all refer to specific types of visual aids. By using the term ”visual media" no current or future form of extended media will be excluded. 15. Jethro K. Lieberman, The Enduring Constitutign; An Egploration of the First Two Hundred Years (New York: ‘0” Harper and Row, Publishers, 1987), 201. 16. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 653, 666 (1925). Sag also Stropberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931); Kelly and Harbison, aupra note 2 at 533, 653; Yale Kamisar, William Lockhard, and Jesse B. Choper, Constitutional Rights apd Libertias: Qaaas and Materials, 2nd. ed., (St. Paul, Minn.: West Publishing Co., 1967), 365. 17. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931); Kelly and Harbison, aupra note 2 at 653. 18. Near. 283 0.8. at 707. 19. Thomas I. Emerson, Toward A Generalmeheorzm_fwthg -M.‘ First Amendment (New York: Random House, 1966), 3. 20. John D. Stevens, Shaping the First Amapdpent:p_1hg Development of Free Expression (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, Inc., 1982), 147. 21. Emerson, apppa note 19 at 72. 22. Alexander Meiklejohn, Political Freedom: The Qapstitatipnal Bowers pf the Pagpla (New York: Harper and Brothers Publishers, 1960), 42. 23. Kelly, Harbison, and Belz, supra note 8 at 651. 24. Stevens, aupra note 20 at 128 (quoting Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis, The Right To Privacy. 4 Harv. L. Rev. (1890)). 25. flapp v, thQ, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 26. Id.; 62 Am. Jur. 2D Privacy §4 (1962, 1987). 27 27. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 0.8. 479, 484 (196'); Kelly, Harbison, and Belz, aupra note 8 at 652. 26. Penumbras are implied powers of the federal government. Spa Black’s Law Dictionary (Abridged 5th ed. 1983). 29. Kelly, Harbison, and Belz, aupra note 8 at 652. 30. 62 Am. Jur. 20 Privacy §4 (1962, 1987) (quoting Kata v. United Stataa, 389 U.S. 347 (1967)). 31. 'deo nw ' ht, 372 U.S. 335, 342 (1963); Kamisar, Lockhard, and Choper, aupra note 16 at 229. 32. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 342. 33. Estes v. Texas, 361 U.S. 532 (1965). 34. Stevens, aupra note 20 at 133; 3 L.W. Levy, ed., Eppzplopedia of the Apericap Constitutigp (New York: MacMillian Publishing Co., 1986), 1493. 35. Kelly and Harbison, appra note 2 at 429*432 (The Freedop’a Bureau Act was created in 1865. The bureau acted as an emergency wartime relief agency for blacks who were freed from slavery. The bill was to expire one year after the war ended. The civil rights bill was introduced by Illinois Senator Lyman Trumball to extend the Freedman’s Bureau’s life. The bill also assured the civil rights of blacks in the seceded states under federal military protec~ tion. Though vetoed by President Johnson, the Congress was able to pass the bill). 36. 1 Levy, supra note 34 at 432. (The citizenship clause formally defined what a citizen of the United States was: ”All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdictions thereof"). 37. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, §1; Kelly, and Harbison, suppa note 2 at 432; 2 Levy, appra note 34 at 757. 38. Kelly, and Harbison, apppa note 2 at 472; 2 Levy, appra note 34 at 589. 39. 1a. 40. 2 Levy, apppa note 34 at 590. 41. Michael Kent Curtis, No State Shall Abrigga (Durham, N.C.:' Duke University Press, 1986), 1. 42. Kelly, and Harbison, aupra note 2 at 752. 28 43. 1a. at 754 (quoting agapson v. Califorpja, 332 U.S. 46 (1948)). 44. Kelly, Harbison, and Belz, aupra note 8 at 643- 644; 4 Levy, supra note 34 at 2023-2031. 45. Curtis, supra note 41 at 2; :Kelly, apppa note at 951-952. 46. 4 Levy, supra note 34 at 2029. CHAPTER 3 PRIVACY RIGHTS Privacy is what separates the self from society. Based on individualism,1 privacy has become a zone where a person “can think his own thoughts, have his own secrets, live his own life, reveal only what he wants to the outside world."2 Alan F. Westin, in his book Btiyapy_apdtfipaadgp, outlined four functions of privacy:3 1 Protects personal autonomy 2 Permits emotional release 3. Opportunity for self-evaluation 4 Allows limited and partial communication However, individual privacy can be violated inpa variety of ways, resulting in the publicizing of personal matters. Though the revelation is true, its exposure is embarrassing and may cause mental distress. The word "privacy" does not appear in the Constitution or the Bill of Rights.‘ However, through the years privacy rights have been based on the first eight amendments, as well as the fourteenth amendment.5 There are four branches of privacy law within the U.S. Constitution:6 1. Personal privacy (as outlined by Dean William Prosser’s Privacy tort) 2. Fourth amendment protection of indivi- dual privacy from governmental in- trusion 29 30 3. Protection from the government gathering and disseminating private personal information 4. Right to engage in private behavior, and free from the intrusion of the curious public and government Individual states also have privacy laws, outlined in con- stitutions or statutes, which vary greatly from state to state. There had been no serious consideration or discussion of the right of privacy until 1890 when Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis wrote an article on the need for individual privacy rights against the intrusion of gossipmongers, particularly the press. Warren and Brandeis, asserting privacy rights were a kind of property right, believed that invasion of privacy was trespassing -- which itself evolved from physical injury to moral and emotional well-being.7 The two men relied on the common laws of defamation, invasion of preperty rights, and breach of confidence when writing about privacy.a Warren and Brandeis asserted, "Recent inventions and business methods call attention to the next step which must be taken for the protection of the person, and for securing to the individual what Judge Cooley calls the ’right to be let alone."9 31 The article went on to say: Instantaneous photographs and newspaper enterprise have invaded the sacred precincts of private and domestic life; and numerous mechanical devices threaten to ‘make good the prediction that “what is whispered in the closet shall be proclaimed from the housetops.“1° The two law partners reasoned that the advancement of culture and civilization had caused people to begin treasuring privacy; however, cultural and civil advances brought with them modern enterprise and technology-- photographs and newspapers -- making solitude and privacy even more difficult to secure. The result of being subjected to unwarranted publicity, Warren and Brandeis said, was mental pain and distress “far greater than could be inflicted by mere bodily injury.11 The ensuing injuries were said to resemble those inflicted upon a victim of slander and libel, for which legal ' remedies were attainable.12 However, unlike defamation, tzuth was not the main concern in issues of privacy invasion. According to Warren and Brandeis, privacy concerns a desire to pamaip ,pziyata, whether or not the (txnth was provided by the invader.13 When arguing for the personal right of privacy Warren and Brandeis suggested that common law guaranteed individuals the right of determining the extent to which 32 thoughts, sentiments, and emotions could be made public.14 Warren and Brandeis also maintained that the right of property, which encompassed all possessions, including all rights and privileges, also included the right to an unmarred personality; thus, it was felt that the right of property was the basis upon which some privacy protections could rest.15 However, Warren and Brandeis concluded that the right of property was not sufficient to protect individuals’ most intimate matters from becoming public. The right of privacy needed to become law: The design of the law must be to protect those persons with whose affairs the community has no legitimate concern, from being dragged into an undesirable and undesired publicity and to protect all persons, whatsoever; their position or station, from having matters which they may properly prefer to keep private, »made public against their will.16 It was the publigation and the effect of disclosures, not the actual apt of intrusion, that Warren and Brandeis were most concerned about preventing.17 The article concluded, The common law has always recognized a man’s house as his castle, impregnable, often, even to its own officers engaged in the execution of its commands. Shall the courts thus close the front entrance to constituted authority, and open wide the back door to idle or prurient curiosity713 33 Warren and Brandeis did admit that a person’s life may cease to be private if for some reason the protection of privacy is lost. The idea of the “newsworthiness“ defense in later years resulted from this statement by Warren and Brandeis.l9 In 1960 Dean William L. Prosser wrote an article entitled ”Privacy“, outlining invasion of privacy. This law review article, as well as the Warren and Brandeis privacy article, made the right of privacy central to the law of torts.2° The accepted definition of right of privacy states that a person has the right to be left alone, to live a life of seclusion, or to be free from unwarranted publicity.21 Prosser suggested that there were four different kinds of privacy invasion:22 1. Appropriation, for the defendant’s advantage, of the plaintiff’s name or likeness 2. Intrusion upon the plaintiff’s seclusion or solitude, or into his private affairs 3. Public disclosure of embarrassing private facts about the plaintiff 4. Publicity which places the plaintiff in a false light in the public eye Appropriation concerns the use of an individual’s name or likeness, which may be considered private 34 property,33 for the benefit and financial gain of another. Many court decisions have awarded recovery to individuals who have not consented to the use of their name, picture, or other likeness by people to sell .a product, enhance a corporation’s image, or for other business purpose5.3i However, a person cannot argue that their privacy has been invaded if "the mere incidental mention of the plaintiff’s name“ appears in a book or film, or if the plaintiff appears incidently in a published photograph or newsreel.25 Although protection of individual privacy plays a role in appropriation cases, it is the recognition of the plaintiff’s name and likeness as an exclusive tradename and trademark that are the determining factors.26 Intrusion involves an uninvited individual entering upon the premises or into the private affairs of another person. For this type of invasion to be actionable the intrusion must be offensive or objectionable to a reasonable person. No right to privacy exists on a public street or in a public place, and “[nJeither is it such an invasion to take his photograph in such a place, since this amounts to nothing more than making a record, not differing from a full written description.“27 The interest protected in intrusion is a mental one. The intrusion defense is often used when trespass, nuisance, and the intentional infliction of mental 35 distress claims need added support.28 There are two determining factors for intrusion of privacy=39 the paapa used to obtain the information; the pungfia of obtaining the information. Public disclosure invades personal privacy by making known true private, often embarrassing, facts. There are three requirements for recovery of public disclosure:30 the disclosure must be a pptlig one; the fact disclosed must be a ppiyata one; and the item disclosed must be highly objectionable and offensive. The Second Restatement of Torts also stated that to claim invasion of privacy the public must not have a legitimate interest in having the disclosed information available.31 Alfred Hill, in his law review article "Defamation and Privacy Under the First Amendment", went so far as to suggest that the controlling basis for privacy invasion "is the single principle of the shocking character of disclosure, such as when there is a disclosure of the name of a rape victim long after the crime.”2 The fourth type of invasion of privacy concerns publicity which places a person in a false light in the public’s eye. The publicity attributed to a person may be an utterance or an opinion.33 The false light may also be in the form of a photograph used to illustrate something in 36 which the plaintiff has no connection, but it is implied that there is a connection.34 In 1967, the Supreme Court ruled that a publication is privileged to print material unless the false statements made about the plaintiff were made willingly and knowingly by the defendant.35 If privacy rights are intruded upon by any kind of invasion, damages may be rewarded for presumed mental distress or for other harm.33 Proof is not required when seeking damages. However, the law is not to protect the over sensitive individual, and, people must realize that to some paaappapla extent our lives will be under public eye=37 The ordinary reasonable person does not take offense at mention in a newspaper of the fact that he returned home from a visit, or gone camping in the woods. . It is quite a different matter when the details of sexual relations are spread before the public eye, or there is highly personal portrayal of his intimate private characteristics or conduct. The right of privacy, however, as with all rights, is not absolute; there are limitations to the right of privacy. Often times people who feel their privacy has been invaded are surprised to learn that circumstances surrounding the situation have caused the individual to surrender privacy rights:80 the plaintiff may have originally sought and consented to the publicity, therefore he or she cannot complain; the personalities and affairs of 37 the plaintiff may already be public and are no longer considered private; the Constitution gives the press the privilege to inform the public of legitimate affairs that concern the public. The privilege of the press is a common defense in invasion of privacy cases. News is said to be all events and items of information that are out of the ordinary everyday routine.’9 As long as the event being publicized is not offensive or indecent and is of interest to the general public the event is said to be newsworthy, and no right of privacy can be claimed.‘‘0 The name or picture of someone can also be publicized as long as it is of news or historical interest to the public, and no invasion of privacy occurred when obtaining the information.‘1 However, the press has been given great latitude in defining newsworthiness. People who are catapulted into the public eye by events are generally classed by privacy law along with elected officials. In broadly construing the Warren and Brandeis public interest exemption to privacy, the courts have ruled material as newsworthy because a newspaper or station carries the story. . . . But is not the meaning of newsworthiness susceptible to trendy shifts in news values and very dependent upon presumed tastes and needs?‘2 Some people willingly give up their right of privacy when they have become public figures because of their business, character, accomplishments, or mode of 38 life.‘3 However, other individuals become public figures unwillingly due to an act the person commits or is a part of which interests the general public. During the period of interest, and for a reasonable time' afterward, consent is not required to use pictures, stories, and comments.‘H W. Page Keeton and William Prosser said, Caught up and entangled in this web of news and public interest are a great many people who have not sought publicity, but indeed . . . had tried assiduously to avoid it. They have nevertheless lost some part of their right of privacy. The misfortunes of the frantic victim of sexual assault, the woman whose husband is murdered before her eyes, or the innocent bystander who is caught in a raid on a cigar store and mistaken by the police as the proprietor, can be broadcast to the world, as they have no remedy.45 The media may also report on judicial proceedings so long as the report is accurate and true.“6 For instance, a defendant in a criminal proceeding is a newsworthy person, thus the media has a right to report on the trial proceeding even though the defendant may object. However, "the liberty of the press does not confer on an individual the privilege of taking advantage of the incarceration of a person accused of crime to photograph his face and figure against his will."47 Furthermore, the constitutional right to a public trial is a privilege intended for the benefit of the accused, and does not entitle the press or public to take advantage of his 39 voluntary exposure at the bar of justice, ”to picture his plight in the toils of the law."u Public court records are often used for obtaining information for a news report. If the information is already in the public domain, disclosure cannot be prohibited.49 However, reporters must be careful because the information obtained may be misleading or erroneous if the trial has not had all arguments presented yet. The news media must also be careful in states where the media can be penalized for publicizing the identity of victims of rape or other assaults, if the identities do not appear in the public court records.50 Inevitably, policies and actions will favor some individual rights over others. Most conflicts arise when one party feels personal privacy is of primary importance, while the opposing party believes societal interest is the major consideration. Some suggest that morals and ethics should play a role when determining if privacy interests or societal interests should outweigh the other.51 Clifford Christian, Kim Rotzoll, and Mark Fackler said, By law, once individuals figure in the news they cease to be private persons protected by applicable statutes. But it is here that the photographer should consider the moral guideline that suffering individuals are entitled to the same respect as any other human being, despite 40 the fact that events may have made them part of the news.52 Charles Fried, in his article "Privacy A Moral Analysis" wrote: Privacy is not simply an absence of information about us in the minds of others; rather it is the gpptzpl we have over information about ourselves. . . . We may not mind that a person knows a general fact about us, and yet feel our privacy invaded if he knows the details.53 ENDNOTES 1. An indiyidpal is commonly considered a private or natural person. Pertaining or belonging to, or character- istic of one single person. (Se§,Black’s Law Dictionary (Abridged 5th ed., 1983). . Thomas I Emerson. WW Expxagaign (New Yerk: Random House, 1970), 545; Thomas I. Emerson, Norman Dorsen and David Haber, (Balitipal_apd_giyil WW. 3rd ed (Boston= Little. Brown and Company, 1967), 1:238. 3. Westin. W. in Emerson. supra note 2 at 546. 4. Clifford G. Christians, Kim B. Rotzoll, and Mark Fackler, Nadia Ethipa: Caaaa and Moral Baaapnipg (New York: Longman, Inc. , 1983), 109; Emerson, Dorsen, and Haber, appza note 2 at 237. 5. Christians, Rotzoll, and Fackler, appya note 4 at 109. 6. Emerson, Dorsen, and Haber, appta note 2 at 238-240. 7. Levine, Ezivapy ip the Ipaditipp pf tha Westepp prld in William C. Bier, S.J., ed., Privacy: A Vapishipg Ealpa? (New York: Fordham University Press, 1980), 7. 8. Lance, ' r v : 5' 'n £9mmpn_Lag_in Bier, fipppa note 7 at 94. 9. Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis, Iha_Bight Ip_Eziyagy, 4 Harv. L. Rev. 195 (1890). 10. 1d. 11. 1d. at 196. 12. Id. at 197. 13. Lance, in Bier, puppa note 7 at 94. 14. Warren and Brandeis, aupza note 9 at 198. 15. 1d. at 211. 16. 1d. at 214. 17. Lance, in Bier, apppa note 7 at 97. 41 42 18. Warren and Brandeis, aupxa note 9 at 220. 19. Lance, in Bier, appza note 7 at 104. 20. Id. at 93. 77 c. J. S. Rimming. §1 (1952); 62 An- Jur- 2D, ‘Pziyagy, §1 (1962,1987). 22. W. Page Keaton. et 81.. Wiggins—gains Lap_pf__Ip;t§, 5th ed., (St. Paul, Minn.: West Publishing Company, 1984), 851; 62 Am. Jur. 2D. Brim. §1 (1962, 1987). 23. Appppppiatipp involves the taking of something to the exclusion of others; a conversion of property without a right. ,Saa Ballentine’s Law Dictionary (3rd ed. 1969). 24. Keeton, et al., appza note 22 at 851-852. 25. Id. at 853-854. 26. Id. at 854. 27. .Id. at 855-856. 28. William L. Prosser, Eziyagy, 48 Calif. L. Rev. 392, (1960). 29. Keeton, et al., u ra note 22 at 856. 30. Id. at 856-857. 31. Id. 32. Id. (quoting Alfred Hill, Dafamatio op apd Privacy ' , 76 Colum. L. Rev. 1205 (1976). 33. Id. at 863. 34. Id. at 864. 35. Iima__yp__EiII, 385 U.S. 374, 387-388 (1967); Keeton, et al., puppa note 22 at 865. 36. Prosser, gupza note 28 at 409. 37. Keeton, et al., aupza note 22 at 857 (footnotes omitted). 38. Id. at 860. 39. Id. 43 40. 62 Am. Jur. 2D, Priyagy, §21 (1962, 1987). 41. Id. 42. Christians, Rotzoll, and Fackler, apppa note 4 at 110. 43. Keeton, et al., supra note 22 at 859-860. 44. 62 Am. Jur. 2D. 2112192 §21 (1962, 1987). 45. Keeton, et al., apppa note 22 at 861 (footnotes omitted). 46. 62 Am. Jur. 2D, Privacy,'§21 (1962, 1987); 2 L.W. Levy. ed.. Win (New York: MacMillian Publishing Co., 1986), 802 (citing Willie. 448 0.8. 555 (1980)). 47. 62 Am. Jur. 2D, 31111321. §23 (1962, 1987). 48. Id.; 2 Levy fippza note 46 at 802. 49. Keeton, et al., appta note 22 at 863 (citing Q9; Who. 420 U.S. 469 (1975)); 2 Lequfiupza note 46 at 802. 50- WM” 420 U.S. at 469; 62 Am- Jur. 2D, E;iyapy_ §23 (1962, 1987). - 51. Keeton, et al., appza note 22 at 859; Christians, Rotzoll, and Fackler, aupxa note 4 at 123. 52. Christians, Rotzoll, and Fackler, auppa note 4 at 123. 53. Fried, ”Privacy [A Moral Analysis)" in Ferdinand David Schoenan. ed. . WW An_Antthpgy (Cambridge: Press Syndicate of the University of Cambridge, 1984), 209-210. CHAPTER 4 AURAL AND VISUAL MEDIA AND THE COURTS: RELEVANT COURT DECISIONS The issue of aural and visual media access to court proceedings was first addressed in the 19305. Bruno Hauptmann was on trial for the kidnapping and murder of Charles Lindbergh’s son. The press acted irresponsibly, reporting inflammatory information and unsubstantiated details, while having access to most of the courtroom. Hauptmann did not receive a trial by jury, but rather a trial by news media.1 In 1937, the American Bar Association House of Delegates adopted Judicial Canon 35, which stated that all photographic and broadcast coverage of courtroom proceedings should be prohibited.2 The issue of aural and visual media access to courtrooms did not arise again until the 19605 with the full development of the television medium. The first case heard by the Supreme Court concerned the first and sixth amendments -- a free press versus a fair trial. Wilber Rideau had been apprehended in Louisiana for bank robbery, kidnapping, and murder. While in jail a "moving picture film with a soundtrack“ of the interrogation was made between the defendant and the sheriff, during which Rideau confessed to the three crimes.3 The film was 44 45 broadcast three times over a three day period, causing the defense attorney to seek a change of venue.‘ The request for change of venue was denied, and Rideau was soon con- victed and sentenced to death. On appeal to the Supreme Court it was held that due to the circumstances surrounding the trial a refusal for change of venue was a denial of due process. Justice Stewart said, Under the Constitution’s guarantee of due process, a person accused of committing a crime is vouchsafed basic minimal rights. Among these are the right to counsel, the right to plead not guilty, and the right to be tried in a courtroom presided over by a judge. Yet in this case the people of Calcasieu Parrish saw and heard, not once but three times, a "trial" of Rideau in a jail, presided over by a sheriff, where their was no lawyer to advise Rideau of his right to stand mute.5 The Rideau decision became a precedent for a 1965 Supreme Court case which concerned the actual presence of television and still cameras and sound equipment in a courtroom. Billy Sol Estes was charged for mail fraud and conspiracy. Newspaper photographers were permitted in the courtroom, and television and radio stations carried the hearings live.6 The Court found that Estes had been denied due process because of the media exposure his trial received.7 The Court majority said the media cannot rely on the sixth 46 amendment’s public trial provision, since that clause was intended for the benefit of the accused.8 Nor could the media argue that the first amendment extended a right to aural and visual coverage from a courtroom, and refusal to permit this privilege discriminated between the different media: All are entitled to the same rights as the general public. The news reporter is not permitted to bring his typewriter or printing press. When the advances in these arts permit reporting by printing press or by television without their present hazards to a fair trial we will have another case.9 Although no confession was broadcast as in the Bideap case, this earlier Court decision was applied to Eataa because of the minute electronic scrutiny and char- acterization brought about by the media.10 The Court also commented that the media would choose only to cover the most notorious cases visually and aurally, thus causing the public to believe these trials were more extraordinary than others.11 The Justices also addressed the problems that aural and visual coverage of trial witnesses could cause. Justice Clark wrote, The impact upon a witness of the knowledge that he is being viewed by a vast audience is simply incalculable. Some may be demoralized and frightened, some cocky and given to overstatement; memories may falter, as with anyone speaking publicly, 47 and accuracy of statement may be severely undermined. Embarrassment may impede the search for the truth, as may a natural tendency toward overdramatization. Furthermore, inquisitive strangers and “cranks“ might approach witnesses on the street with jibes, advice or demands for explanation of testimony.13 Justice Clark commented that witnesses could return home to see or hear themselves or other witnesses on television or on the radio even though a judge may have instructed them to avoid the media. This exposure could cause the witness to reshape their own testimony when called to testify.13 Justice Warren, in his concurring remarks, refuted the argument that televised trials could educate the public. Warren said that an attempt to use a trial as an educational tool would draw attention away from the real purpose of the trial process and damage the court system’s integrity.14 The 19705 did not see conflicts between the courts and audio/visual media coverage since the vast majority of courtrooms were not open to these extended forms of media, even for educational purposes. However, the media were still having to defend their first amendment rights; but the conflict turned to free press versus right to privacy. In 1972, the father of a deceased rape victim brought charges against Cox Broadcasting Corporation for invasion of privacy. Mr. Cohn alleged that his privacy had been invaded when the broadcast company defied a Georgia 48 statute, by revealing the identity of the victim during television coverage of the accused rapists.15 The Supreme Court found in favor of the media entity, stating that the Georgia statute making it a misdemeanor to publish or broadcast the name or identity of a rape victim violated the first and fourteenth amendments.16 The Court also announced that the interest of privacy fades when the obtained information is from a public record. Justice White’s opinion for the Court stated that privacy rights do exist: There is a zone of privacy surrounding every individual, a zone within which the State may protect him from intrusion by the press, with all its attendant publicity. Indeed, the central thesis of the root article by Warren and Brandeis . . . . was that the press was overstepping its prerogatives by publishing essentially private information and that there should be a remedy for the alleged abuses.17 However, the Court added, since the state placed the information on official court records, the public interest, not the individual right of privacy, was to be served.18 Thus, it was concluded that there was no liability since the defendant merely further publicized information that was already public. The Court observed that not all individuals have the opportunity to witness first-hand the workings of the government; citizens must rely on the press to address the 49 governmental activities. In particular, the Court said a “function of the press serves to guarantee the fairness of trials and to bring to bear the beneficial effects of public scrutiny upon the administration of justice.19 The Court said that if privacy interests in judicial proceedings are to be protected it is up to the states to devise a method which avoids public documentation or other exposure of private information.20 The Court commented that reliance must also be placed on the judgement of those who decide what to broadcast or print.21 In 1980, the question concerning the right of the press and public to attend criminal trials was brought before the Supreme Court (Richmond Nawfipapara v. Vipginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980). After the fourth trial of a murder defendant began (the first was reversed on appeal, the following two retrials resulted in mistrials) the defense council requested that the court proceedings be closed to the public to avoid inappropriate discussion of information presented during the trial.22 A motion was granted to exclude the press and public. Chief Justice Burger stated, in the Court’s opinion, the first amendment, as well as the fourteenth amendment, prohibits the government from. denying freedom of the press and the right of people to peaceably assemble.33 The Court 50 referred to Gannett Co. v DePas u le, 443 U.S. 368 (1979) when commenting that the sixth amendment guaranteed the accused a pphIig trial, not a ppiyata trial even if desired by the defendant.34 However, the Court cautioned that the first amendment right allowing the press and public to attend civil and criminal trials was not absolute. Justice Stewart said, Just as a legislature may impose reasonable time, place and manner restrictions upon the exercise of First Amendment freedoms, so may a trial judge impose reasonable limitations upon the unrestricted occupation of a courtroom by representatives of the press and members of the public.25 During the 19705 attitudes changed toward aural and visual coverage of trial proceedings. By the end of 1979, almost half of the states opened their courts to cameras (still and/or television) and audio equipment.33 This Change occurred because the media had proved to be respon- sible, telecasting equipment improved, and closed-circuit cameras used for educational purposes proved to be worthwhile. Each state devised their own set of flexible guidelines to be followed by the press. Typical guidelines included: the trial judge had final authority in determining whether or not the aural and visual media would have access to a trial; if witnesses or the defendant objected to being photographed or recorded the request would 51 be honored by the media; and the number and position of necessary media equipment would be limited.27 Prior to 1980, the Supreme Court had based cases involving aural and visual media on how the press as papple affected court proceedings. However, in 1981, the question of whether or not the phyaigal presence of aural and visual media denied a person a fair trial reached the Court. Chandiappyp_EIpzida, 449 U.S. 560 (1981) was the landmark case that determined if states could provide for radio, television, and still photographic coverage of trial proceedings. In 1977, Florida began a one year experiment allowing audio and video coverage of courtroom proceedings. At the end of the year the Florida Supreme Court conducted a survey of attorneys, witnesses, jurors, and court personnel on their perceptions of the audio and visual coverage. The court concluded from the survey that it was important for citizens to see the court system in progress if the public were to accept and understand court decisions.20 Canon 3A(7) of the Florida Code of Judicial Conduct was rewritten to permit aural and visual media coverage of judicial proceedings. It was the presiding judge’s responsibility to enforce guidelines that would assure the accused the fundamental right of a fair trial. 52 The defendants in andler v. Florida were two Florida police-officers who were arrested for burglary. The trial gained a great deal of media attention because law enforcers had committed a crime. _ The presiding judge permitted the court proceedings to be covered by the television media and newspaper photographers. Relying on ,Eata§_yp__1aga§, the defendants appealed their conviction, arguing that televised criminal trials were a denial of due process. However, Chief Justice Burger and the Supreme Court said Eataa did not announce a con- stitutional rule that all photographic or broadcast coverage of criminal trials was a denial of due process.29 Burger went on to say that instances where a jury is impaired in making an impartial decision of guilt or innocence of a defendant could not justify a constitutional ban on broad- cast coverage: It [Estes v. Iamaa] does not stand as an absolute ban on state experimentation with an evolving technology, which, in terms of mass communication, was in its relative infancy in 1964, and is, even now, in a state of continuing change)0 The Supreme Court did reflect on potential conse- quences of aural and visual coverage of trial proceedings. The Court emphasized that public attention is aroused not only by the nature of the crime, but also by the manner in which the event is reported: 53 Selection of which trials, or parts of trials to broadcast will inevitably be made not by judges but by the media, and will be governed by such factors as the nature of the crime and the status and position of the accused -- or of the victim; the effect may be to titillate rather than to educate and inform.’1 The Chandler decision was a victory for the media in that it determined aural and visual coverage were allowed 50 long as the state approved. However, Chandler did not announce absolute access to all courts by all media-types. Access is determined first by each state and then, if allowed, by the judge of each individual trial. This provision was reemphasized in Combined Communications Corp. v. Einesilver, 672 F.2d 818 (1982). Television station KBTV sought writ of mandamus32 requiring a federal judge to allow television broadcast coverage of proceedings in a federal courthouse. KBTV argued that their ability to report the news as outlined in the first amendment had been injured. The court ruled that KBTV had not been injured because no interest protected by the Constitution or a statute was violated. Reference was made to both.£§t§§ and fihgppgzfi_x&__fl§xg§ll, 384 U.S. 333, (1966), stating that a reporter’s constitutional rights are no greater in a courtroom than the public’s, and the courtroom premises are subject to the control of the court.33 It was stressed that the first amendment did not guarantee a constitutional right 54 to televise in a courtroom, and restrictions may be placed on the media to protect the proper administration of justice.34 The reporter was not denied access; the news reporter was still free to attend the proceedings, take notes, and report the information obtained. In 1982, a case involving the right of free press and right of privacy went before the Supreme Court; Clgbg Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court. etc., 45? U.S. 596 (1982) concerned Section 16A of Chapter 278 of the Massachusetts General Law which required trial judges to exclude the press and general public from court proceedings during testimony of minor sex victims.35 The Massachusetts provision was designed to encourage young sexual abuse victims to report the crime; "once they have come forward, the statute is designed to preserve their ability to testify by protecting them from undue psychological harm at trial."36 The Court admitted that there have been times when portions of trials have been closed to the public when victims of sexual assaults were involved; however, the ’unbroken tradition’ is to have open criminal trials.37 Justice Brennan wrote, the right of access to criminal trials places a particularly significant role in the functioning of the judicial process and the government as a whole. Public scrutiny of a criminal trial enhances the quality and safeguards the integrity of the factfinding process, with benefits to both the defendant and to society as a whole.38 55 In order to close a trial the state's justification must be a ”weighty one . . . necessitated by a compelling govern- mental interest, and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest.“39 The Court agreed that the psychological and physical well-being of a minor is important, but this could not justify the mandatory closure rule. It was suggested that trial courts determine on a case-by-case basis whether a court proceeding should be closed to protect a minor.40 Suggested factors to be weighed when deciding to open or close a trial were the minor’s age, psychological maturity and understanding, the nature of the crime, the desires of the victim, and the interests of the parents and rela- tives.‘1 Justice Brennan and the Court concluded: Surely it cannot be suggested that minor victims of sex crimes are the only crime victims who, because of publicity attendant to criminal trials, are reluctant to come forward and testify. The State’s argument based on this interest therefore proves too much, and runs contrary to the very foundation of the right of access recognized in W: namely. “that a presumption of openness inheres in the very nature of a criminal trial and our system of justice.43 A case very similar to ng_Bzgaan§tipg was brought before a Florida court of appeals in 1983. However, in Cge MW. 436 So.2d 328 (1985) the victim herself was suing for damages after her 56 name and trial testimony had been televised, even though she had asked the prosecuting attorney that broadcast coverage not be permitted. The rape victim sued the television station for intensional invasion of privacy and infliction of emotional distress, charging that a Florida statute had been violated by broadcasting the victim’s identity.43 Before the trial began the rape victim.was assured by the prosecutor that her name and face would not be displayed or photographed. However, during the proceedings a television news team videotaped the trial. Later that evening the station ran a video of the trial, which featured the victims testimony, while the newscaster identified the victim by name.“ The appellee relied on C9;__B;gad§asting Corp. v. Cohn when asking that the case be dismissed.‘5 The televis- ion station argued that the Florida statute did not apply in this case because, as ruled in Cox Broadcastin Co ., the identity of the victim was obtained through a public trial, where the court did not supress the victim’s name from the court records. The court ruled in the station’s favor, and dismissed the case. An appeals court affirmed the trial courts decision, citing three reasons”8 there was no indication that the television station obtained the informa- tion in a improper manner; though the state made a promise 57 to the rape victim, measures were never taken to prevent the broadcasting of her name or picture; the Florida statute, which the victim claimed the station violated, was meant to protect citizens when the information had not yet been made public. Although the appellate court affirmed the lower courts decision, favoring the media, it did so reluctantly: We deplore the lack of sensitivity to the rights of others that is sometimes displayed by such unfettered exercise of First Amendment rights . . . those rights should not be arbitrarily exercised when unnecessary and detrimental to rights of others.‘7 The court went on to say that the television station showed little concern for the rights of the victim: Prior to this trial, appellant was simply an ordinary citizen; she lacked fame and promience, the nature of which might make the publication of her name and visual image newsworthy, but she had the unhappy circumstance of becoming a victim of a crime. The publication added little or nothing to the sordid and unhappy story; yet that brief little-or-nothing addition may well affect appellant’s well-being for years to come.“ However, the court also announced its displeasure with the state: We cannot resist the opportunity to chastise the state somewhat for not having sought a protective order regarding cameras in the courtroom or other 58 proper steps to support its alleged assurance to appellant that her name and photograph would not be published!9 The court concluded that because the decision in ng__Brgadgasting prohibits the balancing of privacy right and first amendment rights it remains up to the publisher or news director to determine what is newsworthy. "Therefore, we believe that in the future it would behoove the media to engage in their own balancing test with an eye to avoiding harm such as may have occurred here.“5° ENDNOTES 1. Trial by News Media is the process by which the news media in reporting an investigation of a person on trial leads its audience to act as judge and jury in determining guilt, liability or innocence before the person is tried in a judicial forum. See Black’s Law Dictionary (Abridged 5th ed. 1983). 2. Don R. Pember, Mass Media Lag (USA: Wm. Brown Company Publishers, 1981), 343 (citing A.B.A. Rep 1135 (1937)). In 1952 Canon 35 was amended to include television also. Canon 35 was reaffirmed in 1972 when the Code of Judicial Ethics replaced the Canons of Judicial Ethics. 3. Rideau v= Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723, 727 (1963). 4. 1g; Yale Kamisar, William Lockhard, and Jesse H. Choper, Constitutional Rights :de Liberties: pCases apd flatggiélp. 20d. ed., (St. Paul, Minn: West Publishing 00., 1967), 311; Kenneth S. Dovel, ed., Mass Media andmIbe Supreme Court (New York: Hasting House Publications, 1982), 419. 5. Rideau, 373 U.S. at 726-727; Kamisar, Lockhard, and Choper, supra note 4 at 311; Dovel, u ra note 4 at 419. 6. Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 536 (1965); Kamisar, Lockhard, and Choper, supra note 4 at 314. 7. Estep. 381 U.S. at 535. 8. 1d. at 536. 9. 1g. at 540. 10. 1g. at 577-578 (stating that "The petitioner was subjected to characterization and minute scrutiny to such an extent that at one point the photographers were found attempting to picture the page of the paper from which he was reading while sitting at the council table"). 11. 1g. at 571 (stating that ”The alleged perpetrator of the sensational murder, the fallen idol, or some other person, who like the petitioner, has attracted the public interest would find his trial turned into a vehicle for television. Yet these are the very persons who encounter the greatest difficulty in securing an impartial trial, even without the presence of television"). 12. 1g. at 547; Kamisar, Lockhard, and Choper, supp; note 4 at 315-316. 59 13. 14. note 4 at 15. L.W. Levy (New York: 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. (1980). 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. fipg Words 33. F.2d 818, 34. 35. 0.8. 596. 36. 60 Estes, 381 U.S. at 547. lg. at 575; Kamisar, Lockhard, and Choper, supra 317. Cox Broagcaflipg v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975); 3 ed., Epgzglopggia pf The American Constitution MacMillian Publishing Co.,-1986), 1457. C9; Brpadcastipg, 420 U.S. at 476. . at 487. . at 492. at 496. lpalfalfalar: SO ighmond Newspapers v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 559 at 580. that . at 600. Pember, suprg note 2 at 324. l_. G. Chgndler v. Floridg, 449 U.S. 563, 565 (1981)- lg. at 570; Dovel, u ra note 4 at 429. Chapglpr, 449 U.S. at 573-574. lg. at 580. flrit of pppggpps is a command by order of a court. and Phrases "Mandamus". Compineg Coppppigatipns Cogp. v. Fipesilvgr, 672 821 (1982). E: Clpp§_flgp§29p§r Co. v. Superior Court. etc., 457 600 (1982). lg. 61 37. lg. at 601. 38. lg. at 606. 39. lg. at 606-607. 40. lg. at 600. 41. lg. 42. lg. at 610. 43. Doe v. Sgpgsotg -- BrgdentongElorida Television, 436 So.2d 328 (Fla.App.2 Dist. 1983). 44. lg. at 329. 45. lg. 46. lg. at 330. 47. lg. 48. lg. at 331. 49. lg. 50. lg. at 332. CHAPTER 5 EXTENDED MEDIA IN THE COURTROOM: OPINIONS AND RESEARCH When debating extended media coverage of court proceedings and the trial participants, advocates offer a variety of arguments in support of courtrooms being open. Constitutional guarantees, educational benefits, and research studies are presented as reasons for allowing aural and/or visual coverage of trial witnesses. Those who oppose aural and visual coverage suggest similar reasons for not allowing the extended media in. THE MEDIA As' expected, journalists feel newspapers and broadcast stations should be allowed to publish what they choose. Timothy Dyk, legal counsel for CBS, Inc., said the first amendment guarantees the right to publish, allowing the press the right to “publish. whatever you can get your hands on. . . . '1. The fair and public trial clause of the sixth amendment is another constitutionally based argument used by the press. James Ragsdale, editor of Ihg_§tapgapg; Ting; urges that fill court proceedings be open to extended media coverage: 62 63 A fair trial means a public, open trial. Once we begin to place envelopes around certain cases -- develop certain protections -- I think we are running great risks of heading down the road toward Star Chamber proceedings.2 The media often refers to itself as a kind of watchdog for the public. The first and sixth amendment clauses allow the press this responsibility. Publicity of trial proceedings, they suggest, insures that the government will act in the best interest of the citizens. One news- paper editor said, Publicity provides an umbrella of protection against government excesses or, much worse in a criminal case, government non-protection for individuals charged with a crime. Publicity also engages the powerful forces of the public’s perceptions about criminal behavior and molds and alters those perceptions. . . . Intensive news media coverage does npt make the judiciary’s job impossible. It makes it more difficult, perhaps, but difficulty is the key to our checks and balances system of government.3 A number of open courtroom advocates in the media industries do not see privacy interests of trial witnesses to be as important as the public’s right to know. Ernie Schultz, of the Radio-Television News Directors Association, said the conflicting interests are not whether the news media’s right to cover trials outweighs privacy rights of trial participants, but whether or not trials will indeed be truly public: 64 The news media are there in the place of the public, and the public relies upon the media to find out what happens in our courtrooms. . . . We in the news media assume that when individuals become involved in a trial, they surrender some of their privacy as a private citizen. They are now involved in a state ordered and state controlled process. That does not mean they need to be harassed or abused. It does mean that their role in the trial must be fully reported so that the public has full knowledge of what transpires at the trial.‘ Few also find valid the adversaries’ argument that witnesses should have fourth amendment privacy protection. Charles McCorkle Hauser, vice president and executive editor of the Wain remarked: there’s no way the fourth amendment can protect the privacy of someone who is thrust into the news. In the case of a rape victim, that privacy is provided by the decision of a newspaper and not through any ”rights” of the individual. That may be old-fashioned male chauvinism or evolve from a pedestal syndrome or something else. But it also raises some serious questions about why the accused should have his name published and the accuser be given anonymity.5 Journalists admit that publicity may adversely effect witnesses. However, an individual’s privacy is generally considered secondary to first and sixth amendment concerns.8 The opinions of the media tend to suggest that this ”invasion” of privacy is a very small price to pay for the trust and confidence which we now have in our 65 judicial system, largely because the public has access to the judicial process and therefore is reassured as to its integrity.7 Some believe pp privacy interests should be considered for witnesses. One news director said, If there is anything chilling regarding privacy, it probably takes place when that private person thinks of having to go on the stand and to swear that he or she will tell the truth.3 The assistant national editor for The Detrplp_fl§p§ adds, "most people with a mania for secrecy strike me as rogues and scoundrels deserving all the attention we can give them.9 However, other newspersons do feel that in some instances privacy interests of witnesses should be con- sidered. Thomas Griesdorn, general manager of WXYZ-TV? in Detroit, is concerned about over-sensationalism and in~ dividual right to privacy. Griesdorn said, The first order of business in the court is justice under the law, and witnesses are an essential and often fragile part of that effort. Viewers who miss a bit of tes- timony can read about it -- some respon- sibility for education in this matter, after all, falls on the citizen.10 ABC Law Correspondent, Tim O’Brien reasoned, It is said that everything secret degenerates, even the administration of justice -- that sunlight is the best of all disinfectants. But increasingly people are asking whether justice may be suffering from excessive sunlight and warning that too much sunlight might jeopardize the 66 delicate balance between free press and fair trial.11 ' Another frequently cited argument by the press for allowing complete visual and aural coverage of trial proceedings is the educational value. A petition submitted to the Judicial Conference of the United States by a number of media organizations stated that a majority of citizens are ignorant about the judicial system’s functions. The petition revealed that seventy-seven percent of the public are not at all familiar with any federal court, let alone the Supreme Court, and twenty-five percent of the peOple believe court decisions are politically oriented.12 The petitioners said, The public is unable to adequately assess the strengths and weaknesses of the present system and is unable to participate meaningfully in the continuing debate about substantive legal issues and judicial administration. Since most people cannot gain the needed understanding by attending court proceedings, they must rely on the press -- both print and electronic. . . . Greater public awareness of the courts could lead to a better understanding of their workings and to a more informed public debate on substantive law issues and judicial administration. It is believed that if people understand the workings of the courts then the judicial system, in turn, will have to be more accountable for its actions. Ernie Schultz said, 67 If trials are fully covered, the results will achieve a higher level of justice and the public for whom.the courts operate will have a greater degree of confidence in those courts.la John Tune. editor of the W819. suggested that televised proceedings will allow the public to see that the image of courts portrayed on television programs is unrealistic: Judges and the court system have a bad image, and I think it would help the court system’s image if people could see how it works. Most people have never set foot in a courtroom and have only seen it on TV.14 However, George Gerbner, Dean of the Annenberg School of Communications, is not as certain about the assumed benefits of televised proceedings. When discussing how television stations will cover trials, Gerbner said, The problem is that opaque reality of the courtrooms is less illuminating of the judicial process than is translucent fiction. One must go behind the scenes to see how things really work. Surface appearances are more likely to conceal than to reveal how the judicial system operates.15 Gerbner also does not believe a televised trial will give a more accurate portrayal of the judicial system than a fictional televised court case. Selected courtrooms will become program originating locations, transporting the sights and sounds of real courtrooms into millions of homes conditioned to weekly rituals of courtroom and crime drama. 68 Trials will be picked and edited to fit that dramatic ritual. . . . The integrity and independence of judicial proceedings serve to protect the accused from both arbitrary power and public prejudice. The purpose of open trials is to help assure observance of those protections, not to entertain or even to educate.16 Often it is not the legal constraints which force a reporter to act in a certain way, but rather it is the ethical behavior that influences how an event will be handled by the media. In 1924, Nelson Crawford was the first to suggest that objectivity in news reporting should be a journalism ethic, and in 1954, Louis Lyons, curator of the Nieman Fellowship Program at Harvard, said objectivity as an ethic was the "ultimate discipline of journalism.“17 However, it was not until 1973 that a Code of Ethics was adopted by a professional journalism society; though only a voluntary code and directed primarily to its members, the Society of Professional Journalists, Sigma Delta Chi (SDX), devised a code of ethics that was “intended to preserve the bond of mutual trust and respect between American jour- nalists and the American people."10 SDX’s Code of Ethics states that it is a jour- nalist’s responsibility to inform the masses: The purpose of distributing news and enlightened opinion is to serve the general welfare. Journalists who use their 69 professional status as representatives of the public for selfish or other unworthy motives violate a high trust.19 The Code proclaims that journalists have an ethical respon- sibility to serve the public interest. "despite obstacles," and assure that “the public’s business is conducted in public and that public records are open to public inspec- tion.'3° Appropriate fair play when reporting news is outlined in the Code:21 1. The news media should not communicate unofficial charges affecting reputa- tion or moral character without giving the accused a chance to reply. 2. The news media must guard against invading a person’s right to privacy. 3. The media should not pander to morbid curiosity about details of vice and crime. Reporters and editors are also cautioned that headlines should reflect the contents of an article accurately, and photographs and telecasts "give an accurate picture of an event and not highlight a minor incident out of context.“32 Although the Code (and others enacted by various media organizations) was meant to assist in serving the public interest while enhancing the image of the press, many journalists react negatively to codes of ethics. One tongue-in-cheek statement suggests that ethics in journalism changes 70 the original intent of news reporting. Theodore L. Glasser, of the University of Minnesota, said, John Merrill feels that ethics can actually hurt objective reporting. right to know, according to Merrill, public Objective reporting has transformed journalism into something 'more technical than intellectual; it has turned the art of story-telling into the technique of report writing.23 all the information gathered because of ethical considerations. Charles not ethics, should be the primary concern. Take the case of the reporter who decided . . . not to print the name of a rape victim. The report is flawed. It is incomplete. Verified and very pertinent information is ppzpppglz omitted from the story. It is a partial report, even in a journalistic sense.34 McCorkle Hauser feels that constitutional rights, editor said, However, Local television may hype a story while the newspaper plays it down. Each medium has a first amendment right to be responsible or irresponsible as it wishes.25 some journalists do consider ethics in their news- making decisions. John Tune said, it’ just like a judge -- you’ve got to be able to balance, decide what’s right and Though most journalists believe in the public’s most do not tell the The executive 71 wrong, and weigh all the factors, and make a responsible decision. You’ve got to have a conscious.35 Jeff Greenfield, political and media analyst for the ABC Network, stressed that although it is- the job of the news industry to deliver news, good and bad, reporters and news directors should still consider the emotional impact a story might have. There is no way that a news organization can refuse to air material just because it unsettles the subject. But there is every reason, even in the rushed hothouse atmosphere of a nightly broadcast, for us to pause for a moment . . . to consider what the consequences may be . . . to act, in other words, as a morally mature member of society and to act out of reason, and not out of reflex.37 Thomas Griesdorn concluded, We in the electronic media will now be charged with proving our ability to truly represent our viewers responsibly .with microphone and camera. We are in charge of our own destiny.33 THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM It is apparent by the number of states that have opened their courtrooms to extended media coverage since the Changlgz decision that even the judicial profession, though cautious, sees a value in televising trials. Since the 1981 landmark case forty-five states have approved some form of 72 visual and/or aural coverage of court proceedings.29 Michigan is one of the most recent states that has decided to open courtrooms to the extended media.3° Just as many of the legal professionals 'from other states have commented in the past, Michigan judges and lawyers believe camera coverage of trials can be beneficial if precautions and rules are adhered to.31 Judge Michael C. Harrison, an initiator of opening Michigan courts, said he does not see a distinction in the abilities of covering court proceedings by the print or aural/visual media.32 The executive director of the Michigan Prosecuting Attorney’s Association, James Shonkwiler, has been involved in trials that have been videotaped for educational purposes. In his opinion, most people quickly forget cameras are present in the courtroom; ”it’s not the camera," Shonkwiler said, “it’s what you do with the picture" that should be the concern.33 However, Raymond Buffmyer, a criminal lawyer who at one time was a prosecuting attorney for Eaton County, opposes extended media coverage of courts: If the general public wants to see a trial, the courtrooms are open to anyone who wants to observe. All they have to do is go and watch the proceedings on the date and place scheduled. . . . The freedom of the press in my opinion is not compromised by attempts to preserve the dignity of the courtroom setting.34 73 The views held by Buffmyer are voiced by many who are cautious about allowing aural and visual coverage of trials, particularly of witnesses. Senator Strom Thurmond, former Chairman of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, said "we must not let our haste to preserve the rights of the criminal swerve us from our duty to protect the rights of victims as well."35 A study conducted by the U.S. Department of Justice’s Office of Justice Programs and Office for Victims of Crime found that fear of intimidation and invasion of privacy are the main reasons that some victims and witnesses refuse to cooperate in judicial proceedings.39 The district attorney during the infamous ‘New Bedford rape case37 contended, We cannot get justice without having witnesses in the courtroom, and if our system is discouraging them from coming, if it is driving them away, then something is wrong with our system. . . . It is time to redirect the debate to focus on the impact of the news coverage itself.33 The opinions of individuals directly involved in the judicial system differ from those of journalists, with regards to the public’s right to know. Although many attorneys and judges agree that the extended media has a right to cover (most) trials, including (most) witnesses, they do not agree with the media’s philosophy that the public has a right to know all that transpires during court 74 proceedings.39 Robert Weiss, the Genesee County (Michigan) Pros- ecuting Attorney, is one who feels the media and public has a right to receive all information: I I believe that the balance between personal privacy rights of victims at trials and the right of a free press should be (and is) tipped in favor of media access. This is so because the integrity of the criminal justice system is of overriding impor- tance.40 However, other Michigan attorneys feel there are exceptions to the public’s right to know. Michael Franck, executive director of the Michigan Bar Association, feels that though the public has a right to know ultimately what goes on in 'courtrooms, the right cannot be translated into the right to know at the exact moment what is happening in a courtroom.“1 James Shonkwiler believes the rights that should be con- sidered are those of the litigants; Shonkwiler also said, I don’t think the public has a right to follow the details of a litigation. They have a right to know how matters come out, which are publically charged [if a criminal matter].‘a According to Shonkwiler, the public has a right to know such things as the charges being assessed by the prosecutor, under what conditions the charges are being made, the factual situations and policies which apply to the decision to charge or not charge a person, and what happens to the 75 charges in the judicial system and sentences passed.43 A few legal professionals feel extended media coverage of trials will only increase the amount and type of information made available to the public. Michigan attorney Raymond Buff-yer reasoned, Turning trials into media events does not enhance our judicial system. Must the media dominate and orchestrate every aspect of our lives in the name of “the public’s right to know". . . . 44 Ronald Pina said, I do not dispute the right of the press to swarm through a victim’s neighborhood, devouring bits of information combed haphazardly from sources good and bad. But is this patchwork of detail regarding the crime victhms lifestyle really necessary. . . . Is there not some point at which the providing of information ptppfi and the pgpgpxing begins?‘5 Criminal defense attorney Herald Price Fahringer remarked that journalists have always been permitted ‘to report the minute details and events of a trial, and excluding extended media coverage of trials would not infringe upon the public’s right to know.43 Some opponents of audio and visual coverage of witnesses feel that the right to privacy should be a basis for excluding the extended media from trial proceedings. However, it has been generally held among legal profes- sionals that privacy rights do not exist when concerning a 76 public matter.47 Robert Weiss said the fourth amendment guarantees cannot be expanded to cover witnesses who object to extended media coverage: The questioning of a witness is not a search or seizure under the commonly accepted definitions of those words. Even if it were, such a “search“ would not be "unreasonable“. To the contrary, the public has a right to every man’s (or woman’s) evidence.u Ronald Pina believes that there is a lack of balance between the right to know and the right to privacy; "the first amendment speaks in terms of absolute, at times,“ Pina said, "if you listen to the press. . . . "4‘ Because witnesses have very few rights when a part of a trial there is little that can be done if a witness feels he or she has been exploited by extended media coverage. Judge Harrison said if the extended media is granted permission to cover a trial then there can be no issue regarding emotional trauma as a result of audio and/or visual coverage. Harrison added that it would be difficult to determine if trauma was indeed the result of extended media coverage, or the result of testifying in front of a jury, going through cross examination, or having to tell the court (and public) how the witness became a part of the trial proceedings.so Judge Carolyn Stell commented that it must be remembered that in a criminal case it is the pepplg 77 pf_the_§tatp, not the victim, who initiates the lawsuit, and as such the victim’s rights as a witness are limited "because it has to be society’s interests in enforcing the criminal law. If you let the victim. alone determine the interest it may well be to the detriment of the society."51 It would also be difficult for an individual to sue for invasion of privacy through.misappropriation. According to James Shonkwiler, once the decision has been made to permit extended media coverage there is no limit to the uses of the material; however, if the state feels that the ex- tended media is using courtroom testimony simply to sensa- tionalize and increase their audience then extended media coverage could be reduced or eliminated.52 Donald Martin feels that it may be possible to sue on the grounds of exploitation of the testimony if the information is repeat- edly aired so that it becomes a detriment to the witness.53 Individuals in the legal profession seem less likely to believe that the extended media want to cover trials solely for the public’s interest. Defense attorney Gerry Spence said, I think the issue is money. I think the issue is ultimately what is entertainment, what trial would be a good commodity that we could sell to the public, and that what is sold to the public isn’t, as the good judge says, the sort of solemn, uninter- esting arguments before appellate courts.54 78 Herald Fahringer said that in order for television news programs to survive rating wars the broadcasters attempt to capture the largest audience possible by concentrating on the sensational; “most TV journalists lust for the spec- tacular,“ Fahringer said, “They don’t want ’talking heads’ but search for the melodramatic.“55 Law professionals believe that aural and visual coverage of trials could be educational if the material is used responsibly. Since most people do not attend trials, extended media coverage would enable the public to learn how the court system works, as opposed to viewing only the television programs which often portray the justice system incorrectly.56 Videotaped and/or recorded trials could also serve an archival function, allowing future generations to “witness“ important state and federal cases.57 In addition, broadcasting witness testimony could educate, people about crimes, such as rape and date rape, and how witnesses/vic- tims of these and similar cases are often treated on the witness stand by judges and attorneys.53 However, attorneys and judges warn that though the media may argue all portions of a trial has educational value, the segments must be edited and aired objectively in order for the public to fully understand the workings of the judicial system. Michael Franck believes television news 79 directors must allow enough time to show portions from both sides of a case in order not to distort and imbalance the trial proceeding.59 Ronald Pina argues that reporters who cover trials aurally and/or visually need to be experienced in courtroom procedures themselves before they can be expected to help educate the public through news reports. Pina says the ppint media usually sends court reporters who are ex- perienced with the court system; however, the electronic media sends in new people who do not know anything about the system. They are coming in, they are photographing a situation, they do not know the rules of evidence, they do not know what can and cannot be used, what is a voir dire hearing, out of the sight of the jury, which is supposed to be considered, and yet they run that.“0 According to James Shonkwiler, the arguments in favor of educational benefits is probably not as true as the public simply being curious about people "being put through periods of agony in their lives and trying to see how they hold up or don’t hold up.“1 Nobody is going to turn on their television to watch a televised trial because they feel it makes them a better citizen and to find out how the court really works. But, they’re going to turn it on because they heard about a particular trial in progress and it has juicy aspects to it that are stimulating or interesting to them.‘2 80 VICTIM/WITNESS ADVOCATES Advocacy groups that work for victim and witness rights are not as r'xious to see extended media coverage of court proceedings. The groups are particularly concerned about state courts that allow audio and/or visual coverage of sexual assault victims. Few positive results are thought to come about by photographing or broadcasting rape trials. Lynn Marks, executive director of Women Organized Against Rape, in Philadelphia, feels the only good extended coverage of a sexual assault trial can do is to show the public that rape is a societal problem, not isolated cases between individuals. That is important because for years rape and the sexual abuse of children were not talked about publicly and they did not receive media attention. Thus, victims felt very isolated and alone. So even though publicity can be difficult for individual victims, in the long run, I think it can be beneficial.63 However, Marks warns that extended media coverage of witnesses in rape cases can only be beneficial if the media acts in a responsible manner; coverage should not sensation- alize the case, resulting in the public getting “vicarious thrills", or polarize the issue so that only one side is presented.“ 81 A primary concern of victim/witness advocates is the “invasion of privacy” that witnesses experience when aural and visual coverage of trials is permitted. The Changlgz decision focused on the guarantee of a fair trial for the defendant. The right to privacy for defendants and witnesses was not considered. Keith Boone, an assistant professor in the Public Service Studies Program at Oberlin College, suggests that the desire for privacy is not only being let alone, or separating one’s self from society. It is not merely freedom fzpp something or someone. Rather, privacy is the legitimate assertion of ownership and control over personal and spiritual goods -- over what the ancients often called the “soul“.35 Many believe that wanting to remain private does not mean that a witness is trying to hide something, only that some witnesses who have already been traumatized in some way wish to keep intimate facts to themselves.66 One rape victim commented, Victims need protection, not exploitation. The victim has been manipulated, invaded and controlled by a criminal. The media does not have the right to assault the victim.again. .As surely as an assailant is held responsible for this invasion of a woman’s life, the press must also be responsible.57 Boone argues that extended coverage of court proceedings may damage the reputation, dignity, and integrity of some 82 witnesses: they are coerced into surrendering to the gaze of the public at large what is properly their “own". As a result, they lose ownership and control over what may be extremely personal, sacrosanct and not for public consumption.33 Victim/witness advocates also do not see aural and visual trial coverage being as educational to the public as journalists and judicial professionals believe. Advocates argue that a thirty or sixty second news report which only publicizes particulars about a rape case serves only to satisfy the public’s curiosity, not to dispel some of the myths surrounding sexual offense cases.6° Jennifer Barr contends that coverage of trials will not adequately educate the public about the seriousness of violent crimes or the workings of the judicial system, because the public cannot be exposed to all activities that go on during trials, and because the media is so selective in choosing which trials to cover: The testimony in the courtroom is only the tip of the iceberg of what she has endured. The camera doesn’t catch the victim having to wait in a waiting room with the witness for the defense or when the victim is verbally abused by the defendant’s mother when they meet in the hallway . . Rapes that get heavy media coverage are the sensational crimes, the most violent, the ‘most dramatic. This glorification of crime does not educate the public about the extent of the crime, the effect of the 83 crime. It does not deal with the issue of rape. The grizzly, titillating details, the details that tend to identify and further injure the victim, do not serve the public good. The portrait these selected stories paint is a dangerously distorted one.7° . Lynn Marks also cautions that if extended coverage is not done in a responsible manner the attempt to educate the public may work in a negative way. Marks said that public- ity of certain trials can encourage imitation acts: after viewing portions of the New Bedford rape case a boy raped a young girl on a pool table; and in 1978, after NBC televised a.movie about a girl sexually assaulted by a group of boys with a mop handle the act was imitated in San Francisco, where a nine year old girl was the victim."1 Finally, supporters of victim/witness rights fear that aural and/or visual coverage of trials will deter people from reporting crimes, or from cooperating in the judicial process.72 Victims of sexual assault worry not only that’ extended media coverage will publicize intimate details of the assault, but also that publicity may en- courage the accused, or family and acquaintances of the accused, to threaten the'victhm again.73 Victims also fear that people -- such as parents, neighbors, co~workers, and relatives -- who had not known about the assault will learn about it, and all of the intimate details, if extended 84 media is permitted to cover rape trials.74 According to Carolyn Stewart Dyer and Nancy: Hauserman, the greatest fear among sexual assault victims when microphones are allowed in courtrOoms is that the name of the victim will be broadcast; however, there seems to be more concern from victims about having cameras allowed in courtrooms. In today’s society a television broadcast (audio and video coverage) will reach a much larger audience and identify the witness more precisely than will just an audio broadcast, newspaper publication, or traditional news report (no camera coverage) of the trial proceedings."5 Jo Beaudry, a victim/witness service coordinator for the District Attorney’s Office in Milwaukee County, said, I have . . . seen prosecutors struggling with the possibility of losing or dismiss- ing serious criminal cases because an essential witness becomes uncooperative solely because of the publicity they received or because of their fear of publicity. The terrible cost to our citizens and our communities of cases lost as a result of victim/witness publicity cannot be calculated.73 RESEARCH Considering the number of states that allow extended media coverage of court proceedings, few studies have been done to analyze its impact on trial participants or the 85 general public. The majority of research that has been done was conducted during the experimental phases of state court coverage, and a few were conducted in simulated court- rooms.77 The research. findings that scholars rely on when discussing extended coverage of trials are also becoming dated. For instance, Susanna Barber, in her book Eggs Dghgpg, relied on nineteen studies for discussion; of the nineteen studies, thirteen were conducted before 1980 (six of which were conducted over a one year period in Florida).7’ A comparative study of two similar trials in Indiana has also been done79; however, the research was done in 1977, in a state that does not allow extended media coverage of the courts, except for official court purposes. Of the nineteen pieces of research literature analyzed by Susanna Barber, nine studies questioned wit- nesses directly about the affects of extended media being present in the courtroom during their testimony. Six of the studies also questioned jurors, five questioned attorneys, and eight questioned judges about the affects on witnesses. There were mixed feelings among the witnesses questioned about cameras and/or recorders being allowed to cover trials. According to Barber, reactions ranged from com- pletely unaffected to refusal to testify for fear of 86 personal safety.°° Though three-fourths of the respondents said still cameras did not inhibit their testimony, and two- thirds replied the same about television cameras, forty percent said still camera coverage, and thirty-three percent said television coverage was up} fair to witnesses.’1 Attorneys who were a part of case studies indicated that camera coverage had no effect on witness testimony, while those who responded to surveys tended to be less positive about extended media coverage. Between forty and fifty percent of those who responded to surveys immediately following a trial said television and still cameras in- hibited witness testimony and was unfair; mail survey responses showed that fifty percent thought television cameras had adverse affects, while sixty-six percent thought still cameras had no adverse affects on witnesses)2 Barber found that judges overall responded ’favorably to extended media coverage of witnesses. Generally, judges found no hesitations or inhibitions from witnesses who testified; they also reported that witnesses tended to ignore the cameras.33 Jurors responded that no noticeable distractions or changes in behavior occurred in witnesses who testified in the presence of audio and video record- ers.04 87 During the state experiments, according to Barber, over two-thirds of the trials covered were in criminal court; however, some studies reported that proceedings such as sentencings, arraignments, zoning disputes, and an affirmative action case were also covered.05 Few trials were broadcast in detail, and even less were broadcast from gavel to gavel. Most trials were reported by the broadcast industry in the traditional news manner -- a short snippit of video with a reporter doing a voice-over; the footage tended to focus on the defendant or the attorneys’ opening and closing statements)6 Judges and attorneys responded in the surveys that they do not believe this type of coverage is an accurate portrayal of the case, trial participants, or court system.07 One of the most disturbing aspects of televised trials, particularly to attorneys and judges, is that broadcasters are generally interested in covering only notorious and sordid types of cases, such as murder, rape, bribery, and corruption. A major concern is that, by concentrating on these kinds of issues (in order to maintain high newscast ratings), the viewing public receives a distorted picture of what takes place in the nation’s courtrooms on a daily basis. In reality, many proceedings are tedious civil and public interest disputes, domestic cases, summary judgments, and legal arguments in appeals courts.00 However, Barber said that the nineteen pieces of independent 88 research reached the similar conclusion that extended media coverage of judicial proceedings does not have a behavioral affect on trial participants in general: It appears that camera coverage of trials (even sensational criminal cases) does not necessarily influence the majority of trial participants to behave in ways that are noticeably different from behavior in nontelevised trials. This is not to say that many trial participants do not have mixed or negative gtjippggp toward camera coverage, only that the bulk of empirical research conducted to date shows little correlation between the presence of cameras at trials and perceived prejudi- cial hphggigz on the part of jurors, witnesses, judges, or attorneys.09 One of the studies that Barber analyzed was origi- nally part of lp pe Pppitipp of Epgt-flewswegk Stgtippg, Elpzig§l_lpgl, 370 So. 2d 764 (Fla. 1979). This survey is of great importance as it was referred to by the Supreme Court in the landmark Chandler v. Flppida decision. The Florida Survey Results indicated that the “presence of the electronic media in the courtroom had little effect upon the respondents perception of the judiciary or the dignity of the proceedings.”0 Awareness of the extended media being present during trials by survey respondents averaged between "slightly” and "moderately"; all respondents indicated that they were made to feel “slightly“ self-conscious by having television and still cameras present. Respondents also reported that the presence of cameras made them feel “only 89 slightly" nervous or more attentive."1 For witnesses specifically, the presence of cameras made them feel "just slightly“ more responsible for their actions. Witnesses were 'slightly“- distracted by the extended media coverage, and fear of harm after appearing on a broadcast ranged from “not at all“ to ”slightly“. Attorneys and court personal responded that extended media coverage made witnesses flamboyant “not at all" to “slight- ly . Attorneys and court personal also felt that witnesses were “slightly“ inhibited by the presence of extended media.“2 The second survey that was a part of the ln_p§ was conducted by the Florida Conference of Circuit Judges, and was administered only to judges. Two-thirds (96 of 146) of the respondents had some experience with extended media coverage of trial proceedings. Thirty-six of these judges responded positively to aural and visual coverage, twenty- nine responded negatively, and thirty-seven had neutral feelings.u Between ninety and ninety-five percent of the judges felt that camera coverage had not affected the performance of jurors, attorneys, or witnesses.H However, when summarizing the survey findings, Circuit Judge Arthur J. Franza said, 90 From the whole, I think Courts do not object to the use of cameras in the courtroom now that they have had some experience. However, in certain areas, some judges have strong opinions. Paramount being . . . that confidential or undercover agents who are witnesses, victims of crimes, family especially children of the convicted, and juvenile proceedings not be photographed.”5 In 1977, the opportunity arose to study the effects of extended media coverage of trial participants. Two men, who were accused of murdering a millionairess, were granted separate trials in separate courts. A judge, whose court- room was equipped with videotape equipment for recording trials for court purposes, agreed to let the media patch into the court’s system in order to record portions of the trial.96 Analysis of the two trials included empirical research: the two men were accused of identical crimes; separate trials were granted; many of the same witnesses and testimony were presented in both cases; public interest was equal; and the same reporters covered the two trials. However, the research could not be controlled since the two trials had different defendants, counsel, and jurors. The data collected and analyzed consisted of: a telephone poll of public opinions within four days of each trial; a questionnaire completed by both juries; calculation of the total newshole devoted to the two trials by the two local 91 newspapers; the official court transcript and taped trial; an aircheck of the local news each night; a telephone interview with the jurors from the televised trial; and interviews with the presiding judges, prosecutors, counsel, television news editors, and newspaper city editors.97 When asked whether they learned more or less about the two trials then from news reports of trials in the past, forty-three percent of the public responded that they learned more when viewing the televised trial reports, while thirty-two percent of those who saw only reports of the nontelevised trial reported learning more than from news reports of past court proceedings; however, twenty-four percent who saw the televised court reports and twenty-two percent who only saw the traditional news reports responded that they learned about the same as from news coverage of trials in the past.93 A majority of both the televised trial (sixty—two percent) and nontelevised (fifty-eight percent) opinion sample said that extended media coverage of trials would not deny the defendant a fair trial.“9 Jurors of both the televised and nontelevised trials indicated that the activities of reporters distracted them to some extent. However, the jurors presiding during the televised trial found the reporters nope distracting.1°° Only four of the total fourteen jurors recognized the names 92 of the newspaper reporters who covered the trials, but twelve of the jurors could identify at least one of the television reporters who covered the trials.101 Dalton Lancaster concluded that this finding suggests that it is the presence of television reporters, not the television equipment, that indicates to the trial participants that the trial has gained media attention.102 Jurors also responded that the presence of cameras during trials would be distracting to some extent.103 The television reports were longer and newspaper reports were more prominently displayed during the first trial, which was covered by the extended media. The television news reports decreased from 2:42 to 1:55, while the mean column inches of newspaper coverage dropped from sixteen to twelve.104 Lancaster suggested that these declines may have been the result of the public having more curiosity during the first trial, and that five months later when the second trial began much of the information was "old news". Also, the importance of other local and world events may have played a factor in the length of news coverage given to the two trials. However, as Lancaster pointed out, the television reports and newspaper reports indeed may have been longer during the trial open to the extended media simply because of the camera access, and thus the local 93 television stations and newspapers sensationalized the coverage.105 Witnesses were not surveyed in this study. However, at least one witness was reluctant to testify during the second trial before learning that those proceedings would pp; be televised.106 James Hoyt conducted a controlled experiment in 1977 to analyze the simulated pressures of being a witness. The thirty-six participants were told the fifteen-minute sessions were to study the "effectiveness of some different types of media presentations."107 The subjects were shown a film, then asked specific questions about the content. When answering the questions participants were in one of three settings: in front of a television camera, which the participants were told would tape the session and be viewed by a large number of people; told that a hidden camera would be recording the question/answer session; or in a setting where no camera was present.108 The study revealed that there was no significant difference in the verbal behavior of the participants who answered questions in the presence of a camera or not. When the camera was hidden, its presence "seemed to be ir- relevant.”1°9 Those who answered questions directly in front of the camera responded with longer sentences. 94 However, Hoyt reported that the longer answers did not contain additional incorrect information, but rather more correct and relevant information.110 A survey done in Minnesota. questioned newspaper reporters and legal professionals about the role of the press and the court system.111 When asked if the press should confine its reports primarily to the facts that unfold in the public court records and proceedings, judges and attorneys agreed that they should, but reporters disagreed. However, all three groups strongly agreed that court actions should be reported as objectively and as humanly as possible. Judges and attorneys agreed, while the press strongly agreed to the statement that the press should attempt to educate the public about the judicial process. The newspaper reporters also strongly agreed vthat the press shOuld play the role of a watchdog; attorneys agreed with that statement, but judges were undecided (“neither agree nor disagree“). With regards to the importance of the press interpreting and/or analyzing court action for readers, both attorneys and judges were undecided, and the reporters agreed with the statement.1 1 a George Gerbner has done a great deal of research on the impact of television on the viewer. Gerbner said that television has “reshaped politics, changed the nature of 95 sports and business, transformed family life and the socialization of children, and affected public security and the enforcement of laws.“113 According to Gerbner, each week a typical television viewer sees forty-three law enforcers, six lawyers, and three judges on dramatic programs. Nearly all of the television legal professionals work on criminal cases, usually involving murder, and bring the criminal to justice. Research also shows that televi- sion programs rarely cover the legal process, such as arraignments, indictments, jury deliberations, and plea bargaining.114 Studies done at the Annenberg School of Communications suggest that people who rely on television are more likely than others to blame the court system for crime, and approve harsher punishments, warrantless search- es, illegally obtained evidence, and other violations of due process.115 When comparing these findings to the possibility of more court proceedings being covered by the extended media, Gerbner said, These trends take on added significance when we contemplate the appeal of “real life“ trials using courtrooms as program origination locations, selected and edited to the specifications of already existing programming of proven audience and ratings drawing power. The stakes become very high indeed. How can (and why should) broad- casters resist the pressures of the marketplace and the rewards of higher ratings?116 ENDNOTES 1. Interview with Timothy Dyk, attorney, Wilmer, Cutler and Pickering, in Washington, D.C. (May 17, 1987). 2 . Mo ' .9216..r_age_<2f__Ra_ne___L_ai leg—Begins Bgfore phg Spbcomm. op Czipinal Lg! of th§_Senate 09pm. on the Jugicigzl. 98th Cong., 2nd Sess. 28 (1984) (statement of James M. Ragsdale, editor, The Standard-Times, Bedford, Mesa) [hereinafter W1; Me 15.9 letter from Tony Villasana, news director, WMAZ-TV13, Macon, Georgia, to the author (September .18, 1987) (dis- cussing free press - right to privacy); letter from Thomas C. Griesdorn, general manager, WXYZ-TV7, Detroit, Michigan, to the author (October 19, 1987) (discussing free press- right to privacy); letter from Tom Johnson, publisher and chief executive officer, Los Angeles Times, to the author, (October 28, 1987) (discussing free press - right to privacy). 3. lpppgt pf Mpgig Covepage, spppg note 2 at 31-32 (statement of James M. Ragsdale). 4. Letter from Ernie Schultz, acting president, Radio-Television News Directors Assoc., Inc., Washington, D.C., to the author (Nov. 3, 1986) (discussing free press- right to privacy). 5. Letter from Charles McCorkle Hauser, vice presi- dent and executive editor, The Providence Journal—Bulletin, Providence Rhode Island, to the author (Nov. 5, 1986) (discussing free press - right to privacy). 6. Letter from Tom Johnson ppppg note 2; lppggt of Magig_Cpxg;§g§, sgppg note 2 at 80 (statement of Ed Godfrey, president, Radio-Television News Directors Association). 7. Letter from Tom Johnson, ppppg note 2. 8. Letter from Tony Villasana, puprg note 2. 96 97 9. Letter from Lawrence T. Sullivan, assistant national editor, The Detroit News, Detroit, Michigan, to the author (October 5, 1987) (discussing free press ~ right to privacy. In reference to growing up in a small town. Sullivan also favors public disclosure of such things as individual income tax returns). 10. Letter from Thomas Griesdorn, pgng note 2; Spg .plgp WDIV (Post Newsweek Stations, Michigan, Inc.), John J. Ronayne, III, The Associated Press, Michigan News Exchange, Mid-Michigan Professional Chapter of The Society of Profes- sional Journalists, Sigma Delta Chi, The Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, and The Society of Professional Journalists, Sigma Delta Chi (Detroit Chapter), Comments pp Ezppp§§g_Agpinistrgtive Qrder Providing FoplExtendgd Media Coverage of- Judicial Proceedings 1987 [hereinafter WDIV, et al.] ("a party may for articulable reasons feel that extended media coverage will affect the proceedings in an adverse and identifiable manner"); interview with John Tune, editor, Traverse City Record Eagle, Traverse City, Mich. (July 25, 1987) ("If the judge is given enough power to make certain safeguards to insure the safety of witnesses, then I think that can be accomplished). 11. Yiewppint: Courts, Camepas, guppipgz (ABC television broadcast, May 24, 1984) (published transcript). 12. Accrediting Council on Education in Journalism and Mass Communications, American Broadcasting Companies, Inc., American Newspaper Publishers Association, American Society of Newspaper Editors, Associated Press, Association for Education in Journalism and Mass Communications, CBS, Inc., Community Television of South Florida, Inc., C-SPAN, Gannett Companies, Inc., Media Access Project, The Miami Herald Publishing Company, Mutual Broadcasting System, Inc., National Association of Broadcasters, National Broadcasting Company, Inc., National Cable Television Association, Inc., National Press Photographers Association, National Public Radio, The New York Times Company, Post-Newsweek Stations, Inc., Public Broadcasting Service, Radio-Television News Directors Association, The Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, Society of Professional Journalists, Sigma Delta Chi, The Times Mirror Company, Turner Broadcasting System, Inc., Cable News Network, United Press International Company, The Washington Post, Egtitipp to the deicigl Cppfgpgpce e Unit t s Concernipg Zisual and gupgl Cpggggge pf Eederal Court Procggglpgs by the Electronic_§pg Pript Bragg, March 1983,14 (citing Yankelovich, Skelly, and White, Inc. , Th Public Image of Courts; Highlights of a National §m_euf_the_§enmlhhli&_ludsean_lla_wd Cpnpgpitz_heag§p§, prepared by the National Center for State 98 Courts (May 1978)) [hereinafter Accrediting Council on Education in Journalism and Mass Communications, at al.]. 13. Letter from Ernie Schultz, guppg note 4. 14. Interview with John Tune, §upra note 10. figp also letter from Thomas Griesdorn,quppg note 2 (quoting the Ann Arbor News, editorial. ’Anything that would make the courts more understandable to the public and make the judicial process user-friendly would be all to the good. The people need to branch of government is also an open book’); Norman Davis, Iglgxisipp 1p Cg; Cpuzts, 64 Judicature 86 (1980). 15. George Gerbner, Irigl by Iglgvipipn: grp fie at th§_Point Qf_No Rptupp? 63 Judicature 420 (1980); §§§_§l§p George Gerbner in Susana Barber, Eggs Camepas in thg Cppgtgppp: AAFree Preps - ngr Trigl Debate (Norwood, N.J.: Ablex Publishing Corp., 1987), xv. 16. George Gerbner, gpppg note 15 at 420-421. 17. Theordore L. Glasser, Objegtivit _§nd the Idgplpgy pf New , lecture delivered at “Ethics in Journalism” seminar, co-sponsored by Augsburg College and the University of Minnesota’s Journalism Center, March 3-4, 1983. 18. Society of Professional Journalists, Sigma Delta Chi, Code of Ethics, reprinted in Bruce M. Swain, Reporters’ Ethigp (Ames, Iowa: The Iowa State University Press, 1978), 116. 19. lg. at 114. 20. lg. at 115. 21. Ida 22. ILL. 23. Theodore Glasser, guprg note 17 at 10-11. 99 24. John C. Merrill, ood Re ortin Can be a Solutigp t9_§thipp_£;pplgp§, 42 Journalism Educator 28 (1987). 25. Letter from Charles McCorkle Hauser, pupra note 5. 26. Interview with John Tune, gupra note 10. 27. Jeff Greenfield, political and media analyst for ABC News and Good Morning America, in Tommy Thomason and Anantha Babbili, eds., Cgime Vigtips apg Ihp Eggs Mgdia a synopsis of a national symposium sponsored by the Texas Christian University Department of Journalism and the Gannett Foundation, November 18, 1986, n.d. 28. Letter from Thomas Griesdorn, pgpgg note 2 (in reference to Michigan courtrooms opening up to the extended media). 29. Eppp_§tates_§tart Igsts gith_C§meras. Recordersrip Cpgrts; Iotal up to 45 States, 11 The News Media and the Law 42-44 (Fall 1987) (Indiana, Mississippi, Missouri, South Carolina, and South Dakota do not permit extended media coverage of trial proceedings). 30. Beginning February 1, 1988 Michigan will begin a one year experiment in all Michigan courts except for the juvenile division, allowing oral and visual coverage of trial proceedings. 31. Interview with Judge Michael G. Harrison, 30th Jud Circuit, Lansing, Mich (October 14, 1987); interview with Judge Carolyn Stell, 30th Jud Circuit, Lansing, Mich (October 19, 1987); interview with Donald E. Martin, Ingham County Prosecuting Attorney, Lansing, Mich (October 14, 1987); interview with James Shonkwiler, executive director, Michigan Prosecuting Attorney’s Association (October 23, 1987); interview with Michael Franck, executive director, Michigan Bar Association, Lansing, Mich (October 22, 1987); letter from Robert Weiss, prosecuting attorney, Genessee County, Flint, Mich, to the author (August 27, 1987) (discussing free press - right to privacy); letter from John D. O’Hair, prosecuting attorney, Wayne County, Detroit, Mich, to the author (August 11, 1987) (discussing free press - right to privacy). 100 32. Interview with Judge Michael G. Harrison, supra note 31. 33. Interview with James Shonkwiler, ppppg note 31; (§p§_glpp Barber, pgppg, note 16 at 74 (In nineteen indepen- dent studies, judges responded that witnesses tended to ignore cameras when present in the courtroom); ln pg Pgtition of Post-nggpeek Statlons, Elorida, ngl, 370 So. 2d 764, 768 (Fla. 1979) (witnesses who were surveyed said they were "slightly" distracted when cameras were present during trial proceedings. Attorneys and court personal responded that witnesses were “slightly“ inhibited by the presence of cameras); James Hoyt, Cpgrtroom Coverage: The Effects of Being Telgvised 21 Journal of Broadcasting 490 (1977) (Hoyt found that subjects who answered questions in the presence of a television camera responded with longer sentences, which contained more correct information, than did other subjects). 34. Letter from Raymond G. Buffmyer, attorney, Charlotte, Mich, to the author (October 6, 1987) (discussing free press - right to privacy). 35. Impact of Media Coverage, supra note 2 at 3 (statement of Senator Strom Thurmond). 36. Office of Justice Programs and Office for Victims of Crime, U.S. Department of Justice, in Cooperation with Crime Victims Project, The National Association of Attorneys General and Victim Witness Project, Criminal Justice Section, The American Bar Association, Victims of Crime: Proposedlflgdellewsl n (1986) . 37. This March 1984 rape case involved the multiple rape of a woman in a New Bedford, Mass. bar. The trial generated national attention, and was broadcast live by the Cable News Network. . 38. lupagt pf Megia Covgrggp, gpppg note 2 at 8, 18 (statement of Ronald A. Pina, district attorney, Bristol District, Mass.). 101 39. Letter from Robert Weiss supra note 31; interview with Donald E. Martin, supra note 31; interview with Michael Franck, suppa note 31; interview with Judge Michael G. Harrison, ggppg note 31. 40. Letter from Robert Weiss, ppppg note 31. 41. Interview with Michael Franck, pgppg note 31. 42. Interview with James Shonkwiler, ggppg note 31. 43. lg. 44. Letter from Raymond Buffmyer, §pppg note 34. 45. Impact of Medig Coverage, pupra note 2 at 19 (statement of Ronald A. Pina). 46. Television in the Courtroqplie- Liplted figmgfllgl uM—u—ow Vital Risks? 3 Communications and the Law 42 (1981). - 47. Charlotte Carter, Iglgvision in the Courts, State Court Journal 25 (1981). Photocopy 1987. §§§_glsp inter- view with Judge Michael G. Harrison, supra note 31; inter- view with Judge Carolyn Stell, gupra note 31; interview with Michael Franck, ggpgg note 31. 48. Letter from Robert Weiss, gpppg note 31 (citing U.S. x. Nigpp, 418 U.S. 683 (1974)). 49. lppggt of updia Coverage, ggppg note 2 at 4 (statement of Ronald A. Pina). 50. Interview with Judge Michael G. Harrison, ppppg note 31. 51. Interview with Judge Carolyn Stell, supra note 31. 52. Interview with James Shonkwiler, gupra note 31. 102 53. Interview with Donald E. Martin, gpppg note 31. 54. e ' : Co r J ti e? (ABC television broadcast May 24, 1984) (published transcript) (statement of Gerry Spence, defense attorney). 55. Keith Boone, IV in 'thp Cogptroop: I§ Sopgthing Bglpg_§pplpp__£;pp_flp2 9 Human Rights 41 (1981); interview with Judge Michael G. Harrison, puppg note 31. 56. Interview with Judge Carolyn Stell, pppgg note 31; letter from John D. O’Hair, pupra note 31; Lyle W. Denniston, Ihe Repprter and thg Lg: (New York: Hasting House, Publishers, 1980) xix. 57. Alan Dershowitz, "Burger Sees TV as Court’s Foe," Ihg Bostop Herald (Nov. 26, 1984). Photocopy 1987. 58. lppggt of Mpdia Coverggg, gupra note 2 at 14 (statement of Ronald A. Pina); interview with Judge Michael G. Harrison, auprg note 31. 59. Interview with Michael Franck, gpppg note 31. 60. lppact of Media Coverggg, guprg note 2 at 10 (statement of Ronald A. Pina). 61. Interview with James Shonkwiler, pgppg note 31. 62. lg. 63. Ippgpt of Mggia Coverage, pupra note 2 at 62 (statement of Lynn Marks, executive director, Women Organized Against Rape, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania). 64. .lg. at 63. 65. Boone, pgppg note 55 at 26 (footnotes omitted). 103 66. Interview with Anne Seymour, director of public affairs, Sunny Von Bulow National Victim Advocacy Center, Fort Worth, Texas, in Lansing, Mich (June 4, 1987); lppggp of Mpgia Covprage, ppppg note 2 at 53 (statement of Jennifer Barr, rape victim, rape crisis counselor); Boone, suprg note 55 at 26. 67. lpppct pf Mggig Cpxggpgg, supra note 2 at 53 (statement of Jennifer Barr). 68. Boone, guppg note 55 at 26. 69. Interview with Anne Seymour, supra note 66; lgpagt of Mgdia Coveragg, §upra note 2 at 49 (statement of Ellen Guyker, rape victim, Maryland). 70. Impact of .Mpéié Coverpgg, suppa note 2 at 58 (statement of Jennifer Barr). 71. lg. at 68 (statement of Lynn Marks). 72. Carolyn Stewart Dyer and Nancy R. Hauserman, Exemptippnlpf ngpgl Assgult Victips fromelectronic_ng§ Coverage in Cou t, 1 Sexual Coercion and Assault 86 (1986); Boone, pgppg note 55 at 27; lmpact oprggia Coverage, ggppa note 2 at 64, 71, 87 (statement of Lynn Marks; statement of Jo Beaudry, coordinator, Victim/Witness Services, Milwaukee County, Wisconsin; statement of Cecily Robbins, executive director, Rape Crisis Center, Washington, D.C.). 73. Stewart Dyer and Hauserman, puppg note 72 at 86. 74. lg.; Impgct of Media Covpragg, puprg note 2 at 87 (statement of Cecily Robbins). 75. Stewart Dyer and Hauserman, suppg note 72 at 88. 76. lppagt pf Megia Covgragg, gupra note 2 at 77 (statement of Jo Beaudry). 77. Barber, puppg note 15 at 19, 70-71; James Hoyt, puppg note 33 at 487-495. 104 78. Susanna Barber, puppg note 15 at 70-71 (Barber is an instructor in the Department of Mass Communication at Emerson College). 79. Dalton Lancaster, Cgppras in the Courtgppp: A W. Research Report No 14(Blooninston. In.: School of Journalism, Center for New Communications, Indiana University, 1984). Photocopy 1987. 80. Susanna Barber, gppgg note 15 at 74. 81. lg. 82. lg. at 75. 83. lg. 84. lg. at 74-75. 85. lg. at 80. 86. lg. at 81. 87. lg. 88. lg. at 80. 89. lg. at 87. 90. In re Epti n f s - ew k tations Fl rida, lppl, 370 So. 2d at 768 (Fla. 1979). 91. lg. 92. lg. at 768-769. 93. lg. at 769. 105 94. lg. at 770. 95. lg. 96. Lancaster, gupra note 79 at 2 (Judge John B. Wilson was forced to halt extended media coverage on the last day of the trial after receiving a notice from Indiana’s Supreme Court reminding judges that Canon 3A(7) prohibited extended media coverage of trial proceedings. Indiana to date still has a closed door policy for the aural and visual media). 97. lg. at 3. 98. lg. at 4 (the forty~two percent and thirty-two percent figures are the combined response totals for learned "a little more" and "much more"). 99. lg. at 5. 100. lg. 101. lg. at 6 102. lg. 103. lg. 104. lg. at 7 105. lg. 106. lg. at 8. 107. Hoyt, puppa note 33 at 490. 108. lg. 109. lg. 106 110. lg. 111. Robert E. Drechsel, ngp Makipg ip thp Izipl Cpuztp (New York: Longman, 1983) (A questionnaire was sent to judges, attorneys, and court clerks, while newspaper reporters were interviewed and asked the same questions. The survey took place in early 1980. In 1983, Minnesota opened the courts to extended media coverage on an ex- perimental basis). 112. lg., 126-127 (Respondents rated the roles of the press on a 5-point scale, ranging from ”strongly disagree“ to ”strongly agree". The median ratings were reported). 113. George Gerbner, puppg note 15 at 418. 114. George Gerbner, Introduction, in Barber, gupra note 15 at xiii. 115. lg. at xiv. 116. lg. CHAPTER 6 AURAL AND VISUAL COVERAGE IN COURTROOMS The decision of whether or not to open state courtrooms to extended media coverage usually is made by the top state court or through state legislation. The Code of Judicial Conduct or the court rules must be suspended or amended in order to allow aural and visual media access. No state has ever reversed its decision after allowing the extended media in.1 By March 1988, forty-five states will permit microphones and/or still and/or video cameras in the courts, either on an experimental or permanent basis; nine states will allow coverage of appeal courts only, while thirty~six states will allow trial and appeal court coverage.2 In the majority of states, prior consent or notice of the ppppt is required before the extended media can cover a court proceeding; the consent of the various trial participants are not required by most of the states.3 According to a 1987 summary of state courts, compiled by the National Center for State Courts, only Arkansas, Maryland, Minnesota, and Pennsylvania required the consent of parties and witnesses involved in trials; and only Alabama, Ohio, Oklahoma, Tennessee, and Washington did not allow extended 107 108 media coverage of individuals who objected.‘| Prior to 1988, of the states whose courts were open to the extended media, only eighteen of the forty-three provided outlined coverage exemptions for certain trial participants.5 Juvenile proceedings (twelve states), divorce (eleven states), and child custody (eleven states) trials were the most frequently exempt proceedings; trade secret hearings (eight states), sex crimes (eight states), adoption (seven states), and motions to suppress (seven states) were exempt in fewer states, as were police informants who testified (six states), undercover agents (six states), vior dire hearings (six states), and relocated witnesses (five states). Rarely have states allowed automatic exemption from extended media coverage for probable cause proceedings (three states), motions to dismiss (three states), minor witnesses (two states), and witnesses in jeopardy of bodily harm (one state).6 There are great differences among the states with regard to exemption rules. The discretion allowed by judges varies, and includes such considerations as applicable legal tests, burden of proof required, and the interests to be considered.7 Exemption is usually approached in one of two ways: requiring the individual to ggnsgnt before he/she may be covered by cameras or microphones, or providing the 109 individual an opportunity to ghjggt to the extended media coverage.8 The important difference in consent and objection is that the former presumes that coverage will not be granted unless the person to